Three Essays on the Political Consequences of International Migration

by

Junghyun Lim

B.A in Political Science and Economics, Sogang University, 2014

Master's in Arts in Political Science, Sogang University, 2016

Master's in Arts in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2018

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2021

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

This dissertation was presented

by

Junghyun Lim

It was defended on

July 29th 2021

and approved by

Jude C.Hays, Professor, Department of Political Science

Michaël Aklin, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

Jae-Jae Spoon, Professor, Department of Political Science

Erica Owen, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Three Essays on the Political Consequences of International Migration

Junghyun Lim, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2021

Over the last few decades, the flow of international migration has increased steadily, and Europe is no exception. At the same time, immigration has become more politically salient in Europe. This growing volume of migration and the politicization of immigration raise a series of questions. Who stands to benefit or be disadvantaged by the politicization of immigration? What are the implications of the large-scale migration for sending countries? The three essays of this dissertation explore different aspects of these questions.

In the first paper, I explore the political attributes of emigrants and how their exit affects the distribution of voters in their home countries, focusing on Eastern Europe, where the number of emigrants has been increasing since the EU enlargement. I find that emigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be younger, highly educated, and politically more progressive, hence the support for far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates.

In the second paper, I explore how political environments in host countries influence immigrants' political attitudes. Migrants' experiences vary by the political environments in host countries. When immigrants experience hostilities toward them, they likely become dissatisfied with the political system of host countries. Using the various kinds of data from 10 Western European countries, I find that when immigrants live in regions with high support for far-right parties, they become more skeptical regarding democracy.

In the last paper, I explore how the growing salience of immigration affects parties' welfare policy. The increasing salience of immigration creates a challenge for left-wing parties. Conventionally, left-wing parties are committed to welfare expansion and pro-immigration policies. Yet, left-wing parties rely on two different groups of constituents. While socially liberal constituents tend to be pro-immigrant, the constituents with low-income tend to be anti-immigrant. Given this dilemma, when immigration becomes salient, parties need to adjust their policy to maximize their vote share. I find that when immigration becomes salient and voters with anti-immigration views are disproportionately more from the low-

income segment of the population, center-left parties tend to converge to a more conservative welfare policy position.

<p align="center">**Table of Contents**</p>

List of Tables

List of Figures

Preface

Above all, I am truly thankful to my advisor, Jude Hays. Jude has been a mentor and guidepost for me throughout this process. He generously shared his invaluable insights while developing this project. I am also grateful to the members of my committee, Michaël Aklin, Jae-Jae Spoon, and Erica Owen, who have been nothing but supportive. I was lucky to have such creative and supportive scholars on my committee. I couldn't have asked for better guidance or encouragement than what I received from them.

Scholars at Pitt have made a big influence on my research as well. Many thanks to Steve Finkel, Mike Colaresi, Burcu Savun, Jon Woon, and Will Spaniel among others. I benefitted tremendously from the Pitt research lab meeting, hosted by Michaël Aklin. I am thankful to Michaël and research lab members who kindly shared their ideas and feedback. My friends and colleagues at Pitt have been an important part of this process. In particular, I am truly thankful to Kelly Morrison, Sara Fox, Minsu Jang, José Incio, Ignacio Mamone, Dongju Lee, and Eun Young Kim. Every cup of the Red Hawk coffee with you was fuel that kept me going.

I developed a passion for research during my time at Sogang University as an undergraduate student. Thanks to Geunwook Lee, who inspired me to pursue social science research, Shang E. Ha, who helped open my eyes to more opportunities, and every other wonderful colleague at Sogang.

I am deeply grateful to my family and friends in Ilsan for their emotional supports. My parents, Moosung Lim and Kyungja Kang always inspire me. My sister Seunghyun Lim and YoungJune Ham have been so supportive and encouraging. I am also truly grateful to Youngsuk Yoo for her wisdom and prayers.

Finally, I dedicate this work to my partnerd Kevin T. Greene. I could not have done it without you.

1.0 Introduction

The international migration flow has been on a steady increase over the last few decades [1, 114]. In 2019 alone, approximately 272 million people (3.5 % of the global population) migrated across borders, which is the highest volume of migration since the 1990s [114]. This upward trend is especially strong in Europe. Since the European Union expanded, EU members have been experiencing rapid growth in immigration inflows from other EU members, as well as from outside of Europe.

As the volume of migration grows, migration has become more politicized as well [30]. A recent Eurobarometer survey reports that 48 percent of Europeans in their sample select immigration as the most salient issue, ahead of the economy and terrorism. At the same time, nationalist backlashes against immigration have become pervasive across much of Europe, from Brexit to the rise of various far-right parties. Far-right parties with anti-immigration agendas like Alternative for Germany(AfD) or National Rally(Front) in France are no longer niche parties. For instance, AFD won 92 seats out of 709 in the 2017 national election, and Marine Le Pen of Front National made the runoff against Macron in the 2017 presidential election.

This growing volume of migration and the rise of the anti-immigration sentiment raise a series of questions. What are the political consequences of the politicization of the immigration issues? Who stands to benefit or be disadvantaged by it? And finally, what are the implications of this large-scale migration for sending countries? In this dissertation, I aim to answer these questions by exploring the political implication of international migration flows from both sending and receiving countries' perspectives.

Conventionally, voluntary migration is studied mainly as an economic phenomenon. Canonical theories in migration research perceive migration as a flow of labor forces and migrants as economic actors or laborers. Accordingly, many studies focus on economic impacts of migration including its impacts on labor market [e.g. 19], economic growth [80, 81], fiscal gain (or loss) [37], and the distribution of income [106]. In fact, most voluntary migration is primarily motivated by economic reasons. According to the World Migration Report

2020, two-third of the entire migrants are labor migrants [114].

Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the impact of migration is only limited to the economic sphere. Migrants are not only economic actors but also political actors. Immigration brings new sets of political actors and their cultures as well as economic actors to receiving countries. On the other hand, migration results in the loss of political and social actors in sending countries.

A growing number of studies explore these political and cultural aspects of international migration and their impacts on politics [e.g. 33, 46]. Especially for the last few years, there have been lots of researches on the causes of anti-immigration sentiment in Western democracies, focusing on its cultural aspects. Many of these works find that citizens form their attitudes toward immigrants primarily based on cultural and social issues that immigration may cause, rather than economic concerns [57, 130, 26, 61]. These confirm that migration has multiple aspects, and migration brings in and takes out more than just labor forces across borders. Depending on who migrants are, where they are from, and where they arrive, international migration can have varying influences on politics through several different channels.

Building on these works, in my dissertation, I view migration as the relocation of political actors as well as economic agents and explore how this movement of political actors can influence political outcomes such as electoral outcomes, public opinion, and parties' policy positions. The three essays of this dissertation explore different aspects of the political implications of international migration. In the first essay, I study how emigration affects the politics in sending countries. I examine the political and social attributes of emigrants and how their departure affects the distribution of voters and electoral outcomes in their home countries. Previous literature on emigration and its political impact mainly focuses on remittances [e.g. 41, 43, 138]. However, emigration is not only a source of remittances but also outflows of political actors. I argue that when politically progressive people leave, the distribution of the remaining voters becomes more conservative and predisposed to supporting far-right parties. Thus, regions with more emigrants will have higher levels of support for far-right parties. I empirically test these expectations in six Eastern European countries using individual-level survey and sub-national level data on emigration and election outcomes.

I find that emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately politically progressive and that the support for far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates.

In the second essay, I explore how political environments in host countries affect immigrants' political attitudes. Immigrants' political attitudes have important implications both in receiving and sending countries. With the growing number of immigrants, the political integration of immigrants has become one of the important policy goals for many Western democracies [e.g. 141, 77]. At the same time, immigrants' political opinions likely influence politics in their home countries as well since immigrants play significant roles in transferring new ideas and information to their home countries [117, 29, 56].

Many previous studies suggest that migrants in advanced democracies become more pro-democratic and transmit democratic values to their home countries. However, migrants' experiences with democracies are not necessarily all positive. Immigrants' daily experiences vary a lot by the political environments in host countries. I argue that when migrants experience hostilities, they likely become less attached to democratic values. Using an individual-level survey of immigrants in 10 Western European countries, along with Bayesian hierarchical models and post-stratification, I find that when migrants live in regions with a strong anti-immigration sentiment, they become more skeptical regarding democracy.

Lastly, in the third essay, I explore how the growing political salience of immigration affects the welfare policy positions of parties. Many previous studies on the salience of immigration primarily focus on its impacts on immigration policies or electoral outcomes. Yet, the politicization of immigration can influence the welfare policy positions of parties as well by reshaping political cleavages. The increasing salience of immigration introduces a new cleavage that cuts across the economic left-right dimension. This new cleavage creates a dilemma for left-wing parties in Europe. Left-wing parties are often committed to welfare expansion and multiculturalism simultaneously. However, a significant portion of the left-wing constituents are receptive to welfare expansion but do not necessarily support liberal migration policies. Given this, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties adjust their welfare policy positions to maximize their vote share. By maintaining their conventional policy positions on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant portion of their core constituents. At the same time, however, adjusting only immigration

policy positions may not be enough to maintain electoral supports. For instance, if left-wing parties takes a more conservative stance on immigration policy to accommodate their low-income constituents, they may lose their socially liberal supporters [4, 55]. To compensate for this loss, left-wing parties will need to adjust their other policy (welfare) to appeal to other voters.

Applying the classic model of [123], I identify the conditions where left-wing parties adjust their welfare policy positions. When voters whose views on immigration are at the median are wealthier than average, left-wing parties converge to right-wing parties' welfare positions. I test these predictions in 10 European countries and find the supportive evidence for this prediction using the Comparative Manifesto database along with several different types of individual-level survey data.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on international migration and domestic politics in several ways. First, by looking into both sending and receiving countries' perspectives, I highlight that international migration can affect politics in sending and receiving countries differently. While there have been many previous studies on the impacts of immigration inflows on the politics of receiving countries, the political consequences of migration in sending countries are relatively under-studied. By examining the political effect of migration in both sending and receiving countries' perspectives, this dissertation points out that migration flows are not just a domestic political issue but a global phenomenon that affects multiple countries' politics simultaneously.

This dissertation also adds to the literature on the rise of anti-immigration sentiment and radical right-wing populism in Western democracies. The findings of this dissertation suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment can have impacts beyond the immigration policy in receiving countries. The second essay shows that the rise of anti-immigration parties can potentially influence the politics in sending countries by shaping immigrants' political attitudes. Through the ideas spread by migrants, immigration politics in popular destination countries such as Western Europe may have political impacts that extend beyond their borders. Similarly, the third essay also shows that the effects of the politicization of immigration are not limited to immigration policies of receiving countries but also can extend to other policy areas. This paper shows that the salience of immigration can influence the welfare

policy positions of parties. These findings suggest that international migration is not an isolated political or economic phenomenon. Future research should study the consequences of international migration in broader areas.

2.0   Electoral Consequences of International Migration in Sending Countries

2.1   Introduction

While Western Europe and the US are receiving large inflows of immigrants, many other countries and regions are experiencing net outflows of their population. Over the last two decades, Central and Eastern Europe have lost nearly 20 million people as a result of emigration, which is approximately 5.5 percent of their population [10]. When emigration occurs on such a large scale, what are the electoral consequences in sending countries?

In this paper, I analyze the economic and political attributes of emigrants from Eastern Europe and how their departure affects the electoral outcomes in their home countries. These two inquiries are closely connected. Depending on the characteristics of emigrants, their exit can have different effects on the distribution of the remaining population. I argue that emigrants are different from those who remain in their political preferences as well as economic profiles such that large-scale emigration affects the distribution of voters in sending countries. In particular, emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately more politically progressive, making the remaining pool of voters more conservative and predisposed to supporting far-right parties. Thus, regions with a large number of emigrants will have greater levels of support for radical right-wing parties.

I test these expectations in six Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004: the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Estonia.[1] They provide useful cases for exploring the effects of emigration in sending countries. Previous studies show that both sending and receiving countries can design their migration policies and control migration volumes and flows according to their political interests [129, 104]. EU enlargement has removed such institutional constraints on labor mobility within the EU. This is an institutional shock at the individual level that lowers the cost of migration significantly. As a result, Eastern Europe has been experiencing large-scale voluntary emigration since EU

---

[1]Eight Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004. Among these eight countries, I included six countries whose emigration data is available at the sub-national level. The excluded countries are Hungary and Lithuania.

enlargement [140]. Exploiting this institutional change, this manuscript assesses the electoral consequences of emigration based on the characteristics of emigrants.

To explore the emigrants' characteristics, I use individual-level survey data from the 2010 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Life in Transition Survey (LiTs) and the European Social Survey (ESS). Then I estimate the total effects of emigration on electoral outcomes at the sub-national level, using regional emigration and electoral data from six Eastern European countries from 2004 to 2018. To address the potential endogeneity issues, I use instrumental variable analysis, leveraging the surge of Polish emigrants to the UK after the EU enlargement. Finally, to investigate the potential effect of emigration on individual policy preferences and vote choices, I use three waves of individual-level panel survey data in Poland (POLPAN). The results of the analyses provide supportive evidence for the argument of this manuscript. I find that (1) migrants from Eastern Europe tend to be younger, more educated, and politically more progressive, (2) regions with a large volume of emigration have higher levels of support for far-right parties, and that (3) regional emigration can affect individuals' policy preferences and voting behavior.

These findings help us to improve our understanding of the implications of international migration from the perspective of sending countries [e.g. 79]. Also, this paper speaks to a growing literature on geographical sorting, which focuses on the political division between rural and urban areas in domestic politics [122, 99]. The findings of this manuscript suggest that migration can facilitate geographical sorting of political preferences even across borders. Finally, this manuscript provides a new angle for the growth of radical right-wing parties in Eastern Europe. Whereas extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe have gathered burgeoning scholarly attention [84, 52, 112, 105], their counterparts in Eastern Europe have received relatively limited attention [e.g. 107, 22]. The emigration of progressive voters is obviously not the only explanation for the recent growth of radical right-wing populism in Eastern Europe [107, 21, 5]. However, the exit of voters who are least likely to be convinced by far-right populism certainly makes the distribution of voters more favorable for radical right-wing parties.

7

2.2 Who Emigrates? Characteristics of Emigrants

In this section, I show that emigrants have different political preferences from individuals who stay. Using two different types of survey data, I compare the economic and political attributes of emigrants and stayers that affect their political support for far-right parties.

The canonical theories of emigration suggest that people migrate to maximize their economic gains [18]. Young and highly educated people are more likely to emigrate to advanced economies since they benefit more economically due to a wide wage gap in high-skilled jobs and lower cost of leaving [73, 100]. Although the main drivers of emigration are economic factors, emigrants also differ in their political attitudes.

Individuals' economic attributes are often strongly associated with their political preferences. Education and age are strong predictors of individuals' political preferences. Young, highly educated people are relatively more pro-immigrant, and cosmopolitan [57], which are salient cleavages that determine individuals' political support, especially for far-right parties [126, 5, 112]. This suggests that the emigration of young, highly educated voters results in the exit of more cosmopolitan and pro-immigrant voters, who would be less likely to support far-right parties if they stayed.

On the other hand, migrants also consider the political environments of the destination countries when making migration decisions [46, 70]. Particularly, the internal migration literature has demonstrated that individuals choose locations where political views are similar to their own [122, 99]. Individuals whose preferences are strongly aligned with their home countries are more likely to stay while those who are open to different cultures are more likely to leave. Given that attachment to their home and attitudes toward different cultures are some of the strongest predictors of far-right support [45, 112], emigrants are drawn more from people who would be less likely to vote for far-right parties if they stayed.

To examine the characteristics of these emigrants, I use the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 2010 Life in Transition survey (LiTs) and European Social Survey (ESS) data. LiTs allows us to explore the attributes of potential emigrants by asking their willingness to emigrate. One limitation with LiTs is that it does not capture if respondents actually emigrate. To complement this, I use the ESS, which captures a sample

of emigrants from Eastern Europe who currently live in Western Europe as well as a sample of people who remain in Eastern Europe.[2] The limitation is that covariates of emigrants in ESS are measured after the respondents emigrated and therefore might have been affected by their migration experiences (post-treatment). Ideally, we would have longitudinal data that captures both pre- and post-emigration attitudes. Unfortunately, there is no data available that tracks international migrants across borders. My approach provides a second best option by showing consistent patterns across pre- and post-emigration.

Using both LiTs and ESS, I compare the distribution of emigrants and individuals who remain across several dimensions. I compare their age and the level of education, which affect their political attitudes as well as migration decisions.[3] Then, I compare their attitudes toward immigrants, which is a strong predictor of support for far-right parties [111, 112, 5]. Figure 1 presents the different distributions of (potential) emigrants and people who remain. The red and gray color each represents (potential) emigrants and stayers.

The first and second row of figures is based on LiTs, and ESS, respectively. The first column shows that emigrants are younger than individuals who stay across both datasets. While the bulk of emigrants are in their twenties to thirties, stayers are distributed evenly through their thirties to seventies. The second column shows that emigrants are relatively more educated. LiTs shows that emigrants have a higher proportion in teritiary (5) or higher, while ESS shows that the share of individuals with a higher degree than a teritary education is larger in the emigrant sample. The third column shows how emigrants have different attitudes toward immigrants. In both datasets, emigrants are more pro-immigrant than individuals who stayed.[4]

---

[2]I use the ESS from Western European countries to capture a sample of emigrants while I use the ESS conducted in Eastern European countries to capture a sample of people who stay in Eastern Europe. To identify the emigrants, I use questions asking if respondents were born in a country of their current residence, when and where they migrated. For more information, see Appendix (A.1.2)

[3]For emigrants respondents in ESS, I use the age of their emigration, instead of their current age to compare the age of emigration decision. ESS wave 5 to 9 have questions regarding when they migrated to the country they currently reside which allow us to calculate the age of emigrants' departure while ESS waves 1 to 4 do not ask the exact year of arrival. For this reason, I use ESS waves 5 to 9 only to compare emigrants' characteristics with stayers.

[4]It is challenging to measure emigrants' attitudes toward immigrants. ESS has several questions asking respondents' attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, when targeted respondents are emigrants, it makes themselves as immigrants in these questions. To address this issue, I use a question asking their attitudes toward immigrants of different ethnicity or race as a proxy for their attitudes toward minorities and diversity in general. For more explanation, see Appendix(A.1.2)

9

Figure 1: (Potential) Emigrant vs Stayers

In sum, Figure 1 suggests that emigrants are younger, more highly educated, and pro-immigrant. LiTs and ESS do not directly ask (potential) emigrants' vote choice, which prevents us from measuring emigrants' support for far-right parties directly.[5] However, previous studies affirm that these attributes are a set of strong predictors of radical right-wing support [e.g. 5, 28, 112].

To analyze the profiles of emigrants more systematically, I estimate a logistic model of individuals' willingness to emigrate on these attributes using the LiTs. The results in the Table 1 shows consistent pattern with the figure 1. Both model 1, and 2 show that that younger and more educated people are more willing to emigrate. In the model 2, I include a vector of variables regarding individuals' political attitudes. I include individuals' attitude toward democracy, which remains one of the salient political cleavages in Eastern Europe [5] and if respondents voted in the most recent election to control for whether (potential) emigrants are politically engaged more or less than (potential) stayers.[6] Model 2 shows that younger and more educated people are more willing to emigrate and have more positive views of immigrants and democracy as well.

These results are consistent with the results from the ESS data reported in the table 2.[7] As in the previous analyses, I use logistic model with country and year fixed effect. The findings in the table 2 confirms that emigrants are likely to be younger, and more educated. Also, emigrants tend to be ideologically more progressive, and pro-immigrant.

Overall, across different sources of data, I find that emigrants are disproportionately drawn more from younger, more educated, and politically more progressive segments of the population. These findings raise a following question: how does the departure of these emigrants affect the electoral outcomes in sending countries? Would their emigration benefit far-right parties in their home countries?

---

[5]ESS asks respondents which party they voted for in the most recent national elections in that country. However, emigrants are not eligible to answer the question regarding their vote choice in national elections of host countries.

[6]Emigrants can be less engaged in politics in expectation of leaving the country in the near future. For instance, [53, 128]

[7]ESS and LiTs do not have the exact same set of questions, but they do have comparable questions. For more information on questions from each dataset, see appendix(A.1)

Table 1: The Characteristics of (Potential) Emigrants (LiTs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Willing to Emigrate	
	(1)	(2)
Age	−0.055***	−0.053***
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Female	−0.327***	−0.334***
	(0.067)	(0.075)
Education	0.116***	0.107***
	(0.025)	(0.028)
Anti-Immigrant		−0.161***
		(0.052)
Support for Democracy		0.263***
		(0.076)
Religiosity		−0.292**
		(0.147)
Vote		−0.090
		(0.078)
Unemployed	0.513***	0.555***
	(0.119)	(0.144)
Satisfied with Econ	−0.148***	−0.159***
	(0.035)	(0.039)
Country FE	✓	✓
Observations	6,149	4,808
Log Likelihood	−2,839.312	−2,274.514
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 2: The Characteristics of Emigrants (ESS Wave 5-9)

	Dependent variable: Emigrants	
	(1)	(2)
Age (of arrival)	−0.086***	−0.086***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	−0.048	−0.046
	(0.109)	(0.109)
Education	0.118***	0.121***
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Anti-Immigrant	−0.132**	−0.090
	(0.065)	(0.068)
Ideology	−0.116***	−0.116***
(Conservative)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Religiosity	−0.044**	−0.046**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Country (of origin) FE	✓	✓
Year FE		✓
Observations	30,358	30,358
Log Likelihood	−1,481.117	−1,474.686
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

13

2.3 Emigration and Electoral Outcomes

Despite its magnitude, the effect of emigration on politics in sending countries has received relatively little attention. One of the largest literatures on this topic focuses on remittances. Diaspora communities can influence politics in their home countries by sending financial or social remittances. Financial remittances from emigrants can affect recipients' political attitudes and voting behavior by lowering their cost of political participation or economic dependence on the domestic market [49, 3, 138, 137]. Financial remittances can also have more direct influences on the survival of the political regime by funding politicians or shaping public opinion [119, 43, 44, 15]. Some researches focus on the role of social remittances such as ideas, information, and attitudes toward human rights or democratic values transmitted through migrants [93, 117].

These studies show some channels of influence from emigration on sending countries' politics. However, emigration is not only a source of capital inflows or ideas but also outflows of political actors. Thus, by looking at the political influences from diaspora communities only, we cannot capture the total effects of emigration.

On the other hand, the literature on brain drain looks into the effects of outflows of emigrants from the perspective of human capital loss. A wide gap in income, especially for high skilled jobs, can draw many highly skilled workers from developing to developed countries. Scholars have been studying outflows of high-skilled laborers, focusing on its economic effects [39]. They view emigrants primarily as economic actors, exploring the economic effects of emigration such as fiscal loss [37], economic growth [80, 81], and income distribution [106].

Recently, some studies look into the political effects of emigration through economic channels. Using the case of Swedish emigration to the US, [82] show that labor shortages, induced by emigration, could empower workers and allow them to demand welfare expansion. Although these findings make valuable contributions to improving our understanding of the effects of emigration, the fact that emigrants are self-selected political actors, as well as economic actors, is still often overlooked in empirical research.[8]

---

[8][82] did not find the evidence of self-selection by political features.

Emigration results in not only a loss of labor but also a loss of political actors as well. Especially when emigrants are disproportionately more from people with certain political ideologies or preferences, their departure will have significant effects on electoral outcomes in sending countries. This argument is also relevant to the 'safety valve' argument from the literature on emigration policies in authoritarian regimes [103]. When politically disaffected people leave [67], the authoritarian regimes may benefit from their exit due to the decrease in (potential) domestic opposition. Thus, authoritarian governments can use emigration as a safety valve for their regime [e.g. 42, 104]. My argument shares a logic similar to this theory in that selective emigration can benefit certain political groups by changing the distribution of the political preferences in sending countries.

As shown in the previous section, emigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be younger, more educated, and politically more progressive than those who stay. In other words, emigrants are drawn more from people who are less likely to vote for far-right parties if they stayed. Thus, their departure will benefit far-right parties by making the distribution of the electorate more conservative. Of course, the emigration of progressive voters is not the sole explanation for the recent growth of far-right parties in Eastern Europe. However, it makes the distribution of voters more favorable for far-right parties.

It should be noted that emigration does not necessarily prevent emigrants from voting [2]. Many countries provide *de jure* external voting. All six countries in the sample also allow *de jure* external voting as of 2006.[9] However, the presence of *de jure* external voting system does not guarantee the same *de facto* chances of voting for migrants. Migration reduces individuals' propensity to vote by increasing the cost of voting by a significant amount. Emigrants often need to visit polling stations to vote. Yet, there are only a few of them, and they are located only in metropolitan areas, which are hardly accessible to many migrants [66]. Using the data from post-communist countries which include all six countries in our sample, [87] found that turnouts for external voting are significantly lower than for domestic. Therefore, emigration changes the electorate in sending countries despite the presence of *de jure* external voting system.

---

[9]The Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced external voting in 2002 and 2006, respectively. The other four countries introduced it at the time of their first legislative elections since the democratization [87].

In sum, I argue that the emigration of young, highly educated, and politically progressive people who unlikely vote for far-right parties if they stayed, benefits far-right parties in sending countries by changing the distribution of electorates in sending countries more favorable to them. Whereas emigration may have further effects on electoral outcomes by induing demographic and societal changes, in this paper, I aim to capture the overall impact of emigration on the support for radical right wing parties.

2.4 Research Design

My theory leads to the hypothesis that the vote share of far-right parties is greater in regions where the share of emigration is larger.I start by exploring this hypothesis at the sub-national level, using the data on migration and electoral outcomes from six Eastern European countries.

For the sub-national unit analyses, I use NUTS 3, which is the most disaggregated regional unit that is comparable across EU countries.[10] I use data on emigration and parliamentary election outcomes at the NUTS 3 level, collected from the national statistics offices of each country.[11] To measure the level of regional emigration, I use the number of permanent or long term migrants who spend longer than a year outside of their country of origin. A good portion of migrants from Eastern Europe are short term or seasonal workers who return to home countries within a few months [e.g. 115]. Whereas short-term migration may potentially affect politics in sending countries through different channels, it is unlikely to change the distribution of electorates since seasonal workers likely vote at their home. Therefore, in this paper, I focus on the long-term and permanent emigrants to estimate the effects of emigration on the electoral outcomes.[12]

---

[10]NUTS 3 is defined as "small regions for specific diagnoses" by Eurostat (`https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background`). For more explanation on NUTS 3 region in each country, see appendix (A.2.1).

[11]For more information on data source, see Appendix (A.2)

[12]Statistical office of each country uses different methods to acquire the emigration data: Some require the registration to their citizens for changes in residency (Estonia, Poland), while others use administrative data such as national health system (Latvia) or implement the extensive annual survey (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic). For more information regarding each data source, see appendix(A.2.2)

To code far-right parties, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data [12, 11]. CHES provides an indicator for ideological positions of parties in Europe and specifies their party family based on the survey of experts of each country's politics.[13] Using CHES' classification for radical right-wing parties, I code far-right parties in the sample. Table 3 reports the list of far-right parties in Eastern Europe since EU enlargement. Most of these parties are classified as radical right-wing parties in other datasets (e.g. Comparative Manifesto Data) and previous studies except Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. Whereas CHES classifies PiS as a radical right-wing party from the early 2000s, some previous studies consider PiS as center-right until the mid 2000s, and instead consider League of Polish Families (LPR) to be a radical right-wing party [e.g. 108, 21].[14] In the appendix, I replicate the results using this alternative coding that classifying LPR as a far-right party in the 2005 and 2007 elections. The results are consistent in terms of the direction of the coefficients and their statistical significance.[15]

For the analysis, I estimate variants of the following model:

$$\text{Far-Right Vote}_{t,i} = \beta \text{Emigration}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}\gamma + \phi_i + \psi_t$$

where i indexes NUTS 3 regions, and t election years. Far-Right Vote$_{i,t}$ is the vote share of the radical right-wing parties whereas Emigration$_{i,t-1}$ is the proportion of emigrants in the voting eligible population, one year lagged.

The term $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$ represents a vector of regional confounders that could affect the support for far-right votes and emigration rate at the same time. This includes regional GDP, unemployment rate, immigration inflows. Lastly, I include NUTS 3 region fixed effects (ϕ_i) meant to account for unobserved region-specific, time-invariant factors, and ψ_t represents year fixed effects, meant to control unobserved time-specific factors.

---

[13]CHES follows [68] to code party family, and classifies agrarian and confessional parties separately. For more detail, see [11].

[14]CHES classifies LPR as a confessional party, and Comparative Manifesto Project data consider LPR as Christian Democratic Party while classifying PiS as a conservative party.

[15]For the results with the alternative coding for far-right parties are reported in Appendix 2.4

2.5   Findings

Table 4 reports the regression results of vote share of the far-right parties on the emigration share of the electorates at $t-1$ for six countries. All results are based on OLS models with both year and region fixed effects. The coefficients of the explanatory variable are signed as expected. Emigration positively correlates with the votes for the far-right parties. This relationship is statistically significant and consistent with the argument that emigration benefits the growth of far-right parties across different models. The size of the coefficients from some model specifications is larger than one might expect solely from changes to the distribution of the electorates. It suggests that emigration may have effects on electoral outcomes through channels other than changing the distribution of voters, such as affecting the policy preferences of individuals who remain in their home countries. This is further investigated in section 2.6.2.

Another interesting finding is that immigration has no significant effect on the dependent variable. Previous studies of Western Europe have found correlations between the growth of far-right parties and inflows of immigrants [e.g. 51, 9, 83]. However, in our sample, the number of immigrants does not affect far-right votes significantly. This implies that we cannot generalize the experience of popular immigration destination countries to sending countries.

Whereas model 1 includes only the emigration share along with region and year fixed effects, model 2 - 4 include different regional confounders. In particular, in model 4, I include lagged dependent variable in addition to other regional covariates. Although I control for the regional-level economic confounders such as GDP and unemployment rate as well as region fixed effect that account for unobserved factors that are specific for each region, there still can be other sources of endogeneity that may bias our estimates. For instance, politically more progressive people may leave their home country because they expect far-right parties to grow in the future. To control for each region's propensity to support for far-right parties, I use the vote share of far-right parties in the previous election (lagged dependent variable) as a proxy for the expected growth of far-right parties. Modeling the lagged dependent variable also address potential serial correlation in the dependent variable in the panel data.

Table 3: Far-Right Parties in Eastern Europe

Country	Election Year	Far-Right Parties
Slovakia	2006, 2010, 2012 2016	Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS) (Slovak National Party)
Slovenia	2008, 2011, 2014, 2018	Slovenská národná strana (SNS) (Slovenian National Party)
Poland	2005, 2007. 2011, 2015	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS) (Law and Justice)
Latvia	2006, 2011, 2014, 2018	Nacionāl̄a apvienība "Visu Latvijai!"— "Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK"(TB-LNNK) (National Alliance, "All for Latvia, for Fatherland and Freedom!/LNNK")
Czech Republic	2015, 2017	Úsvit přímé demokracie (Úsvit) (Dawn of Direct Democracy) Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) (Freedom and Direct Democracy)
Estonia	2015, 2019	Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE) (Conservative People's Party of Estonia)

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2004-2019)

Table 4: Emigration and Vote Share of Far-right Parties

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote Share of Far-right Parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Emigration	2.135*	4.966**	9.148***	6.207***
	(1.207)	(1.998)	(2.432)	(2.306)
Immigration		4.073	1.187	0.532
		(2.564)	(3.444)	(3.197)
GDP			−0.001***	−0.008***
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Unemployment			0.006***	0.003*
			(0.002)	(0.002)
NUTS 3 FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lagged DV				✓
Observations	409	394	352	333
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2.6 Emigration and Electoral Outcomes in Poland

To test the robustness of the results and investigate the potential impacts of emigration on individuals' vote choices, I conduct a more rigorous empirical test with the case of Poland.

Even when controlling for economic confounders and including lagged dependent variables across different model specifications, there can still be remaining unobservable variables that may affect emigration rates and vote share of far-right parties simultaneously. This endogeneity can bias our estimates.

Also, migration may affect electoral outcomes through channels other than changing the distribution of electorates. Emigration may affect the policy preferences and vote choices of those who remain in their home countries. Large-scale emigration can induce societal and demographic changes that could have downstream effects on individuals' voting behavior.

Poland provides a useful test case for investigating these possibilities. Historically, Poland has been one of the largest sending countries in Europe, and is a country where emigrants outnumber immigrants [78]. The volume of immigrants in Poland has been gradually increasing. Yet, the net migration of Poland has remained negative due to their even faster growth in emigration. Since Poland joined the EU in May 2004, their emigration to other EU countries has increased even more. Particularly, migration to the UK, which allowed Polish workers full access to their labor market immediately after the accession, was the main driver of post-EU growth in emigration rates [115]. As of 2006, the year in which the annual long-term/permanent emigration rate peaked, 47,000 Polish workers left Poland, which is more than twice the number of emigrants in pre-EU periods.

In addition to its substantive importance, focusing on the case of Poland allows us to adopt a few empirical strategies to address potential endogeneity issues and investigate the direct effects of emigration on individual policy preferences. First, I address endogeneity by using an instrumental variable approach, exploiting the fact that the growth of Polish emigration in the post-EU accession period has been driven mostly by an increase in emigration to a single destination country (UK). I leverage the exogeneity of economic conditions in the UK to construct an instrument.

Second, to identify the effects of emigration on policy preferences of individuals who

remain, I use a panel survey of a nationally representative sample of Polish citizens between 2008 and 2013, the Poland Panel Survey (POLPAN). This panel survey data allows us to investigate the impacts of regional-level emigration on the remaining individuals' political attitudes.

2.6.1 Endogeneity

An ideal instrument should be exogenous to regional voting outcomes but strongly correlated with emigration rates. Although it is challenging to find such instruments, previous studies in the migration literature use a shift-share logic to address this issue. They predict a country's emigration rates using the economic condition of the destination country, interacted with the past emigration patterns in sending countries [e.g. 106, 121, 7]. This idea builds on the fact that the economic condition of the destination country exogenously affects the emigration rates from the sending country (treatment), but the intensity of this impact could vary across regions by their previous emigration patterns (intensity of treatment).

The economic condition of the destination country is a strong pull factor for migrants. It likely affects emigration rates, and yet is exogenous to regional voting outcomes in the sending country. While the economic condition of the destination predicts the emigration rates at the national level, the intensity of its impact should vary across regions. To capture the regional variation, previous studies have used the past emigration rate of each region [106, 121]. The past emigration rate is a proxy for the presence of pre-existing social networks, which are some of the strongest predictors of emigration flows [e.g. 97]. By interacting the economic condition of the destination with the past emigration rates, previous studies were able to construct instruments for the region-specific emigration rates [106, 121, 132].

Following this approach, I construct the instrument for regional emigration rates in Poland by interacting the unemployment rates in the UK (the exogenous pull factor) and the past emigration rates of each region in Poland before the EU accession. A majority of Polish emigrants' destinations have been Germany and the UK. Approximately 62 % of emigrants went to these two countries (2011 census) [115].[16] Although historically Germany

---

[16]The third most popular destination is the US, which receives 8 % of the emigrants, followed by Netherlands (4 %).

has been a more popular destination than the UK, the emigration rates to the UK have increased dramatically after the EU accession. Since the UK allowed full access to their labor market immediately after the EU enlargement in 2004, the emigration rates to the UK have increased 28 % compared to the pre-accession period, whereas the emigration rate to Germany has remained consistent. In the 2 years after the EU accession, the UK became the most popular destination country (receiving 33% of emigrants) for Polish emigrants post EU accession [115].[17] This allows me to leverage the economic condition of the UK as an exogenous pull factor that affects the emigration rates of Poland. Among other economic indicators, I use unemployment rates in the UK to measure the demand for labor inflow.[18]

To capture the regional variation in tendency to migrate from Poland, I interact the unemployment rate of the UK with the regional emigration rates prior to the EU accession, following approaches similar to the previous studies [106, 121, 132]. The higher past emigration (pre-EU) of a region is, the larger impacts the economic condition in the UK would have on the emigration rates in that region. I use the emigration rate in 2003, a year before the EU enlargement. [19] The equation below summarizes the IV strategy:

$$\text{Emigration}_{i,t} = \beta \text{Emigration}_{i,preEU} * \text{UK Unemployment}_{t-1} + \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}\gamma + \phi_i + \psi_t \qquad \text{(First Stage)}$$

$$\text{Far-Right.Vote}_{t,i} = \beta \widehat{\text{Emigration}}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}\gamma + \phi_i + \psi_t \qquad \text{(Second Stage)}$$

where i indexes NUTS 3 regions and t indexed election years post EU accession.

Emigration$_{i,preEU}$ refers to the share of emigrants in the region i prior to the EU enlargement. Both equations include a vector of confounders such as GDP, unemployment rates, and immigration inflows, $(\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1})$ as well as region specific and year fixed effects (ϕ_i, ψ_t).

---

[17]While EU accession reduced the mobility restriction for Polish citizens overall, only the UK, when Ireland and Sweden, allowed Polish workers unconditional, full access to their labor market immediately. Other countries in the EU gradually opened their labor market. In 2011, Poland gained full access to the labor market of every EU member, with Germany and Austria finally fully opened their labor market.

[18]Some studies use GDP growth as a proxy for the economic condition that affects labor demand and migration [e.g. 7]. The results are consistent when using this measure (Appendix A.3.3).

[19]Ideally, we would have data on the past emigration rates by destination, which would allow me to use the past emigration rates to the UK exclusively to build an instrument. However, such data is not available at the sub-national level. For a robustness check, in the appendix, I use the emigration share in 2004, the year of EU enlargement, instead of pre-EU emigration rates (Appendix A.3.2). This identification leverages the fact that emigration to the UK has increased almost exclusively immediately after the EU enlargement due to the free access to the UK labor market.

The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the additional increase/decrease of emigration rates in regions where emigration rate in pre-EU period is high relative to regions with lower level of the emigraiton in pre-EU period. I use this additional differences in emigrant share to identify a causal effect of emigration on vote share of far-right parties.

Table 5: Instrumental Variable Analysis (Poland)

			Dependent variable:			
			Vote share of Far-Right Party			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Emigration	7.112*	22.943***	9.438**	19.490**	7.478**	15.030*
	(3.694)	(8.867)	(4.604)	(8.802)	(3.558)	(8.273)
Immigration			6.101	1.778	12.358	8.943
			(13.526)	(14.190)	(12.630)	(13.220)
Unemployment			0.007***	0.007***	0.004*	0.004**
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP			−0.015***	−0.012***	−0.014***	−0.007***
			(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
NUTS 3 FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lagged DV					✓	✓
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
First Stage F		52.47***		43.730***		42.106***
N	285	285	258	258	258	258

***$p<0.01$; **$p<0.05$; *$p<0.1$

This IV approach relies on an assumption that there are no other ways that the economic condition of the UK affects the voting results differently across regions by their past emigration rates, except through the current emigration rates. One might argue that there are some unobserved differences between the regions with high past emigration rates and those with low past emigration rates that may also be correlated with voting results post EU accession. For instance, political conditions before EU accession might simultaneously affect the pre-EU emigration rates as well as the voting results in later years.

First, to address such potential issues, I control for the vote share of far-right party in the previous election, including the voting outcomes in pre-EU periods (2001 parliamentary election). Also, I include regional economic confounders such as GDP and unemployment rates as covariates, in addition to regional fixed effects, to account for potential economic

conditions that push emigrants and affect voting results simultaneously. Finally, I would like to emphasize that the instrument does not only rely on the past emigration rates per se but also builds on the exogenous economic condition of the destination country. Even though there are unobserved differences across regions by their pre-EU emigration rates, it is hard to think of a channel where economic conditions in the UK affect the voting results differently by the past emigration rates, except through differences in post-EU emigration rates.

Table 5 reports the results of both OLS and IV estimates for Poland around the EU enlargement. Overall, the results from the table 5 are consistent with the previous analyses, suggesting that emigration benefits the electoral success of far-right parties at the regional level. As more emigrants leave, the far-right party gains more vote share at the regional level. These relationships are statistically significant across models. This is consistent when controlling the lagged dependent variable as well (model 5, 6). Across all model specifications, the IV coefficient estimates are larger than the OLS estimates but their confidence intervals overlap. As in the previous analyses, the size of the coefficient suggests that the exit of politically progressive voters may have second-order effects on voting outcomes beyond the immediate direct effect from emigration on the distribution of voters.

2.6.2   Emigration and Individual Voting Behavior

Finally, there are several reasons to believe that emigration influences policy preference and voting behavior of people who remain behind. Large scale emigration induces demographic changes that could have downstream effects on individuals' voting behavior as well as direct impacts on the distribution of voters.

First, emigration can raise concerns regarding sustainability of traditional and local communities among the people who are left behind. Emigration of family members or neighbors leave psychological distress to those who remain behind. This includes feelings of abandonment and concerns about losing the cultural roots of their communities [95]. As younger and more educated segments of their populations leave, the remaining people may become more worried about the sustainability of their communities and traditional cultures. Given

that the attachment to the traditional values and social capital of local communities are some of the strongest predictors of individual support for far-right parties [45, 17], regional emigration rates could affect the voting behavior of people who remain.

In the same vein, emigration also induces changes in the social networks that migrants leave behind [95], which could affect the political attitudes of the remaining people. As politically more progressive people leave, the people who remain behind will have fewer chances to interact with more progressive political views, and their networks become more uniform in terms of political opinions. Previous studies in political behavior demonstrate that homogeneous networks lead people to be less tolerant of other political views and to be more radical by reducing their chances to be exposed to oppositional views [110, 72].

In this paper, I do not aim to isolate the role of each potential mechanism that may drive the effects of regional emigration on individuals' support for far-right parties. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Plausibly, voters could be affected through more than one mechanism at a time. I aim to capture the overall impact of regional emigration share on individuals' support for far-right parties, which shows that emigration not only changes the distribution of the electorates but also directly influences the voting behavior of people who are left behind.

To estimate the effect of regional emigration share on support for far-right parties at the individual level, I employ the individual-level data from the most recent three waves of Polish Panel Study (POLPAN). Since the EU enlargement, POLPAN is carried out every five years, from 2008 to 2018. Each wave of the survey asks which party respondents support, as well as their demographic information and place of residence. Using the information regarding the place of residence of the respondents, I estimate the effects of regional emigration share on individual vote choice. [20]

The three waves of the POLPAN covered the time after the EU accession, which allows us to estimate the effects of large-scale emigration on individuals' policy preferences and behavior. As in the regional-level analysis, I control for regional economic variables including immigration, unemployment rate and GDP. In addition, I include a vector of individual-

---

[20]While I use NUTS 3 region for the sub-national level analysis in the previous section, the data is only available at NUTS 2 level in POLPAN data, and regional emigration share is computed accordingly.

Table 6: Regional Emigration Exposure and Support for Far-Right Parties (POLPAN)

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote for Far-Right Party			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual Level				
Age	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education (BA)	−0.131***	−0.126***	−0.130***	−0.129***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Unemployed	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.0001
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Regional Level				
Emigration	0.685	1.530**	2.147***	5.195***
	(0.652)	(0.732)	(0.796)	(1.741)
Immigration		−0.786***	−0.642***	−1.077***
		(0.207)	(0.235)	(0.323)
Unemployment			−0.004*	−0.007**
			(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP			−0.003	−0.007
			(0.005)	(0.006)
NUTS 1 FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,349	3,349	3,349	3,349

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

level variables, accounting for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, the level of education, and employment status. The dependent variable is binary variable that takes value one if respondents voted for far-right party (PiS) in the most recent national election.[21]

Table 6 reports the results of both a random effect model that accounts for the repeated observations of individuals. Column 1-3 show the coefficients of linear models with random effects varying across individuals with panel wave fixed effects. Column 4 uses instrumental variable strategy from the previous section. The effect of the regional share of emigration on the propensity to vote for far-right party is positive and mostly statistically significant across different model specification. These results affirm that the emigration affects the electoral outcomes at the sub-national level not only by changing the distribution of electorates, but also by directly affecting individual political preferences.

2.7   Conclusion

What are the electoral consequences of emigration in sending countries? This paper investigates the characteristics of emigrants and how their departure affects the electoral outcomes in sending countries. Using individual-level survey and regional (NUTS 3) migration data, I find that emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately more from politically progressive populations, and the level of support for far-right parties is higher in regions with large levels of emigration.

These findings have several implications for the literature. First, they suggest that international migration affects sending and receiving countries differently. It is a common assumption that globalization makes the world more diverse. Yet, increased mobility can facilitate geographical sorting by political preferences. When emigrants are disproportionately more from politically progressive populations as shown, emigration can make society more homogeneous in sending countries. Second, this paper provides one explanation for the recent growth of radical right-wing populism in Eastern Europe. Many previous studies look into the electoral success of far-right parties in Europe but mostly focus on Western

---

[21]parliamentary election in 2007, 2011, and 2015.

Europe. They point to Western European countries' experiences with globalization as the main driver behind this backlash. Eastern Europe has had vastly different experiences with economic globalization from their Western counterparts, yet they also have experienced the rapid rise of radical right-wing parties. This demonstrates how different experiences with globalization can result in similar political backlashes.

This paper has some limitations, and more needs to be done in future research. First, this paper's empirical strategy focuses on capturing the total effect of emigration, not empirically testing potential mechanisms. As the results suggest, the effects from the exit of politically progressive voters on electoral outcomes likely go beyond its direct influences on the distribution of remaining voters. As table 6 suggests, emigration could have more direct impacts on individual policy preferences and voting behavior. Future research should explore these potential paths by which emigration influences politics.

Also, this paper focuses on Eastern Europe only, which raises the question of how generalizable the results are. The pattern of migrants' selection and their characteristics can vary by case. However, this manuscript still provides an insight that large-scale emigration can induce changes in electorates depending on the attributes of emigrants. For a more comprehensive understanding of the political impacts of emigration, future research should expand on how different migration selection processes influence politics in sending countries differently.

3.0   The Rise of Far-right Parties and Immigrants' Political Attitudes

3.1   Introduction

What shapes immigrants' political attitudes? Do politics in host countries affect immigrants' political attitudes? This paper examines how political environments in host countries influence immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level. I focus on the impacts of the success of far-right parties on immigrants' attitudes toward democracy in Western European countries.

Immigrants' political attitudes have important implications both domestically and internationally. Given the growing number of immigrants, the successful integration of newcomers has been an important policy goal in many Western democracies [e.g. 141, 77]. Particularly, with the increasing political salience of the immigration issue, political integration has become one of the crucial aspects of the integration process [34, 35].

At the same time, immigrants' attitudes affect politics in their home countries as well. Many studies suggest that immigrants play significant roles in the democratization and consolidation of democracy in their home countries [e.g 117, 29, 15, 56]. Immigrants in advanced democracies likely become more pro-democratic due to their experiences with democratic culture and institution [14, 56] and transmit these values and attitudes back to their home countries [23, 56].

The premise of this argument is that immigrants' have positive experiences with democratic political culture and institutions so that eventually they become more supportive of the democracy and political system of host countries [38, 117]. Yet, even in advanced democracies, immigrants' experiences with politics are not necessarily always positive but vary a lot by the political environments of the host countries. Especially, for the last decade, with a growing anti-immigration sentiment, many Western European countries have been experiencing the rapid growth of radical right-wing parties whose main political agenda is anti-immigration [52]. These growing hostilities and electoral success of radical right-wing parties may lead immigrants to have negative experiences with host countries' political

processes. How do these hostile political environments affect migrants' political attitudes, especially toward democracy and the political system of Western democracies?

To answer these questions, I examine the relationship between the support for far-right parties and anti-immigration sentiment among citizens and immigrants' attitudes toward the political system in host countries at the sub-national level. It is crucial to investigate this relationship at the sub-national level instead of at the country level for several reasons. Although far-right extremism has been growing all across Europe, the electoral success of far-right parties widely varies across regions, even within the same country. The volume of immigrants' inflow and experiences with economic globalization, in general, differs massively by region, which leads to a geographical division in public opinion toward immigrants, and support for radical right-wing parties [27, 99].

Furthermore, political environments at the local level likely impact immigrants' daily experiences with politics and the society of host countries more directly. Vote share of far-right parties are highly correlated with anti-immigration sentiment in the region [e.g. 27]. Immigrants' everyday experiences in regions with a high level of anti-immigration sentiment could massively differ from those who live in areas with pro-immigrant and cosmopolitan cultures.

To investigate this relationship, (1) I estimate immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level, then (2) examine the relationship between immigrants' political opinion and vote share of radical right-wing parties. To estimate the immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level, I use Bayesian multilevel regression with post-stratification, or MRP, along with the individual-level survey data (*European Social Survey*) from 9 Western European countries. MRP provides reliable public opinion estimates at the sub-national level by adjusting estimates from non-representative samples with information about the population distribution (Census). When it comes to estimating the immigrants' opinion, adjusting the non-representative sampling is far more salient since the sample size of immigrants in the survey is even smaller than the sub-national level sample of all respondents. Using this method, I find that immigrants who live in regions with a high level of support for far-right parties are less supportive of democracy and host countries' political systems in general.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this study adds

to the study of the impacts of far-right extremism on politics. Given a growing radical right extremism in Europe, many previous studies explore the causes and consequences of far-right parties in domestic politics [e.g. 134, 52, 27]. Yet its impacts on immigrants' political attitudes are relatively underexplored despite of its importance [1]. Considering that immigrants play important roles in transmitting political values to their home countries [117, 14, 15, 56], the impacts of right-wing populism on immigrants have important political implications beyond the border of host countries. Given that many sending countries are new democracies, the transmission of immigrants' negative attitudes toward democracy could degrade public support for democracies, potentially contributing to democratic backsliding in their home countries.

Second, my analysis estimates the immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level in Europe, applying the MRP. This paper is not the very first attempt to examine the impacts of right-wing extremism on immigrants' political opinions [e.g. 75]. While previous studies examine this relationship at the country level, this paper examines it at the sub-national level. With the deep regional variation in popular support for right-wing extremism [99], the sub-national level analysis provides a more detailed examination of the relationship between political environments and immigrants' political attitudes.

Furthermore, whereas MRP is widely acknowledged as the "gold standard" for estimating public opinion in small areas, it is rarely applied outside of the US due to the lack of detailed Census data [92]. This paper applies the MRP method by using several different ways to synthesize detailed Census data. Given that the size of the immigrants' sample in the survey is much smaller than a sample of all residents, MRP is even more useful to estimate opinions among immigrants.

3.2   Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Immigrants' Political Attitudes

There is a small but growing literature exploring the impacts of politics in host countries on immigrants' political attitudes [117, 23, 75, 14, 131]. Immigrants have chances to expe-

---

[1]For the notable exceptions, see [75], and [131].

rience new political institutions and culture in host countries, and these experiences shape their attitudes toward the political system of host countries [38, 56].

Many studies focus on the impacts of migration experiences in advanced democracies on the political attitudes of immigrants from emerging democracies [e.g. 117, 23, 56]. When immigrants are from new democracies, they have higher chances to experience established democratic institutions and cultures. Being exposed to democratic culture and institutions, immigrants learn and adopt democratic values and become more supportive of the Western democracy [38, 56]. While it is hard to rule out the possibility that individuals who are already favorable of Western democracies are more likely to migrate to Western Europe, a number of studies find that individuals with migration experiences in Western democracies are more supportive of democratic political system [14].

Yet, immigrants' experiences with politics in Western democracies are not always positive. Political environments in host countries can be discriminatory and hostile against immigrants, even in advanced democracies. And this can create backlashes from immigrants. Experiences of discriminatory and hostile actions can affect immigrants' opinion toward the host countries in general [40, 142, 75]. When anti-immigration sentiment is on the rise, immigrants likely experience various forms of hostilities. Exposure to negative messages about immigrants or negative posts about their country of origins, posted in media or even coming up in casual conversations with native citizens can turn immigrants to be less attached to host countries and become more nationalistic to their home countries [142, 40]. Similarly, political rhetoric that emphasizes the conventional identity of host countries also can reduce immigrants' political support for the political system. When immigrants encounter nationalistic rhetoric from political elites, immigrants likely feel threatened, excluded from the political process, and end up considering host countries' political system as "not for them" [131]. These anti-immigrant rhetorics reflect and, at the same time, reproduce the anti-immigrant sentiment [e.g. 69, 71]. As anti-immigrant sentiment grows in host countries, immigrants are more likely to be exposed to a more hostile and discriminatory social climate, which leads immigrants to have negative experiences with host countries' politics.

This paper is not the first attempt to explore the impacts of the radical right-wing parties on immigrants' political attitudes. By regressing immigrants' attitudes on the vote share of

far-right parties at the country level, [75] shows that the vote share of far-right parties is negatively correlated with immigrants' satisfaction with democracy. Building on the previous work, this paper examines the impacts of far-right parties on immigrants' attitudes toward democracy and the political system in host countries at the regional level.

While the electoral success of radical right-wing parties can affect immigrants' experiences with democracies at the country level, its impact could vary depending on where they live. The support for far-right parties and public opinion regarding immigrants widely vary across regions, even within the same country [e.g. 27, 99]. For instance, in the recent federal election in Germany (2017), Afd won 11.5 % of votes nationally, but its vote share widely varies across regions. While Afd won the most votes in the Saxony region with a vote share of 27 %, AfD gained only 7.8 % of the votes in Hamburg, being a fifth most voted party. This wide variation across regions is not unique to Germany. In many Western democracies, regional division in terms of support for right-wing extremism is more severe than cross-country divisions [e.g. 99]. Even in the same country, immigrants who live in areas with high popular support for far-right parties likely experience much more hostilities and discrimination against themselves than immigrants in different regions. This leads to the main hypothesis of the paper:

H1: *Immigrants feel less satisfied with democracy in host countries when they live in a region where the support for far-right parties is high.*

One may speculate that immigrants' experiences with discrimination or hostilities may not necessarily affect their political attitudes toward the political system itself. However, for the last decade, immigration has become a salient political issue, and immigration-related issues have become the center of political debates in many Western democracies [35]. Furthermore, far-right parties with strong anti-immigrant policy agendas have been growing and well-integrated into mainstream politics, even affecting other parties' policy positions [134, 52]. The inclusion of radical right-wing in the democratic political institution could lead immigrants to become even dissatisfied toward the political system of the host countries. Thus, I expect that immigrants in advanced democracies are less supportive of democratic

norms and practices when regions they live in have a high level of support for far-right parties and anti-immigration sentiment.

Lastly, the rise of radical right-wing parties may have varying effects on immigrants' attitudes by their country of origin. Immigrants from other EU countries differ from immigrants from outside of the EU in several ways. First, individuals from other EU countries are more likely to be familiar with the political process of the host countries compared to immigrants from non-EU countries. Also, EU citizens have unique legal status that grants relatively more extensive rights, including political rights, compared to non-EU immigrants. For instance, EU citizens residing in other EU member states have unrestricted voting rights in local elections [8]. This unique status of EU citizens in other EU member states can lead them to have different attitudes toward the political system of host countries from immigrants from non-EU countries.

Considering the higher level of expectation and knowledge of the political system of the host countries, immigrants from other EU countries can be more critical regarding the performance of host countries' political systems. However, at the same time, relatively more extensive political and legal rights may lead EU citizens to be more supportive of the political system than other immigrants. Also, their legal status can make them feel less threatened by the rise of radical right-wing parties compared to non-EU immigrants. Furthermore, other EU countries are culturally more similar to the host country relative to other non-EU countries. Given that far-right parties' electoral successes greatly rely on popular grievances regarding cultural differences [e.g. 52, 112], immigrants from less similar cultural backgrounds might feel more threatened by the popularity of far-right parties than immigrants from other EU countries.

In sum, there are reasons to believe both hypotheses that the impacts of success of far-right parties on immigrants' political attitudes may be bigger or smaller when immigrants are from other EU countries. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H2: *The impacts of the support for far-right parties on immigrants' attitudes are lower when they are from other EU member countries.*

3.3 Research Design

I use an individual-level survey of immigrants, along with Bayesian multilevel regression and post-stratification, to estimate immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level. I use the individual-level survey data of immigrants who reside in nine Western European countries, collected as a part of the European Social Survey (ESS). To identify immigrants from a sample, I rely on questions asking respondents' country of birth and country of citizenship. Using this survey data combined with the electoral outcomes data at the sub-national level, I investigate how the rise of radical right-wings affects immigrants' political attitudes, especially toward democracy.

3.3.1 Data

3.3.1.1 Far-Right Parties in Europe

To classify radical right-wing parties in Western Europe, I rely on two sources of data: Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and Chaple Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data. Both datasets are used widely to classify the party family in Europe based on parties' manifesto and surveys on experts of each country, respectively. I collect the vote share of far-right parties in the national elections at the regional level that corresponds to the regional level reported in the survey data (NUTS 1-2). ESS identifies respondents' geographical location at the NUTS 2 level for most countries in the sample.[2]

3.3.1.2 Individual-level Survey for Immigrants

It is challenging to find survey data with a representative sample of immigrants. There are few surveys that target immigrants as the main sample and also ask them political questions. One solution is to use nationally representative surveys in host countries that target all the households regardless of respondents' citizenship and country of birth [75, 131,

---

[2]Germany and UK are the exceptions. They only report respondents' location at the NUTS 1 level, and vote share of far-right parties are collected at the NUTS 1 level accordingly.

e.g.]. For instance, *European Social Survey* targets to sample "All persons aged 15 and over resident within private households in each country, *regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language.*" As a result, ESS includes immigrants in their sample as seen in the table 8.

To capture a sample of immigrants who live in Western European countries, I use *ESS* in nine Western European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark) from wave 1 to 8, which covers from 2002 to 2016 biannually. ESS asks respondents if they are born in the country of their current residence, their citizenship status, and the country of their origin. Using these questions, I identify individuals who are born in foreign countries. Table 8 reports the distribution of respondents' country of birth from the most recent wave of *ESS*. The proportion of foreign-born individuals in the ESS sample ranges from 4 to 10 %.

ESS asks a diverse set of questions regarding politics and democracy, as well as demographic questions. To measure immigrants' attitudes toward democracy, I use the following question: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in this [country]?" Responses are coded on a 0 to t10 point scale, with ten being the most satisfied with democracy in the country. While there are some critics, this question has been widely used and acknowledged as a measure of individuals' attitudes toward the political system [e.g. 5, 75].[3]. In addition, I explore immigrants' satisfaction with host countries' government, trust in democratic institutions such as parliament [4]. I also measure the public opinion of natives on the same variables at the sub-national level using the ESS data, along with the MRP methods. Political attitudes of other people could affect an individual's political opinions (e.g. Mutz, 1998).

Lastly, I estimate the natives' attitudes toward immigrants using the three different questions in ESS regarding the immigrants' impacts on the national economy, culture, and society in general.[5] All three questions are coded in 0 to 10 scale where 10 is more positive, and

---

[3]To see the discussion regarding the distinction between measuring satisfaction with democratic performance and satisfaction with democracy per se, see [98]

[4]All indicators are on 11 point scale (0 to 10), 0 being the lowest level of satisfaction or trust, and 10 being the highest level of satisfaction or trust. Following are the actual questions used in the survey. "How satisfied are you with the way government works in this [country]?", "How much do you trust in parliament/politicians of this [country]?"

[5]"Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?", "Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people

Table 7: Far-Right Parties in Western Europe

Country	(National) Election Year	Far-Right Party
Austria	2002, 2006, 2008, 2013	Freedom Party of Austria
Belgium	1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014	Flemish Interest (Flemish Region) National Front (French Region)
Germany	2013	Alternative for Germany
Denmark	2007, 2011, 2016	Denmark Danish People's Party
Finland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011	True Finns
France	2002, 2007, 2012	National Front
Netherlands	2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012	Party for Freedom
Sweden	2010, 2014	Sweden Democrats
UK	2005, 2010, 2015	United Kingdom Independence Party

Note: Electoral outcomes of Belgium is measured separately in Flemish region and French speaking regions.

Table 8: Proportion of Foreign-born Sample (*ESS*)

2*Country	Foreign-born		2*Native	2*NUTS Region	2*# of NUTS
	EU	Non-EU			
Austria	64 (3.66 %)	99 (5.67 %)	1584 (90.67 %)	States (Bundesländer)	9
Belgium	92 (5.25 %)	118 (6.74 %)	1542 (88.01 %)	Provinces	11
Germany	108 (3.55 %)	190 (6.25 %)	2743 (90.20 %)	States (Länder)	16
Denmark	50 (3.42 %)	31 (2.11 %)	1382 (94.46 %)	Regions	5
Finland	25 (1.20 %)	60 (2.90 %)	1987 (95.90 %)	Large Areas (Suuralueet)	5
France	51 (2.68 %)	156 (8.20 %)	1694 (89.11 %)	Regions	21
UK	66 (2.96 %)	210 (9.40 %)	1957 (87.64 %)	Statistical Region	12
Netherlands	48 (2.53 %)	112 (5.91 %)	1736 (91.56 %)	Provinces	12
Sweden	85 (4.85 %)	113 (6.50 %)	1554 (88.70 %)	National Areas (Riksområden)	8

0 is more negative towards immigrants. This more directly measures the anti-immigration sentiment in each region and discrimination that immigrants likely encounter in their daily lives.

3.3.2 Estimating Immigrants' Opinion with MRP

3.3.2.1 Why Do We Need MRP?

One challenge of using the nationally representative survey to measure the immigrants' attitude is that the sample size of foreign-born individuals is often too small. When it comes to measuring immigrants' attitudes at the sub-national level, the problem is more severe since the number of foreign-born individuals in each region is even smaller.

Figure 2: Sample Size of Immigrants in Survey (ESS)

Figure 2 shows the size of the foreign-born sample of the survey at the regional (NUTS 1/2) level of interest (wave 8). It shows that most regions have less than twenty foreign-born respondents in each region. Furthermore, the number of foreign-born individuals who are not

coming to live here from other countries?", "Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?"

the citizen of host countries are even smaller. Second figure shows that majority of regions have less than ten individuals who are foreign-born, non-citizen in each region.

This raises a methodological challenge for measuring immigrants' attitudes at the sub-national level. Although the survey is nationally representative, the sample is often non-representative at the regional level, which creates challenges for researchers to estimate public opinion at the sub-national level [48]. This problem is even more severe when it comes to estimating the attitudes of immigrants at the sub-national level. The size of the foreign-born sample in each region is often too small to represent or estimate a public opinion of immigrants at the regional level. In extreme cases, there is only one observation that is foreign-born in a particular region. This raises the question of how reliable or accurate the regional mean of this sample would be. The limited size of the sample easily leads to a biased, unreliable estimate of public opinion at the sub-national level.

I address these issues by applying multilevel regression and post-stratification, or MRP. Since the seminal paper by [48], MRP has been widely used and validated by a number of renowned studies as a technique to estimate public opinion at the regional level with non-representative sample [116, 89, 90, 25].

MRP adjusts estimates from a non-representative sample by using additional information regarding a true population (i.e. Census). MRP consists of two stages. First, we model the outcome of interest, using a hierarchical regression model with individual-level survey data, and produce the estimate of outcome ($\hat{y}$) by different combinations of individual characteristics, and geographical locations. For instance, if we model the individuals' attitudes (y) with their age (grouped in *five* age-group), education level (*six*), in *five* different regions, we estimate the attitudes for every combination of these covariates, and have 150 estimates (5 age-group × 6 education level × 5 regions) of y. Then, we improve the accuracy of these estimates of outcomes by weighting the estimate with the ratio of each combination in actual population using Census data.

In sum, MRP is a method to correct the potential bias from a non-representative sample in small areas by using population information. MRP is now widely acknowledged as a "gold standard" in terms of estimating public opinion at the sub-national level [127]. This method is especially useful for measuring the political attitudes of immigrants using the survey at

the sub-national level since the number of observations of foreign-born samples is even more sparse compared to a sample of natives in the same region.

3.3.2.2 Census Data, and Synthesizing the Joint Distribution

For the post-stratification, detailed census data is a crucial requirement. Census data needs to correspond to each demographic feature and geographical location that is used in the individual-level model to predict the outcome. In other words, the joint distribution of every variable in the estimation model is necessary to conduct MRP. For instance, continuing the previous example, if an individual-level model includes the age group (5), and education level (6), in five different geographical locations, the census data needs to include the number of population in every 150 different categories ($5 \times 6 \times 5$).

What is challenging is that such detailed census data is often not available outside of the US [92]. This prevents researchers from estimating public opinion using MRP, which is widely acknowledged as a "gold standard" for estimating public opinion in small areas [127]. Many Western European countries are no exception. Many Western European countries do not provide the full joint distribution of important demographic features such as the level of education and age group. Among nine Western European countries in the sample, only three countries provide a complete joint distribution of important demographic features (UK, Austria, Finland) for limited years, and five other countries only provide marginal distribution for selected demographic features (Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark) for every year. Especially, these countries do not provide joint distribution between the important demographics variables (i.e. gender, age, education) and the country of origin. This is more problematic since our population of interest is foreign-born immigrants. Without the joint distribution, it is not possible to post stratify the estimates at the sub-national level.

In order to address this issue, I synthesized joint distribution using the only marginal distribution of each variable from Census data. There are a few methods available to simulate the joint distribution only with the marginal distribution of variables. First widely used method is the raking or iterative proportional fitting procedure (ipfp) [47, 136]. Raking is a method to apply a proportional adjustment to the sample weights to an initial contingency

table until the adjusted weights being equal to the known marginal distributions for every dimension. Raking has been widely used to estimate the small area estimation.

Another approach is to generate synthetic (adjusted) joint distribution using the marginal distribution of census data and joint distributions in survey data [92]. This strategy generates the synthetic joint distribution by exploiting the information from the survey data. This method relies on an assumption that correlation between variables is representative and the same across the different sub-national levels.

Whereas raking is a widely used standard process in survey research, [?] find that post-stratification with synthetic joint distribution outperforms post-ratification with raking in their sample. The synthetic joint distribution approach takes into account the additional information about the correlation between variables from the survey data while raking does not. In addition, the raking outcomes can be sensitive to the initial contingency table [136].

Lastly, it is possible to combine two approaches: conducting raking, using the correlation between variables from the survey data as an initial contingency table. This approach allows us to exploit the information from the survey data as well as accounting for the possibilities that correlation structure between variables can differ across the different sub-national levels. In order to select and validate the method for synthesizing the joint distribution, I compare the synthesized joint distribution and true joint distribution that is available. As mentioned earlier, UK provides a full joint distribution across the following demographics in the year 2011 at the regional (NUTS 1) level: age (6), gender (2), level of education (3), citizenship status (2), place of birth (3). This leads to 216 joint categories of population s ($6 \times 2 \times 3 \times 2 \times 3$) per each region. I synthesized joint distribution using marginal distribution data and compare the synthesized number of populations per category, in each region to the true population.

Figure 3 shows the comparison between synthesized population size from three different methods (raking, adjust synthesized distribution, raking with synthesized adjust distribution) and true population. The correlation between the synthesizing methods and the true population is 0.710, 0.760, 0.854 respectively. The correlation with the true population is the highest between the synthesized adjust joint distribution method and the true population.

Figure 3: Comparing Performance of Synthesizing Methods

3.3.2.3 Individual-Level Model Estimation

In order to investigate the impacts of political environments of host countries on immigrants' political attitudes at the sub-national level, first, I estimate the political opinion of immigrants using multilevel regression. Then, I post-stratify this estimate to gain more accurate estimate of public opinion at the sub-national (NUTS 2) level. Lastly, using this regional estimate, I investigate the relationship between the vote share of far-right parties in each region, and the attitudes of immigrants at the regional level (NUTS 2).

I use the multilevel (linear) model with random effects varying across NUTS 2 regions. Below is the model to estimate the political attitudes of immigrants, including their satisfaction with democracy. To predict individuals' political attitudes, I use demographic features of individuals such as gender, age, level of education, citizenship status, and country of origin (other EU countries or not).

These demographic features are some of the strongest predictors of political opinions. For immigrants, the status of citizenship and country of origin may play a crucial role in shaping their political attitudes [75].

Immigrants' countries of origin are coded as binary: born in other EU countries or born outside the EU. As discussed in the previous section, the distinction between EU citizens and others could be a significant predictor for individuals' political attitudes since individuals from other EU members differ from other immigrants in several ways. Especially in EU member countries, EU citizens have different legal status and political rights from other foreign-born individuals. These characteristics of EU countries can lead individuals to have different baseline attitudes toward the political system of host countries. They can either be more supportive of the political system of host countries or be more critical of the system due to their higher expectations [75].

Citizenship status is also potentially a strong predictor of individuals' political attitudes. Whereas far-right extremism could impact all of the immigrants' political attitudes by making them feel threatened and excluded [131], the size of impacts could differ a lot by citizenship status since citizenship provides formal protection for immigrants [76, 75]. Citizenship can turn individuals to be more incorporated and involved in politics by providing

legal protection and rights to participate [91]. Furthermore, it is also plausible immigrants who feel more attached and supportive of host countries' political system likely apply for citizenship.

There are other predictors for individuals' political attitudes, such as political ideology. However, to use post-stratification to measure the sub-national level attitudes, the individual level model should only include variables available in Census.

$$Y_i \sim Normal(\mu_i, \sigma^2)$$
$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta^{female} \cdot \text{female}_i + \beta^{EU} \cdot \text{EU}_i + \beta^{citizenship} \cdot \text{citizenship}_i + \beta^{age}_{age(i)} + \beta^{edu}_{edu(i)} + \beta^{nuts}_{nuts(i)} + \beta^{year}_{year(i)}$$
$$\beta^{nuts}_j \sim Normal(\beta_j + \beta^{country}_{country(j)}, \sigma^2_{nuts})$$

I model gender, country of origin (EU), and citizenship status as regression coefficients without multilevel structure embedded given that they are binary variables, following a similar modeling strategy with [116]. For varying coefficients, I assign normal distribution with mean being 0, and standard deviations ($\sigma_{age}, \sigma_{edu}, \sigma_{nuts}, \sigma_{year}\sigma_{country}$) estimated from data using weakly informative prior ($\sigma \sim HalfNormal(0,5)$). Age is coded in 5 different groups,[6] and education is coded as 6 point scale, where 1 being less than primary education, and 6 being higher than master's degree.

Figure 4 shows demographic coefficients in the regression of the level of satisfaction with democracy with 50 and 95 % intervals.[7] As seen in the figure, most of the age and education features have relatively little predictive power except the youngest age group (15-24).[8] On the other hand, the status of citizenship and country of birth have a relatively strong predictor of individuals' satisfaction with democracy. When individuals have citizenship or were born in other EU countries, individuals report lower satisfaction with how democracy works in host countries. This relationship does not provide evidence for whether or how the vote share of far-right parties affects EU citizens differently from other immigrants. Yet, it shows that EU citizens may have higher expectations for the political system of host countries and tend to be more critical when it comes to evaluating the performance of the political system, which is consistent with some of the previous findings [e.g. 75].

---

[6]add age group definition here

[7]Intervals reported here is Bayesian probability intervals or credible interval. 95 % interval indicates two values that contain 95% of the posterior probability.

[8]Multilevel model tends to shrink coefficient to zero. For more detail, see [48].

Figure 4: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients (Satisfaction with Democracy)

Using this individual-level model, I estimate the regional level opinion using the post-stratification with synthesized joint distribution from Census. As mentioned earlier, some of the countries in the sample do not provide a full joint distribution of variables in the model.

3.4 Far-right Party Vote Share and Immigrants' Attitudes

I investigate how the vote share of far-right parties influences the immigrants' political attitudes, using the estimate of their attitudes at the sub-national level (NUTS 2). Table 13 reports the regression of immigrants' political attitudes on far-right vote share at the regional level (NUTS 2). Immigrants' political attitudes at the regional level are estimated using the MRP with synthesized joint distribution from the previous section.

The direction of coefficients are as expected from **H1**: the higher the vote share of radical right-wing parties, the lower immigrants' satisfaction with democracy and government is. Also, immigrants' trust in the political institution of the host countries is correlated negatively with the vote share of far-right parties in the region. Also, I included the level of satisfaction with democracy, government, and trust in parliament among natives as a control (estimated via MRP), which is correlated positively with immigrants' attitudes.

In addition, I also explore the relationship between natives' attitudes toward immigrants with immigrants' satisfaction with democracy in host countries. To estimate natives' attitudes toward immigrants, I use three different survey questions regarding immigrants asking immigrants' influence on host countries, in the economic, cultural, and social aspects.[9] All three variables are coded in 0 to 10 scale where 10 being most pro-immigrant, and 0 being anti-immigrant. Natives' attitudes toward immigrants are also estimated at the regional level (NUTS 2) using MRP with the synthesized joint distribution.

Table 10 shows the relationship between three different measures of natives' attitudes toward immigrants, and immigrants' satisfaction with democracy in host countries. when

---

[9]Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?, Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?, Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

Table 9: Radical Right-wing Parties and Immigrants' Attitudes

	Dependent variable:		
	Satisfied w Democracy	Satisfied w Government	Trust in Parliament
FR Vote.Share	−0.191**	−0.174**	−0.189*
	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.100)
Satisfied w Democracy (Native)	0.699***		
	(0.040)		
Satisfied w Government (Native)		0.264**	
		(0.108)	
Trust in Parliament (Native)			0.185*
			(0.104)
Pop.Density	0.00003	−0.00002	0.00003
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Foreign-born Share	0.562***	1.079***	0.526**
	(0.208)	(0.188)	(0.230)
Region Effect	✓	✓	✓
Year Effect	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−682.798	−2,075.983	−1,767.894
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−656.036	−2,035.338	−1,727.248
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Immigrants' Attitudes

	Dependent variable:		
	Satisfied w Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Economic)Pro-Immigrant (Native)	0.206*** (0.026)		
(Cultural)Pro-Immigrant (Native)		0.031* (0.019)	
(Social)Pro-Immigrant (Native)			0.049* (0.029)
Satisfied w Democracy (Native)	0.660*** (0.042)	0.711*** (0.041)	0.705*** (0.042)
Pop.Density	−0.00002 (0.00002)	−0.00003 (0.00003)	−0.00003 (0.00003)
Foreign-born Share	0.122 (0.118)	0.167 (0.132)	0.163 (0.132)
Region Effect	✓	✓	✓
Year Effect	✓	✓	✓
Observations	356	356	356
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−1,094.095	−1,041.529	−1,042.587
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−1,063.096	−1,010.529	−1,011.588

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

48

public opinion (among natives) toward immigrants is more favorable, immigrants' satisfaction with the political system is higher at the regional level.

Lastly, I explore how the success of radical right-wing parties influences immigrants' political attitudes differently depending on whether they are from other EU member countries or not (**H2**). To examine this conditional effect, I estimate the political attitudes of immigrants from EU countries and the attitudes of immigrants from non-EU countries separately, using the same individual-level model along with the MRP method. [10] In other words, instead of measuring immigrants' opinion at the regional level (as in table 13, and 10), I measure immigrants' attitudes at the region-country of origin level. Then, I interact the immigrants' country of origin (EU vs. Non-EU) with the regional vote share of radical right-wing parties to examine this conditional effect by immigrants' country of origin.

Table 11 shows the partial support for the **H2** in that there are conditional effects of radical right-wing parties' vote share on immigrants' attitudes by whether they are citizens of other EU countries or not. First, across all three models, immigrants from non-EU countries show a significantly higher level of baseline satisfaction with democracy, government, and trust in parliament (Non-EU). In other words, immigrants from other EU member countries have lower baseline satisfaction with the political system of the host countries. It is consistent with the previous studies' findings that individuals with higher expectations and better knowledge of the political system of host countries could be more critical toward it [e.g. 75].

Figure **??** summarizes this pattern by showing how marginal effects of radical right-wing parties' vote share in the region influence immigrants' attitudes differently by their country of origin. Blue represents the immigrants from outside of the EU, and red represents immigrants from other EU member countries. While immigrants from outside of the EU have a higher baseline satisfaction with democracy than immigrants from other EU members, their satisfaction with democracy decreases far more than immigrants from other EU countries when far-right parties are successful. As the vote share of far-right parties increases, non-EU immigrants' satisfaction with democracy decreases while EU immigrants' satisfaction with democracy does not change at the statistically significant level. A similar pattern also

---

[10]Individual-level model used here is the identical model with the individual-level model used to measure the immigrants' attitudes from the previous section.

Table 11: Conditional Effects by Immigrants' Country of Origin (EU vs Non-EU)

	Dependent variable:		
	Satisfied w Democracy	Satisfied w Government	Trust in Parliament
FR Vote Share	0.081	−0.848***	0.249
	(0.141)	(0.238)	(0.178)
Non EU	0.421***	0.488***	0.458***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.015)
FR Vote Share ×$NonEU$	−0.442***	−0.215	−0.459*
	(0.082)	(0.140)	(0.119)
Satisfied w Democracy (Native)	0.522***		
	(0.012)		
Satisfied w Government (Native)		0.538***	
		(0.030)	
Trust in Parliament (Native)			0.503***
			(0.036)
Pop.Density	−0.0001**	−0.00000	−0.0001
	(0.00005)	(0.0001)	(0.00004)
Foreign-born Share	1.342***	0.682	1.347***
	(0.334)	(0.524)	(0.407)
Region Effect	✓	✓	✓
Year Effect	✓	✓	✓
Observations	623	623	623
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−1,104.593	−502.995	−761.455
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−1,060.248	−458.650	−717.110
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

| Satisfied w Democracy | Satisfied w Government | Trust in Parliament |

Figure 5: Marginal Effects by Immigrants' Country of Origin (EU vs Non-EU)

appears for immigrants' level of trust in parliament. Although the impact size is relatively small, the vote share of far-right parties affects immigrants' level of trust in parliament more negatively when they are from non-EU countries.

However, the size of impacts of far-right parties' vote share on immigrants' satisfaction with democracy varies by immigrants' country of origin (EU vs. Non-EU). The interaction term between far-right parties' vote share and immigrants' country of origin (FR Vote Share× Non-EU) is negative and statistically significant. It means that far-right parties' success affects immigrants' satisfaction with democracy more negatively when they came from outside the EU.

3.5   Discussion

This paper examines the impacts of the electoral success of far-right parties on immigrants' attitudes toward the political system in host countries at the sub-national level using the multilevel regression with post-stratification. The findings of this paper suggest that the higher support for far-right parties is, the lower immigrants' satisfaction with democracy, government performance, and trust in a political institution (parliament) in host countries.

These findings have important implications for the research on the political consequences of right-wing extremism in Europe. First, the electoral success of far-right parties can hinder the political integration of immigrants to host countries. With a growing number of foreign-born population, the quality of governance and democracy in Western democracy depends

at least partially on how successful they can incorporate newcomers.

Furthermore, the immigrants' political attitudes likely have impacts on politics outside of host countries. Many immigrants are connected or ultimately even return to their home countries, and they play a significant role in transmitting and diffusing the political values and ideas to their home countries [117, 56]. Given that many immigrants are from new, less consolidated democracies, the impacts of right-wing extremism in Western democracies can negatively affect democratic consolidation beyond their borders.

4.0   Immigration, Party Competition, and Welfare State

4.1   Introduction

For the last decade, immigration has become one of the most salient political issues in Western Europe. From Brexit to the rise of far-right parties all across Western Europe, immigration has been the center of the electoral competition among European parties [35, 36, 32]. While a growing salience of immigration have drawn burgeoning scholarly attention, most of the research has mainly focused on how immigration influences parties' electoral success or immigration policy itself [50, 13, 134, 24, 32]. Yet, the impact of the high salience of immigration is not limited to immigration politics per se. Immigration can influence parties' policy position in other policy areas as well as immigration policy by changing the structure of political cleavage [74, 112].

This paper examines how the growing salience of immigration influences parties' welfare policy positions. In particular, I build on the existing argument that immigration has become a new political cleavage that cuts across the conventional left-right division in redistribution policy [54, 6, 112].

The rise of a cross-cutting cleavage posits a challenge, especially for left-wing parties. Conventionally, left-wing parties are committed to welfare expansion as well as liberal socio-cultural values such as open migration policies [111, 54, 59]. Yet, a significant portion of left-wing parties' constituents is not supportive of liberal migration policies. Left-wing parties depend on the electoral supports of two different types of constituents: working-class voters who benefit the most from welfare expansion and highly-educated voters with liberal socio-cultural values. Whereas highly educated, socially liberal voters support liberal migration policies, working-class voters are often socially conservative and more likely to be nativist [e.g. 57, 58]. The growing salience of immigration highlights such division within left-wing constituents.

Given this, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties adjust their welfare policy positions to maximize their vote. By maintaining their conventional policy positions

on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant portion of their core constituents. At the same time, however, adjusting only immigration policy positions may not be enough to maintain electoral supports. For instance, if left-wing parties change their immigration policy to more conservative to accommodate their low-income constituents, they may lose their socially liberal supporters [4, 55]. To compensate for this loss, left-wing parties will need to adjust their other policy (welfare) to appeal to other voters.

Then, under which conditions do left-wing parties benefit from adopting more or less conservative welfare policy positions? Left-wing parties' policy position will depend on the joint distribution of voters over these two cleavages. To generate specific expectations of how and under which condition parties adjust their welfare policy positions, I apply a classic formal model of [124]. Roemer's model explains how parties' optimal strategy changes differently depending on whether parties compete in a single policy dimension versus multi-dimensional policy space. Using religion as a cross-cutting cleavage to economic policy, Roemer derives a condition where left-parties benefit by converging to conservative economic policies.

Applying this model to immigration, I demonstrate a condition where left-wing parties shift their welfare policy position. When immigration is highly salient, and voters with median views on immigration are wealthier than average voters, left-wing parties have the incentive to converge to right-wing parties' welfare policy position. In other words, when anti-immigrant voters have a lower level of income than average, the left-wing parties need to change their welfare policy position to a more conservative direction.

Based on this implication of the model, I empirically test how the salience of immigration and the joint distribution of voters' preferences over welfare and immigration policy position in ten Western European countries from 2000 to 2019 [1]. For the empirical test, I use the Comparative Manifesto Data, along with a diverse set of individual-level survey data, including the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer. I find that left-wing parties converge to right-wing parties' welfare policy position when immigration is salient. And this tendency is much stronger when voters with median views on immigration are wealthier average voters.

---

[1]Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK

These findings contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, it shows how growing anti-immigration sentiment and its salience can influence policies beyond immigration policies, especially welfare policies. Welfare policies have more direct influences on the daily lives of voters than immigration policies. Considering this, the impacts of the politicization of immigration could be even broader than expected.

Second, this adds to the literature of globalization backlash and party politics. Given that economic globalization induces (economic) winners and losers, it is crucial to provide compensations for losers to prevent backlashes against globalization [63, 62, 96]. Left-wing governments played a significant role in compensating economic losers by increasing social expenditure more actively compared to right-wing governments [120]. The findings of this paper suggest that a growing salience of immigration may hinder mainstream left-wing parties' ability to pursue welfare expansion. The lack of compensation can lead to nativist backlash against globalization, including immigration itself.

4.2   Immigration as Cross-Cutting Cleavage

The rise of cultural cleavage is not a new phenomenon. The left-right division was established originally around redistribution policies. Left-wing parties' core constituents were primarily working-class voters who benefit most from welfare expansion while right-wing parties support free-market policies [e.g. 112]. Yet, since the mid-70s, cultural issues such as ethnic minorities' rights or environmental issues have become increasingly salient in electoral competition [31, 74, 112]. The problem is that individuals' preferences over these cultural issues do not fall nicely into the conventional cleavage of left-right, but cut across the existing cleavage over redistribution policies [6, 112].[2]

Immigration is one of the issues in the cultural dimension, whose salience has increased dramatically over the last few years. Figure 6 demonstrates this trend. To measure the

---

[2]For notable exception, see [24] and [64]. They show that conventional ideological division between left and right is still an important predictor of parties' cultural policy positions. However, their analyses are limited to the period until 2010, which is the time prior to the dramatic increase of the salience of immigration issue in Western Europe.

Figure 6: Salience of Immigration Issue Trend

salience of immigration issue, I rely on the Eurobarometer survey which includes a question asking if respondents consider immigration as an important issue a country is facing. Salience of immigration indicates the proportion of respondents who consider the immigration as an important issue in ten Western European countries in our sample. The proportion of people who consider immigration to be an important issue in their country increased from below 10 percent to 30 percent in the last two decades. Especially after the surge of refugee inflows into Europe in the 2010s, the perceived salience of immigration has increased by a big amount. This increase in the salience of immigration makes immigration an important political cleavage that cuts across the conventional left-right dimensions.

Working-class voters' interests do not align well with open migration policies. Low-skilled, low-income voters feel more threatened by the inflows of foreigners both culturally and economically.[3], and that low-skilled, low-income voters are more likely to be nativist

---

[3]Immigration issue also has an economic aspect as well as a cultural aspect. Many scholars primarily view immigration as an economic issue that aggravates labor market competition by introducing labor forces [e.g. 101]. Especially in developed economies, an influx of low-skilled workers has been perceived as an economic threat for domestic low-skilled and low-income workers. However, many studies find that individuals' attitudes toward immigrants are determined primarily by cultural values [57, 58]

and have anti-immigration attitudes [e.g. 57, 58, 94].

The problem is that left-wing parties are committed to socio-culturally liberal policy positions (e.g. open migration policy) as well as welfare expansions which represent the interest of working-class voters at the same time [6, 59]. Left-wing parties nowadays depend on a coalition of two different types of constituents: low-income working-class voters who benefit from welfare expansions and highly educated voters with liberal socio-cultural values. Immigration issues divide these two different types of left-wing parties' core constituents into two opposite directions. When the salience of immigration is low, this division is not crucial enough to determine constituents' votes. However, when immigration becomes a salient issue for voters, this division within the constituents becomes challenging, particularly for left-wing parties.

Figure 7: Distribution of Income by Immigration Attitudes

Figure 7 visualizes such division within parties' constituents. Figure 7 shows the distribution of income by immigration attitudes using the European Social Survey (ESS). To classify respondents' attitudes toward immigrants, I use following questions from ESS "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people to come and live?" Answers are

coded on a 4 point scale, 4 being most pro-immigrant ("Allow many to come"), and 1 being the most anti-immigrant ("Allow none"). And income of respondents are measured using a question "Which category describes your household's total income after tax deductions? (from 1 to 10th decile)". Solid line is median income among people with each immigration attitudes category.

This figure shows how the distribution of income varies by attitudes toward immigrants. While people with strong anti-immigrant attitudes are disproportionately more from the low-income population, those with pro-immigrant attitudes are more from the high-income segment of the population. The median income of the individuals with a strong anti-immigration attitude is below the 50 percentile of the income distribution. On the other hand, the median income of the string pro-immigration group is above the 60 percentile.

Considering the joint distribution of voters over immigration and the welfare issue, left-wing parties need to adjust their policy positions in both immigration and the welfare issue to maximize the electoral supports for them. Given the high salience of immigration issues, left-wing parties likely lose a significant portion of their constituents regardless of their immigration policy position since immigration is divisive within their constituents. Thus, parties need to adjust their other policy (welfare) accordingly to appeal to a broader set of voters to compensate for the loss of their conventional constituents.

Some argue that parties do not necessarily need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their votes. Instead, they can selectively emphasize the issue area that could broadly appeal to their voters [125]. Many studies show that parties do manipulate the salience of issues as a part of their electoral strategy [125, 20, 139]. Parties make their policy positions more ambiguous for divisive issues while presenting their policy position on issues that have more broad appeal to their constituents more clearly, and frequently [133].

However, these strategies are not always successful. Whereas parties can play a role as an agenda-setter to some degree, the issue still requires to be salient to voters [16, 86]. When an issue becomes salient due to the external shock or stays salient among voters regardless of parties' strategies, parties need to respond and even prioritize the issue [135, 85]. The salience of immigration has increased rapidly over time in Western Europe, especially since the surge of refugee inflow, and widely considered to be a salient issue for voters [36]. Accordingly,

parties are expected to respond and present their policy positions on immigration issues [134].

In sum, a growing salience of immigration poses a challenge for left-wing parties, and they need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their votes. Given the division within their constituents, what would be the optimal policy positions for left-wing parties can adopt to maximize electoral support?

4.3   Party Competition in Multi-dimensional Policy Space

A high salience of immigration poses a challenge for left-wing parties by dividing their constituents, and left-wing parties need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their votes. But the optimal welfare and immigration policy position for left-wing parties depends not only on the salience of immigration but also on the joint distribution of voters across multi-dimensional policy space. Depending on the distribution of voters across both immigration and welfare policies, the optimal policy position that left-wing parties can choose to maximize their electoral success differs.

To generate the formal predictions of how and under which condition left-wing parties choose more or less conservative welfare policy positions, I apply the classic model of [124]. **(author?)**'s model provides an optimal strategy for parties when they compete in multi-dimensional policy space. In his original model, Roemer shows when religion being a cross-cutting cleavage for redistribution policy, which welfare policy positions parties can take to maximize their vote share. Roemer's model provides a specific condition regarding the joint distribution of voters across these two cleavages that parties can benefit from more or less conservative welfare policies.

Immigration plays a similar role to religion in Roemer's original model, which divides the core constituents of left-wing parties into two different groups. Roemer's model has an important implication for Western European politics in that the growing salience of immigration generates multi-dimensional policy spaces for party competition.

In the following section, I will explain Roemer's model step by step and the implication

of the model on the party competition in contemporary Western European politics.

4.3.1 Roemer's Model of Electoral Competition in Multidimensional Space

4.3.1.1 Preliminary of Model

Roemer models a competition between two partisan parties (left, right). One of them is the incumbent, and the other is the challenger.

The sequence of the game is as follows: First, a challenger party proposes a policy position. After observing the policy of a challenger, the incumbent party chooses a policy position. Both parties try to maximize the expected utility of their constituents. Formally, the utility function of parties is defined as below.

$$\Pi^L(\tau_L, \tau_R) = \pi(\tau_L, \tau_R)u(\tau_L; k_L, a_L) + (1 - \pi(\tau_L, \tau_R))u(\tau_R; k_L, a_L)$$
$$\Pi^R(\tau_L, \tau_R) = \pi(\tau_L, \tau_R)u(\tau_L; k_R, a_R) + (1 - \pi(\tau_L, \tau_R))u(\tau_R; k_R, a_R)$$

τ_i is the policy of of each party, and $\pi(\tau_L, \tau_R)$ is the probability of left-wing party to win given policies (τ_L, τ_R). $u(\tau_L; k_L, a_L)$ refers to utility of the voter who has a preference for immigration policy(k), and welfare policy(a) from the policy outcome τ_L. It reflects that parties do not always converge on the median voters' policy position even under a majoritarian electoral system with only two mainstream parties. This premise induces an important difference between the Downsian model and Roemer's model. Roemer's model generates divergent policy positions between left-wing and right-wing parties at a single dimension, whereas the Downsian model predicts convergence to the median voter's position.

4.3.1.2 Divergence at a Uni-dimensional Policy Space

At a single dimension, voters and parties only care about the welfare policy. Parties choose rate of proportional tax t, which is defined between 0, and 1 ($t \in (0, 1)$). Citizens' utility is determined based on a tax rate and their wealth. Particularly, citizen's utility function includes their asset after taxation and their benefit from welfare expense from the tax revenue. Formally, citizens' utility function is determined as follow:

$$u(t; w) = (1 - t)w + t\mu = w + t(\mu - w)$$

where w refers to wealth of citizens, $g(w)$ is a distribution of wealth (w), and μ refers to a mean of g. $(1-t)w$ is the citizen's wealth after tax. Welfare from tax can be represented as a per capita tax revenue. Per capita tax revenue is $t \int_w wg(w)dw = t\mu$.

When we rewrite the function as $w + t(\mu - w)$, it shows that citizens who have less wealth (w) than average (μ) would prefer a higher tax rate, while citizens who are wealthier than average would prefer lower tax rate. In other words, in a single-dimensional space, the distribution of wealth is a dominant determinant of parties' policy positions. Whether the fraction of voters who are poorer than average is larger than half of the voters becomes a condition that determines the winning party. Formally, this is defined as follow:

$$G_{s^*}(\mu) = \tfrac{1}{2}$$

$G(w)$ is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of income distribution $(g(w))$. Roemer introduces the stochastic factor s, a random variable that determines the turnout of voters, and uniformly distributed on $[0,1]$. $g_s(w)$ refers to the distributions of wealth of voters (who turn out in election), and $G_s(w)$ is a CDF of $g_s(w)$. $G_s(\mu) > \tfrac{1}{2}$ means that the fraction of voters who are poorer than average are more than half.

Additionally, Roemer assumes that $G_s(\mu)$ is decreasing in s. This reflects that the turnout rate is not homogeneous across the level of income. Here, s^* is defined as a state s where the fraction of voters who poorer than average are half of the voters. Based on assumption $G_s(\mu)$ is decreasing function of s, s^* is the probability of winning for left-wing parties that suggests a lower tax rate.

In sum, at a uni-dimensional policy space, each party choose distinct policy position from each other to maximize their constituents' welfare given fixed portion of their own constituents.

4.3.1.3 Convergence at the Two Dimensional Policy Space

When it comes to two-dimensional space, parties' policy positions can diverge under certain conditions. In his original model, Roemer uses a religion as a second dimension that cuts across the redistribution dimension. In this paper, I use immigration as the second dimension that cuts across the welfare issue dimension.

The utility function of citizens in the two-dimensional spaces is defined as below:

$$v(t, z; w, a) = (1 - t)w + t\mu - \frac{\alpha}{2}(z - a)^2$$

where w wealth, view on immigration policy a. The first two terms are the same with the utility function at a single dimension. And the third term reflects the utility of citizens with a view on immigration (a) over the immigration policy position z. α reflects the salience of the immigration dimension. Given this utility function of citizens, we can derive the conditions when voters prefer $\tau_L(t_L, z_L)$ to $\tau_R(t_R, z_R)$.

$$\bar{z} + \frac{\triangle t(w - \mu)}{\alpha \triangle z} > a \text{ if } \triangle z > 0$$

$$\text{where } z = z_R - z_L, \quad \bar{z} = \frac{(z_L + z_R)}{2} \quad t = t_R - t_L,$$

In the previous section, the cut-point between supporters for the left and right-wing parties was simply the mean of wealth (μ). However, in a two-dimensional space, the cut-point between the left and right-wing supporters should be determined based on the joint distribution of the two dimensions. $\bar{z} + \frac{\triangle t(w - \mu)}{\alpha \triangle z}$ is a function of parties' policy decision making (t; z). The relative distance between the parties' policy position in each policy area and the size of the salience factor (α) determines the cut-point between the left-wing party supporters and right-wing party supporters.

Roemer assumes the citizens' joint distribution over two dimensions $h(w, a) = g(w)r(a, w)$. $g(w)$ is a distribution of wealth, and distribution of immigrant attitudes(a) at given w. Consistent with the unidimensional model, Roemer defines the stochastic factor s that determines the voter turnout. $h_s(w, a)$ is a joint distribution of voters' wealth and immigrant attitudes at state s. $\Phi(z, s)$ being a cumulative distribution function for immigrant attitudes in state s. Formally, $\Phi(z, s) = \int \int_{-\infty}^{z} g_s(w)r(a, w)dadw$. Roemer assumes that $\Phi(z, s)$ is strictly decreasing in s. This extends the assumption at a single dimension that turn out of voters are not homogeneous across voters.

When s is high, turn out of rich, anti-immigrant voter turn out more than others. And we can define s^* as

$$\int \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{z}+\frac{\triangle t(w-\mu)}{\alpha \triangle z}} g_{s^*}(w)r(a,w)dadw = \tfrac{1}{2}$$

s^* is a state where fraction of voters for both parties are the same. Since $\Phi(z,s)$ is a decreasing function of s, and $s \in (0,1)$, s^* refers to a probability of left wing party winning at the equilibrium.

4.3.1.4   Equilibria at the Two Dimensional Spaces

In the two-dimensional space, Roemer shows that there is a case where the left-wing party's welfare policy converges to the right. More specifically, it shows when immigration being very salient, how parties change their welfare policy positions, and under which condition the left-wing parties' welfare party position converges to the right-wing parties' welfare policy.

Assuming immigration being sufficiently salient ($\alpha \rightarrow \infty$), $z_L(\infty)$ and $z_R(\infty)$ represent left and right-wing party's immigration policy position when immigration is highly salient.

Theorem. When immigration issue becomes very salient, every equilibrium should include $t_L = 0$ when the following condition is held:

$$\bar{\mu} - \mu > \frac{(\mu - w_L)\Delta z(\infty)}{2(z_L(\infty) - a_L)}$$

Here, $\bar{\mu}$ refers to the mean wealth of the voters with median religious position ($\bar{z}(\infty)$ [4] while μ refers to the mean of wealth. On the right-hand side, we can see the $\Delta z(\infty$ in a denominator, which refers to the difference between left and right-wing parties' immigration policy when immigration is highly salient. When immigration being salient enough, parties' policy position on immigration is approximately the same as the uni-dimensional game of immigration. Therefore, both left-wing and right-wing parties converge on median voters' immigration policy position ($\Delta z(\infty) = 0$). Thus, $\bar{\mu}$ should be equal to the median wealth of voters who have the median religious view in the state s^*. Therefore, the theorem implies that when voters who have a median view on immigration are wealthier than the average wealth of the population, the equilibrium includes the left-wing party converging to the

---

[4] $\bar{\mu} = \frac{\int w g_{s^*}(w)r(\bar{z}(\infty),w)dw}{\int g_{s^*}(w)r(\bar{z}(\infty),w)dw}$

right-wing party's tax(welfare) policy position.

The condition that voters who have a median view on immigration are wealthier than the average $(\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0)$ reflects a condition where immigration becomes a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue. A scenario where voters with the median view on immigration are from a higher income group $(\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0)$ means that voters with strongly anti-immigration views are more from the low-income segment of the population. On the other hand, a case where voters with median immigration views have lower income than the average $(\bar{\mu} - \mu < 0)$ is when voters with strong anti-immigration attitudes are disproportionately more from the high-income bracket. In other words, this condition is a condition where immigration is being a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue.

Table 12 summarizes the implication of the model in two-by-two table. According to the model, when the salience of immigration is relatively low, left and right-wing parties diverge in their welfare policy position regardless of the joint distribution of voters' preferences. Yet, when immigration becomes highly salient, parties converge to the right or left wing's welfare policy position depending on the joint distribution of voters. Especially when anti-immigrant voters are disproportionately more from the low-income group $(\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0)$, and immigration becomes a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue, left-wing parties tend to converge to a more conservative welfare policy position.

4.4   Research Design

Based on this model's implication, I empirically test how the salience of immigration issue, and joint distribution of voters' preference over welfare and immigration policy affect the parties' welfare policy position.

First, to test the model's prediction I estimate the variants of the following model:

$$\text{Policy Gap}_{c,i,i',t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Salience}_{c,t} + \beta_2 \text{Condition}_{c,t} + \beta_3 \text{Salience}_{c,t} \times \text{Condition}_{c,t} + Z_{c,t}\gamma$$

where c, i, t index country, party, and election.

Dependent variable Policy $\text{Gap}_{c,i,i',t}$ is the difference between welfare policy position of left-wing party (i) and right-wing party (i') in country c at election-year t. Salience$_{c,t}$ is the salience of immigration in country c at election-year t. Lastly, Condition$_{c,t}$ refers to if voters who have median view on immigration issue is wealthier than average voters ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$). In other words, this is a condition where voters with low income are more likely to have anti-immigrant attitudes, which makes immigration a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue. According to the Roemer's model, difference between parties' policy position should decrease when immigration is salient, and at the same time, a voter with median immigration attitudes is wealthier than average voters ($\beta_3 < 0$). Lastly, $Z_{c,t}$ refers to a vector of covariates that could affect the parties' welfare policy positions, salience of immigration, and the distribution of voters' preferences at the same time. As covariates, I include the level of annual immigration inflows, and the indicator for income inequality in each country (Gini coefficient). Lastly, I add the share of import per GDP. Economic globalization can have more direct impacts on parties' welfare policy positions either by limiting the governments' autonomy on economic policies [65, 60] or by posing fiscal pressure [20]. To account such potential direct impacts of economic globalization on parties' welfare policy positions, I include the share of import in GDP.

4.4.1 Data Sources

First, to clarify the parties' conventional ideological position, I use Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data, which is one of the most widely used data to identify party families [e.g. 88]. CMP classifies parties into twelve different categories. Whereas CMP's classification includes niche parties (i.e. ecological parties), this paper's theory focuses on the mainstream left and right-wing parties. Accordingly, I use parties that are classified as (center) left or right-wing parties.[5]

To measure to what extent parties converge on a welfare policy position, I also rely

---

[5]"Socialist or other left parties", "Social democratic parties (center-left)", "Christian democratic parties", "Conservative parties"

on CMP data. CMP provides each party's position on diverse policy areas based on their manifesto published in each election. Particularly, CMP has a variable regarding each party's favorable mentions toward welfare state expansion (i.e. expansion of social security schemes, such as health care, pensions, social housing). Using this measure, I estimate the differences between left-wing and right-wing parties' welfare policy positions.

To measure the salience of immigration issue ($Salience_{c,t}$), median voters' attitudes on immigration, and their income level ($Condition_{c,t}$), I utilize the (nationally representative) individual-level survey data. First, to measure the salience of immigration, I use the Eurobarometer survey data. Eurobarometer asks if respondents consider immigration as a salient issue. Eurobarometer is especially useful to measure the salience of immigration issue since it asks the same question every year since 2001 in all countries in the sample, which allows us to compare the level of salience across time and countries. While there are other surveys asking the salient issue in the country, they either have limited coverage of time and countries, or they have inconsistent questions and answers across countries.[6]

I rely on the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure the median voters' attitudes toward immigrants and their income level. ESS is widely used in many works to estimate the public attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. ESS has a series of questions asking respondents' attitudes toward immigration. For the analysis, I use a widely used question that asks to what degrees respondents agree with open migration policies [7]

4.5   Results

Table 13 reports the results of regression analysis of gap between welfare policy positions of left and right-wing parties on salience of immigration, and joint distribution of voters' preferences.

Across all models, I use a hierarchical linear model with country and year random inter-

---

[6]For instance, while Comparative Studies of Electoral System (CSES) data has bigger sample size on average compared to Eurobarometer, they ask respondents about the most salient issue in an election only in wave 2, and 3

[7]"How many immigrants do you think [country] should allow?" Answers are coded on 4 point scale, where 4 "being allow as many as possible", 1 being "allow none."

cept to account for variations across countries and time. Model (1) shows that without any other covariates, the salience of immigration is negatively correlated with a policy gap between left and right-wing parties: as the salience of immigration increases, left and right-wing parties tend to converge on their welfare policy positions.

Through model (2) to model (4) test the implication of Roemer's model more directly using the interaction between the salience of immigration and Condition$_{c,t}$, which refers to if voters who have a median view on immigration is wealthier than average voters ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$). Substantively, this condition refers to a case where low-income voters are disproportionately more anti-immigrant, which makes immigration a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue.

According to the model of Roemer, when voters who have a median view on immigration are wealthier than average voters ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$), and salience of immigration is high, left-wing parties' welfare policy position converges to right-wing parties' policy position. Throughout the model (2) to (4), the direction of coefficients are as expected: When a voter who has a median view on immigration is wealthier than average voters, left-wing parties tend to converge more to right-wing parties' welfare policy position as the salience of immigration grows. This relationship is significant when controlling the various covariates such as inflows of immigrants, economic inequality (Gini Coefficient), and economic globalization (Import in GDP (%)).

Figure 8 shows this conditional effect of the salience of immigration by the joint distribution of voters. Left panel shows the marginal effect of salience of immigration on welfare policy position gap between left and right-wing parties when voters with median immigration view has lower income than average ($\bar{\mu} - \mu < 0$). Right panel shows the marginal effect when voters with median immigration view has higher income than average voter's income ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$).

The right side panel of the figure shows the marginal effect of the salience of immigration on welfare policy position when voters who have a median view on immigration have a higher level of income than average voters ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$). As the model predicts, when voters with a strong anti-immigration view are from the low-income class ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$), left-wing parties tend to converge more to right-wing parties' welfare policy position as the salience of immigration.

Table 12: Implication of Model (Summary)

Salience of Immigration \Condition	Condition = 0 ($\bar{\mu} - \mu < 0$)	Condition = 1 ($\bar{\mu} - \mu > 0$)
Low Salience	Diverge	Diverge
High Salience	Converge to Left	Converge to Right

Table 13: Convergence of Welfare Policy Position

	Dependent variable:			
	Difference between Welfare Policy Position (L-R)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Salience	−0.021** (0.010)	0.0425* (0.025)	0.049* (0.026)	0.029 (0.030)
Condition		1.390** (0.568)	1.282** (0.595)	1.712** (0.704)
Salience × Condition		−0.096*** (0.024)	−0.102*** (0.025)	−0.104*** (0.028)
Immigration Inflow (%)				3.115* (1.611)
Import in GDP (%)				0.008 (0.008)
Gini Coeff				0.054 (0.097)
Electoral System			✓	✓
Country Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	167	122	122	108
Akaike Inf. Crit.	469.444	348.385	353.359	321.895
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	485.034	368.013	381.399	354.080

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The left panel, on the other hand, shows the marginal effect of the salience of immigration on welfare policy position when voters who have a median view on immigration have a lower level of income than average voters ($\bar{\mu} - \mu < 0$). The model predicts that when voters' views on immigration and the redistribution issue are aligned ($\bar{\mu} - \mu < 0$), right-wing parties will converge to left-wing parties' welfare policy position as the salience of immigration increases. However, the difference between the welfare policy position of the left and right-wing parties are not statistically significant regardless of the salience of immigration.

4.6   Conclusion

This paper examines how the increasing salience of immigration in Western Europe influences the welfare policy position of parties by changing the structure of political cleavage in electoral competition. Applying the classic model of Roemer, I have demonstrated that when immigration becomes salient and voters with low income are likely to be anti-immigrant, left-wing parties have an incentive to converge to right-wing parties' welfare policy position. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project and several individual-level survey data, I show that given the high salience of immigration, the left-wing parties' welfare policy position converges to right-wing parties' position, especially when low-income voters have strong anti-immigration attitudes.

These findings have an important contribution to the literature on the consequence of the burgeoning anti-immigration sentiment in Western Europe. As immigration becomes more and more salient, there have been lots of research on the consequences of the rise in anti-immigration sentiment. Yet, they mostly focus on how it affects electoral outcomes, the rise of radical right-wing parties, and immigration policies [e.g. 50, 13, 134, 24]. This paper suggests that the rise of anti-immigration sentiment can influence politics beyond the electoral outcomes and immigration policy and potentially have broader impacts on individuals' welfare.

This paper also contributes to the literature on the globalization backlash by showing why it is challenging for left-wing parties to compensate people who suffer from economic global-

ization. Economic globalization inevitably induces winners and losers, and compensation is a key to manage the backlash against it [e.g. 62, 96]. While left-wing parties conventionally play a role in providing compensation by expanding the welfare expenses, this paper shows that as immigration becomes salient in electoral competition, it is difficult for left-wing parties to maintain their welfare policy position. This finding shows a dilemma of globalization that the rise of anti-immigration sentiment leads to a more conservative welfare policy, which leads to another wave of backlash against globalization. Given that low-income voters are disproportionately more anti-immigrant, it is challenging for left-wing parties to solve this dilemma.

Despite these contributions, there is more ground to be covered. First, this paper includes only a limited number of countries and periods. The analysis would benefit from including additional countries and parties. Second, this paper uses only a single measurement of the welfare position of parties based on the comparative manifesto data. While manifesto data is one of the most widely used data to measure the policy positions of parties, it has limitations as well [e.g. 102, 88]. Future work should incorporate a diverse set of data and methods to measure and validate the welfare policy positions of parties. Lastly, this paper only focuses on the supply side of the model, whereas the model relies on an assumption that voters would choose parties that would maximize their benefits. Future research should investigate whether these parties' strategy is successful in elections.

Figure 8: Conditional Effects of Salience of Immigration

5.0 Conclusions

Over the last few decades, the flow of international migration has increased steadily, and Europe is no exception from this trend [113]. Since the end of the Second World War, Western European countries have been some of the most popular destinations for international migrants from other parts of the world [30]. Particularly, since the EU enlargement in 2004, which enables free movement from many Eastern European countries, the inflow of immigrants to Western Europe has increased even more rapidly.

Consequently, immigration has become more politically salient in many European countries. With the fast growth of anti-immigration sentiment and the rise of far-right parties whose main agenda is anti-immigration policies, immigration has become the center of European politics in the last decade [e.g. 35, 52].

Many studies explore the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. There have been burgeoning discussions over the causes and consequences of rising far-right populism and anti-immigration sentiment in Western democracies. Many studies find that individuals with high levels of anti-immigration attitudes likely vote for radical right-wing parties [52, 27], and economic interests and cultural factors are strong predictors of anti-immigration sentiments [130, 26, 57]. On the other hand, another strand of studies focuses on how such growing anti-immigration sentiment and the rise of far-right parties affect political parties' behaviors such as their immigration policies [e.g. 134, 109, 52].

These previous studies primarily consider immigration as an inflow of labor forces that creates competition for domestic workers or as a source of foreign influence that triggers cultural backlash in receiving countries. Yet, immigrants are also political actors [e.g. 34], and their relocation results in an inflow of political actors in receiving countries and exit of political actors in sending countries. Depending on the political attributes of migrants and the political environment they experience, international migration flows can have a range of impacts on politics in both sending and receiving countries.

There is a small but growing literature that sees immigrants as political actors [e.g. 34, 46, 75]. Especially, as immigration become a salient issue in Western democracies, many

studies explore how western democracies can politically integrate immigrants [e.g. 76, 75], and how the inflow of immigrants would change the political competition of parties [e.g. 34].

Yet, as political actors, migrants' political attributes have implications beyond political integration in receiving countries. Migrants are embedded in transnational networks that connect sending and receiving countries. Migrants can transfer not only financial remittances but also social and political remittances to their home countries [118, 23, 41, 14, 29]. In other words, migrants are the source of new ideas and ideologies in their home countries. Thus, questions like who migrants are and what determines their political attitudes have important political implications.

My dissertation builds on these previous studies. In this study, I explore how international migration has varying impacts on politics in sending and receiving countries, depending on who they are, where they are from, and where they arrive. In the first paper, I explore the political attributes of emigrants and how their exit affects the distribution of voters in their home countries, focusing on Eastern Europe, where the number of emigrants has been increasing since the EU enlargement. I find that (1) emigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be younger, highly educated, and politically more progressive, (2) hence the support for far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates. These findings highlight the importance of migrants' political attributes by showing that migration can influence political outcomes in sending countries by geographically sorting citizens by their political preferences.

On the other hand, migrants' political attitudes are not constant. Depending on what they experience in receiving countries after they migrate, their political attitudes may vary. In the second paper, I explore how political environments in host countries influence immigrants' political attitudes. Many previous studies suggest that migrants become more pro-democratic after moving to advanced democracies and transmit democratic values to their home countries [118, 23, 14, 56]. However, migrants' experiences vary widely by the political environments in host countries, even within advanced democracies. When immigrants experience hostilities toward them, they likely become dissatisfied with the political system of host countries and less attached to democratic values. Using the various kinds of data from 10 Western European countries, I find that when immigrants live in regions with

high support for far-right parties, they become more skeptical regarding democracy. This finding deepens our understanding of the consequences of radical right-wing populism in Western democracies. Given that a significant number of immigrants are from new, emerging democracies, the impacts of right-wing extremism in Western democracies can negatively influence democratic consolidation beyond their borders.

Finally, in the last paper, I aim to answer why it is challenging for Western democracies to alleviate the backlash against immigration, and the rise of radical populism, focusing on the impacts of immigration on social democratic parties' policy positions. The increasing salience of immigration creates a challenge for left-wing parties. Conventionally, left-wing parties are committed to both welfare expansion and pro-immigration policies. Yet, left-wing parties rely on two groups of constituents with different policy preferences. While highly educated, socially liberal constituents tend to be more pro-immigrant, the other type of constituents with low-income levels tend to be more anti-immigrant [e.g. 57]. Given this dilemma, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their vote share. By maintaining their conventional policy positions on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant portion of their core constituents. I find that when immigration becomes highly salient and voters with strongly anti-immigration views are disproportionately more from the low-income segment of the population, center-left parties tend to converge to a more conservative welfare policy position. Conventionally, center-left parties have played crucial roles in economic globalization by compensating losers of globalization by expanding welfare provision. Yet, this paper shows that as immigration becomes salient, it is difficult for left-wing parties to maintain their welfare policy position. The finding highlights a dilemma of globalization that the rise of anti-immigration sentiment leads to a more conservative welfare policy, which leads to another wave of backlash against economic globalization and immigration.

Throughout the three papers, this study demonstrates how important migrants' political attributes are (Essay 1), how anti-immigration sentiment in host countries can have detrimental effects on them (Essay 2), and finally how challenging it is for Western democracies to prevent such spreads of anti-immigration sentiment given the high saliency of immigration (Essay 3). These findings contribute to the literature on the politics of international

74

migration by drawing attention to the importance of migrants as political actors and the downstream effects of the politicization of immigration in Western democracies.

Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 2

A.1 Who Emigrates? Descriptive Statistics of Individual-level Survey

A.1.1 Descriptive Statistics (LITS)

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics (LiTs 2010)

Variable	n	mean	min	max	sd
Willing to Emigrate	6273	0.23	0.00	1.00	0.42
Age	6641	47.23	18.00	99.00	17.48
Female	6641	0.53	0.51	0.55	0.01
Education (EISCED)	6641	4.10	1.00	7.00	1.41
Anti-Immigrant	5619	1.31	0.00	2.00	0.70
Pro-Democracy	5963	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.50
Religiosity	6641	0.09	0.00	1.00	0.28
Unemployed	6641	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.24
Vote	6505	0.60	0.00	1.00	0.49
Satisfied with Econ	6506	2.40	1.00	5.00	1.03

To capture (potential) emigrants, and (potential) stayers from the six Eastern European countries, we use LiTs from the all six Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia).

Willing to Emigrate: I measure individuals willingness to emigrate using a question asks "Do you intend to move abroad in the next 12 months?" The responses to this question are coded as binary, 1 indicating willingness to emigrate, 0 not willing to emigrate.

Education (EISCED): highest level of education is coded in 7 point scale of EISCED category: 1: less than lower secondary, 2: lower secondary, 3: lower tier upper secondary, 4:

upper tier upper secondary, 5:advanced vocational, sub-degree, 6:BA level, 7: higher than MA degree.

Anti-Immigrant: Attitudes toward immigrants are measured using a question that asks "if immigrants are a burden for society(2), valuable contribution (0) or have none of these effects (1)."

Pro-Democracy: I measure individuals' support for democracy using a question that asks whether respondents agree with the statement that "democracy is preferable to other forms of political systems". The responses to this question are coded as binary, 1 indicating a preference for democracy, 0 a preference for other forms of political systems. In the survey, an authoritarian government was listed as an example for the other political system.

Religiosity: I measure religiosity using a question asking if a respondent is "a member of religious institution". Answers are coded as binary, 1 indicating an active member while 0 indicating passive or no membership.

Unemployed: I measure employment status using a question asking if a respondent is "unemployed in last 12 months." Responses are coded binary.

A.1.2 Descriptive Statistics (ESS)

In order to capture a sample of emigrants who live in other (Western) European countries, I use European Social Survey data from 13 Western European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Swiss, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark). On the other hand, to capture a sample of people who remain in their home countries, I use the ESS from Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia). Latvia is excluded from this sample due to a lack of coverage of the ESS data.

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics (ESS Wave 1-9)

Variable	n	mean	min	max	sd
Emigrant	66662.00	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.16
Age (of emigration)	65733.00	46.11	0.00	110.00	18.58
Female	66526.00	0.54	0.00	1.00	0.00
Education(EISCED)	66057.00	3.82	1.00	7.00	1.57
Education(BA or higher)	66310.00	0.25	0.00	1.00	0.43
Anti-Immigrant	64302.00	2.59	1.00	4.00	0.90
Ideology	55991.00	5.27	0.00	10.00	2.29
Religiosity	65608.00	4.38	0.00	10.00	3.22

Emigrants: ESS asks respondents if they are born in country of their current residence, when, and where they migrated from. Using these question, I could identify emigrants from six Eastern European countries who live in other (Western) European countries. In order to control for emigrants who migrated before they gain their suffrage, I subset the emigrant sample only to people who emigrate at their age of 18 or older.

Age (of Emigration): ESS wave 5 to 9 provides the exact year of emigration while ESS wave 1 to 4 provides the duration of their migration if emigrants stay in the country less than 5, 10, 15, or 20 years. In order to estimate the precise age of arrival, I only use ESS wave 5 to 9.

Education (EISCED): ESS uses the same EISCED 7 point scale of highest level of education with LITs.

Anti-Immigrant: It is challenging to compare emigrants' political attitudes in host countries with those who stay in home countries since their political environment is different. Especially, it is hard to measure emigrants' attitudes toward immigrants. ESS has several different questions about attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, targeted respondents are emigrants, which means they themselves are immigrants in this context. Therefore, general

questions regarding the attitudes toward immigrants might not be a good proxy for their attitudes toward immigration. To address this concern, I use a question that asks their attitudes toward immigrants with different race or ethnicity ("Do you agree with allowing many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe?"). Using this question will prevent emigrant respondents from considering immigrants in the survey question as themselves and provide a proxy for their attitudes toward minorities and cultural diversity. 1 indicates "allowing many to come," and 4 indicates "allowing none of them to come."

Ideology: SS does not have the identical question with LiTs that asks how supportive respondents are for democratic regimes. ESS has a question with how satisfied with the democracy in your country, but 'your country' could mean the country of their current residence. Therefore, for the second best, more direct way to measure the political attitudes, I use a following question: "Where would you place yourself from 0(left) to 10(right) scale?"

Religiosity: ESS directly asks "how religious are you in 0(not at all) to 10 (very religious) scale.

As discussed in the manuscript, one challenge to use ESS to measure emigrants' attributes is that ESS estimates the post-emigration attributes. In order to address this issue, at least for demographic variables, I select ones that are more likely to be determined pre-emigration such as age (of emigration), gender, level of education. For these reasons, I did not include current unemployment status, or satisfied with the national economy (not home country), which are for sure be affected by emigration decision. Also, I only used the emigrants sample who were older than 18.

A.1.3 (Potential) Emigrants vs Stayers

In addition to the visualization and the regression analyses reported in the main text, I report the simple t-test results that show the differences between (potential) emigrants from stayers. Confidence intervals reported in the tables are at 95% level.

Table 16: T-Test: (Potential) Emigrants vs Stayers (LiTs)

Variable	Emigrants	Natives	Difference	CI.low	CI.high
Age	36.71	50.86	14.15	13.26	15.04
Female	0.53	0.53	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Education (EISCED)	4.33	4.02	-0.31	-0.39	-0.23
Education (BA or higher)	0.207	0.162	-0.045	-0.068	-0.022
Unemployed	0.11	0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05
Satisfied with Econ	2.29	2.43	0.14	0.07	0.20
Support for Democracy	0.56	0.46	-0.09	-0.12	-0.06
Anti-Immigrant	1.22	1.35	0.13	0.09	0.18
Religiosity	2.80	3.00	0.20	0.12	0.27

Table 17: T-Test: Emigrants vs Stayers (ESS)

Variable	Emigrant	Native	Diff	CI.low	CI.high
Age	28.33	46.54	18.21	17.43	18.98
Female	0.55	0.54	-0.01	-0.04	0.02
Education(EISCED)	3.60	3.81	0.20	0.04	0.36
Education(BA or higher)	0.41	0.25	-0.16	-0.19	-0.12
Ideology	5.15	5.27	0.12	-0.01	0.25
Anti-Immigrant	2.12	2.60	0.48	0.42	0.54
Religiosity	5.04	4.36	-0.68	-0.87	-0.48

A.2 Emigration and Far-Right Parties in Eastern Europe

A.2.1 Geographical Unit (NUTS) of Eastern Europe

NUTS is geographical unit that is comparable across EU member countries. NUTS 3 is the most disaggregated unit within the NUTS system, which is defined as "small re-

gions for specific diagnoses" by Eurostat (`https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background`)

Table 18: NUTS 3-Level Information (2013)

Country	NUTS 3 Unit (2013)	Count
Czech Republic	Region (Kraje)	14
Poland	Subregions (Podregiony)	72
Slovakia	Regions (Kraje)	8
Slovenia	Statistical regions (Statistične regije)	12
Latvia	Statistical regions (Statistiskie reģioni)	6
Estonia	Groups of counties (Groups of Maakond)	5

A.3   Source of the Migration Data

This section reports the source of migration data as well as the method of each data collection.

- Poland Statistical Office "Statistics Poland"

  (`https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/dane/podgrup/temat`)

  Data on registration for permanent residence in gmina and on registration of departure for permanent and long-term residence abroad is through PESEL (national registration number) register collected by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.

- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia

  (`https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatDb/pxweb`)

  Data are collected through the statistical survey "Migrations" (SEL). Data in this survey are collected from the administrative collection of the Ministry of the Interior, namely the Central Population Register.

- Statistical Office of Slovak Republic

  (`https://slovak.statistics.sk/`)

The statistical survey on migration movement of population, every year organised by the SO SR, is the main source of data on international migration. It is an exhaustive survey conducted under the Programme of National Statistical Surveys by means of statistical reports ´Report on Migration´. The Ministry of Interior of the SR is the administrative source of data on acquisition and loss of citizenship of the SR.

- Estonia Statistical Office
  (`http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/dialog/statfile1.asp`)
  An emigration event occurs if a person's residency index which at the beginning the year was 1 obtains the value 0 by the end of the year and it is not a death event.

- Latvia Statistical Office
  (`https://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb`)
  Migration data is synthesized based on a various source of administrative data primarily including Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA), State Social Insurance Agency (SSIA).

- Czech Statistical Office
  (`https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf`)
  The data on migration were taken from the reports on migration (reporting units were Registration offices of residence and district offices of the Foreign and Border Police of the Czech Republic) between the years 2001 and 2004. Since 2005 they have been electronically taken from the Ministry of Interior.

A.3.1 Emigration and Far-Right Votes (Log Transformed)

Table 19: Emigration and Far-Right Votes (Log Transformed)

	Dependent variable:		
	log(Votes for Far-Right Parties)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(Emigration$_{t-1}$)	0.059***	0.072***	0.072***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)
log(Immigration$_{t-1}$)		0.004	0.004
		(0.040)	(0.038)
log(GDP$_{t-1}$)		−0.113	−0.231
		(0.187)	(0.175)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$			0.010*
			(0.007)
log(Population$_{t-1}$)	1.143***	1.216***	1.563***
	(0.385)	(0.416)	(0.391)
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓
NUTS3 FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	371	359	350
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

A.4 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable

A.4.1 Instrumental Variable Analysis for Alternative Classification of Far-right Parties in Poland

All the radical right-wing parties in CHES are considered to be radical right wing parties in other datasets (e.g. Comparative Manifesto Data) and previous studies except Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. Whereas CHES classifies PiS as a radical right wing party from early 2000s, some previous studies categorize PiS as conservative party, and instead consider

(LPR) as a radical right wing party in 2005, and 2007 elections [1]. In the main text, I followed the CHES coding. In the appendix, I replicate the same instrumental variable approach, using the alternative coding that classifying LPR as far-right party in 2005, and 2007 elections. The results are consistent in terms of the direction of coefficient and the statistical significance.

---

[1]CHES classifies LPR as confessional party, and Comparative Manifesto Project data consider LPR as Christian Democratic Party.

Table 20: IV Analysis (Poland) with Alternative Coding

	Dependent variable:		
	Vote share of Far-Right Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Emigration	22.526**	15.900*	15.409***
	(9.241)	(8.807)	(4.351)
Immigration		−5.048	−2.649
		(14.200)	(7.015)
Unemployment		0.014***	0.004***
		(0.002)	(0.001)
GDP		−0.000***	−0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
NUTS 3 FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Lagged DV			✓
Estimator	IV	IV	IV
First Stage F	52.47***	43.730***	42.106***
N	285	258	258

$^{***}p < 0.01;$ $^{**}p < 0.05;$ $^{*}p < 0.1$

A.4.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis with Emigration Rates After the EU Accession

Ideally, we would have data of the past emigration rates by destination, which would allow me to use the past emigration rates to the UK exclusively to build an instrument. However, such data is not available at the sub-national level (NUTS 3). For a robustness check, I construct the instrument with the emigration share in 2004, at the year of EU enlargement, instead of pre-EU emigration rates ($\text{Unemployment}_{UK,t} \times \text{Emigration}_{2004}$). This leverages the fact that emigration to the UK has increased almost exclusively immediately after the EU enlargement due to the free access to the UK labor market [115]. Table A. 21 reports the results of this new identification. The results are mostly consistent with the results reported in the main text.

Table 21: IV Analysis with 2004 Emigration Rates (Poland)

	IV	IV	IV
Emigration	29.149***	19.769**	16.779**
	(9.557)	(8.054)	(8.062)
Immigration		9.853	15.006
		(17.740)	(17.732)
Unemployment		0.009***	0.008**
		(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP		-0.000***	-0.000**
		(0.000)	(0.000)
NUTS 3 FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Lagged DV			✓
First Stage F	111.187***	113.053***	112.568***
N	213	187	187

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Appendix B Appendix to Chapter 3

## B.1 Individual-Level Model to Predict Immigrants' Attitudes

Figure 9: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients - Satisfied with Government

B.2 Validating the MRP with Synthesized Joint Distribution

It is difficult to validate the MRP with raking and synthetic joint distribution when it comes to public opinion of immigrants, since the true population opinion is unknown. As an alternative, to show the validity of this method, I show the correlation between the vote share of far-right parties and prediction of vote share of far-right parties in the region (NUTS 1 or 2). ESS asks respondents what party they voted for in the last national election. Using this question, I estimate the voting rate for far-right parties at the sub-national level and test how well this estimate predicts the actual vote share of far-right parties. Since the actual (population) vote share of a party in national election is known, I can evaluate how well the estimate from MRP with raking and synthetic joint distribution predicts the true value,

Figure 10: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients - Trust in Parliament compared to simple mean of vote for far-right parties at each sub-national unit.

First, I estimate the multilevel regression model to generate individual level estimate for the vote for far-right parties. Below is the model:

$$Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(\beta_0 + \beta^{female} \cdot \text{Female}_i + \beta^{age}_{age(i)} + \beta^{edu}_{edu(i)} + \beta^{nuts}_{nuts(i)} + \beta^{year}_{year(i)})$$

$$\beta^{nuts}_j \sim N(\beta_0 + \beta^{country}_{country(j)}, \sigma^2_{nuts})$$

For varying coefficients, I assign normal distribution with mean being 0, and standard deviations ($\sigma_{age}, \sigma_{edu}, \sigma_{nuts}, \sigma_{year}$ estimated from data using weakly informative prior ($\sigma \sim Cauchy(0,5)$). I also add region level predictor with country indicator.

Demographic information in the model are important predictors of individual vote choice. Particularly, age and education are some of the strongest predictors of far-right support. There are other non-demographic variables that could predict vote for far-right parties effectively such as ideology or attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, in order to estimate the public opinion at the sub-national level using Census data, we can only use variables that are available in Census data.

Second step is to generate synthetic joint distribution using both survey information and raking. Among eight Western European countries in the sample, three countries' Census data provide full joint distribution between all the variables included in the model above.

Yet, other five countries provide joint distribution of only a few variables (gender, education, region), and for some variables they only provide marginal distribution (age group). In order to post stratify the estimate at the sub-national level, I synthesized the joint distribution of all variables using raking with initial contingency table based on survey data.

The Pearson correlation between the actual vote share of far-right parties and estimates using MrP with synthetic joint distribution is 0.6250, while the correlation coefficient with sample mean is only 0.5001. This shows that while model prediction does not predict the outcome of interest perfectly, it does reduce measurement error significantly compared to a baseline that does not take Census information into account.


Figure 11: Vote for Far-right Parties (Model Comparison)

B.3   Conditional Effects by Immigrants' Country of Origin

As an alternative approach to the table 11, below table report the regression analysis between the political attitudes of immigrants, and the vote share of far-right parties using a separate sample for EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants respectively.

Table 22: Conditional Effects by Immigrants' Country of Origin

	Dependent variable:					
	Satisfied w Democracy		Satisfied w Government		Trust in Parliament	
	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU	EU
FR Vote Share	−0.366**	0.088	−1.046***	−0.718**	−0.160	−0.148
	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.307)	(0.302)	(0.102)	(0.137)
Satisfied w Democracy (Native)	0.521***	0.553***				
	(0.016)	(0.018)				
Satisfied w Government (Native)			0.618***	0.593***		
			(0.038)	(0.039)		
Trust in Parliament (Native)					0.679***	0.700***
					(0.035)	(0.036)
Pop.Density	−0.0001	−0.0001***	0.00001	−0.00002	0.00002	−0.0001**
	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Foreign-born Share	0.826**	1.715***	0.173	0.749	−0.629**	0.982***
	(0.412)	(0.451)	(0.654)	(0.674)	(0.267)	(0.335)
Constant	3.469***	2.805***	2.463***	2.010***	2.181***	1.534***
	(0.107)	(0.115)	(0.191)	(0.196)	(0.174)	(0.179)
Region Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	332	291	332	291	332	291
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−436.060	−330.206	−81.326	−62.809	−603.628	−392.380
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−405.619	−300.819	−50.885	−33.423	−573.187	−362.994

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C Appendix to Chapter 4

Whereas this paper mainly focuses on parties' welfare policy positions, Roemer's model also produces the predictions regarding the immigration policy positions that when immigration issue becomes salient, left and right-wing parties would converge on median voters' view on immigration. Table A.1 investigate the impacts of salience of immigration on the difference between immigration policy position of left and right wing parties. In order to measure the immigration policy position, I rely on the Immigration Party Manifesto (IPM) data from [32], which code parties' policy position on immigration issue only using the manifesto data. IPM data is specialized in coding immigration policy positions, which CMP only recently started including as a separate category.

Table 23: Difference in Immigration Policy Positions (Left-Right)

	Dependent variable:			
	Diff btw Immigration Policy Position (Left-Right)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Salience	−0.751**	−0.800**	−0.859**	−0.855**
	(0.374)	(0.382)	(0.427)	(0.342)
Import in GDP (%)		−0.002		
		(0.003)		
Gini Coeff			0.008	
			(0.016)	
Immigration (%)				−0.243
				(0.256)
Country	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	54	54	50	46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−52.275	−40.695	−35.065	−49.132
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−44.319	−30.750	−25.504	−39.989

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Bibliography

[1] Guy J Abel and Nikola Sander. Quantifying global international migration flows. *Science*, 343(6178):1520–1522, 2014.

[2] Anar K Ahmadov and Gwendolyn Sasse. A voice despite exit: The role of assimilation, emigrant networks, and destination in emigrants' transnational political engagement. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(1):78–114, 2016.

[3] Faisal Z Ahmed. Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence. *Economics & Politics*, 29(1):22–47, 2017.

[4] Tjitske Akkerman. Immigration policy and electoral competition in western europe: A fine-grained analysis of party positions over the past two decades. *Party Politics*, 21(1):54–67, 2015.

[5] Trevor J Allen. All in the party family? comparing far right voters in western and post-communist europe. *Party Politics*, 23(3):274–285, 2017.

[6] Sonia Alonso and Sara Claro da Fonseca. Immigration, left and right. *Party Politics*, 18(6):865–884, 2012.

[7] Massimo Anelli and Giovanni Peri. Does emigration delay political change? evidence from italy during the great recession. *Economic Policy*, 32(91):551–596, 2017.

[8] JEAN-THOMAS ARRIGHI and Rainer Bauböck. A multilevel puzzle: Migrants' voting rights in national and local elections. *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(3):619–639, 2017.

[9] Kai Arzheimer. Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in western europe, 1980–2002. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):259–275, 2009.

[10] Ruben Atoyan, Lone Christiansen, Allan Dizioli, Christian Ebeke, Nadeem Ilahi, Anna Ilyina, Gil Mehrez, Haonan Qu, and Faezeh Raei. *Emigration and its economic impact on Eastern Europe*. International Monetary Fund, 2016.

[11] Ryan Bakker, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. Measuring party positions in europe: The chapel hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. *Party Politics*, 21(1):143–152, 2015.

[12] Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 1999-2019 chapel hill expert survey trend file. version 1.2. *Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Available at: chesdata.eu*, 2020.

[13] Tim Bale, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, AndréA Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. If you can't beat them, join them? explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in western europe. *Political studies*, 58(3):410–426, 2010.

[14] Toman Barsbai, Hillel Rapoport, Andreas Steinmayr, and Christoph Trebesch. The effect of labor migration on the diffusion of democracy: evidence from a former soviet republic. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(3):36–69, 2017.

[15] David H. Bearce and Seungbin Park. Why remittances are a political blessing and not a curse. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 54(1):164–184, Mar 2019.

[16] Éric Bélanger and Bonnie M Meguid. Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 27(3):477–491, 2008.

[17] Diane Bolet. Drinking alone: local socio-cultural degradation and radical right support—the case of british pub closures. *Comparative Political Studies*, page 0010414021997158, 2021.

[18] G. J. Borjas. Economic theory and international migration. *International Migration Review*, 23(3):457–485, 1989.

[19] George J. Borjas. The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4):1335–1374, 11 2003.

[20] Brian Burgoon. Partisan embedding of liberalism: How trade, investment, and immigration affect party support for the welfare state. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(5):606–635, 2012.

[21] Lenka Bustikova. Revenge of the radical right. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(12):1738–1765, 2014.

[22] Lenka Bustikova and Herbert Kitschelt. The radical right in post-communist europe. comparative perspectives on legacies and party competition. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 42(4):459–483, 2009.

[23] Romana Careja and Patrick Emmenegger. Making democratic citizens: the effects of migration experience on political attitudes in central and eastern europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(7):875–902, 2012.

[24] João Carvalho and Didier Ruedin. The positions mainstream left parties adopt on immigration: A cross-cutting cleavage? *Party Politics*, 26(4):379–389, 2020.

[25] Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. Public opinion in subnational politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1):352–363, 2019.

[26] Jack Citrin and John Sides. Immigration and the imagined community in europe and the united states. *Political Studies*, 56(1):33–56, 2008.

[27] Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig. Global competition and brexit. *American political science review*, 112(2):201–218, 2018.

[28] Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in western europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):936–953, 2018.

[29] David Crow and Clarisa Perez-Armendariz. Talk without borders: why political discussion makes latin americans with relatives abroad more critical of their democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(2):238–276, 2018.

[30] Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas. The globalization of migration: Has the world become more migratory? *International Migration Review*, 48(2):283–323, 2014.

[31] Russell J Dalton. Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change. *Comparing Democracies: Elections and voting in global perspective*, 2:319–42, 1996.

[32] Rafaela Dancygier and Yotam Margalit. The evolution of the immigration debate: Evidence from a new dataset of party positions over the last half-century. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(5):734–774, 2020.

[33] Rafaela M Dancygier. *Immigration and conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[34] Rafaela M Dancygier. *Immigration and conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[35] Rafaela M. Dancygier and David D. Laitin. Immigration into europe: Economic discrimination, violence, and public policy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1):43–64, 2014.

[36] James Dennison and Andrew Geddes. A rising tide? the salience of immigration and the rise of anti-immigration political parties in western europe. *The political quarterly*, 90(1):107–116, 2019.

[37] Mihir A Desai, Devesh Kapur, John McHale, and Keith Rogers. The fiscal impact of high-skilled emigration: Flows of indians to the us. *Journal of Development Economics*, 88(1):32–44, 2009.

[38] Larry Diamond. *Political culture and democracy in developing countries: Textbook edition*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

[39] Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport. Globalization, brain drain, and development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 50(3):681–730, 2012.

[40] Yige Dong. How chinese students become nationalist: Their american experience and transpacific futures. *American Quarterly*, 69(3):559–567, 2017.

[41] David Doyle. Remittances and social spending. *American Political Science Review*, 109(4):785?802, 2015.

[42] Toake Endoh. *Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin America*. University of Illinois Press, 2010.

[43] Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, and Joseph Wright. Remittances and Democratization. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(3):571–586, 09 2015.

[44] Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, and Joseph Wright. Remittances and protest in dictatorships. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):889–904, 2018.

[45] Jennifer Fitzgerald. *Close to home: local ties and voting radical right in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

[46] Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang, and Jessica C Teets. Defying the law of gravity: The political economy of international migration. *World Politics*, 66(3):406–445, 2014.

[47] Floriana Gargiulo, Sônia Ternes, Sylvie Huet, and Guillaume Deffuant. An iterative approach for generating statistically realistic populations of households. *PloS one*, 5(1):e8828, 2010.

[48] Andrew Gelman and Thomas C Little. Poststratification into many categories using hierarchical logistic regression. 1997.

[49] Roy Germano. Migrants' remittances and economic voting in the mexican countryside. *Electoral Studies*, 32(4):875 – 885, 2013. Special Symposium: The new research agenda on electoral integrity.

[50] Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke. European immigration policies in comparative perspective: Issue salience, partisanship and immigrant rights. *Comparative European Politics*, 3(1):1–22, 2005.

[51] Matt Golder. Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in western europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(4):432–466, 2003.

[52] Matt Golder. Far right parties in europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1):477–497, 2016.

[53] Gary L Goodman and Jonathan T Hiskey. Exit without leaving: political disengagement in high migration municipalities in mexico. *Comparative Politics*, 40(2):169–188, 2008.

[54] Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Jesper Krogstrup. Immigration as a political issue in denmark and sweden. *European journal of political research*, 47(5):610–634, 2008.

[55] Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Simon Otjes. A hot topic? immigration on the agenda in western europe. *Party Politics*, 25(3):424–434, 2019.

[56] Sharan Grewal. From islamists to muslim democrats: The case of tunisia's ennahda. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2):519–535, 2020.

[57] Jens Hainmueller and Michael J Hiscox. Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in europe. *International organization*, 61(2):399–442, 2007.

[58] Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment. *The American Political Science Review*, 104(1):61–84, 2010.

[59] Kyung Joon Han. When will left-wing governments introduce liberal migration policies? an implication of power resources theory. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(3):602–614, 2015.

[60] Andrea B Haupt. Parties' responses to economic globalization: What is left for the left and right for the right? *Party Politics*, 16(1):5–27, 2010.

[61] Jude Hays, Junghyun Lim, and Jae-Jae Spoon. The path from trade to right-wing populism in europe. *Electoral Studies*, 60:102038, 2019.

[62] Jude C Hays. *Globalization and the new politics of embedded liberalism.* Oxford University Press, 2009.

[63] Jude C Hays, Sean D Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt. Government spending and public support for trade in the oecd: An empirical test of the embedded liberalism thesis. *International Organization*, 59(2):473–494, 2005.

[64] Marc Helbling. Framing immigration in western europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40(1):21–41, 2014.

[65] Timothy Hellwig. Globalization, policy constraints, and vote choice. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(4):1128–1141, 2008.

[66] Benjamin Highton. Residential mobility, community mobility, and electoral participation. *Political Behavior*, 22(2):109–120, 2000.

[67] Albert O Hirschman. *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*, volume 25. Harvard university press, 1970.

[68] Simon Hix and Christopher Lord. Political parties in the european union, the european union series, 1997.

[69] Mikael Hjerm and Annette Schnabel. Mobilizing nationalist sentiments: Which factors affect nationalist sentiments in europe? *Social Science Research*, 39(4):527–539, 2010.

[70]   Alisha C Holland and Margaret E Peters. Explaining migration timing: Political
         information and opportunities. *International Organization*, 74(3):560–583, 2020.

[71]   Daniel J Hopkins. National debates, local responses: the origins of local concern about
         immigration in britain and the united states. *British Journal of Political Science*,
         41(3):499–524, 2011.

[72]   Robert Huckfeldt, Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, and Tracy Osborn. Disagreement,
         ambivalence, and engagement: The political consequences of heterogeneous networks.
         Political Psychology, 25(1):65–95, 2004.

[73]   Jennifer Hunt. Staunching emigration from east germany: Age and the determinants
         of migration. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 4(5):1014–1037, 2006.

[74]   Ronald Inglehart. 2. the changing structure of political cleavages in western soci-
         ety. In *Electoral change in advanced industrial democracies*, pages 25–69. Princeton
         University Press, 2017.

[75]   Aida Just. The far-right, immigrants, and the prospects of democracy satisfaction in
         europe. *Party Politics*, 23(5):507–525, 2017.

[76]   Aida Just and Christopher J Anderson. Immigrants, citizenship and political action
         in europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 481–509, 2012.

[77]   Aida Just and Christopher J Anderson. Opinion climates and immigrant political
         action: A cross-national study of 25 european democracies. *Comparative Political
         Studies*, 47(7):935–965, 2014.

[78]   Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Marek Okólski. Demographic and labour-market impacts of
         migration on Poland. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 24(3):599–624, 10 2008.

[79]   Devesh Kapur. Political effects of international migration. *Annual Review of Political
         Science*, 17(1):479–502, 2014.

[80]   Devesh Kapur and John McHale. *Give us your best and brightest: the global hunt
         for talent and its impact on the developing world*. Center for Global Development,
         Washington, D.C, 2005.

[81]   Devesh Kapur and John McHale. International migration and the world income dis-
         tribution. *Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development
         Studies Association*, 21(8):1102–1110, 2009.

[82]   Mounir Karadja and Erik Prawitz. Exit, voice, and political change: Evidence
         from swedish mass migration to the united states. *Journal of Political Economy*,
         127(4):1864–1925, 2019.

[83]   Eric Kaufmann. Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the uk inde-
         pendence party vote. *Electoral Studies*, 48:57–69, 2017.

[84] Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J McGann. *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis.* University of Michigan Press, 1997.

[85] Heike Klüver and Jae-Jae Spoon. Who responds? voters, parties and issue attention. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(3):633–654, 2016.

[86] Heike Klüver and Iñaki Sagarzazu. Setting the agenda or responding to voters? political parties, voters and issue attention. *West European Politics*, 39(2):380–398, 2016.

[87] Filip Kostelka. Distant souls: post-communist emigration and voter turnout. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(7):1061–1083, 2017.

[88] Michael Laver. Measuring policy positions in political space. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17:207–223, 2014.

[89] Jeffrey R Lax and Justin H Phillips. How should we estimate public opinion in the states? *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(1):107–121, 2009.

[90] Jeffrey R Lax and Justin H Phillips. The democratic deficit in the states. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):148–166, 2012.

[91] David Leblang. Harnessing the diaspora: dual citizenship, migrant return remittances. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(1):75–101, 2017.

[92] Lucas Leemann and Fabio Wasserfallen. Extending the use and prediction precision of subnational public opinion estimation. *American journal of political science*, 61(4):1003–1022, 2017.

[93] Peggy Levitt. Social remittances: Migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. *The International Migration Review*, 32(4):926–948, 1998.

[94] Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz. Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3):425–457, 2009.

[95] Maria C Marchetti-Mercer. Those easily forgotten: the impact of emigration on those left behind. *Family process*, 51(3):376–390, 2012.

[96] YOTAM Margalit. Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in u.s. elections. *The American Political Science Review*, 105(1):166–188, 2011.

[97] Douglas S Massey and Kristin E Espinosa. What's driving mexico-us migration? a theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis. *American journal of sociology*, 102(4):939–999, 1997.

[98] Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton. Learning about democracy in africa: Awareness, performance, and experience. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):192–217, 2007.

[99] Rahsaan Maxwell. Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in large european cities: Contextual or compositional effects? *American Political Science Review*, 113(2):456–474, 2019.

[100] Anna Maria Mayda. International migration: a panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows. *Journal of Population Economics*, 23(4):1249–1274, 2010.

[101] Anna Maria Mayda, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress. The political impact of immigration: Evidence from the united states. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.

[102] Slava Mikhaylov, Michael Laver, and Kenneth R Benoit. Coder reliability and misclassification in the human coding of party manifestos. *Political Analysis*, 20(1):78–91, 2012.

[103] Mark J Miller and Stephen Castles. *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2009.

[104] Michael K Miller and Margaret E Peters. Restraining the huddled masses: Migration policy and autocratic survival. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 1–31, 2018.

[105] Helen V Milner. Voting for populism in europe: globalization, technological change, and the extreme right. *Comparative Political Studies*, page 0010414021997175, 2021.

[106] Prachi Mishra. Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from mexico. *Journal of Development Economics*, 82(1):180–199, 2007.

[107] Cas Mudde. *Racist Extremism in Central & Eastern Europe*. Routledge, 2005.

[108] Cas Mudde. *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[109] Cas Mudde. Three decades of populist radical right parties in western europe: So what? *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1):1–19, 2013.

[110] Diana C Mutz. Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice. *American Political Science Review*, 96(1):111–126, 2002.

[111] Pippa Norris. *Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[112] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

[113] OECD. *Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European Countries*. OECD Publishing, 2013.

[114] OECD. *OECD Economic Surveys: United States 2018*. 2018.

[115] Marek Okólski and John Salt. Polish emigration to the uk after 2004; why did so many come? *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(2):11–37, 2014.

[116] David K Park, Andrew Gelman, and Joseph Bafumi. Bayesian multilevel estimation with poststratification: State-level estimates from national polls. *Political Analysis*, pages 375–385, 2004.

[117] Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow. Do migrants remit democracy? international migration, political beliefs, and behavior in mexico. *Comparative political studies*, 43(1):119–148, 2010.

[118] Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow. Do migrants remit democracy? international migration, political beliefs, and behavior in mexico. *Comparative political studies*, 43(1):119–148, 2010.

[119] Tobias Pfutze. Does migration promote democratization? evidence from the mexican transition. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 40(2):159–175, 2012.

[120] Niklas Potrafke. Did globalization restrict partisan politics? an empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries. *Public Choice*, 140(1-2):105, 2009.

[121] Yana Pryymachenko, Klas Fregert, Fredrik NG Andersson, et al. The effect of emigration on unemployment: Evidence from the central and eastern european eu member states. *Economics Bulletin*, 33(4):2692–2697, 2013.

[122] Jonathan Rodden. *Why cities lose: the deep roots of the urban-rural political divide*. Basic Books, New York, first edition, 2019.

[123] John E. Roemer. Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. *Journal of Public Economics*, 70:399–424, 1998.

[124] John E Roemer. Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. *Journal of Public Economics*, 70(3):399–424, 1998.

[125] Jan Rovny. Who emphasizes and who blurs? party strategies in multidimensional competition. *European Union Politics*, 13(2):269–292, 2012.

[126] Jens Rydgren. Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? radical right-wing voting in six west european countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6):737–765, 2008.

[127] Peter Selb and Simon Munzert. Estimating constituency preferences from sparse survey data using auxiliary geographic information. *Political Analysis*, pages 455–470, 2011.

[128] Emily A Sellars. Emigration and collective action. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(4):1210–1222, 2019.

[129] Adrian J. Shin. Tyrants and migrants: Authoritarian immigration policy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(1):14–40, 2017.

[130] John Sides and Jack Citrin. European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests and information. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(3):477–504, 2007.

[131] Kristina Bakkær Simonsen. The democratic consequences of anti-immigrant political rhetoric: A mixed methods study of immigrants' political belonging. *Political Behavior*, 43(1):143–174, 2021.

[132] Lorena Škuflić and Valentina Vučković. The effect of emigration on unemployment rates: the case of eu emigrant countries. *Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja*, 31(1):1826–1836, 2018.

[133] Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Everything to everyone: The electoral consequences of the broad-appeal strategy in europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):841–854, 2015.

[134] Joost Van Spanje. Contagious parties: Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties' immigration stances in contemporary western europe. *Party Politics*, 16(5):563–586, 2010.

[135] Jae-Jae Spoon and Heike Klüver. Do parties respond? how electoral context influences party responsiveness. *Electoral Studies*, 35:48–60, 2014.

[136] Thomas F Suesse, Mohammad-Reza Namazi-Rad, Payam Mokhtarian, and Johan Barthélemy. Estimating cross-classified population counts of multidimensional tables: an application to regional australia to obtain pseudo-census counts. 2017.

[137] Katerina Tertytchnaya and Catherine E De Vries. The political consequences of self-insurance: Evidence from central-eastern europe, the caucasus and central asia. *Political Behavior*, pages 1–24, 2018.

[138] Katerina Tertytchnaya, Catherine E De Vries, Hector Solaz, and David Doyle. When the money stops: Fluctuations in financial remittances and incumbent approval in central eastern europe, the caucasus and central asia. *American Political Science Review*, 112(4):758–774, 2018.

[139] Markus Wagner and Thomas M Meyer. Which issues do parties emphasise? salience strategies and party organisation in multiparty systems. *West European Politics*, 37(5):1019–1045, 2014.

[140] World Bank. *Taking stock of recent migration flows in the European Union (English)*. World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010.

[141] Matthew Wright and Irene Bloemraad. Is there a trade-off between multiculturalism and socio-political integration? policy regimes and immigrant incorporation in comparative perspective. *Perspectives on Politics*, pages 77–95, 2012.

[142] David Zweig and Feng Yang. Overseas students, returnees, and the diffusion of international norms into post-mao china. *International Studies Review*, 16(2):252–263, 2014.