Between a Rock and Hard Place: Three Essays on The Role of Domestic

Politics during Economic Sanctions

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How do economic sanctions affect the behavior of the sanctioned states? How does domestic politics moderate this relationship? Over the last few decades, a large body of literature has emerged that examines the effectiveness of sanctions. However, significant gaps in knowledge exist regarding the role of domestic public and politics in the target state. Particularly, I argue that we need to better incorporate the counter-veiling incentives the sanctioned states face. On the one hand, they have incentives to give in to avoid economic costs. But they also have incentives to stand firm to avoid the audience cost. Two factors likely play an important role in either aggravating or alleviating this dilemma the targets face. In three essays, I examine the effect of target regime type and sender behavior. The first essay examines the role of regime type in whether targets meet the sender demands using a longitudinal analysis. I build a counter-intuitive theory regarding the non-linear effect of democracy challenging some of the existing approaches and find robust empirical support. The second essay explores the effect of sanctions on targets' foreign policy behavior. Specifically, whether and how they affect the likelihood of a target's taking militarized action. I find that sanctions increase the risk of a militarized inter-state dispute, even though this risk is lower for some regimes than others. The third essay examines the effect of sanctions on public opinion in the target state through an original survey experiment fielded in Turkey. The effect on public opinion is a question which has long been seen as critical to understanding sanction effectiveness but one which has attracted scant empirical investigation. Taken together, this dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the effect of economic sanctions on the target by employing a mixed-method approach and building on insights from multiple disciplines. The findings from this study also have broader implications for the studies that focus on the role of domestic politics in coercive diplomacy and inter- and intra-state conflict.

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Preface

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Jude Hays and Daniela Donno. They stepped in during a difficult time and patiently provided advice and guidance throughout this process. It was also a privilege to work with Burcu Savun, Steven Finkel and Nikolay Marinov. I learned a lot from all of these exceptional scholars. Finally, this dissertation could not have been completed without the support of my family and fiancée, Elizabeth. I thank them for their unwavering support. I dedicate this dissertation to my mom, late father and late grandmother.

1.0   Introduction

How do economic sanctions affect the behavior of the sanctioned states (targets)? How does domestic politics moderate this relationship? What features of sanctions and domestic institutions make the resolution of inter-state disputes easier or harder? International politics is hard to decouple from domestic politics. Independent of a leader's private preferences, domestic politics determine what types of arrangements are acceptable for governments in the international arena (Putnam (1988)). For example, even though Joe Biden called the Trump Administration's tariffs on China 'damaging', 'reckless' and 'disastrous' (CNBC (2020)), he has not lifted them after getting elected. Part of the reason why President Biden is continuing with hardline policies is due to domestic political changes such as the rising anti-China attitudes among the general public over the last few years (Pew (2021)) which make a conciliatory approach politically costly. Yet the predominant view in international relations had modeled states as 'billiard balls' that are led by executives who pursue 'national interest' (Krasner (1978)). States' behavior was primarily explained by systemic factors such as international anarchy and distribution of power (Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2001)), and informational shortcomings (Fearon (1995)). Domestic politics, in this view, played little role.

But with the unitary actor assumption of the neo-realist, statist, and rationalist theories challenged, domestic politics has been increasingly recognized as a key to understanding international relations. International structure can influence domestic governmental structure (Tilly (1985)). Countries that are surrounded by hostile neighbors, for example, are forced to adopt certain institutional practices than they would otherwise (Ikenberry (1996)). That is why countries are found to be more likely to develop democratic institutions after they settle their border disputes (Gibler and Tir (2010)). Geopolitical alignment, or a state's density of linkages with the West, is also found to increase the likelihood of democratization for countries that are transitioning out of authoritarian rule (Levitsky and Way (2005)). Likewise, in many cases, international organizations play a crucial role in shaping domestic institutions and norms (e.g. Pevehouse (2002), Kelley (2004)).

Domestic politics also shape the external behavior of states. National policy-makers do not operate in a vacuum. Whether in a democratic or an authoritarian system, leaders, whose primary goal is to stay in power, have internal audiences they answer to. Because foreign policy performance can affect a leader's ability to stay in power, leaders have an incentive to take domestic political considerations into account in foreign policy. For example, a major defeat in a war can threaten a leader by undermining his ability to deliver private and public goods to constituents. It can also tarnish the reputation of a country, which, in turn, could incentivize domestic audiences to remove the leader from power. That is why leaders keep an eye towards domestic politics when they initiate or terminate a war (e.g. Goemans (2000)). As such, scholars have increasingly used the domestic politics lens to explore key aspects of international relations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012)), such as why some states are more likely to sign free trade agreements (e.g. Milner and Kubota (2005)), become members of international organizations (e.g. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006)), go to war with each other (e.g. Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999)), or sign peace agreements (e.g. Allee and Huth (2006)).

Like almost any other type of interaction in international relations, domestic politics play a pivotal role in whether and how states engage in coercive diplomacy and whether they succeed in changing each others' behavior. In fact, domestic politics arguably plays an even larger role in this context. Coercive diplomacy is defined as an attempt to change another state's behavior with a "threat of punishment for noncompliance"(George (1991), 4). It is intended to limit the action of an opponent that is currently under way; to persuade the adversary to undo an action already carried out; and to "demand for change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime" (George (1991), Art and Cronin (2003)). It is frequently used as a means to achieve one's goals peacefully or without resorting to military means.

The effect of domestic politics is likely to loom larger in these contexts because the confrontational nature of these interactions attract greater attention from the domestic actors. When a state publicly issues a threat to use force or imposes sanctions, this will not only be highly visible to domestic audiences in the target state, but it will also likely increase the salience of the contested policy. This, in turn, could reduce the likelihood of states striking

deals through more secret negotiations, which are sometimes viewed as necessary to avoid bargaining breakdowns (e.g. Kurizaki (2007), Yarhi-Milo (2013)). Reaching a settlement also becomes more controversial because coercion can generate a backlash in the target. Indeed, coercive measures "are often perceived as tests of resolve and matters of national honor" (Dafoe, Hatz and Zhang (2021), 373). Thus domestic politics matter during coercive diplomacy not only because policy-change would have domestic distributional consequences like it does during cooperative arrangements (Milner (1997)), but also because compliance could signal the target leader's weakness and incompetence to his internal audiences.

To be sure, studies on crisis bargaining do incorporate domestic politics in their analyses. Most of this research, however, analyzes domestic politics from the standpoint of costly signaling. More specifically, they focus on which institutions better allow leaders to make credible threats by generating audience cost (e.g. Fearon (1994) Schultz (2001), Ramsay (2004), Slantchev (2006) Weeks (2008a)). Therefore, they do not fully capture the incentive structure of leaders during coercive diplomacy in general, and economic sanctions in particular. In many cases, leaders do not deliberately generate audience costs. Rather, they arise exogenously. Further, because target leaders endure significant economic costs from the continuation of the dispute, they have strong incentives to give in. Yet due to the domestic political cost of giving in to the demands of outsiders, they also have a strong incentive to stand firm. How these competing or counter-veiling incentives play out is not fully addressed in the sanctions literature. Finally, the focus has been on the actors that *initiate* a conflict by issuing threats. Much less attention has been paid to the behavior of the *target*. Only recently studies have begun to explore how coercive threats influence the target. They demonstrate that coercion may actually tie the hands of the targets and force them to take a more uncompromising position (Gottfried and Trager (2016), Cho (2018), Dafoe, Hatz and Zhang (2021)). How does economic coercion affect target behavior across different regime types?

The central argument of this dissertation is that coercion generates counter-veiling incentives for the targeted states. On the one hand, it motivates them to change policy in order to avert punitive measures, such as a military intervention or economic sanctions. On the other hand, it discourages leaders from complying because doing so might signal weak-

ness and incompetence to the domestic audiences. This is mainly because the principle of sovereignty, which has been the cornerstone of the modern international system since the 17th century, secures nations' internal autonomy and bans states from interfering in each others' domestic affairs. Thus reversing a policy due to outside pressure can be highly controversial in the target countries. Consideration for the counter-veiling incentives faced by target leaders requires an examination of the way in which they affect the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, and under what conditions the incentive to give in outweighs the incentive to withstand pressure. Thus the central questions of this dissertation are: How do these counter-veiling incentives emerge? When is the dilemma between compliance and defiance likely to be aggravated or alleviated?

In this study, I focus on two of the factors that may alleviate or aggravate the conundrum the targets face. The first is regime type. The second is sender behavior. One of the main takeaways is that regime type has a counter-intuitive impact on target behavior. In contrast to the previous literature, I find that democracies and autocracies behave in similar ways in response to economic sanctions, albeit for different reasons. Particularly, both democracies and autocracies are less likely to give in to sender demands. They are also more likely to respond to sanctions with escalatory actions in foreign policy. Secondly, uncertainty over intentions, which is partly influenced by sender behavior, may aggravate the audience cost faced by the target. This suggests that senders have a degree of control over how the public reacts in the target state. Steps that minimize uncertain intentions would reduce audience cost and increase the likelihood of target compliance, even though in some cases it is the targets, not the sender, who stir up uncertainty over intentions.

In this sense, I am interested in both the effect of coercive diplomacy on domestic politics (Second image reversed) and the effect of domestic politics on coercive diplomacy (Second image). I examine these links in the context of economic sanctions, which have been frequently used in the post-Cold War era as a policy tool of choice during international crises and disputes (Hufbauer (1998)). Sanctions owes its popularity partly to the fact that it is seen as a relatively low-cost instrument for leaders to express displeasure with the target's behavior, deter third parties from pursuing similar policies, and impose costs on the target to spur policy-change. Despite its appeal to policy-makers, whether they 'work' has been

subject to a fierce debate (e.g. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990), Pape (1997), Baldwin (2000)). The role of domestic public and politics in the target state, however, remains relatively under-explored. The few studies that analyze domestic institutions do not fully examine the role of these counter-veiling incentives. They mostly focus on economic costs as the primary variable of interest. Sanctions fail either because they do not impose sufficient economic costs on the target or because the costs fall on the wrong sections of the society (Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988)) or because the economic costs do not translate into political costs due to the institutional structure (Lektzian and Souva (2007)). They do not factor in the political cost of compliance and how it might alter the incentives of leaders across different regime types. Further, previous studies have examined sanctions' effect on a limited range of target's activities. Specifically, they have focused mostly on whether sanctions succeed at extracting concessions from the targeted states. We do not know if sanctions have a broader effect on target behavior, especially in the foreign policy arena.

In the three essays, I build on these studies to advance our understanding of the effect of economic sanctions on the sanctioned states. I do so by employing a multi-method approach that combines an original survey experiment, longitudinal analysis and illustrative case studies. The first essay analyzes the effect of democracy on sanction effectiveness. I focus on the question of which regimes have the sufficient incentive to end sanctions and the necessary political leeway to comply with sender demands. The second essay examines the question of sanction effectiveness by looking at a broader range of target behavior. Particularly, I investigate the effect of sanctions on the target's foreign policy, as well as the moderating role of regime type. The third essay primarily deals with the question of how sanction characteristics and sender behavior increase or decrease public support for policy change. How sanctions influence public opinion is key to understand when the political cost of compliance is likely to be high(low).

The first essay examines the effect of regime type on sanction effectiveness. It revisits previous literature which posits a linear relationship between democracy and target capitulation, whereby democracies are most vulnerable to economic coercion (Lektzian and Souva (2007), Allen (2008b), Jeong and Peksen (2019)). I argue that an important shortcoming of these studies is that they do not fully capture the political costs of compliance which

creates incentives to withstand pressure. I argue that when this is taken into account, the relationship is likely to be non-linear. Hybrid regimes, not democracies, would be most likely to meet sender demands. This is because their relative insulation from public opinion allows them a sufficient leeway to offer concessions to the sender. Unlike closed autocracies, they are also likely to have sufficient incentives to end the sanctions. I use the U.S. sanctions against Turkey (in the 1970s) and Costa Rica (in the 2000s) to illustrate the causal mechanism. Then I empirically test my claims using a newly-released comprehensive sanctions dataset that covers the period between 1950 and 2020. The empirical findings lend robust support to my hypothesis.

The second essay moves beyond the dichotomy of whether targets comply with sender demands, and explores sanctions' effect on target behavior in other areas. More specifically, it investigates whether sanctioned states adopt more aggressive foreign policy, manifesting itself in higher likelihood of initiating militarized inter-state dispute. A limited number of studies have examined the links between sanctions and inter-state conflict (Lektzian and Sprecher (2007), Peterson and Drury (2011)). Yet none of these studies explore the effect of sanctions on the target's military behavior. I argue that sanctions should increase the incentive for the target to take military actions as a way to divert attention from internal problems and signal its resolve to the sender. Further, this relationship is likely moderated by the domestic institutional structure, because institutions not only determine the extent to which leaders are sensitive to public opinion, but also influence a leader's ability to send credible signals to their adversaries. Some regimes are more insulated from public opinion and are better positioned to establish credibility than others. Specifically, I argue that democracies and autocracies are more likely to respond to sanctions with military escalation due to greater diversionary incentives and need to signal resolve, respectively. Hybrid regimes, on the other hand, have fewer diversionary incentives due to their relative insulation from public opinion. They also have greater political openness compared to closed autocracies, which would allow the hybrid regimes to signal resolve without military actions.

The third essay examines the effect of sanctions on public opinion in the target state. Do sanctions lead to an increase or decrease in support for policy change? The answer to this question determines the incentives of leaders to give in vs. stand firm. If sanctions generate

a public backlash that reduces support for policy change, this would increase the political cost of compliance for the leaders. Yet despite the importance of this question for sanction effectiveness, it has received limited scholarly attention. Only recently studies have begun to examine this topic in depth (e.g. Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), Frye (2019)). I build on these studies by investigating the role of uncertainty over intentions. Incomplete information is purported to be one of the primary reasons why states fail to reach bargains. Yet the literature has overwhelmingly focused on the asymmetric information about resolve in the context of war. The uncertainty over intentions in the context of economic sanctions has not attracted any scholarly attention. I argue that greater uncertainty would lead to a decline in support for policy-change. To test this claim, I field an online survey experiment in Turkey using the recent U.S. sanctions due to the former's purchase of Russian air defense systems. The results lend partial support to my hypothesis.

Taken together, these three essays provide insights about the effect of economic sanctions in the target states. It highlights the dilemmas faced by the targeted leaders who are often caught between a rock and hard place: giving in could result in the lifting of sanctions, but the political cost of doing so may threaten a leader's hold on power more than the economic cost of sanctions. Most previous studies in the sanctions literature, on the other hand, have either omitted the political cost of compliance in their analysis or *assumed* that it is lower than economic costs and thus inconsequential for target behavior. I develop a theoretical framework that explicitly includes both the political cost of compliance and the economic cost of defiance. Further, I explore sanction-level and institutional factors that influence the leaders' incentive structures.

2.0 When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Regime Type

2.1 Summary

Sanctions have been widely used with the long-term decline in inter-state wars and the increasing preference for non-violent means of dispute settlement. This has spurred a voluminous literature on the question of when sanctions work. A significant number of these studies have highlighted the importance of domestic politics, focusing mostly on how different regime types affect the sensitivity of sanctioned states (target) to the economic costs of sanctions. The scholarly consensus holds that mainly because of their responsiveness to domestic audiences, democratic regimes are most likely to give in to the demands of the sanctioning state (sender). I argue that regime type is important not only in influencing leaders' sensitivity to economic costs—which create incentives to back down—but also to the audience costs—which create incentives to stand firm. I argue that taking the audience cost into account would lead to different predictions about the effect of democracy. Particularly, I argue that the effect of democracy is inverted-U shaped, where hybrid regimes have the highest likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender. Using a newly released dataset on economic sanctions between 1950-2020, I test and find robust support for my argument.

2.2 Introduction

Why do some leaders who come under foreign economic sanctions yield to pressure and make often unpopular concessions, while others stand their ground? Previous research has uncovered the effect of sanction characteristics such as the severity of the measures (e.g. Drury (1998)), the bilateral ties between the sender and the target (e.g. Drezner (1999)), and the presence/absence of multilateral collaboration and enforcement (Bapat and Kwon (2015)). Studies have also examined domestic political factors in influencing the decision-making in the sanctioned state ('target'). Particularly, whether a target is a democracy

or not is found to be a significant predictor of sanction effectiveness (Lektzian and Souva (2007), Allen (2008b)). It is argued that democracies are particularly susceptible to coercive measures mainly due to their sensitivity to domestic audiences. Democracies are also likely to be more constrained in responding to sanctions due to a higher number of veto players (Jeong and Peksen (2019)). Leaders in autocracies, on the other hand, are both more insulated from potential public pressure to change policy, and have more room to take adaptive measures to offset the deleterious effects of sanctions. Non-democratic regimes can also pre-empt societal opposition with greater repression. The failure of sanctions against dictators like Manuel Noriega of Panama, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, or Kim Jong Il of North Korea is generally attributed to these factors (e.g. Kirshner (1997)). In short, the previous studies posit a linear relationship where the probability of sanction success is highest for democracies and lowest for autocracies. In this paper, I revisit this hypothesis.

I argue that an important shortcoming of the previous literature is its failure to account for the political cost of compliance for the target. Giving in to the demands of an adversary can be politically costly for leaders (e.g. Huth (2009), Zarpli (2020)). Making concessions during international disputes invite accusations of "backing down" or "being soft" (Fearon (1994)). That's why scholars have analyzed how governments can avoid domestic backlash for making compromises such as using third-party mediation and international legal dispute settlement mechanisms (Allee and Huth (2006), Beardsley and Lo (2014)). The risk of backlash is compounded by the fact that economic sanctions can harden the public opinion in the target towards the sanctioning state (Galtung (1967), Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)). I argue that accounting for the leaders' incentives to avoid the 'audience cost' would lead to different predictions of target behavior. More specifically, I expect democracies to be discouraged from giving in due to their sensitivity to audience cost. Therefore, I predict that democracies and autocracies would respond to sanctions similarly, whereas hybrid regimes would have significantly higher likelihood of giving in to the sender demands. In other words, the relationship between democracy and sanction effectiveness is likely to be inverted-U shaped.

I test this hypothesis using a newly-released time-series cross-sectional dataset on 1,064 economic sanction cases between 1950 and 2020 (Felbermayr et al. (2020)). I find robust

support for my argument. Additionally, I use the U.S. sanctions against Turkey (in the 1970s) and Costa Rica (in the 2000s) to illustrate the main causal mechanism. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I review the existing studies on the effect of regime type on sanction effectiveness. Then I present my theory regarding why democracy score should have a curvilinear effect on target capitulation. Next, I discuss two illustrative cases from Turkey and Costa Rica, followed by the section on quantitative analysis. I present the main findings and various robustness tests. The final section concludes.

2.3 Existing Literature

The literature on sanction effectiveness has proposed that regime type in the sanctioned state plays an important role in the decision-making of the targeted leaders. It is posited that sanctions will be effective in leading to policy change if it generates political costs for the targeted leaders (Allen (2008a)) and if it affects domestic groups that have the capability of generating pressure on the decision-makers (Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988)). Thus studies have focused on regime type, which determine the groups that have influence over the decision-making processes, as a key factor in sanction effectiveness. For example, Lektzian and Souva (2007) argue that because democracies rely on a larger winning coalition and are more accountable to the general public, they are more likely to change course when the population pressures the government to end the economic distress. Non-democratic leaders, on the other hand, maintain power by distributing 'private goods'–rather than public goods– to a much smaller section of the society and thus are able to shield their core supporters from the adverse economic effects (De Mesquita et al. (2003)). These regimes "can shunt the cost of sanctions off on to general public, who have little influence over policy outcomes" (Allen (2008b), 255).

Others focus on domestic institutions' role in constraining the targeted leaders (Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), Jeong and Peksen (2019)). It is argued that initiating economic policies to counteract the negative impact of sanctions, such as forging economic ties with third-party states through offering trade and investment incentives, require consensus among

the key domestic political actors. And since there is a higher number of veto players that can block such efforts in democracies, leaders are less likely to be successful in avoiding the economic costs. In other words, democracies are argued to have "less freedom to devise countermeasures"(Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), 246). This makes it more likely for them to concede to the sender demands in order to avoid paying the continued costs of sanctions. Taken together, one strand of literature expects sanctions to be more effective against democracies. A number of studies (e.g. Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), Allen (2005), Lektzian and Souva (2007)) find support for this argument. Other studies, on the other hand, report mixed results. McLean and Whang (2010) and Bapat et al. (2013) find no statistically significant relationship between the target's regime type and the probability of sanction success. Early (2011) finds that sanctions against democracies are *less* likely to work. What explains these disparate findings? One possible reason for the mixed empirical record is that these studies do not consider the potentially non-linear effect of democracy.

Theoretically, previous studies mainly focus on the economic costs of sanctions, which creates incentives to reach a compromise. This overlooks the political costs associated with giving in to the demands of the sender. This omission is puzzling given that the research on sanctions has highlighted how costly it can be for the sides to back down during a sanction episode. For example, Hart (2000) argues that an important reason why democracies are more effective 'sanctioners' is that they face domestic punishment should they back down after imposing sanctions. This allows democracies to signal their resolve more credibly and succeed at extracting concessions from the target. Similarly, Krustev and Morgan (2011) argue that audience costs discourage the senders from making concessions. Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) posit that democratic senders are more likely to escalate during sanction episodes by taking military actions due to the audience cost of backing down. What about the audience cost faced by the target? We should expect the targeted leaders to face political costs for backing down after coming under economic sanctions. In fact, the size of this cost should be even larger for the targets than the senders. It is arguably more difficult to "accept settlements that appear imposed upon" a government (Gottfried and Trager (2016), 244), especially given how individuals in many countries tend to be skeptical of foreign interference in domestic affairs. It is one thing to fail to coerce another state into changing its policies.

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It is another thing to fold to outside pressure.

While some studies acknowledge that sanctioned leaders may face a political cost for backing down, they *assume* that this is lower than the economic cost (Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), 246). However, the logic of why it should be lower is not clear. A large body of literature in international relations shows that audience cost can lock actors in a spiral of escalatory behavior, sometimes pushing the actors into costly wars that make both sides worse off (Fearon (1994)). Governments sometimes tolerate significant costs in order to maintain their domestic and international reputation. In fact, 'saving face' is "one of the few things worth fighting over" (Schelling (1966), 124). Similarly, in the sanctions literature, Dorussen and Mo (2001) argue that targeted leaders may continue to endure economic costs in order to avoid the political costs of compromising. These authors, however, do not explore how audience cost influences the effectiveness of sanctions against different regime types. This study aims to address this gap.

2.4   Theory and Hypothesis

2.4.1   Political Costs of Sanctions

Sanctions are intended to change the behavior of the target by increasing the cost of a contested policy. However, there is no scholarly consensus on whether sanctions that impose greater economic costs are more successful. Empirical findings on this question seem to be mixed (Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2003), Major and McGann (2005), Bapat et al. (2013)). One possible reason why the cost of sanctions is not a more robust predictor of sanction effectiveness is that targets can take adaptive measures and reduce their dependence on the sender through finding new trade and investment partners (e.g. Wallensteen (2000), Lektzian and Biglaiser (2013)). Indeed, some studies find that the strongest impact of sanctions occur in the initial stage and progressively becomes weaker over time (Dizaji and Van Bergeijk (2013)). Another likely reason is that economic costs may not translate into political costs for the targeted leaders (Kirshner (1997)). Irrespective of the size of the

economic cost, "without political costs, there is no reason for targeted states to comply" (Allen (2008b), 918).

I likewise argue that sanction effectiveness hinges on the *political* costs faced by the targets. Senders may be successful in extracting concessions to the extent that there are sufficient political costs to maintaining the status quo. In other words, leaders take into consideration how compliance vs. non-compliance "will affect their re-election chances, their support among key constituencies" (Blanchard and Ripsman (2013), 24). However, the literature overwhelmingly focuses on the economic cost as the primary source of political costs. Thus it is argued that the reason why severe measures do not work is that they fail to hurt the *right* groups (e.g. Lektzian and Souva (2007), Allen (2008b)). "Only where sanctions harm the target's ruling coalition", it is argued, are they likely to be effective (Brooks (2002), 2). I depart from this literature by arguing that the issue is not only about whether the economic costs target the right sections of the society. Instead, we need to also take into consideration the political costs associated with giving in to the demands of an outside actors. I also argue that the extent to which this audience cost influences sanction effectiveness varies by regime type.

Ending conflicts by making compromises is risky business (Schultz (2005)). Concessions (e.g. political, territorial, economic, military) may be exploited by an adversary to its own advantage. Such concessions may also undermine the reputation of an actor as a 'tough negotiator' and embolden potential third party challengers in the future[1]. Partly because of these reasons, leaders who give in to sender demands may be accused of weakness and incompetence by domestic audiences. The opposition actors can portray compromises as a foreign policy defeat. Thus for a leader, "continuing the dispute...is often better than offering concessions" (Fravel (2005), 53). For example, an important reason why the 2009 Iran-US nuclear fuel swap agreement failed was the political backlash against President Ahmendinejad, who was attacked by the opposition actors for "giving too much away" and not securing sufficient guarantees from the U.S. (Hurst (2016), 549). The political costs discouraged compromise and resulted in the resumption of the sanctions regime.

The role of audience cost during economic sanctions, however, remains relatively under-

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[1]For a similar argument in the civil war context, see; Walter (2006)

explored in the empirical literature. The canonical model of audience cost is used to explain the behavior of actors that are engaged in a 'war of attrition' (Fearon (1994)). Leaders pay a political price for backing down from fighting after escalating a crisis. Thus audience cost has been mostly studied in the context of military conflicts and as something that leaders *deliberately* generate as a way to signal their resolve. However, cases of economic sanctions are also likened to a war of attrition, whereby the sender and the target, who pay continued costs as the dispute drags on, hold out in the hopes that the other side will give in first (Bonetti (1994), Dorussen and Mo (2001)).

Further, scholars acknowledge that audience cost can arise not only in cases where leaders back down after issuing explicit military threats. Leaders can face audience cost for making concessions, giving into others' demands, cooperating without reciprocation, or simply taking objectionable or unpopular actions (e.g. Colaresi (2004), Allee and Huth (2006)). At its root, audience cost is about the ability of citizens to punish their government "for inappropriate behavior" (Slantchev (2006), 450). Thus scholars have also paid increasing attention to how the behavior of other actors can cause 'provocation' and tie the hands of the leaders (e.g. Kurizaki (2007), Cho (2018), Dafoe, Hatz and Zhang (2021)). Public threats are said to create audience cost for the opponent as well (Fearon (1992)), engaging the receiver's domestic audience and locking "the adversary into a situation where she has no choice but to stand firm" (Kurizaki (2007), 554).

This line of research demonstrates how audience cost can be consequential during economic sanctions where the targets do not necessarily make public statements for the purpose of costly signaling. The audience cost in these situations are likely to be particularly high for two main reasons. First, the salience of the contested policy for the target and a level of distrust between the actors are likely to be higher. This is mainly because the presence of sanctions indicates an initial breakdown of bargaining. Indeed, many inter-state disputes are resolved either through peaceful negotiations or *threats* of sanctions (e.g. Nooruddin (2002)). Therefore, the fact that sanctions are imposed indicates that the parties failed to resolve their differences through other means and that the dispute has escalated. This expectation is consistent with Fearon (1994) who argues that audience cost increases "as the public confrontation proceeds" and crisis escalates (577). Thus the domestic political

salience of contested policies, incompatibility of preferences, and the distrust among actors are likely to be higher during sanction episodes compared to other disputes. This could increase the political cost of making compromises for the target government.

Secondly, the act of imposing sanctions can cause provocation that make compromises by the target more difficult. It may trigger a heightened sense of nationalism in the target society as individuals can perceive sanctions as an assault on the country as a whole (e.g. Galtung (1967), Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)). This, in turn, can harden the resolve of the targets, making them less likely to "bend to the demands of foreigners" (Pape (1997), 93). Coercive actions can "put the reputation and honor of the leader and nation at stake" and increase the cost of backing down (Dafoe, Hatz and Zhang (2021), 382). Even in cases that do not include explicit coercive actions such as economic sanctions, aggressive rhetoric by foreign leaders are found to influence the public opinion in the target state highly negatively. In particular, such rhetoric engages the honor of the the target, and makes compromises less popular and more politically costly (Gottfried and Trager (2016)).

For example, in April 2010, Iran made a set of important concessions concerning its low enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in a trilateral agreement with Turkey and Brazil. The Iranian government agreed to relinquish a significant portion of its stockpile in return for fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. The same Iranian government, however, had refused to make the identical concessions towards the United States in December 2009 in the face of serious domestic political backlash where President Ahmedinejad was "savagely criticized across Iran's political spectrum" (Karon (2009)). The trilateral agreement, on the other hand, did not elicit a similar reaction by the domestic audiences. In fact, it received near-universal support in Iran. Even groups that were sharply critical of President Ahmedinejad, including figures from the Green Movement, "extended their blessing to the deal" (Parsi (2012), 192-193). In short, the same compromises caused radically different reactions by the Iranian political actors within the span of a few months. This was mainly because the deal with Brazil and Turkey allowed the Iranian regime to avoid criticism that it was bending to the will of the United States, which had placed comprehensive sanctions against Tehran. This suggests that while concessions are difficult to make in general, it is even harder for a target to comply with the demands of the sender.

2.4.2 The Role of Regime Type

How does the political cost of backing down influence the behavior of leaders across different regime types? As previous studies have highlighted, domestic institutions play an important role in influencing the political cost by shaping the size of the winning coalition, the extent to which leaders are accountable to the general population, and the availability of repressive instruments to address potential societal discontent. In this sense, one could expect democracies, which have large winning coalitions and diminished ability to employ repression, to be particularly vulnerable to economic coercion. The economic costs could potentially incentivize them to make concessions. But they would be equally sensitive to the domestic political cost of compromising. Therefore, as opposed to the previous studies, I do not expect democracies to significantly differ from autocracies in their likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender.

Democratic targets would likely be deterred from complying with sender demands. Scholars have proposed that the responsiveness of these regimes to the general public thanks to the constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties and robust checks and balances makes them particularly sensitive to audience costs. Democratic institutions make it easier for challengers to remove a government that undertakes costly or failed policies (Schultz (1999)) Therefore, while these regimes may be hurt by the economic costs associated with sanctions, they are also likely to try to eschew giving in to sender demands due to the audience cost.

Autocracies, on the other hand, would unlikely be sufficiently hurt by the sanctions. As the previous literature suggests, these regimes are able to shield their small winning coalition from the adverse economic effects. They can maintain power by distributing 'private goods' to a relatively small section of the population (De Mesquita et al. (2003)). Thus they are less motivated to devise policies that maximize the welfare of the general public. Because closed autocracies "do not have any of the architecture of political competition and pluralism" (Diamond (2002), 26), they face a minimized risk of political punishment for policy failures. These regimes tend to also deploy repression more readily. Autocratic leaders may even exploit sanctions to solidify their rule. More specifically, because they have a better control over the economic activities in the country, they are better positioned to

extract rents that help them hold onto power (Lektzian and Souva (2007)). For example, in Iraq, the UN sanctions imposed substantial costs on the economy as a whole with serious humanitarian consequences such as increased child malnutrition, infant mortality and food-borne and waterborne diseases (Popal (2000), Alnasrawi (2001)). However, the sanctions did not significantly weaken Saddam Hussein. On the contrary, people became even more dependent on the regime for their survival (Dorussen and Mo (2001), 407), making Saddam more secure than ever. In short, democracies and autocracies would likely be deterred from making concessions due to prohibitively high audience cost and insufficient economic cost, respectively.

In contrast to democratic and autocratic systems, sanctions are likely to be more success-ful against hybrid regimes. These regimes encompass mainly two types of political systems (Bogaards (2009)). The first is authoritarian regimes with competitive multiparty elections (Levitsky and Way (2010)). They hold legal elections and tolerate a degree of pluralism and interparty competition (Schedler (2002)). At the same time, government critics face severe limitations, and elections are subject to systematic irregularities, and thus do not qualify as democratic (Schedler (2006), 3). The second is electoral democracies where elections meet the minimum criteria to be qualified as democratic. Yet these regimes lack sufficient institutional checks and balances and respect for civil rights and liberties to qualify as fully-consolidated liberal democracies. These regimes have been described by various scholars as 'delegative' (O'Donnell (1994)), 'illiberal' (Zakaria (1997)), and 'defective' (Merkel (2004)) democracies. Sanctions are more likely to be successful against these regimes for several reasons.

First, compared to autocracies, hybrid regimes have larger winning coalitions, and thus are not as insulated from the economic costs of sanctions. However defective, elections are broadly competitive and they are highly consequential. In these regimes, the opposition par-ties "contest vigorously–and at times successfully–for power" (Levitsky and Way (2010), 3). Even in competitive authoritarian regimes, elections include "dramatic and often unexpected swings in support" for the ruling parties (Miller (2015)). Thus even when the elections are manipulated and fall below the democratic standards, they can contribute to popular ac-countability. Therefore, leaders still need to cater to a sizable segment of the society. That

is why these regimes tend to perform better on many indicators of human development compared to autocracies (Miller (2015)). Electoral competition in non-democratic settings is also found to be correlated with greater public good provision and responsiveness (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman (2008)).

In addition, because political power is more diffused compared to closed autocracies, they are also unlikely to be as effective in extracting rents, due to their incomplete control over the economy. This does not necessarily mean that there is less corruption in hybrid regimes. In fact, Mohtadi and Roe (2003) show that hybrid regimes exhibit greater rent-seeking behavior. However, as opposed to closed autocracies, where rent-seeking tends to be tightly controlled by the political elites, in hybrid regimes, patron-client corruption networks are less likely to be centralized and thus used by the leaders to solidify their rule (Rock (2009)). As a result, compared to closed autocracies, hybrid regimes are more likely to have sufficient incentives to end sanctions. Further, as opposed to democracies, these regimes are relatively more insulated from public opinion that reduces the political cost of compliance. Political accountability in anocracies is weaker and leaders enjoy relative insulation from public opinion. The freedom of press, speech, and association are often curtailed. Further, checks and balances are weak, and institutions and rules are frequently manipulated. These regimes also have greater influence over the flow of information to their citizens (Ottaway (2003), 138). In short, in contrast to autocracies, hybrid regimes have the sufficient incentives to end sanctions. Further, unlike democracies, they have more room to make unpopular concessions towards the senders.

Hypothesis: Economic sanctions are more likely to be successful against hybrid regimes than democracies and autocracies.

2.5   Illustrative Cases

The U.S.' threat and imposition of sanctions against Turkey in the 1970s and Costa Rica in the 2000s can be used to illustrate the causal mechanisms linking regime type and

sanction effectiveness. They show how audience cost matters during sanction episodes and how regime type influences the behavior of the targets. They also demonstrate that these targeted states may choose to endure the economic costs of sanctions if they believe that the audience cost of giving in to sender demands is prohibitively high. In the first case, Turkey became the target of U.S. threat and imposition of sanctions over the 'opium poppy dispute'. The sanctions succeeded in extracting concessions only after an *exogenous* regime change that led to a relative democratic erosion in the country. The concessions were reversed once Turkey transitioned back to a democratic rule. In the second case, the U.S. sanctions failed to convince democratic Costa Rica to agree to sign bilateral non-surrender agreement with regards to potential International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments due to concern about a domestic backlash.

2.5.1   U.S-Turkey: The Poppy Problem

Beginning in early 1960s, the U.S. urged the Turkish government to restrict the cultivation of opium poppy (Robins (2007)). The question of poppy production in Turkey, the second largest exporter of legal opium in the world at the time, became a particularly contentious issue in bilateral relations by the end of the decade. As concerns about heroin addiction in the U.S increased, the poppy problem "shot to the top of American foreign policy concerns with Turkey" by 1969 (Spain (1975), 298). It was claimed that up to 80% of the heroin in the U.S. came from Turkish opium. The Nixon administration, which defined illicit drugs as a "serious national threat" (Evered (2011), 302), intensified its pressure on Ankara to impose total ban on this crop. The U.S. Congress also intervened by threatening "punitive action", in the form of the cutting of aid (which totaled in the excess of $200 million a year), "if Turkey did not cease production" (Spain (1975), 298). However, despite the potential economic damage of the sanctions, the Turkish government under the popularly-elected Prime Minister Demirel resisted the U.S. pressure citing the likely adverse economic and social effects of a total ban. A number of provinces in Western Turkey were highly dependent on this crop making total elimination politically unpalatable. The issue was also seen by the wider population as one of sovereignty, and the U.S. demands were considered

"as an act of imperialistic pressure" (Evered (2011)). So the question was viewed not only as a matter of "the cultivator's right to grow opium poppies" but of "Turkey's right to exercise autonomy" (Ahmad (1977), 418-419). The fear of electoral loss deterred PM Demirel from taking radical steps in complying with the U.S. demands (Örmeci (2020)).

Nevertheless, the U.S. threat of sanctions ultimately worked in June 1971, when Ankara agreed to implement a total ban within a year. Why? In March 1971, the Turkish military forced the resignation of Prime Minister Demirel, replacing him with an un-elected technocrat–Dr. Nihat Erim. The latter's relative insulation from public opinion allowed him to take an unpopular step and give in to the demands of the U.S.[2] The ban, however, proved to be short-lived. Unsurprisingly, the unpopular decision to abolish poppy production was reversed after the 1973 elections. Almost all political parties used the poppy ban during their electoral campaigns in which they "promised to...restore the independence, dignity and prestige of Turkey."(Ahmad (1977)). Despite the continued threats by the U.S. that "the repeal of ban would be met with strong American counteraction"(Spain (1975), 304), the incoming Turkish government rescinded the ban in July 1974. In response, the U.S. cut all aid to Turkey in February 1975. US-Turkey relations continued to deteriorate with the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis and the U.S. decision to impose arms an embargo. Because of the embargo, "half of the Turkish military aircraft were grounded" due to a lack of spare parts for which Turkey relied heavily on the U.S. (Durmaz (2014), 48). But Turkey's democratically-elected governments not only refused to give in to the sanctions, which were seen by many as "an intrusion into domestic affairs" (Güney (2008), 475). Ankara also took counter-measures. Most importantly, it closed down twenty-six of the twenty-seven U.S military installations, including early warning radar stations and intelligence gathering facilities (Holmes (2014)). The U.S. lifted the sanctions in 1978 after failing to extract concessions on either the opium or the Cyprus issue.

This case illustrates that the political cost of compliance is a key factor that influences the decision-making in the target state. It also demonstrates that holding the contested issue,

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[2]It should be noted that March 1971 was not a coup d'etat in the traditional sense. It was the military exercising "a veto over civilian authorities with the goal of preserving the social and economic status quo" (Tachau and Heper (1983), 23). Thus it did not result in a military dictatorship like in Chile, Greece or Brazil.

sender identity and the economic costs constant, changes in the target's domestic political dynamics can have a significant impact on the likelihood of sanction effectiveness. A decline in Turkey's democracy, manifesting in a government that was relatively more insulated than its predecessor, led to success of sanction threats on the opium question. However, the transition back to democratic elections resulted in the reversal of the policy-change. In the post-transition period, the U.S.' threats and imposition of sanctions failed to result in a policy-change.

2.5.2 U.S.-Costa Rica: The ICC Problem

Costa Rica, a founding member of the ICC, came under U.S. pressure to sign bilateral immunity (or non-surrender) agreement (BIA) in early 2000s. These agreements were intended to shield U.S. personnel from a potential prosecution by the ICC, which was founded in 2002 to hold individuals accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. BIAs ensured that, in case an American personnel is indicted by the ICC, they would not be turned over to the court in The Hague. The Bush administration had signed such agreements with over 100 countries (Nooruddin and Payton (2010)). Costa Rica refused to enter into such an arrangement with the U.S., and was placed under sanctions in July 2003 pursuant to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which prohibited military assistance to countries that have not signed the non-surrender agreements.[3] The U.S. assistance was deemed "vital for the maintenance of Costa Rica's counternarcotics and counterterrorism capabilities", and the aid cuts led to "noticeable deterioration of the seaworthiness of the Costa Rican Coast Guard fleet" (Langdale (2005)). In 2005, Costa Rica also lost its eligibility for Economic Support Funds (ESF).

The sanctions, however, were ineffective in changing the behavior of the target. An important factor that influenced the decision-making of the Costa Rican government was the fear of a potential public backlash if it chose to give in to the U.S. demands, which were largely seen as an intrusion into domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Tovar complained that the sanctions were "offensive" (Frisbie (2005)). Thus the government resisted pressure,

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[3]Even though Costa Rica abolished its regular army in 1948, it has police, a Coast Guard, and an Air Section that carry out paramilitary functions

even though President Abel Pacheco personally was not opposed to signing a BIA with the U.S. (Langdale (2005)). In this sense, the likely political cost of capitulation constituted a deterrent. The potential audience cost was so high that the government in San José would have been unlikely to comply with the U.S. demands even if the economic costs had been higher (Kelley (2007), 584). Political actors in Costa Rica strongly voiced their objections against the sanctions and any policy change. "We feel the government is acting correctly and must continue in this direction" said a former politician, while a number of newspaper editorials emphasized that the government was right "not to accept a laceration of our sovereignty" (Frisbie (2005)). The risk of backlash was high especially because ICC membership was a highly salient issue in domestic politics. Thus, domestic accountability tied the hands of the government (Kelley (2007), 584). As a result, in 2006, President Bush backed down and announced that the U.S. would grant Costa Rica a waiver and permit the U.S. to resume military aid even though it refrained from signing the non-surrender agreement.

The case of Costa Rica is not unique. In many countries, the U.S. pressure to sign BIAs caused controversy in domestic politics. For example, in Ghana, the agreement was attacked by the opposition parties for violating sovereignty and for "cheapening [Ghana] just for peanuts" (ModernGhana (2003)). But while some governments were able to circumvent the opposition and make the unpopular choice of signing the non-surrender agreements that provided immunity to American citizens, others refused, despite the threats and imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S. For example, some hybrid regimes like Colombia and Botswana gave in to the U.S. pressure and signed the agreement to maintain the flow of aid despite their initial skepticism. Amid local controversy, the Botswanian government defended its decision by arguing that relations with the U.S. bring "tangible benefits to the people" (TheNewHumanitarian (2003)). Others like Brazil and South Africa, which had markedly higher democracy scores in 2003, resisted the U.S. pressure, resulting in significant loss of economic and military aid (e.g. Boehme (2017)). A simple bivariate analysis also reveals that the countries that signed these agreements had dramatically worse democracy records than countries which refused to sign them. On a scale from 0 to 1, the average liberal democracy score of the ICC members that refused to sign BIAs is 0.69, while it is

0.33 for member states that signed the agreement.[4] The difference is statistically significant at the 0.000 level. This suggests that democracies may be less amenable to outside pressure, arguably due to the political costs of giving in.

Taken together, these two cases demonstrate that leaders in democracies are likely to be particularly vulnerable to the political costs of compliance which deters them from giving in to the sender demands. Changes in the target regime type *within* a sanction episode *over time* can have a significant effect on the likelihood of sanction effectiveness, as highlighted by the Turkish case. The next section tests these claims empirically using a time-series cross-sectional dataset of 1,064 sanction cases between 1950-2020.

2.6 Quantitative Analysis

To test the hypothesis on the effect of regime type on sanction effectiveness, I primarily rely on Global Sanctions Data Base (Felbermayr et al. (2020))[5] that records each bilateral and multilateral sanction episode between 1950-2020. Sanctions are defined as "binding restrictive measures...to address different types of violations of international norms by inducing target countries to change their behavior or to constrain their actions" (Felbermayr et al. (2020), 4). In total, there are 1,064 sanction episodes. The dataset records the sanctions on the basis of three dimensions: 1) sanction type (whether the sanctions include restrictions in trade, finance, military, or travel); 2) political objectives behind the sanctions (whether the goal is to promote human rights, democracy, prevent war, end war, trigger regime-change, address state sponsorship of terrorism, end territorial conflict or spur policy-change); 3) the degree of success of each sanction episode. Particularly, the outcome variable records whether sanctions resulted in failure (when a target does not change its behavior), negotiated settlement (when parties agree to settle a conflict by negotiations), partial success (when a target partially accepts the demands of the sender) or complete success (when a target fully

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[4]The data on countries that signed BIAs is drawn Kelley (2007)

[5]The main results hold using the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi (2014)). This dataset includes 845 cases of sanction imposition between 1945 and 2005. Tables 10, 11 and 12 in the Appendix report these results.

accepts the requests of the sender)

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics (Economic Sanctions 1950-2020)**

Variable	N	Mean	S.D	Min.	Max.
Liberal Democracy	7,596	0.18	0.20	0.005	0.879
GDP per capita (ln)	6,717	6.96	1.43	3.61	11.54
Domestic Instability (ln)	6,712	5.14	3.71	0	13.02
International Organization	7,663	0.21	0.40	0	1
Tenure (year)	6,288	8.99	9.63	0	47
Sanction duration (year)	7,663	7.53	9.64	0	69
Complete Success	7,663	0.05	0.22	0	1
Partial Success	7,663	0.11	0.31	0	1
Negotiated Settlement	7,663	0.06	0.23	0	1

The unit of analysis is sanction episode-year. There are 7,663 observations potential for analysis. The explanatory variable is a target's democracy score. I derive this variable from Varities of Democracy (V-dem). I mainly rely on the liberal democracy index, which measures democracy based on the quality of elections, the limits on the executive, constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and independent judiciary (Coppedge et al. (2016))[6]. This is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. I also include the squared term of this variable to test the non-linear nature of my hypothesis. The main dependent variable in this paper is whether sanctions were successful in extracting concessions from the target. To capture this, I estimate the effect of regime type on three different outcome variables. First, I use a binary variable where a sanction-case-year is coded as 1 if the outcome of the sanction episode is 'complete success', and 0 otherwise. Secondly, I relax the criteria for sanction effectiveness and include cases that are considered to be a 'partial success'. Thirdly, I include sanction episodes that ended in 'negotiated settlements'. This constitutes the most lenient measure of sanction effectiveness. However, given that targets

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[6]Alternatively, I also use the 'polyarchy' variable which measures the extent to which electoral competition is free and fair, civil society organizations operate freely, freedom of expression is respected, and media is allowed to operate independent from government interference. The results are robust.

still need to make certain concessions to reach a settlement, I argue that this would be valid outcome of interest. For robustness, I construct a categorical variable that takes the value of 0 if a sanction episode is ongoing, 1 if it failed, 2 if it ended in a negotiated settlement, 3 if it was a a partial success, and 4 if the target completely capitulated. Then I estimate the effect of regime type separately on each outcome.

I include a number of control variables. The GDP per capita of the target may influence both a country's democracy score (Robinson (2006)) and its likelihood of giving in to sender's demands. Countries with stronger economies may be expected to more easily withstand outside pressure. I control for the level of domestic instability in the target state. This may affect both the democracy score (Vreeland (2008)), and the effectiveness of sanctions. Countries that go through domestic turmoil may be more vulnerable to external pressure. Alternatively, they may be more resistant to avoid appearing weak. This data comes from Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson (2020)). It is a weighted measure that takes into account the presence of anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes, terrorism, government crises, purges, revolutions and riots. I use the natural log of this variable. Some find that sanctions by international institutions are more effective (Bapat and Morgan (2009), Peksen (2019)). Others argue that multilateral sanctions are less likely to be successful due to problems of coordination, bargaining and enforcement (Drezner (2000), Miers and Morgan (2002)). So I include a binary variable that indicates whether the sender is one of the following international institutions: United Nations, European Union, African Union, Organization of American States, League of Arab States, or ECOWAS. Finally, I control for the sanction type, the political objectives, and the duration of sanction episode. Table 21 displays the descriptive statistics of these variables.

Table 2 reports the results from binary logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered around sanction episodes. All the models also include cubic splines to control for temporal dependence within each episode (Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998)). Each column displays results for different measurements of sanction success (stringent, moderate, lenient). Among the control variables, neither GDP per capita nor domestic instability are robust predictors of sanction effectiveness. GDP per capita is only statistically significant at the p<0.10 level in the third model. Similarly, whether sanctions are imposed by an international

Table 2: **Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness (Monodic Model)**

Variable	DV: Stringent	DV: Intermediate	DV: Lenient
Democracy	9.942***	9.272***	8.832***
	(1.066)	(0.930)	(0.888)
Democracy^2	-10.438***	-9.644***	-9.474***
	(1.416)	(1.246)	(1.201)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.067	-0.018	-0.073†
	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Domestic Instability	0.014	0.017	-0.003
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)
International Organization	0.253†	0.129	0.101
	(0.140)	(0.125)	(0.118)
Sanction Duration	1.507***	1.543***	1.546***
	(0.196)	(0.165)	(0.154)
Linear Time Trend	-0.004	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Controls: Sanction type	YES	YES	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES	YES	YES
Cubic Splines	YES	YES	YES
Observations	6,628	6,628	6,628
Pseudo R^2	0.1149	0.1277	0.1155

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

organization does not seem to have a substantial bearing on sanction success. This variable is statistically significant only at the p<0.10 level in the first model. In terms of the sanction types, arms embargoes are significantly less likely to end in success. In terms of the objectives, sanctions are likely to be effective when imposed to improve democracy. On the other hand, they are particularly ineffective when they are imposed in response to a territorial conflict or to stop state sponsorship of terrorism.

The coefficients for the democracy variable lends support for the main hypothesis. In each model, the linear term of the liberal democracy score is positive and statistically significant (p<0.000). The quadratic term, on the other hand, is negative and significant (p<0.000), suggesting an inverted-U relationship. In other words, as the democracy level of a sanctioned state increases, the likelihood of target concessions first increases, and then decreases. Substantively, the predicted probability for a closed autocracy is approximately 1%; for hybrid regimes 11%; 2% for full democracies. Figure 1 displays this relationship graphically.

2.6.1 Robustness Checks

I conduct additional analyses to test the robustness of these findings. First, I control for the length of time a targeted leader has been in power. Spaniel and Smith (2015) show that the tenure of the targeted leader influences the extent to which senders would be uncertain about whether the targets will resist or capitulate. While their outcome of interest is whether sanctions are imposed or not, greater information asymmetry could also affect whether sanctions succeed or not. This data is derived from Database of Political Institutions that cover the years between 1975 and 2020 (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2021)). This variable, however, has no significant effect on the likelihood of sanction success (Table 14 in the Appendix).

I also control for sender characteristics and the ties between sender and the target. To do so, I drop the cases where the sender is either an international organization or a group of states, and keep sanction episodes where there is a single sender[7]. Approximately 30% of the observations are dropped, resulting in 5,419 observations potential for analysis. I include the

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[7]Other studies that include dyadic factors in the analysis (e.g. Peksen (2019) take the same approach

Figure 1: **The Predicted Probability of Concession by Democracy Score**

democracy score and GDP per capita of the sender. As mentioned above, previous studies have highlighted the importance of sender's democracy score (e.g. Hart (2000), Lektzian and Souva (2007)). It is argued that democratic senders are more successful in extracting concessions. I also control for the geopolitical affinity between the sender and the target. Drezner (1999) argues that sanctions are more likely to be effective when the targets have close prior relationship with the sender, even though there is no consistent empirical support for this hypothesis (Lektzian and Souva (2007)). I draw this data from Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey (2009), that records annually the voting similarity of country-dyads in the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, I control for the trade links between the target and the sender. Some studies have identified trade dependence as an important correlate of sanction effectiveness (Hufbauer et al. (2007)). I use the ratio of bilateral trade (exports + imports) to a target's total trade volume. I derive this from Correlates of War's International Trade data that covers the period between 1870 and 2014 (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009)).

The results are reported in Table 3. They show that inclusion of the sender characteristics do not affect the main findings regarding the effect of the target's regime type. The sign and significance of the independent variables remain the same. Among the control variables, consistent with the previous literature, sanctions imposed by democratic senders are more likely to be successful in general. Similar to the results in Table 2, GDP per capita of the targeted state is not a significant predictor of sanction effectiveness. It is weakly significant only the third model. Domestic instability does not have statistically significant effect either. Targets that experience domestic turmoil are not more likely to give in to the demands of the sender. Surprisingly, the GDP per capita of the sender state is inversely related with sanction success. Expectedly, geopolitical affinity seems to have a positive and statistically significant effect on sanction effectiveness. The probability of target concessions (model 3) increases from approximately 5% to 9% when the UNGA voting similarity score is increased from its 25% percentile to 75% percentile value, other variables held at their means. Trade dependence also has a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome variable. Targets are more likely to comply with sender demands when they rely more on the sender for imports and exports.

The findings are also robust to different measures of regime type. More specifically, I use

Table 3: **Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness (Dyadic Model)**

Variable	DV: Stringent	DV: Intermediate	DV: Lenient
Target Democracy	8.020***	7.529***	7.391***
	(1.478)	(1.264)	(1.203)
Target Democracy^2	-7.327***	-6.804***	-7.314***
	(1.823)	(1.590)	(1.517)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.010	-0.125	-0.168†
	(0.108)	(0.091)	(0.086)
Domestic Instability	0.004	0.032	0.018
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Sender Democracy	1.438*	1.045†	1.087*
	(0.635)	(0.561)	(0.510)
Sender GDP per capita (ln)	-0.463*	-0.403**	-0.463*
	(0.201)	(0.182)	(0.163)
Geopolitical Affinity	1.170**	1.157**	1.366***
	(0.445)	(0.388)	(0.365)
Trade dependence	0.927**	1.004***	0.939***
	(0.329)	(0.293)	(0.284)
Linear Time Trend	-0.007	0.002	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Controls: Sanction type	YES	YES	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES	YES	YES
Cubic Splines	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,405	3,405	3,405
Pseudo R^2	0.1485	0.1412	0.1406

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

a categorical variable based on V-Dem's 'Regimes of the World' (RoW) dataset (Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg (2018)). Political systems are classified as "closed autocracy," where the executive and the legislature are either not subject to elections, or there is no de-facto competition; "electoral autocracy," where the executive is dependent on a legislature that is elected in multiparty elections which fall short of democratic standards; "electoral democracy," which meets the minimal conditions for free and fair elections; and "liberal democracy," which includes not only free and fair elections but also legislative and judicial oversight over the executive providing checks and balances, as well as the protection of individual liberties (Lührmann et al. (2018), 3–4). Based on this, I construct a binary "anocracy" variable that takes the value of "1" if a regime is classified either as electoral autocracy or electoral democracy, and "0" otherwise. The results are reported in Table 15 in the Appendix. The anocracy variable has a positive and highly significant effect.

The main results are robust to alternative empirical models, namely the multinomial logit and competing risks survival. First, I estimate the effect of target regime type on the probability of observing each outcome separately. Table 13 in the Appendix reports these results. Each column reflects one of the ways sanctions can be terminated. As can be seen, the sign and significance of the independent variables is in the hypothesized direction. Democracy has an inverted-U shaped effect on target capitulation. I also employ competing risks survival model (Fine and Gray (1999)). It could be argued that the way a sanction case is terminated constitutes competing risks: for each episode, there is in any given year some risk that it will be terminated one of the four ways: complete capitulation of the target, partial concessions, negotiated settlement, lifting of sanctions despite no change in target behavior. The results from this model are reported in Table 16 in the Appendix.

Finally, I account for potential selection bias by employing two-stage Heckman probit model. States are assumed to act strategically when imposing sanctions, whereby the "decision to sanction is related to the decision of the target to resist" (Smith (1995)). Thus the set of observed sanctions is not a random sample of cases (Nooruddin (2002), 66). Of direct relevance to my findings, it is possible that senders may be less likely to impose sanctions against democracies because they are able to resolve their difference at the earlier stages of the dispute. For example, Lektzian and Souva (2003) and Cox and Drury (2006) show that

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democracies are less likely to be sanctioned by other democracies. Democracies may become targets of sanctions only in cases where the disagreements are extreme. On the other hand, states may be less restrained in imposing sanctions against authoritarian or hybrid regimes. Thus the reason why democracies are unlikely to give in may not be about the theoretical mechanism outlined above, but because the democratic targets represent 'hard cases'. As such, in order to measure the effect of democracy on sanction success, one needs to account for the effect of democracy on sanction imposition.

To do so, I use the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) database (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi (2014)), which includes information about the sanction threats–namely, which of these threats result in the imposition of sanctions and which ones do not. This allows me to employ a two-stage model, whereby I examine the effect of democracy on both the decision to impose sanctions (first stage), and the probability of successful sanctions (second stage). The results, reported in Table 4, show that the the main findings from the monodic model hold, after controlling for the potential selection effects. Table 17 in the Appendix replicates the dyadic model by using the Heckman probit technique. This model includes additional control variables such as sender democracy, sender GDP per capita, as well as the target's trade dependence on the sender. Results confirm that democracy in the sanctioned state has a curvilinear (inverted-U shaped) effect on sanction effectiveness.

2.7   Conclusion

Economic sanctions continue to be used as a popular foreign policy instrument, demonstrated by a slate of sanctions imposed recently against countries like Myanmar, Turkey, and China. The literature on sanction effectiveness has identified a number of factors, such as the severity of measures, the extent of international cooperation, and the characteristics of the sanctioning state. A substantial body of research has also examined the role of domestic politics in the target state. I build on these studies and examine the effect of regime type. More specifically, I revisited the relationship between democracy and sanction effectiveness. I have argued that an important shortcoming of the previous literature is its failure to ac-

Table 4: **Selection-corrected Model**

Variable	DV: Sanction Success
Democracy	2.000**
	(0.932)
Democracy^2	-2.205**
	(1.096)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.058*
	(0.075)
Domestic Instability	-0.001
	(0.016)
International Organization	0.428***
	(0.122)
Year	-0.004
	(0.003)
Control: Disputed Issue	YES
	DV: Sanction Imposition
Democracy	-0.976
	(0.686)
Democracy^2	1.432*
	(0.768)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.118 **
	(0.060)
Domestic Instability	0.031***
	(0.011)
International Organization	-0.278***
	(0.092)
Year	0.004
	(0.003)
Control: Disputed Issue	YES
Observations	1,222

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

count for the political cost of compliance that is faced by the target. In this way, I depart from studies which attributed the failure of sanctions to the 'mistargeting of costs'. These studies treat economic costs of sanctions as the primary source of political costs faced by the target. While some scholars (Dorussen and Mo (2001)) noted the role of audience cost in the target's calculations, the assumption that economic costs outweigh other considerations has gone largely unchallenged. Further, no other study has examined how audience cost may explain the relationship between regime type and sanction effectiveness.

I have argued that democracies would be particularly sensitive to such audience costs, and thus would be more likely deterred from making concessions. Hybrid regimes, on the other hand, both have the sufficient incentives to resolve the dispute and have necessary room for maneuver to make necessary compromises. As a result, as opposed to the previous literature, I proposed that the relationship would be curvilinear (inverted-U shaped) and found strong empirical support for this hypothesis.

3.0 Unintended Provocation? Economic Sanctions and Military Conflict

3.1 Summary

Do countries which become targets of economic sanctions pursue more aggressive foreign policies? More specifically, are they more likely to initiate militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs)? The U.S. economic embargo against Japan in the early 1940s is believed to have played an important role in the latter's subsequent decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Similarly, the ramping up of economic sanctions against Tehran have been followed by the escalation of tensions in the Middle East. Yet we have no systematic empirical evidence about the effect of sanctions on the likelihood of initiation of conflict by the sanctioned state. I argue that sanctions may increase the risk of armed conflict for two main reasons. First, economic sanctions alter the domestic political scene and create diversionary incentives. Secondly, the target may use military force as a 'costly signaling' to enhance its bargaining position. The conflict-inducing effect of sanctions, however, is also likely to be moderated by regime type. The time-series cross-sectional analysis of all countries between 1950 and 2010 show that nations that become the targets of sanctions are more likely to initiate militarized inter-state dispute. However, the risk of provocation is lower from hybrid regimes. These findings indicate that while economic sanctions are sometimes viewed as an alternative to war, there are significant scope conditions for this proposition.

3.2 Introduction

Do countries that become targets of economic sanctions pursue more aggressive foreign policies? More specifically, are they more likely to initiate militarized conflict? Severe U.S. embargo against Tokyo in the early 1940s is believed to have provoked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor (Higgs (2006), Miller (2012)). Similarly, the ramping up of economic sanctions against Tehran has been followed by escalatory actions by Iran. From 2011 onwards, Iran is

suspected to have engaged in a series of attacks against the U.S. and Israeli targets around the world (Khajehpour, Marashi and Parsi (2013), 25-26). In response to the Trump Administration's 'maximum pressure' policy, Tehran targeted commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, and attacked Saudi Arabian oil fields in 2019. In August 2021, Iran was accused of carrying out a drone strike against an oil tanker off the coast of Oman killing two crewmembers (Gambrell (2021)). Sanctions against North Korea not only failed to prevent its nuclear program but also "generate[d] escalatory responses" from Pyongyang (Haggard and Noland (2017)). Likewise, policymakers have raised concerns that intensifying sanctions against Russia may increase the risk of a Russian offensive against the Baltic countries (Drozdiak (2017), 181). These examples demonstrate that economic sanctions, which are traditionally viewed as a substitute for the use of force (e.g. Hoffmann (1967), Lopez and Cortright (1995), Morgan and Schwebach (1997)), may have considerable negative international security implications.

Previous research has shown that countries that impose economic sanctions are more likely to initiate militarized conflict (Lektzian and Sprecher (2007)), that sanctions increase the likelihood of violence between the targets and the third-parties (Peterson and Drury (2011)), and that sanctions can increase the likelihood of targets' pursuit of nuclear weapons (Early (2012)) and higher defense spending (McDonald III and Reitano (2016)). Yet we have no firm evidence about the effect of sanctions on the likelihood of initiation of military conflict by the *target*. Whether sanctions provoke the targets into taking escalatory steps is an important question for the debate on whether sanction work or not. After all, sanctions are ultimately about changing the behavior of the sanctioned states. Yet the literature on sanction effectiveness has mostly focused on whether the targets comply with sender demands. Moving beyond this dichotomy, some studies have explored whether sanctions can have 'unintended consequences' in the target such as increased repression and worse human rights record (Wood (2008), Peksen (2009), Escribà-Folch (2012)), sparking the debate on how states can employ more targeted "smart sanctions" (Cortright and Lopez (2002)). Do these 'unintended consequences' extend to the sphere of foreign policy? Specifically, do sanctions increase the risk of inter-state military conflict?

Examining the effect of sanctions on the target's military behavior using the newly-released Global Sanctions Data Base (V.2) (Felbermayr et al. (2020)) and the MID dataset

updated by Gibler, Miller and Little (2016), I find that states that are under economic sanctions are more likely to initiate militarized disputes with other states. I argue that this is because economic sanctions create diversionary incentives for the target, and increases the political cost of compromise through its influence on the domestic balance of power between hardliners and softliners. Sanctions also incentivize the targets to take costly military actions as a way to to signal their resolve. I also argue that the effect of sanctions on the probability of conflict varies by the target's regime type. Full democracies and autocracies are more likely to take military action for domestic political and costly signaling reasons, respectively. Hybrid regimes, on the other hand, are less likely to use force thanks to their relative insulation from public opinion compared to democracies; and their greater capacity to signal resolve without military escalation compared to autocracies. The empirical tests lend support to both hypotheses.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I review the most relevant studies on the relationship between sanctions and military conflict. Then I present my theory and hypotheses. This section is followed by the presentation of the data, and the discussion of the empirical strategy and the main findings. The final section concludes.

3.3   The Link Between Sanctions and Military Conflict

Economic sanctions, defined as "actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies" (Morgan, Bapat and Krustev (2009), 94) are a frequently-used instrument of coercive foreign policy. They can take the form of trade and financial restrictions, aid suspensions, arms embargoes, as well as more targeted measures like asset freezes and travel bans. They are used in a wide range of areas from promotion of democracy and human rights, to prevention of state sponsorship of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and drug trafficking, among others. Sanctions are often viewed as a middle ground between diplomatic efforts, which are 'too feeble', and military force, which is 'too costly' (Hufbauer et al. (1998)). Indeed, for policy-makers, sanctions "provide a visible and less expensive alternative to mil-

itary intervention and to doing nothing"(Haas (1998)). As such, despite the mixed evidence regarding their effectiveness (e.g. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990), Pape (1997)), the use of sanctions has grown significantly in the post-Cold War era. However, despite its increasing prevalence, its relationship with militarized conflict, which it is designed to avert, remains unclear. Do economic sanctions make conflict between states more or less likely?

Previous research on sanction effectiveness has largely focused on the whether the target complies with sender demands. However, the question of whether sanctions produce unintended consequences also has important bearing on the question of effectiveness. As such, a number of studies have also analyzed the unintended humanitarian consequences of economic sanctions (Peksen (2011), Allen and Lektzian (2013), Gutmann, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2020)), as well as their inadvertent effects on targets' human rights record (Wood (2008), Peksen (2009)) and democracy (Peksen and Drury (2010)). And while research has uncovered the effects of economic sanctions on various aspects of *civil* conflicts such as their duration (Escribà-Folch (2010)), intensity (Hultman and Peksen (2017)) and outcomes (Lektzian and Regan (2016)), much less attention has been paid to the the effect of sanctions on the *onset* of conflict *between* states. This ommission is surprising given that sanctions are an increasingly central instrument in inter-state interactions. Further, they are conventionally viewed as a tool that help states avoid military conflict. Yet whether it actually achieves this goal remains underexplored.

A limited number of studies have aimed to fill this gap by examining the link between sanctions and militarized conflict. Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) demonstrates that sanctions may not be effective in preventing conflict. They find that states that impose sanctions are more likely to initiate military conflict against the sanctioned state. This is because sanctions, which are designed to maximize the cost on the target and minimize the cost on the sender, signal weakness and fail to change the behavior of the target. That's why senders follow through the sanctions with more forceful measures in order to achieve their preferred policy outcomes. Democratic states are more likely to take military action following the imposition of sanctions because of the audience cost of backing down. Peterson and Drury (2011) find that sanctions increase the likelihood of conflict between the target and the third states. It is argued that economic sanctions turn the targets into an 'international

pariah' which allows other countries to take more aggressive actions towards the sanctioned countries. In other words, sanctions signal disapproval with the targets, which make those states more vulnerable against their rivals. These studies show that sanctions may have spillover effects for inter-state conflict.

On the other hand, in support of the conventional wisdom, McCormack and Pascoe (2017) argue that sanctions can indeed be effective in preventing conflict. Sanctions that are aimed at preserving the status quo hurt a revisionist actor's economy and thus offset the commitment problem which usually arises from shifting relative capabilities. In other words, sanctions obviate the need for a preventive conflict, by operating "to smooth shifts in relative power" (*ibid*, 1713). Yet the authors acknowledge that sanctions can also be counter-productive. More specifically, they can induce the target to use force to (re-)assert its position, especially when the sanctions are expected to impose a severe cost on the target.

In short, previous literature shows that sanctions can both be counter-productive and effective in averting conflict between states. However, with the exception of Petrescu (2010), these studies focus on how sanctions affect the behavior of the *sender* and third parties, and not the *target*. Petrescu (2010) examines the effect of sanctions on the target behavior. He finds that targets of sanctions are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict in the future. However, this study only analyzes sanctions that are imposed against countries that are currently engaged in militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs). Therefore, the findings are limited to a certain subset of sanction cases, and thus do not tell us about the behavior of the target when sanctions are imposed outside the context of existing militarized disputes. So do economic sanctions help avert military conflict by increasing the costs for the target? Or do they provoke the target into taking further military actions? Secondly, what is the role of domestic political institutions in moderating this relationship?

3.4   Theory and Hypotheses

Economic sanctions are primarily intended to alter the cost-benefit calculations of the target concerning a contested policy in order to change the target's behavior.[1] They can achieve this through two complementary mechanisms. First, senders can use economic sanctions to directly weaken the target by degrading its economic and military capabilities. Secondly, senders can use sanctions as a signaling device to convey their disapproval of the target's status quo policy and the lengths they are willing to go to change target's behavior (Drezner, Drezner et al. (1999), Schwebach (2000)). Given the two overarching logics, how would economic sanctions affect the foreign policy behavior of the target? More specifically, would they affect the likelihood of inter-state conflict?

I argue that economic sanctions would impact the military behavior of the targets through two main channels. First, sanctions have an influence on the target's domestic politics. Specifically, sanctions create diversionary incentives for the targeted leaders. They also increase the political cost of taking a compromising approach. Secondly, costly signaling by the sender incentivizes the target to take costly actions to signal its own resolve. Taken together, I expect the target of economic sanctions to engage in more aggressive behavior in foreign policy that increases the risk of inter-state conflict. However, sanctions' provocation effect is unlikely to be uniform across cases. I expect the risk of provocation to be moderated by the target's regime type. Specifically, I argue that democracy is likely to have a curvilinear (U-shaped) effect where fully democratic and autocratic regimes would be most prone to responding to economic sanctions by taking military actions. Democratic targets would escalate mainly for domestic political reasons, whereas autocratic regimes would take military action due to their diminished ability to signal resolve without escalation (Fearon (1994)). Sanctions, on the other hand, are less likely to provoke hybrid regimes. Compared to democracies, leaders in these political systems are more insulated from likely domestic pressure to act. They also have higher ability to signal resolve due to their relative openness compared to fully autocratic regimes thanks to the presence of competitive elections and

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[1]Even though the senders may have mixed motives in imposing sanctions, such as sending a signal to domestic audiences (Whang (2011)).

stronger institutions.

3.4.1   Sanctions and Target Domestic Politics

There are two main domestic political mechanisms through which sanctions influence the likelihood of inter-state conflict. First, sanctions can incentivize the targets to use force abroad as a diversionary tactic. A long-running argument in international relations scholarship is that leaders may initiate military involvement abroad to divert attention from domestic problems (e.g. Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991)), even though empirical support for this hypothesis is inconsistent (Levy (1988)). Use of force may help the incumbents to bolster their popularity thanks to the upsurge of nationalist feelings through the 'rally-round-the-flag' effect (Mueller (1970), DeRouen (2000)). The incumbents may also benefit from the muted criticism during international crises (Brody (1991)). Military actions may also help the leaders signal their competence to the voters, who may otherwise seek to replace the leader due to the weak economic performance (Tarar (2006)). The military incursion of Argentina, whose leaders were facing growing civil strife and economic downturn, to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in 1982 (Levy and Vakili (1992)), Russia's war in Georgia in 2008 (Filippov (2009), Shevtsova (2010)), Uganda's invasion of Tanzania under Idi Amin (Roberts (2014)), or Turkey's military operations in Iraq and Syria in 2018 and 2019 (Erturk and Sazak (2018)) were seen largely as attempts to deal with domestic threats to incumbents' rule. I argue that economic sanctions can create similar incentives. Sanctioned states may spark conflicts abroad in order to deflect blame for economic problems caused by the sanctions.

International sanctions limit the range of economic activities with the targeted state, including restrictions on exports and imports, and foreign investment. Notwithstanding significant variation in how sanctions affect the target economies[2], *on average*, they create substantial hardships by, among others, undermining economic growth (Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015)), exacerbating income inequalities (Afesorgbor and Mahadevan (2016)),

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[2]Some of the factors that influence this variation include the ability of the target to find alternative trading and investment partners (e.g. Kavaklı, Chatagnier and Hatipoğlu (2020)), and the availability of 'sanctions-busting' opportunities (e.g Early (2015))

undercutting foreign direct investment (Mirkina (2018)), hampering the target's ability to borrow from international financial institutions (Peksen and Woo (2018)), and spurring currency (Peksen and Son (2015)) and banking (Hatipoglu and Peksen (2018)) crises. Weak economic performance, in turn, can undermine a leader's ability to stay in power, especially in democracies where institutions lower the cost for the general public to punish the incumbents (e.g. Powell Jr and Whitten (1993)). Indeed, studies have shown that sanctions may give rise to political costs for the target government (Lektzian and Souva (2007), Allen (2008a)) through the increased risk of leadership turnover (Marinov (2005)) and popular uprising (Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest (2017)). I argue that the increased risk of domestic tumult spurred by the economic sanctions creates diversionary incentives for the target to take military actions abroad.

Secondly, sanctions can make compromises politically costlier for the target for two reasons. Research has revealed that sanctions can harden public opinion in the target society (Galtung (1967), Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)). Individuals may perceive sanctions as an intrusion into domestic affairs and thus an unjustified violation of sovereignty. It is found that coercive actions may provoke the opponents by engaging their reputation and honor (Gottfried and Trager (2016), Dafoe, Hatz and Zhang (2021)). Thus sanctions could spark greater hostility towards the sender, making it difficult for a leader to make concessions. This is especially true when domestic institutional structure increases the sensitivity of the leaders to public opinion. Relatedly, the political cost of compromise can increase due to the changes in the domestic balance of power between competing actors. Particularly, sanctions can provide a fertile ground for hawkish politicians to garner greater popular support by exploiting nationalist sentiments. The empowerment of the 'hardliners', in turn, can tie the incumbents' hands, increasing the likelihood of the target responding to sanctions in a more aggressive way. The failure to do so could invite accusations of being soft in the face of external threats.

More fundamentally, sanctions can vindicate those who oppose a more compromising and cooperative approach. The imposition of sanctions is generally preceded by the breakdown of bargaining (Nooruddin (2002)). While negotiations may continue during sanction episodes, the presence of sanctions implies that the previous diplomatic efforts have failed in resolving

the dispute. This may lend credence to actors who advocate for more extreme measures. For example, in Iran, the re-imposition of the U.S. sanctions under President Trump's 'maximum pressure' policy is believed to have strengthened the hardliners by "discredit[ing] for many ordinary Iranians the usefulness of diplomacy" (Kahalzadeh (2021)). The sanctions against Russia also seem to have strengthened the conservative nationalist narrative (Rutland (2014), 6). The expectation that sanctions may embolden the hardliners at the expense of softliners is consistent with previous studies. The research shows that dramatic events, such as wars and economic sanctions, can increase support for hawks and hawkish policies domestically. For example, the experience with war is often associated with decreased support for peaceful negotiations in the context of inter-group conflict (e.g. Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016)). War also influences foreign policy attitudes with the populace swaying towards more hardline policies against the external actors (Kupatadze and Zeitzoff (2019)). Hawkish incumbent leaders also tend to perform better electorally than dovish leaders during international conflicts (Kiratli (2020)). Economic sanctions can similarly undermine doves, shifting the balance of power in favor of hawks. For example, the U.S withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and renewed sanctions against Tehran led to reduced support for negotiations in Iran (Gallagher, Mohseni and Ramsay (2019), 7). In the same period, the popularity of the President Rouhani–a moderate– has declined to its lowest levels since his electoral victory in 2013 (*ibid*, 37). In short, sanctions can make a diversionary conflict politically beneficial and compromise costly for the targets.

3.4.2 Costly Signaling

Information asymmetries have been proposed as one of the primary factors that present an obstacle to efficient bargaining between states (Fearon (1995)). Actors know their true preferences, capabilities and resolve, but are uncertain about those of their adversaries. Given that states have private information, they also have incentives to misrepresent this information in order to achieve better bargaining outcomes. Therefore, actors face a credibility problem in a crisis bargaining. To rectify this, they can take costly actions to convey information to the less-informed actors about their true resolve. These actions can range

from mobilizing troops to making public threats (Fearon (1997)). Another likely strategy is taking escalatory steps "that leaves something to chance" (Schelling (1960)). The willingness to take such a chance separates resolute from irresolute adversaries.

The cases of economic sanctions constitute a form of crisis bargaining, in which parties negotiate under the risk of a costly war. That's why parties face similar credibility problems. Particularly, there is uncertainty on the part of the senders about whether they are facing a resolute or irresolute type (Spaniel and Smith (2015)). Specifically, sanctioning states do not have complete information about whether the opponent is vulnerable to coercion or not. Given this, a sanctioned state has an incentive to take costly actions that would convince the sender that it is the resolute type and that the sender should lift the sanctions. Targets may attempt to signal their resolve by tying their hands through domestic audience cost, generating benefits that depend on the continuation of sanctions through rent-seeking (Dorussen and Mo (2001)), or imposing retaliatory 'counter-sanctions' (Hedberg (2018)). Of direct relevance to the question of militarized conflict, however, they can also take escalatory steps that increase the risk of accidental war in order to signal their resolve *vis-à-vis* the contested policy. Through this "brinkmanship", the target may hope to convince the sender to lift the sanctions or agree to a compromise that is much more favorable to the target.

For example, in 1994, Iraq's Saddam Hussein threatened to re-invade Kuwait by mobilizing more than tens of thousands of troops on the Kuwaiti border to force the U.S. to end the sanctions (NYT (1994a), Mazaheri (2010), 258). It was believed that the Iraqi "saber-rattling" was "intended to underscore Baghdad's demands for the lifting of the economic sanctions" (NYT (1994b)). The second Kuwaiti invasion never took place, and Saddam Hussein officially recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait in spite of the fact that the United Nations did not lift sanctions (Lopez and Cortright (1995), 66). Still this episode shows that targeted leaders may have incentives to take escalatory steps to demonstrate their own resolve. More recently, Iran's aggressive behavior in the Middle East is attributed partly to Western sanctions. "Since 2005...[Iran] is willing to push back against the US by engaging in aggressive or assertive behavior that could risk triggering the conflict with the United States" (Ward (2019)). In 2019, in response to the new round of sanctions under Trump's "maximum pressure" policy, Iran attacked two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman near the

Strait of Hormuz–where a third of the world's oil supplies transit. A few months later, in September, Iran-linked Yemeni groups attacked Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq and Khurais oil fields temporarily knocking out half of Saudi oil production.

Similarly, China's recent assertiveness in its region is sometimes linked with the escalating 'trade war' with the U.S, as well as sanctions against some Chinese companies. It is argued that more aggressive Chinese foreign policy, manifesting itself in armed clashes with India, new territorial claims against Bhutan, and frictions with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea (Graham (2020)), is not driven by Chinese strength but rather by a sense of weakness–described as "reactive or insecure assertiveness" (Small and Jaishankar (2020)). It is argued that Beijing is adopting a more confrontational approach believing that "coercive means are now the only way to deter new countervailing coalitions" and that they are "responding to moves by others" (*ibid*). In sum, I argue that economic sanctions can incentivize the targets into adopting more aggressive posturing. Targeted leaders may hope to use military action to avoid the political cost of economic downturn and an inadequate international response to sanctions. Targets also have incentives to take a more combative approach in order to signal their own resolve.

Hypothesis 1: Economic sanctions increase the risk of inter-state conflict initiated by the sanctioned state.

3.4.3 Regime Type as a Moderator

While sanctions increase the likelihood of military action by the target *on average*, this effect is unlikely to be uniform across cases. Instead, the conflict-inducing effect of sanctions is likely to be moderated by regime type. Domestic political institutions determine the size of the groups that can punish the leaders for policy failures. In this way, it determines the sensitivity of leaders to public opinion and to the potential challenges by the domestic opponents. In the case of economic sanctions, regime type would influence whether leaders would have diversionary incentives to avoid blame for economic downturn and whether they would be cowed by hardliners into taking a more aggressive stance. Leaders' sensitivity to public opinion and the level of political openness also influences leaders' ability to engage

in costly signaling, where leaders in some regimes are likely to use 'audience cost' more effectively to signal its resolve without resorting to military actions (Fearon (1994), Weeks (2008a)). The focus on regime type as a key moderator variable is also consistent with previous research which has shown that the effect of sanctions on the target's behavior varies by the target's political institutions (Brooks (2002), Allen (2008a), Escribà-Folch (2012)). Similarly, I argue that the effect of sanctions on the likelihood of conflict-initiation is likely to be different for countries with different levels of democracy. This is mainly because these regimes vary in terms of 1) the incentives they have to engage in diversionary conflict ((Pickering and Kisangani (2005)), 2) the extent to which they would be sensitive to challanges by hardliners, and 3) the ease with which they can credibly signal resolve to the opponent without escalation (Fearon (1994)).

3.4.3.1 The Curvilinear Effect of Democracy

How would democracy influence the likelihood of conflict initiation by the sanctioned state? I argue that democracy's effect is likely to be non-linear, where hybrid regimes have the least likelihood of responding to sanctions with military action. Democracies would be incentivized to take a hardline position mainly due to domestic political reasons. Leaders in these political systems would have greater diversionary incentives because weak economic performance is more likely to threaten their hold on power. Regular free and fair elections provide a low-cost mechanism to remove leaders in democracies. The presence of independent institutions, constitutionally protected rights and liberties, and free media also make the leaders highly sensitive to public opinion. These factors also constrain democratic leaders in how they deal with dissent. Devoid of repressive tools to address domestic tumult, they would have greater incentives to use diversionary tactics as a way to bolster their popularity and maintain power. This expectation is consistent with studies which find that diversionary conflict is more likely to be initiated by democracies (Gelpi (1997), Davies (2002)).

Democratic leaders would be more likely to take escalatory measures in order also to address potential challenges from hardliners. As discussed above, sanctions can embolden the hawks. Survey experimental evidence also indicate that sanctions can engender a backlash

in the target state and shift the public opinion in favor of more hardline policies (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)). As a result, governments in democratic regimes may take more aggressive actions as a way not to fall out of step with voters. During international crises, moderate leaders tend to be susceptible to accusations of being 'soft' and 'weak' when they take a more conciliatory approach (Schultz (2005), Mattes and Weeks (2019)). In this sense, potential attacks by the hardliners buoyed by the increasing public support for hardline policies would incentivize democratic leaders to take military actions in order to prevent erosion of electoral support. This is partly why leaders are more likely to engage in violent, adventurous foreign policy behavior when they face uncertain re-election prospects (Smith (1996)). In short, sanctions are more likely to cause provocation when the targets are democratic because of their need to maintain the support of a large winning coalition in the face of deteriorating economic conditions.

Autocratic regimes would also have incentives to respond to sanctions aggressively, albeit for different reasons. As opposed to democracies, authoritarian leaders are unlikely to be motivated by diversionary incentives. They are also unlikely to take military action as a response to hawkish political actors. These regimes "do not have any of the architecture of political competition and pluralism" (Diamond (2002), 26). They maintain power by offering private goods to a small winning coalition. This allows them to keep power despite policy failures (De Mesquita et al. (2003)). These regimes also have a higher number of tools to deal with domestic social unrest and political threats, such as crackdowns and purges. The cost for domestic audiences of punishing or removing these leaders can be prohibitively high (e.g. Goemans (2000)) Thus autocracies would have few incentives to use force as a way to maintain power by bolstering their popularity. For autocracies, military action is unlikely to be mainly about domestic politics.

On the other hand, these regimes are more likely to use force in order to establish credibility. They would use escalation as a form of costly signaling because they have a more difficult time credibly communicating resolve in other ways. As mentioned above, due to the problem of incomplete information, actors engage in costly signaling to establish credibility. And the types of actions states take to send these signals vary. However, non-democratic regimes are particularly disadvantaged in establishing credibility through peaceful ways.

This is because the institutional structure prevents transparency, which makes it harder for outsiders to glean information about the preferences and resolve of the political leaders (Schultz (1998), Bell (2013)). In addition, mainly due to the absence of competitive elections that offer a low-cost opportunity to remove leaders, non-democratic regimes are less likely to generate sufficient audience costs (Fearon (1994), Schultz (2001)). Actors that are less likely to generate audience cost, in turn, would require more military escalation to signal their preference (Fearon (1994), 587).

Hybrid regimes, on the other hand, have certain advantages in how they negotiate during economic sanctions that reduce the need to resort to more forceful measures. In contrast to leaders in democracies and autocracies, hybrid regimes, which "mix democratic with autocratic features" (Fearon and Laitin (2003) 81), have fewer incentives to take military action in response to economic sanctions. Compared to democracies, they are more insulated from public opinion, which diminishes diversionary incentives and allows them to take a more conciliatory approach in meeting the demands of the sanctioning state. In addition, compared to autocracies, they have a relatively more open political system with competitive multiparty elections that allow them to signal resolve in non-violent ways.

Far from being a homogeneous group, hybrid regimes are generally understood as the diminished subtypes of democratic and autocratic systems (Collier and Levitsky (1997)). These regimes include semi-authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way (2002), Ottaway (2003)) which have democratic features such as legislative bodies and competitive, albeit not free and fair, elections that are nevertheless often highly consequential (Schedler (2002)). Thus these regimes tolerate a degree of pluralism and interparty competition. However, they are also authoritarian in that leaders frequently manipulate the rules and institutions and violate rights and liberties such as freedom of press. Hybrid regimes also include electoral democracies where elections meet the minimum criteria to be qualified as democratic. Yet these regimes lack sufficient institutional checks and balances and respect for civil rights and liberties to qualify as fully-consolidated liberal democracies.

I argue that hybrid regimes would be least likely to respond to sanctions with military escalation for several reasons. First, their relative insulation reduces their incentives to engage in diversionary conflict. Compared to democracies, they are not as sensitive to public

opinion due to the lack of fully free and fair elections and consistent violation of freedom of speech. They also have greater influence over the media and thus have the ability to limit the flow of information to the citizens ((Ottaway (2003), 138). They can also use more overt repression to deal with dissent. Thus economic problems triggered by the sanctions would be less likely to undermine their power. Thus compared to democracies, they would have fewer reasons to use force abroad to maintain power. Secondly, in contrast to closed autocracies, hybrid regimes can signal resolve without military escalation. However defective, the presence of democratic institutions such as legislature and legal opposition parties ensure relative political openness. This would allow other states to gain greater information about its resolve.

Further, even when they are manipulated, the competitive elections can provide leaders in hybrid regimes the opportunity to generate audience cost. Unlike closed autocracies, elections in hybrid regimes (including competitive authoritarian systems) are highly consequential. The opposition parties "contest vigorously–and at times successfully–for power" (Levitsky and Way (2010), 3). In fact, Slantchev (2006) argues that under some circumstances, hybrid regimes are better equipped to generate audience cost than either democracies and autocracies. Finally, these regimes would have an easier time complying with sender demands thanks to the relatively lower cost of concession. For example, in the civil war context, Zarpli (2020) finds that hybrid regimes are more likely to reach negotiated settlements with non-state actors because of the greater leeway they have in offering concessions to the rebels. Hybrid regimes may have a similar advantage in making compromises with the sanctioning states, which reduces their incentives to escalate the dispute further.

Hypothesis 2: Economic sanctions are most likely to increase the risk of inter-state conflict when imposed against democracies and autocracies, and least likely when imposed against hybrid regimes.

3.5 Data and Analysis

To estimate the effect of economic sanctions on the likelihood of military action by the sanctioned state, I rely on Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et al. (2020)) and the Militarized Inter-State Dispute (MID) dataset updated by Gibler, Miller and Little (2016). The former records cases of imposed sanctions ("actions that limit economic relations to change the behavior of the target state"). This dataset covers 1,064 sanction cases between 1950 and 2020. Sanctions are defined as "binding restrictive measures...to address different types of violations of international norms by inducing target countries to change their behavior or to constrain their actions" (Felbermayr et al. (2020), 4). The dataset records the sanctions on the basis of three dimensions: 1) sanction type (whether the sanctions include restrictions in trade, finance, military, or travel); 2) political objectives behind the sanctions (whether the goal is to promote human rights, democracy, preventing war, ending war, regime-change, address state sponsorship of terrorism, territorial conflict or policy-change); 3) the degree of success of each sanction episode. Particularly, the outcome variable records whether sanctions resulted in failure (when a target does not change its behavior), negotiated settlement (when parties agree to settle a conflict by negotiations), partial success (when a target partially accepts the demands of the sender) or complete success (when a target fully accepts the requests of the sender). The MID dataset, which defines militarized disputes as "cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996)) covers the period between 1816 and 2010.

The resulting dataset includes all country-years between 1950 and 2010. The dependent variable is a binary variable, coded 1 if a country initiates a militarized dispute in a year, and 0 otherwise. The independent variable is a binary variable that is coded 1 if a country is under economic sanctions in a year, and 0 otherwise. Approximately 29% of the country-years in the dataset are under sanctions. To test Hypothesis 2, I interact the main independent variable with regime type variable. I also include the triple interaction between the independent variable and democracy's linear and squared terms. I primarily rely on Varieties of

Democracy (V-Dem) dataset's (Coppedge et al. (2020)) "liberal democracy" measure, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. It measures democracy based on the quality of elections, the limits on the executive, constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and independent judiciary.

I include a number of control variables. More specifically, the strength of the target economy measured as GDP per capita can predict the onset of sanctions because it can affect the target's ability to absorb costs. It can also influence the decision to take military action. Countries with higher resources may find it easier to carry out operations abroad. I also include the GDP growth, which can be associated with diversionary incentives. These data are derived from Madison Data Project (Bolt and van Zanden (2013)). It is also possible that the relationship between sanctions and militarized conflict is driven by domestic instability. Countries with internal strife are generally good candidates for being target of sanctions that aim to improve human rights. These countries could also have strong incentives for diversionary behavior. Leaders may use conflict abroad to silence critics at home (e.g. Dassel and Reinhardt (1999)). To rule out this alternative explanation, I control for the level of domestic conflict with a weighted measure that takes into account the presence of anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes, terrorism, government crises, purges, revolutions and riots (Banks and Wilson (2020)). I also include a series of binary variables that indicate the specific sanction types (trade, finance, military, travel, other). Finally, I control for the sanctions' objectives. Given that some sanctions are imposed against participants in a military conflict, any correlation between sanctions and inter-state conflict may raise questions about reverse causality. Thus it is important to control for the reasons for imposing sanctions to rule out alternative explanations. Finally, I include a time trend variable to control for time-related unobserved factors.

The results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are reported in Table 5. Models 1 and 2 display the effect of sanctions using pooled logistic regression. Among the control variables, GDP per capita has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a sanctioned state's initiation of military conflict. On the other hand, domestic instability is a significant predictor of conflict initiation. Countries that experience civil unrest are more likely to initiate militarized inter-state dispute. Surprisingly, GDP growth has a positive and statistically significant

Table 5: **Sanctions and Target MIDs**

Variable	Base	Interaction
Sanctions	1.190***	1.647***
	(0.070)	(0.105)
Democracy	-0.179*	-0.284
	(0.105)	(0.527)
Sanctions * Democracy		-4.792***
		(0.730)
Sanctions * Democracy * Democracy		5.137***
		(0.895)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.014	-0.018
	(0.024)	(0.025)
GDP growth	0.752***	0.909***
	(0.234)	(0.232)
Domestic Conflict	0.045***	0.054***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year	-0.031***	-0.029**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	59.811***	56.680***
	(2.524)	(2.546)
Observations	13,420	13,420

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

effect. Countries with higher growth rates are more likely to initiate military conflict, which is inconsistent with the expectations of diversionary theory of war.

The sanctions variable has the hypothesized positive sign. It shows that being a subject of sanctions is an important predictor of target's initiation of at least one militarized inter-state dispute (MID). The second model tests Hypothesis 2. It includes the interaction between the sanctions and regime type variable. It also includes the squared term of the democracy score in order to test the non-linear nature of the hypothesis. It can be seen that the linear interaction has a negative sign and is statistically significant. The interaction between sanctions and the quadratic term of the democracy variable, on the other hand, has a positive and statistically significant sign. This indicates that the effect of sanctions on the probability of conflict initiation by the target first decreases and then increases as we move from low to high democracy scores. The Figure 2 displays this relationship graphically. The effect of sanctions on probability of target conflict initiation first decreases and then increases with the democracy score, lending support to Hypothesis 2.

3.5.1 Robustness Checks

I include an alternative democracy variable. Specifically, I use the polyarchy score, which measures the extent to which electoral competition is free and fair, civil society organizations operate freely, freedom of expression is respected, and media is allowed to operate independent from government interference. The results are reported in the Appendix (Table 19). In addition, I include additional control variables. Particularly, I control for the annual inflation rate which is an important indicator for the economic performance (e.g. Barro (2013)). Thus it is meant to complement the GDP growth variable in capturing the diversionary incentives of leaders. Table 18 in the Appendix reports these results. Finally, I adopt a more stringent definition of a Militarized Inter-state Dispute. I code an observation 1 if the sanctioned state either displayed or used force against another state. Such acts include, among others, troop mobilizations, border violations, blockades, occupations, armed clashes, and inter-state war (Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996)). Thus I exclude cases where a state merely *threatened* to use force. The results are reported in the Appendix (Table 20).

Figure 2: **Conditional Marginal Effects of Sanctions on Probability of Conflict (Error Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals)**

3.6   Conclusion

In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of extracting concessions from other states (Wood (2008), 490). In fact, economic sanctions are not only viewed as a less costly alternative to military intervention that nevertheless allow leaders to demonstrate that they are "doing something". It is also held that sanctions are "highly unlikely to provoke a dangerous counter-attack" (Lopez and Cortright (1995), 68). The findings from this study call this assumption into question. I find that countries that become targets of economic sanctions are significantly more likely to initiate military conflict, even after controlling for a host of other factors including sanction type and contested issue area. Thus the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor following U.S. economic embargo, Iraqi troop mobilization along the Kuwaiti border in response to U.N. sanctions, or Iranian-sponsored attacks in the Middle East in response to the "maximum pressure" policy are not outliers but seem to reflect a broader pattern.

To be sure, this does not mean that sanctions should be abandoned as a policy instrument. Under some circumstances, the risk of sparking a conflict may be tolerable or even preferable when compared to its alternatives like military intervention. Further, this essay shows that the risk of provocation is not uniform, and that it is significantly lower when sanctions are imposed against certain regime types. Yet the study shows that economic sanctions should not be considered as a costless foreign policy tool and the decision-makers should weigh in various risks associated with using sanctions.

In sum, this study offers, to my knowledge, the first empirical evidence regarding the effect of economic sanctions on the military behavior of the targets. The main results show that economic sanctions, which are generally touted as a credible alternative to military force, may have unintended consequences for international security. Economic sanctions can provoke the targets into taking military action abroad. However, the conflict-inducing effect of sanctions is moderated by the domestic institutions in the target state. Full democracies and autocracies are particularly likely to respond to sanctions by taking military actions, albeit for different reasons. Sanctions are unlikely to trigger a similar reaction by hybrid

regimes. With some exceptions, the scholarships on inter-state conflict and economic sanctions have developed mostly in isolation from each other. The findings from this article highlight the need to further explore the links between the two.

4.0 Sanctions and Target Public Opinion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey

4.1 Summary

The research into economic sanctions effectiveness h as h ighlighted t he i mportance of public opinion. Yet the effect of sanctions on public opinion has attracted relatively limited scholarly attention. The few recent studies on this question report mixed findings. In this essay, I investigate the role of uncertainty over intentions in influencing p ublic s upport for policy change in the target state. Studies in crisis bargaining have identified asymmetric information as a key problem. Studies on sanctions also highlight how sanctioning states (i.e. senders) often have unclear goals. Yet we do not have any firm e vidence a bout how such uncertainties would affect public o pinion. How do uncertainties about the intentions of the sender affect p ublic s upport f or p olicy c hange i n t he s anctioned (i.e. t arget) country? I argue that individuals would be less supportive of policy-change when they suspect that the sender has 'ulterior motives' or a 'hidden agenda'. I field a pre-registered online survey experiment in Turkey using the recent U.S. sanctions to test this claim. The findings suggest that uncertainty has a negative impact on support for policy change, but only among certain subgroups. The main analysis is complemented by automated text analysis of respondents' answers to an open-ended question.

4.2 Introduction

States often misrepresent private information in international relations. What happens when the deceit is revealed? Some studies highlight how deception may help a state reach more favorable bargaining outcomes, while paradoxically increasing the risk of conflict outbreak (e.g. Fearon (1995)). Some focus on the long-term impact of cheating on reputation (e.g. Tomz (2012)). How do suspicions over deceit affect p ublic o pinion, w hich p lays a key

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role in inter-state interactions (e.g. Fearon (1994), Schultz (1998), Weeks (2008b))? More specifically, how does uncertainty over the true intentions of another state affect public attitudes towards their own government's bargaining strategy? I address this question in the context of economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions are meant to alter the behavior of another state by showing the cost of maintaining the disputed policy. Yet this foreign policy instrument still suffers from the problem of uncertainty that is prevalent in crisis bargaining. While governments generally declare certain official goals, or publicize demands that need to be met before the sanctions can be lifted, there may still be ambiguity over the "true intentions" of the sender. Is the sender using the disputed policy as an excuse to pursue other objectives? For example, what is the goal of the U.S. sanctions against Iran? Experts have debated whether the "real aim" of the U.S is to prevent Iranian nuclearization (official goal) or overthrow its regime (e.g. Fisher (2020), Yazdani and Hussain (2006)). During the failed nuclear-swap negotiations in 2009, uncertainty about the intentions of the Obama administration played a role in disincentivizing the Iranian leadership to "take a risk by making conciliatory moves" (Parsi (2012), 38). Yet we lack systematic empirical evidence regarding the effect of such uncertainty on public opinion. How does uncertainty over intentions affect support for policy change in the target state?

Previous research indicates that public opinion is key to understanding the effectiveness of economic sanctions. More comprehensive sanctions do not always reach their goals, because economic costs may not translate into political costs for the targeted leaders (Kirshner (1997)). "Without political costs, there is no reason for targeted states to comply" (Allen (2008b), 918). Whether sanctions generate domestic political costs for the target, in turn, depends heavily on how sanctions affect public opinion. While some have argued that sanctions can turn the public against the leader (Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest (2017)), others have suggested that they can spark a rally-round-the-flag effect (Galtung (1967), Pape (1997)). Few studies that directly test this relationship report mixed findings (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), Frye (2019), Alexseev and Hale (2020), Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020), Sejersen (2020)). Further, none of them examine the effect of uncertainty over intentions, which is a pervasive feature of economic sanctions (Barber (1979), Lind-

say (1986)). This study seeks to address this gap. I hypothesize that greater uncertainty over sender intentions can lead to reduced support for policy change in the target. This is mainly because ambiguity over goals heightens the risk that the target's compliance with the *officially proclaimed* goals will not result in lifting of sanctions. To test this argument, I employ an original online survey experiment in Turkey using the recent U.S. sanctions that were announced in December 2020 as part of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

The results show that uncertainty over sender intentions have a negative impact on support for policy change, but only among certain sub-groups. More specifically, government supporters show a strongly negative reaction. This is consistent with previous studies which find sanctions' divergent effects on different groups (e.g. Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020)). But unlike previous studies (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)), I find that the information about economic costs does not influence respondents' reaction in a significant way. In general, treatments do not seem to have a direct, unmediated effect on support for policy-change. However, the text analysis of the responses to an open-ended question reveals that individuals in the uncertainty treatment exhibited more negative sentiments. This suggests that while the treatments were insufficient to move individuals' policy preferences *on average*, information about uncertainty did spark a negative reaction. Taken together, the findings indicate that uncertainty over intentions can be detrimental for sanction effectiveness. The effect of the treatments on pro-government respondents is particularly important given that the opinions of this group are likely to have a stronger influence on a government's decision-making than that of the opponents. This is especially true in competitive authoritarian regimes like Turkey where the opposition actors face significant hurdles in influencing policy-decisions. The findings also suggest that sanctioning states may be able to soften the public backlash in the target state by reducing uncertainty about their goals by, for example, avoiding sending mixed signals. This strategy would be even more effective if the targeted governments, which have greater influence over the domestic messages, avoid fomenting confusion and ambiguity about what the goals of the senders are.

This essay advances our understanding of the relationship between sanctions and target public opinion. While the link between the two has long been considered to be crucial

in understanding sanction effectiveness, it hasn't been systematically tested directly until recently. This study also contributes to the crisis bargaining literature, which has overwhelmingly focused on uncertainty over *resolve* as a key obstacle to peaceful settlement. This study demonstrates that uncertainty over intentions can also shape bargaining through its effect on public opinion, and that communicating *goals* could potentially improve the efficiency of bargaining by averting public backlash. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the most relevant studies on the relationship between sanctions and public opinion, and highlights the contributions of this study. Next, I describe the problem of uncertainty over intentions during sanction cases and likely sources for this uncertainty. In the following section, I present my theory and hypotheses. Then I briefly discuss the U.S. sanctions against Turkey, before I introduce the research design and the main findings. The last section concludes.

4.2.1 Research on Sanctions and Public Opinion

How do economic sanctions affect public opinion in the target state? Scholarship on sanctions has long posited an effect on public opinion, though without directly testing this link. Earlier studies asserted that sanctions lead to political integration (rather than disintegration) and increase the citizens' support for the target government by heightening the sense of nationalism (Galtung (1967)). "External pressure is more likely to enhance the nationalist legitimacy of rulers than to undermine it" Pape (1997), 107). More recent studies, on the other hand, proposed that sanctions can diminish the popularity of the targeted leaders and lead to greater support for policy change (Marinov (2005), Lektzian and Souva (2007), Allen (2008*b*), Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest (2017)). It is argued that the economic hardships caused by the sanctions lead individuals to withdraw their support from the government and pressure their leaders to change their behavior. As a result, sanctions succeed against democracies because of the leaders' sensitivity to public opinion (Lektzian and Souva (2007)). They also lead to more anti-government activity such as protests and riots (Allen (2008*a*), Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest (2017)), and increase the risk of leaders' losing office (Marinov (2005)). These studies, however, do not directly test the effect of

sanctions on public opinion. The increased likelihood of mass protest, for example, may be driven by the fact that sanctions embolden government opponents and increase their willingness to mobilize (Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999)), and not necessarily because it causes a shift in the opinion of the government and its policies.

A number of recent studies aim to fill this gap by directly testing the effect of sanctions on public opinion. One group of studies shows that sanctions can have a backlash effect. In the context of Israel, Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018) find that, on average, sanctions result in increased support for contested policy in the target state. They show that European Union's decision to label goods produced in occupied territories as 'made in settlements' led to higher support for settlements, more hawkish politicians, as well as more negative views of the EU. In a second survey, they examine the effect of sanction type and sender identity on public opinion using a hypothetical scenario. They similarly find that hypothetical sanctions generally led to a 'rally-round-the-flag' effect. Only the information about a comprehensive boycott of Israeli goods by the U.S. was effective in generating support for a policy-change, and even then the effect is significant only among the supporters of the political opposition. Similarly, in a pooled survey analysis, Alexseev and Hale (2020) find that sanctions lead to increased support for President Putin in Russia, and this effect is stronger among respondents with higher incomes.

Another group of studies, on the other hand, report null effects. For example, in a survey experiment in Russia, Frye (2019) finds that information about the US and EU sanctions has no statistically significant effect on the approval rate of the Russian government. Yet, contrary to the rally effect, he finds that among respondents who hold negative views of President Putin, the treatments lead individuals to withdraw their support from the government. Importantly, information about the reasons for imposing sanctions elicit strong reaction in the target public. More specifically, the respondents who were primed that the sanctions were imposed due to the annexation of Crimea exhibit significantly higher support for the Russian leadership. This finding highlights the importance of further exploring the role of sender goals and potential uncertainty surrounding them. Similarly, Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020) finds that sanctions have no statistically significant effect on support for policy change. In a survey experiment in China, they show that the information about

the threat of U.S. sanctions concerning China's exchange rate policy does not, on average, move Chinese respondents' support for allowing Chinese currency–renminbi–to appreciate. Only among a certain sub-population (individuals who initially hold negative view of the U.S.), do the treatments have a backlash effect, resulting in reduced support for currency appreciation.

Finally, Sejersen (2020) highlights the importance of issue area in determining the effect of sanctions on public opinion. More specifically, sanctions that enforce human rights are more likely to be accepted by the target public. In an online survey experiment in Venezuela, he finds that individuals are more supportive of sanctions when they are given the information that sanctions are imposed to stop human rights violations. Yet this study is silent on sanctions that are imposed for other reasons, such as nuclear proliferation, alliance choices, military behavior or economic policy. This highlights the need to develop a broader theory on the relationship between sanctions and public opinion that is not dependent on a particular issue area.

Taken together, the existing literature provides valuable insights into the relationship between economic sanctions and target public opinion. The present article seeks to advance our understanding on this question in three main ways. First, I investigate the effect of sanctions on support for policy change, as opposed to leader popularity. While the latter is a relevant measure, the former is more closely related to the question of sanction effectiveness. Secondly, previous studies either investigate whether sanctions have a universally positive or negative effect (e.g. Frye (2019), Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020)) or focus on certain "fixed" characteristics, such as sanction type (e.g. targeted vs. comprehensive), issue area (e.g. human rights), or sender identity (e.g. friendly vs. unfriendly) (e.g. Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), Sejersen (2020)). I build on these studies by showing that senders may still have a degree of control over the kind of reaction sanctions elicit in the target state. Thirdly and mostly importantly, this study investigates the role of uncertainty over intentions, which, despite being a pervasive feature of economic sanctions, has remained unexplored in the sanctions literature.

This article also has non-trivial policy implications. The findings from the previous studies suggest that certain types of states should refrain from imposing certain types of

sanctions in certain issue areas in order to avoid public backlash. These should provide a cautionary note for policy makers. Heeding these warnings, however, may not always be practical. For example, states generally end up imposing sanctions on adversaries, mainly because they are able to get their allies to change their policies through non-coercive ways. Therefore, that sanctions are more likely to increase support for policy change only when they are imposed against friendly countries (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018)) may be less useful from a policy standpoint. It is also not realistic to expect states to impose sanctions *only* on human rights matters (Sejersen (2020)). The present study suggests that *independent* of certain fixed characteristics, leaders still have control over how sanctions affect the public opinion in the target state. In other words, *given* that a certain sanction is imposed, the sender can soften a potential backlash effect if steps are taken to reduce uncertainty over goals.

4.2.1.1 Uncertain Intentions in Economic Sanctions

Uncertainty has been a perpetual feature of international relations. Since Thucydides, scholars have grappled with the causes and consequences of uncertainty. Uncertainty over intentions has been viewed by the realist school of thought as one of the main obstacles to cooperation (Waltz (1979), 105; Grieco (1988), Mearsheimer (1994)). Similarly, rationalist explanations of war highlight how incomplete information about the actors, as well as the incentives to misrepresent private information, may cause bargaining breakdowns (Fearon (1995)). Yet the research on uncertainty in international relations "has been limited to militarized disputes", whereas its effect during economic sanctions has been "largely overlooked" (Bas, McLean and Whang (2017), 167).

This omission is surprising given that uncertainty over intentions is pervasive in economic sanctions. "Very few sanctions strategies are crafted with a clear sense of purpose". (O'Sullivan (2010), 8). In many cases, sanctions are imposed to achieve a goal that is "unclear" or "ever-changing" (Rennack and Shuey (1998), 9). Senders may pursue multiple goals and the priorities attached to these objectives may evolve over time (Barber (1979), 384). Most importantly, senders can pursue objectives beside the officially-proclaimed ones

(Lindsay (1986)). In fact, in many cases, ensuring target compliance might not be the most important goal of a sender, or it may not even feature among its objectives (Jones and Portela (2014)).

I argue that uncertainty over intentions may have several (though not mutually exclusive) sources. Ambivalence over goals may be strong when sanctions are used as a 'stopgap' measure, and not as part of a comprehensive policy. This may happen when there is a foreign policy crisis that requires urgent attention such as military coups, uprisings or foreign aggression. The use of sanctions in such a manner increases the risk that sender will be unclear about its goals, and what is required of the target government before the sanctions can be lifted. For example, the sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1990s suffered from such confusion. According to some, "sanctions were meant to punish Milosevic and lead to his overthrow" (Stedman (1998), 178). The U.S. intended for sanctions to stigmatize Milosevic and wanted to "help push the Serbian people to turn on their leader" (*ibid*, 186) Others viewed the sanctions as a "bargaining chip to persuade Milosevic to alter his policies and to support a negotiated settlement to the war in Bosnia" (*ibid*).

The problem of uncertainty over real intentions may be particularly severe when sanctions are imposed mainly for domestic political reasons. By imposing sanctions, governments may be responding to interest-group pressures (Baldwin (1985), Lowenberg and Kaempfer (1998), Whang (2011)) or using sanctions as a way to demonstrate their willingness and capacity to act and avoid criticism of ineptitude (Barber (1979), 380). In other words, sanctions may be used more as a signal to voters than a strategic tool to extract concessions from the target based on publicly-declared demands. This would aggravate the uncertainty about whether the sanctions would be lifted if the target meets the sender demands. In the U.S., many sanctions, including the ones against Cuba and Vietnam, were heavily influenced by narrower electoral interests (e.g. Hatipoglu (2014)).

The ambiguity over intentions may be due to the mixed signaling by the sanctioning state. This, in turn, may spark suspicions over the sender's "hidden agenda". Sender's "hidden agenda" can include containment or weakening of a rival, or the outright subversion of another leader or regime (Lindsay (1986)). The U.S. sanctions against Iran have been shrouded in such uncertainty. This was the reason behind President Obama's recognition

of 'Islamic Republic of Iran' in 2009– to dispense doubts that the United States was still seeking regime change in Tehran (O'Sullivan (2010), 10; Parsi (2012), 64). However, the appointment of certain hawkish figures, who advocated for harsher sanctions and isolation of the Iranian regime, to the foreign policy team caused confusion. This, along with certain statements by President Obama highlighting the importance of "tightening the screws on" Iran, aggravated uncertainty over the objectives of the U.S. administration (Parsi (2012), 38). Likewise the U.S. has sent mixed signals about its objectives against North Korea in recent years. While the U.S. stated that it is "not seeking regime change" (BBC (2017)), there has been considerable ambiguity. For example, a Trump administration official reportedly stated that while the "priority" of the U.S. was to address the nuclear threat, regime change may be the U.S.' long-term goal. "If and when regime change comes to the northern part of the peninsula, we'll deal with that then, but *for now* we are focused on the shorter-term threat." (Rogin (2017)) Further, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Mike Pompeo said:

> "It would be a great thing to denuclearize the peninsula ... but the thing that is most dangerous about it is the character who holds the control over them today. So from the administration's perspective, the most important thing we can do is separate those two...As for the regime, I am hopeful we will find a way to separate that regime from this system. The North Korean people...would love to see him go." (Klinger (2017))

Finally, in some cases, uncertainty may be deliberately stirred by the *targets*. Portraying the sender as a nefarious actor harboring ulterior motives can help the targeted leader to mobilize support in favor of non-compliance. For example, in the recent U.S. sanctions against Turkey, it was primarily President Erdogan who fomented uncertainty by publicly questioning the sincerity of declared U.S. objectives. Regardless of its source, uncertainty over intentions has been a prevalent feature of many sanction regimes. For example, in the early 1980s, the U.S. imposed aid sanctions on Nicaragua demanding that the latter stops sending arms to guerillas in El Salvador. Yet, officials in Washington were "divided over the ultimate aim of US economic sanctions" (Leogrande (1996), 332). As a result, even though Nicaragua verifiably halted the arms transfers, the sanctions were not lifted. Instead, the U.S. permanently cut the aid, leading some Democratic politicians to claim that "the real objective of the policy [was] to overturn the Nicaraguan revolution" (Leogrande (1996), 331).

The Western pressure on Iraq in the 1990s was also overshadowed with uncertainty. While the official goal was disarmament, it was believed that U.S.' "true intention" in Iraq was removing Saddam Hussein. China, Russia and France sought to partially lift sanctions against Iraq in response to Baghdad's compliance with some of the UN Security Council resolutions. The United States and Britain, on the other hand, argued in private meetings that sanctions should remain in place as long as Saddam Hussein did (Bosco (2009), 199). Even though the U.S. was suspected of pursuing regime change, it was "never an official...requirement for the removal sanctions" (Mazaheri (2010), 256). Similarly, in 2008, Russia threatened to employ sanctions against Georgia, officially in order to prevent Tblisi's encroachment into the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Russia's real goal was presumably to economically strangle Georgia in order to spur regime change (Asmus (2010)).

It should be noted that while uncertainty over intentions is prevalent, it is not a constant. On the contrary, I argue that there is meaningful variation in terms of the level of uncertainty across sanction cases. For example, the U.S. sanctions against China over the latter's role in nuclear proliferation in 1980s and 1990s were a lot less shrouded in mystery in terms of what its goals were. China was suspected of transferring nuclear-related equipment and sensitive technology to countries like Pakistan, Iran and Algeria (Zhao (2010)). In response, the U.S. imposed sanctions against dozens of Chinese entities, and banned satellite exports to China. However, Beijing understood that the U.S. "did not bear hostile intentions" (Zhao (2010), 270) and that sanctions were a genuine attempt to curb nuclear proliferation. Likewise, there was little uncertainty over intentions when the European Union suspended aid to Niger in July 2009 following the latter's decision to hold a constitutional referendum that aimed at increasing the executive powers in a new presidential system (Del Biondo (2015)). There was little indication that the goal of the sanctions was anything other than the prevention of democratic backsliding. In fact, few months before the sanctions, France had signed a uranium agreement with the incumbent President Tadja and was criticized for giving "tacit support to the constitutional referandum" (Del Biondo (2015), 79).

In addition to variation across cases, uncertainty over intentions can increase or decrease *within* a sanction episode depending on the behavior of the actors. This was why President Obama recognized Iran with its official name–the Islamic Republic of Iran– in 2009 in order

to reduce such uncertainty by signaling that "the days of actively seeking U.S.sponsored regime change in Iran were past" (Parsi (2012), 64). In short, there is frequent uncertainty over intentions during sanctions. However, sanctions also vary substantially in terms of how much uncertainty there is, both across cases and over time. I argue that such uncertainty, which may have multiple sources, would likely have an effect on how the target public views the sanctions and whether they support or oppose policy change.

4.2.2   Uncertain Intentions and Public Opinion

How and why does uncertainty over sender intentions affect public opinion in the target state? I argue that uncertainty can undermine support for policy change in the target state for two main reasons. First, it heightens the risk that a potential target compliance with sender demands will not be reciprocated with the lifting of sanctions. This, in turn, would diminish support for policy change. This is due to both rational cost-benefit calculations and social psychological aversion to being cheated (Vohs, Baumeister and Chin (2007)). Because the target would receive the 'sucker payoff' if it cooperates without reciprocation, individuals would likely be more resistant to policy change. They would also oppose target capitulation because of higher risk of getting cheated. Studies in behavioral economics show that individuals tend to punish defectors, even though "the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain" (Fehr and Gächter (2002), 137). In other words, backlash against sanctions would be tantamount to punishing a suspected 'cheater'.

Researchers have offered both psychological (Vohs, Baumeister and Chin (2007)) and neurological (Rilling et al. (2008)) explanations for aversion to getting cheated. They have also highlighted that situations with asymmetrical information (e.g. when one actor has private information about its intentions) are particularly conducive to activating the fear of 'being duped' (Vohs, Baumeister and Chin (2007)). Thus it could be argued that economic sanctions cases where there is significant uncertainty over the real aims of the sender would be amenable to triggering a backlash among individuals in the target state. This argument is in line with findings from studies in international relations which show that leaders face heightened risk of removal from power when they "over-cooperate" or "cooperate without

reciprocation" (Huth (1996), Colaresi (2004)). Individuals tend to oppose international cooperation unless they are confident that "any cooperation will not be taken advantage of by the rival" (Colaresi (2004), 557). For example, during the 2009 nuclear-swap negotiations, some in Iran believed that the government was unjustifiably putting its trust in the hands of the U.S. As a result, "no Iranian politician wanted to come across as soft or naïve when dealing with the West" (Parsi (2012), 149). The behavior of the senders during the Iraqi sanctions, such as the constant "moving [of] the goalpost", similarly magnified the fears that "even if you comply, [they]'re not going to lift the sanctions anyway" (Mazaheri (2010), 266).

Secondly, the uncertainty over intentions is likely to heighten the sense of threat among the target public. This is especially likely to be the case when the uncertainty is driven by the fear that the sender is harboring a 'hidden agenda'. Are the publicly-declared goals and official demands simply the tip of the iceberg? Is the sender using the contested policy as an excuse to pursue other objectives? I argue that such suspicions about a larger, looming threat could cause a siege mentality (Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992)) among the target public leading to a greater backlash against the sender and depressing support for capitulation. Studies in both international relations (e.g. Mueller (1973)) and social psychology (e.g. Wohl, Branscombe and Reysen (2010)) show that external threats can result in greater in-group cohesion and more negative attitudes towards the source of the threat. Individuals may also respond to threats by "opposing policies" that favor the source of external threat (Stephan and Stephan (2017), 50). In short, I expect greater uncertainty over sender intentions to depress support for policy change because it 1) triggers the fear of getting cheated and 2) heightens the perception of external threat.

Hypothesis 1: The public support for policy change in the target declines when there is uncertainty over the intentions of the sender.

4.2.2.1 Moderating Factors: Partisanship

While I expect uncertainty over sender intentions to have a negative effect in public opinion *on average*, such a shift is unlikely to be homogeneous. Particularly, information about uncertainty would likely have a stronger impact on pro-government individuals. I argue

that this is mainly because the supporters of the ruling party would associate themselves more closely with the potential losses of the government. Previous studies have shown that external interventions in domestic affairs can have heterogeneous effects on the public opinion. More specifically, party identification is found to be an important factor that predicts who approves and who opposes the foreign involvement. For example, Frye (2019) finds that information about Western sanctions against Russia had a negative effect on support for the government among Putin skeptics, while it had no statistically significant effect on the Putin supporters. Studies that examine other forms of interventions, such as electoral meddling (Corstange and Marinov (2012), Tomz and Weeks (2020), Bush and Prather (2020)), reach similar conclusions. More specifically, the supporters of the targeted actors oppose the intervention, the opponents have more positive views.

The effect of partisanship can be driven by the calculations of political cost and benefit. Individuals who support the government would be opposed to sanctions because of the expectation that it could undermine their political fortunes. Conversely, the supporters of the opposition would be motivated to back sanctions in the hopes that the government would be weakened. The partisan divide can also be driven by more symbolic reasons (Tomz and Weeks (2020)). Even if individuals do not expect the sanctions to affect themselves or their party, they may still react harshly. This is mainly because they find outside actors' expression of disapproval of their party objectionable, like when "[in sports] people disapprove when fans cheer for the opposition" (Tomz and Weeks (2020), 860).

Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of uncertain intentions will be more pronounced among the supporters of the target government.

4.2.2.2   Moderating Factors: Economic Costs

Another important factor that may moderate the effect of sanctions is the extent to which they will damage the economy. Priming individuals on the economic costs of sanctions would likely lead to increased support for policy change. This suggests that economic cost treatment would dampen the negative effect of uncertainty over intentions. I argue that information about the cost may increase individuals' willingness to take risks. This

expectation is line with the findings by Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018) who show that Israelis were more supportive of changing government policies when the sanctions were more comprehensive, rather than targeted, and were imposed by the United States, Israel's key ally. That individuals would be more accommodating of concessions when the status quo is costly to maintain is also in line with studies in the conflict literature which have found that higher war costs can undermine public support for war (e.g. Gartner and Segura (1998), Karol and Miguel (2007)). Similarly, individuals are found to be more accommodating of negotiated settlements in inter-state disputes when the economic costs are high. For example, Quek and Johnston (2018) find that, Chinese respondents who were told that a war with Japan would derail China's economic development exhibited higher support for China's backing down in a hypothetical crisis with Japan.

Building on these studies, I argue that individuals who are primed to think about the economic costs of sanctions exhibit greater support for policy change than individuals who are not. For example, between 1961-65 the U.S. imposed sanctions against Sri Lanka in response to the expropriation of the assets of US and UK oil companies. After a period of resistance by the left-leaning Bandaranaike government which concluded deals with the U.S.S.R in response to U.S suspension of aid, the target government signaled its intention to acquiesce to sender demands. But before it could do so, it was replaced in elections by a pro-compliance conservative United National Party who campaigned during the elections that it would settle the dispute with the oil companies "within 24 hours" (Olson (1977), 217). The new government gave in to the US demands as soon as it came to power, and the sanctions were lifted. The severity of the sanctions likely undermined any potential opposition to concessions to the sender. The sanctions intensified the economic crisis that had already been engulfing Sri Lanka, which, by 1964, had "reserves sufficient for only forty-five days' worth of normal imports" (Olson (1977), 214).

Hypothesis 3: The information about economic cost of sanctions will have a positive impact on support for policy change.

4.2.3   CAATSA Sanctions against Turkey

Turkey declared its intention to purchase Russian S-400 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in 2017, after reversing its decision to buy Chinese missiles in 2015 under Western pressure (Reuters (2015)). Yet the warnings by Washington failed to influence Ankara's decision to buy Russian weapons. In 2019, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said Turkey would not "bow down to those who show animosity". The first components of the S-400 arrived in Turkey in July 2019. Then Turkish air force personnel were sent to Russia for training (Kasapoglu (2020)). The final components of the missile system arrived in January 2020, despite the continued threats of sanctions. For example, White House National Security adviser said in 2019 that "there's no place in NATO for the S-400. There's no place in NATO for significant Russian military purchases...Turkey will feel the impact of those sanctions" (Reuters (2019)).

In response to Turkey's defiance of these threats, the U.S. first removed Turkey from the F-35 Lightening II stealth fighter program– a project in which Turkey has been a cost-sharing partner since 2001 (BBC (2019)). Then in December 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions against Turkey's Directorate of Defense Industry (SSB) and four of its officials pursuant to the CAATSA sanctions provisions enacted by Congress against Russia in 2017. CAATSA sanctions are imposed against any individual who "engages in a significant transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for, or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation". The Trump administration added four Turkish officers of the SSB to the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (OFAC SDN) List. It also prohibited granting of U.S. licenses or other authorizations for exports or re-exports to SSB of goods or technology, forbade loans or credits by U.S. financial institutions to SSB, and banned U.S. Export-Import Bank assistance for exports of any kind to SSB.

The main goal of CAATSA is to isolate Russia and prevent Moscow from expanding its sphere of influence. This Congressional Act aims to achieve this by deterring third parties from cooperating with Russian defense and intelligence sectors. The U.S. claims that sanctions imposed at third parties are not aimed at weakening them. For example, in

September 2018, the U.S. imposed sanctions against China for its purchase of SU-35 fighter jets and S-400 missiles from Russia (Reuters (2018)). But the U.S. was careful to highlight that sanctions were "not intended to undermine the defense capabilities of any particular country" and that they "aimed at imposing costs upon Russia in response to its malign activities" (*ibid*). Likewise, following the December 2020 sanctions against Turkey, the U.S reitreated that the real target of sanctions is Russia, and not Turkey. The State Department underscored that the goal of the sanctions was to deny the Russian defense sector access to funds, and protect U.S. military technology and personnel. Former Secretary of State Pompeo reiterated that the intention of the U.S. is not to undermine the military capabilities or the combat readiness of the Turkish army (StateDepartment (2020)). President Erdogan, on the other hand, has insisted that the 'real objective' of the sanctions is "more malevolent". It is purported to undermine Turkey's efforts to become self-sufficient in the defense sector. "The real goal of the sanctions is to cripple the leap forward we have achieved in the defense industry, so as to keep us dependent" (DeutscheWelle (2020)). Some Turkish commentators have further suggested that the 'real reason' for sanctions has nothing to do with the S-400 missiles. The sanctions aim to undermine Turkey's military operations in Iraq and Syria against the armed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). "The real problem is that Turkey hasn't allowed the U.S. to establish a teror state in northern Syria," one commentator is quoted saying by the TRT, a state-owned news channel. "If Turkey had kept silent about the planned terror state in Syria, the U.S. would not have made much fuss about the S-400." (TRT (2020)).

4.2.4 Research Design

I fielded an online survey experiment in Turkey on 1,218 adults to investigate the effect of uncertainty over sender intentions on support for policy change in the target state[1][2]. The respondents were recruited through Facebook ads, which have been increasingly used by political scientists to conduct surveys in non-U.S. contexts (Boas, Christenson and Glick

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[1]This survey received IRB approval by the University of Pittsburgh's Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) on March 3, 2021. The IRB approval number is: STUDY21010024

[2]The survey design pre-registered at Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) registry prior to the implementation

(2020)). This tool is especially convenient given that Facebook has over 50 million users in Turkey (approximately 60% of the country's entire population). The advertisement asked viewers to provide their opinions about an important recent current event[34]. The ad was clicked 4,954 times taking the users to the survey hosted on the Qualtrics platform[5]. Approximately 25% of those who clicked the ad completed the survey. The survey contained ten questions. The average response time was 279 seconds, signaling that respondents were generally attentive.

A major drawback of using recruitment tools such Facebook or Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is that it is extremely difficult to build nationally representative samples. The sample can be skewed towards a certain demographic group. In my sample, the respondents were older and predominantly male. The median age in Turkey is 24, while the median age in this survey was 46. Approximately 49% of the Turkish population is female, while only 21% of the respondents were female. In terms of education, however, my sample was very close to the national average. While 35% of Turkish citizens have post-secondary education, in my sample this was 39%. It should still be noted that a number of studies that conduct comparisons across population-based and convenience samples on a wide array of issues and topics (e.g. Mullinix et al. (2015)) show that the results of experiments using convenience samples largely replicate the results from population samples. Similarly, Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) conclude that Mturk samples are more diverse than typical experimental samples (e.g. internet panels, undergraduate volunteers, recruits off the street) and not substantially different on many demographic and political variables from nationally representative samples.

This case provides a unique opportunity to investigate the effect of sanctions on public opinion. First, it allows me to prioritize realism of the experiments. Providing realistic scenarios to the subjects is important as the hypothetical scenarios that are "abstract and devoid of contextual information" can weaken the external validity of surveys (Weiss and Dafoe (2018), 11) As such, recent studies highlight the importance of asking survey respondents questions about "real, salient issues", instead of fictitious scenarios about fictitious actors (e.g. Kreps and Wallace (2016), Chapman and Chaudoin (2017)). As discussed above, the

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[3]The language is kept deliberately generic in order avoid priming the respondents.
[4]Figure 5b in the Appendix shows the ad the viewers saw. Figure 5a shows the English translation.
[5]The ad was live nine days between March 5-14, 2021

imposition of U.S. sanctions against Turkey is a recent and highly salient event. By investigating the effect of real sanctions, the present research builds on studies that investigate public opinion during real sanction episodes (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), Frye (2019)). It also contributes to the literature on sanctions and public opinion by examining an issue area that has not been explored before. The relationship between sanctions and public opinion has been studied in the context of human rights (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), Sejersen (2020)), military aggression (Frye (2019)) and economic policy (Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020)). However, no research has examined the public opinion effect of sanctions that are imposed for international arms sales or alliance choices.

4.2.4.1 Survey

The main independent variable in the study is the experimental treatments. I manipulate information about 1) uncertainty about sender intentions, 2) economic cost. I adopt 'between-subject' survey design where each participant is subjected to one treatment, and the comparisons are made across individuals. I randomly assigned respondents to one of five experimental groups (Control + four treatment conditions). The control group only receives the following neutral background information about the imposition of U.S. sanctions. The other groups receive varying information about the intentions of the sender and the cost of sanctions. Table 6 summarizes the experimental conditions. Individuals in each group read the following texts:

Control: Last December, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Turkey in reaction to the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. In this respect, a number of restrictions has been placed on the Directorate of Defense Industry, making the importation and exportation of military equipment more difficult.

The first treatment group receives additional information about U.S. objectives. Specifically, after reading the neutral background text, the respondents are given the information that experts agree that the U.S.' 'real objective' reflects the officially proclaimed goals.

Treatment 1: Control+ The US has stated that its goal is to prevent Russia from gaining influence and funds. Some experts agree that the real objective of these sanctions is indeed

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Experimental Group	Treatment
Control	Official U.S. goals
Treatment 1	Official goals = real goals
Treatment 2	Treatment 1 + economic cost
Treatment 3	Official goals ≠ real goals
Treatment 4	Treatment 3 + economic cost

Table 6: **Summary of Experimental Conditions**

to weaken Russia.

The second treatment group receives the same information as the first treatment. Additionally, they read about the potential economic damage the sanctions are likely to impose on the Turkish economy, if the government does not reverse its policy.

Treatment 2: Treatment 1 + Some experts highlighted that additional sanctions would further damage the Turkish economy.

The third treatment group reads the same information as the control group, but receives additional information about uncertainty about the U.S. intentions. More specifically, after reading the neutral background information, the respondents are given the information about doubts raised by experts over the true goals over the sender.

Treatment 3: Control + The US has stated that its goal is to prevent Russia from gaining influence and funds. Some experts, however, raise doubts that the real objective of the U.S. is to limit Turkey's autonomy in defense industry and weaken Turkish military capabilities.

Remember that I expect the subjects in this experimental group to exhibit lower support for policy-change than the control and first treatment groups. If the goal of the U.S. is to weaken Turkey militarily–and not merely about containing Russia– then this introduces the possibility that even if Turkey decides not to buy the S-400 missiles, the U.S. may not lift the sanctions. Finally, in order to test the moderating effect of the cost of sanctions, the fourth treatment group receives additional information about the potential damage of the

sanctions on the Turkish economy, if the U.S. ramps up its sanctions program. I expect the average support for policy change to be higher than the third treatment group.

> **Treatment 4:** Treatment 3 + Some experts highlighted that additional sanctions would further damage the Turkish economy.

The outcome of interest of this study is two-fold. The primary dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating support for policy change. Following the treatments, respondents are asked the extent to which they approve or disapprove of changing the government's S-400 policy. It ranges from 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly support). The second outcome variable is derived from an open-ended question that is asked following whether they support policy change. The respondents are asked to provide more detailed explanation of the reasoning in their answer[6]. Such questions have been asked by other studies, including Tomz (2007) and Weiss and Dafoe (2019), to gain deeper understanding of the thought-process of the respondents.

The polarity scores of these responses constitute the second outcome variable. I generate these scores by using a Turkish lexicon, which is a dictionary that matches each word or phrase with a sentiment score. By employing lexicon-based sentiment analysis, each individual response is assigned a score indicating its emotional tone and polarity (positive vs. negative sentiment). It should be noted that because Turkish is an agglutinative language, where "grammatical functions are indicated by adding various suffixes to stems" (Çakir and Güldamlasioğlu (2016)), language-independent methods that use English lexicons to code non-English texts (e.g. Kaity and Balakrishnan (2019)) would be ineffective. Thus the automated analysis of Turkish texts require its own lexicon. I rely on Turkish sentiment lexicon (SWNetTR++) developed by Sağlam, Genç and Sever (2019), which is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive Turkish lexicon available.

4.2.4.2 Findings

Descriptively, 51% of the respondents said that they oppose policy-change. 30% said that they support the reversal of the S-400 policy, while 18.5% stated that they are neutral. Table

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[6]The question reads: "In 1-2 sentences, please explain why you responded the way you did to the previous question"

21 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Table 22 in the Appendix, which reports the balance test, shows that the randomization was overall sound. Table 7 displays the main results from the ordered probit regression. I pool the first and second treatment groups on the one hand, and the third and fourth treatment groups on the other. Remember that the only difference between these two groups is that the latter introduces uncertainty about intentions. The first model tests Hypothesis 1. The second model, which includes the interaction term between the treatment and partisanship variable, tests Hypothesis 2. The respondents are asked about their political affiliation before the experimental treatments. Both models include a number of control variables. More specifically, I control for the gender, age, and education. I additionally asked respondents their opinion of the U.S. and Russia, both before and after the treatments on a 5-point scale that ranges from 1 (very unfavorable) to 5 (very favorable). The results show that women and individuals with college education are more likely to support policy change, even though these variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p<0.11$ and $p<0.14$, respectively). Expectedly, individuals who have more favorable opinion of the U.S. are more likely to support; while those who have more favorable opinion of Russia are more likely to oppose policy-change. The predicted probability of strongly supporting policy change increases from 2% to 55% when the individual's favorability the U.S. increases from its minimum to maximum, other variables held at their means.

The coefficient plot in Figure 3 displays the main findings. Information that the officially declared goals reflect the U.S.' real goals seem to have had a positive impact on respondents' support for policy change. The effect becomes larger and statistically significant at $p<0.05$ level when individuals are told about the potential economic damage the sanctions would inflict. This seems to lend partial support to the Hypothesis 3. However, the uncertainty treatment did not seem to have a significant impact on support for policy change. Further, the effect is in the opposite direction. The results from Table 7 further indicate that there is no support for Hypothesis 1. Individuals who read information about uncertainty over U.S. goals do not display lower levels of support for policy change.

Figure 3: **The Effect of Treatments on Support for Policy Change**

I do, however, find strong support for Hypothesis 2. As mentioned previously, a number of studies have shown that outside intervention in domestic politics can have heterogeneous effects. As such, I expect the negative effect of uncertainty over intentions to be stronger among the supporters of the government. Model 2 includes the interaction term between the uncertainty treatment and government supporter variable. The sign of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at $p<0.001$ level. Figure 4 shows this relationship visually. The black circles and error bars represent the coefficient values of the variables based on the full sample. The blue circles and the error bars represent the coefficient values of the variables among the government supporters. As can be seen, the negative effect of the uncertainty treatment is stronger among the supporters of President Erdogan and his coalition partner Nationalist Action Party.[7] It should be highlighted that the opinions of this group are particularly consequential in competitive authoritarian regimes like Turkey where

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[7]Erdogan's Justice and Development Party(AKP) has been in an alliance with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) since the July 2016 coup attempt.

Table 7: **Sanctions and Target Public Opinion**

Variable	Base	Interaction
Uncertainty Treatment	-0.003	0.084
	(0.070)	(0.075)
Government Supporter	-1.024***	-0.669***
	(0.116)	(0.152)
Uncertainty*Government Supporter		-0.779***
		(0.279)
Female	0.135	0.129
	(0.086)	(0.086)
Age	0.003	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (Postsecondary)	0.106	0.118
	(0.072)	(0.072)
Favorability of the U.S.	0.519***	0.517***
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Favorability of Russia	-0.176***	-0.176***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Observations	969	969

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

the opposition actors have diminished capability to impose political costs on the government.

Hypothesis 3 regarding the moderating role of economic costs finds mixed support. On the one hand, individuals in the second treatment group exhibited higher support for policy change than the control group. The difference is statistically significant. Respondents in this group also exhibited higher support than the individuals in the first treatment group. On the other hand, economic cost did not move opinions for individuals in the uncertainty treatments. In Table 9, I compare the level of support for policy change across the third and fourth treatment groups. Remember that the only difference between these groups is that one of them receives information about the potential economic damage of possible U.S. sanctions. However, information about economic cost does not have any significant effect. Tables 23 and 24 in the Appendix further show this. But it should be noted that this non-finding does not mean that economic cost does not matter in affecting public opinion. It means that *information* about the *likely* economic impact was insufficient to move opinions in a significant way. Remember that the survey was conducted in early March right after the imposition of the sanctions, and before the sanctions had any discernible negative economic effect. It is possible that economic costs play a role in shaping individuals attitude only after they personally experience the impact.

To complement the main analysis that focuses on the effect of treatments on preferences of respondents regarding policy change, I explore if the treatments had a more subtle effect on individuals. To do so, I conducted automated text analysis using the responses to the open-ended question. Table 8 reports the results from the sentiment analysis. I use SWNetTR++ sentiment lexicon consisting of over 49,000 words, to categorize words into positive and negative classes. Then each individual's response is assigned a sentiment score. I regress the binary variables indicating the treatment group on these sentiment scores. As can be seen, the individuals in the uncertainty treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) exhibit significantly more negative reaction compared to the control group. Individuals who are in the first and second treatment groups, on the other hand, do not significantly differ from the control group. This provides suggestive evidence that while treatments *on average* did not result in a significant change in the policy preferences, it may have had have some effect on individuals' feelings.

Figure 4: **The Moderating Role of Partisanship**

Table 8: **Sentiment Analysis**

Treatment group	Coefficient
Treatment 1	-0.416
	(0.259)
Treatment 2	-0.383
	(0.255)
Treatment 3	-0.650**
	(0.255)
Treatment 4	-0.510*
	(0.262))
Intercept	-0.323*
	(0.178)
Observations	933

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

4.2.5 Conclusion

Sanctions have been widely used with the long-term decline in inter-state wars and the increasing preference for non-violent means of dispute settlement. Scholars have long suggested that how economic sanctions affect public opinion in the target state plays an important role in whether sanctions succeed or not. More specifically, the public reaction to sanctions can influence the political costs for the target leader of a potential policy change. However, until recently, studies did not directly test this relationship. In this chapter, I explored the role of uncertainty over intentions, which is pervasive in sanctions cases. In many instances, the sanctioning states have unclear or conflicting goals. In others, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the officially declared demands reflect the 'true intentions' or whether the sender is harboring a 'hidden agenda'. While incomplete information is believed to be one of the most significant problems during international bargaining, its effect on public opinion remains under-researched. The findings from this study show that such uncertainty

Table 9: **Economic Costs and Public Opinion**

Variable	Coefficient
Cost Treatment	-0.024
	(0.102)
Government Supporter	-1.494***
	(0.182)
Favorability of the U.S.	0.457***
	(0.053)
Favorability of Russia	-0.101*
	(0.060)
Female	0.062
	(0.124)
Age	0.002
	(0.004)
Education (Postsecondary)	0.113
	(0.104)
Observations	471

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

can have an important influence on public support for policy change, at least among certain groups. The fact that the government supporters react negatively to uncertainty has non-trivial implications, given that they are particularly well-positioned to impose political costs on the targeted government, especially in competitive authoritarian regimes like Turkey.

The findings indicate that senders may have some control over whether sanctions trigger a backlash or lead to higher support for policy change in the target public. Thus strategies that minimize mixed signaling by the sender can help increase the probability of sanctions success. Nevertheless, it should be noted that no sender can completely control the message the target society receives. Domestically, the target governments would have far greater influence over the information about the sanctions and the likely intentions of the senders. As discussed above, targets can deliberately stir up uncertainty in order to justify not complying with sender demands. Thus there are limits to what the sender can do to minimize uncertainties. However, as the U.S. sanctions against Iran demonstrate, sender behavior often matters, even when the targets are non-democratic regimes.

The findings have implications beyond the case of Turkey. Other countries have faced threats or the imposition of sanctions for alliance choices or arms purchases. For example, the U.S. imposed targeted sanctions against China's Equipment Development Department in 2018 for Beijing's purchase of Russian weaponry (Reuters (2018)). Likewise, the U.S. has recently threatened India with sanctions if the latter continues with its planned acquisition of the Russian S-400 missiles (Reuters (2021)). In sum, by using the recent U.S. economic sanctions against Turkey over the latter's purchase of Russian air defense systems, this article builds on a small but growing literature on the links between sanctions and public opinion (Grossman, Manekin and Margalit (2018), (Frye (2019), Gueorguiev, McDowell and Steinberg (2020)). It contributes to this research by testing a novel hypothesis about the role of uncertain intentions in a new context. The findings demonstrate that holding certain characteristics (i.e. sender, issue area, economic cost) constant, sanctions may elicit different reactions from the target population. Future studies should further explore how various sender-target interactions can influence public opinion and the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

5.0 Conclusion

The three essays in this dissertation examined the effect of economic sanctions on the behavior of sanctioned states and the role of domestic politics. Overall, these essays show that sanctions can influence the target behavior in unexpected ways, such as by decreasing public support for policy change and by provoking the targets into taking more aggressive actions in foreign policy. Further, they demonstrate that domestic political institutions in the target play a counter-intuitive role in influencing the behavior of the target. In this way, the essays challenge some of the conventional expectations about the outcomes sanctions produce, and offer new approaches to understanding the effect of regime type on sanction success.

More specifically, this dissertation explored how sanctions affect the domestic public in the target state, which remains an under-explored area. Even though earlier studies emphasized that target public opinion is a key factor that influences whether sanctions work or not, later studies have not systematically examined or directly tested this relationship. The first essay aimed to address this gap. I find that uncertainty over intentions, which is a pervasive feature of sanctions, can have a negative impact on public support for compliance. This is especially true among sub-populations, whose attitudes matter most in less democratic settings. This article demonstrates that uncertainty, which is extensively studied in the inter-state conflict context, can be consequential during economic sanctions as well. This suggests that addressing information asymmetries, which reduce the probability of armed conflict, may also help resolve disputes during economic sanctions cases as well.

I also explored how political institutions shape the behavior of the targeted leaders. In contrast to the previous studies, I find that institutions have a more counter-intuitive effect on target behavior. Specifically, the democratic and autocratic regimes behave somewhat similarly in response to sanctions, albeit for different reasons. On average, these regimes are less likely to meet the demands of the senders. Democracies are deterred by the domestic political cost of compliance, whereas autocracies would unlikely be sufficiently hurt by the sanctions. These regimes are also more likely to respond to sanctions by taking escalatory

steps in foreign policy. I proposed that democracies would be driven by domestic political considerations. Specifically, they would have greater incentives for diversionary behavior. They would also face a higher cost for backing down. Autocracies, on the other hand, would likely be taking military actions as a way to signal their resolve. In contrast, sanctions against hybrid regimes are both more likely to be successful in extracting concessions, and less likely to provoke an escalatory response from the target.

Future studies can refine this theoretical framework further. The main theory revolves around comparisons between democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies, which is consistent with a large body of literature in international relations, crisis bargaining and economic sanctions. How can we apply the insights from this study to understand the differences *among* different non-democratic regimes? This is an important question given that some of the most notorious sanctions have been imposed against autocracies like Iraq, North Korea and Cuba. How does variation in the target's institutional structure influence their likelihood of compliance or their initiation of military conflict? For example, (Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)) draws a sharp distinction between personalist and single-party regimes, arguing that they are as different from each other as they are from democratic regimes. How do domestic institutions affect their behavior in response to sanctions?

Further examination of variation in leadership characteristics may also shed light on the relationship between regime type and the effectiveness of sanctions. A growing body of literature in international relations focuses on the extent to which individual-level attributes, such as leaders' past military experience, influence inter-state bargaining (e.g Horowitz et al. (2018)). The ideological orientation of leaders can also matter. Hawks, for example, are found to have more political leeway in negotiating with adversaries (e.g. Mattes and Weeks (2019)). Thus even though I find that democratic targets, *on average*, are less likely to give in to sender demands and more likely to initiate militarized dispute, democracies headed by hawkish leaders may counter-intuitively be more amenable to compromise. Nevertheless, despite the limitations, I believe that these essays contribute to our understanding of how sanctions affect the target behavior, and how domestic politics moderate this relationship.

Appendix A : Target Regime Type and Sanction Success

This section reports various robustness tests for the essay "When Do Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type". First, I show that the main findings are not dependent on the choice of dataset. I am able to replicate the main results by using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset by Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi (2014). The results are also not dependent on a particular model specification. Below I report the results using different models and empirical strategies, including selection-corrected methods.

The unit of analysis in Tables 10, 11 and 12 is sanction-episode. The lack of end dates for many sanction episodes in the TIES dataset make time-series analysis difficult. The values for the independent variables belong to the year the sanctions were imposed. The outcome variable is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the target either 'completely' or 'partially' gives in to the sender demands after the imposition of sanctions, and 0 otherwise. The Table 10 replicates the monodic model. Here the independent variable is the continuous liberal democracy score derived from V-Dem (v2x-libdem). For Table 11, I generate a binary 'anocracy' variable coded 1 if a target is classified as either 'electoral democracy' or 'electoral autocracy' by the V-Dem's "Regimes of the World" variable (v2x-regime). As discussed above, those two regimes comprise what scholars have refered as 'hybrid regimes' (e.g. Bogaards (2009)) It is coded as 0 if it is either a liberal democracy or closed autocracy. Table 12 reports the results from the dyadic analysis of sanction success. Besides target characteristics, additional control variables include sender democracy, sender GDP per capita and target's trade dependence on the sender. The independent variable in the first model is the continuous democracy score. Model 2 uses binary anocracy variable.

Both the monodic and dyadic models control for the disputed issue. This is a categorical variable that indicates whether sanctions were imposed to contain political influence, contain military behavior, destabilize regime, release citizens, solve territorial dispute, deny strategic materials, retaliate for alliance choice, improve human rights, end weapons priliferation, terminate support for non-state groups, punish drug trafficking, improve environmental policies, trade practices, implement economic reform, or to achieve some other goal.

Table 12: **Democracy and Sanction Effectiveness (TIES Dataset)-Dyadic Model**

Variable	Success	Success
Target Democracy	6.109***	
	(2.035)	
Target Democracy^2	-7.068**	
	(2.781)	
Target Anocracy		0.803***
		(0.298)
Target GDP per capita (ln)	-0.031	0.035
	(0.177)	(0.146)
Domestic Instability	-0.061	-0.051
	(0.040)	(0.040)
International Organization	1.429***	1.377***
	(0.374)	(0.372)
Sender democracy	0.050	0.239
	(0.827)	(0.831)
Sender GDP per capita (ln)	-0.238	-0.265
	(0.213)	(0.211)
Target Trade Dependence	0.665	0.508
	(0.763)	(0.769)
Year	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Controls: Disputed Issue	YES	YES
Observations	600	600

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 15: **Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness (Regimes of the World)**

Variable	Sanction Success
Anocracy	8.740***
	(1.011)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.055
	(0.053)
Domestic Instability	0.017
	(0.014)
International Organization	0.184
	(0.138)
Year	$-0.011^{\dagger}$
	(0.006)
Controls: Sanction type	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES
Cubic Splines	YES
Observations	6,645

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Table 16: **Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness (Competing Risks Model)**

Variable	Sanction Success
Democracy	8.740***
	(1.011)
Democracy^2	-9.141***
	(1.281)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.055
	(0.053)
Domestic Instability	0.017
	(0.014)
International Organization	0.184
	(0.138)
Year	-0.011†
	(0.006)
Controls: Sanction type	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES
Cubic Splines	YES
Observations	6,645

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Table 10: **Democracy and Sanction Effectiveness (TIES Dataset)**

Variable	Sanction Success
Democracy	4.820**
	(1.945)
Democracy^2	-5.449**
	(2.333)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.028
	(0.154)
Domestic Instability	-0.030
	(0.035)
International Organization	1.208***
	(0.265)
Year	-0.013*
	(0.008)
Controls: Disputed Issue	YES
Observations	737

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 11: **Democracy and Sanction Effectiveness (TIES Dataset)**

Variable	Sanction Success
Anocracy	0.891***
	(0.253)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.086
	(0.125)
Domestic Instability	0.-031
	(0.035)
International Organization	1.180***
	(0.265)
Year	-0.018**
	(0.008)
Controls: Disputed Issue	YES
Observations	737

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 13: **Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness (Multinomial Logit)**

Variable	Success	Partial Success	Neg. Settlement	Failure
Democracy	10.942***	8.008***	8.065**	-2.277
	(1.438)	(2.259)	(3.900)	(1.850)
Democracy^2	-11.611***	-7.477**	-13.372**	5.852**
	(2.055)	(3.289)	(6.636)	(2.420)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.041	-0.229**	-0.566***	-0.239***
	(0.062)	(0.101)	(0.156)	(0.084)
Domestic Instability	0.023	0.016	-0.122***	-0.017
	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.025)
International Organization	0.139	-0.011	-0.045	-0.215
	(0.157)	(0.271)	(0.392)	(0.251)
Sanction Duration	1.602***	1.294***	1.869***	1.399 ***
	(0.237)	(0.323)	(0.180)	(0.299)
Year	-0.013**	0.008	0.015	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Controls: Sanction type	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cubic Splines	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	4,897	4,897	4.897	4.897

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 14: **Leader Tenure and Sanction Effectiveness**

Variable	Sanction Success
Democracy	12.397***
	(1.164)
Democracy^2	-12.698***
	(1.485)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.166**
	(0.059)
Domestic Instability	0.007
	(0.017)
International Organization	0.477**
	(0.156)
Leader Tenure	-0.001
	(0.008)
Year	-0.012*
	(0.006)
Controls: Sanction type	YES
Controls: Sanction objectives	YES
Cubic Splines	YES
Observations	5,459

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Table 17: **Selection-corrected Dyadic Model**

Variable	DV: Sanction Success	DV: Sanction Imposition
Democracy	1.873**	-1.270*
	(0.780)	(0.741)
Democracy^2	-2.469***	1.616*
	(0.919)	(0.857)
Target GDP per capita (ln)	-0.016	-0.083
	(0.066)	(0.066)
Domestic Instability	-0.042***	0.037***
	(0.013)	(0.012)
International Organization	0.670***	-0.372***
	(0.140)	(0.130)
Sender Democracy	-0.610**	0.301
	(0.278)	(0.282)
Sender GDP per capita	0.201**	-0.222***
	(0.078)	(0.082)
Target's Trade Dependence on Sender	0.315	-0.124
	(0.247)	(0.245)
Year	-0.009***	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations: 969		

$^{***}p < 0.01; ^{**}p < 0.05; ^{*}p < 0.1$

Appendix B : Sanctions and Inter-State Conflict

Table 18: **Sanctions and Target MIDs**

Variable	Model 1
Sanctions	1.255***
	(0.131)
Democracy	-1.416**
	(0.582)
Sanctions * Democracy	-2.773***
	(0.861)
Sanctions * Democracy * Democracy	3.068***
	(1.044)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.132***
	(0.032)
GDP growth	1.045***
	(0.362)
Domestic Conflict	0.120***
	(0.007)
Inflation	0.000**
	(0.000)
Year	-0.006***
	(0.001)
Sanction Type	YES
Sanction Goals	YES
Constant	10.265***
	(3.292)
Observations	9,036

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 19: **Sanctions and Target MIDs**

Variable	Base	Interaction
Sanctions	1.176***	1.816***
	(0.070)	(0.105)
Democracy	-0.263***	-1.087*
	(0.096)	(0.556)
Sanctions * Democracy		-4.366***
		(0.730)
Sanctions * Democracy * Democracy		3.959***
		(0.825)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.023	-0.041
	(0.023)	(0.025)
GDP growth	0.751***	0.956***
	(0.234)	(0.240)
Domestic Conflict	0.046***	0.059***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Year	-0.030***	-0.027**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	59.040***	53.577***
	(2.544)	(2.546)
Observations	13,452	13,452
Sanction Type.	YES	YES
Sanction Goals	YES	YES

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 20: **Sanctions and Target MIDs (Excluding Threats)**

Variable	Base	Interaction
Sanctions	1.267***	1.627***
	(0.074)	(0.111)
Democracy	-0.407***	-0.500
	(0.114)	(0.595)
Sanctions * Democracy		-4.215***
		(0.795)
Sanctions * Democracy * Democracy		4.778***
		(0.976)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.032	0.006
	(0.026)	(0.027)
GDP growth	0.729***	0.857***
	(0.240)	(0.244)
Domestic Conflict	0.054***	0.062***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Year	-0.032***	-0.031**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	63.031***	53.577***
	(2.701)	(2.546)
Observations	13,420	13,420
Sanction Type	YES	YES
Sanction Goals	YES	YES

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Appendix C Sanctions and Target Public Opinion

Tables 23 and 24 report the results of the economic cost treatment. In Table 23, the comparison is made between the first and second treatment group. Both of these groups received information at the officially declared goals of the U.S. reflect its 'real intentions'. The second group, however, additionally read that the U.S. sanctions would damage Turkey's economy. In Table 24, the first and third treatment groups are pooled and compared with the second and fourth treatment groups. Remember that the only difference between these groups is that the former receives no information about economic cost, while respondents in the second and fourth treatment groups do. Overall, the results show that information about economic cost did not have a large impact on support for policy change.

Table 21: **Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Mean	S.D	Min.	Max.
Support for Policy Change (DV)	2.62	1.42	1	5
Gender (Female)	0.21	0.40	0	1
Age	46.77	11.55	18	77
Education (Post-secondary)	0.39	0.49	0	1
Government supporter	0.14	0.36	0	1
Opinion of the U.S. (pre-treatment)	2.28	1.10	1	5
Opinion of the U.S. (post-treatment)	2.27	1.14	1	5
Opinion of Russia (pre-treatment)	2.49	0.92	1	5
Opinion of Russia (post-treatment)	2.48	0.96	1	5

(a) English Translation

(b) Turkish Original

Figure 5: **Facebook Advertisements**

Table 22: **Balance Test** (One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Test)

Variable	Control (N=247)	Treatment1 (N=249)	Treatment2 (N=242)	Treatment 3 (N=244)	Treatment 4 (N=236)	*Prob>F*
Gender (Female)	0.23	0.23	0.16	0.22	0.19	0.27
Age	47.2	46.3	45.7	47.1	47.4	0.46
Education (College)	0.39	0.38	0.40	0.41	0.39	0.96
Pro-government	0.15	0.12	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.40
U.S. Favorability	2.28	2.36	2.19	2.33	2.26	0.46

Table 23: **Economic Costs and Public Opinion**

Variable	Coefficient
Cost Treatment	0.084
	(0.099)
Government Supporter	-0.648***
	(0.155)
Favorability of the U.S.	0.585***
	(0.055)
Favorability of Russia	-0.251***
	(0.059)
Female	0.197
	(0.122)
Age	0.003
	(0.004)
Education (College)	0.130
	(0.100)
Observations	489

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 24: **Economic Costs and Public Opinion**

Variable	Coefficient
Cost Treatment	-0.042
	(0.070)
Government Supporter	-1.025***
	(0.116)
Favorability of the U.S.	0.520***
	(0.038)
Favorability of Russia	-0.177***
	(0.042)
Female	0.138
	(0.086)
Age	0.002
	(0.003)
Education (College)	0.106
	(0.072)
Observations	969

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

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