SOMALI BANTUS IN PITTSBURGH:
AN EXPERIENCE OF RESETTLEMENT

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Refugees resettled in the U. S. have received little attention from the academic community. This research study seeks to address this gap by looking at an especially vulnerable refugee group, the Somali Bantus, recently resettled in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the public health significance of their long-term integration in the wider American culture. Oppressed for centuries, treated as third-class citizens, forced to flee their homes and condemned to live in refugee camps for ten to twelve years because of international events, Somali Bantus qualify as a uniquely disadvantaged refugee population. For this study, interviews were conducted with Somali Bantus and service providers in Pittsburgh to assess their experiences of resettlement. Somali Bantus have a history of being oppressed and discriminated against. Using the qualitative grounded theory approach the exploratory research here shows, the history of discrimination the Somali Bantus have experienced has long-term impacts on individual Somali Bantu's sense of personal agency. Additionally, the enormous need of the Somali Bantu community created conditions in which service providers competed with one another, rather than collaborating. This lack of cooperation among providers and the system of resettlement in the U. S. that encourages refugees to work as soon as possible, regardless of language ability, further hindered the ability of the Somali Bantus to exercise personal agency after arriving in the U.S.
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PREFACE

I would like to thank each of the people who agreed to participate as committee members for my thesis. Their willingness to listen and provide detailed feedback, especially in the midst of very hectic schedules of their own, is sincerely appreciated. I am especially grateful to Dr. Documét, my committee chair, who took time to meet and talk with me every week as I was going through the research process, “talking me down” when I needed it.

My family has also been very helpful and supportive, offering encouragement and interest throughout the process. David, my partner, has been especially good humored about the amount of time I spent conducting, thinking and writing about the interviews, even when I could have reasonably taken a break.

And finally, my sincere thanks to each of the participants in the research study. Whether this is what was expected by any of them, I am not sure, but I hope it helps all of them.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

I arrived in Pittsburgh to attend graduate school in the fall of 2004. Within the first few weeks of the new term I learned of an English as a Second Language (ESL) program being put together by a doctoral student in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, to tutor newly arrived Somali Bantu refugees. The notice caught my eye for two reasons. One, I have a long-standing goal of living and working in African countries. Two, I served as an ESL tutor for two refugee families as an undergraduate and was happy to have the opportunity to do so again. Through the ESL program, Pitt Tutoring, I began working with a Somali Bantu family, and since that first year, I have continued working with the same family on my own, which has been an extremely rewarding experience.

Through my interactions with this family and meeting other volunteers, I was on the periphery of both the Somali Bantu community and the community of service providers. Because of this position, I began to wonder about the process of resettling a refugee group in Pittsburgh; a refugee group that, in many ways, could not have come to a more different culture. Rural to urban, agricultural to post-industrial, communal to individual, Muslim to Christian, and pre-literate to nearly universal literacy, the Somali Bantu entered a community that could not have been further from their previous experiences.

As the differences between the cultures became more and more apparent, I started hearing rumors that the services the Somali Bantu were receiving were not adequate for their
needs, nor were they even inappropriate. All of the rumors came from Americans, however, which made it difficult to judge their validity. These rumors could have been derived from conversations with the Somali Bantus; or, they could have been opinions of the other volunteers and service providers; I couldn’t tell which. For this thesis, then, I decided to conduct a qualitative research study and ask the Somali Bantus what they thought about the services they were receiving. I initially conceived of this study as an evaluation of the services being provided to the Somali Bantus from their own perspective as well as the perspective of the service providers. As will be discussed further in section 4.1, as I got further into the research the overall question became one of how each of these communities, the Somali Bantus and the service providers, conceived of the resettlement experience, but the evaluative questions remained in the interview guides.

1.1 MAKING THE RESEARCH ACADEMIC

Because I was primarily interested in how the Somali Bantus perceived the resettlement process in Pittsburgh, I decided that using grounded theory to guide my data collection and analysis would be the most effective way for Somali Bantus to speak for themselves. Grounded theory has the advantage that I would be taking what was said by the participants and theorizing from the interview transcripts, instead of attempting to make the information I gathered “prove” an existing theory. This seemed especially important because so much of the literature that is published about resettled refugees in the U. S. focuses on outcomes that are important to the resettling government, especially economic self-sufficiency. An exception to this within the United States is a branch of the American Anthropological Association that has published an
annual collection of papers for the last several years, based on studies of refugee and immigrant issues, which most often utilize ethnographic methods.

1.2 OBJECTIVES

This paper seeks to assess the experiences of the Somali Bantus resettled in Pittsburgh in order to understand the following:

- The role of the local-host community and social services delivery system and its effect on a particular group of refugees;
- The experiences of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh as both a minority population in America, and as an unusually vulnerable refugee population; and
- The way in which service providers in Pittsburgh view the experience of resettling Somali Bantus.

Ultimately I would like this research to benefit the Somali Bantus and incoming refugee groups to Pittsburgh by improving their adjustment experience. I hope that using qualitative research, Somali Bantus will be able to assess their own status and make changes that they desire, either to individual lives, how they interact with service providers and/or how they interact with the broader Pittsburgh community. I would also like to see an improvement of refugee services in Pittsburgh as a whole, through collaboration between groups that work on refugee issues in the county. An oral report of what I drew out of the research will be provided to the Somali Bantu community and a copy of this thesis will be provided to each of the service provider participants, as well as a link to the electronic form in PittCat, the university library’s digital database, as soon as it is available.
2.0 BACKGROUND

Somalia has long been cited by the West as one of Africa’s most homogenous countries and as a result, it was one of the countries expected to succeed after independence in 1960 because it did not have any “ethnic problems” with which to contend (Cassanelli, 1996). The homogeneity is a myth, however. While there is a good deal of similarity in people across the country, actual homogeneity does not exist in language, culture or ethnicity. Ethnic, or tribal, differences that have led to one of the most oppressed groups in Somalia, commonly called the Somali Bantus, to seek refugee status in the United States. While the Bantu designation does not itself indicate a single ethnic or language group, its members share enough similarities to be discussed as a whole for the purposes of this thesis.

It should be noted that there are two language groups within the Somali Bantu group in Pittsburgh. While a minority in Somalia and even within the Somali Bantus as a group, the majority language group in Pittsburgh is Zigua. May speakers (pronounced ‘My’) are in the minority in Pittsburgh, though they are majority group in the Somali Bantu designation.
2.1 BANTUS IN SOMALIA

2.1.1 From Slavery to Discrimination

Originally brought to Somalia by Arab slave traders in the 18th and 19th centuries, Bantu speakers were taken from parts of what are today Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi to serve as slaves in Somali and/or for sale as slaves to the Arabian peninsula (Lacey, 2001). Many escaped and freed slaves settled in the southern interriver area of Somalia, both between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers and along the Jubba river valley.

The lower Jubba valley was an especially popular resettlement area for the Bantu speakers because of the relative protection provided by the forest and for the agricultural land available. The lower Jubba was more densely forested than the surrounding plains and as a result, the Bantu speakers became known as the Gosha, or “people of the forest” (Menkhaus, 1996, p 135). Due to the heavier vegetation cover, as well as the presence of tsetse flies, the valley had been largely left alone by the pastoralist Somalis who, instead, traveled with their cattle on either side of the valley. For decades, the forested area provided a sort of sanctuary for Bantu speaking people and others who settled in the area as farmers (Menkhaus, 1996).

Even free, Bantu speakers carried the stigma of slavery with them because their physical characteristics, skin color and facial features marked them as different from the dominant ethnic group in Somalia. Their position as farmers in a heavily pastoral society contributed to the prevailing attitude in Somalia that they were not Somalis, nor even second-class citizens (Cassanelli, 1996). This attitude was compounded by the fact that as outsiders, the Bantu speakers did not belong to any of the existing clans. In such a heavily pastoral area, clans are of
primary importance for protection. As former slaves, agriculturalists, and without the support of a clan, Bantu speakers in Somalia were in fact third-class citizens (de Waal, 1997).

For decades, however, the relatively low value placed on the land the Bantu speakers occupied accorded them a measure of protection. Bantu speakers in southern Somalia developed a sense of self-reliance and security after being ignored first by the pastoralists, and later by the colonial governments, though these feelings of security later proved unfounded (Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996). Under the Italian Trusteeship Administration, already low political representation of the southern Somali groups declined still further as central and northern Somali groups lobbied heavily for representation and inclusion in what would be the independent government (Cassanelli, 1996). Further marginalization of southern Somalia and its people occurred after independence in 1960. This area’s relatively low participation in the wider economic sector also contributed to its lack of importance to the central government until several events in the 1970s occurred to both draw attention to the interriver area and to marginalize its inhabitants further.

In 1972, the government adopted a Latin orthography to use in writing, commonly called ‘Somali.’ This made Somali, or Af-maxaad, the official language of government and education. Af-maxaad has long been the language spoken in northern and central Somali, but in southern Somalia Af-maay and its dialects were spoken, even by pastoralists (Cassanelli, 1996). Related, but not easily mutually intelligible, the two languages produced a divide between southern pastoralists and those in the center and north. In addition, the former slaves in southern Somalia spoke Bantu languages, further fragmenting the Somali population. The language divide was enlarged by a literacy campaign launched by the government in an effort to promote economic recovery after the severe 1973-74 Sahelian drought. While worthwhile, the literacy campaign
included only material for Af-maaxaad speakers, further biasing the system against southern Somalis (Cassanelli, 1996). Another marginalizing effect of the 1973-74 drought in the Sahel occurred when the government resettled northern pastoralists who had lost their cattle herds, on land seized from farmers along the lower Shabeelle and middle Jubba rivers (Cassanelli, 1996). While many of the resettled pastoralists returned north or went to the Gulf to look for work, the dispossession of southern farmers was an indication of more to come.

In the 1970s, irrigated and irrigable land became more highly prized as Somalia began to experience increased urbanization, especially around the capital Mogadishu. Additionally, Siyad Barre, who had seized power in a coup in 1969 and chose to side with the Soviets in the Cold War, implemented large-scale economic reform in compliance with state socialism, which led to rapid inflation (Ayittey, 1998; Cassanelli, 1996). Each of these factors meant that the value of productive land was increasing, but given Somalia’s geography the only concentration of such land was in the interriver area.

Under the rubric of state socialism, the central government under Barre passed the Land Law of 1975, which nationalized all of the land in the country and required farmers to apply to the state for “leasehold titles” that would last for 50 years (Besteman, 1996). Under the law the only legal way to claim rights to land was to register it; any farmer who did not do so held no legal claim, even if the land had been farmed by his family for generations. In a spectacular land grab, politicians, Barre’s family, friends and inside political circle all registered enormous amounts of land in the interriver area, legally dispossessing small shareholding farmers (Besteman, 1996). Given the lack of education of most farmers in the interriver area, the complicated registration process, and an expensive trip to the capital, Mogadishu, very few farmers were able to register the land they had farmed all their lives (Besteman, 1996).
2.1.2 Fleeing a Failed State

Siyad Barre, Somalia’s leader since a coup in 1969, left the Soviet sphere in 1977 when the Soviet Union refused to back his war against Ethiopia, and as a result had been receiving funding from the United States throughout the 1980s (Ayittey, 1998). Somalia received more aid from the U.S. than almost any other country in the world, but little of it was spent on economic or social programs. Instead, Barre’s friends and relatives built elaborate villas and invested in the Gulf region, while his regime presided over a rapidly declining economy with high inflation and declining food production (Ayittey, 1998). Explanations differ as to why Somalia disintegrated into a state of chaos in 1991. Clan fighting and limited resources are the two most discussed reasons by scholars, but whatever the cause, Barre, who appeared to be waging war on his own people throughout the 1980s, was overthrown in January 1991. While many in Somali welcomed his expulsion from power, Barre’s flight to Nigeria left a power vacuum in the country and years of fighting resulted, which continues to this day.

Because the militias needed to support their fighters, much of the violence moved south from Mogadishu into the interriver area, where, with plenty of food to steal combined with poorly defended areas and people, southern Somalia became a haven for militias recuperating, hiding, or merely looting. Southern Somalis, and Bantu speakers in particular, were subject to severe reprisals from occupying militias who accused the southerners of siding with their opponents, when in reality they were trying to limit personal damage by cooperating with each militia group as it came through their villages (de Waal, 1997). Eighteen months after fighting in southern Somalia began, food production ground to a halt, creating a famine that affected the entire country. Exact figures are not known, but estimates of the number who died as a result of the famine and famine-related diseases stand at about 200,000 (de Waal, 1997). During this
period an estimated 285,000 Somalis fled into northern Kenya to escape the devastation, while hundreds of thousands of Somalis also left for Ethiopia and Djibouti (Loescher, 2001). As of December 2006, almost 16 years after Barre was ousted, almost 400,000 Somali refugees remain in camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2006).

Exact figures have not been calculated, probably due to the lack of census data in Somalia, but the number of Bantu in southern Somalia before the civil war is thought to be about 600,000, while those with a strong East African identity, such as the Zigua speakers originally from the Tanzanian coast, are believed to be only a small fraction of that number (Van Lehman and Eno, 2002). The Zigua speakers have kept more aspects of their home culture and beliefs alive, which has made them more of a target for oppression and conflict, even after escaping to Kenya.

2.1.3 Dadaab Refugee Camps

The original camp to which many southern Somalis fled from the eruption of violence in their country was Liboi, located on the equator in Kenya, near a town named Dadaab about ten miles west of the Kenya-Somalia border. When the Liboi camp grew to over 40,000 refugees, UNHCR established three additional camps within the Dadaab area in Northeastern Province in Kenya. At their peak these camps held over 160,000 refugees in total. After closing the Liboi camp in 2002, UNHCR estimated that there were 135,000 refugees in the remaining three Dadaab camps (Van Lehman & Eno, 2002).

Despite having fled the violence in Somalia, the refugees in Dadaab were not safe. Dadaab town, and the surrounding area, is an area frequented by Somali and Kenyan *shiftas*, or
bandits, who used Dadaab to rest and re-supply. Because the Bantu were not the first to arrive, and discrimination by other ethnic Somali (non-Bantu) refugees continued, the Bantus settled on the outskirts of the Dadaab camps, which made them more vulnerable to attacks by the shifta (Van Lehman & Eno, 2002). The Bantu women were especially vulnerable when collecting firewood outside the camps, where they were often raped by shiftas or ethnic Somalis from the camps, many of whom mimicked the clan warfare still going on in Somalia.

2.2 NO PLACE TO CALL HOME: LIFE AS A REFUGEE

2.2.1 Global Refugee Approaches

UNHCR was originally established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950 with a mandate to help resettle the European refugees from World War II within three years (UNHCR, n.d.). The 1951 Refugee Convention, a product of World War II and the Cold War, considered people to be refugees only if their flight was as “a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951,” the formal inauguration date of UNHCR, and resettlement governments were given the chance to decide who qualified as a refugee “owing to events in Europe or owing to events in Europe and elsewhere” (UNHCR, 2006b).

After a precarious beginning with little support from the United States, UNHCR received a grant from the Ford Foundation in 1952 that helped the organization become truly operational (Loescher, 2001). Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, UNHCR expanded its support of refugees from Europe to other parts of the globe. The time limitation of the 1951 convention became a problem however, as was the fact that the majority of new refugees lived not in
Europe, but in developing countries. In 1967 a new *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* was drafted. The protocol included language that not only removed the geographic and time limitations of the original convention, but also guaranteed that any signatories to the protocol were responsible for all of the obligations of the original convention, even if they had not signed it (Loescher, 2001). With the adoption of the protocol, the international definition of a refugee became any person who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country… (UNHCR, 2006a).

Not only responsible for protecting refugees as soon as they have fled their home country, UNHCR is also responsible for their long-term security and settlement. In order to accomplish this, UNHCR aids refugees in pursuing one of three ‘durable’ solutions: voluntary repatriation; integration into the country of first asylum; or resettlement in a third country. Each of the options is regarded as durable because it brings an end to refugees’ suffering and their dependence on the international system (UNHCR, 2006c).

Voluntary repatriation is usually held to be the most desirable solution for refugees. In order for repatriation to occur, UNHCR has to negotiate with the refugee, the country of origin, which has to agree to accept the repatriating refugee, and the hosting country. The most important aspect of this solution is that repatriation can in no way be forced on the refugees. One of the key provisions of the 1951 Convention is the principle of *nonrefoulment*, or not forcing refugees to return to an unsafe home. The negotiation of voluntary repatriation, then, is significant, giving UNHCR a high profile role as negotiator between the parties involved. However, since the 1990s, many of the conflicts producing refugees are of such complexity that repatriation is increasingly impossible (Campbell, Kreisberg-Voss & Sobrepena, 1993).
The second durable solution is integration, in which refugees become self-sufficient in the country to which they have fled (Campbell, Kreisberg-Voss & Sobrepena, 1993). In practice this is problematic because most of the countries to which refugees flee are quite poor. Integration into the local economy can be difficult and raises tensions between nationals of the receiving country and the refugees, possibly creating new discriminatory, or even dangerous, situations (Campbell, Kreisberg-Voss, & Sobrepena, 1993).

The last option, resettlement, occurs when the first two options are not feasible. Resettlement in a third country is relatively widespread, but not generally held to be ideal. It forces refugees to adapt to new environments, frequently quite different from their home cultures. The attitude of citizens in third-party resettlement countries can also be negative: refugees are often seen as a burden because of their initial use of public assistance programs. In countries with prevalent discrimination problems, refugees can suffer what may appear to be simply milder forms of treatment that made them flee their original homes.

2.2.2 Resettlement in America

Refugee resettlement in the U. S. is at present given its legal framework by the 1980 Refugee Act. Before the passage of the Act, resettlement occurred on an ad hoc basis, usually for groups of people from countries deemed to be of interest to the U. S., usually because they were communist. The Refugee Act was passed largely to bring the U. S. into compliance with its obligations under the 1967 Protocol, and to update the procedures outlined in its 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (Amnesty International USA, 1990).

As a resettlement country, the U.S. sets limits on how many refugees it will take every year by geographical region. The details are set out in the president’s annual report to Congress.
Table 1 shows the magnitude of the resettlement impact in the U.S. For fiscal year 2007 the allocated ceiling for the number of refugees is 70,000; 50,000 of these slots are already dedicated to current, known refugee populations by geographic region, with an additional 20,000 left unallocated as a reserve for unexpected humanitarian issues (Proposed Refugee Admissions, 2006).

Table 1: U.S. Refugee Ceilings for FY 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>FY 2006 CEILING</th>
<th>FY 2006 PROJECTED ARRIVALS</th>
<th>PROPOSED FY 2007 CEILING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East/South Asia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Subtotal</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>41,500</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Reserve</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>70,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the definition of “refugee” quoted above, employees from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service) conduct interviews with refugees living in UNHCR camps to determine whether the refugees qualify for resettlement in the U.S. If their refugee application is approved, USCIS, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the U.S. Department of State coordinate to help the refugees travel to the U.S. Once in the U.S., refugees are resettled by one of the ten organizations contracted with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is itself housed within the Department of Health and Human Welfare (Office of Refugee, n.d.). While the resettlement program is mandated and run by the federal government, the process is administered
by individual states and private organizations. The federal program provides cash assistance and
social services to newly arriving refugees with the stated goal that refugees become
economically self-sufficient as soon as possible (Proposed Refugee Admissions, 2007).

The initial phase of resettlement, called ‘reception and placement (R&P)’ is contracted
out by the State Department to nine voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) and one state agency serving
Iowa (see table 2). The R&P agreement signed by ORR and the resettlement agencies requires
that local affiliates of the VOLAGs, using R&P funds and supplemented by private donations
and in-kind contributions, provide several services, including sponsorship; pre-arrival
resettlement planning, including housing; arrival reception at the airport; basic needs support,
including furnishings, food, clothing and housing, for at least 30 days; community orientation;
referrals to health, employment and additional services as needed; and lastly, case management
and tracking for 90-180 days (Proposed Refugee Admissions, 2007).

Table 2: American Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church World Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal Migration Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Community Development Council (ECDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Services of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa Department of Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Catholic Conference of Bishops (USCCB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Relief Corporation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 MOVING UP?: SOMALI BANTUS COME TO THE U.S.

2.3.1 Cultural Orientation Sessions in Kakuma

UNHCR officials originally approached the governments of both Tanzania and Mozambique about resettling the Somali Bantus. Because many of the Somali Bantus, especially Zigua speakers, retained language, and many of their traditional cultural beliefs and practices, both Somali Bantus and UNHCR officials believed resettlement in either of these countries would work well (Val Lehen & Eno, 2002). However, neither country could afford to resettle the some 15,000 Bantus in need of assistance. In the end, after considerable pressure from the Afro-American lobby, the U.S. agreed to take all of the Bantus (Somali Bantus Resettle, 2003).

After the American decision to resettle the Somali Bantus in 1999, the Bantus had to move from Dadaab refugee camps to Kakuma, about 600 miles across northern Kenya near the border with Ethiopia. Dadaab, with its proximity to Somalia, where the U.S. believed terrorists had been able to hide, was considered too violent for INS officials to conduct the refugee interviews (Lorch, 2002). Everything became more complicated with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001, causing world-wide resettlement to be suspended for two months (Lacey, 2001). With American government fears of slipshod INS processing, the Bantus had to go through additional security checks in Kakuma (Lacey, 2001).

After the INS interviews and approval to resettle in the U.S., the IOM conducted ‘cultural orientation’ sessions for all of the adult Bantus. Each refugee group on the verge of being
resettled receives cultural orientation appropriate for the country of resettlement, designed to ease resettlement difficulties, but because of concerns about the challenges that the Bantus would face in the U.S., the State Department approved additional sessions of up to 80 hours for each person, including survival literacy and special classes for mothers with children (Van Lehman & Eno, 2002). Most adult Somali Bantus are illiterate, or preliterate, have lived as farmers in rural areas and have very different cultural beliefs from most Americans. As a result the special orientation sessions focused on writing numbers; the importance of time and dates; the importance of hygiene and cleanliness for Americans; and household cleaning methods and supplies (Stephen and Chanoff, 2003).

In addition to the practicalities of resettlement, many people who had been working with the Bantus in Kenya were concerned about the psychological stress of moving to such a different culture. Bantus have survived a long history of marginalization and years of subjugation, which are widely believed to have affected their sense of equality and self-esteem (Van Lehman & Eno, 2003). Reports by the IOM (as cited in Van Lehman & Eno) raised concern about trauma-related issues, including hopelessness and depression as a result of their history of oppression, as well as having seen friends and relatives raped and/or killed (2003). Many people working in resettlement in the U.S. were consequently given warnings about contending with the after effects of violence-related trauma, as well as an intergenerational culture of inferiority and second-class status (Health: National Somali, n.d.).

### 2.3.2 Welcome to Pittsburgh

Whatever problems they faced in the camps, the first Somali Bantus arrived in Pittsburgh in spring of 2004. In the end, about 33 families settled here, most with several small children. No
exact numbers are kept once refugees arrive; they are allowed to move where they like, and often do so in order to reunite with family members resettled in other cities. While the Bantu population in Pittsburgh appears to be relatively stable, there have been some single family members who have moved here to be with older siblings and their families, and whole families that have moved elsewhere to be with elderly parents or other siblings (personal interviews, 2007).

Pittsburgh is not the only medium-sized city to host refugees. Since the 1990s, when many formerly industrial cities realized that their working tax bases preferred living in the suburbs, mid-sized cities around the country have targeted immigrants and refugees to alleviate depopulation problems. Pittsburgh is no exception. The Heinz Endowments, recognizing the problem of a declining and aging population in the city, have begun funding projects that are designed to “flag down” immigrant traffic, in order to keep the city going (Ewing, 2003). While refugee resettlement in Pittsburgh is not an explicit part of this “flagging down,” the Bantus may become another group in the city’s cycle of redevelopment and renewal.
3.0 EXISTING LITERATURE

Several disciplines have publications about refugee resettlement in the U.S., including sociology, anthropology and social work. The American Anthropological Association has a dedicated series of Selected Papers it publishes periodically through its Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (CORI). Despite the variety of disciplinary perspectives, however, most academic authors studying resettlement in the U.S. agree that the process, as implemented through the federal R&P program through ORR, is flawed.

3.1 SELF-SUFFICIENCY: SHORT TERM VS. LONG TERM

3.1.1 The Focus on ‘Self-Sufficiency’

The mission of the Office of Refugee Resettlement “is to help refugees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, asylees, and other beneficiaries of our program to establish a new life that is founded on the dignity of economic self-support and encompasses full participation in opportunities which Americans enjoy” (emphasis added, Mission of ORR, n.d.). The idea of economic self-sufficiency for resettled refugees is not in itself at issue: most proponents of resettlement agree that through economic self-sufficiency for themselves and their families, refugees are empowered in all aspects of life. The contention over self-sufficiency arises due to the focus of
the federal program on making refugees support themselves economically in the shortest possible time.

The focus on self-sufficiency in its current incarnation is a result of experience with previous waves of refugee resettlement. In 1975, with the first major influx of Southeast Asian refugees (SEARs), the term ‘refugee’ had a positive connotation: the mainly Vietnamese were seen as American allies and in need of a little transitional assistance in order to be successful (Haines, 1993). However, with a recession from 1978-82, and under a federal administration forever deploiring ‘welfare dependence,’ newer groups of SEARs were viewed as a social problem. In part this change of opinion about SEARs was due to the increased diversity in the refugees themselves, and in part because the incoming refugees had been left in camps longer and therefore it was assumed that they would have a harder time adjusting.

The change in views of refugees by the American public and government from ‘asset’ to ‘problem’ is reflected in the change of terms used in the resettlement program. As stated in the 1980 Refugee Act, refugees are to be given assistance in finding employment that is commensurate with their existing skills and abilities, but the ORR program language quickly abandoned this focus for one of economic self-sufficiency, which itself has devolved into rapid employment, regardless of household and/or individual needs (Haines, 1993). The end result is a restructuring of refugee assistance programs to be similar to ‘mainstream’ assistance programs, with no allowance for cultural, educational or historical differences.

This overriding concern with rapid employment is seen in the reduction of funds for refugees, as well as in the language used in ORR’s R&P program. Under the initial authorization of the Refugee Act, the federal government provided funds for the first three years of resettlement in the U.S. Funding at such a level is not guaranteed in the Act, though. The first
cutback occurred in 1986 when the balanced budget amendment was passed and subsequent cuts occurred in 1988 and 1990. Medicaid, state welfare programs and Social Security are not affected by cuts to federal funding specifically for refugees, however refugees now only receive a maximum of four months of direct funding from the federal government through ORR, less than a sixth of what refugees received in the early 1980s (Holman, 1996). These cuts in funding, as well as the overarching concern with self-sufficiency, mean that almost all refugees are required to seek low-level employment and/or manual labor positions within two to three months of arrival in the U.S.

### 3.1.2 Self-Sufficiency and Its Impact on Refugees

Several academics who work with specific refugee groups in the U.S. have detailed the effects of the emphasis on rapid employment and self-sufficiency on refugees themselves. McSpadden, studying Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees, argues that the concern over high welfare dependency of refugees merges the American cultural value of personal independence with the governmental desire to minimize refugee costs (1993). In such an institutional context as this, refugees become problems, rather than “people with problems” (McSpadden, 1993, p. 63). The assumption of service providers working with refugees, then, especially those working in the VOLAGs, is that refugees are ‘outside’ the American socio-economic system and that they need to learn to be “like us.” In another related article, McSpadden (1998) contends that this assumption is also based on beliefs that refugees are not just poor and uneducated, but also ignorant; that their lives have been “saved,” so they should be grateful, accommodating and understanding of the rules that guide the resettlement process, while working very hard in entry-level or manual labor jobs with little prospect for advancement.
While Americans recognize that assimilation, adaptation and integration are difficult, the refugees are expected to change and adopt American behaviors by actively putting aside their own beliefs and values, which are seen as stumbling blocks. A related assumption of many American service providers working in the resettlement system is that Americans are not influenced by their own culture, though this position has been hotly contested by anthropologists (McSpadden, 1998). With all of this, McSpadden maintains that for Ethiopians and Eritreans, the quick-fix of low-level employment perpetuates poverty and prohibits upward social and economic mobility, as well as inhibits individual effort and self-reliance, “the very behavior highly valued in United States culture” (1998, p. 164). While McSpadden’s work is focused on Ethiopians and Eritreans, her findings are easily extrapolated to other refugee groups.

Refugees are not the only ones to suffer from the push for rapid employment. In a study completed in St. Louis, Missouri, employers of SEARs were concerned that their refugee employees might not be able to advance economically because they needed more English education (DeVoe, 1993). DeVoe (1993) states that the single most common response from employers she interviewed was “‘make sure they learn English’ (i.e. learn to read and write)” (p. 54). Some employers also suggested that refugees are forced to look for jobs too soon, so that in the short run they might be gaining employment—an indication of success for the R&P program—but in the long run their overall work history is one of lost opportunities because of their lack of English skills and the chances to train for more advanced positions (DeVoe, 1993).

Other academics working with refugees and studying the issue of self-sufficiency speculate that refugee groups that have spent years living in camps where they live almost exclusively on food that is provided by UNHCR and its partner nongovernmental organizations, expect to receive social services once in the U.S. This expectation has profound effects on
refugee adjustment once in the U.S. A study by Rasbridge and Marcucci (1992) of Cambodian women who were on Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) found that after having spent over five years in a camp in Thailand, where waiting in line for their daily food rations is the only way to secure nutrition, social services like WIC were seen as entitlements. This means that some refugee groups may enter the U.S. with false values and expectations about the services that will alleviate their needs. This study may be of special relevance for the Bantus, most of whom spent 10-12 years in refugee camps, living on humanitarian relief with few opportunities to procure their own food outside of the rationing system.

3.2 ADAPTING AND INTEGRATING TO THE U.S.

3.2.1 General Adaptation

Considering general refugee adaptation, Haines (1996) focuses on commonalities of different refugee groups adjusting to life in the U.S. General population characteristics, occupational and educational background, life experiences, values and expectations, family and kinship structures, and the way in which refugees left their home country, all affect refugees’ ability to integrate into, and adapt to, life in the U.S. (1996).

Somali Bantus face special challenges as refugees. The population is overwhelmingly young, due to both practices of polygyny and large family sizes. Because polygyny is illegal in the U.S., there are also a disproportionate number of single mothers with large numbers of children. Men had to choose which wife to stay with and divorce the other(s) while in the refugee camps before coming to the U.S., which put a strain on families both within the camps
and in the U. S. since the federal government does not guarantee placement in the same city for any refugees except immediate family members. In addition, most Bantus were farmers and had little, if any, formal education before fleeing the country, so their experiences and expectations are radically different from the Americans with whom they interact. At the same time, family and kinship/community ties are of central importance to the Somali Bantus, a characteristic that can conflict with the American sense of individualism.

Based on a comparison between these general characteristics and Somalis Bantus, it appears that the Bantus are yet again at a disadvantage. All of this is further complicated by the fact that, as Haines (1996) points out, each refugee group comes to a different America, and has to adjust to different environments.

Attitudes towards refugee groups vary widely. Cubans were widely supported in their attempts to flee to the U.S. after Castro took power as part of the Cold War antipathy towards communism, but Southeast Asians, while initially welcomed, were later subjected to part of a larger anti-Asian immigration backlash as Americans began to perceive Asian immigrants as taking desirable jobs (Haines, 1996). Related to Haines’s (1996) point about each refugee group coming to a different America, American attitudes over the arrival of different refugee groups is complicated by different economic trends, as mentioned previously, so that refugees who arrive during a boom period are received with compassion, while those who arrive during a recession are viewed with hostility both because of the drain on funding that ‘should’ belong to Americans and the perceived risk of taking jobs from poor Americans.

Additionally, in several articles that look at refugee adaptability and integration most authors point to English acquisition as being necessary for refugee success (Beiser, M and F. Hou; Haines, 1988, Mamgain and Collins, 2003; Montgomery, 1996). The focus of the articles
is on how the English language relates to rapid employment, the proxy goal of ORR for economic self-sufficiency.

3.2.2 Language and Ethnic Support

On the language front, Tollefson (1989) reviews English as a Second Language (ESL) programs for refugees in the 1980s and finds them insufficient to meet refugees’ needs. Reviewing two large studies, Tollefson (1989) presages McSpadden’s negative assessment of services by stating that while encouraging refugees to accept minimum wage jobs may serve the immediate goal of reducing public assistance, it fails to address long-term social and economic consequences of resettled refugees. Refugees, he maintains, are in danger of becoming permanent members of America’s working poor because the ESL classes designed to push them into minimum wage jobs do not contribute to a solution of the larger problem of enduring poverty in the long term (Tollefson 1989).

On a more positive note, Heldenbrand (1996), working with a Sudanese refugee family in the Midwest, noted that having refugees of a similar background in the area helped smooth the integration process. The family with whom she worked, the first Sudanese family in the area, experienced severe family disruption due to their isolated state. The husband started drinking heavily and beating his wife. The wife, who was especially isolated because she did not speak any English and felt trapped at home all day with her youngest child, filed a restraining order and left her husband to move into an apartment complex where there were other African refugees living. After learning to support herself and her children, with the help of her new friends, the woman attempted to reconcile with her husband. When he beat her again, she moved with her children to Minnesota to be with some extended family members (Heldenbrand 1996). Support
and advice from refugees with similar backgrounds can help bolster confidence for new refugees, thus facilitating integration. At the same time, being the first family in an area has several additional stresses.

### 3.2.3 Ethnic Support Through Agencies

Heldenbrand is not the only one to note that refugees find support simply by being around other refugees with similar backgrounds. Several academics have written about the support offered to refugees by mutual assistance agencies (MAAs) (Mortland, 1993; Pobzeb, 1993) and ethnic agencies (Iglehart and Becerra, 1996). Structurally very similar, ethnic agencies are defined as an ethnic group social service organization, including immigrants, refugees, and American minorities, that works to provide assistance to other minority groups. MAAs are very similar, but they can also include cultural groups or associations that do not connect migrants with support systems, while ethnic agencies are focused exclusively on service provision.

Ethnic agencies originally developed out of charity organizations and are designed by members of a particular ethnic group to benefit others in that group in need of assistance (Iglehart and Becerra, 1996). Largely staffed and administered by persons of the particular ethnic group concerned, ethnic agencies serve as mediators between the cultural group and the larger service delivery system and are viewed by Iglehart and Becerra (1996) as being the most efficient way to deliver social services while promoting ethnic cohesiveness and identity. Ethnic agencies are better at keeping members from falling through the cracks of the bureaucratic welfare system. However, as social work became professionalized as a discipline, case workers turned into ‘experts’ and removed themselves from the problems their ‘clients’ encountered.
Additionally, case workers discounted systemic problems and ignored the contributions of institutions to the difficulties of their clients’ lives so that clients were seen as both the cause and solution of whatever existing ‘problem.’ Professionalization, with its creation of case workers, has also meant that ethnic agencies are removed from a central service delivery function, which has created tension between ‘mainstream’ American service providers and ethnic agencies (Iglehart & Becerra, 1996).

Mortland (1993), studying SEARs in the 1980s, found that many in the refugee aid community believed refugee leaders who understood American social services, as well as the language and cultural orientations of fellow refugees, were in a better position to offer services to fellow refugees. The U.S., realizing that integrating large groups of refugees was going to be difficult, began exploring the possibility of funding SEAR organizations to provide social services to refugees, in addition to the VOLAGs that had R&P contracts (Mortland, 1993). Despite this, while the U.S. claimed it was investigating the use of MAAs to provide services to refugees, Pobzeb (1993) maintains that not only did a large Hmong community group in California receive no assistance from the Office of Refugee Resettlement, but through late 1992, ORR had ignored requests for financial assistance from the Hmong group.

Holley (2003) is interested in the influence of ethnic awareness on using ethnic agencies as opposed to mainstream American agencies, whatever their history or funding by the government. Through open-ended interviews with staff members from different ethnic agencies, Holley (2003) found that people see several barriers to using mainstream agencies. The barriers include: staff at such agencies do not understand the language or culture of any given ethnic community group; community members distrust mainstream agencies; staff at the agencies are too busy to offer adequate services; community members are too proud to use mainstream
agencies; and mainstream agencies simply refer community members to other agencies instead of offering direct services. While Holley’s work is in Seattle, it is reasonable to assume that many of the same barriers to accessing mainstream services exist in other parts of the country, including Pittsburgh.

3.3 EVALUATION OF REFUGEE SERVICES

Two evaluations of refugee services elsewhere in the U. S. are particularly relevant to the experience of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh. The first looks at the differences in refugee adaptation and integration based on the nature of the resettlement agency: caseworker-based or volunteer-based. The second evaluation, sponsored by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), looks at the importance of coalition building between service provision agencies, refugee groups and the wider community. The findings and recommendations from these evaluations echo what I found in the interviews conducted for this study, as discussed in section five. I wanted to draw specific attention to these evaluations because they will help inform some of the recommendations provided in section six.

3.3.1 Refugee Service Provision: Professional-based vs. Volunteer-based VOLAGs

Using life histories, a self-anchoring scale, a self-administered questionnaire and participant observation, McSpadden (1993) evaluated the differences in psychological well-being of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees resettled in Colorado by two different types of resettlement agencies, with respect to self-sufficiency as the primary goal of resettlement. The first type of
agency evaluated is the mainstream, ‘professional’ VOLAG that uses caseworkers to help refugee clients, while the second type of agency is volunteer-based and uses volunteers who have minimal ‘professional’ training in resettlement issues.

McSpadden’s (1993) research found that refugees resettled by the volunteer-based agency had higher employment rates, more professional jobs (as opposed to the typical low-wage entry level jobs usually staffed by refugees), and higher rates of educational attendance, usually college (pp 69-70). At the same time, those resettled by the volunteer-based agency experienced lower stress than the refugees resettled by the professional-based agency (McSpadden, 1993 p. 69).

The differences between the success of the two refugee groups in terms of ‘good’ employment and education, both of which are very important to the Ethiopians and Eritreans came down to the need of the professional-based agency to rely on government funding and therefore to follow government requirements including closing cases after three months, little contact with the refugees and, related to all of these issues, high case loads (p. 70). The refugees resettled by the volunteer-based agency, on the other hand, had personal relationships, many of them long-term, with the people who helped them, making it easier for the volunteers to spend longer looking for appropriate jobs for the refugee they were sponsoring, using regular work channels, as opposed to the ‘refugee channels’ set up the professional-based agency that concentrate on entry level jobs (McSpadden 1993, p. 71).

There are several differences between the Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees McSpadden spent time with and the Somali Bantus, including a much higher level of home-country education for the Ethiopian and Eritreans and a smaller family size. The Ethiopians and Eritreans McSpadden (1993) studied also stressed education as an important issue not only for
professional development, but for personal growth, and many of them were anxious to continue their education in the U.S. They were most often young single men who had not yet married and were from families with some level of power in their home country because their fathers held government positions. Despite these differences between the Somali Bantus and the Ethiopians and Eritreans, the differences in the agencies assisting resettlement are applicable for the experience of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh. One of the main agencies assisting the Somali Bantus employed a caseworker-client framework and the other agency that ended up taking on many aspects of service provision was almost exclusively volunteer-based. As discussed in section five below, though the situations between the Ethiopians and Eritreans and the Somali Bantus are not perfectly parallel, volunteers have played a crucial role in how the Somali Bantus have adjusted to Pittsburgh.

3.3.2 Coalitions for Integration

Largely funded by ORR, the Building New American Community (BNAC) initiative in Portland, Oregon, Nashville, Tennessee, and Lowell, Massachusetts is an initiative to assess how local government and civil society groups can work together to achieve improved integration of refugees (Migration, 2003). Turning away from traditional top-down resettlement models, the initiative has four principles underlying the concept of successful integration:

- New Americans should be involved in decision-making processes that affect them;
- Integration is a mutual process that has benefits and implications for resettlement communities, not just refugees;
- Coalitions are the means through which effective collaborations can occur; and
• Resources should be devoted to both appropriate interventions, as well as coalition building (Migration, 2003).

The BNAC initiative assessment of necessary services for newcomers echoes much of what is discussed in the wider literature. Necessary services include: ESL training for adults and children; more educational opportunities; health care; adequate and affordable housing; and skills development for employment beyond low-wage entry level jobs (Migration, 2003). In addition, building leadership skills of all immigrant groups, and including local government and business leaders in conversations about immigrant integrations were both judged to be important. Coalition building, then, is extremely important for immigrant integration as a whole and refugee integration in particular.
4.0 METHODOLOGY

4.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND CHANGES TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION

One of the advantages of qualitative research is that it is not only acceptable if the research questions change as data is collected, it is expected that the questions will change as the researcher delves deeper. This was the experience I had while doing this study. When I began this project I conceived of it as an evaluation. The original research question was: *What are the quality and completeness of resettlement services provided to Somali refugees in Pittsburgh, according to both the Somalis, and to key informants from service provision agencies?* With a further question: *Is there any difference between the Somalis’ and the agencies regarding their services?*

After the first interviews with service providers and Somali Bantus, I realized this question did not fit what the data were giving me, and also was not what I meant to ask. Through about three iterations, I changed the research question into one question posed to two different groups: *How has the process of resettlement been viewed by the Somali Bantus as well as by the service providers?* Going through the analysis I realized that I could actually have done two different research studies, one focused just on the Somali Bantus, and a separate study focused on the service providers. Because separate studies is not how I conceived of the
research, however, the benefit of interviewing people from each group in this study is that a fuller picture of the overall resettlement experiences emerged.

4.2 APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH: CONSTRUCTIVIST GROUNDED THEORY

Within qualitative research there are several methods or approaches that can be used for data collection and analysis. I chose to use a modification of grounded theory, an approach that originated in the late 1960s from the work of two sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, because of its insistence on the reality of the data itself, rather than what researchers may have previously thought. The emphasis of gathering data from which a theory is then extracted flips more traditional quantitative research on its head, making the participants, as the originators of the data, the primary voice in the identified theory.

Grounded theory is a qualitative data analysis approach in which theory is identified from data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The identified theory is referred to as a ‘mid-level’ theory because it seeks to explain what is happening in the context of the data, not, as with higher-level theory, what happens outside the research. The data are usually in the form of transcripts, most frequently of interviews conducted by the researcher. The steps followed by most adherents of the grounded theory approach include coding the data, grouping the codes into themes, writing about the themes several times in memos of varying complexity, from initial impressions to longer, more substantive pieces, and then, after several iterations, using the memos as the basis for the final paper. One of the most important aspects of the grounded theory approach is its use of ongoing data analysis. The specific technique for this is called “constant comparison” in
which each transcript is read and then compared to transcripts that have been read previously so that the coding of each transcript is consistent and allows the researcher to become so familiar with the data that identifying the themes and then theory, is relatively straightforward.

Charmaz (2002), the most vocal proponent of constructivist grounded theory, explains that the “construction” approach “places priority on the phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from the shared experiences of researcher and participants and the researcher’s relationships with participants” (emphasis added). While I was initially unaware of how important this particular aspect of constructivist grounded theory would be, in the end my relationship with participants, especially the Somali Bantus, had a profound effect both on the data collected and how I interpreted the data. Additionally, the constructivist approach to grounded theory holds that researchers do not exist in a social vacuum, so that while the identification of theories from the data may be unique to a particular researcher, researchers themselves are influenced by the time and place of research and past experiences (Charmaz 2006). I want to stress this point, because while I firmly stand by my interpretation of the data as laid out in section five, it is my interpretation. If participants who read this see little of what they said to me in the interviews, it may be because our interpretations differ or because having interviewed several people in multiple positions has given me a wider perspective.

4.2.1 Applying Grounded Theory

Each of the specific methods chosen, interviews, sampling and coding is consistent with the grounded theory approach. I modified the standard process of grounded theory by completing the literature review while data collection and analysis were occurring. Strict adherents of the grounded theory approach maintain that it is best to conduct the literature review after all of the
data collection and analysis has been done, so that the analysis shapes the material collected for the literature review. Due to time constraints for this study, I was unable to do this, although I was directed towards specific concepts that appear in the literature review by my analysis.

4.2.1.1 Interviews

Open-ended, in-depth interviews were conducted with four refugees and nine service providers. After review and comments by multiple people skilled in qualitative research, the interview guides were approved, along with the research project, by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Pittsburgh (see appendix A). I had two interview guides, one for the Somali Bantu and one for the service provider group; both guides asked general questions about experiences concerning the resettlement of the Somali Bantus (see appendices B and C). As the research process went along, the interviews became even more open-ended and new questions were added as I discovered relevant topics that I had initially left out. Some interviews were especially rich and led to considerable expansions on relevant topics.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face and all but one were recorded with a digital voice recorder between January and March, 2007 (the one interview not recorded was done so at the request of the participant: detailed notes were taken instead). The interviews lasted anywhere from 35 to 90 minutes. As per IRB approval, participants had the informed consent script read to them at the beginning of the interview (appendices D and E). To maintain confidentiality, results were not connected with the participant and all notes were kept free of names and any personal identifiers.
4.2.1.2 Sampling

Sampling was different for the two groups. Somali Bantu participants were sampled using the snowball style, in which participants are asked for the names of others who might be willing to participate. Service providers, on the other hand, were sampled using theoretical sampling. This sampling technique allows for an adjustment of those being asked to participate as new information comes out of the ongoing analysis, so that if a particular agency was mentioned as being important, I could contact someone from that agency for an interview.

4.2.1.3 Analysis

Data analysis was ongoing as initial impressions, transcripts, codes and then memos were analyzed individually. Each transcript was read through initially, read through again and coded, read through a third time, with particular attention paid to the codes while being compared to previous transcripts using the constant comparison technique. Codes were then categorized and categories were used to create overarching themes. Memos were written at each stage of the analysis, from short initial impression memos, to longer, more detailed memos that created much of the discussion in section five.
5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 SERVICE PROVIDERS

5.1.1 Breakdown of Interviews

Nine service providers were interviewed from a variety of agencies working with, or having worked with, the Somali Bantus. However, at the time of the interview any particular agency, or participant, was not necessarily working with the Bantus. For confidentiality I will refer to all service provider participants as though they do currently work with the Somali Bantus. The community of refugee service providers in Pittsburgh is quite small. In order to preserve confidentiality, I have grouped the participants into categories based on the agency in which each of them works. The grouping includes:

- Interviews with three people working in literacy programs;
- Interviews with three people in the primary resettlement agency;
- Interviews with three people from advocacy agencies, one specific to refugee issues and one to a particular issue.

Each of these providers works specifically with refugees, except one of the advocacy interviewees, whose agency works with anyone affected by the particular issue. In addition, two of the interviewees work exclusively with the Somali Bantus. As a further measure to protect
identity, the participants are divided into two “position” groups: administrators and direct service providers. Because of the nature of working with refugees in Pittsburgh the distinction between the two groups is blurry, but from job descriptions given during the interviews I was able to assign respondents to one of the groups based on their primary responsibilities. Based on this, I interviewed five administrators and four direct service providers

5.1.2 Service Provider Results

Because I originally conceived of this research study as an evaluation, I concentrated on three broad themes in the interviews with service providers:

- Services each agency provided for the Somali Bantus;
- Participant perspectives on working with the Somali Bantus;
- Collaboration with other agencies working with the Somali Bantus, and if relevant, the process of collaboration.

Responses to each of these topics are detailed in the following sections.

5.1.2.1 Service Provision

I asked each of the interviewees to tell me a little bit about their position and the work the agency did. Three of the agencies provide ESL tutoring, either for children or adults. One of the agencies concentrates on advocacy for refugees in general. One advocates and provides services for minorities and low-income residents on a particular substantive issue. The last agency provides the bulk of the resettlement services as required through the contract with the federal government, with a considerable focus on employment.
5.1.2.2 Working With the Somali Bantus

When asked about working with the Somali Bantus, two major phrases occurred over and over again through the different interviews: “challenging” and “I give them a lot of credit.”

Every one of the provider participants said that working with the Somali Bantus was difficult. For those participants who had prior experience working with other refugee groups, the Somali Bantus were described as being more challenging to work with. One of the participants said, “I was one of those people who thought they would be challenging to resettle, but no different from other groups. I was wrong.” A second participant, who had worked with several refugee groups since the mid-1990s, commented on the difficulties of working with the Somali Bantus: “Their adjustment has been more difficult than most because of tribal background and illiteracy and things like that. The Somali Bantus came from rural, tribal backgrounds, you know… [and] they weren’t familiar with things that we take for granted.”

When participants were asked what they thought about working with the Somali Bantus, all but one specifically mentioned how much the Bantus had learned and since their arrival in the U. S. One of the participants said “…no matter what, these guys have been through a lot, and…they’re doing good.” Another participant, when asked to describe the Somali Bantus said, “Well, I would say they have come a long way….It was very hard for them, at first, but now they drive around, they go to work, their kids know how to speak pretty good English, so I would say yeah, they’ve come a long way.”

The comments from both these participants are representative of what the other interviewees said about the Somali Bantus. One exception was an interviewee who was more concerned about the Somali Bantu children modeling negative behavior they see in their American peers. A second provider, who also talked about the community “coming a long way,”
echoed the concern about the children by mentioning the possibility of gang behavior becoming an issue if the families stay in the same neighborhood in which they now live. However, overall, comments from all of the participants were extremely positive, focusing on the community as a whole and on how much the Somali Bantus have learned and integrated in the last two to three years.

5.1.2.3 Collaboration among Agencies

Generally the discussions about inter-agency collaboration elicited either relatively matter-of-fact responses, or passionate descriptions of why better collaboration was needed and the lack of conversation around issues concerning the Somali Bantus. For the most part there was, and still is, little collaboration between the agencies working with refugees. Four of the participants specifically mentioned a desire for increased collaboration, which has implications that are discussed below.

Only one provider described working with other agencies in a truly collaborative way by describing the function of their agency as dependent on cooperation with partner agencies. The same interviewee noted, though, that partnering with other agencies was difficult because certain agencies refused to collaborate with third-party agencies. Unlike other provider participants, this interviewee also referred to other agencies throughout the interview and repeatedly recognized that services had been well provided by other agencies. At the same time, this interviewee also responded to the question about “what are some of the services that are harder to provide?” by saying that “community coordination [between agencies] has been the hardest part.”

Interviewees from three other agencies described the relationship between agencies as based on need. One of the participants, when asked about the level of formalized relations between agencies, replied, “…with our work, we do it, but it’s not part of any formalized
contract.” The two other participants mentioned partnering with different agencies as needed, but not in an active partnership.

Two interviewees working at the same agency had different perspectives on the level of collaboration between their agency and others. One of the interviewees, who has an administrative position, replied to the collaboration question with, “Absolutely. We collaborate on all of our work.” However, the second interviewee, who works in both direct service provision and administrative positions in the agency, responded to the same question about relationships with other agencies with “they’re nonexistent….The sense inside the agency [is], they’re [other agencies] doing their thing, we’re doing ours…..” Confirmation of the second interviewee’s interpretation came from participants working at other agencies. As one of the participants replied, when asked about their relationship with this agency specifically, “We’ve had some contact when we went to meetings and the representative from [agency in question] was there, but we didn’t really work with them in the same way that we worked with the other organizations that I’ve mentioned.”

About half of the provider participants saw the lack of collaboration as detrimental. One of the interviewees said, “…there was no information flow or centralizing kind of resource. It’s a lot of hearsay about what’s going on with this kid, or what’s happening with the community…..” However, the other half of the participants either did not see a problem with the lack of coordination, or, more frequently, simply never mentioned it as an issue, even when the topic of collaboration came up.
5.1.3 Discussion of Service Provider Findings: Contentious Collaboration

While there were interesting aspects to each of the themes from the interview guide, as I coded and employed the constant comparison technique the most significant finding from the provider participants was how contentious the issue of collaboration turned out to be. Much of the tension between agencies is based on previous behavior of one or more providers at various agencies. Most of the conflict appears to be based on personality differences and battles over “turf.” It is difficult to interpret the conflict between agencies because those participants who did mention the lack of collaboration were very careful about how they framed the discussion. This seems to be an indication of a belated awareness that reputations suffer in so small a community. As an example of the fragility of reputation, one participant said, “I think we heard through [first agency] that they weren’t very productive in what they were doing…so we never connected formally [with second agency].”

Reputation appears to be especially important due to the actions of one service provider that were judged by the Somali Bantus themselves to be a deliberate attempt to divide them along language and tribal lines. This incident was first mentioned by a service provider who declined to say which person or agency was responsible. When asked about it, one of the Somali Bantu participants confirmed that the attempt did occur and that from the community’s perspective, the attempt was deliberate, but was initiated by one of the Somali Bantus. The division was then furthered because of a connection between that Somali Bantu and the service provider. The Bantu participant also declined to name the responsible person and agency.

Discussion on the ‘division incident’ is as an example of how fragile relationships are within the service provider community, and how contentious issues from the past continue to color perceptions of agency work today. Providers feel personally attacked and betrayed by
remarks and incidents that happened within the first year and a half of the Bantus being resettled and the impact of such remarks and actions are still visible.

5.1.3.1 Battles over Turf

Fueling the difficulties of collaboration between agencies is what appears to be a battle over turf and territory, with visibility for helping resettle the Somali Bantus as the ultimate prize. One of the participants, when asked about the difficulties between agencies, stated that because the needs of the Somali Bantus were so great there was confusion among agency workers and volunteers about who was supposed to provide which services, but that “at the end of the day, the Bantus are our [resettlement agency] responsibility.” Another participant said, “There were times where, you know, peoples toes were stepped on. There was a lot of blurring [of] lines….I think it’s unique to the Bantus: the need was so great.” Based on these comments it is clear the enormous need of the Somali Bantus fuelled competition between agencies over which agency would help them and in what way.

Competition appears to have begun even before the Somali Bantus arrived in Pittsburgh. As mentioned on page 15, the U. S. agreed to resettle the Somali Bantus in 1999, but for various reasons Somali Bantu did not arrive in Pittsburgh until the spring of 2004. Forewarned about the difficulties of resettling the Somali Bantus because of their large family sizes, the pre-literate status of most of the adults as well as children, and their former subsistence farming existence, at least two new agencies were created in Pittsburgh. In addition, one existing agency added a site specifically for the Somali Bantus.
5.1.3.2 Lack of Cooperation and its Effect on the Somali Bantus

While hurt feelings of service providers are not conducive to a positive working environment, the worst effect of the lack of collaboration is what happened to the Somali Bantus. As one of the providers said, “…people would end up with too many beds in a house because there was [sic] just all these organizations that feel like they want to do something good and no real either passive or active coordination.”

Too many beds in a small apartment may not be seen as terribly harmful but the lack of collaboration between agencies was not always so benign. The disagreement over the Somali Bantus’ possible move to public housing is an example of a circumstance with a more detrimental effect. Housing is an issue for the Somali Bantus because of their large family size. Bigger families means they needed bigger apartments or houses, which means their rent is higher. However, since most of the Somali Bantus work in the service industry and consequently do not have large incomes, the apartments and houses they can afford to rent are in poorer neighborhoods with more social problems. In an attempt to address this, in 2005, city officials called together all of the agencies that work with the Somali Bantus and asked them to work on the issue. Because there was no foundation for collaboration, though, and because “turf battles” continued, the agencies worked together only in the barest minimum way. One of the outcomes of being forced to work together without a true collaborative spirit was that representatives from different agencies gave the Somali Bantus different accounts of what was going on and what the best solution to the housing dilemma would be. This led to a climate in which, as one of the participants pointed out, the Somali Bantus “didn’t even know who they can trust to ask, ‘What would be a good idea?’ I think it was just hard to figure out where they were going to get that information….” By not collaborating, the agencies put the entire Somali Bantu
community in a precarious position with little information and less knowledge of who to trust. As will be discussed in the next section, this situation has implications of a wider problem for the Somali Bantus.

5.2 SOMALI BANTUS

5.2.1 Breakdown of Interviews

Four Somali Bantus were interviewed. I planned to interview 14 refugees, but interviews proved difficult to arrange. Three people agreed to be interviewed but then, very nicely, refused to set a time for the interview until I realized that this was a polite way of refusing without saying “no,” and stopped pushing. This in fact was a foreshadowing, had I but known it, of the issue of “personal agency” I would encounter with the four people I did interview, as discussed in section 5.2.3.2. Also, due to the nature of snowballing as a sampling technique, I ran into the same “verbal yes,” but “action no” when asking previous participants to introduce me to potential interviewees. Part of the difficulty was due to my being an outsider, as discussed in section four above, and part of the difficulty was because the Somali Bantus lack personal agency, which I will discuss in detail below.

Interviewees varied in background. Three of the participants were men, one was a woman; three were heads of household, one was not; three were parents, one was without children; two were married, two were not; all were employed; the age range was from about early twenties to late-forties/early fifties (these were guesses since I did not ask about age as it could be considered an identifier). Their English language skills ranged from almost non-
existent to being easily understood with a command of idioms. Because of the small community, the smaller number of participants in the research, and the need for confidentiality, no identifying information was recorded about the Somali Bantu interviewees.

5.2.2 Somali Bantu Results

English language skill emerged as the dominant factor in the interviews. I used an interpreter for two of the interviews. Coincidentally, the Somali Bantus interviewed early in the process had less command of English than those interviewed later, so that it was the last interviewee who spoke English quite well and had a command of many American idioms. This variation in English language skill is important because it very much shaped my interpretation of the data.

The first two interviewees, with whom an interpreter was needed, made no negative comments about the resettlement process, nor did they complain about any of the agencies. Even when asked questions about specific instances in the past, the first interviewee made light of any problems that occurred. I summed up that interview as “everything is ‘good’ and everyone is ‘nice.’” The second interview for which an interpreter was used was similarly “positive,” though a few more problems emerged. Interestingly with each of these interviews, when I asked specifically if there was anything the interviewee need help with currently, both responded “no.” However, when I got to the last question and asked if there was anything the interviewee wanted to ask me, each of them brought up an issue they were concerned about. This could be due to confusion through interpretation, but it stood in direct contrast to the last Somali Bantu interviewee, who, along with most of the service provider interviewees, asked me questions about my research and why I was interested in the Somali Bantu population. In the end, it was
only the fourth interviewee who answered the evaluation questions from the interview guide in any substantive way.

As I began grappling with why this was, why only one of the interviewees gave in-depth answers, I realized that the differences in English language skill affected their perception of me. I became not a person, but an interviewer in a dominant position who was requiring them to answer questions in the dominant language of their new culture.

5.2.3 Discussion of Somali Bantu Findings: It’s All about Agency and Language

5.2.3.1 English as a Claim to What Is Right

English language acquisition emerged as the major issue, not only in terms of how the Somali Bantus I interviewed dealt with problems they have in the U. S., but also in terms of the research I conducted. I began searching the existing literature for the impact of language and how people make sense of their surroundings. One of the most useful pieces I found discussed language as important for conceptualization and the ability to incorporate values and beliefs, not merely as a tool or technical label (Temple and Edwards 2006). Temple and Edwards (2006) stress that language is not a “neutral medium,” but is something that can exclude or include people and that language “carries accumulated and particular cultural, social and political meanings… [that] speaks of a particular social reality…” (p. 41). They further state that “language is the medium for promoting claims to a dominant and correct perspective. The interaction between languages is part of the establishment and maintenance of hierarchical relations…” (Temple & Edwards 2006, p. 41).

This point about language and its function in promoting claims to the correct perspective and maintaining the status quo fits perfectly with what I came to see as the major theme from the
data with the Somali Bantus: personal agency through language acquisition. Without a command of the dominant language, people are helpless in their efforts to stake a claim about what they think is right. More specifically, having to rely on an interpreter meant that for two of the people I interviewed, I alone controlled the direction of the conversation. This shut out the possibility of the Somali Bantus being able to insert their claim to what is right.

Unbeknownst to me, reliance on an interpreter for two of the interviews was further complicated because of the Somali Bantu experience with interpreters in Pittsburgh. With the arrival of the first families in the area, there was only one person who could communicate with them. This forced the Somali Bantus to depend exclusively on one person and that person’s view of whatever situation the Bantu’s faced. Regardless of this individual’s commitment to the well-being of the Somali Bantus, their dependence on this one person left them vulnerable and unable to know whether what they were expressing was understood by all parties involved. As more families were resettled in Pittsburgh Swahili, a second or third language many of the Somali Bantus had picked up while living in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, provided another way to communicate with service providers. This opened up the number of interpreters, too, as there are several Swahili speakers in Pittsburgh, many of whom became involved in interpretation and translation with the Somali Bantus, thus easing the vulnerability of the Somali Bantus since multiple interpretations could be compared.

In addition to the interpretation barrier with interviews, Somali Bantus are accustomed to interviews as a mechanism of being judged worthy of receiving services: UNHCR uses interviews to determine the amount of services provided in refugee camps; USCIS uses interviews to determine refugee status; refugee resettlement agencies use interviews to determine work ability and assign potential jobs; and at least two of the agencies in Pittsburgh use
“interviews” to set goals that the agency has already predetermined. Additionally, the way in which the Somali Bantus are used to interviews being conducted, having questions asked that required specific and detailed factual information such as names, places and dates, colors how they perceive the interview process. While I was asking open-ended questions and wanted long answers, their experiences of interviewers only wanting short answers created a problem that I did not initially recognize and consequently found frustrating.

As a result of the Somali Bantus’ experience with interviewing, being interviewed for research purposes is a foreign idea, an unfamiliar concept which cannot be adequately explained with an IRB script. The informed consent script becomes just another piece of paper with no real meaning, especially if there are language barriers. Interviewees believe that they have to answer the questions I am asking in a way that will reflect well on the agencies in question because the results may impact the future service provision for the Somali Bantus. Their answers do not necessarily have to do with a lack of trust of me as a person, but with an overall lack of knowledge and control over interview outcomes. Yu and Liu (1986) discuss the same problem while doing research with Vietnamese refugees, and Krulfeld (1993) warns anthropologists about doing research with refugees in the resettlement country, because as a member of the dominant society, interviewers will be perceived as representatives of that dominant culture by the refugee group with whom they are working.

This perception of me as a gatekeeper of service provision because of my status as interviewer, explained why I had a difficult time obtaining interviews with the Somali Bantus. The two interviewees who did need an interpreter were in some way beholden to me because of their relationship with the family I serve as a tutor. Very reasonably, they assumed that saying “no” might jeopardize the children’s education because I could refuse to continue as a tutor if
they did not agree to the interviews. At the same time, for Somali Bantus who have a more distant relationship with the family I tutor, saying no, however politely, was a way of staking their claim about what is right by refusing to enter into the complexities of the dominant language over which they have a tenuous grasp. Saying no was an exercise in personal agency.

### 5.2.3.2 Personal agency

Just as I needed to find literature on the difficulties in communicating across languages, as the analysis progressed I realized I needed to find literature on how people perceive their control over the world around them. What I found fit the situation for the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh: the concept of personal agency.

The idea of personal agency, arising out of social cognitive theory in psychology, is based on the premise that “judgments and actions are partly self-determined [and therefore], people can effect change in themselves and their situations through their own efforts” (Bandura, 1989, p. 1175). It obviously follows that if an individual cannot effect change in her situation, regardless of her own efforts, belief in self-determination is lost. In a later article, Bandura asserts that belief in self-efficacy is key to personal agency and that without this “core belief that one has the power to produce desired effects by one’s actions…one has little incentive to act or to persevere in the face of difficulties” (2002, p. 271).

The Somali Bantus in particular come from situations that offer them little proof they have the power to change their lives. While they have exercised the ultimate personal agency in staying alive, nothing else about the refugee experience encourages, or even allows, feelings of self-efficacy, and consequently, personal agency. Indeed, Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, in a study of refugees in Australia, comment on an “extended temporary existence, during which many people were not allowed to work and thus forced into passivity,” a situation which is very
applicable to the Somali Bantus with an average of 10 to 12 years spent living in refugee camps
(2003, p. 73).

Responding to concerns about the validity of personal agency in cross cultural contexts, Bandura (2003), one of the main proponents of the idea, explains that in social cognitive theory there are three modes of personal agency:

- Direct personal agency; an individual has, and exercises, control over her own life;
- Proxy agency; individuals have to rely on others to act on their behalf to secure desired outcomes; and
- Collective agency, which is exercised through group action.

No one culture uses just one mode, although the balance among the three modes does shift from culture to culture, as well as within cultures.

From the first refugee interviewed, with almost no English skill to the fourth refugee interviewed, what became apparent as I coded, categorized and then identified themes from the data, is that control over what goes on around the Somali Bantus is intimately tied to English language acquisition. If a person can control the conversation, if she can register protest against and approval of what is being said, she can control what goes on around her. However, without the ability to control the conversation or register protest or disapproval, a feeling of helplessness arises. Pushed out of their country, refused permission to settle in two countries to which they have cultural ties, and in which they asked to be resettled, the Somali Bantus are forced to settle in the one country that is willing to take them, but only on its own terms, not theirs. The literature is full of discussions over “adaptation” and “integration,” but the reference is always to
refugees adapting and integrating, not to adaptation on the part of resettlement countries, or even any system of give and take between refugees and recipient countries.

With few or no English language skills, the Somali Bantus are not in a position to exercise direct personal agency. In response to a question about decision making power over purchases in the first few months of resettlement one participant said, “If you [are] new somewhere; people, they can take whatever they want. There’s nothing you can say. I wasn’t speaking any English…. It was hard.” And then, “Somebody arrived after two months, you take them to work [and] he doesn’t know English, he doesn’t know even ‘caution/dangerous; do not enter,’ he doesn’t know how to read. He just go and then ‘bam,’ he’s gone, you know?” While not recounting a story that occurred in Pittsburgh, this comment clearly indicates a concern with language acquisition and the ability to control dangerous situations.

All but one of the refugees expressed a strong desire to increase their English language ability. One of the three participants who expressed interest in learning more English asked the resettlement agency for ESL classes early in the resettlement process because “I need to know English; I don’t know any English. I don’t need to write, to be educated, I just want to help to speak English, something to begin with.” The same three participants who want further English training also gave examples of how a lack of English hurt them, mostly with reference to employment options and their dependence on other people to provide them with information. However, because of the lack of collaboration between agencies and because the tensions that existed between them filtered down, the Somali Bantus had no way of verifying the information that was being given to them. They were then unable to trust an outsider to act on their behalf to secure desired outcomes, though they were forced to do so in order to navigate through the
system. One of the service providers acknowledged this lack of proxy agency when saying that the Somali Bantus “don’t even know who they can trust to ask, ‘What would be a good idea?’”

Only one of the four interviewees talked during the interview in such a way as to show an ability to exercise personal agency. While the other three interviewees reported not having any problems currently, despite later bringing up particular issues of concern, the fourth interviewee not only expressed personal problems about adjusting to life in the U. S., but also talked about problems other community members were having. The fourth participant stressed that single mothers had an especially hard time because “She only the mother, she has to take care of the kids, take care of the house, take care of the bills, take care of everything…. They need to be in school so they can just understand a little bit.”

Personal and proxy agency were consequently out of the Somali Bantus’ control during the initial resettlement period. The third mode, that of collective agency, was also out of their control because each family was so lacking in personal agency upon arrival, that it took some time for any sort of collective agency to develop. The availability of collective agency is considerably improved now because of the local Somali Bantu organization. At the same time, volunteers who continue to work with the Somali Bantus and who have become friends can be relied on to act in their best interests, so now even if one of the Somali Bantus cannot exercise personal agency, they have some proxy and collective agency to exercise.

However, even in the collective agency mode, because of traditional gender roles, women have fewer opportunities to exercise agency than men. Women have to accommodate the power imbalance of “asking for help” from the collective, whereas men are better able to “demand service.” This is neither good nor bad, but is something to be aware of, especially because of the number of female-headed households due to husbands having to choose which wife, or wives, to
divorce before being allowed to resettle. The requirement of divorce in cases of polygyny itself is an example of the lack of personal agency Somali Bantus have experienced.

5.2.3.3 Navigating ‘the system’

Intimately tied to personal agency, but still distinct from it, ‘navigating the system’ was a second major theme that emerged from the interview data with the Somali Bantus. No navigation is possible without language access, whether that is through a trusted interpreter, which has proven extremely problematic in Pittsburgh, or through a personal command of English. The Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh have mostly been at the mercy of a system they have no control over and which makes very little sense. There were several comments from service providers about how difficult it is to explain ‘the system,’ and direct service providers also commented about how hard it is to understand the system personally in order to be able to explain it to others.

Somali Bantus expressed frustration with ‘the system’ because they do not have a clear understanding of how components such as cash assistance work. Discussing the problems of food stamps, the fourth interviewee stated that “…you cannot buy everything you want, only food. Even my children need diapers, I have to go to the office [resettlement agency], instead of store…. So it was like [laughs], what is this? This is America?! Where?”

In terms of navigating the system for personal fulfillment, one of the two refugees who expressed an interest in formal education said, “You have to work and go to school, and which is better? If I quit job, it will not help with my bills, but I need school, too!” The third refugee, who also wants more education said, “I want more school, but you know it is difficult for me right now, working and studying. It doesn’t look like a good job, so maybe I’ll start, after a few years I can look for study.”
The “navigation” difficulties tied to language became apparent with responses to the question, “Who do you ask for help if you have a problem?” The first two refugees, who had to rely on an interpreter, both answered that they would ask their caseworker at the resettlement agency for help. They later said they would ask one of the ‘people’ who come to their houses. These ‘people’ are officially volunteers, but in most cases have become friends who continue to visit. While the reliance of Somali Bantus on volunteer-friends is an indication of proxy agency, it also shows a lack of ability to navigate the system on their own. The third interviewee responded that asking people at the resettlement agency, “people who come to the house” and other Somali Bantus at the community meetings are all options. With more options for help there is a greater ability to exercise personal agency in figuring out how to navigate the system, but this response still indicates a lack of understanding of the system itself.

The fourth interviewee, who again, spoke the most English, answered the question the way an American would: “It depends on the problem.” Continuing to explain, “If [it is] a little problem, I can solve by myself, like talk, or just be a little bit patient and slow down and think about it and figure out how can I solve it. If it [is] a big problem, it depends….” The interviewee went on to describe how calling the police and insurance company about a broken window is appropriate, and depending on the circumstances of the problem, calling a lawyer is also a possibility. The nature of the response, laying out different problems with different solutions, shows an ability to navigate the system that the other interviewees are missing, which is in large part due to English language skills and the ability to exercise personal agency.
5.3 TYING IT TOGETHER: EVALUATING SERVICES

While the research study evolved in such a way that it became less an evaluation than an exploration of the resettlement experience, some evaluative statements can be made.

The resettlement agency was constrained in its ability to react quickly to problems the Somali Bantus experienced by its reliance on federal funds and the government contract for reception and placement. Commenting on this, one of the provider participants, in response to a question about why gaps in service existed for the Somali Bantus, said, “I don’t think that it’s [the system of refugee resettlement] structured well in that all the resettlement happens very quickly so whatever the agency is, has very little time to prepare for the families that are coming, of if they do, they have very little money to get that family set up.” The requirement to fulfill the government contract makes it difficult for the resettling agency to meet spontaneous needs in a reasonable manner, and this was especially true for the Somali Bantus.

Directly criticizing the resettlement agency, one of the Bantu participants said, “We appreciate the volunteers because [the resettlement agency] isn’t—nobody from there take me [and say], ‘Okay, this is Giant Eagle. When you need anything come shop here.’ No. The first two weeks I was in America, I never been out.” This comment echoes what McSpadden (1993) found working with Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees: those who were resettled by a volunteer-based agency had better jobs and less stress than those refugees who were resettled by the professional-based agency. While all of the Somali Bantus were resettled by a professional-based agency, it was volunteers who provided the bulk of the support for the Bantus, both physically and emotionally.
5.4 CHALLENGES TO DOING RESEARCH WITH REFUGEES

I encountered several difficulties while conducting this study that affected the analysis and theories that I identified from the data.

5.4.1 Doing Research as an Outsider

One of the primary difficulties encountered was that I am an outsider to each of the two participant groups. This is less of an issue for the service providers since I mirrored most of them in terms of education level and interests, but for the Somali Bantus being an outsider had a significant impact on my ability to conduct the research. My relationship with the Somali Bantus, as consistent with the constructivist approach, informed my interpretation of the data. Despite tutoring one family for the past two and a half years, I still do not have real ‘entrée into the community.’ For the Somali Bantus, I am an urban, educated representative of the new dominant culture in which they have to navigate, and I have no language skills that would help them feel more comfortable communicating. Interestingly, one of the provider participants, after asking me about my research for this study, said “I think one of the things that this group might need is someone from their community who’s a scholar.” This would, indeed, be the best option.

5.4.2 Language

My lack of linguistic ability in any of the African languages the Somali Bantus speak was an enormous barrier. This was especially of concern because I wanted to interview an equal number of women and men, but my access to women was generally poor, in part because the
women, on average, speak less English than the men do. Also, I did not want to recruit a non-Somali interpreter to either: 1) interpret for me; or 2) do the interviews with non-English speakers, because everyone in Pittsburgh who can interpret is already involved with the community somehow. I did not want to risk having Somalis believe the research to be related to an agency by having them rely on someone they see in other circumstances, usually in positions of power, to do interpretation. However, in order to conduct two of the interviews an interpreter was recruited from within the community, and was someone with whom I already had a relationship.

5.4.3 Considerations for Future Research

A longitudinal study would be interesting and would provide useful feedback. There are clear indications of long term adjustment issues that are different for the Somali Bantus than for other refugee groups. These adjustment issues would be illuminated better in a longer term study. If possible, it would be beneficial to have someone interview the Somali Bantus at six month intervals to discover what they think about the progression of the resettlement process and adjustment to life in the United States.

If someone else were interested in conducting similar research with the Somali Bantus I would recommend that she allow for a longer time period for the research process. Additionally, finding someone who can communicate with the Bantus more easily would be enormously useful. Swahili would work to communicate with most of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh, although being able to speak Zigua or May would be particularly helpful, especially in order to interview the women. A reconsideration of the interview method might also be helpful. Relying on open-ended interviews with the Somali Bantus presented a difficulty since they have
experienced interviews as “extractive” tools of service providers, and not a means through which to tell their stories. Because the Somali Bantus are so community-oriented, having small group discussions, similar to focus groups might be especially beneficial, particularly if language were not a barrier. Finally, talking with service providers from additional agencies would also provide a more detailed picture. Due to time limitations I was not able to interview providers from the schools, clinics, neighborhood groups or hospitals. Given the resettlement history of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh, participants from the hospitals and schools would have especially interesting insights.
This situation of the Somali Bantus in Pittsburgh is probably not unique, and as such is illustrative of what other Bantu communities are facing in establishing ‘normal’ lives throughout the U.S. Wider communities are affected as well, particularly those of service providers. While collaboration in other cities resettling Somali Bantus may not be as difficult as it appears to have been in Pittsburgh, partnerships break down in many situations and those who are supposed to be served by agencies become units over which to fight for funding and for attention. In order to move from the current state of ad hoc relationships to formalized partnerships and collaboration in Pittsburgh, I am making the following recommendations.

1. Each of the agencies working with refugees should reassess how it interacts with other agencies and be open to real change in working with outside agencies, regardless of institutional differences.

2. Following an assessment of individual agencies willingness to work together, service providers in Pittsburgh could consider setting up a stable collaborative structure with a centralized distribution of information similar to the effective collaboration initiatives funded by ORR in three mid-sized cities detailed in section 3.3 (BNAC). This would work not only for traditional service providers, but for ‘periphery’ agencies as well, including local police, schools, neighborhood organizations, hospitals and health clinics, all of which serve refugees in some way. The benefits of a coalition would not only be
for the long-term integration of the Somali Bantus, but could have spill-over effects for future refugee groups resettling in Pittsburgh.

If there is interest in proceeding with a collaborative initiative, it might be especially useful to bring the Islamic Center in as a meeting place, if its board and executive committee agree. This could provide a relatively “neutral” space for all parties and may be one of the easiest ways to make the Somali Bantus feel comfortable with the collaboration initiative.

3. Agencies may want to consider diversifying and strengthening funding sources so that funding constraints on service provision become less important. This would allow greater flexibility both in which services an agency chooses to provide, but also in how it chooses to provide those services.

4. The Pittsburgh Somali Bantu organization should consider setting up as a non-profit Mutual Assistance Association (MAA), if community members agree it would be in their best interests. Long-term sustainability would need to be carefully considered, but this would allow the Somali Bantus to exercise greater proxy and collective agency, and possibly personal agency for individuals in the long-term, as well. It could also be an effective way for the community to present a collective face to service providers and other outside groups. This may have several benefits for the Somali Bantu community, including putting them in a greater position of power with relation to negotiating their own wants and needs.

The Somali Bantus have been a vulnerable group since they were first taken to Somalia as slaves. Oppressed for centuries, treated as third-class citizens, forced to flee their homes because of violence and condemned to live in refugee camps for ten to twelve years because of
international events over which they had no control, Somali Bantus qualify as a uniquely disadvantaged refugee population. This history of oppression and discrimination has long-term impacts on individual Somali Bantu’s sense of personal agency. Received in a country that forces them to work as soon as possible, personal agency is further negated for the Somali Bantus upon arrival.
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL FORM

University of Pittsburgh
Institutional Review Board

Exempt and Expedited Reviews

University of Pittsburgh FWA 00006790
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, FWA 00006735
Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, FWA 00010900

TO: Leah Taylor, MPH

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, PhD, Vice Chair

DATE: January 17, 2007

PROTOCOL: An Evaluation of Refugee Services Provided to Somali Refugees in Pittsburgh, PA

IRB Number: 0612095

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as “exempt” under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an ‘exempt modification’ form to the IRB.

- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.

- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

Approval Date: January 17, 2007
APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT SCRIPT (SOMALIS)

The purpose of this research study is to evaluate the services that have been provided to you, as part of the Somali community, by the agencies that offer support to recent refugee groups in Pittsburgh. For this, I am interviewing Somali refugees about their experiences since coming to the U.S. I will also be interviewing people from the agencies that work with the Somalis to ask them about their experiences. The interview will take approximately one hour. If you are willing to participate, the questions will ask about your family, your children, adjusting to life in Pittsburgh and how you get help if you need it. In order to make sure that I get all of your responses, I am going to record the interview, if that is okay with you. If you prefer not to be recorded, but would still like to answer the questions, I can take notes.

There are no foreseeable risks associated with this study, although a breach of confidentiality is possible. As I will mention shortly, I am taking every possible means of protecting participants’ confidentiality, so that this risk is minimal. There are also no direct benefits to you. However, I hope that after the study is done, if there are any service provision areas that can be improved, the agencies will be able to work on them. The findings will be written up as part of my Master’s Thesis for school. I will give a copy of this to each of the agencies working with refugee communities in Pittsburgh. In addition, I will be providing an oral summary of the study findings to the Somali community. What you tell me will not be reported to the refugee agencies, but they may read about what you said in my thesis. Your name will not be attached to what is said, and in fact your name will not appear in the paper at all.

I will not write down your name, or any information that might identify you or anyone in your family. In addition, please do not use the full name of anyone you refer to during the interview, but first names are okay. All responses are confidential and interview transcripts will be kept under lock and key. After I write down everything you have said from the recording, it will be erased. Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview at any time, even after we have started. This study is being conducted by me, Leah Taylor, and I can be reached at [phone number], if you have any questions.
APPENDIX C: INFORMBED CONSENT SCRIPT (SERVICE PROVIDERS)

The purpose of this research study is to evaluate the services being provided to the Somali refugee community in Pittsburgh. For this, I am interviewing key-informants from agencies that work, or have worked, with the Somalis. I will also be interviewing Somalis to ask about their experiences with the different agencies that offer services to recent refugees in Pittsburgh. The interview will take approximately one hour. If you are willing to participate, the questions will ask about the work your agency does, both in general and for the Somalis; about intra-agency communication; and about relevant training in working with other communities. Opinions and responses to questions will be summarized and like responses will be aggregated and reported without names attached. Your name will not appear in any written document, including the final paper. Because your responses are important I would like to record them, if that is okay with you.

There are no foreseeable risks associated with this study, except a breach of confidentiality is possible. As I will mention shortly, I am taking every possible means of protecting participants’ confidentiality, so that this risk is minimal. There are also no direct benefits to you. However, I hope that after the study is completed, if there are any service provision areas that can be improved for future service, the agencies will know about them. The findings will be written up as part of my Master’s Thesis, a copy of which will be sent to each of the agencies working with refugee communities in Pittsburgh. In addition, I will be providing an oral summary of the study findings to the Somali community.

I will not write down your name, or anything that might identify you. In addition, please do not use the full name of anyone you refer to during the interview. All responses are confidential and interview recordings will be kept under lock and key until they are transcribed, at which point the audio files will be deleted. All transcribed materials will be kept under lock and key. Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview at any time, even after we have started. This study is being conducted by me, Leah Taylor, and I can be reached at [phone number], if you have any questions.
APPENDIX D: SOMALI INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Tell me about how you came to America and where you were before.
   Probes: how long in refugee camp, how did they find out they were coming to US, how long did the process take

Tell me about your household
   Probes: how many people, how many kids, how many adults w/ jobs, how long employed

Do you have a job outside the home?
   Probes: what is that like, what do you think about it?

How has it been adjusting to living in Pittsburgh?
   Probes: getting housing, finding a job, kids in school

What are some things that have made it easier to get used to living in Pittsburgh?

What are some things that have made it harder to get used to living in Pittsburgh?

When you have problems here, how do you deal with them?

Are there people you can ask for help if you have problems?
   Probes: who

When you were in Somalia or Kenya, if you needed help, who would you ask?

What has been your experience with your case worker?
   Probes: how often seen, still visiting or no, helpful/not

What has been your experience been with Catholic Charities?

What has your experience been w/ Pittsburgh Refugee Center?

What has your experience been with the Greater Pittsburgh Literacy Center?

Who else helps (or has helped) you?
Probes: are they attached to an agency, does the interviewee know the agency name, or difference between the agencies

What did you think America would be like before you arrived here?
   Probes: Is it different from what you found? What do you think about that?

What do you think about your income/ the money you (or your husband) make(s) at your (his) job?

FOR WOMEN:
What have your experiences been with doctors and having to go the clinic or hospital?
   Probes: where have they gone, how has the service been

Is there anything that you could use help with now?

Is there anything that you might not have thought about before, that occurred to you during this interview?

Is there anything you would like to ask me?
APPENDIX E: SERVICE PROVIDER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Tell me a little bit about your job.
   Probes: title, position responsibilities, how long job held

Tell me a little about __agency__ and how it works.
   Probes: how long working w/ refugees, how long w/ Somalis, other refugee groups

Does __agency__ have an evaluation process of the services it provides?
   Probe: what kind of evaluation, how often performed, has it been done since Somalis arrived

Tell me about working with the Somalis.
   Probes: what is provided, how much contact (now and previously), what position has contact

What are some of the services that are easier to provide to refugees?

What are some of the more challenging services to provide to refugees?

Have you received any training in cross-cultural issues as part of your job?
   Probe: what kind: communication, competency, etc?

Would you like to receive any (additional) training through your job?
   Probe: what kind

Does __agency__ keep in contact with other refugee service provision agencies?
   Probe: how often, at what level (admin, case worker, etc.), outside Pittsburgh/not

DEPENDING ON AGENCY:
   How does __agency__ share information between “chapters”?
   Probe: emails, seminars/workshops, newsletters, personal contacts

Do you, personally, have contact with other service provision agencies?
   Probe: in what form, how often, with whom (counterpart, supervisors, etc.)

IF YES:
How has that worked for _you/your_ agency?

Is there anything that you might not have thought about before, that occurred to you during this interview?

Is there anything that I haven’t asked that you think I should have, or that you’d like to mention?

Is there anyone you think I should especially talk to?

Is there anything you would like to ask me?


