PRESENCE TO SELF: AN ESSAY ON THE
PHENOMENAL ORIGINS OF INTENTIONALITY

by

Christopher Frey
B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 2001

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This dissertation was presented

by

Christopher Frey

It was defended on

04/08/2011

and approved by

Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

John McDowell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

Robert Brandom, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

Karl Schafer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

Christopher Hill, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University

Dissertation Director: Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
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Christopher Frey, PhD

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My dissertation is an examination of an oft-invoked but insufficiently understood feature of perceptual experience, namely, its presentational character. We open our eyes and a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present. To experience is always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally something as other or as before one; it is always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally a manifest opposition between the self—that before which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. I call this aspect of experiential phenomenality, this universally appreciable but non-sensuous sense of otherness in experience, phenomenal presence.

Phenomenal presence is uniquely suited to illuminate the substantive interrelations that exist between two fundamental features of perceptual experience: intentionality and phenomenality. I argue that (i) the intentional features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence, (ii) phenomenal presence is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality, and (iii) the intentionality embodied in phenomenal presence is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of experiential intentionality. I then show how these conclusions can be brought to bear on the intentional status of our non-phenomenal, mental states.

These discussions guide us toward an account of perceptual experience in which experiential phenomenality is competent to direct us intentionally beyond ourselves, independently of the contributions made by the understanding or intellect. Modeling the intentionality and self-awareness involved in perceptual experience upon the intentionality and self-awareness
involved in belief and judgment, or insisting that the former depend on the latter obscures both the role of and the contribution made by the exercises of our perceptual capacities. This tendency to assimilate the perceptual and the intellectual realms and to privilege the intellectual leads inevitably to accounts of perceptual experience that either render epiphenomenal the distinctive contributions of experiential phenomenality or neglect those contributions altogether.
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1.0 AN ARISTOTELIAN COMMENCEMENT

All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. (Metaph. I.1 980a22–24)

In these lines, the first of his Metaphysics, Aristotle appeals to the delight we take in our senses, a love directed upon the senses themselves, as the principal evidence that a desire for knowledge is essential to man. But this delight is not as universal as Aristotle suggests. The familiar is often mistaken for the mundane and the ubiquity of experience—beginning in utero and rarely absent thereafter—deadens the sense of wonder that ought to accompany our perceptual episodes. We do not typically value perception for its own sake but for its utility. We do not typically direct our inquiries upon perception itself but upon the world perception reveals.

Though the sentiments to which Aristotle appeals and the reflective orientation that underlies them fall short of the universality his argument requires, we may forgive his enthusiasm. Aristotle is not among the unreflective and the nature and exercises of perceptual faculties are frequently the target of his inquiries. If we examine these discussions and extract the account of perception contained therein, we will find at its center the first articulation of a fundamental insight concerning perception’s significance. And once we understand, as Aristotle does, the full extent of perception’s role in our lives, we can hardly avoid the wonder it excites.

In what does perception’s significance consist? According to Aristotle, it is twofold. First, perception is among the principal means whereby we acquire knowledge about the world in which we live. Though controversial in his day, that perception occupies this epistemological
status is now widely acknowledged.\footnote{1} This epistemological role is indeed important; we must understand it if we are to provide even the simplest, general account of ourselves and our relationship to the world. But according to Aristotle, perception’s significance runs deeper: to be capable of perception is to occupy an exceedingly privileged status among the living. Though it may initially appear unremarkable, this claim is, in my opinion, among the most profound of Aristotle’s numerous insights. But what, exactly, does it mean?

Aristotle is not making a statistical observation. Perceptual faculties are more than rare. For Aristotle, the faculty is transformative. Its possession marks a determinate threshold for attributions of a distinctive form of animate existence, namely, animal life.\footnote{2} Consider an organism that lacks the capacity to perceive. The merely nutritive existence of vegetable life is exhausted by activities that never reach beyond themselves. Nutritive activities have a single end: the existence of the very form of life that they epitomize. For an organism to achieve this end is for it to sustain the exemplification of its particular form of life either in itself or, assuming a finitude that precludes perpetual exemplification in the self-same organism, in a numerically distinct organism (by duplicating the form of life as best it can in that distinct individual).

To possess a perceptual faculty is to advance beyond the reflexivity of a merely nutritive existence. When an animal exercises its capacity to perceive, it is, in a sense, fulfilling its perceptual form of life. But this exemplification of form is not the capacity’s primary end. The end of perception is achieved only insofar as it allows an organism to encounter meaningfully a world that lies beyond itself. Unlike the inanimate or merely nutritive relations in which an organism stands to the world, the relations that the successful exercises of an organism’s perceptual capacities effect allow it to appreciate that it is so-related. That is, perception affords an organism an appreciation, however minimal, that it is a self, a self that is systematically embedded within and stands in opposition to a populated world.\footnote{3}

\footnote{1}{Aristotle supports the claims in our epigraph by invoking perception’s epistemic role: “For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things” (\textit{Metaph.} I.1 980a24–28).}
\footnote{2}{Aristotle defends this claim in \textit{De Anima}, book II.}
\footnote{3}{The terms ‘self’ and ‘world’ are not philosophically innocent: to invoke them, as I do here, may lead even the most charitable reader to conclude that I am committed to a battery of unpalatable philosophical positions. Much work needs to be done to make my preferred use clear and to separate it from alternatives.}
Though this Aristotelian dictum dominated philosophical inquiry into perception for centuries, a survey of the state of the art reveals few accounts of perceptual experience that are even implicitly guided by the outlook it embodies. This estrangement from our Aristotelian heritage has at least two sources. First, our increasingly sophisticated understanding of the physical states and events that constitute or enable the animate activities of living organisms has led many to minimize or eliminate the gap between these activities and the “merely” physical interactions of inanimate bodies. The possession of a perceptual faculty, on this view, doesn’t mark a categorial distinction between altogether different kinds of organism. To be capable of perception is merely to occupy a position on a continuous spectrum of physical complexity.

The second impetus to amend or abandon this Aristotelian dictum arises when we stop considering the perceptual faculties of animals in general and begin to focus on the perceptual faculties of the comparatively rarefied class of organisms to which we belong, namely, rational animals. Our rational (cognitive, intellectual, conceptual, etc.) capacities make available an understanding of our position in the world that surpasses anything that perception would provide independently. Moreover, these rational capacities may be operative, perhaps necessarily, in most, if not all, of our perceptual achievements. Considerations of this sort have led many to confer the significance Aristotle attributes to perceptual faculties upon these rational faculties instead. It is the possession of a rational faculty, according to this outlook, that allows an organism to encounter meaningfully the world that lies beyond it. It is our rational capacities that set us apart from mere brutes—animals which are, in this respect, no different from the myriad nutritive and inanimate entities that surround us.

The discussions and arguments that follow are shaped by two convictions:

(i) If we are to understand perception, we must recognize its transformative and transcendent nature and not rest content with explanations of some emaciated homonym.

(ii) It is the distinctively experiential aspects of our perceptual episodes—not thought, belief,
judgment, or any other rational contribution or accompaniment to perception—that allow us to transcend the isolation characteristic of nutritive life.

The defense of these convictions and of the Aristotelian insight that inspires them are among my principal aims in this essay. Success requires the resolution of a number of difficult questions: In what way do the relations that the successful exercises of our perceptual capacities effect differ from the inanimate (or merely nutritive) relations we stand in to worldly objects? How does perception present a world before its subject? In virtue of what does perception provide its subject with an opportunity to appreciate that it is a self? And in virtue of what does perception provide such a self with an opportunity to appreciate that it stands within and in opposition to the world perception reveals? Upon taking up this pursuit one quickly finds that even modest advances in understanding are rare. This essay records my attempt to achieve such a modicum of progress.
Perception possesses many remarkable features, but two in particular stand out. First, perception is the principal means whereby we establish communion with the world we occupy. Perceptual experience is directed upon the world and its function is to make that world accessible to us. It brings our world into view and, in so doing, makes its denizens available as objects of attention, recognition, thought, and action. Let us call this first feature intentionality and its perceptual exemplification experiential intentionality.

Second, these perceptual engagements, in contrast to the vast majority of the physical and intellectual relations in which we stand to the world, manifest themselves phenomenally. The most salient of the phenomenally appreciable elements in experience, what we will call sensuous qualities, are typically introduced by way of example, say, the way the redness of a Red Delicious apple looks when one sees it, the way middle C sounds when one hears it being played on a Bösendorfer piano, and the way a pain feels when one experiences a pin pierce one’s finger. Let us call this second feature phenomenality and its perceptual exemplification experiential phenomenality.

1In picking out this feature, one’s manner of expression will always appear to beg important questions. I intend at this point to be absolutely noncommittal about the nature of and relationships between experiences, subjects of experience, and that which is appreciable in an experience for a subject. I introduce the core notion in our preferred account of experiential phenomenality—being phenomenally appreciable in an experience for a subject—in § 2.2.

2There is a narrow and a broad use of the term ‘experience’. Conceived narrowly, experiences are states that possess a proprietary phenomenality, e.g. conscious perceivings, bodily sensations, episodes of perceptual imagination, etc. Conceived broadly, experiences include, in addition, occurrent propositional attitudes that presumably lack phenomenality, e.g. thoughts, volitions, judgments, etc. I embrace the narrow use. Also, though experiences, narrowly conceived, are usually taken to comprise both perceptual and non-perceptual states, I use the terms ‘experience’ and ‘perceptual experience’ interchangeably, unless a particular context demands otherwise. This use foreshadows an important thesis that I will defend: all experiences—not just perceptual experiences but bodily sensations and other so-called “raw feels”—possess intentionality (cf. §§ 2.3.2.3 and 5.2). This explains, in part, the present choice to speak of experiential intentionality and phenomenality rather than perceptual intentionality and phenomenality.
Intentionality and phenomenality pervade our mental lives and their signal importance to the philosophical enterprise of understanding the mental as such is widely recognized. In fact, philosophical investigations into the mind almost always take one or both of these features to be constitutive of mentality. Unfortunately, the importance of attaining an understanding of these two features is matched by the degree of difficulty that accompanies our attempts to do so. Despite the centuries of attention that their elevated status has fostered, satisfactory accounts remain elusive.

Though there are many reasons for this failure, one in particular stands out: at present, we do not know what a satisfactory account of either intentionality or phenomenality would even look like. For we do not understand whether or how intentionality and phenomenality are related to one another and without a clear, though possibly revisable, conception of the substantive relationships that obtain between these features, we are not in a position to recognize a successful explanation of either feature for what it is.

My principal concern in this essay is to fill this lacuna. That is, I wish to defend several theses about the substantive interrelations that exist between intentionality and phenomenality and to draw attention to the consequences these theses have for the achievement of a satisfactory account of either notion. The investigation is governed by two guiding questions. First, I wish to understand the relationship between experiential intentionality and experiential phenomenality. Are these features mutually independent and separable despite their frequent, and perhaps universal, co-occurrence in experience? If not, in what ways (and in which directions) does one feature depend on, constitute, or determine the other? Second, I wish to understand the relationship between experiential phenomenality and the intentionality of our paradigmatically non-phenomenal states. Can states that presumably lack phenomenality altogether, say, occurrent, non-perceptual judgments or sub-conscious beliefs, nevertheless possess intentionality? If so, do these intentional features stand in any important relations to states that have experiential phenomenality?

Perceptual experience is uniquely suited to serve as the starting point of our investigation. Intentionality and phenomenality are perceptual experience’s most important features and it is natural to think that the pair are somehow intimately connected. On the one hand, a satisfactory account of experiential phenomenality appears to involve the notion of expe-
ential intentionality. When a subject describes that which is phenomenally appreciable for her in an experience, she will almost always employ concepts that are intentionally directed upon worldly entities. These concepts are, *prima facie*, the very same as those employed in descriptions of the world that do not concern directly our experiences or their phenomenal features.\(^3\) On the other hand, a satisfactory account of experiential intentionality appears to involve the notion of experiential phenomenality. An experience affords its subject an opportunity to avail herself of the worldly entities upon which it is intentionally directed and it is reasonable to think that this availability depends upon what is phenomenally appreciable for her in the experience. *Prima facie*, it is at least partly in virtue of what is phenomenally appreciable for a subject in an experience that an entity is made available as, say, the object of one of her perceptually-based demonstrative judgments.

These considerations support the idea that intentionality and phenomenality are connected, but they hardly determine a clear or exhaustive account of this relationship and fail to guarantee the existence of an essential interface at all. But despite the leeway available to theorists interested in these matters, a near consensus has emerged over the broad shape that a successful account will take. Though the theories of perception that present-day philosophers of mind advance are marked by significant differences, we can discern three claims that garner widespread support and these commitments, despite the opposition of a small and vocal minority,\(^4\), reflect the prevailing attitude toward the first of our guiding questions.

**Methodological Separatism:** If inquiry into the phenomenality of experience is to occur at all, one can (and ought to) adopt a separatist methodology—one’s philosophical labor will comprise two projects with experiential phenomenality and experiential intentionality as their respective foci.

**Intentional Independence:** An experience’s intentionality neither depends essentially upon nor is explanatorily derived from its phenomenality (assuming the features are numerically distinct).\(^5\)

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\(^3\)Gendler and Hawthorne call this claim ‘The Harmony Thesis’ (Gendler and Hawthorne [2006] 8; cf. Campbell [1993], Jackson [1996], and Coates [2007] ch. 8).

\(^4\)Notable challenges to one or more of these commitments include McGinn [1988], Searle [1990], Strawson [1994], Siewert [1998], Horgan and Tienson [2002], Loar [2003a], and Chalmers [2004].

\(^5\)This commitment is often found in connection with another.

**Intentional Unity:** The intentionality of experience and the intentionality of states without phenomenality
Intentional Priority: If there is any connection between the phenomenality and intentionality of experience, it will be a relation of dependence, e.g. supervenience, of the former on the latter. If the phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its intentional features, their status as intentional is somehow fundamental.

The affirmation of one or more of these claims encourages, if not entails outright, the attribution of a secondary significance to experiential phenomenality.

The position that emerges from the discussions and arguments of this essay runs counter to each of these widely held commitments. Though I defend several theses, they are united by a common theme: experiential intentionality is constitutively and explanatorily posterior to experiential phenomenality. An experience’s intentional features neither explain nor determine exhaustively its phenomenal features. In fact, there is a distinctive, autonomous, and original source of intentionality to be found within the phenomenality of even the simplest of our experiences. This irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience, what I will call **phenomenal presence**, is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality. Moreover, it must be appreciable in an experience for it to possess experiential intentionality in any form.

This reorientation of the prevailing attitude toward perception’s most important features has far reaching consequences. In particular, it will allow us to see a path to a surprising conclusion to the second of our guiding questions, namely, that the ability to understand the intentionality of one’s paradigmatically non-phenomenal states requires a prior appreciation of phenomenal presence. A finite being that lacks (or never exercises) a capacity for phenomenal appreciation cannot possess the conceptual resources needed to understand her intentional states as such.

Our headspring will be an examination of an oft-invoked but insufficiently understood feature of perceptual experience, namely, its **presentational character**. We open our eyes and

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is common in kind.

If experiential intentionality is simply a variety of intentionality and a state can possess intentionality without possessing phenomenality, then phenomenality cannot be necessary for intentionality. A state’s phenomenality may, according to such a view, play some role in determining what the state is intentionally directed upon and may indicate the manner in which this directedness occurs, but it cannot be essential to the state’s being intentionally directed. So proponents of both Intentional Independence and Intentional Unity can subject the exhaustive specification of an experience’s intentional features to various conditions of phenomenological adequacy without undermining these commitments.
a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present. In all sensory modalities, the objects of perceptual experience are *there, present to* us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. In perception it is as if the world itself is revealed, its occupants disclosing their sensible natures to our consciousness.

As the following quotes attest, appeals to the presentational character of experience have been made by philosophers that champion wildly different accounts of perceptual experience.

(i) To say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (Russell [1910] 108)

(ii) That this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness [...] cannot possibly be doubted. [...] This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called being given, and that which is thus present is called a datum. (Price [1932] 3)

(iii) In its purely phenomenological aspect *seeing* is [...] ostensibly *prehensile* of the surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended. [...] It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of speaking to say that seeing seems to “bring one into direct *contact* with remote objects” and to reveal their shapes and colours. (Broad [1952] 32–3)

(iv) Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [...] an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us. (Strawson [1979] 97)

(v) [Perceptual] experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief which I might have about the object in its absence. It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations [...] because of the special features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them “presentations”. (Searle [1983] 46)

(vi) [The kind of content possessed by a conscious perceptual experience] seems essentially conscious, shot through with subjectivity. This is because of the janus-faced character of conscious content: it involves presence to the subject, and hence a subjective point of view. (McGinn [1988] 300)

(vii) By an ‘object of experience’ we shall mean something *present* in experience. [...] Presence (in experience) connotes a kind of direct or immediate availability. An object which is present is right there, available to us. (Valberg [1992] 4)

(viii) Consider a basic (demonstratively expressible) singular empirical judgement: say, a judgement one might express, in a suitable perceptual situation, by saying “That cat is asleep”. The content of such a judgement depends on the perceived presence of the cat itself. [...] Such thought does not need to be “carried to” its object by a hypothesis, because the object is directly there for the thinker. (McDowell [1994b] 343)"
is used to support both the existence of mind-dependent objects immanent to consciousness and the existence of the objective, mind-independent objects of “naïve” common sense. It is employed equally in epistemological, metaphysical, phenomenological, and semantical contexts. And attempts to elucidate the phenomenon all too often rely on metaphors—immediacy, directness, givenness, contact, intimacy, openness, being en rapport—that are no less obscure.

Despite this confusion, I contend that it is only by unpacking the metaphors that surround experience’s presentational character and appraising the phenomenon’s alleged consequences that we will come to understand the interface between the intentionality and phenomenality of perceptual experience. But before we begin our pursuit in earnest, we must state our guiding questions more precisely and motivate our preferred approach. To this end, I elaborate upon our brief, introductory characterizations of experiential intentionality and phenomenality (in §’s 2.1 and 2.2 respectively) and employ the distinctions discussed therein to state more clearly our principal theses (§ 2.3.1). I then develop and motivate these claims by situating them within four prominent philosophical movements (§ 2.3.2). I conclude this chapter with an outline of the essay’s argumentative structure (§ 2.3.3).

2.1 INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION

2.1.1 Three Conceptions of Intentionality

Attempts to introduce the notion of intentionality typically (and problematically) conflate three ideas. The first conception of intentionality, which I consider paramount, is this:

(Int 1) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its being of, about, or directed upon an entity (object, property, relation, etc.) other than itself (or upon itself qua other).\(^7\)

\(^7\)This conception mirrors the term’s etymology: ‘intentionality’ derives from the Latin ‘intentio’, which in turn derives from the verb ‘intendere’—being stretched toward something. I use the prepositions ‘upon’, ‘at’, and ‘toward’ interchangeably when describing the directedness of intentional states. Though I use the disjunctive phrase ‘state or event’, the difference will matter little for our purposes and I will often refer only to states. Relatedly, I use ‘entity’ in a metaphysically neutral way to refer to any disjunction of object, stuff,
The rider ‘or upon itself *qua* other’ is significant. According to this conception, it is the nature of intentionality to be directed beyond itself, beyond the individual (or a state thereof) that possess it. Intentional states that are, as a matter of fact, directed upon themselves are possible. But when such cases occur, the identity that obtains between that which is intentionally directed and that upon which it is intentionally directed is entirely accidental; this self-directedness is essentially other-directedness that merely happens to be directed upon itself.\(^8\)

The two alternatives to this conception can be grouped together since they both place conditions of semantic evaluability, broadly construed, on intentional states.

(Int 2) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its having conditions of correctness/satisfaction.

(Int 3) Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its having one or more representational contents.\(^9\)

These conditions of semantic evaluability are meant to elucidate our first conception. For our intentional states are not directed upon entities *simpliciter*. They are always directed upon entities as exemplars of some general property, relation, kind, or category. (Int 2) is one way to capture this. According to this conception, a state is intentional if and only if it makes a claim about the world. In so doing, the state is assessable for correctness or incorrectness. If a perceptual experience makes a propositional claim, there are ways the

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8(i) It is even possible, as Brentano held, that *all* intentional states are, in addition to being directed beyond themselves, self-directed (cf. Brentano [1874/1973] and the articles in Kriegel and Williford [2006]). But this possibility does not undermine the rider. The identity that would obtain between the subject and object of intentional directedness, even if it holds of necessity, would be, with respect to the nature of intentional directedness, a universal accident. (ii) Aristotle employs this same rider when he discusses what takes place when a doctor exercises her ability to heal upon herself. That doctor and patient are identical on such occasions is, with respect to the art of healing, an accident (it is an identity *kata sumbebêkoi*). The art comprises capacities that are, by definition, “source[s] of change or motion in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other” (*Metaph.* V.12 1019a15ff.).

9(Int2) and (Int3) are often associated with conceptions of intentionality that focus on state ascriptions rather than states themselves. On these conceptions a state is intentional if and only if its ascription is susceptible to failures of (i) existential generalization and (ii) truth-preserving substitutions of extensionally equivalent expressions. The *locus classicus* for this linguistic approach is Chisholm [1957] ch. 12. Though the association of these sorts of expression with a state is often a good indication that the state possesses intentionality, such ascriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for intentionality.
world can be that render the experience true; if it makes a non-propositional claim, there are ways the world can be that render the experience veridical.\textsuperscript{10} So, for example, one’s visual experience of an object \( O \) as having a specific color shade \( C \) at a relative location \( L \) is associated with the following condition of satisfaction: the experience is satisfied, i.e. is veridical, if and only if \( O \) has \( C \) at \( L \). An intentional state can be directed upon an entity on occasions in which its condition is not satisfied and, on most versions of (Int 2), it can do so even if this failure is the result of the entity not existing.

(Int 3) attributes representational or informational content(s) to intentional states. If intentional states contrast in respect of their satisfaction, they differ in representational content and if one specifies the representational content of a state, one thereby determines the conditions that must be met if it is to be satisfied. But a state’s representational content can have a principle of type-individuation that is more fine-grained than that of its satisfaction condition. This allows (Int 3) to capture a further feature of intentional directedness. Our intentional states not only direct themselves toward entities as exemplars of some general property, relation, kind or category, but do so from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect.\textsuperscript{11}

States with experiential intentionality are no exception. First, our experiences occur in distinct sensory modalities. A single property, say, sphericity, can be experienced either visually or tactiley. Second, and more important, our perceptual capacities are always exercised from a particular point of view and provide, at best, a partial and incomplete perspective on

\textsuperscript{10}I consider truth to be a subspecies of veridicality that applies only to propositionally structured entities. When a state’s propositional status is unimportant, I use the more general term.

\textsuperscript{11}Searle introduces the expression ‘aspectual shape’ to refer to this feature of intentionality at Searle [1992] 155ff. Frege made the requirement of aspectual shape vivid with respect to our intentional thoughts and their canonical expressions. One’s thoughts can be directed upon a particular entity, say, Venus, under the aspect or mode of presentation (\textit{Art des Gegebenensein}) of being the first heavenly body seen in the evening or under the aspect or mode of presentation of being the last heavenly body seen in the morning. Frege identifies the representational content of a thought with the \textit{Sinn} of the sentence used to express it and these \textit{Sinne} embody the modes of presentation under which the thought’s objects (\textit{Bedeutungen}) occur. Frege’s invocation of \textit{Sinn} reflects his view that the requirements rationality places upon thinking subjects are central to the very idea of thought possessing cognitive value (\textit{Erkenntniswert}). One can simultaneously accept and deny (or withhold acceptance from) thoughts that possess identical conditions of satisfaction without being irrational. So to think about an object as being some way under different aspects is to think different thoughts, to have thoughts with distinct cognitive values, even if the thoughts have the same veridicality conditions. Note, however, that the role aspectual shape plays in perception may not be the same role that Fregean \textit{Sinn} plays in thought. For many conceive perceptual experience, in contrast to the perceptual beliefs and judgments it occasions, to stand outside the normative requirements of rationality.
that which we perceive. The perspectival nature of experiential intentionality involves more than there being properties of perceived entities that are not themselves perceived, e.g. a visual experience of an opaque object doesn’t reveal its every side but only its facing surface. It also involves there being a perspective on the objects, properties, and relations we do perceive. A single perceived shape can appear differently as we move in relation to it. And the appearance of a single perceived color will vary if subjected to differential illumination or if surrounded by objects with contrasting colors. The contextual parameters that contribute to the perspectival, aspectual shape of perceptual experience are legion. A capacity that yields states that are directed upon entities without being directed upon them as being some general way under some particular aspect is traditionally called *intellectual intuition*. Such a capacity cannot be found this side of Heaven.\(^{12}\)

Representational contents can be typed in a manner that reflects the perspectival nature of perceptual experience. This is easily done if one attributes *Fregean contents* to experiences. Fregean contents are structured complexes of modes of presentation of objects, properties, and relations. But one can also capture experience’s aspectual shape by invoking *Russellian contents*—structured complexes of objects (or existential quantifiers), properties, and relations—that comprise appearance properties, i.e. finely-individuated properties that reflect a subject’s perspective, rather than (or in addition to) properties *simpliciter*.\(^{13}\)

There are, however, at least two respects in which the broadly semantical conception of intentionality that the union of (Int 2) and (Int 3) conveys does more harm than good. First, satisfaction conditions and representational contents are not the only way to capture the generality and aspectual shape of intentional directedness. The semantical conception excludes alternative accounts of experiential intentionality, many of which belong to venerable traditions, by definition. Second, the semantical conception improperly demarcates intentionality’s domain. I will discuss these problems in turn and offer a more robust version of (Int 1) that will serve us in the remainder.

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12Kant provides a representative discussion of intellectual intuition in his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*, 28:1051 (Kant [1817/1996] 389). Acts of intellectual intuition are also commonly taken to create or posit the entities upon which they are directed; this feature merely serves to distance it further from intentionality.

13On the notion of appearance properties, see Broad [1923] ch. 8 or, more recently, Shoemaker [1994a] and Egan [2006].
2.1.2 Intentional Objects, Contents, and Relations

According to the semantical conception of intentionality, perceptual success consists in the satisfaction of conditions determined by the experiential state’s representational content(s). But the having of such content on an occasion does not depend on the way the world is at that time. For a state to possess a particular type of content may require a background of systematic causal interaction or veridical representation between the organism (or its relevant representational system) and certain aspects of the organism’s environment. But whether an experiential state has a particular type of representational content on an occasion does not require that the world actually be the way the content represents it to be at that time. On this conception, failures of veridicality do not affect an experience’s intentional features. 

An alternative conception of intentionality emerges when we reflect on perception’s function. Some contend that perceptual success does not consist in the satisfaction of states already in possession of their intentional features. Instead, perceptual success consists in the establishment of a state’s intentional features on an occasion. That is, particular experiential episodes establish connections with entities and, in so doing, make them available to the perceiver as objects for attention, recognition, thought (especially singular, demonstratively expressible judgments), and purposive action. On this conception, perceptual success does not presuppose experiential intentionality; perceptual success consists in its establishment.

This outlook is often referred to as the relational view of experience. It embodies a genuine alternative to the semantical conception of experiential intentionality. On the relational view, experiential intentionality is described, as in (Int 1), as a directedness upon

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14Insisting that the representational content of perceptual experience contains object-dependent elements—object-dependent, singular, demonstrative senses (McDowell [1984]) or instantiation-dependent, predicational, demonstrative senses (Brewer [1999])—is not sufficient to eliminate the independence of a particular experience’s content from the current state of the world. But such matters are delicate and turn on what is meant by ‘dependence’, on whether there is a fundamental difference between the object-dependent contents of experiences and those of non-phenomenal representational states, and on how the principle for individuating experiential contents relates to the principle for individuating experiential kinds or natures (cf. Burge [1991], Soteriou [2000], and Martin [2002a]).

15Notable contemporary advocations of this view can be found in Alston [1999], Brewer [2006], Campbell [2002a], Campbell [2002b], Fish [2009], Johnston [2004], Johnston [2006], Martin [1998], Martin [2002b], McDowell [2008], Travis [2004], and Travis [2006]. Thomas Reid, at least in his early work, is a prominent defender of the view (Reid [1764/1863]). He calls the relevant relation ‘simple apprehension’ or ‘simple conception’. The relational view is a species of the act-object account of perception and is related to what is often called naïve realism.
entities. But this directedness is not semantically evaluable and is not determined by the experiential state’s representational features. The state’s intentional directedness consists rather in the obtaining of a simple, non-representational relation between the state (or the individual whose state it is) and one or more entities. The relata upon which the state is directed partly constitute this intentional relation. The following quotes provide succinct expressions of this view.

(i) [P]erceiving an object is an essentially relational state, of which the object perceived is a constituent; so the perception is constitutively dependent on the object perceived. (Crane [2006] 140)

(ii) Sensory awareness discloses the truthmakers [i.e. an object, obtaining state, or event whose existence guarantees the truth of a judgment] of our immediate perceptual judgments. Those truthmakers are external spatio-temporal particulars, which sensory awareness makes available for immediate demonstration. (Johnston [2006] 282)

(iii) [We must] acknowledge that experience is not exhausted by its propositional content—we have to do this to acknowledge that experience is what explains our grasp of propositional content—and to maintain that experience of an object is not merely an effect produced by the object. Rather, experience of the object involves the mind-independent thing itself as a constituent. (Campbell [2002a] 140)

The relata upon which our experientially intentional states are directed occur as exemplars or instances of various general features and the intentional relation obtains from a particular point of view. But standing in such an intentional relation to an entity is no more evaluable for correctness or veridicality than is standing in the relation kicking to a soccer ball.\(^{16}\)

There may be adequate grounds to reject relational accounts of experiential intentionality. It may turn out that the possession of representational features is necessary for the possession of intentionality. But this necessity is not conceptual and alternative views ought not be eliminated by stipulation through our definition of ‘intentionality’. Some continue to use ‘intentional’ and ‘representational’ synonymously and characterize the debate as being between relational and intentional accounts of experience.\(^{17}\) But the relational view is itself an account of what it is for an experiential state to be directed upon an entity; the debate

\(^{16}\)This is so even if one can only stand in an intentional relation to an entity by drawing on capacities that are operative principally in one’s discursive, conceptual activities.

\(^{17}\)Cf. Crane [2006]. Some prefer to maintain the synonymy because representational states, unlike intentional relations, can be directed upon entities that do not exist. One’s capacity to enter into intentional relations is fallible, but one cannot stand in an intentional relation to a non-existent object. Though the permissibility of directedness upon non-existent objects is a common feature of representational states, I do not think that it is definitive of intentionality.
is between relational and representational accounts of experiential intentionality.\footnote{This pair does not exhaust the possible accounts of experiential intentionality. For example, on one interpretation, Aristotle conceives experiential intentionality to consist in becoming, in one manner of being, the entity one experiences: “That which can perceive is, as we have said, potentially such as the object of perception already is actually. It is not like the object, then, when it is being affected by it, but once it has been affected it becomes like it and is such as it is” (\textit{De Anima} II.5 418\textsuperscript{a}3–7).}

We have isolated two distinct phenomena that may be central to intentional directedness. First, directedness upon an entity can be seen as the establishment of certain non-representational relations. Second, directedness upon an entity can be seen as the possession of representational content.\footnote{On many representational accounts of intentionality, if one is in a representational state, then one stands in a certain relation to a proposition (or a suitable non-propositional structure). Even if these propositions are Russellian, the relation to a proposition or to the entities within it must be distinguished from the relation to entities invoked by relational accounts of intentionality. Also, one can say that the satisfaction of a contentful state’s correctness condition places one in a relation to the entities the state represents. But the relatedness to entities that veridical representation affords, unlike its counterpart in the relational account, is not constitutive of the state’s being intentionally directed (even if the content comprises object-dependent elements, cf. fn. 14).} The common commitment of the relational and representational accounts of experiential intentionality is captured in a slight elaboration of our initial conception.

\textbf{(Int 1*)} Intentionality is that aspect of a state or event that consists in its being of, \textit{about}, or \textit{directed upon} an entity other than itself (or upon itself \textit{qua} other) as an exemplar or instance of some general property, relation, kind, or category \textit{from} a particular perspective or \textit{under} a particular aspect.

This conception of intentional directedness is distinct from and conceptually prior to both the relational and the representational accounts. These accounts simply provide different analyses of this feature.

\subsection{2.1.3 Intentionality’s Domain}

Unfortunately, this updated formulation will not do. For as we descend the \textit{scala naturae} or retreat into the physiological and psychological workings of our perceptual systems we encounter states and events that are, in some sense, of, about, or directed upon an entity in this manner but, nevertheless, do not possess intentionality. To demarcate intentionality’s domain properly we must defend two claims: (i) Neither dispositional states nor capacities...
can possess original intentionality, and (ii) The possession of representational content is not sufficient for the possession of intentionality. I will elucidate these claims in turn, but the discussions are brief and will not dispel all elements of stipulation. This status, however, is temporary; one of my major aims in this essay is, as Sellars once said, to put this verbal currency on the gold standard.

2.1.3.1 Dispositional States and Intentionality

All objects, animate and inanimate alike, relate to each other in myriad ways. To understand most of these relational states or events, for example, standing in spatial relations or undergoing simple causal interactions, one need not invoke any notion of directedness upon an entity. I currently stand in the spatial relation is east of to Los Angeles but am not thereby in a state that is of, about, or directed upon that city. Nor is a cue ball in a state that is of, about, or directed upon an eight ball, or vice versa, when the two strike.

But many states can only be understood completely if one recognizes that they are the manifestations of an object’s stable disposition to be in such a state or are the results of the proper exercise of a capacity with a particular end or goal. To attribute a capacity or disposition to an object is to carve out a class of (possible) states or events in a way that makes it sensible to claim that the object is directed upon members of the privileged class. For example, the event of a glass breaking can only be understood if we recognize that the event is the manifestation of the glass’s fragility, and for a glass to possess fragility is for it to be in a state that is directed upon events in which it breaks. Furthermore, if this privileged class comprises relational states, and if the class of (possible) relata is itself suitably delimited, then it is also sensible to claim that the object is directed upon these relata (or upon a particular relatum when the disposition manifests). For example, a metal ball disposed to attract metallic objects magnetically (when a particular set of conditions is realized) is, in virtue of possessing such a disposition, in a state that is directed upon, among other things, metal bars. On a liberal but natural construal, this dispositional directedness satisfies our current characterization of intentionality: the disposition is directed upon bars as metallic (and not, say, as rectangular prisms or as having a particular mass) and is directed
upon them magnetically (and not, say, gravitationally or electrically).\textsuperscript{20}

Whatever the merits of speaking this way, this sort of dispositional directedness ought not be confused with intentional directedness. First, occurrent, categorical states can possesses \textit{original} (intentional) directedness.\textsuperscript{21} If we prescind from its dispositional origin, the magnetic relation that obtains in our example differs little from the simple, non-dispositional, causal relations of which we deemed attributions of directedness inappropriate. Any directedness that belongs to the categorical state the ball is in when it is attracting the bar will be parasitic on the ball’s dispositional directedness toward metallic objects in general.

Second, and more important, \textit{only} occurrent, categorical states can possess original intentionality. Consider a disposition that manifests states that possess intentionality. For example, let’s assume that to have a standing belief is to be disposed to accept a particular proposition on appropriate occasions. A manifestation of this disposition will be a categorical state that is intentionally directed upon the entities represented by its associated proposition and this directedness will be original to that occurrent state. We may be inclined, in such cases, to attribute intentionality to the dispositional state itself. For differences in the type of entities upon which a disposition’s manifestations are intentionally directed and differences in the manner in which such directedness occurs mark or (partly) type-identify the disposition. But any intentionality we attribute to the dispositional state will be, at best, proleptically parasitic on the intentional directedness of its (perhaps merely possible) categorical manifestations.\textsuperscript{22}

So intentional directedness, including that of experiential intentionality, is principally and primarily a feature of occurrent, categorical states or events. Though we come to perceive the world through the exercises of our perceptual capacities, the directedness of our perceptual

\textsuperscript{20}The example is taken from Nes [2008]. Nes employs the example to undermine the restriction of intentionality (conceived, more or less, as in (Int 1*)) to mental phenomena. Similar arguments are found in Martin and Pfeifer [1986], Place [1996], Mumford [1999], and Molnar [2003]. Mentality will not be central to our proscription of dispositions from intentionality’s domain.

\textsuperscript{21}Philosophers typically employ the narrower distinction between original and derived intentionality [species] rather than that between original and derived directedness [genus]. Early discussions of the distinction can be found in Grice [1957], Haugeland [1981], and Searle [1983]. For opposition to the distinction, see Dennett [1987].

\textsuperscript{22}I say ‘at best’ because this intentionality will not be like that which we standardly attribute to paradigmatic possessors of derived intentionality, e.g. sentences, maps, street signs, etc. For in each of these familiar examples the derived intentionality belongs to a categorical state. See Strawson [2005] and Strawson [2008] for an expression of similar reservations.
experiences is to be distinguished from the directedness that belongs to these capacities.

2.1.3.2 Representational Content and Individual Organisms  Explanations within empirical psychology often focus on the systems by means of which individuals come to be in intentionally directed states. Many of these systems involve the formation, transformation, and employment of states that possess representational contents that satisfy our current characterization of intentionality. Are these states or the systems to which they belong intentionally directed upon entities? If relational accounts of intentionality are viable, then a state’s possession of representational content is not necessary for it to possess intentionality. But regardless of whether this is so, a state’s possession of representational content is not sufficient for it to possess intentionality.

Some states have an environmental significance but do not qualify as intentional because they fail to meet the conditions on intentionality already in place. Information can be registered whenever there is a reliable, causal covariation between two types of state or event. For example, the width of a tree ring registers information about the amount of rainfall that occurred in the tree’s environment during the year the ring came to be. Many organisms possess systems that acquire, transform, and employ such registrations. Heliotropic plants, for example, possess systems in which information about the light of the sun is registered and used to modify cell growth within the stem so that the plant’s photosynthetic surfaces track the light’s westerly movement. And some fish possess systems in which information about environmental oxygen levels is registered and used to calibrate the volume of gas contained in various bladders so that the fish’s depth is altered appropriately. But the states involved in these systems are mere registrations of causally-covariant, proximal stimulation. They do not represent the distal entities that cause the arrays of proximal stimulation to which the system’s receptors are sensitive as being of a particular type and cannot determine distal entities under different conditions. To register information is not to be directed upon an entity as being some way from a particular perspective; informational significance is insufficient for intentionality.23

23Registrations of information fail to meet the semantic criteria for intentionality as well. The informational states within the oxygen-detecting system of a fish or the states of a retinal surface upon which light is incident are, with respect to questions of veridicality or correctness, like the state of a billiard ball that has been
But there are states within perceptual systems that pass all requirements for attributions of representational contents. For example, the visual perceptual system of a honeybee processes its initial registrations of proximal, visual stimulation, viz. dynamic arrays of light frequencies, along with other afferent/efferent inputs, to yield states that represent perspectivally determinate, objective, environmental entities, e.g. egocentric and allocentric angles, distances, compass directions, and landmarks. The outputs of the system (and many of its intermediary states) are not mere registrations of information. First, these states exhibit perceptual, representational **constancies**. The formation of these states within the perceptual system operate under certain fixed, general principles for filtering out the effects of significant variations in proximal stimulation. The resultant states represent a constant distal cause of the variable proximal stimulation and represent it as being a particular type. Second, these states have correctness conditions; we can evaluate them for how accurately they correspond to the objects, properties, and relations they represent.

Nevertheless, many of these genuinely representational states do not possess intentionality. Though it is convenient to attribute intentionality to an organism’s states and events, a convenience that I have already taken advantage of, the feature’s proper bearer is individual organisms. It is individual organisms inhabiting and coping with their environment that perceive, believe, judge, desire, reason, and know. To attribute an intentional state to an individual is to communicate indirectly that the individual is intentionally directed upon an entity. So if a system involved in an organism’s perceptual experience is entirely modular in its output, that is, if the states it yields are neither attributable to the whole organism nor available to guide activity or other responses by the whole organism, then these states do not possess intentionality regardless of whether we can attribute a representational content to them. I will, however, continue to speak about states and will express this condition by saying that an intentional state must be a state for its subject.

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24 See Gallistel [1998] and Burge [2010] for discussion of this and other examples.
25 Burge [2005] 9–21, contains an excellent discussion of the role perceptual constancies play in psychological explanations of perceptual systems. See also the articles in Walsh and Kulikowski [1998].
26 Ruth Millikan, among others, argues that an intentional state “must be one that functions as a sign or representation for the system itself” (Millikan [1989] 284). But Millikan’s account of ‘being for’ encompasses
This condition will not proscribe all of the representational states that are involved with our perceptual systems from intentionality’s domain, but it will eliminate many of them. What criteria must a state meet in order for it to be for its subject? A more thorough discussion must wait (see chapter 5), but a few clarifications can be made presently without leading us afield. First, though some of the states within the perceptual system’s purview are states that are for their subject and possess intentionality, it would be misleading to say that there are “sub-personal” (or, more properly, “sub-organismal”) states that possess intentionality. All attributions of intentionality are attributions at the level of whole individual organisms, but some of the states invoked in explanations of our perceptual system’s operation are attributed principally to the organism. Second, though it is typically conscious states that are for their subject, a particular state need not be conscious, be capable of becoming conscious, or be available to an individual’s conscious (cognitive) agency to possess intentionality.\textsuperscript{27}

2.1.4 Intentionality Defined

Our discussion has left us with the following conception of intentionality.

\textbf{(Int 1**)} Intentionality is that aspect of an occurrent, categorical state or event that consists in

(i) its being of, about, or directed upon an entity other than itself (or upon itself qua other)

(ii) as an exemplar of some general property, relation, kind, or category

(iii) from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect

(iv) to or for its subject.

Let me repeat, given its importance to the arguments to come, that intentionality thus conceived is to be distinguished from representationality. To analyze experiential intentionality in terms of veridicality-evaluable, representational contents is merely to embrace one among dispositional, sub-personal phenomena and should thereby be distinguished from our notion of ‘being for a subject’.

\textsuperscript{27}The appeal to the capacity to become conscious finds expression in Searle’s \textit{connection principle} (Searle [1990]). The appeal to availability attempts to identify being for a subject with being \textit{access conscious} (Block [1995]).
the several alternatives left open by our characterization. I turn now to the second of our elucidatory discussions.

2.2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENALITY

The core notion in our preferred account of phenomenality is that of something being *phenomenally appreciable* in an experience for a subject. To perceive visually a stop sign under optimal perceptual conditions is, *inter alia*, to appreciate phenomenally a quality, namely, a determinate shade of redness. To perceive visually the same stop sign under artificial lighting is, *inter alia*, to appreciate phenomenally a distinct quality, say, a determinate shade of blueness. Merely being in an experiential state suffices to render various elements in the experience phenomenally appreciable for its subject and enables its subject to discriminate experiences on the basis of these elements’ relative (dis-)similarity.28

At this stage of our argument, phenomenal appreciation is, as a matter of methodology, a primitive theoretical notion. We can nevertheless advance our understanding of this notion by distinguishing it from related but importantly different forms of access and awareness: phenomenal appreciation is not introspection, attention, perception, thought, or conception. But before we proceed down this negative path (in § 2.2.2), it will serve us well to examine what has become the canonical means to commence discussions of phenomenality. This brief detour will not only provide us with a relatively accessible foundation for our discussions of experiential phenomenality, it will in addition allow us to examine a class of phenomenally appreciable elements in experience, namely, the non-sensuous, that will play an important role in the forthcoming arguments for our principal theses.

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28Discrimination is weaker than either recognition or categorization and does not require that one be able to form beliefs or judgments about these phenomenally appreciable elements. The term ‘element’ denotes whatever it is that is phenomenally appreciable to an experiencing subject. It carries no significant metaphysical connotations. I emphasize this metaphysical innocence in §§ 2.2.2 and 3.1.
2.2.1 Phenomenally Appreciable, Non-Sensuous Elements in Experience

It is difficult to find a contemporary discussion of experiential phenomenality that does not contain some variation of this passage:

Among the states that one can be in are those which are like something for their subjects. There is something it is like for one to see green grass that is absent when one merely thinks about green grass. And what it is like for one to see green grass is different from what it is like for one to see white snow. For a state to be like something for its subject is for the state (or its subject) to be phenomenally conscious. For states to differ with respect to what it is like for a subject to undergo them is for the states to instantiate different phenomenal (or experiential/sensory/qualitative/subjective) properties. The totality of a state’s phenomenal properties is its phenomenal (or experiential/sensory/qualitative/subjective) character and a state’s phenomenal character determines what it is like for a subject to undergo it.

Within this exemplary passage, the expression ‘what it is like’ is not used to define ‘phenomenal consciousness’, ‘phenomenal character’, or similar terms. Its purpose is to direct us toward phenomena of which we are all antecedently familiar. As Block says, “really all one can do is point to the phenomenon [of phenomenal consciousness . . .] Nonetheless, it is important to point properly.”

Unfortunately, the what-it-is-like idiom fails to achieve even this modest objective. The intuitive notion of being like something for a subject is unable to capture a determinate phenomenon at all. It fails to provide even a semblance of a method for discriminating phenomenality from other non-phenomenal aspects of experience or for adjudicating disagreements about what is phenomenally appreciable for a subject in experience.

These shortcomings are present in the following exchange.

Q: What is it like for you to be in your current state of visual experience?
A: Right now, it looks to me as if a soccer ball is about two meters in front of me. Its surface is covered with alternating black pentagons and white hexagons. The ball is spherical, quite solid, and appears to have been purchased recently. I’m in a good position to know things about it visually and am aware of the possibility of setting it in motion by kicking it.

This response is a perfectly legitimate partial description of what it is like for one to undergo a particular visual episode. But it encourages a variety of (possibly legitimate) extensions to phenomenality’s domain without providing the support they require.

29Block [2002a] 206. The expression ‘what it is like’ stems from Farrell [1950] and owes its popularity to Nagel [1974].
Our exemplary paragraph contains an appeal to the *phenomenal character* of experience and this notion can be usefully employed to characterize this tendency toward phenomenal inflation. There are at least two ways in which the notion of a phenomenal character can be employed.

**Total Phenomenal Character:** The total phenomenal character of a state \( s \) for \( y = df \) the totality of phenomenally appreciable elements in \( s \) for \( y \).

**Sensuous Phenomenal Character:** The sensuous phenomenal character of a state \( s \) for \( y = df \) the totality of phenomenally appreciable, sensuous elements in \( s \) for \( y \).

If an answer to a what-is-it-like question is a partial articulation of an experience’s total phenomenal character, then the total phenomenal character of an experience can, and often does, contain more than its sensuous phenomenal character. That is, descriptions of experience like that in our exchange suggest that we can phenomenally appreciate far more than sensuous qualities in experience: if the kind *soccer ball*, the property *being purchased recently*, and the practical possibilities in which I stand to the objects of experience are phenomenally appreciable, it is not because they are sensuous.

If a philosopher offended by such profligacy wishes to maintain that the total and sensuous phenomenal characters of experience are co-extensive, then they must exclude these additional, non-sensuous features from phenomenality’s domain altogether. Perhaps the subsumption of objects under kinds or sorts that can be recognized only by those who possess various conceptual resources, the seen item being a soccer ball in our example, can be removed. Perhaps the ball’s being purchased recently can be excised since its inclusion in the description of the experience draws on background knowledge about the way the condition of sports equipment changes with use. Perhaps the expectations, judgments, memories, and preferences involved in the appreciation of one’s practical and epistemic position are similarly eliminable. But however much resistance it meets, the invocation of the intuitive notion of what-it-is-like discourages phenomenological austerity and has led to a proliferation of views.

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30 As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the most salient phenomenally appreciable elements in experience are sensuous: the way the redness of a Red Delicious apple looks when one sees it, the way middle C sounds when one hears it being played on a Bösendorfer piano, and the way a pain feels when one experiences a pin pierce one’s finger. Though I will develop the notion of sensuousness momentarily, this enumeration of paradigmatic instances—the typical means whereby the notion is introduced—will suffice for the point at hand.
that countenance various classes of phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in experience. Appendix A (p. 42) contains a partial list of recently defended candidates. Which, if any, of the phenomena compiled therein are phenomenally appreciable and which, if any, of these phenomenally appreciable elements are non-sensuous?

Though it forces this question upon us, the what-it-is-like idiom is of little help in adjudicating the phenomenological disputes it engenders. Consider for example one of the candidates from our list: what it is like to think occurrently *that P*. Many claim that it is like something to be in a state of thinking and that what it is like is sensitive to the thought’s propositional content.\(^{31}\) Chalmers reports that “When I think of a lion, for instance, there seems to be a whiff of leonine quality to my phenomenology: what it is like to think of a lion is subtly different from what it is like to think of the Eiffel tower” (Chalmers [1996] 10). The thesis, in its strongest form, is that “[e]ach type of conscious thought—each state of consciously thinking that *p*, for all thinkable contents *p*—has a proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenology” (Pitt [2004] 5). But the acceptance of cognitive phenomenality, as it is commonly called, is far from universal.\(^{32}\) For one can admit that there are often differences in what it is like to think thoughts with different contents while maintaining a comparatively austere view of experiential phenomenality that refuses to countenance any phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in our occurrent propositional attitudes.

What, then, must one do to establish that there are phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements? First, one must show that the candidate is *phenomenally* appreciable and not, as we will see in the next subsection, appreciable in virtue of some supra-experiential, recognitional capacity or in virtue of some form of higher-order awareness or representation. Second, if the candidate *is* phenomenally appreciable, one must establish that it is non-sensuous. This requires the satisfaction of two conditions: (i) the element must make a distinctive contribution to the experience’s total phenomenal character (i.e. it isn’t simply an amalgam of previously countenanced sensuous qualities) and (ii) the element must not belong to a novel class of sensuous qualities (i.e. it isn’t simply an expansion of what can belong to sensuous phenomenal characters).

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\(^{31}\)Notable defenses of some version of this thesis can be found in Flanagan [1992], Strawson [1994], Goldman [1993], Siewert [1998], Horgan and Tienson [2002], and Pitt [2004].

\(^{32}\)Opposition can be found in Lormand [1996], Nelkin [1996], Jacob [1998], and Georgalis [2006].
This pair of conditions, however, cannot be useful in the adjudication of phenomenological disputes without a more general characterization of sensuousness. Fortunately, there is something common to the examples that have so far served to fix the class of sensuous qualities and this commonality allows us to advance beyond our ostensive understanding.

**Sensuous:** A phenomenally appreciable element $q$ is sensuous if and only if $q$ belongs to a phenomenal modality.

**Phenomenal Modality:** A phenomenally appreciable element $q$ belongs to a phenomenal modality $m$ if and only if $q$ (or the “basic” elements $q$ comprises$^{33}$) has a location within the manifold of phenomenal similarity for $m$.

For example, some phenomenally appreciable qualities are comparable to one another, i.e. can stand in relations of relative similarity that are determined by a subject’s ability to match or discriminate experiences in which they are appreciable, along three continuous dimensions of variation: hue, brightness, and saturation. To be comparable along these three dimensions is to have a location within an ordered similarity space, color space in this example, in which relative similarities are represented by relative distances. Each phenomenal modality is associated with a distinctive and proprietary similarity manifold and all sensuous qualities have a location within such a manifold.$^{34}$

So, to return to our example, if there are content-sensitive, phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in our occurrent, propositional attitudes, they cannot be comparable along previously countenanced dimensions of phenomenal variation and they cannot constitute a distinct phenomenal modality. If the former is true, e.g. if the phenomenally appreciable elements in familiar kinds of orthographical/phonological imagery, bodily sensations, perceptual experiences, etc. exhaust what is phenomenally appreciable in our occurrent, propositional attitudes, then the experience’s total phenomenal character remains co-extensive with its sensuous phenomenal character. If the latter is true, then the state’s

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$^{33}$See Byrne and Hilbert [2008].

$^{34}$On phenomenal modalities and phenomenal similarity spaces in general see Helmholtz [1878/1995] 345, Hardin [1988/1993], Clark [1993], and Matthen [2005]. Note that not every sensory modality—sight, hearing, taste, etc.—will be associated with a similarity manifold that can be represented as a single space. The sensuous qualities associated with the sensory modality of smell, for example, are comparable along dimensions that do not unite to form a single space. So a single sensory modality can comprise numerous phenomenal modalities.
total and sensuous phenomenal characters are co-extensive, but they comprise more than is typically recognized.35

2.2.2 Introspection, Conception, and Attention

Though there are myriad forms of experiential access and awareness, we can sharpen our understanding of phenomenal appreciation by distinguishing it from three similar but importantly different notions: introspection, conception, and attention.

**Introspection:** To appreciate phenomenally an element in an experience places no demand on its subject beyond that of being in the experiential state. For this reason alone, phenomenal appreciation is not to be identified with *introspection*. Introspection, as it is commonly understood, is a form of first-personal awareness or attention that is directed upon one’s occurrent mental states or events and their features as such. This introspective operation is distinct from (though, perhaps, necessarily concomitant with) one’s first-order mental states. It takes first-order mental states as input and yields conceptually structured judgments about these states as output. Phenomenal appreciation, however, neither consists in nor involves essentially any higher-order activity or operation directed upon one’s experiential states. The introspection of experiential states is phylogenetically, epistemically, and, on most accounts, causally posterior to phenomenal appreciation.

But there are two important additional reasons for distinguishing phenomenal appreciation from introspection. First, introspection, as we have described it, is a capacity (or a family of capacities) to engage either an “inner” object or property, say, a sense datum, or (the intrinsic properties of) an experiential state itself. To invoke such a capacity is to commit oneself both to the intelligibility of an inner/outer distinction and to the intelligibility of

35 Others have noticed that the expression ‘what it is like’ fails to differentiate sensuous phenomenality from non-sensuous phenomenality. Their remedy is to employ the expression in two ways: a broad sense to cover both sensuous and non-sensuous phenomenality and a narrow sense to cover sensuous phenomenality exclusively (cf. Flanagan [1992], Carruthers [2000], and Georgalis [2006]). I think it best to jettison the offending notion altogether and proceed, as I have, with our two distinctions: (i) that between the sensuous and the non-sensuous elements that are phenomenally appreciable for one in experience, and (ii) that between the total and the sensuous phenomenal character of experience. Similar distinctions have been made between phenomenal character and presentational character (Fish [2009] 10–14, Martin [1998] 174, and Maund [2003] 57), between phenomenal character and qualitative character (Crane [2001] 75–6), and between what it is like and phenomenal character (Langsam [1997] 35).
this inner domain’s constituents being possible foci of one’s attentional activities.\textsuperscript{36} Though I speak of an element \textit{in} an experience being phenomenally appreciable to or for a subject, this does not entail that these elements are, or are instantiated in, the subject’s experiential states. To be appreciable in an experience for a subject is simply to be appreciable by a subject that is in that experiential state. The metaphysical status of what is phenomenally appreciable is left open.

That phenomenal appreciation is, in this sense, metaphysically neutral is clear when we consider the sensuous qualities in experience. Are the sensuous qualities \textit{in} an experience qualities \textit{of} that experience? Perhaps, but they needn’t be. There are at least three options.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Sensory Quality} =_{df} a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an experiential state  \\
\textbf{Sensible Quality} =_{df} a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an objective, worldly object  \\
\textbf{Sensational Quality} =_{df} a sensuous quality that is instantiated by an “internal”, mental object, e.g. a sense-datum

It may turn out that the sensuous qualities in an experience belong to one and only one of these categories. It may turn out that they lack uniformity and are distributed multiply. But to classify a quality as sensuous is not to specify the ontological category of the objects that can instantiate it. Nor is it to specify the ontological category of the phenomenally appreciable element itself. Though I will often speak of sensuous \textit{qualities}, it may turn out that what one appreciates is not a quality or an object exemplifying a quality but an adverbial modification of an experiential episode or a mode of an experiencing subject.\textsuperscript{38} This point holds for phenomenally appreciable elements in experience generally, so phenomenal characters, both total and sensuous, inherit the metaphysical innocence of phenomenal appreciation.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36}These commitments reflect the term’s etymology: ‘introspection’ derives from the Latin \textit{introspicere}—to look inward. Some suggest that introspection of the “outer” is nonsensical (cf. Stoljar [2004], Aydede [2005] 127, and Hill [2009] ch. 8). The neologism ‘extrospection’ has been introduced to mark this difference. I am not concerned with whether extrospection is a variety of introspection or whether the two belong to fundamentally distinct kinds.

\textsuperscript{37}Though these classifications have been made by many, I am adopting the terminology used in Byrne [2009].

\textsuperscript{38}When matters of metaphysical status are important, I will revert to using the metaphysically neutral term ‘element’ (cf. fn. 28).

\textsuperscript{39}In this respect, our definitions of total and sensuous phenomenal character are somewhat idiosyncratic; most definitions explicitly attribute phenomenal characters to experiential states. Ultimately, phenomenal characters may comprise intrinsic features of experiences. It may turn out that phenomenal characters comprise features of the external world (Tye argues for this position in Tye [2009] and relationalists—see...
Three clarifications: (i) The metaphysical neutrality of phenomenal appreciation is quite radical. Even if an ideal subject is unable to distinguish two experiences on the basis of their phenomenally appreciable elements, it does not follow that the appreciable elements in the first experience have the same metaphysical status as those in the second. Identity in total phenomenal character does not imply metaphysical identity. (ii) Our characterization of phenomenal appreciation excludes neither the possibility that the phenomenally appreciable elements in an experience can exist when not being appreciated nor the possibility that one can come to know facts about the phenomenally appreciable elements in an experience without being in the experiential state. (iii) One may be inclined to judge that a particular phenomenally appreciable element is or is not, say, an intrinsic feature of an experiential state, and one may possess good reasons for doing so. The grounds for such judgments might even include facts about what is phenomenally appreciable for one in experience. But the very ideas of phenomenal character and phenomenal appreciation do not imply such metaphysical conclusions.  

The second additional reason for distinguishing phenomenal appreciation from introspection is that introspection, unlike phenomenal appreciation, yields states that possess conditions of satisfaction. If I make the claim ‘it looks to me, introspectively, as if something is red’, I thereby attribute to myself an introspective state distinct from the experiential state upon which my introspective attention is directed and this introspective state is evaluable for veridicality. But to appreciate phenomenally a sensuous redness in an experience is not to be in a distinct, contentful, veridicality-evaluable, introspective state. Nor does it entail that our experiences themselves possess phenomenal contents. Our descriptions of what it is like to undergo an experience suggest that the phenomenally appreciable elements in it are rich enough to determine one or more conditions of satisfaction for the experience. “Intuitively,” says Chalmers, “by virtue of their phenomenal character, experiences present the world as being a certain way […] the phenomenal character determines a condition of

§ 2.3.2.1—are committed to it as well). Perhaps there is no uniform category to which the phenomenally appreciable elements in experience belong. But each of these is a substantive claim that goes beyond the very ideas of phenomenal character and phenomenal appreciation.

I elaborate on each of these three points in ch. 3.

This is so even if, as many claim, introspection is associated with one or more epistemic perfections—infallibility, indubitability, incorrigibility, self-intimation, etc. I do not presume that any of these features belongs to introspection.
satisfaction for the experience, one that is shared by any experience with the same phenomenal character.”\textsuperscript{42} It is possible that some of our experiences possess phenomenal contents in this sense. And the fact that one appreciates a particular element in an experience may be a “truth-maker” for one’s descriptions of what it is like to undergo the experiential episode. But again, neither of these claims follows from the very ideas of phenomenal character and phenomenal appreciation. The phenomenal appreciation of an element in an experience is neither correct nor incorrect; it merely occurs or does not occur.

**Conception:** There are two ways in which concept-dependent, recognitional capacities can be involved in experience. When I go to the zoo and look into a particular enclosure, I can immediately and noninferentially recognize that there is a lemur in front of me. This recognitional capacity is concept-dependent; if I did not already possess the concept *lemur*, I would have been unable to recognize what I saw as the kind of animal it is. Though important, I wish to place aside this variety of experiential conceptualization and the questions it engenders. That is, I will remain neutral with respect to whether we can phenomenally appreciate kinds in experience that we recognize in this manner.

But there is a second way in which concepts can afford awareness that must be distinguished from phenomenal appreciation. The domain of what we can be aware of or attend to in experience by means of a *supra-experiential*, recognitional capacity is larger than the domain of what is phenomenally appreciable for one in experience. For example, one may be able to attend to properties of experience as properties of experience if one exercises a recognitional capacity that one possesses only if one also has the concept *property of experience* or * quale* in one’s conceptual repertoire. These higher-order, conceptualized modes of attention are directed upon experiences as such and go beyond what is minimally required to undergo or phenomenally appreciate the myriad elements within an experience. The exercises of these supra-experiential, recognitional capacities do not introduce new classes of phenomenally appreciable elements.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42}Chalmers [2006] 51. Experiences can possess both phenomenal contents and non-phenomenal, representational contents. The motivation for countenancing phenomenal contents is expressed well in Siewert [1998] ch. 7 and Horgan and Tienson [2002]. Similar appeals are made in epistemological contexts, e.g. in defences of dogmatism (cf. Pryor [2000] 536ff.).

Attention: Finally, we must distinguish phenomenal appreciation from *phenomenal attention*. To attend phenomenally to a sensuous element in an experience is to focus upon it in a way that commonly increases its intensity, vividness, and resolution. Though phenomenal attention aids the introspective formation of judgments about the phenomenally appreciable elements in experience, it is posterior to phenomenal appreciation and prior to introspection.44

2.3 OUR PROJECT: STATEMENT, ORIENTATION, AND MOTIVATION

2.3.1 Our Principal Theses

With these elucidatory discussions behind us, we are now in a position to express more precisely our principal theses. I begin with a relatively concise statement.

Among the first of our conclusions is this: to experience is always (in part) to appreciate phenomenally an element *as other* or *as before one*; it is always (in part) to appreciate phenomenally a manifest opposition between the self—that before which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. I call this aspect of experiential phenomenality, this universally appreciable but non-sensuous sense of otherness in experience, *phenomenal presence*. Though *much* more needs to (and will) be said, this rough characterization of phenomenal presence will suffice for the time being.

Phenomenal presence is absolutely central to our project. Recall the first of our guiding questions: What is the relationship between experiential intentionality and experiential phenomenality? Within the context of this inquiry, phenomenal presence bears a twofold importance. Its first consequence is negative. Phenomenal presence neither depends essentially upon nor is explanatorily grounded in the non-phenomenal, intentional features of experience. So experiential intentionality, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experiential phenomenality. Its second consequence is positive. Phenomenal presence is itself the minimal manifestation

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44See Hill [1991] and Hill [2009] in which this capacity is called *processing attention*. 

44Current at issue.
of experiential intentionality. Phenomenal presence embodies an autonomous and original directedness that satisfies the conditions we have placed on intentionality. This essentially phenomenal directedness is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of experiential intentionality.

Together, the negative and positive theses imply that experiential phenomenality is, in several respects, more fundamental than experiential intentionality as it is usually conceived. Establishing this relationship is, as we will see, philosophically significant. In particular, it supports a surprising answer to our second guiding question: What is the relationship between experiential phenomenality and the intentionality of our paradigmatically non-phenomenal states? To understand a state’s intentionality, regardless of its phenomenological status, requires that one possess (i) the ability to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a subject of intentional states, and (ii) the ability to conceive one’s intentional states as such, i.e. as being directed upon entities beyond themselves (or upon themselves qua other). I contend that to have either of these abilities in one’s conceptual repertoire requires a prior appreciation of this irreducibly phenomenal but non-sensuous aspect of experience. One’s ability to think in terms of self and other, and therefore one’s ability to understand intentionality, has its ground in experiential phenomenality.45

In order to clarify and to develop these claims, I will situate them within four prominent philosophical currents. These brief discussions will serve additionally to motivate our preferred approach. I will then outline briefly the essay’s argumentative structure.

2.3.2 Four Philosophical Movements

2.3.2.1 Movement 1: The Exaltation of Intentionality At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced three positions that receive widespread support in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Methodological Separatism: If inquiry into the phenomenality of experience is to occur at all, one can (and ought to) adopt a separatist methodology—one’s philosophical labor

45The inability to conceive or understand the intentionality of one’s states is of no small consequence. To be a critical, reflective reasoner, i.e. to be able to recognize, employ, evaluate, weigh, and criticize reasons for one’s thoughts, judgments, etc. as reasons, requires an ability to understand in this manner the intentionality of one’s states (cf. Burge [1996] and Moran [2001]).
will comprise two projects with experiential phenomenality and experiential intentional-
ity as their respective foci.

**Intentional Independence:** An experience’s intentionality neither depends essentially up-
on nor is explanatorily derived from its phenomenality (assuming the features are nu-
merically distinct).

**Intentional Priority:** If there is any connection between the phenomenality and intention-
ality of experience, it will be a relation of dependence, e.g. supervenience, of the former 
on the latter. If the phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its 
intentional features, their status as intentional is somehow fundamental.

The affirmation of one or more of these claims is almost always associated with the 
acceptance of an account of perceptual experience that privileges experiential intentionality 
over experiential phenomenality. So it is no surprise that what are currently the three most 
popular accounts of perceptual experience, despite what appear initially to be quite radical 
differences, are unified by the demands that this orientation imposes.

**Dual-Component Account:** To perceive is, in part, to be intentionally directed upon an 
entity by virtue of the exercises of a distinctively intellectual capacity, say, a capacity 
for non-phenomenal thought or judgment. The sensuous elements that are phenome-
nally appreciable for one in an experience are either (i) intrinsic, sensational qualities of 
“internal” mental entities, e.g. sense-data, that accompany these states, or (ii) sensory 
qualities that somehow belong to the otherwise non-phenomenal states that these intel-
lectual operations yield. These sensuous elements, the phenomenal component or aspect 
of experience, determine exhaustively a perceptual experience’s total phenomenal char-
acter and, on some accounts, can indicate the fact that a limited variety of merely causal 
relations obtain. But an experience’s phenomenal character plays no role in the experi-
ence being intentionally directed. Experiential intentionality is entirely a consequence of 
an experience’s intellectual component or aspect.

**Relationalism:** To perceive is to be intentionally directed upon an entity in virtue of a 
primitive relation of direct awareness or acquaintance. If an experiencing subject stands 
in this relation to entities in the world, then the sensuous elements that are phenom-
enally appreciable for the subject in the experience are the sensible qualities of these worldly relata. If an experiencing subject stands in this relation to an entity “within” one’s mind, e.g. a sense-datum, then the sensuous elements that are phenomenally appreciable for the subject in the experience are the sensational qualities of this “internal” relatum. Either way, it is the features of the entities to which a subject is primitively related through experience, not features of the relation or of the experience itself, that determine exhaustively a perceptual experience’s total phenomenal character. But an experience’s phenomenal character plays no role in the experience being intentionally directed. Experiential intentionality is entirely a consequence of these primitive relations.

**Representationalism (or Intentionalism):** To perceive is to be intentionally directed upon an entity in virtue of a state with one or more representational contents (that meet various conditions). The sensuous elements that are phenomenally appreciable for one in an experience supervene upon or are identical with either (i) features of the experience’s representational content(s), (ii) features of the experiential state in virtue of which it has its representational content(s), or (iii) features of the entities the experience represents. In all three variations, it is representational facts that determine exhaustively a perceptual experience’s total phenomenal character. But an experience’s phenomenal character, considered in isolation from its representational characterization or supervenience base, plays no role in the experience being intentionally directed. Experiential intentionality is entirely a consequence of an experience’s representational features.

I do not accept any of the three positions that encourage, if not entail outright, experiential phenomenality’s relative insignificance. In fact, I will defend their (near) negations:

**Methodological Inseparatism:** Attempts to provide an account of experiential intention-

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46These abstracts are meant to communicate the core commitments of the three approaches; one can find subtle variations that depart from the letter of our characterizations. Among the clearest proponents of the dual-component account are Sellars [1956], Hamlyn [1957/1979], and Coates [2007]; of relationalism Alston [1999], Martin [2002b], Campbell [2002b], and Johnston [2006]; of representationalism Harman [1990], Tye [1995], Dretske [1995], Lycan [1996], and Byrne [2001]. Some accounts incorporate aspects of more than one of these approaches. For example, the views advanced in Peacocke [1983] and Block [1996] can be seen as taking a middle ground between dual-component accounts and representationalism. Also, these do not exhaust the available ways to elevate intentionality over phenomenality in one’s account of experience. An extreme instance is *phenomenal eliminativism*—the view that perception consists in nothing but the exercise of various capacities to identify, recognize, or form beliefs about entities—which refuses altogether to countenance phenomenality (cf. Armstrong [1968], Dennett [1979], and Rey [1998]).
ality that ignore experiential phenomenality (and *vice versa*) cannot succeed. Though the adoption of a separatist methodology can yield important results, the understanding it furnishes will be partial at best.

**Intentional Dependence:** An experience’s intentionality is either constituted by or depends essentially upon aspects of its phenomenality.

**Intentional Impotence:** Experiential intentionality, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experiential phenomenality.

Consequently, the account of experience I develop does not take the basic shape of those just canvassed. Though our account will ultimately share several important features with representationalism, I use this view and the answers that it gives to our guiding questions as foils throughout the essay.47

### 2.3.2.2 Movement 2: Phenomenal Intentionality and Phenomenal Content

It is increasingly popular for philosophers of mind to countenance, in some form or other, *phenomenal contents*. According to these views, the phenomenally appreciable elements in many of our experiences are rich enough to determine one or more conditions of satisfaction that belong to the experiences themselves. Experiences make claims and these claims, which may or may not be propositionally structured or conceptually articulated, are evaluable for veridicality.

In § 2.2.2, I asserted the following: the fact that an element in an experience is phenomenally appreciable for its subject does not entail that the experience possesses phenomenal content. We may ultimately have good reasons to attribute to some or all of our experiences contents that are determined or constituted wholly by aspects of their phenomenality. But the identification within an experiencing subject of states in which a sensuous redness (for instance) is phenomenally appreciable with states that are veridical if and only if something before the subject is red is not guaranteed by any episode of phenomenal appreciation on its own.

47Many of the claims I make about representationalism will be applicable to the remaining pair of views. I will take note occasionally of the distinctive challenges these and other alternative views pose to our arguments.
Though I develop and defend this picture in the chapters that follow, it is important to distinguish the thesis currently at issue—that experiences are *phenomenally contentful*—from a similar thesis that I endorse enthusiastically—that experiences are *phenomenally intentional*. The term ‘phenomenal intentionality’ is commonly (and unfortunately) employed in a way that makes it synonymous with ‘phenomenal content’. This use is natural if one adopts the broadly semantical conception of intentionality in which intentionality is equated with the possession of satisfaction conditions and/or representational contents (as discussed in §2.1). I emphasized in that discussion that intentionality, properly conceived, is to be distinguished from representationality; the invocation of veridicality-evaluable, representational contents is merely one among several possible ways to enrich the relatively basic conception of intentional directedness.

The conditions an experience must satisfy in order to possess phenomenal intentionality mirror those enumerated in our preferred characterization of intentional directedness (in §2.1.4). Roughly and briefly, for an experience to possess phenomenal intentionality is for the other-directedness in which intentionality consists to be phenomenally appreciable in the experience for its subject. Though experiential phenomenality is unable to ground attributions of phenomenal content, I will argue that it does ground attributions of phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal presence is universally appreciable in sensuous experience and this aspect of experiential phenomenality is itself the minimal realization of intentional directedness.

### 2.3.2.3 Movement 3: Mere Sensation

There is a venerable taxonomy of mental states that divides experiences into two distinct kinds: perceptions and sensations. Perceptions seem to be intentionally directed upon *objective* entities, i.e. mind-independent, publicly accessible, enduring entities that are in principle re-identifiable. Sensations, however, do not possess intentionality of any sort, let alone a directedness that purportedly brings an objective world into view. Sensations, e.g. pains and after images, are, to use a once popular expression, *raw feels*. At best (or worst), to undergo a sensation is to appreciate phenomenally an aspect of one’s “inner” consciousness.

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48One can also find the term being used to refer to phenomena of an entirely different sort, e.g. those that would fall under what we called ‘cognitive phenomenality’ (cf. §§2.2.1 and 6).
Sensations are typically conceived to be psychologically and ontogenetically prior to perceptions and this priority presents us with a challenge: if we are to be directed upon an objective world through experience, we must find a way either to transcend this inner domain or to obviate the need by providing an account of perceptual experience in which sensations play no role. One way to execute the former strategy, the way typified by but not limited to dual-component theorists, is to supplement sensation with an additional, distinctively cognitive operation, say, an intentionally directed belief or judgment. This cognitive element accounts for perception’s objective character and itself requires that we possess, in addition, a relatively sophisticated apparatus for individuating experienced objects and for locating them within a wider system of objective entities. One way to execute the latter strategy is altogether to refuse to countenance experiences that are not intentionally directed upon objective entities. According to representationalists, for example, to suffer, say, a pain is to be in a contentful state to the effect that some region of one’s body is somehow damaged or disordered.

In what follows, I defend a view that occupies a middle ground between these approaches. On the one hand, the view I defend is like that of the representationalist. I reject the categorial distinction between sensations and perceptions. There is a primitive form of intentionality that occurs in even the simplest of our sensations and this intentionality is involved essentially in the more sophisticated experiential intentionality of our perceptions. This intentional directedness, however, is not representational in nature. On the other hand, the view I defend is like that of the dual-component theorist. I recognize that the intentional directedness that sensations possess is not sufficient for experiential objectivity. Experiential objectivity, however, is not necessary for experiential intentionality.

2.3.2.4 Movement 4: The Self  Our initial characterization of phenomenal presence invoked a notion that is a perennial source of philosophical frustration: the self. Many of the difficulties that beset attempts to understand the self spring from a famous Humean observation.

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49 For example, to undergo an experience as of an objective, physical object might require the acquisition and exercise of an ability to represent a comprehensive spatial system with non-egocentric origins and an ability to place oneself within such a system (cf. Strawson [1959/2006], Evans [1982], and Cassam [1997]).
When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)

One cannot perceive, attend to, introspect, or otherwise be aware of oneself as a subject of perceptual experience; the self is not among experience’s phenomenally appreciable elements. Since every idea must, according to Hume, have its origin in the phenomenally appreciable elements of a relatively rich and vivid type of experience he calls impressions, the absence of such an origin for the idea of a simple, continuous, experiential subject forces Hume to conclude that this idea is necessarily beyond our ken.\(^{50}\)

But if we relax the condition that our ideas must be copied form prior, phenomenality-rich impressions, several routes to self-awareness become available. For example, many take consciousness or awareness of the self to be possible in virtue of one of the following.

(i) A capacity to think in that manner which is associated with uses of the first-person pronoun ‘I’

(ii) A capacity to think that various experiences belong to a single subject

(iii) A capacity to adopt the perspective of another toward oneself

(iv) A theory of mind that includes the concept *experience*

(v) A capacity to execute successfully various cognitive tasks such as mirror recognition\(^{51}\)

Perhaps a prior appreciation of experiential phenomenality is necessary to acquire these concepts and competencies. Nevertheless, these approaches share a common conviction: the abandonment of experiential phenomenality as a *source* of our self-awareness. Each of these conditions makes self-consciousness and self-awareness essentially intellectual or cognitive achievements; experiential phenomenality plays no essential role in our being self-conscious or in our achieving an awareness or understanding of ourselves as subjects of experience.

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\(^{50}\)It is interesting to note that two decades earlier, Berkeley makes an identical observation but nevertheless maintains that he possesses an idea (or at least a notion) of the self (Berkeley [1713/1998] 231–234). Similar claims are made by philosophers that do not accept a Humean framework. For example, Kant asserts that “The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances [...].” (Kant [1781/1998] A107; cf. B132, B157, and B275–277). See also Mach [1886/1984] 19ff., Carnap [1928/1967] §65ff., and Wittgenstein [1930/1955] 13ff.

\(^{51}\)In recent years, (i) has been held by Baker [2000] and Rödl [2007], (ii) by Cassam [1997], (iii) by Mead [1962], (iv) by Gopnik [1993], and (v) by Lewis [2003].
All of these conditions plausibly delineate phenomena that deserve the label ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’. They do not, however, exhaust the varieties of self-awareness or the means by which one can acquire it. In the course of my argument, I defend two theses about the self similar in form to our conclusions concerning intentionality. First, there is in every experience a distinctive and original source of self-awareness that is phenomenally appreciable for the experiencing subject. Hume’s observation is correct to a point: the self is not among the sensuous elements in experience and is not appreciable to one in the way that sensuous elements are. But insofar as phenomenal presence is appreciable in experience, the self is appreciable as well, in a sense to be elaborated, as that before which this manifest otherness is present. Second, the possession of this irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness is a necessary precondition for the more sophisticated varieties of self-awareness we can achieve.\(^{52}\)

2.3.2.5 A Common Theme  Together, these four discussions lead us toward an account of perceptual experience in which the phenomenality of experience is competent to direct us intentionally beyond ourselves, independently of the contributions made by the understanding or intellect. Modeling the intentionality and self-awareness involved in experience upon the intentionality and self-awareness involved in belief and judgment or insisting that the former depend on the latter obscures both the role of and the contribution made by the exercises of our perceptual capacities. This tendency to assimilate the perceptual and the intellectual realms and to privilege the intellectual leads inevitably to accounts that either render epiphenomenal the distinctive contributions of experiential phenomenality or neglect altogether those contributions. This essay is governed by the conviction, to wax Aristotelian once again, that we do not need to exercise our rational capacities to transcend a nutritive existence. We do, however, need to appreciate the phenomenality of the exercises of our perceptual capacities to achieve a rational existence. A careful examination of experiential phenomenality and the understanding of phenomenal presence this examination provides will equip us with the resources needed to restore perception to its proper place among the

\(^{52}\)An account of self-awareness along these lines was held by the majority of the early phenomenologists including Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Contemporary proponents of broadly similar views include Flanagan [1992], Kriegel [2004], and Zahavi [2005b].
animate capacities constitutive of animal life.

2.3.3 The Project in Outline

Our discussion proceeds in two stages.

Stage One. The first stage of the essay (chapters 3 and 4) concerns the subject of our first guiding question—the relationship between experiential phenomenality and experiential intentionality. I begin (in § 3.1) with a discussion of a phenomenon that is closely related to our core notion of phenomenal presence, namely, *experiential transparency* (sometimes called *experiential diaphanousness*).

Contemporary discussions of experiential transparency have their source in two famous passages within G. E. Moore’s *Refutation of Idealism*.

[I]n general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—we look through it and see nothing but the blue […] (Moore [1903] 20)

[T]hough philosophers have recognised that *something* distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of *what* that something is. They have not been able to hold *it* and *blue* before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which they can compare *blue* and *green*. And this for the reason I gave above: namely that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see *what*, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it *can* be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. (Moore [1903] 25)

Unfortunately, the views inspired by reflection on experiential transparency are laden with numerous (and ultimately extraneous) theses regarding, for example, the (direct/immediate) objects of introspection, awareness, and attention; the nature of intrinsic properties; and the perennial philosophical oppositions between the internal and the external, the subjective and the objective, the private and the public, and the mental (or mind-dependent) and the non-mental (or mind-independent). Phenomenal presence is the precipitate that

53 This is a natural starting point for an inquiry into the presentational character of experience since “transparency and the immediacy of the objects of conscious awareness seem to be part of the same phenomenon. When we encounter the world in perception, it doesn’t seem to be merely represented by us, but *presented* to us” (Levine [2006] 179).
remains once we jettison these encumbrances (§ 3.2). In addition to this negative characterization, I provide a positive description of the phenomenon that models the distinction between self and other upon the Fregean distinction between concept and object (ch. 4).

With this understanding of phenomenal presence in hand, I provide an answer to our guiding question in three steps. (i) Using representationalism as a foil, I argue that the intentional features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, can neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence. Consequently, experiential intentionality neither determines completely nor explains exhaustively experiential phenomenality (§ 3.3). (ii) I argue that phenomenal presence is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality (§ 3.4). (iii) I argue that the variety of phenomenal intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of experiential intentionality (ch. 5).

Stage Two. The second stage of the essay (ch. 6) concerns the subject of our second guiding question—the relationship between experiential phenomenality and non-experiential intentionality. I begin with a discussion of the conditions one must meet to conceive or understand the intentionality of one’s states. To achieve this understanding requires, at a minimum, the exercise of two essentially first-personal, conceptual capacities: (i) the capacity to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a subject of intentional states, and (ii) the capacity to conceive one’s intentional states as such, i.e. as being directed upon entities beyond themselves (or upon themselves qua other). In short, to understand the intentionality of one’s states—and, therefore, to be a critical, reflective reasoner—requires the ability to think, in a distinctively first-personal manner, in terms of self and other.

The relevance of these claims to our question is shown through two arguments. First, I argue that phenomenal presence provides one with an irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness. Second, I argue that the possession of this phenomenal self-awareness is a necessary precondition for the possession of the pair of conceptual capacities one needs to achieve a first-personal understanding of intentionality. I then develop the resultant view by outlining an argument against the possibility of beings with angelic minds, that is, beings that possess a faculty for discursive, reflective judgment and ratiocination but lack a faculty
for experience or phenomenal appreciation.

2.4 APPENDIX A: THE DOMAIN OF THE PHENOMENALLY APPRECIABLE

A partial list of alleged, phenomenally appreciable, non-sensuous elements in experience, expressed in the what-it-is-like idiom:

1. Cognitive/Judicative Phenomenality
   a. What it is like to believe/judge/think/hope/desire/etc. occurrently that $P$
   b. What it is like to think occurrently that $P$/that $Q$/that $R$/etc.
   c. What it is like to comprehend or understand a sentence or utterance
   d. What it is like to try, in thought, to achieve a particular kind of result

2. Agential Phenomenality
   a. What it is like to author a voluntary action (appreciation of efficacy, initiation, or intentional causation)
   b. What it is like to be in control of one’s voluntary actions
   c. What it is like to feel an external check to one’s agency
   d. What it is like to play the piano competently (i.e. to perform an action with “knowledge-how”)

3. Moral Phenomenality
   a. What it is like to do something for a moral reason or with moral concern in mind
   b. What it is like to find, say, murder morally repugnant or to undergo imaginative resistance to what one finds morally repugnant

4. Phenomenally appreciable elements about one’s metaphysical status
   a. What it is like to be a member of kind $K$
   b. What it is like to be alive/male/thirty-something/American/etc.

5. Experiential Phenomenality
   a. What it is like to experience a series of notes as a melody (or, generally, what it is like to experience a gestalt unity)
b. What it is like to possess perceptual expectancies—to appreciate perceptual affordances and potentialities

c. What it is like to appreciate an experience as one’s own

d. What it is like to undergo “odd” experiences: blurred vision, after-images, double vision, hypnagogic/hypnopompic images, shifts of focus, figure-ground switches, etc.

e. What it is like to recognize a face

f. What it is like for an experience to be spatially/temporally organized

g. What it is like to be, say, depressed/elated or to perceive when depressed/elated
3.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE

One frequently encounters the thesis that experience is transparent or diaphanous in contemporary philosophical discussions of perceptual experience.\(^1\) Michael Tye provides a recent and representative statement of this thesis:

When you introspect your visual experience, the only particulars of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. [...] Your awareness is of the external surfaces and how they appear. The qualities you experience are the ones the surfaces apparently have. Your experience is thus transparent to you. When you try to focus upon it, you ‘see’ right through it, as it were, to the things apparently outside and their apparent qualities. (Tye [2002] 139)

According to experiential transparency’s advocates, all that perceptual experience even seems to present us with are objective entities and their sensible characteristics. No amount of phenomenological reflection will enable us to appreciate the intrinsic features of perceptual experience as such.

The question of whether all experiences are transparent occasions spirited disagreement. These disagreements, however, are premature. I will argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call Core Transparency (§3.1).

Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. We open our eyes and a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present.

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\(^1\)Gilbert Harman (Harman [1990]) is responsible for initiating the present era of relatively intense interest in experiential transparency. But the thesis that experience is transparent can be traced back at least to G. E. Moore’s *Refutation of Idealism* (Moore [1903] 20, 25) and has never been entirely absent from subsequent discussions of perception and consciousness. Notable early treatments include Broad [1923], Price [1932], Ryle [1949] 152, Firth [1949], Heidegger [1951/1968] 41, Wittgenstein [1953] §§275-7, and Grice [1962] 252.
In all sensory modalities, the objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to Core Transparency, it is in the disclosure of that which is central to experience’s presentational character, an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience I call phenomenal presence, that transparency’s significance principally consists (§ 3.2).

Though valuable in itself, the consequences of this analysis extend well beyond the clarity it provides to discussions of transparency. For phenomenal presence is uniquely positioned to illuminate the relationship between perceptual experience’s most important features: its intentionality and its phenomenality. One popular account of how these features are related, namely representationalism, asserts, roughly, that an experience’s representational features completely determine its phenomenal features. The thesis that all experiences are transparent is often taken to support representationalism; representationalists maintain that their account best (or uniquely) explains such transparency.²

I will argue that experiential transparency is far from being a solid foundation upon which representationalists can rest their arguments. The phenomenon is, when interpreted properly, not only among the view’s greatest obstacles, it supports a converse orientation. The position I defend comprises two main claims.

1. The representational features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence. Consequently, the representational features of experience neither determine completely nor explain exhaustively experiential phenomenality (§ 3.3).

2. Phenomenal presence is not representational, but is nevertheless the minimal realization of experiential intentionality (§ 3.4).

²Prominent defenses of representationalism along these lines include Harman [1990], Tye [1995], Dretske [1995], and Byrne [2001]. The motivation for representationalism extends well beyond its alleged explanatory advantages with respect to transparency. For example, many representationalists, especially those impressed by cognitive science’s explanatory successes, argue that their account facilitates the establishment of a materialist account of the mind.
3.1 THE PURPORTED SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERIENTIAL TRANSPARENCY

Though transparency’s significance is subject to a multiplicity of (often ambiguous and heterogeneous) interpretations, one can discern an emerging consensus over its general form.

(T) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are (with varying emphases) always appreciated as (i) public, (ii) objective, (iii) mind-independent, and/or (iv) external (i.e. distally located).

According to (T), when one undergoes, say, a visual experience as of a tree, the sensuous green one appreciates is appreciated as a quality of the tree’s leaves. One appreciates the sensuous green as being, being exemplified by, or being about an objective entity in one’s external environment. Moreover, no amount of phenomenological reflection will alter the apparent externality of an experience’s sensuous elements or reveal novel elements with a different apparent ontological status. So if transparency holds generally, one will never appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements as intrinsic features of either the experience itself or oneself qua experiential subject.

This interpretation is, at least in comparison to many characterizations that were advanced during the initial stages of transparency’s recent era of popularity, narrowly phenomenological. It concerns only apparent ontological classifications and does not involve a commitment to Revelation, i.e. the thesis that the intrinsic nature of a sensuous element is fully revealed by the phenomenal appreciation of that element in a standard experience (cf. Johnston [1992]). According to these earlier interpretations, undergoing or reflecting upon

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3 I take no stand on how the adjectives ‘public’, ‘objective’, ‘mind-independent’, and ‘external’ are related. (T) is stated in such a way as to cover various interpretations of these expressions.

4 (i) Though phenomenological reflection can affect the sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience—it can, and commonly does, increase their intensity, vividness, and resolution (cf. Hill [1991])—such reflection, according to (T), does not effect a change in the apparent nature of the experience’s appreciable elements and is not a window onto new ontological domains. (ii) Some attribute an epistemological significance to transparency, e.g. the claim that one’s access to the intrinsic features of one’s experiences is indirect: “By being aware of the qualities apparently possessed by surfaces, volumes, etc., we become aware that we are undergoing visual experiences” (Tye [2003b] 24; cf. Chalmers [2004] 28 and Stoljar [2004]). This essay, however, is concerned primarily with transparency’s metaphysical import. (iii) The rider ‘qua experiential subject’ allows a visual experience of, say, the color of one’s leg to count as transparent.
an experience discloses the apparent ontological status of the sensuous elements one appreci-
ciates therein and Revelation guarantees that these elements are as one appreciates them to be.\textsuperscript{5}

To abandon Revelation, as \((T)\) does, is to recognize that phenomenological reflection, by itself, is metaphysically neutral. This neutrality is twofold. First, phenomenological reflection, by itself, does not disclose the ontological status of an experience’s sensuous elements. \((T)\)’s advocates readily admit that phenomenological reflection does not immediately yield conclusions about the metaphysical status of what one appreciates in experience. For example, Gilbert Harman concedes that “one might be aware of intrinsic features of experience without being aware of them as intrinsic features of experience” (Harman [1990] 42). Similarly, both Michael Tye and Alex Byrne hold that transparency, on its own, does not speak against sense-datum accounts of experience.\textsuperscript{6} So even if we always appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements as being or qualifying physical objects in a publicly accessible environment, it may turn out that they are, as a matter of fact, instantiated by amalgams of sense-data or are intrinsic features of one’s experiential states.\textsuperscript{7}

Second, phenomenological reflection, by itself, does not disclose the ontological status of experiential episodes themselves. Perhaps one has an experience with a particular phenomenal character in virtue of being in a representational state with a special kind of content or a special functionally specified role. Perhaps one has this experience in virtue of standing in some primitive relation of acquaintance or direct awareness to an appropriate class of entities. Perhaps one has this experience by virtue of the divine dispensation of an omnipotent

\textsuperscript{5}“Appeals to transparency appear to involve the following thought: just by having a perceptual experience, the perceiver is placed in a position whereby he or she is able to classify the ontological category of what is manifest in experience. The nature of experience is supposed to be the kind of thing that can be discerned through introspection” (Coates [2007] 157).


\textsuperscript{7}Again, though I speak of an element in an experience being phenomenally appreciable to a subject, this does not entail that these elements are, or are instantiated in, the subject’s experiential states. To be appreciable in an experience for a subject is simply to be appreciable by a subject that is in that experiential state. The metaphysical status of what is phenomenally appreciable is left open. Also, phenomenological reflection is not only neutral with respect to classification but is existentially silent as well. A hallucinatory experience can be subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience, but this phenomenological fact, on its own, requires neither existential profligacy—through, say, the positing of Meinongian objects (Smith [2002]) or the countenancing of uninstantiated properties/universals (Johnston [2004])—nor existential parsimony—through, say, the acceptance of an adverbial (Ducasse [1942]) or disjunctive account of experience (Martin [2004]).
god. Whatever the source, it is invisible. The means by which a scene becomes experientially present to one is not itself phenomenally appreciable.

Despite the relative restraint of (T), many who accept it nevertheless aspire to the yield of its metaphysically indulgent counterpart. If (T) is correct, then undergoing an experience always involves the appreciation of something as having certain features, namely, those that constitute membership in one or more of the classes enumerated in (T). This is best explained, the argument goes, if experiential phenomenality is representational in nature. That is, for an experience to possess a phenomenal character is for it to make a claim that something is a certain way and such claims are evaluable for veridicality. These contentful experiences, the argument continues, will be radically (and problematically) misleading unless things are, at least in standard cases, as we appreciate them to be.⁸

It should concern those who advance such arguments that parallel arguments exist for incompatible views. For example, many argue that transparency is best explained by an explicitly non-representational form of naïve realism.⁹ But of even greater concern is this: the narrowly phenomenological interpretation of transparency against which all parties have agreed to measure the explanatory virtues of their preferred accounts is, I contend, simply false. Let us begin with an examination of two rare but illustrative sorts of experience that serve as counterexamples to (T).

Case 1: Ganzfeld Experiences. A ganzfeld is a visual field that is completely permeated with a constant and homogeneous sensuous color, say, a determinate shade of blue.¹⁰ The advocate of transparency is correct to this extent: the sensuous blue that is present in a ganzfeld experience is not appreciated as being an intrinsic property of the experience itself or of oneself qua experiential subject.

Does this mean that one appreciates the sensuous blue as qualifying (or as being) an objective, mind-independent entity? Not at all. When one undergoes such an experience, one

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⁸Arguments along these lines are widespread, e.g. at Tye [2000] 46, 111ff. and Jackson [2007].
¹⁰This discussion involves a slight but unproblematic idealization. In practice, there are no absolute ganzfeld experiences. Just as the darkness we appreciate when we close our eyes includes what Helmholtz called ‘optical dust’, i.e. sundry points of light and dim patches, the experience of a ganzfeld will be subtly heterogeneous.
does not appreciate anything as possessed of the phenomenal characteristics that constitute the alleged world-disclosing phenomenality of our ordinary perceptual experiences. There is no figure-ground contrast, no manifestation of diachronic perceptual constancies, and no opportunity for perspectival variation. Relations of relative, spatial location are either severely limited or altogether absent, so one does not even appreciate the sensuous expanse as being a properly extended region of space. Finally, one need not (and often does not) appreciate the ganzfeld as distally located; at most, one can say that one appreciates the sensuous blue as being before one, where ‘before’ does not connote ‘in front of’ or any other notion that involves apparent spatial egocentricity.

**Case 2: Spatially Punctiliar Experiences.** Damage to one’s occipital cortex can result in the diminution of one’s visual field. That which is lost is not replaced with darkness, the so-called “brain grey” that permeates our visual field when external optical stimulation is cut off. The visual system registers nothing in these lost regions; the field itself simply shrinks. It is possible in principle for one’s brain to atrophy in such a way that one undergoes visual experiences that are spatially punctiliar. These are not experiences as of a point of light in a sea of darkness, i.e. an isolated phosphene. One who possesses such a visual system would undergo visual experiences in which a single phenomenal point, and nothing more, is appreciable.

A sensuous element is present in a spatially punctiliar experience. But one does not appreciate the sensuous point as possessed of features that constitute one or more of the classes

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11 See Pylyshyn [2007] 66, Hochberg et al. [1951], and Avant [1965].
12 Some individuals report that the ganzfeld vaguely resembles a surface; they estimate that it is located less than six inches in front of them (Gibson and Waddell [1952]). But just as many find such spatial descriptions inadequate or inappropriate (Cohen [1957]). The fact that apparent distance is not a necessary aspect of a ganzfeld experience means that its phenomenality is committed to even less than that of other atypical experiences, e.g. after-images. For we appreciate the sensuous color in an after-image as qualifying a particular distal region in our visual field: according to Emmert’s law, an after-image always occupies a single visual solid angle, but the apparent linear size of the region filling that angle is directly proportional to the apparent distance of the surface onto which it is projected (cf. Clark [2000] 51).
14 I suspect such experiences are nomologically possible, but metaphysical possibility is sufficient.
15 (i) A phenomenal point is not extended in the sense that one does not appreciate it as being spatially divisible. (ii) Spatially punctiliar experiences can occur in other sensory modalities. For example, if there were a creature with a single spine for a limb, and if the spine’s only sensory function is to extend outwards in a single direction so as to register collisions with distinct bodies, then such collisions would yield non-haptic, tactile experiences that are spatially punctiliar (cf. Smith [2002] 154).
enumerated in (T). Moreover, this case undermines not only the necessity of apparent three-dimensional spatiality in experience (as ganzfelds do), but that of apparent two-dimensional spatiality as well (as ganzfelds may not). That is, the possibility of spatially punctiliar experiences shows that a widely held constraint, viz. “If $x$ is visually aware of $y$ (if $x$ sees $y$), then $y$ must look extended to $x$”, is false.\(^{16}\)

What conclusion should we draw from the possibility of these sorts of experience? One response is to maintain the interpretation of transparency expressed in (T), but abandon its universality. These and other atypical experiences show, according to this approach, that transparency is a normal but not ubiquitous phenomenon.\(^{17}\)

But I think this approach is mistaken. The two sorts of experience we have considered are indeed counterexamples to (T). But (T)’s inadequacies extend well beyond these atypical cases. I noted earlier that an experience’s phenomenal character is compatible with a wide range of possibilities about both the experience’s nature and the nature of the sensuous elements one appreciates therein. But the retreat to apparent ontological status does not place its advocate on safe ground. For a typical experience’s phenomenal character is not only compatible with, say, a sense-datum account of perceptual experience, it is exactly what we ought to expect from a sense-datum account. Competing philosophical accounts of perception—e.g. representationalism, naïve realism, projectivism, sense-datum theories, etc.—issue identical phenomenological “predictions.” So even in unexceptional cases, experiential phenomenality, by itself, is silent with respect to the classifications in (T).

Additionally (but relatedly), phenomenological reflection, by itself, places no conceptual or semantic constraints on discourse or judgment about experiential phenomenality. Most of the time, a normal perceiver undergoing an unexceptional experience will describe the sensuous qualities she appreciates as being instantiated in an objective, worldly entity. Furthermore, if she is justified in thinking that nothing is awry, she will be warranted when

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\(^{16}\)Pautz [2007] 517. In particular, the possibility of spatially punctiliar experiences undermines any interpretation of transparency according to which the phenomenon consists in our appreciation of a multiplicity of sensuous elements “as being spatially related to one another” but does not require “that these spatial relationships include that of depth” (Schroer [2007] 410).

\(^{17}\)These responses range from the mere withholding of judgment when certain types of experience are at issue (Dretske [1995] xv) to the outright denial that certain types of experience are transparent (e.g. Block [1996], Kind [2003], and Smith [2008]).
she judges that things are as she appreciates them to be. But we cannot accuse someone of inconsistency or misunderstanding simply because she judges, after reflecting upon the phenomenality of her experiences, that the sensuous qualities she appreciates are instantiated in one or more private, mind-dependent sense-data. If, for example, a perceiver were antecedently committed to a sense-datum account, it would not only be coherent for her to judge that a sensuous color she appreciates is an intrinsic property of an amalgam of sense-data, it would be reasonable for her to do so. It would, of course, be unreasonable for someone not antecedently committed to a sense-datum account to make such judgments. But this suggests only that the phenomenality of experience, by itself, does not epistemically privilege one set of judgments over its alternatives (cf. Gupta [2006]).

### 3.2 CORE TRANSPARENCY AND PHENOMENAL PRESENCE

Should we conclude then that no experiences are transparent? To do so would be to deny that we can educe any important insight from the sort of phenomenological observations to which the champions of experiential transparency appeal. This, I believe, is to go too far. Though transparency’s significance is far more modest than is commonly proclaimed, its advocates are pointing to a genuine phenomenon. The proper response, I contend, is to uphold the thesis that all experiences are transparent, but to employ an interpretation of transparency that is free of unwarranted commitments.

The seed of an appropriately parsimonious interpretation is already contained in our examinations of ganzfeld and spatially punctiliar experiences. It seems that no matter how simple or peculiar an experience may be, we always appreciate its sensuous elements as being *present* or *before us* in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. That is, when we phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in an experience, we appreciate it as being both something other than ourselves and as standing in opposition to ourselves. This view, which I call Core Transparency (CT), can be formulated in two interdependent ways.

(CT1) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are al-
ways appreciated as other.

(CT2) The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the self qua experiential subject (or a state/mode thereof).

I will call the experiential nexus of self and other to which this pair of formulations refer phenomenal presence. Phenomenal presence is central to the presentational character of experience and it is in the disclosure of phenomenal presence that transparency’s significance principally consists.\(^{18}\)

If Core Transparency is to avoid (T)’s fate, we must be careful to distinguish the predicates ‘__ appreciates x as other’ and ‘__ appreciates x as (being…the) self’ from similar expressions that we have already jettisoned, e.g. ‘__ appreciates x as objective’ and ‘__ appreciates x as distally located’. For (T)’s failure stems not from the particular classes or properties it employs, but from the very appeal to classification. If phenomenal presence involved the attribution of properties to, or the classification of, an experience’s sensuous elements, then it would determine a veridicality-evaluable claim. But as we have already seen, the metaphysical neutrality of phenomenological reflection guarantees that transparency, by itself, makes no such claims.

What then is the significance of (CT)? We can, as a first pass, describe the situation as follows. To undergo a sensuous experience is (in part) to appreciate an element as other or as before one; it is (in part) to appreciate a manifest opposition between the self—that before which the other is present—and the other—that which is present before the self. But phenomenal presence does not consist in the instantiation of some relation, say, experience e presents y to z by members of two distinct kinds, viz. other and self. The distinction between self and other is rather an oblique communication of sensuous experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal structure. Sensuous experiences are phenomenally articulate unities and to

\(^{18}\)Experience’s presentational character has long been considered a basic datum that any adequate philosophical account of perception must accommodate. From sense-datum theorists—“[T]hat this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness […] cannot possibly be doubted. […] This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called being given, and that which is thus present is called a datum” (Price [1932] 3)—to direct realists—“[Perceptual] experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief which I might have about the object in its absence. It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations […] because of the special features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them ‘presentations’ ” (Searle [1983] 46).
appreciate something as other is to appreciate its invariant position within this bipartite, phenomenal articulation. I will elucidate this view by examining the two formulations of (CT) in turn.

(CT1) — According to (CT1), experience is necessarily presentational; there can be no appreciation of a sensuous element in experience that is not also an appreciation of it as other. This is true even of pain experiences and cases of perceptual imagination. Insofar as one appreciates a sensuous element in such experiences, one appreciates it as other. There may be, in addition to this manifest otherness, a genuine phenomenal basis for associating some of these elements more intimately with the self than others: an appearance of subjectivity or interiority may be due to, respectively, a distinctive sense of ownership in bodily sensation or an appreciation of the subordinacy of imaginative phenomenality to the spontaneity of our mental agencies. But the sensuousness of these experiences guarantees that they involve an apparent confrontation with something other than oneself.

This is not because sensuous experience always involves the appreciation of something as having features that would ground a classification of kind, viz. the kind other, but because phenomenal presence does not involve veridicality-evaluable classifications at all. It is a category mistake to assess phenomenal presence in terms of success and failure. To appreciate a sensuous element as other is not to appreciate some mark possessed by that element; it does not consist in the apparent exemplification of some property or the apparent satisfaction of some criterion. It is rather to appreciate the sensuous element’s position within the experience’s basic phenomenal articulation. The occupation of such a phenomenal position by a sensuous element in an experience is no more subject to conditions of satisfaction or veridicality than is the occupation of a grammatical position by a proper name in a sentence.\footnote{Compare with the following remarks: “Phenomenal consciousness is indeed a presentation to the individual that cannot fail. It cannot fail, not because it is an infallible representation, but because it is not a representation with veridicality conditions at all. It can neither fail nor succeed. Either phenomenal aspects of psychological states are present for, presented to, the individual in consciousness, or they are not. There is no question of right or wrong. It is a matter of presence or absence” (Burge [2007b] 406–7).}

\footnote{It may help those familiar with Frege’s philosophy of logic to note that this account of experiences as phenomenally articulate unities with a structure describable in terms of the distinction between self and other resembles, in several important respects, Frege’s account of thoughts as logically articulate unities with a structure describable in terms of the categorial distinction between object and concept (Frege [1892/1997b]; cf. Geach [1976], Diamond [1984]). The distinction between object and concept does not effect an ontological
(CT2) — According to (CT2), the phenomenal appreciation of a sensuous element in experience can never be an appreciation of our selves, or the states/modes thereof, as such. Hume makes this point vividly when he reports on his attempts to do so:

When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)

As a matter of ontology, we are personal selves—living, embodied human-beings with complex psychological histories located within an objective, ordered world of public, physical objects. Perhaps it is possible for one to appreciate a sensuous element in experience that is, as a matter of fact, a feature of oneself qua personal. That is, there is nothing incoherent about the sensuous manifestation (and the correlative appreciation as other) of an intrinsic feature of a personal self. But as a matter of what is revealed in experience’s presentational character, experiential subjects are phenomenal selves. Thus conceived, the other is simply that which is present before the self; the nature of the phenomenal self is exhausted by the position it occupies within experience’s phenomenal articulation.21

So the phenomenal self is not sensuously manifest in experience. For to be sensuous is, in part, to be appreciated as other, and to be appreciated as other is to occupy a particular position within experience’s phenomenal articulation. The phenomenal self cannot occupy this position, it cannot be sensuous and present before one, without ceasing to be what it is. Any attempt to appreciate the phenomenal self or to appreciate the features, including structural features, of experience itself in the same manner as we appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements is guaranteed to fail.22

division of entities into kinds; the distinction captures thought’s logical articulation—an articulation which cannot be expressed in thought but is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly constructed language’s well-formed formulas. Similarly, the distinction between self and other does not divide the world into two kinds; the distinction captures experience’s phenomenal articulation—an articulation which cannot be expressed by an experiential content but is phenomenally manifest in sensuous experience. ‘Self’ and ‘other’ signify, as it were, phenomenal categories. This connection (also mentioned in fn. 22) will be expanded greatly in ch. 4.

21 Phenomenal presence determines a phenomenological conception of the self, not an ontological conception. Phenomenologically, the self phenomenal presence reveals is a featureless locus of pure apprehension. But it needn’t thereby be an attenuated Cartesian Ego or a merely formal transcendental subject. It may be, as far as ontology is concerned, an aspect of the temporally extended life of a personal self, i.e. an aspect of a “man who, in natural self-experience, finds himself as a man” (Husserl [1931/1991] 25).

22 The parallels between the current proposal and Frege’s account of thought’s logical structure (cf. fn.
These conclusions may initially appear to be in conflict with my earlier assertion that experiential transparency’s significance consists in its disclosure of phenomenal presence, i.e. in the disclosure of the intrinsic nexus of self and other that structures every episode of sensuous phenomenal appreciation. But to dissolve this tension, we needn’t posit additional sensuous elements. Experience’s presentational character does not involve an appreciation of some sensuous “present-to-me” or “is-mine” quality (cf. Kapitan [1999] 40). If we do appreciate phenomenal presence, it will be among the non-sensuous aspects of experiential phenomenality. For if phenomenal presence were sensuous, it would not be a manifestation of experience’s basic phenomenal structure but would, like every other sensuous element in experience, simply occupy one position within this structure.

And we needn’t advert to additional de se representational capacities. Intellectually sophisticated subjects can conceptually represent an experience’s sensuous elements as being present to them qua subjects, but such representation is not a part of sensuous experience per se. The appreciation of phenomenal presence (and the concomitant appreciation of oneself qua phenomenal subject) is pre-reflective.23

Most important, it is a mistake to suppose that an appreciation of phenomenal presence requires one to turn away from that which is present in experience and toward some isolated interiority. Experience is universally and intrinsically directed toward the other. But it is only through the presence of the other that the phenomenal self exists at all. The intrinsic orientation of experiential phenomenality toward the other phenomenally embodies its converse. To focus, as we must, on the other in experience is, ipso actu, to appreciate its position with respect to our phenomenal selves.

So phenomenal presence is not sensuous. But it is phenomenally appreciable. This is what the phenomenological observations that have so impressed the advocates of trans-

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20 and ch. 4) are especially strong on this point. According to Frege, we cannot truthfully (or sensibly) say of a concept that it is a concept; any attempt to make a singular claim about a concept will invariably result in a claim about an object. For “the three words ‘the concept horse’ do designate an object, but on that very account they do not designate a concept” (Frege [1892/1997b] 184). According to the view I am elucidating, we cannot appreciate the phenomenal self (or the states/modes thereof) as such; any attempt to appreciate the self as such will invariably result in the appreciation of a sensuous element as other. For we can appreciate sensuous elements in experience, but on that very account they are not features of the phenomenal self.

23 On the notion of pre-reflective awareness, see Henrich [1970], Frank [1995], Zahavi [1999], and Thomasson [2000].
parency reveal—not the apparent natures of that which is present in experience, but the aspect of experiential phenomenality that constitutes this appreciable presence itself. Any account of perception that purports to provide a complete explanation of experiential phenomenality must accommodate this ubiquitous phenomenon.

3.3 THE EXPLANATORY INADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATIONALISM

This essay’s ultimate goal is to illuminate the relationship between the intentionality and the phenomenality of perceptual experience. Phenomenal presence bears a twofold significance for this project. Its first consequence is negative. I will argue in this section that phenomenal presence neither depends essentially upon nor is explanatorily grounded in the non-phenomenal, representational features of experience. Its second consequence is positive. Phenomenal presence is not representational, but is nevertheless the minimal realization of experiential intentionality (§ 3.4).

One account of how the intentionality and phenomenality of experience are related, namely representationalism, is overwhelmingly popular. It comprises (i) a representational account of experiential intentionality and (ii) a thesis of ontological supervenience.

**Representationalism:** (i) To undergo an experience is, *inter alia*, to be intentionally directed upon an entity in virtue of being in a state with one or more representational contents (that meet various conditions). (ii) An experience’s phenomenal features supervene upon either (a) features of the experience’s representational content(s), (b) features of the experiential state in virtue of which it has its representational content(s), and/or (c) represented features of the entities the experience represents.

As Alex Byrne correctly notes, representationalism “does not take a stand on whether phenomenal character can be *explained in terms of*, or *reduced to*, [representational features]—at least it doesn’t if these claims don’t follow from the mere fact of supervenience” (Byrne [2001] 204; cf. Horgan [1993]). But if the representationalist is to contribute to the project of understanding experiential phenomenality, she must explain why each basic and distinctive type
of phenomenal feature supervenes upon a specific class of the experience’s representational features.

Representationalism has the resources to provide adequate explanations for many of the relevant supervenience relations. In particular, it can explain how many of an experience’s sensuous elements supervene upon specific features of the experience’s representational content(s). That is, representationalism can in principle explain:

(i) The scope of phenomenal appreciation—Why do I appreciate a sensuous patch of blue (rather than a sensuous patch of red) in the experience I am currently undergoing and why do I appreciate it as being circular and located three feet to my left (rather than as being rectangular and located three feet to my right)?

(ii) The phenomenal differences between experiences—In virtue of what does the phenomenality of my experience of a red patch differ from the phenomenality of my experience of a blue patch? In virtue of what does the phenomenality of my visual experience of a circular object differ from the phenomenality of my tactile experience of the same circular object?

(iii) Many distinctive features of experiential phenomenality—What explains the complexity, richness, determinacy, and particularity of, say, my typical visual experiences?24

But even if we grant that experience’s representational features not only determine but explain these aspects of experiential phenomenality, we have not thereby conceded that the representationalist has successfully executed her explanatory project. For the representationalist must not only explain what is phenomenally present in experience; she must explain the phenomenality of this presence itself. There are numerous representational states, e.g. beliefs, judgments, desires, and other propositional attitudes, that altogether lack a presentational character. What representational facts explain the manifestation of phenomenal presence in experience and the absence of phenomenal presence in other contentful states?25

24 An example: the colors one appreciates in a typical visual experience are phenomenally rich. That is, the shades are absolutely determinate and assessments of their relative similarity yield a dense ordering. The representationalist can explain this aspect of visual phenomenality by attributing a non-discursive or analog content to the experience upon which sensuous colors supervene. The representational structure of such contents is isomorphic to the phenomenal structure of the similarity orderings and can thereby explain the latter’s manifestation.

25 This challenge is similar to that posed by the alleged possibility of absent qualia. The representationalist must be able to explain, insists the proponent of absent qualia, why it isn’t possible for there to be
There are several approaches available to the representationalist. I will focus on the shortcomings of three: (i) appeals to content, (ii) appeals to functional role, and (iii) appeals to primitive forms of representation. I will then offer reasons for thinking that these attempts do not fail because of their respective idiosyncrasies. Representationalism’s explanatory limitations are, I contend, endemic to the theory.

**Approach 1: Appeal to Content.** The representationalist can advert to the distinctive kinds of representational content experiences possess, e.g. non-conceptual, analog, pictorial, etc., to explain experience’s presentational character. But this view is a non-starter. First, the candidate contents can be attributed to representational states that lack a presentational character. For example, it is not unreasonable to think that there are sub-personal states generated in vision that non-conceptually represent changes in light intensity (Tye [2000] 62; cf. Stalnaker [1998]). So the possession of such contents is not sufficient to demarcate phenomenally presentational states.

Second, and more important, *being present* is not a property of experiences’ sensuous elements. According to representationalism, the phenomenal appreciation of *x* in an experience is constituted (in part) by the inclusion of *x*, or an entity that determines *x*, in the content of the experience’s constituent representation. To say that an experience, in addition to representing an object, must represent that object as being present, is to introduce an unnecessary and problematic redundancy.

For these reasons, most representationalists do not attempt to explain an experience’s presentational character in terms of its representational content but rather offer explanations that appeal to the distinctive characteristics of experiential representation itself. That is, they maintain that,

>[representationalism] is not the view that the *content* of an intentional state determines its nature qua mental state without remainder […] it is the doctrine that the content of an experience plus the fact that the experience represents the content as obtaining in the way distinctive of perceptual representation are what determines the experience’s nature without remainder. (Jackson [2007] 58; cf. Chalmers [2004] and Martin [2002b] 378)

functional and representational duplicates of sentient creatures that lack phenomenal consciousness. The present challenge does not focus on qualia themselves but on the phenomenally appreciable presence of such qualia. I believe that this reorientation avoids many of the problems associated with the hypothesis of absent qualia and other challenges that fall under the heading of ‘The Explanatory Gap’ (cf. Levine [1983]) while simultaneously capturing what is central to the dissatisfaction of those who issue such challenges.
These attempts typically appeal to the distinctive functional role of experiential representation (approach 2) or introduce primitive forms of experiential representation (approach 3).

**Approach 2: Appeal to Functional Role.** Representationalists often claim that it is experience’s functional role that makes experiential representation distinctive. For example, Tye claims that

experiences and feelings, *qua* bearers of phenomenal character, play a certain distinctive functional role. They [...] stand ready and available to make direct impact on beliefs and/or desires. (Tye [2000] 62)

A subject phenomenally appreciates something in virtue of being in an experiential state that is, in the normal run of things, a maximally proximal causal trigger for the formation of beliefs, desires, and purposive actions. Representationalists can invoke functional roles of this sort, i.e. roles that involve personal-level cognitive/practical agencies, to explain experience’s presentational character.

[F]or the subject it is as if the objects are right there before him. [The representationalist] seeks to explain this aspect of experience by reference to the kind of state of mind experiencing is. According to him, it is just that state of mind which is liable to fix the subject’s beliefs about how his environment must be, and hence is a state of being presented to as if things are so. (Martin [2002b] 399; cf. Langsam [2001] 413)

It is true that our perceptual experiences are apt or poised to produce (authoritative) perceptual beliefs and influence action. But the representationalist’s approach reverses the proper order of explanation. Though I do not wish to endorse its representationalist accoutrements, the spirit of the following quote goes some way toward motivating this stance.

In my view, it’s not the irresistibility of our perceptual beliefs, nor the nature of our concepts, which explains why our experiences give us the immediate justification they do. Rather, it’s the peculiar “phenomenal force” or way our experiences have of presenting propositions to us. Our experience represent propositions in such a way that it “feels as if” we could tell that those propositions are true—and that we’re perceiving them to be true—just by virtue of having them so represented. (Pryor [2000] 547 fn. 37)

It is phenomenal presence itself that is both the source of our inclination to form beliefs on the basis of experience and the (partial) source of the warrant associated with these beliefs. The doxastic role of experience cannot be explained without adverting to experience’s
presentational character. But representationalism, even versions according to which the
phenomenal features of experience are identical to (a subset of) its representational features,
must be able to explain experiential phenomenality in a manner that avoids altogether
phenomenal notions and characterizations.

**Approach 3: Appeal to Primitive Representational States.** The representationalist
can explain why experiences manifest a presentational character while other contentful states
do not if experience involves a primitive and *sui generis* form of representation. On this
approach, the distinctive manner in which an experience represents its content as obtaining
is not determined by its functional role. In fact, it is not determined by anything at all.
Though not himself a representationalist, Mark Johnston expresses this view when he says
that a, “visual experience is a sui generis propositional attitude—visually entertaining a
content concerning the scene before one’s eyes” (Johnston [1992] 172-3; cf. Chalmers [2004]).
According to this third approach, to be in a state in which something is phenomenally present
is to represent *experientially* that something is the case. Nothing more can be said.

If correct, the representationalist would be able to explain an experience’s presentational
character in terms of its representational features. But this approach deprives the represen-
tationalist’s explanatory project of its value. The invocation of a primitive and *sui generis*
kind of representational state that is essentially presentational in one’s explanation of expe-
rience’s presentational character is no better than the invocation of a *virtus dormitiva*; it is
to abandon the view that there is an independent and relatively basic level of explanation
for facts about experiential phenomenality.

Though these three approaches do not exhaust representationalism’s explanatory re-
sources, the remaining options will fare no better. For if our interpretation of transparency
is correct, then it undermines any representationalist explanation of experience’s present-
tational character. I have argued that the phenomenological observations that ground the
thesis of experiential transparency do not reveal the apparent natures of that which is present
in experience or of experience itself, but disclose what is central to experience’s presenta-
tional character. This non-sensuous aspect of experiential phenomenality, namely phenom-
enal presence, is the manifestation of sensuous experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal
structure. It may still be the case that experiences are essentially representational. But if
the nature of experience is entirely determined by its representational features, then this
class will necessarily include representations that are intrinsically and irreducibly phenome-
nal. That is, if representationalism is true, then it must take the form described in the third
approach canvassed above. But if representationalism requires the introduction of primitive,
presentational forms of representation, then it will be unable to provide an adequate and
exhaustive explanation of experiential phenomenality.

The representationalist can retreat to the less ambitious claim of ontological superven-
nience. For phenomenal presence poses no threat to the thesis that experiential phenome-
nality supervenes upon experience’s representational features. But while relations of supervenience are often uninformative, this particular instance is exceptionally so. Phenomenal presence is not just a universal feature of sensuous experience, it is a necessary feature; one cannot appreciate a sensuous element in an experience that lacks a presentational character. So facts involving phenomenal presence are trivially entailed by facts involving experience’s representational features. Without an adequate explanation of this supervenience relation, representationalism can say next to nothing about a ubiquitous feature of experiential phe-
nomenality.

Perhaps the only option left is the bold recognition of representationalism’s limited ex-
planatory power:

Why then do experiences, including hallucinatory experiences, have a presentational phe-
nomenology while thoughts do not? […] My answer to this question is that there is no
answer. (Pautz [2007] 519)

### 3.4 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND EXPERIENTIAL

**INTENTIONALITY**

#### 3.4.1 Intentionality

Recall our previous characterization of intentionality (§ 2.1.4).

(Int 1**) **Intentionality** is that aspect of an occurrent, categorical state or event that
consists in

(i) its being of, about, or directed upon an entity other than itself (or upon itself qua other) \([directedness]\)

(ii) as an exemplar of some general property, relation, kind, or category \([generality]\)

(iii) from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect \([aspectual shape]\)

(iv) to or for its subject \([personal subjectivity]\).

**Directedness.** It is in the nature of intentionality to be directed beyond itself, beyond the individual (or a state thereof) that possess it. Intentional states that are, as a matter of fact, directed upon themselves are possible. It is even possible, as Brentano held, that all intentional states are, in addition to being directed beyond themselves, self-directed. But when such cases occur, the identity that obtains between that which is intentionally directed and that upon which it is intentionally directed is entirely accidental. Such states are directed upon themselves \([qua\ other]\).

**Generality.** Our intentional states are not directed upon entities \([simpliciter]\). They are always directed upon entities as exemplars of some property, relation, kind, or category that is capable, in principle, of applying to or being exemplified by various particulars.

**Aspectual shape.** Our intentional states are always directed upon entities from a particular perspective or under a particular aspect. This is easily seen in perceptual experience. Our perceptual capacities are divided into distinct sensory modalities—a single property, say, sphericity, can be experienced either visually or tactiley. Moreover, they are always exercised from a particular point of view and provide, at best, a partial and incomplete perspective on that which we perceive.

**Personal subjectivity.** Though it is convenient to attribute intentionality to an organism’s states and events, a convenience that I have already taken advantage of, the feature’s proper bearer is individual organisms. It is individual organisms inhabiting and coping with their environment that perceive, believe, judge, desire, reason, and know. To attribute an intentional \([state]\) to an individual is to communicate indirectly that the \([individual]\) is intentionally directed upon an entity. So if a system involved in an organism’s perceptual experience is entirely modular in its output, that is, if the states it yields are neither attributable to the
whole organism nor first-personally available to guide the activity or other responses of the whole organism, then these states do not possess intentionality.

Some of these conditions, especially personal subjectivity, are controversial. But if we momentarily prescind from this condition, it is clear, as we have already seen (§ 2.1), that (Int $1^{**}$) serves as the core of the comparatively substantive accounts of intentionality one typically encounters: (i) the broadly semantical/representational account of intentionality that takes the basic other-directedness of an intentional state to consist in the possession of one or more representational contents that determine conditions of correctness/satisfaction, and (ii) the relational account of intentionality that takes the basic other-directedness of an intentional state to consist in the establishment of a simple, non-representational relation between the state (or the individual whose state it is) and one or more entities that partly constitute this intentional relation.

According to the representational elaboration, a state is intentional only if there are ways the world can be that render it veridical. This captures the generality of intentional directedness because such contents attribute some general property, relation, kind or category to one or more entities. Moreover, this conception can accommodate the aspectual shape of intentionality since a state’s representational contents can have principles of type-individuation that are more fine-grained than the experience’s satisfaction condition.

According to the relational elaboration, perceptual success does not presuppose experiential intentionality but consists in its establishment. That is, particular experiential episodes establish connections with entities and, in so doing, make them available to the perceiver as objects for attention, recognition, thought, and purposive action. The relata upon which our experiences are intentionally directed occur as exemplars or instances of various general features and the intentional relation obtains from a particular point of view thereby satisfying the conditions of generality and aspectual shape. But standing in such an intentional relation to an entity is no more evaluable for correctness or veridicality than is standing in the relation $kicking$ to a soccer ball.

So directedness upon an entity can involve the possession of representational contents and directedness upon an entity can involve the establishment of certain non-representational relations. But (Int $1^{**}$) captures the common commitment of both views; the representa-
tional and relational accounts simply provide different analyses of this conceptually prior characterization of intentional directedness.

3.4.2 Experiential Intentionality

The neutrality of (Int 1**) with respect to the various, relatively-substantive accounts of intentionality is mirrored by the neutrality of (CT) with respect to the various, relatively-substantive accounts of the nature of experience’s presentational character. This opens up the possibility that phenomenological reflection reveals an essentially phenomenal form of intentional directedness. But it is more than a possibility. Phenomenal presence satisfies all of the conditions for intentionality encapsulated in (Int 1**): (i) The phenomenal appreciation of sensuous elements in experience is universally and intrinsically other-directed. (ii) The sensuous elements one appreciates exemplify one or more appreciable general characteristics. (iii) These sensuous elements are always appreciated under an aspect; phenomenal presence affords a primitive “point of view” on that which is present. (iv) The sensuous elements we appreciate in experience are present to the self; we appreciate these sensuous elements both as being other than ourselves and as standing in opposition to ourselves. Consequently, phenomenal presence realizes a basic and non-derivative form of intentional directedness.

Several philosophers argue that experiences possess some form of phenomenal or experiential intentionality. But most of these accounts take this intentionality to consist in the possession of one or more phenomenal contents, i.e. veridicality-evaluable contents that are determined by a state’s phenomenal features. A subset of these philosophers make the stronger claim that these phenomenal contents are fully constituted by the state’s phenomenal features and cannot be reduced to its non-phenomenal features.26

Given the result of the previous section, namely, that the representational features of experience neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence, it follows that accounts according to which the intentionality of experience is essentially representational are too demanding. This is the case regardless of whether these representational contents are phenomenal or not. Experiences may still possess phenomenal contents, but there is a form of

26Examples of the stronger claim include Horgan and Tienson [2002], Loar [2003a], and Kriegel [2007].
phenomenal intentionality that is distinct from and prior to phenomenal representation.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite these differences, the present proposal shares at least this much in common with alternative views of phenomenal intentionality: experiential phenomenality contains a basic form of intentional directedness and any attempt to provide an account of experiential intentionality that ignores phenomenality (and \textit{vice versa}) cannot succeed.

\textsuperscript{27}Consequently, the present account can avoid many of the controversies that surround the notion of phenomenal content, e.g. whether such contents are narrow or wide. Additionally, this form of intentional directedness only occurs in sensuous experiences. So the present account can remain neutral about its relationship to the intentionality of non-sensuous states.
4.0 CATEGORIES — LOGICAL AND PHENOMENAL

We arrived at our initial characterization of phenomenal presence by first stripping away the inessential features of a related phenomenon, experiential transparency, of which it is the core. A richer understanding of phenomenal presence required the provision of a positive characterization. An attempt was made (§ 3.2) and in the process of doing so, the distinction between self and other was compared to the Fregean distinction between concept and object (fns. 20 and 22). In this chapter, I wish to expand upon this comparison. Doing so will not only (I hope) help the reader to understand phenomenal presence more thoroughly, but will uncover aspects of phenomenal presence that we have yet to touch upon.

I begin with a discussion on Frege’s conception of logical categories (§ 4.1) and then develop the idea that self and other are phenomenal categories (§ 4.2).

4.1 CONCEPT AND OBJECT AS LOGICAL CATEGORIES

In the introduction of his *Foundations of Arithmetic*, Frege states the work’s three guiding principles. The third is “never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object” (Frege [1884/1953] x). This distinction retains its elevated status throughout Frege’s subsequent work and is repeatedly the focus of his philosophical attention.\(^1\) The source of this continual attention, however, goes beyond the distinction’s alleged importance. For as we will see, the distinction between concept and object, by its very nature, erects perhaps

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\(^1\) Most notably in his ‘On Concept and Object’ (Frege [1892/1997b]), but also in several posthumously published texts, e.g. Frege [1892/1997a] and Frege [1891/1997b].
insuperable obstacles to its perspicuous and intelligible description.²

Frege’s expositions of the object–concept distinction typically begin with a discussion of sentences. The most salient grammatical division within a majority of ordinary-language statements is that between subject and predicate. Instantiations of this schema can embody what are logically quite different relations.³ The most important of these logical relations is that which is present in sentences that have a singular term (e.g. a proper name) for a grammatical subject. Let us call such sentences *STP-sentences* (*S*ingular *T*erm *P*redicate sentences). For example, ‘John is six feet tall’ is an STP-sentence that can be analyzed grammatically into a proper name, ‘John’, and a monadic predicate ‘is six feet tall’.

The subject–predicate analysis of STP-sentences can be incorporated in principle into either of two opposing accounts of sentential composition. On the one hand, we can take STP-sentences to be constructed from linguistically self-subsistent and complete subjects and predicates by a grammatically independent relation, say concatenation. On the other hand, we can take subjects, predicates, or both to be dependent, incomplete abstractions of grammatically prior, unitary sentences. Frege defends the latter view. What joins subject and predicate within a sentence is neither concatenation nor any other external relation. According to Frege, there is a basic predicative “relation” that obtains between a sentence’s subject and predicate. This source of sentential unity is not external to its *relata*; it belongs essentially to a sentence’s grammatical predicate. “[T]he relation of subject to predicate” says Frege, “is not a third thing added to the two, but it belongs to the content of the predicate” (Frege [1882/1997] 81). When we decompose a STP-sentence into its grammatical elements, we isolate the predicate from its subject. But this predicate retains the same inherent power to join with a subject that it possesses in its original unified state. So grammatical predicates, considered in abstraction from their sentential context, are *incomplete* (*unvollständig*) and in *need of supplementation* (*ergänzungsbedürftig*). To make this predicative incompleteness pellucid, we can employ a notation that explicitly marks the location of the grammatical subject’s removal, e.g. ‘___ is

²The following discussion of Frege is heavily indebted to Diamond [1984], Diamond [1988], and Thomas Ricketts’ unpublished paper ‘Concepts, Objects, and the Context Principle’.  
³According to Frege, the schema can be satisfied by sentences that express relations of conceptual subordination, e.g. ‘All logicians are philosophers’, or identity, e.g. ‘The Morning Star is Venus’. Also, there are sentences that are not analyzable into subjects and predicates at all, say, most imperatives.
Frege’s ultimate concern is not sentences, but thoughts or judgeable contents. Nevertheless, this linguistic digression is heuristically valuable. For the application of the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate to STP-sentences mirrors the application of the comparatively fundamental logical distinction between object and concept to thoughts.4 “[T]he analysis of a sentence” says Frege, “corresponds to an analysis of the thought [ . . . ] and this [viz. this correspondence] I should like to call a basic logical fact (logische Urthatsache).”5 So just as STP-sentences can be decomposed into subjects and predicates, thoughts can be decomposed into objects and concepts. Objects are discrete and self-subsistent individuals; they are integral wholes (abgeschlossen). Concepts, on the other hand, are unsaturated (ungesättigt). Just as subjects must stand in the grammatically basic “relation” of predication to predicates within a sentence, so objects must stand in the logically basic “relation” of subsumption to concepts within a thought.6 Furthermore, just as predication is an inherent feature of grammatical predicates thereby rendering predicates incomplete when considered in isolation from a subject, subsumption is an inherent feature of concepts thereby rendering concepts unsaturated when considered in isolation from an object. Frege makes these parallels explicitly when he remarks that the imprecision of ordinary language, creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element supervenient upon the object and the concept. This isn’t the case: the unsaturatedness of the concept brings it about that the object, in effecting the saturation, engages immediately with the concept, without need of any special cement. Concept and object are fundamentally (ursprünglich) dependent on each other, and in subsumption we have their fundamental connection” (Frege [1906/1969] 193; cf. Frege [1892/1997b] 193).

That concepts are by their very nature joined with objects to form the unitary judgeable contents of thought allows Frege to equate concepts with functions. Concepts are a subclass of monadic functions which map objects to a pair of privileged objects: the True and the False.7 For example, the concept denoted by ‘____ is six feet tall’ maps any object that is six feet tall.

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4Table 1 (p. 69) encapsulates this paragraph’s analogical characterization of the object–concept distinction.
6“The fundamental logical relation (logische Grundbeziehung) is that of an object’s falling under a concept: all relations between concepts [e.g. relations of conceptual subordination] can be reduced to this” (Frege [1892/1997a] 173). Cf. Frege [1882/1997].
7See especially Frege [1891/1997a].
feet tall, i.e. any object that the concept is six feet tall subsumes, to the True and maps every other object to the False. A concept need not subsume an object, i.e., a concept may be empty and map all objects to the False, but it is “essential for a concept that the question whether something falls under it have a sense” (Frege [1882/1997] 81).

Though Frege commences his expositions of the object–concept distinction as we have—by investigating the grammatical features of sentences and by invoking notions like function and being unsaturated—such passages, on their own, encourage a radically incorrect interpretation of Frege’s view. Taken at face value, these passages support an interpretation in which Frege’s aim is to elucidate a mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive distinction among the logical entities relevant to thoughts. If we could survey the “third realm”, as it were, we would be able to discern in some of its members the exemplification of a mark, say, the property of being unsaturated, in virtue of which those entities belong to the logical kind concept and the remainder to the logical kind object. On this first interpretation, object and concept mark an ontological distinction of logical kind—the expressions ‘__ is an object’ and ‘__ is a concept’ are contrasting, first-level predicates and the concepts they signify effect a non-vacuous classification of thoughts’ logical components into two mutually exclusive kinds.8

But a second way to understand Frege’s view becomes available once we move beyond the initial stages of his expositions. On this second interpretation, Frege’s invocation of the object–concept distinction is viewed as an oblique communication of thoughts’ logical

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8Many advance this incorrect interpretation. A relatively clear example is Parsons [1986].
articulation. That is, ‘concept’ and ‘object’ indicate positions or roles within the logical structure of objective thought. The distinction’s function is not to pick out or to signify logical kinds but is rather to indicate what I will call logical categories.

Peter Geach was the first to provide what has since become a widely accepted starting point for investigations of the object–concept distinction that conform to the second of our interpretations:

Frege already held, and his philosophy of logic would oblige him to hold, that there are logical category-distinctions which will clearly show themselves in a well-constructed formalized language, but which cannot properly be asserted in language: the sentences in which we seek to convey them in the vernacular are logically improper and admit of no translation into well-formed formulas of symbolic logic. All the same, there is a test for these sentences’ having conveyed the intended distinctions—namely, that by their aid mastery of the formalized language is attainable. (Geach [1976] 55)

This passage comprises three claims.

(i) Both ordinary languages and properly constructed logical languages cannot be used to make true (or even sensible) statements about the object–concept distinction.
(ii) Ordinary-language sentences can nevertheless play a heuristic role; they can facilitate the mastery of a properly constructed logical language.
(iii) The object–concept distinction can be discerned in the well-formed statements of a properly constructed logical language.\(^9\)

Though these theses are subject to a variety of subtly different interpretations, it is clear that Frege accepts them in some form. “If I want to speak of a concept,” says Frege “language, with an almost irresistible force, compels me to use an inappropriate expression which obscures—I might almost say falsifies—the thought” (Frege [1892/1997a] 174). Frege asserts slight variations of this claim on many occasions, for example:

I admit that there is a quite peculiar obstacle in the way of an understanding with my reader. By a kind of necessity of language, my expressions, taken literally, sometimes miss

\(^9\)These theses have attracted significant attention in recent years, attention due largely to their appropriation by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The principal concern of this literature is the distinction between saying and showing, that is, the question of whether a language can somehow show or display truths that cannot be said sensibly within it. Notable contributions include Geach [1976], Diamond [1988], Goldfarb [1997], Hacker [2000], Conant [2000], and Sullivan [2002]. In the discussion that follows, I attempt to elucidate the notion of a logical category while remaining neutral with respect to most of the difficult and contentious issues that encumber these debates.

So Frege’s initial descriptions of the object–concept distinction are, by his own admission, at best misleading and at worst nonsensical. There are two ways in which these descriptions are problematic: (i) they are problematic insofar as their grammatical subjects purport to signify concepts, and (ii) they are problematic insofar as they involve the grammatical predicates ‘__ is a concept’ or ‘__ is an object’.

First, when Frege says ‘The concept horse is a function with one argument-place’ or ‘The concept square root of four is unsaturated’, he appears to be making a claim about a concept. But, says Frege, this is not so. For a “concept cannot play [the part of grammatical subject], in view of its predicative nature; it must first be converted into an object, or, more precisely, an object must go proxy for it” (Frege [1892/1997b] 185; cf. Frege [1884/1953] x).  

So the grammatical subject ‘the concept horse’ cannot signify a concept and, in general, we cannot truthfully (or sensibly) say of a concept that it is a concept.

Second, when Frege says ‘No object is a concept’ the terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’, on his own initial construal of such statements, signify first-level concepts that take objects as arguments. This statement is therefore equivalent to a generalization, namely, that no object that falls under the concept signified by ‘object’ falls under the concept signified by ‘concept’. But every object falls under the first-level concept signified by ‘object’ and no object falls under the first-level concept signified by ‘concept’. This generalization is far from capturing a “distinction of the highest importance” (Frege [1892/1997b] 192). It is a vacuous triviality that is equivalent to the claim that no object is a non-object. Frege recognizes this problem when he says,

[T]he word ‘concept’ itself is, taken strictly, already defective, since the phrase ‘is a concept’ requires a proper name as grammatical subject; and so, strictly speaking, it requires something contradictory, since no proper name can designate a concept; or perhaps, better still, something nonsensical. (Frege [1906/1969] 193)

Though these sentences are necessarily misleading and possibly nonsensical, Frege thinks that they nevertheless provide “hints” (Anspielung) that can lead us to an understanding

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10I am less concerned with Frege’s invocation of surrogate objects, say, concept extensions, and the problems that these proxies create than with the claim that concepts are essentially predicative.
of the object–concept distinction.\textsuperscript{11} They can do so because they facilitate the mastery of Frege’s \textit{Begriffsschrift}: a topic-neutral notation for (i) expressing thoughts perspicuously, unambiguously, and in accordance with the laws of logic, and (ii) executing inferences validly. While this logical language is no better than ordinary languages for making statements about distinctions of logical category, these distinctions are reflected in the language’s syntactical segmentation and in the structurally determined ways in which we can use the language to express thoughts.

To see this, we must recognize the importance of Frege’s quantificational conception of logical generalization. Frege understood that there are two logically distinct forms of generality. If we employ the terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’, we can describe these two manners thusly: (i) there are unrestricted, first-level generalizations over objects, and (ii) there are unrestricted, second-level generalizations over concepts. But these descriptions are infected with the same tendency to mislead that we found in Frege’s initial characterizations of the object–concept distinction. They suggest that there is an independently grounded ontological classification of entities into two kinds—objects and concepts—that serve as the respective domains of the two forms of logical generality.

But what Frege is trying to convey is not a conception of \textit{logical entities}, but a \textit{logical conception} of entities. It is the laws of logic that fix exhaustively the conceptions of objecthood and concepthood that are at issue. Frege’s \textit{Begriffsschrift} reflects this logical conception in the ways it can be used to express generalizations. The notation has two syntactically distinct argument positions: (i) an argument position determined by proper names, and (ii) an argument position determined by predicates. The placement of variables in the former allows the expression of first-level generalizations and the placement of variables in the latter allows the expression of higher-level generalizations.\textsuperscript{12} This division marks a categorial distinction; \textit{Begriffsschrift} contains no variable that generalizes simultaneously over both types of argument position.

\textsuperscript{11}Two quotes: “On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible. There is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended” (Frege \textsc{[1892/1997b]} 182) and “‘Complete’ and ‘unsaturated’ are of course only figures of speech; but all that I wish or am able to do here is to give hints” (Frege \textsc{[1892/1997b]} 193).

\textsuperscript{12}In the notation of \textit{Begriffsschrift}’s contemporary descendants, these uses are captured respectively in the statements \((\forall x)F(x)\) and \((\forall F)F(x)\).
So to appreciate a distinction between logical categories is not to appreciate an ontological division among what there is. It is rather to appreciate the logical articulation of thought. This articulation is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly constructed logical language’s well-formed formulas and consists in its segmentation of two logically distinct forms of quantificational generality. Someone who has mastered *Begriffsschrift* or any other properly constructed logical language will recognize that the inadequacies of Frege’s initial characterizations of the object–concept distinction do not strip the logical categories they aim to illuminate of their significance. For the significance of these categories does not stem from the contents of sentences or thoughts; it derives from the logical structure of thought as reflected in the logically proper uses of language, specifically the distinctive ways in which we can use variables of quantification to express generalizations.

### 4.2 SELF AND OTHER AS PHENOMENAL CATEGORIES

This discussion of logical categories can shed light on our descriptions of experiential transparency and phenomenal presence. This is because the principal distinction our descriptions employ—that between *self* and *other*—resembles Frege’s distinction between *object* and *concept* in several important respects. In fact, *self* and *other* are what I will call *phenomenal categories*. I attempt in this section to elucidate this notion and to argue for the appropriateness of its application to the distinction between *self* and *other*. I first highlight five parallels between the object–concept distinction and the self–other distinction and thereupon fashion an account of *phenomenal category*.

#### 4.2.1 Five Parallels

*(LC1) Thought is logically articulate.*

Thoughts, logically, are at once unitary and bipartite. The unity of thought consists in subsumption, i.e. a logical nexus of two interdependent categories: *object* and *concept*. The object is that which saturates the concept and the concept is that which is saturated
Experience is phenomenally articulate.

Experiences, phenomenally, are at once unitary and bipartite. The unity of experience consists in phenomenal presence, i.e. a phenomenally appreciable nexus of two interdependent categories: self and other. The other is that which is present to the self and the self is that before which the other is present.

The logical unity of thought is not effected through a relation external to both objects and concepts.

There is not a third unifying element in a thought in addition to the concept and the object. The source of their unity resides within the concept. It is “essential for a concept that the question whether something falls under it have a sense” (Frege [1882/1997] 81).

The phenomenal unity of experience is not effected through a relation external to both the self and the other.

There is not a third unifying element in an experience in addition to the self and the other. The source of their unity resides within the self. It is essential for a self that the question of whether something is phenomenally present before it have a sense.\footnote{On the last point, compare Zahavi: “Subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito is, consequently, not a self-contained immanence or a pure interior selfpresence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence” (Zahavi [2005a] 308).}

The distinction between object and concept is not a classification of logical kinds.

The terms ‘object’ and ‘concept’ are not first-level predicates. The terms do not effect a non-vacuous classification of a domain into mutually exclusive kinds. For something one can think of to be (trivially) an object or (per impossibile) a concept does not consist in the exemplification of some property or the satisfaction of some criterion.

The distinction between self and other is not a classification of phenomenal kinds.
The terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not first-level predicates. The terms do not effect a non-vacuous classification of a domain into mutually exclusive kinds. For a sensuous element in experience to be phenomenally appreciable (trivially) as other or (per impossibile) as (a state/mode of) the self does not consist in the exemplification of some property or the satisfaction of some criterion.

**(LC4)** We cannot truthfully (or sensibly) say of a concept that it is a concept.

A sentence’s grammatical subject cannot signify a concept. Frege makes this point vividly when he affirms the sentence ‘The concept horse is not a concept’. According to Frege “the three words ‘the concept horse’ do designate an object, but on that very account they do not designate a concept” (Frege [1892/1997b] 184). Any attempt to make a singular claim about a concept will invariably result in a claim about an object.

**(PC4)** We cannot phenomenally appreciate (the intrinsic features of) the self (or the states/modes thereof) as such.

We cannot phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in an experience as (a state/mode of) the self. Hume makes this point vividly when he reports on his attempts to do so:

> [W]hen I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume [1739/1978] I.vi.6)

Any attempt to phenomenally appreciate the self as such in the same manner as we appreciate an experience’s sensuous elements will invariably result in the phenomenal appreciation of an element in experience as other.

**(LC5)** The logical categories reflect the basic forms of logical generalization.

The logical articulation of thought is reflected in the syntactic segmentation of a properly constructed logical language’s well-formed formulas and consists in its regimentation of two logically distinct forms of quantificational generality: first-level generalizations and higher-order generalizations.
The phenomenal categories reflect the basic forms of conscious awareness.

The phenomenal articulation of experience is itself phenomenally manifest and reflects the basic modes of conscious awareness: awareness of something \textit{qua} object and awareness of something \textit{qua} subject.\footnote{Though the distinction between the appreciation of oneself \textit{qua} object and \textit{qua} subject is quite old (e.g. Kant [1781/1998] B407 or even Aristotle, \textit{Metaph.} V.12 1019a15ff.), most contemporary discussions of the distinction stem from Wittgenstein [1958] 66–7. Prominent discussions include Anscombe [1962] and Cassam [1997]. The appreciation of oneself \textit{qua} subject is closely related to the epistemological thesis that some experiences ground self-ascriptive judgments that are \textit{immune to error through misidentification} (cf. Shoemaker [1968], Evans [1982], and Pryor [1999]).}

\subsection*{4.2.2 Phenomenal Categories}

Our investigation of experiential transparency (§ 3.2) yielded two interdependent formulations:

\textbf{(CT1)} The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are always appreciated as \textit{other}.

\textbf{(CT2)} The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the \textit{self \textit{qua} experiential subject} (or a state/mode thereof).

Phenomenal presence is the experiential nexus of \textit{self} and \textit{other} to which this pair of formulations refers.

To conceive \textit{self} and \textit{other} as phenomenal categories is to admit that these initial characterizations of experiential transparency and phenomenal presence are misleading. For example, the expression ‘as other’ suggests that there is some mark that a phenomenally appreciable element in experience exemplifies in virtue of which it is so classified. That is, the expression suggests that phenomenal appreciation is contentful; to appreciate a sensuous element as other is to undergo an episode that is evaluable for veridicality.

But this is not so. To phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in experience as other is not to stand in a relation, representational or otherwise, to an entity. Moreover, the phenomenally appreciable otherness in experience does not consist in an element’s membership in or subsumption under a phenomenal kind.
The sensuous elements in experience exist under the phenomenal category *other*. This attribution is not part of the content of experience but reflects the position of sensuous elements within experience’s invariant phenomenal structure. That is, the phenomenal categories *self* and *other* are manifest in experience but not expressible or expressed in experience; phenomenal presence does not make a claim about the world, not even the minimal claim that something other than oneself is sensuously present in experience.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) As with any analogy, there will be some disanalogous features. For example, one can judge without appreciating the judgement’s logical articulation. An experience’s phenomenal articulation, however, is manifest in experience and one cannot appreciate a sensuous element in an experience without also appreciating phenomenal presence.
5.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY

In this chapter, I will argue that phenomenal presence and the form of phenomenal, intentional directedness that it realizes are constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of experiential intentionality. There are at least three broad challenges to any account that would make phenomenal presence central to the intentionality of perceptual experience. After briefly presenting the challenges, I attempt to meet them in turn.

The Challenge from Sensuousness. Phenomenal presence is not necessary for perceptual intentionality. It is not in virtue of the phenomenal features of experience that one comes to be intentionally directed upon what one perceives. There are reliable causal processes whereby one comes to be perceptually engaged with the world and our sensuous states typically play an important role in these processes. But there are genuinely possible, reliable, causal processes by virtue of which one can come to perceive the world that do not involve any sensuous appreciation. Radical blindseers and non-sentient zombies are extreme “examples”. But even in normal cases, the sensuous features of experience are inessential accompaniments to our perceptual acts and an exhaustive account of perceptual intentionality need not appeal to such features.

The Challenge from Objectivity. Phenomenal presence is not sufficient for perceptual intentionality. Experience, if it is to be intentional, must present us with an objective world, a world of mind-independent, publicly accessible, enduring entities that are in principle re-identifiable. Phenomenal presence structures bodily sensations and phosphene experiences, but these and other “mere” sensations do not present themselves as being or qualifying anything external to phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal presence does not allow one to
transcend the “inner” domain of mere sensation and consequently cannot, on its own, direct one intentionally toward the objective world in which we are embedded.

**The Challenge from Cognition.** Phenomenal presence is not a suitably meaningful form of intentionality and it cannot carry out experiential intentionality’s rational role. We do not simply believe that the world is some way; we perceive that it is so. When we come to believe that something is the case on the basis of perception, we do so because we perceive that things are, or at least appear to be, that way. Phenomenal presence realizes a form of intentionality that is too far removed from the suite of cognitive capacities typical of adult human beings either to yield our contentful, perceptual engagements with the world or to be credited with this rational significance.

### 5.1 THE CHALLENGE FROM SENSUOUSNESS

Does the appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements play an essential role in one’s being intentionally directed upon an entity in perception? A negative answer to this question can be found, often explicitly, in a surprising number of philosophical accounts. I will focus on two philosophical movements that reach the same negative conclusion from diametric starting points.

#### 5.1.1 Naturalist Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality

The first source is a commitment to identifying intentionality with a physically respectable relation that holds between one’s token brain states and the entities toward which one is intentionally directed. Typically this physical relation takes the form of a tracking relation that obtains when one’s sensory apparatus operates appropriately in the presence of specific external stimuli. Various phenomena have been proposed as central to such tracking relations: causal covariation, asymmetric counterfactual dependence, teleofunctional indication-role, etc.\(^1\) But all such attempts to “naturalize” perceptual intentionality agree that it is a com-

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\(^1\)Early accounts focussed solely on “simple” causal relations and the registration of information, e.g. Dretske [1981]. Later developments have tended to incorporate a teleological aspect into their accounts,
pletely physical phenomenon. If one stands in the appropriate tracking relation to an entity and thereby registers information about that entity in a way that makes it available for the control and guidance of behavior, then one is intentionally directed upon, one perceives, that entity.

Within this program, sensuous experience’s role is not to ground perceptual intentionality but to serve as a causal intermediary between perception and various cognitive activities. To undergo an experience in which something is phenomenally appreciable is simply to acquire a (possibly suppressed) disposition to form immediate, i.e. non-inferential, beliefs about the intentional objects of one’s perceptual states and, perhaps, to acquire various recognitional and imaginative capacities as well. Moreover, the warrant conferred to one’s perceptual beliefs does not depend upon any operation on the sensuous aspects of one’s experiences but upon the reliability of the belief-yielding, causal process in which these experiences figure.

Is an exhaustively causal account of perceptual intentionality that does not involve sensuous appreciation achievable? I have already argued that many alleged examples fail to meet one or more necessary conditions for intentionality (§ 2.1.3.2). (i) An ‘accredited receptor system’ (Dretske [2006] 150) can extract, transform, and employ information about causally-covariant, proximal stimulation. But to register information is not to be directed upon an entity as being some way from a particular perspective. (ii) An organism’s perceptual system can involve veridicality-evaluable states that perspectivally represent a constant distal cause of variable proximal stimulation as being an instance of a particular type. But many of these genuinely representational states are neither attributable to, nor available to guide the activity of, the whole organism qua individual, the proper bearer of intentionality.

These exclusions, however, do not proscribe all of the non-sensuous states that a perceptual system can yield from intentionality’s domain. There is considerable evidence that individual organisms, not just subsystems of individuals, have unconscious, and therefore non-sensuous, perceptual states.

First, empirical psychologists impute perceptual states to individual organisms that may

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not be conscious, e.g. honey bees. These states attribute specific properties to environmental particulars, exhibit numerous perceptual constancies, and are integral to the organisms’ action.

Second, in some human pathologies, subjects who lack phenomenal consciousness are nevertheless able to pick out particular entities visually. For example, in cases of blindsight, psychological systems that exhibit perceptual constancies with respect to motion, location, and size enable individuals to attend to particular entities, attribute specific qualities to them, and actively engage these entities appropriately even though the subjects lack any relevant sensuous experiences.

But the point needn’t turn on whether there are actual cases of unconscious perception. Even if, in our own case, sensuous experience is always involved in our perceptual episodes, it is consistent with naturalist accounts of intentionality that sensuous experience is never present. For on this view, non-sentient organisms can in principle be causally related to worldly entities by means of a reliable, physical process that imparts the same cognitive abilities and confers the same warrant as our own perceptual processes do. If the acquisition of a disposition to believe or imagine a scene is only a regular effect of our sensuous experience, then this effect can in principle be caused by any number of causal intermediaries that altogether bypass sensuous experience. Moreover, when sensuous experiences do occur, their sensuous features will be explanatorily irrelevant to the directedness of one’s perceptually-based beliefs and actions. Chalmers expresses this well in the following passage.

To explain my reaching for the book in front of me, we need not invoke my phenomenal sensation of the book; it is enough to invoke my perception instead. When a concertgoer sighs at a particularly exquisite movement, one might have thought that the experienced quality of auditory sensations might be central to an explanation of this behavior, but it turns out that an explanation can be given entirely in terms of auditory perception and functional responses. Even in explaining why I withdraw my hand from a flame, a functional explanation in terms of the psychological notion of pain will suffice. (Chalmers [1996] 168-9)

3 See § 2.1.3.2, Gallistel [1998], and Burge [2010] for discussion of these cases.
4 It is unclear whether blindsight possesses inaccessible phenomenal features or lacks altogether phenomenality (cf. Weiskrantz [1986] and Block [2007a]). Either way, blindsight involves no phenomenal appreciation of sensuous elements. On blindsight and attention, see Kentridge et al. [1999] and Kentridge et al. [2004]. On unconscious perception due to other pathologies such as pagnosia and extinction-neglect syndromes, see Schacter et al. [1989] and Farah [1995]. For general discussions of unconscious perception see Carruthers [2000] 147-79 and Dretske [2006].
If experience’s role is exhaustively causal, then the sensuousness of such experiences is a mere accompaniment to the underlying causal chain that grounds the intentionality of perception.

5.1.2 Dual-Component Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality

A second source for denying the necessity of sensuous experience is the contention that experience’s sensuous elements are simply incapable of grounding perceptual intentionality. Several characteristics of sensuous experience have been cited as the reason for this impotence.

(i) *An experience’s sensuous elements are “internal”.* There is “no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it; they are one and the same thing. It is for this reason that we before observed, that, in sensation, there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt; and this holds true with regard to all sensation” (Reid [1785/1863] II.16).

(ii) *An experience’s sensuous elements are not representational.* Genuine intentionality is always directed upon an entity as being something or being some way and this ‘as’ essentially involves an exercise of a conceptual, representational faculty. The appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements is among the “non-conceptual states of consciousness.” So this sort of appreciation, “though it is a *constituent* of seeing something as something, is not itself a case of seeing something as something” (Sellars [1968] 10 and Sellars [1977] ¶48).

(iii) *An experience’s sensuous elements have no positive epistemic significance.* “Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” and so “the relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes” (Davidson [1986] 310 and 311).

I will discuss these motivations in §§ 5.2 and 5.3. For now, I only wish to highlight their consequences. These charges against the sensuousness of experience lead naturally, though not ineluctably, to a *dual-component* or *dual-aspect* account of perception. According to this view, perception comprises two components: (i) a phenomenal, nonconceptual component, and (ii) the exercise of a cognitive, conceptual capacity by virtue of which the
subject represents aspects of her physical surroundings. The first component determines an experience’s phenomenal character and it can play a role in fixing the references of one’s perceptually-based beliefs. But perceptual intentionality essentially involves the conscious representation of an entity as an exemplar or instance of some general property, relation, kind, or category. And for the phenomenal appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements to be representational in this way requires the exercise of an appropriate conceptual capacity. So perception’s phenomenal component plays no positive role in one’s being intentionally directed upon an entity; perceptual intentionality consists entirely in the other-directedness of the conception or ‘perceptual taking’ that is the actualization of perception’s second, conceptual component.\(^5\)

Though its pessimism about the viability of a non-conceptual account of perceptual intentionality places dual-component accounts of perception in direct opposition with naturalist accounts, both camps are equally committed to the idea that sensuous experience’s role in perception is merely causal. Sellars asserts that a perceptual taking is a “conceptual response to a stimulus” and that “having sensations is having causes of judgments, not reasons for judgments.”\(^6\) Davidson reaches the same conclusion.

What then is the relation [between a sensation and a belief]? The answer I think is obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. (Davidson [1986] 311)

Sensuous experience is typically involved in perception’s etiology and the sensuous manifold one appreciates in these experiences serves to distinguish perception from the non-sensuous thoughts it occasions. But these sensuous elements neither determine nor constitute perception’s intentional directedness and the appreciation of such elements plays no positive epistemic role in the formation of our immediate perceptual beliefs.

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\(^5\) The expression ‘perceptual taking’ is Sellars’ preferred phrase for perception’s conceptual component. Reid holds that perception’s conceptual component takes the form of a belief. Sellars sometimes contrasts perceptual taking with belief (e.g. at Sellars [1981] 89 n. 11). But he consistently treats such perceptual takings as being both ‘propositional’ and ‘doxastic’ (ibid. and Sellars [1982] 101; cf. Chisholm [1957] 75–80, 84–90).

\(^6\) Sellars [1981] 89 n. 11 and Sellars [1954] 205. Elsewhere, Sellars says that “the direct perception of physical objects is mediated by the occurrence of sense impressions which are, in themselves, thoroughly non-cognitive. Furthermore, this mediation is causal rather than epistemic” (Sellars [1963a] 90-1).
Dual-component accounts are therefore just as open to the absence of sensuous experience as are their naturalist rivals. Sensuous experience accompanies or occasions our intentional perceptual states, but this causal relationship is contingent. A non-sensuous causal intermediary could serve just as well in our coming to be perceptually directed upon the world. Reid recognizes this consequence explicitly when he says “[f]or anything we know, we might perhaps have been so made as to perceive external objects, without any [...] of those sensations which invariably accompany perception in our present frame” (Reid [1785/1863] II.20). Though sensuous experience is actually a component of human perception, a philosophical analysis of perceptual intentionality need not advert to it.

5.1.3 Sensuous Experience and Perceptual Availability

I will argue in this section, pace the naturalist and dual-component accounts of perception, that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in one’s being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I will argue that the appreciation of phenomenal presence that occurs whenever one appreciates a sensuous element in experience is necessary for perceptual intentionality.

We want to understand perception’s contribution from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject; we want to understand sensuous experience’s role within the subject’s perceptual life as it unfolds for her. Within this context, perception’s primary function is to afford its subject an opportunity to avail herself of the entities upon which her experiences are directed. To possess intentionality, a perceiver must be directed upon entities in a manner that makes them available, in a sense to be elaborated, as objects of attention, recognition, thought (especially singular, demonstratively-expressible judgments), and purposive action. I will focus on one of these capacities, the capacity to form perceptually-based singular beliefs. Experience not only prompts or disposes us to form singular beliefs but introduces novel entities into our cognitive purview by making them available as the objects of immediate demonstration.7 If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make

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7(i) Here and throughout, I associate singular perceptual reference with demonstrative reference. This move is not universally accepted (cf. Papineau [2007] 113–14). It is, however, convenient to make the assimilation and doing so does not bear any significant argumentative weight. (ii) The following argument does not depend upon the cognitive nature of singular perceptual thought. Perhaps we need to possess
an entity available to its subject and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. We can begin to grasp what it is for perception to make an entity available by focussing upon three topics: the dual-component account of perception, the appeal to phenomenal concepts, and the Russellian notion of acquaintance.

According to the dual-component account of perception, to perceive an entity is in part to perceive it as being some way or as being of a particular type and this involves the employment of recognitional or classificatory conceptual capacities. These concepts cannot be entirely general. Singular reference has to underlie and mediate exhaustively descriptive representations of particular entities. So the dual-component theory must appeal to recognitional/classificatory conceptual capacities that possess a singular demonstrative element, say, the concept ‘that shape’. These concepts single out (or purport to single out) particular entities as being of a particular type thereby enabling the deployment of general classificatory concepts, say, the monadic concept ‘red’ or the relational concept ‘lighter than’.

But all capacities, including conceptual capacities, are essentially dispositional. To possess a concept is to be disposed to respond selectively to what is antecedently in one’s cognitive purview. In perception, it is experience that makes particular entities available as potential objects of singular belief. So if experience is to execute this role, if it is to provide the materials upon which our conceptual capacities are exercised, it must itself be directed upon entities in a manner that is distinct from, and explanatorily prior to, the form of directedness involved in our singular perceptual beliefs. As John Campbell notes,

We are not to take the intentional character of experience as a given; rather, experience of objects has to be what explains our ability to think about objects. This means that we have several conceptual capacities to have singular thoughts involving demonstrative reference to particulars. Our present concern is the role perceptual experience plays in making entities available for singular thought, not the conditions for singular thought itself. The notion of perceptual availability at issue does not change when one shifts focus to availability for non-cognitive capacities and is applicable to the experiences of organisms that altogether lack conceptual capacities.

Though I disagree with several of the conditions Strawson places on singular reference, I consider his argument for the priority of singular reference over general (descriptive) reference to be persuasive (Strawson [1959/2006] ch. 1 and 114–117).

A. D. Smith arrives at the same conclusion: “the dual-component account […] is incoherent because it presupposes that a this-thinking has an object, while making the occurrence of that very thinking constitutive of the awareness of the object that itself alone gives cognitive access to the object […] For a perceptual this-thought to succeed referentially, our senses themselves must provide an object” (Smith [2002] 85, cf. 114).
cannot view experience of objects as a way of grasping thoughts about objects. Experience of objects has to be something more primitive than the ability to think about objects, in terms of which the ability to think about objects can be explained. [...] For experience to have its explanatory role, it must be prior to, and not require, demonstrative thoughts.\(^{10}\)

The non-conceptual component of experience, or at least a component of experience that does not involve the exercise of conceptual capacities for singular reference, must play a distinctive role in making particular entities available as the objects of perceptual demonstration.\(^{11}\)

There are several ways to provide a larger role for experience’s sensuous elements in one’s coming to be directed upon an entity. For example, one can hold that the concepts we employ in perception are *phenomenal concepts*. Most philosophers who invoke phenomenal concepts think they apply primarily to experiences. Phenomenal concepts enable demonstrative-like recognition and reidentification of experiential types on the basis of first-person phenomenological reflection; they have the form ‘that kind [of experience]’. The sensuous features of experience, *qua* sensuous, partly individuate (or are constituent parts of, or are somehow “quoted” by) these concepts.\(^{12}\)

But, as I have emphasized previously (§§ 2.2.2 and 3.1), phenomenological reflection in general, and the appreciation of an experience’s sensuous elements in particular, are metaphysically neutral. An experience’s sensuous elements may be, as far as their phenomenality is concerned, either sensory (instantiated by an experiential state), sensible (instantiated by an objective, mind-independent entity), or sensational (instantiated by an internal, mind-dependent entity). Freed from its restricted application, the introduction of phenomenal concepts allows one to accommodate the intuition that the sensuous qualities we appreciate in experience are tightly connected to the qualities our immediate perceptual beliefs attribute to perceived entities, regardless of the metaphysical category to which these per-

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\(^{10}\)Campbell [2002a] 136. Later, Campbell expresses this point in terms of perceptual availability: “So experience of the object should not be regarded as consisting in grasping a thought about the object, ‘in the mode: vision’, as we might say. Rather, consciousness of the object has to be a more primitive state than thought about the object, which makes thought about the object possible by revealing the object to you” (ibid. 143; cf. Coates [2007] 55 and Peacocke [2001]).

\(^{11}\)This is one way to maintain the basic Kantian distinction between sensibility and understanding. I will discuss “Neo-Kantian” views according to which experience is already conceptually articulated before being made available to our dispositional classificatory/recognitional capacities, e.g. McDowell [1994a] and McDowell [2008], in § 5.3.

\(^{12}\)Notable discussions of phenomenal concepts include Loar [1990], Block [2002b] (an example of the partial constitution view), Papineau [2002] (an example of the quotational view), Tye [2003a], Chalmers [2003], Stoljar [2005], and many of the articles in Alter and Walter [2007].
ceived entities belong. Experience’s sensuous elements, qua sensuous, partly individuate the recog- nitional/classificatory concepts we employ in our immediate, first-order perceptual beliefs. 13

But even if one grants experiences’ sensuous elements this additional significance, doing so will not make them essential to perceptual availability. For the introduction of phenomenal concepts does not preclude one from holding a naturalist or dual-component account of perception. One can maintain that the “references [of phenomenal concepts] are determined solely by the causal and dispositional relations an individual has to her internal states that are effected by an introspective “pointing in”; that is, by the fact that she’s in causal contact with a certain property and is disposed to reidentify it on subsequent occasions” (Levin [2007] 89). So an experience’s sensuous elements may partly individuate some of the concepts that figure in our perceptual beliefs, but when it comes to explaining how experience facilitates singular thought about the objects that fall under these phenomenal concepts, the sensuousness of experience is otiose. For,

any theory that makes the semantic powers of phenomenal concepts a matter of their conceptual role, or their informational links to the external world, or any other facet of their causal-historical workings […] will make it incidental to the referential powers of phenomenal concepts that they have the same phenomenology as their referents. Any such theory leaves it open that some other state, with a different or no phenomenology, could have the same causal-historical features and thus refer to experiences for the same reason that phenomenal concepts do. […] Phenomenal concepts do indeed refer because of their cognitive function, not because of their phenomenology, and therefore other states with a different or no phenomenology, but with the same cognitive function, would refer to the same experiences for the same reasons. (Papineau [2007] 125)

On this view, the sensuousness of experience is epiphenomenal to the causal/functional information-processing that both occasions and fixes the reference of our singular perceptual beliefs. Consequently, one can hold constant an experience’s sensuous features while varying

13Block endorses something like this when he states that we have, in addition to a phenomenal concept of the experience of red, the phenomenal concept of the color red (Block [2007b] 252). The present proposal is even more neutral in that it is prior to any distinction between experience and the objects of experience. Burge comes closer when he claims that, “associated with the intentional content of typical perceptual judgments is a phenomenal element that is part of, or at least necessary to, the content— inseparable from the way of thinking, or mode of presentation, of the perceived entities. A normal visual judgment about a visually presented red surface would have a different content—or would be a different visual judgment—if the phenomenal aspect associated with the judgment were relevantly different (though the different visual judgment might still represent a red surface)” (Burge [1997] 384; cf. Tye [2000] 49, Lycan [2001] 32, and Fish [2009] 10–15).
the properties that one’s phenomenal concepts represent things as having (by varying the experience’s causal/functional ancestry) and two “qualia-inverted” individuals can have distinct phenomenal concepts that nevertheless represent things as having the same property (if the experiences have the same causal/functional ancestry).

Our discussion has so far touched on three questions that we must be careful to distinguish.

(Q1) In virtue of what does experience fix the reference of the singular elements of one’s perceptual beliefs?

(Q2) In virtue of what does experience make this particular entity rather than another available to a perceiver?

(Q3) In virtue of what does experience make an entity available to a perceiver?

The account I have provided on behalf of dual-component and naturalist theories of perception provides an answer to (Q1). Our experiences register information about particular entities and our perceptual beliefs are systematically dependent on the (in principle nonsensuous) informational properties of these states. It is an experience’s causal/functional ancestry that grounds its informational properties and thereby fixes the reference of the singular beliefs the experience occasions. This answer is then brought to bear on the remaining pair of questions. To make a particular entity available to a perceiver just is, on this view, to occasion a belief that refers singularly to that entity and not another. And if experience can make particular entities available, then it clearly satisfies the weaker requirement of making an entity available. If correct, all three questions can be answered without an appeal to the sensuousness of experience.\(^{14}\)

But this response embodies a confusion about the present task. We are not trying to answer (Q2). The class of facts about one’s perceptual situation that determine which entity one is directed upon when one is in an intentional state is broader than, and perhaps need

\(^{14}\)The connection between information-processing, perceptually-based conception, and perceptual availability is made explicitly in the following passage from Evans: “[W]e arrive at conscious perceptual experience when sensory input is not only connected to behavioural dispositions in the way I have been describing—perhaps in some phylogenetically more ancient part of the brain—but also serves as the input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans and deliberations are also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a further link, we can say that the person, rather than just some part of his brain, receives and possesses the information” (Evans [1982] 158).
not even contain, those facts that determine whether one is intentionally directed upon an entity in perception at all. And accounts of experience’s role in fixing reference that would satisfy (Q1) shed no light on the notion of perceptual availability at issue. Perhaps an experience, in order to make an entity available, must meet those conditions that would determine the singular references of the perceptual beliefs it occasions. But to know what determines which entities an experience makes available to a perceiver brings us no closer to understanding this availability itself. In particular, it brings us no closer to understanding perception’s contribution from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject—how a subject, by virtue of undergoing an experience, is in a position to recognize or appreciate that she is directed upon an entity that is available as an object of cognition (broadly construed). (Q3) must be answered independently.

Those who recognize that the extrinsic relationships that fix the reference of one’s singular perceptual beliefs are, in the present context, explanatorily unavailing commonly advert to something like the Russellian notion of acquaintance in order to explain experience’s role in making entities available to their subjects. “I am acquainted with an object,” says Russell, “when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself” (Russell [1910] 108). For Russell, acquaintance is a primitive, sui generis relation that provides direct, infallible, non-propositional, and non-perspectival knowledge about (for the most part) particular entities. Fortunately, we can prescind from many of these controversial epistemological commitments. For our purposes, acquaintance is simply a relation between an individual subject and an entity that (i) affords the subject direct, non-conceptual, cognitive access to the entity and (ii) requires that the entity actually exists.\footnote{These two clauses are expressed well in Coates’ characterization of acquaintance: (i) What “grounds the claim that a particular object is seen [is s]ome form of intrinsic (and non-causal) connection which links the subject’s experience […] with the perceived entity, in a manner that is metaphysically necessary, such that the existence of the former is dependent on the existence of the latter” (ii) “The Direct Realist is therefore committed to the idea of some unique relation of acquaintance between mind and world […] The claim is that the object perceived is intrinsically related to the perceptual experience, and is immediately present to phenomenal consciousness, so that the subject becomes aware of it.” (Coates [2007] 75 and 86).}

The two clauses are not independent. The entity one is acquainted with in experience must exist because it is somehow an essential constituent of the experience whenever the relation obtains and acquaintance could not establish a cognitive connection with an entity, it could
not make an entity available to its subject, without this ontological connection.\textsuperscript{16}

As it stands, the core notions in this characterization of acquaintance are susceptible to naturalistic analyses that do not advert to experience’s sensuous features. There are numerous accounts of how an experience can occasion a belief that contains entity-dependent singular elements and there is no \textit{a priori} argument that the ontological connection that obtains in such cases cannot be explained in exhaustively causal/functional terms.\textsuperscript{17} But in the end, whether or not a causal/functional analysis of acquaintance is achievable is of little consequence. For neither entity-dependence, nor any notion of ontological constitution (be it physically explicable or metaphysically primitive) that underlies it, guarantees the kind of connection to an entity that acquaintance purports to provide. The metaphysical notions of ontological constitution and entity-dependence have the same basic shape as the metaphors of “intimacy” and “brute contact” that surround appeals to acquaintance. But this surface similarity does not make the former apt to explain the latter. Ontological constitution has existential consequences, but it does not by itself entail anything about experience’s cognitive significance; ontological intimacy does not entail cognitive intimacy. An experience’s (meta)physical status and the countless entity-involving relations in which it may stand cannot explain its role in making an entity available to a perceiver.\textsuperscript{18} And without this connection, appeals to acquaintance provide the most unsatisfying answer to

\textsuperscript{16}(i) On the present construal, acquaintance is what Timothy Williamson calls a \textit{prime} psychological relation (Williamson [2000] ch. 3). When acquaintance obtains, the “objective” relatum is an ineliminable participant in this non-composite psychological fact. (ii) This characterization of acquaintance covers a wide variety of relations. For example, McDowell insists that “\textit{we can} make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts about the environment” where ‘direct perceptual access’ picks out a relation that, were it to obtain, would make “an environmental fact directly available to one” in a manner that guarantees the existence of the entities that figure in the environmental fact (McDowell [2006] 228). Though this notion of direct access is a relation to facts and involves the exercise of conceptual capacities, it satisfies our characterization of acquaintance in all other respects. The irreducibly experiential relation of ‘experiential taking’ invoked by so-called \textit{primitivists} also counts as an acquaintance relation (cf. Chalmers [2004] and Pautz [2010]).

\textsuperscript{17}For example, if an experience’s sensuous elements are features of the experience itself, then what it is for a singularly-directed phenomenal concept to contain the particular entity it represents may consist in the physical inclusion of the represented entity within the token brain-state that implements the representation.

\textsuperscript{18}(i) Scott Sturgeon makes a similar claim about the invocation of entity-dependence in explanations of experience’s presentational character (what he calls the ‘scene-immediacy’ of experience) (Sturgeon [2000] 12–15; cf. Levine [2007] 162–3). (ii) If one restricts the class of entities to which one can be acquainted to sense-data (where sense-data are entities whose essence is constituted entirely by the way they appear to a subject), then one might be able to derive availability from entity-dependence. This is, in the context of the present inquiry, a desperate move.
our guiding question: experience makes an entity available to a perceiver because experience acquaints one with the entity, i.e. it affords a perceiver direct cognitive access to the entity.

We have not, however, exhausted the possible responses to our guiding question. The key to an appropriate answer, I will argue, is to be found in the notion of *presence in experience*. The appeal to presentation, in one form or another, is commonplace in discussions of perceptual availability. J. J. Valberg, for example, provides the following definition: “By ‘an object of experience’ we shall mean something *present* in experience.” He then goes on claim that “the fact of an object’s presence is what makes the object available for us [. . . and] creates the possibility of demonstrative reference” (Valberg [1992] 4 and 6–7). But we must move beyond mere postulation.

Experiential presentation may initially appear to be a dead-end. For many philosophers, including Russell, maintain that presence is acquaintance’s converse. After Russell defines acquaintance as a “direct cognitive relation to [an] object” he says,

> When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S.\(^\text{19}\)

If correct, the appeal to presence is no advance.

We find a serviceable notion of presence, I contend, once we focus on experience’s presentational character and on that phenomenon which I have argued is central to it, namely, *phenomenal presence*. When one undergoes a sensuous experience one appreciates an element *as other* or *as before* one; one appreciates a manifest opposition between *the self*—that before which the other is present—and *the other*—that which is present before the self. Phenomenal presence—this experiential nexus of *self* and *other*—is the manifestation of sensuous experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal structure. This notion is not acquaintance’s converse and it is only because of these differences that it can succeed where acquaintance fails. I will argue that phenomenal presence is central to perceptual intentionality by showing how it satisfies three constraints on an acceptable account of perceptual availability that our

discussion has so far revealed.

(A1) Perceptual intentionality (and the availability it affords) is both distinct from, and a prerequisite for, singular perceptual belief.

Our singular perceptual beliefs are directed upon particular entities. I have argued that the exercises of the conceptual capacities that figure in these beliefs cannot secure their own objects. It is experience that brings particular entities into our cognitive purview making them available as objects of singular reference. And if experience is to provide that upon which our conceptual capacities are exercised, it must embody a form of directedness that is distinct from, and explanatorily prior to, the form of directedness involved in our perceptual beliefs.

This priority is an explicit feature of acquaintance. For “[k]nowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths” (Russell [1912] 46). In contrast, the presence of a sensuous element in experience does not by itself furnish knowledge of any kind. But it does embody a basic form of intentional directedness. This distinctive sort of intentionality is pre-reflective (cf. §2.2.2). To appreciate something as other requires neither the possession nor the exercise of recognitional/classificatory conceptual capacities. So the form of intentional directedness that phenomenal presence realizes is distinct from the form of intentionality that the exercises of our conceptual capacities effect. This does not on its own show that phenomenal presence is central to perceptual availability or is a prerequisite for singular perceptual belief. But insofar as phenomenal presence does not presuppose the sort of directedness that it is meant to explain, it is not prohibited from occupying this explanatory position.

(A2) It is experience itself that makes an entity available to its subject and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must be able to appreciate that it has done so.

When a suitably sophisticated individual undergoes an experience, she can deploy successfully the concepts experience, sensuous, present, other, experiential subject, intentional object, singular directedness, etc. Some philosophers maintain that only individuals with
this extensive conceptual repertoire can appreciate the directedness of experience as such. For example, Burge claims that “we can identify the directedness in experience” but “being aware of—and even more, being able to identify—the singularity and outerness of singular intentionality as such requires tracking abilities and certain relatively sophisticated concepts of objectivity, as well as certain perceptual and conceptual abilities that connect one to purported types.”

But experiential intentionality and the availability this directedness affords cannot consist in these conceptualized modes of attention. If one is to conceptually discern and thereby attend to the intentionality of experience as such, experience itself must somehow make its very other-directedness available as an object of one’s conceptual activities.

Phenomenal presence can satisfy this constraint. First, phenomenally conscious states are necessarily states of an individual subject; phenomenal consciousness is consciousness for an individual. And if an individual is phenomenally conscious (in an intransitive sense), then there are necessarily elements in the conscious state that the individual phenomenally appreciates. These elements are conscious to/for the experiencing subject qua individual. In the case of experience’s sensuous elements, these elements are presented to, or present for, an individual.

Second, the form of directedness that phenomenal presence realizes is itself phenomenally appreciable. When we judge that something is the case, the judgment’s logical structure is not an object of judgment. But when we appreciate a sensuous element in experience we appreciate it as other, we appreciate its invariant (op)position with respect to our phenomenal selves. The intrinsic and universal orientation of sensuous experience is not appreciable in the same way that an experience’s sensuous elements are. But phenomenal appreciation’s scope

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20 Burge [2003a] 440 and 441. To be fair, Burge does make the following concession: “Perhaps there is another sense of phenomenal awareness of the singularity that would not require conceptual identification of that feature. Perhaps insofar as a singular usage involves consciousness, one might allow a phenomenal awareness of the singularity, even though one is not conceptually and identificationally aware of it” (ibid. 449 n. 7). Note, however, that the appeal to ‘singular usage’ reflects Burge’s contention that singular intentionality resides in the application of concepts, i.e. in the exercise of capacities for singular reference.

21 For Russell, acquaintance is essentially tied to phenomenal consciousness. But this isn’t necessary. Given our characterization, it is possible for one to be acquainted with an entity in experience (it is possible for a particular entity to be an essential constituent of the experience) without that entity being phenomenally appreciable (cf. Fish [2009] 16–17 and Chalmers’ distinction between ‘disjunctivism about phenomenology’ and ‘disjunctivism about metaphysics’ at Chalmers [2006] 53 fn. 1).
is not limited to experience’s sensuous elements and sensuous experience’s non-sensuous phenomenal structure, viz. phenomenal presence, is itself phenomenally manifest.

Third, the appreciation of phenomenal presence is pre-reflective. So if the availability that presence-based intentionality affords is inherent to the phenomenality of presence itself (which still remains to be argued), then the subject of a sensuous experience will be in a position to appreciate this availability simply by virtue of undergoing the experience.

(A3) An account of perceptual availability concerns not the entities that experience makes available but the nature of the connection between individual subject and entity that is inherent to experience.

Both dual-component and naturalist theorists maintain that perceptual availability is ultimately a semantic phenomenon (broadly construed). A particular entity is available to an experiencing subject because the experience’s causal/functional ancestry determines that entity to be the singular reference of the subject’s perceptual beliefs. But I have argued that we must distinguish questions that concern the entities we are directed upon in experience from questions that concern the subjective availability of these entities. We must not mistake an explanation of that which makes a particular instance of sensuous blue (rather than another particular) the entity one appreciates with an explanation of “that which makes the [appreciation] of blue a mental fact” (Moore [1903] 20).

Accounts that center on acquaintance may appear better positioned to illuminate perceptual availability. According to these accounts, an experiencing subject appreciates a particular entity only if that entity is a constituent of the experience. The ontological inclusion of the entity in the experience is what explains the entity’s availability to the subject’s cognitive powers. But again, I have argued that this approach fares no better than its causal/functional rivals. For though ‘acquaintance’ refers to the connection that obtains between individual subjects and particular entities in experience, this relation’s significance is exhausted by facts about its “objective” relatum. And the metaphysical position of an entity vis-à-vis an individual subject cannot by itself explain how experience makes the entity available to the individual as an object.

The difficulties that attend this pair of approaches have a common root. Whether con-
strued physically, semantically, or metaphysically, these accounts ground perceptual availability in a form of directedness that is fundamentally relational in nature. And all such accounts give explanatory pride of place to the relata upon which one is thereby directed. But perceptual availability must issue from experience itself, not the entities that experience makes available.

Phenomenal presence is suited perfectly to avoid these difficulties. For phenomenal presence is not a relation. It is neither a three-place relation—experience \( x \) presents \( y \) to \( z \)—nor a two-place relation—\( y \) is present to \( z \)—where \( y \) and \( z \) pick out members of distinct kinds, experienced entities and experiential subjects respectively. A subject may in fact stand in numerous relations to the entities she appreciates in her sensuous experiences. But the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes does not constitutively involve any relations.

It might be helpful to compare phenomenal presence with another non-relational construal of experience: the adverbial theory.\(^{22}\) According to this theory, to appreciate, say, an instance of blue in an experience is not to stand in a relation to blue; rather, it is to experience in a particular way, namely, bluely. The sensuous elements one appreciates in an experience are not entities one is purportedly related to but modifications of the activity or state of experiencing.

Though typically applied to experience’s sensuous elements, the form of directedness that is involved in sensuous appreciation can itself receive an adverbial interpretation. And if we were to interpret phenomenal presence adverbially, experience’s sensuous elements would drop out—whenever one appreciates a sensuous element in experience one experiences in a particular way, namely, presentationally.\(^{23}\) Experiencing presentationally, like experiencing bluely, is non-relational. Consequently, the former shares the latter’s existential neutrality—no relatum need exist. But the existential neutrality of experiencing presentationally is even stronger than that of experiencing bluely. One need not even advert to sensuous

\(^{22}\)The loci classici of the adverbial theory are Ducasse [1942] and Chisholm [1957].

\(^{23}\)This would allow one to sidestep many of the objections leveled against adverbial accounts of experience’s sensuous elements, for example, that adverbial formulations lack the compositionality of relational formulations and consequently cannot preserve the inferences one is able to draw from the latter (cf. Jackson [1977]).
modifications of the act or state of experiencing in order to fully characterize its nature.\textsuperscript{24}

Though suggestive, I do not endorse an adverbial interpretation of phenomenal presence. Adverbs are typically taken to denote one-place properties and phenomenal presence can be considered a property of experience only in a strained sense. Sensuous experiences are phenomenally articulate unities and phenomenal presence is the manifestation of this phenomenal structure. So experiencing presentationally is akin to expressing a sentence grammatically or making a judgment logically (cf. §3.2, ch. 4). If these structures or forms were properties, they would have no contrast classes. In particular, one cannot appreciate a sensuous element in experience without it being present as other.\textsuperscript{25} I’m inclined to think, in a Tractarian spirit, that even these expressions are problematic—the issue is not that ‘non-presentational experience’ is empty, it is rather that the very attempt to divide experiences into mutually exclusive classes on the basis of phenomenal presence is somehow confused. These issues, however, are difficult and would lead us far afield. For present purposes, we can proceed with the common core of our preferred interpretation and the adverbial theory: the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes is non-relational, existentially neutral, and is in some sense intrinsic to sensuous experience.

Phenomenal presence’s metaphysical and existential neutrality allows it to be manifest equally in both veridical and hallucinatory experiences. The form of directedness it realizes does not require the posit of uninstantiated universals, Meinongian entities, or merely intentional objects. Consequently, though it may initially sound contradictory, an experience does not need to be directed upon an entity for it to ground perceptual availability. The availability that presence-based intentionality affords is inherent to the phenomenality of presence itself.\textsuperscript{26}

Though sensuous experience always involves the appreciation of one or more entities—the sensuous elements one appreciates as other—the appreciation of phenomenal presence itself is not an appreciation of an entity but rather an appreciation of one’s \textit{being directed}.

\textsuperscript{24}Sensuousness may be necessary for presence. After all, it is an experience’s sensuous elements that one appreciates as other. But these elements are not constitutive of presence. The directedness of sensuous appreciation is exhaustively non-sensuous.

\textsuperscript{25}Nor can one express a sentence ungrammatically or make a judgment illogically. Putative counter-examples are sentences and thoughts in name only.

\textsuperscript{26}A similar view is put forward by Loar: “object-directedness is a non-relational feature that the hallucination shares with the veridical lemon sighting” (Loar [2003b] 85).
upon an entity. What one appreciates when one appreciates phenomenal presence is other-directedness in a pure and isolated form.

The appreciation of phenomenal presence is what allows us to transcend our cognitive isolation; it is what enables us to transition from mere relatedness to directedness. And perceptual availability consists in this difference. Without an appreciation of experience’s manifest other-directedness, one would not be in a position to accept, to take advantage of, the various entities one is directed upon in experience as objects.

Of course, what determines which particular entity, if any, one is directed upon on a given experiential occasion requires another story. And the causal/functional considerations we have discussed will likely play an important role in this story. But, as I have emphasized repeatedly, an account of how our experiences come to be directed upon a particular entity is not an account of what it is for an experience to be directed upon a particular entity, nor is the latter an account of what it is for an experience to be directed at all in the way that would make an entity available to an individual subject.

This argument does not undermine the notion of unconscious perceptual states. There are unconscious states that qualify as cases of perception by the standards of empirical psychology and I am not in a position to object to this classificatory practice. But it does undermine attributions of perceptual intentionality to these states. Without phenomenal presence, perception is incapable of making entities available to an individual subject and without this availability, perception is intentional in name only.

5.2 THE CHALLENGE FROM OBJECTIVITY

Is an appreciation of experience’s sensuous elements sufficient for one’s being intentionally directed upon an entity in perception? I have argued that phenomenal presence realizes a basic and genuine form of intentional directedness. But this position stands in stark contrast to the central tenets of a long-standing philosophical tradition.

According to the traditional view, intentionality is that which allows one to transcend the “inner” domain of phenomenal consciousness and become directed upon entities distinct
from oneself. Experience, if it is to be intentional in this way, must present us with an objective world—a world of mind-independent, publicly accessible, enduring entities that are in principle re-identifiable. The traditional view goes on to claim that this requirement is not universally met. Within experience, there is a manifest difference between *perception* and *sensation*. Perceptions are ostensibly directed upon objective entities and this form of directedness is phenomenally appreciable. Sensations, in contrast, simply do not present themselves as being of anything external to phenomenal consciousness; they do not even purport to be directed upon objective entities. Colin McGinn expresses this view succinctly when he says that

bodily sensations do not have an intentional object in the way that perceptual experiences do. We distinguish between a visual experience and what it is an experience of; but we do not make this distinction in respect of pains.\(^{27}\)

In general, the phenomenality of sensation does not admit a substantive appearance-reality distinction. To appreciate a pain, say, is *to be* in pain and *vice versa*. For sensations, *esse est sentiri*.\(^{28}\)

One way to overcome this problem is through supplementation. This is the approach of the dual-component account of experience. Such theorists hold that sensations and perceptual experiences share a non-intentional sensuous core. Perceptions, however, possess a second, conceptual component in virtue of which we are able to transcend this inner domain and become directed upon an objective world. But, as we have already seen, this view makes the sensuous elements of experience otiose with respect to perceptual intentionality.

A second way to overcome this problem is by rejecting the traditional categorial distinction between sensation and perception. Representationalists, for example, maintain that sensation is a variety of perceptual experience inasmuch as both are appreciably directed upon distinct objective entities. When you feel an ache in your foot, it is an entity within the objective order, viz. your foot, that feels a particular way. When we undergo such an


\(^{28}\)Note that this is not the only view that might deserve the label ‘traditional’. For example, there is a historically prevalent view according to which *neither* perception nor sensation is manifestly other-directed. Hume suggests that intentionality is not a phenomenally appreciable feature of even perceptual experience: “As to the *independency* of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the senses; but any opinion we can form concerning it, must be deriv’d from experience and observation” (Hume [1739/1978] I.iv.2 191).
experience, we appreciate a quality, a quality we strongly dislike, and we appreciate it as
having a more or less definite location within our bodies. The experience is not infallible.
There may not be a foot at that location, perhaps being amputated years ago. But the pos-
sibility of such error supports the view that the experience is associated with a determinate
veridicality condition that the world may or may not satisfy. Bodily sensations, no less than
the perceptual experiences of vision and audition, are possessed of objective significance.29

So though the representationalist rejects a categorial perception/sensation distinction,
she is committed to the traditional requirement of experiential objectivity. The represen-
tationalist and traditionalist disagree only about the extent to which this requirement is
satisfied. According to the representationalist, sensations and perceptions both possess inten-
tionality because both are manifestly directed upon an objective world.

The view I wish to defend occupies a middle ground between the traditional and repre-
sentationalist views. On the one hand, I am sympathetic to the representationalist rejection
of a categorial perception/sensation distinction. As should be clear by now, I maintain that
sensations possess intentionalty and do so in a manner that is phenomenally appreciable. If
a perception and a sensation are in any way sensuous, phenomenal presence will be equally
manifest in them both. Consequently, both types of experience possess an important and
phenomenally appreciable form of intentional directedness. On the other hand, the tradition-
alist is correct to countenance a substantive phenomenological division between perception
and “mere” sensation. The hybrid view I defend countences a division between perception
and sensation but does so only within the genus of appreciably intentional experience. That
is, the “subjectivity” of sensation does not prevent it from possessing intentionality. The
intentional directedness that sensations possess is not sufficient for experiential objectivity.
Experiential objectivity, however, is not necessary for experiential intentionality.

To argue, as I have, that we necessarily appreciate the sensuous elements in experience,
including sensations, as other than and opposed to ourselves may initially appear to be

29 The following quote captures the spirit of the representationalist approach: “The traditional view flies
in the face of the naive phenomenology of such experience [viz. bodily sensation]. When you feel an ache in
your left ankle, it is your ankle that feels a certain way, that aches. Now ankles are no less components of
the physical world than are rocks, lions, tables, and chairs. So at least to first appearance, bodily sensation
is no less concerned with aspects of the physical world—in this case one’s body—than are the experiences
associated with the traditional five senses” (Martin [1995] 268; cf. Armstrong [1962], Chisholm [1969], Pitcher
[1970], Gibson [1979], Bermúdez [1998], and O’Shaughnessy [1995]).
incompatible with there being any phenomenal basis for associating some of these elements more intimately with the self than others. But this is not so. There are several ways in which an appearance of subjectivity or interiority can be manifest in experience.

Consider phosphenes—visual experiences of variegated points and patches of light that occur when one presses one's closed eyes. Phosphenes, like all sensuous experiences, are phenomenally presentational; their sensuous elements are present as other. But they lack many of the phenomenal features of paradigmatically objective perceptual experiences: there are no phenomenally appreciable perceptual constancies, no opportunity for perspectival variation, no three-dimensional spatial locatedness, and so on. One could argue that the sense of subjectivity or interiority in phosphenes consists in the absence of these “objectifying” features.

Or consider perceptual imagination. The sensuousness of perceptual imagination ranges widely from experiences that are, as it were, self-induced hallucinations to experiences that are entirely non-sensuous. But if an episode of perceptual imagination is sensuous at all, it will be phenomenally presentational. Imagination often proceeds unbidden, but the phenomenality of imagination is, in general, subordinate to our mental agencies. We can directly bring about changes in the layout of the sensory manifold of an imaginative experience and we can appreciate just when we are doing so. One could argue that the sense of subjectivity or interiority in perceptual imagination consists in the appreciation of this subordinacy to the spontaneity of our imaginative capacities.

Finally, consider bodily sensation, e.g. pains, throbs, tickles, cramps, aches, itches, etc. One of the many phenomenally appreciable aspects of bodily sensation that supports the traditional view is what is commonly called the sense of ownership. When we undergo a bodily sensation, the region that apparently exemplifies the qualities we appreciate is not just one more among the objects of perception. It is not merely a body that we feel, but our body. This sense of ownership consists in our awareness of the bodily sensation as having a location within a non-sensuous, practically-constituted body-schema (I argue for this position in Appendix B (p. 106)).

The manifest senses of subjectivity or interiority that characterize each of these three types of experience are posterior to the appreciation as other of that upon which the experi-
ences are directed. One is not first confronted with an inner conscious domain that one must transcend. For one’s default phenomenological orientation is toward something other than oneself. That is, one not only appreciates sensuous elements in experience but appreciates phenomenal presence itself; one appreciates one’s being directed upon something other than oneself. Sensation is intrinsically, essentially, and manifestly other-directed.

So, at the level of the phenomenal appreciation of experience’s sensuous elements, there is no inner/outer distinction. Though there are phenomenal grounds for associating some of the sensuous elements one appreciates in experience more intimately with the self, all sensuous appreciation is primarily directed upon something as other.

Many maintain that genuine intentionality requires that one be able to be directed upon a single object despite its manifold appearances. That is, intentionality embodies a distinction between appearance—the sensuous flux of qualities immanent to consciousness—and reality—the pole of identity that transcends this multiplicity of appearances. We will, in the following section, discuss whether this manifest objectivity requires a synthesis under concepts. But whatever is ultimately responsible for one’s being directed upon an objective entity, upon an entity that remains constant through the multiplicity of its appearances, it should not be understood as effecting a transcendence of the inner but rather as a coalescence of meaning within the outer, and the objectivity manifest in perception should not be mistaken for intentionality itself.

5.3 THE CHALLENGE FROM COGNITION

In section 5.1.3, I argued that perceptual intentionality is both distinct from and a prerequisite for singular perceptual belief. It is experience that brings particular entities into our cognitive purview making them available as objects of singular reference and to be that upon which our various conceptual recognitional/classificatory capacities are exercised. This account focussed not on the entities that experience makes available but the nature of the connection between individual subject and entity that experience realizes. Without an appreciation of phenomenal presence, of experience’s manifest other directedness, one is not in
a position to take advantage of the various entities one is directed upon as objects.

But this account is incomplete. It is necessary for one to appreciate phenomenal presence in order for one to be directed upon an entity rather than to be merely related to an entity, but this appreciation is not sufficient for the entity upon which one is directed to be available as an object of attention, recognition, thought, and purposive action. Even if we grant that when one undergoes an experience in which one appreciates, say, the sensuous quality \textit{red} one also appreciates one’s being directed upon that sensuous quality, it does not follow that one is in a position to believe that something is red. For that upon which one is directed must be present in a form that allows it to be rationally significant. That is, it must be present in a form that makes the formation of relevant beliefs intelligible from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject.

Now phenomenal presence is the manifestation of sensuous experience’s basic phenomenal structure. So phenomenal presence occurs in the sensuous experiences of organisms with no cognitive capacities whatsoever (assuming, \textit{pace} Malebranche, et al., that sentience is not limited to rational animals). Insofar as an organism undergoes an experience in which a sensuous element is present, that element will be present as other.

This is consistent with the account of phenomenal appreciation introduced in section 2.2.2. There I distinguished phenomenal appreciation from other forms of experiential awareness: introspection, conception, and attention. For present purposes, the important aspects of that discussion can be reduced to two claims:

(a) Phenomenal appreciation is pre-reflective. To appreciate phenomenally an element in experience places no demand on its subject beyond that of being in the experiential state. In particular, it does not require the explicit exercise of any higher order capacity directed upon one’s experiential states including one’s recognitional/classificatory conceptual capacities.

(b) Phenomenal appreciation is not susceptible to evaluations for veridicality. An experience may possess one or more phenomenal contents, but this does not follow merely from the fact that one is able to appreciate phenomenally an element in that experience. The phenomenal appreciation of an element in an experience is neither correct nor incorrect; it merely occurs or does not occur.
So phenomenal appreciation and the form of intentionality it realizes are in one important sense non-cognitive. To appreciate something as other requires neither the possession nor the exercise of representational or recognitional capacities that are conceptual in nature.

But if this is correct, a new challenge arises. When we focus on the perceptual faculties of the rarified class of organisms to which we belong, namely rational animals, it is unclear whether this account has the resources to accommodate experience’s rational significance. For many maintain that perception, if it is to play a rationally significant role in our coming to believe that something is the case on its basis, that is, if the entities upon which one is perceptually directed are to be present in a manner that makes the formation of relevant beliefs intelligible from the viewpoint of the experiencing subject, must in some way draw upon the conceptual, representational faculties that are exercised in these perceptual beliefs. Our rational capacities must, it is claimed, be operative in experience itself if our perceptual beliefs are to be anything more than rational responses to intrinsically meaningless happenings.

I am, perhaps surprisingly given the preceding arguments, largely sympathetic to this concern. In this section, I will attempt to accommodate what is correct in it without undermining our core account of phenomenal presence and the form of intentional directedness is realizes.

One way to accommodate this challenge is to hold that the form of unity present in that upon which one is perceptually directed is the same form of unity that is present in one’s discursive, rational achievements. To judge that something is red is to exercise a faculty for discursive activity. The judgment which is the actualization of this faculty possess a distinctive form of unity. When effected linguistically, Frege calls this form of unity, this logical nexus of the interdependent categories subject and predicate, predication. When effected in judgment, Frege calls the very same form of unity, a logical nexus of the interdependent categories object and concept, subsumption (cf. §4.1). In what follows I will use the expression ‘predication’ to cover both.

To hold that perception and judgment share a form of unity is to take perceptual experience to be directed upon facts, i.e. to be directed upon something that is propositionally structured. This is not to say that perceiving is an instance of judging. I can see that
an apple is red without judging that it is so. But often enough I do form judgements on
the basis of perception and on such occasions what I perceive is identical to what I judge,
namely, ‘that an apple (or this apple) is red’.

Though perceiving is distinct from judging, it might still be the case that the conceptual
capacities that are operative in one’s discursive achievements are operative as well in per-
ceiving that something is the case. This is clearly incompatible with the view I have been
advancing. To be directed upon an entity in experience is for that entity to be experientially
present in a manner that allows for the exercise of discursive capacities. I have argued (§
5.1.3) that if experience is to provide that upon which our conceptual capacities are exer-
cised, it must embody a form of directedness that is distinct from, and explanatorily prior to,
the form of directedness involved in our perceptual judgments and beliefs. The recognitional
capacities that enable one to judge that an entity of a particular kind is present when one
undergoes an experience do not play a role in the experience making the entity present in
such a way that it can be so-recognized.

The variety of experiential intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes is a direct-
edness upon particular entities. For a particular apple to possess a particular shade of red is
not, unless one adopts a radical version of idealism, a discursive achievement. Moreover, it
does not possess a discursive achievement’s form of unity, viz. predication. For predicative
unities are susceptible to evaluations for veridicality; they are the sort of thing that can be
ture or false. But particular objects (used in the ordinary non-Fregean manner to pick out
worldly entities such as tables, chairs and rocks) are not evaluable in this way. Worldly items
are not true or false, they either instantiate or fail to instantiate particular properties.

So we have here two forms of unity that can occur between an object and a property:
predication and instantiation. But if we are directed upon entities that merely instantiate
various properties when we undergo an experience, we are stuck with the view that incites
the challenge from rationality. If experiential intentionality is a directedness upon mere in-
stantiations, then it must be the case that “immediate judgment is directly adapted to a
structure of some items in the environment, items selectively made present, but not synthe-
sized, by our “sensibility,” our distinctive capacities for sensory awareness” (Johnston [2006]
285). On this view, being directed upon an instantiation is no more rationally significant
than being related to an instantiation. It is just a form of the sense-datum theory that replaces mind-dependent instantiations with mind-independent instantiations.

So Mark Johnston is only partly correct when he remarks that “the “logical togetherness” of the property of being a cube and the cube is not the same in the sensed exemplification and the judgment. Instantiation is one thing; predication is another” (Johnston [2006] 284 fn. 16). Instantiation is indeed distinct from predication, but Johnston is incorrect when he takes instantiation to be the form of unity present in sensed exemplifications. When I perceive a red apple, I do not just perceive an object, an apple, and a property, a particular shade of red. That is, I do not just stand in a relation to an object and the property it instantiates. I perceive the apple being red. The latter manifests a form of unity distinct from both predication and instantiation which I will refer to as exemplification.

An instantiation of a property by an object is not a predicational unity, it isn’t the sort of thing that can be true or false, but it also isn’t the sort of thing that can account for the truth and falsity of what we judge. If an experience is going to be rationally significant it must “reveal things to be the way they would be judged to be in [a knowledgeable, perceptually-based] judgement” (McDowell [2008] 9). But the “way things count as being just where a certain thing counts as true to think” (Travis [2006] 178) is not the ‘way of being’ designated by instantiation, but by exemplification.30 That is, one must perceive something being red, and not simply be directed upon an instance of red, if this episode is to explain one’s coming to believe that something is red on its basis. Exemplification is a form of unity that allows experience to play a rationally significant role that a mere relatedness to property instantiations can not. Without this “sensible” articulation of that which is present in experience into object and exemplified property one is not in a position to relate the one to the other in a subject-predicate judgment in such a way that what experience presents can be the sort of thing that a judgment advances as true.

So that upon which one is intentionally directed in experience must possess a certain form of unity, that of exemplification, if experience is to execute its primary function, namely, to afford its subject an opportunity to attend to, recognize, and think about something other than herself. But this does not mean that concepts are present or actualized in experience,

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30 Travis makes the mistake of identifying this way of being with instantiation.
at least not in the same manner that they are actualized in judgment. In order to be directed upon an entity as exemplifying a particular property, one needn’t have the ability to judge the corresponding proposition; in particular, one doesn’t have to possess the concept of the exemplified property upon which one is directed.

It is still an open question whether these exemplifications are a product of a conceptual synthesis. For example, there is the view that “we could not have intuitions, with their specific forms of unity, if we could not make judgments with their corresponding forms of unity. We can even say that the unity-providing function is essentially a faculty for discursive activity, a power to judge. But its operation in providing for the unity of intuitions is not itself a case of discursive activity” (McDowell [2008] 7).

Though I am uncertain whether this view is correct or not, I am at present inclined to accept it. If true it would mean that experiential intentionality, even that minimal variety which phenomenal presence realizes, must, if it is to execute its primary function of making entities available as objects, be in part conceptual (at least in organisms with discursive conceptual capacities). But experiential intentionality would also, in part, remain irreducibly phenomenal. For while the form of unity present in that upon which one is directed may depend upon the exercise of rational capacities, the appreciation of phenomenal presence itself is not an appreciation of an exemplification but of one’s directedness upon an exemplification, and an appreciation of this manifest other directedness is an ineliminable and intrinsically phenomenal aspect of experience.

But there remains an additional sense in which one’s discursive conceptual capacities depend upon the form of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes. This is the topic of the next and final chapter.

5.4 APPENDIX B: THE SENSE OF OWNERSHIP IN BODILY SENSATION

Consider bodily sensation, e.g. pains, throbs, tickles, cramps, aches, itches, etc. One of the many phenomenally appreciable aspects of bodily sensation that supports the traditional
view is what is commonly called the sense of ownership. When we undergo a bodily sensation, the region that apparently instantiates the qualities we appreciate is not just one more among the objects of perception. It is not merely a body that we feel, but our body.

The representationalist assimilation of sensational intentionality to perceptual intentionality seems to preclude a satisfactory explanation of this sense of ownership. For according to the representationalist view, the objects and the modes of awareness involved in one’s bodily sensations do not differ in kind from the objects and the modes of awareness involved in the visual experiences that occur when one is looking at one’s body. Bodily awareness and bodily-directed vision are both varieties of what Sydney Shoemaker calls ‘object-perception’ (Shoemaker [1994b]). They are both forms of perception that allow one to identify one’s body as the object it is, i.e. to distinguish the physical object that is one’s body from other perceptible physical objects, to track it through objective space, and to reidentify it over time.

In an attempt to accommodate some sort of phenomenal intimacy in bodily sensation, representationalists have adverted to the exclusivity of our sensory access to our own bodies (e.g. Armstrong [1968] 307). But these moves only speak to the fact of ownership, a contingent fact that can be overcome, in principle, by prosthetic extension. The empirical and contingent informational links that obtain between our capacity for bodily awareness and the physical entity that is our body do not explain the sense of ownership in bodily sensation. Alternatively, representationalists often advert to peculiarities of the somatosensory field, e.g. there are no points within the somatosensory field that do not fall within the boundaries of the body that is its object (Martin [1995]) and the frame of reference relative to which bodily sensations are located lacks a single egocentric origin (Bermúdez [2006]). But none of these moves grant bodily sensation the manifest connection to oneself qua experiential subject that is constitutive of the sense of ownership.

I suggested earlier (§ 5.2), that the sense of subjectivity or interiority in phosphene experiences consists in the absence of various “objectifying” features and the sense of subjectivity or interiority in perceptual imagination is due to an appreciation of the experience’s subordinacy to the spontaneity of our imaginative capacities. This pair of proposals may be correct for their respective types of experience, but neither suffices to ground the sense of ownership
in bodily sensation. The suggested explanation of the sense of subjectivity in phosphenes consists in a lack of certain features. The phenomenality of bodily ownership, in contrast, requires a positive characterization. The suggested explanation of the sense of subjectivity in perceptual imagination is, in this way, positive. But the appreciation of the sort of mental agency involved in imagination is external to the experience’s sensuousness. A satisfactory characterization of the sense of ownership in bodily sensation should be more closely tied to the specific types of sensuous element we appreciate therein.

Fortunately, there is a positive characterization of bodily sensation’s phenomenal character that is capable of grounding the sense of ownership. First, I show that bodily sensation is necessarily bound with a particular form of phenomenally conscious bodily awareness. Second, I show that this particular form of bodily awareness is non-sensuous, non-presentational, and is of one’s body as belonging to (or being an extension of) one’s self qua subject.

The form of bodily awareness relevant to our question is organized into a body-schema.

**body-schema:** To possess a body-schema is to have an integrated set of personal-level, non-conceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a phenomenally conscious appreciation of one’s body. It comprises, but is not limited to, capacities to appreciate the structure, boundaries, disposition, and orientation of one’s body and its parts.

Body-schemata occupy a middle ground between two other types of body-related state: *body-images* and *body-maps.*

**body-image:** To possess a body-image is to have an integrated set of personal-level, conceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a (possibly phenomenally conscious) representation of one’s body. It comprises, but is not limited to,

(i) a set of beliefs about the function, nature, structure, boundaries, disposition, and orientation of one’s body and its parts,

(ii) a capacity to semantically identify body-parts and give verbal reports of what is going on in one’s body, and

Paillard [1999], Gallagher [2005], and Vignemont [2007] also see the need to make the distinctions between body-images, body-schemata, and the registration of bodily information, but draw these distinctions in different ways.
(iii) an integrated, multimodal perceptual representation of one’s body which includes a visuo-spatial representation.

**body-map**: To possess a body-map is to have an integrated set of sub-personal, non-conceptual capacities that, when exercised, yields a non-conscious registration of bodily information. It comprises, but is not limited to, capacities to register information about the structure, boundaries, disposition, and orientation of one’s body and its parts that is needed for basic homeostatic regulation and for many aspects of an embodied organism’s unreflective environmental coping.

On the one hand, body-schemata are like body-images inasmuch as both yield conscious states of bodily awareness. On the other hand, body-schemata are like body-maps inasmuch as both can arise without the exercise of the embodied individual’s conceptual capacities.

Bodily sensation and the body-schema are necessarily interconnected. For instance, we always appreciate a bodily sensation’s sensuous elements as having a more or less definite location. Now M. G. F. Martin observes that “the apparent location of a sensation can determine the apparent extent of one’s body, such that wherever one feels a sensation to be located, one thereby feels one’s body to extend to at least that point” (Martin [1993] 210). This seems right and helps to explain phantom limb pain, the projection of bodily sensations into prosthetic limbs and tools, and various sorts of proprioceptive illusion. One appreciates the boundaries of one’s body as encompassing a bodily sensation’s apparent location even when the correlative position of that felt location in the objective spatial order is outside the actual boundary of one’s physical body.

I will call the organized totality of locations one’s bodily sensations can apparently occupy one’s somatosensory space. The preceding claim can be expressed by saying that the somatosensory space and the body-schema are coextensive. That is, at any given time, the outer limit of one’s somatosensory space and the boundary of one’s apparent body will be the same.

So to appreciate a bodily sensation as having a location is to appreciate it as being within the boundaries of the body one is aware of in one’s body-schema. But it doesn’t follow that our capacity to appreciate the location of bodily sensation is what enables us to become aware of our bodies. In fact, the converse is true. Our capacity to appreciate the location of
bodily sensations presupposes the possession of a body-schema and the capacities for bodily awareness it comprises. The body-schema is the organizing form of bodily sensation and one appreciates the location of bodily sensation in somatosensory space only by appreciating its position in one’s apparent body.

So bodily sensation involves an appreciation of sensuous elements as having locations within the system of organized bodily awareness that is our body-schema. But this is not yet an account of the sense of ownership. For unless this form of bodily appreciation is an appreciation of one’s body qua subject, an appreciation of the bodily self one is as such, it will fall short.

The most popular representationalist views fail in just this respect. According to these views, the mode of awareness involved in one’s body-schema does not differ in kind from the mode of awareness involved in sensuous experience. This is implicit in the use of the term ‘proprioception’ to refer to this form of bodily awareness and the previously popular expressions ‘muscular sense’ and ‘innervation feelings’.

Consider the following illustrative passage,

In the case of pain, there is, I grant, a body[-schema]; and, in one way of talking, the pain in the finger is located on that part of the body[-schema] representing the finger. But all this really means is that there is, for each of us, a continuously updating sensory representation of the sort found in general bodily feeling, and that the experience of a pain represents the quality or qualities felt as unpleasant as being instantiated at a certain location within the body space represented by the former representation. (Tye [2005] 109)

On this picture, one’s body-schema is constructed from below, as it were, out of the appreciable locations of bodily sensation’s sensuous elements. There is no capacity of organized bodily awareness over and above the capacity to undergo sensuous experiences.

But the basic phenomenal structure of such experiences is that of phenomenal presence. The sensuous elements in these experiences are always present as other. And any form of bodily awareness that consists entirely in this sort of appreciation will, at best, provide an awareness of the body as an object, as something opposed to oneself qua experiential subject.

So our bodily awareness cannot consist in the appreciation of some novel and proprietary class of sensuous elements nor in the appreciation of sensuous elements involved in our other perceptual modalities. If we are to accommodate the the sense of ownership in bodily
sensation, the body-schema must be a non-sensuous, and hence non-presentational, form of phenomenally conscious bodily awareness.

A suggestion: it is not sensation that provides awareness of our bodies but our activity. Bodily awareness is not presentational, it is practical. This form of awareness consists in the exercise of a capacity to appreciate the space of possible bodily movements available to one at a given time. This involves (i) a general appreciation of the possibilities for bodily acting that come with having the kind of body one has (including bodily constraints like size and strength of the limbs, kinematical constraints like the degree of freedom of the joints, etc.) and (ii) an appreciation of which of these possible movements are available to one at a given time given one’s current bodily disposition.

This form of practical bodily awareness is non-sensuous and non-presentational, so it can be an awareness of one’s bodily self qua subject. What one appreciates in one’s body-schema is not appreciated as other; it is an extension of our bodily selves and we appreciate it as such. This systematic phenomenal manifestation of our capacities for bodily agency is the organizing form of bodily sensation. It is the appreciation of a bodily sensation as being located within our manifest, bodily selves that the sense of ownership consists in.

This is just the barest sketch of an account. And I endorse it only insofar as it enables an awareness of one’s bodily self qua subject. But it shows that there is in principle a middle ground between the traditional and representationalist views of experience. Bodily sensation is intrinsically, essentially, and manifestly other-directed. But we can nevertheless appreciate that upon which sensation is directed as belonging to our bodily selves in a way that the objects of perceptual experiences do not.
6.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND NON-EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY

In this final chapter I will discuss the relationship between experiential intentionality, in particular the kind of intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes, and non-experiential intentionality, the kind of intentionality that occurs in our paradigmatically non-phenomenal intentional states, e.g. occurrent, non-perceptual judgments.

6.1 COGNITIVE PHENOMENALITY

I mentioned earlier (§ 2.2.1) that it is increasingly common to attribute some sort of phenomenal character to judgments. This claim, in its strongest form, is that “[e]ach type of conscious thought—each state of consciously thinking that $p$, for all thinkable contents $p$—has a proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenology” (Pitt [2004] 5). That is, there is a specific phenomenality to thinking $p$, a phenomenality that is not appreciable in any other sort of conscious mental state, and a change in either the attitude type—from believing $p$ to hoping or wondering $p$—or the particular content—from thinking $p$ to thinking $q$—results in a phenomenal change.

Though I am suspicious of the arguments used to establish such claims\(^1\), this view can nevertheless be made consistent with the traditional view that denies phenomenality to

\(^1\)Many of these arguments presuppose a perceptual model for knowledge of one’s own mental states; a model according to which “[c]onsciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own Mind” (Locke [1690/1975] II, I, §19). We know which particular conscious thought we are having on a given occasion, the argument goes, by standing in something like a relation of acquaintance to the thought and it would not be possible to identify one’s thoughts in this way unless each type of conscious thought possesses a proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenal character (cf. ibid. 8 and Goldman [1993]).
judgments. That is, if one takes cognitive phenomenality to be nonsensuous, then one can maintain that a judgment’s total phenomenal character contains more than its sensuous phenomenal character. That is, one can countenance cognitive phenomenality without accepting a class of novel sensuous qualities that are only appreciable when one judges that something is the case or is in some other non-experiential propositional attitude.

This is, as far as I can tell, what many proponents of cognitive phenomenality accept. For example, one piece of evidence that supports the existence of cognitive phenomenality is what Strawson calls ‘understanding experience’ (Strawson [1994]). There is a phenomenal difference between hearing speech in a language that one understands and hearing speech in a language that one does not understand. But this phenomenal contrast ought not be cashed out in terms of sensuous phenomenal elements. It is not as if, in coming to understand a bit of speech, one comes to appreciate something like new colors or sounds. This is why Strawson can say that

the apprehension and understanding of cognitive content, considered just as such and independently of any accompaniments in any of the sensory-modality-based modes of imagination or mental representation, is part of experience, part of the flesh or content of experience, and hence, trivially, part of the qualitative character of experience. (ibid. 12; emphasis mine)

So whatever cognitive phenomenality amounts to, it does not consist in an appreciation of a novel class of sensuous elements.

This does not mean that one appreciates no sensuous elements when one judges that something is the case. In fact, it might even be necessary that there be “some phenomenal consciousness—some sensed or imagined what-it-is-like quality—in the individual for a thought to count as conscious in any sense” (Burge [1997] 386). But this sensuous phenomenality is not tied to the contents of one’s non-experiential thoughts and does not constitute, even in part, its intentional directedness.

Given that phenomenal presence is only appreciable when one appreciates an experience’s sensuous elements, it follows that the intentionality of one’s non-experiential thoughts and judgments need not involve an appreciation of phenomenal presence. Non-experiential intentionality is distinct from the kind of phenomenal intentionality that phenomenal presence realizes.
6.2 SELF-AWARENESS AND CRITICAL, REFLECTIVE REASONING

But there is, I will argue, a sense in which the intentionality of thought depends upon phenomenal presence. The argument I outline for this priority can be viewed as an argument against the possibility of angelic minds: finite beings that possesses a faculty for discursive, reflective judgment and ratiocination but lack (or never exercise) a faculty for experience or phenomenal appreciation.²

There are many ways in which experience could be said to be prior to discursive activity. For example, Kant thought that “[t]here is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our senses [. . . a]s far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins” (Kant [1781/1998] B1). But, as Kant here indicates, this is merely a temporal priority; experience is needed only because it in part supplies the materials about which one thinks.

In what follows, I will argue that experience’s role is more fundamental. There is a way in which an appreciation of phenomenal presence and the form of intentionality it realizes is a necessary precondition for the possession of the conceptual capacities one needs in order to achieve a first-personal understanding of non-experiential intentionality. Phenomenal presence provides one with an irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness, what I will call presentational self-awareness. Presentational self-awareness is not only a necessary precondition for the more sophisticated varieties of self-awareness that one can achieve, but is also a necessary precondition for the possession of the capacities one needs to be a critical, reflective reasoner. Consequently, experiential phenomenality plays an essential role in our achieving an awareness or understanding of ourselves as subjects of intentionally directed states. I will first set out the conditions that must be in place for one to be a critical, reflective reasoner and then argue that these conditions cannot be met without an appreciation of phenomenal presence.

²Given that the tradition typically takes angels to cognize principally by means of something like intellectual intuition, the restriction to finite, discursive intellects prevents the argument from having significant theological import. Angelic minds are also to be distinguished from philosophical zombies insofar as the former notion is not committed to any view about the material reducibility of one’s intentional states.
6.2.1 Critical, Reflective Reasoning

To possess a discursive intellect is not simply to be capable of a distinctively conceptual kind of intentional directedness. It also requires an ability to reflect upon these intentional states in a rational way. That is, one must be a critical, reflective reasoner—one must be able to recognize, employ, evaluate, weigh, and criticize reasons for one’s thoughts, judgments, etc. as reasons.³

Much of our reasoning occurs non-critically. We often reason in accordance with rational norms without appreciating the mental states so-governed as reasons. Moreover, we normally don’t reason about our thoughts but about their subject matter. Nevertheless, a critical stance directed upon our thought contents and the rational relations among them must in principle be available. Critical reasoning involves an ability to reflect upon one’s intentional mental states themselves. That is, it involves an ability to appreciate that one is intentionally directed upon a given subject matter and an ability to recognize that these intentional mental states are subject to certain standards of theoretical and practical reason.

To achieve this understanding requires, at a minimum, the exercise of two essentially first-personal, conceptual capacities:

(S1) the capacity to conceive oneself as a self, i.e. as a subject of intentional states, and
(S2) the capacity to conceive one’s intentional states as such, i.e. as being directed upon entities beyond themselves (or upon themselves qua other).

In short, to understand the intentionality of one’s states—and, therefore, to be a critical, reflective reasoner—requires the ability to think, in a distinctively first-personal manner, in terms of self and other.

The argument for the necessity of sensuous experience can therefore be reduced to this: one cannot possess the concepts self and other if one was never in a position to appreciate phenomenal presence, that is, if one was never in a position to appreciate a sensuous element in experience as other and as present before the self.

Now I have emphasized repeatedly that the notions of self and other employed in the explication of phenomenal presence are not concepts (cf. § 3.2). To appreciate a sensuous

element as other is not to represent it or conceive it as possessing some property or as belonging to some class of entities. Nor is the form of self-awareness involved in an appreciation of phenomenal presence, what I call presentational self-awareness, a reflective, conceptual achievement. But I contend that presentational self-awareness is required in order for one to possess the most basic form of reflective self-awareness, namely, apperceptive self-awareness, and that the latter is required in order for one to possess (S1) and (S2).

6.2.2 Presentational Self-awareness and Apperceptive Self-awareness

Let me begin with the relationship between presentational self-awareness and apperceptive self-awareness. The notion of presentational self-awareness has already made an appearance. In chapter 3, I argued that an appreciation of phenomenal presence provides one with an irreducibly phenomenal form of self-awareness.

Many agree that when one appreciates a sensuous element in experience, there must be a subject to whom the sensuous element is present. Frege expresses this well when he says:

The field and the frogs in it, the Sun which shines on them, are there no matter whether I look at them or not, but the sense impression I have of green exists only because of me, I am its owner. It seems absurd to us that a pain, a mood, a wish, should go around the world without an owner, independently. A sensation is impossible without a sentient being. The inner world presupposes somebody whose inner world it is. (Frege [1918/1997] 334)

But it is possible to maintain this while denying that this subject is itself appreciable in experience. For this is just what many, following Hume, assert.

To advance the view that there is such a thing as presentational self-awareness is to go beyond the mere claim that an experience’s sensuous elements are present to an experiencing subject. It is to claim that the self before which the other is present in experience is itself phenomenally appreciable. And this is just what I maintain.

Now the manner in which we appreciate the phenomenal self is not the same as that in which we appreciate experience’s sensuous elements. Sartre recognizes this when he claims that “[t]his self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something” (Sartre [1943/1956] liv). So to appreciate the phenomenal self in experience is not for the self to be present in
experience as other.

But this is not equivalent to the claim that the phenomenal self is no way phenomenally manifest. For the intrinsic orientation of sensuous experience toward the other phenomenally embodies its converse. That is, the sensuous elements in an experience are not just appreciated as other but as present to self. To focus, as we must, on the other in experience is *ipso actu* to appreciate its position with respect to our phenomenal selves. It is to appreciate phenomenal presence. So presentational self-awareness is part of what it is for a particular sensuous experience to have a presentational character. The phenomenal self is not something that can be isolated and encountered in separation from an experience, but is rather an essential position within an experience’s basic and intrinsic phenomenal structure. The phenomenal self is part of the phenomenal manifestation of experience’s essential directedness. And since phenomenal presence is not something incidental to an experience’s being, since it is not something that an experience could lack without ceasing to be an experience, presentational self-awareness is involved in all sensuous experience.

Presentational self-awareness is not the only variety of self-awareness. First, it is pre-reflective. Second, phenomenal presence is the manifestation of *particular* sensuous experience’s intrinsic phenomenal structure. The most basic form of reflective self-awareness, namely, apperceptive self-awareness, differs from presentational self-awareness in both of these respects. Though there are many varieties of reflective self-awareness, apperceptive self-awareness is the most basic form.

4Though one can interpolate numerous additional varieties of reflective self-awareness, the following is a fairly representative list organized in ascending order of sophistication:

(i) **Apperceptive Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself as a single, temporally extended, experiential subject
(ii) **Physical Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself (*qua* subject) as a physical whole with boundaries
(iii) **Embodied Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself (*qua* subject) as a single embodied owner of manifold, bodily sensations
(iv) **Agential Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself (*qua* subject) as a single author/source of purposive actions
(v) **Objective Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself (*qua* subject) as one particular object located among other objects in an objective, ordered world
(vi) **Personal Self-awareness**: awareness of oneself (*qua* subject) as a particular living, embodied human-being with a complex psychological history that has a location within an objective, ordered world of distinct physical objects and distinct personal subjects.

Some argue that awareness of the objective self partly constitutes apperceptive self-awareness (cf. Strawson [1959/2006], Evans [1982], and Cassam [1997]). Some go even further and argue awareness of the embodied or agential self partly constitutes objective self-awareness (cf. McDowell [1998c]). But no matter how complicated experiential apperception turns out to be, there is no form of reflective self-awareness that is more basic.
**Apperceptive Self-awareness:** an awareness of oneself as a single, temporally extended, experiential subject where (i) this awareness involves the exercise of a capacity to attribute diachronic experiences to oneself *qua* subject, and (ii) the exercises of this capacity for experiential self-attribution find articulation in uses of the first-person pronoun ‘I’.  

The apperceptive self is a pole of identity within the flux of experience; it is a principle of identity that stands apart from and against the manifold of changing experiences of which it is subject. Now insofar as the apperceptive self transcends any particular experience, insofar as it serves as a pole of identity for a plurality of experiences thereby uniting them as experiences within the same stream of consciousness, it is to be distinguished from anything immanent to a particular experience itself. It is to be distinguished, therefore, from the phenomenal self that is revealed through presentational self-awareness.

But this distinction is not, to invoke a bit of Cartesian terminology, a *real* distinction. Though the apperceptive self can be distinguished from the experiences it unifies, it cannot exist independently of them. The apperceptive self is, in Husserl’s famous phrase, “a transcendency within immanency” (Husserl [1913/1982] § 57).

The apperceptive self is transcendent in that it is opposed to experiences themselves. The apperceptive self *has* an experience. The phenomenal self is immanent in that it is opposed to that which is present as other within an experience. The phenomenal self is not something that stands opposed to the stream of consciousness, but is immersed in conscious life as an integral part of its very structure. And it is only by seeing the apperceptive self as constitutively dependent upon the phenomenal self that apperceptive self-awareness ceases to be of a merely transcendental precondition for experience, a notion that is easily jettisoned, and can become a form of awareness of something that is immanent within our experiential lives as they are lived.

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5This second condition is, of course, related to Kant’s view that “the unity of consciousness” finds expression in the ‘I think’ which can “accompany all my representations” (Kant [1781/1998] B131ff. and A346ff.).

6This notion of the self has been rejected by classical phenomenologists (Sartre [1936/1957]) as well as contemporary naturalists (Metzinger [2003]).
6.2.3 Apperceptive Self-awareness and Critical, Reflective Reasoning

An angelic mind capable of critical, reflective reasoning would not only need to be able to conceive of itself as a subject of multiple mental states. It would also have to conceive of these states as being directed upon something distinct from itself qua subject. I am doubtful that this can be accomplished without the sort of apperceptive self-awareness that I have argued requires an appreciation of phenomenal presence. For in the absence of sensuous experience, in the absence of the manifest otherness of experience’s sensuous elements, one can, it seems, at best conceive of one’s mental states as actualizations of one’s capacities for thought and judgment. The self that transcends and unites the various thoughts and judgments of an angelic mind would essentially be a principle of activity or spontaneity and the thoughts and judgments that are available for critical assessment would be modes or actualizations of that principle. Of course, thoughts can arise unbidden. But passivity of this sort does not amount to an appreciation of something as other than oneself.

A more thorough investigation of the resources available to the angelic mind would be required to treat an appreciation of phenomenal presence as not only sufficient for the possession of the capacities one needs to be understand one’s intentional states as such but necessary for it. But these remarks serve as a reminder of the high demands that accompany any such account and highlight the manner in which experiential phenomenality can meet them.
7.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY


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