Chen, Yufei
(2023)
Three Essays on Microeconomic Theory.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on microeconomic theory.
In the first chapter, I model the adjustment process in Chinese graduate school admission
as a two-period decentralized matching game. Four cases are considered and they are different
in the information structure and whether cutoffs are flexible. I find that: all students
applying to the better school first is an equilibrium for all cases; it is the unique equilibrium
when cutoffs are fixed; perfect sorting is the unique equilibrium outcome when students are
uncertain about their abilities. The results suggest that when students have the opportunity
to apply to every school, they can proceed in the order of their preference. However, when
there are more schools than periods, students need to be strategic.
In the second chapter, I analyze censorship using a cheap-talk model. In the model,
there is an external binary signal which can be censored by the sender. I characterize three
partition equilibria - the full-censorship equilibrium, the no-censorship equilibrium, and the
censor-by-lows equilibrium. I compare the ex-ante expected payoffs and find that partial
censorship is always inferior to no censorship for both agents and the welfare comparison
between partial and full censorship depends on the bias. The results suggest that it is in the
government’s (and citizens’) interest to choose full or no censorship, but not something in
between.
In the third chapter, I study a two-period model with a multi-product firm and a single
consumer. The consumer’s type is unknown to the firm, but her choice reveals some
information about it. Two privacy settings are considered. In one setting, the consumer
cannot hide her purchase history whereas she can in the other setting. I characterize the
firm-optimal equilibria in both settings and show that when the opt-out choice is added,
the ex-ante producer surplus increases while the ex-ante consumer surplus decreases. The
results suggest that sometimes privacy protection tools can harm consumers and help firms,
and the strategic interaction between the two sides need to be considered by the regulator.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
|
| ETD Committee: |
|
| Date: |
6 September 2023 |
| Date Type: |
Publication |
| Defense Date: |
1 June 2023 |
| Approval Date: |
6 September 2023 |
| Submission Date: |
2 August 2023 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Number of Pages: |
113 |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
microeconomic theory |
| Date Deposited: |
06 Sep 2023 13:45 |
| Last Modified: |
06 Sep 2023 13:45 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/45212 |
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