CONTENTIOUS URBANIZATION FROM BELOW: LAND SQUATTING IN MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY

by

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What explains the evolution and dynamics of land squatting in Montevideo, Uruguay? Over the last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in this city that lacked a “frontier” of poor illegal settlements until the 1980s, with the exception of a handful of very precarious neighborhoods dubbed cantegriles that started appearing around the 1950s. Today, about 11% of the city’s population lives on illegally occupied land (INE 2006). The more than 400 current squatter settlements have expanded the city limits, leaving a very concrete trace of urban and social change. Squatter settlements mushroomed without natural disasters setting people in motion and without population growth due to rural to urban migration processes, frequent causes of land squatting elsewhere. Thus, both knowing how and why land squatting has developed constitute interesting puzzles. No one has yet written about the history of land squatting in Montevideo. This dissertation recovers this history from oblivion and puts it in dialog with the literature on popular politics. From a social movement/contentious politics perspective, in this dissertation I challenge the assumption that socioeconomic factors such as poverty were the only causes triggering land squatting. I test whether political factors also shaped the cycle of land invasions and examine the mechanisms through which those factors – known as political opportunities in the literature - translated into different types of mobilization. Through statistical analysis, in-depth interviews, document analysis, and multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, this project will describe and explain the origins and trajectories of
squatting as an elusive form of collective action during the last half of the 20th century (1947-2004). The project seeks to a) describe and explain the cycle of squatting and its timing; b) compare trajectories of different kinds of mobilization involved in land seizures and the mechanisms that activated them, and c) understand squatters’ politics through a thick description of squatters’ experiences and memories of their relationships with state agencies and politicians and through the experiences and memories of politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats as well.
To my parents, Carmen and Pepe, who made me promise

I was not going to keep studying after this dissertation.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

What explains the evolution and dynamics of land squatting in Montevideo, Uruguay? Over the last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in this city that lacked a “frontier” of poor illegal settlements until the 1980s, with the exception of a handful of very precarious neighborhoods dubbed cantegriles that started appearing around the 1950s. Today, about 11% of the city’s population lives on illegally occupied land (INE 2006). The more than 400 current squatter settlements have expanded the city limits, leaving a very concrete trace of urban and social change. Aerial pictures of Montevideo today look very different from those in the 1960. Green areas of the past are grey areas today. Squatter settlements mushroomed without natural disasters setting people in motion and without population growth due to rural to urban migration processes, frequent causes of land squatting elsewhere. Thus, both knowing how and why land squatting has developed constitute interesting puzzles.

No one has yet written about the history of land squatting in Montevideo. This dissertation recovers this history from oblivion and puts it in dialog with the literature on popular politics. From a social movement/contentious politics perspective, in this dissertation I challenge the assumption that socioeconomic factors such as poverty were the only causes triggering land squatting. I test whether political factors also shaped the cycle of land invasions and examine the mechanisms through which those factors – known as political opportunities in the literature - translated into different types of mobilization. Through statistical analysis, in-depth interviews,
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Through the study of squatter settlements we learn something about urban popular politics in Uruguay. But, perhaps more interestingly, we learn something about less visibly structured forms of collective action more generally, forms that I dub here *elusive*. Most of the literature on collective action has been based on empirical research conducted in wealthy western democracies about more or less clearly structured movements such as labor movements. As we will see in the body of this dissertation, the study of squatters in part challenges and in part confirms the generalizability of those theories of collective action. Finally, those not even slightly interested in this particular case of contentious politics may still find something appealing here. Through the study of squatter settlements we also learn something about how to know, how to study subjects about which we do not have all the information we would like. In this sense, this dissertation is a sort of ode to the methodological imagination. It challenges us – or at least it challenged me - to count things that seemed un-measurable before, and to combine the parsimony of quantitative explanations with the depth of ethnographic research.
1.1 ON SQUATTING

Squatter settlements are residential communities mostly or completely inhabited by poor residents who build their own houses on illegally occupied land. Residents might be owners or renters of their houses, but the plots where those houses are built belong to someone else, sometimes to the state, sometimes to private owners. They have become a landmark of most underdeveloped cities, especially capital cities, as a consequence of the rapid urbanization process in the last half of the twentieth century. Many migrants who came to the cities to work and did not find affordable housing either through the market or through the state started to occupy land they did not own and to build informal neighborhoods. With time, squatting also became common among other urban poor that were not migrants but had been living in the formal city. They also found in squatter neighborhoods a solution to their housing problems.

Squatter settlements all over the world share their illegality and their most important demand: land titles. Yet they vary from city to city, within cities, and within each settlement as well. They vary in the social composition of their dwellers (from the poorest of the poor to the working class), construction materials (depending on climate conditions, available materials, dwellers’ assets, eviction expectations, and so on), landscape (e.g., from crowded shantytowns or slums to neighborhoods with streets and blocks that look just like a regular neighborhood in the formal part of the city), location in the city (while some of Rio’s favelas are in the middle of the city, side by side other neighborhoods, in most cities squatters locate on the periphery), degree and type of organization and many other characteristics.

It is very difficult to estimate how many squatters or squatter settlements there are in the world, precisely because of their informal character. There are, however, a few plausible estimates. In Lima almost half of its almost 7 million inhabitants live in one of about 300
settlements (Dietz 1998). In Montevideo, according to the most authoritative estimate, about 11 percent of the population lives in a squatter settlement (INE 2006).

The prevalence of squatters greatly depends on population pressures, the housing market, and the labor market. But it also depends on the relationship between the popular classes and the state. This relationship includes housing policy as well as more specific actions towards those who squat. State agencies may encourage, tolerate, ignore, harass or crush squatter settlements. More often, however, their acts belong to a grey zone that includes some tolerance, some repression, some cooptation, and some assistance. In addition, and to add one more layer of complexity, the state is not monolithic. Different state agencies may pursue different policies or specific actions and those policies may change. State actions tend to depend, in turn, on how organized squatters are and on how interested elites are in squatters as political support. In other words, the argument that guides this dissertation is an interactive one. Harsh economic conditions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence or prevalence of squatter settlements in a city or at a point in time in the same city. Economic conditions interact with political factors to make squatting happen, and to shape how it happens.

In a related vein, but from a more micro perspective, I see squatter settlements as sites of both suffering and agency. More often than not, the media, politicians, policy makers and the general public portray squatters as suffering individuals, as citizens that lack what others have. This is indeed objectively true. Moreover, many squatters perceive themselves as suffering individuals, who lack what they need or what they are entitled to. And this is what you see when you enter into deprived households, when you talk to people who do not have jobs, health insurance or hope, when you walk along the streets of neighborhoods that look like lost non-places in the middle of nowhere, and see barefoot children playing with rundown toys close to a
polluted and smelly river. Still, there are many poor people, with similar needs and rights who do not squat. I do not know if “it takes a certain personality” to be a squatter as a social worker told me referring to the toughness you need to survive the ordeal of being cold, hungry, or having no running water, especially at the beginning of a land invasion. What I do know is that squatting takes a lot of individual and family work, and a lot of collective work as well. In more academic terms, it takes a lot of agency. As Gay (1994) puts it “victims they undoubtedly are; innocent however, they are not. Indeed, there's increasing evidence from a variety of contexts that the urban poor have been active, organized, and aggressive participants in the political process and that the popular organizations, in particular, have had a significant impact on the relationship between the urban poor and political elites.”

1.2 THE STUDY OF LATIN AMERICAN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Squatter settlements in Latin American cities became very sexy objects of study in the 1960s.¹ The region’s massive and rapid urbanization in the mid twentieth century, accompanying what would turn out to be an incomplete industrialization process, has fascinated scholars from the

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¹ More recently there has been a revival in interest in squatter settlements, but from a policy-oriented perspective, by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other international agencies who have been supporting slum upgrading programs such as Favela-Bairro in Brazil or the Programa de Integración de Asentamientos Irregulares in Uruguay. The general philosophy underlying these programs dates back to Mangin (1967) and Turner (1976) and has been preached all over the world by Hernando de Soto (1986). Rather than trying to avoid them, governments should help squatters build their neighborhoods. Using Mangin’s words, squatting should be considered a solution rather than a problem. Although at first sight reasonable, the theoretical and political implications of these programs are questionable. First, they do not tend to attack the causes that lead people to squat. Second, their malleable use of social capital and democracy theories is something deeply troubling. As just one example, they often overstate the integration capacities of all types of social capital, sometimes forgetting that without ties outside of these communities, or weak ties to use Granovetter’s (1981) term, the long term wellbeing of squatters will probably not improve, no matter how much they participate in the building of their immediate environment. This is a very interesting line of inquiry but a different one from this dissertation’s. (For more on these programs see Clichévsky (2003)).
region and abroad. In the 1960s and 1970s social scientists, especially anthropologists, found the massive migration from rural areas to urban centers very interesting. Migrants’ demographics, values, behaviors, political attitudes and neighborhoods were under continuous scrutiny. The uncertainty of the time triggered academics’ imagination to think about the new reality.

Two major theories developed, with contending explanations of the migration and the fate of these migrants, especially those left out of the industrialization process, those that could not get incorporated into the built city and had to find alternative jobs and alternative housing and built the shantytowns or squatter settlements that are so characteristic of Latin American cities until this day. On the one hand, modernization theory – with Gino Germani (1968) as its main representative - considered migrants’ shantytowns as transitory, as one stage in a longer process of change and development. Once these migrants learned urban values, and once the modernization process was more complete, squatters would get incorporated into the culture of modernity, and therefore into its institutions, such as the labor market and the formal housing market. On the other hand, José Nun (1969; 2001) and his more structuralist colleagues developed a very different theory. Much more pessimistically, they predicted that shantytowns were there to stay, because the peripheral form of Latin American capitalism would never incorporate them. Squatter settlements constituted the housing of a marginal mass, whose existence was, according to Nun, functional to the whole system. It contributed to low salaries and therefore to the very unequal form of capitalism of the region.

These theories structured the discussion of empirical results, and have been challenged and molded by them, giving birth to a rich tradition of studies and theoretical reflections about urban poverty. Janice Perlman’s (1976; 2004) work on the favelas of Rio showed in the 1960s

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2 For a summary of this tradition by some of its main exponents, see González de la Rocha et al. (2004).
that squatters were not that different from formal urban dwellers, and that their marginality was just a myth. She claimed that *favelados* were very much integrated into the formal economy and the values of the modern city. In the same vein, studying the case of Santiago de Chile, Alejandro Portes (1972) examined “rationality in the slum.” He empirically challenged the idea that slum dwellers were irrational. He demonstrated that they were not apathetic either, and that their political views and strategies could be radical or consensual depending on the circumstances, just like citizens living in the formal parts of the city. Susan Stokes’ work in Lima (1991) and Robert Gay’s (1994) more recent work in the Rio *favelas* have continued to flesh out that idea by showing variation in the political views and strategies of squatters.

The relationship between squatter settlements and the state and politics in Latin America has received much more attention that in other parts of the world, in part because this relationship has been much stronger than anywhere else. David Collier’s (1976) work in Lima persuasively unveils how intertwined *squatters* and *oligarchs* are, how extensively though often silently the Peruvian elite has been involved in the formation of the dozens of settlements that make Lima one of the most informal cities of the region. Also for the case of Lima, perhaps the most studied city when it comes to urban informality, Dietz (1998) studies political participation both formal (vote) and informal (community participation), in six poor Lima neighborhoods over a 20 year time span. Other examples of this line of inquiry include Cornelius (1974; 1977), Roberts (1973), Handelman (1975), Eckstein (1988), Hipsher (1997; 1998), Schneider (1995), Burgwal (1995) and more recently Auyero (2000), Özler (2003a), and Dosh (forthcoming, 2009.)

Specialists on a different region of the world suggest Latin American squatters’ distinctiveness. In their attempt to bring together different traditions of study of urban
informality, Alsayyad (1993) and Alsayyad and Roy (1993; 2003) argue that, contrary to what happened in Latin America, in the Middle East it is the relative depolitization and invisibility of squatters that has enabled their survival.

1.3 SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AS MOVEMENTS

Nobody would deny that squatters of abandoned buildings throughout affluent western cities, especially European cities such as Amsterdam, London or Barcelona, fall into the category of social movements. They see themselves as such. Often also a youth and anarchist movement, the occupation of empty buildings in these contexts is perceived by the actors and by the authorities as an act of defiance of the state or the mainstream society they want to protest against. Of course, the degree of defiance varies by context, depending especially on property laws and the degree to which these laws are enforced. While in the US squatting has been very rarely tolerated, in cities such as Amsterdam or London institutionalization of the movement, through tolerance and even amnesty and legalization of squatters, has been more common (Pruijt 2003). Yet squatters in the cities of the underdeveloped world are not usually seen as participants in social movements. We see them as deprived, impoverished or victims. Many seem them as dangerous as well. It is rare that we think of all the agency and collective effort it takes to build a neighborhood.

Squatter settlements might or might not be considered social movements depending on the perspective we assume, and on their specific forms of organization at particular times and

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3 For an interesting study of the dynamics of movements’ decline, and especially narratives of decline among Amsterdam’s squatters, see Lynn Owens’s book (Owens 2009).
places. Take for example Tarrow’s (1998) definition of social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.” These challenges are different from the ones political parties and interest groups make, though sometimes the limits are blurry. Based on this definition, we can debate about how challenging, how collective, how interactive, and how sustained squatters’ actions are. We can debate if all squatters of one city can be considered a social movement or if each neighborhood is what bounds collective action and therefore we have as many movements as neighborhoods. Some may also say that none is a social movement.

Still, I argue that even if we do not consider squatter settlements as social movements, the theories and methods developed in the last decades for the study of collective action and contentious politics illuminate dynamics of squatting that might otherwise remain unnoticed or under-analyzed. This notion is very much inspired by Dynamics of Contention, a book in which three of the top scholars of social movements encourage researchers to expand their scope of analyzed phenomena and see if the mechanisms that were discovered to be useful to understand classic social movements such as the labor movement, are also useful to understand other phenomena (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Trying to avoid entering in the never ending debate of social movements’ definitions, I prefer the broader concept of contentious politics to illuminate the struggles over urban land shantytowns represent. “Contentious” refers to claims that if realized would conflict with someone else’s interests; “politics” refers to some involvement of the government in these actions. Squatters’ demands on the state, for titling, public services, schools, food and so forth, certainly imply a redistribution of finite resources and in that sense are conflicting with the
interests of the rest of the tax payers and other citizens. Since these demands are made to the local, city or national government, they are political demands.

Not everything that squatters do is contentious or political. To survive, squatters use a broad range of strategies. Some are individual or household strategies (e.g., voting, working, distributing care work within the household, marrying, moving, contacting a politician individually, asking relatives for help, performing illegal activities, and others). Some imply collective action (e.g., seizing land at night, building streets, resisting the police, petitioning the state, and so on). The degree to which collective action takes place depends a great deal on contextual features. The same is true of the ways in which collective action takes place. While some contexts stimulate autonomous or self-sufficient collective action at the margins of the state (which seems to be the case in Middle Eastern cities and in repressive regimes), other contexts stimulate intense interaction with politicians and the state (e.g., Montevideo in democratic times and in other Latin American cities). This dissertation is primarily concerned with this latter form of collective action, and this is form can be illuminated by the literature on contentious politics.

Squatter settlements are the most vital manifestation of political action by the urban poor of Latin America (Portes and Walton 1976). Organization often happens only within the squatter neighborhood, not among all squatter neighborhoods of one city. There have been cases of umbrella organizations among different squatter neighborhoods but the most common type of collective action takes places among neighbors of the same squatter settlement. Organization may take different forms depending on squatters and on the context in which they act. Squatters may invisibly self organize without demanding anything from the state; they may vote for a candidate they perceive as more willing to satisfy their demands; they may enter into patronage
relationships; they may protest in different ways such as blockading streets or marching; or, as it is usually the case, they may combine these and other modalities of organization. Governments, in turn, may repress, tolerate, help or ignore settlements.

Organizing in a context of great deprivation is not easy. Collectively planning invasions, resisting the police, building houses and helping others build their own, getting together to demand or to steal electricity and phone lines, providing running water, building community services such as soup kitchens, forming associations, planning and building streets, opening clinics, blockading streets to get a new school in the area, taking care of the children, ensuring that new neighbors are “good” neighbors or “people of work” that “want to progress” – rather than “thieves” or “scavengers” – policing, and many other ordinary practices take place in squatter settlements and require residents’ participation, energy and cooperation (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 [2000]). Even settlements formed by gradual accretion, without initial collective planning, require trust and collective organization to solve everyday problems. Almost all demands squatters make and all actions they take require solving collective action problems. Squatters often recognize that making demands collectively on the state gives them more likelihood of being heard. Yet the problem of collective action is always there and often appears to researchers in the fieldwork in the form of complaints about lack of interest and participations among neighbors.

Taking a very similar stance, Eckstein (2001) describes squatters as an “expression of consumer defiance, a form of protest against the high cost and low supply of shelter in the formal housing market” (p. 331). Although Özler (2003a) does not see squatting as a social movement he does see squatters as “an important political force making distinctive demands on the government” (p. 2), and as “strategic voters or protestors with clear demands, who use the means
available to them to influence political leaders to advance their interests” (p. 3). He sees squatters as sharing with the rest of the urban poor problems of poverty and employment, but having at the same time a very specific set of unified demands about to their housing conditions and especially about land tenure. In order to solve these specific demands, Özler says, squatters tend to enter into a relationship with the government because land tenure and titling depends on government regulation, even when on private land.

To the general public, however, squatter settlements do not constitute movements. Newspapers have not treated land invasions like “noisier” forms of protest such as strikes or demonstrations. Yet because of the relationship between squatters and politics in Latin America, talked about earlier, several scholars have indeed used social movement frameworks to study organization among land squatters. We can find studies of squatters from almost all the sub-fields or traditions of social movement research. The first studies, those that saw irrationality, marginality and disorganization in squatters, basing themselves on the same theories of social disorganization that saw social movements in the developed world as the action of irrational masses. The following statement from a 1964 essay by Barbara Ward, a British economist and writer interested in development, illustrates this perspective:

All over the world, often long in advance of effective industrialization, the unskilled poor are streaming away from subsistence agriculture to exchange the squalor of rural poverty for the even deeper miseries of the shantytowns, ‘favelas’ and ‘bidonvilles’ that, year by year, grow inexorably on the fringes of the developing cities. They (…) are the core of local despair and disaffection (…). Unchecked, disregarded, left to grow and fester, there is here enough explosive material to produce in the world at large the pattern of a bitter class conflict (…), threatening ultimately the security even of the comfortable West (Quoted in Portes (1972)).
Much later, influenced by the European thinking of the 1980s on social movements, some scholars saw in squatter settlements the “new social movements” that Alain Touraine, Alberto Melucci and others were talking about at the time. The phrase “new social movements” was used to describe post-industrialist movements emerging in Europe after the 1960s whose concerns were different from the more traditional economic focus of the labor movement. These movements were supposed to be less interested in making demands only on the state, in promoting cultural changes in the way we do and think about the world and our lives, and not only in the economic sphere. If there ever were new social movements or if what changed was just the ways scholars look at them is still a matter of discussion (Calhoun 1993). In the end E.P. Thompson would deny any economic reductionism in explaining the English labor movement in the early 19th century. Yet what remains true is that social movement scholars started to pay much more attention to identity, culture and ideology.

The New Social Movements framework became famous among Latin American scholars, and some foreign Latin Americanists, as a way to analyze emerging movements during the democratization process in the region in the 1980s. The theory’s emphasis on the transformative power of civil society, its proposed dichotomy between identity and strategy, and its admiration of autonomous mobilization deeply tinted studies of social movements in the region (Davis 1999; Roberts 1997).

Studies of squatters under or in dialog with this tradition focus on the identities generated by living together in the same neighborhood and having to solve problems through community organization. Researchers saw in the participation in soup kitchens and other types of neighborhood organizations, the politicization of everyday life, that European scholars had seen in the women, gay, ethnic, human rights and environmentalist movements. Holston (1991), for
example, studies autoconstruction as an arena of spatial, political and symbolic mobilization in Brazil. Although he recognizes that squatters reproduce long term relations of domination as well, he focuses on how in auto-constructing their own homes and neighborhoods, they are “transforming themselves as citizens but they are also changing the images of disrespect that blind them to a denigrated sense of their own persons” (p. 462). Holston even sees squatter settlements as one instance of his concept of spaces of insurgent citizenship, which are urban spaces in formation or in transition, in his own words “new metropolitan forms of the social not yet liquidated by or absorbed into the old [which] (...) embody possible alternative futures” (Holston 1999).

Oxhorn’s (1995) work on the resurrection of civil society, especially among pobladores or squatters, in the last years of authoritarian Chile and during democratization, is another example of a study very much colored by the questions of the New Social Movements approach. He finds the idea of lo popular as a defining identity among poor Chilean urban dwellers at the time, and he finds the autonomy of civil society from the state and political parties in this period to be its most salient feature. In his own words:

In a fundamental way, the issues involved in the resurrection of civil society and its potential for democratization reflect the emergence of "new" actors (a myriad of territorially based popular organizations) and their juxtaposition with a variety of "old" actors (the traditional political elite and the parties they represent). The legacy of the authoritarian regime will affect both differently; as a result they may develop identities that are at odds with each other. The above discussion suggests that an important part of the identity of the new popular organizations may reflect a greater commitment to ideals associated with participatory democracy and great distance from political parties (p. 35).
Another example of this focus on identity creation is Caldeira’s (1990) work on women’s participation in São Paulo’s popular neighborhoods. Besides raising our awareness about how much popular neighborhood organizations are actually women’s organizations normally masked by words such as “the popular classes,” or “the poor,” she also examines the possible formation of a new women’s identity through neighborhood participation. She recognizes how participating in neighborhood organizations may be just an expansion of domestic work for some women (i.e. caring for the neighborhood) but she also sees in that participation the possibility of politicizing everyday life for many women who had never thought politics before, and of a change in gender relationships within the household as well. Finally, embedded in an edited volume on the linkages between culture and politics in Latin American Social movements, Díaz Barriga’s (1998) work on Mexican colonias is also sensitive to the fine blurry line between the domestic and the political in squatter settlements’ mobilization.

The political opportunities framework has more recently resonated among scholars of Latin America, and among scholars of squatting in particular. This framework is based on the idea that social movements or contentious politics more generally are not outside but in dialog with more institutionalized politics (Della Porta 1997; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Thus, movements tend to emerge, activate or decay depending on what happens outside them, more precisely in the political realm. Elections, democratization processes, the incumbency of a party that sympathizes with a movement, international pressures for an authoritarian government to open up, variation in patterns of policing can all be political opportunities for movements.

The case of Santiago de Chile, for instance has attracted the attention of some scholars studying the relationship between land squatters and politics from a political opportunities
framework. Schneider (Schneider 1995) studies how the Pinochet military regime reduced political opportunities for Santiago’s squatters – who previously had been highly mobilized - and acted repressively towards them. Hipsher (1998), in turn, looks at how democratization revived great (though not long lasting) mobilization in Chilean *squatments*.

Comparing the case of Santiago, Chile with the cases of Mexico City and Istanbul and Ankara in Turkey, Özler (2003b) also focuses on the political opportunities shaping squatters’ mobilization. Theoretically, he does not explicitly work under the political opportunities framework as known in the social movements’ literature, but under Political Science’s “institutionalism”. Yet there are a lot of similarities between these two frameworks and Özler’s interests and findings can be read completely through the political opportunities lens. He studies the effect of different political characteristics on the strategies that the urban poor choose to make demands to the government. According to him, four characteristics of the political system are crucial in determining squatters’ strategies: legalism versus ad hoc enforcement of the laws, degree of government stability, the government’s tendency to respond to policy demands with programmatic as opposed to opportunistic solutions, and government ideology.

Dosh (forthcoming, 2009) uses the political opportunities framework to compare the different patterns in the cities of Lima and Quito. While in Lima invasions have become routine and institutionalized, in Quito they are considered aberrations, which the author argues, has to do with differential political opportunities in both cities. While Peru has pro-settler legislation, an entrepreneurial city hall in Quito has watched over and protected public land from being seized. However, the author’s further work trying to explain the differences within each of these two cities leans much more to a *resource mobilization* type of argument. Resource mobilization theory finds the most important causes of collective action in movement’s internal assets
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Resources can range from money to type of internal organization to the strength of networks. In Dosh’s work, the main resource that explains variation within each of his two cities in the level of success in getting demands met by the states is the type of organizational strategy. In the end his explanation is twofold, since for him neighborhood service acquisition outcomes result from a combination of factors both external and internal to invasion organizations. As Dosh puts it, “External factors beyond the control of organizations do invite and curtail mobilization in a variety of ways, but this study shows that whatever the array of external variables, certain types of organizations, characterized by specific strategies, assets, and leadership structures, are better able than others to exploit those external factors. In short, organizations do in fact exert control over key aspects of their own process of acquiring resources” (p. 11-12).

1.4 SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN THIS STUDY

The writings on squatters as movements from a political opportunities framework have shown similar dynamics between more or less amorphous forms of collective action such as invading land and organizing to get services and the more classical forms of protesting like striking, rioting or marching. Yet I see two main flaws prevailing most of the literature. These problems are not restricted to the study of squatters or of social movements in Latin America by any means. They are broader flaws, prevailing in the literature of social movements in general. The first one refers to a very loose concept of political opportunities that is impossible to prove wrong. And the other one refers to some dissociation between macro and micro perspectives in the study of social movements.
The first problem thus refers to the excessive looseness of the concept of political opportunity and this leads to its often ad hoc use as an explanation (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Think of a contentious event, look back, and you will always find something politically relevant that could have caused it. Call it political opportunity. Of course, this is a grotesque caricature, but it illustrates by exaggerating one of the main problems in this prolific field of social movements’ studies. As further explained in chapter 5, the idea of this project has been to specify political opportunities from the beginning, to later test if they were relevant or not. As political opportunities I had defined elections in general and a specific historical landmark in the history of the city of Montevideo: the left winning elections for the first time in 1990. I hypothesized a) that squatter invasions are more likely to happen close to election campaigns, and b) that the left in the city government also raised the likelihood of land invasions either because of more permissiveness on the officials’ side or because of more expectations on the squatters’ side. During fieldwork and analysis I learned that post-electoral years were also moments in which squatting peaked.

Trying to address the second and broader of these two problems, this project is at the crossroads of two approaches to social movements. Many studies try to understand why or under what conditions movements emerge. In general, these studies point to macro-level factors, although there are theoretical and empirical disagreements about what those factors are: political and ideological opportunities, activist cultures, absolute or relative grievances, or movement resources (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Advocates of a second perspective on movement emergence focus on micro-level factors, arguing that identifying macro-level causes offers an interesting, but incomplete, picture that veils actors’ decision making (Blee and Currier 2005). Disappointed with the macro perspective, some of its
initial proponents have recommended that scholars should focus more on the dynamic mechanisms that make collective action happen (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In this project, I pursue this latter recommendation by bringing together macro and micro perspectives on social movements. While the macro perspective explains the conditions under which squatters are more likely to emerge, the micro one accounts for how squatters interact with these conditions to produce squatter settlements.

This dissertation is organized in seven different chapters. Following this introduction, chapter two introduces us to land squatting in Uruguay. It shows the changing demographics and other characteristics of squatters at the same time that it briefly describes some important characteristics of the Uruguayan state and political system. Chapter three, in turn, fleshes out the methodological approach of this work based on the use of several data gathering methods and two main ways of organizing those data: mini-ethnographies and an event catalog of land invasions. Chapters four, five and six are the empirical core of this study, based on the data collected. Chapter four describes the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo from its beginnings in the late 1940s until the end of the study period in 2004. It also uncovers the different types of land invasions by telling stories of invasions and showing quantitative data on the prevalence of each type at different historical moments and their characteristics. Chapter five aims at testing the power of rival theories – grievances and political opportunities - in shaping the probability of land invasions in a certain year. It ends up with a more interesting interactive statistical model and substantive argument. Chapter six, in turn, is deeply ethnographic in the sense that it tries to take the reader to the study setting, by choosing a story and scrutinizing the relationship between squatters and the state through political brokerage. It scrutinizes leaders, non leaders and politicians’ experiences with squatting and mobilizing for land and services. It develops the
concept of *market clientelism* to refer to a very successful strategy practiced by squatters’ leaders to get squatters’ demands fulfilled. Finally, chapter seven concludes this study by attempting to very concisely pull together everything I have learned from this research.
2.0 THE CASE

2.1 SQUATTING AND THE REPERTOIRE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION OF THE URBAN POOR OF MONTEVIDEO

The explosion of squatting in Montevideo took place later than in other metropolises of the region. Although some land invasions, dubbed cantegriles, existed in Montevideo before squatting peaked in the 1990s, the Uruguayan capital developed differently than other Latin American cities. Despite already starting to show signs of urban socio-economic inequality in the 1980s (Portes 1989), Montevideo was more egalitarian than other cities of the continent. Even after the military regime (1973-1984) carried out a harsh policy of evictions and demolitions in the city center, where many poor people lived, there was no massive move to squatter settlements on the outskirts of the city. Instead of organizing land invasions, the urban poor of Montevideo gravitated to an already familiar strategy for coping with housing problems: crowding at relatives’ homes (Benton 1986).

In this section I provide contextual features on the relationship of state and society in Uruguay that I believe help explain this puzzle. I do so by drawing on scholarly work on Uruguayan political history as well as on some comparative works. This enables me to identify some long term trends in the way the poorest citizens have related to the state in this country as well as some important changes that shifted that relationship. I later describe the broad changes in land squatting in Montevideo both in identity and in demographics. For this, I unearthed the few sources I was lucky to find that could tell me something about the first land invasions, such as two forgotten early studies of squatter settlements from the 1960s and early 1970s. A documentary film was vital for seeing life inside one of the poorest land invasions of the city in 1958. I have tried to track the change in the popular name of land invasions from cantegriles to asentamientos. I finally attempt to follow demographic changes of squatters by comparing earlier studies with the 2006 household survey.

2.1.1 A stubborn statist tradition in a worn down/elastic state

According to Benton (1986) squatting did not happen by the time the military evicted city buildings in the 1970s because economic activities, as well as neighborhood identity, connected the poor with the city core. However, she also pays special attention to the traditional paternalistic role of Uruguayan welfare policy:

Of crucial importance was the peculiar historical-political relationship between workers and the state in Montevideo. The long tradition of state assistance to the urban poor before 1973 clearly conditioned the responses of residents in bringing pressure to bear on the state. Behavior that seemed to represent attitudes of resignation—the lack of organized protest over the destruction of conventillos
in Palermo and Sur 5 or the wait-and-see strategy of residents housed in the city stables –quietly shifted responsibility to the state for resolving the housing “crisis” it had helped to engineer (Benton 1986: 49).

The Uruguayan state in general and its welfare branch in particular has been noted for its singularity in the region (Filgueira 2000; Mesa Lago 2000). When Centeno (2002) classifies Latin American states in a continuum of institutional capacity, he locates Uruguay, together with Chile and Argentina, as “obvious” successful end points of the spectrum. Yet as Centeno also notes, the Uruguayan state was the latest of the three to consolidate, due to continuous civil wars during the nineteenth century. The early governments of the twentieth century in Uruguay had to face two different tasks that other countries faced at separate moments in time. The first was political institutionalization and the second was the demands for political participation of the new emerging social sectors such as the urban working class (Panizza 1990).

Until 1904, the Uruguayan state did not have a centralized army that could control the country’s territory. The territory was actually divided between the two traditional political forces, the Colorados and the Blancos, born back in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Colorados controlled Montevideo, then the fifth biggest city in Latin America. More than a quarter of the population lived in the capital whereas other cities of the region housed an average of 3% to 5% of the population (Panizza 1990). The Blancos, in turn, under the leadership of the caudillo Aparicio Saravia, controlled the countryside.

5 Palermo and Sur are two traditional neighborhoods of the city core. Together with Ciudad Vieja, they were the areas most affected by the urban policies adopted by the military government. Before 1973, they housed a lot of urban poor in substandard buildings characterized by crowding and poor living conditions, popularly known as conventillos. Subletting and squatting in those buildings was the norm. Not only were these people affected by the deregulation of rents but also by the direct eviction from some of those buildings. In 1978 a decree law authorized the municipality to institute evictions of residents of any property found to be in “imminent danger of collapse.” The number of evictions rose immediately. As a consequence, some individuals resettled somewhere else in the city, while others were relocated either in “temporary” shelters or public housing (Benton 1986).
Welfare policies were one of the tools that the *colorado* president José Batlle y Ordoñez (1903-1907 and 1911-1914) used to consolidate the power of his party over the country. While he spent his initial presidency first fighting the revolts of Aparicio Saravia and the *blancos* and later consolidating the military control of the country, he spent his second presidency building up his state project. Batlle y Ordoñez believed in strong economic interventionism and in pro-worker legislation. He was a believer in state enterprises as well so during his government he nationalized several banks such as the *Banco de la República*. Among his progressive pro-worker legislation, he fought for the eight-hour workday, unemployment compensation, workers’ rights to strike, regulation of child labor, maternity leave, and the establishment of retirement and handicap pensions. Some of these projects were approved during his presidency and some others right after he left office. Thus, the construction of the Uruguayan state is completely linked to the construction of its welfare state.

Despite interruptions such as the Terra dictatorship (1930-1938), the state kept growing and generously provided progressive labor rights, universal or almost universal coverage in basic social protection services, good quality public services such as education and health, and employment in a wide range of public sector administrative and productive activities. With shades such as the world wide 1930s economic crisis, for more almost half a century, the Uruguayan economy enjoyed times of economic prosperity. The convulsive international situation of the two world wars and later the Korean were was beneficial for Uruguay because of the great demand for products such as meat and wool. After the demand for Uruguayan goods decreased, there was a crisis of inflation, unemployment, and falling living standards. Even then, the state kept growing as a sort of counter-cyclical buffer. Even in 1970, when the Uruguayan model of import substitution and state-led development was already falling apart, 95.4% of the
Uruguayan economically active population had social security coverage (Filgueira 2000) and almost 30% of the labor force was employed by the state (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005). In her study of social policy-making in Chile and Uruguay, Castiglioni (2005) poses an interesting puzzle related to this. Both countries suffered democratic breakdowns in 1973 and both had big welfare states at the moment. Still, while the Chilean military carried an aggressive pro market program of state retrenchment, the Uruguayan counterpart left social policies almost untouched. Castiglioni finds that, together with other institutional factors, the ideology of Uruguayan policy makers during dictatorship was still permeated with the legacy of batllismo.

But a slow reform process did take place. Following the regional trend of neoliberal reforms, Uruguay shifted towards a less regulated and more export oriented economy. Yet citizens have consistently and stubbornly rejected state retrenchment reforms, especially privatization of state enterprises. The most recent sign of resistance took place in 2004 when Uruguayans not only for the first time voted the leftist coalition into office with a pro-state platform, but also approved a constitutional reform that defines water as a human right and a public good and states that the provision of piped water and sanitation can only be done by state enterprises. Only months before, through a referendum, Uruguayan citizens had opposed a law that attempted to end the monopoly of the state-owned oil company and opened it up to outside investors. Uruguay has also blocked strong privatization attempts of its social security system, has engaged in an educational reform at odds with retrenchment trends, and has been unable to reform its health system until 2008 – a health reform aimed at increasing coverage rather than privatizing services as in other countries. All this contrasts with the region’s two other welfare pioneers who have privatized most of their state businesses. While Argentina and, even more so
Chile, have experienced a market revolution, Uruguay has obstinately chosen a different path. As Filgueira (2000) puts it,

Uruguay has gone down the market oriented road to a limited extent, but clearly not to the degrees seen in other Latin American countries. The welfare state, and the [people’s, unions’, the left’s and corporations’] response to the decline in the quality of the public goods it distributed have been able to rescue the public dimension of those goods (p. 219).

According to Filgueira, the strong legacies of political and social citizenship help explain why in Uruguay those sectors with resources opted for voice rather than exit. This voice has, however, been more effective in defending the existing worn down welfare state than in making innovations.

The results of these middle road market reforms are mixed. Uruguay keeps doing better in some development measures in comparison to most third world countries. According the United Nations Human Development Index ranking, Uruguay has a high human development and is above the regional average. Uruguay is currently in the 46th place in the IDH. In Latin America, only Argentina and Chile are above. Yet it has lost positions in the ranking over the years. In contrast to other countries of Latin America, it has been unable to improve its score (PNUD 2008). In terms of poverty, Uruguay has always outperformed most Latin American countries as one of the countries with the lowest poverty rates. Yet the comparison with its own past is less hopeful. Poverty rates have tended to rise even at times of economic growth since the mid 1990s (PNUD 2008).

The conclusion of a group of scholars who studied different welfare policies in Uruguay is quite disheartening (Filgueira, Rodríguez, Rafaniello, Lijtenstein, and Alegre 2005). They find an increasing disconnection between risk groups and protected groups. According to the authors, the welfare state has not adapted itself to deep changes in the labor market such as the increase in
structural unemployment and informal labour or to the also deep demographic changes such as less stable families and the increasing poverty among children. They identify a very vulnerable group of 40% of the population that despite being very vulnerable does not have enough state attention. They are mainly children, young women with low incomes, informal workers and land squatters.

The legacy of *batllismo*, the legacy of a big state, is deeply entrenched among Uruguayans. As Panizza cleverly states it, rights for Uruguayan citizens did not evolve as in Europe from political to economic to social. Economic and social rights came first and this impacted people’s subjectivity since they would come to conceive citizenship in a broader way than just voting (Panizza 1990). This legacy impacted also the 2004 election, in which a coalition of leftist factions, the *Frente Amplio*, won national elections breaking two centuries of bipartidism in the country. According to Luna (Luna 2007) parties competed for this election around a state versus market opposition, with *Frente Amplio* on the state side, appropriating and reinventing the *batllismo* ideology, and the traditional parties on the market side.

All these contextual features help us understand Benton’s opening statement about the reliance of the urban poor to the state. With this in mind, it is completely logical that the urban poor were waiting for the state to do something for them. Yet contrary to what she implies by saying that faced with housing problems they did not squat en masse but instead hoped the state would respond to their problem, as will see throughout this dissertation, squatters in Montevideo still depend very much on the state. In that sense, squatting in Montevideo implies more continuity than rupture in terms of relying on the state. In other words, even when they settled on vacant urban land people in need requested state help.

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6 The Constitution of 1918 declared suffrage universal and compulsory for men older than 18. Women’s suffrage did not come until 1932, and it was implemented in 1938 for the first time.
The growth of squatter settlements and their characteristics are a visible trace, almost like a metaphor of this eroding but still stretchable and paternalistic state. The more than 400 squatter settlements in Montevideo, housing 11% of the city’s population are one of the most noticeable signs of the problems of Uruguay’s economy and state. They spatially remind us that the times of the “happy country”, the “fat cows”, or the “Switzerland of Latin America”\textsuperscript{7} – as people used to call Uruguay - are gone. Extreme poverty and unmet basic needs are not the patrimony only of squatter settlements. Urban poverty exists in the city center and in other formal neighborhoods as well. Yet with the exception of homelessness, poverty in the formal city is camouflaged behind the European-style facades of the city center or the working class detached housing that characterizes the once industrial neighborhoods. Squatter settlements in contrast, sometimes because of poor housing, often because some are located close to polluted rivers and piles of garbage, and always because of their lack of paved streets and other public services, make poverty and suffering visible to the most oblivious passerby.

In this sense, squatter settlements are the most noticeable evidence of the process suffered by the Uruguayan urban poor in the last decades. Using Kaztman’s (2001) evocative phrase, the urban poor in Montevideo have been “seduced and abandoned” by a labor market that promised formal and stable jobs, a state that promised good services and benefits, an open education system that offered opportunities of upper mobility and a city that promised not only shelter but also interaction with other social classes. All these promises are unmet for many urban poor. It is only in this context that we can understand why many of my interviewees, both squatter leaders

\textsuperscript{7} The myth of the “Switzerland of Latin America” appeared somewhere in the first part of the twentieth century, perhaps from the admiration that president José Batlle y Ordoñez (1903-1907 and 1911-1915), designer of the Uruguayan state, felt for Swiss political and welfare institutions. Costa Ricans also see themselves as the Switzerland of (Central) America.
and non leaders framed their actions in terms of rights: “It is our right to squat. Housing is a right in the Constitution.”

The “structure of opportunities” available to the urban poor has shrunk in all its spheres: the market, the state and the community (Katzman 1999). Regarding the labor market, taking 1970 as a starting point and comparing it with 2000, jobs became scarcer and those that do exist are less stable. This is in part because women doubled their participation in the labor force in the period – from 27.5% in 1970 to 52.5 in 1999 - (Katzman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005), but it also because many industries closed, the state has reduced its employees by half, and there is not enough employment generation. Moreover, positions that do open up tend to be unstable and low paid, especially if targeted to less skilled workers. Salary differentials by education are increasing (Bucheli and Furtado 2004). Unemployment has increased and is especially high for the youth and the poorly educated. Although traditionally under 10% in Uruguay, since 1970 unemployment has reached double digits several times and rose to 16% during the 2002/2003 economic crisis (Katzman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005). The informal labor market has increased substantially as well. According to the 2006 household survey, 36.5% of the working population in 2006 did not have social security (INE 2006).

These changes in the labor market are a product of the change in the mode of accumulation from the decaying import substitution model to an increasingly open economy since the 1970s. The opening of the economy started with the military government in 1973. This new model has been characterized by overall growth and overall inequality. According to economic historians, this trend of growth with a non egalitarian distribution dates as back as the 1960s, when the trends of GDP per capita (which measure overall growth) and real wages (which measure the wellbeing of average workers), convergent since the 1920s, started to diverge
(Camou and Maubrigades 2005). Not surprisingly, the Gini coefficient, one of the most popular inequality measures, follows an overall growing trend since 1960 (Bértola 2005).

Regarding the state, the second dimension of the structure of opportunities analyzed by Kaztman, I have already mentioned its diminishing role as an employer. But its impact among the urban poor comes also through other avenues such as the educational system, which is unable to retain many students past the first year of secondary school. This becomes particularly worrisome when we know that a person needs on average 9 years of education to get an income above Uruguay’s poverty line. Finally, regarding the community, socioeconomic residential segregation has increased in Montevideo in the last decades (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005). Neighborhoods are increasingly homogeneous in terms of income, occupational status and education. This is especially problematic for the urban poor who today have fewer resources in their neighborhoods, from information to role models, which might have helped in finding a job or making any attempt at upper mobility.

Squatter settlements are therefore visible evidence of these changes. Their inhabitants are among those suffering and facing this shrinking structure of opportunities, as we will see below. Yet squatter settlements are also evidence of the run down but still generous and stretchable state described above. Although with great variation, the state was present in all of the 24 squatter settlements I visited in my fieldwork. While in some it was only there providing, imperfectly, basic services such as piped water and perhaps appearing once in a while to make a census of the population, in others it was there more fully, through its regularization program, investing government and Inter-American Development Bank money paving streets, providing urban services, giving land titles and promoting participation. In most settlements there was or had been some community organization. In all there was or had been at least a local leader or boss.
One of the main goals of these neighborhood associations or local leaders is to mediate with the state for services. Depending on how well organized they are, how connected they are, and of course also depending on the moment in which they make demands, some squatter settlements are able to stretch the limits of the state a little bit further. This stretching becomes literal, spatially speaking, since providing services to squatter settlements, mostly located in the periphery of the city, often implies extending services beyond the originally planned city limits.

Separation of public and private spheres, state and civil society, state and government, parties and state are not clear in Uruguay. More than sharp divisions, it is more faithful to reality to speak of gray shades or permeable tissues (Panizza and Piera 1988) to refer to the relationships between these categories. Practical implications of this are multiple. Among them is the fact that to access some goods or services, it has often been more effective to talk to a politician or a local broker than to stand on line in a public building. Many squatters, particularly those that are organized in neighborhood associations or have a local boss available have experienced this first hand. When I first started doing research in squatter settlements, back in my undergraduate years, I was naively struck by people calling politicians or high rank state officials by their first names or having their telephone numbers in their home directories. They knew from experience that some people can successfully mediate between them and the goods they want to obtain. They knew how to combine the use of these mediators with direct petitioning to the state. They did either or both of them to get what they desperately needed be it light, water or any other service. And they also knew and had experienced the inclusiveness of the Uruguayan state.

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8 A common neologism among Uruguayans scholars is to say that Uruguay is a case of partidocracia or political parties-rule to represent the historic centrality that parties have had both in the state and civil society (Caetano, Rilla, and Pérez 1987).
Squatters move in the interstices of these gray shades, the gray shades of welfare institutions that are neither completely inclusive nor completely exclusive and the gray shades of politics. Merklen (2003), a scholar of grassroots collective action who has studied land invasions mainly in Buenos Aires but also in Montevideo, captures this with a great metaphor. He says that squatters, rather than having the culture of the farmer, who can foresee the future and plan for it, have the culture of the hunter who seizes whatever opportunity he can find. This hunter culture, Merklen says, is part of the popular culture of individual and collective actors.

In sum, squatter settlements in Montevideo are embedded in a broader statist tradition that has characterized the relationship between the civil society and the state since the state’s creation (Filgueira 2000). This strong statist tradition is what has made the state the main target and reference of almost all collective actors (Castagnola 1989). This tradition continues, despite the fact that the state today is only a run-down shadow of what it used to be. There is less to give away and more people that need it.

2.1.2 Statism and Clientelism: continuities and changes

In addition to the entrenched statist tradition, Uruguay squatters are also embedded in another feature of the linkage between civil society and the state: the centrality of political parties and their factions as brokers or intermediaries. Yet there have been some changes in the last decades, basically due to changes in the state and in the political system. In this section I will briefly refer to these changes because I believe they might have had an impact on the number and manners in which people seize lands and squat them.

In their comparative study of Latin America Collier and Collier (1991) argue that the way in which the different countries incorporated the working class in political life constituted a
critical juncture that left short and long term legacies. In Uruguay and Colombia the main agent of that incorporation was a political party, rather than the state as in the other countries. In fact, as mentioned before, it was the *Colorado* party that was in charge of the task in Uruguay. Because of a tradition of pacts and co-participation in government between *colorados* and *blancos*, “progressively both parties ‘colonized’ the state apparatus and become crucial brokers between society and the political system” (Luna 2006).

The State was never a legal-rational abstraction ruled by an unbiased bureaucracy but an entity connected to political parties and their factions. This last item is very important to understand the Uruguayan political system: its high factionalization (Buquet 2001; González 1991; Piñeiro 2004). Each party has many factions each with their own leaders and strong identities. Voter’s are often more loyal to the factions than to the parties. All these factions compete for votes, have representation in some parts of the state and play the clientelistic game.

There were never neutral spaces, as Panizza (1990) notes. Neutrality in the Uruguayan state has meant participation of all parties and their factions. As Filgueira (2000: 95) puts it, “because the consolidation of the state’s social programs coincided with the firm establishment of the state’s authority, of the parties, and of the political system, there was an early appropriation of the state by the party apparatus. (…) Although the norms regulating the state’s social programs were general in content, their application became part of the clientelistic games played by parties, their factions and their leaders.”

Pensions and jobs were the most traditional commodities in the clientelistic exchange (Panizza 1990). Political clubs were the neighborhood or zonal units through which most of those goods were delivered. In his study of political clubs Rama (1971) finds that although their explicit function is to socialize citizens into party politics – something they did in the past - their
real function at the moment was to exchange votes for favors. Their clientele was formed by those without resources such as economic power, union representation, or instrumental personal relationships; that is, by those whose only goods to exchange were their promise of vote and political support. He finds that the period of economic recession after 1955 had several consequences for political clubs. The first reaction was an unprecedented multiplication in their number. While before there was one club per relevant political faction per electoral zone, in 1966 there were about 8,000 clubs for an electorate of 523,000 people in Montevideo (p. 13). The second consequence, closer in time to the dictatorship in 1973, was the disappearance of political clubs as part of the overall destruction of the political system.

At the moment Rama conducts fieldwork, 1969, he observed the proliferation phase. He noted a complete loss of the ideological basis of the traditional parties and their transformation into “political managers.” The last link in the chain of political managers was the political clubs’ runner or broker. These brokers spoke with nostalgia of the clubs of the past. They complained a great deal. Demands greatly overwhelmed what they could get for their constituency. They told stories of frustration and sacrifice.

The proliferation of clubs detected by Rama mirrors a rise in public spending at the time. Although public spending in Uruguay has always followed political cycles systematically growing on the eve of the electoral year (Moraes, Chasquetti, and Bergara 2005), 1962 stands out for its great rise in spending. The Blancos, who presided over the Colegiado government at the time, wanted to keep office (Luna 2006). In fact, “both major political parties reacted to the

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9 From 1952 until 1967, Uruguay had a colegiado government that is an executive of 9 members elected by the people (6 for the majority party and 3 for the one that follows in votes). This was an idea discussed and discarded by the political elite many times. In 1913, when José Batlle y Ordóñez came back from a trip to Switzerland enchanted by their collective executive, he started advocating for it. Yet, the idea of a colegiado did not prosper until an opportunistic time in which the Blancos, who have not been in the presidency since 1865 saw it as their chance to be on the executive and made a pact with the colorado president at the time, Andrés Martínez Trueba, who was also interested in the colegiado. See (Gros Espiell 1964)
crisis by reinforcing their reliance on clientelism and patronage as a way to contain discontent and maintain their electoral share. (…) In spite of that, the electorate started to seek alternatives, shifting their electoral support between and within parties” (Luna 2006: 151).

All the clubs Rama described belong to some faction of the Colorado or Blanco parties. Although there were various leftist parties or progressive factions within the traditional parties, they did not have clubs.¹⁰ As the author notes, “they have not able to penetrate into those social sectors that were more marginalized by production, consumption, politics and culture. Even today for the Frente Amplio which has a different situation [he writes in 1971, year of foundation of this newer coalition], they still have a communication problem with the sectors of the electoral forces that nurture political clubs” (Rama 1971: 35).

It took the Frente Amplio many years to win that electorate, but it eventually did. Only five years after the end of dictatorship, in 1989, it won the Montevideo city government and has been in power in the city since then. In 2004 it won the national elections, bringing Tabaré Vazquez – the former city mayor - to the presidency.¹¹ Many reasons underlie the success of Frente Amplio in breaking with a long history of bipartidism in Uruguay. One of them is their success in winning the increasing electoral competition for the urban poor, traditionally alienated from an organized working class and intellectuals’ left. In Montevideo, where half of the electorate lives, this implied winning geographical territories that were strongholds of the traditional parties, especially of the most populist factions of the Colorado party (Luna 2007; Mieres 1994). While the Frente Amplio was already strong in the West of the city by 1989, in general traditionally working class areas, it still had to win the most deprived eastern periphery.

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¹⁰ The Socialist Party of Uruguay, for example, founded in 1910, was quite old by the time Rama conducted fieldwork in the late sixties. In 1962 several leftist groups and some people and fractions that had broken up with the traditional parties formed the first leftist coalition, FIDEL (Frente Izquierda de Liberación).

¹¹ See Lanzaro (2004) for a collection of studies describing and explaining the growth of Frente Amplio.
In chapter six, through the story of one particular land invasion I unveil how this worked in practice both for politicians and for local leaders.

Thus, the 1990s witnessed an increase in electoral competition for the urban poor. This changed conditions for squatters. In the previous section I have pointed out other contextual features that changed the rules of the game for the urban poor, mainly state retrenchment and increasing vulnerability to employment problems especially for the less educated. There is still another important contextual feature to be mentioned because of its impact on how the state relates to citizens and how clientelism gets played: decentralization.

Like many states following the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, the Uruguayan state started a decentralization process, giving more power to municipal governments (Laurnaga 2001). Besides the general decentralization reform that Uruguay carried out, Montevideo’s municipal government implemented its own decentralization (Goldfrank 2002; Veneziano Esperón 2005). Starting in 1990, once in the city government, the Frente Amplio administration implemented a city decentralization process. According to the electoral platform that took the party into the city administration, decentralization was aimed at bringing the government closer to the citizens, especially the poorest citizens and making it more accountable and efficient. It consisted of dividing the city into 18 zones, each with its local government (dubbed Centros Comunales Zonales or Zonal Community Centers). The original project was resisted by the opposition and in the end the decentralization ended up being more administrative than political or financial. Still every Zonal Community Center has an executive board and a local council that make suggestions to the Mayor about big issues such as spending priorities in the area and some administrative decisions such as small resource allocations within the zone.
The impact of Montevideo’s decentralization on squatters has not yet been studied. Although not the main preoccupation of this dissertation, city decentralization was an important contextual feature of my research. Since my study period extends back to well before it was implemented (1947-2004), I was able to perceive some changes and I here hypothesize about them. I believe decentralization’s impact to be multiple. One consequence was that decentralization brought information closer to the citizens, including information about land ownership and available plots to squat (e.g., either public land or private land whose owners had not being paying taxes for a while). This, in turn, appears to have had different effects for squatters over time according to my oral histories and observations. At the beginning of the decentralization process, the diffusion of this information actually resulted in new invasions. As an example, one of the leaders I interviewed learned about an interesting vacant plot from one of the members of the local council, whom he knew through their common political faction. Yet with time local authorities started to protect that information and all neighbors became more responsible in caring for empty plots that could be use for some public building or space. The experience of government made local authorities learn that allowing or promoting a land invasion had lots of costs for the administration in bringing services to the area. During fieldwork I found an interesting case of a land invasion that was deterred immediately by neighbors and local authorities acting together with the central municipality to evict squatters because the plot they were invading was to be used for the community to build a square.

In addition, decentralization brought municipal services closer to the people. For many of my interviewees, the local community center was their main reference; it is where they go when they have a problem either personal or of their neighborhood. The zonal community centers were increasingly mentioned by newer land invasions as the institution that helped them the most.
Social workers in those community centers complained to me about the overwhelming demands they receive from the population, in particular from squatters.

Decentralization also brought politics closer to the people. For many, participation in the local council (a legislative branch of the local government, with no executive power but with voice in what needs to be done in the area) was their first time in politics. Many squatter settlements have representatives in the local council, especially if they are settled in municipal (or other publicly owned) land. This has on the one hand revived a structure of pre-existing local bosses and on the other hand it has created new ones. This process and its impact have only recently started to be studied (Luna 2006). Decentralization has revived old forms of neighborhood political participation that were dying with the crisis of political clubs and the decay of neighborhood associations once popular in Montevideo (Gonzalez 1989).

In relation to this, zonal community centers encourage collective rather than individual demands by generally dealing with people as representatives rather than individuals and prioritizing those demands that come from a group. Social workers and other professionals working there extensively promote community participation. This has encouraged organization among squatters, generally at the settlement level but in some cases there has been coordination among various squatter settlements of the area.12

As Filgueira, Garcé, Ramos and Yaffé (2003) suggest and Luna (2006) empirically documents, state retrenchment and decentralization have had an impact on clientelism in at least three ways: a) diminishing its role (recession of clientelism due to both a push toward political accountability and to state reform and fiscal crisis); b) moving it from the national to the

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12 For example: *Comisión de Tierras* in the CCZ 17, *Coordinadora de Asentamientos* in the CCZ 9, *Coordinadora de Asentamientos* CCZ 12. I interviewed members of these three umbrella organizations of squatters. None of them was actively meeting at the moment of my fieldwork. All interviewees explained how hard it is to coordinate actions. In general coordinating efforts have been organized from above, from the municipal government.
municipal level; and c) changing strategies and the nature of goods exchanged (e.g., while more durable goods such as pensions or employment were exchanged through clientelistic networks in the past, today more fleeting goods such as social services or information are exchanged).

Despite this recession of clientelism, squatters’ leaders are among those who still use it, because of their great dependence on state resources. They use it as one of the strategies available to get services and other goods for their neighborhoods. In chapter six I develop one particularly successful way to use clientelistic networks among squatters’ leaders: *market clientelism*. It consists of either strategically switching from one party or faction to the other or pretending to be apolitical to get as many things as they can from different patrons. But squatters also use other strategies, such as making demands directly on the state through written petitions or exercising pressure by going en masse and camping outside the office of some authority until they get a concrete commitment to install water or light. Very rarely do they blockade streets to get what they need, but some squatters have done so.

### 2.1.3 Changing the repertoire

Going back to Benton’s (1986) surprise about the Uruguayan poor not mass squatting as in other Latin American cities, I believe land squatting was just not part of the world of the possible for the working poor. By the time Benton writes, squatting was still associated with the poorest of the poor, with slums, with scavenging, with marginality. The framing of land squatting as a right and as a feasible option for the working class who could not afford the formal city appeared somewhere in the late 1980s or 1990s.

Land invasions were an innovation in the repertoire of urban poor dwellers. They became part of the set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate
process of choice (Tilly 1993). They entered the repertoire without a significant rupture with the historical paternalistic relation between the state and civil society in Uruguay. Innovation is frequent in contentious repertoires, but usually within the established forms. In general, there are no complete breaks with the old ways (Markoff 1996; Tilly 1993). In this sense, even though through squatting part of the urban poor became very active in the production of their housing, neighborhoods and living conditions, doing things that had previously been done by either the state or the market, they still relied a great deal on the state. In fact, it is this very interaction between squatters and the state that constitutes the peculiar form of land squatting that we see in Montevideo (especially more recently) and in other cities of Latin America. In other regions of the world, such as the Middle Eastern cities, squatters tend to solve their collective and individual problems outside the state, resourcing to social and religious networks, in what Bayat (1997) calls the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” (See also AlSayaad 1993).

2.1.4 The politics of squatting

Two recent studies throw light on the politics of squatting in Uruguay. While in previous work I (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 [2000]; Álvarez-Rivadulla 2003) focus on the relationship of squatters with the elastic Uruguayan state institutions, a group of researchers at IPES in the Catholic University of Uruguay were pioneers in exploring the relationship of squatters with political parties and with other social movements (Kaztman, Ávila, Baráibar, and Errandonea 2003). These earlier studies illustrate how aspects of the political opportunity structure influence how squatters react to their situations. They are not precise in their definition of political opportunities. They conceive it as “everything happening in the political system” which is
something that more recent studies of collective action have criticized, as developed in chapter five. Yet they do point at a political dimension in squatting that for many remains hidden.

In my fieldwork in addition to squatters I also interviewed politicians and state workers. It was not uncommon to find among the latter people who got really upset with my insinuation or questioning about the role of politics in squatting. For some experts or politicians, especially from the left, squatting comes only because people need a place to live, and because they are poor. As one specialist in urbanism with a long tradition of leftist militancy that I interviewed and with whom I kept up a lively debate over email told me, “I am not a fan of your hypothesis that land seizures are caused by more favorable political conditions. My own hypothesis is less of a novelty and much more economistic. I believe that invasions occurred basically because of need and that they coincide with moments of economic depression and little official response in terms of housing.” Every once and then he writes asking if I have already falsified my hypothesis.

From his perspective, and from the perspective of many people, land squatting is just a matter of need. Given the poor conditions in which many squatters live, this makes sense. Besides, politically, it is wiser to see them as victims rather than as any sort of strategic beings. The general public and the state might be convinced to redirect resources toward the former but definitely not towards the latter. Yet this perspective also takes agency entirely away from squatters. The idea throughout this dissertation is NOT that economic conditions do not matter. But I do argue that they have interacted with political conditions to make land invasions more likely to happen at certain, favorable, moments and less likely at certain other moments, and to make land invasions happen in specific different ways at particular moments in time.
2.2 FROM MARGINALITY TO THE POOR WORKING CLASS: A CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHICS AND IDENTITY

2.2.1 The name

The first land invasions appeared in Montevideo somewhere in the 1940s. The earliest one I could track was founded in 1947, and like most of the early invasions, located in a deprived area of the northeast of the city with vacant non urbanized land. There were some invasions in the more industrial working class northwest part of the city as well. These early invasions were dubbed *cantegriles*, as an irony. In *Punta del Este*, the wealthiest seaside resort of the Uruguayan Atlantic coast and a point of reference for the regional elite and jet set, there is a very exclusive club named *Cantegril Country Club*, built in 1947. It is unknown who started using that name, but some see it as a sign of popular resistance and imagination (Bon Espasandín 1963).

*Cantegriles* were associated with rural-urban migration and with extreme poverty. They were formed by slow accretion, with one family or small groups arriving at a time. Without a sewage system, drinking water or any other service, houses were built by residents with scrap plywood, corrugated metal, sheets of plastic, cardboard, and other found materials. Their urban landscape looked very crowded, with no streets or public places. Often, you could see and smell piles of garbage and horses and horse-carts because some of the inhabitants worked by scavenging in the city and later classifying and selling cardboard and other recyclable materials.

In 1958, a Uruguayan filmmaker, Alberto Miller, made a documentary titled *Cantegriles*. It is the earliest of all sources I found on the topic. This documentary, shot in the *cantegriles* of *Aparicio Saravia* in the Northeast of Montevideo, showed for the first time the reality of the people living there. Shot in black and white, it attempted to let reality speak for itself, as the
director said more than three decades later in an interview for *TV Ciudad.* It shows very precarious houses, lots of children playing with dogs or having a bath in what looks like a very dirty little lake, people working on sorting garbage, more children, some men chatting, people cooking with fire outside their house, and many other details of the everyday life of the *cantegriles.*

Most of Miller’s *cantegriles* are still in the city. And there are new ones similar to those as well, as I will develop in chapter four. Yet as a general pattern, the newer land invasions after the mid 1980s tend to be more urbanistically planned, with streets, blocks, sidewalks, and sometimes public spaces such as a community center or a square. Residents still self build their houses, but they use more solid materials such as bricks or some sort of cement. Some of these neighborhoods are, to an outsider, indistinguishable from a poor but formal neighborhood. The only difference is land ownership. What defines a squatter settlement is that residents may own the house but they do not own the plot on which their house is located.

Slowly the world *cantegril* has become more and more specific. From a synonym of squatter settlement, currently it refers only to those that look like shantytowns. The new word is *asentamiento irregular* (literally irregular settlement). State authorities and the bureau of statistics use *asentamiento irregular* or just *asentamiento* to refer to groups of houses on an illegally occupied land. Most people do as well. But still the word *cantegril* is used informally to refer to the poorest *asentamientos*. The word is rarely used with a positive connotation. One of my interviewees, a leader from a very organized land invasion, proudly told me that “some think this is a *cante* [short for *cantegril*] and this is not a *cante*. Here, nobody collects garbage. Everybody has his *ranchito* [little hut] but tries to have everything neat. You see the houses.

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13 Interview of Alberto Miller with *TV Ciudad*, 1991. Thanks to the staff of *TV Ciudad’s* archive for facilitating my access to this and other digital material.
They are all built with cement.” Like many, this squatter settlement resident identifies cantegriles with marginality, asentamientos with a downward mobile honest and hardworking working class. Curiously, when I asked María, a resident from a typical cantegril, about the difference between a cantegril and an asentamiento she told me “none, they are the same” and she kept using the terms interchangeably during the interview and while touring me around her neighborhood.

Asentamiento is somehow a more neutral word, although that seems to be changing. According to a recent study the group subject to most discrimination in Montevideo and its metropolitan area is that of people living in squatter settlements. For the general public living in an asentamiento is becoming increasingly associated with crime, danger and marginality. About 37% of the population said they would not want someone who lives in a squatter settlement as a neighbor and 1 out of 4 respondents said they would not like to have an informal settler as a family member (IMM 2007). 14

As with cantegril, it is difficult to trace the origin of the word asentamiento and the expression asentamiento irregular (irregular settlement). It probably came from international funding agencies, which use the term settlement a lot. But a former president of the city council, a man of the extreme left who, besides living in a squatter settlement himself, was very involved with many land invasions happening in 1990s, had a different story. He told me:

[it’s interesting] how the term asentamiento took off. I remember when I took my seat in the City Council in 1995, there was a land invasion that January. The mass media started an ideological battle… press terrorism was trying to prevent land invasions from happening (…). And then we [he

14 Other categories of undesirable neighbors were former convicts (33%), politicians (18%), military officers (15%), gay people (14%) and people with AIDS (13%). The percentage of people who said they would not like squatters as neighbors increased with the socioeconomic level of the interviewee’s neighborhood, reaching 49% among those who live in affluent urban areas.
refers to his political sector within the leftist coalition] met and we finally invented the term *asentamientos irregulares*. We started using it in the press and people started using it too. The term has a nuance that takes some pressure out of it. Before, people talked of invasions, land seizures. And we started to use *asentamientos irregulares*.

Regardless of who coined the term, it is important to know that the expression *asentamiento irregular* or irregular settlement seems to be a politically less charged expression, than land invasions or land seizures. In this work, precisely because I am trying to recover the agency and the politics of squatting, I use these terms interchangeably.

Finally, the change in name and identity implies also an increasing recognition by the state. *Asentamientos* are now part of the “deserving poor,” that is, those that need to be helped by state policies such as titling regularization and neighborhood upgrading as developed by the Program for the Integration of Squatter Settlements (PIAI). State policies towards squatters of the past, when there were any, had been mostly aimed at eradication by building substandard public housing for squatter dwellers. Other social actors have also recognized *asentamientos* in a way they had not recognized *cantegriles*. FUCVAM, the social movement for cooperative housing, a traditional working class movement associated with unionized workers and with the left, has started to pay attention to the reality of squatters. As one of the leaders of the movement reflected, “The left never really understood the phenomenon of squatters. The orthodox used to say ‘these are lumpens, classless, blablabla’.” Yet, more recently the movement has developed strategies to be able to work with squatter populations who do not necessarily have the fixed income to pay the small but regular fees, do not have the time to wait the usually long time it takes to get the plot, the loan, and the building process, and do not initially have the collective spirit to build by self help and organize community projects. An example of the effort to
overcome these obstacles is the movement’s work with a group of eleven evicted families from a city center rooming house. They invaded the sidewalk until the municipality gave them a plot and they started to work with FUCVAM to build what is now a finished housing cooperative (Fossati and González 1996; Nahoum 1999).^{15}

This increasing recognition by the state and other social movements as well as by political parties as mentioned in previous sections can be read as a process of “certification.” According to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) certification is one of the recurrent processes or mechanisms present in diverse forms of collective action. It occurs when collective actors get validation of their performances and their claims by external authorities.

2.2.2 Demographics through historical and more recent studies of squatters

The study of squatter settlements in Uruguay has proliferated in the last years, with the increasing attention of the government to this social problem. The National Institute of Statistics (INE) included in its 2006 national household survey for the first time a dichotomous variable that tells you if the surveyed household is located in a squatter settlement or not. The PIAI, government program for titling regularization and upgrading, financed by the Uruguayan government and primarily with funds from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), has encouraged the proliferation of “neighborhood diagnostics” (PIAI 2008). Different groups of professionals, NGOs or associations of construction companies with NGOs compete for PIAI’s funds to upgrade settlements. To win and later to work in the field architects, social workers,

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^{15} For more about FUCVAM see Midaglia (1992)
sociologists, engineers, educators and so on produce lots of information about particular neighborhoods. I have used some of them to compare with information from my interviews or for specific information I needed.\textsuperscript{16} The Montevideo Municipal Government, universities,\textsuperscript{17} and other bodies have also contributed more diagnostics, and some more general works.

The most referenced historical work is a survey conducted in 1984 by two entities, INTEC, an NGO that has been working with regularization projects for a long time, and CIESU, a research center with an interest in urban studies (Cecilio 1997; Mazzei and Veiga 1985). INTEC later followed up alone on that study (Cecilio 1997). But I found two very interesting much earlier works that are rarely cited. These two works mimic the broader Latin American discussion about squatter settlements, characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s that I referred to in the introduction. Bon Espasandín (1963) sees cantegriles primarily from the rural-urban migration angle. His work sides with the marginality theory perspective – he quotes some of its representatives such as Gino Germani - and he is very much worried by the problems residents have in getting used to urban values. In his own words:

The man that lives in cantegriles, besides being economically poor (...) is rootless. (…). This transplanted man, without roots in the urban environment, prefers working in independent occupations because he has learned to work on his own, depending not on a patron but on his own will or nature (p. 66).

\textsuperscript{16} As an example, I have used the neighborhood diagnostics of IPRU, an NGO that has worked in regularization programs for years. In their very thorough case studies, they collect information on the history of the neighborhood, as well as demographics and other data.

\textsuperscript{17} Some undergraduate students of Urban Sociology from the School of Architecture of the Universidad de la República had conducted exploratory work in different squatter settlements of the city, visiting them and randomly interviewing one or two residents. I found some of their papers through professors I contacted and also through social workers at the Zonal Community Centers who had copies. Although they were generally very initial approaches, sometimes naïve, to these settlements they had some information I could use to compare with mine. Some were very interesting and all offered an interesting window on the way students of architecture, not usually exposed to the reality of poverty and popular housing in their courses, see the reality of land invasions.
Nonetheless Bon Espasandín sees the concentration of rural land as the main cause of migrants coming to the city, some of whom become squatters. In that sense, his perspective is structural. For him, the solution is trying to keep these migrants in their places of origin through various population policies. Baudrón (Baudrón 1979), in turn, takes a perspective more typical of Marxist of the time, more structuralist, more dependency-theory-oriented, and therefore sees squatter settlements as characteristic of a capitalist development model that does not create stable employment for all. Replicating Perlman’s (1976) study in the favelas of Rio, Baudrón also rejects the view that squatters have different values or aspirations than mainstream society. Criticizing marginality theory, Baudrón argues that squatters’ problems are not in their heads but in the structural conditions they have to face such as a rising cost of living, especially regarding housing.

Table 1 summarizes and compares the findings of these two studies and more recent ones. It also offers, in the last two shaded columns an update of the information I built based on the 2006 National Household Survey (INE 2006). In the right most column, I present, for comparison, data on formal neighborhoods. Given the inexistence of comparable micro-data on squatters from their emergence until today, this is the best approximation we can have to changes in their size and demographics.
Table 1: Studies on squatter settlements, Montevideo 1963-2006, and comparison of squatter settlements versus formal neighborhoods, Montevideo 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bon Espasandin</th>
<th>Baudrón</th>
<th>Mazzei &amp; Veiga/INTEC</th>
<th>INTEC</th>
<th>Update by Alvarez-Rivadulla</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of the Study</strong></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>circa 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Survey 40 families</td>
<td>Survey 85 families 6 neighborhoods</td>
<td>Survey 524 households</td>
<td>Replication of the 1984 survey study (unknown N) Aerial pictures and city explorations for the catalog of settlements</td>
<td>National household survey 2006 (see notes for exceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Object</strong></td>
<td>&quot;cantegriles&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;barrios marginales&quot; (cantegriles as one subtype of them)</td>
<td>&quot;cantegriles&quot; &quot;asentamientos precarios&quot; and &quot;extreme poverty&quot; as a synonyms</td>
<td>&quot;cantegriles&quot; and &quot;asentamientos precarios&quot; sometimes as synonyms and sometimes to distinguish two different types</td>
<td>Squatter Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimate of the Universe</strong></td>
<td>7000 people</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2541 houses, 15000 people</td>
<td>7013 houses</td>
<td>144707 people (11% of city population) 39116 houses*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin (household head born outside Montevideo)</strong></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16% **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous housing</strong></td>
<td>Other squatter settlement</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inner city slum</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House or apartment</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age: Residents 10 years old or younger</strong></td>
<td>27.37% young population</td>
<td>35% (16% the entire city)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex: percentage women</strong></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mottives</strong></td>
<td>Couldn't afford rent/eviction</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To improve</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>45% ***</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty: % families with an income less than 1 minimum salary</td>
<td>Bon Espasandin</td>
<td>Baudrón</td>
<td>Mazzei &amp; Veiga/INTEC</td>
<td>INTEC</td>
<td>Update by Alvarez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatter families have $9 a day on average ****</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17% 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Work on their own</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35% (hh)</td>
<td>56% (hh)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Education</th>
<th>Without formal instruction</th>
<th>Incomplete elementary education</th>
<th>Finished elementary education</th>
<th>Started secondary education</th>
<th>Started tertiary education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15% (pop&gt;6)</td>
<td>38% (pop&gt;11)</td>
<td>14% (pop&gt;11)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2% (hh)</td>
<td>1% (hh)</td>
<td>24% (hh)</td>
<td>36% (hh)</td>
<td>2% (hh)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household size</th>
<th>4.5 mean</th>
<th>5.4 mean</th>
<th>51% 5 or more</th>
<th>4.0 mean</th>
<th>2.9 mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Over-crowding</th>
<th>3.3 people/bedroom</th>
<th>40% of houses have over crowding problems</th>
<th>2.4 people/bedroom</th>
<th>1.6 people/bedroom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children per family average</th>
<th>1.4</th>
<th>0.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Houses’ walls built with solid materials (bricks or similar)</th>
<th>7.5% (67% are shacks)</th>
<th>36%</th>
<th>63%</th>
<th>89%</th>
<th>98%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<p>| % of households with piped water inside the house | Almost none | 38% | 84% | 97% |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main use of buildings</th>
<th>Bon Espasandín</th>
<th>Baudrón</th>
<th>Mazzei &amp; Veiga/INTEC</th>
<th>INTEC</th>
<th>Update by Alvarez</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercia/other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households connected to the city sewage system</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Uruguay’s Institute of Statistics’ population count, 2004 (1st phase of the 2010 census)
** Census of selected settlements by PIAI (government’s regularization program), 2001-2002
*** To be able to compare, I have grouped the categories offered by the question mv11 of the the 2006 Househould Survey as follows: 1-“eviction” and 2-“economic reasons” as “couldn’t afford rent/eviction” and 3-“house in bad shape”, 4-“get my own house” and 5- “problems of space” as “to improve”
**** Minimum cost of a basic food basket for a poor family was 20 $/day at the time.

The studies summarized in table 1 are not strictly comparable, yet they do show general patterns and trends. Forgetting for a moment the last column, we can see some big changes in the 43 years from 1963 to 2006. The first one is the growth. From a numerically insignificant phenomenon, land squatting has grown today into the form of housing of 11% of the city population. In addition, the profile of squatters changed. Today, they tend to be more educated, work as employees rather than on their own, and they tend to come from other neighborhoods in Montevideo, rather than from the interior of the country. The appearance of the neighborhoods

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18 It is important to note here that squatters were never completely migrants in Montevideo, and they were very rarely the typical rural migrant arriving in the city and not finding a place there, or not having “urban values.” Bon Espasandín (1963) already found the majority of the population of his cantegriles was from the city. When he only
also changed. Houses look more like poor working class houses than shacks. The main construction materials are not plastic, corrugated metal and other found materials but more solid ones. In addition, today more houses have basic services such as running water or electricity although still more often than not the electricity is stolen.

Some of these general trends show improvement in the living conditions, on average, for squatters. For some poor urban dwellers, going to live in a squatter settlement may imply improving their living conditions. That is why when offered the option “to improve” when asked why they moved to a squatter settlement, a considerable percentage of respondents chose it. Even without property rights or complete certainty that they will not be evicted, evictions have been very rare and non-existent after the settlement is consolidated. Thus, for a person that rents a tiny apartment or a very run down house at a high price, or a young couple living with relatives, to mention just some examples, going to live in a squatter settlement might be a good option.

Yet we should not forget that there are many more squatters than there were in the past, and that if we compare squatter settlements with formal city neighborhoods, as we can do looking at the two last shaded columns of Table 1, we clearly see that squatters are an underprivileged group. They are poorer and less educated. They live in larger households, with fewer rooms per person and with more children. And they have fewer basic services. Although most households have potable water inside their houses and pay for that service, half of the households steal electricity from the street with very unsafe connections, and only a minority is connected to the city sewage system.

looked at head of households, he did find the pattern of migration. Nonetheless, those migrants were not mainly coming from rural areas but from cities or towns other than Montevideo (Baudrón 1979).
2.3 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have tried to summarize the relevant features of the Uruguayan context in relation to urban poverty and land squatting in particular. I have emphasized the historical trends and facts that might have started path dependency trajectories, and at the same time I have tried to account for the changes. As exhaustive as I have tried to be, this case presentation is in many ways incomplete. Yet in building it and in including the relevant references for each of the multiple intertwined topics, I have aimed at giving the reader enough elements to understand the main questions of this dissertation as well as to be able to agree or disagree with, or at least be suspicious about, the answers I have found.

The history of land squatters in Montevideo is a window for observing larger transformations in Uruguayan politics, economy and society during the twentieth century. The rarity of squatters during the first part of the century responds to a society with a very early high level of urbanization and to a state and a market with great capacity to incorporate the lower classes as workers and citizens. The explosive growth of squatters in the last decades responds to the erosion of that capacity of integration of both the market and the state.

Beyond the size variation, the changing demographics of squatters show that today in Montevideo it does not take scavenging or unemployment to squat. Quite the contrary, squatters are today more educated and with better jobs than in the past. They are in fact, part of the working class of the past who due to structural mobility got more education than previous generations. But unfortunately that does not guarantee them the satisfaction of their basic needs. They are, in comparison to the rest of the city, a very underprivileged group. They have been “seduced and abandoned” by a model of inclusion that does not seem to work anymore. In that
adjustment, “squatting” changed its past connotation as synonym of “marginal” and became increasingly appealing as a decent housing strategy for the lower classes.

Finally, as I argue throughout this dissertation, mediating between the structural changes and the decision to invade a plot, there are people deciding, strategizing, and sometimes using political networks. These networks facilitate access to the state from which squatters need a lot and whom many squatters feel should do something for them, because they have rights. These perceptions about the state are not new but come from a tradition of state proximity, benevolence and, very important, permeability through personal political contacts.
3.0 HOW TO STUDY ELUSIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION? A CALL FOR MIXED METHODS

Social movements and contentious politics more generally are difficult sociological objects. They have, despite this or because of it, provoked sociological imaginations to think creatively about how to grasp these amorphous, mobile, unstable, and difficult-to-limit type of social phenomena. Studying social movements as processes rather than snapshots brings in an additional difficulty. Scholars have developed several ways of collecting and analyzing historical data, newspaper data being one of the most common. There are examples of collective action, however, that do not make it to the press or to any other record at least in a systematic way. These elusive forms of collective action require additional efforts from researchers who want to give accurate accounts of their development over time.

When I embarked myself on the study of the cycle of land seizures in Montevideo, capital city of Uruguay, I knew I had a lot of work ahead. Studying the history of the informal city by definition posed two problems to the sociological imagination. First, it implied entering into the realm of historical research since I wanted to study things that had already happened. And second, I would probably not have readily available information, at least in official sources.
Broadly speaking I wanted to understand when and the conditions under which squatter settlements were more likely to emerge.\(^{19}\) For that, I needed to follow the development of land invasions throughout time and space. I needed a time series that did not exist and maps. But from a more micro perspective, I also wanted to understand how squatters had interacted with these conditions to produce (different types of) squatter settlements.\(^{20}\) For that, I needed to get at actors’ perspectives. My suspicion was that, despite common sense beliefs that poverty had been the only driving force, politics had something to do with it. I therefore wanted to understand the relationship between politics and squatters. Following a relational approach, I needed to get at the politicians’ side and the squatters’ side, although I later understood that more than two sides, there was often a grey zone (Auyero 2007).

In this chapter I want to describe the methodological effort of studying the dynamics of an elusive form of contentious politics, using several methods and approaches.

### 3.1 WHY A MIXED METHODS APPROACH?

Although I had a priori theoretical and practical reasons for engaging in a project that required crossing methodological boundaries, I found one answer to the question of why I am using a

\(^{19}\) Following Tarrow (1989) I believe that “What needs to be explained is not why people periodically petition, strike, demonstrate, riot, loot and burn, but rather why so many of them do so at particular times in their history, and if there is a logical sequence to their action.”

\(^{20}\) Following Katz (2001; 2002), I believe that “when refined sufficiently, descriptions of how people act merge seamlessly into explanations of their behavior,” and that therefore ethnography should not abandon the search for causality, “if not for other reason, (…) [because] it is a useful narrative device.” In a similar vein, in a sort of advocacy preface for the role of political ethnography, Tilly (2006) wrote: “If you believe (as I do) that how things happen is why then happen, then ethnography has great advantages over most other conventional social scientific methods as a way of getting at cause-effect relations.”
mixed methods approach, in the data. After reconstructing the cycle of events of land squatting as I will explain below, I compared the time series I ended up with, with one from the Ministry of Housing I suspected would have some biases. I found a discrepancy around 1994-1995. While the Ministry of Housing’s series gives the idea that most settlements were already there by 1994, the one I ended up with shows a bunch of them occurring in 1995 and 1996. This turned out to be more than simply a mistake in the initial series. It was because I was using several methodological strategies that I was able to discover the “missing link.”

After interviewing two early residents from the squatter settlement *The Queen*, I had two different dates of settlement. One informant had said squatting started in 1995 and another, in 1996. After neighborhood observations and interviews I always wrote up fieldnotes. I also looked up information about the neighborhood among my materials, considered what other informants had said about the neighborhood and browsed the internet too (usually a not very useful tool for this invisible form of mobilization but useful in this particular case). When I came back from these interviews, I wanted to resolve the contradiction. Curiously, other sources were contradictory as well. A file I had found in the local government said 1995 and so did an article on the history of the neighborhood I found on the internet, but a neighborhood report by students of Architecture from the Universidad de la República said 1996. Moreover, two days before, I had interviewed early residents from a nearby squatter settlement. They had told me that *The Queen* had emerged in 1996, just a few months after theirs, with people that were not allowed to stay in their neighborhood by the local government.

Rather than just applying the majority rule – useless in this case because there was a tie - or the quality rule and decide in favor of 1996 given that the interviewee who said so had actually been more precise in the rest of the information she gave me about the initial days, I
decided to pursue the contradiction a bit further. To solve the mystery I called the resident that had answered 1995 back and told him about the contradictory information. He then confessed that they actually had started in 1996, but that they always say they started in 1995 because only those settlements that started before 1996 can enter into the state regularization program. As the comparison of series in figure 2 will later show this might have been a strategy taken also by other settlements. Since the source of the initial series were exactly those state agencies responsible for deciding which neighborhoods are to benefit from the policy, the series might be biased towards locating settlements that started around 1996, before their actual date. If one year changes the odds of receiving state aid, it is reasonable that that data series is inflated before the policy threshold.

Thus using multiple sources added quantity and quality of data. This was crucial for my object, which I have dubbed an elusive form of collective action because it does not leave many traces in archives. Just like historians of the private life or those that study under-represented subjects in national archives such as children, women, the poor and so forth, using a multiplicity of sources was important to get more data (Markoff 2001). Sociologists tend to use triangulation as a technical word to refer to the use of multiple sources and types of data – and I use it here - but it is important to remember that historians have been doing this for the longest time. So rather than reinventing the wheel, we should look more at how they do it and learn from the ways in which they make inferences from these multiple sources.

Using multiple sources, as the story shows, not only solved contradictions among data but also showed that those contradictions were sometimes informative. As Alessandro Portelli and other oral historians have taught us, the discrepancy between memory and facts often adds
value to oral sources rather than takes it away, as long as we combine them with other sources and analyze those discrepancies (Levine and Sebe Bom Meihy 2001; Portelli 1991).

Finally, using a variety of sources and analyzing them using a variety of analytical strategies is, beyond practical needs, part of my broader conception of social sciences. The so institutionalized difference between quantitative and qualitative methods hides more than it shows. Many have advocated for this multimethod perspective both in general (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Collier and Brady 2004; Tilly 2004) and within the social movements-contentious politics field in particular (Klandermans, Staggenborgh, and Tarrow 2002). According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2008) “triangulating methods on a single research site or episode of contention can produce more robust results than even the most intense exploitation of any single method” (p. 324). For them, triangulation is also a good way to measure mechanisms triggering collective action, that is, small events or processes that link effects to causes.

Yet real multi-method work continues being exceptional. The work of Doug McAdam in his now classic *Freedom Summer* (1988) is perhaps one of the best achieved exceptions of combining methodological strategies such as surveys, archival materials and in-depth interviews, within the contentious politics field. Curiously, McAdam’s is also a retrospective study of mobilization. His success in understanding why young, white, privileged Americans participated in Freedom Summer – a campaign to register African American voters in Mississippi - and how that participation changed their lives, using a multiplicity of sources and methodological strategies, was inspirational. Auyero’s (2007) multimethod study of the 2001 Argentine wave of lootings was also illuminating. His combination of ethnographic data with an event catalog of the lootings helped in the understanding of why and how looters chose their targets and got to participate in the events.
3.2 WHAT DID I DO?

Although I had conducted previous ethnographic work in three Montevideo squatter settlements in 1998 have been following these sites since then with several visits, I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork for my dissertation during a year that extended from mid 2006 to mid 2007.

During those months, I conducted 80 interviews with squatters, politicians, government authorities, bureaucrats and other key informants. I visited 25 different neighborhoods filling observation templates, writing notes from informal conversations as well as impressions about those visits and questions for further exploration. I also collected all the documentary materials I found. I organized data collection based on two goals: I conducted mini-ethnographies of a variety of squatter settlements and I built an event catalog of squatting events.

These two ways of organizing the research design are not very often used together. Each of them easily lends itself to the study of interactive accounts of struggle (Tilly 2008). Their combination enhances this capacity. Event catalogs, when analyzed as time series in combination with contextual knowledge either in the form of qualitative historical information or, with more exactitude, in the form of explanatory and control variables, provide useful knowledge about the interaction of contention and other contextual processes. Ethnographic studies of contention, in turn, enable a closer look to the interplay among actors.

3.2.1 Mini-ethnographies

In order to understand how squatting has happened I selected a group of neighborhoods and tried to reconstruct their history. The basis for selection was the official list and map of squatter settlements that the agency in charge of squatter settlements in Uruguay and the Bureau of
Statistics had just finished building when I started fieldwork (INE-PIAI 2006). However, I also included two cases that were not in that list. One was not listed because it had already been regularized and therefore it was not legally a squatter settlement anymore but a formal neighborhood in which dwellers were owners of their land. The case was however interesting to me, because of the moment in which the land invasion occurred and the squatters’ success in getting the state to pay attention to them by providing urban services and ultimately land titles. The other was not in the official list because it was a failed invasion, deterred by neighbors and local authorities the day it happened. It was interesting precisely for being a non-event.

The criterion for selecting neighborhoods was guided by my original questions about the cycle of land invasions and the influence of politics. I wanted settlements that originated at different points in time in order to cover different political periods. I therefore sampled settlements formed before the dictatorship, during the dictatorship, during the transition to democracy, and during each electoral period thereafter. I ended up visiting 25 different squatter settlements, trying to also get variation by type of settlement to represent both the more and the less planned land seizures and variation in the geographical location in the city.

Although I collected other types of information, the focus of my fieldwork was on the earliest days of settlements, how the early comers got to that piece of land, how they started building, how they solved everyday needs and got (or failed to get) public services such as water and light, how they solved collective action problems (if they did), who helped them, and if they faced any eviction attempt. To get at that information I conducted 41 oral histories from early residents. For that purpose I used a questionnaire template (see appendix A), which I used very flexibly but always making sure I got detailed information about initial times. While interested in the role of politics, I never asked directly about it and only pursued the issue after a name or
event appeared in the interviewee’s narrative. Yet to avoid vagueness, after trying out the interview a few times, I included one question that turned out to be crucial. I asked: *If you had to choose the three people or institutions that were most helpful to this neighborhood, who would you mention?* This question often gave me relevant tips and names that I could later pursue, and pushed some interviewees that had only said the common phrases “we are apolitical here” or “we did everything ourselves” to think and tell me about political and institutional helpers.

Finally, I interviewed leaders and non leaders to crosscheck information. \(^{21}\) Besides helping to fill gaps in the information, non leaders gave me less grandiose and less articulate stories than leaders. They also sometimes helped me understand the final link in the political network chain, as it becomes explicit in the analysis of a clientelistic network in chapter 6. Below, the shaded box includes a characterization of respondents. When leaders and non leaders from the same settlement or some other informant gave me information contradicting what another one had said, I often tried to explore those contradictions further. Sometimes, it was a matter of one remembering incorrectly. But in some other cases, there were just different perceptions of the same reality, based on the differential positions of the interviewee. In those cases there was nothing to solve or clarify but just two equally interesting though different perceptions of the same reality based on experiences. The most common example was the story of a leader who tells his story of sacrifice for his neighborhood without much recognition, and a non leader that sees him as a corrupt person that only participates to fulfill personal interests.

One important bias in this study is the absence of those who arrived later to the settlement. Given that the goal was not to reconstruct the variation in memories within each

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\(^{21}\) The idea of interviewing both leaders and non leaders comes from Collier’s (1976) historical study of squatter mobilization in Peru. He interviewed initial leaders and non-leaders as a crosscheck and I did the same.
settlement according to respondents’ position and especially according to arrival time, I did not include newcomers as informants. This could be something interesting to do in the future.

The rationale for choosing oral histories as a technique was based on Blee and Taylor’s (2002) recommendations: “oral history interviews aim to elicit a robust or ‘thick’ description of a historical period or situation from the perspective of those who lived through that time.” Oral histories are particularly valuable research tools for studying social movements that, like squatting, do not leave great documentary evidence. They are also valuable for unveiling aspects of movements that tend to be underestimated in written accounts, such as the role of women (Blee and Taylor 2002). In addition, they offer the possibility of studying the memory of protest, which I would like to do as a future project. However, retrospective oral accounts, just like all sources, can be misleading if not used with caution. For example, they tend to under-represent conflict, relations of domination, and differences between earlier and later beliefs, processes, and goals (Blee and Currier 2005). Considering these possible biases, I conducted oral histories with differently situated persons and, as already expressed, I combined them with other sources.

As often in ethnographic fieldwork, whenever one of the residents mentioned an external actor in the interview I tried to find information about him or her and often also interview that person. Some people appeared in more than one interview and, as mentioned below, that was often an indicator of an important node. Thus, I talked to former and current local authorities and city councilors, lawyers, social workers and other professionals, the ex-major of Montevideo and current Minister of Housing and his advisors, and so on, totaling 44 formal interviews.

From the three types of invasions I worked with, accretion, planned and land subdivisions and sales, the last one was the most difficult to track. I did include three invasions that started in this way, but I could not always talk to all the actors like I tried in the other ones. In one case, for
example, the settlement started as a fraudulent sale and settlers could never really know where their money went. I could not find those fake sellers either. Yet the story of Manuel in chapter 6 compensates for this a little bit, since it illustrates in depth how subdivision and sales start and develop. Accretion invasions, in comparison to planned invasions, were also more difficult to study because due to the lack of collective planning at the beginning, there was no collective history to tell. Interviews were much shorter, no matter how much I probed my interviewees.

Every time I visited a new neighborhood I used an observation template to systematically observe spatial features such as the existence of streets, public services and collective buildings or spaces such as soup kitchens. I also collected documents such as neighborhood reports conducted by professionals or NGOs and a few press articles. In some neighborhoods, leaders had neighborhood documents such as pictures, minutes from meetings, local press articles and I collected those too.

For the analysis I have tried to reconstruct neighborhood histories by putting together all the sources and exploring contradictory information. I have analyzed how the histories vary across time and space. Yet, I did not use these several neighborhood histories to just compare them using the traditional comparative method based on Mill’s most similar or most different cases. I did pay attention to similarities and differences in order to be able to identify relevant types of invasions. But I also analyzed connections among stories. References to other settlements, leaders, or to the same politicians appearing in more than one neighborhood, were often indicators of something worth pursuing further. This is perhaps best illustrated in the analysis on chapter 6.  

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22 While the comparative method keeps being the basis of one important field in Political Science, Comparative Politics, anthropologists have contributed interesting criticisms to it, proposing multi-sited ethnography as a methodological approach. See: Marcus (1995).
During the analysis and the writing, which often went together, I used the stories to understand and illustrate the cycle of land invasions (and to build it as I will explain below). I have paid particular attention to squatters’ strategies for invading plots and building neighborhoods. These often included connecting with the state either directly or through a political contact. I also paid attention to the perceptions squatters and politicians have of each other.

The reconstruction of these neighborhood histories helped me better understand what it took and what it meant to seize land at different moments in time and with different degrees of organization. Political networks and particularly the action of local political and/or economic brokers appeared to be crucial in the organization of settlements. Those that did not have brokers tend to be poorer. As I will develop on chapter 4, time and space mattered and the settlements that emerged in the 1990s and that were located in the western part of Montevideo were often more organized.

### About my interviews with squatters:

I interviewed 41 squatters (16 women, 25 men), all early residents of the settlements I visited, some leaders and some ordinary residents.

**Age:** On average, middle aged (mid 40s ranging from 33 to late 70s). Even though I explicitly looked for the earlier residents, I ended up talking to a middle aged group, in general. This is not surprising given that squatting has been mainly a housing strategy of recently formed families. While the average age of household heads and their partners in the formal city was 53 in 2006 (ENHA 2006), their counterparts living in squatter settlements are 11 years younger on average. Yet squatters tended to look older. Harsh lives, poor health care and poverty showed in the lack of teeth, early wrinkles and tired looks. During fieldwork, I was mostly impressed by the early aging or quick lives of women. I met Jenny about 10 years before my dissertation fieldwork trip when I started visiting Freedom Village. A life of scarcity and fighting to make ends meet with several children and now early grandchildren, who also live with her, made her look much older than the mid 40s she was.
**Jobs:** My informants tended to survive on low paid informal jobs just like the population of squatter settlements in general. According to the ENHA (2006), 60% of workers from squatter settlements had informal jobs (i.e., without contract or benefits) whereas that percentage is 31% for the formal city. Some were scavengers – in general as a cushion job held in certain periods when they do not find anything else; some had small businesses in their houses; some were temporary workers in construction; two women were maids. A small group was receiving state benefits: two were receiving the governments’ basic income; two were living on their pensions and one was receiving unemployment benefits. Only two of my interviewees resembled the ideal of the working class (i.e., relatively skilled, manual, protected jobs): a soap factory worker and a carpenter working for a building company.

Four others, however, also belonged to the manual working class, but their jobs were much more temporary, dependent on short term contracts with the state. Two of them were scavengers that were at the moment part of a NGO state funded project that worked with scavengers from the poorest area of the city. Two others were building bus stops as part of a short term contract with the state as well. Their jobs reflect a new trend in some Latin American states that after the huge retrenchment policies of the 1990s had started new welfare programs to attenuate the social consequences of liberalization. Some of these programs include short term employment and training projects for those that otherwise would be unable to leave unemployment.

Also among my interviewees I found a few non manual working class or even bourgeois employees: a lawyer, the secretary of a congressional representative, and a public employee. They were among the most educated of their neighborhoods. In addition, I found two retired low rank military men and the wife of one that was at the moment in the Congo, as part of a UN mission. Finally, 5 of the women work in their houses as housewives.

**Urban trajectory:** Before becoming squatters, the great majority of my interviewees lived in a formal neighborhood, either renting or with family, in nearby neighborhoods or at least in the same general area of the city as their squatter settlement. Only four came directly from outside Montevideo, and even in those cases, they were not rural migrants but came from other urban areas. They all had urban experience.

**How they found out:** Most respondents learned that a new invasion was being planned or that one had just occurred through word of mouth rumors and personal networks. Only one woman, who bought her plot of land in what turned out to be a fraudulent sale, learned through a newspaper.

**Politics:** Most respondents identified with Frente Amplio, the leftist coalition that was in office when I was conducting fieldwork, just like the majority of Uruguay population at the time. I made sure to interview people from different political leanings, and I did get at least six Blanco Party voters and five Colorado Party voters.

**Leaders versus non leaders:** People leading land invasions did not belong to different social universes than the rest of the population, but at least among my interviewees, leaders tended to have two features that made them stand out from the rest: they had some political or organizational capital and they knew how to talk. Leaders tended to have some organizational experience before the invasion –unions, cooperative housing
movements, neighborhood associations or political parties. In fact, they somehow translated that experience and the capital that came with it to the organization of the squatter settlement. They knew how to do things, whom to talk to, how to organize neighborhood associations and assemblies, how to petition and so on. In addition, they were very articulate speakers.

I found non leaders that trusted leaders and were willing to help them and others that were distrustful because they considered them to be pursuing personal gains or not communicating all their information.

Neighborhood leaders work hard. But squatter settlements have mobile populations and leaders are not an exception. Those that after the invasion stayed in the neighborhood are likely to stay in charge forever. They become a reference for others who, whenever there is a problem, can easily find them in their houses. For many, the neighborhood is their big oeuvre in life and that is part of the motivation behind hours, money and effort spent in what they perceive as helping others. Leaders perform different types of tasks such as finding out about a plot to invade, facing the police or the owner, organizing squatters, measuring, dividing and distributing plots, selecting new settlers, writing letters, petitioning, wait for hours at a public office to get the water connection for everybody, getting birth certificates for kids whose parents do not know how to do it or do not have the money to pay a bus ticket to the city, calling an ambulance when somebody is seek, evicting people that try to build in what were considered public places, talking to politicians when they come to visit the neighborhood and many other things.

Many define their work as "social work in politics" or "the social" which they at least explicitly consider to be different from regular politics, less strategic and more for the people, more because you care about the poor. Leaders complain of the hard work and because others do not participate. And they also complain because they do not get enough recognition for that hard work, neither by the neighbors nor by the politicians or state officials they work with. An anecdote from my fieldwork illustrates this latter point very well:

*When I arrived at the office of a city councilor from the Frente Amplio to interview him that day, he let me in but he was talking to someone else, an angry woman. This happened the week before the internal elections of the party and both the lady and the local councilor belonged to the same party faction. The woman was complaining because, she said, the party had not given her enough support and, as she said, “those things hurt.” She had been in charge of the door to door political work convincing people to vote for their faction. According to her, they had not given her enough flyers to distribute in her neighborhood, which I later learned was a squatter settlement in which the city councilor had some constituents. Besides, they had only given her one banner that, she emphasized, was old and worn out. She felt that she could not convince others to vote for their faction if the party did not back her up. At one moment, the councilor had to go outside and she told me, “I cannot work like this. The other day I brought 50 people to the meeting. It cannot be that they don’t give me anything.”*

Her story, the story of feeling not supported or in some cases underused by what they perceive as ungrateful others illustrates what some leaders feel. I interpret it as a frustrated search for recognition. Part of the rewards of being a leader is being able to show you are well connected.
The story of a leader and the relevance of language and political capital: I was struck by a very charming and politicized woman, who expressed herself using elaborate language not only in our two long interviews but also when talking in public. She surprised me from the beginning. To break the ice I asked her if I should interview her as a local politician or neighborhood leader. She told me “first of all, I’m a woman, and I am Uruguayan” and she broke into a huge laugh. Her elaborate phrases did not fit with some orthographic mistakes I could see in the handwritten quotes she has as wall decorations throughout her welcoming but extremely poor house. They did not match her formal education either. She had suffered a life of deep economic and social exclusion. She told me she had to quit high school when her parents divorced and she was institutionalized with other homeless girls. She later became a prostitute, got married with a guy that eventually sold their house and left her and her children homeless again. Organizing with others to create what is now a consolidated neighborhood was a way out for her, the opportunity to have a place of her own for her family. There, she has participated from the beginning. She also participates outside her neighborhood, in the local council. Digging into her past, I realized this political capital came from before. Her family was from the Communist Party. She remembers going to meetings when she was a kid. She remembers her aunt taking her to strikes in the factory she used to work at. She remembers clandestinely working for the Communist Party during the military period. When the Communist Party took away her membership upon learning she was a prostitute, she showed her resiliency once again and she kept participating in a different Frente Amplio faction. She acknowledges how much that “political education” – her words - helped her in her participation in the neighborhood, and help the neighborhood through her get recognition and services. Once, she and some other neighbors went to the city council to ask for sponsorship and some material help for a local meeting to talk about the main problems of their area of the city. Her speech was long and provocative, as this quote illustrates:

I always say I am very proud to belong to a squatter settlement and I add that nobody gave us anything. (...) I am telling you this so you get to know the reality, because I haven’t seen many of you walking through my neighborhood or through the area in which we live (...) I would like to explain to you what it means to live in a shack. It means that when it’s 6 or 7 pm [in the winter] you have to go to bed dressed because the cold is atrocious. And you are lucky if the roof doesn’t leak and your floor is not just mud. Besides, if the school is more than two blocks away, you often have to take your kids barefoot or with sneakers and then wash their feet in some puddle to be able to put their shoes on.²³

Knowing how to talk came up several times during my fieldwork as a necessary condition for becoming a leader, both among non leaders explaining why so and so was the leader or among leaders themselves telling me why others delegated things to them. Communication skills become very important when you are so dependent on

²³ Transcription from the Special Commission of Squatter Settlements of the Montevideo City Council, Minutes No 7537, May 13, 2005.
others, as squatters are on state institutions to survive. They are crucial also for brokerage purposes, when you have to speak two or even three tongues: that of the state and of politicians and that of fellow squatters. Conducting retrospective fieldwork, it is difficult to know if leaders gained communication skills with the land occupation and neighborhood organization or they had them before. Judging from the oral histories, probably a mixture of both is closer to reality. Some, as already mentioned, had experience participating in organizations in which they also had to talk in public before invading a plot of land. But for some, participation in the neighborhood organization was a politicizing experience in which they learned many things, including how to communicate effectively, in order to reach out, to build ties, and bring resources to the neighborhood.

3.2.2 Protest event analysis

Most studies of contentious collective action are bounded within particular times and places. Social movements and other forms of contentious politics are often such complex objects of study that the close examination of cases makes sense. Yet there is also a very rich tradition within the study of contentious politics dedicated to the historical analysis of mobilization. Of course most good studies, even if they are focused just in one movement have some historical analysis, but I am referring here to a narrower set of scholarly work: protest event analysis. This line of inquiry is particularly valuable to those interested in the relationships between context and mobilization.

Protest event analysis comprises descriptive accounts of contentious events (e.g., timing, location, size, and so on) and explanatory studies that incorporate protest events as a variable in multivariate models. Perhaps the most salient and common feature of protest events studies is their quantitative nature. They are very much interested in counting events and finding patterns with those counts. Their main methodological challenge is therefore defining what they consider events, which implies as often with social sciences constructing an object that is a proxy of a
broader phenomenon we want to study. The availability of sources usually shapes those definitions of events. Riots, strikes, episodes of political violence, lynching, and mass demonstrations are examples of “countable” events.

Thanks to the study of protest events we have learned interesting things about various types of contention, from postwar Italian strikes (Franzosi 1994) to today’s young *internauts* making online petitions (Earl and Schussman 2008). We now know more about the shape, dynamics, changes and sequencing of cycles of contention (Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 1989; Tarrow 1998). We have learned a lot about the causes of contentious events. We know that ecological factors such as ethnic competition (Olzak 1992; Soule and Van Dyke 1999) or organizational density (Hannan and Freeman 1987; Minkoff 1995; 1997) have triggered specific types of conflict or collective action. We have also learned that political factors such as divided government may spike protest events whereas contesting groups accessing routine politics through congressional representation may have the opposite result (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Angone 2003). Protest event studies have been able to empirically test resource mobilization hypotheses (Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su 1999). Hardship and relative deprivation, in turn, have proved to be less relevant to protest than it was once thought (Snyder, Tilly, and 1972; Spilerman 1976; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). Also through protest event studies, some scholars have taught us about the relationship of repression and mobilization (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). Yet others have been useful in pointing to a much pervasive though sometimes understudied cause: diffusion, both in time and space, through social networks or through other non-direct communication mechanisms such as mass media (Hedstrom 1994; Markoff 1996; Oliver and Mayers 2003; Soule 2004). Finally, protest event analysis has helped us understand the policy outcomes or lack thereof of mobilization (Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su 1999).
3.2.2.1 Building an event data set from various sources

In order to describe squatter settlements in Montevideo as well as get at when and under what conditions different types of land squatting had been more likely, I built a catalog of land invasions with their location, type of invasion (i.e., accretion, planned or land subdivision and sale), date of settlement and land property. Results from this catalog are exposed on chapter four. In addition, I transformed this catalog into a time series of squatting events per year, including some predictors based on the theories I wanted to put into dialog: grievances and political opportunities. Chapter 4 and especially chapter 5 are based on this effort.

The catalog and the time series were not easy to build because sources were not readily available. Most studies of protest events are based on newspaper data. Newspapers have revealed a great potential making comparative, quantitative and historical approaches to social movements relatively easy. They have enabled the systematic description and testing of theories and concepts such as solidarity versus breakdown theories, resource mobilization, political opportunities, cycles of contention, and diffusion processes. Newspaper data have also broadened the geographic scope of studies of social movements outside the affluent democracies, although there is still a lot to be done in this line. The study of different types of protest during the changing authoritarian context of El Salvador 1960-1981, and research on the changing localization of worldwide labor mobilization during the 20th century (Silver 2003) are just two recent inspiring examples of this. Moreover, we now know something about the possible biases newspaper data can introduce to our analysis of protest events and how to work them into our

24 See chapter four for detailed descriptions of each type.
analysis (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004; Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996).

Still, there are many forms of collective action, some contentious, that do not make it to the press. They are less noisy, violent or organized than strikes, demonstrations or lootings. This is the case of land squatting, at least in the context of Montevideo. Are these forms of collective action inevitably fated to case studies or “small n” comparisons? Or, alternatively, is there a way to build protest event data sets with sources other than newspapers? It is my contention that you can, and that the recent methodological reflections on how to build a data set with newspaper data throws light about the types of precautions we are to face. The intimidating task is assembling appropriate data. And the key, as with newspaper studies, is to recognize, understand and factor into the study the potential sources of bias.

In fact the problem of current “silent” or invisible forms of collective action is not different from what happens to sociologists interested in pre 19th century movements. They do not necessarily have or can access to the complete universe of archival materials. As Markoff’s (1996) study of French peasant movements before the Revolution demonstrates, building and exploring data sets that permit the study of conflict over time with sources other than newspapers may be time consuming but is not impossible. And it has the advantage of enabling us to test theories of contention in a broader set of movements than the very organized or recent ones.

Land seizures leave a very visible trace in the urban space. Unless there is repression or government relocation, they tend to last. Governments often have some information about where they are and who is the owner of the land they occupy. Today, with GIS (geographical information systems), the obsession is to map them. However, there is little or no information about their history.
Although I could have answered my question about the determinants of land squatting through a different research design, like a multi-sited ethnography or other type of comparative design with some typical cases, I wanted to see variation over time. In fact, I wanted to be able to stretch the realm of theories of mobilization to less structured collective action, and test them in some statistical way. I wanted to understand the temporal movement of squatting: why and when seizures go up or down. Building the data set of just the dates of land seizures and some of their characteristics was one of the hardest parts of my fieldwork.

3.2.2.2 The event data and its biases

As Scott (1998) says, when the state sees, maps or counts, it controls. It was not until squatter settlements became a problem to be addressed by politicians and by the state in general, that the first attempts to count and map them appeared. This did not happen until the late 90s, when the Ministry of Housing and the Municipal Government of Montevideo started separate efforts to get information about irregular settlements.25

When I started this project, I got a list of settlements from the Ministry of Housing and another one from the Municipality of Montevideo. For some of them, they had the dates of settlement. When they listed the same settlements, they usually had very similar dates minus plus one to three years. I then assembled a time series of 136 settlements. Although I could have used that as my final data set, I was afraid that it was not representative of the whole universe of the more than 400 settlements I knew of in the city. My fear was not so much based on the sample size but on its biases. I feared that the settlements in those lists were among the more organized, given that they had had some sort of contact with the state and got registered in their files. I also

25 At the time the Municipal Government was held by the leftist party Frente Amplio and the Ministry of Housing was held by the Blanco Party. This may explain why there were two separate efforts to identify settlements.
feared they were not representative of the different types of occupied land types. Specifically, I feared that occupations of private land would be underrepresented, since the state could not do much on them, and that those squatters on municipal or state land would tend to be overrepresented. This was why I got engaged in the difficult enterprise of building an event data set, without newspapers, without much archival information, and basically based on retrospective inquire.

For about a year I have worked, among other things, on building this time series mixing the métier of sociologist with that of historian and ethnographer. By the time I started, the Bureau of Statistics had just released a list of 412 squatter settlements in the city, defined as groups of 10 or more houses whose inhabitants were owners of the house but illegal occupants of the land. Those had a geographical reference to which I wanted to link dates, types of land invasion and ownership of land, as well as any other information I could collect. It took many interviews, and different triangulation efforts to build this data set. As I said before government agencies are now interested in the informal city. They see it as a problem they need to locate, count and in which they need to act. But it is not their main task to systematize information about its history.\footnote{The exceptions are the reports of the settlements written by the technical teams that work in the regularization projects. They often include a historical chapter. There are several problems with this source: settlements in regularization are a minority, these reports are not all of the same quality or format, and they are not for public access. However, I was able to access some of them, through NGOs working in regularization programs as state-partners. They were useful for triangulating information and in some cases getting at data I did not get from other sources.}

I started my inquiry by taking a list of squatter settlements and a map to the local governments. Montevideo was divided into 18 local governments after the 1990s inner city decentralization program. Those administrative and political units are the ones that better know the reality of their area. However, each area took much more than one interview. Information
was fragmented. Social workers, architects, local politicians, and local often had parts of the puzzle. Only in one local government did I find a folder with files for each of the more than 60 settlements of the area with some characteristics, including settlement date. In the others, I had to rely on retrospective information from key informants. This often required previous interviews to find the right informants, those more knowledgeable and reliable. Luckily, people were willing to take the time to talk to me. I did not find no-responses from those I contacted. No matter how much I looked, those areas with stronger local participation, and stronger relationships between the local government and civil society had more precise information. This constitutes a source of bias I tried to solve by interviewing more people in some areas and by using other sources.

I also used information from the neighborhood visits and the oral histories I have already talked about to crosscheck dates and find dates the local governments did not have. The first residents of each neighborhood I visited had the most reliable information about the date in which the settlement started since it was part of their experience. They often connected that date to some other personal event, such as the birth of a child. Often, those early residents also knew about the dates of settlement of nearby informal neighborhoods, because they had seen them start and grow.

As a third source, I used archival materials that nobody had processed before and that I unexpectedly found. In 1998 and 2001, the Bureau of Statistics made a list of the country’s squatter settlements and asked some questions of key informants. I got access to the hard copy of the forms which were resting on an office shelf, and I generated an electronic data set with some of the questions. The information is not very reliable, since for that survey they only asked one informant per geographic area, and they asked about number of houses or population numbers which are estimates this person made and not really aggregate measures of micro-data. However,
they asked about settlement age, and I used that information as the last source for those cases for which I did not have any other information, or had contradictory or imprecise information from the previous sources. The main problem of that data series, besides the lack of triangulation in its design, is that they did not ask for a date, year or period of settlement but about the age of settlement. Therefore, the series has what we can call the bias of *retrospective rounding*. People tended to approximate by answering 5, 10, 15, 20 years old and so on. Therefore, since the question was asked in 1998, there are peaks every five years, that is in 1993, 1988, 1983 and so on. We can see them in figure 1. The only peak bigger than 20 land seizures that is not a product of rounding up or down is the one in 1990, year that all series signal as the highest peak, reassuring the robustness of the finding.

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27 The series ends in 2000 and not in 1998. For most settlements there was one original form for 1998 with a second one in 2001 to update some information. For a few, there was only one form for 2001 in which they asked about year of settlement for the first time. Those that were surveyed for the first time in 2001 could have appeared in the period between the two studies (1998-2001) or existed before without being detected for some unknown reason.
Figure 1: Number of Land Occupations per year with the “bias of retrospective rounding.” Montevideo, 1947-2000 (n=295).

Source: Bureau of Statistics surveys of squatter settlements 1998 and 2001

Besides helping me fill some missing data on dates, this new source provided me with 15 “dead” events. It had information about places that were squatter settlements in 1998 but that had been relocated or regularized by 2001. These data were interesting in different ways. First, they alerted me to a very interesting case I later conducted oral histories in. It was a case of a planned land seizure whose leaders used their political contacts in a very efficient way and reached services and regularization in a record time despite being located in protected rural area where the municipality forbids construction. Since they were regularized, they are not legally a squatter settlement any more. In addition, the spatial look at the “dead” events taught me something important about the politics of relocation. The three squatter settlements that were
once in the central neighborhoods of the city (old city and surroundings) had been relocated. That is why there is none today in those areas. The squatters that had managed to find an open space in expensive areas of the city had been relocated.

Combining these three main sources I was able to assemble a data set with the exact or approximate date of origin of 382 out of 427 land occupations.28 Approximations, such as “the 90s” or “between 1985 and 1986” are due two main sources. One has to do with the nature of the settlement, which in many cases is an accretion process. My criteria was always to ask about the year in which the first settlers occupied regardless of the fact that more came years after, but sometimes I could not find an exact year for that. This is precisely the other source of ambiguity: the lack of accurate records and the imprecision of remembering.

Triangulation was useful to sharpen some dates (e.g., when one source said 1990-1995, and the other one helped with a more accurate 1994, I considered the more precise one to be more likely. For the general analysis I made use of every single piece of information on dates, the more or the less precise, trying to locate invasions at least in a period of time. Still, for the event history analysis on chapter 5, I only used those cases for which I had an exact year of settlement. I therefore ended up with 257 events for 58 years (i.e., 1947-2004).

The analysis of number and types of land invasions over time was very illuminating. Yet the study of dates is also problematic. The ethnographic analysis showed that even the best planned invasions kept receiving newcomers years after they started. Still, there is something to be said about using the date in which the “early birds” or pioneers settled. Early residents are the ones who break the rules initially; they are the ones who violate property rights, the ones that show that it is possible to settle there, the ones that test the chance of repression and eventually

28 The total is more than 412, the ones currently existing in the city, because I included also a few “dead events”, meaning settlements that changed into cooperative housing or that were relocated by the government to a different place.
face the police or the owner, and the ones that widen the repertoire of possibilities for other urban poor that may start to see that plot as a possible new home. The moment in which some people seize a plot of land is often the most contentious one in the history of the settlement. This is why studying squatting over time becomes so important.

Figure 2 superposes the initial time series I got from state agencies with the complete one I ended up with, combining all the sources. I gained 121 observations with the effort, a figure that ascends to 246 if we also include the more imprecise dates as I do when I consider period of settlement rather than the exact date (see chapter four).

Figure 2: Number of land occupations 1947-2004. Comparison of different sources.

The comparison of the original and the improved series confirms a general trend: the wave of land occupations peaked in the 1990s. Earlier, land occupations were rare events, and after that, despite what we would predict given the sharp economic crisis of 2002, new land seizures ceased. Some of the already existing occupations grew as newcomers arrived, but the crisis is not associated with new land occupations. The improved series confirms the 1990 peak, but also signals a couple of interesting facts. First, a smaller but interesting peak in 1985, that is the year after the first elections after 11 years of dictatorship (1973-1984). This peak was less visible in the initial series. The second is another peak in 1995. Two patterns seem to emerge. First that, contrary to what I thought at the beginning of my fieldwork, peaks are more likely after elections than in electoral years (elections were towards the end of 1984, 1989, and 1994, and the three peaks are immediately after). Secondly, the extreme peak in 1990 supports the hypotheses that something related to the election of the leftist party to the government of Montevideo for the first time in history had something to do with the expansion of land squatting as a strategy or last resource of the urban poor. I explore these hypotheses in the next two chapters.

In chapter 4, I describe the event catalog of invasions and make it dialog with all the other contextual information I gathered. In chapter 5, in turn, I use the event catalog to test the incidence of politics on the probability of land squatting events in one year, controlling for other variables more associated with hardship. The information provided by this event catalog illuminates each part of this whole work.
3.3 CONCLUSION: QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE?

When conducting multimethod work, the temptation of writing some parts with the quantitative researcher hat and some parts with the qualitative one is huge. That simplifies our lives. Because of disciplinary traditions, methods determine not only a research choice but the way we report results, the journals in which we can publish, the rhetoric we apply, the authors we cite, the audiences we will appeal to and so on. Nevertheless, I have tried to avoid contributing to the seemingly essential division between quantity and quality. Many of the things we count and use as variables in regression analysis are often based on “qualitative” judgements.

In this work, no chapter is exclusively qualitative or just quantitative. As expressed here, the building of the event catalog of invasion events required ethnographic information. The interpretation of the cycle and its explanation relied heavily on the contextual information I could find. At the same time, the initial statistical patterns I started to find helped me shape the lenses through which I was conducting the oral histories, reading documents and so on.
4.0 THE CYCLE OF LAND INVASIONS

This dissertation is devoted to recovering the history of land squatting in Montevideo, understand it and explain it. Based on the idea that understanding when mobilization happens is as important as understanding why it happened and that it may actually tell us something about why it happened I have made an effort to reconstruct the cycle of invasions, the history of the informal city. This chapter opens up this time dimension by describing the cycle of invasions and exploring some hypothetical explanations for the main patterns over time.

The chapter is built on information I collected during one year of fieldwork in Montevideo (described in the methods section). It uses two main types of data. The first is a data set I constructed that includes dates of settlement, location, type of settlement and land property for the majority of the more than 400 land invasions in this city.\textsuperscript{29} The second is a large body of qualitative information I collected observing, reading archives and conducting interviews with squatters, politicians and experts. The two are intertwined throughout the chapter, as they are throughout the dissertation.

\textsuperscript{29} I took the 2006 official cartography of squatter settlements (INE-PIAI 2006) as a starting universe. The cartography originally had 412 instances or cases of squatter settlements. To those I added 15 neighborhoods that started as squatter settlements but that have since been relocated or legalized (dead events in event history language). Thus, the final data set includes 427 cases. The final data set includes information on exact location for 412 squatter settlements, year of settlement for 256 settlement, period of settlement (before dictatorship, dictatorship, 1985-89, 90-94, 95-99, 00-04) for 334 settlements, land property at the moment of the invasion for 346, and type of settlement (accretion, planned or subdivision and sale) for 240 settlements.
The chapter moves from simple to more complex patterns. After showing some general patterns of the cycle of land invasions only paying attention to the time dimension, the chapter adds several layers of complexity: the different types of land invasions and their patterns over time and space. Its overall goal is to take the reader to the site and show the general picture. Of course it does not refer to every aspect of the case for the theoretical orientation about politics and mobilization is always present. Yet instead of being specific as the next two chapters will be (one focused on the role of elections and the other one on the role of clientelistic networks), this one deliberately opens up possibilities for alternative explanations.

4.1 TIME

As Tarrow (1989: 13) clearly argues: “what needs to be explained is not why people periodically petition, strike, demonstrate, riot, loot and burn, but rather why so many of them do so at particular times in their history, and if there is a logical sequence to their action.” As explained in the introduction, I believe ideas and methods developed for the study of social movements can be helpful to understand other more elusive forms of collective action or contentious politics, that are arguably beyond the scope of the concept of social movements, such as land squatting. Juan, one of my interviewees, leader of a land invasion, has a more mundane way to express what Tarrow theorizes: “When the moment arrives, we’ll ask for regularization. You need to wait until the moment arrives.”

When looking at the evolution of land squatting in Montevideo over time, at least three striking features appear: late start in relation to the rural-urban migration process, steady growth during the military regime, a very notorious peak in 1990 followed by a decade of high numbers
of land invasions, and a decline since the end of the 1990s. But before getting into the analysis Figures 3, 4 and 5 describe the cycle in different ways.

Figure 3 illustrates the density of land squatting in Montevideo, that is to say the cumulative number of land invasions per year. It is built on the 256 settlements of the city for which I found the year of settlement, for the period 1947-2004. It shows that land squatting was a rare event until the 1970s. It also shows a low though steady rise in land invasions occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Around 1989-1991 we see a change that corresponds to the highest peak of the cycle, followed by a decade of rapid and sustained growth in land invasions. More recently, the cycle seems to have reached a ceiling with a low number of land invasions per year since the late 1990s.

It is important to state, however, that although new land invasions became rare events again in Montevideo, many existing squatter settlements keep growing. This happens both
because of internal growth (e.g., births, grown up children going to live independently or forming a new family and building a small room in the backyard) or because of new population coming from the formal city in search of housing. Figure 4 illustrates these different processes and different cycles. While the number of land invasions had its peak between 1989 and 1990, and more recently invasions seem to be again the rarer events they used to be, the population living in squatter settlements has been growing pretty steadily. This dissertation is dedicated to the first of these two cycles.

Figure 4. Comparing cycles of land invasions and population growth in squatter settlements, Montevideo 1947-2004

Sources: Own data for the N of land invasions. Data from the National Household Survey (INE 2006) for the % of squatter families arriving in a given year.  

\[\text{\textsuperscript{30}}\] The survey asks in which year the household head arrived to the current house. Therefore, we do not have data on those who moved out or passed away. Also, the survey did not capture anybody arriving before 1965 to a squatter settlement.
Finally, Figure 5 adds another dimension to the time analysis by grouping the number of land invasions by political period: before dictatorship, dictatorship, and the four elected governments after that. Given that the political periods do not have the same number of years, the bins represent the average number of land invasions per period to make them comparable (N of land invasions/N years in the period).

![Figure 5. Average yearly number of land seizures per political period](image)

Represented this way, the cycle takes a close to normal shape, with a mode in the 1990-94 government in which there were an average of almost 20 new land invasions per year.
4.1.1 Late start in relation to the rural-urban migration process

The first striking characteristic about the cycle of land invasions in Montevideo is its late start in comparison to other Latin American cities but, more importantly, its late start in relation to Montevideo’s early urbanization. In most cities of the region and the world squatter settlements house rural migrants trying to find a place in the city. This definitely happened with earlier squatter settlements in the city of Montevideo. Yet it was not a generalized phenomenon. Most originally rural urban dwellers found a place in the formal city.

The first land invasions appeared around 1950. The first one I have a date for dates back to 1947. Yet it is not only until the late 80s that land invasions start to multiply, at a time when the city had already stopped growing. Uruguayans from rural areas or urban areas from the interior of the country started migrating to Montevideo very early, and by 1960 the capital already had stabilized its population at about 45% of the country’s total. Besides, Uruguay experienced its demographic transition very early as well, reaching fecundity rates in the 1950s that the rest of Latin America would reach only around 2000 (Katzman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005). Thus, Montevideo is an odd case because it shows no correlation between population growth and the rise of land invasions.

As already mentioned, other forces were in action. The economic downturn of the country since the 1950s and liberalizing policies, including liberalization of rent prices and state reduction, appear as the main suspects. Yet in this dissertation I explore other forces, political ones, which I will show interacted with economic circumstances in important ways.
4.1.2 Steady growth during the military regime

The second salient feature is a steady growth during the military regime (see figures 3 and 4, from 1973 until 1984). This might have a lot to do with the liberalization of renting prices by a 1974 law, consistent with the monetarist policies implemented by other Southern Cone military regimes. Many of the key informants I talked to, architects, social workers and so on, think so. And although I cannot say that interviewees who settled around that date mention rent more often than others, because many tend to mention rent as their personal reason for the move throughout the cycle, squatters during the military regime do mention not being able to maintain themselves in the formal city. The impact of this law, especially for the poor, was dramatic. (Benton 1986) states that with prices that had been kept artificially down for years, suddenly opening up to market forces, housing prices spiked and became the category of goods to rise most steeply in price.

But these were not the only transformations to the urban environment of the poor that the military brought about. Besides liberalizing rent, the authoritarian government also “cleaned” the city center from poor people living in tenement houses. Central neighborhoods like Palermo and Sur housed many conventillos, the term for generally large old buildings with many rental rooms overlooking an internal patio. Besides offering a relatively cheap way of remaining in the city, conventillos were also related to the playing of candombe music, an afro-uruguayan rhythm originally associated with slaves and later with the popular classes. The government evicted and destroyed many of those buildings. Some people offered resistance but probably much less than they would have in a democratic regime. According to Benton (1986) who studied precisely this period,
The transformation of Montevideo’s central city must be understood above all as part of a process of political change. The advent of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime simultaneously disrupted traditional forms of political integration of the urban poor and dismantled the legal and institutional apparatus that had permitted the survival of stable working-class neighborhoods in the city center. The new housing policies were not explicitly directed at removing the poor from desirable areas or otherwise facilitating the escalation of real estate investment and construction. They were inscribed instead in a general policy of deregulation of the housing market and were implemented through locally directed measures according to supposedly technical criteria.

What puzzles Benton the most is that people’s response was not to invade lands en masse, but resorting to other strategies such as going to live at relatives’ or renting at a different place in groups. She attributes this to the residents’ willingness to remain in the city and to their hopes that the state did something for them.

Yet despite Benton’s surprise about them not invading lands collectively, as pointed out before, there was indeed a steady growth of land invasions during the military regime. According to my estimates, about 5 new land invasions appeared every year from 1973 until 1984. Given that other military regimes, such as the Chilean, were very repressive with new land invasions and with the old ones that showed any kind of mobilization, I was struck to find steady growth in this period. The secret might be in the type of invasions characterizing this period. Except for one, invasions in this period began by accretion, with each family arriving separately. Apparently these slow forming and extremely poor neighborhoods did not represent a threat to the military government.31

31 These land invasions were not the only non-threatening organizations for the military. During the authoritarian period many urban poor solved their increasing needs in a context of liberalization by organizing in what Rodé, Marsiglia and Piedracueva (1985) call “spaces of freedom” such as soup kitchens, neighborhood health clinics and so on, which were also perceived as non threatening by the authorities.
The only exception of land invasion with some degree of planning during the military regime was Calera Vieja, a housing cooperative organized by the Catholic Church and an NGO (CIDC) working with Catholic based communities, liberation theology, self help construction, and participatory methodologies based on the popular education paradigm from Paulo Freire.  

The imminence of an eviction of very underprivileged settlement located on private land in the La Teja Northwestern neighborhood of Montevideo detonated the experience. It was the local parish who asked a local NGO, CIDEC, for help. Together they started a re-location process with those families willing to engage in a self help transforming experience. As in Chile (Schneider 1995) or Argentina (Prévôt Schapira 1999), the Catholic Church had an important role in popular organizations during the military regime in Uruguay (Filgueira 1985). With political parties suppressed, the Catholic Church was a refuge for organizing and solving everyday needs. Yet this is the only instance in which the story of the origin of a squatter settlement was associated with the church in my interviews.

Another important example of church activity with squatters during the military government is the case of San Vicente, in the North East of the city, more precisely in Casavalle, the poorest neighborhood of the city. This nongovernmental organization was founded in 1977, by a Catholic priest, known to all neighbors as El Padre Cacho and is today, after the death of its founder, the most significant institution for many residents of the area. As an example, when I asked Luisa, a resident from Plácido Ellauri, a very poor squatter settlement in that area, about the three people or institutions that have helped her neighborhood the most, she simply said “I would name just one, the San Vicente Organization.” This is hardly surprising, since Plácido

32 Interviews with Susana Regent, Local Secretary of the 14th Zonal Community Center, administrative municipal unit where this settlement belongs, and with Inés Giudice, social worker currently working at the Ministry of Housing and at the time working directly with this settlement, through the NGO CIDC.
Ellauri was in fact the first neighborhood in which Cacho worked\textsuperscript{33} and since Luisa, like many residents nearby work in one of the garbage-recycling projects of the organization, which constitutes her first relatively stable job. Like many people in her neighborhood, she had always worked as a scavenger. Her answer is nonetheless significant, since in many other interviews, elsewhere in the city, people tended to mention a politician, or the municipal government or some state institutions such as the water company.

Although at opposite extremes of the periphery of Montevideo, La Calera Vieja in the West and San Vicente in the East, these two experiences were not disconnected. They started as two separate projects but towards the end of the military regime they both formed the MOVIDE (Movimiento Pro Vida Decorosa or Movement in Promotion of a Decent Life). During the military regime, Catholic parishes and NGOs “were like islands”\textsuperscript{34} in which people could participate while avoiding repression. MOVIDE emerged from a threat posed by a wave of evictions of settlements on private land, probably caused by speculation by owners and by the urban re-structuring caused by the construction of the new access routes to Montevideo from the North West. The movement was formed by two very different types of actors. On the one hand there were the poorest squatters of the city and some people evicted from buildings in the city center. And, on the other hand, there were some parishes and NGOs, with professionals and priests with radical views about making the voice of the poor heard and improving their living conditions.

\textsuperscript{33} Based on the intervention of the historian and city councilor at the time, Mario Cayota, on September 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2002, on the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the death of Padre Cacho. Session 1037. Minutes available at http://www.juntamvd.gub.uy

\textsuperscript{34} Expression of Inés Giudice, one of the professionals founders of MOVIDE, who taught me about the history of the movement, as well as her current reflections about why it vanished with re-democratization. Unless explicitly cited otherwise, all the information about MOVIDE comes from this interview.
MOVIDE was exceptional because it put the voice of the poorest of the poor on some newspapers and radio stations—the few that were not repressed and were sympathetic to the cause. It challenged the prejudices of the left about squatters. Leftist militants used to dub them the lumpen-proletariat and they did not feel they were members of the same class. And there they were, these people coming from the bottom of society giving hot discourses using spontaneous phrases such as “we not only have a head for lice. We can also think,” mesmerizing every listener. They claimed their character as workers as well as their right not only to decent housing but also to health, jobs and so on. A change in name—they were originally the Movement for Decent Housing and later changed to Decent Life—showed a more profound change, from single issue demands after the threat of eviction to a more radical discourse, with a more ample platform, a critical analysis of their situation and the ability to make some external alliances (Filgueira 1985). They held a clearly anti-politicians discourse, whom they blamed in part for their marginalized situation. In one of the documents of the movement, written to be presented at a seminar of popular organizations in October 1984 (a month before the first post-military elections), we can read phrases such as “politicians used us and deceived us,” “when politicians were governing living was very difficult”, “some politicians saw that the situation was difficult and they joined with the military,” “with the coup our situation worsened, we became even poorer,” “some politicians appeared in our neighborhoods making promises they never fulfill,” “the state doesn’t give enough resources for everybody to have good health (...) It gives more resources to the military.”

MOVIDE became so important during the transition that it was one of the movements invited to participate at the 1984-85 multiparty consultations, known as National Conciliatory

Program (Concertación Nacional Programática or CONAPRO). But that fame did not last much. With democratization MOVIDE started dismembering for many reasons specific to the movement\(^{36}\) and also for a general reason, one that affected many of the instances of the mobilization boom towards the end of the military regime: the traditional political actors reappeared (Filgueira 1985). Political parties and unions recover the centrality they had before the military regime and with only some few exceptions the more heterogeneous forms of mobilization slowly vanished through cooptation, neutralization or some other mechanism.

Like an urban mirror of the decline of the movement, today Calera Vieja, the emblematic experience of self help among the poorest of the poor, looks just like any other of the most deprived squatter settlements. The population has grown and the infrastructure deteriorated. Finally, it is important to notice that MOVIDE did not encourage new land invasions. On the contrary, it was a movement that defended people from evictions. And despite its reactive origins it switched towards a more proactive platform, it was not a promoter of new land invasions.

\(^{36}\) Among the specific reasons, Inés Giudice mentions frictions between delegates and their base in the neighborhoods especially when the movement starts having more visibility and delegates participate in the negotiations for democracy. This contrasted with the movement’s principles of horizontal participation. She also mentioned some cooptation of leaders by the traditional political parties. Besides, there were also some tensions between professionals and the people from the neighborhoods. They were part of the same movement, but the former earned a salary and the others did not. There were also tensions between the major organizations in the movement. On one side, San Vicente, and on the other, the NGOs such as CIDC and Aportes, the ones responsible for the cooperative La Calera Vieja mentioned in the text. The two groups had different perspectives about the work they were doing. San Vicente was much less politicized whereas the professionals in the other NGOs were mostly leftist militants as well. With democratization the tension grew stronger. People at CIDC and Aportes put great emphasis on popular education, and they want to translate this methodology into the political parties. San Vicente did not have these broader goals beyond raising the quality of life and the consciousness of those in their area of action. And, finally, she referred to cooptation of the whole project by the first democratic municipal government (Colorado administration). The Plan Aquiles Lanza aimed, among other things, at transforming cantegriles into better neighborhoods using self help construction by the dwellers. According to Giudice (and this appears also in other interviews with key informants), they took the self help working strategy but they did not promote any other participation by residents or any coordination among the different neighborhoods. The plan acted in 7 neighborhoods and it did not go very well. Many families quit, population grew, and plots were subsequently subdivided, taking over public spaces. Today these 7 neighborhoods look again like any other of the less planned squatter settlements of the city. According to Giudice, this plan took some ideas from MOVIDE but, contrary to it, the plan had a clear demobilizing goal.
4.1.3 The big peak

Although there was a small peak of 10 land invasions the year after the democratic elections that ended the military period, land seizures did not rise significantly until the following elections (see figures 3, 4 and 5). Theoretically, democratization processes are associated with a general opening of political opportunities and with a resurrection of civil societies. Empirically, in Santiago, Chile, a relatively close-by city, land invasions peaked right before the military regime, at times of huge electoral competition for the popular classes, and mobilization in those invasions was huge by the end of the military regime (Hipshir 1998).

After eleven years of being one of South America’s most repressive dictatorships (Blum 1995), Uruguay and particularly Montevideo, its capital city, witnessed a wellspring of mobilization around 1984 (Filgueira 1985). Despite high poverty rates at the time squatting mobilization did not peak, however. Other movements headed this outburst of mobilization, especially the labor movement and the student movement. It was only when this wave of mobilization dissipated and the parties took once more their central role channeling and co-opting civil society demands (Canel 1992), that many poor city dwellers adopted the strategy of land squatting.

One could imagine several possible reasons behind the spike of land invasions in 1990. Structural conditions, such as de-industrialization, poverty, rising rent, low real wages and so forth, are conceivably behind it. Yet as I argue throughout this dissertation, political causes were the ones activating those economic causes. There are some general and some specific political factors about the year 1990 that could be associated with that year witnessing 41 land invasions in the Uruguayan capital. (This figure becomes even more surprising if we consider that the two
years with the next highest number of land invasions had only 17 each and that the annual average for the studied period was 4.4).

Among the general political factors that could be associated with this spike, 1990 was a post-electoral year. As tested in the next chapter, post-electoral, and to a lesser degree electoral years, have been the ones more likely to experience land invasions. But 1990 was also a very particular year in Montevideo’s political history. It was not a regular post-electoral year. It was a historical juncture for the city since the Frente Amplio, the leftist coalition, assumed for the first time ever the city government. In fact, it was the first time that a party other than the traditional Blanco and Colorado parties won an executive position in Uruguay since 1830 (first elections). The entire history of bipartidism was put into question. 37

But the growth of the Frente Amplio in Montevideo took the party a great effort (Luna 2007). They needed a larger voting bloc than the traditional educated middle class. Squatters and potential squatters were among those constituents parties started to compete for, especially after the 1984 election. The following extract from an interview with a campaign advisor of the Frente Amplio, clearly illustrates the deliberate attempt of the party to reach out to squatters:

–In the 1984 campaign, we couldn’t really enter into a squatter settlement. You had to look at it from the outside.
MJ –You didn’t enter because you couldn’t or because the Frente Amplio wasn’t interested at the time?
–Both. It wasn’t a territory of the left, and there wasn’t interest. You didn’t enter. They didn’t exist. Squatter settlements were not on the visual spectrum of the left, in the imaginary of the left. In 1989 things were different. The key, was Tabaré [Vásquez], a charismatic figure. But it was a complete

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37 Number of land invasions in post-electoral years during the study period: 1 in 1947, 0 in 1951, 0 in 1955, 0 in 1959, 2 in 1963, 0 in 1967, 1 in 1971, 10 in 1985, 41 in 1990, 17 in 1995, 5 in 2000.
novelty. The left entering a squatter settlement!!…wow!!!. It was very new, and then in 94, bang!!, everything exploded. You entered and it was like deification. I remember an image in the *Tres Ombues* settlement: Arana [current Housing Minister] and Astori [current Economy Minister] on a scavenger’s cart, and people were taking them as if they were carnival queens…it was unbelievable. And they were followed by a huge parade. Unbelievable. That was definitely a turning point that continues until today.

But the *Frente Amplio* was not just any political party breaking bipartidism and increasing the electoral competition for the poor. It was a party from the left. And this had some connotations both for politicians and the people that seemed to have impacted on land invasions. My fieldwork suggested that on the one hand, some politicians and militants from the *Frente Amplio* actively promoted land invasions and, on the other hand, some people assumed that a government from the left was going to be friendly with squatters, especially with organized squatters. Because of the relevance of this turning point in the history of land squatting in Montevideo, I propose zooming in these hypotheses before continuing with the description of the whole cycle.

4.1.3.1 From the squatters’ side

According to one of the social workers I interviewed, this was “a time of hope” for many, especially for social movements. People with housing needs were not an exception and some also saw an opportunity in the *Frente Amplio* municipal government. I found some evidence that in 1990, and also throughout this first and later during the second period of the *Frente Amplio* administration, there were expectations that a leftist government would be more permissive and generous with squatters and attend their demands for titling and services.
For the leader of a squatter settlement that started in 1990, a man of the left himself, their land invasion was directly associated with the Frente Amplio's new administration. As he remembers it:

The municipal government of Tabaré [he refers to the first leftist city major, Tabaré Vázquez, later elected president of Uruguay in 2004] was in its full peak. There was a very special enthusiasm. They supported the people who approached the city government with a good project, people that wanted to do things the right way.

This perception that if they were “doing things the right way” the municipal government was going to be on their side, is present in many of my interviews with early residents of invasions of that first period of leftist city government. By that, they meant things such as being organized as a group, planning the invasion, and only including people that were going to live in the neighborhood (rather than speculators). Another leader of a land invasion from 1993 remembers:

The fact that the left won the municipal government generated in one way or another conditions in the sense that people had a priori some guarantees of not being repressed, some framework for negotiation that maybe they wouldn’t have with other governments. So, I think that’s why in those years the process of land squatting accelerated, and I think that was something good.

In fact, those expectations were more than fulfilled for him and other young friends from the Communist Party who organized this particular land invasion. After an initial month of uncertainty, in which the initial group started to clean the abandoned plot, discuss the rules, and select the newcomers among many that came hoping they could squat there, they asked and got a meeting with the mayor. Given that the plot was privately owned, their goal was to have the municipal government expropriate it so that then they could negotiate directly with the government. Sebastián remembers being a bit scared when he went to that meeting, but it turned out better than he could have ever thought.
It was a working meeting. Tabaré [Vazquez] received us with a map of the plot that we had squatted and he even told us the plot was bigger than what we had thought. We didn’t have accurate information. We just had oral information; we didn’t have any documents. (…) We asked him if we could accept more people from our waiting list. We agreed and went back with the news that we could increase the family. So, I think that the history of Youth 14 has been (…) relatively easy. It included a lot of sacrifice from the people, but that happened everywhere. But we had great advantages. We made a good presentation of ourselves, our situation and the families’ profiles…we had a survey of the number of kids, I mean…I think in some way if there was political willingness, those things matter a lot.

Thus far I have explained this peak as a result of electoral competition and the (sometimes accurate) expectations from squatters that their situation would be supported under a leftist government. But there were other mechanisms behind this peak as well as under the subsequent wave of land invasions during the 1990s: direct promotion by some political leaders and local brokers. No party or faction programmatically promoted land squatting. Yet there were some people and groups within factions that did act as active promoters.

4.1.3.2 From the politicians’ side

Politicians may help squatters for strategic reasons. I have found examples of this throughout the cycle of land invasions in Montevideo and from the whole political spectrum. Yet what happened during the first years of the Frente Amplio city government within this party was different. Some helped squatters also for ideological reasons. Once in the city government, there were different perspectives about how to administer the city, specifically about what to do with those in need. While some promoted centralized city planning, with great control of the
expansion of the city – the official position - some explicitly promoted land invasions. For the latter, invading was giving good use to vacant land. It was a sort of *sui generis* land reform.

The clearest exponent of this vision has been Jorge Zabalza, once a member of the *Tupamaros* guerrilla movement, imprisoned during the Uruguayan dictatorship, then member of the *MPP* faction of the Frente Amplio (the most radical faction), now independent, former city councilor and president of the City Council (1995-2000), and who lives in a squatter settlement in the West of Montevideo. Unlike many elusive references to the role of politicians into squatting, Zabalza spoke to me upfront and proudly about his role:

I was very much involved with squatter settlements because we [his political faction back then, the MPP] had defined it. We had the idea that it was good that people self managed their own problems. And the problem of housing was very important and massive around 1987-88 in Montevideo (...). And squatter settlements were the concrete form of that idea of people self managing themselves. There was something like a peak in which people organized themselves, occupied land, divided the individual plots...all in assemblies. You worked in assembly. You marked the streets, the places for common use like the soup kitchen, or the field for baby-soccer, according to the willingness of each settlement. And then you would start trying to get light, water and so on. (...) I can even today walk around some squatter settlements and find people that remember something like a stellar moment in their lives, in which they felt the main characters, doing the things, fighting. (...) But the result was very good, because the figure I read some time ago was that 11 % of Montevideo’s population is on occupied land.

The centrality of Zabalza in the wave of land invasions around the 1990 peak and during that decade appears in multiple other voices. He is remembered by politicians and squatters as one

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38 This urban guerrilla movement, active in Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s, was also known as MLN (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional* or National Liberation Movement). When, after the dictatorship, they entered into Frente Amplio as an electoral force, they formed a coalition with other groups and changed their name to MPP (*Movimiento de Participación Popular* or Popular Participation Movement).
who “organized land invasions.” During my fieldwork, he was one of the most mentioned persons.

A very active militant from the Socialist Party I interviewed remembered with a smile the 90s decade, in which he helped organize some settlements. He told me that despite the political differences he had with Zabalza, they worked together organizing squatter settlements. “We divided Montevideo in two” –he tells me remembering that while Zabalza worked more with squatters in the West of Montevideo, he worked more in the Eastern periphery of the city. Squatters also remembered Zabalza. He helped directly at least five of the 25 squatter settlements in which I conducted ethnographic fieldwork. When I asked Beatriz, the astonishingly articulate leader of a squatter settlement about why they settled in 1991 rather than before or later, she told me:

Well, we have to acknowledge that Zabalza had started to organize squatter settlements. He would come and have talks with me. He used to come to my house or we would meet somewhere. He had a comité de base (local party committee) nearby around 1988-89 and well, I was involved with them [she voted for the MPP in the last few elections]. And he always gave us guidelines about how to organize ourselves, how to organize people, how processes were going and we had information about which pieces of land where city owned and which ones were not.

According to Garcé (2006) this support for squatters was part of broader tensions between the official Frente Amplio position and that of the tupamaros at the beginning of the leftist administration. It was part of the tupamaros’ “insurrectional view,” their attempts to radicalize the popular classes, and their contempt for “bourgeois institutions” such as the private property.
Yet Zabalza and other *tupamaros* were not the only ones criticizing the official government position against land invasions as too technocratic and far from people’s needs.\(^3^9\) I also found some other individual politicians who were city councilors or local councilors in the first *Frente Amplio* city government who held this vision.

With time, this ideological defense of squatters disappeared within the *Frente Amplio*. The experience of more than 15 years of city government seems to have taught everybody that land invasions bring a lot of problems to the administration. This may be related to the decline of land invasions in the last years, the final striking feature of the cycle analyzed here.

### 4.1.4 Decline

Since about 2000 land invasions in Montevideo became rare events almost as rare as before the 1990s.\(^4^0\) Of course, since my data stops in 2004, it is too soon to draw any definite conclusion, but the fact that land invasions did not explode with the 2002 Uruguayan economic crisis is something remarkable.\(^4^1\) It is in fact one of the main reasons behind my hypothesis that something more than economic hardship has been behind land invasions. If poverty skyrocketed

\(^{3^9}\) As evident from the previous quote from Sebastián, from *Youth 14*, in which the squatter leader mentions the great help of then mayor Tabaré Vázquez, the official position was sometimes violated. This might have been for strategic reasons, that is to say, to avoid the political cost of evictions or because reality was just overwhelming and the only thing politicians in office could do was to help them build decent neighborhoods.

\(^{4^0}\) To add to the graphical representations of the cycle, the average yearly number of land invasions per decade is perhaps illuminating: 0.4 land invasions per year for the period 1950-59; 0.9 for 1960-69; 2.8 for 1970-79; 5 for 1980-89; 14.6 for 1990-99; and 3.4 for 2000-2004.

\(^{4^1}\) As mentioned before, already existing squatter settlements, however, seem to keep growing in population because of newcomers but mainly because of internal growth (i.e. births, formation of new households). Still, comparative figures are not available. It was not only until the last 2004 population count (it was not a complete census) that the National Institute of Statistics included an item identifying if houses were located in a squatter settlement or not, and made sure informal city areas were covered. According to this population count, in 2004 there were 144,707 people living in Montevideo’s squatter settlements, that is 10.9% of the city’s population, in 39,116 houses.
in 2003 and 2004 reaching 40.9% of Uruguayan households, almost doubling the percentages for the 1990s decade (Arim and Vigorito 2007), why did land invasions decay rather than increase?

One could imagine many factors that could plausibly explain this decline. Perhaps the most obvious one is the simple fact that most mobilization cycles tend to have an inverted U shape. Mobilization does not last forever. Yet that does not explain why decline happens at specific times. Another simple hypothesis is that vacant land is scarcer now, and it is in comparison to the past. Yet according to some of the experts I interviewed, there are still many free spaces in the city, especially in the periphery. Something related to the management of that vacant land is perhaps closer to reality. Two hypotheses about land management may help explain the recent decline in land invasions: legal changes and increasing government and citizens´ responsibility.

4.1.4.1 Legal changes

The first hypothesis is a recent harshening of property laws that makes evictions more likely and therefore increases the costs of invading. The wave of land invasions that started with the peak of 1989-90 encountered legislation that made it difficult for land owners to evict squatters as well as a weak policing of vacant land. This slowly changed first in practice and more recently formally.

First of all, even though property is a constitutional right, the Uruguayan Constitution includes “decent housing” as a right as well (article 45). Squatters are located in the legal limbo between these two rights. They might have violated property rights but they are exercising their

\[42\] The literature on Land Economics emphasizes the importance of the costs of squatting for the likelihood of people doing so. The probability of eviction increases those costs. For an economic analysis of land invasions for the Uruguayan case, see: (Amarante and Caffera 2003) Unfortunately, the authors did not have the data to test their model, but they suggest interesting avenues for analysis.
housing rights. More practically, until recently once an invasion occurred, it was legally and bureaucratically difficult to evict settlers. Unless the owner – either the state or a private one - filed a report in the first 48 hours of the land invasion, the police could not evict settlers. After that time, and especially after settlers had started to build, it became difficult to evict them. After the first 48 hours, the owner needed to start a legal eviction trial procedure, which could take its time. If a year passed and settlers never used violence, they acquired “possession rights.” The Uruguayan Civil Code legislates over “possession” by saying that “that one that has possessed a good [including land] quietly and publicly without interruption acquires the right of possession.”

Since squatters do not tend to use violence to get into a plot,⁴³ if a year passes because the owner did not realize her plot had been invaded or because after realizing she spent too much time in legal paperwork, then squatters have the right of possessing the plot. Besides, in an eviction trial squatters could argue a “state of necessity,” one of the excuses for breaking the law and being exempt of responsibility in the Uruguayan Criminal Code. Defined as a situation in which the

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⁴³ Since squatters take over empty plots they do not need violence. During my fieldwork, some squatters emphasized that they had not even broken the wire fence, which can be legally considered as violent usurpation of another’s property. None of my informants in the 25 cases I studied more in depth recalled deaths or injuries in the process of squatting nor did I find any reports of deaths or injuries in the Uruguayan press. The most hostile situations were those in which the police appeared at the invasion site. In 8 out of the 25 cases I found a police presence at the invasion. These were all planned invasions. In five of these cases, the police came and held a group for some hours and then freed them, leaving the issue to a judge. Sometimes a police officer stayed at the invasion site for weeks or months to prevent more squatters from joining. But squatters tend to remember a police presence as threatening (“they came with their clubs”), but only two of the stories were traumatic. In one case, a squatter remembers resisting the police officers trying to destroy their tents. In another case, squatters remember officers and municipal staff besieging the group of early settlers to prevent their building or leaving until authorities came up with a solution to the situation. One of these squatters remembers that if you dared to leave the seized plot, the police would beat you. She was pregnant and with two children at the time, and her friends would come and bring her milk and diapers. When another organized group invaded a plot owned by the navy, thinking it was an abandoned private plot, the military reacted immediately. As one leader remembers, “It was a very harsh eviction. It was a military owned plot so the codes there where militar codes. People were shocked but in reality the procedure was not something unexpected if you consider we were invading that plot, you know? But yes, they besieged the area with navy trucks in the main roads, and marines entered with dogs and clubs. There was no chance of dialog.” Even so, no one spoke of injury. The group left the plot without resisting, but got together at a nearby bus station and planned the invasion of another plot the following morning.
person is acting “to defend her life, physical integrity, freedom, honor or patrimony,” the “state of necessity” was argued by lawyers and judges who defended squatters in eviction cases.

During my fieldwork I found these legal interstices reflected on squatters’ practices. To mention just some examples, when asked if they thought they were breaking the law when they squatted, most residents answered “no.” Some referred to their right to housing, such as a woman who argued they were not breaking anything “because housing is a right by law,” or another resident who was conscious of his going against other people’s property but justified it by saying “you feel you are breaking a rule, but you also feel that the rule is wrong” – and he adds - “there’s also the use value of the plot…before we invaded it, it was a garbage dump.” There were also some that did not even understand the question, because they did not perceive the practice of squatting as something outside the ordinary.

Many of the planned land invasions occurred on weekends or holidays. Far from random, the choice of date responded to the intention of letting 48 hours pass without a report, and start building so it became difficult for the owner to evict them. Even if the police came and wanted to evict them, bureaucratic paperwork made it difficult. As one leader of an invasion in municipal land remembers:

The municipality came several times with trucks and the police and we entrenched ourselves and often three or four ended up at the police station. I was always among them. (..). They came and wanted to destroy the tents and some of us fought so they didn’t take down our houses and some of us went to the police station. They put us in the waiting room, because someone had to go and sign a report saying that we were intruders. Since sometimes nobody went and 12, 24 and even 48 hours had passed, the captain started asking himself what to do with us. Without somebody filing a report they could not send us to a judge. And we fought because… what was the solution?

Politicians, in turn, remember being constrained by the legal procedures. As an example, when I asked the current Housing Ministry, Mariano Arana, and former Montevideo major for
two periods (1995-2004), about what they used to do when they knew of a new land invasion, he said:

We tried to avoid it, but it wasn’t easy. If they were organized, it wasn’t easy. Besides…legislation….You had to be previously informed to be able to proceed in the first 24-48 hours. After that, eviction was difficult.

Some lawyers and judges helped squatters by judging squatting under the realm of civil rights rather than for the crime of usurpation, and arguing the mentioned state of necessity. Yet this favorable situation for squatters has changed. According to Helios Sarthou –a lawyer that has helped many squatters with legal advice, who is also a former senator and representative for the Frente Amplio, and that I interviewed because his name kept appearing in my fieldwork- since about the year 2000 it is more difficult to defend occupations of land, buildings or individual houses. He pointed at two different moments in the legality of squatting.

What makes the difference? I remember it perfectly. It was an instruction they gave to all attorneys. And it coincides with the government of Jorge Battle [president from 1999 to 2004, from the Colorado party]. Attorneys started to prosecute squatters with an absolute insensitivity to their social condition. They give them 48 hours [to evict] (...) Until this decision, which was taken in the political sphere and reflected itself in the attorneys’ decisions, we had room for judicial debate, for invoking the “state of necessity” which is true…What more “state of necessity” you can find that a person that is left on the street from night to morning and has to occupy somewhere? There’s such insensitivity. 44

44 Besides Dr. Sarthou I interviewed other two lawyers that have helped squatters with legal advice. Dr. Sarthou was the most mentioned among residents, however. In two neighborhoods, squatters told me he helped them directly. In one case, he gave advice to one of the leaders when she got notified that she and her family were going to be evicted. She was from his same political party and fraction and he was a representative at the time. In a different case, one of the leaders told me they had invited all political parties to an assembly when they settled and that Sarthou had come and advised them to divide the plots and leave ample streets so they could get an early state regularization since, even though they were on private land, the owner owed too much money to the state. “He gave us the strength –this leader remembers- to build houses with solid materials and so people started building.” Sarthou was a senator then. In two other oral histories, he appeared as someone who helped squatters in general but not them in particular. Finally, the day I interviewed him, while waiting in the very old law office in the center of

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This perceived harshening of the legal procedures against squatters, crystallized recently with a 2007 reform to the Criminal Code. A new law not only makes it easier to denounce cases of property *usurpation* but also broadens what is considered usurpation. While before only a judge could denounce usurpation in the first 48 hours of its happening, now any witness can, anytime. Besides, while before only clandestine or violent invasions were considered usurpation cases, now any invasion of property, even if it occurs during the day and without any use of force, is considered usurpation of someone else’s property and therefore a crime. This new law, originally intended for invasions of houses in the prestigious *Punta del Este* seaside resort, has in practice also affected the land invasions studied here. 45

In sum, the legal interstices on which squatters could rely to invade a plot without being evicted have shrunk significantly. Yet besides changes in the legal management of land, I believe political management of the land has also changed. This constitutes the second and last hypothesis for the recent decline in the number of land invasions.

Montevideo, I noticed something curious. Hanging from the faded walls of the tiny waiting room there were lots of brass plaques from different unions or groups of workers thanking him. There was one little plaque thanking Dr. Sarthou “for his selfless work for the neighbors of the neighborhood 19 de Abril,” a squatter settlement that started in 1990, the year of the greatest peak. 45

Law Nº 18116, which substitutes article 354 of the Criminal Code, approved unanimously by all legislators on April 10th, 2007. It was a change triggered by some occupations of houses in the luxurious seaside resort *Punta del Este*. Since these houses tend to be used only over the summer and remain alone the rest of the year, they are difficult for owners to police. (The old and new texts as well as the justification of the project and the discussions in both chambers are available at [www.parlamento.gub.uy](http://www.parlamento.gub.uy)). Although the law states the usurpation happening in a seaside resort as an aggravating factor, it technically applies to the entire country. Thus, it applies to invasions such as those for squatting, for cooperative housing building or for production by rural workers. Because of this, the law has received criticism from social movements and some sectors of the left. In an article published by FUCVAM, the movement for cooperative housing, titled “Will there be land for the poor?” they severely criticize the law by pointing at the consequences it can have “criminalizing land invasions of workers that are just using a survival strategy under conditions of gradual de-industrialization and recent cyclical crisis and had to choose between eating or paying rent.” They call for looking at the causes of land invasions rather than prosecuting them. (Accessed May 26, 2007 [http://www.fucvam.org.uy](http://www.fucvam.org.uy)). Apparently these dissident voices have been heard since legislators from the *Frente Amplio* have developed a project to modify this article again going back to considering it usurpation only if it is violent and clandestine and allowing only owners, or people that prove to be related to them, to report it. This in turn, has received criticism from the opposition, but the issue has not been formally treated in the legislature.
4.1.4.2 Increasing government responsibility for the land

Another emergent hypothesis from my fieldwork is that what changed was the increasing responsibility by government and by ordinary citizens about vacant land. A new squatter settlement is a problem to the city government which has to spend money taking services to faraway places. Helping them now will probably bring problems later. Besides, when a vacant land is perceived as an important space by citizens, it becomes more likely that they denounce its invasion quickly and that eviction occurs. I will illustrate these two ideas with two examples.

The case of the *El Cambio* land invasion illustrates the increasing awareness of the city government, and of the *Frente Amplio* government in particular, that helping squatters can be problematic. This invasion occurred in October 2004, right before the election that put the leftist coalition in the national government for the first time in Uruguayan history. In fact, the invasion was named after the *Frente Amplio’s* campaign that year: *El Cambio* (The Change). Located in one of the areas of the city with the largest number of land invasions, *El Cerro*, with a tradition of working class organization and with a permissive local government, *El Cambio* was not evicted immediately. Yet contrary to what happened to most land invasions in this area, after a period of hesitation and after a change in local authorities, the local council this time decided to oppose this invasion. Moreover, it wrote a formal declaration opposing any new land invasion in the area.

This case marks the beginning of a new stage in the *Frente Amplio* government of the city. Perhaps because of the responsibility or the learning gained in the 15 years in charge of the city government, or perhaps because of the leverage gained by winning also the national government for the first time, the leftist administration is working hard to avoid new land invasions, even if that disappoints part of its constituency. As one of the former local authorities
of the Cerro local council told me when I asked him about this specific event: “We made many mistakes. It’s impossible to govern without experience. Governing means knowing, understanding, and we used to make many stupid mistakes.”

Finally, a “no case” or a case of a failed land invasion illustrates the increasing responsibility of citizens for vacant land, especially when perceived as of having collective interest. When a group of young neighbors from Brandi, another working class neighborhood, invaded the soccer field of the neighborhood and started dividing the plot and building tents, neighbors reacted quickly. They called the local authorities who despite the fact that it was a weekend, acted quickly enough to evict the people in less than 48 hours. As one of the neighbors told me: “we were there at 8 am on a Saturday morning; we were with the local authorities, the neighborhood association and also municipal staff.” A former city councilor remembers this event with pride. She remembers the city council mediated in this conflict in order to avoid both the invasion and a violent eviction. 46

In sum, I suggest that the responsibility for and the policing of vacant land has increased both from local governments and citizens and that this might explain at least part of the recent decline in the number of land invasions in Montevideo.

4.2 TYPES: DISCOVERING HETEROGENEITY

In this chapter, I have treated land invasions as if they were homogeneous. I have described the cycle of invasions and suggested explanations for its different periods and main features. In this

46 Interview with Delia Rodriguez, city councilor from the Socialist Party from 2000 to 2005 and current vice-director of the Program for the Integration of Squatter Settlements (PIAI).
section, I will add yet another important layer of complexity: the different types of land
invasions. Land invasions vary in many ways: in their landscape, their area, their location and so
forth. Because of the main questions of this dissertation, I will emphasize one type of variation:
settlement formation. I distinguish three types of settlement formation, based on my fieldwork in
Montevideo. Accretion invasions are those that are formed gradually and without planning;
planned invasions are those that involve some degree of organization before the invasion and at
least during the first days or months of settlement; and finally subdivision and sale are those that
start because an entrepreneur divides a piece of land and sells parcels in a transaction that has
some level of illegality.

As chapter 5 will develop, I believe the moment of settlement formation, when the first
people invade a land, to be an important contentious moment. It is contentious because it goes
against property rights. It is important because it tends to have a long lasting impact on such
neighborhood characteristics as spatial design, community organization and services. To start
with a visual image of this long-lasting effect, Figures 6 and 7 show two land invasions with very
different origins.
Figure 6: Aerial Picture of the squatter settlement *Acosta y Lara*, formed by accretion (by Google Earth).

Figure 7: Aerial picture of the squatter settlement *COTRAVI*, a planned land invasion (by Google Earth).
4.2.1 Land invasions by accretion

Box 1: A story of an accretion invasion

The name of the settlement, as the state and people around the neighborhood know it, is Acosta y Lara, like the street that forms one of the neighborhood boundaries. It is not a name that settlers have chosen but was chosen by others to identify a settlement without a name. The neighborhood is located in a thin stretch of land in between that street and a polluted stream (see figure 6). Crammed with houses, the only open space is the irregular narrow passages that go through it. Unlike most accretion invasions in Montevideo, houses are poor but built with solid materials, thanks to the help of a local NGO. Yet their quality depends on their location. Walking towards the end of the neighborhood bordering the stream, the landscape becomes denser and poorer. Garbage is everywhere with dogs and horses eating from it, and a putrefactive smell becomes more penetrating.

A group of 4 or 5 shacks were there by the end of the 1950s but most arrived slowly during the 60s decade. Many were migrants from other areas of Uruguay, coming to the capital. José, 48, current neighborhood president and a temporary construction worker, moved to this neighborhood with his parents when he was very little. They used to live in a formal working class peripheral neighborhood in Montevideo, but – he remembers - they could not pay the rent because they did not have regular jobs. His grandparents had been among the first comers, and they settled somewhere in 1956-57. At the beginning people worked selling sand from the stream’s bank for construction, until the sand was over. There was no neighborhood association then. As José describes it:

There was no organization, no structure. Nobody told you this is your plot. There was no limit. So people would come and fence in the parcel they wanted. Some took too much. Many people from the interior of the country started to come. A family would come and then that family told other families “come to Montevideo. At least here you don’t have to pay rent, you live in a shack, and there are some jobs” (...) My grandparents came with a plastic tent and then, I remember that they built a house with mud, reeds and cane, all from the swamp that used to be here. (...) People cooked with fire (...) They found their way to survive.

Many years ago an NGO started working there and due to that external intervention a neighborhood association was generated, named La Esperanza (Hope), of which José is the president. José is a very articulate and empowered man but, he told me, most of his neighbors feel ashamed to speak in public. They always rely on him to talk to authorities. They feel they do not know how to speak.

Because it has been there for decades and because of its very poor landscape, many call it cantegril (see chapter 2 for the history of this term). Since the settlement is located close to one of the most affluent areas of the city, there had been pressures for relocation. During the dictatorship, some of the settlers were relocated and their houses bulldozed. Outside neighbors accuse squatters of robbery. José recognizes that some people in the settlement do rob but he says that they also do it inside the settlement, and that it is only a small group. “They can’t put us all in the same bag” –he protests. He is angry at that stigma. Denouncing the thieves is difficult – he says - because people fear retaliation against their families. “It is difficult to work together” against this problem –
José adds. In fact, it has been difficult to work together for many things, such as bringing light to the neighborhood. Although there have always been some neighbors willing to work for the neighborhood, in general associations have been very fragile.

There might be changes in the future, however, since this settlement is entering into the state regularization program. The State will introduce sewage and other public services, and will propose a different map of the neighborhood that will involve relocation of many dwellers, perhaps to some place outside this plot, because there is no room for everybody. It is still to be seen how successful the state and the neighborhood association are in this process. It is still to be seen if this intervention can undo the legacy of an accretion land settlement.

Figure 6 shows a typical Montevideo land invasion formed by *accretion*. In these invasions land was occupied gradually, without organization or planning. After the first family or group of families invaded a land, more residents started coming gradually. There was generally no political intervention at the beginning, no apparent government involvement, neither formal nor informal. There was no neighborhood association or local leader assigning plots, drawing blocks and streets, or selecting newcomers and this is reflected in the outline of the neighborhood. When I asked María, a resident of a very poor squatter settlement in the North East of Montevideo, whose family was among the first ones to invade the today packed neighborhood, if someone had told them where to build or how much land they could take, she explained:

No, no, everyone took a piece of land. Now, there’s no more land. I'll tell you. We are a big family.

We must have about 40 square meters [about 400 square feet] and we have 3 houses there and we also have the sheds for the horses, because we have animals, you know?

María’s family knew about this abandoned plot because they used to live in front of it, in public housing. They had moved out public housing to a town outside Montevideo but things did not go well there economically and they moved back to their old neighborhood. As she remembers it, “we came back to the neighborhood. The only choice we had was to build a shack in the middle
of that lot. With time, more people started to come and a neighborhood started to grow. I think it has more than 400 families now.”

Accretion settlements are generally crowded groups of small shacks, with no public space or streets. Services are scarce. Settlers tend to provide themselves with water and light by “hooking” themselves to the main lines. Typical houses are very poorly built, with materials owners find in the garbage such as metal sheets and wood. Piles of smelling garbage, horses, carts, and other indications of scavenging are common in their landscape.

One of the main features of accretion invasions is their invisibility. As a resident of one of the settlements I visited told me, “this neighborhood was never in the map, never. When we tried to get the phone line, they didn’t find the address. The neighborhood did not exist.” Invisibility derives from a lack of contact with the state, which in turn reveals negligence both from a state that does not come and a generally nonexistent neighborhood association that does not demand.

There is generally no collective history of the neighborhood but a multiplicity of histories. When I asked Jacqueline, a resident of an accretion settlement who works at a scrap dealing family business, if there was any NGO working in the neighborhood she answered, “I can tell you about this part of the neighborhood [the one visible from her location]. Maybe someone that lives there can tell you about that part, but I can’t.” A telling indicator of this is that having applied the same oral history questionnaire – with adjustments - to first residents of planned and accretion invasions, while interviews in the first type of neighborhood lasted on
average one hour, they lasted only half an hour on average for accretion invasions, and this after probing as much as I could.47

In general, I did not find neighborhood associations or leaders. When there were, it was in those cases in which an external agent such as an NGO or the government regularization program (PIAI) had motivated the election of neighborhood representatives. Early residents are the ones that have some attributes of leadership, since they have been there for the longest time. When other people arrived the newcomers asked them if they could stay. Sometimes neighbors rely on them for help. But they do not tend to be bridges to the outside world, like leaders of other neighborhoods. Nor do they assume the task of guaranteeing the wellbeing of the neighbors.

Perhaps because of this lack of collective history and leadership, collective action problems are common. Residents often speak of lack of trust, fragile neighborhood organizations that last very briefly, neighbors stealing collective goods such as food from the soup kitchen, etc. This resident’s appreciation of her neighborhood illustrates this:

Everyone pulls towards his side, to find things for himself and not to help the neighborhood. My father was about to participate in a neighborhood association but everyone wanted a bite, and that's not it…If you are fighting for the neighborhood it shouldn’t be because what you really want is to get a job in the municipal government. Everyone pulls towards his side. That's why it never worked. I have known at least 4 or 5 neighborhood associations, but they don't last.

Politicians did not appear spontaneously in squatters’ narratives when I asked about the history of the neighborhood. When I asked, residents saw politicians as very distant, not caring about them and trying to use them. José, from one of the accretion invasions I visited, told me

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47 Visits lasted longer. Averages only refer to the recorded part of the interview. See the questionnaire in the Appendix.
“nobody ever did anything for this neighborhood.” And another resident critically answered that politicians “always came five or six months before the elections but they never came to say (…) They never give you anything! They build their fame with you. They come, they film you and then you are there [on TV] showing the poverty in Uruguay.” For him, “those at the top are all a band of liars.”

When asked “which are the three persons or institutions that helped the neighborhood the most,” people had trouble answering. The most common answers, after hesitating, were “nobody” or the name of some NGO working in their neighborhoods. In fact, even though some of these NGOs if not all of them have projects funded by the state, squatters do not perceive the state presence.
4.2.2 Planned invasions

Box 2. A story of a planned invasion

*Villa Libre* (Freedom Village) was founded in December 1995. A group of about 20 young and middle aged people had been meeting for about a month at a soup kitchen in *El Cerro* neighborhood to plan a land seizure. They did not all know each other from before but they all learned about the plot through friends, job colleagues or acquaintances. Some were from a group of young anarchist militants and those did know each other. But more than anything what connected them was their common need for housing. They started by exploring different possibilities of plots to invade. Since most of them were from *El Cerro* – an organized working class neighborhood in Montevideo, with a tradition of union participation and, more recently, leftist voting - they started to look for plots there. As one of the early settlers who was then renting at a rooming house in the city center told me:

The majority, who were people from the soup kitchen, people from the FAU (Anarchist Federation of Uruguay), they wanted the plot to be in El Cerro. For people like me who were not from El Cerro, we didn’t care.

They also wanted a place from where they could go to their jobs easily. When they felt ready, they invaded a private plot from the *Frigorífico Nacional*, once a huge meat processing plant that gave jobs to many but that is now closed like many other similar plants and industries in the area. Since that plot had been abandoned for many years, they thought it was a safe one. They invaded on a Friday night, trusting nobody would notice them over the weekend. But the police came that same evening and held some of the men overnight. They freed them the following morning with the ultimatum of leaving that plot immediately. Squatters decided to cross the street and invade a public park. The police came and this time took some of the women. They were the ones at the camping site while most men were asking for donations in street markets or searching for advice on what to do. Settlers asked a local lawyer for help and she put them in touch with some other lawyers. The group started to shrink because some people got scared with the eviction threats.

After holding the group of settlers at the police station for a day, they released them the following morning telling them they needed to leave that public land. On January 6, a holiday in Uruguay, municipal staff came with an eviction order and starting charging settlers’ belongings and told them they needed to come with them. They took them to another plot. Residents remember this as a confusing event, because trucks were private and the eviction order was not signed by a judge. They feel the Mayor wanted to get them out of the park and since he could not do it legally, he hired private trucks on a holiday to be able to do it. They also remember this day with anger since the trucks were completely careless with their belongings and just threw them on this new plot. Since now they had been taken to a private plot, the owner – a neighborhood soccer club - also wanted to evict them. The group started to fight with the local government asking them for a solution. If the municipality had
evicted them from the park, now they had to find them a solution. The group became stronger, choosing some representatives in charge of talking to authorities but deciding everything in assemblies. Pedro, one of the representatives, was chosen because he had previous experience in a land invasion, “he had contacts, and he knew how to move himself and whom to talk to” – as another settler told me. They started to fight with the local government and in the end they gave them another plot in which they could stay. Residents remember different sectors of the leftist municipal government fighting for the decision to evict them or not. The fact that most of the invaders were leftist militants was an asset, according to Darío:

> When the local government came and saw some of us here, they said ‘Wow, you were here?’ It was as if they came with a position and when they saw there were people from their political sector, they changed.

This picture shows the group in these early belligerent days, when they were starting to settle and build. The neighborhood flag on the background shows the symbolic ties to the broader neighborhood, *El Cerro*, by a drawing of the *El Cerro* hill, geographic feature that gives name and symbolic recognition to this working class neighborhood.

![Image of the group in early days](image)

After a period of confrontation with authorities, the local council assigned them another plot. It was next to two other land invasions, but rather than join either of them, the group wanted to form its own neighborhood. “We had different ways to see things and different ways to decide. We stayed apart” – one early resident remembers. Some of those differences were political, since the other neighborhoods had connections with the traditional rightist parties.

Early times were tough because they had to clean the plot, smooth it, and start building everything. They planned streets and blocks, with the hope that one day they would become regularized, that is, they would receive their property titles and urban services and, in the end, become an ordinary city neighborhood. They started
building their shacks. The group built a house for one of the residents who was a single mother. A group was in charge of cooking for everybody. They remember this as a time of solidarity. They discussed with local authorities the criteria for selecting new residents. Although authorities only wanted to accept families with children, since some of the group were single men, they fought to change that criterion. Newcomers could not have incomes superior to 3 minimum salaries. They had a deadline to build something with solid materials. This left out very poor people who could not build anything but a shack. They did not allow people with horses or other animals, which left scavengers out. In an assembly they decided they did not want anybody from the military, strike breakers, or thieves. They quickly got services such as water and light by directly asking the relevant state agencies, and often also asking the local council for help. They brought services for the whole area that the nearby settlements had never managed to get. They were always distrustful of politicians. They did not want to feel used. But they were very pragmatic at the same time:

*We were always rebellious with that (...) We used to go to the City Council or wherever and we talked to everybody, blancos, colorados, frenteamplistas. If someone opened the doors to us and offered something, we were there (...) Here in the local government, many times we went and told them “ok, you are closing us the doors, we go somewhere else.*

After the first two years, participation started to decline. Some of the initial settlers had moved out. According to Pedro, “Divisions started when people began to sell parcels and leave.” And he adds –“That’s when respect was over (...) it’s hurtful...after all this sacrifice.” Pedro and Nelly, early founders who are still in the neighborhood association, say people do not want to participate. “Everybody complains because the neighborhood association doesn’t do this or that – Nelly explains, - but whenever we call a meeting to choose representatives, everybody votes for us because nobody wants to be responsible for this...and with the years you get tired.” But Darío, one of the early comers who is not participating in the neighborhood anymore, says that the neighborhood association is sold out, that they do not confront any more the local government but just does what they want them to do.

The neighborhood association’s main goal remains as it was in 1995: getting regularized. Although they are included among the settlements to be regularized, it is still unclear when that will happen. The State runs on slow time. The first time they asked for a school was in 1998. In 2007, when I conducted fieldwork, it was under construction.

Figure 7 shows a typical *planned invasion* from Montevideo, seen from the air. These invasions generally happened suddenly, and were thought out by either one person or a group. People may have kept arriving on the following days and months, but a first group came together and seized the plot, generally over night and on a weekend or holiday in order to avoid attention
from police and owners. They required some prior organization at least to find out about available plots and decide which one to seize and when to do it. Research about available and safe plots, that is state owned land or private land whose owners had died or had not paid taxes in a while, often included contacts with politicians or state officials who had that type of information. It was not uncommon for the group to confront authorities, the police or the owner in the first days of the invasion. Still, besides perhaps 24 hours of detention at the police station and, even less likely, relocation by the authorities after some fighting, eviction was very rare. From the start, an (often self proclaimed) leader or group started dividing the plot into smaller parcels, drawing streets and leaving some room for community buildings or public spaces. This planning imitated the urban planning and the norms of the outside formal city. This person or group often crafted some neighborhood rules, including rules for selecting newcomers.

These rules often reflected the intention of not being like an accretion invasion or, in a resident’s words “we didn’t want this to be a cantegril. (…) What we always tried, the idea, was to build a neighborhood.” Another resident spoke of planning the neighborhood as a collective project, a “vision.”

You have to have a certain vision. That’s the difference between asentamientos and cantegriles. And there are asentamientos that end up being cantegriles. And there are others that end up being a barrio (neighborhood). If you have the vision that you don’t want to live in a cantegril and want to build a barrio, then you have to do what the state doesn’t do. The state often plans the city. Since the state is not planning [your settlement] then you have to do some planning yourself so one day the state can bring you some services and you can develop. If you don’t have that vision, then you turn into a cantegril.

Some of the neighborhood rules had a class connotation, excluding the poorest of the poor by either prohibiting animals such as the horses used for scavenging, or establishing a
deadline to start building with brick or other (relatively expensive) solid materials. Explaining these rules, residents of three different planned invasions told me:

We were all people of work. If the person had a job, we gave them a parcel. If he didn’t, then we didn’t. Because if you don’t work, what are you going to do, man? You can’t even build one room with cement.

We were not delinquents and here there were no carts, no horses. I mean, there were no people of very low resources. We were really hard working people, workers that needed a house and couldn’t pay the rent (…) We are families of workers [her emphasis] not people that beg or rob. We are people that like to live well but don’t have the means, that’s it. But with dignity, that’s the thing. Because I’m sure that if you now enter into any of these little houses, the humblest you can find, I’m sure it doesn’t stink of dirt, rotten things or animals. [And her husband added] If you bring a black with a cart and a horse….We didn’t want that. We didn’t want to live in the dirt, you know?

We formed a group with people like me, workers, I mean not marginal people, for instance.

The working class identity expressed in this quotes was present in most of my interviewees of planned invasions, that is leaders and non leaders that have lived in the settlements since the early days. It is probably not shared by all residents, but it was part of the project of the neighborhood, of the idea that the early settlers had about where and how they wanted to live, and with whom. Despite the fact that most of them were, at the moment I interviewed them, in low paid informal jobs they defended their identity as workers.

The spatial outline of planned neighborhoods tends to look like the one in figure 7. From the air they look, like this one, like a regular neighborhood. Yet because of the population pressure, especially for internal growth and also because of newcomers, sometimes the original
design starts to fade. Shacks start to appear towards the fringes of the settlement, some families start dividing their parcels either because they sell part of it or because they give a piece to a family member to build a new house there. Population pressure also makes it difficult to maintain public spaces or those plots originally designed for the future construction of a soup kitchen or a neighborhood plaza. The durability of the original design tends to depend on the capacity settlers have to enforce the original rules.

If accretion invasions were characterized by invisibility, planned invasions are generally in the other extreme. They want visibility. They want the state to recognize them, bring services, put them an address so they can have phone and other services, pay the bills and get an ambulance if an emergency happens. They went to be regularized, that is to say, they want the titles of their property. They want to be owners. That was the common answer when I asked about the neighborhood goals, even if some were starting to recognize that they might not be able to afford taxes if regularization becomes true. This search for visibility is also a search for recognition, for belonging, and ultimately for citizenship. Elsewhere I have called it a search to “resist exclusion” (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 [2000]).

Because at least early residents endured together the invasion and the construction of the neighborhood, there is a common narrative of origins among them. Of course there are dissident voices, even among founders, but there are memories of a shared past. This distinguishes the early comers from the late comers. The latter came at different moments in time, when the plot was already seized and the most pressing needs solved, so they did not have the same experiences as the founders. They did not share the experiences and hopes they did at the beginning. Often, this narrative includes epic accounts of how residents fought with the police, filled a swamp with their own hands, purged the neighborhood of a group of thugs by destroying
their shack and entrenching themselves for three days with provisions and arms in case they came for revenge, transformed a garbage dump into a clean and smooth plot, helped each other to build houses, cooked together in a soup kitchen, left their doors open, and displayed all kinds of group solidarity. As an already quoted politician that has helped many squatters put it planned invasions go through a “stellar moment in which people feel they are the main actors of their own lives.”

This real and idealized past is very difficult to transmit to the next generations of dwellers, especially because after a while an informal market tends to appear and people start buying and selling their plots with great rotation of settlers. As Celeste, a settler of a planned invasion nostalgically told me,

> When we came to live here, people cared if you needed money to pay the light, or if you needed some medicine. It was very nice, and it still is, but there are new people now that do not know the habits that we use to have at the beginning. Here, for instance, when the neighborhood started, we said, well if you start a produce store, I start a grocery store, but don't start the same business as me, you know?
> We respected each other to be able to work together, you know?

This “key theme of memory” as another resident put it, often translates into insecurity problems. Many told me they fear to leave their houses alone. Celeste, the same interviewee quoted above, has a little store in her house but she only dares to attend to customers through the window grille for fear of being robbed. The solution of collective action problems as well as more individual ones depends a lot on the persistence and legitimacy of a leader or neighborhood association. As an example, I got access to the minutes of the neighborhood association meetings of one planned invasion from 1998 to 2003. I was surprised to see, for example, how they controlled every land transaction in the neighborhood. People buying or selling had to be authorized by the neighborhood association. They also impeded the invasion of the
neighborhood soccer field. Yet this notebook takes us to another feature of planned invasion: their close relationship with the state, since in almost every meeting the group registers meeting with some authority or writing a letter to petition something, etc.

Neighborhood associations involved in planned invasions want to reach out. Once in the plot, one of their main tasks is to reach out, especially to the state, to get the things the neighborhood needs. They do so using different strategies. Directly demanding something from the authorities bypassing regular bureaucratic procedures is a very common strategy among squatters of planned invasions. Sometimes they use political brokers to reach authorities or to accelerate the fulfillment of their demand. They know insisting is key. And when some pressure is needed they use the power of multitude, that is, they go all together to a public office and camp there until they get the water pipe or the electricity service they are looking for. Only rarely do they use more disruptive strategies such as street blockades. The most successful strategy – described in depth on chapter 6 - is what I dub market clientelism, which consists of a very strategic use of clientelistic networks promising loyalty and votes to the best bidder. The common phrase “we are apolitical in this neighborhood” often hides these market-like clientelistic networks in which leaders do not commit to any politician or party but flirt with many at the same time in order to get the services for their neighborhood.

Some of the leaders I interviewed were experts in how the state works, where and who to ask, had the phone numbers of the secretaries of this or that authority and some even had very technical knowledge on issues such as water connection. Joking about their thorough knowledge of state institutions and the amount of time spent demanding, one leader told me: “We were like City Council staff members; when we entered everyone knew us. We used to go 2 or 3 times a week. ”Some brought this knowledge from before, from their participation in unions, housing
cooperatives or neighborhood associations, but many learned by doing once they invaded. For the latter, participating in the neighborhood association was their first politicizing experience.

When asked who were the three institutions or persons who helped your neighborhood the most, early residents of planned invasions, both leaders and non leaders, contrary to accretion invasions, tended to mention a variety of state institutions as well as politicians and authorities. Those institutions varied depending on the needs of the settlement. As one resident put it:

We went were we had to go. If you know that the Municipal Council has the competence to give you what you want, then you go to the Municipal Council. You are not going to go to the Health Ministry.

The institutions they knocked at also depended on the plot’s owner. If the plot was city owned, then the municipal government was the most visited by squatters. Yet those institutions also varied with time and with institutional changes. When in 1990, the Montevideo municipal government started a decentralization process squatters started making demands on their closest local government (CCZ or zonal community center).

To conclude this characterization of planned invasion, I will discuss one very particular kind: utopian invasions. During my fieldwork I found a few planned invasions whose early residents wanted more than solving their housing needs. Their framing of the land invasion was different. They emphasized horizontal decision making and a great distrust for vertical neighborhood associations, for example. Decisions were to be made in assemblies and many declared themselves in a “state of permanent assembly” during the first months of the invasion. Leaders were connected to the left, had participated in one of the Frente Amplio factions, in unions and/or in the cooperative housing movement. This is reflected in actions that make utopian invasions different, such as the distribution of plots in Nuevo Amanecer (New Sunrise) where instead of distributing land on a first come, they first divided the plot into equal parcels and then gave them out randomly among the first 36 families. It is also reflected in critical
discourses such as the one from this neighborhood leader, who received me in a living room dominated by a huge picture of Raúl Sendic, one of the founders of the Tuparamo guerrilla movement, and a firm believer in the need for land reform in Uruguay:

> The theory was to build an invasion clearly denouncing existing housing policies. So in a way it was a protest. But at the same time, it tried to be effective for the people who were invading. I mean, we were not only interested in the symbolic act of invading. There was a real commitment to solving people’s housing problem. And the third element was to try to give some organization to the invasion, for example in the infrastructure, that could later be a bridge to other forms of organization (...) In one assembly we even had a discussion to try to arrive at a model of collective property (...), to offer an alternative to individual property somehow. We also thought that perhaps the collective part could come through self help construction (...). Once we thought of producing collectively in those plots [currently invaded by a second wave of squatters] because there were a lot of unemployed people that knew how to bake, make shoes, plant (...). But with time the neighborhood association started to decline. It disappeared, in fact. The most crucial needs were solved and you can have a lot of political willingness but people only move for the prod of necessity. Your ideas can be beautiful, but if you don’t have people’s needs, you are done.

He nostalgically describes two or three months as a “fulfilled utopia” because they all fought for the same thing, they all helped each other in a context of need. Sometimes the fulfilled utopia lasted longer but in none of the cases I observed, was it currently alive. It was something early residents remembered, but the idealists’ projects of the beginning tended to fade in the first year of settlement.
4.2.3 Subdivision and sale

Box 3: A story of a land invasion by subdivision and sale

When María and her husband saw an ad in one of the national newspapers of an affordable plot in Villa García, North East of Montevideo, they decided to visit. It was December 1988. She was quite puzzled because there was no light or water. It was just a plot in the middle of the countryside. Yet they decided to buy it. They had to pay a downpayment and then monthly installments. They never saw the owners. They paid everything to a notary in an office located in the city center.

María, who had a history of social participation in different organizations and political participation in the Colorado party, became the president of the newly formed neighborhood association. Soon she began to be suspicious because plots were too small and she had the idea that the municipality required more area per parcel. One day, while waiting to pay taxes at the notary office, she overheard an argument between two men. One of them said “If the people of Villa García know this is a fraud, they kill us.” Her suspicion was confirmed. She went back to the neighborhood, called an assembly and told the 20 families already living there what she heard. She went to the municipality where she had some political friends from the Colorado party and she found out that the bigger plot had never been formally divided. Their property titles were false. She did not find much support in the municipality, however. One staff member told her to be careful, to not pursue the issue, because these people were mafia. But the fraud was even bigger, because they oversold parcels. So there were parcels with two or three owners that came to claim theirs and found it was already inhabited. With the help of a lawyer they sued the sellers, but nothing happened. They were in jail for 48 hours and after that they released them. According to María, they had political connections.

When the neighbors realized they were on their own, and that they were formally squatters, they started to organize as such. Using her political contacts and her leadership skills, María got light and water for the neighborhood. She remembers how she got the water, after failing through the regular procedures:

It was a time of electoral campaign, so we had to use it. You needed to negotiate. You need votes, I need 80 water meters. (...) People here needed water and we didn’t have it because we had already demanded it but the paperwork was sleeping somewhere. (...) I talked to the water company’s president. He was colorado. I told him ‘I’m a colorada’ (...) He said they were overwhelmed with work. And I said, ok, the campaign is coming and if you want votes, come down to earth, I need water for my people.

Today the neighborhood is in good condition. Houses have basic services and are built with solid materials. There are streets, although not paved. Yet I was impressed by the high tension cables right next to the settlement. María talked about that too:

The pollution from high tension cables is worrisome. Kids can have cancer in 10 years or so [due to radiation exposure]. That’s been proved. (...) We also have the pollution from the garbage containers. We’ve talked
Besides accretion and planned invasions, Montevideo also has what we can call entrepreneurial invasions or invasions by subdivision and sale. From the air, that is spatially, they tend to look like the one in Figure 7, because they are also planned, but they differ in that their planning involves (often fraudulent) economic profit. (See figure 22 for an aerial and other pictures of an invasion that started through subdivision and sale). Informal housing markets tend to develop in all types of invasions. After a while, even in utopian invasions, some may sell their house and go to a formal neighborhood or to another squatter settlement, even the most committed leaders. But what distinguishes this third type of land invasion is that the market component is there from the moment of the invasion. No household settles without paying something.

These are planned invasions, generally by one individual, in which land is subdivided and sold to residents. The individual may be the owner of the land or a designated seller, but they are sometimes bandits that claim to be the owners and cheaply sell plots they do not own. Therefore, sometimes squatters do not know they are squatters until they discover they have been victims of a fraud. Some owners of vacant and unproductive land have incited invasions to later ask the state for compensation. Land is often private and located in protected rural areas in the periphery of the city. According to the Montevideo municipality, plots cannot be subdivided for urban use there, so these transactions are illegal. Besides, these areas do not have the necessary services for
a new neighborhood. As in planned invasions, settlers start making demands on the state for services.

During my fieldwork I found several examples of this type of invasion. I develop one in depth in chapter 6. In yet another one, one of the residents started coming to the plot because they saw an ad on the newspaper. They bought a plot and later realized they had been victims of a fraud. The sellers had divided the plot in smaller pieces than the zoning rules permit for that area, and the property titles they gave them were fake although signed by a notary. Neighbors started organizing after they realized they were not owners but squatters. They were able to get water and other services, mainly through the leadership and contacts of one of the neighbors who is from the Colorado party and has always worked for the party. Their current goal is that the Ministry of Housing regularizes their neighborhood, by giving them real property titles and bringing all the services.

Imagination has not been absent in order to get around the law. As a former city councilor told me,

[generating squatter settlements by selling private land in rural areas] got pretty technical. The last thing that happened to us at the City Council, and we reported it, (…) was that somebody that owned rural land as a corporation [sociedad anónima] would sell pieces of it as a share. [There was a case] in which after you bought a share, they calculated how much you needed to build your house. So people could go to the owner’s son’s construction materials store, purchase what they needed leaving the share as a guarantee. If you didn’t pay for the materials, they would take your share and evict you. It was a cartel!
4.2.4 Prevalence

Figure 8 shows how prevalent these types of invasion have been in the city of Montevideo, for those I have been able to classify (240 out of 427).  

Figure 8: Types of Settlement Formation, Montevideo 1947-2004 (N= 240)

The most common type of land invasion in Montevideo has been accretion (57% of those I could find information about). Yet about 1 out of 3 invasions have been planned, and 11% have

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48 I was able to classify 56% of all Montevideo’s settlements. At first I thought those unclassified were most likely accretion cases, but after checking with the data I realized they do not follow a pattern different from the whole. Unclassified invasions do not resemble one type more than the other. They tend to be in public land (67%) just like most invasions of any type (63%). They are not clustered in one area of the city but distributed throughout the city periphery although there is a slight tendency to be in the Eastern part of the city rather than in the West (56% of unclassified invasions are located in the East versus 51% of all invasions). Finally, although unclassified invasions started throughout the period of study, their peak is in 1990-94, just like for all invasions.
been a product of land subdivision and sale. This variation challenges any generalization about land invasions. Although in the first part of this chapter I have treated all as the same in describing their evolution over time, it becomes important to open the box and explore the heterogeneity. In the following section I will explore the variation of these types over time and space, to see if there are patterns that my own previous generalizations might have hidden.

4.3 TYPES OF LAND INVASIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE

Types of land invasions are not distributed randomly throughout the history of the cycle or throughout the city. Although in this study I emphasize more the time dimension, in this section I explore also the spatial clusters and suggest some hypotheses about them. Figure 9 shows the cycle of land invasions by type, over time.
Figure 9: Cycle of land invasions by type of invasion. Montevideo 1947-2004 (N=256)
The first land invasions in Montevideo were of the accretion type. Families, probably immigrants from other areas of the country searching for an opportunity in the capital city would come and slowly form new informal neighborhoods (see chapter 2 for demographics). It was not only until the mid 1960s that the first planned land invasion appeared in the city. I have 1965 as the date when people started forming what today is Casabó (not visible in the graph because in 1965 there was also another accretion invasion that hides this one). Planned invasions did not become popular in the repertoire of land squatters until the 1989-1990. They remain popular during the 1990 decade, surpassing the number of accretion invasions every year from 1991 until 1997. Even today, judging by the characteristics of the cycle towards the end of the studied period (2004), if there is a land invasion, it is likely that it is a planned one rather than an accretion one. (Fraudulent) land subdivision and sale, in turn, appeared late in the repertoire of squatters. It probably took some time for promoters to perceive the profit of the business.

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49 The squatter settlement known as Casabó, located in the traditional working class neighborhood of El Cerro, is a big portion of land that in fact includes three different smaller squatter neighborhoods. It was one of the settlements I studied in depth. All the stories of early residents coincided on the role of the Colorado Party in this invasion. A local broker, who would later be a city councilor (1985-1990) and who at the time worked for a politician who would soon be presidential candidate (i.e., Vasconcellos would run for election in 1966) and senator, was the one who distributed the parcels, selected the first residents, and created the original neighborhood association, whose president was also a Colorado. This squatter settlement would show unusual signs of urban planning and mobilization that ended up with the treatment of this case in the Parliament and the approval of a law, designed by a Colorado Party politician, which gave settlers ownership of their plots and assured them services (Ley 14006). The discussion of this bill in the House of Representatives is very interesting for many reasons (Diaro de Sesiones de la Cámara de Respresentantes 605 (1593-1613), March-April-May 1971, Uruguay). First, the great majority of representatives supported the law (41 of 47 voted affirmatively for the bill in general). All representatives from all parties agreed they wanted to guarantee the rights of the inhabitants of Casabó. In that discussion, one Colorado representative expressed what seemed to be a consensus in the chamber by saying: “At the moment, about 200 families or about 1000 people live there. They are hard-working and of good habits. They have not only built their own houses, which are very different from those in cantegriles, but they have also built a clinic, a sports plaza, a soup kitchen, things that speak of a great spirit of solidarity. These people deserve the support of the State”. The second interesting thing derives from this quote. The opposition is clear. While inhabitants of Casabó are “deserving poor” those that live in cantegriles are not. A third interesting aspect of the discussion is that representatives enter into a discussion on the concept of marginality that I will not analyze here but that deserves its own treatment. Fourth, a delegation of neighbors from Casabó was present at the discussion. The transcription includes some moments in which neighbors applaud and the chamber’s president threatens to remove the spectators. Finally, although the bill dated from 1967, this discussion and the final approval occurred in August 1971, right before the November elections. Although the state has provided Casabó many services, property titles were never given out. Yet, squatters in Casabó were never evicted and feel somehow backed by this law, even if many would like the titles to be real. Neighborhood associations still fight for the implementation of the law.
Besides, given that they are mostly in private land while the others are mostly in public land, it might be the case that an exhaustion of vacant and neglected public land is playing a role in changing the repertoire. Figure 10 introduces the analysis of land property into the picture.

![Figure 10: Percentage of invasions settled in private land (vs. public land) by type of settlement formation. Montevideo 1947-2004 (N=217)](image)

Most land invasions have taken place on public land (61%). Occupying public land is safer because the state does not enforce its rights as private owners do. Yet this varies by type. While planned and accretion invasions are overwhelmingly located in state-owned land (68% and 63% respectively, which is not a significant difference as the error bars illustrate), those invasions that started by subdivision and sale are mostly located in private land. The state, especially Montevideo’s municipal government, has been strongly opposed to subdivision and
such invasions often involve defrauding poor people and building up in far away areas that the government considers not proper for it either because they are reserved for productive or ecological purposes or because it is too costly to bring services to them. Entrepreneurs are therefore more attracted to private land, where policing is lower. They have been owners of unproductive land or opportunistic intermediaries the ones who have promoted subdivision and sale invasions in private land.  

Finally, and in order to also have an idea of how this varied throughout time, figure 11 presents the evolution of type of property for accretion and planned invasions. I have omitted subdivision and sale invasions from the analysis because there are not enough cases per period to be able to calculate percentages. Figure 11 shows something that the averages hide. Although the majority of accretion and planned invasions tend to be located on public land, by looking over time, a changing pattern emerges. Somewhere in the mid 1990s, squatters started to choose private plots rather than public ones. This is likely to be in part due to the obvious exhaustion of public plots suitable for invasion, that is, vacant, not too far away, without surveillance, etc. Yet if we consider that there are still some good – i.e., well located, smooth - public plots available and that some land invasions are in the roughest and less habitable places such as polluted river banks where there is still room, we should think of other factors rather than availability affecting this change. The shift towards private plots may be related to the already mentioned greatest surveillance of public plots both by the municipality and citizens.

50 I found a small group of squatter neighborhoods that were settled on pieces of land from different owners. For the cases in which the owners were two different but public institutions, I simply considered the settlement to be on public land. Yet, I have excluded from this analysis those settlements located on public and private land at the same time. Those were mostly accretion invasions (9 out of 10) that probably started in one plot and slowly expanded towards a neighboring plot from a different owner.
Besides the temporal description of the cycle of land invasions, it is telling to look at the geographic or spatial distribution of these land invasions. Far from being randomly located, land invasions are clustered in certain places of the city. Contrary to what happens in a city like Rio, whose peculiar topography generates favelas in the middle of the city, on the hills, in Montevideo squatter settlements are on the periphery, circling the urban city center. Figure 12 shows a map of Montevideo superposing the about 400 squatter settlements to the 18 administrative units in which the city is divided.

Those areas of the city with more squatter settlements are the traditionally most deprived ones. There are very few land invasions in the coastal south east of the city, a very urbanized area and the most affluent of the city. A combination of higher population density, high land
values of the relatively scarce vacant land, and pressure from affluent neighbors who would not like to see their properties depreciated have provoked on the one hand fewer land invasions to begin with and on the other hand relocation of those squatter settlements that were there. As an example, the few squatter settlements that in the 1990s were still in the old city, the commercial and historical center, were relocated to the periphery. The north eastern and north western parts of the city are the ones with most squatter settlements. These were areas already deprived before the peak in land squatting, with available land and, importantly, not far away from avenues or streets that could get people to their jobs. More recently, however, even more distant areas have been occupied (e.g., see the more isolated spots in the east and west of the city). Some of those are the land subdivisions and sales in what the city government considers non-urbanizable rural land. In fact, figure 12 shows them with a different color.
I have marked with circles two clear clusters: on the West part of the city (left) there is a group of planned invasions, in the post-industrial, working class, leftist Cerro area; on the East side, in turn, there is a smaller cluster of settlements that started by subdivision and sale, located in what the city considers rural land. There is no clear pattern for accretion invasions, other than what they share with all invasions: they tend to be in the periphery of Montevideo.

Putting all these characteristics together in a nutshell, we can see three main constellations of settlement formation. (Because of the main line of inquiry of this dissertation, that is, the role of politics in squatting, I will impose a categorization by political period on the
time dimension). Table 2 organizes information by political period and shows the distribution of land invasions according to land property, type of invasions and region of the city. Prevalent types per political period are highlighted in grey.

Table 2 Distribution of squatter settlements by land property, type of invasion and location, per political period (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Property</th>
<th>Type of Land Invasion</th>
<th>Region of the City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1974</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictatorship</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first wave of land invasions in Montevideo occurred between about 1950 and the first years of democracy in the late 1980s. These land invasions were formed by accretion and settled in public land, especially city owned land, located in the Eastern periphery of the city. The second configuration is formed by a boom of planned invasions throughout the 1990s decade in the Western periphery of the city, although with time they diffused to the Eastern periphery. Although the first planned invasions were in public land, they increasingly started considering private land as well. Towards the end of the considered period, planned invasions tended to be on private plots. Utopian invasions are a particular subgroup of this configuration. The ones I identified dated all from the 1990s and they were located in *El Cerro* or in the nearby working class neighborhoods in the Western periphery of Montevideo. Residents agree that they are more organized because they are from El Cerro or the nearby area. As one of them told me,
“El Cerro is different. We are the Republic of El Cerro.” A municipal official agreed with this perception but was more specific:

*El Cerro* is a place, like *La Teja* [nearby neighborhood] with a working class fighting tradition. They have been fighting since the beginning of the 20th century, so they have that tradition. (…) If you walk around El Cerro you will not find many metal sheet shacks, even though there are about 60 squatter settlements there. That happens because people still have that fighting spirit. It is something that gets transmitted from generation to generation. And the person who squatted with some metal sheets and wood, you visit him two months later and he has started to build something with bricks. You go again, and he has started to make something bigger and already has a septic tank. I mean, there is an organizing tradition. And there is a tradition of improving your house.

Finally, the last configuration that can be identified is an emergent one of very few land invasions that are either planned or land subdivisions and sales, overwhelmingly in private land and in the Eastern part of the city.

### 4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has emphasized that time – especially if divided by political periods - seems to be related not only to the *number* of land invasions but also to the *types* of land invasions in Montevideo. The peculiar context of the 1990s decade with great political competition and the *Frente Amplio* in the municipal government appears to be connected with the emergence of a wave of planned invasions. Geography has some explanatory power as well. Most of these planned invasions are located in the west part of the city, especially in the traditional working
class neighborhood of *El Cerro* and its surroundings. A tradition of working class organization and leftist militancy may have played part in this story. Diffusion processes or imitation may have as well, since the first planned invasion, *Casabó*, happened in this area.

This heterogeneity defies most generalizations about squatting. In a very interesting comparative analysis of land squatting Nezar Alsayyad (1993) suggests that while in Latin America most common types of squatting are of the generated (i.e., planned and incited by some person or group) and mobilized type, in the Middle East gradual and spontaneous processes of squatting are more typical. Although probably true in general terms, there is great variation between cities in Latin America, and as I explore here, great variation even within the same city, depending on the location and timing, and, fundamentally, on the relationship of squatters and authorities. When squatting started in Montevideo, neighborhoods were more similar to what Alsayyad and other authors like Asef Bayat (1997; 2004) describe for the Middle East: a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” to use Bayat’s term. There were however counted exceptions. The exceptions depended on the availability of political networks.

While accretion invasions did not established early relationships with the authorities, planned invasions are fundamentally built on those relationships. It is through them that squatters sometimes get the plots, that they always get the services and so on. Land subdivision and sales are different in that they are born in the informal land market. But they are very similar to planned invasions otherwise, both in spatial outline and in relation to authorities (see chapter 6 for a description of one invasion that started as a hybrid between subdivision and sale and planned).
5.0 INTERACTIVE MODELS FOR AN INTERACTIVE THEORY: EVENT ANALYSIS OF LAND INVASIONS

In the previous chapter, I have described the cycle of land invasions based on contextual historical evidence. Here, drawing on the literature on political opportunities, protest events and contentious politics more generally, I explore a more parsimonious explanation by examining the influence on that cycle of a few theoretically driven predictors. In so doing, I propose testing the effect of political opportunities in a new context and with an elusive form of contentious collective action about which we do not have the usual newspaper or historical archives that we have about other forms of mobilization.

5.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AS A DETERMINANT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: AN IMPORTED FRAMEWORK

That political context matters for the emergence, development, and impact of social movements is, as Meyer (2004) points out, at the core of the political opportunity perspective. More specifically, political opportunities are dimensions of the political system that suggest that effective action is possible and thereby encourage people to engage in contentious politics (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). The theory appeared initially to counter the idea that people rebel or mobilize because of their perceived hardships (Gurr 1974). Having
inspired a great deal of research (McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1987; Snyder, Tilly, and 1972; Tarrow 1989), this perspective has also received criticisms. In this chapter I will address two of those criticisms: one related to its “ad-hocness” and the other related to the scope of the theory in terms of context and types of mobilization it may explain. I will not address here, although I do it at several other points in this dissertation, a much more fundamental criticism to this approach, that of its structural bias or its neglect of human agency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999).

Many have criticized political opportunities explanations for explaining everything, and therefore running the risk of not explaining anything (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Meyer 2004). What constitutes an opportunity is so loose and often so ad hoc that all features of a political structure can be an opportunity, and therefore one can always find some opportunity to account for a movement happening. Addressing this criticism, a group of scholars has made an effort to first specify beforehand what they meant by political opportunities and second take the study of protest events from descriptive time series of cycles of protest to multivariate analysis. In so doing, they have found specific political opportunities to be more or less relevant depending on the type of mobilization and the time and place in which it happened. (For examples see: Jenkins, Jacobs, and Angone (2003); Minkoff (1995; 1997); Soule and Van Dyke (1999). For reviews or states of the art of this work see Rucht and Neidhart (1999); Olzak (1989); Meyer and Minkoff (2004)).

A less heard but very accurate criticism is that the majority of the work on the effects of political opportunities on mobilization takes place in what today are wealthy western democracies, basically in the US and Western Europe. This is slowly changing, but still the case (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003), especially regarding multivariate studies of protest events. Although studies of social movements in Latin America proliferated in the 1980s,
stimulated by widespread mobilization throughout recently democratizing societies, the reigning paradigm of those studies focused on identities and autonomous capacities of the movements, not on their relationships with formal politics (Caldeira 1990; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Evers 1985; Holston 1991; Oxhorn 1995; Touraine 1987). But more recently, the political opportunities framework has, however, become increasingly popular among scholars studying collective action in Latin America (Almeida 2003; Auyero 2000; Auyero 2007; Hipsher 1997; Hipsher 1998; Schneider 1995; Strawn 2005). 51

Some of these latter studies have explicitly used the empirical cases of Latin America to expand the political opportunities ideas to authoritarian (Almeida 2003) or democratizing contexts (Hipsher 1997), generating new theoretical ideas and scope conditions for the political opportunities theory. Others have distanced themselves from the framework as it is because they found it inappropriate to explain reality in Latin America. According to authors such as Davis (1999) and Auyero (2007) the idea of having politics on one side and mobilization on the other does not accurately describe a region where politicians and activists intertwine. Yet very few have conducted multivariate studies of events testing political opportunities vis-à-vis other theories of collective action. And, as I argue here, those that did it have not really considered the interactive nature of the political opportunities framework. As a consequence they have jumped too quickly to the conclusion of Latin American exceptionality.

51 For insightful commentaries on this paradigmatic shift in the study of social moments in Latin America see Davis (1999) and Roberts (1997).
5.2 PREVIOUS MULTIVARIATE STUDIES OF PROTEST EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

Walton and Ragin’s (1990) work on austerity protests throughout Latin America and other third world countries in response to the 1980s debt crisis is one of the very few multivariate studies of protest in the region. Another one is Strawn’s (2005) work on various types of protests during 1999-2000 in 31 Mexican states. These two works have many things in common. Besides being multivariate protest studies, they use newspapers as sources, as is common in the field (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004). More substantively, they both find political opportunities to be irrelevant or at least less important than economic factors in explaining protest.

Walton and Ragin (1990), using a Tobit model, find that the most consistent predictor of austerity protest severity across countries is IMF pressure. From this finding and from a significant coefficient for overurbanization (a measure of how distant the level of urbanization of a country is from the one expected according to its GNP per capita) they conclude that World Systems or Dependency theories are the best predictors of protest. The most dependent countries are the ones who experienced the most severe austerity protests. Their measure of political opportunities, a civil rights index, is insignificant in their models. 52

Strawn (2005) uses pooled time series (he has longitudinal data on states) to regress protest (measured as monthly averages of daily events of different types of protests) on different predictors. Among these predictors he includes measures of political opportunities – e.g.,

52 Because of the moment in which they write, before the Political Opportunities framework became distinct from the Resource Mobilization approach, the authors talk about Resource Mobilization Theory, in opposition to the relative deprivation or hardships theory. They include three predictors of this theory: the civil rights index, the percent employed in manufacturing and the past protest events. None of them turns out significant in their models. While in current studies the former would normally be classified as a political opportunity indicator, the second two would be classified as resources.
dummies for months before and after elections since election times are often considered moments of opportunities for mobilization - and measures of economic hardship – e.g., consumer price index, open unemployment, wages, and direct foreign investment. He is particularly interested in the latter because, he thinks, “structural adjustment states” such as Mexico pose a challenge to political opportunities theory. There, Strawn argues, economic conditions are so harsh that people tend to protest because of them, regardless of the opening or closing of the political opportunity structure. His models’ results support this idea. His political opportunities measures turn out to be non significant whereas his economic hardship measures turn out to be statistically significant predictors of the number of protest events in a certain month and state.

These studies leave us with the idea that Latin America – or the third world - is different, that mobilization there is perhaps more driven by grievances than in wealthier western democracies. This might be true, but I believe it is too early to rush into that conclusion. Furthermore, I believe the opposition of grievances or hardships versus opportunities is a flawed one. Grievances and opportunities tend to interact with each other to make people mobilize. In a nutshell, grievances are a necessary but not sufficient condition for protest to happen. This type of theoretical argument has a natural multivariate analysis companion: interaction effects. Yet the use of interaction effects is not common in multivariate studies of protest events. I wonder if the conclusions of both Walton and Ragin and Strawn would have changed somewhat had they included political and economic factors as interactive terms rather than only as additive effects. Perhaps, for example, Walton and Ragin would have still found that austerity protests were more severe in those countries where overurbanization and the IMF pressure were higher but that the impact of those factors was much higher among those countries with more freedom (e.g., where the index of civil liberties was higher).
Interaction effects are appealing because they capture in a model something that is conceptually very intuitive, common, and relevant in social sciences in general and in the study of protest in particular: conditional effects. Conditional effects occur when one predictor has an effect on the dependent variable only under certain conditions. In other words, the effect occurs only in certain categories or values of a second independent variable. Thus, interaction effects allow us to contextualize equations, without having to specify two different equations for two different contexts. We model that context through the use of a second, interactive variable that funnels, moderates or otherwise shapes the effect of the main independent variable of interest on the outcome we are looking at (Kam and Franzese Jr 2007).

Without interaction terms, we assume that the same specification of the estimated equation is valid for all the data points in the sample (and the population from which the sample is drawn). Without interaction terms, we assume that the effects of the independent variable or variables over the dependent variable are additive, this is that they are the same regardless of the level of other variables. Assumptions that simplify reality are desirable for parsimony. The problem is when we oversimplify to the point of distorting reality. Given the complexity of many social phenomena, it often makes sense to admit the possibility of nonadditivity or interaction (Friedrich 1982).

In this chapter I will test this interactive argument for political opportunities and grievances, with the occurrence of land invasions in Montevideo Uruguay. As explained in previous chapters, land squatting is a survival strategy of many urban poor of the third world that involves various degrees of planning, neighborhood organization and relation to the state. For many urban poor is the closest they get to state policies, party politics, and organization/mobilization. (At least in Latin America, although this might not be true for other
parts of the world as explained by Alsayyad (1993), Alsayyad and Roy (2003) and Bayat (1997; 2004). Many studies have explored the relationship of squatters and formal and informal politics (Burgwal 1995; Castells 1983; Collier 1976; Dietz 1998; Dosh forthcoming, 2009.; Eckstein 2001; Gay 1994; Handelman 1975; Hipsher 1998; Özler 2003a; Özler 2003b; Portes and Walton 1976; Schneider 1995; Stokes 1991). Yet there is no previous study of squatting as protest events. Most studies are case studies, narrative histories of mobilization, or comparative studies of different types of informal and formal political participation. The clearest antecedent of the analysis presented here is Collier’s (Collier 1976) study of settlement formation in Lima. There, Collier analyzes variation in settlements’ foundation in different political contexts. He provides great historical explanations, with details on squatter policy. He does not, however, model his data statistically.

The statistical analysis of the role of political opportunities poses several challenges. As explained in the methods chapter, land invasions are elusive forms of contention, among other things, because they do not leave traces in the usual sources used for this type of research: archives or newspapers. Still, the fact that some historical sociologists have been able to imaginatively assemble event catalogs about ancient times and use them in multivariate analysis made the endeavor seem feasible. Markoff’s (1985; 1986; 1996; 1997) analysis of French peasant protests around 1789 was, in this sense, incredibly inspiring. Data collection for my project was long and required the use of many sources. It resembled more the type of data collection of a historian or even a detective than that of a sociologist. Yet the challenge was worth taking, and I think it is worth taking for other elusive forms of contention as well.

In their *Dynamics of Contention*, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), express their dissatisfaction with the compartmentalization of studies of mobilization. For them, strikes, wars,
revolutions, social movements and other forms of political struggle or, as they put it, contentious politics share causal mechanisms and processes. To find those patterns, they argue, it is necessary to break large complex series of events such as revolutions or social movements into smaller episodes and then identify recurrent mechanisms and processes within them. Following this guidance, I will focus here on the moment of settlement formation as a contentious event.

5.3 STUDYING EVENTS OF LAND SQUATTING IN MONTEVIDEO

Chapter four has already described the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo since its beginnings in the 1940s until the early 2000s. Chapter three has explained the data collection process that enabled the study of that cycle. I will not repeat this here, but go directly into trying to explain that cycle. Because, as Figures 3 and 4 in chapter four showed, land squatting peaked around 1990, which was the year that the leftist party (Frente Amplio) assumed the government of the city for the first time in history, we could leave with the impression that squatting was caused by something related to the left in the city government. Perhaps that fact raised the expectations and hope of the urban poor. Perhaps politicians, from the winning party or from the opposition, actively promoted squatting. We could alternatively think that some underlying cause led to both the left’s triumph and the increase in land squatting. There is also the possibility that the two events coincide in time but are completely unrelated. Yet the analysis proposed here is somewhat more ambitious since it does not aim at understanding a peak retroactively but at comprehending variation in the count of land invasions per year throughout the period.

The main hypothesis behind the study is that moments of political opportunities mediated and intensified the effect of hardship on the likelihood of new land invasions.
5.3.1 Definition of contentious event

Social movements and other forms of collective action are composed of different kinds of events. The study of just some of those events of mobilization is therefore a gross simplification. Still, it enables sophisticated and parsimonious explanatory analysis. There is no single definition of what a contentious or a protest event is. Sampson et al. (2005), for example, consider “collective action events,” two or more individuals engaging in some sort of non-profit, political, public act that is not part of routine political activity (initiated by the state or political parties) or part of regularly scheduled gatherings such as meetings of self-help groups. For Koopmans and Statham (1999) any instance of claim making of migrants and ethnic minorities appearing in daily newspapers of Germany or Britain was considered an event. Here, I consider an event to be the invasion of a plot of land by a group of people with the purpose of building their houses there. It is a contentious moment because it involves going against one of the most sacred principles of capitalist societies: property rights.

5.3.2 Data

To review, Montevideo has currently about 400 squatter settlements, defined as residential communities of 10 or more houses located in a plot of (public or private) land residents do not own (INE 2006). In general, squatter settlements tend to be inhabited by poor residents who self built their houses. Land invasions do not leave traces in newspapers or any other systematic archival material. As explained in length in chapter three, I had to use various sources – oral histories, interviews, and various documents - to find out the dates (year) of land invasions. I was
able to assemble a data set of 257 out of a total of 427 land occupations53 covering 58 years, from 1947 to 2004. Figures 3, 4, 5 and 9 in chapter four has already presented the cycle of land invasions based on these data.

This information was used to build my dependent variable, *number of land invasions per year*. The data set was completed with a series of variables that I thought would be good predictors, based on the interactive theory of hardships and political opportunities already explained, and some controls.

As an indicator of hardship I have used average yearly *real wages* of workers. Thanks to the work of economic historians, a time series of real wages, or wages adjusted for inflation to make them comparable across time, is available for Uruguay from 1870 until 2002 (Historia Económica 2008). Historically, real wages are a better measure of quality of life, especially for the lower classes, than the more artifactual GDP per capita (Aghion and Williamson 1999). Other series of relevant indicators of hardship such as poverty rates, number of evictions or housing prices are only available since the late 1980s and this is why they are not appropriate for longer term historic analysis. However, real wages correlates strongly with other possible measures of grievances such as yearly number of renters’ evictions (r = -.87).

Figure 13 shows the bivariate relationship between real wages and the number of yearly land occupations.

53 The total is more than the figured of 412 used in official sources (INE 2006). There are 412 that currently exist but I included also a few “dead events”, meaning settlements that changed into cooperative housing or that were relocated by the government to a different place.
The widespread of number of land invasions at low values of real wages and the low occurrence of invasions at higher values of real wages suggest that real wages might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of land invasions, which usually suggests an interactive relationship between one or more pair of variables. The scatterplot also shows an outlier year, with low average real wages and the highest yearly number of land invasions (40). That point corresponds to 1990, and it is the year that figure 4 (chapter four) showed as a peak. As stated before, my interest here is to explain variation throughout the period, and not only understand the peak. Yet it is important to control for this in order to avoid having one data point influencing the results inordinately. It is also important to run the models without that data point to check if results hold without the outlier.

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54 Real wages are measured in an index with base 100 (which corresponds to the year 1913).
Rather than including a dummy variable to account for a single outlier, which would be an a-theoretical ad hoc solution, since land invasions increased after 1989, I preferred to include a dummy variable to account for the whole period after 1989, coded 1 if the year was 1990 or afterwards and 0 otherwise. Therefore, if there is something special about that period we should see a positive effect of the 1990-and-beyond dummy on the number of land invasions, controlling for the other factors.

This dummy variable has a more substantive meaning, however. 1989 is the year that the leftist party Frente Amplio won the Montevideo municipal elections for the first time in history. It has been in office since then, winning all the consecutive elections. Many argue that the city administration was a launching pad for winning national elections in 2004 (Lanzaro 2004; Luna 2007). In previous chapters I suggest that the Frente Amplio’s city government had a more invisible and unexpected effect by provoking an increase in land invasions at the very beginning of the period. This rise in squatting seems to have been activated by several mechanisms. These mechanisms included hope on the part of squatters that a leftist government would be benevolent towards the homeless poor, the promotion of land invasions by a minority of radical leftist politicians and local leaders guided by the idea of land redistribution, and a divided government with a traditional party in national office and the leftist party in the city’s office. I have also hypothesized that the drop in land invasions after 1996-97 might be related to the increasing responsibility taken by the leftist city administration and the citizens for the vacant land of the city. Yet, in order not to over-fit the data based on ad hoc hypotheses I have just included one predictor, the 1990-and-beyond dummy to account for the period that the Frente Amplio is in the city government from 1990 until 2004, the year in which the study period ends. In practice, the analysis actually finishes in 2002 because the historical real wages series finishes then.
This dummy accounts for a contingent political opportunity. Yet my goal was to account also for more systematic ones. As indicators of political opportunities I have therefore used two dummy variables: electoral year and post electoral year, both coded one if that year was electoral or post-electoral respectively and 0 otherwise. The use of election times as a political opportunities indicator is pretty conventional. Other studies have suggested a relationship between electoral competition and squatters’ mobilization (Özler 2003b; Schneider 1995). The first dummy, electoral year is supposed to capture the campaign effect. Since elections are held in November in Uruguay, parties and individual politicians have that entire year to campaign, and therefore this dummy captures what happens before elections. The second dummy, post electoral year, captures a different type of political opening or opportunity: the one that happens once the winner party is in power (e.g., incoming government paying favors, perhaps the perception of more tolerance or more overlooking by the authorities due to the confusion and adjustment of the first months in power, or some other mechanisms). I expect one or both of these dummies to be positively related to the number of land invasions.

It becomes important to note here that the election year variable introduces some noise into the analysis given because it includes December data, and therefore, it might include some post-election cases. This is one of the disadvantages of having the year as the unit of analysis rather than more detailed information on timing. Yet, I could not reconstruct invasions’ exact date of settlement.

I have also included a one year lagged number of invasions in the models for two connected reasons. On the one hand, this is a customary practice in time series analysis because data points are not independent as regression models assume: what happened the year before probably influences what happens on a certain year. If, at an extreme, the dependent variable
were entirely predicted from last year’s values, one would have no evidence that the exogenous variables were causing anything to happen the current year. The other reason is more theoretical. This lag captures a diffusion process. Once a group of people invade land, they open the possibility for others to do it as well. Thus, I expect this lag to the positively related to the number of land invasions.

Finally, to test the type of interactive or conditional effect of grievances and political opportunities suggested before, I have included two interactive terms in the model. They are interactions (multiplications) of real wages with the electoral year dummy and with the post electoral year dummy. The signs and significance of the coefficients of these interactive effects do not mean much in themselves (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005; Braumoeler 2004). As explained below, their interpretation requires a more nuanced analysis.55

5.3.3 Methods

I estimated the yearly number of land invasions using Poisson regression, which is appropriate for use with count data, where the use of the linear regression model usually results in inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Barron 1992; King 1988; Long and Freese 2006; Minkoff 1995; Minkoff 1997).56 Since the unit of analysis is the year, there are 55 observations (1947-2002). I ran all the models using STATA.
After estimating the models, I predicted the count of yearly land invasions using the `predictnl` command in STATA which is used for postestimation of nonlinear predictions. The estimation of parameters in non linear regression models such as Poisson can be used to predict and plot probabilities. Probabilities of the dependent variable are more intuitively meaningful to interpret than the coefficients, especially when we have interactive terms.

### 5.3.4 Results

Table 3 shows the Poisson regression results, both for the simpler model and for the model with interaction terms. In both models, most variables are significant and with their signs in the expected direction. However, with the presence of interaction effects, we cannot interpret coefficients as if we were in the simpler linear additive regression world. (Remember that in models with interaction effects the main effects’ coefficients represent the effect of one the variables when the other is zero. In this case, for example, the coefficient of electoral year represents the effect of an electoral year when real wages equals zero, which is an inexisten situation.) The exception is the lag variable which surprisingly turns out not significant. Apparently, the number of invasions at t-1 does not affect the number of invasions the following year. Yet, this does not rule out all possibilities of diffusion. There is no evidence of diffusion of squatting experiences year to year, but perhaps our yearly measures do not account for shorter term diffusion processes occurring say, month to month. The coefficient for the 1990-and-beyond dummy is significant and positive which means that after controlling for hardships and other political opportunities, invasions were more likely to happen after 1989, that is, after the
*Frente Amplio* won the city government. It is important to note that the outlier of 1990 with 40 land invasions is not drawing the data to this result. I have run the analysis without that year and results hold.

Both models give significant results for theoretically relevant predictors. Both political opportunities (election year and the year after) and hardship (low salaries) have increased the number of land invasions per year during the period from 1947 until 2002. There are several criteria for choosing one model over the other. Parsimony is one common criterion. Predicting power is another one. Combining these two, the option would be the simpler model because it is more parsimonious without losing goodness of fit (log ratios are not very different between the two models). Yet in this case, I choose to analyze the interactive model because it is the one that derives from my theoretical model. Both grievances and opportunities are needed for mobilization and mobilization depends on their interaction. Following this logic, the model without interaction terms is underspecified. 57

57 An autocorrelogram (using the acplot routine in STATA) does not show serious autocorrelation problems in the time series model. In any case, as explained in the text, I include the lagged dependent variable as a control.
Table 3: Poisson Regression Estimates of the Influence of selected predictors on the Number of Land Occupations per year, Montevideo 1947-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N invasions total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real wages</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election year dummy</td>
<td>0.508**</td>
<td>1.970**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year after election year dummy</td>
<td>0.546***</td>
<td>2.976***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages*Election Year</td>
<td>-0.013*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages*Year after election year</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 and beyond dummy</td>
<td>1.488***</td>
<td>1.409***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag (N total invasions t-1)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.298***</td>
<td>2.056***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>55</th>
<th>55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi2</td>
<td>281.000</td>
<td>294.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

As stated before, the interpretation of our theoretically more relevant predictors, given the fact that we have included interaction terms, is not intuitive. The coefficient for, say real wages does not represent the average effect of yearly real wages on the number of land invasions. It only indicates the effect of real wages when both the post electoral dummy and the electoral dummy are 0 that is to say in between election years. As Kam and Franzese (2007) remind us,
each variable involved in the interaction terms of interactive models has multiple effects, depending on the values of the other interactive variables, not a single, constant effect.

Figure 14 offers a more intuitive understanding of the effect of real wages on the number of land invasions. It shows the predicted count of land invasions for different types of years (electoral, post-electoral and other) for the different levels of real wages. The first thing that is clear from the figure is that there are more land invasions when real wages are low and that there are almost none when real wages are high. Clearly hardship does have an effect on the probability of land invasions happening. Yet that effect is conditional on the year. Post electoral years tend to have a greater number of land invasions, followed by electoral years. Years in between elections, however, even if average salaries for people are low, do not see many land invasions.\(^58\)

\(^{58}\) To predict the number of land invasions for different types of years I used the predictnl command in STATA, with three different equations. I let real wages vary freely and held all other variables constant using a central measure (median for dummy90andbeyond and median also for the lag dependent variable). Given the Poisson equation

\[
\mu_i = \exp(x_i \beta),
\]

I used the following equation to predict the count of land invasions in electoral years:

\[
\text{predictnl } p\text{-invtot\_electoral\_years} = \\
\exp(\beta_0 \text{[cons]} + \\
\beta_1 \text{[real wages]} \times \text{real wages} + \\
\beta_2 \text{[electoral year]} \times 1 + \\
\beta_3 \text{[post electoral year]} \times 0 + \\
\beta_4 \text{[interaction realwages\_electoral year]} \times \text{real wages} \times 1 + \\
\beta_5 \text{[interaction real wages\_postelectoral year]} \times \text{real wages} \times 0 + \\
\beta_6 \text{[dummy90andbeyond]} \times \text{median value of dummy90andbeyond} + \\
\beta_7 \text{[lagged n invasions]} \times \text{median value of lagged n invasions}').
\]

In this equation, the value for the dummy electoral year is set to 1(both in the main effect (\(\beta_2\)) and in the interaction term (\(\beta_4\))), whereas the value for the dummy postelectoral year is set to 0. The equations for postelectoral years and for other years, were similar but with the values changed in the dummies and the interaction terms.
Figure 14: Predicted total number of land occupations per year by real wages

Figure 15 illustrates the magnitude of the differential effects of real wages on the number of land invasions, depending on the type of year, with the corresponding confidence intervals. 59

59 As stated before, the effect of real wages on the number of land invasions is not just the coefficient for real wages ($\beta_i$). To calculate that effect we need to take the first derivative of $y$ (number of land invasions) with respect to $x$ (real wages), as suggested by Kam and Franzese Jr (2007) and Friedrich (1982). When we have two-way interactions as it is the case here (real wages interacts with the two type of year dummies), and the outcome is categorical or count data, the marginal effect of $x_i$ on $y$ ($p$ in the equation) is:

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial p}{\partial F(XB)} (\beta_i + \beta_{ij} x_j + \beta_{ik} x_k)$$

In the Poisson model, this translates into:

$$\exp (x \beta) * \beta_i + \beta_{ij} x_j + \beta_{ik} x_k$$

Thus, to calculate the effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions I used the following equation, using the `predictnl` command in STATA:

predictnl derive of n land invasions for low real wages =
\[ \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_{r\text{real wages}} \cdot \text{low real wages} + \beta_{r\text{electoral year}} \cdot \text{electoral year} + \beta_{r\text{post electoral year}} \cdot \text{postelectoral year} + \beta_{r\text{interaction realwages_electoral year}} \cdot \text{low real wages} \cdot \text{electoral year} + \ldots) \]
The effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions is a negative one. When real salaries are low the number of land invasions increases. But that effect depends on the type of year. The greatest effect occurs in post-electoral years, followed by electoral years. In other years, that is years in between elections, the negative effect is still negative but almost insignificant. The upper limit of the 95% confidence interval is almost 0.

![Figure 15: Marginal effect of low real wages on total number of occupations per year by year type](image)

These results, supporting the hypothesis of a conditional effect of real wages on the number of land invasions per year, refer to the whole population of land invasions. As stated

\[
\beta_5 \text{[interaction real wages_postelectoral year]* low real wages * postelectoral year +}
\beta_6 \text{[dummy90andbeyond]* median value of dummy90andbeyond +}
\beta_7 \text{[lagged n invasions]* median value of lagged n invasions) +}
\]

\[
(\beta_1 \text{[real wages]} +
\beta_4 \text{[interaction realwages_electoral year] * electoral year +}
\beta_5 \text{[interaction real wages_postelectoral year]* postelectoral year})
\]

I also calculated confidence intervals for the effect. Since the ultimate goal was to show this graphically and there is one marginal effect for each value of real wages, I had to hold that variable fixed at a certain value. Because substantively I was interested in hardships, I held real wages constant at a low value (its mean minus 1 standard deviation). I let the types of years dummies vary, and held the dummy90andbeyond and the lag n of invasions constant at their medians.
before, however, land invasions are far from homogeneous in Montevideo. While some are
planned before the invasion, some start by accretion and yet others start because somebody
subdivides the land and starts selling it to people often fraudulently (see chapter 2). In the
following section I explore the possibility that these three types of settlement formation are
different kinds of collective actions, triggered by different factors.

5.3.5 Comparative results

Table 3 shows the results of running the same interactive model as in Table 2, but this time also
for the three different types of land invasions separately.
Table 4: Poisson Regression Estimates of the Influence of selected predictors on the Number of Land Occupations per year for three types of occupations, Montevideo 1947-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Organized</th>
<th>Accretion</th>
<th>Land subdivision and Sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real wages</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election year dummy</td>
<td>1.970**</td>
<td>6.329**</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>9.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.728)</td>
<td>(2.191)</td>
<td>(1.104)</td>
<td>(5.699)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year after election year dummy</td>
<td>2.976***</td>
<td>5.178**</td>
<td>3.472**</td>
<td>3.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.677)</td>
<td>(1.790)</td>
<td>(1.043)</td>
<td>(3.990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages*Election Year</td>
<td>-0.013*</td>
<td>-0.046*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages*Year after election year</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>-0.039*</td>
<td>-0.027**</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 and beyond dummy</td>
<td>1.409***</td>
<td>2.346***</td>
<td>0.800*</td>
<td>3.875**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.458)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(1.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag (N total invasions t-1)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.056***</td>
<td>-2.221</td>
<td>1.451*</td>
<td>-4.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(1.637)</td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
<td>(4.273)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N                                   | 55            | 55            | 55            | 55                         |

LR Chi2                              | 294.78        | 132.03        | 67.75         | 45.21                      |

P > Chi2                             | 0.000         | 0.000         | 0.000         | 0.000                      |

Pseudo R-squared                     | 0.573         | 0.6023        | 0.309         | 0.482                      |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The 1990 and beyond dummy and the lagged number of land invasions behave similarly across the four models. For all types of land invasions, their expected count was greater after 1989. Yet looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, and comparing the models for each type with the model for the total, we can see some interesting difference. The entrepreneur invasions
seem to be the ones more likely to occur after 1989, followed by the organized invasions. In turn, none of the three types seems to be triggered by temporal diffusion processes since the lagged number of invasions is not significant for any of the models. Again, it becomes important to note that this only rules out diffusion year to year, but not week to week or month to month.

To interpret the conditional effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions per year for each of the three types of invasions, I have calculated predicted counts and marginal effects for the three models (following the same logic explained in footnotes 53 and 54). Figures 16 to 21 show these calculations graphically.
Figure 16: Predicted Number of ACCRETION occupations per year by real wages and year type

Figure 17: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of ACCRETION occupations by year type
Figure 18: Predicted Number of PLANNED occupations per year by real wages and year type

Figure 19: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of PLANNED occupations by year type
Figure 20: Predicted Number of LAND SUBDIVISION AND SALE occupations per year by real wages and year type

Figure 21: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of LAND SUBDIVISION AND SALE occupations by year type
The comparative analysis of the models for the three different types of land invasions shows variation that remained hidden in the overall analysis. Accretion invasions are the closest to the general pattern (e.g., it makes sense because accretion invasions are the majority, so they influence the overall results). The expected number of invasions is greater as the yearly real wages go down (Figure 16). Yet the effect of real wages is much greater in post electoral years. In fact, if we look at Figure 17, we see that low real wages are only significant for post electoral years. This is quite different from planned invasions, which are more likely to occur also when the salaries are low but when elections are coming, that is, in election years (Figures 18 and 19). Post electoral years also positively affect the expected count of planned land invasions but to a lesser extent (e.g., the effect of low real wages in post electoral years is close to being insignificant).

Although entrepreneur invasions seem to behave similarly to planned invasions in the estimated counts (Figure 20), when we look at the marginal effect of low real wages on the expected count of land invasions (Figure 21) we see that it is not significant for any of the year types. Thus, entrepreneur invasions seem to be yet a different type, unrelated to grievances and political opportunities, at least as measured here.

5.3.6 Discussion

As expected, as real wages diminished, land invasions grew. Land invasions are generally a strategy of the urban poor which are the ones mostly affected by overall indicators of hardship such as low real wages. Still, this is just part of the story. It does not take only hardship to squat.
The effect of low real wages is enhanced if an election happened the year before. Electoral years also increase the effect of real wages on the number of land invasions.

As it seems, land invasions cannot be explained only by looking at attributes of individuals or families. Another level or mechanism is needed. Based on my broader fieldwork I hypothesize that isolated individuals or families may feel ready to squat when their salaries are low or other hardships high but often brokers, leaders or entrepreneurs, are needed for those families to take action. This is especially true for planned invasions, which takes us to another discussion point.

More interestingly, the interactive effect of grievances and politics varies for different types of land invasions. This is especially clear for accretion and planned invasions. Accretion invasions tend to happen in post electoral years while planned invasions tend to happen in election years. This finding can be understood in the broader context of the fieldwork I conducted in the city of Montevideo, visiting squatter settlements across the city and interviewing more than 80 residents (leaders and non leaders), politicians, state employees, and other key informants.

To give just one sharp indicator, while interviews with residents of accretion invasions lasted less than half an hour, interviews with residents of organized invasions never lasted less than two hours, and they could take several visits. In accretion invasions there is not much of a collective story to tell, which was what the interview schedule was about. Of course, there are lots of stories, and lots of examples of solidarity among neighbors. But when asked about how they got to the occupied land, and what they did when they first arrived and had to build their houses and face the lack of any services, there are mostly individual stories, not stories of neighborhood organizations. With residents of planned invasions, after listening to epic stories
about the old days (e.g., organizing beforehand, finding a safe plot to squat, resisting the police, building houses together, sharing a soup kitchen, discussing everything in assemblies with direct democracy and so on) I was the one who sometimes had to cut the interview short because information was getting redundant after the third hour or so and I had to run to the other extreme of the city to my next interview. Planned invasions, especially at the beginning, were more proactive. Interestingly, they frame their squatting in terms of rights. They demand a place in the city. This might be the reason explaining why they tended to squat in electoral years, during the campaign, just like more organized social movements and pressure groups.

The reasons why accretion invasions tended to happen in post-election years can be several. Using the framework of all my data, I hypothesize two mechanisms as important. On the one hand, politicians and new state officials, once in the government, might have repaid their constituents’ votes by letting them squat. In addition, most politicians and state officials squatters are connected to are those in office, the ones that have resources to give away. On the other hand, individual families or small groups might have decided to invade a plot after elections under the safety of the confusion of an authority change.

Finally, entrepreneurial invasions are a new type and they do not seem to be related to hardship or elections as political opportunities. Since they start with subdivisions and the sale of plots by the owner or by a fraudulent broker, they might follow more of a market logic that is not captured in the models presented here. Yet also from my interviews and ethnographic observations, I can say they are very much connected to politics. Elections might not determine when they start, but to get what they need (e.g., streets, information, tolerance, water, and so on), owners or fraudulent brokers need to be in contact with state officials and politicians. It is a
puzzle that they have been more likely since 1990 given that the Frente Amplio in government has been harsh with this type of often fraudulent sales.

5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Drawing from this case but going beyond it, this study contributes to the literature on contentious politics in at least three ways. First, it suggests an interactive relationship between political opportunities and hardships or grievances, rather than an additive or competitive one. The idea is that political opportunities constrain and enhance/moderate hardships but do not tend to be the sole cause of mobilization outcomes.

Because they wanted to quarrel with the engrained idea that relative deprivation was the cause of (irrational) mobilization, exponents of resource mobilization first and political opportunities later downplayed the role of hardships or grievances completely. In a beautifully provocative statement in 1974, Tilly wrote:

Grievances are fundamental to rebellion as oxygen is fundamental to combustion. But just as fluctuations in the oxygen content of the air account for little of the distribution of fire in the workaday world, fluctuations in grievances are not a major cause of the presence or absence of rebellion. For that, the political means of acting on grievances which people have at their disposal matter a good deal more (Tilly 1974).

The argument was that hardships and grievances, more or less constant, could not be the cause of episodic mobilization. Just as they led the pendulum too much into the rationality direction, overlooking the role of emotions in mobilization (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001), they led it to the political opportunities direction as well, perhaps going too far from hardships.
and grievances. The idea of specific political factors such as electoral times interacting, channeling, magnifying or ameliorating the effect of grievances or hardships is perhaps closer to reality for many cases.

Second, these findings suggest that political opportunities do matter for Latin American mobilization, in particular for poor people’s mobilization in the region, as well as they matter for wealthier contexts. Even for the most aggrieved, politics do matter in their participation in collective action. Findings do not support claims of regional exceptionality, in terms of greater relevance of hardship there. Yet proving such broad statements would require much more research on contentious events in the region and in other places. Among other things, indicators of hardship and opportunity should be the same if the goal is really replication, something I did not do here (my measures of hardship and opportunity are not the same as in the studies I started the discussion with). We are still very short of being able to generalize about broader theories of mobilization on the basis of empirical findings about specific movements in certain times and places, using narrow and very heterogeneous indicators of political opportunities. We need more research that uses similar methodologies and similar variables across a wide range of contentious events to be able to make such generalizations.

Finally, these findings show that an elusive form of collective action, especially the less planned invasions, that many would not even call contentious and most not a social movement can be modeled in similar ways as more structured forms of mobilization. Through intensive data collection it is possible to get at event data even without the availability of convenient sources such as newspapers. Oral histories and institutional histories can also be used to reconstruct mobilization events. Of course these reconstructions will be imperfect, and certainly mine has imperfections, missing data and perhaps some mistakes in the dates. But even so, some effects
are clear. And of course studying just the beginning of land occupations is not everything. But history does matter. And the type of land settlement, and the moment of land settlement do have a long lasting effect on the landscape of neighborhoods in the trajectories of mobilization and on the wellbeing of the people that live in those neighborhoods.
6.0 MARKET CLIENTELISM: “IF YOU DON’T FLIRT, YOU DON’T GET ANYTHING.”

Hanging from the white walls, surrounding the table where I interviewed Manuel Gómez, there were all sorts of trophies he proudly showed me one by one. Just as we tend to have in our living rooms the pictures of people we love, places we like, and maybe some ornaments or paintings that denote a taste, a lifestyle and that constitute part of how we present ourselves to the visitor, this squatter neighborhood leader owned a very peculiar gallery. Manuel had his walls decorated with a picture of him hugging Tabaré Vazquez, former Montevideo mayor and later Uruguayan president for the leftist coalition Frente Amplio; a big paper clip with many articles about the neighborhood including words and a picture of Mario Carminatti, once candidate for City Mayor from the traditional center-right Colorado Party; another picture of Manuel, this time with Jorge Zabalza, a former city councilor, who lives in a squatter settlement, politically located to the left of the left, once a member of the Tupamaros guerrilla movement, and who has helped and promoted the creation of many settlements in the city. Perhaps the most surprising of all, was a letter in a golden frame that Manuel took down with the help of a chair to show me. Signed by the then president Julio María Sanguinetti, from the Colorado Party, it congratulated Manuel for the “thriving human group that moves this neighborhood ahead.” Besides the celebrity of the sender, I was puzzled by the paradox of Manuel being congratulated for building a neighborhood considered irregular in a rural area where the Montevideo Municipal Government forbids construction.60

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60 Neighborhoods and people’s names are fictitious to comply with confidentiality. Only public figures’ names are real.
Beyond the meaning of each particular letter, article or picture described in these fieldnotes, the most curious thing was the combination of them in the same place. It was not mere chance. Just as Manuel saved each of these objects, I saved this vignette from my fieldwork because I remember it as one of those moments in ethnographic fieldwork when suddenly everything makes sense, micro windows through which you can see the broader picture, seconds that reveal what months of research had hidden not because they are anecdotal but because they synthesize what you have already seen but in a confused or fragmented manner.

This living-room materializes what I call market clientelism, which has been the most successful strategy of brokerage used by Montevideo squatters’ leaders to get the goods they need from the state –the squatters’ main interlocutor. In this chapter, I use the story of Manuel and his neighborhood to walk the reader through my fieldwork and then fly with him or her to the concept of market clientelism. I finish referring to some important points in the literature on clientelism and mobilization that I believe this case speaks to.

6.1 METHODS

As mentioned elsewhere, the goals of this dissertation are twofold. First, I want to identify when and the conditions under which squatter settlements have been more likely to emerge in Montevideo. And second, I want to understand how squatters have interacted with those conditions, especially with politics, to produce (different types of) squatter settlements. This chapter aims at contributing (primarily) to the second of these goals.

As part of a broader city and time wide ethnographic fieldwork I describe in the methods section of the dissertation I conducted a “mini-ethnography” of the squatter settlement New
Through zooming in on the story of this particular neighborhood I learned in depth about one particular way in which squatters have interacted with politics (and through them with the state): market clientelism.

Fieldwork included a multiplicity of data. Because my approach to contention aimed at being “relational” or “interactive” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2008) exploring the squatters’ points of view was not enough. I also needed to explore other viewpoints such as those of politicians and state bureaucrats. Because my approach was historical, the people I needed to interview were not necessarily currently in office but were people who could tell me about the moment in which New Rock settled and asked for services.

To get started, I walked through the neighborhood, took pictures, and conducted oral histories with two of the founders and leaders of the neighborhood as well as with ordinary early residents. I had previously identified one of the leaders, Manuel, through other interviews. His name turned up in some of the interviews with politicians and officials. So did the neighborhood he founded, which some people mentioned as a fraudulent sale and some as an example of planning and organization. So I decided to look for him.

To find Manuel I randomly called people in the phone book with his name and asked if they lived in New Rock until I eventually found him and arranged an interview. The day of the interview another founder, Miriam, was also there so I had the chance to ask both of them about the story of the neighborhood. It was Manuel who introduced me to a family of early residents I also interviewed on that long afternoon.

Those oral histories were guides for me to find new interviewees and crosscheck the stories or see the same information from another point of view. Thus, I interviewed former city councilors from different political parties, social workers and local authorities at the Local...
Community Center (CCZ), one of the main directors of the Ministry of Housing, two other local brokers that knew the main leader of New Rock, and asked all of them about New Rock and its main leader, Manuel. I also looked at newspaper articles. Finally, I got access to the minutes of the City Council’s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements for the day in which they received a group of neighbors from New Rock.

I have used the rich information obtained from these sources in several ways (e.g., the date of settlement for the statistical modeling). But for this chapter I have focused on the strategies used to build the neighborhood, and in particular to contact the state. By carefully reconstructing the genealogy of the settlement and the main leader’s political network I try to get at the most common patterns or mechanisms involved in the construction of the neighborhood.

Finally, and in order to put the case of New Rock into context, throughout the chapter I also use information about other settlements and about the political context of Montevideo collected in the broader fieldwork for this dissertation.

6.2 THE GENEALOGY OF NEW ROCK

As mentioned in the methods section, it is unusual to find articles on land invasions and this is the reason I dub squatting elusive collective action. It is also rare to find articles on squatters’ neighborhood organizations. It is perhaps easier to find references to squatters in the newspapers in poverty, or crime, related articles. Thus, finding this article in El País’ – one of the main national newspapers - online archive struck me as puzzling.
*New Rock* is now 8 years old and it celebrated its birthday by inaugurating a fountain and a bus terminal. The latter enables this area of the city, inhabited by about 1400 families, to have better access to several areas of the city (...) For the inauguration ceremony (...) about fifty neighbors were present, the Housing Minister, Lucio Cáceres, José Bello from the bus company, the vice-president of OSE [the state owned water company] Hugo Granucci and other authorities. The ceremony included the neighborhood association giving acknowledgement plaques to the officials of the bus company and the water company (...)

After about 800 families occupied the area, they all acquired the 25 hectares plot, paying a sum of about 140,000 dollars, according to Manuel Gómez, president of the neighborhood association. (...) In eight years of existence, they were able to get water, light and roads and stand out from the rest of the squatter settlements according to neighbors who add that “safety is greater than in many other places.” The Minister of Housing agrees and says “compared to other zones with similar characteristics, *New Rock* is one of the most ordered that I know of. It has an adequate social cohesion and better urban conditions.”  

I found other published news about *New Rock* in *El País* and other mainstream media, all reporting the successes and exceptional character of this squatter settlement. In one of them, the Interior Minister, after visiting what the reporter considers a “model” neighborhood for its low crime rate, said that in *New Rock* “neighbors take care of the neighborhood and cooperate with the police.”  

The reason why *New Rock*, unlike other settlements, appears on the news is because its leaders are well connected. In particular, the president of the neighborhood association, Manuel Gómez – a very outspoken short man in his fifties, - is a very important node. It was because his name and the name of the settlement kept appearing in other interviews

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I was conducting, either with key informants, politicians, or other local leaders, that I decided to include *New Rock* among the group of 25 squatter neighborhoods that I researched in more depth. This well connectedness is reflected in the visits made by very important political figures to this settlement.

From the very beginning, *New Rock* and its main leader were embedded in political networks. They became a squatter settlement and a neighborhood leader through political networks. Manuel had always lived in the area next to the settlement called Rock. There, a few clustered poor houses were the only urban sign in the middle of an enormous green area of small family farms, in the Northeast of Montevideo. They did not have good light, piped water or any other services. They were in the middle of nowhere. According to Manuel, he had “always thought that the way to progress was to bring people in.”

The opportunity came –Manuel and another neighborhood representative, Miriam, remember in an interview- when in November 1995, “we occupied because FUCVAM [the cooperative housing movement] had a group of people evicted from a cooperative and did not know where to put them.” They were interested in the plot next to where Manuel and Miriam lived, a plot that had been empty for 30 years, and nobody knew who its owners were. Manuel – who in his words had always been “just one more neighbor” - started becoming the leader of what would be *New Rock*.

Unlike the slow reaction that some settlements in public land had experienced, since the land invasion was on a private land, the police came immediately and took everybody to the police station. As Manuel recalls it, “The owners appeared immediately (...) But we agreed that they would sell and we would buy.” The invaders did not have any money to pay for the land, but Manuel had an idea. He opened a bank account, divided the plot in about 250 small parcels,
and started receiving people who would pay 2,500 Uruguayan pesos each – at the time about 200-250 dollars. People did not need to pay all up front. Most people paid in small installments, depositing directly at the bank and giving the receipt to the neighborhood association.

As was true for many other owners of private land in what is considered a rural area by the municipality, this was probably a good deal for the owners of the unproductive land in which New Rock is currently located. Since protected rural areas cannot be subdivided, owners could have only sold the whole plot, for much less than the amount they received from New Rock neighborhood association. How much money was exactly involved in the transaction between the New Rock’s neighborhood association and the owners remains confused. Different sources have different numbers, and some accuse Manuel and the others of having kept some money for themselves. Manuel and Miriam deny any gain from the transaction.

The early days of the neighborhood were busy ones. A lot of knowledge from the cooperative housing movement was transmitted into the planning of this neighborhood, through

63 Not only did other interviewees (such as a neighborhood leader of another area of the city) suggest Manuel had kept some money, but some of the neighbors of New Rock, accused him at the City Council. Checking the minutes of the City Council’s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements, I found that on October 3, 2003 (that is about the same time newspapers were publishing about this model neighborhood and politicians were visiting it), a group of neighbors came to ask the City Council for help in finding the property titles of the neighborhood. They were worried about their legal situation, and they accused Manuel of not giving them the information they wanted and of having kept money from the transaction for himself. In the words of one of the speakers: “We put together in a bank account about 300,000 dollars and the two plots of the neighborhood were bought for 160,000 (…) Apparently there is a difference that this man kept and that money is ours.” The councilors gave them information on property titles and promised to get in touch with the local municipal authorities in order to help promote a more democratic neighborhood association. They also promised to visit the neighborhood soon. I do not have information on what happened after this session but things did not seem to have changed much since. When I conducted fieldwork, about four years later, Manuel was still president of the neighborhood association. Interestingly, neither this possible fraud case nor the problems with the neighborhood association appeared on the minutes of the regular sessions of the City Council. The issue remained in the special commission. Whenever the minutes of the whole City Council referred to New Rock it was always to mention the neighborhood exceptionality, the “decency” of its houses or how “sometimes civil society goes ahead the state” (e.g., minute N° 1012, 11/04/2002; minute 1177, 17/03/2005). The last mention I found was in 2008 in reference to a letter that the neighborhood association sent the city council asking them to sponsor the celebration of the neighborhood’s 13th birthday. The councilors unanimously agreed. There was no discussion. Nobody questioned the legitimacy of the neighborhood association or reminded the others of the visit of a group of worried neighbors five years before (minute N° 1418, 23/10/2008). (See minutes at http://www.juntamvd.gub.uy).
the alliance of Manuel with the FUCVAM leaders. In an interview with one of those leaders, he explained to me that they tried to organize them “in a communitarian way.”

Now they have streets, they have electricity; everybody’s plot has the same area. People had a deadline to build their homes, and they had to build them with solid materials. So we tried to export the organizational experience [from cooperatives] to squatter settlements. (...) I can name you a bunch of settlements in which I participated and other fellows as well, and we gave them the organizational inclination. New Rock also has a community center, and actually tomorrow I need to go because they have created a production cooperative. So I think conceptually FUCVAM has irradiated this organization.

It becomes important to note that these leaders, one of them also a city councilor for the Socialist Party (a faction of the broader leftist coalition Frente Amplio), and the other one an advisor at the city council, did this on their own, not formally under a movement or a political party. It is also important to remember here, as an important contextual feature, that Uruguayan parties have defined factions with their own identities, programs and candidates (Buquet 2001). No party or movement have ever programmaticallly promoted land squatting. Manuel also remembers this knowledge transmission and support. “We will always be grateful – he said - to the Socialists, even if later we had political differences with them, because they gave the first step in this neighborhood. Without them, this neighborhood wouldn’t exist. Afterwards, it was all our work.” He speaks of his relationship to FUCVAM as a friendship, “and what a friendship!” – he emphasizes.

Manuel also remembers the president of the City Council at the time, Jorge Zabalza – one of the characters in the pictures from the opening vignette - helping them, defending them at the City Council. Speaking about this, Zabalza told me that at the time the left was divided about this

64 FUCVAM has always been connected with the Socialist Party.
settlement. Some thought they should not help because it was built in a forbidden place, there was money involved, and besides Manuel was building his political career within the *Colorado* Party with this. “And what we thought was – Zabalza speaks for himself and other councilors from the left - that there were more than 400 families solving their housing needs.”

This story accounts for deeper divisions within the left. One of the frictions had to do with the position towards land squatting. On one side there was a radical minority thinking that land squatting was a sort of spontaneous land reform, and on the other the major maintaining that squatting should be avoided in a city that had not grown in population and that they should find other more sustainable ways to accommodate the lower income groups. The idea was that bringing services to squatter settlements is more expensive, and that the expansion of the city should be avoided. The other friction had to do with the relationship of the *Frente Amplio*, traditionally a middle class party, with the lower classes. As Luna (2007) explains in detail, the triumph of the *Frente Amplio* in the 2004 national elections for the first time in history, required a process of constituency diversification and expansion. One of the toughest tasks in that process was the “penetration of traditional party strongholds in Montevideo’s periphery” (p. 2) which was facilitated through the decentralization process that the leftist coalition put in action once it won the municipal government in 1990.

On the ground, winning those strongholds was not easy. Among other things it meant winning local leaders and, perhaps more difficult, it meant breaking with prejudices. As one of the leftist politicians involved in the foundation of *New Rock* told me:

-I used to work with these people. They are very peculiar comrades…they have many codes that I think were never really understood by the left. It takes a lot to understand these codes. But these leaders have served the people in an unconditional manner, being bandits at the same time of course.
MJ- I’ve heard Manuel switched parties…
-Yes, they were all from the right. This has to do with another debate we had in the left.

I always thought being a leftist militant was sectarian. And even more in my generation. You had to smoke a particular brand of cigarettes, wear boots, long hair, jeans, listen to folk music….The Beatles were bourgeois. (…)

[bringing these leaders to the left] was a great job. They were all from the right, but from the right right, anticommunists. And now, they are all leftist militants. This is a great achievement. And it’s a product of not just giving them a book to read but of really going and getting into the mud with the people. We were in the land seizure, we worked, we saw, we learned.

When New Rock was founded, Manuel belonged to the Colorado Party, which held national office at the moment. He had been a Colorado since young, although he had switched factions within the party because once “they came and got me a job at the municipality.” After invading and squatting, he started using his political contacts in the Colorado Party to get things for the neighborhood such as money to fund a children’s soccer team and the roads of the neighborhood. He is very grateful, for example, to one politician who worked at the state water company. He remembers him as someone who helped many squatter settlements bringing them water and, essentially, as a very modest man, who would come and “eat chorizos with us.”

During fieldwork I repeatedly found this idea of the good politician being the one that comes to the neighborhood, is unpretentious, speaks people’s language, walks around the neighborhood and “steps into the sheet,” listens, shares food or mates with the neighbors. In a nutshell, the good politician is the one who shows understanding and closeness.

In 2004, two years before my fieldwork year, the national government switched from being held by the Colorado Party to being run by a leftist one. Manuel also switched sides and became a Frente Amplio voter, with a huge sign of one of the factions of the leftist coalition in his front door. He was actually on that faction’s ballot “as filler in the 30th place” –he clarifies.
According to Manuel, “all types of politicians came here” and he mentions several from the whole political spectrum. He became a *Frente Amplio* supporter for the 1999 elections, but then he chose another faction, the socialist one, since in the end they had been the ones helping in the neighborhood. However, he had fundamental discrepancies with the socialists. He considered them too sectarian for his needs:

What happened? If you said to the socialists that someone from the *Colorado* party was coming to bring water [to the neighborhood], they said no, no, no. If you told them someone from the *Blanco* Party was coming to solve the electricity problem, they said no, no, no. That’s how it started. We can be your friends but we need to do the public works. If we don’t do them, people are going to start revolutionizing and we need to get the things. If we don’t…

High loyalty to just one party was especially inadequate during the years in which *New Rock* emerged. Not only were the municipal and national authorities from different political parties, but the ministries were divided. From 1990 until 2004, the municipal government was leftist and the national government rotated between the *Colorados* and the *Blancos*, the two traditional parties. In addition, these two were bound by political pacts to give some ministries to each other. Among those ministries were some relevant to squatters such as the Housing Ministry, which, as an example, was held by the *Blanco* Party, during the 1995-1999 *Colorado* national government.

Manuel was not the only one switching from the *Colorado* Party to the *Frente Amplio* in the neighborhood. At least people from his inner circle also did. In a long interview with Luis and Betty, a middle aged couple who have been in the neighborhood almost since its foundation, and used to be *Colorado* voters, they told me that they also voted for that *Frente Amplio* faction in the last election, following Manuel. They are both skeptic about politics. As Luis puts it “I
don’t identify with any party because politicians are all the same.” They have had a life of hardship and they do not feel politicians have helped them a lot. Yet the one who has helped them – even more than their own families - is Manuel. He was the one who took their disabled child to the hospital the day a car knocked him down. He did so using a truck from the water company for which he was doing some work –again, through his political contacts. Manuel also lent them money to pay for Luis’ mother funeral, since her death found them broken. Once in Easter, when they could not buy any chocolates for their kids, Manuel came and brought some. He also gave Luis a job in a cooperative of workers he founded. They feel indebted to him. As Betty puts it, “he is always there when you are not ok (…) We matter as people to someone. He cares that something happens to us. That’s enough. So in appreciation we … if he asks me for help in a soup kitchen, even if he cannot pay me, I’m there.”

Manuel founded the workers’ cooperative where Luis, himself, and other men from New Rock work. Their first contract was with the Colorado administration. They worked for the water company bringing piped water to squatter settlements. Now, they have a contract with the Minister of Public Works who, not by chance, belongs to the same Frente Amplio faction as Manuel. At the moment I conducted fieldwork, they were building bus stops along some main roads around Montevideo’s periphery and nearby areas. Manuel recalls the story of this contract as part of a negotiation to promote his new faction in the neighborhood. In his words, “we work politically with a sector, with the vice-president’s. So I went and told him ‘if you want me to work for you politically, there are two things: first the neighborhood and second, jobs. I can give you credit, but I am not going to work for free’.”

As the empowered and proactive leader he ended up becoming in the process of building the neighborhood, Manuel also organized a meeting with President Tabaré Vazquez. According
to him, they had sent Vazquez a letter before the election to talk about his policies on squatter settlements, but he never answered. Once he was elected, they sent another letter scolding him for not having answered. He gave them an appointment immediately. Manuel went together with some people he knew from squatter settlements in his area. As Manuel recalls it:

What we said to the president was that we disagreed with the Emergency Plan (basic income). Instead of it we want to solve our job problems. One of the arguments was that the people who work for state agencies as builders, maintenance stuff, cleaners, and so on are people from squatter settlements. But the ones who get the contracts are big companies that pay low salaries. So it’s better that they teach people from squatter settlements, who are the ones that need the most, how to organize themselves, create their own small company, their own cooperative, NGO, whatever.

This story shows some particular and some general things about Manuel as a squatters’ leader. On the one hand, it shows a very unusual proactive leader who wants to meet with politicians before elections and that has a proposal different from the government’s. On the other hand, it shows something I saw repeatedly, at least among those squatter settlements that have some degree of neighborhood organization: a direct relationship with authorities. Squatters prefer to meet with the director, the councilor and even the country’s president. Through their own history or through what they heard, they have learned that those meetings are feasible. They know, besides, that through those direct meetings they will get what they want more easily and

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65 One of the Frente Amplio’s main campaign plans, and one of the first measures the administration implemented once in office, was a new social welfare program for poor families, in response to the big economic crisis that had hit the country in 2002-2003. The plan, popularly known as Plan de Emergencia (Emergency Plan) had two main objectives: immediate assistance (e.g., basic income of about 50 dollars per month, health care) and support to get out of poverty (e.g., educational programs, labor programs). I conducted fieldwork exactly in the middle of the implementation of the plan. Although not the focus of my research the plan, especially its basic income component, recurrently appeared in my interviews and observations. Some of my interviewees were beneficiaries of the basic income. A neighborhood leader, for instance, was anxiously waiting for her monthly check to be able to bring her daughter and granddaughter home from a different city since they could not pay for it. For another, the basic income meant a lot for his capacity to care for his kids and wife, because his work as a scavenger never brings them much. Some complained because they had been excluded, others because someone they knew lied about her income and got it unfairly or more fundamentally because it promotes people’s laziness. As one woman put it, “Uruguays are lazy; they don’t want to work. They want to earn a lot and do little, and the government…We are against the Emergency Plan because it’s promoting more laziness…don’t give people money or food. No. Give them a job”. 
quickly than following the regular bureaucratic channels. The state is perceived as something stretchable. And the best mechanism to extend its limits is to meet directly with the right person.

Clockwise from upper left: a) View of New Rock from the air, January 13 2008, by Google Earth. The settlement appears as a dense urban island in rural surroundings. The block and street design are typical of planned neighborhoods or of those, like this one, that started by subdivision and sale. b) Neighborhood kindergarten, product of an association between the Municipal Government and the neighborhood association. c) Two of the best neighborhood houses. All houses are made of solid materials (condition to stay in the neighborhood) but there is great variation in the quality and completion of constructions. d) Very typical image of a squatter settlement street: houses in construction with a pile of bricks or other construction materials outside. For many squatters houses are always slow, ongoing projects they go back to every time they can save some money or when there is a family need, such as the marriage of a child who will stay there.

Figure 22: New Rock squatter settlement. Montevideo, 2007-8
6.3 DISCUSSION

Beyond the quite folkloric character of Manuel and the specific details of New Rock’s yet unwritten history, this case is an open window to dialog with many interesting theoretical issues related to clientelism and mobilization. I will focus on developing the concept of market clientelism but I will also refer to other aspects of the literature that I think this case speaks to.

The construction of New Rock relied heavily on Manuel’s political networks. Those networks, at the same time, were created and recreated through the building of the new neighborhood. Of course, there were also other networks at play in its construction, for each household probably used family, church, friends and other ties to come to live there, build their homes and solve their everyday needs. Yet I will focus just on a small part of the universe, on those networks used to contact the state and bring it to the neighborhood, specifically on the clientelistic ones.

The story of this squatter neighborhood shows that face-to-face contacts keep being important for modern or post-modern politics. They were not just something tied to traditional politics and destined to disappear with the modernization of political parties and the use of the media to spread political messages and attract voters. People still like politicians who come to them. At least the squatters I interviewed did. Politicians, in turn, need to get more votes and in so doing face-to-face interactions and exchanges seem to still be effective. As Auyero (1997) points out, “the personalized distribution of goods and favors keeps being crucial to obtain support, loyalty and – ultimately - votes” (p. 20).

But clientelistic networks manifest differently in different contexts. In the context I refer to in this chapter, of a) people with housing and other needs, b) in a society with a tradition of
statism and clientelism (Panizza and Piera 1988)\textsuperscript{66} that recently underwent structural adjustment policies and with c) high electoral competition (especially for the poor), fragile and mobile clientelistic networks were likely to emerge. And, when these networks were present for squatters, they were the most efficient way to reach the state.

6.3.1 Squatters and clientelism

The use of clientelistic networks by squatters has a long tradition in Latin America. So does the study of them by the social sciences. In his study of colonias in the periphery of Mexico City Cornelius’ (1977) saw a suitable environment for old type rural caciques to emerge and reproduce. According to him, “the lack of a governmental ‘presence’ combines with the severity of problems confronting such settlements to create a situation in which people may feel a greater need to enter into a dependency relationship with a local cacique” (p.348). Like most mainstream social science at the time, Cornelius was embedded in Modernization Theory, so he thought caciquismo would disappear with the integration of squatters to the city. Collier (1976) has also addressed the often hidden and particularistic relationships between squatters and politicians for the Lima case. According to him this relationships have served, among other things, as a means to gain political support for politicians.

These early studies provoked a reaction in younger generations of scholars. Some wanted to prove Modernization Theory wrong and show that clientelism was alive and well in the more developed democracies and economies of twenty years later. Some others wanted to show

\textsuperscript{66} It is likely that without this statist tradition squatters would not expect so much from the state and that they would not speak of their rights to housing—as many did in my interviews. According to Alsayyad (1993) making claims to the state and being politicized is part of the “squattng culture” in Latin America, not only of Uruguay. By contrast, in the Middle East squatters tend to resort to strategies outside politics such as, depending on the particular context, complete political invisibility, tribal networks, or religious law to legalize land.
variation in the political behavior of squatters, by saying that not all of them were clientelistic. This is precisely the argument of the early work of Stokes (1991) in Peru. She found two ideal types of squatters: clientelists and radicals. Clientelists accept social hierarchy and perceive their work in the neighborhood as approximating that of professionals or managers. Their strategy is to cultivate friendly relationships with officials and others, they see the state as representative of universal interests and friendly to the demands of the poor, they respect the state-established rules of the game understanding that this may win some rewards. Radicals, in turn, are more egalitarian, identify strongly as workers, and see themselves in conflict with owners. They pursue coordinating efforts with other poor to exert maximum pressure on the state, they see the state as a representative of capitalists. They see themselves as part of broader social movements.

Stokes’ perspective, which definitely returns agency to the poor by saying that not all of them buy into the clientelistic game and that some have a very critical perspective, is similar to the one Gay (1994) takes in his very interesting comparison of two favelas in Rio. As he puts it

Latin America’s urban poor are often portrayed as the innocent victims of repressive, and exclusionary regimes [in a footnote Gay includes David Collier’s book on Peruvian squatters as one of the examples of this perspective]. Victims they undoubtedly are; innocent however, they are not. Indeed, there’s increasing evidence from a variety of contexts that the urban poor have been active, organized, and aggressive participants in the political process and that the popular organizations, in particular, have had a significant impact on the relationship between the urban poor and political elites.

What I found in Montevideo was quite different than this perspective in the sense that I did not find a divorce between clientelism and agency. On the one hand, Manuel’s brokerage shows the possibility of using clientelistic networks with great agency if that means being able to decide and propose. On the other hand, even those few squatters who were more radicalized
tended to behave according to the rules of the game, negotiating, flirting with politicians, and so on.

6.3.2 Market clientelism

I call market clientelism to those fragile clientelistic networks, based on competition among patrons, which give more power to clients and brokers and are based more on short term exchanges than on long lasting loyalties. Clients and brokers are able to switch patrons or combine them in unprecedented manners.

I draw this concept from scholars of Colombian politics. They developed the concept of “market clientelism” to understand the changes that the 1991 constitutional reform brought by introducing decentralization. According to them, decentralization has increased political options and political competitors. This, in turn, has developed into what they dub “market clientelism” which is characterized by unstable networks that are less asymmetric than in the past because the client acquires more weight in the relationship (García 2003). Early scholars of clientelism already thought of the changes electoral competition may cause to clientelistic relationships. In his study of Southeast Asia, Scott (1977) argues that electoral competition had improved clients’ bargaining power.

Like other forms of clientelism, market clientelism is a form of citizen-politician linkage that, unlike programmatic ones, is particular, based on direct tangible goods targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens in exchange for (the promise of) electoral support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The peculiarity of market clientelism is that it defies the common ideas of a passive client because it shows a very strategic one, willing to change bands and flirt with many at the same time to get concrete goods.
Manuel’s self representation, his practices, and the stories that others in his network and outside of it told me about him strongly contrast with other experiences of clientelistic relationships that are highly unequal and in which the lower class leader assumes “an attitude of submission or even servility vis-à-vis the powerful” (Stokes 1991). Way beyond passiveness or submission, and also beyond hidden resistance in Scott’s (1990) terms, Manuel’s strategy is explicit and active. Using Merklen’s (2003; 2005) metaphor to illustrate the behavior of squatters in Argentina, Manuel’s logic and practices resemble those of a hunter more than those of a farmer. He is always attentive, ready to grab any opportunity.

As he puts it: “we had to flirt a lot with politicians. If you don’t flirt, you don’t get anything.” As stated before, besides flirting, he has actually switched parties and factions several times. Besides, as he explained, he left one particular faction of the Frente Amplio because they demanded too much loyalty or exclusivity. Others’ descriptions do not situate him in a submissive attitude either. “A popular urbanist,” “a rogue (picaro) from a Cervantes’ novel,” “a person who only defends his pocket,” “an intelligent man that always goes towards where there is [political] strength,” are some of the phrases both fans and detractors used to describe him. Although poor and in a position apparently subordinate to any politician, Manuel has power and has used it strategically to his and his neighborhood benefit.

Those squatters who, like Manuel, learned how to use these networks in a market-like way were the most successful in reaching the state. Yet there were ways to behave like a market client other than Manuel’s. The leaders of New Blossom, one of the most upgraded squatter settlements in Montevideo, practiced a different strategy: division of political labor. The two main neighborhood leaders belonged to two different political parties and they both used their political networks to get services. The colorado leader got easy access to roads because the
Ministry of Public Works was in his party’s hands. The leftist leader, in turn, got a lot of support from the Frente Amplio municipal administration. But New Blossom also used another strategy, this one much more common among other squatter settlements I visited: apolitical performance, that is, pretending no interest in political affairs. One of the early founders explained to me that even though invaders were from the left, after they squatted “there were no political parties.” During the early times, they did not let people put political signs in their houses.

“We are apolitical here” was a common phrase among leaders of squatter settlements, especially the most organized ones. Given the many stories of contacts with politicians to get this or that, this latter phrase sounds a bit paradoxical. In fact one could substitute apolitical by hyper-political and it would make perfect sense. But what squatters really mean when they say they are apolitical is not that they are politically neutral since most of them have their clear preferences, but that they behave or perform as if they were apolitical. Part of that performance is “open[ing] doors to everybody” as they claim they do. If they show preference for one party publicly they would probably not get many things they want that are not under the control of that single party. They might even get less from that party too. It becomes important to remember, for example, that in the period 1995-2004, the national government of Uruguay was controlled by the Colorado party – and so was the Ministry of Public Works, - the Frente Amplio had Montevideo’s municipal government, and the Blanco Party controlled the Ministry of Housing. In that context, showing no preference was the cleverest thing to do if you wanted to get something from each.
6.3.3 The “other” clientelism

No doubt market clientelism was the most successful strategy for squatters’ organizations and leaders that wanted to get the state’s attention. Yet in the varied universe of squatter settlements I did find, although less frequently, other less strategic uses of political networks, based on long term loyalties and strong affective ties.

“The Distributor”, a local Colorado party broker that earned his nickname because he has organized many squatter settlements in one of the most deprived areas of the city and distributed land in them to many people, is an example of a more traditional type of broker than Manuel. He has always been very much involved in political networks but he has never left his party. As he put it looking at me with wet and fixed eyes:

If the Colorado Party has a vote, that’s my vote. I have had offers by the blancos, the frenteamplistas (…). They offered a blank check to switch…but how can I do that? With myself….I can’t do that as easily as others change colors. What would I say to my children?

The squatter settlements organized by “The Distributor” were, however, visibly less developed or upgraded than New Rock. He only has a single patron, someone twice representative and once a candidate for mayor but who has not been in office since 2000. The Distributor, therefore, does not have access to much for his constituency. Once in a while the patron comes and distributes mattresses and blankets and invites people to a barbecue. But although in the past “The Distributor” once got a job through the party, today he is unemployed. “I am one of the living dead – he says - (…) I live from my wife.” He gets sporadic personalized help from his patron. Once in a while, he gives him some money, but he does not feel that is really dignifying; and he also got medical attention through him. But the relationship appears to survive for reasons other than the goods exchanged. Loyalty and belonging seem crucial.
The contrast of Manuel and “The Distributor” shows different ways of reaching state resources through political contacts with different degrees of effectiveness. In the 24 different cases of land invasions I visited,67 three patterns were clear. First, a leader or neighborhood association with political ties helped the neighborhood acquire services. Those neighborhoods whose initial leaders had some political ties, with any party, and no matter which brokerage modality they used, today have better services and better urban quality in general. Second, accretion invasions did not have this type of leader. Politically well connected leaders are often present in planned invasions and sometimes in subdivisions and sales (see table 5). Finally, among the connected leaders or neighborhood associations, those that had ties with different political parties were more successful in obtaining a greater variety of state resources, (something that gives them the best urban quality).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invasion type</th>
<th>Presence of leader or neighborhood association at the beginning of the invasion with political ties</th>
<th>Total number of invasions in the sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Accretion</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdivision and Sale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
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67 I studied 25 different invasion cases, but one of them was a case of an eviction. For that case, my informants were a local leader of the broader neighborhood and the local authorities that avoided the occupation of a public plot. This is why the n of invasion leaders equals 24.
I hypothesize that the effectiveness of Manuel’s market clientelism is a product of the increasing electoral competition between parties, and even between factions, for the urban poor. In the past, being loyal to one party could be effective. In fact, the squatter settlement that has achieved the greatest recognition from the state in the history of the informal city in Uruguay has been Casabó, whose leaders were very loyal to the Colorado party for many years. They are the only ones whose case, after being discussed by the parliament, is backed by a law that recognizes their property over the land and promises upgrading the neighborhood. Yet more recently, flirting with many parties became more effective.

6.3.4 Some other theoretical reflections on clientelism and mobilization

Besides being an example of market clientelism, the story of New Rock also speaks to some of the core issues in the literature on clientelism. The first of those matters is the false dichotomy between rational and normative action. As Auyero (1997) explains, arguing against those who thought that clientelistic practices were pre-modern, irrational and characteristic of traditional societies, some authors have emphasized the rationality of clientelism for both sides. This has illuminated many aspects of clientelistic networks and practices, yet it has forgotten the important non-instrumental aspects of it. By invading a plot and organizing the settlement of people in New Rock, Manuel reinvented himself. He is important for many people both inside and outside the neighborhood, both clients and patrons. As he puts it, “everybody comes here. If there’s a police problem, they come here. If there’s a divorce problem, they come here.” During the interview he mentioned he was friends or had a good friendship with this senator or that bureaucrat, or the vice-president and so forth. As one politician from Manuel’s same current political faction told me, “[He] feels important if he is next to someone important.”
Another important matter in this case can speak to the literature’s lack of attention to the emergence of actors, ties and networks (Auyero 1997). Studies often take the existence of networks as granted and do not explain how clients, patrons and brokers become so. Manuel’s turning into the central position he is at today happened in an interactive manner. There was a turning point when two activist-politicians came and contacted him. But this did not happen in a vacuum. Although Manuel is right in saying he was “just a neighbor” in the sense that he was not the president of a neighborhood association as he is today, he was a neighbor with political ties in the Colorado party. In fact, when I requested specific details, I learned that it was through another broker from the Colorado party who lived close to the evicted people the two activists-politicians wanted to find a place for, that they reached Manuel. Curiously, about 12 years later I also interviewed that other broker and he mentioned Manuel and New Rock as well. He was “The Distributor.”

Another relevant subject in the literature on clientelism that this case tackles is the role of brokers. In addition to the dyad patron-client, the role of brokers has been studied by many because of their relevance in clientelistic relationships (Auyero 2000; Burgwal 1995; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Scott 1977). As Burgwal (1995:26) puts it,

In contrast to patrons, brokers do not control resources, such as land, jobs, knowledge, protection, directly. They are intermediaries who manipulate their contacts to bring about communication between their clients and patrons who can dispense the first order resources. A broker bridges gaps in communication for profit, his main (second order) resource therefore is his network of crucial contacts. Patrons, brokers and clients are thus distinct roles, which can be fulfilled by the same person.

As I see it, the story of New Rock, and possible the story of Montevideo’s squatting, is mainly a story of brokerage. Manuel is a broker in the sense that he links previously “unconnected social
sites” and “mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Manuel connected the owner of the plot with the buyers. In this sense he was an economic broker. But there were more actors involved in the invasion and settlement of people in New Rock. He also put people in his neighborhood in touch with state agencies through politicians. Without those connections it would have been impossible for people like the couple I talked about before, Betty and Luis, to live where they currently do or at least in the way they currently do. Had they squatted on their own, without being embedded in Manuel’s network, they would have been evicted by the owner or the police or, alternatively, joined a very different type of settlement, one by accretion with little services and probably no planning would have emerged.

Finally, another subject in the literature on clientelism I address here is the opposition between clientelism and mobilization. Clientelistic networks are often mentioned as a catch-all explanation for poor people’s demobilization. (For nuanced exceptions see Auyero (1999; 2000); Burgwal (1995); Gay (1994)). Yet clientelism varies. We have here analyzed a network very centralized on one person, Manuel. This type of network does tend to demobilize, and yet this is not always the case.

One example of this is that a group of neighbors from New Rock mobilized against Manuel. Having paid for their plots by depositing in the bank account that Manuel opened to pay the land owner, not having received a property title yet and after receiving elusive answers from Manuel, they went to the City Council and said “we want you to help us defend our rights.”

This group of neighbors resorted to the channels of the Municipal Government which has been, at least formally, an enemy of land invasions in rural areas and of those suspicious of fraudulent

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68 Minutes of the City Council’s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements, October 3, 2003.
transactions. Moreover, they explicitly denounced the centralized clientelistic network, as these meeting minutes illustrate:

There is no interest in neighbors’ organization because they work with the old caudillo to whom neighbors are hostages. There are a lot of accusations to make but since we don’t have solid arguments to found them we can’t mention them...because that can cause us a law suit (...) What we want is that New Rock organizes more democratically. We want to have the support of the City Council, of the Municipal Government and the Local Councils – people who are neutral here - and promote the creation of a good neighborhood association that is truly representative. 69

A different example involves Luis and Betty, members of Manuel’s network’s inner circle. Before coming to live in New Rock they had never participated in any organization. In Luis’ words, “the only thing we used to do was to vote.” When they started building their current house, the neighborhood was just starting and there were a lot of people in need. Betty started participating in a soup kitchen. She remembers that the colorados donated them things such as pots, glasses, clothing. “We used to give milk, rice with milk, bread with jam that INDA (the National Institute for Nutrition) gave us to the children here. In the winter, it was cold, it was raining and they were barefoot.” Interestingly, Betty did this with Manuel’s wife and daughter.

In addition, Betty and Luis became members of the neighborhood association. And as members, it was their first time talking face to face to politicians, going to the City Council, and so on. In general, however, they worked in the neighborhood – dividing the plots, building streets, filling some irregular parts of the plot, organizing celebrations, building their own house, and helping others with theirs - letting Manuel and a few others do the public relations work.

In sum, clientelism and mobilization can coexist. Moreover, clientelism may under certain conditions enhance mobilization. Rather than a theoretical opposition the relationship

69 Ibid.
between these two concepts invites to ask empirical questions such as how and under what conditions does clientelism enhance or inhibit mobilization?

6.4 CONCLUSION

The story of *New Rock* is not representative of the more than 400 squatter settlements in Montevideo. Yet many of the things I found in scattered form in my visits to 25 of those neighborhoods, in my interviews with bureaucrats and politicians, and in my statistical analysis of the land invasion cycle more generally, I found all together in *New Rock*. Many separate features appeared condensed and exaggerated in this social universe, as in a “weberian” ideal type. I have focused on the neighborhood leader’s crucial brokerage role in connecting squatters with the state. In particular, I have pointed at what I dub *market* use of political networks to get things for himself and his neighborhood.

Through the use of multiple political ties at the same time, switching patrons, performing or behaving as if they were apolitical and in the meantime opening the doors to different parties, some squatters were able to transform the political opportunity of electoral competition for their promise of loyalty and votes into new land invasions and new services for their neighborhoods.

Some scholars of contentious politics are switching from the study of big causes to the study of mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). This study is part of that current. In this sense, market clientelism was one of the possible mechanisms through which electoral politics – as one example of concrete political opportunity – sometimes transforms into (different types of) squatters’ mobilization. In particular, the role of brokers appears as crucial.
Scholars of mobilization point at brokerage as one of the most important relational mechanisms that make some contentious events happen (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Yet it becomes important to remember that brokerage is not a univocal concept. Brokers vary significantly and this can have important consequences for mobilization. So we should be careful not to mingle things that are not identical and therefore fall into the same problem we attempted to solve by specifying the originally sponge concepts of politics or political opportunities (Markoff 2003). “Brokers vary significantly in social location and modus operandi” –some keep their clients segregated from each other, others merge them; some are conscious of their brokerage activity while others call their activities favor-giving, gossiping and so on (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Manuel showed us one type of brokerage, one that has a central location in the network, one that controls his inner circle but that at the same time can generate strong oppositional networks, and fundamentally one that is able to adapt to change and switch or combine the sites it connects to. This type of brokerage seems to generate either oppositional mobilization or directed mobilization, that is, mobilization that the leader needs or is willing to accept.
7.0 CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have described the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo. This work is a history of the informal city of the capital of Uruguay, whose growth has been responsible for the biggest spatial transformations of this city in the last half of the twentieth century. I have also tried to explain and understand this cycle. I did so by looking at patterns of variation over time and space as well as zooming in on the actors involved in invading land and, often, requesting services from the state.

This work merges urban sociology and sociology of poverty with the literature on contentious politics and regular politics. It also combines methods by trying to count what seemed uncountable given the scarcity of data, such as the number of land invasions per year, as well as to understand occurrences and experiences by collecting as many points of view as I could as I tried to reconstruct events that happened in the past. During a year of fieldwork I collected several types of data, including 80 interviews, 41 of them oral histories with the founders of squatter settlements – both leaders and non leaders - and the rest with politicians, experts and government employees. I traveled back and forth from West to East getting to know 24 different squatter settlements and one experience of a failed invasion. I walked around, took pictures, and observed the physical appearance of the areas, inside and outside the settlements. I talked informally with squatters I run into. I collected newspaper clippings, notebooks with
meeting minutes and every piece of written document I could find in places such as a leaders’ house, a local government office or the archive of the City Council.

I organized data collection and analysis in two ways. On the one hand, I focused on the 25 invasion experiences and tried to get different points of view on each. These “mini-ethnographies” threw light on the process of squatting, helped me differentiate types of land invasions, taught me about squatters’ strategies to survive through conditions of scarcity (especially during the first times on their plots when they had no shelter), and threw light on the responses they got from the state as well as on the perceptions of politicians about squatters. I also built an event catalog of land invasions, noting their geographical location, type of invasion, type of land owner and date or period of settlement. This event catalog was useful for finding patterns over time and space. When converted into a time series, it allowed me to statistically test a model of the count of invasions per year as predicted by variables measuring grievances or needs and political opportunities.

Over the last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in Montevideo, a city that unlike other Latin American metropoles of the region did not suffer a barrage of rural to urban migration in the 1940s and 50s. By the time Uruguay entered into government-led industrialization and the import substitution economic model in the 1930s – usually held responsible for attracting rural migrants and generating squatter settlements in the periphery of Latin American cities - the country was already primarily urban and most of the urban population was concentrated in Montevideo. This urban population for the most part had been incorporated into the urban fabric formally and did not need to squat. Even so, a few squatter settlements started to appear in the 1950s, primarily populated by rural migrants. But they were an exception. The explosion of land invasions in Montevideo did not occur until the
1990s. By 2006, about 11% of the city’s population was living in a squatter settlement (INE 2006). Settlements mushroomed without mediating natural disasters and without population growth. Other forces were in action.

The main causal factor behind the growth of the informal city in Montevideo is need, need for housing, need for a job, need. It is a peculiar need, however, because it is not the need of rural urban migrants as in other cities but the need of already urban dwellers that, as if expelled by a centrifugal force, have populated previously rural or semirural areas on the periphery of the city, expanding the previously relatively compact urban core. This need is related to the big economic and policy changes in the country and the region operating in the last quarter of the twentieth century: a shrinking state, a more export oriented and less regulated economy, the closing of many national industries and the consequential reduction of the pool of stable jobs for the less educated.

As powerful these changes have been, need cannot explain the specific moments in which people invade land and mobilize for services or the different types of land invasions. Only by considering the organizational and political dimensions of the concrete groups of people that invade land at specific moments and in particular places of the city can we understand the genealogy of the informal city in Montevideo. It is my contention throughout this dissertation that it is through the interaction between need and politics that squatter settlements can be understood. In sum, a need that can be satisfied by the state tends to get activated into a grievance and into collective action when people perceive political opportunities.

I have explored this interaction in several ways. In chapter four, when describing the different types of land invasion through space and time, the moment of the land invasion appears as a turning point or critical juncture. Land invasions in Montevideo were of three types:
accretion, planned, and subdivisions and sales. Accretion invasions did not have a leader or organization at the beginning who was in charge of planning the seizure and connecting the settlement with the state. These unplanned seizures were typical of earlier times of the cycle, from 1947 until 1985. They were the typical type of invasion during the dictatorship, from 1973 to 1984, when political parties were forbidden as were other forms of political organization. Planned invasions need a leader or organization and tend to have more political connections. They became popular during the 1990s, a time of political opportunity for organized groups. This was because there was first an increase in electoral competition for the urban poor and second there was a new leftist Frente Amplio administration in the city. The novel needs of a downwardly mobile working class combined with these opportunities to produce planned invasions. Finally, subdivisions and sales appear to be a product of need in a still newer political context. They start with a person, the owner or an intermediary, subdividing a rural plot into much smaller parcels than the law allows and usually fraudulently selling them to people. Forbidden by a municipality increasingly concerned with the growth of squatter settlements, these settlements are led by people with political and other contacts that allow them to conduct the fraudulent transactions. Many times, buyers do not know they are squatters because they are not conscious of the illegality of the business.

In chapter five I explore the interaction between needs or grievances and politics in a different, more parsimonious, and therefore more restricted way. I test a model of the count of land invasions per year predicted by several variables accounting for grievances, politics and their interaction. I use real wages as a measure of grievances, dichotomous variables for electoral year and post-election year, and I also use interaction terms for grievances and opportunities (controlling for diffusion effects using the lagged dependent variable as a predictor as well). The
results are convincing in showing that the effect of low real wages on the probability of more land invasions that year is enhanced if that year is post-electoral. But if instead of running the model for all invasions we do it separately for each type of invasion, things become even more interesting. While the general model is valid for accretion invasions which seem to grow reactively in post-electoral years, it is electoral years which become significant in determining growth in planned invasions. They resemble more a proactive social movement that appears when contention is higher rather than when contention is over. The few cases of subdivision and sale do not allow me to draw conclusions from the statistical model, but they appear to behave a lot like planned invasions regarding the moments at which they tend to settle.

Finally, in chapter six I explore this interaction through a more intimate lens by looking closely at one story of a squatter settlement and its leader. That settlement illustrates how some leaders and neighborhood organization have been successful in fulfilling their needs by reaching the state through political contacts. This is an instance of what I call market clientelism, which consists of flirting with many patrons from different parties and factions to get services for their neighborhood. By looking at the actors, both from the politicians and from the squatters’ perspective, this chapter offers a dynamic perspective that illustrates how political opportunities are in part created. There is room for agency and strategy in this framework.

With the increasing growth in research and theory on social movements in recent years, there has been considerable criticism of the political opportunities framework. One of the most illuminating criticisms has been directed towards the malleability and stretching of the concept, which can transform it into a catch-all explanation that can never be contested (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). I have tried to address this by defining political opportunities beforehand as electoral politics, especially in chapter five but also in a less
narrow way throughout the dissertation. In addition, I have always tried to emphasize an alternative explanation, in this case grievances.

Another important set of criticisms has to do with the “structural bias” of the stress on political opportunities, that is, the lack of attention to agency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). But the fact that not all research shows actors with flesh and bones does not mean agency is incompatible with the theory. Of course losing track of strategizing, emotions and meanings is a risk of all structural work. And this certainly has happened in some structural research in social movements, such as perhaps Skocpol’s study of revolutions (Skocpol 1987). But for the most part I see it as a matter of emphasis and what the researcher wants to explain. In my case, to explain variation over time in types of settlements as well as to predict the number of invasions per year, opportunities seem to matter a great deal. And contrary to the belief that the concept of political opportunities takes agency away from the real actors and treats them like puppets, I am convinced in this case this framework gives actors agency.

Conceiving squatters merely as the victims of structural adjustment takes away their agency. Seeing them through the lenses of political opportunities, on the contrary, enables us to see people that use different strategies, among them family strategies and market clientelism, to survive and get the things they believe are their rights. Squatting needs agency. And the degree of agency varies. One of the factors determining variation is precisely political opportunities, not in the abstract but generated by other actors strategizing and feeling as well. Politicians competing for squatters’ votes, for instance are actors with agency. Politicians and local brokers promoting land invasions to reach “the people’s” self government and other utopias are as well. Throughout this dissertation I have mentioned emotions such as hope and I have shown the
frustration and suffering caused by poverty. All this does not eclipse the role of political opportunities.

Thinking about the possible contributions of this study, I believe it is important to keep testing and modifying the political opportunities theory outside the wealthy democracies where it was created. In this sense, what if anything does the study of this particular case say to the theory of political opportunities? Or, in other words, is it useful to test this theory outside its original context to attempt to broaden its scope or should we just use it for what it was originally for?

One important contribution of this case to the theory can be a blurring of the boundaries between collective actors and the political. Rather than a sharp division between two sides, as the theory assumes – the movement and the state or other authority – in studying squatters in Montevideo we learn that reality is more complex. We find former politicians or politicians in office living in squatter settlements or helping squatters with information on available plots to invade. We find squatters that work for the state as military staff or as contractors building bus stops. Moreover, we find political parties that permeate both the state and the squatter settlements. This more complex reality invites us to use already made theories with caution.  

Still, being the devil’s advocate here, if the results of modeling the count of invasions hold, this work also shows that the plain theory as created in the context of the wealthy democracies also works for this case even though squatters do not fit definitions of social movements and the scene takes place in a totally different setting from where the theory was born. Land invasions have been more likely in post-electoral years and electoral years. True, I add the interaction dimension, but overall the theory works. Thus, how can the case show the

\[^{70}\] Also studying a context outside the wealthy democracies, the turbulent Argentina of the 2001 economic and political crisis, Auyero (2007) suggests that rather than looking at opponents and state, we should pay attention to their interpenetration and confusion.
strengths and the weaknesses of the theory at the same time? I believe this has to do with another important issue this study speaks to, namely methods and methodologies.

Developments in the philosophy of science have made it customary to believe, at least in the social sciences, that theories are lenses through which we see reality. If we change lenses we may see different things. Methods or methodological approaches are also lenses through which we see reality. By combining what are traditionally called quantitative and qualitative methods this research faces the problem of finding contradictory realities. Qualitative inquiry is often illuminating in telling us things were not as simple as they seemed and in illustrating how, if we look in depth, there is much more heterogeneity than we originally thought. Quantitative inquiry, in turn, often tells us there are patterns or trends. Both types of inquiry have risks such as encountering complexity where parsimony is reigning, or claiming parsimony where complexity is evident.

This particular study, in attempting to mix both types of methodological lenses, runs the risk of getting at contradictory results. And it does. When looking at land invasions as events it finds some parsimony in terms of an outside political opportunity (election timing) being relevant for collective action (occurrence of a land invasion). Yet, when looking at land invasions more closely, as processes with actors, it finds the interpenetration of politicians and the state with squatters and other sources of complexity. I do not think choosing is a great idea. In many ways this work has, from its conception, advocated for that no-choice, for the fun and richness of mastering and using different lenses. 71

71 I have use the expression “traditionally called quantitative and quantitative methods” because I believe part of the division has to do with the social construction of Sociology and other social sciences such as Political Science as disciplines rather than with intrinsic characteristics of the data any method deals with. I have here shown how stories are essential to understand coefficients and how ethnography can be used to find data points and to create categories we later use to count. Because of this, I distrust the essentializing perspectives such as King, Keohane, and Verba’s
Another important question for this study is, beyond methodological choices and beyond the particular political opportunities theory, what if anything has this case to say to the literature on contentious politics more broadly? Perhaps the most important contribution in this front is attesting that this literature is useful beyond the most common forms of contention such as violent riots, revolutions or well defined social movements. Squatters in Montevideo do not see themselves as social movements or any type of defiant actor. It has been difficult for them to coordinate efforts and form umbrella organizations. They do not use collective violence either. Still there are many smaller processes and events involved in squatting that require collective action, coordination, petitioning, selecting leaders and so on. The literature on contentious politics is extremely useful to understand such processes. This work, therefore, sides with the idea that it is much more useful to focus on causal mechanisms that are common to different types of contentious politics, or even more broadly different types of collective action, than on questions such as what causes revolutions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The role of political brokers in finding safe plots to invade, planning invasions and getting resources from the state illustrates this. Brokerage is a mechanism present in many different forms of contentious politics.

In addition, also in relation to contentious politics, this work illustrates the connections between contention and routine or ordinary politics. It is an old claim of the modern literature on contention that social movements and other forms of organized collective action are not different from institutional politics but, on the contrary, very much alike. Besides, there are connections between them. Some activists may participate in both. Contention may cause changes in institutions. Institutions often channel and structure movements’ claims. Movements may end up (1994) when they leave the realm of explanation to quantitative inquiry and the realm of description to qualitative methods.
as political parties. And, as the case of squatters illustrates, electoral politics have a lot to do with the moments in which people may mobilize or request services from the state. Moreover, we can risk a counterfactual and say that squatting in Uruguay would have been very different if political parties were not as omnipresent in state institutions as they have traditionally been.

To finish these concluding remarks, I would like to think of two new directions I imagine this work could take. One of them is comparative and the other has to do with the analysis of space. Regarding comparison, the delicate question concerns the relevant comparative categories or cases. This work has already been comparative in two ways. It compares time periods and types of land invasions. The challenge would therefore be to go beyond Montevideo or beyond squatters. Taking the first option, I have suggested throughout this dissertation that the timing of Montevideo’s peak in squatting was delayed in comparison to other metropoles of the region. The interesting question here is of course why. The case I believe is most interesting to compare Montevideo with is Santiago de Chile, among other things because they are both capital cities of countries with similar welfare state traditions, early industrialization and urbanization, and considerable experience of uninterrupted democracy until their militaries took over. The interesting difference between these two cases is that while in Santiago the greatest peak in squatting occurred before the military regime, in Montevideo, as we saw, squatting peaked afterwards. Nonetheless, the coincidence is that both peaks occurred at times of great electoral competition for the urban poor followed by leftist governments: Allende’s presidency and Vázquez’ city administration.

In going beyond squatters to compare, options are multiple. One could be comparing squatters with other more traditional forms of mobilization within Uruguay, such as the cooperative housing movement (FUCVAM) or the labor movement. Do they follow similar
trends of mobilization? Are they countercyclical? Are they connected in any way? I have been already collecting information and speculating about this type of comparison, especially with the cooperative housing movement. Given its main issue, housing, the cooperative housing movement belongs to the same family as squatting. But it is a much more structured movement and, as we saw in this dissertation, it was thought for a working class with stable jobs and with organizational abilities transferred from unions. Besides, while FUCVAM thinks of itself as a social movement and is perceived by the general public and politicians as such, squatters are not. In two occasions, in 1989 and in 2006, FUCVAM decided to invade land in order to request more land for their cooperatives from the state. Both times their violation of property rights was considered as defiant behavior. Moreover, FUCVAM’s land invasions had positive outcomes for the movement. The occupations of 1989 ended with the municipal policy called *Cartera de Tierras* (pool of vacant land) which promoted the use of public vacant land by organized groups, including cooperatives. The occupations of 2006 had great publicity as well and ended with the municipality offering 12 plots for cooperatives.  

What makes the comparison between FUCVAM and squatters interesting, among other things, is how the same fact, invading land, has different connotations and consequences both for the collective actors and for their political environment. Squatters’ land invasions keep the urban poor in invisibility. They do not appear in the news and they solve by themselves housing problems the state and the market are not solving. Land invasions by the cooperative housing movement, on the contrary, make the movement visible. This takes us to another interesting

72 As developed in chapter four, after these last land invasions by FUCVAM, a change in legislation increased penalties for property violations of all sorts. The movement reacted furiously against this law, especially because all *Frente Amplio* legislators voted in favor.
possibility for comparison with other groups that have also reached visibility by invading land. The most famous one is perhaps the MST from Brazil.

Finally, the second dimension I could use to expand this work is the spatial one. Mobilization, like all other social phenomena, does not occur in a vacuum. Space can have a crucial positive or negative impact on mobilization and can influence the shape and characteristics of mobilization. Contentious groups like squatters, in turn, mold, create, reinvent, or overcome the constraints of space as well. Although unfortunately social analysis many times forgets about space or takes it as a simple container of social phenomena, there has been some renewal in interest on spatial issues among sociologists (Gans 2002; Gieryn 2000). There is also very interesting work on spatial issues and mobilization in sociology and other social sciences (Auyero 2006; Gonçalves 2001; Gould 1991; Hedstrom 1994; Holston 1999; Markoff 1996; Martin and Miller 2003; Tilly 2000; Tilly 2003).

I have already analyzed some spatial aspects in this dissertation, by mapping squatters and by finding patterns of clustering of types of invasions. Yet, much more could be done. On the one hand, statistically, there are very interesting paths one could take. With the idea that neighbors do matter, we could test if the probability of a geographic unit having squatter settlements is determined in part for neighboring areas having land invasions as well. Even though the clustering found in this work suggests this is the case, much more refined work could be done controlling for other variables. The challenge is to find available relevant political and socio-demographic variables to control for that vary across the chosen geographical units.

More substantially, space is a constitutive dimension of squatting. Squatters’ main contention has to do with land, with urban space. They are socio-territorial actors that transform vacant space into meaningful territory, into their neighborhood. Their existence depends on the
availability of land. After seizing the land, mobilization shapes the space of the neighborhood. Without knowing anything about the people who live in a settlement, we can speculate about the degree of current neighborhood organization and type of land invasion just by looking at the neighborhood layout. Planned invasions and subdivisions and sales distinguish themselves from accretion invasions because their neighborhood layout resembles a grid in the formal city, their houses tend to be built with cement, there is often a space for public use and so forth. Still, maintaining the original layout is not always easy, because norms are difficult to keep over time especially when more people keep coming every day. This expresses itself in the space if we observe the fringes of a settlement. Sometimes a very neat street layout starts to diffuse into crowded houses, perhaps closer to a river bank or in what originally was considered an uninhabitable area, with piles of garbage, and clearly poorer shacks.

As individuals, by moving to an illegally occupied plot, squatters may transform their identities as well. Before they were poor or workers and now they are squatters, a status that is defined by where they live and not by their unsatisfied needs or what they do for a living. Before, they had to solve problems using family networks or friends. Now, they have collective problems to solve, such as getting water for their settlement, which they should try to solve with their neighbors. The idea of vicinity acquires a different meaning. By moving they also become subjects of state attention, which they were not when they lived in the formal city. In addition, it becomes interesting to study the processes that occur between a squatter settlement and its environment. In my fieldwork I was able to see a range from sharp spatial and social barriers between a settlement and a much wealthier environment to very blurry boundaries that made it difficult to distinguish where the informal settlement ends and the formal city begins. The
experiences of living in one situation or the other are likely to differ from one situation to the other, both for squatters and their neighbors.

All these are new directions this work could take from now on. I would greatly enjoy being able to pursue one of them or, if not, I would love to think this work may inspire others’ curiosity to do so.
APPENDIX A

ORAL HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE

I am María José Álvarez, and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh in the US. I am conducting a study of squatter settlements in Montevideo, and I am interested in the story of your neighborhood. The interview will take approximately 90 to 120 minutes. Dr. John Markoff, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, is supervising my progress on this project.

| Record on Template. Do not Tape | • Date: |
| • Location of Interview: |
| • Neighborhood: |
| • Role of interviewee in the neighborhood (type of activities performed and since when): |
| • Demographic information: (age, gender, race, class identification, occupation, education, household composition, and residential trajectory – previous neighborhood, childhood neighborhood, date the person moved to the squatter settlement and plans to move out if any): |

<p>| Neighborhood data: Open question about neighborhood origin first. It’s important to let the interviewees speak freely to later analyze their narrative construction. After that, ask specific questions if the information does not come up as specifically as needed. Focus on how they solved problems (do | 1. How did this neighborhood start? What do you know about its history? |
| |
| Make sure the following issues are covered. If not, probe or ask directly. |
| • When did it happen? |
| • Name (who named the settlement and why?) |
| • Who were the first settlers? |
| • Number of initial settlers. |
| • Did settlers know each other from before (e.g., coworkers, neighbors, members of the same political group, etc)? |
| • What were the previous neighborhoods of initial settlers? |
| • Why did people decide to move to a squatter settlement? |
| • Who were the initial leaders and how did you chose them? |
| • Who owned the land? |
| • Very specific description of the first day or days of settlement (was there a planned invasion? If planned, how planned? By whom? Where did they/you meet to plan? How did they/you choose the land? How did they/you choose |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After the origins, ask about the evolution.</th>
<th>2. What happened after the initial days? How did you solve the neighborhood problems?</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus on one or two issues (housing, water, light, food) and explore in detail how they obtained those goods. Probe for specific answers (including names and dates) in order to reconstruct the process and the social networks involved. Remember that you want to know if there are family, neighborhood, political or other networks that play a significant role and what is the role of the interviewee in these networks. You want to understand if clientelism plays a role, and if so, how. Make sure you get data on:</td>
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<td>• Who initiated and was in charge of the actions (a politician, a neighborhood group, a leader, the government)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• What type of strategy was used (e.g., writing a letter, a person contacting somebody, a group contacting somebody, etc.).</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3. If you had to choose the three people or institutions that were most helpful to this neighborhood, who would you mention?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. How is the neighborhood currently organized? Make sure the following issues are covered. If not, probe or ask directly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How many and what types of groups are functioning in the neighborhood right now?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When were they created and why?
How often do they meet?
Who participates in these organizations? (number of people and characteristics).
Do women and men participate in similar or different ways? (Older and younger? Employed versus unemployed? People from the city versus people coming from elsewhere?)
Do you participate in inter-neighborhood associations? Have you ever gotten together with any other neighborhood organization? For what? Which neighborhoods (location, name). Do you have any relationship with other social movements such as the labor movement or the cooperative housing movement?
Who are the leaders and who chose them?
What are your goals as a neighborhood?
What are your main problems?
What have been the main successes?
Are there any political clubs in the neighborhood? Who participates and what do they do?
Does the neighborhood association identify with any political party? Why?
Does the neighborhood participate in the local government? How?
Compare the neighborhood of today with its initial state? What has changed? What is the same?
Are there any rules regarding who visits/lives/or works here? Which ones?
How would you characterize this settlement politically? Is there a primary political party? Is there a political club in the neighborhood or close by? Which party would you say got the most neighborhood votes in the last election?
What’s the most famous politician in this neighborhood?
How would you characterize the relationship of the neighborhood with the administration? (local and national)?

5. Now I’d like to ask you some questions about yourself in relation to your neighborhood. Why did you move here? And why at that particular moment?

6. (for leaders) How did you become a neighborhood leader? (for non leaders) were you ever in a leadership position in the neighborhood? Why or why not?). Have you ever participated in other organizations outside the neighborhood?

7. What were your steps (if any) in neighborhood or political militancy? Have you ever participated in organizations outside the neighborhood (parties, unions, neighborhood association, etc).?

8. I have already asked you about the neighborhood, but how have you solved your personal problems such as housing, labor, and so on?

9 Which party do you identify with (if it did not come up during the interview)? Why? Which party did you vote for in the last elections of 2004? Why?

Additional questions will be asked to clarify or expand on answers given by subjects.
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