IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL BOLIVIA:
NEGOTIATING GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXTS

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Christine Hippert, PhD

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This dissertation examines participatory development in its cultural context: how people define it, the significance of their definitions, who participates in it, and how. Since the passage of the Law of Popular Participation in 1994, participation has become obligatory and emblematic of Bolivian citizenship. At the same time, identity based on culturally determined conceptualizations of gender, ethnicity, and class has become increasingly salient in questions of policy, politics, the law, education, and the Bolivian economy. In this social milieu, local people first and foremost must engage identity discourse in order to “do development.” My central argument is that local people are required to deliberately accommodate, resist, and/or construct their own particular “development identities” in different development contexts. They employ a variety of subject positionalities – either forged themselves or imposed on them – on instrumental grounds, so that they sell the community as a good risk for development in order to garner development funding, and for transformative reasons, to engender community social relations.

The study is based on 13 months of anthropological fieldwork in the small, rural community of Huancarani near Cochabamba, Bolivia. I conducted participation observation in three development contexts: 1) the local governing body, 2) a grassroots food security organization, and 3) a local women’s organization. Although many of the same community members participate in more than one of these contexts, they forge different development identities for
Participation observation was also complemented with intensive, unstructured interviews with 10 key informants and semi-structured interview schedules with 30 community members and 20 community leaders.

Identity politics has the potential to both limit community participation and empower local people. My study shows that participatory development work in Bolivia is squarely a matter of negotiating and reformulating collective community identities. Instead of leveling the playing field, participation in Bolivian development often means that not having the right development identity restricts people from competing for already very scarce development resources. Under these conditions, the current model of development in Bolivia is one in which external political processes attempt to regulate not only the direction of rural development, but the very identity of communities.
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DEDICATION

To Pete,

For all of your love, encouragement, and support.

And to Elijah.

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*Editorial notes on linguistic notation in the dissertation.* For the sake of accuracy, consistency, and simplicity, I use specific notation throughout the dissertation in order to record people’s words in Spanish or Quechua. Quotations in Spanish are noted in *italics*, while I *underline* people’s thoughts expressed in Quechua. For Spanish or Quechua words that appear more than once throughout the dissertation, I underline or italicize the word only the first time it is used, and then each time the word appears after that I use normal font.
Figure 1: Map of Bolivia (Wikipedia 2006).
0.0 INTRODUCTION

0.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM

This dissertation examines participatory development in its cultural context: how people define it, what it means to do it, who participates in it, and how. Since the passage of the Law of Popular Participation in 1994, participation has become obligatory and emblematic of Bolivian citizenship. At the same time, identity based on culturally determined conceptualizations of gender, ethnicity, and class has become increasingly salient in questions of policy, politics, the law, education, and the Bolivian economy. However, I found that in rural Bolivia questions of identity are most prominent in the national and local discourse of participatory development. In this social milieu, local people first and foremost must engage identity discourse in order to “do development.” My central argument is that local people are required to deliberately accommodate, resist, and/or construct their own particular “development identities” in different development contexts. They employ a variety of subject positionalities – positionalities either forged themselves or imposed on them by the State or by international funders – on instrumental grounds, so that they sell the community as a good risk for development in order to garner exogenous development funding, and for transformative reasons, to maintain and engender community social relations. Development identities, both endogenous and exogenous, account
for historicity, the political economy of identities in Bolivia (Healy and Paulson 2000), and the material reality of residents’ lives, especially for the poor.

My main focus is rural community development and how both state-prescribed politics and voluntary organizations foster a particular sort of participation among residents of the small, rural community of Huancarani near Cochabamba, Bolivia. Above all, rather than assume the meanings of “participation” and “development” I explore how these meanings have become problematized and the manner in which residents negotiate these meanings in their construction of development projects. Most studies of community development or participatory development examine the way local people and development interlocutors (i.e., non-governmental organizations, or NGOs) articulate their efforts to develop a community – in other words, development “as a process of working from the outside” (Quarles van Ufford et al. 2003:31). However, in the context of contemporary Bolivia, local people are expected to design and implement community development plans regardless of their connections to such development ‘experts.’ Huancarani has almost no NGO presence in development work, both past and present, forcing residents themselves to negotiate the highly bureaucratized development world both within Bolivia and internationally. In order to implement development plans, residents of Huancarani participate in three local development contexts, two organizations where participation is voluntary (the Pirwa and the Adela Zamudio women’s group), and one in which residents are obligated to take part (the local governing body in the community, the OTB).

Bolivian identity politics directly influences the way development plays out in Huancarani and has the potential to both limit community participation and empower local people in the name of doing development. For residents of Huancarani, successful development means knowing under what circumstances and for which audience they must accommodate and
resist imposed development identities, as well as recognizing when it would be more beneficial to forge their own development identity. Development contexts in Huancarani illustrate that imposed development identities focus on the ways that culture is a barrier to development and encourage residents to renounce tradition for the sake of more modern, Western practices. Conversely, community-forged development identities accentuate cultural specifics such as reciprocity, complementary gender roles, and class-based social organizing activity. My results suggest that in specific local contexts where people have limited “room to maneuver” (Tsing 1999) within the strictures of development bureaucracy, their choice to resist imposed development identities is curtailed. Under these circumstances, projects undertaken in development contexts in Huancarani are less successful than in those contexts where they have more agency to control their image and construct their own development identities.

The implications of this study underscore the extent to which participatory development is a highly political process, something that only recently has been addressed in the literature on participatory development (Crewe and Harrison 1998). Agencies that have the power to impose development identities, such as the State and international NGOs, target such vulnerable populations as women and indigenous people for development funding – populations considered poor and undeveloped precisely because of characteristics of identity that Paulson and Calla (2000) define as “Indian-ness,” and “rural-ness,” such as illiteracy, lacking adequate Spanish language proficiency, a dearth of social capital, and lack of or restricted social networks. In turn, the development identities that these agencies impose on rural communities depict residents as victims of underdevelopment and/or stalled, unsuccessful development. Therefore, development contexts in Bolivia that fit these characterizations of victimhood often have more options to garner support for development projects than those communities who do not. In my research in
Huancarani, I found that communities responded to this stricture in one of two ways: 1) they found ways to emphasize those aspects of the community to better align themselves with the imposed development identity, or 2) they struggled to redefine the imposed development identity by forging their own identity; they do so on the grounds that their own community is just as needy of development funding as the those communities who fit the characterizations depicted in the imposed identity. Yet in the end, I found that forging their own development identity was more successful in some development contexts than others.

By and large, participatory development is touted as the gold standard of development practice, usually because it draws on such modernist, Western assumptions that prioritize democracy, tolerance for difference, and representation for marginalized and elite groups alike. Participatory development, in theory, is supposed to give voice to people whose society restricts their access to power (Morgan 2001; Paulson and Calla 2000; Molina 2004; Ayo 2004; Cornwall 2003; Desai 2002a; Faguet 2000; Fuller 2005; Michener 1998; Mohan 2002; O’Malley 2001; Rahnema 1992; Schech and Haggis 2000; Sillitoe 2002; Vargas 2005; Veltmeyer 2001b; Woost 1997; World Bank 1996; ), a sort of leveling mechanism that balances unequal power relations among distinct social groups. But my study shows that participatory development work in Bolivia is squarely a matter of identity work; in other words, participatory development work in Bolivia is first and foremost a process of the creation and negotiation of identity. Instead of leveling the playing field, participation in Bolivian development requires that people heighten their distinct identities as they work to develop their communities. And oftentimes, not having the right ascribed or inherent development identity erects a boundary around a community, prohibiting or restricting people from competing for already very scarce development resources.
Questions of identity and development pervade political, economic, and cultural discussions in contemporary Bolivia as well as in media and scholarly representations of Bolivia around the globe. With regards to identity, Bolivian social movements since the 1990s have centered on particular conceptualizations of gender, ethnicity, and class that have strong implications in contemporary national policy (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Brysk 1996; Albó 1994; Eckstein 2001; Gill 2000; Goodale 2006; Halebsky and Harris 1995; Healy and Paulson 2000; Paulson and Calla 2000; Hurtado 2004; Kearney and Varese 1995; Miller 1995; Orellana 2005; Patzi 2005; Ticona Alejo 2005; Vargas 2005, 2004). The international media is quick to characterize Bolivia as one of only two Latin American countries where the majority of its citizens are of indigenous Indian descent. In Bolivia, over 70% of its citizenry claims indigenous heritage from over 35 distinct ethnic groups from both Andean and Amazonian cultures (Pan American Health Organization 2001a, 1999; World Bank 1996; World Health Organization 2001). Many social movements within Bolivia now revolve around the axis of indigenous descent, a far cry from prior union and peasant organizations who, from the Agrarian Reform of 1952 to the early 1980s, sought to assimilate cultural differences and undermine Indian-ness in favor of a modern melting pot and national homogeneity (Healy and Paulson 2000; Albó 1994). But the 1990s saw an explosion of social movement activity centered on indigenous identity, and this force led to a stream of national policy-making that brought indigenous identity to the fore, such as the Education Reform Law (1995), the Law of Popular Participation (1994), and the Law of Decentralization (1996). Furthermore, social movements in the 1990s were also dedicated to improving social conditions that affected women’s lives, and this decade ended with the initiation of social policies to protect women, as in the Law Against Violence Against Women.
and particular aspects of the Law of Popular Participation (1994) that seek to give women equal representation in local government (Boyd 2005). And the rural/urban divide, a problematic tension that pervades much of Bolivia’s recent history, is also something that social movements are highlighting in their work (Brañez 2003). In the contemporary Bolivian context with ever increasing rural to urban migration rates, the neglect of the rural poor has become a pervasive problem that has ramifications for both urban and rural areas alike (Valenzuela 2005). In fact, 85% of the municipalities in Bolivia are classified as rural, so recent social movements have called for a rethinking of national policies in order to place rural regions more squarely in the center of development discussions (Shah 2006; World Bank 2006; Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2004). Identity, overall, has become a salient factor in Bolivian life and has been good to think with in terms of understanding contemporary politics.

Along with identity, development as a concept and practice has also become fundamental to national and international discussions of Bolivia, in terms of economic, political, and human development. Usually, these conversations center on increasing rates of poverty and Bolivia’s underdevelopment (Shah 2006). Upwards of 75% of Bolivians live below the poverty line (World Bank 2001, 1996; Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2004; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2001), and many international agencies like the Pan American Health Organization (2001), the World Bank (2001), and the World Health Organization (2001) consider Bolivia the poorest country in the Western hemisphere after Haiti. In 1985, the newly “re-democratized” Bolivian government (Klein 2002; Healy and Paulson 2000) introduced the New Economic Policy – orthodox shock therapy (Iriart, Merhy, and Waitzkin 2001) in the form of a structural adjustment program that privatized industries formerly run by the State and deregulated internal markets. In fact, Bolivia’s new economic and political restructuring was renowned as the
premier model by neo-conservative economists who dogmatically argued – in the past and today still – that poverty can be remedied with a “retreat of the State” (Gill 2000) in the new world economic order. While this program was successful in curtailing out of control inflation rates and replacing an economically “shaky” (Healy and Paulson 2000) state-controlled economy, it severely limited funding for social services. Without a doubt, the structural adjustment programs of 1985 are responsible for much of the exacerbated poverty that persists in Bolivia today, as well as the broadening of the gap between rich and poor within the country (Veltmeyer and Tellez 2001; Valenzuela 2005; Thévoz 2006).

Within this social, political, and economic environment, Bolivian neoliberalism, in the form of deregulated markets and the privatization of state-run industry, has followed an eclectic trajectory. Grassroots social movements focusing on indigenous people, women, and rural areas have reacted strongly to what they see as policies that maintain power and privilege within the hands of Bolivian elites and multinational corporations. As a group, these movements have become prominent actors in national politics, and their activities and demands have been met with increasing national acceptance. But what the Bolivian example shows us is that the poor and the powerless have become “strange bedfellows” (Thévoz 2006) with the neoliberal State. Since the 1990s, participatory development, in the form of municipalization and popular participation, and rhetoric that puts indigenous people, women, and the rural poor at the center of national discussions were included to some extent in the political platforms of both the left and the right. What was formerly an area of concern for the left was co-opted in the early 1990s by former President Sanchez de Lozada. Under this administration, the Bolivian constitution was re-drafted to include a provision that defined Bolivia as a “multicultural” and “pluri-ethnic” nation. This phraseology paved the way for popular participation, a vehicle for redistributing
power from the urban, rich, European, male elite to include women, indigenous, and the rural poor. It heralded an era in which local communities are now the arbiters of their own development together with grassroots organizations, municipal governments, and officials elected specifically to oversee the process of participatory development.

My research, however, shows that this redistribution of power is often limited by conceptualizations of identity, in which scarce resources are earmarked for those who fit particular characterizations of ‘the neediest’ – indigenous people and women – while communities who fail to fit these identities are left out. But rural regions as a whole are plagued by the consequences of poverty, and this picking and choosing of those who are deemed the poorest is pitting communities against each other in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Brecher and Costello 1994; Navarro 2002), a phenomenon occurring more globally in the developing world (Shiva 1992). This dissertation explains that communities and grassroots organizations unsettle and resist characterizations of those that others deem ‘the neediest.’ In doing so, they forge development identities that are often successful at garnering outside support while at the same time foster social relationships that are jeopardized by the process of development using imposed development identities. In a functionalist sense, development identities allow communities and organizations to accomplish two things at once: 1) transcend residents’ individual differences that might splinter and antagonize community decision-making, and 2) foster feelings of harmony so that others perceive the community as unified and cohesive – making them a good risk for development investment.
My understanding of the way residents of Huancarani construct their own development has been informed by 18 months of fieldwork in Bolivia from August 2004 through January 2006, in addition to 4 months of preliminary research in the summers of 2002 and 2003. For 13 months I lived in Huancarani, a community of 250 residents about 26 km west of the city of Cochabamba, using participant observation and semi-structured ethnographic interviews as my primary methods to gain a better picture of community participation in rural development. As part of this study, I became a member of and fully participated in 2 grassroots organizations (one work-for-food collective organization and a county women’s organization) and a local savings club; observed the mandatory monthly community meetings of the local governing body, called the Organización Territorial de Bases (Grassroots Territorial Organization), or OTB; and attended one of the three annual municipal meetings where all of the community leaders of the 68 communities in the region proposed their community development projects and were accepted or rejected by the regional government. Furthermore, I immersed myself in everyday life in the community, participating in everything from the 4-day annual community fiesta to the vegetable plantings and harvests and the myriad other engagements of interest.

In order to prepare myself for fieldwork in rural Bolivia, I studied the South American Indian language, Quechua, at the University of Pittsburgh for two years, and in Cochabamba for three months from August to November 2004. It is the first language of almost all residents of Huancarani, oftentimes being the only language spoken by most older residents. Fieldwork in Huancarani led me to interview not only local residents, but also past and present community leaders, regional political officials, political party officers, development funders, grassroots organizers, doctors, nurses, community health workers, hospital administrators, teachers, school
administrators and personnel, and one regional Peace Corps volunteer, as well as development “experts,” journalists, and social scientists from around the world. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and Quechua, except for 2 that were conducted in English (with the Peace Corps volunteer and again with a journalist), and all translations in this dissertation are mine.

0.4 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation illustrates the way residents in different development contexts undertake and regard development as identity work. In the first chapter, I discuss the theoretical antecedents of identity and development, showing how political economy perspectives of development have underscored the need to problematize the process, intentions, and results of development. Some scholars have pressed for a post-development era in which social movements generate social change in order to opt out of the modernist development paradigm (Rist 1997; Escobar 2005, 1995). But despite academic discussions advocating a move toward a post-development era, this is not what we see on the ground when we ask people how they want to improve their lives, and when we listen to them telling us how they are trying to do just that. People still talk in terms of development and developing their communities (cf. Gardner and Lewis 2005). Yet development means different things to different communities, as well as to different people within the same community. Using an interpretivist lens to tease out local conceptions of development and participation is as important as understanding the political economy of these terms and its broader implications. In both a micro-level and a macro-level sense, development is a cultural system (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). The meanings conferred by these terms are affected by historical circumstances – particularities that not only govern the ways in which people conceive
of development, but also influence present-day norms dictating who participates in development, when these various actors get involved in the process, and how they do or do not meet their own and others’ expectations. This chapter situates my work on identity and development in a broader context and explains why ‘development identities’ have become so prevalent in contemporary Bolivia.

Chapter Two provides a detailed explanation of what I mean by development identity, both imposed and community-forged, and how development identities become salient forces in the process of rural Bolivian development. Using responses from interviews with 30 community residents, I argue that residents define development in different contexts and emphasize various aspects of their identities in relation to their conceptions of development. First, development refers to maintaining and fostering indigenous knowledge, usually referring to indigenous and experiential ways of medicine, education, social organization, and agriculture. Second, development means maintaining, engendering, and transforming social relationships. Residents find that good social relationships are the foremost sign of development; without specific plans to cement relations, community improvement does not exist. And finally, development has historical antecedents from their own lives. No development plan should be put forth that does not fit with the norms of society from which they have benefited in the past. Although the process of doing development is different in the era of popular participation in rural Bolivia, residents in Huancarani suggest that drawing on their past experiences is a strength that the community can ill afford to ignore.

This chapter argues that accentuating a multiplicity of identities positions residents to forge their own development in the way that they define it. In fact, all residents participate in more than one of these development contexts, meaning that they slip in and out of different
development identities as they go about doing development in Huancarani. Although this is a complex process, residents seemingly have no problems with highlighting certain characteristics of identity in different contexts. I discuss that this is so because of the way identity is conceptualized in Bolivia as “systems of relations” (cf. Paulson and Calla 2000) rather than essentialized or inherent characteristics. In this way, identity formation in Bolivia is always context-specific, so making the leap to context-specific development identities is not such an inconceivable task.

Chapter Three is a description of Huancarani and the municipality of Sipe Sipe as a whole. I provide an analysis of the state of the community of Huancarani – the condition of the local economy, schools, health facilities, businesses, etc. – in order to give the reader a baseline of community needs and strengths. Additionally, I give a brief history of the community and how people have come to live there. In so doing, I profile three distinct social groups in the community: people who were relocated there after the privatization of the mines in the 1980s, the people who married those who relocated to Huancarani, and new migrants who have come from all over highland Bolivia to Huancarani only since the early 1990s. Chapter Three makes evident that the small community of Huancarani – a place of only 67 families during my fieldwork – does not consist of a homogenous population, making participation that much more complex in development work. Given this diversity, forging a common community development identity makes sense in order to transcend cultural, linguistic, and class differences. Furthermore, although this is a community study, this chapter illustrates the extent to which national and international events affect even such out of the way places. Far from being insular or isolated, the history of Huancarani reveals its broader regional, national, and international
linkages. Finally, Chapter Three concludes with a discussion of the methodological design of my fieldwork.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six are distinct case studies of three development contexts – the only contexts rooted in Huancarani – in order to explain how residents make development work identity work, or the negotiation of gender, ethnicity, and class for the purpose of doing successful development. Chapter Four examines the local governing body in Huancarani, the Organización Territorial de Bases (Grassroots Territorial Organization, or OTB). The OTB requires mandatory monthly participation of all community residents. The primary purpose of this organization is to construct a yearly Plan Operativo Anual (Yearly Operative Plan, or POA), a document that they submit each year to the municipality in order to garner funds to undertake a specific community development project. The OTB has been relatively unsuccessful at garnering adequate development funding to begin and/or complete tasks that are laid out in their proposed POAs. The OTBs experiences with the POAs show that the imposed development identity given Huancarani – as a junta vecinal, or neighborhood group – limits their development success. Juntas vecinales imply a certain bland identity, so to speak, one in which the residents fail to meet certain characteristics of identity that the government has targeted as the neediest of development funds, such as indigenous communities and, to a lesser extent, peasant unions. Because of the particular strictures of the Law of Popular Participation, the rules and regulations that govern OTBs, Huancarani has no real recourse in which to resist this imposed identity so that they can forge their own – more successful – development identity. In the end, the community as a juntal vecinal is doomed to continue to be a development failure, even though their community is as needy of municipal funds as those communities who are targeted for funding.
Chapter Five examines the development work in the Pirwa, a voluntary organization that provides children’s programs and a communal work group for adult residents in Huancarani. This organization accommodates the imposed development identity laid out by the Bolivian founder and European funders of the organization – that of a hard-working, indigenous organization that prides itself on carrying out projects that 1) maintain traditional reciprocal relationships, 2) revitalize indigenous agricultural knowledge, and 3) transform social change brought about by poverty and emigration. However, the imposed identity is gradually incorporating a rhetoric of sustainability and efficiency, not unlike the rhetoric espoused by international development organizations (such as the World Bank) that advocate participatory development on the grounds of its efficiency in its use of untapped local labor. I explain that the members of the Pirwa resist the new characterization of the Pirwa as a “self-sustainable” organization, what has in fact become the new imposed development identity, on the basis that it ignores an important facet of community-forged development identity: the organization’s ability to maintain and engender strategic new social relations in the community that transcend pre-set social groups. However, this resistance has so far fallen on deaf ears, and because of this, the future of the organization is in jeopardy.

Chapter Six examines the last case study of development contexts, the county women’s group named for Adela Zamudio, an important literary figure and feminist activist in Bolivian history. The members of this group originate from throughout the municipality of Sipe Sipe, including Huancarani. This group is a contemporary off-shoot of the now defunct mothers’ clubs – clubs that were most prolific after the redemocratization of Bolivia in the 1980s that were then abandoned in the mid-1990s. The agenda of the past mothers’ clubs sought to ‘modernize’ rural women, a process that would help women overcome illiteracy, malnutrition, poor health,
high maternal and infant mortality rates, and poor Spanish proficiency by stripping away cultural specificities and replacing them with scientific knowledge and new Western technology. These groups foregrounded women as the signature support of the family and experts of ‘community building.’ But these groups entrenched the distance between female community builders and male politicians and political participants. Furthermore, constraints in the way popular participation is laid out exacerbate women’s pronounced absence in the official process of Bolivian development.

Table 1. Organizations examined as case studies in the dissertation (Chapters Four, Five, and Six).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>As it is referred to in the dissertation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organización Territorial de Bases (Chapter Four)</td>
<td>Grassroots Territorial Organization</td>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>The local governing body in Huancarani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. La Pirwa (Chapter Five)</td>
<td>Silo, or storage building.</td>
<td>Pirwa</td>
<td>A voluntary organization that attempts to eradicate hunger and malnutrition by providing a work-for-food program in Huancarani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organización de Campesinas Adela Zamudio (Chapter Six)</td>
<td>The Adela Zamudio Rural Women’s Group</td>
<td>Adela Zamudio</td>
<td>A women’s empowerment group that focuses on 1) educating women about the process of development and 2) inserting women into the local development process.</td>
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The Adela Zamudio group, on the other hand, accommodates and resists the development identity of women as absent non-participators in popular participation and participatory development. In this women’s organization, the leaders inform members about women’s prescribed role in participatory development, according to the Law of Popular Participation of 1994, as equal partners with men at each step of the development process. The organization inserts itself, albeit sometimes ineffectively, into the official municipal channels of popular participation and garners funding to help women financially and politically in their communities.
However, members of the group resist being singled out as women per se, and find that their efforts in forging a development identity would be more successful if focused on including another vulnerable population into their demands for equality and representation in popular participation – poor men. Women in Adela Zamudio argue that forging a development identity based on culturally-relevant *complementary* gender roles would be more helpful – in which men and women together work for the good of the family – than constructing a developing identity aligned with what they see as *competing* gender roles – in which the organization makes demands from the municipality that single women out as a targeted group for scarce funds. This women’s group has been somewhat successful in garnering development funding when they align their development identity with the imposed identity of women as absent non-participators. But when they forge a development identity based more on class, broadening their focus to include poor men in their development work, they have been less successful because of the direct disconnect between the imposed development identity and the one that they themselves forge.

Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation. I argue that far from leveling the playing field, participatory development exacerbaches social distinctions based on identity. Imposed development identities target particular groups for scarce development funding, and those who meet the qualifications successfully garner development funding. These imposed identities, however, not only limit targeted groups in the way that they do development, but they also severely prohibit other groups who do not fit certain criteria from successfully carrying out projects that they define as beneficial to their communities. Residents of Huancarani react to this by accommodating, resisting, and often forging their own development identities that show that they warrant development funding. In a country like Bolivia, where the majority of its citizens live in conditions of severe poverty (*Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano en Bolivia* 2006),
targeting based on identity is an ill-conceived strategy, but one that is fostered both by social movements and by the national and international development bureaucracy. My study demonstrates that the current model of development in Bolivia is one in which external political processes are seeking to regulate not only the direction of development, but the very identity of communities. Until the local process of participatory development truly permits people to define development goals and objectives and still receive the external resources needed to advance their own development objectives and goals, it will be difficult to consider Bolivian participatory development a successful endeavor.
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: DEVELOPMENT AND IDENTITY: THEORETICAL INFLUENCES

In order to better understand the ways that identities are accommodated, resisted, and constructed for the purposes of development in Huancarani, I begin my discussion by fleshing out the historical and theoretical lineages that led anthropologists to the study of development as a cultural system. I provide a brief overview of the history of development ideas, symbols, policies, and practices leading up to recent critiques in the social sciences of the concept and practices of development. Social movements focusing on development alternatives have facilitated specific courses of prescribed social change, often steeped in rhetoric based on ethnicity, gender, and sometimes class. These development alternatives have been deeply critical of more recent global metanarratives that have surged in the wake of development-as-modernization, such as neoliberal policies that emphasize market deregulation and curtailed government expenditures. Under these circumstances, community participation and participatory development have become essential concepts in the establishment of a signature model for development throughout the world. However, these concepts are often co-opted by both social movement activists and international organizations that dictate global development policy in an effort to forward specific objectives and goals. This is an important leap which emphasizes the way the construction of identity and identities often become intertwined with ideas about social change. I conclude the chapter with an explanation of how current identity
politics in Bolivia have helped usher in a new era of development practice, one in which contemporary social, political, and cultural movements have converged to foster a nationalist ideology that centers on Indian identity and is linked with anti-Western global alliances.

1.1 DEVELOPMENT AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL GAZE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT AS IDEA, SYMBOL, POLICY, PRACTICE

For the last three decades, anthropologists have turned their attention to deconstructing development as a cultural system (Edelman and Haugerud 2005) – placing the concept and practice of development in its historical, social, cultural, political, and economic context in order to trace its normative and assumed global privilege. At the turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, decades after the conference at Bretton Woods that would define the first global development initiative (Black 1999; Rist 1997), billions of people still live in dire poverty at the same time that the number of billionaires in the world has increased (Cavanaugh and Anderson 2002; Anderson and Cavanaugh 2000). The sheer number of poor people is rising (Human Development Report 1999 and 2000), and with the rise of global capitalism – its increasing mobility, flexibility, and ubiquity – millions of people who did not previously define themselves as poor have been more and more aware of their relative lack of material wealth. In fact, Escobar (1995) goes so far to say that it is the concept of development that thereby defines the concept of its opposite – underdevelopment and undeveloped. In effect, Escobar argues that the paradigm of development has produced the developing world. This “development gaze” (Grillo and Stirrat 1997) has had economic, political, cultural, and social implications for the way culture change has been directed since the beginning of the development era.
Early conceptions of development signifying advancement in material progress on a society-wide scale, rather than on an individual basis, date to the rapid expansion of industrial capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). But the ideas that spurned the theoretical discussions supporting the paradigm of development surfaced as early as the Enlightenment era, in which the belief in the power of the scientific method took root and paved the way for the fetish of the rational in Western thought (Gardner and Lewis 1996; Hobart 1993; van Ufford et al. 2003; Crewe and Harrison 2000). Clearly, evolutionism, both biological and social, with its focus on stages of existence and small changes in species over time helped pave the way for the theoretical distinction of stages of society based primarily on material wealth (Escobar 1991; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Binns 2002). Although materially focused, these stages were steeped in moralistic assumptions, collapsing technological advancements with normative social superiority (Power 2002). In these discussions, Western societies inevitably stood out as the most advanced and that to which to aspire. Social science forwarded these assumptions most notably in the work of E.B. Tylor, Lewis Henry Morgan, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx beginning in the late 19th century.

Nonetheless, development as a hegemonic social metanarrative is usually heralded as a product of mid 20th century politics. Development was first discussed as foreign policy in the United States in a 1949 speech by President Harry Truman (Rist 1997; Black 1999). Aligning well with the objectives and goals of the Cold War, development was argued as a policy that set as a goal to increase economic wealth of poor nations in order to improve the health and overall well-being of the world’s poor. The president’s rhetoric and tone has been characterized as nothing short of evangelistic (Rist 1997), as he argued that the U.S. was duty-bound to improve the lives of the poor and would increase budgetary expenditures to do so. Although the impetus
for Truman’s conceptualization of development was largely political – to sway global favor away from communist regimes – the way development was defined from the outset focused predominantly on economic measures, such as increasing Gross Domestic Product of poor nations (Rist 1997). Therefore, development began as economic policy, generally as a way to increase and expand markets. Critics contend that these markets did not increase nor did they expand to the poor nations that development was intended to benefit; instead, rich nations used development as a strategy to broaden their profit margins on the backs of the world’s poorest (Schech and Haggis 2000; Giri 2003; Grillo 1997; Sen and Grown 1987; Nelson and Wright 1995; Mayo and Craig 1995; Rahman 1995; Walker 2000; Valenzuela 2005; Desai and Potter 2002).

While the advent of the development era mainly characterized economic improvement (and still does), it also signaled a change in the way rich and poor nations interacted, having social, cultural, political, as well as macro-economic repercussions. Scholars have documented both beneficial and injurious societal impacts in the name of development while simultaneously emphasizing its processual nature. Gardner and Lewis (2005) argue that:

[Development refers] to processes of social and economic change which have been precipitated by economic growth, and/or specific policies and plans, whether at the level of the state, donor agencies, or indigenous social movements. These can have either positive or negative effects on the people who experience them. Development is a series of events and actions, as well as a particular discourse and ideological construct. We assume that these are inherently problematic; indeed, some aspects of development are actively destructive and disempowering (Gardner and Lewis 2005:25).

Gardner and Lewis locate development in its cultural context when they note the importance of economic growth in the development equation. However, they are right to point out that development fosters social as well as economic changes, and that these changes may have negative affects. While development projects and goals have most certainly increased global awareness of the extent of the problems that the dire poor face – i.e., poor health,
overpopulation issues, food insecurity, mandated relocation, lack of health care and infrastructure, etc. – many argue that development as a paradigm has not been the salve that it was expected to be (Escobar 1997, 1995; Illich 1997).

Historically, development theory has shifted its objectives and its focus, but critics argue that these modifications have not necessarily produced better policy and outcomes. Since the 1950s, theories of development from all academic disciplines and applied fields can be primarily characterized in one of two ways: 1) instrumental theories of development, emphasizing objectives and methods to bring about change, the nuts-and-bolts, so to speak, of the development paradigm; and 2) moral critiques of development, which evaluate the very mission of development itself, underscore its maintenance of global inequality, and deem a global failure the development metanarrative – the hegemonic global ideas, symbols, policies, and practices that signify development as natural and normal (Mosse 2005). In no way do I claim that the discussion below of the convergence of development ideas, symbols, practices, and policies is complete and comprehensive. My objective in presenting the following discussion is to point out the process by which instrumental theories and moral critiques of development have produced the hegemony of participation. In fact, participation has garnered support from both sides of the argument. In order to better understand how this plays out in contemporary societies, I show how select events and discussions have resulted in our present-day understanding of bottom-up development, even though this label reveals a logic that often is not put into practice.

1.1.1 Modernization theory

Post World War II social theory reflected a nascent hope in order to offset the dire results of the devastation wrought by war as well as to foster “the rising process of decolonization” (van
Development was viewed as a tool by which the global North and South would work together to remedy world-wide poverty and social ills, such as high rates of morbidity and mortality, overwork, child labor, technological deficiency, illiteracy, etc. (Veltmeyer and O’Mally 2001; Black 1999; Edelman and Haugerud 2005; Esteva 1992). Sparked by President Truman’s call to “modernize” seemingly “backward people,” social scientists and politicians postulated the age of modernity and its omnipresence around the world as the single most important goal of social change (Escobar 2005). Therefore, this marked the beginning of not only directed global social change, but changes that would all have the same outcome as their goal: modern society, which in this sense connotes Western society. Non-modern societies were expected to catch-up to their Western counterparts by copying intensive industrialization and the accumulation of wealth that was credited as the prerequisite of modernity (Rostow 1960). In effect, modernization theory suggested that modernity was desirable and catch-up was possible.

Modernity as a concept is imbued with symbols that diametrically oppose that which is deemed modern against that which is not. In other words, all that is not modern is traditional, and tradition is what development, in due course, seeks to remedy (Sachs 1992). The dichotomy of modern/traditional is analogous and synonymous with developed/undeveloped, urban/rural, rational/irrational, acultural/cultural, democratic/non-democratic, rich/poor, cosmopolitan/provincial, powerful/powerless. Proponents of modernization theory (i.e., Lipset 1959) view historicity and cultural specificity at best not important, and at worst an impediment to the development process. The primary goal of development-as-modernization is to integrate non-Western societies into the global market in order to improve their economies; in so doing, proponents argue that the economies of the global North improve as non-Western societies find
increasing access and interest in global markets (Lipset 1959; see Cooper and Packard 2005; Powers 2002; Shanin 1997; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). The understanding is that achieving modern status would take a series of stages (Rostow 1960) in order to be fully incorporated into the global economy, and these stages would be marked by: a shift in morbidity and mortality rates, characterized by high fertility rates and high death rates due to infectious diseases, to low fertility rates and low death rates, where chronic diseases were of chief concern (a phenomenon entitled the epidemiologic transition (Omran 1971)); the replacement of autocratic and oligarchic political systems with democratically elected governments; the gradual anachronism of oral tradition and its substitution by literacy, and universal education would be the vehicle by which this is accomplished; and the migration of rural residents to reside in urban centers.

Nolan (2002) points out that external development assistance to the global South was seen as imperative to completing the development mission. This assistance was indeed monetary, but underdevelopment was – and still is – predominantly understood as a technical problem. Modernization theory suggests that industrialization and manufacturing would create more income, and this increased income would have social and political repercussions that would make modernity a reality in historically non-Western societies. Nolan explains that:

What might be termed a technicist approach therefore guided development thinking from the outset. The ends sought were primarily material, strategy was derived from Western economic theory, and the means consisted of Western capital combined with Western technology and know-how. Progress, of course, would be measured in economic terms, and industrialized societies would be the model to which weaker economies should aspire. Development, in this view, was essentially a unilinear evolutionary process that could be accelerated through the adoption of Western technology, models, and methods. The end point of the process would result in societies that, although perhaps outwardly different in terms of national dress, cuisine, or language, would operate and think largely along Western lines (Nolan 2002:45, emphasis in the original).

Development experts concluded that once a critical mass of technology and investment in the developing world had been accumulated, the society would reach a stage of “take-off”
(Rostow 1960) and enter the modern age, signifying the absence of poverty and its consequences.

As development became synonymous with a moral stance against the global devastation that had occurred in the previous 20 years of war and tentative peace, van Ufford et al. (2003) have framed the expectations of post World War II development practice as “development as work of hope”. However, as development planning moved into the realm of development “doing” (van Ufford et al. 2003:14), the politics within the development industry obstructed the making of the grand vision of development a reality. Development paradigms came and went, each promising the benefits of technological advances and improved quality of life (Harrison 2003), but theoretical territorialism and political agendas of the development industry created “erratic” results (van Ufford et al. 2003:16) and a hodgepodge of practices that failed to meet the needs of the world’s poor in any tangible way. A great deal of funds were given to developing nations as aid, but the 1970s and 1980s were years of ever increasing inequality and poverty throughout the world, particularly in Latin America (Hoogvelt 2001). During the post World War II era, development assistance was used as a condition to counter the Soviet threat, but development recipients also exploited Cold War alliances in order to receive more funds (Nolan 2002). Despite development funds and the promise that progress would come as a result of economic investments, social evolution as defined by proponents of modernization had failed to make inroads, and people wanted to know why (see Gupta 1998; Krishna et al. 1997).

1.1.2 Dependency theory

Critics of early models of development and modernization theory viewed the problem of underdevelopment in a different way. Instead of defining the problem as one of lack in the
developing world – lack of technology, lack of educational systems that meet the needs of the populace, lack of health care infrastructure that has the resources to do any meaningful good, lack that can be remedied with the diffusion of modern ideas, technology, and bureaucratic infrastructure – some scholars contended that underdevelopment was a symptom of gravely unequal relations of power between the states of the global North and those in the global South (Black 1999; Conway and Heynan 2002; Edelman and Haugerud 2005; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978). Dependenistas, as their Latin American contingent is now well-known, argue that the problem of increasing poverty is part and parcel of promoting a global capitalistic economy. Capitalism is fundamentally based upon competition between groups of individual actors that force inequitable distribution of wealth, according to the Marxist analysis of the dependency school of thought. People in the global South – those who have been exploited historically as slaves, serfs, the colonized – will never be able to reach so-called modernity, as defined by modernization theorists, because the global North exists due to the exploitation of labor and primary resources in the global South. In other words, modernity is part of the same process that manifests and deepens abysmal poverty (see Cardoso 1977). The two results cannot be extricated from each other. Far from the vision of development as hope that modernization theory espoused, dependency theory deflated the sense of optimism fostered by development.

Dependency theory was widely influenced by Wallerstein’s (1979, 1976; see also Klak 2002) world-systems theory, which demonstrated the interdependence of states at the center (richer, developed, Northern nations) and those at the periphery (poor, underdeveloped, Southern nations). In Latin America, dependency theory in part prompted a new rhetoric of economic nationalism that popularized import substitution industrialization (ISI). If the capitalist world system enmeshed the poor and the rich in a dependent relationship that only exacerbated poverty
and entrenched wealth in their respective areas, it was argued then the only option for those who lived with this disadvantage must be to opt out of the world system and fulfill unmet needs of the state. This “Third World Strategy” (Black 1999) led to a period of foreign and domestic investment in state-owned enterprises that became economically unsustainable over the long-term. But socially and politically speaking, the dependenista critique of development exposed the hope of modernization as empty and unattainable.

The political economy of development cultivated a more cynical interpretation of the symbol of development and its failed or inaccessible results. The duality of traditional/modern, underdeveloped/developed is not what was challenged by the dependenistas; instead, dependency theory revealed the process by which the analogies become sociologically relevant. In effect, dependency theory advanced a moralistic argument that demonized the Western concept of modernization as a symbol of exploitation. However, the economic problems created by ISI – hyperinflation and insurmountable debt – soon proved this model an untenable option, regardless of its symbol as a strategy of the oppressed. The crisis of development (Veltmeyer and O’Malley 2001; Veltmeyer 2001a) generated new economic responses as well as social and political activism that defined a new era of social thought.

1.1.3 Neoliberalism and the rise of social movements

The ontological crisis of development – what it is, what its purpose should be, and how and/or if it should be forwarded as a global agenda – underscored the prevailing presence of unchecked global poverty and the need to do something about it. The primacy of using economic models and concepts to mitigate these problems continues to be at the forefront of development theory (Rist 1997). While economic strategies dominate development planning, the impacts of politics,
social organization, and culture are better understood and utilized in contemporary arguments for and against development. Neoliberalism, on the one hand, and the rise of new social movements, on the other, are the two extremes in a continuum of responses that attempt to alleviate global poverty (O’Malley 2001; Veltmayer 2001; Escobar and Alvarez 1998). Although historically neoliberalism has been characterized as an economic model and new social movements have been constituted along socio-cultural axes, each of these responses is imbued with economic, political, social, and cultural implications.

Neoliberalism, initiated as international economic policy in the late 1970s/early 80s by American economist Jeffrey Sachs and the Washington Consensus, stems from principles espoused by 18th century economic theorist Adam Smith, who suggested that rational political economies avoid any governmental intrusion on the market (Kim et al. 2000; Green 1995; Baer and Maloney 1997; Brown 1996; Simon 2002). Neoliberal principles have pervaded the core economic values that drive the world economy, as evidenced by economic objectives put forth by the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (World Bank 2001, 2002). Contemporary neoliberal proponents argue that an unfettered market will have beneficial consequences for society as a whole and will promote growth and progress, a kind of trickle down effect in which economic growth impacts social, political, and cultural change (Shakow and Irwin 2000). Thus, the neoliberal era (Millen, Irwin, and Kim 2000) collapses the notion of economic growth with development; the two concepts have become synonymous throughout the world, even at the behest of development officials (Rist 1997; Gershman and Irwin 2000; Shakow and Irwin 2000). As a result, prominent symbols of development have become the GNP (gross national product) and the GDP (gross domestic product), as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, two international
lending institutions. This is no small epistemological shift in the concept and practice of development. Since the 1970s, neoliberalism has ushered in an era of development that first and foremost considers the international economy as the vehicle of development, a world in which mega-corporations operating in the Third World often have budgets that far exceed those of the nations in which they reside (World Health Organization 2000). Development agencies are directly responsible for setting a course of development policy in the Third World, in part by tying up international development models with international aid (Escobar 1995; Laurell 1989, 2000; Corbridge 2002).

Neoliberalism, as an international cultural ideology (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001) is made manifest by the IMF when it loans money to economically-struggling nations to offset hyperinflation (Gershman and Irwin 2000; Green 1995). The IMF uses a universal prescription for stabilizing these economies, called structural adjustment programs (SAPs), defined as:

The structural adjustment prescription was (and is) usually seen as embracing three interrelated aims and processes:

- Reduce the role of the state relative to the market in the economy;
- Enhance economic efficiency by allowing prices to be determined by market forces, such as exchange rates, interest rates, and real wages;
- Integrate the national economy into the world economy by lifting barriers to trade and investment.

In short, the policies comprise privatization, liberalization, and deregulation (Gershman and Irwin 2000:23, emphasis in the original).

One of the many problems with SAPs in the developing world is the level of debt nations incur after the loan. IMF and WB loans are lent in order to stabilize economies, yet the interest from the loans are crippling for these struggling nations. Therefore, the reduction of the role of the state (privatization) more often than not is translated into slashed budgets for social services that were previously funded by the state; hence the term “shock therapy” has been substituted for SAPs (Iriart, Merhy, and Waitzkin 2001).
In the contemporary global socio-political climate, neoliberalism, SAPs, and worsening debt in the Third World are all viewed as corollaries of the West, especially the United States, having profound implications for social movements that take the West to task for what they deem new neocolonial relations between the North and South. SAPs as an economic strategy was born out of the economics department at the University of Chicago in the 1950s (Shakow and Irwin 2000), and exported throughout the world not only by American scholars but also by economists from the Third World who studied at the University of Chicago (Green 1995). It has become a project that incorporates the rhetoric of modernization and science and links progress with political type (democracy) and economic mechanisms (free markets). Most importantly, neoliberalism has become bigger than just an economic policy throughout the world. For economists, neoliberalism as an economic model has been the defining worldview for understanding the process of international development. The shock therapy and the enormous indebtedness incurred throughout the Third World have come to symbolize Western imperialism and neocolonialism in the Third World. This has political implications not only for states who borrow IMF money, who become seemingly forever linked to the West in yet another exploitative relationship, but also for local people who experience none of the economic benefits of SAPs and incur all of its disadvantages – the rise in the cost of living, the lack of necessary social services, etc. (i.e., Paley 2001; Homedes and Ugalde n.d., Kim et al. 2000).

Neoliberal economic policies pressure governments to comply with SAPs, and as a result, neoliberal discourse becomes incorporated into everyday life, what Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) call the culture of neoliberalism. Gill (2000) contends that this neoliberal culture leads to a “retreat of the state” in providing for classic public goods – health care, education, domestic security, etc. SAPs result in the privatization of public services; in the case of health care in the
developing world, for example, a severely strained public health system – usually the only health care services for the poor – becomes even more financially strapped, while international NGOs (INGOs) fill in the gaps to offer services where the state is no longer able to. These INGOs are frequently from North America or Europe, maintaining common perceptions that these projects are reinforcing neocolonial relationships. Because these services are funded by entities in the developed world, Gill (2000) argues that there is no accountability to the developing state in the way that these organizations deliver social services.

Given this socio-economic and political environment, the rise of new social movements has come on the heels of the neoliberal agenda in order to attempt to make governments and international monetary institutions accountable to the very people that they are supposed to serve. The rules of the new economic model of neoliberalism have fashioned new workers in the late 20th/early 21st century, from organized, collective union activists to individualized, flexible, and mobile actors on an increasingly international scene (Ong 1998). Identity factors such as gender, class, and ethnicity have become ever more prominent positionalities around which new social movements have arisen. Women and indigenous groups have gained ground in conversations about development and carved out different approaches to the way development is conceived, implemented, and evaluated (i.e., Paulson and Calla 2000). These movements have been instrumental in pursuing alternative ways of viewing development, both alternatives to development (which attempt to upend the unequal power relations inherent in development as a cultural system by redefining appropriate culture change outside of the paradigm of development) and development alternatives (new ways of designing and implementing development programs within the development paradigm) (Nolan 2002). In other words, new social movements have in fact had a hand in changing the ends of development – better health,
increased access to the political process, higher literacy rates, and intact environments instead of increased GDPs — and reframing the processes of how development is designed and implemented — bottom-up approaches rather than top-down prescriptions (see Arce and Long 2000).

New social movements stress the importance of historical and cultural particularities when directing social change — issues that they charge are largely absent in development programs. Taking this to heart, recent development theory underscores the importance of incorporating “local” or “indigenous” knowledge into development design, implementation and evaluation (Hobart 1993; Ellen 2002; Sillitoe, Bicker, and Pottier 2002). Local people, therefore, hold much more prominent and visible positions in recent models of development work than ever before. In so doing, development at the community level is said to have more relevance than the regional, national, or supra-national level (i.e., Central or South America, African Union). Using indigenous knowledge to plan and implement development programs is argued to empower local peoples — building local capacities for the planning and management of the changes associated with improvement; the concept of empowerment (i.e., Mayo and Craig 1995), with intellectual lineages from Paulo Freire’s work in conscientización (1970), has held a place of increasing distinction in development thought since the 1990s.

The emergence of new social movements and their struggles have inserted new actors in development, delineated the roles that each group of actors play in development, and fostered new ways of thinking about citizenship — in the local, national, and global arenas — and people’s relationship to the state (Albro 2003; Albó 1995, 1994, 1993; Eckstein 2001; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez 1990; Naples 2002; Desai 2002; Hoogvelt 2001). This bottom-up approach to development theoretically places local people at the center of defining and resolving
their own development agendas. “Participation” has been the primary rhetorical and practical construct guiding local people to take part in the course of their own development (Townsend et al. 2002). In the next section, I discuss the confusion concerning participation and give examples of the ways that it is used in development models. While the concept of participation has enjoyed a prominent place in development circles at the end of the 20th century, I point out how the concept has been used by social movements as well as co-opted by neoliberal institutions to which social movements are responding (i.e., IMF and WB). Participation has been so broadly defined as to become impotent, having lost its ability to disrupt power relations among the different groups involved in the development process – a grave problem that has maintained the status quo of unchecked global inequality and poverty. I do not point out the limitations of participation in order to argue that it should not be incorporated or rethought. But I want to illustrate that the way participation has been articulated in on the ground development planning has implications for the way local people are required to manipulate and construct particular identities in order to insert themselves into the process of development.

1.2 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATION

1.2.1 The unfolding of the concept of participation

Community participation has most certainly been a buzzword or trendy concept in development studies since the WHO/UNICEF Alma Alta Declaration of 1978 (Morgan 1993). In fact, most scholars of development of all theoretical persuasions include participation as a primary objective and method of development work. Overall, its prevalence in development work seeks
to empower the poor to alleviate poverty and remove the obstacles that prevented it. Yet despite its notoriety, participation has been poorly conceptualized and operationalized. Nolan (2002:21) puts forth a most basic definition of the concept of participation as “the involvement of different members of a society – groups and subgroups – in the decisions that will affect their lives, now and in the future.” This definition is vague, but is generally echoed by most organizations that attempt to pen what is meant by the concept. However, this definition begs all kinds of questions about the instrumentality and morality of the concept, such as, how do different members of society get involved, and to what degree? What types of decisions warrant the label those that “will affect their lives, now and in the future” – budgetary, administrative, project implementation, etc.? What constitutes a subgroup or group in society? Do individuals only have a voice via their group, and what group is that? Do people only belong to one group, or to multiple? In order to participate, does this presuppose that groups consist of a like-minded, homogeneous population that forges a consensus of ideas? If not, then how does this definition of participation deal with heterogeneity and disagreement within groups? And finally, how does anyone know what types of decisions will have prominence in the future, so how can we be certain of those decisions that will affect it? Although meant to be wide-ranging to encompass the variety of participatory practices, this definition is oversimplified and fails to engage some of the more complex factors that underlie participation in development.

Community participation, although assumed to be beneficial for development, has never been empirically tested for its efficacy (Foster 1987). Instead, participation has gained ground in development rhetoric due to its deep roots in Western cultural ideals of democracy, human rights, and tolerance for pluralism (Desai 2002). But as defined by Nolan above, participation in this sense does not necessarily prescribe democratic or tolerant ideals: although the definition
assumes that individuals have a say in the course of local decision-making, technically “involvement” under this definition could also be interpreted as carrying out objectives that are decided by local elites. My point here in the discussion is to unsettle primarily assumed and unspoken premises of participation and to demonstrate the cultural context of its use. The popularity of participation has more to do with the modernist ideals of Western society rather than any assurance that it inherently fosters better development work or eradicates poverty (Eyben and Ladbury 1995).

The absence of any clear guidelines of what participation is, what it should aspire to, and how to actually participate has been, and still is, vague for two reasons. First, since the 1970s, studies of development and the project of modernizing non-Western peoples often encountered obstacles that had been relegated to the ‘problem of culture’ (Ahmed 1982; Crewe and Harrison 1997; Norberg-Hodge 1997). Experts in non-Western cultures were thereby asked to unveil the problem of “non-compliance” in development programs and figure out ways to circumvent the issues that were raised. In their investigations, these experts revealed problems in development work due to the misunderstanding of local social norms and its disjuncture with development objectives. Investigators argued that in order to make any real, meaningful inroads in development, projects needed to better synchronize their objectives with local culture. Cultural relativism was not what was at stake here because the modernist, evolutionist end results of development remained the same: i.e., population control, the cooptation of local health care by biomedicine, etc. However, what was important at the time was cultural appropriateness – how local people made sense of the objectives and methods of development projects in order to maximize cooperation. In the end, some cultural experts argued that in order to achieve a certain level of ‘buy-in,’ so to speak, local people should be encouraged to share their own knowledge of
problems and potential solutions, and development experts should take this knowledge seriously instead of disregarding it as superstitious or simplistic. This call for understanding indigenous knowledge was often argued for its own sake and heeded appeals to cultural relativism and the existence of more than one trajectory for social change (Hobart 1993; Purcell and Akinyi Onjoro 2002). Participation, therefore, was observed in order to promote a more nuanced understanding of local culture and less ethnocentrism and arrogance on the part of development officials. This call for cultural sensitivity meant that although participation was now an important part of the development process, local particularities were now extremely relevant; instead of using monolithic models that work in all settings, development programs were thought to be most effective by using specifically-tailored objectives and methods. This is an ideal, though, and it is evident in the history of development that development officials are not very good at leaving their models behind in order to account for local specifics; but the ideal of cultural appropriateness makes it difficult to construct a rigid definition of local participation.

The second reason that participation has not been clearly defined in development work has again to do with local cooperation, but compliance at a different level. Participation and empowerment in the Third World, most notably in Latin America in light of liberation theology and conscientización, has been used to characterize social movement activity in order to upset the status quo, rather than maintain it, as I described above. At its inception, participation was not about finding ways to encourage compliance. Therefore, handing over decision-making power to local communities had frightening political implications for State governments – governments that were often floundering in the face of increased indebtedness and international pressure to meet particular political and economic standards. In order to make participation attractive to the state, the development bureaucracy (both at the state level as well as at the level
of international NGOs) had to de-politicize the concept (Morgan 1993), part of what Ferguson notes in his characterization of development as the “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1994). Instead of empowering local people and balancing power relations as its attractiveness surged, participation began to imply instrumentality and practicality, a sort of ‘democracy up until a certain point’ approach. This perspective maintained the modernist assumptions of development intact while allowing states to assume their own development agendas and setting the stage for adherence in local communities (cf. Morgan 1990). Participation in this sense became a conduit of the state, not an especially radical ideal, a problematic relationship particularly in rural areas where residents are often absent in national discussions of development (Mullen 2002). The vague definition of participation allowed the state the opportunity to cease participatory measures when it saw participation as a threat to its national interests.

For example, Morgan (1993) discusses a national primary health care program in Costa Rica during the 1980s and how community participation was appropriated by the state at a certain point. Morgan suggests that bottom-up development can in fact curtail, rather than encourage, participation in development work. In the case of primary health care and community participation in Costa Rica, she contends that

[S]tates unwittingly sowed the seeds of discontent by inviting community participation in health. The process entailed several steps. First, state employees taught organizational skills to people who had no recent history of communal efforts. Then they taught communities how to diagnose their own problems, acknowledging that land tenure and unemployment may be the fundamental cause of illness. They showed that politicians could be held accountable for solving their problems, if only people were sufficiently well-organized to make their demands heard… The very act of organizing a community committee, one informant said, is the equivalent of “arming the community” to organize themselves outside of institutional limitations. This presented a problem when the government realized that community participation had outgrown its ability to control it. The situation was exacerbated when the economic climate worsened and the government found itself promoting community-government dialogue when it literally could not afford to respond to community demands (Morgan 1993:164-5).
Morgan points out the structural limitations of community participation in a political environment that exacerbates inequality and poverty. In other words, this case study shows that community participation is only as good as the powers that be allow.

Although the ideals of community participation are laudable, they are part and parcel of a history of depoliticizing the development process. Far from apolitical, participation has been used to maintain existing power relations and to undermine the voices of local people. Furthermore, the concept of community participation is also far from acultural. The concept assumes a certain Western bias toward the liberal democratic process and fails to critically reflect on the ways it can be used to reinforce community hierarchies and agendas. As I point out in the next section, participation has not only been used as an agent of power at the local and national level, but it has been co-opted by multinational development agencies in order to forward neoliberal goals – an issue that becomes extremely relevant in the Bolivian ethnographic context.

1.2.2 Co-optation of the concept

The popularity of participation in development work cannot be overstated, and the fact that international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank encourage a certain strain of participation is testament to its universal attractiveness. Although participation historically aligned well with leftist political leanings of grassroots NGOs and community networks, throughout the 1990s the concept has been increasingly co-opted by multinational lending organizations to forward a retreat of the state from the administration of social services (Lane 1995; Nelson 2002; Olico-Okui 2002; Rahman 1995; Rew 1997; Morgan 2001). The political backlash against these organizations has been severe; social movements from camps as diverse as feminist, environmental, labor, anarchist, etc. have demonized neoliberal policies espoused by

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the IMF and WB that leave the Third World severely indebted and its people poorer than they ever have been. Community participation has been a sort of symbol of shifting power relations from the international level to that of the local, and critics argue that these organizations see the potential that community participation has to give “structural adjustment a human face” (Mayo and Craig 1995).

Critics of participatory rhetoric point out that participation is being used by the political right to foster fiscal conservatism and governmental accountability. Mayo and Craig (1995:4), in their introduction to the volume *Community Empowerment*, demonstrate that the co-optation of participation aligns well with the goals of “cost-sharing/cost reduction for the public sector (that is, shifting costs from public sector budgets by persuading communities to make increased contributions through voluntary effort and/or self-help/voluntary unpaid labor) and through increased project/programme efficiency.” Empowerment and participation, in this sense, shifts the burden of development onto the backs of the already overworked poor using a business model that promotes efficiency, frugality, and a merit-based capitalistic system. While development rhetoric in the early post World War II era used the whole of the developing nation as the development subject, now the goal of investing development funds is based on “targeting” particular populations of people that are seen as deserving of development attention, such as women, indigenous groups, and the elderly. Furthermore, the convergence of the corporate management model and the development industry over the last decade highlights the purported ‘crisis’ in the historic absence of well-defined outcomes and evaluation of development projects. This turn towards a “manageability culture” within the development industry has affected the way that development actors – NGO representatives, representatives of international organizations, local people – are expected to participate and the way that funders increasingly
define success and failure of development projects (van Ufford, Kumar Giri, and Mosse 2003). “Community participation… thus [becomes] part of a wider strategy to promote savings, to target services only towards those who have been identified as being most desperately in need of them, and to shift the burden of resource provision away from the public sector towards communities (Mayo and Craig 1995:7).

Analysis of the discourse of participatory development is an important indicator of relationships of power among various actors in the process of development; and the most recent rhetoric has been cited as giving voice to various actors that may not have been previously incorporated as part of community participation (Moore and Schmitz 2000). In general, the objectives and goals of community participation alter the language used to define the relationships that local people have with their development interlocutors or the stakeholders of the development bureaucracy (i.e., development officials from NGOs and international development agencies, representatives of the state bureaucracy, etc.). Prior to the participatory development era, local people were deemed development “beneficiaries” or “recipients” of development aid, highlighting a passive relationship to those who had power to give aid, the “donors.” Once the discourse of participation took root in development models, these labels seemed anachronistic at best and patronizing at worst to characterize the shift in power that was supposedly sustained in community participation. In order to remedy this, the labels were modified to signal this shift, and local people became known as “stakeholders,” “partners,” and “participants.” The rhetoric of partnership in models of community participation is used to signify local people, poor people, people who are using the participatory process to increase their power in development.
Yet recently, there has been a shift in thinking about who constitutes a partner. Morgan (2001) points out that the World Bank (1996) has come to define participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them.” Furthermore, the Bank states that stakeholders in the process of participation are defined as those “who could affect the outcome of a proposed Bank intervention or be affected by it” (cited in Morgan 2001:222), and they go further to suggest that stakeholders in participatory development are everyone from NGOs, local people, as well as lenders and Bank personnel. Morgan upholds that

Sceptics might argue that the Bank’s definition co-opts the concept of ‘participation’, using it to put a rosy face on business as usual. They might argue that we should all be sceptical of using organizations like the World Bank as major actors in attempts to strengthen civil society, at the same time that states (in the neoliberal economic model) are being asked to step back. The danger with this model, as Jelin [1998:412] notes for NGOs and international financial institutions in general, is that they ‘do not have a built-in mechanism of accountability’; they claim various constituencies (including, in the case of the Bank, the rich AND the poor), but they are accountable to none of them… At the very least though, the Bank’s definition acknowledges what many others have said: participation is about power (Morgan 2001:222, emphasis in the original).

And, I add, skeptics must argue that participation as a concept, symbol, policy, and practice is becoming empty of value in the process of development. Unless models of participation accommodate the ways that actors gain power in the process of defining their own development, what kind of future does it have to stimulate of the process of development?

### 1.2.3 Participation and power

Participation and empowerment as goals and/ objectives of development have become increasingly problematic at the local level, where nascent analyses of power imbalances among stakeholders demonstrate that participation has failed to empower the poor and does not undermine the modernist ideals of development (Chambers 1995; Nelson and Wright 1995). For
example, Mosse (2005:19) found that in the decades of development work in which he was involved in western India, participation was not a path to empowerment, but a process by which “people become empowered not in themselves, but through relationships with outsiders, and not through the validation of their existing knowledge and actions buy by seeking out and acknowledging the superiority of knowledge and technology and lifestyles construed as modern.” International NGOs, the primary interlocutors of development assistance, are keen on setting aside monies for targeted populations, and in so doing, set the stage for defining who and what are and are not appropriate types of development actors, goals, and strategies. Gill (2000) points out that this pattern of development assistance has given NGOs power to set the course of development agendas within sovereign nations with no sense of accountability to the national governments in which they work. In order to maintain development assistance from international NGOs, participation often encourages patron-client relations (Woost 1997) – a far cry from the initial objectives and goals of participatory development. Woost (1997:247) found that in a small rural Sri Lankan community

…development was understood to be a process in which outsiders brought wealth and improvement to a settlement or to individual families from outside the village boundaries. In general development was something that someone powerful and wealthy brought to you or gave you access to. It was not usually thought to be a process over which poor villagers themselves felt they had any control.

Participation, a construct that has been deemed communalistic and consensus-building, will often encourage residents to compete for development funds and do so by manipulating their discourse and actions in order to be eligible for these funds. Mosse (2005:227) calls these actors the “unruly objects of development – people [who] strive to be modern when we [development officials and academics] want them to be indigenous.” In this sense, Mosse views the competition for funds in the participatory process as aligned with modernist agendas, contrary to the “indigenous” or ‘traditional’ appeals of communalism and cooperation of participation.
Crewe and Harrison (1998:175) state that participation as a concept has been stripped of its power to unsettle structural relations and instead now takes individuals as its referent. Participation in certain ethnographic contexts thus dictates that individuals are responsible for the course of their own development, rather than supporting the ideology that individuals have a right to be involved in their own development. In fact, the rhetoric of contemporary participation does not resolve historic arguments suggesting that cultures are barriers to development. Instead, participatory models now forward an agenda that takes individuals as the sites of development-in-the-making, where nothing short of a “personal transformation” to take up the banner of modernization will be required of participatory development (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). In the neoliberal era, in which people are required to be flexible workers and citizens, people are learning to use development discourse to their advantage, to be flexible in their use of identity as a marker. Mosse (2005) finds that in their quest for development funding for projects, people have learned that community cohesion is a selling point, a strong indicator of a good risk in the competitive world of development in which outcomes and efficiency have become more and more important. “Community in this sense is a sought-after ‘commodity’ that group members can offer for ‘sale’ to would-be patrons…or use to deter would-be exploiters” (Mosse 2005:216). However, forging a collective common ground is often not an easy task in communities or organizations that serve to represent the needs of the rural poor.
Critical reflections on development and participation have underscored the importance of identity in the process of improving political and economic access to resources. Decades of study of identity, social movements, and/or development illustrate that identity has become relevant to insert particular under-represented groups into the process of development, groups such as women (i.e., Boserup 1970), indigenous people (i.e., Warren and Jackson 2005), and constituencies of workers (i.e., Medina 1997). The politics of these identities show that particular local histories, especially the encounters between given locales and the global economic system, affect the power afforded certain groups to define development (cf. Pigg 1992) and the trajectories of their own social change, either at the local level or at the level of the State. The social and historical constructions of these groups, in the cases of women, indigenous groups, or collective class action, involves using power in what has become a contest to both define the relevance of the group and set the agenda of development goals and objectives. Participation, as the cornerstone of the current global model of development, has brought the process of constructing identity, and its political, social, and economic implications, to the fore in social movement activism.

The power to affect and effect social change in the neoliberal era has become, in some ways, a discursive struggle for the power to exert and forge ideology(ies). Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) note that contemporary capitalism, now more than ever referring to the decontextualization of people from place and production, obligates people to draw on peculiar individualisms to participate as actors on the local, national, and international stage. “[The culture of neoliberalism] is a culture that…re-visions persons not as producers from a particular
community, but as consumers in a planetary marketplace: persons as ensembles of identity that owe less to history or society than to organically conceived human qualities” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:13). Furthermore,

…[I]t is not just that the personal is political. The personal is the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence. By extension, interpersonal relations… come to stand, metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the world as we know it. It is in these privatized terms that action in organized, that the experience of inequity and antagonism takes meaningful shape (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:15, emphasis in original).

Using Comaroff and Comaroff’s words as a guide, we see how development at the local, national, and international levels becomes a process whereby individual agents articulate paths for change that have specific interests at heart. Particular identities, in a world that uses identity markers as targets of development assistance (an issue that I discuss more in Chapter Three on identity and development), are political tools to be reckoned with as capital in the process of development. The process of defining these identities is intertwined and enmeshed in the politics of setting a course against relevant hegemonic forces; in many cases these are seen as the State and international institutions.

In her discussion of class identities and development policies in Belize, Medina (1997) illustrates the way that various groups articulate power through the process of defining who, or what, is the “small-man,” or what becomes conflated as the will of the Belizean political majority. In order to make sense of her study, she finds Hall’s (1986) discussion of the functionality of identity discourse and its application in social movements to be particularly apt. In order to corroborate Medina’s discussion, I use her interpretation of Hall’s ideas in order to clarify my sense of the way identities become instrumental in development. Medina argues that

…[D]iscourses attain dominance through “ideological struggle” – contests to fix meanings, constitute collective agents, and direct collective action (Hall 1983:45, 1986:42). Competing discourses articulate sets of shared identities and interests that may resonate in different ways with the material conditions of the people they aim to move; they consequently vie for allegiance (Hall 1988). Recognition that opposing discourses may “make sense” of people’s experiences in different ways leads us away from

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judging the truth or falsity of discourses to focus instead on their efficacy – on how and why particular discourses bind together collective agents in support of particular political and economic projects (Hall et al. 1977).... The effectiveness of particular discourses can be measured by the degree to which they “impose certain ‘ways of looking,’ particular angles of vision, on events and relationships...” (Hall 1983:49; Hall and Donald 1985:ix-x).

In this analysis, Hall specifically highlights class discourse in political processes, and Medina uses these ideas to clarify her position. For my purposes here, I think that Hall’s insight is also useful for our understanding of how identity based on constructions of gender and ethnicity, as well as class, are also utilized in development.

Li’s work among two rural communities in Indonesia (2000) points up the importance of Hall’s focus on the positionality of subjects in a particular context. She shows how indigenous discourse becomes relevant in the political endeavors of one community, while discourses of ethnicity never really take hold in another community. In her analysis, Hall’s concept of articulation becomes central to understanding the ways that communities incorporate what Li calls the “tribal slot.” Articulation, based on the work of Stuart Hall, is the “process of rendering a collective identity, position, or set of interests explicit (articulate, comprehensible, distinct, accessible to an audience), and of conjoining (articulating) that position to definite political subjects” (Li 2000:152). Hall suggests that these identities “…far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, …are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (Hall 1990:225, quoted in Li 2000:152). Li further states that because identities are not fixed or stable, “this feature renders any articulation complex, contestable, and subject to rearticulation. Positively asserted on the one hand, articulations are also limited and pre-figured by the fields of power… that others provide” (Li 2000:152). In this sense, the process of articulating identities “…points to the necessity of teasing out, historically and ethnographically, the various ways in which room for maneuver is present but never unconstrained” (Li 2000:153); in other words, while people select particular sets of characteristics of identity on instrumental grounds in a
logical manner, the choices from which they do this choosing is not at all unlimited. Their articulations take place within the narrow constraints of contemporary ethnographic sites, given specific political, economic, and social factors.

Hall’s important insights, and the way that these concepts are used in our analysis of ethnographic research, help pave the way for a more nuanced understanding of the relevance of gender, ethnicity, and class in certain social contexts of development. In order to correct for past indifferences, scholars for decades have sought to re-examine the roles enacted by women and indigenous groups, for example, in contemporary economic, political, and cultural practices (i.e., Ahmed 1982; Narayan 1997; Moghadam 1993; Fernandez Kelly 1989; Gill 1994). Additionally, theories of development that have paid close attention to an analysis of identity(ies), such as the trajectory of Women in Development/Women and Development/Gender and Development, and have illustrated the detrimental effects of development planning that neglects to engage and account for the differences among individuals, communities, social classes, and organizations in their access to resources and power. Hall’s concept of articulation demonstrates that take up the banner, so to speak, of one identity over another in order to use symbols, the meanings invoked by the sets of characteristics in a social context. Therefore, in this respect, people’s access to power and resources becomes linked to the power they have to use particularly relevant symbols in the “places of recognition” in the process of development, i.e., within the bureaucracy of the State or international institutions, in the media, and/or to other organizations within the same region.

In ethnographic contexts, like Bolivia, where there are literally hundreds – perhaps thousands – of organizations and communities vying for development assistance, the dexterity with which individuals learn to articulate their identity referents and symbols means all the
difference in the process of participatory development. Li’s study of two rural communities in Indonesia shows that

Rural people in Indonesia have some room to maneuver as they situate themselves in relation to the images, discourses, and agendas that others produce for or about them. On the one hand, if they are to fit the preconfigured slot of indigenous people they must be ready and able to articulate their identity in terms of a set of characteristics recognized by their allies and by the media that presents their case to the public. But the contours of the tribal slot themselves are subject to debate… Struggles over resources, which are simultaneously struggles over meaning, tend to invoke simplified symbols fashioned through processes of opposition and dialogue, which narrow the gaze to certain well-established signifiers and traits (Li 2000:157, emphasis mine).

In positioning themselves within national discussions of development, these communities were caught between images of simple “village folk” and indigenous people, and their articulation required them to engage these images in order to make themselves amenable to the development process. But most importantly, Li suggests that these requisite processes of articulation should not be seen as “simple deceit, imposition, or reactive opportunism,” but rather should be known for their “complexity, collaboration, and creative cultural engagement in both local and global arenas” (Li 2000:173). In articulating cultural identities in the process of development, local people must first understand the complex ways that particular constructions of gender, ethnicity, and class become relevant in contexts, and then they must coalesce their own social histories along these lines within the broader strictures of the development bureaucracy. As my discussion of the activities of the Pirwa, the OTB, and the women’s empowerment group in subsequent chapters shows, this is no easy task and results in relative success and failure depending on the context.

The construction of identities clearly has a profound role in such socially constructed practices as development and participation. These constructions are subjected to interpretation and reinterpretation that is contingent upon the political, economic, and social positions of the subject. While for many, development has become a symbol of neocolonialism in the
developing world, articulations of identities and the role of community participation in this process often re-appropriate specific concepts and practices of development to establish alternative trajectories for change. In the next section of this chapter, I trace the history of development discourse over the last century in Bolivia. Development – signifying both the modernist ideal of development and critiques of this ideal – has been an organizing force for social policy in Bolivia. Bolivia has a unique history in that recent social and political movements have centered on opening up narrow definitions of progress and modernity that subvert the dominant economic determinism of global meanings of development. Conversely, movements related to ethnic and peasant identities have advanced arguments and demands that highlight the importance of respecting cultural norms and values. In so doing, they have been instrumental in proposing alternatives to development, projects that situate Bolivian development beyond the dictates of what they see as neocolonialism, globalization as homogenization, and cultural hegemony. Participation has been the cornerstone of these projects – prescribed at the state level and in voluntary organizations that have been essential in defining Bolivian development throughout the neoliberal era.

1.4 FROM MESTIZAJE TO A PLURIETHNIC NATION: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN BOLIVIA

Racial, ethnic, and class struggles have been important in defining Bolivian politics throughout the history of the nation, but have taken on a different flavor during the 20th century up until the present day. The focus of these struggles has been and continues to be how to reckon the eradication of poverty and what had been deemed the stagnant social evolution of the Bolivian
nation. The social project of *mestizaje*¹ beginning in the 1930s fixated upon the “backward Indian” as the contested site of this stagnant development (Healy and Paulson 2000; Paulson and Calla 2000; Lagos 1997; Stephen et al. 2003; Stern 2003). *Mestizaje* garnered social support within creole and elite circles in the 1930s and gradually found its way into the rhetoric of social movements struggling in the 1950s. *Mestizaje* further entrenched modernist ideals, arguing that the traditional, indigenous, rural, poor subjects in Bolivia – the Indian – must be weeded out in order to make way for the modern, creole, urban, and economically improved Bolivian citizen (see Abercrombie 1991; Laguna 2004). The method proposed to do this was essentially ethnocide, in part by using universal schooling to replace indigenous languages and ways of life with Spanish and mestizo culture. The social support for *mestizaje* policies increased as the Agrarian Reform of 1952 sought to redefine Indians as peasants, the rationale of which was to modernize Bolivia by carving out a role for the majority indigenous population overall (Ibáñez 2005). The political party *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) won the presidential election in 1952 based in part on a platform of the homogenization and complete assimilation of indigenous peoples (Healy and Paulson 2000; Klein 2003). The political rhetoric devoted to “civilizing” Bolivia pervaded social and political circles. In fact, this rhetoric served as a rallying cry among social movement actors encompassing poor, rural, indigenous groups: “let us be true citizens once and for all, ceasing to be Indians” (Albó 1995, 1994; Healy and Paulson 2000). At this time, citizenship in the modern nation was defined against Bolivia’s multicultural populace. Race, ethnicity, and class were not inherent characteristics, and it was argued that true

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¹ The agenda of *mestizaje* drove politics and social policies throughout the first half of the 20th century in Latin America (Gould 2003). The Spanish term *mestizaje* refers to the subsuming of Indian identity for the sake of modernity; in other words, forwarding a strategy to modernize Latin America meant that all that was associated with ethnic difference – Indian – became linked instead to class differences – peasant and middle class. The project of *mestizaje* expected the erasure of ethnic difference in order to forge a common nationality – i.e., Bolivians – within the nation-state.
citizens could choose to replace the ‘social skin’ (Turner 1993) and role of indigeneity with that of the cholo, or modernized Indian (de la Cadena 2000).

Two important factors of the Agrarian Reform paved the way for better national integration of poor rural residents. First, President Paz Estenssoro in 1952 seized hacienda lands and redistributed them to those who worked them, and second, he then nationalized important industries, such as the mining industry. Former haciendas were collectively given to rural communities so that they could be redistributed via usos y costumbres, by usage and customs, meaning they could be redistributed based upon communitarian norms in originario communities (Klein 2003). Producing subsistence farmers in the Bolivian rural hinterland from the struggles of social revolution provided social movements with no less than a symbol of indigenous resistance to capitalism, although differences in the social movements in the highlands of La Paz and the valleys of Cochabamba led to different kinds of symbols of resistance (Larson 1998). Furthermore, it created a class of landed peasants who now had a more visible relationship to the Bolivian state. The nationalization of the mines and the creation of COMIBOL (Corporación Minera de Bolivia, or the Mineral Corporation of Bolivia) created thousands of state jobs, establishing another class of actors with a new relationship with the state. These events forged strong, organized social movements – although the devolution of state-owned enterprises and the shock therapy of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s changed the ways activists positioned themselves in relation to the State. While former social movements – and to a lesser extent, social movement activism since the 1990s – revolved on the axis of class and the identity of the Bolivian peasant worker, new social movements are now rooted in indigenous identity (United Nations Development Programme 2003; Yashar 1997). Feminisms – both indigenous theories as well as activism aligned with more global agendas – have also been a
strong influence in national political and social decision-making (cf. Rivera Cusicanqui and Arnold 1996).

Yet these movements, depending from where they come within Bolivia, envisioned social change, and articulated demands for this change, in different ways (Delgadillo Tercero 2004; Pari Rodríguez 2004). Bolivian ‘regionalist’ nationalisms and visions of the developing modern state evolved as a result of colonial-peasant relations throughout the colonial history of particular regions – highlands, valleys, lowlands. Although her work suggests that history provides a much more nuanced interpretation of contemporary regional responses, Larson (1998:342), in her seminal work on the history of the agrarian transformation in Cochabamba, argues that scholars looking to the past to make sense of contemporary Bolivian politics construe that

…the prevailing regional dichotomy (particularly in its more generic forms of valley/highland or mestizo/Indian dualities) became symbolic – not necessarily of the complexity and plurality of Andean political culture but of the ideological poles in modern Bolivian politics. In its most reductive form, this binarism counterposed two mutually exclusive cultural heritages – and irreconcilable political imaginaries – that seemed to boil down to the acceptance or rejection of market capitalism, agrarian reform privileging peasant smallholding, and integrative nationalism. From the valley perspective, peasantologists perceived in Cochabamba’s history the hopeful signs of a resilient adaptive peasantry which could, and would, resist the social forces of proletarianization, while they struggled for small measures of economic autonomy and justice. For militant ethnic nationalists, on the other hand, Cochabamba’s regional history was emblematic of peasant quiescence, assimilation, and co-optation – the evils of colonialism and modernity which had thwarted highland ethno-communal ideals (communal land reclamations, cultural self-determination, and pluriethnic conceptions of nationhood).

In other words, regional actors used a variety of strategies to position themselves as resistors and/or actors in contemporary political relationships with the state, and these strategies are interpreted as alternatives to development or development-as-modernization depending on the position of the actors.

Specific regions have used markers of identity in various ways in order to forward their own trajectories for the economic, political, and social development of the Bolivian state. Some, like the residents of the lowland city of Santa Cruz, have argued in recent political debates for
independence (*autonomía*) in order to have more regional control over natural gas resources, allowing multinational and foreign corporations who own these reserves more power within national politics and economics (Crespo 2005). This position has deemed the region as being the bastion of *neoliberalismo* – what has come to be a code word in Bolivia for Western cultural, economic, and political imperialism of Bolivian sovereignty. Additionally, Cochabamba coca growers are renowned for their resistance to the U.S. imposition of the drug war in its own backyard: the American Drug Enforcement Agency has a presence in the region to curtail the growing and processing of coca. To these *cocaleros* (people who grow coca and support the legalization of coca cultivation), Bolivian development must include the legal growing and selling of coca, referred to as a sacred plant with cultural implications (Spedding 2004; Allen 2002). Lowland indigenous groups of the northern and eastern Amazonian regions have become more involved in social movements since the 1990s, fighting for political representation in the upcoming Constitutional Assembly that will again redraw the Constitution and hopefully provide more autonomy for indigenous groups. And arguably the most vociferous social movement has been the *Katarista* movement of the altiplano region in and around La Paz, which took shape in the early to mid 1980s to counter the project of mestizaje with its modernist hegemony (Larson 1998; Albó 1994) and still lives on in the political platform of former presidential candidate Felipe Quispe, *El Mallku* (the Aymara word for community leader). Katarismo and the agenda of Quispe’s political party, the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakutiq* (MIP), demands political power for highland indigenous people as well as indigenous self-governance. The movement draws from the past as well as the present to justify its demands, referring to Tupac Katari, the 18th century leader of a well-known Bolivian indigenous uprising, and associating present-day government officials as agents of contemporary colonization (Quispe 2002).
The politics of race and ethnicity, although seemingly erased in the project of mestizaje, become essential to the forwarding of a pluriethnic state in the 1990s. The Constitution of the Republic was first re-drawn in the early 1990s, and Bolivia was for the first time referred to as a multicultural, pluriethnic country, giving indigenous groups more political autonomy and rights than before. The definition of the contemporary modern Bolivian nation, therefore, refers to something quite different from that which was conceptualized in the Revolution of 1952. In fact, characterizing Bolivia as a modern multicultural and pluriethnic nation would have been oxymoronic to proponents of the mestizaje social agenda of the 1950s. This redefinition of the modern Bolivian state required different kinds of political representation, especially with regard to a formal channel for indigenous representation in national discussions.

In this environment, participation became the demand of social movements, in this sense a call for more decision-making in the course of local development. The MNR government of Sanchez de Lozada, his party having shifted to the ideological right of the political spectrum earlier in the 1980s, passed in 1994 the Ley de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Law) and the Ley de Descentralización (Law of Decentralization). These pieces of legislation created 311 official local governing entities throughout the country (Organizaciones Territoriales de Bases, or referred to as OTBs), which now brought primarily indigenous, rural Bolivian residents into the purview of the State in a way that was unthinkable in the past. Formerly, the country was divided into nine departments, where only the needs of the principal city and less often county seats were represented within the federal government. The rural countryside was largely forgotten in this political arrangement. The LPP and decentralization opened up these political networks and gave rural residents a voice and a chance to be involved in the development of their own communities.
While the LPP and decentralization were demanded by the Bolivian poor, scholars, activists, and proponents of the left were distrustful of President Sanchez de Lozada’s intentions in passing a law that clearly relinquished the power of the federal government to local governing bodies. The problem was a matter of ideological leanings and the symbols that these ideologies represented. Although Sanchez de Lozada’s vice president at the time was Victor Hugo Cárdenas, the first time a man of indigenous descent (Aymara) was elected to this political office, Lozada’s administration and its links to the right-leaning Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario party held no clout with the indigenous social movements that were gaining power in national, regional, and local politics. The rhetoric used by movement activists charged that the president’s past political decisions had all too often favored multinational industry; besides, having grown up in Texas, bestowed the nickname *Gringo*\(^2\), and speaking Spanish with a ‘North American’ accent, the Bolivian populace viewed him as a residual part of the colonial project in Bolivia who couldn’t possibly have the needs of the indigenous majority in Bolivia at heart. But while there has been much scholarly and popular discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of the LPP and decentralization and its real political potency (see the varying viewpoints in Ayo Saucedo 2004), these laws gave legitimacy in mainstream politics to the concept of participation that had been formerly been known for its links with the left-leaning development work of NGOs. Participation, which formerly had been used in ‘official’ development work with NGOs and social movement activism, now became part of the everyday social and political fabric and a household word for all Bolivians. It literally and figuratively put participation on the map of the development of the Bolivian nation.

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\(^2\) *Gringo* is a Spanish word to denote someone of foreign origin. This nickname is offensive because it not only distinguishes Lozada’s ties to the West, but it also connotes that he is more loyal to the West than to his own people.
However, while some of Lozada’s policies, such as popular participation, had support at the national level, his government ended in his resignation in 2003 after he proposed his most unpopular plan to export Bolivian natural gas reserves via a pipeline through Chile. This proposal underscored the Bolivian populace’s entrenched, deeply held disdain for Chile. From grade school onward, Bolivians are taught that Chile took as the spoils of war Bolivia’s only access to the sea when Peru and Bolivia lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific in the late 19th century (Klein 2003). Fueling this animosity is Chile’s repeated rejection of Bolivia’s request for the return of this sea port, the former Bolivian department called Litoral, in the Organization of American States. In his proposal to send natural gas via Chile on its way to the Pacific coast of Mexico, Lozada’s chief mistake was ignoring Bolivian nationalist ideology and assuming that the economics of the matter would suffice in establishing policy. The Bolivian reaction to this proposal was, in part, a factor that led to fierce opposition against the Lozada administration, which finally resulted in many lives lost in the city of La Paz in what is known as Black February (Schultz 2005). After Lozada’s official resignation, he fled to the U.S., where he lives to the present day, even though Bolivia has repeatedly requested from the U.S. government his return to stand trial in a Bolivian court (Schultz 2006).

Lozada’s vice president, Carlos Mesa, was thereby elevated to the office of the president, a position that he too resigned from only a year after Lozada. During his administration, Mesa grew increasingly frustrated with the polarity of the left and the right throughout the federal and state levels of government. As expected, this left him virtually impotent to deliver any sort of future State development plans in the face of burgeoning national unrest regarding what to do about national natural gas reserves, the demands in the Eastern region for autonomy, and the plea for a national Constitutional Assembly to re-draft the Bolivian constitution. Various political
actors, not least of which 2002 presidential candidate Evo Morales and his political party the Movement To Socialism (MAS), vied to fill a power vacuum left in the wake of a fledgling executive branch against an organized, powerful movement of civic groups, legislators, and interest groups (such as the Chapare’s coca growers, who had full support of MAS and Evo Morales, a former coca grower and proponent of the legalization of all coca cultivation).

After a brief interim presidency from the Supreme Court chief justice, Eduardo Rodriguez, the rescheduled 2005 Bolivian presidential elections yielded an unprecedented majority vote for Evo Morales. This meant that there would be no run-off between the first and second place candidates, like there had been for most of the presidential elections for many years, and Morales outright won his seat as the president. Morales’ political platform consisted of nationalist rhetoric born out of his clear anti-West stance. As a person born of indigenous descent who speaks both Aymara and Quechua as well as Spanish, Evo Morales was heralded as the first Latin American indigenous president. Throughout his campaign, he highlighted his identification as a highland Aymara Indian in order to connect his nationalist ideology with cultural characteristics. Yet he also used his roots as a peasant coca cultivator and class-based rhetoric to secure his place as a man who knows the needs and problems that face poor Bolivians. Among many pledges to eradicate Bolivia of what was deemed Western imperialism and neocolonialism, Morales promised a return of Bolivia’s gas reserves to the Bolivian people. In May 2006, he sent troops to various gas reserves throughout Bolivia in a State “siege” of mineral resources (Los Tiempos April 30, 2006). Although some critiqued this act as mere theatrics (i.e., The Economist May 4, 2006), his follow-through on this campaign promise was a step to shake up the hegemony of privatization that has been sweeping not only Bolivia, but Latin America overall.
Throughout his presidential campaign and since his inauguration, the Western world has taken a hard line against Morales for the most part because of his personal and professional alliance with Hugo Chavez, the contemporary president of Venezuela and another Latin American head of state renowned for his contempt for the U.S. and its political and economic intervention around the world. Like Chavez, Morales tends to frame the development of the Bolivian nation against Western models. He favors the nationalization and protectionism of key Bolivian industries, like agriculture and minerals, and courts other South American nations to create a regional bloc with real power to influence politics and economics on the global stage. Using not only nationalist rhetoric but also verbiage that is steeped in the common ethnic Indian roots of Bolivian peoples, he forwards an agenda that prioritizes culture and particular social values as the foundation of Bolivian and regional development. For instance, in his most recent address to the heads of South American States (October 2, 2006), he puts forth a plan for a South America that opts out of a neoliberal world system and forges common economic interests. This address demonstrates his commitment to a development model that strengthens not only economic factors but also cultural, social, and political issues. The following extended excerpt from this address illustrates my point:

…Our integration is and has to be an integration of, and for, the peoples. Trade, energy integration, infrastructure, and finance need to be at the function of resolving the biggest problems of poverty and the destruction of nature in our region. We cannot reduce the Community of South American Nations to an association that carries out projects for highways or gives credit that ends up essentially favouring the sectors tied to the world market. Our goal needs to be to forge a real integration to "live well". We say "live well" because we do not aspire to live better than others. We do not believe in the line of progress and unlimited development at the cost of others and nature. We need to complement each other and not compete. We need to share and not take advantage of our neighbour. "Live well" is to think not only in terms of income per capita but cultural identity, community, harmony between ourselves and with mother earth…

…Rather than following the path of privatization we need to support ourselves and complement each other to develop and promote our state companies. Together we can forge a South American state airline, a public telecommunication service, a state electricity network, a South American industry of generic medicines, a mining-metallurgical complex, in synthesis, a productive apparatus that is capable of
In fact, his concept of “to live well” is what he delineates as the direct antithesis of the idea of competition that is highly prized by the West, particularly in the West’s primacy of free-market economics. Some of the ideas espoused in this address, such as his reference to “a South American industry of generic medicines” are directly abstracted from Castro’s administration and the Cuban socialist model, another link that exacerbates the tension between Morales’ administration and the Western world. Morales’ vice president, Alvaro García Linera, has labelled the platform espoused by the current administration as Capitalismo Andino (Andean Capitalism) and the Tercera Vía (Third Way) (El Juguete Rabioso, September 18, 2005).

In the early 2000s, a series of decisions to privatize State-owned Bolivian enterprises, most notably the water services, led to national protest and often battles over the control of resources that the Bolivian people wanted to remain in the public’s hands (Olivera and Lewis 2004). Protestors took the form of not only members of grassroots organizations and unions, who had historically sided with left-leaning politics, but consisted of ordinary men and women who may not have formerly been involved with public demonstrations against government policy. These protests, such as the brief Water War and the Gas War that were fought to maintain public control of water and gas reserves, served to bolster Morales’ standing in the public’s eye. This Bolivian unrest has become what some claim to be a second revolution (Goodale 2006), and point up the need for a new way of thinking about the definition and significance of a theory of modernity (Rojas Aspiazu 2004). As Goodale suggests, this new revolution unsettles formerly dichotomized meanings of the modern and the traditional, and the actions of everyday people form a new sort of claim on indigenousness, what he calls “indigenous cosmopolitanism.”
By envisioning new categories of inclusion, by constructing an alternative moral universe in which indigenousness represents a set of principles that are both cosmopolitan and uniquely Bolivian, indigenous leaders and other in Bolivia do not simply “vernacularize” modernity or strike a “bargain” with it (Foster 2002). Nor is indigenous cosmopolitanism a way of constructing either an “alternative modernity” or an “alternative to modernity” (Kelly 2002). Rather, indigenous cosmopolitanism is a way of reclaiming modernity, a way of redefining both what modernity as a cultural category means and what it means to be modern in Bolivia (Goodale 2006:646, emphasis in the original).

As Morales serves out the remainder of his presidency, it will be interesting to see how this war of images and ideas of the unique trajectory of Bolivian modernity plays out in the international scene, in effect having implications for the trajectory of Bolivian development policies.

1.5 CONCLUSIONS

In the contemporary ethnographic Bolivian context, participation and identity have become central concepts in national discussions of the development of the nation. The resonance of these concepts have implications for Bolivian social movements that take indigenous roots as their foundation, and for the most part, have entrenched constructivist approaches of development in rural Bolivia. Recent political and social issues have raised the banner of the significance of identity in everyday life in Bolivia, especially with regards to how the construction of identity influences the way Bolivians participate not only in local events, but how the Bolivian State relates to the rest of the world.

However, in my fieldwork in Huancarani, I found that the heterogeneity of peoples found in the community affects the way residents participate in community development contexts, and this then has repercussions for the role identities play in their development work. The next chapter lays out the methods I used in my study and then describes the community of
Huancarani, its history, and its people in order to provide the ethnographic context of the study. These descriptions are useful to give the reader an idea of what the community is like as well as the historical and cultural forces at work that have made the community what it is today. Examining the site of the study will also introduce some of the community actors in development contexts, fleshing out those who are relevant to the events and people presented in subsequent chapters.
We are really united… well, not like we were in the past. We have some problems because we come from different places. But our community makes decisions for the good of the community. Our past has been difficult, but isn’t that normal?

-- 60 year old woman from Huancarani

People from other communities who know Huancarani call it hell…. There are so many problems here. We make bad decisions… and people just aren’t listened to. Well, some people are and some people aren’t.

-- 38 year old woman from Huancarani

This chapter first begins with an explanation of the methods I used to conduct my dissertation fieldwork: participant observation, intensive key informant interviews, semi-structured ethnographic interviews of persons chosen from purposive samples, and archival research. Then, I discuss the site of my study, Huancarani, with a description of the community and the residents who live there, once lived there, and who intermittently live there. No community ethnography – especially one regarding community development – would be complete without a systematic description of the state of the community: the physicality of the community, a socio-demographic profile of its residents, as well as a description of the facilities and services that are available to residents (i.e., types of housing, educational options, health services, etc.) and an explanation of how these have changed since the beginning of the relocation of ex-mining residents in the late 1970s. Additionally, I elucidate how community participation has been used in Huancarani as a way to fulfill certain development projects, and how this participation has
recently incorporated international actors. An examination of the history of this community shows the extent to which global policies – and global networks – affect even the most out of the way places.

I have constructed this history of Huancarani mainly from narratives of the residents of Huancarani in informal interviews with 10 key informants, as well as in my interviews with 30 residents and 20 interviews with current and past community leaders, I asked specific questions about their tenure in the community: how long they have lived there, when they arrived, who lives with them and when, who migrates to other places, etc. Also, during these interviews, my interviewees were more than generous in allowing me access to information in their voting registration books, their family informational booklets (libretas), military service papers, titles to their lands and houses, retirement pension documents, and baptismal records. Finally, in order to produce this history, I also studied the written results of an oral history workshop that was conducted in the region in 1998 (Geoffroy Molina et al. 2002), a diagnostic study conducted among female community leaders in Sipe Sipe (CERES 2001), and another diagnostic study of the OTBs and vigilance committee in Sipe Sipe (Brañez 2003). I thank my interviewees, as well as those who conducted these local studies, for their generosity.

2.1 METHODOLOGY FOR THE PRESENT STUDY IN HUANCARANI

Participation, as both a state-prescribed and voluntary development strategy, has changed the way rural residents relate to the Bolivian state. In the case study of Huancarani, participatory development is primarily a matter of negotiating identity according to the context and the expectations of development. In order to explain what I mean by this, I examined residents’
participation in grassroots development projects as well as the in their community local governing body, the OTB. NGOs are largely, but not entirely, absent from development work in Huancarani today and less so in the past. The only NGO presence in Huancarani is through a community health outreach program run by a hospital funded by a Bolivian NGO. Although I closely followed the work of three community health workers who were residents of Huancarani, as well as a nurse and a doctor who were assigned Huancarani as ‘their community’ for monthly outreach work, I found that this development context did not provide community residents a space to freely exchange development discourse. Instead, I spent much of my time in three development contexts that proved to be an invaluable space for development talk – the local governing body, the Pirwa, and the Adela Zamudio women’s empowerment group. Therefore, the sample of development contexts that I chose for my study is a saturation sample, since these were the only contexts in the community that met my criteria for the project. In the OTB, I participated in monthly meetings – obligatory for all community residents – that usually were about 2.5-3 hours in duration. I also attended six emergency meetings that were called in addition to the monthly get-togethers. These meetings were set up to discuss the yearly development proposal that is submitted to the municipal government. In all, then, I attended 16 OTB meetings. I also took part in two extraneous events sponsored by the Huancarani OTB: a community clean-up day, and a day to clean and clear out the community canal.

My participant-observation in the Pirwa was more involved. The Pirwa houses a communal work group which was founded to alleviate pervasive hunger in the community. It requires its members to volunteer one day (8 hours) a week. Each week, I joined a work group and took part in the tasks assigned to that group, and I rotated groups so that I participated in each group at least 4 times during my fieldwork. The Pirwa also is home to a children’s after-
school program. I conducted participant-observation in this program as well, albeit to a lesser degree than in the work group. The children’s after-school program meets from 2-5pm, Mondays through Thursdays. Overall, I spent an average of two days a month working alongside the teachers in the children’s program. On three of these occasions, one of the teachers sought out my assistance because she had special activities planned that required more adult supervision. I agreed, helping the teachers to: implement a head de-lousing program, monitor children around industrial-sized ovens as they baked Christmas cookies, and organize the Christmas community fiesta.

My participant-observation in the last community development context involved attending semi-monthly or monthly meetings – depending on when the members had spare time to actually participate. This meant that sometimes a meeting was scheduled and members might not have been able to come, particularly during harvest season or when they were involved in other types of work. Meetings for the Adela Zamudio women’s organization were held in the municipal capital, Sipe Sipe, at the home of a retired nurse who had married a resident of Huancarani and now resides in Sipe Sipe. I attended 10 such meetings that ranged from 30 minutes to three hours in duration.

In each of these development contexts, I conducted semi-structured ethnographic interviews with all of the leaders of each organization: both of the leaders in the Pirwa, the two founders of the women’s group, and all four of the officials in the OTB. These interviews ranged in length from 1-4 hours, with a median interview length of 90 minutes. I also interviewed many members of each of these development contexts. Sometimes, members approached me because they wanted to be interviewed, and I always accommodated these requests. However, I also sought out members that I thought might give me a different
perspective than I had already obtained in other interviews. Therefore, I used a purposive sample in acquiring interviewees because I wanted to ensure that a range of subjects were represented in my sample size (i.e., people of various ages, genders, classes, ethnicities, place of origin, etc.). The interviews that I conducted with these informants lasted anywhere from 12 minutes to 5 hours, with a median interview length of 60 minutes. Overall, I interviewed at least 60% of the membership in each organization, with the highest response rate in the Pirwa with 80% of the members.

Furthermore, I interviewed 30 local residents, again using a purposive sample, in order to better understand the way huancaraneños conceptualize development and how they align these conceptualizations with their participation in the various contexts of community development. I then interviewed 20 people from outside Huancarani who have presently, or have had in the past, had a direct effect on development in Huancarani over the last 60 years or so. Interviews with these informants helped me triangulate the information that I received from members in contemporary development contexts in Huancarani with responses that I gleaned from leaders and experts who had experiences that were different from those in Huancarani. Interviews with these informants ranged in length from 30 minutes to 4 hours, with median interview length of approximately 90 minutes. These interviewees work in politics, schools, health care, or in local businesses. They are journalists, municipal government officials, doctors, nurses, community health workers, development experts, social scientists, past and present OTB leaders in surrounding communities, teachers, school administrators, workers and foremen in the chicha bar, the pig slaughterhouse, the chicken slaughterhouses, and the nearby limestone plants, and one Peace Corps volunteer who worked in the municipality. The questions that I used for these interviews explored into specific demographic information and fleshed out residents’ level of
participation in the various development contexts. I also gathered their perceptions of the status of local facilities and services, and whether they had any ideas about ways to improve the community. I asked targeted questions about three topics: 1) health care (i.e., types of biomedicine and traditional medicine used, preferred biomedical facility(ies), level of participation in the community health worker program and outreach, and elicited illness narratives from the last 5 years); 2) the environment (i.e., method of trash disposal, the current state of field irrigation and system of running water, level of participation in community environmental activism); and 3) perceptions of the future of the community (i.e., adherence to what they deemed “traditions,” ideas about community development projects, changes in social networks, etc.) Appendix A lists the interview schedule that I used with my sample of 30 community residents and all of the 20 interviewees from outside of Huancarani.

Additionally, I carried out a census in the community of Huancarani. Huancarani is a community with a very migrant population – people both moving to the community and moving away to find work. Although there is an official population count in Huancarani with the release of the results of the 2001 census data, I found that these data were not very accurate. As I conducted my census, I used an oral survey that contained just three questions: 1) their names and the names of all the people who live in the household, either temporarily or permanently, 2) how long they have lived in Huancarani and from where and when they came to Huancarani, 3) what language(s) is/are spoken in the home. I asked the last question primarily so that when I followed up with a semi-structured interview, I could be prepared for an interview in Quechua or Spanish. If needed, I would also arrange to bring along an interpreter to interview those who are monolingual Aymara speakers. The Huancarani census was a complete census, meaning that I accounted for every household that was occupied during 2005.
2.2 COMMUNITY PROFILE

Huancarani’s location is both a blessing and a curse. Residents often avail themselves of amenities such as large markets, health facilities such as hospitals and laboratories, etc., in Quillacollo, a city with a population of roughly 100,000 residents 16km west of Cochabamba and the county seat of the province of the same name. Most residents in Huancarani are agriculturalists, either working lands they own or working on land that a friend, neighbor, or family member owns in the community. The land in this part of the Valle Bajo (low valley) has been farmed for years, and 90% of huancaraneños are involved in working these fields during at least one season a year. Overall, residents here are pleased that they have the convenience of living close enough to a large city like Quillacollo while their lands still afford them some opportunity to pursue what they know best – subsistence agriculture.
However, contemporary Bolivian politics has made living near the highway to the highlands more difficult. Like the roads in and out of most Bolivian cities, the Cochabamba-Oruro highway is the only road that leads out of Huancarani, and this stretch of road from the Quillacollo bridge in the city of Cochabamba that ends in the Oruro highlands is well-known for the most employed method of protest in recent years, the *bloqueo*, or road blockade. In a country
that often has with only one road in and out of cities, the old tires, rusted car parts, thorn bushes, and large rocks that litter the highways during these protests – in addition to the large groups of protesters who put pressure on renegade drivers who care to dismantle the blockades – are fairly successful at virtually halting all transportation. During the 18 months that I lived in Bolivia, protestors blockaded this highway no less than a dozen times, sometimes for weeks at a time. Frequently, I would walk the dirt path to the highway to hail a trufi, or small bus, to go to the market, only to be met along the way by a friend telling me, “mana kanchu” or “no hay,” meaning “there isn’t any” in their respective Quechua or Spanish, while looking at me knowingly so that I knew that she meant that the blockade had continued. Residents of Huancarani complained that not only did the blockades make it very difficult to frequent the marketplace to buy food, but the blockades also inflated the prices of food. Many residents of Huancarani could be found walking around the community during the blockades tuned into the news with their transistor radios to their ears, or seen huddled around the tienda (corner store) in groups talking about the veracity of a rumor about the suspension of a blockade.

The community of Huancarani is located 26km west of the city of Cochabamba, in the department of Cochabamba, 1km to the east of the Cochabamba-Oruro highway. The political boundaries of Huancarani lie within the canton of Sipe Sipe, one of the three cantons – Sipe Sipe, Itapaya, and Mallco Rancho – in the municipio of Sipe Sipe, the second section of the province of Quillacollo. The small town of Sipe Sipe, with about 3,000 residents, serves as the administrative center for the surrounding area that borders the province of Tapacarí to the west, Capinota to the south, the city of Quillacollo to the East, and the departamento of La Paz to the north (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal de Sipe Sipe (PDM) 2001). The community of Huancarani lies just 3km east of Sipe Sipe, and it is in Sipe Sipe where young residents of Huancarani attend
high school, huancaraneños vote on election day, residents march in the obligatory parades on the anniversary of Sipe Sipe as well as the national Independence Day, and residents go to shop at the small outdoor vegetable market and pay their bills at the local office branch of ELFEC (the electric company).

Figure 3 Map of the community of Huancarani.
Although the church of the Virgen de Guadalupe stands in Huancarani’s community plaza, there has been no priest in residence there for the better part of two decades, and masses are only celebrated there when the pastor from Sipe Sipe comes during the fiesta celebrating the patron Virgen in September. Huancaraneños attend holy day masses in the Sipe Sipe Templo del Señor de San Pedro and honor their relatives buried in the Sipe Sipe cemetery on the Día de los Muertos.

According to my census of 2005, as well as updated OTB records from January 2006, Huancarani is home to 66 families and 275 residents. These figures are not consistent with the national 2001 census, which documents only 56 domiciles and 173 residents in the community, with an average of 5.8 members per family (*Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) 2001; Plan de Desarrollo Municipal de Sipe Sipe (PDM) 2001*). It is important to note here that these discrepancies are most likely not so much a result of errors, (although there probably are errors), but to the presence of new community members who have recently moved there, the seasonal migration patterns of residents to other places for work, both in and out of the country, as well as to the fluid nature of family life in Huancarani, in which family members take up residency with community members during bouts of unemployment or to leave children in the care of their grandparents for a limited period of time.

In Sipe Sipe overall, 69.3% of the population speak 2 languages, the majority a mix of Spanish and Quechua (68.6%), while very few speak a mix of Spanish and Aymara (0.7%). Some residents are monolingual speakers of Quechua (21%), but far fewer speak only Spanish (7.3%) or only Aymara (0.07%). In Huancarani, I found that only four adults are monolingual Spanish speakers, and only one woman is a monolingual Aymara speaker. Regarding Quechua, I found that the majority of the adults and children understand and can speak Quechua, while
about 20% of adult women are functionally monolingual Quechua speakers – meaning that although they can understand some Spanish spoken to them, they always and only speak Quechua and conversations with monolingual Spanish speakers are frequently either unproductive or contain a series of clarifying questions due to issues of accent and lexicon. About three-quarters of these women are over the age of 50 years. Almost all school-age children speak Spanish, even if their native tongue is Quechua, for the most part because classes at the local primary school are taught in Spanish (although about 50% of the primary grade teachers speak Quechua during their daily lessons).

Figure 4. The greater Sipe Sipe region, with Huancarani located at the base of the left hill in the center of the photo. Tunari is the highest peak shown, and Linku is the smaller snow-capped peak in the background. Photo credit: Peter Stovall.
Most of the residences in Huancarani are located on one of 4 main streets or along the railroad tracks. All of the structures in the community are adobe (mud-brick) homes and/or compounds, but some 25% have a cement finish on the exterior of the home and are plastered on the interior walls in order to control the spread of the endemic *vinchuca*, the beetle often infested with the larvae that causes Chagas’ disease. The average house has 3 rooms – a kitchen and 2 bedrooms – around the circumference of a courtyard, where people sit on log stools or straight-back chairs to eat and talk. About a quarter of the homes have an indoor kitchen (often with appliances like a propane range oven and sometimes a refrigerator and a sink) along with an outdoor kitchen (with a clay oven and stove or just a cook fire, and an outdoor spigot). Laundry is washed at the outdoor spigot and/or laundry sink and then hung up to dry on clotheslines within the courtyard; there is only one clothes washing machine in the entire community. Street lights have been installed within the last decade, but there are swaths of the community where the network of lights has not been completed, making walking around at night very dark and tricky to navigate in the pitted, rock-filled, unpaved streets. About 80% of the residences have electricity and 98% have potable water (PDM 2001). There are currently no sanitation services in the community, but these services are found in the nearby communities of Montenegro and Valle Hermoso. Although the Huancarani local governing body has repeatedly requested the extension of garbage pick-up to Huancarani, the government of Sipe Sipe has denied their requests, saying that there are insufficient funds to provide these services. Currently, there are five telephones in the community; three of them are used as public telephones in private homes, where community members come and pay a small fee to make outgoing and receive incoming calls.
From the Cochabamba-Oruro highway, the only part of Huancarani that can be seen are three large hills to the north of the community, so that the community is tucked into a bowl with the hills to its north and the banks of the Rio Viloma to its south. The community of Huancarani abuts the communities of Sorata, Montenegro, Valle Hermoso, and Hamiraya (across the river to the south). Children from Sorata, Valle Hermoso, Huancarani, and parts of Montenegro attend the community school located in Huancarani, where about 200 students crowd into six small classrooms that house kindergarten through sixth grade. The school complex consists of the 2-story brick school building, a small apartment-like structure with two rooms to house the portera and her family (a woman who cleans the building and sells students treats during recess and
between classes), an outdoor latrine, and a paved courtyard where the students play and community meetings are held in good weather. The second floor of the school has been constructed over the last two years and at the time of my research was not yet completed. The school courtyard is enclosed with a chain-link fence and the gate is padlocked when classes are not in session.

Figure 6. Typical adobe house, fencing, and courtyard in Huancarani. Photo credit: Astrid Wild.

The District of Education in Sipe Sipe boasts 46 primary and secondary schools in the municipality (DDE de Sipe Sipe 2000) where over 9,000 students are enrolled and 500 teachers are employed. The numbers of male and female students enrolled is roughly equal at the primary level but the proportion of females declines as they grow older. The drop-out rate is 14.6%
overall, with the drop-out rate for boys outpacing girls in high school (16.4% and 12.6%). More often than not, girls leave school earlier in their educational careers than do boys. The drop-out rate is calculated based upon high school retention rates, so the greater rate of girls’ retention is really a misleading statistic, because actually girls leave school in greater numbers than boys throughout primary and secondary schooling. In the municipality of Sipe Sipe, the overall illiteracy rate is 21.25%, with a rate of only 12.3% for men but 30.2% for women.
According to the most recent health statistics in the municipality (PDM 2000), the health status of residents of the Sipe Sipe region is about average in relation to the department of Cochabamba as a whole. The fecundity rate is 4.8 children per woman, the infant mortality rate is 67/1000 live births, and currently there are no documented data for maternal mortality rates in
the municipality. The average life expectancy rate is 55 years – equal to that of the country as a whole (Pan American Health Organization 2001). Almost one-third (31%) of children under age 5 are malnourished, and 27% of these children are moderately to severely malnourished. Childhood vaccination rates vary, from 61.8% immunized with the anti-tuberculosis vaccine BCG (an obligatory vaccine for babies) to 93.3% of children between one and two years of age vaccinated against measles (Asociación de Programas de Salud del Area Rural (APSAR) January – March 2000, in PDM 2001). Health personnel also indicate that many children in the region begin vaccination series but never complete the prescribed number of doses in order for the vaccine to provide the fullest coverage. The four most common presenting illnesses in area health centers with the highest incidence of morbidity in the region are respiratory infections (14.5%), diarrhea (10.5%), pneumonia and bronchial pneumonia (6.7%), and intestinal parasites (6.3%). During the 13 months that I lived in Huancarani, there were 4 known cases of persons bitten by resident stray dogs, and the Sipe Sipe hospital provided the rabies vaccine for the dog and the victim in a new outreach program that was funded by the state. Two area residents had died during the year due to rabies transmitted via dog bites, and the community thereby was considered a rabies “red zone” (zona roja), a distinction that few communities throughout the state had been considered even though rates of rabies had been rising in the Cochabamba region (Los Tiempos November 30, 2004). Also, two people in the community were diagnosed with tuberculosis, and both consistently refused free monthly treatment offered by outreach doctors who came to the patients’ homes.

There are no biomedical health care services in Huancarani, but there are five facilities within and around the municipio of Sipe Sipe that are readily accessible to residents of Huancarani. First, there are two large, well-equipped hospitals in Quillacollo (one privately-run,
one publicly-funded), with a plethora of private and public laboratories to conduct most analyses. Second, the Sipe Sipe hospital is a public primary care hospital that in emergency cases can perform cesarean sections – but this is the only operation that is carried out here. Supposedly, there are ambulance services – I saw the ambulance in front of the hospital during my observations there, and the hired driver is the son of one of my informants. However, the ambulance was unreliable at best; I witnessed two occasions on which huancaraneños called for an ambulance for emergency transport and were told that the ambulance was not in working order (one event was a problematic labor and delivery, and another was a sudden illness that resulted in death). A third biomedical option for huancaraneños was the well-regarded hospital in Mallco Rancho, the canton east of Sipe Sipe. This hospital is a private facility providing secondary-level care (e.g., performing routine or scheduled cesarean sections) run by APSAR (Asociación de Programas de Salud del Area Rural, or Association of Area Rural Health Programs), the national non-governmental organization (NGO). Four years ago, the former president of Huancarani’s governing body arranged an agreement with the administrator of this hospital that provided all huancaraneños with discounted care and prescriptions at the hospital. However, residents are still reluctant to use this facility regularly because the trip requires taking two trufi (collective taxi) rides to get there, making the commute expensive. And the fourth and last health care option nearby the community of Huancarani is a small, family-run, primary care clinic located 1 km away in the community of Montenegro. When residents of Huancarani use biomedical services, they are more apt to choose this clinic over the other facilities because they feel the attention here is better. Huancaraneños consistently complained that at the other facilities: 1) they had to wait for long periods of time to be seen by staff (sometimes hours), 2)
doctors, nurses, and hospital administrators were not thorough, yelled at patients, or didn’t listen well, and 3) the facilities were often not open on schedule.

According to the 2001 Sipe Sipe’s Municipal Development Plan (PDM 2001), the region officially claims 28 curanderos, or natural medical specialists, and 18 midwives (parteros). These records indicate that all of them are located in the highland, rural areas of the municipality, implying that these are the only communities where they work and are supported, while also indicating that in the more urban communities there has been “the incursion of conventional medicine [biomedicine], the process of education, and the interference of factors of health, gender, rights, and others” (PDM 2001:47). However, I found both curanderos and parteras working in all areas of Sipe Sipe – even the town center. Also, most residents of Huancarani indicate that they seek out the help of curanderos and use medicinal plants for almost all of their health needs. About 80% of huancaraneños only use biomedical health care services in case of emergencies (i.e., emergency operations).

When I first arrived in Huancarani, there were two small tiendas (corner stores) located within 20 meters of each other that sold canned foods (i.e., tomato paste, canned fish, etc.), eggs from the nearby chicken farms in Montenegro and Suticollo, sweets and popsicles, sodas, and sometimes baked goods that the owners had baked that day. However, during my stay there, one of the stores closed permanently because the refrigerator broke and the owner could not replace it or fix it. Additionally, there are two chicherías in Huancarani – local bars that sell locally-brewed chicha (aqha), or corn beer.
Figure 8. Residents buying goods from one of the two corner stores (*tiendas*) in Huancarani. This is located on the main road through the community. Photo credit: Astrid Wild.

The main plaza is very small – only 30 X 40 meters – and is not landscaped. The dirt square is located along the intersection of two main roads. The church sits to the north of the plaza, its padlocked double doors and steeple a reminder of the days when the community used to attend weekly mass there performed by the pastor of the Sipe Sipe church. But because of
sparse attendance, the priest decided two years ago to forgo his weekly mass in Huancarani. However, the church is opened twice a year: once during the fiesta of the Virgen de Guadalupe (8-12 September), the patron of the community, and again in January after the festival of Reyes (6 January), when huancaraneños who still live in Oruro come to pay homage to the Virgen and to ask her to bless them in the coming year.

The municipio of Sipe Sipe, along with a large portion of the Quillacollo province, is known as an oasis of sorts in the middle of what has become a high-plains, semi-arid desert. Molles, eucalyptus, and locust trees are abundant; eucalyptus trees line the railroad tracks that meander through the community – tracks that were used to transport goods and minerals from the highlands to the Chilean border during the mining boom of the last century. The tracks now

Figure 9. Planting corn with a hand tool. Photo credit: Peter Stovall.
serve as a shaded *via peatonal* (pedestrian path) to neighboring Sorata and the markets in Suticollo. During the rainy season from November to March, the community becomes a lush green as native flora blooms, including cactus fruit (*tuna*), fruit trees, and seasonal flowers and bushes. The region is heavily cultivated and well known for its harvests of potatoes, onions, carrots, fava beans, corn, parsley, beets, achojcha (an Andean vegetable), and less often wheat (PDM de Sipe Sipe 2001). Residents practice dry farming and have dug a system of irrigation ditches on which they rely to water their fields. The size of the average field in Huancarani is approximately $600m^2$ (Geoffrey Komadina et al. 2002).

Although the Cochabamba area has been recognized in the past as the breadbasket of Bolivia (Klein 2003; Larson 1998; Laserna 1995), a drought over the last century has gradually left area subsistence farmers scrambling to find water for their fields (Rocabado Vasquez 2004; Laserna 2005). Residents of Huancarani remember that only 30 years ago the municipio was dotted with hundreds of small fruit orchards that provided an overabundance of peaches, grapes, figs, and pomegranates. In fact, the municipio of Sipe Sipe is renowned historically for its vineyards and still produces wine that is sold throughout the country (Laserna 2005). However, there are far fewer fruit orchards and vineyards today, and although the symbol of Sipe Sipe is still the grape (used to make not only wine, but the sweet liquor called *guarapo* that is emblematic of the municipio), fruit production has plummeted in all parts of Sipe Sipe due to the degradation of the quality of the soil and less water.
Figure 10. Residents carrying straw in **awayos** via the railroad tracks through Huancarani. Photo credit: Astrid Wild.
2.3 A HISTORY OF A PLACE

The region of Sipe Sipe is nestled up against the more than 15,000 ft. peaks of Tunari and Linku, two familiar landmarks in the valley that are mentioned and well described in the accounts of regional historians (i.e., Rocabado Vasquez 2004); they also have special cultural significance in the social memory of contemporary inhabitants of the area, referred to as *apus*, or gods. Residents of the region are descendants of indigenous groups remembered as the Urus, groups that populated the region of the Lago Poópo near Oruro whose settlement spread into the lower valley regions of western Cochabamba (Rocabado Vasquez 2004). During serial waves of migration, the area was settled by the Sauces, Tupurayas, Yamparas, Tihuanacus, Cotas, Cavis, as well as the Aymara-speaking Sipisipis, the etiological origin of the name of the region (Gordillo and del Rio 1993) whose name means “the mountainous cord in the form of an amphitheater whose inhabitants dance with warble feathers” (Rocabado Vasquez 2004:12). This region was known as a high yield agricultural zone for the Inca empire (see Larson and Harris 1995). The archaeological ruins of Inca Raqay lie approximately 2,000 meters above today’s town of Sipe Sipe, and it is presumed to be an old Inca military outpost used to alert Cuzco of any aggressive Chiriguano invasions coming up from the eastern Amazonian lowlands. The Sipe Sipe region was also a marker on the preferred route from the Cochabamba valleys to the highlands of La Paz to transport agricultural goods to Cuzco (Larson 1998, 1987).

According to the oral history of local residents, the residents of Huancarani during the War of Independence (1810-1825) were instrumental in the war’s success in the Cochabamba valley. The Spanish soldiers faced intense resistance in the Battle of Hamiraya, located only a few miles from the present location of Huancarani (Medrano Rodríguez and Gonzales Valdivia 2005). The indigenous peasants lost this battle and incurred many casualties but prevented the
Spanish from entering the main city of Cochabamba for several days, giving regiments in the city time to regroup and plan an attack that ultimately led to the defeat of Spanish forces in the region. Contemporary residents of Huancarani are proud of the area’s role in the nation’s independence, and point out that this strength of character and determination lives on in today’s inhabitants.

In the colonial era, Huancarani was inhabited by hacienda *mitimaes*, essentially serfs who worked agricultural fields for one of a few local haciendas located within a one mile radius in present-day Suticollo, Hamiraya, and Sipe Sipe (Rocabado Vasquez 2004). These indentured servants were bought as part and parcel of the hacienda property. Some residents of Huancarani could trace their landholdings back to the colonial era when their families worked in the haciendas’ fruit orchards and vegetable fields. One older huancaraneño recounted that

...People who lived in Huancarani, almost all of them worked for the landlord. All he [the landlord] did was blow his *pututu* [instrument made from cow horns] in order to send his workers running. They would be summoned to work a full day’s work with no food or water. Imagine that... he did not provide his workers with even a *tutuma* [gourd cup] of chicha or a little bit of food! And whatever they harvested they would get a very very small portion so that they could feed their families. But they had to get to the landlord fast when he called because not everyone would be chosen to work on any given day. The landlord owned all of the lands here. Everyone who worked these lands were slaves – they were the property of the landlord. This was of course before the Reforma Agraria.

This over 60 year old resident stressed that he remembers this scenario during his childhood years, inferring that these practices were continued right up until the early 1950s, when national agrarian reform transferred the ownership of land to the indigenous mitimaes who worked it. One of the hacienda owners in Huancarani, known as Sr. Valdivieso to residents (Geffroy Komadina et al. 2002), partitioned his hacienda to the peasants of the area and his own children, one of whom married a local peasant whose family still lives in the community. This patrón also left a small structure to the community to be used as a school (Geffroy Komadina et al. 2002).
The last 75 years or so have been the most formative for residents of Huancarani, the period that my informants recounted most frequently in their oral histories of their families. Although all informants considered themselves huancaraneños – veritable residents of the community – their narratives consistently described waves of migration both to and away from Huancarani, yielding an uneven process by which local residents have come to identify each other as huancaraneños. Beginning in the 1930s with the onset of the Chaco War in the southern region of the country against Paraguayan forces, most men in the community were commissioned to serve in the military and left Huancarani for some time, some never to return home from the war. This was the start of a residence pattern in which men remained sparse in the community, a residence pattern that is still found today. In fact, women and children are today the most visible people in Huancarani, with men and teen-age boys often leaving the community for jobs in Santa Cruz, other parts of Cochabamba like the tropical, coca-growing Chapare region, or further away in Spain and Argentina.

After the Revolution of 1952 and the nationalization of the mining industry, huancaraneños left the community for the mines in the highlands of Oruro (Siglo XX, Uncia, and Catavi), La Paz (Cami), and Potosí (Cerro Rico). Contrary to the accounts of hardship and struggle figured so prominently in the autobiographical and anthropological works regarding the Bolivian mines (i.e., Nash 2001, 1992; Barrios de Chungara and Viezzer 1979), huancaraneños report their times in the mines as periods of great camaraderie, abundance, and security. Many informants convey a sense of longing for their lives in the highland mines, best expressed by one elderly woman:

When I was in [the mines in Potosí], we never lacked for anything. Also, we all were so generous and united, not at all like the way we are now… During holidays, we would send prepared dishes [of food] over to other people’s houses… now, we don’t maintain that custom at all. We always had meat and bread in the mines… the stores never ran out, well, until the end when we had to move back here [to
Huancarani]. Life was good there. We worked hard and we had enough to survive. I was really sad to leave everything there.

The return from the mines for most huancaraneños began in the late 1970s and ended for the most part in the mid-late 1980s – a few years after the 1985 decree that privatized the mining industry (El Decreto de Relocalización (D.S.21060)), ironically conceded by President Estensorro Paz, who was also head of the government that nationalized the mines in the 1950s (Klein 2003). Some residents were lucky; they had worked the requisite number of years needed to earn a pension from COMIBOL (the state mining company), and from then on became what is known as a rentista. When a rentista died, their spouse received their pension benefits (monthly stipends as well as access to a health care system specifically for rentistas). Presently many grown children of deceased huancaraneño rentistas, although having inherited lands and houses from their parents, are not eligible by law for extended rentista benefits. The landholding rentistas of Huancarani today come from a handful of families – los Gonzales, Saavedra, Pérez, Gómez, and Loma – and the titles of tracts of lands in Huancarani are held in their names.

2.4 THE NEED FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION

Upon the privatization of the state-run mines and the overall restructuring of the Bolivian economy, people returning to and settling in Huancarani found a community very unlike that in which they had lived in the mines. Informants describe the Huancarani they returned to by the late 1980s as “sad,” “abandoned,” and “disorganized,” a very normal characterization of a community that was experiencing the stress of relocation on that scale. Little by little, the community came to life with returning families from mining areas in the highlands. But they
returned to a community that had very few of the amenities that they had become accustomed to in the mines – i.e., some electricity, running water, relatively well-attended hospitals, and a functioning school. At this time, rural areas of municipal districts, such as Huancarani, were sorely lacking basic services due in part to a lack of tax base in the area and because federal monies that were distributed to municipalities were almost entirely spent on the urban municipal government seats – in this case, Sipe Sipe (cf. Miró i Pascual 2000). In an attempt to improve and introduce basic services to the community, residents of Huancarani formally appealed to the government in Sipe Sipe requesting funds for well pumps, infrastructure for running water, electricity, and streetlights, as well as materials to construct more classrooms for the local school. All of these requests were denied by the government in Sipe Sipe on the grounds of lack of sufficient funds. Residents understood that if they were going to accomplish any of what they wanted for the community, they were going to have to do it themselves.

2.4.1 José – cultural and development broker.

The residents of Huancarani used an eclectic mix of sources in order to bring important community development projects to fruition within the first few years of their return from the mines. An important figure in the jumpstarting of community development during these years was don José, a huancaraneño by birth who had moved to the mines as an infant with his mother and grandmother in the early 1950s. In Catavi, his mother worked as a laundress in the hospital – a somewhat coveted position that earned her a pension when she was laid off in the late 1970s. The salaried income that José’s mother received allowed José to graduate from high school in Catavi and then pursue college at the Universidad de San Simón in Cochabamba. He became interested in national politics during his college years, and his political protests and activities
quickly labeled him a threat to the government – a government plagued by a series of military coups and struggling democracy. After fleeing to Chile in the early 1970s, José was arrested and tortured in prison before he was released and exiled to Switzerland. He remained in Switzerland for more than a decade, where he married a Swiss woman and started a family. But he returned to Bolivia in 1990 with the intention of assisting Huancarani to make it “the paradise that I knew it could become,” he states.

When he returned to Huancarani, he found residents there struggling to find funds to pay for much needed running water, electricity, and streetlights. José’s stay in Switzerland had fostered strong networks of people with left-leaning political aspirations who supported Third World independence from colonial and neocolonial influences. In 1991, José designed a formal proposal outlining what would be needed to complete the initial projects of introducing basic services in the community and then reached out to his friends back in Switzerland for funding.

In order to persuade his Swiss contacts to come to the community’s aid, José’s proposal described the community of Huancarani in four important ways. These four points of emphasis underscore the community of Huancarani as indigenous, with regard to language as well as to culture, victims of Western evils, and portray the residents as timeless and unchanging until what he calls “globalization endangered their way of life.” First, José strongly emphasized that Huancarani is a united, cohesive community, an argument Mosse (2005) found that development officials in India considered successful and used in order to secure international funding for development projects. In this case, José argued that this cohesion stems from the similar trajectories that residents have taken as ex-miner Quechua-speakers, and because of this the residents “live by the same rules and understand each other.” Second, José stressed that residents of Huancarani, as ex-miners, are victims in the web of international capitalism, a
system that is imposed on them from the West. When the mines were privatized, the lives of huancaraneños changed for the worse within a very brief period of time. José explained that although they had eked out meager existences in the mines, most of their basic needs had been met – unlike the situation in which residents now found themselves upon their return to Huancarani. Third, the strong, cohesive community of Huancarani was based on a complex system of reciprocal relations, or what is called ayni in both Aymara and Quechua, in order to help huancaraneños help themselves. Residents, he argued, were used to hard work, and although they were financially poor, they took it upon themselves to solve their own problems with hard work. In fact, an old Quechua adage, ama llulla, ama suwa, awa qhella – don’t lie, don’t steal, don’t be lazy – discourages people from sitting back and allowing others to do what they could do for themselves. José assured that their reciprocal networks would guarantee that residents would see the projects through to the end, because they owe that not only to their financiers but to each other in the community. José emphasized that huancaraneños were not poor because they were lazy, but because they were victims in an international plan to exploit the Third World. Investing in this community, in other words, was a good financial risk. And finally, José argued that extreme poverty was overtaking residents of Huancarani, so much so that their way of life – their webs of ayni or reciprocal relations, their indigenous farming knowledge, etc. – was endangered by the attraction of wage labor in major Bolivian cities. Wage labor pays poorly and divides households, forcing men and women to migrate far away from their homes in search of work, driving families to abandon their homes and lands, and compelling children to drop out of school to help make ends meet in their families. Therefore, all in all, José’s proposal aimed to show that if his Swiss contacts contributed financial backing,
not only would they be providing basic services, but they would be fundamentally helping their culture to survive.

**2.4.2 The beginning of contemporary community participation.**

Fortunately, his contacts acquiesced, and this marked the beginning of an international development collaboration in Huancarani, a collaboration that continued to exist during my fieldwork – something I will discuss later on in the dissertation. But for the present discussion, it is important to note that with the introduction of international actors in local community development, definitions of participation for community development followed cultural dictates and simultaneously reified and enhanced these traditions. After international funding was secured, the residents of Huancarani immediately began to implement the projects. Their main concerns were 1) constructing wells and laying the infrastructure for a network of pipes for running water, and 2) repairing the building that housed the school, adding on four more classrooms to the existing structure, and putting in a play area and latrine. In order to complete these tasks, residents took it upon themselves to approach local businesses to donate construction materials (bags of cement and plaster) to the projects and organized workgroups that would be responsible for completing the work. Also, José and two other residents sought out an international NGO, ADRA (the Adventist Development Relief Agency), who had been involved with other development projects in the Sipe Sipe region, to request donations of food that would be used to feed the workgroups while they worked on the projects. ADRA donated foodstuffs like oil, flour, rice, and sugar throughout the duration of the projects – approximately two years.

These projects were completed in 1998 with the help of all community members, based on pervasive cultural norms found throughout the Bolivian rural areas. With donations from
ADRA and money sent by their Swiss funders, women cooked food for the workgroups while the construction was underway, part of a cultural tradition of food-sharing among fellow vecinos (neighbors) to solidify feelings of trust, camaraderie, and solidarity. These workgroups consisted of women and men, young and old – one representative from each family was required to attend their rotation and work an 8-hour shift. Both historically and in present-day Bolivia, rotating workgroups are an integral part of life (Allen 2002), and another example in Huancarani of this approach is evidenced by the contemporary workgroups set up to clean and maintain a system of canals to irrigate farmlands. In addition, each family was also obligated to make 50 adobes (mud-bricks) to contribute their contraparte (counterpart) to the effort. Many people report that these years were the best in the history of the community. Residents who took part in these projects contend that they helped ease the tensions that had gained ground in a community of people returning from their lives in the mines. Participation in these projects had clear rules and goals, and everyone had abided by them in order to accomplish the tasks at hand. Participants saw the direct benefits of their actions and were able to sustain the necessary motivation for the duration of the projects.

In fact, when the projects were completed – when virtually all existing residences and businesses at the time had running water and the school plans were finished – some community members expressed interest in maintaining the momentum of the workgroups to accomplish other needed projects in the community. However, they had no remaining funds left, no donations of food to feed the workgroups, and no real outlet in which to work. José again resorted to his Swiss contacts and proposed the construction of a casa comunal – a community center – in order to continue work projects that would benefit the community as a whole. Again, the international collaborators sent funds, and the Pirwa was born. The project was so named
because **pirwa** is the Quechua word for an Inca storehouse, or silo, which stores grain and other food to be communally redistributed during lean years. Again, the workgroups communally constructed the casa comunal; a total of 47 families were involved with the project, just about everyone in the community at the time. One resident relates her experiences:

Cristina, we carried rocks from the river [about a half-mile away] on our backs in awayos [cloths folded up as carrying devices]. Big rocks… and everyone did this… even (80-year old) doña Marina, doubled over with rocks on their backs! We made the bricks as a group… we didn’t have the 50 brick family quota that we used to make the school. It was very hard work. We knew that we were part of something important…that would help the community. José told us that this casa comunal would help us poor people.

The Swiss funders had sent enough money to implement a *cupo*-system, in which people who participated in the weekly *trabajo comunal* (communal work) were given foodstuffs in exchange for work. After 17 eight-hour work days, participants received 1 *arroba* (approximately 12 lbs.) each of rice, flour, and sugar, and 5 liters of cooking oil. Residents explain that these foodstuffs allow them to use what little cash they have available to them to buy meat. Currently, 22 families take part in the Pirwa trabajo comunal (which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five), and all participants have grown to depend on these food rations, reporting that “*muchas veces me han salvado los cupos,*” or “the food rations have saved me many times.”

José’s proposals for the Pirwa and to fund other development projects depicted the residents of Huancarani as ethnically homogenous, signaled by his emphasis on a unifying culture (indigenous) and language (Quechua). But a closer examination of present-day community dynamics shows that this is an overly-simplistic vision of actual community diversity. The residents of Huancarani are much more heterogeneous due to events that are associated with national and international political economy. Since the early 1990s, new migrants have begun to call Huancarani home, occurring in three waves over the course of 15
years (1990-2005). The three waves of migration to the community are a result of two coterminous factors: first, many newcomers have relocated to Huancarani from the highlands of Quillacollo and beyond – most notably, from Tapacari and from the Los Yungas region of La Paz – in order to look for work in area limestone and plaster plants, to harvest and plant the regional agricultural fields, and to educate their children. These migrants cite the abysmal poverty in their places of origin as the primary reason of their relocation. This group of newcomers rent homes from absentee rentista landlords who live in the city of Cochabamba or have migrated to other countries. Second, a more recent group of people have bought land and built homes in the area: people who are middle class Cochabambinos who have moved to the “country” in order to escape the busyness, pollution, and congestion of the big city. In the next section, I explain how migratory patterns in Huancarani have resulted in residents’ identification with four major groups of actors in the community – relocalizados, spouses of relocalizados, new migrants, and Orureños. Then, I introduce specific people who typify each of these major groups and the events that led them to Huancarani.

2.5 IDENTITY AND BELONGING IN HUANCARANI: FOUR GROUPS

2.5.1 Group 1 – Those who left and returned: los relocalizados.

The most prominent group in Huancarani consists of those people who left Huancarani to work in the mines after the Agrarian Reform of 1952 and then returned as relocalizados in the late 1970s and 80s. These residents own their own home, some land for subsistence farming, and keep animals like cows, a small flock of sheep, pigs, guinea pigs, and some chickens and ducks.
Furthermore, this group also includes the children born to relocalizados in the mining communities. Approximately 60% of the families that live in the community are members of this group. Residents who worked in the mines generally are now between the ages of 50 and 80, and presently the youngest child in the community who was born in the mines is 17 years old. All members of this group inherited their homes and land from families who had been here for as long as they could remember. Most of their fields are planted and harvested every year either by the owners or via the *peonage* system, in which the landowners enter into a type of sharecropping agreement with residents who are allowed to keep half of the harvest and sometimes are paid a daily wage of about US$1.25 (10 bolivianos). Relocalizados who worked in the mines, for the most part, are *jubilados* – retired – and earn a monthly pension. Those relocalizados who are not retired, as well as adult children of relocalizados, earn their living by working in their fields and selling their produce and meat to market.

All members of this group speak Quechua and most speak both Quechua and Spanish; there are four elderly widows and one elderly widower who are monolingual Quechua speakers. All of the widowed elderly women are illiterate to the extent that they cannot sign their names, so they give their fingerprint to represent their name in community voting. They have completed very little schooling – one woman never attended school while the other three left primary school in the first or second grade. However, the majority of the relocalizados have at least a primary school education, and some have been to a year or two of high school. Three women and one man are high school graduates, and only one adult daughter of a relocalizado along with her husband has gone to college or earned a college degree.

One of these women is doña Julia, a 49 year old relocalizado and the youngest of 4 children. Julia’s experiences typify those of most relocalizados, despite the fact that she is one of
only a handful of high school graduates in the community. Her father and mother were born in the Sipe Sipe region and bought their house in Huancarani when they were married in 1930. Julia was born in Huancarani the year before her family moved to Llallagua in the department of Oruro so her father could work in the mines of Catavi. She attended school in Catavi and fondly remembers her school days there. She graduated from high school in Catavi, one of the few huancaraneña women of her generation to do so. Like most of the miners working in Bolivia during this time period, she lived in a one-room company house with her family, shopped at the company store (pulpería), and utilized the mine’s health clinic and schools. In school there, Julia had met a boy who was originally from Sorata, a neighboring community to Huancarani, and at the age of 20 in January of 1978 she became pregnant and gave birth in the Catavi hospital. When the international tin market crashed and the bust cycle of the mining industry took hold, her father lost his job at the end of 1978 but was one of the fortunate workers who was awarded his pension. Julia, her infant son, her siblings, and her parents all moved back to her parents’ home in Huancarani, where Julia lives to this day. Julia raised her son with her parents but her son does not know who his father is, even though his father currently lives in Sorata, only 1 mile from Julia’s home. She confesses that she was not very close to her son’s father and her parents would not allow her to marry him, saying that there was not enough room for this man in their home. She implies that he came from a landless family and would have had to have lived with Julia and her son in her family’s home – something that her family would not tolerate. In 1995, her father was diagnosed with cancer, and Julia took an active role in his care, attending his doctor’s visits and chemotherapy appointments. He died at the age of 84 in May of 1996 and her mother died 3 months later of apparently natural causes.
When Julia’s parents died, she inherited the house that she and her son were living in and some lands in her father’s name. One of her older sisters inherited other lands, although this sister does not live in Huancarani nor is she interested in farming these parcels. Julia and her husband hire peones to farm both her own and her sister’s lands, selling the produce to market and splitting the profit between her sister, the peon, and herself. In 2001, at the age of 43, Julia married for the first time. Her husband is a man who was born in Norte de Potosí, a region well-known as being one of the poorest in the entire nation. He is the youngest of 5 children and the other four still live in Norte de Potosí with his father, his only surviving parent. Although he is not a high school graduate, he went to school until he was 18 but only succeeded in finishing 9th grade. He remained a bachelor until he met Julia, traveling around the region working for a construction company as a crew foreman, operating heavy machinery and building roads and buildings. When he met Julia, he was a foreman for a local limestone plant, one of the few fortunate men of the region who had salaried secure employment. Julia’s husband has no children, but has formed strong bonds with Julia’s son and grandson. While he has only lived with Julia in Huancarani since 2000, he considers himself a huancaraneño, but he does not become involved in local development contexts – such as in the local governing body or the Pirwa – like his wife does. “I talk to Julia about my ideas and she brings them to the community. That’s how I live here. This is her [Julia’s] community – I live here and want it to be better. But I don’t think that people would listen to me. I’m an outsider.” In this respect, Julia’s husband understands that his wife, as a relocalizada and an educated woman, has more power than he does to affect local decision-making and behaves accordingly.

Doña Julia’s maternal tongue is Quechua, but due to her extensive schooling, she is a bilingual Spanish/Quechua speaker. She very often finds herself in the position of translating for
other female residents of Huancarani who do not understand and/or speak Spanish well enough to converse with monolingual Spanish speakers. Her manner of dress indicates to others that she is a literate person; in Bolivian schools, students wear a school uniform and, with this, female students usually renounce the traditional *pollera*, or short skirt worn over a petticoat, worn by *cholitas* (women who wear traditional dress) (see Stephenson 1999; Feminías 2005). Julia wears more Western style clothing – a calf-length skirt, button down plain blouse or t-shirt, Western sandals, and sometimes a sweater vest. Her hat is the only thing that she shares with almost all community residents – she wears the white, plastered, brimmed hat with a broad ribbon that flows down her back, indicative of the region of Cochabamba. Most women who are relocalizados have spent very little time in school and are therefore *de pollera* (wear the pollera), not *de vestido* like Julia (wearing Western-style skirts). Julia’s mother was de pollera, and when asked why Julia herself does not wear traditional dress, she simply stated: “because I went to school.” But upon further questioning her to clarify her position, Julia underscores the political importance of dress in the community:

Most people will tell you – women who don’t wear the pollera – that the pollera is too expensive and hard to wash. They don’t want to wear it, they say, for these reasons, but this isn’t true. Or, better said, it’s only partly true. Women wear [western dress] because it tells people that they can read and write. They are literate. And that is a good thing. I was the secretary of the OTB [local governing body] in Huancarani for more than 10 years, and I couldn’t have done that if I didn’t graduate [from high school]. They [community leaders] asked me once to be president of the OTB, but I said no…. People will listen to me more if I am secretary than if I am president… [laughs] Huancaraneños aren’t ready for a woman president! And doña Victoria is the *encargadora* (person in charge) of the Pirwa, and she is *de vestido*. She can read and write, so she records people’s absences, and you have to read and write to do that. But the most important thing that people look for in a [leader] is if people are from here. Usually, leaders have been relocalizados.

Julia’s above comments not only show how women locate themselves in positions of power and how external appearances mark them as suitable potential community leaders – or not – but she also emphasizes the political importance in the community of the relocalizados as a group. Residents know that those people who own their own homes and lands are more
permanent members of the community, meaning they have less incentive to leave in order to look for work in other parts of the country or internationally. Overall, relocalizados make up the most powerful group, although not the wealthiest, in the community.

2.5.2 Group 2 – Spouses of relocalizados: insiders and outsiders.

About half of all relocalizados have spouses who are not huancaraneños; generally, these spouses, like doña Julia’s husband, come from the mining regions where the relocalizados had worked – Oruro and Potosí. They make up the second group of actors in the community. These actors have married into not only a family but also a community – a community in which landowning residents are part of an existing web of extended family relations, either by blood or by compadrazgo (godparenthood). This affects their political power in the community and the way that they have been incorporated in daily life in Huancarani.

Most spouses of relocalizados admit that their integration into huancaraneño life was not easy. For instance, doña Sofia, a woman originally from Oruro, moved to Huancarani with her husband when he returned from the mines in 1986. She had married her husband, Raúl, when she was 20 years old, and Raúl was 12 years her senior. In 1986, she, her husband, and two children moved into Raúl’s parents’ house in Huancarani. Sofia is a high school graduate, having graduated from a high school in Oruro, and was a monolingual Spanish speaker when she moved to Huancarani from Oruro. Sofia’s grandparents spoke Quechua but, like many parents who lived in the city of her generation, insisted that Sofia speak Spanish and she never learned Quechua. This set her apart from her parents-in-law, especially her mother-in-law who spoke no Spanish. Also, Sofia was born and grew up in the city of Oruro and knew nothing of farming and life in rural Cochabamba. Everything, she said, from the language, farming, and weather to
the relative isolation of life in Huancarani, was new and different to her. Her new life took some getting used to:

Oh, how I didn’t get along with my mother-in-law. She hated me! Raúl was slated to marry another woman from the community before he left to work in the mines. But then he met me and we got together. My mother-in-law never forgave me for that. ‘Her skin is so dark,’ she used to say to my husband while I [was in earshot]. I have [the skin] of people from the highlands who are burned by the sun – different from the people from here. ‘She is stupid – she doesn’t speak Quechua or know how to take care of the cows and the fields,’ she said about me. I had to learn Quechua fast so that I could try to get along with my parents-in-law. And I speak well now. I also farm well now. And the store that I run brings in some money. But it was really hard in the beginning [when I first moved here]. She also made fun of me, saying that I didn’t wear the pollera but I was still a [hick] like everyone else here. I wanted to go back [to Oruro]. Many times I thought it was too hard and wanted to take my children away from here and never come back.

Sofia’s assimilation into Huancarani life may have been difficult, but she is a person of influence in the community today and currently has a formal position in the OTB as juez de agua, the person who reads and records the water meters each month in order to bill people accurately for their water usage. She credits her high school education for her charge with this position, since it takes a good knowledge of budgeting and mathematics to do it well. But she also recognizes that her status as the wife of a relocalizado has eased her integration into the community – although she has political problems from time to time.
Figure 11. Members of the Pirwa, one of the development contexts in Huancarani. The second woman from the left is from La Paz and wears the typical clothing of this region. A woman de vestido is standing behind the first child from the left. The third woman from the left in the front row is a new migrant from Tapacari and is wearing the typical skirt, blouse, and hat of a woman from Cochabamba. The first woman from the left is a monolingual Spanish speaker from Cochabamba and the teacher in the Pirwa’s children’s after-school program. The second woman from the left in the back row is a Swiss volunteer who worked in the Pirwa for two months in 2005. Photo credit: Christine Hippert.

Another spouse of a relocalizado, doña Isadora, also found it difficult when she first moved here with her husband after they met in the mines of Potosí in the 1960s. Her mother, a Chilean, and her father, a Peruvian, met in the city of Potosí where he was working as a miner and she as a domestic servant in the house of a Swiss manager of the mine. Isadora went to school until she was 9 years old, when she was forced to drop out and work alongside her mother as a domestic and nanny for their patrón’s two young children. She met her husband when she was 16; he worked directly under the Swiss manager, and Isadora met him one day when he was at the house doing some work for his boss. Isadora became pregnant very soon after and went on to have 14 children – 13 with this husband, with only 9 surviving beyond the age of two years.
Isadora’s husband’s family owned a home and lands in Huancarani, and in the late 1970s they became one of the first relocalizados to move back to the community after her husband was laid off with his pension intact. Today she is 61 years old and has been widowed for over 18 years.

Like Sofia, Isadora moved into her parents-in-law’s home and was also criticized by her mother-in-law (a common issue between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in Bolivia (see Bolton and Mayer 1977)). Isadora did not speak Quechua when she moved to Huancarani, nor did she wear the pollera like her mother-in-law. In order to try to win approval from her mother-in-law – something she never feels that she succeeded in doing – Isadora traded her Western dress for the pollera of Cochabamba and learned to speak Quechua. While most rural women wear the pollera as a child and then learn to wear Western clothes, Isadora conversely grew up wearing Western-style dress and then swapped it for the pollera. And unlike Gill’s (1994) informants who learned to wear the pollera as their “uniform” as domestic servants, Isadora never wore the traditional skirt as a domestic servant in Potosí – “they were foreigners (gringos),” she said, referring to her former employer, “and they didn’t require me to wear the pollera like other people did of their servants.” For Isadora, wearing the pollera gave her social and political capital that she feels she wouldn’t have had otherwise in Huancarani. Although she attended school until the age of 14, her reading and writing skills are very poor, so in her mind it also ideologically made sense to wear the pollera. Isadora has never and doesn’t aspire to hold any sort of formal leadership position in the community. But as the widow of a relocalizado who now owns the home she lives in and the land on which she and her peons work, she easily speaks her mind and feels that she is listened to in the affairs of the community. Being both de pollera as well as a local landowner gives her important status as insider as a relocalizado and political clout among members of the group I discuss next – new immigrants who have moved to
Huancarani for the most part from the rural regions of the departments of La Paz and Cochabamba.

2.5.3 Group 3 – Nuevos migrantes: three waves of migration.

Since the early 1990s, new families have been moving into the community who have no kinship ties in the Sipe Sipe region. There are 11 such families living in Huancarani, and most of them have moved to the community since 1995. The success of these families in assimilating to life in Huancarani has varied, depending on where they have come from as well as on cultural, socioeconomic, and linguistic factors. Within this group, there are three categories of newcomers: those from Tapacari, those from La Paz, and those from middle-class Cochabamba. I will discuss each of these in turn.

Four of these families have relocated to Huancarani from the province of Tapacari, located in the highlands north of Sipe Sipe. Out of 311 municipalities in the country of Bolivia as a whole, Tapacari ranks 291st in the national index of unsatisfied basic needs and has a Human Development Index ranking of 0.376 with a net migration rate of 9.29% – a high rate of emigration in the departamento of Cochabamba as a whole (Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2004). When asked why they left their homes and extended families in Tapacari for Huancarani, all of the respondents said that there was no work for them to earn a living and no land for them to work in Tapacari. For years, the men in these four families had migrated from Tapacari to Huancarani in order to work for months at a time in the limestone and plaster plants throughout Sipe Sipe. During the mid 1990s, they had saved enough money to move their families to Huancarani, rent homes, and become enmeshed in the networks of peonage in the agricultural fields in the region. Men in these families also worked as day laborers in construction and
traveled to the Chapare and Santa Cruz with work crews for months at a time. Furthermore, the women of these families found day labor in the plaster plants cleaning and sewing bags that would eventually be used to package the plaster for transport. One of these women even started her own *chichería* – local chicha bar – in her home and had become the most successful in the community. All of the women from Tapacarí are monolingual Quechua-speakers and functionally illiterate, having only attended first and maybe second grade in their home villages. Yet all of their children currently attend area primary and high schools. Respondents told me that the schools in Tapacarí had problems staying open because the teachers who were assigned to these schools were unreliable and absent for days on end (a problem found in many rural regions, see Luykx 1999), forcing them to rethink staying in the highlands. Upon arriving in Huancarani, the women of these 4 families discarded their distinct rural polleras and hats that identified them as residents of Tapacarí and started wearing the garb stylistic of Cochabamba. Overall, members of these four families have been fully integrated into life in Huancarani, identifying themselves as huancaraneños and having had very few obstacles that prevented them from doing so.

One of these such families was headed by don Carlos, age 26, and doña Viviana, age 22, who came to Huancarani in 2002 from a small community in Tapacarí called Chullpani. They have two young children, ages 5 and 3, both born in Tapacarí and brought to Huancarani as toddlers. Viviana and Carlos have parents who still live in Tapacarí, but all of their siblings – Viviana has seven younger and two older siblings while Carlos has two older brothers – have migrated to the city of Cochabamba to find work to feed their families. Beginning in 2000, Carlos made the four hour bus drive from his hometown so that he could work for a month at a time in a plaster plant on the road to Huancarani. It was then that he met Oscar, the spouse of a
daughter of a relocalizado who needed help planting and harvesting his fields and other handiwork around his house. Oscar hired Carlos and was pleased by his work, so he offered Carlos to bring his family from Tapacari to live in two small rooms adjacent to a large shed on Oscar’s property. This was the beginning of a working peonage relationship between Carlos and Oscar. Carlos told me that

…working for Oscar has saved me and my family. When we first came to Huancarani as a family, my sons’ bellies were always swollen with worms. We never had enough food to eat, and they were always sick. I don’t know my father – I never knew him – so I have no lands in Tapacari to inherit or to work. My mother lives with her sister there and she has some lands to work, but not enough [to go around]. So I had no other choice but to leave Tapacari… It was hard work in the plaster plants – I worked 8 hour days, 7 days a week while I was in town, and I was paid 25Bs (US$3.12) a day. After I ate and paid my bus fare to get there, I wasn’t making much money to bring home. Oscar treats my family like his own. He pays me well, and I am able to save money. I bought some land in Huancarani and during the next dry season we are going to build a house… I have just commissioned Isadora and her son to make the adobes for it. And I have the money to pay her for it. My children are now well-fed and my wife sews and cleans bags at the plaster plant. This never would have happened in Tapacari.

Along with these four families from Tapacari, there are three families living in Huancarani who are originally from Inquisivi, a small municipality located in Los Yungas, a semi-tropical region southeast of the city of La Paz. The adults in these three families speak both Aymara and Spanish except for one woman who is a monolingual Aymara-speaker. Like the families from Tapacari, these families moved to Huancarani in order to take advantage of working in the area’s plaster plants. They prefer living and working in the Cochabamba region instead of trying to find work in La Paz because of Cochabamba’s temperate climate. “La Paz is too cold,” says doña Martina, “the climate here in Huancarani is more like Inquisivi, so we moved here.” Men from these families have found work either as construction workers on traveling work crews and are rarely in the community for more than a week at a time, or they work daily in nearby plaster plants. Women from these families are well-known for their diligence; generally, they wash others’ laundry and work as day laborers in the region’s fields for 10Bs (US$1.25) a day. However, while women from Tapacari wear the pleated, short pollera of
Cochabamba in order to assimilate into life in Huancarani, the paceñas continue to wear their long, ruffled pollera and bowler hats that distinguish them as outsiders. They speak Aymara among themselves. While they have been quick to learn Quechua and understand it perfectly, they speak to their Quechua-speaking neighbors in Spanish with an accent that some huancaraneños find a bit difficult to understand.

Differences in language and dress have made life in Huancarani more complicated for the members of these three families. All of them report instances in which they or their children have felt discriminated against by their neighbors, at work, or in school. One by one, all of the women in this group told me that other huancaraneños have warned them not to talk during the local government (OTB) meetings because they are not from here. “They think that we can’t know what’s good for the community,” says Wilma, a 38 year old mother of three children who has lived in Huancarani since 1996. One family has been particularly affected, the family of doña Patricia. Two years ago, her son was beaten up by three boys in the community, mocked all the while as the “Indian from La Paz.” Additionally, Patricia asserts that seven years ago when she first moved to the community, area residents forbid her to use the common clothes washing site in the canal that other women in the community used to wash their clothes. Instead, the women told her that she must use a more secluded, polluted section of the canal downstream from the common washing site. She obliged the women by using the other site, and one day her 7 year old daughter accompanied her to wash clothes. Patricia contends that on this day an airplane’s shadow crossed the canal right where her daughter was playing, causing her to enter a trance and then a coma. “A demon entered her and took her spirit,” she explained. Patricia brought her daughter to the hospital in Sipe Sipe and another in Quillacollo. She paid for lab tests, and the doctors told her that all of tests indicated that there was nothing wrong with her
daughter. So, she brought her daughter to local curanderos on two different occasions, but she sorrowfully reports that nothing helped her daughter regain consciousness. Her daughter died within a week of the day she was playing by the canal while Patricia was washing clothes. Patricia contends

… the women of Huancarani killed my daughter. If they had just let me wash clothes at the [site] with everyone else, then she never would have been possessed like she was. Some women remember that this happened to my daughter. They never talk about it with me, but they do not give me a hard time. Not like other people. There are some people here that call us names as we walk by, or if I speak Aymara with [others]. These people forget that their actions killed my daughter. Slowly, people here are coming to know me and trust me. I have [trusting relationships] with just one or two people here, but that is more than before. It’s harder for us from Inquisivi to fit in in Huancarani. My husband, in all his 10 years here, has never befriended anyone in the community. But I am trying to fit in and show people that I am worthy of their trust… Little by little, this is changing.

Although this is an extreme example, it depicts the kind of isolation that paceños face in Huancarani. It also points out that the designation of outsider is a relative term in Huancarani. While some, like those from Tapacarí and some spouses of relocalizados, are clearly not huancaraneños by birth, there are some residents who are considered to be more different than others. While those from Tapacarí enter into peonage relations with other huancaraneños, paceños on the whole do not; instead, they generally work for people outside of Huancarani. (However, this is slowly changing as these families are becoming more well-known as hard-working and dependable). Patricia’s story demonstrates that some residents are more slowly accepted and trusted in the community, and all of the paceño residents of Huancarani echo this observation. They have found that this affects the way that they participate in some community development contexts, as we will see in later chapters.

Overall, those from Tapacarí and Inquisivi have all come to Huancarani in order to economically improve their lives. They are all roughly from the same socioeconomic class – considered poor because they rent homes instead of owning their own, and working as peons or day laborers in order to make ends meet. However, there are four families who have recently
moved to Huancarani that are positioned very squarely in the middle class. Two of these families are retired couples – one from the military and one from industry in Cochabamba. Another family is an evangelical Christian family who settled and built a home here 7 years ago after Tomás, the 55 year old ex-manager in the mines of Cami in departamento of La Paz, was laid off with his pension intact. He currently has a salaried job with a private trucking company in Suticollo, a small community about three miles away from Huancarani. And the last middle-class family of this group is a single mother of Swiss citizenship with her two Bolivian-born children. She is a former NGO official who worked in Cochabamba. She attended don José’s language school when she first arrived in Cochabamba a decade ago, and one of her children is now José’s ahijado (godchild). These four families bought their homes in Huancarani in order “to escape the busyness of life and the pollution in Cochabamba,” as one of these residents says. They do not consider themselves huancaraneños – unlike those from Tapacari and La Paz who consider themselves full residents of Huancarani and are identified by others as huancaraneños. Socially, these families do not interact that much with other residents of Huancarani. But these families hire a handful of residents as peons to wash clothes, cook food, plant and harvest crops, and as construction workers when certain projects arise.

Almost all of these newcomers have high school diplomas and some have college degrees. All speak Quechua except for the Swiss single mother and her children, who speak French and Spanish and attend a private school in the city. The members of these families all wear Western-style clothes and are identifiable as outsiders as such. However, members of this group of newcomers have not experienced discrimination of the sort experienced by the paceños that I described above. In fact, in the community development contexts in which they are involved – notably in the OTB – they freely speak their mind and discuss their ideas. Although
everyone does not always agree with their ideas, members of this group are encouraged to take leadership positions in the community. One of these men, don Mateo, was president of the Comité Pro-Agua, the community organization in Huancarani before the Popular Participation Law of 1994 and the subsequent birth in 1995 of the OTB as a junta vecinal (neighborhood organization – I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter Four). Currently he continues to hold much influence in the OTB. Although he does not hold a specific office, he is often found steering OTB discussions in a particular direction and always sits at the front of the room where the officers sit during meetings. All members of this group admit that their experience with city bureaucracy gives them a sort of social capital in the community. Mateo relates that

I was an accountant for the military for many years. I understand how to be accountable with money, so I was trusted with being president and raising money to do community projects before we were an OTB. I don’t really seem like a huancaraneño, but people here trust me to do what’s best for them. I live here too, you know, and I own my house.

Another example of a new middle-class migrant in the community demonstrates how positions of power and identity factors can have both beneficial and harmful effects. Tomás is well-respected in the community, but draws a bit of suspicion because of his conversion to evangelical Christianity three years ago. He takes a pension from the state for his previous work in the Cami mine in La Paz, and now he works as a salaried bookkeeper for a local trucking company. Both sources of income provide for his family of 7 children and have paid for a relatively large five bedroom home with a painted exterior in Huancarani (something that sets his house apart from the other unfinished adobe homes in the community). During my fieldwork, he was asked to take the position of treasurer in the OTB “because I am a Christian and people realize that I will be honest and not cheat them,” he states.

However, he tried to abbreviate his tenure as treasurer because of mounting frustrations in fulfilling his duties. Part of his job as treasurer required him to collect fines due the OTB
when people failed to attend the mandatory monthly meetings. Prior treasurers had allowed these fines to go unpaid for sometimes years on end. But according to the rules, these fines were doubled if left unpaid after a certain period of time, and Tomás began to apply this rule, much to the dismay of the residents. This instigated problems in the community. Persons indebted to the OTB were usually poorer relocalizados as well as some of the new migrants from Tapacarí – residents who had more power in the community than most. These residents complained about Tomás to their neighbors, making ad hominem attacks saying that he thought he was too good to be living in a place like Huancarani and had no sensitivity to the economic plight in which others found themselves. An additional problem plagued Tomás: he had set a schedule for residents to adhere to in order to come to his house to pay their water bills. Community residents were more accustomed to going to the treasurer’s house to pay bills whenever they had the money, so when Tomás initiated his strict schedule community residents were unhappy with what they saw as unnecessary demands. Tomás and his family members had been known to turn people away if they arrived at his house during non-scheduled hours. There was thus a disconnect between Tomás’ lifestyle – a man with a 9-5pm job – and the agricultural lives of other residents in the community. After weeks of listening to residents’ complaints and underground murmuring, Tomás announced during a regular OTB meeting that he was resigning. He made a blanket charge saying that community back-stabbing was preventing him from doing his job correctly, so he couldn’t continue in the position of treasurer. Powerful relocalizados and the middle class new migrants came to his defense, saying that they were pleased that Tomás was taking his charge seriously and not showing the kind of favoritism that allowed past treasurers to turn a blind eye to the rules. In the end, his resignation wasn’t accepted so he withdrew it, prompting a round of applause from residents at the meeting.
Experiences like the ones shared here point out the differences in access to resources and power in the community among the various groups of new migrants – tapacareños, paceños, and middle-class cochabambinos – all enmeshed to different degrees in relationships with relocalizados and their families. Overall, the three main groups of huancaraneños – relocalizados, their spouses, and new migrants – consist of those people who have taken up residence in the community and have some members of their families occupy a domicile in Huancarani during the year. However, there is one final group of actors that plays a primary role in the community and have affected the face of development in the long-term – los orureños.

2.5.4 Group 4 – Los orureños.

Along with members of the community who live in Huancarani, there are huancaraneños who live permanently in Oruro, a city 250km west of Huancarani. Oruro is the name of the capital city and the department where Siglo XX, Catavi, and other mines are located – mines that, before they were privatized, used to employ huancaraneños. After these ex-miners were laid off by COMIBOL (the state mining corporation), they decided to stay in Oruro instead of returning to Huancarani. Presently, there are about 20 families who live in Oruro but either 1) lived in Huancarani before they moved to the mines to work, or 2) have inherited lands and houses from their parents who did so during their childhood. All of these families have extended kin who are presently living in Huancarani – grandparents, parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, etc. – who keep them abreast of any news of community events and changes. The Orureños have chosen to rent out their houses in Huancarani to the new migrants in the community that I have outlined above – primarily those from Tapacarí and La Paz. And because these Orureños own property in Huancarani, their names are included in the community census as well as in the OTB list of
residents, even though there are others who live in their homes and harvest their lands. As landlords, they often come to check up on their renters, although the frequency in which they come varies. Some new migrants told me that their orureño landlord visited them once a month, while others told me that they haven’t seen their landlord in years.

Figure 12. Members of the orureño dance troupe (in the fringed hats) who danced during the Virgen de Guadalupe festival in Huancarani, 8-12 September 2006. Photo credit: Christine Hippert.

None of the orureños belong to any voluntary community development organizations, nor do they attend the monthly OTB meetings. However, they do have influence in the community, as they often will discuss ideas for community development with a community leader or family members during their visits to Huancarani. But they have a more regular
presence in the community, and Huancarani has come to rely on them to play a particular role in a specific, albeit informal, development context. Two festivals – the community fiesta and the first week after Reyes, 6 January – have come to have special significance to los orureños that connect them with their home community of Huancarani. During the annual community fiesta, 8-12 September, dance troupes from Sorata and Huancarani pay homage to the Virgen de Guadalupe, the community patron saint. This is a 4-day celebration that draws visitors and vendors to the community by the hundreds. Every year, huancaraneños in Oruro send a dance troupe to compete in the festival and to honor the Virgen of their home community. Recently, this annual troupe has come to include children of los orureños, and these children consider themselves proud to be a part of Huancarani as well. Additionally, during the first week after the holiday of Reyes on 6 January, or what is called in English the festival of the Magi, orureños again make the trip to Huancarani to dance in honor of the Virgen. This commitment to celebrate the religious and cultural patron of Huancarani, the Virgen de Guadalupe, allows them the honor – and obligation – of financially contributing to the maintenance of the church in Huancarani in her name. For example, in 1998, los orureños donated the money needed to buy the materials to repair the vestibule and floors of the church, while the residents of Huancarani actually made the repairs to restore it. Currently, there is a plaque to commemorate the project and the collaboration on the part of the orureños and the residents of Huancarani. Overall, with regards to the general maintenance of the church, residents of Huancarani can count on the support of their kin in Oruro and as a group have an important role in community development.
Figure 13. The church dedicated to the Virgen de Guadalupe at the central plaza in Huancarani.

Photo credit: Christine Hippert.

2.6 CONCLUSION

The abbreviated life histories that I described above show how identity politics have profound implications for even a small community like Huancarani. In the latter half of this chapter, I have discussed the ways in which residents differ in order to show that Huancarani is not as homogenous as portrayed by José’s proposal for international funding. An analysis of
development in Huancarani and of the process by which local residents participate in their own
development must account for how this heterogeneity affects the types of projects that are
decided upon and the way that they are designed and implemented. Identity differences within
the community itself must be transcended in order for residents to decide on which development
projects to design and then implement. The history of Huancarani also indicates the importance
of the concept of community participation – well before current national politics has endorsed
community participation (in part with the passage of the Popular Participation Law in 1994) as
essential to rural development.

The next chapter outlines how participation has become entwined with specific
constructions of identity, so much so that I argue that organizations are required to forge,
accommodate, or resist particular ‘development identities’ in order to do development work.
Development objectives tend to signify nearly the same thing for all residents regardless of
identity (i.e., improved access to resources, nutrition and health, infrastructure, employment
options, etc.), but these objectives are culturally specific and differ from the way outsiders might
define development – as in their insistence that development includes maintaining and fostering
community relationships. The way people participate in development work varies depending on
1) the development context in which they are working and 2) the identity that this organization
constructs to try to fulfill their goals. Therefore in Huancarani – a place where most residents
participate in more than one development context – residents accentuate multiple development
identities in their development work in the community, a phenomenon I call “development work
as identity work.”
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT IDENTITIES AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT WORK AS IDENTITY WORK

We are all huancaraneños, every one of us. We all got here in different ways, but that doesn’t mean that we don’t belong here… We all have an obligation to develop this community.

-- President of OTB in Huancarani

Residents of Huancarani actively participate in the development of their community, and they do so generally without the assistance of so-called development experts, such as representatives from NGOs or municipal government officials. Within the community, they have three development contexts at their disposal in which they participate in various projects to improve their community: the local governing body (OTB), the Pirwa, and the Adela Zamudio women’s group. After 13 months of participant observation in each of these contexts, I discovered that members of all of these contexts are responsible for the design, implementation, and organization of community projects, with some actors having a greater or lesser degree of responsibility, depending on the project and the context. Their work in these contexts gives them keen insight and knowledge of the development trajectory that they have decided to pursue for the good of their community.

In this chapter I define what I mean by development identity and what I see are the two types at work in the process of doing development: imposed development identities and community-forged development identities. Interviews with 30 residents of Huancarani revealed
that emic perspectives of development are linked to relative social norms, not some universalist sense of how the community should improve. While people have myriad ideas for community development projects, they all seem to agree on a particular ‘process of development,’ and connote that ‘developing Huancarani’ in a certain way supersedes the actual projects that are undertaken in the community. They contend development not only implies an improvement in the physical aspects of the community, such as the construction of more classrooms in the overcrowded local school or paving the muddy, rocky streets in the community. Moreover, the process of development in Huancarani involves defining and forging a collective community identity, not only for themselves but also for the outside world, whether that means for the municipal government in Sipe Sipe or to their national and international funders.

Additionally, this chapter explains what is suggested when I state that development work is, in fact, identity work. Development in Huancarani requires that residents transcend individual differences in order to foster social relationships for the good of the community. Therefore, doing development means that individuals in the community – regardless of where they come from, what they speak, and to whom they are related – encourage three factors: 1) the revalorization of a common indigenous knowledge, 2) the maintenance of social relationships, and 3) the continuance of norms of everyday behavior from the recent past. However, when people participate in various development contexts, they slip in and out of different development identities, accentuating certain characteristics of identity in particular contexts. This is a complex process, requiring acumen of regional politics and cultural expression of which Bolivians are acutely aware. Therefore, forging and resisting a multiplicity of context-specific development identities makes sense in Huancarani because the concept of identity in Bolivia, as well as the practice of identity formation, is articulated more by “systems of relations” (Paulson
and Calla 2000) rather than by inherent, essentialized traits or behaviors. In other words, people define their own individual identities in a particular time and space, based on who they are with, what they are doing, and where they are. Using this model of identity as a guide, it becomes clear that the formulation and adherence to different identities in development work is an extension of a social process that pervades Bolivian everyday life.

3.1 DEVELOPMENT IDENTITIES

A development identity is a set of particular ethnic, gendered, and class-based characteristics deliberately articulated by an agent – a voluntary organization, the local political body in a community, the State, or foreign actors such as an international NGOs or funders – in order to target themselves or others for development assistance, either in the way of funds or project implementation. These sets of characteristics emerge when an agent, at the local, national, and international level, purposively selects certain principles to accentuate and build upon in the work that is done within a development context. In the era of popular participation, local people are obligated to directly participate in development work and sometimes compete for scarce resources. In this environment, participatory development is as much an issue of who gets to develop as it is an issue of what it means to develop. The creation of development identities is a way to accommodate and resist universalist notions of development, as well as to construct endogenous, alternative understandings of development. Additionally, creating development identities is an attempt to insert an agent into the process of development, usually an agent that may be underrepresented in political and/or social contexts. The act of articulating development identities is an effort to tip the balance of power towards one agent over and above another agent.
The creation of development identities is not necessarily reserved for the powerless or voiceless. Development identities are indeed articulated by local people who must rely on the generosity and graces of others to grant them financial, logistical, and technical assistance. However, powerful actors such as the State and other international and national organizations create development identities all the time. These actors have the socially and politically ascribed power to set the agenda for the selection of particular types of development beneficiaries. In effect, what these actors – the State and organizations – are doing is forging a signature development identity that becomes the one that sets the standard for development work on a grand scale, either at the regional, national, and international level.

In the literature on identity and development, an early mention of the phrase “development identities” is found in Kumar’s work (2003) concerning national reproductive health policy in India. She discusses the phrase in this context to outline the “role of the state in directing the rationales of development (2003:74).” Explicit in her discussion of the Reproductive and Child Health Policy (RCH) is the argument that “the state is not merely a neutral administrative institution, but is rather a bearer of ideologies and values that actively give particular interpretation to the way development is strategized” (2003:74). The State of India, via the RCH policy, uses a particular characterization of the ideal Indian woman as the beneficiary of programs under the RCH policy. This policy came about as a result of the 1994 International Conference for Population and Development in Cairo and was established to promote “gender-sensitive” reproductive policy. The development identity that the State constructed for the sake of policies outlining reproductive health programs arose in a socially-prescribed and historically particular context. Prior to the RCH, the Indian State had been accused of being both directly involved and complicit in the oppression women within its
territory, specifically regarding: 1) the increased practice of *sati* among widows, 2) turning a blind eye to the welfare of Muslim women in India, 3) the problem of exorbitant dowry claims among women of marriageable age, and 4) the collusion of government health clinics that failed to curtail widespread selective abortion of female fetuses using genetic testing procedures. In this environment, the Indian government recognized a need for promoting gender-sensitive policies that made improving women’s health and well-being an important goal.

Women’s development identity in the case of this Indian health policy pivots on two axes: 1) women as *socialized mother* (the person in the family who teaches children proper Indian tradition and customs), and 2) women as what Kumar calls *abstract worker* (an identity that directly promotes women’s productive role in society as laborers in order to increase national efficiency in a competitive economic world market). Programs established to improve women’s health therefore center on the health of the Indian mother. Using this development identity, women become objects of development instrumentality, in which improving women’s health becomes synonymous with women’s role in Indian society to produce the next generation of Indian worker/citizens. “[I]t is essential for the state to construct a female citizen who accepts the state’s interests as her own,” Kumar states in her discussion of women’s identity in Indian development programs. She further explains that “[M]y contention is that the state imbues the female citizen with an identity that is grounded in the concerns around reproduction that interest the state…. [T]he dominant identity deployed by the state is that of mother” (Kumar 2003:82). Kumar argues that women’s development identity limits their political power and “their possibilities for empowerment” (2003:86):

…[I]n crossing the boundary between ‘mother’ and ‘worker’, women do not necessarily experience personal freedoms; if anything, women’s claims to the state are limited by the expectations that the state has attached to the conceptualization of mother as productive beings. The important lesson to be drawn is that if development is a key arena where women in India strive to make political gains, the role of the state in defining the context of development cannot be underestimated (2003:86).
Kumar’s discussion of the State’s use of a particular women’s identity in Indian health policy is useful for our purposes here in laying the groundwork for the concept of development identities. She points out that historical and contemporary Indian relations of power affect the way identities are constructed and defined. Moreover, she also explains that there is a practical political dimension of identities, the role that they play being essential in the formulation of social policies. In the example of RCH policy in India, the State had the power to define the values and ideologies, or what I contend is a particular set of characteristics, that are used to devise specific development trajectories. In other words, the state incorporated identity constructs of the ideal Indian mother – the arbiter of Indian values for the next generation of citizens – for instrumental reasons. In doing so, the transformative power of improving women’s reproductive health care was trumped for the express purpose of national development. This example clearly shows that the rhetoric of human rights becomes relative in this case. Instead of women having the right to better access to quality reproductive health care on the grounds that it is a matter of human rights for its own sake, women have the right to good reproductive health care on the grounds that it is useful for the development of the nation. Development, and people’s identity, is expressed as a system of power relations within a particular social/political/economic milieu.

Using Kumar’s piece that indicates the centrality of identity construction in development work, I extend her conclusions and analysis to my own work in Huancarani. From this discussion, I understand that development work is in fact identity work, connoting a complex relationship between particular context-specific formulations of development and the negotiation of identity in everyday social interactions. Kumar’s emphasis is to demonstrate that the language of State-level economics influences the political power of constituencies based on the way these
constituencies are constructed. I value this important point and also support her claim that this is a useful way of thinking about the connections between neoliberal rhetoric, which places the individual at the center of economic life and human rights discourse that emphasizes subjects’ inherent worth for its own sake. In this case, women became objects of Indian development, and the State used a particularly focused identity – or set of gender-specific characteristics – in order to foster a unique development trajectory. This is an important contribution to the literature on identity and development.

My thesis uses Kumar’s work as a starting point, and then builds on and broadens this concept in order to make sense of development work in rural Bolivia. First, I want to expand the scale of identity that Kumar perceives to be pertinent in Indian development work. Kumar’s stress on the conception of gendered identity in her work in Indian development is useful, but I want to point out that an analysis of specific conceptions of ethnic and class-based identities is also important to understanding the way people position their identities in development work. Overall, in my work in rural Bolivia, I found that people accommodate, resist, and construct ethnic and class-based identities, along with gendered identities, in their development work.

Second, I think that the concept of development identities is also directly related to the politics of participatory development and the way people become both subjects and objects of development. Kumar’s work demonstrates the power of the State in development efforts. She emphasizes that the State is a powerful actor that manages the “rationales of development” in development work. Nevertheless, her discussion on the case of reproductive health policy did not elaborate on the idea that other actors have the power in the process of development to manage their own “rationales of development.” In Bolivia, I found that local people also have the agency to articulate identities in the process of development, using their own development
identities in an attempt to negotiate the course of State-prescribed development. Perhaps given the social environment of contemporary Indian development politics, local people do not have much of say in the way their identities are used in development work, although the prolific literature regarding the activities of Indian social movements suggests to me that this is probably not the case (i.e., Das 1997; Unnithan and Srivastava 1997). But in the Bolivian context, it is clear that contemporary circumstances allow people room to direct their own identity work in the process of development. Along the lines of other research that underscores the power that local people have to affect social and political activities (i.e., Scott 1985; Ong 1987; Sen and Grown 1987), I argue that people use what is at their disposal – in this case, development identities – in order to foster social change.

In the global neoliberal economy, specific groups of people are targeted for development assistance based upon particular constructions of gender, ethnicity, race, or class (i.e., Li 2000; Dwyer 2002). The concept of targeting in the current political economy of international development points up the centrality of identity – and the dire consequences of having or not having the right identity – in doing successful development. My research in Bolivia demonstrates that past and present political, economic, and cultural conditions create an ethnographic context where local people participate – and sometimes are mandated to participate – in a variety of development contexts, and these same actors employ varied constructions of ethnicity, gender, and class in order to improve their chances of garnering external support for development work. But within the strictures of international development, some groups find that their identity – the way they construct it themselves and the way it has been constructed for them from the outside – leaves them more or less “room to maneuver” (Tsing 1999); in other words,
they are afforded more or less access to use their own constructions of identity in an effort to negotiate their own development trajectory.

For example, with the Law of Popular Participation, Bolivians are directly involved in state-mandated community development. And the recent establishment of scores of new NGOs working in Bolivia, both internationally-based as well as locally established, has become somewhat of a national phenomenon (see Gill 2000), and has resulted in the incorporation of more local people than ever before into the intricate development bureaucracy. However, as I found in my work in Huancarani and Sipe Sipe, many people have grown skeptical of the ability of NGOs to forge an impartial development agenda that accounts for the ideas and activities of local people independent of the goals of international agencies and the State. Instead, they insert themselves into the process of development in a unique, measured, eclectic way, having established grassroots organizations that have no ties to NGOs.

In this contemporary setting with many development contexts at their disposal, I contend that actors in the process of development accommodate, resist, and construct development identities within a specific system of relations with other development actors; that is, the process of using development identities is always a negotiation and renegotiation within a particular ethnographic context, a sort of talking back or reacting to actors’ perceptions and use of particular sets of characteristics that make sense in specific contexts. And in this negotiation, development ‘success’ is relative; it depends on the context as well as the strength of the specific selected characteristics of identity to resonate within a particular context. It also is based on the bureaucratic strictures that are present within a particular context. I want to state upfront that local actors often have limited agency to forge their own community development identities because their constructed identities may not resonate in the way that they had hoped, or the
development bureaucracy does not allow much room to maneuver – in other words, there is no real outlet within some contexts for people to forge their own community development identity. Local people do not have the same type of agency that the State or international organizations do; I want to acknowledge that there are real limitations and power imbalances among different actors in the development process. However, local people are not completely powerless to affect the development process, and I contend that the process of accommodating, resisting, and forging development identities helps them to do just that. In order to account for the differential relations of power between various actors in the development process, I break down the concept of development identities into two types, imposed and community-forged, the topic of discussion in the next section.

3.2 TWO TYPES OF DEVELOPMENT IDENTITIES: IMPOSED AND COMMUNITY-FORGED

Within the last two decades, there has been an increase in the number of anthropological studies of development that examine global processes of development and its effects in specific ethnographic contexts (i.e., Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2005; Morgan 1993). Using a political economy perspective, these scholars suggest that the hegemony of development discourse and practices are aligned with modernization rhetoric indicating that the Western world is responsible for the development of the Third World. This perception of the agenda of development and its goals has been likened to a type of imperialism that fosters neocolonial relationships between the West and the Third World. For example, ethnographic research on development in Lesotho (Ferguson 1994) and in Colombia (Escobar 1991, 1995, 2005) shows
that the development machine, or the international development bureaucracy, has actually constructed what we think of as the Third World – high rates of poverty, malnutrition, maternal/infant deaths, illiteracy, communicable diseases, child labor, and poor health care. These scholars have charged the global development industry with not doing the right things to alleviate global poverty, and worse, that development work actually further entrenches poverty in the Third World and fosters a dependence on the development industry. With all of its good intentions, development work does not produce the results that it sets out to accomplish. Some of these studies suggest that the time has come for a new era for social change that entails increased social movement activism. Escobar (1995) contends that these changes in the way that development is defined, designed, and implemented would signal a post-development era. This era would encourage local people to define their own development trajectories in particular contexts and would empower them to carry out projects with these trajectories in mind, giving them access to vital and necessary political and financial resources.

These analyses of the global development industry, and the power imbued in it, are important contributions to our understanding of development as a concept and as practices. These arguments allow us to take a step back and get a more global perspective to evaluate the process of development, something that was overlooked in prior research that was primarily concerned with attempting to perfect development processes and make them compatible to fit unique ethnographic contexts. Studies of new social movements (i.e., see Alvarez and Escobar 1998) conclude that grassroots activity provides the requisite contexts for alternatives to development, meaning that these movements forward culturally and socially relevant agendas for local development that by-pass the hegemonic development industry. In the contemporary global context, what these studies indicate is a need for a new framework for social change.
The global development machine produces unintended consequences that further the need for more and more development intervention, and in so doing, produce a type of dependence between intervention and the normal, everyday activities of the State and local people. Rather than perceiving the increase in social movement activity as a signal of a post-development era, I understand social movement activity to be part and parcel of the development process. Social movements are one side of the development coin, so to speak, with the State, the global development bureaucracy, and monetary institutions on the other. Corroborating Foucault’s analysis (1997) of the ubiquity of power, and in thinking about power as part of systems of relations among agents, I contend that while the development industry is imbued with and afforded an enormous amount of power to influence and affect social change around the world, local people also have a certain amount of power to take part in and forward their own development agendas – especially in the current environment that touts participatory development as the signature model of good development. For the purposes of my research here, I want to point out that local people are taking part in the process of development, and are vibrant social actors that affect the workings of the development bureaucracy. I argue that all actors in the process of development – local people, the State, NGOs and other organizations, etc. – use constructions of particular identities as a way to forward a particular development trajectory. And throughout the second half of the 20th century until the present, development work has been affected by constructions of identity from a variety of local actors, something that other scholars have found in different ethnographic contexts (i.e., Jackson 1995). But development identities are imbued with different kinds of power and originate from different actors.
For example, Ferguson’s work in Lesotho demonstrates that in an attempt to paint a picture of the people of Lesotho as needy of the development industry’s resources and expertise, the World Bank Report of 1975 redefined the population as isolated, insular, and backward agriculturalists who until only recently had had very little economic contact with the outside world. However, Ferguson understandably points out that this is a mischaracterization of the population of Lesotho – a people who have had much contact with people from outside its boundaries for well over a century, and who in fact migrate to partake in industrial work, usually in neighboring South Africa. Ferguson’s analysis here illustrates that development actors use identity in order to forward a particular development trajectory; in this case, the World Bank, as development actor, suggested a specific course of action that included technical development options to attempt to ‘modernize’ the ‘backwards’ population of Lesotho. Ferguson argues that in redefining Lesotho’s population as backwards agriculturalists, the development “apparatus” in fact strips away the politics that led Lesotho to its current state of underdevelopment, what he contends is a main function of the development industry as the “anti-politics machine:”

...Lesotho can be represented in “development” discourse as a nation of farmers, not wage laborers, a country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics. Political and structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are systematically erased and replaced with technical ones, and the “modern,” capitalist, industrialized nature of the society is systematically understated or concealed..... The image of Lesotho as “LDC” [less developed country], once constructed, thus shapes not only the formation of reports and documents, but the construction of organizations, institutions, and programs (Ferguson 1994:66,73).

While this re-definition of the people of Lesotho is part of the anti-politics machine, this act is by far not apolitical but a political move in and of itself. In their mischaracterization of the people of Lesotho, the World Bank used an ahistorical perspective, in that it fails to account for the historical political, economic, and social relations and circumstances that Lesotho has maintained with other peoples and nations in the region and beyond. The World Bank’s mischaracterization of Lesotho’s people is a political act in order to create a specific
development identity of Lesotho and its people. Whether this was done intentionally in order to forward a particular development agenda, or because those who wrote the UN document just didn’t consider the history of Lesotho as an important factor (Ferguson argues that the former rationale is the more accurate one), this report signals the importance of identity in development work. In order for development work to take place, the beneficiaries of programs must meet specific prerequisites of identity in order to justify all of the financial, technical, and organizational investment involved.

Ferguson’s analysis of Lesotho and its description in the World Bank report is useful to exemplify that development identities have always been a vital component of development work – both development work that is directed from the top (as in agendas and plans orchestrated by organizations like the World Bank), as well as in development work from the ground up (as in participatory development by local people and grassroots movements). Since this information regarding Lesotho and its people was written into the development report in 1975, I argue that development identities have been essential components of development work even before the increased popularity and activity of new social movements (based on facets of identity) since the 1990s. But development identities constructed with specific perceptions of ethnicity/race, gender, and class in mind have become more prominent since the World Bank Report of 1975 came out, and these have become inextricably linked with neoliberal development rhetoric of “targeting” particular types of persons for development assistance (see Mayo and Craig 1995).

Kumar’s analysis on the RCH policy of India, discussed in the previous section, is similar to Ferguson’s analysis of the mischaracterization of Lesotho and its people in that both examples underscore the power that the State or international institutions have to identify and define a key constituent or beneficiary in the development process. In both ethnographic contexts, these
powerful agents impressed their own sets of characteristics of development beneficiaries for instrumental purposes in order to forward a specific development agenda: in India, women were defined for their role as socializing mothers in women’s reproductive health programs, and the people of Lesotho were defined as isolated agriculturalists to justify the implementation of technical, rather than structural, development solutions. In both of these cases, I argue that these development agents – the Indian State and the World Bank, respectively – constructed their own development identities that they imposed on beneficiaries for a specific development goal; these identities are what I call imposed development identities. The key difference between these two examples is that Kumar’s analysis stresses the importance of a specific gendered identity for Indian women, while in the case of Lesotho, Ferguson argues that the World Bank redefined the population by manipulating information about their subsistence pattern. In the current global environment that registers ethnicity, race, gender, and to some extent class as important markers of social difference, contemporary development identities highlight these factors and people select specific sets of characteristics over others in order to define and target particular beneficiaries of development investment. The act of selecting from a range of possible targeted identities is what Kumar refers to as being “bearers of ideologies and values that actively give particular interpretation to the way development is strategized” (2003:74). In the case of imposed development identities, those development agents who are selecting particular ideologies, values, and sets of characteristics are the State and its corollaries, as well as international institutions.

However, as I noted in the above discussion, local people can also be “bearers of ideologies and values,” especially in ethnographic contexts where they are expected to participate in the development process, as in the process of Bolivian popular participation and in
La Bolivia Nueva (the New Bolivia, cited in Paulson and Calla 2000) where grassroots activism has become an inherent part of normal political and social life. These ideologies and values of development are directly related to the sets of characteristics that they choose to emphasize in development contexts in order to participate in development work. They construct their own development identities in these contexts, establishing what I call community-forged development identities. For the sake of simplicity, I use the adjective “community” to define this type of development identity, yet many of these development identities originate in grassroots organizations. Suffice to say that community-forged development identities include identities constructed by agents as both communities and grassroots organizations.

3.3 PARTICIPATION AND THE USE OF MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

In my research in three development contexts in the community of Huancarani, local people were constantly negotiating their community-forged development identity in response to the imposed development identities in each development context. Moreover, part and parcel of this negotiation process is knowing when, where, and how to underscore distinct aspects of identity. Indeed, I found that people usually participated in more than one development context in the community, and this participation requires that they accentuate different development identities in each. This is a complex process, one in which local people must acquire a thorough understanding of external factors in the process of doing development, such as the objectives and goals of State-level and international development actors, as well as a keen awareness of the specific collective development trajectory that they are attempting to establish. Yet having this knowledge is not enough; they must then use it to accommodate an imposed identity and/or
construct a more appropriate community-forged development identity within a specific development context. For example, in the case of the Adela Zamudio women’s group, residents accentuate particular different constructions of gendered identity – women – one which is aligned with the imposed development identity and one that is not. While the imposed women’s development identity of this group singles women out as the sole beneficiaries for development assistance, its community-forged development identity focuses on incorporating poor men as important beneficiaries for targeted development funds. In the first development identity, women are regarded as absent, non-participators, and in the second development identity, women are thought of as complementary partners to men. In order to successfully participate as lucrative actors in the development process, members of this group emphasize both competing and complementary roles of men and women, depending on their audience and their development objectives.

In Huancarani, depending on the context, local people have some power to use distinct aspects of identity on instrumental grounds. To participate in the process of development, members are required to slip in and out of various development identities depending on the context and the specific goals and objectives of development. On the surface, the process of accommodating, resisting, and forging developing identities can seem to entail contradictory ideas. However, Bolivians are accustomed to this sort of dynamic construction of identity. In fact, ethnographic research in Bolivia concludes that people identify themselves differently in different contexts, and these identities are used as a guide to affect their behavior in specific interactions with others (i.e., Paulson and Calla 2000; Crandon Malamud 1991; see Hale (1997), Rogers (2003), and Greenway (1998) for a thorough discussion of the cultural politics of identity in the Andes and in Latin America as a whole). Rather than conceptualizing identity as an
inherent, essentialized set of characteristics, instead Bolivians perceive identity formation as a system of relations. In doing so, identity formation is a systemic process rooted as much in contemporary relations of power as it is in historical understandings of race, ethnicity, gender, and class.

In her ethnographic fieldwork in Mizque, a community located south of the city of Cochabamba, Susan Paulson experienced first-hand the relativity of Bolivian identity, especially among market women (Paulson and Calla 2000). In order to illustrate the process of identity formulation, she details the day to day interactions of Faustina, a woman from Mizque, as she goes about her life as a potato farmer in the rural countryside and in her interactions with people in the city of Cochabamba. During a typical morning, Faustina harvests and gathers potatoes, readying them for sale in the market. While she works at home in her fields, her identity is formulated in relation to her family and neighbors around her. She uses the word *campesina*, or country woman, to refer to herself in this context. However, in order to get the very best price for her crop and secure a successful place in the market, Faustina must reconstruct her identity from *campesina* to *cholita*, a term referring to rural women who sell in the market. This is a transformation that requires modifications of dress, hairstyle, and style of speech. She puts aside her traditional clothes from Mizque to don the outfit indicative of vendors in Cochabamba, and washes and tightly braids her long hair so that those who transport and buy her potatoes won’t think that “she is a dirty Indian” and cheat her. When she is approached by men in the market, she speaks Spanish and competes flirtatiously to sell her produce, a common practice among market women and urban mestizo men. However, when urban housewives shop at her stall, Faustina interacts with them more humbly, speaking in mixed Quechua and Spanish when they address her as *waway* (literally, my child). Faustina utilizes particular aspects of her identity as a
rural market woman for instrumental reasons in her everyday interactions with a variety of people in different contexts – in her fields with her family and neighbors, transporting her produce to market, and in her market stall with potential buyers. The politics and economics of identity have profound implications for everyday interactions of Bolivian life.

However, while dynamic identity formulation is the norm in everyday life in Bolivia, Paulson and Calla (2000) charge that development policies in Bolivia are out of step with these relational understandings of identity. Policies like the Law of Popular Participation, Educational Reform, and Political Decentralization foster perceptions of a homogenous ‘undeveloped other,’ identifying them as indigenous, traditional, poor or at times even classless, dependent, gendered (women), and oppressed (as opposed to the strong, independent, cholita, like Faustina, who knows how to position herself for her own benefit). In effect, these development policies, advanced by the State and supported from both sides of the international political spectrum for different reasons (see Healy and Paulson 2000), connect essentialized characteristics of identity within a highly politicized development trajectory – forging a pluriethnic, multicultural nation-state. Paulson and Calla argue that ethnicity and gender have become important axes around which development policies revolve. Under these conditions, the State recognizes certain subjectivities as ripe for development, and policies are constructed with these people in mind.

It is not accidental that in most development efforts, as in most identity politics, target groups coincide with social categories that are marked in terms of class, gender and ethnicity. We do not design policies for ‘regular people’ (in Bolivia called ‘gente decente’ wherein decency indicates a privileged normalcy associated with a dominant class position). We design policies and projects to recognize and help poor people, Indians, women, single mothers, homosexuals, illiterates and the like. What is ironic in the Bolivian case is that these so-called “marginal groups” make up the vast majority of the national population (Paulson and Calla 2000: 132).

Paulson and Calla call for a rethinking of development policies that dismiss the needs of ‘regular people’ as irrelevant. They point out the importance of urban elites claiming a stake in the development of Bolivia; without their support of development objectives and agenda,
significant programs to help bolster health care, education, rural economies, etc. will always seem like programs to help the Other. In this environment, the gap between the rich and the poor broadens where services and facilities differ markedly for the poor and the rich.

Corroborating Paulson and Calla’s analysis, I found that in Huancarani, because identity in Bolivia is context specific, people who are often identified as having the right (read: targeted) identity in one context are often perceived as not being identified in the same way in another context. For instance, I found that sometimes people could be considered indigenous, and then at other times, these same people might be regarded as ‘regular people’ (albeit still poor). When development agendas and targets become linked with essentialized constructions of particular identities, those who are not targeted lose out. Sometimes this means that in one context people’s identities fit the characterizations of the target group, but they are not as fit when they are compared to others within the same context. For example, most residents of Huancarani speak an indigenous language as their first language, and many are monolingual Quechua or Aymara-speakers. Most women wear the traditional dress of either their places of origin (as the women from La Paz do) or clothing indicative of rural Cochabamba. In the Pirwa, one of the development context case studies that I present in Chapter Five, residents emphasize their indigenous roots and attempt to revalorize certain characteristics that they claim as indigenous knowledge. Moreover, in interviews with these same residents, they described for me many instances when they were discriminated against by urban Bolivians who yelled slurs like indios, referring sometimes to their dark skin, but more often indicating uncouth behaviors, or their manner of dress or speech (what Briggs and Mantini-Briggs (2006) indicate is referred to as maleducado in Venezuela). Nevertheless, despite all of these indicators that distinguish huancaraneños as ‘ethnic,’ and ‘indigenous,’ the community of Huancarani is often not
considered as ethnic as other communities in the municipality of Sipe Sipe. In the context of popular participation, the local governing body of Huancarani loses out year in and year out because communities who are earmarked as really indigenous receive more development funds and therefore can implement more programs and projects. Overall, I agree with Paulson and Calla that “… marginal groups make up the vast majority of the national population,” yet how a group measures up after the powers that be answer the question “how marginal?” is an important determinant of development targeting and has implications for their development success.

Because Bolivian identity formulation is dynamic and context-specific, I contend that the application of dynamic development identities is a logical transition. Residents of Huancarani use imposed development identities and/or community-forged development identities as guides in their interactions in specific development contexts. I found that in Huancarani, development as a concept and practice is also context-specific, having different political, economic, and cultural implications for communities and organizations. In light of this fact, I found that development identities are directly related to how people define their own proper and appropriate community development. Before I discuss development identities within specific development contexts in Chapters Four, Five, and Six – and the ethnographic circumstances that make identity a salient factor in community development – I turn now to an explanation of what residents in Huancarani mean – and don’t mean – when they think about and work toward community development. Consequently, this discussion explicates the framework for the synthesis of development work and identity formulation in rural Bolivian development contexts.
In order to gain a clearer picture of how residents of Huancarani understood the development process, I interviewed 30 people – a representative from almost half of all households in Huancarani – to unveil their thoughts about development: what it is, what types of projects foster development, and how they go about participating in the process of development. These questions engaged the informants in a discussion of: health care practices; environmental concerns; subsistence patterns and migration; social networks of mutual-aid; perceptions of cultural traditions and factors such as wearing traditional dress or speaking Quechua or Aymara; the degree of participation in development contexts in Huancarani; personal background information such as where they and their parents were born and where they have lived; and finally, socio-demographic indicators (i.e., how many years of education completed, how many children in the family, how many languages spoken, etc.). The median length of interviews was 90 minutes, but the range of interview lengths was between 11 minutes and 5 hours.

In order to maintain a representative sample among the heterogeneity of people who call Huancarani home, I used a purposive sample in that my informants were specifically chosen for particular characteristics of identity. Three-quarters of my interviewees were women (n=30), which is representative of the uneven gendered distribution in Huancarani. To account somewhat for the distribution of various ages in the community, I chose: 4 interviewees who were between 20-29 years old; 6 between 30-39; 7 between 40-49; 6 between 50-59; 4 between 60-69; and 3 between 70-79. Finally, interviewees were also chosen on the basis of their association in one of the three demographic groups in Huancarani that I describe in Chapter

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3 The list of questions that I used for these interviews is found in Appendix A.
Three: those who relocated to Huancarani after the mines were privatized in the highlands; those who married someone who relocated to Huancarani; and the new migrants who arrived in Huancarani during the mid to late 1990s. Overall, I interviewed 12 people who relocated to Huancarani, 8 people who married into Huancarani, 4 people who moved to Huancarani from Tapacarí, 3 people who moved here from the Yungas region of La Paz, and 1 person who moved to Huancarani after retiring from a job in the city of Cochabamba.

All of the interviewees take part in at least one development context because Bolivian law mandates participation in the community OTB. However, three interviewees do not regularly attend OTB meetings; they report that they attend about six monthly meetings annually and the rest of the time they send their older son or daughter in their stead. Fully half (n=15) of the interviewees participate in two development contexts. Fourteen of these are members of the Pirwa. The 15th person who takes part in two development contexts is the lone adult participant in the desayuno escolar (school breakfast) program. She prepares the daily meal for children during school hours. Finally, only two interviewees take part in three development contexts: the OTB, the Pirwa, and the Adela Zamudio women’s program.

The results of my interviews show that residents of Huancarani are very active participants in development work in the community. People have clear ideas about what development means and what it looks like. In their interviews, informants used a few different terms to express the concept of development: urbanizar (literally, to urbanize), mejorar (to improve), and desarrollar (to develop). Most people used these words interchangeably to mean

4 The school breakfast program is a vital part of children’s lives, and its objectives are to improve child nutrition in the region. However, I did not include this program in my discussion of development contexts in Huancarani because there is no forum for development discourse in school breakfast as there is in the other three development contexts. Nevertheless, I include this cook in my tally of people who take part in two development contexts because school breakfast is, in fact, development work in Huancarani.
the same thing: the improvement of community facilities, services, and residents’ economic, physical, and social well-being. Development projects that people would like to see completed in the community in the near future are: paving the roads in Huancarani; building a community center that does not belong to the founder of the Pirwa (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of this topic); building a cemetery; extending municipal sanitation services and trash collection to Huancarani; establishing an alternative education technical center that would allow residents to apprentice with skilled laborers and gain professional skills as carpenters, painters, weavers, seamstresses, etc.; attract more unskilled and skilled jobs to the community; draw public transportation to Huancarani; and restore the community church. These responses were uttered freely and with ease, giving me the impression that responding to my inquiries about future community development projects was not a difficult task for them. Indeed, the activities of residents in development contexts in Huancarani are quite extensive, and these activities give them insight into what needs to be done and the confidence to discuss these ideas.

Although I was impressed with the forethought and relevance of these responses, I was more impressed with interviewees’ abilities to express what they do not mean by development. In their responses, people deliberately go out of their way to make clear that while they want improved facilities and services – things they point out that are more often components of urban communities – they state that they do not want these benefits to be coupled with what they see as severe limitations of urban living: in other words, no social networks to rely on in times of need; the perception of increasing crime rates; a loss or de-valuing of traditions such as farming their family plots, food sharing during the holidays, and maintaining community fiestas; and outright discrimination from urbanites who disparage rural people. When interviewees discuss development, they advocate a specific type of development. Within their ideas for improving
community facilities, services, and economic prospects, interviewees explicitly and implicitly indicate that their development visions incorporate a strong desire to maintain and improve community well-being and social relationships.

Their responses pivot on three main themes in their discussions of what they perceive to be an essential link between their conceptions of development and improved social relationships and well-being. In the next few paragraphs, I lay out these themes and explain what residents mean when they refer to development as improved social well-being. These themes will become clearer when I provide a follow-up discussion of specific imposed and community-forged identities that residents resist and construct in particular development contexts. For the time being, I detail the themes, and then in the next section, I will demonstrate how these themes are taken up in the construction of community-forged development identities.

First, development in Huancarani refers to the maintenance and fosterage of what people consider indigenous knowledge. In this case, residents suggest that development work and activities must consider certain experiential knowledge that is rooted in their identity as rural people. They frequently discussed aspects of agriculture, medicine, education, and social organization as part of this collective experiential knowledge. For example, residents want to make sure that their children learn about the use of different herbs to maintain good health. They told me that they want their family plots to remain in their families, a daunting prospect in the current economic crisis that sometimes forces people to sell off their lands to the highest bidder. They want to maintain their community *usos y costumbres* (uses and customs) regarding the irrigation of their fields. They want to make sure that teachers at the local school speak Quechua

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5 Community custom dictates when and from where people water their crops. Each parcel of land comes with its allotment of water based on a strict schedule. For example, a particular parcel retains the right to be watered from
so that they can assist children with limited Spanish proficiency. They want to make sure that both women and men have access to development resources to strengthen their complementary roles in the family. And they want to make sure that development work, or improvements in the community, helps them sustain reciprocal relationships with neighbors – something that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5. As Julia so eloquently told me:

[Reciprocity] helps me when I need it most…. For example, when my parents died [within three months of each other], everyone in the community helped me with [funeral preparations]… I don’t know what I would have done without people coming together and preparing and cooking food, driving us to Sipe Sipe to make preparations… and a lot more…. You know, my sister lives in [a neighborhood in the city of Cochabamba], and she doesn’t even know any of her neighbors. When her husband’s mother died, [my sister] had to make these preparations almost by herself. Of course, I helped her, but none of her neighbors did…. When I mean develop[ing] Huancarani, I don’t want us to lose these [community obligations].

Julia’s vision of development in Huancarani is directly contrasted with urban development trajectories. She points out the importance of strong community reciprocal obligations in Huancarani and bemoans their absence in urban communities. Like Julia, all interviewees told me that they want to improve facilities and services in Huancarani, but not at the expense of the community’s strengths. They state that development that fails to incorporate their own way of doing things would be detrimental rather than beneficial.

Second, interviewees expressed that the signature mark of good development is balanced access to community resources. They appreciate ideas for development projects that seek to build relationships through improved access to resources, and development success is defined by a project’s ability to do this. Development, in this sense, is supposed to put the needs of the community over and above individuals’ needs. But this begs a broader question: are residents canal X on Wednesdays from 5am to midnight. Irrigation rules and regulations are extremely complicated because landowners frequently own parcels that have staggered schedules throughout the week from various water sources.
suggesting that Huancarani is some sort of utopian, harmonious community where individualism, competition, and struggle over scarce resources do not exist? “No,” responds José:

There is [inequality] in Huancarani…. There are many people who try to get ahead [at others’ expense]…. But without ways to help people, [this conflict over resources] will continue and get worse... Development projects must help the community so that all individuals have better access to resources, and this puts the [needs of the] community over specific individuals… [This way of thinking about development curtails individual] corruption, too.

José’s revelation that there is real inequality in Huancarani underscores the political, historical, and cultural differences between various groups of actors in the community. In Chapter Three, I discussed in detail three main groups in Huancarani: the people who relocated to Huancarani, the spouses who married into the community, and the new migrants to the community. These groups have differential access to economic resources along with various degrees of social capital in the community. Often, interviewees narrated stories of social discord in the community, and residents usually point to a differential access to resources as the source of this discord. In Chapter Three, I narrated many of informants’ stories when this occurs. But overall, interviewees define successful development as a trajectory that initiates projects which would allow residents to transcend these individual differences for the sake of community relationships. Therefore, ideal development refers to providing a framework that helps residents gain better access to resources and improve their social capital.

Finally, interviewees show that history matters in doing development, especially in development work that seeks to improve community well-being and social relationships. Residents of Huancarani originate from and have lived for long periods of time in many parts of Bolivia. The cultural diversity in Huancarani can often be a source of conflict in the community, where different people have experience doing different things and using distinct cultural schemas as their guide for thought and behavior. However, interviewees report that ideal successful development projects draw on this diversity and use it as an asset, not as a liability. As Máximo
assures me: “some of us [in Huancarani] have different ways of doing things depending on where we come from and what we were taught. That means that we have all seen different things work well to help communities, while other things hurt communities... This knowledge should help us avoid things that don’t work and encourage us to [pursue] things that do work.”

Moreover, residents also suggest that their past circumstances as rural residents unite them in development work in a struggle against poverty. They often use their “rural-ness” as a way to transcend individual cultural differences that sometimes divide them. However, this reference to a commonality is unlike prior social development thought. Their current conceptualizations of development differ starkly with the modernization rhetoric espoused by politicians of the mid-20th century that sought to undermine cultural differences in favor of a homogenous nation-state. Residents’ current definitions of ideal community development reveal that cultural diversity is respected and not forsaken for the good of a common goal. Yet they recognize that living in rural areas has given them some points of commonality, such as struggling against financially-strapped municipal governments which failed to distribute scarce funds to rural regions in the past before popular participation. Regardless of residents’ points of origin, the majority of them have had to socially organize in order to fight for services such as community-wide running water or public streetlights. Interviewees suggest that while community development benefits from cultural diversity, it also profits from their shared experiences as community activists.

These three themes – maintaining indigenous knowledge, building social relationships through balanced access to resources, and using historical antecedents in their own lives as guides for development work – were discussed time and again in conversations about ideal community development. And these themes form the basis for connecting particular
constructions of identity – or identities – to specific conceptualizations of development and development activities. In pursuing the improvement of facilities and services in the community, residents construct their own alternatives to development against the backdrop of what they consider to be both beneficial and injurious social change in other places. Understanding the way residents deliberately articulate and establish their own way of doing development helps us better grasp the links between development work and identity work – something that I illustrate in more detail in the case studies that I present in subsequent chapters.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

Development identity is a concept that I use to explain the way people accommodate and resist particular development practices that target specific groups of actors for development assistance. I distinguish two types of development identities – imposed and community-forged. These types are classified based upon who is selecting specific sets of characteristics, how much power the agent has to do this, and the repercussions of the agent doing this. The State and international-level development experts have the power to establish imposed identities, having implications for policies and programs that affect local people in development contexts. In turn, local people respond to imposed development identities by either working within the parameters of the imposed development identity, or forging their own community development identity that justifies their share of development assistance.

The social relevance of context-specific gendered, ethnic, and class-based identity makes pertinent the rationale of having a multiplicity of development identities. Participation in various development contexts offers local people the structure where they both recognize the imposed
development identities at work, and then make the decision to work with it or against it. Residents are extremely articulate about their own development trajectories, and clearly define their own development as *alternatives* to what they see as development-as-usual that they see elsewhere – development objectives and results found in the city, for example. Residents prioritize particular values in development work that accentuate the importance of indigenous knowledge, social relationships, better access to resources, and their past histories. These values become relevant to their accommodation, resistance, and construction of specific development identities depending on the development context – the topic of the following three chapters. Chapters Four, Five, and Six detail the everyday operations of three local development contexts in Huancarani and provide the requisite ethnographic grounding to illustrate the workings of development identities.
The OTB is about politics, but we put together [projects] to improve the community… that’s our main purpose in the OTB. Of course, we have to resolve conflicts that come up [in the monthly OTB meetings]…. But what matters most is the project that we plan for the [meeting of all OTB leaders] to be approved by the municipal government. Without this money, and without our planning, we get nothing. That’s what all of our work is for….

-- President of the OTB in the community of Montenegro (speaker’s emphasis)

Since the passage of the Ley de Participación Popular (LPP) in 1994, participation as a concept and practice has not only gained legal acceptance but also has grown to achieve political and social significance in everyday Bolivian life. For all intents and purposes, this law made rural regions “legible to the State” (Mosse 2005), whereby formerly ignored citizens are now legally mandated under the LPP to voice their needs and concerns, and expect a response about these concerns, from the municipality. Although the phrase ‘popular participation’ signifies a shift in political organization throughout Bolivia, in reality it serves as a tool so that communities can extract and garner development funding from municipal governments based upon their own proposals. As the president of Montenegro’s local governing body cites in the quotation that prefaces this chapter, participation may have a political purpose, but it first and foremost refers to participatory development. It maps out where people are living, the conditions in which people are living, and the priorities they designate for their own futures. The essential unit of the LPP – the Organización Territorial de Bases (the Grassroots Territorial Organization, or OTB) –
is both a political organization as well as the cornerstone of participatory development throughout Bolivia. It is the legally sanctioned arm of the State and an ever-present stakeholder in the process of local development. As such, it is a vital component in the formulation of development discourse throughout the country.

In the first half of this chapter, I describe those aspects of the LPP that help situate my study in its historical, political, and social milieu. I give a brief overview of the events that led to the passage of the LPP, as well as a short synopsis of the ensuing arguments that both support and critique the law and its implementation throughout the country. Overall, the literature confirms that the LPP has both strong benefits and serious deficiencies in the way that participation plays out in Bolivia. Next, I discuss the practical components of the LPP and the way it spells out exactly the way OTBs must legally participate. Throughout the discussion I use the OTB in Huancarani as an example, spelling out how they fulfill this legally defined participation. I base this analysis on information I gleaned from participant-observation that I conducted as a member of the local OTB, as well as from interviews with government representatives and OTB leaders from Huancarani and other communities.

The last half of the chapter examines the Huancarani OTB as a case study that points up ways that residents forge a particular development identity and the problems they have with this identity being recognized within the confines of the LPP. I then explain how the development identity conferred by the OTB in Huancarani – an identity that is based on their historical past as relocizados – along with their State imposed development identity as a junta vecinal often cripple their participation in the bureaucratic development process in the municipality. I end my discussion with an explanation of some key events that the OTB in Huancarani grappled with during my fieldwork, and continues to struggle with, in order to forge a successful development
identity but one that still allows them to both meet the legal requisites laid out by the LPP and improve the community in the way that residents see fit. By and large, in the process of fulfilling the requirements of the LPP, members of the OTB learn by trial and error that their lives are both subjects and objects of the development process, so much so that they must position themselves and underscore different priorities and needs in the community in order to successfully maneuver within the strictures of the municipal bureaucracy.

4.1 THE LPP – SETTING THE STAGE

In 1985, the government of President Victor Paz Estensorro created the New Economic Plan (NEP), a series of economic reforms enacted in order to curb exponentially-increasing inflation rates, sometimes as high as 2,177%, as well as to gain control of the country’s severe debt crisis (Klein 2003). These reforms, endorsed whole-heartedly by international monetary institutions, are incontrovertibly referred to as “orthodox shock therapy,” a structural adjustment program aligned with the neoliberal economic order that prioritized “currency devaluation, floating exchange rates, freed public sector prices, new taxes and more effective collections, and a severe cutback on government expenditures” (Klein 2003:244). In order to manage the country’s socio-economic problems (i.e., Bolivia had some of the highest illiteracy, morbidity, and mortality rates in the hemisphere, and continues to do so), Paz Estenssoro’s government responded with an entirely economistic solution, a solution centered on undoing the ideology of state capitalism that, ironically, Paz Estensorro had been responsible for implementing only years before. Along with the drastic reduction in national social spending, the government privatized the mining industry, eroding COMIBOL (the State mining corporation) and furthering national employment
problems. This resulted in a grave national economic recession. Although the government attempted to mitigate the social instability brought about by this conservative economic liberalism with a program called FSE (or “Emergency Social Funds” in English), poverty rates were left largely unchecked. The trickle-down effect, the expected result of economic deregulation, never materialized, and the gap between rich and poor broadened.

These economic policies led to a de facto process of political decentralization, in which the arm of the State became less directly economically invested within Bolivian industry. This shock therapy also was responsible for undermining the formerly powerful sindicatos (unions) as leaders in social activism, especially when COMIBOL was dismantled and thousands of miners were forced into unemployment. This left a political vacuum where labor had once dominated. Leaders of the emerging indigenous movement – primarily of the highland Aymara Kataristas – gained prominence in the burgeoning new political parties, in the largest struggling national unions (the Central Oberera Boliviana (COB), or the Bolivian Workers Central, and the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), or the Only Union Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia), and in their own right as actors in Bolivian civil society. Although a full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this dissertation, new actors vied for space and voice in the national political arena (see Albó 1994 for an in-depth explanation of these processes and events). By focusing their efforts on legitimizing indigenous culture in a country that had formerly prided itself on assimilating the Indian as part of the nationalist modernizing project, actors in the indigenous social movements sought decentralization as a strategy to divert more autonomy and decision-making power to the local level (Miró i Pascual 2000).
Furthermore, the Emergency Social Funds, set up as a safety net to soften the effects of structural adjustment, had rerouted control of some social spending (albeit very little) to the local government, serving as a precursor to the kind of local control and decision-making power expected under the LPP (Boris 1998; Grindle 2000; Boyd 2005). Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, the Minister of Planning under Paz Estensorro, had drafted the FSE program, after which he saw fit to use the tenets of this program that promoted local decision-making and development planning in order to create a more universal political agenda for the nation. When he became president in 1993, his political platform, the *Plan de Todos* (Plan for All), paved the way for more local institutional control of development matters, using the concept of participation that had been the demand of such varied groups as indigenous activists, NGO officials, national political figures, and international institutions.

4.2 PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL DISCOURSE – SOLVING LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS

Decentralization and participation became household words in Bolivia in the early 1990s, but only became prominent because of historical, social, political, and economic antecedents in Bolivian society. As Boyd (2005) points up, from the perspective of the Bolivian central government popular participation as a legal mandate aimed to redress three outstanding issues that had plagued the nation since the colonial era. First, participation could be used to draw municipal boundaries in territories that had been formerly poorly understood and insufficiently recognized by the federal government. Indigenous communities in rural areas – both of highland and lowland origins – often maintained their own political administrations that were somewhat
beyond the arm of the State. For instance, in the highland regions of rural Potosí and Oruro, Aymara- and Quechua-speaking groups use the political unit of the *ayllu*, which is a non-geographically bound, kinship-based political and economic unit that is loosely governed by a leader who oversees a complex system of reciprocal trade based on products gleaned from various ecological zones (Murra 1984; Murra et al. 1986; Platt 1982; Patzi 2004). Colonial rule had penetrated these rural regions, thus affecting the way that they related to the State, often resulting in a more entrenched resistance against centralized state power. Ayllus in these rural regions are bound to their own rules and norms, and although historically they were forced to pay tribute to the colonial powers, they have been left alone relatively-speaking to administer their own politics. Ironically, decentralization as municipalization brought about under popular participation was designed to actually rein in these groups and make them more accountable to centralized state power than they had been accustomed to in the recent past.

While participation was thought to assist rural groups in making their voices heard among those who had received more representation and those whose concerns had been previously prioritized by the State (namely, large urban cities), participation also more fully incorporates these regions into the national scope and makes local development contingent on this incorporation. Grindle (2000) notes that the Sanchez de Lozada administration used municipalization as a means to foster nationalist legitimacy, something Molina (2004) argues is an appropriate alternative to decentralization in the strict sense. Some, like Arias (2004), contend that this way of implementing decentralization has a “functionalist” component, compromising some autonomy in rural regions in order to improve them – regions which are generally the poorest and most dire places in the country. However, others (i.e., Booth et al. 1996; Albó’s interview in Arias 2004) argue that the way popular participation is written into
Bolivian law compromises too much. Under the guise of decentralization and democratic participation, critics of popular participation contend that rural regions lose power by which they make local decisions. Using the so-called carrot of development funding creates a dependence on the State that most of these groups fundamentally oppose.

Corroborating this thesis but focusing on different constituents, Conroy’s study (2002) of civic committees and popular participation in Bolivia found that decentralization-as-municipalization “decentralized conflict” while it “centralized decision-making” in the hands of the federal government. She argues that Sanchez de Lozada pushed for the LPP so that Bolivian regionalisms (based primarily on population centers in the highlands versus the lowlands) could be divided and conquered — an important feat for a national figure whose platform centered on opening up and deregulating Bolivian markets.

The second issue that popular participation sought to address is the widespread allegation of governmental corruption (Boyd 2005). Throughout Latin America, the expansion of Spanish colonialism since the 16th century encouraged varied forms of “clientalism,” or patronage, in which powerful Spanish elites and New World-born people of Spanish descent used local indigenous leaders to their own ends at the expense of indigenous peoples (Stern 2003, 1981). Indigenous leaders throughout rural Bolivia learned that it benefited them to place their loyalties with colonial administrators, administrators who often bribed local leaders for their support. This form of patronage was widespread and became the norm for many political relationships at the local, regional, and national level. Without a structured link between the varied levels of government, nor a formal method of accountability among the horizontal links between government officials, people have no way of verifying the validity of charges of corruption. However, Sanchez de Lozada’s administration believed that corruption might be curtailed under
the watchful eye of the LPP’s requirement of popularly-elected oversight committees (something I discuss more fully below).

The final issue that popular participation attempted to resolve is the problem of departmentalism, in which the state capitals used funds for their own benefit to the detriment of other regions whose needs were left unattended (Boyd 2005). For all intents and purposes, popular participation sought to remedy the urban/rural divide, a problem that had never been settled under the old political districting. Instead of relying on the state government to distribute federal funds to communities within their political boundaries, 311 initial municipal districts were established that were responsible for overseeing the equitable distribution of funds (IDH 2006; *Human Development Report* 2004; Jetté 2005). Therefore, the management of development planning and funding is closer in proximity to communities than it had been previously. Popular participation thus puts funds into the hands of local leaders who have a better understanding of how to distribute the funds in underserved, especially rural, regions.

Overall, popular participation was conceived and put in place by an administration led by a very wealthy businessman who had been educated in the United States and purportedly speaks Spanish with an American accent – hence his nickname, *El Gringo*. These factors presented an identity problem from the beginning of his political campaign and carried over into his administrations among groups in Bolivia who linked his foreign ties to his neoliberal political and economic agenda. Therefore, some argue (i.e., Arias 2004) that the LPP as it was designed has been the subject of severe suspicion and criticism because of this lineage. But popular participation has been more evenly studied and analyzed by myriad experts, and the general consensus seems to emphasize both advantages and disadvantages, especially for rural communities. By and large, scholars approve of the appeal to democracy that the law fosters.
Most critics of the law do not suggest that a dismantlement of the program would provide the much needed salve for the problems that the law generates, but they do argue that the law does not solve the issues that it was meant to that I outline above.

4.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE LPP

In order to better understand participation and how it is legally defined in Bolivia, I turn now to explain those parts of the Law of Popular Participation that spell out the everyday, operative, practical rules of conduct. I have first-hand experience with the day to day operation of popular participation, after having conducting participant observation in Huancarani’s governing body for 13 months. And I found certain aspects of the law to be instrumental in helping me understand why huancaraneños were doing what they were doing. In fact, in interviewing present and former leaders of the governing body, as well as residents who are required to attend monthly meetings, I learned that there are some parts of the Law of Popular Participation that are more widely known than others; it is these parts that I highlight below, as these are the crucial segments of the law that shape what I call the discourse of participation.

4.3.1 The law and the actors.

Law #1551, the Law of Popular Participation, was passed on April 20, 1994. Varied Supreme Decrees (executive-level modifications) were passed within the following years that clearly spelled out important aspects of participation, such as Decreto Supremo (D.S.) #24447 (December 20, 1996) which laid out the rules of political decentralization, and D.S. #26570
(April 2, 2002), which revealed all of the 2001 census data that would serve as the population benchmark for earmarked funds under the law (UPS Editorial 2004). In Chapter One, Article One of the LPP, the objectives of popular participation are clearly identified:

The present Law recognizes, promotes, and consolidates the process of popular participation articulating the indigenous communities, peasants, and urban dwellers, in the juridical, political, and economic life of the country. It tries to improve the quality of life for Bolivian women and men with a more just distribution and better administration of public resources. It fortifies political and necessary economic instruments to perfect representative democracy, facilitating citizen participation and guaranteeing equal opportunities at the level of representation for women and men (Ley No. 1551). 6

The law further explains that its goal is to “amplify competencies and increase resources in favor of the Municipal Governments, and to transfer to them the physical infrastructure of education, health, sports, neighborhood roads, irrigation, with the obligation to administer, maintain, and renovate them” (Chapter One, Article Two). In short, the law mandates citizen involvement in local governance – emphasizing the importance of women’s participation – as well as in the local administration and maintenance of key public affairs. Within the first few sentences, the law forefronts two important changes in the expectations of public life of Bolivian citizens: 1) the equal role of women as participants, and, 2) the power that local communities are afforded in publicly-run schools, clinics, sports facilities, water resources, and transportation.

6 All Spanish-English translations of the LPP in this chapter are mine.
Table 2. Acronyms used in the process of popular participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Development Institution</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. LPP</td>
<td>Ley 1551 – Ley de Participación Popular</td>
<td>Law of Popular Participation</td>
<td>Legally defines and mandates popular participation, which increases resources to the municipal and local governments from the federal coffers, as well as transfers the administration of social and environmental services to local governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OTB</td>
<td>Organizaciones Territoriales de Bases</td>
<td>Grassroots Territorial Organizations</td>
<td>The essential units of popular participation legally defined by the LPP. These organizations speak on behalf of the community when requesting county money for projects, and are the formal administrators of their own community public affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. POA</td>
<td>Plan Operativo Anual</td>
<td>Annual Operative Plan</td>
<td>The formal proposal submitted yearly by each community in order to request county monies set aside for community development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PDM</td>
<td>Plan de Desarrollo Municipal</td>
<td>Municipal (County) Development Plan</td>
<td>A document created and updated by the county at least every five years that: 1) analyzes aggregate data describing sociodemographic, economic, geographic, and political information of the municipality, 2) lays out a development vision for the county as a whole, and 3) provides budgetary expenditures for county and community development projects.</td>
</tr>
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The legally recognized “subjects” (Chapter Two, Article Three) of popular participation are the Organizaciones Territoriales de Bases (OTBs), or grassroots territorial organizations. Chapter Two, Article Seven of the law states that OTBs have the right to:

Propose, ask for, control, and supervise the carrying out of works… in the subjects of education, health, sports, basic sanitation, irrigation, community roads, and urban and rural development…

And the same Chapter, Article Eight dictates that OTBs have the duty to:

Identify, prioritize, participate, and cooperate in the execution and administration of works [projects] for the collective well-being…, [and] to participate and cooperate by working for the interest of the community….

Therefore, while OTBs have the power to oversee their own public works projects, they have the express duty to work together for the good of the community.

According to the law (Chapter Two, Article Three), OTBs can take one of three forms. They are “expressed as peasant communities, indigenous pueblos, and neighborhood groups, organized according to their uses, customs, and statutory ordinances [disposiciones].” With this
article, the law connotes juridical significance to ethnic and class-based groups which had never been previously afforded that distinction in Bolivian society. This article makes comunidades originarias/campesinas (indicating communities that claim indigenous heritage – a legal designation that is accorded to groups, in part, who have access to titles to their lands) and sindicatos (unions) “legible to the State” (Mosse 2005). In effect, they are allowed to operate according to their own rules and norms, but they must abide by the rules of popular participation, which I discuss below, in order to be eligible for federal development funds.

Table 3. Legally-defined types of OTBs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of OTB</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comunidad originaria / campesina</td>
<td>Original, indigenous, rural community</td>
<td>This type of community is accorded to groups who claim indigenous heritage legally due, in part, by having access to community titles to their lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sindicato</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>This type of community historically has existed as a union of workers in a nearby industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Junta vecinal</td>
<td>Neighborhood Group</td>
<td>This type of community is neither a comunidad nor a sindicato, and has submitted to the municipality a libro de actas (book of meeting minutes and attendance), proving that they act as a group to make political/community decisions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTBs are responsible for their own everyday operations, but they must submit yearly reports to request the municipal government for funds set aside for popular participation projects, and they also must account for the ways that these funds are spent. These reports are passed on to the departmental level, which are then accounted for finally at the federal level. The LPP, therefore, acts as Foucault’s panopticon (1995), in which the State simultaneously has a presence in these communities without actually maintaining administrative positions physically within these communities. The LPP via the OTB makes communities more within reach of the State, especially with regard to the knowledge of the size of their populations, the physical states of their communities, and the networks that they have established with other development organizations to improve their communities, such as NGOs.
Along with original/peasant communities and unions, there is a third legally designated OTB – the *junta vecinal*, or neighborhood group – that communities have formed in order to fulfill the requirements of the law. OTBs that are designated as juntas vecinales have neither the legal classification of an ethnic-based group, nor do they have the historical organization that defines them as a class-based union. Huancarani’s OTB is a junta vecinal. In fact, many communities, in both urban and rural regions, have been classified as such, and roughly two-thirds of all OTBs throughout Bolivia legally participate as juntas vecinales (INE 2006). In effect, according to the law, these three distinctions – indigenous pueblos, peasant unions, and neighborhood groups – are State-recognized development identities, and later on in this chapter I show that these designations matter in the way that OTBs relate to the State.

The law states that within the political boundaries of each community, there is allowed only one OTB. A community applies to be an OTB, free of charge, by submitting in part their *Libro de Actas*, or their record of meeting minutes, and then filing a document that states the names of the community leaders. In order to meet these requirements, OTB meetings must be held throughout the year, but when and how these meetings are established is completely at the discretion of each OTB. Based on informal interviews that I conducted with 25 community leaders at one of the three annual meetings of all OTB leaders, it seems that OTBs who hold monthly meetings are the norm. Furthermore, most OTBs fine their members if they fail to attend the required monthly meeting, making participation in OTBs a significant marker of Bolivian citizenship. Huancarani’s OTB was approved in 1995; in order to file as an OTB, they used their Libro de Actas from their monthly community meetings that they had held since 1989 to springboard their community water project (discussed in Chapter Two).
The operations of the LPP at the municipal level are overseen by a Cómite de Vigilancia, (vigilance committee). According to Title Two, Article Sixteen, these representatives, called consejales (advisors), are voted into office, and the number of advisors per municipality depends on the number of inhabitants. In the case of the municipal district of Sipe Sipe, a region that has “a population of up to 50,000 inhabitants,” five advisors sit on the vigilance committee. And in order to maintain gender balance, at least two of these advisors must be women so that the committee fulfills the national objective to enhance women’s participation. During my fieldwork, two women and three men were elected to fill these positions on the vigilance committee. As one member of the Sipe Sipe committee emphatically told me:

Our job is to represent the people of the municipality. At no time was I appointed by the mayor. That is really important. I happen to disagree with the politics of [the current mayor]. But I don’t have to [agree with him]. I want people to understand that I am not someone who works for the administration, so they can be frank with me and really work with me to help them improve their communities (speaker’s emphasis).

These advisors work as ombudsmen, so to speak, for the good of the communities. On more than one occasion, I witnessed community-wide meetings that had been called and led by the advisors in order to resolve issues that communities had experienced when attempting to propose projects to the municipal government. By and large, the advisors are the people to whom community representatives resort when they face problems in their own OTBs and act as mediators between members/leaders of the OTBs and the officials in the local government.

The mayor’s office is also responsible for carrying out the goals of popular participation. Members of the mayor’s staff – especially the county treasurer – have the job of making sure that they have current information about the status of communities and their needs for development projects. Frequently, they do community visits with local leaders in order to assess communities’ strengths and to ascertain where they might need funds to improve. In conversations with municipal staff, I learned that they had extensive knowledge of the status of
some communities, but they admitted that they had less information about others – a problem that I will discuss later on in this chapter.

### 4.3.2 Objectives and goals

According to the LPP, the main objective of the OTB is to voice their community needs to the municipality in a formal proposal called the *Plan Operativo Anual* (Yearly Operative Plan, or POA) (Title Three, Article Twenty-three), and this proposal must be “in agreement with the municipal budget.” Each community must submit a proposal indicating what type of project they will embark on over the upcoming year, how much money they estimate the project will cost, how much they propose to receive from the municipality, and finally if there are any other organizations (i.e., local NGOs) who will be financially contributing to the project. The community must have knowledge not only of the total cost of a project, but they also must know that they are capable of spending the allotted money on the subsequent items of the project within the year the funds are disbursed. According to the law, if the money that has been disbursed for the project is not spent within the year, the funds are then returned to the municipality and the community is allotted nothing for that year.

Each year, the leaders of all of the OTBs within every municipality meet to discuss the POA projects and decide how these proposals will be funded. In Sipe Sipe, the leaders meet three times a year in meetings called summits (*cumbres*). The first of these summits is held in October, a short time after all of the POAs are submitted to the district from the OTBs, and is dedicated to informing all of the OTB leaders about the budgetary needs of the municipality and the funding sources from the federal government. The second summit discusses all of the proposed POA projects, adds up all of the requested budgets of the projects, and then matches
this sum to the reality of the municipal budget – a dismal prospect for the district because they often find that revenues do not cover proposed needs. This was the particular summit that I attended, an eight-hour all day meeting in a large municipal room attended by over 150 OTB leaders, advisors, and representatives from the mayor’s office. The final summit notifies all of the leaders as to which projects have been approved for funding and which proposals have been modified for funding. In the end, all communities that submit proposals receive funds, but the mayor’s office might disperse funds for projects that were not proposed because they decide it might be money better spent. Along with attending the second summit in Sipe Sipe, I received all of the paperwork that had been distributed during the three summits during 2005 (i.e., spreadsheets laying out the municipal budgets, detailed descriptions of all POA proposals, analyses of the status of all schools and health facilities throughout the municipality, etc.) and I interviewed local leaders in Huancarani and other nearby communities as to their experiences and interpretations of the events held during each summit.
The municipality itself, under municipal ordinances and along the lines of the community POA, files a *Plan de Desarrollo Municipal* (Municipal Development Plan, or PDM) with the state government. While communities create their own POAs from year to year, the municipality, together with local NGOs, analyzes aggregate municipal-level data and then an NGO underwrites the PDMs for the municipalities. The municipalities are obliged to update their PDMs and resubmit them to the department at least every five years. The PDMs provide a detailed profile of the municipality as a whole, highlighting data that: 1) describe the socio-demographic make-up of its residents, 2) lay out the physical geography of the region, 3) outline economic indices of the communities, 4) delineate the networks of international and national organizations present in the municipality that work with the OTBs to carry out local POAs, and
finally, 5) sketch a *Strategic Vision of Municipal Development*. This sketch targets areas that are especially lacking throughout the municipality, for example areas such as “Aspects of Education” and “Aspects of Productive Economics.” It also details the types of projects that the municipality has been working on and the organizations that they have partnered with in order to complete these projects. And finally, the PDM lists all of the POA projects that LPP monies have been dispersed to over the last five years, itemizes the budgets of all of these projects, and indicates in which communities the projects have been implemented.

Funding in part for the proposed POAs are generated at the federal level and referred to as “*Coparticipación Tributaria.*” As it is laid out in Title Three, Article Twenty, coparticipación tributaria “is understood as the transference of resources arising from national revenues and public universities for the exercise of the defined competencies by the law, and for the fulfillment of popular participation.” These revenues generated by the federal government are then distributed to the “municipal beneficiaries” – the OTBs – based upon a delineated amount per inhabitant per community (Title Three, Article Twenty-one). These funds are thereby placed directly into a municipal “purse” (*bolsa*) and then dispersed to communities upon the approval of particular POA projects. Ninety percent of coparticipación tributaria must be used exclusively for popular participation (Title Three, Article Twenty-three), meaning that they must be dispersed according to POA budgetary needs instead of being used for municipality expenditures, i.e., salaries of government employees for municipal services such as park maintenance, the court system, etc. Added to the overall funds in the municipal purse are monies from additional sources, such as international loans for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH), funds generated through established contracts with
gas companies operating within the country. But these monies are earmarked for other mandated programs and for the most part are not part of the funds used for POA projects.

All in all, I use this discussion to help point out the importance of community participation in the dispersal of funds to OTBs. Coparticipación tributaria is the lifeline of community development, and the POA is the vehicle in which OTBs have access to these funds. Without submitting annual proposals, communities have no access to these monies. Next, I explain how these various facets of the LPP operate in the municipality of Sipe Sipe.

### 4.4 PDMS AND POAS IN THE MUNICIPALITY: PRIORITIES AND GOALS

The 2001-2005 PDM for the municipality of Sipe Sipe was written in 2001 by representatives of the municipal district along with colleagues in a local NGO called PRIDESAMA (Programa Integrado para el Desarrollo Social Agropecuario y del Medio Ambiente). The project was funded by the departmental prefecture of Cochabamba, the mayor’s office in the municipality of Sipe Sipe, the Programa de Apoyo Presupuestario del Reino de los Países Bajos (the Program of Budgetary Aid from the Kingdom of Holland), and the Proyecto de Inversión Rural Participativa (the Rural Participative Investment Project – a Bolivian program through the federal government). Writing a PDM every four or five years is no easy task. It is a legal document containing more than 450 pages of graphs, maps, charts, schedules, formularies, and text that describe the municipality, define objectives, and lay out a vision for the future of the region.

For the purposes of my discussion here, I want to specifically outline the “tree” (arbol) of development objectives laid out in the PDM. Overall, the municipal district is focused on
“fortifying and developing different municipal productive bases in an organized, planned, and participative fashion to accede integrated, sustainable, harmonious, and equitable social development in its entirety” (PDM 2001-2005:116). There are four branches underscored in this tree that describe the primary aims of development in popular participation in the municipality:

- “To promote the sustainable use of natural resources, renewable and non-renewable.

- To diminish the migratory flow [emigration], bettering the quality of life and the opportunities for community members to work.

- To utilize appropriate technology in agricultural, animal-husbandry, micro-business, and artesenal production, and to foster the improvement of tourism while bettering the transportation and neighborhood infrastructure of the municipality.

- And to fortify the municipality of Sipe Sipe, the OTBs, and public and private institutions with activities of articulated and interrelated empowerment [capacitación]” (PDM:116).

Based on interviews that I conducted with local advisors in Sipe Sipe, these objectives are coterminous with the stated national goals of fostering the development of community infrastructure that creates the necessary conditions for people to stay and business to flourish in rural regions. In reality, says doña Feli, one of the advisors who worked with Huancarani to put together their 2006 POA project, representatives from the mayor’s office who approve or reject proposals actually use these objectives as guidelines or targeting criteria. In other words, most projects are rejected outright if they fail to secure funding for: basic sanitation services; irrigation; public streetlights (alumbrado público); improvement of roads, central plazas, public outdoor markets, and public equipment storage edifices; health clinics (mainly postas
sanitarias); education, especially the construction of classrooms and/or schools; and sports facilities.

In 2006, there were 81 POA projects approved by the municipality for LPP funds. Table 4 breaks down the types of projects and the numbers of each that were approved in 2006 (p. 166). In all, there were nine different categories under which all 81 POA projects fell in 2006. The total amount requested of popular participation funds for POA projects was 3,866,700Bs (US$483,337.50), and the range of requested and approved funds for these projects was 1000-560,000Bs (US$125-70,000). The most expensive POA project, the final phase of the construction of a school within the urban district of Sipe Sipe, was funded for 560,000Bs (US$70,000). However, the most expensive project proposed and approved for a community outside of the urban zone of Sipe Sipe garnered 200,000Bs (US$25,000) for the asphalting of a road in the community of Parotani. The average amount of money approved for POA projects in 2006 in Sipe Sipe was 47,737.04Bs (US$5,967.13). Because the average fails to represent the typical disbursement of funds (because there are some very high and very low disbursements that are atypical of actual funds for most POA projects), the median sum, 30,000Bs, (US$3,750) better represents how much communities received in funds in 2006. (Please see Table 3).

The above discussion lays out the fundamental facets and actors of popular participation in Bolivia: LPP; OTBs as juntas vecinales, sindicatos, and pueblos originarios; PDMs; POAs; vigilance committees; representatives in the mayor’s office; partnering local and international NGOs; and local leaders of OTBs. Describing these elements was important in order to provide a clear understanding of the complex process of partaking in popular participation in Bolivia. Additionally, I analyzed data from Sipe Sipe’s PDM and documents handed out at the three summits in the municipality in 2006 to offer a general picture of which types of POA projects get
funded and how much the municipality spends on approved POA projects. In the following pages, I turn to a more focused examination on the experiences of residents of Huancarani in their own OTB and how they participate in their own development process under the legal watch of the LPP.

4.5 PARTICIPATING IN THE OTB IN HUANCARANI

OTB meetings in Huancarani are held every month and are publicly announced the morning of the meeting using the megaphone announcement system that is hooked up to the church belfry. During my fieldwork, I attended a total of 16 OTB meetings in Huancarani: 9 regular OTB meetings and 7 emergency meetings. In addition to regular monthly meetings, often additional “emergency” meetings are called so that the community can resolve issues that cannot be postponed until the next regularly scheduled meeting. All of these seven additional meetings that I attended were held to discuss some problems that had arisen regarding the 2006 POA project. Overall, OTB meetings were important to my research in that they provided a space where residents openly discussed the resolution of community problems and how these resolutions articulated various conceptualizations and strategies of “doing” development.
Table 4. Approved POA projects in 2006, municipality of Sipe Sipe, Bolivia ($n=81$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of projects</th>
<th>No. of approved projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic sanitation projects (infrastructure for potable water, sewerage, water tanks and wells)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Irrigation (construction costs and equipment for canals and irrigation wells)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amplifying existing rural electric networks</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Urban and rural infrastructure (constructing gymnasium and municipal hot-spring pools in downtown Sipe Sipe, as well as building vehicular bridges and constructing edifices in rural markets and principal plazas)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Constructing and maintaining roads</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Constructing health facilities (posta sanitaria)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Constructing educational facilities (amplifying school buildings or buying lands for school facilities)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Developing and promoting sports (buying lands and constructing sports facilities)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Preventing the risk of natural disasters (constructing defensive walls and dams in rivers)</td>
<td>3 ( \text{TOTAL} = 81 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.1 Positions of leadership in the OTB in Huancarani

In November 2004, just two months before I began my fieldwork in Huancarani, the OTB held general elections for the positions on the mesa directiva (the official board): the positions of president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. The positions of juez de agua (water judge) and operadores del sistema de agua potable (operators of the running water system) were not up for election and the same people from the year before continued in these positions.

The president in 2005 was a 55 year old single man named Vicente. He is a relocalizado from a well-known and respected family in the community, known for maintaining good agricultural fields and contributing well to the maintenance of the community. Although being president of an OTB carries enormous responsibilities, this was Vicente’s first charge ever as an officer on the OTB. In one of the interviews that I conducted with him, he admitted to me that
this is one of the first real positions of leadership he has ever had in his life. Furthermore, Vicente also confided to me that he never wanted to be president and has severe limitations in the position. Even worse, he told me, is that former presidents in Huancarani have been men that have had more “experience with outsiders.” He explains that

…for example, don José lived in Switzerland, runs a business in Cochabamba, and has a lot of experience working with people in government and organizations. Don Máximo, he lives in Sipe Sipe now and is the president of their OTB, so he really knows how to do this [be president]. And don Mateo made his career in the military in Cochabamba. He was a professional, so he knows how to deal with other people [in a professional way]. But me? I’m a farmer. I used to be a miner. I am a worker, and I’ve never been a leader. I don’t really know how to help Huancarani the way it needs to be helped. But I’m trying and learning. I am very humble… [C: Does the municipality offer any capacitación training7 for new presidents?] If they do, I never heard about or received any. I think they used to, but not anymore. I learn as I go along…

As Vicente makes clear, he has some limitations as president of the OTB. Vicente speaks Quechua and Spanish, but he is very self-conscious about speaking Spanish in front of large gatherings because he speaks with a heavy Quechua accent and he mumbles notoriously. This makes it difficult only for members of the OTB who don’t speak Quechua. OTB meetings are generally in Spanish, but there are many times that he will speak purely in Quechua. Often, monolingual Spanish-speakers in the OTB complained to me that even when Vicente speaks Spanish, they don’t understand him because of his mumbling. Another factor that impedes him from completing his tasks as president of the OTB is that Vicente is badly needed in his family fields year-round. He is often kept in his fields until after 6pm, which means that the monthly OTB meetings usually start without him present since they are supposed to begin at 5:30pm. Furthermore, since all of the summits in Sipe Sipe are in the middle of a harvest season, Vicente was unable to attend two of the three meetings – a serious shortcoming in a bureaucratic system that recognizes the president of the OTB as the final arbiter in the process of popular

7 Literally, this word means empowerment, but here I use it to mean capability, as it is commonly used to refer to training someone to perform certain duties.
participation for the good of the community. And finally, Vicente is a poor reader and writer, and although he asks for help with certain tasks in the past, he has incorrectly filled out forms or misunderstood directions because of this deficiency.

However, Vicente is highly respected in the community, evidenced by his nomination to the position of president and then unanimously voted into the charge. Although he is not altogether very charismatic, he is persuasive in meetings and people respect his opinions. He is immensely aided by the assistance of his vice president, and the two of them function as a good team. (Please see Isichei (2005) for analysis of how this compares to other “village intellectuals” in other locales).

The vice president of the OTB in Huancarani is Oscar, the son-in-law of a prominent relocalizado. He is one of the encargadores, or directors, of the Pirwa (see Chapter Five), so he has quite a bit of responsibility in community development contexts in Huancarani. He was born and raised in Cochabamba in an upper-middle class family and is a monolingual Spanish-speaker. Trained as a professional agronomist, he works on a large farm owned by his wife and his father-in-law in Huancarani on lands that were bought at one time or another from desperate community members who were forced to sell parcels of land to survive economically. This impedes his social capital in the community for some people because they see him as an outsider who is literally consuming the livelihoods of other residents. Oscar is very comfortable speaking in front of large groups, and his contributions during OTB meetings are thoughtful, measured, and solution-oriented. He is patient and a good listener, yet he has no problem redirecting members of the OTB who fail to stay on task, discuss things out of turn, or avoid trying to resolve problems. His leadership skills are well-noted in the community, and his strengths and weaknesses complement those of Vicente well.
The secretary of the OTB is Jaime, a relocalizado of another well-respected family in the community. He is dependable and fulfills his duties well – keeping shorthand meeting minutes and transcribing them into the record book, recording attendance at meetings, and maintaining the schedule of events that take place in the OTB and informing everyone in a timely way (such as scheduling and announcing community clean-up days, scheduling mandatory cleaning shifts of the community water tank for every resident, etc.). He speaks both Quechua and Spanish comfortably, and often translates during the meeting for both monolingual Quechua and Spanish speakers who do not understand comments in either language.

And finally, the OTB treasurer is Tomás, the only non-relocalizado officer, who is a new migrant from the department of La Paz. He is an evangelical convert, father of seven children (all of whom live with him or nearby), an ex-manager of the Cami mine who receives a pension each month, and holds a salaried job in the nearby community of Suticollo. He was nominated to be treasurer of the OTB “because as un hermano (a Christian), people could count on me not to steal or cheat the OTB.” Although he has had some problems in his position in the OTB (see Chapter Two) and he is regarded as an outsider by birth as well as religiously and culturally as an evangelical Christian, he is well-respected in the OTB and takes his charge seriously as the collector of monthly water and electric bills and the fines that members accrue when they break OTB rules.

4.5.2 The monthly OTB meeting

On the first Tuesday of every month, I started the 15-minute walk to the elementary school in Huancarani at approximately 5:15pm. Always the gringa (a word referring to a foreigner from the global North), I found myself arriving on time at 5:30 only to discover that only one or two
older women had arrived before me. Generally, I could count on doña Marina preceding me. As I arrived, I would walk over to sit by her side on the wall near the school gates, greet her with the customary *buenas tardes*, and then was easily rewarded by her smile and her rapid-fire questions in Quechua about my family as well as my health. One by one, women began trickling over to the school, women who had just finished cooking the last of their families’ *cena seca* (literally translated as a “dry supper,” usually rice, potatoes, and a bit of meat and vegetables cooked in a sauce) and still had the smell of finely cut fresh parsley on their clothes. More often than not, only one or two OTB officers would arrive by 5:45pm, and someone would inevitably yell over to a child playing nearby and ask them to run to one of the missing officer’s homes to remind him or her that it was, in fact, the day of the meeting. The officer who arrived first would open the school gates, and everyone who had been sitting outside the school would begin filing into the school courtyard and then find a seat in the classroom designated for the meeting.

Most of the meeting attendants were women. At all of the OTB meetings that I attended, over 75% of the roughly 60 people at the meetings were women, and 10% of the attendees were teenagers who had been sent to the meeting in their parents’ stead. The attendants sat at old wooden desks in hard benches, two people (or sometimes three small women) to a bench, with individual desks for the OTB officers in front of the classroom chalkboards looking out over the meeting. The first grade classroom was the one most used for OTB meetings, and the desks were built to scale – meaning that I always had a difficult time fitting my knees under the desk in front of me as I waited for the OTB president to call the meeting to order. Usually at approximately 6 or 6:15pm, the meeting was called to order as the last officer walked up to his place at the front of the room. It started with a roll call. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was quite confused when the names on the list were called, as I noted that many of the names that I
heard were not names of the people who answered “presente” in response. But I came to understand that the secretary of the OTB called out the names of the socios, those names of the people who owned homes in Huancarani and had water installed in their homes. Homes of absentee landlords, who at the time were living in Oruro, La Paz, or even overseas, were rented to residents in Huancarani who in fact were registered as members of the OTB through the name of the landowner, not by their own name.

During roll call, the meeting room would begin to get crowded, and as the benches filled up most attendees were required to stand at the back of the room. Children waiting for their parents or older siblings who attended the meeting played right outside the open door and windows, creating a low drone that often drowned out the voices of the speakers in the meeting. After roll call, the next order of business was called correspondence, meaning that an officer read aloud any memos that had been sent over the month to the municipality from the OTB or anything from Sipe Sipe that had been sent to Huancarani. Usually there were very few letters to be read, and sometimes this section of the meeting was skipped altogether.

The next order of business was sometimes the longest: dealing with the distribution of water in the community. People who had failed to pay their water bills for more than three consecutive months were called upon in the meeting to do so. The person charged with reading water meters and documenting water usage, doña Sofía, distributed a spreadsheet laying out the funds collected for water bills in the community for the month and informed community members when she deposited the collected money in the community account in Quillacollo to cover the necessary expenses. As the water judge, it was her job to go from house to house throughout Huancarani once a month to read the water meter and record the month’s household consumption. It was also during this time in the meeting that newcomers to Huancarani or
people who newly requested water services in their homes verbally appealed to the community to add them to the water *socios* list. Often, a heated discussion ensued of the exact location of the newcomer’s house, those who argued taking great pains to make certain that the location of the home was in fact within the boundaries of Huancarani and not in the neighboring community of Sorata. But once provenience was established, the new socios would receive a timetable and payment plan to cover the installation fees (US$150 – a large sum of money for all residents that was usually paid for over the course of one year) and then the residents would applaud to welcome the socios as genuine members of the OTB. During my fieldwork, five new water socios were added to the membership of Huancarani’s OTB.

The last part of the meeting was called *puntos varios* (various points), and this was the time for residents to bring up questions or concerns for the community to resolve. Sometimes, but rather infrequently, residents used this time to air a grievance about a problem they were having with a neighbor or another community member. One such issue came up at a meeting between the community and the *portera* (school live-in caretaker) who was accused of running a sewing business out of her home, consuming exorbitant amounts of electricity with her electric sewing machine and leaving the community to pay the cost (one of the perks afforded the school portera). She did not deny the fact to her fellow residents that she did indeed run a cottage industry out of her free living quarters. Instead, she argued that as a portera she should be paid for her work, but since her only pay had been the use of the portera’s quarters and free utilities, she should be allowed to run this business out of her home. The head of the school board attended this particular meeting to clear up any misconceptions about the portera’s position. In the end, the portera was told that she had signed a contract that said that she would never receive a salary for her position, and that the only remuneration that she would be offered was a free
apartment and utilities. She was forced to either give up her business or renounce her post as portera. She chose the former, but many residents months later alleged that she continued her business by rigging up an electric cable to another home in the neighboring community of Valle Hermoso in order to offset the large amounts of energy that her machines consumed.

Yet most of the time, this part of the meeting was a time to discuss problems that residents in the community faced together, problems that arose as a result of changes in the community brought about by local industry or the municipal government itself. It was also that part of the meeting that oriented residents to the regulations of the LPP regarding how to put together POAs and formulate new projects. Discussing community problems, as well as residents’ perceptions of LPP activities, gave me ample opportunity to explore the ways residents articulated different discourses of development. Throughout the ensuing discussion, I show that the community’s process of attempting to solve these issues forged a development identity that focused on their solidarity as social activists, historically rooted in their experiences in the mines of highland Bolivia. In order to illustrate this, I detail two such issues: one that surfaced in an OTB meeting, and the other that occurred in the construction of Huancarani’s 2006 POA proposal to the municipality. I point out how particular structural limitations at the municipal level, as well as the community’s lack of information, resources, and confidence regarding how to maneuver within the strictures of development in Bolivia, resulted in suspended resolutions and stalled development. In the end, their development identity as residents of a junta vecinal who use social activism to root out injustice in the community was not enough to allow them to pursue community development as they saw fit.
Before the March 2005 OTB meeting, I arrived at the school gates at 5:30pm and found don Mateo talking excitedly with Oscar outside the school courtyard. With a worried look on his face, Oscar walked over to where all of us were sitting, as we waited to be let onto the school grounds to start the meeting. Rather brusquely – uncharacteristic in all of my dealings with him, I noted – he told us to hurry into the appropriate classroom and we were going to start the meeting on time. “Compañeros (friends), we have a lot to talk about,” he said.

Without the presence of half the membership and the president, Oscar started the meeting at 5:40pm. There were no letters to read aloud, and doña Sofia had very little to report on that month as the water judge. When the time for various points arrived, Oscar stood up and narrated two related events that visibly troubled everyone present at the meeting. Mateo and doña Melisa had told him on two different occasions that they had witnessed problems down by the river that marked the southern boundary of the community. First, while Mateo was driving his truck home from the market the day before, he saw a truck that was owned by the local chanchería (pig slaughterhouse) driving erratically and much too fast for the bumpy, dirt path that residents in Huancarani call the main street. As the truck rounded the corner that led to the slaughterhouse, two children came out of the bamboo field next to it rather unexpectedly. The truck made no attempt to slow down or swerve to miss the children, and the two children were forced to jump back into the bamboo field out of the way of the truck. The truck driver than blared his horn, and at that time Mateo heard the passenger in the truck laugh. Mateo stopped to help the children up and out of the fields. One of them was crying, having ripped his pants and wiping away blood from his nose, and the other child had a bump on his head from hitting it on a large tree stump.
As Oscar was finishing up this recount of the events that happened, Mateo stood up and said that this was not the first time that he has seen workers from the slaughterhouse drive without regard for the heavy pedestrian traffic on Huancarani streets. Many people then stood up to support this, telling of times that they had seen similar tragedies.

When people had finished narrating their eye-witness accounts, Oscar went on to tell the OTB of an additional event that I personally witnessed that week in the communal work group (see Chapter Five for a discussion of these work groups). The Wednesday before the OTB meeting, as the work groups were working at the Pirwa, doña Isadora asked me if I had seen all of the trash on the ground that day at the top of the street that led to our neighborhood. I told her that I had seen it and wondered where it had come from. Doña Rosario, who had overheard our conversation, said quite matter-of-factly, “oh, it was the truck that dumped that trash.” We all looked at her with confused faces. What truck, asked Oscar? By now, most of the members of the work groups had stopped working and were listening to our conversation. “You know,” said Rosario, “the Sipe Sipe truck that comes every week with the trash and goes to the river.” Isadora, Oscar, and I said simultaneously, “what?” Then, Melisa came over and said that she had seen the truck many times in the community but had no idea where it was going or what it was doing. The community of Huancarani does not have trash collection services, owing to the lack of funds in the municipality to serve communities lying beyond a certain distance from Sipe Sipe. So the presence of a garbage truck was perplexing.

Serendipitously, the truck drove by the Pirwa about 30 minutes after our conversation began. Oscar ran out to the truck and stopped it to inquire what it was doing there and where it was going. All of the members of the work group walked out to witness the conversation. Oscar came over to me to ask me if I had brought my camera with me to the work group that week. I
told him I had, and then he asked if I would run with him to follow the truck to see where it was going. As we followed the truck to the river, Oscar told me that the driver of the garbage truck told Oscar that he regularly hauls a load of trash to the river to dump it in a place that was within the boundary of Huancarani. When Oscar told him that that was against the rules and not permissible, the driver told Oscar that he was just doing what the mayor’s office told him to do. Oscar and I arrived at the river just as the truck was dumping a mound of garbage right on the banks of the river. Oscar used my camera to take pictures of the garbage as well as the truck with the symbol and name of the municipality on the door. A man walked over to the truck driver and asked what Oscar was doing with the camera. The driver told Oscar that the land that he was dumping the garbage on was owned by this man. Oscar told the landowner that this sort of dumping is not permissible in Huancarani. “It destroys the river, and it sickens the children,” he said as he pointed to a group of children that were picking through the trash and playing with some old toys they had found in it. The landowner said that since he owns this land, he can do what he wants with it. Oscar asked him if the municipality was paying him for this, and the landowner walked away.

When Oscar retold this story to the OTB a week after this event occurred, he finished the story by saying that he had taken the photos to the mayor’s office and demanded an explanation for the dumping. The mayor had no explanation, but promised that the dumping would cease. OTB members were furious that the mayor failed to explain why the dumping had occurred, but they commended Oscar for alerting the mayor which led to the cessation of the dumping. But some members said that the road to the river – the same road on which the pig slaughterhouse was located – should be regulated with a tranca (a toll booth limiting passage). Others suggested that the slaughterhouse and the mayor’s office should be fined or should pay a use tax for
operating their services in the community – services that they said polluted the river and endangered the residents of the community, as in the erratic truck driving. Several people then stood up to state that they had seen workers from the slaughterhouse throw pig carcasses in the river as well as other types of entrails and organic matter. “This kind of environmental pollution is hurting our health and our children,” said Melisa. Throughout this discussion, four different people reminded OTB members that if this sort of thing had occurred in the mines, they would have protested and stopped working in order to force the company to successfully resolve the issues. “No matter if you own land here or you rent, these problems will harm you. We all live here, now let’s act like the workers we are and stop this!” cried Tomás.

However, others in the OTB rejected the idea of fining or taxing the municipal government and the businesses that work in the community. They suggested that if the community taxed and fined businesses that had chosen to operate in the community, then there would be far fewer jobs for community residents because no business would ever choose to relocate their business in Huancarani again. “We need money from popular participation,” said Matilda, “and that money comes from Sipe Sipe. Do you think that they will give us money if we try to fine them?” Throughout the meeting, there was a ratio of about three comments favoring the sanctioning the slaughterhouse and the municipality for every comment that opposed these sanctions. Once residents began to reject suggestions that favored fines and toll booths, the conversation started to din. But after some time, it was decided that someone from the municipality should come to Huancarani to inspect the slaughterhouse to verify the alleged egregious pollution. Residents also wanted the government official to mediate a discussion between community leaders and the owner of the slaughterhouse so that drivers would slow down and stop driving erratically. It was decided that a commission of four representatives from
Huancarani would go to the mayor’s office the next day to see about the inspection and mediation.

Over the next couple of weeks, I surveyed some of the OTB meeting’s attendants about the resolution of these problems. For the most part, the majority of residents were not satisfied by the outcome. “Hardly anyone from Huancarani works at the slaughterhouse,” said Julia. “We don’t need them to be here – they need us. They should pay us for the use of our road. They should care about us since their business is in our community.” “A toll on the road would stop making it easy to dump things in the river, and it would probably make the truck drivers from the slaughterhouse take a different route to work, which would help keep our children safe,” said Sofia. “We have to make them care [about us].” I asked people if they thought that the inspections and mediation would work. Clara argued that:

Nah, these things will not help us. I think that coming back to Huancarani [after the mines in the highlands closed] has made some of the relocalizados soft – they never would have suggested [this course of action] in the mines. We used to stand up for ourselves. I say that we still can and should. [C: But isn’t going to ask the municipality for help supporting the community?] No because the municipality is hurting us too! Didn’t you hear that in the meeting? How can we trust [the inspector from the mayor’s office]?

But some people who I polled responded positively, saying that the solution was heavy-handed enough to crack down on the existing problems without hurting the community in the long term. “At least something was done about it,” says Martina. “I just want the [erratic driving and the pollution] to stop.”

These events pointed up a very important dialectic for community members. People’s perceptions of the strategy the OTB chose to resolve these issues highlight the particular development identity that the community is trying to forge. On one hand, residents struggle with their desire to use their honed social organizing skills – skills that they learned while living in the mines – to support their community, and on the other hand with their assessment that they may
be forced to accommodate regional actors who have, or might have, the power to harm the community in some way in the future. Their development identity as compañeros who work together to try to keep outsiders from harming their residents is a product of their history and social class as workers, regardless of stark differences that set distinct groups apart from one another in Huancarani. This collective identity transcends individual differences that pervade the community: differences in language use, ethnic heritage, socioeconomic status, and dress. And as members of an OTB that is registered as a junta vecinal, this collective identity makes sense. Residents attempt to find a commonality that they can use to forge an identity that will help them succeed in protecting and improving the community in order to work together to solve community problems.

Maintaining development identity is never more pronounced as it is when the OTB as a group must come together to solve a problem that involves someone or another entity (such as the slaughterhouse) considered an outsider. Their collective development identity as worker/social activist is not drawn upon when residents have problems with other residents, as is shown in the case of the portera and her home-based sewing business. Although in some ways a portion of residents feel that their development identity is sometimes too “soft” in its expression, or fails to mimic strategies that were successful in the past, most residents feel that their development identity has been fairly well maintained. However, as we will see in the next section, in some cases it is exactly this collective identity that impedes their community development.
4.7 FORGING DEVELOPMENT IDENTITIES: CONSTRUCTING AND DEFENDING THE POA, AGAIN AND AGAIN…

4.7.1 Huancarani: a development failure?

Residents of Huancarani for a long time were well-known throughout the municipality as members of a strong, united community, given their history as successful activists who fought hard for water resources in the 1980s. Before their community OTB was accepted as a junta vecinal in 1995, it was a relatively organized community in the municipality. And even before it was an official OTB, the community elected officers of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and vocals (positions at large). Since 1987, they have held community meetings at least once a month, sometimes as often as once a week, and the libro de actas documents minutes from meetings held since 1989. However, according to two representatives in the vigilance committee and two former presidents of the community, Huancarani is no longer considered an organized community. Primarily, Huancarani has lost this distinction because of its relative failure to propose successful POA projects and to garner external funding or to raise sufficient contrapartes (counterpart funds, meaning funds raised by the community to augment donated funds from NGOs or the State) in order to carry out their proposed projects.

The first time that the POA (the yearly community proposal for county development funds) is mentioned in Huancarani’s record of meeting minutes is November 9, 1999, and these notes indicate that the community had to meet before the next regularly scheduled meeting to discuss the POA. Since this time, Huancarani has proposed yearly projects, but the projects have not necessarily been carried out. According to the PDM of Sipe Sipe 2001-2005, the proposals that Huancarani has recently submitted and been approved have garnered funds to:
2001 – augment the potable water system (to purchase a water tank for the community).

2002 – buy land to construct a multiple use sports field.

2003 – cobble-stone the streets throughout the community.

2004 – enlarge the irrigation system.

2005 – modernize the community’s central plaza.

However, after interviewing past OTB presidents and other local officials, this list of projects is not correct. These officials corroborate that the project that the PDM (the county development plan) lists for 2001 is correct (buying a water tank). But they all told me that in 2002 they proposed to cobble-stone the streets, in 2003 they were awarded funds for a new canal system in a sector of the community, and in 2004 they proposed to buy some land for a multi-use field (cancha múltiple). The 2005 project was never proposed, and officials told me that they had never heard of such a project being suggested for the community. After these officials showed me copies of the submitted POA proposals for the years 2001-2004, I contend that the officials’ list of POA projects is correct, not the PDM’s.

Nevertheless, of the accounted for POA projects in Huancarani, only the water tank has been purchased and set up for use. The canal, cobble-stoned streets, and the playing field have all not materialized. A past president of Huancarani’s OTB, don Máximo, reports that the LPP funds from the municipality for these projects were “put back into the municipal purse” at the end of the years in which the money was awarded because Huancarani failed to spend it within the time allotted. Máximo, a 77 year old relocado, now lives in Sipe Sipe because health problems prevent him from walking to the clinic everyday from Huancarani. He is very politically active in the OTB in Sipe Sipe, as well as in the workings of the municipality as a past
When I asked him why Huancarani has failed to carry through with their POA projects, Máximo told me:

I blame both the community and the municipality. First, the municipality waits a very long time before the money is dispersed. Then, they want the community to turn around and spend it in a very short time. For example, the municipality gives the community money to spend for the project in October, and then the community has to spend it by November. Or, as has happened more recently, Huancarani was supposed to get an estimate to [the municipality] by October for how much a project was supposed to cost, and then they would have given Huancarani the money…. But Huancarani didn’t know this, so they let the time lapse and then this money was taken from them…. The municipality wants to give the money to organized communities, communities that will work to spend them and spend them well. Huancarani has not done this.

When I asked him why Huancarani hasn’t done its part in this process, Máximo explained that

There has been no capacitación training for new presidents in the OTBs in Sipe Sipe for a long time. We used to have it, but there’s no money anymore. I think a foreign NGO used to run this training, and now they are no longer here. Cristina, [the leaders] just don’t know what to do. [These presidents] don’t know how to do their job. But I don’t blame them. This is all very tricky, and I try to help them when I can. But I’ve got my own worries, you see?

Then, as the interview was ending and I was packing up to leave, he said to me, “and of course, Cristina, Huancarani is the wrong type of OTB.” I asked him what he meant by this, and he went further: “to get more funding in Sipe Sipe, you have to be an indigenous or peasant community. That’s just the way it is.” This last statement – the fact that Huancarani garners less funding for their POA projects because it is a junta vecinal and not a “comunidad campesina” – was not the last time that I heard this sentiment: it was also echoed by doña Feli, one of the representatives of the vigilance committee, during the process of proposing the 2005 POA project in Huancarani.

In the next section, I discuss Huancarani’s process of constructing the 2005 POA project in order to explain how this community’s distinction as a junta vecinal – their legally defined development identity – limited their success in popular participation. Although the rules of the
LPP are seemingly straightforward, the process of popular participation is not as simple as it would first appear.

4.7.2 The process of constructing the 2005 POA

In late October 2005, I woke up to hear an announcement booming from the church megaphone that there would be an emergency OTB meeting that evening at 6pm. At the communal work group that day, residents were discussing the raison d’être of the announcement. Although no one had specifically told them, everyone I asked told me that that night’s emergency meeting was called to plan the POA project for the next year. Among themselves, the women in my group suggested various projects for the community yearly project: building a new cemetery, paving the main community road, building a meeting house for the OTB, pave the community’s central plaza with cobble-stones, and re-furbishing or completely reconstructing the community church. “This is a very important OTB meeting, Cristina,” they all prompted me. “You need to be there.”

At 6pm, members of the OTB were allowed inside the school grounds. This was an impromptu emergency meeting, and the teachers did not leave the key to one of the classrooms like they have done every Tuesday for the regular meetings. So, we all sat outside on the stairs that led up to the kindergarten classrooms. Since Oscar had worked in the city for his father-in-law all day, and therefore did not hear the announcement that had been broadcast in the community all morning long, he was absent from the meeting. But the rest of the leaders were present, standing in front of the seated residents alongside two people who I had never seen before. Vicente introduced them as advisors from Sipe Sipe named Omar and Feli. Vicente began by saying that Huancarani had a problem. “Since we wanted to fix the church this year –
many people have told me that they wanted this to happen – I went ahead and wrote up the POA plan for this project,” admitted Vicente to the group. “But the advisors are here to tell us that we can’t do that project.” And then he stood back and indicated to the two guests from Sipe Sipe to speak.

Both of the advisors were dressed in business suits (slacks, button-down shirts with collars, and jackets (the woman’s was short-sleeved)), something that I have rarely seen in Sipe Sipe, much less Huancarani. Omar was the first to speak. In Spanish, he briefly and rapidly explained that fixing the church was not something that popular participation monies were able to fund. The OTB would have to come up with a different POA project very quickly, since there was less than a week left to put in a POA proposal before the municipal deadline. He said that he and Feli were prepared to stay for the remainder of that night’s emergency meeting so that they could help residents of Huancarani “put together an appropriate POA.” I could sense from the expressions on residents’ faces that they were confused, but I was unclear as to why they were confused: was it because they did not understand why fixing the church was not an option, or was it because of the more fundamental problem that they were not part of the decision-making process when Vicente decided to propose the church POA plan in the first place? But clearly, Omar’s explanation did little to assuage anyone, and no one said anything when he stopped talking.

Then, Feli began to speak. She is a quick-witted, articulate woman who seems very comfortable with her role as ombudsman for the OTBs of Sipe Sipe. Her first question for the OTB was spoken in Quechua: “how many people want me to speak like this (jayq’a runa munanku que nqá parlani kajijnachu)?” I then heard chuckling from her audience, and people started to laugh and banter light-heartedlly with her in Quechua: “yes, yes, she’s one of us!” She
smiled widely before launching into a 15-minute prepared speech in perfectly inflected Quechua in the local dialect of Cochabamba. She told the crowd that if they failed to draw up a new POA project, then they would lose their opportunity to garner funding that year. The mayor’s office – “who I don’t work for,” she repeatedly told us – decided that POA monies are not earmarked for fixing churches. Her only stated reason was that fixing churches is “just not part of development.” “But this project meets the priority of the municipality to encourage cultural preservation, and our church is part of our heritage, part of who we are,” said don Martin. Feli did not deny this, but nevertheless said that the municipal government will not approve a POA project to restore the colonial-era church. The community must draw up a new POA project, she explained, there was no other way. She told the group that POA projects must be agreed upon in the community, and she strongly encouraged women to participate in deciding on the final project. “It is women who live in these communities, raise their children, care for the homes. They know best what needs to be done in the communities. So speak!” she instructed animatedly. She went on: “You know,” she said, “all of the Sipe Sipe money is going to indigenous communities – do you know that? The [federal] government thinks that they are the poorest and need the most to develop their communities. But what about you? Huancarani needs this money, don’t [you]? Don’t let your money get put back in the municipal purse!” After Feli was finished, both she and Omar sat down on a ledge of a school wall and listened to the meeting until 7:30pm, when they told the group that they had another meeting to attend in the highlands at 8pm.

For the next three hours, the residents of Huancarani discussed prospective new 2005 POA projects. Vicente presided over the meeting, but we all noticed that don Mateo, a past president of Huancarani, had drifted to Vicente’s side to help him guide the group to make their
decision. Four projects were chosen as the finalists and voted upon: building a new community center, extending the network of street lights, constructing another community well, and paving the community streets with cobble-stones. By the end of that meeting, the community decided to draw up a first priority proposal to fund a project that would pave the streets of the community with cobble-stones, with a second priority proposal to fund another well for the community. While the project topics were clearly chosen, the community had not discussed the cost of the projects, nor the timeframe that would be needed to complete them – two necessary factors that must be addressed in the proposal to the municipality.

This POA was submitted the next day to the municipality of Sipe Sipe. I had an interview scheduled with Oscar the day after the emergency meeting, and when we met to conduct it, I first asked him why he hadn’t attended the meeting the night before. He looked confused and told me that he didn’t know about it. “Did they choose a POA project?” he asked me. I told him that two advisors had met with the community to explain why the project that had been first submitted – restoring the church – was inappropriate and that we had to decide on something else. Oscar appeared even more confused with that statement, and asked me when we had proposed that POA to restore the church? I told him that Vicente informed us that he had submitted it after some people had expressed interest in the project. Oscar told me then that he had had no idea that that proposal had been submitted. “So now what did we finally propose?” I told him about the cobble-stoning project, and he scowled.

Cristina, some people here think that development means what the United States did to their nation in the 1950s. There’s no reason why we need our street cobble-stoned. That’s crazy (qué malaña)! But, since we decided this democratically... unlike Vicente just writing up the [church project], I respect this decision. But I don’t agree that this should be a first priority proposal.

One week later, the second summit of the year was held in Sipe Sipe for leaders of all 67 communities in the municipality. Because there were no female officials on the board of the
OTB in Huancarani, I attended the meeting to represent the interests of all Huancarani women along with Vicente and Oscar. Doña Victoria, one of the encargadores of the Pirwa, also attended this meeting as an official from her own OTB in the nearby community of Montenegro. Women in Huancarani told me that sometimes women from the community who were not official representatives of the OTB attended the municipal summit. In fact, doñas Sofía and Julia told me that they had attended the meeting to represent Huancarani women in previous years. At this meeting, representatives from the mayor’s office presented the entire group of over 150 leaders with a power point presentation indicating the projects that communities proposed to do, and how the mayor’s office modified the proposals if it was needed. The day was filled with nonstop presentations – the meeting progressed even over the lunch hour, when small wrapped plastic containers that consisted of dried beef (charque), hard-boiled eggs, hominy, and a tomato, pepper, and onion salad were distributed to each attendee while they listened to community proposals.

The presenter finally addressed Huancarani’s project at 1:30pm, right as we were all finishing our lunches. Vicente, Oscar, Victoria (who knew of our cobble-stoning proposal), and I were all surprised that the mayor’s office informed the entire meeting that our second proposal too had been rejected. He announced that the amount of money that we had proposed for the cobble-stoning project, 40,000Bs (US$5,000) “wouldn’t have cobble-stoned 100 meters of the road,” he said. He went further to say that “cobble-stoning the road is also not really a necessary project in Huancarani.” Instead, he told the people in attendance that Huancarani would have to come up with yet a third proposal or lose the opportunity to garner funding that year. Oscar raised his hand and told the presenter that although Huancarani had been awarded funds to buy a

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8 See Chapter Five for an in-depth discussion of women’s participation in OTBs.
tract of land to build a multi-use field the year before, they had been having a hard time finding land that cost under the amount of money awarded (20,000Bs, or US$2,500). Oscar asked the presenter if it would be acceptable to combine a sum of money from this year’s popular participation funds with last years’ funds so that they could buy a big piece of land to construct a suitable field? Although the presenter admitted that he was unaware that Huancarani had not spent the money from last year’s POA, he liked this new idea very much, and he said he had the authority from the mayor to accept any “appropriate alternatives if projects needed to be modified.”

At the final summit at the end of November, Huancarani officials were notified that the multi-use field project for the 2004 and 2005 POA projects would garner a total of 48,500Bs (US$6,062.50). Therefore, in 2005 Huancarani was given 28,500Bs on top of the 20,000Bs that they had been awarded in 2004. The presenter warned community officials that if they did not purchase the land by October 2006, then they would forfeit all of the funding from both 2004 and 2005 POA budgets.

Constructing the POA is a complex process, and by and large is not entirely a product of the community that constructs it. As the story of the process of constructing Huancarani’s 2005 POA exemplifies, local communities must propose projects within a narrow framework of what the municipality defines as “appropriate development.” The State had much to say about the ideas that Huancarani proposed, and in the end the mayor’s office rejected their POA twice before they accepted a proposal that essentially piggybacked an already accepted proposal from the year before. POAs – the vehicle to community development funding from the State – and their construction require communities to reorganize and shift their priorities dependent on the needs of the State and the needs of other communities. While coparticipación tributaria funding
is based on the numbers of people inhabiting the municipality, the amount of money each community receives is rooted in the budget of the proposed project. Therefore, those communities that are deemed “neediest,” or simply propose more expensive projects, receive more funds than others. In my research in Sipe Sipe, I learned that the politics of how the State regulated these funds was dependent on how the State targeted funds for various types of communities. And these community types were based upon the cultural politics and the political economy of identity (cf. Healy and Paulson 2000), having profound effects on the process of accepting and funding POAs in Sipe Sipe.

4.8 TARGETING INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES AND THOSE THAT GET LEFT BEHIND

During the summit that I attended, I discussed some important issues with doña Feli, one of the advisors who had informed Huancarani of their POA problem the month before. I asked her what she had meant when she told the community that LPP monies were being unevenly dispersed in the municipality, favoring projects proposed by indigenous communities. She replied in a matter-of-fact manner, noting that:

The government of Sipe Sipe is choosing to invest more money in indigenous communities. Well... because of all the political protest and activism throughout the country, this is the case all over Bolivia.... So, communities like Huancarani do not come at the top of the list for having their proposals approved.... Lamentably, residents in Huancarani have to work harder to get their projects approved. They also don’t have as many resources.... Government [officials] go to the [indigenous] communities and work with them to help them put together their proposals. The OTB in Huancarani doesn’t get this, do they? It was a very bad position for Huancarani when they only had an evening to construct another POA – and then they had to do another one when they arrived at this summit, didn’t they? This means that the things that they want to get done, can’t… and they have to do what the government advises. But the government doesn’t know Huancarani well at all. Now, they do visit indigenous communities frequently so that they can get an accurate [assessment] of what they need in their communities. But they have no idea about what Huancarani needs. This is the problem for communities like Huancarani. [C:
Later on at the summit, I asked Máximo, the former resident of Huancarani who was active in one of Sipe Sipe’s OTBs and in the vigilance committee, if this was indeed true – did he suspect that indigenous communities in Sipe Sipe were favored over other types of OTBs? “Yes,” he replied:

This is one of the problems I am personally working on. People in the government, at all levels, seem to think that because a community is labeled a comunidad, then they have more needs and are poorer than others. This is simply not true in Sipe Sipe. In fact, there are many juntas who have more problems than indigenous communities in development…. There’s no difference [between the two types of communities]. Sure they live further away from Sipe Sipe. But people who live closer to Sipe Sipe don’t have more money [asuntos economicos]. Nah, we are all indigenous in a sense… don’t we speak Quechua or Aymara in Huancarani? There are many people who are uneducated in Huancarani. In fact, some people migrate there from the comunidades, and we then have to help them. Yes, this is a problem…

Most of the leaders at the summit who are the most vocal, he told me, are members of OTBs that are labeled comunidades. They received capacitación training when it was offered in Sipe Sipe, but leaders of juntas and most unions were not invited to receive this training, he said. When I asked why, he responded with a sigh and said that the government thinks that only leaders from these communities need help understanding and participating by the rules. “But as we talked about before, Cristina,” he said, “all of these communities have problems with popular participation.” I asked him who funded these capacitación trainings, and he said it was the municipal government with the assistance of the foreign NGO who helped write the PDM (the Program of Budgetary Assistance from the Kingdom of Holland). He said these organizations “wanted to help indigenous people, not poor people,” he said wryly. “In their minds, these are two different things, two different kinds of people. Huancarani does not fit in with the winners.”

I quote these two leaders in order to illustrate the local perception that certain communities are targeted for more assistance and funding than others in the municipality. This
is a hard charge to prove, but I found some startling facts in various sources that I used to analyze both the way the government categorized particular OTBs and the sums of monies and that were set aside for these communities. In the entire municipality of Sipe Sipe, there are 19 OTBs that the PDM categorizes as *comunidades campesinas*, a term used to designate those communities who have original titles to their lands. Again in the PDM, there are 18 OTBs labeled *sindicatos*, and 32 are juntas vecinales. This document also records the particular legal resolutions at the department and the municipal levels that determined when and how these OTBs were formed. All of these OTBs were legally instated as *sindicatos* or *comunidades* between 1994 and 1999, except for five which, at the time of the writing of the most recent PDM (2001), were “*en tramite,*” meaning that their paperwork was in the process of being legally approved. All of these communities “*en tramite*” indicated that they were to be classified as *comunidades campesinas*.

Supposedly, these data were taken from information provided by the Cochabamba prefecture, gathered for the most recent national census in 2001. These national census data became available before the publication of the PDM that I used to research this problem. These census data are available publicly and I used the census in order to triangulate the data from the PDM. However, I noticed discrepancies between the PDM and the census. There were 23 discrepancies between the classification of OTBs in the PDM and those put forth in the census; in other words, OTBs labeled in the PDM under one type were not consistent with the label that the census data affords the same community. Out of these 23 discrepancies, 17 of them were labeled either *sindicatos* or juntas vecinales in the 2001 census, yet they were reclassified as *comunidades campesinas* in the PDM. Since the PDM indicates the date that the OTB was legally approved as an OTB under one classification, and the PDM specifies that these data
originate from the 2001 census, it is not possible that these discrepancies were a product of a process that sought to legally reclassify these OTBs (i.e., submitting titles that claim that residents are in fact original dwellers). Therefore, I researched further to try to understand why these discrepancies occurred.

When I looked further at those 17 communities labeled comunidades in one document and sindicato or junta in another, I noticed some surprising problems. Four of these communities that the PDM labeled comunidades campesinas are located near Huancarani – Montenegro Central, Villa Pankuruma, Montenegro Zona 1, and Valle Hermoso. During my fieldwork, I had either interviewed the leaders of these communities or these leaders were friends and family members of some of my key informants. When I asked the leaders of these four communities how their communities were legally classified, all of them unequivocally said that they were juntas vecinales, not comunidades. They had no titles to their lands as comunidades, they all told me. Since Feli and Máximo told me that comunidades were targeted to receive more financial and technical assistance with their POAs than other communities, I turned to the summit reports to see how much money each of these communities had received. I found that these four communities garnered above, sometimes well above, the median\(^9\) \(30,000\text{Bs}\) that the communities in the overall municipality received:

- Montenegro Zona Central received \(50,000\text{Bs}\) for a new irrigation well.
- Montenegro Zona 1 received \(92,500\text{Bs}\) for the installation of potable water.

\(^9\) I use median figures here in order to show the amount of money that is generally given to fund development projects throughout Sipe Sipe. The mean figure calculated for both reclassified and not-reclassified communities is much higher than the median figures (\(50,000\text{Bs}\) and \(75,000\text{Bs}\), respectively). Most often, communities received approximately \(30,000\text{Bs}\) for their project, as the median suggests (\(50,000\text{Bs}\) for reclassified projects, as I state in the next paragraph), not \(50,000\), as the mean suggests. The mean figure is much higher because there are a handful of communities who received much more than the median figure for their development projects, thus driving up the overall means for all community projects.
• Villa Pankuruma received 50,000Bs for an elevated water tank.

• Valle Hermoso received 35,000Bs to buy a piece of land for a football field.

Before proceeding further, I want to point out here that it is somewhat problematic to compare the amounts of funds that different communities received for the 2005 POA projects. Communities propose all types of different projects, and inevitably, these projects garner varied amounts of funds that coincide with the needs of each project. But in the cases of the communities that I found have been reclassified as comunidades campesinas but are instead juntas vecinales, I want to show that they in fact have received more funding than communities that have not been reclassified. The median cost of their POA projects is 50,000Bs, well above the median cost of the POA projects as a whole. As the experiences of constructing Huancarani’s 2005 POA project shows, some communities that propose projects that are unaffordable are outright rejected and/or modified (like Huancarani’s proposed and rejected cobble-stoning project). Yet the projects that these communities proposed, although relatively expensive, were nonetheless approved.

4.9 CONCLUSIONS

Overall, my objective in detailing how much these four communities received is to argue a political, not an economic, point: it seems that according to these data, and corroborating the claims that Feli and Máximo have alleged, some communities that have garnered larger amounts of funding have been reclassified as comunidades campesinas from their legal development identities as juntas vecinales. PDMs are submitted at least every five years to the departmental prefecture to demonstrate that they are abiding by the rules and regulations of the LPP. Claiming
that comunidades campesinas have been approved to carry out more expensive projects would seem to help the municipality meet the national goals of abetting the development of indigenous, isolated, rural people. However, the OTBs of Montenegro Zona 1, Montenegro Zona Central, Villa Pankuruma, and Valle Hermoso are not legally distinguished as comunidades campesinas. Yet the document that is regularly submitted to the departmental government indicates that these communities, in fact, are. In order to make sense of this, I submit that these discrepancies point out how important it is not only for communities themselves to forge the right development identities to garner as much funding as possible (read: development identities rooted in indigenous ethnicity), but how essential it is for municipalities to justify to the prefecture that their spending priorities favor communities who are legally identified as ethnic in origin. The most effective development identity, as a comunidad campesina, is necessary, although not sufficient, to gain access to more development funding than a community that is categorized as a sindicato or worse as a junta vecinal – as is the case of Huancarani.

The Popular Participation Law, in effect, has opened new doors for rural communities to access municipal, and then by extension, federal monies for development projects that local people themselves design. While initially a demand of both the right and the left in national political discussions, popular participation works to empower local communities, especially in rural regions, to implement projects that they deem necessary. However, as we see in the case of the municipality of Sipe Sipe, federal priority-setting restricts municipalities in a peculiar politics of exclusion, wherein POAs submitted from legally designated indigenous or peasant communities are favored over and above development plans from communities legally defined as neighborhood groups. In fact, the pressure to conform to these priorities is so great that in accounting for budgetary expenditures, municipalities find it necessary to redefine communities
targeted for development funding to fit the federal priorities, as we see in Sipe Sipe. My point is not to expose these practices as unethical, but to point to problems that municipalities must deal with when communities are targeted based upon narrow definitions of those who are deemed the most fit or the most in need of development resources.

Of course, in this political environment, the development needs of local communities are far from completely met. Therefore, grassroots organizing and voluntary organizations work throughout Sipe Sipe to fill some gaps in finances and other development assistance. The following two chapters discuss the role that two voluntary development contexts play in development planning in Huancarani – the Pirwa and the Adela Zamudio peasant women’s group. Participation in these groups is heavily influenced by the way that the State spells out popular participation overall. Furthermore, these organizations have various degrees of connection to the OTBs in the region and to the development work that is carried out in rural communities. As my subsequent discussion details, development identities, both imposed and community-forged, also become vital to the work that is designed and implemented in these two voluntary contexts. In these contexts, the Popular Participation Law and development targets of the State become a point of departure for development work, which has varied implications for the success of development efforts undertaken in the Pirwa and the women’s group.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE PIRWA AND THE POLITICS OF MITIGATING HUNGER IN HUANCARANI

Relationships are more important than money in the Pirwa. Relationships are better for people’s health… their spirits… We left the mines and came back here and we have had to put our community back together. We have been doing it ourselves; we put the community first.

-- José, founder of the Pirwa in Huancarani

Besides the OTB, the Pirwa is the most energetic and vibrant of all of the development contexts in Huancarani. Fully one-third of the families in Huancarani are officially members of this collective – 20 members and two administrators – and there are at least five families on a waiting list, hoping that a current member will be unable to fulfill their obligations and a new family can replace them. In effect, the members of the Pirwa are some of most active community residents in all development contexts, and it is impossible to talk about development in Huancarani without discussing the activities of this group. In its third year of existence, the Pirwa and its community programs have quickly gained a place of prominence in Huancarani; the organization touches the lives of almost all of the residents in the community and is singled out as a stakeholder in various development projects undertaken by other development contexts, such as POA projects of the OTB (see Chapter Four). Most importantly, the Pirwa is the premier site of voluntary development in Huancarani, and in being so is one of the most important locations of the formulation and reformulation of development discourse in the community.
This chapter describes the Pirwa and the community programs for which it is responsible. Chapter Three describes the founding of the Pirwa in detail – tracing its roots from community political activism in the 1980s that grew into a formal, internationally-funded, community development context; thus I only briefly summarize its founding here. Instead, I concentrate on the Pirwa’s daily operations, its programs, and its mission as an organization. I provide a profile of those community residents who choose to take part in the programs, especially the adult members and the administration of the signature program, *trabajo comunal* (the communal work group). My analysis of how the Pirwa and its members define participatory development draws mainly on the events and activities of the communal work group program, although I also refer to another project, the children’s after-school program, in order to exemplify key points or to contrast differences between the two programs. Finally, I end the chapter with a discussion of the relationship between the philosophy and objectives of the Pirwa and the actual results of the programs. This discussion demonstrates the way that the members of the Pirwa forge a common development identity that, while constructive as a tool in establishing their own unique development imaginary or alternative to development, sometimes promises more than it delivers.

Community participation in development is entrenched in Huancarani, owing to political movements in the 80s that garnered basic services the government failed to provide. This political action grew into an alternative vision of development which draws on ethnic roots – huancaraneños’ self-described Inca past – as well as recent historical class dynamics – their life in the mines – in order to improve community and individual health, as well as to attract and secure international funding for their work. However, the Pirwa’s appeal to indigenous knowledge as a cornerstone of its development work often contrasts sharply with the reality of the lives of its members. In this case, the ideology of the organization and its development
identity can jeopardize the satisfaction of material needs of some of its poorest members. This chapter, overall, points up the importance of understanding the current political conditions in community development work and how these relations affect the way people participate in programs. As a result, the lines demarcating that which is traditional and that which is modern are constantly negotiated and renegotiated in the attempt to suit both ideology and material well-being.

5.1 PIRWA PROGRAMS IN HUANCARANI

Pirwa is a Quechua word signifying *depósito*, or silo, a structure usually made from a local bamboo-like plant (*cañahueca*) and mud that was used to store food and grain to be distributed in lean years within Inca society (Lara 2001). The grassroots organization in Huancarani called the Pirwa began as a weekly community work group that grew out of communal political action in the 1980s to acquire a community system of running water. The force behind this collective action was José, who after spending a decade abroad in Europe to escape political persecution returned to Huancarani in the early 1990s and quickly became involved in the most important political action in the community at that time: the *Comité Pro-Agua* (Committee for Water). During the 1980s, Huancarani attempted to solicit government funds from the municipal capital in Sipe Sipe, but was repeatedly denied resources for a public water supply; so José decided to use his personal connections in Europe to help Huancarani, and little by little, these contacts in Europe sent the community funds for the water project. Weekly work groups were established to complete the labor, and the funds from José’s contacts paid for food that women cooked during the day to feed the laborers – a common historic and contemporary practice in the Andes (Allen 203).
2002; Salomon 1985, 1982; Murra 1984. This water project was just the beginning of a long relationship between the community and José’s network of Europeans who wanted to help fund participatory development in Huancarani. Since this first project, José’s contacts have sent Huancarani funds for the construction of a new school as well as the construction of the casa comunal, or community center, which houses the Pirwa programs. The residents of Huancarani built the school and the community center themselves. Residents formed work groups to build the structures, and an international NGO named ADRA (the Adventist Development Relief Agency) provided some food in order to feed those who worked. The new school and the community center were successfully completed in 2000. All huancaraneños told me that the completion of these first projects invoked tremendous feelings of community pride. When these projects were completed, a number of community residents proposed to continue with the weekly work groups; they had been so inspired by the overwhelming determination of the community to complete the projects regardless of the lack of financial help from the local government. In the end, José wrote to his European contacts for continued funding to finance an ongoing community work group that would be responsible for undertaking development projects. They acquiesced, and the Pirwa was born.

The first Pirwa program that was funded was the weekly communal work group, but soon after this was founded, another program came into existence specifically for the children of the area. While the philosophy of these programs is similar, the structure of these programs is quite different. I first discuss the children’s after-school program and explain how this program is aligned with a certain development paradigm to empower local children to participate in the community – even though this sort of empowerment is not coterminous with cultural norms regarding conflict resolution. Then, I describe the flagship program of the Pirwa, the weekly
communal work group, and point out how its philosophy aligns with development paradigms that highlight the importance of indigenous knowledge. Both of these programs simultaneously entrench and transgress cultural norms, planting seeds of culture change while maintaining a certain status quo by the process of defining and redefining those elements that are traditional and modern within the programs.

5.1.1 The children’s after-school program

At 2pm every weekday in Huancarani, scores of children can be found walking down the hill on the main dirt road through the community to the community center in order to attend the Pirwa’s after-school program. On a typical weekday, an average of 20 children stays at the Pirwa until 5 or 5:30 with one or two adults who provide a structured agenda of activities. The children’s program has been in existence since the end of 2002, and since its inception has been funded by José via his European contacts – the same contacts who provided the financial resources to construct the school buildings and the community center. When the program first began, the adults who came and watched over the children changed each day. They were either community residents – all women – or they were non-Bolivian volunteers who had traveled to Bolivia to attend José’s language school in Cochabamba.10 In the beginning, this program was unstructured, more in tune with what Americans think of as a day care program. In exchange for their time, community women who participated in the children’s after-school program received the same food rations that adults received from the communal work group (see the below discussion), and the European volunteers were boarded in the community for the duration of

10 Most of these volunteers were Swiss nationals who were put in contact with José by one of the funders of the Pirwa in Switzerland.
their volunteerism. However, this arrangement – with local women and foreign volunteers shifting in and out of the role of caregiver in the program – lasted only 18 months. It had proved difficult to maintain the program’s continuity because often community women were unable to fulfill their role as caregiver. In Huancarani, day care is an unheard of phenomenon; women either take their children to work or leave them at home with older siblings to care for them. This flexibility allows women to work outside their home on a moment’s notice; for example, they can work in someone’s field or wash someone else’s clothes as the opportunities arise. Therefore, the routine of the children’s program was problematic because the program itself was seen as something that was not necessary, something that failed to meet an important need in the community. The success of the program at this point was in jeopardy.

It was then that José garnered funding for a more permanent position, so that the adult(s) who watched the children were hired for a typical urban teacher’s salary. In this way, José could be assured that the children would have the benefit of a scheduled program with the continuity of instructors, activities, and objectives. Before professional teachers were hired in this position, formal curriculum and objectives had been designed for the project with the help of three European volunteers who had remained in Huancarani for a total of three months. They were teachers in Switzerland, and they designed the children’s program with a mix of Western progressive educational theory and what José defined as “indigenous knowledge.” José found that a successful curriculum could not be maintained with instructors who changed each day, nor was it helpful to place local women in this position who had no formal training as teachers. He decided to hire professionals with teaching degrees, either from Bolivian normal schools

11 In Bolivia, rural teachers are compensated more generously than urban teachers, given that teaching in rural areas is often seen as undesirable and difficult. At the time of my fieldwork, urban teachers – those teachers who taught in areas within a certain number of meters from the town hall – are paid a monthly salary of 500-600Bs (US$62.50-$75), while rural teachers can earn as much as 1000Bs a month (US$125).
(schools designed specifically to educate future primary and secondary school teachers) or from area universities. The first woman hired, Elena, graduated from a normal school within the department of Cochabamba, but has found it difficult to find a job as a teacher. Originally from the city of Cochabamba, she is a woman who is known in the community not as a permanent resident, but as a person who had been hired for a year to help José’s daughter, who is a community resident, raise José’s grandchildren. Elena admits that teaching at the children’s program has not been easy, as the type of teaching that she has been asked to do within the curriculum does not align with the style of instruction that she learned in the normal school:

When [some European volunteers] came here and observed the school in Huancarani, they were appalled at what they saw… children memorizing facts, marching around, reciting things from memory. They thought that children should be free to learn things from experience… not from sitting at a desk. Therefore, with José, they introduced the idea of the “anti-escuela” [anti-school]. The children’s program is a place where kids can come and learn from each other by doing things…. They learn how to express their feelings about the things that go on in their lives… at home or at school. They have difficult lives and must talk about these things… Every day we sit in a circle and talk to them about their feelings and their lives. This is very different from what they are taught to do at home. Bolivians are not used to talking about their problems… This has been somewhat difficult for me to learn, too…

Elena also points out:

But we also remind them that who they are, their culture, is important. We plant our own crops and they are responsible for maintaining them…. We talk about the importance of community relationships and [reciprocity]…. We want them to appreciate where they come from.

Children of all ages attend the program, although most commonly children between the ages of 3 and 12 years old attend with any regularity. Often, girls will take their younger siblings with them, and some of these children are as young as 18 months old. This is the strength of the program, says Elena, because children are not separated into age groups, which would divide children into “unnatural” age-sets. “In our culture, children are connected to other families via ayni because of compadrazgo or [other kin relationships]. If they don’t have any daily connection to them, then they don’t learn to work together within these connections.” In other words, the children’s program is a place set up so that children learn to work and play with
others to whom they have social obligations. Of course, they also learn and play with those that they do not, but this program teaches children that they are responsible for maintaining good relationships with all community children:

We teach children that it is important to ask for what you want and figure out how to get it. In this program... kids decide which projects they are going to do within our daily schedule, and how they will do them. They have to work that out themselves. This is really important to learn now, so that when they have to use these skills in other places, like the [OTB] for example, they can [participate] well.

Moreover, the children’s program is completely voluntary. Children participate when they want to and they are not penalized if their attendance is sporadic. When children attend the program, they are expected to participate according to the rules, which emphasize obedience to the teacher and respect for other children. Elena stresses the importance of the community “…by valuing what goes on in the community, everything from the farming that the kids’ parents do to the community festivals.” In doing so, the children learn that the community is valuable – a lesson that they may not receive elsewhere “because they learn from Bolivian society that rural places do not have any worth. We want to show them that this is not right,” says Elena.

Overall, the children’s program is a place where community children learn to be proud of who they are and where they come from. The philosophy of the program emphasizes the importance of maintaining community relations and resolving conflict in order to maintain those relationships. While maintaining community relations is defined as part and parcel of what is defined as “indigenous knowledge,” the way that conflicts are resolved – airing out grievances in a public setting each day – is something that is not seen as a product of culture. However, Elena, José, and those people responsible for designing the curriculum of the program, like the three European volunteers, contend that this type of conflict resolution is important for the maintenance of community relations. In effect, this new exogenous way of discussing problems helps preserve social relations that are thought to be in danger of being lost due to macro-level
socio-economic factors. Leaders of the children’s program have designed a curriculum that not only counters the denigration of rural regions and lifestyle in Bolivian society, but also provides a resuscitated vision of the way rural residents relate to one another. The program, therefore, fosters gradual social change in order to maintain certain traditions – an objective that is duplicated in the communal work group.

5.1.2 The communal work group

The Pirwa communal work group is a “communal political consciousness-raising work group that works to improve nutrition and combat some of the negative environmental and economic ramifications of globalization and neoliberalism that have reached Huancarani,” says the woman in charge of daily administrative operations of the program, Victoria. First and foremost, says José, it is a program to improve the health, both bodies and spirits, of huancaraneños. Each week, members work for an 8-hour workday on communal projects. In theory, these work projects are initiated, designed, and implemented by the members themselves. And in exchange, members receive foodstuffs to feed their families after they work 17 8-hour days. The foodstuffs received are 1 arroba (approximately 12 lbs.) each of rice, flour, sugar, and 5 liters of cooking oil. These items were chosen by the group because, along with the root vegetables that the residents grow, these rations help the residents use what little cash they earn in their own economic endeavors outside of the work group to buy meat. Community members have come to depend on these food rations; every member of the Pirwa told me at one point or another that these rations have saved their family from going hungry.

The Pirwa communal work group is essentially a work-for-food program created to alleviate malnutrition in the area. A recent local study (APSAR, cited in the PDM 2001)
indicates that almost one-third of all children in the municipio of Sipe Sipe are malnourished, with 8% of all children moderately to severely malnourished (PDM 2001). There are no health data that indicate the incidence of malnutrition among adults in Sipe Sipe, nor about the quality and quantity of food that huancaraneños consume. However, almost every resident whom I talked to during my fieldwork relay that they are hungrier and go without food more often now than they did when they lived in the mines and even when they first moved to Huancarani, which was a time of hardship in the social memory of all huancaraneños. Furthermore, residents emphasized that the type of food and prepared dishes that they eat in Huancarani are inferior to the foods that they used to eat in the mines. Meat and bread are high status foods in Huancarani. According to all huancaraneños whom I interviewed, they never lacked meat or bread in the mines, while many people complained to me that now they didn’t have any meat on the table and rarely do people bake their own bread in the community. The Pirwa has introduced specific projects that target these issues and help alleviate this problem.

Since the inception of the communal work group, it carries out projects such as growing organic produce, baking bread, making adobe bricks, and raising **cuys** (guinea pigs, common fare in the rural Andean diet) – all produced for sale in the community and in the immediate surrounding region. The last project, raising guinea pigs, is a new program that was just underway as I was finishing my fieldwork. The project was initiated to sell an inexpensive protein option to members of the Pirwa at discounted prices. Pirwa members chose to raise cuys because it fills a gap in their diet – most residents don’t eat cuys because they don’t have the resources to raise them. In order to maintain healthy cuys, Julia says, a relatively large amount of money is initially needed for a structure to house them, for a steady supply of food (alfalfa), and for a sufficient number of animals – a large financial undertaking for most residents in
Huancarani. However, all of the Pirwa members told me that they appreciate the new communal project—especially because making individual investments to raise cuys is daunting and nearly impossible. They all stated that they look forward to buying the animals that they raise. Cuys are also an identity marker in the Andes. José and Victoria point out that cuys were important to their ancestors and raising them “links them to their Inca roots.” But other residents tell me that “cuy is rural food, and some people think that you are [a “hick,” or “country-bumpkin”] if you eat cuy.” Corroborating Weismantel’s (1988) study of food and identity in rural Peru, residents of Huancarani link food sources with status, in that some food, like cuy, is considered low status food, something that designates the eater as poor and unrefined (see Graham (2003) for a similar finding). But while some huancaraneños find that eating cuy presents an identity problem, others resist these negative associations, thus reaffirming their identity as rural residents and reformulating what it means to eat “rural” foods.

Along with the cuy house, the communal work group has also incorporated a bread-baking project into its weekly program. Throughout Bolivia, provinces are known for having a specialty bread, and huancaraneños used to have the resources—the firewood, gas, ingredients, time, and motivation—to bake cochabambino bread, but now find that they no longer do. Moreover, residents rarely have money available to buy bread, indicating that having bread on the table is a luxury (lujo) that few can afford. The Pirwa is remedying this by providing not only the foodstuffs that women could use to make bread (via the rations), but is also holding bread baking classes during the communal work group. While some Pirwa members during the weekly work group plant and harvest organic vegetables in the communal fields, make adobes, or care for their nascent cuy house, another rotating group of 4 members works in the kitchen of the community center baking bread to be shared among all of the members who worked that day.
Many young women never learned how to bake bread growing up, so older women who know how to bake bread are dispersed throughout the baking groups to teach the others. These classes not only provide members with a much needed food source, but they also allow women access to a communal oven donated to the Pirwa by a research group from Cochabamba who had conducted an oral history workshop in the community in the late 1990s. With this gift, the Pirwa boasts a community panadería (bakery) to be used expressly for the purpose of reintroducing bread into residents’ diets.

Each week in the communal work group, workers are found planting, harvesting, or preparing the soil for future crops on communal lands in the community. José purchased community parcels of land that were for sale in 2002. Although he maintains the title to these lands in his name, they were bought for the express purpose of the communal work group. Members decide as a group which crops will be planted. The crops are then maintained and harvested communally, the members distribute the produce equitably, and each member pays a token price of 1B (US$0.12) for each ration. The produce is organically grown, meaning that no chemical fertilizers are used; instead, chicken feathers from the local chicken slaughterhouses, as well as dried vegetable matter and leaves from nearby eucalyptus trees, are used as abono (fertilizer) – typical by-products used by many farmers in the region. However, most farmers in Sipe Sipe combine organic and chemical fertilizers. Some members of the communal work group emphasize that their produce is organic, and thereby healthier and of higher quality, because of their exclusive use of organic fertilizer. José and Victoria argue that this way of farming is aligned with “the way that their ancestors farmed – which is what the Pirwa is about – helping people remember who they are,” claiming the project as a matter of ethnic identity.
But most members of the Pirwa communal work group link the issues of both the bread-baking classes and communal farming to matters of class and history, specifically to their earlier experiences living in the mining regions. Doña Isabela characterizes these experiences as

…being a time of great solidarity. We had the food that we needed to survive. We were really united [in the mines]. During holidays… we used to cook up big big plates of food, mountains of food, and send them over to another [huancaraneño’s] house… This is how we shared food with people from our community… It was good, healthy food. We maintained our social relations by sharing this food. It really didn’t matter to us much that it was probably grown with [chemical fertilizers]. But what did matter is that it was shared with members of our community. We didn’t forget who we were, even when we were in the mines.

Finally, the last project undertaken in the communal work group is the construction of adobes, or mud bricks. Residents in the community often place an order for a certain amount of adobes with the Pirwa communal work group, usually utilized to build a new house. During my fieldwork, there were 4 orders placed for adobes: the first two requests ordered 1,500 adobes, and the two subsequent orders requested 2,000. In order to fulfill these contracts, members step up their workweek by contributing two days a week for a month for each request. Each week, the first day of the work group is spent preparing the mud, which involves forming a pit on the grounds of the community center where dirt, water, and ichu (straw) are mixed together using members’ own feet or with hoes and picks. The mud then is left until the next day, when the members transfer the mud into moldings to form bricks. The bricks are laid on the grounds of the community center in order to bake in the sun for a week. Then, the bricks are stacked out of the sun and are ready to be used for construction. There is a gendered division of labor in adobe-making: women cut and gather the straw, carry buckets of water from the spigot to the dirt pit, and transport the finished mud in wheelbarrows to the brick moldings, while the men mix the mud and straw and then form the bricks in the moldings. But both men and women dig with hoes and picks, and then use their feet to mix the mud and straw.
5.1.3 Ideology of the communal work group – “traditional communalism and cooperativism.”

The communal work group is structured so that particular cultural norms are revalorized in the community – norms that residents complain are gradually disappearing due to urbanizing influences of the city. Julia illustrates that

Communal work is part of us, part of who we were. But it is not valued much by some people here – I mean young people. Before the Pirwa started children here only thought of communal work for planting and harvesting food. This is important [for children to see communal work in this context]. But what happens if you grow up to think that you are not going to continue the work of your parents? What if you don’t want to farm? What happens to communal work then? Who helps you build your house? Who helps you cook for community fiestas? What happens to community obligations – who fulfills them? We lose all of our traditions without community work. How can we call ourselves a community then?

Julia’s questions underscore the problem Huancarani is having with identity and social change – a problem that is pertinent throughout most of rural Bolivia. Younger generations of rural residents are exposed to urban life via television, radio, and schools, as well as by visiting relatives who live in cities, in Bolivia and sometimes abroad. Children in Huancarani have often lived for some period of time with relatives, including their parents, who have migrated to the city either for a short stint of a few weeks or sometimes for as long as years. More often than not, children report that they were discriminated against in some way when they lived in the city because their apparent differences in dress, speech, customs, etc. highlight them as rural residents. These experiences reinforce existing social divisions between urban and rural, and children often learn that their way of life is scorned.

More importantly, current economic conditions, or the “crisis” as it is generally articulated in the media, have made the maintenance of social obligations and reciprocity in rural regions like Huancarani more difficult for everyone. In their daily struggle to feed their families,
men, women, and children in Huancarani work in the informal economy for meager daily wages with no security or savings for the future. Based on census responses in Huancarani, the median household income in Huancarani is only 100Bs (US$12.50) a month, far below the average $2,000 annual income of Bolivians nationally (World Bank 2001). Under this type of financial stress, normal social obligations are often put aside in order to survive. In theory, reciprocity can alleviate material lack, as in the case of borrowing money from relatives or food sharing. However, in practice, opportunities to lend and borrow, as well as to take on more complex obligations of godparenthood or to hire peons to plant and harvest crops, are becoming more and more problematic. Not only do people spend more time away from their community in order to find work, but they simply do not have the necessary financial resources that would fulfill social obligations. The Pirwa is trying to provide some relief so that reciprocal relations that make up the community safety net are safeguarded.

In effect, the philosophy or mission statement of the communal work group emphasizes the importance of group solidarity and defines participation in the Pirwa as the maintenance of reciprocal relations, the significance of which is historically rooted in ethnic norms and class relations. As Olivia, a 42 year old relocalizada, points out:

When we left the mines, we realized that no one was going to help us. The government took our lives away from us. We can’t wait for them [government officials] to do anything for us here. So, the Pirwa has helped us stay united. Ayninakuy is important to us, and it comes first in the Pirwa.

Ayninakuy is the reflexive Quechua verb meaning “to resort to a system of mutual help” (Lara 2001). In everyday usage in Huancarani, it connotes a social norm that obligates members to help each other by maintaining reciprocal social relationships. In the context of the Pirwa, it means committing to its members by fulfilling the weekly communal work group according to the rules of participation. Participation is an important concept in the communal work group and
it is referred to often in everyday conversations. People use the term to indicate that 1) members come on time and fulfill an 8 hour shift of the communal work group, 2) if members can’t come themselves on any particular work day, they send someone else in their stead, usually a family member or a family member of another worker in the work group, 3) members actively speak up and listen to other members when planning and implementing new projects, 4) members are responsible for buying their share of the produce grown or bread baked at the Pirwa for 1B, and finally, 5) after three absences, their membership in the communal work group is terminated.

These rules for participation in the communal work group, states Victoria, foster a sense of community that is being threatened in part by the economic crisis. These rules help share the responsibility of maintaining the momentum of projects and equally distribute the workload among members. In fact, José states and Victoria reiterates that “the key to the Pirwa is replacing capitalism and too much individualism with cooperativism and communalism.” And they do this by focusing their efforts on what they call the organization’s “self-sufficiency,” free from the influences of outside organizations with other agendas. José exclaims

It’s important that people in the community don’t think that they are getting charity. They’re not. They are getting help, but not charity…. It’s a bad custom to keep giving the community money and food without them having to work for it. I have seen many communities go bad because NGOs give them things that they can’t provide for themselves. This kills community spirit. It makes everyone compete for what the NGOs provide, individual against individual. This is not what the Pirwa is about.

José goes further to describe in detail communities and projects that he was involved with in the past that he feels became completely dependent on external assistance and funding sources. Residents in these communities, he explains, became locked into patron-client relationships with the organizations that provided external help. This in turn fostered apathy and complacency in these communities. José does not want this type of relationship to grow between the Pirwa and its members. On the contrary, he wants the Pirwa to relieve some material lack so that members “are not so preoccupied with barely surviving. In this way, people will have more
energy to be creative, to solve problems creatively together, to do what’s good for the community. Because what’s good for the community is good for themselves. This is what the Pirwa is about” (speaker’s emphasis).

Overall, the Pirwa programs stress the importance of valorizing historical community norms – either rooted in ethnic identity or linked to class relations – that place the needs of the community above individual needs. The program is designed so that the activities of the communal work group are supposedly good for both the community and the individuals that make it up. This spirit of what residents cite as communalism (comunalismo) interconnects with the value of cooperativism (cooperativismo), which refers to a system of generalized reciprocity, ayni, indicative of Andean society “before the [contemporary economic] crisis,” says Isadora. A widespread material lack and economic poverty has led to a general dissolution of what these rural residents recognize as normal social relations. Although migrant laborers have always been historically part of Andean society (as yanaconas, see Klein 2003), residents note that people leave Huancarani more often in search of work, and the work that they do is less stable and economically riskier than it has been in the past. For instance, many community members told me frequently of a story in which a resident worked as a recruiter for a construction firm that was working in the department of Santa Cruz. He recruited 8 huancaraneños to work for three months on a project in this tropical region. According to involved and uninvolved residents, after the job was completed, this recruiter never paid the eight men from Huancarani, and to this day owes these men a lot of money. Furthermore, with the money that he should have used to pay his fellow community members, the recruiter built himself a new house in the community. About one month after the workers returned to Huancarani from Santa Cruz, the recruiter fled the community to live with his wife who had moved to Madrid, Spain. Since then, he has not
returned to the community. During my fieldwork, his mother and brother cared for his house that was built with such “dirty money.” I relay this story because residents complained to me very often of the increasing untrustworthiness and social disorganization the community is thought to be experiencing as a result of the national economic crisis. And it is this type of social disorder that the programs in the Pirwa are attempting to avoid or curtail.

5.1.4 Those who participate in the work group: the administration

There are two administrators of the Pirwa programs: doña Victoria and Oscar, José’s son-in-law. Victoria is a 62 year old wife of a relocallizado. She is originally from Oruro, and although she identifies herself as a huancaraneña, she calls herself first and foremost an orureña. She has been instrumental in maintaining social networks between Huancarani and huancaraneños who reside in Oruro (los orureños), as well as acquiring support from them for church projects in Huancarani. For instance, a new vestibule was recently constructed in the Huancarani church, and Victoria was the organizer of that project and in charge of raising funds from los orureños. Victoria has also been singled out as one of a handful of women leaders in a small recent study examining gender and leadership in politics in the municipio of Sipe Sipe (CERES 2001), in part because of her positions of leadership in two local OTBs and her charge in the Pirwa. In monthly OTB meetings in Huancarani, she is the Pirwa representative; it is her job to speak on behalf of the interests of the Pirwa regarding its projects and membership. She is very vocal and has much influence on the events and projects undertaken in the name of the OTB. Additionally,
she is an official (as the treasurer) of the OTB where her house is now located in Montenegro.\footnote{Although the title for Victoria’s home indicates that it is located in Huancarani, recent redistricting of regional communities now requires Victoria to attend OTB meetings in nearby Montenegro. Community lines were redrawn in the late 1990s, and a handful of people told me that they found themselves in doña Victoria’s same situation: their titles state Huancarani as their community but local boundaries now dictate to which OTB they belong. However, Victoria still proudly identifies with Huancarani: “my running water comes from Huancarani wells,” she exclaims, “so I am fully part of this community.”}

She attends all of the OTB leadership summits, where leaders of the 67 OTBs in the municipal district of Sipe Sipe come together to discuss development projects proposed in their annual Plan Operativo Anual (POA) (see Chapter Four). She is only one of about a half dozen women at these meetings, but she does not let that prohibit her from speaking out and working to ensure Huancarani’s fair share of development funding from the local coffers.

José asked Victoria to fill the position of encargadora (administrator) of the Pirwa’s communal work group in 1999 – when the work group was still linked to the community political activism that led to the system of running water in Huancarani before the existence of the Pirwa. Since then, she has been in charge of recording attendance, distributing food rations to members every 17 eight-hour shifts, and initiating group decisions about the timing and implementation of projects in the communal work group (i.e., where and when to plant which crop, who has ordered adobes and how many, etc.). She takes her position very seriously – a little too seriously for some of the members. Some members admitted that they think that Victoria is condescending, using her position of power as a crutch to relinquish herself from taking part in the heavy labor, such as carrying fertilizer for long distances from slaughterhouses to the fields, or digging and carrying water to make adobes. In this way, Victoria defines her own participation in the work group as encargadora and excuses herself from the work in which regular members engage. For some members, this is a problem of identity. Victoria is a high school graduate and de vestido, or wears Western-style skirts accompanied with a plain cotton t-


shirt or blouse. She wears her hair short and often is seen wearing a Western-style brimmed hat to shield herself from the sun. She has the ability to speak fluent Quechua, but in all of my time with her, she never once spoke to anybody in Quechua. Most members of the communal work group speak Quechua among themselves during the work group sessions. And while they will directly speak to Victoria in Quechua, she only responds to them in Spanish. All but two of the members of the work group are de pollera, or wear the traditional skirt of Cochabamba or of La Paz, depending on their origins. Therefore, while Victoria’s dress and linguistic preference signify an educated person (i.e., a person who can write, read, and do arithmetic – necessary prerequisites for the position of encargardora), members of the work group see these factors as further entrenching what they feel is a chasm that exists between them and Victoria.

The Pirwa’s second encargador is Oscar, José’s 32 year old son-in-law and the husband of José’s only child. He was born into an upper-middle class family and raised in the city of Cochabamba. Neither of his parents spoke Quechua, nor did any of his living family members live in rural regions. He has a college degree in agronomy and farms large tracts of land in Huancarani that José and his daughter have purchased over the last 15 years. The members of the communal work group depict Oscar as a good-natured and resourceful encargador. Members are impressed by his knowledge of agriculture – something that they don’t associate with city-dwellers like Oscar. However, they point out that his knowledge, albeit extensive, is theoretical rather than practical in application. The fact that he has only farmed lands in Huancarani for the past few years does not make him an expert farmer in the area, says Ricardo, a member of the work group. In some members’ minds, his lack of experience does not align well with his position of authority in the Pirwa. Furthermore, Oscar and his family in Huancarani are very financially stable. In fact, most of the lands that José and his daughter have purchased in the
community were Pirwa members’ parcels until their financial insecurity forced them to sell them to José. José, Oscar, and their family do not have the same types of survival problems that other community residents have, and sometimes members interpret Oscar’s comments during communal work as insensitive to their own financial worries. In fact, some of the conflicts that arose in the communal work group during my fieldwork stemmed from socioeconomic differences between los bases (regular members) and Oscar.

5.1.5 Those who participate in the communal work group: the workers

The communal work group has attracted residents in the community who have had the most difficulty in maintaining community reciprocity. When the Pirwa communal work group officially began in 2000, all of the community members who had helped construct the school and the community center became involved in the Pirwa’s ongoing communal work group; these 47 families, along with José and Victoria, were instrumental in setting the course of community development projects that were undertaken from the beginning of the communal work group in the Pirwa for the subsequent two years, 2000-2002. However, little by little, families were unable to fulfill their commitment to the communal work group and either dropped out voluntarily or were asked to leave. In 2002, José and Victoria drew up the final list of 20 families that remained in the Pirwa and decided to restrict membership to these 20 families, unless they were unable to participate according to the rules. Then, and only then, were new members allowed to join the communal work group in the Pirwa. Since this list was established, only three members have been asked to leave. In order to gain a better understanding of who the members of the communal work group are, I have divided them into four groups using two different variables: the first variable is gender, and the second is in terms of their identification in
the community groups laid out in Chapter Three (relocalizados or spouses of relocalizados, and
nuevos migrantes from Tapacarí and the Yungas region of La Paz). Thus, I classify members of
the communal work group as: 1) men, 2) women who are relocalizados or spouses of
relocalizados, 3) women from Tapacarí, and 4) women from the Yungas (see Table 1).

Membership in the communal work group consists primarily of women. Besides José
and his 32 year old son-in-law, who has gradually transitioned into a leadership position in the
Pirwa, only two other men participate in the weekly communal work group. Both of them are
over 65 years old, single, have never married, and have no children or other immediate family
members to care for them in their old age. They are both sons of relocalizados – their fathers
worked in the Catavi mine and returned in the late 1970s. They both completed up to sixth grade
in the school in Huancarani, but ceased their education so that they could work to help feed their
families. Both men have spent most of their lives as itinerant migrants, working on construction
projects in Santa Cruz, or farming in the Chapare region or in the nearby fields of Hamiraya and
Sorata.

The other 18 members of the Pirwa are women between the ages of 22 and early 70s. Ten of these 18 women are relocalizados; they returned to Huancarani with their families from
the mines in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Two more members of the Pirwa are spouses of
relocalizados; they married men who worked in the mines and had family homes and lands in the
community. After they were married, they returned with their husbands and children to their
affinal kin’s community and made it their own. These 12 women – 10 relocalizados and 2

\[13\]

The oldest member of the work group, doña Martina, has no existing identity card or other documentation that verifies her age. However, this estimate has been decided upon by talking to her, as well as her closest friends and relatives.
spouses of relocalizados – are grouped together based on age: 9 of them are over 49 years of age, and three of them are in between 29 and 38 years old.

First, I will first discuss the socio-demographic characteristics of the older group of women. Six of these women over 49 years old (two-thirds) have been widowed for many years, and very few of their children live in the community, the municipality, or even in Cochabamba; most of their children all reside far from home in Santa Cruz, Argentina, or Spain. All of the widows explained to me that they get very little help, in the way of financial remittances, from their children. Two widows receive BONOSOL – the social security program in which Bolivians over the age of 65 receive an annual lump sum of 1800Bs (US$225) on their birthday. Three of these older women are rentistas, meaning that they receive their deceased husbands’ quarterly pensions from the government, the average amount of which was 500Bs (US$62.50).

The youngest woman in this group – Julia, aged 49 – is the most financially stable member in the Pirwa. She is married to Eusebio, who maintains a salaried, steady job at the biggest local limestone plant. However, when she became a member of the Pirwa at the program’s beginning, Julia was a single mother of a teenager while caring for her two aged parents, one of whom was dying of cancer. Her father was a rentista, and his pension went to his wife when he died. Yet Julia’s mother survived her late husband only a very short time; she died in her sleep almost three months to the day of her husband’s death. When this occurred, Julia no longer received the financial benefits of her father’s pension. The house she was living in with her parents was bequeathed to her upon her parents’ death. Although her economic situation improved when she married her husband, Julia suffered grave economic hardship for 7 years after her parents’ death. She admitted that “the Pirwa saved me many times. There were many days that I had no money to buy food for me and my son, or I had to use what little money I had
to pay for his schooling. The food rations [from the Pirwa] were what helped me survive those years. And I need them now, too. The communal work group is very worthwhile to me.” This sentiment – that the food rations from the communal work group are key to household survival – was echoed almost verbatim by every other member in the Pirwa.

The next group of members consists of three younger women – all children of ex-miners who worked in the mines of Catavi. Two of these women are sisters (aged 38 and 36) who have no other family except each other; however, they have been feuding for over a decade and, for all intents and purposes, have nothing to do with each other. Each sister is often hired as a peon to work in the fields of two other relocalizado residents. Doña Melisa often works alongside her husband in the fields, a rare occurrence in a community where most men migrate to find work that pays better than the standard 10Bs a day wage of farming others’ lands in the community. Her sister works in a local chicken slaughterhouse, when she is not working in the fields, in order to earn money to raise her five children; this position also pays the typical 10Bs. The final young woman in this group, Marisol, is single, without children, and lives with her rentista mother. She is also the daughter of a male member who was struck by a car and killed the day that I arrived in my fieldsite to conduct my research. When her father died, José and Victoria asked Marisol if she wanted to take his place in the work group and she affirmed that she did. In this way, her family maintained membership in the Pirwa.

All 12 of these members speak Quechua while only four are comfortable speaking both Spanish and Quechua. One woman has graduated from high school and one woman has 8 years of education, while the rest of these members have only one or two years of schooling and are functionally illiterate. Each of the feuding sisters has six children under the age of 12 who still live at home. Marisol has no children. But all of the remaining 9 women in this group have no
children who live with them nor do these children live in Huancarani. Two of the 12 women are vendadoras (women who sell vegetables in regional markets) who travel to four regional markets on a prescribed weekly schedule.\textsuperscript{14} Five of these women work at a nearby chicken slaughterhouse, working from 3am-9am every morning. And finally, all of these women work in the fields in Huancarani – primarily their own or for other community members. They also maintain animals such as cows, pigs, sheep, ducks, chickens, and goats. One woman has an established guinea pig pen for personal consumption and to sell or trade to community residents.

### Table 5. Members of the Pirwa, demographic indicators (N=20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Age/Age Range</th>
<th>Category of Huancaraneño (see Chapter Two)</th>
<th>Currently with Spouse/Partner?</th>
<th>Number of Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Men (n=2)</td>
<td>2 = over 60 years old</td>
<td>Relocalizados</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>No children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Women, relocalizadas or spouses of relocalizados (n=12)</td>
<td>9 = ≥ 49 years</td>
<td>7 of these women are relocalizadas, and 2 are spouses of relocalizados.</td>
<td>3 of these women currently lives with spouse, and 6 are widowed.</td>
<td>These women each have between 1-14 children, all adults, and only one of these women currently lives with any of her children (a son aged 16 years old).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 between 29-38 years old</td>
<td>All women between 29-38 years are relocalizadas.</td>
<td>2 live with spouse, and 1 is unmarried.</td>
<td>The two married women have 6 children each (all under 15 years old). The unmarried woman has no children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Women from Tapacarí (n=4)</td>
<td>All women are between 22-38 years of age.</td>
<td>Nuevas migrantes (tapacareñas)</td>
<td>All women live with their spouses, who are tapacareños as well.</td>
<td>All women have between 2-6 children living at home (all ≤ 10 years old).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Women from the Yungas region of La Paz (n=2)</td>
<td>These women are both 38 years old.</td>
<td>Nuevas migrantes (paceñas)</td>
<td>Both paceñas live with their husbands.</td>
<td>One of the paceñas has 2 children (aged 11 and 7), while the other lives with her own 2 children (aged 17 and 10) and cares full-time for her brother-in-law’s 3 children (aged 16, 12, and 7).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{14} They sell their produce in Vinto on Mondays, a highland community market (Jap’o) on Tuesdays, the Cochabamba market on Wednesdays, and then come home to the local Sipe Sipe market on Fridays.
The remaining six members of the communal work group are *nuevos migrantes*, or residents who have migrated here from other places looking for work and better opportunities to educate their children. Four of these women are from Tapacarí, a province bordering Sipe Sipe to the west. These members are between the ages of 22 and 38, married, and have between 2 and 6 children, ranging in age from 4-16 years old. None of these women have beyond a first grade education. The four tapacareña members of the communal work group earn as little as 100Bs a month in local menial day-labor. For example, I came to dread my interviews with doña Eugenia – not because she wasn’t a valuable informant (she was indeed), but because I knew that I would have to walk in search of her, sometimes long distances. Her time was always spent hired as a peon working in the fields of Huancarani or Hamiraya. For her 8am-5pm shift work picking onions, fava beans, or maize, she is paid 10Bs for an eight hour shift (US$1.25). Three of the four women from Tapacarí have no extended family nearby to rely on in times of need. But one of the members from Tapacarí, doña Graciela, has extended family in Huancarani. Her sister-in-law, Celestina, migrated to Huancarani about five years before Graciela and her husband came there with their 6 children. However, Celestina is the owner of the *chichería* (*chicha*, or corn beer, bar) in the community, and Graciela states that this precludes her sister-in-law from maintaining community relations beyond the indebtedness of her clients at the bar. Owning a chicha bar is precarious work; it operates on credit that is often repaid in kind, but the repayment is neither timely nor equitable (at least in Celestina’s opinion). Therefore, essentially Graciela has no kin relations in the community that can be considered dependable ayni relations.

When I asked the tapacareñas why they joined the communal work group, all four of them indicated that the distribution of food rations is the driving factor for their membership. However, doña Graciela further explains her membership in relation to social relationships:
Of course, I am a member of the Pirwa because of the food rations. [C: Would you be a member if you didn’t receive these rations?] No, I couldn’t, because it takes a lot of time to be a member of the Pirwa. Sometimes we have to do the communal work group twice a week. This means that we get the rations more quickly than we would if we only did trabajo once a week, but we don’t get any more rations – the amount stays the same. But I have benefited from the work group because I got to know more people this way. I now take care of Isadora’s animals when she has to go to the city for the day to help her daughter, which happens about once a week… She pays me to do this. I think that if I wasn’t a member of the Pirwa, I wouldn’t get hired as much as I do for people in Huancarani. [C: Why is that?] …Because people wouldn’t know how hard I work, how they can count on me… People ask me to help them cook for big parties, too… And they don’t pay me for this, but I can count on them to hire me when they need help… And again, they wouldn’t have hired me if I wasn’t in the Pirwa.

Graciela’s insight into the Pirwa’s role in remaking community relations and establishing new social obligations is echoed by the other three women from Tapacari. They all indicate that to some extent the communal work group has given them more access to dependable community relationships with relocalizados – a resourceful entrée to both productive and reproductive work (work for pay and non-paid work).

There are two remaining members of the Pirwa, the most recent additions to community the communal work group. In the late 1990s, two paceñas – women who migrated here from the Yungas region of La Paz – joined the work groups in the construction of the school and community center as these projects were nearing their completion. Although they were late-comers in these community projects, these women were two of the first people to commit to the communal work group as it transitioned from a community affair to a project associated with the Pirwa. At the time, Sara and Patricia, the paceñas, had great difficulty finding work in the community. “No one would hire us to pick their vegetables or help them care for their animals,” says Patricia. “I found some women in Sipe Sipe who would hire us to wash their clothes, but they would not ask us often, and lamentably, they stopped asking altogether.” Patricia and Sara succeeded in working in the fields of a man who lived in Hamiraya but this work was also irregular, and they both complained that on more than one occasion, the man refused to pay them for their work.
Both Sara and Patricia – as well as other members who interviewed with me – told me that when they first joined the communal work group, many people spoke out about the paceñas’ membership in a community organization, complaining that outsiders had no loyalty to the community and therefore would not fulfill their obligations in community projects. However, responding to these complaints, Sara notes that the paceñas “worked harder than anyone else in the communal work group. We needed to prove to everyone that we were valuable to the Pirwa. And we succeeded.” Throughout the 10 months that I participated in the communal work group, I still occasionally heard a work group member express discomfort with the paceña presence in the community, advertently exclaiming, for example, their concern that Aymara would replace Quechua in the community. These comments were always made in hushed tones but loud enough so that Patricia or Sara could overhear. While both Patricia and Sara told me that they were not at all surprised by these reactions in the community – in fact, they expected this type of guarded response from community residents, a reaction that is common among people from different ethnic and geographical regions in Bolivia (i.e., Gill 1994) – they were surprised that these comments still continue to the present day despite the paceñas’ consistent hard work in the Pirwa. “We may come from a different place, but our ayni is the same there [in La Paz] as it is here [in Huancarani]. We know how to fulfill social obligations, and we have – despite the way some people have maltreated us. We benefit from the communal work group, but it benefits from our work here, too,” says Patricia.

Over time, Sara and Patricia have ultimately become more accepted in the communal work group as well as in the community. Both women have become more enmeshed in social relations with prominent relocalizados in the community, and these relationships are now regarded as more acceptable with community residents than they were before. For example,
Julia, a relocalizado and a member of the communal work group, suffered a mild stroke that initially left the entire right side of her body and face immobilized in August 2005. Although Julia had frequently and conspicuously questioned the paceña presence in the communal work group, Patricia began to regularly visit Julia to run errands for her and help her with such activities of daily living as getting dressed and cooking meals. At first, Julia was uneasy with the help that Patricia offered. “But I remembered her work in the Pirwa… how she never let us down, how she was one of the few people who never asked for a break and swung the pick harder than anyone… I began to really see that she cares about us… not just her own family,” admits Julia. When Julia recuperated somewhat from her stroke, Julia apologized to Patricia for the comments that she had made in the Pirwa that had made Patricia uncomfortable. Julia and Patricia have formed a very dependable, close-knit bond that includes Patricia helping Julia meet her daily needs and Julia extending support to Patricia at community and Pirwa meetings.

Additionally, Sara has formed dependable, close-knit relations with doña Isadora, an influential 61 year old widow of a relocalizado. Isadora’s late husband left her his house and lands when he died, but all but one of Isadora’s 9 children live far outside the community (her youngest child, age 16, still lives with her). One of her children migrated to Spain two years ago and left his two young children (aged 4 and 6 at the time) in Isadora’s care. Isadora, her 16 year old son, and her two young granddaughters live in a precarious state of being “one disaster away from complete starvation,” says Isadora. Since he was 12 years old, her son has left school for months at a time in order to work odd jobs to pay off his mother’s outstanding debts. And her granddaughters are often pulled out of school in order to travel with their grandmother when she is asked to cook for community gatherings or help her daughter sell seasonal wares in the market.
in Cochabamba. “I had been looking for someone to help me, a woman in the community who would assist me,” says Isadora.

Yet although they are neighbors, Isadora admits that she did not consider fostering ayni relations with Sara until she noticed Sara’s diligent work in the Pirwa. Isadora and Sara now often provide each other support in activities ranging from planting and harvesting to cooking food at community gatherings. She first asked Sara to accompany her to cook for a wedding in the community, and since then Sara cooks with Isadora for any event for which Isadora is commissioned. For example, during the 2005 four-day community fiesta celebrating the patron Virgen of Guadalupe, Isadora was honored with the role of *pasante* – the community member chosen at the end of the fiesta the year before to be in charge of providing food, drink, and costumes to the dance troupe representing the community in the fiesta. In order to fulfill this important social obligation, Isadora must garner support from community members to help her. While Isadora brought together women from all over the community to help her, Sara was relegated a position of power under Isadora’s charge – in effect, all of the community women considered Sara Isadora’s assistant and treated her with the honor that a person in this position was afforded. Sara admits that she never would have been given this type of role in so important a fiesta if it weren’t for her relationship with Isadora, and she credits this relationship with her membership in the Pirwa.

5.1.6 Transcending personal identity politics and the role of the communal work group.

Overall, the members of the communal work group are the poorest members of the community, regardless of their identification as relocalizado or nuevo migrante. Members of the communal
work group who are relocizados or spouses of relocizados – by far the wealthiest group as a whole in the community – are those residents who have difficulty maintaining their social relations because of life circumstances. These women are widows, women with no other local family members, or, in the case of Marisol, the adult daughter of a recently widowed woman. Moreover, the two male members of the Pirwa are elderly and without family or without family nearby. Corroborating the information gathered in an oral history workshop conducted in Huancarani in the 1990s (Geffroy Komadina et al. 2002), I find that people who are not part of a pair (widows and single people with no family) are the poorest members of the community, regardless of their status as land-owner or new migrant. From my work in the Pirwa, I conclude that residents are attracted to the Pirwa because the communal work group, with the food rations that are distributed in the program, not only alleviates grave material lack but also gives its members access to establish vital social relationships in the community. In fact, I found that people who would never consider each other as eligible partners have formed alliances among themselves specifically because of their experiences in the Pirwa. In this way, the Pirwa not only helps members garner economic capital – because the food rations help residents use what little cash they earn to buy meat, cheese, and spices – but the communal work group also gives members more social capital in the community – by linking people with outsider status with people with insider status (nuevos migrantes with relocizados and spouses of such persons).

Members of the communal work group forge a common organizational development identity – the communal work group consists of workers who strive to complete projects that are beneficial to the community, inspire community pride, and foster community relationships based on ethnic and class norms. This identity is rooted in a pan-Andean ethnicity that pivots on communalism and cooperativism, principles residents take pride in defining as “traditional.”
Individual politics in the community are transcended in an effort to establish this development identity. Therefore, the Pirwa is an organization that helps people use gains in economic capital to strengthen important social capital and relationships that improve social capital. In other words, the communal work group is a place where the most vulnerable people in the community help provide each other with support and a sense of stability – something that without the Pirwa, they admit, would not have been possible.

While the diversity of identities in the Pirwa is sometimes a cause of conflict – as in the case of the administrators – more often than not this diversity is an important component of a strategy to help those in the community who are the most vulnerable. However, the communal work group is not without its problems, and these problems stem from a disconnect between forging a development identity that prioritizes the needs of the community sometimes over and above the needs of individual members. Next, I discuss the discourses of development and identity in the communal work group to trace those factors that become salient when new projects are designed and the rules of participation are modified or challenged. It is during these moments of conflict in the Pirwa – either covert grumblings or overt disagreement – that the members of the communal work group are actively engaged in negotiating and renegotiating the course of their own development. These negotiations both accommodate and resist what members designate as modern, exogenous conceptions of development. The development identity of the communal work group that put the needs of the community above all else is often incompatible with the individual needs of its members. The common development identity being forged in the work group (an identity based upon what members deem traditional communalism and cooperativism) is often jeopardized by the more common-place centering of the individual and the material in everyday life in Huancarani – a necessity of life for the poorest of the poor in
the community. And in the end, factors defined as Andean and traditional at times supersede those that are deemed Western and modern, and at others times the latter are given prominence. The way people accommodate and resist when resolving problems spell out which factors are salient and under what circumstances. In order to illustrate this, I describe and analyze six events that occurred over the course of my research in the communal work group: three occasions that members accommodated changes in the rules, and three circumstances when members resisted the results of the way the rules had been used as justifications of what had occurred.

5.2 ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE IN THE COMMUNAL WORK GROUP

5.2.1 A typical work day

In order to better understand the way members accommodate and resist changes and modifications in the Pirwa, I first describe the activities and rituals that take place during an eight-hour shift of the communal work group. Members arrive at the Pirwa between 8:45 and 9am, when the tin door to the gate of the community center compound is opened by Oscar or Victoria. Members walk there with their pick or hoe slung over their shoulder, and sometimes they carry their tools in a wheelbarrow, if they own one. As residents enter the compound, they address each and every member with a nod of the head, repeating “buenos dias” to each person and calling them by name. Each person sits down on either plywood benches or the cement floor of the covered patio portion of the Pirwa right outside the entryway to the *panadería* (bakery), a small room about 15’X20’ that houses the communal oven, bulk sacks containing flour, sugar,
and other sundries, and a large table. Members engage in small talk until Oscar or Victoria retrieve a bag of coca and hand-rolled cigarettes. Then, the encargadores walk around with the coca bag and distribute about a handful of coca leaves to each member, who extend their cupped hands, a baseball hat, or their apron to catch the distributed coca leaves. “Salado o dulce? (salty or sweet?),” the encargadores ask, referring to the choice members make between a piece of a salty or sweet substance (lejía) that is chewed with the coca leaves to extract more of the numbing and energizing properties of the coca leaves. After receiving their coca (all members chew coca, while usually only the men choose to smoke the hand-rolled cigarettes), members attend to preparing the coca for chewing, which means that they separate the dry, green leaf from the stem, placing the leaves in the pocket between their cheek and lower gums. The coca leaves are chewed only until wet, and then they remain in place in the cheek until they lose all flavor, which can last as little as a few hours and sometimes are left in all day long. The process of separating the leaves from the stems and placing enough coca in the mouth usually takes about a half an hour. Generally, the work task for the day has been decided upon during the work group the week before, but if it hasn’t, the members discuss this issue while they attend to their coca. This is the hour when the encargadores also take attendance and bring up any issues that have come up during the week of which the members must take note. So the first part of the communal work group is reserved for these tasks.

The daily work of the work group is broken down into activities that occupy the morning until lunch at noon, and then those that are worked on after lunch from 2-5pm. Most women who take part in the communal work group cook their midday meal at home in the morning and have a daughter attend to it over hot coals or an open fire until their mothers arrive home for lunch; this is the only way that almuerzo will be ready for hungry children coming home after
school or for those children that must leave by 12:30 in order to attend afternoon classes.

Members decide how the tasks will be divided among members, and most of the time members work in groups of 4 or 5 workers. Therefore, for instance, when the task of the day is to make mud for adobes, one group of women will go in search of good straw, cut it with their jusis (small hand-held scythes), and carry it back to the Pirwa with their awayos (cloths that are slung on their backs in backpack fashion), while another group will dig up the necessary dirt and yet another group will carry water in buckets from the spigot to the dirt. Frequently, another group is engaged in the task of baking the bread of the day that will be evenly distributed among the members who work that shift. Each week, a rotating schedule dictates which member is responsible for bringing chicha to distribute to the workers about 3 or 4 times during the day. This member walks around to the workers engaged in their tasks carrying a plastic pail of chicha and a tutuma (gourd). The server presents each worker with a full gourd of chicha with the right hand, and the worker receives it in their right hand. First, the worker pours a libation from the gourd on the ground in order to give thanks to the Pachamama (the Andean goddess of the earth). Then, the worker drinks the chicha in one or two gulps, empties the gourd by shaking it of the last remaining drops of chicha, and then hands the gourd back to the server. This ends when every worker receives the chicha, and then the distributor returns to his/her work group and picks up the task at hand.

Chewing coca and drinking chicha are important ritualistic activities throughout the Andes. In fact, work usually does not take place without them, especially communal work activities (Allen 2002). Both activities not only provide nourishment for the bodies of the workers, but members told me that these rituals also signify social camaraderie and solidarity among Pirwa members. According to Martina and Juana, “coca and chicha remind everyone that
we work together with a common purpose.” It also serves as a leveling mechanism in the Pirwa. Both Oscar and Victoria affirm that “the encargadores distribute the coca and cigarettes, and this shows the workers that we are here to help them, to serve them in a way. It shows them that no one has more power – we all equally serve the group.” These activities are essential markers of ethnic and group identity and help foster group well-being.

Part and parcel of a day’s work in the communal work group is the weekly discussion that takes place at the end of an eight-hour shift, usually from 4-5pm. This discussion is usually led by Oscar or Victoria, and often is a time set aside to decide the upcoming weeks’ activities or to present ideas to the group for new work projects. Decisions are reached via a verbal vote after everyone has had an opportunity to opine about the matter. Heated debates are not the norm, and if they do occur, usually transpire between two members, not between an administrator and a member. In theory, any member could bring up an idea for a new project; however, in practice, I noted that all of the new ideas were introduced by Oscar or Victoria. And when the time arrives to vote on a new project, usually the vote is unanimously favorable. The final day’s discussion usually ends by 5pm, and members hurry home to cook dinner for the evening meal with their families.

5.2.2 Decision-making and deviations from the norm: accommodating change

The structure of the communal work group – an eight-hour shift, one day a week, and food rations after 17 shifts – is a historical vestige of community action and development projects that were carried out in the 1990s. When residents’ expressed the desire to continue working beyond the scope of these first projects, members and administrators of the Pirwa agreed to sustain a weekly work group. Members reiterate Juana’s thoughts:
One day a week is very worthwhile, and we felt as a group that one day a week was beneficial to the group and beneficial to us, too. You know, weekly work lets us do certain projects, like plant crops, and it still allows me to work my stall [in nearby markets]. The rations helped make up for the day that I didn’t work at the market. This [scenario] worked for me.

José explains that his contacts in Europe sent enough funding so that food rations were to be distributed a few times a year. After some calculations, he initially decided that 16 shifts would suffice. It was always his intention that the activities of the Pirwa would allow the communal work group program to become self-sustainable. With the money from the sale of the adobes, organic produce, and bread, José was certain that these funds would provide the contraparte (their fair share) to the start-up money from Europe. However, he soon realized that these funds could not sustain the program, and he resorted in 2003 again to his contacts in Europe for more funding to buy the necessary food rations for the workers. After this second request for funds, José increased the workers’ obligation to 17 shifts before they received food rations. This has been the condition ever since.

Yet it continues to be José’s intention that the communal work group becomes self-sustainable. He cannot bear the thought of making a third formal request for funds to maintain the food rations. He says that “the program has passed its initial stages when help from the outside is necessary. Now, the workers must do what it takes to do it themselves. That is why we’ve taken more adobe orders, tried to grow more food and sell it, why we’ve started the cuy house.” In other words, José argues that the workers must be more economically successful – turn a profit – in their endeavors in order to sustain the program. And they have tried to do this in two ways: 1) they have attempted to intensify the projects in which they are already engaged, like growing more organic produce and garnering more orders for adobes, and 2) they have introduced other projects that may provide more income, such as the new cuy house project.
However, both of these strategies have increased the amount of work and the number of days of the communal work group in order to successfully complete these tasks. For instance, the new cuy house project now requires daily attention, in that a member must retrieve the alfalfa from a nearby field, feed the animals, and clean out their living areas. Growing more organic produce has resulted in a strain on water sources in the area. The lands that the members use to grow communal food were bought with the rights to access the nearby canal that other landowners in the community use for their fields. In order to distribute the water equitably, these lands lock the owners into a timetable in which the owners have access to the water for their fields. In the case of the Pirwa lands, the members have rights to water their lands on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays in four-hour afternoon intervals. When the communal work group grew fewer crops, they only used the water on Wednesdays, the day of the communal work group. But when they intensified their efforts, their crops required more irrigating, which meant accessing the water additionally on Tuesdays and Thursdays following the strict community schedule. Furthermore, when Oscar and Victoria took on more orders of adobes from people in nearby communities, this translated into at least two days a week of the communal work group – one day to make the mud, and the next day to mold the mud into bricks and lay them in the sun to dry. During my fieldwork, there were four big orders of 2,000 adobes or more. To fulfill these requests, members worked two days a week for a month for each order.

Overall, I participated in the communal work group for 10 months or approximately 40 weeks – from December 2004 to the beginning of June 2005, and then again from the end of August 2005 to January 2006. For 20 weeks or half of the time that I participated in the communal work group, the members of the Pirwa participated in the work group twice a week. This increase of time and effort became intolerable for many members, largely because working
an extra day at the Pirwa meant that they were not able to participate in their own individual
economic activities that they rely on to survive. Juana states that

I cannot keep going to work group twice a week. I am supposed to [sell vegetables in a stall in a
regional market] on Tuesdays and Thursdays. I rent that stall – I pay money, and when I don’t go there to
sell my produce, I lose money. The work group is important to me, but it only helps me so much. I can’t
just spend all my time doing that [the work group]!

Juana and other members point up the fact that the communal work group is important to
them, but it is one piece of an economic strategy, a livelihood, that they use to survive. While
José has informed the workers that the communal work group must become self-sustainable, he
justifies the increase in time and effort by arguing that workers must maintain their ayni, their
social obligations, to each other as well as the Pirwa. To do this, they must undertake these
labor-intensive projects and complete them. But members complain that ayni is not what is to
blame for their increased workloads; instead, they focus on José’s issue of self-sustainability. “I
thought [José’s contacts] wanted us to be united, for us to be a better community,” says Julian.
“José told us that if we were a united community and worked together, then the gringos [José’s
contacts] would send him money for the rations. Well, we are united. But we have to make a
living!” In other words, José depicted Huancarani as a “united community” in order to garner
funding from his contacts in Europe, a fundraising strategy used by other projects in the
developing world (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Mayo and Craig 1995). The emphasis on
Huancarani camaraderie and solidarity – the maintenance of social relationships – became almost
a sort of binding contract for many members of the Pirwa, in that they regarded their weekly
work group as a dependable source of income as long as their attendance remained steady. Now,
with José’s newfound stress on turning a profit and self-sustainability, many members
interpreted – accurately so – this shift as one that espoused an economistic, rather than a
relationship-oriented approach to development. Although they did not appreciate this switch in focus, they attempted to keep up with the increased workload.

In fact, members started to send children in their stead in order to fulfill their weekly obligation to the Pirwa. For example, Juan Carlos, the 12 year old son of doña Melisa, went to the morning portion of the communal work group for a total of 10 weeks while I attended trabajo. He is an 8th grade student at Rudolfo Mercado High School in Sipe Sipe, where classes are scheduled from 2-6pm Monday through Friday. Rules of participation in the communal work group state that members may send someone else to work a shift provided that they inform the encargador for whom they are working. However, members began to complain that sending children to do adults’ work put a burden on other workers who were present because children did not work as hard or diligently as adults do. Oscar and Victoria suggested that a modification of this rule should clearly spell out that children are not suitable replacements for members. This modification was agreed upon by all members, albeit reluctantly by some, because the inarguable fact was that children were not working as hard as adults, and overall the group saw that everyone was suffering for it.

Consequently, an attendance problem arose in the work group because members were finding it difficult to meet the obligations of the increased workload and unable to send available children in their stead. Oscar and Victoria reminded everyone of the penalty of expulsion from the work group if they had three absences, and this squelched the problem somewhat. But attendance issues continued to plague the Pirwa, so much so that José told Oscar to threaten the members with the demise of the communal work group and to use its funding to support the children’s after-school program. For some members, this threat helped prior fears resurface from the past. Martina illustrates:
If José ceases the food rations, then I will feel like I did when we left the mines. He’s saying figure out your problem for yourself – that’s not ayninakuy the way I know it. How am I supposed to feed my family without the food rations, but how can I feed my family without working in the markets?

Martina’s insight shows us that not only do members understand ayninakuy to be a driving force behind the daily tasks and projects of the communal work group – i.e., participating in weekly work groups and working diligently – but they also sense that ayninakuy is a tie that also binds José’s European funders directly with the workers of the communal work group. And the threat of pulling the work group funding and investing it in the children’s program, along with an apparent shift in focus from social relationships to the economic bottom-line of “self-sustainability,” has led members to believe that the impinging encroachment of non-Bolivian, modern, Western ideals is replacing their understanding of a development identity based on the fostering of traditional community-building.

Members are meeting these modifications to the rules and norms of the communal work group with flexibility and creativity, although it is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain their obligations despite their best efforts. By and large, members blame the encargadores for these difficulties and charge that José, Oscar, and Victoria are insensitive to the material needs of the Pirwa membership all for the sake of “an ideology.” One member says:

José has an ideology, and it’s a good one. He wants us to remember who we are – not as individuals, but as huancaraneños. We are supposed to put the community first. But that’s just not working for some of us. José has food on his table; he doesn’t need the [food rations from the Pirwa] to survive. In this way, he can have an ideology. Me, I just need to feed my family.

This member underscores the importance of class differences between the members and the encargadores. José and Oscar, but less so in the case of Victoria, are solidly middle-class Bolivians and do not presently have any problems with feeding their families – unlike all of the 20 members of the work group. Another point that members contend is that José espouses an ideology – putting the community first, maintaining social relationships as the cornerstone of
development – but in practice, this ideology is losing ground and being replaced by a focus on an insistence that individuals find their own way to meet the near-impossible demands of participating in the Pirwa. These problems are jeopardizing not only the livelihoods of the work group members, but also the success of the Pirwa altogether. Accommodating these changes, as difficult as this is, has led some members to resist recent demands in a number of ways, the focus of the last section of this chapter.

5.2.3 Decision-making and deviations from the norm: resistance and maintaining identity

In my unstructured interviews with them, all members of the Pirwa overwhelmingly support the idea of the weekly communal work group, pointing out how grateful they are for the food assistance as well as the chance to foster social relationships in an environment where their access to ayni relations may be limited due to their individual histories and identities. However, as I have illustrated in the last section, members are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their obligations to the Pirwa along with their obligations to their families. During the 10 months that I participated in the communal work group in Huancarani, I witnessed five occasions when members chose to resist what members saw as: 1) the increased demands on their time and resources, 2) the encargadores’ recent insistence on individual responsibility instead of a focus on the community, and 3) the encargardores giving outsiders access to the group in order to forward an agenda that members felt was not only beyond the scope of the communal work group, but also clashed with their conceptualizations of morality and conflicted with their notions of proper health care. All of these acts of resistance demonstrate members’ frustration with what they see as a disconnect between the impinging individualist, capitalistic development identity
that is gradually supplanting the communal, cooperative development identity espoused by the Pirwa. I describe and analyze these acts of resistance in turn below.

First, on two different occasions, people refused to pay the requisite token 1B (US$0.12) for the distributed produce and bread. Owing to the important rule that all members are alerted to upon their entrance into the Pirwa, these refusals were taken very seriously, and in and of themselves could be grounds for dismissal from the communal work group. While members are expected to contribute 1B as a token payment of bread or produce that they produce during the communal work group, lately 1B is becoming too steep a price for members. When the Pirwa’s first corn crop of the year was harvested, members divided it up in the usual way into equal piles for each member. But this harvest was particularly dismal, and some members complained that 1B was too much for the quantity and quality of distributed corn. When it came time for the members to pay for their produce, two women refused to buy the Pirwa corn, saying that they could buy bigger and better corn in the market. Victoria was furious. In front of the group, she informed these two women that they didn’t have the choice to opt out of this responsibility. Not only was it a prerequisite of membership to buy the produce, she said, but they also owe it to their fellow members to buy their share of the communal corn. They would not be fulfilling their ayninakuy if they refused to buy the corn. In the end, these two women stood steadfast. Another member, doña Patricia, bought out their shares of corn, much to the dismay of Oscar and Victoria. The encargadores told me later after this incident that she was afraid that it was a bad precedent to have someone buy out other people’s shares. If members do not feel a responsibility to other members and an ownership in their work in the Pirwa, then maybe they shouldn’t be members after all, Oscar and Victoria argued. They went on to say that 1B may be too much to pay for this particular harvest of corn, but prices may go up and 1B will again be
more of a token payment. “And besides,” says Oscar, “the money is not what is important. When they refused their corn, Patricia took on [the other members’ burden in order to resolve the conflict. Patricia may have needed the [extra] corn, but she [shouldered too much responsibility]. This is the way I see it.” In other words, the encargadores interpret this act of resistance primarily as the neglect of their social responsibility to the other members.

However, when I spoke with the resistors – doñas Melisa and Juana – they made it clear that their refusals were purely matters of economics. Simply put, they just didn’t have the money to pay for skimpy, emaciated piles of corn. And they added that while they were the only members who outright refused to oblige the trabajo rule, other members that day also complained that they were overburdened by having to purchase the corn for that price. “If I bought that corn,” says Melisa, “my son would not have been able to buy [the sheet of paper that his history exam was on] in school today. Is that just? No, I had to make a choice between my family and the Pirwa, and I made the right one.” I also questioned Patricia about her role in resolving this matter – she bought the other shares of corn, paying 3Bs that day for emaciated corn. Patricia told me

I knew that they [the resistors] just didn’t have the money that week for the corn. None of us liked the look of that corn – even I didn’t. But I actually had the money… so I decided to help end that conflict. Maybe one day I won’t have the money for it, but I do now. I had just worked in the fields [in Hamiraya] yesterday, so I could spend it on [the resistors’] corn.

Patricia is from La Paz, the same woman who told me that her daughter’s death was due to the community discriminating against her and mandating that she wash her family’s clothes in the wrong section of the canal (see this discussion in Chapter Three). When I asked her if she felt that it was her responsibility to buy the resistors’ shares of corn that week – a part of her ayni obligations to the Pirwa – she looked at me and wryly laughed, saying: “no, it’s really not my
responsibility, but it really does help people trust me now, doesn’t it? It shows people that I do my part and more for the community – that’s worthy of respect, isn’t it?”

After this initial refusal to buy corn, I witnessed two other events very much like it: once a member refused to buy the bread that was made during trabajo because she complained that the loaves were too small (meaning that she could get bigger loaves at the regional market for a much better price), and again someone refused to buy their share of another corn harvest later that year. Each time, the encargadores verbally assaulted the resistors, charging them with neglecting their social obligations to the rest of the group. And again, someone in the group that day bought the resistors’ shares, telling me later that it was not their responsibility to do so, but they did it because they had been more economically fortunate at the time and could pay for another share. And in the end, the resistors contend that they should not be penalized for their actions because their 1B was paid. “Why should it matter if I pay for [the corn] when someone else bought it,” asks Melisa? While the encargadores think that individuals should uphold the membership rules, these resistors argue that the group finances are intact because someone else paid their dues for them. These events directly resisted what people read as an assault on the members’ meager, and ever-shrinking, economic resources, as well as a shift in focus from the community to the individual – the topic of the second type of act of resistance.

A striking example of a member’s resistance to the shift away from a focus on the community to the individual occurred after the community festival, held every year from 8-12 September. Doña Isadora was honored with the charge of pasante for the 2005 community celebration venerating the Virgen of Guadalupe. The community pasante is someone who is chosen during the last year’s celebration to take the chair of organizing and paying for the necessities of the next year’s festival: namely, renting costumes for the dance troupe, hiring a
band to play for the dance troupe during the celebration, and providing food and chicha for all of
the community dancers as well as for other dance troupes who come to Huancarani to honor the
Virgen (in large part, the orureños). Based on interviews that I conducted with prior pasantes, as
well as recording doña Isadora’s expenses that she incurred during the 2005 celebration, pasantes
usually pay upwards of 6,000-7,000Bs (US$750-875) for each four-day festival. This is an
enormous amount of money for almost everyone in Huancarani, and no pasante in recent
memory was able to fulfill these obligations without the help of the whole community in various
capacities: for their time, their expertise, and their material and financial resources. For example,
during the festival, almost a dozen women worked all day and well into the evening to cook
meals for over 100 dancers and visitors. Isadora successfully bargained with doña Celestina, the
owner of one of the chicherías in the community, to allow her to pay a discounted price for six
colossal wooden vats of chicha for the festival. Additionally, the *portera* (live-in groundskeeper)
of the community school gave her time and expertise as a seamstress when Isadora solicited her
to ready and repair some of the costumes for the dance troupe. And Isadora expertly called in on
loans that she had given her family and friends throughout the years, requesting that people repay
the money lent to them and help Isadora fulfill her obligations as pasante.

Everyone who was requisitioned in some way for the 2005 festival acquiesced, especially
because of the events that led up to Isadora’s charge as pasante: her son was a prominent
member of the community until he fled to Spain after he cheated 8 men in Huancarani who he
had recruited to work on a construction project in Santa Cruz of their pay. Unfortunately, at the
2004 festival, this son had also been elected to be the pasante for the 2005 festival. But when he
fled to Spain, he left incomplete two very important matters: first, he left his two young
daughters to be raised by his mother, and second, he left his mother to fulfill the role of pasante.
in his stead. This charge was something that doña Isadora was poorly-equipped to carry out financially. But as the widow of a well-liked and successful relocalizado, she maintained well-established, deeply rooted, and faithful ayni relations that she drew on to fulfill her charge.

One day at the communal work group, about one month prior to the community festival, she also made a request of the Pirwa in her efforts to accomplish her tasks as pasante. During the late afternoon discussion of trabajo, she asked the encargadores and the members if she could use the casa comunal and its grounds as a place to house and feed members of the dance troupe and band members who were coming in from out of town for the festival. This request was accepted, and the encargadores gave her the keys to the casa comunal grounds, warning her to make sure that no one vandalized or misused the casa comunal in any way. She gratefully promised that she would safeguard the casa comunal and return the keys to Victoria immediately after the festival.

However, things did not turn out as Isadora had hoped. First, she lost the keys to the casa comunal during the excitement of the festival. Second, during the evening meal of the second day of the festival, the women who cooked the *picante de cerdo* (spicy pork dish) in the huge, industrial oven that had been donated to the Pirwa and was dedicated to baking trabajo bread, spilled hot pork gravy all over the inside of the oven. When work group members went to bake bread the next week, they deemed the oven inoperable, saying that the smell of pork that had seeped into the bricks lining the bottom of the oven would sour the bread and make it inedible. After the festival, Isadora, her granddaughters, and other community members had attempted to clean the oven to no avail. For 3 weeks Isadora avoided the communal work group, sending her 17 year old in her place. But when she returned, the encargadores immediately had a work group group discussion, where they told Isadora that she would be responsible for replacing: the bricks
of the oven, which would cost her 280Bs (US$35), the keys, and the lock on the door of the casa comunale, since perhaps the keys were stolen and someone could use them to steal resources there. They scolded her for using the oven in the first place, saying that Isadora never had permission to use the oven for this event. She argued that she was supposed to use her outdoor oven to cook the pork, but it was a windy day and the fire just would not light. In fact, she claimed, one of Isadora’s cooks – not Isadora herself – made the decision during the festival to use the oven in the casa comunale. This made no difference to the encargadores – Isadora was still required to replace the necessary items. After having used all of her available funds and social ties to fulfill the enormous task of pasante, Isadora would never be able to do purchase the things that the encargadores told her to do. But, in response to the encargadores mandates, she told them in the meeting that she would in fact replace the bricks.

About 2 hours later, after the communal work group had ended and Isadora and I were sitting at her house talking, I asked her directly about what had happened that day. Specifically, I asked her how she was ever going to be able to buy those things that needed to be replaced. She looked at me, and with a stern voice and her fist pounding on the table, she said:

Cristina, I will never [replace] those bricks. I lament very much that the oven bricks are ruined, but I was cooking for a community event. A community fiesta! They [Oscar and Victoria] never told me that I couldn’t use the oven. But I was not the person to ruin the oven. It was an accident – a terrible accident. There are other ways to replace those bricks – why don’t we all take up a cuota [collection]? Everyone benefited from the food and chicha during the festival – and I paid for all of that! No, Cristina, I will never pay for those bricks.

And this was the last statement that anyone ever made during my fieldwork about the oven bricks – and effectively extinguished the bread-baking during the communal work group.

Overall, Isadora’s act of resistance, although unexpected by the encargadores, was supported by the other members of the communal work group. When I directly asked the members, all of them thought that it was inappropriate for Isadora to take on the responsibility of
replacing the oven bricks because she had spared nothing to fulfill her duty as pasante. And when pressed further, all of the members said that it would be appropriate for the community members to take up a collection in order to raise the money to fix the oven. In effect, the trabajo membership recognized that as an organization that espouses the importance of community, they must remedy the mistakes made by an individual who had sacrificed so much for in the name of the community.

Finally, the last example of resistance in the communal work group concerned the way the communal work group as a program would be used as a gateway for outsiders into the community of Huancarani. In August 2005, Oscar requested that the outreach doctors from the NGO-run hospital in the nearby community of Mallco Rancho visit the communal work group in order to persuade female members to allow doctors to perform free pap exams, distribute information regarding reproductive health, and discuss birth control options. The APSAR outreach doctor and nurse for the community – who both came once a month to the school in Huancarani in order to administer free vaccinations and other health care – acquiesced, and Oscar scheduled them to come during the following week’s communal work group afternoon discussion. No opinions from the members about this idea were elicited beforehand, and none of the members knew anything about this arrangement until the doctors arrived at the casa comunal. The community outreach doctor is a young man in his 30s, with blue eyes and blond hair, wears a beard, and is over six feet tall. He does not speak Quechua nor Aymara, grew up in Cochabamba, and attended medical school in Mexico. The nurse, though, is a woman from the Valle Bajo and speaks Quechua, although she wears Western clothes and does not wear the pollera. However, in order to introduce the women of the communal work group to the project, the doctor addressed the group in Spanish, and the nurse did not translate for him. He told the
group that he was there to help them maintain their health and he would perform an important test—papinicolou, he said slowly in Spanish. The test would be free, but the women would have to travel to the hospital and pay 5Bs (US$0.63) to get their test results. The doctor never explained to the women what the purpose of the test was, nor how the results would make them any healthier.

The women sat in silence during the doctor’s speech. He finished and asked them if they had any questions, and when no one spoke up, the doctor and the nurse left. Oscar then told the members that he wanted this project to be successful because then “the doctors could come again and help us with other health matters.” No one, again, said anything after Oscar spoke, and with the communal work group finished for the day, everyone started to leave. I walked home with a group of five women who were making their way towards my neighborhood, and I asked them what they thought of the proposal from Oscar and the doctor. Each woman scowled and said, “nah,” an utterance of disgust that I had heard before. The youngest woman, doña Marisol, said to me:

Now, we know that Oscar means no harm, but we will not go along with this project. I know what this exam [the pap exam] is, and I would never want anyone else to go through that. With that doctor?! [Everyone laughs]. No way! Besides, we’d have to pay 4Bs roundtrip to get there, take two trufis, and then pay for our test results? Again, no way! But the most important thing is that we here in the community do not trust those doctors [from the hospitals nearby]. And Oscar thinks that if this project is successful, they [the doctors] will keep coming back. No, we don’t want that. I don’t think that people would come to the communal work group if these are the types of things that we would have to do [i.e., submit to the exams]. [C: What do you mean?] I mean that people can come into the Pirwa so that they can do what they want to us in the community…

I asked the other women present if they agreed, and they all affirmed Marisol’s statement. And other members reiterated Marisol’s sentiments in later interviews as well, leading me to believe that there was overall consensus on this matter. As Marisol so emphatically pointed out, the members first and foremost do not want the communal work group to become an
organization that gives outsiders entrée into the community – especially for activities that they may not agree with or see as appropriate.

The doctor and nurse returned two months later to follow up with the women at the communal work group. They came to see if the women had agreed to the project, and for the sake of efficiency, they had brought the tools they needed to transpose one of the rooms in the casa comunal to become an exam room. When the doctor addressed the group again, letting them know that he had brought all of the necessary materials and was ready to make use of them, Marisol spoke up and told him that since none of the encargadores were there that day, the members didn’t feel that they could submit to the exams. The doctor became visibly frustrated, telling them that he had canceled other appointments in his busy schedule that day so that he could come to Huancarani and perform these exams. All of the members sat in silence, and Marisol again argued that they did not feel that they could go ahead with the exams without the encargadores. The doctor said that he would return if they changed their minds, but they would have to notify one of the three the Huancarani community health workers in order to schedule another appointment. No one responded, and the doctor and nurse left. Again, their quiet resistance stalled the project. And the matter was never put before the group again during my fieldwork.

The members of the communal work group use particular acts of resistance as a way of commenting on what they see as a shift in focus in the Pirwa. In order to maintain a development identity that emphasizes communalism, cooperativism, and tradition, the members either openly – in the case of the refusing to buy the shares of corn – or covertly – in the cases of not replacing the bricks and making excuses to engage in the new health project – defy the gradual encroachment of what they see as a development identity based on outsiders’ needs and
José’s insistence on the Pirwa’s “self-sustainability” has resulted in a stark increase in members’ time and effort in order to accomplish trabajo projects. This in turn hurts the members by decreasing the amount of time, energy, and resources that they can spend on their own economic endeavors to raise their families. They contend that the encargadores, José, and ultimately their European funders are not fulfilling their ayni by increasing their demands of the membership and expecting them to individually figure out how they can juggle so many competing needs. Ironically, though, José and the encargadores argue that self-sustainability is an important goal for the Pirwa because it further solidifies members’ responsibility to the group. Consequently, the Pirwa’s recent focus on the individual and personal responsibility is hard-hitting when members engage in community affairs, like Isadora and her duty as pasante in the fiesta, and are then expected to suffer the cost as individuals at the group’s expense. Meanwhile, the membership also resist when others, like the Mallco Rancho doctor and nurse, attempt to use the Pirwa as a context to access women in the community who may never use the biomedical health services. The members see this as a breach of not only the objectives of the Pirwa, but as an infringement of the very heart of what development means in the communal work group. The members do not see the advantages of their participation in this type of health care project, especially in light of the clandestine way in which the encargadores organized it. To the members of the work group, this health care project violated their own sense of proper and appropriate health care, where a young foreign-looking man would not be the intermediary of a very private corporeal matter. These acts of resistance point up the importance of maintaining the initial development identity and defining participation in a way that proves to do just that. Members resist attempts at a reformulation of their own development identity by those they feel
do not represent the needs of *los bases* – i.e., the administrators, the Europeans, and outsiders like the Mallco Rancho doctor.

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

In creating their own development context, the administrators, funders, and workers in the Pirwa struggle to maintain a coherent development identity and negotiate distinct conceptualizations of appropriate development in the work that they do. While the proposed community-forged development identity is rooted in ethnicity and indigenous Andean roots, each development collective actor – administrators, funders, and workers – puts forth their own plan for the way that this identity will manifest itself in the contemporary ethnographic context. Workers indicate the importance that the Pirwa has in maintaining and engendering new ayni relations between people in the community that never would have been enmeshed in these relations otherwise. The international funders concede that these relations are a distinctive marker of successful development in the community, but emphasize the importance of profit-building to secure a financial future for the Pirwa independent of continuous exogamous funding. Pirwa members argue that the ideologies of financial self-sustainability and maintaining ayni are competing and incongruent. And in pursuing this trajectory, members indicate that international funders are shirking their ayni relations that they are supposed to maintain with Pirwa members. Moreover, the administrators of the Pirwa are caught between attempting to mitigate the two allegedly competing ideologies and broker development plans and projects that can somewhat align both sides. However, in their attempt to do so, they widen the gap between themselves and the
members with regards to the political economy of identity in the community: differences in class, language proficiency, dress, and ultimately social capital.

Overall, there are fundamental differences in the imposed development identity from the international funders and the community-forged development identity coming from the members. While the members argue that their work must align with their historical and contemporary indigenous roots, funders contend that this development identity is too indigenous and fails to account for Western ideals of individualism and financial independence – ideals that are central to international discussions of successful participatory development. Thus far, the everyday struggles of Pirwa members and administrators – conflicts arising both within and between these groups – have resulted in continued participation and funding for the projects. However, the Pirwa is at a pivotal point, and the future of the program and its success will entail continued negotiations of identity on both sides in order to figure out exactly what it does and who its members are.
Women are extremely visible in development contexts in Huancarani. As I have shown in both the OTB and the Pirwa, membership in these contexts almost exclusively consists of women. In a sense, this is a predictable event in a community where men have very few options but to leave the community to find wage work or to remain in the community to engage in subsistence farming and peonage. Women in Huancarani regularly attend OTB meetings and the Pirwa workgroups, speaking on behalf of their families when voicing their opinions and voting. If they are not able to attend an obligatory event, women in Huancarani send a family member or friend in their stead, often an adolescent son since their daughters are expected to care for their younger siblings. Without women’s participation in these contexts, there would be no development work in Huancarani. On the surface, it seems like the State’s goal of increasing women’s participation in development, as the LPP legally mandates, is being met.

However, no women in the community hold official positions of leadership within these contexts, except Victoria, the encargadora of the Pirwa, and Sofia, the water judge in the OTB. There are a handful of men who are active in development contexts and the community relies on them to fill the official charges in the OTB and the Pirwa. Most women, as many of my informants, both male and female, tell me, prefer to remain as part of the regular membership or in positions that have a lesser degree of responsibility. Women in Huancarani suggest that it
would be impossible for most women to be elected to positions of power either within the OTB or the Pirwa (and point out that there are far fewer of these such positions to hold within the structure of the Pirwa). This common sentiment is heard not only in this community but in the region as whole and, arguably, it reverberates throughout Bolivia. Although women are not passive participants in development work (see Isadora’s resistance story in Chapter Five), there are very few women in leadership positions in the municipality. As I further explain in this chapter, women tell me that this is the case because it is just too difficult for women to participate in a leadership capacity – especially for women who wear the pollera, of which more than 75% of the women who participate in development contexts are such women.

This chapter presents the last case study of the development contexts in Huancarani. I discuss the Adela Zamudio women’s group (hereafter referred to as Adela Zamudio), composed of women from throughout Sipe Sipe who, according to the group’s founder, meet in order to “give women a real voice in local development and political work.” Throughout my discussion, I examine the way gender as a construct is used in participatory discourse and how the State’s focus on gender is meant to single out women and correct for their near absence in the development process. Popular participation has come to incorporate gender into development discourse and refers to women’s equal access in the development process. Those who founded Adela Zamudio see this as only a laudable first step in highlighting the need for a gendered analysis of development in Bolivia. They point out that women indeed have an overwhelming physical presence in development contexts, but their political power and participation is limited in scope. Adela Zamudio works to empower women to modify discrepant power relations with men – and with other women – in order to give women opportunities to fully engage in the development process. In doing so, I demonstrate that they forge a common development identity
as a women’s group in their own right, and as women who transfer the knowledge, confidence, and skills they learn in Adela Zamudio to their work in other development contexts. My analysis illustrates that the group’s focus on women both garners community recognition and some local support. But while other development contexts – the Pirwa and the OTB – attempt to maintain social relations, Adela Zamudio struggles instead to engender and transform social relations. However, I show that the success of Adela Zamudio is jeopardized because its members must look elsewhere to meet their families’ material needs, thus curtailing the time and energy they have to participate in the group. In the end, the members of Adela Zamudio, often fall short of feeling empowered, and often complain of being overburdened by the enormous responsibility of having to participate in development work for which they are targeted, transforming power relations within their communities, and taking care of their families.

6.1 THE FOUNDING OF ADELA ZAMUDIO

My first meeting with Nancy, the founder of Adela Zamudio, was in my first few weeks of fieldwork in Huancarani. I was introduced to her through a friend of a friend who, after learning of my research in the Sipe Sipe region, told me that “you can’t do your research here without knowing doña Nancy. She knows everything and everybody, and she works tirelessly to improve this community and to help women.” Our first meeting was short, and it was the first of many trips to her house to participate in her “ladies’ group,” as Nancy called it. Nancy is a 62 year old married woman originally from Tarata, a small community in the southeastern part of the department of Cochabamba, who married a man from Huancarani named Geraldo. Nancy and Geraldo met in the mines of Llallagua in the 1960s, where she was working in the hospital as
a nurse and he was working in the mines. She led an unusual life for a married woman in that when she was laid off from the hospital in Llallagua, she left the mines by herself to work in another part of the department while her husband remained behind in the mines. When Geraldo was finally laid off five years later, he went home to live in Huancarani. Nancy then took a job at the small clinic of Sipe Sipe, as the present-day hospital was known then, and they have lived there together since this time.

Nancy retired from her work at the Sipe Sipe hospital in 2000, and is proud of the fact that she was instrumental in helping build what was once known as a small clinic into a full-fledged, primary care hospital. Under the tutelage of a well-known and respected doctor/administrator who worked in Sipe Sipe the entire duration of her career there, Nancy became renowned in the region as a nurse who supported the rights of patients, especially poor patients who had no resources to access good health care. Since the beginning of the 1980s when Nancy and her superiors arrived, the hospital in Sipe Sipe began offering 24-hour care “because many people in this region are farmers and simply can’t get their health care during regular business hours,” she told me. Even before the establishment of the state-run maternal and infant health program that provides free prenatal/postnatal care for women and children up to their fifth birthdays\textsuperscript{15}, Nancy and the staff at the Sipe Sipe hospital were delivering babies and treating women and children free of charge, oftentimes making house calls. Her patients remember her most as a woman who “went from door to door, teaching us about health, and telling us how we would be respected and well-cared for at the clinic,” as one of her past patients happily reported. Nancy’s role at the clinic for years was best described as a public health and direct care nurse, someone who taught women in their homes about health issues while

\textsuperscript{15} SUMI was established in Bolivia in 1993 and continues up to the time of this writing.
aggregating health data throughout the municipality, as well as seeing patients at the hospital and providing follow-up care in their homes. “This [strategy] is just what was most successful,” she said in reference to her multifaceted role.

For years, Nancy and Geraldo’s home became a sanctuary of sorts for women and children. Patients would arrive at their house if an emergency arose even before they went to the clinic, especially women who were escaping an abusive husband or father. Additionally, for all intents and purposes, Nancy became a practicing midwife with the consent of her superiors at the clinic.16 Nancy and Geraldo have four grown children, two of whom live in the Sipe Sipe region, while the other two live with their own families in the city of Cochabamba. One of her daughters who lives in Sipe Sipe, Ana, as a teenager used to accompany her mother while she conducted house-calls and assisted her mother in compiling health data. Ana now gathers data for a local organization that conducts research projects in the region, and she also works alongside her mother in Adela Zamudio. And like her mother, Ana works tirelessly in community development work; during my fieldwork she was a representative on the school board as well as an official in one of the Sipe Sipe OTBs.

Since her retirement in 2000, Nancy, along with Ana as a support, has dedicated her time and energy as the director of Adela Zamudio. She explained that the group has over 50 members, women from all over the municipality, and the popularity of the group is due in large part to Nancy’s house-calls that were made over the years. Word of mouth among women of the region made Nancy somewhat of a local hero, and Nancy notes that women whom she has never seen before often show up at her door to inquire about the group. Nancy decided that meeting with women as a group would be beneficial for two reasons. First, it would allow her to save her

16 This kind of acquiescence from physicians for practicing midwifery is rare in rural Bolivia. Physicians have been known to drive practicing midwives to work clandestinely (see Zulawski 2000).
strength, since she is a bad asthmatic and is longer able to walk long distances with ease. And second, it would “show women that they are not alone in their concerns about improving their health, improving their families’ health, and developing community resources to help them do just that. Meeting as a group allows women to talk to each other about things, not just to me.”

The Adela Zamudio group was scheduled to meet once a week on Tuesdays during my fieldwork, but more often than not they met approximately twice a month. At any given meeting, between 5 and 20 members were in attendance. The agenda of the meetings varied, ranging from discussions about health or community concerns to cake-baking or sewing classes. When Nancy retired from her nursing post at the local hospital, the former administering physician of the Sipe Sipe hospital was then the director of the Cochabamba’s Department of Public Health, and she discussed with him her work in Adela Zamudio. He advised her to allow the meetings to be open enough so that women felt free to learn from each other and have control of what they wanted to learn, but scheduled enough so that they could be exposed to new information that they wouldn’t otherwise learn about in any other way. He lent her a series of audio cassettes that were part of a national public health campaign to teach people about health issues such as: birth control and reproductive rights, patients’ rights in hospital and other clinical settings, and step-by-step instructions to formulate rural community health worker programs that helped with community surveillance of communicable diseases. Every couple of months or so Nancy played one of these cassettes at Adela Zamudio or brought in a speaker from the community to discuss not only topics related to health, but also concerning the logistics of the LPP or how to resolve problems that arise with their children’s teachers. The rest of the meetings were reserved for topics that the women suggested themselves, which primarily
involved how to start their own at-home businesses (i.e., baking cakes and pastries, seamstress, or making yogurt).

Members of Adela Zamudio live in the town of Sipe Sipe or in a number of small communities that abut the town center, such as Montenegro, Huancarani, Vinto Chico, Valle Hermoso. All of the members of the group are women aged 16-45 who have between 1-6 children. They all consider themselves campesinas, or peasant women, and this is the common identity that they share as members of the group. All of the members wear the traditional skirt of rural Bolivian women. Most of them wear the short, pleated skirt that distinguishes them from Cochabamba, while only four women don the long-ruffled one that indicates their roots in La Paz. Nancy and Ana wear western clothing which illustrates that they are proficient Spanish-speakers, high school graduates, and/or professionals. Both Nancy and Ana speak Quechua as well, and most but not all of the women in the group are monolingual Quechua-speakers who understand some spoken Spanish. However, often I heard a few women in the group complain in Spanish that they are paceñas from rural La Paz, indicating that they speak Aymara and not Quechua. This sometimes made it difficult, they told me, for these women to follow or participate in the discussions. Nancy then made a point to speak to them in Spanish, translating for them when necessary.

6.2 THE ADELA ZAMUDIO GROUP – ITS SOCIETAL ANTECEDENTS

Nancy told me that after a lot of thought she named the group Organización de Mujeres Adela Zamudio (Adela Zamudio Women’s Group). Adela Zamudio (1854-1928) was a renowned literary figure and social activist from Cochabamba who fought for women’s suffrage and
women’s right to quality education. Zamudio’s birthday, October 11th, is now celebrated widely as Bolivia’s National Women’s Day. Her poems are primarily the most well-known of her literary works, especially “Quo Vadis?” and “To Be Born a Man.” She founded girls’ schools as well as a school of art and design in Cochabamba, and her activism included works such as distributing sewing machines to poor women (Muñoz 2003). Nancy definitively states that Zamudio’s legacy is an “honor to which we as a group should aspire.”

The Adela Zamudio group has no real budget and no institutional backing besides the expertise and support from the aforementioned director of the Cochabamba public health department via Nancy’s professional connection. But they have been successful in garnering external funding from Nancy’s and Ana’s personal contacts abroad in order to purchase items that women use to practice practical skills used to earn extra cash. In the past, the group used these funds to by a sewing machine, baking pans and cooking paraphernalia, and an industrial oven, all of which are used during Adela Zamudio meetings or as needed for their own use.

When I inquired as to why and how Nancy and Ana started Adela Zamudio, Nancy explained:

Well… it started with the women who used to visit me to talk about health… well, really, they came to talk about anything that was happening in their lives or in the community. They would come to me to talk about their kids in school, the problems that they had talking to their kids’ teachers, the problems that they had with their husbands, with their kids, with their lives in general…. The local club de madres [mothers’ club] was disbanded in 1998 so I knew that women had no where to go, no where to talk about things that mattered to them. Unless they discussed these things among themselves, they didn’t talk to anyone about it, nor did they have people to help them resolve these things… They trust me, and I think that I can help them with these things. They can also help each other. That’s what capacitación [empowerment] is all about… women helping each other.

I then inquired further about the local disbanded club de madres: were the members of Adela Zamudio former members of the mothers’ club?

Actually, no… the local mothers’ club consisted more of women who were not poor, not campesinas… [the members of that club were] women who came back from the mines but who often were educated [bachileres]. Adela Zamudio members, on the other hand, are not these types of women. I
think that Adela Zamudio is important because these women were the forgotten ones, those not involved in the [former] mothers’ club. Empowering the [Adela Zamudio] women is just as important as [the members of the disbanded mothers’ club].

The mothers’ club that Nancy speaks of was part of a national phenomenon that reached its peak during the years after the privatization of the mining industry in Bolivia in the 1980s (Moreno 2003). These groups received funds from the national government to buy food rations that were distributed among members who completed projects to improve and develop their communities – much like the system of food distribution set up in the Pirwa (see Chapter Five). The overall objective of these clubs was, in part, to help empower poor women by giving them information as well as the opportunity to gain work skills, improve their financial position, and in turn to improve the outlook of communities (cf. Felty 1991). By and large, federal funding for most mothers’ clubs nation-wide ceased in the mid-1990s.

Nancy was the president of the Sipe Sipe mothers’ club from 1990 to 1997. Some of the club’s activities that Nancy is most proud of are: 1) holding a day-long self-esteem [auto-estema] workshop in Sipe Sipe for women from throughout the municipality, presented by two psychologists from Cochabamba, and 2) helping to secure the beginnings of the desayuno escolar (school breakfast) program in Sipe Sipe that to this day continues to provide a meal to school children during school hours. Despite the enormous amount of time and energy she spent as head of the club, at the end of 1997 Nancy simply announced one day that she would no longer serve as the club’s president in order to “make room for new women to carry this charge,” she told me. In turn, another very active member of the club was nominated and then unanimously elected to the office, a woman who at first seemed fit for the job. However, according to Nancy, this woman was responsible for the disbandment of the club. Nancy alleges that the new president faithfully served for three months and then gradually began to shirk her
duties. After four months, she stopped going to meetings altogether. Then, in the beginning of 1998, the president furtively sold all of the furniture that had been bought specifically for the club and kept the money for her own needs, in effect stealing from the club. With tears in her eyes, Nancy angrily reported that all of her hard work had ended with the sale of the club furniture, furniture that had been bought with money raised by the members who sold crocheted and knitted wares and baked goods. “But the mayor at the time was behind this,” she told me. “You know, people don’t like women gaining too much power in a community, and that’s what they felt was happening.” After this event, she promised herself that she would start a women’s group that was unlike the one that had disbanded, primarily because the pain she experienced with the former group was too acute and she did not want to work with “those particular women” again.

The structure and agenda of Adela Zamudio is similar to that of the former mothers’ club in Sipe Sipe. While their meetings cover the same sorts of topics and sponsor similar kinds of fundraising events that the club did, Adela Zamudio does display some unique differences. The ubiquity of the Bolivian mothers’ clubs reached its peak before the passage of the Law of Popular Participation, so Adela Zamudio has had to update the concept of empowerment [capacitación] in order to make it socially relevant in contemporary society (please see Galjart (1995) for an historical perspective of the global discourse of empowerment). Members of the group now struggle for more access to “the process of development,” both through local OTBs and their community POAs as well as in the municipal budget and the PDM. But, as Nancy, Ana, and the members of Adela Zamudio argue, having more access to this process is more complex than merely increasing the presence of women in development contexts. The following discussion explains how gender is regarded in contexts of community development – primarily,
in the OTBs and in popular participation as a whole – in order to illustrate the contemporary environment that gave rise to the contemporary agenda of Adela Zamudio.

6.3 RIGHTING DEVELOPMENT WRONGS

The impetus for Adela Zamudio was, for the most part, correcting for grave oversights that Nancy and Ana have experienced in other development contexts regarding women and their role in community development. Gender has been an essential factor in national discussions of popular participation since the passage of the Law of Popular Participation. Although indigenous ethnicity has assumed a place of prominence in questions of citizen access to political resources, gendered perspectives of popular participation are yielding more attention. As I discussed in Chapter One, gender has now been “mainstreamed” in Bolivian development discourse (Moser et al. 1999; Chant and Guttmann 2005); in other words, gender as a concept has gained national attention as an important factor deserving of special rules and regulations in all facets within all facets of community development. In the context of Bolivian popular participation, the issue of gender is written into the LPP in one of the very first paragraphs, in that the law serves “to endeavor to improve the quality of life of Bolivian women and men, with the most just distribution and best administration of public resources… [and] to fortify the political and economic instruments necessary to perfect representative democracy, to facilitate citizen participation, and to guarantee equal opportunity at the levels of representation for women and men” (Law #1551, Title One, Chapter One, Article One). The foregrounding of gender in the LPP has been lauded as a victory for Bolivian women (Paulson and Calla 2000) and is the result of the tireless struggle for and by women at the national level, as well as due to
pressure from international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and UN organizations, on the Bolivian government to prioritize women’s access in the political process (Lind 2004; Booth et al. 1996).

As over a decade of experience with popular participation demonstrates, this mainstreamed discourse has come to focus on women’s presence in the process of development. For all intents and purposes, the legal focus on gender and women in development effectively renders women’s development identity in the negative, as in the *absent, non-participating woman*, and serves as a corrective for what is seen as women’s unequal participation. During this time, the topic of gender has warranted a place within the bureaucracy of the national government, first within the former Ministry of Sustainable Development, Gender, and Generation, and then again within the current restructured Ministry of Rural Affairs, Indigenous Populations, Gender, and Generation (2006). In both of these government departments, gender is an issue that has been lumped with other targeted, vulnerable populations and social concerns: the environment, indigenous people, rural communities, children, and the elderly. Within this context, gender means the vulnerable population of women. Moreover, the LPP’s emphasis on equal opportunity for both women and men has also come to signify and equate ‘gender’ with ‘women,’ meaning that instead of working toward balancing power relations between men and women, the LPP focuses on inserting more women into the process of participation. This method aligns itself with limited “Women In Development” perspectives of gender and development (Parpart 2000; Clisby 2005; Bhavnani, Foran, and Kurian 2003), adopting an add-women-and-stir, “tagging on women,” (cf. Clisby 2005), cookbook approach to acknowledging and rectifying the absence of women in local, regional, and national Bolivian politics. As has happened elsewhere (cf. Black 1999), women throughout Bolivia were first to advocate for a
gendered analysis of development, and since then they are almost always the ones who continue to advocate for this gendered analysis of development (Lind 2004). Women have been responsible to make sure that the rules are followed and that women are represented in positions of power in popular participation.

But it is unclear whether or not the LPP has resulted in increased participation of rural women or a better representation of their needs. As I point out previously in Chapter Four, women do have a strong presence in the membership of the local governing body (the OTB) in Huancarani. Yet this was also the case before the existence of the LPP; in my review of the community’s attendance record of meetings before 1995, when the OTB was officially recognized, women frequented community meetings more often than men, sometimes outnumbering men 2:1. But the presence of women at local meetings does not in and of itself connote that women have more political power than they did before the LPP. Increasing the numbers of women in popular participation does nothing to undermine the power imbalances linked to problems that arise between men and women – and men or women of various class and ethnic backgrounds – and how they relate to each other in the course of popular participation and in society more generally. As I saw first-hand at the summit that I attended with all of the municipality’s OTB leaders, almost all of the leadership positions are filled by men. Out of about 150 attendees at the summit, only 10-12 of them were women, not including the two advisors on the vigilance committee. Popular participation’s emphasis on the equal footing of men and women in local politics is not necessarily being met. “Except for a couple of advisors [on the vigilance committee], women do not have more numbers in the local government,” says Nancy. At the municipal level, women are being elected into onto the vigilance committee, according to the Sipe Sipe mandate that 40% of its vigilance committee advisors are women. So
while women’s presence has increased within some municipal positions, this is just not so at the level of the community OTBs.

A 2001 study conducted in Sipe Sipe, “A Diagnostic Report for the Formulation of Women’s Demands of Sipe Sipe” (CERES 2001), assessed women’s political position in the context of popular participation. This report found that, more often than not, women who do serve in leadership positions in the municipality sit on community school boards (juntas escolares). In this context, women are seen as appropriate candidates to advocate for the quality of their children’s education. But in other political positions, such as officials of the OTB, women are less often perceived as adequately prepared for leadership. As the CERES study points up, most OTB boards lack any female representatives, unlike the municipal’s vigilance committee, where two of the five advisors are in fact filled by women. In the municipality overall in 2001, the only women who filled positions on OTB boards were two female presidents and about 8 female secretaries (CERES 2001).

However, the municipality mandates that at least one position on every community’s OTB board be reserved for a woman (see Cuba Rojas n.d. and the POA of Arque (1999) for notes regarding similar/dissimilar practices in other municipalities and provinces). Nancy and Ana contend that most communities work around this mandate. When these OTBs fail to elect women onto the board, they appoint women to positions called vocales (voters, or spokespersons), positions that are subsequently very ill-defined and have no real duties or power. In this way, the OTBs fulfill their obligation to encourage women’s participation, but the effect is a mere illusion – evidenced by the fact that women in the position of vocal are not even invited to the summits, as in the case of Huancarani’s vocales during my fieldwork. As I reported in Chapter Four, since there was no woman on the board of Huancarani’s OTB, I was invited to
participate as the voice of Huancarani women in the summit that I attended in Sipe Sipe. When I inquired as to whether I was replacing another woman who may have gone in my stead, the OTB vice president responded, “No, [the women who serve as vocales] do not come to these summits. Sometimes, Sofia, the water judge, comes, but she really does not want to and often decides not to go at the last minute. Almost always, no woman from Huancarani is in attendance at the summit.”

The Diagnostic Report from Sipe Sipe also revealed that women who speak out in public meetings often endure discriminatory insults, both publicly in the meeting and privately with friends, neighbors, and even family members. As a result, the authors of the report argue that women suffer from “feelings of insecurity” (sentimientos de inseguridad) that serve to further distance them from seeking out leadership positions. Moreover, the study also pointed out that women are already overburdened in their lives as it is, and adding another responsibility, such as serving on the board of the OTB, is just not possible for women who farm in the fields, work in nearby slaughterhouses, and take care of their families, among other daily tasks. Corroborating these findings, the most recent municipal PDM (2001) also confirms that these factors – cultural perceptions that women are not suited to lead along with women’s overwork – severely restrict the presence of women in leadership positions in the local government. Overall, after studying these reports and observing local leaders in action, I conclude that the focus on increasing women’s presence in popular participation has fallen short of garnering better representation of women and their needs in development contexts, partly because this focus fails to fully engage the underlying reasons as to why women are excluded from leadership in local governments.

Women’s limited political representation may, in fact, also be the result of the way popular participation is defined and written into law in Bolivia (see Rai (2002) for a more global
discussion of women and political representation). Clisby (2005) argues that the law states that OTBs are territorial organizations, explaining that they represent people who are geographically linked to each other in space, and all residents within this space must be accounted for among the membership of the OTB. Additionally, each geographic space is allowed only one OTB. Therefore, members of OTBs are prohibited from participating in more than one OTB. The OTB in a community is deemed the local governing authority in the area, having the full power of the law to manage resources and direct community development. Among residents, the OTB and the municipal bureaucracy of the LPP are synonymous with politics. However, women, especially women living in rural Bolivia, assume complementary, not co-participatory, roles within the social fabric of everyday life. In other words, men are considered to live more in the public sphere while women have power over the private sphere. Along these lines, men generally take leadership roles in the OTB, acquiring full political authority in the public sphere. Women, on the other hand, participate in women’s groups like mothers’ clubs and are thought to be community-builders – people who serve as intermediaries and bring attention to residents’ private problems into the public sphere. Women’s groups like these play an important role in community development, and their ideas and voices warrant serious consideration in the process of popular participation. Yet Clisby explains that the LPP does not allow women’s groups to establish their own OTB in their own right.17 When the law was drawn up, these women’s

17 Often, Clisby’s male informants explained to her that women’s groups, centering around women and women’s needs, were not at all representative of the overall community and therefore should not be given the right to have access to community resources. However, Clisby contends that the juntas vecinales that she studied were composed almost exclusively of men, thereby, in her mind, failing to represent the needs of the community at large
groups are seen as redundant in the process of popular participation since they already are members of the OTB and are thereby represented. Because members of women’s groups are already members of their geographically appropriate OTB, these women’s organizations are prohibited from participating in any official way in popular participation.

In this social, cultural, and political environment, Adela Zamudio is seen as an alternative space for women to voice their community concerns and work collectively to remedy problems and contribute to community affairs. Miraftab (2004) makes a useful distinction between what she sees as “invited” spaces and “invented” spaces in local processes of participatory development. According to Miraftab’s (2004: 1) classification, the OTBs in Sipe Sipe are specifically “invited spaces” in the process of Bolivian popular participation – “the ones occupied by those grassroots and their allied non-governmental organizations that are legitimized by donors and governmental interventions.” On the other hand, an organization like Adela Zamudio is what she would deem an “invented space” – “…those, also occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their collective action, but directly confronting the authority and the status quo.” Like the Pirwa, Adela Zamudio is a program that allows women to come together as often as possible to share ideas that help them help their families and communities. These groups voice their concerns and needs in the official development channel of the OTB through a group representative – Victoria in the case of the Pirwa, and Nancy and Ana in the case of Adela Zamudio – as well as in other development contexts. In the following sections, I illustrate some of the problems that women in Sipe Sipe face in the process of popular participation and as well. For all intents and purposes, while a traditionally men’s space is considered to be representative of the community, typically what is designated as a women’s space is not.
developing their communities. First, I point out ways that the yearly community development plans, (the POAs) discriminate against women and women’s needs because of certain development priorities that have been set at the national level. And then, I examine how Adela Zamudio inserts itself into the process of development in Sipe Sipe, working to overcome problems that women face throughout the municipality.

6.4 A GENDERED ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL POAS

6.4.1 Androcentric bias

It seems that community development plans as a whole are biased towards men and men’s needs. Although most of the people in attendance at OTB meetings are women, careful study of municipal POAs and the PDM written during the four years between 2001 and 2005 reveal that there is less money spent and fewer POA projects proposed that take up issues that are traditionally considered more within women’s domains than within men’s. This is something that doña Feli, an advisor from the municipal vigilance committee, hinted at when she and another advisor came to Huancarani to explain the mayor’s rejection of their first proposed POA project in 2005 (see Chapter Four). As I discussed previously in this dissertation, Feli encouraged women at the meeting to voice their opinions about appropriate POA projects. In a later discussion with her, I asked her why she thought that it was necessary to give such advice, and she explained:

This is a difficult problem. Women do not speak up when their communities decide on their POA projects…. And I think that they should. Women are not benefiting from popular participation, and by law they should. Of course, lots of projects are done that help everyone, like building new wells and electricity to people’s homes. But women live in their communities more than men do – often, men leave
to look for work. Women need money spent in their communities that will help them take care of themselves and their kids. [C: But many communities are proposing these kinds of projects, right?] … Yes, but many aren’t. Look at the projects as a whole, and you’ll see what I’m talking about….

Upon further investigation, I found one pattern that could be considered an example of androcentric bias in the types of projects that are funded and the amount of money spent on them. According to the municipal budget that indicates how coparticipación tributaria funds were spent on POA projects in 2005, there were six community projects for a total of 334,428Bs (US$41,803.50) relegated to “the development and promotion of sports.” All of these POAs requested money to buy parcels of land to construct multiple-use sports fields; Huancarani’s proposal was among these six. The median budget for these sports-related projects is 46,750Bs, well above the median budget for 2005 projects as a whole, which was 30,000Bs. Sports fields, by and large, are used mostly to host inter-community men’s soccer games once a week, along with some impromptu games that children play. When I asked women from Huancarani what they thought about their community POA requesting funds for the construction of a sports field, many women complained that this was not at all a helpful community project. As Patricia contended:

We already have access to a soccer field in Sorata. Our men from the community play there on Sundays, and it is a good field. It is very close to Huancarani. Why do we need one right here? The kids have a lot of places to play, like in the fields by my house. We don’t need another place for kids [to play]… Couldn’t that money be spent on something else…? [C: Like what?] Well, I think that we should have gotten the money to cobble-stone the street. Do you know how far we all have to walk to get to the bus stop? It is very far… And with a baby on your back and food to carry back from the market, women suffer when they have to walk far. No bus will come drive into Huancarani without a better street to drive on…

Patricia’s remarks point up: 1) the fact that a sports field in Huancarani is a gendered space, a place that is primarily used by men and for men’s activities, and 2) that one of the community’s rejected proposed projects, the cobble-stoning project, would have been beneficial to women in the community – much more so than a sports field. Everyone I spoke with seemed
to agree that investing in improving community roads would eventually entice someone to provide regularly scheduled bus service in the community. Residents have to walk about 1-1.5 miles (depending on where their house is located) to the nearest bus stop – a hardship, as Patricia argues, for people who have problems walking or have things to carry. However, not everyone I spoke with agreed with Patricia’s analysis. Julia stated that a sports field would be beneficial for everyone in Huancarani, partly because “women could make gelatin or ice creams and sell them to the players and kids.” But the majority of Huancarani women felt that the benefits to them of a project like cobble-stoning the street far outweighed those of constructing a sports field – something that they see as redundant in a community that has access to a nearby field and ample room for kids to play.

Nancy and Ana use the Adela Zamudio group to discuss problems that arise in the community construction of POAs and in other development work throughout Sipe Sipe. During the course of my fieldwork, they scheduled two Adela Zamudio meetings to explain: 1) the rules of the LPP in relation to women, and 2) the process of constructing and approving a POA project. As part of these meetings, they taught women that the LPP is attempting to insert women as much as possible into the process of community development. Nancy and Ana commended women for attending their OTB meetings, but encouraged them to give voice to their opinions and ideas for POA projects. The women in the group responded in a variety of ways. Some women told Nancy and Ana that they are speaking out but feel that they just aren’t listened to, both at the community level and when the projects come up for approval in the mayor’s office. Some women retorted that their communities were so poor – poor enough that any type of project that was approved for funding would be helpful to women, regardless if it was a project like a sports field or not. But by and large, women overwhelmingly supported
Nancy and Ana’s contention that women need to work harder to be heard so that POA projects will benefit them.

6.4.2 The role of the municipality and their attempts to prioritize women

To be fair, the municipal government in 2005 took an important step toward supporting women and women’s work in the process of development throughout Sipe Sipe. In the second 2005 municipal summit that I attended, I was pleasantly surprised to read that the municipal budget included a line item entitled “Políticas de Género” (gender politics) that was awarded 20,000Bs (US$2,500). In the summit presentation given by the accountant from the mayor’s office, he told us that this was a brand new line item in Sipe Sipe’s budget, something that was a result of “a long-fought struggle from the women of Sipe Sipe – your government here and in La Paz has heard you.” I questioned Nancy about this comment: was the Adela Zamudio group in part responsible for this new source of funding? and what types of projects exactly did this sum of money fund? Nancy explained to me that

Yes, Ana and the ladies and I have [lobbied] the municipal government offices in order that they comply with this… [C: With what, exactly?] … With the fact that they are supposed to be making sure that women know about the LPP and that they know how to participate well… help construct the POAs… make sure that their needs are heard. The only way to do this is with empowerment [capacitación] training. Women just don’t know what popular participation is all about. They need to know that only going to [OTB] meetings is not enough. They need to speak! … This training will teach women how to do this and what they need to consider in these meetings (speaker’s emphasis).

Nancy and Ana were instructed by the mayor’s office to put in a proposal to fund these empowerment trainings, with the agreement that the mayor’s office would distribute to them a portion of the 20,000Bs set aside for gender politics. These monies were specifically earmarked for community women’s groups, either functioning mothers’ clubs or other groups whose membership is exclusively female. ‘Gender politics,’ in this context, signifies ‘women-only.’
And the funding for gender politics was not the only municipal money set aside for women in the 2005 budget. The presenter at the summit indicated that within that year’s budget, there was a sum of 10,000Bs allotted for the cobble-stoning of the road up to Inca Raqay, archaeological ruins and a popular tourist spot in the municipality. These monies, he said, “are to pay women in the municipality who want to work. We are only going to hire women for the job of cobble-stoning the road up to Inca Raqay because women here told us that they need work. They need more options.” Each worker would earn 450Bs each month, working 6 days a week for 8 hours a day. After hearing this comment, I questioned the presenter about the motivation for women-only hiring practices for this project. He told me that Nancy and Ana were directly behind this project. They had lobbied the mayor’s office to hire women for specific public works projects, arguing that certain municipal projects – like the decrepit road to Inca Raqay – had remained in disrepair because public work employees never managed to prioritize them and carry them out. Nancy and Ana confirmed for me that they did indeed hold a meeting with the mayor’s office to request such funds. After hearing their request, the mayor’s office did not say one way or another if it would be approved. Ana and Nancy, along the other attendees at the summit, had thus learned that their requests had been approved during the summit, months after their meeting in the mayor’s office. Nancy told me that “10,000Bs is not much money to fund this project and to pay women to carry it out, but I think that it’s better than nothing. It’s better than I had expected.”

Overall, as I conveyed in the last section, the LPP’s emphasis on increasing the presence of women in positions of power within the local government is curtailed by political, economic, and cultural factors. The law is not resulting in a better representation of women, nor is this approach succeeding in foregrounding women’s issues and development priorities that would
better aid women and children. But there have been substantial changes in the way that people understand popular participation as a gendered process, such as the way that POA projects are perceived as having gendered implications and how the government is attempting to prioritize women’s needs in community work. Through the activism of Nancy, Ana, and Adela Zamudio, women are garnering more attention within development contexts in Sipe Sipe. In their work, they contend that women’s participation will improve and be more effective if the issue is tackled from the standpoint of “working to balance power between men and women and how they relate to each other,” says Ana. In the ensuing discussion, I describe how the leaders of the Adela Zamudio group use their meetings to empower poor women to take a more active role as leaders in their communities. These meetings, in effect, encourage women to work toward transforming social norms in their relationships with men and women of different socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds. However, many women regard this encouragement as a directive – a near-impossible directive to carry out given the material realities of their lives.

6.5 EMPOWERMENT: PARTICIPATION AS WOMEN’S WORK IN SIPE SIPE

6.5.1 A typical meeting in Adela Zamudio

At 5:00 on a Tuesday afternoon as I walked to Nancy’s house for a meeting, I saw women walking in my direction with babies carried on their backs and little ones holding on to their mothers’ hands, usually with a couple of toddlers in tow. Two or three of Adela Zamudio members often arrived when I did. After knocking on her door, Nancy would open the doors of her home and we would all file into her center courtyard. Greetings of “buenas tardes” could be
heard as everyone acknowledged all of those present with a nod. Nancy always placed small, homemade, wooden sitting stools in the center of the courtyard in a circle, and each woman would sit down on one with their children on their laps or bundled in blankets and set on the ceramic courtyard floor in front of her. The ensuing minutes before the meeting started was an opportunity for women to chat while they spun wool into yarn or knit baby clothes. Conversations usually focused on their crops that were being planted or harvested, issues that had been discussed in a recent parent/teacher meeting at the local school, or the plans laid out for the next community festival. Children were usually directed to play (puillaylla!) away from the courtyard in a section of the compound where grapes grew on trellises and herbs were grown in small clay pots.

About once a month Nancy brought out her radio cassette player and inserted a tape donated to Adela Zamudio from the former director of the APSAR hospital in Mallco Rancho. These tapes begin with a short audio skit that highlights specific problems that women experience in the rural health care system, usually regarding a problem they had talking to their doctor or accessing medical services. The tape moves on to a brief discussion about how the women in the skit solved their problem, and then ends with a series of questions that were to be addressed in the Adela Zamudio group with Nancy. The length of the tape generally played for about 10 minutes, and the discussion after the tape ended would run for approximately 20 minutes. At 5:30pm, the crops in women’s fields sometimes compelled them to return home, but more often than not the attendees would pull out some vegetables from their carrying cloths that they had brought from home. Nancy would provide the meat, and they would all get to work preparing and cooking the food that was collected for a meal that they would eat together with
Nancy. This time spent cooking and eating gave the women opportunities to talk about life problems, eliciting advice and comments from other members and Nancy.

In order to better understand the way Nancy and members of Adela Zamudio use these meetings to talk about empowerment and the obstacles women endure that prevent them from getting their needs met, I describe below the details of two such meetings. My first example notes the details of a particular meeting when a discussion developed concerning some problems pregnant women encountered in receiving prenatal care. The second example features an impromptu challenge from Adela Zamudio members to one of Nancy’s prouder bouts of activism in Sipe Sipe – the municipal program to hire local women to cobble-stone the road leading to Inca Raqay.

6.5.2 Eliminating obstacles to prenatal care

During an Adela Zamudio meeting in April 2005, seven women – the mothers of twelve small children – listened to a audio tape donated by the Mallco Rancho hospital (APSAR) of a skit that presented a pregnant woman who was experiencing problems in accessing good prenatal care. First, the tape indicated that the skit took place during a harvest season, and the husband of the main character in the skit told her that she couldn’t go to the clinic to receive prenatal care because she was needed in the fields. Women present at the meeting nodded their heads when they heard this. I asked a nearby woman why the character in the skit couldn’t just go to the clinic during a break, or during lunch? She responded:

That would be a good thing, I guess… But when I go the hospital for a consult, I am there all morning long. Sometimes, they don’t get to me [in the morning] and I have to return after the doctors and nurses take their lunch… Also, I have my husband, other workers, and my kids to feed during lunch…that means that I have to cook the food. This, too, takes all morning long. When does that give me time
to go to the hospital? …It would be better if I could go at night, when the sun is down and I don’t have to be in the fields. But the hospital is not open then for prenatal consults.

Many women overheard this response and told me that this was their experience as well.

Then, the skit went on to relay a common problem that women often complain to Nancy about: having to deal with the hospital personnel in Sipe Sipe. The character in the skit was yelled at by their doctors for not having completed six prenatal visits during her pregnancy – the minimum number of visits that should be completed, the tape suggested. However, the women in Adela Zamudio did not relate necessarily to this particular example. Many women revealed that they do not usually run into problems when visiting with doctors or nurses at the Sipe Sipe hospital. Instead, they contend that they consistently have issues with the hospital administrators when they sign in for an appointment upon their entrance to the hospital. These administrators are women who sit behind a large desk and act as gatekeepers for the hospital, collating patient charts and explaining the paperwork and procedures that are required of patients. They received post-secondary training to fill these positions, and are largely not from Sipe Sipe nor do they live in the region. Like many of the hospital personnel, they commute from communities more closely located to Cochabamba. One of these administrators speaks Quechua and one does not, while neither speaks Aymara. Members of Adela Zamudio told the group that these administrators often yell at them for not having brought certain health forms with them to the hospital, or scold them for allowing a long lapse of time between hospital visits, either for themselves or for their children. “And for me,” one woman who wears the traditional clothing of La Paz told the group, “[the administrators] often give my name to the doctors hours after I get there, so I often have to wait all day long to see a doctor.” Many women nodded their heads in support of this point, and one woman used the term “devil” [diabla] to refer to one of these administrators.
After hearing these stories, Nancy asked the women what they do when they encounter these types of problems, either with their husbands for seeking out healthcare and leaving responsibilities at home unfinished, or with hospital personnel. Women in the group remained silent for what seemed like a long time. Finally, one woman said in Quechua, “Nancy, I don’t do anything. I just know that I can’t go to the hospital if I’m pregnant during harvest season or when we plant. Usually, I don’t go to prenatal visits because I work in the chicken slaughterhouses until 9am – and that’s too late to get on the list to see the doctors that day. And when the administrators yell at me… well, what can I do?” Nancy replied

Listen to me… your health is important. If you don’t get medical care, you will get sick, and then who will take care of your children? …You need to tell your husbands that one day off [from work] to get medical care is worth it [vale la pena]. Your children will grow healthy if you take care of yourself…. And these administrators, they have their jobs to help you, not to yell at you! When I worked at the hospital in Sipe Sipe, we never yelled at women. These administrators think that they are better than you, but they aren’t… Should we do something to help them see this…?

One woman suggested that the Adela Zamudio group write a letter to the head of the hospital to tell them about some of the problems they were experiencing. Another woman said that they should all demand a meeting with the mayor to try to fix these problems. Nancy told them that it would be best to start with the head physician at the hospital, so they decided to write the letter to her at the next meeting. This letter garnered a meeting with Nancy, Ana, and the director of the hospital, and in the end, the director promised to hold future “comportment” trainings for all hospital personnel. Nancy seemed a bit defeatist as she informed the members of Adela Zamudio of this meeting’s results, saying “…listen, nothing will change much really.” However, she did point out that the meeting better served as a medium to begin dialoguing with the director. “Now she knows that the quality of care at the hospital matters to patients, and they discuss it with each other. We’re watching them, and we’ll do something about it if [the care] is bad,” Nancy said of her warning to the hospital director.
When Nancy further inquired about how women could help their husbands understand the importance of prenatal care, members of Adela Zamudio were again reluctant to respond. “It’s not a problem of them not understanding,” replied Agustina. “Really, it’s just that we need to eat. One day [out of working in the fields] is a lot.” Nancy then asked them if they could ask a relative or friend to work the fields for them that day in their stead. “But Nancy, they already are,” Agustina told her. Another woman told the group that she thinks that men in the community should listen to the taped skit so that “…if any of [these men] don’t understand how important prenatal care is, they can hear it themselves on the tape.” Members chuckled and nodded their heads in support of this suggestion.

Although Nancy has a more nuanced understanding of the lives of poor women than many health care personnel in the region thanks to her years of work as a direct care nurse, she clearly inferred that women’s reluctance to seek out prenatal care is a result of their husband’s ignorance of its importance. Instead, as a corrective to Nancy’s misinterpretation of events, members point to their own reluctance to abbreviate economic activities during harvest season. But to be fair to Nancy, their comments also allude to the fact that men as a group in Sipe Sipe receive very little in the way of education about the health care and the health care system. Men in rural Bolivia often assist their partners’ home births alongside a female midwife (ref.), yet they are not typically active in their partners’ prenatal care. But while Nancy’s suggestions are meant to empower women to seek out medical care, the members of Adela Zamudio convey to her that this ignores the larger social context in which they live. Instead of an individualistic approach, women insightfully argue that a more ecological approach would be more effective – one that underscores the links among all relevant factors and actors (such as the men in their lives) in the quest for good health. While Nancy in part perceived men’s resistance to be one of
the primary causes of women’s lack of biomedical prenatal care, other women highlighted the importance of including men in health education programs so that they would be better prepared to help women gain access to essential health services.

6.5.3 Members’ reactions to the women-only hiring policy for the Inca Raqay project.

The members of Adela Zamudio scheduled a meeting only a couple of days after the municipal summit that I attended, when the mayor’s office and OTB leaders assembled to approve POA projects and balance the municipal budget. Nancy and Ana were excited to inform Adela Zamudio members of the mayor’s approval of Nancy’s proposal that requested hiring preference to area women for the Inca Raqay project. Under this proposal, women in the municipality of Sipe Sipe would be hired to cobble-stone the road leading up to the popular tourist attraction, the Inca Raqay archaeological ruins. The members of Adela Zamudio were not the authors of this proposal – only Nancy and Ana were – and they were also not informed of the meeting that the mother and daughter had with the mayor in order to get the proposal approved. So Nancy and Ana informed members of the proposal and its benefits at the beginning of the first Adela Zamudio meeting after the summit, immediately after the children settled into their games on the far side of the courtyard. Nancy and Ana believed that the proposal was necessary to not only give women an opportunity to earn an income engaging in the nuts and bolts of community development work, but also to make officials in the municipal government aware of gender inequalities in the region. Having this proposal approved, they told members, meant that “now, the mayor’s office knows that we are here and that they have to listen to our demands.” This meeting, in other words, paved the way for more opportunities for Adela Zamudio to be included.
in official channels within popular participation, as in making their demands heard by the mayor’s office and finding their way into the municipal budget.

By the end of their explanation of the proposal, however, Nancy and Ana knew something was not quite right. Members reacted rather unexpectedly. As soon as Nancy and Ana finished, women continued to knit or spin yarn, and no one said a word. Finally, Nancy began to speak again, saying that this project would help women all over the municipality. But Viviana, a 20 year old mother of two small children, interrupted her, exclaiming in Quechua:

Yes, Nancy, thank you for fighting for us… But what about my husband? Do you know that he has to leave all the time to work in Santa Cruz? What about him? Why isn’t he [given preference] and hired for this job? You know… he would work hard… And I work, you know, at the [chicken slaughterhouse] so I don’t have time to work for the town. But my family, my husband, would work for the town. Why do we [women] always have to do everything?! You know… my husband is a good man and helps [with family expenses…]. It would be better if my husband were hired… (speaker’s emphasis).

Other members remained silent after Vivana’s comments. Ana asked members if they agreed with Viviana, and the ensuing silence signified that they did indeed. One woman nodded her head. Nancy said that she would talk to the mayor and see if they would modify their plans to include men as well to work on the project. “But Nancy,” said Juana, a 32 year old mother of six children, “often when [the mayor’s office] hire men, they hire their own friends and never people like my husband.” Nancy nodded her head and replied, “I will talk to them about that.”

After the meeting, I debriefed the events of that evening with Nancy and Ana. They were very sensitive and thoughtful about members’ reactions to the project and told me:

Cristina… this is a women’s group, and we fight for things that will help women and their families… In this case, I know that the mayor just hires the same men for the [municipal] jobs. These are unskilled laborers, but they are [kin] of people in the mayor’s office, so they get the jobs. But they should hire others, poor people, to do these jobs… And that’s why we proposed that women get a chance to work on this project. Frequently, women have to pay for things for their children with their own money, or they trade things that they make for things like eggs, meat… You see how they knit and spin [yarn] during the meeting, no?… But I see that [the Inca Raqay project] would help women if poor men, like their husbands, got a chance [to work in town], too…
Nancy and Ana’s initial proposal was drawn up to insert women into the development picture in Sipe Sipe. Their motivations intended to correct for what they rightly perceived as an absence of women’s participation in municipal projects. As leaders of a women’s group, Nancy and Ana felt that it was their duty to advocate for women and to bring about social change in this neglected area of municipal economic development. But Nancy and Ana’s proposal further entrenched the development identity of women as absent non-participants in area development work. However, members of Adela Zamudio, rather than identifying this as an economic opportunity, saw this policy as just one more burden on women who are already doing more than their fair share in trying to raise their families. Viviana’s question – why do women have to do everything? – shows how inappropriate the imposed development identity of women as absent non-participants actually is. Instead, Vivana’s insight illustrates the importance of gender mainstreaming: a gendered analysis of development should not always signify women or women-only policies, but should tackle inequalities and imbalanced power relations between men and women as well as among differently identified women or men (i.e., middle class and poor women, or indigenous and non-indigenous men). Opening up the Inca Raqay project to poor men in fact points up the vulnerability of them as a group. Targeting women for development work can be useful, but it often ignores other identity factors – such as class – that can at times alienate subgroups of men from development work.

In this case, the perception that women are absent from development work and the process of development unnecessarily overloads poor women, women that have a hard time juggling their responsibilities, as it is, in two ways. First, in order to earn much-needed cash, it is usually men who migrate throughout the department, country, and internationally – even if they work seasonally at home as agriculturalists. Vivana’s comment points to a practical implication
of opening up the Inca Raqay project to men: one of the main priorities of the municipality, as laid out in the PDM, is to curtail residents’ emigration from Sipe Sipe in search of work, both permanently and seasonally. While most poor men do not own their own lands, they often work as peons in neighbors’ fields, usually alongside their wives and other family members. When men leave home for long stretches of time, it puts more of a burden on women and children to maintain these fields and animals. Second, women’s development identity as absent, non-participators of development hinders them because targeting women for development projects does not do enough to work toward balancing unequal power relations between men and women. Although attempting to give women more economic options can be beneficial, poor men in Sipe Sipe are not afforded the same types of options. This exacerbates already stressful family relations and effectively pits poor women against poor men to compete for scarce development resources. As Marisa told me, “I get so tired. I have so many things to do. But when I have to do everything, then I have to do everything. And then I can’t stop…” (speaker’s emphasis).

6.6 GENDER MAINSTREAMING AS WOMEN’S WORK

The two events that I shared above – conversations that developed during Adela Zamudio meetings about prenatal health care and the Inca Raqay project – illustrate members’ ambivalence about being singled out or set in opposition to men in the development process. In the prenatal health case, both the leaders of Adela Zamudio and the skit on the audio tape espouse a consistent message: men are reluctant to allow women in economically productive seasons to seek out biomedical prenatal care, and women must learn to seek out care regardless of men’s reluctance. However, members argue that poverty and structural limitations of the
hospital, not the men in their lives, dictate when and if they receive prenatal care. Members imply that they do in fact have agency in relationships with men, but conversely have very little agency when it comes to making choices between seeking health care or putting food on the table to feed their families. Additionally, women also suggest that it would be more beneficial for women to include men in health education, like that which is taught in Adela Zamudio, than to simply single women out to struggle for their own rights. In the case of the Inca Raqay project, members argued in a similar vein. Targeting women for this project singles them out apart from poor men – something that members thought was unhelpful and ineffective. Instead, members contend that using class as a unifying factor for both men and women would be more beneficial to poor families. In this case, members transcend their imposed development identity as absent and non-participating and in turn highlight the vulnerability that men and women share. In so doing, they define themselves as men’s partners in development.

Interestingly enough, I find the reactions of the Adela Zamudio group to parallel certain recent development critiques of gender and development thought. Chant and Gutmann (2005) point out the importance of mainstreaming gender into development work – meaning incorporating gender into development work, instead of tacking it on as an additional concern for development agendas. In their survey of development officials from the USA and Britain in 1999, they found that development projects and programs that focus only on women risked serious consequences: over-work for women who are burdened with the enormous responsibility of community development AND feeding their families, a blame the victim mentality that leaves women alone to resolve problems “relating to such issues as domestic violence and contraception,” the omissions of perceiving men as gendered beings, and the exclusion of men from development resources, which led one of Chant and Gutmann’s (2005:242) surveyed
officials to suggest that “there’s some evidence that men are using women as a conduit for bringing resources into the family.” Chant and Gutmann argue that for development work to be successful, men must be incorporated into development, as development officials and as development beneficiaries, in order to identify and clarify how relations between men and women could detract from and/or enhance potential development programs (see Kabeer (2003) as well). They contend that the current theoretical paradigm of gendered analysis of development, GAD (Gender and Development) “is concerned with gender relations, and therefore with men as well as women.” Instead of exclusively focusing on women and women’s roles in society and how these roles influence development and development theory – as former theoretical paradigms WID and WAD had – GAD emphasizes the value of examining gender relations and their effects on development thought (*Gender Human Development Report 2003; Young 2002*). The experiences of Adela Zamudio recounted here demonstrate that an examination of gender relations over and above gender roles is central to successful development theory and practice.

In effect, the mainstreaming of gender in development has surfaced new analyses of gender relations, as in Hamilton’s (1998) work in household economies of rural Ecuador. In her book, *The Two-Headed Household: Gender and Rural Development in the Ecuadorean Andes*, she finds that most development theory guiding development policies and programs in Ecuador in the 1990s was driven by the assumption that women are oppressed in Ecuadorean rural households. It was, and often continues to be, development fact that women have very little power within the household to distribute household income for family needs: food, health care, schooling costs, clothing, etc. Instead, Hamilton states that, like much development thinking the world over, most government and development officials assume that while women use the cash
they earn for familial needs, men on the other hand spend their cash on their own needs (cf. Agarwal 2003). Typical WID and WAD development theory (see Fernandez Kelly 1989, de los Rios (1993), Parpart (2002), and Parpart et al. (2000) for full chronologies of gender and development thought) claim that women have no power to negotiate the needs of the family with male wage-earners. Therefore, most development experts who use WID and WAD hold the view that unless women earn part of the household income, familial needs are not fulfilled. However, in her work in a small rural community in Ecuador, Hamilton found that women indeed have power and say over how household earnings are spent. She argues that in this community, men and women have complementary roles in the family extending to matters of household economics. Hamilton maintains that while mestizo, urban social norms often uphold male dominance, the women of Chanchaló (a rural community in Cotapaxi province) do not find themselves bound by conventions that foster male-domination/female-subservience – conventions that were historically established with Spanish colonial land-use patterns that supplanted indigenous gender roles of complementarity.

As my analysis of the events that unfolded in Adela Zamudio demonstrates, successful development work must both single women out as specific beneficiaries (as the group provided women with their own space to learn more about popular participation) and transcend the tendency of outdated development thought that fosters the impression that “men’s power and privileges are uniform, fixed, and universal (Chant and Gutmann 2005:241).” Examinations of gender relations with a sensitivity to the specific dimensions of class and ethnicity in rural communities will prove to be more instructive than perceiving the ‘problem of underdevelopment’ as an issue that only affects women. And the members of Adela Zamudio intuitively know this. Women in Adela Zamudio argue that often men are left out of municipal
development work, but their inclusion would directly help women and the families for which they are trying to provide. Furthermore, women also complain that sometimes people in power (i.e., scholars who conduct studies in Sipe Sipe, or doctors who conduct outreach work there) work under the assumption that men and cultural patriarchy are the obstacles that women must overcome in order to be empowered. Instead, the women of Adela Zamudio urge leaders to recognize that men are not their problem but poverty and overwork. Their critiques of typical development “facts” such as these show that gender mainstreaming would indeed be an acceptable and effective alternative perspective than the one currently at work guiding development policies in Sipe Sipe.

But at the same time, I also recognize that the Adela Zamudio group is a space specifically for women, especially to help women learn more about the powers-that-be in their own communities, and the municipality as a whole, and how they are expected to get involved in popular participation through workshops. As Nancy and Ana suggest in their interviews with me, the mission of Adela Zamudio is to empower women to participate in development in the municipality. Adela Zamudio is a place where women can learn about issues that directly and indirectly affect their lives – issues on which they may not be schooled anywhere else. Empowerment in this sense connotes that women would and do benefit from a woman-only space to gather apart from men – men who typically play a more visible role in matters of community politics. In order for women to insert themselves and their specific needs into the development agenda, a space such as Adela Zamudio is key for women attempting to learn the rules and norms of popular participation. The collective space also provides credibility to the women as a group in the face of the county’s governing officials.
Gender mainstreaming in the Law of Popular Participation attempts to correct for the exclusion of women in local politics. The law’s focus on both men and women in the text is written purposefully to both single women out as beneficiaries of popular participation, as well as reinforce the importance of the roles of both men and women in local politics. These statements were important victories for feminist groups who pushed hard for their inclusion in the legal draft of popular participation. And groups such as Adela Zamudio, with a mission in part to teach women about popular participation, have become legible to the State in a way that they never could have before the Law of Popular Participation took effect. In order to meet certain development targets, the municipal government is now obligated to encourage women’s involvement in local popular participation and earmark local funds specifically for women’s development projects. But neglecting the needs of poor men is out-of-step with the concept of gender mainstreaming, and the demands of the members of Adela Zamudio reflect this issue.

Attempting to resolve these problems has led the Adela Zamudio group to re-write their own development identity, and the development identity that they are forging is set directly against that of the identity imposed on them by the State. In doing so, the members of Adela Zamudio utilize a different conceptualization of empowerment than had been previously anticipated by the leaders of Adela Zamudio or the State. Within the context of popular participation, the imposed development identity of women – absent non-participators – renders empowerment to mean that women need to come forward, get involved in the process, voice their concerns. However, the insight of Adela Zamudio demonstrates that this definition of empowerment is not at all complete. The development identity forged by the members of Adela
Zamudio attempts to both correct for development wrongs that have occurred in the past as well as get both women and men involved as they see fit in contemporary development projects.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS: DEVELOPMENT WORK AS IDENTITY

This dissertation has shown how residents of Huancarani accommodate, resist, and/or construct their own “development identities” in order to target themselves or others for development assistance, either in the way of funds or project implementation. My analysis rests upon data collecting during fieldwork that took place over the course of 13 months in rural Bolivia. I highlight three local development contexts in Huancarani— the local governing body (the OTB), the community work group (the Pirwa), and the Adela Zamudio women’s group— as case studies to illustrate the way residents use development identities to participate in the construction of their own development. “Development identities” is a concept that I use to try to best encapsulate residents’ articulation of specific aspects of identity in order to participate in development contexts in the region. These identities emerge from the priorities and goals set by a local, national, and/or international agent who then accentuates and builds upon these characteristics in the work that is done within any given development context. Constructing development identities links the political economies of identity in contemporary Bolivia to post-structural interpretations of development, its objectives and goals, and its significance. In Huancarani, agents enmeshed in the construction of development identities are the State in the form of federal and municipal government officials, international actors such as the European funders of the Pirwa, organizations like the hospital in Mallco Rancho in the case of the work that is done in
Adela Zamudio, and of course the members and administrators that make up the Pirwa, the OTB, and Adela Zamudio women’s group.

Although the Popular Participation Law directly involves Bolivian citizens in a specific form of local governance, the ideology and rhetoric of participation transcends the realm of politics and permeates daily life. Far from living in a post-development era, Bolivians are expected to participate directly in designing and implementing their own community development projects. This process may deviate from the hegemony of developmentalism (as proponents of participatory development assure us is one of the primary benefits of participation) but development itself, having both global and local implications in theory and in practice, still holds a prominent place in everyday Bolivia.

Table 6. Organizations examined as case studies in the dissertation (Chapters Four, Five, and Six).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>As it is referred to in the dissertation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organización Territorial de Bases (Chapter Four)</td>
<td>Grassroots Territorial Organization</td>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>The local governing body in Huancarani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. La Pirwa (Chapter Five)</td>
<td>Silo, or storage building.</td>
<td>Pirwa</td>
<td>A voluntary organization that attempts to eradicate hunger and malnutrition by providing a work-for-food program in Huancarani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organización de Campesinas Adela Zamudio (Chapter Six)</td>
<td>The Adela Zamudio Rural Women’s Group</td>
<td>Adela Zamudio</td>
<td>A women’s empowerment group that focuses on 1) educating women about the process of development and 2) inserting women into the local development process.</td>
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Residents of Huancarani use three terms to designate the concept of development: urbanizar (to urbanize), mejorar (to improve), as well as desarrollar (to develop). All of these terms are used to define the process and practices forged to improve facilities and services in the community, such as establishing a community health clinic and an adult education center,
building a cemetery, extending municipal sanitation services to the community from Sipe Sipe, and paving the dirt roads with cobble-stones. When asked, all interviewees listed these ideas as future development projects, but I was more impressed with their ability to articulate what they don’t mean by development. Residents of Huancarani contrast rural community development with urban development, indicating that community development is unlike development that they see occurring in Cochabamba. They describe the outcomes of urban development as: lack of social networks that are vital to the survival of rural residents; increased crime rates; a de-valuing of traditions; and outright discrimination against rural residents. Therefore, to residents of Huancarani, rural community development projects must account for the social well-being of its residents, defined as encouraging social networks and engendering social relationships. In order to do so, residents insist that community development projects must be designed and implemented with these three factors in mind: 1) the fostering of indigenous knowledge, 2) a balanced access to community resources, where the good of the community must be put over and above the personal advancement of individuals, and 3) the lessons learned from residents’ past development experiences in other communities in which they have lived. Overall, all huancaraneños indicate that improvements in community facilities and services cannot occur without simultaneously strengthening social networks and community relationships.

In the era of popular participation, local people are obligated to participate directly in development work and this requires them to compete for scarce resources. Overall, I found that the process of negotiating and reformulating specific constructions of identity to access development resources is a vital component of development, especially in rural regions. Development work is, in fact, identity work – development as a process that obligates participants to create, negotiate, and reformulate new identities as part and parcel of their
participation. While almost all residents participate in more than one development context, they forge different development identities in each. This is a complex process, one in which local people must acquire a thorough understanding of external factors in the process of doing development, such as the objectives and goals of State-level and international development actors, as well as a keen awareness of the specific collective development trajectory that they are attempting to establish in each development context. Yet having this knowledge is not enough; for residents of Huancarani, successful development means knowing under what circumstances and for which audience they must accommodate and resist imposed development identities, as well as recognizing when it would be more beneficial to forge their own development identity. Due to particular contextual constraints, residents have more or less room to articulate identities – what I call identity work – that would allow them access to resources within the development bureaucracy. Below, I summarize the findings from the three case studies illustrated in the dissertation.

7.1 THE THREE CASE STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT IDENTITIES, AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT

My analysis of development work in three development contexts in Huancarani shows the centrality of the negotiation of identity in development work. In the first case study, I demonstrated that development identities are used in development work in the OTB, the local governing body, and have become an essential component of the obligatory system of popular participation in Bolivia. Residents of Huancarani are required to take part in community
meetings, and in some of these meetings, they are expected to take part in the most important task that the OTB undertakes: constructing the plans for annual development projects (the annual POA) that they submit to the municipal government for federal and county funds. These annual plans must be aligned with the county’s priorities and goals elucidated in the municipal development plans, or PDM. In 2005, the plan that the community of Huancarani first proposed to the Sipe Sipe government – to fortify and reconstruct parts of the church – was rejected on the grounds that it did not meet any of the development priorities in the county. However, many residents, including the former OTB president and present county official don Máximo, noted that the church project actually does meet these priorities because the church is not only a religious edifice, but a cultural and social meeting house. As only a religious edifice, the development plan does not align with the development priorities of the county of State, but cultural and historical preservation is a development objective in the county, especially in lieu of the economic, cultural, and political importance of the preservation of such sites as Inca Raqay (the archaeological ruins in Sipe Sipe dating to the Inca period). Residents of Huancarani, as well as the municipal advisors who tried to help the community construct another 2005 POA that would be considered more pertinent to the county development goals, thought that the county’s rejection of the first POA was a political decision based foremost on Huancarani’s problematic identity.

The Huancarani OTB is legally designated as a neighborhood group (junta vecinal), a designation given those communities or urban neighborhoods that have no history or legal paperwork that accords them the status of indigenous/campesina group or union (sindicato). However, in order to redistribute federal funds to rural areas – funds that historically remained in municipal and departmental centers at the expense of rural communities – municipal
governments are targeting LPP funds specifically for indigenous, “peasant,” or union communities. In the county of Sipe Sipe, this means that communities as poor as another are competing for scarce funds. The Huancarani OTB as neighborhood group is not targeted for LPP funds, and they have been extremely unsuccessful at garnering development funds for POA projects that they deem essential for their own community development. In the end, Huancarani was awarded money in 2005 to fund a multi-use field for the community, but these monies were to augment the 2004 budget for the same project – a project that was never completed due to structural problems of land sales in the region and a lack of technical support to get the project started.

After analyzing the range of community POAs submitted to the municipality over a five year period, I found that communities which received large sums of money to fund major development projects were being redefined by the municipal government as indigenous/”peasant” communities or unions, when extensive conversations with presidents of these OTBs revealed that they were in fact legally designated neighborhood groups. The development identities of targeted indigenous/”peasant” groups and unions, in this case, take much precedence over that of neighborhood groups. I argue that the pressure at the federal, county, and local community levels to have the right development identity leads to practices such as the county’s redefinition of OTB designations and finding ways to divert the majority of LPP funding to communities not designated as neighborhood groups. The process of popular participation as a legal, State-inscribed participatory process imposes development identities on OTBs. In other words, without the appropriate legal paperwork, communities like Huancarani have no recourse to forge their own development identities that would help them garner scarce municipal funds. Unless Huancarani can legally modify their OTB to be other than a
neighborhood group— that is, forge their own development identity to replace their imposed development identity of neighborhood group—Huancarani is seemingly doomed to repeat the failures and problems they have encountered over the last five years.18

The second case study of the Pirwa in Huancarani is one of two case studies that illustrates the extent to which development identities have also become essential components of development work undertaken in voluntary organizations, much like the work done in the State-inscribed system of popular participation. However, the agents involved in the development work in the Pirwa include transnational actors—e.g., the Swiss funders of the Pirwa programs—a component that adds a different dimension to development work, having implications for the ways that development identities get forged, accommodated, and resisted in the Pirwa. There is a disconnect between the development identities forwarded by the Pirwa members and their international funders, pivoting on the axes of indigenous knowledge and ayni relations that the European counterparts interpret as essential but obstructive and antithetical to the more global goals and objectives of participatory development. Constituents of the Pirwa often find themselves struggling to make sense of competing ideologies between members and administrators, with members protesting that having “ideology” is most certainly a luxury only those people who are more financially secure (such as the administrators) can embrace. Members at different times and for a range of reasons resist the imposition of a strategy for the Pirwa’s self-sustainability; however, they are often obligated to accommodate the imposed development identity in order to remain on the exclusive membership list or risk their expulsion from the Pirwa. Although members object to the imposition of the ideology of the international

18 Although the LPP officially was passed in 1994, there are only records of POA projects in the county of Sipe Sipe for the last five years (2000-2005). Projects undertaken before this were not recorded. Funding for these projects was, allegedly, sparse and intermittent.
funders and the administrators, they are careful and selective with their strategies of resistance because they have come to depend on the food rations doled out as a benefit of the communal work group.

Funding for the Pirwa is in jeopardy, and will continue to be, as long as the maintenance of ayni relations remains both the end and the means of development work in the Pirwa. Without some sort of plan for gradually supplanting the international funding with funds generated by the development projects themselves, the imposed development identity of the Pirwa (the organization as too indigenous) will conflict with the development identity the members attempt to forge in order to strengthen community ties and incorporate new residents who were formerly unconnected in the web of social relations – social relations that have been and continue to be central to survival in this rural community.

The last case study, the Adela Zamudio women’s group, demonstrates that sometimes policies that portend to correct for social inequalities – such as gender mainstreaming – often have unintended consequences when put in practice. As an empowerment group, the Adela Zamudio members come together as often as possible to learn new information about health, politics, new cottage-industry business possibilities, etc. This women-only space has become essential to members as a place unencumbered by complex relations with men. The group aims to redress the perception that women are absent non-participants in Bolivian participatory development, and as a woman-only group, Adela Zamudio accommodates this imposed development identity. But while there is some truth to this perception, the programs that are put in place to insert women into the process of development often fail to account for the underlying causes of this imposed development identity. As a result, these programs neglect the reality of women’s lives.
Women’s reactions to both the prenatal health care educational program and the women-only hiring policies underscore the strain that targeting women as specific beneficiaries of knowledge and funding has overall on families. The information that women gleaned from the health program underwritten by the APSAR health clinic emphasizes that men are women’s primary obstacles to obtaining prenatal care. However, women argue that this is indeed not true and allege that APSAR underplays the roles that subsistence patterns and survival have as determinants of health care access. As Farmer (1999) concludes in his work among poor patients in Haiti, I contend that APSAR’s argument is an “immodest claim of causality,” one in which cultural arguments (such as the predominance of patriarchy) overshadow the underlying poverty that serves as the primary motivator of behavior. Women are “non-compliant” in that they often postpone prenatal care because if they neglect their subsistence work in order to attend a prenatal appointment, their families go hungry – hardly a choice that is determined by cultural factors.

In the case of women-only hiring policies – something that the leaders of Adela Zamudio prioritized in their municipal development work – members again protest that these practices display a gross misunderstanding of cultural gender norms that emphasize gender complementarity. Excluding men as beneficiaries of development funding hurts women rather than helps them. Women indicate that they are over-burdened with too many responsibilities in the face of the current economic crisis in Bolivia. They also claim that this policy makes little sense in light of the fact that the county of Sipe Sipe aims to reign in soaring rates of male emigration in order to work in other parts of the country and the world. Therefore, poor men should be primary targets of some development projects, like paving the road to Inca Raqay for pay. The development identity forged by the members of Adela Zamudio emphasizes the importance – in both cultural and economic terms – of women’s and men’s complementary roles.
in the family. In other words, empowering women means empowering families – including men. The leaders of Adela Zamudio have begun to recognize the new development identity forged by the members, and future development objectives and goals of the group will be more pertinent – and hopefully successful – because of it.

In effect, the process of accommodating, resisting, and constructing development identities encapsulates who gets to define – and be defined as – “the neediest” with regard to development targets. In the classic sense of de Saussure (1960 [1949]), development identities are the signifiers, and communities and grassroots organizations are the signified. Yet the signified – as women, indigenous people, and the poor – are not as clear-cut as these terms suggest from the outset. Establishing development identities is a process of defining exactly what type of gendered, ethnic, or class-ed group of people are allowed to be involved in the process of participatory development.

### 7.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITY(IES) IN PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS

Successful development is not about whether people negotiate gender, class, and ethnicity, but how they do this. Development work is identity work: it’s about how people define the most-deserving women and men, indigenous and non-indigenous, and the poor as beneficiaries of development funding and project implementation. The Huancarani OTB as a junta vecinal, for example, is implicitly defined as less deserving of funds than other communities primarily because of the way the State narrowly defines indigenous communities and then links these definitions to conceptualizations of the poorest of the poor. However, as Meisch (2002) cautions
based on her ethnography of merchants and musicians from Otavalo, Ecuador, it does not necessarily follow that indigenous groups are the poorest or most in need of development funds. Although the OTB is officially denied status as an indigenous community, the Pirwa in Huancarani clearly defines itself as an indigenous organization. Membership in the Pirwa is predicated on a sort of pan-ethnic indigeneity, as the membership consists of both Aymara- and Quechua-speaking residents, and the distinctions between the two cultures morph and are transcended for the good of the group. Pirwa membership is only open to the poorest members of the community, so the Pirwa indirectly associates ethnic indigeneity with poverty – much the same way that the State identifies ‘the neediest’ as ethnically marked. And while Adela Zamudio and the State mark the neediest as women, the membership in that organization challenges this assumption and asserts that what is most needed in development work is to better understand relations between men and women – as a result, marking poor men as just as much in need of development attention as women.

The process of positioning themselves in any given development context is less an artifact of manipulation or deception and more an extension of a familiar strategy of constructing identity in the way people conduct themselves in daily life. Identity construction, particularly constructions of ethnic belongingness, is a relational process rather than any sort of articulation of inherent traits or characteristics (i.e., skin color, hair texture, etc.). Forging and negotiating development identities against a backdrop of imposed development identities may not be easy, but it makes sense to the residents of Huancarani.

Although most residents of Huancarani participate in more than development context, their development identities vary depending on each development context. Residents who participate in both the OTB and the Pirwa, for example, must deal with two very different
development identities in order to successfully participate in these contexts. First, in order to appease international funders, they must negotiate a forged development identity in the Pirwa as indigenous enough/but not too indigenous – playing up a pan-Andean ethnicity that emphasizes communalism and cooperativism but still leaves room for capitalism and some individualism. And second, in the OTB, residents are obligated to resist the imposed development identity of junta vecinal because it leaves the community noncompetitive in the distribution of county funds, while simultaneously glossing over the very real differences in class among residents in order to foster community cohesion – an essential factor necessary to convince potential donors of the community’s capacity and willingness to accomplish projects.

To further illustrate: for women who participate in both the OTB and Adela Zamudio, they must struggle to balance the imposed development identity of women as absent, non-participators with other cultural, social, and economic obligations to 1) their spouses – who are poor and underemployed, having implications for the practice of targeting women for development projects – 2) their children, and 3) other women who may have different conceptualizations of how women should be empowered in the process of popular participation. Women such as doña Feli (the county advisor who helps communities construct their own development plans), and Ana and Nancy (the middle-class professional mother/daughter co-leaders of Adela Zamudio) challenge local women to speak up, offer suggestions for projects at community meetings, and take on leadership positions in local OTBs. However, women like doña Julia firmly contend that Huancarani “is not ready for a woman president” (noted in Chapter Three), implying that if women push too hard they may be charged with upsetting community cohesion and jeopardizing this essential element that gives their community a competitive edge over another in the tight race for scarce county development funds. But many
women, like Julia, do find ways to influence community decisions and undertake positions of power – like community secretary in the OTB – that they find align well with community expectations of women. Therefore, in women’s development work in these two contexts, their identity work in complicated: they walk a fine line in order to balance imposed and community forged development identities in order to insert women into the process while still maintaining and engendering important social relations.

During the writing of this dissertation, I discussed my findings with an anthropologist colleague of mine who, after learning of the way that identity formulation takes place within particular development contexts, posed me the question, “but who are huancaraneños really?” And my answer was simple: this is a moot question. Huancaraneños see women as both absent non-participators in the process of development (their imposed development identity from the State) and their role as complements to their male counterparts in their families (the development identity that they forge in Adela Zamudio). They see that sometimes their understanding of a world that is growing ever more interconnected – as in their development connections with Swiss funders of the Pirwa – involves linkages that may be construed as a continued dependence on exogamous funds, but they at the same time emphasize that ayni and these relations of generalized reciprocity must be continued and reformulated in order to maintain a social sense of who they are. Forwarding a development agenda that takes them away from these essential social relationships is exactly what residents of Huancarani work against. In their negotiation of development identities, they work against characterizations that they perceive to disable them to forward their own development trajectory. More often than not they fully understand why certain development identities are imposed on them and do not deny that there is some sort of truth in the articulation of these identities. However, when these imposed identities put them at a
disadvantage in garnering much-needed funds or in engendering very important community social relations, they attempt to articulate other development identities that support the work that they are trying to carry out. Negotiating imposed and community-forged development identities helps them bridge these two frequently competing issues.

In this environment, participatory development is as much an issue of *who gets to develop* as it is an issue of *what it means to develop*. I found that development identities have the potential to do two seemingly conflicting things at once: while in some respects forging development identities coaxes local people out of the margins and opens up opportunities for them to voice their own concerns, it also limits community participation in a peculiar politics of exclusion that is part and parcel of the current development process. My research shows that communities and grassroots organizations unsettle and resist characterizations of those that others deem ‘the neediest.’ When the municipality of Sipe Sipe prioritized the needs of communities designated as indigenous or peasant over those of communities labeled neighborhood groups for the sake of meeting federal targets, the residents of Huancarani were excluded from completing projects that they felt were vital to their own survival. When the founders of Adela Zamudio and the municipality singled out women as beneficiaries to development project monies, members contended that men were being systematically excluded from opportunities to contribute to the welfare of their families. Instead of giving a voice to the poor and marginalized, participation in these contexts means that people must position themselves to compete for scarce resources against other people who are just as poor and marginalized. Those that are defined as the poorest and most in need become synonymous with ethnicity and gender (indigenous people and women), but with very specific constructions of ethnicity and gender. In this sense, the current model of participatory development aligns well
with the neoliberal emphasis on individualism, while simultaneously providing for a strange sort of protectionism built on the marketing and competition of identities under the rubric of targeting. In a country where, according to the latest World Bank estimates (World Bank 2006), roughly 63% of all Bolivians live below the national poverty line, the process of targeting different constituents of rural peoples as more or less worthy of development funding seems poorly designed, unjust, and counter-productive.

Overall, results in Huancarani suggest that development projects are more successful in those contexts where they have some agency to control their image and construct their own development identities than when projects are undertaken in contexts where people have limited “room to maneuver” (Tsing 1999) within the strictures of development bureaucracy. In doing so, they forge development identities that have varying degrees of success at garnering outside support, and foster social relationships that are jeopardized by the imposition of development identities from the outside. But sometimes development strictures prohibit communities from constructing their own development identities in response to those that are imposed, as in the case of Huancarani as it is legally defined as a neighborhood group. Under these conditions, I argue that the current model of development in Bolivia is one in which external political processes attempt to regulate not only the direction of rural development, but the very identity of communities – a far cry from the objectives espoused by proponents of participation and participatory development.

As the concept of participation more and more becomes the global salve for all development woes, my findings complement and contrast a bit with the analysis of other scholars who have examined local participatory practices (i.e., Crewe and Harrison 1998; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Morgan 1993, 2000; Mosse 2005; Mayo and Craig 1995). Like most of these
scholars, I see that the practices of participation and participatory development often relieve international monetary institutions and organizations from any accountability to the needs of the world’s growing poor population. Instead of rendering development solutions in a systemic, macro-level approach, the literature of participation can become bogged down by discussions of problems that are seen as pervading the Third World and holding up development there: local and national level corruption and patronage, the problems of an undereducated populace, racism and sexism, etc. Of course, these issues are problematic for any society, and persist in all societies despite the tendency in the literature to paint the Third World in such broad strokes. I certainly agree that global structural solutions must be incorporated into a strategy for improving the way development is carried out, and these structural shifts would need to occur at all levels – locally, nationally, and internationally.

But without such far-reaching and pervasive structural solutions, I offer a few thoughts as points of departure for remedying some of the problems associated with the practices of participatory development. Forging their own development identities allows communities and organizations to: 1) transcend residents’ individual differences that might splinter and antagonize community decision-making, and 2) foster feelings or harmony so that others perceive the community as unified and cohesive – making them a good risk for development investment. In a world where there is more and more competition for development attention, I contend that forging their own development identities is a right of all organizations and communities, but development investment must not be conditional upon forging one identity over another. As it stands, forging a particular identity has far too many political and economic ramifications, so much so that the reality of people’s lives is overshadowed by the image or perceptions of who the poor is supposed to be. I recommend the broadening of the current narrow definitions of
those who are the neediest or the most-deserving of development funds. Development expenditure – either in the way of funds or project implementation – does not occur in a vacuum. While communities and organizations secure their own collective identities to engender and transform social relations, donors must see past the archetypes of poverty in order to get a better sense of where the need really lies. In a very real sense, neighborhood groups such as Huancarani and poor men are in every bit of need of investment as other groups. These groups are relationally defined and are rarely fixed, having implications for who is ‘in’ and who is not at different times in different development contexts.

My work in Bolivia supports the relatively nascent critique of participatory development (i.e., Morgan 2001; Mosse 2005) and its presumed ability to solve the problem of underdevelopment in the Third World. Forging development identities against imposed development targets from the outside is a creative strategy in an effort to ensure that the needs of the poor and marginalized are accounted for and heard. However, because of local, national, and international development bureaucracy, negotiating development identities will always celebrate only very limited successes. In the end, the agency of local development actors – whether part of growing social movements, part of the State as requisites of citizenship, or approaches that are more grassroots oriented – is curtailed by the global rhetoric and ideologies of what it means to develop, what the world is going to do about growing rates of inequality, and how the world defines the types of conditions of material lack that people live in as acceptable or unacceptable. Future research is needed about the way that targeting as a strategy of prioritizing development funding and assistance makes sense – or fails to make sense – in a world with such severe

\[19\] Except the imposed OTB categories of neighborhood group, indigenous community, or union, and I have discussed the problems of these fixed categories and the consequences of such categories on development investment.
inequality, inequalities both within developing countries and between the developing and developed worlds.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH 30 RESIDENTS OF HUANCARANI

A.1 PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Name, age, occupation, how many children do you have (living and deceased), who do you live with (depending on the season)?
2. Where were you born? How long have you lived in Huancarani? Why did you move here?
3. Did you go to school? Where? Did you graduate? Beyond?
4. Do women in family wear the pollera? Speak Quechua/Aymara? Do your children speak Quechua/Aymara? If so, in what contexts?

A.2 HEALTH

1. Mallco Rancho doctors that come to Huancarani – do they come to your house? What do they do when they come? Do they tell you what to do? Do you do it? Give me an example. Is their visit useful for you?
2. Promotora in town – does she come to your house? How often? What does she ask you about? Is her visit useful for you?
3. What do you do when you get sick and need a doctor? Where do you go? Has there ever been a time when you needed a doctor but didn’t have any money to pay for it? What did you do?
4. Have you ever needed someone to help care for you? Who was it, and why did you need the help? What did they do for you? Have you ever cared for someone else who was
sick or needed assistance with daily living? What did you do, and why did you help them?
5. When you are sick, do you ask anyone for advice about how to get well? Who?
6. Do you belong to the Pirwa? For how long? If not, why don’t you belong to the Pirwa? Why did you decide to join? If you didn’t get the food rations, would you still belong to it?
7. How has your diet changed since you were a kid? Do you eat the same types of foods that you used to when you were a kid?
8. Desayuno escolar – do your children get it in school? How much do you pay for it? Is it useful for you to have your children receive it?
9. How would you improve health in Huancarani? Have you ever talked about this with people at the Pirwa or the OTB? What happened when you did, or why didn’t you bring it up?

A.3 ENVIRONMENT

1. Do you use chemicals to fertilize your crops? If not, what do you use?
2. Were you involved with the Cómite de Agua in the 1990s? What was your role in it? Do you have any problems with water for your fields (i.e., lack of water, water stealing, etc.)?
3. What do you do with your garbage?
4. Where do you collect firewood? Do you have any problems finding firewood?

A.4 SUBSISTENCE PATTERN

1. Do you farm lands? Do you own these lands? If so, who did you get these lands from? If not, who does own the lands that you work on? How do you farm these lands (does the owner get half of what you produce?)
2. Who will inherit your lands?
3. Have you ever worked someone else’s lands for pay? Where, when, and for how long?
4. Have you ever worked for pay doing something else – i.e., limestone plants, construction work, driving truck, sewing, cooking, laundering clothes, etc.? Where, when, and for how long?
5. How much money did you make last year? Is that typical yearly earnings for you? How about total earnings (counting remittances, other family members’ earnings, etc.)?
A.5 FUTURE/CHANGES/HELP

1. Do you go to the OTB meetings?
2. When was the last time you spoke up in an OTB meeting? Why? If you don’t talk in the OTB meetings, why not?
3. If you have a problem, do you talk about it in the OTB meeting? The Pirhua? Adela Zamudio? Why or why not?
4. Do you think that residents in Huancarani have similar ideas of what types of projects they want to see the OTB pay for? Have their ever been any problems picking the projects for the POA?
5. If you have a problem, who do you rely on for help? How have they helped you? Who relies on you for help? How have you helped them? Is this help based on ayni, or is it another form of help?
6. What type of work do you do in Huancarani (and with outsiders) that maintain ayni?
7. Do your [grown] children live in Huancarani? Why or why not? If they do live in Huancarani, what do they do to earn money or a livelihood? If they don’t, where do they live and what do they do to earn a livelihood? Do you receive money from them? How often do you see them?
8. Do your daughters wear the pollera [if interviewee does]? Why or why not? Do your children speak Quechua [if speaker does]? Aymara [if speaker does]? If not, why don’t they? Did your parents?
9. Did you vote in the last elections? Do you usually vote in local/departmental/national elections? Why not, if not? In the last elections, for what political party did you vote for? Why?
APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

Adela Zamudio The name of the development context featured as the third case study in Chapter Six, named in honor of a well-known Bolivian literary figure and feminist activist in the late 19th century/early 20th century.

ADRA (Adventist Development Relief Agency). An international non-governmental organization that was involved in development work in Huancarani during the 1980s, primarily responsible for doling out food rations to residents who worked on the construction of the community school. (English acronym)

APSAR (Association of Rural Health Programs). A Bolivian non-governmental organization that coordinates and provides funds to state-run and private health agencies throughout the country.

Aqha Corn beer, or chicha.

Ayni/ayninakuy (Noun/verb). A system of mutual aid, generalized and/or balanced reciprocity that people use to complete work (i.e., harvesting or planting fields, constructing houses, etc.).

Casa comunal Community center.

Cholo/a A person who wears traditional dress (i.e., the pollera) and is said to be partly of Indian descent.

Compadrazgo Godparenthood. These ties can develop between blood and fictive kin. Godparents are chosen to represent people in certain rites of passage (i.e., baptism, high school graduation, marriage, etc.).
**COMIBOL**  The Bolivian Mining Company. This organization was made essentially defunct in the 1980s when the State partly privatized the industry as part of Bolivia’s structural adjustment programs.

**Criollo/a**  A historical term used to denote a person of European heritage but had been born in Latin America.

**Cupos**  Food rations distributed during the communal work group in the Pirwa.

**De pollera/de vestido**  Literally, of the traditional skirt/of the dress. De pollera means that a woman wears the pollera, the traditional skirt of the region. A woman de vestido wears Western skirts and blouses.

**Desarrollar**  To develop. One of the three terms residents in Huancarani use to mean community improvement.

**Don/doña**  Titles of respect for men and women, respectively.

**Encargador/a**  Title given to the administrators of the Pirwa, Victoria and Oscar.

**Gringo/a**  Foreigner. Sometimes jokingly used to refer to a Bolivian with very light skin. I heard women in Huancarani often tease good-naturedly a resident as a “gringa cholita.”

**Jubilados**  Retired persons.

**LPP**  Ley de Participación Popular. Law of Popular Participation that was passed in 1994 under President Sánchez de Lozada. Established 314 municipalities throughout the country that essentially became administrators of local social services (i.e., schools and clinics) and physical services (i.e., sports facilities, waste and sanitation services, etc.), garnering federal funds to finance these budgets.

**MAS**  Movement To Socialism. The political party established by Evo Morales Aima, who ran as the party’s first presidential candidate in 2002. In the 2005 elections, he was the first president in recent memory to garner enough votes (50% + 1 of the votes) to win the general presidential elections without a run-off with the second place candidate in the 2005 elections.

**Mejorar**  To improve. One of the three terms used by residents of Huancarani to mean community development.
Mestizaje

The agenda that heavily influenced social policy throughout Latin America beginning in the first half of the 20th century. Encompassed the political ideology of elevating the national identity to that of an hispanic, Iberian identity in place of the "backwards" indigenous identity that was thought to stunt the unification of a national citizenry.

Mestizo/a

A person who is of mixed Indian and European ancestry, usually wearing Western clothes.

MIP

Indigenous Pachakutiq Movement. The political party founded by Felipe Quispe, a person of Aymara descent who lives in La Paz. Served as a national senator in the early 2000s. Pachakutiq was the ninth monarch of Tawantinsuyu (Lara 2004). In the context of this political party, he is used as a referent to signify the revolutionary nature of the party that attempts to redefine Bolivia as an Indian, not mestizo, nation.

MNR

Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. The political party that both enacted Agrarian Reform in the 1950s and instituted orthodox shock therapy in the 1980s. One of the oldest political parties in contemporary Bolivian politics. Sánchez de Lozada was the head of the party during both of his presidential terms (1993-1997, 2002-resignation in 2003).

NGO

Non-governmental organization. (English)

Nuevos migrantes

New migrants. One of the four demographic groups of residents in Huancarani. There were three waves of new migrants: those from Tapacari, those from los Yungas, and those from Cochabamba.

OTB

Grassroots Territorial Organization. The essential unit of local politics in Bolivian popular participation. Each community is obligated to form an OTB to participate. Three types: indigenous/campesina communities, unions, and neighborhood groups. The OTB in Huancarani is featured as the first case study in Chapter Four.

Participación popular

Popular participation. The process of participatory democracydevelopment instituted in 1994 that fosters decentralization of political decision-making, administration of local resources and services, and the redistribution of federal funds.
**Pasante**  The person elected to be the primary host, organizer, and fundraiser or financier of the community festival.

**Pirwa**  Silo, or a place to store food to be redistributed in times of need. The Pirwa is the name of the voluntary development context featured as the second case study in Chapter Five.

**PDM**  Municipal (County) Development Plan. The plan that is written by county officials along with representatives from local NGOs that establishes goals and objectives for the development as a county. Constructed at least every 5 years. Mandated by the LPP.

**POA**  Annual Operative Plan. This plan is written each year by community leaders with the input of local residents to create a development project which will be undertaken that upcoming year. Submitted to the county to be evaluated, modified, and/or approved for county funds. Mandated by the LPP.

**Portera**  The live-in groundskeeper of the local schools.

**Pulpería**  Company stores where miners and their families shopped for goods in the mining boom of the 20th century.

**Relocalizados/as**  Relocated people. One of the four groups of residents of Huancarani who relocated to the community after living and working in mining regions of Bolivia.

**Rentista**  A person who receives a pension from the government. In Huancarani, rentistas are most frequently those people who worked or who had family members who worked a sufficient numbers of years on the mines and then were laid off in the 1980s when the mines were partly privatized.

**Socios**  Members of any of the three development contexts in Huancarani: the OTB, the Pirwa, and the Adela Zamudio women’s group.

**Trabajo comunal**  Communal work. The community workgroup of the Pirwa.

**Urbanizar**  To urbanize. One of the three terms residents of Huancarani use to signify community development.
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