

You Are a Stranger Here:

**A Comparative Study on the Experiences and Expressions of Social Exclusion,
Xenophobia, and Unbelonging towards African Immigrants in South Africa and France.**

by

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This research explores how dimensions of social exclusion towards African immigrants and their descendants are experienced and expressed in South Africa and France as a way of understanding intergroup conflict amidst an increase in international migration. Despite having their unique histories with African migration inflows, South Africa and France represent two case countries similar in their consistent exclusion of African immigrants and reinforcement that civic or cultural membership does not preclude immigrants from “embodied unbelonging”, xenophobia, and other forms of othering at the interpersonal and structural level. This research engages with existing literature on responses to theories of intergroup relations (Tajfel, Sherif, Stouffer, Gurr, Brewer); xenophobia and membership (Landau, Beaman), national identity formation in France (Weber, Anderson); and Dual Consciousness (DuBois).

This research analyzed 24 migrant experiences (12 qualitative interviews per country) based on an original conceptual framework of migrants' experiences of unbelonging existing at the personalized and depersonalized (homogenized) level, and the communication of the exclusionary sentiments by perpetrators manifesting in overt and covert behaviors. In South Africa, migrants related most of their personalized and depersonalized experiences with unbelonging to be rooted in their national identity, while in France it was due to how their blackness or other markers of periphery identity was perceived, such as differences in religion or accent. The findings suggest that overt expressions of xenophobia in South Africa and France take various forms, primarily

manifesting according to how integrated or "apart" the migrants seem. Covert expressions manifest as migrants having their membership consistently questioned and feeling like they have to "pass" or hide (to certain extents) their immigrant identities (lest they encounter overt exclusion).

African migrants' and their descendants' fluid spatiotemporal self-perception, along with their interactions with regional politics, peoples, and governance structures, are often a result of their experiences with social practices of othering and exclusion. This research exposes the impact and intersections of daily racism, existing colonial perceptions of "outgroups", sexism (specifically the hyper-sexualization of the black female body), class struggles, and state organization on migrants. This study on unbelonging reemphasizes the need for migrants' voices (their micro-sociologies) to be at the center of plans toward national and international social cohesion projects and anti-xenophobic policymaking.

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Preface

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Finally, I thank each participant for allowing me into your lives and being willing to share experiences that are less than welcoming or easy to speak about. Thank you for showing me how much more there is left to do, and reaffirming my belief that the voices of those who have been marginalized, and that people try and tear down, will always rise higher and seek justice in all its forms. This is just the beginning.

I dedicate this thesis to all those who have been called *makwerekwere*, *blédard(e)*, *étranger*, *foreigner*, or anything in-between.

While you may be seen as a stranger out there, you are not a stranger here.

1.0 Chapter 1: Background

1.1 Introduction and Background: Xenophobia, Migration, and Unbelonging as Global Challenges

In August 2001, world leaders met in Durban, South Africa, to discuss the emergent challenges of prejudice, violence, and discrimination towards immigrants and other marginalized groups as a consequence of racism, xenophobia, and colonially-informed intolerance, against the backdrop of increasingly globalized societies and economies.¹ Successful in producing a publication on racism and xenophobia in the twenty-first century,² and the drafting and subsequent adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA), the World Conference Against Racism showcased both South African and global commitment to combatting all manifestations of prejudice-based exclusion.³ However, almost 22 years and 281 million international migrants (as of 2020) later, an absence of tolerance in the face of 2001, explicit and more subtle forms of conflict between immigrants (and their descendants) and autochthonous

¹ OHCHR “WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM OPENS IN DURBAN South African President Mbeki Tells Conference ‘We Must Defeat Consequences of Slavery, Colonialism, Racism,’” 2001

² ILO, IOM, and OHCHR, “Inter-Agency, International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia, August 2001” (Inter-Agency, 2001)

³ “Fighting Racism, 20 Years on from the Adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action,” OHCHR

populations have risen, begging the question of how these exhibitions of othering take place in globalized and multicultural contexts.⁴

Throughout human history, the movement of persons has proved crucial to the survival and the socio-economic development of people across demographic lines. With our increasingly globalized societies and economies, international migration, especially forced, economic migration, and ‘social’ migration, has played a key role in shaping the geopolitical perspectives of who is part of the nation; the attributes of those who belong; or whether membership is inherited or can be acquired by those who originated outside national borders. The increased politicization of international migration, regardless of the migratory push and factors, has seen a categorical rise in both the awakening and exacerbation of xenophobic sentiments in the global sphere, where “immigrant” has become synonymous with “outsider”, criminal behavior, economic opportunists, and vagrancy. In addition to the connotation of being considered allochthonous, individuals of African-immigrant backgrounds in South Africa and France continue to face the challenge of navigating an ambiguously denied membership despite ascribing to the necessary sociocultural codes. This challenge to their membership, typically faced by the generations after the first exists in the presence of comments on how the immigrants contradict the assumed characteristics of their “group”. While this is supposed to be received as a compliment, it suggests that immigrants’ perceived integration or possibility to be true members of the states or society is only available to a point.

Defining Xenophobia and Unbelonging

⁴ “Interactive World Migration Report 2022,”

Globally, exclusionary, and xenophobic attitudes (that are developed through practices of socialization, ethnonationalism, and the cultural politics of the different nation-states) towards immigrants are reflected in individual or collective action, policy, and civil unrest towards migrants and marginalized groups. The United Nations defines xenophobia as “Attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity”.⁵ Xenophobia, although existing in intragroup relations, has steadily increased in conjunction with the migration of people fleeing from the violent and volatile socio-political circumstances in their countries of origin, or those who migrate for socioeconomic or environmental reasons.

In the context of the exclusion, marginalization, or hostility towards immigrants, unbelonging can be understood as immigrants’ explicit and implicit experiences of being excluded from aspects of the communal social-cultural life due to indicators of their difference (such as race, language, religion, ethnic background, etc.). Similarly, the concept of unbelonging is useful in showcasing the nuance of these insider-outsider tensions and the overall treatment of immigrants in ones society. As being in a state of belonging is both a dynamic process of being accepted and welcomed in a social environment, as well as a psychological state of interconnectedness and imbedded membership, a state of unbelonging can also be conceptualized as both a process and state of being perceived as “outside” the narratives of that social environment and its “true”

⁵ILO, IOM, and OHCHR. “*International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia*” (Inter-Agency: August 2001) 2

members.⁶ As each country (and perhaps region) holds distinct understandings of nationhood, belonging, and interactions with “others”, destination regions and countries vary in their expressions of xenophobia and unbelonging as a response to the demographic and cultural shifts.

South Africa’s economic growth and industrial potential on the African continent have made migration its consistent benefit and burden. Despite being known for its post-apartheid reconciliation, ethnocentrism, particularly towards African immigrants, has plagued South Africa. From large-scale, anti-immigrant protests- intimidation and humiliation by members of the public towards supposed illegal and low-income foreigners- to the burning down of houses, the aggression towards African immigrants in South Africa is remarkable in its impact and persistence despite social cohesion efforts. On an institutional level, these outbursts of violence and hostility have been referred to as responses to criminality and anti-social behaviors (to which migrants are coincidentally tied), however, such denialism fails to explain occurrences of exclusionary policies taken up by the government.⁷ The exclusion of foreigners in South Africa goes beyond visible and violent denials of membership and belonging, it also manifests in the creation of a two-tiered system of civic membership (that is citizenship). Despite the official stance and Department of Home Affairs websites stating that all South African citizens and permanent residents are eligible to receive the SMART ID card, the official form of identification updated from the green identification booklet, such access does not apply to foreign-born South Africans. In Tshepo

⁶ Ann-Dorte Christensen, “Belonging and Unbelonging from an Intersectional Perspective,” *Gender, Technology and Development* 13, no. 1 (January 2009): 21–41

⁷ Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran, “No. 66: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism,” *Southern African Migration Programme*, January 1, 2014,

Magoma’s article on digital identification documents in combating identity theft, he illustrates how insiders are tactically differentiated from outsiders who happened to gain access to civic membership in South Africa. As naturalized migrants or descendants of non-South Africans receive the green ID book, this practice represents how expressions of unbelonging, and debatably xenophobia, extend towards those who should not be discriminated against under classical definitions of citizenship.⁸

Despite being introduced in 2013, South African citizens born outside of South Africa cannot apply for the Smart ID card, nor can they access the online services of Home Affairs (as of November 2020). For identity purposes, such applicants still only receive the old green ID book.⁹

In stark contrast to the visceral and overt expressions of xenophobia in South Africa, the xenophobic sentiments in France have been expressed in more subtle and technocratic, informed by understandings of national culture and identity, and policy, with subthemes of racism, sexism, and islamophobia. The 2015 influx of non-EU migrants has been used by far-right populist groups to gain political ground and secure seats in formal institutions of government. This can be seen in the 2012 elections where the leader of the Front National (now the National Rally) in France, Marie Le Pen, based her campaign on the deportation of asylum seekers and refugees, increased regulation and restriction on immigration, and actively opposed the principle of jus soli (birthright

⁸ “Xenophobic ID Cards,” News24, accessed , 2023, <https://www.news24.com/news24/xenophobic-id-cards-20160302>.

⁹ Tshepo Magoma, “The Effectiveness of the South African Smart ID Card,” n.d.

citizenship) to those who were not of French heritage,¹⁰ as a means to preserve all that might dilute French culture and laïcité (secularism).¹¹ While Le Pen's practice is reflective of her father's (Jean-Marie Le Pen) in their fundamentally anti-immigrant narratives, a more recent example of xenophobic sentiments translated into policy was the 2011 legislation that banned wearing full face-covering veils in public areas due to the threat posed by terrorism. However this correlation, in turn, plays to the increasing islamophobia pandered by right-wing groups. This law implicitly radicalizes Islam in the public perspective such that the public needs to be protected from it, and also resulted in Marie Le Pen stating that "the veil is not a trivial piece of cloth, it is a marker of radicalism."¹² The legacy of colonialism and racism in France, despite efforts to remain in an ideal French universalist model, also plays a role in the xenophobic sentiments expressed towards those non-white members of French society. Migrants, and their descendants, even when they have achieved citizenship and long-lasting membership are seen to be 'embodied' others, due to their phenotypical difference and the perception of their culture. This is further explored in forthcoming sections. Thus, although xenophobia and unbelonging are expressed and experienced in both South Africa (more correctly also known as Afrophobia)¹³ and France is characterized by unjust aggression toward international migrants, its realization occurs in different forms.

¹⁰ Nicola Pasini and Elisa Rebessi. "Immigration and Political Competition in Five European Countries: A Comparative Perspective-First Draft" (August 2013), 7-8

¹¹ Carissa Porter. "Unveiling French Xenophobia: A Study of Prejudice Against Arabs in France" 13 (2012): 10

¹² "Another Hijab Furor Hits France, Over a Mother on a School Trip." Aurelien Breeden, *The New York Times*, October 19, 2019, sec. World

¹³ Christopher Isike and Efe Mary Isike. "A Socio-cultural Analysis of African Immigration to South Africa." (2012) 96 (Afrophobia as the discrimination of towards other Africans by their African counterparts)

Defining African (Im)migrants

Various drivers for human intercontinental or international mobility exist as we see an increase in global interconnectedness through trade, politics, and interactions with international laws and customs, thus it is important to engage the various definitions of the word migrant and its related terms. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recognizes that there is no singularly accepted definition for the word migrant under international law, which presents both the opportunity and challenge of using an umbrella term as an operational definition.¹⁴

*An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.*¹⁵

An international migrant refers to a person that moves “away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not nationals, temporarily or permanently”¹⁶ Forced migrant refers to “a person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising

¹⁴ “Who Is a Migrant?,” International Organization for Migration,

¹⁵ IOM Glossary on Migration 2019,, “International Migration Law No.

¹⁶ “*International Migrant*,” International Organization for Migration (January 17, 2020)

from natural or man-made causes”¹⁷, while economic migration can be often be seen as a consequence of forced migration it refers to someone “who leaves their country of origin purely for economic reasons...in order to seek material improvements in their livelihood.”¹⁸ However, African immigrants can also be conceptualized within the context of a diaspora. The IOM defines diaspora as “Migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country.”¹⁹

South Africa and France have seen a steady increase in economic²⁰ forced migrants. The potential of the South African economy had captivated both global investors as well as those looking to alleviate the poverty and the economic stagnation of their regions. While the European Union definitively separates the forced international migrants from the economic ones, the strong correlation between the two groups and the complexities of migration cannot be ignored in a South African context and is thus referred to as mixed international migration.²¹

¹⁷ “*Forced Migrant*,” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission (July 12, 2019)

¹⁸ “*Economic Migrant*,” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission (July 12, 2019)

¹⁹ IOM Glossary on Migration 2019 “Diasporas,” Migration data portal,”

²⁰ IOM Glossary on Migration 2019: “While not a category in international law, the term is sometimes used to refer to any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State, solely or primarily motivated by economic opportunities.”

²¹ Refiloe Ogude Helidah and Aditya Sarkar, “*The Urban Dimensions of Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement in South Africa*,” World Bank Blogs

*Johannesburg, South Africa had over 450000 forced migrants with a majority of 417700 still seeking asylum and official refugee status.*²²⁻

However, the aforementioned definitions in their breadth made it challenging to contextualize whom this research was discussing: those who experienced expressions of social exclusion in South Africa and France due to some manifestation of their international migratory history which placed them outside the dominant culture or nationally perceived in-group. The term to describe this group must take into account the social capital²³ of out-group members against other in-group or outgroup members. Another challenge arises as the status of perceived out-groups due to global mobility, is politicized, due to its connotations of illegality, involuntary mobility, and thus historical ties outside of the receiving countries, regardless of said migrant's citizenship status.

The construction of formalized ethnonational identities through documentation (ie: passports) and the necessity of such documentation for international migration, mobility, and belonging purposes, the term chosen to describe the aforementioned target group was the word “migrant” in its sociocultural context. However, this is not to deny their ability to find belonging and citizenship within a state. When one considers to whom the xenophobic action and expression are being directed, one often falls into the “denied-membership-denied-citizenship trap”. This term suggests that when research on how social exclusion or expressions of partial or full denial of

²² “No Place to Go But Up: Urban Refugees in Johannesburg, South Africa” (Women's Refugee Commission: October 2011) 1

²³ Christina Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa: What Does It Say about Trust?,” *The Round Table* 98, no. 403 (August 1, 2009): 439–47.

membership takes place towards members of society who are considered outsiders to the nation-state and constructed national identity, both scholars and commentators on the subject will often tie to the concept of membership denial to that of citizenship denial as they often run parallel with one another.

However, as Beaman also suggests in her paper on cultural citizenship, emphasizing legal citizenship, loses sight of the fact that citizenship, in its embodying of membership, is also social and cultural.²⁴ The denial of someone's social and cultural citizenship (membership), which can have economic and political consequences, can occur concurrently with having access to legal citizenship. That is to say that immigrants/allochthonous individuals and groups can find ways to engage with the state and society in legal and culturally relevant terms (such as speaking the language), while also being excluded and othered from it."

As the etymology of xenophobia ("xènos" meaning stranger and "-phobia" meaning fear in Greek) defines the term as "the fear of the other"/ stranger", the next logical step for conceptualization is that socially speaking migrants and their descendants, regardless of legal status, are considered to be not of the soil, are perceived as outsiders to the social identity in different ways. This arises due to perceived sociocultural differences in languages, racial identities, ethnic identities, gender relations, socioeconomic backgrounds, differences in histories, and the perceived differences in their future trajectories. This suggests that there is can be an implied or assumed mobility associated with ones physical and social identity, even though that may not be

²⁴ Jean Beaman, "Citizenship as Cultural: Towards a Theory of Cultural Citizenship," *Sociology Compass* 10, no. "Part of cultural citizenship is recognizing that full citizenship as a process and social status is inherently cultural, in that ideas regarding worthy members of a citizenry are based on cultural assumptions."

the truth. Thus, for the specific purpose of this research, the term migrant and immigrant will be used interchangeably, both reflecting a social and cultural perception of belonging rather than a strictly political one. African (im)migrant in a robust sociocultural context refers to the members of South African and French society who have a current or past history of international migration from Africa. In a further operationalized term, it refers to: those who experienced expressions of social exclusion in South Africa and France due to some manifestation of their international migratory history from Africa which placed them outside the dominant culture or nationally perceived in-group.

Reasons for Migration in Push-Pull Contexts

Functionalist migration theory suggests that international migration is fundamentally rooted in the push and pull factors; the push factors are what drives migrants to leave their countries of origin, and the pull factors are the attractiveness of the destination countries that juxtapose the factors driving the migrants to leave.²⁵ While more theories exist and competing theories are debated, this research will utilize the push and pull theories as an extremely brief primer on why people move.²⁶ While the reason for migration often categorizes how migrants are treated and processed in their new societies. Environmental push factors such as natural disasters, resulting in crop failures, and the progressively destructive effects of climate change involuntarily encourage migration. The complete or partial in-habitability of an environment increases socioeconomic

²⁵ Hein de Haas, "A Theory of Migration: The Aspirations-Capabilities Framework," *Comparative Migration Studies* 9, no. 1 (February 24, 2021): 8

²⁶ de Haas's review of the literature on migration theory is exemplary in understanding the comparative approaches to migration theory.

stressors (such as inflationary prices on essential goods and the lack of access to basic resources) such that the cycle of poverty and oppression can only be broken and survival can only be ensured by the possibility of migration.

Some migration to South Africa and France reflect economic and sociopolitical push and pull factors. The push factors are the economic harsh situations in migrants' countries of origin that such as a recessive economy and high unemployment and the pull factors are the nearby or distant destination countries with stronger economies, education, social, or job opportunities. This can be seen in Zimbabwean migrants seeking work in South Africa. In the sociopolitical sphere, more extreme push factors for migration include the consistent persecution of non-dominant groups, civilians enduring war, and inhabitable conflict zones with the desire to flee in hopes of reaching a destination country with favorable policies towards their specific displaced group. The insider-outsider dichotomy that characterizes xenophobic sentiments is thus often represented by the presence of transnational migration, as the influx of international migrants disrupts the national heterogeneity of the destination country and can manifest as intergroup tension, hostility, and conflict.

1.2 Problem Statement and Justification of the Comparison

Xenophobia in South Africa has been seen in the brutalization and oftentimes death of African immigrants, the looting and destruction of immigrant stores, homes, and growing mobs charged with publicly intimidating those who seem to be foreigners. While the official stance of the South African government remains rooted in its respect of human rights, dignity, and acceptance of all regardless of color, creed, or gender identity, such sentiments are not rooted in

the approaches taken by local officials and members of the public. Additionally, the existence of recent pseudo-political groups such as ‘Operation Dudula’ (Operation Pushback),²⁷ reminiscent of the 1994 ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (Operation Go-Back-Home),²⁸ and the online #PutSouthAfricaFirst movement,²⁹ reflects the ineffectiveness of national responses such as the 2019 National Action Plan.³⁰ While South Africa has often been praised for its growing industrial power, being one of the economic hubs in Southern Africa, and embracing the diversity within its borders and the vision of ubuntu, the waves of xenophobic attacks against migrants and foreign nationals within the last two decades juxtapose said vision.

In France, discrimination towards migrants has often occurred in the form of a cultural distancing of immigrant identities from the republican, French identity. With policy and governmental pushback on those seeming to disrupt the peace of republicanism, whose message is then disseminated by the French public through subtly exclusive behavior, othering and

²⁷ Thabi Myeni, “What Is Operation Dudula, South Africa’s Anti-Migration Vigilante?,”

²⁸ Christina Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa: What Does It Say about Trust?,” *The Round Table* 98, no. 403 (August 1, 2009): 439–47

²⁹ Rob Moleleki, “Digital Xenophobia Is on the Rise in South Africa,” *Africa at LSE* (blog), March 7, 2023

³⁰ Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, National Action Plan: “In answering this call, Cabinet has adopted this National Action Plan to combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. The Plan is based on the collective conviction of South Africans that, given that the ills of unfair discrimination and inequality are human-made; we have the means to completely eradicate these ills from our country. The Plan has been developed through a comprehensive consultation process involving government, the Chapter Nine institutions and civil society, and is informed by general principles of universality, interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, participation and inclusion, progressive realisation, accountability, equality and non-discrimination.”

discrimination against supposed ‘étrangers’(outsiders) is a persistent force in French universalism and its determination to counter ‘communautarisme’ (ethnic factionalism).³¹ The social exclusion and othering of those considered lacking in their ‘francite’ (Frenchness)- via covert differentiation, policy proposals, and policymaking- in France has been crucial in furthering the “us vs them” narrative which reflects the underlying pervasiveness of France’s colonial culture. In the French context, while francite can be gained to a certain extent (as can be seen with the children and grandchildren of African migrants in France from the sixties and onwards), such Frenchness is not always an effective tool in combatting issues of racial discrimination as a descendant of a migrant. This is rooted in separating those ‘native’ to the center, or ‘la metropole’ (France on European soil), from those ‘native’ to ‘l’empire colonial français’ (The French colonial empire).

By recognizing the regional and national histories and identities of these countries, and the role of structural and individual elements, one can grasp the greatly nuanced relationship these countries have with immigrants. These relationships, rather than determining the experiences of immigrants, represent the distinct and similar expressions of xenophobia in South Africa and France. This in turn enables us to understand the relevant lenses and expressions through which othering action takes place in these distinct societies.

When reading this thesis the question may arise: Well why South Africa and Why France, and why the need for an interregional comparison instead of an intraregional one? A simple answer to that could be that just as the intraregional comparisons have already been conducted and

³¹ Dena Montague, “Communitarianism, Discourse and Political Opportunity in Republican France,” *French Cultural Studies* 24, no.

contributed to the existing literature, so too can this thesis. A more nuanced answer would be that while researching comparative sentiments is not new, researching xenophobic expressions, experiences, and questions of unbelonging in two of the largest African migrant-receiving countries in their regions is a growing and critical field of study. In both South Africa and France, we see the role of migration, the myth of a sociopolitical (Ubuntu and the Rainbow Nation) and national identity (Republicanism and Universalism), and the impact of the local's perceived relative deprivation (in terms of the economic difficulties) and relative wealth (in terms of culture). This comparison not only allows us to see what is happening on the ground, albeit in different socioeconomic and social-cultural contexts, but it also allows us to look toward future solutions. We cannot only compare states according to their socioeconomic standing or history of transition into a peaceful democracy. It cannot be a shield we hold up to block us from seeing the reality that inequality towards the most vulnerable in society, in this case, migrants, is not singular, just differently expressed.

1.2.1 South Africa: Understanding the Hostility towards, Xenophobia, and Social Exclusion of African Immigrants

As South Africa continues to be one of the most popular destinations of other African nations in Southern Africa, due to relative democratic, economic, and social stability,³² with almost 2.9 million immigrants the question of where brethren or countryman ends and stranger or

³² Khangelani Moyo, "South Africa Reckons with Its Status as a Top Immigration Destination, Apartheid History, and Economic Challenges,"

foreigner begins has been well documented³³. However, there must also be a further evaluation of the reasons behind the realities of foreigner-local relations and the seeming (im)possibility of coexistence and belonging, despite South Africa marketing itself as the land of inclusion and belonging.³⁴ Thus, this paper will be examining the existing theories behind the tension between African foreigner-local relations in South Africa and to what extent such arguments explain the de facto xenophobia, or Afrophobia, present in South African society and how it has been expressed in recent years. This will be explored by contextualizing the xenophobia in South Africa; evaluating arguments of resource scarcity and socioeconomic hardship, and the existence of a “stalled transformation” chronotope within the South African consciousness.

Contextualizing Xenophobia in South Africa

In 1994, Archbishop Desmond Tutu declared the new South Africa a “rainbow nation”,³⁵ highlighting that the inhumane practices of the Apartheid regime and their racial stratification of society, had come to an end, and in its place was a nation where all belonged regardless of color, creed, truly representing “ an inclusive human community”³⁶. Prior to 1994, South Africa experienced highly restrictive overall, and specifically non-white migration into its borders due to

³³ “South Africa,” *Migrants & Refugees Section* (blog)

³⁴ “South Africa ‘on the Precipice of Explosive Xenophobic Violence’, UN Experts Warn,” UN News, July 15, 2022

³⁵ Kellie Paxian, “Shaping the Rainbow Nation: The Role of Indians in South Africa,” *World Footprints* (blog), June 19, 2021

³⁶ Nwamilorho Joseph Tshawane, “The Rainbow Nation : A Critical Analysis of the Notions of Community in the Thinking of Desmond Tutu” (Thesis, 2009),

the discriminatory policies of the Apartheid government, such as the 1991 Aliens Control Act.³⁷ The Act, in its broad description of “prohibited” and “undesirable persons”, as well as what constituted their illegality from their appearance, “reasonable suspicion”, or their official migration status, characterized the aggressive lengths to which the government sought to control both the existence and appearance of those within its borders.³⁸ However, when one considers the post-apartheid South African nation in terms of whose presence is tolerated, who can belong in their space, and with whom the nation identifies, the images and sentiments which seem to form the rainbow nation are rather exclusive. This exclusive sense of belonging and nationhood in South Africa has been exemplified by the persistent waves of xenophobic violence and discrimination against foreign nationals, specifically African migrants and foreigners in South Africa from 2008 to the present.³⁹

Spurred on by the hateful rhetoric and acts of organizations such as Operation Dudula’s (an organization demanding the mass exodus of foreigners) leaders such as Nhlanhla Lux Dlamini and Dan Radebe, xenophobia in South Africa continues to manifest itself through violence and explicit intimidation.⁴⁰ Such hatred has been documented even before the nationwide 2008 xenophobic attacks, and most recently at the violent arson attack which targeted and burned down

³⁷ Jonathan Crush, “Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid’s Migration Regime,” *Geoforum* 30, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 6

³⁸ Thomas F. Hicks, “The Constitution, Aliens Control Act, and Xenophobia: The Struggle to Protect South Africa’s Pariah—The Undocumented Immigrant,” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 7, no. 1 (1999): 393–417.

³⁹ Caroline Chen, “Xenophobia in ‘The Rainbow Nation’: Economic and Political Failure in South Africa,” *Glimpse from the Globe*, April 17, 2017.

⁴⁰ Thabi Myeni, “What Is Operation Dudula, South Africa’s Anti-Migration Vigilante?,”

Yeoville Market (a prominent marketplace run by African traders in Johannesburg) in July 2022.⁴¹ The xenophobia experienced in South Africa is characterized by public displays of violence (burning down stores, and home, brutalizing suspected foreigners in the streets) towards African foreigners, often underwritten by politicians scapegoating the “outsider group” as public threats and discrimination from law enforcement.⁴² As South Africa is known for its multiplicity of cultural and ethnic identities, the consequences of tribalism, ethnocentrism, and economic insecurity are exacerbated when it comes to engaging with African foreigners.⁴³

The violent actions of locals in areas of low service delivery towards African foreigners are reflective of their grassroots approach to xenophobia, which is met by governmental action without crucially acknowledging the issue. The attacks on the ever-increasing number of migrants, especially migrant workers, became a common trend in townships and areas with high unemployment and poor service delivery since the first major wave of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa in 2008, which left over 150000 migrants displaced and 62 dead.⁴⁴ Recent xenophobic riots, such as the between the 2019 March and September riots, have left businesses and homes looted and ransacked, collectively displacing over 1000 foreigners, and in the most

⁴¹ “The Destruction of the Yeoville Market in Johannesburg and Afrophobia,”

⁴² Kristi Ueda, ““They Have Robbed Me of My Life,”” *Human Rights Watch*, September 17, 2020

⁴³ Mavhungu Abel Mafukata, “Ethnicity, Tribalism, and Xenophobia in a South African Rural-Based University,” chapter, *Impact of Immigration and Xenophobia on Development in Africa* (IGI Global, 2021) 152-156

⁴⁴ Aurelia Segatti and Loren B Landau. “Contemporary Migration to South Africa.” (Agence Française de Développement -AFD, the French Development Agency: 2008)10

unfortunate circumstances, the rampant violence endured by the migrants often proved to be fatal as they would be attacked by mobs and subsequently beaten to death.⁴⁵

The reality of the cyclical xenophobic outbreaks is reflected in major losses of life, residence, safety, and damage to personal property of non-South African migrants, such that in 2015 and the military was deployed to areas experiencing catastrophic xenophobic unrest in Johannesburg and Durban.⁴⁶ While this is known, the actual statistical data relating to these events is severely underreported as local police officers are often found to be unsympathetic towards the plight of the non-South African migrants, and reporting platforms, such as Xenowatch, are often only accessed by the minority of victims if they are still in possession of contact devices.⁴⁷ The rampant spread of xenophobic sentiments has been met with significant governmental silence and denial, with government officials often framing these attacks as “random acts of crime”, rather than blatant xenophobia.⁴⁸ Anti-immigrant rhetoric, xenophobic sentiments, and the scapegoating of migrants have been central to the contemporary formation of party politics in South Africa in recent years. With calls for immigrants to leave the country by a set date, blaming migrants for the economic conditions and degrading low-income migrants as lawless, lazy, and dangerous, movements against migrants and the otherness that they embody took place at the municipal, local, and national levels.⁴⁹ In 2019 South African Defense Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula said the

⁴⁵ “South Africa: Attacks on Foreign Nationals,” *Human Rights Watch* (blog), April 15, 2019,

⁴⁶ “South Africa: How Common Are Xenophobic Attacks? - BBC News,”

⁴⁷ United Nations, “University Combats Xenophobia in South Africa,” United Nations (United Nations)

⁴⁸ Eusebius McKaiser, “South Africans Are Used to Being the Targets of Racist Hatred. Now They’ve Become the Haters.,” *Foreign Policy* (blog)

⁴⁹ “Xenophobia and Party Politics in South Africa,” *The Mail & Guardian*, September 3, 2019

evidence presented to them "has not shown that foreign nationals are being targeted because of their nationality", but rather we "are seeing acts of criminality".⁵⁰

Socioeconomic Threat in the Face of Resource Scarcity

In investigating one of the primary factors which represent African foreigner-local tensions in South Africa, both the government and local organizations across time have portrayed violence and hostility as responses to socioeconomic stimuli. Derived from Stephan and Stephan who categorize the hostility towards outsider groups as perceived "realistic-, symbolic-, or negative-," threats or being viewed within "intergroup anxiety", the Intergroup Threat Theory stresses the overall relevance of the realistic and symbolic threat on outsider-targeting prejudice.^{51 52} While the symbolic threat is mainly focusses on value and moral differences (often the perceived deficiencies in the outsider group relative to that of the insider), the realistic threat submits the more commonly found argument of emphasizing resource scarcity, macro, and macroeconomic concerns, perceived shifts in political power brought on by the presence outsiders.⁵³ In post-Apartheid South Africa, the history of upholding social justice and civil rights, by overturning the discriminatory and racist policies of Apartheid, is juxtaposed by the actions of its working-class locals in which violence is displayed towards African foreigners. This juxtaposition presents itself as a remnant of the impact that the Apartheid era had on the national psyche and national identity, as migration to and from surrounding African counties and the rest of the continent was highly

⁵⁰ "Gauteng Xenophobic Violence: 10 of 12 Victims Were South Africans - Defence Minister | News24,"

⁵¹ Stephen Croucher, "Integrated Threat Theory," 2017

⁵² James Patrick Clifton, "The Role of Intergroup Threat in Attitudes Toward,"

⁵³ Croucher, "Integrated Threat Theory."

restricted. Thus, the socioeconomic and cultural deprivation of the South African people from matters outside of their perspective resulted in the development of increased ethnocentrism and relative deprivation in underperforming communities.⁵⁴

The perceived continuous influx of migrants from other neighboring and regional countries like Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Congolese, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Malawi in search of both skilled and unskilled labor opportunities in South Africa,⁵⁵ along with the disappointment and frustration the locals face as the economy fluctuated, service delivery continues to be unreliable and unemployment rises, have led to a rise in both negative (and then xenophobic) sentiments about African foreigners.⁵⁶ As highlighted in Steven Gordon's chapter on *Are Foreigners Welcome in South Africa? An Attitudinal Analysis of Anti-immigrant Sentiment in South Africa during the 2003–2018 Period*, he summarizes the economic insecurity which plagued the nation during its corresponding years of notable xenophobic violence. He states, "In 2008 and 2009, the national economy suffered a significant downturn and has struggled to return to the growth levels of the mid-2000s. Levels of real GDP growth in the 2014–2019 period were especially poor. The commodity price slump of that period has been one of the main reasons for the slow recovery. Another important contributor for persistent low growth rates has been government mismanagement of the sovereign debt as well as state-owned enterprises (especially the public

⁵⁴ "Ejoke, Ufuoma, and Kelechi Ani. "Historical and Theoretical Analysis of Xenophobia in South Africa." *Journal of Gender, Information and Development in Africa* 6, no. 1/2 (December 2017),166-168

⁵⁵ Steven Gordon, "Xenophobia Is on the Rise in South Africa: Scholars Weigh in on the Migrant Question," *The Conversation*

⁵⁶ "South Africa: Widespread Xenophobic Violence," *Human Rights Watch* (blog), September 17, 2020,

electricity utility) during this period.”⁵⁷ With foreigners being perceived as economic competitors (using unfair means to secure their shops, homes, and merchandise) as well as being criminals to blame for South Africa’s high crime rate, locals took to the streets in riots and mobs, stores, and homes of these foreign entities to counter this realistic threat in an already strained economic climate.⁵⁸

Although the economic instability and resource scarcity in South Africa has cultivated a charged environment, it is the anti-immigrant and inflammatory rhetoric used by politicians in times of economic downturn that light the spark of xenophobic violence.⁵⁹ Such rhetoric is utilized on both national and local levels. Former Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi presents a prime example of this xenophobic pandering as he once stated that all Nigerian immigrants are criminals and drug traffickers.⁶⁰ His sentiments again reflect the central argument of the realistic threat perception in his statement that “if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme”.⁶¹ More recently, organizations such as Operation Dudula, seek popular support in driving out African foreigners (by demanding to see permits, visas, etc) as a way to resolve the scarcity issue, while also seemingly addressing the criminality

⁵⁷ Gregory Houston, Modimowabarwa Kanyane, and Yul Derek Davids, *Paradise Lost: Race and Racism in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Boston, UNITED STATES: BRILL, 2022),

⁵⁸ Ueda, ““They Have Robbed Me of My Life.””

⁵⁹ Thabi Myeni, “S African Minister Suggests Foreigners Are to Blame for No Jobs,”

⁶⁰ Tella, O., Ogunnubi, O. (2014). Hegemony or survival: South Africa’s soft power and the challenge of xenophobia. *Africa Insight*, 44(3), 154,”

⁶¹ Hicks, “The Constitution, Aliens Control Act, and Xenophobia.” 10

brought forth by the foreigners, by driving them out of popular business districts and conducting “clean-up” operations.⁶²

Spatial-Time Analysis of Migration and Justice: Stalled Transformation

The reasoning for the violence towards, specifically, African migrants ranges from spatial-time analyses of belonging, identity, justice, and tolerance in the South African psyche, to the historical contextualization of nationhood in a relatively new and democratic South Africa. Dr. Loren Landau illustrates such in his paper on hospitality, hostility, and justice within South Africa, where it explores the existing “chronotopes” within specific migration and mobility contexts and their impact on intergroup relations. To understand the hostility that exists within the South African contexts from this nuanced angle, one must conceptualize chronotopes as the “moralized space-time” through which a regional/ national issue is seen, thus they reflect a subjective understanding that defines the way individuals and groups morally interact with one another in a specific space-time and context.⁶³ This indicates the dichotomy of justice within the frame of migration in South Africa, where migrants are protected under the highly democratic constitution and bill of rights, however, the public implementation and acknowledgment of those rights often overtake the practice of the law.

⁶² “Dudula: How South African Anger Has Focused on Foreigners,” *BBC News*, March 13, 2022, sec. Africa,

⁶³ L. B. Landau, “Asynchronous Mobilities: Hostility, Hospitality, and Possibilities of Justice,” *Mobilities* 16, no. 5 (2021),

Dr. Landau designates the moralized-space time within which national identity in relation to migration in South Africa and practices of xenophobia is viewed as a “restorative chronotope”.⁶⁴ This is described within the lens of a collective consciousness of the past and imagining a collective future within which past wrongs as remedies, such that “citizens position themselves in a chronotope of stalled transformation where justice comes only by remedying deprivations inherited from an apartheid past.”⁶⁵ This is significant as the development of a national consciousness and imagined future (in terms of community identification, tolerance, and encouraging belonging) modeled after specific deprivations and traumas of apartheid leave little room for historical outsiders (African foreigners and migrants) to exist as equal peers within the national psyche, thus they are essentially “written out” of South Africa’s imagined future.⁶⁶

This stalled transformation chronotope thus provides an explanatory model through which xenophobia in South African can be understood in its prevalence regardless of the macroeconomic conditions. The issue of resource scarcity may still remain; however, it is the collective historical narrative and imagined trajectory which underwrites the conflict and hostility between the nationally traumatized in-group, and the seemingly untouched and extractive out-group. Dr. Landau describes it further: “Accessible to the majority of black South Africans who share histories of socio-spatial racism, this chronotope is nationally inclusive and radically exclusive. It is a discursive infrastructure binding groups and excluding others. In creating space for the

⁶⁴ Landau. 657

⁶⁵ Landau 657

⁶⁶ Ibid 657

country's various ethnolinguistic and religious groups, it draws boundaries around the deserving citizenry and excludes those who do not share their penurious past.”⁶⁷

The removal of the presence and contribution of African foreigners from the perceived South African narrative worked to deny them the right to fully exist as true contemporary contributors to society in the national consciousness. Therefore, their outsider status remains along with the perceived stereotypes and stigmas regardless of ethnic similarities, the time spent as a resident, or even being a naturalized citizen within the country. In the South African search for justice and restoration of the dignity, resources, and political power lost in the apartheid era (most often felt by the black lower-middle class groups in South Africa), oppressive behaviors towards those who do not fit into the national temporal trajectory or geographic proximity (as the native citizens do) become regarded as deserved and justified responses as foreigners present a threat to the perceived progress. Thus, when faced with those foreigners who determine their progress in terms of upward social mobility, rights recognition, and consistent movement towards destinations with comparatively less socioeconomic uncertainties by any means, the national discourse of what is just and restoration in the post-apartheid era adopts the language of xenophobia. In being hospitable to the African foreigners, who “author modes of being compatible with a future life to be lived elsewhere,” South Africans find themselves at a loss, where the foreigners’ “mere presence threatens progress, justice in their [foreigner’s] presence becomes impossible.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Ibid 662

⁶⁸ Ibid 663

*Landau states that the “temporal infrastructures afford or inhibit recognition of ‘the other’ and the subjective sense of a common temporal trajectory necessary for practicing hospitality and justice. These potentially connect people across geographies, in archipelagos of belonging and membership.”*⁶⁹

While the presence of African foreigners in South Africa presents a threat to the national consciousness, the racialization of those mainly black foreigners, their livelihoods, and labor, illustrates the distinction with which black South Africans view their fellow Africans while also representing a contemporary racism existing in the national psyche. The racialization and vilifying of the non-native black body in South Africa are reflected in the xenophobic discourse which pervades discussions of class and other socioeconomic conflicts. In Linda Mutariri’s article on xenophobia in South Africa during the pandemic and the racialization of both nationalism and xenophobic hostility, she writes that “In South Africa, the trope of citizenship is used on specific African nationalities and ethnicities identified as foreigners. Because they are perceived to be lesser human beings, black foreigners become the targets of xenophobic attacks.”⁷⁰ From a post-colonial perspective, it has been hypothesized that the oppression poor black South African’s experienced under Apartheid, by the white minority, was internalized and expressed outwards towards international migrants, and thus in the South African perspective, (black) African

⁶⁹ Ibid 657

⁷⁰ Linda Musariri: Buyel’ Ekhaya (Go Back Home) – NEW DIVERSITIES, 2022

foreigners are derogatorily viewed as aliens and others who ultimately disrupt the structural and cultural make-up of an already diverse South Africa.⁷¹

This phenomenon of the racialization of migration and the differing threat perceptions of the migrant is not singular to South Africa. In their article Timothy Hellwig and Abdulkader Sinno advance upon studies on the public perceptions of immigrants in Britain.⁷² Hellwig and Sinno contextualized their research by focusing on the perceived qualities the British public ascribes to Muslim and Eastern European migrants to quantify their varying levels of threat to the public.⁷³ Hellwig and Sinno present strong statistical data on how public attitudes towards Muslim and Eastern European migrants change depending on the frame through which they are presented, those frames being economic threats, security concerns, culturally distinct, or criminal threats.⁷⁴ The authors hypothesize that certain public issues are Eastern-Europeanized such as crime and economic threats, whereas issues of immigration threats and security threats are Islamized.⁷⁵

South Africa reflects similar patterns of stereotyping and negatively associating criminality, poor service delivery, and economic hardship with African foreigners such that in South Africa's National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and

⁷¹ Cindy Warner, Gillian Finchilescu, and Gillian Finchelescu, "Living with Prejudice: Xenophobia and Race," *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, no. 55 (2003): 36–44.

⁷² Timothy Hellwig and Abdulkader Sinno, "Different Groups, Different Threats: Public Attitudes towards Immigrants," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no.

⁷³ Hellwig and Sinno, "Different Groups, Different Threats." 2-3

⁷⁴ Hellwig and Sinno, 3-4

⁷⁵ Hellwig and Sinno, 12

Related Intolerance, they emphasized that “years of a racist and isolationist policy of apartheid have planted seeds of xenophobia, particularly towards Africans.”⁷⁶ While the racialization may manifest in rhetoric such as foreigners being told that they are “too Black to be South African,”⁷⁷ it has also manifested in the greater perceptions of African foreigners. Audie Klotz highlighted this by stating:

*“What apartheid defined as the ‘black’ threat, South Africans now generally apply to the continent as a whole, the amakwerekwere [derogatory term for foreigner]. ‘Africa’ remains a place outside its territorial boundaries, an area rife with crime and political instability. West Africans, and Nigerians in particular, become the stereotypical criminals, followed by Mozambicans and Zimbabweans.”*⁷⁸

South Africa as a case for understanding othering, social exclusion, xenophobia, and hostility toward African immigrants

In South Africa, the prevalence of xenophobia goes beyond just the literal fear of the other, with its African foreigner-local relations embodying a nuanced intergroup relation impacted by both historical contexts and contemporary realities. With brutal incidents of violence towards African foreigners documented and the scapegoating of foreigners for the consecutive

⁷⁶ Ueda, ““They Have Robbed Me of My Life.””

⁷⁷ “South Africa: UN Experts Condemn Xenophobic Violence and Racial Discrimination against Foreign Nationals,” OHCHR,

⁷⁸ Audie Klotz, “Migration after Apartheid: Deracialising South African Foreign Policy,” *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (October 2000)

socioeconomic downturns, the xenophobic action that exists as an outlet of frustration towards the existing national issue, and as a form of exacting justice, more accurately captures the discrimination, apparent hatred, and violence towards migrants and foreigners from other African nations. Since the formalization of a post-apartheid South African national identity, through which the marginalized South African populations were encouraged to participate in the political processes of socioeconomic reconciliation, contextualizing the systems of inclusion and exclusion towards African migrants and foreigners have presented a significant challenge. While the xenophobic hostility towards African foreigners in South Africa manifests itself both in the rhetoric of politicians and community actors, and waves of targeted and untargeted public violence, the foundation upon which these sentiments exist vary.

When understood from an intergroup threat theory perspective, the conflict between African foreigners and South Africans was less based on the fundamental differences in morals or ethnic perceived between the two groups, but rather the precarious macroeconomic situation plaguing the South African economy. However, the racialized bitterness and violence existing in South Africa, against African foreigners, not only highlighted the realistic risk that African foreigners pose to South African citizens in terms of the competition for scarce socioeconomic resources (such as employment, service delivery, and education), but also reflected deeper historical understandings of who was seen as part of South Africa's future.

In understanding the "stalled transformation chronotope" which exists both as a reflection of the post-Apartheid national psyche also as a political tool used by anti-immigrant organizations, racialized xenophobia and hostility towards African foreigners, centers around more than just economic uncertainty, but rather the lack of a shared trauma experience between the two groups. This is significant as where African foreigners seek mobility and economic progress, native South

Africans regard them as outside of the nation's temporal and geographic destiny and narrative, and such a rejection contributes to the waves of violence that the foreigners face. In summation, the xenophobia prevailing and expressed in South Africa goes beyond just resources. It is a battle of history, politics, identity, and tensions within the national consciousness of who contributes to and benefits from South African society. As Dr. Landau's states:

“For South Africans, accepting foreigners becomes a form of permanently denying or deferring one's birth right. Even where South Africans are open to including immigrants, doing so binds new arrivals to a spatialized future at odds with their ambitions.”⁷⁹

1.2.2 France: Understanding the Hostility towards, Xenophobia, and Social Exclusion of African Immigrants

Since the initial French colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, trans-local relations with migration organizations have been characterized by de facto distinctions present in French society such as race, religion, and cultural differences, despite the de jure ideals of French universalism of a colorblind society. Questions on the complexities of race, ethnicity, religion, and socio-cultural identity in France have come to contextualize the contemporary experiences between migrants and their descendants in France (crudely referred to as “français de papier”)⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Landau, “Asynchronous Mobilities.” 664

⁸⁰ An exclusionary term meaning “French on paper” or “French through citizenship” which is often used to implicitly discriminate against non-white French people who have an history of migration in their families.

and the population of predominantly European descent (“français de souche”)^{81, 82} From colonial to modern times, France has been emboldened to establish implicit hierarchical systems within their society through means of identification documentation, the curation of the French identity in the modern nation-state, and the continuing practices of prejudice. Racial historicism, also known as progressive racism,⁸³ played a major role in framing who could belong to the French nation as a citizen. This was as opposed to who could be categorized as (former) subjects of the French empire or those significantly distinct from the conceptualization of the French nation. To that extent, hostility towards, xenophobia, and the social exclusion of African immigrants can be explored through understanding role of racial historicism, French colonialism, documentation, and media in contextualizing the relationship between the “rooted” French and the “unrooted” migrants, and those migrants’ and subsequent treatment in French society. The tension between “unrooted” migrants and their descendants, and the “rooted” French population is significant in understanding conceptualizations of belonging in France irrespective of France defining itself as a colorblind society.

Contextualizing African immigrants and Their Belonging In France

The historical context and perception of non-European migrants in France are important to evaluate through race theory as it highlights the degrees shift in the way naturalist and exploitative racism have shaped elements of national identity and relations with migrant populations in France.

⁸¹ An ethnocentric term meaning “French from the stump” or “French from the root” which is an attempt to measure one’s “Frenchness” (francité) according to number of generations one’s family is removed, or not, from France.

⁸² J. Rydgren, “Meso-Level Reasons for Racism and Xenophobia: Some Converging and Diverging Effects of Radical Right Populism in France and Sweden,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, no. 1 (n.d.): 48.

⁸³ Alana Lentin, “Short Notes: Racial Naturalism and Racial Historicism,” *Alana Lentin.Net* (blog), August 10, 2018

Historically, perceptions of subjects of the French empire and non-European migrants were founded upon the colonial associations of race, such as infantilization, hyper-sexualization, and exploitation of those with racialized identities.⁸⁴ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, perceptions of non-Europeans were fundamentally rooted in existing ideologies of social Darwinism (or naturalist racism) and fulfilled through the practice of imperial and colonial expansion.⁸⁵ Imperialists and colonialists utilized structural and exploitative racial theory, whereby restricting colonial subjects through social structures from engaging in the full socio-economic and political practices of that society to ultimately diminish their bargaining power to improve their circumstances.⁸⁶

Many Western-Central European empires such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium enjoyed hegemony over their colonies and justified their conquests through quasi-religious and racial policies for economic gain.⁸⁷ Through these perceptions, subjects of the empire and non-European migrants were deemed as racially and intellectually immature, such that their human capacities were greatly influenced by and built upon the foundations of race; this, in turn, sought to justify the colonial conquests and barbarism and carnage they would cause.⁸⁸ In the context of intergroup relations, the French colonial presence was that of a master-protégé relationship. There was the acknowledgment of the contributions colonial subjects had made to

⁸⁴ David Theo. Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 44-46

⁸⁵ David Theo Goldberg, *The Threat of Race* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 293, 298

⁸⁶ Screen Culture, *Digital Lecture with Prof. David Theo Goldberg on Contemporary Racisms in Europe*, 2020

⁸⁷ Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "The Time and Space of Race: Reflections on David Theo Goldberg's Interrelational and Comparative Methodology," *Patterns of Prejudice* 44, no. 1 (February 2010): 80

⁸⁸ Goldberg, *The Threat of Race*. 361

French society in terms of art, literature, etc. all the while continuing practices where the French claimed and behaved as having superior racial and biological parentage to which colonial subjects were socialized to aspire.

The history of that biological and social differentiation has been used in the determination and understanding of who belongs to the French Republic and has the existence of such categories is well-articulated by the French right-wing. The term “français de souche” emerged late nineteenth century to describe white, secular Frenchmen who were considered French generational natives (quite literally having a generational “stump” or root in France past the third generation), as opposed to the French ethnic Algerians in French Algeria.⁸⁹ French colonization of Algeria was famed for the distinctions it placed on belonging, with the adoption of Algeria as an extension of France through it being a “department” where white French settlers, “Pied Noirs”, enjoyed citizenship and socioeconomic freedom, whereas ethnic Algerians were treated as second-rate French subjects.⁹⁰ Although its use changed over time, the term has been championed by politicians and the far-right entities, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and the far-right website “François Desouche”, to highlight an implicit hierarchy that exists within French society and what their potential erasure might mean with the introduction of unassimilable elements into French society.⁹¹ In contrast to this generational claim to France, members of the right utilize another historical term “français de papier” as it was originally used in the classification of naturalized

⁸⁹ Vincent Geisser, “Exit ‘français de souche’ ?,” *Migrations Societe* N° 158, no. 2 (2015): 5

⁹⁰ Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850* (University of Illinois Press, 2005). 181

⁹¹ “‘Français de Souche’ : Ça Veut Dire Quoi ?,” Planet, ,

French citizens typically from the former French empire.⁹² Its contemporary meaning, however, describes those who are French citizens, but whose generational history of migration sets them apart as they are deemed unable to fully assimilate into secular French society as some of their identities are considered outside of universalist “francité”. This referral of one group as “unrooted” is significant as it indicates the fissures within French universalism as there exist both in-and out-groups, such that “the Other is specified: the Other is the exile, the foreigner, the displaced person, the survivor, but most Other has the face of the immigrant, notably the immigrant France’s dismembered former colonial”⁹³

The Colonial Connection- Flawed Universalism.

The French colonial missions, “La Mission Civilatrice,” from 1890-1945 created expansive territorial gains for France by formalizing migratory, trade, and political networks between the French nation and its empire.⁹⁴ The military and colonial expansion into both North and Sub-Saharan Africa, South-West and East Asia, and the islands of the Antilles, depicted the French as progressive and benign forces seeking to correct and civilize the retrogressive practices, norms, and cultures of the indigenous “others” over which they were to rule.⁹⁵ France fashioned its colonial rule through policies of assimilation and association in Francophone Africa-where the Africans could be deemed as potential equals in French society, provided that they adopted the

⁹² “‘Française de Papier’ : Nadine Morano Recycle Une Expression d’extrême Droite Contre Rokhaya Diallo,”

⁹³ Naomi Schor, “The Crisis of French Universalism,” *Yale French Studies*, no. 100 (2001): 43–64, 57-52

⁹⁴ “Mission Civilatrice | Encyclopedia.Com,”

⁹⁵ Tony Chafer, “Teaching Africans To be French? : France’s ‘civilising Mission’ and the Establishment of a Public Education System in French West Africa, 1903-30,” *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente* 56, no. 2 (2001): 203

French language and cultural norms as their own.⁹⁶ French policies of assimilation in the empire were meant to reflect French universalism within the nation, which stated that French identity was a matter of undertakings the ideals and virtues of “liberté, égalité, et fraternité”⁹⁷ regardless of their physical attributes. These policies aimed to create “Black Frenchmen” provided that they adopted the French language and cultural norms as their own, thus reinforcing, and propagating the idea of a superior French nation.⁹⁸ Hence, migrants and former subjects of the empire could achieve positive social mobility if they were higher up on their cultural identity was French enough, and if their racial or ethnic identity deemed them as a “benevolent other.”

Continuing into the post-colonial era, the determinants of non-European migrants’ capacity for socio-political and economic mobility were often delineated through perceptions of certain traits or elements which could reconcile those “others” to the nation despite their distinctions. Such traits, founded in masked ethnocentrism and racism, included the swifter integration of migrants in society who reflected a likeness to Eurocentric features, proficiency in the commonly spoken language, and similar or reticent religious practices.⁹⁹ These defining elements highlighted the frailty of French universalism in the face of an increasingly heterogeneous society in France, thus illustrating the problem of the liberal paradox.¹⁰⁰ Mary Dewhurst Lewis presents that the paradox is the difficulty of balancing “their [France’s] promotion of the free movement of people” -and the

⁹⁶ Boundless. “*Boundless World History.*” Lumen.

⁹⁷ Teresa Artjoki, “The Problems with French Universalism,” *The Sundial Press* (blog), , 2019,

⁹⁸ Boundless. “*Boundless World History.*” Lumen. Accessed November 28, 2019.

⁹⁹ Thomas Bell, *Out of This Furnace* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 34, 122-124

¹⁰⁰ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940.* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 3

acceptance of migrants for economic and political reasons- meeting “with their constituencies desires to limit who can move freely,” based on who is perceived to truly belong to the nation-state.¹⁰¹ This is significant as the delineation between rooted and unrooted (migratory) Frenchmen created a paradox within French universalism as the emphasis on whiteness and minimal tolerance for “non-European religion” hegemonizes the core principles of French identity and migrants’ possibility of belonging.

Racial Historicism- Social Differentiations to French Identity

Contemporary interactions between migrants or non-Europeans and European Frenchmen have been characterized by persistent elements of race theory, thus intergroup relations, whether positive or negative, contain aspects of David Theo Goldberg’s concept of “racial historicism”. Racial historicism is described as the perspective held by Europeans that non-European socio-cultural norms were inferior to that of European socio-cultural and political standards and that indigenous people were to be corrected through means of socio-cultural reframing.¹⁰² The perception of the fundamental difference between socio-cultural and political norms and legitimacy prompted Europeans to form policies rooted in the re-education and re-socialization of racialized non-Europeans. Goldberg describes the contrasting perspectives of racial historicism and racial naturalism in the colonial application as “the velvet glove [that] was to the iron fist” respectively.¹⁰³ Through this analogy, he delineates the manipulative, coercive, implicit, and

¹⁰¹ MICHAEL MENG, “Democratic (In) Equalities: Immigration in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” ed. David Art et al., *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 1 (2013): 144.

¹⁰² David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (350 Main Street Maiden, Massachusetts 02148 USA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002). 43-35, 156

¹⁰³ Goldberg, *The Racial State*, 86

socially constructivist of racial historicism as opposed to the definitively exclusionary, explicit, and barbaric character of racial naturalism.¹⁰⁴

Goldberg also argues the role of racial constructions and distinctions as a key tool in the creation of the modern nation-state and the prevalence of a homogenized “European identity” within a state’s borders.¹⁰⁵ Migration throughout France spiked in the post-World War II (WWII) era, thus increasing heterogeneity of French society through guest worker programs and the former colonial subjects starting lives within the nation.¹⁰⁶ Consequentially, universalist France was faced with the problems created by its increased diversity in the face of an implicitly racialized state identity. The amalgamation of empire and nation in the Parisian suburbs exposed French conceptualizations of national identity, where there was a superior European (white) society that had long reinforced colonial practices.¹⁰⁷ Thus, the adopted socio-cultural and linguistic practices of non-Europeans were barely enough to compensate for their racial identity and could be easily scapegoated by ethnocentric French media and politicians as too different and non-conformant to French ideals.¹⁰⁸ This occurred as means to force those migrants and former subjects to assimilate to the state-sponsored image of national identity and Europeanness, which, when met with

¹⁰⁴ Goldberg, *The Racial State* 88

¹⁰⁵ Goldberg, *The Racial State* 86

¹⁰⁶ Patrick Simon Veniard Kimberly A. Hamilton Kimberly Hamilton, Patrick Simon, Clara, “The Challenge of French Diversity,” migrationpolicy.org, November 1, 2004,

¹⁰⁷ Jean-François Caron, “Understanding and Interpreting France’s National Identity: The Meanings of Being French,” *National Identities* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 223–37

¹⁰⁸ Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity.*, Volume 5. (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 201-203, 206

opposition by those racialized groups, often resulted in the progression of an “us vs them” rhetoric propagated by politicians linked to the state. Despite trying to shield the republican model from addressing the issues of racism, prejudice and discrimination through universalist practices, French society still exposes its racially historicist view of its non-white counterparts, by emphasizing their shock and surprise when a non-white member of society behaves in an ‘ideally’ French manner (ie: speaking French without an ‘African’ accent). Not only does this indicate that within French society when one perceives a non-white body, and particularly a black, African body, an evaluation is already made on what that individual should represent based on the assumed integration of their ethnic or racial group. This can be seen in the French context as French Muslims and other racialized groups, perceived to exist outside the standard European context, are viewed as separatist, communitarian, aggressors rather than discriminated French communities, as they are seen to be resistant to the state-sponsored image of identity as a unified, colorblind, and secular state.¹⁰⁹ This is significant as in France one can see increasing acceptance of anti-Islamic policies, such that they are not viewed as xenophobic, but rather as the preservation of liberal practices and a common socio-cultural stance which has contributed to the negative perceptions of non-European migrants.¹¹⁰

Documentation and Defining Belonging

¹⁰⁹ “French Muslims Are Now Being Called ‘separatists’... Well That’s a Surprise!,” openDemocracy

¹¹⁰ “France’s Macron Vows to Fight ‘Islamist Separatism,’” *BBC News*, October 3, 2020, sec. Europe,

The invention of identification documentation in the late nineteenth century shifted the conceptualization of identity from a localized perspective to a national one.¹¹¹ Despite their perceived initial intrusion into French society, the codification of “the other” became a tool for nation-building as the nationals were afforded certain rights and privileges by law in French society foreigners were not, such as the ability to trade and reside in areas for unlimited periods.¹¹² This distinctive effort to separate outsiders from citizens also fortified ethnocultural beliefs that immigration, if lacking the correct documentation or of those migrants with traits deemed undesirable and unlike the in-group, was antithetical to a strong and unified nation.¹¹³ As Gérard Noiriel states, “The creation of legality created the possibility for illegality, that is, of illegal immigration.”¹¹⁴ Thus, as states became the defining authority on the legitimate means of movement and belonging, conceptions of the identity of the foreigner began to shape whether the migration of certain groups were actions of embracing the nation or acts of penetration and potential cultural erasure. Thus, foreigners bound to the European continent by ethnicity and race played a different social role than those foreigners who existed as colonial subjects and cheap guest labor. The migration of those of European descent was codified as complementary immigration as the migrants shared enough geographic familiarity with France in terms of race, class structures, and social norms to be integrated as equals into French society- they were citizens of somewhere with self-autonomy, and their presence in France reflected its socio-economic viability.

¹¹¹ John C. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 24

¹¹² Torpey. 27-28

¹¹³ Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*. xix

¹¹⁴ Noiriel. 59

The migration of former colonial subjects and “unrooted” populations, however, was codified as intrusive, invasive, and a symbol of the deterioration of national identity.¹¹⁵ This is significant as while the migrants’ distinct racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds played a role in their treatment, it was also because those migrants sought the benefits of citizenship through naturalization and perceived themselves as potential citizens rather than as subjects of the empire.¹¹⁶ Simply put, although socialized in racially historicist environments, when in France, many of them refused to perceive themselves through such lenses that juxtaposed the very setup of French society. Thus, through the strengthening of French border control and identification documentation, French society began to form subclasses which are expertly reflected as Noiriel claims that “As France’s external contours were stabilized, an increasingly rigid line of demarcation established divisions within the internal social space.”¹¹⁷ Therefore, through their characterization and documentation of being outside the state in socio-political identity, the presence of migrants, overall, and as socio-cultural, economic, and security penetrators became racialized within France through media and political-party framing.

The Role of The Media

As the living representation of freedom of speech, the reflection of the current state of society, and a focal disseminator of information, the French media has played a significant role in gatekeeping French identity, identifying unassimilable entities and qualities in French society, and othering “unrooted” Frenchmen and migrants and their descendants. Following the prevalence of

¹¹⁵ Riva Kastoryano, “Immigration and Identities in France: The War of Words,” *French Politics and Society* 14, no. 2 (1996):60-61

¹¹⁶ Justine Dodgen, “Immigration and Identity Politics: The Senegalese in France,” n.d.,23-26

¹¹⁷ Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*. 272

French Algerians in the French metropole, since as early as 1914, the French media cultivated stigma around them, such that they were characterized as inassimilable through the fundamental differences in their family structures.¹¹⁸ Anti-Algerian stereotypes, such that they were threatening to civil society because of their assumed inclination towards violence, criminality, and depraved behavior were rooted in French media reports, with one report reading “The crimes and offenses committed by Arabs are increasing ... almost all the rabble which infests us is foreign.”¹¹⁹ This politicization and separation of the Maghrebi presence in France by the media and other political entities were characterized by xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments not as representations of hatred or unjust malice, but rather as a legitimized warning and protection of the French republic and its universalist ideals.

In a contemporary context, media coverage of non-European migration (including refugees, asylum seekers, etc.) played a significant role in the prevalence of xenophobia in intergroup relations in France today and the perceived national trust in the EU. During the 2015 “migration crisis”, the media in each member state fulfilled three necessary functions: the dissemination of knowledge about the influx of migrants, framing public opinion on what action should be taken for or against the migrants and ultimately constructing the political behavior of the civil and uncivil society through providing a platform to various political entities.¹²⁰ The politicized media representations of the non-European migrants contributed to Euroscepticism, as well as characterizing the treatment of the migrants once they arrived.¹²¹ This was fulfilled by

¹¹⁸ Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*. 172

¹¹⁹ Lucassen. 181

¹²⁰ Camille Desmarès, “Addressing Xenophobia: Representations of Migration and the Role of the Media,” 7-9

¹²¹ Desmarès. 11-12

emphasizing their religious, gender, and racial identities, and playing on national stereotypes which effectively framed them against the nation.¹²² Thus, the issue of non-European migration became hyper-visible in the media, which allowed Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties to gain platforms centered around the disillusionment with national and supranational entities through framing non-Europeans as economic, cultural, and security threats.

The Progression of Intergroup Relations in France

In France, intergroup relations between European populations and non-European migrants and their descendants have shifted over several generations. When the first groups of guest-workers and migrant laborers settled to rebuild French infrastructure and economy after the devastation of WWII, they were highly exploited and unprotected by their patrons and the law as citizens harassed them as invasive and economic opportunists in the face of a crisis.¹²³ Common vestiges of racial historicism and distinctive othering (“us vs them”) were present in the violence and discrimination displayed towards the first generations of migrants in France. Thus, accusations of migrants benefiting from social welfare programs meant for “true” French nationals, categorically isolated non-European migrant populations from the larger French society.¹²⁴ Migrants could work to reconcile their self-perceived identities (and thus places within French society) as Frenchmen through the adoption of French cultural norms, abandoning their religious practices, etc. however, they were met with challenges as their racialized identities constituted

¹²² Jakob-Moritz Eberl et al., “The European Media Discourse on Immigration and Its Effects: A Literature Review,” *Annals of the International Communication Association* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 210

¹²³ Antonia Wimbush, “A French ‘Windrush’? When French Caribbeans Were Treated as Second-Class Citizens,” *The Conversation*,

¹²⁴ Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*. 129-130

them as threatening to state-sponsored French identity. Attempts to integrate into French civil society without losing their identity of origin, strong ties to their former homes through their religious, cultural, or social practices, and formalized identification documentation placed them outside of the purview of French identity. Messaoud Djemai reflects these sentiments in his interview with Al Jazeera as he states that: “Assimilation has another meaning in France. It means fitting in by denying everything from your foreign culture.”¹²⁵ As migrants entered French society as codified “others” they remained so for the rest of their generation regardless of whether they naturalized or not as complete assimilation into French demanded a complete loss of themselves.

A New Generation of Unrooted Frenchmen

More recently, second-, third-, and fourth-generation migrants face different questions of identity, belonging, and trans-local relations. In theory, the existence of their citizenship and socialization as French children, having been born and raised in French society, should leave no room to question their place within the state under French universalist ideals. Thus, their utilization of the French language, the meaningful, lengthy, and repetitive interactions with mainstream institutions, and their knowledge of French socio-cultural norms should be drivers of their social mobility.¹²⁶ However, these descendants still have racialized identities and are expected to perform in certain ways to further identify with and be accepted by the French state, even if it diminishes their tie to their ethnic or religious background, which largely contrasts the celebration of

¹²⁵ Linah Alsaafin, ““We Shouldn’t Erase Who We Are to Fit in Certain Mould,””

¹²⁶ Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, eds., *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 19

multiculturalism touted by the EU.¹²⁷ A quote that best reflects the understood French identity can be found in Jean-François Caron's article on French identity:

*“French means to be white, Catholic and to be able to date back my ancestors to many centuries. We must be careful not to destroy what the French people took centuries to build.”*¹²⁸

Despite their status as citizens or lengthy familiarity with French society, the state is also responsible for the difficulties new and generational migrants face as politicians and state officials consistently call for the integration of these descendants into the greater French society without acknowledging that those descendants are already legally and culturally French and thus contribute to the French identity.¹²⁹ These sentiments are well reflected in an interview conducted by Al Jazeera's Linah Asslafin, where an interviewee said: *“Even if you feel like you are part of this nation, there is always someone to make you remember that you are not.”*¹³⁰ The need for the descendants of “unrooted” migrants to constantly prove their “francité” reflects the failure and hypocrisy of French universalism, as such universalism was used to create a two-tiered system- a whitewashed, liberal, and metropolitan France, and a France of the “other”.

¹²⁷ Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Bloomington, UNITED STATES: Indiana University Press, 2004), 122

¹²⁸ Jean-François Caron, “Understanding and Interpreting France’s National Identity: The Meanings of Being French,” *National Identities* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 227

¹²⁹ Dodgen, “Immigration and Identity Politics: The Senegalese in France.” 15

¹³⁰ Alsaafin, ““We Shouldn’t Erase Who We Are to Fit in Certain Mould.””

The history of exclusion of second-, third-, or fourth-generation migrants from the whiter, French society becomes even more poignant when calls against banlieue separatism arise. Despite the recent rallying behind ending separatism in the banlieues in Paris,¹³¹ which house predominantly low-income, non-white populations with a history of migration in their background, according to Lucassen, the French government practiced exclusionary tactics in establishing those areas which have been upheld through various socio-political and economic institutions.¹³² “At the beginning of the 1970s, foreigners were assigned explicitly to the HLM areas, also called “Grands Ensembles,”... This concentration in the HLM estates added to the growing dichotomy between the native French (Français de souche) and the Maghrebin immigrants.”¹³³ Thus, a significant consequence of the non-white and non-European migration to France was that those masses of migrants fell outside of the de facto perceptions of French identity, and their exclusion was reinforced by national policies. Their ties to both the state and the older generations’ heritage, along with the ever-present xenophobia, racism, and islamophobia they endure, signified that French identity must become more expansive than white, secular, and speaking le français normé. This is significant as it shows that despite the progress made by the consistent, meaningful trans-local interactions, there is still overall disillusionment about migration thus generating sentiments of the erosion of national identity which is exploited by Populist Radical Right parties such as France’s National Rally (formerly known as the National Front).¹³⁴

¹³¹ “France’s Macron Vows to Fight ‘Islamist Separatism.’”

¹³² Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*. 188

¹³³ Lucassen. 188

¹³⁴ Faruk Hadžić, “The European Union (EU) Political Identity within the Migrant Crisis, and the Balkan – Bosnian Route; Xenophobia and Religious Identity,” *Research, Society and Development* 9, no. 10 (2020): 5

France as a case for understanding othering, social exclusion, xenophobia, and hostility toward African immigrants

France, much like the rest of Europe, has a complicated history with migration and the presence of non-European persons on French soil. However, their situation is particularly unique due to the Republican ideas upheld by the French constitution, such that anyone can be French regardless of their physical, religious, or ethnic backgrounds, so long as they adopt the socio-political and cultural ideals of French identity-liberty, equality, and fraternity. While French Universalism did play a major role in French colonial practices, such that they valued the assimilation and reeducation of colonial subjects into the French empire, its utility was called into question when former subjects and non-European migrants began to seek aid, work, and settle within the French nation. In the colonial era, these migrants could be treated as elements of the empire and be socialized in environments rooted in exploitative racism and racial historicism, however, this changed in contemporary times. When physically present within the nation (as determined by the creation of identification documentation), their racialized identities proved to impede truly gaining French identity. The media portrayal of migration and its subsequent racialization shaped relations between seemingly “rooted” and “unrooted” Frenchmen, as the consistent, negatively framed broadcast of the 2015 migration crisis failed to represent the decades of exclusion propagated by European populations to those migrants of non-white and non-European descent. Ultimately, non-European-migrant (unrooted) and European-local (rooted) relations have been constituted by the limited view of French identity held by the state and conservative members of civil society, which is rooted in whiteness, secularism, and the pervasiveness of racial historicism.

1.3 Research Question

1.3.1 Research Question

How are social exclusion, othering, hostility, and xenophobic sentiments experienced and expressed toward African immigrants (and their descendants) in South Africa and France?

1.4 Paper Outline

This paper consists of five (5) chapters. The first chapter lays the history, politics, socioeconomic contexts, and legal practices that have contributed to creating a situation in which social exclusion and xenophobia are expressed towards is expressed toward African immigrants in South Africa and France. The second chapter is the Literature Review, which highlights the key takeaways from theories of intergroup relations and conflicts such as Social Identity Theory, Realistic Conflict Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Nationalism and National Identity, and Double Consciousness. It also briefly applies the theories to the case countries. The third chapter is the Methodology chapter which consists of the conceptual framework and the methods that were used to conduct the study. The fourth chapter, containing the Qualitative Analysis, is split into two sections. The first: is a summary of the findings in South Africa, and the second: is the finding in France. This chapter is also split in tone and writing style, as the first section represents the typical summation of findings and key quotes, whereas the second section follows an autoethnographic approach to present the findings with key quotes. The fifth chapter is the Discussions and Limitations chapter to analyze and discusses key trends, similarities, and differences found in the study. The sixth and final chapter concludes the thesis and presents some recommendations to

address the concerns brought up by the participants in the studies. The Appendix includes the Interview Guides Used in France and South Africa.

2.0 Chapter 2: Concept Building

2.1 Literature Review and Analysis

2.1.1 Global Analysis of Individual and Group Social Identity within Intergroup Relations and Conflict

In their 1994 second-edition release of *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives*, Dr. Donald Taylor and Dr. Fathali Modgohaddam recounted and analyzed the diverging, developing, and complimentary conceptualizations used to understand intergroup social dynamics and the relationships that form in response to similarity and difference. Their global analysis is relevant in its integrated approach to the formation of one group's social identity, and how opposition, hostility, and excluding behavior towards another group can form. This review will focus on how key chapters on Realistic Conflict Theory, Social Identity Theory, and Relative Deprivation Theory work in tandem to create the theoretical perspectives necessary for understanding xenophobic and anti-other expressions.

Much like Stephen and Stephen's Integrated Threat Theory (ITT), the Realistic Conflict Theory (RTC) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) illustrate a competition for material resources and diverging (and irreconcilable) interests and goals, as fundamental in shaping intergroup conflict and tensions. Taylor and Modgohaddam write that the core tenants of Muzafer Sherif's RTC are the assumptions of egocentric and Hobbesian self-realization, an incompatibility

of interests, and a perceived social psychological dissimilarity between the in and outgroup.¹³⁵ Social identity, and extrapolated to national identity, is thus a matter of the gains and losses to be made through interaction, whereby "... the success of one group means the failure of the other."¹³⁶ While being foundational in understanding group dynamics, RTC is not without its flaws, in its assumptions on the nature of conflict as inherently destructive, the power dynamics between groups seeking collaborative cohesion, and its ascribing of reactions to material insecurity as largely psychological.¹³⁷ However, Sherif's 'Robber's Cave' experiment¹³⁸ illustrates how in-group forms perceptions of justice and fairness- in the face of relative lack and a desire to gain a more positive group status- inform the practiced relationship between an outsider. In referencing a desire for justice; accusing the out-group of unauthorized behavior; and stating their happiness when the out-group faced a "loss", Sherif's experiments suggest that intergroup conflict is not just the irrational behavior of a Freudian horde, but a model for nation-building and effective self and group governance.

In moving towards an integrated theory of intergroup relations and their sources of conflict, RCT finds a natural ally in Relative Deprivation Theory. Samuel Stouffer's RDT focuses on the

¹³⁵ Donald M. Taylor and Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994). 35

¹³⁶ Taylor and Moghaddam. 35

¹³⁷ Taylor and Moghaddam. 55-60

¹³⁸ M. Sherif, "Status in Experimentally Produced Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1954 The goal of the study was multifold: to see how quickly group identity could become established among strangers, how fixed or flexible that identity was, how it would play out in competitive settings with other groups, and how the group conflict dynamic could be mitigated after the fact."

relative material and social standing of individual and group members to form distinct social identities, and tensions with others, based on one's satisfaction with life, and the disparity in their expected versus experienced position in society.¹³⁹ In terms of intergroup relations, Runciman's adaptation of relative deprivation theory posits that one can experience lack because of personal status (egoistical deprivation), and also their association with another group (fraternal deprivation).¹⁴⁰ However, in extending a position of relative deprivation to overt or covert action against such an outgroup representative, Smith et al argue that egoistical deprivation and fraternal frustration, along with adverse socioeconomic conditions, can lead individuals to cognitively appraise a perceived disadvantage compared to outgroup members as well as an inherent unfairness. In seeking to resolve the injustice on behalf of the self or the perceived in-group deprivation in the presence of outsiders, individuals then express anger and resentment via aggressive collective or interpersonal behaviors towards potential outgroup causes.¹⁴¹

The progression of relative deprivation theory and realistic conflict theory is relevant when decoding ethnonational identities in contemporary sociopolitical contexts. When one considers the notion of a nation-state, not only is there an assumed interdependence between those within the state, but also an acknowledged (or constructed) shared future. As such, within the realist threat and relative deprivation framework, economy, history, and governance-induced conditions¹⁴² can

¹³⁹ Taylor and Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations*. 119-120

¹⁴⁰ Ibid 129

¹⁴¹ Heather J. Smith et al., "Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 16, no.

¹⁴² (such as high unemployment, poor service delivery, and inequitable access to education, and health care)

contribute to the discrimination ingroups use to address their situation of deprivation within their national setting.

Foundational to the study of intergroup relation and the relative discrimination (positive or negative) which occurs, Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT) regards the construction of group-level dynamics as indicative of three core processes: self-categorization, social comparison, and the need for the psychological distinctiveness of an ingroup to subsequently form understandings about the outgroup.¹⁴³ SIT argues that individuals form group associations in their desire to be seen as distinct from other groups, and while also attaining a significantly positive social identity (the identity of the dominate group). In viewing society as constantly in conflict rather than in a state of neutral contact or cohesion, Tajfel defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."¹⁴⁴ As individuals seek community membership, they proceed to minimize the difference between those who they perceive to be in similar categories, such that they create a consolidated social category that can provide a "locus of self-identification for the self"¹⁴⁵ In doing so, the inter-category difference is highlighted, along with the self's social category being ascribed a positive emotional value where intra-category members are not locked in hostile competition. Dr. Marylinn B. Brewer writes that the creation of salient and affective ingroup categories, on the other hand, lends itself to the depersonalization of the outgroup, such that their identities become homogenized

¹⁴³ Taylor and Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations*. 63

¹⁴⁴ Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* 1978a, 63

¹⁴⁵ Taylor and Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations*.

and individuals, so when an individual within the out-group are encountered, they are characterized through stereotypes and unified outgroup prejudice.¹⁴⁶

The next step in establishing salient barriers to belonging is through social comparison, whereby “individuals achieve an understanding of the relative status and value of their group and , thus, the status and value they acquired through membership in their group.”¹⁴⁷ This is significant as an individual’s or group’s behavior towards an outgroup (individual or in its entirety) can be based on the assumed status of ‘social poverty’ that one associates with the outgroup, which is outside of that group’s control (such as the political or economic state of an immigrants’ country of origin). This can trigger responses to outsiders within both a realist and symbolic threat framework because if a migrant, for example, is viewed as economically poor (due to their country’s status), they are viewed as an economic threat to the resources ‘belonging’ to the ingroup, or countrymen in this case. On a symbolic level, if the migrants as a group are viewed as ‘socially’ or ‘culturally’ poor due to the perceived differences in cultural norms, ideals, and values, then an individual who is a member of the outgroup, can, a certain extent, be seen as representative of those assumed traits by virtue of their existence in those sociopolitical and economic contexts.

Tajfel determines that along with social categorization, social identity, and social comparison, the initiation of psychological distinctiveness between an in- and outgroup supports

¹⁴⁶ M.B. Brewer, “Intergroup Relations, Social Psychology Of,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Elsevier, 2001) “According to the premises of social identity theory, a primary consequence of salient ingroup–outgroup categorization is the depersonalization of members of the outgroup. Social behavior in intergroup situations is characterized by a tendency to treat individual members of the outgroup as undifferentiated representatives of a unified social category,” 7731

¹⁴⁷ Taylor and Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations*. 80

the creation of bias and discriminatory practices towards the outgroup and its members. As they are (perceived to be) morally and socially superior to outsiders given the in-group's collective changes and response to challenges, the ingroup thus desires to exist on a different material and psychosocial level.¹⁴⁸ However, in the search for distinctiveness, which Brewer further extends in her theory of 'optimal distinctiveness'¹⁴⁹ the more specific identities are formed, the less support and identification ingroup members will have towards those who fall outside its exclusive categories. This is significant as it demonstrates that living within highly specified and politically determined societal constructs (ie: within geopolitical borders) poses a challenge to intergroup cohesion and superordinate common group identification, whereby it is the subordinate or interpersonal identity (national or personal) that becomes the key differentiator and determinant of trust between "us vs them".¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Taylor and Moghaddam. "The participation of such persons in intergroup life would be characterized by competition rather than cooperation, and by a strong desire to achieve distinctiveness, to stand apart from other groups, rather than to converge and become more similar. In social identity theory, it is postulated that group members will desire to achieve an identity for their group that is both distinct from and positive in comparison with, other groups."

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¹⁴⁹ Marilynn B. Brewer, "The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?," *Journal of Social Issues* 53, no. 1 (April 9, 2010): " This model posits that humans are characterized by two opposing needs that govern the relationship between the self-concept and membership in social groups. The first is a need for assimilation and inclusion, a desire for belonging that motivates immersion in social groups. The second is a need for differentiation from others that operates in opposition to the need for immersion". 203-204

¹⁵⁰ Brewer. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations

2.1.1.1 Realistic Conflict, Relative Deprivation, and Social Identity Theory applied to South Africa

The xenophobia in South Africa seems to illustrate a familiar pattern of black South Africans externalizing their fear, or realization, of not being able to meet their subjective needs (both physical and metaphysical) at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. According to Afrobarometer's working paper "*Explaining South African Xenophobia*", South Africans hold an amalgamated disillusionment with the ruling political class, most likely from the exposure to personal and communal unemployment, unstable electricity supplies due to ongoing energy crises, rising food and health service costs.¹⁵¹ Thus, xenophobic mobilization, scapegoating of the "other" and collective action can also be viewed as an extension of personal protest against the lack of upward socioeconomic mobility.

While recent protests emphasize the existing and growing role of community ties, political organization, and the galvanization of macro-level suspicions of the foreign other, relative deprivation theory is useful in this context as it suggests that personal conviction and individually determined loss must be considered in the exclusion of non-dominant groups despite their racial (superordinate) or geographic proximity (ie: the significant proximity between South Africa and Zimbabwe). Although Brewer highlights that intragroup preference (ingroup favoritism) cannot determine axiomatic outgroup hate, the salience with which the ingroup feels subject to injustice

¹⁵¹ Christopher Claassen, "Explaining South African Xenophobia," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2017,

and unable to trust the outgroup can drive intergroup conflict, such that ‘defeating’ the depersonalized outgroup, directly or indirectly, is an action of justice rather than prejudice.¹⁵²

In her paper on applying the Social Identity Theory to xenophobia in the South African context, Rachel Calcott poses black South African’s hyper-identification with the South African “bloodless revolution” national identity, and their mythicized economic and democratic elevation compared to broader African countries as partially explanatory for their rejection and scapegoating of African immigrant populations. While this coagulation of Steenkamp’s isolation hypothesis,¹⁵³ along with understanding relative deprivation reflects historical literature on South African approaches to xenophobia and anti-immigrant hostility, politicians such as Julius Malema, president of the Economic Freedom Fighters, highlight the role capitalism plays in the persistent racism in South Africa and black South Africans having negative sentiments to towards black (specifically low income), African migrants. Relevant in addressing the narratives on the ground, of capital owners exploiting African immigrants who are desperate for work, while simultaneously

¹⁵² Richard D. Ashmore, Lee J. Jussim, and David Wilder, eds., *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity, v. 3 (Oxford [England] New York, N.Y. [USA]: Oxford University Press, 2001). Marylinn Brewer: When does Intragroup Love Become Outgroup Hate?

¹⁵³ Oluwaseun Tella, “Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The Individual, the State and the International System,” *Insight on Africa* 8, no. “.. due to the oppressive nature of the apartheid system, South Africa was isolated by the international community. While there was a considerable inflow of white immigrants during this period, Black African immigration to South Africa was extremely limited. Thus, there was minimal contact between South Africans and black foreigners. The end of apartheid and South Africa’s re-entry to the international arena sparked a massive inflow of African migrants into the country. This resulted in hostility and hatred towards foreigners, especially African immigrants.”

telling black South Africans that someone else has stolen their job, the political disorganization and corruption within the EFF convolute their class struggle argument.¹⁵⁴

“In South Africa, we are still dealing with class divisions. At the core of our divisions is racism,- Julius Malema”¹⁵⁵

2.1.2 Theories on the Formation of a National Identity and a National Self

In his evaluation of the formation of nations and national identity, Renan suggests that nations are forged through the desire to continue a common memory and heroic past, where that desire often changed with the circumstances or pressures in the sociopolitical and sociocultural space.¹⁵⁶ “To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation.”¹⁵⁷ While Renan acknowledges the role of language, religion, and race in the creation of the nation, he contested that the nation can be formed by anyone regardless of those proposed barriers, whereby the nation was to be viewed as an “everyday plebiscite”. This conceptualization of the nation posited that the nation was the end product of the necessary consent-driven, shared, and

¹⁵⁴ Although self-described as a Pan-Africanist, socialist party, their leadership still seeks to benefit from the same class inequality they seek to dismantle.

¹⁵⁵ “The EFF Cannot Deliver Radical Change in South Africa,”

¹⁵⁶ Edward G. Berenson, Vincent Duclert, and Christophe Prochasson, *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca, UNITED STATES: Cornell University Press, 2011),. 151-152

¹⁵⁷ Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” as quoted in Anthony Douglas Smith et al., *Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 1994). 17

vested interest in remaining together, which was often forged in a history of painful sacrifice and threat from some significant danger.¹⁵⁸ This is significant as Renan's understanding of the nation and the malleability of national identity in the face of new pressures illustrates that nations are less formed from the ancient concept of a certain group having "historic right" to specific territories, languages, and cultures, but rather communities of continuous change.

According to Renan, nations, national identities, and the camaraderie that form, are not eternal and follow the temporal arrangement through which human society makes sense of their world, whereby there exists the relativity of the nation and national identity from one point of time to the next. Nations and national identity have a socio-politically, -geographic, -cultural genesis that was relevant to a specific period (oftentimes strengthened but not dependent on linguistic, racial or ethnic, and religious linkages). Consequently, they have had periods of unity and desire to strengthen those bonds which might have been achieved through deepening civic bonds and the creation of an active polity and citizenry, and finally, commonly conceptualized nations and national identity will have a similar end with the arrival of new social challenges, people, and value prioritization. "Nations are not something eternal. They have begun, they will end. They will be replaced, in all probability, by a European confederation. But such is not the law of the century in which we live. At present, the existence of nations happens to be good, even necessary."¹⁵⁹

Where Renan problematizes a shared, heroic past rooted in sacrifice as the core driver of belonging when it comes to nations and national identification, Max Weber emphasizes the desire

¹⁵⁸ Smith et al. 17

¹⁵⁹ Ibid 18

to commit to a share political destiny as the soul of the nation. To Weber, the nation is a “community of sentiment” where individuals are connected by the desire to achieve solidarity through the creation of a distinct political destiny.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Weber argues that what made one nation distinct from the other was the formation of those shared values and devotion beyond the individual to the communal. “Thus it seems that a group of people under certain conditions may attain the quality of a nation through specific behavior, or they may claim this quality as an 'attainment'-and within short spans of time at that.”¹⁶¹ This is significant as shared history, which is utilized to create shared memory, is oftentimes called upon as the foundational values of newly formed autonomous, civically-engaged states, where there is a desire to be autonomous, as individuals but also as a community against external non-community members.

For the process of self-to-national identification, Weber necessitated the acknowledgment of an “other” whose values are distinct to ones own over the cultural value of language and religion, as he also highlighted that the idea of the nation cannot be fixed as national identity develops over time. “... that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity.”¹⁶² Weber considers the linear temporality of nations and national identity through the phenomenon of homogenization, such that national identity is the process of combining, differentiating, and highlighting differing perspectives of groups primarily confined to

¹⁶⁰ Max Weber 's "The Nation" in Smith et al., *Nationalism*. 22

¹⁶¹ Ibid 23

¹⁶² Ibid 22

a specific territory (where the ideas from which would spread to the diaspora). This is significant as the diaspora's exposure to "community" culture values is influential in terms of their solidarity and association with belonging to a specific nation, where their "nationalism" is variable due to sociopolitical and economic influences from their host nation-states. "It is a well-known historical fact that within the same nation, the intensity of solidarity felt toward the outside is changeable and varies greatly in strength. On the whole, this sentiment has grown even where internal conflicts of interest have not diminished... In any case, the differences in national sentiment are both significant and fluid ..."¹⁶³

"What the eye is to the lover – that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with – language – whatever language history has made his or her mother-tongue – is to the patriot. Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed" – Anderson, 154¹⁶⁴

To Benedict Anderson, nations and those identities are manifestations of "imagined communities", thus highlighting the theoretical shift in nation-building from ethnic/sociobiological to culturally nationalist. Will Kymlicka defines cultural nationalism, "as national membership in terms of integration into a cultural community, rather than descent"¹⁶⁵. This is reflective of Anderson's imagined community as he absolves himself from setting up a primordial reality, where "...national cultures are openly imagined and invented, sites of shared conventions

¹⁶³ Ibid 24

¹⁶⁴ Ibid 154

¹⁶⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Clarendon Press, 1995). 5

where ideas are contested and redefined. From this perspective, nationality's subjective character is an asset rather than a burden"¹⁶⁶ Anderson's evaluation posits that nations are increasingly subjective, invented entities whose construct can complement liberal, democratic practices (i.e: having equal avenues to contribute to the national dialogue) where its construct only needs to seek the legitimacy of those who wish to be together, but are still to be viewed as genuine. "Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined."¹⁶⁷ Anderson defines the imagined community as both sovereignly imagined and limited, such that all members of a forming or formed community can't know all other members, however, the core of their union is the subscription to the general belief that they belong together in a finite, border-utilizing community, where there is no "global" nation.¹⁶⁸ In accounting for the variability in terms of solidarity and indifference, Anderson also recognizes that the formation of a nation does not rid the existing structures of center and periphery, as there remains also a presence of inequalities within those communities where there is conflict in binding the members together in fraternity.

However, where Anderson differs from his intellectual counterparts, is in the role of language in the formation of the antiquity of the nation, consequently raising its importance in establishing a national identity that is distinct, seemingly natural in modern-day perspectives, and

¹⁶⁶ Gal Gerson and Aviad Rubin, "Cultural Nationalism and Liberal Values: An Elusive Synthesis," *International Political Science Review* 36, no. 2 (15): . 201

¹⁶⁷ Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. ed (London ; New York: Verso, 2006).

¹⁶⁸ Anderson. 6-7

necessary in the contextualization of belonging. Anderson attributes print-capitalism to the creation of higher and lower bounds of language, through the gradual formation of a vernacular that was reflective of the sociocultural homogenization of national identity.¹⁶⁹ Print-capitalism also developed an awareness of the groups existing in particular territories, which showcased the shift from regional and local awareness to a growing national (albeit sometimes superficial) identity.¹⁷⁰ The standardization of language, thus, created a shared communication space for those who seemingly belonged to both the territory and the values and ideals being contested in the socially constructed space, while simultaneously placing the non-language speakers at the fringes of those ideals and implicitly outside of the nation.¹⁷¹

2.1.2.1 The Fractures of French Identity: A Linguistically and Culturally Fractured Center and A Nearing Periphery

The rhetoric of eras, roots, and centers and peripheries are fundamental to understanding French identity because despite France being a “civically-defined nation”,¹⁷² its historical development of codifying identity from territory to blood in 1803,¹⁷³ created an implicit hierarchy,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid 44

¹⁷⁰ Ibid 46

¹⁷¹ Idola Perdini Putri, Ellisha Nasruddin, and Juliana Abdul Wahab, “Imagined Communities and the Construction of National Identity,” *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 8, no. 7 (August 13, 2018): 567-569

¹⁷² “Civic Nationalism – Uncovering Social Exclusion in Contemporary France,”

¹⁷³ Nicolas Giacomini, “Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis: Understanding the Two Concepts,” *Space Legal Issues* (blog), February 25, 2020,

which begged further questioning into when one's blood becomes French in both de jure and de facto lenses. The early modern -, colonially expansive -, and post-colonial eras represented three distinct periods in time where the French national identity and imagination homogenized, fractured, or coexisted due to the unique pressures of that period. Within the premodern era, French national identity had not yet formed to be a force of significance, as the dynastic periods effectively bolstered regional and local identification, whereby France was a conglomerate of many imagined communities who spoke distinct languages groups such as basque, allemande, bréton, flamand, and Occitan dialects.¹⁷⁴ This is evident in Eugen Weber's analysis of French identity formation as he quotes an Englishman who describes those who "live on French soil, but cannot be called Frenchmen. They speak a language as unintelligible to a Frenchman as an Englishman; they have none of the national characteristics little, perhaps, of the national blood."¹⁷⁵ To inspire the national identity that is seen today, French scholars, bureaucrats, nobles, and revolutionaries utilized civic avenues to draw populations of a regional association to a broader homogenized one, often at the cost of the destruction of local languages, shared practices, and culture.¹⁷⁶ Again Weber highlights "A lot of Frenchmen did not know that they belonged together until the long didactic campaigns of the later nineteenth century told them they did, and their own experience as conditions changed

¹⁷⁴ Kiley Bickford, "Nationalism in the French Revolution of 1789," May 2014., 1.

¹⁷⁵ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford University Press, 1976), 97

¹⁷⁶ James W. Hawkey and Jonathan R. Kasstan, "Regional and Minority Languages in France: Policies of Homogenization or a Move toward Heterogeneity? A Case Study on Francoprovençal," *The French Review* 89, no. 2 (2015): 111

told them that this made sense.”¹⁷⁷ The process of creating a High French language (a High French culture in turn) saw the creation of a center that reflected francité in terms of the metropolitan, thus placing the peasantry at the periphery whose only option in order to see socio-political and economic progression was to fall within the metropolitan francité.

“But civic integration was also integration into a particular culture, which took shape at the same time: the culture of French national identity. The national culture, which spread gradually from the center (Parisian elites) to the periphery (geographically and socially remote groups), infused membership in the “community of citizens” with concrete emotional content. The rhetoric of “La Grande Nation,” which drew on the universalistic ambitions of the Revolution and belief in the superiority of French civilization, permanently blurred the distinction between civic integration (universalistic in principle) and cultural assimilation (particularistic by definition), as recurrent debates over the law of nationality attest.”¹⁷⁸

Colonial (and the subsequent decolonial) periods saw the racialization and homogenization of the “national” center, as the increased contact and knowledge of those which such a significant phenotypical, cultural, and linguistic, entrenched the ideas of similarity and harmony among even the most conflictual French regions.¹⁷⁹ In the political crafting of French identity from within ones

¹⁷⁷ Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*. 113

¹⁷⁸ Berenson, Duclert, and Prochasson, *The French Republic*. 139

¹⁷⁹ Riva Kastoryano, “Immigration and Identities in France: The War of Words,” *French Politics and Society* 14, no. 2 (1996): 61

borders, to be projected outward to external territories, civic approaches such as universalism were used as a means to standardize the treatment of the polity. However, French colonial universalism was also used to emphasize the hegemonic power dynamic through racial historicism. Racial historicism is described as the perspective held by Europeans that non-European socio-cultural norms were inferior to that of European socio-cultural and political standards and that indigenous people were to be corrected through means of socio-cultural reframing.¹⁸⁰ Where racial historicism sought to justify the banality and brutality of colonialism as a force of reeducation and for the overall social benefit and progression of those colonized people, French universalism sought to provide a worthwhile end to justify those means such that they would be treated equally as their “particular identities” faded away. Thus those colonial subjects would gain the opportunity to acquire francité through civic means of citizenship, language adoption, and republic value attribution, however, they would still be fundamentally tied to their places of origin in the socio-cultural and political realms of identity.

Despite the non-ethnic roots of French national identity and its seeming indivisibility and universality, the national narrative still holds memories of elements of a heroic past, even before the Revolution, that separates routed Frenchman from “off-branched Frenchmen”. A 2005 New York Times article, “What Makes Someone French”, betrayed the misgivings of the state-handling of France as a multiethnic and nuanced Republic, which can be seen by Yazid Slabeg’s comments on how French education was still informed by primordial sentiments.¹⁸¹ The article stated: “France doesn't know how to manage diversity,” he said. “It doesn't want to accept the

¹⁸⁰ David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002). 156

¹⁸¹ Craig S. Smith, “What Makes Someone French?,” *The New York Times*, November 11, 2005, sec. World,

consequences of a multiethnic society." Like most French schoolchildren, he was taught that his ancestors were Gauls and that "in 732, Charles Martel, the Mayor of the Palace, repelled the Arabs in Poitiers."¹⁸² While institutionally the French do not utilize hyphenated determinants in describing those within its borders, the Afro-French and Maghrebi experience reflect that there is a hierarchy present within conceptualizations of French national identity which is propagated by the state and media in their depictions and descriptions of those who seem to belong to the former empire.

In 2005, the death of two teenage boys of Malian and Tunisian descent, (Bouna Traore and Ziad Benna, respectively), in a power substation, when hiding from the police at Clichy-sous-Bois, ignited wide-spread protests.¹⁸³ The 2005 French Riots called against institutionalized oppression and criminalization of POC (especially those with migrant backgrounds) in France. Since the 2005 riots, which revealed the depth of inequity and mistreatment that goes unaddressed by de jure universalism, there have been considerable expansions to notions of the French national identity and expressions of nationhood in a multi-identified society such that new national heroes who exist within the "française de multiculturelle/tronc" category are celebrated as true reflections of francité. However, such advances seem conditional on certain successes and culturally identifiable actions in emotionally heightened circumstances, such that their actions either bolster their francité or invalidate it and relegate them as being a "local foreigner" in the larger French nation. This can be seen with the racialization of French soccer players, from Zinedine Zidane to Paul Pogba, such

¹⁸² Smith. "What Makes Someone French"

¹⁸³ Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, "Understanding Urban Riots in France," *Brookings* (blog), November 30, 1AD,

that their francité remained relative to how much they defended and upheld their racial and religious identities, thus making them vulnerable to xenophobia as the protection of those identities from discrimination under the French model would emphasize particularism over universalism.¹⁸⁴ Thus the discrimination towards Maghreban workers, police brutality towards and hyper surveillance of Afro-French in men all reflect the inadequacies of such laws and pitfalls of French universalism, as legal equality within the abstracted French identity is hardly practiced in reality and there is a visceral dichotomy between the “real” and “created” French.¹⁸⁵ While the descendants of migrants’ exposure to the dominant or majority culture since birth or a highly impressionable age impact their views on social self-perception and origin, their ethnic identities remain significant in the external perception of themselves. Patrick Simon reveals a similar sentiment in sayings “To have been born in France shifts the center of gravity of origin but does not eliminate a continued reference to one’s parents’ country: three-quarters of descendants of immigrants state it among their origins.”¹⁸⁶ Thus to evaluate understandings of who belongs to the French nation, national identity, and imaginations, there must be a contextualization of the implicit hierarchies within French society, which go unaddressed in the civic arena despite growing identity tension within.

French nationalism is rooted in shared ideas based on the enlightenment, the developmental hopes of a shared political destiny as the political directives of the state change through increasing civic engagement, where mastery of the French language is a reflection of solidarity to “la patrie”

¹⁸⁴ “The Penalties of Universalism: Football and French Racism,” Weave News

¹⁸⁵ “Fighting Racism Is What Makes Us Universalists,”

¹⁸⁶ Patrick Simon, “French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to the National Community?,” n.d., 25. 15

and a reflection of ones francité. However, Francité, Frenchness, or French National Identity, despite it being marketed as universal in nature and representative of communities of sentiment who consent to belong together, reflect ideas of the nation that are increasingly informed by practices of intrardiscrimination. This means that if France progressed from prioritizing regional ties to national ties, which is manifested in the erasure and homogenization of particular identities such as race, religion, ethnicity in law, etc, unequal treatment within the system where everyone is universally French only serves to highlight that categories of members of the same umbrella group are stills differentiated as “others”. Despite the creation of a common national identity through the promotion of secularism, liberal human rights ideology, and linguistic commonality, recent years have shown that the myth of the colorblind and antique French society is significantly fractured as issues of identity contradict the carefully curated sense of belonging and togetherness formed through political ideology and institutional governance.

2.1.3 Double-Consciousness and the Consequences of Black Hypervisibility in Europe

Coined by W.E.B Du Bois in 1903 in “The Soul of Black Folks”, double consciousness is “feeling as though your identity is divided into several parts, making it difficult or impossible to have one unified identity.¹⁸⁷ Du Bois highlights that the liberty and freedom dreamed of and demanded by the enslaved populations is not a true liberty that they achieved. In their liberation, black people in the United States view themselves from the perspectives of their communities (as former slaves, as struggling community members, etc), however, to thrive in a white society, they

¹⁸⁷ “Understanding W.E.B. Du Bois’ Concept of Double Consciousness « Kristin Does Theory,”

also view themselves from the perspectives of their white counterparts. What makes Du Bois' statements impactful is that this disillusion he discusses, in terms of black people struggling to experience a true realization of self that is not in opposition to any preconceived notion, still exists today, especially in academic and social settings. The existence of black people in primarily white spaces for extended periods distorts their view of themselves, as black experiences and cultural norms are posited as outside of what is deemed socially acceptable and proper. Black students consistently face micro-aggressive behavior from their non-black counterparts, which leads to internalizing the oppressive and prejudiced lenses through which society views them. Many feel as though they must sacrifice elements of their ways of speech, celebration, and expressions of sadness to advance in predominantly white spaces to make their white counterparts more comfortable and open to the suggestions that they might pose in the future. Today to be black is also to experience the feeling of being an imposter in the non-black environments that you are in, as your alienation encourages feelings of self-doubt. This hyper-focused sense of self-awareness and how they may be made othered in social situations enforces the feelings of imposter syndrome because, despite their success and capabilities, the implicit bias and systems of racial inequality within society continue to create a distance between who they are and who they are perceived to be.

The black experience across the globe is complex and nuanced, as the regions in which African descendants reside engender their own socioeconomic, sociocultural, and sociopolitical challenges that those of African descent must navigate. The enduring legacy of colonialism, racial historicism, and slavery, propagated by the European states and the United States of America (US), have characterized the daily experiences of those of African descent (both citizens and migrants) in those regions, and the varying degrees of injustice and inequality that they face.

In Europe, the treatment of continental African descendants is characterized by delineating them as “the other” in covert terms, such as utilizing the legality of their status, and their hypervisibility in primarily white environments, to further oppress and discriminate against them. Such can be seen with the “Sans papier” laborers who initiated the Black Vest protests in France, whereby they opposed Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly repressive migration policies and advocated for migrant laborer rights.¹⁸⁸ In Italy, undocumented migrant’ laborers are exploited as cheap, efficient labor without workers’ rights as they fulfill “lavoro nero” (black jobs)¹⁸⁹ in which they are paid significantly below minimum wage (€2/h instead of €9.50).¹⁹⁰

In the European sports and entertainment industries African descendants face increasing stigmatization as they are often viewed through racialized and ethnocentric lenses. The existence of Afro-Europeans within the nation is often only viewed as positive when they achieve exceptional feats that bring the community critical acclaim, such that to be viewed and treated as equal they must go beyond and succeed despite their blackness rather than because of it.¹⁹¹ This is significant as it illustrates how Afro-Europeans exist as both invisible and hyper-visible entities within European society. African descendants are simultaneously hypersexualized and perceived as unwelcomed “others” infiltrating and tainting an otherwise homogenous white society from an ethnocentric standpoint. However, they were also invisible in the legal and socioeconomic aspects

¹⁸⁸ 2nacheki, *The Black Vests Fight For France’s African Undocumented Migrants*, 2019,

¹⁸⁹ “The Shattered Dreams of African Migrants - YouTube,”

¹⁹⁰ Lorenzo Tondo, “Brutal Deaths of Exploited Migrants Shine a Spotlight on Italy’s Farms,” *The Guardian*, July 13, 2020, sec. Global development

¹⁹¹ *Thierry Henry Talks About Racism In Europe And The USA And Has A Message For Football Fans*, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2Yx9L4jZ4>.

through the refusal to acknowledge that race plays a significant role in the opportunities one can achieve due to the enduring colonial sentiments that pervade European society.

3.0 Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Conceptual Framework

In reviewing the development of in- and outgroup sentiments across time and space, I used the aforementioned theories to construct a conceptual framework that considered how belonging, and exclusionary, hostile, and xenophobic sentiments could be perceived by the immigrants in South Africa and France. Against the backdrop of the global perceptions of migrants and their externalized identities, this framework explores exclusion and othering within Brewer's analysis that intergroup relations have traditionally been explored dualistically: at the interpersonal level, and the subordinate social category level (reflecting community perceptions, institutions, and systems). Rather than follow a deterministic approach, this framework rather suggests that the exclusion and othering are representations of the theories against the backdrop of the case countries' histories of interacting with outgroups. This approach was taken to leave room for new findings during the interview and qualitative analysis process. A key approach of this research was to bring the voices and experiences of the migrants to the fore of the conversations on the impact of social exclusion and xenophobic expression on their lives. Thus, this framework seeks to analyze how interpersonal and intergroup exclusion manifests in the lives of the migrants, where they experience unbelonging on two interconnected levels: the personalized and depersonalized.

Experiencing Unbelonging

This framework posits personalized unbelonging as immigrants experiencing individual exclusion, being perceived as a threat, or encountering hostility and othering due to individual perpetrators' beliefs and actions. These actions and beliefs are founded on their perceptions of who

should be denied societal membership, their internalized narratives of the other, and the stereotypical lenses with which they regard outsiders and their identifiable characteristics. Working in tandem with the individual actions and prejudices of the perpetrators of unbelonging and xenophobia, depersonalized unbelonging seeks to explain the experiences that immigrants experience when their social exclusion is based on the collective discrimination of their migrant group, such that their identity as an immigrant has been homogenized (depersonalized). Depersonalized unbelonging will refer to immigrants experiencing group or homogenized exclusion, hostility, and othering due to encountering the formal power structures between the victim and system. This oppression that the immigrants experience will be due to policies, existing practices of social stratification and oppression, governing institutions, geopolitical history, media depictions, and sociocultural codes/conditions.

While personalized and depersonalized unbelonging focuses on the consequences of intergroup conflict and the beliefs and actions about and towards the other, these concepts are also grounded in social domination theory as well as anti-racist pedagogy. Social domination theory conceptualizes three elements that are key to understanding the oppression of individuals who are perceived to have a low social value in specific societal constructions, in this case, such perceptions target migrants, specifically African immigrants.¹⁹² The first is individual discrimination, the second: is institutional discrimination, and the third: is behavior asymmetry between different social groups which either bolster their status in society or have a tendency to inhibit

¹⁹² Jim Sidanius, *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression* (Cambridge, UK ; Cambridge University Press, 1999).

advancement.¹⁹³ Anti-racist pedagogy notes that race and ethnicity-based discrimination occurs as an as a process that exists on many levels, specifically the individual, interpersonal, internalized, cultural, institutional, and cultural levels.¹⁹⁴ A challenge that I must accept with utilizing these two categories is a fact that personalized unbelonging can be a consequence of depersonalized policies of exclusion, and depersonalized unbelonging, can also be based on the personalized prejudices of those in power, who create the laws, policies, and shape the overall social stratifications and political realities. Thus, in this framework, experiences of unbelonging are fluid and the level that one personally feels affronted by a situation, versus them, feeling situationally and societally othered differs according to their personal conceptualizations of identity, agency, how welcome one should feel in a society, what one needs to do to belong etc.

Expressions of Unbelonging

Understanding the personalized and depersonalized experiences of unbelonging stand as expressions themselves, I wanted to see how the tensions which supported such experiences came into being in terms of communication. Thus it seemed logical to utilize the concept of covert and covert communication processes of expressions of tension as the first would address the visibility, the physical and explicit harm (as well as the intentionality of a perpetrator's actions); whereas the other would, respectively, explore, the subtle and subdued ways in which membership, belonging, and the acceptance of immigrants were denied. Within this conceptual framework, references to overt expressions of xenophobia and unbelonging refer to the visible, spoken and ultimately

¹⁹³ Serge Guimond, "Individual and Institutional Discrimination: Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of Social Psychology," *Appartenances & Altérités*, no. 3 (March 1, 2023)

¹⁹⁴ "Antiracism Glossary: Racial Equity Consciousness Institute,"

explicit actions which target immigrants with intentionality to cause harm (physical, psychological, emotional, financial, etc.). Complimentary to the overt expressions refer to the subdued, subtle, biased, and prejudiced behaviors, which gives the perpetrator deniability. Even though attitudes and actions may not be explicitly stated, it manifests in ways that have real-life consequences. As stated before, these categories seek to emphasize the variation in expression, not suggest that one expression is mutually exclusive from the other. This framework seeks to emphasize that both the experiences and expressions of unbelonging that migrants face are interlinked and continually influencing one another. This illustrated framework (see figure 1) is useful as it specifically relates to the experiences of immigrants in countries where they are subject to social, economic, political, and cultural oppression and denial of membership, experience tensions with 'autochthonous' groups, and whose discrimination is considered a work of justice by insiders.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework to Understanding How Migrants Experience Unbelonging and How Unbelonging is Expressed

3.2 Methodology

In this research, xenophobia, social exclusion, and sentiments of unbelonging were evaluated through conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews with migrant populations and their descendants. They were evaluated in two main groups: young people between the approximate ages 18-35 (Group A) and those between 36-65 (Group B) with considerable life experience. These interviews were conducted with migrants from Hillbrow, within the central business district of Johannesburg, and with migrants in Reims, France.

The purpose of this research is highly qualitative and seeks to gain an indicative understanding to complement the deductive and theoretical evaluation of the case overviews already found in the previous sections. These interviews followed an ethnographic design seeking to understand community experiences, rather than act as a statistical representation of all of the experiences of the participant groups. Informed by the theoretical analysis conceptual framework laid out above and in previous sections, I sought out 6 participants to interview per group (12 total per country), with the understanding of discrimination based on race and ethnicity already being streamlined throughout the research sub-grouped by their gender, age, and socioeconomic experiences. In creating these stratifications based on gender and age I hoped to gain a better spread of qualitative data on what differences might exist in the exclusionary practices that the younger or older generation face, as well as how that impacts their experiences with belonging. The participants were brought into the study by contacting local gatekeepers, organizations, and

community members who understood the migrant communities in the area. These actors invited the participants to come and share their stories voluntarily. Another way members of the public became voluntary interviewees was by just encountering them in daily life and having conversations with them. In speaking out about our lives, I would invite them to consider being part of the research for those who would fit into the study.

The migrants were asked to share their experiences on belonging, identity, the factors that they feel contribute towards their position and treatment within society, and how they would like to see challenges of xenophobia resolved. Some other questions may have included informal discussions on the role of race relations and colonial legacies on their belonging and quality of life, the role of religious identities, and tolerance as it relates to their belonging or othering. Additionally, they were asked whether sentiments of unbelonging and xenophobia seem prevalent towards all groups of migrants or if there was a hierarchy/ alternative variable that is impacting their experiences, as well as the role of gender in understanding and interacting with the “other”. They were encouraged to share their stories, experiences, and histories, as those (with their consent) will aid the assessment of existing sentiments on the ground. Before each interview was conducted the participants received printed copies of the interview questions, and relevant definitions in English (South Africa/France) or French (France) detailing the following

- The general description of the research
- The research questions
- An overview of the methods
- The participant’s verbal consent is needed to record the interviews,

- Information on the risk involved, any compensation involved, and how any of their identifying information will remain confidential for the publishing of this research.
- Their ability to request a break, reschedule, or withdraw from the interview process and the research in general
- Their right to have their data completely removed and erased from the research.

4.0 Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis

This qualitative analysis is based on the questions and sections outlined in the interview guide used in South Africa and France which sought to understand the migrants' experiences with unbelonging. This included how they have been treated, their perceptions on their quality of life, who they believe are the targets of xenophobic violence and exclusion, and what they consider as possible solutions to their situation. These interviews were conducted in a public space due to the logistical challenges of setting up formal meeting places. In South Africa, the migrants' (valid) fears of being ambushed in an unknown place, made creating a "controlled" environment a non-option for these interviews. During the interviews, the participants were recorded, and field notes were taken in a soft-cover notebook to document some key points and note their level of comfort during the process.

The participants from both age groups 18-35 and 36-65 interviewed one at a time, in no specific order, so the documentation of their ages was in them sharing their age and it being written down in the fieldnote journal or on the recording. In South Africa, the interviews were conducted with the gatekeeper and an experienced public health and demography field researcher present. However, in France, finding gatekeepers and community researchers proved more difficult than imagined, as I didn't have any formerly established connections, and I was on an academically rigorous exchange program at the same time. The participants with whom I engaged were thus individual relations that I had built during my 4-month stay. In South Africa, these migrants mostly identified as Zimbabwean, even though some were also South African citizens. The participants were a mix of people who were directly from Zimbabwe (whether legally or illegally), were born in South Africa to at least one parent or grandparent from outside the country, or had lived in South Africa for several years. In France, these participants were from a wider range of countries (i.e.:

Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, etc.) and similar to the South African participants, some were (dual) citizens of France with migrant backgrounds.

4.1 South Africa

In preparation for my trip to Johannesburg (Joburg as it is commonly called), I remember being told to keep an open mind and prepare to address the challenges along the way. Despite having grown up in South Africa for most of my life -and the seeds of this research being planted in my mind due to my own encounters with news of xenophobic action and having difficulty with finding membership despite being a citizen – I knew that this time it would have to be different. In finalizing my interview guide that April, receiving my IRB Exemption Approval from the University of Pittsburgh's Institutional Board Review, and seeking guidance from Dr. Loren Landau on how best to navigate questions and research on migration and xenophobic tension in South Africa, I stepped into conducting ethnographic research.

The first step was recognizing my positionality. I had grown up in this city; gone to school here; and shaped my personal understanding of self-based on what it meant to be from here, elsewhere, and the places which lay in-between. While some may consider that a barrier in remaining unbiased and objective in the face of experiences to which I may personally relate or may evoke emotional reactions from me, I considered my (broad) exposure to the community and participants in question an advantage. In this case, I fit back into the cadence of my “Model C” accent (a colloquial term used to describe the accent of many black South Africans developed after attending formerly all-white schools) and societal rhythms (what my French participants would call codes) of Joburg. My accent, while different from theirs, and my showing them that I was

someone from a migrant background too, allowed my participants to be more open with me about their experience than I imagine my American accent would have.

It is also important to note that these interviews occurred in parallel to the xenophobic upheaval and operations largely ascribed to the actions of Operation Dudula in June of 2022 in Hillbrow and surrounding areas. Throughout the previous months, there had been Dudula affiliates harassing foreigners, aggressively telling them to show their proof of legal residency without the legal grounds to do so, and also threatening them with claims of desiring to reclaim the South African economy back from foreigners.¹⁹⁵ As many of the interviews were conducted after the aforementioned Yeoville fire, it was important to respect and uphold the migrants' invisibility more than ever and that came with making efforts to (re)blend and also reassure them that I understood their fears and we were safe.

4.1.1 Experiences of Unbelonging, Exclusion, and Xenophobia

4.1.1.1 Fear, Unsafety, An Inability to Advance

In sharing their experiences and understandings of exclusions, I spoke to migrants about how they understood inclusion and exclusion, along with sharing some of their experiences of such. Both young and old cohorts shared that their exclusion ranged from being called names, difficulty accessing to access services, to feeling scared to reveal their identities or have their identities exposed. The exclusion they describe could also be characterized by their inability to feel safe, their exposure to violence, how people viewed them as a threat, and how they felt rejected

¹⁹⁵ Sunday Times, Phathu Luvhengo, “Foreigners Who Lost Their Stalls in Yeoville Market Fire Fear for the Future,” TimesLIVE,

by their immediate or non-immigrant communities. In discussing the way xenophobia, and exclusion have been exacted against them, the participants discussed the challenges that they had faced with finding and maintaining work, along with feeling like they cannot advance beyond a certain point because of how people perceive them, and the fears that they will be targeted because of their migrant identities.

The public does not respect the right of foreigners. They violate people, like the operation Dudula. – Male, Group B, South Africa

I was scared to go out because of that xenophobia because I thought that anything bad was gonna happen to me and my family so I was always hiding myself in the house – Female, Group B, South Africa

You can never never let your guard down. You do not feel safe, neither can you be sure of what is happening next. Any situation could result in violence against migrants. – Male, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.2 The Names You Are Called, The Invisible Wounds

In discussing the seemingly non-violent experiences of being excluded, participant shared their experiences of name calling and being ridiculed for identity markers outside of their control. One female participant in the young cohort told me of experience of her cousin whose self-esteem and mental health struggled after he was ridiculed for his identity as a Zimbabwean, his height, and his accent. She shared how his fear of being othered or ridiculed by those in his environment placed him in a position of dependency and further isolation as he was afraid to go to the shops or banks because he was worried about the way he would be treated. Other participants shared that

feeling excluded was also in not being understood and the fact that they have to hide who they are lest they face discrimination.

[My] cousin that came, and he was ridiculed for everything, the way he spoke, height, his accent. He requested to be sent back to Zim, because he was so affected. He couldn't go to the shop, he couldn't go to the bank or even clothing shops because he was worried about the way he would be treated. He went back to Zim but he never recovered from the isolation and bad feelings he got. He is mentally affected.- Female, Group A, South Africa

The negative people call you names , and call people like you names, like kwerekwere, it doesn't feel right but you have to put it outside you and live your life because if you put it in your heart, its gonna bug you.

– Male, Group A, South Africa

We are people who look like them but they don't understand us at all. I keep living a life that doesn't show I am a foreigner by ancestry, because I tell people I am from Rustenburg, I speak Tswana, even my immediate supervisor at work believes I'm from the same place with him. I don't reveal my true identity or my true place of origin. Its too complicated. – Female, Group A,

South Africa

As things stand I cannot even afford rent. I sleep 3 days at the BP garage [petrol/ gas station]... this is a very freezing winter. I have faced bad treatments, some are good and some are bad.... But the general reaction from

people is bad.- Male, Group B, South Africa

4.1.1.3 Experiences of the Older Generation

In discussing their experiences with unbelonging and exclusion, both men and women in the older cohorts (Group B) reflected on how their experiences with unbelonging or feeling like an outsider today either changed or persisted as years, and sometimes decades passed. They faced challenges on many sides: due to their foreign identities, but also situations that continue to impact the country and its citizens at large. Many participants in the younger cohort also shared the experiences of their parents and the exclusion that they faced despite working in South Africa for many years.

People talk badly to us from Zim. I came to SA in 2000 but still the people treated me badly. One day I parked my car in front of a flat and went inside but the car was gone when I returned, with all the tools. I started buying and selling small items like cigarettes, snacks etc, and that was also a problem. The people in the location where I stayed came to take everything. Life went so bad. – Male, Group B, South Africa

I was here since 2010 and things are not going alright, things are up and down especially jobs, so its difficult... I was working as a domestic worker[housekeeper].... Because of corona I lose all of my jobs - Female, Group B, South Africa

Focusing for me is seasonal, depending on the type of alert at a particular point in time. Foreigners are always excluded, you can hardly be included. My father has an ID, doing transportation business but they come in the night to attack and take what he has. That affected his self esteem, he

couldn't get himself, till he left, went back to Zim. – Female, Group A, South Africa.

4.1.1.4 Who You Know Shapes Where You Are, Female, Group A

I spoke to a female participant from the Group A (young) cohort, who was both South African and Zimbabwean, about her experiences. She told me how it would be better for her to hide her foreign citizenship and just keep to the narrative that she is from Rustenburg, as the history of her family's migration (which spanned several countries) would make it more difficult for people to be receptive towards her. She tells me before she discloses her identity to others, a close bond needs to be created. To her, who you know in the community and the tips that they give you to blend in are key elements of how you can avoid being excluded or targeted as a foreigner. What could give you away would be the way you dress, the way you hold your phone, the way you speak etc.

Before you migrate to another province or move to a new place or something you have to find someone that is going to understand, you also have to do your own research.- Female, Group A, South Africa

When you grew up in Zim and then you come this side there is the way that they tell with the tongue, because even though she tries to twist her tongue [not give her Zimbabwean accent away], its easier for people to pick it up. .-

Female, Group A, South Africa

When you get to locations like Soweto, or locations like Cosmo City they can also tell by the way you are dressed, you understand? .- Female,

Group A, South Africa

For some people I can say it's so difficult because those people are there to watch how you dress, how you look, how you do things and even then it so difficult for them to welcome you. – Female, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.5 Identification, Being Exposed, and Feeling Unwanted

In explaining her experiences with attitudes of acceptance or rejection, she reflected that if you identify yourself with Zimbabwe, the attitude that people have towards you is always different. These topics highlighted the specific phrases, such as *makwerekwere*, that are used to indicate non-migrants dislike of foreigners. She spoke about needing to explain how you got your identification document (ID) if someone found out that you were a foreigner, and if your story is too long or you cannot explain how you got your ID, then that is a problem in itself. She tells me how this would invite an endless line of questioning. In speaking about the challenges she faced, she spoke about how difficult it would be to find a new job if she was unhappy with the way she was being treated despite having South African citizenship.

You'll always be the suspect, something goes wrong at work and they [foreigners] are always the first people to be asked. I think there is this... fear, they are not trusted, people don't have faith in them. -Female, Group A, South Africa

They undermine, criticize, saying you can't do things right because you are from Zim. You are never taken serious. They make you feel unwanted, that they don't like you. – Male Participant, Group A, South Africa

*Some people say bad things about us, they say they don't want us here.
So they say we should go back to Zim, but no economy at Zim- Female*

Participant, Group B, South Africa

*It's like you don't belong anywhere, like you don't have a nationality.
Some people feel like they can just take advantage of you because they know at
the end of the day you cant even fight for yourself or fight for your right as
someone who doesn't belong anywhere. – Female, Group A, South Africa*

4.1.1.6 Operation Dudula

Across the board, the actions of Operation Dudula were mentioned several times in both gender and age cohorts. Migrants discussed the actions they had seen or heard , their own fears about being caught by Dudula affiliates, and the fact that the government has not actively tried to curb the actions of the pseudo political organization. When asked about whether they felt like they could focus on their main responsibilities and go about their daily activities with members of Operation Dudula potentially accosting them on the street, a typical answer given was that focus was conditional to the security threat they faced. That is to say when they felt more secure they felt like they could go to work and participate in society despite the challenges, but with an uptick in xenophobic violence, not being able to focus was both inevitable and extremely costly.

*Here I am not safe. The Dudula, if they know you are from Zim, they
come to fight you, throw things at you, take your stuff, even what you are
selling, they say this is not your country.- Female, Group B, South Africa*

*I don't feel inclusive [included] because the people are fighting
foreigners. They ask for documents and when you give your document, its still*

not enough. If you are not with your document there and then, the Dudula beats you up- Female, Group B, South Africa

The public does not respect the right of foreigners. They violate people, like the operation Dudula.- Male, Group B, South Africa

When the Yeoville market was burnt down, there was a high level of alert, migrants were not going out, impossible to go to work or anywhere at all, for fear of your life, so you cannot focus.- Male, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.7 Exclusion at an Organizational Level

As mentioned before, the participants pointed out that exclusion, xenophobia, and unbelonging that also occurred at an organizational, policy, access to services and opportunities level. The participants perceived that there were little to no policies that were available to stop the violence towards and discrimination against them, but also protect them from being exploited. This was evident in a male participant from the older cohort. He spoke about how he had 2 stalls where he was doing his business, but some government officials started coming to confiscate his stalls and goods. With officials going about confiscating goods and wares of those doing business, he told us that has been unable to pay the people from whom he borrowed money to set up the stalls in the first place. He recalled how he felt exploited and abused by people when they would intentionally look to underpay him for highly skilled labor. It is this continuous cycle of being taken advantage that made him decide that he is no longer interested in looking for promotions, and he no longer cares about his career.

....I have no control over the policy that says there should be no job for anyone without ID, and I do not have control over the processes of getting a

ID for myself, policies and laws do contribute to exclusion and exploitation.-

Male, Group B, South Africa

There are some policies in place, but people took advantage of it wrongfully using it against foreigners.- Male, Group B, South Africa

I don't see any policies that are for us, to protect us migrants. We are excluded from policies here or policies are there to make us feel excluded.-

Male, Group A, South Africa

When I got shot, I needed the bullet to be taken out of my leg. When I got to the [public] hospital, was told yes, we are going to help you, but you need to pay first before we can do anything... only got assistance after I paid R2500, even though its an emergency. – Male, Group A, South Africa

The police officers go out to arrest the us men when we are going to work, either while going for night shifts or while returning from night shifts. They know that South Africans don't agree to do the night shifts especially in security companies. So police officers don't go about arresting people during the daytime, but rather they do a targeted arrest when the migrants are going for night shifts. They patrol only when migrants are going to work or returning from work.- Male Group A, South Africa

People are bad, for example, the police are supposed to be doing a good job but when you contact them, they want bribes from you before they do anything. They demand for bribes from you a foreigner before they can do their work.- Male, Group B, South Africa

4.1.1.8 The Challenges of Employment

Younger male participants highlighted the cut-throat nature of maintaining ones employment opportunities when one is a foreigner. They mentioned how there was no room for mistakes, or being lazy, and how easy it will be to lose your job even if you cannot come to work for legitimate reasons, such as being sick. One discussed how there is preferential treatment for white migrants or white South Africans as something important to address. Participants also discussed how generally there are people more accepting or tolerant of foreigners as colleagues, whereas with others one should not expect to be welcomed, liked, or tolerated.

If a migrant is sick and is unable to come to work, even when they know, they will be fired. if the migrant that has been with the company for a very long time makes any slightest mistake, they will be told to go and think about what they did-no pay. Pedi, Tswana, Sotho are more accommodating but the Zulus You can be working with them but they are not with you. The Zulus can turn against you at any time without a reason.- Male, Group A, South Africa

At work, when my line manager was a foreigner, growth was inevitable, but the line manager has been changed to a white South African, now the potential for growth is gone. Male, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.9 Where the Negativity, Exclusion, Hostility, and Xenophobia Come From

In asking the participants their opinion on why they felt like people behaved towards them (as individuals and as members of the “foreigner” group) with negativity, exclusion, hostility, and xenophobia, their answers centered around similar themes. They highlighted that some of the

foreigners were dangerous people and commit crimes and robbery, which make people angry and afraid. Others mentioned that the South Africans feel threatened because they know that the foreigners are willing to work out of desperation and a need to send money back home. Additionally, one young, male participant spoke about the fact that they (the foreigners) are willing to do the “dirty work”- the work that the South Africans do not want to do.

They are so afraid of us because they know we are here with one mindset – to make a living. And when you are so focused with one mindset, they cant deter you, the only way to make you lose focus is to discriminate against you. – Male, Group A, South Africa

Some migrants are a menace to the society , and should be sent back immediately, while some are well skilled and need the papers, proper documentation to stay and use the skills- Female, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.10 The Opinions That Matter the Most

I asked where they thought those sentiments came from and whose mattered most- the public (as in people in everyday life) or the government (the people who are in power or the political leaders). Participants produced a variety of answers where some thought that the government and its institutions were responsible for the misinformation about migrants, and others felt as though it was the public who were taking actions into their own hands and discriminating against migrants.

I think the public because the public sees the things that the government don't see. Some people in the public live in rural areas and experience things that, cause you know if you work for the government you get paid a lot of money,

you wont live in... Alexandria... so the opinions of the public matters the most because they experience things that the government don't.. you know some things that don't get reported to the government.. if soemthing happens to the public, they report the things that happen widely, but if someone is killed around here for no reason the government will have nothing to do with it.- Male, Group A, South Africa

There is misinformation by the government and by the people. Sometimes government say the migrants are responsible for crime in the country, and the people starts killing migrants they see around, when in reality, crimes are propagated by South Africans. So both govt and people need to act based on correct information. - Male, Group A, South Africa

The influence to fight and attack foreigners come from the government, especially, the different factions of government. The government is the one that influences the opinions of the public.- Female, Group A , South Africa

The people of South Africa are not welcoming. I do not feel welcome because of the xenophobia. I was affected because I was scared t go out, because I feel anything could happen to me as soon as I step out. Only in the house is the safety. The people make life difficult for migrants because of the things they do, They shoot people and anyone can be affected. They do not understand us because of the way they treat us foreigners. The South African people don't accept us.. – Female, Group B, South Africa

Government is to be blamed for how the people are treating migrants.

The people do not have the resources to organize the level of attacks and sustain it. It is the government that is fueling it. Male, Group B, South Africa

4.1.1.11 Quality of Life

When asked about how being a migrant has impacted their quality of life (their satisfaction, feeling life their life has meaning, where they are able to live, how safe they feel) most of participants responded that they are not satisfied with their lives at present. They spoke of their struggles and that they did not feel safe or able to live without worry in South Africa.

As a migrant, you cant enjoy life though you are working hard because you are always conscious of “home”, though you visit the home once in 3 years, you continue to deny yourself of so many thins just to build a house at home. You rarely have the time to enjoy your life here.- Female, Group A, South Africa

There is no room for growth for me here in SA, because whenever I apply for a job they always give the job with better pay to south Africans, irrespective of the fact that I am better skilled than the locals- Female, Group B , South Africa

As a migrant, you cant enjoy life though you are working hard because you are always conscious of “home”, though you visit the home once in 3 years, you continue to deny yourself of so many things just to build a house at home. You rarely have the time to enjoy your life here.- Female, Group A, South Africa

When I get a job, I will not have the quality of life I desire because I would be focused on sending money home- Male, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.11.1 The Importance of Where You Live

In discussing what impacts their perception of their lives, they highlighted that finding a safe place to live was a priority and safety was not something that could be achieved anywhere.

I cannot even consider going to live in Soweto, going there will be suicidal, impossible, because he will be surrounded by many South Africans who are envy-minded, ready to attack foreigners and kill, just for being in their midst. – Male, Group A, South Africa

Here is South Africa there are different places, like locations or provinces or towns that get difficult to easily blend in with the people...I ask myself why they would decide to live in such places [where xenophobic violence is prevalent], and they tell you the rent is cheaper- Female, Group A, South Africa

It is important to know that the place you live can easily show where you come from, locations are migrant country of origin linked. . Many people from SA are also discriminated against when they speak languages spoken in neighboring countries, like Ndebele.- Male, Group A, South Africa

I don't feel safe in SA. The people here engage in so much crime, the crime makes life complicated and feel unsafe. Male, Group A, South Africa

4.1.1.12 The Hopes for the Future, Possible Solutions

Finally, participants were asked about their hopes for the future and how life for migrants could be made better, if they had the power to do so. Some participants looked towards largescale saying that the government should provide more accessible pathways to access documentation so that migrants can work in South Africa. Others mentioned that foreigners who commit crimes to be sent back to their countries, and for South Africans to recognize that foreigners are people with value, just like them.

Just make it easier for everyone to get documentation and as Africa why don't we all have that one nationality, so they can put there [on the passport/ documentation] African and they can put which culture, which race, and then one currency then we will all feel like we like we belong under one bloodline. – Female, Group A, South Africa

Give those who want to work the papers that can enable them to work and integrate those who are law abiding into the society- Mae, Group B, South Africa

As a South African I would need to understand that one day there will be a problem in South Africa that will make us run to Zimbabwe, so [they] need to understand that these [Zimbabweans] are also humans. When they say xenophobia and South Africans kill Zimbabweans like chickens, so [they] need to understand that these are also humans that have blood like us. – Male, Group A, South Africa.

4.2 France

After conducting what I considered a successful study in Johannesburg, I was excited for the opportunity to try and do the same when I was in France. I had spent months working practicing my French, getting all the documents and visa paperwork out of the way, and settling my accommodation and semester schedule. This time, the challenge would be to find a way to connect with different migrant communities while not knowing where they were, as France does not allow data to be collected based on race or ethnic origin, or how open the participants would be when it came to being interviewed and recorded. This would be paired with being a full-time student, being involved on campus, while also taking some time to learn more about France outside of just the touristy places where I was situated. As I was conducting a modified study of the previous one, I received another IRB Exemption Approval from the University of Pittsburgh's IRB, and this time I was both participant and observer. In this circumstance, I was an American and African immigrant to France and an interviewer seeking to understand the sociopolitical and cultural conditions and experiences which invited feelings of (un)belonging and exclusion in France. With this as my justification and seeing the precedent in Dr. Jean Beaman's chapter on her time in France as a "Black (American) Girl in the Banlieue" ethnographer, I chose to continue with the same interview guide, however, the analysis of my interviews would be in an autoethnographic account.

When I got to France, I received guidance and supervision from Prof. Olivier Godechot, an award-winning French sociologist and professor. In being familiar with the challenges of qualitative research in France, he was sympathetic to the apprehensions I brought to him and the challenges that I was having in recruiting participants. The pre-interview process took much longer with navigating the bureaucratic side of obtaining the correct approvals and paying careful

attention to the wording of questions so as not to break any (un)spoken rules that an *étranger* [foreigner] may not be aware of. As I was also outside of more popular migrant areas, 45 minutes outside of Paris, his suggestions, of finding participants through personally investing and engaging in environments where people of the African diaspora find community, corroborated the advice of my supervisor back home in Pittsburgh, Dr. Germain.

As I was situated closer to my exchange university and *centre-ville* [the city center] than the migrant communities on the outskirts of the city, many of the *milieux diasporiques et transculturels* [diasporic and cross-cultural environments] that I visited and my interview participants were within my immediate proximity. Two key *milieux diasporiques et transculturels* stand out in my mind. The first was an *épicerie* [corner store] that I constantly visited which sold cuisine, clothing, and hair products found in Francophone West Africa (from Mali, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire). I remember feeling at home there, despite being nervous to speak French in front of native French speakers, I was always greeted warmly, as I made my way to the almost-ripe plantain. I was happy to share news about how my research was going and sharing why I felt it was important to understand what it meant to feel welcome or excluded in French society as an African immigrant. In the short 4-months I was there, I established an easy friendship with the African store cooks and cashiers, and *Maman* [Mom], the ever-patient mother-figure and chef of the corner store who told me that my French was better than I gave myself credit for. While people in the store were open to telling others about my study and seeing me multiple times a week, despite asking (many times), there was hesitancy in being formally interviewed. Although I did not get to interview any workers within the store, I believe that interacting with customers, and the workers themselves, as well as just exposure to the space, showed me that this corner store was more than just a place to buy something and leave. Just being in that environment was an opportunity to build

a connection with people who had something in common with me, regardless our individual ties to the African cuisine or items that were being bought.

The second key location I visited was a hair and beauty store in *centre-ville* owned by a Nigerian immigrant who had moved to France about 2 years ago for work. In visiting the store for both personal reasons, as well as wanting to learn more about the immigrants who owned businesses in the area for research purposes, I approached him about my study and he was willing to be interviewed. While I learned a lot about what brought him to France, his views on being included, safe, and how he has dealt with exclusion, it was the similar feelings of being in a place that was familiar with items and accents that you recognize, which made me excited to conduct this research.

While I encountered and had many conversations with many African immigrants and people from the African diaspora in Reims. Out of the interviews I conducted, with some ranging from 20 minutes to our conversation taking us to almost 2 hours due to the bulk of information given, I have included 5 experiences in this autoethnographic analysis. Following my exploratory model, my interviews produced key information about the importance of understanding the social codes as a measure of an immigrant's success in France. Participants also discussed role of anti-blackness in French society which was propagated through looks, comments on their (lack of) accent, their hair and assumptions about their personality. Our discussions on the importance of integrating into a society so that one can feel accepted into it, by two key participants, challenged me to see the issues of exclusion and unbelonging in France as a responsibility between immigrants from their dynamic gave and take perspective, rather than an ultimatum-based 'win-lose' lens. The participants also discussed the ways that migrants feel excluded when they feel like they are going to lose their culture; how people misidentify them even if they are French citizens, and the real

and present threat of racism which was often spoken about as a main source of exclusion that the younger migrants felt.

4.2.1 Experiences of Identity Difference, Anti-Black Racism, Unbelonging, Exclusion, and Xenophobia

4.2.1.1 The Social Codes: Male, Group A

One of the first participants I interviewed was a male in the Group A (young) cohort. Although he was born in Cameroon come on he moved to France at the age of 4 and then move back to Cameroon and then the Congo. While he felt included overall, his inclusion was rooted in knowing how to navigate French culture, language, and society. “ I was in French high school every time. That’s where I might have felt kind of an exclusion but at the same time, we were in Africa.” In speaking about his experiences with inclusion and exclusion, he mentioned elements of being actively followed around in stores when he was out shopping with his family while on vacation in France. During the times that he did not feel actively excluded, he still felt like he had to limit or restrict his behavior and increase his presentability, in order to not be excluded. “My father, he wasn’t a strict father, but he was always really like "You need to work twice as twice as much to get half as much. It was always really like- go to the hairdresser at a regular time, always look very clean. You see your white friends going out with joggings and so on, you don’t do that."... that kind of things that would set a gap and that's where you feel a bit of a difference.”

In recounting his experiences, I learned the language of these “codes” which set the insiders apart from the outsiders in France, and he shared how his parents, in their travels and knowledge of French society, passed them down to him. His experiences of going to French school, being exposed to French culture, and learning early-on the details of building a French identity, he tells

me he feels like he understands French people and France more than they understand him. “ We don’t really have a choice you know. Us being here is because of that. Because if we don’t.. we are ghetto. We have no choice but to be that eloquent, well dressed, standing right black people. And that’s why we are here [at the university] because we understood the code, you know? And if I spoke in the same way as many white people do I wouldn’t be in the same place as they are.” He told me about an experience in which he had to go to the bank and how the teller complimented him when she found out that he was from Cameroon. “She was like "Oh but your French is so nice. You speak, your French is amazing" and I was like, well we basically speak French in Cameroon, and she was like "Yeah but you have no accent." These experiences were not unfamiliar to him, and while it might have bothered him some time earlier, he didn't feel hurt by it because he had already expected that it would have happened. he told me that he didn't think about it too much because he knows that she will probably do that to somebody else, and he just wanted to get on with his day. Overall, he was satisfied and felt fulfilled in his life, but also indicated that he felt like he has less of the right to make a mistake because he was in someone else’s country

What she implied by saying that, its just “dommage” [a shame] that her projection of black people is only people who speak [with an accent], but she said it as something really good, like you don’t have an accent that’s really impressive, but if I had an accent what would be the problem? First, and second the thing, is that for her she would see a black person and she would already think of someone who is not really integrated, who has a strong accent, maybe who didn’t go to French school and so on. Also it implied that when she saw me she thought I was French , so just because of things I grew up with, I am always dress, so she thought that I was the good “black” and

when she found out that I wasn't from France she was even more impressed and that's twisted. And it also says much about representation. It means that they never see like black people who are not in the extreme with the strong accent, which is really not a bad thing. There is no in-between and I think that's too bad.- Male, Group A, France

4.2.1.2 The Narratives, Little Moments, and the Accents: Female, Group A

In an interview before class a female Group A participant reflected on similar experiences of having everyday events that accumulate and make you feel like you are different from the French society. She moved to France from Cote d'Ivoire when she was 5 and she ultimately described her experience with exclusion as "little moments, every day, but then you grew up with it and kinda like live with it" We began with discussing moments of inclusion, where she told me of how connected and joyful she felt when the French soccer team won the 2018 World Cup. The players, excellent as they were, represented something more to black people because that when you see someone who looks like you winning. "It was a really big moment for me being someone Black in France." As we continues she describe everyday moments which made her feel like she was always on display: only being asked her point of view because of race, people assuming that she is an outsider before she is able to speak, being told that her hair looks weird and touching it without permission. "When people see you they assume directly that you're not French, but I could be French, born in France, being Black and French, but the fact that you ask me where I am from directly means that for you it's not possible to be black and French." "Even though I was in a predominantly white school, I didn't want to touch their hair, so why did they want to touch my hair?"

The issue of “the accent” raised its head again, as an indicator that one is not French. She told me how about how she had to change her accent to feel more included, as some words that she pronounced in her Ivorian French accent led people to ridicule her. “I had to change my accent to feel included”. The word that gave her away when she was younger, if you can guess? *Maman*. She also spoke about how people, despite the fact that there should be no differentiation based on race or ethnicity in France, referred to immigrants as *blédard(e)*. This was a slang word for people who were born in “Africa or other places and came to France” and viewed as “countryside or from a poor country” “I didn’t want them to make fun of me and not say that I wasn’t born in France, because then they’ll call you a *blédard(e)*, and being aware of that, you move differently, you adapt to certain environments differently because then there is a risk of being excluded every day.” However, the experiences with exclusion exist beyond everyday encounters, she also told me able it impacts where you live and the types of jobs that are seen as accessible to you. In her town the white people in mainly live close to the center and the migrants, black, Arab, and non-white communities live on the outskirts. She told me how that was something that was tough to see knowing that she would never be able to live there because she was black. “It’s weird because I think I have the capacity to be whatever I want to be, but then again I have to remember that because I am Black in France I will have difficulties more than everyone. When you realize that the place you live in is conditioned by your skin color, it just messes up your self-confidence, the way you see yourself and the future” When I asked her whether she felt like the French people understood and accepted her, as part of the quality-of-life questions, she said that “...they accept me, but they never understand me.” In all this this she remained steadfast in her desire to achieve her goals, and see her ambitions met, but remained with the sobering fact that she would have to work to prove herself more due to how people perceived her.

When I asked her about what makes the lives of migrants more difficult in France, she told me that religion played a key role and that if you are Muslim, it's a problem and if you're Black and you are Muslim, then it's over for you. She highlighted that religion, one's skin color, and their country can make your life easier or more difficult, regardless of socioeconomic status as one could be rich and Black but still know that they will face discrimination once someone is unaware of the amount of money that they have. When we spoke, she told me that part of what someone people in France consider belonging, also is a process of consciously forgetting ("erase everything to feel part of the group") but if you try and uphold your African heritage then that can also be a problem for you and to others. As we were discussing French identity, I also ended up asking her what it meant to be French and said "We don't even know, because even if you grew up in France there's always this difference. You don't even have the right to feel French even though they say that you are French."

Finally, we discussed what made people violent or angry towards migrants: and she highlighted that the narrative that is created in the news around the idea of the other, specifically those who could not blend in as much (in terms of race or religion). While this narrative often counters the reality that the migrants face and their reasons for coming to France, the general populace is not aware or they are not well informed of the state of immigrants' countries, what is happening there, the role of France in their countries and why they come to France. She tells me that the narrative that is, however, created is the fact that they ran away from their countries to come and do crimes, that they are terrorists, they take people's jobs, etc. In the end she emphasized the importance of having a more robust narrative told in the news, as it would help people be rightly informed as wrong information is what she considered a source of violence and the aggressive reaction of the French people towards immigrants.

“People told they are dangerous, want to take your job, you build this idea that they are your enemy. Nobody wants to leave their countries, their family, their food, but if you do that its because you don’t have a choice, Most of the times France is involved in those countries and they are the reason that people are obliged to leave.” Female, Group A, France

4.2.1.3 The Importance and Impact of Perception, Male, Group A

The interview I had with this male, group A participant was in his kitchen one evening, the slightly-open window letting a gentle breeze blow across the room, as he reflected on not-so-gentle memories. He was from Cote d’Ivoire and to him, the xenophobia and the racism he has experienced since coming to France, about 2 years go for school, were linked together. He told me of about when he first arrived and felt more welcome and safer within the small community of black people and African immigrants in the initial town he was in and how he then moved to Paris, and then Reims. He told me about the looks he had received when going grocery shopping, feeling different when his friends made references to French authors and poets he didn’t recognized, discrimination that can occur regarding the way your name is perceived as French or not, and his friend’s experience of finding out that he was just someone’s ‘token black friend’. In asking him why he thought people felt this way he highlighted the education which begins at home and the way the media portrays black people as part of the problem. “When they hear from their parents, ‘Those black guys, those fools,’ obviously when they are grown, they are going to have this thinking. ...The media. ...We see a lot of black people with guns, they are thieves, and history.... In history white people felt superior to black people.” he also told me about the time he faced housing discrimination. As his last name sounds very French, and he had only met with the landlord over text or online, he told me how the landlord had been very agreeable and open to

renting him the apartment, but then he asked to have a video call. As the participant described to him how the landlord's tone changed, and how suddenly, the agreed upon apartment was no longer available, I began to see similar patterns of exclusion and subtle ways in which people were told they don't belong with few words as possible.

He also told me about how the exclusion can go both ways. "Sometimes I feel like we were making the exclusion, because I think we were 12 black people in this city. So, there were a lot of white people, so if we don't put ourselves to just help each other, we were not going to be able to live in the city, feeling comfortable, and it has advantages and disadvantages" As a student in Reims, knowing that he is here to study and work hard, he feels comfortable and welcome by the friends that he has made, but he also is aware of the looks he receives when he walks down the street. He, much like another male, Group A participant recognized the important in not looking like he is a threat, being significantly polite and it being perceived that way, not wearing joggings (athleisure) or playing his music loudly. I thought back to W.E.B. du Bois' dual consciousness, and I would see it at play in how he not only navigated his expectations of himself, but the perceptions that others prematurely ascribed to him because of his race. This became even more apparent about the anxiety he feels due to the narratives in France that are created about Black people and how that could potentially influence someone's behavior.

I watched Netflix again, its called Top Boy, and I know some white men just put fire on a black man house and sometimes when I got home and look around I think about these things and I ask myself, 'I know there are people who hate me just because I'm black and people are racist,' . I just look around and I imagine what if I go to sleep and I wake up and there is a fire in my

house, and sometimes I am afraid that people who are racist are going to be putting me in threat.- Male, Group A, France

Yeah, sometimes when I am walking in the street, I think what if I am actually going to be living in a racist moment like a guy is going to beat me up. For my mental health also, I don't feel safe in this country, because I have to think what if this guy is racist, what if this guy is looking at me because I'm black. You cannot know what are people's thoughts and sometimes you're just thinking and overthinking and overthinking. Just being Black is just make you feel so excluded even if I try my best to know that some people accept me for what I am. -Male, Group A France

4.2.1.4 An Unspoken and Unremovable Outside-ness, A Constant Awareness- Female, Group A

This time we are sitting in her living room. I have been here before and sat with the same pillow in my lap. I find the environment comforting and warm, a reflection of the female, Group A participant. She, a Senegalese student who had lived in France many times before, was one of the first students I had met and remained open to making campus and my time in France a positive experience. As with every participant, I ask her what she thinks inclusion and exclusion mean along with whether she is willing to share moments where she has felt such. Along with her thoughts and definitions, she also gave the following analogies for inclusion and exclusion. “[speaking about inclusion] Imagine I am like with the group of friend and they are all talking about a book that I didn't read. And so, they look at me and they feel like I'm not feeling integrated, they will change this subject to another book that we all read, so that I feel integrated in this

group... [speaking about exclusion] if I am in a group of people that all speak Spanish in English, but I only speak English, they will, and they know it. They will only speak Spanish so that I won't understand their conversation." I remember coming back to these examples because of how she emphasized inclusion as members of a group recognizing that someone is different, and still seeking to find common ground, instead of just having an open society. On the other hand, she saw exclusion as more nuanced, as members of the ingroup recognizing the ways in which the outgroup member could fit in, but choosing to exclude them for whatever reason.

We spoke about exclusion on many levels. On one hand, she recounted experiences of people being directly racist to her by calling her the n-word on the street, and living in an accommodation where people were actively being racist towards her, or people making stereotypical and racialized comments about Africa, Senegal, the food she eats, and the music she listens to. She tells me about a party she went to, where: "I went outside and this guy was like where do you come from? I said I'm from Senegal... guy is like, Senegal is so bad you guys live in huts, you don't have shoes you, eat scorpions-stuff like that. France is amazing, blah blah" On the other hand, she says, "I would say that more recently. I feel sometimes a little bit excluded but I think it's very subtle. It's not like specific things. I don't even think that most of the time it's conscious things." She tells me about how there is a social assumption the people in her program are not well integrated, are poor "scholarship students", and cannot speak "good English", as her program has many black, Arab, African, and non-white students who study Africa as a relevant continent to understand in terms of its history and future trajectory. We speak about the fact that she takes a lot of effort into making herself welcoming to others and integrated, especially when it comes to hair as she tells me she would never wear her afro out at school, even if she thinks that it is beautiful. "I just don't want them to experience something that they never saw, and [being]

excluding me from their group. I anticipate the exclusion” In terms of feeling understood by the ingroup she says that “the people who understand me have a specific background and for the ones who are just French *French* , I will never believe that they can understand me. I think they can tolerate me... they will never understand the struggle of being black.” She spoke about wanting to leave France after her studies because while she does feel safe now, the little experiences with racism that accumulate make her scared for a future in France.

The struggle is a little, little social situation is the little exclusions. The little words, they say the sentences, the abandoned racism, those things hurt, you every single day and it's not necessarily done on purpose, and that's the worst thing and it affects your the way you are. Like it just you shape yourself totally different than according to them. And that is something that just like. For example, Franz Fanon, he said that there's also this mental alienation that I believe in a lot. Because I think I'm touched by that to just for that. I would never think that a white person that never experienced racism could ever stand. Not a little bit of the struggle that I'm going through because it's so complex. It's so multi-dimensional and even myself. There's a lot of thing that is out of my reach and I still need to figure out because it affects me directly.

If you have the financial independence you can you have more margin to do other stuff that you care about and it's emancipate yourself from discrimination. But if you're black and poor or black and rich people don't perceive you the same way.

So, I think yeah the fear of the in the foreigner, the immigrant comes from believing that. If they come here they want to steal something from us that is already not enough for us.

4.2.1.5 The Need to Acknowledge Where You Are, and Know Who You Are, Female,

Group B

When I came to Reims, and began looking for African associations in the community, I was given many suggestions on how to go about it. While some suggested I go out and explore the city, and others suggested that I try and look on Facebook groups, there was one organization that caught my eye because of its mandate, and I got the chance to speak to the founder of the organization over zoom for nearly 2 hours.

« L'association a pour but de - accompagner et faciliter l'intégration des africains à Reims et aux alentours-favoriser la prise de contact et l'échange par la création de moments favorables - favoriser le sentiment d'appartenance à la ville d'accueil par la participation au développement au même titre que tous par l'emploi, le volontariat et le bénévolat- faire connaître aux différentes communautés de l'agglomération les particularités des uns et des autres par des temps de découverte. »

[The purpose of the association is - to support and facilitate the integration of Africans in Reims and the surrounding area- to encourage contact and exchange by creating favorable moments - foster a sense of belonging to the host city through participation in development on the same basis as all through employment, and volunteering- to make known to the various communities of the city the particularities of each other through times of discovery.]

While her parents were from Gabon, she was born in France, but moved back to Gabon when she was 4 years old. She told me about how she felt like an outsider there because the French

that she spoke was different, and in her heart she felt French because that is what she identified most closely to. She told me about how her experience in coming back to France in 1977 shaped her today. She tells me that she was very happy because I was going back to her home, but when she returned, she felt rejected by those around her because they did not treat her like she was French. “I could see in the eyes of people and in their relation that the interactions that I had with people that there were looking at me as if I was a stranger...and I had about two to three years very tough then, because I didn't know anymore where I was from what was my country of origin. What was my country the heart because, I was like rejected I felt rejected in Gabon and rejected in France.” We spoke about her experiences with inclusion as well as exclusion, and she told me how many people, including her ex mother-in-law, we're surprised to have her in the environment but we're overall incredibly welcoming and friendly. She did tell me about some of her experiences with having difficulty in France when it came to looking for a job after obtaining her degree.

I took 15 months to get a job while my classmates got the right jobs within 3 or 4 months. Two HR directors called me and asked me to change my name so that the hiring managers could consider my CV. They knew my name would not pass. I had the experience of racism, where people show you you are not only different but they would prefer that you should go back to where you come from. They are prejudiced. It was a bad feeling and hurtful but I understood it's a matter of people's heart. This happened twice. I've been living in France since 1997, 25 years, so twice is nothing.

When I asked her whether she thinks French people understand her, she told me that neither does she know, nor does she care. She said it was more a matter of respect, than understanding “One thing I want people to know is that people should learn to be respectful of their environment

and people within their environment. You have to be respectful, you have your opinion, which is okay, but you express your opinion with respect to the environment and people in your environment... You have to respect the rules and you have to face the consequences.” She carried that sentiment with her when discussing how migrants face challenges in French society. Many times, she tells me, when a migrant comes to France they are not well prepared for life in France. From the weather to how fast some people are speaking French even if they come from a French speaking country, they become afraid of losing their culture because they feel like if they will be forced to change, and therefore they lose.

Tu me comprends. Il a peur de ne pas survivre ... parce que on m'a dit que quand je vais arriver là-bas on va me demander de m'oublier, de me renier, de devenir quelqu'un d'autre. Et moi je vais tout de suite faire attention à ça. Donc je vais garder mes habitudes de musique. Je vais garder mes habitudes. Je vais le faire savoir qui sache que ma musique c'est ça. Ma nourriture c'est ça. Mon parfum, c'est ça et beaucoup font ce genre de chose par peur de se perdre. C'est pas parce qu'il veut pas respecter, c'est parce qu'il se dit si je ne le fais pas.

[You understand me. He is afraid of not surviving... because [he] was told that when I get there I'm going to be asked to forget myself, to deny myself, to become someone else. [so when he comes here he says] I'm going to pay attention to that right now. So I'm going to keep my music habits. I'm going to keep my habits. I'll let him know whose music this is. My food is this. My perfume is that. Many people do this kind of thing for fear of getting lost.

It's not because he doesn't want to respect, it's because he thinks I [French people] don't.]

She brought up the idea of the social codes that my previous participants had mentioned before, and said that migrants needed to learn the correct codes to be successful and to thrive in French society. While some of them might feel like integration is an indication that they are losing themselves, she said once you know you are, you can never lose it, but you must also be respectful of the place that you are in. She also mentioned how the media doesn't help when it comes to presenting migrants to the French public, as well as soothing migrants fear that they will be forced to lose everything and become someone else if they come to France. She shared about how regardless of whether I was American or not, when I was in France (before I would be able to say that I am American) people would automatically assume that I was African. From news to dramas with black people mainly being posed as immigrants, or violent people, she says that people have been taught stigmatize others.

*Il ne cherche pas ça. [my identity as an American] On a stigmatisé.
On a fait concentrer les gens sur la l'immigration. Voilà pourquoi c'est un mot
qui est devenu péjoratif. Les gens ne comprennent pas l'immigration, c'est
comme son le fait d'imigrer partir d'un pays aller vers un autre.*

*[They're not looking for that. They've been stigmatized. They've
focused people on immigration. That's why it's become a pejorative word.*

*People don't understand immigration, it's like its imitating leaving one
country to go to another.]*

5.0 Chapter 5: Discussion and Limitations

As outlined in Chapter 3, this study sought to answer its research question through the development of a conceptual framework which categorized the experiences of migrants in France and South Africa as personalized experiences of unbelonging or depersonalized experiences of belonging. To further understand the processes which contributed to such experiences, the framework divided the expressions of exclusion, xenophobia, hostility, and unbelonging into overt expression and covert expression categories. This discussion seeks to evaluate the main findings indicated by Chapter 4's Qualitative Analysis in line with the conceptual framework and discuss some limitations that must be considered when reviewing the findings of the study. As this is a comparative analysis, this discussion will address whether the personalized, depersonalized, covert, and overt experiences and expressions of unbelonging in South Africa and France have any similarities or distinct characteristics that the interview participants highlighted.

This chapter also includes Figure 2. A Venn diagram illustrating the interlinkages between personalized unbelonging, depersonalized unbelonging, covert exclusion, and overt exclusion.

5.1 Personalized Unbelonging in South Africa and France

Findings from the qualitative interviews conducted in South Africa and France indicate that within the conceptual framework's definition, ¹⁹⁶ migrants recalled experiences of personalized unbelonging. As Figure 2 illustrates, personalized unbelonging is interlinked with the four other categories. In coalescing some key experiences of migrants in both South Africa and France, such experiences can manifest as ranged from a fear of personal unsafety, derogatory name-calling, having to deal with racist or discriminatory interpersonal circumstance, consistently feeling out of place or that you going to be picked out and exposed, etc.

In South Africa, personalized unbelonging was particularly characterized by a fear of not wanting to leave their homes due to what they may experience if they were to encounter xenophobic perpetrators. This experience of feeling unsafe and unafraid came out across all age and gender groups, such that it was the threat of being perceived as an unbelonging, which led to them to separate from their daily activities and contributions to society, as a cost to their livelihoods. Personalized unbelonging also manifested in being exploited at work because people know your "secret" and you cannot complain, and the places immigrants felt like they could not live or work due to its potential to expose their identities. In some cases, personalized unbelonging also looked like the risk evaluation that they took in interacting with certain people or telling the truth about themselves in general.

¹⁹⁶ Immigrants experiencing individual exclusion, being perceived as a threat, or encountering hostility and othering due to individual perpetrators beliefs and actions.

In France, personalized unbelonging manifested mostly as experiencing anti-black racism, sexism, and bigotry from the people within their immediate environment. While majority of the participants stated that they felt physically safe, emotionally they were experiencing alienation, within themselves by having to anticipate the exclusion that their identities, their accents, their hair, or their clothing may evoke from people. Every participant discussed the importance of knowing specific social codes, and even when they knew the codes, they were aware that people may still call them names or complimenting them that they are better than what was expected from their group.

5.2 Depersonalized Unbelonging in South Africa and France

Again, Figure 2 summarizes a number of experiences which could lead feeling a sense of depersonalized unbelonging¹⁹⁷, which include experiences of feeling discrimination or an inability to experience membership at a structural, organizational, systemic or institutional level. This also includes the way that migrants are portrayed within the media, and how such narrative contributes to the treatment that they receive as a group and the lack of safety they feel within society.

In South Africa, experiences of depersonalized unbelonging took the form of police brutality, government officials confiscating the stock and selling items of Zimbabwean vendors; constantly feeling like they are under threat because the government either supporting or being silent about the xenophobic attacks taking place; and having no way to truly advance in the job

¹⁹⁷ Immigrants experiencing group or homogenized exclusion, hostility, and othering due to encountering the formal power structures between the victim and system

market. Another key form of depersonalized experiences with unbelonging was in the form of limited access to services such as seeking assistance from the police or receiving medical attention.

In France, experiences with depersonalized unbelonging took the form of housing, academic, and job discrimination. These experiences can be categorized as depersonalized due to the organizational structures that the perpetrators can exploit based on how they have been socialized to perceive those they consider the “outside” group. In these cases, migrants were unable to attain jobs for which they were qualified, housing for which they had the necessary approvals and paperwork, and status within the academic community due to the structural impact of anti-black, and anti-immigrant sentiments in France. In many ways the understanding and conceptualization of the public French identity can also be considered a source of depersonalized unbelonging experiences. The findings illustrated that despite having access to the cultural codes, and the history of African migrants being present in France and contributing to the French social, economic, cultural, and political space, the structure of French society and French identity homogenized what it meant to be African and imposed societal pressure as a result.

5.3 Overt Expressions of Unbelonging, Exclusion, and Xenophobia

While the previous two subsections focused on the overall experiences, these subsequent subsections will focus on the major findings regarding the expressions and actions themselves that caused the experiences of unbelonging. As mentioned before this section is not exclusionary to any of the other categories highlighted in the Venn diagram, but rather exists somewhere in the middle. Figure 2’s summary of the expressions of Overt exclusion include: loss of employment;

verbal aggression and name-calling in relational contexts; physical abuse; purposeful denial of access to public resources (medical care, protection by the police, etc).

In South Africa the findings illustrated that overt expression of exclusion consisted of verbally humiliating and ridiculing those that were considered foreigners by calling them *makwererkwere*, making fun of their accent, and shaming them for their presence in South Africa. Physical violence and public unrest was a key expression that came up in the findings, whose sources consisted of the police, individuals, and mob activities (Operation Dudula) to name a few. The findings also indicate that socio economic exploitation is a key part of the overt expression of exclusion when it comes to migrants in South Africa as some employers will take advantage of the fact that their workers do not have the correct identification, or will seek to devalue their work if they do have documentation.

In France, with overt expressions of exclusions consisted of the racist interactions that participants mentioned either in school, at work, in social settings, or upon being identified as significantly different. One trend that constantly showed up was the fact that participants mentioned that they were followed around when they entered stores, regardless of how they were dressed. While that would not seem like an active exclusion in places like the United States, the intentionality of the behavior and the explicit nature in which it was expressed made it something that could exist in both categories. Falling within the intersections of sexism and racism, cat calling was raised as a circumstance that not only made a participant uncomfortable, but also made her feel excluded through hypersexualizing her in society as a black woman. Other overt forms of exclusion consisted of direct comments, such as being called the n-word, a monkey, or a *blédard(e)*.

5.4 Covert Expressions of Unbelonging, Exclusion, and Xenophobia

Figure 2 illustrates that covert expressions of exclusion could take the following, non-exhaustive, form: An inability to obtain employment despite the availability and equipping for skill; verbal aggression and name-calling in societal contexts; not being able to live where you would like to live; emotional abuse and the use of fear that keeps migrants from going about their daily lives; people making fun of your culture; people comparing you to a stereotype, etc.

In South Africa, you're able to see covert expressions of exclusion when it comes to where migrants choose to live. The majority of the participants indicated that they feel safety in areas such as Hillbrow, Yeoville, and Berea, as those places are more welcoming in their acceptance of migrants. On the contrary, places such as Soweto were compared to suicide because of how the migrants felt they would be discriminated against or attacked. Another key form of covert exclusion that manifested in South Africa was the impossibility of promotion in the presence of non-migrants or white migrants in work contexts. This was significant because it challenged the view that Migrants are being chosen over South Africans for advanced jobs in South Africa, thus contributing to the feelings of relative deprivation.

The findings from the French qualitative field work brought out the most experiences of covert expressions of exclusion, especially in the discussions where participants mentioned feeling the pressure to submit to social codes that were universally known, but never explicitly stated. This was particularly illustrated in migrants changing their behavior in anticipation of exclusion, and still having to endure rude looks and comments, masked as compliments, about their hair, food, (lack of) behaviors, etc. What stood out the most was the fact that the experiences of being othered daily, through microaggressions and macroaggressions, had become such normalized experiences that it no longer felt useful to act against such discriminatory forces. The theme of being

discriminated against because of your name or skin color, and the perceptions that are developed, are also important to emphasize because it places the participants in a continued state of dual consciousness. The participants know they are being discriminated against because of what they look like or what their name sounds like to the broader, (whiter) French society, but they must be accommodating to their mainly white audience by establishing a non-threatening demeanor.




Figure 2: “P-DOC” Venn Diagram Illustrating the Interlinkages between Personalized Unbelonging, Depersonalized Unbelonging, Covert Exclusion, and Overt Exclusion.

5.5 Limitations

1. The increased activity of Operation Dudula in June 2022 could have contributed to the increased feelings migrants consistently mentioning that they are afraid to leave their house. If the study was conducted at a calmer period of time, then different responses may have emerged around their experiences with safety, fear, etc.
2. It is important to note the different sociopolitical and economic contexts of between this group of interviewees compared to the South African group of interviewees. The immigrants I interviewed in France did not have the same fears of exposure as the immigrants in South Africa did. These immigrants were either employed or self-employed, dual-citizens, international students who has lived in France for more than a year, educators and visual artists. In hearing more about their lives, connections, and socioeconomic realities, I came to understand that the comparison between the French and South African case, could not be exactly the same in terms of similar life conditions. To see if I could find comparatively similar participants I contacted *CIAM - Collectif Interculturel d'Accompagnement de Migrants [The Intercultural Collective for Migrants Support]* in the city as well as a student organization whose focus was migrant support, advocacy and education. While we were not able to work together due to various reasons, I was grateful to meet one student working with both organizations who reminded me that while the stories of the people I was going to interview would look different, it did not mean that they did not have their own relevant stories.

3. Not having access to gatekeepers, and community associations, as well as being a full-time student while conducting research in France, may have contributed to the types of experiences I was able to document.

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

Amidst the politicization of ethnonational African identities and the proliferation of migration within and without the African continent, studies on African migrant and diasporic realities often contextualize why barriers are encountered in their navigation of membership in their destination countries rather than how overtly or covertly membership is denied.

The politicization of international migration has made xenophobia a global epidemic as it targets those most vulnerable in our society, disregarding migrants' fundamental human right to dignity, safety, and equality. Xenophobia is the combined manifestation of ignorance, hatred, and fear, and its consequence is not solely burdened by the persecuted and oppressed migrants, as it also is a clear indicator of how easily members of these case countries fall into bystander roles in the face others experiencing exclusion and unbelonging. It is also important to note that this study of xenophobia can also be viewed with the lens of the racialization of and racism against the black bodies. The presence of these racialized others (even by members of their own racial group in South Africa) in countries challenges their ability to belong and thrive as contributing members of society. Their perceived 'embodied' unbelonging- *in the coloring of their skin, their accent, their style of dress, the places they sought to live, and the communities they to which they felt connected-* has limited migrants' and the descendants of migrants' membership, regardless of their legal, citizenship, or resident status. While, South Africa and France have unique histories and socioeconomic conditions, and relationships with societal and national identity, the expressions and experiences of xenophobia towards migrants can be considered using the Unbelonging conceptual framework and further illustrated by the "P-DOC" Venn Diagram. In South Africa, while migrants relate most of their personalized and depersonalized experiences with unbelonging to be rooted in their national identity, in France participants expressed personalized and

depersonalized unbelonging due to how their blackness was perceived, but they also suggested that blackness is also equated to African-ness. The trends shown Chapter 5, suggest that while the overt expressions of unbelonging and xenophobia in South Africa are what is widely published in the news, covert expressions still have a significant impact and need to be further investigated. In France, covert expressions of exclusion and unbelonging seem to be more common than overt expressions in the experiences laid out by the study participants.

This research will be a useful addition to the existing literature and conceptual problem-solving space of understanding intergroup conflict, exclusion, and xenophobia. This comparative study can hopefully be the first of many to build upon the nuanced and complex relationship between African migrants and their descendants, and non-migrant populations around the world. Such relations are informed by different perceptions of history, colonial legacies, religion, xenophobia, cultural geography, and the formation of national and othered identities.

This study is impactful as it could also leave others to evaluate whether the manifestation of issues of unbelonging and violence, such as anti-black racism and islamophobia, can be further connected to the openness of a state's constitution, immigration policies, or the state of their democracy. The strength of a state, and the existence of either structural, systemic, or covert violence, oppression, and sentiments of unbelonging, or overt, public-driven violence, could be evaluated through the rule of law, degrees of corruption, and trust in government, history, poverty levels, criminality, and the types of policing and control measure.. Thus, further iterations of this study could to a better understanding of the process of marginalization in stronger and weaker states.

6.1 Recommendations (based on participant suggestions of possible solutions)

1. In South Africa: Renegotiate and renew the ZEP (Zimbabwean Exemption Permit Visa) so that migrants can work towards getting the correct documentation to enter the country and obtain work. The current state of affairs increases people's desperation and their chances of being exploited or becoming victims of xenophobic violence.
2. In South Africa: The government should work to revitalize its economy through public and private investments; address its energy crisis; nation-wide investment into skills development programs of both the young and old; directly address the corruption and crime that takes place within government institutions. Not only will this increase confidence in the South African economy, but also increase job availability in South Africa, which can be considered a key source of xenophobic sentiments and feelings of relative deprivation. The government must actively dismantle the false narratives created about African immigrants and address the xenophobia in South Africa by more than just name.
3. In France and South Africa: There should be programs to better inform migrants of the circumstance on the ground before migrating to France and South Africa. This will not only demystify South Africa and France (in both their wonders and their challenges) but also make migrants aware of the cultural shift that they must keep in mind if they are to come.
4. In France and South Africa: The general population should become better informed on African history as it still has an impact on both societies today, the state of affairs in

other countries (beyond just economic or political), and about who the migrants are as people.

Appendix A : Interview Guide South Africa

7.0 Research Summary

- **Research Question:** How are exclusionary and xenophobic sentiments expressed towards migrants of African origin* in South Africa?
- **Hypothesis:** This field work is exploratory, and thus not hypothesis based. No hypothesis will be tested, however, a hypothesis may develop from interactions with participants.
- **Methodology:** Interviewing male and female migrants of African origins in Johannesburg, South Africa in two age groups. The aged groups were created to give me a better spread of qualitative data on what differences might exist in the exclusionary practices that the younger/older generation faced.
 - o Group A(18-35)
 - o Group B (36-65).

**Migrants of African origins also include the descendants of migrants of African migrants.*

- **Interview Structure:** Semi-Structured Interview.

8.0 Preamble:

- Permission to record and verbal consent

- Highlighting freedom to stop the interview if there is any discomfort
- Sheet of definitions: Xenophobia, Excluded, Included, Quality of Life, Migrants, The Government, The Public, etc.

9.0 Introduction (to be heard by participants)

- Greetings and getting comfortable
- Introducing myself: (ie: Name, School, Major, Favorite Type of Music/Sport/Food, Cultural Background)
- Is it alright if I record this conversation so I can listen back to it for my research?
- Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me. I really appreciate it. How are you feeling today?
- Would you feel comfortable introducing yourself to me?
- Briefly explain my research
- Do you have any questions for me before we begin?
- Here is a sheet of definitions in case anything is not clear, but also feel free to ask me.
- Again, thank you for being willing to speak to me.

10.0 Topics, Questions, and Subtopics/Probes

11.0 Topics

12.0 Main Questions

13.0 Subtopics/ Probes to Facilitate Conversations

14.0 Belonging

15.0 Here are some definitions:

16.0 **Exclusion:** Being unwanted and ignored by the people in your environment. Feeling excluded includes feeling unaccepted for who you are and the qualities and identities that you have, and people taking actions to isolate you and make you feel bad for being different. Example: Someone calls you a rude name because you are from a certain country

17.0 **Inclusion:** Being accepted and welcomed by the people in your environment. Feeling included means that you feel like people want you in that space and that they are open to learning about you and from you. People celebrate the differences that they have and see

1. Could you share your experiences of instances you felt included?
2. Could you share your experiences of instances you felt excluded?
3. Could you tell me more how have other people treated you because you are a migrant?
4. Have there been things outside of your control (i.e.: laws, policies, guidelines etc.) that made you feel more included/excluded?
5. Could you explain the things that people did that made you feel included/ excluded?

	<p>those differences as valuable.</p> <p>Example: Someone wants to learn more about your culture (or your parents' cultures)</p> <p>18.0 Can you tell me about your experiences in South Africa as a migrant?</p>	
<p>19.0 Quality of Life</p>	<p>20.0 Here is a definition:</p> <p>Quality of life- "The degree to which an individual is healthy, comfortable, and able to participate in or enjoy life events."</p> <p>21.0 Please could you share some experiences of when being a migrant affected your quality of life?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How has being a migrant determined your living conditions? 2. How has being a migrant determined your position in life? 3. How do you feel like being a migrant influence how much you enjoy your life? 4. Do you think that non-migrants/locals/native-born understand you? 5. How accepted do you feel by the people around you? 6. How much do you enjoy your life?

	<p>Xenophobia</p> <p>Attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity</p> <p>Xenophobic action often looks like bullying, verbal abuse, physical or psychological violence because they are from a different country, look different, or they have an accent that is different from the majority of the people around them.</p>	<p>7. Do you feel that your life has meaning?</p> <p>8. Can you explain why you think so?</p> <p>9. How safe do you feel as a migrant in South Africa?</p> <p>10. How easy/ difficult is it to focus on your main responsibilities (ie: daily activities, schoolwork, your job)</p> <p>11. How informed do you feel about the services around you that help with your day-to-day life (such as healthcare, immigration, and NGO assistance services)</p> <p>12. Where do you go to find safety/ peace of mind if there is xenophobic action in your environment?</p>
<p>22.0 Finding</p> <p>Factors to Determine the</p>	<p>23.0 Can you tell me what you think makes some migrants lives more difficult than others?</p>	<p>1. Do you think that [race, ethnicity, gender, religion, class, public opinion, or government policies] play a role in how migrants are treated?</p>

<p>Characteristics of the Strata</p>	<p>24.0 Can you tell me what you think makes people scared of/violent towards/ angry at migrants?</p>	<p>2. Can you explain why you think so?</p>
<p>25.0 Possible Solutions</p>	<p>26.0 If you had the power to change things and make life better for your community, how do you think that you could make migrants have a better life?</p> <p>The Government This refers to the South African Government, law-making bodies, politicians, and all the institutions that help protect the rights of people within the country.</p> <p>The Public This refers to the population at large and</p>	<p>1. How do you think xenophobia/exclusion can be reduced in South Africa?</p> <p>2. How do you think the government can make life better for migrants?</p> <p>3. Do you think The Public respects/ disrespects the rights that The Government gives to migrants?</p> <p>4. Can you explain why you think so?</p>

are the people who vote for The Government and live everyday lives.

From everything we have discussed today, whose opinions about migrants are more powerful when it comes to the way migrants are treated in everyday life: The Government or The Public?

27.0 Sheet of Definitions to provide Understanding in Context

- Migrant**

- A person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.¹⁹⁸
- A person of African origin who is not native to South Africa, even if they are citizens (i.e.: Your parents were not born as South Africans, but you grew up and are a citizen of South Africa)

- **Xenophobia**

- Attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity¹⁹⁹
- Xenophobic action often looks like bullying, verbal abuse, physical or psychological violence because they are from a different country, look different, or they have an accent that is different from the majority of the people around them.

- **Exclusion**

- Being unwanted and ignored by the people in your environment. Feeling excluded includes feeling unaccepted for who you are and the qualities and identities that you

¹⁹⁸ “Migrant”- International Migration Law No. 34 - Glossary on Migration,” June 19, 2019, <https://publications.iom.int/books/international-migration-law-ndeg34-glossary-migration>.

¹⁹⁹ ILO, IOM, and OHCHR, “International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia,” (Inter-Agency, 2001)

have, and people taking actions to isolate you and make you feel bad for being different.

- Example: Someone calls you a rude name because you are from a certain country

- **Inclusion**

- Being accepted and welcomed by the people in your environment. Feeling included means that you feel like people want you in that space and that they are open to learning about you and from you. People celebrate the differences that they have and see those differences as valuable.

- Example: Someone wants to learn more about your culture (or your parents' cultures)

- **Quality of Life**

- How much an individual is healthy, comfortable, and able to participate in or enjoy life events.²⁰⁰

- **The Government**

- This refers to the South African Government, law-making bodies, politicians, and all the institutions that help protect the rights of people within the country.

²⁰⁰ “Quality of Life- Definition, Measures, Applications, & Facts | Britannica,”

- **The Public**

- This refers to the population at large, the people who vote for The Government.

Appendix B : Interview Guide France

28.0 Research Summary

- **Research Question:** How are exclusionary and xenophobic sentiments expressed towards migrants of African origin* in France?
- **Hypothesis:** This field work is exploratory, and thus not hypothesis based. No hypothesis will be tested, however, a hypothesis may develop from interactions with participants.
- **Methodology:** Interviewing male and female migrants of African origins in R in two age groups. The Reims, France aged groups were created to give me a better spread of qualitative data on what differences might exist in the exclusionary practices that the younger/ older generation faced.
 - o Group A(18-35)
 - o Group B (36-65).

**Migrants of African origins also include the descendants of migrants of African migrants.*

- **Interview Structure:** Semi-Structured Interview.

29.0 Preamble:

- Permission to record and verbal consent
- Highlighting freedom to stop the interview if there is any discomfort
- Emphasizing the participant's right to erasure if they no longer are comfortable participating
- Sheet of definitions: Xenophobia, Excluded, Included, Quality of Life, Migrants, The Government, The Public, etc.

30.0 Introduction (to be heard by participants)

- Greetings and getting comfortable
- Introducing myself: (ie: Name, School, Major, Cultural Background)
- Is it alright if I record this conversation so I can listen back to it for my research?
- You are free to stop this interview at any time and ask for your data to be erased.
- Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me. I really appreciate it. How are you feeling today?
- Would you feel comfortable introducing yourself to me?
- Briefly explain my research
- Do you have any questions for me before we begin?
- Here is a sheet of definitions in case anything is not clear, but also feel free to ask me.
- Again, thank you for being willing to speak to me.

31.0 Topics, Questions, and Subtopics/Probes

32.0 Topics

33.0 Main Questions

34.0 Subtopics/ Probes to Facilitate Conversations

35.0 Belonging

36.0 Here are some definitions:

37.0 **Exclusion:** Being unwanted and ignored by the people in your environment. Feeling excluded includes feeling unaccepted for who you are and the qualities and identities that you have, and people taking actions to isolate you and make you feel bad for being different. Example: Someone calls you a rude name because you are from a certain country

38.0 **Inclusion:** Being accepted and welcomed by the people in your environment. Feeling included means that you feel like people want you in that space and that they are open to learning about you and from you. People celebrate the differences that they have and see

6. Could you share your experiences of instances you felt included?
7. Could you share your experiences of instances you felt excluded?
8. Could you tell me more how have other people treated you because you are a migrant?
9. Have there been things outside of your control (i.e.: laws, policies, guidelines etc.) that made you feel more included/excluded?
10. Could you explain the things that people did that made you feel included/ excluded?

those differences as valuable.
 Example: Someone wants to learn more about your culture (or your parents' cultures)

39.0 Can you tell me about your experiences in France as a migrant?

40.0 Quality of Life

41.0 Here is a definition:

Quality of life- "The degree to which an individual is healthy, comfortable, and able to participate in or enjoy life events."

42.0 Please could you share some experiences of when being a migrant affected your quality of life?

13. How has being a migrant determined your living conditions?

14. How has being a migrant determined your position in life?

15. How do you feel like being a migrant influence how much you enjoy your life?

16. Do you think that non-migrants/locals/native-born understand you?

17. How accepted do you feel by the people around you?

18. How much do you enjoy your life?

	<p style="text-align: center;">Xenophobia</p> <p>Attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Xenophobic action often looks like bullying, verbal abuse, physical or psychological violence because they are from a different country, look different, or they have an accent that is different from the majority of the people around them.</p>	<p>19. Do you feel that your life has meaning?</p> <p>20. Can you explain why you think so?</p> <p>21. How safe do you feel as a migrant in France?</p> <p>22. How easy/ difficult is it to focus on your main responsibilities (ie: daily activities, schoolwork, your job)</p> <p>23. How informed do you feel about the services around you that help with your day-to-day life (such as healthcare, immigration, and NGO assistance services)</p> <p>24. Where do you go to find safety/ peace of mind if there is xenophobic action in your environment?</p>
<p>43.0 Finding</p> <p>Factors to Determine the Characteristics of the Strata</p>	<p>44.0 Can you tell me what you think makes some migrants lives more difficult than others?</p>	<p>3. Do you think that [race, ethnicity, gender, religion, class, public opinion, or government policies] play a role in how migrants are treated?</p>

	<p>45.0 Can you tell me what you think makes people scared of/violent towards/ angry at migrants?</p>	<p>4. Can you explain why you think so?</p>
<p>46.0 Possible Solutions</p>	<p>47.0 If you had the power to change things and make life better for your community, how do you think that you could make migrants have a better life?</p> <p>The Government This refers to the French Government, law-making bodies, politicians, and all the institutions that help protect the rights of people within the country.</p> <p>The Public This refers to the population at large and</p>	<p>5. How do you think xenophobia/exclusion can be reduced in France?</p> <p>6. How do you think the government can make life better for migrants?</p> <p>7. Do you think The Public respects/ disrespects the rights that The Government gives to migrants?</p> <p>8. Can you explain why you think so?</p>

are the people who vote for The Government and live everyday lives.

From everything we have discussed today, whose opinions about migrants are more powerful when it comes to the way migrants are treated in everyday life: The Government or The Public?

48.0 Sheet of Definitions to provide Understanding in Context

- **Migrant**

- A person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.²⁰¹
- A person of African origin who is not native to France, even if they are citizens (i.e.: Your parents were not born as France, but you grew up and are a citizen of France)

- **Xenophobia**

- Attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity²⁰²
- Xenophobic action often looks like bullying, verbal abuse, physical or psychological violence because they are from a different country, look different, or they have an accent that is different from the majority of the people around them.

- **Exclusion**

- Being unwanted and ignored by the people in your environment. Feeling excluded includes feeling unaccepted for who you are and the qualities and identities that you

²⁰¹ “Migrant”- International Migration Law No. 34 - Glossary on Migration,” June 19, 2019, <https://publications.iom.int/books/international-migration-law-ndeg34-glossary-migration>.

²⁰² ILO, IOM, and OHCHR, “International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia,” (Inter-Agency, 2001)

have, and people taking actions to isolate you and make you feel bad for being different.

- Example: Someone calls you a rude name because you are from a certain country

- **Inclusion**

- Being accepted and welcomed by the people in your environment. Feeling included means that you feel like people want you in that space and that they are open to learning about you and from you. People celebrate the differences that they have and see those differences as valuable.

- Example: Someone wants to learn more about your culture (or your parents' cultures)

- **Quality of Life**

- How much an individual is healthy, comfortable, and able to participate in or enjoy life events.²⁰³

- **The Government**

- This refers to the French Government, law-making bodies, politicians, and all the institutions that help protect the rights of people within the country.

²⁰³ “Quality of Life- Definition, Measures, Applications, & Facts | Britannica,”

- **The Public**

- This refers to the population at large, the people who vote for The Government.

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