"Populist Philanthropy": Corruption in Social Assistance and the *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* Program in Valladolid, Yucatán, Mexico

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Bachelor of Philosophy, International and Area Studies, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences, 2024

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

The David C. Frederick Honors College in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2024

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES

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Abstract

Mexico has a long history in innovating poverty alleviation techniques. However, this history is also mired with instances of corruption that have become in ingrained in the Mexican psyche. These perceptions of past corruption have resurfaced with the 2018 election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and the creation of new programs such as the *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* program aimed at combatting youth unemployment. This thesis seeks to add to existing research on perceptions of corruption in Mexico's social assistance system by replicating a recent study as well as providing greater insight into how Mexicans view the JCF by utilizing the list experiment or item-count technique. I conclude that perceptions of political and organizational corruption are consistent with the original study replicated, and that the higher proportion found in this thesis can be attributed to the makeup on the sample studied. Additionally, I conclude that Mexicans view the issue of corruption as deeply ingrained within the system, and that the disorganization of the JCF program reinforce this perception.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Preface

This thesis has certainly been a labor of love. When I enrolled in Pitt in August 2020, I knew I wanted to pursue a Bachelor of Philosophy. As the years rolled by, I put together pieces of what would become this thesis – then senior year hit. I had conducted my research, written drafts, and toiled endlessly over how to read the data. Every step of this way I have asked myself whether this was the right choice. However, every step has been met by amazing people along the way who have guided me back the love that set me on this path.

I would like to thank my mother and father, Elizabeth and Mark Hornak, as well as my siblings Samuel, Rachel, Rebecca, and Mary for their endless well-wishes and inspiration. I grew up in a home full of care and scholarship; I wouldn't be here without you all.

I would also like to thank my friends for their encouragement during the most difficult times of this project and the happiness that shared with me.

I would also like to especially thank the middle school and high school teachers that encouraged my varied academic passions and pushed me to create a niche for myself wherever I land. I have spent the last four years concocting a plan of study and research project that I would've never thought of without every little lesson you shared with me.

I would also like to thank my committee for their years of wisdom and compassion as I have struggled on the road of research. Dr. Scott Morgenstern has guided me these past two years both inside and outside of class and has been an

1.0   Introduction

"But sooner or later [López Obrador] will realize that just one person

cannot save Mexico. Others have tried and failed."

Jorge Ramos

Mexico has a storied history in seeking salvation and betterment. The last two centuries have been characterized by great upheaval toward a more inclusive and more prosperous Mexico. This progress has not been linear, though. As Mexico approached the modern era its economy and international reputation demanded greater attention toward alleviating the most oppressive forms of poverty, and the state responded in kind with repeated innovations in poverty alleviation at immense scale. However, these innovations served a dual role: to subsume Mexicans into the party structure of the reigning *Partido Revolucionario Institutional* (PRI). Access to social assistance became contingent on political and organizational brokerage, and this decades-long history of politicization has shaped how Mexican view social programs today.

This thesis seeks to expand upon existing literature the politicization of welfare benefits and how Mexicans perceive corruption in the allocation of social benefits by asking the question: to what extent do Mexicans view social assistance as corrupt?

First, I present detailed history of how corruption in the Mexican social assistance system developed and how historic instances of corruption have etched themselves into the modern Mexican psyche. Second, I delineate subquestions to consider in answering the above question and specific considerations that the Mexican context necessitate. Next, I present the specific methodology used in collecting data on perceptions of corruption and detail a replication of a 2020 study conducted by Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner. I then present the raw results of the surveys used to collect data and interpret how perceptions have changed and developed under the specific population I studied in Valladolid, Yucatán, Mexico. Finally, I conclude that Mexicans still perceive the larger welfare system as corrupt and disorganized, but do not hold aggressive or highly polarized views on the welfare system, indicating that corruption is viewed as an endemic issue in the Mexican political sphere.

2.0   Literature Review

2.1   Background and History of Mexican Poverty Alleviation

Mexico's history with social assistance dates back to the end of the 1910
Revolution. The postrevolutionary 1917 Constitution included basic assurances to
social protections, which were detailed during the Cárdenas (1936 - 1940) and Ávila
Camacho (1940 – 1946) presidencies to include workplace safety regulations as well
as retirement guarantees, with retirement funds being administered by the
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS).

In the following decades, however, economic growth did not translate to the
development of a robust middle class or upward mobility for rural communities.
IMSS covered only formally employed, private workers and was accessible in
primarily urban areas as a result of Mexican industrial policy, leaving public
workers as well as non-industrial workers largely out of the developmental fold. By
1950, 88.4% of Mexicans fell below the poverty line, and as late as 1970 only 23.1%
of Mexican's were eligible to receive IMSS benefits. The 1959 creation of a public
worker-oriented social security department – the *Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios
Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado* (ISSSTE) – led to more physical health
infrastructure, such as hospitals and smaller health centers, in rural areas.
However, state investments in the predominantly rural South diminished in
comparison to the industrialized North and urban centers.

During this period, the national government did enact agricultural policies in tandem with urban-focused investments, but these policies further entrenched rural areas in poverty. Modernization via Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) – whereby the state restricted imports and invested in capital goods imports to promote domestic production of consumer goods – was largely funded by agricultural exports through the 1940's and 1950's (Overmyer-Velázquez 41). With annual GDP growth hovering at a robust 6%, the federal government subsidized irrigation access to the highest yielding farms, which consequently consolidated agricultural production and led to 69% of agricultural credit coming from private farms as opposed to communal *ejidos* by 1964 (Overmyer-Velázquez 41). Rural emigration skyrockets as urban centers presented better opportunities than the rapidly privatizing countryside (Aspra 1977). The state's agricultural and industrial policies exacerbated existing inequities and placed the economy in a precarious position (Williamson 403).

With Mexico's ISI-induced growth juxtaposed by sustained poverty, opposition against the dominant *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) developed (Williamson 403). Presidents Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) and José López Portillo (1976-1982) sought to undercut opposition calls for poverty alleviation and further bolster PRI support by engaging in "populist philanthropy," whereby the state provided subsidies and benefits that were contingent on PRI support, all to be funded by higher taxes and exporting (Williamson 404). The term "philanthropy" generally illustrates good governance policies whereby the state acts without

expectation of reward for its actions. However, "populist philanthropy" details a shift in the responsibility of social welfare assurances away from the state and toward the party apparatus. Under Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho, for example, social welfare policy was exercised through expanding the government by creating new institutions to facilitate social welfare gains. Under Echeverría and Portillo, however, social policy operated through programs that directed the spending of existing government institutions under the leadership of political appointees. This subtle difference partitions the government and the party, with the government provided the funds and bureaucracy to facilitate poverty alleviation – a seemingly philanthropic endeavor – and the party directing the flow of benefits in such a way that best serves party interest. In other words, "populist philanthropy" characterizes how political goals become a much more overt aspect of social assistance as opposed to past policies that had at least some insulation from the political aims of the ruling party.

To exercise "populist philanthropy," Echeverría and Portillo utilized *La Compañía Nacional de Subsistencia Populares* (*CONASUPO*) to further control food prices for the Benefit of consumers while still keeping agriculture profitable for small farmers (Herrera Tapia 2008; Yunez-Naude 2003), as well as *La Programa de Inversiones Públicas para el Desarrollo Rural* (*PIDER*), *el Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados* (*COPLAMAR*), and *la Sistema Alimentário Mexicano* (*SAM*) to develop infrastructure and increase social service access to rural communities (de Souza Leão 2019).

The expansion of the state apparatus to fulfill "populist philanthropy" ballooned in cost and could not be sustained with tax revenues and depressed export revenues, ultimately hampering the effectiveness of the programs to substantially alleviate poverty (Williamson 404; (Morton 2003). The situation became further untenable as oil prices – which Echeverría and Portillo had used to fill the financing gap of the programs – dropped, leading to Mexico's 1982 sovereign debt default (Aguilar 2019; Kurtz 2002; Uribe Gómez 2011). Cost of living skyrocketed amidst rising inflation, and International Monetary Fund-imposed austerity measures as a result of Mexico's debt default greatly curtailed social spending (Williamson 406). The failure of the PRI to carry out its developmental goals via "populist philanthropy" engender public anger as the consequence of the PRI's politicization of social welfare.

Despite this, politicized social assistance persisted and grew with the belief that truly effective and cost-efficient aid required targeting the poorest. This reorientation first manifested during the Carlos Salinas de Gortari presidency (1988-1994) as the *Programa Nacional Solidaridad*, or *PRONASOL. PRONASOL* represented a shift in the conception of development in Mexico. From the end of the Revolution and through the 1980's, the Mexican state essentially sought to adapt the market to meet goals of worker safety, social security, and poverty alleviation. As shown, Mexico achieved vast GDP growth via ISI, but it came at the expense of rural society and further entrenched poverty. In contrast, *PRONASOL* did not involve price control or competition with producers as *CONASUPO, COPLAMAR,*

PIDER, and *SAM* did (Kurtz 2002), and the program sought to involve beneficiaries in its implementation by creating "Solidarity groups" which would receive resources to increase productive output (Aguilar 2019). *PRONASOL* was the first step toward modern poverty alleviation strategies that effectively *counteract* the market that put rural and deeply impoverished communities at a disadvantage. Furthermore, while *PRONASOL* expanded social service access, it sought to engage people more directly with services. Beyond the food, healthcare, and basic educational focuses on previous programs, *PRONASOL* invested in utilities, greater employment opportunities, and housing (Aguilar 2019).

The combination of *PRONASOL*'s need for localized resources and access, as well as a burgeoning political opposition, caused social welfare politicization to skyrocket under *PRONASOL*. Given the flexibility of *PRONASOL*'s resource allocations to regional and local "Solidarity Groups," local PRI operatives were able to create clientelist relationships with locals where PRONASOL resources were provided on the basis of the community's votes (Alarcón 2003; Kurtz 2002). As one source put it, the program was "run out of the president's private pockets, its beneficiaries … selected on personalistic and partisan grounds, and, most fundamentally … immune from any democratic means of control or accountability" (Dresser 1991 as cited by Overmyer-Velázquez 141). Even though *PRONASOL* ended with the Salinas presidency in 1994, politicization left lasting damage to faith in the allocation of social assistance, as reflected in the 2001 and 2003 National Surveys on Corruption and Good Governance that reflected decreasing yet concerningly high

perceived corruption in the allocation of social programs (*Transparencia Mexicana* 2005).

From 1994 to 2018, Mexican poverty alleviation largely followed one model of aid: Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). CCTs are the most prominent anti-poverty measure instated across developing countries, in particular Latin American nations. The premise is simple: beneficiaries of the program receive a set amount of money that can be spent however they desire so long as they continue to meet certain criteria, such as sending children to school or attending annual health check-ups. Through the 1990's and 2000's, Latin American governments experimented with CCTs, such Peru's *Juntos* program (Grompone 2006), Colombia's *Familias en Acción* (Guzman Gonzalez 2020), Chile's *Ethical Income Family Program* (Arza 2018), and Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* (Bucheli 2014). While it is recognized that CCTs are not a cure-all to existing inequality (Arza 2018; Guzman Gonzalez 2020), these programs have been widely lauded for their effectiveness in supporting health outcomes and empowering women by delivering the transfers directly to them as the heads of households (Barber & Gertler 2009), effective at reducing poverty when targeted to the poorest in a country (Guzman Gonzalez 2020) and, in the case of *Juntos*, increasing trust in state welfare institutions (Camacho 2014).

CCTs began under Salinas' success Ernesto Zedillo (1994 – 2000) as the *Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación,* otherwise known as *Progresa*. The program continued the infrastructure investments from *PRONASOL*, but primarily delivered bimonthly deposits to households so long as children attended school and

regularly visited health clinics (Vaz, Malaeb, & Quinn 2019). Following the 2000

election of PAN President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and the unseating of PRI's

dominance in Mexico's politics, *Progresa* was effectively continued under the name

Oportunidades. The rebrand loosened eligibility requirements and sought to be

more transparent in resource allocation to avoid allegations of corrupt distribution

ala *PRONASOL*, and notably expanded benefits access to urban communities and

developed scholarships for students 22-years-old and younger as well as funded

pensions for those 70-years-old and older (Aguilar 2019; Hevia de la Jara 2009). The

expansion of *Oportunidades* was costly yet effective; the program cost 170.5% the

budget of *Progresa*, but the poverty headcount in Mexico decreased by seven million

over the course of Fox's presidency (Aguilar 2019). *Oportunidades* continued

through 2012 with the PAN presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), along with

another program developed under Fox: *Seguro Popular*, a public health insurance

option for informal workers that enrolled up to 60 million Mexicans and was funded

by both federal and state governments (Sánchez Talanquer 2020).

The 2012 election of PRI president Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) led to

another reorientation of Mexico's social assistance program, with *Oportunidades*

becoming *Prospera*. This iteration of the CCT effectively continued the bulk of

Oportunidades, but notably added greater outreach and marketing that framed the

program as a tool for creating "an equitable and inclusive society" (Aguilar 2019).

Additionally, *Prospera* added a fourth social objective to the previous focuses of

food, health, and educational access: "Vinculación," or connectedness, which meant:

"providing advice, providing information and promoting access of

beneficiary families to programs or actions for productive development,

income generation, training and employment, financial education,

access to savings schemes, life insurance, credits or others that allow

access to complementary goods and services that contribute to the

enjoyment of social rights, through inter-institutional coordination

actions. (Presidencia de la República 2017).

Overall, the 1994 – 2018 dominance of CCTs – once heralded as a solution to

corruption in poverty alleviation as access followed specific criteria – still struggled

against politicization. When asked where benefits from *Oportunidades* came from,

for example, respondents often named "Presidente Vicente Fox" rather than the

bureaucracy or government itself (De la O 2015, 116). Access to the programs also

implicitly required that potential beneficiaries *knew* about the program in the first

place, a barrier in place largely due to sparse internet coverage (Avilés, Larghi, &

Aguayo 2016). In the Yucatán in particular, internet access is among the lowest in

Mexico, with only 12.5% having broadband access and 31.2% reporting any internet

access as of 2020 (Garcia-Mora & Mora-Rivera 2023; "Mexico's" 2020). This

information barrier often frames social organizations brokers of welfare access,

ultimately making social organization support seemingly as important as political

clientelism (Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner 2021).

This politicization is not permanent, but it has lasted as a consistent

hallmark of Mexican social assistance policy. Programs that mitigate economic

vulnerability – as CCTs have been shown to do – can decrease political clientelism by making citizens less reliant on politically-allocated resources (Bobonis et al. 2022; Frey 2019). However, the aforementioned instances of programs being personally linked to politicians and the consistent cycle of rebranding programs with each presidency only further entrenches the perception that poverty alleviation requires corruption, even if benefits access has become fairer.

1: Social Assistance Programs and Institutions, 1943 - 2018

Program / Institution	Advantages & Disadvantages
IMSS (1943 –)	Only covers public workers.
ISSSTE (1959 –)	Only covers private urban workers.
PIDER, COPLAMAR, SAM (1970–73)	Expensive; financed by taxes and oil imports. Vote-buying.
PRONASOL (1988–1994)	Targeted vote-buying. Damaged gov't reputation.
Progresa (1994–2000)	Standardized benefits. Paid female HoH. Poor indigenous access.
Oportunidades (2000–2012)	70% increase in cost. 7M dec. in poverty headcount.
Prospera (2012–2018)	Increased outreach to isolated communities. Organizational brokerage to receive due benefits.

2.2   Social Assistance under Andrés Manuel López Obrador

The 2018 election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, commonly referred to as AMLO, of the left-wing *Movimiento Regeneración Nacional* (*MORENA*) ushered in a new era of Mexico's social policy journey. Sánchez Talanquer 2020 provides a

detailed account of AMLO's personalization of politics and of social policy in particular, but a few themes are necessary to highlight for this thesis. First, AMLO has framed his term in office as a radical departure from both the decades of PRI dominance and Mexico's endemic corruption. He declares his term as the "Fourth Transformation" of Mexico after the War of Independence (1810-1821), the Reform War (1856-1861) and the Revolution (1910-1917) (Fuentes 2018). He is consistently "Evoking classical republican tropes, […] such [..] as […] wide-spread corruption, moral decline, and elite domination disguised in democratic trappings" (Sánchez Talanquer 2020).

Second, AMLO ended almost a quarter century of CCTs in 2018. In addition to replacing *Seguro Popular* with a similar rebranded program – *INSABI* – that lacked transparency in how funds are allocated, Sánchez Talanquer 2020 explains how AMLO's reforms have at best been expensive rebrands of existing programs, and at worst ill-designed and ineffective at alleviating poverty:

> "Thoroughly evaluated and successful programs, most notably the conditional cash transfer program *Oportunidades-Prospera,* have now been scrapped. By the end of 2018, *Prospera* benefited some 25 million low-income citizens in 6 million households. The program was internationally considered a model of evidence-based, non-clientelistic antipoverty policy and had inspired the adoption of CCTs throughout the world. Although former beneficiaries may have been absorbed under AMLO's scholarship programs, benefits have been reduced, are

limited to one child per family, and the requirement of periodic visits

to health clinics that had yielded improvements in children's health

has now been dropped."

In the wake of Mexico's CCT legacy AMLO has created new programs to

challenge poverty. Of particular focus to this thesis is *Jóvenes Construyendo el*

Futuro (JCF), which reportedly covers 2.9 million Mexicans ("Capacitate" 2024).

According to a 2021 report of the program, the JCF seeks to rectify the problem of

"2.3 million young people between 18 and 29 years old who do not study or work and

who primarily live in municipalities of high and very high marginalization, with

high rates of violence or who belong to groups historically discriminated against do

not have opportunities to develop productive activities" (Jóvenes 2021, 9). The

report finds that as of 2018, roughly four million Mexicans meet the program's

eligibility requirements, with the state of Yucatán near the median among the 32

states at 93,569 potential beneficiaries (Jóvenes 2021, 38). Beneficiaries of the

program would register as an apprentice for one year with a partnering private

business in their community and receive a monthly stipend funded by the

government. At the onset of the program the stipend amounted to $3,600MX per

month, and has increased since its inception to $7,572MX as of the publishing of

this thesis (Jóvenes 2021, 8; "Capacítate" 2024).

The JCF draws some inspiration from popular contemporary rhetoric

surrounding young people in Mexico. A dominant narrative is that young people

that do not study or have a job – who are referred to as "NiNis," meaning "ni

trabajan no estudian" – are vulnerable to organized crime and are a threat to Mexico's values. These young people often become disillusioned with both employment and education due to the difficulty of accessing public universities and the social undesirability of low-wage work (Sánchez-Soto & León 2020), leaving them vulnerable to manipulation by criminal organizations (Santiago, Prats, & Hernandez 2021). In 2019, 80% of Mexicans rated "NiNis" as a very grave problem, and 59% believed that young people would choose organized crime because it is easier to be a delinquent, as opposed to 37% who said young people would choose crime due to lack of opportunity (de las Heras 2019). This anti-youth narrative has been advanced by AMLO as well, stating "it is a thousand times better to have young people in school than to have them in the streets" ("Presidente" 2019). In response to the "NiNi" problem in Mexico, AMLO has advanced programs such as the JCF as a solution, with "the money to cover these social programs [coming] from ending corruption, a scourge that [AMLO] called on to combat for moral reasons 'but also because all the money was going down the drain of corruption'" (Presidente 2019). The anti-corruption message is especially clear as it pertains to the JCF: the government website for the program details at the bottom "This program is public [and] unrelated to any political party. Use for purposes other than those established in the Program is prohibited" ("Capacítate" 2024).

However, AMLO's dramatic course shift in social assistance has struggled to grasp the sheer scale of poverty in Mexico. The unfortunate timing in ending established programs immediately before the COVID-19 Pandemic greatly

hampered the government's ability to reach impoverished people, with the newest

programs lacking established eligibility criteria or partnerships with local education

and health centers as late as 2022 and the extreme poverty headcount increasing

from 8.7 million in 2018 to 10.8 million by 2020 (Knaul et al. 2023). The pandemic

also drowned out many potential employment outcomes: pandemic-related

unemployment increases outpaced any increase in youth employment as a result of

the JCF (Ugalde, Zamaro, & Castillo 2022). Additionally, an independent audit of

the JCF found that numerous businesses registered with the program did not

actually exist, and many beneficiaries registered as apprentices were false identities

(Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad 2019 as cited in Sánchez

Talanquer 2020).

3.0   Research Question

The history of Mexico's poverty alleviation strategies details a constant struggle against the politicization of resource allocation and the seeming inevitability of social welfare programs being used to entrench the power of elected officials. Programs change names, change criteria, and change entire bureaucracies; with each change comes new corrupt practices. Mexicans notice this and register their views of programs as linked to the personalities of elected officials and political parties and apply perceived past instances of corrupt allocation to contemporary programs. AMLO's presidency has ushered in an entirely new era and bureaucracy of social assistance with the same rhetorical trappings of "populist philanthropy," as well as similar struggles in allocating resources with suitable eligibility criteria. Furthermore, the unprecedented economic impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic greatly limited potential benefits of AMLO's welfare reforms and drawing further scrutiny toward these programs. Overall, the way Mexicans perceive social assistance at-large and the JCF is likely shaped by both historical and contemporary factors.

This thesis seeks to answer the question: to what extent do Mexicans view social assistance and the JCF as corrupt? To adjudicate the answer more fully, a few considerations are necessary as well. First, terms such as "corruption" and "politicization" may imply different practices between individuals, and particularly between a foreign research perspective and native experiences. As such, while certain historic practices of corruption, such as political or organizational brokerage,

will be tested, interview and survey questions must be designed so that respondents can express the potential unwritten rules or extralegal practices they may or may not view as endemic to the social assistance system. Instead of directly asking respondents whether programs are corrupt or politicized directly, the research design must investigate how Mexicans understand their ability to take part in the social assistance system and if Mexicans view their situation negatively, neutrally, or positively. Thus, the methodology must avoid using charged terms such as "corrupt," "politicized," or "populist" to avoid cornering respondents into a specific perspective they must either disagree or agree with and instead allow respondents to express their opinions of the social assistance system more fully. When analyzing the opinions given by respondents, perceptions of corruption will be meant to illustrate that respondents believe extralegal practices are necessary to receive benefits, which may include but are not limited to political and organizational brokerage.

Second, demographics may explain perceptions of corruption. It is well-documented in Mexico that women are perceived to be more concerned with social welfare issues; however, experimental evidence does not necessarily prove that women *are* more concerned with social welfare issues (Kerevel & Atkeson 2015). Additionally, the poor, the least educated, women, and workers show diminished political participation in Mexico (Klesner 2009); participating less may mean that these groups have fewer experiences with possible instances of corruption or clientelism and would thus not rate perceptions of such issues. AMLO's populist

politics have also prompted the use of social media to subvert traditional media outlets and push social policies "directly to the people," which may mean that the avenues through which respondents learn about available programs may affect their trust in the system (Dussauge-Lagune 2022). As such, the thesis also seeks to investigate how a person's identity may relate to their perceptions of corruption in welfare.

Third, this topic deals with potentially embarrassing or taboo topics such as someone's personal affiliation with corrupt practices. Between 2014 and 2018, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) found that the percentage of respondents in Mexico who said that they knew someone who was offered a benefit in exchange for their vote rose from 22.7% to 28.4%. Additionally, when asked instead if they were personally offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, only 17.2% answered yes in 2018 – a difference of 11.2% from the more indirect phrasing of the question that year (*Mexico's Response*). This difference may be due to social desirability bias – respondents being reticent to agree to socially undesirable behaviors, such as engaging in corrupt practices to receive welfare – which tends to be present in surveys of political engagement (Garay, Palmer-Rubin, Poertner 2020). Therefore, the methods of data collection in this thesis must consider how potential research subjects may view these behaviors, and how that may affect their reported perceptions during data collection.

2: Reported Brokerage in Mexico, 2014 & 2018

% of Mexicans offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, 2014 & 2018

■ 2014 ■ 2018

Know someone offered
- 2014: 22.70%
- 2018: 28.40%

Themselves offered
- 2014: 15.10%
- 2018: 17.10%

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00%

4.0   Methodology

Data collection was divided into two components: opinion surveys and oral interviews. 286 opinion surveys were administered to university students in Valladolid at Centro Universitario de Valladolid (CUV), Universidad de Oriente (UO), and Universidad de Valladolid Yucatán (UVY). Surveys were administered via paper and pencil with no time limit. The survey contained 24 questions: 14 questions collect demographic information, five questions ask respondents their agreement level with statements concerning social assistance, two questions concerning how people gain their information about social assistance programs in general and for the JCF in particular, and two list experiments, which are explained in detail below. While 16 questions were asked to help contextualize the results of the opinion surveys and list experiments, only three were varied enough to conduct meaningful analysis of demographic effect: gender, income, and welfare information source.

Of these three demographics used for analysis, a few difficulties presented during data collection. While respondents were asked to self-report their income using provided income brackets, these brackets in increments of $5,000MX/month proved to be difficult to analyze given the concentration of responses into only a few income brackets, and respondents shared verbally during survey collection that they were unsure of the exact amounts they earned in pesos or that their monthly incomes varied between increments. Therefore, a secondary income question asking respondents to list how many household items from a given list was used. This

question is modeled off of question five of an *Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática* (INEGI) survey: the 2022 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (INEGI 2022). Eight household items were selected for testing to ensure each subgroup had an effective sample size for analysis. Additionally, Respondents were asked to choose from a provided list what sources from which they learn about government programs. Respondents were provided the following options: social media, government publications, campaign publications, non-governmental organization publications, family or friends, television or radio, newspapers, or other sources, which they were asked to list. Only categories where 25% or more respondents answered affirmatively were used for analysis in order to analyze sufficiently large sample sizes, which only included social media, government publications, and family or friends.

While the initial plan was the administer surveys to the general public of Valladolid, the choice was made to focus solely on university students for ease of data collection as well as focusing on a group that cannot access the JCF due to their school enrollment. Because these respondents do not have access to the program, social desirability bias may be controlled because they will not feel the same pressures to respond positively to protect their benefits access. Additionally, this age group is unique in Mexican history: they are the first generation to enter adulthood without tangible experience under the single-party PRI rule of the twentieth century where historic examples of political and organizational brokerage have been identified. If this group rates sufficiently large perceptions of corruption,

it will imply that historic precedent has shaped how social assistance is discussed and framed within Mexican political society.

In order to address the concern of social desirability further, the primary tool to measure perceptions is a list experiment, otherwise known as the item-count technique of data collection in replication of the experiment conducted by Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner 2020. The list experiment works as follows: participants are randomly assigned into a control and experimental group. Respondents were then asked "Below is a list of actions or conditions that some people consider necessary to receive any type of welfare. In your opinion, HOW MANY of these actions or conditions are necessary to receive any type of social assistance?" In the control group, respondents were given three options to choose from. In the experimental group, the three control options are present with an additional fourth option of experimental interest. Table 1.1 illustrates the choices for the control group and the two experimental groups of interest, with slight change in language for clarity from the Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner 2020 experiment. The power of a list experiment lies in the anonymity of the response: if respondents view their answer as socially unacceptable, they may choose to not respond truthfully.

Table 1: Options for List Experiment

Control Group	Electoral Treatment	Organizational Treatment
1. Submit an application	1. Submit an application	1. Submit an application
2. Be an elected politician.	2. Be an elected politician.	2. Be an elected politician.
3. Have no criminal record.	3. Have no criminal record.	3. Have no criminal record.
	4. Support a political party.	4. Be supported by a social organization.

The control options are designed such that one is expected to be seen as necessary (submitting an application) and one is not expected to be seen as necessary (Being an elected politician). By formulating the question this way, answering "0" or "3" in the control group is unlikely. This in turn means respondents in the experimental group will be unlikely to respond "0," which would confirm they do not believe the experimental option is necessary, or "4," which would confirm that they do believe it is necessary. Because either option essentially undoes the anonymity of the list experiment, controlling for these "floor" and "ceiling" effects is necessary for the list experiment to remain valid. A further discussion of the viability of this type of list experiment in this context can be found in Garay Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner 2020.

Two list experiments were developed: one asking respondents about any type of social assistance, and a second asking respondents specifically about the JCF. For the general experiment, 89 control responses, 89 electoral group responses, and 87 organizational group responses were collected. In the JCF-specific experiment, 80 control responses, 81 electoral group responses, and 76 organizational group responses were collected. Respondents were randomly allocated into each group,

with the paper surveys being shuffled and handed out among classrooms of students. The decrease in JCF-specific experiment group sizes is due to a screener question in the survey that asked respondents if they are familiar with the JCF program; those who answered negatively were instructed to not answer further and any erroneous responses to the list experiment were removed.

Because there is no way of telling exactly which respondents answered the experimental choice affirmatively, the `kict` STATA package developed by Tsai 2019 was used to analyze the data. Essentially, a difference-in-means estimate is made between the control and experimental groups. Each group's mean response is interpreted as the average amount of the given items that respondents in that group believe are necessary to receive benefits. If the experimental option were to be perceived as necessary by everyone, and answers to control questions are not affected by the presence of the experimental option – a design effect that the package can test for – one would expect that the mean of the experimental group would be one greater than the control group. Furthermore, if the group means are identical, this result can be interpreted as the experimental option bot being seen as necessary by anyone. Holbrook & Krosnick 2010 detail how this difference-in-means estimate is identical to a linear regression of multiple variables as follows:

$$Y_i = \gamma_a + \gamma_b X_i + T_i(\delta_a + \delta_b X_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $\gamma_a + \gamma_b X_i$ details the expected value of listed items given variable X_i in the control group, and $(\delta_a + \delta_b X_i)$ details the probability that someone responded affirmatively to the experimental option given variable X_i in each treatment group

($T_i = 0$ if they are in the control group, $T_i = 1$ if they are in the experimental group).

Without the variables X_i – which measure the effect gender, education, income, and answers to the opinion questions in the below analysis – this regression simplifies to:

$$Y_i = \gamma_a + T_i\delta_a + \varepsilon_i$$

Where γ_a details the amount of control options chosen and δ_a details the proportion of those in the experimental group that answered the experimental option affirmatively. Because the multivariate variety of this regression may produce nonsensible values such as a negative proportion of respondents agreeing with the experimental option, a nonlinear version is developed as well according to Imai 2011. For the purposes of this thesis, it is not important to detail this nonlinear regression in depth.

However, it is important to emphasize a few key assumptions of this model. First, the model assumes that respondents do not lie about their answers. While there is no way to statistically test this, the purpose of the list experiment is to provide respondents more anonymity than the already-anonymous survey provides which should prevent potential biases. Second, the allocation of respondents into the experimental and control groups must be sufficiently random. While this is not much an issue with the basic single-variable regression this problem can manifest within the other variables. To test for randomization, gender, educational attainment, income, and the answers to the opinion questions were tested against the group variable via a chi-squared analysis to test for randomization. All variables

were sufficiently random with the exception of gender in the electoral group. As such, gender cannot be used in the electoral group list experiments; however, all other variables fit the treatment randomization assumption.

Third, the answers to the control items should not change based on the presence of the experimental option, a design effect. Blair & Imai 2012 create a test for design effect. It is expected that any combination of control and experimental item counts is sensibly probable; in other words, there is a non-zero chance that a respondent chose one, two, or three of the control items and/or/ the experimental option. If the probability of any combination is negative, this implies that the presence of the experimental option changed how respondents answered the control items. Tables 5 through 8 present the results of each the general and JCF-specific list experiments for both the electoral and organizational groups. Because every coefficient is positive, the no design affect assumption holds and the list experiments remain valid for analysis.

Five opinion questions were also formulated, with three focusing on "negative" statements and two focusing on "positive" statements as measured on a Likert scale; respondents chose either strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree for each statement. While these questions present their own opportunities for analysis, they also act as stand-ins for directly asking people the sensitive experimental items. It is expected that if someone were to affirm that political or organization support is necessary for benefit access, they will also register negative views of the welfare system in Mexico.

Oral interviews were collected to further contextualize the results of the opinion questions and list experiments. Three interviews were conducted with various Yucatán state officials, two with local social organization activists in Valladolid, one with a program "tutor" – a business owner that hires JCF beneficiaries—and one with a JCF beneficiary working at this tutor's business. Their identities are withheld for anonymity.

5.0   Results & Analysis

5.1   Opinion Survey Results

Table 2: Opinion Survey Results

Opinion Questions	Agreement Level					Mean	Std. Dev.
	Strongly Disagree	**Disagree**	**Neutral**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**		
"Welfare users are lazy."	72	87	110	14	2	-.747	.915
Welfare programs are useless."	110	115	46	9	6	-1.098	.924
"Welfare programs are accessible.	16	42	110	93	23	.229	.988
"People lie in order to receive benefits."	26	28	125	67	40	.234	1.098
"Welfare programs promote social development."	14	27	118	91	34	.366	.98

Table 2 details the raw results of each opinion question. These general results indicate a faith in the goals and intention of programs and a notable lack of polarization. Respondents generally disagree with the first two negative statements, believing that those who receive benefits are not lazy and that the programs are not inherently useless. Additionally, respondents generally agree that programs are accessible and that they promote social development. The most unexpected result given this interpretation is that respondents also believe that people tend to lie to receive benefits. Taken together, though, the results sketch a

portrait of citizens who believe the programs are available if desired, and the problems they seek to solve are real issues that are crucial for handling in order to promote development. While there are people who abuse the system, it is overall well-intentioned.

Additionally, these inflammatory statements do not detail as polarized views as expected from such a politicized history of poverty alleviation and "populist philanthropy." Each question was dominated by neutral results, and every question's average response was well within two standard deviations of the neutral category. As such, the null hypothesis that people do not hold polarized opinions cannot be rejected. This indicates that those surveyed do not feel strongly either way and are not aroused to defend a particular worldview; there are advantages and disadvantages to the current welfare system, but the nothing about the existing system is an urgent problem.

When broken down by gender, income, and information source, most relationships are insignificant with some exceptions. For question five, gender is significantly related to responses, with men providing fewer neutral responses than suggested and registering both greater levels of disagreement and agreement – in other words, more polarized opinions – and women providing much more neutral responses.

Additionally, question five's responses are significantly related to how respondents learn about programs. Those who learn about programs via friends or family responded with more agreement than expected from a random distribution.

Overall, these responses detail that polarization is most likely to manifest in the fifth question on social development. As discussed previously, women are often disengaged from political engagement relative to men in Mexico and may explain the higher neutrality across gender lines. Additionally, beneficiaries with positive experiences with the welfare system may be more willing to share their experiences with others, hence those learning about programs from friends and families rating more positive opinions on the social development potential of the welfare system.

5.2   List Experiment Results

Tables 3 and 4 detail the raw results of the general list experiment and JCF-specific list experiment, respectively. For the general list experiment, 1.64 control items were selected as necessary to receive benefits as compared to 2.01 and 2.11 for the electoral groups and organizational groups respectively. The difference in the group means reveals that 37% of respondents view political party support and 47% of respondents view organizational support as necessary to receive any type of government benefits.

Additionally, the JCF list experiment found that 1.64 control items were chosen as compared to the 1.96 and 1.93 items chosen as necessary to receive JCF benefits in the electoral and organizational groups respectively. This implies that 35% and 32% of respondents view political support or organizational support respectively as necessary to become a JCF beneficiary. All four proportions are

statistically significant to the 5% level, and we can reasonably reject the null

hypothesis that respondents do not view benefits as contingent on corrupt practices.

Table 3: General List Experiment Summary

List Experiment	Experimental Groups						
	Control	Prop.	Electoral	Prop.	Organizational	Prop.	Total
0	11	12.36%	7	7.87%	5	5.75%	23
1	28	31.46%	18	20.22%	18	20.69%	64
2	32	35.96%	43	48.31%	35	40.23%	110
3	18	20.22%	9	10.11%	20	22.99%	47
4			12	13.48%	9	10.34%	21
Total	89		89		87		265
Avg.	1.64		2.01		2.11		
s^2	0.8920		0.9617		0.8218		
Estimated Frequency			**37.1%*** **(0.014)**		**47.4%*** **(0.001)**		

Table 4: JCF List Experiment Summary

List Experiment	Experimental Groups						
	Control	Prop.	Electoral	Prop.	Organizational	Prop.	Total
0	9	11.25%	4	4.94%	2	2.63%	15
1	25	31.25%	23	28.40%	23	30.26%	71
2	34	42.5%	36	44.44%	33	43.42%	103
3	12	15%	8	9.88%	14	18.42%	34
4			10	12.35%	4	5.26%	14
Total	80		81		76		237
Avg.	1.61		1.96		1.93		
s^2	0.654		0.821		0.544		
Estimated Frequency			**35.0%*** **(0.020)**		**32.2%*** **(0.023)**		

These results outpace those found in the Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poernter 2020 experiment, which found roughly 20% to 25% of respondents viewed benefits this way, which suggests that the sample studied may have more polarized views.

The decrease in reported perceptions of corruption from the general to JCF-specific list experiments also indicates that the JCF is not the sole source for perceptions of corruption. Given the young age of nearly every respondent who do not have first-hand experience dealing with potential corruption under past welfare systems suggests that the history of corruption is relatively well-known and frames the culture of welfare in Mexico. These results leave ample room for respondents who affirmed corrupt practices are necessary in general, but not for the JCF, indicating an overall distrust in the system.

The difference in demographics surveyed between this survey and the original study may explain this difference, as the original was much more varied across geographic region and demographic makeup. Because this survey largely focused on 18- to 24-year-olds in university education, respondent age and university education may have played an outsize role in these proportions that cannot be tested from the collected data alone. For example, the Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner 2020 found that younger participants were more likely to register affirmative answers to the experimental options as compared to older respondents. Additionally, for the organizational general list experiment, a higher proportion of high education respondents viewed organizational support as necessary as compared to the overall list experiment, which further explains such a high proportion found in this survey.

The proportion that views social assistance as contingent on corrupt practices is broad-based as well. Tables 9 through 20 detail a nonlinear regression between all four list experiments and: income, gender, agreement to the statement "welfare programs promote social development," and those who use social media, government publications, or friends and family to learn about welfare programs. None of these regressions produce even remotely significant results, indicating that none of these demarcations can predict if a respondent views the system as corrupt or reliant on clientelist practices. This result is particularly interesting given the poorly intersectional history of welfare allocation in Mexico, where we would expect particularly men and women to have different views on social assistance. Additionally, a respondent's belief in the ability of the welfare system to create positive development in Mexico plays no role in determining their perceptions of corruption. Furthermore, how respondents learn about the programs does not affect their perceptions of corruption. Overall, perceptions of corruption effectively permeate all levels of Mexican society surveyed.

This broad-based view of corruption likely comes from the government's inability to curtail manipulative practices by businesses as well as historical distrust in the welfare system. When asked why some programs are currently underutilized, a local social organization activist stated that:

"[…] companies tell the young people not to come to work and then only give you half of your salary, and this does not generate trust. Both in companies that say that there are young people who do not want to

work, or the young people do not trust them because they say the

companies only want to take our money, or the companies do accept us

but do not respect the guidelines, or if we complain it looks bad on us.

And this is what causes this question of "I don't know whether to trust

them or not." I would say there is a little less credibility to some

actions that the Government does."

This activist further noted that under past administrations, government entities

would partner with social organizations to help connect potential beneficiaries to

resources, but the discontinuation of programs with AMLO's election significantly

curtailed their ability to conduct community outreach. Taken in tandem, these

statements explain how past experiences with social organizations may explain the

notably high level of perceived organizational brokerage because under past

administrations that was a primary avenue to access many programs, particularly

in the Yucatán where internet access is marginal at best. Additionally, the lack of

regulations in JCF stipend allocations allow for businesses to manipulate

beneficiaries. As such, Mexicans are familiar with past instances of welfare

brokerage, and the sudden end to traditional programs and their replacement with

a disorganized program only reinforce these perceptions that one has to know the

right people in order to substantively take part in the program.

In discussions with both a program beneficiary and business partner that

"tutors" recipients, these view of manipulative business owners emerged with a

particular focus on the lack of protections for beneficiaries. When both were asked

how corruption may manifest in the JCF, both noted that they've personally heard of other businesses manipulating beneficiaries to give some of their money to the business owners. When asked about workplace protections for beneficiaries, the business owner detailed how they allow one beneficiary to work another job on weekends – explicitly disallowed while enrolled in the program – and was very lenient with another beneficiary's sick day requests. These instances further reinforce the lack of regulations in how beneficiaries operate as employees and give business owners significant leeway in deciding the future of beneficiaries in the program. Additionally, the program beneficiary noted that when their stipend was delayed due to an administrative error, they did not receive substantial help until the business owner called to help rectify the issue. They also reported that in their own discussions online with other JCF beneficiaries, administrators do not seem to act until the businesses get involved. Overall, businesses seem to have significant pull over how beneficiaries actually participate in the program and effectively disempowering beneficiaries. Because of the minimal regulations surrounding the program, potential participants may be reticent to trust the program.

The disorganized nature of the JCF's allocations and enforcement are easily linked to disorganization at the hands of the AMLO-era reforms. Another activist stated that "this happened because our government systems seem to have this perspective of politics. They give but they are not interested in whether what they are giving is really generating an objective or is meeting the objectives as such, right?" With the relatively neutral opinions found in the direct opinion survey and

the list experiment results, it is clear that Mexicans view this type of political and organizational brokerage as endemic to the system in which they live; it is not necessarily good or necessarily bad, it is just part of the system. The survey results indicate that. Mexicans do see problems with the system and are willing to be critical, but they also recognize that these problems have deep historical roots that will not be wiped away easily.

6.0 Discussion & Conclusion

Mexico's history is rife with examples of poverty alleviation strategies falling into politicization and eventually becoming corrupt tools in maintaining partisan power. Despite this, these programs have consistently emerged as novel and well-intentioned tools at substantively helping the least advantaged advance in society and helping Mexico advance as a whole. In the face of – or, perhaps, in emulation of – this history, Andrés Manuel López Obrador's government has drastically reformed the welfare system in Mexico to tackle what is described as a dire threat to contemporary Mexico: unemployed and uneducated young people. Recent studies have sought to understand broadly how Mexico's recent democratization and particularly how AMLO's presidency have changed and challenged this history of corruption. This thesis seeks to advance this discussion further by replicating a 2020 study conducted by Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner as well as specifically measuring how young people in Mexico view the *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* program. Utilizing surveys and oral interviews, the Garay, Palmer-Rubin, & Poertner results were successfully replicated, and greater depth was provided to the discussion on clientelism in modern Mexico. Mexicans view the social assistance system as well-intentioned and aimed at the correct goals and least advantaged in society; however, the system and the JCF in particular cannot escape the framing of corruption. These perceptions are further reinforced by the disorganization of the JCF in its quick rollout and the chaotic nature of the COVID-19 Pandemic era.

Mexicans are not polarized or militant in their opinions; instead, they are frank and frustrated.

This topic and particularly this method of data collection deserve greater emphasis in future research. The list experiment is a novel technique to ascertain perceptions of taboo topics such as corruption. However, this study would have been greatly aided by the addition of other list experiment techniques such as the dual-list and partial-item-count techniques noted in Tsai 2019. This thesis departed from past research on corruption perceptions by greatly focusing on the university student population. Because this population does not have the same personal experiences with past corruption and are the first generation to entirely come of age under a multiparty Mexico, this demographic is important to further understand in the quest toward fostering trust in the government's poverty alleviation tactics and developing programs that substantively protect the dignity of impoverished Mexicans while bringing them out of poverty.

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Appendix A: Design Effect Tests

Table 5: Design Effect Test of the General L.E.; Electoral

	Coefficient	Robust SE	z-score	Prob.>z
Pr(R=0,S=1)	0.045	0.045	0.997	0.841
Pr(R=0,S=0)	0.079	0.029	2.756	0.997
Pr(R=1,S=1)	0.157	0.071	2.217	0.987
Pr(R=1,S=0)	0.157	0.059	2.664	0.996
Pr(R=2,S=1)	0.034	0.062	0.544	0.707
Pr(R=2,S=0)	0.326	0.069	4.707	1.000
Pr(R=3,S=1)	0.135	0.036	3.724	1.000
Pr(R=3,S=0)	0.067	0.056	1.206	0.886

Table 6: Design Effect Test of the JCF L.E.; Electoral

	Coefficient	Robust SE	z-score	Prob.>z
Pr(R=0,S=1)	0.063	0.043	1.476	0.930
Pr(R=0,S=0)	0.049	0.024	2.051	0.980
Pr(R=1,S=1)	0.092	0.076	1.204	0.886
Pr(R=1,S=0)	0.221	0.063	3.495	1.000
Pr(R=2,S=1)	0.072	0.061	1.183	0.882
Pr(R=2,S=0)	0.353	0.072	4.898	1.000
Pr(R=3,S=1)	0.123	0.037	3.378	1.000
Pr(R=3,S=0)	0.027	0.054	0.490	0.688

Table 7: Design Effect Test of the General L.E.; Organizational

	Coefficient	Robust SE	z-score	Prob.>z
Pr(R=0,S=1)	0.066	0.043	1.542	0.938
Pr(R=0,S=0)	0.057	0.025	2.303	0.989
Pr(R=1,S=1)	0.174	0.071	2.458	0.993
Pr(R=1,S=0)	0.141	0.059	2.396	0.992
Pr(R=2,S=1)	0.131	0.066	1.984	0.976
Pr(R=2,S=0)	0.228	0.073	3.132	0.999
Pr(R=3,S=1)	0.103	0.033	3.168	0.999
Pr(R=3,S=0)	0.099	0.054	1.841	0.967

Table 8: Design Effect Test of the JCF L.E.; Organizational

	Coefficient	Robust SE	z-score	Prob.>z
Pr(R=0,S=1)	0.086	0.040	2.165	0.985
Pr(R=0,S=0)	0.026	0.018	1.433	0.924
Pr(R=1,S=1)	0.096	0.077	1.244	0.893
Pr(R=1,S=0)	0.216	0.064	3.359	1.000
Pr(R=2,S=1)	0.087	0.063	1.378	0.916
Pr(R=2,S=0)	0.338	0.074	4.588	1.000
Pr(R=3,S=1)	0.053	0.026	2.055	0.980
Pr(R=3,S=0)	0.097	0.047	2.053	0.980

Appendix B: List Experiment Regressions

Table 9: General List Experiment (Electoral) Income & Opinion Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
High Income	6.470	15.387	0.420	0.674	-23.688	36.629
Belief in Social Dev. Potential	-1.266	1.425	-0.890	0.374	-4.059	1.526
Constant	-5.741	15.450	-0.370	0.710	-36.023	24.541

Table 10: JCF List Experiment (Electoral) Income & Opinion Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
High Income	7.86	7.62	1.03	0.302	-7.07	22.8
Belief in Social Dev. Potential	-2.06	2.55	-0.850	0.398	-6.85	2.72
Constant	-6.01	5.85	-1.03	0.304	-17.5	5.46

Table 11: General List Experiment (Organizational) Income & Opinion Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
High Income	1.55	1.58	0.980	0.326	-1.54	4.64
Belief in Social Dev. Potential	-0.851	0.997	-0.850	0.394	-2.81	1.10
Constant	-0.518	1.11	-0.470	0.641	-2.70	1.66

Table 12: JCF List Experiment (Organizational) Income & Opinion Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
High Income	15.72	389	0.04	0.968	-747	778
Belief in Social Dev. Potential	-7.54	194	-0.04	0.969	-389	374
Constant	-9.27	194	-0.05	0.962	-390	372

Table 13: General List Experiment (Electoral) Gender Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Male	1.744	1.637	1.070	0.287	-1.465	4.952
Constant	-1.386	1.126	-1.230	0.218	-3.592	0.821

Table 14: JCF List Experiment (Electoral) Gender Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Male	0.424	1.46	0.29	0.772	-2.44	3.29
Constant	-0.862	0.852	-1.00	0.317	-2.55	0.826

Table 15: General List Experiment (Organizational) Gender Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Male	-1.83	2.22	-0.82	0.410	-6.19	2.53
Constant	-0.282	0.690	0.41	0.682	-1.07	1.63

Table 16: JCF List Experiment (Organizational) Gender Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Male	0.0744	1.403	0.05	0.958	-2.68	2.82
Constant	-0.768	0.771	-1.00	0.319	-2.28	0.743

Table 17: General List Experiment (Electoral) Info. Source Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Social media	-6.327	8.977	-0.700	0.481	-23.923	11.268
Govt. Publication	-1.321	2.508	-0.530	0.598	-6.237	3.595
Friends or Family	3.034	7.784	0.390	0.697	-12.223	18.292
Constant	0.782	2.195	0.360	0.722	-3.520	5.084

Table 18: JCF List Experiment (Electoral) Info. Source Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Social media	-3.556	5.611	-0.630	0.526	-14.553	7.442
Govt. Publication	-1.568	2.039	-0.770	0.442	-5.564	2.428
Friends or Family	3.811	5.612	0.680	0.497	-7.188	14.809
Constant	-0.319	1.859	-0.17	0.864	-3.962	3.324

Table 19: General List Experiment (Organizational) Info. Source Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Social media	-0.803	1.381	-0.580	0.561	-3.51	1.904
Govt. Publication	-1.142	1.448	-0.790	0.430	-3.981	1.696
Friends or Family	-0.866	1.420	-0.610	0.542	-3.649	1.916
Constant	1.167	1.499	0.78	0.436	-1.771	4.104

Table 20: JCF List Experiment (Organizational) Info. Source Regression

	Coefficient	std. err.	z-score	Prob.>z	95% Confidence Interval	
Delta						
Social media	-0.0985	1.37	-0.070	0.943	-2.780	2.583
Govt. Publication	-0.701	1.42	-0.490	0.621	-3.480	2.077
Friends or Family	-0.937	1.42	0.660	0.508	-3.713	1.839
Constant	0.0427	1.40	0.030	0.976	-2.692	2.778

Appendix C: Control, Electoral, and Organization Surveys

In order to maintain the formatting of the surveys as they were delivered to respondents, the two-page surveys for the control, electoral, and organization groups begin on the next page.

Le pido amablemente responder a esta encuesta. Este cuestionario no requiere identificación de nombre; los resultados serán anónimos. Esta investigación no está afiliada a ninguna organización pública o privada. El análisis sólo se utilizará para fines académicos de la Universidad de Pittsburgh en los EE.UU. Su participación es voluntaria.

Instrucciones: lea atentamente cada pregunta y marque la respuesta que cree que satisface mejor a su situación. No hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas a estas preguntas.

1. ¿Ha residido en México o Yucatán por más de 5 años?

☐ SÍ   ☐NO

2. ¿Cuantos años tienes?

☐ 18 - 24   ☐ 25 - 29   ☐ 30 - 34

☐ 35 - 39   ☐ 40 - 44   ☐ 45+

3. ¿Cuál es su sexo?

☐ Hombre   ☐ Mujer   ☐**Otro:** _____

4. ¿Qué el lenguaje más habla en su casa? Marca sola una.

☐Maya   ☐Español   ☐**Otro:** _____

5. ¿Qué estudios tiene? (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐Ningun	☐Preparatoria
☐Prescolar	☐Estudios Técnicos
☐Primaria	☐Licenciatura
☐Secundaria	☐Maestría o doctorado

6. ¿Cuál describe mejor su estado civil?

☐Viudo/a   ☐Casado/a   ☐Soltero/a

☐divorciado/a ☐separado/a ☐Unión libre

7. ¿Cuántos jóvenes de las siguientes edades tiene usted a su cargo? Indique un número de 0 a más para cada fila.

	Cantidad
5 años y más joven?	
Entre 6 y 13 años?	
Entre 14 y 18 años?	
Entre 18 y 21 años?	
Entre 21 y 29 años	

8. En los últimos tres meses, ¿cuál de estas formas de asistencia social ha recibido del gobierno? Por ejemplo, estos programas pueden incluir, pero no están limitados a Prospera, IMSS, ISSSTE, las pensiones, y Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juarez.

☐Asistencia de ingresos	☐Asistencia médica
☐ Entrenamiento para un trabajo	☐No recibí nada
☐ Asistencia de educación	☐No sabe

☐**Otro:** _____

9. Si recibió una forma de asistencia social del gobierno, nombre el programa o describa lo que recibió.

_____

_____

10. ¿Recibe las remesas? (dinero recibido de fuera del país)

☐ SÍ   ☐NO

10.1. Si respondió "Sí," ¿cuántos recibe?
$_____

11. ¿Cuál es el ingreso familiar mensual de solo empleo o venta?

☐Menos de $2,500   ☐$2,500 a $5,000

☐$5,000 a $10,000   ☐$10,000 a $15,000

☐$15,000 a $18,000 ☐$18,000 a $20,000

☐$20,000 a $24,000 ☐Más de $24,000

12. ¿Cuál opción describe mejor su situación laboral actual? (Marca todo lo que corresponda)

☐Empleado/a   ☐Vendedor/a

☐Autónomo/a   ☐Desempleado

☐Jornalero/a   ☐Empleador/a

☐Estudiante

13. En los últimos tres meses, ¿de cuántas actividades/empleos ha recibido ingresos?

☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3+ ☐prefiero no responder

14. En su vivienda tiene… (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐Refrigerador ☐Automóvil ☐Televisor ☐ Laptop o tablet ☐Consola de videojuegos

☐Internet fijo ☐Lavadora ☐Servicio de música o video de pago como Netflix, Claro Video o Blim

¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones? Marca con equis en el casillero correspondiente

	Muy en desacuerdo	En desacuerdo	Neutral	De acuerdo	Muy de acuerdo
15. Las personas que usan los programas de bienestar son perezosas.					
16. Los programas de bienestar son inútiles.					
17. Los programas de bienestar son accesibles.					
18. La gente miente para ganar los beneficios de los programas de bienestar.					
19. Los programas de Bienestar promueven desarrollo social.					

20. ¿Cómo se enteró de los programas de asistencia social para los que es idóneo? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña ☐organización social no gubernamental

☐familiar o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico ☐ Televisión o radio ☐Otro:_____

21. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una solicitud
(B) Ser un político electo   ☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3
(C) No tener antecedentes penales

22. ¿Ha oído hablar del Programa de Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro? ☐ SÍ ☐NO

SI RESPONDIÓ "SÍ" A LA PREGUNTA 22, CONTINÚE. SI "NO", NO CONTINÚE Y DEVUELVA LA ENCUESTA.

23. ¿Cómo se enteró de este programa? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña ☐organización social no gubernamental

☐família o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico ☐ Televisado o radio ☐Otro:_____

24. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir el Programa de Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir este programa de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una aplicación
(B) Ser un político electo   ☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3
(C) No tener antecedentes penales

Le pido amablemente responder a esta encuesta. Este cuestionario no requiere identificación de nombre; los resultados serán anónimos. Esta investigación no está afiliada a ninguna organización pública o privada. El análisis sólo se utilizará para fines académicos de la Universidad de Pittsburgh en los EE.UU. Su participación es voluntaria.

Instrucciones: lea atentamente cada pregunta y marque la respuesta que cree que satisface mejor a su situación. No hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas a estas preguntas.

1. ¿Ha residido en México o Yucatán por más de 5 años?

☐ SÍ ☐ NO

2. ¿Cuantos años tienes?

☐ 18 - 24 ☐ 25 - 29 ☐ 30 - 34

☐ 35 - 39 ☐ 40 - 44 ☐ 45+

3. ¿Cuál es su sexo?

☐ Hombre ☐ Mujer ☐ **Otro:** _____

4. ¿Qué el lenguaje más habla en su casa? Marca sola una.

☐ Maya ☐ Español ☐ **Otro:** _____

5. ¿Qué estudios tiene? (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐ Ningun	☐ Preparatoria
☐ Prescolar	☐ Estudios Técnicos
☐ Primaria	☐ Licenciatura
☐ Secundaria	☐ Maestría o doctorado

6. ¿Cuál describe mejor su estado civil?

☐ Viudo/a ☐ Casado/a ☐ Soltero/a

☐ divorciado/a ☐ separado/a ☐ Unión libre

1. ¿Cuántos jóvenes de las siguientes edades tiene usted a su cargo? Indique un número de 0 a más para cada fila.

	Cantidad
4 años y más joven?	
Entre 5 y 13 años?	
Entre 14 y 18 años?	
Entre 18 y 21 años?	
Entre 21 y 29 años?	

7. En los últimos tres meses, ¿cuál de estas formas de asistencia social ha recibido del gobierno? Por ejemplo, estos programas pueden incluir pero no están limitados a Prospera, IMSS, ISSSTE, las pensiones, y Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juarez.

☐ Asistencia de ingresos	☐ Asistencia médica
☐ Entrenamiento para un trabajo	☐ No recibí nada
☐ Asistencia de educación	☐ No sabe

☐ **Otro:** _____

8. Si recibió una forma de asistencia social del gobierno, nombre el programa o describa lo que recibió.

_____

_____

_____

9. ¿Recibe las remesas? (dinero recibido de fuera del país)

☐ SÍ ☐ NO

9.1. Si respondió "Sí," ¿cuántos recibe?

$_____

10. ¿Cuál es el ingreso familiar mensual de solo empleo o venta?

☐ Menos de $2,500 ☐ $2,500 a $5,000

☐ $5,000 a $10,000 ☐ $10,000 a $15,000

☐ $15,000 a $18,000 ☐ $18,000 a $20,000

☐ $20,000 a $24,000 ☐ Más de $24,000

11. ¿Cuál opción describe mejor su situación laboral actual? (Marca todo lo que corresponda)

☐ empleado/a ☐ vendedor/a

☐ autónomo/a ☐ desempleado

☐ jornalero/a ☐ empleador/a

☐ Estudiante

12. En los últimos tres meses, ¿de cuántas actividades/empleos ha recibido ingresos?

☐0　　　☐1　　　☐2　　　☐3+　　　☐prefiero no responder

13. En su vivienda tiene… (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐Refrigerador　　　☐Automóvil　☐Televisor　☐ Laptop o tablet　　☐Consola de videojuegos

☐Internet fijo　　　☐Lavadora　　☐Servicio de música o video de pago como Netflix, Claro Video o Blim

¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones? Marca con equis en el casillero correspondiente

	Muy en desacuerdo	En desacuerdo	Neutral	De acuerdo	Muy de acuerdo
15. Las personas que usan los programas de bienestar son perezosas.					
16. Los programas de bienestar son inútiles.					
17. Los programas de bienestar son accesibles.					
18. La gente miente para ganar los beneficios de los programas de bienestar .					
19. Los programas de Bienestar promueven desarrollo social.					

20. ¿Cómo se enteró de los programas de asistencia social para los que es idóneo? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña ☐organización social no gubernamental

☐familiar o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico ☐ Televisión o radio ☐Otro:_____

21. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una solicitud
(B) Ser un político electo
(C) No tener antecedentes penales
(D) Apoyar un partido político

☐ 0　☐ 1　☐ 2　☐ 3　☐ 4

22. ¿Ha oído hablar del Programa Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro?　☐ SÍ　☐NO

SI RESPONDIÓ "SÍ" A LA PREGUNTA 22, CONTINÚE. SI "NO", NO CONTINÚE Y DEVUELVA LA ENCUESTA.

23. ¿Cómo se enteró de este programa? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña　☐organización social no gubernamental

☐família o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico　☐ Televisado ☐Otro:_____

24. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir el Programa Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir este programa de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una solicitud
(B) Ser un político electo
(C) No tener antecedentes penales
(D) Apoyar un partido político

☐ 0　☐ 1　☐ 2　☐ 3　☐ 4

Le pido amablemente responder a esta encuesta. Este cuestionario no requiere identificación de nombre; los resultados serán anónimos. Esta investigación no está afiliada a ninguna organización pública o privada. El análisis sólo se utilizará para fines académicos de la Universidad de Pittsburgh en los EE.UU. Su participación es voluntaria.

Instrucciones: lea atentamente cada pregunta y marque la respuesta que cree que satisface mejor a su situación. No hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas a estas preguntas.

1. ¿Ha residido en México o Yucatán por más de 5 años?

☐ SÍ ☐ NO

2. ¿Cuantos años tienes?

☐ 18 - 24 ☐ 25 - 29 ☐ 30 - 34

☐ 35 - 39 ☐ 40 - 44 ☐ 45+

3. ¿Cuál es su sexo?

☐ Hombre ☐ Mujer ☐ **Otro:** _____

4. ¿Qué el lenguaje más habla en su casa? Marca sola una.

☐ Maya ☐ Español ☐ **Otro:** _____

5. ¿Qué estudios tiene? (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐ Ningun	☐ Preparatoria
☐ Prescolar	☐ Estudios Técnicos
☐ Primaria	☐ Licenciatura
☐ Secundaria	☐ Maestría o doctorado

6. ¿Cuál describe mejor su estado civil?

☐ Viudo/a ☐ Casado/a ☐ Soltero/a

☐ divorciado/a ☐ separado/a ☐ Unión libre

7. ¿Cuántos jóvenes de las siguientes edades tiene usted a su cargo? Indique un número de 0 a más para cada fila.

	Cantidad
4 años y más joven?	
Entre 5 y 13 años?	
Entre 14 y 18 años?	
Entre 18 y 21 años?	
Entre 21 y 29 años?	

8. En los últimos tres meses, ¿cuál de estas formas de asistencia social ha recibido del gobierno? Por ejemplo, estos programas pueden incluir pero no están limitados a Prospera, IMSS, ISSSTE, las pensiones, y Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juarez.

☐ Asistencia de ingresos	☐ Asistencia médica
☐ Entrenamiento para un trabajo	☐ No recibí nada
☐ Asistencia de educación	☐ No sabe

☐ **Otro:** _____

9. Si recibió una forma de asistencia social del gobierno, nombre el programa o describa lo que recibió.

_____

_____

10. ¿Recibe las remesas? (dinero recibido de fuera del país)

☐ SÍ ☐ NO

10.1. Si respondió "Sí," ¿cuántos recibe?

$_____

11. ¿Cuál es el ingreso familiar mensual de solo empleo o venta?

☐ Menos de $2,500 ☐ $2,500 a $5,000

☐ $5,000 a $10,000 ☐ $10,000 a $15,000

☐ $15,000 a $18,000 ☐ $18,000 a $20,000

☐ $20,000 a $24,000 ☐ Más de $24,000

12. ¿Cuál opción describe mejor su situación laboral actual? (Marca todo lo que corresponda)

☐ Empleado/a ☐ Vendedor/a

☐ Autónomo/a ☐ Desempleado

☐ Jornalero/a ☐ Empleador/a

☐ Estudiante

13. En los últimos tres meses, ¿de cuántas actividades/empleos ha recibido ingresos?

☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3+ ☐prefiero no responder

14. En su vivienda tiene… (marque todo lo que corresponda)

☐Refrigerador ☐Automóvil ☐Televisor ☐ Laptop o tablet ☐Consola de videojuegos

☐Internet fijo ☐Lavadora ☐Servicio de música o video de pago como Netflix, Claro Video o Blim

¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones? Marca con equis en el casillero correspondiente

	Muy en desacuerdo	En desacuerdo	Neutral	De acuerdo	Muy de acuerdo
15. Las personas que usan los programas de bienestar son perezosas.					
16. Los programas de bienestar son inútiles.					
17. Los programas de bienestar son accesibles.					
18. La gente miente para ganar los beneficios de los programas de bienestar.					
19. Los programas de Bienestar promueven desarrollo social.					

20. ¿Cómo se enteró de los programas de asistencia social para los que es idóneo? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña ☐organización social no gubernamental

☐familiar o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico ☐ Televisión o radio ☐Otro:_____

21. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir cualquier tipo de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una solicitud
(B) Ser un político electo
(C) No tener antecedentes penales
(D) Pertenecer una organización social

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4

22. ¿Ha oído hablar del Programa Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro? ☐ SÍ ☐NO

SI RESPONDIÓ "SÍ" A LA PREGUNTA 22, CONTINÚE. SI "NO", NO CONTINÚE Y DEVUELVA LA ENCUESTA.

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23. ¿Cómo se enteró de este programa? Marque todo lo que corresponda.

☐publicidad del gobierno ☐publicidad de campaña ☐organización social no gubernamental

☐família o amigo/a ☐redes sociales ☐Periódico ☐ Televisado ☐Otro:_____

24. A continuación, hay una lista de acciones o condiciones que algunas personas consideran necesarias para recibir el Programa Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro. En su opinión, ¿CUÁNTAS (0 a 3) de estas acciones o condiciones son necesarias para recibir este programa de asistencia social? **NO MARCA opciones específicas. MARCA SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD DE OPCIONES QUE CREE QUE SON VERDADES.**

(A) enviar una solicitud
(B) Ser un político electo
(C) No tener antecedentes penales
(D) Pertenecer una organización social

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4