A Study of Perceptions of How to Organize Local Government Multi-Lateral Cross-Boundary Collaboration

by

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This dissertation research is a study of subjectivity. That is, the purpose of this dissertation research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this purpose, I first conduct literature review on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, both in the United States and in other countries. Then, I conduct literature review on regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs). The literature review is followed by a historical review of South Korea's local autonomy and regionalism, and a systemic analysis of the current South Korean literature on regional governance. Based on the comprehensive review of the extant literature, I propose that the RIGO framework is exportable beyond the United States boundaries and I use the South Korean case to test this. Then, I provide a description of the methodology used in this study to conduct research and analysis: I first present research questions and hypotheses; describe how the concourse and the Q-set of this study are created as well as how the study participants are selected, and Q-sort administered; describe how the data analysis is conducted; and provide a list of the Q statements used for the study. I then report the findings: there are five factor groups, which are agenda-broadening, agenda-narrowing, membership-expanding, equality-promoting, and local-government-centric. I present an interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and Nelles' identification of RIGOs and also discuss consensus and disagreement that exist among the factor groups identified. Then,

I evaluate the hypotheses of this research in relation to the factors elicited. Furthermore, based on the factor profiles, I evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences among South Korean local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South Korea. Lastly, I conclude the research with a summary of the findings, the research implications, both theoretical and practical, and some limitations of this research and recommendations for future research agenda.

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Preface

I am profoundly grateful for the support of my family, friends, and professors during my academic studies. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, B. Guy Peters, for his grace. I would also like to thank my committee members, George W. Dougherty Jr., William N. Dunn, and Tobin Im for their patience and mentorship. Last but not least, I thank David Y. Miller for his guidance and support. May his soul continue to rest in peace with God.

1.0 Introduction

This dissertation research is a study of subjectivity. That is, the purpose of this dissertation research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this purpose, I employ Q methodology to investigate those officials' patterns of attitude toward regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs), one of the key channels, if not the dominant, through which multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments is implemented, enforced, and promoted. In the first and second section of this introductory chapter, I address the problem studied in this research and briefly discuss the research rationale. The first two sections are followed by the section that discusses policy and theoretical significance of this research and highlights the contribution this study intends to make to the extant regional governance[1] literature. In the last section of the chapter, I outline the structure of this dissertation.

[1] Although there are some conceptual similarities between governance and regional governance (e.g. involving actors across different tiers of hierarchy and sectors, stressing importance of both formal and informal rules as well as the role of self-regulation, and so forth), regional governance refers to a certain geographical scale whereas governance does not (Jordan, 2008; Willi et al., 2018). Furthermore, Wallis (1994a: 21)'s working distinction between regional governance and regional government is helpful in understanding how the two concepts differ: whereas regional government refers to actual political units, regional governance addresses the "collective capacity to assess needs and opportunities, and to mobilize resources in response to them." Some scholars theorize that regional governance is an effective alternative to regional government (although such theories lack empirical support) (Whisman, 2013). For the definitional understanding of regional governance, by resorting to numerous scholars (e.g. Orfield, 1997; Parks and

1.1 Problem Statement

The aim of this research is to investigate South Korean local government officials' patterns of attitude toward multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments and viewpoints on RIGOs in terms of RIGOs' current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development. RIGOs, belonging to a larger class of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations,[2] are voluntary associations of which general-purpose local governments make up the majority of the membership and serve as channels through which various members (including but not limited to those local governments) communicate, coordinate, and collaborate on multiple policy domains that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are of significant academic interest and widespread practical importance since people now live in a complex, multi-boundary world (Miller and Nelles, 2020) and all tiers of government pursue innovative responses to citizens' service demands (e.g. Grigsby, 1996; Visser, 2004; Whisman, 2013; Wolf and Bryan, 2009). Although cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are of academic and practical importance, yet they remain largely overlooked and underexplored in the regional governance literature (Barbour, 2019; Bryan and Wolf, 2010; Miller et al., 2019; Wolf and Bryan, 2009). According to Rickabaugh (2018a), there exist only a small number of studies conducted in the United States investigating cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations from a wider geographic scope and they are now at least two decades old (e.g. Dodge,

Oakerson, 2000; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Stephens and Wilkstrom, 2000; Wallis, 1994a; Whisman, 2013; Willi et al., 2018), I broadly define regional governance as collaborative arrangements between local governments without a structural consolidation.

[2] Both cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations and RIGOs are defined in detail in chapter two.

1996; Mogulof, 1971; Wikstrom, 1977), whereas much of the more recent work is heavily case-study-driven and narrow in terms of geographic scope (e.g. Kwon and Park, 2014; Luna, 2015; Visser, 2004). Whisman (2013) also notes that most extant studies are descriptive and case-study-driven and she cites Wood (2006), Vogel and Nezelkewicz (2002), and Gordon (2007) as some examples of such cases. Thus, we likely have a limited (and also outdated) understanding of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (of which RIGOs are one class), "lacking underlying conceptual structure and empirical breadth" (Rickabaugh, 2018a: 1). Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there are only a handful of studies on how stakeholders (especially insider experts) thought to be relevant to the conduct of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations view their organizations as well as multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments that they take part in implementing, enforcing, and promoting.[3][4]

As for the main theoretical approach to better understanding regional governance in this dissertation study, I rely on Miller and Nelles (2020)' identification and classification of regional organizations of which RIGOs are one class. I propose that Miller and Nelles' theoretical

[3] According to Whisman (2013), Bowman and Franke (1984)'s 1981 survey of regional council executive directors of the United States is the only perceptual study conducted in this field. To the best of my knowledge, as of the time of writing, Bowman and Franke (1984), LeRoux et al., (2010), LeRoux and Pandey (2011), Whisman (2013), and Zeemering (2016; 2019) are the only scholars who have conducted perceptual study on regional governance stakeholders in the United States. The first four investigations mentioned above are surveys on city managers whereas Zeemering is primarily interested in elected officials' role in and perceptions of regional governance.

[4] Such a lack of literature devoted to understanding perceptions of public officials engaged in intergovernmental relations is surprising especially given that, as Anderson (1960) argues, "strictly speaking, there are no intergovernmental relations, there are only relationships among officials who govern in their official and unofficial capacities" (see also Choi and Wright, 2004; Wright, 1988).

framework is a useful tool for empirical analyses of regional governance not only in the United States but also in different social, political, economic, and cultural settings outside of the United States.[5] Particularly, their theoretical framework is useful to better understand how stakeholders (especially insider experts) who are relevant to the conduct of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations perceive multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration. Regardless of national differences, there exists a fair degree of practical consensus reached on what attributes that cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations share in common, and that is one of the reasons why Miller and Nelles' theoretical framework can be applicable to different geographies of the world although it is primarily based on the analysis of the United States case.

To better understand how multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments is perceived by the key stakeholders especially in terms of RIGOs' current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development, this research explores patterns of South Korean local government officials' attitudes and viewpoints toward RIGOs, examine factors contributing to the shaping of the patterns identified, and discuss their perceptual and attitudinal differences and similarities.[6] In so doing, I utilize Q methodology, which is a methodology

[5] Why their theoretical framework is a useful tool especially in conducting comparative research on regional governance is explained in detail in chapter two.

[6] Exploratory factor analysis is an "orderly simplification of interrelated measures" used to explore "the possible underlying factor structure of a set observed variables without imposing a preconceived structure on the outcome" whereas confirmatory factor analysis is "a statistical technique used to verify the factor structure of a set of observed variables" to "test the hypothesis that a relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent constructs exists" (Suhr, n. d.; see also Child, 1990). As for the latter, the researcher "uses knowledge of the theory, empirical research, or both, postulates the relationship pattern a priori and then tests the hypothesis statistically" (Suhr, n. d.). As far as perceptual studies are concerned, the lack of our understanding of RIGOs (as well as the lack of existing

increasingly gaining popularity among not only public administration but also political science and urban studies scholars in their systematic survey of perceptions (e.g. Durose et al., 2016 in public administration; Zechmeister, 2006 in political science; Raynor et al., 2018 in urban studies). The surveys for this research were developed by taking into consideration of five properties Miller and Nelles (2020) identify that RIGOs have in common: membership (primarily of local governments but not necessarily limited to); agenda (encompassing a considerable number of policy domains); legitimacy (as viewed and to certain extent bestowed by state (or local) government and/or federal (or national) government and its agencies); ambition (or articulation of its representational scope); and scale (of its geographic and representational superimposition). In this study, these properties are deemed useful in generating statements for the empirical analysis of South Korean local government officials' patterns of attitude toward multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration and viewpoints on RIGOs. Once those patterns and viewpoints are obtained using Q methodology, I examine potential (background) factors contributing to the shaping of the revealed patterns and discuss perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences that exist among those officials.

empirical evidence and/or previous perceptual research) does not permit generation of theoretically rigorous a priori hypotheses and subsequent confirmatory factor analysis to test whether the data fit a hypothesized model. As such, I conduct exploratory factor analysis (i.e. Q methodology) to identify perceptual (and attitudinal) factors and to maximize the amount of variance explained, which is more fit in the early stages of theoretical and empirical development.

1.2 Rationale

People worldwide in the contemporary world no longer live in a simple, single-boundary world but a complex, multi-boundary world (Miller and Nelles, 2020). As such, public service providers are increasingly committed "to confront (ing) spillovers and to leverag (ing) the benefits of social agglomeration" through the means of regional collaborative governance designed and implemented to "address problems that are bigger than any one local government" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 326). Despite the importance of the topic, however, little academic work has been done on it beyond the United States, especially in the context of systematically documenting the existence of RIGOs and analyzing the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of them. This lacuna provides an opportunity for this dissertation study to contribute to understanding regional governance through the lens of RIGO framework especially in a non-US setting by testing the framework's exportability beyond the United States boundaries.

What is the current state of our collective knowledge about the ways in which local governments transcend their borders to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate with their neighbors especially through the channel referred to as RIGOs by Miller and Nelles? As identified by Miller and Nelles, there are 477 RIGOs in the United States (as of 2018). In the meanwhile, as of 2019, using the South Korean Ministry of the Interior and Safety's statistics, I have identified that there are 28 RIGOs in South Korea.[7] In the United States, there were almost no RIGOs in 1920 but, by 1970, RIGOs rose as the primary channel through which local governments connect to each other in policy and administrative problem-solving. In South Korea, RIGOs are more of a recent phenomenon since an absolute majority of RIGOs came into existence per the Local

[7] How I have identified RIGOs in South Korea is explained in detail in chapter three.

Autonomy Act enacted in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, administrative consultative councils (many of which are South Korean RIGOs) merit analysis since there exists a rapidly growing population of them (as of the time of writing, at least 220) commanding significant budgetary and personnel resources to promote multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration in collective problem-solving. Such a regionalist approach to policy and administrative problem-solving bears greater importance in the South Korean context since, as shall be discussed in depth in chapter three, the country's city-county consolidation attempts have been largely unsuccessful. However, despite the prevalence of RIGOs in the United States and the recent proliferation of them in South Korea, studies on them are yet scarce, and thus there is a need to attain a systematic understanding of what they are, what they do, and what they aspire to be.

Miller and Nelles' theoretical framework constructed based on the findings of the United States case enables us to make an extension of the research on RIGOs outside of the United States boundaries in a systematic manner. They identify that there are five properties of RIGOs that help us not only define what RIGOs are, but also analyze them with a high degree of concept operationalizability and measurability. Especially, given that ICA dilemmas are ubiquitous (Tavares and Feiock, 2018) and as the trend of decentralization likely leading to "beef (ing) up regional and especially local government" (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 132), or "plac (ing) local authorities back in the saddle" (Lefèvre, 1998), is now global (Rondinelli, 1981; Sellers and Lidström, 2007; Tavares and Feiock, 2018) and will likely continue, regional governance systems such as RIGOs that facilitate multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration are receiving more systematic attention than before.[8] This dissertation research aims to add to the growing body of

[8] Multi-level governance, a concept that shares many conceptual commonalities with regional governance, emerges "as the combined result of decentralization, the 'hollowing out' of the state, a shift from an interventionist towards an

knowledge on regional governance systems in the era of decentralization (followed by institutional changes and reshufflings in most country cases) by examining patterns of South Korean local government officials' attitudes and viewpoints toward RIGOs in terms of RIGO's current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development, examining factors contributing to the shaping of the patterns identified, and discussing their perceptual and attitudinal differences and similarities. To achieve this aim, I use Q methodology as the primary analytical technique and base my research on Miller and Nelles' theoretical framework especially in developing a set of statements that I administer to South Korean local government officials.

1.3 Policy and Theoretical Significance

Governments at all tiers (i.e. local, provincial, and national in the South Korean case; local, state, and federal in the United States case) spend substantial amounts of resources in designing and implementing institutions and policies aimed at promoting communication, collaboration, and coordination across all levels of the hierarchy. However, substantial resources are lost due to fragmented authority and thus there arise institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas[9] whereby

'enabling state,' budgetary cutbacks and a growing degree of institutional self-assertion and professionalism at the subnational level" (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 134). Thus, since the above factors influencing the emergence of multi-level governance are getting increasingly intensified across the world, multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration and the organizations that host such collaboration merit further analysis.

[9] ICA dilemmas can be understood as a set of dilemmas arising when there is fragmentation of political authority leading to two or more local governments in a region or metropolitan area "to make individual decisions that lead to

the lack of integrative and collaborative efforts leads to inevitable spillovers and/or loss of scale economies (Feiock, 2009 and 2013; Feiock and Scholz, 2009; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). As RIGOs serve as a basis of "social agglomeration" (Miller et al., 2019: 2) to overcome such issues of externalities (Downs, 1994) that cross jurisdictional boundaries, it is critical to advance our knowledge and understanding of the ways in which RIGOs reduce the negative impacts of division or partitioning of authority and how they strengthen the organizational capacity "to confront spillovers and to leverage the benefits of social agglomeration" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 2). These issues are gaining more importance as the numbers of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that can be labeled as RIGOs are continuously on the rise in a global scale.[10]

Moreover, it is important for not only academicians but also policymakers and practitioners to better understand the dynamics of perceptions RIGO stakeholders (especially government officials working for them) hold on their organizations in terms of what RIGOs are, what they do, and what they aspire to be. Such an enhanced understanding would enable the academicians, policymakers, and practitioners to help upgrade the institutional design of RIGOs and improve organizational practice that would produce enhanced performance in multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration.

In summation, this research aims to fill in the gaps of our understanding of RIGOs with respect to different perceptual and attitudinal aspects underlying how South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs perceive their organizations in terms of RIGOs' current

inferior collective outcomes than would be obtained if they acted together" (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 299; see also Feiock, 2013).

[10] As to which non-US cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be labeled as RIGOs is discussed in detail in chapter two.

practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development and, by doing so, it will yield knowledge and insights that policymakers and practitioners can leverage on when they strive to solve policy and administrative problems broadly referred to as ICA dilemmas.

1.4 Overview of Chapters

This dissertation is presented in six chapters. For the purpose of provision of a basic understanding of this dissertation research, the first chapter describes an issue to be addressed, establishes a rationale for the research, and underscores the policy and theoretical significance this research intends to demonstrate.

In the second chapter, I conduct a literature review on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, both in the United States and in other democracies (primarily Western). There are two sections in this chapter, including a broad review of the extant literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations and an in-depth review of the emergent literature on RIGOs on which this dissertation primarily draws to develop a set of Q statements.

Chapter three provides an overview of RIGOs of South Korea. The first section of this chapter presents a historical account of how legally mandated local government networks came into existence. The second section is a systematic review of the current status of those networks illustrating their organizational profiles (e.g. geographical location, constituent members, year of establishment, and types of public services provided). In the same section, I also distinguish networks that are RIGO-qualifiers from networks that do not qualify. In the last section of this chapter, I test whether the RIGO framework is exportable beyond the United States boundaries using the South Korean case.

Chapter four, in which there are three sections, provides a description of the methodology used in this dissertation to conduct research and analysis. The first section of this chapter presents research questions and hypotheses, and the following section two provides details of the research design. That is, section two describes how the concourse and the Q-set of this study are created as well as how the study participants are selected, and Q-sort administered. I also provide a description of how the data analysis is conducted. The third section of this chapter introduces the selection of statements employed for the actual empirical survey and analysis.

Chapter five contains five sections. The first section reports the analysis results and the factors derived from the results and provides a description of the factor profiles constructed from the data. In the second section, I present an interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and Nelles' identification of RIGOs. Section three reveals and discusses consensus and disagreement that exist among the factor groups identified. Section four evaluates the hypotheses of this research in relation to the factors elicited. In the following section five, based on the factor profiles, I evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences among South Korean local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South Korea.

In chapter six, which is comprised of four sections, I conclude the research with a summary of the findings and the implications of my research, both theoretical and practical. I also discuss some limitations of my research and recommendations for future research agenda.

2.0 Literature Review

For the purpose of providing a theoretical background for this study, this chapter surveys the current literature on regional governance. More specifically, I first examine cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations and then RIGOs, which constitute a part of a larger group of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. In so doing, this chapter reviews major theoretical approaches utilized in studying regional governance in public administration, political science, and urban studies.

In the first section of this chapter, I first briefly introduce and organize various forms of regional governance into a hierarchy of increasing difficulty. Then I introduce some competing views on various forms of regional governance. In the following subsections, I first examine cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' defining attributes and activities as well as their historical change and evolution. I then review the non-US literature on regional governance. Lastly, some theoretical limitations are discussed in the last subsection of the first section. The second section of this chapter takes a closer look at the newly emergent literature on RIGOs. Conducting in-depth review of the RIGO literature enables me to provide a thick description of five distinct properties that RIGOs have. The five properties serve as benchmarks in the course of constructing the Q statements to be used for empirical assessment in this research.

2.1 Extant Literature on Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations

In this section, I conduct review on the extant literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. But before doing so, as informed by the extant literature, I first briefly introduce and organize various forms of regional governance into a hierarchy of increasing difficulty. I then outline long-standing, ongoing debate and controversy around some competing views on the merits and demerits of various forms of regional governance (in particular consolidation versus fragmentation debate).

Scholars of regional governance has insisted for many years that governmental fragmentation as well as metropolitan fragmentation and suburban autonomy are the major sources of US urban problems (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 854). Some consequences of such fragmentations, as summarized by Mitchell-Weaver and his colleagues (2000: 854-855) are "racial imbalance in the metropolis"; "income and resource imbalance in the metropolis"; "the protection of privilege"; "increased business power"; "the impact of suburbs on central cities (i.e. the exploitation hypothesis)"; "problems of housing affordability and homelessness"; "the lack of rational land use planning and commitment to environmental values"; and "problems in service (as) citizens deny the advantages of economies of scale." In response to such emerging urban problems of the United States, as early as in the 1960s, Gulick (1962), perhaps better known for the acronym POSDCORB representing the functions of the chief executive, calls for the need to replace a "focus on the core city of metropolitan areas" with "a broader view of socioeconomic and governmental development across the metropolis"; bring "all levels of US government – especially the states – on emerging urban problems"; and consider "some form of metropolitan 'federalism'" as an "appropriate intergovernmental approach" (as quoted in Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 854). However, as to what intergovernmental approach (whether it takes a form of

federalism or not) is appropriate remains a matter of scholarly (as well as practical) debate.[11] Therefore, understanding what intergovernmental approaches are available and viable would be a good starting point from which to start discussions.

To the best of my knowledge, scholars thus far have identified as many as seventeen types of approaches to intergovernmental coordination (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 864; Walker, 1987: 16) for regional governance and practitioners have likewise (Alliance for Regional Stewardship, 1987, as quoted in Parr et al., 2006[12]). The below Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate both the scholars and practitioners' understanding of the seventeen types of intergovernmental coordination options, in which the options are presented along a spectrum from those requiring the least structural change (and thus the easiest to implement and least debatable) to those requiring the most structural change (and thus the most difficult to implement and most controversial) (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 864; Parr et al., 2006; Walker, 1987: 16). All of the seventeen intergovernmental coordination choices are potential institutional responses to some prominent urban development trends (that affect suburban and rural areas) especially in the United States like continued governmental fragmentation, increased metropolitan diversity, significant cuts in federal and state aid to local governments, and a continued increase in the number of metropolitan areas and their populations (Walker, 1987; Weitz and Seltzer, 1998). The below two tables are helpful in understanding the

[11] In a similar vein, as noted by numerous scholars, although it would be ideal to match the scale of public goods provision with the scale of the goods themselves, as to what the "correct" size of government is remains an ongoing debate (e.g. Chakraborty, 2010; Parks and Oakerson, 2000; Whisman, 2013).

[12] According to Parr and his colleagues (2006), the seventeen options are identified by Walker (1987) and the Alliance for Regional Stewardship has later modified Walker's study by developing two additional options for professional use.

ongoing debate and controversy around some competing views on the merits and demerits of various forms of intergovernmental coordination, regional governance, and even regional government.

Table 1. Spectrum of Intergovernmental Coordination Options (Scholars)

Level of difficulty	**Type of intergovernmental coordination option**
Relatively easy	1. Informal cooperation
	2. Interlocal service contracts (or interlocal service agreements)
	3. Joint powers agreements
	4. Extraterritorial powers
	5. Regional councils / Councils of Governments (COGs)
	6. Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
	7. State Planning and Development Districts (SPDDs)
	8. Contracting (from private vendors)
Moderately difficult	9. Local special districts
	10. Transfer of functions
	11. Annexation
	12. Regional special districts and authorities
	13. Metropolitan multi-purpose district
	14. Reformed urban county
Very difficult	15. One-tier consolidations: city-wide and area-wide consolidations
	16. Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
	17. Three-tier reforms: metropolitan-wide structures

Sources: Adopted from Mitchell-Weaver et al. (2000: 864); Paiva (2003: 43); Walker (1987: 16)

Table 2. Spectrum of Intergovernmental Coordination Options (Practitioners)

Level of difficulty	Type of intergovernmental coordination option
Easier options	1. Informal cooperation
	2. Interlocal service contracts
	3. Joint powers agreements
	4. Extraterritorial powers
	5. Councils of governments
	6. Federally encouraged single-purpose regional bodies
	7. State planning and development districts
	8. Contracting
	9. Regional purchasing agreements
Harder options	10. Local special districts
	11. Transfer of functions
	12. Annexation
	13. Special districts and authorities
	14. Metro multipurpose districts
	15. Reformed urban county
	16. Regional asset districts
	17. Merger/consolidation

Source: Adopted from Alliance for Regional Stewardship (as cited in Parr et al., 2006)

To the best of my knowledge, the most recent theoretical update on the above classification is Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303 and 313)'s illustration of policy instruments and mechanism for integrating ICA dilemmas as presented in the below Figure 1. Their framework defines two dimensions of intermunicipal cooperation: the type of urban integration mechanism (the horizontal axis on Figure 1) and the degree of institutional scope (the vertical axis on Figure 1). In their framework, on the x-axis lie integration mechanisms in the order of increasing autonomy costs

(and thus difficulty)[13]: network embeddedness, contracts, delegated authority, and imposed authority. On the y-axis lie the level of complexity of solutions to ICA dilemmas in the order of increasing decision-making costs, ranging from narrow-scope (e.g. single purpose or bilateral intergovernmental cooperation) to complex, large-scope intergovernmental cooperation.[14] Transaction costs can be understood in terms of the two axes represented in Figure 1, which are differences in autonomy costs and decision costs. According to Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303), among various kinds of integration mechanisms, local government officials initially seek mechanisms that best produce the collective benefit with the lowest decision costs and the greatest extent of autonomy, but due to a number of constraints,[15] participating local government sacrifice

[13] Autonomy costs refer to the degree to which local governments sacrifice their local autonomy because any kind of cooperative arrangement involves local governments' "hollowing out" their power and legitimacy (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Holum, 2016 and Jacobsen, 2015). Thus, the more formalized integration mechanisms are, the more significant transfers of powers (i.e. the higher autonomy costs) from the participating local governments to the inter-governmental agreements.

[14] Decision-making costs refer to both the costs associated with designing and negotiating an inter-governmental agreement "capable of overcoming collective action problems" especially in terms of the number of actors (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Olson, 1965 and Provan and Kenis, 2008) and the costs associated with "managing task diversity and complexity" (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Holmström and Milgrom, 1991 and Tadelis, 2002). According to Feiock (2013), when the number of local governments and the number of tasks involved increase, complexity increases.

[15] Tavares and Feiock (2018) name a country's constitutional-legal framework (as well as its history, culture, and traditions), heterogeneity within a local jurisdiction and between local jurisdictions, the scope of pre-existing integration arrangements, and the degree to which local government officials disagree on goals (especially on the allocation of benefits and costs) as potential constraints.

decision costs and some extent of autonomy. Figure 2 is their real-world application of the theoretical framework using European country cases.



Figure 1. Integration Mechanisms and Transaction Costs

Source: Adopted from Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303)

Encompassing Complex Collective	City-regions/ Network cities	Multi-Purpose Municipal Associations	Regional / Metropolitan Governments	Forced Municipal Mergers
Intermediate Multilateral	Social Welfare Networks	Single-Purpose Municipal Associations	Intermunicipal Corporations	Metropolitan Transportation Authorities
Narrow Single Issue Bilateral	Informal Working Groups	Interlocal Agreements	Municipal Corporations	Consorcios and Syndicats Mixtes
	Embeddedness	**Contracts**	**Delegated Authority**	**Imposed Authority**

Figure 2. Policy Instruments for Integrating ICA Dilemmas in European Countries

Source: Adopted from Tavares and Feiock (2018: 313)

As to the ongoing debate and controversy around some competing views on the merits and demerits of various forms of regional governance, tension between the advocates for decentralized versus consolidated systems of government is most visible (Frisken and Norris, 2001; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010; Kim and Jurey, 2013). According to Dolan (1990), at the time of his writing, the issue of local government fragmentation versus (metropolitan) consolidation is more than fifty years old (see also Weitz and Seltzer, 1998).[16] The former, who can be broadly referred to as poly-centrists or the public choice school (e.g. Foster, 1993; Kim and Jurey, 2013; Lefèvre, 1998; Nelson and Foster, 1999), stress the importance of leveraging local autonomy and inter-jurisdictional competition under decentralized governance systems to promote public welfare. Their rationale is that, when there are a large number of governments, they would be under competition with others and this competition to accommodate their residents' preferences (so as

[16] Some even argue that the debate has raged since the 19th century (e.g. Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010).

to retain those residents and even attract more) would generate greater efficiency (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Ostrom et al., 1961; Tiebout, 1956).[17][18] On the contrary, the latter (i.e. the advocates of consolidation), often labeled as the American reformers (Lefèvre, 1998), argue that a political and administrative fragmentation into a large number of local governments is less conducive to achieving improved public welfare as such a disaggregation causes a lack of economies of scale (and also economies of scope) along with a lack of inter-governmental cooperation.[19] Their rationale is that more consolidated systems of government are more advantageous in promoting public welfare as they can achieve greater regulatory consistency and administrative efficiency through more strategic, coherent policy making and implementation. The extreme notion of consolidation can be referred to as centrist whereas the more moderate notion can be referred to as regionalist (e.g. Foster, 1993; Kim and Jurey, 2013; Nelson and Foster, 1999).

Making value judgment on which systems of government (i.e. decentralized versus consolidated) are better is not the purpose of this dissertation study. Rather, the purpose of

[17] According to Lefèvre (1998), the American reformers have been criticized by the public choice school on the grounds that the so-called (consolidated) 'metropolitan model' does not necessarily favor either a reduction in production costs or innovation; furthermore, it does not allow a free choice of localization to citizens (Tiebout, 1956). The public choice school instead favors "poly-centric political systems," which are more competent in providing public goods and services and mitigating potential externalities in so doing (Ostrom et al., 1961).

[18] Especially, Ostrom and her colleagues (1961: 837) caution that metropolitan, large, and centralized governments can be "insensitive and clumsy in meeting the demands of local citizens for public goods."

[19] Furthermore, Lyons and Lowery (1989), as quoted in Weitz and Seltzer (1998), argue that their empirical research findings "run contrary" to "several tenets of the public choice model: citizens living in fragmented areas are not better informed about tax and service packages, are not more likely to participate in local affairs, and are not more satisfied with their local government services than are their counterparts who live in consolidated government areas."

providing the above contrasting account of the trichotomy (or dichotomy in a reductionist's view) is to situate cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations within the context of a broader theoretical debate about various forms of regional governance as such a debate "on how regions should be governed" is "bigger than the presence or absence of regional cross-boundary organizations" of which RIGOs are one type (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 339). In short, theoretically, cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be understood as a regionalist choice among many (e.g. on inter-jurisdictional cooperation, see Bollens, 1993; on metropolitan governance, see Feiock, 2004; Lefevre, 1998) to address the problem of political, administrative, and policy fragmentation.

In the following subsections, I conduct brief review on the extant literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in terms of their conceptual and operational foundations as well as their rationale and basis of existence. I also conduct review on the non-US and non-Korean literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations as well as some caveats of them informed by the literature. In so doing, I deliberately use the term 'cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' instead of rather vague terms like regional governance or regional organizations although there are "other types of private and nonprofit institutions engaged in the work commonly associated with local governments" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340) because, in alignment with Miller and Nelles (2020) and Agranoff (2014), I take a government-centric approach to understanding multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration out of a belief that local governments "still represent a powerful organizing structure around which civil society functions" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340).

2.1.1 Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations' Attributes and Activities

In today's world, almost all local governments in America belong to at least one regional organization of local governments that represents the region and promotes its members' collective interests and addresses "problems that are bigger than any one local government" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 326). [20] Such organizations can be broadly labeled as cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, and they provide a variety of services to their member jurisdictions, some of them directly targeted to solving interlocal problems, ranging from joint purchase programs to interlocal cooperative agreements between local governments (Leland and Whisman, 2012; Whisman, 2013). Perhaps the best starting point for any understanding of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations especially in the American context would be the 1962 report published by the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) titled *A Commission Report: Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas*. In the report, the ACIR calls for the creation of an organization in each region that would "seek a better understanding among the governments and officials in the area, to develop a consensus regarding metropolitan needs, and to promote coordinated action in solving their problems" (United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1962, p. 34) and identifies that there are ten potential strategies that would be intended to encourage better

[20] Furthermore on why cooperation among local governments is forged, or motivations for creating cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, scholars point out to cost-efficiency (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002), economies of scale and scope (e.g. Boyne, 1992; 1995), the presence of a policy entrepreneur (Cigler, 1999), fiscal stress (both real and perceived) (Olberding, 2002a), changing fiscal conditions and thus fiscal pressure (Kwon and Feiock, 2010; LeRoux and Carr, 2007), trust between local governments (Feiock, 2005; Tavares and Feiock, 2018; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002), and administrative (rather than political) leadership at local level (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991).

regional governance, of which voluntary metropolitan councils are one strategic choice.[2122] To date, cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, of which voluntary metropolitan councils are the most extensively used and thus the predominant strategic choice taken in the United States, have been understood as "a specific type of interlocal activity to be compared with other types of interlocal activity" (Rickabaugh, 2018a: 132; see also Foster and Barnes, 2012; Feiock, 2009; Tavares and Feiock, 2018) as recommended by the ACIR or on the spectrum of intergovernmental coordination options as listed in Table 1 and Table 2.

Some national-level professional associations, of which cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are their constituent members, refined the technical definition of their member organizations based on the members' shared characteristics. For instance, the National Association of Regional Council characterizes its members as "a multi-service entity with state- and locally-defined boundaries that delivers a variety of federal, state, and local programs while carrying out its function as a planning organization, technical assistance provider, and "visionary" to its member local governments" (National Association of Regional Councils, 2020). Another example is the National Association of Development Organizations' characterization of its members: "multi-jurisdictional regional planning and development organizations … (that are)

[21] The ten potential strategies are the use of extraterritorial powers, intergovernmental agreements, voluntary metropolitan councils, urban county, transfer of functions to the state government, metropolitan special districts (limited purpose and multipurpose), annexation and consolidation, city-county separation, city-county consolidation, and federation (in the order of appearance in the report).

[22] However, according to Miller and his colleagues (2018: 17)' retrospective review of the extent to which the ten strategies have been used in practice since the publication of the report, only voluntary metropolitan councils are extensively used as a strategy that "engage (s) all of the principle governmental jurisdictions within the region to either deliver shared services or attempt to address the common issues facing the region as a whole."

public-based entities play (ing) an invaluable role in fostering intergovernmental collaboration among federal, state and local officials … deliver (ing) and manag (ing) various federal and state programs … work (ing) to solve areawide issues and to address the fundamental building blocks required for competitive and sustainable communities and economies" (National Association of Development Organizations, 2020).

In the meanwhile, scholars "taking new looks at" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336) cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations have reached some level of consensus about the defining attributes of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in practice, especially in the United States. For instance, Visser (2004: 51-52) views regional councils of voluntarily participating local governments that prefer "the use of interorganizational collaboration rather than hierarchical regional government" in resolving area-wide public problems a "possible mechanism" through which the aims of planning for "area-wide land use, public infrastructure, and the delivery of regional public services" can be achieved, thereby promoting "the equitable distribution of fiscal resources and developmental benefits across the region." Furthermore, in accordance with Savitch and Vogel (2000: 161), he understands cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, of which regional councils are one type, as manifestations of new regionalism, which is both a policy agenda and an action approach that enables effective metropolitan governance.[23] Another example is

[23] According to Visser (2004: 51-52), "(a)s a policy agenda, the new regionalism promotes the cost-effective provision of area-wide public infrastructure and services and the equitable distribution of fiscal resources and developmental benefits across the region. It calls for removing intraregional barriers of access to economic and social opportunity. It also supports global economic competitiveness for the region and ecologically and economically sustainable patterns of land use and development." As an action approach, he continues, the new regionalism "promotes regional action through governance, defined as the use of interorganizational collaboration rather than hierarchical regional government to resolve areawide public problems."

Rosan (2016). In defense of bottom-up regionalism, she argues that a voluntary, collaborative approach to coordinating regional planning to address region-wide issues including but not limited to transportation and land use is a more politically and administratively feasible option in mobilizing effective strategies to align regional goals and priorities with local interests. Lat but not least, Bryan and Wolf (2010: 100-101) also summarize the United States federal, state, and local governments' efforts to create "softer structural solutions emphasizing voluntary cooperative mechanisms among (local) governments" to help "metropolitan areas address region-wide problems" and "provide efficient service delivery" including "systems maintenance such as sewage and transportation."

Taking a closer look at what cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations do, Wikstrom (1977: 97), in his seminal study of councils of governments in the United States, identifies four core activities of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations: providing venue for community planning; facilitating planning and supporting joint planning; representing local governments at state levels; and conducting regional review for federal programs. Similarly, Bryan and Wolf (2010: 109-110) identify that there are five activities having been core part of the regional councils' role since those organizations' unprecedented growth in the 1960s: managing federal and state planning and review requirements; facilitating and coordinating identification of regional issues; operating as a technical data source; providing technical and planning-related consulting services; providing legislative/intergovernmental relations services; and operating regional programs (e.g. joint purchasing operations). Furthermore, according to Bryan and Wolf (2010: 110-113), there are many commonalities among the regional councils in terms of kinds of programs and policy areas those organizations are engaged with: transportation, environmental protection (i.e. air and water quality management); land use; human services; housing; economic

and community development; and disaster preparedness. Miller and Nelles (2020: 343) have further modified Bryan and Wolf (2010)'s functional categories into eight activities "that cover the array of issue areas common to virtually every region" in the United States: economic and workforce development; social services; community development, housing, and public infrastructure financing; environmental management planning; transportation planning and coordination; growth management; regional public safety; and regional service provision/constituent services.

It should be noted that, despite the existence of some level of consensus within regional governance scholarship with regard to what important features cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations share in common (i.e. their defining attributes and activities), there is a lack of "a common naming convention" (Miller and Nelles, 2020) in both the academic[24] and practical realms.[25] As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020), the lack of a common naming convention results in a number of operationalization issues. One of such issues is that such a lack "makes large-scale comparative research difficult and prone to potential blind spots" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 325).

[24] For instance, the ACIR report, although not strictly an academic publication, uses the term voluntary metropolitan council; Visser (2004) and Bryan and Wolf (2010) voluntary regional council and regional COGs; Miller and Cox (2014) regional governing organizations (RGOs); and Feiock (2013) "councils of governments and other regional organizations" when they all refer to more or less the same organization.

[25] Councils of Governments (COGs), Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs), Associations of Governments, and Economic Development Districts (EDDs) are among many popular names of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. According to Miller and his colleagues (2019: 94-95), there are at least thirty different naming conventions of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that can be categorized into RIGOs. The list will expand further if non-RIGO cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are taken into account.

In summation, despite some operationalization issues (especially the lack of a common naming convention) as addressed above, as to what cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are and what they do, regional governance scholarship and practitioners agree to some extent with the core principles underlying regional governance systems within which cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are predominant: in terms of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' defining attributes, they are multi-service, multi-jurisdictional entities, of which primarily voluntarily participating local governments are members, working to solve area-wide problems "bigger than any one local government"; in terms of their activities, they are engaged with diverse programs and policy areas specifically targeted to resolving area-wide problems, ranging from regional planning to disaster preparedness.

2.1.2 Historical Change and the Evolution of Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations

According to Wallis (1994b), there have been three distinct waves of attempts among local governments in the United States in the twentieth century to achieve regional governance.[26] The

[26] One interesting case study that resonates to a great extent with the below general historical survey of change and evolution of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in the United States is the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service (1988). In this work, the Bureau reviews three distinct eras in the development of Councils of Governments in Oregon: voluntary cooperation (1945-1965); federal and state incentives and requirements (1966-1980); and strategic localism (1981-1988). Also, according to the report, the "common thread" roles for the Councils of Governments in Oregon are "coalition-building, managing economic development partnerships, collecting and analyzing regional data, providing service, and brokering and advocacy on regional issues" (see for the detail Tollenaar, 1988; Weitz and Seltzer, 1998).

first wave of (rather unsuccessful) regional governance, which coincided with the progressive movement, focused on "structural solutions designed to expand the sphere of the central city" (Wallis, 1994b: 447) and can be characterized by strategic choices, including but not limited to regional government and annexation,[27] that "tried to draw capacity from the extension of general government powers – typically those of the central city – outward to encompass the region" (448). However, the fact that only few regional governments exist today speaks to the limited acceptance of the first wave regional governance strategies (Clark, 1995; Olberding, 2002a; Walker, 1987). This is not surprising since, particularly technical-wise, regional government and annexation are among the most difficult intergovernmental coordination options (see Table 1 and Table 2).

The second wave of regional governance occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The second wave, in recognition of the structural complexity and poly-centricity of regions, was "more procedurally oriented, focusing on objectives of comprehensiveness and coordination" (Wallis, 1994b: 447). Therefore, the second wave was more focused on facilitating regional planning and area-wide program coordination (Olberding, 2002a). By and large thanks to federal sponsorship,[28][29] the number of regional councils of government reached its peak in 1977 (669),

[27] According to Walker (1987), annexation was especially a popular, if not the dominant, device in the 19th century to bring "local jurisdictional servicing boundaries and expanding settlement patterns into proper alignment."

[28] In this era, especially in the 1970s, 48 federal programs prioritized regional councils in funding or required a regional planning agency as a condition of funding (Olberding, 2002a: 252; see also Grigsby, 1996) or local grant applications be reviewed by a regional council (a process called A-95 review) and federal money made up as much as three fourths of regional councils' budgets (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). See also Grigsby (1996).

[29] Not only the federal government but also state governments took part in encouraging local governments' participation in regional councils through legislation (Whisman, 2013: 11). As of 2013, there are forty-four states having legislation concerning regional cooperation and regional councils (Whisman, 2013: 11).

but as of 2000, the number dropped to 450, according to the National Association of Regional Councils. Scholars suspect that this decline was partially caused by the Reagan administration's budget cuts in the 1980s (for example, see Bowman and Franke, 1984; Olberding, 2002a).

The third wave of regional governance has occurred since the early 1990s. According to Dodge (1990: 354), "(t)he federally mandated regional planning efforts and the consolidation proposals of the past three decades are being replaced by voluntary cooperation among governments and sectors through public-private, 'intercommunity partnerships.'" Wallis (1994b:) notes that intergovernmental/regional partnerships forged during this wave have the following common features: "they stress the development of governance capacity rather than the expansion of government"; "they are led by coalitions of interest groups which are often cross-sectoral (nonprofit, private, and public)"; "they focus on areas of substantive strategic concern"; and "they employ facilitated processes to develop a shared vision and means of collaboration."

Thus far, I have reviewed the historical development of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. In addition, there is a functional approach to understanding various geneses of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations: the approach Miller and Nelles (2020) take. According to them, differences in ways local institutions (i.e. local governments) responded to the rapid transformation of post-World War II American life has had a significant impact on how cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations have evolved differently in different regions of the United States. They identify that there were four routes that led to the development of regional-level cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations eventually undertaking cross-boundary activity (335): Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs); Economic Development Districts (EDDs);

Councils of Governments (COGs); and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs).[30] In spite of the United States cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' various geneses, an institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) occurs among those organizations as, although initially founded to meet federal funding requirements and/or state mandates, they take on additional activities beyond regional planning to address constituent members' needs including program development and coordination as well as local service delivery (Bennet and Nathanson, 1997; Miller and Nelles, 2020; Olberding, 1997 and 2002a).

Based on the above literature review, I summarize that cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be understood as, among the seventeen intergovernmental coordination options available, an array of moderate (either relatively easy or moderately difficult) government-centric options local governments voluntarily take that can be characterized as intergovernmental entities with state- and locally-defined boundaries that deliver a variety of federal, state, and local programs and regional public services and solve region-wide issues. However, this literature-review-based definition is somewhat vague and thus can be problematic especially for operationalization. As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020: 337), the key problems at the level of operationalization arise due to that cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations "are sometimes membership-based, sometimes not, sometimes multipurpose, sometimes not,

[30] Miller and Nelles (2020: 335) provide the following account as four examples of the evolutionary paths of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations: "Initially, the organizations were named to reflect the specific function they were meant to address. Those focused on urban land-use planning created organizations known as RPCs; those focused on economic development (primarily in rural/smaller metropolitan area) attached the federal moniker of EDDs to their organization; those focused on mobilizing local governments in engage with each other in primarily metropolitan areas became known as COGs; and those interested in urban transportation planning use the federal moniker of MPOs."

sometimes region-wide, sometimes not, sometimes “this” and sometimes “that.”” Therefore, there is a need to provide a precise definition of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations at the level of operationalization for the purpose of rigorous analysis.

2.1.3 Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations beyond USA

Thus far, I have mostly relied on the regionalism literature of the United States in articulating what cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are and what they do. However, given the ubiquity of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations across the globe, efforts not only in other industrialized countries but also developing countries deserve scholarly attention. Below are selective examples of studies on regional governance and cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations beyond the United States: some of them are comparative and others are single country studies.

First of all, although not in great numbers, there exist studies comparing the United States cases with other countries. For example, Burnley and Murphy (1995) compare the United States and Australia in terms of different characteristics of exurban development and regional planning in the two countries. Hansen and his colleagues (1990) include the United States in their comparative analysis of regional policies in numerous countries. Van der Veer (1994) conducts comparative analysis of metropolitan areas of the Netherlands and the United States in terms of the degree to which those areas are centralized and regional power exercised in those areas. There also exist a few studies comparing systems of regional governance in the United States and Canadian metropolitan areas (e.g. Robinson and Webster, 1985; Rothblatt, 1994).

Second, as to the non-US based regional governance practices, I first take a close look at European countries. The European integration efforts of the past three decades have influenced all

of the European Union (EU) member countries in terms of how each member country governs its regions (de Sousa, 2013; Szmigiel-Rawska, 2016; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). As opposed to the United States in which metropolitan consolidation rarely takes place, many Western European countries have consolidated their metropolitan areas; some cases were successful, and some were not (Lefèvre, 1998; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). In the meanwhile, fragmentation has been a more common practice among Central and Eastern European countries[31] (Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). The rationale of many European countries (mostly Western European countries)' metropolitan consolidation efforts, like counterparts elsewhere around the world, is "increased capacity, economies of scale, and efficiency" (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 300; see also Kopric, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2010). On the contrary, the key motivation of equally many European countries' efforts to decentralize and devolve power that lead to more fragmented local government systems, (again) like counterparts elsewhere around the world, is to promote democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy (Kopric, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). However, it is relatively a recent phenomenon that intergovernmental cooperation efforts have received scholarly attention and the academic debate on intergovernmental cooperation remains not only dominated by, with only a few exceptions, a top-down perspective but also incomplete (see Bel and Warner, 2016; Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares and Feiock, 2018;

[31] Such cases of governmental fragmentation were common among those countries especially during the 1990s in an effort to resurrect local democracy and abolish "territorial consolidations imposed under former communist regimes" (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 300; Swianiewicz, 2010).

Teles, 2016; Teles and Swianiewicz, 2018).[32] Some selective examples of regional governance reforms geared towards promoting intergovernmental cooperation include the Dutch case of shifting from *stadsgewesten* (smaller monocentric regions) to integral urban networks titled Regional Collaborative Associations and Deltametropolis (Haran, 2010); the English experiment with establishing metropolitan authorities (counties) in the six largest urban areas (Lefèvre, 1998); the French creation of *communaute´s de communes* and *communaute´s de villes* (Lefèvre, 1998); the Italian case of reorganizing its cities and municipalities into *città metropolitan* (Lefèvre, 1998); and the last but not least, the German manifestation of Regional Communities (e.g. *Verband region Stuttgart*) (Lefèvre, 1998). As presented earlier in this chapter (Figure 2), Tavares and Feiock (2018) use the ICA framework to draw distinctions among various types of regional governance in Europe that can be applicable elsewhere around the world. They identify that there are four distinct types of mechanism for integrating ICA problems: network embeddedness (e.g. city-regions in the Netherlands of which Regional Collaborative Associations are one type); contracts (e.g. interlocal contracts in France and Norway); delegated authority (e.g. municipal corporations in Sweden and Germany); and imposed authority (e.g. *consorcios* in Spain and *syndicats mixtes* in France).[33]

[32] According to Tavares and Feiock (2018: 300), the EU member countries' long-standing preference for top-down (hierarchical) and formal solutions "still puzzles American scholars seeking to comprehend the choice of governance arrangements to address specific ICA dilemmas."

[33] See Hertzog (2010) for more detail on interlocal contracts in France and Jacobsen (2015) in Norway; Monti and Amna (2000) on municipal corporation in Sweden and Grossi and Reichard (2008) in Germany; and on *consorcios* in Spain and *syndicats mixtes* in France, Bel and Warner (2015) and Hulst et al. (2009).

Third and last, besides the so-called Western countries (i.e. the United States, Canada, and the EU member countries), scholars report that there exist various types of regional governance in practice across the globe: examples of effective (to certain extent) regional governance in Turkey are West Mediterranean Economic Development Foundation (BAGEV) and South Antalya Tourism Development and Infrastructure Operation Union (GATAB); in Australia, Tasmania's Cradle Coast Authority (CCA) is an example of regional governance that merits analysis; some exemplar intergovernmental cooperation takes place in the Yangtze River Delta region of China; and Wide Area Federations of Municipalities in Japan are the latest Japanese national government's regional solutions to "enhance interlocal, collaborative public service delivery within multi-municipal areas, especially in areas where amalgamations (are) thought to be politically difficult to implement" (Jacobs, 2004: 247).[34]

2.1.4 Limitations of the Current Literature on Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations

Whether cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are effective means to solve region-wide problems and promote better standards of regional governance is not only beyond scope of this dissertation study but also needs further practical and academic considerations.[35] In

[34] See Ataöv and Eraydin (2011) for more detail on regional governance in Turkey; Davidson and Lockwood (2008) on the Australian regional governance (especially Tasmania); Luo (2005) on the mainland Chinese case of regional governance; and Jacobs (2004) on the Japanese regional governance.

[35] Cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' effectiveness and potency, as assessed by some scholars thus far, do not seem that strong. According to Hamilton (2014: 248-250), cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are "defensive" and they give "the illusion that something is being done in order to address regional problems to prevent

this subsection, I focus not on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations' issues and problems but rather on some limitations of the current literature on those organizations.

According to Rickabaugh (2018a), because regions are not uniform in the United States and hence there exist many varieties of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, regional governance scholars have thus far not been successful in developing an understanding of those organizations in a systematic way. Another limitation related to the first one is that the extant regional governance scholarship has "limited the universe" of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations "functionally or geographically." Therefore, such a limited scope of functional or geographical understanding of cross-boundary organizations leads to a lack of generalizability.

Furthermore, as addressed by Miller and Nelles (2020), although cross-boundary intergovernmental organizational names have virtually zero value in "establishing or clarifying any specifics about the form and function of" those organizations" (328), "many different names have been used to signify approximately the same thing" (329) or familiar names have been applied inconsistently, causing confusion to regional governance scholars. Among the consequences of this confusion is a research dilemma: "(i)n the absence of a broad consensus about which organizations matter or are the "right" manifestations of American regional intergovernmentalism the scholarship has had to develop an imprecisely defined and tacitly circulated perception of

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any more powerful or drastic regional governmental reorganization." He also criticizes those organizations as: "hav (ing) failed to develop strong political support from the state or among local governments; remain as advisory and planning bodies without the means to implement their plans; continued (to be) dependent on federal government funding; and have been able to create only a weak sense of the region for planning purposes and almost no political or administrative regional identity" (Hamilton, 2014: 249 as quoted in Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336). Furthermore, Hall (2009: 71 as quoted in Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336) adds to this criticism by asserting "COGs with rules like 'one jurisdiction-one vote' are perfect examples of the structural problems facing regions."

regions and the cross-boundary organizations that embody them" (350). Although some effort has been made to define cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in a broad, consistent manner, even those definitions have been "applied loosely and with notable exceptions" (350). Therefore, as Miller and Nelles (2020: 328) lament, "it is very difficult to evaluate the state of regional governance in America partially because, to date, there has been no consensus about how to identify or measure it within regional organizations." Also, related to this difficulty, one crucial problem of the lack of a common lexicon, as noted by Miller and Nelles (2020: 351) is that such a lack "makes large-scale comparative research difficult and prone to potential blind spots."

2.2 Extant Literature on RIGOs

As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020), previous attempts to conceptualize and operationalize regional governance focusing on the role of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations have suffered from a lack of conceptual precision and consensus. Miller and Nelles (2020; see also Miller et al., 2019, especially 81-102)' proposal of a system of studying cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, although having not yet gained much popularity in the domain of regional governance scholarship,[36] enables us to pursue a "fruitful line of investigation" (337) especially in conducting comparative research. Their framework is useful as it not only

[36] As of the time of this writing, there are three academic publications that cite Miller and Nelles' peer-reviewed article (2020) and ten publications that cite Miller and his colleagues' collective work (2019). This is most likely due to that it has been only two years since their introduction of the RIGO framework.

provides conceptual definitions but also provides detailed accounts of how they can be operationalized for research purposes.

In this section, I first outline the RIGO framework developed by Miller and Nelles (2020; see also Miller et al., 2019, especially 81-102) in the first subsection and then discuss some strengths of it in the following subsection.

2.2.1 Defining and Operationalizing the Five Properties of RIGOs

To develop a general framework of what a RIGO is, Miller and Nelles (2020) first identify five properties that either regional councils loosely share or voluntary metropolitan councils would have in the ideal world envisioned by the ACIR. Then they define and operationalize those properties to identify RIGOs in the United States. There are 477 cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that fit Miller and Nelles' definition of RIGOs.[37] As to what those five properties are, they are membership, agenda, legitimacy, ambition, and scale.

First, RIGOs' **membership** property refers to whether a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization is "primarily constituted by general-purpose local governments"[38] regardless of whether it is a self-organized one or created in response to the higher governments' requirements (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340; see also Miller et al., 2019: 86). To qualify as a RIGO, a cross-boundary organization should be constituted largely, if not exclusively, by local governments and,

[37] The US RIGO database is available at http://metrostudies.pitt.edu/RIGOData.

[38] They are basic local authorities, and examples are counties and municipalities in the United States; districts in England; *communes* in France; and *Gemeinde* in Germany.

as to its governing body (where applicable), it should be composed of at least fifty-one percent of representatives from local governments.

Second, whether a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization has **agenda** that cover an array of policy areas is another criterion that it has to meet to qualify as a RIGO. Miller and Nelles (2020; see also Miller et al., 2019) modify Bryan and Wolf (2010)'s list of regional council program areas into eight categories of activities. Table 3 below is an abridged version of Miller and Nelles (2020)' table. A cross-boundary intergovernmental organization must be engaged in as little as three of the below mentioned activities to qualify as a RIGO.[39][40]

[39] Miller and Nelles (2020: 342) propose three activities as "the threshold to be as certain as possible that the organization is multipurpose … while ensuring that the broadest number of organizations could meet this criterion."

[40] According to Miller and Nelles (2020: 342), "(p)articipation in at least one of the sub-activities could satisfy that requirement. For instance, to be active in transportation planning in coordination, a RIGO could be engaged in either rural or urban transportation."

Table 3. Policy and Program Areas that Constitute Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations' Activities

	Policy area	Examples	Sub-activity (if any)
1	Economic and workforce development	Serving as an Economic Development District; engaged in coordinating tourism development	Economic development Workforce
2	Social services	Serving as an Area Agency on Aging; operating drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs and other forms of social welfare programs	Aging Social services
3	Community development, housing, and public infrastructure financing	Working with a higher government's Housing and Urban Development department	
4	Environmental management planning	Planning, coordinating, and/or implementing one or more regional efforts to address water, sewer, stormwater treatment; solid waste and/or recycling; air quality and/or energy	Water/wastewater Solid waste Air quality/energy
5	Transportation planning and coordination	Serving as a Rural Transportation Planning Organization; serving as a rural transit coordinator or provider; serving as a Metropolitan Planning Organization; and/or serving as an urban transit coordinator or provider	Rural transportation Urban transportation
6	Growth management	Addressing and/or reviewing growth management needs, regional land use proposals and/or addressing regional parks, open space, greenspace, or other unique physical characteristics of the region (e.g. desert, coastline, wetlands, and mountains)	
7	Regional public safety	Police/fire training; planning for or operating emergency call centers; planning for or coordinating emergency management; addressing hazard mitigation; and/or operating regional detention facilities	
8	Regional service provision / constituent services	Providing any of the above activities as a service to constituent local governments in support of the internal governing needs of that particular jurisdiction	

Source: Miller et al. (2019: 88)

Third, **legitimacy** is concerned with a form of organizational legitimacy. To qualify as a RIGO that is legitimate in the eyes of the higher tiers of government (e.g. state and federal in the United States; provincial and national in South Korea), a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization must be seen as "the primary representative of the region's governments and their collective interests" (Miller et al., 2019: 87) by appropriate higher-tier government agencies. Therefore, legitimacy defined and operationalized by Miller and Nelles (2020: 344; see also Miller et al., 2019: 87-89) is "more "top-down" than "bottom-up"" as it concerns more with service delivery than democracy (on the issue of "performance legitimacy" versus "democratic legitimacy," see Lipset, 1984; Mcloughlin, 2015; Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2004). In the United

States case, in thirty-two states, state and local governments have identified and designated a single cross-boundary membership-based intergovernmental organization for each and every region of the state. In other states, multiple policy/program designations assigned to cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (e.g. MPOs, RTPOs, and EDDs) are perceived to be indicative of their high degree of acceptance as valid regional representatives especially by appropriate higher-tier government agencies (e.g. MPOs and RTPOs by the US Department of Transportation; EDDs by the US Economic Development Administration, a bureau within the US Department of Commerce).

Fourth, the degree to which a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization "desires to be considered an agent of the region as well as an agent of its governmental constituents" (Miller et al., 2019: 89) is another important property to take into account when disentangling RIGOs from other types of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. **Ambition**, as understood by Miller and his colleagues (2019: 89), is not a concept that can be captured in terms of performance or practice, but by a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization's intent to represent the region and be the voice for it. As such, to quality as a RIGO, a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization should strive to represent regional interests that transcend a mere aggregation of local governments' interests. Therefore, whereas organizational legitimacy, the third property, is concerned with the verticality of intergovernmental relations, ambition deals with the horizontality. However, as Miller and Nelles (2020) admit, ambition is the most difficult one to operationalize among the five properties. As far as the ambition dimension is concerned, a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization qualifies as a RIGO if there is any textual evidence that it strives to take part in "identifying, articulating, negotiating, deciding, or implementing regional solutions to area-wide problems" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 345). The below table that I adopt from Miller

and his colleagues (2019: 89) helps build a clearer understanding of ambition of RIGOs: in the table, varying degrees of ambition are listed in the order of increasing aggressiveness (1 = timid; 2 = modest; and 3 and 4 =highly aggressive).

Table 4. Varying Degrees of Ambition of Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations

Category	Summary	Description
1	Serve constituent interests	In this capacity local government expertise and outputs are improved as those local governments share the norms and values inherent in the service provided to them by the organization.
2	Create regional dialogue discussion	In addition to service to members, the organization sees its role as one of bringing its members together (with others) for purposes of discussing cross-jurisdictional and/or region-wide public issues. It serves as the convener of interests.
3	Seek regional cooperation or collaboration	The organization exhibits the characteristics of the first two (serve and convene) but the purpose of convening is more clearly articulated to develop cooperative or collaborative outcomes.
4	Seek regional decision-making	The organization exhibits the characteristics of the first two (serve and convene) but the purpose of convening is more clearly articulated to develop regional decisions.

Source: Miller et al. (2019: 89)

Fifth and last, **scale** is a property defined and operationalized to distinguish RIGOs from geographically smaller-scale cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. This scale distinction is necessary because of the following two reasons. First, practical. In many regions, there are multiple cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations having the above four properties.[41] Among those organizations, the one that represents "the largest territory in which a

[41] Any organization that has the four properties is referred to as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) by Miller and his colleagues (2019). "Anytime two or more local governments get together to formally engage in discussion and actions on multiple issues they create an IGO" (Miller et al., 2019: 84).

set of local governments address common policy problems" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 347) is typically the most visible, and hence the easiest one to find and monitor. Second, methodological. As Miller and his colleagues (2019) find, the largest-scale organization in the region tends to have most power to fulfill the primary functions of regional governance.

In summation, membership and agenda are concerned with RIGOs' organizational identification (i.e. what they are and what they do). A cross-boundary intergovernmental organization that qualifies as a RIGO can be understood as, membership-wise, composed of general-purpose local governments; agenda-wise, it covers a broad array of policies and programs targeted to solve region-wide issues. In the meanwhile, legitimacy and ambition are the properties concerning internal and external (or vertical and horizontal) credibility of a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization. A RIGO qualifier is regarded as the voice of the region not only by the higher tiers of government (legitimacy) but also by its constituents as it desires to represent the regional interests (ambition). Also, scale matters for the sake of practicality and parsimony.

2.2.2 Strengths of the RIGO Framework

Thanks to Miller and his colleagues' effort (2019; see also Miller and Nelles, 2020), we now have a broad picture of the 477 cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in the United States that look alike. Then, it is natural to think their project can be replicated elsewhere across the world. Indeed, with the five properties of the RIGO framework, we can conduct large-scale comparative research including cross-national studies of RIGOs.

One of the greatest strengths of the RIGO framework is that it provides "a conceptual *lingua franca*" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 351) that enables us to discern RIGOs from non-RIGOs in the universe of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. Such a differentiation can be

carried out outside of the United States too. For example, in the case of France, we can now discern *communauté de communes* and *communauté d'agglomération*, French RIGOs, from *syndicats mixtes*; in the Netherlands, Regional Collaborative Associations from Deltametropolis; in Turkey, GATAB from BAGEV; in Japan, *Koiki Rengo* (Wide Area Federation of Municipalities: MFs) from *Ichibu Jimu Kumiai* (Partial Administrative Unions); and CCA from the Local Government Association of Queensland in Australia. And the list can go on and on. Once we have different countries' RIGOs teased out from their respective pools of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, we can conduct comparative studies of RIGOs across the world. In other words, we can compare, for example, RIGOs in the United States with *communauté de communes*, *communauté d'agglomération*, Regional Collaborative Associations, GATAB, *Koiki Rengo* and CCA, as, in Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303)'s terminology, they are all contract-bound, multi-purpose intermunicipal associations (see Figure 2) having "intermediate institutional scope" and, in terms of the RIGO framework, they are all organizations possessing the five properties.

3.0 Understanding Regional Intergovernmental Organizations of South Korea

Individuals' perceptions are not only influenced by culture (e.g. Ekman and Friedsen, 1971; Hofstede, 1991 and 2001; Kastanakis and Voyer, 2014) but also organizational reforms and institutional changes (e.g. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Rafferty and Restubog, 2017; Saksvik et al., 2007) as well as history (Linder and Peters, 1989; Miller, 2002). Concerning the influence of history on individual perceptions, Miller (2002: 8) notes, "historical context frames and structures where we are headed." Therefore, since the purpose of this dissertation study is to better understand South Korean public officials' perceptions of cross-boundary multi-lateral collaboration, in addition to the literature review of Western knowledge of regional governance, I provide the cultural, organizational, and historical contexts within which those officials are embedded before the actual analysis of their perceptions. In so doing, I first provide a brief historical background of the South Korean regional governance as well as some major reforms related to it in the first section. Then, in the second section, I summarize the extant regional governance literature of South Korea. In the last section, I apply the RIGO framework to studying the South Korean case of regional governance to test the exportability of the framework beyond the United States boundary.

3.1 South Korea's Local Autonomy and Regional Governance

Regional governance is a new child of local autonomy, which is almost equally young, in South Korea.[42] Therefore, before advancing to the country review of regional governance, I first briefly provide the history of local autonomy in South Korea as well as some weaknesses of, and threats to, it.

The Korean peninsula has been ruled by a strong central government for centuries. After the division of Korea into North and South in 1948, although there were some episodic and erratic efforts to establish local autonomy in South Korea, the national leaders, in particular military dictatorships, had long overridden the embodiment of local autonomy on the grounds that agendas such as economic development, administrative efficiency, and reunification (with North Korea) should be prioritized (Cho et al., 2010). However, from the early 1990s, "some degree of local autonomy" (Cho et al., 2010) has emerged along with the development, deepening, and consolidation of democracy in the country: in 1995, the country held local elections for the first time in a half-century, again in 1998, and then every four years since (Choi and Wright, 2004; Tao, 2016; Cho et al., 2010). Since 1995, intergovernmental relations (IGR)[43] in the country have been

[42] Although the original Constitution of South Korea stipulated local autonomy and local election, local autonomy had been long dismissed and suppressed during the protracted period of military rule (1961-1987). It has been only two decades and a half since the country saw the resurgence of local autonomy.

[43] IGR, both a behavioral and an institutional concept, as defined by Krane and Wright (1998: 1168), is, behavioral-wise, "(t)he various combinations of interdependencies and influences among public officials – elected and appointed – in all types and levels of governmental units, with particular emphasis on financial, policy, and political issues." Institutional-wise, the concept emphasizes the division of authority and functions as well as intergovernmental

renewed (at least nominally), and accordingly, some related-institutional features have been also changed.[44] Appendix A provides a short summary of the current political and administrative structures of local government in South Korea and the below table describes a brief history of evolutionary phases of South Korean local autonomy.

functional and fiscal transfers (vertical) among governments. Also, "formal, legal, institutional, and fiscal interjurisdictional arrangements are major features of the institutional approach (Choe et al, 2010: 398).

[44] Here, I refer to institutional changes, by modifying Wright (1987; see also Choi and Wright, 2004: 2), changes in national-provincial-local, provincial-local, national-local, and interlocal relationships; changes in the attitudes and actions of public officials, especially perceptions or images of officials operating in other political jurisdictions; changes in the regularity, consistency, and patterns of interactions among governing officials as they span inter-jurisdictional boundaries; changes in the roles and significance of all public officials, both appointed and elected; and changes in the prominence of policy and political issues with particular attention to financial relationships, including assignment of functional responsibilities, taxing and revenue raising authority, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and policy implementation and evaluation efforts.

Table 5. Evolutionary Phases of Intergovernmental Relations in South Korea

Period	Phase Descriptor	Major Problems	National Goal	IGR Mechanisms	IGR Reform Theme(s)
(I) 1948-1961	• Constitutional Basis for Autonomy Aspirations	• Ideological confrontations • Civic chaos (war) • Governmental instability	• Stable government(s) • Effective governance	• Constitutional provisions • Local Autonomy Act • Delayed Autonomy	• Political decentralization • Administrative autonomy
(II) 1961-1987	• Military-Based Central Control	• Military authoritarianism • Anti-communist consistency • Economic choices • External threats	• Political Stability • Ideological conformity • Administrative efficiency • Economic growth	• Executive decrees • Negated local discretion • Central appointment of local officials	• Political and administrative centralization
(III) 1987-1991	• Anticipated Autonomy	• Rising civic awareness/ participation • Increased local/ regional consciousness	• Enhanced prosperity • Electoral experimentation • Democratic debate(s) and dissent	• Commission(s) on local autonomy • Tentative actions on autonomy	• Proposed local election(s)
(IV) 1991-1995	• Electoral (limited) Autonomy	• Political cleavages • Anti-corruption issues • Civilian governance	• Political reform(s) • Administrative reform(s) • Economic equity • Globalization	• Local election(s) (a) legislators (b) executives • Functional devolution	• Administrative decentralization/ discretion
(V) 1995-present	• Expanding Autonomy:	• Economic crisis (IMF) • Globalization-economic vulnerability • NGO's influence	• Sunshine policy (northward) • Economic stability • Administrative efficiency • Quality of life	• Expanded political authority • Greater administrative discretion • Local fiscal resources	• Political decentralization • Enhanced civic participation

Source: Choi and Wright (2004: 3)

However, some scholars (e.g. Choi and Wright, 2004: 3) argue that "the short experience of autonomous administration by local governments in South Korea has not produced a significant degree of decentralization or substantial local autonomy," especially due to local governments' lack of operational autonomy.[45] That is, "a large portion of resources and power still remains" with

[45] See also Tao (2016) and Cho et al. (2010). In a comparative perspective, it seems that only a small portion of power, responsibility, and resources has been devolved to local governments in South Korea. According to Cho and his

the national government and thus supervision by the national government over local government still exhibits on the characteristics of national guardianship, making the nature of national-local relations still "tightly-coupled" (Choi and Wright, 2004: 8-9). Not only the imbalance in distribution of power, policy responsibility, and resources between national and local governments, but scholars also address fiscal unbalance, both vertical and horizontal,[46] and "weak self-governing competency of local governments" (Cho et al., 2010) as pressing issues that affect the quality of local autonomy. Thus, those scholars argue that local autonomy in the country is "still in the fledgling stage" (Cho et al., 2010).

Leaving aside the quality of the South Korean local autonomy for a moment, one prominent trend related to decentralization and local autonomy that has emerged in the country is city-county consolidation as a means to address region-wide problems.[47] Such a trend is worrisome since, as

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colleagues (2010: 381), "(a)mong the total of all governmental functions, roughly one-fourth belong to local government," which is relatively low when compared with countries like "Japan (34%), France (40%), and the United States (50%)."

[46] Especially with regard to the issue of horizontal fiscal unbalance, Kim (2002), for example, reveals that there is a great variation in the fiscal independence ratio (ratio of own-source revenues to total revenues) of local governments in the country: the ratios that fiscally affluent Seoul and six other cities exhibit are more than 60% whereas the provincial and local fiscal independence ratios (excluding the seven cities) are approximately 35% and 21% respectively. In other words, "there is wide disparity in the fiscal capacities among various local governments" (Choi and Wright, 2004).

[47] An interesting fact is that city-county consolidations in the country are heavily centered on a particular period. During the period from 1995 to 2012, forty-four consolidated local governments were established by merging forty-four cities and forty-four counties: thirty-nine created in 1995; one in 1998; two in 2005; one in 2010 and one in 2012) (see Appendix B for the full list of the newly created cities during this period). In the same period, there were also nine failed consolidation attempts because of the opposition of residents.

reviewed in the previous chapter, consolidation is a more difficult intergovernmental coordination option and South Korea is no exception. This is all the more dismaying since empirical findings on the South Korean case of city-county consolidation are not supportive of the current mainstream approach to promoting regional governance.[48] Then, a question arises. Why, among many available regional governance options, do South Korean local governments choose to consolidate over other options although the empirical evidence suggests otherwise?

Some scholars suspect that, while local governments in the United States have consolidated with the aim of enhancing efficiency (Miller, 2002; Rusk, 1993), the South Korean national government had a different motivation when it coerced many cities and counties to consolidate: to control local governments more efficiently in an implicit manner (J. Hong, 2005; J. Park, 2013). In the meanwhile, one noteworthy scholar's empirical findings point out to politicians at the national level (i.e. Members of the National Assembly) wanting to maximize their self-interest (as consolidation would give them greater territorial power as well as weaken and/or reduce the number of their potential contestants, which are highly likely incumbent mayors) as the prime proponent of city-county consolidation (J. Yoo, 2015). He also makes a regretful comment that, although other policy options (such as special purpose district, association of local governments, and outsourcing) are technically available, the so-called "larger is better" belief persists not only

[48] For instance, B. Min (2013) finds that South Korea's city-county consolidation has thus far failed to deliver improvement in technical efficiency, improvement in fiscal management, or narrowing regional (urban vs rural) disparities. J. Park (2010)'s analysis results also testify that city-county consolidation is associated with an increase in the level of debt burden of local government, which is consistent with many non-Korean case studies that consolidated governments are likely to result in higher debt burdens (e.g. Blomquist and Parks, 1996; Rosentraub, 2000; Savitch and Vogel, 2004). On the contrary, the South Korean case study findings also suggest that the effect of economies of scale incurred by consolidation is dubious or mixed at best (J. Yi and S. Cho, 2000; J. Yoo and H. Son, 2009).

among the public but also experts to the extent that they think consolidation is the only successful option (J. Yoo, 2010; 2015).

In spite of the fact that the most prominent regional governance option exercised in South Korea is city-county consolidation, although in a limited scope, other options too are used. Besides city-county consolidation, there are three policy options that have been used by local governments since the country's Local Autonomy Act provides formal grounds for the development of those policies as desirable means of regional governance: they are entrustment of affairs, local government association, and administrative consultative council. Appendix C offers articles, sections, and subsections that are relevant to the three types of regional governance in terms of their legal, organizational, and procedural aspects.

As stipulated by the Local Autonomy Act, entrustment of affairs refers to the act of a local government or the head thereof entrusting part of its administrative and/or policy affairs within its competence to any other local government or the head thereof to manage such part of affairs. Therefore, it can be loosely defined as a type of interlocal service contract (or agreement) (see Table 1 and Table 2). To the best of my knowledge, as of the time of writing, since 1995, fifty-five cases of entrustment of affairs have taken place (heavily centered in 2000 with twenty-one cases) in a number of policy domains including water and sewage services, waste management, road construction, education, and for-profit public enterprise management. According to I. Kang (2007), this type of regional governance has not grown in popularity due to three reasons: first, the Local Autonomy Act does not explicitly state the role of local councils in reaching entrustment agreements between local governments, and such a lack of institutional arrangements results in an accountability issue that makes local governments (especially managerial bodies) reluctant to enter into agreements; second, since the Act is too vaguely defined to allow such agreements, local

government officials who tend to be the so-called "buck-passers" prefer better-articulated regional governance choices; and last, the national government, which still exercises considerable power and influence over local governments, does not provide strong incentives to local governments to engage in this type of policy project.

A local government association, as defined by the Local Autonomy Act, is a juristic person established for joint performance of one or more administrative and/or policy affairs by two or more local governments. Therefore, this type of regional governance is a South Korean equivalent of regional special districts and authorities (see Table 1 and Table 2). As of the time of writing, there exist six local government associations (of which two are Free Economic Zones (FEZs) with the primary purpose of economic development, other three are related to transportation infrastructure-building and operation, and the remaining one is to promote informatization of local governments). According to I. Kang (2007), this type of regional governance also suffers from the lack of legal clarity and, as the national government officials exploits this issue to their advantage, operational bases of local government associations tend to be problematic in terms of accountability (as they are predominantly represented by national-level career officials and experts) and governance (as their autonomy is usually restricted by Minister of the Interior and Safety) issues.

Administrative consultative council is also a manifestation of local governments' joint performance of part of any administrative and/or policy affairs involving two or more local governments. Legally, the only difference between local government association and administrative consultative council is that, while the former has to be a juristic person, the latter does not necessarily have to be. Definitionally, this type of regional governance is a South Korean equivalent of regional council or COG (see Table 1 and Table 2). As of the time of writing, there

are 89 administrative consultative councils covering fifty-three regions of South Korea. Once again, as with the above-mentioned two types of regional governance, administrative consultative councils also suffer from the lack of institutional arrangements and legal clarity (I. Kang, 2007). Nonetheless, given its "malleable" nature, administrative consultative councils prevail as the dominant type of regional governance and, as shall be explained in the last section of this chapter, this type of regional governance is the most prominent candidate for the South Korean RIGO equivalent that merits further analysis. Therefore, administrative consultative councils shall be reviewed further in detail in the last section.

3.2 Extant Literature on Regional Governance in South Korea

Paralleling the two and a half decades-long proliferation of city-county consolidation in South Korea, studies on consolidation have flourished. My extensive academic and government database search of the South Korean literature[49] yields that there are 205 articles published on city-

[49] In search for academic and professional publications on regional governance in South Korea (keywords including regional governance, city-county consolidation, intergovernmental relations, local governments and autonomy, decentralization, interlocal agreement, interlocal contract, intergovernmental cooperation as well as coordination and collaboration, and regional council and council of governments) I used the following databases: Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com), Naver Academic (https://academic.naver.com), DBPIA (http://www.dbpia.co.kr), and RISS (http://www.riss.kr/index.do).

county consolidation: of which twenty-seven have appeared in peer-reviewed journals[50] and the rest in academic journals; the first article ever published on this policy issue dates back to 1994; and six-seven articles have been published in public administration-related journals while twenty-two in policy-related journals and nineteen in geography journals. Surprisingly, only five articles on city-county consolidation have been published in Economics-related journals. There are 102 masters theses and forty-five doctoral theses on city-county consolidation, of which fifty-three belong to the academic domain of public administration and nine to urban affairs. Concerning expert reports, 127 publications are available to the public via government websites.

On the contrary, perhaps demonstrating the lack of both academic and professional attention paid to other regional governance choices, my database search of the South Korean literature yields that there are only four academic (including peer-reviewed) articles published on entrustment of administrative and/or policy affairs[51]; a mere fourteen articles, zero thesis, and five professional/expert reports on local government association; and seven articles, nine theses, and two professional/expert reports on administrative consultative council (i.e. council of governments). As the primary focus of the literature review is to identify and examine studies on

[50] They include some of the top-tier KCI-indexed, peer-reviewed journals in public administration and urban affairs such as Korean Public Administration Review, Korean Policy Studies Review, and Journal of the Korean Urban Management Association.

[51] As opposed to the scant research on contracting-out between local governments, there are a plenty of studies investigating government, both national and local, contracting-out to the private sector, numbered as many as 204 academic journal articles, 339 master and doctoral theses, and 829 professional and expert reports.

council of governments in South Korea, I provide the details of the existing studies on councils of governments only, which can be summarized as the table below.[52]

Table 6. Studies on Administrative Consultative Council (Council of Governments) in South Korea by Type and Year

	1984	1987	1995	1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2005	2007	2008	2009	Subtotal
Explorative / descriptive	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	16
Correlational / experimental										1	1		2
												Total:	18

As above, studies on administrative consultative councils are a rarity in South Korea. Even more scant are correlations / experimental studies providing methodologically robust evidence related to the actual practices and the real (as well as potential) impact of administrative consultative councils although there is a call for further empirically driven research given the existence of a large number of them (as mentioned above, at least 220 as of the time of writing) that we know very little about. In sum, the South Korean regional governance scholarship has been faced with more or less the same issues as the United States regional scholarship has with regard to research into cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (primarily councils of governments): there exist only a small number of studies investigating cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (especially from a wider geographic scope) and they are now at

[52] I classify the studies on administrative consultative council into two types: explorative / descriptive and correlational / experimental. Explorative /descriptive studies refer to studies that do not involve any manipulation, hypothesis test, and measurement whereas correlational studies involve measurement and hypothesis test but no manipulation. Experimental studies involve manipulation, hypothesis test, and measurement. See Denzin (2017) and Huron (2013) for more.

least ten years old; the absolute majority of previous studies of administrative consultative councils are explorative / descriptive, heavily case-study-driven, and narrow in terms of geographic scope; and therefore the extant regional governance studies especially on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (with a particular focus on the three regional governance options as stipulated by the Local Autonomy Act) lack "underlying conceptual structure and empirical breadth." Therefore, in the below section, I attempt to make a humble academic contribution by testing the exportability of the RIGO framework to the South Korean case to clarify some conceptual issues and also provide some empirical breadth to the existing (rather shallow) depth.

3.3 Testing Exportability of the RIGO Framework: Using the South Korean Case

To test the exportability of the RIGO framework beyond the United States boundaries, I use the South Korean case.[53] In so doing, I rely on Miller and his colleagues' (2019) framework of "what is means to be a RIGO" (15). As demonstrated earlier, their framework is useful as it not

[53] According to Peters (2013: 39), most comparative research involves "purposeful, rather than random, selection of the cases," and in selecting the case of this study, I apply the strategy identified by Przeworski and Teune (1970, as quoted in Peters, 2013: 40), which is the most different systems design, since this study is more "variable-based research" aimed at testing whether the RIGO concept can "survive being transported across a range of very different countries" (Peters, 2013: 43). Among the many differences between the United States and South Korea are, unlike the United States, the Korean peninsula has been ruled by a strong central government for centuries, and the South Korean governance system remains largely bureaucracy-centric, "hierarchical" (Kim and Han, 2015: 703), and top-down in decision-making (see also Appendix A for a better understanding of the current political and administrative structures of local government in South Korea).

only provides conceptual definitions but also provides detailed accounts of how they can be operationalized for research purposes. As to collecting data, I use various data sources to obtain information on administrative consultative councils.[54]

Although I do not rule out the potential and possibility of other public, private, and nonprofit organizations' participation in cross-boundary multi-lateral collaboration, I use the term membership exclusively for local governments' membership of a RIGO as I take a government-centric approach like Miller and his colleagues do. I refer to multi-agenda as a set of organizational objectives, or agendas, that a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization like a RIGO strives to achieve. Those organizational objectives can be also translated as policy goals as RIGOs, regardless of their original mandate, engage in a great number of policy areas and deliver public services that cover wide policy domains. Miller and his colleagues' (2019) modification of Bryan and Wolf's (2010) identification of voluntary regional councils' programs suggests that there are broadly eight key policy areas that RIGOs engage in: economic and workforce development; social services; community development, housing, and public infrastructure financing; environmental management planning; transportation planning and coordination; growth management; regional public safety; and regional service provision and constituent services. I identify all types of policy and program areas that South Korean cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are engaged

[54] Databases I use for the purpose of data collection include databases of National Association of Mayors (http://www.namk.or.kr), Governors Association of Korea (https://www.gaok.or.kr), the Korean Statistical Information Service (https://kosis.kr), the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (e.g. https://www.mois.go.kr/frt/bbs/type001/commonSelectBoardList.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000013; https://www.mois.go.kr/frt/sub/a05/statistics/screen.do), and the National Archives of Korea (http://www.archives.go.kr).

in and sort them into eight categories in accordance with Miller and his colleagues' (2019) classification of policy and program areas (see the below table for operational details).

Table 7. Policy and Program Areas that Constitute Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations' Activities – Comparison between the United States and South Korea

	Policy Areas	USA	South Korea
1	Economic and Workforce Development	• Serving as (or staffing) an Economic Development (EDD) and/or Workforce Investment Board (WIB) • Engaged in coordinating tourism development; • Coordinating broadband capacity in the region	• Fostering of and support for the local economy • Fostering of and support for local industries • Development and fostering of specialized regional industries • Support for production and distribution of agricultural, forestry, livestock and marine products • Promotion of tourism • Coordination of demand and supply of agricultural, forestry, livestock and marine products
2	Social Services	• Serving as (or staffing) an Area Agency on Aging (AAA) • Operating headstart, Community Action Programs (CAP), drug and alcohol rehabilitation and/or other forms of social welfare programs	• Affairs concerning the promotion of welfare of residents • Affairs concerning the promotion of education
3	Community Development, Housing, and Public	• Working with Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds and/or a variety of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	• Promotion of local culture and art • Joint installation of public facilities • Matters concerning the connection of tourist destinations • Matters concerning the connection of local festivals
4	Environmental Manage Planning	• Planning, coordinating and/or implementing, one or more regional efforts to address water, sewer, storm water treatment; solid waste and/or recycling; air quality and/or energy	• Environmental management • Activities for protection of nature • Management of rivers and small rivers • Management of water qaulity • Installation and management of waterworks and sewerages
5	Transportation Planning and Coodination	• Serving as (or staffing) a Rural Transportation Planning organization (RTPO) • Serving as a rural transit coordinator or provider • Serving as (or staffing) a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) • Serving as an urban transit coordinator or provider	• Installation, repair and maintenance of roads • Coordinating public transportations • Installation and management of facilities for traffic convenience such as parking lots, traffic signs, etc
6	Growth Management	• Addressing and/or reviewing growth management needs, regional land use properties • Addressing regional parks, open space, greenspace, or other unique physical characteristics of the region (desert, coastline, wetland, mountains)	• Wide-area planning and the implementation thereof • Projects for local development • Execution of urban planning projects • Assistance to electric power plants - neighboring areas
7	Regional Public Safety	• Police/fire training • Planning for or operating 911 call centers • Planning for or coordinating emergency management • Addressing hazard mitigation • Operating regional detention facilities	• Establishment and execution of countermeasures against disasters • Protecting citizens' health and environment
8	Regional Service Provision/Constituent Services	• Providing any of the above activities as a service to constituent local governments in support of the internal governing needs of that particular jurisdiction • Virtually all RIGOs, to the degree they are membership organizations, meet this criterion	• Exchange of administrative information • Coordination of administrative and financial affairs • Promoting the mutual exchange and cooperation, and deliberating on the mutual issues

According to Miller and his colleagues' criterion of multi-agenda, a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization must be engaged in at least three of the above eight key policy areas in order to qualify as a RIGO. Miller and his colleagues (2019: 20) understand legitimacy is something that resides in the eyes of the higher levels of government (i.e. state / provincial and

federal / national government and their agencies), and thus is "more top-down than bottom-up" and there is a strong sense of verticality pertaining to intergovernmental relations in their definition of legitimacy. I employ the term ambition from Miller and his colleagues (2019) without any additional nuance. Ambition, which is a property that concerns the horizontal dimension of intergovernmental relations, refers to a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization's ambition to be the voice for regional interests rather than just each individual member's interests. Measuring this concept enables us to better understand what a RIGO's "regional orientation and commitment to regional interest" (Miller et al., 2019: 23) are that are bigger than just its members' individual or aggregated interests. Last, I borrow the term scale from Miller and his colleagues (2019: 23) to identify a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization's extent to which it scales "to represent the largest territory in which a set of local governments address common policy problems." A cross-boundary intergovernmental organization that represents the largest territory within its region qualifies as a RIGO.

In South Korea, there are 226 local governments. Of those 226 local governments, there are 192 local governments that are members of some form of administrative consultative councils (see Appendix D for the list of local governments that are members of administrative consultative councils). On average, each local government is a member of 3.61 administrative consultative councils. As to the number of administrative consultative councils, there are eighty-nine in total, whether operant or dormant. Of those eighty-nine administrative councils, there are seventeen IGOs that do not qualify as a RIGO and forty-four perfunctory cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that do not qualify either as an IGO or a RIGO. The remaining twenty-eight qualify as RIGOs (see Appendix E for the list of administrative councils that are RIGOs, IGOs, and neither of them). The below is a graphic representation of the South Korean territory in terms of areas that

are covered by RIGOs (in blue), IGOs (in orange), and administrative consultative councils that are neither of them (in grey) or that are not covered at all (also in grey).



Figure 3. Area Coverage of Administrative Consultative Councils in South Korea

In below, I discuss some general characteristics of the twenty-eight RIGOs of South Korea in detail. First of all, the grand total population the twenty-eight RIGOs serve adds up to 36,476,974 (2019). That Figure suggests that, as of 2019, at least 70% of South Koreans live within a RIGO. In term of the size of the South Korean RIGOs, the largest RIGO in terms of the aggregate population of its constituent local governments is Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council whereas the smallest is Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative Council. As to the age of the South Korean RIGOs, the oldest is Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council (founded in 1981) whereas the most recently established RIGO is Central and West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council (established in 2017). In average, 7.4

local governments are a member of a RIGO in the country. With regard to policy and program areas that the South Korean RIGOs are engaged in, twenty-three RIGOs provide services related to economic and workforce development; twenty-three engaged in community development, housing, and public infrastructure financing; twelve in environmental management and planning; twelve in transportation planning and coordination; twelve in growth management; three in regional public safety; and twenty-three in regional service provision and constituent services. It is noteworthy that there is no RIGO in the country providing social services. Table 8 illustrates the distribution of the South Korean RIGOs by population size and region (i.e. province) and Table 9 shows the populations of them in terms of the minimum (the smallest RIGO), the maximum (the largest RIGO), and the average by region. As oppose to the case of the United States,[55] the formal names of the South Korean RIGOs, without an exception, bear "Administrative Consultative Council."

Other indicators that inform of some other characteristic of the South Korean RIGOs are, as summarized in Table 10, the average number of local governments participating as a member of a RIGO and the number of policy and programs that an average RIGO is engaged in. The regional breakdown of the average number of local governments and the number of activity (that Miller and his colleagues refer to as "Activity Index") into some regional factors that might have impact on the South Korean RIGOs. The average numbers of local governments are high in the Seoul metropolitan area and the province of Gyeongsangnam. Although there is insufficient evidence to understand the exact roles of population density and the degree to which areas are developed (e.g. whether they are industrialized or infrastructure-wise advanced or transportation-

[55] As identified by Miller and his colleagues (2019: 94-95), although most frequently used are "Council" and "Association," there are at least thirty different naming conventions of RIGOs in the United States.

wise well-connected), various government statistics show that the Seoul metropolitan area and Gyeongsangnam are the two most densely-populated and developed regions of South Korea. As to the activity index, there is not a significant variation in the number of activities that the South Korean RIGOs are engaged in.

Table 8. Distribution of RIGOs by Population Size and Section of South Korea

RIGO population size		South Korea	Province of South Korea							
			Seoul / Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chungcheongnam	Chungcheongbuk	Jeollanam	Jeollabuk	Gyeongsangnam	Gyeongsangbuk
Extra large (1,000,000 +)	N	8	5				1		2	
	Pop	24,074,739	19,685,221				1,861,234		2,528,284	
Large (500,000 - 1,000,000)	N	13	1		3	1	4			3
	Pop	10,374,180	950,550		2,519,856	896,447	2,810,855			2,596,722
Medium (250,000-500,000)	N	4			1	1	1			1
	Pop	1,545,400			599,750	384,370	355,138			402,880
Small (under 250,000)	N	3		1	1			2		
	Pop	482,655		187,631	403,012			295,024		
Grand total	N	28	6	1	5	2	6	2	2	4
	Pop	36,476,974	20,635,771	187,631	3,522,618	1,280,817	5,027,227	295,024	2,528,284	2,999,602

Table 9. RIGOs by Province and Population Size

Province and number of RIGOs		Population			
		Total	Mininum	Maximum	Average
Seoul/Gyeonggi	6	20,635,771	950,550	5,526,262	3,439,295
Gangwon	1	187,631	187,631	187,631	187,631
Chungcheongnam	5	3,522,618	403,012	952,918	704,524
Chungcheongbuk	2	1,280,817	384,370	896,447	640,409
Jeollanam	6	5,027,227	355,138	1,861,234	837,871
Jeollabuk	2	295,024	73,367	221,657	147,512
Gyeongsangnam	2	2,528,284	1,204,895	1,323,389	1,264,142
Gyeongsangbuk	4	2,999,602	402,880	960,055	749,901
Grand total	28	36,476,974	73,367	5,526,262	1,302,749

Table 10. RIGO Average Local Government Size and Activity Index by Province

Province and number of RIGOs		Indicators	
		N of local governments	Activity index
Seoul/Gyeonggi	6	8.7	3.8
Gangwon	1	4	3
Chungcheongnam	5	4.4	3.4
Chungcheongbuk	2	6.5	3.5
Jeollanam	6	8	4.7
Jeollabuk	2	3.0	3.0
Gyeongsangnam	2	12	5
Gyeongsangbuk	4	7	3
Grand total	28	7.4	4

Although another index that Miller and his colleagues (2019) use, which is the Regional Power Diffusion Index (RPDI),[56] would be helpful also in the South Korean context to better understand RIGOs there, a Korean version of it is not attainable for now due to that, given the South Korean local governments' very high reliance on the national government especially regarding financial affairs,[57] there is not a guarantee that the South Korean local governments' revenue-generating or expenditure activities are largely insulated from the influence of the national government.

Furthermore, as historical context, RIGO formation is rather a new phenomenon in South Korea. As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 1 subsection 2), while there were a few important historical impulses that have shaped RIGOs of the United States, there does not seem to be a historically influential incident in the South Korean case besides the 1995 local elections. In this

[56] The RPDI "measures the diffusion of local government activity between those institutions within the boundary of the RIGO" and is "a way to assess the jurisdictional environment within which the RIGO operates as it can affect how the RIGO can interact with those local government" (Miller et al., 2019: 96). For example, a "high number indicates that that environment is made up of multiple actors that make regional discussions and deliberations complex by virtue of the number of players. A small number indicates fewer actors or a small number of large players. As such, with fewer players those deliberations and discussions might be easier to foster" (Miller et al., 2019: 96). Statistically, the RPDI is "the square root of the percentage of contribution of each government" to the region, whether that contribution be revenue or expenditure (Miller et al., 2019).

[57] As scholars address, the South Korean national government has had excessive power or authority over the local government's taxing and spending. The national government's control of local taxes is "exceedingly tight, while local discretion to shape spending priorities is slight" (C. Park, 2006: 13). Also, the local government is "limited in its ability to increase local revenues through borrowing" (C. Park, 2006: 13-14). Moreover, the national government "can enforce the local government's fiscal responsibility" through "a multitude of rules and regulations" (C. Park, 2006: 14). See also Cho et al. (2010) on the ongoing controversy over the South Korean fiscal decentralization.

context, the 1995 surge in the number of RIGOs is understandable and further historical analysis is needed to clarify what has influenced the recent (2015) surge. Beside the two mentioned cases, it can be said that the number of RIGOs has increased in a steady manner. Table 11 below shows percent of RIGOs formed by year and cumulatively in South Korea.

Table 11. Percent of RIGOs Formed by Year and Cumulatively

	1981	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2010	2011	2012	2014	2015	2017
Percent formed	3.6%	3.6%	14.3%	7.1%	3.6%	3.6%	7.1%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	7.1%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	7.1%	10.7%	3.6%
Cumulative % formed	3.6%	7.1%	25.0%	28.6%	32.1%	35.7%	42.9%	46.4%	50.0%	57.1%	60.7%	67.9%	71.4%	75.0%	78.6%	85.7%	96.4%	100%

This section of the chapter has laid out the first broad effort to understand a particular form of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in South Korea and examine whether that form, like in the United States case, can be labeled as RIGOs. Also, this section is, to the best of my knowledge, the first ever attempt to test the exportability of the RIGO framework beyond the United States boundaries. One contribution of the data collection and descriptive analysis as summarized in this section is that, by demonstrating that there exist at least twenty-eight RIGOs in South Korea, I suggest that the RIGO framework has rich potential for comparing cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in a cross-national manner.

4.0 Research Design, Methods and Data

In this chapter, I present research questions, hypotheses, and research design of this dissertation study in the first two sections. In the last section of this chapter, I present a set of Q statements used for the areas of inquiry of this study. As repeatedly stated, the purpose of this dissertation research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this end, I employ Q methodology to investigate those officials' patterns of attitudes toward RIGOs through which multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments is implemented, enforced, and promoted. In the first section of this chapter, I develop research questions and also propose hypotheses corresponding to the research questions. In the second section, I describe research design of this study especially in terms of the procedural and analytical aspects of Q methodology. Finally, I present the selection process of Q statements and also discuss Q statements selected for the inquiry of this dissertation study.

4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

As Smith (2001) argues, Q methodology, which is a semi-qualitative methodology, resorts to abductive reasoning, and hence does not follow the common quantitative research (i.e. R methodology) framework of 1) proposing a theory, 2) deriving hypotheses (in a deductive manner), and then 3) testing them with group averages. In other words, Q study seeks to make discoveries

rather than making predictions.[58] Since Q methodology is primarily concerned with generating meaningful typologies, it reveals qualitative segments (as opposed to quantitative) that exist in a population by doing so. As generating a meaningful perceptual framework is the priority in this study and since the methodology differs significantly from R methodology (e.g. content analysis, experiment, survey, and so forth), I do not present a typical R methodology-style set of hypotheses in this study. Therefore, I have no proposition other than the below research questions and hypotheses with regard to how RIGOs in South Korea are construed by relevant inside experts. Research questions of this study are concerned with the perception (or attitude) of South Korean local government officials toward RIGOs. As such, the first research question I address and the first hypothesis I propose are as follow:

Research Question 1: Do South Korean local government officials share the same pattern of perception (or attitude) toward RIGOs?

H_1: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate a single pattern of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs.

[58] This strategic choice is inevitable, because of the lack of existing empirical evidence (especially in a format usable for a quantitative research) available in the field of regionalism studies. Therefore, it is a challenge to frame this research in a traditional R methodology format in which there is a hypothesized causal loop explaining the behavior of a system by illustrating a collection of variables and nodes connecting them. For instance, to the best of my knowledge, there is not a single study examining the performance of RIGOs, which can be operationalized as a major variable for quantitative research.

As it is most likely that there would be diverse patterns of thoughts and attitudes among South Korean local government officials about RIGOs, it is equally likely that H_1 be rejected. Such a likelihood of the first hypothesis rejection leads to the question of what factors potentially exist that have impact on those South Korean local government officials' different patterns of perception and attitude toward RIGOs. The findings emerged from the case study of RIGOs in South Korea (as summarized in 3.3) suggest that there are significant variations in organizational characteristics among the South Korean RIGOs in terms of variations in population size (minimum = 73,367; maximum = 5,526,262), regional dispersion, number of member local governments, and year of the foundation. However, there is not a significant variation in a set of policy and programs that the South Korean RIGOs are engaged in (minimum = 3.0; maximum = 5.0) especially vis-à-vis the United States RIGOs (minimum = 3.0; maximum = 7.0).[59] Therefore, I hypothesize that South Korean local government officials demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent upon the above-mentioned variations. To be more specific, I address and propose the below sets of research questions and hypotheses that account for the above-mentioned variations.

First, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO officials that are subjected to the variation in RIGO population size because of the following three reasons. First, ceteris paribus, the greater the population living within a RIGO, the more likely a RIGO would be involved in managing tasks that are either more diverse or more complex or both. Second, evidence from a large body of the management literature (especially the decision-making and goal-setting research literature) informs us that the degree to which tasks are complex has

[59] See Miller et al. (2019: 97) for a detailed account of the variation in the number of policy and program areas that the United States RIGOs provide.

impact on task-doers' cognitive and motivational processes (Campbell, 1988). Third, as several scholars argue (e.g. Rickabaugh, 2020), population differences have a significant role in determining how regional organization identity is shaped and integration mechanisms are forged. Thus, as to the variation in population size, I address and propose the following research question and hypothesis:

Research Question 2: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the variation in RIGO population size?

H_2: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the variation in RIGO population size.

Second, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO officials that are subjected to the regional variation of RIGOs because of the metropolitan RIGO / rural RIGO divide. Although regional organizations outside of the metropolitan context have been rarely discussed in the urban studies literature and hence some scholars describe regional organizations serving rural local governments as "forgotten" (Hall, 2008), a few studies (e.g. Rickabaugh, 2020) suggest that rural RIGOs may be significantly different from their urban counterparts. For example, the former may emphasize different policies and programs. Therefore, the regional variation of South Korea, which is closely correlated with the rate of urbanization, is likely to have impact on how local governments forge their regional governance strategy. Thus, as

to the regional variation of RIGOs, I address and propose the following research question and hypothesis:

Research Question 3: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the regional variation?

H_3: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the regional variation.

Third, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO officials that are subjected to the number of member local governments because of decision-making costs associated with it. As discussed earlier in the literature review, complexity (and thus decision-making costs) rises when the number of actors increase (Feiock, 2013; Olson, 1965; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). Thus, as to the variation in the number of member local governments that have joined RIGOs, I address and propose the following research question and hypothesis:

Research Question 4: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the number of member local governments?

H_4: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the number of member local governments.

Last, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO officials that are subjected to the historical variation of RIGOs. Many scholars (e.g. Hulst and van Monfort, 2007; Tavares and Feiock, 2018) demonstrate that not only cultural and institutional differences but also historical variations play an important role in how different modes of self-governance are organized and exercised. Thus, as to the historical variation, I address and propose the following research question and hypothesis:

Research Question 5: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the historical variation in terms of year of the foundation?

H_5: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the historical variation in terms of year of the foundation.

In sum, I expect that there is not a single but multiple patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that the South Korean local government officials who work for RIGOs exhibit, and such a multiplicity is attributable to the variation in RIGO population size, region, number of member governments, and history. Furthermore, I expect that an analysis of each pattern's

perspective on RIGOs that involves additional examinations, characterizations, and interpretations of each pattern as well as comparison between different patterns add to our understanding of the cognitive architecture underlying the expert perception of RIGOs in South Korea.

4.2 Research Design

As repeatedly mentioned thus far, I use Q methodology, a methodology of which the main strength is "its affinity to theory" (Kerlinger, 1986: 517), as it "provides a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity" (Brown, 1991; see also Brown, 1980) and "intersubjectivity" (Nederhand et al., 2019: 235). Since the purpose of this study is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for, especially in terms of their patterns of attitude toward RIGOs, I utilize Q methodology first to identify those patterns. Then, I conduct further analysis to better understand the revealed patterns.

There are several steps involved to conducting Q methodology-based analysis. First, to construct the so-called "concourse," I collect statements concerning RIGOs from the extant literature as well as interviews. Second, from the concourse, I extract the Q sample set by selecting the most relevant and representative statements from the concourse. Third, South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to RIGOs are invited to participate in this research. Fourth, I analyze the Q sorting by using Ken-Q Analysis (version 1.0.6), which is a

freely available web-based software specifically designed to conduct Q analysis.[60] Last, the results of Q analysis that reveal the patterns of attitude toward RIGOs are then interpreted, further analyzed, and compared to gain additional insights on how RIGOs are perceived in South Korea. In the following subsections, I provide additional details on each aforementioned step.

4.2.1 Concourse, Q Set, Q Distribution, and Pilot Study

There are two different approaches to applying Q methodology to research activities: intensive individual studies and population studies.[61] In this study, I apply population studies. In simplified terms, the very first step of Q methodology involves researchers to "develop knowledge about the breadth of the debate" (Molenveld, 2020: 5) and "capture the diversity of the debate" (Nederhand et al., 2019: 238; see also Watts and Stenner, 2012) of an issue, which is termed as 'concourse.' A more refined definition of concourse is "a hypothetical concept that conveys the infinite set of possible expressions" that refer to an issue of concern, "from all different points of view" (Zabala and Pascual, 2016: 3). As to establishing the breath of the debate (i.e. concourse), researchers can use interviews, mass media, focus groups, policy reports, and academic discourses (Brown, 1991; Nederhand et al., 2019). In this research, I take the academic discourse as a starting point (see Durning and Osuna, 1994; Nederhand et al., 2019; Klijn et al., 2016). One benefit of this approach is that researchers can relate the empirical findings of their studies to existing

[60] For further details, see https://shawnbanasick.github.io/ken-q-analysis/.

[61] Molenveld (2020: 4) categorizes Q studies into two types, which are intensive individual studies and population studies. The former refers to studies that reveal "how a person thinks about different constructs" whereas the latter refers to studies focusing on "a larger group (i.e. given population)" and on "significant differences between respondents in a sample of the population."

theoretical debates (Nederhand et al., 2019). I first document an extensive list of statements from the extant literature on regionalism (with specific regard to RIGOs) around the five properties identified by Miller and his colleagues (2019) to construct the concourse, and then extract sample statements that are most representative of and relevant to RIGOs (Molenveld, 2020; see also Webler et al., 2001). In so doing, I follow the statement-sampling method used by Dryzek and Berejikian (1993; see also Molenveld, 2020 and Nederhand et al., 2019)[62] and I take precautions to maximize the parsimony of the statements while guaranteeing the diversity of the debate at the same time. Initially, there are seventy-two statements collected and documented that represent the concourse, which are reduced to thirty-six statements that are used as the actual Q-set (a proxy of the concourse) of this study.

The second step of Q study involves researchers to formulate a factorial design.[63] I design the factorial matrix of this research based on the five properties of RIGOs identified by Miller and his colleagues (2019): membership, agenda, legitimacy, ambition, and scale. Each statement is inspired by one of the five properties. Across the vertical axis, the matrix considers two types of statements: retrospective and prospective. Across the horizontal axis, the matrix considers five types of statements corresponding to the five properties of RIGOs. For the purpose of ensuring a balanced sample, I retain at least four statements in each cell especially for the prospective perception of RIGOs. Since the primary purpose of this dissertation study is to examine South Korean RIGO officials' prospective views on improving their organizational practice (e.g.

[62] Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) first create a deductively informed matrix and then cluster inductively gathered statements (see also Molenveld, 2020: 9).

[63] To the best of my knowledge, McKeown and Thomas (1988; 2013) have coined the term 'factorial design' to refer to a list of Q statements clustered by themes.

improvement in technical efficiency and institutional arrangements), I include a relatively smaller number of statements for the retrospective evaluation of RIGOs. The below table is a visual representation of the factorial design reflective of the five properties. To ensure the reliability and the validity of the factorial matrix, I have consulted a number of professionals and scholars, including David Miller who, in collaboration with his colleagues, has proposed the RIGO framework. Especially, David Miller's feedback has been most helpful in making significant adjustments and refinements of the final Q-set of the study. Also, although strictly not a pilot test, a Chinese master's student at University of Pittsburgh majoring in Urban Affairs has conducted Q study on Chinese public officials using the same Q-set as the one used in this study to further validate the reliability and the applicability (see Zhang, 2020).

Table 12. Factorial Design of the Q Study

Evaluative nature	Property				
Retrospective	Membership (0)	Agenda (1)	Legitimacy (0)	Ambition (2)	Scale (1)
Prospective	Membership (10)	Agenda (6)	Legitimacy (8)	Ambition (4)	Scale (4)
Total	10	7	8	6	5

As to the third step, although not absolutely necessary, Q statements are usually sorted into a normal or a quasi-normal distribution of preference (a Q sort), with the assumption that there are fewer statements that are either most agreeable or most disagreeable (Zabala and Pascual, 2016: 3).[64] In this study, I follow the conventional wisdom and use a forced distribution that takes the

[64] On Q distributions, Kerlinger (1986: 516-517) argues that "(t)he normal or quasi-normal distribution has advantages, mainly statistical, that make its use desirable" while Watts and Stenner (2012; see also Molenveld, 2020) advise that, if the respondents are knowledgeable about the issue, then it would be desirable for the researcher(s) to

shape of a quasi-normal distribution. That is, I use a scale from -5 (most disagreeable) to 5 (most agreeable) with the statements' distribution from the far-left column to the far-right having values in the order of 1-2-3-4-5-6-5-4-3-2-1 (see Appendix F for the shape of the response grid).

4.2.2 Participant Selection and Q-Sort

With regard to selecting participants and administering Q-sorts, which is the fourth step of Q study, I first define the unit of analysis. In this study, the unit of analysis is an individual South Korean local government official who works for a RIGO and thus the population of the study consists of all local government officials who work for their respective RIGOs in South Korea.[65] Although there is a general consensus among Q scholars that samples of between twenty-five and forty are sufficient (Brown, 1980; Nederhand et al., 2019; Watts and Stenner, 2012), a total of forty-one South Korean local government officials who work for their respective RIGOs were recruited for participation (the P set of this study). From November 2019 to March 2020, I made phone calls to South Korean local government officials and asked if they would be willing to participate in the study. When they consented to participate in the study, I sent them an online Q-

make the distribution more flat. A flatter distribution allows the respondents to place more statements in the more agreeable / disagreeable columns, reflecting that there are less statements on which the respondents have neutral views.

[65] The reason I selected local government administrators as the participants of this study was because, to best understand South Korea's intergovernmental relations as well as multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration, "the most important variable to consider" is bureaucrats (Im, 2003: 90) since they are de facto power brokers. Therefore, strictly speaking, regarding intergovernmental relations (and multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration) in South Korea, what should be of academic interests are relationships among and perceptions of career officials who govern in their official and unofficial capacities.

sort link.[66] They responded to interviews by answering one demographic question (i.e. job rank)[67] and completing Q-sorting (online) and a brief follow-up interview session (by phone). All interviews were conducted in Korean and confidentiality was assured.

Initially, I aimed for a larger P set with the hope that a non-probability, referral sampling that "involves identifying individuals who meet inclusion criteria, gaining their cooperation, and then asking them to recruit additional respondents with the same conditions" (Hogan et al., 2009; see also Heckathorn, 2002) would be feasible. However, due to a large number of South Korean local government officials' reluctance to participate and inability to understand either the purpose of the study or how to complete the Q sort, the final count of forty-five participants completed the Q sort (of which four perfunctory Q-sorts were discarded). Among the forty-one mid-level and lower-level officials who work for eighteen RIGOs, fourteen officials work for four RIGOs in Seoul; four for one RIGO in Incheon; one for one RIGO in Daejeon; eight for two RIGOs in Gyeonggi; six for five RIGOs in Chungcheongnam; three for three RIGOs in Jeollabuk; two for two RIGOs in Gyeongsangnam; and three for two RIGOs in Gyeongsangbuk. As for the other

[66] I decided to administer this study online given the size of the P set and I used Q Method Software (https://qmethodsoftware.com/) as the online platform for Q sorting.

[67] As Kennedy (2013: 804) notes, "due to the inductive, explorative nature" and typically "small sample size" of Q studies, it is hardly likely that "statistical inferences or projections can be made" from the Q results "to the actual percentages of individuals in the general population with these particular worldviews." Nonetheless, many scholars report their study participants' demographic characteristics to "highlight interesting patterns and suggest the possibility of questions worthy of further study." I attempted to do the same by including approximately ten demographic questions in the questionnaire, but such an attempt only resulted in further discouraging the South Korean local government officials from participating in the study. After a few unsuccessful attempts, I discarded all the demographic questions except job rank.

details of the characteristics of the respondents, the below Table 13 illustrates the makeup of the South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs in terms of job rank and organizational characteristics of RIGOs they work for.

Table 13. Participant Matrix (N = 41)

	N	% of total sample
Job rank		
Upper-level	0	0
Mid-level	37	90.2%
Lower-level	4	9.8%
Region		
Seoul	14	34.1%
Incheon	4	9.8%
Daejeon	1	2.4%
Gyeonggi	8	19.5%
Chungcheongnam	6	14.6%
Jeollabuk	3	7.3%
Gyeongsangnam	2	4.9%
Gyeongsangbuk	3	7.3%
RIGO population size		
Extra large	28	68.3%
Large	11	26.8%
Medium	1	2.4%
Small	1	2.4%
RIGO year of establishment		
1980s	7	17.1%
1990s	12	29.3%
2000s	14	34.1%
2010s	8	19.5%
RIGO number of member governments		
>10	12	29.3%
5~10	25	61.0%
<5	4	9.8%

4.2.3 Data Analysis

As to the final step of Q study, I use Ken-Q Analysis,[68] a web-based computer software, for the data entry and analysis. In Q methodology, an analysis involves factor extraction, rotation, and interpretation (Flurey et al., 2014). As such, I first create a 41 by 41 matrix by correlating the Q-sorts of the research participants. Such a preliminary correlation analysis is, per Q scholars (e.g. Brown, 1980; Schmolck and Atkinson, 2013; Zabala and Pascual, 2016)' suggestions, followed by a factor analysis that I conduct to reduce the data to a few summarizing factors. I conduct principal components analysis (PCA)[69] for factor extraction and varimax rotation for sharpening of the factor structure.[70] I elaborate further in chapter five on how the results of Q analysis that reveal the patterns of attitude toward RIGOs are interpreted and compared.

[68] https://shawnbanasick.github.io/ken-q-analysis/

[69] According to Zabala and Pascual (2016: 3), as opposed to PCA, centroid factor analysis is "a rare form of factor analysis, used exclusively in Q methodology. Also, as Ramlo (2016) notes, "most Q methodologists today use the more "modern" factor analytical choices of PCA."

[70] As opposed to judgmental (or theoretical) rotation, varimax rotation produces a simple structure and thus is accepted as the best rotation technique (Ramlo, 2016; see also Rummel, 1970; Zabala and Pascual, 2016). Also, Ho (2006) elaborates that varimax rotation has gained popularity because of its ability to maximize the separation of factors and provide the clearest and simplest (or as Zabala and Pascula (2016: 5) terms, "mathematically optimal") structure.

4.3 Selection of Q Statements

In this section, I discuss how I extract the Q set used for this study from the concourse. I rely on the extant literature as reviewed in chapter two and three to construct the concourse of this study. In the sample statement selection process, I interview and consult with David Miller, one of the RIGO framework creators, for his advice. The selected thirty-six statements are then assigned to the ten categories as defined in the factorial design (see Table 12).

4.3.1 Membership

As government-centric as Miller and his colleagues are in their understanding of RIGOs, they also appreciate that participation by civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) as well as different tiers of government in RIGOs "represents an important innovation" in regional governance (Miller et al., 2019: 87). In addition, there have always been issues of how decision-making rights of and financial contributions to RIGOs should be distributed between local governments. As such, the following Q statements are selected to reflect the most salient thoughts on the membership property of RIGOs.

15	Our organization should be primarily constituted by general-purpose local governments.
13	The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more accountable it will be.
23	Our organization should give each member the same voting weight when making decisions.
9	The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be.
6	Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions.
36	Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by national / provincial agencies on our board.

30	The more there are other government entities (e.g. national agencies and provincial departments) represented within our organization, the more accountable it will be.
26	Each general-purpose local government member should provide financial support to our organization in relation to their relative population.
22	The more there are other government entities (e.g. national agencies and provincial departments) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be.
28	Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by civic sector organizations on our board.

4.3.2 Agenda

There is an ongoing discussion as to whether RIGOs' policy and program domains should be as broad or narrow as possible. Also, whether RIGOs should pursue a competitive advantage by promoting strategic policy niche management is another issue. The following Q statements reflect the competing views on the policy-broadening/narrowing debate as well as on the necessity of policy niche management.

4	Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas.
19	There are certain policy areas (or policy niches) that only our organization can tackle.
5	The fewer the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be.
27	The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be.
18	Having a broad agenda is better than having a narrow agenda.
33	Our role should be more focused on planning than on delivering programs and services.
24	Our organization should actively address emerging policy issues confronting our region.

4.3.3 Legitimacy

Definition-wise, a RIGO must be seen as "the primary representative of the region's governments and their collective interests" (Miller et al., 2019: 87). However, as to which tiers of government and which types of national agencies / provincial departments matter to RIGOs remains a crucial question. As such, the following Q statements, generated based on Lowi (1964)'s typology of public policy in the United States, concern RIGOs' legitimacy as viewed by different tiers and types of government.

29	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government law enforcement agencies.
17	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government transportation agencies.
25	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government health, education, and welfare agencies.
2	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government budgeting or personnel agencies.
8	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by provincial government law enforcement agencies.
14	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by provincial government transportation agencies.
16	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by provincial government health, education, and welfare agencies.
31	Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by provincial government budgeting or personnel agencies.

4.3.4 Ambition

Ambition is a concept that captures the extent to which RIGOs intend to represent their regions. The below Q statements are reflective of RIGOs' efforts to "identify, articulate, negotiate,

decide, or implement regional solutions to area-wide problems" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 345), including forging partnerships with other local / regional players.

1	Our organization should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, including with our neighboring regions and across provincial lines when appropriate.
12	Our organization should take a leadership role and strive to be a primary player in regional economic development issues.
21	Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services.
32	Our organization has modified our culture over the years to continue serving local governments, yet also broadened our partnerships and relationships with private, nonprofit, philanthropic and academic institutions.
3	Our organization is focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to remain competitive.
34	Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments.

4.3.5 Scale

Scale is a property concerned with whether RIGOs are, or should be, large enough to be representative and to address policy problems common to a set of member local governments. Therefore, this property involves issues of defining regions / clusters of cities and counties. As such, the following Q statements reflects thoughts on the territorial issues of RIGOs.

35	Our organization actively promotes the mission of multi-jurisdictional collaboration among local governments within a clearly defined region.
7	Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our region.
20	If there were fewer members in our organization, we would be better able to perform our function.
10	Our organization should help governments in sub-regions of our region deal with issues unique to those sub-regions.
11	Our organization should review significant regional economic development plans that are proposed for our region.

4.3.6 Summary

As above, for the construction of the Q set of this study, I select the total of thirty-six sample statements with the aim of capturing "the diversity and complexity of the different views contained within the concourse" (Brown et al., 2008: 723): ten prospective "membership" statements; one retrospective and six prospective "agenda" statements; eight prospective "legitimacy" statements; two retrospective and four prospective "ambition" statements; and one retrospective and four prospective "scale" statements are included in the set. By so doing, this research design satisfies the Q methodological requirement that "the sample must include enough statements to fully represent the diversity of the concourse, but must not have so many statements that it cannot be used effectively in the sorts to be administered" (Brown et al., 2008: 723).

5.0 Research Findings

Chapter five contains five sections. The first section reports the analysis results of factor extraction, rotation, and interpretation of this study. In the second section, I present an interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and Nelles' identification of RIGOs and build profiles of the factors (patterns). In section three, I identify statements scored similarly across all factors, which are therefore considered to have reached consensus. Section four evaluates the hypotheses of this research in relation to the factors elicited. In the last section, based on the factor profiles, I evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences among South Korean local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South Korea.

5.1 Analysis and Interpretation

As briefly described in chapter 4, I first correlated the Q-sort of the research participants, creating a 41 by 41 matrix. I then conducted principal component analysis (PCA) to extract factors from the data. I carefully reviewed the unrotated factor matrix and determined how many factors would be retained for rotation. A significant factor loading at .01 level was calculated using the formula $(1/\sqrt{n})*2.58$ or $(1/\sqrt{n})*(-2.58)$, where n is the number of Q statements used in this study. In this study, the total of thirty-six statements were used. Thus, respondents with factor loadings of ± .43 were accepted as having loaded on a factor and they were sorted into a factor group. For factor extraction, I first evaluated factors with an eigenvalue greater than unity. The below Table

15 is a line plot of the eigen values (>1) of the eight unrotated factors (scree plot)[71] and the below Table 14 summarizes the respective eigenvalues and the percent of variance explained by each factor group as well as the cumulative percent explained variance of the eight factors.



Figure 4. Scree Plot

[71] See Appendix G for the full unrotated factor matrix.

Table 14. Summary of the Eight Factors

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
Eigenvalues	11.9116	3.8966	3.7797	3.5837	2.2328	2.1823	1.8146	1.5093
% explained variance	0.29	10	9	9	5	5	4	4
Cumulative % explained variance	0.29	39	48	57	62	67	71	75

I carefully reviewed the eight factors' eigenvalues, percent explain variance, and cumulative percent explained variance. Also, I reviewed another important criterion, which is whether each factor has a reasonable number of participants loaded on them,[72] to make a better-informed judgment on which factors would be retained. After the review process, I decided to retain four factors for varimax rotation. After conducting varimax rotation, I derived a four-factor solution, and the result is reported as below in Table 15, which is a factor matrix (i.e. factor loadings) with defining sorts flagged.[73] The factor loading for each Q-sort is indicative of its correlation with each factor. With the four-factor solution, thirty-six out of forty-one participants loaded on one of the four factors, resulting in five (this is explained further in the next section of this chapter) distinct viewpoints of RIGOs. Table 16 summarizes the factor characteristics.

[72] According to Watts and Stenner (2012), the two conditions that researchers should consider in retaining factors are whether the factors' eigenvalues exceed one and whether two or more Q-sorts load significantly on each factor.

[73] See Appendix H for the correlations between factor scores.

Table 15. Factor Matrix with Defining Sorts Flagged

Part.No.	Q sort	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
1	Par1	-0.1976		-0.0276		0.1165		0.4802	flagged
2	Par2	-0.2796		0.1099		-0.1054		0.6844	flagged
3	Par3	0.0482		0.1229		-0.1513		0.6761	flagged
4	Par4	-0.02		-0.3302		0.2617		0.5176	flagged
5	Par5	-0.0763		-0.3761		-0.0371		0.5712	flagged
6	Par6	0.1397		-0.1542		0.7477	flagged	0.1391	
7	Par7	0.4935		0.1827		0.4128		-0.2608	
8	Par8	0.1113		0.1839		0.4897		-0.5526	flagged
9	Par9	0.1287		0.6276	flagged	0.1901		-0.046	
10	Par10	-0.0227		0.1841		0.0374		0.3396	
11	Par11	-0.02		0.4963	flagged	0.3659		0.0638	
12	Par12	0.181		0.6728	flagged	0.1744		-0.0195	
13	Par13	-0.1343		0.7853	flagged	-0.1402		-0.0388	
14	Par14	-0.0429		-0.2292		-0.3774		-0.0582	
15	Par15	-0.1892		-0.1019		0.4781	flagged	0.1565	
16	Par16	0.051		0.2148		0.4278		-0.6286	flagged
17	Par17	-0.0195		-0.0239		0.7512	flagged	-0.2165	
18	Par18	-0.2784		0.26		-0.562	flagged	-0.1226	
19	Par19	-0.0444		0.5157	flagged	-0.3368		0.009	
20	Par20	0.187		-0.4993		0.6519	flagged	-0.2317	
21	Par21	0.5709		0.6123	flagged	-0.0226		-0.1384	
22	Par22	0.6267	flagged	0.2839		-0.0546		-0.1557	
23	Par23	0.2076		0.2479		-0.0937		0.1236	
24	Par24	0.6766	flagged	-0.0767		0.1583		0.3033	
25	Par25	0.7752	flagged	-0.2528		0.0027		-0.1931	
26	Par26	-0.5064		0.6484	flagged	-0.0271		-0.0524	
27	Par27	-0.7237	flagged	0.0867		0.0297		0.5269	
28	Par28	-0.5791		-0.2682		-0.0787		0.5127	
29	Par29	0.8197	flagged	0.072		-0.0303		-0.1494	

30	Par30	0.76	flagged	-0.1594	-0.0722	0.0621	
31	Par31	0.6852	flagged	0.448	-0.0837	-0.1144	
32	Par32	-0.7214	flagged	-0.124	0.1767	0.4814	
33	Par33	-0.8095	flagged	0.0388	0.1154	0.4516	
34	Par34	-0.7658	flagged	0.05	0.0608	0.4789	
35	Par35	0.8157	flagged	0.1702	-0.0019	-0.2253	
36	Par36	-0.5686	flagged	-0.1421	0.1196	0.5218	
37	Par37	-0.2687		0.0626	0.4668	0.5557	flagged
38	Par38	-0.1126		0.0713	0.1774	0.7204	flagged
39	Par39	0.5344	flagged	0.2265	0.1801	0.1008	
40	Par40	0.7447	flagged	0.1886	0.0772	0.1467	
41	Par41	0.8242	flagged	0.0678	-0.1956	-0.3073	
% explained variance		23		10	9	13	

Table 16. Factor Characteristics

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
No of defninig variables	15	7	5	9
Avg. rel. coef.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Composite reliability	0.984	0.966	0.952	0.973
S.E. of factor Z-scores	0.126	0.184	0.219	0.164

After the completion of factor extraction and factor rotation, I analyzed each factor group to interpret its meaning. In Q methodology, factors are interpreted based on a model Q-sort for each factor that is revealed. The model Q-sort, alternatively termed as factor array, can be constructed by merging the individual participants' significant sort loadings. The degrees to which the individual participants' significant sorts are loaded on factors are indicative of the fact that some Q-sorts are more closely associated with the perspective of the factor than other Q-sorts. Therefore, I first computed factor weights, and then using the factor weights and raw data of

individual participants, I merged individual Q-sorts to produce factor scores. The below Table 17 presents the four model Q-sorts.

Table 17. Factor Scores

Statement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
1	-3	4	2	4
2	0	2	0	3
3	-4	0	3	4
4	5	3	-2	2
5	-1	3	-2	2
6	-1	4	3	-4
7	-1	1	-5	-2
8	0	2	0	-1
9	3	5	-4	-2
10	-1	0	-1	-3
11	-3	0	-4	-1
12	0	1	-3	-2
13	3	2	-1	1
14	1	1	-3	0
15	-2	2	0	1
16	0	1	2	0
17	0	0	-1	-1
18	4	1	4	-2
19	1	0	-2	0
20	-2	-1	1	1
21	-5	-1	2	3
22	1	-1	-2	1
23	0	-2	4	-4
24	-3	-1	0	3
25	2	0	-1	-1
26	-1	-1	0	-3
27	1	-2	5	-5
28	3	3	3	-3
29	2	-3	1	0
30	-2	-2	-1	-1
31	2	-2	1	2
32	4	-4	-3	0
33	-2	-3	1	2

34	-4	-5	0	5
35	1	-4	1	1
36	2	-3	2	0

5.2 Five Factor Groups

In the first four subsections, I report the findings from the abovementioned factor analysis. In so doing, I provide a description of each pattern (or factor group)'s arrangements of the statements in terms of their most agreed (+5) and most disagreed statements (-5) as well as positive and negative distinguishing statements. Distinguishing statements refer to those statements of which the absolute differences between factor z-scores are larger than the standard error (S.E.) of difference for a given pair of factors (significant at $p < .01$) (Vorm and Miller, 2018).

5.2.1 Factor Group One and Factor Group One-: Agenda-Broadening and Agenda-Narrowing

Factor group one (pattern one) is defined by ten participants and factor group one- (pattern one-) by five participants. That is, of the fifteen participants who load significantly on this factor, ten load positively and five load negatively. Therefore, this is a bipolar factor, which can be understood as there being two exact opposite perspectives expressed and hence each have a factor array "that is the mirror-image of the other" (Flurey et al., 2014). Factor group one and one- together explain twenty-nine percent of the study with an eigenvalue of 11.91.

The highest ranked statement of this factor group is "Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas" whereas the lowest ranked statement of this

factor group is “Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services.” The other positive distinguishing statement for factor group one is “Our organization has modified our culture over the years to continue serving local governments, yet also broadened our partnerships and relationships with private, nonprofit, philanthropic and academic institutions.” Other negative distinguishing statements for factor group one are (in ascending order): “Our organization is focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to remain competitive”; “Our organization should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, including with our neighboring regions and across state/provincial lines when appropriate”; and “Our organization should be primarily constituted by general-purpose local governments.”

Individuals positively loading on this factor (factor group one) strongly believe that their respective organizations should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas. However, they do not seem enthusiastic about representing the region or fostering regional collaboration among various actors within the region or providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to remain competitive. Membership-wise, they tend to be less government-centric as they disagree with the statement that their organization should remain primarily local government membership-based. On the other hand, individuals negatively loading on this factor (factor group one-) hold the exact viewpoint: they strongly doubt that their respective organizations should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas but they are willing to be a voice of the region in the broader provincial and national community. Membership-wise, they prefer that their organizations maintain the dominance of local government members. Based on the interpretation of the highest and lowest ranked statements as well as the

distinguishing statements, I label factor group one as “agenda-broadening” and factor group one- as “agenda-narrowing.” The below Figure 5 is a graphic summary of composite Q sort for factor group one (pattern one).



Figure 5. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group One (Pattern One)

5.2.2 Factor Group Two: Membership-Expanding

Factor group two (pattern two) is defined by seven participants and explains ten percent of the study with an eigenvalue of 3.90. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is "The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be," whereas the lowest ranked statement of this factor group is "Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments." The other positive distinguishing statement for factor group two

is: “Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions.” The other negative distinguishing statement for factor group two is “Our organization actively promotes the mission of multi-jurisdictional collaboration among local governments within a clearly defined region.”; and “Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by national and/or provincial agencies on our board.” One of the two second lowest ranked statement is “Our organization has modified our culture over the years to continue serving local governments, yet also broadened our partnerships and relationships with private, nonprofit, philanthropic and academic institutions.” The view emerging is that of an individual who welcomes the recent phenomenon of civic sector organizations increasingly taking significant roles in his/her RIGO, believing that those nonprofits and business interests’ participation would make the organization more effective and efficient. However, these individuals are as reluctant as those loading on factor group one- in terms of their intent to represent their regions. Agenda-wise, they seem moderate as they do not either want to broaden or narrow their policy agenda. Thus, I label factor group two as “membership-expanding.” The below Figure 6 is a graphic summary of composite Q sort for factor group two (pattern two).



Figure 6. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Two (Pattern Two)

5.2.3 Factor Group Three: Equality-Promoting

Factor group three (pattern three) is defined by five participants and explains nine percent of the study with an eigenvalue of 3.78. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is "The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be"; the second highest ranked statement of this factor group, which is also a positive statement ranked higher in factor group three than in other factor arrays, is "Our organization should give each member the same voting weight when making decisions"; and the lowest ranked statement of this

factor group is “Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our region.” The other negative distinguishing statement for factor group three is “The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be.” Individuals loading on this factor group are, membership-wise, egalitarian in decision-making but do not want to expand the membership basis of their organizations; agenda-wise, they believe that the greater the number of policy areas their RIGOs engage in, the more effective they will be; and, scale-wise, they do not prefer a territorial expansion. However, ambition-wise, their viewpoint is not coherent, and it seems as though they are confused. Thus, I label factor group three as “equality-promoting.” The below Figure 7 is a graphic presentation of composite Q sort for factor group three (pattern three).



Figure 7. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Three (Pattern Three)

5.2.4 Factor Group Four: Local Government-Centric

Factor group four (pattern four) is defined by nine participants and explains nine percent of the study with an eigenvalue of 3.58. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is "Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments" and one of the two second highest "Our organization should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, including with our neighboring regions and across state/provincial lines when appropriate," whereas the lowest ranked statement of this factor group is "The more

the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be." Positive statements ranked higher in factor group four than in other factor arrays are (in descending order): "Our organization is focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to remain competitive"; "Our organization should actively address emerging policy issues confronting our region"; and "Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services." Negative statements ranked lower in factor group four than in other factor arrays are (in ascending order): "Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions"; "Each general-purpose local government member should provide financial support to our organization in relation to their relative population"; "Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by civic sector organizations on our board"; and "Having a broad agenda is better than having a narrow agenda." Individuals loading on this factor group are, membership-wise, those who believe that, with respect to each member's financial contribution to the RIGO, even poor jurisdictions should be equally burdened; agenda-wise, they believe that the less the number of policy areas their RIGOs engage in, the better-off they will be; and, ambition-wise, they believe their respective organizations should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, including with their neighboring regions and across provincial lines when appropriate, and that their utmost priority is to serve the interests of their constituent local governments. Thus, I label factor group four as "local government-centric." The below Figure 8 is an illustration of composite Q sort for factor group four (pattern four).



Figure 8. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Four (Pattern Four)

5.2.5 Factor Group Profile Summary

Agenda-broadening local government officials are individuals who rank "Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas" the highest and "Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services" the lowest. In the meanwhile, agenda-narrowing local government officials are individuals who hold the exact opposite perspective (i.e. mirror

image) on RIGOs, and thus rank "Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services" and "Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas" the lowest. In other words, regarding the former's viewpoint on the agenda dimension, they are in favor of broadening their policy and program domains. Concerning their viewpoint on the ambition dimension, they tend to be antagonistic against, or at least reluctant to invest their efforts to collaborate with private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders as well as their political leadership in their regional problem solving including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services. On the contrary, the latter, which are agenda-narrowing local government officials, are enthusiastic about regional collaboration to "identify, articulate, negotiate, decide, or implement regional solutions to area-wide problems" (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 345) but prefer concentrating on a fewer number of policies and programs. With regard to the two factor groups' perspectives on the membership dimension, the former tend to be more inclusive whereas the latter tend to be exclusive. That is, whereas the former are willing to invite non-government actors as their partners, the latter desire to regain predominantly local government-based.

Membership-expanding local government officials are individuals who rank "The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be" the highest and "Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments" the lowest. This implies that, concerning the membership dimension, this group of individuals believe that, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their RIGOs, they would not hesitate non-

governmental actors such as nonprofits and business interests assuming a more important role within their organizations. Therefore, it is natural that, regarding the ambition dimension, they do not consider serving the interests of their member local governments as their utmost priority. On the issue of whether RIGOs should either broaden or narrow the scope and scale of their policy and program services, these individuals do not reveal any defining feature.

Equality-promoting local government officials, or egalitarians, are individuals who rank "The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be" the highest and "Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our region" the lowest. This group of individuals stress the importance of equality in their decision-making process as they rank "Our organization should give each member the same voting weight when making decisions" as the second most agreeable statement. However, on the scale dimension, they do not want their organizations to grow in terms of territorial size and population, and thus it seems as though they would want to deliver more services to a smaller territory and/or a smaller population of citizens.

Finally, local-government-centric local government officials, or perhaps egotists, are individuals who rank "Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments" the highest and "The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be" the lowest. In other words, concerning the ambition dimension, this group of individuals' prime concerns are serving their member local governments, and agenda-wise, they believe that their organizational effectiveness would be enhanced when they reduce the number of policy areas they engage in. Membership-wise, they tend to apply strict policies regarding financial contribution that each member local government is expected to make.

In this subsection, I thus far summarized the profiles of the five factor groups in terms of their relative rankings of statements. However, I have not yet discussed in depth the five factor groups' perspectives on the scale dimension and the legitimacy dimension because, as opposed to the other three dimensions, the five factor groups have more commonalities than differences in their perceptions of how they should deal with territorial issues and legitimacy concerns. In the following section, I discuss major consensuses and disagreements among the five factor groups. In so doing, I also review the five factor groups' viewpoints on the two remaining dimensions. The below Table 18 portrays relative rankings of statements by factor group.

Table 18. Relative Rankings of Statements by Factor Group (Pattern)

	Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening
Highest	Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas
Lowest	Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services
	Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing
Highest	Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services
Lowest	Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas
	Factor group 2: Membership-expanding
Highest	The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be
Lowest	Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments

	Factor group 3: Equality-promoting
Highest	The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be
Lowest	Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our region
	Factor group 4: Local government-centric
Highest	Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments
Lowest	The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be

5.3 Consensus vs. Disagreement among the Five Factor Groups

In this subsection, I report further on the research findings by focusing on statements that either generated consensus or created disagreement in the study sample. I explore what statements the participants agree on (i.e. consensus) and what statements create a large amount of disagreement. Consensus statements are statements of which all participants appreciate the importance, as "indicated by a low Z-score variance" in their arrangements, whereas disagreement statements are statements that are polarized in terms of factor groups' viewpoints, as "indicated by a high Z-score variance" in their arrangements (Vorm and Miller ,2018).

The five statements that the study participants agree on the most are (in descending order): "Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government transportation agencies"; "The more there are other government entities (e.g. national agencies and provincial departments) represented within our organization, the more accountable it will be"; "Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by state/provincial government health, education, and welfare agencies";

"There are certain policy areas (or policy niches) that only our organization can tackle"; and "Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national government health, education, and welfare agencies."[74]

It is noteworthy that four out of the five statements are concerned with RIGOs' relationships with national agencies and provincial governments. Also, three statements out of the top five statements are on legitimacy; and the remaining five "legitimacy" statements are also relatively agreeable statements, as indicated by a relatively moderate Z-score variance. The least agreeable "legitimacy" statement ranks the nineteenth out of the thirty-six statements. Based on the above findings, it can be inferred that local government officials have a shared sentiment of importance regarding vertical (or hierarchical) relations among different tiers of government. In addition, all five "scale" statements are relatively more agreeable statements, as indicated by low to moderate Z-score variances. This may be indicative of an existing consensus among the five factor groups on RIGOs' "legitimacy" and "scale" dimensions.

As to disagreement, the five statements that the study participants disagree the most are (in ascending order): "The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be"; "Our organization's highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments"; "Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services"; "The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be"; and "Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions." Among the five most disagreeable statements, two

[74] The top two statements, which are statement 17 and statement 30, are non-significant at $p > 0.01$.

are “membership” statements; two “ambition” statements; and one “agenda” statements. Extending the observation range to the eighteen most disagreeable statements, which are exactly half of this study’s Q-sample, all but two (one “scale” and the other “legitimacy” statement) are either “membership” or “agenda” or “ambition” statements. Thus, it can be inferred that there exist more diverse views and attitudes toward these three aspects of RIGOs than the other two. The below Table 19 presents consensus versus disagreement among the five factor groups (patterns).

Table 19. Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements Sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement

Statement Number	Dimension	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Z-score variance
17	Legitimacy	0	0	-1	-1	0.048
30	Membership	-2	-2	-1	-1	0.056
16	Legitimacy	0	1	2	0	0.09
19	Agenda	1	0	-2	0	0.11
25	Legitimacy	2	0	-1	-1	0.118
22	Membership	1	-1	-2	1	0.134
10	Scale	-1	0	-1	-3	0.166
8	Legitimacy	0	2	0	-1	0.169
26	Membership	-1	-1	0	-3	0.176
20	Scale	-2	-1	1	1	0.177
2	Legitimacy	0	2	0	3	0.246
31	Legitimacy	2	-2	1	2	0.286
12	Ambition	0	1	-3	-2	0.303
15	Ambition	-2	2	0	1	0.331
11	Scale	-3	0	-4	-1	0.354
33	Agenda	-2	-3	1	2	0.357
29	Legitimacy	2	-3	1	0	0.367
35	Scale	1	-4	1	1	0.429
14	Legitimacy	1	1	-3	0	0.452
36	Membership	2	-3	2	0	0.472
7	Scale	-1	1	-5	-2	0.51
5	Agenda	-1	3	-2	2	0.573
13	Membership	3	2	-1	1	0.646
4	Agenda	5	3	-2	2	1.192
18	Agenda	4	1	4	-2	1.308

28	Membership	3	3	3	-3	1.396
1	Ambition	-3	4	2	4	1.415
24	Agenda	-3	-1	0	3	1.43
23	Membership	0	-2	4	-4	1.565
3	Ambition	-4	0	3	4	1.568
32	Ambition	4	-4	-3	0	1.603
6	Membership	-1	4	3	-4	1.623
27	Agenda	1	-2	5	-5	1.706
21	Ambition	-5	-1	2	3	1.989
34	Ambition	-4	-5	0	5	2.458
9	Membership	3	5	-4	-2	2.593

5.4 RIGO Characteristics and the Five Factor Groups

In this section, whether South Korean local government officials (who work for their respective RIGOs)' perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs are uniform is first examined. The Q analysis results of this study yield five factor groups: Ten participants load on the first factor group; five participants on the second factor group; seven participants on the third factor group; five participants on the fourth factor group; and nine participants on the fifth factor group. This is indicative of the existence of various types of perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs. Thus, I reject the first hypothesis (H_1). That is, South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate diverse patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs. As such, in the following subsections, I further examine whether such a diversity of perceptions is attributable to significant variations in organizational characteristics existent among the South Korean RIGOs.

5.4.1 RIGO Population and the Five Factor Groups

First of all, I examine whether RIGO population differences are related to the different patterns of thoughts and perceptions of South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs. As presented in the below Table 20, the analysis results are suggestive of there being a relationship between RIGO population size variations and different perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs in South Korea. Therefore, H_2, which is "South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the variation in RIGO population size" is accepted.

Table 20. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and RIGO Population Size

RIGO population size	Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening	Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing	Factor group 2: Membership-expanding	Factor group 3: Equality-promoting	Factor group 4: Local govt.-centric	Total
Extra-large	13%	4%	29%	21%	33%	100%
Large	56%	33%	0%	0%	11%	100%
Medium	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Small	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%

Furthermore, the results suggest that participants working for RIGOs serving extra-large population of citizens do not load on factor group one- whereas factor group one and factor group one- are strongly associated with participants working for RIGOs serving smaller populations.

5.4.2 RIGO Location and the Five Factor Groups

Second, I examine whether regional differences in terms of where RIGOs are located have any linkage to perceptual differences of the study participants. The analysis results as presented in the below Table 21 indicate that regional variations create perceptual differences of the study participants. Therefore, as to whether South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the regional variation, H_3 is accepted.

Table 21. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Regional Variation

Region	Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening	Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing	Factor group 2: Membership-expanding	Factor group 3: Equality-promoting	Factor group 4: Local govt.-centric	Total
Seoul	0%	0%	36%	9%	55%	100%
Incheon	0%	0%	0%	75%	25%	100%
Daejeon	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%
Gyeonggi	43%	0%	43%	14%	0%	100%
Chungcheongnam	60%	40%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Jeollabuk	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Gyeongsangnam	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	100%
Gyeongsangbuk	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

Moreover, it is worthy of attention that the study participants who work for metropolitan RIGOs load on factor group two, three, and four only, whereas all participants but one who work for non-metropolitan RIGOs load on factor group one and factor group one- only.

5.4.3 Number of RIGO Member Local Governments and the Five Factor Groups

Third, I examine whether a difference in the number of local governments participating in RIGOs is associated with the five factor groups. The below Table 22 presents the analysis results in support of H_4, which is "South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the number of member local governments."

Table 22. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Number of Member Local Governments

RIGO number of member governments	Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening	Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing	Factor group 2: Membership-expanding	Factor group 3: Equality-promoting	Factor group 4: Local govt.-centric	Total
>10	10%	10%	20%	40%	20%	100%
5~10	27%	14%	23%	5%	32%	100%
<5	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%	100%

Additionally, it is worth to note that, the greater the number of local governments RIGOs have as their members, the more likely it is that the study participants load on factor group two, three, and four.

5.4.4 RIGO History and the Five Factor Groups

Lastly, I examine whether RIGO history has any connection with how RIGOs are perceived by South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs. The below Table 23 is a presentation of the analysis results that support H_5, which is "South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different

patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the historical variation in terms of year of the foundation."

Table 23. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Year of RIGO Establishment

RIGO year of establishment	Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening	Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing	Factor group 2: Membership-expanding	Factor group 3: Equality-promoting	Factor group 4: Local govt.-centric	Total
1980s	50%	0%	33%	0%	17%	100%
1990s	11%	0%	22%	44%	22%	100%
2000s	0%	25%	25%	0%	50%	100%
2010s	63%	25%	0%	0%	13%	100%

In the case of the relationship between the factor groups and RIGO history, it is observed that participants who work for relatively older RIGOs (i.e. RIGOs established in the 1980s) and relatively newer RIGOs (i.e. RIGOs established in the 2010s) load on factor group one (fifty percent and sixty-three percent respectively) whereas those who work for RIGOs founded in the 1990s and the 2000s load on factor group three (forty-four percent) and four (fifty percent) respectively.

5.4.5 Summary of the Relationship between RIGO Characteristics and the Five Factor Groups

As demonstrated in this section, all but the first hypothesis are accepted as the Q-analysis results are in support of the relationship between some important organizational characteristics of RIGOs and the five factor groups. That is, it is evident that RIGOs' organizational characteristics identified in this study are associated with how people who work for RIGOs perceive them.

Furthermore, the results present some interesting trends emerged during analysis. First, many study participants who work for RIGOs that either serve relatively smaller populations or are non-metropolitan or have fewer member local governments or are relatively older or more recently founded load significantly on factor group one. That is, South Korean local government officials working for those RIGOs focus on broadening their policy agendas. However, they are not much interested in providing the leadership and vision necessary for their regions to remain competitive. Second, some study participants who work for RIGOs that serve relatively smaller populations load significantly on factor group one-. This has some potentially interesting implications as agenda-narrowing local government officials who want to concentrate on only a few numbers of policy agendas may feel that way on account of their resource availability and geographical disadvantages. Third, many study participants who work for RIGOs that either serve extra-large populations or are metropolitan or have many member local governments load significantly on factor group two, three, and four. In other words, South Korean local government officials who work for RIGOs serving relatively larger populations do not think of the policy agenda debate (broadening vs. narrowing) as importantly as others do. They consider other dimensions more importantly, and thus issues of whether they should expand their membership bases; or promote equality in decision-making or making financial contribution; or prioritize their core missions of serving the interests of their constituent local governments above and beyond other missions. Last, many study participants who work for RIGOs that are established in the 1990s or the 2000s load significantly on factor group three and four. This implies that some of the older and the newer RIGOs (e.g. those established in the 1990s or in the 2010s) consider the scope and scale of agendas more importantly than other dimensions.

As to how to interpret these findings, I take caution as the nature of the data collected and the method used in this study is less than ideal to make generalized comments on the above-mentioned relationships between variables.[75] I consider the findings reported in this section in particular only as contours of the relationships between variables. However, it should be noted that the purpose of this dissertation study is more exploratory than to make generalizations.

5.5 Three-Dimensional Patterns of Attitudes toward RIGOs' Membership, Agenda, and Ambition

As reported in the previous section (5.3.) summarizing consensus and disagreement among the five factor groups, it is evident that there exists a consensus across all five factor groups on how RIGOs' legitimacy and scale issues are understood whereas there exist moderate to high degrees of disagreement with regard to how agenda, membership, and ambition issues are viewed. Furthermore, additional findings on the relationship between some of RIGO characteristics and the five factor groups inform that there exist significant differences among the study participants in terms of how they load on the five factor groups. Thus, based on the below Table 24 summarizing the findings of the previous four sections of this chapter, I propose a framework (as presented in the below Figure 9) in which the five factor groups are converted into vectors having certain magnitudes and directions (or three-dimensional patterns of attitudes) that are reflective of

[75] Although it would be ideal to conduct statistical analysis of frequencies (e.g. Chi-squared test) to examine whether two categorical variables are associated, like many other Q studies, the number of participants in this study are not large enough to satisfy the general rule that "the expected value for each cell should be great than five" (), and thus, further efforts are needed to confirm the validity of the findings reported in this section.

where the five factor groups' perspectives on the agenda, membership, and ambition dimensions are positioned relative to others in a three-dimensional space. Therefore, the Figure depicts the variations of the five different viewpoints along three intersecting continua and where each viewpoint is situated along each variable. Agenda-broadening officials, agenda-narrowing officials, membership-expanding officials, equality-promoting officials, and local-government-centric officials demonstrate that there exists a significant variation along the three key dimensions of how RIGOs are perceived. Each of the viewpoints reflects there being a different combination of each of the three dimensions of RIGOs. Therefore, with regard to the three key dimensions, at least five different patterns of perceptions and attitudes may emerge among South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs.

Table 24. The Five Factor Group Viewpoints on the Five Dimensions of RIGOs

	Agenda	Membership	Ambition	Scale	Legitimacy
Factor 1: Agenda-broadening	**Broad**	Inclusive (less government-centric)	Humble	Not as important	Important
Factor 1-: Agenda-narrowing	**Narrow**	Exclusive (more government-centric)	Ambitious	Not as important	Important
Factor 2: Membership-expanding	Moderate	**Inclusive (less government-centric)**	Humble	Not as important	Important
Factor 3: Equality-promoting	Broad	**Exclusive (more government-centric)**	Moderate	Important	Important
Factor 4: Local govt.-centric	Narrow	Exclusive (more government-centric)	**Ambitious**	Not as important	Important



Note: A balloon in the back of the "Agenda-narrowing" is "Local government-centric."

Figure 9. Three-Dimensional Patterns of Attitudes towards RIGOs' Membership, Agenda, and Ambition

6.0 Conclusion

In the sixth and final chapter of this study, I will first summarize the findings of the study. Then, in the second and third sections, I will discuss the implications, both theoretical and practical, of the findings of this study. Lastly, I will conclude by discussing some limitations of this study and proposing future research agendas.

6.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation research is a systemic study of subjectivity to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the past and current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for.

To this purpose, I first reviewed the extant literature (primarily Western) on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, both within the United States and beyond the country, in terms of their core attributes and activities as well as historical changes and the evolution of them. Also, I identified some limitations of the current literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations and proposed that the RIGO framework helps overcome such limitations.

Next, I provided a brief historical overview of South Korea's local autonomy and regional governance. In so doing, I identified the lack of a broad, systemic scholarly investigation into how multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments in South Korea is organized

and practiced. Thus, I tested whether the RIGO framework was exportable beyond the United States territory and applicable to the South Korean context.

Lastly, using Q-method, I identified that there exist at least five different patterns of thoughts and attitudes toward RIGOs among South Korean local government officials. South Korean local government officials who work for RIGOs to promote development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the government that they work for can be categorized into agenda-broadening officials, agenda-narrowing officials, membership-expanding officials, equality-promoting officials, and local-government-centric officials. I also provided each type's profile and discussed what major consensus and disagreement exist among those types. In addition, I demonstrated that there exist relationships between RIGOs' key organizational characteristics and the five revealed patterns of thoughts and attitudes toward RIGOs. Based on the findings, I proposed a conceptual contour in which the variations of the five different viewpoints along three intersecting continua as well as where each viewpoint is situated along each variable are depicted.

6.2 Implications for Theory

This dissertation research contributes to scholarship in urban affairs and regional governance by filling in the gaps of our understanding of how local government officials perceive the past and current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. That is, this study is a response to Frederickson (1999)'s argument that public administration scholars should strive to better understand the development of administrative conjunction in metropolitan areas, assuming that networks of professional local government officials provide a foundation for

metropolitan cooperation (see also Zeemering, 2019). This study is also an extension of the study of intergovernmental relations conducted by Deil Wright, in a sense that this study is an analysis of both behavioral and institutional perspectives of intergovernmental relations that have been developed among professional local government officials in South Korea. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the RIGO framework is exportable beyond the United States boundaries, confirming that the pursuit of large-scale comparative research using the framework is feasible.

6.3 Implications for Policy and Management

Especially important for practitioners in South Korea, this study provides an insight into how to promote multi-lateral cross-boundary collaborations among the local governments through RIGOs by considering insider perspectives of professional local government officials who work for them. As reviewed in chapter three, city-county consolidation, once a popular means of solving urban and regional problems, has thus far failed to deliver its promises (e.g. improvement in technical efficiency, improvement in fiscal management, and narrowing urban vs. rural disparities). Thus, it is time to unlock and leverage on the potential of RIGOs in improving regional governance, especially by considering viewpoints of professionals who work for them, as it is likely that they know better than laypeople in maximizing the strength and minimizing the weakness of RIGOs. Some empirical findings of this study would serve as an initial guidance on making such improvements. For example, since this study's prospective assessment of how RIGOs are viewed by South Korean local government officials is strongly linked to how those officials understand their respective organization's goals, the findings of this study could help not only the regional governance scholarship but also policymakers and public administrators better understand how

different perspectives on RIGOs affect the behavior of local government officials and the operation of RIGOs especially in terms of goal setting, goal clarification, and goal prioritization. Such an improved understanding of perceived organizational goals could be helpful in better clarifying goals, and the heightened clarity of organizational goals in turn is likely to improve organizational performance (Rainey and Jung, 2014).

In addition, as identified in this study, there exists the universe of RIGOs outside of South Korea. Therefore, when South Korean practitioners want to improve their institutional arrangements and operations of RIGOs by learning from the best practices, they would be able to find exemplars outside of the country using the findings of this study (e.g. RIGOs in the United States, *communauté de communes* and *communauté d'agglomération* in France, Regional Collaborative Associations from Deltametropolis in the Netherlands, and *Koiki Rengo* in Japan) that they can make reference to.

6.4 Limitations and Future Research

In this study, I have set out an original set of five viewpoints of South Korean local government officials on RIGOs. Although the five factor groups (patterns) of thoughts and attitudes toward RIGOs identified in this study open promising lines of research to be conducted in the future, this study is not without its weaknesses and limitations. One limitation of this study is that the findings are local-specific and thus this study's theorizing is also site-specific. One way to overcome such a limitation is to conduct systematic comparison using the same methodology (e.g. Durose et al., 2016). Also, although this study demonstrates not only the distinctiveness of the viewpoints but also similarities and overlaps of those viewpoints, as to how agenda,

membership, and ambition are related to each other is not yet clear. This ambiguity is another limitation of this study. Therefore, one example of interesting future research agenda would be an investigation into how each dimension is related to another (e.g. are agenda and membership complementary or contrasting?). Also, the exploratory evidence of this study suggests the possibility of a relationship between how RIGOs are perceived and RIGO characteristics. Therefore, another example of an interesting future study, which would involve various R-method skills and techniques in research design as well as data collection and analysis, is on whether various organizational characteristics as well as personal attributes have any impact on how RIGOs are perceived among regional governance experts. Last but not least, another interesting related future research question involves the life cycle of the five perspectives: do individuals' perspectives change over time, and if so, what patterns exist?

This dissertation study, in conclusion, recommends future studies to consider "the configuration, coexistence, collaboration, and contestation" (Durose et al., 2016: 584) of different perspectives within a particular regional context and how these perspectives may evolve through a series of interactions. It is recommended that further studies consider the nature and development of RIGOs over time, "the relationships and transitions" among the five perspectives, and their "interrelation with particular conditions, contexts, and institutional designs" (Durose et al., 2016: 584).

Appendix A Current Political and Administrative Structures of Local Government in South Korea in Brief

South Korea is a unitary state whereby the ultimately supreme national government delegates authority to various lower tiers of government in the country. In South Korea, at the time of this writing, there are seventeen autonomous first-tier, or upper-tier, administrative divisions, often referred to as regional governments: there are one special city (which is also the capital city of the country), six metropolitan cities, one special self-governing city (which is also the administrative capital city of the country), and nine provinces (including one special self-governing province). The first-tier administrative divisions are divided into 258 autonomous second-tier, or lower-tier, administrative subdivisions, often referred to as municipal governments: there are seventy-five cities, eighty-two counties, and 101 districts. The lower-tier governments are further subdivided into smaller nonautonomous entities at "an administrative level to implement higher legal and administrative acts within their jurisdiction" (Anderson, 2019: 4). Local councils and executives (governors for the regional governments and mayors and supervisors for the municipal governments) are elected for both the regional and municipal level local governments every four years. The local councils "act as the representative body as well as the highest authority for a local government in the realm of autonomous functions" (Anderson, 2019: 6; see also Y. Choi, 2016 and C. Park, 2006). However, there have been criticisms that local councils lack policy expertise (Anderson, 2019; C. Park, 2006). In the meanwhile, the local executive acts as the chief of the local administration managing local government employees as well as local government budget and property (Anderson, 2019: 7; see also Y. Choi, 2016 and C. Park, 2006). There are two types of responsibilities that autonomous local governments address:

responsibilities delegated by the national government and "issues that only concern the local jurisdiction" (Anderson, 2019: 7). The former are referred to as delegated responsibilities whereas the latter are referred to as autonomous responsibilities (Anderson, 2019). As to the delegated responsibilities, examples are "registering residents and maintaining data for election rolls" (Anderson, 2019: 7). The Local Autonomy Act lists in detail possible local functions that include "selection of local personnel, local development and economic management, local welfare, and local planning" (Anderson, 2019: 7) and they are autonomous responsibilities. As to the issue of fiscal decentralization, "the range of fiscal resources varies greatly among government, with some governments having very little independence" (Anderson, 2019: 8). Although the national government still maintains the strongest taxes for itself and local governments do not yet have a great degree of fiscal flexibility, some effort has been made "to give local governments more resources by transferring taxes" from the national government "to the local governments as well as through subsidies and grants" (Anderson, 2019: 8). Thus, the "actual level of fiscal autonomy in general has been estimated to be about 90% of the OECD average" (Anderson, 2019: 8; see also Y. Choi, 2016: 149-150).

Appendix B City-County Consolidations in South Korea: 1995-2012

Province	Former Jurisdiction		Consolidated City	Province	Former Jurisdiction		Consolidated City
	City	County			City	County	
Kyounggi	Pyoungtaek /Songtan	Pyoungtaek	Pyoungtaek	*Kyoung-buk*	Pohang	Youngil	Pohang
	Migum	Namyangju	Namyangju		Gyoungju	Gyoungju	Gyoungju
Gangwon	Chuncheon	Chuncheon	Chuncheon		Gimcheon	Geumneung	Gimcheon
	Wonju	Wonju	Wonju		Andong	Andong	Andong
	Gangneung	Myoungju	Gangneung		Gumi	Seonsan	Gumi
	Samcheok	Samcheok	Samcheok		Youngju	Youngpung	Youngju
Chungbuk	Chungju	Chungwon	Chungju		Youngchun	Youngchun	Youngchun
	Jecheon	Jecheon	Jecheon		Sangju	Sangju	Sangju
Chungnam	Cheonan	Cheonan	Cheonan		Jeomchon	Munkyoung	Munkyoung
	Gongju	Gongju	Gongju		Gyoungsan	Gyoungsan	Gyoungsan
	Daecheon	Boryoung	Boryoung	*Kyoung-nam*	Changwon	part of Changwon	Changwon
	Onyang	Asan	Asan		Masan	part of Changwon	Masan
	Seosan	Seosan	Seosan		Jinju	Jinyang	Jinju
Jeonbuk	Gunsan	Okgu	Gunsan		Chungmu	Tongyoung	Tongyoung
	Iri	Iiksan	Iiksan		Samcheonpo	Sacheon	Sacheon
	Jeongju	Jeongeup	Jeongeup		Gimhae	Gimhae	Gimhae
	Namwon	Namwon	Namwon		Milyang	Milyang	Milyang
	Gimje	Gimje	Gimje		Jangseungpo	Geojae	Geojae
Jeonnam	Yeosu	Yeocheon	Yeosu				
	Suncheon	Seungju	Suncheon				
	Naju	Naju	Naju				
	Dong-gwangyang	Gwangyang	Gwangyang				

Source: J. Park (2010: 202)

Appendix C Articles, Sections, and Subsections of Local Autonomy Act Relevant to Three Types of Regional Governance

Article 151 (Entrustment of Affairs)

(1) A local government or the head thereof may entrust part of the affairs within its competence to any other local government or the head thereof to manage such part of affairs. In such cases, the head of the local government shall report thereon to the Minister of the Interior and Safety and the head of the relevant central administrative agency if a party entrusted with such affairs is the City/Do or the head thereof, and to the Mayor/Do Governor if a party entrusted with such affairs is the Si/Gun/autonomous Gu or the head thereof. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(2) If a local government or the head thereof wishes to entrust affairs under paragraph (1), the local government or the head thereof shall establish the rules in consultation with the competent local government and provide public notice of such rules.

(3) The rules for entrustment of affairs under paragraph (2) shall include the matters falling under the following subparagraphs:

1. The local government entrusting the affairs and local government entrusted with them;

2. Details and scope of the entrusted affairs;

3. Management and handling method of the entrusted affairs;

4. Allotment of expenses required for the management and handling of the entrusted affairs and the method of disbursing such expenses;

5. Other necessary matters concerning the entrustment of affairs.

(4) If a local government or the head thereof intends to change or terminate entrustment of affairs, the local government or the head thereof shall provide public notice thereof in consultation with the competent local government or the head thereof, and report it to the Minister of the Interior and Safety and the head of the relevant central administrative agency, or to the Mayor/Do Governor, according to the example under paragraph (1). <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(5) Where affairs are entrusted, any municipal ordinance or municipal rule concerning the management and handling of the entrusted affairs shall also apply to the local government entrusted with the affairs, except as otherwise provided for in the rules for entrustment of affairs.

Article 152 (Formation of Administrative Consultative Council)

(1) Local governments may establish an administrative consultative council (hereinafter referred to as "consultative council") for joint performance of part of any affairs involving two or more local governments. In such cases, the heads of the local governments shall report it to the Minister of the Interior and Safety and the head of the central administrative agency concerned if Cities/Dos are the members thereof, and to the competent Mayor/Do Governor if Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus are the members thereof. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(2) If local governments seek to establish a consultative council, they shall provide public notice thereof after formulating rules through consultation among the competent local governments, and going through resolutions of the respective local councils concerned.

(3) The Minister of the Interior and Safety or the Mayor/Do Governor may recommend the competent local governments to establish a consultative council if necessary for the public interest. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

Article 153 (Organization of Consultative Council)

(1) A consultative council shall consist of a chairperson and members.

(2) The chairperson and members shall be elected from among the employees of the competent local governments in accordance with the rules of the consultative council.

(3) The chairperson shall represent the consultative council, convene the meeting, and manage all affairs thereof.

Article 154 (Rules of Consultative Council)

The rules of a consultative council shall include the following matters:

1. Title of the consultative council;

2. Local governments that constitute the consultative council;

3. Affairs to be managed by the consultative council;

4. Organization of the consultative council and the method of election of the chairperson and members;

5. Method for bearing and disbursing expenses necessary for the operation of the consultative council and the management of affairs thereof;

6. Other necessary matters concerning the formation and operation of the consultative council.

Article 155 (Request of Consultative Council for Presentation of Materials, etc.)

If deemed necessary for handling its affairs, the consultative council may request the heads of the competent local governments to present materials, express their opinions and provide any other necessary cooperation.

Article 156 (Mediation of Matters for Consultation)

(1) If the heads of local governments request mediation of matters that have not been agreed upon by the consultative council concerned, such matters may be mediated by the Minister of the Interior and Safety if such matters are for consultation among Cities/Dos, or by the competent Mayor/Do Governor if such matters are for consultation among Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus: Provided, That if the competent Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus extend over two or more Cities/Dos, the Minister of the Interior and Safety may mediate such matters. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(2) If the Minister of the Interior and Safety or the Mayor/Do Governor intends to offer mediation as referred to in paragraph (1), he/ she shall do so according to the deliberation of the dispute mediation committee as prescribed in Article 149 after consultation with the head of the central administrative agency concerned. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29,

2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

Article 157 (Effect of Consultation and Handling of Affairs by Consultative Council)

(1) The local governments which have constituted a consultative council shall handle their affairs according to the matters determined by the consultative council, if any.

(2) With respect to the matters mediated by the Minister of the Interior and Safety or the Mayor/Do Governor under Article 156 (1), the provisions of Article 148 (3) through (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(3) If the consultative council has handled affairs in the names of the competent local governments or the heads thereof, such affairs shall be deemed to have been conducted by the competent local governments or the heads thereof.

Article 158 (Modification of Rules and Abolishment of Consultative Council)

If local governments seek to modify the rules of the consultative council or to abolish the consultative council, the provisions of Article 152 (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Article 159 (Establishment of Local Government Association)

(1) If necessary for joint performance of one or more affairs by two or more local governments, they may establish a local government association, after formulating rules and going through resolutions of the local councils concerned, with the approval from the

Minister of the Interior and Safety in the case of Cities/Dos, or with the approval from the competent Mayor/Do Governor in the case of Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus: Provided, That if the Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus that are the members of the local government association extend over two or more Cities/Dos, approval from the Minister of the Interior and Safety shall be obtained. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(2) The local government association shall be a juristic person.

Article 160 (Organization of Local Government Association)

(1) A local government association shall have a board of the local government association, president of the local government association, and other clerical personnel.

(2) The members of the board of the local government association, the president of the local government association, and other clerical personnel shall be selected and appointed under the rules of the local government association.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 35 (1) and 96 (1), members of the local councils of the competent local governments and the heads of such local governments may hold concurrently the office of members of the board of the local government association or the president of the local government association.

Article 161 (Authority of Board and President of Local Government Association)

(1) The board of a local government association shall deliberate and decide on important affairs of the local government association, as prescribed by rules of the local government association.

(2) The board of the local government association may determine the user fees, fees, or allotted charges for any service furnished by the local government association within the scope of the municipal ordinance under Article 139 (1).

(3) The president of the local government association shall represent the local government association, and exercise general direction and control over affairs of the local government association.

Article 162 (Rules of Local Government Association)

The rules of a local government association shall include the following matters:

1. Title of the local government association;

2. Local governments that constitute the local government association;

3. Location of the local government association's office;

4. Affairs of the local government association;

5. Organization of the board of the local government association and the method of appointing the members thereof;

6. Organization of the executive organs and the method of appointment;

7. Method for bearing and disbursing expenses necessary for the operation and the handling of affairs of the local government association;

8. Other matters concerning the establishment and operation of the local government association.

Article 163 (Direction and Supervision of Local Government Association)

(1) A local government association in which Cities/Dos are the members shall be directed and supervised by the Minister of the Interior and Safety, and a local government association in which Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus are the members shall be directed and supervised primarily by the competent Mayor/Do Governor, and secondarily by the Minister of the Interior and Safety: Provided, That if the Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus that are the members of the local government association extend over two or more Cities/Dos, the local government association shall be directed and supervised by the Minister of the Interior and Safety. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

(2) If necessary for the public interest, the Minister of the Interior and Safety may order the establishment or dissolution of a local government association, or the modification of the rules thereof. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017>

Article 164 (Modification of Rules of Local Government Association, and Dissolution Thereof)

(1) In modifying the rules of a local government association or dissolving a local government association, the provisions of Article 159 (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) If a local government association is dissolved, the assets thereof shall be disposed of through consultation among the competent local governments concerned.

Appendix D List of Local Governments and Their Membership in RIGOs and Non-RIGO Administrative Consultative Councils

No.	City / county / district (in Korean)	City / county / district (in English)	No. of memberships in administrative consultative councils	RIGO membership (in Korean)	RIGO membership (in English)
1	종로구	Jongno district	3		
2	중구	Jung district	0		
3	용산구	Yongsan district	2		
4	성동구	Seongdong district	4	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
5	광진구	Gwangjin district	2	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
6	동대문구	Dongdaemun district	1	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
7	중랑구	Jungnang district	1	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
8	성북구	Seongbuk district	3	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
9	강북구	Gangbuk district	1		
10	도봉구	Dobong district	3	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
11	노원구	Nowon district	2	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
12	은평구	Eunpyeong district	3		
13	서대문구	Seodaemun district	4		
14	마포구	Mapo district	2		
15	양천구	Yangcheon district	3	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
16	강서구	Gangseo district	4	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
17	구로구	Guro district	4	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
18	금천구	Gumcheon district	4	안양천수질개선 대책협의회	Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council

19	영등포구	Yeongdeungpo district	3	안양천수질개선 대책협의회	Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
20	동작구	Dongjak district	3	안양천수질개선 대책협의회	Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
21	관악구	Gwanak district	1	안양천수질개선 대책협의회	Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
22	서초구	Seocho district	1	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council
23	강남구	Gangnam district	1	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council
24	송파구	Songpa district	1	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council
25	강동구	Gangdong distrcit	2		
26	중구	Jung district	0		
27	서구	Seo distrcit	0		
28	동구	Dong district	0		
29	영도구	Yeongdo district	0		
30	부산진구	Busanjin district	0		
31	동래구	Dongnae district	0		
32	남구	Nam district	0		
33	북구	Buk district	0		
34	해운대구	Haeundae district	0		
35	사하구	Saha district	0		
36	금정구	Geumjeong district	0		
37	강서구	Gangseo district	1		
38	연제구	Yeonje district	0		
39	수영구	Suyeong district	0		
40	사상구	Sasang district	0		
41	기장군	Gijang county	1		
42	중구	Jung district	1		
43	동구	Dong district	0		
44	서구	Seo district	1		
45	남구	Nam district	0		
46	북구	Buk district	0		
47	수성구	Suseong district	0		
48	달서구	Dalseo district	0		
49	달성군	Dalseong county	2	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
50	중구	Jung district	0		
51	동구	Dong district	0		
52	남구	Nam district	2		

53	연수구	Yeonsu district	0		
54	남동구	Namdong district	3		
55	부평구	Bupyeong district	2	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
56	계양구	Gyeyang district	1	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
57	서구	Seo district	1	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
58	강화군	Ganghwa county	3	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
59	옹진군	Ongjin county	1		
60	동구	Dong district	2	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council
61	서구	Seo district	3	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council
62	남구	Nam district	3	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council
63	북구	Buk district	3	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council
64	광산구	Gwangsan district	4	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council
65	동구	Dong district	1		
66	중구	Jung district	0		
67	서구	Seo district	0		
68	유성구	Yuseong district	2	백제문화권 관광벨트협의회	Baekje Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
69	대덕구	Daedeok district	2		
70	중구	Jung district	0		
71	남구	Nam district	0		
72	동구	Dong district	1		
73	북구	Buk district	0		
74	울주군	Ulju county	1		
75	수원시	Suwon city	6		
76	성남시	Seongnam city	5	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council
77	의정부시	Uijeongbu city	3	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council
78	안양시	Anyang city	6	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
79	부천시	Bucheon city	7		

80	광명시	Gwangmyeong city	6	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
81	평택시	Pyeongtaek city	2		
82	동두천시	Dongducheon city	2	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council
83	안산시	Ansan city	5	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
84	고양시	Goyang city	3		
85	과천시	Gwacheon city	3	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
86	구리시	Guri city	2		
87	남양주시	Namyangju city	4		
88	오산시	Osan city	3		
89	시흥시	Siheung city	10	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
90	군포시	Gunpo city	4	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
91	의왕시	Uiwang city	3	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council
92	하남시	Hanam city	3		
93	용인시	Yongin city	4	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council
94	파주시	Paju city	3	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council
95	이천시	Icheon city	2		
96	안성시	Anseong city	1		
97	김포시	Gimpo city	3	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council
98	화성시	Hwaseong city	4		
99	광주시	Gwangju city	3		
100	양주시	Yangju city	3	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council
101	포천시	Pocheon city	4	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council
102	여주시	Yeoju city	3		
103	연천군	Yeoncheon county	3	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council
104	가평군	Gapyeong county	3		
105	양평군	Yangpyeong county	3		
106	춘천시	Chuncheon city	2		

107	원주시	Wonju city	2	중부내륙권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
108	강릉시	Gangneung city	1		
109	동해시	Donghae city	0		
110	태백시	Taebaek city	2	폐광지역시장군수협의회	Abandoned Mine Area Administrative Consultative Council
111	속초시	Sokcho city	0		
112	삼척시	Samcheok city	1	폐광지역시장군수협의회	Abandoned Mine Area Administrative Consultative Council
113	홍천군	Hongcheon county	2		
114	횡성군	Hoengseong county	2		
115	영월군	Yeongwol county	4	중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
116	평창군	Pyongchang county	4	중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
117	정선군	Jeongseon county	3	폐광지역시장군수협의회	Abandoned Mine Area Administrative Consultative Council
118	철원군	Cheorwon county	1		
119	화천군	Hwacheon county	3		
120	양구군	Yanggu county	2		
121	인제군	Inje county	0		
122	고성군	Goseong county	0		
123	양양군	Yangyang county	0		
124	청주시	Cheongju city	3		
125	충주시	Chungju city	4	중부내륙권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
126	제천시	Jecheon city	5	중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
127	보은군	Boeun county	6		
128	옥천군	Okcheon county	4		
129	영동군	Yeongdong county	6		
130	증평군	Jeungpyeong county	1		
131	진천군	Jincheon county	1		
132	괴산군	Goesan county	2	중부내륙권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
133	음성군	Umseong county	3	중부내륙권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
134	단양군	Danyang county	5	중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council
135	천안시	Cheonan city	4	천안·아산 생활권 행정협의회	Cheonan-Asan Administrative Consultative Council

136	공주시	Gongju city	6	백제문화권 관광벨트협의회	Baekje Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
137	보령시	Boryeong city	4	환황해권 행정협의회	Yellow Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
138	아산시	Asan city	3	천안·아산 생활권 행정협의회	Cheonan-Asan Administrative Consultative Council
139	서산시	Seosan city	3	서산·당진·태안생활권 행정협의회	Seosan-Dangjin-Taean Administrative Consultative Council
140	논산시	Nonsan city	5	금강권 관광협의회	Geumgang Area Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
141	계룡시	Gyeryong city	1		
142	당진시	Dangjin city	4	서산·당진·태안생활권 행정협의회	Seosan-Dangjin-Taean Administrative Consultative Council
143	금산군	Gumsan county	5	백제문화권 관광벨트협의회	Baekje Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
144	부여군	Buyeo county	6	백제문화권 관광벨트협의회	Baekje Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
145	서천군	Socheon county	6	환황해권 행정협의회	Yellow Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
146	청양군	Cheongyang county	2		
147	홍성군	Hongseong county	3	환황해권 행정협의회	Yellow Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
148	예산군	Yesan county	1		
149	태안군	Taean county	5	서산·당진·태안생활권 행정협의회	Seosan-Dangjin-Taean Administrative Consultative Council
150	전주시	Jeonju city	4		
151	군산시	Gunsan city	3	금강권 관광협의회	Geumgang Area Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
152	익산시	Iksan city	4	금강권 관광협의회	Geumgang Area Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
153	정읍시	Jeongeup city	2	전북서남권 관광행정협의회	Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
154	남원시	Namwon city	2	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council
155	김제시	Gimje city	1		
156	완주군	Wanju county	3		
157	진안군	Jinan county	7	무진장 행복생활권 협의회	Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative Council
158	무주군	Muju county	4	무진장 행복생활권 협의회	Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative Council

159	장수군	Jangsu county	5	무진장 행복생활권 협의회	Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative Council
160	임실군	Imsil county	5	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council
161	순창군	Sunchang county	4	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council
162	고창군	Gochang county	4	전북서남권 관광행정협의회	Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
163	부안군	Buan county	3	전북서남권 관광행정협의회	Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism Promotion Consultative Council
164	목포시	Mokpo city	2	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
165	여수시	Yeosu city	7	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
166	순천시	Suncheon city	8	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
167	나주시	Naju city	8	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
168	광양시	Gwangyang city	9	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
169	담양군	Damyang county	8	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
170	곡성군	Gokseong county	6	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council
171	구례군	Gurye county	4	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council
172	고흥군	Goheung county	6	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
173	보성군	Boseong county	3	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
174	화순군	Hwasun county	6	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
175	장흥군	Jangheung county	5		
176	강진군	Gangjin county	5	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
177	해남군	Haenam county	4	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
178	영암군	Yeongam county	4	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
179	무안군	Muan county	4	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
180	함평군	Hampyeong county	7	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council
181	영광군	Yeonggwang county	5	전남 북부권 행정협의회	North Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council

182	장성군	Jangseong county	7	전남 북부권 행정협의회	North Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council
183	완도군	Wando county	5	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
184	진도군	Jindo county	3	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
185	신안군	Sinan county	4	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
186	포항시	Pohang city	5	경상북도 동해권 행정협의회	East Coast Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
187	경주시	Gyeongju city	6	경상북도 동해권 행정협의회	East Coast Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
188	김천시	Gimcheon city	3	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
189	안동시	Andong city	6	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
190	구미시	Gumi city	3	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
191	영주시	Yeongju city	5	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
192	영천시	Yeongcheon city	8	경산권 행정협의회	Gyeongsan Administrative Consultative Council
193	상주시	Sangju city	6	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
194	문경시	Mungyeong city	5	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
195	경산시	Gyeongsan city	3	경산권 행정협의회	Gyeongsan Administrative Consultative Council
196	군위군	Gunwi county	4	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
197	의성군	Uiseong county	7	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
198	청송군	Cheongsong county	5	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
199	영양군	Yeongyang county	4	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
200	영덕군	Yeongdeok county	5	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
201	청도군	Cheongdo county	3	경산권 행정협의회	Gyeongsan Administrative Consultative Council
202	고령군	Goryeong county	5	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council

203	성주군	Seongju county	5	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
204	칠곡군	Chilgok county	3	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
205	예천군	Yecheon county	4	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
206	봉화군	Bonghwa county	6	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
207	울진군	Uljin county	4	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
208	울릉군	Ulleung county	3	경상북도 동해권 행정협의회	East Coast Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council
209	창원시	Changwon city	3		
210	진주시	Jinju city	6	남해안남중권발전협의회	Central South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
211	통영시	Tongyeong city	1		
212	사천시	Sacheon city	4	남해안남중권발전협의회	Central South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
213	김해시	Gimhae city	5		
214	밀양시	Miryang city	1		
215	거제시	Geoje city	1		
216	양산시	Yangsan city	0		
217	의령군	Uiryeong county	2	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
218	함안군	Haman county	3		
219	창녕군	Changnyeong county	4	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
220	고성군	Goseong county	4		
221	남해군	Namhae county	6	남해안남중권발전협의회	Central South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
222	하동군	Hadong county	8	남해안남중권발전협의회	Central South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council
223	산청군	Sancheong county	8	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
224	함양군	Hamyang county	7	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
225	거창군	Geochang county	4	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council
226	합천군	Hapcheon county	5	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council

Appendix E List of Administrative Councils that Are RIGOs, IGOs, and neither of Them[76]

No.	Administrative consultative council (in Korean: RIGO in red)	Administrative Consultative Council	Participating local governments (in Korean)	No. of Local Gov'ts	Activity
1	광주광역시 구청장협의회	Gwangju Administrative Consultative Conference	광주 동·서·남·북·광산구	5	0
2	빛고을 생활권 행정협의회	Gwangju Region Administrative Consultative Council	광주 동·서·남·북·광산구, 나주, 담양, 화순, 함평, 장성	10	3
3	경기중부권 행정협의회	Central Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council	안양, 안산, 광명, 시흥, 군포, 과천, 의왕	7	5
4	동두천권 행정협의회	Dongducheon Administrative Consultative Council	파주, 포천, 양주, 동두천, 연천	5	5
5	경기도시장군수협의회	Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Conference	수원, 성남, 고양, 부천, 용인, 안산, 안양, 남양주, 의정부, 평택, 시흥, 화성, 광명, 파주, 군포, 광주, 김포, 이천, 구리, 양주, 안성, 포천, 오산, 하남, 의왕, 동두천, 과천, 양평, 가평, 연천	31	2
6	시흥·안산시 정책협의회	Siheung-Ansan Administrative Consultative Council	시흥, 안산	2	0
7	시흥·부천시 정책협의회	Siheung-Bucheon Administrative Consultative Council	시흥, 부천	2	0
8	백두대간 광역행정협의회	Baekdudaegan Mountain Area Administrative Consultative Council	영월, 태백, 정선, 평창	4	3
9	폐광지역시장군수협의회	Abandoned Mine Area Administrative Consultative Council	태백, 삼척, 영월, 정선	4	4
10	중부내륙권 행정협의회	Central Inland Administrative Consultative Council	원주, 여주, 충주, 괴산, 음성, 단양, 문경	7	4
11	경상북도 중・서부권행정협의회	Central & West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council	김천, 구미, 상주, 군위, 의성, 고령, 성주, 칠곡	8	3
12	남부권 행정협의회	South Chungbuk Administrative Consultative Council	보은, 옥천, 영동	3	0
13	충북 북부권 행정협의회	North Chungbuk Administrative Consultative Council	충주, 제천, 단양	3	0
14	천안·아산 생활권 행정협의회	Cheonan-Asan Administrative Consultative Council	천안, 아산	2	4
15	서산·당진·태안생활권 행정협의회	Seosan-Dangjin-Taean Administrative Consultative Council	서산, 당진, 태안	3	3
16	환황해권 행정협의회	Yellow Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council	서산, 보령, 당진, 태안, 서천, 홍성	6	3
17	전주권 행정협의회	Jeonju Administrative Consultative Council	전주, 익산, 김제, 완주, 임실	5	0
18	무진장 행복생활권 협의회	Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative Council	장수, 무주, 진안	3	3
19	여수·순천·광양시 행정협의회	Yeosu-Suncheon-Gwangyang Administrative Consultative Council	여수, 순천, 광양	3	0
20	순천권 행정협의회	Suncheon Region Administrative Consultative Council	여수, 순천, 광양, 구례, 곡성	5	0

[76] Colored in red are RIGOs and colored in black are either IGOs or neither of the two.

21	전남 북부권 행정협의회	North Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council	나주, 담양, 화순, 함평, 영광, 장성	6	4
22	남해안권 행정협의회	South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council	강진, 장흥, 보성, 고흥, 완도	5	0
23	서남해안권 행정협의회	West South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council	목포, 해남, 영암, 무안, 완도, 진도, 강진, 신안	8	6
24	영산강유역권 행정협의회	Youngsan River Area Administrative Consultative Council	목포, 나주, 담양, 화순, 영암, 무안, 함평, 장성	8	4
25	나남발전 행정협의회	Nanam Administrative Consultative Council	나주, 광주 남구	2	0
26	광주광역시 근교권 행정협의회	Gwangju Suburb Administrative Consultative Council	나주, 담양, 화순, 장성	4	0
27	광양만권발전협의회	Gwangyang Region Administrative Consultative Council	순천, 여수, 광양	3	0
28	전남 4 촌 정책연합회	4 Rural Counties Administrative Consultative Council	완도, 장성, 장흥, 강진	4	0
29	서북지역 행복생활권 협의회	Northwest Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council	장성, 함평, 영광	3	2
30	상생협력 정책협의회	Southern Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council	강진, 장흥, 영암	3	0
31	전남 동부생활권 협의회	East Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council	여수, 순천, 광양, 고흥, 보성	5	3
32	경산권 행정협의회	Gyeongsan Administrative Consultative Council	영천, 경산, 청도	3	5
33	경상북도 북부권 행정협의회	North Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council	안동, 영주, 상주, 문경, 의성, 청송, 영양, 영덕, 예천, 봉화, 울진	11	4
34	경북시장군수 협의회	Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Conference	경북 23 개 시·군	23	0
35	영천·경산시 행정협의회	Yeongcheon-Kyeongsan Administrative Consultative Council	영천, 경산	2	0
36	경상북도 동해권 행정협의회	East Coast Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council	포항, 경주, 영천, 영덕, 울진, 울릉	6	6
37	마창연담권 행정협의회	Masan-Changwon Region Administrative Consultative Council	창원, 김해, 함안, 창녕	4	0
38	서부권행정 협의회	West Kyeongnam Administrative Consultative Council	진주, 사천, 고성, 하동, 산청	5	0
39	서북부경남 행정협의회	North West Kyeongnam Administrative Consultative Council	함양, 산청, 합천, 거창	4	0
40	산청 함양공동 현안 행정협의회	Sancheong-Hamyang Administrative Consultative Council	함양, 산청	2	0
41	진·사연담도시권협의회	Jinju-Sacheon Administrative Consultative Council	진주, 사천	2	0
42	서부수도권 행정협의회	West Capital Area Administrative Consultative Council	강서, 양천, 구로, 부천, 광명, 시흥, 김포, 계양, 부평, 서구, 강화	11	6
43	서낙동강 행정협의회	West Nakdong River Administrative Consultative Council	김해, 부산 강서	2	0
44	군산서천 행정협의회	Gunsan-Socheon Administrative Consultative Council	군산, 서천	2	0
45	21 세기뉴리더 행정협의회	West Jeonnam Administrative Consultative Council	나주, 무안, 함평	3	0
46	장수벨트 행정협의회	East Jeolla Administrative Consultative Council	곡성, 담양, 순창, 구례	4	2
47	중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회	Central Inland Region Administrative Consultative Council	영월, 평창, 제천, 단양, 영주, 봉화	6	3
48	남해안남중권발전협의회	Central South Sea Coast Administrative Consultative Council	여수, 순천, 광영, 고흥, 보성, 진주, 사천, 남해, 하동	9	4

49	하동-광양 공생발전협의회	Hadong-Gwangyang Administrative Consultative Council	하동, 광양	2	0
50	시흥·남동구정책협의회	Siheung-Namdonggu Administrative Consultative Council	시흥시, 남동구	2	0
51	시가문화권 보존·복원 행정협의회	Jeolla Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council	전남, 광주, 담양, 광주 북구	4	0
52	잠실권역 물관리협의회	Jamsil Water Management Administrative Consultative Council	서울, 구리, 남양주, 하남, 포천	5	0
53	전국동주도시 교류협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of Ju Cities	제주, 경주, 공주, 나주, 상주, 광주, 영주, 원주, 전주, 진주, 청주, 충주, 파주, 양주	14	3
54	전국 마늘주산단지 시군광역협의회	Garlic Producing Area Administrative Consultative Council	서산, 태안, 고흥, 해남, 무안, 함평, 신안, 영천, 의성, 창녕, 남해	11	3
55	더불어 함께하는 도시협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of Co-development Cities	공주, 강릉, 광양, 구미, 수원, 전주, 제주, 창원, 청주	9	3
56	가야문화권 행정협의회	Gaya Administrative Consultative Council	김해, 함안, 고성, 상주, 고령, 성주	6	3
57	지리산권 단체장협의회	Jiri Mountain Area Administrative Consultative Conference	산청, 함양, 하동, 구례, 곡성, 장수, 남원	8	0
58	섬진강 환경행정협의회	Seomjin River Area Administrative Consultative Council	순천, 광양, 곡성, 구례, 순창, 하동, 장수, 진안, 임실, 남원, 남해	11	4
59	안양천수질개선 대책협의회	Anyang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council	서울 구로, 강서, 관악, 금천, 동작, 양천, 영등포, 경기 안양, 광명, 군포, 부천, 시흥, 의왕	13	4
60	환경행정협의회	Central North Seoul Administrative Consultative Council	서울 은평, 종로, 마포, 서대문	4	0
61	탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회	Tancheon-Yangjaecheon Administrative Consultative Council	서울 강남, 서초, 송파, 경기 성남, 과천, 용인	6	4
62	백제문화권 관광벨트협의회	Baeje Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council	금산, 공주, 부여, 유성, 무주	5	3
63	전국대도시 시장협의회	Administrative Consultative Conference of Major Cities	수원, 성남, 고양, 부천, 안양, 용인, 안산, 화성, 남양주, 청주, 천안, 전주, 포항, 창원, 김해	15	1
64	삽교호권역 물관리대책협의회	Sapgyoho Lake Area Administrative Consultative Council	세종, 천안, 아산, 당진, 청양, 홍성, 예산	7	0
65	금강권 관광협의회	Geumgang Area Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	부여, 공주, 군산, 논산, 서천, 익산	6	3
66	전북서남권 관광행정협의회	Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	정읍, 부안, 고창	3	3
67	남부권 관광협의회	South Chungbuk Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	보은, 옥천, 영동	3	0
68	원전소재 지방자치단체 행정협의회	Power Plant Area Administrative Consultative Council	경주, 기장, 울주, 울진, 영광	5	3
69	전국고추 주산단지 시장군수 협의회	Chilli Pepper Producing Area Administrative Consultative Council	안동, 의성, 영양, 청송, 봉화, 예천, 태안, 충주, 제천, 괴산, 음성, 단양, 해남, 고창, 임실, 영월	15	3
70	가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 협의회	Gaya Cultural Area Administrative Consultative Council	고령, 성주, 달성, 거창, 의령, 함양, 합천, 산청, 창녕, 남원, 장수, 순천, 하동, 광양, 함안	15	3
71	사과주산지 시장군수협의회	Apple Producing Area Administrative Consultative Council	영주, 안동, 의성, 청송, 문경, 봉화, 상주, 포항, 예천, 군위, 영천, 영덕, 영양, 김천, 경주	15	3
72	서부경남관광 진흥협의회	West Gyeongnam Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	진주, 통영, 사천, 거제, 고성, 남해, 하동, 산청, 함양, 거창, 합천	11	3
73	노령산맥권 관광행정협의회	Noryeong Mountain Range Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	정읍, 고창, 순창, 담양, 장성	5	0

74	3 도 3 군 관광벨트협의회	3 Rural Counties Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	금산, 영동, 무주	3	3
75	금강권 댐 유역 공동발전협의회	Geumgang Dam Area Administrative Consultative Council	옥천, 금산, 대전 동구, 대덕, 무주, 보은, 영동, 장수, 진안	10	0
76	전국 한방도시협력회	Administrative Consultative Council of Oriental Medicine Cities	산청, 금산, 장흥, 진안, 평창, 함양, 화순, 문경, 안동, 영천, 제천, 대구 중구	13	0
77	동부권 광역자원회수시설 공동설치 운영위원회	East Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative Council	광주, 하남, 여주, 양평, 이천	5	0
78	춘천권역 서울춘천 고속도로 통행료지원 행정협의회	Chuncheon Highway Area Administrative Consultative Council	춘천, 홍천, 화천, 양구, 가평	5	2
79	중랑천 생태 하천협의회	Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative Consultative Council	서울 광진, 중랑, 노원, 성동, 도봉, 성북, 동대문, 경기 의정부	10	3
80	전국 댐 소재지 시장·군수·구청장 협의회	Dam Area Administrative Consultative Conference	대덕, 춘천, 횡성, 화천, 충주, 보령, 진안, 임실, 부안, 순천, 광양, 장흥, 안동, 영천, 청도, 진주, 밀양, 합천	21	3
81	대한민국 아름다운 섬 발전협의회	Island Development Administrative Consultative Council	강화, 옹진, 보령, 여수, 고흥, 완도, 진도, 신안, 울릉, 남해	10	3
82	전국 농어촌지역 군수협의회	Administrative Consultative Conference of Rural Counties	강화, 연천, 가평, 양평, 횡성, 평창, 정선, 철원, 화천,양구, 보은, 영동, 증평, 진천, 음성, 단양, 부여, 서천, 홍성, 태안, 완주, 진안, 무주, 장수, 임실, 순창, 고창, 부안, 담양, 곡성, 고흥, 화순, 강진, 해남, 영암, 함평, 영광, 장성, 완도, 진도, 신안, 군위, 의성, 청송, 영덕, 고령, 성주, 칠곡, 봉화, 의령, 함안, 창녕, 고성, 남해, 하동, 산청, 함양, 거창, 합천	59	4
83	전국 다문화도시협의회	Administrative Consultative Council for Multicultural Cities	종로, 성동, 서대문, 강서, 구로, 수원, 안양, 부천, 평택, 안산, 고양, 남양주, 시흥, 용인, 김포, 화성, 광주, 포천, 성남, 인천 남동, 광주광산, 천안, 아산, 김해	24	2
84	경부선 지하화 추진 협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of Gyeongbu-railway area	서울 동작, 영등포, 구로, 금천, 용산, 경기 안양, 군포	7	3
85	금강 수상관광 상생발전협의회	Geumgang Tourism Promotion Consultative Council	부여, 익산, 논산, 서천	4	4
86	전국사회연대경제지방정부협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of cities for Social-economy	서울 성북구, 도봉구, 노원구, 은평구, 서대문구, 강서구, 금천구, 강동구, 대구 서구, 달성군, 인천 남구, 남동구, 부평구, 광주 광산구, 대전 유성구, 울산 동구, 경기 수원, 성남, 부천, 광명, 오산, 시흥, 강원 홍천, 충남 논산, 부여, 서천, 전북 군산, 완주, 진안, 전남 나주	30	3
87	동해남부권해오름동맹상생협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of Sunrise Cities	울산, 포항, 경주	3	4
88	충청산업문화철도행정협의회	Chungcheong Railway Area Administrative Consultative Council	세종, 공주, 보령, 부여, 청양	5	2

89	혁신교육 지방정부 협의회	Administrative Consultative Council of Cities for Innovative Education	서울 종로구, 용산구, 성동구, 광진구, 성북구, 강북구, 도봉구, 은평구, 서대문구, 마포구, 양천구, 강서구, 금천구, 영등포구, 동작구, 강동구, 인천 남구, 광구 서구, 경기 수원시, 화성시, 의정부시, 시흥시, 광명시, 오산시, 충북 제천시, 보은군, 충남 논산시, 당진시, 전북 익산시, 전남 여수시, 곡성군	31	2

Appendix F Shape of the Response Grid



Appendix G Unrotated Factor Matrix

Part.Num.	Participant	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
1	Par1	-0.4049	0.1487	0.252	-0.1853	0.374	-0.2493	-0.0741	-0.1776
2	Par2	-0.5333	0.2244	0.1297	-0.4671	-0.0622	-0.2597	0.2271	0.0313
3	Par3	-0.2465	0.1805	0.2282	-0.5933	0.0928	-0.3409	0.0299	-0.0343
4	Par4	-0.3456	-0.062	0.5563	-0.1145	0.0762	-0.5122	-0.115	-0.0359
5	Par5	-0.4207	-0.214	0.3896	-0.3167	0.1518	-0.2104	-0.2385	0.2462
6	Par6	-0.0041	0.2043	0.6644	0.3722	0.0378	-0.2758	0.3306	-0.015
7	Par7	0.573	0.2314	0.2599	0.2568	0.2035	-0.213	0.0065	0.232
8	Par8	0.3844	0.2428	-0.0036	0.6202	-0.231	-0.2199	0.2118	0.2118
9	Par9	0.2701	0.6054	-0.0961	-0.0046	0.1477	-0.07	-0.2624	0.3776
10	Par10	-0.1388	0.251	0.1188	-0.2341	0.3498	0.5613	-0.2522	0.0863
11	Par11	0.0565	0.6057	0.0616	0.1039	0.2267	0.2562	-0.0765	-0.4221
12	Par12	0.3129	0.6382	-0.0882	-0.0572	-0.1185	-0.072	-0.5086	0.0621
13	Par13	0.0523	0.6448	-0.4328	-0.2238	-0.0444	0.1887	0.0461	0.168
14	Par14	-0.0508	-0.3705	-0.1971	-0.1464	0.4086	0.3725	0.5548	0.1397
15	Par15	-0.2721	0.1707	0.3449	0.2777	0.5378	0.2401	-0.2933	0.0229
16	Par16	0.3781	0.2329	-0.1196	0.6446	-0.1651	0.0122	0.0205	-0.1908
17	Par17	0.0588	0.2599	0.3638	0.6394	0.1745	-0.1059	0.0528	0.1997
18	Par18	-0.1349	0.4717	0.0734	0.4794	0.0534	0.2275	0.4682	0.0465
19	Par19	0.0864	0.3096	-0.4293	-0.3062	0.3407	-0.014	0.3206	0.4296
20	Par20	-0.0845	-0.1225	0.8072	0.2987	0.2809	0.0636	0.0111	0.1338
21	Par21	0.6923	0.4351	-0.0881	-0.2104	0.0473	-0.1802	0.0615	-0.1413
22	Par22	0.67	0.1733	0.1039	-0.1039	0.2333	0.1649	0.0658	-0.3166
23	Par23	0.1777	0.1803	-0.0054	-0.254	0.0744	-0.3608	0.4577	-0.355
24	Par24	0.4092	-0.0031	0.5709	-0.2956	-0.4405	0.0922	0.0835	0.1031
25	Par25	0.6919	-0.3393	0.3243	-0.0558	-0.1525	0.0992	0.0856	0.1833
26	Par26	0.6052	0.4894	-0.0873	-0.2587	-0.176	-0.1876	0.0367	0.0584
27	Par27	-0.8454	0.2746	-0.0432	-0.134	0.2087	0.0238	0.1035	0.0003
28	Par28	-0.7942	-0.099	0.0804	-0.171	0.0548	0.057	0.0603	0.2595
29	Par29	0.7847	-0.0662	0.2173	-0.1815	0.1592	0.0683	-0.0581	-0.1897
30	Par30	0.5818	-0.2346	0.3668	-0.2899	0.0083	0.31	-0.0727	0.0438
31	Par31	0.7419	0.2591	-0.002	-0.2696	0.1459	-0.0952	0.1107	-0.0772
32	Par32	-0.8745	0.1448	0.1097	0.0303	-0.234	0.0199	-0.0108	-0.1154
33	Par33	-0.8961	0.2627	-0.0453	0.0073	-0.1427	-0.1388	-0.0741	0.0175
34	Par34	-0.8677	0.2502	-0.0518	-0.0617	-0.0004	-0.1073	-0.0608	0.0991
35	Par35	0.839	0.0157	0.1555	-0.1292	0.0917	-0.0749	-0.1457	-0.2032

36	Par36	-0.7663	0.0973	0.1655	-0.0769	-0.1527	0.2897	0.068	-0.2296
37	Par37	-0.4904	0.4021	0.4479	-0.0071	-0.3263	0.3906	-0.0004	-0.1882
38	Par38	-0.4254	0.3035	0.4123	-0.3536	-0.3316	0.2461	0.2603	0.027
39	Par39	0.4533	0.2416	0.3008	-0.1584	-0.5072	0.2366	-0.0382	0.2868
40	Par40	0.6045	0.1524	0.3624	-0.3124	0.1954	0.152	0.1971	0.0902
41	Par41	0.8671	-0.1754	0.034	-0.1812	-0.0975	0.0045	-0.049	0.0674
	Eigenvalues	11.9116076	3.8966387	3.7797084	3.58374916	2.2327837	2.18234016	1.81461101	1.5093221
	% Explained Variance	29	10	9	9	5	5	4	4

Appendix H Correlation between Factor Scores

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Factor 1	1			
Factor 2	0.266	1		
Factor 3	-0.0543	-0.1278	1	
Factor 4	-0.4461	-0.1419	0.0091	1

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