Justifications for the Iraq War: An Analysis of the Government’s Public Case for War, 2001 to 2003

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This dissertation involves a content analysis of public discussion by government officials involved in the debate over the use of force against Iraq. Elite participants in government made public announcements to justify policy positions to constituents, educate interested participants inside government and external to the process, and persuade fellow decision-makers in government that the decision to use force against Iraq was the correct decision. Government officials’ public statements regarding the potential use of force against Iraq comprise the “policy primeval soup” from which the policy of an invasion emerged. This analysis examines how U.S. political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq from when President Bush took office on January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, the day the invasion of Iraq began. This research identifies aspects of the debate over which groups of officials most disagreed in the public discourse and how the degree of consensus or divergence changed over time.

Results demonstrate that there was little consensus between parties and branches of government in how force was justified against Iraq. As the amount of discussion regarding Iraq increased in late 2002, this degree of consensus decreased. Though Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq in October 2002, Republicans and Democrats in Congress differed significantly in how they discussed the use of force. These differences were smaller than the differences between Congress as a whole and the Executive branch. Nonetheless, the evidence collected here demonstrates that Congress was not acquiescent. While
the prevailing interpretation in congressional-executive relations is that Congress passively supports the Executive branch in foreign military endeavors, this research demonstrates that Congress was involved in the debate about Iraq and increased that involvement as the time for the Iraq Resolution vote approached, increasingly growing more hawkish. At the same time, the story of the Iraq war debate was more nuanced than the typical argument would suggest, namely that Congress tends to follow the Executive branch’s foreign policy. While the Executive branch exhorted war with Iraq more so than the Legislative branch, there may have been some enablement of this message from congressional Democrats.
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

Consent of the governed takes form as deference, active or tacit, gained at least long enough for the war to proceed. What comes to the surface later—including evidence of prewar deceptions and wartime distortions—may cause us to feel that we live in a society with freedoms sufficient to make sure the truth will shine through, sooner or later. But war happens in the interim—after widely told lies are widely believed and before the emergence of some clarity….

Norman Solomon, 2006¹

But the great lesson is that secrecy and surprise are the enemies of democracy; open and prolonged debate are the great power of democracy. The policies that have failed have tended to be those adopted by presidents without meaningful debate….

Stephen E. Ambrose, 1991²

The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was the first preventative war in the history of U.S. military operations. There is not likely to be policy and historical consensus regarding the decision to invade Iraq for many years to come. Much of the central evidence detailing the decision is highly secret, or at least politically charged so as to be inaccessible to researchers for decades. Thus, much of the current research regarding the decision to invade Iraq relies on an incomplete evidentiary record that involves cherry-picking from available evidence. Some critics of the Bush Administration have suggested that it settled on invasion before developing a strategy to

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build political support for the invasion and develop an effective set of contingency plans. Others, generally supportive of the Bush Administration, have argued that the decision to invade took place as a last resort, that the important decision was not settled until months after the congressional authorization of the use of force. There is another way to examine the decision to invade Iraq, however, one that does not require access to secret documents, insider retrospectives, or a narrow definition of when the decision to invade Iraq actually occurred. Content analysis of public discussion by government officials regarding Iraq is a useful analytical tool that can shed light on the deliberative process and the differences between what various government officials said publicly regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Understanding the debate is the first step to being able to explain the decision to understanding the decision to invade Iraq. The basic thrust of this research is a descriptive examination developed over a length of time regarding the debate on the use of force against Iraq. The two theses examined by this dissertation is whether Congress was acquiescent in President Bush’s decision to use force against Iraq in March 2003 and whether or not there was a level of consensus between political parties and branches of government regarding this decision to use force against Iraq. As will be demonstrated, the brief but significantly qualified answers are that both theses are incorrect.

The debate regarding the use of force against Iraq occurred over a long period of time, long before and long after the Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq in October 2002. During this lengthy debate, U.S. political figures and experts repeatedly made public statements concerning the propriety of using force against Iraq. These statements regarding aspects of the potential use of force against Iraq comprise the “policy primeval soup”
from which the recourse to force policy emerged. Elite participants in government made their public announcements to justify policy positions to constituents, to educate interested participants inside government and external to the process, and to persuade fellow decision-makers in government that the decision to use force against Iraq was the correct decision. In this way, the public speech of policy-makers in the U.S. government regarding Iraq constitutes the best evidence for how government officials deliberated regarding the use of force against Iraq. This analysis examines how U.S. political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq during the entire twenty-seven months of the Bush Administration prior to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. The goal of this research is to identify aspects of the debate over which groups of officials most disagreed in the public discourse as well as to identify how the debate changed over time.

In October 2002, President Bush praised the passage of an authorization to use military force against Iraq saying, “America speaks with one voice.” When signing the Joint Resolution, President Bush thanked Congress for its “thorough debate and an overwhelming statement of support.” The U.S. House had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq on October 10, 2002 with a vote of 296 to 133; the Senate followed a day later with a 77 to 23 vote. The 2002 Resolution was supported by Republican and Democratic leadership and passed both houses of Congress with margins much larger than the authorization to use force against Iraq in 1991. Some members of Congress, officers in the Executive branch, and many political

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4 George W. Bush, "President's Statement on Senate Vote," (Oct. 11, 2002).
7 The 1991 Resolution passed the House 150 to 83 and passed in the Senate by a margin of only 52 to 47. *Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution*, P.L. 102-1.
commentators initially touted the invasion itself to be evidence of a bipartisan foreign policy supported with a broad consensus. Examining the public statements of central U.S. policy makers of both political parties and the Executive and Legislative branches will enable an analysis to determine whether or not this degree of consensus changed during the 27 months prior to the invasion of Iraq.

To support the study of public governmental deliberation on the use of force against Iraq, Chapter 2 examines the system of government officials who are involved in promulgating foreign policy and the decision to use military force. The Constitution creates and constrains the Executive and Legislative branches, creating a basic framework for decisions to use military force. National security policy-making in America is a complex process that involves a constellation of actors and interests. As will be shown, both political branches of government have a share in the decision to use force, particularly with respect to justifying the use of force to other government actors in the system and the public at large. The President, the highest levels of the Executive branch involved in policy development, and the Congress are the most central actors in the earlier stages of the national security policy-making process. Together, the Executive branch and Congress wield near-plenary power in the formal enactment of foreign policy. A content analysis of public governmental deliberation regarding Iraq should therefore include the speech of both Executive and Legislative actors. Chapter 3 describes the source and methodology of the content analysis as well as the resultant data set while Chapter 4 provides the background for understanding the results of the content analysis and presents summaries of the descriptive data from the content analysis. In this way, Chapter 4 demonstrates the significant

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differences between political parties and branches of government and how those cleavages increased over time as the March 2003 invasion approached.

Chapter 5 addresses specific research questions regarding the public discussion of government officials where the unit of analysis is the group, namely political party or branch. There are three sets of research themes presented in this chapter. The first two themes are both essentially descriptive in nature, as opposed to inferential. The first theme compares Legislative and Executive branches in their focus on and attention to the problem of Iraq. Did groups of Executive and Legislative branch officials have more or less focus on Iraq during the two years before the invasion? Were there changes in group focus associated with significant events such as the 9/11 attacks or the passage of the October 2002 Iraq Resolution? Did the Legislative and Executive branches differ in how speakers of the two branches supported the use of force against Iraq? When and how did this level of support change? How do these changes relate to events such as the 9/11 attacks and the October 2002 Iraq Resolution? Was there a divergence or convergence in how much support for the use of force speakers of each group expressed publicly? Was there a convergence or divergence in how and how frequently the two branches made their assertions? Research in these areas allows for an examination of the notion that the Executive branch led the passive Congress toward war with Iraq using speech as an indirect measure for support for the invasion. The implication of this research may challenge the notion that the Congress acquiesced to or “passed the buck” by authorizing President Bush’s war.

The second theme repeats these inquiries with respect to the political parties. Did Republicans and Democrats differ in how and how frequently government speakers of each party made assertions about the use of force against Iraq? Did the parties, particularly Democrats and Republicans in Congress, converge or diverge in who and how frequently they supported the use
of force against Iraq?  Was one party more likely to discuss costs of the war or to make assertions about weapons of mass destruction and terrorism?  If significant differences are found between the parties regarding the use of force against Iraq, then this research theme may cast doubt upon the notion that Congress “spoke with one voice” when it authorized the President to use force against Iraq in October 2002.  Because the political parties can be shown to be different with respect to many aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq, this theme may also provide data that may partially explain why arguments that the use of force against Iraq was unwarranted did not prevent the Iraq Resolution from being passed.

The third research theme examines the potential relationship between political accountability and justifications favoring the use of force.  Who spoke publicly about Iraq more, elected politicians or their appointees?  Is there a statistically significant relationship between strong, sustained public justifications for the use of force and the level of political accountability of the speaker?  In other words, was the decision to use force the product of a debate by elected political leaders or was more support for the war expressed by their appointed surrogates?  If those who were the most in favor of force were appointed officials serving the President, then there might exist some evidentiary basis to support a claim that the Executive branch ushered the Congress into supporting force against Iraq.

In Chapter 6, the unit of analysis is changed from the aggregated unit of political party or branch of government to specific government officials who were most central to the public debate regarding the use of force against Iraq.  This analysis of individuals’ speech presents descriptive data regarding the most active government speakers.  Did certain individual speakers tend to refer to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the same public appearances where they discussed Iraq?  If so, were these speakers who mentioned 9/11 more likely to support the use of force
against Iraq? This study’s conclusions, implications, and directions for further research are presented in the Conclusion. It is hoped that this study might provide some empirical basis upon which arguments between the political parties and branches of government might be tested, as well as to buttress the notion that Legislative and Executive branch relations are more complicated and nuanced over micro-issues than simple, zero-sum theories of separation of powers suggest.

This content analysis revealed increasing preoccupation with Iraq and increasing divergences between Democrats and Republicans and between Legislators and Executive branch officials in how the use of force against Iraq was justified. The debate that occurred reflected less and less consensus on the use of force against Iraq. Instead of coming together, political differences between the branches and the parties diverged. This divergence along party lines, while regrettable in the gravest matters concerning war and peace, might be anticipated given increases in party polarization over the last decades. What was unexpected is that the data also shows that there was a lack of consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches as well. The divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches were greater than those between Republicans and Democrats. Thus, while Republicans in Congress did generally tend to support the president in the use of force, they did not match the Executive branch in the frequency with which President Bush and other Executive branch officials made assertions favoring war.

In addition to decreasing consensus, this analysis strongly suggests that Congress was not a passive or acquiescent bystander in the Iraq war debate. Some commentators have argued that Congress deferred too much authority to the President and that the Iraq war was an example of how Congress, consistent with the trend of the past half-century, chooses to defer to the
President in national security matters. To the contrary, this content analysis indicates that Congress was very much involved in the debate regarding policy toward Iraq. While Congress as a whole was not as supportive of the use of force as was the Executive branch, Democratic and Republican legislators often made arguments that advocated the use of force against Iraq or reinforced the Bush Administration’s basic arguments.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE DECISION TO USE FORCE

No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that...[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

James Madison, The Federalist No. 47

History has shown that a country most effectively speaks with one voice. To achieve this, Bush will need to form a close relationship with a divided Congress to build consensus on the critical foreign policy and national security issues facing our nation.

Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE), Spring 2001

This chapter presents an examination of the system of government officials involved in the promulgation of foreign policy and the decision to use military force. National security policy-making in America is a complex process that involves a constellation of elite government actors and interests. There are many different government officials involved in making decisions, reporting on decisions, justifying decisions, and communicating facts, plans, and goals that impact decisions, whether those decisions are made or potential. Such government elites obviously include the president, his closest advisors, and members of Congress. Also included in the foreign policy decision-making system are appointed Executive Branch officials and

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congressional witnesses, both groups that inform and influence deliberations as well. The Constitution creates, assigns powers to, and constrains the Executive and Legislative branches of government, thereby creating the basic constitutional and political framework for decisions to use military force. The first part of this chapter explains how both political branches of government have a share in the decision to use force. The second part of this chapter examines academic literature on the politics of foreign policy decision-making, including party polarization. Together, these two sections define public governmental deliberation regarding the use of force: what is it, who is involved, and how it relates to the legal and constitutional processes of legitimate foreign policy-making.

Congress voted to authorize President Bush to exercise his own discretion on whether or not to use force against Iraq in October 2002. The actual invasion did not begin until months later, in March 2003. Congress’ involvement in the decision to use force extended beyond the House and Senate’s roll-call votes. The content analysis of this dissertation analyzes expressed political differences that played a role in the decision to use force against Iraq, as well as how this political discourse changed during the Bush Administration prior to the actual U.S. invasion of Iraq. This public discourse is expressed by government elites in order to inform and educate the public and other policy decision makers, but also to legitimate the government’s policy decision. Thus, the public discourse that government elites publicly contribute in accordance with their constitutional roles may aptly be considered public government deliberation on policy decisions. The examination of constitutional requirements and practices regarding the use of American military force in this chapter will serve to provide context for the content analysis of public government deliberation presented in chapters 4 and 5.
2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE

The Constitution itself does not assign foreign policy power to a single branch. Instead, various aspects of foreign policy power are assigned to each of the political branches of government such that foreign policy decision-making is, at least theoretically, shared between the Executive and Legislative branches. The Constitution sets forth the bulk of Legislative branch authority in Article I, § 8. The Constitution assigns to Congress the power “To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and to make Rules concerning captures on Land and Water….” Congress is explicitly assigned the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a navy.” The Congress also is given the power to tax, borrow, and spend “for the common Defence and general Welfare.” All powers assigned to Congress, including war powers, have traditionally been construed broadly due to the last clause of Article I, § 8, a clause commonly referred to as the “Necessary and Proper Clause.” The Necessary and Proper Clause gives to Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers….”

Congress was designed to be a deliberative body, with congressional deliberations intended to produce policy outcomes through direct and indirect action. With one hundred Senators, four hundred thirty-five Representatives as well as several non-voting representatives, congressional structure and procedures exist to encourage communication among members for the debate of policy. The Senate and House have vastly different procedures regarding the structure of debates, but this is a function of the number of individuals involved in congressional

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activity. For practical reasons involving the amount of time available for discussion, the wide scope of Congress’ areas of responsibility, and the high number of participants, much discourse and deliberation occurs within congressional committees and subcommittees, including informal, private channels. Congress informs itself through the calling of witnesses who by virtue of their positions or experience have access to information of which Congress may take notice. Congressional witnesses may be called from the ranks of the Executive branch, private industry, or academia. Testimony is usually produced orally before committees, and often involves the incorporation of additional written reports. These witnesses inform and advocate, advising, shaping, and contributing to the congressional debate of policy. Congressional debate and the testimony of congressional witnesses may sometimes take place behind closed doors, but much of congressional deliberation, even on foreign policy matters, issues of national security, and the potential use of force, occurs in public. Later sections in this chapter will support this assertion when the focus is on decision-making and public speech by government officials.

The policy outcome of congressional deliberations may take several different forms, but the typical outcome involves the passage of legislation, an act for which the Constitution requires presidential signature or acquiescence. If presidential approval is not forthcoming, both houses of Congress can overcome a presidential veto with a two-thirds vote. All government spending takes the form of appropriations legislation, a power commonly referred to as the “power of the purse.” In addition to legislation, Congress may pass concurrent resolutions. Although concurrent resolutions are not binding, they serve an important communicative function.

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13 There is no substantive difference between the passage of a bill and the passage of a joint resolution—both may be properly referred to as legislation as both have the force of law under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 7 cl. 3. U.S. Ex Rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U.S. 470 (1889).
Concurrent resolutions communicate congressional will without Congress becoming responsible for the execution of that will. Individual members of Congress may have more flexibility in supporting a mere statement for the record as opposed to legislation.

Congressional work product also involves the oversight of other government entities and organizations, including the Executive branch. Oversight is not a power granted explicitly by the Constitution but instead is implied through Congress’ ability to create and fund the institutions of government. Oversight is as much consultative, involving the joint involvement of legislators and members of the executive branch, as it is an exercise of coercive and authoritative power.\textsuperscript{15} Political pressure, non-binding legislative policy statements, restrictions on funding, and informal advice are also important ways that Congress participates in foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{16}

Article II, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests “The executive Power” in the president. The Constitution states in Article II, §§ 2 and 3 that the president “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States….” Additionally, the president is granted the power to make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of voting Senators, to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” as well as to nominate and appoint Ambassadors and other senior Officers “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate….” In this way, the president nominates and the Senate confirms the most senior officials, officials who are likely to be involved in the most difficult foreign policy decisions. The Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, for example, go through this process, but Senate confirmation is not limited to Secretaries and other Cabinet-level officials.

\textsuperscript{15} Frederick M. Kaiser, "Congressional Oversight," (Congressional Research Service, 2001), 3.
\textsuperscript{16} Richard F. Grimmett, "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress," (Congressional Research Service, 1999).
Many other subsidiary positions created by the president and/or Congress must have their nominees confirmed; such is the case with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In all, more than 1000 of the highest-level Executive branch officials face some modicum of heightened political accountability from Senate confirmation. This includes Deputy and Assistant Secretaries and their highest deputies, including Deputy Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Senate confirmation even extends to those of higher level military rank, such as majors, colonels, and generals, though the lower ranks are generally confirmed as a slate. Often Executive branch spokesmen have ranks into which they are confirmed, as was the case for Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, who was the State Department’s spokesman from May 2000 through June 2005. Presidential Spokesmen Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, active during the first two years of President Bush’s Administration, did not have rank that required confirmation. Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also held a post that did not require Senate confirmation. All of these named senior government officials, whether or not they are confirmed by the Senate, played significant roles in the development, justification, and enactment of policy.

The few Constitutional clauses in Article II are the only textual basis upon which the president may rely when attempting to exercise legitimate foreign policy powers. Relative to the

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foreign policy powers that the Constitution grants to Congress, presidential foreign policy powers are vague. As has been pointed out by Professor Daniel Franklin, the ambiguity and imprecision of these few clauses regarding the president’s role in foreign affairs and war power, especially the Commander in Chief clause, has allowed the president to exercise a wide latitude of prerogative, often to a greater extent than Congress is able to exercise its authority.19 There is some evidence that the founders deliberately made this relationship ambiguous; the president should have the flexibility to protect the nation in cases of actual or impending attack, and yet in cases where the degree of choice to resort to armed conflict was higher, then the legislature would be involved in any decision to resort to force.20

The U.S. Constitution does not grant any single branch of government sole authority over foreign affairs or war powers, the rhetoric of the “unitary” executive theorists and congressional supremacists notwithstanding.21 The Legislative and Executive branches are each assigned various aspects of the decision to use force in order to avoid a dangerous concentration of too much power within a single branch. As James Madison explained in the Pacificus-Helvidius debate with Alexander Hamilton, war powers were distributed between the president and Congress in contrast to the power of the British monarch, whose Executive authority was broader than the American president’s:

Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.22

Thus, with constitutional text and the original intent of the founders to ensure that decisions to resort to war include both Congress and the president, it would seem that both should be included in an inquiry into the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003.

2.2 PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

This constitutional division of foreign policy and war powers has been the cause of much constitutional tension as various presidents and congressional leaders have tried to operationalize the requirement in ways that advantage their own political ends as well as enhance the institution of which they are a part. The opinions offered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the rare foreign policy and constitutional law case are not easily reconciled. The two lines of cases, following Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., seem to offer two contradictory explanations of congressional and Executive branch separation of powers in foreign policy.23 Curtiss-Wright is generally interpreted as supporting expansive presidential authority in foreign affairs, while Youngstown Sheet & Tube stands for a more fettered president and a foreign policy power that involves both political branches of government.

In *Curtiss-Wright*, the Supreme Court upheld President Roosevelt’s proclamation forbidding the export of military use items to Bolivia and Paraguay with a vote of 8-1. One of the arguments that the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation had made in opposition to its prosecution for the export of fifteen machine guns was that the prosecution was not made pursuant to law and therefore represented an unlawful presidential exercise of discretion. Congress had authorized FDR to outlaw the export of arms in a joint resolution if the president were to make a finding that cutting off arms exports to the area would assist in the establishment of peace in that area. Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion upheld FDR’s presidential proclamation, but Sutherland did so with a broad rhetoric supportive of strong presidential discretion in foreign affairs. Sutherland wrote:

> It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the president by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.\(^\text{24}\)

Citing a speech in the House of Representatives in 1800 by then Rep. James Marshall, Sutherland’s reference to the president as the “sole organ” in international affairs is often used to support expansive presidential authority.\(^\text{25}\) If this argument were pressed to the extreme, it would make no sense—the president could not have plenary or near-plenary power in foreign affairs, because the Constitution clearly assigns treaty ratification power to the Senate and the power to declare war to Congress as a whole. Additionally, the “sole organ” portion of Justice

\(^\text{24}\) *Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation v. United States*, 319-20.

\(^\text{25}\) See, e.g., John Yoo, "Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President," (Department of Justice, 2001), 1.
Sutherland’s opinion may very well constitute dicta.\textsuperscript{26} The legal footing of \textit{Curtiss-Wright} is more sound in the portion of the opinion where Sutherland disposes of Curtiss-Wright Export’s case by holding that Congress may delegate broader discretion in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs, and that by passing the joint resolution that authorized FDR’s proclamation, Congress had delegated just such a wide amount of discretion to FDR. Nonetheless, \textit{Curtiss-Wright} is usually cited as supportive of independent and inherent presidential authority in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Youngstown Sheet & Tube} presents a somewhat more circumscribed presidential power than does \textit{Curtiss-Wright}. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recognized Congress’ significant role in policy-making in \textit{Youngstown}, even in situations when the president has relied on the “Commander in Chief” clause to legitimate an action. Justice Black’s 6-3 majority opinion held against President Truman, who had attempted to commandeer steel mills to avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers. Truman had argued that the nation needed to continue steel production during the “national emergency” of war in Korea, and premised the legal legitimacy of his steel mill seizures “by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States.”\textsuperscript{28} In this way, the \textit{Youngstown} decision directly concerns inherent presidential authority under the Constitution and its relationship to the enumerated and implied powers the Constitution provides to Congress.

Justice Black’s majority opinion held that Truman’s seizure of private property could not be sustained because the president’s Commander in Chief authority meant control over day-to-

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer}, 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{27} Louis Fisher, "Presidential Inherent Power: The "Sole Organ" Doctrine," \textit{Presidential Studies Quarterly} 37, no. 1 (2007): 151. A close reading of Curtiss-Wright, however, would indicate that the case is more about the delegation of authority to the president through statute (joint resolution in this case) rather than the inherent authority of the president. To Fisher, the passages that support broad presidential power are dicta. See also Louis Fisher, "President's Game? History Refutes Claim to Unlimited Power over Foreign Affairs," \textit{Legal Times} (2006).
\textsuperscript{28} Truman ordered the steel mills seizure in Executive Order 10340. \textit{Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer}. 
day fighting in the theater of war. Such power did not include the power to commandeer private
property far from that theater. Moreover, Black found that the president’s role is not a law
maker, but someone whose primary power is “to see that laws are faithfully executed.”\textsuperscript{29}
Truman’s attempted seizure usurped Congress’ power to make laws. Congress had enacted
procedures via the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Defense Production Act
1950 that might have facilitated the government’s ending the dispute and keeping the mills
operating. President Truman, however, had argued that the Act’s requirements were “much too
cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”\textsuperscript{30} To Justice
Black, Truman’s attempt to seize steel mills “does not direct that a congressional policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in
a manner prescribed by the President.”\textsuperscript{31} Wartime necessity did not allow the Commander in
Chief to substitute presidential policy for legislation.

While much of Black’s majority opinion relied upon the traditional notion that the
president and Congress have separate roles and legitimate powers, Justice Jackson’s concurring
opinion sets forth a framework of integration. Jackson characterized governmental action
requiring interaction between branches as “separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.”\textsuperscript{32} The implication of this arrangement, which Justice Jackson pointed out
explicitly, was that, “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”\textsuperscript{33} Jackson provides a framework for
balancing presidential and congressional power: presidential power is greatest when the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 587.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 586.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 588.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 635.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
The Constitution makes foreign policy a concurrent power of both Congress and the president. While there are certain foreign policy tasks that only Congress or the president can do—only Congress can “declare war” while the president “makes treaties” with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, for example—foreign policy as a whole fits comfortably into Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” where the president and Congress have concurrent power. Jackson does not say so exactly, but legitimate resolution of such situations where power distribution between Congress and the president is uncertain is going to occur through legitimate political machinations, such that involves deliberation between the branches.

The difficulty with foreign policy and war powers as allocated in the U.S. Constitution is that the text lacks the kind of specificity or bright-line rule that modern commentators would like to see in a fundamental document. Jackson’s framework offers little specificity in resolving

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 637.
36 Ibid., 636.
37 Ibid.
“zone of twilight” issues involved with concurrent jurisdiction. Can the president negotiate and the Senate ratify a treaty that changes the constitutionality of enacted foreign policy or future congressional decisions involving war and peace? Are there limits upon the president to put American troops into situations where war is substantially likely to break out? Can either branch initiate war, and in what circumstances (if any) is this power limited? Having become embroiled in a war, what can happen when the political branches of government are at odds with each other? How much congressional “meddling” in presidential Commander in Chief prerogative is too much? How does constitutional theory comport with constitutional practice? Since only Congress can declare war, is it significant that no wars since World War II have been explicitly “declared?” Commentators have resolved these “zone of twilight” issues in various ways, though nearly all agree that the 1973 War Powers Resolution reflects the rare exception to the modern trend that the president operates at the center of U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

Since World War II, foreign policy has been dominated by the president.\(^\text{38}\) In the Korean War, apprehension of a global and aggressive Communist subversion and the consequences of leaving that threat unchecked led to President Truman’s decision to engage U.S. forces there in late June 1950.\(^\text{39}\) While the U.S. did act within the United Nations Charter, the decision to take action was primarily a presidential one. Truman did consult with congressional leaders, but he did not seek congressional authorization to use military force in Korea. President Truman worried congressional debate would delay and possibly lead to political stalemate too close to

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 congressional elections. Similarly, the Vietnam War also was initiated largely through presidential discretion. Although Congress did authorize the use of force in Vietnam by way of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, this activity was a mere fig leaf that served to cloak the presidential use of force with legality just as it served to obscure congressional deference to the president. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was premised on an attack on U.S. warships that likely did not take place, on a Manichean worldview toward the threat of Communist aggression, and on the perceived consequences of falling dominoes.

More contemporary presidents have also sought to establish themselves as the sole decider in decisions to use force. President Clinton argued that as president he had the unilateral power to order air strikes on Baghdad in 1993 as well as to engage U.S. forces in Haiti in 1994. In a 1994 press conference, Clinton argued, “Like my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get [the congressional support].” Even when President George W. Bush signed the October 2002 authorization to use force against Iraq, Bush issued a signing statement in which he claimed that his signature did not reflect a change in “the President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” President Bush gave an ultimatum in a nationally televised speech 48 hours prior to the invasion,

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41 Tonkin Gulf Resolution; Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, August 7, 1964.
45 Bush, "President Signs Iraq Resolution."
in which he referred to the duty “to use force in assuring [U.S.] national security” that fell to him, as Commander in Chief.  

2.3 THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

The high point of congressional attempts to regain political control over decisions to use force was the passage of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 over the veto of President Nixon. The Act seeks to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply” to the introduction of armed force into hostilities or situations where armed conflict is imminent. To accomplish this end, the War Powers Resolution describes the president’s constitutional Commander in Chief power as limited to allowing the introduction of U.S. forces only in situations where Congress has declared war, where Congress has given specific authorization, or in situations where an armed attack has occurred. The president “shall terminate” any use of force after 60 days unless Congress has declared war or has otherwise authorized the use of force continuing, or the Congress is unable to meet due to an attack upon the United States. The Act mandates regular consultation with Congress, including through the submission of periodic reports in cases where war was not specifically declared.

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48 Ibid., § 1541(a)
49 Ibid., § 1541(c). The Act does not contemplate any change to the constitutional status quo, holding explicitly that “Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President....” Ibid., § 1547(d)(1).
50 Ibid., § 1544(b). The 60 days may be extended to 90 if the President certifies in writing regarding the military necessity of continued action.
51 Ibid., § 1543(a).
One significant problem with the War Powers Resolution is that the mechanism whereby Congress might mandate the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities after the passage of a concurrent resolution is constitutionally suspect. This procedure has never been tested in practice or before a court; nonetheless there exists widespread doubt whether or not the concurrent resolution procedure in the War Powers Resolution is constitutional. In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a similar “legislative veto” procedure whereby a single House of Congress claimed the power to invalidate an exercise of delegated executive authority in *I.N.S. v. Chadha*. The Court’s holding rested on the notion that for legislation to be considered constitutional, it must pass through the procedure outlined in Article I of the Constitution—namely, that passage by both houses of Congress and presidential presentment is required for a bill to become a law. Dissenting Justice White explicitly referred to the concurrent resolution procedure in the War Powers Resolution in support of the legislative veto. Following *Chadha*, Congress amended the applicability of the concurrent resolution procedure by substituting a joint resolution, but Congress did so in a State Department Authorization bill without explicitly revising the Act. Regardless of the possible constitutional problem concerning the concurrent resolution procedure, the substantive provisions of the War Powers Resolution would not be invalidated as provisions in the act are separable.

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52 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c)  
55 Ibid., 970 - 71.  
57 Ibid., § 1548.
The War Powers Resolution has done little to change the importance of the presidency in establishing foreign policy and determining when the use of force is appropriate.\(^{58}\) Since the War Powers Resolution came into force, over 100 reports have been issued to Congress regarding the introduction of troops into a potentially hostile situation, but only one has referred to the time limits imposed by the act, and many of these reports came well after U.S. forces had been introduced.\(^{59}\) Every president since Nixon has claimed that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon presidential prerogatives as Commander in Chief.\(^{60}\) The statute’s requirements are somewhat vague. The statute provides no explicit mechanism for determining when the 60-day maximum clock begins, or how much consultation is enough to satisfy the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, or even with whom such consultation should occur. These questions are generally not justiciable in the courts, because such questions are easily dismissed as being barred by the Political Questions doctrine, because individual members of Congress lack standing to bring suits, and because courts generally prefer to leave such questions to majorities of Congress.\(^{61}\) Thus, Congress must enforce the War Powers Resolution on its own, something that Congress as a whole has never attempted. Congress has, however, funded operations where Congress could have made a plausible argument that the Executive branch had not complied with the Act.\(^{62}\) In practice, the War Powers Resolution has


\(^{62}\) See Appendix 2 in Grimmett, "The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years." Such military operations include the “force augmentations” in 1988 and 1989 preceding the invasion of Panama and Operation Desert Fox in 1998, for example.
ended up entrenching the status quo of presidential and legislative relations, a situation that generally favors broad presidential discretion in foreign affairs.

2.4 RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITIES OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

Presidential dominance in foreign affairs was recognized as early as 1966, when Wildavsky wrote of two separate presidencies. In domestic affairs, Wildavsky wrote, Congress and the president were co-equal, but in foreign affairs, “serious setbacks” to presidential policy were both “extraordinary and unusual.”63 Most scholars and commentators echo this characterization, though not all agree that this is desirable. John Yoo argues that the modern president should have a freer hand in foreign and military affairs not just because Congress is too cumbersome and slow, but also because there is no guarantee that ex ante oversight would reduce the likelihood of errors in policy and strategy.64 Yoo argues for a wide scope of presidential power in foreign affairs and war powers, one where Congress can block presidential policy merely by refusing to fund an initiative.65 Judge Posner argues that Yoo’s theory of presidential supremacy in foreign affairs is perhaps too strong, but nonetheless it should be to the president where foreign policy decisions, even extraconstitutional decisions that the president bases solely on no

63 Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies."
65 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11, 22. However, Yoo has been seriously criticized for making such bold assertions that seem to contradict originalist or textualist interpretations of the U.S. Constitution as well as subsequent constitutional practice. See Ramsey, "Text and History in the War Powers Debate.", Michael D. Ramsey, "Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs," Columbia Law Review 106 (2006).
other authority than necessity, should fall.\textsuperscript{66} To some constitutional scholars, the shared foreign policy power enshrined in the Constitution “invites” highly charged policy warfare between Congress and the president, where ultimately the president must triumph because national security requires unusual discretionary executive authority.\textsuperscript{67} The president has initiative and capability stemming from speed, secrecy, and unity of dispatch.\textsuperscript{68} Not only is the president the Commander in Chief, but as civilian head of the bureaucracy that includes the diplomatic and intelligence services, the president has formidable capability. At its worst, this situation of presidential dominance of foreign affairs has been characterized as the “Imperial Presidency.”\textsuperscript{69}

Crabb et al. have suggested a typology of modes or patterns of congressional involvement in foreign policy, identifying four basic modes or patterns of relationship: acquiescence, activism, bipartisanship or executive and legislative unity, and division of labor.\textsuperscript{70} During the periods between the world wars and just after Watergate at the end of Vietnam, congressional activity may be characterized as activist. To Crabb et al., the norm in foreign policy is acquiescence, a mode that exists some 75 to 80\% of the time.\textsuperscript{71} Lowi characterizes congressional passivity as a voluntary renunciation of power—since the New Deal, Congress has repeatedly created institutions that deferred power to the presidency such that the president has

\textsuperscript{68} Daniel C. Diller and Stephen H. Wirls, "Commander in Chief," in \textit{Guide to the Presidency}, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002). For a contrary opinion regarding the bureaucracy, see Foley and Owens, \textit{Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System}. Foley and Owens argue that the bureaucracy that the president commands is as likely to be a constraint as it is a capability.
\textsuperscript{69} Arthur M. Schlesinger, \textit{The Imperial Presidency} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), Schlesinger, \textit{War and the American Presidency}. Others have used the term “monarchical presidency” to describe the George W. Bush Administration, arguing that an assertive president was a “long-nursed ideological project of a small clique.” Frederick A. O. Schwarz and Aziz Huq, "No King Please, We're Americans," \textit{Legal Times.com}: at 1.
\textsuperscript{70} Crabb, Antizzo, and Sarieddine, \textit{Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior}.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 52, 189.
become the embodiment of government, thereby sacrificing traditional separation of power doctrine.\textsuperscript{72} Lowi calls this phenomenon “the personal president,” and Lowi argues that it reinforces the notion that the president should be the center of foreign policy. Fisher echoes Lowi’s concern, characterizing congressional passivity in foreign affairs as an undermining of its own authority. This self-undermining is assisted by an academic community and the media who fixate on the “zone of twilight” and presidential leadership.\textsuperscript{73} This puts the president in a position where communication with Congress justifies the president’s foreign policy vision in order to build a support in Congress for the specific legislation required to put it into practice.\textsuperscript{74}

Other scholars on the relationship between Congress and the president are less critical of Congress. Where Crabbe et al., Lowi, and Fisher see congressional acquiescence, Lindsay identifies structural impediments to active congressional participation in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{75} Lindsay argues that arguments of congressional timidity should not be taken too far. Lindsay suggests that a president has the initiative in foreign affairs because of the widespread interpretation in favor of inherent presidential power such as the Commander in Chief power. Lindsay points out that broad presidential discretion is usually upheld in federal courts.\textsuperscript{76} While Congress can overturn the status quo established by the president, it can do so effectively only with enough votes to override a presidential veto. The president also has the benefit of interaction with negotiating with other states and with administering secrecy rules, which administrations regularly use to manipulate the situation for political advantage as well as to avoid embarrassment or fallout. Fisher points out that the characteristics of congressional

\textsuperscript{73} Fisher, \textit{Presidential War Power}. See also Fisher, "Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power."
\textsuperscript{74} Cronin and Genovese, \textit{The Paradoxes of the American Presidency}, 166 - 67.
\textsuperscript{75} James M. Lindsay, \textit{Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 141 - 46.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 150.
oversight power are not well suited to foreign policy.\textsuperscript{77} Congress does have subpoena power, but such authority only extends over Americans, not foreigners or foreign countries, and this power can often be disarmed by the president and executive branch officials relying on executive privilege. Perhaps, more importantly to Fisher, the lack of clear and measurable goals in how foreign policy means and ends relate insulates the president from congressional criticism so that all criticism seems politically motivated.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, Fisher portrays Congress as dominated by the president in foreign policy, but due to real structural impediments rather than political acquiescence.\textsuperscript{79}

An analysis of presidential and congressional relations from 1946 to 1997 by Scott and Carter indicates that there is more nuance in the relationship than prior evidence had shown.\textsuperscript{80} Scott and Carter analyzed legislative activity, specifically the passage of legislation, including foreign and defense appropriations bills, hearings, and the issuance of reports—thus, their conclusions are based on a broader source of evidence than the mere passage of bills. Scott and Carter showed how, despite an increase in activity between 1967 and 1982, congressional activity has decreased since 1947. However, Scott and Carter also demonstrate that Congress increased its assertiveness in opposing the presidency over the same period. Scott and Carter therefore characterize the contemporary, post-1982 relationship between the president and Congress as either strategic, where Congress uses its power to challenge the president when interested, or supportive, where congressional activity is relatively higher, but less oppositional

\textsuperscript{77} Fisher, "Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power," 1213 - 18.
\textsuperscript{78} Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy.
\textsuperscript{79} Andrew Rudalevige would agree that the president is dominant in foreign policy, but he is critical of scholarship that assumes the power dynamic between Congress and the president is zero-sum. He writes that not everything that weakens Congress strengthens the president. Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate, 261.
to the president. The dominant factor that influences the oppositional conflict between Congress and the presidency is divided government and partisanship—the control of the Senate, House, and the presidency by political parties that display significant ideological and political differences between them.  

There is widespread agreement that partisanship is at an all-time high and is increasing. Many studies use party unity votes to indicate polarization in Congress. That is, when the majorities of both parties oppose each other on a roll call vote, that vote is characterized as polarized. While other measures for polarization exist, roll call results are favored because they are quantifiable, generally comprehensive, readily available, and well-tested through many overlapping studies. Roll call votes demonstrate that Democrats and Republicans in Congress are more polarized now than at any time in the past three decades. Theriault has demonstrated that the parties have been polarizing at measurably different rates. Republicans have become 62% more polarized in the past 32 years while Democrats have become 33% more polarized. Relying on roll call data, most scholars agree that the notion suggested by Senator Vandenberg

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during the Cold War that politics stops at the water’s edge is “more a political ploy than an empirical verity.”

Polarization is measured through party disagreements in roll call votes, but just as Scott and Carter examined the relationship between political branches in greater light by looking at indicators other than just roll call results, party polarization can be shown through other indicators. This analysis examines differences between party and branch in the frequencies of the most common arguments by which Republicans and Democrats publicly justified the use of force against Iraq. Thus, this content analysis can serve to determine empirically what justifications were used most to justify an invasion of Iraq, but also whether or not there was a significant difference across groups of government elites along party lines or between branches of government.

2.5 GOVERNMENT DELIBERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

Justifications supporting the use of force against Iraq, like all public statements made by government elites, have several underlying purposes. Government elites make public statements to participate in government decision-making, to further governmental oversight, to persuade and build consensus, and to educate the public regarding the issue. The decision-making aspects of public discussion refers to the public “weighing of substantive information and consideration[" in

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88 As will be shown in chapter 4, the differences between parties and branches varied over time from January 2002 to March 2003, but the increasing magnitude of difference over time for an increasing number of variables indicates divergence between the parties and branches of government on the use of force against Iraq.
making policy decisions.” 89 In this sense, public statements represent the basis upon which government officials exercise collective judgment. 90

It is perhaps easier to recognize the congressional role in deliberation as Congress is the most obvious government institution “designed to filter public opinion through its internal procedures and deliver policy outcomes,” 91 but both Executive and Legislative branches participate at least to some degree in accordance with their shared constitutional authority over foreign policy. Even in cases where Congress delegates authority to the Executive branch, as was the case in the 2003 Iraq invasion, congressional activity and policy preferences continue to affect foreign policy. 92 Congress also engages in public deliberation and discussion in furtherance of its oversight function. 93

Government elites also participate in discussion and deliberation in order to persuade others and build consensus. This airing of various views in public is strategic, sometimes allowing supporters and potential allies of a would-be policy who operate outside government to force an opponent’s hand as well as to gauge public support for an action. 94 Much of government decision-making involves compromise with other government elites—despite the president’s tendency to dominate foreign policy—due to the level of consensus required for a foreign policy to be enacted over the many veto points that exist in American government. 95

90 Fisher, Presidential War Power, 1.
91 Foley and Owens, Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System, 38.
92 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, 118.
Government officials also use public statements to appeal for public support—which has the benefit of increasing one’s own public support as well as the potential for attracting other government officials to join the appeal.96 This public education function may be achieved by members of Congress or the president. While members of Congress may focus their remarks primarily upon their own constituencies, the president and vice president are the only government officials who are elected by the nation as a whole. This gives the president a unique bully pulpit in addition to his central role in foreign policy-making.97 Nonetheless, public debate by all government officials contributes to how foreign policy issues are framed.98 In this way, public statements regarding the justification of the use of force against Iraq made by government officials is simultaneously part constitutional policy decision-making, part public education and justification, and part political wrangling.

The purpose of this review of constitutional foreign policy power, polarization, and public deliberation is to demonstrate that the speech of government officials has both value and meaning beyond the mere words used. The Constitution may seem ambiguous in assigning foreign policy power, but this is because the purpose of the Constitution was merely to set forth a framework for a decision-making process. Despite the arguments discussed above, there is no right way to interpret the Constitution and resolve the ambiguities.99 The constitutional exercise

98 Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*.
of war powers therefore involves political conflict and deliberation between both the president and Congress.\textsuperscript{100}

In practice, however, Congress cannot be expected to be an equal partner in the decision to use force against Iraq. The president’s benefit of singleness of mind, secrecy, and inherent Commander in Chief authority combine to put the president at the center of foreign policy development. As a result, presidential discretion has been given more and more weight by the Congress in recent history. The president also has access to more information as well as direct access to the tools of government, enhancing congressional focus on enablement of federal powers. Nonetheless, the basic constitutional framework has not changed. Foreign policy power—at least in so far as that power is a broad strategy or a decision of whether or not to use force writ large—is shared. The operational result of this sharing is discussion and deliberation between the government institutions that legitimately possess some aspect of that power. Although much of this deliberation occurs behind closed doors, there is, nonetheless, a significant amount of public deliberation between government actors and institutions. This was certainly true with respect to the decision to invade Iraq, as the content analysis of Executive and Legislative branch speakers demonstrates in the next several chapters.

3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET AND METHODOLOGY

Please have someone find precisely when I said the term “dead-enders” and what the context was.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Sept. 5, 2006\textsuperscript{101}

3.1 GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the conception of the research study and the method by which the descriptive material was obtained and reviewed. The initial impetus for this project arose from my own sense of disappointment in the quality of political debate in late 2002 regarding the potential use of force against Iraq. As the invasion began in March 2003 and important elements in the Bush Administration’s case for war began to unravel, I focused on congressional Democrats as opposed to higher-level Executive branch officials and Republican legislators. I thought Republicans and Bush Administration officials would naturally support the Republican president, but I had expected Democrats to provide some alternative voice. I suspected that if I could somehow detail and analyze public debate on potential war with Iraq in a systematic way, I would find that those making the most noise on the subject of Iraq would be

Republicans—that Democrats had generally been silent and therefore had acquiesced into the president’s war.

During the summer of 2004, I read Richard Clark’s *Against All Enemies* and Bob Woodward’s *Plan of Attack*. Both books suggested that the president had perhaps decided to invade Iraq much earlier than March 2003, and there was an insinuation that some members of the Bush Administration had urged an attack on Iraq just after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I wondered whether there was a publicly available source of evidence that could corroborate or contradict this insinuation. Was there a systematic way to measure government preoccupation with Iraq? That fall, I discovered Federal News Service’s Washington Transcript Service.

Federal News Service (FNS) is a private company that provides verbatim transcripts of government briefings, speeches, press conferences, and “other newsmaker events.” The FNS transcribes public appearances of government officials who are central to policy-making. The speakers of the FNS transcripts include members of Congress as they participate in floor debates and committee hearings as well as Executive branch officials as they hold press conferences and hold briefings. As a convenient shorthand, these officials will be referred throughout this analysis as government elites. Their public statements will be denoted as public speech or public deliberation. In December 2004, I downloaded every FNS transcript dated from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, where the word “Iraq” appeared at least once. January 19, 2001 is the date when President Bush was sworn in as the 43rd President of the United States. The end date, March 19, 2003, is the date the invasion of Iraq began. In running my query, I did not select the option “Search whole word only.” As a result, the FNS search engine included alternative forms

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of the word Iraq, such as “Iraqi” or “Iraq’s.” Thus, my search was more inclusive than a simple word search. In this way, I obtained 158 mega-bytes of textual data containing well over 34 million words—2,206 individual transcripts each containing the public speech of many different government officials. Many of these transcripts were as long as 115 pages. I wondered if these transcripts would reveal increasing references to Iraq, and that perhaps they might then indicate growing government preoccupation with Iraq. I was also interested in whether the FNS transcript data would show that references to Iraq by government officials increased prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. If the transcripts showed an increase in government discussion of Iraq prior to September 11, 2001, then such evidence might indicate that the decision to go to war against Iraq might have occurred prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well.

My earliest use of the FNS Iraq transcripts I obtained in December 2004 was in a doctoral seminar project. My goal in this class project was to examine changes in government officials’ public references to Iraq in order to examine whether there had been any changes in government focus on the problem of Iraq at various times prior to the March 2003 invasion. In this simple descriptive study, my method involved nothing more than simple word counts. For each transcript, I recorded by hand the transcript number (ranging from 1 to 2206), the date of the meeting recorded by the transcript, and the number of times the word “Iraq” was used in the transcript as uttered by government officials. This methodology may have been simple, but it was also exceedingly time-intensive. I used Microsoft Word to open the electronic file of each FNS transcript. Using MS Word’s Find and Replace tool, I manually counted the number of

103 For the sake of clarity, when this analysis refers to a search for the term “Iraq,” it should be noted that such a search included the word Iraq and its variations, including terms such as Iraq’s, Iraqi, and Iraqi’s.
times U.S. government speakers in the transcript referred to the word “Iraq.” I did these searches without the option “Find whole words only” selected so that my search would not preclude references to Iraq using other forms of the word.

In this initial study, I considered any member of the Executive and Legislative branches as well as congressional witnesses testifying in a hearing to be government speakers. My counts did not include references to Iraq made by reporters in press conferences or the leaders of foreign countries in joint press conferences with U.S. government officials. After several weeks of work, I had completed a small dataset of government officials’ public references to Iraq in the FNS transcripts. As the universe of government officials from which FNS creates its transcripts remains relatively constant, it is possible to compare the relative increase or decrease in the use of the term Iraq over time. FNS transcripts are hardly exhaustive in including government speech, but they are representative enough of the government system described in Chapter 2.

Figure 1: Public References to Iraq, January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003

104 At the time I undertook this initial study, I did not have access to quantitative text analysis software such as MaxQDA, which could have done this search in a matter of minutes. However, had I used such a program, my research design would still have required manually checking each transcript to determine whether or not the speaker who used the term Iraq or Iraqi was a government official.
The result of this initial inquiry, detailed in Figure 1, was surprising. I had expected to find significant change in the number of times government speakers had publicly referred to Iraq after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Instead, the increase in references to Iraq did not begin until September 2002. Although the references to Iraq by government elites illustrates nothing more than when Iraq began to be discussed publicly by government elites, the increase in references that begins in September 2002 reminded me of a New York Times “Quotation of the Week” of White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card. Card had been quoted as saying, “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in August.”\(^{105}\) This increase in the number of references to Iraq also coincided with President Bush’s address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002.\(^{106}\) In this address, Bush laid out a case against Iraq and essentially put the problem of Iraq on the foreign policy agenda. This small study piqued my interest in how the FNS transcripts might be used, but I determined that I needed a more sophisticated research strategy, one that would allow me to examine the Iraq war debate in a more extensive and complicated manner.

I grew more interested in examining the decision-making that led up to the invasion of Iraq and wondered if the publicly available information might shed light on some aspects of this decision. I initially conceived of the transcripts as a way to frame a future analysis of internal Bush Administration foreign policy development. I knew that the bulk of my research would necessarily be limited to public information—with the war in Iraq ongoing, it was unlikely that I would have much access to private or internal governmental evidence such as secret policy memos. These scattered pieces of evidence were unlikely to support a systematic approach, however. I instead began to shift my focus from decision-making to how the war was justified

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publicly. This focus would make the most of the FNS transcripts and avoid the problem that existed due to lack of private and internal evidence.

For good reason, several of my colleagues and professors were at first suspicious of my research interest, thinking that there would be no way to do any sort of objective analysis with my strong sense that the decision to invade Iraq was a grievous foreign policy error. However, I felt that my bias would be minimized since my proposed interest would entail empirical analysis of what had been said prior to the invasion, not cherry picking of quotes out of context or finger pointing at politicians with whom I disagreed. I sought to design my project as a descriptive study with a simple objective: to collect data on what government leaders publicly said regarding the invasion of Iraq.

As I developed this research agenda, I consciously decided to focus on how those who were generally supportive of the use of force against Iraq justified that support and less on those who argued against invading Iraq for several reasons. I recalled that only a few government officials argued explicitly against an invasion of Iraq, and thus as a practical matter, I doubted how much data I might be able to collect on those arguments against the use of force. Many of those who argued against using force against Iraq were either arguing against the use of force generally, or, more often, disagreeing that the facts that proponents of force used to buttress their arguments warranted an attack of Iraq. I did not want to code anti-war arguments for all 2,206 transcripts when there were not many anti-war arguments made by government speakers. After all, my interest was in how the invasion was justified. Also, because I was new to the research design literature, I was unsure how to design a project that would incorporate both pro and con facets of the debate on Iraq in a systematic but efficient manner. I did not want a coding
instrument that included so many content variables that might increase the likelihood that human error would be introduced during hand-coding.

### 3.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS

My research objective was to describe systematic changes in the public debate on U.S. policy toward Iraq between elite government policymakers in order to discover whether there existed differences in how various groups of officials justified the use of military force against Iraq. I chose content analysis to achieve this end. Content analysis refers to the process of mapping symbolic data into some form suitable for statistical analysis, and as such is properly characterized as measurement.\(^{107}\) The symbolic data for this research project is the public debate between U.S. government policy elites on Iraq, from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003. The mapping was accomplished through hand-coding of a series of variables comprising a single coding instrument for the entire pre-invasion of Iraq time period. The output statistics concern the content variables and allow comparison over time across groups of government speakers, such as party affiliation and branch of government. Analyzing the stated policy preferences of political actors in a common space allows for comparison of parties and to measure the extent to which parties are mutually congruent.\(^{108}\)

There is no complete record of government officials’ deliberation on policy toward Iraq during this or any other period. Nonetheless, my collection of 2,206 FNS transcripts of public

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discussions where the word Iraq was used by at least one speaker, dated from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003 constitutes a substantial, though non-random, sample of the public debate between government elites regarding Iraq. FNS includes in its Washington Transcript Service verbatim transcripts of congressional hearings, speeches, statements; press conferences of administration and congressional leaders; briefings and press conferences of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; political interviews on morning and weekend television shows; and speeches from political campaigns. FNS transcripts are not subject to ex post facto manipulation as is the Congressional Record. The Congressional Record also does not include briefings and speeches by Bush Administration leaders and spokesmen. Sampling validity in content analysis depends on how much, in “proportion, scale, or distribution,” the FNS transcripts correspond to all public government deliberation. For this reason, conclusions based upon analysis of these transcripts are likely to be more scientifically valid than conclusions based on an analysis of the Congressional Record.

FNS transcripts record the public speech of important government elites in both the Legislative and Executive branches of government. The collection of 2,206 FNS transcripts where the word Iraq was used provided a representative sample of public governmental deliberation on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Content analysis requires issue “salience,” the idea that issues be important enough to be relevant within a common space. The fact that there were so many transcripts involved in this particular content analysis illustrates how salient the issue of using force against Iraq was, even in public discussion, as well as how representative of public

governmental deliberation on the subject of Iraq the collected FNS transcripts were. As the target of this analysis was to determine how government officials publicly discussed the potential invasion of Iraq, the validity of conclusions drawn from a content analysis of FNS transcripts where the word Iraq appears was rather strong.

3.3 THE CODING INSTRUMENT

Content analysis requires a coding instrument that has been designed to ensure that the empirical analysis is scientifically reliable. The content analysis is reliable to the extent that the coding instrument is 1) stable and invariant over the length of time under consideration; 2) reproducible and can be recreated under varying circumstances, such as through the use of different coders; and 3) accurate to an established standard.\textsuperscript{112} The base unit of this content analysis was each individual speaker in each transcript. Each observation was independent, because the speaker per transcript base unit was unique. Many FNS transcripts involved multiple government speakers, but the content of each individual speaker in a transcript was coded independently. Because of this, many transcripts yielded multiple observations. There were 2,206 transcripts dated between January 19, 2001 and March 19, 2003 where the word Iraq appeared. Because 37 of these transcripts were verbatim duplicates of other transcripts, this analysis subsequently ignored them. Even by ignoring these duplicates, the analysis drew data from 2,169 unique transcripts.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112} Krippendorf, \textit{Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology}, 130.

\textsuperscript{113} FNS duplicated some of the transcripts in its records. In only a few cases, this was due to exact matches between advance copies of a speech and the official transcript of that speech. In those cases, it seems, FNS preserved both the advance copy and the official transcript in the Washington Transcript files.
These 2,169 transcripts generated a total of 4,279 observations. The focus of this analysis was the speech of U.S. government officials as they made arguments concerning Iraq. To eliminate the ambiguity of determining whether a given statement made by a U.S. government official concerned Iraq, an observation has been included in the analysis only if the U.S. government speaker or congressional witness used the word Iraq at least once during a public appearance. In 469 of these observations, the speaker was not a U.S. government speaker or a congressional witness in the process of giving testimony. In 1,285 observations, the U.S. government speaker did not use the word Iraq, and so these observations were not considered. Thus, this analysis was made using a dataset constructed from 2,525 observations of the speech of U.S. government speakers taken from 1,564 unique FNS transcripts.

A few illustrations of the process by which this analysis made observations may be useful. Imagine a joint press conference between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin where each leader makes a brief statement and then reporters ask questions. My search for transcripts would have returned this hypothetical press conference if the word Iraq or its forms were present in the transcript of this press conference. If Putin or a reporter made the reference to Iraq, then this observation would not be coded. If President Bush mentioned the word Iraq or used one of its forms, then this observation would be scored using the coding instrument. Even if President Bush were to mention the word Iraq several times, this transcript would yield at most one single observation, because President Bush is the only U.S. government official in the transcript that has yielded an observation. Similarly, in a transcript of a Senate committee hearing, each Senator who used the word Iraq or one of its forms will yield one observation. Each congressional witness who used the word Iraq would also yield an observation. The speech
of Senators or witnesses who did not use the word Iraq or one of its forms would not be analyzed with the coding instrument.

The initial coding instrument in this analysis consisted of 44 different variables. Nineteen of these variables described the transcript and the speaker, while the other 25 variables measured the content of each individual’s arguments about the use of force against Iraq. The 25 content variables represent narrowly defined aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq. The values for each of these content variables were coded as either present (the value is equal to 1) or not present (the value is equal to 0) in order to maximize objectivity and stability of the variables’ definitions during the long hand-coding process. A research assistant and I then manually applied the 44-variable coding instrument to all 2,206 FNS transcripts over a period of about eight months. After the coding was complete and I began preliminary analysis of the data, I added seven variables to the coding instrument. Of these seven, I manually coded four variables concerning references to the 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden, but I used the qualitative research software program MAXQDA 2.0\(^\text{114}\) to do text string searches in the transcripts for three additional codes. In these two steps, I coded all 51 variables across all 2,525 observations.

My content analysis goes beyond word counts as it also measures the intended meaning of government officials’ public arguments regarding the use of force against Iraq. This “representational” analytical approach is to be contrasted with other content analysis that is “instrumental.” A representational approach is used when a researcher uses texts “to identify their sources’ intended meanings” while a researcher with an instrumental approach would

\(^{114}\) MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.
interpret texts in terms of his or her own theory. As with the analysis of any political speech, there is the problem that political officials may attempt to deceive, mislead, or misstate their own preferences. Thus, some transcripts may reflect what politicians want to reflect rather than their actual preferences. This might be a difficulty if the content analysis were to be used in an instrumental research design where the data would then be compared with decision-making models. However, the target of this research project is what elite U.S. decision-makers are saying publicly about the use of force against Iraq: public governmental deliberation on Iraq. While the outcome of public discussion is often a decision made by government officials, the research here focuses on the content of public governmental speech itself. When government officials make public speeches, the speech has meaning and effect beyond the mere expression of preferences. Government deliberation informs the public, justifies and constrains the exercise of power by government actors, and affects the agenda of other government officials. Understanding the nature of government deliberations prior to a popular invasion that has since plummeted in support is important for trying to avoid such situations in the future.

The 51 variables captured by the coding instrument may be divided into three types. The first type of variable describes the specific FNS transcript, the second variable type depicts each individual speaker in each unique transcript, and the third variable type concerns the arguments for or against an invasion of Iraq put forward by a particular speaker in each transcript. As each individual U.S. government speaker who used the word Iraq or its forms at least once constitutes a separate observation, the data can be aggregated in several ways, such as by party affiliation, governmental branch, or by individuals.

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Ten variables pertained to the transcript itself. These ten variables included a unique identifier for each transcript (the transcripts were numbered from 1 to 2206), the date pertaining to the transcript’s contents, the total number of words for all speakers in a particular transcript (a number that was provided in the transcript itself by FNS), and the place or forum where the transcript’s contents were made. In addition, the coding instrument included a series of six variables that captured whether the transcript covered Senate or House floor deliberation and which committee or subcommittee, if any, was involved. Table 1 explains the variables in the coding instrument that denote the transcript.

Table 1: Transcript-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document Number</td>
<td>The unique identifier for each transcript, ranging from 1 to 2206. An observation consists of a speaker per transcript combination. Some transcripts included multiple speakers and therefore yielded multiple observations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>This refers to the date that the government speech occurred, not to the date the transcript was made or uploaded into the Washington Transcript Service’s database. In this analysis, dates ranged from Jan. 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words</td>
<td>Total words in the transcript, as given by Federal News Service. The word length of the transcripts ranged from 233 to 71,276 words; the mean number of words was 12,795 words while the mode number of words in the transcripts was 30,693.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum</td>
<td>The forum variable refers to the place where the transcript’s content was produced. This value was usually given by Federal News Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Deliberation</td>
<td>This binary variable was coded as a 1 if the observation concerned deliberation that took place in the House. 612 of 2,525 observations occurred in the House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Deliberation</td>
<td>This binary variable was coded as a 1 if the observation concerned deliberation that took place in the Senate. 773 of 2,525 observations occurred in the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Committee</td>
<td>The name of the Senate Committee before which a government actor spoke, if any.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Subcommittee</td>
<td>The name of the Senate Subcommittee before which a government actor spoke, if any.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Committee</td>
<td>The name of the House Committee before which a government actor spoke, if any.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Subcommittee</td>
<td>The name of the House Subcommittee before which a government actor spoke, if any.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Speaker-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Name of the government speaker. There were 416 different government speakers that each generated at least one observation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian / Military Status</td>
<td>Whether the speaker was military or civilian at the time the deliberation was made. Speakers were overwhelmingly civilian, at 2,334 of the 2,525 observations. Military speakers contributed only 140 out of 2,525 observations. An additional 51 observations were made by anonymous “Senior officials,” so whether the speaker civilian or military was not known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq References</td>
<td>The total number of times the word Iraq or any of its forms was used. By definition, each observation has at least one reference to the word Iraq. The maximum number of times a speaker mentioned Iraq per observation was 313.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>The role or title of each U.S. government speaker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>The agency of government to which the speaker belonged. For Senators and Representatives, this is the Senate and House, respectively. For congressional witnesses who were not government officials in their own right, the agency was denoted as “congressional witness.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>The branch of government to which the speaker belongs. Several variants of this variable were created to allow for disaggregation of Executive branch speakers testifying before Congress and congressional witnesses who were not government officials in their own right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>Whether the speaker was an elected official. Elected officials made 1,246 of 2,525 observations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed with Senate</td>
<td>Whether this official is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Only 824 out of 2,525 observations were made by government speakers who had been confirmed in their posts by the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>The political party of each speaker, if known. Of 2,525 observations, Republicans contributed 916, Democrats contributed 614, and one observation was made by an Independent. The remaining 994 observations were contributed by speakers whose political affiliation was unknown.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second type of variable included in the coding instrument collected information on each U.S. government speaker in each transcript who used the word Iraq at least once in the transcript. There were nine variables in the coding instrument of this speaker-oriented type of variable. These variables included the name of the speaker and the number of times the speaker used the word Iraq, whether the speaker was a civilian or military official, the speaker’s role and status in the U.S. government, and the political party affiliation of the speaker. I coded the political party affiliation of government speakers only when that information could be obtained through publicly available and confirmed information. If there was any ambiguity in determining the political party affiliation of the speaker, the party affiliation was not coded. I could not verify the political party of two prominent presidential staff members, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz or Presidential Spokesman Ari Fleischer, for example, and thus their political party affiliation is missing data. The political party of elected officials, on the other hand, was easily available and well confirmed. Table 2 lists the coding instrument’s variables that pertained to the speaker.

3.4 CONTENT VARIABLES

The variables discussed in the previous section concern the attributes of the transcript and speaker. The most meaningful variables in this analysis represent the content of government speech concerning war in Iraq. These 32 variables will hereinafter be referred to as content variables. I coded the first 25 variables with the help of my undergraduate research assistant Avishy Moshenberg over a period of about eight months.116 After I started an analysis of the data from this part of the coding process, members of my dissertation committee suggested that I look into the issue of whether government speakers were inclined to mention the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in support of the invasion of Iraq. I therefore hand-coded an additional four content variables that measured references to 9/11 and Osama bin Laden. I also used the text analysis software MAXQDA 2.0117 to do text string searches for three phrases that were used during the debate. The three phrases were “second resolution,” “regime change,” and “fight to the enemy.”

116 Avishy Moshenberg and I worked together for nearly two years as he assisted me on this project and I advised him in his studies. Avishy used part of the data to prepare a thesis in support of his B.Phil. degree from the University of Pittsburgh Honors College.

117 MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.
I developed my coding instrument out of the initial study into references made to Iraq for a PhD seminar. I was drawn to seeing whether public statements regarding Iraq might illustrate a growing focus on Iraq, and whether these statements might relate to the decision of how to confront the threat posed by Iraq. Two articles from the first half of 2003 contributed to my defining of the content variables the way I did. The first article was a *Washington Post* article published a few months before the invasion of Iraq.118 This article presented the decision to go to war against Iraq as “circumventing traditional policymaking channels” by connecting the cause against Iraq to the war on terrorism. The article quotes Georgetown University Professor G. John Ikenberry, who argued that the Bush Administration’s preventative war represented an “extraordinary” development. Ikenberry was then quoted, “the external presentation and the justification for it really seems to be lacking…. The external presentation appears to mirror the internal decision-making quite a bit.” This supports my connection of public government speech with decision-making.119 Moreover, it suggested that I see whether different government speakers were more or less likely to publicly connect their case for war to the war on terror. I also decided to look for other references to terrorism as well, both specific references to terrorists or terrorist groups and to more general references to the threat of terrorism.

The second article that influenced my creation of the content variables in my coding instrument appeared in *The New Republic* three months into the Iraq war. The authors of this article wrote how the Bush Administration ignored the lack of a consensus within the American

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119 This is not to say that public words are a sufficient indicator of the decision-making surrounding U.S. policy toward Iraq. The analysis here analyzed how the war was publicly justified. A content analysis is no substitute for later historical analysis of the major players and the decision based on confidential and subsequently declassified information, interviews, and other such evidence.
intelligence community about the nature of the threat that Iraq represented.\textsuperscript{120} The article suggested that Bush had made the actual decision to invade Iraq shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but that the public debate over the war in Iraq did not start until the fall of 2002 when the administration used the first anniversary of the attacks to “launch its public campaign for a congressional resolution endorsing war.”\textsuperscript{121} I attempted to define content variables that might measure differences in how government officials characterized the nature of the threat. I created a code that would indicate that a speaker had characterized the Iraqi threat as imminent. I also created codes that would distinguish between explicit and implicit references to national security to justify the invasion. To keep the coding instrument from growing ungainly, I did not initially code for references to the 9/11 attacks, but after encouragement from my dissertation committee, I later added codes to measure references to 9/11, Osama bin Laden, and claims of responsibility to the coding instrument.

The language used in the 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq\textsuperscript{122} also contributed to my development of the coding instrument’s content variables. Before the substantive authorization, this statute included 23 “whereas” clauses that set forth background in support of the authorization. The clauses stated that Iraq was “continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations....”\textsuperscript{123} The clauses referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and to the “gravity” of Iraq’s connections to terrorists groups, such as al Qaeda, and even linked the war against Iraq to the war on terror by acknowledging that the

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. These same points were later echoed by Democrats in the House Judiciary Committee in their report, House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff, \textit{George W. Bush Versus the U.S. Constitution: The Downing Street Memos and Deception, Manipulation, Torture, Retribution, Coverups in the Iraq War and Illegal Spying} (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 2006).
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{H.J.Res.114, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq}.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
President had been authorized to take such necessary measures against international terrorists responsible for 9/11. In addition, the clauses referred to Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction on its own civilian population. By using these elements of the decision to use force against Iraq in my coding instrument, I was able to demonstrate how prevalent these justifications were in the public debate. A 2005 CIA report concluded that Iraq had not possessed weapons of mass destruction at the time of the invasion—instead the Hussein regime maintained the strategy of maintaining enough technical capability to perhaps reconstitute capability once international sanctions were lifted. A 2007 Pentagon study using internal memos of the Hussein regime did find that Hussein had provided some support to terrorists for activity directed at enemies of his regime, but that the Hussein regime essentially did not trust religiously motivated terrorists. The report concluded that there were few operational ties between Iraq and terrorism and no operational links between Saddam and al Qaeda. Those government speakers who made assertions that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or was connected to terrorism more frequently than there speakers were also wrong more of the time.

Five content variables captured information regarding potential costs and benefits of the war. During late 2002 and early 2003 the projected cost of the war was the matter of some debate in the media. In September 2002, White House Economic Advisor Lawrence Lindsay projected the cost of the war to be about 1% of U.S. GDP, between $100 and $200 billion. Lindsay resigned only a few months after releasing this projection, a projection that was

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124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
criticized for being too high. The White House, through Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch McConnell soon afterwards argued that Lindsay’s figure was not so much a projection as an “historical benchmark,” and projected the cost of war with Iraq as being only $50 to $60 billion. Congressional Democrats projected the cost of war to be about $93 billion, while vocal opponents of the war used high cost projections in an effort to build support against the invasion of Iraq. With this controversy in mind, I decided to include a content variable in the coding instrument that would capture when a speaker made an explicit statement that the cost of the war would be less than $100 billion as well as a content variable that would stand for a speaker giving any explicit cost of the war. I also created a content variable that captured when a speaker suggested that Iraqi oil revenues would lower the costs of the war. These variables do not differentiate between costs of potential military actions and the costs of rebuilding.

I chose and defined my content variables in the coding instrument as narrowly as possible in order to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible without reducing the content analysis to mere word counts. It was tempting to develop codes for the assertion of facts that might later be proved true or false. I did not do this, however. When I started this project in late 2004, the verifiability of many claims was impossible to establish. In early 2008, the Center for Public Integrity did release an analysis of the veracity of public statements of many prominent Bush Administration officials. This report concluded that Bush Administration officials “orchestrated” a case for the use of force against Iraq through the repeated assertion of

131 Ibid. As the Iraq war now approaches its fifth anniversary, the debate over the potential cost of the war may have been rekindled with the serious suggestion that the actual cost of the war may approach $3 trillion. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008).
132 Charles Lewis and Mark Reading-Smith, “The War Card: Orchestrated Deception on the Path to War,” (Center for the Public Integrity, 2008).
misleading statements. The press amplified these misstatements and failed to do an adequate job of independently investigating or verifying the administration’s misstatements.\textsuperscript{133} While truths and falsehoods are beyond the scope of my analysis of public statements, my analysis does share with the Center for Public Integrity’s project a common frame of reference—that public statements made by public officials in the course of their deliberations on using force against Iraq constitutes an important empirical basis for research on “how the war in Iraq came to pass.”\textsuperscript{134}

Each content variable represents various justifications for going to war in Iraq or some other aspect related to the debate on the use of force against Iraq. All but one of the 32 content variables were coded as nominal-level variables with only two possible values, 0 and 1. A value of 1 denoted positive meaning only—a value of 1 for “Speaker says Iraq possesses WMDs” means that a speaker expressed this precise meaning while a value of 0 meant that the speaker did not say this. A value of 0 is not equivalent to a speaker expressing the opposite meaning to the content variable. In other words, a value of 0 does not denote that the speaker said that Iraq does not possess WMDs. The only content variable that I did not code with values of only 1 or 0 was the number of times a speaker used the exact phrase “regime change” per observation. I counted the number of times a speaker used this exact phrase. By my capturing the data as an actual number, I was then able to convert this number into a binary variable that stood for the use of the phrase “regime change” in an observation. As it turned out, the phrase was used in nearly 13\% of observations. This was often enough to justify the time spent identifying the individual speakers who used the phrase. As I did so, I recoded the number of times the speaker used the phrase “regime change” into a binary content variable to denote that the phrase was used by the

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
speaker for each particular observation. I also did exact phrase searches “second resolution” and “fight to the enemy,” but I did not identify and count the speakers who used each phrase because the phrases were not used often enough to justify the time to code the individual speakers’ use of the phrases. “Fight to the enemy” was used by government speakers only eight times in 2,525 observations. “Second resolution” was used only a total of 45 times in the 2,206 transcripts by government speakers. The exact phrase searches were accomplished using the MAXQDA 2.0\textsuperscript{135} software package.

Some of the content or justification variables contained qualifiers such as speaker “explicitly mentions” a certain condition or “alludes to” something. Under my definitions of “explicit” and “general allusion,” any content variable coded as explicitly present will also be coded as denoting a general allusion. The reverse, however, is not true. I designed the codes to overlap this way intentionally, giving them closely related definitions in order to better separate statements that made general allusions and those that were more specific. Mentioning a terrorist group or a specific terrorist name in connection with Iraq constituted an explicit statement under this definition. Referring to Iraq’s connections or links with terrorism or unspecified terrorist activities was an allusion. The table below describes the 32 content variables of the coding instrument. An example of statements from actual transcripts that constituted values of 1 for each content variable may be found in Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{135} MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.
Table 3: Content Variables in the Coding Instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable description</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the speaker have an identifiable position on Iraq policy (i.e., is at least one other content variable present)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the speaker implicitly assume U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the speaker explicitly refer to U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Does the speaker equate the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Does the speaker explicitly characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Does the speaker characterize the invasion of Iraq as a potential method to disarm Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Does the speaker reference the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Does the speaker explicitly mention international law to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Does the speaker refer to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Does the speaker allude to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Does the speaker explicitly refer to a specific terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Does the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international weapons inspections?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Does the speaker say Iraq possesses WMDs?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Does the speaker mention Iraq's past use of chemical weapons?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Does the speaker characterize intelligence analysis as interpretive or ambiguous?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Does the speaker give an explicit cost estimate for the war as less than $100 billion?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Does the speaker call for further analysis of costs and benefits of the invasion or opine about unanswered questions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Does the speaker explicitly refer to any estimates of costs or benefits of an invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Does the speaker give an explicit value for U.S. cost estimates of an invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available as a cost offset to the war or rebuilding costs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Does the speaker specifically mention post-war or Phase IV planning?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Does the speaker mention the possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Does the speaker urge a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Does the speaker mention the possible multilateral invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Does the speaker support multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “second resolution”?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “fight to the enemy”?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Number of times speaker uses the exact phrase &quot;regime change&quot; (an ordinal level variable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the 9/11 terrorist attacks?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Does the speaker explicitly mention Osama bin Laden?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Does the speaker make an explicit assignment of blame to Osama bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Does the speaker refer to any party other than bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for actual or potential involvement in planning or carrying out the 9/11 attacks?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In some of the 2,525 observations, the values of all content variables in the coding instrument were 0. In these observations, the speaker offered no identifiable position on Iraq, or at least no identifiable position regarding any of the other 31 content variables. This was the
case, for example, if a Congressman mistakenly mentioned Iraq when they meant Iran. In the case of Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), he repeatedly mentioned Iraq in arguments that the United States needed to develop its domestic oil production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Murkowski contributed 12 observations, but in 5 of those observations, his discussion had nothing to do with U.S. policy toward Iraq—he was arguing for drilling in Alaska. After reviewing all 2,525 observations, 826 of them were excluded because the values of all content variables in the coding instrument were zero. Thus, the analysis proceeded using 1,699 observations where a government speaker mentioned the word Iraq and where at least one content variable had a positive value.

3.5 REGARDING THE RELIABILITY OF THE CODING INSTRUMENT

Subjectivity will be present in this analysis in one of two ways. First, there is always a degree of interpretation of the meaning of speech. My undergraduate research assistant, Avishy Moshenberg, and I met as often as several times a week to make sure that our definitions of each variable remained consistent and identical. Additionally, I trained my research assistant to use the “objective person” standard used in law, approaching the transcripts with the question “What would the reasonable person think when reading the transcript?” Despite my best efforts, this is not a perfectly reliable method. Subjectivity can also be introduced by the coding process because the base unit of the analysis is each speaker per transcript. As many of the transcripts were dialogues and therefore contained many speakers engaged in discussion, the research aggregated the meaning of each speaker’s statements over the course of the transcript and then coded those meanings. There is going to be some degree of subjective interpretation introduced
by this aggregation. In addition to potential subjectivity, in the construction of this dataset or any other large dataset, there are likely to be random errors—but there is no reason to worry that the rate random errors were made during the coding process changed.

In content analysis, scientific reliability requires systematic application of a coding instrument that is itself reliable. The base unit of analysis of my coding instrument is the observation, which consists of each U.S. government speaker per transcript. Each observation was coded by hand independent of other observations. To maximize the reliability of my coding instrument, I designed the content variables to have a specific, fixed meaning with binary expression. If a speaker expressed the meaning of a content variable in a transcript, then the value of that content variable was 1 for that observation; if not, the value of that content variable was 0. My research assistant Avishy coded 478 of the FNS transcripts and I coded the remaining 1,728 transcripts. I tested the inter-rater reliability between us at two different times using two different methods. To test inter-rater reliability early in the coding process, I recoded 105 observations chosen at random from among my research assistant’s first 200 transcripts. Remarkably, we coded only two content variables differently out of a possible 1,875 for an inter-rater reliability of 99.9%. Later in the process, I formally tested randomly selected 160 single-observation transcripts from among all 478 of my research assistant’s transcripts. After recoding the original 25 content variables in these 160 transcripts, I calculated the Krippendorf’s \( \alpha \) inter-rater reliability coefficient as .9847. The 95% confidence interval for the Krippendorf’s \( \alpha \) inter-rater reliability coefficient ranges from a lower limit of .9765 to an upper

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137 I chose to use single-observation transcripts, i.e., transcripts of a single government speaker who used the word Iraq at least once, for verifying reliability because it is much easier and faster to recode transcripts with only a single government speaker in them.
138 Calculation of Krippendorf’s \( \alpha \) was accomplished by means of an SPSS macro written by Andrew F. Hayes and published in Klaus Krippendorf and Andrew F. Hayes, "Answering the Call for a Standard Reliability Measure for Coding Data," *Communication Methods and Measures* 1, no. 1 (2007).
limit of .9918. This high degree of reliability suggests that the definitions of the content variables were uniformly applied between the two coders.\textsuperscript{139} It may also be evidence that the codes have a high external validity.\textsuperscript{140} I did not formally test the inter-rater reliability for the added 7 content variables because my research assistant did not assist me in coding them. I was the only coder for these 7 content variables, and thus there is no inter-rater reliability to examine.

### 3.6 **THE IRAQ INDEX SCORE**

To facilitate statistical computation involving the content variables aggregated by various factors such as political party or branch of government, I aggregated content variables into a single index variable that I will hereinafter refer to as the Iraq Index score. The Iraq Index score is an ordinal level variable that has a range of 0 to 9.\textsuperscript{141} A score of 9 means that for a particular observation, the speaker’s message has included all nine content variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score. I chose these nine content variables because of all the content variables in my coding instrument, these nine were the arguments that most unambiguously supported the use of force against Iraq. Aggregating these variables into a single ordinal level index variable allowed a quick comparison between speakers, parties, and branches of government over the most typical

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\textsuperscript{140} Sandra K. Mitchell, "Inter-Observer Agreement, Reliability, and Generalizability of Data Collected in Observational Studies," *Psychological Bulletin* 86, no. 2 (1979).

\textsuperscript{141} Originally, my Iraq Index score aggregation included 19 content variables. However, not all of these variables were necessarily supportive of the use of force. One of these 19 was whether the speaker asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Many people on both sides of the Iraq war debate made this assertion, a point originally made by Dr. Janne Nolan, referring to the Iraq Index score as perhaps likely to reveal what Dr. Nolan called potential “false positives”—those speakers with high Iraq Index scores and yet who were known in policy circles to have been against the war. I therefore revised the Iraq Index score to reflect less ambiguous aspects of the debate.
arguments in favor of the use of force. In this way, the Iraq Index score indirectly measured the strength of a speaker’s argument for the use of force for a given observation. When a government speaker favored the use of force against Iraq and engaged in public deliberation about the potential use of force, he or she was more likely to bolster that support through argument and use of the content variables that were associated with the use of force. The more observations that went into the calculation of mean Iraq Index scores increases the likelihood that a speaker’s or group of speakers’ true level of support for the use of force was reflected by calculated Iraq Index scores. As the Iraq Index score for a particular group or individual may be averaged over a number of individual observations, a consistently high Iraq Index score can give a proxy measure of the level of support for the use of force against Iraq as expressed publicly. For the 1,699 observations included in this analysis, the actual measurements of Iraq Index scores ranged from 0 to 8, with a mean Iraq Index score of .95 and a mode score of 0.

The nine content variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score included variables that captured government officials’ public statements regarding the nature of the threat. I included both explicit and implicit references to the Iraqi threat to U.S. national security interests, including references to that threat as being imminent. By including several variables that represented a speaker’s public statement regarding the nature of the Iraqi threat, the Iraq Index score not only reflected greater variability but will served as a better indicator of support for the use of force against Iraq. The debate over the potential cost of the invasion and the repeated claim from many hawks on the Iraq war that the Iraqis themselves would help to fund the war effort through oil revenue led me to aggregate this variable in the Iraqi index score as well.

The content variable that measured when government speakers called for a unilateral invasion of Iraq clearly expressed support for the use of force, so I included that in the Iraq Index
score. Other content variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score included two others arguments often made to support the use of force: that the use of military force would disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as well as serve as a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the people of Iraq. The remaining content variables aggregated into the Iraq Index score included whether action against Iraq was part of the war on terror, whether the speaker called for a unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq, and whether the speaker characterized international weapons inspections as ineffective or futile. Table 4 lists the nine variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score.

### Table 4: Content Variables Aggregated in the Iraq Index Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the speaker implicitly assume U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the speaker explicitly refer to U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the speaker equate the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Does the speaker explicitly characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Does the speaker reference the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Does the speaker refer to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Does the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international weapons inspections?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available as a cost offset to the war or rebuilding costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Does the speaker urge a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest Iraq Index score of an individual observation was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld’s January 20, 2003 remarks before the 2003 Mid-Winter Conference of the Reserve Officers Association scored an 8 out of 9. Strictly speaking, the Iraq Index score variable is a ratio level variable, but it does have a slight tendency of an ordinal level variable. The difference between ratio level and ordinal level variables has to do with the meaningfulness of the differences between measurements. Clearly an Iraq Index score of 8 is
indicative of a stronger and more justified argument for the use of force against Iraq than a score of 2, and the difference is that the former observation’s score made 6 more justifications for the use of force than 2. However, because it is unlikely that all 9 content variables were given equal weight by all contributing U.S. government speakers, the meaningfulness of a difference between Iraq Index scores of 9 may be difficult to define with any precision, certainly not the precision of $8 - 2 = 6$. The Iraq Index score makes the assumption that all 9 content variables are weighted equally. This may be true on average for large numbers of observations, but is a dubious assumption when comparing specific observations. Nonetheless, the Iraq Index score has tremendous value because it allows for a simple comparison between speakers and groups of speakers as well as the visual representation of the strength of hawkish arguments over time.

Having explained the constitutional system in which government deliberation takes place in Chapter 2 and the methodology used to measure that deliberation in this chapter, the next two chapters present the results of this content analysis. The unit of analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 is the group, both political party and branch of government. In Chapter 6, the unit of analysis is the individual government speaker.
4. QUANTIFYING THE IRAQ WAR DEBATE: RESULTS BY POLITICAL PARTY AND BRANCH OVER TIME

To me ‘bipartisan foreign policy’ means a mutual effort, under our indispensable two-party system, to unite our official voice at the water’s edge so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world. It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position. On the contrary, frank cooperation and free debate are indispensable to ultimate unity. In a word, it simply seeks national security ahead of partisan advantage. Every foreign policy must be totally debated (and I think the record proves it has been) and the “loyal opposition” is under special obligation to see that this occurs.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., 1952¹⁴²

This analysis uses two key indicators to show changes in how government officials debated the Iraq war, the relative focus on Iraq and relative strength of arguments favoring the use of force against Iraq. These two indicators demonstrate that government officials paid increasing attention to Iraq through their public deliberations and that justification of an invasion also increased over the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq. One would certainly expect this to be the case—it seems logical that government officials increasingly would recognize the problem with Iraq, and then deliberate on the proper response to that problem, ultimately reaching a consensus. In the case of Iraq, the response was a U.S. invasion of Iraq, carried out in March

2003 after a prolonged period of national deliberation and international diplomacy. This analysis concerns the public deliberation of government officials from the start of George W. Bush’s presidency to the invasion, from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003. It will be shown that there were significant differences between how government officials of the Legislative and Executive branches and of both political parties deliberated about U.S. policy toward Iraq. Strikingly, these differences did not diminish over time as would be expected if government officials had reached a consensus—instead those differences regarding the use of force increased up to the time of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This description of government deliberation over time will serve as the foundation for Chapter 5, where specific research questions involving political party polarization, the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches, and the relationship between political accountability and discussing an invasion of Iraq will be addressed.

4.1 TWO INDICATORS OF ATTENTION AND SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE

Government officials paid more and more attention to Iraq over time, as the number of times Iraq was mentioned in the transcripts trended upwards. Over time government officials also increased their justification of the use of force, as shown by a pronounced upward trend in mean Iraq Index scores. The two figures below illustrate these general rising trends over the 27 months prior to the 2003 invasion. Figure 2 shows that government officials tended to refer to Iraq less than 500 times per month until late January 2002, when President Bush gave his State of the Union address in which he referred to the “axis of evil.” Figure 3 shows that Iraq Index
scores indicate a slight increase in support for the use of force after September 11, 2001, but still low support for the use of force against Iraq until after July 28, 2002. After July 28, 2002, the support for the use of force increased and remained high.

Figure 2: References to Iraq in Government Transcripts

Figure 3: Mean Iraq Index scores of Government Officials
The graph’s shape in figure 3 trends upwards, but there also seems to be three different plateaus of mean Iraq Index scores. The period of the first step corresponded to the first nine months of President Bush’s first term, from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001. The second period, with somewhat higher Iraq Index scores, runs from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002. The period with the highest Iraq Index scores runs from July 29, 2002 to the date of the invasion, March 19, 2003. Dividing the time scale into three periods facilitates a closer look at the data. The next three chapters will make use of this tripartite division to look for trends within each period. The remainder of this section will describe trends in the dataset over all three periods for the entire period January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.

Iraq increasingly became a subject for concern among government officials. The number of unique government officials involved in the public deliberations increased over time, as did the numbers of observations involving Democrats, Republicans, and officials of both the Legislative and Executive branches. In the analysis, a single observation represents an individual government official who used the word Iraq at least once in a single public appearance; the number of observations increased as more government officials began contributing to public deliberation concerning Iraq. Nearly 70% of the content analysis observations occur in the seven months prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This figure, by itself, demonstrates that the bulk of government preoccupation with Iraq occurred only six to eight months before the invasion. The total number of references to Iraq increased more dramatically than the number of observations, from 1,155 in the first period, doubling to 2,324 in the second period, and then increasing six-fold in the third period to 14,452. Table 5 displays attention and Iraq Index scores for each of the three periods, as well as the party and branch affiliations for each observation.
The average number of times a speaker used the word Iraq increased over time as well, from 15 references to Iraq per speaker’s appearance in the first period, to 15.09 in the second, to 45.02 in the third. There is, however, no significant difference between the distributions of the number of times speakers used the word Iraq in the first two periods. Only the distributions of speakers’ attention in the third period were significantly different from the distributions in the two earlier periods (p<.000 using Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust test for equality of means, groups compared at the 95% confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests). This means that while the general trend seems to be an increase in the amount of attention speakers paid to the problem of Iraq, it was not until after July 28, 2002 that speakers began to be more focused on Iraq in each public appearance in a statistically significant manner.

In addition to an increase in the amount of attention paid to Iraq, there was an increase in support for the use of force against Iraq over the three periods, from a mean Iraq Index score of 0.05 in the first period, to 0.39 in the second, and then to 1.25 in the third period, the final eight months before the invasion of Iraq. The maximum Iraq Index score also increased, from 3 in the first period, to 5. The high of 8 then occurred in the third period. These figures represent an increase in the presence of arguments favoring the use of force against Iraq in public
governmental deliberation. It should not be surprising to see how government officials’ support for the use of force grows prior to the actual use of that force. The distributions of government speakers’ Iraq Index scores per observation were significantly different between each of the three periods (p<.000 using Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust test for equality of means, groups compared at the 95% confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests). The statistical significance of the differences between the three periods underscores the significance of the rough stair-step shape of Iraq Index means in figure 3—the changes in tendency with three different plateaus is real and not likely to be the result of chance. The next section of this analysis will examine differences between groups of government officials within the three periods prior to the invasion of Iraq.

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE PERIODS PRIOR TO WAR

The first period begins January 19, 2001, when President Bush’s administration began, and ends on September 11, 2001, when al Qaeda’s attacks in New York and Washington, DC took place. As measured by the relatively low number of times the words Iraq or Iraqi is referred to in the entire transcript set and the relatively low number of times the word Iraq or Iraqi is repeated in a single transcript by a single speaker, the first period is characterized by relatively little government attention paid to Iraq. There did not seem to be any statistically significant difference between Republicans and Democrats in the amount of attention they paid to Iraq (n=23 Democratic and 72 Republican observations; p=.156 using Student’s t-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.031 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution though Mann-Whitney is unreliable with unequal
group numbers). On average, Republicans used the word Iraq a mean of 4.56 times per observation and Democrats used the word a mean of 3.47 times per appearance. Executive branch speakers used the word Iraq an average of 7.49 times per public appearance while Legislators referred to Iraq an average of only 3.12 times. The distributions of Executive and Legislative branch references to Iraq were statistically different (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution). There was no significant difference between the number of times the word Iraq was used between subgroups within the Executive branch, however (p=.015 ANOVA; p<.000 using Welch’s and p=.030 using Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means because equal variances cannot be assumed; differences between groups confirmed by the Games-Howell, Tamhane, Dunnett T3, and Dunnett C post-hoc tests). Executive branch officials and the subgroup of Executive branch officials testifying before Congress did not use the word Iraq a statistically significant different number of times per observation.

With relatively little discussion on Iraq occurring in public government deliberation in the first nine months of President Bush’s first term, there was also very little public discussion regarding the use of force against Iraq during the same period. Not a single Democratic speaker gave any public justification for the use of force in this first period. Very few Republican speakers did so as well. The mean Iraq Index for Republican speakers during this period was 0.0278 while all Democratic speakers had Iraq Index scores of 0.00. There was no statistical difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores for Republican and Democratic speakers in this first period. At the 95% confidence level, there is no significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Republican and Democratic legislators (p=.575.
using Student’s t-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.572 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Student’s due to non-normal distribution). There was also no statistical difference between the Iraq Index scores of Legislative and Executive branch speakers (p=.380 using Student’s t-test because equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.353 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution though with n=112 Executive branch observations and n=48 Legislative branch observations, Welch’s seems sufficient). The highest Iraq Index score of any speakers during the first period was collected from an observation of Republican Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute and the Defense Policy Board. Perle had an Iraq Index score of 2 when he testified before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 1, 2001. Perle would later become chair of the Defense Policy Board in July 2001. Out of 182 observations from the first period, only five observations had Iraq Index scores greater than 0. Two of these five Iraq Index scores from the first period were generated by the Executive branch officials, including Perle, while the other three scores were contributed by congressional witnesses who were not from the Executive branch.

The second period extended from September 12, 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks, to July 28, 2002. This date is just prior to the beginning of Senate hearings on Iraq as well as when an influential article in the conservative Weekly Standard began a media campaign for war with Iraq.143 In addition, Iraq invited international weapons inspectors to resume their work in the country shortly on or around this date, news that became public August 1, 2002.144 More government speakers discussed Iraq in this period: the total number of references to Iraq

increased from 1,155 in the first period to 2,324 in this period; the number of unique speakers involved in the public deliberations increased from 77 in the first period to 154 in this period; and the number of observations increased from 182 observations in the first period to 334 observations. This is an 82.4 % increase in the number of observations and a two-fold increase in the number of individual speakers involved. The amount of attention the typical speaker devoted to the subject of Iraq remained essentially stable during this period, however—the number of references made by each speaker per public appearance did not increase much, from 15 in the first period to only 15.09 in the second. Indeed, there is not a statistically significant difference between distributions in the number of references to Iraq by government speakers in the first and second period (though the distributions of both periods are statistically different from that of the third period; p<.000 using both Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means; differences between groups ascertained at the 95 % confidence level through Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests).

With a mean of 4.57 uses of the word Iraq per public appearance, the average Democrat had a slightly higher number of references to Iraq in public appearances than did Republicans, who had a mean of only 3.74. There was no significant difference between the two political parties’ distributions of public references to Iraq during the second period, however (n= 60 Democratic and 157 Republican observations; p=.321 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p=.971 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution). The Executive branch was only somewhat more active than the Legislative branch, discussing Iraq in 169 observations to the Legislative’s 119 observations. However, Congress has 535 potential speakers and typically only the top echelon in the Executive branch participate in public discussions. When these facts
are considered, the Executive branch was in actuality much more active in discussing Iraq during this period than the Legislative branch. This level of activity in terms of public attention paid to Iraq was statistically different (n= 169 Executive branch officials’ and 119 Legislative officials; p=.002 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions). Executive branch officials used the word Iraq an average of 5.72 times per public appearance while Legislators used the word Iraq an average of only 3.55 times per appearance.

Legislators were not statistically different from all other groups of government speakers, however. This was due to a high number of Executive branch officials who testified before Congress and who had great variability in the number of times they referred to Iraq. There were 43 such Executive branch officials as congressional witnesses, with a mean number of Iraq references of 6.28 with a standard deviation of 6.974. Only congressional witnesses referred to Iraq a statistically significant higher number of times than Legislators, Executive branch officials, and Executive officials testifying before Congress (p=.001 using both Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means; differences between groups ascertained at the 95 % confidence level through Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests).

The discussion of the use of force against Iraq did increase moderately in this second period, but this increase was largely due to increases in Iraq Index score by Executive branch speakers as opposed to Legislators. More government speakers began to give more justifications for the use of force against Iraq, as the mean Iraq Index score for all speakers increased from 0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in this second period, though as mentioned above, the second period’s distributions of Iraq Index scores are not statistically different from the first period.
Republicans and Democrats generally had similar Iraq Index scores in the second period. The Republican mean Iraq Index score was 0.42 and the Democratic mean was 0.37. There was no significant difference between the distributions of Republican and Democratic speakers’ Iraq Index scores ($p=.645$ using Student’s $t$-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; $p=.713$ for Levene’s test statistic for equality of variances; $p=.415$ using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Student’s due to non-normal distributions).

In the second period, the mean Iraq Index score of Executive branch officials was 0.37 while the mean for Legislative branch speakers was 0.31. Executive branch officials discussed the use of force only slightly more than Legislative branch officials, but there was no significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of these groups ($p=.509$ using Student’s $t$-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; $p=.359$ for Levene’s test statistic for equality of variances; $p=.394$ using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Student’s due to non-normal distributions). Aside from the significant difference between Iraq Index scores distributions of Legislative and Executive branch officials just mentioned, there was no difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores for groups of Executive branch officials, Legislative branch officials, Executive branch officials testifying before Congress, and other congressional witnesses ($p=.087$ ANOVA; $p=.384$ using Welch’s and $p=.176$ using Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means since the distributions’ equal variances cannot be assumed).

Despite a lack of statistically significant differences in distributions, it is interesting that the number of references to Iraq and mean Iraq Index scores of Executive officials and congressional witnesses were so much higher than those of Legislators. Legislators had a mean of only 3.55 references per public appearance during this period, but Executive branch officials
had a mean of 5.52. Executive branch officials testifying before Congress had a mean of 6.28 and other congressional witnesses had a mean of 20.33 references to Iraq per public appearance. Perhaps Congress was fact-gathering as opposed to making pronouncements in the second period, perhaps Congress did not consider Iraq to be a foreign policy problem that was worthy of significant public attention, or perhaps Congress was allowing the Executive branch to identify the foreign policy problems worthy of addressing by acquiescing to executive prerogative. This data from public speech is incapable of identifying the reason. Regardless of the reason behind these results, the results do indicate that the Executive branch was much more active and focused on Iraq during the second period.

The third period covers July 29, 2002 to the date the invasion of Iraq began, March 19, 2003. This period is characterized by the highest amount of government attention to Iraq, as measured by three indicators. First, there was a dramatic increase in the total number of references in the transcripts to Iraq. In period I, the total number of references to Iraq for all speakers was 1,155 while in period II, the total had doubled to 2,324. In this final period, the total was 14,452. Second, this period has the highest number of observations. In the third period, the total number of observations was 1,183, much more than the 182 observations in the first period and 334 observations in the second, even if the first two periods were to be combined. Third, in this final period of analysis government speakers had the highest number of references to Iraq per each public appearance demonstrating focus on Iraq. In the first and second periods, speakers discussing the subject of Iraq tended to mention the word Iraq 6.35 and 6.96 times, respectively. In the third period, the average speaker discussing Iraq used the word 12.2 times per public appearance.
In the third period, the distributions of references to Iraq per public appearance made by Democrats and Republicans were statistically different (n= 557 Republicans and 349 Democrats; p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions). On average, Republican speakers used the word 11.91 times per public appearance. This rate is nearly twice that of Democrats, who had an average of 5.83. There was also a statistically significant difference between speakers in the Executive and Legislative branches (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions). Within the Executive branch, there was no significant difference between the distributions of references to Iraq by those Executive officials who testified before Congress and other Executive branch officials (p<.000 ANOVA; p<.000 confirmed with Welch and Brown-Forsythe robust tests for equality of means).

There was, however, a statistically significant difference between Legislators and all other groups, and between congressional witnesses and all other groups (group differences confirmed at the 95 % confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the Games-Howell post-hoc tests). Congressional witnesses tended to refer to Iraq an average of 31.18 times per appearance. This seems reasonable, as congressional witnesses are experts and are likely to be focused on the subject of their expertise. If a congressional witness mentions Iraq (and therefore will be included in the transcripts), he or she is likely to be testifying on the subject of Iraq. Legislators are much less likely to refer to Iraq than any other group, with an average of only 5.30. Executive branch officials mentioned Iraq an average of 16.55 times per
public appearance while Executive branch officials testifying before Congress referred to Iraq a total of 18.72 times per observation.

Executive branch officials used the word Iraq an average of 16.83 times per public appearance while Legislators tended to mention Iraq only an average of 5.32 times per appearance. Legislative officials increased their focus on Iraq from the first and second periods to the third period (3.12 and 3.55, respectively, but there is no significant difference between the two periods’ distributions of references to Iraq for Legislators). For speakers in the Legislative branch, only the distribution of references to Iraq in the third period was statistically different from the other two (period III was statistically different with $p=0.008$, confirmed with Welch and Brown-Forsythe robust test for equality of means; groups differences confirmed through Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the Games-Howell post-hoc tests). Even though the mean increased in the third period, the Legislative mean of 5.32 is still less than the Executive branch mean over any period. These facts indicate that the Executive branch was always much more focused on Iraq than was the Legislative branch—the Congress did not begin to increase its attention on Iraq until beginning around January of 2003, by which time the authorization to use force had already been granted—war was near, perhaps even a foregone conclusion. Table 6 displays the averages of references to Iraq for groups of officials over all three periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Iraq (number of references to Iraq per observation)</th>
<th>Period I</th>
<th>Period II</th>
<th>Period III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>11.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Legislators</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Legislators</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive branch</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative branch</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Group Means for References to Iraq
The third period also saw an upsurge in public deliberation supporting the use of force against Iraq. Of course, some sort of a rise would be consistent with the expected, as government officials sought to inform the public of their reasoning and justify any impending actions with an increasing effort in the period in which government authorizes that use of force. The highest mean Iraq Index scores for any group or subgroup occur in the third period. Speakers in the Executive branch had a mean Iraq Index score of 1.93—each time someone in the Executive branch publicly used the word “Iraq,” he or she would also mention nearly two of nine different justifications in favor of using force against Iraq. The mean Iraq Index score for Legislators during this same period was a mere 0.61. In this third period, there is a statistically significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Executive and Legislative branch speakers (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison purposes due to non-normal distributions).

Congressional witnesses had statistically significant distributions of Iraq Index scores higher than any other group, including Executive branch officials and Executive branch officials testifying before Congress (p<.000 ANOVA; group differences confirmed through Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the Games-Howell post-hoc tests). At the same time, the mean Iraq Index scores of Legislators were statistically significant but far smaller than the means of the other groups. From this, it can be inferred that during the third period, the Executive branch was much more outspoken in public support for the war than the Legislative branch, but the congressional witnesses tended to be the most pronounced in favor of the use of force against Iraq.
The mean Republican Iraq Index score was 1.79 and the mean Democratic Iraq Index score was only 0.40. The difference in Iraq Index score distributions for Democrats and Republicans is also statistically significant (n= 557 Republicans and 349 Democrats; p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions). Much of this significant difference between Democrats and Republicans may be due to the inclusion of Executive branch speakers, who tended to have high Iraq Index scores. In order to see whether the two parties in Congress were also statistically different, I repeated significance tests between distributions of Iraq Index means between Legislative Democrats and Legislative Republicans. I did not test for significance between Republican and Democratic Legislators in the first period because there was no variation in mean Iraq Index score—the Iraq Index scores of all Legislators in the first period were 0. In the second period, there was no statistical difference between the mean Iraq Index scores of Democratic and Republican Legislators (n=64 for Republican Legislators, n=55 for Democratic Legislators; p=.298 using Student’s t-test because equal variances may be safely assumed with a Levene’s statistic for equality of variances p=.056). The mean Democratic score in the second period was actually slightly higher than the mean Republican Iraq Index score, 0.38 to 0.25.

In the third period, the mean Legislative Republican Iraq Index score was 0.94 while the mean Legislative Democrat was 0.39. The mean Iraq Index score for Democratic Legislators barely increased at all. The distributions of Iraq Index scores across party lines are significantly different (n= 220 Legislative Republicans and 335 Legislative Democrats; p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p=.001 using the nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions). The table below displays the mean Iraq Index scores for groups of officials over all three periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Index scores</th>
<th>Iraq Index scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Period I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Legislators</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Legislators</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive branch</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative branch</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Mean Iraq Index Scores

This data demonstrates that during the third period, Republicans were much more outspoken in their public support for the war than were Democrats. This was despite the notion that Congress had supposedly been unified in voting for the authorization that allowed the president to use force against Iraq in October 2002. During the third period, Congress was much less active in advocating support for the use of force, especially Democrats in Congress. Even Republicans in Congress did not support the use of force as much as did Executive branch officials. The Executive branch was more active in participating in public discussions, more focused on the problem of Iraq, and more likely to advocate for the use of force throughout the third period.

The differences between the mean Iraq Indexes of groups plotted over time is an effective way to illustrate the increasing degree of divergence on the intra-governmental debate regarding Iraq. There is consensus between the groups in the first period because virtually no one discussed the use of force against Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The major splits between Democrats and Republicans and between officials of the Executive and Legislative branches occur at the beginning of the third period. The divergence between
Democratic and Republican legislators occurs at about the same time, but grows significantly after October 2002, after the President Bush signed Congress’ Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq on October 16, 2002.

![Figure 4: Differences in Mean Iraq Index Scores Between Groups](image)

This section has focused on the use of general indicators, not on specific arguments. Iraq Index scores and the number of uses of the word Iraq have served as rough measures of activity in participating in public discussions, focus on Iraq, and advocacy of using force against Iraq. The next subsection will examine the use of specific arguments and aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq to look for evidence of the same trend of political cleavages. Using inferences from this section on general indicators and the next section regarding various groups of government officials’ use of specific arguments, Chapter 5 will then address specific research questions.
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS REGARDING WAR AGAINST IRAQ

The Iraq Index score is only a general indicator of the content expressed by government speakers during the 27 months leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Subtle differences between political parties and branches may be missed by an indirect measurement of focus or reliance on an aggregated index variable such as the Iraq Index score, particularly when the amount of time included in a given period of analysis was six to eight months. It was demonstrated in the previous section that during the first two periods of analysis, from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001 and from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002, there was no statistically significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Republican and Democratic or Executive and Legislative branch government officials. The only significant differences between such groups of government officials occurred in the last period of analysis, from July 29, 2002 to March 19, 2003. This trend is suggestive of growing disagreement between political parties in the approach to U.S. policy with regard to Iraq. In this section, this trend of growing divergence will be examined between groups of government officials across many other aspects of the public debate on Iraq as opposed to the single aggregated variable that is the Iraq Index score.

There are not equal numbers of Democratic and Republican speakers in the transcripts. It was previously shown that Republican speakers were more active with regard to making public appearances wherein they referred to Iraq, as well as the number of times they mentioned the word Iraq in each appearance. This is understandable as Republicans controlled much of government during the 27 or so months of transcripts collected in this content analysis. In order to compare Democratic and Republican speakers, it is reasonable to compare groups by using the
frequency that an average speaker of either party makes a justification or refers to the content variables in the coding instrument, as opposed to the absolute number of times that a content variable is used. For example, there are 60 observations of Democratic speakers in the second period. For the second period, 29 of these observations of Democratic government officials included a reference to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The frequency of Democratic references to 9/11 in public appearances where Democrats also mentioned Iraq in the second period was therefore 29/60, or 48.3%. For the same period, 94 out of 157 Republicans also referred to the attacks of 9/11, a frequency of 59.9%. The frequencies that Democrats and Republicans referred to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 can then be compared on an equal footing.

In table 8, grey shading identifies those content variables where the content variables frequencies expressed by Republican and Democratic speakers are numerically similar by being within 1% in frequency. Out of 26 content variables, Republicans and Democrats have similar frequencies across 16 content variables in the first period. By the second period, Republicans and Democrats are similar across only 12 content variables. In the third period, there is consensus between Democratic and Republican government officials with respect to only three content variables.

Table 8 illustrates the major points of divergence between Democrats and Republicans. Because the frequencies are expressed in percentage terms, the differences between the frequencies that Republican and Democratic speakers expressed a content variable denotes the percentage additional likelihood that one political party favored a given content variable expression. During the second period, Republicans were more likely to mention the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (.115 difference), but Democrats were more likely to mention Osama bin Laden (.153 difference). Republicans were more likely to allude to a general connection
between Iraq and terrorism (.163 difference). Democrats were more likely to refer to Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons (.094 difference) and were also somewhat more likely to make calls for additional analysis of the costs and benefits of an invasion of Iraq (.081 difference).

In the third period, there are ten content variables where the frequencies are most divergent between political parties where Republicans were more likely to assert those content variables. They are: 1) assertions that Iraq possessed WMDs (.344 difference); 2) referring to international law to justify an invasion of Iraq (.335 difference); 3) referring to disarming Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (.307 difference); 4) alluding to general connections between Iraq and terrorism (.306 difference); 5) identifying efforts against Iraq with the war on terror (.284 difference); 6) considering an invasion of Iraq to be a method to disarm Iraq (.277 difference); 7) assuming U.S. national security interests justified the invasion (.261 difference); 8) mentioning a possible multilateral invasion of Iraq (.255 difference); 9) suggesting the inefficacy of international weapons inspections (.212 difference); and 10) referring to the 9/11 attacks in the same appearance that they also mentioned Iraq (.191 difference). For their part, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to call for a further analysis of the invasions costs and benefits (.236 difference).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Goals</th>
<th>E% (out of 112)</th>
<th>E% (out of 169)</th>
<th>E% (out of 555)</th>
<th>L% (out of 48)</th>
<th>L% (out of 119)</th>
<th>L% (out of 556)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says invasion of Iraq is a potential method to disarm Iraq</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker references the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon to justify an invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker gives humanitarian justifications in order to justify the invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker uses the phrase &quot;regime change&quot;</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the Threat</th>
<th>E% (out of 112)</th>
<th>E% (out of 169)</th>
<th>E% (out of 555)</th>
<th>L% (out of 48)</th>
<th>L% (out of 119)</th>
<th>L% (out of 556)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to OBL</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to justify an invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the &quot;War on Terror&quot;</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means to the End</th>
<th>E% (out of 112)</th>
<th>E% (out of 169)</th>
<th>E% (out of 555)</th>
<th>L% (out of 48)</th>
<th>L% (out of 119)</th>
<th>L% (out of 556)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions international law to support the invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV operations</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or continued) international weapons inspections</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the U.S.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs and Benefits</th>
<th>E% (out of 112)</th>
<th>E% (out of 169)</th>
<th>E% (out of 555)</th>
<th>L% (out of 48)</th>
<th>L% (out of 119)</th>
<th>L% (out of 556)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker gives an explicit value for US cost estimates of the invasion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 billion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding costs)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of the (potential) invasion or opines about &quot;unanswered questions&quot;</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of the (potential) invasion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican speakers in Three Periods

Data from the frequencies of individual content variables also shows a general lack of consensus between Republican and Democratic legislators and between the Executive and Legislative branches. The two parties in Congress are not as far apart as Democrats and Republicans generally, or even between the Executive and Legislative branches. Table 9
displays the differences between Democratic and Republican legislators and table 10 lists differences between the Executive and Legislative branches. The grey shading indicates a consensus between the two groups as the frequencies speakers within each group expressed a content variable similar to the frequency of their counterpart. As Table 9 shows, the six content variables where the frequencies are most divergent in the second period between political parties in the legislature are 1) considering an invasion of Iraq to be a method to disarm Iraq (.112 difference); 2) alluding to connections between Iraq and terrorism generally (.092 difference); 3) calling for additional analysis of the costs and benefits of using force against Iraq; 4) referring to 9/11 (.064 difference); 5) using the phrase “regime change” (.057 difference); and 6) explicitly mentioning U.S. national security to support the use of force against Iraq. Surprisingly, legislative Democrats tended to express these content variables more than Republicans—of these six content variables, Republicans were more likely to express only one of them, namely to allude to general connections between Iraq and terrorism.

In the third period, Republicans and Democrats generally moved farther apart on most aspects of the Iraq war debate—the two parties expressed only three content variables within 1% frequency. Whereas Democratic legislators had often expressed content variables more often than Republicans in the second period, Republican legislators surpassed Democrats on most indicators. Republicans were more likely to 1) connect the effort against Iraq with the war on terror (.130 difference); 2) assert that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.112 difference); 3) assert that an invasion would disarm Iraq (.112 difference); and 4) express an assumption that U.S. national security interests supported the use of force against Iraq (.106 difference). Democratic legislators, for their part, were .200 more likely to call for further analysis of the costs and benefits of an invasion of Iraq or to opine about unanswered questions.
Legislators of both parties moved closer to consensus on the use of humanitarian concerns to justify the invasion of Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Goals</th>
<th>Rleg % (out of 27)</th>
<th>Dleg % (out of 21)</th>
<th>Rleg % (out of 64)</th>
<th>Dleg % (out of 55)</th>
<th>Rleg % (out of 220)</th>
<th>Dleg % (out of 335)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says invasion of Iraq is a potential method to disarm Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker references the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon to justify an invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker gives humanitarian justifications in order to justify the invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker uses the phrase &quot;regime change&quot;</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to OBL</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to justify an invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means to the End</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions international law to support the invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV operations</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.131</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or continued) international weapons inspections</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker expresses explicit reservations regarding unilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs and Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker gives an explicit value for US cost estimates of the invasion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 billion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions Iraq's use of oil production as a cost offset to the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding costs)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of the (potential) invasion or opines about &quot;unanswered questions&quot;</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of the (potential) invasion</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican Legislators in Three Periods

The shaded cells in the period I columns of table 10 show that the Executive and Legislative branches tended to agree more than they disagreed in the first period. Only six pairs of cells are not shaded, and those differences that do exist are rather small. It should be noted
that even in the first period that the Executive branch was more likely to assert that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or had used them (the differences for both content variables is .071). Divergences began to appear between the two political branches of government in the second period, with differences increasing over 19 of the 26 content variables. By the third period, little consensus remained as the Executive and Legislative branches tended to agree over only 3 content variables of 26.

In the second period, the five content variables that Executive branch speakers expressed more frequently than the Legislative branch all went to the nature of the threat posed by Iraq. The Executive branch tended to argue more than the Legislative branch by 1) referring to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (.243 difference); 2) alluding to a connection between Iraq and terrorism (.188 difference); 3) mentioning Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons (.144 difference); 4) asserting that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.127 difference); and 5) making explicit connections between Iraq and terrorism (.086 difference). Of these content variables, the reference to 9/11 is most noteworthy due to its magnitude. In situations where government officials referred to Iraq, Executive branch officials were 24.3% more likely than Legislative branch officials to refer to 9/11 in the eleven months after September 11, 2001.

In the third period, the Executive branch increased the margin of its percentage frequency for ten content variables to greater than 20% (though, it should be noted, the strong 24.3% margin for references to 9/11 would decrease by 3%). In the final period, the ten content variables that Executive branch speakers were more likely to assert than Legislators were: 1) claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.379 difference); 2) justifying the invasion for the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (.314 difference); 3) justifying the invasion by reference to international law (.308 difference); 4) alluding to general
connections between Iraq and terrorism (.272 difference); 5) arguing that an invasion of Iraq would serve to disarm Iraq (.257 difference); 6) assuming that U.S. national security interests support an invasion of Iraq (.238 difference); 7) identifying the effort against Iraq with the war on terror (.234 difference); 8) mentioning the possibility of a multilateral invasion of Iraq (.227 difference); 9) mention Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the past (.218 difference); and 10) referring to the 9/11 attacks (.213 difference).

Legislators were more likely to 1) call for additional consideration of the costs and benefits of the invasion or Iraq (.182 difference); 2) support a multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval (.076 difference); 3) refer to an explicit value for the potential cost of the invasion (.034 difference); 4) assert that the cost of the war might be less than $100 billion (.016 difference); 5) refer to post war planning (.012); 6) use the exact phrase “regime change” (.012 difference); and 7) urge a unilateral invasion (.004 difference). However, because so few of these observations involved speakers that called for a unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq, the extremely low frequency in both branches of government was very near to equivalent. These results indicate that Congress considered the costs and benefits of the invasion of Iraq somewhat more than the Executive branch, but significantly underestimated those costs. Congress was also significantly more interested in UN approval for the invasion of Iraq.
Another way to express the differences of content variables’ frequencies between Republicans and Democrats is to give the ratio between them for each content variable. When a ratio of the frequency that one party expresses a content variable is equal to the frequency that the other party expresses that same content variable, then the ratio between the two parties’
frequencies will be equal to one. In such a case, there would be a perfect consensus between the
two groups for that content variable. Obviously perfect consensus between various groups
should not be expected, but increasing or decreasing ratios over time would indicate growing
consensus or divergence. Table 11 displays the ratios of expressed frequencies for content
variables for Republican and Democrats. To make this table easier to read, all frequencies have
been rounded to the nearest hundredth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Goals</th>
<th>Republicans / Democrats</th>
<th>R / D Legislators</th>
<th>Exec. / Legisl. Branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Iraq is a potential method to disarm Iraq</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>.33/0</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons justifies invasion</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.57/0</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian concerns justify invasion</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.30/0</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker uses the phrase &quot;regime change&quot;</td>
<td>3.06/0</td>
<td>1.24/0</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>1.24/0</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to QBL</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.65/0</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>18.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to justify an invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.38/0</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>1.07/0</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the “War on Terror”</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.12/0</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally</td>
<td>.03/0</td>
<td>1.57/0</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>1.02/0</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentioned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons</td>
<td>.08/0</td>
<td>3.62/0</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says Iraq possesses WMDs</td>
<td>.07/0</td>
<td>1.58/0</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means to the End</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions international law to support the invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>.05/0</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV operations</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>1.15/0</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or continued) international weapons inspections</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>1.53/0</td>
<td>10.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the U.S.</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>1.34/0</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>0.62/0</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval</td>
<td>.01/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs and Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker gives an explicit value for US cost estimates of the invasion</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 billion</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding costs)</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of the (potential) invasion or opines about &quot;unanswered questions&quot;</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>0.19/0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of the (potential) invasion</td>
<td>.00/0</td>
<td>0.76/0</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Content Variable Frequency Ratios over Three Periods
Ratios where the number zero appears as either the numerator or denominator (but not both) are not reduced to decimal form; ratios where the number zero is both the denominator and numerator appear as \( \approx 0/0 \). Because ratios are expressed as Republican frequencies of content variables divided by Democratic frequencies, cell values of less than one represent ratios where Democrats have a higher frequency for that ratio. The same is true for ratios between Republican and Democratic legislators and those between the Executive and Legislative branches. Many of the frequencies of content variables from the first period and several from the second period are so small that they round to zero and result in ratios of \( \approx 0/0 \). Despite the division by zero, in these instances the ratio is functionally equivalent to one, since the two groups’ frequencies involved in calculating the ratio are equally close to zero.

Differences between the percentage frequency of content variables (tables 8, 9, and 10) and increases in the frequency ratios between groups’ content variables (table 11) when considered together generates a more detailed representation of the Iraq war debate. While the debate on Iraq generally was characterized by increasing differences of opinion between groups of Democrats and Republicans and Executive branch officials and Legislators, changes in the frequency that a specific group expressed a given content variable allows for a more detailed analysis of the public debate. Between September 11, 2001 and July 28, 2002, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to consider invasion as a potential method to disarm Iraq as well as to justify an invasion of Iraq through calling for the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Likewise, Legislators were more likely than Executive branch officials to make both assertions (likely because nearly every Democratic government official in the sample served in Congress). However, from July 29, 2002 to the start of the invasion, Republicans and Executive branch officials were much more likely to make these two arguments. In fact,
Republicans were 3.68 times more likely than Democrats to justify an invasion of Iraq in order to disarm Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons between July 29, 2002 and March 19, 2003. As for the use of a humanitarian justification to invade Iraq, Democrats did not make such an argument until the third period, but in that period Republicans were more likely to do so by a factor of 4.54. The Executive branch was more likely than the Legislative branch to argue for an invasion on humanitarian grounds by a factor of 5.48. As for regime change, Republicans were 3.06 times as likely as Democrats to use the phrase “regime change” when discussing Iraq during the first period and 1.24 times as likely in the second period. In the third period, however, Democrats used the phrase more often, but only by a factor of 1.18. This decrease in ratio is illustrative of a growing consensus on the concept of regime change as the date of invasion approached. Of goal-oriented content variables, the content variable of regime change was the only variable to show increasing convergence as the time of invasion approached.

Content variables that measure officials’ discussion of the Iraqi threat show a near-consistent pattern of widening disagreement between groups. The Executive branch was nearly always more likely to express content variables related to the threat. The Executive branch was more likely than the Legislative branch to equate an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror, and became increasingly more so in the third period. In the nine months after September 11, 2001, Executive branch officials were only 4.5 % more likely than Legislators to make this claim, but the Executive branch increased its margin to 23.4 % after July 28, 2002. In the third period, the Executive branch was 2.63 times more likely than the Legislative branch to claim the invasion of Iraq to be part of the war on terror. Executive branch speakers were also much more likely to refer to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the second and third periods than were Legislators, by a margin of over 20 % each period. In other words, Executive branch officials were 1.58 times
more likely in the second period and 1.82 times more likely in the third period to mention 9/11 than were legislators, regardless of party affiliation.

The Executive branch was also more likely than the Legislative branch to portray connections between Iraq and terrorism in public appearances. The difference between branches in the frequency of alluding to general connections between Iraq and terrorism seems slight in the first period at .015, but this rate was actually 1.71 times more than the frequency of the Legislative branch. The Executive branch’s frequency grew to .473 in the second period, but the Legislative branch also began to make more allusions to connections between Iraq and terrorism because the ratio with the Legislative branch decreased somewhat, from 1.71 in the first period to 1.66 in the second. In the third period, however, the Executive branch’s margin was .187 giving a ratio with the Legislative branch of 2.70.

While there was virtually no difference in likelihood between the frequencies that Executive and Legislative branches pointed to explicit links between terrorists and terrorist groups and Iraq in the first period (the Legislature was slightly more likely, but the difference was only .021). The Executive branch increased its margin to .086 in the second period for a ratio of 1.72. After September 11, Executive branch officials were much more likely than Legislative branch officials to name more specific connections between Iraq and terrorism by naming groups and individual terrorists. The margin grew to .140 in the third period for a ratio of 4.72. Legislative officials were actually less likely to publicly refer to explicit links between Iraq and terrorism in the third period.

Executive branch officials were also more likely to mention that Iraq possessed WMDs than were Legislative branch officials. In the first period, no Legislator made such a charge, but 7.1% of the time Executive branch officials mentioned Iraq, Executive branch officials asserted
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. After September 11, 2001, Executive branch officials were even more likely to say that Iraq possessed WMDs, exceeding Legislative officials by a factor of 2.17 in the second period and 2.22 in the third. These dramatic differences in percentage frequencies over several terror-related content variables suggest a high degree of disagreement between the Legislative and Executive branches of government, particularly for the issue of the nexus between Iraq and terrorism. These results show that the Executive branch was much more involved than Legislators in laying out potential connections between Iraq and terrorism to the public.

These divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches tend to be greater in magnitude than cleavages between Republicans and Democrats and between Republican and Democratic legislators, but divergences between the parties nonetheless do exist. While Democratic legislators were more likely than Republican legislators to equate an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror in the second period by a factor of 1.16 (the multiplicative inverse of .86, the R/D ratio), Legislative branch Republicans were 2.41 times more likely than Democrats to make the same argument in the third period. Republican legislators were also more likely than their Democratic counterparts to allude to both general and specific connections between Iraq and terrorism. In the first period, no Democrat made either a general or specific connection between Iraq and terrorism; the ratio of Legislative branch Republicans to Democrats is .03/0 for general connections and .01/0 for specific connections between Iraq and terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, *i.e.* in the second period, the Legislative Republican to Democrat ratio increased to 1.39 for general allusions and 1.72 for specific references. These ratios increased in the third period to 2.71 for general allusions and 3.81 for specific references. For Republican Legislative observations in the third period, 25.9 % of them alluded to general
connections between Iraq and terrorism, compared to only 9.6% of Democratic Legislative observations.

For the first two periods, there was a high degree of consensus in the legislature between Democrats and Republicans on Iraq’s possession of WMDs. In the first period, no legislator of either party ever publicly said that Iraq possessed WMDs. In the second period, legislators of both parties made the claim with essentially the same frequency. Only in the third period did Republican legislators assert that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction more than Democratic legislators, with a ratio of 1.42 in the third period. Also in the third period, Republican legislators described the threat posed by Iraq as imminent much more often than Democratic legislators, at a frequency of 12.18 to the frequency of Democratic legislators. These differences show that Legislative branch Republicans and Democrats made significantly different public cases for the use of force against Iraq.

In the first period, there was little divergence between parties and branches for content variables associated with international law or weapons inspectors because so few government speakers had anything to say about those subjects. Those few that did suggest that international law was supportive for an invasion of Iraq were in the Executive branch, and even then only 1.4% of Executive branch observations included this suggestion. The same percentage of Executive branch observations also contained criticism of international weapons inspections. These figures compare with 7% of observations where the Executive branch official mentioned Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons. Legislative branch Republicans and Democrats did not make such arguments in the first period. In the second period, speakers of both political parties criticized weapons inspections, and Legislative Democrats were actually slightly more likely to be critical of inspectors than Legislative Republicans with a ratio of 1.16. The Executive branch remained
more critical of weapons inspection by a frequency ratio of 1.45 more than the Legislative branch’s rate during the second period. In the third period, Executive branch speakers were much more critical of weapons inspections than any other government group or subgroup—23.5% of Executive branch observations were critical of weapons inspections while only 2.3% of Legislative branch observations were, a frequency ratio of 5.09. Republicans in Congress joined the Executive branch in criticizing weapons inspections during the third period more than their Democratic colleagues, but they did so with a much lower rate. Nine-point-one percent of Republican legislators’ observations were critical of international weapons inspections while 1.8% of Democratic legislators made such an argument. The ratio between Republican and Democratic legislators’ frequency was 5.09 during the third period. In spite of this significant Republican criticism during the second and third periods, weapons inspectors did resume inspections of Iraq on November 18, 2002, three months into the third period and only ten days after the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441.145

Groups differed over the kind of invasion to mount against Iraq, and the divergences grew over the three periods. No one mentioned the possibility, let alone advocated, using unilateral force against Iraq in the first period. In the second period, however, government speakers began to mention possible multilateral and unilateral options for an invasion of Iraq. Democrats in the Legislative branch were twice as likely as Legislative Republicans to mention the potential use of multilateral force against Iraq as 12.7% of observations of Democrats and only 6.3% of Republicans mentioned this possibility. The Legislative branch tended to mention the possibility of using multilateral force against Iraq slightly more than the Executive branch in the second period, with 9.2% to 7.1% of observations. Few speakers mentioned the potential

use of unilateral force against Iraq in the second period, though it was discussed somewhat more in Congress than by the Executive branch. Of Legislative branch Republican observations, 4.7% mentioned the possibility of using unilateral force, 3.6% of Legislative branch Democrats did so, and only 2.4% of Executive branch observations mentioned the possibility of unilateral force in the second period.

In the third period, Republicans finally began to mention the possible use of multilateral force more than Democrats, 44.7% to 13.2% of observations, a frequency ratio of 2.11 to 1. The Executive branch mentioned the potential use of multilateral force 43.2% of all observations during the third period, while only 20.5% of Legislative branch observations did so. Republicans in Congress were slightly more likely than their Democratic colleagues to mention a potential multilateral invasion, with 23.6% and 18.5% of each group’s observations mentioning multilateral force. Possible unilateral force was more likely to be mentioned by a Republican Legislator than a Democratic one in the third period, at a frequency ratio of 1.35 to 1. The political branches of government were more evenly matched in frequency, with the Executive branch slightly more likely to mention the possibility of a unilateral invasion than the Legislative branch at a frequency ratio of 1.11 to 1. Few observations involved speakers publicly advocating the use of unilateral force against Iraq, but those that did were somewhat more likely to be congressional Republicans. The frequency of Legislative branch calls for the unilateral use of force to that of Executive branch speakers was 1.67 to 1 (the inverse of the R/L ratio of .60) and the frequency ratio of congressional Republicans advocating the unilateral invasion of Iraq to congressional Democrats was 2.28 to 1. Democratic Legislators advocated the multilateral invasion of Iraq with United Nations approval by a frequency ratio of nearly 25
to 1. Nearly 13% of Legislative branch Democratic observations involved this argument, while only 0.5% of Legislative Republican observations did.

Legislative branch Democrats were also more likely to refer to post-war planning than their Republican counterparts. No speakers of either party mentioned post-war planning in the first period. In the second and third periods, however, Democrats in Congress were more likely to refer to post-war planning than Republicans in Congress by frequency ratios of .02/0 to 1 and 1.25 to 1. Interestingly, the Executive branch discussed post-war planning more frequently than the Legislative branch in the second period by a ratio of 3.52 to 1, but in the third period as the debate began to become more prominent, Congress increased its discussion of post-war planning such that the ratio flipped toward Congress, 1.11 to 1.

Potential costs and benefits associated with an invasion of Iraq were not discussed until the second period and then only in a general way. In the second period, Executive branch officials were the most likely to make public references to estimates of costs and benefits of invading Iraq, but with only 1.2% of observations. Only 0.8% of all Legislative observations during the second period referred to costs and benefits of the invasion, but all observations were from Democratic legislators. During this same period, Democratic legislators were more likely than their Republican colleagues to call for more analysis of potential costs and benefits or to complain about too many unanswered questions, by a factor of 3.45. These factors should not be blown out of proportion, because so few observations were involved, perhaps any potential invasion of Iraq still seemed too remote. Ten-point-nine percent of observations from Democratic legislators called for more analysis and complained about too many unanswered questions, compared to 3.1% of observations of Republican legislators.
Not until the third period did Congress begin to appreciably increase its calls for additional analysis of costs and benefits, and when Congress did so, each political party did so with vastly different frequencies. In the third period, 26.9% of observations from Democratic legislators wanted more analysis while only 3.2% of Republican observations did so. Congress was much more likely to want more analysis of costs and benefits by a factor of 14.3—only 0.7% of third period observations of Executive branch officials discussed the need for further analysis or suggested there were unanswered questions.

No government speaker gave any explicit cost value for a potential invasion until the third period. Democratic legislators were 4 times more likely to mention a cost value than were Republicans in Congress, who were themselves 3.5 times more likely to do so than Executive branch speakers: 5.4% for Democratic legislators while only 1.4% of Republican legislators and 0.4% of Executive branch speakers’ observations. Somewhat unexpectedly, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to suggest that the potential cost of the war would be less than $100 billion. Legislative Democrats did so by a factor of nearly 2 to 1 and the Legislative branch was more likely to do so than the Executive branch by a factor of 2.27. References to a potential cost of the war being less than $100 billion were rare, however, with only 3.6% of Democratic legislator’s observations, 1.8% for Republican legislators, and 1.3% for Executive branch officials. While Democrats seemingly undervalued the cost of war, many Republicans tended to stress certain benefits. During the third period, the Executive branch referred to Iraqi oil as a benefit that would help to offset the costs of the invasion or rebuilding efforts as 3.8% of their observations regarding Iraq and 2.7% of Republican legislative observations included this argument. Only 0.6% of Democratic legislators made this argument. Republicans were more likely to refer to Iraqi oil as a cost offset than Democrats by a factor of 4.56. These percentages
tended to be much lower than the percentage frequency that speakers discussed terrorism and the threat posed by Iraq. This content analysis suggests that government discussion was primarily about the threat posed by Iraq, and only secondarily about how to invade Iraq or how much such an invasion might cost.

These frequencies have told a descriptive story, a story where Democrats and Republicans, Legislators and Executive branch officials diverged more and more in how often they expressed ideas about the Iraqi threat and the potential use of force to confront that threat. In the next two chapters, this story and this descriptive data will be used to address specific research questions. The examination in Chapter 5 involves the comparison of various groups of government officials, addressing specific research questions using the results of the content analysis with data aggregated at the level of political party and branch of government. In Chapter 6, results from the content analysis will be presented with data aggregated by individual speakers. This will enable a relative comparison of individual speakers involved in the debate regarding Iraq, at least for those government officials who contributed the most to the public debate.
5. CONFRONTING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH THE DESCRIPTIVE DATA

Over all three periods of analysis, Republican speakers referred to Iraq a total number of times more than did Democrats. This is to be expected as there were more Republicans in Congress and high-level Executive branch officials are nearly all well-known Republicans (DCIA Tenet a notable exception). Democrats tended to discuss Iraq less often per public appearance than did Republicans, reinforcing the notion that Republicans were much more focused on Iraq—this disparity was greatest during the third time period. In addition to focus, Iraq Index scores provide a measure to compare speakers in their support for the use of force against Iraq. Executive branch officials gave much more public justification than did Legislative officials. When Executive branch officials justified the use of force while testifying before Congress, they tended to produce Iraq Index scores that were higher and statistically significant than those of Legislators. There was little partisan difference in both Iraq index scores and the focus that individual speakers paid to Iraq until the third period, that is, until after July 29, 2002. Even during the third period, Democrats as a whole tended to have low Iraq Index scores. These low scores show that Democrats were not nearly as engaged in public justification of the war as were Republicans, despite the fact that many Democrats did vote in favor of the authorization to use force against Iraq in the middle of the third period. Table 6 summarizes these descriptive findings for each period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Period I: 1/19/01 to 9/11/01</th>
<th>Period II: 9/12/01 to 7/28/02</th>
<th>Period III: 7/29/02 to 3/19/03</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Iraq References</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>2324</td>
<td>14452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Iraq references</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(by speaker per appearance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention paid to Iraq</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH (for both Legislators &amp; Executive branch officials, Period III is higher than other periods in a statistically significant manner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Iraq Index score (per observation)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Iraq Index score (out of 9)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public advocacy for the use of force against Iraq (attention to Iraq considered jointly with concomitant Iraq Index scores)</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MIXED (low for Legislators, high for Executive branch officials and congressional witnesses)</td>
<td>HIGH (higher for Republicans than Democrats as well as higher for Executive branch officials than Legislators)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Summary of Descriptive Findings

This study posed three sets of research questions for the period of January 2001 to March 2003—the first set deals with comparing Legislative and Executive branches in their attention to Iraq, the second focuses on potential consensus or divergence between groups of government elites, and the third examines the relationship between political accountability and justifications favoring the use of force. To examine Executive/Legislative branch relations on the subject of Iraq, the specific research questions are: Did Congress pay more or less attention to Iraq during the first two years of President Bush’s first term prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003? Were there external events associated with an increase (or decrease) in Legislators speaking about Iraq, or an increase in the congressional support for an invasion of Iraq? If the high water mark of congressional activity was the lead-up to the passage of the October 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq, then this would be consistent with the hypothesis that
Congress was truly a passive partner in President Bush’s effort against Iraq. The specific research question regarding consensus in government groups is: Were there changes in the level of consensus or divergence between political parties and government branches during the period January 2001 to March 2003? The specific research question regarding political accountability is whether there exists a statistically significant relationship between and Iraq Index scores and two methods of ordering government officials’ political accountability.

5.1 LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOCUS ON IRAQ

The question of which branch of government addressed the subject of Iraq more during the two years prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 will be addressed by using the total number of observations made by both branches, the mean number of references to Iraq per observation made by both branches, and the mean Iraq Index scores of both branches. These three measurements plotted over the twenty-seven months prior to the March 2003 invasion are displayed in figures 5, 6, and 7 below. An observation denotes a single government speaker who mentions the words Iraq or Iraqi at least once in a single public appearance. For most of the period of analysis, more Executive branch speakers than Legislative speakers mentioned Iraq. Out of 27 periods, there are only five exceptions to this trend—September 12 to October 11, 2001; June 2002; August 29 to September 11, 2002; September 12 to October 9, 2002; and February 5 to March 4, 2003.

The differences between the number of observations of Legislative and Executive branch speakers in the first two of these time periods is negligible. The last three time periods during which the Legislative branch had a higher number of observations indicated intensified
legislative branch activity. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu testified regarding Iraq before the House Governmental Reform and Oversight Committee on September 12, 2002, and many Congressmen joined in the discussion regarding Iraq. Within the same month, the Joint Intelligence Committee, the armed services committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations committees all held hearings regarding policy toward Iraq. In February and early March 2003, there were hearings in the armed services and budget committees, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Ways and Means Committee. As one might expect, these periods of extensive hearings were accompanied by legislative branch news conferences, further increasing the number of public appearances where Legislators mentioned Iraq at least once.

![Figure 5: Number of Public Appearances where the words Iraq or Iraqi were Used by Speakers](image-url)
The number of Executive and legislative observations, however, is only part of the story. The use of the words Iraq or Iraqi a high number of times in each public appearance is indicative of a higher focus on the subject of Iraq. While this definition may seem unsuitable for an individual speaker or a low number of observations, for a high number of observations for groups of individual speakers over a longer time frame, the definition is more convincing. Under this definition of focus on Iraq, the Executive branch is more focused on Iraq than the Legislative branch for all periods save for the month just after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the first month of 2002. This increase in Legislative focus on Iraq may have been influenced by several disproportionate observations. During a House International Relations hearing concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq held on October 4, 2001, three Representatives each used the word Iraq more than 15 times during this single meeting, thereby driving up the average for this period. The slightly higher legislative focus on Iraq during January 2002 was due to a period of
relatively little discussion on Iraq coupled with a speech given by Senator Joseph Lieberman at Georgetown University on January 14, 2002. During Lieberman’s address, entitled “Winning the Wider War Against Terrorism,” Lieberman referred to Iraq 18 times in only 9,241 words that was focused primarily on global terrorism and al Qaeda.

Executive branch officials tended, on the whole, to have higher mean Iraq Index scores than did Legislators. The mean Iraq Index scores of Executive branch officials were higher than the scores of Legislators in 15 of 27 periods. In six periods, both branches tied mean Iraq Index scores of 0. Each of these six time periods occurred before September 11, 2001. In another six periods, Legislators had higher mean Iraq Index scores—each of these periods occurred between October 12, 2001 and July 28, 2002. Generally, when the Legislative branch’s mean Iraq Index was higher than the mean Iraq Index score for the Executive branch, the differences between means were slight. One exception, however, was the period from December 12, 2001 to January 28, 2002. The highest Legislative score was contributed by Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) who gave a speech at Georgetown on January 14, 2002. This appearance had an Iraq Index score of 3.0. The highest Executive branch Iraq Index score during this same period was only 1, scored by President George Bush in a January 16, 2002 press conference held in the Oval Office during a visit with then Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. The reason the mean Executive branch Iraq Index score is lower than that of the Legislative branch is due to the fact that during late 2001 and early 2002 period, more observations are of Executive branch speakers, and more of these speakers had Iraq Index scores of 0, reducing the calculated mean. In short, Executive branch speakers tended to have higher Iraq Index scores than did Legislative branch speakers for virtually the entire pre-war period of analysis. It is important to note, however, that this difference was not statistically significant until after July 29, 2002. Iraq Index scores seem to
trend upwards for both branches after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and beginning in the late summer of 2002.

This content analysis is a descriptive study, and it is only indirectly and with some difficulty that the number of observations, references to Iraq per observation, and Iraq Index scores can be used to examine the nature of Legislative and Executive relations prior to the invasion of Iraq. It would seem that Congress was less active in the deliberations regarding the use of force against Iraq than the Executive branch. Executive speakers made more appearances where Iraq was mentioned than did Legislative branch speakers. Executive officials started the Bush Presidency with a high focus on Iraq, and while this focus decreased somewhat over 2001, it was usually higher than the focus that the Legislative branch had on Iraq. Congress’ public support for the use of force increased after September 11, 2001, but after January 2002, this public advocacy by Congress was generally less than that given by Executive branch officials.
By late summer 2002, when Congress began hearings on how to confront Iraq, the Executive branch had statistically higher Iraq Index scores and continued to be more supportive of the use of force against Iraq than Congress. Congressional activity and congressional focus on Iraq peaked in July-August-September 2002, which corresponds to the period just before Congress formally considered and then quickly passed the 2002 Iraq Resolution. Despite the passage of the Iraq Resolution, support for the use of force in Congress was significantly lower than that publicly advocated by the Executive, a disparity that was significant during the last seven months prior to the invasion of Iraq. And, as will be demonstrated in the next subsection, Democrats in Congress had statistically lower Iraq Index scores than congressional Republicans.

These conclusions are based on the content analysis data, but each conclusion has serious qualifications. Congressional support for the use of force against Iraq did increase in the period after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and after the late summer 2002 congressional hearings on Iraq, but these trends may be coincidental or due to spurious associations. Congress did seem to increase its public support for the use of force just after the 9/11 attacks—congressional focus on Iraq was high in the month following the attacks, the number of observations of Legislative speakers increased indicating more congressional attention on Iraq, and Iraq Index scores did increase after 9/11 to a level statistically higher than before 9/11. However, it is not clear that 9/11 was the external event responsible for this increase. Perhaps congressional support for the use of force was increasing anyway, especially with the frustration of what seemed like collapsing international support for sanctions against Iraq and impasse on obtaining renewed weapons inspections of Iraq.

Viewing congressional hearings as a threshold event for the increase in congressional support for the use of force in later summer 2002 may also be somewhat problematic. It is true
that Congress’ mean Iraq index scores increased over two months before the final passage of the Iraq Resolution, but the mean Iraq Index scores then decreased after October 10, 2002. President Bush signed the Iraq Resolution on October 16, 2002. Perhaps Congress advocated less public support for the war because Congress moved on to other legislative priorities—such as the November 2002 midterm election campaign. Alternatively, perhaps Congress waited to see what would happen now that the president’s hand had been strengthened through successful passage of the Iraq Resolution but actual support for the use of force amongst Legislators remained high. Or, perhaps Congress’ public support for the war actually decreased somewhat. The most likely scenario is that Congress recessed shortly after the Iraq Resolution vote and therefore made fewer public appearances where legislators then mentioned Iraq in such a way that those appearances were transcripted by the FNS service. Content analysis of public statements alone cannot eliminate these significant qualifications. Nonetheless, the associations of congressional activity, focus, and support for the use of force seem strong enough to support the empirical conclusions of this analysis.

While Congress may be said to have been “less active” than the Executive branch, the data here does not seem to suggest that Congress acquiesced in the decision to use force, or was passive. While observed speakers tended to be in the Executive branch rather than the Legislative, this could be due to the “bully pulpit effect”—Federal News Service may have transcripted Executive speakers more often than Legislative speakers because what the Executive branch says is considered more newsworthy than what a mere Representative with less access to intelligence information and self-interested political ambitions might say on a subject. It is true that the highest Iraq Index scores of all speakers tended to be from congressional witnesses, of whom some were Executive branch officials. This does not mean that Congress was necessarily
goaded or misled into increasing public discussion of invasion, however. Congress’ Iraq Index scores trend upwards over the entire period of analysis; thus Congress was likely moving in that direction anyway. Congress, moreover, decides for itself which witnesses to invite and consider—thus even if the testimony congressional witnesses informed Congress in such a way as to increase Iraq Index scores, Congress had a significant role in this development. The high water mark of congressional activity and focus on Iraq was prior to the formal consideration of the 2002 Iraq Resolution. This is consistent with the idea that Congress increased its focus on Iraq consistent with its role of considering important national security matters and national policy. Congress ultimately chose to pass the 2002 Iraq Resolution, an outcome clearly within its Constitutional powers.

Some critics argue that Congress’ passage of the Iraq Resolution amounts to “passing the buck” or being “overly acquiescent” because the Resolution allowed the president to make the final decision to use force. While it is true that the Resolution gave the president the final decision-making authority, the final decision to use force would likely be the president’s anyway, due to the president’s authority as Commander in Chief. The data show dramatically increasing observations as well as increases in focus and public advocacy for the use of force over the entire period of analysis; this means Congress was involved in the process and was knowledgeable that the use of force was a likely outcome of the passage of the Resolution. It is disingenuous to ignore congressional participation in the constitutional decision-making process and focus on the delegation of authority to use force. After all, it is the president, and not Congress, that ultimately directs the military into battle.
5.2 IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS

This study’s second set of research questions involves determining the level of consensus between Republicans and Democrats and between the Executive and Legislative branches. A degree of consensus exists between two groups when those two groups publicly make a given argument with similar frequencies—the more similar the frequency, the greater the degree of consensus. An increasing consensus over a given justification for war over a given time period is represented by a convergence of the frequencies that groups publicly express the content variable for that justification. A divergence over time in frequencies is evidence of a weakening consensus. In this study, Iraq Index scores were examined over time to look for possible evidence of a changing consensus between political parties and between branches of government during the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq. The Iraq Index score is a construct variable that aggregates nine content variables associated with the supporting force against Iraq.

The differences between Iraq Index scores for Republican and Democratic legislators are plotted over time in figure 8 below. Differences were calculated by subtracting mean Democratic legislators’ Iraq Index scores from those scores of their Republican counterparts. Where the difference is positive, the mean Republican Iraq Index score exceeded the mean Democratic score; where the plotted difference is negative, the opposite is true. There were few observations but no difference between the two groups in the first period, from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001. Over the second period from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002, the magnitude of differences between political parties in Congress increased. This trend identified visually is consistent with results of means testing for the two political parties over the three periods. There was no significant difference between the distributions of Republican and Democratic legislators’ Iraq Index scores until the third period. The most extreme difference
between the parties in Congress came from the period December 12, 2001 and January 28, 2002. During this period, there were no observations of Republican legislators while at the same time, there was a high mean Iraq Index score for Democratic legislators.

![Graph showing differences in mean Iraq Index score between Republican and Democratic Legislators](image)

**Figure 8: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republican and Democratic Legislators**

The trend of increasing divergences between Democratic and Republican legislators is evident between political parties and branches as well, but the differences are much more pronounced in figures 9 and 10. Figure 9 shows the differences in mean Iraq Index scores between Republicans and Democrats and figure 10 displays the differences in mean Iraq Index scores between the Legislative and Executive branches. Where the differences in these figures is positive, the mean Republican or Executive branch Iraq Index score exceeded the mean Democratic or Legislative branch score; where the plotted difference is negative, the opposite is true. The figures show that the consensus on Iraq that had existed prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 weakened over time, particularly after Jul 28, 2002. There is one outlier, a difference of -3 that occurred in the period that ran from December 12, 2001 to January 28, 2002. During this time period, Democrats had a high mean Iraq Index and there were no observations of Republican legislators. Therefore, this value should most likely be ignored as unrepresentative.

The major splits between Democrats and Republicans and between officials of the Executive and Legislative branches occurred essentially at the beginning of the third period. The divergence between Democratic and Republican legislators was much slighter in magnitude, and this split occurred later than it did for the Executive and Legislative branches and between Democrats and Republicans generally. For Democratic and Republican legislators, the small divergence occurred about mid-way in the third period, a month or so after President Bush signed the Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq on October 16, 2002. The lack of consensus in the third period was substantially greater between the Executive and Legislative branches than between Legislative Republicans and Democrats.
Figure 9: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republicans and Democrats

Figure 10: Iraq Index Score Differences between the Executive and Legislative Branches
There was consensus between Democratic and Republican Legislators on the decision to use force against Iraq, and this consensus weakened very little during 2002, lasting even through the debate and passage of the 2002 Iraq Resolution. Not until January 2003 did Republican and Democratic legislators begin to diverge significantly, and even then this difference is much less than the differences between other groups. There had been consensus between Democratic and Republican government officials on the decision to use force against Iraq, but this consensus weakened after September 11, 2001 and disappeared after September 2002. The Executive branch produced significantly higher Iraq Index scores than any other group, a trend that began on January 19, 2001 when President Bush began his first term and which continued through all three periods. Despite this statistical significance, there existed a weak consensus between Congress and the Executive branch on Iraq Index scores until September 11, 2001. This consensus grew even weaker beginning in spring and summer 2002. By August 2002, the consensus was gone. Consensus would improve slightly between all groups in the month or so just prior to the use of force as war became imminent, but as this discussion of Iraq Index scores shows, it would be a stretch to say that America’s support for the use of force was spoken “with one voice.”

When the construct variable Iraq Index is disaggregated and frequencies of individual content variables are examined, the story of weakening consensus is somewhat more troubling. Content variables that measure officials’ discussion on the nature of the Iraqi threat show a near-consistent pattern of widening disagreement between groups. The Executive branch was nearly always more likely than the Legislative branch to express content variables related to the threat, often by factors greater than 2. Generally, Republicans discussed the potential threat from Iraq more than Democrats, and the divergences between how often the political parties mentioned
those threats grew over the entire period of analysis. This includes making allusions between Iraq and terrorism generally, explicitly referring to individual terrorists or groups of terrorists operating in Iraq, Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, and considering the possible invasion of Iraq as part of the war on terror. The most frequent focus on the threat was from the Executive branch and, to a much lesser extent, from Republican legislators. Democrats were more likely to discuss the potential costs of the war, but also to value those costs less than $100 billion. Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, few government officials discussed terrorist links with Iraq, either general or specific, and few argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or even mentioned Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons. After 9/11, the Executive branch began to repeatedly express these ideas, stressing the threat posed by Iraq. It would seem that the attack of 9/11 was in many ways the beginning of the end for consensus on policy toward Iraq.

Going to war takes the yea vote of only 218 Representatives, 51 Senators, and one president. There is no legal requirement that the consensus for war be any wider than that. While it would be nice to have a war supported by a broad coalition of politicians with similar understandings of the situation and justifications favoring force—if there was little consensus on a decision to go to war, this does not make the war itself illegitimate, just contested. The invasion of Iraq was not politically illegitimate, merely politically contested. However, when certain groups of politicians are much more likely to repeatedly and consistently discuss the nature of the threat posed by the enemy, a threat that the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence unanimously considered to be “overstated” or “not supported by” secret intelligence
regarding the threat\textsuperscript{146}, then the lack of consensus on the decision to go to war against Iraq is more ominous.

5.3 EXAMINING IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS BY LEVEL OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The sections above demonstrate statistically significant and dramatic increases in party polarization and a growing disconnect between the Executive and Legislative branches of government over the 27 months prior to the invasion of Iraq. This section examines whether government speakers who were more accountable tended to make arguments favoring war more or less than government speakers who were less politically accountable. Political accountability here refers to the directness with which an individual government elite faces pressures from the American public. Under this definition, private sector experts who testify before a congressional committee are less accountable than a Senator who is elected to a 6 year term, who in turn is less accountable than a Representative, who must run for office every two years.

I constructed two scales of political accountability for the types of government speakers who appear in the Iraq transcript data set. The first accountability scale is an ordinal level variable that ranges from 1 to 7, with 7 denoting those government elites who have the greatest political accountability and 1 denoting those who have the least. The group of government speakers with the highest level of political accountability are Representatives, who face election


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every two years. The second highest group of government officials refers to the president and vice president, who face election every four years. Senators have the lowest level of political accountability of all elected officials as they face election only every six years. Groups of government elites who are not elected to their posts have much less political accountability than elected officials, but there are still differences amongst them. Senate confirmation is an indirect way of holding political appointments accountable and those officials so vetted represent the most accountable of unelected government officials. Notoriety can also lead to greater accountability. Thus, the three groups with the lowest accountability are, in order of decreasing accountability, cabinet-level Executive branch staff who are appointed but do not undergo Senate confirmation, other appointed by unconfirmed Executive branch staff and congressional witnesses, and anonymous “senior officials.” The second accountability scale collapses the seven categories of the first scale into three levels: elected officials, Executive branch officials, congressional witnesses & anonymous officials. The table below summarizes these two political accountability scales. Both accountability scales are ordinal level because higher level categories denote groups of more political accountable officials, but it is not known how much greater each group is in terms of accountability nor whether each step in accountability represents a consistent increase in accountability.
In examining the relationship between political accountability and the discussion of U.S. policy toward Iraq, I calculated correlation coefficients between political accountability using both the 3-tier and 7-tier scales and two other variables: the number of times a speaker used Iraq per observation as well as the Iraq Index score for each observation. These correlation coefficients were first calculated using the set of those 1,699 observations where speakers had an identifiable position on policy toward Iraq. I then repeated these calculations for a subset of 701 observations where the speaker’s Iraq Index score was equal to or greater than one. These two different calculations are given in tables 15 through 18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability Scale (1 – 7)</th>
<th>Accountability Scale (1 – 3)</th>
<th>Description (Example)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anonymous “senior officials”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Congressional witnesses (former Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Executive branch staff who are not Senate confirmed (National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Executive branch staff who are Senate confirmed (DCI George Tenet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>President &amp; Vice-president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Political Accountability Scales, Ordinal level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only those observations where the speaker had an identifiable position on the use of force against Iraq</th>
<th>Pearson's Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Kendall's Tau-b</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only those observations where the speaker's Iraq Index score is ≥1</td>
<td>-.106*</td>
<td>-.099*</td>
<td>-.118*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only those observations where the speaker had an identifiable position on the use of force against Iraq</td>
<td>-.085*</td>
<td>-.063*</td>
<td>-.080*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Table 14: Correlating Iraq Index score with Political Accountability (1 to 7 scale)
The calculated correlations between political accountability (on both scales) and Iraq Index score given in Table 15 and 17 are relatively small negative values with statistically significant results. Government speakers with higher political accountability tended to be associated with slightly lower Iraq Index scores. The calculated correlations between a speaker’s political accountability (on both scales) and the number of times that speaker used of the word Iraq is much stronger though still negative and also statistically significant. Thus, government speakers with higher political accountability tended to be somewhat more make somewhat fewer
mentions of the word Iraq per observation. Said another way, those who spoke most about Iraq per observation tended to be speakers with the lowest political accountability. This moderate linear relationship was stronger for those speakers who expressed some support for the use of force such that their observed Iraq Index score was one or greater.

On the whole, the strength of the linear relationship between political accountability and Iraq Index scores appears to be weak at best. The highest Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the linear relationship between political accountability and Iraq Index scores is -.106, which is low. It would seem as if those government speakers with the lowest political accountability, anonymous government officials and congressional witnesses, were only weakly associated with higher Iraq Index scores.

The strength of the linear relationship between political accountability and the number of times a speaker tended to refer to Iraq per observation was stronger than the correlation between political accountability and Iraq Index score, but was still only moderate. The highest Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the linear relationship between political accountability and the number of times speaker referred to Iraq is -.392, which indicates a linear relationship of low to medium strength. Higher numbers of references to Iraq per observation may be indicative of a higher focus on the problem of Iraq, and thus those speakers who were of the lowest political accountability may be said to be moderately associated with a somewhat higher focus on the problem of Iraq.

While this examination of the relationship between political accountability, Iraq Index scores, and the number of references to Iraq has proved little, the findings do seem inconsistent with the notion that politically unaccountable political elites were more involved in the public case for the war against Iraq than were the elected political leaders. While those with lower
political accountability tended to be more focused on the problem of Iraq and therefore mention Iraq more per observation and also tended to have slightly higher Iraq index scores, though this latter correlation tends to be very small. Stronger linear associations between political accountability, Iraq Index scores, and references to Iraq per observation would have been more consistent with strong support for the use of force made by those of the least political accountability.

5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This analysis has generated a more detailed description of differences in approach toward Iraq publicly expressed between the political parties and branches over the 27 months prior the invasion of Iraq. As expected, government speakers generally increase their focus on Iraq and support for the use of force against Iraq over the 27 months of this content analysis. The number of times government speakers public refer to Iraq per public appearance trends upwards, as do Iraq Index scores. A more detailed look at the data illustrates that the Executive and Legislative branches and the political parties grew farther and farther apart from each other regarding the U.S. use of force against Iraq, especially in the final six months prior to the March 2003 invasion. This lack of consensus between the parties and branches belies the overwhelming congressional support for the Iraq Resolution, passed in October 2002, and the notion that Congress united behind the president to authorize the Iraq invasion.

In the Senate, 98 % of Republicans joined 58 % of Democrats in supporting the Iraq Resolution. In the House, Democrats were more divided, but 39 % of Democrats still joined 96 % of Republicans to support the bill. Oddly, the divergence between Republicans and
Democrats in supporting the use of force does not grow significantly until after the Iraq Resolution vote. The consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches experienced steady by slight declines but peaked in the few months prior to the Resolution vote. From July 29, 2002 until the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, Executive branch speakers had significantly higher mean Iraq Index scores and were therefore much more supportive of war in their public statements than were legislators of both parties. It would seem that president and Congress had very different perceptions of the circumstances surrounding the potential use of force against Iraq.

For the entire 27 months analyzed, Democrats were less active than Republicans in mentioning Iraq in public appearances and usually had lower Iraq Index scores than their Republican counterparts. In the last six months before the invasion, Republican speakers had Iraq Index scores 4.5 times higher than Democratic speakers. In the same final six months, Republicans were 34.4% more likely to assert that Iraq possessed WMDs; 30.6 % more likely to allude to general links between Iraq and terrorism; 27.6 % more likely to mention that invasion was a method to disarm Iraq; 19.2 % more likely to mention 9/11 in the same public appearances where they mentioned Iraq; but only 1.3 % more likely to mention that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its past. Although the percentages of frequency are somewhat lower for Republican legislators, generally they were more likely than Democratic legislators to make these same arguments, though the disparity between legislators of both parties tended to be much smaller than the divergence between Republicans and Democrats generally. For their part, Democrats were 23.5 % more likely to call for further consideration of the costs and benefits of a potential invasion and 12.5 % more likely to advocate explicit authorization for the use of force from the United Nations Security Council. Those government speakers with lower levels of political
accountability tended to generate slightly higher Iraq Index scores, though these higher Iraq Index scores were slight at best. At the same time, those who mentioned Iraq the most per public appearance tended to be among the least political accountable.

The picture that emerges from this data is hardly one of a war-mongering president and an acquiescent Congress. While the Executive branch was more active than the Congress in making statements regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq, this is as likely due to the intense focus on the Presidency for leadership and the concomitant bully pulpit of the office. Congress was certainly active and contained a diversity of opinions captured by this content analysis. However, Congress did seem to subject itself to witnesses with rather extreme views on the use of force against Iraq. Congress’ overall support for the use of force trended upwards over the period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches, between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both branches increased greatly. Nonetheless, Republican legislators were much less likely to make public statements supportive of the use of force against Iraq, and Democratic legislators were less likely still. A few months before the debate the differences between Republicans and Democrats in both focus on Iraq and support for the use of force was statistically significant while the differences between the Executive and Legislative branches in both focus and support for the use of force was statistically significant. The result was a breakdown in consensus regarding the use of force against Iraq, where Democrats can fairly blame the Republicans for their support of the president who was supportive of the invasion of Iraq and the president can rightly point out that Republicans were more supportive of his effort against Iraq and enough Democrats participated enough to enable the president’s policy.

Every member of Congress must make their own decision on the level of threat posed by Iraq and what to do to respond to that threat. I've said many times to my caucus that each member should be guided by his or her own conscience, free from others trying to politicize the issue or questioning others' motives…. You all know that we have a lot of differences on many issues. We disagree on many domestic issues. But this is the most important thing that we do. This should not be about politics. We have to do what is right for the security of our nation and the safety of all Americans.

Representative Richard Gephardt, Oct. 2, 2002

We're having a very good, thoughtful debate as befits a matter of life and death, literally.

Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Oct. 8, 2002

6.1 **ANALYZING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ**

Recall that this analysis codes the content of transcripts of public governmental speech in order to identify potential differences in how political parties and the Executive and Legislative branches justified and debated the use of force against Iraq. The evidence used by this analysis

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consists of all Federal News Washington Transcripts of public speech, dated January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, where the words “Iraq” or “Irqi” appears. The electronic files of these 2,206 transcripts consist of 158 MB of textual data. It is difficult to estimate the equivalency of this data to pages, but estimates using standard conversion this is equivalent to between 16 and 72 thousand pages of single-spaced, 12-point text.

Clearly, these transcripts do not constitute exhaustive or bias-free evidence—there were no doubt many times where many important government speakers engaged in public deliberation but did not have their discussions recorded and transcripted by the Federal News Service. Moreover, it is without a doubt that much deliberation occurred behind closed doors and little if any public record can preserve this important element in the decision-making prior to the use of force against Iraq. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data in Chapters 4 and 5 must remain tentative. This is particularly so if the implications drawn from this research are cross-referenced with an attempt to gauge public reaction or trying to determine why government decided to take the policy it did toward Iraq.

Observations that were aggregated by party affiliation or branch of government can also be aggregated by individual government speakers’ identities. This evidence can, in some cases, give an adequate basis for comparing individual speakers that participated in deliberations regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq over an extended period of time. When the set of 1,699 observations is aggregated by the identity of individual government speakers, the resultant aggregation consists of data drawn from 416 different individuals. The average number of observations for each individual speaker was 4.08 while the median number of observations per speaker was only 1. This means that half of the speakers in the dataset spoke about Iraq on only
a single occasion during the period from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003. The histogram below graphically represents the distribution of the number of observations per speaker.

![Histogram of Number of Observations for Government Speakers](image)

Figure 11: Number of Observations (Appearances) for Government Speakers

Many of the 416 individual government speakers spoke about Iraq in only a single appearance—211 of the speakers in the dataset have only a single observation. The mean number of observations per speaker is 4.08, meaning that the average speaker appeared in about four separate transcripts, each of which preserved the speech of a single public appearance or occasions. Those individuals who spoke about Iraq in the most number of observations were State Department spokesman and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher (131 observations); White House spokesman Ari Fleischer (100 observations); President George Bush (99 observations); Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (85 observations); and Secretary of State Colin Powell (76 observations). All other individuals had no more than 40 observations each. Individual legislative speakers were well represented in the dataset, as thirty of the fifty most active speakers, i.e., those fifty individuals with the most total number of observations from the transcripts, were legislators.
The two most active speakers were White House spokesman Ari Fleischer and State Department spokesman Richard Boucher. These two individuals will not be included in this analysis where the individual is the unit of analysis. Fleischer and Boucher presented the official message in regularly-held press conferences. As spokesmen, it was their role to present the message of others as consistently as possible. During these press conferences, journalists peppered the two with questions and attempt to uncover nuance and changes in that official message. As a result, Fleischer and Boucher were qualitatively different from other individual speakers in this analysis. Even witnesses testifying before Congress had more discretion over the message and the degree of repetition with which they present it to the public. Fleischer and Boucher were outliers for the purposes of the focus on individuals and were subsequently dropped from this analysis.149

The number of observations that each individual speaker had is likely to have an impact on this analysis. Not all speakers had high numbers of observations. If a speaker with only a single observation had a high Iraq Index score, it was impossible to say with any reasonable certainty that this high score was the result of a consistent pro-war stance or was the result of chance. Perhaps that single observation happened to involve the speaker making several arguments in favor of the use of force against Iraq, arguments that the speaker later softened or modified. On the basis of a single such observation with a high Iraq Index score, one might

149 Observations from both Boucher and Fleischer were included with Executive branch where the unit of analysis was branch of government, however. The observations of the two speakers were not outliers when compared with other Executive branch speakers. Although Fleischer and Boucher were still bound by their role in the Executive branch hierarchy to present the official message, their Iraq Index scores and the frequencies of the content variables were not disproportionate and therefore did not skew the results for the group. If anything, the data shows how remarkably good Fleischer and Boucher were at staying with their message regarding Iraq as both Fleischer and Boucher have similar mean Iraq Index scores with their bosses. Richard Boucher had 131 observations and a mean Iraq Index score of 0.81 while Secretary of State Colin Powell had 76 observations and a mean Iraq Index score of 1.38. Ari Fleischer had 100 observations and a mean Iraq Index of 1.96 while President Bush had 99 observations and a mean Iraq Index score of 2.46.
conclude that that speaker was more supportive of the use of force than they might have actually been. Similarly, a government speaker with a disproportionately large number of observations might have their mean Iraq Index score reduced by a high number of observations where the speaker mentioned Iraq but did not actually discuss the potential use of force. The strength of conclusions is to a large degree drawn from comparisons among the most active government speakers, and therefore it is necessary to refer to both an individual’s mean Iraq Index as well as the number of observations of that particular speaker. Thus, this analysis focused only on those individuals with two or more observations.

Eleven individuals are noteworthy because while they represent only a single observation each, their support for the use of force in Iraq was disproportionately substantial. While these 11 observations represent only 0.6 % of all 1,699 total number of observations, each of these 11 speakers had a disproportionately high Iraq Index score. While these individuals did not contribute much to the debate on Iraq in terms of repeated appearances in the public debate advocating the use of force, they robustly supported the use of force those few appearance that they did have. The average Iraq Index score for all observations was only 0.95 and the maximum Iraq Index score was eight. These 11 noteworthy individuals’ average scores range from a low of 3 to a high of 7, much higher than the norm of any grouping of government speakers. While a score of 3 out of 9 might seem low, the mean for all observations was only 0.95. Each of these 11 speakers with only one observation was in the 84.6 percentile, over three times the mean. Table 19 lists these 11 speakers, their Iraq Index scores, and three other content variables associated with support for the use of force against Iraq and portrayal of the threat posed by Iraq.
Dr. Elliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University testified before the House Armed Services Committee on October 2, 2002. In this single appearance (i.e., a single observation), Dr. Cohen made a strong case in favor of the use of force against Iraq, including through a unilateral U.S. invasion, if necessary. Cohen’s Iraq Index score was 7, a value that ties for the second highest Iraq Index score for all 1,699 observations. Moreover, though Cohen appeared in only a single observation, his Iraq Index score of 13 was the highest mean Iraq Index for all individual speakers. To be intellectually fair, it makes no sense to consider taking a mean from only a single observation even if the observation does entail a significant amount of advocacy for the use of force against Iraq.
Three of these 11 single-observations high Iraq Index score government speakers were legislators. Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) was elected in November 2002 and therefore did not have much opportunity to contribute to the debate until after he assumed office on January 7, 2003. Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) chaired the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee on September 12, 2002 when former Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu testified. Netanyahu argued that the threat posed by Iraq was imminent, while Burton likened Netanyahu to Churchill warning of fascism’s rise during the 1930s. Burton’s Iraq Index score for this observation was only 3. Netanyahu’s observation at this hearing had an Iraq Index score of 6. Senator Don Nickles R-OK) chaired the Senate Budget Committee and held a hearing February 11, 2003 where Secretary of State Powell testified. Both Powell and Nickles had an Iraq Index score of 3 for their speech in this hearing.

Another three of the 11 noteworthy speakers with high Iraq Index scores and only a single observation during the period January 2001 to March 2003 from the Executive branch. Elliott Abrams of the National Security Council spoke about Iraqi reconstruction and humanitarian issues at a White House special briefing held on February 24, 2003. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Kim Holmes held a briefing for foreign media on February 27, 2003 in which he discussed U.S. efforts before the United Nations Security Council. Holmes argued in favor of the passage of a resolution that would explicitly hold Iraq to not be in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1441 as well as arguing that failure to pass a resolution would demonstrate that the UN lacked resolve and credibility in nonproliferation. Holmes’ observation scored an Iraq Index score of 3. The third Executive branch official, FBI Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Jon Pistole, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 18, 2003, one day before the outbreak of war.
with Iraq. Pistole’s testimony was directed at the readiness of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Unit in the event that Iraq attempted retaliation on U.S. soil either directly or by enlisting “people sympathetic to the Hussein regime.” In the course of his testimony, Pistole scored an Iraq Index score of 3.

The remaining four individual speakers with high Iraq Index scores in only a single observation were not part of government but nonetheless contributed to the debate on Iraq as congressional witnesses. Each of these four congressional witnesses’ had Iraq Index scores of 3. William Kristol testified before the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on May 22, 2002. Richard Butler, Henry Kissinger, and Robert McFarlane each testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Butler testified on July 31, 2002 while Kissinger and McFarlane testified on September 25 and 26, 2002, respectively. That so many low-observation high-Index-score-speakers were congressional witnesses raises the possibility that pro-invasion congressional witnesses were an important element in encouraging government’s hawkish stance toward Iraq. Although an assessment of the strength of this decidedly pro-war testimony in affecting Congress’ decision-making is beyond the scope of this analysis, it may nonetheless constitute a useful starting point for a future research project on how congressional witnesses impact government decision-making. This might include research into the politics behind determining which potential witnesses to invite before a congressional committee and how such decisions affect policy debate.

By limiting the analysis of individual speakers to those with two or more observations, the number of individuals drops from 416 to 202. As the median and mode number of observations is only 1, by focusing on observations with two or more observations, the analysis will minimize the likelihood of including those least active government speakers who might
score disproportionately high Iraq Index scores. At the same time, it does not reduce the number of individuals to such a small number that the sample is no longer representative of the public debate regarding Iraq. Thus, this analysis confined itself to the 202 individuals with 2 or more observations—this subset of individuals is hereinafter referred to as the most active individuals for these individuals’ participation in the public debate regarding the war in Iraq.

The large majority of the 202 speakers most involved in the public deliberation regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq were legislators. This is to be expected, as there are 535 legislators, many of whom are active in public discourse. Although the Executive branch consists of a large number of potential speakers, only the relatively few officials near the top of Executive branch hierarchy are able or willing to participate in public deliberation. Simply put, many more members of Congress talked about Iraq than did officials of the Executive branch, but this is due to obvious sample bias. Figure 12 illustrates the relative proportions of legislators, Executive branch officials, and congressional witnesses.

![Figure 12: Most Active 202 Speakers by Branch of Government](image-url)
The political affiliations of these 202 speakers are generally known—nearly three-quarters of the speakers have a generally-known and verifiable political party membership. Of the 27% unknown political affiliation group, a few speakers are congressional witnesses such as academics or area experts who do not have publicly disclosed party affiliations, but most of the “unknown” group consists of mid- to high-level Executive branch officials whose party affiliation could not be verified. Most of these Executive officials might easily be presumed to be Republicans because they were appointed to political positions by the Republican President George Bush. In such cases where party affiliation could not be verified, individual speakers were coded as “unknown party affiliation,” however.

![Figure 13: Most Active 202 Speakers by Political Affiliation](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>% of total Observations</th>
<th>Number of active individuals</th>
<th>Average Observations per individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td></td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Observations Produced by the Most Active 202 Speakers According to Political Affiliation
Figure 13 displays the party affiliations of the most active government speakers on the topic of Iraq. Considering the most active 202 individual speakers, Democrats are slightly more represented in the total number of speakers with 78 speakers who contributed to the public debate as opposed to 69 Republican speakers. However, approximately half of these individuals who had unknown political party affiliations served in government within the Executive branch. These 69 individual Republicans contributed many more total observations than did the 78 Democrats, however, as table 19 shows. In fact, Republican active speakers contributed almost twice the number of observations than did Democrats. Some of this may be due to sample bias. Republicans held the Executive branch as well as majorities in Congress during much of the period of analysis. President Bush and his closest advisors were nearly all Republicans. Republicans dominated the House throughout 2001, 2002, and 2003. Republicans also controlled the Senate during most of this same period, except for seven months from May 2002 to January 2003, where the Democratic majority was handed control due to the defection of a Republican Senator. However, outlier Republicans such as White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer who contributed 100 observations were removed from this analysis to minimize the bias. With this in mind, it may also be indicative that Democrats were not as active publicly as were Republicans in discussing Iraq. In chapters 4 and 5, this analysis demonstrated how Democrats tended not to support the use of force against Iraq nor discuss the threat from Iraq and possible connections between Iraq and terrorism as much as did Republicans. Democrats did, however, tend to discuss the potential costs of the war as well as to stress that those costs would likely be less than $100 billion. As shown here, Democrats may have made these arguments
more often than Republicans but individual Democratic government officials were not nearly as active as were individual Republican government officials.\textsuperscript{150}

6.2 ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE

The Iraq Index score is a construct variable that measures the number of public justifications in favor of the use of force against Iraq. A higher Iraq Index score indicates stronger support for the use of force against Iraq. Theoretically, the value of an Iraq Index score can range as high as 9. In practice, the mean Iraq Index score tends to be much lower because the scores of many observations of the same speaker were averaged to calculate this variable and most government speakers had variability in their public discussion on Iraq. The highest mean Iraq Index score of any speaker was only 4.5, a score that belonged to Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Einhorn’s two observations, in which his Iraq Index scores per observation were 5 and 4, come from testimony he gave before the Senate in March 2002. The second highest mean Iraq Index score of 4.0 belonged Richard Spertzel, a former UNSCOM biological weapons inspector who testified before Congress three times in March and September 2002. Spertzel’s Iraq Index scores for his three observations were 3, 4, and 5.

Summary statistics for the 202 most active government speakers are displayed in table 20 below. The table demonstrates that more individual Democrats participated in the public debate regarding Iraq than did individual Republicans. However, Republicans contributed nearly twice

\textsuperscript{150} This suggests to me that even if my coding instrument had been designed to include some anti-war content variables, I would not have found those arguments much in the public debate. Democrats were not active enough and anti-war Democrats were even more rare to have made inclusion of anti-war content variables worth the time necessary to code them.
as many observations as did Democrats. The average Republican Iraq Index score was over three times as high as the average Democratic speaker’s score. The typical score of both parties was zero, but Republicans still tended to make the coding instrument’s arguments supporting the use of force much more frequently than did Democrats. Republican speakers also had more variation in their Iraq Index scores than did Democrats. Testing for statistical significance between the parties was not done here, as the focus in this chapter is on the individual speaker.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Number of speakers</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Iraq Index Score calculated from Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Mean Iraq Index Scores of Most Active Speakers by Political Affiliation

On average, Democrats had lower mean Iraq Index scores than their Republican counterparts in government. The Democrat with the highest mean Iraq Index score as well as the highest maximum Iraq Index score for a single observation was Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT). Lieberman generated a total of 11 observations, each of which involved a public appearance between January 14, 2002 and March 17, 2003. Only one of these 11 observations had an Iraq Index score of 0. Lieberman had a consistently high Iraq Index score—as early as January 14, 2002, Lieberman gave a speech at Georgetown University with an Iraq Index score of 3. In his Georgetown speech, Lieberman asserted explicitly that U.S. national security interests supported an invasion of Iraq and argued that efforts against Iraq were part of the war against terrorism, saying, “...this war against terrorism will not be over until Saddam Hussein is removed from power in Iraq.” Lieberman’s index scores range from 0 to 4 with a mean of 2.45.
The next highest Democrat has a mean Iraq Index score of only 1.5. Lieberman’s strong support for the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq was a major factor which led to Lieberman’s defeat in the 2006 Connecticut primaries.\textsuperscript{151} After losing the Democratic primary, Lieberman won reelection to his Senate seat as an independent.

Lieberman’s Iraq Index scores were so consistently high and were unlike any other Democratic speaker. They were, however, very similar to the means and distributions of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney Iraq Index scores. Vice President Cheney contributed 13 observations, with Iraq Index scores ranging from 0 to 6, and a mean Iraq Index score of 2.62. Only two of Cheney’s Iraq Index scores were 0. Bush’s scores also ranged from 0 to 6. President Bush had 99 observations, many more than Cheney and Lieberman, and a mean Iraq Index score of 2.46. President Bush’s mean was lowered slightly due to 18 observations where Bush had Iraq Index scores of 0. To indicate how similar Lieberman’s support for the war in Iraq was to that of senior Republican government officials, table 21 displays recalculated descriptive statistics if all 11 of Lieberman’s observations were subtracted from other Democrats and added to that of Republicans—the mean Iraq Index scores of both parties increased from those means reported in table 20.

What happens if you remove Lieberman’s 11 observations of Iraq Index scores (3, 0, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 4) and add them to the set of Republican scores?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Number of speakers</th>
<th>Number of obs</th>
<th>Iraq Index Score calculated from Individuals’ observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Iraq Index Scores of Active Speakers by Political Affiliation, Adjusted for Senator Lieberman

Three Democrats among the top thirty Democrats’ mean Iraq Index scores are particularly noteworthy. As candidates for the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination, they have faced inquiries into their early support for the Iraq war. As the war has become unpopular amongst the Democrat party faithful, Senators Joe Biden (D-DE), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), and John Edwards (D-NC) all faced criticism during the campaign for voting in favor of the 2002 authorization to use military force against Iraq, as well as their initial support for the war. Some anti-war activists tried to pressure Biden and Clinton into “apologizing” for their early support for the war. Edwards did repeatedly apologize for his support for the war since a November 13, 2005 op-ed in the Washington Post. Both Biden and Clinton grew critical of the war as the war became increasingly unpopular amongst Democratic primary voters, but both initially limited their criticism to how the Bush Administration has handled the war. Clinton did say in 2007 that had she known that intelligence reports were going to be proven false, she would not have voted to authorize the war in October 2002, and has even introduced legislation to repeal the 2002 Iraq war Resolution.

The Democrats with the top thirty mean Iraq Index scores are listed in table 22. Senator Hillary Clinton’s mean Iraq Index score is the second highest mean Iraq Index score of all Democratic speakers with two or more observations. Other candidates for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination have lower mean Iraq index scores. Senator John Edwards’ mean score was 1.0 while the mean scores of Senators Biden and Dodd were 0.48 and 0.38, respectively. However, Biden and Dodd each spoke about Iraq much more often than Senator’s Clinton and Edwards, who each only had two observations. Biden had 29 and Dodd had 8 observations. While Biden’s and Dodd’s average are less than Clinton’s, these averages are disproportionately low due to a higher number of public appearances where Biden and Dodd discussed Iraq but did not make arguments where they advocated the use of force. Dodd had only a single appearance where his Iraq Index was greater than 0, and for that observation, his score was 3. Biden had 18 observations where he had Iraq Index scores of 0. Dodd and Biden’s maximum Iraq Index scores of 3 are higher than the highest scores of both Clinton and Edwards.

Moreover, Clinton and Dodd are the only of the two who did not mention 9/11 in their public appearances where they mentioned Iraq while Senator Edwards mentioned the 9/11 attacks in both observations. With this in mind, Clinton may have less support for the war to “repudiate” or reverse, and may therefore have less support for the invasion for which she needs to apologize. Biden, Dodd, and Edwards withdrew from the campaign,¹⁵⁴ but Clinton has continued to face serious criticism from challenger Senator Barak Obama (D-IL) for her decision to vote for the 2002 Resolution that authorized the Iraq war.

Republican Iraq Index scores were generally higher than those of Democrats. Table 23 displays the Republicans with the top 30 Iraq Index scores. While the highest mean Iraq Index score belonged to Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN), he contributed only 3 observations. President Bush and Vice President Cheney have very high mean Iraq Indexes, particularly when the number of observations is taken into account. Cheney’s mean Iraq Index is 2.62 while President Bush’s is 2.46. Many of the highest Republican Iraq Index score means are senior Bush Administration officials with relatively few appearances but significant maximum Iraq Index scores, such as Ambassador Negroponte and notable neoconservatives Richard Perle and Douglas Feith. Senator John McCain had a high mean Iraq Index score, particular for a
congressional Republican. McCain is currently the 2008 Republican Presidential Nominee. On McCain’s campaign website, he has stressed his role in criticizing post-invasion plans—more troops and more counterinsurgency—but is conspicuously silent as to just how supportive of the invasion of Iraq he was in 2002 and early 2003.155

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Total number of references to Iraq</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coleman, Norm (MN)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cheney, Richard</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chambliss, Saxby (GA)</td>
<td>Representative &amp; Senator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Bush, George</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frist, Bill (TN)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crouch, J.D.</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intl Security Policy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Wolfowitz, Paul</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Perle, Richard</td>
<td>Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee testifying before Congress</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Feith, Douglas</td>
<td>Nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy testifying before Congress</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hyde, Henry (IL)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Graham, Lindsey (SC)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Rumsfeld, Donald</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>McCain, John AZ</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Negroponte, John</td>
<td>Ambassador to the United Nations</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Powell, Colin</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lott, Trent (MS)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bolton, John</td>
<td>Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Specter, Arlen (PA)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rice, Condoleezza</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Saxton, James (NJ)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Brownback, Sam (KS)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sessions, Jeff (AL)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Allen, George (VA)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Roberts, Pat (KS)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Black, Cofer</td>
<td>Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coyce, Edward (CA)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Schlesinger, James</td>
<td>Former Secretary of Defense and Energy and CIA Director testifying before Congress</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Lugar, Richard (IN)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Warner, John (VA)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shays, Christopher (CT)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23: Iraq Index Scores of the 30 Highest Scoring Republicans

The speakers whose party affiliation is unknown have the highest mean Iraq Index scores, as well as the highest variation in those averages. These speakers were typically Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, military leaders, and congressional witnesses. Table

24 lists seven individuals who had the highest mean Iraq Index scores. These seven individuals all have the distinction of having only a relatively few number of observations, but have high Iraq Index scores. All of these individuals testified before Congress. Each of these individuals contributed to Congress strong advocacy for the use of force in the few appearances they had. Thus, Congress was the recipient of strong advocacy for the use of force against Iraq by the experts.

The most active speaker of unknown party affiliation was General Dick Myers, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 2001. General Myers contributed 14 observations, and had a mean Iraq Index of 1.07. Although Myers’ highest Iraq Index score was 4, most of his observations’ scores were 0. Myers had a regular habit of appearing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at press conferences and Defense briefings. Although Myers mentioned Iraq at several of these press conferences, he rarely made arguments regarding the use of force against Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Total number of references to Iraq</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Einhorn, Robert</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies testifying before Congress</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Spertzel, Richard</td>
<td>Former Head of UNSCOM Bio-Weapons Inspection testifying before Congress</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Wolf, John</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation testifying before Congress</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kay, David</td>
<td>former Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector for UNSCOM testifying before Congress</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>McInerney, Thomas</td>
<td>retired general and former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff testifying before Congress</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Netanyahu, Benjamin</td>
<td>former Israeli Prime Minister testifying before Congress</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Collins, Joseph</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations testifying before Congress</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: Iraq Index Scores of the 7 Highest Scoring Speakers with Unknown Political Affiliations
Speakers of unknown party affiliation argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons) and tended to justify the use of force against Iraq for the purposes of disarming the country of those weapons. Nearly a quarter of these speakers mentioned international law to bolster this argument. Such speakers also tended to argue that the use of multilateral force would be the preferred means of disarming the regime. These speakers also frequently mentioned that Iraq had shown the willingness to use chemical weapons in its past and also to argue that U.S. security interests were threatened by Iraq’s continued possession of such weapons.

When deliberating policy toward Iraq, government speakers discussed several policy goals to be achieved through an invasion of Iraq. Disarmament was by far the most expressed policy goal of government speakers when they publicly deliberated regarding Iraq policy. Speakers were likely to mention the disarmament of Iraq 5.6 times more than speakers were likely to use humanitarian justifications to support the war. Speakers were also 2.8 times more likely to mention disarmament of Iraq than they were to use the phrase “regime change.” The five individual speakers who used the justification of disarmament the most number of times were President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Senator Trent Lott (R-MS). Together, these five speakers accounted for 37% of all uses of the disarmament justification during the entire 27 months of analysis.

Table 25 displays the percentage frequencies that individual speakers presented several arguments in favor of the use of force against Iraq. The upper portion of the table concerns the argument that that invasion of Iraq would serve the goal of disarming Iraq while the lower portion concerns the justification that invading Iraq would serve humanitarian goals. President Bush uses disarmament to justify the use of force against Iraq almost three-quarters of the time.
he mentions Iraq (74.7%). The frequencies that government speakers make justifications in favor of force can be ranked, allowing for comparison between speakers. For example, President Bush made the argument that force would disarm Iraq’s WMDs slightly more than every other public appearance, a rate higher than 91.5% of all government speakers. While a few other speakers in this dataset make the disarmament justification more often per number of observations than President Bush, each of those persons had much fewer observations. With such a few number of appearances, such speakers were not nearly as active as President Bush was in making the disarmament argument regarding Iraq. Similarly, several speakers make the humanitarian intervention argument more often in percentage terms than President Bush, but such speakers had many fewer observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of uses of the disarmament of NBC weapons justification</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>% Use of disarmament justification per observation</th>
<th>Percent rank within all speakers for the disarmament justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wolf, John (Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, George</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieberman, Joseph (D-CY)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugar, Richard (IN)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroponte, John (Ambassador to the U.N.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levin, Carl (MI)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney, Richard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice, Condoleezza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of uses of the humanitarian intervention justification</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>% Use of humanitarian intervention justification per observation</th>
<th>Percent rank within all speakers for the humanitarian intervention justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armitage, Richard (Deputy Secretary of State)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, George</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gephardt, Richard (MO)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagel, Chuck (NE)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice, Condoleezza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroponte, John (Ambassador to the U.N.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Disarmament of NBC weapons and Humanitarian Intervention Compared

Considering these two tables together allows a researcher to compare the relative weights that various speakers put on the goals of disarmament over humanitarian intervention. President Bush was more likely to argue for invasion for the goal of disarmament than
humanitarian intervention by a factor of 74 to 24, or 3.1. Secretary of State Colin Powell was more likely to mention disarmament as a goal than humanitarian intervention by a factor of 27 to 3, or 9. Of the speakers listed on table 25, Paul Wolfowitz had the lowest disarmament to humanitarian intervention justification ratio, 11 to 6, or 1.83. President Bush used the justification of humanitarian intervention more than any other government speaker, but this was only 21.4 % of his appearances while he gave the disarmament justification 74.7 % of his appearances. For all individual government speakers, humanitarian intervention does not as significant a policy goal as the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as the arguments used the public debate demonstrate.

The transcripts indicate that government speakers were generally supportive of the policy goal of disarmament and were less supportive of humanitarian intervention is mentioned as a justification much less often. Only seven out of 202 speakers used the humanitarian intervention justification more often than they gave the specific justification of disarming Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Though two of these seven speakers did mention the goal of disarmament generally, only four of them ever mentioned that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. None of these six speakers were nearly as heavily involved in the public debate as were the individual speakers given in the tables above. While Bush, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the others discussed above generated dozens of public appearances in this dataset, the seven speakers who gave the humanitarian justification more had no more than 2 public appearances, as the table below shows.
In addition to arguing about what goals that an invasion of Iraq might further, U.S. government officials’ public statements showed differences in how they characterized the level of threat posed by Iraq. The speakers in the table below are examples of important government leaders take from the 202 most active speakers with the greatest number of observations. To illustrate these government leaders’ activity in the public debate, the table lists the frequency that these leaders produced public speech with six content variables that coded the nature of the threat posed by Iraq. Many government officials mentioned the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the same public appearances where they mentioned Iraq, but some speakers tended to do so much more frequently than others. For example, Vice President Cheney mentioned 9/11 and Iraq together 12 of 13 times, putting him in the near-93rd percentile of all active speakers in the likelihood of doing so. In any given public appearance, Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage were more likely to characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent than 95 % of all other speakers, even though President Bush made this assertion an absolute number of times more than any other speaker.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>References the 9-11 attacks</th>
<th>Characterizes Iraqi threat as imminent</th>
<th>Asserts that Iraq possesses WMDs</th>
<th>Mentions Iraq's past use of chemical weapons</th>
<th>Explicitly mentions U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq</th>
<th>Equates the (potential) invasion of Iraq with the war on terror</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armitage, Richard</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>61.67%</td>
<td>46.67%</td>
<td>85.50%</td>
<td>43.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biden, Joseph</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.59%</td>
<td>84.62%</td>
<td>90.00%</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>93.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bush, George</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>58.59%</td>
<td>84.62%</td>
<td>90.00%</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cheney, Richard</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92.31%</td>
<td>92.31%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daschle, Tom</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.53%</td>
<td>23.53%</td>
<td>41.70%</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dodd, Christopher</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
<td>41.70%</td>
<td>56.20%</td>
<td>56.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gephardt, Richard</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>41.70%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lieberman, Joseph</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
<td>56.20%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lott, Trent</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
<td>41.70%</td>
<td>93.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lugar, Richard</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39.29%</td>
<td>39.29%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>McGin, John</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>84.50%</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powell, Colin</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40.79%</td>
<td>40.79%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rice, Condoleezza</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rumsfeld, Donald</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62.35%</td>
<td>62.35%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenet, George</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87.50%</td>
<td>87.50%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wolfowitz, Paul</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>64.00%</td>
<td>64.00%</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
<td>95.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government speakers in table 27 also show great variability in the tendency to equate an attack upon Iraq with the “war on terrorism.” Generally speaking, members of the Executive branch tended to more frequently equate an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror, though this was not true for State Department officials. Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman is also an interesting example of a rare Democrat who equates an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror nearly as often as the most ardent pro-war Executive branch Republicans such as President Bush or Vice President Cheney. Moderate Republican Richard Lugar and Democrats Tom Daschle and Joe Biden were much less likely to suggest that an attack on Iraq would be part of the war on terror—what is more, Lugar, Daschle, and Biden were less likely to mention Iraq actually

Table 27: Prominent Active Speakers and Threat-oriented Content Variables
possessed WMDs or that Iraq had used chemical weapons while they never once asserted that Iraq posed an imminent threat.

6.3 ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE OVER TIME

This chapter has been focused on individual speakers as the unit of analysis. Clearly speakers did not participate equally in the deliberations regarding the use of force against Iraq. There are more observations of prominent political leaders in the executive branch, such as President George Bush and the most senior members of his administration, than there are of congressional leaders of both parties. With speakers that had a certain level of activity, it is possible to chart changes in an active individual speaker’s Iraq Index score for public appearances over time. This approach is only suitable for those speakers a relatively high number of total observations over a long length of time, implying a sustained and relatively high level of public participation from January 2001 to March 2003. Graphing an individual’s Iraq Index score from January 2001 to March 2003 shows change in the level of support in favor of the use of force in Iraq as measured by public statements.

Democratic Senators Joseph Biden, Tom Daschle, Carl Levin, and Joseph Lieberman and Democratic Representative Richard Gephardt had a sustained level of public deliberation. So too did President George Bush and other administration officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretaries Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Ambassador John Negroponte, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Republican Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Trent Lott (R-S), John McCain (R-AZ), and John Warner (R-VA). I
focused on these individuals because they all had a high enough number of observations to demonstrate changes in the Iraq Index score over the 27 time periods. Each of these periods is roughly one month. Figures 14, 15, and 16 are graphs that show changes in a speaker’s mean Iraq Index score over each public appearance from when President Bush took office to the time of the March 19, 2003 invasion of Iraq. The figures illustrate that speakers generally increased their level of public support for the use of force against Iraq, somewhat so after September 11, 2001 but particularly just prior to the October 2002 congressional authorization for the president to invade Iraq.

![Figure 14: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative Democrats](image-url)
Figure 15: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Bush Administration Officials

Figure 16: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative Republicans and Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)
In Chapters 4 and 5, the government’s pre-war public deliberations were divided into three periods. The first period corresponded to January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001 and was characterized by relatively little government attention paid to Iraq (as measured by the number of times the word Iraq or Iraqi is referred to in the transcripts) and very little public discussion regarding the use force against Iraq. Although 5 observations made during this first period involved some advocacy of the use of force, none of the prominent administration officials or legislators in the above tables made any public advocacy for the use of force.156 Nonetheless, several administration officials, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed the policy of regime change in Iraq and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mentioned Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons several times. The Iraq Index scores for several speakers, notably Senators Chuck Hagel and Carl Levin appear to undergo increases during the later months of this period, but this is the misleading result of the extrapolated trend line—both Hagel and Levin generated consistent Iraq Index scores of zero during this first period.

The second period of analysis covered September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002. More government speakers discussed Iraq as the total number unique speakers, observations, and the number of references to Iraq increased in this period. However, the amount of attention the typical speaker devoted to the subject of Iraq remained relatively stable during this period—the number of references made by each speaker per public appearance did not increase much, from 6.35 to only 6.96. In this second period, some speakers began to advocate for the use of force.

156 During the first period, only 5 observations had an Iraq Index score of greater than 0. Four of these observations were made by four witnesses in a March 1, 2001 hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The four witnesses were Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey, Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, and Morton Halperin, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Department of Defense Spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley made the fifth observation on June 26, 2001 during a Pentagon Briefing. These five Iraq Index scores ranged from 1 to 3.
More government speakers began to give more justifications for the use of force against Iraq, raising the mean Iraq Index score from 0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in this period. Republicans and Democrats generally had identical Iraq Index scores in this period because speakers of both parties tended to have low Iraq Index scores. One noteworthy speaker, Senator Joseph Lieberman, tended to generate Iraq Index scores much higher than his colleagues of either party fairly consistently for all of his observations. This is made evident when Senator Lieberman’s mean Iraq Index scores displayed in Figure 14 are compared with the scores of Bush administration officials in Figure 15. To facilitate easier comparison, Senator Lieberman’s line was reproduced with Republican Legislators in Figure 16. Only a spike in the Iraq index score of Senator Carl Levin (who had a single observation with a score of 4 on October 22, 2001—thus his average during this period is uncharacteristically high) exceeded Lieberman’s scores. From December 2001 onward, Senator Lieberman’s Iraq Index score never went below three. At the same time, Lieberman’s Iraq Index score averaged 2.45, a remarkably consistent and high level of support for the invasion of Iraq—the fourth highest of any elected official. In the third period, Lieberman’s Iraq Index scores were more similar to those of Republican speakers such as President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld than to Democratic speakers, as figure 16 demonstrates.

The third period covers July 29, 2002 to the date the invasion of Iraq began, March 19, 2003. This period was characterized by a high amount of government attention to Iraq, as measured by the dramatic increase in the total number of references in the transcripts to Iraq, the high mean number of references to Iraq by each speaker in each public appearance, as well as a high level of public justification for the use of force by each speaker. Donald Rumsfeld had 4 of the 10 highest Iraq Index scores per observations during this period, with an Iraq Index score of
2.02 for this period alone. Senator Lieberman had the eighth highest Iraq Index score during this period, which helped keep his average high—as high as Bush Administration officials. Republican Senators Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar generated scores much more like those of the typical Democrat, as figure 16 shows. Hagel’s highest mean Iraq Index score during the third period was only 1.0, which he repeated several times shortly after the congressional votes that authorized the use of military force against Iraq. Lugar’s mean scores peaked twice, shortly after the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and again at the beginning of the third period, but Lugar’s highest mean Iraq Index scores were no higher than 1 for any time period. Other Republicans, such as President Bush and his spokesman and the Secretaries of Defense and State generated disproportionately high Iraq Index scores during the third period, illustrated by the trend lines in Figure 15.

### 6.4 Invocation of 9/11 and Support for the Use of Force

Some speakers were more likely to invoke the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in their public deliberations regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq. The government transcripts on Iraq allow analysis of those speakers who referred to the terrorist attacks when discussing Iraq. It is important to note that reverse is not true—because the transcripts that were collected and coded referred to Iraq, it is not possible to see whether government speakers who referred to 9/11 were more or less likely to discuss Iraq. This is simply because all of the coded transcripts by definition of the coding instrument include a government speaker that used the word Iraq or one of its forms at least once per transcript. Table 28 lists ten speakers who have a high number of observations as well as are more likely most other speakers to mention the attacks of 9/11. Vice
President Richard Cheney mentioned the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks in 12 of his 13 appearances—only speakers with two or fewer observations mention 9/11 in the same appearances that they also discussed Iraq with a higher frequency rate as Vice President Cheney.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>References to the 9-11 attacks</th>
<th>Mean Iraq Index Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheney, Dick</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>92.31% 92.90% 2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenet, George (DCI)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87.50% 92.20% 0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice, Condoleeza</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.67% 84.80% 1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64.00% 84.30% 1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63.64% 83.30% 2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gephardt, Richard (D-MO)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63.64% 82.90% 1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumsfeld, Donald</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62.35% 83.20% 1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, George</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56.57% 80.80% 2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilman, Benjamin (R-NY)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.56% 80.80% 0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lott, Trent (R-MS)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54.17% 79.80% 1.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28: Active Speakers that Often Refer to the 9/11 Attacks

As table 28 shows, those active government speakers who were most likely to refer to the 9/11 attacks in public appearances where they discussed Iraq were Vice President Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet. One might expect Tenet to discuss Iraq and 9/11 within the same congressional hearing as Tenet’s supervisory role over the intelligence community enabled him to inform Congress on many subjects. It is unclear why the Vice President so often discussed 9/11 and Iraq in the same public appearances. However, so many other Bush Administration officials were also likely to do the same that it may be an indication that doing so was intentional—as part of demonstrating to the American people that an attack on Iraq was part of the war on terror.

A casual glance at the above table might lead one to conclude that invocation of the attacks September 11 and support for the use of force against Iraq are linearly related. Indeed,
there is a positive correlation between the percentage of time that a speaker mentions September 11 and that speaker’s mean Iraq Index score, albeit only a slight one. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.153 (p = .03) while Spearman’s ρ is 0.143 (p = .041) and Kendall’s τₚ is 0.112 (p = .35). In a model that assumes that the percentage a speaker mentions 9/11 is linearly related to overall mean Iraq Index score, the effect of percentage frequency of mentioning 9/11 on a speaker’s mean Iraq Index score for the period January 2001 to March 2003 is fairly weak. The coefficient of determination for the equation below is so low as to be almost negligible (R² = .23). This level of explanatory weakness in the model is likely due to the fact that the dependent variable is an average that varies in precision depending on the number of observations each speaker has. This regression still has some value, however, as it demonstrates that mentioning 9/11 and mean Iraq Index score do have a small positive relationship. In other words, if a speaker mentioned 9/11 often, they were likely to have a slightly higher Iraq Index mean.

Estimated mean Iraq Index Score = 0.427 x (% frequency speaker mentions 9/11) + .535

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.535</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage rate that the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speaker refers to 9/11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficientsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: mean iraq index variable

Government speakers mentioned Osama bin Laden between January 2001 and March 2003 in government transcripts where the word Iraq appeared much less frequently than they mentioned the terrorist attacks of September 11. 67.5 % of government speakers never mentioned Osama bin Laden in any of the public appearances where they mentioned Iraq. Only
65 different government speakers in this database mentioned bin Laden at least once in the Iraq transcripts; those speakers who did mention bin Laden the most frequent percentage of their public appearances were not usually the most active speakers, nor were they typically speakers with the highest Iraq Index scores, as Table 11 indicates. Vice President Cheney and Senator Kennedy are the most active of these speakers with 13 and 10 appearances, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>References to Osama bin Laden</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Iraq Index Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>References to Osama bin Laden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>% Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards, John (D-NC)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>tied with top 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenet, George (DCI)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>96.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Woolsey (former DCI)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>95.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney, Richard</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61.54%</td>
<td>94.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy, Edward (D-MA)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>88.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perle, Richard (Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>82.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td>81.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>81.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biden, Joseph (D-DE)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.69%</td>
<td>78.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugar, Richard (R-IN)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>76.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumsfeld, Donald</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.65%</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30: Prominent Speakers who in the Same Appearance Frequently Mentioned Osama bin Laden and Iraq

It is worth noting that many of those government speakers who mentioned bin Laden most often were intelligence professionals and Democrats. Twelve of the top 25 speakers with the highest percentage references to bin Laden were Democrats, while only five were Republicans (the last eight were of unknown political affiliation). It could be that some Democrats might have mentioned Osama bin Laden in an effort to try and focus foreign policy efforts against al Qaeda rather than to include Iraq as a possible target for military force. This is mere speculation, however, as no arguments against the use of force were included in the coding instrument.
More active speakers, such as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or Secretary of State Powell, did mention bin Laden a greater number of times than other speakers, 15 and 11 times respectively, but because they had so many other public appearances, the percentage appearances in which they mentioned bin Laden were comparatively much lower. For example, President Bush mentioned Osama bin Laden only once out of 99 observations, a percentage of only slightly better than 1%. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did so in 15 of 85 observations, but this is only 17.6% of his public appearances.

There is not a statistically significant relationship between speakers’ mean Iraq Index scores and the percentage frequency of references to bin Laden at the 95% confidence level. Bivariate regression analysis performed on the percentage references to bin Laden and mean Iraq Index scores also failed to identify a statistically significant relationship. It is therefore impossible to conclude that those speakers who mentioned bin Laden more also made more public justifications for the use of force against Iraq. This is not terribly surprising because most of the speakers did not mention Osama bin Laden when they mentioned Iraq, or if they did, they generally did so infrequently.

### 6.5 SUMMARY ON INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Prior to September 11, 2001, few government officials even mentioned the possibility of using force against Iraq. Those few who did give public justifications for the use of force were congressional witnesses and a single Executive branch official. Legislators of both parties did not make public justifications favoring the use of force against Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After September 11, 2001, Republican legislators began to focus more on Iraq—there
was a small but statistically significant increase in the tendency to support the use of force amongst Republican legislators. Republican Senators Lugar and Hagel were representative of this slight increase. The majority of the support for the use of force against Iraq after 9/11 came from Republicans in the Executive branch, such as that generated by President Bush and Vice President Cheney, and also, to a lesser extent by Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld and Ambassador John Negroponte. Democratic Legislators generally did not increase their support for the use of force until late July, 2002, when discussion of the use of force against Iraq increased within all groups of government officials, Republicans, Democrats, Legislators, and Executive branch officials. One notable exception to these trends was then-Democratic Senator from Connecticut Joseph Lieberman. Lieberman’s support for the use of force began shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was always much higher than his fellow Democrats and often more likely to discuss the use of force more than many Republicans.

Government officials who most frequently referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks tended to advocate in their public statements the use of force against Iraq more strongly. This relationship is slight but significant, but a small increase in the frequency of mentioning the terrorist attacks of 9/11 leads to a substantial increase in Iraq Index score. What is true of speakers who invoked 9/11 is not true of speakers who mentioned Osama bin Laden. Those government officials who tended to mention Osama Bin Laden the most, however, tended to have lower Iraq Index scores—that is, such speakers tended to discuss the possibility of using force against Iraq less often and with fewer justifications. These two findings might seem contradictory, but perhaps those who mentioned bin Laden did so in order to advocate more effort in Afghanistan as opposed to Iraq, or to advocate more emphasis on the known terrorist threats rather than on a potential nexus with terrorism in Iraq.
In this chapter, the focus has been on individual government officials and how their support for the war changed over time. This use of individuals as the unit of analysis has reinforced other findings regarding the political parties and branches of government. Republicans were much more outspoken in their public support for the war. Congress was much less active than the Executive branch in advocating support for the use of force, even in the last few months prior to the start of the invasion of Iraq. The Executive branch was more active in participating in public discussions, more focused on the problem of Iraq, and more supportive of the use of force throughout the third period. For some individuals, namely Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman and Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, their discussions of Iraq were atypical of their own political parties.
7. CONCLUSION

In war, truth is the first casualty.

Aeschylus

7.1 WHY UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE FROM 2001 TO 2003 MATTERS

Five years have passed since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. In those five years, the decision to invade Iraq has faced growing criticism and frustration from the American public and government officials. Since January 2006, a majority of Americans have considered the war against Iraq to be a mistake.\textsuperscript{157} In the November 2006 congressional midterm elections, Democrats took control of the House and won a narrow 51-49 majority in Senate. Many, including President Bush, have viewed the Democratic victory as resting in large part upon widespread disaffection and frustration with the Iraq war.\textsuperscript{158} The continuing efforts in Iraq are likely to have some impact on the 2008 Presidential election as well.\textsuperscript{159} As the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 has become increasingly unpopular and may now be used as a political

\textsuperscript{157} Jeffrey M. Jones, "Majority Continues to Consider Iraq War a Mistake: No Change in Attitudes in Past Two Months," (Gallup.com, Feb. 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{158} "Bush Replaces Rumsfeld to Get 'Fresh Perspective'," (CNN.com, Nov. 9, 2006), Gary Langer et al., "Much-Diminished GOP Absorbs the Voters' Ire: 57 Percent of Voters Disapproved of Bush's Job Performance," (ABCNews.com, Nov. 8, 2006).
wedge issue useful against political opponents, a revisit to the debate regarding Iraq prior to the invasion is in order. This thesis is first and foremost a descriptive study of how government officials justified the war in Iraq.

That there remains interest in how the war was discussed is also demonstrated by ongoing investigations within government. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is expected to soon release a report on whether Bush Administration officials’ public statements regarding Iraq accurately reflected the intelligence reporting that had been prepared on Iraq.\textsuperscript{160} A team of researchers at the Center for Public Integrity has issued its own analysis of the public statements of eight key Bush Administration officials, concluding that they made at least 935 false statements about the national security threat posed by Iraq.\textsuperscript{161} This analysis of what government official said regarding the use of force against Iraq allows a more systematic and inclusive characterization of the public record, by including both Executive and Legislative branch officials and being conducted in a manner that allows relative comparisons between groups of officials in how often they made their assertions regarding war with Iraq. This descriptive analysis allows interested persons the opportunity to determine whether what they think they remember about the debate regarding the use of force against Iraq is accurate.

After all, revisionism regarding the decision to invade Iraq has already taken place. In November 2007, former Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove claimed that the Bush Administration was opposed to holding the 2002 Iraq Resolution vote before the Congress adjourned for the 2002 congressional elections because such timing “made it too political.”\textsuperscript{162} Within that same

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{160} Greg Miller, "Verdict Mixed on Iraq Claims: A Long-Awaited Senate Panel Study Reportedly Hedges on Whether the White House Misused Prewar Intelligence," \textit{Los Angeles Times} March 10, 2008.
  \item\textsuperscript{161} Lewis and Reading-Smith, "The War Card: Orchestrated Deception on the Path to War."
  \item\textsuperscript{162} Charlie Rose, "An Hour with Karl Rove, Former Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush," (Public Broadcasting Service, Nov. 21, 2007).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
week, Bill Clinton, stumping for his wife Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, said that he had “opposed Iraq from the beginning.” Both statements seem to contradict what Americans think they remember about the debate that ended in March 2003 when the Iraq war began. If truth is the first casualty of war, then there is value in attempting to rediscover lost truth through systematic analysis of the public record.

Eventually, the private record regarding the war in Iraq will be available for analysis, and perhaps at that time this analysis of the public case for war might be compared with the internal decision-making process. This may happen sooner rather than later in the United Kingdom, where the Information Commissioner ruled that the British government had to release private and confidential cabinet ministers’ notes regarding the Iraq war decision. Although the opinion pertains to the United Kingdom, the aspects of the legal support for the release of ministerial notes could easily apply in the United States, namely public interest in transparent and accountable policy- and decision-making. Information Commissioner Richard Thomas wrote:

In this case, in respect of the public debate and controversy surrounding the decision to take military action in Iraq, the process by which the government reached its decision adds to the public interest in maximum transparency. This is reflected by, among other matters, the controversy surrounding the [British] Attorney General’s legal advice on the legality of military action and the ministerial resignations which took place at that time. It is also the case that there is a widespread view that the justification for the decision on military action in Iraq is either not fully understood or that the public were not given the full or genuine reasons for that decision.

165 Ibid., ¶¶23-24.
There are three significant ways that this research project might be broadened through additional research. The first way involves a media content study. Having established that there were significant divergences of opinion regarding support for the use of force, it remains to be seen whether the media reported that there existed a diversity of opinions amongst government leaders regarding the use of force against Iraq. How well did the major media outlets communicate the differences in opinion on Iraq war policy to the public? Did the media report that the Congress was relatively lukewarm on the use of force against Iraq when compared to the Executive branch, and that Democrats were even more ambivalent on the war? The second possible avenue for further research involves investigation into the relationship between the public deliberation of government officials and public opinion favoring the use of force against Iraq. It might be possible to construct a model of government influence on public opinion in the run up to war using this Iraq data and opinion poll data. Alternatively, the influence may run in the opposite direction, from public opinion to government, or involve additional factors. A third possibility for further research involves examining the relationship between the public government deliberation examined here and the actual decision-making process that resulted in the use of force against Iraq. Of course, examining this question, both historical and policy-oriented in nature, will require knowledge involving government documents and interviews that will not be accessible for some decades to come. As the behind-the-scenes information on Iraq becomes available, later research can return to this question and better address it.
7.2 FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS

This research project involved a content analysis of the debate over the use of force against Iraq that occurred as government officials discussed the potential use of force from the beginning of George W. Bush’s presidency in January 2001 to the actual invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003. The results of this content analysis have supplied a historical and political frame of reference to identify how the debate actually occurred. The content analysis has enabled relative comparisons between how the political branches of government and political parties supported the use of force against Iraq. Additionally, the analysis made it possible to compare those individual government officials who were most involved in the public deliberation of the war. On the basis of this empirical analysis, one can now evaluate the relative differences between groups’ political claims as well as evaluate some of the competing claims and potential revisionism regarding the Iraq war debate. Using this analysis, it is possible to determine if what we think we remember about the debate regarding the invasion of Iraq comports with what actually was said, and which various arguments regarding war in Iraq were more dominant in the public deliberation produced by government. Perhaps more importantly, this analysis has provided an empirical basis for a relative comparison between political parties, branches of government, and between some individuals, in how often they stressed various arguments in public.

Under the U.S. Constitution, foreign policy is shared between the political branches of government. Though the Founders envisioned Congress as the principle seat of government policy making, since World War II the modern presidency has generally increased its foreign policy power with respect to Congress. No changes have been made to this constitutional arrangement; the primary reason the president dominates Congress in foreign affairs is political
rather than structural. Since World War II, Congress has often seen fit to acquiesce to presidential foreign policies including the use of military force abroad. The widely shared perception that the president’s unity of purpose and speed of dispatch are required to counter modern threats to U.S. national security has also contributed to Executive power augmentation. Thus, Congress is often in the position of responding to presidential activity and has often been content to defer to the Executive branch’s foreign policy.

Despite this position, the Constitution’s structurally-imposed shared foreign policy power and checks and balances remain in effect. In short, Congress has not lost its role in foreign policy due to some presidential “adverse possession” of constitutional authority over foreign affairs.\footnote{Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked," 1391.} Under the U.S. Constitution, the decision to use U.S. military force is a result of consultation, deliberation, and collective decision-making despite the lack of a clear demarcation between power that is shared and power that is solely executive or legislative in nature. Even though the Constitutional arrangement between presidential and congressional foreign policy authority remains imprecise, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on clear congressional authorization. Both the Congress and the president participated in the decision as well as the public debate on whether or not to use force.

The 2002 Iraq Resolution was widely touted as bipartisan and overwhelmingly supported by Congress. With the affirmative vote, President Bush proclaimed that, “America speaks with one voice.”\footnote{Bush, "President's Statement on Senate Vote."} The Executive and Legislative branches had engaged in discussion and debate concerning Iraq long before and even after this 2002 Resolution vote. This analysis has shown that significant differences existed between how the political parties and the Executive and Legislative branches supported the war. This lack of consensus was present despite the 2002
Resolution vote and the divergence between groups widened much further in the last few months prior to the March 2003 invasion. Congress was most active in discussing Iraq prior to and during the formal consideration of the 2002 Iraq Resolution. However, Congress had been increasing its focus on Iraq, as demonstrated by legislators’ increasing number of references to Iraq per transcript. Thus, Congress increased its focus on Iraq consistent with its role of considering important national security matters and national policy. The data of this analysis showed dramatically increasing numbers of observations as well as increases in focus and public advocacy for the use of force over the entire period of analysis.

The data obtained through this content analysis has revealed a story of increasing preoccupation with Iraq and increasing divergences between Democrats and Republicans and between Legislators and Executive branch officials in how the use of force against Iraq was justified. The debate that occurred reflected a decrease in consensus on the use of force against Iraq. Instead of coming together, political differences between the branches and the parties diverged. This divergence along party lines, while regrettable in the gravest matters concerning war and peace, might be anticipated given increases in party polarization over the last decades. What was unexpected is that the data also shows that there was a lack of consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches as well. The divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches were greater than those between Republicans and Democrats. Thus, while Republicans in Congress did generally tend to support the president in the use of force, they did not match the Executive branch in the frequency with which President Bush and other Executive branch officials made assertions favoring war.

The content analysis was based on transcripts dated from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003. The first date corresponded to the date President George W. Bush was sworn in and the
second corresponded to the date that the U.S. invasion of Iraq began. These twenty-seven months were divided into three separate periods to facilitate analysis. During the first period, from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001, there was little discussion of the possible use of force against Iraq. Out of 182 observations made during this time period, the mean Iraq Index score was merely 0.05 and the maximum Iraq Index score was 3. Government officials who mentioned Iraq tended to do so 6.35 times per public appearance. The second period covered September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002. During this second period, there was a mixed amount of public discussion concerning the use of force against Iraq. While the mean number of references to Iraq increased only slightly over the first period, from 6.35 to 6.96, the mean Iraq Index score increased from 0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in the second. While the typical government official’s average focus on Iraq increased negligibly, officials’ expressed level of support for the use of force against Iraq increased by a factor of nearly eight. Executive branch officials were much more likely than Legislators to make arguments favoring the use of force against Iraq. This increase was almost entirely due to Executive branch officials making arguments in favor of the use of force. The maximum Iraq Index score increased from 3 in the first period to 5 in the second.

The third period of this content analysis concerns transcripts from July 29, 2002 to March 19, 2003. During this period, the attention that speakers paid toward Iraq was greatly increased. When discussing Iraq, the number of references to Iraq per public appearance nearly doubled, from 6.96 in the second period to 12.2 in the third period. The distributions of references to Iraq made by speakers in this third period are statistically higher than the distributions of references made by speakers in the earlier two periods. Speakers in the third period also had a significantly higher Iraq Index score. After mean Iraq Index scores of 0.05 and 0.39 in the first two periods,
respectively, the mean Iraq Index score in the third period was 1.25. This score is higher than 1, indicating that the typical government speaker who referred to Iraq at least once in a public appearance between also tended to give at least one reason (typically more) why armed force should be used against Iraq. Executive branch officials tended to have much higher Iraq Index scores than Legislators, with scores of 1.93 to 0.61, respectively. Republicans tended to have much higher Iraq Index scores than Democrats, with scores of 1.79 to 0.40, respectively. The maximum Iraq Index score for the third period was 8, as opposed to only 3 and 5 in periods one and two, respectively. The differences in these scores indicate the lack of consensus between political parties and branches of government regarding the use of force against Iraq.

More of the observations of government officials concerned public statements made by Executive branch officials. However, this may be a result of inadvertent sample bias—the Washington Transcripts database may preference Executive branch public statements over those of Legislators. Nonetheless, the content and frequency data does support the notion that Executive officials had a higher focus on Iraq than did Legislators. This was the case at the beginning of the Bush Administration in January 2001 up to the invasion. With few exceptions, Executive branch speakers mentioned Iraq more per public appearance than did Legislators. Congress’ public support for the use of force against Iraq did increase after September 11, 2001, but starting in January 2002, Legislative branch speakers consistently produced lower Iraq Index scores than did Executive branch officials. By late summer 2002, when Congress began hearings on how to confront Iraq, the Executive branch had statistically higher Iraq Index scores than Congress. Congressional activity and congressional focus on Iraq did not peak until July-August-September 2002, which corresponds to the months just before Congress formally considered and hurriedly passed the 2002 Iraq Resolution. Despite the passage of the Iraq
Resolution, support for the use of force in Congress was significantly lower than that publicly advocated by the Executive branch.

Congress was far less active than the Executive branch and far less publicly supportive of the use of force against Iraq. The highest Iraq Index scores of all speakers were produced by Executive branch officials—of 394 observations of Iraq Index scores greater than 2, 274 scores (70.0%) came from Executive branch. Only 91 of the 394 observations of Iraq Index scores greater than 2 were made by Legislators (23.1%). Congress’ comparative lack of public advocacy in favor of war with Iraq should not be equated to congressional acquiescence in the president’s war, however. Congress’ Iraq Index scores did trend upwards over all 27 months of the analysis. Thus, Congress was likely moving toward expressing more support for the use of force. Moreover, Congress generally decides for itself which witnesses to invite and consider—thus even if the testimony congressional witnesses informed Congress in such a way as to cause an increase in the Iraq Index scores of congressional speakers, Congress itself had a significant role in this development. Twenty-nine observations of the 394 with Iraq Index scores higher than 2 were congressional witnesses, and those congressional witnesses who had a low number of observations but had disproportionately high Iraq Index scores, such as Johns Hopkins professor Eliot Cohen and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were discussed elsewhere.

The high water mark of congressional activity and focus on Iraq was immediately prior to the formal consideration of the 2002 Iraq Resolution. This supports with the idea that Congress increased its focus on Iraq consistent with its role of considering important national security matters and national policy. Congress ultimately chose to pass the Resolution, an outcome clearly within its Constitutional powers. The data show dramatically increasing observations as
well as increases in focus and public support for the use of force over the entire period of analysis; this means Congress was increasingly involved in the process, was knowledgeable that the use of force was a likely outcome of the passage of the Resolution, and generally was in favor of the use of force being an outcome. It is disingenuous to ignore congressional participation in the constitutional decision-making process of authorizing the use of force and accuse the Congress of passivity. Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, did vote strongly in favor of delegating the authority to use force to the president, but Congress did so with a degree of public support for the use of force much lower than that possessed by Executive branch officials. This lack of consensus in the third period was substantially greater between the Executive and Legislative branches than between Legislative Republicans and Democrats. That the parties were and are polarized is often touted by the press. That Congress was not as supportive of the Executive branch’s war prior to the invasion was not.

Few government officials gave public justifications for the use of force prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Those who did were Republican officials in the Executive branch of government, among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Legislators of either political party did not make public justifications favoring the use of force against Iraq prior to the 9/11 attacks. Also prior to September 11, 2001, the differences between Democrats and Republicans were negligible. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Republican legislators began to focus more on Iraq as demonstrated by a small but statistically significant increase in the tendency to support the use of force. Still, the majority of the support for the use of force against Iraq after 9/11 came from Republicans in the Executive branch, such as that generated by President Bush and, to a lesser extent by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld. Democratic Legislators generally did not increase their support for the use of force
until late July 2002, when discussion of the use of force against Iraq increased significantly within all groups of government officials, Republicans, Democrats, Legislators, and Executive branch officials. These differences indicate a lack of consensus regarding aspects of the use of force against Iraq, despite the expressed congressional support for the president’s Authorization to Use Military Force, passed in October 2002. One notable exception to these trends include then-Democratic Senator from Connecticut Joseph Lieberman, whose support for the use of force began shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was always much higher than his fellow Democrats. Lieberman was often more likely to discuss the use of force more even than many Republicans.

Six months before the invasion, Republican speakers had Iraq Index scores 4.5 times higher than Democratic speakers. Over the period of those final six months before the invasion of Iraq, Republicans were significantly more likely than Democrats to assert that Iraq possessed WMDs (34.4 % more likely, to be exact); more likely to allude to general links between Iraq and terrorism (30.6 %); more likely to mention that invasion was a method to disarm Iraq (27.7 %); and more likely to mention 9/11 in the same public appearances where they mentioned Iraq (19.1 %). These differences are not as large when only Legislative branch Democrats and Republicans are compared, but they nonetheless point in the same direction. Republican legislators were more likely than Democratic legislators to assert that Iraq possessed WMDs (11.2 %); more likely to allude to general links between Iraq and terrorism (16.4 %); more likely to refer to the disarmament of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (11.3 %); more likely to mention that invasion was a method to disarm Iraq (11.2 %); and more likely to identify the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror (13.0 %). Democratic and Republicans generally, as well as Democrats and Republicans in Congress, had rough parities between the rates that speakers of each group
mentioned that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the past (only a .01% difference between both pairs of groups). There was also consensus between the frequencies that Republicans and Democrats in Congress supported the invasion of Iraq with humanitarian justifications (only a 0.01% difference). There was no consensus regarding the humanitarian justification when the Executive branch Republicans were factored in—Republicans generally tended to make the humanitarian justification 10.4 % of observations while Democrats did so only 2.3 % of observations, a difference of 8.1 %. The picture that emerges from this data is not one of a broad bipartisan consensus, much less a consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches.

For the entire twenty-seven months of the period of analysis, Democrats had on average lower mean Iraq Index scores than their Republican counterparts in government. While many of the highest mean scores belong to President Bush and Vice President Cheney, the maximum Iraq Index score for all appearances by a Republican is a tie between Secretary Rumsfeld and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz. Many of the highest Republican Iraq Index score means are senior Bush Administration officials with relatively few appearances but significant maximum Iraq Index scores, such as Ambassador Negroponte and notable neoconservatives Richard Perle and Douglas Feith. Senator Richard Lugar had the highest mean Iraq Index score of any congressional Republican. The Democrat with the highest mean Iraq Index score as well as the highest maximum Iraq Index score for a single public appearance was Senator Joseph Lieberman. Then-Democratic Senator Lieberman equated the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror nearly as often as the most ardent pro-war Executive branch Republicans such as President Bush or Vice President Cheney. Cheney and Lieberman also referred to 9/11 more often than all other government speakers in transcripts where they also mentioned Iraq at least once.
Government officials who most frequently referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks tended to advocate more for the use of force in their public statements, albeit weakly. This relationship is statically significant but small with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of only 0.153. Nonetheless, a small increase in the frequency of mentioning the terrorist attacks of 9/11 leads to a substantial increase in Iraq Index score. Referring to 9/11 only about 10% more frequently would increase a typical speaker’s mean Iraq Index score for all observations by nearly 0.5.

Those government officials who tended to mention Osama bin Laden the most, however, tended to have lower Iraq Index scores—that is, such speakers tended to discuss the possibility of using force against Iraq less often and with fewer justifications, though this relationship is not statistically significant. These two findings might seem contradictory, but it may be due to some government officials stressing bin Laden in order to advocate an increase in focus on Afghanistan as opposed to a new effort against Iraq.

While the data shows that the Executive branch and Republicans tended to support war more often and more potently than Democratic Legislators, it would not be entirely accurate to paint that picture of a Congress passively supporting the president. Individual actors within the Executive branch were more active than individual actors in the Congress in making public statements regarding Iraq, but this is likely due to the intense focus on the presidency for leadership in times of national crisis. Congress remained active throughout the twenty-seven month period analyzed. The support for the use of force in Congress trended upwards over the period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches, between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both branches greatly increased. Still, the differences of Iraq Index score across groups and the frequencies that groups expressed content variables illustrates little agreement between the Executive and
Legislative branches and between the political parties. The result was a breakdown in consensus regarding the use of force against Iraq, where Democrats can fairly blame the Republicans for their support of the president who was supportive of the invasion of Iraq and the president can rightly point out that Republicans were more supportive of his effort against Iraq and many Democrats’ public statements enabled the president’s policy.

The more direct pressure a government official faces from the American electorate, the more political accountable that elite official may be. This definition of political accountability ranks a Representative, elected every two years, as more politically accountable than the president, who, in turn, is more accountable than a Senator. The least politically accountable, according to this definition, is someone who is not a government official but who testifies before Congress; only slightly more accountable would be an Executive branch official who testifies before Congress. An analysis of the potential relationship between accountability and support for the use of force against Iraq identified a statistically significant but relatively small negative relationship between political accountability and Iraq Index score as the correlation coefficient is only -0.106. At best, therefore, government speakers with low political accountability tended to make only slightly stronger arguments in favor of war in their public appearances. There is much stronger statistical association between low political accountability and making high numbers of references to Iraq per observation (as high as -0.392). Thus, people of the highest political accountability tended to discuss Iraq less each public appearance. There are a few possible reasons for this. First, many of those with lowest political accountability were congressional witnesses who focused on Iraq because that was their substantive expertise. The more pessimistic ways to explain the reduced discussions by those with higher political accountability was that elected officials with the highest levels of accountability tended to
discuss Iraq less per public appearance and therefore may not have been as focused on the
problem or as engaged in the public debate, or that those politicians were afraid of publicly
discussion an opinion about the controversial use of force against Iraq. The truth is likely
somewhere in between these two extremes.

This content analysis indicates empirically that the Executive branch was more active
than the Legislative branch in making the public case for the use of force against Iraq. The data
illustrates that Congress became more actively involved after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and
activity trended upward significantly the month before the October 2002 Iraq Resolution
authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Congress’ overall support for the use of force increased
over the period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative
branches, between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both
branches regarding the support for the use of force increased significantly. The picture that
emerges from this data is hardly one of a war-mongering president and an acquiescent Congress.
The data does indicate that the Executive branch began the public deliberation regarding the use
of force and Executive branch officials generally made the most public justifications for war
against Iraq. Republican legislators were less likely to make public statements supportive of the
use of force against Iraq, and Democratic legislators were much less likely still.

Despite the 2002 Iraq Resolution that seemed to indicate that America spoke “with a
single voice,” there was actually a breakdown in consensus regarding the use of force against
Iraq. Democrats can rightly say that they were less in favor of using force against Iraq than were
Legislative Republicans and Executive branch officials. Legislative Republicans can rightly
claim that Executive branch leaders were the cheerleaders for war. The president promulgated
the earliest and most forceful public support for the use of force, and it stands to reason that
critics of the war may focus their political frustrations on him. President Bush and Republicans can rightly point out that while Republicans were more supportive of the president’s effort against Iraq, enough Democrats participated in the public deliberation with just enough support for the use of force to enable the president’s policy.

Democrats were significantly more likely to refer explicitly to the national security threat posed by Iraq between September 12, 2001 and July 28, 2002 (the second period of analysis). Democrats made this argument 5.0% of all observations to Republicans’ 1.9% (a ratio of 2.6 to 1). When administration officials and congressional Republicans began to stress the threat posed by Iraq after July 29, 2002 in earnest, Democrats had already laid the groundwork for recognizing the threat posed by Iraq. In the third period, congressional Democrats suggested that an invasion of Iraq would cost less than $100 billion two times more frequently than did congressional Republicans. Democrats made this argument 3.6% of observations to congressional Republicans’ 1.6%. The ratio is shy of 2 to 1 when Executive branch Republicans are factored into the ratio, but still similar. By making these arguments, it may have been the case that Democrats undermined the possibility that government officials skeptical of the invasion of Iraq would be able to challenge the prevailing discussion. Thus, those Democrats who were skeptical of using military force against Iraq and who might have been most likely to form a coalition opposing the use of force faced severe political hurdles. American public opinion was strongly in favor of the use of force, and had been for several years.168 Democrats had been stressing the threat in the second period of analysis. In the third period when Republicans were more likely to stress the threat posed by Iraq, Democrats were twice as likely to suggest that the war would cost less than $100 billion. The level of consensus between

Republicans and Democrats for references to “regime change” decreased over time, from Republicans outweighing Democrats by a factor of 3.06 and 1.24 to 1, to the point where Democrats only slightly outnumbered Republicans by a factor of 1.18. This may indicate that regime change was one thing Republicans and Democrats could agree upon, which further undermined any opposition that anyone might have offered to the use of force.

This may demonstrate that once the administration started to discuss the possibility of using force against Iraq, the Democrats had painted themselves into a corner regarding alternatives. Perhaps the majority of Democrats could not walk away from supporting the use of force against Iraq. Republicans made justifications more often than Democrats in the third period of analysis, as shown by their higher Iraq Index scores. Government officials who were skeptical of the efficacy and prudence of an invasion of Iraq—those who might have been the most likely to eventually coalesce into full opposition to the use of force against Iraq—argued many of the same content variables that reinforced the perception of the threat. Speakers with a mean Iraq Index score of 0 still mentioned that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the past, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraq had connections to terrorism. Such officials sounded like the people who supported the use of force. Thus, the speakers who were not hawkish ended up reinforcing arguments favoring the use of force. This may have been why there was little opposition to the use of force in Congress and what opposition there was tended to be diffuse and disordered.

Presidential politics may have played a role in how some Democrats supported the use of force against Iraq as well, although the effects are likely to be amorphous or tenuous.169 Out of 75 Democratic Legislators that appeared in the FNS transcripts, five government speakers were

169 This point was first suggested to me by Representative Mike Doyle (D-PA). Avishy Moshenberg and Lance Hampton, "Interview with Representative Mike Doyle," (Pittsburgh: Feb. 26, 2006).
presidential candidates for the Democratic nomination in 2004 and another five were candidates in 2008. In 2004, the Democratic nominee candidates included Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), John Edwards (D-NC), John Kerry (D-MA), and Representatives Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and Dennis Kucinich (D-OH). Senator Edwards and Representative Kucinich ran again for the 2008 presidential nomination, joined by Senators Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Joseph Biden (D-DE), and Christopher Dodd (D-CT). Table 31 lists mean Iraq Index scores for these government speakers, as well as Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who was the only government speaker in the transcripts to run for the presidential nomination of the Republican party. Because there was no Republican contest for the presidential nomination in 2004 and because McCain is the only Republican presidential contender, it is difficult to make generalizations about McCain’s support for the invasion of Iraq and the presidential contest.

During Fall 2002 at the time the House was considering the 2002 Iraq Resolution to authorize the President’s use of force, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt justified his support for the bill which he co-sponsored, saying that the authorization would strengthen the Bush Administration’s credibility with the international community and with Iraq. In effect, passage of the joint resolution would serve to avert war. However, Gephardt’s Iraq Index score was the fourth highest of all Democratic legislators with greater than two observations. Of those speakers with more than six observations, Gephardt’s Iraq Index score is second only to Senator Lieberman’s support for the war. This strong support for the use of force undermined Gephardt’s argument that his work for the Resolution was to avert war. It is possible that Gephardt supported the use of force against Iraq in order to position himself as a strong and viable candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004.

170 “Senate Approves Iraq War Resolution: Administration Applauds Vote.”
In context, Gephardt’s decision was unlikely to be just mere political calculation. So many government speakers had argued that Iraq posed a national security risk; in fact, Democrats had done so more frequently than Republicans from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002. Many speakers asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and many speakers referred to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These arguments tended to make it harder to achieve political traction because as speakers asserted them frequently and repeatedly, they reinforced the dominant frame of threat perception. Democrats tended to argue more frequently that the war would be relatively inexpensive, less than $100 billion. With these facts in mind, Gephardt’s support for the use of force seems more the natural and reasonable exercise of foreign policy than positioning himself for the 2004 presidential race. Gephardt’s mistake was resting upon this reasonable exercise and frequently expressed assertions, leading to a lack-luster fourth place finish in the Iowa Caucuses for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination. Gephardt dropped out of the 2004 race shortly afterward; some aides suggested that Gephardt’s support for the war cost him support from Iowa caucus-goers.\(^{171}\) Lieberman’s presidential ambitions also suffered from his hawkish stance on Iraq.\(^{172}\)

In the course of their 2008 nomination campaigns, Senators Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton and former Senator John Edwards have each been criticized for voting for the 2002 authorization to use military force against Iraq and initially supporting Bush’s war. Clinton and Edwards have only two observations each, meaning that the calculation of their Iraq Index score was not based on as many observations as other speakers, and all four of their observations come from the third period, when the support for the use of force was at its highest. Thus, their Iraq

Index scores are very likely to be biased upwards. Hillary Clinton’s Iraq Index score is higher than all Democratic Legislators except for Senator Lieberman. Clinton mentioned Iraq in only two transcripts, with Iraq index scores of 2 and 1 for the two observations. Edwards also mentioned Iraq in only two transcripts, but his Iraq Index scores were 2 and 0, giving him a slightly smaller mean Iraq Index score. Biden spoke about Iraq in all three periods of analysis—Biden’s mean Iraq Index score was 0 in the first period, 0.14 in the second, but was 0.61 in the third period. The Democratic legislators’ mean Iraq Index score for the third period of analysis was only 0.39, putting Clinton, Edwards, and Biden much higher than the norm for Democrats in making arguments supporting the use of force. Edwards did apologize for his initial support for the war in late 2005, but the data shows that his support was actually slightly smaller than Clinton’s. On the other hand, Clinton never alluded to connections between Iraq and terrorism as did Edwards and Biden; Edwards mentioned the 9/11 terrorist attacks and asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in both of his observations while Biden did so in the majority of his observations. Clinton never made these assertions. Clinton, like Edwards, asserted that efforts against Iraq were part of the war on terror, but Biden made this assertion four of eleven observations. Thus, Edwards and Biden were much more active than Senator Clinton was in asserting the threat posed by Iraq was connected to 9/11 and terrorism.

173 Edwards, "The Right Way in Iraq."
Republicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (with other Legislators of same political party)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>6th</th>
<th>9th</th>
<th>23rd</th>
<th>25th</th>
<th>tied for</th>
<th>37th</th>
<th>6th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Observations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Iraq Index score</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Iraq Index score</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Iraq Index score</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times speaker explicitly characterized the threat from Iraq as imminent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker gave an explicit cost estimate for the war as less than $100 billion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker equated the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker explicitly referred to U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker explicitly mentioned international law to justify invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker referred to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker referenced the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to justify invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker alluded to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker explicitly referred to a specific terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker called for further analysis of costs and benefits of the invasion or spined about unanswered questions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker explicitly referred to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available a cost offset to the war or rebuilding costs?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international weapons inspections</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker mentioned the possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker asserted that Iraq possesses WMDs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker mentioned Iraq's past use of chemical weapons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker used the exact phrase &quot;regime change&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times the speaker mentioned Osama bin Laden</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31: 2004 & 2008 Presidential Contenders and the Iraq War Debate

This content analysis has presented a story that systematically demonstrates that the war in Iraq was supported more by the Executive branch than the Legislative branch, but that there may have been some enablement of this message from Democrats in Congress. There were tremendous differences in how Democrats and Republicans discussed the problem of Iraq as well as how frequently members of the parties expressed support for the war. The story highlights that there was little consensus between parties and branches of government. In terms of congressional-executive relations, this story demonstrates that Congress was not passive.
Congress was involved in the debate about Iraq. However, the data from these public statements demonstrates how difficult it might have been for any organized opposition to the war to form. Congress as a whole could not effectively consider and evaluate the nature of the threat posed by Iraq because too many speakers frequently highlighted the threat Iraq posed. Few government speakers could challenge the basic threat perception frame because, even when the subject was Iraq and not terrorism \textit{per se}, the memory of what happened on 9/11 was too fresh. Thus, the result was a resolution that deferred to the president the discretion to make the final determination regarding an invasion of Iraq. Congress deferred to the president, but the discourse regarding potential force against Iraq indicated that members of Congress often made public justifications for the use of force against Iraq—thus, legislators knew what they were doing in voting for the 2002 Iraq Resolution and presumably believed in what they were doing by publicly advocating such a position.

Another lesson offered by this analysis is that Congress can get involved in decision-making discussions too late to have much of an impact, or can contribute too little to impact a foreign policy decision. The majority of the debate regarding Iraq occurred only a month or so before the 2002 Iraq Resolution and the majority of the speech came from the Executive branch. The Executive branch was more likely to stress the nature of the threat posed by Iraq than the Legislative branch. The Legislative branch’s ability to rely on careful and prudent consideration of the costs and benefits of potential military action through budget control is not an effective mechanism to check the power of the president in foreign policy. This is particularly the case when those Democrats who, \textit{ceteris paribus}, might have been less inclined to support the use of force against Iraq but for the fact that Democrats tended to view the cost of the war as relatively cheap (less than $100 billion), or at least expressed publicly more so than Republicans did that
the war would cost less than $100 billion. That, and in the eight to nine months prior (the second period of analysis), it had been the Democrats who had been more likely to publicly stress the threat posed by Iraq. Thus, war decisions, in practice, tend to remain the province of presidents with a small circle of advisors while the Legislative branch acquiesces or defers to the discretion of the Executive branch—undermining Article I § 8’s “declare war” clause. The political problem so described undermines the intent of the Founders, who wanted two strong and vigorous branches, the Legislative and Executive, each enlightened by attention to the national interest by virtue of various modes of representation and consensus development.

This analysis has contributed to an empirical understanding of the differences between political parties and the Legislative and Executive branches regarding the Iraq war debate for reasons of historical or political use, but there are wider ramifications of this research project. To many, the decision to invade Iraq is another example of a passive and acquiescent Congress bowing to Executive power and presidential discretion in matters of national security. However, the results here challenge this portrayal somewhat. Congress was less supportive of the use of force than were members of the executive branch, but the data and results indicate that Congress was engaged in the debate. The notion that congressional-executive relations is a zero-sum in the matter of foreign policy is overly simplistic, but it also does not seem consistent with the results of this analysis. The Executive branch advocated for the use of force against Iraq by referring to the nature of the threat posed by Iraq, but so did many members of the Congress. The Executive branch argued that the war against Iraq could be prosecuted cheaply, a view also shared by much of Congress. Congress was not so much a passive enabler but an active participant in the facilitation of the justification for the war. This was true even though there
existed significant differences over many aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq between political parties and branches of government prior to the invasion on March 19, 2003.

This analysis of differences between political parties and Executive and Legislative officials in their public governmental deliberation regarding the invasion of Iraq involved three research themes. The first two themes compared the Legislative and Executive branches and Democrats and Republicans to address the following questions: Did groups of Executive and Legislative branch officials, as well as Democratic and Republican officials, have more or less focus on Iraq during the two years before the invasion? Did the political parties and branches differ in how speakers of the two sets of groups supported the use of force against Iraq? The answers to these questions was that the record of the debate indicates little in the way of consensus between branches of government and Republicans and Democrats, and that the divergence generally started after September 11, 2001. The third theme examined the potential relationship between political accountability and justifications favoring the use of force. Government officials with the least amount of political accountability tended to discuss more per public appearance, but there was very little relationship between accountability and support for the use of force. Although the relationship was statistically significant, the effect was slight indeed. This small ray of good news should not be overlooked—publicly, at least, it would not seem as if a small group of government officials with low political accountability led the U.S. government into war. On the other hand, the debate regarding the use of force in Iraq is largely a story of divergences between branches of government and political parties. The data described here suggests a more active and hawkish Executive branch. At the same time, the story of the Iraq war debate was more nuanced than the typical argument would suggest, namely that Congress tends to passively follow the Executive branch’s foreign policy.
APPENDIX

CONTENT VARIABLE EXAMPLES FROM THE TRANSCRIPTS

This Appendix gives examples taken from transcripts for each of the content variables in the coding instrument. The additional details regarding the U.S. government speaker, date, and forum are provided below the illustrative statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content Variable Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the speaker have an identifiable position on Iraq policy (i.e., is at least one other content variable present)?</td>
<td>This dummy variable was automatically coded as a 1 if at least one content variable per observation had the value of 1. The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 was performed only on observations where at least one content variable had the value of 1 (i.e., where the speaker had an identifiable position on Iraq policy). The analysis was based on 1,699 observations of U.S. government speakers’ public appearances.</td>
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<td>2. Does the speaker implicitly assume U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>“Any nation, particularly my nation, but any nation, has a right at any time to act in self-defense, and our view is that the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein and his regime, which had demonstrated the ability to use them, even on their own population, which has demonstrated a rather brutal, repressive nature with their own population, and has raped and pillaged a neighboring country, we don’t want to give him a chance, the first chance to hit us. We don’t want to give him the first chance to hit our friends and allies—whether it’s the Arab states in the region or Israel. So, something has to be done…” Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 10, 2002. Transcript #1117.</td>
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<td>4. Does the speaker equate the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror?</td>
<td>“Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger, not only to his neighbors, but also to the United States. His regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for their use against us. And as the president said on Tuesday night, “It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our nation unlike any we’ve ever known.” That’s why confronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a distraction from the war on terror—it is absolutely crucial to winning the war on terror.” Vice President Richard Cheney, speaking at the Republican National Committee Winter Meeting, January 31, 2003. Transcript #424.</td>
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<td>5. Does the speaker explicitly characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent?</td>
<td>“Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent, that Saddam Hussein is at least five to seven years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain.” Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. Transcript #1063.</td>
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<td>6. Does the speaker characterize the invasion of Iraq as a potential method to disarm Iraq?</td>
<td>“With the countries of the Middle East, our friends and allies and the community of nations, we must also deal with the grave and growing danger posed by the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein. By unanimously passing Resolution 1441, the United Nations Security Council has offered Iraq a final opportunity to meet its obligations to peace and to the international community. The Iraqi regime can either disarm or it will be disarmed. The choice is theirs, but this cannot be postponed.” Colin Powell, Secretary of State, speaking at the Heritage Foundation, December 12, 2002. Transcript #645.</td>
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<td>7. Does the speaker reference the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>“This is certainly a critical time for us to be considering American action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to Congress, the United Nations and the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.” Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), speaking in a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 2003. Transcript #1063. [Note that this content variable may be coded as a 1 even in cases where the explicit term disarmament was not used.]</td>
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<td>8. Does the speaker explicitly mention international law?</td>
<td>“It’s not as if we are coming to the problem of Saddam for the first time in September of 2002. We have had 11 years of experience in which he failed to live up to his obligation under Resolution 687, and about 11 other resolutions of the UN, to get rid of those weapons. I have absolutely no reason to believe he’s going to change his spots. I simply believe—and what is so extraordinarily hard for democracies—that is to protect themselves and to risk the lives of their sons and daughters when they don’t have overwhelming proof in the form of having lost the first battle.” David Kay, former UNSCOM weapons inspector, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2002. Transcript #1121.</td>
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<td>9. Does the speaker refer to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>“We are enthusiastic about the potential of the Middle East Partnership Initiative and commend our witnesses today for their efforts to implement the president’s vision for the Middle East—a vision which includes the liberation of Iraq. Iraq is a test of the extent of U.S. commitment to freedom for the people of the Arab world. As President Bush has said: “The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, themselves. Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein—but Iraqi lives and freedom matter greatly to us.” It is the men, women and children of the Middle East which are the real wealth and value of these countries, and the United States will always stand firm for the demands of human dignity….My hope and commitment is for our brothers and sisters in the Middle East to be able to fulfill their dreams and immense potential, through the full exercise of their fundamental human rights and civil liberties.” Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), speaking in a hearing of the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, March 19, 2003. Transcript #2.</td>
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<td>10. Does the speaker allude to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally?</td>
<td>“I have a hard time—I have a hard time telling the country that you should be comfortable that we covered all the bases in the wake of what we saw they were able to accomplish on September 11th. I mean, that was a watershed in terms of the accomplishment—of a group of individuals to come together, utilize modern means of technology in terms of their communication, their planning, their organization, their travels—a type of discipline that prior to that time I don’t think we had seen. So I am uncomfortable sitting here saying, look, we are taking every step. But based on the fact that we are taking every step, you the American public should not be aware that there is a substantial risk out there that they could undertake. And by “they” I mean not just those associated with Iraq, but those associated with al Qaeda or Hezbollah or somebody else.” Robert Mueller, FBI Director, testifying before the Joint House and Select Senate Intelligence Committees, October 17, 2002. Transcript #862.</td>
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<td>11. Does the speaker explicitly refer to a specific terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq?</td>
<td>“We know about the meeting in Prague between Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official.” Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), speaking in a hearing of the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2002. Transcript #1493.</td>
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<td>12. Does the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international weapons inspections?</td>
<td>“The president emphasized the requirement for the weapons inspectors to be returned. If the weapons inspectors are returned under conditions that are satisfactory to the United States of America, then obviously, the process would be, quote, “extended.” But Saddam Hussein is as likely to allow a robust and effective weapons-inspection regime as I am to be the next astronaut. He’s not going to do it. And he hasn’t done it for four years. So I don’t see how he finds himself on the road to Damascus. But we’d welcome a return of the inspectors, a robust inspection regime and an iron-clad way of us making sure that he has halted and dismantled his weapons-of-mass-destruction capability.” Senator John McCain (R-AZ), speaking to reporters at the Capitol, September 12, 2002. Transcript #1100.</td>
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<td>13. Does the speaker say Iraq possesses WMDs?</td>
<td>“Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction? Sure, he does. We know he has chemical weapons. We know he has biological weapons. We have been unable to ferret them out and find them.” Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, testifying before the Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 1, 2001. Transcript #2151.</td>
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<td>14. Does the speaker mention Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons?</td>
<td>“For more than 20 years, Saddam has obsessively sought weapons of mass destruction through every means available. We know that he has chemical and biological weapons today, that he’s used them in the past, and that he’s doing everything he can to build more. Every day he gets closer to his long-term goal of nuclear capability. We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to have nuclear weapons.” Senator John Edwards (D-NC), speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 7, 2002. Transcript #926.</td>
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<td>15. Does the speaker characterize intelligence analysis as interpretive or ambiguous?</td>
<td>“Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed that we had &quot;bulletproof&quot; evidence of the link. But a year later, CIA Director Tenet conceded in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the administration’s understanding of the link was still &quot;evolving&quot; and was based on &quot;sources of varying reliability.&quot; In fact, the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have expressed their concern that intelligence is being politicized to support the rush to war.” Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), speaking at the United Methodist Church National Conference, March 4, 2003. Transcript #165.</td>
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<td>16. Does the speaker give an explicit cost estimate for the war as less than $100 billion?</td>
<td>“[T]his war to disarm Saddam, as crucial as it will be, may cost—according to estimates reported today—$95 billion.” Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 26, 2003. Transcript #218.</td>
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<td>17. Does the speaker call for further analysis of costs and benefits of the invasion or opine about unanswered questions?</td>
<td>“With regard to costs, I think it’s irresponsible and extremely unwarranted for the administration to withhold key information for us as we make critical decisions about the budget and the implications of this war on our own fiscal circumstances.” Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), speaking in the Ohio Clock Corridor at the Capitol, March 11, 2003. Transcript #108.</td>
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<td>18. Does the speaker explicitly refer to any estimates of costs or benefits of an invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>“It seems to me that part of our function as a committee, and the reason why we’re seeking your advice and help, is that we should be laying out the nature of the threat and the range of opinion relative to the nature of the threat, but not only the nature of the threat, the timing of the threat, the time frame in which we have to respond to the worst case, and then lay out for the American people what not the certain costs are but what the probable costs are in terms of everything from our treasure at it relates to life as well as it does to property and cost. And so that’s why I’m about to pursue a couple more questions with you; again, not—understanding that none of us know for certain what will happen once this is undertaken or even prior to being undertaken, if it is undertaken. The last Gulf War, as a coalition—which went extremely well, significant coalition, significant participation in the military undertaking as well as the aftermath—cost in today’s dollars about $76 billion, I’m told. Am I giving the right figure? Is that about right? I think it was sixty-some billion in Desert Storm. And in today’s dollars, I’m told it’s in the $75 billion-$80 billion range out. And of that, 80% of it was paid by the Japanese, the Europeans and others. Now, I want to make it clear for me, at least, that if I am convinced that Saddam has and is likely to use weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear capability, I think we have to be prepared to pay any price—70 billion, a hundred billion, 150 billion, whatever it would take—to protect our interests.” Senator <strong>Joseph Biden</strong> (D-DE), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, <strong>August 1, 2002</strong>. Transcript #1206.</td>
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<td>19. Does the speaker give an explicit value for U.S. cost estimates of an invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>“We’re likely to run into big trouble unless we have big help from other countries in handling this. And you shouldn’t feel empty-handed, Dr. [Eliot] Cohen [a congressional witness], in not having a ready prescription. Neither has anyone else we’ve talked to. We’ve probed them for answers to give us a little bit of depth and assurance that some of this planning is going on, and they can see how it works out. It isn’t there yet. And that’s a major concern we have, namely that we’ll be there. And Mike O’Hanlon, CBO, for better or worse, they took a stab at it, and you’re talking 15, $20 billion, they’re talking for a sizable force, over two years, $91 billion, and for a small force, $33.6 billion. Big change, particularly if you run it out over 10 years. It’s a substantial chunk of change that comes out of the defense budget. To what end, we’re not really sure. If it works, so much the better.” Representative <strong>John Spratt</strong> (D-SC), speaking in a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, <strong>October 2, 2002</strong>. Transcript #960.</td>
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<td>20. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available a cost offset to the war or rebuilding costs?</td>
<td>“Well, I think people are overlooking the fact that he’s [Saddam Hussein] been using a substantial amount of his oil income for military. They [the Iraqis] won’t be needing that after this war is over. We presume that a lot of that rebuilding in Iraq’s going to be done with their own money.” Representative <strong>Ted Stevens</strong> (R-AR), speaking to the press in the Senate Media Crypt at the Capitol, <strong>February 26, 2003</strong>. Transcript #221.</td>
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<td>21. Does the speaker specifically mention post-war or Phase IV planning?</td>
<td>&quot;[Speaking to Secretary of State Colin Powell]…I appreciated very much your outlining this afternoon what a new Iraq government might look like. Granted, we do not know that there will be military action….But in response to all the contingencies you were asked—that is, if a regime change occurred—you pointed out that it would have to be a regime that would help us find and destroy the weapons of mass destruction. That will take some doing, as you pointed out—scientists, intelligence sources, everybody—but at least that's the formation of a plan that indicates some sound thinking about this area, which we asked for. Secondly, with the government, you said we would try to raise up a government representative of the people, the democratic model as a basis, keeping the state together, with $20 billion of resources, possibly, from oil to help finance humanitarian projects for the people, and so forth. A strong American presence required, both political and military, probably for some time, and prayerfully a lot of other presence of our allies, friends in the area. And you said this is an opportunity to create. Now, that is important. And I suspect it comes not only from your own supposition, but from a planning effort on the part of the administration. In other words, there are people actually at work on this. The chairman and I have been asking for, in the hearings, evidence that even in our important discussion about war and peace, we are thinking about the consequences. And there are consequences obviously coming.&quot; Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 2, 2002. Transcript #1000.</td>
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<td>22. Does the speaker mention the possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?</td>
<td>&quot;I would ask each of you [former Secretaries of Defense Samuel Berger and Caspar Weinberger] if you would respond to that question, your question, Mr. Berger, in this way. Is it the opinion of—or what is your opinion as to if the United States would find itself, as it essentially does today, alone and if we would move in a military action to destroy Saddam Hussein unilaterally, or essentially unilaterally? Is that wise?” Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 1, 2002. Transcript #1206.</td>
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<td>23. Does the speaker urge a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?</td>
<td>&quot;It is that the choice before the United States is a stark one, either to acquiesce in a situation in which the regime of Saddam Hussein can restore his economy, acquire weapons of mass destruction and pose a lethal threat to his neighbors or to us, or we take action to overthrow him. In my view, the latter course, with all of its risks, is the correct one. Indeed, the dangers of failing to act in the near future are unacceptable. To that end, Congress should authorize the president to initiate large-scale military action against Iraq, and give him the widest possible latitude in acting, even in the absence of additional U.N. authorization to do so,…One final point that I—I hate to make but I think I have to make it—it’s one of the ways in which our determination will be understood, particularly in that part of the world, is if we make it clear that we're going to do this anyhow….I do tend to think that once it’s clear that this is going to happen, other countries will sign up, for a variety of reasons, some good, some not so good…..And the other thing is that, particularly in that part of the world, people respond to success. And so if the campaign is a fairly successful one, I think the amount of support that we will get, or at least really pretty benign acquiescence, is quite substantial….[I]ronically, the more determined we look, I think the more likely—the more determined we look to do it even alone, the more likely we are to get the support that we want.” Dr. Eliot Cohen, Johns Hopkins University professor, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, October 2, 2002. Transcript #960.</td>
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<td>24. Does the speaker mention the possible multilateral invasion of Iraq?</td>
<td>&quot;The U.N. Security Council, the NATO alliance, and the United States are united: Saddam Hussein will fully disarm himself of weapons of mass destruction; and if he does not, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm him.&quot; President George W. Bush, speaking at a press conference, December 2, 2002. Transcript #692.</td>
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<td>25. Does the speaker support multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval?</td>
<td>&quot;If the administration decides to go to war with Iraq without a Security Council resolution explicitly calling for such enforcement action, what do you think the impact of that decision will be on the international coalition against terrorism? Isn’t it going to get harder for some of the key governments who will be seen as cooperating with us in the Iraq situation to be able to cooperate with us as well with regard to the effort against terrorism? I find it hard to believe, based on what I’ve heard in many conversations with diplomats from these [Arab] countries, that there isn’t a danger and a price to be paid, in terms of their ability to help us in the war against terrorism, if we go forward with this Iraq action unilaterally.” Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 6, 2003. Transcript #374.</td>
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<td>26. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “second resolution”?</td>
<td>“And the other point to make is that it is clear from statements that have been made by other permanent members of the Security Council, particularly France, that there was no United Nations resolution that contained an ultimatum piece -- a clear threat of military action if Saddam did not disclose and destroy his weapons of mass destruction; that not the United States, but some of the other members of the U.N. Security Council closed the door to a second resolution at the Security Council. It’s regrettable. I mean, it is a shame that there is not more international support for this effort, which we are about to lead at considerable expense to ourselves and putting more than 200,000 Americans into harm’s way, not—in a cause that is not only critical to our own security but critical to the world’s security.” Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), speaking in the Senate Radio/TV Gallery at the Capitol, March 17, 2003. Transcript #43.</td>
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<td>27. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “fight to the enemy”?</td>
<td>“The attacks of 11th September have impressed on, I think all of us, the importance of taking the fight to the enemy and maintaining the initiative.” General Tommy Franks, Command-in-Chief of Central Command [title change to CENTCOM Commander], testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2002. Transcript #1556.</td>
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<td>28. Number of times speaker uses the exact phrase &quot;regime change&quot; (an ordinal level variable)</td>
<td>“Do you view a regime change as an act of self-defense—a regime change in Iraq as an act of self-defense by this country?” Representative Lindsay Graham (R-SC), speaking in a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. Transcript #1063. [In this hearing, Representative Graham used the exact phrase “regime change” 5 times.]</td>
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<td>29. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the 9/11 terrorist attacks?</td>
<td>“Today I do want to discuss the task of preventing attacks of even greater magnitude than what was experienced on September 11th—attacks that could conceivably kill not just thousands of Americans but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.” Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. Transcript #1063.</td>
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<td>30. Does the speaker explicitly mention Osama bin Laden?</td>
<td>“The only other point on your historical comments about Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are absolutely correct. After 9/11, a lot of things changed, including the need to be somewhere. There were some marriages of convenience that I think that over time we’ll be able to show. And we’ve gotten a lot smarter about Osama bin Laden.” Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 30, 2003. Transcript #428.</td>
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<td>31. Does the speaker make an explicit assignment of blame to Osama bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks?</td>
<td>“You know, on—you cited, you make reference to the terrorist attacks and that September 11th changed the world, and of course—at least we believe it changed the world; over in Europe, I think it only—I think they changed America—but you know, the fact of the matter is that what I see is, who did we go after, after September 11th? We didn’t go after Iraq, we went after al Qaeda and bin Laden. And so we identified what was the threat to the United States, and a year later we were pursuing that element of terrorism against our country.” Representative Robert Menendez (D-NJ), speaking in a hearing of the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002. Transcript #1056.</td>
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<td>32. Does the speaker refer to any party other than bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for actual or potential involvement in planning or carrying out the 9/11 attacks?</td>
<td>“Been a lot of reports, Mr. Secretary [of State Colin Powell], saying that there are links between the September 11 terrorist attacks and the recent anthrax attacks and Saddam Hussein. Is that just a manufactured report, or is there accuracy to it?” Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 25, 2001. Transcript #1750.</td>
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