What Benefactors Want: Social Movement Patronage in Pittsburgh's 20th century Redevelopment

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the

Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment

Of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2024

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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April 19th, 2024

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University of Pittsburgh, 2024

Some social movements rely on the support of powerful benefactors, including state agencies, philanthropic foundations, or businesses, and scholars have long examined how this support both enables and constrains movement activity. In this dissertation, I elucidate benefactors' decision-making processes by developing the concept of patronage and a patronage argument that I assess alongside prevailing theories in three case studies in Pittsburgh's 20th century history in which community-based movements emerged with the support of powerful benefactors to challenge urban redevelopment. In particular, I examine the foundation of Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. in 1968, Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc. in 1971, and the Steel Valley Authority in 1986. Using formal historical methods and archival data, this study examines whether and how benefactors' decisions to support these movement efforts were influenced by the prospects of containing insurgent movements or opportunities to advance their own interests. The dissertation concludes by spelling out patronage argument's novel insights and new avenues for research.

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Preface

If you have read local news in the last three months, you may have come across one of these stories. In January, the non-profit Greenwood Plan acquired a building downtown to develop an incubator for Black-owned businesses. In March, Japan's Nippon Steel reached an agreement to buy U.S. Steel for $14 billion, and the agreement drew criticism from President Biden and other elected officials. In April, Pittsburgh's Housing Justice Coalition hosted the People's Assembly for Fair and Equitable Housing, drawing scholars and activists from cities across the U.S. and Canada.

Students of Pittsburgh's history will recognize that none of these struggles are new. The struggle for Black-owned business is an old one. In the 1970s, community organizations in the Hill District, Homewood-Brushton, and Manchester organized to break down racial barriers to employment and business-ownership. The struggle for control of industry is not new either. In the 1980s, a coalition of labor unions, clergy, and community organizations planned to buy out and operate the steel mills that industry executives were shutting down. Housing struggles also have a long history in Pittsburgh. In the 1960s, activists pressured public officials and banks to stem the tide of substandard housing proliferating throughout the city. All of these movements struggled heroically and against great odds to improve the lives of their constituents. Yet, these challenges, in one form or another, persist to the present.

I studied these historical episodes because I they can provide lessons about social change that can inform movements in the present. History doesn't repeat, but it rhymes. In all of these historical cases, movement groups cooperated with some authorities or related power-holders,

whether public officials, financiers, industry executives, philanthropists, or some combination of them. For many, it is no surprise that cooperating with authorities and other power-holders could blunt the impact of social movements. Such power-holders have long track records of interfering with oppositional movements to neutralize, if not dismantle, them.

As I studied these cases, however, they raised questions that a simple argument about social control could not answer. If Alcoa executives wanted to control movements in the Hill District, why would they go so far as to help them establish their own manufacturing company? And why did Mayor Barr capitulate to the housing movement in 1967 before the activists had the leverage of the urban rebellions behind them? I came to suspect that to understand why power-holders got involved in a movement, it was not enough to know what power-holders found threatening about a movement but also what they expected to *gain* from supporting it. If I knew that, I could better explain how benefactors make their decisions and also why movement campaigns sometimes have contradictory effects that promote social change in some directions while entrenching social order in others. This dissertation is my attempt to understand what benefactors expected to get out of supporting movements and what their agendas meant for the social movements they support.

Many people helped make this dissertation possible. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Joshua Bloom, for his support, inspiration, and guidance (both formal and informal). All of my academic achievements are a testament to your teaching. I still recall lessons I learned in your Research Design course back in 2016 and from many conversations during walks around campus. I would like to thank the other members of my committee, Drs. Lisa Brush, Suzanne Staggenborg, and John Logan, for your insightful critiques and advice on

1.0   Introduction

City boosters celebrate Pittsburgh for becoming a prosperous, post-industrial city with a diversified economic base. Pittsburgh has won awards for being a "most livable city" (Majors 2007), has served as a model for other industrial cities to emulate (Neumann 2016), and was chosen by the Obama administration to host the global G20 summit in 2009 to celebrate its economic resilience. However, many people have become aware that the city's prosperity persists alongside high levels of unemployment and poverty, especially the city's predominantly Black neighborhoods and the communities of the Monongahela Valley (Mon Valley). In 2019, the mayor's Gender Equity Commission documented steep race-, gender-, and class-based disparities in health outcomes, income, employment, and education (Howell et. al. 2019).

Over the course 20th century, urban redevelopment transformed Pittsburgh. When the city faced the prospects of decline, leaders of government, industry, finance, and universities designed and implemented a series of ambitious redevelopment projects. One wave of redevelopment began in the 1940s. Leaders were faced with the prospect of industrial flight, and in response they enacted smoke and flood control, revitalized the central business district, rebuilt and expanded infrastructure, expanded industry, and developed residential-commercial complexes. A second wave of redevelopment began in the late 1970s in response to de-industrialization. This time city leaders developed infrastructure while also promoting the region's economic diversification that drew especially on the strengths of the city's research universities, specialty manufacturing, and hospitals (Lubove 1996; Dietrich-Ward 2015; Neumann 2016; Winant 2021).

Urban redevelopment is a contentious process. When redevelopment threatens residents with demolition and displacement, residents organize to advocate for themselves and their communities (e.g., Mollenkopf 1983; Logan and Molotch 1987). In Pittsburgh, researchers have found that redevelopment efforts prompted the emergence of neighborhood-based organizations that launched ambitious campaigns to halt or redirect redevelopment, some of which succeeded in gaining entry to the city's political structures (Sbragia 1989; Jezierski 1990; Lubove 1996). Some research suggests that Pittsburgh's political structures have been relatively open to influence by neighborhood and community-based groups, at least compared to other U.S. cities (Ferman 1996; Metzger 1998; Crowley 2005). Despite their efforts, however, these groups were rarely successful in altering the fundamental direction of the redevelopment promoted by leaders of local government, industry, and finance (e.g., Jezierski 1990).

What accounts for this discrepancy between gaining access to political structures and having the actual power to affect decision-making processes? Answering this question is crucial for understanding the prospects of democracy, and it is the question that I take up in this dissertation. I draw on social movement theory to analyze the efforts of three social movement organizations as they advocate for their communities' access to housing, employment, and political representation. I develop the concept of patronage to analyze how the conditions of their entry into political structures both enabled and limited their efforts. The findings help illuminate the politics of Pittsburgh's 20th century redevelopment and also refine social movement theory.

1.1 Movements, Benefactors, and Patronage

Social movement scholars have long asked: under what conditions do movements become effective agents of social change? One condition is gaining access to the material, social, cultural, and human resources necessary for movements to emerge and sustain themselves through campaigns. Some movements gather these resources from their own constituents. For instance, in his study of the early Civil Rights movement, Aldon Morris found that the money, social networks, institutions, and leadership that mobilized the movement came from local Black communities, or what he called an "indigenous resource base" (Morris 1984).

Other movements gain access to resources from outside supporters who sometimes include powerful benefactors, such as state agencies, corporations, and philanthropic foundations. These powerful benefactors provide movements with financing, technical assistance, and other resources, and often guide movement efforts into established channels for resolving conflicts. Over the second half of the 20th century, researchers have found a variety of social movements in the U.S. – including the Black Liberation Struggles, the women's, peace, and environmental movements – drawing on the support of powerful benefactors to establish professionalized movement organizations in efforts to access and influence lawmakers, voters, state agencies, business leaders, and more (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Minkoff 1995; Martin and Ferree 1995; Jenkins 1999; Jenkins and Halcli 1998).

Researchers have documented the various ways in which benefactors' support functions as a means of social control. As long as these power-holders want to maintain their power, however, they have interests in avoiding fundamental social change, and these interests inform their relationships with social movements in a variety of ways. They discourage movements from

utilizing disruptive practices or from pursuing systemic change, or even "controversial" causes. At the same time, they encourage movements to adopt professionalized organizational forms and pursue social change through establish channels where their activity can be monitored and disciplined by authorities. In some cases, benefactors deliberately manipulate movement activity in these ways because they see the movement as a direct threat to their interests (e.g., Roelofs 2003; Domhoff 2010; INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2007; Francis 2019). In other cases, these changes occur through more subtle and indirect processes, such as the pressures of organizational survival, that operate even in the absence of an explicit agenda for co-optation (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Ferree and Martin 1995; Aksartova 2003; Minkoff and Agnone 2010). Benefactors' support not only narrows the movements' range of tactics and goals, it also discourages movement leaders from organizing mass-based movements, undermines the conditions that generate protest, and renders movements more susceptible to co-optation and selective repression (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982). While benefactors can provide movements with immense resources and direct access to decision-makers, their support tends to moderate movement activity.

I contribute to these debates by elucidating another aspect of movement-benefactor relations. While power-holders' commitment to power leads them to discourage some forms of change, can also lead them to the actively encourage others. To maintain power, they must continually engage in efforts to reproduce and preserve the prevailing social order. For instance, elected officials continually build coalitions and court voters, and corporate executives continually discipline workforces and cultivate favorable relations with the state. The extent to which these efforts are successful depends on continually shifting balance of political, economic, and social forces. If power-holders can alter these balance of forces through the pursuit of

strategic and limited social change, then they may be able to not only maintain but even expand their bases of power. Such strategic efforts at social change may converge, albeit in imperfect ways, with those of social movements. In these cases, power-holders may approach social movements not merely as agents of social control but as opportunists willing to working at cross-purposes.

I use the term "patronage" to describe benefactors' offer to support movement activity in hopes of instrumentally advancing their own interests. By offering patronage, benefactors can gain access to and influence over movement resources, including material, human, organizational, social, and moral and cultural resources, that they may employ toward advancing their own ends. For instance, some corporations will lend support, very publicly, to environmental movement organizations in order to "greenwash" their brands, as Coca-Cola has done with Greenpeace (e.g., Trumpy 2008). In these cases, corporations draw on the moral and cultural resources of environmental movement organizations in an attempt to improve their image for a politically conscious consumer public. Further, through patronage, benefactors can also exploit opportunities created by a movement's entrance into a new arena. For instance, political parties may support movement activity when and to the extent that it can bring them continuing advantages in national elections, as Democratic Party aimed to do with the Civil Rights movement (e.g., McAdam 1982).

Benefactors' self-interest always informs their relations with the social movements they support, but in some instances, it expresses itself through specific acts of patronage. The prospects of patronage may decisively influence how benefactors select which movement groups and causes to support, decide what kind or extent of support to offer, or choose when to begin or end specific initiatives. By including patronage in their analyses, then, scholars can develop

fuller accounts of powerful benefactors' decision-making processes and also the possibilities and limits for movements that rely on their support.

1.2 Pittsburgh's 20th Century Redevelopment

In this dissertation, I analyze urban social movements comprised primarily of neighborhood- and community-based organizations. They are independent of political parties and other interest groups, though their interests may overlap with those of particular social classes or racial and ethnic groups. Urban social movements often direct their efforts at city government, often to advocate for improved access to housing, employment, schools, health care, and to ensure that their communities benefit, rather than suffer, from urban development (e.g., Fitzgerald and Simmons 1991; Fainstein and Fainstein 1985). Urban movements can also play roles in national and international movements since cities are critical sites for global capitalism, racial formation, and the implementation of federal policy (e.g., Andrews 2004). Recently, scholars and activists have been increasingly discussing strategies for social change that start at the level of local urban governance, sometimes called "right to the city" campaigns (e.g., Harvey 2013) and "municipalism" (e.g., Quiquivix et. al 2023).

The urban movements I study emerged out of a particular historical context. By the late 19th century, Pittsburgh became a center for the production of iron steel, and its political economy gave rise to industrial fortunes, financial fortunes, early philanthropic activity, and a multi-ethnic, multi-racial working class organized by labor unions (Hinshaw 2002; McCollester 2008; Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982; Gottlieb 1987; Cilli 2021). In the 20th century, city

leaders undertook massive redevelopment efforts to revitalize the central business district and diversify the city's economic base (e.g., Lubove 1996; Winant 2021).

1.2.1. 1960s Pittsburgh: Urban Renewal, Urban Rebellion

After World War II, Pittsburgh showed signs of decline. Between the disinvestment and unemployment of the Great Depression, and the industrial boom of war-time production, the city suffered from pollution, congestion, dilapidated housing stock, and degraded infrastructure. This stagnation threatened the city's tax base with the flight of capital investment White flight to the suburbs (Lubove 1995).

City leaders mobilized to reverse these trends. Leaders in government, industry, and finance brought together public and private resources to design and coordinate a series of large-scale, top-down redevelopment efforts. Their efforts were greatly facilitated by the federal Housing Act of 1949, which made federal funding available. Cities across the country launched similar redevelopment efforts around this time (e.g., Mollenkopf 1983; Frieden and Sagalyn 1989), but scholars attribute special importance to the ones in Pittsburgh. This city was early and influential in forming an alliance between leaders of the public and private sectors (an alliance that is consistent with what scholars call a "growth machine" (Logan and Molotch 1987) or a "growth coalition" (Mollenkopf 1983)) and in using federal funding from the Housing Act for infrastructure and commercial redevelopment. One historian writes that Pittsburgh's leaders "set the tone for redevelopment across the country" (Weiss 1985: 262; see also Teaford 1990: 46).

The7elocate7ipp operated through an elite and exclusive civic organization called the Allegheny Conference on Community Development. This organization, founded in 1943, was

comprised of White men who included various corporate executives, industrialists, financiers, philanthropists, university leaders, the mayor's office, and the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) (Mershon 2000). At first, they directed their efforts in the central business district with programs to control air pollution and flooding, but soon after they worked through the URA and eminent domain to seize "blighted" properties and demolish them to make way for commercial office buildings, industrial expansion, highway infrastructure, stadiums, and commercial and residential complexes designed to attract suburbanites, shoppers, and tourists with "a suburban atmosphere" (e.g., Alcoa 1961). By 1969, Pittsburgh's Urban Redevelopment Authority had undertaken 30 redevelopment projects covering 2,096 acres of land in the city, on the city's periphery, and beyond, costing approximately $100 million in private financing and $180 million from federal, state, and local government sources (Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh 1969). This wave of redevelopment was concentrated between 1946 and 1973, and observers later dubbed them "renaissance 1" (e.g., Lubove 1995).

While local boosters celebrated the renaissance, many city residents questioned it. Many of the largest redevelopment projects were located in or near neighborhoods with large Black populations, including Penn Circle in East Liberty, Allegheny Center on the North Side and especially the Civic Arena in the Hill District (Trotter and Day 2010). The Hill District is a historically Black neighborhood that was nationally recognized for cultural achievements in jazz, literature, theatre, and baseball, and was home to one of the most widely read Black newspapers in the country (Whitaker 2018). Conference members and allied city leaders, however, saw the Hill as an opportunity to expand their redevelopment efforts and the central business district itself. In 1943, White city councilman George Evans said that the Hill District was so disorganized and run down that it could be redeveloped "at no social cost" to the city (Evans

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1943). In 1956, the public-private partnership used eminent domain to seize and clear a large section of the Lower Hill District to make way for the Civic Arena, highway infrastructure, and residential-commercial complexes. The demolition displaced over 1,500 families, mostly Black, who relocated to neighborhoods with substantial Black populations, exacerbating patterns of racial residential segregation, White flight, and dilapidated housing stock (Voelker 1971). In cities across the country, city leaders designated Black communities for demolition and redevelopment. Observers in Pittsburgh and elsewhere contended that "urban renewal means Negro removal" (Fullilove Thompson 2016).

As large-scale redevelopment proceeded, neighborhood residents organized to protect their communities and livelihoods, sometimes by protesting and sometimes by forming neighborhood organizations. Neighborhood organizing was greatly facilitated by federal programs designed to combat poverty and get residents to participate in urban planning processes, including the Model Cities and Community Action programs (Jezierski 1990; Lubove 1996; Ferman 1996). By 1963, Pittsburgh's city leaders chose ACTION-Housing, a non-profit organization created by the Allegheny Conference, to act as the intermediary that brought neighborhood organizations into urban planning processes (Lubove 1996: Ferman 1996).

In Pittsburgh's Black communities, community organizing was stimulated further by the Black Liberation Struggles mobilizing across the country. Black community leaders drew on existing organizations, like local chapters of the NAACP and the Urban League, and formed wholly new organizations and coalitions to challenge the color line in employment, housing, recreation, education, policing, and access to health care (Trotter and Day 2010). On the city's North Side, Black women founded a group called Citizens Against Slum Housing (CASH) to advocate for the expansion of public housing and improvements to tenant protections and code

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enforcement (Jezierski 1990). In some cases, community leaders tied the displacement and destruction of urban redevelopment to the struggle for Black Liberation. Carl Morris, editor of the *Pittsburgh Courier,* wrote that redevelopment allowed for the renaissance in the central business district at the expense, and to the exclusion of, its Black communities (Morris 1968). In the Hill District, community leaders organized to oppose plans to expand redevelopment into the Middle Hill District where by erecting a large billboard reading "No Redevelopment Beyond This Point" (Dietrich-Ward 2015).

Frustrations over redevelopment and White supremacy boiled over in the spring of 1968. On April 4th, Martin Luther king, Jr. was assassinated, and urban rebellions erupted in cities across the country. In Pittsburgh, they began in the Hill District and spread to other predominantly Black neighborhoods, especially Homewood-Brushton and Manchester. Up to 1,000 residents, who observers described as mostly young Black men, occupied the streets to express grief and anger. Some smashed windows and looted shops, especially White-owned shops, and others threw rocks and firebombs, causing 515 fires and up to $1,000,000 in property damage (8.8 million in 2024 dollars) (Rosensweet and Conti 1968). The mayor's office implemented a citywide curfew and called in 4,500 national guardsmen and 350 state troopers. The disorder lasted for eight days and resulted in over a thousand arrests (Dietrich-Ward 2015: 178-181; Trotter and Day 2010: 104-5). Reports in the mayor's office described the rebellions as "the worst civil disturbance since the railroad riots in 1877" (Mayor's Special Task Force 1968:1).

The rebellions changed the priorities of Pittsburgh's White leaders. In public statements on June 25th, Conference members said the rebellions signaled the failures of the city's renaissance and the necessity of a new course of action. The president of the Allegheny

Conference declared that "we must admit we failed to recognize the urban crisis...," that now "the plight of Pittsburgh's slum dwellers would be the main concern of the conference" (Quoted in Hritz 1968b). The Conference spent that year developing "solutions to the problems of the urban crisis" (Allegheny Conference on Community Development 1968; also see Trotter and Day 2010; Ribeiro 2012). These solutions drew on the resources of state and national programs, including the Johnson administration's Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB), and the Small Business Administration. Their efforts also drew on the local resources of Conference members and their philanthropic foundations. In particular, Conference members pooled $13 million dollars to organize a "minority entrepreneur loan program" that funded various for-profit and non-profit enterprises in these neighborhoods including economic investment, workforce training, civic beautification, gender relations, housing programs, and motivational youth programs (Ribiero 2012).

In Black neighborhoods, community leaders mobilized to recover from the rebellions. Community residents formed new organizations and drew existing ones together into new coalitions. In the Hill District, residents formed the United Black Front (UBF) in April 1968. This umbrella organization connected representatives of 14 other community-based organizations, and, like other Black Power organizations at the time, sought to develop community self-determination for Hill District residents. In a mission statement, representatives of the grouped compared themselves to the Allegheny Conference and stated that their "purpose was single-minded: to make the Hill economically sound through Black entrepreneurship and self-reliance" (United Black Front 1969b: 4). The UBF and organizations like it – Forever Action Together in Homewood-Brushton, the Bidwell Cultural and Training Center in Manchester – took advantage of the opportunities provided by the Allegheny Conference's

programs to guide their communities' social, political, and economic development. These efforts

channeled millions of dollars into these communities ostensibly to address their longstanding

grievances, and they led to a proliferation of new businesses and other formal institutions. Most

of them, however, proved to be short-lived (Gigler 1974).

1.2.2. 1980s Pittsburgh: Industry's Decline and Rebirth?

The region's heavy industry remained highly profitable through World War II, but its

profit rates showed signs of plateauing as early as the 1960s. The following decades brought the

1973 oil crisis, stagflation, and signs of a changing global economy. In 1979, U.S. Steel

announced the closure of its facilities in Youngstown, Ohio and in the following years, partial or

complete closures came to its operations in and around Pittsburgh, one-by-one, reaching Carrie

Furnace (1982), the Duquesne Works (1984), Clairton's steel mill (1984), Homestead Steel Mill

(1986), National Tube (1987), and Ambridge (1987). Other steel corporations and related

industries followed suit. Closures entailed layoffs affecting tens of thousands of workers, driving

unemployment to heights that had not been seen since the Great Depression. Between 1980 and

1986, the region lost 43% of its manufacturing employment (Detrick 1999). U.S. Steel

executives attributed the shutdowns not to their own profit-maximizing strategies but instead on

foreign imports, labor costs, and environmental regulations (Stout 2020).

The collapse of steel marked a critical juncture in Pittsburgh's history. The Allegheny

Conference responded by forming an Economic Development Committee in 1981. This

committee was comprised of the executives of Mellon Bank, Pittsburgh National Bank, U.S.

Steel, and Jones and Laughlin Steel, and developed and monitored the implementation of a

regional economic development strategy (Pease 1981). In 1984, the Allegheny Conference published "Strategy 21," a document that would serve as a blueprint for a post-industrial Pittsburgh, recommending that the region develop its infrastructure (including airports and riverfront developments), expand its finance, health, education, and specialty manufacturing sectors, and draw on the strengths of the city's research universities to promote the growth of biotechnology and advanced technology research (Allegheny Conference on Community Development 1984; Caliguiri et al 1985; Deitrich-Ward 2015: 219). To bring these plans to fruition, the Allegheny Conference drew on public funding, especially from the State of Pennsylvania, and developed an extensive high-tech start-up eco-system, comprised of seed funds, incubators, networking programs, technical assistance programs, and supportive state agencies, through which they channeled hundreds of millions of dollars in public and private funding to hundreds of high-tech firms in Pittsburgh and the surrounding region (Ahlbrandt 1990). These efforts, later dubbed "renaissance 2," were concentrated between 1977 and 1992 (e.g., Lubove 1996; Neumann 2016).

Both the Conference and the historical context in which it operated had changed in the decades since the first renaissance had begun. Starting in the 1970s, the federal government had begun phases of retrenchment and de-centralization that changed its relation to cities and urban redevelopment. Beginning with the Nixon administration, the federal government had reduced funding available to cities like Pittsburgh and encouraged them to support their revitalization efforts by relying on the private sector instead (Neumann 2016). The increasing global economic competition also complicated matters of local economic development. Urban governments began competing with each other to attract increasingly mobile capital investments (Harvey 1989), and corporate executives were less invested in addressing local social problems (Ahlbrandt and

Coleman 1988). The composition of the Conference had changed, too. By the 1980s, the Conference lacked the tight-knit political leadership that it had in the first renaissance, and it included more representation from non-profit organizations and universities (Lubove 1996). In the second renaissance, the Conference took less unified and comprehensive courses of action, and their responses to the region's problems received criticism for being superficial (e.g., Deitrick and Briem 2021).

The field of neighborhood organizing changed, too. Many of the community-based organizations and networks that emerged in the 1960s had persisted, and newer ones emerged as well. Neighborhood organizations received a major boost from the Mayoral administration of Peter Flaherty in the 1970s who cut ties with the organized business community and redirected funding and power to neighborhood organizations for developing their own communities (e.g., Ferman 1996). By the 1980s, these neighborhood organizations now included more professionalized organizations, especially community development corporations (CDCs), and they represented not only high-poverty neighborhoods who faced "slum clearance" but neighborhoods all around the city (Ahlbrandt 1990; Lubove 1996; Crowley 2005). These neighborhood groups also came to be incorporated into support systems, such as the Pittsburgh Partnership on Neighborhood Development, through which corporations and foundations provided funding and technical assistance (Metzger 1998).

The most ambitious community-based responses came from the working-class communities of the Monongahela Valley (Mon Valley). This Valley consists in a series boroughs and cities along the Monongahela River, adjoining Pittsburgh to the Southeast, where heavy industry had been concentrated. Since the 19th century, heavy industry, especially steel-making, supported these communities with employment and tax revenues. The pollution from industry

also took a toll on the communities' air and water, infrastructure, and the health of workers and their families (Tarr 2004; Winant 2021). In the wake of de-industrialization, residents of these communities mobilized coalitions of labor unions, clergy, and community organizations (Hathaway 1996; Stout 2020). At first, they organized to sound the alarm about the coming de-industrialization. Many residents and workers did not see disinvestment coming since layoffs were part of the cyclical nature of the steel industry and corporations like U.S. Steel had been promising future investment as late as 1979 (Hathaway 1996: 94). Leaders of these communities were aware of the Allegheny Conference and its plans for a post-industrial economy, and they contended that such high-tech and service-sector industries could not support the working-class communities of the Mon Valley (McCollester et al. 1983). As layoffs and plant shut downs proceeded, the community coalition effort gained steam, and they advocated plans to halt disinvestment and mitigate its effects on their communities.

Organized labor united with community groups to prevent plant shut downs in industrial areas across the country (Haas 1985; Nissen 1995). The coalition in Pittsburgh began with activists arriving from Youngstown, Ohio where plant shutdowns began earlier. In 1980, clergy members from churches in the Mon Valley met to discuss their concern over rising unemployment in the Valley. This group, later called the Denominational Ministry Strategy (DMS), conducted strategic research on corporate decision-making, and they found that some decision-makers responsible for shutting down Mon Valley plants were profiting from the disinvestment. For instance, they found that Mellon Bank, which was responsible for foreclosing on West Homestead's Mesta Machine Company, had $100 million invested in Sumitomo Industries, Mesta's primary competitor, located in Japan (Denominational Ministry Strategies 1985). The DMS mobilized unemployed workers and other allies to publicly name and shame

such decision-makers by organizing boycotts and other publicity generating tactics (Hathaway 1996; Stout 2020). Other Mon Valley residents organized to ameliorate the suffering of the unemployed and their families. Just as they did in the Great Depression, workers and their communities created food pantries and unemployed councils. In 1982, several union locals combined their efforts to form the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee (MVUC) who campaigned to prevent foreclosure on workers' homes, prevent utilities shut offs in their homes, and expand their access to unemployment compensation, funds to retrain for new jobs, and other services (Mon Valley Unemployed Committee 1982; see also Hathaway 1996). While the most visible leaders of these organizations were White men, their constituents and communities included many Black workers and women, who had only recently gained access to high-paying union jobs in the mills with the Consent Decree of 1974 (Stout 2020).

Alongside the DMS and MVUC, Mon Valley residents also formed the Tri-State Conference on Steel. Tri-State represented working-class communities in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, and it was comprised of steel workers, economists, clergy, and leaders of union locals. Tri-State developed a strategy for preventing industrial flight. As early as 1981, they proposed that municipal authorities could use the power of eminent domain to prevent plant shutdowns and coordinate the sale of plants to private investors or to worker-owned operations. In other industrial areas, like Chicago, community-labor coalitions organized to achieve the same thing (e.g., Rosenheim 1984). In some instances they were successful. In nearby Weirton, West Virginia, steel workers succeeded in organizing an employee-stock ownership plan to buy out a mill abandoned by National Steel and operating it for twenty more years (Hathaway 1996: 38). Worker-ownership could give workers control not just over labor conditions but also

environmental conditions. Since they lived in the communities where the mills operated, they would have strong incentives to reduce the pollution they emitted.

The Allegheny Conference observed the Mon Valley coalition's activities with apprehension. They observed what they described as the "widespread discontent" in these in the Mon Valley (Weiss 1984). Some Conference members feared that the plan for re-industrialization could become "politically irresistible" if the Conference did not present appealing alternatives (Ibid.). Others feared that their activities would create an image of a "hostile labor climate" that would discourage capital investment (Simon 1984). As with the rebellions, Conference members drew on their financial resources and expertise to develop programs, the Mon Valley Renaissance and the Mon Valley Initiative, to guide the Valley's economic development in a direction consistent with their own goals (e.g., Allegheny Conference on Community Development 1986).

As the Tri-State Conference mobilized, however, it turned for support to other benefactors. They received considerable political and financial support from the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and the Allegheny County Commissioners, and they secured the support of the City of Pittsburgh and eight Mon Valley municipalities who agreed to charter the Steel Valley Authority in January 1986 (Stout 1986). While the SVA persists today, and works to preserve jobs throughout Southwestern Pennsylvania, its original vision of preserving heavy industry in the Valley has not come to fruition.

The renaissance architects are famous for reinventing the city's central business district and for diversifying the regional economy. What remains puzzling for their story, however, is how these same architects– despite pooling millions of dollars, stimulating an array of new organizations, and much public fanfare – were unable to achieve anything comparable in the

city's Black communities in the wake of the rebellions and in the Mon Valley communities in the wake of de-industrialization.

1.3 Case Selection, Methods, and Data

To analyze the decision-making processes of powerful benefactors, I need a method that can unpack complex causal processes while keeping them contextualized and also addressing theoretical questions. Toward this end I use case studies. Case studies allow me to utilize multiple sources of data to assess the contextual factors that influenced these decisions, the agency exercised by benefactors and other parties, and the contingency of the processes leading up to the decisions. Case studies are also advantageous for theoretical development, especially concerning the refinement of concepts and the development and assessment of new hypotheses (George and Bennet 2005; Yin 2003).

I conduct three in-depth case studies of community-based movement organizations that secured the support of one or more powerful benefactors. From among the many collaborations of this kind, I purposively selected three that were most suitable for my theoretical inquiry. Each case features the relevant hypothesized causes, outcomes, and contextual conditions specified by each of the arguments under consideration. Further, in each case, the contextual conditions (the crises provoked by urban rebellions and de-industrialization) and the outcomes (the nature and extent of benefactor support) are especially pronounced. These pronounced features make the processes and mechanisms behind benefactors' decisions easier for me to identify (Beach and Pederson 2018; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). I also selected cases that offered some variety in historical periods, movement groups, movement causes, and benefactors, in order to provide

robust assessments of the arguments in question and to provide multiple perspectives on Pittsburgh's 20th century politics.

The first study concerns housing. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, substandard housing proliferated in Pittsburgh's low-income and Black neighborhoods, and it was often exacerbated by urban redevelopment. These poor housing conditions became one of the major grievances underlying Pittsburgh's rebellions. In 1965, a group led by Black women formed Citizens Against Slum Housing (CASH) to mobilize residents of the city's eight high-poverty neighborhoods to advocate for improved housing conditions. They used pickets, demonstrations, and sit-ins but also held conferences and negotiated with city councilmembers and other elected officials. By July 1968, CASH secured critical support from the mayor's office, the philanthropic Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, and a group of financial institutions who helped them create a non-profit housing improvement program called Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS). The NHS's early achievements caught the attention of federal agencies who then replicated its program across the nation. This network of programs grew into NeighborWorks America, a federally chartered non-profit organization that has channeled $19.5 billion into low-income communities across the U.S. (NeighborWorks America 2022). Research on Pittsburgh often refers to CASH and the NHS as examples of effective neighborhood organizing (Cunningham 1970; Lubove 1996; Jezierski 1990;), but no detailed history of CASH and its efforts has yet been written.

The second case study concerns employment and business ownership in the city's Black communities. Pittsburgh had long suffered steep racial disparities in employment and income, and these disparities were exacerbated by urban renewal that forced the closure and relocation of Black-owned businesses and business incubators. This lack of economic opportunity also fueled

the rebellions. After the rebellions, residents of the Hill District formed an umbrella organization called the United Black Front (UBF) which aimed to develop Hill residents' capacity for self-determination. In doing so, they secured support from the White-led Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) who granted them the human capital, fixed capital, and guaranteed markets to establish a light-manufacturing firm called Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc. (WCI) in 1971. The WCI was operated and eventually owned by Black workers and Black managers, almost all men. The WCI was part of a national trend of similar industry-community collaborations that observers described as "Black Capitalism" and hoped would revitalize economically depressed urban Black communities (see Allen 1990). The WCI was hailed by local observers as a success story for Black Capitalism in Pittsburgh (Taylor 1973b). No history has yet been written of the Conference-backed efforts to promote Black capitalism in Pittsburgh or of Wylie-Centre Industries.

The third and final case study concerns de-industrialization in the Mon Valley that entailed massive job loss and plummeting tax revenues for municipalities. In response to this devastation, Valley communities, clergy, and organized labor mobilized with a plan to preserve heavy industry in the Valley and produce steel to be used in domestic infrastructure. The organization that led these efforts, the Tri-State Conference on Steel, secured support from many quarters. They secured financing to conduct feasibility studies from Allegheny County Commissioners, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), and the City of Pittsburgh. Then, through a long series of campaigns, they secured the support of Pittsburgh and eight surrounding boroughs and cities to officially charter a new municipal authority, the Steel Valley Authority, in January 1986. The SVA stands out for being one of the most ambitious efforts to come out of the anti-plant closure movement in the U.S. (see Tilly and Kennedy 2014). The SVA's history has

been told before (e.g., Hathaway 1996; Stout 2020), and it features prominently studies of

neighborhood organizations in the 1980s (Ahlbrandt 1990; Jezierski 1990; Ferman 1996), but my

study builds on these accounts by using novel archival data and a formal historical methodology.

The studies' data consist in archival records. Between 2017 and 2023, I collected and

examined records from twenty one collections housed in four different Pittsburgh-based

archives: the University of Pittsburgh Archives and Special Collections; the Heinz History

Center's Detre Library and Collections; the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh's Hill District

community archives; and Rivers of Steel. These records consist in annual reports, internal

memos, manifestos, private correspondence, public speeches, conference presentations, project

descriptions, grant applications, meeting minutes, and more, from the individuals and

organizations concerned. These data provide me with the perspectives of movement

organizations, benefactors, and various third parties involved. I complement these primary

sources with an array of secondary sources written by activists, historians, lawyers, and

community organizers, as well as local newspapers. For newspaper sources, I draw from

newspapers with different readerships, some predominantly White, some predominantly Black,

and some predominantly working-class. These sources allow me to produce analyses that are

sensitive to context and perspectives rooted in different social locations.

I analyze these data with formal, historical methods of within-case analysis. Two cases

employ theoretically-guided event-structure analysis (tESA) (Bloom 2015: see also Uehara 2001;

Dixon 2008; Brueggemann and Brown 2003). With this method, researchers decompose a case

into constituent actions for analysis and formally identify those actions that instantiate the

variables and concepts of one or more theories of interest. The researcher then uses

counterfactual analysis to assess the causal relations between each action and every subsequent

action. Since the actions instantiate the components of one or more theories, these causal

assessments constitute tests for one or more rival hypotheses.

The other case employs process tracing. Process tracing is a method of within-case

historical analysis that allows researchers to assess causal relations between one or more

hypothesized causes and an outcome of interest. Researchers first construct hypothetical

processes that could produce the outcome, then specify what "diagnostic evidence" or series of

intervening steps this particular process would leave behind in the data. Researchers then search

the empirical record for evidence that can support or challenge that hypothetical explanation

(Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012). If researchers develop two or more hypothetical explanations,

and do so on the basis of theories, then their process tracing analysis will be capable of assessing

theoretical rivalries (George and Bennet 2005).

1.4 Chapter Outline

Pittsburgh's 20th century redevelopment is celebrated for revitalizing the central business district

and diversifying the regional economy. Researchers have documented well how redevelopment

gave rise to neighborhood organizations that challenged powerful decision-makers and often

succeeded in getting access to political structures to advance their causes (e.g., Jezierski 1990;

Ferman 1996). Despite these efforts, their impact on redevelopment was limited to canceling a

small number of proposed projects. My dissertation aims to make sense of these limitations by

drawing on social movement theory to analyze the cases of three community-based organizations

that accessed political structures with the help of powerful benefactors. In the following chapters,

I examine how and whether benefactors' decisions were influenced by responses to insurgent

movement activity and/or by the prospects of instrumentally advancing their own interests. I find that acts of patronage, alongside efforts at social control, were key to understanding the possibilities and limitations of the benefactor support that community-based organizations obtain.

Chapter 2 concerns social movement theory. Social movement scholars have long examined how movements gain access to resources and, for movements that do so, the consequences of relying on powerful benefactors. In this chapter, I examine the research on this subject and trace the development and different iterations of the social control argument. I then introduce the patronage argument. I define patronage as those acts through which benefactors supply movement groups with resources in the hopes of instrumentally advancing their own interests. By developing this concept and including it in social movement analyses, scholars can produce fuller accounts of benefactors' decision-making processes and fuller accounts of the gains that movements can make with their support. The subsequent case studies draw on and refine the theoretical arguments developed in this chapter.

The following three chapters present the empirical case studies. Chapter 3 concerns Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS). This chapter uses tESA and archival data to examine how a grassroots community-based organization, CASH, gained the support of the mayor's office, the Sarah Mellon Scaife foundation, and a group of thirteen lending institutions to create this non-profit to address substandard housing in its constituent neighborhoods in 1968. This chapter assesses whether these outcomes can be explained through social control and patronage arguments. The next chapter concerns Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc (WCI). This chapter uses archival data and process tracing to examine how executives of the United Black Front secured the support of corporate executives of the White-led Alcoa who lent the personnel,

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machinery, and guaranteed markets to create a light-manufacturing firm from scratch. This chapter assesses whether and how this outcome can be explained by a conscience constituent argument, a social control argument, and/or a patronage argument. The last case study examines the origins of the Steel Valley Authority (SVA). This analysis follows the campaign of the Tri-State Conference on Steel and its allies as they secure the support of local governments, and the cooperation of U.S. Steel, to create a new municipal authority that can utilize the power of eminent domain. This chapter assesses how and to what extent these outcomes can be explained by a social control and a patronage argument.

I conclude with a chapter that summarizes the studies' findings. For social movement theory, I spell out the implications of my findings for prevailing theories but most importantly for a patronage theory. The empirical analyses help flesh out the many forms that acts of patronage can take. The insights that emerge also generate testable hypotheses for future research. For the history of Pittsburgh, I spell out what my findings imply for the politics of its 20th century redevelopment. I consider how disruption and patronage shaped the course of community organizations' efforts and how the altered trajectories of these efforts affected or failed to affect the cities' larger redevelopment plans.

2.0 Movements, Benefactors, and Patronage

For social movements to be effective, they must have access to a vast array of material, social, cultural, and human resources. Some movements gather these resources from their own constituents. For instance, in his study of the early Civil Rights movement, Aldon Morris found that the money, social networks, institutions, and leadership that mobilized the movement came from local Black communities, or what he called an "indigenous resource base" (Morris 1984). Other movement groups access these resources from powerful benefactors, such as state agencies, corporations, and philanthropic foundations, who provide movements with financing and technical assistance and often guide movement efforts into established institutions. Over the second half of the 20th century, researchers have found a variety of social movements in the U.S. – including the Black Liberation Struggles, the women's, peace, and environmental movements – drawing on the support of powerful benefactors to establish professionalized movement organizations in efforts to access and influence lawmakers, state agencies, business leaders, and more (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Minkoff 1995; Martin and Ferree 1995; Jenkins 1999; Jenkins and Halcli 1998).

Scholars and activists have long debated how these powerful benefactors transform the activity for those movement groups that rely on them. As long they are committed to maintaining positions of power, these benefactors have interests in preserving social order, and these interests inevitably inform their relations with the social movements they support. These benefactors may manipulate movement agendas, channel movements into established institutions, discipline them,

and encourage them to adopt professionalized organizational forms. In these ways, benefactor support tends to draw movements away from pursuits of systemic change and direct-action tactics and toward piecemeal reforms that are more likely to reproduce rather than disturb the prevailing social order. In other words, these benefactors, through direct and indirect mechanisms, act as agents of social control (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982; Ferree and Martin 1995; Roelofs 2003; INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2007).

I contribute to these debates by elucidating another aspect of movement-benefactor relations. Benefactors can use movement groups to instrumentally advance their own goals, whether through appropriating movement resources toward their own ends or by exploiting opportunities created by the movement's emergence into a new arena. When benefactors lend movements support to advance their own ends in these ways, I describe it as an act "patronage." While benefactors' self-interest informs all of their relations with social movements, it sometimes comes to the fore in acts of patronage that can be highly consequential for the movement groups who rely on them. If scholars include patronage in their analyses, they can develop fuller accounts of benefactors' decision-making processes and the gains that movements can and cannot make with their support.

2.1 The Social Control Argument

Early studies of social movements focused primarily on the social psychology of movement participants. According to these studies, social movements emerged when large-scale social changes, such as urbanization or mass unemployment, disrupted the normative social order and created social psychological strain that individuals expressed by participating in movements

(e.g., Gurr 1970; Turner and Killian 1972; Smelser 1962). A major development in social movement studies came when scholars turned their focus toward the many resources necessary for building and sustaining a social movement (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). These scholars, who became known as resource mobilization theorists, examined movements on the American Left in the 1960s and 70s, and they found that a key variable in their emergence, development, and decline was their access to a wide variety of material, human, social, organizational, and cultural resources (see Edwards, McCarthy, and Mataic 2019).

To gather these resources, social movement groups may rely on their own constituents. This strategy can be difficult since movement constituents typically belong to social groups that lack formal access to economic and political power. Research has demonstrated, however, that even under these conditions this strategy can be highly effective. For instance, Aldon Morris analyzed the emergence and mobilization of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement in the South between 1953 and 1963, and he found that the movement relied primarily on the money, networks, institutions, organizations and leadership drawn from local Black communities (Morris 1984).

Movement groups also obtain resources from people outside of the movement. In McCarthy and Zald's study of movements of the American Left, they found a growing number of social movement organizations relying on resources from outside supporters, including state agencies, churches, philanthropic foundations, and businesses. They found that outside support was critical in shaping movement outcomes, but it also transformed social movement activity by encouraging movement organizations to adopt professionalized organizational structures, creating career paths for movement leaders, and giving rise to entire social movement industries (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977). More recent research suggested that

outside support continued to grow through the end of the 20th century, especially from philanthropic foundations, in the Black Liberation Struggles and women's, environmental, and peace movements in the U.S. (Jenkins 1999; Jenkins and Halcli 1998; Minkoff 1995; INCITE! 2007).

Resource mobilization theorists speculated that some outside supporters acted on altruistic motives. These supporters sponsor movement activity not because they expect to directly benefit from the accomplishment of movement goals but because they find the movement's goals to be morally desirable. Resource mobilization theorists call these supporters "conscience constituents" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1222). Researchers have empirically identified conscience constituents in the "liberal middle class" who provided financial support for the Civil Rights and Farmworkers' movements in U.S. (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). More recent research identifies conscience constituents in activists supporting student demonstrations in the UK and the Netherlands (Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damon 2015) and participants in Pride parades across Europe (Wahlström, Peterson, Wennerhag 2018). McCarthy and Zald suggested that some conscience constituents could be found among more powerful social groups, who they call "conscience elites" (1977: 1223), but these kinds of supporters have proven to be exceedingly rare.

Much more scholarship, however, concerns movements' relationships with powerful benefactors, especially state agencies, corporations, and philanthropic foundations, whom McCarthy and Zald described as "elites" (1977). These benefactors can provide movements with direct access to powerful decision-makers and enormous pools of resources. Their support can enable movements to pursue entirely new strategies for change, such as lobbying, litigation, or policy research (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986), and allow movement groups to withstand periods

of movement abeyance and political backlash (e.g., Staggenborg 1988). These benefactors, however, also have vested interests in preserving the social order on which their power depends, and these interests inevitably inform their decisions about whether, how, and to what extent they offer movements support.

Benefactors may build relations with movements they find threatening in order to neutralize them. They may try to deliberately dismantle a movement group altogether, or they may gain influence over its agenda to direct its efforts away from any changes that could disturb the prevailing social order. Movement scholars in the U.S. suggest that authorities resort to these "hard" social control efforts when they are confronted with movements seeking revolutionary change that employ disruptive and extra-institutionalized tactics (e.g., McAdam 1982: 57-58). They also suggest that hard social control responses are more likely during times of political uncertainty. Under ordinary circumstances, authorities can usually ignore or repress insurgent movements. These options are less feasible, however, in times of instability when authorities' political alliances are less certain. If authorities ignore insurgency, they risk the appearance that they cannot maintain social order, but if they repress the insurgency, they risk provoking sympathetic allies to join the insurgent actions (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1977; Bloom 2015). On this account, authorities and benefactors offer movements concessions primarily as a means of preserving social order, perhaps in tandem with lighter methods of repression. This is what I call "hard" social control.

For instance, research suggests that the emergence of militant Black Power groups in the 1960s elicited a hard social control response from White-led corporations and philanthropic foundations. In response to the shortcomings of the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power groups emerged in urban Black communities throughout the country. Many of them sought Black

liberation in the form of separatism and used militant organizing styles and direct-action tactics.

Corporate and philanthropic leaders, especially in the Ford Foundation, viewed this mobilization

as a threat and responded by cultivating relationships with movement leaders and steering their

activity toward efforts that were consistent with corporate interests, including Black capitalism

and racial assimilation (Allen 1990; Ferguson 2013). Scholars have identified similar

interference by powerful benefactors in other urban social movements (Domhoff 2010),

environmental movements (Roelofs 2003), and various social justice movements working

through the "non-profit industrial complex" (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2007).

Benefactors' interest in social order also expresses itself in a variety of more

commonplace decisions that impact movements in more subtle and indirect ways. Benefactors

often try to preserve order by directing movement efforts into established institutions for

resolving conflicts where authorities and related power-holders can maintain some control over

the direction and pace of social change. For instance, in the 1930s, the industrial workers'

movement fought to improve working conditions by organizing massive strikes that paralyzed

national industries. In response to the disruptions, the federal government offered workers the

right to organize unions which would channel their efforts into state-sanctioned grievance

procedures that would replace the strike. By channeling the movement in this direction, the

federal government could deprive the movement of their most disruptive tactics, making their

activity regular and commensurate with capitalist and state interests and also giving movement

leaders a stake in preserving major elements of the status quo (Piven and Cloward 1977).

Once movement groups are drawn into established channels, benefactors can also

monitor and regulate their activities. In the non-profit sector, many philanthropic foundations

engage in "strategic grant-making," a practice that requires discipline and transparency from

their grantees. These foundations see themselves as "entrepreneurs" investing in the social change that movement groups produce. To ensure returns on their investments, they require their grantees to pursue specific and measurable goals through a prescribed set of tactics and regularly report on their activities for evaluation by foundation trustees. If a movement group fails to meet their goals, they risk jeopardizing their access to future funding (Frantz and Fernandes 2018). For instance, Frantz and Fernandes' study of New York-based worker centers in the early 2000s finds that some centers allied with strategic-grant-making foundations, and maintaining good relations with these funders (drew the centers away from direct-action campaigns and worker-led styles of organizing (ibid.).

Relatedly, many benefactors encourage movement groups to adopt formal and professionalized organizational forms. Research suggests that philanthropic foundations in particular tend to favor professionalized movement groups with paid staff and centralized bureaucratic decision-making structures because these forms are familiar to them, they can hold grantees accountable to meeting foundation standards, and they provide trustees with some assurance that the movement group will not provoke political controversy (e.g., Minkoff and Agnone 2010; Aksartova 2003; Jenkins, Carmichael, Brulle, and Boughton 2018). Researchers find that professionalized organizations have proliferated in a variety of social movements in the U.S. over the second half of 20th century, including the Civil Rights Movement (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins 1998; Jenkins and Halcli 1999), the environmental movement (Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Bartley 2007; Jenkins, Carmichael, Brulle, and Boughton 2018); the women's movement (Martin and Ferree 1995; Jenkins and Halcli 1998; Minkoff and Agnone 2010); and the peace movement (Jenkins and Halcli 1998; Jenkins 1999; Aksartova 2003).

Because of their investment in social order, benefactors are also typically averse to political controversy (e.g., Aksartova 2003). For example, Spalter-Roth and Schreiber examined feminist organizations during a period of anti-feminist political backlash in the 1980s. They examined records from 19 professionalized and national women's organizations based in Washington D.C., and they found that in order to maintain relations with the government agencies and corporations who funded them they adjusted their rhetoric by expressing their cause through the language of liberal individualism. While this rhetoric was safe from political controversy, it also legitimized the structural inequalities that many feminist groups sought to dismantle (1995). Similarly, Francis's study of the NAACP found that the White-led, philanthropic Garland Fund steered the organization away from its anti-lynching campaigns at a critical moment in the 1930s because its trustees thought opposition to racial violence was too controversial at the time (Francis 2019).

Powerful benefactors, whether deliberately seeking to neutralizing threatening movements or not, tend to transform the movements that they support. If the movements are not directly co-opted, they are often professionalized, channeled, and disciplined, and the cumulative impact of these transformations tends to moderate movement activity. On one hand, these transformations narrow a movement's range of tactics and goals, and on the other, they absorb movement leaders into institutionalized roles where they are discouraged from mass-based organizing, separated from constituents, and embedded in networks of foundation trustees, non-profit professionals, and state administrators. For these reasons, powerful benefactors can be usefully described a agents of social control.

Researchers have long considered whether powerful benefactors do more to facilitate the success or the demise of the social movements they support. When it comes to movements of

marginalized social groups, some researchers argue that their incorporation into established political channels likely hastens their demise. Piven and Cloward's well-known study of four such movements – civil and welfare rights and industrial and unemployed workers – finds that these movements' greatest political efficacy lies in organizing mass-based movements that engage in disruptive and extra-institutional tactics, such as sit-ins, riots, or strikes. When these groups are channeled into established institutions, they are deprived of their most effective tactics, separated from outside supporters, and easily fragmented, co-opted, and selectively repressed, and these developments undermine the conditions that mobilize protest activity from these groups (Piven and Cloward 1977). For similar reasons, in his study of the Black Liberation Struggles, McAdam argues that "elite involvement in social protest may more often contribute to the demise of a movement than to its success" (1982: 27).

By contrast, other scholars contend that powerful benefactors provide meaningful gains for social movements. This argument appears in Jenkins' and co-authors' "channeling theory." These researchers study philanthropic foundations' involvement in a variety of U.S. -based movements, sometimes comparing the timing of philanthropic support with the rise and fall of different movement tactics and styles of organizing (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986). In a study of the Civil Rights Movement between 1953 and 1980, their findings suggested that philanthropic support came in response to protesting and riots and that it favored professionalized organizations with moderate goals, but that it did not alter the movement's agenda or prevent movement groups from engaging in protests or riots. In later studies of Civil Rights, women's, environmental, and peace movements, the researchers suggested that philanthropic support provided the movements with considerable gains by allowing them to pursue social change through litigation and lobbying. Jenkins writes of these movement that "the main impact of

movement philanthropy has been professionalization..." and that "...professionalization has frequently created greater mobilization and social movement success" (Jenkins 1998: 212; see also Jenkins and Halcli 1999).

Other scholars have contended that a full understanding of movement-benefactor relations requires an account the dynamic interaction between the disruptive tactics of some groups and the institutionalized tactics of others. In his study of the Black Liberation Struggles between 1954 and 1970, Haines disaggregated the movement into a "radical flank," characterized by Black Power groups utilizing disruptive tactics seeking radical change, and a "moderate flank," characterized by mainstream Civil Rights organizations with reformist goals and institutionalized tactics. He found that when the radical flank created crises through protests and riots, the moderate flank was more successful at wresting concessions from White authorities. He called this dynamic interaction a "positive radical flank effect" (in contrast to a "negative radical flank effect," where radical wings could provoke authorities into repressing the entire movement). Haines argued that positive radical flank effects could work toward the movement's advantage in the long-run, even if only incrementally (1988). Some researchers have criticized and refined Haines' theory (Morgan 1990; Fitzgerald and Rogers 2000; Rowe and Carroll 2012; Robnett, Glasser, and Trammell 2015), but others have found it useful for analyzing urban homeless movements in the U.S. (Cress and Snow 2000), Latin American labor movements (Anner 2009), the U.S. women's movement (McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015), Occupy Wall Street (Gaby and Caren 2016), and the U.S. environmental movement (Schifeling and Hoffman 2019).

The debate about the long-run impact of powerful benefactors is longstanding. After all, it is difficult to measure movement success, and defining movement success depends on the

political perspective of the observer. More recent scholarship has continued discussing movement-benefactor relations not in an attempt to try to resolve the long-standing debate but instead in an effort to document the ways in which movement activities defy the conceptual frameworks of earlier scholarship. These earlier frameworks invite scholars to categorize social movement groups as either confrontational or co-opted, disruptive or institutionalized, and radical or moderate. Scholars have found many movement groups that manage to bridge these divides, often deliberately. They find that movement groups both solicit support from powerful benefactors while also maintaining sufficient autonomy to critique and confront them. This includes feminists who practice "politics of engagement" with the state in Texas (Reinelt 1995), feminists who "critically collaborate" with state agencies in El Salvador (Burridge 2021), movement groups who blend institutionalized and disruptive tactics in their relations with various Latin American states (Alvarez et. al. 2017), and housing movement groups who both challenge and collaborate with political and economic institutions in New York City and Chicago (Cahen, Schneider and Saegert 2019). These studies find that activists choose their organizational styles and tactics strategically, often varying them for specific purposes, over the course of long campaigns comprised of continuously shifting gains and setbacks (e.g., Cahen, Schneider, and Saegert 2019).

2.2 Patronage

As the social control argument emphasizes, power-holders' commitments to maintaining power leads to them to discourage some forms of change. I contend, however, that this commitment can also lead them to the actively encourage other forms of change. To maintain power, they

continually engage in efforts to reproduce and preserve the prevailing social order. For instance, elected officials continually build coalitions and court voters, and corporate executives continually discipline workforces and secure favorable relations with the state. The extent to which these efforts are successful depends on continually shifting balance of forces in one or more arenas, including the state, market economies, or public opinion. If power-holders can alter these balance of forces, through the pursuit of strategic and limited social change, then they may be able to not only maintain but even expand their bases of power. Such strategic efforts at social change may converge, albeit in imperfect ways, with those of social movements.

Movement scholars have acknowledged that power-holders may look to social movements in their strategic pursuits of change. For instance, in McAdam's study of the Black Liberation Struggles, he writes that powerful decision-makers, or "elites," can respond to social movements in more than one way...

... most movements confront an elite divided in its reaction to the insurgent challenge. Some components of the elite usually perceive the movement as a threat and seek through their actions to neutralize or destroy it. Others see in it an opportunity to advance their interests and thus extend cautious support to insurgents (1982: 57).

If benefactors see a movement as an opportunity to instrumentally advance their own interests, their involvement with the movement cannot be reduced to simple, genuine allyship nor as a simple means of social control.

A recent case study illustrates this point. Walker examined philanthropic foundations with corporate parents in the health care sector (2018). These foundations regularly made grants

to health advocacy groups, and he examined the factors that influenced the size of the grants the kinds of advocacy organizations that received them. His findings suggested that one of the factors that influenced the foundations' selection of advocacy groups was the marketing and political interests of the foundations' corporate sponsors. For instance, when foundations'' corporate parents include pharmaceutical and device-manufacturing firms, they tend to favor groups who advocate for health conditions that these pharmaceuticals and devices can be used to treat. These foundations' selection processes cannot be understood as altruism, since it is too strategically self-interested, nor as attempts at social control, since they aim to facilitate rather than dilute movement activity. Instead, they act as opportunists using movement groups to improve relationships with their donors by serving their political and marketing needs (Ibid. 2018).

Benefactors' self-interest inevitably informs their relations with social movements, but in some moments, the opportunity to advance their own interests will be a crucial factor in their decision-making processes and especially consequential for the movements that rely on their support.

2.2.1 Theorizing Patronage

When benefactors bestow resources onto a movement group in an effort to instrumentally advance their own interests, I call it an act of "patronage." Here, my usage is broadly consistent with other scholars' usage of the term. Edwards, McCarthy, and Mataic define patronage as an "exchange relationship" that entails a "reciprocal set of expectations and obligations between the parties..." (89). The obligation for the benefactors is to provide resources, usually in the form of

"[g]overnment contracts, foundation grants, and large private donations" (Ibid.: 87). The obligation for movement groups, however, is left unspecified. The authors state that benefactors typically reserve some control over how the group can utilize its resources, but they do not explain to what end benefactors might use that control (2019).

Through patronage, benefactors can appropriate movement resources and employ them toward their own ends. In their article, Edwards, McCarthy and Mataic (2019) considered what resources movements could gain from supporters, and they developed a five-part typology that I referenced above (2019). This typology can be turned around to also represent the resources that benefactors can appropriate from movements. Movements can offer access to: *material* resources, such as income streams or property that belong to movement organizations, their constituents, or outside supporters; *human resources* in movement leaders' knowledge of issues, understanding of their constituents, and their ability to mobilize their constituents; *social-organizational* resources, for instance, in the social ties and social networks among movement constituents and their allies; and *cultural and moral resources* that allow patrons to pose as allies of certain social groups or champions of particular causes.

The specific resources that benefactors seek from movements will depend on the benefactors in question and the projects through which they consolidate their positions of power. Whereas elected officials might see a movement's human resources as an opportunity to influence voters, corporate executives might see the same movement's material resources as an opportunity to increase sales. Benefactors' appropriation of movements' moral and cultural resources provide easy examples. For instance, corporations, like Coca-Cola, engage in "greenwashing" where they lend support to an environmental cause, such as Greenpeace, without actually altering their business practices to suit environmental causes (e.g., Trumpy 2008). In

these cases, corporations draw on the moral and cultural resources of movements in order to improve their image for a politically conscious consumer public.

Through patronage, benefactors can also benefit from disrupting the balance of forces of a particular arena. By bringing a movement group into a new arena, they can alter decision-makers' agendas, strengthen their own coalitions, and undermine their rivals. One example is the way in which the Democratic Party brought elements of the Civil Rights movement into the electoral arena. The federal government responded to the sit-ins and freedom rides of the early 1960s with support that could direct movement energy into the 1962-1964 Voter Education project which, among other things, brought many Southern Black voters into the electoral arena where they provided the Democratic Party advantages over its rival (McAdam 1982: Ibid. 170).

Authorities and power-holders do not typically rely on movement patronage to maintain their positions of power. Instead, benefactors are likely to offer patronage under certain conditions. On one hand, benefactors will be more likely to seek new allies in response to pressures in their environment that pose a threat to their interests. These pressures can take different forms. They could be regular and longstanding struggles against competitors, as political parties vie with each other in elections and as corporate management always seeks new ways to lower labor costs. Alternatively, these pressures could come from exogenous shocks that disrupt or re-organize the social orders on which power-holders came to rely. For instance, the governing coalitions that many municipal governments in the U.S. once relied have been disrupted by the retrenchment of federal government and the emergence of economic globalization since the 1980s, and many municipal governments responded by seeking out new partners for urban governance (e.g., Harvey 1989).

In addition to environmental pressures, benefactors are likely to extent offers of patronage to some movement groups rather than others. In part, this is a matter of capacity. Some movements may have the resources and organizational capacity to necessary to achieve the desired effects while others may not. In part, this is also a matter of trust. Benefactors' will tend to favor movement groups that they expect will cooperate as benefactors expect with minimal chances of inducing political backlash.

2.2.2. The Advantages of Analyzing Patronage

By including patronage in their analyses, scholars can develop fuller accounts of benefactors' decision-making processes. For one, benefactors choose which movement groups and causes to support. As research has demonstrated, their choices are shaped by many considerations, including avoiding controversial causes, favoring professionalized organizations, and others mentioned above, but one additional criterion, that may sometimes be decisive, is the opportunity to instrumentally advance benefactors' interests. For instance, in Walker's study discussed above, many of the health advocacy groups avoided controversial causes and adopted professionalized organizations forms, but only a subset of these had the additional advantage of generating marketing opportunities for the foundations' corporate parents, and this factor may have been decisive in the selection process (Walker 2018).

Further, benefactors make decisions about the nature and extent of support they offer to movements. Most scholars analyze the financial support that they offer, and some of them measure how this support varies over time or between different movement groups (e.g., Jenkins and Halcli 1998; Walker 2018). Less research has been devoted to analyzing the extent and

variation in other kinds of support, including technical support, cultural and moral resources, access to decision-makers, and human and organizational resources. If benefactors offer movements patronage, then they will tailor the kind and extent of support they offer to the ends they want the movement to achieve. For instance, patronage can help explain how elected officials decide whether to offer movement groups support in the form of inclusion into their administration, access to state funding, or merely symbolic support, since some of these kinds of support can produce a desired effect, perhaps the loyalty of a certain voting bloc, while others do not.

Benefactors also make decisions about the timing of their support. They choose when to begin or end particular initiatives and whether to begin or end relations with movement groups altogether. Existing research sheds some light on the timing of these decisions by tracking the rise and fall of foundation grants in response to particular events, like riots or the spread of sit-in protests (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; McAdam 1982). Patronage can further illuminate these decision-making processes. Benefactors may decide to initiate particular initiatives with a movement group in response to sudden opportunities for advancing their own interests, or they may terminate initiatives when movement activity is no longer sufficient or necessary for achieving its ends.

One last advantage of analyzing patronage is that allows scholars to identify how movement efforts are shaped by the broader contexts in which they mobilize. Over the past decade, some scholars have turned their attention to this issue and critiqued recent generations of scholarship for having a narrowly movement-centric focus. A movement-centric focus adheres closely to developments within movement organizations themselves and to the exclusion of field-level dynamics, the impacts of interlocutors outside of the movement, and connections

between a movement's goals and its locations within social structures (Walder 2009; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Walker 2018). My intervention can help correct for this overly narrow focus by developing a better understanding of patrons as actors in their own right, not just as supporters or inhibitors of movement success, but as strategic players with stakes in their own positions of power within particular political arenas.

2.3 Conclusion

For decades, scholars have been asking how movements acquire the resources that allow them to mobilize, and, for those movement groups who rely on external supporters, how the support of powerful benefactors enables, constrains, and transforms their cause. I contribute to these debates by developing the patronage argument. I contend that benefactors' decisions about the groups it supports, the extent and nature of its support, and the timing of its support are in some cases decisively influenced by the opportunity to advance their own interests. By better understanding their decision-making processes, scholars can also gain a better understanding of what support they will make available to movement groups and the conditions of accessing it.

In the rest of the dissertation, I develop the patronage argument by identifying empirical instances of patronage, examining the conditions under which benefactors offer patronage, and assessing what effects patronage has on movements who rely on it. The next three chapters present empirical studies that develop and assess patronage arguments alongside social control arguments. In the concluding chapter, I sum up the novel findings uncovered by the patronage argument and articulate six propositions that can guide future research to develop a fuller theory of patronage.

3.0   Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc.

In 1965, residents of Pittsburgh's low-income neighborhoods formed a grassroots organization, called Citizens Against Slum Housing (CASH), to advocate for improvements to housing that had suffered from decades of overcrowding, pollution, and neglect. By 1968, CASH secured the support of three powerful White-led benefactors – the administration of Mayor Joseph Barr, a philanthropic foundation, and a group of lending institutions – to establish a non-profit housing-improvement organization, Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS). The NHS brought code enforcement and housing rehabilitation to residents of impoverished, predominantly Black, and formerly redlined neighborhoods. In the decades after its foundation, federal agencies cultivated the NHS's expansion into NeighborWorks America, a nationwide non-profit organization consisting in over 240 community development organizations located in 126 U.S. cities in all 50 states. Between 2017 and 2022, this network of organizations had directed over $19.5 billion into low-income neighborhoods around the country (NeighborWorks America 2022).

In this chapter, I examine the foundation of the NHS in 1968. Using archival data and theoretically-guided event-structure analysis (tESA), I assess the decision-making processes of each of the NHS's benefactors and ask whether their decision to lend support was influenced by insurgent movement activity and/or the prospects of instrumentally advancing their own interests. The findings suggest that the formation of the NHS depended critically on the Scaife foundation's response to the rebellions, the mayor's interest in securing funding for urban redevelopment, and lenders' interests in stabilizing property values in the North Side. These

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findings provide some support for the social control argument but more for the patronage argument.

3.1 1960s Pittsburgh: Renewal, Displacement, Resistance

In the 1960s, Pittsburgh was changing. The city's government, business, and civic leaders, comprised of almost exclusively White men, initiated a series of large-scale, top-down urban redevelopment projects later termed "the renaissance." They executed these projects through local government agencies and exclusive private organizations, primarily the Allegheny Conference on Community Development. City leaders used eminent domain to seize large tracts of property so they could demolish structures standing on them and replace them with stadia, highways, shopping centers, expanded industry, and homes for the affluent. City leaders hoped these projects would reverse economic decline, counteract White flight, and preempt capital flight (Lubove 1995).

Redevelopment projects exacerbated the inadequacies of the city's housing supply, especially for residents of the city's Black communities. These communities grew rapidly in the early 20th century with migrants arriving from the South. Upon their arrival, Black migrants were often confined by White homeowners, financial institutions, and other real estate interests to increasingly segregated communities with substandard housing (Gottlieb 1987). These conditions provided Black families with few opportunities for homeownership, and they facilitated health crises (Cilli 2021: Ch. 2). Urban redevelopment projects of the 1950s and 1960s then demolished large swaths of Black communities and displaced thousands of their residents (Thompson Fullilove 2016). These displaced residents had few options other than relocating to

neighborhoods where housing was affordable and Black populations already existed. As a result, their45elocateion exacerbated racial residential segregation and concentrated greater numbers of residents into a shrinking supply of affordable housing (Trotter and Day 2010; Voelker 1971). In 1966, a study from the Urban League found that Black families, who made up only 15% of the city's population, occupied 44% of all the city's substandard housing (Urban League 1966: 3). Other observers estimated that Pittsburgh's substandard housing was some of the worst in the country (Rosensweet 1968).

Residents of these neighborhoods organized. At the center of the local housing movement was Citizens Against Slum Housing (CASH). At its inception, CASH organized roughly 120 people from the city's lowest-income neighborhoods. Some of these neighborhoods were predominantly Black, and others had both Black and White residents. The most visible leader of CASH was Dorothy Richardson, a Black woman who lived in the neighborhood of Central North Side. Initially, Richardson recruited women informally from her church and community to repair substandard housing themselves (Carlin 1969). These women drew on the support of staff organizers with the city's Community Action Program to go door-to-door in the eight neighborhoods where the program was based to collect complaints and build files on alleged slumlords (Cunningham 1970). CASH made its public debut in November 1965 at the Greater Pittsburgh Conference on Equal Opportunity in Housing where members demonstrated outside while Richardson secured an opportunity to address attendees from the podium inside (Robb 1965). Soon after, CASH gained the support of civil rights groups and White allies who included legal professionals and academics (Carlin 1969).

CASH attributed the proliferation of substandard housing to exploitative landlords who charged "sky high rents for rock bottom dwellings" (Quoted in Artis 1967), a public housing

authority that prioritized the needs of White residents over Black ones, and urban redevelopment projects that provided no adequate means for relocating the families they displaced. CASH used a combination of tactics to put pressure on a variety of decision-makers. When decision-makers proved cooperative, CASH was willing to operate through institutionalized channels. For instance, CASH worked alongside the mayor's office to implement a rent-withholding program to protect tenant rights (CASH 1966). But when decision-makers proved uncooperative, CASH held demonstrations, sit-ins, and pickets, as they did in the offices of the Pittsburgh Housing Authority and the homes of alleged slumlords (e.g., Hallow 1967). CASH also publicly threatened to use civil disobedience to obstruct redevelopment projects that would displace their constituents (Artis 1967).

CASH was not alone in its efforts. Throughout the 1950 and 60s, Black community leaders organized to dismantle the color line in employment, police-community relations, education, and health care access in addition to housing. While CASH was the most prominent organization in the housing movement, it also received support from peer organizations, such as the NAACP and the Urban Movement for Progress (UMP), and joined coalitions of groups, such as the Citizens-Clergy Coordinating Committee (CCCC) and Concerned Citizens Against the Housing Authority (CCHA). Despite efforts from these groups, many White Pittsburghers refused to abandon the color line (Trotter and Day 2010). After the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., on April 4th 1968, Pittsburgh, along with many other cities, witnessed urban rebellions. In Pittsburgh, over a thousand people, whom observers described as mostly young Black men, engaged in property destruction, arson, looting, and resisting arrest primarily in the business districts of predominantly Black neighborhoods between April 5th to April 10th (see Morris 1968; Ribiero 2012; Rosensweet and Conti 1968).

Within three months of the rebellions, one of CASH's campaigns had secured the support of three powerful benefactors. CASH had long advocated for more effective code enforcement, and their spokeswoman referred to it as "the big sledge hammer" in the fight against slumlords (Robb 1966). By 1968, this call for improved code enforcement received the support from the Mayor's office, the philanthropic Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, and a group of 13 lending institutions. While the Mayor's office consolidated and strengthened existing code enforcement programming, the philanthropic foundation and the lenders assembled a high-risk revolving loan fund that enabled low-income residents to repair and sometimes purchase their homes. The revolving loan fund, established in July 1968, came to be called Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 49-58). The context from which the NHS emerged presented benefactors with insurgency that threatened their interests as well as chances for more opportunistic alliances with emerging social movements.

3.2 Study Design

This chapter presents a case study of the NHS. This case has particular value since it has proven attractive to highly powerful benefactors and since it returns to the context out of which the present debates emerged – the U.S. post-war Black Liberation Struggles (Haines 1988; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977).

In this case, I seek to understand the complex processes culminating in benefactors' decisions to grant support to the NHS and whether and how these decisions were influenced by concerns with containing insurgent movement activity and/or in advancing more instrumental interests. If a benefactor seeks to restore social control, then their support would be a response to

some insurgent movement activity, or the possibility thereof, that posed a credible threat to their

interests. To assess this argument, I analyze the impact of two insurgent actions that I judge to be

the most likely to provoke a social control response in this context. One is a citywide rent strike

launched by UMP and CCCC in July 1967. For one month, this action posed disruption costs

directly to landlords and the Greater Pittsburgh Board of Realtors and indirectly to the Mayor's

office (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1967a). I also analyze the impacts of the urban rebellions of

April 1968. The rebellions emerged primarily in the business districts of Black neighborhoods,

but they posed disruption costs to authorities, businesses, residents, workers, and consumers

throughout the city as they threatened the viability of urban redevelopment projects and

provoked authorities to initiate a citywide curfew (Rosensweet and Conti 1968).

Benefactors may also support the NHS in order to advance more instrumental interests. In

this case, their support would follow in response to some perceived opportunity to advance these

interests. To assess this argument, I analyze the impact of three actions that bring CASH's

activity into potential alignment with benefactors' interests: in January 1954, a growth coalition

local to the North Side began a new campaign to revitalize North Side neighborhoods, including

the Central North Side (Pittsburgh Press 1965); in September 1966, a large-scale commercial-

residential redevelopment project, called Allegheny Center, had its first phase of opening near

the Central North Side (Urban Redevelopment Authority 1969); in September 1967, amendments

to the federal Housing Act of 1954 went into effect that required cities receiving federal funding

for urban redevelopment projects to have "workable programs for community improvement" that

featured housing rehabilitation and opportunities for citizen participation (Ham 1965).

To conduct the analysis, I use theoretically guided event-structure analysis (tESA)

(Bloom 2015: see also Dixon 2008 and Brueggemann and Brown 2003). tESA can produce

within-case analyses that capture contingency, context, agency and a wide range of evidence while also remaining formal, systematic, explicit, and refutable. With this method, researchers select a case and then de-compose it into constituent actions for analysis. Analysts formally identify actions for analysis that can instantiate the variables and concepts of one or more general theories of interest. After identifying actions, the researcher uses counterfactual analysis to assess the causal relations between each action and every subsequent action. Because the actions instantiate theoretical variables, the counterfactual assessments allow researchers to arbitrate theoretical rivalries.

In my study, I have selected three outcomes of interest – the mayor's support, the Scaife foundation's support, and the lenders' support for the NHS – and five hypothesized causes that instantiate the independent variables of either the social control or patronage argument, described above (see Table 1). I then examine causal connections between each action and every other action using counterfactual analysis. This study design allows me to assess both the social control and patronage arguments within the case of the NHS.

The study's data consist in archival records, newspaper reporting, and secondary sources. For the archival data, I sifted through over a thousand documents belonging to twelve archival collections housed in the University of Pittsburgh's Archives and Special Collections, the Heinz History Center's Detre Library and Collections, and the City of Pittsburgh's archives between 2017 and 2022. The study cites a unique set of primary sources, not previously assembled, that include records from each of the organizations involved, including annual reports, internal memos, conference presentations, private correspondence, and meeting minutes. Of special importance is a 1975 evaluation of the original NHS program (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975). This report was written by agents of ACTION-Housing, who accounted for the program's funds,

and it includes a narrative history of the NHS's formation based on interviews and correspondence with the benefactors involved. In addition, the study uses secondary sources that include the perspectives of historians, sociologists, lawyers, public policy experts, and community organizers. Finally, the study complements these sources with coverage of the events from local newspapers.

Table 1. Actions Identified for Analysis

Benefactors' Support	
Mayor's office consolidates code enforcement programs	August 1967
The Scaife Foundation makes $125,000 grant	July 1968
The lenders provide financing and technical expertise	July 1968
Disruption	
UMP and CCCC hold Rent Strike	July 1967
Urban Rebellions	April 1968
Patronage	
Growth Coalition launches North Side revitalization efforts	January 1965
Allegheny Center opens	September 1966
Congress tightens requirements for workable programs	September 1967

3.3 The Origins of NHS, Inc.

The NHS was founded after three powerful benefactors lent support to CASH's campaign. What role, if any, did the prospects of social control or patronage play within these benefactors' decisions?

3.3.1. The Mayor Consolidates Code Enforcement Programs

After World War II, many of Pittsburgh's neighborhoods suffered from dilapidated housing stock, especially Black and low-income neighborhoods that were the sites of redlining, other forms of disinvestment, and exploitative landlords. In the 1960s, CASH and others attributed the proliferation of substandard housing partly to inadequate code enforcement (e.g., Robb 1965). Code enforcement was ineffective, as CASH and others observed, because it was split between county and city agencies and suffered from a lack of inspectors (Lubove 1969). Then, in September 1967, the mayor unified code enforcement efforts into a single streamlined program, hired more building inspectors, and employed the program in neighborhoods throughout the city, the Central North Side being one of the first (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 51) The new program provided a major boost to CASH's campaign against slumlords, and it provided the impetus for the subsequent developments that produced the NHS.

Disruption Costs – To assess the social control argument, I identified a disruptive action most likely to elicit a social control response from local government prior to the code enforcement program's consolidation. This is the rent-strike in July 1967 (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1967a). The United Movement for Progress (UMP) and the Citizens-Clergy Coordinating Committee (CCCC) placed demands for better low-income housing before the Greater Pittsburgh Board of Realtors on July 15. When the board declined to meet the demands, 114 tenants in neighborhoods across the city agreed to strike (Rosensweet 1967). The strike continued through the end of the month until the two parties, with mediation from the mayor's office, agreed to an 8-point memorandum of understanding (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1967b). Did the mayor's office

consolidate the city's code enforcement in order to minimize the disruption costs of the rent strike?

Data appear to support this argument. In mediating the conflict, the mayor's office first offered the parties a five-point housing plan that included stepped-up code enforcement programming (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1967a). Further data suggest, however, that this connection is merely apparent. On one hand, UMP and CCCC were not the first groups to advocate for improved code enforcement. CASH had advocated for the same improvements in the year before (Robb 1966), and various civic leaders and experts advocated for consolidated code enforcement in late 1965 (Rosenseweet 1965; Chancellor 1965). Moreover, other data suggest that city agencies were preparing to implement the new code enforcement program before the rent strike began. In late 1965, the Department of City Planning recommended consolidating code enforcement programs (Krumholtz 1965). In April 1966, the mayor publicly announced a 15-point housing program featuring improved code enforcement (City Planning Commission 1966). Most importantly, city agencies publicized their plans for implementing the new code enforcement program as early as January 1967 (Stuart 1967). This evidence suggests that the new code enforcement program was well underway prior to the rent strike.

Thus, the data are insufficient to suggest that the counterfactual absence of the rent strike would have altered the Mayor's plans to launch the new consolidated code enforcement program in August 1967.

Patronage – Since the 1940s, Pittsburgh's government, business, and civic leaders had been deeply invested in federally funded urban redevelopment projects. In 1966, 20 of these projects still required funding for completion (Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh 1966). At

the same time, U.S. Congress had been tightening restrictions on cities' access to this funding. Federal legislation required cities to have "workable programs of community improvement" that included citizen participation in redevelopment planning and favored rehabilitating buildings rather than demolishing them (Ham 1965). The Housing Act of 1964 then strengthened the requirements for workable programs. Beginning in September 1967, federal agencies would certify such programs only for cities that had adequate housing codes and effective code enforcement programs in operation for at least six months (Ibid.). Consequently, lending support to CASH's call for code enforcement could simultaneously strengthen the city's workable programs. Did the mayor consolidate code enforcement programs in order to secure access to federal funds for urban redevelopment?

Testimonial evidence suggests so. In 1975, representatives of ACTION-Housing chronicled the history of the NHS. They found that the NHS emerged from the collaboration between North Side residents, local lending institutions, and the City of Pittsburgh. Based on interviews with city officials, they claimed that the mayor's office supported this initiative because it was instrumental for satisfying workable program requirements:

Neighborhood Housing Services was created in 1968 as the result of three groups working together... [including] the City of Pittsburgh —who was interested in working with neighborhood groups to get needed programs going and to meet HUD's Workable Program requirements (building and housing codes and effective code enforcement machinery were requirements for urban renewal funding) (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 3-4)

Records from the mayor's office reinforce this connection. In October 1968, the mayor

and other city officials submitted an application to HUD to renew the city's workable program.

In this application, officials provide a detailed account of the progress made by the city's

workable program in the preceding years. Officials included a lengthy review of the new code

enforcement program (City of Pittsburgh 1968: 6-7). These data confirm that the mayor did use

the new code enforcement program to bolster the city's application for urban renewal funding.

This document also reveals, however, important auxiliary outcomes. In a statement on "citizen

participation," the application describes CASH and its origins, alongside other community-based

organizations (Ibid. 23a). Further, the application reviews a series of other new housing

rehabilitation programs, including a rent-withholding program implemented in 1966, a housing

court established in 1967, and also the NHS itself (Ibid: 6b). Each of these programs was initially

endorsed by CASH before being implemented by city agencies. This application reveals that city

officials were well aware that some of CASH's causes would facilitate housing rehabilitation,

that they could use those causes to strengthen the city's workable program, and that they had

been doing so since 1966. This application also suggests that the mayor's office was selective in

its support for CASH. While the mayor's office endorsed programs that strengthened the city's

workable program, like code enforcement, it was unresponsive to those that did not, such as

CASH's calls for expanding public housing (*Pittsburgh Press* 1967).

This analysis suggests that if Congress had not strengthened requirements for cities'

workable programs then the mayor's office would not have consolidated the city's code

enforcement programs. In this counterfactual scenario, Congress could still pass the Housing Act

of 1964 just without altering workable program requirements. Then, the mayor and allied power-

holders would continue their large-scale urban redevelopment projects while also letting city and

county code enforcement programs suffer from split jurisdictions and a dearth of inspectors, just as they had for decades prior. In this scenario, CASH could still advocate for improved code enforcement, but their calls would fail to gain traction with the mayor's office since, as evidence above also suggests, this office tended to support only those causes relevance to urban redevelopment projects.

3.3.2   The Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation Makes a $125,000 Grant

Once CASH won a stronger code enforcement program, it faced the urgent task of preventing that program from displacing low-income residents of its constituent neighborhoods, including homeowners who could not afford repairs or renters with absentee landlords. At the suggestion of the mayor's office, CASH and allied organizations submitted a grant proposal to the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation in "early 1968" (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 50-51). The Scaife Foundation is a philanthropic foundation based in Pittsburgh whose trustees had ties to local banking fortunes and universities (Scaife Foundation 1968). On July 3rd, 1968, the foundation's trustees voted to approve a $125,000 grant for CASH and allied organizations to establish a high-risk revolving loan fund that would allow "unbankable" residents to repair and sometimes purchase their homes (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 50-51).

Disruption Costs – On April 4th 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, and urban rebellions erupted in cities across the U.S. In Pittsburgh, they occurred between April 5th and April 10th in predominantly Black communities in the Hill District, Homewood-Brushton, and on the North Side. Observers counted between 1,000 and 3,000 insurgents, described as mostly

young Black men, who processed through business districts looting, vandalizing, and firebombing properties, especially White-owned businesses, and clashing with police (Rosensweet and Conti 1968). Did the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation offer the $125,000 grant to the NHS in order to prevent a recurrence of urban rebellions?

Representatives of ACTION-Housing, in their account of the NHS's origins, drew a link between the urban rebellions and the foundation of the NHS. They write:

> The entire process of [the NHS's] formation may have been helped along by the crisis attitude brought on by the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King and the subsequent civil disturbances which occurred in April, 1968 (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 53)

While this observation could apply to any of the NHS's supporters, further data suggest a strong link between the rebellions and the Scaife Foundation's grant in particular.

The rebellions provoked swift responses from Pittsburgh's mostly White government, business, and civic leaders. City officials quashed the rebellions by imposing a citywide curfew and having the police force, State Troopers, and the National Guard occupy the rebelling neighborhoods (Rosensweet and Conti 1968). Afterwards, the mayor formed task forces to assess the causes of the rebellions and develop strategies for preventing their recurrence (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968a). The mayor worked with the city's business and civic leaders to develop an array of social programs to ameliorate the longstanding grievances of Black communities that gave rise to the rebellions. The mayor's staff remarked that these programs marked an entirely new orientation for the city's business and civic community, who previously prioritized large-

scale redevelopment in and around the central business district (Coleman 1983; also see Ribiero 2012 and Trotter and Day 2010).

These ameliorative efforts worked primarily through the exclusive and elite Allegheny Conference on Community Development. These efforts focused on addressing longstanding grievances of the city's Black communities, including access to housing, focused their efforts on neighborhoods in and near where the rebellions emerged, including the Central North Side, and emphasized working with the Black community's leaders, including CASH's spokesperson (Ridenour and Rodd 1968; Mayor's Special Task Force 1968). The Conference's chairman suggested making $50,000 available to a Black-run savings and loan association to make mortgage funds available to Black homeowners on the North Side in order to avert "full-scale rioting and firebombing" that could pose a risk to his corporation's North Side properties (Heinz 1968: 1).

To fund these efforts, conference members drew on the philanthropic foundations of their members, and this included the Scaife Foundation. The foundation shared interlocking directorates with the Allegheny Conference, and representatives of the two met one week after the rebellions (Pease 1968). Further, the foundation's annual publications reveal a sharp change in grant-making priorities in 1968. That year, the Scaife Foundation's annual report shows a marked shift in grant-making priorities. In 1966, the closest prior year for which data is available, the Foundation made 51 grants, and 50 of them supported educational institutions or charities with no clear link to Pittsburgh's Black communities or their grievances (e.g., Scaife 1966). In 1968, however, the Scaife Foundation recorded a large new category of grants described as "rendering assistance to the disadvantaged" (Scaife 1968: 2). These grants, totaling a combined $1.3 million, supported housing, education, youth recreation, workforce-

development, and business-development initiatives in the Black communities where the rebellions emerged. Among these new grants, trustees listed the $125,000 grant that established the NHS.

These data support a compelling counterfactual scenario where the absence of Pittsburgh's urban rebellions precludes the Scaife foundation from making the $125,000 grant that established the NHS. In this scenario, the urban rebellions of April 1968 would still sweep across the country, but they would bypass Pittsburgh. This scenario is not difficult to imagine since the rebellions that swept U.S. cities between 1965 and 1967 bypassed Pittsburgh. In that case, Pittsburgh's government and civic leaders would not have been shaken from their earlier downtown-centric focuses on redevelopment that both neglected and exacerbated the longstanding grievances of the city's Black communities. Consequently, government and civic leaders would not have developed the array of social programs aimed at improving these communities' access to housing, employment, and recreation, and they would not have called on the assistance of the Scaife Foundation in doing so. As a result, the Scaife foundation would not have launched new programs of "rendering assistance to the disadvantaged," including the $125,000 grant, but instead maintained its earlier focus on charitable causes in education, youth recreation, and medicine.

Patronage –The North Side was also the location of a large-scale urban redevelopment project called Allegheny Center, located in a neighborhood adjacent to the Central North Side. Allegheny Center is a residential-commercial-office complex designed to appeal to white-collar suburbanites. Construction began in 1964, and it opened in a succession of phases between 1965 and 1970, costing over $82 million in public and private funding (Urban Redevelopment

Authority 1969). The architects of the renaissance were deeply invested in Allegheny Center. In addition to being a centerpiece of North Side renewal, members of the Allegheny Conference were financially invested in it as well. This includes executives of Alcoa and executives of Mellon Bank, who were linked to Scaife trustees through interlocking directorates (Drexler 1981: 115). Stakeholders could ensure the viability of Allegheny Center by encouraging rehabilitation in the surrounding neighborhoods that suffered from disinvestment, including the Central North Side. Did the Scaife Foundation make the $125,000 grant in order to ensure the viability of the Allegheny Center?

Data suggest that Allegheny Center had no difficulty attracting department stores to occupy its shopping center or residents for their apartments and townhomes. Each new opening in Allegheny Center was attended with ceremony and fanfare (e.g., *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1966a). These data do not provide any indication that Allegheny Center's viability was in jeopardy by 1968 or that Scaife Foundation trustees had reason to think so.

Further, evidence shows that other groups were already undertaking rehabilitation efforts on the North Side. A growth coalition comprised of representatives of local retail, industry, and finance had united through the North Side Chamber of Commerce and vigorously pursued urban redevelopment projects in the North Side, some of it with financial assistance from the Scaife Foundation (North Side Study 1954). In 1965, before the Allegheny Center opened, the growth coalition announced a new wave of efforts to rehabilitate housing in and around the Central North Side (*Pittsburgh Press* 1965). Thus, even if Scaife trustees were concerned about the viability of Allegheny Center, they were well aware that the North Side Chamber of Commerce was already making efforts to rehabilitate the surrounding neighborhoods.

Finally, the preceding analysis revealed that Scaife's grant to the NHS was part of a new category of grants, dubbed "rendering assistance to the disadvantaged," that bestowed grants on a wide variety of efforts located in or near the Black communities where the urban rebellions erupted in 1968. This pattern suggests that this category of grants was directed at ameliorating the grievances of Black communities generally more than ensuring the survival of particular projects.

Thus, the data are not sufficient to establish that the counterfactual absence of the Allegheny Center's opening would have altered Scaife trustees' decision to make the $125,000 Scaife grant. However, the analysis does suggest that another form of patronage played an indirect role in Scaife's decision to offer the grant, and that was the Mayor's pursuit of a consolidated code enforcement program. It was the mayor's guidance that directed CASH and its allies to apply to the Scaife Foundation for a grant, and it was the consolidation of the code enforcement programs that created an urgent need to find ways to finance home rehabilitation. Through the mayor's office, then, patronage played an indirect role in the Scaife trustees' decision.

3.3.3   Lenders Provide Financing and Technical Expertise

CASH and its allies appealed to lending institutions for assistance. With help from the mayor's office, CASH had been meeting with representatives from over a dozen banks and savings and loan associations based on the North Side and requesting that they increase their levels of investment in the neighborhoods. Many of these lenders had redlined the Central North Side since the 1950s when neighborhood demographics began to change: large-scale redevelopment, especially in the Hill District, had displaced many low-income and working-class Black families

who relocated in the Central North Side, and their arrival was met with White flight and disinvestment that accelerated through the 1960s (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 22; Carlin 1969). CASH began meeting with these lenders in the summer of 1967. CASH initially requested that the lenders resume lending activity in their neighborhoods, but the lenders declined because they thought these investments would be too financially risky. The meetings, which were often contentious, continued for a year (Cassidy 1979: 333). In July 1968, after CASH secured the grant for the high-risk revolving loan fund, the lenders agreed to provide administrative costs, technical expertise, and loans for residents who qualified by conventional lending standards.

Disruption Costs – As described above, the urban rebellions of April 1968 altered the priorities of powerful decision-makers throughout the city. Did the lenders offer financing and technical expertise in order to eliminate the disruption costs posed by the rebellions?

The lenders expressed interest in reinvesting in the Central North Side and other formerly redlined, low-income neighborhoods before the rebellions occurred. Their representatives agreed to meet with CASH in the summer of 1967 (Cassidy 1979), and one of the lenders publicly expressed a commitment to investing in these kinds of neighborhood in March 1968 (Wylie 1968). This evidence suggests that the rebellions could not have been the original impetus behind the lender's involvement. Still, the rebellions could have influenced their final decision.

One must ask whether the lenders would take it upon themselves to prevent the recurrence of the rebellions when other authorities and power-holders were ready to do so. To immediately quell the rebellions, the Pittsburgh Police and the National Guard stepped in (Rosensweet and Conti 1968). To address the grievances underlying the rebellions, the Allegheny Conference, the Mayor's office, and other government agencies launched their array

of social programs to address the housing, employment, and recreational needs of Black communities. In light of these efforts, the lenders may not have seen their intervention to be necessary. In fact, the lenders and their allies had demonstrated their willingness to let established authorities handle contentious activism in the past. In 1966, CASH and a coalition called the Citizen-Clergy Coordinating Committee (CCCC) picketed outside of the homes of alleged slumlords on the North Side (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1966b). Spokesmen of the North Side Chamber of Commerce, to which some of the lenders belonged, urged activists to redirect their efforts to the County Health Department and other agencies (Ibid.). This evidence gives one reason to doubt that the lenders would have seen their own intervention in the Central North Side as necessary or desirable for mitigating the disruption costs of the rebellions.

The data are insufficient to establish that the counterfactual absence of the rebellions would have altered the lenders' decisions to provide technical expertise and financing for the NHS. Data do suggest, however, an indirect connection. The analysis above found that the rebellions were necessary for the Scaife foundation to make its $125,000 grant for the NHS. It also suggests that Scaife's support was necessary for the lenders to offer their support. The lenders and CASH had been meeting for nearly a year before the NHS was founded, but the lenders declined to cooperate because they saw direct investment into the Central North Side as too risky (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 22). Once the Scaife Foundation offered the grant that could establish the revolving loan fund, however, the lenders could assist by helping disburse the loan fund and making selective investments in the neighborhood. Through the Scaife Foundation, then, the rebellions had an indirect impact on the lender's support for the NHS.

Patronage – For the lenders, the NHS offered multiple advantages for their businesses. They received tax credits for half of their contributions to the NHS through the Neighborhood Assistance Act (Brody 1970), and they also had opportunities to increase their lending activity, which some of them were seeking desperately (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 22). Further, the NHS posed an opportunity to expand their efforts at economically revitalization of North Side neighborhoods. Some of the lenders belonged to a local growth coalition on the North Side that operated through the North Side Chamber of Commerce. This chamber had been advocating for redevelopment projects on the North Side since 1954 (*Pittsburgh Press* 1965). A decade later, the chamber publicly announced a new revitalization plan that, unlike previous plans, would favor rehabilitation over demolition and cooperate with community organizations. To consolidate these neighborhoods' existing strengths, the coalition wanted to focus efforts on rehabilitating areas of "blight and neglect," including the Central North Side (Ibid.). Did the lenders support the NHS in order to facilitate their revitalization efforts?

Testimonial evidence suggests so. ACTION-Housing agents interviewed representatives of the lending institutions. One lender describes why some lending institutions support the NHS and others do not...

In his opinion, NHS has been in operation too short a period of time for the neighborhood to have stabilized, and it would take a much longer period of demonstrated stability in order to change the attitudes of lending officers in other financial institutions... As neighborhood vitality is shown through rising property values, the information will eventually be conveyed to other institutions as appraised values rise, and therefore, other

financial institutions may be expected to increase their involvement over time (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 23)

Other lenders provided similar testimony. In interviews with ACTION-Housing agents, one lender stated that they supported the NHS once they saw that "residents in the CNS [Central North Side] committed to the stabilization of the community" (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: 22). Further, one journalist described the lenders' involvement in similar terms: "banks and savings institutions pay a minimal 'insurance premium' on the upkeep of some neighborhoods where their branches are located" (Brody 1970). This evidence strongly suggests that the lenders supported the NHS once they saw it as an effective means for stabilizing property values in select neighborhoods.

This evidence suggests that the lenders would not have offered support to the NHS had they not perceived its utility in increasing North Side property values. In that counterfactual scenario, the lenders may have declined cooperation with CASH and pursued revitalization efforts through other means instead, possibly advocating for selective large-scale clearance as they did one decade earlier.

Table 2. Summary of Findings
X indicates a direct causal relationship between a cause (row) and outcome (column)
(x) indicates an indirect causal relationship

	Mayor's office Consolidates Code Enforcement	Scaife Foundation Makes $125,000 Grant	Lenders Offer Financing and Expertise
Disruption Costs			
Urban Rebellions		X	(x)
UMP and CCCC's Rent Strike			
Patronage			
Workable Program Requirements	X	(x)	
North Side Revitalization Efforts			X
Allegheny Center Opens			

3.4 Discussion

The analysis assessed social control and patronage arguments for each of the three benefactors that established the NHS.

The Mayor's office set the NHS in motion by consolidating the city's code enforcement programming in August 1967. The analysis considered whether this decision came in response to a citywide rent strike launched the previous month by civil rights groups UMP and CCCC. Evidence suggested, however, that the new code enforcement programming had been planned and on its way to implementation several months before the rent strike even occurred. Evidence did strongly suggest, though, that the Mayor's decision was influenced by the program's potential contribution toward the city's workable program certification. Testimonial evidence suggested this connection, and records from the mayor's office not only reinforce this connection but also reveal that the Mayor's office had cited its cooperation with CASH in its workable program certification for years. This analysis provided strong support for the patronage argument.

With help from the Mayor's office, CASH and its allies then sought out ways to prevent the code enforcement program from displacing its more vulnerable constituents. They applied for and received a $125,000 grant from the Scaife Foundation that comprised the core revolving loan fund of the NHS. The analysis suggests that Scaife trustee's decision was a response to the disruptions costs of the April 1968 urban rebellions. A combination of testimony and other records revealed that the rebellions provoked a "crisis attitude" among the city's most powerful decision-makers who initiated a broad array of efforts that drew on philanthropic foundations and other resources and to address the longstanding grievances of the city's Black communities, and the Scaife foundation's grant to the NHS was part of these efforts. By contrast, the analysis also considered whether the grant could offer a Scaife trustees a means to ensure the viability of the newly-opened Allegheny Center, but evidence failed to establish that trustees were concerned about its viability or that such a grant would be necessary to do so. This analysis provided strong support for a social control argument.

Finally, CASH received the support for 13 lending institutions that agreed to provide technical expertise and financing for the NHS. The analysis considered whether the lenders' support could also be a response to the April 1968 urban rebellions. The data, however, showed that the lenders expressed interest in revitalizing low-income urban neighborhoods prior to the rebellions while failing to establish that the lenders would think it was necessary to intervene in the rebellions themselves. The analysis found support instead for a patronage argument that the NHS offered the lenders an effective means to stabilize property values in the neighborhoods that contained their branch offices and redevelopment projects in which a local growth coalition was invested. This analysis found moderate support for a patronage argument.

3.5 Conclusion

CASH combatted substandard housing in Pittsburgh, and the NHS provided their efforts with a $125,000 grant and access to code enforcement, representatives of lending institutions, and contractors. The revolving loan fund provided loans and grants for residents to repair and sometimes purchase their homes. The professional staff provided residents with access to financial assistance, conventional-rate loans, and housing contractors. Together, these developments improved housing conditions in the Central North Side while minimizing the number of residents who would be displaced by the city's new consolidate code enforcement program. Local media and other observers praised Dorothy Richardson's efforts and the NHS's promise to revitalize the Central North Side and other neighborhoods (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975: Spatter 1972).

The analysis above revealed much more about the conditions, consequences, and contradictory effects of this support on CASH's cause. The social control argument expected that benefactors may have offered these resources as strategic concessions in the wake of the April 1968 urban rebellions. The data provided strong support for that argument regarding the Scaife Foundation. In the wake of the rebellions, the city's industrial, government, financial leaders developed an array of social and economic programs to address the longstanding grievances of the city's Black communities, and the $125,000 grant from the Scaife foundation was part of these initiatives. This grant established the high-risk revolving loan fund that comprised the core of the NHS's activities. Thus, the urban rebellions in April 1968 gave CASH crucial leverage in its negotiations with prospective benefactors.

The patronage theory accounted for other benefactors' support for the NHS. The NHS marked an opportunity for other benefactors to secure concrete benefits that enabled them to consolidate their own positions of power. By consolidating the city's code enforcement program, the mayor's office strengthened the city's workable program and helped secure federal funding for urban redevelopment projects. This was especially important since the mayor's office was a keystone in the NHS's development. It not only consolidated code enforcement but it also assisted CASH and its allies in securing funding from the Scaife Foundation and in organizing meetings between CASH and the lenders (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975). Finally, by providing financing and technical expertise, the representatives of local lending institutions could stabilize Central North Side property values. Lenders were also able to increase their lending activity and secure tax credits, though the analysis was inconclusive about their contribution to the lenders' support. While the urban rebellions explain why CASH's cause received an infusion of grant money in 1968, the prospects of patronage explained why the mayor's office, CASH, and the lenders were already holding discussions prior to the rebellions and why the NHS took the form of code enforcement and rehabilitation in the Central North Side, specifically.

These patronage relations granted CASH access to critical resources and decision-makers but only in a limited and selective way. On CASH's analysis, the proliferation of substandard housing was a deeply rooted problem that required not only code enforcement and housing rehabilitation but also new tenant protections, expanded public housing, and new housing authority personnel (e.g., Hallow 1967). When benefactors lent support to CASH, however, their support was limited to the NHS's program of rehabilitating privately owned housing, and the patronage argument helps explain why. The mayor's office favored those activities that could improve the city's workable program, and the lenders favored those activities that could stabilize

Central North Side property values. While the NHS did improve the housing conditions of many of CASH's constituents, its reach was limited. The NHS could not assist with expanding public housing, and it failed to address the housing conditions of some of CASH's most vulnerable constituents, namely very low-income renters. In these ways, the patronage relations behind the NHS enabled real movement gains but only within a range of activities that could instrumentally advance the interests of its benefactors.

4.0 Wylie Centre Industries, Inc.

In 1971, Wylie Centre Industries, Inc. (WCI) began production. The WCI was a for-profit nail-manufacturing firm initiated by a Pittsburgh-based Black Power organization, the United Black Front, Inc. (UBF). The UBF received critical support from a powerful White-led benefactor, the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), which supplied the fixed capital, personnel, salaries, and guaranteed markets necessary to get WCI running. After a four-year start-up phase, the WCI was owned and operated by approximately 20 Black workers who produced a million aluminum nails a day and generated $400,000 of annual revenue (Shapiro 1973). City leaders and local newspapers celebrated WCI as a victory for "Black capitalism" in Pittsburgh (Gigler 1974; Taylor 1973a).

In this chapter, I examine the foundation of WCI in 1971. Using process tracing and archival data, I examine the decision-making processes of Alcoa's executives and ask whether and how their decision to support WCI was influenced by the prospects of advancing racial justice, containing movement insurgency, or improving their profit margins. The findings suggest that Alcoa executives were open to collaborating with the UBF because of the threat posed by the urban rebellions but they offered them resources to establish WCI in particular in order to lower labor costs. These findings provide support for both a social control and patronage argument.

4.1 1970s Pittsburgh: Black Capitalism, White Benefactors

In the 1960s, Pittsburgh underwent major changes. The city's government, business, and civic leaders, comprised of almost exclusively White men, initiated a series of large-scale, top-down urban redevelopment projects that were later termed "the renaissance." City agencies, with help from federal funds and new state legislation, used eminent domain to seize large tracts of property and demolish any structures standing on it in order to construct new arenas, highways, shopping centers, industrial expansion, and luxury housing. Among many others, the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) had large stakes in these projects, given its multi-million-dollar investments in a downtown skyscraper and a commercial-residential-office complex on the city's North Side. City leaders hoped these efforts would reverse economic decline, counteract White flight, and preempt capital flight (Lubove 1996).

Urban redevelopment exacerbated many longstanding problems in the city's Black communities. These communities grew rapidly throughout the first half of the twentieth century with migrants arriving from the South. Upon arrival, White real estate interests and employers largely confined the migrants to racially segregated neighborhoods, substandard housing, and low-wage employment (Gottlieb 1987). When city leaders began urban redevelopment, they often selected these Black communities as sites for the largest redevelopment projects. The demolition of housing displaced thousands of residents who relocated in other predominantly Black neighborhoods with substandard and overcrowded housing that became increasingly racially segregated (Thompson Fullilove 2016). The demolition also entailed the relocation or closure of other community institutions including businesses. A 1964 report from Pittsburgh's

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Urban Redevelopment Authority recorded that the six biggest redevelopment projects instigated the movement or closure of 1,317 businesses that included Hill District community staples: Gus Greenlee's Crawford Grill, Goode's pharmacy, Stanley's Tavern, and non-profit entities that served as informal business incubators, like the Loendi Club and the Bethel AME Church (*Pittsburgh Courier* 1951; Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh 1964).

By the 1960s, residents of these communities mobilized in increasing numbers. Resistance to urban renewal converged with the Black Freedom Struggles sweeping the country as well as organizing with federal War on Poverty programs. Established organizations, like Pittsburgh's chapters of the NAACP and Urban League, joined forces with newly emerging organizations to fight racial inequities in housing, health care, education, access to swimming pools, employment, and police-community relations. White Pittsburghers mobilized to protect the color line, however, slowing the rate of progress and frustrating many. By the end of the 1960s, the Black movement community gave rise to organizations that favored militancy, direct-action tactics, and separatism, including the United Movement for Progress, a local chapter of the Black Panther Party, and the Democratic Association of Black Brothers (Trotter and Day 2010).

The rebellions of April 1968 provoked swift responses from White City leaders and Black communities alike. City leaders mobilized to contain the rebellions and prevent their recurrence. To quash the rebellions, city officials called on the Pittsburgh Police, State Troopers, and the National Guard to occupy the rebelling neighborhoods and impose a citywide curfew (Rosensweet and Conti 1968). To ameliorate the grievances underlying the rebellions, business and civic leaders operated through private and elite civic organizations, namely the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, to launch a series of new social programs (Hritz

1969). Within Black communities, organizations mobilized to rebuild their communities. In the Hill District, residents formed a new umbrella organization called the United Black Front (UBF). The UBF connected representatives of 14 existing organizations advocating for Black communities' access to mental health care, cultural development, housing, recreation, employment, and other social services in the Hill District (United Black Front 1969b: 7). Its members represented diverse political perspectives, including "anti-establishment militants," formerly incarcerated people, a university professor, and elected state representative K. Leroy Irvis (Kemathe 1978: 206). Leadership positions were filled mostly by Black men, though Black women were present in both leadership and staff positions (United Black Front 1968a: 14).

According to UBF records, the Hill District's biggest challenges stemmed from the involvement of White outsiders in their community. These outsiders controlled the economic and political institutions within the Hill District, and they operated these institutions so as to enrich themselves without regard for the Black community's interests or input. White control deprived residents not only of opportunities for work, housing, and education, but also of the chance to develop racial consciousness, racial pride, valuable skillsets, and control over their community's destiny (e.g., United Black Front 1969c: 2). Accordingly, the UBF's mission was to bring these institutions under local Black control. The rebellions left many properties burnt-out or abandoned, and UBF executives sought to purchase them, rebuild them, and integrate them into a commercial-industrial complex owned cooperatively by, and operated in the interest of, Hill District residents (United Black Front 1968b). The UBF's vision reflected calls for Black self-determination by Black leaders throughout the country (see Allen 1990), similar efforts in Black urban communities across the U.S. (Countryman 2006; Hill and Rabig 2012), and a tradition of economic co-operation with deep roots in Black American communities (e.g., Nembhard 2014).

The UBF's vision of a community-controlled industrial-commercial complex did not come to pass, but its efforts did produce more piecemeal developments. The flagship development was Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc. WCI opened for production in 1971, and it employed between 15 and 25 Black workers, mostly men. To launch the WCI, the UBF drew on the support of White executives and managers from Alcoa who provided the WCI with 13 high-speed nail-making machines worth an estimated $250,000 (leased for $1), a building to house the machines (sold for $2), as well as auxiliary equipment. Alcoa also provided the personnel and salaries for engineers, accountants, and managers during the WCI's start-up phase (*New Pittsburgh Courier* 1971b). Finally, Alcoa also provided a guaranteed market for WCI's products. In 1971, Alcoa purchased 95% of the WCI's output (Taylor 1973b). Alcoa agreed to withdraw its personnel from the WCI after a period of four-to-five years so that the WCI could become a self-sustaining, profitable, Black-owned and -operated enterprise. The UBF planned to enroll the WCI into a community stock ownership program that would invite any Hill District resident to own joint stock in the WCI, benefit from its activity, and provide input into its operations (George 1969).

4.2 Study Design

This chapter presents a case study of the foundation of WCI. This case has particular value since it proved highly attractive to powerful benefactors, it reflects similar community-corporate collaborations in other cities at the time (e.g., Allen 1990), and it returns to the context out of which much of the relevant literature emerged – the U.S. post-war Black Liberation Struggles (Haines 1988; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977).

To analyze the foundation of WCI, I employ process tracing. Process tracing is a widely used method of within-case historical analysis that allows researchers to assess causal relations between one or more hypothesized causes and an outcome of interest (George and Bennet 2005). When researchers identify causes that instantiate independent variables of one or more theories, then the analysis can arbitrate theoretical rivalries. Researchers have used process tracing to examine the decision-making processes of power actors (e.g., Tannenwald 1999). In these studies, researchers identify a cause and an outcome of interest, specifying only a minimal and abstract theory about the connection between the two (Beach 2017). The researcher then examines their data for empirical clues, or "diagnostic evidence" (Collier 2011), that would indicate that one cause or another produced the outcome of interest.

In the present case, Alcoa executives decided to grant the UBF all of the fixed capital, wages, guaranteed markets, and human capital necessary to open the WCI by 1971, and I draw on prevailing theories to assess the causes and processes that produced this outcome. If Alcoa executives acted as conscience constituents, then they supported the WCI because they found it to be morally worthy, likely due to its capacity to advance racial justice. This process could leave behind diagnostic evidence such as executives' expressed commitments to racial justice or their acknowledgment that the WCI was an effective means for advancing this goal. The other two arguments under consideration suspect causes that are incompatible with an altruistic motive, so evidence in favor of them can weaken the evidence for the conscience constituent argument.

A social control argument would suggest that Alcoa sponsored the WCI because they perceived in it an opportunity to mitigate disruption costs of insurgent movement activity. This process would leave behind distinctive empirical clues. One would be insurgent movement activity that posed a credible threat to Alcoa's operations, actually or potentially. In the present

context, the most likely event would be the April 1968 urban rebellions. The other clue would be an indication that Alcoa's executives believed that a collaborative endeavor like WCI would be useful for mitigating the disruption costs of such a threat.

Finally, a patronage argument would suggest that Alcoa sponsored WCI because they saw in it an opportunity to instrumentally advance their own interest. Since Alcoa is a for-profit enterprise, their interests concern profits. This process could leave behind still different empirical clues: evidence of an acute threat to Alcoa's profit margins and/or evidence that WCI would be especially useful for boosting profits, for instance, by securing tax credits, generating positive publicity, or securing regulatory exemptions.

This study searches for diagnostic evidence than can challenge or support these arguments. This evidence consists in archival records, newspaper reporting, and secondary sources. For the archival data, I sifted through over a thousand documents belonging to six archival collections housed in the University of Pittsburgh's Archives and Special Collections and the Heinz History Center's Detre Library and Collections between 2017 and 2022. The study cites a unique set of primary sources, not previously assembled, that includes annual reports, internal memos, manifestos, private correspondence, public speeches, project descriptions, grant applications, and meeting minutes from Alcoa, the United Black Front, and third parties. I complement these sources with coverage from local newspapers, including newspapers with majority-White and majority-Black readerships.

4.3 The Origins of Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc.

In June 1968, the United Black Front's executive director, Clyde Jackson, canvassed the executives of Pittsburgh-based corporations seeking support for the UBF's efforts in establishing manufacturing operations in the Hill District. Among others, Jackson approached the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), one of the largest producers of aluminum in the world, and their executives John D. Harper and Frederick Close. After some discussion, Alcoa's executives agreed to provide Jackson with the capital, personnel, salaries, guaranteed markets to start a light-manufacturing firm and a commitment to turn the operation over to the UBF after it became self-sustaining (United Black Front 1969a: 2-4; Taylor 1973a).

Conscience Constituents – The UBF had an explicit commitment to fostering the self-determination of Pittsburgh's Black communities. This commitment is reflected in the UBF's founding documents, objectives, and even its name. Did the UBF's pursuit of racial justice secure Alcoa's support?

Archival data for this study include many exchanges between UBF, Alcoa, third parties, and the general public, in the form meeting minutes, meeting agendas, project designs, personal correspondence, ceremonies, and public interviews. If Alcoa's executives had a commitment to advancing racial justice, they could easily express these commitments in these exchanges. However, none of these documents contain any trace of moralistic language or expressed concerns with racial equity.

The only place that the archival record shows moralistic language is with Alcoa's other, similar initiatives. Alcoa's executives supported a wide variety of programs aimed at expanding

employment opportunities for un- and under-employed Black workers in urban areas. Alcoa executives even played leading roles in expanding these programs nationally through the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) (National Alliance of Businessmen 1971). Alcoa executive John Harper encouraged business leaders to join these programs through speeches to pro-business organization in meetings across the U.S. between 1967 and 1972 (e.g., Harper 1968a; Harper 1968b).

In these speeches, Harper uses some moral language to describe employment programs in Black communities. Harper argues that business leaders have a "social responsibility" to solve national problems, such as unemployment (Harper 1968b: 1). He also tries to cultivate sympathy for the unemployed by invoking past injustices visited on Black communities, including discrimination and unfairly limited access to housing, education, and employment (Harper 1968b: 6). This could be an empirical fingerprint left by Harper's commitment to advancing racial equity.

However, the strength of this evidence must be tempered by further considerations. One is that the context of these statements gives Harper reason to make appeals to moral worth even if he himself is not acting as a conscience constituent, especially given that in these speeches he is recruiting business leaders to his programs. In fact, Harper often mixed his appeals to the moral worth of the program with appeals of very different kinds that highlight the instrumental and political value of these programs, often in the same breath. For example, in an address from March 1968, Harper states that supporting these programs is both morally commendable and a business opportunity:

We cannot afford, either as private business enterprises or as a nation, to underrate the

potential contribution of any group of people to society. Too much brainpower has been

trapped in the ghetto. Too much has been wasted away on the street. And it is not just

brainpower, but also buying power that is trapped and wasted! (Harper 1968b: 6)

In other passages, he contends that supporting these programs can demonstrate the capacity of

business to address social problems, discredit the critics of business, curb government overreach,

reverse urban decline, and contribute to businesses' long-term stability and profitability. These

mixed appeals suggest that Harper is trying various strategies to recruit members for his

program, whether or not he is persuaded by them himself.

Social Control – UBF executive Clyde Jackson approached executives John Harper and

Frederick Close just two months after Pittsburgh's rebellions. These rebellions posed numerous

disruption costs to Alcoa's business, from destroying property to disrupting patterns of

production and consumption. Did these disruption costs contribute to Alcoa's decision to support

the WCI?

Data suggest that Alcoa executives perceived the urban rebellions as a threat to their

interests and perceived employment programs as effective means for containing them. Harper's

NAB speeches, introduced above, establish both conditions quite explicitly. In a speech

delivered in March 1968, Harper speaks at considerable length about the "urban crisis," that he

defines as "the racial crisis," centered in "the slums of our major cities" (Harper 1968b: 2). He

claims this crisis poses a threat to cities in general and the businesses of his audience in

particular. Harper states:

Few businesses of any size can pull up stakes and abandon the city. We're wed to our

cities, for better or for worse. So let it be for the better. Our inherent commitment, as

evidenced by the urban locations of a good share of our plants and offices, is as binding

as any legal contract. It gives us little choice but to see this struggle through to a

successful conclusion. When the structure of a city collapses, it crushes everything inside

it – employees, machinery, jobs, products, suppliers, customers, capital, unions,

management, stockholders, profits – everything... A major portion of our customers,

present and potential, live in cities. Business pays a major share of the taxes that are spent

in cities - whether or not it is there to help be sure these taxes are invested wisely. *There*

is no greater threat to our economic system in America today than the degradation of our

cities. And it thus is, of course, a threat to each of us and our companies [emphasis

added] (Ibid.: 5).

Harper then claims that businesses can help solve the urban crisis by hiring and training

unemployed Black workers in urban areas, and lauds the employment programs of the NAB,

Alcoa, and Urban America, Inc. In a speech from May 1968, one month after urban rebellions

swept across the country, Harper puts the same point more bluntly...

It is generally agreed that hard-core unemployment is one of our deepest national shames.

In the ghettoes, the jobless rate is three times the national average. These so-called hard-

core unemployables, these so-called psychological misfits are a live fuse in the urban

tinderbox. Providing gainful employment for this group of permanently poor would go

far toward solving many social ills (quoted in *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968b).

As with the analysis above, I must consider that the context of these statements gives Harper

incentive to make these claims even if he himself is not acting as an agent of asocial control. For

instance, he may be attempting to recruit business leaders by appealing to their racialized fears.

Further evidence, however, reinforces the social control argument. First, Alcoa's support

for Black economic development was reactive. Prior to the rebellions, Alcoa had a poor track

record with Black workers. For instance, Civil Rights groups in Pittsburgh included Alcoa on a

list of Pittsburgh-based corporations that regularly failed to hire, train, and promote Black

workers (Morris 1969). After the urban rebellions began emerging across the country in 1965,

however, Alcoa became increasingly involved in efforts to promote urban Black employment,

and they concentrated their efforts in locations where Alcoa had property (Morris 1969). In 1967,

the Alcoa Foundation made a $10,000 grant to Urban America, Inc., a non-profit organization

that united leaders of government, business, and civil society in efforts to address the "violence"

and "urban disorder" occurring in U.S. cities since the rebellions in Newark (Urban America,

Inc. 1968). In April 1968, Urban America's representatives solicited funds from the Alcoa

Foundation, writing that "... events in the urban field, especially the riots of the last few weeks,

underscore so very heavily what remains to be done" (Hickman 1968). In response to this

request, Alcoa Foundation trustees offered at least two $10,000 grants (Ibid.).

Other reactive efforts were led by the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB). This

organization formed in 1968, and it promoted and coordinated businesses' participation in the

federal JOBS program that provided subsidies for businesses to hire and train "hard core"

unemployed workers. Some of its programs aimed at providing employment for young Black

men in urban communities, particularly during the summer months when rebellions tended to

occur (National Alliance of Businessmen 1971). Alcoa participated in this program. In 1968 and

1969, Alcoa received grants totaling more than $435,000 from the U.S. Department of Labor to

train and hire over 250 "hard-core" unemployed Black workers at its facilities in four major U.S.

cities – Cleveland, Chicago, Portland, and Los Angeles – three of which had experienced urban

rebellions in years prior (Morris 1969). Alcoa executives also played leading roles in expanding

the JOBS program with Harper serving as board director and regional chairman for NAB

between 1968 and 1971 (National Alliance of Businessmen 1971).

After Pittsburgh's rebellions in April 1968, Alcoa got involved in similar responses there,

too. Pittsburgh's city leaders made concerted efforts to prevent future rebellions, and they

operated through both public and private organizations. Publicly, Mayor Barr formed task forces

to assess the causes of the rebellions and develop strategies "aimed at avoiding the recurrence of

the 'disorders' last week" (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968a). Privately, city officials worked with

civic organizations, especially the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, to deploy

social programs aimed at ameliorating Black communities' longstanding grievances. These

efforts marked a dramatic departure from the Conference's previous focus on coordinating and

promoting urban redevelopment projects (Hritz 1968: Trotter and Day 2010; Ribiero 2012). The

new programs aimed at improving opportunities for employment, entrepreneurship, education,

and recreation for the city's Black population, and in some of these efforts they partnered with

NAB. Some of these programs aimed at economic development, and they channeled over $13

million into Black-led efforts within Black communities, including the United Black Front (Hritz

1969; Gigler 1974). Between 1968 and 1972, John Harper sat on the Conference's executive

board, and Frederick Close belonged to the Citizens' Sponsoring Committee (Allegheny Conference on Community Development 1968).

Further, observers and participants described Alcoa's employment programs as superficial and short-lived. In the 1970s, observers pointed out that the NAB program in Pittsburgh, where John Harper served as regional chair, had a drop-out rate of 41% (Voelker 1971), and the Allegheny Conference's Minority Entrepreneur Loan program had a failure rate of approximately 50% (Gigler 1974). Some Black workers who participated in these employment programs doubted their sincerity. For instance, the Black-led Urban Youth Action program interviewed numerous Black youth who worked in these employment programs, and one of these youth worked in Alcoa's summer employment program in 1970. Mary Moore, a Black woman who worked in Alcoa's mailroom, described her experience as "tokenism." She states: "It is tokenism because they have to hire blacks. The government requires them to hire blacks" (Urban Youth Action, Inc. 1970: 14). The architects of these programs knew that these programs had serious shortcomings, but rather than redoubling their efforts, they let these programs quietly die out after six years of experimentation (Gigler 1974). These programs achieved short-term and temporary relief from the Black community's longstanding grievances while falling far short of the long-term structural changes they initially promised (Ibid.).

Patronage– Since Alcoa offered to purchase nearly all of WCI's output, WCI marked an opportunity for Alcoa to reconfigure how it arranged production. It is possible that Alcoa executives saw in WCI an opportunity to enhance their operations' profitability.

Direct testimony from decision-makers lends support to this hypothesis. The support that Alcoa offered to the UBF consisted in 13 high-speed nail-making machines taken from Alcoa's

Lancaster Works facility in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Lancaster Works was a $3 million dollar facility that began production in 1954. It produced aluminum nails and a wide variety of other aluminum products and employed over 350 workers (*Philadelphia Inquirer* 1952). When reporters asked why Alcoa selected these particular operations, an Alcoa spokesperson said that "the aluminum nail business has been profitable but that the Lancaster facilities can be utilized for more profitable manufacturing by the company" (*Wall Street Journal* 1970). UBF executives, in a progress report, explained why Alcoa selected the Lancaster Works' equipment in particular: "The plant [Lancaster Works] produced a quality product, but had been encountering employee difficulties over a period of months which caused production and income problems" (United Black Front 1973: 3).

Other data reinforce these claims. The Lancaster Works had a unionized workforce, and in the summer of 1968, their union went on strike. The workers, organized by the Aluminum Workers International Union, had been in negotiations with management for increased wages, pensions, and benefits. When the negotiations fell apart, however, 11,000 workers picketed, and eight plants fell idle, eliminating approximately half of Alcoa's aluminum production capacity (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968c; *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968d; Allard 1968). One of the striking aluminum plants was the Lancaster Works. It was not the first time that Lancaster workers struck. They launched strikes, or threatened to, in 1956, 1962, 1964, and 1968. By July 1968, Alcoa agreed to provide Lancaster Works employees with higher fringe benefits and wage increases for the next three years (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1962; *Wall Street Journal* 1964; *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968d).

Further, in their discussions with UBF, Alcoa's representatives suggested that the WCI offer wages that were low for the aluminum industry. After the 1968 strike and negotiations, the

average cost of an aluminum worker was $5.50 per hour (including fringe benefits) (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1968c). Records of Alcoa's correspondence with UBF in 1970 reveal that, at Alcoa's suggestion, WCI's regular full-time employees were expected to be $3.00 per hour, and once fringe benefits were included, this figure rises to $3.46 an hour (George 1970: 9). WCI workers would earn lower wages and fewer benefits than the unionized workforce at Lancaster Works, at a difference of about $2 per hour once fringe benefits were included. That difference was even larger for newly hired WCI workers who earned a lower training rate of $2.30 per hour, a rate that would be utilized often in an industry that expected high turnover rates among workers (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1971).

Direct testimony suggests that this wage differential was not incidental. In 1973, UBF executive Clyde Jackson circulated a project proposal to a variety of prospective benefactors, including state agencies, philanthropists, and the Allegheny Conference. This proposal contends that UBF could expand its operations using lessons it learned from working with Alcoa...

...As a consequence of having developed a manufacturing operation for aluminum screws and nails (expected to generate better than $65,000 in 1974), in conjunction with ALCOA, it became quite apparent that quite a few of Pittsburgh's corporate giants have subsidiaries that to them are marginal operations, but which would be ideal for a spin-off arrangement to a minority owned company. As often as not, these operations are only marginally profitable due to the labor costs which accompany unionization. Transfer to a minority company could provide the same product at a significantly better price (United Black Front 1973: 23).

This correspondence suggests that, for Alcoa, a major selling point of the WCI was its ability to undercut the costs of unionized labor.

4.4 Discussion

The analysis found varying levels of support for the three arguments under consideration. At first, it appeared to provide support for the conscience constituents argument. In the speeches where Harper promotes the NAB program, he does contend that these programs can help rectify past injustices done to Black communities. This evidence is considerably weakened, however, by the context in which he made these statements. Since Harper uses these speeches to recruit business leaders to the NAB program, and especially since he mixes moralistic appeals with more instrumental appeals, it is highly likely that Harper would use moralistic language even if he was not acting as a conscience constituent himself. Further, this evidence is negated by the strength of the evidence in favor of the other arguments. The analysis found much stronger evidence in favor of social control and patronage arguments, and these are incompatible with the process hypothesized by the conscience constituent argument.

In favor of the social control argument, evidence furnished two important empirical clues. First, Alcoa executives were deeply concerned about insurgent movement activity that posed a credible threat the company's operations. Urban rebellions emerged in cities across the U.S. starting in 1965, and Alcoa's executives supported national efforts to prevent their recurrence through strategic concessions. When they erupted in Pittsburgh in 1968, Alcoa joined these local efforts, too. Second, evidence strongly suggested that Alcoa's executives would see WCI as an effective means for mitigating the disruption costs of the rebellions. Prior to Pittsburgh's

rebellions, Alcoa's executives promoted and even ran the national JOBS program which encouraged employers to hire un- and under-employed Black workers in urban areas, and Harper touted them as means for quelling urban rebellions. Just like these programs, WCI also hired urban Black un- and under-employed workers, primarily men from the Hill District where the rebellions were concentrated. This diagnostic evidence counts in favor of the social control argument, but its strength is somewhat tempered by the fact that this evidence does not concern WCI in particular but only the general tendencies and previous behaviors of Alcoa executives regarding similar initiatives.

Finally, this analysis provides strong evidence in favor of a patronage argument. The data revealed an acute challenge to Alcoa's profitability. In the summer of 1968, workers at Alcoa's Lancaster Works facility struck for wage increases and better fringe benefits. This facility was the original home of the nail-making machines later removed for use at WCI. Further, evidence suggested that Alcoa's executives anticipated that WCI would provide a means to circumvent this challenge. Records showed that Alcoa representatives suggested paying WCI workers wages lower than the industry standard, and representatives both Alcoa and UBF stated directly that Alcoa supported WCI because it could improve the profits of nail-making business. Together, this data provides compelling evidence that Alcoa supported WCI in anticipation of improving its profit margins.

4.5 Conclusion

WCI opened for production in 1971. Through its operation, Alcoa channeled precious resources for UBF and its constituents. It provided employment, business ownership, and training

opportunities for Hill District residents who had been historically excluded from such

opportunities through racially discriminatory labor markets, businesses, and labor unions. WCI

also provided the UBF with an economic engine that it hoped could support the other

developments that would comprise the commercial-industrial complex that was key to the Hill

District's self-determination. Local media hailed WCI as the rare success story of the Allegheny

Conference's minority entrepreneur loan program (Gigler 1974).

My analysis revealed far more about the conditions, limits, and implications of Alcoa's

support for this project. The social control argument suggested that Alcoa executives might see

WCI as useful for mitigating the disruption costs of urban rebellions, and evidence provided

moderate support for this argument. When UBF executive director Clyde Jackson approached

Alcoa executives in June 1968, these executives were not only aware that Pittsburgh's rebellions

had occurred two months prior: they were also experienced with programs aimed at mitigating

the threat of such urban rebellions in cities around the country, and they had been using

employment programs for urban Black workers in particular to do so. Whether he knew it or not,

Clyde Jackson's proposed project aligned neatly with the aim of such employment programs. If

not for this alignment, Alcoa executives could have denied Jackson any assistance, just as did the

other Pittsburgh-based executives that Jackson canvassed that summer.

While the social control theory explained why Alcoa executives were initially receptive,

the patronage theory explained the WCI's particular characteristics. This theory suggested the

Alcoa executives may have seen in WCI an opportunity to boost their rates of profit, and

evidence provided compelling support for this argument. During the June 1968 meeting, Alcoa

executives also faced strikes from their unionized workforce, and later events demonstrate that

they saw in WCI an opportunity to circumvent the power of organized labor. Alcoa's pursuit of

low-wage labor explains why WCI hired a relatively small, non-union workforce who worked for wages below the industry standard with nail-making machinery taken from the Lancaster Works facility. This conditionality had serious consequences for WCI. On one hand, it limited WCI's capacity to hire, pay, and train workers. Since UBF looked to WCI as the economic catalyst for its broader project, this condition at least slowed their longer-term campaign for community self-determination. On the other hand, this conditionality meant that WCI's operations would empower not just UBF but also Alcoa and its efforts to undermine organize labor.

5.0 The Steel Valley Authority

In the 1980s, Pittsburgh began a process of de-industrialization. Large steel corporations laid off workers by the thousands and gradually closed plants in Pittsburgh and the adjoining Monongahela Valley (Mon Valley). Between 1980 and 1986, Southwestern Pennsylvania lost over 115,000 manufacturing jobs, almost half of them in the steel industry alone (Detrick 1999). Working-class residents of the Mon Valley, where heavy industry was concentrated, organized to prevent plant shutdowns and preserve the region's heavy industry. A coalition of local labor unions, clergy, and community leaders organized the Tri-State Conference on Steel (Tri-State) and sought to create a municipal authority with the power to seek injunctions against closing plants, acquire properties using the power of eminent domain, and act as a broker to sell closed plants to third parties (McCollester et. al. 1983). Through a series of campaigns, Tri-State organizers secured the support of the City of Pittsburgh and eight surrounding municipalities – Rankin, Turtle Creek, Swissvale, Munhall, Glassport, Homestead, East Pittsburgh, and McKeesport – that agreed to apply for a charter for such an authority with the State of Pennsylvania. In January 1986, the State granted the charter, and the Steel Valley Authority was officially established (Stout 1986; Lynd 1987).

In this chapter, I examine the foundation of the SVA in 1986. I use theoretically-guided event-structure analysis (tESA) and archival data to examine the decision-making processes that led these benefactors to offer their support for the SVA, and I ask how and whether these decisions were influenced by the prospects of containing movement insurgency or the prospects of instrumentally advancing their own interests. The findings suggest that U.S. Steel made

concessions to Tri-State in order to ward of threats of legal action, and the nine municipalities lent support when they expected the SVA to generate employment and tax revenues for their communities. These findings provide support for separate social control and patronage arguments.

5.1 1980s Pittsburgh: De-Industrialization, Re-Industrialization

Pittsburgh is known for its historical role in iron and steel production. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the city saw the rise of industrial fortunes, financial fortunes, and a powerful organized labor movement. The steel industry boomed especially during World Wars I and II with military defense contracts and capital investments from the federal government (Hinshaw 2002). As industry grew, so did the city. Employment prospects attracted immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and Black workers from the South, and Pittsburgh's population swelled (Bodnar, Simon, Weber 1982; Gottleib 1987; Stout 2020). Heavy industry supported these communities but also polluted their air and water and harmed workers' bodies (Winant 2021).

In the decades after World War II, the profit margins of large steel companies in the U.S. began to decline. Internationally, they were losing ground to steelmakers, especially in Japan and Germany, with more modern equipment who had received state subsidies to rebuild their steel industries after World War II (Stout 2020). Domestically, they lost ground to mini-mills with modern equipment and non-union workforces, especially in Southern states. In response to these sagging profits, large steel companies in the U.S. laid off workers, raised prices, sought concessions from organized labor, lobbied for protective tariffs, and disinvested from steel

production (Hinshaw 2002: 175). U.S. Steel lobbied the federal government, claiming that they could not modernize their mills because of the costs of complying with environmental regulations and federal tax laws. When Congress agreed to relax these requirements in 1981, however, U.S. Steel used its savings not to modernize its mills but to diversify their investments by purchasing Marathon Oil for $6 billion (Hathaway 1996: 94). This move astounded members of Congress as well as U.S. Steel employees (Stout 2020: Ch. 17).

Many people thought that big steel was facing a temporary recession and that laid off workers would be called back to work. Additionally, U.S. Steel had publicly stated that it planned to modernize equipment at its facilities as late as 1979 (Hinshaw 2002: 174, ch4; Stout 2020). Throughout the 1980s, however, plant closures and workforce reductions only accelerated. In 1977, U.S. Steel closed facilities in nearby Youngstown OH, eliminating the jobs of 5,000 workers. In November 27, 1979, U.S. Steel announced the closure of over a dozen of its facilities in and around Pittsburgh, eliminating 13,500 jobs (Stout 2020: 101). In the following years, it announced partial or complete closures at Carrie Furnace, the Duquesne Works, the Clairton steel mill, and Homestead Works (Hinshaw 2002: 239). Manufacturers throughout the region followed suit with their own layoffs, workforce reductions, and plant closures. Between 1980 and 1983, Southwestern Pennsylvania's manufacturing jobs declined by 86,000, amounting to one out of every three such jobs (Levdansky and Ahlbrandt 1984). Between 1980 and 1986, the region lost over 115,500 manufacturing jobs in total, with nearly half of them in the steel industry alone (Detrick 1999:4-5).

As the steel industry withdrew from Pittsburgh, the leaders of city's government, civil society, and remaining industries charted a new, post-industrial course for the city's economic development. These leaders were united through the Allegheny Conference on Community

Development, a private civic organization, through which an earlier generation of city leaders coordinated a public-private partnership that planned and executed large-scale, top-down, efforts at redevelopment later dubbed "renaissance 1" (Lubove 1995). In 1981, the Conference reinstated their Economic Development Committee and populated it with executives from financial institutions (including Mellon Bank and Pittsburgh National Bank), a variety of industries (including U.S. Steel, Jones and Laughlin Steel, Westinghouse Electric Corporation), and allied non-profit organizations that focused on economic development (*Pittsburgh Press* 1981). This committee developed a strategy to diversify the region's economic base and decrease its reliance on heavy industry. To realize this vision, they set the economic development priorities with public officials, expanded office space for corporate headquarters in the central business district, worked with the city's research universities to develop high-tech research and development facilities, developed an ecosystem for a high-tech startups and advanced manufacturing, and coordinated infrastructure projects to improve the region's airports and highways. These efforts were later hailed as "renaissance 2" (Lubove 1996; Neumann 2016; Deiterich-Ward 2015).

De-industrialization also galvanized a response from the working-class communities of the Mon Valley. These communities developed around heavy industry, but they had been undergoing changes themselves. In response to Civil Rights litigation, U.S. Steel entered into a consent decree with the federal government to hire more women and workers of color to offset the effects of discrimination in previous hiring and promotion decisions (Stout 2020). As a result, the mills saw an influx of workers experienced with the women's movement, the Civil Rights movement, and the Anti-war movement, who worked at democratizing local unions and

dismantling longstanding barriers to the advancement of women workers and workers of color (Ibid.; Hinshaw 2002).

As the reality of de-industrialization set in, Mon Valley communities organized. Activists from mill communities in Youngstown arrived to sound the alarm, and local unions, clergy, and other community leaders mobilized in coalitions that drew on their communities' networks and traditions of organizing. Many organized to ameliorate the suffering of the unemployed and their families. Just as they did in the Great Depression, workers and their communities created food pantries and unemployed councils. In 1982, several union locals combined their efforts to form the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee (MVUC), campaigning to prevent foreclosure on workers' homes, prevent utilities shut offs in their homes, and expand their access to unemployment compensation, funds to retrain for new jobs, and other services (Mon Valley Unemployed Committee 1982; see also Hathaway 1993).

Others organized to challenge corporations' rights to divest from and abandon the communities that created their wealth. They advocated that working communities should have some say in corporations' decisions to close plants and that companies should pay the social costs of shut downs. Similar movements to resist plant shutdowns emerged in industrial regions across the country (Haas 1985). In Pittsburgh, a coalition of Pittsburgh-area churches representing five Protestant denominations held a conference in 1980 to discuss the plight of unemployed workers. In the following years, they named their group the Denominational Ministry Strategy (DMS), and they hired an organizer named Charles Honeywell, a student of Saul Alinksy (Hathaway 1993:49-54). The DMS aimed to educate the public about what they called "de-industrialization by design." Using strategic research, they found that some of the financial institutions responsible for closing Pittsburgh-area mills, especially Mellon Bank, were

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also investing in and profiting from these mills' competitors overseas, especially Sumitomo Industries in Japan (Hathaway 1993: 52-53). Using these findings and others, DMS mobilized clergy, workers and other community members and pressure Mellon executives and others into reversing their decisions to disinvest, often using publicity-generating direct-action tactics (Hathaway 1993).

Finally, in 1979, activists formed the Tri-State Conference on Steel (Tri-State). This organization consisted of activists from the Youngstown shutdowns, various union locals, including Homestead Works local 1397, and leaders of religious and community-based organizations, and it represented communities in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia (Hathaway 1993). At first, Tri-State also sounded the alarm about the coming de-industrialization. Later, they developed a campaign to preserve heavy industry in the Mon Valley, possibly by organizing buyouts of the mills and operating them worker-owned cooperatives. At a conference on October 29, 1983, Tri-State organizers agreed to focus on creating a new municipal development authority, called the Steel Valley Authority (SVA), that could seek injunctions against closing mills, act as a broker to sell closed mills to third parties, and seize properties using the power of eminent domain (McCollester et. al. 1983). As mills closed throughout the region, Tri-State organizers approached city and municipal officials with the offer to create the SVA in order to keep mills open and preserve workers' jobs and municipalities' tax bases. The City of Pittsburgh and eight surrounding municipalities – Rankin, Turtle Creek, Swissvale, Munhall, Glassport, Homestead, East Pittsburgh, McKeesport – appealed to the State of Pennsylvania to charter a new municipal authority, and in January 1986 and the Steel Valley Authority was founded (Stout 1986; Lynd 1987). With the SVA's eminent domain power, Tri-State and its allies tried but failed to acquire former sites of industrial

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production in Pittsburgh. In 1992, they opened the cooperatively-owned City Pride bakery that initially employed 150 workers, but it stayed in business only for a few years (Hathaway 1996).

5.2 Case Selection, Methods, and Data

This chapter presents a case study of the SVA. In the 1980s, worker-community coalitions emerged in industrial areas across the U.S. to fight plant shutdowns (Haas 1985; Nissen 1995), and the SVA is an especially ambitious effort of this kind (Tilly and Kennedy 2014). The SVA's history has been told before (e.g., Hathaway 1996; Stout 2020), and it features prominently studies of neighborhood organizations in the 1980s (Ahlbrandt 1990; Jezierski 1990; Ferman 1996), but my study builds on these accounts by using novel archival data and a formal historical methodology.

In this case, Tri-State received the support, or at least, cooperation, of several benefactors but the analysis below will focus on two of them whose support was especially critical for the SVA. One was U.S. Steel's decision to postpone dismantling its Dorothy 6 blast furnace. The other is a group of nine municipalities – the city or municipal governments of Pittsburgh, Rankin, Turtle Creek, Swissvale, Munhall, Glassport, Homestead, East Pittsburgh, and McKeesport – that agreed to apply to the state of Pennsylvania for the SVA's charter. The theories above generate divergent expectations about what features of the SVA these benefactors would consider, and which considerations weighed most heavily, in their decision to lend support. How and to what extent were the benefactors swayed by the SVA's capacity to mitigate disruption costs or to use the SVA to advance their own interests?

To answer these questions, I use theoretically guided event-structure analysis (tESA) (Bloom 2015: see also Dixon 2008 and Brueggemann and Brown 2003). With this method, researchers select a case and then de-compose it into constituent actions for analysis. What makes the method theoretically guided is that analysts select actions for analysis that can instantiate the variables and concepts of one or more theories of interest. At minimum, some actions instantiate the independent variables of one or more theories while others instantiate the outcomes to be explained. After formally identifying actions for analysis, the researchers then uses counterfactual analysis to assess the causal relations between each action and every subsequent action. Since the actions instantiate the components of one or more theories, these causal assessments constitute tests for one or more rival hypotheses. Thus, tESA can produce within-case analyses that capture contingency, context, agency and a wide range of evidence while also remaining formal, systematic, explicit, and criticizable in its method of drawing causal inferences from data. In this case, I use tESA to identify critical junctures in the campaign to form the SVA and then investigate the decision-making processes of relevant benefactors within those junctures.

The study's data consist in archival records, newspaper reporting, and secondary sources. For the archival data, I sifted through over a thousand documents belonging to five archival collections housed in the University of Pittsburgh's Archives and Special Collections, the Rivers of Steel archives, and the Heinz History Center's Detre Library and Collections between 2018 and 2023. The primary sources consist in annual reports, internal memos, manifestos, private correspondence, public speeches, project descriptions, grant applications, and meeting minutes from the organizations comprising the Mon Valley coalition, including Tri-State, the DMS, and the MVUC. I complement these sources with coverage from local newspapers.

Table 3. Actions Identified for Analysis

CAMPAIGN	ACTION	DATE
SAVE CRUCIBLE (Midland, PA)	Colt Industries Plans to Sell Crucible Steel	March 10, 1982
	Cyclops Corporation Considers Buying Crucible	April 21, 1982
	Tri-State Presentation to Midland Borough Officials	June, 1982
	Cyclops Corp. Loses Interest	July 1982
	Midland Officials decline use of Eminent Domain	August, 1982
	J&L Steel purchase Crucible	November, 1982
SAVE NABISCO (Pittsburgh, PA)	Nabisco Plant Announces Closure	October 15, 1982
	SNAC Forms	December 1982
	SNAC Launches Nabisco Boycott	December 16, 1982
	SNAC Appeals to Urban Redevelopment Authority	December 16, 1982
	Pittsburgh Mayor Endorses Boycott	December 16, 1982
	Pgh City Council Passes Resolution	December 20, 1982
	Nabisco Cancels Closure	December 21, 1982
SAVE MESTA (West Homestead, PA)	Banks foreclose on Mesta Machine Company	February 8, 1983
	DMS Organizes Mellon Bank Boycott	March 27, 1983
	Continental Plant Corp. Considers Buying Mesta	April 13, 1983
	Save Mesta Committee Meets W. Homestead Borough Officials	April 22, 1983
	USWA Mobilizes Local Members	May 27, 1983
	Allegheny County Commissioner Urges Mellon Bank Boycott	June 1, 1983
	Tri-State & DMS Launch "D-DAY"	June 6, 1983
	Pgh City Council Passes Resolution Supporting Mellon Boycott	June 6, 1983
	Mellon Bank Releases Mesta Funds	June 9, 1983
	The Park Corp. Buys Former Mesta Machine Plant	June 16, 1983
	W. Homestead Council Approves Forming a Municipal Authority	June 21, 1983
	W. Homestead Mayor Vetoes the Municipal Authority	July 1, 1983
	Park Corporation Opens WHEMCO	September 20, 1983
SMELLIN' MELLON (Various)	Network Launches Mellon Bank Penny Protests	October 19, 1983
	Network Members Store Fish in Mellon Deposit Boxes	November 4, 1983
	Network Members Disrupt Easter Services at Shadyside Presbyterian	April 22, 1984
	Network Disrupts Christmas Services at Shadyside Presbyterian	December 16, 1984
SAVE DOROTHY 6 (Duquesne, PA)	U.S.Steel Plans to Dismantle Dorothy 6 Blast Furnace	October 9, 1984
	Tri-State Holds Emergency Meeting	October 29, 1984
	U.S. Steel Postpones Dismantling	December 5, 1984
	USWA, City of Pgh, & Allegheny County Offer Study Funds	December 6, 1984
	Tri-State Meets with Borough and City Officials	December, 1984
	Laid Off Workers Winterize Dorothy 6	December 8, 1984
	Jesse Jackson Campaign Holds Rally	January 9, 1985
	Munhall City Council Votes to Join SVA	January 17, 1985
	Locker/Abrecht Feasibility Study Results	January 29, 1985
	Laid Off Workers Hold Vigil at Dorothy 6	February, 1985
	USWA Funds In-Depth Feasibility Studies	February, 1985
	U.S. Steel rejects Offer to Participate in a Joint Study	March 2, 1985
	West Homestead Borough Declines Invitation from Tri-State	March 7, 1985
	Homestead Borough Votes to Join SVA	March 14, 1985

	McKeesport City Votes to Join SVA	April 3, 1985
	Turtle Creek Borough Votes to Join SVA	April 4, 1985
	U.S. Steel Publishes Results of Feasibility Study	April 15, 1985
	Torres-Tumazos Feasibility Study Results	May 8, 1985
	Tri-State Hosts Parade and Rally in Duquesne	May 18, 1985
	Pittsburgh City Council Votes to Join SVA	June 10, 1985
	Glassport Borough Votes to Join SVA	June 11, 1985
	Swissvale Borough Votes to Join SVA	June 12, 1985
	Rankin Borough Votes to Join SVA	June 13, 1985
	East Pittsburgh Borough Votes to Join SVA	August 14, 1985
	Wilmerding Borough Declines Joining SVA	November 18, 1985
	Lazard Frerés & Co. Feasibility Study Results	January 8, 1986

5.3 The Campaign To Create The Steel Valley Authority

Tri-State members first proposed using eminent domain during an effort to save the Crucible

Steel plant. In 1982, Crucible Steel's stainless steel and alloy division showed declining rates of

profits. The Crucible plant was located outside of Pittsburgh in Midland, PA, where it once

employed 4,300 workers unionized with the United Steel Workers (USW). In March 1982, the

plant's owners, Colt Industries, announced their plan to sell the plant. The announcement came

as a surprise to workers, elected officials, and residents of the borough, where the plant generated

about 75% of total tax revenues (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1982). Over the summer, Colt

Industries considered selling to Cyclops Steel, a domestic steel producer, but when talks fell

apart Colt announced that without any new buyers they would dismantle the plant. In June, a

community-based coalition, called Midland Alive, sought to preserve the plant and invited Tri-

State members to speak to the borough council. Tri-State members delivered a presentation on

the use of eminent domain and suggested that the borough create a municipal authority that could

use this power to seize the plant and coordinate its sale to another owner, possibly the plant's

former employees (Cairns 1982). By August, however Midland borough officials voted down the

proposal to form such an authority, claiming that doing so would be risky and impractical

(*Pittsburgh Post* 1982). The following October, Colt Industries shut down the Crucible Steel plant. One month later, Colt sold the plant to Jones & Laughlin Corporation who reopened it with only 400 of the original 4,300 jobs (Hathaway 1996: 97; Stout 2020).

The next Tri-State campaign emerged in Pittsburgh. In the city's East Liberty neighborhood, Nabisco ran a baking plant that provided 650 jobs to workers unionized with the Bakery Confectionary and Tobacco workers union. In October 1982, Nabisco executives announced that they would close this plant and move production to other facilities around the U.S. Nabisco initially gave no reason for the shut down, but observers repeatedly point out that in 1975 women employees at this facility successfully brought a lawsuit against the employer alleging discrimination in pay and promotions that resulted in the company's paying $4 million in damages (Doubet 1982). In response to the closure announcement, community labor, and religious organizations formed the Save Nabisco Action Coalition (SNAC), including representatives of Tri-State. In December 1982, SNAC held a public meeting, attended by roughly 1,200, where members, residents, and workers spoke out against the closure (Rouvalis 1982). SNAC distributed several hundred pledge cards for members to threaten a boycott of Nabisco if the plant shutdown, members of Tri-State urged Pittsburgh's Urban Redevelopment Authority to seize the plant with eminent domain, and Pittsburgh's Mayor Caliguiri spoke out against the closure and threatened to join the boycott. The following week, Pittsburgh City Council passed a resolution expressing their commitment to keeping the Nabisco plant open. On December 21st, Nabisco executives called Mayor Caliguiri to announce that they had canceled the closure and the plant would remain open (Byrd 1982).

Three months later, Tri-State became involved with the shut-down of the Mesta Machine Company in West Homestead, a borough just outside of Pittsburgh. The Mesta Machine plant

produced equipment used in steel mills, and for decades it had been the largest of its kind in the world. Mesta Machine Company owed $19.6 million to a consortium of Pittsburgh-area banks, including Mellon Bank. In February 1983, these banks foreclosed on Mesta. This foreclosure laid off 1,200 workers, and because the foreclosure froze Mesta's payroll accounts, it prevented 250 workers from receiving back pay owed by the company (Lin 1983). This foreclosure set off two sequences of action. On one side, Tri-State members drew together an alliance of workers, council members, and clergy to form the Save Mesta Committee. In the spring, they met with borough council to persuade them to use eminent domain to seize the Mesta Machine plant in order to keep it operating (Hopey 1983a). In April, Mesta Machine considered selling its facility to the Continental Plant Corporation who specialized in dismantling and liquidating manufacturing plants (Ibid.). These talks fell through, however, and Mesta sold its plant to the Park Corporation for $9 million in June (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1983). The Save Mesta Committee, after multiple public hearings and town hall meetings, succeeded in getting the West Homestead Borough to consider a resolution to create a municipal authority that could buy the plant using eminent domain. On June 21, the council voted, and the resolution passed 4-3 in favor of the authority (Davis 1983). The following July, however, the resolution was vetoed by West Homestead Mayor John Dindak, who worked in management at U.S. Steel and had ties to the business community. In September, the Park Corporation opened the West Homestead Engineering and Machine Company (WHEMCO) in the former Mesta facility with 15 employees (Wylie 1983; Tri-State Conference on Steel 1983).

On the other side, others organized a boycott of Mellon Bank. In March 1983, the Denominational Ministry Strategy (DMS), a coalition of Mon Valley pastors, called a meeting attended by 200 people, including Tri-State members. DMS's research revealed that Mellon

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Bank, while it was foreclosing on Mesta Machine Company, was making millions of dollars in loans to Mesta's main competitor, Japan's Sumitomo Industries, which outraged workers and residents (Denominational Ministry Strategies 1985). The DMS organized Mon Valley workers and residents to sign pledge cards expressing their intent to withdraw their savings from Mellon Bank accounts unless Mellon allowed Mesta to pay their workers owed back pay and reverse their decisions to disinvest from the Valley. This boycott attracted powerful supporters. The United Steel Workers of America (USWA) President agreed to call on 120,000 members of union locals to join the boycott, which could amount to an estimated $1.2 billion (Hopey 1983b). The Allegheny County Commissioner called on County government to reduce its funds of $81 million from Mellon Bank (Locy 1983). Pittsburgh City Council passed a resolution to withdraw $38 million of the City's funds from Mellon Bank accounts (Lin 1983). On June 6th, members of Tri-State and the DMS launched "D-Day" (Disinvestment Day) by mobilizing members, workers, and residents to begin withdrawing their funds from Mellon Bank accounts (Knezevich 1983). On June 9th, Mellon Bank released the funds for Mesta to pay former workers what they were owed (Donalson 1983).

For the next year, DMS and the coalition Network to Save the Mon Valley (Network) continued attempting to influence Mellon Bank executives through confrontational tactics and generating negative publicity. In October 1983, Network members obstructed business at Mellon Bank branches by having tellers change large denominations into pennies, then dropping the pennies on the floor and obstructing doorways (Tolpin 1983). The next month, they stored frozen fish in Mellon safe deposit boxes (the "Smellin' Mellon" campaign) (Sheehan 1983). In 1984, they directed their attention to Shadyside Presbyterian Church, where Mellon executives

allegedly attended. Protestors disrupted their Easter services in April and disrupted a Christmas party with skunk-oil filled balloons in December (Locy 1984: Stout 2020).

The final plant-closure leading up to the SVA's incorporation was Dorothy 6. Dorothy 6 was a blast furnace in U.S. Steel's Duquesne Works facility located in the city of Duquesne, just outside of Pittsburgh. Dorothy 6 was a relatively new and modern blast furnace, built in 1960, and its size and efficiency made it a crucial component of steel-making throughout the Mon Valley. In fact, in December 1983, its workers won the Iron Master Award from U.S. Steel for breaking steel-production records (Hathaway 1996: 99; Stout 2020: 218). In May 1984, U.S. Steel closed Dorothy 6 and others parts of the Duquesne Works, and the following October, they announced plans to dismantle the steel-making end of the plant to make way for an industrial park (McKay 1984).

On October 29th, Tri-State organized an emergency meeting with union locals, clergy, Allegheny County Commissioners, and other elected representatives to formalize a plan to save the Dorothy 6 blast furnace (Stout 2020: 217). The USWA, County Commissioners, and other officials met with U.S. Steel and asked them to postpone the plant's demolition, and U.S. Steel executives agreed (Savel 1984). In December, the USWA, Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh, and the electric utility provider Duquesne Light each contributed $50,000 to hire consultants to conduct an initial feasibility study on the furnace while Tri-State launched an ambitious grassroots organizing effort and convince borough and city officials to hold public hearings and take votes on forming the SVA. Over the winter, laid-off Duquesne workers winterized the plant to keep pipes from bursting in freezing temperatures (McKay 1985a), held a vigil outside of the plant gates to prevent U.S. Steel from removing any of the plant's equipment

(Scarton 1985), and hosted Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign at a rally in support of Tri-State's efforts (Hopey 1985).

In the coming months, Tri-State's grassroots campaigning and the feasibility study bore fruit. On January 17th 1985, Munhall city council was the first municipal government to pass a resolution favoring the creation of the SVA. On January 29th, Tri-State publicized the study's results in a town hall meeting in a Duquesne church with 800 attendees (Stout 2020: 221). The study, conducted by New-York based Locker/Abrecht Associates, found that Dorothy Six could produce steel slabs at a competitive rate and that there was a market for its products. The costs of rehabilitating and restarting the furnace would amount to $40 million, and operating costs for the first three years would add another $50 million. If the furnace required a new continuous caster, however, that would add another $150 million (Leff 1986: 23; Hathaway 1996: 100). The following Marching and April, borough and city councils in Homestead, McKeesport, and Turtle Creek passed resolutions to join the SVA (Bergholtz 1985a; *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1985; Dudiak 1985) U.S. Steel doubted the results of the study, and at the request of Pittsburgh City Council, released their own feasibility study challenging the results of the Locker/Abrecht study. U.S. Steel's study alleged that rehabilitation and startup costs would range from $400-$500 million, that no market existed for Dorothy's products, and that production would operate at a loss for at least three years (U.S. Steel 1985: Leff 1986: 23).

The USWA International funded two more in-depth feasibility studies on the blast furnace. In May, the first of these studies, by consultant Rosa Torres-Tumazos, focused on marketing and found that there was a growing domestic market for Dorothy's products if the plant installed a new continuous caster (McKay 1985b). Later that month, Tri-State and its allies held a parade through the city of Duquesne with a rally at the gates of the Duquesne Works.

From June to August, more cities and boroughs formalized votes to join the SVA – Pittsburgh, Glassport, Swissvale, Rankin, and East Pittsburgh – and in November the nine cities and boroughs filed articles of incorporation with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Lee 1985; Hornack and Lynd 1986). On January 8th, 1986 the New-York based consultants Lazard Frerés and Company publicized the results of the final feasibility study. They found that the costs of rehabilitating and restarting the mill would surpass $300 million, that production would operate at a loss, and that it could not attract any buyers from the private market. This study spelled the end of the Dorothy 6 campaign (Hopey 1986). On January 31, the Steel Valley Authority (SVA) was officially incorporated in Pennsylvania (Stout 1986: 28).

Figure 1. Summary of the Campaign to Create the SVA

Colt Plans to Sell Crucible
Tri–State Meets Midlan
Cyclops Corp. Consid
Midland Declines E
Cyclops Corp. Loses Intere
J&L Purchases Crucibl

Nabisco Announces Closure
SNAC Forms
SNAC Appeals to URA
SNAC Launches Boycott
Pgh Mayor Endorses Boycot
Pgh City Council Passes Re
Nabisco Cancels Cl

Banks Foreclose on Mesta
DMS Organizes Mellon
Save Mesta Meets Boro
W. Homestead
Continental Corp. Con
W. Homestead M
Park Corp. Buys Mesta
USWA Mobilize County Commi
Park Corp. opens WHEMCO
Tri-State & DM
Network Launch
Pgh City Council
Network Puts Fish in Deposit Boxes
Mellon Bank Rele
Network DIsrupts Easter Services
Network Disrupts Christmas Party

US Steel Plans to Demolish Dorothy
Tri–State Holds Emerg
U.S. Steel Postpones Disma
Workers Winterize Dorothy
USWA, County, City, Fund S
Locker/Abrecht St
Jesse Jackson Rally
Munhall Supports S
U.S. Steel Study Result
Tri–State Lobbies Govts
Homestead Supports S
USWA Funds In–Depth
W. Homestead Declines SVA
McKeesport Su
U.S. Steel Decli
Wilmerding Decline
Turtle Creek Sup
Torres–Tumaz
Workers Vigil a
Duquesne Declines
Pittsburgh Supp
Save Dorothy Pa
Glassport Supports SVA
Swissvale Supports SVA
Rankin Supports SVA
East Pittsburgh S
Lazard–Frerés

5.4 Analysis

The results of the tESA analysis are summarized in Figure 1. The first three campaigns – Save

Crucible, Save Nabisco, and Save Mesta – all featured Tri-State members advocating for the use

of eminent domain, but these calls were ultimately not picked up by relevant decision-makers.

Instead, municipal governments were either indifferent or opposed to the plan, and the relevant

plant was either sold to another private corporation that significantly reduced production and

workforce or remained open, temporarily. The Dorothy Six campaign, partly because of the

experience of these earlier campaigns, was quite different. Tri-State succeeded in getting the

support of nine municipal governments to create a new municipal authority that would have the

power to use eminent domain, though the campaign ultimately failed to save the blast furnace.

The analysis also reveals that the decisions of certain powerholders and benefactors marked

critical junctures within this campaign. The rest of this analysis focuses on two of these critical

junctures and investigates whether and how these decisions were influenced by the prospect of

mitigating disruption costs or obtaining patronage.

5.4.1 U.S. Steel Postpones the Demolition

On December 5, 1984, Allegheny County Commissioners requested that U.S. Steel postpone its

plans to dismantle the Dorothy Six blast furnace. U.S. Steel planned to dismantle the furnace,

along with the rest of the Duquesne Works, to develop an industrial park in its place. If U.S.

Steel executives declined the request and begun dismantling the plant, they would have

effectively prevented Tri-State and its allies from conducting feasibility studies, building support

among municipal governments, and establishing the SVA. U.S. Steel, however, agreed to cooperate. This decision surprised observers (e.g., Savel 1984). What considerations did U.S. Steel executives make in coming to this decision?

U.S. Steel executives could have used this opportunity to instrumentally advance their own interests. If Dorothy Six proved to be economically viable, and the SVA used eminent domain to take the blast furnace and other elements of the plant, then the SVA would have to compensate U.S. Steel the fair market value of the plant, which some observers estimated at $10 million (Leff 1986: 23). Interviews with executives suggest that they were hoping to making money from the property (Ibid.: 2), but evidence does not suggest that U.S. Steel would have made more money from the one-time sale of this property to the SVA than it would have from developing the industrial park, which would promise more long-run returns on investment. Thus, there is only weak evidence for asserting a patronage argument here.

U.S. Steel executives also wanted to prevent disruption costs. The company had been closing plants not only in Pittsburgh, but throughout the country. In Chicago it owned the South Works, a steel-making plant with three blast furnaces that once employed 18,000 people. In 1981, U.S. Steel had promised to expand these facilities with a new rail mill there that would add 2,000 new jobs (Longworth 1984; Schneidman 1984). In December 1983, however, U.S. Steel announced that it was not cancelling plans for the rail mill but it was also closing the South Works and laying off the plant's last 3,100 workers (Bohn 1983). The next month U.S. Steel began demolishing the plant (Richards 1984). The sudden reversal met with public backlash. A coalition of public officials and workers, led by the USW, emerged to oppose the demolition. They pursued legal injunctions to prevent the demolition so that they could conduct a feasibility study in the hopes of reopening one blast furnace, possibly through a worker buy-out

(Rosenheim 1984). U.S. Steel resisted cooperating until public officials intervened. In the process, the company generated extensive negative publicity (e.g., Longworth 1984), had its plans to demolish the South Works facility tied up in legal battles for over a year, and faced actual or possible lawsuits for a breach of contract, libel, and violating anti-trust legislation behavior (Schneidman 1984).

Executives would have good reason to expect a similar response in the Mon Valley. For one, they were aware of and concerned with confrontational groups in the Mon Valley, namely DMS and Network, who often used disruptive actions to generate negative publicity. Further, U.S. Steel may have been liable to the same lawsuits in Duquesne as it was in Chicago. In Chicago, the Illinois Attorney General sued U.S. Steel for a breach of contract because U.S. Steel had obtained tax breaks and regulatory exemptions from state agencies in exchange for building the new rail mill, then canceled the mill (Schneidman 1984). U.S. Steel exhibited the same behavior in the Mon Valley. Executives publicly promised to modernize its equipment as late as 1980. They lobbied the federal government to obtain tax breaks and regulatory exemptions so that it could afford the necessary upgrades. When the federal government granted these requests, however, U.S. Steel used the windfall to purchase the Marathon Oil company for $6 billion (Stout 2020: Ch. 17: Hathaway 1996: 94).

The archival records that most directly concern U.S. Steel's executives' decision-making, consist in documents based on interviews with multiple U.S. Steel executives. These interview-based documents strongly suggest that these executives' decision to postpone Dorothy's demolition was aimed specifically at avoiding the same negative backlash it got in Chicago. One U.S. Steel official stated:

It's been a mess out there [referring to Chicago]. It's done nothing but tarnish our image.

Back here in Duquesne, we said we don't want to duplicate that situation. We have this

union-backed opposition. Let's cooperate as much as we can with these people. We just

did not want to get into an adversarial situation. We found it didn't get us anywhere in

Chicago. We especially wanted to stay out of court. We didn't want to upset people any

more than they already were (Quoted in Leff 1986).

Executives had good reason to expect backlash, given that the activities of Tri-State and DMS

revealed that these groups knew how to generate publicity and they were not afraid to publicly

name and shame their opponents.

Thus, this analysis provides compelling support for a social control argument. U.S. Steel

faced potential disruption costs in the form of lawsuits, court proceedings that would delay their

projects, and extensive negative publicity, and data suggest that their decision to postpone

Dorothy's dismantling was in part an effort to avoid or at least delay these outcomes.

5.4.2 Municipal Governments Support the SVA

SVA's incorporation also depended on the decisions of individual municipalities themselves.

Each of these municipalities agreed to form the SVA between January and August 1985 after

hearing Tri-State's advocacy and seeing the results of feasibility studies. The nine municipalities

that formally joined the SVA could have chosen otherwise. In fact, three municipalities that Tri-

State canvassed –Duquesne, West Homestead, and Wilmerding – declined invitations to join the

SVA. What considerations did municipal officials weigh in their decisions to join the SVA, or not?

Could some municipal officials have supported the SVA in order to mitigate disruption costs? The only potential source of disruption costs would stem from the confrontational tactics of the DMS and the Network to Save the Mon Valley. However, it seems unlikely that DMS and Network's activities posed disruption costs directly to the municipalities in question. First, the actions of DMS and Network were directed primarily at Mellon Bank, not the municipalities involved in the SVA. Further, the DMS's activities had begun to wane by 1985, especially after one of its leaders was arrested (Rouvalis 1985). Members of the Allegheny Conference were concerned that the activities of the DMS and Network could frighten away prospective capital investment (e.g., Simon 1984), but, unlike Conference members, the officials in Mon Valley municipalities had not yet given up on preserving industry. So it seems unlikely on the face of it that supporting the SVA could mitigate disruption costs.

On the other hand, the SVA presented these municipalities with opportunities to advance their own interests. These municipalities, especially the boroughs and cities in the Mon Valley, depended heavily on manufacturing for their tax bases. For instance, in Midland taxes from the Crucible Steel plant generated roughly 75% of the borough's revenues (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1982; see also Ackerman 1982). If the SVA could preserve industry and employment within these communities, then municipal officials could at least mitigate impending financial hardship.

The analysis suggests that municipalities' approval of the SVA depended on Tri-State's canvassing efforts. Starting in December 1984, Tri-State members organized a grassroots base and canvassed city and borough council members, asking them first to hold a town-hall-style public hearing on the SVA, and then voting on formal membership with the SVA. Archival

records include flyers, meeting agendas, and speeches from these town hall meetings, and they make clear that Tri-State members encouraged residents and municipalities to support the SVA on the basis of the industry and jobs that it would provide (e.g., McCollester 1985) While Tri-State often emphasized the value of Dorothy Six, they also tailored their appeals to municipalities' particular industries, such as Homestead's structural and plate mills or McKeesport's National Works (Tri-State Conference on Steel 1985a; Tri-State Conference on Steel 1985b). Tri-State members learned from their earlier failures in Midland and West Homestead how to construct these appeals persuasively. They observed that borough officials were hesitant to challenge the decisions of corporations but they could overcome this hesitance when faced with strong and encouraging grassroots pressure. They also observed that the primary concern of officials and residents was that their municipality would end up with unmanageable financial obligations and that Tri-State could allay these fears with feasibility studies and financial plans that entailed no financial obligation for the municipalities. Further, testimonial evidence from municipal officials states clearly that their support for the SVA was based on preserving jobs and tax bases. To take just a couple of examples, in an oral history interview, Swissvale mayor Charles Martoni stated he supported the SVA because he "felt this area couldn't survive unless we retained as many high paying industrial jobs as possible" (Anderson 1991: 7). In newspaper coverage of McKeesport council's vote, council members described their actions as saving Dorothy 6 and National Works and preserving industry and that "the economic heart of this valley is steel" (quoted in Bergholtz 1985b). Thus, what Tri-State tried to persuade municipal officials, and what some of them found convincing, was that they stood to gain in employment and tax revenues by supporting the SVA.

Further, it is worth considering the negative cases here, those municipalities that declined to join the SVA. These municipalities were the borough of West Homestead, the city of Duquesne, and the borough of Wilmerding. Officials in these municipalities had reasons to doubt that their communities were threatened by capital flight: in West Homestead, the abandoned Mesta Machine plant had already been bought and partially re-opened by WHEMCO; in Duquesne, U.S. Steel had promised to open an industrial park in place of Dorothy Six; and in Wilmerding, the Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) still operated a plant that officials thought would remain there (Balcerek 1985). Further, each of these councils included officials who worked in corporate management or with organizations affiliated with Allegheny Conference (Stout 2020: Ch. 21), meaning that they could be more likely to see the value in preserving heavy industry. This pattern suggests that those officials who declined to join the SVA were those who saw little utility in the jobs and tax revenues that it could produce.

Thus, the evidence provides compelling support for a patronage argument. Tri-State promoted the SVA by emphasizing the jobs and tax revenues that it could provide for municipalities, and the municipalities supported it when they were convinced that it could do so.

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The SVA was officially incorporated in January 1986. The SVA lent considerable support to Tri-State's cause. It had the power to use court injunctions to prevent plant closures, and it had the power of eminent domain, which it could use to seize plants and coordinate their sales to third parties or worker-buyouts. After its incorporation, the SVA made bids to purchase parts of other mills as they closed down in the Pittsburgh-area, including LTV's South Side Works, but these

endeavors fell through primarily due to a lack of capital (e.g., Stout 2020: 230). The SVA remains today, though it has shifted its strategy away from buying manufacturing plants and toward averting layoffs and shutdowns (Steel Valley Authority 2020).

The analysis above revealed more about the conditions, limits, and implications of benefactors' cooperation. A social control argument expected the benefactors might cooperate in order to mitigate disruption costs of movement activity, and the analysis found support for this argument on multiple occasions. In 1982, executives at the Nabisco plant decided to avert a shutdown after Tri-State and its allies threatened a boycott of their brand. In 1983, Mellon Bank agreed to unfreeze the assets of Mesta Machine after Tri-State and allies organized a boycott of Mellon Bank. One of these outcomes was especially critical to the formation of the SVA – U.S. Steel's decision to postpone dismantling Dorothy 6. Without this decision, Tri-State would not have had time to canvas municipal governments or have consultants conduct the feasibility studies to persuade officials. The analysis revealed that U.S. Steel executives cooperated with Tri-State because they feared that if it did not comply with the request they would face the same disruption costs that it faced in Chicago: extensive negative publicity, multiple lawsuits, and extensive delays in its plans to demolish its facilities. The analysis suggests that without the threat of these disruptions in Pittsburgh, U.S. Steel could have begun demolishing Dorothy Six sooner and the SVA could not have been incorporated at this juncture.

The study also found support for a patronage argument. Patronage featured prominently with the support of multiple benefactors. For instance, observers argue that USW lent such support as it did to Tri-State's efforts because USW was facing a crisis of union membership (Hathaway 1996: PG), and the utility company Duquesne Light contributed funds for the Dorothy 6 feasibility studies because of the electricity it consumed (Stout 2020: 230). One of

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these outcomes was especially critical for establishing the SVA – nine municipalities' decisions to apply to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the SVA's corporate charter. The analysis suggested that municipal officials supported establishing the SVA when they were convinced that it was an effective means for preserving industry, and thereby jobs and tax revenues, for their boroughs and cities. The amount of patronage that these benefactors could offer was limited, however. Because many of the Mon Valley municipalities were facing financial precarity, they could not provide capital for compensating the owners of mills to be seized with eminent domain. By contrast, the City of Pittsburgh and also Duquesne Light were able to front funds for capital investments at different points, but what they offered was insufficient (Stout 2020: 230). As result, the SVA was designed to draw on the finances of private investors instead, and it was the inability to secure this private investment that sank their efforts at buying out any mills.

6.0 Conclusion

How do movements organizations gain access to resources and power-holders, and what are the consequences of working with powerful benefactors to do so? Movement scholars have documented the extensive and growing involvement of state agencies, philanthropic foundations, and businesses in social movements over the 20th century, and how these power-holders' investments in preserving social order inform their relations with this movements and moderate movement activity (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Haines 1988). I contributed to these debates by elucidating another aspect of benefactors' relationships with movements: the ways in which benefactors may use movements to instrumentally advance their own interests. The patronage argument uncovered key insights in each case study by revealing how powerful benefactors made critical decisions about which movement causes to support, what kind of support to offer, and when to offer it. These insights promise to develop scholars' understanding of the possibilities and limits of movement-benefactor relations, as well as the politics of Pittsburgh's 20th century redevelopment.

6.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation used three empirical case studies to develop both social control and patronage arguments, with each case providing varying degrees of support for each argument. The findings

suggest that threats of disruption and the benefits of patronage were not mutually exclusive but often complementary forces in benefactors' decisions. In some cases, social control and patronage each drew different benefactors to support the same movement cause. In other cases, individual benefactors considered both factors at once in their decision to lend movements' support.

In Chapter 3, I examined the origins of Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS). I found that the urban rebellions of 1968 played a significant role in the organization's foundation. The rebellions moved White city leaders to prioritize the longstanding grievances of the city's Black communities, and this shift in priorities made possible the $125,000 grant from the Scaife Foundation that established the NHS's revolving loan fund. While the rebellions account for this grant, however, they fail to explain why the NHS addressed the grievances specifically through consolidated code enforcement and housing rehabilitation in the Central North Side. These features were best explained by patronage relations that had origins predating the rebellions. The analysis suggested that the mayor's office favored consolidating code enforcement programs because it marked an opportunity to improve the city's workable program for community improvement which would ensure the city's continued access to federal funding for urban redevelopment. The analysis also suggested that the lenders would offer financing and technical expertise as long as they could expect the NHS's efforts to stabilize spiraling property values in the Central North Side. While the Scaife grant provided considerable financial resources, the organization's specific form and function developed through patronage relations between CASH, the mayor's office, and the lenders that began developing as early as 1965. The patronage uncovered argument aims and conditions of benefactors' support that the social control argument left unexamined.

While the NHS enabled some of CASH's constituents to affordably repair and sometimes purchase homes, their benefactors' support was conditional. Their support was limited to those causes that could satisfy workable community improvement programs and also help stabilize spiraling property values in the Central North Side. Consequently, while CASH could get their support for a program like the NHS, these patrons' support would not be available for addressing the many other facets of the housing crisis with which CASH was concerned, including expanding access to public housing, relocation assistance for people displaced by urban redevelopment, and robust tenant protections. In order to address those facets of housing, CASH would have to find other benefactors (which they sometimes did successfully). Further, by strengthening the position of the mayor's office and the lending institutions, the NHS risked entrenching some of the practices and institutions responsible for the proliferation of substandard housing to begin with: the urban redevelopment projects that displaced thousands of residents and discriminatory patterns of lending that lead to White flight and disinvestment.

In chapter 4, I examined the foundation of Wylie-Centre Industries, Inc. (WCI) in 1971. As with the previous chapter, the social control argument proved insightful. In response to the urban rebellions that began sweeping the country in 1965, Alcoa's White executives began developing programs to hire and train unemployed Black workers in urban communities. While this experience explains why Alcoa executives were receptive to UBF's initial canvassing, it does not explain how the two parties, out of all the possibilities of containing the rebellions, arrived at the decision to found an aluminum-nail manufacturing operation. Investigating the patronage argument, I uncovered the plausible material motives of Alcoa's management: they faced a strike from their unionized workforce in the summer of 1968 and that WCI marked an opportunity for Alcoa to lower its labor costs by undercutting the union. This explains why

Alcoa's management offered the UBF nail-making machinery from the Lancaster Works, which could be operated with a small workforce, suggested low wages for WCI employees, and agreed to buy nearly all of WCI's output. While the threats of the rebellions made Alcoa executives receptive to Black grievances, they addressed those grievances in ways that gave Alcoa advantages in its longstanding struggles against organized labor. Thus, the patronage argument again uncovered additional aims and conditions of benefactor support.

Alcoa's patronage enabled UBF to make some gains, but only on certain conditions. It enabled the UBF to provide some of its constituents with employment and training and establish what UBF hoped would be the economic engine to develop the rest of the commercial-industrial complex. From UBF's other canvassing efforts, it seemed that no other benefactors would have been willing and able to provide these kinds of resources. However, this patronage was contingent on WCI's ability to produced aluminum nails more profitably than Lancaster Works had done. This condition entailed limits on what products it could make, the profits it could make, the wages it could offer employees, the number of employees it could hire and train, and its capacity to generate revenue streams that could fund UBF's vision for a broader commercial-industrial complex. Further, because WCI strengthened the power of Alcoa, it entrenched some of the actors who employed racially discriminating hiring practices that deprived Black communities of opportunities for employment and business-ownership.

In the final case, I study examined the foundation of the Steel Valley Authority in 1986. Once again, the social control argument proved insightful. The analysis suggested that U.S. Steel cooperated with Tri-State's requests to postpone dismantling Dorothy 6 because its executives feared a repeat of what they experienced in Chicago: public backlash that tarnished their image and entangled them in legal proceedings for years. While the social control argument

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accounted for U.S. Steel's decision, it left unexplained the support of other benefactors: the City of Pittsburgh and eight cities and boroughs in the Mon Valley. Here, the patronage argument proved insightful. These nine municipalities supported Tri-State's efforts when they were convinced that the eminent domain strategy would be an effective means for preventing or at least mitigating the impact of industrial flight on their communities' employment and tax revenues. The patronage argument was key for explaining the support of the nine municipalities that founded the SVA.

This patronage enabled Tri-State's efforts but only to a certain extent. These nine municipalities applied for a charter with the State of Pennsylvania to create a municipal authority with the power to use eminent domain. The patronage only reached so far, however. As plants closed, tax revenues plummeted and Mon Valley municipalities entered financial hardship that rendered municipal officials unwilling and/or unable to contribute the financial capital that would have been necessary for acquiring industrial facilities through eminent domain. The City of Pittsburgh did offer $200 million for the Dorothy Six buyout in 1985, but this sum alone was insufficient (Stout 2020: 229). As a result, the SVA tried to fund plant buyouts by attracting private investors, but no such investors were willing to finance a buyout of Dorothy Six or other mills that closed in subsequent years (Stout 2020; Hathaway 1996).

6.2. Theoretical Implications

In this section, I elaborate further on the implications of my findings for social movement theory.

6.2.1. Social Control

Each empirical chapter developed and assessed one or more social control arguments. These arguments were consistent with the "hard" social control arguments that I outlined in chapter 2. This argument contends that when movements engage in disruptive practices, such as sit-ins, strikes, or riots, they can provoke a combination of repression and concessions from authorities and related power-holders. Through concessions, these authorities offer the movements access to resources and influence that can appease the movement and also draw it into legitimate political channels that rob them of their most effective tactics (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982; Haines 1988; Luders 2010).

In this dissertation, each case study featured one or more disruptive actions (a rent-strike, urban rebellions, boycotts, negative publicity, and threats of legal action), and the analyses suggested that some of these actions provoked authorities and related power-holders to offer concessions that could at least partially ameliorate the underlying grievances: the urban rebellions prompted the Scaife Foundation to distribute grants to an array of programs aimed at addressing Black communities' longstanding grievances regarding housing, employment, recreation, and education; the urban rebellions also prompted Alcoa's executives to develop employment programs in cities around the country; and the threat of negative publicity and legal action prompted U.S. Steel to comply with Tri-State's requests to postpone dismantling the Dorothy Six blast furnace.

These findings confirm the social control argument and also provide an opportunity to refine it. Two of these case studies offered fine-grained analyses of the urban rebellions and their impacts on certain elements of urban politics. These analyses suggest that these disruptive actions are only the beginning of a multi-stage process that involves an array of authorities and allied power-holders that eventually culminates in concessions: the rebellions first provoked a response from police and the National Guard; the Mayor's office commissioned reports to understand the grievances underlying the rebellions; then, leaders of the Allegheny Conference announced their intention to develop new social programs in Black communities and drew on their philanthropic foundations to bring these programs to fruition. In this way, these studies shed light on the ways in which multiple contextual factors mediate the outcomes of disruptive actions. One of these contextual conditions was patronage. When benefactors and authorities distributed largesse in the wake of crises, their decisions were animated not just by ameliorating grievances but also by opportunities to appropriate resources or alter political equilibria that stood to advance their own pre-existing interests. In this way, social control and patronage operate by different but complementary dynamics.

6.2.2 Patronage

Each of the dissertation's chapters also developed and assessed one or more patronage arguments. As spelled out in chapter 2, this argument contends that benefactors' decisions about whether, how, and to what extent they support movement activity are influenced by the prospects of obtaining concrete benefits that allow them to consolidate their positions of power. Patrons may seek to appropriate resources generated by the movement or to exploit opportunities created

by the movement's emergence into a new arena. Whereas social control efforts aim to inhibit movement activity that benefactors find threatening, patronage aims to encourage movement activity that benefactors find beneficial.

This dissertation allowed me to flesh out the patronage argument with empirical details. Each study included benefactors who engaged in acts of patronage, including the mayor's office, thirteen lending institutions, executives of Alcoa, the City of Pittsburgh, and eight Mon Valley municipalities. The studies included a broad of kinds of benefactors in contrast the narrow focus on philanthropic foundations (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986) or state agencies (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1977) in much existing research. The studies also found many different forms of patronage. Existing research tends to focus primarily on financial support that benefactors offer to movement organizations, especially grants (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Haines 1988; Jenkins and Halcli 1998; Aksartova 2003; Minkoff and Agnone 2010). The studies of my dissertation, though, uncovered a wide variety of possible exchange relationships between patrons and movements: the mayor's office offered consolidated code enforcement programming; lenders offered financing and technical expertise; Alcoa offered fixed capital, human capital, and guaranteed markets; and nine municipalities chartered a municipal authority. This variety of benefactors and support allowed me to expand the variety of patronage arguments that I could test.

The findings also revealed the ways in which the prospects of patronage influenced benefactors' decisions about whether, when, and how to support a movement cause. Patronage influenced benefactors' choices of which groups or causes to support. For instance, in the case of the NHS, CASH sought to address substandard housing through a variety of causes that included expanded tenant protections, expanded access to public housing, and code enforcement. From

among these possibilities, two of the benefactors supported those causes that stood to advance their interests. The mayor's office favored code enforcement, and the lenders favored causes that worked through the rehabilitation of privately owned homes. Patronage also influenced benefactors' decisions about the nature and extent of patronage that they offered. For instance, Alcoa could have supported the UBF's cause in many different ways, such as offering a grant or directing their efforts into the local JOBS (Job Opportunities in the Business Sector) program. Alcoa executives decided, however, to offer those resources that would enable the UBF's constituents to undercut the labor costs of its unionized workforce.

Further, patronage helped explain the timing of some benefactors' support. In all three cases, the benefactors who offered patronage did so in response to a combination of threats and opportunities that made relations with the movement advantageous: Mayor Barr's office chose not to consolidate code enforcement programs until new requirements for federal funding went into effect that could have jeopardize the city's redevelopment efforts; the group of 13 lending institutions were content to disinvest from North Side communities until disinvestment reached a point that threated the survival of their local offices; Alcoa's executives proposed the WCI in the summer of 1968 when they faced a strike by their unionized workforce at Lancaster Works; the nine municipalities of the SVA would not have seen a need for such a municipal authority until the widespread closure of steel mills that supported their communities. Notably, the studies of this dissertation examined only the beginning of these movement-benefactor collaborations. To see whether patronage played a role in their change over time or their demise would require further research.

The case studies also revealed movement groups' agency in securing patronage. In each study, movement groups spent years negotiating with prospective benefactors before they

decided to offer support. For instance, CASH negotiated with the lenders for a year, during which the lenders initially declined to cooperate, before they agreed to resume selective lending activities to the Central North Side. Similarly, in its campaign to create the SVA, Tri-State launched extensive campaigns to build public support and convince borough and city officials that their eminent domain strategy was viable and beneficial. Thus, movement groups played active roles in framing the utility of patronage for benefactors.

Importantly, patronage relations can be racialized. This dynamic is easy to see in the cases of the NHS and WCI. In each case, systemic racism created pockets of disinvestment in Black communities: redlining and White flight created a lack of financial investment in the Central North Side; and discriminatory policies by White-led employers, unions, and banks created a lack employment opportunities and business-ownership in the Hill District. This disinvestment drove community leaders to seek out resources from White benefactors, and it also made the potential exchange relationship more rewarding for White patrons: the lenders could benefit most from homeowners desperate for investment; and Alcoa could benefit most from unemployed people desperate for work. In these cases, and likely others, the terms of the exchange relations are made possible and/or desirable by systems of racial oppression. By the same logic, patronage relations can take on characteristics of gender-based, class-based, and other systems of oppression.

Finally, it is important to note that the patronage relations that I examined concern particular collaborative projects between benefactors and movements, and not necessarily the activity of the entire movement or movement organization. For instance, the terms of Alcoa's patronage certainly imposed constraints on WCI. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the UBF was entirely compromised by or subsumed into this project. The UBF was capable of

initiating other projects with other benefactors. In fact, they drew on the support of the Economic Development Administration to open a convenience store, the Community Mart, in the Hill District as another component of their industrial-commercial complex in the early 1970s (United Black Front 1973). Still, it would require further research to determine whether the Community Mart was also a product of patronage relations and whether and how one patronage relation, whether this one or others, can have implications for a movement's relation with other patrons.

While my dissertation uncovered various acts of patronage, future research would do well to uncover still other forms of patronage within the context of urban politics and other contexts.

6.2.3. Propositions

In this dissertation, I develop the concept and theory of patronage in a preliminary way only. The empirical analyses, however, do allow me to develop six propositions that future research can build on to develop a fuller theory of patronage.

The first two propositions concern structure and variation in patronage relations. Each patronage relation is an attempt to balance the interests of multiple parties. The number of interests involved can vary. A movement organization may seek to secure the support of many patrons, since they can offer the movement access to greater amounts of resources and influence. This approach carries its own risks as a greater number of patrons introduces a greater number of interests that need to be balanced. The number of interests is only one of many features structuring patronage relations. Some interests are more congruent than others. For instance, the interests behind the SVA were relatively congruent. Even though this collaboration secured the support of nine patrons, their interests aligned neatly with those of Tri-State. All of the parties

agreed to pursue a municipal authority because they were all threatened by de-industrialization and its impact on employment and tax revenues in Pittsburgh and the Mon Valley. Because of the convergence between their interests, Tri-State's main challenge in securing the municipalities' support was less about making compromises to balance competing interests than it was about convincing municipal officials that the eminent domain strategy would be an effective means toward this end. The case of WCI presents a stark contrast. In this case, I examined the relation between the UBF and just one benefactor, Alcoa. Although this case featured just two parties, the parties' long-term interests diverged noticeably. The two parties agreed to establish a light-manufacturing operation, but they both used this operation to pursue very different end-goals. For Alcoa, this ultimate end was lowering labor costs by undercutting organized labor. For UBF, this ultimate end was to develop community self-determination through a commercial-residential complex. The ultimate ends were not just divergent, but somewhat antagonistic, as they require the UBF to accept conditions on the WCI's activities that limited its potential. These observations lead to the first proposition:

- *Proposition 1: patronage relations balance a number of interests that may be or less congruent*

The case studies also suggested that different kinds of patrons offer different exchange relations. The case studies feature many benefactors in the public sector, especially city, county and borough governments, and movements sought from them influence over policy, particularly code enforcement and eminent domain, which other kinds of patrons (in the private or non-profit sectors) could not. In exchange for this influence, these patrons sought movements' help in their

ongoing projects of securing tax bases: the City of Pittsburgh, especially the mayor's office, was deeply invested in urban redevelopment projects throughout the years under study, and CASH succeeded in getting the Mayor's office to consolidate code enforcement because it helped fulfill workable program requirements and thereby ensure continued access to federal funding for redevelopment; cities and boroughs in the Mon Valley sought to avoid plummeting tax revenues in the wake of de-industrialization in the early 1980s, and the Tri-State Conference secured their when and to the extent that municipal officials saw in the SVA an effective means toward that end. These cases both found that, at least in the context of 20ᵗʰ century urban politics, public sector patrons were willing to exchange influence over policy for assistance in securing tax bases.

Philanthropic foundations feature heavily in the social movement literature. The case study of the NHS involved the philanthropic Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation that provided the NHS with a $125,000 grant, and I explored both patronage and social control arguments. The analysis failed to find support for the patronage argument. Following Walker's study, I considered whether the trustees of the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation might perceive some link between the NHS and the other projects they were involved in at the time, namely Carnegie Mellon University and Mellon Bank, but the analysis did not substantiate such a connection. Instead, the analysis found support for the social control argument, which suspected that the Scaife foundation's support would follow from the urban rebellions. This chapter and others suggested members of the Allegheny Conference often drew from their members' philanthropic foundations to address widespread social unrest, first in the wake of the urban rebellions and again in the face de-industrialization. Other research, however, provides examples of philanthropic foundations offering movement patronage, such as Walker's study of foundations

in the health care sector or the corporate foundations that lend support to feminist causes in efforts to "gender wash" their parent corporations' brands and products (Walters 2022).

Each of the case studies featured for-profit businesses offering patronage to movements. Businesses have not received the same extensive treatment in the literature as state agencies or philanthropic foundations, except for Luders' in-depth treatment of businesses responding to Civil Rights organizing (2010). In the cases of my dissertation, businesses offered movements access to conventional rate loans, financing for staff, and human and fixed capital. Business offered loans for rehabilitating and purchasing homes and also machinery for WCI. Unsurprisingly, what businesses wanted in exchange for their patronage was assistance in boosting their rates of profit. What is perhaps more surprising is the ways in which movement groups could contribute to this aim. In the case of NHS, CASH's constituents, who had previously been redlined, created opportunities for lenders to extend more conventional-rate loans. In the case of WCI, the UBF's constituents constituted a low-wage and non-union workforce to boost Alcoa's properties. These cases both found that businesses were willing to offer capital, whether financial, physical, or human, in exchange for help boosting their rates of profit. These observations lead to a second proposition.

- *Proposition 2: patrons in different structural locations (e.g., public, private, or non-profit sector) will present movements with different patronage in exchange for different benefits.*

The next two propositions concern the conditions under which patronage facilitates movement gains. A perennial question in social movement research is whether benefactor

support does more to enable movement mobilization or more to co-opt and blunt movement activity. In this dissertation, I do not take up this question directly, as doing so would require me to go far beyond the scope of my analysis. Still, my findings suggest that the outcomes of patronage relations vary considerably, and the analyses also allow me to identify relevant factors that tilt the outcome in one direction or the other.

Movement groups will be able to negotiate favorable terms with patrons when they have bargaining power. One of the factors that shapes bargaining power is the supply and demand of desired resources. Movement groups will have greater leverage to the extent that they can find the resources they desire from a range of different benefactors, or to the extent that they can substitute one kind of desired resources for an easily-available alternative. Conversely, the fewer the benefactors, and the scarcer the substitutes, the less leverage movement groups have. For instance, UBF likely had little leverage with Alcoa in its negotiations before founding WCI. On the one hand, UBF was a new organization starting out with few resources (financial or otherwise) and seeking the human, fixed, and financial capital required start a manufacturing facility. While UBF canvassed corporate executives throughout Pittsburgh only Alcoa's executives were willing to entertain a collaboration. In other words, the resources they sought were scarce. On the other hand, Alcoa's executives had years' worth of experience in developing employment programs in Black communities, suggesting that they could find low-wage laborers in other places if they so desired. In other words, low-wage laborers may have been plentiful. This imbalance gave UBF little bargaining power, and it may explain why UBF accepted the terms that they did even they had no particular animus against organized labor at their inception.

Movements' leverage with patrons can also depend on the patrons' location within the polity. For instance, some patrons occupy the margins of some polity. These are patrons who

have less power and fewer resources those that at the center, but, perhaps for this reason, they may also have greater interests in joining broad coalitions to pursue social change and so their interests may be more convergent with movement groups' than other patrons. For instance, in the case of the SVA, the cities and boroughs of the Mon Valley were marginal relative to the City of Pittsburgh. The Mon Valley municipalities lacked the financial resources, social networks, and relations with the state that the City of Pittsburgh had. As a result, it is less surprising that they supported the Tri-State's efforts, as they had less to lose by rejecting the Allegheny Conference's plans for a post-industrial economy. For movements, the tradeoff with marginal patrons is that they have fewer resources and access to offer. In the case of the SVA, Mon Valley municipalities could help incorporate the SVA, but they could not provide financial capital for the eminent domain strategy. Other patrons occupy central or hegemonic positions within the polity, and while they can offer relatively more resources and access to decision-makers they may have less interest in promoting social change. For instance, Alcoa is an international corporation, one of the largest aluminum producers in the world. While Alcoa's executives had the power to assemble a light manufacturing facility for the UBF at virtually no cost in a couple of years, Alcoa's executives saw little stake in pursuing changes other than those that would undercut their perceived rival, organized labor. As a result, Alcoa's patronage required substantial compromise from the UBF.

Movement groups' bargaining power will be a function of social and cultural factors as well. Movement personnel can gain leverage by building established rapport with authorities and patrons. For instance, CASH's Dorothy Richardson had built a relationship with the mayor's office between 1965 and 1968. Over this period, CASH sometimes agitated for change with protests and sit-ins but also demonstrated that they were willing to work through established

channels, such as assisting the mayor's office implement a rent-withholding program in 1966 (Citizens Against Slum Housing 1966). This relationship likely positioned Richardson as someone who gained the trust of authorities while retaining credibility within her constituents' communities, and authorities could use someone in this position to both articulate her communities' grievances and also assist in implementing programs designed to assuage them. In fact, in the aftermath of the rebellions, reports from the mayor's office listed community leaders that they could work with in developing new programs, and Richardson's name was among them (Ridenour and Rodd 1968). This unique position would grant Richardson some leverage in negotiations with the Mayor's office and other prospective patrons.

Movement leverage may also be hindered or facilitated by culturally established practices that patrons may draw on in their decision-making. For instance, in the U.S., White employers have a long history of using Black workers to break strikes by White workers (e.g., Brown 2000). Alcoa's executives repeated this history when they decided to offer the UBF on terms that would undercut organized labor, and it is possible that they knew of this history and drew on it in making their decisions. Establishing this connection would require further research, however. These observations lead to the third and fourth propositions:

- *Proposition 3: movements can negotiate favorable terms to the extent that they have bargaining power over prospective patrons*

- *Proposition 4: movements' bargaining power is a function of the supply and demand of resources, patrons' location within their polity, social relations, and cultural repertoires.*

Two more propositions can help researchers use the patronage argument to challenge and refine prevailing theory. Researchers have observed that when benefactors support social movements they select certain movement groups from among the broader population. What criteria guide their selection processes? Researchers have suggested that benefactors will select particular movement groups to support, and after observing their goals, rhetoric, tactics, and organizational structure, they will favor those they judge to be more "moderate" than "radical" (e.g., Haines 1988; Jenkins and Halcli 1999; Jenkins 1998). By contrast, the patronage argument suggests that benefactors will also consider the more practical effects of sponsoring a particular cause, and these considerations can even outweigh any of their reservations about a movement's goals or tactics. For instance, prevailing theories would have difficulty explaining why the mayor's office would collaborate with CASH, a movement group willing to resort to pickets and sit-ins, who was not afraid to make powerful enemies, and who publicly threatened to obstruct urban redevelopment projects using civil disobedience. The patronage argument, however, offers an explanation. Despite CASH's rhetoric and tactics, the practical effects of some of their campaigns, at least regarding housing rehabilitation and code enforcement, worked to the advantage of the mayor's office. The case of WCI poses a similar challenge for prevailing theory. The UBF's goals of community self-determination aligned with those goals of Black Power organizations across the country at the time. How would a group like this secure the support of Alcoa's executives? The patronage theory would suggest considering the practical effects of this collaboration, such as its effect on Alcoa's efforts to lower its labor costs. This observation is consistent with the insights of insurgent practice theory, which attributes advantages to the insurgent practices of a movement rather than the social group of which the movement is comprised (Bloom 2015). These observations provide the fifth proposition:

- *Proposition 5: when selecting movement causes to support, benefactors will consider the practical effects of a given cause, and in some cases these anticipated effects can outweigh reservations about a group's tactics, rhetoric, or goals.*

The final proposition concerns professionalization. Researchers have documented that benefactors' support encourages movement organizations to professionalize by adopting formal and bureaucratic structures operated by paid staff. Prevailing theories have posed different explanations for this phenomenon. Proponents of the hard social control argument contend that benefactors encourage professionalization because it channels movement activity into forms that rob it of its most effective tactics (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982). Proponents of the soft social control argument contend that benefactors channel movements in these ways because they have preferences for familiar organizational forms and aversion to movement groups that could cause controversy (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Minkoff and Agnone 2010).

The patronage argument reveals another potential cause for professionalization: professionalization can ensure that the patronage produces the effects desired by benefactors. For instance, the NHS developed a professionalized structure with paid staff, committees, and boards of directors that included representatives of the lending institutions. This professionalized structure would allow patrons, specifically the lenders, to make sure that the grant fund was distributed in ways that could most effectively stabilize property values in the Central North Side. Similarly, Alcoa lent the UBF managerial personnel who would lend various forms of expertise, help organize WCI, and train its future managers, and then withdraw their support after a few years of operation so that WCI could be fully owned and operated by the UBF. By

lending this support, Alcoa's executives could ensure that WCI would most effectively undercut the labor costs at Lancaster Works. These observations lead to a sixth proposition:

- *Proposition 6: patrons encourage professionalization to ensure that continued movement activity produces the outcomes that patrons desire.*

These six propositions can guide future research to develop a fuller patronage theory by comparing cases of patronage, discovering conditions most conducive to movement gains, and challenging and refining prevailing theory.

6.3 Empirical Implications

The results of these studies shed light on not just social movement theory but also on Pittsburgh's 20th century redevelopment. In chapter 1, I presented an empirical puzzle: if so many neighborhood-based organizations emerged in response to redevelopment, and if they succeeded in getting incorporated into larger political structures, why was their power limited to vetoing a small number of redevelopment efforts? I return to this puzzle now. In the light of the case studies, the patronage argument provides partial answers to this question and also prompts further research.

While many factors can blunt neighborhood-based organizations' efforts, one of them can be the constraints of patronage relations. As the studies suggested, patronage relations enabled these organizations by providing them with resources and access that facilitated their efforts, but they also imposed constraints on movement activity by supporting them selectively and by

requiring them to take on additional goals. My case studies suggested that the constraints of patronage relations moderated the NHS and WCI, and it raises questions about other similar cases at the time. If patronage relations are widespread enough, then they could collectively blunt even broad efforts to promote social change.

In 1968, the urban rebellions created an opportunity for long-term, structural change in race relations in Pittsburgh (e.g., Ribiero 2012). White city leaders turned to their attention to the long-standing grievances of the city's Black communities, and they drew on vast resources to develop an array of programs to address housing, employment, recreation, education, healthcare access, and community-police relations in these communities, especially neighborhoods where the rebellions left the biggest impact: Manchester, the Hill District, and Homewood-Brushton. To facilitate these programs, White city leaders turned to Black community leaders in these neighborhoods, many of whom themselves had either formed new organizations or united organizations into new coalitions in the wake of the rebellions. Despite this outpouring of support, however, this opportunity went unrealized (ibid). Many of these programs proved to be short-lived (Gigler 1974), and severe racial inequities persist (e.g., Howell et. al. 2019).

These efforts faced many challenges, and the resources they marshalled were little in the face of the deeply entrenched and wide-reaching systems of racial oppression they sought to address. Still, it did not help matters that patronage relations prevented at least some of these efforts from addressing what Black community leaders saw as the root causes of racial inequities. On CASH's account, the proliferation of substandard housing had roots in a racially discriminating housing authority, a lack of effective code enforcement, redevelopment projects that displaced people without relocation assistance, and exploitative landlords. Because the NHS's patrons were selective in their support for CASH, their efforts were unable to address

these root causes. On the UBF's account, the Hill District suffered from having White outsiders owning and operating many of the community's fundamental institutions, from business to political offices, and the corrective for this was for the Black community to take control of these institutions and have them run by and for Black residents of the Hill District. Because Alcoa's support for the UBF was selective, and based on the prospects of lowering labor costs, it had only a limited capacity to help realize the UBF's vision.

While my analysis examined only these two cases, it raises questions about the many similar collaborative endeavors that emerged in the wake of the rebellions – the Allegheny Conference's minority entrepreneur loan program (Gigler 1974), the conference's other efforts to stimulate Black capitalism (Business Week 1968), or the Business and Jobs Development Corporation's venture in manufacturing electric vehicles with the support of industrial giant Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Ibid.), among others. Efforts like these represent multi-million dollar investments in revitalizing Black communities. What did benefactors expect to gain from these initiatives? Did they act as movement patrons, and if so did the conditions of patronage constrain movements' abilities to address structural and systemic issues at the root of the problem? These are questions for future research.

In the early 1980s, the dawn of de-industrialization lead to a similar crisis and response. As plants closed up and down the Mon Valley, these communities' workers and residents organized and many of them agitated to get power-holders to intervene. Once the discontent reached passed a certain threshold, the Allegheny Conference and its allies began channeling vast resources into efforts to promote post-industrial economic development in these communities. The Allegheny Conference drew on the support of the Ford Foundation to simulate a coalition of community-development corporations called the Mon Valley Initiative (Kane

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1988). The Conference also sponsored business-incubators and job-training programs through the Mon Valley Renaissance, hosted at the California University of Pennsylvania (Mon Valley Renaissance Program 1984). And the Pittsburgh Foundation, which had ties to the Allegheny Conference, provided financial resources for the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee (Hathaway 1996: 143). Despite the outpouring of support, the communities of the Mon Valley have not witnessed anything like a renaissance in the ensuing decades.

The Mon Valley revitalization efforts also faced tremendous obstacles. Still, the findings of my case studies raise the question: did benefactors act as movement patrons here, and if so, did the conditions of their patronage constrain movement efforts? Unfortunately, the case of the SVA cannot answer this question. The Tri-State Conference avoided relations with the Allegheny Conference and, with the exception of the City of Pittsburgh, other potential benefactors that had stakes in a post-industrial economy. Consequently, it remains for future research to investigate the Allegheny Conference's endeavors in the Mon Valley, the conditions of their support, and their impact on any movement outcomes.

On any occasion where powerful benefactors invest substantial resources into movement efforts, but movements seem to benefit little from it, the patronage argument suggests that scholars ask whether the benefactors' support does more to consolidate their own position of power rather than facilitate movement gains.

6.4 Conclusion

Social movement scholars have long asked how the support of powerful benefactors transforms social movement activity. In this dissertation, I contributed to these discussions by developing

the patronage argument and assessing it, alongside prevailing theories, in three empirical case studies. These analyses allowed me to shed light on the politics of Pittsburgh's 20th century redevelopment and also generate six propositions that can guide future research to developing a fuller patronage theory.

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