Erroneous European Jitters? A Pathway for Moderating the Extremes

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Anthony Louis Ocepek, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2022

Abstract: The increasing electoral success of euroskeptic parties in Europe is perceived as a potential stumbling block for the region's commitment to liberal democracy as they often advocate for more extreme policy positions. However, what are the chances that the euroskeptic parties instead moderates these positions over time? This study proposes different pathways towards moderation down which these parties travel as they expand their political representation in various levels of governance. One pathway examines the role of participation in their nation's governing coalition, another their participation in supranational institutions such as the European Parliament (EP). Additionally, the study examines how any potential moderation resulting from these pathways influences voter behavior, whether they vote for or turn away from the moderating party. Using party manifestos for national and EP elections from the 1980s through 2010s, the results indicate some support for the moderating effect of membership in the governing coalition through features such as types of cabinet portfolios awarded to the party. The supranational pathway and the effect of moderation on voters, however, demonstrates an opposite relationship. There is scant evidence that participation in the EP results in more moderated positions, and instead results in more extreme policy positions expressed by the euroskeptic party. Moreover, voters are increasingly drawn and switch their votes to the euroskeptic parties when they campaign on more extreme policy positions, while existing euroskeptic party voters abstain their votes for the party when the party expresses more moderated positions. Taken together, the results of the study show

that it is more advantageous for the euroskeptic party to remain outside of the governing coalition and maintain more extreme policy positions to attract new voters and minimize losses from their current voters. This is problematic as this suggests that concerns over the rise of illiberal policies in Europe and a shift away from long existing liberal norms and practices even by the mainstream parties as they attempt to catch up with the euroskeptic parties and take back voters, is likely to increase soon.

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Preface

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1.0 Chapter 1 – Introduction

In recent European elections, both at the domestic and supranational level, there has been increasing electoral success of euroskeptic parties. For example, the *National Rally* (formerly the *National Front*) of France in the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections came in sixth place and garnered about 6.3 percent of total votes, receiving 3 of France's 74 European parliamentary seats. A decade later in the 2019 elections, the party would come in first place, garnering 23.34 percent of the votes and 23 of the seats. Domestically, in the recent French elections, the party's candidate, Marine Le Pen, made it through to the second round of the election against President Emmanuel Macron, earning 41.4 percent of the vote compared to 33.9 percent in the previous election and the party won 89 of 577 seats in the parliament. In the 2017 federal parliamentary elections of Germany, the *Alternative for Germany* (AfD) party increased its vote share from about 4.7 percent to over 12.5 percent, receiving 94 seats in the parliament. For the AfD, this was both the first time it entered parliament and that a nationalist party was represented there since the end of the Second World War. While the recent 2021 election saw the party's vote share decrease to 10.3 percent, the party maintains a sizeable presence.

Euroskepticism is not only confined to parties on the ideological right. Denmark's *Red-Green Alliance* (EL) is a leftist eco-socialist party that in the past few electoral cycles earned around 7 - 8 precent of the vote share, and 12 - 14 seats of the 179 seats in the *Folketing*. Maintaining an euroskeptic position, the party did not contest EP elections, rather supporting the *People's Movement against the EU*, until the 2019 EP election when the party decided to field candidates in the election and received 5.5 percent of the vote and 1 of Denmark's 14 European parliamentary seats. Moreover, Sweden's *Left Party* (V) in the 2018 Swedish general election won

8 percent of the vote and 28 of 349 seats in the *Riksdag* and has maintained 1 of Sweden's 20 European parliamentary seats in recent EP elections.

The electoral success of these parties raises concerns within Europe that politics is entering a potential phase of extremism, where nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-globalization values undermine the political order established in the post-World War II period. Consequently, the continued policy successes of preceding decades and the prospect for further European integration, economic and political, looks more uncertain. Moreover, this diminishes the capacity for national governments and the EU to have a unified voice when considering how to resolve issues of global and geopolitical importance such as with the changing climate and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The question remains, however, does increased representation for parties and movements in Europe that profess such nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-globalization values result in more polarized democratic institutions and exacerbate current domestic societal tensions, such as those directed against minority populations or the broader EU integration project? Are these concerns misplaced? Instead of resulting in polarized politics, does the participation of these political parties and their ideologies, often relegated to the margins of the political debate, moderate their positions as they actively participate in governing and representational institutions? Their increasing electoral success raises the potential for these parties to participate with other political parties in their nation's governing coalitions and gain a greater representational voice in the supranational institutions that they often criticize. Their increased electoral success and participation in governing coalitions and supranational institutions, however, also facilitates linkages with other actors. These linkages, explored in subsequent chapters, alter the preferences of the party's leaders and other party actors, and results, I theorize, in a moderation of their party's policy positions. Specifically, I argue that alternative pathways for policy moderation occur for euroskeptic parties over time as they increasingly participate in the political process, with specific focus given to both domestic and supranational political arenas.

In this project, I examine the process of moderation through political participation and how this moderation potentially reduces over time the professed commitment of these parties to their more extreme policy positions. For example, how does successful participation in the political process at the supranational level, such as within the European Parliament, result in a moderation of the party's preferences on EU integration or economic protectionist policies that are in opposition to the decades long economic agenda of the institution? Recent research provides several examples offering perspectives that help us to understand how political participation enables the prospects for moderation. Ethnoregional and green-ecological parties, traditionally attaining minimal representation in their national assemblies and other governing institutions, support policies of devolution away from the national governments, the protection of minority rights and languages, and a stronger EU-role in environmental protections (Bomberg 2002; De Winter et al 2006; Mabry et al 2013). The scholars find that these parties at times actively seek out the EU and its institutions for assistance in achieving their agenda. Consequently, some of these parties and their supporters demonstrate greater positive attachments to the EU than demonstrated by other parties and voters in their respective states. The representational linkage provided by the EU and its institutions gives a voice to these parties and allows them to achieve policy goals, and subsequently setting up the parties and their actors to express more pro-EU attitudes.

This project builds off these findings to look at another case, the euroskeptic parties, those parties that maintain an anti-EU integration position within their advocated policy initiatives.

Euroskeptic parties seek policies that range from the outright withdrawal of their state from the EU to the devolution of power away from the EU and its return to their own national authorities (Kriesi 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009). Euroskepticism, as I note, occurs both on the political left and right, and within different political families ranging from far-left communist parties to the far-right nationalist and populist parties. Scholars have shown that for these parties, participation in the EU and its institutions does not necessarily demonstrate support for the organization, and rather participation is an attempt to counter the perceived threat that the EU has for their own national identities and an attempt to return administrative powers back towards their state to achieve preferred policy objectives (Taggart 1998; Conti and Memoli 2011; van Elsas et al 2016; Braun et al 2019). As euroskeptic parties increase their representation in the EU's institutions, they are, theoretically, able to either introduce or alter policies that are favorable to their constituencies. Domestically, when the euroskeptic parties achieve representation in their national assemblies, they often seek to block policies that lead to a perceived erosion of national sovereignty to the EU (Borriello and Brack 2019; Csehi and Zgut 2021). And when these parties enter government, such as with Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS) or Hungary's Fidesz - Hungarian *Civic Alliance*, they often enact policies that often counter the general aims, laws, and regulations of the EU, leading to potential legal confrontation with the EU as recently demonstrated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling concerning rule-of-law problems in the two countries (Bayer 2022).¹

¹ A parallel argument can be made for europhilic parties. *Volt Europa*

⁽https://www.volteuropa.org/), for example, is a pro-European political movement with member parties located in many European countries. In the most recent national elections, the party won 3 of 150 seats and 2 of 240 seats in the Dutch and Bulgarian general elections, respectively. While euroskeptic parties counter pro-European integration and policies both domestically and in their participation in the EU's institutional bodies, pro-European movements, and parties such as *Volt Europa* instead advocate for stronger European institutions and a continued commitment/

The question then remains, how committed are these euroskeptic parties in remaining within their anti-EU stances as the political influence within their national and EU level political arenas increases over extended periods? A great deal of scholarly attention has focused already on how participation of green-ecological parties within the European Union institutions, such as the European Parliament, potentially result in a moderation of their policy positions over time. **Figure 1.1** provides a cross-country comparison from 1985 to 2015 of green-ecological party emphasis on EU integration positions within their party manifestos. This information is from the Comparative Manifesto Project² which examines individual party manifestos over time and codes



Figure 1.1 – Green-Ecological Parties and Positive/Negative EU Stance

expansion in broad social equality and citizen empowerment initiatives enacted both domestically and by the EU.

² Comparative Manifesto Project data is accessible at <u>https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/</u>.

the emphasis placed on specific issue dimensions and is the basis of policy dimensions that I examine then in the following empirical chapters. The figure demonstrates both the emphasis mentioned in the party's manifesto on either a positive EU or negative EU stance. Overall, there is a positive emphasis attached to the EU by ecological parties, with Germany depicting a continued increase in the position overtime. Conversely, negative stances in the manifestos regarding the EU are either largely absent or decline in subsequent periods for the green-ecological parties. While no party family is a monolith and variation on the policy different policy areas occurs, the figure depicts an overall trend where the green-ecological parties appear to demonstrate a continual, and at times increasing, positive attitude towards the EU over time.

Exploring the green-ecological parties a bit deeper, Bomberg (2002) and Bomberg and Carter (2006) for example observe that green-ecological parties, with a few exceptions, within the EU have shifted away from their anti-EU integrationist positions and towards being "flagbearers of reform, clean government and better governance" (Bomberg 2002, 36), even as the EU advocates for a series of economic and development policy choices that often run against the green-ecological party's preferred policy position in areas such as economic and energy development. Bomberg and Carter argue that a potential reason for the perceived deradicalization on the integrationist position is due to their participation in the EU and the European Parliament. The green-ecological parties, upon entering and engaging the institution had the ability at times to shape EU policies and issues. At the same time, however, they also needed to adapt organizationally to work with other political groups within the EU and the different EU committees and institutions pertaining to environmental issues. Bomberg and Carter ultimately determine that participation in supranational institutions overall shapes how the parties deradicalize their agenda in different issues. They do so to have the capability to operate within the institution and shape the

direction of policies of the institution to achieve incremental policy achievements for their supporters domestically.

The deradicalization of the green-ecological parties offers an interesting counterpoint to the concerns espoused on the rise of euroskeptic parties as it pertains to their participation in supranational institutions and how this impacts policy outcomes. Do these parties ultimately succumb to the same forces as suggested by the green-ecological parties and begin to deradicalize on certain positions to operate and shape policies from within the institution?

In Europe's Contending Identities, Gould and Messina (2014) explore the rise of ethnoregional and new euroskeptic parties in the EU, the support for and against the EU, and how these parties utilize the structure of the EU to facilitate changes in national policies. Contributing scholars, such as Jolly (2014) and Meguid (2014), argue that a strange bedfellows occurs for these parties as they actively participate in the EP elections to attain further political representation beyond the marginalized status that is typical in their own national assemblies. The possibility to increase their representation in the EP facilitates an alternative pathway for these parties and essentially renders the EP elections as an extension of the national contestation of domestic politics (Carrubba 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991, 1996). The success of these parties in the EP elections, the evidence suggests, allows the possibility for the parties to exert further pressure from the EP onto their national governments to adopt the preferred polices supported by their constituents. In ethno-regional parties, for example, there is evidence that the EP lends support and enacts policies that favors the decentralization of powers away from the central governments to the regions and protections for minority languages. Consequently, there is an increased support for the EU by these ethnoregional parties (Jolly 2007). While euroskeptic parties display anti-EU integration stances currently, the capacity for these parties to increase their political representation

and shape the policies of the EU to achieve their own goals enables a situation where they are also shaped by the institution itself, with moderation of their policies as a possible outcome.

In this study, I additionally argue that participation in national level politics increases the likelihood for policy moderation. I theorize how participation in coalition governments and the need to capture new voters to maximize seat gains results in policy moderation for the euroskeptic parties. Moderated positions theoretically benefit a party if it is strategically attempting to insert itself into a policy area ignored by the other parties, and/or capture voters located closer to the median voter that did not vote previously for the party (Downs 1957a; Cox 1990; Kitschelt 1995). If successful, the strategy increases its vote and seat shares, rendering it a more attractive target for inclusion in the governing coalition if potential coalition partners are present. For the euroskeptic parties, I theorize that these moderated stances open the possibility to enter governing coalition negotiations that then lead to further commitments made by the party. This is required for its participation in the governing coalition either because the other potential coalition partners are uncertain about its involvement in the coalition, or so that the party receives a preferred cabinet portfolio. This then renders the party and its actors more susceptible to intra-coalition dynamics that further moderate the party (Akkerman et al 2016; Capaul and Ewert 2021). As the party moderates their policies to align with potential coalition partners, however, they may lose voters that reject such moderation on key issues of importance for their support of the party (Green 2011) or through a loss of differentiation between the party and other coalition partners (Spoon and Klüver 2019; Fortunato 2021). Moreover, as parties increase their vote share this gradually constrains it as they now must respond to the pressures of different segments of their expanded voting base who support more moderate positions on issues such as on anti-EU integration or immigration compared to their previously more issue-specific voters. The parties, therefore,

balance between a need to expand their voting base to increase their seats in the national parliament and signal their capacity to be a partner in a coalition with their commitment to the specific issues supported by their more supporters. Spoon (2011) demonstrates this balancing in her examination of policy differentiation and vote share for smaller parties in Europe. She notes that parties need to differentiate themselves on policies with the larger parties in the system to compete for votes. If the party constrains itself too such an extent that it only attracts its more ardent issue-specific voters or adopts a policy position too close to that of the mainstream parties so that it is difficult for the voters to differentiate the party from the competition, consequently it is more difficult to attract enough voters to gain greater representation in the national legislative assembly. The key decision for the party then is how to determine where the optimal position is located for policy differentiation to achieve maximal electoral gains.

As the above discussion demonstrates, the role of the voters is an additional factor when discussing moderation and its implications for euroskeptic parties. Within this project, I explore the question of how moderation by the parties both attracts new voters to the party and potentially leads to greater vote abstentions by their existing voters. To assess these questions, this study focuses on two types of voters, vote switchers and vote abstainers. Vote switchers are defined as those voters that switch the party that they vote for between elections, while vote abstainers do not vote in the subsequent election (Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Hong 2016). As I note in the previous section, the euroskeptic parties are able to insert themselves into policy areas ignored by the other parties to attract voters, and this strategy is effective in drawing switchers to the party if the policy area is one where the voters view the mainstream as not effectively representing. The switchers could select the euroskeptic party merely as a sign of protest to garner the attention of the more politically mainstream parties (Hobolt and Spoon 2012), but I theorize that the vote switchers are

motivated to transfer the vote instead because the euroskeptic party signals increased moderation on various policies. For vote abstainers, I examine existing euroskeptic party voters and their reaction to abstain in reaction to moderation by their party. Increased attention paid to highly salient issues increases the party's responsiveness to the broader electorate, while costing the priorities of their traditional voters (Abou-Chadi 2018). If the euroskeptic party moderates too far from the preferred position of these voters, I theorize that this leads previous party supporters to abstain from voting for the party in subsequent elections. By acknowledging how moderation affects the choices of voters, I more fully understand the incentives for the euroskeptic party to moderate and whether this is an effective strategy for the party wanting to increase its seat share in the national parliament or signal its willingness to enter into governing coalitions.

In this study, I seek to provide a greater understanding concerning the role that political representation within different contexts plays in policy moderation. Euroskeptic parties advocate for more extreme policy positions than the average position in their national party systems and within the EU's institutional bodies. As such, they are a key case group through which to explore the pathways of moderation outlined in the project. If policy moderation occurs within a category of political parties campaigning on extreme policies, then I expect similar outcomes for other parties as they enter into their respective political arenas. Euroskeptic parties additionally make a good case study as there are different varieties within the group, soft versus hard and leftist versus rightist, that impact how they interact politically in national and EU-level politics. Leftist euroskeptic parties, for example counter the neoliberal economic and welfare policy agenda advocated by the EU and its institutions as this agenda is viewed as a threat to workers' rights and the national welfare state. Rightist euroskeptic parties focus on national sovereignty issues pertaining to immigration and a broader commitment to anti-globalization processes (Conti and

Memoli 2012; van Elsas *et al* 2016; Braun *et al* 2019). The hard-soft distinction relates to how the euroskeptic party views the EU and their nation's role within the institution. Hard-euroskeptic parties typically advocate for a withdrawal of their nation from the institution or for policies that fully counter further integration at the EU level, while soft-euroskeptic parties do not object to membership *per se*, rather they assert that specific policy areas should remain under the control of their state, reforming the EU policies and institutions to achieve these goals (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008; Braun *et al* 2019). This study focuses primarily on the hard-soft distinction of euroskeptic parties, but the models that I examine throughout this project can be extended in future studies to explore the left-right division of euroskeptic parties more explicitly.

The different factors affecting policy moderation outlined by this study empirically examine how the electoral success of parties operating at the extremes of the political sphere and their incorporation into different governing and representational institutions ultimately result in an overall diminution of this polarization and a moderating of the extremes. While currently the political instability perceived by the incorporation of these parties and movements potentially undermines democratic values and institutions, I argue that theoretically these fears and uncertainties are misplaced as the inclusion of these political actors ultimately result in their moderation and less polarized political systems. While these lesser polarized systems are surely different than their previous forms as the margins were sidelined from the previous political debate, it does demonstrate, however, that these margins when incorporated into a system of political representation and receive the benefits of such incorporation, find it both difficult and potentially misguided to completely destabilize the established democratic systems and institutions in order achieve their preferred policies. The findings of this project, outlined in the following section that breaks down the chapters of the study, however, provide a different picture.

1.1 Plan of this study

Before defining the plan of this study, I first must outline the general scope conditions. This study examines a period from the 1980s to 2010s and encompasses up to 28 countries in Western and Eastern Europe with their inclusion depending on the availability of data. For example, in examining the effects of EU membership, data is only available for countries as they joined the institution in its various waves of expansion. The party manifesto data is only available in Eastern and Central European states following their transitions to democratic regimes starting in the 1990s. Four different sources of data are utilized in the study, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), the Euromanifesto Study (EMP), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CMP data is used in calculating the categories of euroskeptic parties, soft and hard, that are then employed in the empirical models. Additionally, it and the EMP data are used in classifying the different policy areas used in establishing whether party moderation occurs or not within the euroskeptic parties and its implications in the chapters examining the effects of governing coalition participation, EP membership, and impact on voter choice. The CSES provides survey data for voters from the 1990s to 2010s and is used in establishing the profiles of vote switchers and abstainers. This data is then applied when estimating the effects of euroskeptic party moderation on the voter's action to either switch or abstain. Finally, the CHES data provides an alternative source for measuring policy areas and is employed in a series of robustness checks of the models. In addition to these data sources, I also include excerpts from interviews of different euroskeptic party actors that I completed during the summer of 2019 in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. I completed 11 interviews during this period, 4 with party members of the Danish People's Party, 5 from the Sweden Democrats, 1 from the Finns Party, and 1 from the Blue Reform. These interviews included individuals from varied levels of the party hierarchy, with a majority being members of their respective parliaments. These interviews help provide context on the strategies of the euroskeptic parties, and how these then complement the general theories that I posit in the following chapters. They also shed light on the experiences that the parties have as they consider whether to first join the governing coalition, interact with their coalition partners, and participate within the EP. The interviews offer the party's perspectives on the voters, the groups that they attempt to target, and the problems the party faces as their base of support grows.

The study begins, Chapter 2, providing the theoretical argument of this project. It discusses in detail the two different pathways of moderation that I theorize is occurring as the euroskeptic party increases its representation and participation in national and supranational governing institutions. The first pathway outlined focuses on the effect of participating in the national governing institutions and its subsequent effect on policy moderation. Explicitly, the pathway posits that a key driver for the likelihood of policy moderation is the euroskeptic party's strategic decision to join the governing coalition. The party may moderate policies prior to the election to signal potential partners its willingness to negotiate and be a constructive member of the coalition. Joining the coalition requires the party to bargain with its potential partners, offering policy concessions in some areas to achieve policy gains in others. Once within the coalition, the party is not only constrained by then these negotiated policy positions, but additionally the interaction of the party's actors with other coalition members and the resulting relationships alters its strategies for subsequent elections. They gain a representational voice in policymaking, but this has unintended consequences. I argue the end of this process is a party espousing less extreme policy positions due to their participation in the governing coalition.

The chapter then outlines the second pathway that examines the euroskeptic party's participation in supranational institutions and how this potentially leads to policy moderation. The pathway posits that there is a possibility for the supranational institution to offer representational benefits to the participating parties in comparison to their national assemblies. For euroskeptic parties that achieve nominal levels of representation nationally, given that more extreme policy positions decrease the available pool of voters, participation in the supranational institution provides the opportunity to gain increased representation and a voice in policy matters, especially due to the second order nature of EP elections. As with the governing coalitions, membership in the supranational institution then exposes the party and its actors to new relationships and expectations, and helps the party realize the benefits that they accrue by participating. This indicates how the institution enables an opportunity for socialization within the party and their actors, and results in leading the party towards adopting less extreme policy positions as this helps the party align with the general preferred policy positions of the institution.

The chapter then examines the role of the voters in the pathways. Voters are key to the story of policy moderation at different points of the pathways as decisions to moderate by the euroskeptic party both draw new voters to the party, while also driving away its current supporters. For example, increasing the party's seat share in the national assembly is critical, as this enlarged size renders it a more attractive target for inclusion in a governing coalition. Gaining additional seats, however, requires capturing additional voters closer to the median who prefer more moderated positions. It is through policy moderation that the euroskeptic party, I theorize, captures these new voters, thus providing the first step in joining the governing coalition pathway. This segment of the chapter additionally outlines how the party's existing voters then respond to changes in the party's policy positions. Chapter 2 concludes by providing an explanation of how

I construct the euroskeptic party category, how this category is then broken down between soft and hard-euroskeptic, and finally how I define policy moderation and the different policy area dimensions employed in the empirical chapters (economic, welfare, environmentalism, multiculturalism, and internationalism/EU integration) provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project and Euromanifesto Study.³

The empirical chapters follow. Chapter 3 explores how shifts in policies made by the euroskeptic parties either attracts new voters or turns off their existing voters. This is an important first step to establish how any moderation undertaken by the euroskeptic parties impact voter choices to switch or abstain. The remaining two chapters examine whether participation in governing coalitions and the EP leads to policy moderation. Establishing first how voters react to moderation helps us to understand the potential motivations underlining the strategies that euroskeptic parties then employ both nationally and within a supranational institution. For example, if moderation is beneficial in attracting more voters to the euroskeptic party, then this in turn helps to explain why the party may see moderation as a successful strategy when joining the governing coalition.

In this chapter, I argue that convergence of the mainstream parties on policies decreases differentiation between the parties for the voters. The open policy spaces provided by the convergence offers the euroskeptic party an opportunity to moderate and enter new policy dimensions that they were previously unable to effectively compete on. The chapter provides discussion on one such example with euroskeptic parties competing on economic and welfare policies to capture voters previously voting for social democratic and other center-left parties. The

³ Euromanifesto Study data is accessible at <u>http://europeanelectionstudies.net/ees-study-components/euromanifesto-study</u>.

strategy to moderate on certain policies to capture new voters located closer to the median potentially weakens the political support that the party receives from its existing voters as they view policy moderation or an expansion by the party into new policy areas as undermining the party's commitment to its traditional owned policy areas. Accordingly, this chapter examines how policy moderation by the euroskeptic parties impacts two groups of voters, vote switchers and vote abstainers, made available through the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).⁴ Again, vote switchers are voters not previously voting for the euroskeptic party, but who switched their vote to the party. Vote abstainers are previous euroskeptic voters that then abstain their vote in subsequent elections. I expect policy moderation to help the party capture the vote switchers, while also increasing the probability of vote abstentions from its previous supporters.

The results of the pooled policy models demonstrate one interesting finding. With regards to vote abstentions, more moderate policy positions taken by the party increases the probability that the party loses support from its previous voters, with this probability decreasing as the policy position becomes more extreme. This effect is found only with the soft-euroskeptic parties. The pooled models show that for the soft-euroskeptic parties less moderation is key to minimize vote abstentions from their existing voters. Examining the individual policy areas, hard-euroskeptic parties demonstrate the most robust results as more extreme economic, environment, and multicultural policy areas increases the likelihood that the hard-euroskeptic party captures the vote switchers, whereas for the soft-euroskeptic parties only more extreme multicultural policy positions increase this likelihood. These counter the theoretical assumptions of the study. Conversely, moderated policy welfare positions increase the probability of attracting switchers to the hard-euroskeptic parties, supporting my theory and showing the benefits in this key policy area

⁴ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data is accessible at https://cses.org/.

in attracting new voters. With abstentions, less moderated positions in welfare, the environment and multicultural policy areas decrease the rates of abstentions by voters of hard-euroskeptic parties, while less moderated positions in the economic policy area increase the rates of abstentions, countering the assumptions of my theory.

Chapter 4 examines the pathway of moderation through participation in the national governing coalition. To briefly reiterate, I theorize in this pathway that there is an increase in the likelihood for policy moderation if the euroskeptic party enters the governing coalition because of the need to negotiate less extreme policy positions, maintain coalition stability, build relationships, and learn good governance practices. The chapter empirically investigates this relationship and the degree that the euroskeptic party in the governing coalition is shaped by this participation. Using the CMP data, it explores four potential factors to explore this relationship, membership in the governing coalition, the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the euroskeptic party in the coalition, whether the party was awarded any of the "big three" cabinet portfolios (foreign/interior/finance), and the number of years that the party spent as a governing coalition partner.

The results show that policy moderation does indeed occur, but largely only for hardeuroskeptic parties. Within the pooled policy models for the hard-euroskeptic parties, being a member of the coalition demonstrates a negative relationship and an expected moderation of policies. Second, as the percentage of cabinet portfolios that the euroskeptic party maintains in the governing coalition increases, more extreme policy positions are displayed by the parties. Lastly, if the euroskeptic party maintains any of the "big three" portfolios, there is increased moderation as the number of "big three" portfolios the party receives in the governing coalition increases. When this is broken down into the specific policy areas, membership in the governing coalition only leads to moderation in the economic and international policy areas, while leading to less moderated positions in environment and multicultural policies. As the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party increases, in all the policy areas except for the environmental dimension, less moderated positions are demonstrated. The strongest indicator of policy moderation is found within the "big three" portfolios, as economic, welfare and international policy moderation increases when the hard-euroskeptic party is awarded these cabinet portfolios.

Chapter 5 examines the supranational pathway. This chapter explores how euroskeptic party participation in the EP leads to policy moderation to the EP average. The EP as a supranational institution provides parties an additional avenue of representation beyond their national assembly. I theorize that in this pathway parties come to view the EU and its institutional bodies as tools to achieve policy aims and this is often reflected in their policy preferences. Additionally, through a process of socialization, such as through their membership in political groups, the parties learn new strategies and perspectives. The euroskeptic parties provide an excellent means to empirically examine how their participation effects policy preferences. These parties by nature advocate for less European integration and, especially for the more populist/nationalist variants of the parties, support more extreme policy positions than those advocated for by more mainstream and centrist parties. Establishing that these parties alter their positions through participation in the EP is a "hard test" and shows that if it occurs for even those parties most opposed to further European integration, then I expect other party types to do so as well. To explore this relationship, I use the EMP data and test the share of seats in the national delegation to the EP, the degree of representation that the party maintains in the EP compared to their national assembly (referred to as the party's representation difference), the share of seats the party maintains in their political group, and the number of years spent within the EP.

Like the governing coalition findings, hard-euroskeptic parties demonstrate the greatest significance in the models and with a few exceptions, less policy moderation is found with participation in the EP. With the pooled policy models for the hard-euroskeptic parties, as the share of seats in the national delegation increases, less policy moderation is expected. This counters the expectations of the pathway, as I theorize increased representation in the EP and its associated socialization linkages result in more moderated positions. The opposite is found, showing an increase in extreme policy positions expressed by the parties. Examining the individual policy areas for the soft and hard-euroskeptic parties offer additional findings. First, for soft euroskeptic parties there is a moderation in their welfare policy position as the number of seats within their national delegation increases, but more extreme multicultural policy positions as their size within their political group increases. For the hard euroskeptic parties, there is moderation in the economic and environment policy areas as the number of years spent in the EP increases, but less moderation in the economic and EU integration policy areas as the party's share of seats in the national delegation increases. Additionally, as the hard euroskeptic party achieves more representation in the EP compared to their national assembly, less moderation is expected in the party's environment policy position. More importantly, with the hard-euroskeptic parties and the EU integration policy area, moderation is likely as the party's share of seats in their political group increases. As these parties advocate most strongly against EU integration, the finding suggests that a degree of socialization through their participation in the political group is influencing their anti-EU integration commitment. Overall, however, the findings of the chapter suggest a concerning outcome, greater representation in the EP leads to more extreme policy positions.

1.2 Conclusion

This study aims to demonstrate whether policy moderation by the euroskeptic parties is possible under different pathways. First, when examining the effect of moderation on voter choice, I find that more extreme policy positions, greater policy differentiation from the other parties in the system, increases the probability that the euroskeptic parties attracts vote switchers, and decreases the propensity of vote abstentions for the party. Yet, the models reveal that some features of participation in the governing coalition lead to moderation such as if the party receives one of the "big three" cabinet portfolios. This suggests that increased participation and representation of the euroskeptic parties in their national institutions under certain conditions does result in moderation. The same cannot be said, however, for their participation in the EP as the various explored variables largely show more extreme policy positions as the level of representation in the institution increases. There is a key exception regarding the hard-euroskeptic party and their anti-EU integration position as the model suggests moderation with certain aspects of involvement in the EP. This is an important finding as it shows how involvement in the institution lessens the hard-euroskeptic party's stance on the EU, and good news for those concerned that their involvement sets up barriers to greater integration. While I do find evidence in support of moderation as the euroskeptic parties participate in governing coalitions and the EP under certain conditions and policy areas, there also appears to be nominal strategic incentives for the euroskeptic parties to moderate with regards to the voters. If the voters are attracted to the euroskeptic party's more extreme positions, then strategically the party may find it more beneficial to maintain less moderated policies. This creates a tension for the party, however, if it does decide to enter the pathways of moderation as any potential moderation puts it at odds with the voters.

2.0 Chapter 2 – Theoretical Models of Moderation

This chapter outlines the theoretical models explored in the subsequent empirical sections that focus more specifically on the moderating effects of the euroskeptic party's participation in their respective state's governing coalitions, supranational institutions such as the European Parliament, and the influence of their voters. First, I examine the underlying assumptions justifying the model on the moderating effect of participation in governing coalitions, highlighting aspects such as the impact of inter-party dynamics in the coalition, the composition of the euroskeptic party's cabinet portfolios, and their relative seat share in their national assemblies. This is then followed by an examination and model of supranational institutions and their theorized effect on moderating their participants. I then theorize how the changing composition of the euroskeptic party's voters as they attract new voters affects the moderation of policies that the parties campaign on going forward. The chapter then provides an overview of a unified model of moderation that incorporates each of the beforementioned models. Note that for the sections outlining the pathways, I provide a brief overview of the pathways with more expansive explanations given in the respective empirical chapters where I discuss the theorized mechanisms and their underlying assumptions. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of how I construct the euroskeptic party category, split between soft and hard-euroskeptic, and the varied policy dimensions, both from the Comparative Manifesto Project and Euromanifesto Study, employed in the empirical chapters.

2.1 Coalitions and moderation

The first pathway towards moderation that I theorize relates to the coalition formation process and subsequent participation in a governing coalition by euroskeptic parties. Before introducing the theoretical model, it is necessary to briefly describe the different types of political parties and how this impacts coalition formation. Strom (1990) and Muller and Strom (1999) outline three distinct party types: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking. Vote-seeking political parties represent the Downsian model (1957a) where there is a constant contest for political leaders and elites between gaining political control and appealing to voters, achieving this by maximizing vote plurality at the median ideal point. If the party's attempt to convey a policy message to maximize their vote share fails in subsequent elections, then, if possible, they seek out policies and issues through which to differentiate themselves on to the voters. Office-seeking political parties seek to maximize their control over political office benefits. Riker (1962) distinguishes the office-seeking party as a party that seeks "to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of winning." (p33) Riker emphasizes that when a coalition is the likely outcome, the primary goal of the party is to maximize its control of positions within the executive branch, i.e., cabinet portfolios. Upon achieving an electoral victory, political leaders of the officeseeking party use the disbursement of portfolios to actors within the parties participating in the coalition and to ensure its own appointment to more key, and prestigious, positions. Policy-seeking political parties seek to maximize their impact on specific policy. This political party model was developed in response to what was referred to as a "policy-blindness" of how the other party types were conceptualized. (Strom 1990, 567) If political parties are formed to address a specific issue and to enact policies to achieve a preferred outcome, then the previous party models needed to include policy and how this interacts with coalition formation.
This is not to suggest that parties are only be classified in each of these categories. Indeed, the parties may display the motivations and strategies of each type to achieve their aims. Take the issue specific parties, including the euroskeptic parties explored in this study and other niche parties, that are often categorized as policy-seeking parties (Adams et al 2006; Meguid 2005; 2008; Ezrow 2008; Wagner 2011). These parties typically focus on specific issues areas that fall outside the traditional cleavage structures such as 'green' politics, extreme rightist, ethnic-territoriality, or communist movements. While they exhibit attributes of the policy-seeking parties, they are also considered office-seeking if they enter a governing coalition and are awarded a cabinet position that helps them to achieve their preferred policy agenda and even play the role of kingmaker during the negotiations on coalition formation. An example of an issue-specific party being able to utilize their position in the governing coalition to achieve some preferred policies, albeit while facing challenges from the senior coalition party, is demonstrated through the Greens Party of Germany. With the 1998 German federal parliamentary elections, the party was able to capitalize on its electoral success and form the Red-Green Coalition led by the Social Democratic Party candidate, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The *Greens*, as the junior partner, were able to utilize their electoral success to act as a kingmaker and receive key portfolios, such as with the Vice-Chancellorship and Foreign Minister position under Joschka Fischer

As shown in the above example, with their recent electoral successes, issue-specific parties such as with the euroskeptic parties have increased leverage in brokering which portfolios they are able to negotiate with their potential coalition partner(s). As such, they negotiate and enter a governing coalition to achieve key salient policies that they and their core voters demand, though the challenges and calls for moderation once they are within the coalition may prove difficult. This occurs due to the nature of coalition formation. Axelrod (1970) posits a policy-based coalition theory arguing that coalitions develop among parties with similar policy and issue preferences, and Laver and Schofield (1990) note that parties located more centrally on a policy dimension enter governing coalitions as they only need to provide minor policy concessions. These two examples demonstrate that euroskeptic parties, often further apart from other parties ideologically, need to moderate and negotiate to greater degrees than parties located closer to the potential coalition partner. Potential coalition partners, attempting to broker an agreement for the formation of the coalition, may provide concessions to the euroskeptic party, but could also require the party to compromise on positions that may make a partnership difficult. Once inside the coalition, the euroskeptic parties then need to ensure that they toe-the-line for cabinet stability and to achieve the policy gains they achieved in the bargaining phase. For example, the Greens party leadership was confronted with whether to back the German intervention into Kosovo that was supported by the Social Democrats. The Greens maintained a large block of supporters who favored a policy of pacificism for Germany. It was only under the direction of Joschka Fischer that the Greens were able to maintain unity in support of the measure (Goldenberg 2017). The case demonstrates that while this niche party was potentially hindered by the policy compromises (i.e., moderation) necessitated by its participation in the coalition, it was still able to capitalize on this success and achieve minor policy concessions, such as with its anti-nuclear policy agreements, from the other coalition members.

Participation of euroskeptic parties as members of a coalition clearly represents both advantages and disadvantages for the party. And yet, with these challenges there are also clear benefits, whether in specific cabinet portfolios awarded or of promises for policy implementation, for the parties. This leads to the first question of this study concerning governing coalitions, how and why may moderation of the euroskeptic party occur if the leadership does decide to broker a



 Table 2.1 Model 1 - Participation in Coalitions and Moderation

compromise and join a coalition? I theorize a multi-stage process through which the process of joining and maintaining membership within the coalition results in an overall moderation of the party's more extreme policy preferences. **Table 2.1** displays the multistage path for moderation via the governing coalition pathway.

In the first stage of this model, the degree of potential moderation is a function of the party's overall electoral strategy to moderate on its preferred policy position. I contend that the party enters stage 1 and towards moderation in the coalition pathway as the party and its actors decide to leverage their increasing electoral power towards seeking specific offices and positions in government. Instead of remaining a purely obstructionist party, the party instead focuses on its capacity to be constructive and act as a reformer of policies. The party strategizes that moderation maximizes electoral gains and both increases its attractiveness as a potential coalition partner and the possibility to receive preferred cabinet portfolios to enact their desired reforms. Spoon (2011) demonstrates how small parties in Europe balance between policy positions that attract their sincere or expressive voters (i.e. those voters who tend to vote for the small party on average given an attachment to its policies or ideologies) and the strategic voters (i.e. those voters that tend to vote maximize and choose a party that they assume are able to compete effectively and not waste their vote) and others that are closer to the median voter. The smaller party, if its goal is to achieve office, is aware that it needs to increase its seat share in the national assembly to increase its relative

bargaining position with potential partners during the coalition formation negotiations. If the party instead focuses principally on maintaining the support of the sincere/expressive voters that are situated further from the median voter, remaining a predominately policy-seeking party that plays an obstructionist position in the national assembly, it is limiting the available vote share that it could gain if it were to soften its stance on policy position in order capture voters that are positioned closer to the median voter on the issue. In this first stage, I argue that the party determines which strategy, i.e., how much moderation, on the preferred policy best balances between maintaining the support of the sincere/expressive voters and maximizing the available voters that are located closer to the median voter. This optimal position (Moderated Position 1 in Model 1) results not only in a moderated policy position that attracts voters located more towards center of the political spectrum, but also has a signaling effect to potential coalition partners how the party is willing to participate in a potential coalition. As demonstrated earlier, parties are less likely to form coalitions



Figure 2.1 Greens and Social Democratic Party of Germany

with parties that are positioned too far from their own positions on policy areas. With the signaling, we see that the party positions itself closer to a potential partner and alleviate this concern. **Figure 2.1** provides an example of this and offers the percentage of positive emphasis of the EU in party manifestos⁵ of the *Greens* and *Social Democrats* in Germany since the early 1990s. The figure displays the low levels of positive emphasis of the EU for the *Greens* in relation to the *Social Democrats* in the early 1990s with a slight moderation occurring until the election in 1998. After this election and during the time the *Greens* are in coalition with the *Social Democrats*, we see that the *Greens* then become more closely aligned with the *Social Democrats* on their expressed positive emphasis of the EU in their party manifestos.

Once the party joins the coalition, the second stage of the moderation model occurs. After the party joins, it faces additional pressures from the senior coalition partners to moderate their positions in exchange for different policy initiatives that the party may also want to see implemented or for the promise of different portfolios in future coalition arrangements, such as with the *Greens* after the 1998 German federal parliamentary elections and their stance on Kosovo intervention and anti-nuclear policies. This, I argue, demonstrates a degree of socialization occurs within the euroskeptic party and its actors as it participates in the coalition. Socialization is "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005, 804; see also March and Olsen 1998). For example, monitoring by the prime minister under a principalagent theory (Hawkins *et al* 2006) and other players within the coalition is one potential mechanism that subjects the euroskeptic party to the intra-dynamic forces that socialize and shape the party. While the party may be able to become a kingmaker, it still needs to toe the line with official governing coalition policy stances and compromise with the other coalition partners to

⁵ Values of issues in the party manifestos are made available via the Comparative Manifesto Project database.

achieve sought after portfolios or the implementation of some its preferred policies. These compromises require over time that the euroskeptic party further moderates on policy positions and should demonstrate a stance that is more moderated when compared to the party's position from the first stage of the model.

While moderation is theorized, there are potential factors that may reduce the pressures in this pathway to moderate for the euroskeptic party in the coalition. For example, the extent of moderation is lessened depending on the number of portfolios the party holds in governing coalition vis-à-vis the coalition partners as this allows it the opportunity to further distinguish itself from the senior partner. Spoon and Klüver (2017) suggest that niche parties are typically able to differentiate themselves ideologically, negating some of the clarity of responsibility effects. Consequently, a euroskeptic party with a larger portfolio share demonstrates an increased capability to signal its policy successes to its voting base. When the party maintains a smaller share, it may maintain a role of kingmaker in coalition formation, but it also faces stronger pressure from coalition partner arises. The smaller the share that the party brings to the negotiations should also mean that the larger parties may exert more pressure for moderation, especially if there are other potential coalition partners that the senior coalition party could turn towards instead of the euroskeptic party if the party is found to be shirking on its negotiated positions.

There is one final point expanded on in subsequent sections of this chapter. A degree of moderation within the coalition may result in increased contestation with their supporters as issuespecific party voters are typically more inflexible with their support of key party policies (Adams *et al* 2006) and could electorally punish niche parties that are viewed as being too conciliatory within the coalition, potentially demonstrated by Greene *et al* (2020). In this case, the pathway for moderation would mean a balancing act, whereby the euroskeptic party compromises to the extent where it thinks there will not be too great of a backlash by its more ideologically oriented supporters. As the vote share increases for the niche party, so does the proportion of voters that are located closer to the median, assuming a normal distribution under the median voter theorem (Downs 1957a). The increased vote share among more moderate voters provides the party some space through which it protects itself against a backlash of the voters who favor greater commitment to the party's policies and disapprove of any moderation by the party in the negotiations with the other coalition members. In this case, the party needs to balance its approach with the negotiations with the coalition and this subsequently influences the potential degree of moderation demonstrated by the party.

2.2 Supranational institutions and moderation

The second pathway of moderation I propose occurs due to the euroskeptic parties' participation in a supranational institution, such as with their participation in the European Parliament (EP). Research demonstrates that for the ethnoregional parties, for example, early participation in the EU was less conciliatory and more antagonistic (Jolly 2007; Gould and Messina 2014). While the parties do demonstrate a degree of anti-integrationist attitudes due to their goal of decentralization and regional autonomy, some, such as with the *Scottish National Party* (SNP) have come to support the EU and the role it plays in helping them achieve policy goals. Increased representation in the EP, in these cases, opens an alternative pathway for the parties and extends national politics and policy debates to the supranational level (Carrubba 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991, 1996). The success of these parties in the EP elections helps them

through expanded representational linkages to then exert pressure from the EP onto their national governments, but also enables them to be shaped by the institution as well.

As the euroskeptic party's size and participation in supranational institutions such as the EP increases, the question becomes how much the party and its actors participating in the institution alter their strategies and policies, and how this then effects overall moderation of the euroskeptic party's policies. This is centered on the concept of institutional socialization. Socialization to reiterate is "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005, 804; see also March and Olsen 1998) which begins with a logic of consequences where the actors make decisions based on strategic calculations to achieve their goals. As socialization deepens, there is a shift towards a logic of appropriateness where the actor learns a role within the expectations of the norm that enables the actor to act in agreement with its principles or the actor exhibits the norms of the community in which they participate because it is the "normal" thing to do, and the norms possess a "taken-for-granted" status for the actor. Risse and Sikkink (1999) iterate similar logic in stating that "norms can only be regarded as internalized in domestic processes when actors comply with them irrespective of individual beliefs about their validity" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 16). Overall, these definitions demonstrate that socialization does not mean that the actor fully adopts the norm, rather simply that the actor must no longer perceive the norm as contentious and accepts the norm regardless of the actor agreeing with the norm or not. This means that the socialization of the norm occurs when the actor simply views compliance as the "normal" thing to do, even if the actor "is not convinced of its moral validity and appropriateness" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 17).

The relationship of MEPs with their national parties offers one example of how participation in the EP can facilitate an opportunity for socialization. MEPS in the EP directly interact with the institution and other parties' actors through their participation with groups such as the EP political groups, and this participation enables them to interact with any potential socialization effects. Their exposure to these socializing linkages is impacted by the capacity of their party's national party actors to control and prevent them from diverging from the party's official policy positions. Scholars such as Hix (2002, 2004) and Faas (2003), for example, note that the national party has multiple tools at its disposal to ensure that their MEPs operating in the supranational institution do not stray too far from the overall preferred position of the party. For example, they argue how the party controls the placement of the MEP on party lists for the subsequent EP election and raise the potential threat of the MEP being unable to compete effectively in the election. Moreover, the party controls appointments within the party domestically and the MEPs would be less likely to stray too far from the party line if it means being unable to receive appointments with the party in the future. Hix also iterates that typically the leadership of the national parties explicitly inform their MEPs on how to vote on legislation that is debated in the EP, often using the controls listed above to keep the MEP in compliance out of concern for future political opportunities in the party after their tenure in the EP has concluded.

There is increasing evidence, however, that the MEPs may not fully align with their national party's interest and that the party does not exercise control over their MEPs. Instead, MEPs potentially shift their own positions depending on the dynamics of their respective party groups and the broader EU institutional bodies. Scholars (Hix 2002; Ringe 2010; Scully *et al* 2012; Mühlböck 2012; Hix and Hoyland 2013) demonstrate that the MEPs within the EP often act against the wishes of the national party. Scully *et al* (2012), for example, note how it appears that when the MEP enters the EP, they typically associate with the party group more closely aligning with their ideological rather than national party concerns. Mühlböck (2012) moreover

demonstrates that while the national governing party may try to control the MEPs with mechanisms such as candidate selection, the evidence demonstrates how MEPs often diverge from the preferences of the national party as they do not always reflect and vote in alignment with these preferences. This potentially lends further support to the findings offered by Scully et al and shows the importance that ideological commitment to groups in the EP such as the EP political groups and the potential benefits of operating within the parameters set by the EP in diminishing the bonds between the MEP and the national party. I argue that this is evidence that upon entering the EP, due to an apparent lack of control by the national party, the MEP is more likely to feel the socializing pressures by the institution to moderate on positions or to act in a manner that may contradict the position of the national party. This, consequently, also provides an opportunity for the supranational institution to socialize and ultimately to moderate the MEP's position. For MEPs of euroskeptic parties, the EP provides them the means to strategically achieve policy goals, and additionally it is through their institutional learning and participating in the institution that they recognize the positive policy gains that are achievable by moderating their position and in turn advocate for the learned strategies and moderated positions with their national party leaders.

With these assumptions, **Table 2.2** demonstrates the expected pathway for moderation due to a euroskeptic party's participation in the EP. The main motivation for this strategy, I theorize, relates to the representational linkages provided by the EP. As I discuss in further detail in the empirical chapter exploring the supranational pathway, often the euroskeptic parties do not achieve significant representation in their national legislatures. The second-order nature of EP elections benefit challenger parties like the euroskeptic parties and provide them an additional representational linkage through which they then advocate for their preferred policies. Paradoxically, the parties countering further EU integration are also those that gain greater political



 Table 2.2 Model 2 - Participation in the EP and Moderation

representation through the institution. This also, however, provides the motivation for the party to enter the supranational pathway that draws the party towards moderation.

In the first stage of the pathway, the party determines which strategy and policy position is best employ to increase its relative vote share in the next EP election. This is like what was described earlier in the section on coalition strategies and the optimal balance they must achieve when deciding on which policy to emphasize in the upcoming European parliamentary election to attract the voters, though due to the second order nature of EP elections policy positions are expected to be less moderated. I theorize that the party's MEPs and other party actors entering the EP during this stage are more congruent with the national party position. The second stage of the pathway then shows the moderation effects from the participation of the party's actors in the EP and its varied institutions begin the process of moderation. As studies increasingly demonstrate an apparent lack of oversight and control of MEPs in the EP by their national party, this creates an optimal opportunity for the effects of socializing linkages to facilitate moderation. For example, the party's MEPs and other actors bargain with other members of the EP and gain roles that allow the party to shape policies, even if these policies may not fully achieve the party's optimal preferred policy ability to shape policy outcomes. I theorize that as the process of socialization within the institution deepens and the MEP and other party actors participate in the varied roles provided by the EP and interact with other parties such as in their EP political group, that they become more aware both of their role as a shaper within the institution and the benefits that increased representation offers the party. This is of particular interest for those parties that receive greater political representation in the EP over their own national assemblies as it offers a greater voice and ability to shape policy outcomes. Socialized to this moderated position, these actors then take the strategies and policies learned back to their national party actors, diffusing supranationally the policy positions made possible by their participation in the institution and leading to potential moderated positions to the EP average by the euroskeptic parties.

A few factors may inhibit the capacity of moderation along this pathway. First, the second order nature of EP elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980) lead to lower voter turnout and increased protest voting (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). These elections become extensions of the national political arena. Consequently, mainstream parties and parties in government typically perform worse compared to smaller parties, such as niche parties, and those parties in opposition. Parties advocating more extreme policy positions gain the most in these elections and enter the EP. This means that euroskeptic parties may have little incentive to moderate in EP elections as they are aware that the voters turning out are either protesting against the mainstream parties or are those that more committed to the extreme positions campaigned on by the parties. Given the success that these parties achieve by emphasizing more extreme policy positions in the EP elections, this potentially sets a higher bar for potential socialization and moderation to occur. This is especially the case if the MEPs are aware that their own future electoral success hinges on maintaining more extreme policy positions to receive continued support from their constituents. Consequently, this puts in place a potential roadblock to any socializing effects provided through participation in the EP if the party and the MEP both perceive the importance of emphasizing extreme policy positions for continued electoral success in EP elections.

Relatedly, another potential roadblock on the pathway relates to how the euroskeptic party and their elected members to the EP approach their participation, whether the party is obstructionist or constructive. Häge and Nils 2019 note in interviews with various MEPs how some euroskeptic parties view their role in the EP as obstructionist such as demonstrated by their interviews with members of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This is compared to members of soft euroskeptic parties that state they approach their participation in the EP in a more constructive way. Additionally, they note how non-euroskeptic party MEPs "prefer not to deal with members of the Eurosceptic far right, given divergent values and preferences over political outcomes" (Häge and Nils 2019, 224). If this is indeed true, then this potentially curtails the linkages available to the MEPs that lead to socialization and, subsequently, moderation. What this means for the specified pathway outlined above is that those euroskeptic parties and actors that approach the EP as obstructionists, oftentimes the hard euroskeptic parties, will not engage the institution to the same degree as euroskeptic parties that instead take the constructive, reformist approach. As a result, the prior group limits their exposure to socialization compared to the latter, decreasing the likelihood of moderation of policies to occur.

2.3 Voters and moderation

While participation in either a coalition government or a supranational institution may offer a means of understanding moderation of the euroskeptic parties, an argument can also be made regarding the additional moderating effect of the voters themselves on the policies that the parties campaign for within national and EP elections. Overall, this effect is connected to the responsiveness of the parties to the preferred policies of their supporters as well as the strategies of the other parties in the political system that potentially undermines the capacity of the euroskeptic parties to shift towards other policy areas to increase their electoral success in elections.

A shift in the values and ideologies of segments of the electorate the development of the niche/new politics parties from the 1970s onwards based on the rise of posited post-material values (Inglehart 1977) and the potential dealignment of parties and voters (Dalton et al 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). The dealignment between the mainstream parties and the average voter facilitated the opening of new issue spaces that permitted the entrance of niche parties into the party system. Recall that the issue specific parties typically do not attempt to moderate their party programs to capture a larger share of the electorate (Adams et al 2006; Meguid 2005, 2008; Ezrow 2008; Wagner 2011) as they represent specific issues points that fall outside the traditional political cleavage structures. The reasoning for this is primarily due to the political strategies of other political parties in the system and the effect of the niche party's voters. The mainstream parties attempt to preserve the status quo in the system by emphasizing their primary issues and policy positions as more salient for the voters than the issues advocated by the issue specific parties or other new entrants into the political system. These parties introduce and convey the salience of the new issues traditionally not included in the political contest to seize the voter's attention, while the mainstream parties utilize strategies to counter the new entrants (Sani and Sartori 1984; Meguid 2005, 2008; Rovny and Edwards 2012).

The strategies of the mainstream parties essentially confine the smaller niche parties to the more ideologically oriented and expressive voters, which typically are a smaller share of potential voters. Consequently, however, these parties are additionally found to be more responsive and more congruent to the policy preferences of these voters as they need these voters to turn out to

vote at the election time (Carrubba 2001; Kriesi 2007; Ezrow *et al* 2011). Being unable to moderate, theoretically, limits the existing pool of voters closer to the median that are available to issue specific parties like the euroskeptic parties and so necessitates that it responds to the interests of the more sincere/expressive voters that tend on average to comprise a larger proportion of their party's voter support. In fact, Adams *et al* (2006) demonstrate that these parties' efforts to moderate their position on policies according to popular opinion on the issue results in a backlash from the traditional supporters and a decrease in their electoral success. This seems to suggest that these parties are incapable of fluctuating their policy position if the public opinion on average moderates on the issue as voters that are on average more rigid in their support for the party's policies are unlikely to support a moderation of the party's policies.

Additional studies, however, demonstrate instances where the mainstream parties fail to strategically preempt the new entrants. Matilla and Raunio (2012) for example show the continued disconnect between the anti-integration attitudes of constituents in Western European states and the position on this topic held by the center-left and center-right mainstream parties. Kriesi *et al* (2008) offer an additional example in their discussion on how effective political parties of the nationalist right actually may be expected to compete on economic issues, traditionally viewed as a policy area dominated by the mainstream parties. These emphasize the point that if parties need to be able to differentiate themselves to attract voters, then the convergence of the mainstream parties towards to the center blurs this differentiation and makes it difficult of the parties to compete. Consequently, voters switch their votes away from the converging mainstream parties and towards those parties that are able to differentiate themselves on policy dimensions that are either unrepresented by the mainstream parties or where the mainstream party's position is blurred and difficult to assess by the voter. Parties such as the euroskeptic parties have capitalized on this

convergence to differentiate themselves and attract those voters that previously voted for the mainstream parties.

These voters, however, could also switch their votes away from the party and back to the mainstream parties in the next election depending on the mainstream parties' altered policy positions as they respond to the electoral challenges posed by the euroskeptic and other challenger parties. This is because voters who typically vote for the mainstream parties are situated closer on average to the median voter than the more ideologically driven supporters typical of the euroskeptic parties. If the parties that are electorally successful wish to continue to attract these new voters in the next election, I theorize that they then need to balance the commitment to their traditional issue positions with these new policies. While scholars (Adams et al 2006; Meguid 2005, 2008) have noted the difficulty for issue specific parties to enter new policy areas, greater convergence towards the center in policy areas between the mainstream parties provides some space on which the euroskeptic party is able to differentiate itself. The party is able to offer policy alternatives for those voters who either recently switched their vote to the euroskeptic party or are seeking a new party offering an alternative to the mainstream parties. If the euroskeptic party emphasizes issues and policies closer to the traditional position advocated by their ideologically driven voters, they risk alienating the new voters who are less committed to this policy and who are potentially switching due to the convergence of the mainstream parties.

As such, I predict that the party, to maintain its electoral advantage vis-à-vis the other parties, moderates on a position to prevent the alienation of new voters who are less committed to their traditionally extreme position, while also not moderating to such an extent that it then isolates its traditional voter base. This balancing towards moderation by the parties only occurs, however, to a certain degree. For the party to reach each additional vote switcher closer to the median, it needs to moderate further on a policy. The logic behind this is that increased levels of vote shares results in a greater proportion of voters that are not as ideologically committed to the more extreme positions of the euroskeptic party. In subsequent electoral cycles, the parties then need to reassess their level of moderation to determine if further moderation is implemented to capture a greater share of new voters. A level is reached, however, where the share of voters available to the parties decreases as the party converges increasingly with other parties in the system. While the mainstream parties may be converging, they still represent a policy position to some degree on which the euroskeptic party must balance against. As the party moderates, however, this results in an increasing lack of policy differentiation between itself and the mainstream parties. Consequently, it is increasingly difficult to attract those new voters closer to the median who may then look elsewhere for a party that is able to differentiate itself against the other parties. Moreover, further moderation to garner new voters may not be available as this moderation potentially marginalizes even further its traditional voters. As a result, the party finds it exceedingly costly to balance and appease their existing voter base with the degree of moderation that they need to also increase their relative share of the vote switchers. These constraints mean that there is a level at which the party finds it simply too costly to continue moderating on a position if the effect is both the isolation of its traditional voters and the loss of the vote switchers.

2.4 Full moderation model

The combination of the participation of the euroskeptic parties in a governing coalition, their participation in a supranational institution such as the EU, as well as the effect of the composition and preferences of their respective voters, allows me to propose a final unified model of the pathways in **Table 2.3**. During the first stage of the model the party selects the strategy to either retain its traditional policy position or to moderate in relation to the voters. They determine which strategy they believe is the best option to both retain existing voters as well as attract new voters to the party, maximizing the party's electoral success. This decision, I theorize, is determined by whether the euroskeptic party wants to remain a strictly policy-oriented one as preferred by their traditional voters and/or maintain an obstructionist role within their national assemblies or the EP or whether it moderates to seek office and participate in governing coalitions or expand their presence in the EP. If the party decides to moderate, this then starts the process as outlined in the above sections. Through the governing coalitions pathway, in stage 1 the party



Table 2.3 Model 3 - Unified Model of Moderation

moderates to attract potential voters and expand its seat share, thus enabling the party to become a more viable coalition partner. After joining the coalition in stage 2, however, the intra-coalition dynamics within the coalition will result in the party's moderation. Party participation and electoral successes in the EP elections results in a greater share of party MEPs within the supranational institution. Participation in the institution and the learning and socialization that this entails, results with a moderation of the party and its actors in the EP. Achieving political representation in the EP offers the party a greater capacity to shape policies and achieve some of their preferred policy positions. It also enables a capacity for the party to learn new ideas and approaches to political problems from other actors in the EP that can then in turn be implemented by the party domestically. This results in a moderation of policies that align more closely with those of other party actors within the EP, for example from within their EP political groups. Subsequently these positions impact the voters and their behavior in the next election. There are two potential outcomes. First, the voter decides whether the party moderated too much and turned its back on the policy preferences that it originally advocated for or moderated to an extent where it no longer offers a policy different than the other parties in the system. As a result, the voters become either disenchanted with the moderated party that has turned its back on its founding principles or they seek out parties in the system that do offer a differentiated policy position compared to the others. In either case, this behavior by the voters signals back to the party and reveals whether the party overplayed its hand with its moderating policies. This may result in the party shifting its party strategy and rebalancing its approach on a moderated position to persuade the voters to return to the party in subsequent elections. The second outcome, however, could also be that the party reveals through moderation that there is still space on which it can moderate to attract any remaining voters nearer to the median. If this were to be the case, then I expect that the party reevaluates their electoral strategy, determine how much it think it could moderate without alienating its traditional core supporters, and then moderate further to attract any remaining median voters. After the party responds to the voters' behavior, the process then restarts and the pathway towards moderation continues.

It is important to highlight, no single path explains the total moderation that occurs for the euroskeptic parties. For certain parties, participation in the governing coalition demonstrates greater effects towards moderation than participation in the EP. For example, parties that maintain a greater proportion of seats in the national government than in the EP may not perceive contesting EP elections and participation in the EP as a useful strategy towards achieving its policy goals. Moreover, the increased number of seats in their national parliament means the party is a more attractive target as a potential coalition partner and moderate through this pathway with nominal effects due to participation in the EP. Conversely, if the party achieves greater representation in the EP compared to the national assembly, it can leverage this into an advantage towards pressuring national governments to adopt some preferred policies. For example, as mentioned previously some ethnoregional parties became increasingly pro-EU over time as they participated in the institution and were able to enact policies that benefited their region and overall policy goals against their own national government. In cases such as these, it is the role of participating in the supranational institution that enables moderation of the party compared to their participation in the governing coalition. It is also possible that a party maintains high degrees of representation in both national and supranational institutions. In this case, the party achieves effective representation nationally and is subjected to the dynamics of the pathways both if it decides to join the coalition and by its participation in the EP. Consequently, the party is, in this example, impacted by both pathways, and I expect displays the greatest evidence of moderation when compared to parties relying either solely on the national or supranational pathway. Finally, the influence of the voters themselves may be the most influential factor in these models as the parties must determine which policies are conveyed to attract new segments of voters, while also not losing their traditional core voters. If the party miscalculates, this leads to a higher-than-expected electoral loss in subsequent elections and preclude them from participating in either of the other two theorized pathways for moderation. The party would need to strategize and balance between moderating to signal to other parties its willingness to participate in the coalition, for example, and the preferences of the voters. The party then needs to strategically choose the extant of moderation it thinks it could achieve in the beginning stages of the models while keeping an eye on its traditional core voters and any new voters it may attract through its actions.

2.5 Defining euroskeptic parties

As euroskeptic parties consist of many different party families as coded by the Comparative Manifesto Project beyond the simple nationalist party distinction, this study categorizes the euroskeptic parties dependent on their position on the EU integration position in the CMP. First, I code the party as euroskeptic (**Euroskeptic**) against the other parties in the party system where (0) denotes non-euroskeptic and (1) denotes all-euroskeptic party types. As euroskeptic parties consist of many different party families beyond the simple nationalist party distinction, this study categorizes the euroskeptic parties dependent on their position on the EU integration position in the CMP from the mean position on the issue in their overall party system respective to their election date. I calculate this value as each party's expressed positive emphasis on EU integration minus the negative emphasis as coded by the CMP (**per108** European Community/Union: Positive minus per110 European Community/Union: Negative). I then rescale this value to a (0) to (10) scale where (0) is completely anti-European Community/Union in the party's manifesto, (10) is completely pro-European Community/Union, and (5) is neutral. Using this, I then calculate the average and standard deviations for each country/year. Those parties that fall to the left (i.e., more euroskeptic) and between 0.5 to 1.5 standard deviations of the mean position I classify as softeuroskeptic parties (Soft Euroskeptic) with 0 being non-euroskeptic and 1 being only softeuroskeptic, while those demonstrating greater than 1.5 standard deviations of the mean position I classify as a hard-euroskeptic party (Hard Euroskeptic) with 0 representing both non-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic parties and 1 being only hard-euroskeptic. This creates 3 comparison groups used in the study, 1) all non-euroskeptic parties against all-euroskeptic parties in the party system, 2) non-euroskeptic parties against only soft-euroskeptic parties, and 3) non-euroskeptic and softeuroskeptic parties against hard-euroskeptic parties. Each of these comparison groups are structured in this way to compare the different euroskeptic party configurations against all other parties located to the right, less-euroskeptic side from the euroskeptic parties. In this way, hardeuroskeptic parties are compared to both non-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic parties as these parties are located to the right of the party on the euroskepticism policy area, while soft-euroskeptic parties are only compared to the non-euroskeptic parties.⁶

Conceptualizing euroskepticism in this manner allows me to capture three important factors. First, while the anti-EU integration position is typically a position located on the right side of the political discourse through parties such as the Alternative for Germany, this conceptualization enables me to capture and include euroskeptic parties on the left side of the

⁶ **Appendix A Euroskeptic Political Parties** displays a listing of all parties and whether the party is soft/hard euroskeptic.

political spectrum as well such as the Communist Party of Greece. This allows me the ability to test euroskepticism in its entirety regardless of ideological placement on the propensity for the party to moderate towards their country's average policy positions. Second, measuring soft/hardeuroskepticism in this manner allows for the political parties to transition over time. No party remains static and transitions over time on a variety of policies and issues. Some may start out with a more negative anti-EU position, as shown by some green-ecological parties such as the Greens in Germany, and soften this stance, while others may shift in the opposite direction, as the Conservative Party in the UK demonstrates at different times. Finally, measuring euroskepticism in relation to the party system average per country and year allows me the ability to account for national differences in euroskepticism. As opposed to defining a political party as hard-euroskeptic and broadly using this definition across all countries and periods examined, the means of categorizing parties as soft/hard-euroskeptic within the national context allows me to employ a more nuanced perspective. The party classified as hard-euroskeptic in relation to their national average as opposed to being broadly defined and grouped with euroskeptic parties of other countries has the potential to exclude political parties that are more euroskeptic within their own country, but whose country overall is either neutral or slightly more europhilic on average. For example, the Netherlands in 2017 had a party system average of 4.9536 on the integration position, where a value below (5) indicates euroskepticism, compared to Spain in the same year with a party system average of 5.0708, thus more europhilic, on the same position. No party in Spain scored less than 5 on the scale, yet there are parties in Spain that fall into the soft-euroskeptic party distinction when the standard deviations based on the party system average is utilized. This permits the study to approach euroskepticism in, hopefully, a more well-rounded approach.

2.6 Defining policy areas

In this study, I calculate two different sets of policy dimensions using the Comparative Manifesto Project and Euromanifesto Study data. The CMP data used in the empirical models of Chapters 3 and 5 on the effects of governing coalitions on moderation and how moderation affects voters. The EMP data is then employed in the empirical models of Chapter 4 on the effects of EP participation on moderation. Starting with the CMP, the included positions measures five policy dimensions: Economy, Welfare, Environment, Multiculturalism, and Internationalism made available through the CMP.⁷ This includes all political parties measured by the CMP from the 1980s for Western Europe and from the 1990s following the transition to democratic governance for Central and Eastern Europe. Each of the policy variables measures the percentage of the party's manifesto devoted to each topic with the negative positions for the policies subtracted from the positive policy positions. Originally, this creates a scale of (-100) to (100), where (-100) represents the greatest possible anti-policy position and (100) representing the extreme opposite. For these measures, I collapse these measures from the (-100) to (100) scale to a (0) to (10) scale, with (0)representing the greatest possible extreme anti-position, (10) representing the extreme proposition, and (5) representing a neutral position.

As this study attempts to determine the degree to which the parties moderate under the theoretical assumptions, I must calculate the average distance position of the party from their country's mean position. This allows me to examine any moderation in this distance between

⁷ Appendix B.1 Calculating Policy Positions – CMP details the Comparative Manifesto Project values I use to construct the policy measures. Economic Position = ((per401 + per414) - (per403 + per404 + per412)); Welfare Position = ((per503 + per504) - (per505)); Environment Position = ((per501 + per416) - (per401 + per410 + per703)); Immigration/Multiculturalism Position = ((per602 + per607) - ((per601 + per608)); International Politics Position = ((per101 + per105 + per106 + per107 + per407)) - ((per102 + per104 + per109 + per406)).

elections, and how the party's participation in the governing coalition in particular influences the degree of moderation in the subsequent election. The calculation for the average policy distance in **Formula 1** is:

Formula 1: Distance =

$$1^{st}$$
 step: $X_1 - (\overline{X} = ((\Sigma x_i) / n)) = Y$
 2^{nd} step: $|Y|$

Where X_1 is the party's position on the policy at the time of the election and \overline{X} is the mean policy position of all available parties in the party's country at the time of the election, excluding the position of X_1 from the calculation, to determine Y. After this calculation, I take the absolute value of the distance |Y|. This creates a singular positive measure of distance that allows me to examine the degree of moderation to the average country position for all-euroskeptic parties regardless of their position to the left or the right of their country's average position on the policy.

I calculate the distance from the mean position in the country for five policy dimensions. The first dependent variable measures the economic policy distance position of the political parties (**Economy**). This variable includes planned economic policies advocated by the party such as long-term economic planning by the government, support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market as well as for direct government control of economy. For market economic policies, the variable includes the measure of the party's support for a free market and free market capitalism and policy making such as in reducing government deficit spending. To simplify, the economy position measures 'pro-market' - 'pro-state', i.e., from a market-oriented approach to managing the economy to a state regulated planned economy, with values below (5) representing the party's support for a more 'pro-state' intervention into the economy, and values above (5) demonstrating greater support for the 'pro-market' position. The policies I use to construct the

pro-market and pro-state policy positions come from the planned and market economic measures provided by the CMP (Volkens *et al* 2018).

The second dependent variable measures the welfare policy distance position of the political party (**Welfare**). The welfare variable measures whether the parties demonstrate a commitment to social justice such as advocating for fair treatment of all people, including underprivileged social groups, and calling for the end of discrimination. This variable also measures whether the party emphasizes the need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. Based on this measure, values below (5) represent the party's support for welfare retrenchment in their state, and values of above (5) demonstrating greater support for welfare expansion or at least the continuation of welfare provisions if they are perceived as being attacked by retrenchment or austerity policies in their country. I derive the policies used to calculate the pro-welfarism and anti-welfarism positions from Armingeon & Giger (2008) and Jensen & Seeberg (2015).

The third dependent variable measures the environment policy distance position of the political party (**Environment**). This measures whether the party is shown to advocate for policies protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other "green" policies. Based on this measure, values below (5) represent the party's support for anti-environmental policies, while values above (5) indicate the party's support for pro-environmental policies. I derive the pro-environmental position from measures employed in previous studies (Green-Pedersen 2007; Bäck *et al* 2011; Klüver and Spoon 2016). As the CMP does not include clear-cut anti-environmental measures, I use the policy suggestions offered from Meguid (2008), Lowe *et al* (2011), and Abou-Chadi *et al* (2020) to construct the anti-environmental measure. This anti-environmental position

emphasizes pro-production, growth, and agricultural policies that the scholars suggest counter the general aim of pro-environmental policies.

The fourth dependent variable measures the multiculturalism/immigration policy distance position of the political party (**Multiculturalism**). Multiculturalism assesses the degree to which the party supports policies demonstrating a commitment to diversity in the country by the party. Positive multiculturalism highlights a party's support of cultural diversity and cultural plurality in society. While negative mentions highlight the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration and cultural homogeneity in the society. Moreover, these measures potentially capture an anti-/pro-immigrant policy position for parties using the CMP coding. As the CMP does not code for immigration specifically, alternative methods are needed to capture this policy position. Abou-Chadi *et al* (2020) building off earlier work (Meguid 2008), suggests that a combination of the national way of life and multiculturalism measures capture both the extant of the party's policy position on both multiculturalism and indirectly immigration. Values below (5) indicate that the party holds greater anti-multicultural/immigrant policy positions, while above (5) demonstrates the positive emphasis of on the issue.

The final dependent variable measures the internationalism policy distance position of the political party (**Internationalism**). Internationalism is a policy position measuring the degree to which the party supports policies advocating international cooperation. Positive internationalism demonstrates the party is supporting international co-operation, such as the need for foreign aid to developing states or global institutions. Negative internationalism opposes this more global approach, showing the party as emphasizing national independence and sovereignty, a more isolationist and/or unilateral approach to global affairs. Values above (5) demonstrate that the party is supporting pro-internationalist positions, while below (5) represents the party supporting

policies that emphasize their preference for a more unilateral approach to internationalism. I derive this policy measure from Bäck *et al* (2011), Volkens *et al* (2014), and Klüver & Spoon (2016).⁸

Similar to the CMP measures from the previous chapter, with the EMP data I focus on five policy dimensions as the dependent variables to calculate policy distances: **Economic**, **Welfare**, **Environment**, **Multicultural**, and **EU Integration**.⁹ Using the same average policy distance formula as with the CMP data, I calculate the five policy dimensions, but instead of determining these values based off of the party's country average policy position at the time of their national election, I instead use the average policy position of euromanifestos at the time of the EP election. I calculate the policy dimensions on euromanifestos for the EP elections from 1994 to 2014. Using the same **Formula 1** as from the CMP policy calculations, **X**₁ is the party's position on the policy at the time of the EP election, excluding the position of **X**₁ from the calculation, to determine **Y**. After this calculation, I take the absolute value of the distance $|\mathbf{Y}|$. This creates a singular positive measure of distance that allows me to examine the degree of moderation to the average EP position for all-euroskeptic parties regardless of their position to the left or the right of the EP's average position on the policy.¹⁰

Note that instead of the international policy measure calculated with the CMP data, I utilize the EU integration dimension (**EU Integration**). As I used the CMP data to calculate the euroskeptic party measures, I was unable to include this as its own policy dimension. Using the

⁸ Appendix C.1 Descriptive Statistics, Average Policy Positions - CMP provides a breakdown per country and decade for the various policy areas.

⁹ **Appendix B.2 Calculating Policy Positions – EMP** details the Euromanifesto Study values I use to construct the policy measures.

¹⁰ **Appendix C.2 Descriptive Statistics, Average Policy Positions – EMP** provides a breakdown per EP political groups and EP parliamentary session for the various policy areas.

EMP data, however, allows me to examine this important policy dimension especially as this is one of the euroskeptic party's principal owned issue areas. A Positive EU integration position demonstrates the party is supporting further EU integration, such as through support of different EU institutional bodies and the single market. A negative EU integration position opposes this more approach, showing the party as emphasizing less competences given EU institutional bodies and the single market. Values above (5) demonstrate that the party is supporting prointernationalist positions, while below (5) represents the party supporting policies that emphasize their preference for a more unilateral approach to internationalism. I derive this policy measure from Schmitt *et al* (2016).

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduces the general framework of the theoretical pathways of the project. One centers on a national pathway through participation in a governing coalition and its impact on policy moderation, while the other argues that increased representation and membership in a supranational institution provides an additional pathway towards moderation. It also offers an examination on how the voters react to the moderation, whether they then switch to the euroskeptic party as it moderates on policies or punish the party electorally if it is viewed as moderating too much and turning its back on traditional policy positions. The chapter also specified how this project defines the euroskeptic party, the hard and soft-euroskeptic distinction, and the different policy dimensions employed in the empirical chapters. The next three chapters now examine different aspects of the unified model, first examining the reaction of voters to potential euroskeptic party moderation. The subsequent empirical chapter then explores the participation by the euroskeptic parties in their national governing coalitions. Finally, the last empirical chapter explores the supranational pathway through the party's participation in the EP.

3.0 Chapter 3 – The Effect of Moderation on Voters

Participation in either a coalition government or a supranational institution, or combination thereof, are two pathways in understanding the circumstances leading the euroskeptic party to moderate their policy positions towards the average position in their party system. Before exploring these pathways, I must first address how the moderation of euroskeptic parties in subsequent elections affect voter choice. This is an essential first step as it establishes whether a strategy of moderation for the euroskeptic parties in the first stages of the unified model is effective in attracting the necessary electoral support that sets the euroskeptic party down the pathways of moderation. This chapter explores the euroskeptic party strategy of policy moderation, and whether it attracts previously non-euroskeptic party voters to the party. Additionally, it explores how the party's policy moderation effects the party's partisan voters, explicitly whether this results in greater vote abstentions in subsequent elections. The chapter first provides a more generalized discussion of party electoral strategies in relation to party policy positioning to establish why and how parties moderate on policies as an electoral strategy. Then, the chapter explores the literature on whether and how voters respond to these strategies. Using electoral polling data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), I examine two key groups, vote switchers and abstention voters, and their vote preference for euroskeptic parties. I am interested in assessing if these voters switch or abstain (reward or punish) their vote for euroskeptic parties between elections, as the parties moderate on polices and converge towards the average policy position in their party system. Overall, the effect of this moderation on the voters is connected to the responsiveness of the parties to the preferred policies not only of their traditional core supporters, but also potential new voters positioned closer to the median, as well as the strategies of the other

parties in their party system. By examining the conditions under which voters switch, or abstain, their vote towards the euroskeptic parties, I assess on which policies euroskeptic parties find it beneficial, or not, to moderate to capture new voters and how this impacts the potential for further moderation in future elections.

3.1 Policy positioning and its effects

3.1.1 A brief discussion of party positioning

To understand the effects of party positioning on attracting (or driving away) voters, I briefly discuss two areas within the literature, party positioning vis-à-vis new entrants and the responsiveness of the voters to changes in the party's position. To follow the strategies of parties to determine which policies to emphasize and campaign on, I examine the literature on new entrants, using niche parties as an illustrative example, and the strategies in response of the mainstream and other established parties. Note that as euroskepticism is a spectrum, any party, such as new entrants, are classified as euroskeptic according to their party's stance on the issue and the party system context. The following sections are a discussion on party strategies more broadly. The euroskeptic parties that I explore in this study engage in strategies that vary according to their position against those of the other parties in the party system.

The ability for a party to strategically enter new policy areas depends on the responsiveness of the other parties in the system to the issue. For example, a shift in the values and ideologies of segments of the electorate led to the development of the new politics parties from the 1970s onwards based both on new post-material values (Inglehart 1977) and the potential dealignment of parties and voters (Dalton *et al* 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). This dealignment between the mainstream parties and the average voter facilitated the opening of new issue spaces, such as on the environment, later with EU-integration, and other post-material issues. Where the mainstream parties ignored a potential policy, new entrant parties attempted to capitalize on and capture voters that are more fervent in their support for that issue, thus the niche party was born (Adams *et al* 2006; Meguid 2005, 2008; Ezrow 2008; Wagner 2011; Rovny and Edwards 2012).

New entrants often find it difficult to expand into other policy areas depending on the issue ownership of other parties. Kriesi *et al* (2008), providing evidence of the difficulty, note how radical right-wing parties attempt to compete on economic issues and challenge the mainstream parties, but are often delegated towards competing on non-economic anti-EU integration and immigration policies that the more centrist mainstream parties are less willing to emphasize and campaign on. In the mainstream vs. niche party example, the change in the political environment and the electoral threat that the new niche parties posed for the mainstream parties necessitated that the party assess the policies they could campaign on strategically to minimize the new entrant's success. Meguid (2005) notes the varies strategies often employed by the parties against adversarial and/or new entrant parties such as 1) an accommodative strategy, 2) an adversarial strategy, or 3) dismissive strategy (see also Sani and Sartori 1984; Harmel and Janda 1994; Meguid 2008).

Several examples demonstrate mainstream party attempts to strategically position themselves against the new entrants and their main adversarial parties. Spoon and Klüver (2020), for example, examine the accommodative strategy of political parties on immigration policies in response to the increased electoral strength of radical right-wing parties. They show that this strategy, while neither harming nor benefiting right-wing mainstream parties, does help left-wing

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mainstream parties from having their voters switch to the radical right-wing party. Abou-Chadi and Immergut (2019) note how the presence of a far-right challenger party changes the type of welfare recalibration that left mainstream parties advocate for in elections compared to cases where electoral competition from the far-right is lower.¹¹

Peter Jensen, a *Danish People's Party* (DPP) consultant from Denmark, lends further evidence to the strategy noting how the *Social Democratic Party* (SDP) is crossing the ideology divide towards the DPP position on immigration and migrants to capture DPP voters in the run up to the 2019 Danish general election:

"The social profile of the DPP will attract the main voters still, but I think that most voters will go to the SDP due to its strict immigration policy. But again, personally, I think of the voters who leave the DPP and vote for the SDP will go back because it's not very clear about the approach of the SDP. Are they just talking, or do they mean to have this strict approach towards immigration?"¹²

Another example of the strategy relates to the electoral efforts of the *Greens* to challenge the *Christian Democratic Union* (CDU) as they sold their economic message to voters who may not traditionally associate the party with the policy area in the 2021 German federal elections. Additionally, however, the *Greens* are faced with the other German political parties campaigning on green-ecological policies (Gehrke *et al* 2021). The CDU is increasingly incorporating climate change considerations into their campaign in response to the increased support for the Greens in comparison to their traditional opponent the SDP. Gehrke *et al* (2021) quote Norbert Röttgen, a CDU MP, stating that the CDU would "become stronger at the expense of the Greens when our policies emphasize that intelligent climate and economic policy aren't contradictory, but are

¹¹ Note that Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2020) find, however, that social-democratic/left-wing mainstream parties do not electorally benefit when they try to accommodate and move towards the more extreme immigration and anti-EU positions typical of the extreme right parties.

¹² Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Peter Jensen, a *Danish People's Party* (DPP) consultant, in English, in Copenhagen, Denmark on May 27, 2019.

mutually reinforcing." Like the left-wing parties incorporating immigration policies to mitigate potential electoral losses to the radical right-wing, the situation in Germany demonstrates a potential case of a right-wing mainstream party using policies from the left to mitigate negative electoral costs.

It is not only mainstream parties that strategize, however. Spoon and Williams (2021), for example, find as they examine the extent to which green parties emphasize economic policies (the traditional issue space owned by the mainstream parties), that the ability for the greens to position themselves against mainstream parties hinges on the electoral strength of other parties located ideologically to extreme the left of the green party. Thus, the green parties' ability to shift and compete relies on the challenges and threats coming from its left. For euroskeptic parties, as with green parties, the opening of electoral space due to mainstream party convergence provides the opportunity for their "mainstreaming" into socio-economic policy areas such as welfare (Akkerman *et al* 2016) beyond their owned issue space. Moving beyond a purely policy seeking, this allows the party to draw in new voters and maximize potential office and policy gains (Muller and Strøm 1999).

3.1.2 Euroskeptic policy expansion and its constraints

Euroskeptic parties could expand into the open electoral space, moderating and campaigning on issues they had not previously to capture new groups of voters. Parties need to differentiate themselves to attract voters, and the convergence of parties towards the center blurs this differentiation, creating spaces for the challengers such as the euroskeptic parties to strategically insert themselves, if they choose to do so, and making it more difficult for the centrist parties to compete (see Downs 1957; Cox 1990; Kitschelt 1995).

This is due to the need of product differentiation as "parties cannot adopt identical ideologies, because they must create enough product differentiation to make their output distinguishable from that of their rivals, so as to entice voters to the polls" (Downs 1957b, 142). Convergence of the mainstream parties lessens the available "products" from which the voters choose, but also opens the policy spaces that new parties, like the euroskeptic parties or other issue specific parties, enter and campaign on. This allows the parties to distinguish themselves to counter the mainstream parties. Kitschelt (1988) for example in examining left-libertarian parties notes how new societal preferences and the inability of institutions such as political parties to address these preferences leads to dissatisfaction. In these cases, new political parties "will form only when the *unresponsiveness* of existing political institutions coincides with favorable *political opportunities* to displace existing parties" (Kitschelt 1988, 209). Euroskeptic parties and other new entrants demonstrate the ability to capitalize on the convergence of mainstream parties to differentiate themselves and attract those voters that previously voted for other parties.

Spoon and Klüver (2019) building off these arguments, demonstrate how the dealignment and convergence of the parties has facilitated the opportunity for the parties, particularly euroskeptic parties, to differentiate and attract new groups of voters than they received in previous elections. Voters having viewed the more centrally positioned parties as unresponsive, shifted their allegiances to parties campaigning on their preferred policies and offering a greater choice of alternative policies. Matilla and Raunio (2012) show the disconnect between the anti-integration attitudes of constituents in Western European states and parties located more towards the center of the party system. These parties did not react to the anti-integration preferences, committed to more pro-integration policies, and this led to the establishment and growth of many radical right-wing parties at the expense of the more centrist parties. Persson *et al* (2019), examining the impact of
euroskeptic parties in the European Affairs Committees of Denmark and Sweden, demonstrate increased anti-EU statements made overall in the committees, but also that these parties offered more policy alternatives to voters than those previously presented by other parties. So, while these parties are challenging the liberal democratic norms, they are also providing voters through democratic means greater policy alternatives beyond what they had done previously. As parties converged towards the center, they lost their distinctiveness, allowing euroskeptic parties additional policy areas *and new sets of voters* to capture, expanding their own electoral support to the detriment of the centrist parties.

This is not to say that it is easy for euroskeptic parties as they often find it difficult to moderate on policy positions due to two key features. First, the beforementioned strategies of their opposition parties can box them out of potential policy areas to campaign on. The mainstream parties convey strategies to move closer to the party's position on immigration or expand into policy areas previously ignored to prevent the euroskeptic party from gaining a foothold.

Second, the composition of euroskeptic party voters tends to be more ideological/partisan and steadfast in holding the parties to account for any signs of deviation from the party's owned issue. This theoretically limits the larger existing pool of voters closer to the median available to euroskeptic parties, more extreme euroskeptic parties, and necessitates that instead they respond to the interests of the more partisan voters that tend on average to comprise a larger proportion of their party's core voter support. As an example, Adams *et al* (2006) demonstrate that efforts to moderate on policies according to popular opinion on the issue results in a backlash from their traditional supporters and takes away from their electoral success as they are "prisoners of their ideologies" (Adams *et al* 2006, 516). By shifting focus to different policies and away from the owned issue space, the party risks separating itself from its core supporters. Likewise, euroskeptic parties find it difficult to alter their policy positions if their base consists of voters that are on average more rigid in their support for the party's policies and unlikely to support a moderation of the party's policies if it perceives this moderation is abandoning the party's core values. Parties emphasizing an owned issue space, however, need to be more responsive and more congruent to the policy preferences of these voters as they need these voters to turn out to vote at the election time (Carrubba 2001; Kriesi 2007; Ezrow *et al* 2011).

Richard Jomshof, Secretary of *Sweden Democrats* and MP of the *Riksdag* in Sweden, highlighting the problem states:

"So there is a slow turn within the new members within the party...They still believe that, we should, you know, address issues connected to mass immigration and Islam and things like that and we should defend certain values, but they are more like into nature and stuff like that...And since we are a quite big party today...you can also talk about us having perhaps a one little more liberal section and one more conservative perhaps. I don't know, but it didn't always used to be like that. The bigger we get it tends to be like that..."¹³

The quote shows that for the Sweden Democrats, the expansion of new voters includes those that support policies and positions for the party beyond those traditionally held by the party. The inclusion of the voters that may support a more conservative approach to immigration in alignment with the party's traditional position, but a more moderate stance on other policies such as the environment, shows the different camps within the party's voters that they need to appease in subsequent elections if they are to keep these new voters while simultaneously avoiding defection of their traditional base.

¹³ Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Richard Jomshof, Secretary of the *Sweden Democrats* and MP of *Sweden Democrats* in *Riksdag*, in English, in Stockholm, Sweden on June 4, 2019.

This is a classic example of the problems associated with the supra-class strategy (Przeworski and Sprague 1988). The strategy is based off the authors' observations of social democratic party strategies to attract both working and middle-class voters as they cannot win with working class voters alone. As the party attempts to lessen the importance of class and capture the middle-class voters, it increasingly alienates and loses support from the working class. Thus, the social democratic parties were constantly faced with a trade-off dilemma, balancing how much of the working class vote it was willing to lose to gain the middle-class vote. The earlier case concerning the quote from the *Sweden Democrats* illustrates a supra-class strategy and the trade-off dilemma that euroskeptic parties need to make regarding the policies and degree of moderation that they successfully achieve without bearing electoral losses. While the euroskeptic parties may insert themselves into electoral spaces on issues where there is an incongruity between the voters and mainstream parties, to capture voters located closer to the median, they additionally need to be mindful of their existing voters.

3.1.3 The voter response

With an open electoral space as the mainstream parties converged to the middle, euroskeptic parties or other new entrants have the opening necessary to expand their policy offerings. "Mainstreaming" and moderating positions on policies is meant to attract new voters, but do these voters even pay attention and switch to the party? Moreover, do the euroskeptic party's core supporters who, if they are listening to the cues of their party, see moderation as a betrayal of the party's traditional positions and turn from the party?

To assess these questions, this study focuses on two types of voters, vote switchers and vote abstainers. Vote switchers are defined as those voters that switch the party that they vote for

between elections, while vote abstainers do not vote in the subsequent election (Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Hong 2016). Vote choice can be strategic, voting for the parties that the voter views as optimally utilizing their vote to maximize preferences such as for a specific policy or configuration in the governing coalition (Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997). Whether the voter approaches their choice in a strategic way, and how this leads to switching or abstaining, relates to the available policies offered by the parties in the system as these primes the motivations of the voter.

This additionally assumes that the voters are updating the information on party positions, listening to see if and how parties are responding to what they consider is their most important policy or basket of policies. There is evidence that voters do update their information on party positions. Adams *et al* (2011) exploring election manifestos find "no substantively or statistically significant evidence that voters adjust their perceptions of parties' Left-Right positions in response to the policy statements in parties' election manifestos...find no evidence that voters adjust their Left-Right positions or their partian loyalties in response to these policy statements." (Adams *et al* 2011, 371) Instead, the authors suggest that voters instead focus on the party's overall image, reacting to their perception of what the party stands for as opposed to what the party is saying it would like to do if given the opportunity to govern.

Fernandez-Vazquez (2014), however, finds that following campaigns, voters' perception of the party's left-right position shifts in the direction of the election platform expressed in their party manifestos. Adams *et al* (2014) narrow their scope to looking at European integration policy positions of parties, finding that voters, especially the party's supporters, do appear to update their perceptions, and that these typically align with the direction observed by political experts. Seeberg *et al* (2017) in examining cases in Denmark, additionally find that voters pay attention and update their perceptions on party positions. Nor was this confined only to high information voters, noting that "both high and low awareness voters changed their perceptions of the parties' positions. In other words, our study suggests that voters are fully capable of observing parties' behaviour and adjusting their perceptions of them accordingly." (Seeberg *et al* 2017, 350). The evidence supports the view that voters are aware of the positions that the parties are taking. They notice when party positions are ambiguous or difficult to differentiate from the other parties in the system. This has direct implications on when to expect them to switch or abstain their vote.

Under a proximity model of voting (Downs 1957a), voters rationally choose the party that is closest to their policy preferences, maximizing the utility of their vote. While traditionally perceived on a unidimensional left-right spectrum, increasingly this space is viewed in a multidimensional lens and where incongruence in the electoral space between parties and voters both ideologically and in terms of policy preferences has increased (Albright 2010; Stecker and Tausenpfund 2016; Bakker et al 2018). The convergence of the mainstream parties, and lack of differentiation on important policies have resulted in an incongruity between the parties and the ideological and policy preferences of the voters. As a result, voters may respond and switch parties or abstain either through sincere voting or out of protest (Kselman and Niou 2011; Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Dassonneville et al 2015; Hong 2016). Moreover, as Dassonneville and Dejaeghere (2014) note, "having a party close by does not necessarily induce switching to this party. Once voters decide to switch parties, however, they are most likely to do so towards the closest one" (p596). If another party, for example a euroskeptic party, enters the electoral space and represents a policy that the voter prefers most, positioning the party closer to the voter ideologically on the issue, then switching to the party the voter is expressing a sincere vote. However, the voter through their switched vote could also be using the opportunity to protest as a signal to the parties located more towards the center that they want the party to be more focused on a particular policy.

The vote switchers are a challenge for the euroskeptic parties as they can withdraw their support in subsequent elections and re-shift their vote back towards those parties located closer to them ideologically. If vote switchers are switching merely out of protest to show the mainstream, centrist parties that there are no "acceptable mainstream parties to vent their frustration" (Pop-Eleches 2010, 238), then these voters could also switch their votes away from the party and back to the centrist parties in the next election depending on how the party responds strategically and alters its own policy positions to counter the euroskeptic party threat. This study does not intend to demonstrate whether the voter is acting sincere or out of protest, rather it focuses on the opportunity that arises when euroskeptic parties enter new policy areas and potentially position themselves closer to new sets of voters. Consequently, vote switchers become more prevalent as they shift their votes away from the converging parties and towards those parties that differentiate themselves on policy dimensions that are either unrepresented by the parties or where the party's position is blurred and difficult to be assessed by the voter.

3.2 Theories of euroskeptic parties and voters

Examining the effect of euroskeptic party convergence to their country's average policy position on potential vote switchers, voters that did not vote for the euroskeptic party in the preceding election, I assume that the vote switchers transfer their vote towards the euroskeptic parties due to the lack of differentiation between the mainstream parties and the electoral strategy of the euroskeptic parties to provide different policy positions. These voters, seeing the overall trend towards convergence and lack of differentiation between parties, seek out the signals and cues from other parties in the system. They could switch and select the euroskeptic party merely as a sign of protest to garner the attention of the more politically mainstream parties (Hobolt and Spoon 2012), but I theorize that the vote switchers are motivated to transfer the vote instead because the euroskeptic party has signaled increased moderation on various policies. While maintaining policy positions perhaps on the most important issue to their party, there are other policy areas whereby the euroskeptic party enter or moderate on and still maintain differentiation from the converged parties in the middle. Note that due to the convergence of the other parties, the euroskeptic parties only need to highlight which topics are underrepresented in the political discourse to provide a cue to the voters. This is, for example, what we see with populist far right parties as they highlight anti-globalization economic policies and welfare policies to attract voters as the mainstream political parties converged towards neo-liberal/internationalist economics. Vote switchers may not agree with all the polices offered by the euroskeptic party, some of which are more extreme than is their preference. However, other policies where the euroskeptic party moderates to a degree while still maintaining a differentiated policy position from the other parties in the system, positioning themselves nearer to the voter on that policy, is expected to attract those vote switchers seeking varied policy alternatives than those offered by the mainstream parties.

This strategy of moderation to capture vote switchers is constrained by two different features. First, while convergence of parties located towards the center occurs, they still represent policy positions that the euroskeptic or challenger party must balance against. As the euroskeptic party moderates, however, this results in an increasing lack of policy differentiation between itself and the centrist parties on the policy area. If the euroskeptic party converges too much towards the average policy position of the party system, the party then loses the policy differentiation that draws the new voters to the euroskeptic party in the first place. It is increasingly difficult to attract those vote switchers closer to the median as they look elsewhere and are drawn to a party that is able to differentiate itself against the other parties (see Downs 1957; Spoon and Klüver 2019). Fortunato (2021), while not writing about euroskeptic parties, provides an example of this loss of differentiation in his discussion concerning the coalition between the Liberal Democrats and Conservative Party in the UK between 2010-2015. The collective responsibility within a coalition required the *Liberal Democrats* to negotiate and alter policy positions to align with the Conservative Party, but this process also meant that the party lost its differentiation that made it electorally successful in the preceding election and the loss of support from voters that saw the negotiations as one-sided against the Liberal Democrats. While the party attempted to highlight its differences from the Conservative Party and other parties in the subsequent election, it was an uphill battle against the voters' perceptions and resulted in a sharp decline in the electoral support. This example highlights how I expect that the euroskeptic party runs into the same problem as the *Liberal Democrats.* The more that the party moderates and converges to the average policy position in the system, I theorize that vote switchers see this as too conciliatory with the other parties. The party at a level loses that differentiation from the other parties, positioning itself further away from the voter on that policy, and lessens the propensity for the vote switchers to vote for the euroskeptic party. As such, I expect that there is a curvilinear relationship between moderation and the propensity for the vote switching to occur for the euroskeptic parties. This leads to the first set of hypotheses:

HV-1: As the euroskeptic party moderates, non-euroskeptic party voters (t - 1) switch their vote to that party in the next election (t).

HV-2: If the euroskeptic party moderates too much, non-euroskeptic party voters (t - 1) are less likely to switch their vote to that party in the next election (t).

Shifting to the euroskeptic party's existing voters and the potential for over-moderation and policy convergence, the party needs to be careful not to over-moderate as this can lead to a backlash among its traditional base of supporters that tend to be on average more committed to the party's original position on the preferred policy. As Green (2011) argues, parties have a goal to demonstrate a commitment to the issues that their core supporters care about or risk alienating these supporters if they seek to branch out to different groups in the electorate. Moreover, supporters do recognize, to a point, that a party needs to act strategically at times against opposition parties and shift positions accordingly (Keman 2011; Karreth *et al* 2013). Abou-Chadi (2018) notes that increased attention paid to highly salient issues increases the party's responsiveness to the broader electorate, while costing the priorities of their traditional voters. If the euroskeptic party moderates too far from the preferred position of these traditional voters, I theorize that this leads previous party supporters ultimately to abstain from voting for the party in subsequent elections. The third hypothesis states:

HV-3: If the euroskeptic party moderates, the party's voters (t-1) will abstain in the next election (t).

I should stress that the euroskeptic party garners the vote from their core voters due to their commitment to the voter's preferred policy position and absence of other parties representing the issue. And so, the lack of party alternatives that are willing to represent the preferred policy position for these voters in the system leads these voters then to abstain. If there is a new entrant into the preferred policy area of these voters, then increasingly they may switch and vote for these parties representing their preferred policy position. This was the case in the 2019 Danish general election where the *New Right* and the *Hard Line* parties campaigned against the DPP as becoming too lenient on immigration policies (Panagiotopoulos 2017). This is a challenge for euroskeptic parties as they must balance between moderating to maintain support from vote switchers without driving their key base of support to these new entrants. This study is focusing principally on

whether the core supporters of the euroskeptic party abstain their vote in the subsequent election and controls for instances where other euroskeptic party options are available for their voters.

3.3 Research design

3.3.1 Dependent variables

For this study, the main dependent variables are derived from the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES)¹⁴ that provides modules of survey questions in national post-election studies released every four years, with modules for 1996-2016 fully released and the current module 2016-2021 partially released. In this study, I use survey data from 25 Western and Central and Eastern European countries made available through the CSES. The CSES asks respondents current and previous election voting preferences and, of particular interest for this study, whether the respondent switched or abstained their vote from the previous election to the current election, and which parties they switched from/to.

Using the CSES surveys, I construct one dependent variable (Vote Switcher) which measures if the respondent stated they switched their vote between parties from the previous election to the current election and, if so, if they indicated that they then switched their vote from a non-euroskeptic party to a euroskeptic party. For this variable, (0) indicates that the voter did not switch from a non-euroskeptic party to a euroskeptic party to a euroskeptic party and (1) signifies that the voter reports making the switch to the euroskeptic party. This variable helps me to explore the two first two hypotheses on moderation (HV-1 and HV-2). The second dependent variable (Abstention

¹⁴ For Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, please see <u>https://cses.org/</u>.

Voter) using the CSES measures if the respondent reported voting in the previous election but abstained their vote in the current election. For this variable, (0) indicates that the voter reported voting in the preceding election and still voted for the same party in the current election, and (1) signifies that the voter indicated that they voted in the preceding election but abstained their vote in the current election. This variable allows me to assess (*HV-3*).

Each of these independent variables are then recoded to account in the models for the principal question of the chapter, whether voters switch to the euroskeptic party and if the euroskeptic party's existing voters abstain. As such, I employ the coding for euroskeptic parties described earlier in Chapter 2. First, I code the party as euroskeptic (Euroskeptic) against the other parties in the party system where (0) denotes non-euroskeptic and (1) denotes all-euroskeptic party types. I classify soft-euroskeptic parties (Soft Euroskeptic) as 0 being non-euroskeptic and 1 being only soft-euroskeptic, and I classify a hard-euroskeptic party (Hard Euroskeptic) as 0 representing both non-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic parties and 1 being only hard-euroskeptic. Using these different euroskeptic party categories, I recode the vote switcher and vote abstention variables so that I am only looking at those instances where the vote switcher stated they switched and switched to the euroskeptic party, and second whether they stated they voted for the euroskeptic party in the previous election but abstain in the current election. I include both a pooled model of the policy dimensions as well as a breakdown of each individual policy area. For these first two dependent variables, as they are both binary, I employ fixed effects multilevel logistical regression models with a robustness check clustered by CSES country and election date. The coefficient estimates are reported in their odds ratios.

3.3.2 Independent variables

To examine the hypotheses, I use distance measures calculated using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data that provides an analysis of the party manifestos put forward by the parties for their national election. As outlined in Chapter 2, I utilize five different policy areas from the CMP data: **Economic, Welfare, Environment, Multicultural**, and **International**. Recall that I am using an average policy distance formula, where I calculate the five policy dimensions based off the party's country average policy position at the time of their national election. This includes all political parties measured by the CMP from the 1990s onwards for Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe that are then also made available through the CSES.

There are two additional features that are included in these analyses. First, I create a pooled measure of position distances of all policy dimensions collectively (**Pooled Policy Distance**) that is analyzed along with each separate policy area. Second, with (*HV-2*), I expect a curvilinear relationship whereas the distance converges towards the average policy position, the probability that the vote switchers vote for the euroskeptic party increases to a level after which this declines due to the lack of differentiation between the euroskeptic party and the other parties in the system. Accordingly, I include a squared term for each of the separate policy distances and the pooled policy distance to assess whether this curvilinear relationship is present in the models.

3.3.3 Control variables

Respondent Specific Micro-Indicators The first grouping of control variables represents micro-indictors that are specific to the respondent and include the respondent's position on the left-right political scale (Left-Right), their position on this scale from the party they voted for in the previous election (Voter – Party Distance), age (Age), gender (Gender), education levels (Education) (Newton 1999; Whiteley 1999; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Uslaner 2008; Newton and Zmerli 2011). Where the respondents position themselves on the traditional left-right scale has demonstrated influence in the respondent's level of political participation and vote preference. As the individual shifts their placement on the scale towards the extremes, I expect that they then prefer more extreme policy preferences that go unaddressed by the parties located more towards the center politically. This decreases the apparent responsiveness of the parties in the middle and lead these individuals to switch their votes to parties offering different policy alternatives, such as the euroskeptic parties. However, this also increases the likelihood that voters abstain their vote for the euroskeptic party if the party converges too closely with the average position of other parties in the system. The models also consider the distance between the individual's ideological placement and the placement of the party they voted for in the previous election (measured the party's rile score provided by the CMP in the current election minus the individual's self-placed ideological score). As the models are exploring vote switching and abstention, I expect the greater the distance between the voter and the party increases the likelihood that the voter switches or abstain their votes in the subsequent election. The individual's age, gender and level of education additionally demonstrate influence concerning political participation and their party vote preference. These respondent variables are provided through the CSES survey rounds.

Party-level Indicators The second grouping of control variables represents party level indicators. First, I include a simple dichotomous governing coalition participation variable (**Coalition**) that measures whether the party was a member of the governing coalition and the relative size of the party in the legislature (**% Seats**) following the preceding election. As Klüver

and Spoon (2020) find, junior partners in a coalition face significant electoral losses in subsequent elections after they join the coalition as they are unable to achieve campaign promises and differentiate themselves from other members of the coalition, resulting in a greater likelihood that vote switchers transfer their vote to a party that differentiates itself in the subsequent election. Moreover, as euroskeptic parties typically maintain junior partner status when joining a coalition, they are less likely to be able to differentiate themselves from their coalition partners that are less extreme in their policy preferences, and therefore are theoretically more likely to face electoral losses in a subsequent election. This is indicative of the probability that their core supporters abstain their vote in the subsequent election as they view their party as converging too close with other parties in the system. Data for these variables comes from the European Journal of Political *Research* that releases yearly political data on the composition of the national legislature, cabinet, and offers an overview on important political events with the governing coalition in the preceding year. Lastly, I include the party's RILE score (RILE). The variable provided by the CMP represents an aggregated measure of various policies used to place the political party on the leftright political scale. I recode the RILE score to a 0-10 scale with (0) being the left-most position and (10) being the right-most position on this scale (Laver and Budge 1992). Then I calculate the distance of the party's RILE score from their country's overall mean RILE score. Using the same **Formula** 1, X_1 is the party's RILE at the time of the election and \overline{X} is the mean RILE score of all available parties in the party's country at the time of the election, excluding the RILE score of X_1 from the calculation, to determine **Y**. After this calculation, I take the absolute value of the distance **Y**. This creates a singular positive measure of the RILE score distance from the average country score. This variable is included as the more (less) extreme the RILE score the euroskeptic party exhibits from the average country score decreases (increases) the chances that a vote switcher transfers its vote to the party in the subsequent election. Additionally, if the euroskeptic party's RILE score converges too far towards the average country score, the chances for its voters to abstain their vote for the party in the subsequent election increases. Lastly, I account for the presence of additional euroskeptic parties (**Euroskeptic Option**) in the party system for the voter to choose from. For vote switchers, the presence of additional euroskeptic parties offers varied differentiated alternatives for them to select in the subsequent election, thus increasing the likelihood that they switch their vote. For abstainers, the presence of additional euroskeptic parties also provides additional alternatives. For these voters, however, the control helps to account for the opportunity to vote for an additional euroskeptic party as opposed to abstain their vote in the subsequent election. I expect that with euroskeptic party alternatives present in the system, the voter is less likely to abstain and instead switch their vote to the other euroskeptic party.

Country-level Indicators The third grouping of control variables represents country level indicators. The first accounts for the unemployment (**Unemployment**) rate in each country and is provided by the European Commission's Eurostat databases.¹⁵ The economic variable is lagged one year from the election for each respective country to capture any lagged time effects on the electorate. In general, economic perceptions are theorized to influence political trust and degree of political participation in democratic institutions such as voting (Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001; Hetherington and Rudolph 2008) by shaping retrospective and prospective perceptions of the individual. A downturn in the economy and increased unemployment rates could draw these voters to switch their votes to the euroskeptic and other opposition parties if they offer economic policies that represent the individual's preferred economic policy position. I also include a control variable for whether the party's country is

¹⁵ For Eurostat, please see <u>https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat</u>.

located within "Western Europe" or in "Central-Eastern Europe" (**CEE Europe**). This is done to account for regional economic differences, the legacy of communism on their communities' approach to social issues, and the new democratic institutions and political parties created after the end of the communist regimes. All these factors influence the degree to which the political parties place themselves on various policy issues.

3.4 Model analyses

3.4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 3.1 contains summary statistics¹⁶ for voters that switched to the euroskeptic parties and then those voters that voted for the euroskeptic party in the preceding election but abstained in the current election. For those switching to the euroskeptic parties, they skew male, in their upper 40s and have at least higher secondary education. They are located slightly center left on the ideological spectrum and about 1.8486 from the ideological position of the party they voted for in the previous election. The latter two findings are important to highlight. If switchers are coming from the center-left politically, this may be indicative of the success that the euroskeptic parties have had in capturing former social democratic and other center left party voters. This may also be indicative about the types of policies that the parties are campaigning on, discussing economic and welfare policies amenable to these voters, in addition to their anti-globalization/immigrant rhetoric. As the switchers also exhibit a greater distance from the party that they voted for in the

¹⁶ See **Appendix C.3 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 3** for a full report on the summary statistics of the variables of interest in this chapter.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Euroskeptic Vote Switcher					
Gender	2,701	0.4491	0.4975	0	1
Age	2,695	49.0416	15.4206	18	93
Education	2,652	2.2824	1.1156	0	6
Left-Right Self Placement	2,497	4.9812	2.2962	0	10
Voter - Party Distance	2,196	1.8486	1.4996	0	8.5294
Euroskeptic Vote Abstainer					
Gender	628	0.5446	0.4984	0	1
Age	626	48.4281	16.5718	20	93
Education	619	1.8627	1.0759	0	6
Left-Right Self Placement	532	5.0977	2.4491	0	10
Voter - Party Distance	502	1.7275	1.4435	0.039	6.2806

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Vote Switchers and Abstainers

previous election, this could mean that these voters are more likely to be swayed by a party that is positioning itself closer to them on their preferred policy, providing the opening necessary for the euroskeptic parties to successfully capture these voters.

For the euroskeptic party voter that abstained in the current election, they are found to instead skew female, also in their upper 40s (though younger than the vote switchers) and have at least a lower secondary education on average. Compared to the vote switchers, these voters are located to right of center on the ideological spectrum and are located closer to the party they voted for in the previous election (in this case the euroskeptic parties) than found with the vote switchers. These are interesting findings. First, the fact that the euroskeptic party may face higher abstention votes from voters that state that they are center-right ideologically makes sense in that if the party moves too close to the center, there are often not many other party alternatives for those located on the right to switch to compared to the typically more fragmented left. If a further extreme euroskeptic party enters the party system on the right, this may instead attract these voters, but

lacking this alternative they face no other option other than continuing to vote for the same party or to abstain. Second, the fact that the abstention voters in the models skew towards women shows the difficulty in keeping this group of voters committed to the euroskeptic party. Often, these parties have a difficulty in attracting female voters, and as noted in an interview I conducted with Paula Bieler of the *Sweden Democrats*,¹⁷ are aware of the need to address policies that are important to this segment of the population such as pocketbook issues, family values, or the costs of supporting immigrant communities. With women exhibiting higher abstention rates, this may be indicative in the difficulty that euroskeptic parties have in continually receiving support from these voters if they move too far from their preferred policy position.

3.4.2 Pooled model analyses¹⁸

Table 3.2 displays the results for the models using the pooled policy distance for vote switchers. With the distance measure, the lower the distance from the average policy position indicates that the position expressed by the party is less extreme, more moderate. Additionally, to account for extreme positions that may skew results, I limit the model to only those parties expressing a policy distance of (2) and below. Lastly, a robustness check for each model is clustered by CSES country and election date.

In the table, no significance is demonstrated for the policy distance on vote switching behavior. For the soft or hard euroskeptic parties, neither a moderated position nor more extreme position is found to increase the ability of the party to attract new voters to the party. Looking at

¹⁷ In-person interview author conducted with Paula Bieler, MP of *Sweden Democrats* in Riksdag, in English, in Stockholm, Sweden on June 5, 2019.

¹⁸ See For full pooled and individual policy models results, including control variables, see Appendix D.1 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 3. For the predicted marginal effects see Appendix E.1 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 3.

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Pooled Policy Distance	0.8909	1.8940	1.9892
	(0.8900)	(1.5601)	(1.4029)
Pooled Policy Distance (sqd)	-0.0578	-1.9835	0.0655
	(0.7393)	(2.2070)	(0.9465)
Controls:			
Coalition	-1.0468**	-0.8384†	
	(0.3878)	(0.4357)	
Seats%	-8.0797**	-6.1395*	-26.1344***
	(2.5583)	(2.4264)	(6.1432)
Rile	0.1258	-0.1059	0.3525
	(0.2682)	(0.3554)	(0.7013)
Euroskeptic Option	1.1078**	0.2459	1.0827
	(0.4032)	(0.6478)	(0.7566)
Unemployment	0.0887*	0.1133†	0.2669***
	(0.0352)	(0.0583)	(0.1205)
CEE	-0.1700	-0.3644	-1.5384
	(0.4609)	(0.5818)	(1.1758)
Gender	-0.1688*	-0.0786	-0.5084**
	(0.0687)	(0.0709)	(0.1618)
Age	-0.0122***	-0.0124***	-0.0124*
	(0.0037)	(0.0036)	(0.0053)
Education	-0.1471†	-0.1029	-0.3216*
	(0.0800)	(0.0931)	(0.1272)
Left - Right	-0.0241	-0.0266	0.0964
	(0.0711)	(0.0898)	(0.1041)
Voter - Party Distance	-0.0240	-0.0211	-0.1925
	0.0596	(0.0649)	(0.1231)
Constant	-1.3119	-0.2139	-2.9446
Observations (N)	100,047	77,237	55,662
Group Clusters (N)	48	34	21

Table 3.2 Pooled CMP Policies Model, Vote Switchers

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties.

All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties

Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10 + p < 0.05 + p < 0.01 + p < 0.01

the control variables provide some interesting findings. First, if the euroskeptic party was a member of the governing coalition following the preceding election and as the percentage of seats held by the euroskeptic party in their national assembly increase, there is an expected decrease in the likelihood that the voter switches to the euroskeptic party. This may be showing the difficulty of differentiation. As the chapter on coalition participation will outline, being a member of the governing coalition is challenging, especially for those parties that are junior partners. Participation is theorized to lead to a difficulty in differentiation for the party, where the voters ascribe the policies of the senior coalition party onto the junior party. The models show that this may indeed be occurring for the euroskeptic parties as membership in the governing coalition hampers their ability to attract new voters to the party in subsequent elections. Unemployment rates also seem to reward euroskeptic parties. As the unemployment rate increase, there is an expected increase in the odds that the voters switch to the euroskeptic party. As I explore later with the individual policy areas, this could be demonstrating efforts made by the euroskeptic parties to insert themselves into economic and welfare policy areas to attract voters, especially those voters traditionally supporting the social democratic and other center left parties. Finally, looking at the individual level control variables, a few patterns emerge. First, with gender the estimates shows that females are less likely to vote for the euroskeptic parties, in particular the hard-euroskeptic parties. As both age and education levels increase, there is also a decline in the likelihood that the voter switches to the euroskeptic parties. These two findings make sense given that party attachment becomes less flexible as the voter ages, and as more educated voters typically gain the most economically from globalization and liberal economic policies, protectionist and other antiliberal policies advocated by the euroskeptic parties harm their capacity to interact with the global economy.

Table 3.3 examines the relationship, reported as an odds ratio, between the pooled policy distance and whether the respondent, previously voting in the prior election for the euroskeptic party, stated they abstained their vote in the current election for the same party. Both the alleuroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic parties' models, show that when the policy distance increases, it is less likely that the voter abstains their vote for the party they voted for in the previous election. The model shows an odds ratio of (0.6902) in the all-euroskeptic party model and (0.6388) in the soft-euroskeptic party model. The pooled policy distance measure is not significant with the hardeuroskeptic model. While the relationship is found to hold significance in two models, the predicted marginal effect is small, only significant with a pooled policy distance between 0 to 3 and decreasing the probability that the voter abstains their vote from 6.74% to 2.32% for the alleuroskeptic party model, and 7.28% to 2.01% for the soft-euroskeptic party model, see Figure 5.2. These relatively marginal effects potentially show the strong partisan attachment of the voters as well as their willingness to continue to stick with the party line even as the party becomes more extreme in their policy positions. Overall, the all-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic party models do lend support for (HV-3), as the decreased pooled policy distances, i.e., moderation, lead to increased probabilities of abstention for the previously euroskeptic voters, however slightly the odds of doing so.

With the controls, there is significant and positive finding in the all-euroskeptic and softeuroskeptic models for the central and eastern European countries. The greater the policy distance, more extreme policies, leads to increased rates of abstention voting for the euroskeptic parties in these countries. With the individual level controls, increased age, education, ideological placement, and voter – party distance results in decreased probabilities of abstention voting for the euroskeptic party. With the age control, this is again explained by established political attachment

	(Model 4)	(Model 5)	(Model 6)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Pooled Policy Distance	0.6902†	0.6388*	0.8931
	(0.1406)	(0.1311)	(0.1269)
Controls:			
Coalition	0.8615	0.8924	
	(0.1829)	(0.2065)	
Seats%	1.3602	1.4659	4.1093
	(0.9608)	(1.5192)	(4.3545)
Rile	1.1235	1.1505	0.7711
	(0.2191)	(0.2668)	(0.1737)
Euroskeptic Option	0.6266	0.5775	1.0230
	(0.2061)	(0.2280)	(0.3172)
Unemployment	1.0145	1.0381	0.9868
	(0.0221)	(0.0435)	(0.0210)
CEE	2.4558**	2.6238*	3.5394
	(0.7131)	(0.7248)	(1.3401)
Gender	1.0981	1.0182	1.5716
	(0.0930)	(0.0906)	(0.4611)
Age	0.9836***	0.9867***	0.9580**
-	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0154)
Education	0.7154***	0.7533***	0.6100***
	(0.0517)	(0.0662)	(0.0909)
Left - Right	0.9183*	0.9071**	1.0344
	(0.0326)	(0.0318)	(0.0777)
Voter - Party Distance	0.8619**	0.8558*	0.9875
	(0.0494)	(0.0531)	(0.0968)
Constant	0.3278	0.2220	2.0915
Observations (N)	30,915	25,340	5,410
Group Clusters (N)	43	29	19

Table 3.3 Pooled CMP Policies Model, Vote Abstentions

Notes: Model 4 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 5 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 6 hard-euroskeptic parties.

All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0



Figure 3.1 Pooled Distance Model, Vote Abstainers – Soft Euroskeptic Parties

as these voters are more set in their political positions and aligned with the party brand. The estimate for education is interesting and perhaps shows greater education leads to increased knowledge of a party's political positions and brand. This increased awareness means that the voter is choosing the euroskeptic party for a particular reason and purpose. This is particularly important for the hard-euroskeptic parties as the more highly educated voter is deciding to vote for a party espousing extreme policy positions about the EU and thus demonstrate their alignment with the general aims and policies of the party. Being more extreme on the left-right ideological spectrum also makes sense as to why there is a decrease in the probability for abstention voting. For these voters, there are fewer party alternatives to choose from the further extreme their political ideological placement. With limited options for switching, they only have the option to abstain or to continue supporting their euroskeptic party. It appears that the latter option is more likely.

Table 3.4 provides a summation of the findings from the pooled models. First, the vote switcher models demonstrate no relationship between policy distance, i.e., how extreme the party

positions itself, and the likelihood of attracting vote switchers to the euroskeptic parties. Taken together these do not show evidence for either (HV-1) or (HV-2). For vote abstentions, the alleuroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic party models show that lower levels of policy distance, more moderation, does lead to increased probabilities of vote abstentions from their previous voters, supporting (HV-3). Altogether, the pooled models show that it is not beneficial for the euroskeptic party to moderate their policies. It is more beneficial for the euroskeptic party to maintain more extreme policy positions as this increases the ability of the party, in the case of soft-euroskeptic parties to minimize vote abstentions in subsequent elections. Moreover, the vote switcher pooled model shows decreased vote switching for those parties that participate in the governing coalition and with increased seat share in their national assembly. Facing these odds, it is again only beneficial to maintain more extreme policy positions as this enables the party the opportunity to counter these effects that potentially decrease their electoral odds in subsequent elections. This is concerning not only for the purposes of this study, but more broadly when we think about euroskeptic parties and how they affect political discourse and ultimately policy outcomes.

	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	Model	Model	Model
HV-1: Vote Switcher	Х	Х	Х
HV-2: Vote Switcher, Curvilinear	Х	Х	Х
HV/2: Abstantian Vatar	1	I	v
nv-3: Abstention voter	\checkmark	\checkmark	X

 Table 3.4 Hypotheses and Findings – CMP Pooled Distance Models

Notes: $X = null hypothesis; \psi = coefficient estimate below 1, policy moderation found;$ $<math>\uparrow = coefficient estimate above 1, more extreme policy found$

3.4.3 Individual policy position models

Table 3.5 breaks the pooled model down into individual policy areas, and how this predicts the propensity for vote switching. Note that for these individual policy models, I removed the squared term of each policy area. Due to a low number of observations of hard euroskeptic parties, the squared term was highly skewed towards zero and as a result impacted the estimates for the individual policy areas. Consequently, I am unable to empirically examine the expected curvilinear relationship, (*HV-2*). For the all-euroskeptic party model, only the multicultural policy area demonstrates a positive significance in the model. Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their multicultural policy distance from 0 to 2 relates to an increase in vote switching from 5.47% to 98.73%. While these do not align with the expectations of (*HV-1*), the results point to an interesting finding. The multicultural policy area is one of the owned issue spaces of the euroskeptic parties. The results show that instead of moderation on the policy area to attract the new voters, a more extreme policy position is most electorally beneficial for the parties.

With the soft-euroskeptic parties, only the multicultural policy dimension exhibits a significant and positive estimate in the model, showing that a more extreme policy position results in a greater probability of attracting switchers to the party. Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their welfare policy distance from 0 to 1 relates to an increased probability of vote switching from 7.05% to 53.93%. This shows that for the soft-euroskeptic party, emphasizing multicultural policies positioned further away from the average policy position in the country is an advantageous strategy to capture the vote switchers. For example, the *Polish People's Party* (PSL) in the 2007 Polish parliamentary election demonstrate a multicultural policy distance of (0.1125), meaning there is an increased probability of a switcher voting for the party of 9.55%. The *Socialist Party* (SP) of the Netherlands in the 2006 Dutch general election demonstrate a

	(Model 7)	(Model 8)	(Model 9)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Economic Distance	-0.7459	-1.1331	6.0101†
	(1.3859)	(1.6332)	(3.6466)
Welfare Distance	0.8106	1.0636	-10.0651*
	(1.1040)	(1.4371)	(4.6765)
Environment Distance	0.1313	-0.4631	7.3686***
	(0.6668)	(0.7391)	(1.8461)
Multicultural Distance	4.5875***	3.4330*	10.5602***
	(1.2183)	(1.6636)	(2.3016)
International Distance	0.0435	1.4829	9.4880
	(2.6125)	(3.2605)	(5.7904)
Controls:			
Coalition	-1.1248*	-0.9487*	
	(0.4571)	(0.4462)	
Seats%	-6.2121*	-5.7012*	-40.1690***
	(2.4847)	(2.3890)	(11.1474)
Rile	-0.0389	-0.0046	-1.4195
	(0.3807)	(0.4437)	(1.0283)
Euroskeptic Option	1.8391***	0.8533	4.6300**
	(0.4370)	(0.7707)	(1.5344)
Unemployment	0.1104*	0.1236†	0.2614*
	(0.0531)	(0.0705)	(0.1164)
CEE	-0.1449	-0.2975	5.74557
Candan	(0.5/10)	(0.6388)	(3.1358)
Gender	-0.1690**	-0.1088	-0.4235***
٨дө	(0.0649) _0 01/1***	(0.0719) _0 0121***	-0.0105
Age	-0.0141 (0.0859)	(0.0037)	(0.0056)
Education	-0.1691*	-0 1098	-0.5455***
	(0.0831)	(0.0981)	(0.0831)
Left - Right	-0.0090	-0.0083	0.0808
5	(0.0831)	(0.1006)	(0.0911)
Voter - Party Distance	-0.0369	0.0078	-0.4462***
,	(0.0613)	(0.0647)	(0.0989)
	()	()	(,
Constant	-2.2722	-1.8608	-3.2581
Observations (N)	20003	15441	11300
Group Clusters (N)	46	34	21
i - ()			

Table 3.5 CMP Policies Models, Vote Switchers

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

Notes: Model 4 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 5 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 6 hard-euroskeptic parties. All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic partie: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Clustered by CSES country election date.

multicultural policy distance of (0.1447), with an increased probability of capturing a switcher at about 10.34%. This demonstrates that for the soft-euroskeptic parties, more extreme multicultural policy positions benefit the party, helping them to capture new segments of voters.

The most significant results are provided by the hard-euroskeptic model, where all the policy areas except for the international policy area demonstrate significance. Of the four, only the welfare policy dimension demonstrates an increased level of policy distance decreases the probability of capturing the switchers, see **Figure 3.2** Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their welfare policy distance from 0 to 0.60 relates to a decreased probability of vote switching from 7.96% to 0.96%. For example, the *Coalition of the Radical Left* (SYRIZA) of Greece in the 2012 Greek legislative election demonstrated a welfare policy distance of (0.0411), with a decreased probability of capturing a switcher at about 7.28% or a decline of about 0.68%



Figure 3.2 Welfare Distance, Vote Switchers – Hard Euroskeptic Parties

compared to if the party converged with the average position of the party system. This shows how overall, the hard-euroskeptic parties are electorally punished the closer the party is to the average policy position of the party system in the policy area, receiving fewer vote switchers, than if the party maintained a more extreme, less moderated position.

The three remaining policy areas demonstrate that greater policy distances, more extremism, results in greater probabilities of capturing the vote switchers. First, with the economic policy dimension and the predicted marginal effects, an increase in the economic policy distance from 0 to 0.90 results in an increased probability of vote switching to the hard-euroskeptic party from 3.32% to 10.65%. For example, the economic policy distance for SYRIZA was about (0.2892) in 2012 Greek legislative election, meaning that there was an increased probability of securing a switcher at about 5.72%. Second, with the environment policy area and the predicted



Figure 3.3 Multicultural Distance, Vote Switchers – Hard Euroskeptic Parties

marginal effects, an increase in the policy distance from 0 to 1.4 results in an increased probability of vote switching to the hard-euroskeptic party from 1.32% to 19.27%. The environment policy distance for SYRIZA was (0.668), meaning that there was an increased probability of capturing a switcher at about 7.19%. Finally, with the multicultural policy dimension and the predicted marginal effects, an increase in the policy distance from 0 to 1.25 results in an increased probability of vote switching to the hard-euroskeptic party from 0.53% to 35.95%, see **Figure 3.3**. Turning to the *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) in the 2015 UK general election, the multicultural policy distance was about (0.5224), meaning that there was an increased probability of capturing a switcher at about 6.15%. All the above demonstrate that for the hard-euroskeptic party, the best electoral strategy remains one of extremism, except for welfare policies. There is little incentive is the party is targeting new voters to moderate positions to capture their vote.

The control variables for the vote switcher models demonstrate similar findings as with the pooled models. First, both being a member of the governing coalition following the preceding election, in addition to increased seat shares in the national assembly leads to a decrease in the overall probability that the parties capture switchers. Again, this may be showing support for studies demonstrating the difficulties that junior coalition partners face in subsequent elections, unable to differentiate themselves from their senior coalition partners to the voters. Interestingly, the presence of additional euroskeptic parties in the party system demonstrate a significant and positive effect on switch voting. This could be showing that an increase in the number of euroskeptic parties in the system provides more party and policy alternatives to choose from, leading to a greater probability of vote switching. Additionally, in all three models, increased unemployment rates result in greater probabilities of vote switching to the euroskeptic parties. As the economic and welfare policy dimensions demonstrate significance to varying degrees in the

hard euroskeptic parties model, it is not surprising that the increased unemployment rates lead to vote switching. The hard euroskeptic parties are offering the voters different policy alternatives that may be viewed as beneficial in countering adverse economic situations. Looking at the individual level controls, gender, age, and education are significant in the models. The gender and education variables demonstrate that females and more educated individuals are less likely to switch to the hard euroskeptic parties, and older individuals are less likely to switch to either soft or hard euroskeptic parties.

Table 3.6 breaks the pooled model down into individual policy areas, reported as odds ratios, and how this predicts the propensity for abstention voting. In the all-euroskeptic party model, only the economic and environment policy distance demonstrate significance, showing a decrease in the odds of abstentions for the euroskeptic parties as the policy distance increases. Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their economic policy distance from 0 to 1 relates to a decreased probability of vote abstentions from 10.33% to 2.54%. As the environment policy distance increases from 0 to 2, there is an expected decrease in the probability of abstention voting from 8.50% to 3.57%. In each case, greater extreme positions result in a decrease in the probability that previous euroskeptic party voters abstain their vote in the current election. This means, however, that it is when the party expresses a decreased policy distance, more moderation, that the rates for abstention are higher, supporting the theoretical expectations of (*HV-3*). As with the vote switching models, it appears then that for the euroskeptic party maintaining greater policy differentiation from the average policy position of the party system, in this case on economic and environment policies, is better electorally for the party than if it were to moderate.

For the soft-euroskeptic party model, only the economic policy distance is significant, demonstrating that an increase in the policy distance results in a decline in abstention voting for

	(Model 10) All	(Model 11) Soft	(Model 12) Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(32)	(32)	(32)
Independent Variables:			
Economic Distance	0.2133*	0.2098†	11.2211**
	(0.1513)	(0.0069)	(9.8993)
Welfare Distance	0.6570	0.5266	0.0331***
	(0.3401)	(0.3468)	(0.0177)
Environment Distance	0.6198†	0.5638	0.2254***
	(0.1780)	(0.2382)	(0.0791)
Multicultural Distance	0.6231	0.7072	0.0002***
	(0.2363)	(0.3914)	(0.0003)
International Distance	2.4305	3.5382	43.7721***
	(1.5151)	(3.0399)	(41.2898)
Controls:		()	(,
Coalition	1.0086	1.1386	
	(0.1732)	(0.2481)	
Seats%	1.2277	1.3812	5.07e-08***
	(0.8925)	(1.3091)	(1.78e-07)
Rile	1.1196	1.0882	0.2808***
	(0.2070)	(0.2097)	(0.1053)
Euroskeptic Option	0.7214	0.7205	0.1180***
	(0.1722)	(0.1963)	(0.0582)
Unemployment	0.9961	1.0274	1.3255***
	(0.0221)	(0.0454)	(0.0730)
CEE	2.5924***	2.3913***	6.0599***
	(0.5792)	(0.5599)	(2.9520)
Gender	1.0904	1.0084	1.5453
	(0.0912)	(0.0851)	(0.4825)
Age	0.9828***	0.9853***	0.9608*
	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0160)
Education	0.7285***	0.7723***	0.6210**
	(0.0431)	(0.0520)	(0.1026)
Left - Right	0.9212*	0.9007**	1.1000
	(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0773)
Voter - Party Distance	0.8640**	0.8593**	0.9918
	(0.0462	(0.0499)	(0.1001)
Constant	0.5367	0.4497	693.9199
Observations (N)	6183	5068	986
Group Clusters (N)	43	29	18
	75	25	10

Table 3.6 CMP Policies Mode	els, Vote Abstentions
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Standard errors in parentheses. $\ \ ^{+}p < 0.10 \ \ ^{*}p < 0.05 \ \ ^{**}p < 0.01 \ \ ^{***}p < 0.001$

Notes: Model 10 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 11 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 12 hard-euroskeptic parties All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.



Figure 3.4 Economic Distance, Vote Abstainers – Soft Euroskeptic Parties

the party, see **Figure 3.4**. Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their economic policy distance from 0 to 1 relates to a decreased probability of vote abstentions from 11.22% to 2.73%. For example, the *Socialist Party* (SP) of the Netherlands in the 2010 Dutch general election has an economic policy distance of (0.1934), meaning that there is a decreased probability vote abstentions of about 8.72%, a probability that is 2.5% lower than if the party converged to the average policy position of their party system at the election. As with the all-euroskeptic party model, a greater extreme economic policy position results in a decrease in the probability that previous euroskeptic party voters abstain their vote in the current election. This means, however, that it is when the party expresses a decreased policy distance, more moderation, on economic policies that the rates for abstention are higher, supporting the theoretical expectations of (*HV-3*).

As with the vote switcher models, the hard-euroskeptic party models for vote abstentions demonstrate the most robust results. All the policy areas are significant in the model, however with

two different outcomes. First, with the economic and international policy areas, an increase in the policy distance, less moderation, leads to an increase in the rates of abstention voting by the euroskeptic party voters, contradicting the theoretical expectations of (*HV-3*). **Figure 3.5** depicts the relationship of economic policy distance on abstention voting for the hard-euroskeptic parties. Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their economic policy distance from 0 to 1.2 relates to an increased probability of vote abstentions for the hard-euroskeptic parties from 4.11% to 34.80%. For example, the *Danish People's Party* (DF) of Denmark in the 2001 Danish general election has an economic policy distance of (0.1965), meaning that there is an increased probability in vote abstentions of about 6.34%, a probability that is 2.23% higher than if the party converged to the average policy position of their party system at the election. For the international policy area, increasing their policy distance from 0 to 0.90 relates to an increased probability of vote abstentions for the hard-euroskeptic parties an increased probability in vote abstentions for the hard-euroskeptic parties from 0 to 0.90 relates to an increased probability of vote abstentions for the hard-euroskeptic parties from 0 to 0.90. With the DF, the party has an



Figure 3.5 Economic Distance, Vote Abstainers – Hard Euroskeptic Parties

international policy distance of (0.3976), meaning that there is an increased probability in vote abstentions of about 10.05%, a probability that is 7.37% higher than if the party converged to the average policy position.

While these two policy areas demonstrate that greater extreme policy positions lead to greater rates of voter abstentions, the three remaining policy areas demonstrate the opposite relationship in alignment with the theoretical expectations of (HV-3). Looking at the predicted marginal effects, increasing their welfare policy distance from 0 to 1.2 relates to a decreased probability of vote abstentions for the hard-euroskeptic parties from 17.57% to 0.48%. SYRIZA in the 2012 Greek legislative election had a welfare policy distance of (0.0883), meaning that there is a decreased probability in vote abstentions of about 14.27%, a probability that is 3.30% lower than if the party converged to the average policy position. With the environment policy distance of hard-euroskeptic parties, an increase from 0 to 2 in the policy distance results in a decreased probability of vote abstentions from 7.05% to 0.43%. SYRIZA demonstrated had an environment policy distance of (0.5332), meaning that there is a decreased probability in vote abstentions of about 3.51%, a probability 3.54% lower than if the party converged to the average policy position. Finally, with the multicultural policy distance, an increase from 0 to 1.0 relates to a decreased probability in vote abstentions from 19.00% to 0.05%. SYRIZA had a multicultural policy distance of (0.3272), meaning that there is a decreased probability in vote abstentions of about 4.72%, a probability that is 14.28% lower than if the party converged to the average policy position.

As with the pooled models, there is significant and positive finding in the all-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic models for the central and eastern European countries. The greater the policy distance, more extreme policies, leads to increased rates of abstention voting for the euroskeptic parties in these countries. With the individual level controls, increased age, education, ideological placement, and voter – party distance results in decreased probabilities of abstention voting for the euroskeptic party. With the age control, this is explained by established political attachment as these voters are more set in their political positions. The estimate for education perhaps may show increased knowledge of a party's political positions and brand, and so the educated voter that chooses the euroskeptic party may be doing so for a particular reason and purpose and thus are less likely to abstain their vote.

Table 3.7 provides an overview of the general findings of the individual policy models. Overall, for soft-euroskeptic parties, more extreme multicultural policy positions result in an increased probability of capturing vote switchers. Finally, for soft-euroskeptic parties, an increase in the economic policy distance decreases the probability of vote abstentions. This demonstrates that as the party converges towards the average economic policy position, greater abstentions are likely by the euroskeptic party's voters, thus affirming theoretical expectations.

The hard-euroskeptic party models provide the most robust results. First, with vote switching, only the welfare policy dimension aligns with the theoretical expectations of the chapter as the party is more likely to capture new voters when they emphasize greater movement towards the average welfare policy position of the party system. The economic, environment, and multicultural policy areas demonstrate the opposite relationship. As the hard-euroskeptic parties become more extreme in these policy areas, it is expected that they then attract more vote switchers to the party. Looking at the probabilities for abstention voting, more extreme policy positions in the economic and international policy dimensions results in greater vote abstentions by their voters, contradicting what I expected. However, the welfare, environment, and multicultural policy dimensions do align with the theories of the chapter as they show how a more moderated position by the hard-euroskeptic parties leads to increased probabilities that their voters abstain.

		Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
		Leonomy	Wendle	Environment	Watteditural	international
All Euroskeptics	HV-1: Vote Switcher	х	Х	х	\uparrow	х
	HV-2: Vote Switcher, Curvilinear	х	х	x	х	х
	HV-3: Abstention Voter	\checkmark	х	\checkmark	х	х
Soft Euroskeptics	HV-1: Vote Switcher	х	x	x	↑	x
	HV-2: Vote Switcher, Curvilinear	х	х	х	х	х
	HV-3: Abstention Voter	\checkmark	х	x	х	х
Hard Euroskeptics	HV-1: Vote Switcher	\uparrow	\checkmark	\uparrow	\uparrow	х
Luioskeptics	HV-2: Vote Switcher, Curvilinear	х	х	х	х	х
	HV-3: Abstention Voter	\uparrow	\checkmark	\checkmark	\downarrow	\uparrow

Table 3.7 Hypotheses and Findings - CMP Policies Models

Notes: X = null hypothesis; ψ = coefficient estimate below 1, policy moderation found;

 \uparrow = coefficient estimate above 1, more extreme policy found

Taken together, the findings offer a mixed bag regarding the how moderation by the euroskeptic parties impacts voter choice. Largely, however, it appears that with regards to attracting the vote switchers, more extreme policies espoused by the euroskeptic parties is a successful electoral strategy. Moreover, except for economic and international policy issues, the parties are not punished by their existing voters if they emphasize more extreme policy positions. In fact, there is an incentive not to moderate as this increases the chances that their existing voters abstain their votes, but only for the hard-euroskeptic parties.¹⁹

¹⁹ See **Appendix F.1 Robustness Check – Chapter 3** for a robustness check using the CHES data. The robustness check includes a brief explanation of the results and the output tables for the models.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to explain whether policy moderation by the euroskeptic parties could be used to attract new voters. Maintaining strong positions in specific issues theoretically limits the ability of the party to capture additional votes, especially from median voters. Instead, the party in this circumstance garners the votes from those viewing the specific issue as most salient. For euroskeptic parties, that traditionally meant votes from those supporting antiglobalization/immigration preferences. Moderation opens the possibility then to enter new issue spaces, increasing the party's policy offerings and appeal as a legitimate alternative to voters closer to the median and not from their traditional voting bloc. Increased electoral success then provides the party additional influence in advocating for these policies, whether they are within the governing coalition or in opposition. The evidence presented in this chapter, however, shows a different picture. Instead, differentiation is a more effective signal for the party to attract vote switchers and maintain the support of the party's pre-existing voters. Differentiation through extremism, not moderation, is the key to electoral success for these parties.

As opposed to moderation, increased policy distances between the euroskeptic party and other parties in their party system that attracts vote switchers to the party. Moreover, the models additionally suggest in some cases moderation leads to greater abstention voting by their existing voters. Accordingly, it appears that strategically for the euroskeptic party it is better to emphasize differentiation and maintain extreme policy positions, as moderation depresses the extent of switchers that the party obtains, while also reducing the possibility of abstentions for the party from its existing voting support base. This lends support to spatial models of party competition (Cox 1990; Downs 1957) arguing that product differentiation is needed to achieve maximal electoral gains. Voters seek out those parties representing different policies, those parties deviating

from the average policy position in the country and offering a unique product for their consumption. This chapter supports this perspective.

The implications of these findings should not be underestimated. The overall study aimed to find evidence suggesting moderation as a beneficial strategy for the euroskeptic party to compete and attract new voters. If greater policy extremism instead is the more beneficial strategy, then concerns that the success of the euroskeptic parties relates to more confrontational politics and an erosion of liberal policies and norms may indeed be valid. As noted in other chapters of this project, even among non-euroskeptic parties there has been a shift on average towards euroskepticism over time. I argue that the rise and challenge of the euroskeptic parties is one potential explanation. Non-euroskeptic parties, acknowledging the success in euroskepticism have shifted policies accordingly to recapture voters. If the euroskeptic parties had this effect, then it stands to reason those other positions often advocated by the parties such as on anti-immigration or antiglobalization could also be taken up by the mainstream parties if viewed as electorally successful. Indeed, Denmark's Social Democratic Party's shift towards more a restrictive immigration policy position is viewed as a response to the challenge posed by the Danish People's Party in capturing their voters. If differentiation and more extreme policy positions continue to electorally benefit the euroskeptic party as evidenced in this chapter, then shifts as seen with the Social Democratic *Party* are likely to continue and lead to greater instances of illiberal policies in Europe.

What mechanisms potentially are leading to these results? As discussed earlier in this chapter, the need for policy differentiation is fundamental for parties to effectively compete. I find that greater policy distances lead to greater chances of vote switching and this may be due to a few potential reasons that focus on the protest versus sincere voting mechanisms. First, it may be that voters, frustrated with the convergence of the mainstream parties and lack of policy differentiation

switched to the euroskeptic parties out of protest and to signal their displeasure with the political positions of the mainstream parties. The CSES data does not allow the possibility to know exactly the motivations for the voter's decision to switch parties, but there is indeed the possibility that a share of those switching to the euroskeptic party are switching out of a motivation to protest. The more extreme the euroskeptic party positions itself from the average party system position, the further it is from the median voter position in the system. Accordingly, the motivations of the voters choosing the more extreme euroskeptic party further away from themselves compared to a more closely positioned party align, I theorize, with the protest mechanism. Under this situation, euroskeptic parties that exhibit increasingly extreme policy positions are the best option for the protest voters seeking to increase the "shock" value of selecting the party. The more extreme pick increases the shock to the mainstream party in hopes that their vote sways the mainstream parties to take note and alter policy positions in subsequent elections.

The second mechanism relates to how product differentiation leads to a sincere voting mechanism. While the above section stresses the protest motivation, it may also be that the strategy of policy differentiation itself leads to sincere voting. If voters prefer a wide range of policy options and convergence between the parties causes a bland set of policies with nominal differentiation, then euroskeptic parties offering differentiated policies are providing the missing product options to the voters. In this case, the more extreme the policy offering, the more differentiated the party is from the party system average. Voters, wanting different policy options on which to select, turn to these parties not under a protest mechanism, but rather because they are instead sincerely choosing a party offering a new and different product on the market. Used as an example earlier, the *Danish People's Party* campaigned on issues such as economic protectionism and the welfare state to counter the *Social Democratic Party* and capture their voters who were

also more culturally conservative. A lack of differentiation between the *Social Democrats* and other mainstream parties created opportunity for the DPP to offer economic and welfare policy options that were more extreme from the average position of the policy areas in the country, increasing the products available for the voters to choose from in the election. Former *Social Democratic Party* voters may have voted for the DPP out of protest, but it is equally probable that these voters wanted policies no longer offered by the *Social Democratic Party* and sincerely transferred their vote to the DPP as this party provided the different option.

I should stress that given the structure of the CSES data, teasing out whether the voter switched was either due to a protest or sincere voting mechanism is not possible. This chapter does demonstrate, however, that in my future research I need to consider ways to examine more closely whether the voter is selecting euroskeptic parties via the sincere or protest mechanism. In-person interviews and panels of voters who switched to the euroskeptic parties will provide greater clarity on this matter, establishing a linkage on how the differentiated, but extreme, policies offered by the party led to the voter's decision to switch their vote.

4.0 Chapter 4 – The Effect of Governing Coalitions

This chapter examines the behavior of the euroskeptic parties as it relates to participation in their government's governing coalition and how this results in the moderation of the party on various policy positions towards the average policy position within their respective states. In particular, the chapter explores what happens to the euroskeptic party, broken into soft- and hardeuroskeptic, when it takes the role of a junior partner in the governing coalition. As I explain in the theoretical chapter, these parties, after signaling their potential coalition partners, are expected to negotiate and decide which policies they are willing to moderate on compared to their more hardline, traditional issues to participate in the governing coalition. This chapter empirically investigates this relationship and in particular the degree that the euroskeptic party in the governing coalition is shaped by this participation. It explores potential factors, such as the number and composition of cabinet portfolios awarded to the party following the negotiations on coalition formation, that hinders any effects of moderation exerted by other senior members in the governing coalition. The results show that for parties categorized as hard-euroskeptic, and when looking at specific policy areas, participation in the governing coalition under certain features results in a moderation of the party, though under other policy areas there is an increase in the policy distance, less moderation of the party, from the average party policy position in the country.

4.1 Coalition formation and subsequent effects – An overview

4.1.1 Where, how, and why to expect coalition formation?

Before introducing the theorized effects of coalition participation, I first introduce the literature on coalitions, their formation and the challenges and benefits for a party to decide to join, and subsequently continue to support, the coalition. Additionally, I examine studies exploring how the participation of a party, in particular a junior role, influences the party in subsequent elections. First, however, I outline and discuss the motivations of the parties, what their goals are for participating in the coalition, how this shapes the negotiations between potential coalition partners.

Strøm (1990b) and Müller and Strøm (1999) outline three distinct party types that represent differing goals conveyed by political parties: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking. Vote-seeking political parties are considered to represent an approximation of the Downsian model where there is a constant contest for political leaders and elites between gaining political control and appealing to voters. Politicians, according to Downs (1957a), "are motivated by the desire for power, prestige, and income...their primary objective is to be elected...This in turn implies that each party seeks to receive more votes than any other." (30-31) This contest is realized by politicians and parties seeking to maximize vote plurality and positioning themselves in the appropriate ideological dimension, what Downs refers to as the median ideal point (see also Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Budge and Laver (1986) note how parties convey these messages to maximize their vote-share among policy-seeking voters to win elections and then secondarily, if elected, act on the issues to maintain or further the policy-seeking voter support in subsequent elections, then they assumingly seek out policies and issues through which to respond

to voters, differentiating themselves on the policy issue from other parties within that issue space. This is, for example, argue by scholars such as Meguid (2005, 2008) when examining party strategies, noting how the larger mainstream parties highlight an issue already represented by a smaller party to capture the voters of the party that may be closer to the median voter position and thus limit the smaller party's electoral success.

Office-seeking political parties differ from voter-seeking parties as their primary goal is maximizing control over political office benefits, that is, "private goods bestowed on recipients of political discretionary governmental and subgovernmental appointments." (Müller and Strøm 1999, 5) Riker (1962) distinguishing the office-seeking party model from the Downsian/vote-seeking party model notes how opposed to seeking a maximization of votes, these parties "seek to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of winning." (p33) Riker emphasizes that when a coalition is a likely governing outcome, then the primary goal of the party is to maximize its control of positions in the government. Upon achieving an electoral victory, political leaders of the office-seeking party use both the distribution of portfolios to key actors within the participating parties in the coalition and to ensure its own appointment to key positions. Budge and Laver (1986) and Laver and Schofield (1990) examine the office-seeking model and note that the benefits of being awarded offices is valued both intrinsically and instrumentally. Achieving office for the party leadership provides financial and prestige benefits that are associated with cabinet.

Policy-seeking parties, on the other hand, seek to maximize their impact on specific public policies. This political party model developed in response to a "policy-blindness" in the conceptualization of party types (Strøm 1990a, 567). The perceptions of vote-maximization and of political leaders concerned primarily with achieving political office largely resulted in a view

of parties not emphasizing public policy. If a political party is formed to address and to enact policies to achieve a preferred policy outcome, then when they are approached to join a coalition, they negotiate with the senior partner(s) to receive portfolios and other positions that are beneficial to achieving their policy goal. As these parties are policy specific, they lack the broad appeal to the electorate compared to the mainstream parties that emphasize more their vote-seeking and office-seeking behavior. Consequently, policy-seeking parties achieve lower electoral turnouts which lessen their appeal as a coalition partner unless the party possesses just enough seats that renders it the only possible coalition partner and the capacity to act as the kingmaker within the coalition, as demonstrated by the Greens following the 1998 German federal election.

Note that while there are three different types of motivations specified for parties, this does not mean that a party's motivations are mutually exclusive. For example, a party advocating for a specific policy position could also then seek the office associated with the policy position. Greenecological parties support environmental policies and, if offered the opportunity, seek to hold the office/cabinet portfolio controlling environmental policies. The prestige of holding the office supporting their preferred policy and the fact that they campaign on a specific policy dimension suggests that they are both a policy-seeking and an office-seeking party, and this affects their negotiating strategy with a potential coalition partner.

Based on these types of motivations for politicians and parties, where and how do we see coalitions form? Scholars such as Axelrod (1970) posited a policy-based coalition theory arguing that coalitions develop among parties with similar policy and issue preferences. This results in parties with widely divergent preferences, for example those between a centrist party and a party located at a more extreme position on the policy dimension within a country, being less likely to come to an agreement and form a coalition. Instead, Axelrod contends, we see political parties operating in proximity to one another on a policy dimension forming coalitions. Consequently, Laver and Schofield (1990) note that parties located more centrally on a policy dimension are also more likely to enter into governing coalitions as they only need to provide minor policy concessions with potential coalition partners. When parties attempt to form a coalition, they do so in what Strøm (1990b) refers to as "fine orchestration" (51), where the senior and potential junior parties negotiate terms for the coalition's formation and minimize the number of parties needed to support the government to maximize the benefits awarded to the coalition's members, such as cabinet portfolios and other office positions, the minimal winning theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Gamson 1961).

While parties bargain and join coalitions located closer to them politically on policy dimensions, this does not mean that these same parties share the exact same policy preferences. As a result, parties trying to enter a coalition are faced with two different options. First, the senior and junior partners agree on which portfolios and other cabinet positions are under the purview of the party receiving them. Under this 'policy dictator' (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Müller and Meyer 2010) perspective, the party awarded the portfolio has independence in implementing their party's preferred policies. This is useful in situations where the parties have widely divergent policy preferences. A contrasting perspective on coalition formation examines how parties bargain within policy dimensions until a common compromise between the coalition partners is reached (see Müller and Strøm 2000, 2008; Müller and Meyer 2010; Klüver and Spoon 2017). If, for example, a party is awarded the portfolio pertaining to social welfare policies, they do not act independently per their own party's ideal policy position, but rather the coalition's compromised point. Martin and Vanberg (2014) show this in their study

on policymaking in multiparty governments, noting how policies adopted by a coalition government generally reflect these compromised points.

4.1.2 The difficulties for junior coalition partners

Although the evidence supports this more collegial model (Klüver and Spoon 2017) of bargaining and compromise in coalition formation, there are potential roadblocks to negotiation that make it difficult to reach a compromised point. Notably, and important for the subsequent discussion on niche parties, are the concerns for junior parties within the coalition after they compromise and join the coalition on their ability to achieve policies for their party members and voters going forward. One of the principal problems that junior coalition partners face revolves around the issue of clarity of responsibility within the coalition government (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). With multiparty coalition governments, the average voter is unable to discern which party or actor within the coalition is held accountable for either policy successes or failures. Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) note how the inability of voters to differentiate between parties within a coalition government results in voters heuristically ascribing the same ideological stance to the participating parties such that "to the extent that voters care about the ideological or policy positions of individual parties but face uncertainty about the specific views and stances of the individual parties, then cabinet membership provides a natural shortcut because it conveys ideological information about the set of parties that are in the cabinet" (462-463). Fortunato and Adams (2015) additionally find that voters typically project the policies of the prime minister's party onto the junior party coalition members. Again, demonstrating that for the junior member participation results in being overshadowed by senior coalition parties and a difficulty in distinguishing itself from them in subsequent elections. Hjermitslev (2020) also

notes how it may be advantageous for the prime minister's party to attract junior coalition members as these parties insulate the prime minister's party in subsequent elections when compared to parties that attempt to govern alone.

An example of this concerns the *Liberal Democrats* in the United Kingdom following the 2010 United Kingdom general election. The party then under the leadership of Nick Clegg entered into the governing coalition with David Cameron's Conservative Party. In the subsequent 2015 general election, support for the *Liberal Democrats* collapsed, dropping from 57 to 8 seats in Westminster. This was in part due to two factors, first the *Liberal Democrats* were unable to work with the larger *Conservative Party* to fully achieve the electoral promises made in the 2010 election. Bill Emmott (2015) of the Financial Times writes, "Nick Clegg, the party's leader, made political reform his own main task, and came out with nothing: a humiliating defeat in a referendum on a new voting system ("Alternative Vote") that he himself had previously dismissed contemptuously, no progress on reforming the House of Lords, and just the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, whose real effect may have been to trap the Lib Dems in the coalition for longer than was good for them." The latter part of the quote highlights the second factor, membership in the governing coalition. Quinn *et al* (2011) note how the coalition agreement made between the two parties may have been closer to the Liberal Democrats average position on various issues (the party at the time could be considered center-left according to the authors), but still pulled the party towards the right (closer to the Conservative Party preferred positions). Pulled overall towards the right in exchange for policy concessions that were then left unfulfilled in addition to their support for the coalition's austerity cuts to toe the line with their senior coalition partner rendered the Liberal Democrats open to backlash from voters in the subsequent election. Consequently, the problems associated with the coalition gave the Conservative Party cover and the ability to claim that voters needed to support their party in the 2015 election, as a single party government would allow it to fulfill its promises and enact change without having to worry about a coalition partner that was facing pressures from dissatisfied voters (Guardian 2013). The *Liberal Democrats* may have thought they could as the junior partner be able to push back against the senior partner in the coalition, achieving campaign promises and reduce the extant of austerity, but the opposite occurred, and they, not the *Conservative Party*, would pay the price in the 2015 general election.

The difficulties for junior coalition partners are demonstrated through interviews that I conducted during the summer of 2019 in Europe. Tobias Andersson, National Spokesperson of the *Young Swedes SDU* and MP of the *Sweden Democrats* in the *Riksdag* noted, concerning the potential participation of the party in a governing coalition after the 2018 general election, that:

"I think it was a good thing that we didn't get involved in the government. I think that would have hurt us because we would have been forced to negotiate and leave some of our policies and so on and you know we are going towards tougher times economically and which you know might mean chaos to us. So, I would have liked to be outside of the possible government and be able to give input and make sure our deals are passed. So, I think it was a good thing, even though I obviously am not a fan of the prime minister at this moment, but yeah, I think if we had been in the government, it would have hurt us in the long run."²⁰

Providing a perspective from within the governing coalition, Tiina Ahva, First Vice-Chairman of

the *Blue Reform* in Finland, stated:

"It is obvious that they are trying to kind of undermine us and the power that we have in the government, so it was a constant fight there. It was rather ridiculous... and showed us something about the power dynamics in the government, that they didn't really care for our ideas, and we had to fight tooth and nail for even the things that had already been agreed upon."²¹

²⁰ Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Tobias Andersson, National Spokesperson of the *Young Swedes SDU* and MP of *Sweden Democrats* in the *Riksdag*, in English, in Stockholm, Sweden on June 3, 2019.

²¹ Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Tiina Ahva, First Vice-Chairman of the *Blue Reform*, in English, in Helsinki, Finland on June 10, 2019.

Both quotes demonstrate how parties are well enough aware of the challenges that they face during the negotiations with other potential coalition partners and subsequently the pressures they need to confront from within the governing coalition. They are tapping into the concerns raised in the literature (Klüver and Spoon 2020), supporting the idea that joining a coalition may not be to the junior partner's advantage. Due to the lack of clarity of responsibility, the authors claim, junior partners are unable to differentiate themselves from their partners in the coalition. While there typically is a decrease in the votes that coalition parties receive in the elections immediately following the coalition formation, the authors find that junior partners witness sharper electoral losses than those displayed by the senior partners. It is not surprising then that opposition parties theoretically find it disadvantageous to join a coalition with parties situated opposite their ideological preferences as they may be perceived as indistinguishable from their coalition partners and parties form coalitions with parties located in their policy dimensional neighborhood. Scharpf (1997) and Huber (1999) both note how that even when compromises are made between opposition parties to form a coalition, the lack of clarity of responsibility means they risk being unable to differentiate themselves from their coalition partners to the voters. Consequently, these parties choose, on average, not to compromise on the policies needed to reach an agreement and form the governing coalition. This lack of will to compromise on issues that the parties view as crucial for their success in subsequent elections often results in a lengthened phase for coalition negotiations, typical in the proportional systems in Western Europe (DeWinter and Dumont 2008).

4.1.3 Is it all bad news for all junior coalition partners?

While the challenges for a junior partner to participate in the governing coalition are evident, recent studies show that it may not be all bad news and they may possess attributes allowing them to minimize the negative consequences. Spoon and Klüver (2017) note that within coalitions where the participating parties are more ideologically diverse, voters are more readily able to differentiate between the parties that in turn utilize this potentially to their advantage when campaigning in subsequent elections. These findings challenge previous studies demonstrating how a lack of clarity of responsibility makes it difficult for voters to discern accountability with governing coalitions. As niche parties are more likely to hold ideological preferences different than mainstream parties in the coalition, it is likely that the actions taken by the party leadership participating in the coalition is more perceivable by their voters. Alexiadou and Hoepfner (2019) find this possibility, noting how a party that advocates for a policy that is both salient with their voters and holds the cabinet portfolio responsible for this policy see their bargaining position with the coalition increase. This enhanced bargaining position in theory permits the party to achieve some of their preferred policies that is then conveyed to their voters in a subsequent election. Moreover, Greene et al (2020) demonstrate the positive electoral effects that junior coalition partners sometimes receive in subsequent elections as the number of portfolios, to a degree depending on the types and numbers of portfolios held, they hold in the coalition increases. Importantly, both studies imply that when the party holds the cabinet portfolio connected to the salient policies that are favored by their core voters, then their bargaining position within the coalition is strengthened. This permits them the ability to pushback against demands to moderate coming from other parties in the governing coalition and allows them the opportunity to achieve some of their preferred policies.

While studies show how clarity of responsibility is negatively impacting junior coalition partners, there is evidence illustrating junior partners, in particular niche parties, distinguish themselves from the senior coalition partner. Euroskeptic and other niche parties may be insulated from some of these concerns. Recall that niche parties are traditionally categorized as policyseeking parties as they are issue-specific parties that seek to enact specific policies against the mainstream parties that engage in broad policy agendas (Adams et al 2006; Meguid 2005; 2008; Ezrow 2008; Wagner 2011). These scholars note that the niche parties typically focus on specific issues areas that fall outside the traditional cleavage structures such as 'green' politics, extreme rightist, ethnic-territoriality, or communist movements. Wagner (2011) iterates that the niche parties typically do not concentrate on economic policies as their salient issue, rather utilizing postmaterialist values such as environmentalism, regionalism, and skepticism with the EU integration project as their preferred policies on which to campaign. Consequently, it is argued that this enables the mainstream parties to maintain dominance on economic policy areas, such as with social welfare, while the niche party instead focuses their attention to specific non-economic policy areas. As a result, scholars note that niche parties do not operate under the traditional spatial model and cannot compete in the same manner as the mainstream parties as they have a difficulty to moderate on policies or enter new policy areas to capture voters against the strategies of the mainstream parties (see Adams et al 2006; Meguid 2005, 2008). However, these problems can be overcome, and niche parties are able to distinguish themselves from their senior coalition partners due to the specific policy areas that they typically represent. There is evidence (Spoon and Klüver 2017; Alexiadou and Hoepfner 2019; Green et al 2020) demonstrating instances where parties are capable of either differentiating themselves or negotiating with senior coalition members to receive portfolios that may benefit their bargaining position on preferred policies. The ability for niche parties as policy-seeking parties then gives them that space to potentially differentiate themselves from other members in their coalition, leaving them room to signal their voters. This provides the niche junior party members room to breathe within the coalition thinking they have the connection and support of their voters that they carry over into subsequent elections.

4.2 Theories of governing coalition moderation

Knowing that there are both challenges and potential opportunities for niche parties, in this study euroskeptic parties, in joining a coalition as a junior partner, how does this affect their policy positions? While the literature has examined how participation by junior coalition partners influences their electoral chances in subsequent elections, such as the discussion on clarity of responsibility demonstrates, there is scant discussion about how this participation also affects the party's policy position. For example, we see in the coalition literature that the during the negotiation phase the junior party ultimately needs to bargain with the senior partner. While they may receive enough concessions from the senior party to ultimately agree to join the coalition, they then still need to offer their own concessions as well. The *Liberal Democrats*, for example, are considered to have been pulled towards the right on average towards their senior coalition partner, even though that partner itself was also pulled towards the left on issues. Moreover, we know that parties within the coalition are expected to maintain the agreement, toeing the line to support the policy positions of the coalition. They need to work with other coalition parties and maintain a working relationship to ensure that the concessions they received are enacted by the coalition. This relationship, however, leaves the junior partner susceptible to pressures from other coalition members and have unintended consequences. Currently, the literature has not sufficiently addressed what these unintended consequences entail. While participation, for example, in a coalition may, or not, influence the junior party's subsequent electoral vote share, how do the intracoalition dynamics manifested through their participation in the coalition change the junior party itself?

Briefly recall from Chapter 2 - Theoretical Models of Moderation that I propose a multistage pathway of moderation through a party's participation in their country's governing coalition. This process starts with the potential junior party signaling to other potential coalition partners their willingness to negotiate and potentially join the governing coalition preceding an election. The next stage after the election then theorizes that during the negotiation phase of coalition formation, these junior parties then need to determine which policies to further moderate on or not in exchange for concessions from their coalition partners, what is typically seen in the collegial model (Klüver and Spoon 2017). If a compromise is reached and the junior party participates in the subsequent governing coalition, it is then subjected to intra-coalition pressures by its coalition partners. The pathway model additionally suggests that there are factors that enables the party, such as by the relative size of the party within the coalition, to push back against calls from within the governing coalition to moderate on positions.

For the purposes of this chapter, moderation is discerned by examining the position of the junior party on various policy dimensions against the average policy positions of political parties within their respective countries. This includes examining policy dimensions ranging from ones that the junior party may "own", for example the immigration policy position of the euroskeptic parties, to issues that traditionally lie outside their policy agenda such as social welfare provisions and economic policies. I theorize that euroskeptic parties attempting to join coalitions follow a similar pathway to that shown by the green-ecological parties, such as by the *Greens* in Germany during the 1990s. In the case of the green-ecological parties, the parties typically exhibited early on a more extreme preference on their ideal policy when compared to average position on the same

policy. Yet, the green-ecological parties moderated on their stances over time to such a degree that in some policy areas their positions are indistinguishable from the positions of the mainstream parties, and this is potentially due to their participation in the governing coalition. While the euroskeptic parties demonstrate similar extreme preferences on their preferred policies, such as their anti-EU integration or immigration positions, when compared to the median position of other parties on the topic in their country, over time I expect that they are confronted by a similar set of intra-coalition dynamics that shaped the green-ecological parties as they take on the role of junior partner in governing coalitions.

This moderation is expected as their continued participation as a junior party in the coalition requires them to support compromised points made during the governing coalition's formation phase. If they were to speak out against their coalition partners, then the coalition itself would be in jeopardy of collapse and they risk losing any policy gains that they achieved in the coalition formation negotiations. This seems to be a concern for Finland's *Blue Reform* following their decision to split from the *True Finns*. If they did not remain with the other coalition partners, they were concerned that whichever governing coalition came into place after would simply overturn policies favored by the party with Tiina Ahva of Finland's *Blue Reform* stating:

"I think the original plan of the two other parties was to ditch the *Finns Party*... so just ditch us all and take the *Swedish People's Party/Greens Party* [*Green League*] into the coalition, which is not an ideal situation either, [as] they would have, could have blackmailed them, because they needed their support so much, they could have blackmailed them to change the agenda made two years prior, and for the people in the Blue Reform this was not an ideal situation either because [we would be] losing everything that we had worked for in the government agenda."²²

²² Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Tiina Ahva, First Vice-Chairman of the *Blue Reform*, in English, in Helsinki, Finland on June 10, 2019.

This example demonstrates that with the threat of losing hard-earned compromises from its coalition partners, the junior party member may want to continue to work and compromise with its partners, and continually feel pressured to moderate when requested to maintain both the governing coalition's cohesion and any previously agreed to policy gains that the junior party negotiated with the senior coalition party. Consequently, I first theorize that:

H-C1: The euroskeptic party moderates if it joins a governing coalition.

If the theoretical assumptions of the model are correct, I should discern two patterns. First for the junior party, I expect that it is pulled towards the average position of the other parties in the coalition because of the negotiation processes such as what theoretically occurred to the *Liberal Democrats* following to the 2010 election. If this is accurate then for euroskeptic parties that join a coalition, I expect that they are pulled from the extreme towards the average position of policies in their country by their partners, typically the more mainstream, coalition party member. However, I do not expect this movement to the center to be greater than the senior party's position. To work with the coalition partners, the euroskeptic party needs to take definitive steps in the moderation of policy positions in exchange for the coalition taking up some of its own key policy issues.

Shifting towards what happens once the junior euroskeptic party finds itself within the coalition, its members receiving portfolio appointments are confronted by a degree of pressure through socialization. Recall that socialization is "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005, 804; see also March and Olsen 1998) which begins with a logic of consequences where the actors make decisions based on strategic calculations to achieve their goals. As socialization deepens, there is a shift towards a logic of appropriateness where the actor learns a role within the expectations of the norm that enables the actor to act in

agreement with its principles or the actor exhibits the norms of the community in which they participate because it is the "normal" thing to do, and the norms possess a "taken-for-granted" status for the actor. For junior parties participating in the governing coalition, there is pressure exerted, largely directed by the senior coalition party and through the coalition's prime minister, on it to fall in line and adhere to the coalition's brokered deal.

Under the principal-agent theory (Hawkins *et al* 2006) the agents, those holding cabinet portfolios, are tasked with carrying out specific policy tasks under the direction of the principal (the prime minister). The prime minister is aware the that the junior parties and their ministers have agendas that often test the boundaries of the coalitions negotiated compromise, known as agency slack. To resolve these issues the principal needs to monitor and sanction the agents when slack is observed. Prime ministers can reshuffle cabinet portfolios to monitor and sanction when cabinet officials are perceived as not towing the coalition line on carrying out policies. Indridason and Kam (2008) note how the option to reshuffle cabinet function as a deterrent against agency slack as they "work by sensitizing ministers to the future consequences of their actions." (649) While Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) note that this tool is a bit more difficult in coalition governments as the junior party leadership provides a barrier through which the prime minister must contend, cabinet reshuffles do appear to be one example of how the prime minister can actively engage the junior party and its members within the logic of consequences framework that leads to a continued moderated position on various policies.

The continual interaction and socialization between members of the cabinet and monitoring potential of the prime minister and broader senior coalition party provides an additional pressure of moderation. This is perhaps more important with regards to euroskeptic parties joining a governing coalition for the first time, as they are socialized more into the general expectations of "governing". While previously they were outsiders to the system, and often campaigning on this fact, once within a governing coalition they are exposed to the difficulties of governance, the continual need to compromise and negotiate with members of the coalition. Moreover, due to the euroskeptic party's historically more extreme policy preferences and the contentious decision of the mainstream party deciding to include them in a governing coalition (Twist 2019), I expect that the euroskeptic party and its members holding cabinet portfolios are confronted by a higher degree of monitoring by the prime minister and senior coalition party. This process of socialization results in a continued moderating effect on party members who are subsequently players in determining which positions to take on policies in subsequent electoral cycles.

While moderation is theorized, there are a couple potential factors that may reduce the pressures on the junior party in the coalition to moderate towards the average policy position. For example, the extent of moderation is lessened depending on the number of portfolios awarded to the party following the coalition negotiations. The expected relationship is demonstrated in **Figure 4.1**. The number of seats a party earns in an election translates into the number and types of portfolios they receive (Browne and Franklin 1973; Bäck *et al* 2011). When the party maintains a smaller seat share, it may maintain a role of kingmaker in coalition formation, but it also faces stronger pressure from coalition partners to moderate on positions after the coalition is formed where conflicts with the senior coalition partner and prime minister arise. The smaller the seat share that the niche party brings to the negotiations results in fewer portfolios awarded to the party. This opens the possibility that the larger mainstream parties may exert more pressure for moderation as the lower number of portfolios would make it easier for the prime minister to monitor and ensure that the junior party is toeing the coalition line. The moderating effect of the governing coalition on euroskeptic party actors only increases until a level is reached where the euroskeptic



Figure 4.1 Proportion of Portfolios and Expected Level of Party Moderation

party's representation within the coalition enables it to push back and decrease the effectiveness of moderating from its coalition partners, resulting in a second theory for coalition moderation:

H-C2: The euroskeptic party moderates as its share of cabinet portfolios in the governing coalition increases.

H-C3: As its share of cabinet portfolios in the governing coalition increases, there is a level where moderation decreases.

As demonstrated earlier, it is difficult for a niche party to participate as a junior partner in the coalition and differentiate itself from the other partners for the voters. However, the ability for the issue specific niche party to distance itself ideologically from coalition partners allows some space through which to signal to its voting base. If Spoon and Klüver (2017) are correct, then the niche parties, which differentiate themselves due to their extreme positions on specific owned policy areas, are able to negate some of the clarity of responsibility effects, for example when voters lumping the junior coalition partners together with the senior coalition party (see also Fortunato and Adams 2015). Consequently, the party demonstrates an increased capability to signal its policy successes to its voting base. With increased portfolios awarded to the party, they

could increasingly push back against calls for moderation in negotiations with the other members of the coalition. There is the caveat that with increased portfolios, the party is pressured increasingly to provide "good governance" and therefore moderate to compromise with the members of the coalition. However, the pressure to moderate exerted on the party from directly within the coalition is expected to decrease as the number of portfolios increases past a given level. This results either from an increased ability to differentiate itself from the senior coalition party, or the ability of the leaders of the junior party to obfuscate actions of their members from the prime minister and senior coalition party. As an example, in the 2002 Austrian legislative election, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) garnered about 10.01% of the vote and 3 out of 12 portfolios in the governing coalition under Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel's second government. After the 2017 Austrian legislative elections, however, the party garnered roughly 25.97% of the vote and gained 7 out of 14 available portfolios in the governing coalition with the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz.²³ If the theory is accurate, then under the prior 2002 coalition arrangement, the junior coalition partner, in this case the FPO, is more susceptible to the moderating pressures of the senior partner compared to the more recent coalition where the party held a greater relative share of portfolios, and therefore influence, within the coalition.

I additionally expect that the type of portfolios awarded to the euroskeptic party determines the potential for moderation. Not all portfolios are created equal (Browne and Fests 1975) and are weighted differently for parties. Some hold greater policy saliences for parties, such as the environment portfolio for the green-ecological parties, however, there are the "big three" cabinet portfolios (foreign/interior/finance) as highlighted by Laver and Schofield (1990). If the party

²³ Information regarding electoral vote shares and cabinet composition made available through <u>http://www.parlgov.org</u> and <u>https://www.politicaldatayearbook.com</u>.

possesses one or a combination of the "big three" cabinet portfolios, then I theorize that the party counters any intra-coalition pressures, leading the party to moderate on positions. Why? I contend that the junior coalition party could, for example, signal its differences from the senior coalition party due to increased media exposure received by holding the prominent cabinet positions. Given the amount of exposure historically that the "big three" portfolios receive in the media, and the prestige that is awarded to the position by the party's voters, this provides an additional means for countering the moderating influences of the senior coalition partner. Consequently, I theorize:

H-C4: The euroskeptic party will not moderate if the party holds one or any combination of the "big three" cabinet portfolios (foreign/interior/finance).

Moreover, if a junior party receives one of these portfolios, it is indicative of how important the party overall is needed for the coalition to survive. For example, the Greens of Germany acted as kingmaker in the coalition and received the prominent foreign affairs portfolio after the 1998 German federal election. Consequently, this provides the party some space to differentiate itself further from other coalition members as well as dissuade the other coalition members from pressuring the junior party too much towards moderation due to its role as a lynchpin in maintaining coalition stability. Additionally, if this is indeed evidence of the party acting as a lynchpin, then the ability of the prime minister and the senior coalition party to monitor and potentially sanction any deviation by the junior party minister from any negotiated compromise lessens. The prime minister finds it difficult to monitor or sanction one of the "big three" ministers if any of the portfolios are held by a party that is critical to the survival of the coalition to begin with. This offers the ministers a bit more leeway than may be expected if the portfolios are awarded to members of the prime minister's own party. Consequently, the junior party has some leeway to act more independently and faces less pressure placed down upon it from the senior coalition party to follow negotiated compromises or calls for moderated positions. This is not to suggest that

moderation does not still occur within the party, such as those explored in subsequent chapters of this project, rather that the effect of moderation because of intra-coalition interactions are lessened.

Briefly, one final consideration must be given to how the duration spent by the euroskeptic junior party in the governing coalition influences the expected level of moderation. Repeated iterations of the euroskeptic party participating in governing coalitions results in continued pressures exerted on the junior party during different points of time, i.e., the coalition negotiation phase and socialization via the intra-coalition dynamics phase, that leads the euroskeptic party to continue to moderate broadly on policies towards the average position of the parties within their state, although where this effect lessened as outlined above. As the duration spent in the governing coalition increases, the more the euroskeptic party is exposed to the expectations of "good governance" and the rules of the game compared to when they operated more at the margins of the political discourse. Consequently, I theorize that:

H-C5: The euroskeptic party moderates as it participates in additional governing coalitions.

4.3 Research design

4.3.1 Dependent variables

To examine the theories I outline above, the main dependent variables are a measure of the distance between the party's positions on five policy dimensions relative to the average position of the other parties in their respective country and election date. The positions include measures on five CMP policy dimensions: **Economy**, **Welfare**, **Environment**, **Multiculturalism**, and **Internationalism** as outlined in Chapter 2. Note that in addition to each of the measures addressed

below, I also create a pooled measure of position distances of all policy dimensions collectively (**Distance**) that I then use in a pooled multivariate regression model. Each of these policy dimensions represents a dependent variable measure in the subsequent models.

4.3.2 Independent variables

To test the hypotheses, I first construct three separate independent variables that measure coalition participation and cabinet portfolio composition. Data for these three variables come from the *European Journal of Political Research* that releases yearly political data on the composition of the national legislature, cabinet, and offers an overview on important political events with the governing coalition in the preceding year. Using this data source, I set the values for each of the following three independent variables to account for the governing coalition agreement between the parties after the preceding election in three categories: coalition membership, number of portfolios, and whether the party received any of the "big three" portfolio appointments. For example, I derive the values for the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election from the governing coalition under then Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen.

First, using this data I generate a simple dichotomous governing coalition participation variable (**Coalition**) that measures whether the party was a member of the governing coalition following the preceding election. This variable explores (HC-1) and examines the degree to which membership in the governing coalition explains moderation by the euroskeptic party on the specified various policy dimensions.

The second independent variable, testing (H-C2) and the size of the euroskeptic party within the coalition, examines the number of portfolios held by each party within the coalition as

a percentage of all portfolios (Cabinet%). The percentage is used to account for the different relative sizes of coalitions between countries and periods of time. It is important to highlight that I expect a curvilinear relationship where, as the percentage of portfolios increase, the expectations by the other coalition partners on the euroskeptic party to moderate also increases to a certain level. Accordingly, I include a squared term of this independent variable (**Cabinet%**²) testing (*H*-*C*3). The party needs to demonstrate its capability in negotiating and finalizing agreements with other cabinet officials. It is through these negotiations that the party needs to moderate at times to achieve an agreement between the potential coalition partners. The relationship is curvilinear, however, as if the euroskeptic party maintains fewer portfolios, I expect greater moderation to occur between its position and the average coalition position. I expect an optimal level, however, where the percentage of portfolios held by the euroskeptic party in the coalition lets the junior party push back against the calls for moderation, thus decreasing the expected level of moderation. In instances where the euroskeptic party maintains fewer portfolios, I assert that there is moderation and a decrease in the distance between the euroskeptic party's position from the average position of parties in the system. With an increase in the share of portfolios, however, the rate to which the distance between the euroskeptic party position and the average group position converges decreases. To account for this curvilinear relationship, I square the cabinet percentage term in the third independent variable.

The fourth independent variable allows me to examine (HC-4) and measures the number of the "big three" cabinet portfolios held by the junior party (**Cabinet3**). If the party holds one or any combination of the "big three" cabinet portfolios (foreign/interior/finance) Laver and Schofield (1990) this provides the junior party some space to differentiate itself further from other coalition members as well as dissuade the other coalition members from pressuring the junior party too much towards moderation. Recall that if the junior party has any one of these three portfolios it may indicate its kingmaker status and role as a lynchpin holding the governing coalition together. If this is assumption accurate, then the ability of the prime minister, and the senior coalition party more broadly, to monitor and sanction any deviation by the junior party minister may be undermined. The prime minister finds it difficult to monitor or sanction one of the "big three" ministers if any of the portfolios are held by a junior party that is critical to the survival of the coalition. This offers the ministers from the junior party more leeway than if the portfolios are awarded to members of the prime minister's own party. Consequently, this independent measure helps to determine the degree to which holding any number of the "big three" by a euroskeptic junior party allows it to push back against the intra-coalition dynamics that draw the party towards moderation on various policy dimensions.

In addition to examining the cabinet portfolio composition, I also include a fourth independent variable accounting for the number of years (**Cabinet Years**) that the euroskeptic parties participates in the governing coalition (*H-C5*). There is a time dimension in my argument whereby an increase in the duration of participating in the coalition theoretically relates to an increase in the probability of moderation for the euroskeptic junior party. By incorporating a measure counting the duration that the party participates in the governing coalition, I hope to capture the length of time that the euroskeptic party is exposed to the internal mechanisms of the governing coalition to moderate. If this theory is accurate, then the number of years of the party participating in the coalition corresponds to the shift in their positions on various policies towards the average position in the system. Data for the duration of governing coalitions is available by Andersson *et al* (2014) through the *European Representative Democracy Data Archive*. As the data archive contains information for governing coalitions through 2013, I use the governing

coalition information from Casal Bértoa (2021) and the *Database of WHO Governs in Europe and Beyond*.²⁴ Compared to the first three variables whose values are coded following the preceding election (t -1), I count the value of this variable as the total number of days/years that the party is a member of the governing coalition leading up to their current election at time (t).

Lastly, a final independent variable classifies whether I categorize the party as euroskeptic (**Euroskeptic**) or not against the other parties in the party system, breaking this then down into both soft-euroskeptic (**Soft Euroskeptic**) or hard-euroskeptic (**Hard Euroskeptic**). I use the calculations outlined in Chapter 2 to construct these variables. Using these, I calculate interaction effects between the variables and the other five outlined independent variables in their respective models.

4.3.3 Control variables

A series of control variables are included in this study. First, I include a control variable for whether the party is classified as a niche party (**Niche Party**). Using CMP party family values, the variable includes parties classified as ecological, socialist/left, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative, nationalist, agrarian, ethno-regional, or special issue. The niche party variable is dichotomous and based off the party family measure includes those parties classified as ecological, nationalist, or ethno-regional. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, niche parties and mainstream parties typically emphasize different policies from each other, but also react to new entrants or when they perceive other parties as attempting to emphasize one of their preferred policy areas. As Meguid (2005, 2008) demonstrates, mainstream parties strategize and

²⁴ For European Representative Democracy Data Archive see <u>www.erdda.se</u>. For Database of WHO Governs in Europe and Beyond see <u>https://whogoverns.eu/</u>.

maneuver against new entrants such with the niche parties. Therefore, including the niche party variable is useful in considering the different policies preferred by the parties and the different strategies they employ, including where they position themselves on the policies explored by the dependent variables.

Additional measures include a control variable evaluating each party's overall RILE score (**RILE**) as well as whether the party's country is located within "Western Europe" or in "Central-Eastern Europe" (**CEE Europe**). The CMP provides the RILE score and represents an aggregated measure used to place the political party on the left-right political scale. I recode the RILE score to a 0-10 scale with (0) being the left-most position and (10) being the right-most position on this scale (Laver and Budge 1992). Given that how extreme the party is placed on this scale correlates likely to the extremity of its policy positions vis-à-vis the party system average and the party's willingness to compromise on these issues even if given the opportunity by the more centrally located political parties, this control accounts for any additional unforeseen effects that the parties may influence in the varied models. I include the control variable for whether the country is outside of Western Europe to account for regional economic differences, the legacy of communism on their communities' approach to social issues, and the new democratic institutions and political parties created after the end of the communist regimes. All these factors influence the degree to which the political parties place themselves on various policy issues.

Lastly, as this study encompasses four decades, I include four different time variables (**1980s**, **1990s**, **2000s**, and **2010s**). The time variable for the 1980s is used as the point of reference with the remaining estimations for the remaining three reported in the output table. The shifting importance of different policy dimensions at various points of time influence which policies are more salient for the country and political parties. For example, the Great Recession in the 2000s

could decrease the policy distance between political parties as they unite around a set of economic and welfare policy positions to combat the economic downturn. The 2004/07 enlargement of the EU, as well as the subsequent EU migrant crisis starting in 2014/15, could highlight policy divisions between political parties, and thus increase the distance between parties on multiculturalism and internationalism policy positions. Consequently, the decade time variables are crucial in accounting for factors outside of the governing coalition features that are affecting the policy positions of political parties over time.

4.4 Descriptive statistics and analyses

4.4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.1 and **Table 4.2** depict summary statistics, including the minimum, maximum and average policy position values for the parties on the five dimensions during each decade starting in the 1980s.²⁵ **Table 4.1** first offers a composite view for each decade for all countries and parties on the policy dimensions. The table demonstrates a few interesting findings. First, there is a consistent decline in the average position overall on the economic policy measure from the 1980s onwards, from 5.0930 to 4.9339 or about a decline of 3.12%. There is an increase in the welfare position average from the 1990s, from 5.5146 to 5.6769 or about an increase of 2.94%. The maximum and minimum values additionally demonstrate a reorientation from the 1980s. The

²⁵ See **Appendix C.4 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 4** for a full report on the summary statistics of the variables of interest in this chapter.

Table 4.1	1 Policy	Position	Averages	(Decades),	All Countries
	•/			())	

	1980s		1990s				2000s			2010s		
Policies:	<u>Min</u>	Max	Avg	Min	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	Max	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg
Economy	4.0715	6.9553	5.0930	3.9286	6.7106	5.0528	3.8614	6.0520	4.9464	3.8710	6.3636	4.9339
Welfare	4.3333	6.9850	5.5319	4.3293	7.1930	5.5146	4.7675	7.2549	5.6431	4.5816	7.0036	5.6769
Environment	3.9600	7.4150	5.0365	2.1667	8.7700	4.9596	2.8296	8.5961	4.9748	3.6170	8.7001	5.0300
Multiculturalism	3.6505	6.6484	4.9912	2.7451	7.1930	4.9631	2.1334	5.8491	4.9180	2.6923	6.3060	4.8838
Internationalism	3.4000	6.3208	5.1937	3.4746	5.8681	5.1022	4.0339	5.9417	5.0808	4.0698	5.7955	5.0189

Table 4.2 Policy Position Averages (Decades), Euroskeptic Party Category

		1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s	
Policies:	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>
Economy	4.4000	5.6113	4.9756	4.2177	5.9967	4.9847	4.2310	5.8193	4.9227	4.4270	5.6540	4.893
Welfare	4.9242	6.0644	5.4497	4.9183	6.4726	5.5797	5.0000	7.0000	5.6386	4.7061	6.9293	5.600
Environment	4.5098	6.9000	5.1835	3.9899	7.1659	5.0679	2.8296	6.5220	4.9933	4.3393	6.6861	5.078
Multiculturalism	4.3727	5.3728	4.9807	4.1334	5.4650	4.9542	4.0000	5.5000	4.8827	3.9162	5.1077	4.834
Internationalism	4.6184	5.7661	5.2004	4.2667	5.8681	5.1032	4.0339	5.5983	5.0253	4.3692	5.3830	4.973
Hard Euroskeptic												
		1980s		1990s			2000s			2010s		
Policies:	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	Max	<u>Avg</u>
Economy	4.4340	5.7292	4.9016	4.6012	5.4861	4.8991	4.6053	5.2632	4.9605	4.5389	5.6850	4.966
Welfare	5.0000	6.3560	5.5069	5.2299	6.0417	5.5814	5.0556	6.1779	5.5673	5.0568	6.3550	5.551
Environment	4.7016	6.9403	5.3929	4.0315	6.8391	5.2627	3.7025	6.3975	4.9621	4.5078	5.4171	4.979
Multiculturalism	4.6227	5.1244	4.9340	4.1667	5.6687	4.9807	3.0000	5.6670	4.6386	3.0000	5.1186	4.598
Internationalism	5.0000	6.3208	5.4934	4.6463	5.6250	5.1745	4.6484	5.9417	5.0791	4.0698	5.2214	4.918
Non-Euroskeptic												
	1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s		
Policies:	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>									
Economy	4.4350	6.9553	5.1708	3.9286	6.7106	5.0715	3.8614	6.0520	4.9519	3.8710	6.3636	4.939
Welfare	4.3330	6.9850	5.5194	4.3293	7.1930	5.4992	4.7675	7.2549	5.6493	4.5816	7.0036	5.707
Environment	3.9600	7.4150	4.9414	2.1667	8.7705	4.9403	3.3730	8.5961	4.9707	3.6170	8.7001	5.024
Multiculturalism	3.6505	5.5078	4.9862	2.7451	7.1930	4.9643	2.1334	5.8491	4.9458	2.6923	6.3060	4.912
	2 4000	6 2405	F 4700	2 4746	F 0204							

of about 0.27% and 5.73%, respectively. These findings make sense as a decline in the economy position demonstrates an increased emphasis in the manifestos for more state intervention into the economy, and this then leads to greater emphasis in the manifestos for more pro-welfare policy position. This may be explained by the increased sense of economic uncertainty facing many advanced economies because of deindustrialization and the shift to services and the 'gig' economy from the 1980s onwards. This transition, however, results in many workers receiving short term employment contracts and an increase in concerns for economic and wealth inequalities. This additionally seems to show that while the EU pushed during this same period for a closer economic union, through policies such as the common currency, it appears the political parties (and the populations they are expected to represent) are pivoting their positions towards increased state intervention in the economy and welfare provisions. If this trend continues in the continuing decades, then the EU may find it harder to negotiate for greater harmonization in economic and fiscal policies between member states or for trade liberalization with external countries.

Turning to the remaining policy dimensions, the environmental policy average remains relatively unchanged between the four decades, with a decline from 5.0365 to 5.0300 or only 0.13%. So, while there is greater emphasis in the media and among the public more recently regarding environmental issues and a shift to the green economy, among the parties surveyed in the CMP this pattern is less apparent. Looking at the maximum policy position, however, we see an increase since the 1980s from 7.4150 to 8.7001, about a 17.33% increase. The minimum position decreases in the same period from 3.9600 to 6.6170, or a decline of about 8.66%. This indicates that as environmental issues became more prominent over time, those political parties focusing on the issue, whether pro- or anti-, became more fervent in their manifestos on the topic, even if the overall average position in their country was relatively stable.

In contrast, both the multiculturalism and internationalism policy averages consistently decrease from the 1980s until the 2010s, with multiculturalism declining from 4.9912 to 4.8838, a decline of about 2.15%. Additionally, for multiculturalism the maximum and minimum policy position of parties in the 2010s demonstrate a decline of about 5.15% and 26.25% from their 1980s levels respectively. The average policy position for internationalism declines from 5.1937 to 5.0189, a decline of 3.37%. For internationalism, however, the maximum policy position declines about 8.31%, but the minimum position increases 19.7% between the 1980s and 2010s. This seems to show overall a trend towards convergence on internationalist policies in the countries. The decline in both the multicultural and international policy positions, however, is an additional concern, potentially showing party systems in Europe over time representing more protectionist and isolationist positions.

Taken all together, **Table 4.1** shows that overall, from the 1980s onwards European political parties became slightly more statist and pro-welfare in their economic policies, slightly less pro-environmental, but also more anti-multiculturalist and anti-internationalist in their manifestos. This suggests that the efforts of the European Union in forming closer economic and political ties in the future may be increasingly difficult and helps to explain the increasing support seen in the political parties espousing anti-multiculturalist/anti-internationalist policies.

Table 4.2 breaks down the differences in the policy dimensions between the noneuroskeptic, soft-euroskeptic, and hard-euroskeptic parties. On the economy policy position, both soft- and hard-euroskeptic parties tend to be more statist in their policies compared to noneuroskeptic parties in the 1980s. For both non- and soft-euroskeptic parties there is a continual decline in the position, implying increased preferences for state-led economic policy positions. Hard-euroskeptic parties differ, however, and show an increase from 4.9016 to 4.9660, an increase of about 1.31%, and in fact demonstrate a slightly higher economic position compared to noneuroskeptic parties, though still favoring a state-led economic position. Welfare positions for each group from the 1980s to the 2010s demonstrate an increased emphasis on pro-welfare policies, with soft-euroskeptic parties' position increasing by 2.77%, hard-euroskeptic parties by 0.81%, and non-euroskeptic parties by 3.41%.

The environmental dimension is interesting in that both soft- and hard-euroskeptic parties show a decline in their average environmental position score, with soft-euroskeptic parties declining about 2.02%, but hard-euroskeptic parties by almost three times as much with a decline of about 7.66%. Meanwhile, non-euroskeptic parties demonstrate an increase of about 1.67% in their position. This differs from **Table 4.1** that indicates an overall collective decline in the policy dimension. This shows the shift of green-ecological parties away from their earlier anti-EU integration position. As they emphasize less an anti-European Community/Union position, they slowly move towards the average position in their country and are categorized as non-euroskeptic parties. This results in parties emphasizing greater environmental policy being placed within the non-euroskeptic party category, and slowly increasing the environmental policy score in the group. If correct, however, this leaves those parties emphasizing more anti-environmentalist positions in the euroskeptic categories, leading to a decline in the average environmental policy position, a more anti-environmental position, over time.

When looking at the multiculturalism and internationalism policy dimensions, for both euroskeptic and non-euroskeptic parties, there is a pivot towards emphasizing more anti- versus pro-policies. With multiculturalist positions specifically between the 1980s and 2010s, non-euroskeptic parties show a decline of about 1.48%, soft-euroskeptic parties by 2.93%, and hard-euroskeptic parties by 6.8%. Internationalist positions in the same period decline by 2.64% for

non-euroskeptic, by 4.37% for soft-euroskeptic, and 10.47% for hard-euroskeptic parties. All parties, except for hard-euroskeptic parties between the 1980s and 1990s, show a continuous decline in both policy dimensions between each subsequent decade. Again, this demonstrates a troubling trend in Europe, where political parties, regardless of being euroskeptic or not, display a declining emphasis and commitment to multicultural values and in fostering international relationships.

Overall, **Table 4.2** depicts European political parties as emphasizing more state-led economic and pro-welfare positions over time, though with hard-euroskeptic parties becoming slightly more pro-market compared to the other groups in the later decades. Euroskeptic parties overall also tend to demonstrate less emphasis on environmental parties compared to non-euroskeptic parties, with the latter group being the only one showing a pro-environmental position. And all groups seem to be emphasizing less pro-multicultural/international policy positions over the past four decades. These trends suggest troubled waters ahead for the EU in its attempts to facilitate a stronger economic and/or political union. The question now needs to be asked, what happens when the soft/hard-euroskeptic parties interact with the other political parties? With the evident decrease in various policy dimensions, does participation in governing coalitions and the potential constraints and intra-coalition dynamics stem some of this decline?

4.4.2 Model analyses

There are two important points that I need to explain before introducing the models and result. First, note that when interpreting the coefficient estimates an increase (decrease) in the policy distance shown in the results equals less (more) moderation, such that a negative (positive) coefficient equals more (less) moderation demonstrated by the party. Second, concerning the
cabinet percentage and cabinet percentage squared variables within these models, I ended up excluding the squared term. I decided to do this for a few reasons. First, contrary to expectations, when both the cabinet percentage and cabinet percentage squared variables are included in the pooled and individual models for the all-/soft-euroskeptic parties, no significance is found, demonstrating a lack of confirmation in the theorized curvilinear relationship. Second, in the models focusing solely on hard-euroskeptic parties there is a collinearity between the two terms. When I include the terms separately in the model, both demonstrate significance with similar coefficient estimates. Consequently, I decided to only include the cabinet percentage term in the models and I that increases in the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the euroskeptic party leads to an increase in the policy distance (less moderation) as their increasing size provides the party more power within the governing coalition and to push back against any intra-coalition dynamics exerted on it by other partners.

I employ a multilevel regression mixed effects model clustered on each country's election date provided by the CMP dataset. In the first set of models depicted in **Table 4.3**, I explore a pooled model of all the policy distances measured in the study through the (**Distance**) dependent variable and the interactions of the governing coalition independent variables with all-euroskeptic (**Model 1**), soft-euroskeptic (**Model 2**), and hard-euroskeptic parties (**Model 3**). The pooled model helps to show whether participation in any of governing coalition factors, regardless of policy type, show a reduction in the distance between parties and their country's average position. Subsequent models in **Table 4.5** focusing exclusively on hard-euroskeptic parties use the same multilevel mixed effects model²⁶, but instead examine the changes in the distances of each policy

²⁶ See **Appendix D.2 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 4** contains the results for the models of all-/soft-euroskeptic parties and each separate policy area. With weak significance in the results of these models, I instead focus on and analyze the hard-euroskeptic models.

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled
	All Euroskeptic	Soft	Hard
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:			
Party Type*Coalition	-0.0260	-0.0083	-0.2621†
	(0.0235)	(0.0212)	(0.1446)
Party Type*Cabinet%	0 1681	0.0324	1.9018***
	(0.1268)	(0.0627)	(0 1069)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.0218	0.0059	-0 6058***
Faity Type Cabinets	-0.0218	(0.0163)	-0.0058
Party Type*Cabinet Vears	-0.0011	-0.0010	0.0026
	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0209)
Independent Variables:		. ,	. ,
Coalition	-0.0123	-0.0142	-0.0151
	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.0093)
Cabinet%	0.0031	0.0049	0.0143
	(0.0273)	(0.0271)	(0.0243)
Cabinet3	-0.0071	-0.0075	-0.0088
	(0.0067)	(0.0067)	(0.0063)
Cabinet Years	-0.0001	0.0000	-0.0001
	(0,0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	0.0146+	(0.000)	(0.000)
	(0.0085)		
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)		-0.0005	
		(0.0088)	
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)			0.0748***
			(0.0184)
Controls:			
Niche Party	0.0212*	0.0192*	0.0246**
	(0.0087)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)
RILE	0.0157***	0.0172***	0.0189***
	(0.0036)	(0.0037)	(0.0036)
CEE Europe	-0.0146	-0.0092	-0.0097
	(0.0085)	(0.0107)	(0.0115)
1990s	-0.0065	-0.0072	-0.0071
	(0.0191)	(0.0184)	(0.0189)
2000s	-0.0264	-0.0280	-0.0294
	(0.01834)	(0.0173)	(0.0181)
2010s	-0.0038	-0.0041	-0.0072
	(0.0184)	(0.0176)	(0.0181)
	0.4500		
Constant	0.1533	0.1455	0.1390
Observations (N)	7098	6794	7098
Group Clusters (N)	217	217	217

Table 4.3 Pooled Multilevel Regression, Position Distance and Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties, All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

dimension separately in relation to the party's level of participation in governing coalitions.

Table 4.3 displays the results for the pooled distance models. For **Model 1** and **Model 2**, examining all-euroskeptic and soft-euroskeptic parties, I find no significance between the interactions of the euroskeptic party variables and any of the theorized governing coalition features. **Model 3**, however, exploring the pooled distance model with hard-euroskeptic parties, demonstrates significance in three of the interaction terms with **Figure 4.2** depicting the coefficient estimates for the interactive terms. First, the **Coalition** interaction term shows a negative relationship, demonstrating that if a hard-euroskeptic party is a member of the governing coalition, there is an expected decline (-0.2621) in the distance of their position, i.e., a moderation to the average position of their country at the subsequent election, supporting the expectations of (*HC-I*). Second, the **Cabinet%** interaction term demonstrates a positive relationship, showing that as the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the hard-euroskeptic party increases, there is an expected increase (1.9018) in the distance, less moderation, of their position from the average



Figure 4.2 Pooled Distance – Hard Euroskeptic Parties

position in their country, providing no support for (HC-2). As no curvilinear relationship was supported, these results are unsupportive of the expectations of (HC-3). Lastly, the **Cabinet3** interaction term demonstrates a negative relationship, with an expected decline (-0.6058) in the distance of their position. This suggests that hard-euroskeptic parties receiving any of the "big three" positions may in fact moderate on their party's position in the subsequent election, again not supporting the expectations of (HC-4) where I theorize that maintaining any of the three portfolios may offer the party the ability to counter any intra-coalition dynamics, such as through monitoring by the prime minister, leading to an increase in the policy distance (less moderation).

Examining marginal effects each of the interactive terms²⁷, for the **Coalition** interactive term, when the party is not a member of the coalition, there is a predicted and significant increase in the marginal effect (0.2173). When it is a member of the coalition, however, the predicted marginal effect is (-0.0265), however this is not found to be significant. This reflects the weak significance that the interaction displays in the model. What it does show, however, is that while the coefficient estimate demonstrates a negative relationship aligning with the expectations of the theory, the predicted marginal effect does not additionally support the relationship. For the **Cabinet%** interactive term, moving from the hard-euroskeptic party possessing 0 to 1 (0 to 100%) of the cabinet portfolios increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.2139) to (2.0913), demonstrating less moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increase. This suggests that when the party maintains a lower percentage of portfolios, the expected increase in the policy distance is less than if it maintains a greater share of cabinet portfolios. With the **Cabinet3** interactive term, when a party does not maintain any of the "big three" positions, there

²⁷ See **Appendix E.2 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 4** provides tables for the Marginal Effects of Coalition Features for both the hard euroskeptic pooled distance and all individual policy distance models.

is a predicted and significant marginal effect increase (0.2189) in the policy distance at the subsequent election, showing less moderation when the party does not control one of the three portfolios. If the party receives one of the three, however, there is a predicted negative (-0.3551) marginal effect that is significant. Additionally, if the party receives either two or three of the "big three" portfolios, the predicted marginal effect is negative and significant, (-0.9511) and (-1.5361) respectively. This demonstrates that if the hard-euroskeptic party maintains any combination of the "big three" then there is a predicted decline in the policy distance from the average policy position in the party system, implying increased moderation.

Taken together, the pooled distance models do not fully align with the predictions of this chapter as neither of the all-/soft-euroskeptic party models display significance with the interaction terms. **Table 4.4** summarizes the findings, however, with the hard-euroskeptic party pooled distance model in relation to the hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter. First, being a member of the coalition in the model demonstrates a negative relationship and expected decline/moderation of the policy distance. The predicted marginal effects model, however, does not support this as it demonstrates a negative, yet insignificant, marginal effect. It does show, however, that parties that are not a part of the governing coalition are predicted to display an increase in their policy distance in the subsequent election. This is interesting as this indicates that parties located outside the government are differentiating themselves further from the parties within the coalition. This potentially shows how these opposition parties are strategically positioning themselves to counter the governing coalition in the subsequent election. Second, as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increases, there is a predicted increased in the policy distance from the average country position and this is supported by the predicted marginal effects, implying decreased moderation. While

	All-Euroskeptic	Soft-Euroskeptic	Hard-Euroskeptic
HC-1 Coalition Member	Х	Х	\checkmark
HC-2 Cabinet Percentage	Х	Х	\uparrow
UC 2 Cabinat Darcantaga (cad)	v	v	v
nc-s cubinet Percentage (squ)	^	^	^
HC-4 "Big Three"	х	Х	\checkmark
-			
HC-5 Years in Coalition	Х	Х	Х

Table 4.4 Hypotheses and Findings - Pooled Distance Models

Notes: $X = null hypothesis; \downarrow = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found;$ $<math>\uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found$

unable to test the curvilinear relationship, this demonstrates that if the euroskeptic parties continue to perform better electorally, then if they enter the governing coalition with the increased gains, they also may not face the same intra-coalitional constraints to moderate. Lastly, if a party maintains any of the "big three" portfolios, the evidence suggests a negative, but significant, relationship and this is supported by the predicted marginal effects. This is the opposite to what is theorized and shows increased moderation as the number of "big three" portfolios the party receives through the coalition negotiations increases. Instead of using the portfolio to push back against the intra-coalitional pressures to moderate, maintaining any of the "big three" suggests that the party instead succumbs to these forces. The next step is to explore the policy dimensions separately to determine whether the relationships established in the pooled distance model for the euroskeptic parties are additionally supported or whether these effects vary by policy dimension.

 Table 4.5 displays the model estimates for each policy dimension for hard-euroskeptic

 parties, with Figure 4.3 depicting the coefficient estimates for those interactive terms

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*Coalition	-0.6871**	-0.5492	1.0148***	0.2482**	-1.3257***
	(0.2339)	(0.3389)	(0.2478)	(0.0909)	(0.1052)
Party Type*Cabinet%	1.9118***	3.4307***	-0.5410**	1.4048***	3.206***
	(0.1894)	(0.2563)	(0.1899)	(0.1275)	(0.1008)
Party Type*Cabinet3	- 0.8211** (0.2701)	- 0.7492† (0.3879)	-0.0508 (0.2998)	0.1837 (0.1528)	-1.6133*** (0.1398)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	0.0318	-0.0118	-0.0171	-0.0674***	0.0828***
	(0.0330)	(0.0482)	(0.0362)	(0.0186)	(0.0158)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.0263	-0.0325	0.0354	-0.0199	-0.0276*
	(0.0187)	(0.0221)	(0.0264)	(0.0167)	(0.0128)
Cabinet%	-0.0359	0.0896	-0.0253	0.0053	0.0239
	(0.0515)	(0.0564)	(0.0657)	(0.0440)	(0.0334)
Cabinet3	0.0154	-0.0330*	-0.0163	0.0011	-0.0056
	(0.0120)	(0.0141)	(0.0148)	(0.0099)	(0.0071)
Cabinet Years	-0.0006	0.0007	-0.0007	-0.00001	-0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)	0.0030	0.0367	0.0675	0.1757***	0.0724**
	(0.0224)	(0.0293)	(0.0479)	(0.0474)	(0.0262)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0701***	-0.0716***	0.1113***	0.1021***	0.0287*
	(0.0132)	(0.0144)	(0.0221)	(0.0164)	(0.0130)
RILE	0.0227***	-0.0060	0.0060	0.0410***	0.0175**
	(0.0070)	(0.0073)	(0.0082)	(0.0066)	(0.0058)
CEE Europe	-0.0352†	-0.0130	-0.0590*	0.0398*	0.0044
	(0.0198)	(0.0191)	(0.0236)	(0.0201)	(0.0144)
1990s	-0.0371	0.0117	0.0171	0.0308	-0.0461†
	(0.0344)	(0.0309)	(0.0372)	(0.0200)	(0.0276)
2000s	-0.0803*	-0.0130	-0.0303	0.0606**	-0.0685*
	(0.0322)	(0.0315)	(0.0349)	(0.0223)	(0.0277)
2010s	-0.0532†	0.0128	-0.0139	0.1041***	-0.0696*
	(0.0320)	(0.0302)	(0.0354)	(0.0248)	(0.0276)
Constant	0 1820	0 3270	0 2722	-0 1/30	0 1117
Observations (N)	1/102	1/10	1/11	1/20	1/22
Group Clusters (N)	217	217	<u>1</u> 711 017	1720 017	1722 017
Group Clusters (N)	21/	21/	21/	21/	21/

Table 4.5 Individual Policy Distance, Hard Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

demonstrating significance in the model. First, looking at the coalition interaction terms for the economic policy dimension there are similar results as found in the pooled model. If the party is a member of the governing coalition or maintains a "big three" portfolio results in a decline, (-0.6871) and (-0.8211), in the expected distance, more moderation, to the average position in the country. As the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party increases, however, there is an expected increase (1.9118) in the distance, less moderation, from the average position. Looking at the predicted marginal effects for the **Coalition** interactive term, we see that when the party is not a member of the coalition there is a predicted marginal effect is (-0.4837), with both effects being significant. With the **Cabinet3** interactive term, when a party does not maintain any of the "big three" positions, there is a predicted and significant marginal effect increase (0.2049) in the policy distance at the subsequent



Figure 4.3 Policy Distances – Hard Euroskeptic Parties & Coalition Features

election, showing less moderation when the party does not control one of the three portfolios. If the party receives one of the three, however, there is a predicted negative (-0.6163) marginal effect. This predicted negative marginal effect increases and remains significant with each additional "big three" portfolio, demonstrating continual moderation of the party to the average position in the country if they receive a "big three" portfolio. Lastly, for the **Cabinet%** interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 1 of the cabinet portfolios increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.1990) to (2.1108), demonstrating less moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increase. These last two variables mirror what I find in the pooled distance model, lending credence to the conclusions that the parties moderate when they receive any combination of the "big three" cabinet portfolios, but also an increase in the overall percentage of portfolios held decreases the propensity to moderate. Lastly, the economic policy dimension is the first instance where I find that if the party joins the coalition, then there is the predicted decrease in the policy distance, more moderation, supporting (HC-1).

For the welfare policy dimension, if the party maintains a "big three" portfolio there is an expected decline (-0.7492) in the expected distance, more moderation, to the average position in the country. As the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party increases, however, there is an expected increase (3.4307) in the distance, less moderation, from the average position. Looking at the predicted marginal effects for the **Cabinet3** interactive term, when a party does not maintain any of the "big three" positions, there is a predicted and significant marginal effect increase (0.2778) in the policy distance at the subsequent election, showing less moderation when the party does not control one of the three portfolios. If the party receives one of the three, however, there is a predicted negative (-0.4714) marginal effect. The significance of the predicted negative marginal, however, is not significant effect unless the party receives all three "big three" portfolios.

Lastly, for the **Cabinet%** interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 1 of the cabinet portfolios increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.2699) to (3.7005), demonstrating less moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increase. Overall, for the welfare policy dimension, the outcome for the percentage of cabinet portfolio again reflects a similar effect as in pooled model. While the "big three" interactive term does as well, the overall predicted marginal effect is weaker than in the previous economic policy model.

For the environment dimension, if the party is a member of a coalition there is an expected increase (1.0148) in the expected distance, less moderation, from the average position in the country and does not support the expectations with (*HC-1*). Contrasting the previous the models, as the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party increases, there is an expected decrease (-0.7492) in the distance, more moderation, to the average position. In all the policy dimensions, this is the only instance where the percentage of cabinet portfolios demonstrates a negative relationship to the expected distance from the average position in the country. Looking at the predicted marginal effects for the **Coalition** interactive term, we see that when the party is not a member of the coalition there is a predicted marginal effect (0.2993) and when it is a member the predicted marginal effect is (1.3141), with both effects being significant. Lastly, for the **Cabinet%** interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 1 of the cabinet portfolios continually decreases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.3023) to (-0.2387), demonstrating more moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increase, however, this relationship is only significant at lower levels of the predicted marginal effects. The results from the environment policy dimension are perplexing as it counters results from the previous models, showing decreased moderation when a party joins the coalition, but increased moderation as the party is awarded a greater proportion of the cabinet portfolios. Perhaps, as environmental policies are one

of the post-materialist policy dimensions, this shows euroskeptic parties increasing the extremity of the position to differentiate itself from the other coalition partners, compromising on economic or international list policy positions, but heightening its position on its environmental stance. It is unclear why this policy dimension is the only example from all policy dimensions where increased percentages of cabinet portfolios lead to more moderation on the position.

For the multicultural policy dimension, if the party is a member of the governing coalition or if there is an increase in the percentage of cabinet portfolios, then there is an expected increase, (0.2482) and (1.4048), in the expected distance, less moderation, from the average position in the country. However, as the number of years in a governing coalition increase, there is an expected decrease (-0.0674) in the distance, more moderation, to the average position. This is the only instance in the various models where an increase in the number years participating in the coalition results in a moderation towards to the average position. Looking at the predicted marginal effects for the **Coalition** interactive term, when the party is not a member of the coalition there is a predicted marginal effect (0.1511) and when it is a member, the predicted marginal effect is (0.3994), with both effects showing significance. For the Cabinet% interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 1 of the cabinet portfolios increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.1495) to (1.5543), demonstrating less moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios increase. Finally, for the Cabinet Years interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 35 years continually decreases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.1553) to (-2.2024), demonstrating more moderation as the number years participating in the governing coalition increases, this relationship demonstrates significance at all levels. Like the environmental policy dimension, it appears that when the party joins the coalition, it is heightening its position on the multicultural policy dimension, to help it to differentiate itself from its coalition partners, enabling

it to compromise on other positions. The finding that time spent in the coalition increases the propensity to moderate on multicultural policies aligns with my expectations. This shows that for one issue area typically associated with euroskeptic parties, hardline positions on multicultural policies, increased interactions within the governing coalition leads to moderation over time, providing some hope that coalition participation leads to moderation.

Finally, in the internationalism dimension, all four interactive terms display significance in the model. If the party is a member of the governing coalition or maintains a "big three" portfolio there is a decline, (-1.3257) and (-1.6133) respectively, in the expected distance, more moderation, to the average position in the country. As the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party or the number of years spent in the coalition increases, however, there is an expected increase, (3.2060) and (0.0828) respectively, in the distance, less moderation, from the average position. Looking at the predicted marginal effects for the **Coalition** interactive term, when the party is not a member of the coalition there is a predicted marginal effect (0.1487) and when it is a member, the predicted marginal effect is (-1.1770), with both effects being significant. With the **Cabinet3** interactive term, when a party does not maintain any of the "big three" positions, there is a predicted and significant marginal effect increase (0.1516) in the policy distance at the subsequent election, showing less moderation when the party does not control one of the three portfolios. If the party receives one of the three, however, there is a predicted negative (-1.4617) marginal effect. This predicted negative marginal effect increases and remains significant with each additional "big three" portfolio, demonstrating continual moderation of the party to the average position in the country if they receive a "big three" portfolio. With the **Cabinet%** interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 1 of the cabinet portfolios increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.1410) to (3.3470), demonstrating less moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios

increase. Finally, for the **Cabinet Years** interactive term, moving from possessing 0 to 35 years continually increases the predicted marginal effect on policy distance from (0.1415) to (3.0377), demonstrating less moderation as the number years participating in the governing coalition increases. It is interesting that the model the international policy dimension shows some of the strongest results of all models. Reflecting similar results to the economic policy dimension, coalition membership and receiving a "big three" portfolio leads to moderation, while an increased percentage of cabinet portfolios held leads to less moderation. The duration of time, however, runs counter to my expectations, leading to an increase in the policy distance, less moderation, with more time spent in the governing coalition.

Table 4.6 displays an overview of the findings for the five hypotheses outlined in the chapter in relation to the hard-euroskeptic parties and policy dimensions. With coalition membership, both economic and internationalist policy dimensions support (HC-1), showing a decline in their policy distances when the hard-euroskeptic party is a member of a coalition, while the opposite is found in environment and multicultural policy dimensions. It is possible that these results represent a strategy to differentiate the party from their coalition partners. While

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
HC-1 Coalition Member	\downarrow	х	\uparrow	\uparrow	\downarrow
HC-2 Cabinet Percentage	\uparrow	\uparrow	\checkmark	\uparrow	\uparrow
HC-3 Cabinet Percentage (sqd)	х	х	х	х	х
HC-4 "Big Three"	\downarrow	\checkmark	х	х	\downarrow
HC-5 Years in Coalition	х	х	x	\checkmark	\uparrow

 Table 4.6 Hypotheses and Findings - Hard Euroskeptic Parties by Policy Dimensions

Notes: $X = null hypothesis; \downarrow = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found;$ $<math>\uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found$ compromising and moderating on economic and international policies, they use the environment or multicultural positions to signal their differences to voters. Due to collinearity between the cabinet percentage and cabinet percentage squared variables, I was unable to fully examine (HC-2) and (HC-3). Recall that in the hypothesis, I expect more moderation as the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by the party increased to an optimal level, after which less moderation is theorized to occur. Running the models with only the percentage of cabinet portfolios, I find broadly that if the percentage of portfolios increase, then there is an increase in the policy distance from the average country policy position. Linking this to the effect of intra-coalition dynamics, it suggests that euroskeptic parties push back against these effects as they increase their representation in the coalition. Only the environment policy dimension demonstrates a decline in the expected distance, more moderation. Where moderation is more consistently found in the models is with the "big three" portfolio variable. Contrary to the expectations of (HC-4), the models show that control of these portfolios typically results in greater moderation. While the theory of this chapter proposes that receiving one of the "big three" allows the party to push back against intra-coalition dynamics, this appears to not be the case. Instead, having one of these portfolios increases exposure to the intra-coalition dynamics that results in moderation. It shows that if potential coalition partners consider bringing in a euroskeptic party into the coalition, then they may want to consider offering the party one of the "big three" portfolios. Whether through monitoring by the prime minister and senior coalition party or other intra-coalition dynamics, by giving one of these positions, the other parties in the coalition help to moderate the euroskeptic party, increasing stability in the coalition overall. Finally, when looking at the length of time spent in the governing coalition (HC-5), the evidence is mixed. Largely, no significant effects are found. The multicultural policy dimension shows increased moderation as the length of time increases.

However, the opposite is found with the international policy dimension, showing decreased moderation as time spent in the coalition increases.²⁸

4.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to examine whether membership of a euroskeptic party in a coalition through different factors leads to increased moderation towards their country's average policy position. In the models exploring all the euroskeptic parties collectively and soft-euroskeptic parties separately, there is scant evidence to support this claim. None of the theorized features show significance for these models. For hard-euroskeptic parties, however, the story is different as coalition features support my specified assumptions, though the extent to which a hard-euroskeptic party either moderates or becomes more extreme depends on the policy dimension. With the mixed results, varying by policy dimension and coalition variables, the question remains whether it is advantageous or not for the euroskeptic party to then join governing coalitions if offered the opportunity by potential coalition partners.

The lack of support for soft-euroskeptic parties is interpreted in two ways. First, it is possible that soft-euroskeptic parties do not represent extreme policy positions compared to hardeuroskeptic parties, offering positions like non-euroskeptic parties overall. Looking at the positions of the different policy dimensions, the average positions of the soft-euroskeptic parties differ slightly generally from those offered by the non-euroskeptic parties and this may explain

²⁸ See **Appendix F.2 Robustness Check – Chapter 4** for a robustness check using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. The robustness check includes a brief explanation of the results and the output tables for the models.

why I do not find changes within the policy distance for the category. This raises an interesting prospect that soft-euroskeptic parties may find it beneficial to join the governing coalition if offered the opportunity. If their average policy positions are already not that far off from the noneuroskeptic parties, then they need to compromise less when negotiating with potential coalition partners to achieve their preferred policies in earlier stages of the pathway to moderation. This also means, however, that there is little movement where the party is also able to moderate to in the later stage of the model where I expect intra-coalition dynamics to moderate the party. The models presented in this study support this as they show that soft-euroskeptic parties are largely unaffected by their participation in governing coalitions in relation to their subsequent policy positions. In this instance it is beneficial for the soft-euroskeptic parties to enter the coalition as it assures the party some policy or portfolio appointments, while not effecting their propensity for moderation in comparison to the hard-euroskeptic party. The one potential downside, however, is that that they may also have a more difficult time differentiating themselves from their coalition partners as they are located positionally closer to the parties on average and consequently running the risk of negative electoral effects in the subsequent election.

For the hard-euroskeptic parties, however, the evidence raises questions whether they should consider strategically joining a governing coalition in the earlier stages of the pathway. As the results indicate, there are examples of policy dimensions where the hard-euroskeptic parties display moderation to their country's average policy position, suggestive of the policy compromises and concessions that they make with their coalition partners while in the governing coalition. At the same time, however, the evidence suggests they also move further away from the average position on policies, in this chapter both in the environmental and multicultural policy dimensions. This potentially demonstrates the hard-euroskeptic parties attempting to differentiate

themselves from the other parties while participating in the coalition. Being overshadowed by the other parties in the coalition or perceived as non-differentiable on policy positions leads, it has been argued, to a blurring of the coalition parties with negative electoral outcomes in subsequent elections for junior parties. Taking a more extreme position benefits the hard-euroskeptic party in the subsequent election if this is used strategically to signal voters that while they are moderating on some policy areas to an extent that it appears to blur its positions with those of its coalition partners, they are still committed to the parties' core issues, and this is represented by their subsequent more extreme positions. The fact that the hard-euroskeptic party exhibits tendencies to both move closer to and away from different policy areas indicates that they are concerned about the perception that they are moderating on certain issues and how this may hurt them electorally with their voters in subsequent elections. As a result, they strategize to determine which policy area they can effectively employ to differentiate themselves from their coalition partners in the following election.

The evidence also suggests that the hard-euroskeptic party moderates less as their size within the governing coalition increases. If they are awarded a larger set of portfolios this appears to aid them in countering any potential pressures from the other coalition partners towards that leads the party towards moderation and concessions. It is clear from the results that as the relative size of the party's share of portfolios increase there is less susceptible to the intra-coalition dynamics. The increase in their share of cabinet portfolios could also be demonstrating attempts to differentiate the party from their coalition partners. Possessing more portfolios increases its visibility within the coalition for the voters and consequently the chances that the party is lumped together with the other coalition partners, harming its electoral prospects. Therefore, if the party maintains an increasing share of the portfolios, then perhaps this necessitates them needing to be

more fervent in distinguishing themselves from the other coalition parties and show less of a moderated stance on policies.

There is the risk, however, that by moving further away from the policy average to differentiate, they alienate a subset of their voters who may prefer a more moderated stance on the positions. In short, the party is harmed electorally if they compromise too much on polices, but also if they move further away on policies to distinguish themselves from their coalition partners. If the party's leadership does not think that they are able to find a balance between these two positions, then it is more beneficial for the party to remain in the opposition as being in the governing coalition brings uncertainty in how successful they are in the subsequent election. Remaining in the opposition prevents the party from following the pathway of moderation explored in this chapter. This is a problem going forward if

Future studies need to focus on why the hard-euroskeptic parties in particular moderate on some policies, economic issues, and internationalism in this study, while not on others and whether the parties are indeed emphasizing more extreme positions on polices, such as with the environment, strategically to differentiate themselves from the coalition partners and signal voters. Relatedly, what are the principal motivations behind deciding which policies to either comprise or to become more extreme on to begin with? If the party is both moderating but also becoming more extreme on various policies, how does this affect the voters' voting behavior in subsequent elections? As the euroskeptic party has increased its electoral share, the diversity of their voters also increased with some preferring more moderate positions, others more extreme ones, and those that want the party to remain committed to its traditional positions. How well does the party balance between these different groups and what constraints does it place on their ability to strategize against other parties or potential coalition partners? Lastly, another question to explore

regards the nature of the "big three" portfolios. Contrary to my expectations, receiving any of these portfolios results in greater moderation on the policy. If correct, more detailed exploration of the underlying mechanisms is needed. Qualitative surveys/interviews of former cabinet members appointed to these portfolios is perhaps the best manner to really understand whether and how monitoring or other intra-coalition dynamics leads to changes in the party's policies.

5.0 Chapter 5 – The Effect of Supranational Institutions

The previous chapter examines participation in governing coalitions and attempts to explain the degree that participation in the coalition government shapes and moderates the policy positions of the euroskeptic parties. This focus on the arena of domestic politics represents one of the theoretical pathways of this project. Political parties in Europe additionally, however, compete in a different arena, focused on the supranational level within the European Union and its various institutional bodies. This chapter focuses on one such body, the European Parliament (EP), and how the institution potentially shapes the policies of the euroskeptic parties. This is used to test the second pathway towards moderation theorized in Chapter 2. For parties, such as the greens or ethno-regional parties, the European Union (EU) and its institutional bodies provide an alternative means of representation, with rates that exceed, at least proportionally, what they often achieve in their national, domestic elections. As I discuss below, there is evidence that these parties view the EU and its bodies as tools to achieve policy aims and are the more supportive of the institution over time, and this is often reflected in their policy preferences. This chapter explores this evidence by extending it to the euroskeptic parties to determine how participation in the institution influences their policy positions. The euroskeptic parties provide an excellent means to empirically examine how their participation effects subsequent policy preferences. These parties by nature advocate for less European integration and, especially for the more populist/nationalist variants of the parties, support more extreme policy positions than those advocated for by more mainstream and centrist parties. These positions and their anti-EU integration stance mean that we could expect the euroskeptic parties to be theoretically the least likely to change policy positions through

the effects of institutional socialization. Establishing that these parties alter their positions through participation is a "hard test" therefore and shows that if it occurs for even those parties most opposed to further European integration, then I expect other party types to do so as well.

This chapter first outlines the concept of socialization and then within the EU institutional context. It explains how the participation of the euroskeptic parties within the institution opens them up to a socialization of the expectations and culture of the institution. For example, their participation in political groups within the EP allows these parties theoretically to learn new strategies and policy prescriptions that can be then conveyed in their national, domestic political arena. Accordingly, if socialization is occurring, the end of this process is less extreme policy positions in relation to other parties in the EP. Following these sections, the chapter then introduces the theoretical assumptions and research design. Using euromanifestos, I calculate policy distance measures like those in previous chapter in relation to the EP average for the EP sessions from 1994 - 2014. I test how measures such as the proportion of seats held by the party both within their respective political groups and overall national delegation as well as time spent in the EP affect the policy distance of the euroskeptic party. As the policy distance decreases between the parties, I argue that this signifies moderation by the party to the overall EP average position on the policy dimensions. As socialization is a difficult effect to empirically examine, I contend that evidence of moderation by the parties signifies that socialization through the EP is, to some degree, occurring. The various measures of EP participation by the euroskeptic parties help to peel back some of the uncertainty, revealing where and if the effect of socialization may be occurring as parties participate in the EP and, by extension, other EU institutional bodies.

5.1 Socialization and supranational institutions

Why do I expect that participation in the supranational institution leads to policy moderation for participating euroskeptic parties, those parties that are the most critical of the institution and its stated goals? I center this assumption based on socialization and how institutions through this process set the standards and expectations, along with rewards, that shape the participating actors, in this case the euroskeptic parties.

Socialization is "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005, 804; see also Johnston 2001; March and Olsen 1998) which begins with a logic of consequences where the actors make decisions based on strategic, rational calculations to achieve their goals and receive rewards. As socialization deepens, there is a shift towards a logic of appropriateness where the actor learns a role within the expectations of the norm that enables the actor to act in agreement with its principles or the actor exhibits the norms of the community in which they participate because it is the "normal" thing to do, and the norms possess a "taken-forgranted" status for the actor. Risse and Sikkink (1999) iterate similar logic in stating that "norms can only be regarded as internalized in domestic processes when actors comply with them irrespective of individual beliefs about their validity" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 16). Overall, these definitions demonstrate that socialization does not mean that the actor must fully adopt the norm, rather simply that the actor must no longer perceive it as contentious and accepts the norm regardless of the actor agreeing with it or not. This means that the socialization of the norm occurs when the actor simply views compliance as the "normal" thing to do, even if the actor "is not convinced of its moral validity and appropriateness" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 17).

Extending this to the institutional context, institutions facilitate an environment where socialization occurs. As March and Olsen (1996) note, "institutions constitute and legitimize

political actors and provide them with consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality standards of assessment, affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action" and where "action is taken on the basis of a logic of appropriateness associated with roles, routines, rights, obligations, standard operating procedures and practices" (March and Olsen 1996, 249). For the scholars, the logic of appropriateness does not imply morality, rather it is behavioral. Actors participating in the institution, interacting with its routines, rules, procedures, and other participating actors, shapes the actor's behavior.

As an institution, the EU "through the establishment of formal institutions authorised by a succession of treaties, by informal practices that have grown up around these institutions, and by the creation of strong vertical links with the institutions of the member states" (Laffan 2006, 77) has set the rules and expectations for party actors that are necessary for the routinized behavior and logic of appropriateness to take hold. Evidence, for example, from the experience of Central and Eastern European states shows how the EU sets the point of reference for European standards through which national policies are debated and formulated against. These standards in turn are used then domestically to assess the competency of the parties and politicians. Additionally, there is a switch within these parties from being an outside voice prior to accession to that of active participant, helping to establish new policies that they need to then adhere to domestically (Haughton 2009; Haughton and Rybář 2009). This demonstrates "an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech 1994, 69). The EU and its institutional bodies provide the arena for socialization, setting the expected standards and representative mechanisms that alter how participating parties orient their national politics and policy choices. As Beyers (2005) notes, "officials continue to define themselves as national representatives while at the same time they increasingly consider national perspectives as overlapping and compatible with a common European perspective...They adopt layers of multiple roles in the sense that an intergovernmental role is supplemented with a supranational role" (Beyers 2005, 904).

Nils Ringe (2022) in discussing the politics of language usage in the EP provides evidence of socialization occurring through participation in the EP. He notes how "multilingualism, in fact, depoliticizes EU politics...by providing an institutional framework that safeguards the formal equality of all national languages while ensuring effective communication between participants in EU policymaking" (Ringe 2022, 9). This is of great importance in the EP as the principal multilingual EU institution as its members are elected directly by citizens of member states. In the EP, English has become the dominant form of communication between members in both formal and informal meetings as a tool that facilitates communication. This function, Ringe finds, leads to depoliticization as using English, a non-native language for many in the EP, leads to simplified speeches and in the writing of various drafts of legislation and policies made by the EP as this allows ease of translatability. The evidence suggests that even native speakers of English alter their speech patterns, simplifying their use of English in the EP to ensure ease of comprehension among their colleagues. The use of EU English in the EP and the simplified speech patterns demonstrated by native English speakers provides perhaps direct evidence of the effect of socialization facilitated by involvement in the institution, as it sets up the arena of socialization through which actors in the EP operate.

Socialization and exposure to the routinized behavior provided by the EU's institutions not only affects the how parties approach their national politics but also has the potential to foster new identities for the actors. These new identities form as the processes "establish systems of value and beliefs, reified in social representations...that specify both the content and value of individual identities" (Breakwell 2004, 30). This is not to say that a resulting European identity situated either within the EU or its institutions supplants other identities such as national/ethnic preferences. Rather, identities are considered as nested, situated among, and complementing each other where the intensity of each identity vary (Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Aksoy and Hadzic (2019), for example, note how actors experiencing "multilayered governance in the domestic context is more likely to be comfortable with another layer of governance and express attachments to a collective identity affiliated with this additional layer" (Aksoy and Hadzic 2019, 585). The scholars use this to show how actors within these forms of governance are more likely to demonstrate greater attachment to the EU and its institutions. Exposure to the multilayered governance facilitates a nested identity for the actor that encompasses both their national political structure and the supranational one and increasing their attachment/support for the supranational institution. This identity resulting from the socialization of the supranational institution does not "necessarily have to be detrimental to national identity but that the two can co-exist next to each other" (Negri et al 2021, 116).

Consider previous research on ethnoregional participation within EU institutions. The nature of EP elections and the success in these elections of parties expressing more extreme policy preferences, such as demonstrated at times by ethnoregional and, of particular interest for this study, the euroskeptic parties, begins a process where these parties are exposed to varied strategies, expectations, and policies of the supranational institution. Treading along this pathway through their participation in the institution entails a degree of socialization, where the parties learn, emulate, and adapt. Through this process nested identities develop. While previously the parties operated in their respective national, domestic political arenas, exposure to the supranational

institution arena enables new identity formation. They become socialized by their participation to the expectations of the institutions, and this in turn shapes how they approach their national politics and policies.

Research done by scholars such as Jolly (2007) and Gould and Messina (2014) demonstrate that for the ethnoregional parties, early participation in the EU was less conciliatory and more antagonistic due to the concerns of the party and its supporters that the EU could take the place of the nation-state and that they would be simply replacing contested governance from their national government with contested governance based in Brussels. While the parties do demonstrate a degree of anti-integrationist attitudes due to their goal of decentralization and regional autonomy, some of the parties such as the *Scottish National Party* (SNP) over time have come to also support the EU and the role it functions in ensuring the discussion and potential adoption of their own preferred policies. Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister of Scotland and Leader of the SNP since 2014, in a speech given to the European Policy Centre stated:

Scotland is a country which can and will make a difference – we will lead by example where we can, but we will also learn from the example of others. But we know we will do this more effectively by working in partnership. I believe very strongly that our sovereignty will be amplified, not diminished, by membership of the EU.²⁹

The EU as demonstrated by this speech provides the SNP with a voice and, it is hoped ultimately, recognition of its own sovereignty within the EU. The opportunity to achieve a greater voice in advocating for desired policies can be extended to those parties that may espouse more extreme policy positions often excluded for consideration by the mainstream parties such as the euroskeptic parties examined in this project. The possibility to increase their representation in the

²⁹ Sturgeon, Nicola. 2020. "Speech: Nicola Sturgeon makes a case for an independent Scotland in the EU." Delivered 02/10/2020 at *European Policy Centre*. Full speech available at <u>https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Speech-Nicola-Sturgeon~2e8a10</u>.

EP facilitates an alternative pathway for these parties that essentially renders the EP elections as an extension of the national contestation of domestic politics (Carrubba 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991, 1996). The success of these parties in the EP elections, this evidence suggests, allows the possibility for the parties to exert further pressure from the EP onto their national governments to adopt the preferred polices of their constituents. Unsuccessful in achieving electoral success and implementing their preferred policies domestically, these parties could turn towards the EU and its institutional bodies. Importantly, the quote from Sturgeon signifies how the party has tied itself to the EU, viewing itself in a mutual beneficial relationship with the institution and opening the opportunity for further socialization of the party within the supranational institution.

The question remains do the euroskeptic parties additionally demonstrate changes in their policy positions like what is demonstrated by green-ecological or ethnoregional parties? Through interactions of routinized behavior and institutional socialization, do these parties, the most vocal critics of the EU and its institutions, moderate their policy positions from their often more populist orientation? Previous research within national contexts finds that new parties or politicians entering the legislature deradicalize on policy positions overtime (Mughan *et al* 1997; Searing 1986). I contend that the EP provides an additional arena whereby "deradicalization", moderation, occurs. With the increased manifestation of euroskepticism in many European countries, the EP elections have become the arena for more euroskeptic parties to compete, and in some cases more effectively than they achieve domestically. For euroskeptic parties as well as other parties that espouse more extreme policy preferences, the EU and its institutions offer a greater opportunity to voice their concerns and preferences through increased party representation. Their entrance into the institutions, however, sets the stage where they become active participants shaping EU policies

as well as being exposed to the standards, practices, and routinized behaviors of the institutions that alter how they approach the institution and by extension their domestic policymaking.

Ladrech (2002) argues that participation in the EU and its institutions results in alterations in many features of the participating parties: policy/programmatic content, organizational, patterns of party competition, party–government relations, and relations beyond the national party system (Ladrech 2002, 396). Roos (2019) offers an example of this routinization of behavior with reference to the EP stating that "the structures and procedures which the early MEPs established and gradually formalised developed themselves an own socialising effect on later delegates. Being new to the Parliament, MEPs tended to follow established procedures to swiftly integrate, and to benefit from the position and influence their respective party group had achieved. Having once become integrated members of a party group, MEPs would continue to abide to party group lines and procedures, to continuously benefit from group membership" (Roos 2019, 470). The parties are exposed to the general rules and expectations of the EP, and to the preferences of their fellow parties within the EP.

Socialization within the EP also has the added benefit of exposing the participating parties to different strategies and policy positions from other parties. These changes are a clear result of the party's interactions and socialization within the institution, reflecting how the party operates not only within the supranational institution but also how this socialization impacts the party's domestic policy positions and organizational structures. Recent research has explored the policy diffusion between parties (see Weyland 2005; Elkins and Simmons 2005, Gilardi 2010, 2016) and within the EU, its institutional bodies, and national parties. Böhmelt *et al* (2016) note how parties through their political groups are exposed to information and policies of these parties and are more readily to accept this information due to their similar grouping with one another. Wolkenstein *et*

al (2020) extend this to the multi-level space in Europe, noting how parties learn and emulate from parties in their political groups, as well as the multilayered nature of party structures between the domestic and supranational spheres helps to understand policy diffusion. Recent evidence supports the transnational policy diffusion and the role of EP in facilitating the learning and emulation of policies for parties (Schleiter *et al* 2021; Senninger *et al* 2020).

Anders Vistisen, former MEP of the *Danish People's Party* (DPP) from Denmark, speaking about his time as a MEP, supports the potential effect of socialization provided by participation in the EP when stating:

"Yes of course you try to listen for inspiration when you're out. For instance, the Austrian government has tried this strategy for indexation of child allowances that is sent out of the country that is a part of the European scheme. That is something that we also want to do in Denmark and we use it as an example of if the Austrians are able to do it, why can't we... so I informed the party that there was a debate that was picking up some momentum and something the party also then decided to call a question time for the prime minister...so of course, sometimes you get inspiration from the European work. There have also been some examples of some migration proposals in Belgium that we have got inspired by. So of course, you always try to bring back home what you learn that will be useful..."³⁰

The quote demonstrates how participation in the EP provides the party the ability to be socialized on new approaches to common problems that are able to be used as policy gains domestically. In this particular case, the MEP mentioned how he was able to take this information back to their national party and then used this information to pressure the existing government, at that time under the center-right bloc headed by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen of the *Venstre Party*, to adopt a new policy that the party sees as aligning with their interests and providing them a potential positive policy gain to take back to their voters. It shows how the EP as a socializing institution is used as an arena by parties traditionally expressing more extreme

³⁰ Quote from in-person interview author conducted with Anders Vistisen, former MEP of the *Danish People's Party* (DPP), in English, in Copenhagen, Denmark on May 26, 2019.

policy positions to learn new tactics and policies that are then utilized strategically for their benefit. A trade-off of learning these tactics and policies, however, is exposure to the institutional socialization that has the potential to lead to potential moderation.

5.2 Theories of supranational institution moderation

To examine the effects of supranational institutions on the party's policy positions, and whether this leads to moderation, this chapter explores varying measures of representation achieved by the euroskeptic parties in the EP. I should stress that examining the effect of socialization is not an easy task. It is difficult to assess when actors shift from the logic of consequences to appropriateness, whether they have internalized the norms from the arena of socialization to alter their routine of behaviors. This section introduces one way I attempt to determine if there is a socialization effect being enabled by participation in the EP. To do this, I examine the degree that involvement in an institution, in this case the EP, leads to the moderation of policies made by the euroskeptic parties. Determining whether participation in the institution leads to moderation of policies is an indirect way of showing the potential occurring socialization mechanisms at play in the EP. I believe, however, that if there is moderation of policies as involvement increases in the EP by the euroskeptic parties, that one of the explanations is the socialization effect outlined in the preceding section. As demonstrated by the MEP from Denmark, where the altering of policies and strategies is linked to the socialization provided by the EP, I theorize that if moderation is occurring through participation in the institution, one of the possible explanations is the effect of socialization. There are of course, other explanations than

socialization that explain moderation by the parties. These are explored in subsequent sections that explain the implications of the chapter's findings.

To establish any potential socialization effect, the hypotheses of this chapter principally focus on how various measures of participation by the parties in the EP impact policy moderation. The first set of hypotheses to be explored relate to the relative proportion of seats that the euroskeptic party achieves in the EP elections within their political group and national delegation to the EP. As established, elections and the EP provide the euroskeptic parties the capacity to achieve greater degrees of representation proportionally than they often receive in national elections as EP elections are second-order (Reif and Schmitt 1980). For example, France's *National Rally* won 23.3% of the vote in the recent EP election and 23 of France's 79 seats compared to the 8.8% and just 8 of 577 seats in the National Assembly in the most recent French legislative election. The expanded representation provides the euroskeptic party a new institution through which it advocates for policies as was the case with the ethnoregional and green-ecological parties.

As noted in Chapter 2, there are two paths that the party and its actors can take when they join the institution, obstructionist or constructivist. If the party and its actors engage this expanded representation through obstruction, they cut themselves off from the socializing linkages that lead to moderation. However, for those euroskeptic parties and actors that take on the more constructive, active role in the organization socialization is likely to occur. Why? I theorize that leaders and other actors of the euroskeptic party realizes that their participation in the EP provides the party with greater representation than what is achieved in the national parliamentary elections. For these actors, the political representation offered provides a platform on which the party voices its concerns and potentially shape policies in ways that are not as available to them in their national

assemblies. Consequently, I argue they perceive the means through which they can impact the policies and priorities of actors within the EP, and how the broader institution can then be shaped by the party. Additionally, the euroskeptic party actors can receive input from other actors in the EP concerning successful strategies and policies. Through this process of policy diffusion, the party increasingly can learn, emulate and adopt the policy positions of other parties within the EP, especially if these are viewed as electorally successful.

I additionally theorize that the greater the proportion of seats both within their national delegation to the EP and within their political group, the more that the euroskeptic party is exposed to the arena of institutional socialization that opens the opportunity for moderation. **Figure 5.1** depicts the expected effect of moderation as the size of the euroskeptic party within their national delegation to the EP increases. With fewer members of the party from the national delegation in the EP, there less linkages available to structure socialization. The party is less exposed to the effects of socialization, lessening the possibility for learning from others in the EP and the



Figure 5.1 Euroskeptic Party Seat Share in National Delegation

probability of policy diffusion that could lead to moderated policy positions. As the size of the euroskeptic party in the national delegation grows, however, the party perceives the representational benefits of the institution, the linkages needed for socialization are more numerous, and the probability for socialization leading to moderation increases. If this reasoning is correct, then I assume that an increased size of the euroskeptic party within the institution results in moderation. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H-EP1: The euroskeptic party moderates as its share of seats in the national delegation increases.

This hypothesis is moderated by the representation that party has in their national assembly. Euroskeptic parties that are more electorally successful in having their members elected to their national assemblies compared to their respective seat shares in the EP may display greater degrees of adherence to their preferred policy and less moderation except for the moderation linked to the governing coalitions (discussed in the previous chapter). The need to utilize the EP and other EU institutions to augment its political representation is secondary to the power it demonstrates within the national political system. This is not to suggest that there is no moderation effect at all through participation in the institution, rather that the party is simply not as obliged to the EP to achieve political representation and a voice at the bargaining table. They hate the opportunity to achieve the implementation of their preferred policies domestically without the need of a supranational institution. As such, these parties do not need the institution to receive political influence as readily as a party with lower levels of representation in their respective national assembly. This realization dampens the receptibility of the party's leaders and actors of the socialization effect that occurs through their participation in the institution. Consequently, I expect the effect of involvement in the institution on policy moderation to be lower for these parties compared to the latter ones. The next hypothesis states:

H-EP2: The euroskeptic party moderates less if it possesses more representation in the national assembly than in the EP.

I now turn towards party involvement in the EP's political groups to examine how participation in this institution within the EP relates to potential moderation. I also theorize that the size of the euroskeptic party within the political group effects the degree that moderation towards the EP average on the policy dimension occurs. **Figure 5.2** depicts the expected relationship. As with (*H*-*EP1*), I expect as the proportion of seats that the euroskeptic party has in their political group increases, they moderate their policy position. This relationship, however, is expected to be more curvilinear in nature. There is a level where the size of the party in the political group allows it to become more the transmitter rather than receiver of policies and strategies within the political group. This is not to suggest that moderation is not likely to occur. The party still learns strategies and policies from its fellow political group members and its involvement in the institution still subjects it to any effects of socialization occurring through participation and



Figure 5.2 Euroskeptic Party Seat Share in EP Political Group

interaction with other actors outside of the political group. Rather, its increased size within the political group signifies the party's success to the other members who then look to the party as a source of new ideas, policies, etc. that they then are able to emulate within their own party programs. Being the policy transmitter does not mean that the effect of socialization via the institution is not occurring, rather I argue that the role of the institution in providing arenas to learn policies and strategies from fellow participants is not as needed for a party as its size within the political group increases and denotes its electoral success. Smaller parties within the political group look to the electorally successful, larger party in their political group instead for queues on policies and strategies and this insulates the leaders and actors of the larger party like my assumptions concerning national legislative delegation size. A larger presence within the political group denotes electoral success and the success of the party's policies and strategies. They are less reliant on the institution to provide these mechanisms for electoral success, thereby lessening the potential effect of socialization. Being the point of origin for policy diffusion dampens the overall impact of participation of the institution on the party and the propensity to moderate to the average policy position of the political group. The next hypothesis states:

H-EP3: The euroskeptic party moderates as its size in their EP political group increases, but there is a level where moderation decreases.

Lastly, one final consideration must be given to how the duration spent by the euroskeptic party in the institution influences the expected level of moderation. Repeated iterations of the euroskeptic party participating in the EP results in continued socialization pressures exerted on it during multiple points of time by the institution. Continual learning of the rules of the game through the arena of socialization, formal and informal meetings held with leaders and other actors of the EP, I expect provides the opportunity for the party to be conditioned by the roles and rules of the institution. The relationships that the party's actors build over time with those representing

similar interests reinforces any effect of socialization that happens due to their involvement in the institution. This results in the euroskeptic party continuing to moderate on policies towards the average position of the EP. As the duration spent in the institution increases, I also expect that the euroskeptic party is more exposed to the expectations of the other members of the EP and the rules, standards, and expectations of the broader EP institution. Consequently, with regards to the duration of time spent in the EP, I theorize that:

H-EP4: The euroskeptic party moderates as its time spent in the EP increases.

5.3 Research design

5.3.1 Dependent variables

To examine the hypotheses, I use distance measures calculated using the Euromanifesto Study (EMP) data that provides an analysis of the party manifestos put forward by the parties for the election to the European Parliament outlined in Chapter 2. Like the CMP measures from the previous chapter, I focus on five policy dimensions as the dependent variables to calculate policy distances: **Economic**, **Welfare**, **Environment**, **Multicultural**, and **EU Integration**. Note that instead of the international policy measure from the previous chapter on coalitions, I utilize the EU integration dimension. Recall that the policy distances are measured to the average EP position for each specified EP election. In addition to each of the measures addressed below, I also create a pooled measure of position distances of all policy dimensions collectively (**Distance**). Each of these policy dimensions represents a dependent variable measure in the subsequent models.
5.3.2 Independent variables

The first independent variable, testing (*H*-*EP1*) and the size of the euroskeptic party within the national delegation, examines the number of seats the party earned in the previous EP election as a proportion of all seats their country sent to the EP (National EP Seat %). The percentage is used to account for the different relative sizes of national delegations over time as new member states acceded to the EU. The second independent variable, testing (H-EP2) and EP versus national legislature representation of the euroskeptic party, is calculated as the proportion of seats of the party in their national delegation to the EP minus the proportion of seats that the party maintains within their national legislature (**Representation Difference**). As multiple national elections may occur prior to the EP election, the national proportion is calculated based off the nearest previous election but lagged by one year from the EP election. For example, the Italian 1994 general election took place in March 1994, a few months prior to the 1994 EP election. In this case, the national election results from the previous April 1992 election are used to calculate the national legislature seat proportions used in the representation difference calculation. I additionally rescale the measure by adding one to the difference to create a positive scale from 0 to 2. In this case, values below one represents instances where the party maintains greater representation in their national legislature than in the EP, and values above 1 represent instances where the party maintains greater representation in the EP than in the national legislature. The third independent variable, testing (H-EP3) and the size of the euroskeptic party within their political group, examines the number of seats the party earned in the previous EP election as a proportion of all seats within their respective EP political group (EP Group Seat %). The proportion is used to account for the different sizes of the political groups. It is coded for the composition of the political group in the period immediately following the previous EP election.

This is done to consider for changes in political group composition between EP elections. As outlined above in the hypotheses, for this independent variable I expect a curvilinear relationship. Accordingly, I include a squared term of this independent variable (**EP Group Seat % (squared)**). The fourth independent variable tests (*H-EP4*) and the duration of time spent in the EP. It is simply a count of the number of years that the party participated in the EP prior to the Euromanifestos election and is lagged by one year (**Years in EP**). Data to construct the national and EP political group proportions and years are made available through the *European Journal of Political Research: Political Data Yearbook* and the official European Parliament election results.³¹

Lastly, a final independent variable classifies whether I categorize the party as euroskeptic (**Euroskeptic**) or not against the other parties in the party system, breaking this then down into both soft-euroskeptic (**Soft Euroskeptic**) or hard-euroskeptic (**Hard Euroskeptic**). I use the calculations outlined in Chapter 2 to construct these variables. Using these, I calculate interaction effects between the variables and the other five outlined independent variables in their respective models.

5.3.3 Control variables

Party level controls A series of control variables are included in this study. First, I include a control variable for whether the party is classified as a niche party (**Niche Party**). Using CMP party family values, the variable includes parties classified as ecological, socialist/left, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative, nationalist, agrarian, ethno-regional, or special issue. The niche party variable is dichotomous and based off the party family measure

³¹ For the *European Journal of Political Research: Political Data Yearbook*, please see <u>https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/20478852</u>. For European Parliament election results and political group composition, please see <u>https://www.europarl.europa.eu</u>.

includes those parties classified as ecological, nationalist, or ethno-regional. Including the niche party variable is useful in considering the different policies preferred by the parties and the different strategies they employ, including where they position themselves on the policies explored by the dependent variables. Additional measures include a control variable evaluating each party's overall RILE score (RILE). The CMP provides the RILE score and represents an aggregated measure used to place the political party on the left-right political scale. I recode the RILE score to a 0-10 scale with (0) being the left-most position and (10) being the right-most position on this scale (Laver and Budge 1992). I also include a control for whether the party was a member of either the European People's Party (PPE) or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) political groups within the EP (Grand Coalition). Until 2019, these two political groups formed a grand coalition and worked together on various issues within the EP. Involvement in either of the two groups is accounted for in the model as these political groups being the largest potentially serve as the greatest source for institutional socialization through the numerous potential linkages between their participating actors. Lastly, I include a simple dichotomous governing coalition participation variable (National Coalition) that measures whether the party was a member of the governing coalition in their country. This is to control for the potential governing coalition side-effects noted in the previous chapter impacting party decisions on policy positions. Moreover, one of the principal arguments of this chapter relates to the representational mechanism offered by the EU through the EP and other institutional bodies as a motivating factor towards socialization and the moderation of the euroskeptic party's policy positions. Membership in the governing coalition shows that the euroskeptic party has achieved sufficient national representation and mitigates the need for a representational mechanism through the EU. Coding for this measure is used from the previous chapter.

Country level controls I include a series of country level controls. First, a measure of political fragmentation is included, the effective number of political parties (ENPP) measuring how electoral success translates to seats for the party in the national legislature (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Carey and Hix 2011).³² This measure is included to account for the capacity for representation available to the parties within their national contexts. As a part of the argument in this chapter centers on the representational capacity offered by the EP, the ability for the parties to achieve representation in their national legislatures needs to be considered. I additionally include three variables that control the timing of the national elections with the EP elections used in the euromanifestos. As elections occur at other times during the same year as the EP election and this potentially affects the composition of the euromanifestos as parties may potentially address both national and EP concerns in these manifestos due to the close proximity of the national election to the EP election, I additionally control if there is a national election any time during the year of an EP election (1) or not (0) (Same Year Election). Lastly, I include a measure for the length of time in years from the previous national election to the current EP election (Time Since Nat Election (yrs)). Lastly, as this study encompasses three decades, I include five different time variables (EP 1989, EP 1994, EP 1999, EP 2004, and EP 2009) based on the five different EP legislative sessions from 1989 - 2014. The time variable for the EP 1989 is used as the point of reference with the remaining estimations for the remaining four reported in the output table. The shifting importance of different policy dimensions and the various expansions in EU members states throughout the period influence which policies are more salient for the political parties within the national legislatures and in the broader EP. While the previous chapter utilized the decade time

³² See Party Systems and Governments Observatory; Casal Bértoa, F. (2022): Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond, PSGo. Available at: <u>www.whogoverns.eu</u>.

variables, I believe that structure of the EMP data provides a more fine-grained time dimension that I am able account for using the EP sessions rather than with the decades. For both the pooled and individual policy dimension models, I employ multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models clustered on country and EP election dates.

5.4 Model analyses

5.4.1 Summary statistics

Before introducing the empirical results, I first briefly discuss summary statistics for the policy dimensions offered by the EMP data.³³ **Table 5.1** displays a summary for the policy areas for all countries available within the EMP dataset for each EP session from 1989 – 2014. These are calculated based on the availability of the euromanifesto for each EP election through the EMP data. Overall, the table demonstrates that in the available euromanifestos for all periods, the average economic policy dimension is more in favor of planned economic policies over free market policies. The euromanifestos also are generally on average pro-welfare and pro-environment. It is interesting to note that largely, the multicultural policy dimension on average is slightly on the positive side during the periods, while overall the policy average on EU integration steadily decreases over time. As the multicultural policy dimension is a measurement of positions on multiculturalism and immigration, it is interesting that largely this policy area is static. The negative/opposition to this policy area may be being subsumed by the EU integration policy

³³ See Appendix C.5 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 5 for a full listing of summary statistics for all variables included in the specified models.

dimension. The increasingly negative turn towards euroskepticism in the policy area over time signifies an increasing opposition to integration and its features such as free movement of people, goods, services, and instead a commitment to the national way of life and return of national sovereignty to member states.

Table 5.2 breaks down these policy areas by non-euroskeptic, soft-euroskeptic, and hardeuroskeptic parties. Largely, this table reflects the patterns demonstrated in the previous table though with some interesting deviations. For the economic policy dimension averages during all periods, the hard and soft-euroskeptic parties demonstrate less commitment to planned economic policies compared to the non-euroskeptic parties. For the welfare policy dimension, there are periods where the hard and soft-euroskeptic parties also demonstrate greater pro-welfare positions on average than the non-euroskeptic parties, such as during the 1994 – 1999 period. The average position of the environment policy dimension also demonstrates and interesting finding as for both hard and soft-euroskeptic parties there is an overall decline over the period towards antienvironment positions compared to the non-euroskeptic parties. As discussed in the previous

	Min	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>
Policies:	1989 - 1994		1994 - 1999			1999 - 2004			
Economy	4.1667	5.4947	4.9071	4.0966	5.5932	4.8883	4.3675	5.8658	4.8607
Welfare	4.9823	5.8140	5.3215	4.9301	6.2821	5.3251	4.9176	5.9972	5.3557
Environment	4.8725	6.9838	5.3683	4.5489	6.4765	5.3072	4.7349	6.6624	5.3919
Multiculturalism	4.4063	5.4487	5.0811	4.3662	5.6818	5.1019	4.7368	6.6667	5.1232
EU Integration	3.9101	7.3718	5.4989	3.8679	6.5414	5.5075	3.2740	6.8992	5.3726
	2	2004 - 200	9	2	009 - 201	4			
Economy	4.2926	5.3894	4.8112	3.7859	5.7979	4.8343			
Welfare	4.9413	6.5625	5.4051	4.8077	7.9688	5.3689			
Environment	4.6875	7.7323	5.4252	4.3396	5.9677	5.2039			
Multiculturalism	4.7843	5.4717	5.0643	4.7131	6.1957	5.0536			
FU Integration	2 9101	6 4 1 9 8	5 2614	3 3019	6 2298	5 1695			

 Table 5.1 EMP Policy Summary Statistics, All Countries

	1	989 - 199	94	1	994 - 199	1994 - 1999 1		1999 - 2004 2		2	2004 - 2009		2	009 - 201	2009 - 2014	
	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	
Soft Euroskeptic:																
Economy	4.5588	5.4740	4.9208	4.6222	5.2817	4.9685	4.3675	5.6410	4.8923	4.2935	5.3894	4.8444	4.5109	5.1961	4.8661	
Welfare	5.0290	5.7071	5.2805	5.0000	6.2821	5.5009	5.0000	5.9357	5.3461	5.0000	6.2973	5.4657	4.9873	6.2180	5.3705	
Environment	4.9551	6.1345	5.4415	5.0000	5.5854	5.2262	4.7349	6.6624	5.3359	4.7611	6.7969	5.2792	4.8819	5.6574	5.1403	
Multiculturalism	4.9214	5.3654	5.0598	4.3662	5.3719	4.9950	4.7368	6.6667	5.2236	4.9401	5.3804	5.0808	4.7131	6.1957	5.1144	
EU Integration	3.9101	6.1962	5.0258	4.1549	5.7692	5.0480	3.2740	6.0852	4.9938	4.0000	5.5323	4.9230	3.5787	6.0870	4.8710	
Hard Euroskeptic:																
Economy				4.7092	5.2500	4.9262	4.6791	5.0704	4.9050	4.8942	5.2973	5.0957	4.7029	5.0943	4.9117	
Welfare				5.0078	5.7181	5.3236	5.0000	5.9972	5.4630	5.0000	5.0811	5.0405	4.8077	5.5433	5.2143	
Environment				5.0000	6.4765	5.5503	5.0741	6.2493	5.6062	5.0265	5.1081	5.0673	4.3396	5.5932	5.1339	
Multiculturalism				4.9934	5.0000	4.9984	5.0000	5.1440	5.0438	4.8919	5.2646	5.0782	4.7794	5.7547	5.0831	
EU Integration				4.2121	5.0671	4.6647	4.0845	4.8920	4.4666	2.9101	3.2162	3.0631	3.3019	4.5983	4.0792	
Non-Euroskeptic:																
Economy	4.1667	5.4947	4.9025	4.0966	5.5932	4.8765	4.4792	5.8658	4.8445	4.2926	5.1759	4.8030	3.7859	5.7979	4.8228	
Welfare	4.9823	5.8139	5.3351	4.9301	5.8122	5.3056	4.9176	5.9694	5.3619	4.9413	6.5625	5.4012	4.9405	7.9688	5.3814	
Environment	4.8725	6.9838	5.3439	4.5489	6.4495	5.2982	4.8877	6.6157	5.4074	4.6875	7.7323	5.4673	4.7845	5.9677	5.2266	
Multiculturalism	4.4063	5.4487	5.0882	4.7500	5.6818	5.1215	4.7500	5.9589	5.1022	4.7843	5.4717	5.0622	4.8733	5.9324	5.0433	
EU Integration	4.4444	7.3718	5.6566	3.8679	6.5414	5.6210	4.1160	6.8992	5.5508	4.5405	6.4198	5.3812	3.4501	6.2978	5.2808	

chapter, this is potentially reflecting the shift in the green-ecological parties over time away from euroskeptic positions. As the CMP data is used to calculate the euroskeptic position of the party that is then used to signify whether the party is soft/hard-euroskeptic or not, as the greens become either neutral or more europhilic in their position on the EU, they move out of the euroskeptic party category. This overtime then is reflected in the average position on the environmental policy dimension as the parties that remain euroskeptic and maintain less of a commitment to green politics. Finally, the EU integration dimension between the different parties demonstrates the expected relationship between party type and position on EU integration. The average policy position of hard-euroskeptic parties on the dimension maintain the most negative-EU integration position, shifting further towards euroskepticism from 4.6647 to 4.0792. Soft-euroskeptic parties are in the middle, shifting from 5.0258 to 4.8710. Non-euroskeptic parties are the most europhilic though even they also demonstrate a shift towards more euroskepticism from 5.6566 to 5.2808. This is a worrying sign as a shift even among non-euroskeptic parties towards greater euroskepticism has a potential negative indication for the broader EU integration agenda.

5.4.2 Pooled EMP policies model

Table 5.3 displays the results for the pooled EMP policies model.³⁴ Recall that each pooled model represents the interaction of each euroskeptic party category, all-euroskeptic (**Model 1**), soft-euroskeptic (**Model 2**), and hard-euroskeptic (**Model 3**), with the independent variables of interest. Comparing parties against those parties located to the right of them on the euroskeptic policy issue, i.e., less euroskeptic, the all-euroskeptic parties model compares all-euroskeptic parties (1) against all non-euroskeptic parties (0). The soft-euroskeptic parties model compares soft-euroskeptic parties (1) against only all non-euroskeptic parties (1). The hard-euroskeptic parties (1) compares hard-euroskeptic parties against both soft and all-euroskeptic parties (0). Also recall that the policy distances analyzed in the subsequent models are interpreted as the policy distance to the EP average. An increase in the policy distance means that the party demonstrates a more extreme policy position compared to the average EP position, and a decrease indicates that the party is moderating to the average EP position.

Figure 5.3 displays the significant interactive terms for the pooled models. For the alleuroskeptic parties model, the only term that demonstrates significance is share of seats the party holds within their political group. The model depicts a positive effect of the EP political group

³⁴ Due to the number of control variables, I only display an abridged table of the models' results for clarity, the coefficient estimates for the pooled models includes the control variables. For full pooled and individual policy models results, including control variables, see **Appendix D.3 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 5**. For the predicted marginal effects see **Appendix E.3 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 5**.

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	All Euroskeptic	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
	Model	Model	Model
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:			
Party Type*National EP Seat %	-0.1631	-0.1198	1.4675*
	(0.1020)	(0.0996)	(0.7428)
Party Type*Representation Difference	0.1967	0.2014	0.3919
	(0.1435)	(0.1462)	(0.5032)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	0.4250†	0.3254	-2.5644
	(0.2270)	(0.2360)	(2.7920)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	-0.5883*	-0.4764†	14.4567†
	(0.2754)	(0.2834)	(8.2808)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0013	0.0004	-0.0060
	(0.0014)	(0.0011)	(0.0046)
Independent Variables:			
National EP Seat %	-0.0995*	-0.1165**	-0.1502**
	(0.0461)	(0.0435)	(0.0481)
Representation Difference	-0.0063	0.0130	0.0342
	(0.0567)	(0.0546)	(0.0534)
EP Group Seat %	0.0277	0.0111	0.2437
	(0.1674)	(0.1664)	(0.1611)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.2284	0.2561	-0.0723
	(0.2009)	(0.2041)	(0.1869)
Years in EP	0.0006	0.0006	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	-0.1354		
	(0.1508)		
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)		-0.1799	
		(0.1552)	
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)			-0.2398
			(0.4793)
Controls:	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Constant	0.2157	0.2095	0.1780
Observations (N)	2130	2050	2130
Group Clusters (N)	88	88	88

Table 5.3 Pooled EMP Policies Model, All Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties, All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by EMP country EP election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01



Figure 5.3 Pooled Policy Distances, Interactive Terms - Euroskeptic Parties

seats share variable on policy distance, (0.4250). This signifies that as the party's size in their political group increases, there are more extreme policy positions from the average EP position. Moreover, the squared term of the measure is also significant in the model, demonstrating that the relationship is curvilinear. While the curvilinear relationship is present, these findings contrast with the expectations of the hypothesis (*HEP-3*) where I theorized that the party moderates to the average EP mean as its size in the political group increases. Instead, the opposite relationship is demonstrated by the model. The predicted marginal effect as the party's size in the political group increases from 0 to 0.9 is (0.2362) to (0.6187). For those parties that maintain greater representation in their political group, it is instead shown that they become less moderate in their policy positions.

With the pooled model of hard-euroskeptic parties, there is only one effect that demonstrates significance in the model, and as with the case of the previous two models, the outcome does not match the outlined theoretical expectations of (*HEP-1*). In the model, as the proportion of seats of the national delegation to the EP held by the euroskeptic party increases, there is an expected increase in the policy distance from the average EP position, with a coefficient estimate of (1.4675). The predicted marginal effect as the proportion of seats held by the hard-euroskeptic party increases from 0 to 0.20, increases (0.2412) to (0.5317). This indicates, contrary to my theoretical assumptions, that as the share in representation of the national delegation to the EP increases, there is an expected increase in the policy distance exhibited by the hard-euroskeptic parties from the average EP position. For example, with the *Front National* of France their share of seats to the EP from France equaled roughly 9% from during the 2004 – 2009 EP session. As such, the marginal effects shows that the party's predicted policy distance in their 2009 euromanifesto is (0.1321) greater than if the party maintained zero representation in the institution.

As this example shows, for a hard-euroskeptic party with increased representation in the institution, the presumed greater voice that this provides the party does not lead to greater moderation but instead more extreme policy positions.

Of the control variables in the pooled models, there are a few notable findings. First, the non-interacted national EP seat share variable for each pooled model demonstrates significance and a negative coefficient estimate. This shows that for the parties in the comparison group for each, namely the non-euroskeptic parties, increased proportion of seats does lead to decreased levels of policy distance, indicating moderation to the EP average. This is important as while for the euroskeptic parties there does not appear to be moderation, this does seem to occur for the noneuroskeptic parties and thus shows potential moderation that is occurring through socialization. Additionally, two controls consistently demonstrate significance, but with the estimates showing less moderation to the EP average, the party's RILE score and the duration of time since the last election. This implies first that the more extreme the party is positioned in the party system, the more likely that it espouses greater extreme policy positions from the EP average. Secondly, as the duration of time from the last national election increases, there are also more extreme policy positions. This may result from the effect of EP elections functioning as second order elections. The further the time from the national election results in the EP election being used a bell weather election to demonstrate displeasure with the national government or how national politics are handling various issues in general at that time. As such, parties that campaign on more extreme policy positions do well compared to the mainstream parties, increasing their seat share in the EP following the election and positioning the party further from the average EP position. The findings in the pooled model for this control variables seems to support this finding in the literature.

	All-Euroskeptic	Soft-Euroskeptic	Hard-Euroskeptic
HEP-1 National EP Delegation Size	X	X	\uparrow
HEP-2 Representation Difference	X	x	X
HEP-3 EP Group Seat Share ²	\uparrow	X	X
HEP-4 Years in EP	X	х	X

Table 5.4 Hypotheses and Findings - Pooled Distance Models

Notes: $X = null hypothesis; \downarrow = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found;$ $<math>\uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found$

Table 5.4 provides a summation of the general findings for the pooled models. Overall, there is no evidence suggesting that institutional participation leads to moderation to the average EP position. In fact, instead the models suggests that greater representation in the EP increases the likelihood that the euroskeptic parties become more extreme in their positions and away from the average EP policy position. If the EP is providing the representational linkage for these parties in comparison to their national legislatures, the effect is less moderation. Even if socialization is occurring within the supranational institution, participation in the EP itself does not provide any evidence of this for the euroskeptic parties. Instead, it appears that the euroskeptic parties are either able to counter any of these effects or are in general less receptive to them. While the interaction effects for the euroskeptic parties do not lend support to the theoretical assumptions of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that the standalone independent variable for the seat share of the national delegation to the EU for non-euroskeptic parties demonstrates a predicted negative relationship. For each pooled model, as the seat share in the national delegation increases, there is a predicted decrease in the expected policy distance measure, i.e., more moderation towards the average EP position. This supports the original theoretical assumptions of the chapter concerning

the measure, that an increase in the national delegation seat share leads to a decline in the policy distance, but this only pertains to non-euroskeptic parties.

5.4.3 Individual policy position models

Breaking the pooled models down into their individual policy areas demonstrates interesting outcomes, some reinforcing the findings from the pooled models showing less moderation to the average EP position, while others aligning with the theoretical expectations. Figure 5.4 displays the coefficient estimate plots for each of the independent variables in the alleuroskeptic party model by policy dimension. In the models, the term measuring the proportion of seats that the euroskeptic party has in the national delegation to the EP is significant for only the welfare and EU integration policy areas. In these policy areas, there is a negative effect on the policy distance, (-0.3670) and (-0.6550) respectively, supporting the theoretical assumptions of (*HEP-1*) and demonstrating moderation to the average EP position. For the welfare policy area, the predicted marginal effect as the party's size in their national delegation increases from 0 to 0.3 is (0.2315) to (0.1214), while for the EU integration policy dimension the predicted marginal effect is (0.4548) to (0.2584). The representation difference term, however, shows an unexpected increase in the expected policy distance, though only for the environment policy area, that contradicts the expectations of (*HEP-2*). The model depicts a positive effect of the measure on the policy distance at (0.5754), indicating a more extreme position from the average EP position in the policy area. The predicted marginal effect of the representation difference measure from 0.6 to 1 is (0.499) to (0.7295), and from 1 to 1.4 it is (0.7295) to (0.9596). The predicted marginal effects demonstrates that as the euroskeptic party maintains greater representation in their national delegation to the EP compared to their national legislature, there is an expected increase



Figure 5.4 EMP Policy Positions, Interactive Terms – All Euroskeptic Parties

in the policy distance, i.e., a more extreme position in the environment policy area compared to the average EP position. For the measure on the party's size within their group political, only the multicultural dimension demonstrates significance with an expected increase of the coefficient estimate of (1.3281). Recall that I theorize a curvilinear relationship with this measure. As the seat share of the political group increases, I expect a decline in the policy distance, moderation to the average EP position, until a level is reached after which moderation decreases. For the multicultural policy dimension, an increase in the share of seats in the political group instead increases the policy distance away from the EP average. The squared term of the political group measure is significant and negative in the model, suggesting that even though the political group measure indicates less moderation on the multicultural policy dimension, there is a level at which the effect lessens. While a curvilinear relationship is present, it is an inverse of the theoretical predications of the chapter in (*HEP-3*). Finally, the number of years spent in the EU displays significance in the model, but only in the economy and environment policy dimensions. Recall (*HEP-4*) theorizes that as the length of time participating in the EP increases, there is a predicted increase in moderation towards the EP average position. Each model depicts a negative effect of the years spent in EP on policy distance, (-0.0039) and (-0.0049) respectively. For the economy policy area, the predicted and significant marginal effects from 0 to 28 years is (0.1899) to (0.0795). For the environment policy area, the predicted and significant marginal effects align with the theoretical assumptions of the model, supporting (*HEP-4*). As the time spent in the EP increases, there is an expected decline in the policy distance of the two policy areas, demonstrating moderation to the average EP position in these policy areas.

Turning to the non-interacted independent variables in the all-euroskeptic parties models reveals interesting findings. First, with the national EP seat share measure, each policy area, apart from the environment and EU integration areas, demonstrates a significant negative effect. This shows that for the non-euroskeptic parties, an increased proportion of seats in their national delegation to the EP results in decreased policy distances, indicating moderation of these policy areas to the average EP position. This is important as while for the euroskeptic parties there does not appear to be moderation, this does occur for the non-euroskeptic parties and thus shows potential moderation that is occurring through socialization in the EP. Additionally, the representation difference term demonstrates significance for the multicultural policy dimension where there is an expected increase in the policy distance of (0.1276). This shows that for the noneuroskeptic parties, as their representation in the EP over their national assembly increases, the multicultural policy distance increases and I expect a more extreme policy position. Lastly, with the years spent in the EP term, there is an expected decrease in the policy distance, more moderation to the EP average, in the welfare policy area at (-0.0035) and an increase in the policy distance, a more extreme position from the average, in the EU integration policy area at (0.0069). This latter finding is important as it shows how even among the non-euroskeptic parties, there is increasing polarization and more extreme policy positions for these parties on the issue within the EP. This could be in reaction to the electoral rise of the euroskeptic parties over time in the EP as the parties attempt to strategically counter these parties.

Of the control variables, an increase in the RILE score predicts an increase in the policy distance from the EP average, but only for the environment and EU integration policy areas, (0.0027) and (0.0038) respectively. Additionally, if the party was a member of the governing coalition following the preceding national election, there is a predicted increase in the policy distance for the economy and multicultural dimensions, (0.0314) and (0.0381) respectively, from the EP average. This may be a result of the party needing to differentiate itself for the voters, as the previous chapter outlines, to counter adverse effects of participating in the coalition. Finally, the variable on the number of years since the previous national election is both positive and significant for the welfare and environment policy areas (0.0173) and (0.0192) respectively, demonstrating less moderation in these policy areas to the EP average as the duration of time from the preceding national election increases.

Table 5.5 provides a summation of the general findings of the individual policy areas for the all-euroskeptic parties model. Overall, there is evidence in partial support of two hypotheses. First, as the size of the euroskeptic party within the national delegation increases, the party moderates to the average EP position as expected by (*HEP-1*), but only for the welfare and EU integration policy area. Second, as the time spent in the EP increases, the party moderates to the

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
HEP-1 National EP Delegation Size	X	\checkmark	X	X	\checkmark
HEP-2 Representation Difference	X	X	\uparrow	X	X
HEP-3 EP Group Seat Share ²	X	X	X	\uparrow	X
HEP-4 Years in EP	\checkmark	Х	\checkmark	X	X

Table 5.5 Hypotheses and Findings - All Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: X = null hypothesis; ψ = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found; \uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found

EP average position as expected in (HEP-4), but only for the economy and environment policy dimensions. Otherwise, the results show that as the parties achieve a greater share of representation in the EP compared to their national legislature, the result is more extreme policy positions away from the EP average position in the environment policy area, negating (HEP-2). With regards to the size of the party in the political groups, only the multicultural policy area demonstrates significance in the model. As the size of the euroskeptic party in the political group increases, there is an expected increase of the party's position in the policy dimension from the EP average, contradicting the expectations of (HEP-3). The non-interacted independent variables for the seat share of the national delegation demonstrates the expected relationship. For each policy model, except for the environment and EU integration policy areas, as the seat share of the non-euroskeptic parties in the national delegation increases, there is a predicted decrease in the policy distance measure, i.e., more moderation towards the average EP position. This again supports the original theoretical assumptions of the chapter concerning the measure, that an increase in the national delegation seat share leads to a decline in the policy distance measure. However, an increased representation difference for the non-euroskeptic parties results in a less moderated position in the multicultural policy dimension, diverging from the average EP position in the policy area.



Figure 5.5 EMP Policy Positions, Interactive Terms - Soft Euroskeptic Parties

Additionally, as the number of years spent in the EP increases, these parties are estimated to advocate for more extreme policy positions compared to the EP average on the EU integration dimension in their euromanifestos.

Figure 5.5 displays the coefficient estimate plots for each of the independent variables with the soft-euroskeptic party variable by policy dimension. Overall, the results demonstrate two similarities with the all-euroskeptic parties model. First, as the size of the soft euroskeptic party in their national delegation increases, there is an expected decrease, more moderation to the EP average, of the welfare policy area at (-0.4387). Therefore, the welfare policy dimension supports (*HEP-1*). The predicted marginal effect as the share of seats in the national delegation increases from 0 to 0.20 declines from (0.2297) to (0.1420). For example, *Forza Italia* in the 2004 euromanifestos has about 25.29% of Italy's seats to the EP. At this level, the predicted marginal

effect is about (0.1096) less than if the party maintained zero representation in their national delegation. The second similarity relates to the size of the party in their political group. For the term measuring the party's size within the political group, only the multicultural dimension demonstrates significance with an expected increase of the coefficient estimate of (1.1758). This demonstrates that for the multicultural policy dimension, an increase in the share of seats in their political group increases the policy distance, indicating a more extreme position in the policy dimension away from the EP average position. The squared term of the political group measure is significant and negative in the model, suggesting that even though the political group measure indicates less moderation on the multicultural policy dimension, there is a level at which the effect lessens. While a curvilinear relationship is present, it is an inverse of the theoretical predications of the chapter in (*HEP-3*).

With the non-interacted independent variables, as the non-euroskeptic party's share of seats in their national delegation to the EP increases, there is an expected decline in the policy distance in all of areas except for in the environment and EU integration policy areas, demonstrating moderation to the average EP position and support of the expectations in (*HEP-1*). Additionally, the non-interacted representation difference term demonstrates significance in the multicultural policy dimension where there is an expected increase in the policy distance, contradicting the expectations of (*HEP-2*). This shows that for the non-euroskeptic parties, increased representation in the EP compared to their national assembly relates to more extreme positions in the multicultural policy area from the EP average. Lastly, as the number of years spent in the EP increases, there is an expected decrease in the welfare policy distance, more moderation towards the EP average, but an expected increase in the EU integration policy distance and more extreme policies. Looking at the control variables, with the RILE measure there is an expected increase in the expected policy distance from the EP average for the multicultural and EU integration policy areas, but a decrease in the distance for the welfare policy area. With the governing coalition measure, there is a positive and significant effect for the economic and environment policy areas, indicating more extreme policy positions away from the EP average for those two policy areas if the party participated in the governing coalition following the preceding national election. Finally, measuring the number of years since the previous national election demonstrates a positive relationship with environment policy areas, indicating a more extreme policy position from the EP average.

Table 5.6 provides a general summation of the hypotheses as they relate to the softeuroskeptic parties. In this model, only (*HEP-1*) theorizing the effect of the soft euroskeptic party's seat share in the national delegation to the EP demonstrates significance and aligns with the general theoretical assumptions of the chapter, but only for the welfare policy dimension. As in the previous models, the evidence suggests that greater representation of the soft euroskeptic party in their political groups results in further extreme positions held in the multicultural policy

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
HEP-1 National EP Delegation Size	X	\checkmark	x	X	x
HEP-2 Representation Difference	X	X	x	X	X
HEP-3 EP Group Seat Share ²	X	X	X	\uparrow	X
HEP-4 Years in EP	X	X	X	X	X

Table 5.6 Hypotheses and Findings – Soft Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: X = null hypothesis; ψ = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found; \uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found dimension away from the average EP position, contrary to the expectations of (*HEP-3*). As demonstrated by the all-euroskeptic model, when looking at the non-interacted independent variables, again the seat share of the party's national delegation to the EP demonstrates a significant and negative relationship. This suggests that while an increase in the national delegation's seat share for euroskeptic parties does not lead to moderation towards the EP average, it may for the non-euroskeptic parties in the specified policy areas. However, greater representation in the EP over their national assemblies is found to increase the expected policy distance of the multicultural policy area, indicating a more extreme policy position. Also, an increase in the number of years spent in the EP demonstrates an increase in the expected policy distance of the EU integration policy dimension.

Figure 5.6 displays the coefficient estimate plots for each of the independent variables with the hard-euroskeptic party variable by policy dimension. Like the previous chapter where various governing coalition features were found to demonstrate greatest significance with the hardeuroskeptic parties, the same occurs with regards to these parties and the various measures of participation in the EP. Within the policy dimensions, the economic, environment and EU integration policy dimensions demonstrate significance in the models.

Within the economic policy model, the seat share of the national delegation in the EP term is positive and significant at (1.3308), indicating a more extreme position in the policy area away from the EP average and showing no support for (*HEP-1*). The predicted marginal effects as the share of the national delegation's seats in the EP increases from 0 to 0.20 increases from (0.1745) to (0.4406) for the hard-euroskeptic parties. The years spent in the EP interactive term, however, is negative and significant at (-0.0030), showing moderation towards the EP average and supporting (*HEP-4*). The predicted marginal effects as the number of years spent in the EP

increases from 0 to 28 decreases from (0.1806) to (0.0979). Overall, this demonstrates that greater time spent in the EP relates to a decrease in the policy distance of the hard euroskeptic party's position towards the average EP position.

Within the environment policy area, the model depicts a positive and significant estimate of (2.4896) in the representation difference term on policy distance, indicating a more extreme policy position away from the EP average. The predicted marginal effect of the representation difference as the level increases from 0.6 to 1 is (1.6710) to (2.6669), and from 1 to 1.4 it is (2.6669) to (3.6627). For example, *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (PRC) for the 2004 euromanifestos has a representation difference of about 1.03, showing greater representation in the EP. At this level, the predicted marginal effect is (2.7415) for the environment, an increase of (0.0746) in the policy distance when compared the predicted marginal effects if the party's



Figure 5.6 EMP Policy Positions, Interactive Terms - Hard Euroskeptic Parties

representation difference between the EP and national assembly was equal. As this example demonstrates, the greater representation of the party in the EP leads to a further increase in the policy distance from the average policy position of the EP on environmental policies, showing no support for (*HEP-2*). Additionally for the environment policy dimension, the interactive term for the years spent in the EP is significant and negative in the model at (-0.0230), supporting (*HEP-4*). For the environment policy area, the predicted marginal effect is only significant from 0 to 28 years and decreases from (0.2820) to (-0.3631). Overall, this shows that greater time spent in the EP relates to a moderation in the policy distance of the hard euroskeptic party's environment position towards the average EP position.

The EU integration policy dimension demonstrates significance in the term measuring the seat share of the party in their national delegation to the EP as well as with the size of the party within their political group. First, the model depicts a positive estimate, (4.6890), on the policy distance for the measure of the party's seat size within their national delegation, displaying a more extreme position in the policy area away from the EP average. The predicted marginal effect of the measure as the proportion of seats increases from 0 to 0.20 increases from (0.4199) to (1.3577). Returning to the PRC, during the 1999-2004 period they consisted of about 0.05 of Italy's national delegation. At this level, there is a predicted marginal effect of (0.6544), or an increase of about (0.2445) when compared to the predicted marginal effect if the party maintained zero seat share. As this case demonstrates, as the hard-euroskeptic party's size within their national delegation increases, there is an expected increase in the policy distance on the measure away from the EP average. However, the model also provides and interesting finding. As the size of the party within their political group increases, there is a negative estimate, (-20.9849), indicating that the party demonstrates a decreased policy distance in this area towards the average EP position. Moreover,

the squared term is additionally found to hold significance in the model, indicating that this is a curvilinear relationship in alignment with the theoretical assumptions of (*HEP-3*). This is an interesting and important finding, as euroskeptic parties hold, by nature, anti-EU integration stances. The model indicates that they decrease their extreme EU positions towards the average EP position on the policy. If this is accurate, then this may be indicating the hard-euroskeptic parties changing policy positions to match more closely the average EP policy position on EU integration, an indicator, I argue, that socialization is occurring.

With the non-interacted independent variables, there are similar patterns as depicted in the previous models. First, for the seat share of the national delegation to the EP, the welfare and multicultural policy areas demonstrate a negative and significant relationship. Demonstrating that when compared to the hard euroskeptic parties, the other parties do moderate their positions to the EP average as their size in their national delegation to the EP increases in these policy areas. As in the previous models, two findings demonstrate mor extreme policy positions displayed by the parties. First, as the party's size within their political group increases, there is an expected increase in the policy distance from the EP average of the multicultural policy area. Second, the number of years spent in the EP increases the policy distance for the EU integration policy dimension, indicating more extreme positions away from the EP average. This result is consistent with the previous models and is disconcerting as this increase shows the potential spread of antimulticulturalism even among less euroskeptic parties in the EP. As with the earlier models, an increase in the RILE score of the party increases the expected policy distance of the party in the multicultural and EU integration policy areas away from the EP average. Additionally, there is an expected increase in the policy distance for the economic and multicultural policy areas for those parties that participated in the governing coalition following the preceding election, and an

expected increase in the policy distance for the welfare and environment policy dimensions as the duration of time from the preceding national election increases.

Table 5.7 summarizes the general findings of the hard-euroskeptic parties model. As with the previous models, overall, there is not much evidence in support of the hypotheses in the hard euroskeptic policy models except for years spent in the EP within the economy and environment policy dimensions (*HEP-4*) and the political group seat measure for the EU integration measure (*HEP-3*). However, for the economy and EU integration policy areas, an increase in the party's size within their national delegation results in more extreme policy positions from the EP average, contradicting the expectations of (*HEP-1*). Moreover, in the environment policy area, increased representation in the EP compared to their national legislature as well as an increased seat share within their political groups expands the policy distance between the party and the average EP position on the policy, i.e., less moderation, providing no support for (*HEP-2*). More importantly, the model indicates that within the EU integration policy area there is an overall decrease in the

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
HEP-1 National EP Delegation Size	\uparrow	X	x	X	\uparrow
HEP-2 Representation Difference	x	x	\uparrow	X	X
HEP-3 EP Group Seat Share ²	x	X	x	X	\checkmark
HEP-4 Years in EP	\checkmark	X	\checkmark	x	x

Table 5.7 Hypotheses and Findings – Hard Euroskeptic Parties

Notes: X = null hypothesis; \downarrow = decrease in coefficient estimate, policy moderation found; \uparrow = increase in coefficient estimate, more extreme policy found policy distance, moderation towards the EP average, as the hard-euroskeptic party's size in their political group increases, supporting hypothesis (*HEP-3*).³⁵

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to examine how socialization through participation in a supranational institution increases the probability for moderation of policy positions. As the effect of socialization is difficult to assess empirically, I focus on the EP and varied participatory measures to assess how participation in this institution impacts the propensity for moderation of the political parties. This is not a precise measurement, and any noticeable moderation of policies may be attributed to a host of various other factors beyond the effect of socialization. I contend however, that any moderation is attributable at least and however indirectly, to the arena of socialization enabled through their participation in the institution. Bearing this in mind, the results of the EMP models demonstrate that overall participation in the EP through the specified measures either has no effect or in fact leads to more extreme policy positions of the parties from the EP average.

The significance, for example, of the representation difference and national delegation measures in the models shows that for the hard euroskeptic parties, increased representation both in the EP compared to their national legislature and in their national delegation more broadly expands the potential for more extreme policy positions. If increased representation in the EP is theorized to draw the euroskeptic parties towards moderation of their policies, the evidence largely

³⁵ See **Appendix F.3 Robustness Check – Chapter 5** for a robustness check using the CMP data. The robustness check includes a brief explanation of the results and the output tables for the models.

points to the other direction. Increased representation in the model leads, where significance is shown, to increased policy distance and more extreme policies from the EP average by the euroskeptic parties. Additionally, looking at the representation difference measure for noneuroskeptic parties, there is evidence of greater policy extremism in the multicultural policy area. One possible explanation for this is a response by the non-euroskeptic parties to the rising threat of the euroskeptic parties. The parties must increasingly talk about the issue and move towards the right to block out and stunt the electoral success of the euroskeptic parties. Regardless, finding more extreme policy positions even among the non-euroskeptic parties is problematic if the EP is indeed putting in place conditions for socialization.

Why do I find a lack of evidence supporting moderation, especially as this undermines the claims of institutional socialization? There are a few potential answers. First, it could be that the lack of moderation to the EP average is due to the same need for differentiation for the parties to compete effectively in EP elections as in their national elections. In the previous chapter, the importance of differentiation was noted as this helps the junior party to overcome being overshadowed by their senior partners or being blamed for policy mishaps during their time in the governing coalition. The lack of moderation towards the EP average may show a similar occurrence. In this case, parties attempt to differentiate from their fellow EP members in their euromanifestos so they demonstrate to voters that the party has not changed during their time in the EP and that the policies they advocate for remain situated in national political concerns and less concerned with potential partners in the EP. This would be of particular interest for the euroskeptic parties as their EU integration position makes them more vulnerable if their voters perceive the party as moderating or aligning to closely with the institution or other party actors in the EP. The parties could be bearing this in mind as they determine the policy positions in their

euromanifestos. There may be some evidence of this with the variable accounting for governing coalition involvement by the parties. Largely within the models, the measure indicates more extreme policy positions in subsequent euromanifestos. This may be evidence of parties attempting to differentiate from other parties in these policy areas and to signal voters how the party is diverging from its coalition partners.

This touches on a second potential reason for a lack of evidence supporting socialization. As discussed in earlier chapters, EP elections are considered second-order, an extension of the national political contestation. If this is accurate, it could be that for the euroskeptic parties the draw of national politics overcomes any representation linkages offered by the EP. The EP remains a tool that the party uses when convenient to advance national policy objectives, but otherwise the party remains focused solely on using the EP elections to drum up their support nationally and critique the policy positions of the mainstream and other centrist parties. For the euroskeptic parties, maintaining more extreme policy positions in the EP elections in fact is a key strategy to increase their visibility to voters, highlighting how they offer differentiated policies against the other national parties. This essentially sets up a barrier for the party and its actors in the EP against any socialization effects, as they view the EP only through the lens of national politics and how the party can leverage the EP elections into increased electoral successes nationally.

Lastly, the nature of their participation in the EP may provide an explanation why socialization is not found. First, as noted in Chapter 2, the euroskeptic party and their actors can maintain either an obstructionist or constructive role. As the more robust results are with the hard euroskeptic parties, it is perhaps not surprising that I find increased policy extremism from the EP average with some of the specified representational features. These parties often are obstructionists and non-euroskeptic MEPs and other EP actors do not engage with them due to their extreme

policy positions and apparent unwillingness to interact constructively in the EP (Häge and Ringe 2019). If accurate, this inhibits the number of socializing linkages that can facilitate the necessary opportunities to internalize norms and procedures of the institution. It also bars these actors from learning about other policies and practices from their fellow MEPs and other EP actors. Maintaining an obstructionist role in the institution segregates the euroskeptic party actors from other actors in the EP and puts in place a higher bar for any potential socialization to the EP average.

Second, even among those euroskeptic party actors that are more constructive, how they engage may also matter. Euroskeptic parties, especially hard-euroskeptic parties, typically join political groups outside of the more mainstream political groups. Being in these less centrist political groups may create an echo chamber where the euroskeptic parties and their actors do not interact with more moderate parties and actors. Additionally, these parties shift their memberships between different political groups quite often or are members of the non-inscrits between EP elections. This means that the party, even if they join the political group, may only be in the same political groups creates a less stable space for socialization to occur when compared to parties participating in multiple parliamentary sessions in same political group.

It may not be all bad news however, there are a few policy areas where moderation through participation occurs. First, for the most part this is in relation to time spent within the EP by the euroskeptic parties. This is an important finding in that it shows how over time, through extended interactions within the EP, there may be moderation of the euroskeptic parties, though the models suggest this is most likely to be found in economic and environmental policies. Note that it can be argued that these findings are simply capturing how older parties simply advocate more moderated positions when compared to younger, more extreme parties. While this is indeed a possibility, the fact that I also find evidence of more extreme policy positions in the multicultural policy area for non-euroskeptic parties over time seems to counter this argument. I only find policy moderation in the economy and environment policy areas over time and no instances of increased policy extremism when compared to the non-euroskeptic parties. This suggests that other factors, such as socialization, may provide alternative explanations for policy moderation over time. Additionally with the EU integration policy area for the hard-euroskeptic parties, the size of the party within their political group results in a predicted decrease in the expected policy distance, moderation towards the EP average This is an important finding as this potentially means that as hard-euroskeptic parties enter the EP, they may also become less extreme in their policy position within the EU integration dimension. Turning to the non-euroskeptic parties, the models additionally suggest how participation in the EP does influence policy moderation in some instances. As their share of seats in their national delegation increases, there is a decline in the policy distance of every policy area except for environment and EU integration policies towards the EP average.

When compared to the previous chapter on governing coalitions, the general lack of evidence supporting moderation because of supranational institution participation is concerning. Instead of leading to moderation, participation may lead to further extreme policy positions, thus making consensus on policies more difficult to achieve. Why might this be occurring? First, it could be that given that EP elections are considered second-order elections and that niche and other parties espousing more extreme policy positions generally are electorally more successful in these elections compared to their national elections. With a higher share of parties with extreme parties in the institutional body, the effects of socialization may take a longer period to take hold. This is evidenced as the duration of years in the EP measure is the variable most consistently showing an effect of moderation. Secondly, the motivation to campaign in the second-order election in the beginning stages of the pathway may impact its propensity to moderate. In the coalition pathway, I theorize that the motivations such as office-seeking by the party to help shape policies within the governing coalition opens the possibility for moderation. Instead, with the case of the EP the motivations differ as the party is using the second-order nature of the EP elections as an extension of the arena of national politics. Extreme policy positions capture the vote of their supporters, and potentially vote switchers as evidenced by Chapter 3, in the EP elections. Remaining outsiders within the EP through political group participation plays to this message to their domestic audiences. Altogether, these present barriers to the effects of socialization.

6.0 Chapter 6 – Conclusion

This project sought out to understand the probability for policy moderation in the euroskeptic parties as they gained representational linkages both domestically and at the supranational levels. The aim was to demonstrate whether concerns that the success of these parties would lead to illiberal policies and more confrontational politics are indeed accurate or that being actively involved in institutions such as governing coalitions results in policy moderation. The project offered theorized pathways to moderation based on participation in domestic governing institutions and involvement in supranational institutions, and the effect that potential moderation then has on voter behavior, both in attracting new or losing existing voters. The evidence from the empirical chapters provides worrisome outcomes. Importantly, the pathways instead of leading to moderation indicate the opposite, greater policy extremism by the euroskeptic parties. This conclusion summarizes the general findings of the empirical chapters and offer explanations that help explain why I find the outcomes that I do with regards to greater policy extremism. The chapter then offers an overview of the study's contributions and finally a discussion on how I plan to extend the study in the future.

6.1 Summarization of findings

First, I examined the reasoning behind why the euroskeptic party may strategically moderate to capture vote switchers to the party. Due to the convergence of the mainstream parties, the lack of product differentiation offered by political parties provided the open issue spaces through which the euroskeptic parties could enter and campaign on. While committed to their owned issue spaces, they could expand their policy offerings, moderating into areas where the mainstream parties were unresponsive to the needs of the voters. For example, the *Danish People's Party* campaigned on issues such as economic protectionism and the welfare state to counter the *Social Democratic Party* and capture their voters who were also more culturally conservative. This moderation does come at a cost, and the chapter also theorized that moderating too far into new policy areas increases the chances that the party turns off its traditional supporters. Overall, the models suggest that it is in more advantageous for the euroskeptic parties to emphasize more extreme policy positions to capture their voters and to prevent losing their existing voters.

With the pooled models, there are no significant findings demonstrating whether moderation effects the ability for the party to attract vote switchers. In the pooled model examining vote abstainers, however, more extreme policy positions decrease the likelihood that the softeuroskeptic party loses voters. It is when the party moderates that I see greater abstentions for the party. This demonstrates the clear electoral advantage for soft euroskeptic parties to emphasize more extreme policy positions as this allows them to minimize the loss of their existing voters in subsequent elections.

Focusing on the individual policy dimensions, if the soft-euroskeptic party emphasizes more extreme multicultural policy positions, this increases the probability of capturing the vote switcher to the party. This is opposite to what is viewed with the hard-euroskeptic parties, as the party is expected to decrease the probability of capturing vote switchers as they emphasize more extreme welfare policy positions. However, if the hard euroskeptic party is more extreme in its economic, environment, or multicultural policy positions, it improves the chances of capturing the vote switchers. With the vote abstention models, more extreme economic policy positions decrease the chances that soft-euroskeptic parties lose their voters. Theis contrasts the hard-euroskeptic parties, where more extreme policy positions in both the economic and international policy dimensions increase the chances of vote abstentions, while in the welfare, environment, and multicultural policy areas this results in decreased probabilities of abstentions. The results of both the vote switcher and abstainer models demonstrate that for the euroskeptic party, it is largely beneficial to maintain more extreme policy positions.

The models demonstrate that greater policy differentiation, in this case more extreme policy positions, increases the electoral success of the euroskeptic parties. This may not be too surprising as it validates previous studies showing that lack of policy differentiation results in less electoral success for parties. Given the convergence of mainstream parties on many policy positions, this provides an opening for parties such as the euroskeptic parties to insert themselves and claim ownership. Continued emphasis of extreme policies also aids the euroskeptic parties as mainstream parties attempt to strategically counter their success. The mainstream parties, seeing the success of the euroskeptic parties attempt to adopt positions to stem the flow of their voters to the party. Indeed, the drift of the non-euroskeptic parties to shift their own positions to offset the rise of the euroskeptic parties. Accordingly, the euroskeptic party must then strategically provide more extreme policy positions to maintain differentiation and their electoral success in capturing new voters.

Looking towards the domestic pathway to moderation, I theorized that the euroskeptic party's participation in the governing coalition leads to moderation. The party moderates on policies to signal its willingness to participate in a governing coalition as the potential partners see which policies the party is willing to negotiate on in return for achieving another, perhaps more preferred, policy objective. Once inside the governing coalition, the euroskeptic party, especially

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in the junior partner position, must continually negotiate and toe-the-line to maintain coalition stability. They learn good governance practices and develop relationships with their fellow coalition partners that form how they campaign and govern.

The empirical models exploring governing coalition features using the CMP data provide some support for this pathway, though largely only for the hard-euroskeptic parties. For these parties in the pooled model, maintaining any of the "big three" cabinet portfolios resulted in a decrease in the policy distance, more moderation. This is important as it potentially shows a linkage between being offered more prominent positions in the governing coalition and moderation. It may be that they are under greater scrutiny. Instead of having the opportunity to use the portfolio to their own benefit and push back against the prime minister and senior coalition partner to differentiate itself, it appears that the scrutiny levelled against the party. Offering a prominent portfolio may theoretically provide a structure for learning good governance practices and sets up the expectation of similar portfolio rewards for the party in future governing coalitions, leading to further moderation where the party believes it is beneficial to maintain relationships with their coalition partners.

The model, however, also indicates that as the proportion of portfolios held by the party increases in the cabinet, moderation also decreases. So, while maintaining one of the "big three" results in moderation, the overall size of the party in the coalition negates any effects leading to moderation. Why might this be? It may simply be an answer of the party's size. As the size increases, it holds a more influential position in the coalition. As a junior partner it has the opportunity to direct this influence against the senior coalition partner, mitigating calls for moderation as they possess the option to pull their support for the coalition, resulting in its collapse.
The senior partner, aware of this possibility, finds it more beneficial to temper its calls for moderation. Moreover, an increased portfolio size may also indicate that the party had to a stronger bargaining position and was able to negotiate less concessions during the coalition's formation.

Breaking down the models into their individual policy dimensions for the hard-euroskeptic parties offers interesting findings. While largely reflecting the pooled model, not all policy dimensions provide the same results. Principally, the environment and multicultural policy areas show that membership in the governing coalition results in greater policy extremism compared to economy and international dimensions. This may represent the negotiations that the euroskeptic party makes to join the governing coalition. Niche issues such as the environment, nationalism and immigration are less likely to be issues that the party negotiates and moderates on compared to economic issues. Moreover, they could use these issue spaces in subsequent elections to differentiate themselves from their coalition partners. The concern of being lumped together with other parties, such as the senior coalition party, necessitates, as Downs terms, product differentiation for the euroskeptic party. Accordingly, the negotiate on policies like in the economy or international policy areas, while leaving open the environment and multicultural policy areas for their future strategy of differentiation.

Altogether, the chapter on governing coalitions demonstrates that moderation does indeed occur, though this depends on the portfolio composition offered to the party and on the policy dimension in question. What this does show, however, is that if non-euroskeptic parties are serious in their considerations to include euroskeptic parties into a tentative governing coalition, then they must also be proactive in which portfolio is offered to the party. It appears, that awarding the party any combination of the "big three" portfolios may indeed aid with intra-coalition stability. The parties need to be aware before entering into coalition formation negotiations, however, that the euroskeptic parties still attempt to differentiate themselves by offering more extreme policies in their owned issue areas, such as on nationalist and anti-immigration policies.

Turning to the supranational institutional pathway, the theory posits that entering the supranational institution provides an additional representation linkage for the euroskeptic party. Traditionally, these parties, especially the hard line euroskeptic parties, were not as electorally successful nationally and so increasingly focused their attention towards the EP. As second order elections, EP elections benefited the parties and allowed them to extend national policy debates to the supranational level. With their increased representation in the EP, I theorized that the party and its actors participating in the EP would be subjected to the institution's socializing effects, leading the party to moderate on policies, especially to the average position of their political groups as these parties share similar policy preferences. Contrary to findings with the governing coalition pathway, participation in the supranational institution does not appear to result in broader moderation though with exceptions.

With the pooled models using the EMP data, more extreme policy positions away from the EP average are expressed by the hard euroskeptic parties as the share of seats in their national delegation to the EP increases. If the supranational institution is supposed to offer greater representation advantages to the party and this representation then in turn results in structures permissive to socialization effects, the models indicate that more extreme policy positions, not moderation, is likely to occur.

With the individual policy models, as the share of seats in the national delegation to the EP increases for the soft-euroskeptic parties, there is an expected decrease in their welfare policy position towards the average EP position. However, their size in their political groups increase, there is an expected increase, less moderate position by the soft euroskeptic parties in the

multicultural policy area from the EP average position. For hard-euroskeptic parties, greater representation in the EP than in their national assemblies results in more extreme positions from the EP average in the environment policy area. Moreover, an increase in the party's size in their nation's delegation to the EP increases expected policy extremism in the economy and EU integration policy dimensions. Why do I find these findings for the euroskeptic parties in relation to their participation in the EP? One explanation is the second order nature of EP elections and the need for greater differentiation even in the EP elections for parties. While they join the EP, they may need to still differentiate themselves from other EP parties and actors for their national audience. It could also be demonstrating that as the hard euroskeptic parties often fill an obstructionist role in the EP, they are cutting themselves off from any potential avenues of socialization provided by the institution that enables moderation. If they are concerned more for how EP elections can be used to benefit the party in national elections and decide not to engage the EP as an additional representational institution through which to engage in policymaking, the conditions for socialization to be effective is lessened.

I should point out, however, that two findings do show some moderation in the euroskeptic parties through their participation in the EP. First, for the economy and environment policy dimensions, increased length of time spent in the EP results in moderation. This shows potential evidence of the socialization effects as repeated interactions, in this case the duration of time, of the party in the institution are theorized to affect the propensity for moderation. Additionally, with the hard-euroskeptic parties, an increased seat share in their political groups results in moderation of their EU integration position towards the EP average. This is an important finding given that EU integration is an owned issue space of the euroskeptic parties. Demonstrating that they moderate their position to the average EP policy position conveys the importance of the institution

in potentially moderating the most extreme groups critiquing the institution. In all, supranational institutional effects do not appear to affect policy moderation overall in the specified models of this study, but these latter examples do offer some evidence showing possible socialization.

6.2 A path forward

The main contribution of this study relates to two of its findings. First, it does appear that when then euroskeptic party successfully attains representation in national governing institutions, in this case the governing coalition, there is a linkage with increased moderation of the party. This is encouraging and suggests that if the coalition partners structure the negotiations for coalition formation carefully, particularly with regards to the composition of portfolios awarded to the euroskeptic party through the "big three", this has the potential to moderate the party's positions in subsequent elections. There should be an awareness by these parties, however, that the euroskeptic party may be concerned with being overshadowed by its fellow coalition partners and losing its perceived differentiated stance in its appeal to the voters. While the euroskeptic party negotiates on certain policy areas, such as the economy, to the benefit of intra-coalition stability, they still remain committed to, and even become more extreme in, other policy areas such as with multiculturalism. Electorally this may be a successful strategy but could cause some difficulties with their involvement in the governing coalition.

The second contribution of this study centers on what electoral strategies scholars may expect from the euroskeptic parties more broadly. With the chapter on the EP, it is apparent that within the EP elections the euroskeptic parties consistently emphasize more extreme policy positions in their euromanifestos. This indicates that these parties still view EP elections as a tool to campaign on and advocate for the policies that they would like to see implemented domestically, affirming the perspective that EP elections are an extension of domestic, national politics. With the chapter on the voters, the effective electoral strategy for the euroskeptic parties is to maintain extreme positions, to differentiate and capture new voters and maintain the support of their previous supporters. There is little electoral benefit to moderate, A main takeaway from both chapters, however, may be increased confrontational politics located at the national level as well as the supranational level. The consequence of the latter is a decrease in the institution's ability to provide a united voice even when faced by critical global issues such as climate change, the rise of refugees and asylum seekers and armed conflict in addition to Europe's role as a critical region in the support of democracy and liberal policies and norms. Also, this increased polarization may erode trust in the institution and, relatedly, support for further integration. If the goal of euroskepticism is to halt or turnback integration, then increased polarization may facilitate by fostering uncertainty in the ability of the EU and its institutions to function even during a period of heightened polarization. In turn, this then has the potential to decrease the willingness of voters to cede national sovereignty further to the institution. Nationally, the heightened polarization could increase a displeasure with how national democratic institutions are operating and leading to decreased participation in democratic activities such as voting.

From these two contributions, I plan to extend this study down a few potential avenues. First, this study mainly focused on the latter stages of the pathways model, examining how entering either a governing coalition or the EP results in euroskeptic party moderation. What the study does not examine, however, is the earlier stages of the pathways model and the reasoning behind why these parties decide to enter the pathways. The findings of Chapter 3 demonstrate how more extreme policies are best at attracting new and retaining previous voters. Why, then, would the party enter a governing coalition where it must negotiate more moderated positions and moderate due to the intra-coalition dynamics? I believe that expanded interviews of euroskeptic parties are needed to explore why parties employ the strategies they do prior to elections and then also regarding their decision to enter negotiations with potential coalition partners. This will help to fill in an important gap of the proposed pathways to moderation, potentially revealing conditions in the earlier stage of the pathways that are favorable towards moderation of the euroskeptic parties in the latter stages.

Additionally, this project only explored the soft/hard distinction of euroskeptic parties, but there are multiple dimensions within euroskepticism that I do not touch on. First, the study does not explore the differences between left and rightwing euroskepticism. I plan in future studies to explore this important distinction to see if there are any differences in the propensity for moderation between euroskeptic parties on the left versus right or if there are differences in the policy areas on which they are more likely to moderate. Moreover, exploring this distinction will let me examine how these different euroskeptic parties approach and then interact with the pathways model, allowing me to note any differences, for example, in how a left or rightwing euroskeptic party approaches negotiations to join a governing coalition. Additionally, this study did not look at competition between different euroskeptic parties and how this effects policy moderation. For example, if a new euroskeptic party enters the party system and challenges an existing euroskeptic party on an owned issue space, such as occurred in the 2019 Danish general election, how does the existing euroskeptic party react? Does the party strategically balance against the newcomer or still focus on the mainstream parties when it determines where and how to differentiate? Exploring these different angles beyond the soft/hard distinction will provide me the ability to approach euroskepticism in a more holistic fashion.

Turning to the pathway models more explicitly, there are different research possibilities that I plan on exploring in future studies such as in the governing coalition pathway and the importance of the "big three" portfolios in moderation. There appears to be a connection between receiving these portfolios and subsequent party moderation. I assume that increased scrutiny and visibility of those holding these portfolios increases the probability that they toe-the-line with the senior coalition partner and prime minister's position to ensure intra-coalition stability. The weakness of my approach is that I find moderation indirectly through, for example, a categorical variable simply assessing the number of portfolios awarded to the euroskeptic party. A more direct approach is required to fully assess whether those holding these portfolios are indeed under greater scrutiny or form relationships with other coalition partners that lead them to advocate for, and succeed in procuring, moderated policy positions. I think that one potential avenue of research comes in the form of more qualitative elite level surveys with those individuals, both from noneuroskeptic and euroskeptic parties according to the classifications within this study to identify a broad set of perspectives on which to draw inferences from. While I conducted interviews, unfortunately none were with individuals that currently or previously held any of the "big three" portfolios. Understanding the intra-coalition dynamics that they provide in these interviews will help in in examining the linkages and mechanisms more fully at play. This also helps to establish whether a direct line from possessing any combination of the portfolios to a moderated policy outcome with the euroskeptic occurs. Additionally, the interviews may reveal on which policies the parties are willing to negotiate with their potential coalition partners and those, for example environmental and multicultural, that they are not prepared to moderate on.

An additional avenue of research concerns, 1) the lack of moderation of parties within the EP and 2) the apparent moderation on EU integration to the EP average among the hard-

euroskeptic parties. As mentioned in the chapter on supranational institutions, socialization and how it operates in the supranational context to alter the preferences of participating actors is a difficult concept to measure and empirically validate. Instead, I approached the question by looking at the representational linkage and whether this then leads to moderation, inferring that noted moderation demonstrates that some degree of socialization is indeed interacting with parties and their actors in the EP. Instead, the findings largely demonstrate less moderation, and more extreme policy positions expressed by the parties in their euromanifestos. As such, similar with the governing coalition, I think that interviews with party MEPs and staff working in the EP will provide an additional context as to why exactly more extreme policy positions are being found in the models. I theorize that the outcome may be explained by the party thinking that either it must differentiate itself from its fellow EP political group members in the EP election, and/or that the party and its actors still view EP elections framed within the national political contest and use the euromanifestos to signal their domestic audience. Qualitative interviews will, I believe, help to tease out more fully the mechanisms and whether any noticeable effect of socialization is indeed occurring.

The apparent moderation on the EU integration measure with the hard-euroskeptic parties was a surprising finding. While the outcome aligned with the theoretical expectations of the chapter, it was unexpected given the lack of moderation in other policy areas within the hardeuroskeptic party category. If this outcome is accurate, then it is indeed good news for those concerned that the euroskeptic parties provide a stumbling block to further integration. Finding moderation on the policy dimension among the most euroskeptic party category counters this concern and shows that some degree of socialization or other factor is occurring that is drawing the party towards greater moderation as their size within their EP political group increases. As such, I believe that it is necessary to explore this linkage even further to understand what underlying mechanisms are in fact leading the parties to moderate their EU integration position. What exactly, for example, within their participation in the EP political group is causing this moderation? Is it a consequence derived by specific positions held within the political group leadership, participation in plenary sessions, or in committee hearings, etc.? Honing the model to examine MEPs from hard-euroskeptic parties more specifically in relation to these different participatory features in addition to elite interviews as specified in the preceding paragraph will help to fully understand the reasoning behind their moderation on this policy dimension, but not on the others.

The final avenue of research that I consider relates to the voters. The findings demonstrate quite consistently that policy moderation by the euroskeptic parties is not a good electoral strategy as it leads the party to receive fewer vote switchers and to face greater existing voter abstentions in subsequent elections. This study, therefore, examines one side of the voter section in the full moderation model, how moderation affects voter behavior before the parties enter the specified pathways. The question that I need to first address is how voters then react to moderation caused by the euroskeptic party's interaction with the theoretical pathways. And if the voters are paying attention at all to what the parties are doing and changing their voting behavior accordingly, how does this behavior in turn affect the kinds of policies that the euroskeptic party, at the same time the vote abstention model demonstrates this extreme position leads to greater abstentions. This implies that the party may, depending on the policy, need to balance between more and less moderation to maximize attracting new voters while minimizing the loss of existing voters.

Examining this aspect helps to fill in a current gap in the full moderation model that only addresses the reaction of voters to moderation at the beginning of the model, and not how the parties themselves in turn react and formulate subsequent electoral strategies.

Taking a broader perspective, this study lends itself to other avenues of research beyond the euroskeptic parties. First, while there are no other political and economic unions integrated to the same degree as the EU, globally organizations are increasing both their scope and their efforts to further integrate their member states. African Union and Mercosur, for example, have in the recent decades set up the Pan-African Parliament and Mercosur Parliament, respectively, to increase democratic participation in the institution as with the EP. The pathways I propose in this study could be extended to these institutional bodies and provide a blueprint for how to expect political parties and their actors in these regions to relate to and interact with the institution going forward. This is of important research interest as these parliaments shift towards direct elections of their MPs, reflecting the supranational pathway like what this project theorizes with the EP, and expand the legislative powers of the institutions.³⁶ As these regional institutions institutionalize these democratic practices more, it additionally opens the possibility to compare cross regionally. How do political parties participating in the Mercosur Parliament, for example, differ from those in the EP? Do we see the development of skepticism within Mercosur and the governments of member states and how does this differ from its European cousin? While the institutionalization of these parliamentary institutions is still nascent and evolving when compared to the EP, it is

³⁶ The Mercosur Parliament set a target date of 2020 for all member states to switch to direct elections to the parliament, see <u>https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/422411-parlasul-adia-eleicoes-diretas-de-parlamentares-do-mercosul-para-2020/</u>. Also note that there are concerns about the ability of the member states of the African Union to hold free and fair direct elections, see Bheki Mngomezulu. 2018. "Reflecting on the Pan-African Parliament: Prospects and Challenges," *Journal of African Union Studies* 7(2): 45–62.

interesting to see how they mirror or diverge from the experiences demonstrated by the EP and whether the pathways I put forward in this study are additionally reflected by the experiences of the political parties and actors in their respective regions.

Another area of research that I believe the model of moderation proposed by the study can be extended to includes the broad challenger parties (de Vries and Hobolt 2020). These parties are defined as political parties that have not entered a governing coalition. With this definition, any new entrant into the party system of any ideological persuasion is considered a challenger party. In these cases, the pathway of moderation through governing coalition participation is of particular interest. Since these parties have not participated in a governing coalition, they provide an excellent case study in exploring the moderation of political parties since they have not been exposed to the intra-coalition dynamics that lead the party towards moderation. This allows me to first conduct interviews of the challenger party's elites and actors leading up to elections to understand their motivations, and to determine how these motivations align with the early stage of the theorized moderation pathway. As their inclusion in the governing coalition exposes them to these dynamics for the first time, this then provides a hard test of second stage of the pathway towards moderation through intra-coalition dynamics. Expanding the model to the challenger parties helps to establish the pathway as one not only specific to euroskeptic parties, but one that is more broadly applicable to any future party types that espouse unforeseen, extreme policy positions.

Lastly, there are different avenues that I would like to examine to understand moderation of the parties, whether euroskeptic or not. The most interesting one, is the use of social media by parties to reach out to their voters and to signal policy positions. These signals help to map out party policy positions over time and how this then interacts with the timing of elections or during

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periods of governing coalition participation. Strategically, social media provides parties a direct link to their supporters and provide signals that I can, hopefully, discern to determine how parties, whether euroskeptic or not, moderate both preceding the election in the first stage of the pathway and then during their participation in the governing coalition. Analyzing the social media of the parties also aids me in understanding how these signals may relate to the final composition of the governing coalition by establishing how far the parties are from one another and how this impacts the probability of joining a coalition. Moreover, these signals are useful in establishing how well the party is toeing the line within the governing coalition by comparing its policy signals during its participation against the average policy signals of its coalition partners. As the models find the influence of possessing any of the "big-three" cabinet portfolios in moderation, following the social media posts concerning these portfolios has the potential to reveal how the party's actors reflect the broader coalition policy. It also potentially reveals more definitively the mechanisms connecting possessing these three portfolios with policy moderation of the parties. Examining signals through social media helps to also distinguish points where the party attempts to differentiate itself from its coalition partners. As the chapters on voters and governing coalition membership show the importance of differentiation for junior partners, signals provided by the party's social media are a vital tool in helping to determine where and how differentiation occurs for junior party members, its implications for subsequent electoral successes and governing coalition formation.

Appendix A Euroskeptic Political Parties

Table A.1 Euroskeptic Political Parties

**Values calculated as distance of position on EU integration of party from their respective country's average of all parties in the recorded year based on rescaled 0-10 range. Soft euroskeptic parties are calculated as 0.5-1.5 standard deviations from the country average. Hard euroskeptic parties are calculated as having a position greater than 1.5 standard deviations from the country average.

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	(BZO)	2006, 2008	
Austria	Austrian Communist Party	(KPO)	2008	2002
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party	(FPO)	1994, 1995, 1999, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017	
Austria	Austrian People's Party	(OVP)	2017	
Austria	Green Alternative	(GA)	1990	
Austria	Team Stronach for Austria	(TS)	2013	
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish	(CD&V)	2003	
Belgium	Christian Social Party	(PSC)	1987, 1999	
Belgium	Ecologists	(ECOLO)	1985, 1987, 1991, 1999	
Belgium	Flemish Bloc	(VB)	1999, 2003	
Belgium	Flemish Interest	(VB)	2007, 2010	2014
Belgium	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	(VLD)	1995	
Belgium	Flemish Socialist Party	(SP)	1985, 1991	
Belgium	Francophone Democratic Front	(FDF)	1985, 1987	
Polgium	Groop	(groon!)	2010	
Belgium	Liberal Reformation Party	(PPI)	1087 1001	
Belgium	List Dedecker	(I RL)	2007	
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	$(\mathbf{L}\mathbf{D}\mathbf{D})$ $(\mathbf{N}_{-}\mathbf{V}\mathbf{\Delta})$	2007	
Belgium	Party of Liberty and Progress	(\mathbf{PVV})	1991	
Deigium	rany of Liberty and Flogress	(1 V V)	1771	

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
Belgium	People's Union	(VU)	1985	
Belgium	Reform Movement	(MR)	2003	
Belgium	Worker's Party of Belgium	(PTB/PVDA)	2014	
Bulgaria	BSP for Bulgaria	(BSP za Bulgariya)	2017	
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party	(BSP)	1994, 1997	
Bulgaria	Coalition of Bulgarian Socialist Party, Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union – Alexandar Stambolijski and Political Club 'Ekoglasnost'	(BSP-BZNS- AS-PKE)	1994	
Bulgaria	Democratic Left	(DL)	1997	
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	(DPS)	1997, 2001	
Bulgaria	National Union Attack	(ATAKA)	2013	2005, 2014
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja	(HDSSB)	2007, 2015	
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	(HDZ)	1990, 1992, 2000	
Croatia	Croatian Labourists – Labour Party	(HL)	2011	
Croatia	Croatian Party of Slavonia and Baranja	(SBHS)	1995	
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party	(HSS)	1995, 2003	
Croatia	Croatian People's Party	(HNS)	2007	
Croatia	Human Shield			2015
Cyprus	Democratic Coalition	(DISY)	2016	
Cyprus	Ecological and Environmental Movement		2006	
Cyprus	Movement of Ecologists – Citizens' Cooperation		2016	
Cyprus	Progressive Party of the Working People	(AKEL)	1996, 2001, 2006	
Cyprus	United Democratic Union of Cyprus of Cyprus	(EDEK)	1996	
Czechia	Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	(SPR–RSČ)	2002	
Czechia	Christian Democratic Party	(KDS)	1992	
Czechia	Civic Democratic Alliance	(ODA)	1992	
Czechia	Civic Democratic Party	(ODS)	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017	
Czechia	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	(KSČM)	1996, 2006	

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic		
Czechia	Freedom and Direct Democracy	(SPD)		2017		
Czechia	Left Bloc	(LB)	1992			
Czechia	Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Direct Democracy	(ÚSVIT)	2013			
Denmark	Common Course	(FK)		1987		
Denmark	Danish People's Party	(DF)	2005, 2011	1998, 2001, 2007		
Denmark	Justice Party	(RF)		1984		
Denmark	Red-Green Unity List	(EL)	1998, 2001, 2007	2005		
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	(SD)	1988			
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	(SF)	1987, 1988, 1990	1984, 1994		
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	(EKRE)	2015			
Estonia	Estonian Center Party	(K)	2007	1995		
Estonia	Estonian Greens	(EER)	2007	2011		
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	(ER)	1999			
Estonia	Union for the Republic	(RP)	2003			
Finland	Finnish Christian Union	(SKL)	1995			
Finland	True Finns	(PS)	1999	2003, 2007, 2011		
France	French Communist Party	(PCF)	1988, 1993, 1997			
France	Indomitable France			2017		
France	National Front	(FN)	1988, 1997, 2002, 2017	2007, 2012		
France	The Greens	(Les Verts)	2002			
France	Socialist Party	(PS)	2012, 2017			
Germany	Alternative for Germany	(AfD)		2013, 2017		
Germany	Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union	(CDU/CSU)	2002, 2005			
Germany	Free Democratic Party	(FDP)	1987			
Germany	Greens/Alliance 90	(Greens/90)	1990, 1994			
Germany	Party of Democratic Socialism	(PDS)	1990, 1994, 2002	1998		
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	(SPD)	2005			
Germany	The Left - Party of Democratic Socialism	(L-PDS)	2005	2009		
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	(SYRIZA)	2007, 2012/5			

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left – Unionist Social Front	(SYRIZA-EKN)		2012/6
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	(KKE)	1985, 1993, 2000, 2009	1996, 2004, 2012/5, 2015/1
Greece	New Democracy	(ND)	1989/6, 1989/11, 1990	
Greece	Popular Unity	(LAE)	2015/1	
Greece	Progressive Left Coalition	(SYN)	1989/6, 1989/11	
Hungary	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Union – Christian Democratic People's Party	(FiDeSz-MPSz- KDNP)	2006, 2014	
Hungary	Christian Democratic People's Party	(KDNP)	1998	
Hungary	Federation of Young Democrats	(FiDeSz)	1990, 1994	
Hungary	Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Union	(FiDeSz-MPSz)	2006	
Hungary	Hungarian Democratic Forum	(MDF)	1990, 2006	
Hungary	Hungarian Social Democratic Party	(MSzDP)	1994	
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	(MSzP)	1990	
Hungary	Independent Smallholder's Party	(FKgP)		2002
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary	(Jobbik)	2010, 2014	
Ireland	Green Party	(Greens)	1992, 2002	1989, 1997
Ireland	Independent Alliance			2016
Ireland	Socialist Party		2011	
Ireland	We Ourselves	(SF)	2002, 2011, 2016	2007
Italy	Brothers of Italy	(FDI)	2018	
Italy	Civil Revolution	(RC)	2013	
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	(PRC)	1994	1992, 1996, 2001
Italy	Democratic Alliance	(AD)	1996	
Italy	Five Star Movement	(M5S)	2018	
Italy	Go Italy	(FI)	2001, 2006, 2018	
Italy	Green Federation	(FdV)	1994	
Italy	House of Freedom		2001	
Italy	Italian Social Movement – National Right	(MSN-DN)	1983	1987
Italy	Italy in the World	(lnM)	2006	
Italy	Labour and Freedom List	(3L)		2013
Italy	League	(L)	2018	
Italy	National Alliance	(AN)	1994, 2001, 2006	

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic		Hard Euroskeptic
Italy	New Italian Socialist Party	(NPSI)	2001, 2006		
Italy	Northern League	(LN)	2001, 2006		
Italy	Union for Christian and Center Democrats	(UDC)	2006		
Italy	White Flower		2001		
Latvia	Concorde Center	(SC)	2011		
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom – Latvian National Independence Movement	(TB-LNNK)	2002		
Latvia	Latvian Social Democratic Alliance	(LSDA)	1998		
Latvia	New Party	(JP)	1998		
Latvia	People's	(TP)	1998, 2002		
Lithuania	Coalition Labour Party and Youth		2008		
Lithuania	Election Action of Lithuania's Poles	(LLRA/AWPL)	2012, 2016		
Lithuania	Liberal and Centre Union	(LiCS)	2004		
Lithuania	Lithuanian Centre Union	(LCS)	1996		
Lithuania	Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party	(LDDP)	1996		
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	(LSDP)	1996		
Lithuania	National Resurrection Party	(TPP)	2008		
Lithuania	New Union	(NS)	2000		
Lithuania	Order and Justice	(PTT)	2016		
Luxembourg	Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice	(ADR)	1989, 1999, 2009, 2013		1994
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	(KPL/PCL)	1984, 1989		
Luxembourg	Socialist Worker's Party of Luxembourg	(LSAP/POSL)	2004		
Luxembourg	The Left		2009, 2013		
Malta	Labour Party	(PL)	1996, 1998		
Netherlands	Christian Union	(CU)	2003, 2012, 2017		
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	(FvD)	2017		
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	(LPF)	2002		
Netherlands	Livable Netherlands	(LN)	2003		
Netherlands	Pacifist Socialist Party	(PSP)	1986		
Netherlands	Party of Freedom	(PVV)			2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
Netherlands	Radical Political Party	(PPR)	1986		
Netherlands	Reformatory Political Federation	(RPF)	1989, 1994	1998	

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
Netherlands	Reformed Political League	(GPV)	1989	
Netherlands	Reformed Political Party	(SGP)	1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2010, 2017	2002
Netherlands	Socialist Party	(SP)	1994, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2017	
Netherlands	50Plus	(50PLUS)	2017	
Poland	Freedom Union	(UW)	1997	
Poland	Law and Justice	(PiS)	2007, 2011	
Poland	League of Polish Families	(LPR)	2005	2001
Poland	Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland	(ROP)	1997	
Poland	Polish Peasants' Party	(PSL)	2007	
Poland	Union of Real Politics	(UPR)	1991	
Portugal	Ecologist Party "The Greens"	(PEV)	1985, 2015	
Portugal	Left Bloc	(BE)	1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2015	
Portugal	National Solidarity Party	(PSN)	1991	
Portugal	Popular Democratic Movement	(MDP)	1985	
Portugal	Popular Democratic Union	(UDP)	1987	
Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party	(PCP)	1985, 1991, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2015	2009, 2011
Portugal	Social Democratic Center Party – Popular Party	(CDS-PP)	1995	
Portugal	Unified Democratic Coalition	(CDU)	1991, 1999, 2002, 2005	
Romania	Greater Romania Party	(PRM)	2004	
Romania	Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania	(UDMR- RMDSz)	2000	
Romania	National Liberal Party	(PNL)	2008	
Romania	National Union PSR+PUR	(PSD-PUR)	2004	
Romania	Social Democratic Party	(PSD)	2016	
Romania	Socialist Labour Party	(PSM)	1992	
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	(KDH)	1994, 2006	
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	(KSS)	2002	
Slovakia	Direction-Social Democracy	(Smer)	2002	
Slovakia	Freedom and Solidarity	(SaS)	2010, 2012	
Slovakia	Hungarian Civic Party	(MOS/MPP)	1994	
Slovakia	Kotleba's People's Party Our Slovakia	(KĽSNS)		2016
Slovakia	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	(HZDS)	2010	

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
Slovakia	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	(OĽaNO)	2012	
Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left	(SDĽ)	1998	
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	(SDKÚ-DS)	2002, 2010	
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic Coalition	(SDK)	1998	
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	(SNS)	1994, 1998, 2006, 2010, 2012	
Slovakia	Workers' Association of Slovakia	(ZRS)		1994
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	(DeSUS)	2011	
Slovenia	Liberal Democratic Party	(LDS)	2011	
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	(SNS)	1996	2000, 2004, 2008, 2011
Slovenia	United Left	(ZL)		2014
Slovenia	Zoran Janković's List – Positive Slovenia	(PS)	2011	
Spain	Aragonese Regionalist Party	(PAR)	1986, 1993	1989
Spain	Basque Country Unite	(EH Bildu)		2015
Spain	Basque Solidarity	(EA)	1989	
Spain	Catalan Republican left	(ERC)	1986, 1993, 1996, 2008	
Spain	Convergence and Union	(CiU)	2011	
Spain	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	(CDC)	2016	
Spain	Galician Nationalist Bloc	(BNG)		1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011
Spain	In Common We Can		2016	
Spain	People's Party	(PP)	1989	
Spain	Popular Unity	(UP)	2015	
Spain	United We Can		2016	
Spain	United Left	(IU)	1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004,	
			2008, 2011	
Spain	We can		2016	
Sweden	Green Ecology Party	(MP)	1988, 1994, 2006	1991, 1998, 2002
Sweden	Left Communists Party	(VPK)	1988	
Sweden	Left Party	(V)	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	(SD)		2010, 2014, 2018
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	(Conservatives)	1987, 1992, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017	1997
United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party	(DUP)	1992, 2017	
United Kingdom	Labour Party	(Labour)	1983, 1987	
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	(UKIP)	2017	2001, 2015

Country	Political Party	Abbreviation	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
United Kingdom	We Ourselves	(SF)	1997	

Appendix B Calculating Policy Positions

Appendix B.1 Calculating Policy Positions – CMP

Economic Position

(**per401** Free Market Economy + **per414** Economic Orthodoxy)

MINUS

(**per403** Market Regulation + **per404** Economic Planning + **per412** Controlled Economy)

From: Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont (2011); Volkens, Andrea, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D. McDonald, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2014); Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016); Traber, Denise, Nathalie Giger and Silja Häusermann (2018); Volkens, Andrea, Werner Krause, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Bernhard Weßels, (2018).

Welfare Position

(**per503** Equality: Positive + **per504** Welfare State Expansion)

MINUS

(per505 Welfare State Limitation)

From: Armingeon, Klaus and Nathalie Giger (2008); Volkens, Andrea, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D. McDonald, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2014); Jensen, Carsten and Henrik Bech Seeberg (2015); Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016); Traber, Denise, Nathalie Giger and Silja Häusermann (2018); Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen (2020).

Environment Position

(**per501** Environmental Protection + **per416** Anti-Growth Economy: Positive)

MINUS

(**per401** Free Market Economy + **per410** Economic Growth: Positive + **per703** Agriculture and Farmers: Positive)

From: Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2007); Meguid, Bonnie (2008); Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont (2011); Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov and Michael Laver (2011); Spoon, Jae-Jae, Sara Hobolt, and Catherine de Vries (2014); Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016); Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen (2020).

Immigration/Multiculturalism Position

(**per602** National Way of Life: Negative + **per607** Multiculturalism: Positive)

MINUS

(**per601** National Way of Life: Positive + **per608** Multiculturalism: Negative)

From: Meguid, Bonnie (2008); Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016); Traber, Denise, Nathalie Giger and Silja Häusermann (2018); Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Werner Krause (2018); Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen (2020).

International Politics Position

(**per101** Foreign Special Relationships: Positive + **per105** Military: Negative + **per106** Peace + **per107** Internationalism Positive + **per407** Protectionism: Negative)

MINUS

(**per102** Foreign Special Relationships: Negative + **per104** Military: Positive + **per109** Internationalism: Negative + **per406** Protectionism: Positive)

From: Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont (2011); Volkens, Andrea, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D. McDonald, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2014): Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016).

Appendix B.2 Calculating Policy Positions – EMP

Economic Position

Planned economy: per_v[x]_403a + per_v[x]_404a + per_v2_4011a + per_v[x]_412a + per_v[x]_4121a + per_v[x]_4122a + per_v[x]_4123a + per_v[x]_4124a

MINUS

Market economy: $per_v[x]_401a + per_v2_4011b + per_v[x]_4012a + per_v[x]_414a$

From: Schmitt *et al* 2016

Welfare Position

Pro-Welfare Expansion: $per_v[x]_503a + per_v[x]_504a + per_v[x]_5041a + per_v[x]_5042a + per_v[x]_5043a + per_v[x]_5044a + per_v[x]_5045a$

MINUS

Anti-Welfare Expansion: $per_v[x]_503b + per_v[x]_504b + per_v[x]_5041b + per_v[x]_5042b + per_v[x]_5043b + per_v[x]_5044b + per_v[x]_5045b$

From: Schmitt *et al* 2016

Environment Position

Pro-Environment: per_v[x]_416a + per_v[x]_501a

MINUS

Anti-Environment: per_v[x]_410b

From: Klüver and Spoon 2015; Lowe *et al* 2011

Multicultural Position

Pro-Multicultural: $per_v[x]_601b + per_v[x]_607a + per_v[x]_6011b$

MINUS

Anti-Multicultural: $per_v[x]_601a + per_v[x]_607b + per_v[x]_6011b$

From: Meguid, Bonnie (2008); Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon (2016); Traber, Denise, Nathalie Giger and Silja Häusermann (2018); Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Werner Krause (2018); Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen (2020).

*Note that immigration dimension is additionally added to the recommendations by the above cited authors.

EU Integration Position

Pro-EU: per_v[x]_108a + per_v2_203a + per_v2_3011a + per_v2_306a + per_v2_308a + per_v2_310a + per_v2_3101a + per_v2_312a + per_v2_314a + per_v2_3141a + per_v2_316a + per_v2_3161a + per_v2_4011a + per_v2_4084a + per_v2_601a + per_v1_601b

MINUS

Anti-EU: per_v[x]_108b + per_v1_1081b + per_v2_203b + per_v2_3011b + per_v2_306b + per_v2_308b + per_v2_310b + per_v2_3101b + per_v2_312b + per_v2_314b + per_v2_3141b + per_v2_316b + per_v2_3161b + per_v2_318a + per_v2_4011b + per_v2_4084b + per_v2_4086b + per_v2_601b + per_v1_601a

From: Schmitt *et al* 2016

Appendix C Descriptive Statistics

Table C.1 Descriptive Statistics, Average Policy Positions - CMP

		1980s				1990s			2000s			2010s		
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg										
	Economy	4.9650	6.1250	5.4738	4.9286	6.2500	5.3175	4.5218	5.0277	4.8528	4.6788	5.2683	4.8905	
Austria	Welfare	5.2500	5.7150	5.5038	5.0050	6.3112	5.4911	5.5385	7.0000	5.9681	5.2913	6.2414	5.6896	
	Environment	3.9600	5.9100	4.9425	3.8542	6.0300	4.9769	4.9146	5.7385	5.1554	4.8016	5.9448	5.1714	
	Multiculturalism	4.9850	5.0700	5.0138	4.7651	5.1710	4.9647	4.4923	5.2296	4.8638	4.0435	5.2153	4.8547	
	Internationalism	5.0000	5.3900	5.2000	4.8650	5.2961	5.0880	4.8593	5.6221	5.1275	4.7235	5.1169	4.9971	
	Economy	4.7336	5.5298	5.1217	4.6510	5.1596	4.9874	4.4327	5.8193	4.8817	4.3533	6.0976	4.8908	
	Welfare	4.9247	5.9643	5.3134	5.3081	6.2685	5.6096	5.1179	7.0988	6.0097	5.0074	6.5522	5.7680	
Belgium	Environment	4.2318	5.7936	4.9872	4.8322	5.6147	5.1527	4.7710	6.3915	5.2561	4.0244	5.8031	5.0961	
	Multiculturalism	4.9126	5.1924	5.0023	4.8862	5.0503	4.9880	4.3924	5.1329	4.9667	4.3447	5.1077	4.9213	
	Internationalism	4.8311	5.3000	5.1008	5.0000	5.3485	5.1140	4.9758	5.5470	5.2002	4.9476	5.3754	5.1211	
	Economy				4.5271	5.5457	5.1049	4.6053	5.3550	5.0514	4.2961	5.2036	4.9158	
	Welfare				5.0319	5.7369	5.3392	5.1875	6.3308	5.5660	5.2209	5.8617	5.5126	
Bulgaria	Environment				3.6962	5.8889	4.7527	4.2835	5.0000	4.5735	4.2925	5.0194	4.7424	
	Multiculturalism				4.8802	6.1607	5.0677	3.0263	5.5000	4.8503	3.6735	5.4717	4.7511	
	Internationalism				4.9550	5.3704	5.1479	4.3657	5.2631	4.9729	4.0698	5.2672	4.8632	
	Economy				4.9119	5.5435	5.1374	4.9474	5.7143	5.0854	4.6613	6.0370	5.0450	
	Welfare				5.0000	6.1980	5.4608	5.0000	6.4881	5.5528	5.0000	6.3550	5.6496	
Croatia	Environment				4.0580	8.7705	5.0844	2.8296	5.4947	4.4729	3.9426	5.0000	4.4979	
	Multiculturalism				3.9831	5.6897	5.0171	2.1334	5.0909	4.7307	4.2046	5.2174	4.9602	
	Internationalism				4.7313	5.8108	5.1863	4.7853	5.1617	5.0086	4.8563	5.3371	5.0431	

	1980 s				1990s			2000s			2010s		
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg									
	Economy				4.8084	5.1266	4.9408	4.7196	5.2773	4.8923	4.0404	5.2369	4.8512
	Welfare				5.2064	5.5121	5.3766	5.2737	5.7865	5.5364	5.0000	6.8995	5.5621
Cyprus	Environment				4.8418	5.3341	5.0108	4.8964	6.5220	5.1765	4.5919	6.4889	5.1091
	Multiculturalism				4.8102	4.9552	4.8947	3.7079	5.0061	4.8139	4.1837	5.1132	4.7304
	Internationalism				4.9891	5.1582	5.0677	4.8264	5.0990	4.9358	4.1837	5.0761	4.8244
	Economy				4.7403	5.5682	4.9777	4.5602	5.3681	4.9252	4.2931	5.2869	4.7522
	Welfare				4.3293	5.9575	5.2736	5.1078	6.0899	5.5590	5.0957	6.2242	5.5433
Czechia	Environment				4.5000	5.4082	5.0260	4.7788	5.4062	5.0146	4.7541	5.7111	5.1059
	Multiculturalism				4.5313	5.1124	4.9410	4.3526	5.0369	4.8916	4.6908	5.0070	4.9385
	Internationalism				3.7755	5.6160	4.9948	4.0339	5.2581	4.8945	4.7405	5.2068	4.9338
	Economy	4.5565	6.9553	5.1607	4.4643	6.0715	5.1726	4.7009	5.8334	5.0958	4.2000	5.7472	5.1286
	Welfare	4.3333	6.4019	5.4154	4.5513	6.1291	5.3845	5.0000	6.3668	5.7072	5.0394	6.2424	5.6748
Denmark	Environment	4.0141	5.4854	5.0165	3.8700	6.2116	5.1833	4.5371	6.0397	5.3655	3.9080	5.4481	4.8495
	Multiculturalism	4.5977	5.0285	4.9744	4.1667	5.5334	4.9346	3.0000	5.4717	4.7623	3.9162	5.5906	4.8889
	Internationalism	3.4000	6.0000	5.1070	4.7436	5.8120	5.1775	4.9000	5.9417	5.2676	4.5521	5.1181	4.9808
	Economy				4.3070	5.7422	5.0540	4.8182	5.5851	5.0565	4.9112	5.2024	4.9932
	Welfare				5.0000	6.0417	5.6288	5.3182	6.3172	5.8137	5.2922	6.2022	5.7563
Estonia	Environment				4.0507	5.3177	4.7912	4.6809	5.3864	4.9768	4.6840	5.3469	4.9865
	Multiculturalism				3.6000	5.1923	4.8223	4.2553	5.0228	4.7283	4.3427	4.9947	4.7363
	Internationalism				4.7306	5.2176	4.9794	4.6819	5.0000	4.8923	4.5506	5.0000	4.7964
	Economy	4.0715	5.4630	4.7538	3.9286	5.7143	4.9646	4.5313	5.5610	4.9241	4.5930	5.5125	4.9998
	Welfare	5.1323	6.9481	5.8712	5.0000	6.9608	5.7975	5.4546	6.8919	6.1518	5.3328	6.8024	5.8624
Finland	Environment	4.1490	6.9802	5.3865	4.2411	6.9802	5.2582	4.7059	6.2926	5.2973	4.5078	5.9482	5.0465
	Multiculturalism	4.8864	6.6484	5.0881	4.6262	6.0081	4.9942	4.5369	5.8491	5.0130	4.3156	5.4386	4.9876
	Internationalism	4.7728	6.1187	5.2649	4.7861	5.4951	5.1108	4.6484	5.3462	5.1030	4.9629	5.3801	5.1516

	1980s				1990s			2000s			2010s		
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg									
	Economy	4.5000	6.0909	5.3606	4.2177	6.0909	4.9950	4.6844	5.2449	4.9234	4.1048	5.2335	4.7430
	Welfare	4.9555	5.9300	5.5082	4.9334	6.2858	5.5659	5.0321	6.2500	5.7586	5.2084	6.5070	5.7603
France	Environment	4.1500	4.9150	4.5419	4.3637	6.2500	5.0312	4.6409	5.9211	5.1220	4.6080	6.2954	5.1315
	Multiculturalism	4.3727	5.1850	4.9176	4.1334	5.0769	4.8694	4.3715	5.0752	4.8947	4.2248	5.0234	4.8207
	Internationalism	4.6184	5.3050	5.0287	4.2667	5.3846	5.1026	4.5513	5.5333	5.1080	4.5155	5.2384	5.0008
	Economy	4.9695	5.8029	5.1715	4.7529	5.5078	4.9483	4.5539	5.4440	4.9164	4.4237	5.6850	4.8431
	Welfare	5.1455	5.9253	5.4947	5.0498	5.9723	5.5066	5.0808	6.1779	5.5866	5.1726	6.5753	5.7258
Germany	Environment	4.7445	5.8232	5.2495	4.4445	6.0267	5.2780	4.6723	5.5994	5.0801	4.6317	5.7794	5.1648
	Multiculturalism	4.9268	5.0365	4.9967	4.7178	5.0975	4.9946	4.7301	5.0872	4.9928	4.0837	5.2542	4.9440
	Internationalism	5.1831	6.2195	5.5830	4.8413	5.8681	5.3226	4.9354	5.5983	5.2634	4.7560	5.3422	5.1920
	Economy	4.6871	5.3790	5.0554	4.8707	5.5974	5.0198	4.6172	5.0461	4.9333	4.8511	6.3636	5.2516
	Welfare	5.1899	5.6936	5.3877	5.0968	6.1255	5.5053	5.0000	7.0229	5.7151	5.1227	6.0494	5.5441
Greece	Environment	4.4622	5.1413	4.8507	4.4170	5.4485	4.8438	4.6814	5.7516	5.0014	3.9952	5.4171	4.8038
	Multiculturalism	4.3988	4.9825	4.8293	4.1372	5.0371	4.8004	4.5513	5.1250	4.9637	2.6923	5.0926	4.6938
	Internationalism	4.8931	5.1467	5.0190	4.6463	5.4074	5.0272	4.5233	5.2025	4.9808	4.2308	5.7955	4.9840
	Economy				4.3289	6.7106	5.1456	4.5033	5.4019	4.8767	4.4423	5.0273	4.7766
	Welfare				5.0000	6.0185	5.4032	5.3738	6.2659	5.7858	5.1558	6.2606	5.7910
Hungary	Environment				2.3276	5.0977	4.5008	3.7025	4.8977	4.7089	4.5834	5.7068	4.8691
	Multiculturalism				4.3960	5.5914	4.9421	4.5570	5.0543	4.8400	4.5426	5.0628	4.8333
	Internationalism				4.2618	5.5840	5.0794	4.8102	5.1899	4.9676	4.8278	5.1390	5.0200
	Economy	4.4340	6.1350	4.9743	4.5658	5.6105	4.9917	4.4952	5.1449	4.8260	4.5775	5.0500	4.8318
	Welfare	5.0944	6.9474	5.9934	5.3429	6.7981	5.8450	5.5010	6.4806	5.8791	5.1227	6.7842	5.9620
Ireland	Environment	4.3516	6.9403	4.8523	4.5062	6.9403	5.1594	4.1837	5.6787	5.0239	4.6851	5.8656	5.0985
	Multiculturalism	4.6227	5.2000	4.9636	4.8286	5.1808	4.9864	4.7193	5.0773	4.9946	4.8425	5.1398	5.0070
	Internationalism	4.9080	6.3208	5.2484	5.0040	5.3143	5.1690	5.0658	5.3831	5.2078	4.8592	5.3911	5.0816

			1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s	
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg									
	Economy	4.5930	5.4290	5.0618	4.5622	5.5883	5.0166	4.3418	5.5620	4.9485	3.8710	5.2304	4.9055
	Welfare	4.8691	5.6338	5.2651	4.7059	5.8572	5.1659	4.7675	5.8890	5.4107	5.0000	6.0665	5.5549
Italy	Environment	4.5550	7.1512	5.0514	4.1266	7.1659	5.0666	4.7850	5.5814	4.9975	4.7449	6.6861	5.3109
	Multiculturalism	4.8327	5.0582	4.9617	4.6460	5.7143	5.0133	4.7995	5.0157	4.9588	4.5605	5.1224	4.9461
	Internationalism	4.8540	5.5652	5.1336	4.7710	5.5128	5.1329	4.0417	5.3210	5.0711	4.5879	5.3183	5.0683
	Economy				4.6512	5.9417	5.0239	4.6711	5.0747	4.9319	4.5588	5.2439	4.9618
	Welfare				5.0000	7.1930	5.6624	5.2778	7.2549	5.9122	5.5147	6.5958	5.7717
Latvia	Environment				4.2222	5.4256	4.8015	4.0278	5.2325	4.7523	3.6170	5.1613	4.7273
	Multiculturalism				3.8236	5.2222	4.8697	4.1177	5.4606	4.8277	3.0556	5.0000	4.2678
	Internationalism				4.4681	5.1351	4.9762	4.7500	5.6452	5.1036	4.4231	5.2941	4.8778
	Economy				4.9156	5.5319	5.1604	4.5699	5.1671	4.9392	4.6758	5.3210	4.9511
	Welfare				5.0000	5.6897	5.3921	5.1420	5.7013	5.4583	4.8901	6.2657	5.7004
Lithuania	Environment				4.3204	5.0373	4.8194	3.3730	5.0678	4.7095	4.6266	5.9653	5.0243
	Multiculturalism				4.4445	5.6522	4.9428	4.6565	5.7540	4.9888	4.3669	5.1086	4.9209
	Internationalism				4.7581	5.4892	5.0327	4.7267	5.1141	4.9765	4.8184	5.1611	4.9637
	Economy	4.9300	5.7585	5.0880	4.7126	5.1632	4.9393	4.7639	5.1595	4.9372	4.4319	5.0704	4.7819
	Welfare	5.2000	5.9379	5.6077	4.8177	5.9032	5.5331	5.4726	6.0163	5.7391	5.2415	6.2114	5.7783
Luxembourg	Environment	4.5614	7.4150	5.4099	4.8691	6.4618	5.2754	4.8526	5.6024	5.1893	4.9982	5.4069	5.1487
	Multiculturalism	4.9650	5.0750	5.0169	4.8636	5.1070	5.0076	4.6365	5.0670	4.9068	4.5931	5.0505	4.9255
	Internationalism	5.0131	5.5300	5.2155	4.9903	5.4929	5.1309	5.0135	5.4269	5.1560	4.9770	5.1010	5.0452
	Economy				4.6168	5.0455	4.9044						
	Welfare				5.8038	5.9965	5.9450						
Malta	Environment				4.6929	5.0655	4.8856						
	Multiculturalism				4.9408	4.9631	4.9533						
	Internationalism				4.9692	5.0911	5.0104						

	1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s			
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Мах	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg
	Economy	4.7950	5.2650	4.9907	4.4299	5.3138	4.9606	4.7984	5.2956	5.0424	4.5439	5.4314	4.9646
	Welfare	4.9242	6.0644	5.4044	4.9437	6.2446	5.4720	5.1095	5.7430	5.4431	4.9510	6.9293	5.5261
Netherlands	Environment	5.0900	5.7900	5.3878	4.6862	6.2077	5.3710	4.6746	8.5961	5.2764	4.6481	8.7001	5.4923
	Multiculturalism	3.6505	5.0800	4.9175	3.6470	5.1370	4.8897	3.8687	5.0695	4.9068	3.0000	5.3433	4.8579
	Internationalism	4.9135	5.8500	5.3491	4.8325	5.4589	5.2057	4.9539	5.3237	5.1560	4.8000	5.6579	5.1359
	Economy				4.6129	5.9967	5.0791	4.3111	5.4473	4.9679	4.9380	5.2245	5.0926
	Welfare				4.9183	5.9951	5.4098	5.0000	6.0527	5.5770	5.0612	5.7424	5.5081
Poland	Environment				3.3333	5.2290	4.5691	3.9474	5.3736	4.6757	4.0425	5.0000	4.7281
	Multiculturalism				3.1141	5.5000	4.9163	4.2000	5.0108	4.8923	4.8796	5.0000	4.9693
	Internationalism				4.6296	5.8204	5.0321	4.7059	5.6000	5.0150	4.5770	5.2041	4.8296
	Economy	4.9020	6.1875	5.1828	4.6952	5.2468	4.9329	4.6429	5.1551	4.8952	4.4927	5.3547	4.9331
	Welfare	5.0000	5.9596	5.4838	5.6282	6.3672	5.9116	5.3055	6.1195	5.6715	5.3240	6.0842	5.6746
Portugal	Environment	4.3750	6.7275	4.9623	4.6591	5.2344	4.9267	4.6010	7.6744	5.2792	4.3335	7.0742	4.9912
	Multiculturalism	5.0000	5.0000	5.0000	4.9249	5.0391	4.9948	4.7351	5.0445	4.9425	4.9187	5.0998	4.9912
	Internationalism	4.9315	5.3921	5.1233	4.9172	5.2343	5.0746	4.9870	5.1130	5.0399	4.8000	5.0908	4.9967
	Economy				4.4307	6.1560	4.9824	3.8614	5.1130	4.6752	4.7917	5.2593	5.0374
	Welfare				4.8803	6.7124	5.3829	5.0000	5.9615	5.4476	5.0000	6.0359	5.4510
Romania	Environment				2.1667	6.9512	4.6553	3.9430	5.4375	4.6715	4.3393	4.9875	4.6986
	Multiculturalism				4.2797	6.2084	4.9176	4.5370	5.2850	4.9631	4.6667	6.3060	5.0683
	Internationalism				3.4746	5.4110	5.0274	4.8371	5.1925	5.0721	4.8530	5.4272	5.0290
	Economy				4.5161	5.3390	5.0308	4.7436	5.4196	5.0511	4.5984	5.6759	5.1389
	Welfare				5.0000	6.1268	5.5341	5.0664	6.5714	5.4754	4.5816	6.0366	5.3981
Slovakia	Environment				3.9899	6.1471	4.9282	4.6239	5.0392	4.8606	4.5232	5.3691	5.0194
	Multiculturalism				2.7451	7.1930	5.0768	4.5714	5.1391	4.9067	4.4944	5.8659	4.9500
	Internationalism				4.8947	5.4302	5.1198	4.6678	5.2144	4.9193	4.3692	5.1684	4.9415

			1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s	
	Policies:	Min	Max	Avg									
	Economy				4.7561	5.5883	5.0163	4.3750	5.2632	4.8375	4.6010	5.2846	4.9178
	Welfare				5.1852	6.4634	5.6688	5.1496	6.2766	5.4649	5.0379	5.5866	5.3344
Slovenia	Environment				4.3519	6.3951	5.0407	4.3334	5.1824	4.8589	4.1348	5.4067	4.8676
	Multiculturalism				4.4922	5.0926	4.9561	4.6605	5.0309	4.9134	4.6893	5.0000	4.9084
	Internationalism				4.1837	5.2240	4.9840	4.8092	5.1852	5.0404	4.8585	5.2012	5.0474
	Economy	4.5113	5.3919	4.9880	4.4776	5.1996	4.8993	4.5113	5.0542	4.8692	4.4000	5.1071	4.7648
	Welfare	5.3175	6.0379	5.5350	5.2861	5.6754	5.4983	5.1753	5.8669	5.5444	5.3945	6.4919	5.8240
Spain	Environment	4.2028	5.2966	4.7713	4.0315	5.4203	4.8974	4.1453	5.5360	4.9748	4.6229	5.8140	5.1802
	Multiculturalism	4.9581	5.5078	5.1124	4.9337	5.6687	5.1326	4.9490	5.6670	5.1450	4.9138	5.3239	5.0309
	Internationalism	4.8865	5.7661	5.1734	5.0000	5.7059	5.1935	5.0000	5.4775	5.1701	4.9245	5.2829	5.1048
	Economy	4.4350	6.5400	5.4487	4.5317	6.4322	5.4606	4.3959	6.0520	5.0764	4.8405	5.2632	5.0355
	Welfare	5.0800	6.9850	5.7902	5.0754	6.5120	5.8210	5.3963	6.4899	5.9242	5.2106	7.0036	6.0622
Sweden	Environment	3.9900	6.9000	5.3549	4.3932	6.8391	5.3193	4.4799	6.3975	5.2610	4.8404	6.6891	5.4184
	Multiculturalism	4.9400	5.0000	4.9871	4.8077	5.0000	4.9722	4.8728	5.0514	4.9821	4.0196	5.2268	4.9156
	Internationalism	5.0000	5.8050	5.3782	4.9219	5.6250	5.2869	4.9767	5.5901	5.2198	4.7558	5.2486	5.0545
	Economy	4.4000	5.6113	4.9974	4.7849	5.3650	5.0066	4.8321	5.1528	5.0116	4.5012	5.1215	4.8368
	Welfare	5.1700	5.8550	5.4814	5.2630	6.4060	5.6938	5.0556	6.4060	5.5729	5.2655	6.4865	5.9698
United Kingdom	Environment	4.6600	5.0446	4.8196	4.5856	5.4150	4.9232	4.5856	5.3285	4.9588	4.4323	6.3513	5.0847
	Multiculturalism	4.9400	5.0357	4.9939	4.5950	5.1460	4.9337	4.5695	5.1397	4.9499	4.1485	6.1581	4.9854
	Internationalism	4.9450	5.4300	5.2498	4.9678	5.3640	5.1439	4.8056	5.3650	5.1371	4.7144	5.4145	5.0917

Table C.2 Descriptive Statistics, Average Policy Positions - EMP

4th European Parliament, 1989 - 1994

Policies:	<u>Group:</u>	Min	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Group:</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>
Economy	Confederation of	4.4042	5.0255	4.7829	European United	4.7559	4.7619	4.7589
Welfare	Socialist Parties of	5.2551	5.6994	5.4174	Left	5.0541	5.7008	5.3775
Environment	the European	4.8725	5.5959	5.3041		5.5591	5.6602	5.6096
Multiculturalism	Community	4.9859	5.3169	5.0971		5.0325	5.0591	5.0458
EU Integration		5.3967	6.1962	5.8123		5.0541	5.4016	5.2278
Economy	European	4.1667	5.0644	4.9184	European Right	5.0104	5.2778	5.1441
Welfare	People's Party	5.0000	5.5353	5.2420		5.2708	5.3333	5.3021
Environment		4.8725	5.3769	5.1848		5.0000	5.2604	5.1302
Multiculturalism		4.7758	5.4487	5.1170		4.4063	4.7778	4.5920
EU Integration		5.1709	7.3718	5.8358		4.4444	4.9583	4.7014
Economy	Liberal and	4.8582	5.4947	5.1179	Left Unity	4.6970	4.9296	4.8456
Welfare	Democratic	4.9823	5.8140	5.2789		5.1056	5.7071	5.3308
Environment	Reformist Group	5.0350	5.5439	5.3381		4.9551	5.7071	5.2794
Multiculturalism		4.9618	5.4403	5.1122		4.9214	5.1010	4.9899
EU Integration		5.1163	6.0973	5.5595		3.9101	4.4444	4.2520
Economy	European	4.7842	5.3841	5.0841	Rainbow Group	4.7636	5.0375	4.8785
Welfare	Democrats	5.0000	5.0290	5.0145		5.2901	5.7565	5.4934
Environment		5.0719	5.2246	5.1483		5.3925	6.1751	5.7619
Multiculturalism		4.9348	5.2518	5.0933		5.0000	5.2730	5.1134
EU Integration		5.4130	6.7626	6.0878		5.1300	6.0410	5.3902
Economy	European			4.5656	Non-Inscrits	4.6635	4.9236	4.8344
Welfare	Democratic			5.4344		5.0943	5.3698	5.2445
Environment	Alliance			5.0621		5.2628	5.3654	5.3107
Multiculturalism				5.0621		5.1468	5.3654	5.2634
EU Integration				5.2660		4.3365	5.6265	4.9562
Economy	Green Group	4.5588	4.9449	4.7941				
Welfare	In the European	5.2464	5.5042	5.3964				
Environment	Parliament	5.7710	6.9838	6.2964				
Multiculturalism		4.9831	5.0280	5.0000				
EU Integration		5.0560	5.3217	5.1518				

5th European Parliament, 1994 - 1999

Policies:	<u>Group:</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg	<u>Group:</u>	Min	<u>Max</u>	Avg
-		4 2 2 7 0	5 4 2 2 2	4 0000	-	4 0000	E 2005	4 7622
Economy	Party of	4.2378	5.1220	4.8090	European	4.0966	5.2895	4.7632
Welfare	European Socialists	5.1128	5.7690	5.4586	Democratic	5.0000	5.5526	5.2113
Environment		4.5489	5.6098	5.2185	Alliance	5.0000	5.3992	5.1656
Multiculturalism		5.0000	5.3672	55.1145		5.0420	5.5000	5.2416
EU Integration		5.4688	6.5414	5.8714		4.7934	5.9474	5.4937
Economy	European	4.2105	5.2500	4.9397	Green Group	4.4355	4.9583	4.7408
Welfare	People's Party	4.9301	5.7692	5.1695	in the	5.0323	5.8122	5.3978
Environment		4.9615	5.5172	5.1732	European	5.6744	6.4765	6.0275
Multiculturalism		4.9598	5.6818	5.1636	Parliament	4.9884	5.1458	5.0331
EU Integration		4.4530	6.4338	5.4437		5.0671	5.7656	5.3438
-								
Economy	European Liberal,	4.6627	5.5932	5.0114	European	4.6844	5.2222	4.9533
Welfare	Democrat and	5.0000	5.6366	5.2425	Radical	4.9630	5.3156	5.1393
Environment	Reform Party	5.0917	5.9274	5.3758	Alliance	4.9630	5.2492	5.1061
Multiculturalism		5.0000	5.5898	5.1530		5.0000	5.1827	5.0914
EU Integration		5.2837	6.4236	5.8343		5.7475	6.1482	5.9478
Economy	European United	4.6222	4.9697	4.8334	Europe of Nations			4.7932
Welfare	Left	5.1212	6.2821	5.6525				5.1241
Environment		5.0000	5.5995	5.2453				5.4925
Multiculturalism		4.8718	5.1570	5.0345				5.0677
EU Integration		4.1928	5.7692	4.9725				4.9023
Feeren		F 110C	F F 204	F 224F	Non lagarita	4 5 2 9 2	F 2017	4 0676
Economy	Forza Europa	5.1136	5.5294	5.3215	Non-Inscrits	4.5283	5.2817	4.8676
welfare		5.0000	5.7059	5.3529		5.0833	5.4930	5.2874
Environment		4.8824	5.0000	4.9412		5.0000	5.1923	5.0865
Multiculturalism		5.0000	5.1765	5.0882		4.3662	5.1887	4.8070
EU Integration		5.6471	5.6818	5.6644		3.8679	5.6538	4.5963

6th European Parliament, 1999 - 2004

Policies:	<u>Group:</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>	<u>Group:</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>
Economy	European	4.4792	5.6410	4.9745	Europe of the	4.7494	5.0704	4.9147
Welfare	People's Party	5.0000	5.7692	5.2710	Nations	5.0000	5.3819	5.1273
Environment		4.7436	5.5717	5.1514		4.7349	5.2506	5.0656
Multiculturalism		4.9572	5.9589	5.1384		5.0000	6.6667	5.6311
EU Integration		4.1160	6.8993	5.6156		4.0845	5.7197	5.1098
Economy	Party of	4.5070	4.9890	4.7715	Europe of			4.7170
Welfare	European Socialists	5.1120	5.9694	5.5253	Democracies and			5.0995
Environment		5.0362	5.7000	5.2972	Diversities			5.6126
Multiculturalism		4.7500	5.3000	5.0659				5.0536
EU Integration		5.4310	6.1333	5.7476				5.3446
Economy	European Liberal,	4.5492	5.8658	4.9030	Technical Group	4.6627	5.2344	4.9064
Welfare	Democrat and	5.0000	5.9357	5.3028	of Independents	5.0000	5.1205	5.0508
Environment	Reform Party	4.8771	5.8186	5.3732		5.0000	5.5181	5.1436
Multiculturalism		5.0000	5.3910	5.1028		4.7368	5.6024	5.1910
EU Integration		5.0000	6.3525	5.5786		3.2740	5.1563	4.3247
Economy	Greens/	4.5238	1.0000	4.7967	Non-Inscrits	4.7533	4.9725	4.8629
Welfare	European	5.1627	5.8924	5.3589		4.9176	5.0000	4.9588
Environment	Free Alliance	5.1042	6.6624	5.9756		4.9836	6.2363	5.6099
Multiculturalism		4.9602	5.3819	5.1162		5.0165	5.1099	5.0632
EU Integration		4.4721	5.8681	5.3052		4.2857	4.4408	4.3633
Economy	European United	4.3675	5.0000	4.7756				
Welfare	Left/Nordic	5.2370	5.9972	5.5944				
Environment	Green Left	5.0000	6.2493	5.4112				
Multiculturalism		5.0000	5.3617	5.0718				
EU Integration		3.6170	5.4167	4.8335				

7th European Parliament, 2004 - 2009

Policies:	Group:	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg	Group:	<u>Min</u>	Max	<u>Avg</u>
F	F	4 4707	5 2004	4 05 4 4	European the iterd	4 645 4	F 0000	4 7040
Economy	European	4.4/3/	5.3894	4.8511	European United	4.6154	5.0000	4.7913
Welfare	People's Party	5.0000	6.0000	5.2748	Left/Nordic	5.1960	6.2973	5.5992
Environment		4.7611	5.8636	5.2831	Green Left	5.1307	5.7692	5.3730
Multiculturalism		4.9367	5.4717	5.0715		5.0000	5.1177	5.0220
EU Integration		4.7788	6.4198	5.4493		4.0067	5.0474	4.7243
Economy	Party of	4.2926	5.0973	4.7457	Independence/	4.8405	5.0000	4.9303
Welfare	European Socialists	5.3067	6.5625	5.7199	Democracy	5.0000	5.2413	5.1336
Environment		4.6875	7.6357	5.4260		5.0000	5.6293	5.3541
Multiculturalism		4.8812	5.0921	5.0182		4.8616	5.2973	5.0544
EU Integration		4.8810	5.6711	5.3136		4.5405	5.5647	4.9937
Economy	Alliance of Liberals	4.2935	5.1724	4.8259	Europe of the	4.5277	5.2973	4.7970
Welfare	and Democrats	4.9413	6.1080	5.2777	Nations	5.0697	5.7217	5.3068
Environment	for Europe	5.0392	6.1275	5.4456		5.0000	5.7976	5.3076
Multiculturalism		4.7843	5.4082	5.0957		4.8919	5.2577	5.0949
EU Integration		4.5918	5.8730	5.4062		3.2162	5.3571	4.8795
Economy	Greens/	4.6552	4.9029	4.7933	Non-Inscrits	4.4792	4.9869	4.7526
, Welfare	European	5.2245	5.9704	5.4769		5.0000	6.1458	5.3429
Environment	Free Alliance	5.1220	7.7323	6.1436		5.0000	5.3318	5.1689
Multiculturalism		4.9050	5.3659	5.0406		5.0000	5.3237	5.1689
FU Integration		4.8438	5.7317	5.3406		2.9101	5.6179	4.5046
			0.7017	0.0100		2.0101	2.01/5	

8th European Parliament, 2009 - 2014

Policies:	<u>Group:</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	Avg	Group:	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Avg</u>
-	-	4 2046		4 0000	-	4 5005	E 4064	4 07 40
Economy	European	4.2916	5.7979	4.9230	European	4.5385	5.1961	4.9742
Welfare	People's Party	5.0146	6.2180	5.2669	Conservatives and	5.0683	5.8696	5.4057
Environment		4.4574	5.6707	5.0921	Reformists	4.9510	5.5435	5.1333
Multiculturalism		4.8984	5.9324	5.0813		4.7131	6.1957	5.2526
EU Integration		4.4020	6.2978	5.3455		4.2647	6.0870	4.9610
Economy	Progressive Alliance	3.7859	5.0538	4.6630	European United	4.5738	4.9513	4.7954
Welfare	of Socialists and	5.1415	6.1149	5.5893	Left/Nordic	5.2363	7.9688	5.7175
Environment	Democrats	4.8458	5.9677	5.1861	Green Left	4.9610	5.5978	5.2335
Multiculturalism		4.8854	5.1871	5.0315		4.9765	5.0554	5.0064
EU Integration		4.9742	5.7534	5.3341		4.0341	5.2121	4.6618
Economy	Alliance of Liberals	4.4961	5.5142	4.9296	Europe of	4.5109	5.0000	4.8083
Welfare	and Democrats	4.9405	5.6541	5.2076	Freedom and	4.8077	5.2717	5.0698
Environment	for Europe	4.8174	5.7460	5.2512	Democracy	5.0000	5.5932	5.1773
Multiculturalism		4.9597	5.1709	5.0432		4.7283	5.4348	5.0079
EU Integration		4.8321	6.2046	5.4602		3.4501	4.9457	4.2852
Economy	Greens/	4.4509	5.0411	4.7487	Non-Inscrits	4.7363	5.0943	4.9098
Welfare	European	5.0308	5.6164	5.3355		4.9873	5.4643	5.2152
Environment	Free Alliance	5.0000	5.8516	5.6574		4.3396	5.2341	4.9939
Multiculturalism		4.9470	5.0582	5.0008		4.7222	5.7547	5.0886
EU Integration		4.8077	5.9035	5.3092		3.3019	5.4286	4.3349

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Policy Areas					
Economic	77,245	0.1789	0.1818	0	1.2136
Welfare	77,245	0.2668	0.2116	0.00005	1.4013
Environment	77,245	0.2682	0.249	0.00025	3.4474
Multiculturalism	77,245	0.1317	0.1881	0	1.8541
Internationalism	77,245	0.1223	0.117	0.00013	0.9184
Individual Level					
Gender	119,561	0.5225	0.4995	0	1
Age	119,227	47.8956	17.3489	15	106
Education	117,528	2.0121	1.1373	0	6
Left-Right	100,293	5.1819	2.4304	0	10
Distance	42,705	1.8586	1.4496	0	8.5294
loyalist	48,708	0.6764	0.4677	0	1
Party/Country Le	vels				
Coalition	73,134	0.4325	0.4954	0	1
Seats	74,045	0.2601	0.1609	0	0.6378
Rile	77,245	4.8648	0.8268	2.3665	8.5294
Uemployment	114,570	9.0684	4.2404	3.1	26.5
CEE	119,681	0.3697	0.4827	0	1
Options	114,570	0.6329	0.482	0	1

Table C.3 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 3
Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Coalition Member	1448	0.337	0.4729	0	1
Cabinet %	1447	0.1354	0.2484	0	1
Big 3 Portfolios	1446	0.3977	0.8501	0	3
Cabinet Years	1787	7.14	11.7563	0	60.846
All Euroskeptic	1822	0.2168	0.4122	0	1
Soft Euroskeptic	1748	0.1836	0.3873	0	1
Hard Euroskeptic	1822	0.0406	0.1975	0	1
Niche Party	1839	0.2474	0.4316	0	1
RILE	1831	4.8917	0.9701	1.7857	9.5455
CEE	1839	0.3964	0.4893	0	1
1980s	1839	0.1224	0.3278	0	1
1990s	1839	0.3225	0.4675	0	1
2000s	1839	0.2768	0.4475	0	1
2010s	1839	0.2784	0.4483	0	1

Table C.4 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 4

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Policy Area Distance					
Economic	719	0.1734	0.1586	0.0004	1.0622
Welfare	719	0.2256	0.1995	0.0005	2.6206
Environment	719	0.2971	0.3418	0.0002	4.4812
Multiculturalism	719	0.1435	0.2155	0.0001	2.2506
EU Integration	719	0.5115	0.5282	0.0012	3.751
Independent Variables					
EPNat%	553	0.1498	0.1347	0	0.8864
Represent Diff	530	1.0028	0.0913	0.5053	1.5904
EPGroup%	553	0.0705	0.1096	0	0.9412
Years in EP	581	13.3856	9.8349	0	34
Euroskeptic Party	505	0.2317	0.4223	0	1
Control Variables					
Niche Party	792	0.4583	0.4986	0	1
Rile	793	-3.467	17.5262	-50.9259	70.339
Grand Coalition	447	0.4922	0.4995	0	1
National Coalition	675	0.2963	0.457	0	1
ENPP	679	3.9483	1.5606	2	8.4
Same Year Election	679	0.2003	0.4005	0	1
Time Since Nat Election	679	2.1928	1.1707	0	4.99
EP 1994	683	0.1391	0.3463	0	1
EP 1999	683	0.2006	0.4007	0	1
EP 2004	683	0.2533	0.4352	0	1
EP 2009	683	0.2826	0.4506	0	1

Table C.5 Descriptive Statistics, Models Chapter 5

Appendix D Supplemental Output Tables

Appendix D.1 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 3

	(54 1 1 4)	(14, 1, 10)	(11 1 1 2)
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Pooled Policy Distance	0.8909	1.8940	1.9892
	(0.8900)	(1.5601)	(1.4029)
Pooled Policy Distance (sqd)	-0.0578	-1.9835	0.0655
	(0.7393)	(2.2070)	(0.9465)
Controls:			
Coalition	-1.0468**	-0.8384†	
	(0.3878)	(0.4357)	
Seats%	-8.0797**	-6.1395*	-26.1344***
	(2.5583)	(2.4264)	(6.1432)
Rile	0.1258	-0.1059	0.3525
	(0.2682)	(0.3554)	(0.7013)
Euroskeptic Option	1.1078**	0.2459	1.0827
	(0.4032)	(0.6478)	(0.7566)
Unemployment	0.0887*	0.1133†	0.2669***
	(0.0352)	(0.0583)	(0.1205)
CEE	-0.1700	-0.3644	-1.5384
	(0.4609)	(0.5818)	(1.1758)
Gender	-0.1688*	-0.0786	-0.5084**
	(0.0687)	(0.0709)	(0.1618)
Age	-0.0122***	-0.0124***	-0.0124*
	(0.0037)	(0.0036)	(0.0053)
Education	-0.1471†	-0.1029	-0.3216*
	(0.0800)	(0.0931)	(0.1272)
Left - Right	-0.0241	-0.0266	0.0964
	(0.0711)	(0.0898)	(0.1041)
Voter - Party Distance	-0.0240	-0.0211	-0.1925
	0.0596	(0.0649)	(0.1231)
Constant	-1 3119	-0 2139	-2 9446
Observations (N)	100 047	77 237	55 662
Group Clusters (N)	48	34	21
	10	34	<u> </u>

Table D.1.1 Pooled Policies Model, Vote Switchers

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties.

All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties

Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10 + p < 0.05 + p < 0.01 + p < 0.01

	(Model 7)	(Model 8)	(Model 9)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Pooled Policy Distance	0.6902†	0.6388*	0.8931
	(0.1406)	(0.1311)	(0.1269)
Controls:			
Coalition	0.8615	0.8924	
	(0.1829)	(0.2065)	
Seats%	1.3602	1.4659	4.1093
	(0.9608)	(1.5192)	(4.3545)
Rile	1.1235	1.1505	0.7711
	(0.2191)	(0.2668)	(0.1737)
Euroskeptic Option	0.6266	0.5775	1.0230
	(0.2061)	(0.2280)	(0.3172)
Unemployment	1.0145	1.0381	0.9868
	(0.0221)	(0.0435)	(0.0210)
CEE	2.4558**	2.6238*	3.5394
	(0.7131)	(0.7248)	(1.3401)
Gender	1.0981	1.0182	1.5716
	(0.0930)	(0.0906)	(0.4611)
Age	0.9836***	0.9867***	0.9580**
	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0154)
Education	0.7154***	0.7533***	0.6100***
	(0.0517)	(0.0662)	(0.0909)
Left - Right	0.9183*	0.9071**	1.0344
	(0.0326)	(0.0318)	(0.0777)
Voter - Party Distance	0.8619**	0.8558*	0.9875
	(0.0494)	(0.0531)	(0.0968)
Constant	0.3278	0.2220	2.0915
Observations (N)	30,915	25,340	5,410
Group Clusters (N)	43	29	19

Table D.1.2 Pooled Policies Model, Vote Abstainers

Notes: Model 7 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 8 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 9 hard-euroskeptic parties. All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic partie Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy. Clustered by CSES country election date.

	(Model 7)	(Model 8)	(Model 9)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Lada a subscription de la composición d			
Independent Variables:	0 7 4 5 0	4 4 9 9 4	C 04 04 ±
Economic Distance	-0.7459	-1.1331	6.01017
	(1.3859)	(1.6332)	(3.6466)
Welfare Distance	0.8106	1.0636	-10.0651*
	(1.1040)	(1.4371)	(4.6765)
Environment Distance	0.1313	-0.4631	7.3686***
	(0.6668)	(0.7391)	(1.8461)
Multicultural Distance	4.5875***	3.4330*	10.5602***
	(1.2183)	(1.6636)	(2.3016)
International Distance	0.0435	1.4829	9.4880
	(2.6125)	(3.2605)	(5.7904)
Controls:			
Coalition	-1.1248*	-0.9487*	
	(0.4571)	(0.4462)	
Seats%	-6.2121*	-5.7012*	-40.1690***
	(2.4847)	(2.3890)	(11.1474)
Rile	-0.0389	-0.0046	-1.4195
	(0.3807)	(0.4437)	(1.0283)
Euroskeptic Option	1.8391***	0.8533	4.6300**
	(0.4370)	(0.7707)	(1.5344)
Unemployment	0.1104*	0.1236†	0.2614*
	(0.0531)	(0.0705)	(0.1164)
CEE	-0.1449	-0.2975	5.7455†
	(0.5710)	(0.6388)	(3.1358)
Gender	-0.1690**	-0.1088	-0.4235**
	(0.0649)	(0.0719)	(0.1603)
Age	-0.0141***	-0.0121***	-0.0195***
	(0.0859)	(0.0037)	(0.0056)
Education	-0.1691*	-0.1098	-0.5455***
	(0.0831)	(0.0981)	(0.0831)
Left - Right	-0.0090	-0.0083	0.0808
	(0.0831)	(0.1006)	(0.0911)
Voter - Party Distance	-0.0369	0.0078	-0.4462***
	(0.0613)	(0.0647)	(0.0989)
Constant	-2.2722	-1.8608	-3.2581
Observations (N)	20003	15441	11300
Group Clusters (N)	46	34	21
Group Clusters (N)	40	54	21

Table D.1.3 Individual Policies Models,	, V	ote S	Switc	hers
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Notes: Model 4 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 5 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 6 hard-euroskeptic parties. All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic partie: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^{+}$ p < 0.10 $\ ^{*}$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	(Model 10)	(Model 11)	(Model 12)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Economic Distance	0.2133*	0.0298†	11.2211**
	(0.1513)	(0.0069)	(9.8993)
Welfare Distance	0.6570	0.5266	0.0331***
	(0.3401)	(0.3468)	(0.0177)
Environment Distance	0.6198†	0.5638	0.2254***
	(0.1780)	(0.2382)	(0.0791)
Multicultural Distance	0.6231	0.7072	0.0002***
	(0.2363)	(0.3914)	(0.0003)
International Distance	2 4305	3 5382	43.7721***
	(1 5151)	(3.0399)	(41 2898)
Controls:	(1.5151)	(3.0355)	(41.2000)
Coalition	1 0086	1 1386	
coalition	(0 1732)	(0.2481)	
Seats%	1 2277	1 3812	5 07e-08***
5641370	(0.8925)	(1.3091)	(1.78e-07)
Rile	1,1196	1.0882	0.2808***
	(0.2070)	(0.2097)	(0.1053)
Euroskeptic Option	0.7214	0.7205	0.1180***
	(0.1722)	(0.1963)	(0.0582)
Unemployment	0.9961	1.0274	1.3255***
	(0.0221)	(0.0454)	(0.0730)
CEE	2.5924***	2.3913***	6.0599***
	(0.5792)	(0.5599)	(2.9520)
Gender	1.0904	1.0084	1.5453
	(0.0912)	(0.0851)	(0.4825)
Age	0.9828***	0.9853***	0.9608*
	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0160)
Education	0.7285***	0.7723***	0.6210**
	(0.0431)	(0.0520)	(0.1026)
Left - Right	0.9212*	0.9007**	1.1000
	(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0773)
Voter - Party Distance	0.8640**	0.8593**	0.9918
	(0.0462	(0.0499)	(0.1001)
Constant	0.5367	0.4497	693,9199
Observations (N)	6183	5068	986
Group Clusters (N)	43	29	18
Group clusters (IV)	45	23	10

Tabl	le D.1.4	Individual	Policies	Models,	Vote A	bstainers
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Standard errors in parentheses. $\ \ ^{+}p < 0.10 \ \ ^{*}p < 0.05 \ \ ^{**}p < 0.01 \ \ ^{***}p < 0.001$

Notes: Model 10 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 11 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 12 hard-euroskeptic partie All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic partie: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Appendix D.2 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 4

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*Coalition	0.0056	-0.0413	0.0217	-0.0850†	-0.0319
	(0.0785)	(0.0651)	(0.0666)	(0.0486)	(0.0323)
Party Type*Cabinet%	0.2310	0.2794	0.1018	0.0370	0.1905
, ,,	(0.1489)	(0.2522)	(0.1305)	(0.1185	(0.2071)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.0294	-0.0209	-0.0379	0.0113	-0.0314
	(0.0333)	(0.0536)	(0.0436)	(0.0288)	(0.0431)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	-0.0022†	-0.0015	-0.0005	-0.0013	0.0001
	(0.0013)	(0.0016)	(0.0015))	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.0277	-0.0300	-0.0331	-0.0110	-0.0270†
	(0.0171)	(0.0252)	(0.0295)	(0.0181))	(0.0143)
Cabinet%	-0.0627	0.0844	-0.0421	0.0102	0.0264
	(0.0556)	(0.0621)	(0.0755)	(0.0511)	(0.0349)
Cabinet3	0.0191	-0.0348*	-0.0124	-0.0011	-0.0063
	(0.0137)	(0.0152)	(0.0165)	(0.0115)	(0.0071)
Cabinet Years	-0.0004	0.0010	-0.0010	0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	-0.0043	0.0238	-0.0254	0.0602***	0.0180
	(0.0141)	(0.0170)	(0.0237)	(0.0172)	(0.0131)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0706***	-0.0712***	0.1136***	0.1077***	0.0299*
	(0.0130)	(0.0144)	(0.0222)	(0.0170)	(0.0130)
RILE	0.0216***	-0.0074	0.0067	0.0422***	0.0162**
	(0.0066)	(0.0078)	(0.0082)	(0.0068)	(0.0003)
CEE Europe	-0.0366†	-0.0130	-0.0638**	0.0381†	0.0019
	(0.0199)	(0.0188)	(0.0239)	(0.0200)	(0.0144)
1990s	-0.0399	0.0080	0.0182	0.0301	-0.0501†
	(0.0344)	(0.0323)	(0.0372)	(0.0199)	(0.0286)
2000s	-0.0831**	-0.0175	-0.0247	0.0634**	-0.0716*
	(0.0319)	(0.0328)	(0.0348)	(0.0229)	(0.0288)
2010s	-0.0564†	0.0087	-0.0107	0.1095***	-0.0722*
	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.0352)	(0.0256)	(0.0287)
Constant	0.1929	0.3321	0.2791	-0.1589	0.1202
Observations (N)	1422	1422	1411	1420	1422
Group Clusters (N)	217	217	217	217	217

Table D.2.1 All Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

Notes : All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*Coalition	0.0121	-0.0113	0.0004	-0.0469	0.0032
	(0.0792)	(0.0659)	(0.0610)	(0.0428)	(0.0272)
Party Type*Cabinet%	0.1660	0.0043	0.0846	-0.0629	-0.0308
	(0.1395)	(0.1489)	(0.1318)	(0.0943)	(0.0793)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.0157	0.0276	-0.0163	0.0262	0.0082
	(0.0315)	(0.0376)	(0.0377)	(0.0244)	(0.0227)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	-0.0023†	-0.0023	0.0002	-0.0006	-0.0001
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.0292†	-0.0316	0.0300	-0.0120	-0.0289*
	(0.0172)	(0.0254)	(0.0295)	(0.0181)	(0.0145)
Cabinet%	-0.0593	0.0882	-0.0380	0.0043	0.0298
	(0.0556)	(0.0620)	(0.0751)	(0.0512)	(0.0350)
Cabinet3	0.0184	-0.0352*	-0.0134	-0.0007	-0.0068
	(0.0137)	(0.0152)	(0.0163)	(0.0115)	(0.0072)
Cabinet Years	-0.0004	0.0011	-0.0010	0.0002	-0.0001
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)	-0.0065	0.0220	-0.0471†	0.0271†	0.0013
	(0.0161)	(0.0191)	(0.0257)	(0.0153)	(0.0138)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0729***	-0.0667***	0.1103***	0.0961***	0.0325*
· · ,	(0.0137)	(0.0150)	(0.0230)	(0.0174)	(0.0134)
RILE	0.0257***	-0.0062	0.0138	0.0337***	0.0196**
	(0.0069)	(0.0076)	(0.0086)	(0.0068)	(0.0062)
CEE Europe	-0.0376*	-0.0091	-0.0574*	0.0531**	0.0046
·	(0.0203)	(0.0189)	(0.0240)	(0.0196)	(0.0143)
1990s	-0.0376	0.0144	0.0060	0.0281	-0.0473†
	(0.0341)	(0.0314)	(0.0370)	(0.0200)	(0.0282)
2000s	-0.0772*	-0.0099	-0.0315	0.0486*	-0.0709*
	(0.0320)	(0.0315)	(0.0351)	(0.0209)	(0.0278)
2010s	-0.0506	0.0197	-0.0098	0.0891***	-0.0701*
	(0.0320)	(0.0303)	(0.0357)	(0.0248)	(0.0282)
Constant	0.1704	0.3161	0.2489	-0.1093	0.1002
Observations (N)	1361	1361	1351	1359	1361
Group Clusters (N)	217	217	217	217	217

Table D.2.2 Soft Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

Notes: Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	International
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:		0 5 4 0 0		~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * *	
Party Type*Coalition	-0.68/1**	-0.5492	1.0148***	0.2482**	-1.325/***
	(0.2339)	(0.3389)	(0.2478)	(0.0909)	(0.1052)
Party Type*Cabinet%	1.9118***	3.4307***	-0.5410**	1.4048***	3.206***
	(0.1894)	(0.2563)	(0.1899)	(0.1275)	(0.1008)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.8211** (0.2701)	- 0.7492† (0.3879)	-0.0508 (0.2998)	0.1837 (0.1528)	-1.6133*** (0.1398)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	0.0318	-0.0118	-0.0171	-0.0674***	0.0828***
	(0.0330)	(0.0482)	(0.0362)	(0.0186)	(0.0158)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.0263	-0.0325	0.0354	-0.0199	-0.0276*
	(0.0187)	(0.0221)	(0.0264)	(0.0167)	(0.0128)
Cabinet%	-0.0359	0.0896	-0.0253	0.0053	0.0239
	(0.0515)	(0.0564)	(0.0657)	(0.0440)	(0.0334)
Cabinet3	0.0154	-0.0330*	-0.0163	0.0011	-0.0056
	(0.0120)	(0.0141)	(0.0148)	(0.0099)	(0.0071)
Cabinet Years	-0.0006	0.0007	-0.0007	-0.00001	-0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)	0.0030	0.0367	0.0675	0.1757***	0.0724**
	(0.0224)	(0.0293)	(0.0479)	(0.0474)	(0.0262)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0701***	-0.0716***	0.1113***	0.1021***	0.0287*
	(0.0132)	(0.0144)	(0.0221)	(0.0164)	(0.0130)
RILE	0.0227***	-0.0060	0.0060	0.0410***	0.0175**
	(0.0070)	(0.0073)	(0.0082)	(0.0066)	(0.0058)
CEE Europe	-0.0352†	-0.0130	-0.0590*	0.0398*	0.0044
	(0.0198)	(0.0191)	(0.0236)	(0.0201)	(0.0144)
1990s	-0.0371	0.0117	0.0171	0.0308	-0.0461†
	(0.0344)	(0.0309)	(0.0372)	(0.0200)	(0.0276)
2000s	-0.0803*	-0.0130	-0.0303	0.0606**	-0.0685*
	(0.0322)	(0.0315)	(0.0349)	(0.0223)	(0.0277)
2010s	-0.0532†	0.0128	-0.0139	0.1041***	-0.0696*
	(0.0320)	(0.0302)	(0.0354)	(0.0248)	(0.0276)
Constant	0 1820	0 3270	0 2722	-0 1/20	0 1117
Observations (N)	1/22	1/22	1/11	1/20	1/22
Crown Clusters (N)	1422	1422	1411	1420	1422
Group Clusters (N)	21/	21/	21/	21/	21/

Table D.2.3 Hard Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

Notes: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Appendix D.3 Supplemental Output Tables – Chapter 5

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	All Euroskeptic	Soft Euroskeptic	Hard Euroskeptic
	Model	Model	Model
	would	WOUEI	would
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:	0.4624	0.4400	4 4675*
Party Type*National EP Seat %	-0.1631	-0.1198	1.4675*
	(0.1020)	(0.0996)	(0.7428)
Party Type*Representation Difference	0.1967	0.2014	0.3919
	(0.1435)	(0.1462)	(0.5032)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	0.4250†	0.3254	-2.5644
	(0.2270)	(0.2360)	(2.7920)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	-0 5883*	-0 4764†	14 4567†
Turty Type Er Gloup Seat / (Squarea)	(0.3754)	(0.2824)	(0.2000)
	(0.2754)	(0.2834)	(8.2808)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0013	0.0004	-0.0060
	(0.0014)	(0.0011)	(0.0046)
Independent Variables:			
National EP Seat %	-0.0995*	-0.1165**	-0.1502**
	(0.0461)	(0.0435)	(0.0481)
Representation Difference	-0.0063	0.0130	0.0342
	(0.0567)	(0.0546)	(0.0534)
EP Group Seat %	0.0277	0.0111	0.2437
•	(0 1674)	(0 1664)	(0.1611)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0 2284	0.2561	-0.0723
El Gloup Seat / (Squared)	(0.2204)	(0.2011)	-0.0723
Manage in ED	(0.2009)	(0.2041)	(0.1869)
Years In EP	0.0006	0.0006	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	-0.1354		
	(0.1508)		
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)		-0.1799	
		(0.1552)	
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)			-0.2398
			(0.4793)
Controls:			
Niche Party	0.0227†	0.0168	0.0219
	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.0147)
RILE	0.0012***	0.0010**	0.0012***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0029	-0.0023	-0.0004
	(0.0033)	(0.0090)	(0.0032)
Member of National Coalition	0.0033)	(0.0030)	(0.0052)
	0.0122	0.01811	0.0141
	(0.0106)	(0.0104)	(0.0108)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0028	0.0010	0.0033
	(0.0033)	(0.0030)	(0.0048)
National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0128	-0.0085	-0.0075
	(0.0171)	(0.0169)	(0.0174)
Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	0.0087†	0.0090†	0.0103*
	(0.0045)	(0.0047)	(0.0048)
FP 1994	-0.0047	-0.0067	-0.0170
	(0.0233)	(0.0231)	(0.0244)
ED 1000	0.0007	0.0021	0.0009
LF 1999	-0.0007	-0.0021	0.0003
50 2004	(0.0229)	(0.0223)	(0.0233)
EP 2004	-0.0071	-0.0149	-0.0095
	(0.0251)	(0.0225)	(0.0227)
EP 2009	-0.0176	-0.0266	-0.0247
	(0.0235)	(0.0232)	(0.0227)
Constant	0.2157	0.2095	0.1780
Observations (N)	2130	2050	2130
Group Clusters (N)	88	88	88

Table D.3.1 Pooled EMP Policies Model

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties,

All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exicuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic partie Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by EMP country EP election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy (SE)	Welfare (SE)	Environment (SE)	Multicultural (SE)	EU Integration (SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*National EP Seat %	0.1213	-0.3670†	0.3208	-0.2356	-0.6550*
	(0.1772)	(0.2067)	(0.2193)	(0.2075)	(0.3141)
Party Type*Representation Difference	0.0389	-0.0146	0.5754†	-0.1144	0.4983
	(0.2019)	(0.2707)	(0.3243)	(0.2518)	(0.5502)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	-0.3583	0.5249	-0.4932	1.3281*	1.1238
	(0.2967)	(0.3383)	(0.6011)	(0.5418)	(0.8359)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.2267	-0.5189	0.2231	-1.4432**	-1.4291
	(0.3620)	(0.4015)	(0.7490)	(0.5262)	(0.9627)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0039*	0.0027	-0.0049†	-0.0005	0.0001
	(0.0019)	(0.0027)	(0.0025)	(0.0024)	(0.0051)
Independent Variables:					
National EP Seat %	-0.1310†	-0.1872†	-0.1268	-0.1580*	0.1055
	(0.0719)	(0.1063)	(0.0892)	(0.0797)	(0.1675)
Representation Difference	-0.0293	0.0734	0.0424	0.1276†	-0.2455
	(0.0855)	(0.1412)	(0.1087)	(0.0678)	(0.2034)
EP Group Seat %	-0.0321	-0.1090	0.4173	0.2654	-0.4031
	(0.2343)	(0.1850)	(0.5368)	(0.1762)	(0.5016)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.4902†	0.3344	-0.0831	-0.0580	0.4583
	(0.2674)	(0.2230)	(0.6381)	(0.2696)	(0.6073)
Years in EP	0.0010	-0.0035*	-0.0007	-0.0006	0.0069***
	(0.0010)	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0008)	(0.0019)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	0.0426	0.0539	-0.5586†	0.0996	-0.3144
	(0.2079)	(0.2747)	(0.3087)	(0.2597)	(0.5873)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0358	-0.1051**	0.1528***	0.0293	0.0723†
	(0.0285)	(0.0336)	(0.0286)	(0.0197)	(0.0437)
RILE	0.0007	-0.0014*	0.0003	0.0027***	0.0038**
	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0012	-0.0018	0.0026	-0.0016	-0.0126
	(0.0176)	(0.0094)	(0.0147)	(0.0085)	(0.0170)
Member of National Coalition	0.0314†	-0.0127	-0.0224	0.0381*	0.0265
	(0.0176)	(0.0208)	(0.0261)	(0.0188)	(0.0400)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0083†	-0.0066	0.0036	0.0051	0.0034
	(0.0049)	(0.0053)	(0.0080)	(0.0051)	(0.0133)
National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0043	-0.0391†	-0.0199	0.0133	-0.0141
	(0.0201)	(0.0234)	(0.0301)	(0.0188)	(0.0474)
Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	0.0033	0.0173†	0.0192*	-0.0032	0.0068
	(0.0055)	(0.0098)	(0.0093)	(0.0058)	(0.0135)
EP 1994	0.0413	0.0703**	-0.0061	-0.0402	-0.0888
	(0.0340)	(0.0260)	(0.0424)	(0.0278)	(0.0815)
EP 1999	-0.0005	0.0756**	0.0312	-0.0307	-0.0791
	(0.0299)	(0.0268)	(0.0470)	(0.0279)	(0.0824)
EP 2004	-0.0184	0.1220***	0.0550	-0.0005	-0.1941*
	(0.0300)	(0.0271)	(0.0628)	(0.0289)	(0.0780)
EP 2009	0.0302	0.1089**	-0.0294	-0.0185	-0.1791*
	(0.0327)	(0.0404)	(0.0418)	(0.0245)	(0.0773)
Constant	0 1617	0 1718	0 1313	-0 0119	0.6255
servations (N)	426	426	426	426	426
oup Clusters (N)	88	88	88	88	88
	00	00	50	50	50

Table D.3.2 All Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

tes : All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by EMP country EP election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10 + p < 0.05 + p < 0.01 + p < 0.01

	Economy (SE)	Welfare (SE)	Environment (SE)	Multicultural (SE)	EU Integration (SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*National EP Seat %	0.0761	-0.4387†	0.3365	-0.1605	-0.4124
	(0.1877)	(0.2306)	(0.2264)	(0.2083)	(0.2914)
Party Type*Representation Difference	0.0377	0.0437	0.3921	-0.1410	0.6743
	(0.2094)	(0.2878)	(0.3217)	(0.2928)	(0.5590)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	-0.3720	0.4229	-0.5677	1.1758*	0.9677
	(0.3089)	(0.3533)	(0.6042)	(0.5752)	(0.7404)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.2415	-0.3940	0.2613	-1.3012*	-1.1897
	(0.3679)	(0.4202)	(0.7403)	(0.5451)	(0.8795)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0037	0.0038	-0.0015	0.0005	0.0030
	(0.0026)	(0.0032)	(0.0027)	(0.0024)	(0.0048)
Independent Variables:					
National EP Seat %	-0.1235†	-0.1917†	-0.1244	-0.1634*	0.0203
	(0.0619)	(0.1055)	(0.0909)	(0.0778)	(0.1612)
Representation Difference	-0.0354	0.0874	0.0318	0.1397*	-0.1583
	(0.0850)	(0.1410)	(0.1076)	(0.0666)	(0.1981)
EP Group Seat %	-0.0466	-0.1345	0.3924	0.2190	-0.3748
	(0.2325)	(0.1896)	(0.5239)	(0.1796)	(0.4898)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.5084†	0.3661	-0.0409	-0.0024	0.4490
	(0.2657)	(0.2307)	(0.6229)	(0.2819)	(0.5932)
Years in EP	0.0009	-0.0032*	-0.0009	-0.0007	0.0067***
	(0.0010)	(0.0016)	(0.0014)	(0.0008)	(0.0017)
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)	0.0529	-0.0033	-0.4205	0.1130	-0.6415
	(0.2243)	(0.2901)	(0.3180)	(0.3159)	(0.5859)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.0340	-0.1030**	0.1553***	0.0254	0.0403
	(0.0290)	(0.0333)	(0.0294)	(0.0198)	(0.0444)
RILE	0.0006	-0.0013*	0.0003	0.0023***	0.0031†
	(0.0008)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0020	-0.0025	0.0019	-0.0008	-0.0083
	(0.0172)	(0.0092)	(0.0140)	(0.0083)	(0.0171)
Member of National Coalition	0.0311†	-0.0097	-0.0228	0.0415*	0.0503
	(0.0174)	(0.0212)	(0.0262)	(0.0189)	(0.0378)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0080	-0.0097†	0.0022	0.0041	0.0005
	(0.0051)	(0.0058)	(0.0083)	(0.0052)	(0.0128)
National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0063	-0.0376	-0.0212	0.0166	0.0061
	(0.0201)	(0.0242	(0.0317)	(0.0177)	(0.0467)
Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	0.0040	0.0155	0.0190*	-0.0024	0.0087
	(0.0058)	(0.0101)	(0.0092)	(0.0056)	(0.0132)
EP 1994	0.0426	0.0711**	-0.0195	-0.0284	-0.0992
	(0.0343)	(0.0273)	(0.0427)	(0.0289)	(0.0813)
EP 1999	0.0009	0.0714**	0.0256	-0.0268	-0.0814
	(0.0308)	(0.0269)	(0.0468)	(0.0278)	(00.0773)
EP 2004	-0.0209	0.1225***	0.0528	-0.0078	-0.2210**
	(0.0300)	(0.0281)	(0.0635)	(0.0290)	(0.0719)
EP 2009	0.0354	0.1088**	-0.0311	-0.0278	-0.2182**
	(0.0332)	(0.0422)	(0.0416)	(0.0246)	(0.0756)
Constant	0.1670	0.1719	0.1535	-0.0179	0.5729
Observations (N)	410	410	410	410	410
Group Clusters (N)	88	88	88	88	88

Table D.3.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

Notes: Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by EMP country EP election date.

(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) Interactions:		Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
Interactions: Interactions Party Type National EP Seat % 1.3308*** 0.08066) 1.0558) 0.1018 4.6890* Party Type *Representation Difference 0.0365 -0.3542 2.4896*** 0.0347 (0.3495) 1.1566 0.2472 0.0347 Party Type *EP Group Seat % -1.5562 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 -2.0849** Party Type *EP Group Seat % -1.5562 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 -2.0849** Party Type *EP Group Seat % (1.2386) (1.2387) (14.3588) (20.7085) Party Type *ters in EP -0.0030* -0.00230*** -0.0020 0.0021 Independent Variables: (0.0063) (0.0035) (0.039) (0.0721) (0.1828) Per Group Seat % -0.1036 0.2769*** -0.0141 (0.1234) (0.1234) Party Type * Years in EP (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0391) (0.0371) (0.4281) Per Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 0.5295* -0.3912 Party Type { Hard Eur		(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions: Party Type National EP Seat % 1.3308*** 0.0621 1.1546 0.1018 4.6890* Party Type Representation Difference 0.0365 0.3542 2.4896*** 0.0472 0.0347 Party Type *EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.330 720.9849*** Party Type *EP Group Seat % (squared) 4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.6303 92.9490*** Party Type *Pe Group Seat % (squared) 4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.0230 0.0022 Party Type *Pars in EP -0.0030* -0.0230* -0.0230* -0.0201 0.0022 Independent Variables: -0.00653 0.0755 0.0059 -0.2239*** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0825 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.2229*** 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2771 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0315 0.0314 0.1234 0.0483 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.2229*** 0.1517 0.1611						
Party Type*National EP Seat % 1.3308*** 0.0621 1.1546 0.1018 4.6899* Party Type*Representation Difference 0.0365 -0.8542 2.4896*** 0.2472 0.0347 Party Type*EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 -20.9849** Party Type*EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 -20.9849** Party Type*EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 20.9896** Party Type*EP Group Seat % (squared) 4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.4503 92.9490*** National EP Seat % (0.0030* (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0136) Independent Variables: - - 0.0030* 0.0043 0.00431 0.00471 0.1511 0.7216* 0.27171 Representation Difference -0.0050 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 0.01611 0.7216* 0.3122 -0.5595* -0.3122 Paroup Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0350* (0.0316) (0.0026)	Interactions:					
(0.3495) (0.8066) (1.0558) (1.410) (0.2131) Party Type *Representation Difference (0.3021) (0.7433) (0.5452) (0.6187) (1.7036) Party Type *EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.3330 -20.9349*** Party Type *EP Group Seat % (squared) 4.5493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.4503 92.9490*** Party Type *Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0043 -0.0230*** -0.0020 0.0022 Independent Variables: -0.0055 0.00491 (0.0087) 0.0327** -0.0755 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 (0.1639) (0.0372) (0.1281) P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* -0.3912 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.6172 (0.1679) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) P Group Seat % (squared) 0.2272** 0.0315 -0.0312 -0.3912 P Group Seat % (sqq	Party Type*National EP Seat %	1.3308***	0.0621	1.1546	0.1018	4.6890*
Party Type*Representation Difference 0.0365 -0.3542 2.4989*** -0.2172 0.0347 Party Type*EP Group Seat % -1.5962 1.7837 4.6365 3.3300 -20.9849** Party Type*EP Group Seat % (1.2586) (2.8362) (3.8709) (4.8123) (6.6484) Party Type*Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0043 -0.0220*** -0.0220 0.0022 Party Type*Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0043 -0.0250 (0.0087) (0.0367) Independent Variables: - -0.0250 -0.0755 (0.0083) (0.0014) (0.1059) (0.752) (0.1221) Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1212 -0.0785 PG roup Seat % (0.1622) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2394) (0.1621) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0205 0.0311 0.1214 -0.0785 PG roup Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5957 -0.3912 Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.		(0.3495)	(0.8066)	(1.0558)	(1.4510)	(0.2181)
(0.3921) (0.7443) (0.5452) (6.187) (1.7036) Party Type*E Group Seat % (squared) (1.2566) (2.8362) (3.8709) (4.8123) (6.8484) Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared) (3.9733) (10.1850) (12.522) (14.558) (2.07083) Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared) (3.0373) (10.1850) (12.522) (14.558) (2.07083) Party Type* Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0043 -0.0230**** -0.0200 (0.0016) Independent Variables: - <td>Party Type*Representation Difference</td> <td>0.0365</td> <td>-0.3542</td> <td>2.4896***</td> <td>-0.2472</td> <td>0.0347</td>	Party Type*Representation Difference	0.0365	-0.3542	2.4896***	-0.2472	0.0347
Party Type*EP Group Seat % -1.5952 1.7837 4.6365 3.3900 -20.9849*** Party Type*EP Group Seat % (squared) 4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.4503 92.9490**** Party Type*Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0030* -0.0023*** -0.0027 (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0072) Independent Variables: -0.0136 -0.2769*** -0.0590 -0.2329** -0.0785 National EP Seat % -0.1036 0.0276* -0.0590 -0.2329** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.01205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1511 0.7216* 0.2312 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5959* -0.3912 Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 -0.0039 0.066**** (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) 0.0007 (0.0016) 0.0027* 0.038*** Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0302 -0.097*** 0.		(0.3921)	(0.7443)	(0.5452)	(0.6187)	(1.7036)
(1.256) (2.870) (4.872) (6.8484) Party Type PC Group Seat % (squared) (4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.4503 92.9490*** Party Type PC aron Seat % (squared) (0.0034) -0.0230*** -0.0020 0.0021 Party Type PC aron Seat % (squared) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0031) Independent Variables: Variables -0.1036 -0.2763 -0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.11221 -0.0982 FP Group Seat % -0.1229 0.817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2312 FP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5555* -0.312 Fe Group Seat % (squared) 0.0232 -0.0316 (0.0010) -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0032 Fe Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.312 -0.5555* -0.312 Fe Group Seat % (squared) 0.0202 0.0001** 0.00010 0.00015 0.00	Party Type*EP Group Seat %	-1.5962	1.7837	4.6365	3.3390	-20.9849**
Party Type* P Group Seat % (squared) 4.9493 -2.7597 -18.4051 -4.4503 92.9490*** Party Type*Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0043 -0.0230*** -0.0020 0.0022 Independent Variables: -0.0136 -0.2769** -0.0590 -0.2329*** -0.0785 National EP Seat % -0.1036 -0.2769** -0.0590 -0.2329*** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216** 0.2771 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 P Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.0009 0.0663*** (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.4782) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0937** 0.0906 0.9272 Controls: -0.0302 -0.0977** 0.1503**** 0.0310 0.0528 Niche Party -0.0302 -0.097		(1.2586)	(2.8362)	(3.8709)	(4.8123)	(6.8484)
(3.8743) (10.1850) (12.5229) (14.2588) (20.7083) Party Type Years in EP 0.0004 0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0087) (0.0136) Independent Variables: 0.0050 0.0590 0.2329*** 0.0785 National EP Seat % (0.0663) (0.1055) (0.0833) (0.0817) (0.1621) Representation Difference (0.0703) (0.1294) (0.1059) (0.0752) (0.1382) EP Group Seat % (0.1632) (0.1673) (0.1410) 0.0226** 0.2312 0.1382) EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0416) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0392 -0.0977** 0.0528*** (0.0278) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.016) (0.0077) (0.0477) RUE 0.0006 -0.017** 0.1503**** 0.0316* 0.0317* Niche Party -0.0296	Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	4.9493	-2.7597	-18.4051	-4.4503	92.9490***
Party Type*Years in EP -0.0030* -0.0023 -0.0220** -0.0020 0.0022 Independent Variables: (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.1621) Representation Difference -0.1036 -0.2769** -0.0590 -0.2329** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2771 F Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 (0.1762) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031* -0.0010 -0.0098 0.9272 (0.418) (0.7410) (0.5023) (0.0247) (0.3426) 0.0247* Niche Party -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0031 (0.0051) (0.0248) (0.0477) RiLE 0.0026 -0.0017* 0.016 -0.0031 (0.014) (0.0129) Member of Grand Coalition <td></td> <td>(3.8743)</td> <td>(10.1850)</td> <td>(12.5429)</td> <td>(14.2588)</td> <td>(20.7083)</td>		(3.8743)	(10.1850)	(12.5429)	(14.2588)	(20.7083)
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0087) (0.0136) Independent Variables: -0.1036 -0.2769** -0.0590 -0.2329** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0020 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 P Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2771 (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2936) (0.4408) P Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 Years in EP (0.001 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0028) Years in EP (0.003 -0.0031* -0.0101 (0.0027) (0.2082) Years in EP (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0322 -0.097*** 0.1503**** (0.0028) (0.0278) Niche Party -0.0021 0.0001 0.0027**** 0.0032 (0.0015) (0.0201) (0.0027) RLE 0.0026	Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0030*	-0.0043	-0.0230***	-0.0020	0.0022
Independent Variables: National EP Seat % -0.1036 -0.2769** -0.0590 -0.2329** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 Representation Difference -0.0229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2329* EP Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2379* EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0303 -0.0010* (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.4982) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0322 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0522* Niche Party -0.0302 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 (0.0477) RiLE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027**** 0.0038*** (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0206) (0.0206) <td></td> <td>(0.0014)</td> <td>(0.0035)</td> <td>(0.0049)</td> <td>(0.0087)</td> <td>(0.0136)</td>		(0.0014)	(0.0035)	(0.0049)	(0.0087)	(0.0136)
National EP Seat % -0.1326 -0.2769*** -0.0590 -0.2329*** -0.0785 Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 EP Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1511 0.77216* 0.2771 (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2936) (0.4408) EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 (0.1762) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0320 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.5528 (1.5482) Controis: - - (0.00278) (0.0015) (0.0274) (0.0027*** 0.0386*** (0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 -0.0027*** 0.0386*** (0.0007) (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0027**** 0.0038****	Independent Variables:					
(0.0663) (0.055) (0.083) (0.0617) (0.1621) Representation Difference (0.0763) (0.1294) (0.1059) (0.0752) (0.1828) EP Group Seat % (0.1229) 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.7771 (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2936) (0.4408) EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227*** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595** -0.3912 (0.1762) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.204) (0.4477) RiLE 0.0007 (0.0013* 0.0304 0.0024* 0.0038*** Nember of Grand Coalition -0.021 0.0014 0.0123* 0.0036*** 0.0031** 0.0016 -0.0031* Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0021 0.0024 0.0	National EP Seat %	-0.1036	-0.2769**	-0.0590	-0.2329**	-0.0785
Representation Difference -0.0205 0.0735 0.1041 0.1121 -0.0982 (0.0763) (0.1294) (0.1059) (0.0752) (0.1828) EP Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 (0.1611 0.7216* 0.2771 EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5277** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 (0.1782) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4082) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0063**** (0.010) (0.0115) (0.02073) (0.5228) (1.542) Controls: (0.0118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.542) Controls: (0.0276) (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.024) (0.0477) RLE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027**** 0.0031 Member of Grand Coalition 0.0296* -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367* 0.0397 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0024 -0.0267 0.0131 0.0062 0.0012		(0.0663)	(0.1055)	(0.0833)	(0.0817)	(0.1621)
(0.0763) (0.1294) (0.1695) (0.0752) (0.1828) EP Group Seat % (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3161) 0.7216* 0.2771 (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.312) -0.5595‡ -0.3912 (0.1762) (0.1789) (0.4007) (0.3107) (0.4408) Years in EP (0.0003) -0.0031** -0.0010 -0.0090 (0.063*** (0.418) (0.7410) (0.0007) (0.0065)*** (0.007) (0.0065) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0302 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0552 Controls: - (0.007) (0.007) (0.027** 0.0310 0.0562 Nember of Grand Coalition -0.006 -0.0013* 0.0006 (0.007) (0.0078) Member of National Coalition -0.0297* -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367* 0.0397 Member of Parliamentary Parties -0.0021 0.0061 0.0016 0.0031 (0.0192) Member of Srand Coalition -0.0296* -0.0148 <td< td=""><td>Representation Difference</td><td>-0.0205</td><td>0.0735</td><td>0.1041</td><td>0.1121</td><td>-0.0982</td></td<>	Representation Difference	-0.0205	0.0735	0.1041	0.1121	-0.0982
EP Group Seat % -0.1229 0.1817 0.1611 0.7216* 0.2771 (0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2936) (0.4408) EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595* -0.3912 Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0101 -0.0009 0.0063**** Years in EP 0.0016 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) 0.00016 0.0007 (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0310 0.0562 Controls: (0.0278) (0.0015) (0.0274) (0.0204) (0.0477) RiLE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027*** 0.0031 Member of Grand Coalition -0.0221 0.0001 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296* -0.013* 0.0026 0.00367* 0.038*** (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0205) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0386) Member of National Coalition 0.0296* -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367* 0.0397 </td <td></td> <td>(0.0763)</td> <td>(0.1294)</td> <td>(0.1059)</td> <td>(0.0752)</td> <td>(0.1828)</td>		(0.0763)	(0.1294)	(0.1059)	(0.0752)	(0.1828)
(0.1632) (0.1679) (0.3416) (0.2936) (0.4408) EP Group Seat % (squared) (0.3762) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP (0.0003) -0.0031** -0.0010 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.4982) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0278) (0.5278) (0.310) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0977** 0.1503*** (0.310) (0.0244) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0011 (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0124) (0.0477) Member of Grand Coalition 0.0226† -0.0148 0.0007 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0192) Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083* -0.0011 (0.0178) (0.0128) (0.0128) Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0087 -0.0012 (0.0178) (0.0218) (0.0066) (0.0125) National Coalition 0.0226† <td< td=""><td>EP Group Seat %</td><td>-0.1229</td><td>0.1817</td><td>0.1611</td><td>0.7216*</td><td>0.2771</td></td<>	EP Group Seat %	-0.1229	0.1817	0.1611	0.7216*	0.2771
EP Group Seat % (squared) 0.5227** 0.0355 0.0312 -0.5595 ⁺ -0.3912 Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** 0.04072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 (0.0006) -0.0003 Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 Controls: (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: -0.0302 -0.097*** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0562 Niche Party -0.0302 -0.097** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0057 NillE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0006 0.002*** 0.0038*** Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.017 0.016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.00296 ⁺ -0.0148 -0.0255 0.0367 ⁺ 0.0397 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.00071 (0.0058) (0.0049) (0.0125) National - EP Election, Same Year -		(0.1632)	(0.1679)	(0.3416)	(0.2936)	(0.4408)
(0.1762) (0.1789) (0.4072) (0.3107) (0.4982) Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0010 (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0063***) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 Controls: (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.0204) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027*** 0.038*** (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0017 (0.0017 (0.0017 (0.0016) (0.0012) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0221 0.0011 0.017 0.0014 (0.0128) (0.014) (0.0128) Member of National Coalition 0.0296* -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367** 0.0387 (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) (0.0060) (0.0122) Member of Grand Coalition 0.0226* -0.0126 (0.0240) (0.0240)	EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.5227**	0.0355	0.0312	-0.5595†	-0.3912
Years in EP 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.010 -0.0009 0.0063**** (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 (0.118) (0.7410) (0.5273) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: -0.0302 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0562 RLE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 (0.0274)** 0.0038*** (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0204) (0.012) Member of Grand Coalition -0.021 0.0011 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296* -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367* 0.0337 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083* -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 (0.0201) (0.027) (0.0323) (0.0198) (0.0367) 0.013 Stience Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179* -0.0048<		(0.1762)	(0.1789)	(0.4072)	(0.3107)	(0.4982)
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls: (0.0278) (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.0204) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0006 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0221 0.0001 0.0012 (0.014) (0.0128) (0.014) (0.0128) Member of National Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083** -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 (0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0125) (0.0471) National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1205 National - EP Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179* -0.0006 0.0122 <td>Years in EP</td> <td>0.0003</td> <td>-0.0031**</td> <td>-0.0010</td> <td>-0.0009</td> <td>0.0063***</td>	Years in EP	0.0003	-0.0031**	-0.0010	-0.0009	0.0063***
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic) -0.0436 0.3297 -2.5099*** 0.0980 0.9272 (0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.528) (1.5482) Controls:		(0.0010)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0007)	(0.0016)
(0.4118) (0.7410) (0.5073) (0.5228) (1.5482) Controls:	Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)	-0.0436	0.3297	-2.5099***	0.0980	0.9272
Controls: Niche Party -0.0302 -0.0977*** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0562 RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0024) (0.0278) (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.0047) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0013* 0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0038 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0210 (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083† -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 (0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0088) (0.0060) (0.0125) National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1220 [0.0274) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) <td></td> <td>(0.4118)</td> <td>(0.7410)</td> <td>(0.5073)</td> <td>(0.5228)</td> <td>(1.5482)</td>		(0.4118)	(0.7410)	(0.5073)	(0.5228)	(1.5482)
Niche Party -0.0302 -0.0977** 0.1503*** 0.0310 0.0562 (0.0278) (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.0204) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0397 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083† -0.0067 0.0113 0.0062 0.0074 Mender - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 Mender - EP Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0066 0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0066 0.0133) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0021 0.0270 (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0276* 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 E	Controls:					
(0.0278) (0.0015) (0.0294) (0.0204) (0.0477) RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027*** 0.0038*** Member of Grand Coalition 0.00071 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012) Member of Grand Coalition 0.00296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0397 Member of National Coalition 0.00296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0397 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083† -0.00677 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0072 -0.0323 0.0088 (0.0060) (0.0125) National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 Image: Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0066 0.0122 Image: Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0031 0.00951 (0.0092) (0.0633) (0.0177) EP 1994 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779	Niche Party	-0.0302	-0.0977**	0.1503***	0.0310	0.0562
RILE 0.0006 -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0027*** 0.0038*** Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) Member of National Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083† -0.0067 0.0013 0.0060 (0.0125) National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 Member of Parliamentary Parties 0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 Mice Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0066 0.0122 Mice Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0021 0.02671 0.0201 0.0471 0.0212 Mice Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0021 0.02701 (0.0430)		(0.0278)	(0.0015)	(0.0294)	(0.0204)	(0.0477)
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012) Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0397 (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0063† -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0122 -0.0257 -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1226 EP 1994 0.0011 0.0227) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797)	RILE	0.0006	-0.0013*	0.0004	0.0027***	0.0038***
Member of Grand Coalition -0.0021 0.0001 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0031 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0397 Member of National Coalition 0.0296† -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367† 0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083† -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 Notional - EP Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0199* 0.0179† -0.0063 (0.017) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.00411 0.0592* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1994 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0779) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0274) (0.0266)		(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)
(0.0163) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0104) (0.0192) Member of National Coalition 0.0296 ⁺ -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367 ⁺ 0.0397 (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083 ⁺ -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0199 [*] 0.0179 ⁺ -0.0066 0.0122 [0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.063) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592 [*] -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 [0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767 ^{***} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 [P 2004 -0.0162 0.120 ^{****} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108 ^{***}	Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0021	0.0001	0.0017	0.0016	-0.0031
Member of National Coalition 0.0296 ⁺ -0.0148 -0.0205 0.0367 ⁺ 0.0397 (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083 ⁺ -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.00411 0.0592* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1994 -0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207*** 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108**		(0.0163)	(0.0104)	(0.0128)	(0.0104)	(0.0192)
(0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0386) Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083 ⁺ -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190 [*] 0.0179 ⁺ -0.00663 (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592 [*] -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1994 0.0021 0.0767 ^{**} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.120 ^{***} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108 ^{**} (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020 ^{**} -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) <td>Member of National Coalition</td> <td>0.0296†</td> <td>-0.0148</td> <td>-0.0205</td> <td>0.0367†</td> <td>0.0397</td>	Member of National Coalition	0.0296†	-0.0148	-0.0205	0.0367†	0.0397
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 0.0083 ⁺ -0.0067 0.0013 0.0062 0.0074 National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190 [*] 0.0179 ⁺ -0.00663) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592 [*] -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767 ^{**} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.120 ^{****} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108 ^{**} (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020 ^{**} -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730 ^{**}		(0.0175)	(0.0216)	(0.0240)	(0.0198)	(0.0386)
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0088) (0.0060) (0.0125) National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0066 0.0122 (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0063) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207*** 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108** (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414)<	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0083†	-0.0067	0.0013	0.0062	0.0074
National - EP Election, Same Year -0.0072 -0.0323 -0.0267 0.0184 0.0101 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.00663) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207*** 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108** (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**		(0.0049)	(0.0058)	(0.0088)	(0.0060)	(0.0125)
(0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0471) Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190* 0.0179† -0.0006 0.0122 (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0063) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767** 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207*** 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108** (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**	National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0072	-0.0323	-0.0267	0.0184	0.0101
Time Since Last National Election (yrs) 0.0033 0.0190^* 0.0179^+ -0.0006 0.0122 (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0063) (0.0137) EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592^* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767^{**} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207^{***} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108^{**} (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.321 0.1020^{**} -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730^{**})		(0.0201)	(0.0227)	(0.0323)	(0.0195)	(0.0471)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	0.0033	0.0190*	0.0179†	-0.0006	0.0122
EP 1994 0.0411 0.0592^* -0.0120 -0.0488 -0.1246 (0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0817) EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767^{**} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207^{***} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108^{**} (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020^{**} -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730^{**})		(0.0057)	(0.0095)	(0.0092)	(0.0063)	(0.0137)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	EP 1994	0.0411	0.0592*	-0.0120	-0.0488	-0.1246
EP 1999 0.0021 0.0767^{**} 0.0291 -0.0257 -0.0779 (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0475) (0.0299) (0.0797) EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207^{***} 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108^{**} (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020^{**} -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730^{**})		(0.0317)	(0.0270)	(0.0430)	(0.0313)	(0.0817)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	EP 1999	0.0021	0.0767**	0.0291	-0.0257	-0.0779
EP 2004 -0.0162 0.1207*** 0.0572 0.0014 -0.2108** (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**		(0.0285)	(0.0268)	(0.0475)	(0.0299)	(0.0797)
(0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0605) (0.0300) (0.0720) EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**	EP 2004	-0.0162	0.1207***	0.0572	0.0014	-0.2108**
EP 2009 0.0321 0.1020** -0.0248 -0.0171 -0.2146 (0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**		(0.0274)	(0.0266)	(0.0605)	(0.0300)	(0.0720)
(0.0302) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0245) (0.0730**	EP 2009	0.0321	0.1020**	-0.0248	-0.0171	-0.2146
Constant 0.1640 0.1736 0.0825 -0.0092 0.4786		(0.0302)	(0.0403)	(0.0414)	(0.0245)	(0.0730**
Constant 0.1040 0.1750 0.0625 -0.0052 0.4780	Constant	0.1640	0.1736	0.0825	-0.0092	0.4786
Observations (N) 426 426 426 426 426 426	Observations (N)	426	426	426	426	426
Group Clusters (N) 88 88 88 88 88 88	Group Clusters (N)	88	88	88	88	88

Table D.3.4 Hard Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies

Notes: Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by EMP country EP election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 + p < 0.05 + p < 0.01 + p < 0.01

Appendix E Marginal Effects Tables

Appendix E.1 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 3

Table E.1.1 Pooled Distance Models

	All Euroskeptic				Soft Euroskeptic		
	Abstainer	Conf.	Interval		Abstainer	Conf.	Interval
Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
0	0.0674***	0.0520	0.0827	0	0.0728***	0.0538	0.0918
0.5	0.0566***	0.0456	0.0677	0.5	0.0590***	0.0448	0.0732
1	0.0475***	0.0328	0.0622	1	0.0478***	0.0312	0.0643
1.5	0.0398***	0.0207	0.0588	1.5	0.0386***	0.0189	0.0582
2	0.0333**	0.0112	0.0553	2	0.0310**	0.0096	0.0525
2.5	0.0278*	0.0040	0.0516	2.5	0.0250*	0.0029	0.0470
3	0.0232+	-0.0012	0.0476	3	0.0201+	-0.0016	0.0417
3.5	0.0194	-0.0048	0.0435	3.5	0.0161	-0.0045	0.0366

Notes: † p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.005

		Vote				Abstain		
		Swticher	Conf.	Interval		Voter	Conf.	Interval
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
					0	0.1033***	0.0676	0.1391
					0.2	0.0792***	0.0637	0.0947
Economy					0.4	0.0602***	0.0447	0.0757
					0.6	0.0454***	0.0238	0.0669
					0.8	0.0340**	0.0092	0.0588
					1.0	0.0254*	0.0001	0.0506
					1.2	0.0188	-0.0051	0.0428
					0	0.0850***	0.0669	0.1031
					0.5	0.0689***	0.0527	0.0850
					1	0.0555***	0.0309	0.0802
					1.5	0.0446**	0.0136	0.0756
					2	0.0357**	0.0013	0.0701
					2.5	0.0285	-0.0068	0.0637
					3	0.0226	-0.0118	0.0571
					3.5	0.0180	-0.0144	0.0504
	0	0.0547***	0.0297	0.0799				
Multicultural	0.25	0.1328***	0.0770	0.1885				
	0.50	0.2705***	0.1054	0.4356				
	0.75	0.4578**	0.1520	0.7635				
	1.0	0.6543***	0.2707	1.0380				
	1.25	0.8137***	0.4722	1.1552				
	1.5	0.9140***	0.6853	1.1427				
	1.75	0.9651***	0.8407	1.0896				
	2.0	0.9873***	0.9297	1.0448				

 Table E.1.2 All Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

		Vote				Abstain		
		Swticher	Conf.	Interval		Voter	Conf.	Interval
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
					0	0.1122***	0.0609	0.1635
					0.2	0.0860***	0.0663	0.1057
Economy					0.4	0.0653***	0.0507	0.0798
					0.6	0.0491***	0.0253	0.0730
					0.8	0.0367*	0.0075	0.0660
					1.0	0.0273†	-0.0034	0.0580
					1.2	0.0203	-0.0093	0.0498
	0	0.0705***	0.0410	0.0999				
Multicultural	0.25	0.1371***	0.0580	0.2161				
	0.5	0.2414*	0.0156	0.4673				
	0.75	0.3809+	-0.0447	0.8066				
	1	0.5393+	-0.0617	1.1404				
	1.25	0.6923*	0.0224	1.3623				
	1.5	0.8170**	0.2193	1.4148				
	1.75	0.9022***	0.4668	1.3377				
	2	0.9520***	0.6815	1.2226				
		0.40 * 0.05	** 0.04	*** 0.00				

Table E.1.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

		Vote				Abstain		
		Swticher	Conf.	Interval		Voter	Conf.	Interval
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
	0	0.0332***	0.0129	0.0535	0	0.0411***	0.0345	0.0478
	0.2	0.0498***	0.0373	0.0622	0.2	0.0634***	0.0511	0.0757
Economy	0.4	0.0658***	0.0396	0.0920	0.4	0.0954***	0.0536	0.1371
	0.6	0.0811***	0.0370	0.1252	0.6	0.1393**	0.0498	0.2289
	0.8	0.0974**	0.0306	0.1642	0.8	0.1967*	0.0410	0.3524
	1	0.1168*	0.0154	0.2181	1.0	0.2671*	0.0320	0.5021
	1.2	0.1417†	-0.0142	0.2975	1.2	0.3480*	0.0311	0.6649
	0	0.0796***	0.0344	0.1249	0	0.1757***	0.1133	0.2382
Welfare	0.2	0.0475***	0.0336	0.0613	0.2	0.1085***	0.0788	0.1382
	0.4	0.0241***	0.0094	0.0387	0.4	0.0626***	0.0525	0.0727
	0.6	0.0096	-0.0083	0.0274	0.6	0.0343***	0.0297	0.0390
	0.8	0.0025	-0.0067	0.0116	0.8	0.0182***	0.0130	0.0234
	1	0.0004	-0.0021	0.0029	1.0	0.0094***	0.0049	0.0140
	1.2	0.0001	-0.0004	0.0005	1.2	0.0048***	0.0015	0.0082
	0	0.0132†	-0.0007	0.0270	0	0.0705***	0.0579	0.0831
Environment	0.5	0.0555***	0.0437	0.0673	0.5	0.0365***	0.0315	0.0416
	1	0.1148***	0.0844	0.1453	1	0.0182***	0.0103	0.0261
	1.5	0.2172**	0.0823	0.3521	1.5	0.0089*	0.0021	0.0157
	2	0.3671**	0.1118	0.6224	2	0.0043+	-0.005	0.0090
	2.5	0.6151*	0.1115	1.1188	2.5	0.0020	-0.0009	0.0050
	3	0.8344***	0.5633	1.1055	3	0.0010	-0.0008	0.0027
	3.5	0.9152***	0.7321	1.0983	3.5	0.0005	-0.0005	0.0015
	0	0.0053***	0.0021	0.0085	0	0.1900***	0.1527	0.2273
Multicultural	0.25	0.0201***	0.0111	0.0290	0.25	0.0667***	0.0590	0.0744
	0.50	0.0615***	0.0426	0.0804	0.50	0.0196***	0.0177	0.0216
	0.75	0.1408***	0.0918	0.1896	0.75	0.0034***	0.0022	0.0047
	1.0	0.2498***	0.1627	0.3369	1.0	0.0005*	7.35e-06	0.0009
	1.25	0.3595***	0.1874	0.5316	1.25	0.0127	-0.00003	0.0002
					0	0.0268***	0.0196	0.0341
International					0.1	0.0380***	0.0339	0.0421
					0.2	0.0532***	0.0489	0.0576
					0.3	0.0737***	0.0577	0.0897
					0.4	0.1005***	0.0658	0.1352
					0.5	0.1347***	0.0736	0.1957
					0.6	0.1768***	0.00817	0.2719
					0.7	0.2271***	0.0915	0.3626
					0.8	0.2846**	0.1054	0.4638
					0.9	0.3479**	0.1263	0.5695

 Table E.1.4 Hard Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

			Conf.	Interval	
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	
Coalition	0	0.2173***	0.2077	0.2269	
	1	-0.0265	-0.3098	0.2568	_
Cabinet%	0	0.2139***	0.2043	0.2235	
	0.2	0.5894***	0.5467	0.632	
	0.4	0.9649***	0.8811	1.0487	
	0.6	1.3404***	1.2150	1.4657	
	0.8	1.7159***	1.5489	1.8828	
	_1	2.0913***	1.8827	2.2999	_
Cabinet3	0	0.2189***	0.2092	0.2285	
	1	-0.3551*	-0.7005	-0.0317	
	2	-0.9511**	-1.6206	-0.2817	
	3	-1.5361**	2.5406	-0.5316	
	AL 1 +		** .0.01	*** 0.001	

Appendix E.2 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 4

Table E.2.1 Hard Euroskeptic Parties, Pooled Model

Notes: [†] p < 0.10 ^{*} p < 0.05 ^{**} p < 0.01 ^{***} p < 0.001

Table E.2.2 All Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

	Economy Cabinet				Multicultural Coalition		
	Years	Conf.	Interval		Member	Conf.	Interval
Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
0	0.2038***	0.1868	0.221	0	0.1550***	0.1384	0.1716
5	0.1929***	0.1734	0.2123	1	0.0701	-0.0176	0.1577
10	0.1818***	0.1536	0.21				
15	0.1708***	0.1315	0.2101				
20	0.1597***	0.1084	0.211				
25	0.1487***	0.0851	0.2123				
30	0.1376***	0.0615	0.2138				
35	0.1266**	0.0378	0.2154				
40	0.1156*	0.0141	0.217				
45	0.1045†	-0.0097	0.2187				
50	0.094	-0.0335	0.2205				

	Economy		
	Cabinet Years	Conf.	Interval
Level	Margin	Min	Max
0	0.2037***	0.1866	0.2209
5	0.1923***	0.1729	0.2118
10	0.1809***	0.1527	0.2091
15	0.1695***	0.1303	0.2087
20	0.1581***	0.107	0.2092
25	0.1467***	0.0833	0.21
30	0.1353***	0.0595	0.211
35	0.1238**	0.0355	0.2122
40	0.1124*	0.0115	0.2134
45	0.1010+	-0.0126	0.2146
50	0.090	-0.0368	0.2159

 Table E.2.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

	Level	Coalition Member Margin	Conf. Min	Interval Max	Level	Cabinet% Margin	Conf. Min	Interval Max	Level	Cabinet3 Margin	Conf. Min	Interval Max	Level	Cabinet Years Margin	Conf. Min	Interval Max
	0	0.2034***	0.18644	0.2204	0	0.1990***	0.1821	0.2159	0	0.2049***	0.1878	0.2219				
Economy	1	-0.4837*	-0.9405	-0.0268	0.2	0.5814***	0.5043	0.6584	1	-0.6163*	-1.1433	-0.0892				
					0.4	0.9637***	0.8134	1.1141	2	-1.4374**	-2.4935	-0.3812				
					0.6	1.3461***	1.1218	1.5704	3	-2.2584**	-3.8439	-0.6730				
					0.8	1.7285***	1.4301	2.0268								
_					1	2.1108***	1.7383	2.4833								
					0	0.2699***	0.2538	0.286	0	0.2778***	0.2614	0.2942				
Weflare					0.2	0.9560***	0.8569	1.0551	1	-0.4714	-1.2282	0.2854				
					0.4	1.6421***	1.4432	1.8411	2	-1.2207	-2.7376	0.2963				
					0.6	2.3283***	2.0291	2.6275	3	-1.9699†	-4.2471	0.3074				
					0.8	3.0144***	2.6148	3.414								
					1	3.7005***	3.2005	4.2005								
	0	0.2993***	0.2799	0.3187	0	0.3023***	0.2829	0.3217								
Environment	1	1.3141***	0.828	1.8002	0.2	0.1941***	0.1164	0.2719								
					0.4	0.0860	-0.0650	0.2369								
					0.6	-0.0223	-0.2472	0.2027								
					0.8	-0.1305	-0.4297	0.1688								
					1	-0.2387	-0.6122	0.1349								
	0	0.1511***	0.1356	0.1667	0	0.1495***	0.1341	0.1649					0	0.1553***	0.1389	0.1716
Multiculturalism	1	0.3994***	0.2180	0.5808	0.2	0.4304***	0.3722	0.4887					5	-0.1816*	-0.3575	-0.0057
					0.4	0.7114***	0.6039	0.8189					10	-0.5184**	-0.8763	-0.1604
					0.6	0.9924***	0.8352	1.1495					15	-0.8552**	-1.3953	-0.3150
					0.8	1.2733***	1.0663	1.4803					20	-1.1920***	-1.9144	-0.4695
					1	1.5543***	1.2974	1.8112					25	-1.5288***	-2.4336	-0.6240
													30	-1.8656***	-2.9527	-0.7785
													35	-2.2024***	-3.4718	-0.7785
	0	0.1487***	0.1367	0.1608	0	0.1410***	0.1288	0.1531	0	0.1516***	0.1397	0.1635	0	0.1415***	0.1287	0.1543
Internationalism	1	-1.1770***	-1.3869	-0.9670	0.2	0.7822***	0.7397	0.8246	1	-1.4617***	-1.7387	-1.1846	5	0.5552***	0.4059	0.7046
					0.4	1.4234***	1.3423	1.5045	2	-3.0750***	-3.6259	-2.5241	10	0.9690***	0.6654	1.2726
					0.6	2.0646***	1.9442	2.1849	3	-4.6883***	-5.5131	-3.8635	15	1.3827***	0.9247	1.8408
					0.8	2.7058***	2.5461	2.8655					20	1.7965***	1.1839	2.4090
					1	3.3470***	3.1478	3.5461					25	2.2102***	1.4432	2.9773
													30	2.6240***	1.7024	3.5455
													35	3.0377***	1.9616	4.1138

Appendix E.3 Marginal Effects Tables – Chapter 5

		Skeptic*			Skeptic*				Skeptic*		
		EP Group	Conf.	Interval	EP Group Seats	Conf.	Interval		Nat Ep	Conf. I	nterval
		Seats %			% (Sqd)				Seats %		
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
	0	0.2362***	0.2228	0.2496	0.2504***	0.2374	0.2634				
All	0.1	0.2787***	0.2401	0.3174	0.1916***	0.1429	0.2403				
uroskeptic	0.2	0.3212***	0.239	0.4035	0.1313*	0.03077	0.2347				
	0.3	0.3637***	0.2373	0.4902	0.0739	-0.0818	0.2297				
	0.4	0.4062***	0.2354	0.5771							
	0.5	0.4487***	0.2335	0.664							
	0.6	0.4912***	0.2316	0.7509							
	0.7	0.5337***	0.2296	0.8379							
	0.8	0.5762***	0.2277	0.9249							
	0.9	0.6187**	0.2257	1.0118							
								0	0.2412***	0.2284	0.2540
Hard								0.02	0.2706***	0.2449	0.2962
uroskeptic								0.04	0.2999***	0.2466	0.3533
								0.06	0.3293***	0.2472	0.4113
								0.08	0.3586***	0.2477	0.4696
								0.1	0.3880***	0.2480	0.5279
								0.12	0.4173***	0.2483	0.5863
								0.14	0.4467***	0.2486	0.6447
								0.16	0.4760***	0.2489	0.7031
								0.18	0.5054***	0.2492	0.7616
								0.2	0.5347***	0.2494	0.8200

Table E.3.1 Pooled Distance Model

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		Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*		
		EP	Conf.	Interval		Represent	Conf.	Interval		EP	Conf	. Interval		EPGroup%	Conf	. Interval		Years in	Conf	. Interval
		Nat %				Diff				Group%				Squared				EP		
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
																	0	0.1899***	0.1725	0.2073
Economy																	4	0.1741***	0.1605	0.1877
																	8	0.1583***	0.1356	0.1810
																	12	0.1426***	0.1066	0.1786
																	16	0.1268***	0.0765	0.1771
																	20	0.1110***	0.0461	0.1759
																	24	0.0953*	0.0156	0.1749
																	28	0.0795†	-0.0150	0.1740
																	32	0.0637	-0.0456	0.1731
	0	0.2315***	0.2082	0.2548																
Weflare	0.1	0.1948***	0.1627	0.2270																
	0.2	0.1581***	0.0888	0.2274																
	0.3	0.1214*	0.1251	0.2303																
	0.4	0.0847	-0.0643	0.2337	0.6	0.4002***	0 2470	0.75.09										0 20/5***	0.2505	0.2195
Environmont					0.0	0.4995	0.2479	0.7508									4	0.2645	0.2303	0.5165
Environment					0.7	0.5505	0.2422	0.0710									4	0.2049	0.2378	0.2920
					0.8	0.0144	0.2304	1 113/									12	0.2455	0.2121	0.2784
					1	0.0720	0.2305	1 2344									16	0.2257	0.1702	0.2732
					11	0.7233	0.2240	1 3554									20	0.1865***	0.1413	0.2697
					1.1	0.8446**	0.2107	1 4764									20	0.1669***	0.1632	0.2691
					1.3	0.9021*	0.2068	1.5975									28	0.1473*	0.0258	0.2687
					1.4	0.9596*	0.2008	1.7185									32	0.1277†	-0.0133	0.2686
									0	0.0918***	0.0659	0.1178	0	0.1336***	0.1154	0.1517				
Multicultural									0.1	0.2246***	0.1390	0.3103	0.1	-0.0108	-0.1033	0.0818				
									0.2	0.3574***	0.1663	0.5486	0.2	-0.1551	-0.3502	0.0401				
									0.3	0.4902***	0.1931	0.7874	0.3	-0.2994*	-0.5975	-0.0013				
									0.4	0.6230**	0.2198	1.0263	0.4	-0.4437*	-0.8449	-0.0426				
									0.5	0.7559**	0.2465	1.2652	0.5	-0.5880*	-1.0923	-0.0838				
									0.6	0.8887**	0.2731	1.5042	0.6	-0.7324*	-1.3397	-0.1250				
									0.7	1.0215**	0.2998	1.7432	0.7	-0.8767*	-1.5872	-0.1662				
									0.8	1.1543**	0.3264	1.9821	0.8	-1.0210*	-1.8346	-0.2074				
									0.9	1.2871**	0.3531	2.2211	0.9	-1.1653*	-2.0820	-0.2486				
	0	0.4548***	0.4125	0.4972																
EU Integration	0.1	0.3893***	0.3393	0.4394																
	0.2	0.3238***	0.2200	0.4277																
	0.3	0.2584**	0.0951	0.4216																
	0.4	0.1929†	-0.0310	0.4167																
	0.5	0.1274	-0.1574	0.4121																

Table E.3.2 All Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

		Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*		
		EP	Conf.	Interval		EP	Conf	. Interval		EPGroup%	Conf	. Interval
		Nat %				Group%				Squared		
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
	0	0.2297***	0.2061	0.2533								
Welfare	0.1	0.1858***	0.1493	0.2223								
	0.2	0.1420***	0.0633	0.2206								
	0.3	0.0981	-0.0249	0.2211								
Multicultural					0	0.0958***	0.0711	0.1205	0	0.1292***	0.1112	0.1471
					0.1	0.2134***	0.1198	0.3070	0.1	-0.0009	-0.0976	0.0957
					0.2	0.3310**	0.1253	0.5367	0.2	-0.1311	-0.334	0.0719
					0.3	0.4486**	0.1303	0.7669	0.3	-0.2612†	-0.5708	0.0484
					0.4	0.5662*	0.1352	0.9971	0.4	-0.3913†	-0.8076	0.0251
					0.5	0.6837*	0.1401	1.2274	0.5	-0.5214*	-1.0445	0.0017
					0.6	0.8013*	0.1450	1.4577	0.6	-0.6515*	-1.2815	-0.0216
					0.7	0.9189*	0.1499	1.6880	0.7	-0.7816*	-1.5184	-0.0449
					0.8	1.0365*	0.1547	1.9182	0.8	-0.9118*	-1.7553	-0.0682
					0.9	1.1541*	0.1596	2.1486	0.9	-1.0419*	-1.9922	-0.0915

Table E.3.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

		Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*				Skeptic*		
		EP	Conf.	Interval		Represent	Conf.	Interval		EP				EPGroup%	Conf.	Interval		Years in	Conf.	Interval
		Nat %				Diff				Group%	Conf.	Interval		Squared				EP		
	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max	Level	Margin	Min	Max
	0	0.1745***	0.1611	0.1878													0	0.1806***	0.1674	0.1938
Economy	0.1	0.3076***	0.2399	0.3752													4	0.1688***	0.1521	0.1855
	0.2	0.4406***	0.3051	0.5761													8	0.1570***	0.1322	0.1818
	0.3	0.5737***	0.3699	0.7775													12	0.1452***	0.1107	0.1797
	0.4	0.7068***	0.4346	0.979													16	0.1334***	0.0887	0.1781
	0.5	0.8399***	0.4993	1.1805													20	0.1216****	0.0664	0.1767
	0.6	0.9730***	0.5639	1.3821													24	0.1098***	0.0440	0.1755
	0.7	1.1061***	0.6285	1.5836													28	0.0979*	0.0215	0.1743
	0.8	1.2391***	0.6931	1.7852													32	0.0861+	-0.0010	0.1732
	0.9	1.3722***	0.7577	1.9867																
					0.6	1.6710***	1.0714	2.2707									0	0.2820***	0.2520	0.3121
Environment					0.7	1.9200***	1.2136	2.6264									4	0.1899***	0.1515	0.2282
					0.8	2.1689***	1.3558	2.9821									8	0.0977**	0.0273	0.1681
					0.9	2.4179***	1.4979	3.3379									12	0.0055	-0.1011	0.1122
					1	2.6669***	1.6401	3.6937									16	-0.0866	-0.2305	0.0573
					1.1	2.9158***	1.7822	4.0494									20	-0.1788†	-0.3603	0.0028
					1.2	3.1648***	1.9243	4.4052									24	-0.2709*	-0.4904	-0.0515
					1.3	3.4138***	2.0664	4.7610									28	-0.3631**	-0.6205	-0.1057
					1.4	3.6627***	2.2086	5.117									32	-0.4553**	-0.7507	-0.1598
	0	0.4199***	0.3826	0.4572					0	0.5062***	0.4511	0.5612	0	0.3979***	0.3596	0.4362				
EU Integration	0.1	0.8888***	0.4758	1.3018					0.1	-1.5923*	-2.8914	-0.2933	0.1	9.6928***	5.6525	13.7332				
	0.2	1.3577**	0.5175	2.1979					0.2	-3.6908**	-6.3319	-1.0497	0.2	18.9877***	10.8887	27.0868				
	0.3	1.8266**	0.5588	3.0944					0.3	-5.7893**	-9.7726	-1.8060	0.3	28.2826***	16.1249	40.4404				
	0.4	2.2955**	0.5999	3.9911					0.4	-7.8878**	-13.2133	-2.5623	0.4	37.5775***	21.3610	53.7940				
	0.5	2.7644*	0.6410	4.8878					0.5	-9.9863**	-16.6540	-3.3186	0.5	46.8724***	26.5972	67.1477				
	0.6	3.2333*	0.6821	5.7846					0.6	-12.0847**	-20.0947	-4.0748	0.6	56.1673***	31.8333	80.5013				
	0.7	3.7022*	0.7231	6.6813					0.7	-14.1832**	-23.5354	-4.8310	0.7	65.4622***	37.0695	93.8550				
	0.8	4.1711*	0.7641	7.5781					0.8	-16.2817**	-26.9761	-5.5873	0.8	74.7571***	42.3057	107.2086				
	0.9	4.6400*	0.8052	8.4748					09	-18 3802**	-30 4169	-6 3435	09	84.0520***	47 5418	120.5623				

Table E.3.4 Hard Euroskeptic Parties, Individual Policy Models

Notes: + p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Appendix F Robustness Checks

Appendix F.1 Robustness Check – Chapter 3

Notes: To ensure the accuracy of the findings from the CMP policy models, I also conduct a robustness check using the policy positions from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). Note that instead of the international policy measure, I utilize the EU integration dimension. As I used the CMP data to calculate the euroskeptic party measures, I was unable to include this as its own policy dimension, and so used the international policy area instead. Using the CHES data, however, allows me to examine this important policy dimension especially as this is one of the euroskeptic party's principal owned issue areas.

Pooled Models Findings: Comparing the vote switcher models, no significance is demonstrated with the CHES data compared to the positive hard euroskeptic party result found within the CMP data. The pooled vote abstention models mirror similar results between the CHES and CMP models, that increased pooled policy distances leads to decreased probabilities of the vote abstentions by the euroskeptic party's voters, the soft euroskeptic parties, and supporting (*HV-3*).

Individual Policy Models Findings: With the individual differences between CMP and CHES data. First, due to an insufficient variability of hard euroskeptic parties with the CHES data, the models do not include the hard euroskeptic models. Comparing the vote switcher models, for the soft euroskeptic party model, only the environment policy dimension is significant, showing an increase in the policy dimension increases the probability of attracting the vote switchers, and a curvilinear relationship is supported. The vote abstentions models offer different results as well as an increase in the economic policy distance increases the probability that the soft euroskeptic party's voters will abstain their vote, opposite what was demonstrated in the CMP model. Additionally, an increase in the welfare policy dimension, however, lowers the probability of vote abstentions model shows an increase in the probability of their voters abstaining. This was not found in the CMP models, though does compliment the findings in the CMP concerning coalition participation decreasing the probability of vote switching to the euroskeptic party. Additionally, individual level controls on gender, age, and education roughly correspond with the findings of the CMP models.

(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
All	Soft	Hard
Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
0.7648	0.8145	0.8877
(0.2394)	(0.2863)	(0.4371)
1.1161†	1.0970	1.0922
(0.0680)	(0.0756)	(0.0968)
0.4652	0.7126	
(0.2237)	(0.3775)	
0.0027**	0.0019*	0.0000**
(0.0008)	(0.0059)	(0.0000)
1.2231	0.9907	1.5282
(0.3735)	(0.3156)	(0.9097)
3.3483*	15.1695***	0.6797
(1.7583)	(9.1699)	(0.7188)
1.0564+	1.0693	1.0885
(0.0328)	(0.0474)	(0.0880)
0.8049	1.1247	0.1248*
(0.3779)	(0.6304)	(0.1120)
0.8440+	0.9774	0.6565***
(0.0794)	(0.0927)	(0.0864)
0.9886**	0.9855**	1.0000
(0.0040)	(0.0048)	(0.0060)
0.8140*	0.8354†	0.9563
(0.0823)	(0.0807)	(0.1312)
0.9652	0.9603	1.1683**
(0.0576)	(0.0731)	(0.0645)
0.9582	0.9319	0.8647*
(0.0534)	(0.0643)	(0.0519)
0.2545	0.0722	0.0385
67,833	65,730	43,455
	(Model 1) All Euroskeptic (SE) 0.7648 (0.2394) 1.1161† (0.0680) 0.4652 (0.2237) 0.0027** (0.0008) 1.2231 (0.3735) 3.3483* (1.7583) 1.0564† (0.0328) 0.8049 (0.3779) 0.8440† (0.0379) 0.8440† (0.0794) 0.9886** (0.0040) 0.8140* (0.0823) 0.9652 (0.0576) 0.9582 (0.0534) 0.2545	(Model 1) (Model 2) All Soft Euroskeptic Euroskeptic (SE) (SE) 0.7648 0.8145 (0.2394) (0.2863) 1.1161 [†] 1.0970 (0.0680) (0.0756) 0.4652 0.7126 (0.2237) (0.3775) 0.0027** 0.0019* (0.0008) (0.0059) 1.2231 0.9907 (0.3735) (0.3156) 3.3483* 15.1695**** (1.7583) (9.1699) 1.0564 [†] 1.0693 (0.0328) (0.0474) 0.8049 1.1247 (0.3779) (0.6304) 0.8440 [†] 0.9774 (0.0794) (0.0927) 0.9886** 0.9855** (0.0040) (0.0807) 0.9652 0.9603 (0.0576) (0.0731) 0.9582 0.9319 (0.0534) (0.0643)

Table F.1.1 Pooled Distance Model, Euroskeptic Parties, Vote Switchers – CHES

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic partie All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic part Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic part Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0

	(Model 7)	(Model 8)	(Model 9)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Pooled Policy Distance	0.9001***	0.9076**	0.9807
	(0.0273)	(0.0324)	(0.0327)
Controls:			
Coalition	0.8998	0.9523	
	(0.1884)	(0.2231)	
Seats%	1.8124	2.1109	3.8317
	(1.2931)	(1.9741)	(5.0585)
Rile	1.1623	1.2233	0.6094
	(02408)	(0.2792)	(0.2246)
Euroskeptic Option	0.7272	0.6846	0.9976
	(0.2617)	(0.2792)	(0.3286)
Unemployment	1.0207	1.0449	0.9944
	(0.0231)	(0.0447)	(0.0249)
CEE	2.6062***	2.3732**	4.3765**
	(0.7581)	(0.7882)	(2.2774)
Gender	1.0626	0.9937	1.5782†
	(0.0918)	(0.0957)	(0.4335)
Age	0.9845***	0.9870***	0.9583*
	(0.0037)	(0.0035)	(0.0198)
Education	0.6985***	0.7286***	0.6081**
	(0.0581)	(0.0695	(0.1040)
Left - Right	0.9053**	0.8901***	1.0902
	(0.0302	(0.0279)	(0.1004)
Voter - Party Distance	(0.8500)*	0.8513*	0.9399
	(0.0560)	(0.0591)	(0.0964)
Constant	0.2821	0.1627	4.2517
Observations (N)	23,751	19,620	3,966
Group Clusters (N)	41	27	19

Table F.1.2 Pooled Distance Model, Euroskeptic Parties, Vote Abstainers – CHES

Notes: Model 7 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 8 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 9 hard-euroskeptic parties. All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01

Table F.1.3 Individual Polic	y Models, Euroskeptic Parties, [†]	Vote Switchers – CHES

	(Model 4)	(Model 5)	(Model 6)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Economic Distance	84.6545	4.7003	
	(298.8397)	(25.9014)	
Economic Distance (sod)	0.5405	1.0203	
	(0.3157)	(1.0051)	
Welfare Distance	2.3396	27,2169	
	(7 1902)	(161 2279)	
Welfare Distance (sod)	0.5561	0.3839	
	(0.2926)	(0.4167)	
Environment Distance	31,1382†	1 2904	
	(63 7685)	(2.8781)	
Environment Distance (sod)	0 5713	1 0583	
	(0.2198)	(0 5144)	
Multicultural Distance	2 0368	7.7234*	
	(1 4339)	(7 1727)	
Multicultural Distance (sod)	1 0015	0 7394*	
Marticultur di Distance (344)	(0.0978)	(0 1067)	
FUL Integration Distance	0.0027	0.0791	
Lo integration Distance	(0.0144)	(0.2429)	
FUL Integration Distance (sad)	(0.0144)	3 9878	
Lo integration Distance (squ)	(10 /272)	(4 4510)	
Controls:	(13.4373)	(4.4510)	
Coalition	5 8505	12 7562	
countion	(6 5618)	(29.2578)	
Seats%	0 7455	0.0050	
Scats/6	(5 8110)	(0.0258)	
Rile	0 2747	1 3438	
nic -	(0.3068)	(1 8/99)	
Furoskentic Ontion	182 4653	56 2270*	
	(400 0082)	(111.065)	
Unomployment	1.0269	0.0242	
onemployment	(0.1410)	(0.1516)	
CEE	(0.1410)	(0.1510) 7 4670+	
CEL	(14 2016)	(9 2172)	
Condor	(14.3916)	(8.3172)	
Gender	0.9992	1.0980	
4.50	0.1790)	(0.1339)	
Age	0.9695	(0.0004)	
Education	(0.0072)	(0.0064)	
Education	(0.0029	0.0229	
Loft Diabt	(0.0986)	(0.1059)	
Leit - Right	1.1594	1.1037	
Votor Darty Distance	(0.0810)	(0.1344)	
Voter - Party Distance	0.7290	0.6772	
	(0.0617)	(0.0976)	
Constant	0.0001	0.0000	
Observations (N)	6574	6251	
Group Clusters (N)	22	22	

Notes: Model 4 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 5 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 6 hard-euroskeptic parties.

All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exicuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CSES country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^{+}$ p < 0.10 $\ ^{*}$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	(Model 10)	(Model 11)	(Model 12)
	All	Soft	Hard
	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic	Euroskeptic
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Independent Variables:			
Economic Distance	3.1284***	2.4105***	
	(0.6263)	(0.6658)	
Welfare Distance	0.1934***	0.2487***	
	(0.0569)	(0.0843)	
Environment Distance	0.9469	0.8984	
	(0.0824)	(0.0920)	
Multicultural Distance	0.7205***	0.7808	
	(0.0690)	(0.1192)	
International Distance	0.9586	1.0156	
	(0.0478)	(0.0843)	
Controls:			
Coalition	2.4132**	2.4666**	
	(0.6774)	(0.8487)	
Seats%	1.8098	2.2969	
	(1.2766)	(1.8896)	
Rile	0.8303	0.8536	
	(0.2166)	(0.2337)	
Euroskeptic Option	0.9660	0.6887	
	(0.2158)	(0.2151)	
Unemployment	0.9416**	0.9864	
	(0.0206)	(0.0242)	
CEE	1.6183†	0.9616	
	(0.4249)	(0.2814)	
Gender	1.0744	1.0115	
	(0.1101)	(0.1169)	
Age	0.9776***	0.9791***	
E du castinu	(0.0046)	(0.0052)	
Education	0.7198***	0.7156***	
Loft Dight	(0.0527)	(0.0576)	
Leit - Right	0.8951	0.0765	
Vatar Darts Distance	(0.0366)	(0.0352)	
voter - Party Distance	0.8373*	0.8539*	
	(0.0638)	(0.0669)	
Constant	22 0428	18 1931	
Observations (N)	2667	2122	
Group Clusters (N)	19	12	
Group Clusters (IN)	19	12	

Table F.1.4 Individual Policy Models, Euroskeptic Parties, Vote Abstainers – CHES

Notes: Model 10 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 11 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 12 hard-euroskeptic parties. All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Odds ratio, estimates below 1 denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy. Clustered by CSES country election date.

Appendix F.2 Robustness Check – Chapter 4

Notes: To ensure the accuracy of the findings from the CMP policy models, I also conduct a robustness check using the policy positions from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). Note that instead of the international policy measure, I utilize the EU integration dimension. As I used the CMP data to calculate the euroskeptic party measures, I was unable to include this as its own policy dimension, and so used the international policy area instead. Using the CHES data, however, allows me to examine this important policy dimension especially as this is one of the euroskeptic party's principal owned issue areas. Due to collinearity, this robustness check does not include a test of the hard euroskeptic party model.

Pooled Models Findings: As with the CMP pooled model, there is little evidence supporting the theoretical assumptions of the chapter. There is only one significant result in the model. For soft euroskeptic parties, there is an increase in the policy distance as the number of years spent in the coalition increases. This is opposite of the expectations in (HC-5).

Individual Policy Models Findings: With the individual differences between CMP and CHES data. With the all euroskeptic model, being a member of the governing coalition results in a decline in the policy distance, more moderation, in the economy, multicultural and EU integration dimensions, supporting (HC-1). The only other interactive term showing significance in the model is the cabinet % term. There is an expected increase in the policy distance, less moderation, in the economy, welfare, and environment policy dimensions as the percentage of portfolios held by the party in the governing coalition increases, contrary to the theoretical expectations. With the soft euroskeptic models, being a member of the governing coalition results in a decline in the policy distance, more moderation, in the economy, multicultural and EU integration dimensions, supporting (HC-1). There is an expected increase in the policy distance, less moderation, in the economy, welfare, and environment policy dimensions as the percentage of portfolios held by the party in the governing coalition increases in the policy distance, less moderation, in the economy, welfare, and environment policy dimensions as the percentage of portfolios held by the party in the governing coalition increases. Lastly, there is a decrease in the policy distance, more moderation, in the economy dimension as the number of years spent in the governing coalition increases, supporting (HC-5).

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled
	All Euroskeptic	Soft	Hard
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:			
Party Type*Coalition	-0.1185	0.0063	
	(0.3870)	(0.3841)	
Party Type*Cabinet%	0.3637	0.4359	
	(1.5833)	(1.5897)	
Party Type*Cabinet3	0.0014	-0.0518	
	(0.3844)	(0.3878)	
Party Type*Cabinet Years	0.0130	0.0183†	
	(0.0092)	(0.0097)	
Independent Variables:			
Coalition	0.1782	0.1807	
	(0.1918)	(0.1897)	
Cabinet%	0.3740	0.3397	
	(0.6653)	(0.6614)	
Cabinet3	0.1932	0.1865	
	(0.1410)	(0.1406)	
Cabinet Years	0.0190***	0.0178***	
	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	-0.8394***	(*****)	
	(0.2089)		
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)		-0.9824***	
		(0.2102)	
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)			
Controls:			
Niche Party	0.0124	-0.1488	
	(0.1262)	(0.1328)	
RILE	1.0222***	1.0229***	
	(0.0843)	(0.0851)	
CEE Europe	-0.2205†	-0.2235†	
	(0.1275)	(0.1343)	
1990s	-0.2838	-0.2207	
	(0.3018)	(0.2959)	
2000s	-0.0674	0.0048	
	(0.1107)	(0.1174)	
Constant	-4.8971	-4.8665	
Observations (N)	2703	2563	
Group Clusters (N)	116	116	
	-	-	

Table F.2.1 Pooled Distance Model, Euroskeptic Parties - CHES

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties, All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties, Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy. Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*Coalition	-0.7894**	0.0250	-0.2060	-1.0054*	-0.7255*
	(0.3058)	(0.4031)	(0.5195)	(0.4164)	(0.3032)
Party Type*Cabinet%	2.3899*	3.0523*	2.2412†	1.6421	-0.2284
	(1.1267)	(1.3949)	(1.1840)	(1.1721)	(1.0137)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.0877	-0.2968	0.2922	-0.1832	0.0531
	(0.2952)	(0.3536)	(0.3283)	(0.3194)	(0.2646)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	-0.0187	-0.0150	-0.0200	0.0023	-0.0130
	(0.0119)	(0.0176)	(0.0179)	(0.0145)	(0.0117)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.0976	-0.4532*	-0.1327	-0.1511	-0.2908*
	(0.1863)	(0.2140)	(0.2091)	(0.2192)	(0.1228)
Cabinet%	-0.2723	0.5705	1.1983†	0.8412†	0.6565†
	(0.5232)	(0.6620)	(0.6804)	(0.4904)	(0.3421)
Cabinet3	0.1183	0.1227	-0.1829	-0.2063*	0.0051
	(0.1251)	(0.1405)	(0.1309)	(0.0926)	(0.0646)
Cabinet Years	-0.0105*	-0.0104*	-0.0217***	-0.0128***	-0.0040
	(0.0045)	(0.0046)	(0.0051)	(0.0043)	(0.0028)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	0.4208**	-0.1118	-0.0559	0.4827**	0.8692***
	(0.1447)	(0.1659)	(0.2373)	(0.1875)	(0.1214)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.6144***	-0.5423***	0.9795***	1.1047***	-0.1154
	(0.1166)	(0.1178)	(0.1924)	(0.2166)	(0.1044)
RILE	-0.1126*	-0.0564	0.0569	0.2532***	0.0959*
	(0.0492)	(0.0552)	(0.0580)	(0.0580)	(0.0435)
CEE Europe	-0.5375***	-0.6018***	-1.1588***	-0.6290***	-0.4125***
	(0.1319)	(0.1332)	(0.1249)	(0.1579)	(0.1032)
1990s	-0.0900				-0.0251
	(0.1100)				(0.1842)
2000s	0.0092	0.1006		-0.0868	-0.1463
	(0.1063)	(0.1098)		(0.1962)	(0.0985)
Constant	3.0190	2.7293	1.6599	0.9043	1.1767
Observations (N)	693	496	342	490	689
Group Clusters (N)	116	82	58	82	116

Table F.2.2 All Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies - CHES

Notes : All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^{+}$ p < 0.10 $\ ^{*}$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy	Welfare	Environment	Multicultural	EU Integration
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Interactions:					
Party Type*Coalition	-0.9059**	-0.0392	-0.0376	-0.7627†	-0.5529†
	(0.3195)	(0.4165)	(0.5272)	(0.4420)	(0.3068)
Party Type*Cabinet%	2.3213*	2.0796*	2.2677†	1.5545	-0.1881
	(1.1302)	(1.3893)	(1.2115)	(1.1767)	(0.9819)
Party Type*Cabinet3	-0.0445	-0.2822	0.2222	-0.2417	-0.0014
	(0.2991)	(0.3592)	(0.3302)	(0.3212)	(0.2560)
Party Type*Cabinet Years	-0.0224†	-0.0173	-0.0130	0.0117	-0.0073
	(0.0120)	(0.0180)	(0.0182)	(0.0154)	(0.0117)
Independent Variables:					
Coalition	-0.1090	-0.4580*	-0.1420	-0.1652	-0.2895*
	(0.1871)	(0.2160)	(0.2099)	(0.2183)	(0.1230)
Cabinet%	-0.2387	0.5874	1.2047†	0.8422+	0.6441†
	(0.5240)	(0.6633)	(0.6753)	(0.4918)	(0.3408)
Cabinet3	0.1227	0.1258	-0.1849	-0.2083*	0.0067
	(0.1244)	(0.1397)	(0.1308)	(0.0930)	(0.0646)
Cabinet Years	-0.0093*	-0.0099*	-0.0215***	-0.0125**	-0.0039
	(0.0045)	(0.0046)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)	(0.0029)
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)	0.5367**	-0.0647	-0.2739	0.2386	0.6863***
	(0.1714)	(0.2037)	(0.2629)	(0.2180)	(0.1422)
Controls:					
Niche Party	-0.4939***	-0.4738***	0.9599***	1.0686***	-0.1229
,	(0.1219)	(0.1211)	(0.1969)	(0.2147)	(0.1026)
RILE	-0.1000*	-0.0434	0.0701	0.2290***	0.0632
	(0.0497)	(0.0572)	(0.0524)	(0.0548)	(0.0429)
CEE Europe	-0.5238***	-0.5996***	-1.1381***	-0.5667***	-0.3912***
	(0.1319)	(0.1353)	(0.1262)	(0.1610)	(0.1027)
1990s	-0.1296				0.0199
	(0.1092)				(0.1865)
2000s	-0.0164	0.0991		-0.0066	-0.1154
	(0.1057)	(0.1043)		(0.1880)	(0.0977)
2010s					
Constant	2.9245	2.6449	1.5966	0.9801	1.3079
Observations (N)	658	470	323	464	654
Group Clusters (N)	116	82	58	82	116
	110	02		52	110

Table F.2.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies - CHES

Notes: Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country and election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

Appendix F.3 Robustness Check – Chapter 5

Notes: To ensure the accuracy of the findings from the EMP policy models, I also conduct a robustness check using the CMP policy positions outlined in Chapter 2. To do this, a few changes are done to the model. First, the policy distances calculated in the previous chapter were based on the country's party system average for the election year. For this robustness check, I calculate the policy measures based instead on the EP mean position immediately preceding the national election data in the CMP. Those parties participating in the EP during the period and included in the CMP data are used to calculate the EP mean position. Secondly, with the CMP data, the international policy area is used in lieu of the EU integration measure. Additionally, in the EMP models there is a control measure for the time elapsed between the national election to the EP election. For the following models, I flip this to measure instead the length of time from the preceding EP election to the national election in the CMP data. Similarly, the duration of time spent in the EP is also calculated from the previous EP election to the national election within the CMP data, lagged by one year.

Pooled Models Findings: For the all euroskeptic pooled model, only the time spent in the EP demonstrates significance in the model and moderation to the EP average, supporting (*HEP-1*). For the soft euroskeptic pooled model, an increase in the seat share of the party within their EP political group leads to an increase in the expected policy distance from the EP average and no curvilinear relationship is found, contradicting (*HEP-3*). For the hard euroskeptic pooled model, the model indicates that an increase in the seat share of the party within their EP political group leads to a predicted decrease in the seat share of the party within their EP political group leads to a predicted decrease in the expected policy distance towards the EP average. Moreover, the squared term for this variable demonstrates significance in the model, demonstrating that the relationship is curvilinear, supporting (*HEP-3*). The findings for each pooled model are different than what was observed with the EMP data, as the seat share in the national delegation to the EP of the hard euroskeptic party pooled model demonstrated significance in the model. Additionally, the controls consistently demonstrate that if the national election is in the same year as the EP election, this results in a decrease in the policy distance.

Individual Policy Models Findings: For the all-euroskeptic model, an increase in the seat share of the party in their national delegation leads to a predicted increase in the expected welfare policy distance away from the EP average, contradicting (*HEP-1*); indicates that an increase in the seat share of the party in their EP political group leads to a predicted increase away from the EP average in the expected economy, welfare, and international policy distances with a curvilinear relationship present in the welfare and international policy areas, contradicting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the number of years spent in the EP average, supporting (*HEP-3*). The soft euroskeptic party model indicates that an increase in the seat share of the party in their national delegation leads to a predicted increase from the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance, contradicting (*HEP-1*); indicates that an increase in the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance, with a curvilinear relationship present increase from the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance, contradicting (*HEP-1*); indicates that an increase in the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance with a curvilinear relationship present, contradicting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance with a curvilinear relationship present, contradicting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the EP average in the expected welfare policy distance with a curvilinear relationship present, contradicting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the expected welfare policy distance with a curvilinear relationship present, contradicting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the number of years spent in the EP leads to a predicted decrease towards the EP average in the expected environmental policy distance, supporting (*HEP-4*). For the hard euroskeptic parties, the model

indicates that an increase in the seat share of the party in their EP political group leads to a predicted decrease towards the EP average in welfare policy distances with a curvilinear relationship present, supporting (*HEP-3*); indicates that an increase in the number of years spent in the EP leads to a predicted decrease to the EP average in the expected multicultural policy distance, supporting (*HEP-4*), but an increase away from the average in the expected international policy distance, contradicting (*HEP-4*).

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled	Distance - Pooled
	All Furoskeptic	Soft	Hard
	(SF)	(SF)	(SE)
	(32)	(32)	(32)
Interactions:			
Party Type*National EP Seat %	0.0483	0.0994	0.0555
	(0.0734)	(0.0869)	(0.3864)
Party Type*Representation Difference	0.0201	0.0371	-0.0786
	(0.1105)	(0.1486)	(0.1582)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	0.2776	0.3488†	-2.5327†
	(0.2045)	(0.2077)	(1.4498)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	-0.2649	-0.3284	11.0570*
	(0.2242)	(0.2169)	(4.8495)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0029†	-0.0020	-0.0036
	(0.0015)	(0.0014)	(0.0023)
Independent Variables:	,	()	
National EP Seat %	-0.0416	-0.0454	-0.0457
	(0.0616)	(0.0621)	(0.0543)
Representation Difference	0.1228*	0.1226*	0.1424*
	(0.0624)	(0.0616)	(0.0586)
EP Group Seat %	0.0423	0.0623	0.1184
	(0 1573)	(0 1555)	(0.1218)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.0759	0.0574	0.0152
	(0.1703)	(0 1692)	(0.1250)
Years in EP	-0.0008	-0.0011	-0.0009
	(0.0008	-0.0011	-0.0003
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	0.0162	(0.0010)	(0.0008)
	-0.0102		
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)	(0.1120)	-0.0721	
		(0.1495)	
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)		(0.1495)	0.2612
			(0.1719)
Controls:			(0.1715)
Niche Party	0.0144	0.0046	0.0150
	(0.0111)	(0.0119)	(0.0115)
RILE	0.0132*	0.0102	0.0121*
	(0.0059)	(0.0064)	(0.0059)
Member of Grand Coalition Member of National Coalition	-0.0127	-0.0129	-0.0069
	(0.0165)	(0.0162)	(0.0157)
	-0.0017	-0.0020	0.0033
	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0132)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Partie National - EP Election, Same Year	0.0041	0.0060	0.0041
	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0034)
	-0 0243*	-0 0246*	-0 0234*
	(0.0116)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)
Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	-0.0003	-0.0000	-0.0005
	(0.0000)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)
EP 1994	-0.0014)	-0.0094	-0.0013)
	-0.0040	-0.0094	-0.0070
EP 1999	0.0210)	0.0223)	0.0009
	0.0030	-0.0019	
ED 2004	(0.0207)	(0.0197)	(0.0200)
EF 2004	0.0288	0.0279	0.0254
ED 2000	(0.0247)	(0.0237)	(0.0249)
EP 2009	0.0455*	0.04/5*	0.04067
	(0.0229)	(0.0231)	(0.0232)
Constant	0.0011	0.0149	-0.0208
Observations (N)	2145	2035	2145
Group Clusters (N)	76	76	76
, , ,	-	-	-

Table F.3.1 Pooled Distance Model, Euroskeptic Parties – CMP

Notes: Model 1 examines all euroskeptic parties, Model 2 soft-euroskeptic parties, and Model 3 hard-euroskeptic parties, All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties,

Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exicuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties. Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country election date.
	Economy (SE)	Welfare	Environment (SE)	Multicultural	Internation (SE)
	(JL)	(32)	(32)	(3L)	(JL)
Interactions:					
Party Type*National EP Seat %	-0.1294	0.2853†	0.0469	0.0320	0.0069
	(0.1681)	(0.1460)	(0.2021)	(0.1603)	(0.1833)
Party Type*Representation Difference	-0.1400	-0.1186	0.1513	0.1912	0.0167
	(0.3051)	(0.2777)	(0.3414)	(0.2807)	(0.2116)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	0.4561†	1.1021**	-0.3887	-0.4146	0.6331+
	(0.2643)	(0.3970)	(0.4897)	(0.4045)	(0.3562)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	-0.2042	-1.5511***	0.3992	0.6567	-0.6250
	(0.3525)	(0.4147)	(0.6147)	(0.4514)	(0.3517)
Party Type*Years in FP	-0.0036	0.0011	-0.0047	-0.0073*	0.0001
	(0.0022)	(0.0027)	(0.0040)	(0.0037)	(0.0017)
ndependent Variables:	()	(,	()	(,	(0.0000)
National EP Seat %	-0.0385	-0.4021***	0.1965	0.1153	-0.0795
	(0.1322)	(0.1233)	(0.1341)	(0.0895)	(0.0708)
Representation Difference	0.1961†	0.4272**	-0.0644	-0.0777	0.1330+
nepresentation Difference	(0.1075)	(0.1389)	(0.1545)	(0.0818)	(0.0738)
P Group Seat %	0.0678	0.11443	0.0633	-0.1933	0.1296
	(0.3156)	(0.1994)	(0.3532)	(0.1929)	(0.1848)
P Group Seat % (squared)	-0.0278	0 1764	0 1262	0 1819	-0.0770
i croup seur /s (squareu)	(0.3820)	(0.2454)	(0.4013)	(0.2805)	(0.2243)
lears in ED	0.0011	-0.0010	-0.0029	-0.0009	-0.0004
	(0.0011	(0.0017)	(0.0025)	(0.0003	(0,0004)
Party Type (All Eurockentic)	0.1277	0.0017	(0.0020)	0.0012)	0.0003)
Party Type (All Euroskeptic)	(0.2156)	-0.0410	-0.1001	-0.0149	-0.0404
Controls	(0.3130)	(0.3024)	(0.5455)	(0.3070)	(0.2100)
liche Party	0.0551*	0.0046***	0 0006**	0 1260***	0.0040
Nicile Party	-0.0551	-0.0940	(0.0334)	(0.0215)	(0.0049
	(0.0226)	(0.0242)	(0.0554)	(0.0215)	(0.0193)
(ILE	0.0345	0.0072	-0.0294	0.0519	0.0018
	(0.0151)	(0.0146)	(0.0118)	(0.0144)	(0.0091)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0079	0.0257	-0.05897	-0.0210	-0.0012
	(0.0315)	(0.0146)	(0.0325)	(0.0220)	(0.0182)
Member of National Coalition	-0.0042	0.0495*	-0.0408	-0.0105	-0.0025
	(0.0317)	(0.0275)	(0.0295)	(0.0190)	(0.0148)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0067	0.0136*	0.0147†	-0.0090*	-0.0056
	(0.0064)	(0.0061)	(0.0079)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)
National - EP Election, Same Year Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	-0.0401†	-0.0140	-0.0065	-0.0394*	-0.0217
	(0.0219)	(0.0173)	(0.0339)	(0.0154)	(0.0162)
	0.0009	0.0011	-0.0043	0.0011	-0.0004
	(0.0025)	(0.0023)	(0.0046)	(0.0030)	(0.0017)
EP 1994	-0.0446	-0.0039	0.0553	-0.0063	-0.0237
	(0.0375)	(0.0330)	(0.0477)	(0.0224)	(0.0234)
EP 1999	-0.0386	0.0815*	-0.0079	0.0199	-0.0358
	(0.0386)	(0.0351)	(0.0341)	(0.0343)	(0.0234)
EP 2004	0.0228	0.0655	0.0264	0.0502	-0.0208
	(0.0575)	(0.0451)	(0.0507)	(0.0438)	(0.0238)
EP 2009	0.0535	0.0871*	0.0476	0.0552*	-0.0156
	(0.0524)	(0.0433)	(0.0436)	(0.0273)	(0.0229)
Constant	-0.1958	-0.2196	0.4262	-0.0546	0.0490
Observations (N)	429	429	429	429	429
Group Clusters (N)	76	76	76	76	76

Table F.3.2 All Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies – CMP

Notes : All euroskeptic parties compares both soft and hard euroskeptic parties collectively against all non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0

	Economy (SE)	Welfare (SE)	Environment (SE)	Multicultural (SE)	International
					(3E)
1. h					
Party Type*National FP Seat %	0 1464	0 2076+	0 1504	0 1000	0.0755
Party Type*Representation Difference	-0.1404	0.3076	0.1594	0.1009	0.0755
	(0.1793)	(0.1585)	(0.2074)	(0.1775)	(0.1916)
	-0.1302	-0.2528	0.2562	0.3007	0.0116
	(0.4410)	(0.4270)	(0.3552)	(0.2990)	(0.3157)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	0.3535	1.2285**	-0.2024	-0.2159	0.5800
	(0.2908)	(0.4507)	(0.4425)	(0.5572)	(0.5669)
Party Type "EP Group Seat % (squared)	-0.1008	-1.0303	0.2207	(0.2621)	-0.3740
	(0.3582)	(0.4636)	(0.5523)	(0.3621)	(0.3840)
Party Type Years in EP	-0.0036	0.0030	-0.0003 (-0.0011	-0.0019
Independent Verichles	(0.0025)	(0.0037)	(0.0035)	(0.0024)	(0.0021)
National ED Seat %	-0.0365	-0 3972***	0 218/	0.0419	-0.0537
National Er Seat 70	(0.1336)	(0 1222)	(0.1340)	(0.041)	(0.0557
Representation Difference	0.1930)	0.4263**	-0 1009	-0.0155	0 1107
Representation Difference	(0.1092)	(0.4203	-0.1009	-0.0155	(0.0754)
ER Group Soat %	0.1083)	0.1404)	(0.1334)	-0.1280	(0.0734)
Lr Gloup Seat %	(0.3187)	(0.1434	(0.3545)	-0.1380	(0.1237
ED Crown Soat % (coward)	0.0222	(0.1984)	(0.3343)	(0.1789)	(0.1842)
EP Gloup Seat % (squared)	-0.0252	(0.1626	0.0391	0.1428	-0.0747
Veere in FD	(0.3640)	(0.2428)	(0.4084)	(0.2655)	(0.2238)
rears in EP	0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0039	-0.0005	-0.0009
	(0.0023)	(0.0017)	(0.0027)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)
Party Type (Soft Euroskeptic)	0.1351	0.0452	-0.2414	-0.2762	-0.0233
Controlo	(0.4512)	(0.4628)	(0.3643)	(0.3125)	(0.3209)
Controis:	0.0520*	0 0000***	0.0703*	0.0000***	0.0125
Niche Party	-0.0539*	-0.0988****	0.0762*	0.0868***	0.0125
	(0.0244)	(0.0242)	(0.0348)	(0.0205)	(0.0209)
RILE	0.0377*	0.0009	-0.0283*	0.0397***	0.0009
	(0.0163)	(0.0154)	(0.0134)	(0.0104)	(0.0098)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0094	0.0253	-0.05897	-0.0226	0.0012
	(0.0316)	(0.0358)	(0.0323)	(0.0191)	(0.0189)
Member of National Coalition	-0.0049	0.0503*	-0.0492	-0.0018	-0.0044
	(0.0314)	(0.0283)	(0.0304)	(0.0135)	(0.0149)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0055	0.0154*	0.0212*	-0.0088*	-0.0032
	(0.0070)	(0.0068)	(0.0090)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)
National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0406†	-0.0196	-0.0047	-0.0309*	-0.0273†
	(0.0230)	(0.0181)	(0.0347)	(0.0134)	(0.0158)
Time Since Last National Election (yrs)	0.0012	0.0011	-0.0034	0.0009	-0.0001
EP 1994	(0.0026)	(0.0022)	(0.0043)	(0.0026)	(0.0017)
	-0.0450	-0.0042	0.0426	-0.0113	-0.0289
	(0.0394)	(0.0350)	(0.0505)	(0.0218)	(0.0236)
EP 1999	-0.0357	0.0695*	-0.0063	-0.0032	-0.0338
	(0.0404)	(0.0358)	(0.0344)	(0.0238)	(0.0242)
EP 2004	0.0255	0.0610	0.0335	0.0339	-0.0146
	(0.0590)	(0.0452)	(0.0486)	(0.0360)	(0.0240)
EP 2009	0.0564	0.0853†	0.0675	0.0299	-0.0018
	(0.0561)	(0.0453)	(0.0483)	(0.0268)	(0.0244)
Constant	0.2025	0 1000	0.4400	0.0265	0.0642
	-0.2035	-0.1906	0.4409	-0.0365	0.0643
Observations (N)	407	407	407	407	407
Group Clusters (<i>NI</i>)	76	76	76	/b	76

Table F.3.3 Soft Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies – CMP

Notes: Soft euroskeptic parties compares only soft euroskeptic parties, exlcuding hard euroskeptics, against non-euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

	Economy (SE)	Welfare (SE)	Environment (SE)	Multicultural (SE)	International (SE)
	(-)	(- <i>)</i>	(-)	V - V	V = V
Interactions:					
Party Type*National EP Seat %	-0.4506	1.2704+	-0.5837	0.4079	-0.3668
	(0.5184)	(0.7388)	(1.4620)	(1.4097)	(0.5110)
Party Type*Representation Difference	-0.1682	0.1511	-0.0286	-0.4124	0.0653
	(0.1856)	(0.3032)	(0.8484)	(0.6302)	(0.2017)
Party Type*EP Group Seat %	1.3758	-4.1616*	-3.8031	-6.8928	0.8181
	(1.3135)	(1.8001)	(3.5701)	(5.2754)	(1.2251)
Party Type* EP Group Seat % (squared)	-1.7827	18.9102**	11.9372	26.7622	-0.5418
	(4.6052)	(6.1123)	(13.2980)	(18.1328)	(4.7759)
Party Type*Years in EP	-0.0039	-0.0028	0.0012	-0.0176*	0.0051*
	(0.1332)	(0.0034	(0.0072)	(0.0075)	(0.0024)
Independent Variables:					
National EP Seat %	-0.0565	-0.4152***	0.2400†	0.0979	-0.0947
	(0.1332)	(0.1222)	(0.1306)	(0.0879)	(0.0675)
Representation Difference	0.1754*	0.4570***	-0.0450	-0.0151	0.1395†
	(0.0847)	(0.1346)	(0.1404)	(0.0823)	(0.0771)
EP Group Seat %	0.0938	0.4395*	-0.0402	-0.2196	0.3184*
	(0.2951)	(0.1870)	(0.2909)	(0.1831)	(0.1603)
EP Group Seat % (squared)	0.0555	-0.2757	0.1997	0.3354	-0.2389
	(0.2884)	(0.2635)	(0.2867)	(0.2521)	(0.1778)
Years in EP	0.0007	0.0002	-0.0039†	-0.0007	-0.0007
	(0.0022)	(0.0017)	(0.0023)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)
Party Type (Hard Euroskeptic)	0.0996	-0.0582	0.2922	1.1054	-0.1322
	(0.2000)	(0.3404)	(0.9002)	(0.7586)	(0.2298)
Controls:	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	· · ·	· · ·	. ,	· · ·
Niche Party	-0.0511*	-0.0906***	0.0937**	0.1161***	0.0068
	(0.0221)	(0.0226)	(0.0332)	(0.0200)	(0.0190)
RILE	0.0326*	0.0076	-0.0323**	0.0505***	0.0020
	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0117)	(0.0127)	(0.0090)
Member of Grand Coalition	-0.0057	0.0408	-0.0520	-0.0218	0.0043
	(0.0300)	(0.0362)	(0.0323)	(0.0205)	(0.0181)
Member of National Coalition	0.0013	0.0545+	-0.0289	-0.0051	-0.0054
	(0.0298)	(0.0288)	(0.0296)	(0.0143)	(0.0146)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	0.0050	0.0127*	0.0158+	-0.0082+	-0.0047
	(0.0064)	(0.0063)	(0.0084)	(0.0042)	(0.0037)
National - EP Election, Same Year	-0.0384†	-0.0133	-0.0127	-0.0338*	-0.0187
	(0.0218)	(0.0170)	(0.0344)	(0.0159)	(0.0155)
Time Since Last National Election (vrs)	0.0010	0.0008	-0.0038	0.0005	-0.0009
This since last National Election (yis)	(0.0025)	(0.0020)	(0.0045)	(0.0026)	(0.0018)
EP 1994	-0.0403	-0.0015	0.0581	-0.0286	-0.0229
	(0.0383)	(0.03446)	(0.0499)	(0.0236)	(0.0238)
EP 1999	-0.0388	0.0739*	-0.0117	0.0028	-0.0304
	(0.0396)	(0.0363)	(0.0354)	(0.0265)	(0.0238)
EP 2004	0.0248	0.0543	0.0267	0.0337	-0.0127
	(0.0607)	(0.0474)	(0.0495)	(0.0407)	(0.0224)
EP 2009	0.0569	0.0741	0.0523	0.0329	-0.0133
	(0.0545)	(0.0464)	(0.0468)	(0.0287)	(0.0237)
	()	()	(213100)	((
Constant	-0.1639	-0.2918	0.4143	0.0203	0.0321
vations (N)	429	429	429	429	429

Table F.3.4 Hard Euroskeptic Parties Model, Individual Policies – CMP

Hard euroskeptic parties compares only hard euroskeptic parties against both non-euroskeptic and soft euroskeptic parties.

Negative coefficient estimates denote decrease in policy distance = moderation of policy.

Clustered by CMP country election date.

Standard errors in parentheses. $\ ^+$ p < 0.10 $\ ^*$ p < 0.05 $\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01 $\ ^{***}$ p < 0.001

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