SELF, GROUP, AND SOCIETY: EMERGENCE OF NEW POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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The Republic of Macedonia provides an illustration of how a society's identities reciprocally affect government and politics. This research investigates the extent to which Macedonia is developing a stable and cohesive society and contrasts more traditional investigations that treat identity as coextensive with fixed ethnic boundaries. This study employs an inductive approach to identity formation by investigating how individual beliefs and values function within a society. To accomplish this, a method for discerning and characterizing identity groups was employed, generating a rich mixture of qualitative and quantitative data.

Fieldwork took place in two stages in 2005-2006. In stage one, university students across Macedonia (n=109) were interviewed using an adaptation of George Kelly's repertory grid technique, a semi-structured interview procedure. In stage two, a national follow-up survey (n=496) based on those findings was administered to a random sample of Macedonia's general population, allowing for an evaluation of initial results. Multidimensional scaling, factor analysis, generalized procrustes analysis, and a measure of cognitive homophily were employed to identify and assess similarities and differences among identity groups. This multitier approach

made it possible to discern unifying themes that contribute to the previously unrecognized growth in civic identity that is beginning to span ethnic divisions in Macedonia. Although ethnic designations remain important to the assessment of identity, research findings support the contention that emergent identities in this new state are not categorically deterministic. This implies that some members of society are developing identities more strongly associated with Macedonia's viability as a state than with ethnic and other designations.

The methodology employed in this study offers an emic perspective that permits inductively derived comparisons, rather than etic comparisons that limit investigations to easily identifiable fixed categories. The emic methodology, operationalized through the repertory grid technique and Kelly's theory of constructivist alternativism, elicits culturally relevant frames of reference in a manner that preserves the meanings attached by members of society while minimizing the effects of the researcher's own cultural and intellectual biases. This is a promising methodology for investigating potentially emergent identities in other regions and communities where cultural misconceptions pose potential barriers to societal stability.

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PREFACE

This project arose out of my interest in understanding what it is that makes a society cohesive. From that interest, come a number of important questions. How can we better understand group behavior, especially at the society level? What is it that ultimately draws a society together or pushes it apart? Do individuals shape society, or is it the other way around? How do people prioritize what is best for them, their group, or society as a whole and how universal are those ideas?

After completing a Master's degree in history, I chose to change fields and pursue a PhD in public and international affairs. At the time, I joked with my friends that I saw no future in history. What I was really saying was that, although I had enjoyed the processes and puzzles of historical inquiry, I craved a more active role in researching – and at some point perhaps influencing – contemporary events.

My Master's thesis had tracked the Nazi's marginalization campaigns and how they ultimately grew beyond the control of their originators. As people at every level of German society internalized the messages that the campaigns offered, it became increasingly more difficult for even direct commands from the some of the highest offices to belay some aspects of the regime's more infamous operations. The administrative interactions that ultimately produced such a state of affairs were complex and dynamic, but some of the most persistent and pervading reasons for the worst aspects of those operations were the cognitive and perceptual changes that the marginalization campaign had wrought on ordinary citizens. It was ultimately an over-amplified sense of ethnocultural identity that directed the expulsions, and worse, of the perceived outsiders or "others."

When I began my new program, I decided to search for what draws societies together rather than what draws them apart. Concepts such as social capital, civil and uncivil society, and political culture all seemed promising but somehow unsatisfactory approaches to understanding how societies are formed and how they may be maintained in the face of ethnic, cultural, religious, and other disparities that may exist. In particular, what have become the accepted

approaches for measuring each of the above concepts did not strike me as being sufficient to explain how and with whom people interact and form bonds.

It was my opinion that people do not so much "choose" a leader, friend, or compatriot, so much as they tend to respond to someone when some aspect of that person's makeup resonates with their own. Such a view implies that people may form connections on a variety of levels as individuals discover their commonalities or differences. My first introduction to a formal theory of this sort was through Niklas Luhmann's theory of autopoetic (i.e., self-referential) social systems. The view of identity as being socially constructed was, in my opinion, vastly superior to many of the economic and rational choice models for understanding public choice and social cohesion. The only problem was in how to obtain the sort of data that would make such an investigation possible.

I have my mentor, Bill Dunn, to thank for introducing me to George Kelly's repertory grid methodology as a solution to this dilemma. His explanations and early work – some of it with Kevin Kearns – in employing this methodology to better understand how knowledge is created, spread, and otherwise utilized were an invaluable part of my initial instruction and fine tuning of this approach in my research. Additionally, his familiarity, expertise, and involvement with Macedonia and the Balkan region provided me with the introductions that I would later require to carry out my investigations.

I owe additional debts of gratitude to Louise Comfort for her unflagging support, enthusiasm, and depth of knowledge in many of the innovative analytic approaches that I have investigated during my studies and ultimately applied in this dissertation. Drs. Comfort and Dunn patiently attended almost every theoretic and analytic roundtable and discussion group that I organized in an attempt to get a handle on this wide and varied field. My sincere appreciation is also extended to Dr. James Grice. His guidance and feedback taught me much about generalized procrustes analysis and his excellent program: Idiogrid. My thanks are similarly extended to Kevin Kearns, Dave Miller, and David Barker, each of whom took the time to help me fine-tune my survey and interview work.

The students, faculty and administration of South East European University constituted the main source of support and funding for carrying out this project. Without them, this work would not have been possible. The backbone of the project consisted of its student interview and data staff. Interviewers were: Evica Kisa, Vahide Ziberi, Amet Ibraimi, Elena Mishevska, and

Rusana Gjurcheska. The data team consisted of: Florent Jashiri and Kujtim Bajrami. Each and every student who participated was a brilliant and valued addition to the team. I would additionally like to thank Rector Alajdin Abazi, Professor Abdylmenaf Bexheti, Professor Nazmi Maliqi, Professor, and Pro-Dean Jonuz Abdullai for their support and enthusiasm for my project.

Financial support was also provided by the French Embassy's Cooperation Program to South East European University. Initial interviews were made possible by the cooperation of participating universities. Sincere appreciation is therefore owed to the Rectors of the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, the University of St. Clement Ohridski, and State University Tetovo, each of whom provided their approval for the interviews that took place on their campuses.

I derived some of my most important support from my friends and colleagues. In Macedonia, the contributions and enthusiastic help of Shqipe Tahiri, Sonila Gogu, Mensur Mamuti, Emilija Simoska, and Pande Lazarevski were a valuable part of the project, but their friendship proved more valuable to me. In particular, my dear friends Veli Kreci, Memet Memeti and Burim Sadiku were unflagging supporters and facilitators for getting this project off the ground and keeping me sane in the process. To my colleagues at GSPIA, Sharad Joshi, Tavida Kamolvej, Salma al haq Yousif, Joohun Lee, and many others, I owe my thanks for the many hours of intellectual and quasi-intellectual discussion and diversion and really just for attending my discussion groups. Additional and important sources of sanity came from enduring friends James Hollifield and Richard McKinney. Thanks for bringing light to dark days.

Thanks also go out to my neighbors in Norwell, MA. The Asnes, Batte, Chiasson, and Wilson families repeatedly gave firsthand demonstrations of how close groups are best constructed: start with what we have in common and build from there. I never realized until now how important walking dogs could become.

Perhaps my greatest debt is owed to the person who has been closest to me from the start: Karen T.Cuenco. Karen, you have been my patient editor, honest critic, voice of reason, source of stability, and so much more throughout this process. You believed in me despite my own opinions on the matter. I owe you more than I can express.

Finally, my deep and sincere thanks go to my parents, who did eventually master the underappreciated art of knowing when not to ask whether I was done with that dissertation thing yet.

1. INTRODUCTION

> The phrase "the people" is sheer nonsense. It is not a political term. It is a phrase of natural history. A people is a species; a civilised community is a nation. Now, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. A nation is gradually created by a variety of influences – the influence of original organisation, of climate, soil, religion, laws, customs, manners, extraordinary accidents and incidents in their history, and the individual character of their illustrious citizens. These influences create the nation – these form the national mind, and produce in the course of centuries a high degree of civilisation. If you destroy the political institutions which these influences have called into force, and which are the machinery by which they constantly act, you destroy the nation. The nation, in a state of anarchy and dissolution, then becomes a people; and after experiencing all the consequent misery, like a company of bees spoiled of their queen and rifled of their hive, they set to again and establish themselves into a society. (Disraeli [1836], 343)

Benjamin Disraeli provides a fair starting point from which to consider events and ideas in the Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia). Following its divorce from the then-failing state of Yugoslavia, Macedonia has struggled to reestablish itself as an independent, multiethnic state with a new system of government and a new identity. In so doing, the greatest surprise to outside observers appears to have been the lack of interethnic conflict there, as the institutions that had kept ethnic groups in a political balance in Yugoslavia had been abandoned in the move to secession. It was only relatively recently that Macedonia's population reached a state similar to Disraeli's analogy of a "company of bees spoiled of their queen and rifled of their hive."

While there has not been an apparent impetus for enthusiastic ethnic intermingling in Macedonia, neither has there been any precedent within the country for the recent armed conflict between the major ethnic groups there or the resulting social detritus that such discord has provided. Residents from all ethnicities in Macedonia have histories there that date back for centuries and they all share at least some level of common experience and memory. Macedonia

is, however, a new state and, as such, its citizens still appear to be in a period of renegotiation of what it means to be a Macedonian citizen and what relationship that implies between the various ethnic communities there. The question that arises from this is: how is Macedonia progressing in its development of a stable and cohesive society?

This research investigates Macedonia's development of shared identity in a sense that is similar to that of Disraeli's concept of the "national mind." In so doing, this work provides a characterization of how the people of Macedonia frame their decisions about what is good for the state. These frameworks are analyzed as indicators of how the country is progressing in its efforts to establish itself into a stable and cohesive society by shedding light on how much and in what ways Macedonia's various communities fundamentally agree and disagree. As such, the present study represents a confluence of my personal experiences and intellectual interests, as well as recent historical events in Macedonia. The research setting was established by my work and travel in Macedonia, and my interest in this new country's potential for sustainability and, correspondingly, whether it is developing a united or fragmented identity. The theoretical underpinnings of this research were developed out of an abiding interest in social systems and how people view themselves and others in terms of larger and often more abstract ideals.

1.1. INITIAL IMPRESSIONS

My first visit to Macedonia took place over the summer of 2001, well into the brief conflict between ethnic Albanian militants and the still largely untrained Macedonian government forces. I was living in Skopje, the capital city of Macedonia, and working as an intern in the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University's Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research. It was my first chance to see Macedonia and experience firsthand how its society is structured.

I had initially traveled to Macedonia to learn more about the fallout there in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. Through contacts I made with various nongovernmental and international aid organizations, I was able to visit Macedonia's two remaining refugee camps, each housing Roma – commonly referred to as "Gypsies" – refugees from Kosovo. The larger camp was located in Šuto Orizari, Skopje's primarily Roma municipality; and the smaller in

Katlanovo, east of Skopje. The refugees in these camps were people who were no longer welcome in any country. As Kosovars, Macedonia was unprepared to settle them permanently. As Roma, their prospects were similarly limited. These particular communities claimed no homeland other than Kosovo and no other country in the region appeared eager to increase its Roma population. They were also unable to return to Kosovo, as they were blamed for atrocities committed on both Serbian and Albanian Kosovars and the threats leveled against them had continued, even in their exile.

All those whom I interviewed in the camps told me that they felt that they had been driven out of their homeland, where their ancestors had lived for centuries. Various Roma told of being chased out and persecuted by both sides in the Kosovo conflict. Many were driven out by advancing Serbs, who accused them of being in league with Albanians. Many more of those who had remained were driven out by returning Albanian Kosovars, who reasoned that no Roma could have remained unless they had conspired with Serbian forces. Even those who had fled and later returned alongside displaced Albanians were often driven back out by paramilitaries from outside their communities for being "suspicious." As a community living at the margins of more powerful ethnic communities, Roma found themselves caught in the middle when ethnic Albanians and Serbs were in conflict.

When I later visited Kosovo, my Albanian guides made it clear to me that it was seldom assumed that anyone in Kosovo could have remained neutral in the conflict. Everyone there was assumed to be either on the Serbian side or the Albanian side. There was no middle ground.

In Macedonia the situation was more complex. There, ethnic Albanian militants were the initial aggressors, though the decision to take up arms in that community was far from unanimous. Once begun however, both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians began to radicalize. I witnessed some evidence of this while shopping in Skopje. I had walked into what turned out to be a nearly empty shop where a middle-aged couple was considering the purchase of a handgun. When I later told an ethnic Macedonian friend what I had seen, he smiled and said "You did not see that. Those shops are not legal here and they don't exist."

Others in the ethnic Macedonian community told me stories of how the two communities were growing apart. They told of increasing levels of violent crime in Macedonia, a place where news of a murder would have shocked all parts of the present-day country just ten years earlier. Others talked of their friends finding ethnic Albanian neighbors, with whom they had lived for

years, apparently practicing military-type maneuvers near their neighborhood. More personal experiences were also related, such as that of the ethnic Macedonian woman who told of her experience with an Albanian snack vendor whom she visited regularly and had often chatted with her in the past. On this occasion however, when she stopped to make a purchase, the vendor thrust the order at her with the admonition, "I hope you choke."

Although there was ample evidence of conflict all around me (e.g., manned sandbag bunkers around all official buildings, Russian-donated helicopter gunships and military jets flying overhead, reports of fighting in the news every night), Skopje was largely peaceful. I did not personally experience much of the fallout from the conflict until late in my trip. Two incidents in particular changed this.

In the first incident, I was traveling with a friend to visit a town near the city of Tetovo, around which the majority of the fighting took place. On our way there, my friend, who is neither ethnic Albanian, nor ethnic Macedonian, was telling me that he thought that fighting was a very bad alternative for Macedonia, but that there was a very real problem and that politicians in Skopje had to stop ignoring it and address Albanian grievances. Just then, we approached a military checkpoint and were told to stop the car.

The soldier who flagged us down looked to be a teenager, not much larger than the weapon he carried. I asked my friend if we were speeding and he told me that the soldier had probably spotted the license plate, which indicated where he lived. His suspicions were largely confirmed when the soldier cited a seatbelt violation, saying that I, as a foreigner, would probably have to go to jail for the weekend unless we paid a fairly substantial bribe. My friend, both embarrassed and infuriated, called his bluff. Confusing things still further, I had offered the soldier my business card, which, at the time, still gave reference to "Russian and East European Studies." "Ruski?" he asked, obviously startled. It was obvious that I was not from Macedonia, but the word "Russian" was too much for the, now very confused and unsure, soldier. After a few more moments of looking from us to his colleague loitering across the street, he sent us on our way.

My friend was upset for the remainder of the ride. He explained that he was embarrassed that I would have to witness such a thing happening in his country. It was not how he had hoped that I would experience his country for the first time. The soldier's efforts may not have been

ethnically oriented, though the conditions were such that the young man was able to, and clearly had decided who it was and was not acceptable to extort.

My visit came to an end shortly after the start of peace negotiations. The night before I left Macedonia, another friend had called to tell me to stay inside, as a riot was beginning and any foreigners were probably at risk. The anti-foreigner sentiments had arisen concurrently with the internationally brokered peace agreement and further underscored the anger and frustration that was going through all parts of Macedonia's society. When I flew out the next morning, it was still possible that a group of nearby ethnic Albanian militants would carry out their threat to mortar the airport, but no one seemed to believe it.

Most people I had spoken with about the conflict were clearly upset, but their reactions were varied. Some expressed a fatalistic attitude regarding Macedonia's ultimate ability to survive as a country. Others had maintained the opinion that, come what may, some new agreement had to be negotiated between ethnic communities in Macedonia for the country to remain viable. A few fringe Albanians I met spoke of creating Greater Kosovo or Greater Albania, to the apparent annoyance of their nearby peers. Still others, especially those in Skopje and the resort town of Ohrid, were reserved on the subject of the conflict and gave the impression that they were still holding out in hope that the excitement would die down and allow life to return to normal.

As I departed, I was left with a number of questions about what I had witnessed. *Is it realistic to expect that Macedonia will achieve self sustaining stability and, relatedly, is or in what ways is its population developing a sense of shared identity? Given that Macedonia's ethnic and cultural groups have coexisted, albeit in parallel societies, and have "shared" experiences through the common history of the republic, how do social identity distinctions such as ethnicity or urban and rural designations affect perceptions and decisions made within these groups? Are political identities in Macedonia irrevocably divided along ethnic, nationalistic, or otherwise "primordially" determined lines or is there evidence of a middle ground where identities are more complex and at least partially integrated?*

1.2. ADDRESSING THE QUESTIONS

To me, these appeared to be the growing pains of a country that was formed after the identity groups there had already crystallized under another, now defunct, system (i.e., Yugoslavia). Those identity groups now had to learn how to live together and, if possible, find some way to form a shared identity of mutual acceptance: that of citizens of Macedonia. One of the more profound questions facing Macedonia and similar societies therefore has to do with nature of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict and the conditions that foster and maintain it.

There are a few well trodden paths to addressing this issue that constitute a good starting point for such an investigation. These paradigms, primordialism, modernization, or some combination of the two, appear to have informed development policy in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkans and each is ultimately concerned with the health of the state. As such, each paradigm represents an important part of the investigation, but neither felt to me as though it resonated with my experiences.

More recent approaches such as investigations of social capital (e.g., Putnam 2000, Lin 2001) seemed to me much more promising, as they deal more broadly with cooperation and some form of inter-group communication. I soon came to realize however, that the social cohesion that such interaction was thought to produce can be very difficult to operationalize and measure. Additionally, it had become fairly clear to me after spending only a very brief time in Macedonia that there were very few interethnic clubs, organizations, or other such venues in Macedonia. This implied that the types of group activities that are thought to produce social capital would be very limited in Macedonia, and probably of low explanatory value in relation to larger trends within the country.

I also investigated the potential of social and other types of human networks for explaining the phenomena taking place in Macedonia. None of this looked promising until I came across a reference to Niklas Luhmann (1985, 1995) and his analysis of society as an autopoietic (i.e., self-creating) social system based in communication. Luhmann was not the first to employ this idea,[1] but his ideas were the first I had studied in depth and they introduced me to

[1] The first to substantially formalize the idea of social communication as a determinant factor in the formation of society and development was Karl Deutsch (1961, 1966a, 1966b), who in turn cited many prior influences as well as approaches that were more contemporary to his work contemporary such as the cybernetics movement.

a new way of perceiving human interactions and perceptions that were not necessarily dependant upon demographic or cultural designations.

Social systems, advocacy coalitions, and similar approaches to human interaction and knowledge creation, while interesting, are very difficult to operationalize or test in a field setting. In answer to this dilemma, my mentor, William Dunn, introduced me to a method and a theoretical approach that came much closer to addressing the questions that I was interested in answering: George Kelly's (1955) psychology of personal constructs and repertory grid method. These tools provide an inductive approach to discerning and characterizing identity groups that is relatively efficient, reduces researcher bias, and generates a rich mix of qualitative and quantitative data.

As I familiarized myself with employing repertory grid in an interview an important characteristic of this approach quickly became apparent: repertory grid interviews can be very time consuming and labor intensive. The use of computer-based elicitation programs promised to at least partially mitigate the time and effort required to perform each interview, but the respondent sample was not likely to be large. Additionally, because respondents were to be recruited from university populations, the question of representativeness had to be addressed. For these reasons, it was decided that a survey should be constructed based on the repertory grid findings and administered to the population at large. This developed into the two part strategy I would use to investigate Macedonia's nascent political identities.

Upon returning to Macedonia, I was able to secure a post as visiting professor in the Faculty of Public Administration at South East European University (SEEU). This allowed me to recruit interviewers through a research internship and training program that I established. Additionally, research grants from the Office of Research at SEEU and the Cooperation Program of the French Embassy to Macedonia allowed me to carry out my research.

Six of my eight months in Macedonia were spent doing field research with my interview staff in the country's four accredited universities. At the close of each interview day, I asked the interviewers what new constructs they had seen. By the close of the interviewing phase, all interviewers were reporting that they had heard no new constructs, signaling that we had likely reached the conceptual boundaries of the collective identities under investigation (Dunn 2002).

Over the weeks that followed, the interview data was recoded, translated and the constructs were sorted into major categories. Once I had sorted the constructs into categories,

those initial categories were used to select the constructs that would comprise the national survey. The survey was beta tested, revised, and ultimately administered across Macedonia.

1.3. DISSERTATION STRUCTURE

Chapter Two introduces the problem that guided this research and discusses some of the major theoretical approaches to understanding identity formation in the Balkans and elsewhere. In the process of discussing the various theories, I develop several hypotheses to be tested in later chapters. *Chapter Three* provides some context for this research by presenting a review of the literature that is concerned with identity research in Macedonia. The chapter begins with an overview of the, mostly recent, historical events that have surrounded the new republic and each of the succeeding sections build further on that historical framework by focusing on individual aspects of how contemporary research has addressed the creation and maintenance of identity in Macedonia.

Chapter Four provides a detailed introduction to how this research was performed. In so doing, the chapter is divided into two major subsections, each of which deals with a different stage of analysis. *Section 4.1* deals entirely with repertory grid interviews, descriptions of the data that result from such inquiry, and methods for analyzing the data. *Section 4.2* picks up from there, describing in detail the process that was employed to construct, troubleshoot, and analyze the national survey. Correspondingly, descriptions of how and under what conditions interviews and surveys were each administered and a description of the resulting samples for each are given in *Chapter Five*.

The longest and most detailed chapter, *Chapter Six*, presents the findings of analyses on both repertory grid interview and national survey data. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first three sections (*Sections 6.1*, *6.2*, and *6.3*) present the findings of the analyses that were employed to test the hypotheses given in *Chapter Two*. The chapter then closes with a discussion of reliability and validity considerations and how they were addressed in the course of this research. *Chapter Seven* then further contextualizes the findings from *Chapter Six* and closes with suggestions for future research.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The present study is guided by a central concern: *Is it realistic to expect that Macedonia will achieve self sustaining political stability? Stated another way, is its population developing a sense of community or societal cohesiveness and, if so, in what way?* Relatedly, is there evidence that segments of Macedonia's population are developing a common identity that is based on being a citizen of Macedonia, as opposed to ethnic or other demographic identity alone? To address these and related questions, three theories of identity formation and maintenance were tested: (1) primordialism, (2) modernization theory, and (3) postmodernization theory.

Although some of these theories have fallen out of favor with contemporary researchers, each has been influential in the field. This chapter reviews how each of these three theories are applicable in the context of the present research. One or more hypotheses are generated in accordance with each theory and tested in later chapters. The chapter additionally provides an introduction to the hypotheses by presenting the methods (discussed in more detail in *Chapter Four*) employed in this study and how variables such as "identity" are operationalized.

2.1. PRIMORDIALISM AND THE TWO IDENTITIES HYPOTHESIS

The primordialist perspective has become a ubiquitous element of research into identity formation and maintenance in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkans. Although seldom employed as a central thesis in such studies, primordialism constitutes a pervasive undercurrent in how people in and outside the region have framed identity and bolstered arguments regarding ethnic conflict and sustainability in the region. The central thesis of primordialism holds that

ethnic identities, once formed, are persistent, relatively rigid, and frequently a source of conflict in multiethnic states (Geertz 1963, Shils 1957). As articulated by Geertz:

> …considered as societies, the new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments. By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens" of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound…in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. (1963, 259)

Western diplomats and institutions have repeatedly cited longstanding conflicts and primordial-type divisions as a characteristic trait of Balkan countries (Harvey 2000). The administration of George H. W. Bush cited "bottom-up, ancient, ethnic or tribal hatreds…that had raged for centuries" as reason for not involving American troops as peacekeepers in the various Balkan conflicts that took place in the wake of Yugoslavia's dissolution (Power 2003, 282).[2] Later, the Clinton administration signaled an abandonment of such hesitancy and much of the reasoning behind it by committing 300 – later upgraded to 500 – lightly armed peacekeepers to prevent the Bosnian conflict from spreading to Macedonia (Ifill 1993). Some undercurrent of expectations based on primordialism was however, noted by outside observers. In one example of such expectations, Glenny (1995) applauded US intervention, speculating that "Bosnia and Macedonia have always required the protection of an external power to survive" and further asserted that Macedonia was then beginning to show signs of "heading down the same path as Bosnia" (98).

In early applications of the primordialist paradigm, factors such as biological, genetic, or psychological imperatives for homophily are thought to explain group identity and ethnic solidarity (Mousseau 2001). As such, at the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution, primordialism

[2] The then Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, summed up the administration's attitudes in his now famous quote: "I have said this 38,000 times and I have to say this to the people of this country as well. This tragedy is not something that can be settled from the outside and it's about damn well time that everybody understood that. Until the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it." (Power 2002, 282-283)

quickly became the "dominant 'evolutionary' explanation for ethnic conflict" in the Balkans (Harvey 2000, 40).

> Primordialist explanations of past and current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, not to mention the foreign policies they engender, are all derived from the same basic premise: ethnic hatreds and fears of the "other" are so entrenched that efforts to control violence are not likely to work. Nothing can be done to prevent ancient animosities from escalating into another Balkan war, the argument goes, because behaviour in the region is driven by perceived threats to the security and survival of the entire ethnic group. … Proponents of this view claim that wars in the former Yugoslavia continue to be fought between different genetic and cultural lines. (Harvey 2000, 41-42)

In such terms, strong ethnic identities are reason enough for societal divisions and conflict. The very nature of what primordialists view as intense within-group ties promotes an exclusivity that does not allow for shared boundaries with other identity groups (e.g., Connor 1994, Mousseau 2001, Huntington 1993, Kaplan 1993, West 1982). The implication is that each primordial identity group is continually striving for territorial boundaries that are exclusive to only that group.

For the most part, only a very few in Macedonia have given justice to such assumptions. When, in June of 2001, a plan – attributed to Macedonian nationalist academic Blaže Ristovski – to divide Macedonians and Albanians in a land swap deal with Albania was leaked to the press, it caused widespread outrage and was rejected by ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians alike (Phillips 2004, 123-124). Similarly, hardline Albanian nationalists who advocate the creation of a "Greater Albania" or "Greater Kosovo" by breaking away from Macedonia have been routinely distanced by their peers in the ethnic Albanian community (Judah 2000).

In addition to geographic territory however, primordialism is also associated with cognitive space.[3] In a recent trend, a few scholars have begun to reposition primordialist thought to fit with the current understanding of the constructed nature of identity. Such a trend is in line with early theories on partisanship and voting behavior, which approached political decision making as being determined through self-interest, as defined by a static or monolithic feature of

[3] The term "cognitive space" is used here and elsewhere in this study to convey the idea of a worldview (W*eltanschauung*) or frame of reference, through which individuals and groups understand and interpret the world around them.

an individual's life (e.g., ethnicity, religion, party membership), established early in life, and reinforced within the home (e.g., Hyman 1959, Campbell et al 1960).

Rather than approach ethnic bonds as a "given," as expressed in Geertz's (1963) famous characterization of primordial ties, the newer understanding of primordialism acknowledges that identities, ethnic and otherwise, are socially constructed, but also asserts that ethnic identity, once formed, is persistent (Suny 2001, Van Evera 2001), especially in the wake of inter-ethnic violence (Kaufmann 1996). Such an approach does away with the idea of built-in genetic or otherwise ancient imperatives, but subsequently argues that such a distinction is moot, as the durability of ethnic identity is the same either way. The important implication of the new constructivist reframing of primordialism is that, in addition to physical boundaries, there is a new focus on the specific cognitive territory associated with each group. Such territory is the collective's frame of reference that is formed through common experiences, discourse, and a shared sense of history. Once established, a group's ethnic identity, defined as a collective frame of reference, is assumed to be largely static and enduring due to strong internal reinforcement within the ethnic community. (e.g., Suny 2001, Van Evera 2001)

There are some good reasons for the persistence of the primordialist argument. Ethnic identity is typically easy to discern since it is based on what are often external characteristics. In times of strife, such an operationalization is helpful and often necessary in order to facilitate quick identification of competing groups and mediate some form of appropriate response aimed at the immediate cessation of hostilities. Alternatively, such an approach has also been noted as one of many justifications for not getting involved in interethnic conflict, citing the futility of quelling deep-seated or primordial ethnic hatreds (Harvey 2000). In effect, it is that sort of diffused application that has helped primordialist explanations to persevere. Due largely to its apparent pariah status in academic circles, primordialism – although compelling in its simplicity – is seldom explicitly tested any longer as anything other than a straw man argument. As such, primordialism is more frequently found in its application than in its rationalization.

Although primordial explanations are often an implicit element of other actions and explanations, it is clear that, at the very least, primordialism has often functioned as a lens for making sense of identity groups in Macedonia and other Balkan countries in the past (Simpson 2002, Harvey 2000). Such an aspect regards ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians as mutually opposed identity groups and an enduring source of potential conflict. As ethnic

Macedonians and ethnic Albanians constitute by far the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia, the primordialist approach guides the *"Two Identities" Hypothesis*: *Macedonia is dominated by two major ethnic identities, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and each of these identity groups has its own characteristic frame of reference that allows it to interpret ideas and events according to the beliefs, interests, values, and perceptions of the group*. This and the next four hypotheses will be formally restated later in this chapter in order to formally test the accuracy of such assumptions in the context of what is taking place in Macedonia.

2.2. MODERNIZATION AND THE THREE IDENTITIES HYPOTHESIS

Not all approaches to aiding Macedonia's development have focused on separations and creating barriers to conflict. Many international, foreign state-sponsored, and private institutions have instead labored under the aegis of "capacity building" in the interest of aiding Macedonia in its transition to a "modern," capitalist, democratic country. With thousands of such organizations operating in Macedonia, there is a correspondingly large amount of diversity in the interpretation of how to increase the country's capacity for modernization (see overview in USAID 2004).

Organizational missions involve such topics as leadership development, public sector training, environmental research and conservation, expansion of public health access and activities, improvements in the education sector, and business outreach. Although the scope and character of the various approaches demonstrate little interorganizational coordination and planning, individual programs are often supported by a variety of shared funding agencies and other organizations (Marks and Fraenkel 1997, Shochat 2003), suggesting that their missions enjoy some degree of overlap (Murphy and Memeti 2005). Such correspondence is not unexpected, not only because of the asymmetric ties created by individual nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs') needs for funding and support, but also because the goals of many of the various development-based organizations reflect, consciously or unconsciously, a common body – in the international community at least – of somewhat controversial theory and research: modernization theory.

The central tenet of modernization theory purported that the process of modernization may be best characterized as social behavior and social organizations becoming more consistently governed by rational thought and action (Moore 1965, 1979). The rationalization of society was thought to be the necessary fulcrum by which to move a traditional agrarian peasant society into the industrial age. Whereas traditional society was seen as cyclical and relatively unchanging, modern society was characterized as being in a constant state of linear growth and change (Rostow 1960, Isbister 1998). A shift from traditional to modern society was expected to take place over a number of generations, though the genesis of such a shift in non-Western or less developed countries was also thought to originate from external stimuli. Because the United States and Western countries were styled as "ideal type" modernized countries, they were the expected source of such stimuli (e.g., Coleman 1976, Pye 1966). Therefore such activities as foreign aid, educational exchange, foreign direct investments, mass media, and even colonialism were defined as possible channels for the transmission of modernity. (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978)

Though both primordialism and modernization theory recognize the potential for conflict that is posed by competing ethnic groups. An important distinction between the two approaches is that modernizationist views challenge the primordialist assumption that ethnic heterogeneity is automatically associated with violence. Interethnic competition in such states, and the violence associated with it, is instead approached as a temporary and controllable state in the process of modernizing (Mousseau 2001). The key to modernization resides in the communication of modern beliefs and practices to traditional societies (Hagen 1962, Schultz 1964). Before populations mobilized to create modern industrial states, they tended to be rooted in place with little communication with other communities or the outside world (Lerner 1958). Whereas primordialists had perceived nationalism and ethnicity-based conflict as an immutable problem that was rooted in the very origins of how the ethnic groups were conceived, modernization theory hypothesized that the horizontal ethnic-based conflict would give way to the vertical merit-based competition of cosmopolitan industrial societies.

In contrast to primordial beliefs, a number of studies have noted that decision making structures remain subject to variability later in life due to environmental shocks such as conflict (Markus 1979), scandals and economic fluctuations (Fiorina 1981), governmental and societal change (Jennings & Niemi 1981, Jennings & Markus 1984). Correspondingly, research interests

have largely shifted from the early focus on the biological or genetic determinism of the primordialist approach to consider later stages in life as possible formative periods, and instead applied economic models that focus on self-interest and rational choice. Modernizationists therefore came to regard nationalism as the product of traditional agrarian society whose xenophobia arose from its static traditions and its limited contact with other cultural groups due to the rooted nature of its settlements, but hypothesized that such a myopic fear of the "other" could potentially dissipate as population groups mixed and mingled in the course of the process of modernization. (Deutsch 1966b, Inkeles 1974)

As a country modernizes, modernization theory promotes the expectation of increased internal population migration from traditional (rural) to modern (urban) areas (Lewis 1955). As different elements of the population mobilize to move from small, traditional agrarian surroundings to larger, more modern industrial societies the inevitable population mixing creates a corresponding shift in frames of reference. Such a shift in reference frames develops as increased opportunity for expanded communications creates the more (socially and culturally) educated, better informed, and more cosmopolitan populations that ultimately define the character of the modern state. Barriers between formerly exclusive groups were therefore expected to weaken in the presence of increased social communication whereby the state's population gradually develops a shared sense of civic identity (Deutsch 1961, 1966a).

As outlined above, modernization theory holds that the frames of reference in use in rural and urban populations are inherently different. Rural populations are seen as being rooted in place and rooted in tradition, resulting in more ethnocentric and nationalistic tendencies. Urban populations on the other hand are seen as mobilized, resulting in a cosmopolitan group of more civic-minded citizens with cross-cultural frames of reference due to the comparatively higher levels of communication with those from outside their ethnic or cultural group. The *"Three Identities" Hypothesis* that arises from such an assertion is: *the – more cosmopolitan – urban dwellers exhibit a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities, whereas rural populations should more strongly resemble the "primordially" divided society, in that frames of reference are largely unique to each ethnicity*.

2.3. POSTMODERNIZATION: COGNITIVE COMMUNITIES AND AGE

While much of the work that falls under the aegis of modernization is united in certain core aspects, many of which are covered above, scholars who were active during the apex of modernization theory tended to be in active competition with one another and Marxist scholars as they struggled to promote their own ideas as the dominant theory of how a society should or could develop (Martinussen 1997, Power 2002). Since the idea of modernization was reintroduced to mainstream development and political science research however (Pye 1990), a body of work has emerged that does define itself, at least in part, as being united in some of the central tenets of modernization: postmodernization.

Postmodernization offers a variety of methods for aiding Macedonia in developing a more stable society. Such methods are informed in part by modernization theory, but are also strongly influenced by many of the grass-roots and constructivist approaches that have since developed (see review in Simon 2002). As with modernization-oriented approaches, postmodernization represents a way of understanding the developing state through multiple, often overlapping views. In general, it may be said that the postmodernization approach is, like modernization, focused on increasing capacity, though usually the capacity being developed is that of the populace rather than that of the elite.

Such efforts to measure civic or collective identity in Macedonia are becoming more common in Macedonia. The top-down approach of modernization – treating a limited collection of determinant factors as being instrumental – is declining somewhat but also remains a common feature of social inquiry. In the meantime however, the practice of assessing cohesion in a population by approaching decision making as an emergent factor has become a growing trend. As such, relatively more recent approaches to addressing decision making in politics and policy have begun to give more attention to the constructs (e.g., information, ideas, experiences) that define how decisions are made (Reich 1988, Stone 1988, Vanberg and Buchannan 1989, Ostrom 1990: 33-38, Fischer and Forrester 1993, Jacobsen 1995, Campbell 2002). Such an approach to understanding the process of decision making is particularly noted in constructivist theories of

identity, which regard such construct sets as frames of reference, through which individuals and groups filter their perceptions, differentiate between inputs, and predict outcomes. As opposed to economic and rational choice models, these constructivist approaches treat identity as a systemic phenomenon that is complex, relatively fluid, conditional, and socially and experientially constructed (Huddy 2001, Kelly 1955).

Postmodernization offers a way of viewing the developing world that is complex and pluralistic. Whereas modernizationists had assumed that the growth of modernity and rationality would lead to the development of a shared sense of civic identity as a society's ethnic groups mixed together over time, postmodernizationists – as I argue here – see no such direct linear relationship. They instead focus on the variety of ways that various groups perceive one another, whether there has been or could be any development of such a shared sense of identity between groups, and how stereotypes and other, less static, frames of reference affect how disparate members of a society perceive one another.

In this manner, the perspective offered by postmodernizationist inquiry is systems-oriented, rather than linear (Inglehart 1997). Many modernizationists expected the state to be the engine for development in a linear and even somewhat inevitable process of industrialization creating economic incentives for rural to urban migration, which in turn would lead to a growth in civic identity. Alternatively, postmodernizationists envision development as more of a system, where changes in one attribute of a given country, such as its civic identity and solidarity, economic growth, education levels, or the like, will in turn create interactions with some or all other aspects of that country's development (e.g., Mousseau 2001). The implication is that development-oriented organizations need not focus only on state capacity building to encourage growth, but may instead focus on any given aspect of a country's development and retain the ability to positively affect a given country's development. In particular, development inquiry has shifted away from Comptean rationalist approaches such as economics or governmental capacity building, to a focus on the mobilization of identity.

An early advocate of such a shift in inquiry was Karl Deutsch. Although his perspective appears to have been firmly rooted in rationalist paradigms and postwar industrialization, Deutsch straddled the line between modernization and what would later be considered postmodernization by incorporating psychology and systems theory (cybernetics) approaches into his work. In his (1966b) proposal for a theory of politics, he outlined how diverse groups

become a cohesive population and how researchers may perceive and measure the progress of such burgeoning cohesion:

> Briefly, we may consider a *people* a community of social communication habits. Its members usually have common habits of speech, such as language, or common cultural memories permitting them to understand one another's ideas, even if they are expressed in two different languages, as among German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss. The ability of the members of such a people to transmit information to each other over a wide range of topics; the ability to form efficient patterns of teamwork for a wide variety of purposes; and perhaps their ability to form new patterns of teamwork for new purposes – all of these may be estimated or measured by methods ranging from the judgment of well-informed observers to the more refined experimental techniques of social psychologists. Data on all these points measure, as it were, the invisible communications equipment the members of a population carry in their minds. From it, inferences can be drawn not only as to the cohesion of an already existing people, and of the membership of particular individuals or groups within it, but also as to the presence or absence of a minimum of cultural compatibility and mutual understanding, sufficient to permit common political or economic institutions to weld different populations in a gradual process of social learning into one people or one nation. (Deutsch 1966b, 177)

The cohesiveness of a society is based on the degree to which groups or individuals can communicate with and understand one another. Such communication is not limited to explicit forms such as language, but includes knowledge systems as well. Deutsch hypothesized that examining the frames of reference in use in a population (i.e., Deutsch's hypothesized "invisible communications equipment") would make it possible to discern groups of individuals who think enough alike to communicate effectively as well as the degree of conceptual agreement and mutual understanding present in a society (1966b, 177). Discernment of such characteristics could allow researchers to predict whether a country possesses the requisite degree of unity of perception and understanding necessary to develop into a viable and stable state.

Whereas modernization theory addresses identity in terms of ethnic and other demographic (rural and urban) characteristics, postmodernization theory is concerned with what the process of educing characteristic frames of reference in a population will reveal about a society's cohesiveness and stability. The resulting hypothesis bears some similarity to the *"Three Identities" hypothesis* of modernization theory. The *"Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis* that

arises from such inquiry is: *Macedonia's population can be clustered into groups of individuals whose frames of reference are sufficiently similar for effective communication. One or more of such groups may constitute a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities.*

An ardent follower of Deutsch and self-proclaimed postmodernist, Ronald Inglehart (1970), expanded on the idea of social communication as a critical aspect of development. Using his own theory of cognitive mobilization, whereby groups in a population formed perceptions and preferences according to their exposure to cosmopolitan values and high levels of communication, Inglehart tested whether such values and increases in communication were giving rise to a new level of pan-European identity in the wake of the Second World War. In particular, he found that younger cohorts tended to be more mobilized and correspondingly, more likely to take on meta-levels of identity than were their elders. Although later tests of Inglehart's hypotheses have called some aspects of his findings into question (e.g., Janssen 1991), the expectation that younger generations are more likely to form new, meta-levels of identity has been supported with some consistency (Inglehart 1997). This expectation leads to another hypothesis. The *Age Cohorts Hypothesis* is: *younger generations are more likely to have frames of reference that converge across ethnicities.*

2.4. DEFINITIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODS

Thus far, four hypotheses have been noted for their application to the research problem of assessing the source(s) and character of the various types of identity present in Macedonia's population. For the purpose of this study, "identity" is defined in terms of frames of reference that allow members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions. Each of the hypotheses employed in this study offer a distinctive way to understand how such frames of reference are expected to function in identity creation, maintenance, and change in a society such as Macedonia.

The "Two Identities" Hypothesis implicit to primordialism is:
Macedonia is dominated by two major ethnic identities, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and each of these identity groups has its own characteristic frame of reference that allows it to interpret ideas and events according to the beliefs, interests, values, and perceptions of the group.

In this way, the *"Two Identities" Hypothesis* frames the problem of identity formation around two mutually exclusive groups that perceive Macedonia's social, political, and economic environment very differently. Further, primordialist theory depicts identities of such groups as relatively durable and frequently rigid over the long-term. Such a position is at odds with the three remaining hypotheses.

The "Three Identities" Hypothesis posed by modernization theory offers the additional variable of rural and urban environments:
The – more cosmopolitan – urban dwellers exhibit a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities, whereas rural populations should more strongly resemble the "primordially" divided society, in that frames of reference are largely unique to each ethnicity.

It follows then that the *"Three Identities" Hypothesis* obtained from modernization theory essentially modifies the primordialist *"Two Identities" Hypothesis* by adding a factor of mobilization and social communication as a mitigating factor. Modernization theory posits that urban (modern) environments offer a more cosmopolitan or ethnically varied environment that makes it possible for people from rural (traditional/agrarian) and ethnically homogenous environments to mix and communicate with greater frequency.

The "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis of postmodernization theory is similar to that of the modernization theory, but contains an important difference:
Macedonia's population can be clustered into groups of individuals whose frames of reference are sufficiently similar for effective communication. One or more of such groups may constitute a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities.

Whereas the *"Three Identities" Hypothesis* restricts the expectation of convergent identities to only modern, urban environments, the *"Cognitive Convergence" Hypothesis* conveys the expectation that modern mass communication within a society can result in frames of reference that converge, regardless of individuals' physical environment. It also suggests that such a convergence is more likely to take place in younger generations, as stated in the *"Age Cohorts" Hypothesis*: *Younger generations are more likely to have frames of reference that converge across ethnicities.*

Each hypothesis helps to explain the formation and maintenance of identity in Macedonia. In each case, frames of reference may be seen as a set of cognitive coordinates. In this context, measurement processes present a challenge, as they involve individual thought processes which are not readily evident to the casual observer. This research follows the constructivist lead in beginning at the level of the individual, eliciting the components of the frames of reference that comprise the individual actor's way of construing the world, and then aggregating upward, to the societal level. These comparison structures are treated as communicable maps that depict a given aspect of how individual observers experience reality (Holzner 1972).

The constructivist models of individual and collective decision making are more evident in *post-ist* literature (e.g., postdevelopment, postmodern, postmodernization) and contend that individuals reduce their judgment to a series of evaluative comparisons, with identity groups sharing a number of core comparisons, or constructs. In essence then, group identity can be said to consist at least in part of a shared frame of reference and to be reinforced through different types of dialogue within and outside a community. A shared frame of reference may therefore function as a plausible indicator of an individual's tie to an identity group (Holzner 1972, Dunn and Ginsberg 1986, Dunn et al 1984, Cohen 1985, Shaw 1985, Luhmann 1995). These referential frameworks help the members of identity groups to interpret the world around them and make decisions based on those interpretations.

Traditional approaches, such as surveys or ethnographic observation, are not well suited to investigating identity as an emergent phenomenon. The use of surveys and aggregate demographic indicators are top-down approaches and are frequently more strongly dependent on the researcher's preconceptions and the degree to which they are able to internalize what they are experiencing (Stanfield 1993). Although ethnographic research offers some definite advantages

over surveys and questionnaires for studying identity, its use is often much more time consuming and expensive to undertake and the results can be difficult to generalize to the aggregate population.

Many modern studies approach identity as an individual's intentional association with a particular group (ethnic, religious, political, etc.; e.g., Sears 1987, Huddy 2001). These classifications, however, often fail to capture the more fluid aspects of identity construction and cognition. Although constructivist scholars agree that identity is constructed and exists on multiple levels, few venture beyond the *intentional* construction of identity. Identity is also constructed, at least in part, through an accumulation of perceptions, communications, and experiences that accrete in a manner that is often beyond the control of the individual referent. So, while individuals may consider themselves to be a part of a particular ethnic group, their personal experiences may set them far apart from many among those whom they may wish to consider their peers.

Accordingly, identity groups are approached in this study as emergent collectives (e.g., thought communities, societal beliefs, collective realities) of individuals who make sense of the world around them through comparison structures that tend to have a good deal of overlap, originate through experience, and are reinforced through communication (Bar-Tal 2000, Fraser and Gaskell 1990, Himmelweit and Gaskell 1990, Luhmann 1995, Zerubavel 1997). These identity groups are neither static, nor monolithic; which is to say that a given individual may have a number of levels of identity and it is possible for those levels to change in character or become subordinated to one another due to changes in that individual's environment. It has additionally been recognized that, because individuals acquire experiences differently, even individuals who superficially belong to the same community may still perceive symbols and events in completely different ways (Cohen 1985, Kelly 1955).

The past half century has witnessed a steady expansion in the application of constructivist approaches to the assessment of group perception and decision making (e.g., Kelly 1955; Holzner 1972; Cohen 1985; Dunn and Ginsburg 1986; Luhmann 1985, 1995; Huddy 2001; Lakoff 1987, 2002; van den Bossche 2003). Under this paradigm, perception is viewed as being comparative in nature and is determined by one's identity (frame of reference). Further, groups who share identity on some level are similarly assumed to share a general comparison scheme,

with which members of that group or system make sense of what they perceive in the world around them (Kelly 1955; Luhmann 1985, 1995).

A primary goal of this research has therefore been to develop a method that will allow for the delineation of shared political identity through a comparison of individuals' cognitive frameworks. To accomplish this, Niklas Luhmann, a German philosopher who dedicated his career to developing a theory of how identity groups form and grow, recommended employing George R. Kelly's (1955) personal construct psychology as a well suited and appropriate method for eliciting the constructs that comprise an individual's interpretive framework (Luhmann 1995: 242). Luhmann, a latecomer to Kelly's theories, was following the lead of such academics as Dunn (1986), Dunn and Ginsburg (1986), Adams-Webber (1985), and Fransella and Bannister (1967) in recognizing the potential that the repertory grid can offer.

Kelly's repertory grid method is a semi-structured psychological interview technique that is specifically designed to elicit culturally relevant frames of reference in a manner that minimizes the impact of the researcher's own cultural biases. It additionally minimizes the impact of respondents who offer only what they want the researcher to hear, a common concern of Balkan political research. As a result, the repertory grid offers a relatively resilient method that is less subject to concerns of interpretation and reliability than many other survey or interviewing techniques.

The present study considers both the socially constructed aspects of identity and the cognitive artifacts of events, communications, and observations that are neither sought out nor necessarily expected by the individual. This is accomplished by eliciting the comparative constructs which together form frames of reference rather than applying pre-existing constructs based on ethnic, organizational, or demographic characteristics. Identity is approached as a cognitive fingerprint that is specific to each individual, and which may have some degree of overlap or convergence with others' perspectives due to shared or similar experiences, communications, and media. Membership in an identity group is therefore operationalized in this study as being determined according to which individuals' cognitive fingerprints – frames of reference – display the greatest semantic and/or perceptual similarity (i.e., those who tend to use the same constructs and/or differentiate similarly between comparisons).

2.4.1. Methods and Hypothesis Testing: Stage One

Repertory grid involves procedures that go beyond conventional interview techniques. As such, some degree of specialized equipment and/or training is necessary to prepare interviewers to properly administer the method, making it a potentially costly method for use with large, diverse populations. Therefore, in order to improve the feasibility of the study, data collection was undertaken in two stages. In the first stage, repertory grid interviews were undertaken in a subpopulation of Macedonia's community: university students. Data elicited from this group was analyzed to test the *"Two Identities" Hypothesis* of ethnic solidarity suggested by primordialist theory, the *"Three Identities" Hypothesis* of modernization that posits a difference in identity between rural and urban groups, and provide an initial investigation of the *"Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis* that is employed in postmodernization theory and assumes that frames of reference may converge in a population regardless of ethnic and demographic differences.

However, the use of university students in social inquiry raises an important issue that should be addressed in the course of testing hypotheses. There is a legitimate concern that the sampling method may present a potential confounder: the opinions and attitudes elicited by sampling from such a population may be a reflection of the universities that individual respondents attend rather than that of the independent citizens they are becoming (Sears 1986). If this assumption is true, students' perceptions should exhibit more cognitive similarity within their university groups than can be seen in the sampled population at large. A hypothesis was therefore constructed to test this for possibility using stage one data. The *University Groups Hypothesis* is: *university students' frames of reference exhibit more similarity to other students in their own universities than they do with those from other universities.*

2.4.2. Methods and Hypothesis Testing: Stage Two

A second stage of data collection was devised for three reasons: (1) to test the *Age Cohorts Hypothesis*; (2) to test the *"Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis*; and (3) to retest the *"Two Identities"* and *"Three Identities" Hypotheses*. Because university students represent only a limited spectrum of age groups, data from the first stage of collection could not be used to test the *Age Cohorts Hypothesis*. The survey conducted for the second stage of data collection was

therefore administered throughout Macedonia to a random sample of respondents over the age of 18 in order to better capture the full range of voting age respondents.

Additionally, it was possible that the groups identified in the process of testing the *"Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis* were merely an artifact of the clustering procedure used to delineate them. In order to account for such a possibility, the survey used in the second stage of data collection was assembled using a sample of constructs (comparative terms) elicited in the first stage of interviews. The constructs were then analyzed according to response patterns in order to verify whether the initial findings from the first stage could be replicated in the wider population.

2.5. CONCLUSION – IDENTITY

Overly simplified models severely restrict the variety and scope of inquiry that is likely to take place, and therefore stunt our overall understanding. In a similar vein, poor or misleading information that may result from such constrained inquiry may lead to missed opportunities. Research into the Balkans is increasingly suggesting that the current stock of knowledge about Macedonia and the region involves Balkan stereotypes and other misleading popular assumptions, making it of dubious value to those interested in understanding social and political development. This recognition has in turn given rise to an increasing call for more generative inquiry that relies less on prior assumptions and traditional models.

3. IDENTITY RESEARCH AND MACEDONIA

This chapter provides a review of literature that has directly and (mostly) indirectly addressed issues of identity and civic ideals in Macedonia. As with the guiding paradigms mentioned above, formal and informal efforts to understand identity and/or its role of the development of the state presents a number of different and frequently oppositional points of view. With this consideration in mind, the sections that follow are structured to give some order and framing to the mosaic of viewpoints and opinions that comprise such literature.

The question of whether or not Macedonia is developing a sense of civic identity (i.e., a level of identity based on being a citizen of the state) manifests in a small but growing literature that addresses various aspects of the formation, nurturing, and growth of political identity in Macedonia. As with identities themselves, accounts pertaining to identities and methods of identity formation in Macedonia form a mosaic of, sometimes diametrically opposed, viewpoints. Before entering into a discussion of such competing frameworks however, this chapter begins with a contextualizing section – *Section 3.1* – that provides an introduction to the background and history in which the discussion is situated. Each of the four sections that follow *Section 3.1* discuss specific trends in conceptualizing how the role of identity in Macedonia has been employed, portrayed, or analyzed in public forums throughout Macedonia's history as an independent country. These trends have been ordered into four categories: (1) attempts at boundary setting and the retrospective creation or justification of identity; (2) a focus on the role of elites in shaping and defining identity; (3) employing classic models and stereotypes (e.g. primordial divisions, nationalism, "balkanization"); and (4) attempts to move beyond earlier assumptions.

Much of the work pertaining to identity in the Republic of Macedonia deals only indirectly with its creation, maintenance, or function in society; though academic inquiry in these areas has begun to increase. *Section 3.2* introduces a highly pervasive mechanism of identity

formation in Macedonia: formal and informal attempts to create or define the boundaries of Macedonia's identity groups. Although such purposive attempts to influence interethnic boundaries are a common feature of public debate, these actions are most frequently noted when they are identified among elites, whose role in identity creation and maintenance is discussed more fully in *Section 3.3*. Wider inquiry into the formation and maintenance of Macedonia's identities is discussed in *Section 3.4*, much of which is best characterized as relying most heavily on classic models and stereotypes. By contrast, *Section 3.5* provides an introduction to – mostly exploratory – research that approaches the role of identity and its formation more explicitly. The chapter concludes – *Section 3.6* – with a discussion of where the trends in identity research appear to be leading and how the present study compliments and builds on those trends.

3.1. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

During the early 1990s, Macedonia – one of the poorest and most ethnically diverse of the Yugoslav republics – accomplished something remarkable: it was the only constituent republic to manage a "velvet divorce" (Adamson and Jovič 2004, 304), sidestepping the internal and external violence that was taking place elsewhere throughout the former Yugoslavia. Since that time however, Macedonia has had to struggle to forge the ties that will bind its society together as a more civically oriented state. Such an effort appears to be a Herculean task, as outward appearances indicate that identity groups there may in fact be moving toward greater polarization rather than convergence around commonly held civic ideals.

Some social and historical considerations are important for understanding the events and motivations that affect identity formation and maintenance in Macedonia.[4] Although there is certainly no shortage of people with roots in the region who trace the genesis of current identities back to ancient times (e.g., *Section 3.2*), many of the more salient aspects of identity and its

[4] This review does not include the many treatises on the "Macedonian question" as it existed before Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia. That issue is essentially related to Macedonia's historical geography and territorial rights and it pitted the interests of a Macedonian state against those of the countries that it borders. Though that topic deals heavily with issues of historical national identity and forms the roots of some very salient issues that are deeply seated in Macedonian politics today, it is not central to this research and is referenced only indirectly in *Section 3.1.1*.

investigation in Macedonia are the products of much more recent events and practices. Of particular importance are considerations arising from Macedonia's location and its interstate relations (*Section 3.1.1*), assumptions and events surrounding the further deterioration of Yugoslavia and conflict within and among the former Yugoslav republics (*Section 3.1.2*), and the politics of identity that have developed in Macedonia (*Section 3.1.3*).

3.1.1. Neighboring States and International Recognition

Colorfully described by Christopher Hill, former United States Ambassador, as "a nice little country in a high crime neighborhood" (McKinsey 1999), Macedonia is located between Serbia, Kosovo, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria; and has been subject to international protection and stabilization efforts since its 1992 secession from Yugoslavia. As a newly independent state, Macedonia was far from being either welcome or secure in its neighborhood. Neighbor states were unstable (e.g., Serbia and later, Albania), questioned the uniqueness of Macedonians' language and culture (e.g., Bulgaria, Greece, and to a lesser extent, Serbia), heatedly contested Macedonia's choice of name and state flag (i.e., Greece), and have each, at some point in time, stated claims to some or all of Macedonia's population and/or territory.

In the face of this, the recently independent Republic of Macedonia was functioning under a number of distinct disadvantages: it was small, landlocked, without an army, and nowhere near economic self-sufficiency. The common perception by Macedonia's neighbors was that the country would inevitability either be annexed or divided among some or all of them (Mirčev 1999, Sokalski 2003). It is therefore ironic that at least some neighboring countries' overt attempts at destabilizing Macedonia in response to this expectation often functioned to aid the new country's stability. Expectations of Macedonia's inevitable economic or security collapse prompted individual neighboring countries to begin jockeying for position in what was expected to be the redistribution of Macedonia's territory and population. In so doing, individual neighbor countries each sought to increase their individual claims by encouraging Macedonia's dependence on them, and thereby increasing the probability that the new state would further legitimize such claims by turning to them for assistance in an upcoming time of need (Mirčev 1999).

Macedonia's first president, Krio Gligorov, perceived the potential for such actions to shape Macedonia into a dependent state and responded by adopting a policy of "active equi-distance [*sic*] to and with all neighboring countries" (Mirčev 1999, 210), avoiding any regionally exclusive alliances or associations. Such policies allowed Macedonia to establish trade and diplomatic ties with any or all neighbor states, without aligning too closely with any particular country or group of countries in the region. Rather than seeking security and renegotiating the new country's identity according to its potential for membership in the new divisions that were being proposed throughout the Balkans, Macedonia chose to "develop good and friendly relations with all, so that no neighboring state will have a privileged position in Macedonia" (Sokalski 2003, 50). More to the point, such an egalitarian approach to diplomacy appears to have helped prevent Macedonia from being subsumed by any of its much more powerful neighbors. Outward intentions and internal growth notwithstanding however, without the cooperation of those powerful neighbors, it was doubtful that the new country could have existed long.

As the first to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name in 1992, Bulgaria at least partially assuaged fears of irredentism from the east. Tensions between the two countries were not altogether alleviated however; as Bulgarian officials persisted in their longstanding argument against ethnic Macedonians' linguistic and cultural uniqueness and instead continued to insist that they were merely ethnic Bulgarians living in a separate state (Mahon 1998). Under similar circumstances, Serbia agreed to tacitly honor Macedonia's independence and withdrew its troops from Macedonia peacefully but at the same time made it clear that it considered the matter to be unfinished business (see Section 3.1.2). (Mirčev 1999, Sokalski 2003)

A bittersweet milestone was reached in 1993, when Macedonia was recognized by and admitted to the United Nations (UN). This greatly enhanced Macedonia's bargaining position vis-à-vis other nations and provided increased security for its borders. Such recognition had been blocked a year earlier by Greek representatives, who argued that Macedonia's name represented irredentist claims against Greece, whose territory also included a large part of ancient Macedonia that is home to a substantial "slavophone" population along its northern border (Rossos 1994). Any elation over Macedonia's recognition and inclusion in the UN was therefore mitigated by the long delay and the eventual choice not to recognize the "Republic of Macedonia" under its

official name, but instead provisionally referring to it as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) in deference to Greece (United Nations Security Council 1993).

Such was their outrage at being denied exclusivity to the name "Macedonia" that Greek influence, through official channels as well as its substantial diaspora network, was pitted against nearly all diplomatic and economic efforts that the new republic undertook. Macedonia's diplomatic initiatives were therefore hampered both indirectly, by other nations' reluctance to offend Greece, and directly, when Greece's membership in international governing bodies allowed its representatives to veto many initiatives and membership applications that could have aided the new developing state. Even more damaging were the Greek trade blockades in 1992 and 1994 that caused enormous economic losses for the newly independent country. (Dunn 1994, Phillips 2004, Sokalski 2003)

Despite trade routes opening through Bulgaria and Albanian as relations with those countries were established, the lack of Macedonia's most substantial freight corridor through Thessaloniki made the task of establishing a viable economy much more difficult. By the time Macedonia and Greece finally came to an agreement in 1995 that allowed for a lifting of the blockade – leaving only the name issue unresolved – Greece had exercised nearly every diplomatic option at its disposal to discredit, divide, impoverish, and destabilize the fledgling country. Although such efforts did not achieve all of their intended goals, they were a brutal blow to a country that was already starting out from a severely disadvantaged position. The Greek blockade had stunted much of Macedonia's early growth potential and had catalyzed some of the already increasing tensions as different communities there found themselves competing for increasingly scarce resources (Gallagher 2005, 95). To make matters worse, soon after Macedonia's economy finally began to show signs of stable and consistent improvement, much of that growth was once again curtailed with the advent of the Kosovo crisis (Hislope 2003).

3.1.2. Yugoslav Deterioration and Conflict

Although many neighboring countries' attempts to undermine Macedonia's legitimacy and stability had an impact on the population and government there, no other state had more profound effects – both positive and negative – on the development of Macedonia's civic identity than the erstwhile Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia). Serbia has functioned in turns to either unite

or polarize Macedonia's population. The prospect of aggression from Serbia under the Miloševič regime did the most to unite the population of Macedonia under a single identity, contrasting with Serbia as the outside, hegemonic "others" (Adamson and Jovič 2004). Although Serbia eventually honored Macedonia's secession from Yugoslavia and withdrew its military from Macedonian territory, it was clear that Serbian officials regarded such actions as temporary measures only.[5]

Later, reports were circulated that Miloševič had offered to conspire with Greece in a plan to destabilize and divide Macedonia between the two countries (Mirčev 1999, Phillips 2004). Other sources additionally contended that Serbia had prepared plans for an eventual unilateral invasion of Macedonia in order to return it to the Yugoslav fold (Sokalski 2003, 53). Even the presence of the UNPREDEP forces (see Section 2.1) was not sufficient to allay concerns, given the failure of those same forces to contain the violence erupting elsewhere. In such manner, for at least part of its history, the looming presence of such hostile "others" provided a neutral rallying point that united the population in defense of the new state's territory, right to existence, and self-determination.

Although Serbian attitudes toward Macedonia initially presented a strong stabilizing factor there, Serbia's later actions in Kosovo and the resulting fallout did far more to contribute to the destabilization of Macedonia's politics and identity. Whereas the recognized potential for Serbian aggression had united Macedonia along a single front (i.e., "us" against "them"), the violence and destruction that took place in neighboring Kosovo polarized Macedonia's two largest ethnic communities by exacerbating a variety of already mounting interethnic issues and radically shifting the balance of power in Macedonia's internal interethnic politics. Three issues were of particular importance: (1) the economic and political strain created by the necessity of caring for Kosovar refugees; (2) the loss of the University of Pristina, the only outlet for Albanian-language university education in the former Yugoslavia; and (3) the advent of a militarily trained, mobilized, and restive cross border group of ethnic Albanians.

As Serbian military incursions into Kosovo sent hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing across the border into Macedonia in early 1999, the sheer numbers put an incredible

[5] Much of the decision to remove Serbia's troops from Macedonia was based on expediency and disregard for Macedonia's potential for economic or interethnic social stability, an opinion that was reinforced by the destabilizing effects of Greece's 1992 and 1994 trade embargoes. With instability increasing in the former Yugoslavia's more prosperous northern republics, Serbian leaders opted to move their troops out of the relatively peaceful south, where they had been sitting idle. (see Sokalski 2003, 51-55, Mirčev 1999)

strain on the already economically troubled country. Macedonian officials, hoping that alternative solutions would prove possible, were slow in their response and even closed the borders at first. In the meantime, foreign aid, when any was offered, was also slow in coming. The poor handling of the refugee problem and obvious reluctance of ethnic Macedonian officials to take in Kosovar refugees was interpreted by ethnic Albanians in Macedonia as resulting from ethnic discrimination. For their part, ethnic Macedonian leaders lashed out verbally at the international community for what they perceived as an enormous influx of – primarily ethnic Albanian – Kosovars who represented a financial burden that the country could not afford. Additionally, ethnic Macedonians were keenly aware that the lingering presence of between 150,000 and 400,000 additional ethnic Albanians would have a profound effect on interethnic relations in the small country. (Phillips 2004, Sokalski 2003)

As it was, interethnic tensions were already strained by differing cultural affinities vis-à-vis the peoples of Kosovo. Although they held little trust in the motivations of Serbia's leadership and did not approve of the brutal tactics employed by Serbian troops in Kosovo, ethnic Macedonian sympathies often tended to be with Kosovo's Serbs, with whom they shared a common religion and similar culture. Albanians, for their part, tended to side with Kosovar Albanians, who tended to share family and business ties and had always viewed the border between Macedonia and Kosovo as virtually nonexistent in such respects. Although Albanians radical enough to advocate the creation of a "Greater Albania"[6] are a small minority in Macedonia and Kosovo ("What happened to Greater Albania" 2007, Judah 2001), those voices were briefly amplified by the horrors of what took place during Serbia's attempted ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, bringing the topic of Albanian secession further into the center of internal politics (see Section 3.1.3).

Two other internal issues were exacerbated as a result of the Kosovo conflict: Albanian-language university education, and extremist politics. The issue of Albanian-language education at the university level was already in strong contention in Macedonian politics when the violence and destruction of the Kosovo conflict caused Pristina University to close and much its faculty to

[6] Some radical Albanian nationalists have proposed that Albania should be united with all contiguous territory that is occupied by a majority of ethnic Albanians. The creation of "Greater Albania" would involve carving out regions of present-day Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in order to unite all ethnic Albanians in one state. Such an undertaking is reminiscent of Serbian and Croatian attempts to fashion "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" from the remnants of Yugoslavia. Even the possibility that Albanians may one day move to create a "Greater Albania" has created a strong undercurrent of tension in Macedonia's politics.
(For an overview of "Greater Albania" issue and its implications see Judah 2001)

scatter across Europe. As the former Yugoslavia's only Albanian-language university, its loss lent more immediacy to earlier ethnic Albanian demands for the establishment of an equivalent institution in Macedonia and shifted politics there further from the center and onto to more extreme ethnopolitical margins.

The political battleground in Macedonia continued to grow to resemble the physical battleground to its north, but it did not reach its crescendo until well after the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in 1999.[7] At the end of the fighting in Kosovo, there were a substantial number of trained, armed, and experienced Albanian fighters whose presence nearby served to further transform the political climate in Macedonia. Many of those fighters had originated in Macedonia and had crossed the border to join the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in fighting against Serbian troops. Although their experience was derived from the fighting in Kosovo, many of the Albanians from Macedonia who joined with the KLA claimed to have been training to fight Macedonian government forces since well before the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict (Murphy 2001, March 24).

When Albanian militants calling themselves the National Liberation Army (NLA) appeared in Macedonia's western mountains around the – largely Albanian – city of Tetovo in late January, 2001, it was an indication that they had decided they were ready to use force in dealing with the Macedonian government (Rusi 2002). The words of one militant leader, Arban Aliu, made their intentions clear: "Kosovo inspired us a great deal. … We can do the same thing here" (Murphy 2001, March 19). Such a decision contrasted sharply with ethnic Albanian political leaders who were already in power in Macedonia (Rusi 2002) and Kosovo (Murphy 2001, March 23), all of whom spoke out against an armed uprising and demanded that the militants desist (see Sokalski 2003, 230). There was also disunity among the militants, whose stated goals ranged from the separation of Western Macedonia and the establishment of "Greater Albania," to demands for equal dialogue with the Slavic majority in government.

Leaders in the NLA quickly downplayed the more radical ideas of establishing a "Greater Albania" or "Greater Kosovo," due to the political unpopularity of such an effort at both the national and international levels. For their part, Albanian leaders who had attained legitimate power on either side of the Macedonia-Kosovo border did not support yet another outbreak of

[7] Serbian troops were withdrawn and a treaty was signed in June 1999, shifting the targets of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo from Albanians to Serbs. With continued ethnic cleansing, now at the hands of those perceived to have been the original victims, Western support for Albanians in Kosovo became much more muted. (Judah 2001)

armed antagonism. So even while the flow of equipment and arms across the Macedonia-Kosovo border offered strong evidence of ties between the Macedonia's NLA and Kosovo's disbanded KLA, Kosovo's leaders downplayed the significance of ties, as they perceived the armed uprising in Macedonia as a threat to Kosovo's push for independence from Serbia. (Judah 2001, Phillips 2004)

Once the violent uprisings had begun, ethnic Albanian politicians attempted to shift blame for the uprisings to the failure of ethnic Macedonian politicians to enter into a dialog sooner in order to address Albanian grievances (Xhaferi and Bjelica 2001). Ethnic Macedonian politicians responded by dismissing Albanian paramilitary groups as terrorists bent on the establishment of Greater Albania. Although arguments by both sides were correct to at least some degree, the building rhetoric did more to increase tensions and further radicalize much of the country's interethnic dialogue. By the time international groups began to push both sides – albeit ethnic Macedonians felt much more of the push than did ethnic Albanians – into beginning peace talks, ethnic communities had become radicalized to the point that it appeared that Macedonia may not be able to achieve political or ethnic stability once more. (Phillips 2004)

3.1.3. Macedonia's Identity Politics

Much of the disagreement between Macedonia's largest ethnic communities had its roots in the former Yugoslav system. Because Macedonia's citizenry based their perceptions of the new state on their experience as Yugoslav citizens, the state's new status as an independent country often held very different connotations for ethnic Macedonians than it did for other ethnic communities in the country. As the second-largest ethnic community, Albanians in particular voiced the opinion that they should have more of a stake in the running of the country. Albanian participation in politics and government therefore began with the pursuit of specific issues that were important to them. It was not long, however, before Albanians, perceiving that their proposals were going unheeded, shifted their political approach to a competition with ethnic Macedonians over power and representation.

Upon its secession from Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia was to be a new, pluralistic, capitalist society; but many artifacts of the Yugoslav system had carried over as well. One artifact in particular has direct and strong implications for perceptions of identity and status

in Macedonia: the concept of what it is to be a "nation." Under the Yugoslav system, ethnic communities were differentiated as "nations" (*narodi*), "nationalities" (*narodnosti*), or "ethnic groups" (*etnički grupi*). Slavic ethno-cultural groups that constitute a local majority within the state and do not consider themselves to have a homeland anywhere else beyond the borders of the state were defined as "nations" (e.g., Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Bosniaks, Slovenes, Montenegrins). Nationalities, by contrast, were those non-Slavic ethno-cultural groups who could claim a homeland outside the borders of the state (e.g., Turks, Albanians). The last designation, "ethnic groups," was applied to those ethno-cultural groups which were not considered to have a territorial homeland (e.g., Vlachs, Roms). (Adamson and Jovič 2004, 296; Brown 2000b, 129-129)

When Macedonia adopted its new system of governance, the spirit behind the conceptualization scheme (i.e., nation, nationality, and ethnic groups) carried over to color how membership in the new state would be understood and how the two major ethnic communities perceived the implications of Macedonia's secession. As such, the preamble to Macedonia's constitution proved to be an early point of contention. The constitution's preamble originally stated in part that Macedonia was "established as a *national* state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other *nationalities* living in the Republic of Macedonia [emphasis added]"[8] (Constitution). Although the body of the constitution defines Macedonia as a civic state and there is no further mention of "national" status, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia interpreted the statement in the preamble as an indication that ethnic Macedonians intended for Macedonia to become a single-nation state, marginalizing Albanians there (Aliti 1994, Adamson and Jovič 2004). In protest to the preamble, Albanian leaders in Macedonia boycotted the November 20, 1991 parliamentary session that was convened to ratify the new constitution, further weakening Albanian ties to the state (Mincheva 2005; Hislope 2003, 139).

[8] The preamble has since been amended to remove any direct reference to nation or nationality in defining Macedonia's citizens. Amendment IV, Item 1, adopted in 2001, replaces the original preamble and states in part: "The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Roma people, the Bosniak people and others, taking responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland, aware of and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and struggle to create the independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future generations for preserving and developing everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good – the Republic of Macedonia – …" (Constitution).

Unlike "nations," Yugoslavia's "nationalities" had not possessed the right to self-determination or secession. Because of their former status as a "nationality" under the Yugoslav system, Albanians had never enjoyed the same political status as the constituent nations, despite the fact that the Yugoslavia's Albanian population had outnumbered some of those nations (e.g., Macedonian, Montenegrin, Slovene), in part because their status as a "nationality" indicated that they had a homeland elsewhere. As Adamson and Jovič observed, when applied in the case of Macedonia, "this discourse enabled separation of Macedonia from Yugoslavia, but denied separation of ethnic Albanian territories (which in 1993 declared their own 'Republic of Illirida') from Macedonia" (2004, 296).

Frustrated over what they perceived as the prospect of permanent marginalization, Albanian leaders had attempted to force the issue by establishing themselves as a constituent nation – Illirida – in an unsanctioned referendum. Because the referendum was not legal, it was officially ignored and, for their part, ethnic Macedonians interpreted such Albanian demands for constituent nation status as the first step on the road to Albanian secession and the creation of Greater Albania. Although Macedonia's constitution guaranteed citizenship regardless of ethnicity or religion, popular perceptions based on the old Yugoslav system had been used to frame the discourse of politics around ethnicity, rather than the civic definitions contained in the constitution (Adamson and Jovič 2004, Dimova 2003). But while the parliament and other aspects of the Macedonian constitution appeared to be geared toward establishing a civic-based national identity, ethnic Albanian communities were loath to give up their hopes of achieving constituent "nation" status in the new country.

Clearly, Macedonia's ethnic Albanians were unsatisfied with their perceived constitutional status and ethnic Macedonians regarded the idea of granting them constituent nation status as being tantamount to the territorial fragmentation of the country. Yet, despite the mutual suspicions among the two largest ethnic communities, Macedonia's system of government did manage to function with the participation of all ethnic communities in the country. In the first two years especially, a spirit of optimism was notable in the Albanian population, who anticipated having more of a voice in government than they had under the Yugoslav system. The pluralistic system was immediately evident in the multiethnic parliament, and, despite early misgivings, Albanians were wary but hopeful participants. Albanian political

representatives proposed legislation related to their desire for greater ethnic expression that, they contended, the constitution did not adequately address. (Arifi 1996)

Proposals such as the establishment of a state-supported Albanian-language university, the inclusion of Albanian as an official language, and a mandated increase in the number of ethnic Albanians employed in the civil service were put fourth by ethnic Albanian members of parliament. Such proposals were routinely either voted down or tabled by the ethnic Macedonian majority who perceived them as either separatist or unnecessary. Although ethnic Albanian parliamentary leaders were an essential part of every interethnic coalition government, many became increasingly disgruntled with what they perceived as a lack of Albanian voice in Macedonia's government. This dissatisfaction lead caused the largest ethnic Albanian political party to split into radical and moderate wings, leading to an even smaller number of representatives in the following election cycles, further adding to the spiral of frustration. (Arifi 1996; Shea 1997, 240)

In response to what they perceived as "the tyranny of the majority" (Arifi 1996), Albanians shifted more of their political focus to matters of numbers and representation in order to influence the balance of power in Macedonia. In particular, the "numbers game" – associated with the effect of relative population sizes on access to power – has been a persistent feature of Macedonia's politics throughout its independence. Of the roughly two-million inhabitants, approximately sixty-four percent are ethnic Macedonian, twenty-five percent are ethnic Albanian, and the remaining eleven percent represent a variety of ethnic backgrounds (Republic of Macedonia 2005). The importance of the relative sizes of the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian populations in power politics can be seen in ethnic Albanian references to Macedonia as a country with "two majorities," a claim that gives no apparent weight to the importance of civil identity.

The politics of identity and ethnicity have become so pervasive in every aspect of Macedonian life that it is not uncommon to hear locals refer to it jokingly as a "country of two-million politicians." The numbers game began as ethnic Albanian groups protested – and often boycotted – census counts, claiming that the census was biased and misrepresented the size of the Albanian population in Macedonia, which they claim to be up to forty percent of the total population. The numbers game has further muddied an already confusing milieu of identities and ethnicities as ethnic Turks and even Moslem ethnic Macedonians in some areas of Macedonia

are being pressured to refer to themselves as "Albanian." In return, Moslems of other ethnicities are officially encouraged to express their ethnic identity and some Christian Albanians have been pressured to report themselves as "Macedonian." (Friedman 1996, International Crisis Group 2003)

Although Macedonia's Albanian community grew increasingly frustrated at what they perceived as the ineffectiveness of their political leaders, the most effective catalyst in the radicalization of Macedonia's politics proved to be the destabilization of Kosovo. (see Section 3.1.2) When armed fighters with ties to Kosovo began to operate in the northwest of Macedonia, both Albanian and Macedonian communities quickly radicalized, often with other ethnic communities caught in the middle. However, much of the success of the armed movement was due to the participation of Macedonia's local ethnic Albanians, which in turn was more closely tied to an internal struggle for political power due to dissatisfaction with Albanian leadership than with any desire to unite with another province or country (e.g., Daskalovski 2003, Judah 2001, Pearson 2002).

In the end, war was averted by means of an internationally brokered peace agreement that was composed in a secluded complex of government buildings on Lake Ohrid, in southwestern Macedonia. What came to be known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement was negotiated between the leaders of Macedonia's largest and most influential ethnic Macedonian parties and ethnic Albanian parties and indirectly with NLA leadership, with whom ethnic Albanian leaders remained in contact throughout the process (Popetrevski and Latifi 2002). The final agreement addressed Albanian demands for elevating the political and legal status of Albanians in Macedonia, without sacrificing the unitary character of the state.[9] The indirect effect of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was that it introduced a new Albanian political party and new actors to the political scene in Macedonia as the NLA disbanded its former leaders began jockeying for power (see Pettifer 2002; Simpson 2002, September 17). The creation of the new – more radical – Albanian party was yet another signal that politics and identity in Macedonia had been moved further into the radical fringes by the militant uprising (Phillips 2004).

The Ohrid Framework Agreement and the events surrounding it radically changed interethnic politics in Macedonia. A major concern expressed by ethnic Macedonians is that the

[9] For an overview of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and factors surrounding it, see Ohrid and Beyond (Brown et. al., 2002) and Macedonia (Phillips 2004).

internationally brokered Ohrid negotiations legitimized the role of militant leaders and established the precedent of armed uprising as an effective method of addressing political grievance (Sokalski 2003, 236-238; Phillips 2004, 134-136). The agreement also had constructive implications however, in that this was the first time that leaders from the country's ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities were forced to meet and work together to address issues that had been festering since the time Macedonia declared independence. In this manner, the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement has denied the – now disbanded – NLA much of its former platform, but armed splinter groups remain in both ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities and both sides appear to regard Macedonia's politics and identity as a zero-sum contest.

3.2. BOUNDARY SETTING AND CREATION OF IDENTITY GROUPS

Since it achieved independence, Macedonia has been in an almost constant state of negotiation and renegotiation of its national boundaries – physical and symbolic – both externally and internally. In the course of this struggle, external forces provided an early threat to Macedonia's legitimacy and stability (e.g., Section 3.1.1). Ethnic Macedonians have responded to external challenges to their country's legitimacy by seeking to define, or redefine, the history of the Macedonian people both informally, through websites, discussion lists, and media outlets; and formally, through state-supported scholarship and political rhetoric (Balalovska 2002; Brown 2000a, 2000b; Kohl 1998). Although international scholarship that investigates such efforts to create or define Macedonia's identity refer to the claims made by Macedonian scholars and statesmen as "patently untenable" (e.g., Kohl 1998), or approach the subject as the contemporary "Macedonian *question*" (e.g., Pettifer 1995, Roudometof 2000), some scholars also focus on examples of how such identity building has been used to foster a multiethnic identity for the state. In particular, Brown (2000b) related an instance where what he had initially perceived as an historical distortion or exaggeration of the multiethnic character of the 1903 independence uprisings – Illinden – was in the eyes of his Macedonian hosts "a blueprint for the kind of relations that should exist [in Macedonia] (2000b, 43). In this revelation, Brown had discovered

that efforts by international scholars such as himself to deconstruct the sort of popular histories that are being delineated in Macedonia can constitute a threat to that state's claims to its right to existence as a cohesive and independent country.

A similar phenomenon can occur internally, when competing groups in a society work to undermine their perceived competitors' state or national symbols or seek to elevate the importance or their own symbols. Such efforts have been taking place with more frequency in Macedonia, especially since a mixture of internal and external forces have functioned to more effectively destabilize the country and increasingly polarize the population into ethnically-based identity groups (e.g., Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). This type of "symbolic militancy" is fairly well documented in situations where ethnicities are in competition (e.g., Cohen 1985, Dyck 1985, Hobsbawn and Ranger 1991). Some researchers have even developed an appreciation for this sort of activity, contending that it provides insight into the "national narrative" for a particular group (e.g., Frusetta 2004, Roudometof 2002). Much of the work that focuses on such differences and distances in Macedonia is undertaken by its citizens or residents, who have contributed to the process of establishing or rebuilding ethnic boundaries in order to reify community identity or to mobilize a political base (e.g., Babuna 2000, Ristovski [1983], Xhaferi 1998, 2001; see also Brown 2000a; Koppa 2001, 8-10).

The importance of reversing this apparent trend toward ethnic polarization and developing Macedonia's national identity according to civic culture, rather than ethnic designations has been widely noted within Macedonia's ethnic Albanian (e.g., Brown 2000b, 129) and ethnic Macedonian (e.g., Daskalovski 2002, Hristova 2005, Vankovska-Cvetkovska 1998) communities, as well as internationally (e.g., Ackermann 2000, Draftary 2001, Fraenkel 1996, Hislope 2003, Liotta and Jebb 2002, Sokalski 2003). Macedonia's first president, Kiro Gligorov, made a plea for unity in 1995, where he reiterated his vision of Macedonia as a multiethnic, civic state, and highlighted the ultimate pitfall of ethnic nationalism:

> We are all Macedonians. We are all citizens of this country and Albanians have a long-term interest to integrate themselves in this country. This does not mean that they should lose their national, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. On the contrary, they should have all the prerequisites to nurture their special characteristics. … In the ethnically-mixed Balkans, it is impossible to create compact national states in which only one nation can live. This is an absurdity which can hardly be realized in Europe, where ethnic intermingling is high and

> where such a solution would only lead to new and endless wars. (Ackermann 2000, 66)

Such pleas by Gligorov and others were ultimately insufficient to unify the mosaic of ethnic communities in Macedonia. Economic and humanitarian strains arising from the Kosovo conflict converged with the introduction of a new source of political influence (i.e., armed militant groups) to empower ethnic Albanian groups to demand a more immediate solution to their grievances over lack of power and access to national symbols such as the Albanian flag and Albanian-language education. Ethnic Albanian politicians insisted that they desired only a single state solution, but among their core demands was the right to constituent nation status within Macedonia and the exercise of a separate ethnically-based identity.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement, though necessary as a means of addressing Albanian grievances and putting an end to the escalating conflict in Macedonia, has been criticized by a variety of ethnic Macedonians on the grounds that it threatens Macedonian national identity (Brunnbauer 2002). One such author, Daskalovski (2002) posits that the Ohrid Agreement does more harm than good, arguing that it constitutes a framework for making ethnicities more separated and autonomous. Daskalovski reasons that, by locking ethnicities into their present incarnations and not allowing individual identities to grow and change in relation to the state, the agreement allows conservative hard-liners a virtual monopoly on determining the shape and character of ethnic identities within the state.

Daskalovski's contentions reflect a common concern in Macedonia: the further restriction of access to power structures and its effect on the development of state identities. Such concerns are voiced by both laypeople and scholars such as Lidija Hristova (2005), who argue that the Ohrid Agreement only further legitimated authority that is based on ethnic designations, without addressing issues of civil society and corruption and inefficiency at the state level. It therefore empowered an already corrupt group of political elite to use ethnic relations as a venue for depleting state resources in service of their personal desires and interests. Concerns about elites and corruption are widespread and well documented in reference to Macedonia (e.g., International Crisis Group 2002), and inquiry into their role in the creation and maintenance of identity is a growing feature of research relating to Macedonia.

3.3. FOCUS ON ELITES

Elites are frequently acknowledged for their role in identity formation in Macedonia, but surprisingly few formal studies focus entirely on elites. Such a focus on elites is arguably important as their high profile is likely to lend more weight to their words and actions in regard to influencing public attitudes, and their public role makes much of their speech and actions accessible for analysis. The studies that incorporate such analyses consider two different sorts of elite actors in shaping Macedonia's identity: internal elites (e.g., political leaders, ethnic partisans, media personalities); and external elites (e.g., diplomats, international governing bodies, foreign media). Studies that consider the role of internal elites often focus on their efforts in defining and redefining identities in Macedonia. Those studies involving the role of external elites generally report how the words and actions of such actors define the environment in which Macedonia's identity is developed.

3.3.1. Internal Elites

Research dealing with the effects of internal elites in Macedonia postulate that the recasting of the country's identity is primarily the domain of elites and intelligentsia and is later absorbed by the masses. The most common approach to viewing internal elites in Macedonia reflects the distrust that politicians there have garnered through the corruption that has repeatedly and consistently been uncovered in government there. Regional and international scholars alike have noted the power and frequency of misusing ethnicity in politics (e.g., Hristova 2005, Limenopoulou 2004), noting that identity is being employed as a tool for political maneuvering by national leaders in order to lay claim to greater power and influence in Macedonia, usually neglecting the actual needs of the population in the process.

Others have explored dominant discourse of Macedonia's elite as a means of tracking the process of negotiating identity in a post-Yugoslav state. Adamson and Jovič (2004) concluded that much of what characterizes politics and identity in Macedonia is the direct result of the suddenness of the collapse of the Yugoslav state and the resulting cognitive detritus in the form of the national categories, by which the former "nations" and nationalities had been classified under that system. Under this model, the conflict "evolved as a consequence of … political

responses" (2004, 303) as each community struggled to remake its identity under the new system. This thesis was taken a step further by Dimova (2003), who tracked the way that ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian elites have each co-opted the language of civil society in order to justify their respective political goals.

In each case party elites were aided and abetted by a similarly ethnically-divided media (e.g., Hristova 2005, Icevska and Ajdini 2002). In their increasing reliance on the jingoistic and nationalistic rhetoric of extremism, the media elite appear to have fostered ever greater divisions in Macedonia's society. Such inwardly-focused verbal onsloughts are reported to have been at least partially mitigated by the outward-looking propensities of Macedonia's elite, many of whom are also preoccupied with Macedonia's prospects for acession into the European Union. For that reason, many among the elite have been noted as trying to distance themselves from Macedonia's outward identity as a Balkan state in order to renegotiate Macedonian identity as more "European," in order to gain the acceptance of member states and eventually reap the benefits of EU membership (e.g., Balalovska 2002; Hislope 2003, 145).

3.3.2. External Elites

Whereas internal elites in Macedonia have been depicted as both cause and cure of the divisions that threaten the country's future, external elites much more frequently enjoy a positive association with creating unity in Macedonia. Ironically, even Slobodan Miloševič may be seen as a figure who inspired unity – albeit, mostly due to the fear his regime inspired – in Macedonia during the early years of the Republic (Adamsen and Jovič 2004). Neighboring states' attacks on Macedonia's legitimacy also frequently did more to temporarily mute internal divisions than to exacerbate them (Section 3.1.1).

External elites are particularly well regarded in context of their role during the 2001 conflict that nearly overtook Macedonia. In fact, many have contended that Macedonia's ultimate survival as a state was largely dependent on the role external actors played in negotiating an end to the conflict (e.g., Liotta and Jebb 2002; Hislope 2003, 134). Two works in particular point to the intervention of major foreign powers in remaking the national identity and helping to stabilize Macedonia. Both Ackermann (2000) and Sokalski (2004) focus on how major powers prevented long term conflict there. But whereas Ackerman – working prior to the

beginning of hostilities in Macedonia – saw an early combination of local and international political actors working to produce a new, national identity that is based on citizenship and downplays the ethnopolitical identities there (2000), Skoalski took a more jaundiced view. Sokalski depicted conflict in Macedonia as the inevitable result of the "deep psychological rift" (2004, 72) that he observed separating ethnic Macedonians from ethnic Albanians. To Sokalski, a former Assistant Secretary-General at the United Nations, it was a classic example of a Balkan state in breakdown that was only prevented by the intervention of an international force working in concert with the NGO community.

3.4. CLASSIC MODELS AND STEREOTYPES

With the disintegration of the former Yugoslav states, defining identity in Macedonia has frequently appeared to be a simple matter of drawing parallels between the divisions in Macedonia and those of its northern neighbors (e.g., Glenny 1995). Macedonian political identities have frequently been reduced to competing nationalistic paradigms (e.g., Danforth 1995, Pettifer 1992, Vickers and Pettifer 1997). Such reductionism of what was taking place in Macedonia was superficially straightforward and apparent, but more reliant on early assumptions than new or primary resources. Some studies, although much less subject to assumptions of such "primordial" divisions, fell victim to the easily observed differences nonetheless. While the focus on ethnic polarization (e.g., Vlaisavljevic 2003) and nationalism (e.g., Fraser 2002) has remained as a strong undercurrent, there have also been some attempts to look more closely at what else may be taking place.

Early attempts to investigate Macedonia's identities and cultures provided background and context to the discord there, but still relied on the easy answer of longstanding nationalistic opposition between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians (Poulton 1991, 1995). While later works were able to delineate more of the fluid and dynamic characteristics of the ethnic identity and inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia (Koppa 2001) they also relied on Western theoretical models to judge how these processes *should* work. In one such case, Brunnbauer (2004) noted the beginnings of divisions between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians in Macedonia as

having their roots in the early Yugoslav years and reasoned that those divisions were spawned through perceptions of relative deprivation (Gurr 1969). Brunnbauer's investigation focuses on the propaganda that is supported by the more extreme elements from each of two largest ethnic communities in negotiating the identity of the state. Radical groups from both ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian communities take a Malthusian approach to the negotiation of identity in light of reproductive rates, household organization, and demographics, with the state's identity being the ultimate commodity for which they are competing.

Whereas the work of western researchers is most frequently influenced by classical models of identity and nationalism, it is perhaps even more strongly noted in scholars in and around Macedonia, whose identity is often strongly subject to western discourse about nationalism and the Balkans (Thiessen 2006). As such, the rich empirical information to which they often have access it typically subsumed under the deluge of popular theory. In one such case, a Bulgarian student studying in the United States (Mincheva 2005) relies most heavily on rational choice theory and Gurr's (1993) ideas of transborder ethnic mobilizations to explain the causes of the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. Mincheva employs the case of Macedonia's conflict to illustrate, rather than to test such theories, finding that ethnic Albanian leaders in Macedonia and insurgent forces moving into Macedonia from Kosovo were two manifestations of the same thing: the Albanian ethnoterritorial separatist movement.

Other scholars have also turned to popular theory to elucidate on cures as well as causes to Macedonia's troubles with building an inclusive identity. Macedonia has been observed by some locals to have started out as a "relatively cohesive society" (Atanasov 2004, 312), but that the *recent* move to ethnicization has increased separation between the two largest ethnic communities. In this case Macedonia's impending accession into the European Union is posited as being the critical factor in building reconciliation between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, as that is expected to raise the amount of resources available to each (i.e., decreasing relative deprivation). Alternatively, in examining the rural/urban divide in Macedonia, Neofotistos came to the conclusion that conflict there was avoided because urban Albanians have decided that remaining part of the state of Macedonia ultimately offers more advantages than the alternatives (2002). For that reason, Neofotistos argues, urban ethnic Albanians cast their lot in with ethnic Macedonians in defining rural ethnic Albanians as the backward "others" in claiming modernity as a critical component of their identity.

3.5. KNOWLEDGE CREATION

Perhaps in answer to the model of the beneficent outsider mending sundered ties, other works by both native and non-native scholars have begun to delve even deeper into the workings that shape, and are in turn shaped by identity formation in Macedonia. Non-native scholars have used linguistic (Friedman 1995) and anthropological (Friedman 2002, Schwartz 1996) tools to assess power relations and identity formation taking place there. These move beyond the more simplistic models of ethnic violence and power politics to highlight some counterintuitive sources of local and international power, manipulation (Friedman 1995), and resiliency (Friedman 2002) at work in Macedonia. Overall, these more inductive methods express a much greater appreciation for the richness and complexity involved in the formation and interaction of different forces and influences present in Macedonia.

An interest in monitoring the state of ethnic relations and social cohesion in Macedonia – at the population level rather than that of the elite – began to emerge in academic and international development communities around the time of the Kosovo crisis. Two examples of such reports are Simoska's (2004) *Inter-ethnic and Intra-ethnic Dialogue*, sponsored in part through the Open Society Institute, and an annual effort sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme called the *Early Warning Report* (e.g., Bilali et al 2007). Where both studies are concerned with social distance, each describes, as expected, a pronounced gulf between Macedonia's two largest ethnic communities, though trends of decreasing social distance and other signs of social consolidation are also highlighted. In each case, the ethnic distance studies were valuable for the nuance their descriptions added about the character of ethnic cleavages and have the potential to add the wider debate. Simoska's research is especially valuable for its inductive elements (focus groups and open-ended questions), which also revealed a much more complex set of factors that respondents named as influencing their identity such as economics, representation, corruption, and EU accession. Each of these internationally sponsored studies found that respondents from each ethnic community regard Macedonia as their country and that people there are beginning to feel as though the country's situation is improving.

Other studies, like Lela Jakovlevska-Josevska's (2002) investigation of interethnic relations in adolescents, Shochat's (2003) study of how children's television programming can

build greater interethnic understanding, and Marks and Fraenkel's (1997) investigations of methods of building cross-cultural understanding through mediation are initiatives that are geared to discovering *how* to close some of the social distance in Macedonia. In response to reports of ever-increasing instances of stereotyping and increasing social distance place between ethnicities in Macedonia (Najčevska et al 1998), Jakovlevska-Josevska investigated a method for reversing such trends through multiethnic education programs. Shochat's study documents an effort to foster interethnic understanding and counter stereotypes even before children enter school. Although each study uncovered an association between participation or use of the respective programs and decreasing social distance between ethnic groups, each also noted that, without further reinforcement, the effect was temporary and that their external environment (e.g., national politics, the current state of ethnic relations) also played a major role in determining social distance.

In a further effort to cast Macedonia's future prospects in a more optimistic light, studies have begun to argue that, despite problems associated with the parallel but separate coexistence of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, the worst of the conflict may now be past and that the country appears to be following a positive trend (Tanevski 2005, Glenny 2006). International journalists similarly seek to dispel some of the pessimism that is collecting around the ethnic separations in this strategically located Balkan state. One such correspondent, Tim Judah (2001) contends that the "visceral hatreds" present in the populations further north never formed between ethnic communities in Macedonia. Judah argues that international observers and their resulting models are oftentimes informed by a divisive media, which tends to exaggerate the scope of what is actually a much more subtle and complex reality. Others have reinforced this assessment in their observations that societal and individual identities are actually multidimensional and influenced through environment (Seleva 2003, Giannakos 2004). In this light, the ethnic identifications taking place in Macedonia may be seen as more of a manifestation of the extreme wings of currently dominant identities, as opposed to the inescapable and inevitable state of identity in Macedonia or the Balkans.

Other work goes as far as to point out that the ethnic categories that seem so crystallized in present day Macedonia are actually relatively recent phenomena. Parkes study of "milk kinship" (2004) points out that the phenomenon of adoptive kinship – often stretching across ethnic lines – lasted into the twentieth century in Macedonia and elsewhere, in sharp contrast

with the widely noted ethnic exclusivity and "separate but parallel" existence of ethnic communities there. Such conceptions are further tested in Ellis' treatment on "shadow genealogies" (2003). In the process of exploring the lives of Macedonia's urban Muslims, Ellis has brought to light a time when the concept of ethnic belonging was much more fluid and "…[ethnic] identities were treated as personal choices or preferences, subject to jokes and teasing, but were not perceived to override or alter one's loyalties to the family. Thus, an individual's identity as a member of a family became one of the shadows that constituted his or her over-arching self-definition" (2003, 79). Although contemporary manifestations of identity in Macedonia have been, at least temporarily, solidified by interethnic competition for the power and resources of the state, researchers such as Neofotistos (2004) are still finding that ethnic boundaries can sometimes remain porous, if only on a situational basis.

3.6. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION FOR RESEARCH

As this review demonstrates, appearances are frequently deceiving and the lenses employed to understand a particular phenomenon often lend some color to the findings. Although immediately evident outward appearances and common wisdom regarding Balkan countries and nationalism seem to point to a bleak future for Macedonia, that country has continued to defy expectations by continuing in the face of what appear to have been a series of insurmountable hurdles. More recent reports even highlight positive trends in identity formation in this impressively resilient country.

The common thread uniting all of the above research is perception. Following its declaration of independence from the collapsing Yugoslav state, the earliest inquiries into identities in Macedonia were heavily reliant on earlier perceptions and stereotypes from the region or tended to view issues in Macedonia as being typical of what was occurring in other Balkan countries at the time. Later attempts to broaden the scope of knowledge about the country and its internal issues attempt to perceive Macedonia's identities in terms of how well they fit scholarly models available at the time. During this time, there have additionally been proactive attempts to influence or even create new and stronger perceptions of individual ethnic identities

within Macedonia, as well as reactive attempts to illustrate the greater richness and complexity that actually characterizes the country.

What is needed is more of an effort to better illustrate and interpret the actions and reactions of Macedonia's people through research that is grounded in their own perceptions, rather than what is imposed by models of standard inquiry. This is not to say that established theories and outside descriptions have no relevance to this topic. On the contrary, residents of the region are all too often steeped in outside views, and the effect that those views have on events and actions taking place within Macedonia. The very term "Balkan" was first derived outside the region and is received as a pejorative from which countries in that region are eager to disassociate themselves (Razsa and Lindstrom 2004; Todorova 1997, 2004, 2005) and to which many residents readily ascribe the worst of the events and conditions that affect life there (Balalovska 2002). So the question arises, how do the people of Macedonia perceive themselves and each other as political actors, and what can their identities tell us about the future of power and politics there?

More inductive investigations into how the people of Macedonia perceive themselves and those around them are desirable for their value in illustrating more of the actual complexity that actually characterizes the situation there and to help move away from the reductionist tendency to see politics in Macedonia as little more than ethnic conflict. This investigation therefore seeks to better illustrate and interpret the actions and reactions of Macedonia's people through research that is grounded in their own perceptions. As indicative above, such an approach remains relatively uncommon, and is therefore all the more valuable as a novel means of addressing the question.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF OBSERVATION

This research employs an inductive approach to delineating Macedonia's emerging political identities. With a few notable exceptions, generative inquiry has been neglected throughout the region and this research was designed to help address that deficiency. While recognizing the easily observed link between ethnicity and voting behavior in Macedonia, this research decomposes individual and group political decision making in a two stage process. The first stage involves extracting, depicting, and analyzing the frames of reference in use within the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia (i.e., ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians) when they evaluate political decisions and test the hypotheses outlined in *Chapter Two*. The second stage then makes use of those findings by incorporating them into a generalized survey that was administered to a randomly sampled population of respondents from across Macedonia to allow the hypotheses from *Chapter Two* to be retested in a representative sample of the population.

Section 4.1 introduces three methods that are central to the process of extracting, depicting, and analyzing frames of reference and begins with a general introduction to studies of identity and some associated methods. The next section, *4.1.1*, introduces the repertory grid interviewing technique, its application, and analytic characteristics. Afterward, *Section 4.1.2* discusses clustering techniques and introduces a method of delineating and extracting cognitive subpopulations from repertory grid data. *Section 4.1.3* then provides a method for assessing the degree of cognitive similarity *within and between* groups (e.g., cognitive subpopulations, ethnic groups) with an introduction to variable homophily categorical autocorrelation. Finally, *Section 4.1.4* introduces a method of comparing perceptual agreement *within* groups: generalized procrustes analysis (GPA). Attention is paid to the application of GPA, and some of the strengths and limitations of the analytic measures that it can provide.

Next, *Section 4.2* introduces the generalized survey and discusses its design and construction, with detailed descriptions of the major survey elements. *Section 4.2.2* then

discusses the testing and further development of the survey tool, with information about how and why at least one major element failed when administered by third party interviewers in the field. The chapter then concludes with a brief introduction to the methods employed to analyze the data that resulted from the survey.

4.1. IDENTITY AND INQUIRY: REPERTORY GRID AND ALLIED METHODS

Mainstream approaches to investigating politics and identity frequently begin with assessing the makeup of the public sector. When Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 it also abandoned much of the former Communist party leadership apparatus, effectively remaking its governing system. One aspect of governing that was not abandoned in the changeover, however, was the internally perceived need for secrecy. Macedonia's political elite are therefore relatively youthful and its public sector is still relatively early in its development when compared with European counterparts, though still fairly difficult to access from outside. Rather than attempt to penetrate this curtain, it makes more sense to investigate the polities that this group serves, and which will in turn produce a substantial portion of the next cadre to enter its ranks.

As Macedonia's public sector continues to mature, there appears to be substantial need throughout the country for the expertise that Macedonia's universities endeavor to create. Macedonia's university students represent not only the next generation of their country's political and governmental elite, but also that of the private sector. These students are far more likely to participate in mid- and high-levels of government and society in Macedonia than those among their peers who will not attend a university. As such, their views can provide a good indication of future trends among various identity groups that will one day join Macedonia's policy making elite.

The methodological plan for this study therefore required an approach to accessing the above population in a manner that minimizes researcher bias (i.e., the effect of experimenter expectancies), and respondent anticipation bias (i.e., the interviewees' interpretation of and reactivity to the experimental situation), while generating an empirically rich representation of identity groups that are emerging as the country continues to develop. Data were collected using

George R. Kelly's (1955) repertory grid interview technique, to elicit political decision making frameworks from randomly selected university students across Macedonia. Repertory grid is a constructivist psychological method, chosen as well suited to the needs of this study, as it allows respondents to make comparisons in their own terms, rather than those of the researcher, while collecting those terms in a manner that is explicitly comparative and far more efficient and less subject to interpretation than more conventional interview techniques. In addition, because there is no standard set of answers for respondents to assess, it is extremely improbable that an individual would be able to provide answers or evaluations that fall outside of their personal comparative repertoire, thus decreasing the effect or likelihood of respondents providing responses that they think an interviewer desires.

Each of the completed repertory grid interviews represents a unique cognitive framework relating to an individual's perception of Macedonia's political landscape. These individual frameworks have been analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitative analyses employed generalized procrustes analysis (GPA) (Gower 1975, Dijksterhuis and Gower 1992), mathematically comparing respondents by means of their ratings of public figures. Qualitative analyses in the form of semantic comparison of the individual constructs (descriptive terms) were used to compare the public figures and respondents were segregated using a variety of criteria (e.g., ethnic affiliation, demographic indicators, semantic overlap in comparison frameworks) to further analyze perceptual differences across the population.

Much of the repertory grid method's richness is derived from comparisons within and across populations that are made possible by means of quantitative measures of individual respondents' cognitive characteristics. It is possible to discern commonality of perception within or among some social, ethnic, or other groups according to the particular construct or group of constructs that group members tend to include in their perceptual framework. When analyzed through GPA, it is also possible to provide a quantitative measure of group consensus in how individuals within a group construe similarities and differences within a given set of stimuli. Overall, the combination of quantitative and qualitative measures provides a rich, detailed, and measurable description of identity frameworks that traditional hermeneutic and ethnographic analyses can not replicate.

4.1.1. Repertory Grid Interviews

Individual repertory grid interviews were conducted to elicit the bipolar comparative constructs that are employed when individual respondents make comparisons between public figures. Whereas most contemporary research into identity and political decision making tends to take the form of surveys that rely on researcher-defined constructs or hermeneutic evaluations of what subjects are willing to state publicly, the repertory grid method (Kelly 1955) provides respondents with an opportunity make evaluations on their own terms, using their own comparison structure, and differentiating quantitatively between the elements they are evaluating. The advantage that the repertory grid offers over the aforementioned others is that it does not impose the researcher's expectations upon respondents. Rather than ask a respondent to rate decision elements in terms that are meaningful to the *researcher's* theoretical framework, the respondent is instead asked to provide his or her own theoretical framework and use that to differentiate between the events or personalities in question.

Repertory grid methodology is part of a family of constructivist methods that includes Q sort (Stephenson 1953) and semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). Though originally introduced for use in psychotherapy, variants of the repertory grid have since been employed in marketing research (Marsden and Littler 1998; Steenkamp et al 1987) and the food industry (Deliza et al 1999; González-Tomás and Costell 2006; Meilgaard et al 2001) to elicit consumer perceptions of products; in occupational research (Crump et al 1980; Eden and Jones 1984) to identify organizational stresspoints and problem construction; in management research (Calori et al 1994; Kearns 1995; Oppenheim et al 2003) to investigate decision making and information use among managers; in organizational research (Dunn and Ginsberg 1986; Goodwin and Ziegler 1998; Locatelli and West 1996) to assess culture and cognition in organizations; in public opinion research (Frewer et al 1997); in research into identity formation (Stojonov et al 1997); and in other applications where a comprehensive understanding of an individual's or group's conceptualization of a topic is deemed important (see Fransella et al 2004).

Although a repertory grid interview may be administered in a wide variety of variations (Fransella et al 2004), all types consist of three main components: (1) *elements* to be compared, which can take the form of people, events, places, or other concrete and discrete stimuli; (2)

bipolar *constructs*, used to differentiate between elements; and (3) *ratings*[10], to indicate to which pole and/or by what degree an element is characterized by a construct. A relatively standard form of the repertory grid, used for this research, consists of presenting the respondent with a group of elements (usually 10-15) three at a time and asking them "in what way are two of these [public figures] the same and different from the third?" The respondent will then supply their construct (e.g., corrupt…honest) and subsequently rate each element from the entire group according to the comparison structure they have supplied. This process is repeated with additional triads of elements until the respondent can supply no new constructs.

The data that results from a repertory grid interview is organized in matrix format (*Figure 1*), providing a graphic representation of an individual's perceptual framework as it relates to a given set of stimuli. The data consist of a list of elicited, qualitative constructs that frame an



Figure 1: Example of a Repertory Grid Matrix

[10] The term "ratings" is used here with some latitude. In practice, ratings take many forms including rank order, discrete scale, and binary choice. For a fuller treatment on rating styles, see: Fransella et al. 2004.

individual's perceptions and provide quantitative measurement of how elements (i.e., public figures) are perceived in light of the respondent's comparative constructs, and in relation to each other. Each respondent's matrix of constructs and comparison measurements is idiosyncratic, as it is inductively constructed from that individual's experiences and observations and is used by that individual to model what they would expect to occur, given an encounter with similar personalities, events, or situations in the future. It has also been argued that these systems are influenced or colored by the communities to which an individual belongs, even while they determine the communities to which an individual may "belong" or desire to belong (Shaw 1985).

The repertory grid technique has been noted for the veritable mountain of descriptive data that may be derived from even a single interview (Fransella et al 2004). For each interview, it is possible to derive a variety of measures, such as cognitive complexity (for a review see Bell 2004), which refers to individuals' tendency to make evaluations that tend to be in terms of either a few stark differentiations, or many 'shades of gray.'" There are also a wide variety of measures of construct and element differentiation, such as principal components analysis or cluster analyses such as the dendograms presented in *Figure 1*, that are used to reveal how closely individual elements or constructs are related within a respondent's frame of reference (reviewed extensively in Fransella et al 2004). In addition, each interview may be assessed qualitatively, to assess the semantic characteristics of the qualitative comparisons (constructs) that comprise a respondent's frame of reference.

Given the assumption that identity groups share similar cognitive characteristics (Kelly 1955, Luhmann 1995), these data can also be analyzed at the society level by comparing individuals' construct sets (Shaw 1985) by means of 2-mode network clustering and visualization techniques described in *Section 4.1.2*. The identity groups delineated in this manner may then be further assessed to discern to what extent individuals in a group actually differ or agree in their perceptions of the same stimuli. The resulting groups, or clusters, must then be assessed to determine whether these partitions are valid representations of shared identity, defined here as groups of individuals whose frames of reference share a preponderance of constructs and yield similar perceptions. In other terms, identity groups are defined as those which share comparative constructs and agree in their perceptions.

In order to assess whether group members (i.e., ethnic, rural/urban, university, and those groups detected through a construct clustering method) share a political identity, each grouping was evaluated on two measures: (1) shared constructs, and (2) perceptual consensus. Measures of shared constructs were derived using the variable homophily categorical autocorrelation model (Borgatti et al. 1999), which indicates whether a given groups members are more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than with other groups. A measure of perceptual consensus is provided for individual groups using generalized procrustes analysis (GPA, Djiksterhuis and Gower 1992), which provides a measure that indicates to what degree the members of an individual group agree in their perceptions of the similarities and differences in a particular set of stimuli. *Section 4.1.3* provides an overview of the variable homophily procedure and *Section 4.1.4* briefly introduces GPA and some of its analytic features.

4.1.2. Assessing and Extracting Cognitive Subpopulations

Under the assumption that individuals who share a common identity should also share some common views (Cohen 1985; Holzner 1972; Kelly 1955; Luhmann 1985, 1995), it is possible to distinguish identity groups within a population if one can first discern where individual frames of reference overlap within that population. To do so, the population was approached as a network existing in cognitive space, and analyzed using network analytic visualization methods. Network data were obtained from the list of between three and fifteen semantic statements (i.e., constructs) that each of the respondents used to differentiate between public figures in their repertory grid interviews. Each of these construct lists provides a representation of the cognitive frame of reference that a given respondent employs in order to make sense of, and differentiate between public figures whose sphere of influence includes Macedonia (Kelly 1955, Luhmann 1995: 242).

First, the elicited constructs are assessed for common usage between individual respondents. Those constructs that are shared by two or more respondents are treated as constituting a tie between those individuals. Once the cognitive network is assembled, it may then be rendered using network visualization tools in order to discern patterns of cognitive or semantic overlap that are, for the purpose of this analysis, taken to indicate a likelihood of shared identity. Once the indicated clusters of shared identity are identified and delineated, the new

population partitioning system may then be evaluated by submitting each cluster identified in this manner to GPA for further comparison and analysis.

The process of extracting subgroups from the population on the basis of shared frames of reference first required that data be standardized and classified before it could be formatted for use in network visualization. The standardization process began with pooling together all the constructs elicited in each of the grid interviews across the entire sample population. In order to account for language differences and slight variations in individual responses, the resulting 877 constructs were all cross-translated into Albanian, Macedonain, and standard English and cross-checked for equivalence of meaning before being classified into seventy-seven construct categories (see *Table 6* in *Section 6.1.2*). In this process, all of the constructs were first translated by two native Macedonian- and Albanian-language speakers. The resulting translations were then checked for accuracy by two additional native speakers before a subsample of constructs were back-translated by four additional native translators. All translators possessed a strong command of English, though a few English terminology adjustments were nevertheless necessary before the construct classification process could begin.

For the purpose of construct classification, the English translations were treated as the neutral arbiter between original Macedonian- and Albanian-language constructs.[11] Constructs were classified using two main creteria: (1) for constructs to be considered equivalent (i.e., in the same category), they must either, contain some common term (e.g., multiethnic, self-interest, nationalist), or hold substantially with the common meaning expressed by all other constructs in a set (e.g., impartiality ≈ don't discriminate by ethnicity), and (2) constructs containing terms that could be included in more than one category were ultimately assigned to the category that was determined to best express the primary idea contained in the original construct.

Upon completion of the classification process, a respondent:construct association matrix was constructed. Respondents were arrayed along the y-axis and construct categories were arrayed along the x-axis, with ones and zeros serving as boolean indicators of the presence or absence, respectively, of a given construct category in a respondent's construct set. In other terms, the respondent:construct matrix X was constructed, in which x_{ij}=1 if the *i*th respondent

[11] As none of the constructs were judged by the translators as being idiomatically exclusive to one language or the other, employing a neutral language not expected to pose a problem in establishing equivalency. Additionally, these populations exist in close enough proximity for a limited amount of linguistic accommodation and, at times, terminological blending to have taken place. For a discussion of the effects of linguistic relativity on cross-cultural studies see Takano (1989).

supplied a construct in the *j*th construct category, and x_{ij}=0 otherwise. The resulting respondent:construct matrix was then assessed for the presence of clusters that could be interpreted to indicate the presence of cohesive subgroups of "cognitively similar" respondents.

The respondent:construct matrix was analyzed using the NetDraw network visualization software (Borgatti 2002). Cohesive subgroups were identified using a combination of principal components analysis and multidimensional scaling (MDS). Principal components analysis was used to reduce the dimensionality of the data. To accomplish this, NetDraw extracts the first two eigenvectors from the matrix and maps the coordinates of all points in the matrix on those two dimensions (Borgatti 2005).

The dimensionally reduced data is then visualized using MDS, an established method for mapping out relational systems of meaning-based structures (Mohr 1998). MDS offers a method for visually mapping relative distances between nodes (i.e., respondents/constructs) according to similarities and differences, as ascertained by common ties. The MDS algorithm in Netdraw involves (1) calculating geodesic distances[12] between all pairs of nodes, and then (2) submitting the distance matrix generated in this manner to MDS. The resulting map was visually assessed for clusters of what are expected to be "cognitively similar" respondents, leaving the possibility of "outliers" that are not readily identifiable as "belonging" to one cluster or another and are presumably not sufficiently similar to the identified clusters for inclusion among their ranks.[13]

4.1.3. Assessing for Shared Constructs: Variable Homophily

A common expectation in social research is that people with similar characteristics are likely to share distinguishing qualities. Such is the basic principle behind the idea of homophily: "birds of a feather flock together." (see review in McPherson et al 2001) Because people are often attracted to those who are similar to themselves, demographic categories such as ethnicity, religion, education, occupation, and lifestyle are often considered to be strong predictors of homophily (Levine and Kurzban 2006, 179; McPherson et al 2001). While it is expected that the

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[12] Geodesic distance, d(i,j) refers to the minimum number of links between any given pair of nodes in a matrix. This can be expressed mathematically as $d(i,j) = \min_p x_{ij}^{[p]} > 0$, where *p* is the number of ties that must be crossed to reach from node *i* to node *j*. (Wasserman and Faust 1999, 161)

[13] For an example of a cluster map, see *Figures 2 & 3* in *Section 6.1.3.1*

experiences of individuals who share distinct demographic groups will in time develop similar values, the converse is also expected. Social psychologists have extensively tested the proposition that similarity of beliefs, values, and attitudes can lead to attraction and interaction (Huston and Levinger 1978).

The principle of homophily was therefore used to assess for similarity (i.e., shared constructs) within and between groups. This principle makes it possible to test the hypothesis that various groups (e.g., ethnic, rural/urban, university, and those groups detected using clustering techniques) were more likely to share constructs among themselves than with other groups. Although it is anticipated that individuals will share constructs with one another to some degree, it is expected that those who share an identity group will share elements of their frame of reference (i.e., constructs) more often.

The variable homophily categorical autocorrelation model is a blockmodel test of group differences that is available on the UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti et al 2002) network analysis package. The algorithm is performed on a matrix (e.g., the respondent:construct association matrix generated in the process outlined in *Section 4.1.2*) that has been partitioned into two or more groups. The procedure is a nonparametric analysis of variance, where parameter estimations are permuted using the quadratic assignment procedure (Krackhardt 1988) to generate measures of homophily between and within groups (Cross et al 2001). Output for this algorithm in interpreted as the probability of a dyadic tie (i.e., shared construct) within and between groups. For example, in the hypothetical output presented in *Table 1*, the intercept (Between Groups) indicates the probability that any two individuals will share a construct (0.33). The hypothetical output also indicates that the probability that individuals in Group 1 will share constructs is 0.02 less than that and it is significant. The probability that a set of constructs will be shared within Group 2 is significantly higher – by 0.45 – than that of individuals from different groups. (see Hanneman and Riddle 2005)

Table 1: Hypothetical Variable Homophily Output

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Significance
Intercept (α)	**0.334452**	**0.9999**
Group 1 (β_1)	**-0.019682**	**0.0000**
Group 2 (β_2)	**0.451096**	**0.0012**

4.1.4. Assessing for Perceptual Consensus: Generalized Procrustes Analysis

This section introduces generalized procrustes analysis (GPA) and some of the analytical measures that it can provide. GPA (Gower 1975) is a technique that is particularly well suited to the task of measuring the level cognitive agreement that is present within groups, as indicated by repertory grid data. GPA was developed as a mathematical technique for assessing similarities and differences between individuals who are employing varied sets of evaluative criteria in differentiating between elements in a given set of stimuli (Djiksterhuis and Gower 1992). Any number of matrices (i.e., repertory grids) may be analyzed collectively, and the dimensions (i.e., the number of rows and columns) of individual matrices can vary, providing they all share at least one dimension (either the same number of rows or columns; Grice 2006). In terms of this particular project, GPA can be employed to analyze the repertory grid matrices of any number of individual respondents together as a group, and each individual in the group can provide any number of constructs, provided that all respondents are assessing identical elements (i.e., public figures), and that the elements are arranged identically from matrix to matrix.

In order to measure the communality between a set of grids, the GPA algorithm involves minimizing spurious differences in rating style or the range and number of constructs used from individual to individual before averaging the grids overall to reach a consensus configuration (i.e., a centroid grid that summarizes the average responses within the group). Differences are minimized through a standardization process of iteratively *scaling*, *rotating*, and *centering*

individual grids until arbitrary differences are minimized without affecting the relative differences among the elements (in this case, public figures).

To better understand this process, imagine a person who is comparing a box full of photographs and trying to decide is they are all pictures of the same person. Looking at the photographs two at a time, she may hold them side-by-side, rotate one or both so that the faces line up better, or perhaps move one closer or further away so that they will be of the same relative size. There is also the problem of what to do if one of the pictures is half in shadow. In that case, she would be forced to visualize the obscured part in her mind, or at least understand that it is missing information rather than some gross deformity.

The GPA algorithm operates in much the same way as it assesses the similarities and differences in a set of matrices. During the standardization process, the algorithm will dimensionally *scale* grids by appending columns of zeros to resize grids with fewer constructs to the same dimensions as the largest grids (i.e., those with the most constructs), much like the woman who is comparing a picture that is in shadow. The scaling process prevents larger grids from unduly influencing the results while offering no harmful side effects to the overall analysis (Djiksterhuis and Gower 1992). Grids are additionally *rotated* to account for respondents using different constructs or groups of constructs to describe the same assessment. Such rotation is analogous to looking at photographs taken from different angles. Lastly, the scores in individual grids are *centered* to account for variation in scoring styles, similar to moving a photograph closer or further away until their aspects match. (Steenkamp et al 1987; Grice 2006)

It is important to note that GPA does not provide an indication of how much the members of a group agree in their *preferences*, but merely provides a summary of how the respondents in a group perceive the relationships between elements. What GPA can indicate is to what degree individual grids in a set agree on the relative amounts of similarity and difference between each of the public figures, as revealed by the consensus configuration. High amounts of agreement may be interpreted as suggesting that respondents' assessment criteria are based on similar standards. A principal components analysis can additionally be carried out on the consensus configuration in order to graphically depict relative distances between elements, or relative distances between respondents. For example, individual respondents may agree that public figure A and public figure C are similar, and that both are very different from public figure B, but that is no indication that the respondents agree in their preference for said figures. Certain

respondents may prefer figures A and C, while viewing B as an unappealing opposite, whereas others may well view the situation in converse and both would still be in agreement with the consensus configuration.

Agreement between grids in a set is indicated by the consensus proportion (CP), which may take a value ranging between 0 and 1.0, with 1.0 indicating perfect agreement. The larger the consensus proportion, the less respondents vary in regard to their representation of the relative similarities and differences between public figures. Another way to view the consensus proportion is therefore as an indicator of the amount of variance between grids that is accounted for by the consensus grid. Because the standardization process of scaling, rotating, and centering matrices is an iterative optimization-based procedure, the significance of the consensus proportion can also be tested under the null hypothesis that the consensus configuration is only an artifact of the statistical technique. Because GPA is so efficient in reducing differences between grids, it is important to check whether an observed CP is actually outside the bounds of what may be observed from a randomly generated set of grids. The hypothesis is tested by means of a randomized permutation test, where data in the set are randomly reassigned and reanalyzed over a large number of iterations.

It important to note that, whereas the variable homophily algorithm tests for similarities both *within and between* groups, GPA tests only for similarities *within* groups. Thus far, an extension of GPA has not been developed to calculate the statistical significance of differences in consensus proportions between subgroups in a population or differences between the consensus score for a population and those of its subpopulations. This indicates that consensus proportions may be compared empirically, but not statistically. Comparing GPA output for several subgroups in a population is not analogous to reading an ANOVA table as it only provides measures of differences in internal consistency. For this reason, GPA – although a powerful descriptive measure – is primarily used in concert with homophily measures for the purpose of hypothesis testing.

Think of GPA and the consensus proportions it provides as a means of answering the question: given that we can see that perceptions are shared by the general population *x* percent of the time, how would it look if we examined the population as two or more subpopulations? If we divide the population into what we expect to be people who think alike, will each of those subpopulations agree in their perceptions more often that the population at large as we would

expect of like-minded people? How are their perceptions similar or different? Do cultural, demographic, or other similarities naturally produce like-minded people? As the findings in *Chapter Six* will demonstrate, this may not always be the case.

4.2. SURVEY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

As is the case with any survey or interviewing technique, the repertory grid technique applied above represents a tradeoff between the data demands of the research question, the time and other resources necessary to elicit these data, the cultural relevance of said data, and the reliability and validity of the eventual findings. As discussed in *Section 4.1.1*, the repertory grid occupies a methodological middle ground between the consistency, low cost, quantifiability, and expediency available through the application of standardized surveys and the cultural validity, flexibility, and level of detail possible when applying ethnographic and open-ended interview techniques. Advances in the form of computer-based applications in repertory grid interviewing have reduced costs associated with conducting repertory grid interviews but not to the point where that method is as efficient as generalized survey research. Further, the standardized format necessary to construct a survey allows for reliability and validity testing that is not possible with more freeform methods such as repertory grid interviews, open-ended interviews, and ethnographic research. The construction of a standardized survey from pooled repertory grid data and is therefore desirable, as the application of a survey to a random sample of the population of Macedonia offers the opportunity to investigate the reliability and construct validity of some of the repertory grid findings as well as improving external validity by expanding the sampled population to potentially include all demographic groups within Macedonia.

This section introduces a survey that was assembled using constructs that emerged in the course of the repertory grid interviews outlined in *Section 4.1.1*. The survey was intended for two purposes: (1) to create a tool that will make it possible to generalize the findings from the repertory grid interviews to the population of Macedonia, and (2) to assess the validity of those findings. The following sections discuss general aspects of survey construction and provide a

more detailed treatment of how the survey, Section 2 and Section 3 in particular, was developed, tested, and administered.

4.2.1. Survey: Format and Development

The national survey is divided into four sections. Section 1 is composed of a standard introduction that describes the research project, the interview itself, and the conditions for participation. The criteria for participating in this survey were that respondents be residents of Macedonia who are at least 18 years of age. As such, the first question, "Which group contains your age?," was the only demographic element in Section 1. The remaining four questions in the first section are comprised of an opinion survey regarding Macedonia's potential entry into the European Union and perceptions of what effect that will have on the country and its residents. These questions are intended for later research and analyses.

Section 2 and Section 3 are direct offshoots from the repertory grid interviews presented in *Chapter Four*. Each of these two sections makes use of constructs that capture themes (i.e., construct categories) that emerged when the constructs elicited in the repertory grid interviews were pooled and assessed for commonality. Each section was designed to capture a different aspect of how the constructs elicited in repertory grid interviews may be used to classify or differentiate between public figures.

Section 4 of the national survey is comprised of demographic indicators such as, gender, household income, ethnicity (i.e., "What language do you speak at home?"), and religion. Such items are included for use in characterizing any apparent identity groups that emerge in the course of analyses. This section ends with a brief statement of closing and appreciation to the respondent.

4.2.1.1. Section 2: Bipolar Ratings of Macedonia's Politicians

Section 2 of the survey tool was intended to assess public attitudes towards politicians in general throughout Macedonia. It consists of 60 items, presented in five item groups. These items are presented as bipolar constructs on a five point discrete visual analog scale, similar to Likert and semantic differential scales. Each construct is therefore presented on a five point continuum

where the left pole is assigned a value of "1" and the right pole is assigned a value of "5." Constructs do not all progress from positively loaded values to negatively loaded values (e.g., Not Corrupt-Corrupt). Instead constructs progressing from positive to negative are alternated with those progressing from negative to positive in a quasi-random fashion in order to discourage patterning, wherein a respondent may be tempted to assign all high or low ratings in lieu of considering each item individually.

This section required that respondents consider how they feel about politicians in Macedonia *in general* and then rate them according to each of the bipolar constructs provided for them. The bipolar ratings used in this manner are constructs that were selected from the pooled repertory grid interview responses during the early stages of the construct categorization process outlined in *Section 5.2.1*. In this way, respondents evaluated politicians using criteria that emerged through earlier repertory grid interviews.

It was expected that respondents would provide information about which constructs best resonated with their own feelings of satisfaction or disappointment with the performance and other characteristics of politicians in Macedonia. Although this section was not expected to yield information regarding specific criteria that individuals employ in choosing their preferred representatives, the format of the data resulting from this section was designed to be suitable for exploratory analyses, such as factor analysis or other clustering algorithms. Such analyses are important for their value in revealing underlying structure within a set of data (i.e., latent variables) and, through comparison with earlier investigations, to ascertain some measure of the validity.

4.2.1.2. Section 3: Selection Characteristics

Whereas the prior section was designed to assess public attitudes about politicians in general, Section 3 was intended to ascertain specific criteria that respondents favored when they differentiate between politicians. Respondents were presented with a list of characteristics (i.e., constructs) and asked to choose up to seven of the most important characteristics of their preferred political representative and up to seven characteristics that best describe their least favorite politicians. Once their choices were made, respondents were then asked to indicate

which of the characteristics they identified for their preferred political representative was most important to them and which was most important to them for their least favorite politician.

The forty bipolar characteristics were presented in two columns on a single sheet of paper that could be presented or read to respondents. The characteristics were a subset of the constructs employed in Section 2. In order for the list to be easy to scan, the positively worded pole (e.g., "is a humanist," "is a nationalist," "was for conflict," "fulfills promises") of each characteristic appeared in the left column, with its opposite pole (e.g., "is not a humanist," "is not a nationalist," "opposes conflict," "doesn't fulfill promises") appearing directly across from it in the right column.

In an unfortunate eventuality, this section of the survey instrument was misapplied in a manner that beta testing and expert evaluation did not anticipate. The instructions for the section were misinterpreted by some interview groups, but not by others. Such an eventuality essentially meant that two different variants of the tool were applied, depending on how the instructions were interpreted. Moreover, one version of the tool was applied in a region with a majority of ethnic Albanians, while the other variant was applied to a primarily ethnic Macedonian region, making any resulting comparison of the preferences held by the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia tenuous at best. For this reason, the data in this section were treated as compromised and therefore uninterpretable for anything other than empirical purposes.

4.2.2. Testing and Further Development of the Survey Tool

The national survey was administered by trained, professional interviewers. The survey tool was therefore constructed in a manner that would be easily understood by those administering the survey and in a format that is at least somewhat familiar to those being interviewed. In so doing, the language of the survey was standardized between English, Albanian, and Macedonian. The survey format was also field tested to evaluate the clarity of the instructions, and further expert advice was obtained before using the survey was administered in the field.

The original objective behind constructing the national survey was to develop a tool that would allow the results of the earlier repertory grid analyses to be assessed for reliability and validity. For this reason, the majority of the survey is derived directly from the findings of

repertory grid interviews. The second and third sections in particular were designed with the goal of replicating aspects of the repertory grid interviews.

The constructs employed in Section 2 and Section 3 were selected from the pooled repertory grid interview responses during the early stages of the construct categorization process outlined in *Section 5.2.1*. Because time constraints dictated that the survey be assembled before all constructs could be categorized, the constructs selected in this manner are representative of most but not all of the major construct categories (i.e., categories containing ten or more constructs). The dynamic nature of the categorization process caused some categories to emerge later in the course of identifying common concepts within the pooled data. The major categories not represented in the survey were "issues pertaining to 'nations,'" "results," and "power." There were also four categories with more than one representative construct in the survey, they were: "corruption," "legal aspects," "self-interest," and "transparency."

Creating the survey in this manner greatly facilitated tool-building process by reducing the initial need for translating and back translating the survey tool during early iterations. Because the constructs employed in the second and third sections of the survey were taken directly from pooled repertory grid interview data, those sections required only minimal translation and standardization. The items in greatest need of language standardization and wording refinement efforts were therefore the survey instructions and demographic information.

All elements of the survey were translated and checked for language equivalence by native speakers of both Macedonian and Albanian who possess English language fluency. Once initial translation efforts were judged to be sufficient, two student interviewers from the repertory grid interview project were provided with an early version of the survey to field test without any instructions other than those written on the survey itself. Their feedback guided some minor changes in the initial design of the survey instructions and answer sheet.

Further input was sought from the institution that was hired to conduct the survey administration. Representatives from the Centre for Interethnic Studies at the Institute for Sociological, Political, and Juridical Research in Skopje reviewed the survey and offered further suggestions to better match this survey to standards to which their interviewers and the target population were most familiar. In this way, any remaining wording that was ambiguous or culturally inappropriate was corrected and the survey tool was judged to be ready for administration in the field.

At the close of interviews, it was possible to have a gauge of the successes and shortcomings of the final version of the survey. The most glaring issue was that of the inconsistency of responses in Section 3. The format of this section was the most problematic, apparently because it was the least familiar to the interviewers and many appear not to have read the instructions closely. Many misinterpreted the numbering scheme (e.g., 1а, 1б, 2а, 2б, 3а, 3б, . . .) in this section as corresponding with the lettering of the two questions (e.g., "А. Please choose 7 (seven) characteristics that are the best descriptions of what you like about your political leader." and "Б. Now think of a politician who you do not like and choose the seven (7) characteristics that describe them best."), and allowed respondents to choose only those constructs that bore the same letter as the question they were answering. Others failed to record the letter indicating which pole of the construct the respondent chose. Ultimately, the inconsistency in response styles for this section resulted in data that were uninterpretable.

Interviewer comments indicated that respondents held a fairly wide range of opinions in regard to the survey. Some respondents reported having difficulty thinking about Macedonia's politicians "in general," reporting that the politicians tended to "differ drastically." Other respondents commented that they were either not interested in politics, or expressed distaste for politicians in general. Most respondents answered all demographic responses, with the exception of political affiliation, which many either declined to answer or declared that they were unaffiliated. Interviewer comments were positive overall, with many reporting that the interviews went well, with respondents answering each question "quickly and easily" or "with confidence."

4.2.3. Survey Analyses

Survey data were evaluated for reliability using Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach 1951). A factor analysis was then run to determine what, if any, underlying structure exists in the scaled responses to the survey questions. Finally, resulting factors were assessed to test whether they differed by ethnic group, using parametric and nonparametric analyses of variance. All analyses were performed using SPSS 14.0 for Windows.

5. FIELD SETTING

This chapter provides an overview of the field setting where this research took place. Study populations for repertory grid interviews (*Section 5.1.1*) differed from those of generalized surveys (5.1.2) in terms of number of respondents, mean age, and ratio of ethnicities responding. This disparity is a reflection of the different goals of each phase of research. Whereas the repertory grid interviews were largely concerned with eliciting a representative sample of constructs from each of the two largest ethnic groups, it was deemed necessary to recruit equal or near equal numbers from each group. The survey was intended as a means of assessing and generalizing the findings from the repertory grid interviews. As such, it was necessary for the population to be representative of Macedonia's ethnic and demographic characteristics. The administration of interviews and surveys (*Section 5.2*) also reflects differences inherent in the two methods.

5.1. STUDY POPULATIONS

5.1.1. Repertory Grid Population

Macedonia's university students were chosen as the study population for repertory grid interviews. As a group that is in the process of transitioning into the country's educated elite, they are representative of the future of their country's public- and private-sector elite while they are still subject to the current opinions of the wider population. The students of Macedonia's universities are far more likely to participate at higher levels in government and society than

their peers who do not attend a university. They potentially provide indications of political cognition in Macedonia and of future trends for political identities.

The cognitive frameworks for political decision making were elicited from 109 respondents, 39 females and 59 males (mean age = 20.7 years, SD = ± 2.2 years), recruited from Macedonia's four state-accredited undergraduate universities. Of this group, 54 were self-reported as ethnically Albanian, 54 were ethnic Macedonian, and one respondent fell outside both categories. Upon completion of the repertory grid interview, respondents were given a token compensation for their participation. Respondents were recruited at random in common areas and cafeterias on university campuses. To ensure sampling diversity and to proactively curtail the practice of focusing their recruitment efforts on their own friendship groups, interviewers were required to recruit respondents according to a randomly assigned shoe color while on or nearby to their home campus.

5.1.2. Survey Population

Interviews were conducted with 500 randomly selected respondents from throughout Macedonia. Residents of the Republic of Macedonia were approached in public places and asked if they would be interested in participating. Only those who were 18 years of age or older were eligible to participate. Due to missing and incomplete data in the scaled responses (i.e., Section 2 of the survey), 53 respondents were eliminated from analyses. Mean age of remaining 447 respondents was 39.8 years (SD = ± 14.0 years). Male respondents (n=247) outnumbered female (n=199), with one respondent not reporting. The ethnic breakdown of survey respondents bears a much closer resemblance to Macedonian's population statistics, as reported in the 2002 census (Republic of Macedonia 2005). Respondents self-reported as ethnic Macedonian (298), ethnic Albanian (134), Turkish (5), Romani (4), Serbian (3), and Vlach (3).

5.2. INTERVIEW/SURVEY ADMINISTRATION

5.2.1. Repertory Grid Elicitation Procedure

For the repertory grid interviews, respondents were asked to make comparisons between ten public figures (*Table 2*) that were easily recognizable to Macedonian citizens for their effect on Macedonia in the national or international arenas. Although repertory grid interviews can be conducted using a wide range of different types of elements, provided that they are concrete, discrete, and readily familiar to the individuals being interviewed; it is also imperative for the investigator to choose elements that are somehow representative of the phenomenon being investigated (Fransella et al 2004). For this reason, various symbols of politics and society in Macedonia were investigated for their suitability in this investigation (e.g., laws, public and private institutions, institutional reforms), but none were as easily recognized and familiar to society at large in Macedonia as the public figures themselves.

Table 2: Grid Elements: Public figures who have had an effect on Macedonia and are likely to be familiar to the average citizen there

Public Figures	
Arben Jaferi	Leader of the ethnic Albanian DPA party
Ali Ahmeti	Leader of the ethnic Albanian DUI party
Kiro Gligorov	First President of the Republic of Macedonia
Branko Crvenkovski	President of the Republic of Macedonia
Vlado Buckovski	Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia
Lupco Georgievski	Leader of ethnic Macedonian VMRO party
Nikola Gruevski	Leader of ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE party
Havier Solana	Chief of External Policy in the European Union
Mother Teresa	Roman Catholic Nun
George Bush	President of the United States of America

In keeping with this line of reasoning, the individuals selected for use as elements in the repertory grid interviews were chosen because they have each had some effect on Macedonia and were judged by informal focus groups as most likely to be familiar to the average citizen there. To enhance respondents' recognition of these individuals, a standard set of cards was also prepared and presented as visual stimuli during interviews. Each card bore the picture, name, and brief title of a public figure, translated into both Albanian and Macedonian.

Repertory grid interviews were conducted by trained interviewers using an interactive, computer-based elicitation format under the supervision of the primary investigator. The Rep IV interview program (Gaines and Shaw 2005) was reconfigured, with all written prompts and sub-routines translated into both Albanian and Macedonian (Cyrillic font) so that respondents would be able to follow along without need for translation. To the extent that it was possible, every effort was made to ensure respondents' privacy and reduce extraneous distractions.

Respondents and interviewers were seated side-by-side in front of a computer, with the ten cards bearing likeness of the public figures placed directly in front of the respondent. Respondents were then shown the names of three public figures and were prompted to choose two who are alike and yet different from the third. Once the respondent made their selection, they were then prompted to consider how they were comparing the three public figures and type in the word or words that describe each pole of that comparison (e.g., nationalist/non nationalistic). After identifying and entering their bipolar constructs, the respondent was then prompted to rate each of the ten public figures according to the construct they had supplied. Ratings were made on a scale of one to seven, with one being the first of their construct poles and seven being the opposite pole (i.e., nationalist = 1, not nationalist = 7). Once they had had an opportunity to rate all ten public figures, respondents were requested to review their ratings of each public figure and make any changes that they felt were necessary. Upon completion of the rating phase, the process would begin another iteration with a different triad of public figures. This continued until the respondent stated that they could no longer supply new constructs. In this manner, respondents were able to supply anywhere from 3 to 15 constructs, with a mean number of 8 constructs.

At the close of the elicitation process, each interviewee was asked to rate all public figures according to one additional, imposed, construct: positive influence/negative influence. This was

done to insure that the interviews were also capturing the preferences of each respondent vis-à-vis the elements they were evaluating.

5.2.2. Survey Administration

Despite high costs relative to telephone and mail-in surveys, personal interviews were chosen as the most appropriate method for administering the survey throughout Macedonia. Personal interviews offer a number of advantages over the aforementioned others, including higher response rates, the opportunity to use visual cues such as the list of constructs in Section 3, and the potential to reach a wider demographic (Miller & Salkind 2002, 310). The Centre for Interethnic Studies at the Institute for Sociological, Political, and Juridical Research in Skopje was chosen to administer surveys, as it is an established group with extensive experience in conducting social research throughout Macedonia.

The interviewing team at the Centre for Interethnic Studies is professionally trained and experienced in accessing the population of Macedonia. Interviewers were typically from the regions of Macedonia in which they were conducting interviews. Additionally, interviewers were frequently bilingual and experienced with any colloquial language variants in the region where they were operating. Interview times averaged 25 minutes.

6. FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the analyses outlined in *Chapter Four*. Analyses and results of repertory grid interview data are presented in *Section 6.1*, with special attention paid to restating the hypotheses from *Chapter Two*. *Section 6.2* presents the results of the reliability testing and factor analysis performed on the survey data. The factor model is then used to test the *two and three identities hypotheses* (*Section 6.3*). The concluding section provides a discussion of how this research addresses threats to reliability and validity (*Section 6.4*).

6.1. GRID ANALYSES AND RESULTS

This section describes the tests of the various hypotheses provided in *Chapter Two*. First, however, each hypothesis is restated in *Section 6.1.1* in terms of whether groups share constructs (homophily) and agree in their perceptions (consensus). Analyses were conducted in two phases. In Phase I, *Section 6.1.2* presents the findings from the hypothesis testing the "*Two Identities,*" "*Three Identities,*" and *University Groups* hypotheses introduced in *Chapter Two*. This is done through the use of the variable homophily model and a comparison of GPA output as a measure of perceptual similarity in subgroups. In Phase II, *Section 6.1.3* presents the findings from analyses of the "identity groups" that were identified according to the algorithm in *Section 4.1.2*. The section concludes with a further characterization of the "identity groups" according to GPA output and frequency data.

6.1.1. Hypotheses for Stage 1: Repertory Grid Interviews

If assumptions about groups in a population underlie decision making that affects the entire population and those assumptions are found to be true of some groups but not of others, then it follows that such a generalization is a flawed description of that population and therefore offer a potentially problematic foundation on which to construct policy. The hypotheses presented in this section are constructed to test whether popular assumptions relating to Macedonia's population groups are accurate for all groups in question and to test an alternate means of conceptualizing the population. This section therefore translates the hypotheses presented in *Chapter Two* into a format that is testable using measures of variable homophily and comparisons of the consensus proportions produced through generalized procrustes analysis. In so doing, the alternate hypotheses presented below reflect scenarios where *all* subgroups groups are expected to be relatively cohesive. The hypotheses are as follows, presented in the order they appear in this chapter:

Hypothesis 1, the *"Two Identities" Hypothesis*, is meant to test whether it is appropriate to characterize Macedonia as a state where politics is mostly determined by concerns of ethnicity. It states that *Macedonia is dominated by two major ethnic identities, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and each of these identity groups has its own characteristic frame of reference that allows it to interpret ideas and events according to the beliefs, interests, values, and perceptions of the group*. If such is the case, then the ethnic Albanian group and the ethnic Macedonian group should each be composed of people of like mind. If so, then the members of each group will be more likely to share elements of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) amongst themselves within the group than with people from other groups. This hypothesis can be expressed formally in terms of the variable homophily model:

$H_{0(2i)}$: Macedonians and Albanians have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian})

$H_{1(2i)}$: Both Macedonians *and* Albanians are more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than with each other (In both groups $\beta_x>0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian})

In addition, if these are groups of like minded people, then each group should display greater agreement in their perceptions of stimuli. Measures of perceptual consensus (i.e., consensus proportions (CP_x)) should therefore be higher for each group than that of the general population. The *"Two Identities"* hypothesis can therefore be restated in equivalent terms to take consensus proportions into account. However, the hypothesis statement to test this assumption is not stated in terms of a statistical test, but instead as decision criteria, as the difference between consensus proportions is not statistically testable:

$H_{1(2i)}$: Both groups will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In both groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian})

Hypothesis 2, the *"Three Identities" Hypothesis*, tests a popularly accepted assumption that has its roots in modernization theory. This hypothesis states that *the – more cosmopolitan – urban dwellers exhibit a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities, whereas rural populations should more strongly resemble the "primordially" divided society, in that frames of reference are largely unique to each ethnicity*. If such is the case, then the urban group, rural Albanian group and the rural Macedonian group should each be composed of people of like mind. If so, then the members of each group will be more likely to share elements of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) with each other in the group than with people from other groups. This hypothesis can be expressed formally in terms of the variable homophily model:

$H_{0(3i)}$: The urban dwelling group, the rural Macedonian group, and the rural Albanian group have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian})

$H_{1(3i)}$: Urban dwellers, Rural Macedonians, and Rural Albanians are all more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than between groups (In all groups $\beta_x>0$, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian})

Again, if these are groups of like minded people, then each group should also display greater agreement in their perceptions of stimuli. So measures of perceptual consensus (i.e., consensus

proportions (CP_x)) should be higher for each group than that of the general population. The *"Three Identities" Hypothesis* can therefore be restated in equivalent terms to take consensus proportions into account. However, the hypothesis statement to test this assumption is not stated in terms of a statistical test, but instead as decision criteria, as the difference between consensus proportions is not statistically testable:

$H_{1(3i)}$: All groups will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In all groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian})

Hypothesis 3, The *University Groups Hypothesis,* was constructed to test for sampling bias. The hypothesis states that *university students' frames of reference exhibit more similarity to other students in their own universities than they do with those from other universities.* If such is the case, then the group from each university should each be composed of people of like mind. If so, then the members of each group will be more likely to share elements of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) with each other in their own university than with people from other universities. This hypothesis can be expressed formally in terms of the variable homophily model:

$H_{0(ug)}$: The university groups have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO[14]})

$H_{1(ug)}$: All university groups are more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than between groups (In all groups $\beta_x>0$, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO})

If students who attend the same university think alike, then each university group should also display greater agreement in their perceptions of stimuli. So measures of perceptual consensus (i.e., consensus proportions (CP_x)) should be higher for each group than that of the general population. The *University Groups Hypothesis* can therefore be restated in equivalent terms to take consensus proportions into account. However, the hypothesis statement to test this

[14] University abbreviations are as follows: SEEU – South East European University; SUT – State University Tetovo; UKIM – University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius; SKO – St. Clement Ohridski.

assumption is not stated in terms of a statistical test, but instead as decision criteria, as the difference between consensus proportions is not statistically testable:

$H_{1(ug)}$: All university groups will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In all groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO})

Hypothesis 4, *the "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis,* was constructed to test whether the clustering algorithm that was outlined in *Section 4.1.2* achieved its stated goal of distinguishing between groups that may be considered virtual "cognitive communities" within a population. The hypothesis states that *Macedonia's population can be clustered into groups of individuals whose frames of reference are sufficiently similar for effective communication. One or more of such groups may constitute a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities.* The clustering algorithm that was outlined in *Section 4.1.2* was designed to assess for and extract cognitive subpopulations (i.e., "cognitive communities"). Assuming success of the process, the groups delineated in this manner should each be composed of people of like mind. If so, then the members of each group will be more likely to share elements of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) with those in their own cluster than with people from other clusters. Additionally, because this clustering process may result in individual respondents who are not classifiable in one or another group, the process may be considered to have produced an "outlier" 'group' – perhaps more correctly conceived as an anti-group. Such "outliers" are expected to be disparate in their views and are not considered likely to share elements of their frames of reference with one another. The hypothesis can be expressed formally in terms of the variable homophily model:

$H_{0(cc)}$: Identity groups and "outlier" groups delineated using the algorithm outlined in *Chapter Four* have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={Group 1, Group 2, …})

$H_{1(cc)}$: Identity groups delineated using the algorithm outlined in *Chapter Four* are more likely to share constructs *within* than *between* groups; AND the "outlier" group delineated in the same manner is more likely share constructs between groups than within groups ($\beta_x>0$, where x={Group 1, Group 2, …} AND $\beta_{\text{"Outliers"}}<0$)

If individuals in each cluster think alike, then each cluster should also display greater agreement in their perceptions of stimuli. Measures of perceptual consensus for each group should therefore be greater than that of the general population. The hypothesis can therefore be restated in equivalent terms to take consensus proportions into account. However, the hypothesis statement to test this assumption is not stated in terms of a statistical test, but instead as decision criteria:

$H_{1(cc)}$: Each identity group demonstrates greater within-group perceptual similarity than the overall sample population, as indicated by the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) AND the outlier 'group' is perceptually fragmented and displays greater within-group variability in their perceptions than the overall sample population ($CP_x > CP_0$, where x={Group 1, Group 2, …} AND $CP_{\text{"Outliers"}} < CP_0$)

6.1.2. Phase I: Ethnicity and Rural vs. Urban

Phase I of analyses involved testing popular conceptions of ethnopolitical divisions in Macedonia. First, *Section 6.1.2.1* characterizes the entire sample in terms of perceptual consensus (i.e., the consensus proportion). Such a characterization of the entire sample is necessary to establish a baseline for comparison in all further tests involving consensus proportions. The next three sections, *6.1.2.2*, *6.1.2.3*, and *6.1.2.4* test the "*Two Identities,*" "*Three Identities,*" and *University Groups* hypotheses, respectively.

6.1.2.1. Baseline Consensus Proportion

The 109 resulting grids were analyzed as a group using GPA to evaluate the degree of similarity in how respondents preceived the ten public figures across the entire sample. The consensus proportion (CP) for the overall sample was employed as a baseline, by which to compare any further partitions of the sample. As indicated in the first column of *Table 4,* the baseline measure (CP_0) is 0.63, a permutation test indicates that the value is statistically significant ($p<0.01$), and the minimum and maximum values of consensus proportions from the randomly reassigned matrices that were permuted over the 100 iterations in order to test for significance were 0.56 and 0.57, respectively (see Grice 2004c, 18 for details of the GPA permutation test available on the Idiogrid repertory grid analysis package). Given the values listed above, it may be

conceptually easier to think of the baseline CP as indicating that the amount of within-group consensus in regard to the relative distances between public figures appearing in the study is 0.63, or perhaps that the respondents "agree" 63% of the time.

6.1.2.2. The "*Two Identities*" Hypothesis: Ethnicity

Phase I of analyses tests the *"Two Identities," "Three Identities,"* and *University Groups* hypotheses, respectively. The first part of Phase I of analyses tests the *"Two Identities"* hypothesis using the variable homophily model and a comparison of consensus proportions generated through GPA. The variable homophily categorical autocorrelation procedure was applied to a respondent:construct association matrix generated in the process outlined in *Section 4.1.2* (UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti et al 2002)). This matrix was partitioned according to ethnicity. The hypothesis tested was:

$H_{0(2i)}$: Macedonians and Albanians have equivalent shared constructs *between and within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian})

$H_{1(2i)}$: Both Macedonians *and* Albanians are more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than with each other (In both groups $\beta_x>0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian})

The output (*Table 3*) indicates that the $H_{1(2i)}$ alternative hypothesis does not provide a good fit. Although both the ethnic Albanian (β_A) and the ethnic Macedonian (β_M) groups are significant at $p<0.05$, the coefficients are not *both* greater than zero. The interpretation of variable homophily testing here is that the *Betas* are not positive as expected, resulting in a failure to reject the null established by the "*Two Identities*" hypothesis.

Based on initial test results, the alternate hypothesis is restated as Macedonians and Albanians do not share equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x\neq0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian}). With a correction for multiple testing implemented by dividing the *alpha* value by 2 ($\alpha=0.05/2=0.025$), the new test of the new alternative hypothesis leads to a rejection of the null at $p<0.025$ and acceptance of the alternative hypothesis. Under the alternate hypothesis, the output for this model may be interpreted as indicating that the probability that individuals in the ethnic Albanian group will share constructs within their ethnic group is 0.19

greater than the average probability that any two members of different groups will share a construct (α=0.61). (see Hanneman and Riddle 2005) Macedonians as a group shared constructs significantly less than average (β_M=-0.10). Additionally, the R-square is low (R^2=0.05), indicating that there is additional variability that the model has failed to capture.

Table 3: Variable Homophily Output for "*Two Identities*" Hypothesis

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Significance	R-Square
Intercept (α)	**0.610425**	**- -**	**0.047**
Ethnic Albanian (β_A)	**0.193209**	**0.0000**	
Ethnic Macedonian (β_M)	**-0.096798**	**0.0012**	

The "*Two Identities*" hypothesis was further evaluated in terms of perceptual consensus. To do so, multiple repertory grid matrices were grouped according to respondent ethnicity and analyzed using GPA under the hypothesis that both groups will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In both groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian}). The output of each of these analyses is presented in *Table 4* alongside the output from the analysis of the entire sample (Baseline, CP_0).

The output does not provide a good fit for the "*Two Identities*" hypothesis. When dividing the sample by ethnicity, the ethnic Albanian group (n=54) displayed quantitatively greater within-group agreement in the consensus proportion (CP_A=0.71 vs. CP_0=0.63), whereas evaluating ethnic Macedonians (n=54) as a group did not offer any apparent difference from the baseline consensus proportion (CP_M=0.63 vs. CP_0=0.63). In these terms, ethnic Albanian respondents demonstrate greater perceptual consensus than ethnic Macedonians, who do not appear to demonstrate any greater perceptual consensus than the population at large.

Table 4: Nonparametric Estimates of Consensus Proportions within Ethnic Groups

	Ethnic A	Ethnic M	Baseline
[1]Consensus proportion (CP)	CP_A=0.71	CP_M=0.63	CP_0=0.63
[2]p-value	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
[3]min/max	0.62/0.63	0.52/0.53	0.56/0.57

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis
[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)
[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

6.1.2.3. The "*Three Identities*" Hypothesis: Rural vs. Urban

The second part of Phase I of analyses evaluates the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis using the variable homophily model and a comparison of consensus proportions generated through GPA. The variable homophily categorical autocorrelation procedure was applied to a respondent:construct association matrix generated in the process outlined in *Section 4.1.2* (UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti et al 2002)). This matrix was partitioned into three groups: urban dwellers (n=22), rural dwelling Albanians (n=47), and rural dwelling Macedonians (n=39). "Urban dwellers" were defined as those who identified Skopje, the country's largest and most cosmopolitan city, as their permanent residence. "Rural dwellers" were all others. The hypothesis tested was:

$H_{0(3i)}$: The urban dwelling group, the rural Macedonian group, and the rural Albanian group have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups (β_x=0, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian})

$H_{1(3i)}$: Urban dwellers, Rural Macedonians, and Rural Albanians are all more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than between groups (In all groups β_x>0, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian})

The output (*Table 5*) indicates that the $H_{1(3i)}$ alternative hypothesis does not provide a good fit. Although the rural Albanian (β_{RA}) group is significant at p<0.05, the other two groups, urban (β_U) and rural Macedonian (β_{RM}), are not. Even had it been deemed appropriate, there was

no question of removing non-significant groups from the model and retesting, as within and between measures would not be possible with only one group in consideration. This line of reasoning resulted in a failure to reject the null model established by the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis.

The "*Three Identities*" hypothesis was further evaluated in terms of perceptual consensus. To do so, multiple repertory grid matrices were grouped according to urban, rural Albanian, and rural Macedonian designations and analyzed using GPA under the hypothesis that all groups will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In both groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={Urban, Rural Macedonian, Rural Albanian}). The output of each of these analyses is presented in *Table 6* alongside the output from the analysis of the entire sample (Baseline, CP_0).

Table 5: Variable Homophily Output for "*Three Identities*" Hypothesis

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Significance	R-Square
Intercept (α)	**0.604832**	**- -**	**0.024**
Urban (β_U)	**-0.046391**	**0.2390**	
Rural Albanian (β_{RA})	**0.184252**	**0.0000**	
Rural Macedonian (β_{RM})	**-0.024535**	**0.2716**	

The output does not provide a good fit for the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis. When dividing the sample by urban and rural designations, the rural Albanian group displayed quantitatively greater within-group agreement in the consensus proportion (CP_A=0.70 vs. CP_0=0.63), whereas evaluating the urban group did not offer any apparent difference from the baseline consensus proportion (CP_U=0.63 vs. CP_0=0.63) and the rural Macedonian group evinced little difference from the baseline consensus proportion (CP_{RM}=0.64 vs. CP_0=0.63). In these terms, rural Albanian respondents demonstrate greater perceptual consensus than either urbanites or rural Macedonians, who demonstrate little if any difference in their perceptual consensus vis-à-vis the population at large.

Table 6: Nonparametric Estimates of Consensus Proportions within Urban and Rural Groups

	Urban	Rural Macedonian	Rural Albanian	Baseline
[1]Consensus proportion (CP)	CP_U =0.63	CP_{RM}=0.64	CP_{RA}=0.70	CP_0=0.63
[2]p-value	p<0.01	P<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01
[3]min/max	0.52/0.57	0.51/0.54	0.18/0.61	0.56/0.57

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis
[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)
[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

6.1.2.4. The *University Groups* Hypothesis

Phase I of analyses concludes with a test of the *University Groups* hypothesis using the variable homophily model and a comparison of consensus proportions generated through GPA. The variable homophily categorical autocorrelation procedure was applied to a respondent:construct association matrix generated in the process outlined in *Section 4.1.2* (UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti et al 2002)). This matrix was partitioned according to the university they attend. The hypothesis tested was:

$H_{0(ug)}$: The university groups have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups (β_x=0, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO[15]})

$H_{1(ug)}$: All university groups are more likely to share constructs amongst themselves than between groups (In all groups β_x>0, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO})

The output (*Table 7*) indicates that the $H_{1(ug)}$ alternative hypothesis does not provide a good fit. Although the SEEU (β_{SEEU}), SUT (β_{SUT}), and UKIM (β_{UKIM}) university groups are significant at p<0.05, and the SKO (β_{SKO}) university group is marginal (p=0.063), the coefficients are not *all* greater than zero. The interpretation of variable homophily testing here is

[15] University abbreviations are as follows: SEEU – South East European University; SUT – State University Tetovo; UKIM – University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius; SKO – St. Clement Ohridski.

that the *Betas* are not positive as expected, resulting in a failure to reject the null established by the *University Groups* hypothesis.

Based on initial test results, the alternate hypothesis is restated as Macedonians and Albanians do not share equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x \neq 0$, where x={Macedonian, Albanian}). If a correction for multiple testing is implemented by dividing the *alpha* value by 2 ($\alpha=0.05/2=0.025$), the Bitola group is not significant, resulting in a failure to reject the null. Leaving aside a correction for multiple testing increases the chances of making a Type I error, but allows for the interpretation of the data under the modified alternate hypothesis. With this in mind, the output for this model may be interpreted as indicating that the probability that individuals in the SEEU and SUT university groups will share constructs within their university group is 0.14 (β_{SEEU}) and 0.26 (β_{SUT}) greater than the average probability that any two members of different groups will share a construct ($\alpha=0.61$). The UKIM university group shared constructs significantly less than average ($\beta_{UKIM}=-0.16$) and the SKO university group ($p=0.063$) is trending toward sharing more constructs with other groups than within its own group ($\beta_{SKO}=-0.10$). (see Hanneman and Riddle 2005) Additionally, the R-square ($R^2=0.03$) is lower than the model based on ethnicity (the "*Two Identities*" model, $R^2=0.05$), indicating that this model does a comparatively accounts for even less of the variability in the data. It is possible that eliciting a larger sample of SKO students would resolve the significance issue with this group and produce more interpretable results, but it would be difficult to guess what this may accomplish in light of the overall performance of the model.

Table 7: Variable Homophily Output for *University Groups* Hypothesis

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Significance	R-Square
Intercept (α)	**0.607363**	**- -**	**0.028**
SEEU (β_{SEEU})	**0.141786**	**0.0000**	
SUT (β_{SUT})	**0.261918**	**0.0000**	
UKIM (β_{UKIM})	**-0.168767**	**0.0056**	
SKO (β_{SKO})	**-0.096541**	**0.0626**	

The *University Groups* hypothesis was further evaluated in terms of perceptual consensus. To do so, repertory grid matrices from individual respondents were grouped according to university attended and analyzed using GPA under the hypothesis that each university group will exhibit a consensus score that is higher than the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) for the overall sample (In all groups $CP_x > CP_0$, where x={SEEU, SUT, UKIM, SKO}). The output of each of these analyses is presented in *Table 8* alongside the output from the analysis of the entire sample (Baseline, CP_0).

The output does not provide a good fit for the *University Groups* hypothesis. When dividing the sample by university groups, the SEEU (CP_{SEEU}=0.68 vs. CP_0=0.63) and Tetovo (CP_{SUT}=0.73 vs. CP_0=0.63) university groups displayed quantitatively greater within-group agreement in the consensus proportion, whereas evaluating the UKIM group did not offer any apparent difference from the baseline consensus proportion (CP_{UKIM}=0.63 vs. CP_0=0.63) and the rural SKO group evinced little difference from the baseline consensus proportion (CP_{RM}=0.64 vs. CP_0=0.63). Of the two university groups that demonstrated higher levels of consensus, one is a multicultural university located in a predominantly ethnic Albanian area (SEEU), and the second is located nearby to the first and caters almost exclusively to ethnic Albanian students and

Table 8: Nonparapetric Estimates of Consensus Proportions within University Groups

	SEEU	SUT	UKIM	SKO	Baseline
[1]Consensus proportion (CP)	CP_{SEEU}=0.68	CP_{Tetovo}=0.73	CP_{UKIM}=0.63	CP_{Bitola}=0.64	CP_0=0.63
[2]p-value	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01
[3]min/max	0.62/0.63	0.61/0.65	0.51/0.54	0.52/0.56	0.56/0.57

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis
[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)
[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

faculty (SUT). The remaining two universities are largely attended by ethnic Macedonian students, but have faculty that include representatives from a variety of ethnicities (Murphy et al 2005). In these terms, respondents from predominantly Albanian or ethnically mixed universities demonstrate greater perceptual consensus than those from universities with primarily ethnic Macedonian students, who demonstrate little if any difference in their perceptual consensus vis-à-vis the population at large.

6.1.3. Phase II: Frames of Reference

Whereas the Phase I of analysis tests existing assumptions of identity and cognition in Macedonia, this next phase develops an alternative means of exploring similarities and differences in how the people of Macedonia differentiate between public figures. The goal of Phase II of this analysis is to partition the population into "identity groups" according to patterns in the data that indicate clusters of respondents whose frames of reference overlap. In this way, it is respondent input, rather than external characterizations that indicate how the sample population may be partitioned. Each group identified in this fashion is then assessed in the same manner as the groups that were delineated and analyzed in Phase I.

6.1.3.1. Clustering Frames of Reference: *Cognitive Communities* Hypothesis

As outlined in *Section 4.1.2*, the populaiton for repertory grid respondents was partitioned according to shared frames of reference. In so doing, all constructs (n=877) from individual grids (n=109) were aggregated, cross-translated, and organized into seventy-seven construct classes according to equivalence of meaning (*Table 9*). Data from this classification procedure was organized into a respondent:construct association matrix and was then visualized using PC/MDS clustering approach. A visual assessment of the resulting map of cognitive/semantic space (*Figure 2*) indicated the presence of four easily discernible clusters and a number of outliers (n=14) that did not appear to belong to any cluster in particular. "Clusters" were selected on the basis of the mutual proximity of individual respondents (square nodes) that are delineated by a border of constructs (circular nodes). Individuals that were not in close proximity to any others

Table 9: List of Construct Categories by Frequency of Occurrence

Construct Category	*freq.*	Construct Category	*freq.*
Humanism	38	Indirect / direct	6
Nationalist	35	Political / non-political	6
For/against Albanians	33	Western interests	6
Economics	29	Administrative reforms	5
Self-interest	29	Government leadership / opposition	5
Corruption	26	Nation vs. people	5
EU Issues	25	Popular support	5
Local / global	24	Population in general	5
War / conflict	20	Charisma	4
Influence	19	Legal aspects	4
Experience	18	Minorities	4
Macedonia in general	18	Old style / new style	4
Liberal / conservative	17	Patriot	4
Equality / proportionality	16	Problem solving	4
Stability	16	Religion	4
Ohrid agreement	15	State University of Tetovo	4
Qualifications	15	Transparency	4
Uniting or dividing Macedonia	15	Autocratic tendencies	3
Issues pertaining to "nations"	14	Cooperative tendencies	3
Leadership skills	14	Dependent/Independent	3
Radical	14	Diplomacy	3
Peace	13	Education	3
Development	12	Foreign vs. domestic issues	3
Multiethnic	12	Manipulates	3
Reforms	12	Similarity	3
Results	12	Social issues	3
International relations	11	Anticipation	2
Power	11	Balance	2
Special vs. general interest	11	Bravery	2
Nepotism	10	Bureaucratic politics	2
Promises	9	Employment	2
Democracy	8	Formation of the state of Macedonia	2
Ability / effectiveness	7	Identity issues	2
Communist	7	Intolerance/bias	2
Effort	7	Kosovo	2
Region	7	Loyal	2
Strategy	7	Promising	2
Communicator	6	Violence	2
Grass roots	6		



Figure 2: Visualization of Respondent Data after PC/MDS Procedure
Note: Squares represent individual respondents and circles represent constructs.



Figure 3: Visualization of Respondent Data after Manually Reordering Nodes and Removing Constructs with Fewer than Six Ties, in order to Increase Visual Clarity
Note: Squares represent individual respondents and circles represent constructs.

or fell outside of the bordering constructs were considered to be "outliers." *Figure 3* displays the same network, after less frequently used constructs[16] were removed and the remaining nodes had been manually reordered to enhance visual clarity.

Assuming that this clustering approach was successful in delineating "cognitive communities," respondents in each of the four clusters should share more elements of their frames of reference amongst themselves than with other groups. Conversely, respondents who fell into the "outlier" category were expected to be heterogenous and less likely to bear such similarities. The procedure was therefore tested using the variable homophily procedure under the *Cognitive Communities* hypothesis:

$H_{0(cc)}$: Identity groups and "outlier" groups delineated using the algorithm outlined in *Chapter Four* have equivalent shared constructs *between* and *within* groups ($\beta_x=0$, where x={Group 1, Group 2, …})

$H_{1(cc)}$: Identity groups delineated using the algorithm outlined in *Chapter Four* are more likely to share constructs *within* than *between* groups; AND the "outlier" group delineated in the same manner is more likely share constructs between groups than within groups ($\beta_x>0$, where x={Group 1, Group 2, …} AND $\beta_{\text{"Outliers"}}<0$)

The output (*Table 10*) indicates that the $H_{1(cc)}$ *Cognitive Communities* alternative hypothesis provides a good fit. All groups are significant at $p<0.05$. Additionally, the coefficients are greater than zero for all four clusters and less than zero for the outlier 'group' ($\beta_{OL}=-0.17$), indicating a rejection the null. The interpretation of variable homophily testing here is that the probability that all four of the identity groups identified through the clustering process will share constructs within their respective groups is greater ($\beta_{C1}=0.38$, $\beta_{C2}=0.31$, $\beta_{C3}=0.24$, $\beta_{C4}=0.26$) than the average probability that any two members of different groups will share a construct ($\alpha=0.56$). Those respondents classified as "outliers" shared constructs significantly less than average ($\beta_{OL}=-0.17$). (see Hanneman and Riddle 2005) Additionally, the R-square, while low ($R^2=0.10$), is greater than either of the two prior models that did not fail to reject the null ("*Two Identities*"

[16] Those constructs that were supplied by fewer that six respondents (i.e., <6 ties) were considered to be 'less frequently used' for the purpose of this visualization only.

R^2=0.05, *University Groups* R^2=0.03) indicating that the model was able to account for a comparatively greater amount of the variability in the data.

Table 10: Variable Homophily Output for "*Cognitive Communities*" Hypothesis

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Significance	R-Square
Intercept (α)	**0.559299**	**- -**	**0.096**
Cluster 1 (β_{C1})	**0.383384**	**0.0000**	
Cluster 2 (β_{C2})	**0.310266**	**0.0000**	
Cluster 3 (β_{C3})	**0.235573**	**0.0032**	
Cluster 4 (β_{C4})	**0.257368**	**0.0004**	
Outliers (β_{OL})	**-0.174683**	**0.0224**	

The *Cognitive Communities* hypothesis was further evaluated in terms of perceptual consensus. To do so, repertory grid matrices from individual respondents were grouped according to the results of the clustering procedure described in *Section 4.1.2* and analyzed using GPA under the hypothesis that each identity group demonstrates greater within-group perceptual similarity than the overall sample population, as indicated by the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) AND the "outliers," as a group, are perceptually fragmented and display greater within-group variability in their perceptions than the overall sample population ($CP_x>CP_0$, where x={Cluster 1, Cluster 2, Cluster 3, Cluster 4} AND $CP_x<CP_0$, where x={Cluster 1, Cluster 2, Cluster 3, Cluster 4}). The output for each of these analyses is presented in *Table 11* alongside the output from the analysis of the entire sample (Baseline, CP_0).

The output indicates a good fit for the *Cognitive Communities* hypothesis. When the sample according to the clustering procedure, each of the four resulting identity groups displayed quantitatively greater within-group agreement in the consensus proportion (CP_{C1}=0.69, CP_{C2}=0.70, CP_{C3}=0.71, CP_{C4}=0.70 vs. CP_0=0.63). Conversely, the "outliers," when analyzed as a group, evinced a much lower consensus proportion than that of the baseline consensus proportion (CP_{OL}=0.48 vs. CP_0=0.63). In these terms, respondents who were clustered according to what was expected to be shared frames of reference demonstrate greater perceptual consensus than may be observed in the population at large.

Table 11: Nonparametric estimates of consensus proportions within identity groups

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Outliers	Baseline
[1]Consensus proportion (CP)	CP_1=0.69	CP_2=0.70	CP_3=0.71	CP_4=0.70	CP_{OL}=0.48	CP_0=0.63
[2]p-value	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.04	p<0.01
[3]min/max	0.62/0.63	0.57/0.60	0.54/0.60	0.63/0.66	0.42/0.52	0.56/0.57

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis
[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)
[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

6.1.3.2. Further Exploration: Frames of Reference

Evaluating a sample of Macedonia's university students in terms of shared constructs, using the model of variable homophily and shared perceptions, through a comparison of consensus scores available through GPA, made it possible to test some assumptions about politics and society in Macedonia. In each case, commonly accepted models of cognitive convergence (i.e., the "*Two Identities*" hypothesis of ethnic divisions, the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis of ethnic and urban groups, and the *University Groups* hypothesis) did not perform well with these data. Although each model represents a plausible basis for identity, the analyses demonstrated that the various designations inherent to each (e.g., ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian; urban dweller, rural Albanian, rural Macedonian) are not all indicative of groups of people who share a frame of reference.

Measures used to test for convergent frames of reference were consistent in their identification of – what were interpreted here as – groups that either are or are not comparatively more cohesive in their frames of reference than the population at large. Groups with negative or non-significant *Beta* scores in the variable homophily model also exhibited consensus proportions that were consistently equal or nearly equal to (±0.01) the baseline consensus proportion (CP_0) measure derived from the entire sample. This is interpreted here as indicating

that groups that are less likely to share aspects of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) amongst themselves than with the population at large also exhibit little or no more consensus in their perceptions than may be observed on average in the population as a whole. Conversely, those groups which exhibited significant and positive *Beta* scores in the variable homophily model also exhibited consensus proportions that were consistently greater than (min. +0.05, max. +0.08) the baseline consensus proportion. As such, these are characterized as "identity groups" because they share more aspects of their frames of reference (i.e., constructs) amongst themselves and are correspondingly noted as exhibiting more agreement (i.e., consensus) in their perceptions than the population at large.

The consistency noted in the apparent relationship between the output for variable homophily tests and the comparison of consensus proportions is worth noting as an indication that both tests appear to be measuring related aspects of the same phenomenon. This is very important, as each model tests a different aspect of individual frames of reference using different data formats and disparate analytic procedures. GPA assesses for similarity of perceptions by comparing groups of matrices that respondents supplied in reporting how their constructs relate to the given stimuli (i.e., public figures), though the algorithm does not make use of the constructs themselves. Alternatively, the variable homophily categorical autocorrelation model is concerned only with commonality among the constructs used and its calculations are based on how a single Boolean matrix of individuals who share constructs is partitioned.

Using these tools, it was possible to illustrate how well suited the various models presented in each of the hypotheses was for characterizing the population. Neither the "*Two Identities*" hypothesis of ethnic divisions, nor the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis of urban and rural designations affecting interethnic cognitive convergence, nor the *University Groups* hypothesis of frames of reference being strongly influence by individual university environments proved to be a useful description of cognitive convergence for all groups so described. The more generative approach used to partition the population and test the *Cognitive Communities* hypothesis was much more successful in identifying groups of respondents who share aspects of their frames of reference. These groups may be characterized further according to their demographic information and some additional GPA output. However, it should also be noted that this phase of research was exploratory and that inferential judgments derived from these analyses

must be made with care, if at all, due to questions regarding the representativeness of this population.

With that important caveat in mind, it possible to make some preliminary qualitative observations regarding what the frames of reference that are employed among Macedonia's university students can demonstrate about identities in Macedonia. When consulting the demographic breakdowns for each of the identity clusters (*Table 12*), it quickly becomes apparent that partitioning a population according to the frames of reference in use does not necessarily produce neat and well defined classifications. Although four cohesive subpopulations were apparent after partitioning the sample in "cognitive space," there were also a number

Table 12: Nonparametric Estimates of Consensus Proportions and Breakdowns within Partitioning Clusters

	Entire Sample	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Outliers
Number of grids	**109**	**41**	**24**	**13**	**17**	**14**
Ethnicity:						
Macedonian	**54**	**13**	**7**	**13**	**11**	**10**
Albanian	**54**	**28**	**17**	**0**	**6**	**3**
Other	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
Hometown						
Urban	**22**	**4**	**7**	**3**	**3**	**6**
Rural Alb.	**47**	**24**	**15**	**0**	**5**	**3**
Rural MK	**39**	**13**	**2**	**10**	**7**	**7**
University:						
SEEU (1)	**50**	**27**	**10**	**2**	**7**	**3**
SUT (2)	**18**	**7**	**9**	**0**	**1**	**2**
UKIM (3)	**19**	**7**	**2**	**6**	**4**	**3**
SKO (4)	**22**	**0**	**4**	**5**	**5**	**6**
Gender:						
Male	**59**	**22**	**11**	**6**	**12**	**7**
Female	**39**	**19**	**13**	**7**	**5**	**7**
[1]**Consensus proportion (CP)**	**CP_0=0.63**	**CP_1=0.69**	**CP_2=0.70**	**CP_3=0.71**	**CP_4=0.70**	**CP_{OL}=0.48**
[2]**p-value**	**p<0.01**	**p<0.01**	**p<0.01**	**p<0.01**	**p<0.01**	**p<0.04**
[3]**min/max**	**0.56/0.57**	**0.62/0.63**	**0.57/0.60**	**0.54/0.60**	**0.63/0.66**	**0.42/0.52**

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis
[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)
[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

of individuals who defied classification and bore little resemblance to any of the four groups or even one another. This highlights an advantage that this approach holds over the two- and three-group models: it allows for outliers in the definition of its partitions. Indeed, this may be considered as a criticism for many generalizations such as those tested in Phase I of analyses, as such categorizations often allow little of the flexibility necessary for dealing with contextual variance and change over time.

Another important observation also concerns the two- and three-group ethnic and rural and urban divisions models. While three of the clusters were revealed to be multiethnic, there were still some notable ethnic-based characteristics that may be used to distinguish each of the groupings. The demographic indicators for these cluster-based groups reveal that two groups (Cluster 3 and Cluster 4) have ethnic Macedonian majorities, whereas the two other groups (Cluster 1 and Cluster 2) are majority ethnic Albanian. This lends *some* credence to the idea of ethnic divisions, but does not support the stark divisions implied through the two-identities ethnic divisions model. Further, there is nothing in these partitions that appears to substantiate the hypothesis of urban environments bringing together disparate populations, as none of the groups may be considered as primarily urban.

It is important to keep in mind that frames of reference are not discrete and that there is notable and frequent overlap in the use of constructs between groups. In this *Cognitive Communities* model, most constructs are shared to some degree between groups and only a very few reside solely within one group or another. This highlights the artificiality of delineating "divisions" between cognitive groupings, regardless of how they are determined. The algorithm above is best viewed as a method for taking a snapshot of what is actually a very dynamic and fluid environment. As such, it is best to regard the clusters that emerge through the above algorithm as a series of overlapping Venn diagrams rather than as discrete, independent classifications. In consideration of this, some constructs may later be considered for their value as a bridge between some or all groups. For the sake of characterization, however, it is also possible to differentiate each of the groups according to the constructs that are employed by at least twenty-five percent of the respondents in each (*Table 13*). This process is analogous to

Table 13: Construct Breakdowns by Population and Cluster

	Total Sample		Cluster 1 *Humanism*		Cluster 2 *For/Against Albanians*		Cluster 3 *Macedonian*		Cluster 4 *Experience/ Qualifications*		Outliers	
	n=109		n=41		n=24		n=13		n=17		n=14	
Constructs used by at least 25% of respondents/cluster:	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**
Nepotism	10	9%	7		0		1		2		0	
Special vs. General Interests	11	10%	5		0		3		2		1	
Powerful	11	10%	6		1		1		2		1	
International Relations	11	10%	3		4		0		3		1	
Development	12	11%	5		5		0		1		1	
Multiethnic	12	11%	6		3		0		1		2	
Reforms	12	11%	4		8	33%	0		0		0	
Results	12	11%	3		3		1		4		1	
Peace	13	12%	6		6	25%	0		1		0	
Issues Pertaining to "Nations"	14	13%	3		2		1		7	41%	1	
Leadership Skills	14	13%	9		0		3		2		0	
Radical	14	13%	1		4		0		6	35%	3	
Ohrid Agreement	15	14%	6		2		1		1		5	36%
Qualifications	15	14%	1		2		5	38%	6	35%	1	
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	15	14%	6		5		0		2		2	
Equality / Proportionality	16	15%	7		6	25%	0		3		0	
Stability	16	15%	8		8	33%	0		0		0	
Liberal / Conservative	17	16%	6		2		1		6	35%	2	
Experience	18	17%	6		2		0		9	53%	1	
Macedonia in General	18	17%	6		4		1		4		3	
Influence	19	17%	7		10	42%	0		1		1	
War / Conflict	20	18%	10		7	29%	0		3		0	
Local / Global	24	22%	17	41%	0		4	31%	2		1	
EU Issues	25	23%	12	29%	7	29%	0		1		5	36%
Corruption	26	24%	12	29%	4		3		7	41%	0	
Economics	29	27%	14	34%	11	46%	0		0		4	29%
Self-Interest	29	27%	12	29%	6	25%	2		6	35%	3	
For/Against Albanians	33	30%	16	39%	15	63%	0		1		1	
Nationalist	35	32%	24	59%	0		10	77%	0		1	
Humanism	38	35%	29	71%	5		0		3		1	

naming factors in a factor model according to the constructs that have the highest loadings in each. This also provides a representation of the constructs that are most widely shared within the cognitive frameworks in use within each group and, accordingly, allow for some general observations about each.

Each of the identity groups delineated above contains one or more construct categories that are shared by 25 percent or more (see highlights, *Table 13*) of the members of the group, with maximally shared constructs being held in common by between fifty-three and seventy-seven percent of respondents in a group. When examining these groupings for their shared constructs, some patterns begin to become apparent. Cluster 1, most strongly characterized by references to "humanism," is also suffused by references to "nationalism," "local vs. global issues," and referenced to public figures who are either "for or against Albanians." The group in Cluster 1 will therefore be referred to as the *Humanism* group. Cluster 2, the most strongly Albanian cluster by proportion, is dominated by the construct "for or against Albanians" with the additional frequent references to economic concerns and political influence. The group in Cluster 2 will therefore be referred to as *For/Against Albanians*. The Cluster 3 group was comprised entirely of ethnic Macedonians, had the smallest number of constructs in use, and was overwhelmingly dominated by references to nationalism. However, because this group is unique in this model for its mono-ethnic character, it will be referred to as the *Macedonian* group. The final identity group, Cluster 4, is primarily associated with references to "experience," as well as "corruption," "qualifications," and issues pertaining to "nations." The Cluster 4 group will therefore be referred to as the *Experience/Qualifications* group. Lastly, as they do not constitute a "group" in the cohesive sense of the word, outliers were not classified under a construct name.

Additional examination of these clusters can reveal which public figures were the subject of the greatest or least amount of disagreement. By examining the residuals (*Table 14*)[17] from an ANOVA test of the consensus configuration that is used to calculate the consensusv proportions in GPA, it is possible to see where members of a particular cluster disagree most strongly in relation to specific public figures. For example, for respondents in the *Humanism* group, Arben Jaferi was the subject of the most disagreement, whereas George Bush and Mother Teresa were

[17] To better understand the relationship between residuals and the consensus proportion (CP), the CP for each group may be calculated using the residuals provided above. Simply divide the summed residuals by 100 and subtract the result from one, [CP=1-(ΣR/100)] the result will match the CP.

the subjects of relatively less disagreement.[18] A more general look at the residuals in Table 10 reveals distinctive patterns of agreement and disagreement that are unique to each group.

Although any actual correlation between a group's relative unity or disunity in regard to a particular public figure, and the constructs in use by that cluster is difficult to ascribe from this information, it is possible to make some additional qualitative observations. For example, the *Humanism* group, the only group to view Mother Teresa with relatively little disagreement, is most strongly dominated by references to humanism. Conversely, the *Experience/Qualifications*

Table 14: ANOVA Residuals from GPA of Partitioning Clusters

Elements	Entire Sample	Cluster 1 *Humanism*	Cluster 2 For/Against Albanians	Cluster 3 *Macedonian*	Cluster 4 *Experience/ Qualifications*	Outliers
Kiro Gligorov	3.85	2.95	2.92	3.05	3.69	5.98
Ali Ahmeti	3.55	3.29	2.76	2.12	2.45	5.47
Lupco Georgievski	3.83	3.27	3.70	2.23	3.20	4.97
George Bush	3.35	2.65	3.20	2.06	3.01	4.84
Branko Crvenkovski	3.28	3.06	2.80	3.00	2.32	5.28
Arben Jaferi	3.83	3.67	3.34	3.47	2.65	4.41
Nikola Gruevski	3.79	3.19	2.75	3.19	2.75	5.89
Mother Teresa	4.21	2.79	3.55	3.14	4.27	5.77
Havier Solana	3.49	2.94	2.77	3.89	2.79	3.75
Vlado Buckovski	3.46	2.80	2.67	3.07	2.85	5.35
[1]Consensus proportion (CP)	CP_0=0.63	CP_1=0.69	CP_2=0.70	CP_3=0.71	CP_4=0.70	CP_{OL}=0.48
[2]p-value	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.01	p<0.04
[3]min/max	0.56/0.57	0.62/0.63	0.57/0.60	0.54/0.60	0.63/0.66	0.42/0.52

Residual scores reflect disagreement. Read column-by-column, lower residuals reflect less disagreement and higher residuals reflect more disagreement vis-à-vis elements (i.e., public figures).

[1] generated through generalized procrustes analysis

[2] reflects the frequency with which the CP of randomly reassigned data exceeds the observed CP over 100 iterations of the permutation test (i.e., p<0.01 indicates less than 1% of iterations will generate observed consensus proportion)

[3] minimum and maximum CPs of permuted randomized data over 100 iterations

[18] Mother Teresa, an ethnic Albanian christian, was born in what is now the capitol city of Macedonia. To those unfamiliar with Macedonia's politics, it may at first appear surprising that Mother Teresa seems to be the subject of much of the disagreement found in all except for one of the above clusters. Though, when one considers that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are primarily Moslem and ethnic Macedonians are primarily Christian, it is perhaps much less surprising that such an extraordinary figure should become the subject of disagreement. When one considers that neither ethnic group can lay complete claim to one who is otherwise universally regarded as a positive figure, the idea that Mother Teresa would inspire mixed feelings may begin to make more sense.

group displays the greatest amount of internal disagreement over the political outsider (i.e., Mother Teresa) among the public figures. At any rate, the ease of interpretability, coupled with the apparent improvement in agreement vis-à-vis ethnic and urban vs. rural models, appears to lend some support for this constructivist approach to identity and decision making within groups, with the important caveat that, though groups defined in this manner may construe using a somewhat homogenous framework, their construal is still very subjective to the likes and dislikes of the individual.

In light of this, it is also possible to discern the relative similarities and differences between respondents in each cluster. A principal components analysis was run on the procrustes statistics for all individuals in each set and the results were graphed to provide a visual depiction of the relative similarities and differences existing within each group. These "PCA Plots" demonstrate that, while respondents tend to "agree" on the relative distances between the individuals in question, they do not appear to agree in their preferences thereof. In a typical example (Figure 3), ethnic Albanian respondents (indicated by the letter 'A') tend to be clustered to the left of the y-axis, while ethnic Macedonian respondents (indicated by the letter 'M') tend to cluster to the right of the y-axis.

The individual sides of the y-axis bear no special meaning in isolation, save to qualitatively highlight the relative differences present in the preferences within each group. It appears that, although these groups share similar evaluation criteria in their frames of reference, ethnicity ultimately plays the deciding role in determining preferences for public representation. This is certainly information of value to a policy professional who is interested in crossing ethnic and political lines. But it could also be of benefit to a public figure who desires to make of his- or herself a bridge across the ethnic divide. After all, though the multiethnic clusters may be divided in the sense that they choose their representation by ethnicity, they are also united in the issues that most concern them regarding how those representatives focus their time and energy.



Figure 4: PCA Plot for Cluster 2

6.2. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSES

Variables employed in the factor analysis are constructs that were taken from the pooled responses from the repertory grid interviews as outlined in *Section 4.2*. As such, variables were named according to the category in which each was included after the final iteration of the construct classification process outlined in *Section 4.1.2*. Please refer to APPENDIX F for a listing of variable names and the wording of the corresponding constructs, as they appeared in the survey.

Section 6.2.1 introduces the hypotheses used to test survey data. An overview and reliability assessment of the survey data in provided in *Section 6.2.2* and *Section 6.2.3* provides an overview of validity testing in the form of a factor analysis. The overview of the survey data and its analyses concludes in *Section 6.2.4* with a discussion that further characterizes each factor

according to the constructs with the highest factor loadings, and compares each factor with the groups identified in Phase II of the first stage (see *Sections 4.1.2* and *6.1.3*) of analyses.

6.2.1. Hypotheses for Stage 2: Generalized Survey

Stage 2 of analyses essentially begins where Stage 1 ended: with a test of Hypothesis 4, *the "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis.* Again, this hypothesis states that *Macedonia's population can be clustered into groups of individuals whose frames of reference are sufficiently similar for effective communication. One or more of such groups may constitute a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities.* This hypothesis was tested using a generalized survey comprised of constructs from 60 of the construct categories elicited in Stage I. A factor analysis was performed to ascertain what, if any, structure exists in the scaled response data from surveys. Because a factor analysis was determined to be appropriate for these data, a factor model was generated. The factor model was then compared empirically with results from clustering algorithm performed in Phase II of analysis of repertory grid data.

Because it is a data reduction method, the factor generated in this analysis also allows for other hypotheses to be revisited. Pending the generation of an acceptable factor model, two additional hypotheses from those delineated in *Chapter Two* were therefore identified as appropriate for testing using identified factors: Hypothesis 1, the "*Two Identities*" *Hypothesis*; and Hypothesis 2, *"Three Identities" Hypothesis.* These hypotheses will differ from those listed in *Section 6.1.1* in their application, however. Whereas the first stage of research tested assessed groups for whether or not they share – substantial portions of – a frame of reference, this second stage of research begins with identifying frames of reference and testing whether they are associated with the groups identified in the "*Two Identities*" and "*Three Identities*" hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1, the "*Two Identities*" Hypothesis, states that *Macedonia is dominated by two major ethnic identities, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and each of these identity groups has its own characteristic frame of reference that allows it to interpret ideas and events according to the beliefs, interests, values, and perceptions of the group*. This implies that frames of reference in Macedonia are particular to individual ethnicities. Each frame of reference (e.g.,

the factors derived *Section 6.2.3*) should therefore be applied very differently from ethnicity to ethnicity. The hypotheses for individual factors are therefore:

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} \neq \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_1: Ethnic groups differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} = \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

Hypothesis 2, *The "Three Identities" Hypothesis*, states that *the – more cosmopolitan – urban dwellers exhibit a frame of reference that converges across ethnicities, whereas rural populations should more strongly resemble the "primordially" divided society, in that frames of reference are largely unique to each ethnicity*. This implies that frames of reference in Macedonia are particular to individual ethnicities, though urban situations allow for convergent frames of reference. Each frame of reference (e.g., the factors derived *Section 6.2.3*) should therefore be applied very differently from ethnicity to ethnicity in rural environments and at least some frames of reference should not be vary by ethnicity in urban environments. The hypotheses for individual factors are therefore:

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in rural environments ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} = \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_R: Ethnic groups in rural environments differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} \neq \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

and

H_0: Ethnic groups in urban environments differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} \neq \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_U: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in urban environments ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} = \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

6.2.2. Data Overview and Reliability

Data from Section 2 of the national survey were used for all further quantitative analyses. Section 2 consisted of 60 bipolar selection variables arranged on a discrete visual analog scale, similar to Likert and semantic differential scales. In order to aid in interpretation, construct poles were entered from positive to negative and scale values that originally ranged from one to five were recoded to range from -2 to 2, representing the negative and positive ends of the construct spectrum, respectively. Those constructs that do not have poles that are definable in terms of positive and negative (e.g., local vs. global: have localized political strategy…have global political strategy) are arranged in accordance with the name of their construct category (e.g., liberal/conservative: (positive pole) are liberal… (negative pole) are conservative).

Before proceeding with analyses, all 60 variables were evaluated for reliability using Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach 1951) in SPSS 14.0 for Windows. Incomplete data were excluded listwise, resulting in 447 valid cases. Cronbach's alpha coefficient is relatively high for these data (α=0.907), suggesting good internal consistency in the survey instrument overall. The results of the reliability analysis indicate that the data resulting from the survey are sufficiently reliable for their inclusion in a subsequent factor analysis.

6.2.3. Validity Testing – Factor Analysis

An exploratory factor analysis utilizing maximum likelihood and varimax rotation was conducted in SPSS 14.0 to determine what, if any, underlying structure exists in the scaled responses to the 60 bipolar constructs in Section 2 of the national survey. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity were used to assess the data for their suitability in a factor analysis. The KMO measure was 0.901, indicating that patterns of correlations in these data are relatively dense, and that factors extracted through a factor analysis should be distinct and reliable (Field 2005). Additionally, Bartlett's test was significant ($p < 0.001$), allowing for the rejection of the null hypothesis that the matrix is an identity matrix, meaning that there are interrelations among the variables and that a factor analysis should be appropriate.

Table 15: Abbreviated Table of Initial Eigenvalues

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	12.418	20.697	20.697
2	3.481	5.801	26.498
3	2.367	3.945	30.444
4	1.967	3.278	33.722
5	1.693	2.822	36.544
6	1.541	2.568	39.111
7	1.443	2.404	41.516
8	1.307	2.178	43.693
9	1.266	2.110	45.803
10	1.253	2.089	47.892
11	1.169	1.948	49.840
12	1.109	1.848	51.689
13	1.106	1.843	53.532
14	1.053	1.754	55.286
15	1.021	1.702	56.988
16	0.985	1.642	58.630
17	0.978	1.630	60.260
18	0.946	1.577	61.837
19	0.918	1.531	63.368
20	0.904	1.507	64.876

At the outset of the analysis, no single criterion proved sufficient in determining the number of factors to ultimately retain. Kaiser's (1960) rule of retaining all factors with an eigenvalue greater than one indicates that fifteen factors should be retained (*Table 15*). Alternatively, examination of a scree plot of the eigenvalues (*Figure 5*, Cattell 1966) indicates that four factors should be retained.

An initial extraction of four factors using varimax rotation produced a rotated factor structure with eight fairly substantial crossloadings (i.e., loadings within 0.05), potentially making interpretation difficult. In an effort to produce a factor structure that is more readily interpretable, with better separation between factors, three, five, and six factor models were additionally generated and each was evaluated. The five factor model (*Table 16*) was determined to be most appropriate, with the fewest crossloadings and no unstable factors (i.e., factors containing three or fewer variables).



Figure 5: Scree Plot

Table 16: Factor Loadings

	Loading
Factor 1: State Development	
Grass Roots	0.662
Special vs. General Interests	0.610
Self-Interest 2	0.601
Promises	0.599
Humanism	0.558
Corruption 1	0.546
Population in General	0.534
Self-Interest 1	0.513
Development	0.511
Confidence	0.510
Macedonia in General	0.486
Transparency 1	0.482
Social Issues	0.482
Nepotism	0.476
Region	0.465
Education	0.446
Leadership Skills	0.436
Employment	0.420
Democracy	0.406
Economics	0.392
Local vs. Global	-0.363
International Relations	0.358
Media	-0.344
Patriot	0.332
Administrative Reforms	0.253
Anticipation	0.235
Strategy	0.203
Factor 2: Peace and Conflict	
War / Conflict	0.621
Uniting/Dividing Macedonia	0.555
Federalism	0.541
Peace	0.537
Religion	0.511
Violence	0.478
Constitutional Name	0.437
Stability	0.429
Multiethnic	0.398
Cooperative Tendencies	0.316
Capitalism	0.245
Radical	0.203
Factor 3: Qualifications	
Liberal / Conservative	0.522
Qualifications	0.496
Experience	0.458
EU Issues	0.443
Ability / Effectiveness	0.436
Transparency 2	0.399
Communist	0.390
Economics	0.368
Balance	0.344
Cooperative Tendencies	0.324
Reforms	0.301
Corruption 2	0.255
Influence	0.224
Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	
Formation of State of Macedonia	0.528
Legal Aspects 1	0.430
Identity Issues	0.383
Legal Aspects 2	0.371
Popular Support	0.302
Nationalist	-0.226
Factor 5: Albanian Interests	
For/Against Albanians	0.651
State University Tetovo	0.584
Ohrid Agreement	0.491
Equality / Proportionality	0.480
Multiethnic	0.412

Together, the five factors accounted for 30.9% of the total variance. Factor 1 consisted of 27 items and accounted for 11.9% of the total variance. Since Factor 1 was comprised of items relating to democratic governance (grass roots, special vs. general interests, population in general, transparency 1, nepotism, democracy), corruption (self-interest 1 and 2, humanism, corruption 1), scope of influence (Macedonia in general, region, local vs. global, international relations), concrete performance issues (promises, development, social issues, education, employment, economics, patriot, administrative reforms), and skills (confidence, leadership skills, media, anticipation, strategy); it was labeled *State Development*. Factor 2, accounting for 6.4% of variance, consisted of 12 items relating directly to peace and conflict (war/conflict, uniting or dividing Macedonia, peace, violence, stability, cooperative tendencies, radical) and items that have been issues of internal or external conflict (federalism, religion, constitutional name, multiethnic, capitalism), and was therefore labeled *Peace and Conflict*. Factor 3, accounting for 6.2% of variance, consisted of 13 items that dealt directly (liberal/conservative, qualifications, experience, ability/effectiveness, transparency 2, corruption 2, influence, communist, balance, cooperative tendencies), and indirectly (EU issues, reforms, economics) with its namesake: *Qualifications*.

Factors 4 and 5 consisted of six and five items, respectively, and account for 3.2% of variance apiece. Each appears to represent core interests of one or the other of the two major ethnic groups in Macedonia. Factor 4 (formation of the state of Macedonia, identity issues, legal aspects 1 and 2, popular support, nationalist) was labeled *Macedonian Identity*. Factor 5 (for/against Albanians, State University Tetovo, Ohrid Agreement, equality/proportionality, multiethnic) was labeled *Albanian Interests*.

6.2.4. Discussion and Comparison of Factors

The factors identified above are approached here as latent variables that describe structures that underlie identity groups' decision making. The labels are general characterizations that were thought to summarize general trends prevailing in each factor and were applied for ease of identification and differentiation between factors. As such, factor labels should not

Table 17: Construct Breakdowns by Population and Cluster

	Total Sample		Cluster 1 *Humanism*		Cluster 2 *For/Against Albanians*		Cluster 3 *Macedonian*		Cluster 4 *Experience/ Qualifications*		Outliers	
	N=109		n=41		n=24		n=13		n=17		n=14	
Constructs used by at least 25% of respondents/cluster:	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**
Nepotism	10	9%	7		0		1		2		0	
Special vs. General Interests	11	10%	5		0		3		2		1	
Powerful	11	10%	6		1		1		2		1	
International Relations	11	10%	3		4		0		3		1	
Development	12	11%	5		5		0		1		1	
Multiethnic	12	11%	6		3		0		1		2	
Reforms	12	11%	4		8	33%	0		0		0	
Results	12	11%	3		3		1		4		1	
Peace	13	12%	6		6	25%	0		1		0	
Issues Pertaining to "Nations"	14	13%	3		2		1		7	41%	1	
Leadership Skills	14	13%	9		0		3		2		0	
Radical	14	13%	1		4		0		6	35%	3	
Ohrid Agreement	15	14%	6		2		1		1		5	36%
Qualifications	15	14%	1		2		5	38%	6	35%	1	
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	15	14%	6		5		0		2		2	
Equality / Proportionality	16	15%	7		6	25%	0		3		0	
Stability	16	15%	8		8	33%	0		0		0	
Liberal / Conservative	17	16%	6		2		1		6	35%	2	
Experience	18	17%	6		2		0		9	53%	1	
Macedonia in General	18	17%	6		4		1		4		3	
Influence	19	17%	7		10	42%	0		1		1	
War / Conflict	20	18%	10		7	29%	0		3		0	
Local / Global	24	22%	17	41%	0		4	31%	2		1	
EU Issues	25	23%	12	29%	7	29%	0		1		5	36%
Corruption	26	24%	12	29%	4		3		7	41%	0	
Economics	29	27%	14	34%	11	46%	0		0		4	29%
Self-Interest	29	27%	12	29%	6	25%	2		6	35%	3	
For/Against Albanians	33	30%	16	39%	15	63%	0		1		1	
Nationalist	35	32%	24	59%	0		10	77%	0		1	
Humanism	38	35%	29	71%	5		0		3		1	

be understood as a strict interpretation of each variable, but instead as a characterization similar to the groups identified in *Section 6.1.3* (*Table 17*).

Upon inspection of the factors that emerged through the factor analysis, some notable similarities to the groups that were identified in *Section 6.1.3* (*Table 18*) become apparent. The factor *State Development* bears some similarity to the identity group labeled as *Humanism*, and which bears references to "humanism," "corruption," and "local versus global" public figures. In addition, the factor *Qualifications* also bears some strong similarities to the identity group *Experience/Qualifications*, which was dominated by references to "experience," "qualifications," "corruption," and "liberals and conservatives."

There are also some notable similarities that follow along ethnic lines. There are factors that appear to be dominated by concerns that are commonly expressed by members of Macedonia's two largest ethnic groups: Albanians and Macedonians. The factor *Albanian Interests* bears a strong similarity to the identity group *For/Against Albanians*, which was strongly characterized by constructs from the categories "for or against Albanians" and "equality and proportionality." There is also a factor labeled *Macedonian Identity* that bears some similarity to the identity group *Macedonian*. Albeit, the similarities between the *Macedonian Identity* factor and *Macedonian* are limited due to the fact that the construct category they share,

Table 18: Comparison of Identity Groups and Factors

Stage I: Identity Groups	**Stage II: Factors**
Cluster 1: *Humanism*	**Factor 1: *State Development***
Cluster 2: *For/Against Albanians*	**Factor 2: *Peace and Conflict***
	Factor 5: *Albanian Interests*
Cluster 3: *Macedonian*	**Factor 4: *Macedonian Identity***
Cluster 4: *Experience/Qualifications*	**Factor 3: *Qualifications***

"nationalist," while strongly associated with the identity group *Macedonian*, loads weakly onto the *Macedonian Identity* factor.

A notable divergence between the identity groups tested in *Section 6.1.3* and the factors produced above is the presence of an additional factor, *Peace and Conflict*, that holds no substantial equivalency to any one particular cluster. This factor includes constructs that are noted for their presence in the identity groups *For/Against Albanians* and *Humanism*, but has a character that is unique to the factor analysis.

Although the factor analysis does not directly replicate the findings of the cluster analysis in the first stage of research, the findings of the factor analysis bear some similarities to the identity groups delineated earlier. Any differences should not be surprising as the repertory grid interviews outlined in *Section 4.1.1* sampled from a substantially different population from that sampled in the national surveys (see *Section 5.1*). Additionally, constructs employed for the national survey were a subset of those that emerged over the course of repertory grid interviews, as employing the full set of construct categories that emerged from the repertory grid interviews was not possible due to time limitations and the desire to avoid producing an overly long or unwieldy survey.

6.3. ANALYZING AND CONTEXTUALIZING FACTORS

The central goals of the survey project have been to (1) assess the frames of reference in use in the population of Macedonia to aid in determining how the identity groups in that population may best be characterized and (2) to revisit the "*Two Identities*" and "*Three Identities*" hypotheses in order to test whether politics are best approached and contextualized along ethnic lines and/or urban and rural designations. This section approaches these questions in reverse order. First, in *Sections 6.3.1* and *6.3.2*, the factors are analyzed using an analysis of variance to test the "*Two Identities*" hypothesis that each factor may be characterized as "belonging" primarily to either Macedonian or Albanian ethnic groups. Next, the factors are assessed once more using analysis of variance, with the sample population divided among two age groups. This provides a different perspective from the earlier analysis of variance and aid further in

understanding the intersection of ethnicity and politics in Macedonia and how identity groups there may best be characterized. *Section 6.3.3* then repeats the above analyses for the "*Three Identities*" of urban environments creating convergent frames of reference.

6.3.1. The "*Two Identities*" Hypothesis: Ethnicity

The first step in assessing the five factor model (*Table 16*, *Section 6.2.3*) was to determine if the factors representing frames of reference in use within Macedonia's population were characteristic to specific ethnic groups or crossed ethnic lines. The purpose was to evaluate the factors for evidence, or lack thereof, of identity groups that cross ethnicities. The expectation is that, assuming that ethnic groups share a frame(s) of reference as embodied in each of the five factors outlined above, the different groups should apply the constructs that comprise the factor in a manner that is similar and there should be no significant difference in mean scores on that factor from ethnic group to ethnic group. Conversely, if the difference in mean scores between ethnicities on a given factor is significant, then that factor may be considered to be characteristic of a particular ethnic group. The hypotheses for individual factors are therefore:

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups ($\mu_{Albanian}=\mu_{Macedonian}$)

H_1: Ethnic groups differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{Albanian}\neq\mu_{Macedonian}$)

Because the ethnic groups other than Macedonians and Albanians are not represented in sufficient numbers, Turkish (n=5), Serbian (n=3), Romani (n=4), and other ethnic groups (n=3) were excluded from the analyses. Analyses were therefore limited to ethnic Albanian and Macedonian respondents, the largest ethnic groups in Macedonia.

Data were screened to verify that assumptions of analysis of variance were satisfied (APPENDIX I). The major assumption of analysis of variance, homogeneity of variances, was not satisfied for one factor: Factor 2, *Peace and Conflict*. Data were analyzed using parametric and non-parametric approaches to be able to assess the impact of Factor 2 on analyses. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted using all five factors. Main effects revealed that the

means for all four of the remaining factors differed significantly: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.012$), Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.003$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.001$), and Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.001$). Significant scores for factors indicate that we can reject the null that there is not a difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians for each factor. Results reveal that each of the interpretable factors may be used to differentiate between ethnicities.

Because one-way analysis of variance assumptions were not met for all factors, a nonparametric approach to analysis of variance was also employed. The Kruskall-Wallis Test is a nonparametric method for assessing the significance of differences between groups that is analogous to analysis of variance (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). The interpretation of this method is less straightforward than one-way analysis of variance, but it is not subject to the assumptions of a parametric analysis of variance and thus an important supplementary alternative. In this method, individual factor values are converted to ranks and rank ordered within each factor. If there are no differences between groups, then the ranks should be distributed approximately equally between groups. Conversely, if there are differences between groups, then the mean rank for one group should be higher than the mean rank for the other. The null and alternate hypotheses for each of the five factors in this test may therefore be restated in a manner that is similar to that of the one-way analysis of variance (i.e., testing for significant differences between group ranks):

H_0: There is no difference in mean ranks on factor *x* between ethnic groups (Mean $\text{ranks}_{\text{Albanian}}$=Mean $\text{ranks}_{\text{Macedonian}}$)

H_1: Ethnic groups differ in their applications of factor *x* (Mean $\text{ranks}_{\text{Albanian}}\neq$Mean $\text{ranks}_{\text{Macedonian}}$)

A Kruskall-Wallis Test was conducted using all five factors. Test statistics revealed that mean ranks differed significantly for all five factors: Factor 1 – *state development* ($p<0.003$), Factor 2 – *peace and conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *personal qualifications* ($p<0.009$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 5 – *Albanian interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that ethnic groups do not differ as indicated in mean ranks for each of the five factors. Results reveal that all five factors may be used to

differentiate between ethnic groups. In addition, we may conclude that the frames of reference embodied in each of the five factors are not shared across ethnicities in this population.

6.3.2. The *"Age Cohorts"* Hypothesis

Section 6.2.4 concluded with an important caveat: the differences noted between the outcomes of the cluster analysis in *Section 6.1.3* and the factor analysis in the current chapter should not be surprising, given that they are sampled from demographically different populations. It is therefore important to test whether the conclusions noted in the analyses of variance above hold if the sample population is subdivided by age. The *"Age Cohorts" Hypothesis* states: *Younger generations are more likely to have frames of reference that converge across ethnicities.* The age division was chosen as a method of approximating the parameters of the demographic group that was accessed in the cluster analyses and allowing for a comparison between the older, Yugoslav generation, with the younger, post-Yugoslav generation.

The age selected as a line of demarcation between demographic groups was 35 years of age. Respondents aged 35 years and under may be regarded as having spent nearly their entire adult lives in post-Yugoslav Macedonia and are expected to have stronger ties to the systems of governing that have been instituted since Macedonia declared its independence in 1991. Conversely, the over 35 generation is expected to have more memories of the former Yugoslav system and therefore have a notably different perspective on the political personalities and events that they have witnessed in the years since independence. An additional benefit to the choice of 35 years as an age cutoff is that it bifurcates the sample population in such a way that each age category may retain sufficient sample size (n_1=224, n_2=208) to allow for statistical analysis.

As above (*Section 6.3.1*), the expectation was that, if ethnic groups in individual age categories share a frame of reference (i.e., one of the five factors), then they should apply the constructs that comprise the factor in a manner that is similar and there should be no significant difference in mean scores on that factor from ethnic group to ethnic group. Conversely, if the difference in mean scores between ethnicities on a given factor is significant, then that factor may be considered to be characteristic of a particular ethnic group. The hypotheses for individual factors are therefore:

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in age category *y* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} = \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_1: Ethnic groups in age category *y* differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y} \neq \mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

Data for each age group were screened simultaneously to verify that assumptions of analysis of variance were satisfied for each. The major assumption of analysis of variance, homogeneity of variances, was not satisfied for two factors in the Over 35 age category (Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* and Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests*) and one factor in the 35 and Under category (Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict*). Data were therefore analyzed using parametric and non-parametric approaches to be able to assess the impact of those factors on analyses. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted using all five factors in each category.

For the Over 35 age category, main effects revealed that differences in the means of all five factors were significant: Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.011$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$); or borderline significant: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.075$). Significant – and borderline significant – scores indicate that we can reject the null for each factor in this age category that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. Results reveal that each of the interpretable factors may be used to differentiate between ethnicities.

For the 35 and under category, main effects revealed that the means of four factors significantly: (Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.050$), Factor 2 – *Peace & Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.007$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate that we can reject the null for each factor that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Factor 3 – *Qualifications*, was not significant ($p<0.201$), indicating that the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians on this factor can not be rejected. Results reveal that four interpretable factors may be used to differentiate between ethnicities, but that the Factor 3 – *Qualifications*, appears to cross ethnicities.

Because one-way analysis of variance assumptions were not met for all factors, a nonparametric approach to analysis of variance was also employed. The Kruskall-Wallis Test is a nonparametric method for assessing the significance of differences between groups that is analogous to analysis of variance. If there are no differences between groups, then the ranks

should be distributed approximately equally between groups. Conversely, if there are differences between groups, then the mean rank for one group should be higher than the mean rank for the other. The null and alternate hypotheses for each of the five factors in this test may therefore be restated in a manner that is similar to that of the one-way analysis of variance (i.e., testing for significant differences between group ranks):

H_0: There is no difference in mean ranks on factor *x* between ethnic groups in age category *y* ($\text{Mean ranks}_{\text{Albanian } y} = \text{Mean ranks}_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_1: Ethnic groups in age category *y* differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\text{Mean ranks}_{\text{Albanian } y} \neq \text{Mean ranks}_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

A Kruskall-Wallis Test was conducted using all five factors in each age category (APPENDIX J). Test statistics for the Over 35 age category again revealed that mean ranks differed significantly for all five factors: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.045$), Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.009$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean ranks for each of the five factors in this age category. Results reveal that all five factors may be used to differentiate between ethnic groups in this age category. In addition, we may conclude that the frames of reference embodied in each of the five factors are not shared across ethnicities in this segment of the population.

Outcomes for the 35 and under age category differed from those of the contrasting age category. Test statistics reveal that mean ranks differed significantly at $p<0.05$ in four of the five factors: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.027$), Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.003$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean ranks for those four factors in this age category. The remaining factor, Factor 3 – *Qualifications*, was not significant ($p<0.284$), indicating that the null that there is no difference in mean ranks between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians on this factor can not be rejected. Results for the 35 and under age group reveal that, although four of the five factors may be used to differentiate between ethnic groups in this age category, at least one factor was not significantly different between ethnicities. We may therefore conclude that there is reason to believe that there is some presence of shared frame of reference in this segment of the population. At worst, we can not

rule out that there is no difference in the way that Macedonians and Albanians in this age group employ this frame of reference.

6.3.3. The "*Three Identities*" Hypothesis: Rural vs. Urban

In the interest of testing the "*Three Identities*" hypothesis, the sample was split according to place of residence. As with analyses conducted in *Section 6.1.2.3*, the urban population was defined as those who reside in the city of Skopje, Macedonia's largest and arguably most cosmopolitan city. All others were classified as rural. Small sample size in the urban group (Urban n=119, Rural n=301) was problematic, and it soon became evident that one of the ethnic categories (i.e., urban Albanians n=17) contained disproportionately few respondents, implying that analyses undertaken on these group designations would yield little if any latitude for inference. It was decided to run the analyses nonetheless, with the caveat that any output would be interpreted as suggestions for future research and *not* as statistically valid findings.

As stated in *Section 6.2.1*, the expectation was that, each frame of reference (i.e., factor) should be applied very differently from ethnicity to ethnicity in rural environments and at least some frames of reference should not be vary by ethnicity in urban environments. The hypotheses for individual factors in rural and urban environments, respectively are therefore:

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in rural environments ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y}=\mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_R: Ethnic groups in rural environments differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y}\neq\mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

and

H_0: Ethnic groups in urban environments differ in their applications of factor *x* ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y}\neq\mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_U: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in urban environments ($\mu_{\text{Albanian } y}=\mu_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

Data for urban and rural groups were screened simultaneously to verify that assumptions of analysis of variance were satisfied for each (APPENDIX K). The major assumption of analysis of variance, homogeneity of variances, was not satisfied for two factors in the rural category (Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* and Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests*) and one factor in the urban category (Factor 1 – *State Development*). Data were therefore analyzed using parametric and non-parametric approaches to be able to assess the impact of those factors on analyses. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted for all five factors in each category.

For the rural category, main effects revealed that the means for all factors differed significantly: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.002$), Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.036$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.018$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians for each factor in this category. Results reveal that each of the interpretable factors may be used in rural groups to differentiate between ethnicities.

For the urban category, main effects revealed that the differences in means for four factors were either significant, Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.008$), or borderline significant: Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.072$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.090$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.086$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in those factors. The remaining factor, (Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.835$)) was not significant, indicating that the null that there is no difference in mean scores between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians on that factor can not be rejected. Results reveal that four factors may be used to differentiate between ethnicities among the urban population, and that the remaining factor, *State Development*, appears to cross ethnicities.

Because one-way analysis of variance assumptions were not met for all factors, a nonparametric approach to analysis of variance was also employed. The Kruskall-Wallis Test is a nonparametric method for assessing the significance of differences between groups that is analogous to analysis of variance. If there are no differences between groups, then the ranks should be distributed approximately equally between groups. Conversely, if there are differences between groups in a particular age category, then the mean rank for one group should be higher than the mean rank for the other. The null and alternate hypotheses for each of the five factors in

this test may therefore be restated in a manner that is similar to that of the one-way analysis of variance (i.e., testing for significant differences between group ranks):

H_0: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in rural environments (Mean ranks$_{\text{Albanian } y}$=Mean ranks$_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_R: Ethnic groups in rural environments differ in their applications of factor *x* (Mean ranks$_{\text{Albanian } y}$≠Mean ranks$_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

and

H_0: Ethnic groups in urban environments differ in their applications of factor *x* (Mean ranks$_{\text{Albanian } y}$≠Mean ranks$_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

H_U: There is no difference in mean scores on factor *x* between ethnic groups in urban environments (Mean ranks$_{\text{Albanian } y}$=Mean ranks$_{\text{Macedonian } y}$)

A Kruskall-Wallis Test was conducted in both rural and urban categories, using all five factors. Test statistics for the rural category again revealed that mean ranks differed significantly for all five factors: Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.002$), Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.0001$), Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.026$), Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.005$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.0001$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean ranks for each of the five factors in the rural category. Results reveal that all five factors may be used to differentiate between ethnic groups in the rural category. In addition, we may conclude that the frames of reference embodied in each of the five factors are not shared across ethnicities in this segment of the population.

Outcomes for the urban category differed substantially from those of the rural category. Test statistics indicate that differences in mean ranks are significant in two of the five factors (Factor 4 – *Macedonian Identity* ($p<0.010$), Factor 5 – *Albanian Interests* ($p<0.033$)), and borderline significant in another: Factor 2 – *Peace and Conflict* ($p<0.073$). Significant scores indicate a rejection of the null that there is no difference in mean ranks for those three factors in the urban category. The remaining factors, Factor 1 – *State Development* ($p<0.653$), and Factor 3 – *Qualifications* ($p<0.114$), were not significant, indicating that the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean ranks between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians on these factors can not

be rejected. Results for the urban group reveal that, although two of the five factors may be used to differentiate between ethnic groups in this age category, at least three of the remaining factors show promise for future inquiry. Although limited sample size in the urban group makes any further inference inadvisable, these results are worth noting for possible inclusion in upcoming studies.

6.4. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

No discussion of research would be complete without some treatment on how the methods employed account for threats to the validity of the study. In designing this research it was often necessary to make decisions regarding tradeoffs between some form of cost and validity. This chapter focuses on issues of ethics and validity encountered in this research and how they were addressed.

The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the ethical considerations of this research in *section 8.1*. The next section, *7.2*, discusses how this relatively unique research design sought to minimize threats to construct validity. *Section 7.3* then introduces what was thought to be of minimal impact in this study: threats to internal validity. *Section 7.4* then discusses how the combination of repertory grid interviews and standardized survey interviews worked to minimize threats to external validity. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of how future research and further reduce threats to validity and provide further tests of the findings of this research.

6.4.1. Ethical Considerations

A primary concern for any research is the welfare of respondents. It was therefore a priority of this project to do no harm, perceived or real, to those participating in any stage of this research. Consistent with the University of Pittsburgh's Institutional Review Board guidelines, all participation was voluntary, confidentiality was maintained, and only those of 18 years of age or older were eligible to take part.

As this research was concerned with assessing the role of identity in political decision making among polities, only those of voting age were asked to participate. No subjects under 18 were considered for inclusion in either the repertory grid interviews or survey interviews.

As potential respondents were approached, they were informed of the purpose of the research and were given a description of what would be expected of them should they elect to participate. They were advised that there were no forseeable risks or benefits associated with their participation, that their participation is entirely voluntary, and that all responses will be kept confidential. All contact with respondents took place with trained interviewers who had been instructed in ethical research practices and the importance of maintaining confidentiality. In all cases, only non-identifying information was recorded, with a unique identifying number as the only reference to individual respondents.

6.4.2. Construct Validity

From its inception, this research was designed as a method to investigate political identity in a manner that is culturally appropriate to the people of Macedonia and as free of researcher bias as possible. The issues at hand included questions of how to account to threats to construct validity resulting from *inadequate operationalization of the independent variables*, *treatment artifacts,* and *mono-method bias.* Each of these threats to construct validity is addressed below.

6.4.2.1. Inadequate Operationalization of the Independent Variables

The research design employed in this study was intended to enhance the *reliability* and *representativeness* of the independent variables that emerged and came to be employed in the course of the project. These factors are an important consideration given the semi-structured style of eliciting independent variables that is in use when conducting repertory grid interviews. Although the semi-structured nature offers the advantage of accessing a population on its own terms and eliciting culturally relevant constructs in use in that population, the semantic variability in responses from one respondent to another can be large. Such variability is partly mitigated through the practice of standardizing emergent constructs across languages and grouping similar constructs into categories or themes. Though even with the precautions of

multiple translations and back-translations to establish equivalency and the use of a third, arbiter language (i.e., English) to amass equivalent categories, the construct categories may be subject to certain amounts, however limited, of eclecticism.

In light of the potential for variance within construct categories, a researcher can never be entirely certain that such categories are entirely homogenous and therefore *representative* of a given independent variable. It is for this reason that great care was taken in establishing equivalency of meaning between individual constructs in what became a very involved and dynamic process. Constructs were ultimately classified using two main creteria: (1) for constructs to be considered equivalent (i.e., in the same category), they must either, contain some common term (e.g., multiethnic, self-interest, nationalist), or hold substantially with the common meaning expressed by all other constructs in a set (e.g., impartiality ≈ don't discriminate by ethnicity), and (2) constructs containing terms that could be included in more than one category were ultimately assigned to the category that was determined to best express the primary idea contained in the original construct. Although some degree of variance is inevitable when dealing with equivalency of meaning from person to person, even under conditions of seeming linguistic homogineity, this process was thought to have produced categories of constructs that correlate well enough to allow for research extensions and further analyses.

Once the categorization process was judged to have advanced sufficiently in reducing the pooled constructs to a more manageable list of construct categories, representative constructs from each category were selected for inclusion in a survey. In this way, the research begun with repertory grid interviews was extended to create a survey that could be employed to further assess the reliability (i.e., consistency) of the independent variables (i.e., constructs). A factor analysis of survey results revealed the dimensionality of the variables by revealing latent structures in the data and further reduced the variables into manageable factors.

6.4.2.2. Treatment Artifacts

There is potential in all research for some aspect of the research method to influence the nature of the data collected. This research program focused on minimizing the potential for *experimenter expectancies* and *evaluation anxiety* to influence responses. The main method for

addressing these threats to validity was standardization of the research tools and testing environments, especially for repertory grid interviews.

It was quickly recognized that grid interviewers could influence the respondents' output if the process was unscripted. In addition, it was also seen as possible that respondents being interviewed by a member of what they perceive to be a competing ethnic group would respond less naturally than they would to a member of their own ethnic group or another group that they may perceive as sympathetic or "harmless." To combat these tendencies, repertory grid interviews and testing environments were standardized wherever possible.

In regard to reducing the effects of experimenter expectancies, repertory grid interviewers underwent an intensive training regimen that taught research methodology and ethics and stressed important interviewing techniques such as staying on-script and putting the respondent at ease, in addition to their instruction in the repertory grid method and some of its underlying theory. Interviewers were also directly monitored by the primary investigator to affirm that they are relying only on the script and not adding their own content. Above all, however, the most valuable aid to standardizing the repertory grid interview process was the introduction of the computer-based elicitation program. The advantages of computer-based elicitation included: standardization of the testing environment; greater standardization between languages, allowing the respondent to follow along with the prompts throughout the process; reduced temptation for the interviewer to extemporize instructions to the respondent as they were already clearly visible on the screen; and some possibility of increased privacy for the respondent if they wished to follow the computer prompts on their own in completing the interview.

The linguistic and methodological standardization mitigated but did not eliminate the effects of evaluation anxiety. Although there were both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian interviewers, it was not always possible to match ethnicities between interviewers and interviewees. Therefore, other methods of putting the respondent at ease included stressing the confidentiality of all responses and the lack of any identifying information. The possibility that some respondents were limiting their range of responses remained, especially when the interviewers were operating on their home campus. At least one respondent reported that they wished to end the interview after offering only a few constructs for the stated reason of feeling self-conscious about what they were saying.

It is possible that the practice of respondents limiting the range of constructs they were willing to provide may have had some effect on the findings of the outcomes of pooled comparisons of repertory grid data. However, such effects were not thought to have been substantial due to the rarity of respondents revealing unease in the interview format and the frequency of interviewer comments indicating that respondents seemed to enjoy the process. In other instances, interviewers disclosed their own unease at the bluntness of interviewee responses.

The validity concerns addressed above in regard to repertory grid interviews were thought to be somewhat less problematic for the national surveys. These surveys were standardized, scripted, and general in their application. Whereas the repertory grid method had involved disclosing specific measures of how respondents' constructs relate to each public figure, the survey was only concerned with respondents ratings of politicians in general or constructs associated with politicians whose identity the respondent was not asked to disclose.

6.4.2.3. Mono-Method Bias

Political inquiries using the techniques outlined in this research are uncommon. The constructivist assumptions that underpin the logic of this study, while justifiable, have not been frequently verified through replication using these methods. Although the combination of repertory grid method and a standardized follow-up survey were intended to mitigate this concern, this was essentially only a first, exploratory, test. The findings of this study should therefore be viewed with some skepticism until further studies can be conducted to test or follow-up on these methods and findings.

6.4.3. Context Validity

As an aid to inference in both stages one and two, it was important to insure an accurate estimate of the limits of the knowledge system(s) being investigated. As such, it was important to be able to determine if and when an adequate sample of the constructs in use by the communities being investigated had been secured. To do so, a correctness-in-the-limit test was employed (Dunn 2002, Kearns 1984). Such an approach employs a plot of the cumulative frequency of non-

duplicate constructs to determine whether the gathered data has reached the approximate limit of constructs in use in the sampled communities.

Figure 6 represents the cumulative number of unique (non-duplicate) constructs introduced by each successive respondent. Although the curve becomes much less steep by the sixty-first respondent, it flattens out entirely after the ninety-first respondent. This indicates that additional interviews are not likely to have provided a significant contribution to the sample of constructs.



Figure 6: Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Non-Duplicate Constructs

6.4.4. Internal Validity

Threats to internal validity were thought to be limited in the context of this research. Because this research was largely exploratory rather than experimental or quasi-experimental, the concerns about threats to internal validity were limited to controlling the extraneous effects of *history* and group composition effects that would result from *selection bias*. In particular, the effects of history were an ever-present concern throughout data collection.

Two concerns relating to history were relevant throughout the project: the upcoming elections, and the effect of major news events on an extended data collection. Both interview methods took place in the eight months prior to the 2006 general elections in Macedonia. This was an important factor to note because of the two stage process of data collection. It was critical that both the repertory grid interviews and the national survey to be completed before the elections. If the survey were delayed until after the elections, it would be measuring a population that is in a very different frame of mind from the one on which the survey was based. The election had the potential to function as a major confounder if construct measures for each phase of the project were not taken when the populations were in a similar frame of mind.

A similar and related concern is that of major news events. Because influential or polarizing events that take place during the collection period have the potential to directly augment political discourse and therefore the cognitive frames of reference of the population, these became an uncontrollable factor that had to be kept in mind. It was therefore important to minimize the amount of time between the beginning and the inception and culmination of data collection in the interest of avoiding the possibility that newsworthy events may have an affect on individual responses that would essentially change the nature of the data collected after the event would be reported. Again, the news events had the possibility of creating a major confounding effect comparable to creating two separate cognitive populations, one from before the event, and one that is different due to the interaction effect of the news event. For this reason, the principal investigator was more relieved than usual that no major outbreaks of ethnic tension or civil unrest took place in that eight month period.

The problem of comparing what are essentially disparate groups as though they were a single population may create a major impediment to interpretation. This is an especially relevant when considering the potential for selection bias. In addition, there was a similar concern that

student interviewers would tend to choose their friends for interviews rather than people with whom they were not acquainted. Such a sampling method was suspected to have the potential to produce a particularly homogenous sample of cognitive constructs. It was for this reason that the random assignment of a required shoe color for potential respondents was implemented while on the home campus. Before leaving to recruit a new respondent, interviewers were required to roll dice and consult a chart for the color that corresponded with the numbers on the dice. The interviewer was then obligated to choose a potential respondent based on the color shoes he or she was wearing. Although the interviewers did note that they were sometimes self-conscious of the attention they were getting for wandering the campus while looking at feet, it added some levity to the recruitment efforts and greatly increased the diversity of those who were recruited.

6.4.5. External Validity

As with the sampling concerns noted above, the factor of *nonrepresentative sampling* was regarded as a serious threat to external validity. As mentioned in the analyses in *Section 6.1.2.4* above, there was some concern that simultaneously sampling from four different universities could become a confounder by producing a sample that is more representative of the universities in question than the cognitive properties of the country as a whole. Although these concerns were partly addressed through homophily measures, generalized procrustes analysis and semantic comparison of the constructs employed, a major function of the national survey was to create a basis for comparison and validation for the findings of the repertory grid interviews.

The national survey was constructed with the goal of generalization in mind. Whereas the repertory grid interviews were semi-structured and limited in number (n = 109) due to time and other costs, the national survey was composed of standardized constructs from the repertory grid interviews. The standardized format allowed for a much larger sample (n = 447) to be conducted in much less time with fewer costs. The national survey was additionally applied to a random sample of people from across Macedonia, resulting in more representative and generalizeable data.

7. DISCUSSION

> Briefly, we may consider a *people* a community of social communication habits. Its members usually have common habits of speech, such as language, or common cultural memories permitting them to understand one another's ideas, even if they are expressed in two different languages, as among German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss. The ability of the members of such a people to transmit information to each other over a wide range of topics; the ability to form efficient patterns of teamwork for a wide variety of purposes; and perhaps their ability to form new patterns of teamwork for new purposes – all of these may be estimated or measured by methods ranging from the judgment of well-informed observers to the more refined experimental techniques of social psychologists. Data on all these points measure, as it were, the invisible communications equipment the members of a population carry in their minds. *From it, inferences can be drawn not only as to the cohesion of an already existing people, and of the membership of particular individuals or groups within it, but also as to the presence or absence of a minimum of cultural compatibility and mutual understanding, sufficient to permit common political or economic institutions to weld different populations in a gradual process of social learning into one people or one nation*. [emphasis added] (Deutsch 1966b, 177)

This research has employed a multimethod approach to evaluating whether, or in what ways Macedonia is developing a stable and cohesive society. The two methods that were applied in this research were repertory grid interviews (stage one) and a national survey (stage two) that was based on the results of those interviews. Repertory grid interviews made it possible to directly compare the frames of reference of Macedonia's university students and gauge how much or in what ways they are similar and different. The findings from the repertory grid interviews also made it possible to compile a more generalized survey instrument for use with a random sample of voting-age adults across Macedonia. The survey, while better suited for use with larger samples, could not match the depth and detail of repertory grid interviews. However, because the survey allowed for the findings of the repertory grid interviews to be extended to a

wider population, it functioned as a validation tool for the earlier interviews, and it also allowed for a comparison between the student responses in the first stage of inquiry and responses from the general population in the second stage of inquiry.

At each stage, this study was concerned with the following questions: *Is it realistic to expect that Macedonia will achieve self sustaining political stability?* Stated another way, *is its population developing a sense of community or societal cohesiveness and, if so, in what way?* Relatedly, *is there evidence that segments of Macedonia's population are developing a common identity that is based on being a citizen of Macedonia, as opposed to ethnic or other demographic identity alone?* Or, in Deutsch's terms, do they posses a "minimum of cultural compatibility and mutual understanding, sufficient to permit common political or economic institutions to weld different [communities] in a gradual process of social learning into one people? (1966, 177)" Because the variables implied by the above questions are not immediately or directly observable, past studies and popular theories were employed as a guide to how such inquiry should be addressed.

An assessment of three different theoretical perspectives that are commonly used to understand identity formation and maintenance yielded the working hypotheses: (1) the *"Two Communities" Hypothesis* of primordialism, (2) the *"Three Communities" Hypothesis* of modernization theory, and (3) the *Cognitive Communities Hypothesis* and *Age Cohort Hypothesis* of postmodernization theory. These hypotheses were tested to ascertain whether the current situation in Macedonia corresponds with the identity-related expectations present in each of the three theoretical perspectives. Inference may therefore be drawn according to how well each of the theories of identity fit the data and whether that and the qualitative information resulting from this research represent a departure from or correspondence with prior inquiry into identity formation or maintenance in Macedonia.

Overall, the findings appear to support the predictions of major theories, with some important deviations. Taking interviews in university populations as a starting point for inquiry created the – somewhat misleading – impression that there is a great deal of potential for multiethnic interaction and communication. When interpreting the findings from this population, it must be kept in mind that these respondents are representative of the younger and better educated population strata in Macedonia, not the entire population. Similar inquiry using

population-representative samples presents a different picture. From the perspective of the wider population, such tendencies for identity to cross culture are notably more limited.

The following sections discuss, in more detail, the findings from analyses of repertory grid interviews (*Section 7.1*) and the national survey (*Section 7.2*). Those sections are followed by a brief contextualizing section (*Section 7.3*) that discusses the importance of this sort of research in context of prior research and similar inquiry. The chapter closes with a discussion of directions for future research (*Section 7.4*).

7.1. REPERTORY GRID

The use of the repertory grid method is well suited to identity research because it provides a snapshot in the form of a perceptual map of how an individual perceives a given set of stimuli. These perceptual maps may be used to directly compare individual or group perceptions with those of others. As such, this method presents an opportunity for the researcher to effectively glimpse into the workings of people's minds and then compare individuals, groups, or an entire population based on the similarities and differences in their perceptions. Such a method works well with investigations into theories of what makes a society cohesive.

In each of the three theories of identity formation and maintenance discussed in *Chapter 2* (i.e., primordialism, modernization theory, postmodernization theory), a population must share something fundamental – apart from common physical borders – in order for it to be considered a cohesive society. Whether that "fundamental something" results from some degree of shared experiences, history, common culture, common antipodes, or patterns of communication and interaction, its presence or absence should become apparent when comparing how people frame their perceptions. Under the constructivist paradigm, it is expected that the ways people compare and define others are largely based on their personal knowledge and what their experience tells them to expect. Such knowledge and experience is in turn thought to be colored by more general feelings, stereotypes, and the input of others. In this way, perceptual frameworks are unique to each individual and should also bear a good deal of similarity to others with whom an individual spends time or is related in some way.

In practice, people's perceptions, as embodied by the frames of reference elicited with the repertory grid method, were unique to each individual. When analyzed *en bloc* for hypothesis testing, recognizable patterns of perceptual similarities emerged in some, but not all, of the various groups into which the population was partitioned. In general, the findings indicate that Macedonia's university students are not primordially divided, and nor are they more likely to share constructs and perceptions if they come from an urban environment. However, there are some notable differences between ethnicities when they are considered in this manner.

When respondents were partitioned according to ethnicity, ethnic Albanian groups tended to exhibit more similarities in their perceptions than did ethnic Macedonian groups. This disparity persisted, even when accounting for possible differences between rural and urban populations. Also, when partitioning this population of students according to the university they attend, those universities with large proportions of ethnic Albanian students (i.e., South East European University, State University Tetovo) exhibited more similarity in their perceptions than did those with primarily ethnic Macedonian students (i.e., University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, St. Clement Ohridski). The overall appearance is that ethnic Albanians are more united in their perceptions than ethnic Macedonians.

These apparent differences become much more muted, however, when the population is clustered according to frames of reference. When viewed in this manner the partitions represent



Figure 7: Ethnic Membership in Identity Groups

issue-based identity groups, as opposed to groups that are based on ethnic, urbanized, or other designations. Although the identity groups that were delineated by clustering in this manner are noted to possess clear ethnic majorities (*Figure 7*), only Cluster 3 is monoethnic (*Macedonian*). The dominance of one or the other ethnicity in each of these identity groups once again demonstrates the ubiquity of ethnicity-based concerns in Macedonia, but it does not support hypotheses that forecast stark ethnic divisions.

Viewing this population from the standpoint of issue-based identity groups provides a much clearer representation of patterns of emerging identity in Macedonia's university students. As such, it is evident that at least some degree of cultural compatibility and mutual understanding is present in three of the identity groups that were delineated according to overlapping frames of reference. It is equally clear, however, that ethnic differences also play a substantial role in individual preferences and that shared perceptions and overlapping frames of reference are best interpreted as indicators that certain groups within the population of university students have a basis for communication that, if fostered, may lead to common understanding and greater mutual acceptance. The survey stage of the research was designed to investigate how perceptions of this younger, well educated demographic compare with those of the wider population.

7.2. SURVEY

The survey was conducted to see what, if any commonalities in perception are shared between the student population and the wider population. When applying a sample of the constructs from the first stage of research in the wider population, some similarities and dissimilarities became evident, particularly in relation to how each population employs the constructs. The most striking similarity arose in relation to the factor analysis that was undertaken to determine what, if any, structure exists in the survey responses.

The factors produced were interpreted as comparison structures that underlie decision making in Macedonia, much in the same manner as frames of reference. Four of the factors

Table 19: Comparison of Identity Groups and Factors

Stage I: Identity Groups	Stage II: Factors
Cluster 1: *Humanism*	**Factor 1: *State Development***
	Factor 2: *Peace and Conflict*
Cluster 2: *For/Against Albanians*	
	Factor 5: *Albanian Interests*
Cluster 3: *Macedonian*	**Factor 4: *Macedonian Identity***
Cluster 4: *Experience/Qualifications*	**Factor 3: *Qualifications***

(*Table 19*) bore a fairly strong resemblance to the four identity clusters from the repertory grid findings. In addition, an additional factor – *Peace and Conflict* – was also produced that was not evident in the earlier stage of investigation and, in terms of the constructs it incorporates, corresponds with two of the, proportionally, more ethnically Albanian identity groups.

Assessing the five factor model by means of analysis of variance and related nonparametric models again reveals what many scholars and practitioners operating in Macedonia suspect: political identity is strongly linked with ethnicity. However, when employing age as a contextualizing factor, a notable difference emerges within the population. Findings indicate that there is a factor (Factor 3 - *Qualifications*) that is shared between ethnic groups in the younger (aged 35 and under) demographic, but not in the generations senior to them. This is an important consideration when evaluating these results in comparison with the identity groups delineated from repertory grid interviews, and for the implications this holds for the future of Macedonia.

This notable parallel between the factor analysis and the cluster analysis procedures came to light with the final analysis of variance. The factor that appears to cross ethnicities in younger generations, Factor 3 – *Qualifications,* bears strong similarities to the *Experience/Qualifications* identity group, which was dominated by constructs such as "qualifications," "liberal or conservative," "corruption," and "experience," all of which are elements of Factor 3.

Additionally, the correspondence between Factor 3 and the identity group in Cluster 4 was not evident until the sample was split between age groups, making it possible to compare results between groups of similar age, if not necessarily level of education.

In both stages of inquiry, the under 35 age group gives the appearance of possessing a level of shared political identity that is not evident in the over 35 age group. This may be because they are developing their political identities under a system that bears little resemblance to the one in which the generations senior to them were raised. Whereas the older generations' identities appear to have crystallized under the prior system (i.e., Yugoslavia), which suggests that they often look to that system for comparisons with the current state of the country, the younger generation shares only histories, tales, and sometimes vague memories of that system. The state that the younger generation knows best is the one that is still in the process of taking shape.

As the next generation to enter Macedonia's government and society, the younger demographic is arguably representative of the country's future. That future, however, is far from clear. The present research does not ascertain whether the shared factor (Factor 3 - *Qualifications*) is employed by a substantial proportion of the younger generation. Also, the current research design does not provide a means for determining whether the advent of this shared frame of reference was a unique event, is part of a waning trend, or is gaining strength in the younger generation. Also, if history is a reliable guide, it is possible, likely even, that ethnicity will remain a significant determinant in how individuals and events are perceived by at least some parts of the population for some time in Macedonia.

7.3. GENERAL FINDINGS

> "When the ethnic glasses are on, all problems, all controversies are seen as expressions of the ethnic question."
> (Weaver 1993, as cited in Vankovska-Cvetkovska 1998, 9)

It seems clear that ethnicity is likely to remain an important consideration when evaluating identity development in Macedonia for the foreseeable future. However, I argue that much of the

reliance on ethnic considerations for understanding local and international politics in Macedonia is overly simplified. The repertory grid interviews demonstrated that viewing the population in terms of issue-oriented groups provided a much more accurate representation of the various identities that are developing in Macedonia. Until the population was clustered according to frames of reference, only one community (i.e., ethnic Albanians) appeared to be at all cohesive in terms of whether they tend to employ the same or similar constructs and whether they agree in their perceptions. If inquiring no further, it would be a simple matter to conclude that the ethnic Albanian community is more homogenous in their frames of reference than are those in the ethnic Macedonian community. That is, ethnic Albanians are united in their interests and desires, whereas ethnic Macedonians are divided.

Such a proposition is not entirely at odds with the earlier investigations. Although Albanian political parties in Macedonia are noted to have divided and subdivided, their disagreements appear to have been more focused on the *means* to an end as opposed to the ends themselves. Albanian political parties have been fairly consistent in their goals such as greater access to power and freedom of ethnic expression (e.g., Arifi 1996, Adamson and Jovič 2004, Dimova 2003, Shea 1997). Alternatively, ethnic Macedonians appear to have been divided between moderate views of Macedonia as a truly multiethnic democracy, and hardline views of Macedonia as a state of the "Macedonian people," with hardline groups attracting much of the attention out of sheer bellicosity (e.g., Ackermann 2000, Brown 2000b, Daskalovski 2002, Dimova 2003, Icevska and Ajdini 2002).

Although there is, no doubt, a kernel of truth to such an argument, both the repertory grid interview data and the survey data demonstrate that the reality of how interests are actually structured in Macedonia is more nuanced. In terms of the factor model, ethnic Albanian interests, though concerned with the issues related to who is for or against Albanians, equal representation, and issues of ethnic expression, are also subdivided into issues of peace and conflict, where concerns with preserving the stability of the state dominate. Among ethnic Macedonians, the competing views take on a different character from the above assumptions of ethnocentrism competing with multiethnicity. What appear to be Macedonian hardliners are more strongly concerned with issues of the formation, preservation, and functionality of the state and the national identity. The apparently moderate Macedonian factor also stresses state development,

but focuses on issues of corruption and self interest and how they oppose the interests of the population in general.

The factor that is concerned with qualifications provides yet another facet to the emerging portrayal of Macedonian identities. Among the older generations, ethnic Albanians are more strongly associated with a public figure's experience, qualifications, of ability-related qualities. This was also the factor that younger generations appear to share between ethnicities. Also, in the repertory grid interview data, these qualities were most strongly associated with the cluster that was proportionally least disparate in terms of ethnicity (i.e., the most ethnically mixed cluster) but included a greater number of Macedonians than Albanians. It is difficult to ascribe a trend to this particular frame of reference based on these observations, but it is apparent that concerns with leadership qualifications is something that could have a strong potential for generating a dialogue based on mutual understanding and cultural compatibility in times to come.

Recent reports have communicated that the worst artifacts of the interethnic conflict in Macedonia have largely passed and that Macedonian society appears to be following a positive trend (e.g., Tanevski 2005, Glenny 2006). It is entirely possible that ethnic tensions will continue to diminish, provided that a basis for mutual dialogue is maintained. The reliance on ethnicity as the basis for identity appears to be another artifact of the growing pains of a country that was formed after the identity groups there had already crystallized under another, now defunct, system (i.e., Yugoslavia). In light of the above findings, it is certainly possible that these identity groups can learn how to live together and, in so doing, negotiate the formation of a shared identity of mutual acceptance as citizens of Macedonia.

As a relatively new multiethnic Balkan country, Macedonia has a number of hurdles to overcome as it continues to develop. Prominent among such concerns are the ethnic tensions that appear to dominate international attention in the country. With all of the changes that have taken place in Macedonia since its independence, it is reasonable to assume that Macedonia's younger generation is coming of age in an environment that is sharply different from that of their parents. In addition to the changes in government, the younger generation is growing up with unprecedented access to communications and media.

The people of Macedonia have experienced some of the most virulent internal discord to occur there in recent memory. The associations that they carry away from that are sure to have

colored their perceptions. There have also been, however, an enormous number of other events and occurrences taking place in Macedonia that add further to the character and complexity of the country and its inhabitants. Unifying events such as former President Boris Trajkovski's death and Macedonia's tie game against England in football (soccer) – with the winning goal scored by one of the Macedonian team's ethnic Albanian players – were strong reminders that there is still much (both positive and negative) that crosses cultures in Macedonia and maybe only someone who lives or has roots there can share.

Policy practitioners can benefit by knowing more about the knowledge in use by the population (Lindblom and Cohen 1979), and how those knowledge frameworks can be influenced is a potentially effective tool for public policymakers (Lakoff 1987). Macedonia, like much of Eastern Europe, suffers from a dearth of research that is grounded or inductive. It is clear that inquiry of this sort can be a valuable aid to our understanding how identity and perception relate to macro-level behavior in that country and elsewhere.

As such, the role of identity is an important consideration for policymakers operating in the Balkans and elsewhere. The ultimate scope of policy processes, implementations, and evaluations is constrained by individuals or groups whose decisions and actions are effectively delimited by their own perceptual and cognitive boundaries (Simon 1957). Such boundaries have been observed to have their roots in the collective knowledge that is produced "through a vast social process in which even relatively uninformed, ordinary people play significant parts along with political and opinion leaders" (Lindblom 1990, 3).

At every level of governance, local, national, or international, popular perceptions commonly suffuse public debate and policy decision making by acting as frames of reference, through which the range of considered options is narrowed. As such, perception delimits the potential scope of a debate and ultimately either facilitates, or impedes communication. Differences in perception can present a substantial barrier to communication and understanding between groups. The implication for politics is that understanding is a function of how a topic is framed (Lakoff 2002). Because perception is idiosyncratic, individuals tend to interpret certain widely shared terms in different manners, depending on their individual frame of reference (Grice 2004a). Stated differently, while a particular term (e.g., honor, loyalty, safety) may be universally evocative in a population, the deeper interpretation or application may differ substantially from person to person, or more notably, from culture to culture.

It is for this reason that, in addition to investigating the various methods for grouping or categorizing Macedonia's population listed above, the present study also seeks to shed greater light on the frames of reference in use by the various groups and how they may be better understood. This is to say that this research provides a means of peering into the various ways that individuals and groups frame their perceptions, and the descriptive terms that resonate most strongly with each. As such, this has been a view into many of the thoughts, needs, desires, and interests that shape the way Macedonia's population perceives their policy environment.

Using the bottom-up approach to ascertaining shared cognition, it was possible to discern groups of individuals who use many of the same criteria to come to very similar conclusions about how public figures differ in respect to one another. It was also apparent that members of any particular group may still occupy opposite ends of the spectrum in their preference for a given public figure and that, in this case, ethnicity appears to be a strong influence in regard to ultimate preference. The results demonstrate that, while ethnicity is certainly a strong factor in determining an individual's preference for a particular set of public figures over another, it is not the only factor that should be taken into consideration when working with this population. There are also groups that cross ethnic lines, whose political interests focus on qualitative aspects of governing that fall outside of ethnic categorization.

The current research offers an approach to investigating political identity in Macedonia that is novel and presents an opportunity to escape the limitations of what appear to be established misconceptions about political identity and ethnopolitics there, allowing for more contextually relevant policy decisions. This information is worth investigating for its value in generating a richer empirical representation of individual and collective political decision making.

7.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The current research has, up to this point, dealt exclusively with the case of Macedonia. It should be reiterated at this point that Macedonia is but one of many states where ethnic, cultural, religious, or other categorical distinctions are employed in lieu of developing a better

understanding of the issues, ideas, and other cognitive mechanisms that contribute to societal rifts and bridges. Although the research presented above was designed and tested for use in Macedonia, the algorithm is flexible and designed for inductive and culturally relevant inquiry. As such, this design holds great promise for enhancing policymaking, increasing stability, and implementing policy in divided societies throughout the world.

The idea of defining identity at the cognitive level in the form of shared perceptions and overlapping frames of reference makes it possible to access and develop commonalities in a society that may otherwise go unrecognized. The ability to identify and perhaps promote shared identity in a population transcends the limitations of categorical designations and allows the observer to employ the tools in use within the population rather than rely on assumptions inherent to categorization.

Policy recommendations that arise from this research may therefore be stated in terms that relate specifically to Macedonian society, and more generally to any society where there is notable discord between two or more communities. General recommendations relate more strongly to how policy is made, as opposed to recommending a specific policy or program. One of the more regrettable aspects of policymaking in divided states is the tendency for policymakers to employ terms that are culturally loaded, either positively or negatively, in order to pander to an extremist base.

Although such displays are of notoriously dubious merit, they are also very difficult to prevent or and even more problematic to censure due to the malleable nature of language and symbolism. It is, however, possible to actively identify terms that produce strong reactions in different communities and use them to create new associations and cross-cultural symbols. Such actions essentially amount to the undermining or disarming of symbolic militancy and, as such, should be undertaken conservatively and only with some of the more casually and frequently used linguistic barbs.

Negatively loaded terms are seldom difficult to identify in a society, however. It is the terms in common currency that can often prove to be more problematic to isolate, normally to their seemingly ubiquitous nature. The constructs employed by the identity groups that are more strongly concerned with *qualifications* and *experience* are examples of such terms. When such terms are harnessed and employed as a basis for policy communications, it increases the

likelihood that disparate groups will be able to participate in a mutual dialogue in culturally neutral territory.

In the case of Macedonia, the *qualifications* group appears to bridge ethnicities only within younger generations. Such a finding implies that such cross cultural communication may still be a while in the making. However, the further implication is that such terms, if fostered, hold the potential to grow as terms in common currency, provided that they are not allowed to be co-opted by one group or another.

Foreign and international institutions can play an important role in creating and maintaining terms in common currency by introducing a variety of communications, entertainment, and news media that exploit neutral terminology to reach a variety of target audiences. Again, the focus should be on how best to foster communication and create shared understanding between communities. In many cases activities such as bilingual news and entertainment may benefit from production and broadcast from outside the boundaries of the state, especially in situations where one or another political or similarly exclusive group has the potential to take over or subvert a program for its own uses. In each case, the goal should be either the creation of a venue for cross cultural education, or establishment of terms that have substantially similar meanings from group to group.

7.5. FUTURE RESEARCH

This research was intended as an initial foray into the more extended process of developing an informative and relatively efficient method for characterizing and quantifying the frames of reference in use within and between groups in Macedonia. Further research will be necessary to build a deeper understanding of how identity is developing in Macedonia and elsewhere. As such, a number of questions arise that, though they are outside the parameters of the present research, are strong candidates for future inquiry.

An important initial series of questions concern the external environment to which citizens of Macedonia are subject. One such question concerns the effect of all of the added information and faster communications that appear to have descended upon Macedonia in a

deluge within the past twenty years. How has such a change affected the growth of identity in Macedonia? Have the improved communications strengthened ties with the diaspora and, if so, how does that affect identity there? Also, how responsive are frames of reference in the face of major events and how much are they changed?

This project found most of the evidence of shared identity to be characteristic of the younger generation. As that generation enters the workforce, it is likely to bring with it some fairly new ideas and ideals. How likely is it that these ideas and ideals will survive in the face of the organizational cultures that they will be joining? What changes may begin to take place in the character of Macedonia's public and private sectors in the coming years?

A further question is, what other sorts of changes are likely? Although the nationalism and ethnic conflict model did not prove fruitful for explaining the differences in cognition above, ethnicity is certainly a factor in decision making throughout the country. Tangible evidence of that is given by the relatively frequent use of the *for/against Albanians* construct in two of the identity groups and the similarly frequent application of references to *"nations"* and *nationalism* in the others. Still, it is similarly apparent that ethnic differences in Macedonia are not monolithic and do not comprise "primordial" divisions. Rather, there are more subtle differences among the identifiable identities that are evident there. Will these differences continue to dissipate?

The investigation into rural and urban identities bore little fruit in the repertory grid stage of research, but appeared promising when analyzed using the survey data. Future investigation into urban and rural identities may be an important aspect of future inquiry into Macedonia's developing identities and should be considered for further inquiry.

The concept of identity is complex and has promising applications for future research into social cohesion at various levels. Identity was approached in this research as a perceptual phenomenon. As such, the term "identity" refers to the perceptual filters that all people develop as they negotiate their way through life. It is essentially a boundary-setting exercise, from which each individual derives their sense of self. This exercise is persistent and continuous. Individuals – mostly unconsciously – compare themselves with each other and everything else around them, the question implicit to such an activity being, "where is it that *I* end and *others* begin?"

At the physical level, most would agree that the answer to such a question tends to be fairly straightforward. In terms of group membership or membership in the wider society

however, such a boundary is often much less clear and, I would argue, less assiduously scrutinized. Much of the contemporary identity research focuses solely on how superficial designations and a desire for belonging shape and determine identity. I propose that future study should approach identity from the other direction, starting from individual perceptions and investigating how similarities in individual perceptions can be a basis upon which to build a community. Some of this is already being done in the form of investigations into what makes someone liberal, conservative, or partial to a particular issue group. Little, however, has been done to investigate the cognitive components of such boundary setting and identity building. This research represents another in a series of small steps toward such a goal. Future work will require further refinement in the current tools and approaches and their application to a variety of populations.

APPENDIX A

SCREENSHOTS OF REPERTORY GRID INTERVIEW SEQUENCE
(English Language Version)



Figure 8: Screenshot of Screen 1 of Elicitation Procedure – Introduction



Figure 9: Screenshot of Screen 2 of Elicitation Procedure – Name Construct Poles



Figure 10: Screenshot of Screen 3 of Elicitation Procedure – Rate Elements Using Constructs



Figure 11: Screenshot of Screen 4 of Elicitation Procedure – Edit Ratings



Figure 12: Screenshot of Screen 5 of Elicitation Procedure – Begin Second Iteration



Figure 13: Screenshot of Screen 6 of Elicitation Procedure – Elicitation Options



Figure 14: Screenshot of Screen 7 of Elicitation Procedure – Edit Ratings for Element Option



Figure 15: Screenshot of Screen 8 of Elicitation Procedure – Edit Construct Option



Figure 16: Screenshot of Screen 9 of Elicitation Procedure – End Elicitation and Begin Demographic Questionnaire



Figure 17: Screenshot of "Focus" Option



Figure 18: Screenshot of "PrinGrid" Option

APPENDIX B

REPERTORY GRID CHECKLIST AND RECRUITMENT SCRIPT

A checklist and recruitment script were constructed in the early stages of project development. Originally intended for training purposes, the checklist and recruitment script were treated as a single, continuous document and was retained for all interviews. The checklist functioned as a reminder of standard interview procedure and the materials required for every interview.

The title "recruitment script" is misleading, as recruitment is only a small part of its function. The recruitment script was designed to be used in every aspect of the repertory grid interview process, if necessary. Although the paper forms for the repertory grid elicitation phase were never used during the actual interviews, all interviewers were trained in their use before being introduced to the computer-based format. This was to familiarize them with the process and theory of a repertory grid interview in a manner that may not be possible from reading computer prompts.

In addition to standard scripts for recruitment, closing, and appreciation, the recruitment script is also comprised of a demographic questionnaire and an opinion survey regarding Macedonia's potential entry into the European Union and perceptions of what effect that will have on the country and its residents.

Checklist

Make sure you have:

- □ 5 Pencils
- □ USB
- □ Extra recruitment/interview forms
- □ Leader Cards
- □ Incentives
- □ Extra paper
- □ Dice

Upon arrival at university:

- □ Meet with contact person on campus.
- □ Choose a place to administer grid that is *quiet* and *comfortable*. (or use computer lab if necessary)
- □ Set up computers and start Repgrid IV so that it is all that is visible on computer desktop.

Recruitment:

- □ One interviewer stays with computers and the other goes out to recruit. (The computers and data are ***never*** left unattended.)
- □ Roll dice and record target shoe color *before* leaving to recruit.
- □ Cross one number off list and record number on top right hand side of recruitment script
- □ Administer recruitment script

If they satisfy recruitment requirements:

- □ Go to grid area
- □ Read grid intro
- □ Immediately record number and save under number
- □ Administer grid
- □ Closing interview
- □ Give incentive and thank you
- □ Fill out comment sheet after termination

Interviewer _____

Recruitment script

Shoe color _____ Date _____

Recruitment time: _____

University: _____

Introduction:

Hello I'm _____. We're conducting a brief survey. Would you like to participate?

If respondent agrees, do not recruit anyone else in the vicinity.

Screening Questions:

1. Let me begin by asking if anyone else has already approached you with this survey?
   Yes
   No **Skip to Q3**

2. Did you go through with the survey?
   Yes **Thank and terminate interview.**
   No

3. Which group contains your age?
   A. under 18 **Thank and terminate interview**
   B. 18 to 21
   C. 22 to 25
   D. 26 to 29
   E. 30 +

4. Indicate your year in school:
   First year
   Second year
   Third Year
   Final year

5. Which faculty do you attend?
   _____

6. Are you currently employed?
   Yes
   No **Skip to Q8.**

7. How many hours per week do you work on average during the school year?
   Read List.
   A. Under 10 hours
   B. 10 to 20 hours
   C. 21 to 30 hours
   D. Over 30 hours

8. Indicate gender:
   Female
   Male

We are inviting a few select people to take part in a survey about political identities. Your participation will assist us in better understanding your opinions and observations and those of people like yourself. Would you be interested in participating?

Yes No **Thank and terminate interview.**

If respondent agrees to take part, immediately proceed to predetermined interview location.

If respondent does not have time at that point to take part, take down contact information and try to set a time to meet later that day if possible.

Construct Form

1	Kiro Gligorov	Ali Ahmeti	Lubço Georgievski	Xhorxh W. Bush	Branko Crvenkovski	Arbër Xhaferi	Nikola Gruevski	Majka Teresa	Havier Solana	Vlado Bučkovski	7

Construct Form

1	Киро Глигоров	Али Ахмети	Љупчо Георгиевски	Џорџ Буш	Бранко Црвенковски	Арбен Џафери	Никола Груевски	Мајка Тереза	Хавиер Солана	Владо Бучковски	7

Demographic Questionnaire

1) Are your parents currently employed?
    a. Yes
    b. No

2) What is (are) their profession(s)?
    _____
    _____
    _____
    _____

3) What language do you consider your primary language? (What language do you speak at home?)
    a. Albanian
    b. Macedonian
    c. Other _____

4) What other languages do you speak fluently?
    a. _____
    b. _____
    c. _____
    d. _____
    e. _____

5) What is the name of your hometown or village? _____

6) Where do you most frequently get your news? _____

7) [Unless the answer is friends or family] Which one(s) (website, paper, magazine, station, etc.) in particular?
    _____
    _____
    _____
    _____

For the following statements, please indicate whether you *strongly agree*, *agree*, *have no opinion*, *disagree*, or *strongly disagree*.

8) Macedonia will be able to satisfy all requirements for acceptance to the European Union.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. *strongly disagree*

9) Becoming a member of the EU is important for the wellbeing of Macedonia.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. strongly disagree

10) Joining the EU will improve life for all of Macedonia.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. *strongly disagree*

11) The reforms that the Macedonian government is undertaking to satisfy EU requirements have already shown positive effects.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion – or – both agree and disagree*
    d. *disagree*
    e. *strongly disagree*

Closing and Appreciation

That was the last item. Do you have any questions?

[IF NO…]

Thank you for participating in this study. As a thank you for your time, you may have either one of these pens or a candy. Also, if you like, we can send you a summary of the overall results.

[IF THEY WOULD LIKE A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS, RECORD RESPONDENT'S EMAIL OR PHYSICAL ADDRESS ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER. DO NOT RECORD IT ON ANY OF THE RESPONSE FORMS.]

Reviewer Comments

Time of recruitment: _____

Starting time of interview: _____

Time of interview termination: _____

Total interview time: _____

Did the respondent express that any of their constructs did not seem to apply to three or more of the elements (political personalities)? **Yes** **No** (circle one)

If so, please list the constructs in question:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Do you feel that there is any reason to believe that this interview is not representative of how this individual would normally answer? **Yes** **No** (circle one)

Reason: _____
_____
_____
_____

Please list any other comments or questions that you have about this interview:
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

APPENDIX C

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS PLOTS FOR IDENTITY CLUSTERS

PCA (no rotation) for Procrustes Statistics
Axis Range: -1.47 to 1.47



Figure 19: PCA Plot for Cluster 1

PCA (no rotation) for Procrustes Statistics
Axis Range: -1.29 to 1.29



Figure 20: PCA Plot for Cluster 2

PCA (no rotation) for Procrustes Statistics
Axis Range: -1.01 to 1.01



Figure 21: PCA Plot for Cluster 3

PCA (no rotation) for Procrustes Statistics
Axis Range: -1.23 to 1.23



Figure 22: PCA Plot for Cluster 4

PCA (no rotation) for Procrustes Statistics
Axis Range: -0.98 to 0.98



Figure 23: PCA Plot for Outliers

APPENDIX D

NATIONAL SURVEY
(English Language Version)

We are inviting a few people at random to take part in a survey about political identities. Your participation will assist us in better understanding your opinions and observations and those of people like yourself. Would you be interested in participating?

The purpose of this research is to investigate how the people of Macedonia make decisions regarding themselves and their country. To do this, I will ask you to make comparisons of how certain public issues are meaningful to you. This interview should take about 15 minutes to compelete. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. There are no forseeable risks or benefits to you if you complete the interview. Your participation is entirely voluntary and all responses will be kept confidential. You may choose not to participate. There is no negative consequence for doing so. Only persons aged 18 and older are eligible to participate. The study is being conducted by Mr. Philip Murphy. If you have any further questions, you can contact him at murphy@birch.gspia.pitt.edu.

Section 1 of 4

1. Which group contains your age?
    a. under 18 **Thank and terminate interview**
    b. 18 to 25
    c. 26 to 35
    d. 36 to 45
    e. 46 to 55
    f. 56 to 65
    g. 66 +

For the following statements, please indicate whether you *strongly agree*, *agree*, *have no opinion*, *disagree*, or *strongly disagree*.

2. Macedonia will be able to satisfy all requirements for acceptance to the European Union.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. *strongly disagree*

3. Becoming a member of the EU is important for the wellbeing of Macedonia.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. strongly disagree

4. Joining the EU will improve life for all of Macedonia.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion*
    d. *disagree*
    e. *strongly disagree*

5. The reforms that the Macedonian government is undertaking to satisfy EU requirements have already shown positive effects.
    a. *strongly agree*
    b. *agree*
    c. *have no opinion – or – both agree and disagree*
    d. *disagree*
    e. strongly disagree

Section 2 of 4
For this section, we are interested in your general opinion of public leaders in Macedonia.

The following are characteristics that other citizens of Macedonia have used to describe politicians in Macedonia.

Please think about how you feel about politicians in Macedonia *in general*.

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

6	have an indirect influence in politics	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have a direct influence in politics
7	are humanists	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not humanists
8	are nationalists	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not nationalists
9	work for personal interests	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	work for general interests
10	work less for the integration of Macedonia to EU	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	work very much for the integration of Macedonia to EU

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

11	work for economic development	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not work for economic development
12	have a localized political strategy	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have a global political strategy
13	are not corrupt	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are corrupt
14	are less capable of managing politics	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are more capable of managing politics
15	are liberal	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are conservative

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

16	work for country's interests	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not work for country's interests
17	are against Ohrid Agreement	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are pro Ohrid agreement
18	aren't very experienced in politics	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are experienced political leaders
19	are qualified politicians	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are unqualified politicians
20	stimulate conflicts	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not stimulate conflicts

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

21	are for conflict	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are against conflict
22	are against the division of Macedonia	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are pro the division of Macedonia
23	are not very good leaders	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are good leaders
24	are interested in having an ethnic state	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not interested in having a multiethnic state
25	are nepotistic	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not nepotistic

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

26	fulfill promises	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	don't fulfill promises
27	have not helped the population	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have helped the population
28	have influenced the reforms in Macedonia	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	didn’t influence the reforms in Macedonia
29	are not communistic	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are communistic
30	did not help stability in Macedonia	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	Helped stability in Macedonia

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

31	encourage politicization of the state administration	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	encourage the depoliticization of the state administration
32	provide proportional representation among ethnicities	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	provide non proportional representation among ethnicities
33	listen to the voice of the people	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	don't listen to the voice of the people
34	are democratic	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are undemocratic
35	have great influence on international relations	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not have influence on international relations

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

36	divide people on the basis of religion	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not divide people on the basis of religion
37	are radical	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not radical
38	are concerned with special interests	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are concerned with the general interest
39	were against the legalization of the State University of Tetovo	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	were for the legalization of the State University of Tetovo
40	are open for cooperation with other political parties	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are closed for cooperation

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

41	gave less contribution to national identity	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have made a contribution to national identity
42	didn't make legislative reforms	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have made legislative reforms
43	are tactical	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are impulsive
44	work more for regional stability	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	work less for regional stability
45	are transparent	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not transparent

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

46	are upfront politicians	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are shady politicians
47	are balanced	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are unbalanced
48	are more interested in state development	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are less interested in state development
49	are not making education a priority	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are making education a priority
50	helped with employment in RM	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	didn't help with employment in RM

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

51	Anticipate critical situations on the ground	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	do not anticipate critical situations on ground
52	give less of a contribution to the sovereignty of the country	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have contributed to the sovereignty of the country
53	don't deal with social issues	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	deal with social issues
54	are for using of violence in politics	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are interested in diplomatic realization through politics
55	are not prepared to offer help to everyone	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are always prepared to help

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

56	have no capitalist ideas	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	have capitalist ideas
57	are politicians who make compromises	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are politicians who do not make compromises
58	are confident politicians	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are not confident politicians
59	are in favor of the constitutional name of Macedonia	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are against constitutional name of Macedonia
60	are pro federalization of Macedonia	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are against federalization of Macedonia

In general, politicians in Macedonia:

61	are against use of Albanian language as an official language	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are in favor of use the Albanian language as an official language
62	have an affect on the media	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	don't have an affect on the media
63	are great patriots	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are less patriotic
64	are against rule of law	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are for rule of law
65	are not supported by the population	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	are supported by the population

Section 3 of 4

A.

For this next section, please think about a political figure that you admire.

Now look at the sheet in front of you. You will recognize many of these from the previous section. These are characteristics that other citizens of Macedonia have used to describe politicians in Macedonia.

Please choose 7 (seven) characteristics that are the best descriptions of what you like about your political leader.

Which characteristic is most important to you? (Please circle)

B.

Now think of a politician who you do not like and choose the seven (7) characteristics that describe them best.

Which characteristic is most important to you? (Please circle)

1 а	is a humanist
2 а	is a nationalist
3 а	was for conflict
4 а	is nepotistic
5 а	fulfills promises
6 а	influenced the reforms in Macedonia
7 а	favors the politicization of state administration
8 а	favors proportional representation among ethnicities
9 а	divides people on the basis of religion
10 а	works for regional stability
11 а	anticipates critical situations on the ground
12 а	favors using the Albanian language as an official language
13 а	has an affect on the media
14 а	works for personal interests
15 а	works for economic development
16 а	is liberal
17 а	works for country's interests
18 а	improved stability in Macedonia
19 а	listens to the people's voice
20 а	has great influence on international relations
21 а	is open to cooperation with other political parties
22 а	is tactical
23 а	is transparent
24 а	is a politician who makes compromises
25 а	is a confident politician
26 а	is very patriotic
27 а	is corrupt
28 а	is more capable of managing politics
29 а	favors the division of Macedonia
30 а	favored the legalization of the State University of Tetovo
31 а	Made legislative reforms
32 а	makes education a priority
33 а	Dealt with the social issues
34 а	favors rule of law
35 а	works for the integration of Macedonia into EU
36 а	favors the Ohrid agreement
37 а	is an experienced political leader
38 а	has helped the population
39 а	is a communist
40 а	Made a contribution to national identity

1 б	is not humanist
2 б	is not a nationalist
3 б	opposes conflict
4 б	is not nepotistic
5 б	doesn't fulfill promises
6 б	didn’t influence the reforms in Macedonia
7 б	opposes the politicization of state administration
8 б	opposes proportional representation among ethnicities
9 б	does not divide people on the basis of religion
10 б	does not work for regional stability
11 б	does not anticipate critical situations on the ground
12 б	opposes using the Albanian language as an official language
13 б	doesn’t have an affect on the media
14 б	works for general interests
15 б	do not work for economic development
16 б	is conservative
17 б	does not work for country's interests
18 б	did not improve stability in Macedonia
19 б	doesn’t listen to the people's voice
20 б	has no influence on international relations
21 б	is closed to cooperation with other political parties
22 б	is impulsive
23 б	is not transparent
24 б	is a politician who does not make compromises
25 б	is not a confident politician
26 б	is not patriotic
27 б	is not corrupt
28 б	is less capable of managing politics
29 б	opposes the division of Macedonia
30 б	was against the legalization of the State University of Tetovo
31 б	didn’t make legislative reforms
32 б	does not make education a priority
33 б	didn’t deal with social issues
34 б	opposes rule of law
35 б	does not work for the integration of Macedonia into EU
36 б	opposes the Ohrid Agreement
37 б	is not an experienced political leader
38 б	has not helped the population
39 б	is not a communist
40 б	did not make a contribution to national identity

Section 4 of 4

66. Employment status
    A. Work in public sector
    B. Work in private sector
    C. Agricultural / Farmer
    D. Domestic
    E. Retired / Pensioner
    F. Student
    G. Unemployed

67. How many hours per week do you work on average? (if applicable)
    A. Under 10 hours
    B. 10 to 20 hours
    C. 21 to 30 hours
    D. Over 30 hours

68. Please indicate your family's monthly income:
    A. less than 5000 Denars/month
    B. 5001 to 10000 Denars/month
    C. 10001 to 15000 Denars/month
    D. 15001 to 20000 Denars/month
    E. 20001 to 25000 Denars/month
    F. 25001 to 30000 Denars/month
    G. more than 30001 Denars/month

69. Indicate gender:
    Female
    Male

70. What language do you consider your primary language? (What language do you speak at home?)
    a. Albanian
    b. Macedonian
    c. Turkish
    d. Serbian
    e. Romani
    f. Other _____

71. What other languages do you speak well? (Please mark all that apply.)
    a. Albanian
    b. Macedonian
    c. Turkish
    d. Serbian
    e. Romani
    f. English
    g. German
    h. Italian
    i. Russian
    j. Greek
    k. French
    l. Spanish
    m. Other _____

72. Which source of news and information do you trust most?
    a. Media (TV, Radio, Newspapers or magazines)
    b. Church or Mosque
    c. Internet
    d. Political parties
    e. Friends and family
    f. other _____

73. What is your religion?
    a. Orthodox Christian
    b. Moslem
    c. Catholic
    d. Other Christian
    e. Not religious
    f. Other _____

74. How often do you attend your church or mosque?
    a. Every day
    b. One day per week
    c. More than 6 times per year
    d. Less than 6 times per year
    e. Never or almost never

75. Political party _____

Closing and Appreciation

That was the last item. Thank you for participating in this study. Your answers will help us to understand the opinions and observations of people like yourself and other citizens of Macedonia.

APPENDIX E

VARIABLE HOMOPHILY OUTPUT

Variable Homophily Output for "*Two Identities" Hypothesis*

Table 20: Density Table -"Two Identities" Hypothesis

	Albanian	Macedonian
Albanian	0.80	0.61
Macedonian	0.61	0.51

Number of permutations performed: 5000

Table 21: Model Fit - "Two Identities" Hypothesis

R-square	Adj R-Sqr	Probability	# of Obs
0.047	0.047	0	11556

Table 22: Regression Coefficients - "Two Identities" Hypothesis

	Un-stdized Coefficient	Stdized Coefficient	Significance	Proportion As Large	Proportion As Small
Intercept	0.6104	0.0000	0.9994	0.9994	0.0004
Albanian	0.1932	0.1732	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
Macedonian	-0.0968	-0.0868	0.0012	0.9986	0.0012

Variable Homophily Output for "*Three Identities" Hypothesis*

Table 23: Density Table - "Three Identities" Hypothesis

	Urban	Rural Albanian	Rural Macedonian
Urban	0.56	0.66	0.53
Rural Albanian	0.66	0.79	0.61
Rural Macedonian	0.53	0.61	0.58

Number of permutations performed: 5000

Table 24: Model Fit - "Three Identities" Hypothesis

R-square	Adj R-Sqr	Probability	# of Obs
0.024	0.024	0	11556

Table 25: Regression Coefficients - "Three Identities" Hypothesis

	Un-stdized Coefficient	Stdized Coefficient	Significance	Proportion As Large	Proportion As Small
Intercept	0.6048	0.0000	0.9998	0.9998	0.0000
Urban	-0.0464	-0.0189	0.2390	0.7608	0.2390
Rural Albanian	0.1843	0.1492	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
Rural Macedonian	-0.0245	-0.0170	0.2716	0.7282	0.2716

Variable Homophily Output for *University Groups Hypothesis*

Table 26: Density Table - University Groups Hypothesis

	SEEU	SUT	UKIM	SKO
SEEU	0.75	0.76	0.58	0.61
SUT	0.76	0.87	0.54	0.54
UKIM	0.58	0.54	0.44	0.46
SKO	0.61	0.54	0.46	0.51

Number of permutations performed: 5000

Table 27: Model Fit - University Groups Hypothesis

R-square	Adj R-Sqr	Probability	# of Obs
0.028	0.027	0	11556

Table 28: Regression Coefficients - University Groups Hypothesis

	Un-stdized Coefficient	Stdized Coefficient	Significance	Proportion As Large	Proportion As Small
Intercept	0.6074	0.0000	0.9998	0.9998	0.0000
SEEU	0.1418	0.1185	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
SUT	0.2619	0.0873	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
UKIM	-0.1688	-0.0594	0.0056	0.9942	0.0056
SKO	-0.0965	-0.0393	0.0626	0.9372	0.0626

Variable Homophily Output for "*Cognitive Communities*" *Hypothesis*

Table 29: Density Table - "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis

	Cluster 1	Custer 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Outliers
Cluster 1	0.94	0.75	0.68	0.61	0.50
Custer 2	0.75	0.87	0.19	0.57	0.51
Cluster 3	0.68	0.19	0.80	0.45	0.18
Cluster 4	0.61	0.57	0.45	0.82	0.42
Outliers	0.50	0.51	0.18	0.42	0.39

Number of permutations performed: 5000

Table 30: Model Fit - "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis

R-square	Adj R-Sqr	Probability	# of Obs
0.097	0.096	0	11556

Table 31: Regression Coefficients - "Cognitive Communities" Hypothesis

	Un-stdized Coefficient	Stdized Coefficient	Significance	Proportion As Large	Proportion As Small
Intercept	0.5593	0.0000	0.9998	0.9998	0.0000
Cluster 1	0.3834	0.2778	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
Cluster 2	0.3103	0.1374	0.0000	0.0000	0.9998
Cluster 3	0.2356	0.0564	0.0032	0.0032	0.9966
Cluster 4	0.2574	0.0762	0.0004	0.0004	0.9994
Outliers	-0.1747	-0.0452	0.0224	0.9774	0.0224

APPENDIX F

SURVEY ITEMS AND CORRESPONDING CONSTRUCT CATEGORIES

Table 32: Bipolar Survey Ratings (i.e., Constructs) and the Construct Category they Each Represent.

Construct category	Construct
Ability / Effectiveness	Are more capable of managing politics...Are less capable of managing politics
Administrative Reforms	Encourage the depoliticization of the state administration...Encourage politicization of the state administration
Anticipation	Anticipate critical situations on the ground...Do not anticipate critical situations on the ground
Balance	Are balanced...Are unbalanced
Capitalism	Have capitalist ideas...Have no capitalist ideas
Communist	Are not communistic...Are Communistic
Confidence	Are confident politicians...Are not confident politicians
Constitutional Name	Are in favor of the constitutional name of Macedonia...Are against constitutional name of Macedonia
Cooperative Tendencies	Are open to cooperation with other political parties...Are closed to cooperation
Corruption 1	Are not corrupt...Are corrupt
Corruption 2	Are politicians who make compromises…Are politicians who do not make compromises
Democracy	Are democratic...Are undemocratic
Development	Are more interested in state development...Are less interested in state development
Economics	Work for economic development...Do not work for economic development
Education	Are making education a priority...Are not making education a priority
Employment	Helped with employment in the Republic of Macedonia...Didn't help with employment in the Republic of Macedonia
Equality / Proportionality	Provide proportional representation...Provide non proportional representation among ethnicities
EU Issues	Work very much for the integration of Macedonia to European Union...Work less for the integration of Macedonia to the European Union
Experience	Are experienced political leaders...Aren't very experienced in politics
Federalism	Are against federalization of Macedonia...Are pro federalization of Macedonia
For/Against Albanians	Are in favor of the use of Albanian language as an official language...Are against the use of the Albanian language as an official language
Formation of the State of Macedonia	Have contributed to the sovereignty of the country...Give less of a contribution to the sovereignty of the country
Grass Roots	Listen to the voice of the people...Don't listen to the voice of the people

Table 32 (Continued)

Construct category	Construct
Humanism	Are humanists...Are not humanists
Identity Issues	Have made a contribution to national identity...Gave less contribution to national identity
Influence	Have direct influence in politics...Have indirect influence in politics
International Relations	Have great influence on international relations...Do not have influence on international relations
Leadership Skills	Are good leaders...Are not very good leaders
Legal Aspects 1	Have made legislative reforms...Didn't make legislative reforms
Legal Aspects 2	Are for the rule of law...Are against rule of law
Liberal / Conservative	Are liberal...Are conservative
Local vs. Global	Have localized political strategy...Have a global political strategy
Macedonia in General	Work for country's interests...Do not work for country's interests
Media	Have an effect on the media...Don't have an effect on the media
Multiethnic	Are interested in having a multiethnic state...Are not interested in having a multiethnic state
Nationalist	Are not nationalists...Are nationalists
Nepotism	Are not nepotistic...Are nepotistic
Ohrid Agreement	Are pro Ohrid Agreement...Are against Ohrid Agreement
Patriot	Are great patriots...Are less patriotic
Peace	Do not stimulate conflicts...Stimulate conflicts
Popular Support	Are supported by the population...Are not supported by the population
Population in General	Have helped the population...Have not helped the population
Promises	Fulfill promises...Don't fulfill promises
Qualifications	Are qualified politicians...Are unqualified politicians
Radical	Are not radical...Are radical
Reforms	Have influenced the reforms in Macedonia...Didn't influence the reforms in Macedonia
Region	Work more for regional stability...Work less for regional stability
Religion	Do not divide people based on religion...Divide people on the basis of religion
Self-Interest 1	Work for general interests...work for personal interests
Self-Interest 2	Are always prepared to help...Are not prepared to offer help to everyone
Social Issues	Deal with social issues...Don't deal with social issues
Special vs. General Interests	Are concerned with the general interest...Are concerned with special interests
Stability	Helped stability in Macedonia...Did not help stability in Macedonia
State University Tetovo	Were for the legalization of the State University of Tetovo...Were against the legalization of the State University of Tetovo
Strategy	Are tactical...Are impulsive
Transparency 1	Are transparent...Are not transparent
Transparency 2	Are upfront politicians...Are shady politicians
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	Are against the division of Macedonia...Are pro the division of Macedonia
Violence	Are interested in diplomatic realization through politics...Are for using violence in politics
War / Conflict	Are against conflict...Are pro conflict

APPENDIX G

ANNOTATED OUTPUT FOR RELIABILITY TESTS OF SURVEY ITEMS

The data from Section 2 of the national survey were assessed for reliability by means of Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach 1951), a commonly accepted form of assessing the reliability of theoretical constructs, such as the latent variables produced in a factor analysis, when such constructs cannot otherwise be observed. As such, Cronbach's alpha provides a measure of the internal consistency of scaled response survey data, calculated as $\alpha = \frac{k}{k-1}\left(1 - \sum \frac{s_i^2}{s_t^2}\right)$, where k is the number of survey items being assessed, s_i is the standard deviation for the ith survey variable, and s_t is the standard deviation for the observed total test scores. Under normal conditions, the value of Cronbach's alpha ranges between 0 and 1, with a reliability between 0.70 and 0.80 as an acceptable goal in early evaluations of a survey instrument (Nunnally & Bernstein 1994, 264-265; Kerlinger & Lee 2000, 662-663).

All 60 variables for Section 2 were analyzed using Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient in SPSS 14.0 for Windows. Incomplete data were excluded listwise, resulting in 447 valid cases.

Cronbach's alpha coefficient, listed in *Table 33*, is relatively high (α=0.907), suggesting good internal consistency in the survey instrument overall. Individual item statistics (*Table 34*)

Table 33: Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.907	60

Table 34: Item-by-item Reliability Analysis

Item-Total Statistics			
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Ability / Effectiveness	12.18	729.594	0.904
Administrative Reforms	11.92	748.999	0.907
Anticipation	12.18	735.207	0.905
Balance	12.15	732.144	0.904
Capitalism	12.82	746.298	0.907
Communist	12.60	736.357	0.905
Confidence	11.72	724.951	0.903
Constitutional Name	13.47	742.358	0.906
Cooperative Tendencies	12.51	729.591	0.904
Corruption 1	11.26	734.226	0.905
Corruption 2	12.56	780.615	0.911
Democracy	12.23	725.726	0.904
Development	12.12	716.714	0.903
Economics	11.87	731.345	0.905
Education	12.05	726.560	0.904
Employment	11.41	735.835	0.905
Equality / Proportionality	12.38	734.578	0.905
EU Issues	12.05	723.516	0.903
Experience	12.16	727.732	0.904
Federalism	12.82	738.246	0.906
For/Against Albanians	12.17	751.183	0.908
Formation of the State of Macedonia	12.55	730.337	0.904
Grass Roots	13.66	793.497	0.913
Humanism	11.87	731.679	0.905
Identity Issues	12.40	723.613	0.903
Influence	13.14	743.507	0.907
International Relations	12.00	736.812	0.905
Leadership Skills	11.92	724.881	0.903
Legal Aspects 1	12.18	726.661	0.904
Legal Aspects 2	12.34	725.951	0.904
Liberal / Conservative	12.30	726.281	0.904
Local vs. Global	12.85	774.983	0.911
Macedonia in General	11.93	721.969	0.903
Media	13.46	763.662	0.909
Multiethnic	12.68	734.600	0.905
Nationalist	12.18	744.043	0.907
Nepotism	11.49	737.336	0.905

Table 34 (Continued)

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Ohrid Agreement	12.72	740.523	0.906
Patriot	12.00	736.260	0.905
Peace	12.41	725.431	0.904
Popular Support	12.17	730.218	0.905
Population in General	11.51	727.345	0.904
Promises	11.25	731.575	0.904
Qualifications	11.98	724.190	0.903
Radical	12.52	744.425	0.906
Reforms	12.56	737.956	0.905
Region	12.16	725.043	0.904
Religion	12.52	725.241	0.904
Self-Interest 1	11.22	730.213	0.904
Self-Interest 2	11.41	727.203	0.904
Social Issues	11.61	731.028	0.905
Special vs. General Interests	11.55	725.436	0.903
Stability	12.51	722.874	0.903
State University Tetovo	12.22	750.193	0.908
Strategy	12.46	738.885	0.906
Transparency 1	12.01	733.572	0.905
Transparency 2	12.51	734.022	0.905
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	13.09	732.621	0.905
Violence	12.76	730.022	0.904
War / Conflict	12.68	730.800	0.905

bear out this finding.[19] In most cases, deleting an item would reduce alpha. In only six cases would deleting an item raise the value of alpha, those items are: “corruption,” “for/against Albanians,” “grass roots,” “local vs. global,” “media,” and “State University Tetovo.” In each case, however, deleting one of the named variables would result in only a very small (<0.007) change in the value of alpha. Upon further inspection, the six items named were judged to have been sufficiently prominent in terms of frequency throughout the repertory grid analyses to further justify their retention in subsequent analyses.

Overall, the results of this reliability analysis indicate that the data resulting from the survey are sufficiently reliable for their inclusion in a subsequent factor analysis.

[19] Please note that, due to space considerations, bipolar survey ratings are identified here by the construct category to which they were assigned. Please refer to the table in Appendix F for the exact wording of each survey rating.

APPENDIX H

OUTPUT FROM FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SURVEY ITEMS

Table 35: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.901
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	8735.453
	df	1770
	Sig.	.000

Table 36: Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Ability / Effectiveness	0.383	0.285
Administrative Reforms	0.276	0.095
Anticipation	0.272	0.131
Balance	0.391	0.232
Capitalism	0.314	0.198
Communist	0.378	0.258
Confidence	0.472	0.378
Constitutional Name	0.358	0.263
Cooperative Tendencies	0.329	0.251
Corruption 1	0.419	0.339
Corruption 2	0.294	0.149
Democracy	0.373	0.310
Development	0.512	0.433
Economics	0.387	0.295
Education	0.403	0.345
Employment	0.312	0.195
Equality / Proportionality	0.416	0.343
EU Issues	0.459	0.348
Experience	0.435	0.320

Table 36 (Continued)

	Initial	Extraction
Federalism	0.343	0.330
For/Against Albanians	0.406	0.424
Formation of the State of Macedonia	0.486	0.432
Grass Roots	0.548	0.512
Humanism	0.440	0.391
Identity Issues	0.464	0.385
Influence	0.231	0.135
International Relations	0.377	0.219
Leadership Skills	0.470	0.364
Legal Aspects 1	0.457	0.371
Legal Aspects 2	0.429	0.373
Liberal / Conservative	0.394	0.383
Local vs. Global	0.292	0.192
Macedonia in General	0.483	0.400
Media	0.317	0.172
Multiethnic	0.395	0.346
Nationalist	0.289	0.148
Nepotism	0.346	0.275
Ohrid Agreement	0.368	0.326
Patriot	0.321	0.190
Peace	0.461	0.404
Popular Support	0.395	0.277
Population in General	0.454	0.344
Promises	0.506	0.433
Qualifications	0.473	0.447
Radical	0.236	0.088
Reforms	0.307	0.164
Region	0.412	0.317
Religion	0.428	0.378
Self-Interest 1	0.465	0.359
Self-Interest 2	0.550	0.463
Social Issues	0.487	0.388
Special vs. General Interests	0.537	0.491
Stability	0.533	0.408
State University Tetovo	0.377	0.360
Strategy	0.255	0.123
Transparency 1	0.360	0.277
Transparency 2	0.306	0.207
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	0.433	0.352
Violence	0.392	0.315
War / Conflict	0.473	0.431

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Table 37: Eigenvalues and Explained Variance

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	12.418	20.697	20.697	11.762	19.603	19.603	7.144	11.907	11.907
2	3.481	5.801	26.498	2.796	4.659	24.263	3.845	6.408	18.315
3	2.367	3.945	30.444	1.708	2.846	27.109	3.721	6.202	24.517
4	1.967	3.278	33.722	1.288	2.147	29.256	1.925	3.208	27.725
5	1.693	2.822	36.544	1.005	1.675	30.931	1.923	3.205	30.931
6	1.541	2.568	39.111						
7	1.443	2.404	41.516						
8	1.307	2.178	43.693						
9	1.266	2.110	45.803						
10	1.253	2.089	47.892						
11	1.169	1.948	49.840						
12	1.109	1.848	51.689						
13	1.106	1.843	53.532						
14	1.053	1.754	55.286						
15	1.021	1.702	56.988						
16	0.985	1.642	58.630						
17	0.978	1.630	60.260						
18	0.946	1.577	61.837						
19	0.918	1.531	63.368						
20	0.904	1.507	64.876						
21	0.876	1.459	66.335						
22	0.861	1.435	67.770						
23	0.834	1.390	69.160						
24	0.790	1.316	70.476						
25	0.776	1.293	71.770						
26	0.742	1.236	73.006						
27	0.734	1.223	74.229						
28	0.712	1.186	75.415						
29	0.685	1.142	76.556						
30	0.683	1.138	77.694						
31	0.667	1.111	78.806						
32	0.654	1.089	79.895						
33	0.622	1.037	80.932						
34	0.618	1.030	81.963						
35	0.601	1.001	82.963						
36	0.584	0.973	83.936						
37	0.569	0.948	84.884						
38	0.543	0.905	85.788						
39	0.529	0.882	86.670						
40	0.525	0.875	87.546						

Table 37 (Continued)

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
41	0.508	0.847	88.393						
42	0.475	0.791	89.184						
43	0.454	0.756	89.940						
44	0.449	0.748	90.688						
45	0.440	0.734	91.422						
46	0.437	0.729	92.151						
47	0.428	0.713	92.864						
48	0.406	0.676	93.540						
49	0.394	0.656	94.196						
50	0.390	0.649	94.846						
51	0.365	0.608	95.454						
52	0.361	0.601	96.055						
53	0.351	0.585	96.640						
54	0.325	0.542	97.182						
55	0.311	0.519	97.701						
56	0.297	0.495	98.196						
57	0.291	0.484	98.680						
58	0.285	0.475	99.155						
59	0.271	0.452	99.607						
60	0.236	0.393	100.000						

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.



Figure 24: Scree Plot

Table 38: Factor Loadings

Rotated Factor Matrix(a)

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Grass Roots	**0.662**	-0.062	-0.159	-0.173	-0.121
Special vs. General Interests	**0.610**	0.254	0.048	0.056	0.223
Self-Interest 2	**0.601**	0.133	0.098	0.261	0.079
Promises	**0.599**	0.019	0.262	-0.024	-0.067
Humanism	**0.558**	-0.002	0.224	-0.164	0.054
Corruption 1	**0.546**	0.125	0.130	-0.092	-0.002
Population in General	**0.534**	0.166	0.111	0.141	-0.004
Self-Interest 1	**0.513**	0.091	0.291	0.038	0.031
Development	**0.511**	0.242	0.220	0.253	0.019
Confidence	**0.510**	0.110	0.291	0.120	0.080
Macedonia in General	**0.486**	0.159	0.369	0.038	-0.003
Transparency 1	**0.482**	0.001	0.124	0.141	0.095
Social Issues	**0.482**	0.090	0.013	0.383	0.016
Nepotism	**0.476**	0.170	-0.033	-0.046	0.127
Region	**0.465**	0.177	0.250	0.064	0.045
Education	**0.446**	0.127	0.067	0.352	0.033
Leadership Skills	**0.436**	0.220	0.323	0.105	0.100
Employment	**0.420**	0.064	0.109	0.014	0.049
Democracy	**0.406**	0.229	0.294	0.079	0.005
Economics	**0.392**	-0.007	**0.368**	-0.078	0.011
Local vs. Global	**-0.363**	0.002	-0.012	-0.019	-0.245
International Relations	**0.358**	-0.066	0.238	0.170	-0.032
Media	**-0.344**	0.125	0.156	0.013	-0.115
Patriot	**0.332**	0.165	0.184	0.084	-0.109
Administrative Reforms	**0.253**	-0.060	-0.014	0.158	0.045
Anticipation	**0.235**	0.184	0.200	0.023	-0.039
Strategy	**0.203**	0.193	0.194	-0.023	-0.080
War / Conflict	0.063	**0.621**	0.170	-0.108	-0.017
Uniting or Dividing Macedonia	0.083	**0.555**	0.123	0.150	-0.003
Federalism	0.030	**0.541**	-0.037	0.182	0.040
Peace	0.250	**0.537**	0.190	-0.018	0.129
Religion	0.107	**0.511**	0.211	0.073	0.235
Violence	0.177	**0.478**	0.100	0.159	0.143
Constitutional Name	-0.069	**0.437**	0.173	0.178	-0.072
Stability	0.277	**0.429**	0.274	0.248	0.100
Capitalism	**-0.205**	**0.245**	**0.227**	0.198	0.073
Radical	0.087	**0.203**	0.114	0.012	0.161

Table 38 (Continued)

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Liberal / Conservative	0.246	0.215	**0.522**	0.038	0.048
Qualifications	0.442	0.019	**0.496**	0.066	0.038
Experience	0.215	0.098	**0.458**	0.201	0.118
EU Issues	0.312	0.208	**0.443**	0.102	0.017
Ability / Effectiveness	0.198	0.074	**0.436**	0.116	0.192
Transparency 2	0.049	0.205	**0.399**	0.056	0.001
Communist	0.029	0.292	**0.390**	-0.093	0.108
Balance	0.290	0.133	**0.344**	0.096	0.051
Cooperative Tendencies	0.211	**0.316**	**0.324**	-0.026	-0.012
Reforms	0.090	0.105	**0.301**	0.170	0.159
Corruption 2	0.238	0.139	**0.255**	0.085	0.017
Influence	-0.107	0.167	**0.224**	0.178	0.117
Formation of the State of Macedonia	0.181	0.313	0.150	**0.528**	0.024
Legal Aspects 1	0.215	0.237	0.283	**0.430**	0.059
Identity Issues	0.318	0.304	0.212	**0.383**	0.002
Legal Aspects 2	0.285	0.300	0.250	**0.371**	0.038
Popular Support	0.176	0.232	**0.296**	**0.302**	-0.115
Nationalist	0.125	0.172	0.160	**-0.226**	0.162
For/Against Albanians	0.013	-0.016	0.001	-0.014	**0.651**
State University Tetovo	0.112	-0.056	-0.054	0.023	**0.584**
Ohrid Agreement	-0.009	0.173	0.220	0.077	**0.491**
Equality / Proportionality	0.202	0.199	0.154	-0.093	**0.480**
Multiethnic	0.050	**0.398**	0.097	0.075	**0.412**

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 27 iterations.

APPENDIX I

ANNOTATED OUTPUT FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FIVE FACTOR MODEL – ETHNICITY

Table 39: ANOVA - Descriptive Statistics

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	134	-.1822	.89830	.07760
	Macedonian	298	.0802	1.03932	.06021
	Total	432	-.0012	1.00405	.04831
Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	134	.4332	.74957	.06475
	Macedonian	298	-.1758	1.02762	.05953
	Total	432	.0131	.99026	.04764
Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	134	.2202	.93512	.08078
	Macedonian	298	-.0777	.96212	.05573
	Total	432	.0147	.96268	.04632
Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	134	-.3108	.98964	.08549
	Macedonian	298	.1353	.98729	.05719
	Total	432	-.0031	1.00827	.04851
Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	134	.4520	1.00626	.08693
	Macedonian	298	-.1960	.94139	.05453
	Total	432	.0050	1.00658	.04843

Table 40: ANOVA - Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Factor 1: State Development	1.696	1	430	.194
Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	17.519	1	430	.000
Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	.004	1	430	.953
Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	.085	1	430	.771
Factor 5: Albanian Interests	3.016	1	430	.083

Levene's statistic is significant for Factor 2, peace and conflict, ($p<0.001$), indicating that the null hypothesis that the variances between groups (i.e., Macedonian and Albanian) are not equal. This violates the assumption of equal variances. Normally, one-way ANOVA is robust to a

violation of this assumption, providing that the groups are of equal size. However, the descriptive statistics reveal that the groups are not of equal size or of approximately equal size, making the ANOVA output for Factor 2, peace and conflict, uninterpretable.

Although the output for Factor 2 could not be interpreted, Levene's statistic for the remaining four factors was not significant at the .95 level. Although the significance level for Factor 5 ($p<.083$) is questionable, the null hypothesis that variances between groups are not equal could be ruled out. In each case, the differences in means were significant for the remaining four factors.

Table 41: ANOVA Output

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Factor 1: State Development	Between Groups	6.365	1	6.365	6.393	.012
	Within Groups	428.136	430	.996		
	Total	434.502	431			
Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Between Groups	34.285	1	34.285	37.961	.000
	Within Groups	388.359	430	.903		
	Total	422.643	431			
Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Between Groups	8.206	1	8.206	9.019	.003
	Within Groups	391.226	430	.910		
	Total	399.432	431			
Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Between Groups	18.401	1	18.401	18.850	.000
	Within Groups	419.760	430	.976		
	Total	438.161	431			
Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Between Groups	38.811	1	38.811	41.944	.000
	Within Groups	397.878	430	.925		
	Total	436.689	431			

Kruskall-Wallis Test – Total Population

Because not all of the results of the one-way ANOVA could be interpreted, a nonparametric approach to analysis of variance was employed. The Kruskall-Wallis Test is a nonparametric method of assessing the significance of differences between groups that is analogous to analysis of variance (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). The null hypothesis for each of the five factors in this test is that there are no significant differences between groups.

Table 42: Kruskall-Wallis – Ranks

	Only Macedonians and Albanians	N	Mean Rank
Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	134	189.85
	Macedonian	298	228.48
	Total	432	
Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	134	268.65
	Macedonian	298	193.05
	Total	432	
Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	134	239.99
	Macedonian	298	205.94
	Total	432	
Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	134	173.46
	Macedonian	298	235.85
	Total	432	
Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	134	267.78
	Macedonian	298	193.44
	Total	432	

Table 43: Kruskall-Wallis: Test Statistics(a)

	Factor 1: State Development	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Factor 5: Albanian Interests
Chi-Square	8.850	33.891	6.873	23.082	32.765
df	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.003	.000	.009	.000	.000

a Grouping Variable: Only Macedonians and Albanians

APPENDIX J

ANNOTATED OUTPUT FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FIVE FACTOR MODEL – BY AGE

Table 44: ANOVA - Descriptive Statistics by Age Group

Respondent age			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Over 35	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	64	-0.20820	1.02710	0.12839
		Macedonian	160	0.09067	1.17074	0.09256
		Total	224	0.00528	1.13737	0.07599
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	64	0.50039	0.93023	0.11628
		Macedonian	160	-0.21731	1.16618	0.09219
		Total	224	-0.01225	1.14879	0.07676
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	64	0.24531	1.12366	0.14046
		Macedonian	160	-0.18888	1.15227	0.09109
		Total	224	-0.06483	1.15846	0.07740
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	64	-0.47308	1.16723	0.14590
		Macedonian	160	0.17193	1.20440	0.09522
		Total	224	-0.01236	1.22656	0.08195
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	64	0.33851	1.20575	0.15072
		Macedonian	160	-0.29758	1.02397	0.08095
		Total	224	-0.11584	1.11412	0.07444
Age 35 and under	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	70	-0.20884	0.92565	0.11064
		Macedonian	138	0.09047	1.08281	0.09218
		Total	208	-0.01026	1.04005	0.07211
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	70	0.47061	0.81927	0.09792
		Macedonian	138	-0.17487	1.21717	0.10361
		Total	208	0.04236	1.13918	0.07899
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	70	0.24803	1.14504	0.13686
		Macedonian	138	0.03168	1.15249	0.09811
		Total	208	0.10449	1.15179	0.07986
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	70	-0.32404	1.27142	0.15196
		Macedonian	138	0.17021	1.20636	0.10269
		Total	208	0.00388	1.24772	0.08651
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	70	0.67988	1.12808	0.13483
		Macedonian	138	-0.13997	1.21692	0.10359
		Total	208	0.13594	1.24704	0.08647

Table 45: ANOVA - Test of Homogeneity of Variances by Age Group

Respondent age		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Over 35	Factor 1: State Development	1.056	1	222	.305
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	4.466	1	222	.036
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	.336	1	222	.563
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	.000	1	222	.986
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	4.467	1	222	.036
Age 35 and under	Factor 1: State Development	.472	1	206	.493
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	13.785	1	206	.000
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	.544	1	206	.462
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	.085	1	206	.771
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	.036	1	206	.849

Table 46: ANOVA Output by Age Group

Respondent age			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Over 35	Factor 1: State Development	Between Groups	4.08345	1	4.08345	3.18760	0.075
		Within Groups	284.39179	222	1.28104		
		Total	288.47525	223			
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Between Groups	23.54711	1	23.54711	19.30719	0.000
		Within Groups	270.75189	222	1.21960		
		Total	294.29899	223			
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Between Groups	8.61791	1	8.61791	6.58233	0.011
		Within Groups	290.65338	222	1.30925		
		Total	299.27129	223			
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Between Groups	19.01878	1	19.01878	13.34120	0.000
		Within Groups	316.47594	222	1.42557		
		Total	335.49472	223			
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Between Groups	18.49663	1	18.49663	15.89681	0.000
		Within Groups	258.30661	222	1.16354		
		Total	276.80324	223			
Age 35 and under	Factor 1: State Development	Between Groups	4.16075	1	4.16075	3.90039	0.050
		Within Groups	219.75144	206	1.06675		
		Total	223.91219	207			
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Between Groups	19.34960	1	19.34960	15.99022	0.000
		Within Groups	249.27852	206	1.21009		
		Total	268.62811	207			
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Between Groups	2.17390	1	2.17390	1.64379	0.201
		Within Groups	272.43427	206	1.32250		
		Total	274.60817	207			
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Between Groups	11.34542	1	11.34542	7.51701	0.007
		Within Groups	310.91550	206	1.50930		
		Total	322.26092	207			
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Between Groups	31.21566	1	31.21566	22.12131	0.000
		Within Groups	290.68928	206	1.41111		
		Total	321.90495	207			

Kruskall-Wallis Test – By Age

Table 47: Kruskall-Wallis – Ranks by Age Group

Respondent age		Only Macedonians and Albanians	N	Mean Rank
Over 35	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	64	98.75
		Macedonian	160	118.00
		Total	224	
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	64	142.11
		Macedonian	160	100.66
		Total	224	
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	64	130.27
		Macedonian	160	105.39
		Total	224	
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	64	86.70
		Macedonian	160	122.82
		Total	224	
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	64	136.52
		Macedonian	160	102.89
		Total	224	
Age 35 and under	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	70	91.57
		Macedonian	138	111.06
		Total	208	
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	70	127.11
		Macedonian	138	93.03
		Total	208	
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	70	110.77
		Macedonian	138	101.32
		Total	208	
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	70	87.06
		Macedonian	138	113.35
		Total	208	
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	70	129.83
		Macedonian	138	91.65
		Total	208	

Table 48: Kruskall-Wallis: Test Statistics by Age Group(a)

Respondent age		Factor 1: State Development	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Factor 5: Albanian Interests
Over 35	Chi-Square	4.033	18.703	6.733	14.197	12.304
	df	1	1	1	1	1
	Asymp. Sig.	.045	.000	.009	.000	.000
Age 35 and under	Chi-Square	4.868	14.894	1.145	8.861	18.684
	df	1	1	1	1	1
	Asymp. Sig.	.027	.000	.284	.003	.000

a Grouping Variable: Only Macedonians and Albanians

APPENDIX K

OUTPUT FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FIVE FACTOR MODEL – URBAN AND RURAL

Table 49: ANOVA - Descriptive Statistics by Urban and Rural Designations

			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Rural	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	110	-.2401	.97053	.09254
		Macedonian	191	.1547	1.07233	.07759
		Total	301	.0104	1.05203	.06064
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	110	.4661	.85689	.08170
		Macedonian	191	-.1394	1.09934	.07955
		Total	301	.0819	1.05713	.06093
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	110	.3070	1.17858	.11237
		Macedonian	191	.0211	1.10541	.07998
		Total	301	.1256	1.13913	.06566
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	110	-.2677	1.25524	.11968
		Macedonian	191	.0824	1.21246	.08773
		Total	301	-.0456	1.23775	.07134
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	110	.5585	1.22906	.11719
		Macedonian	191	-.3445	1.10103	.07967
		Total	301	-.0145	1.22732	.07074
Urban	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	12	.0506	.60461	.17453
		Macedonian	107	-.0239	1.22047	.11799
		Total	119	-.0164	1.17161	.10740
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	12	.4203	1.04495	.30165
		Macedonian	107	-.3017	1.33142	.12871
		Total	119	-.2289	1.31980	.12099
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	12	.3431	.89118	.25726
		Macedonian	107	-.2792	1.22216	.11815
		Total	119	-.2165	1.20467	.11043
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	12	-.6142	.94672	.27330
		Macedonian	107	.3296	1.17570	.11366
		Total	119	.2344	1.18604	.10872
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	12	.5673	.78344	.22616
		Macedonian	107	-.0106	1.12209	.10848
		Total	119	.0477	1.10399	.10120

Table 50: ANOVA - Test of Homogeneity of Variances by Urban and Rural Designations

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Rural	Factor 1: State Development	.708	1	299	.401
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	7.820	1	299	.006
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	.952	1	299	.330
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	.004	1	299	.952
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	4.872	1	299	.028
Urban	Factor 1: State Development	5.152	1	117	.025
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	1.492	1	117	.224
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	1.900	1	117	.171
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	1.074	1	117	.302
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	2.306	1	117	.132

Table 51: ANOVA Output by Urban and Rural Designations

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Rural	Factor 1: State Development	Between Groups	10.882	1	10.882	10.131	.002
		Within Groups	321.151	299	1.074		
		Total	332.033	300			
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Between Groups	25.594	1	25.594	24.713	.000
		Within Groups	309.660	299	1.036		
		Total	335.254	300			
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Between Groups	5.708	1	5.708	4.449	.036
		Within Groups	383.575	299	1.283		
		Total	389.283	300			
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Between Groups	8.553	1	8.553	5.670	.018
		Within Groups	451.052	299	1.509		
		Total	459.605	300			
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Between Groups	56.914	1	56.914	43.084	.000
		Within Groups	394.982	299	1.321		
		Total	451.896	300			
Urban	Factor 1: State Development	Between Groups	.060	1	.060	.043	.835
		Within Groups	161.914	117	1.384		
		Total	161.974	118			
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Between Groups	5.624	1	5.624	3.292	.072
		Within Groups	199.916	117	1.709		
		Total	205.540	118			
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Between Groups	4.179	1	4.179	2.927	.090
		Within Groups	167.065	117	1.428		
		Total	171.244	118			
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Between Groups	9.611	1	9.611	7.191	.008
		Within Groups	156.379	117	1.337		
		Total	165.990	118			
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Between Groups	3.603	1	3.603	3.006	.086
		Within Groups	140.215	117	1.198		
		Total	143.818	118			

Kruskall-Wallis Test – by Urban and Rural Designations

Table 52: Kruskall-Wallis – Ranks by Urban and Rural Designations

		Only Macedonians and Albanians	N	Mean Rank
Rural	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	110	130.68
		Total	301	
		Macedonian	191	162.70
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	110	182.98
		Total	301	
		Macedonian	191	132.58
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	110	165.72
		Total	301	
		Macedonian	191	142.52
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	110	132.60
		Total	301	
		Macedonian	191	161.60
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	110	189.67
		Total	301	
		Macedonian	191	128.73
Urban	Factor 1: State Development	Albanian	12	55.75
		Total	119	
		Macedonian	107	60.48
	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Albanian	12	76.92
		Total	119	
		Macedonian	107	58.10
	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Albanian	12	74.92
		Total	119	
		Macedonian	107	58.33
	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Albanian	12	35.75
		Total	119	
		Macedonian	107	62.72
	Factor 5: Albanian Interests	Albanian	12	80.17
		Total	119	
		Macedonian	107	57.74

Table 53: Kruskall-Wallis: Test Statistics by Urban and Rural Designations (a)

		Factor 1: State Development	Factor 2: Peace & Conflict	Factor 3: Personal Qualifications	Factor 4: Macedonian Identity	Factor 5: Albanian Interests
Rural	Chi-Square	9.447	23.407	4.957	7.748	34.225
	df	1	1	1	1	1
	Asymp. Sig.	.002	.000	.026	.005	.000
Urban	Chi-Square	.203	3.209	2.495	6.595	4.561
	df	1	1	1	1	1
	Asymp. Sig.	.653	.073	.114	.010	.033

a Grouping Variable: Only Macedonians and Albanians

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