

NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN SECURITY IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION:

LESSONS FROM FRANCE AND SPAIN

By:

Danielle M. Samek

BA, Bradley University, 2008

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of
Master's of Public and International Affairs

University of Pittsburgh

2010

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Graduate School of Public & International Affairs

This thesis was presented

by

Danielle M. Samek

It was defended on

April 9, 2010

and approved by

Dr. Mihriban Finkel, Thesis Committee Chair, Assistant Professor, GSPIA

Dr. Lisa Nelson, Assistant Professor, GSPIA

Dr. Martin Staniland, Professor, GSPIA

Dr. B. Guy Peters, Professor, Political Science

NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN SECURITY
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: LESSONS FROM FRANCE AND SPAIN

Danielle Samek, MPIA

University of Pittsburgh, 2010

Abstract

Immigration in the European Union is an issue increasingly discussed by EU member states and researcher across the world. Although immigrants come to Europe from many countries across the world, flows from North Africa constitute a substantial percentage of total immigration, in particular to France and Spain. While many studies focus on the impact of this immigration on EU member states, this paper discusses the issues faced by immigrants and how they are impacted by host state policymaking. Drawing from case studies on France and Spain, the paper provides an assessment of how human security and immigration are interrelated. It then analyzes immigration policies in France and Spain, laying the groundwork for an overview of the situation in Europe.

Policies in both France and Spain have an impact on human security of immigrants, especially those related to immigration control and integration. At the EU level, limited integration on immigration policies has limited the ability of the organization to do more than suggest that member states coordinate their efforts. EU policies have also not had much effect on human security of immigrants until recently. Changes following the 2008-2009 economic crisis have the potential to pave the way for increased integration, though the future of a human security doctrine in the EU remains uncertain.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Background.....	5
Definition of the problem.....	6
Definition of concepts: review of the literature	7
Case studies.....	11
<i>France</i>	11
Immigration Profile.....	11
Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion.....	17
Immigration policies	23
Assessment of human security	32
<i>Spain</i>	34
Immigration Profile.....	34
Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion.....	41
Immigration policies	45
Assessment of human security	54
The role of the European Union.....	55
Policy Analysis: effectiveness of French, Spanish, and EU policies	59
Conclusions.....	66
<i>French vs. Spanish immigration policy</i>	66
<i>Prospects for cooperation at the EU level</i>	67
<i>Future of immigration policy and human security in Europe</i>	68
Appendix.....	73
Bibliography	79

Background

Migration has been a frequently occurring phenomenon in European history. From wandering Roma to asylum-seekers fleeing war-torn countries across the globe, many populations are on the move. Although public opinion¹ tends to be negative toward immigrants, there is a clear demand for foreign, and especially unskilled, labor. Low birth rates combined with aging populations leave gaps in the European labor market, which must be filled to keep up economic growth. Simultaneously, immigrants are attracted to these European jobs and come to earn higher wages to better support themselves and their families. Although the expansion of the European Union has led to cross-continental flows of people who compete with immigrants for employment, as newer member states catch up with the veterans, it is likely that they too will need outside sources of labor.

One of the most contentious immigration issues in Europe today is the influx of Muslim immigrants, the majority of them from North African countries. Immigration from the Maghreb to the EU has been principally concentrated in France and Spain. This group has struggled with assimilation into European societies and is subject to significant discrimination and social stigma, or more broadly, threats² to human security (Janoski, Alford, Hicks, & Schwartz, 2005, p. 640). Both France and Spain have had different historical experiences with immigration, and hence they serve as useful comparative case studies of how Muslim immigration is impacting Europe, highlighting the human security risks faced by immigrants, and relative policy implications. As the EU has been considering implementing a human security paradigm at the regional level, it is worth investigating whether coordination of immigration policies would be

¹ Recessions or depressions worsen public opinion because of increased unemployment rates (Janoski, et. al., 2005, p. 632).

² Generally, human security risks or threats refer to negative effects on the human security of immigrants.

compatible with such an approach. Both France and Spain have struggled to cope with human security aspects of immigration, but there seems to be potential for increased cooperation through the EU.

Definition of the problem

Within the EU, several member states are struggling to develop immigration policies that both allow them to fulfill the needs of their labor markets and also avoid offending the general population. It is a difficult balance and some states have been more successful than others. Immigration also brings up human security concerns; immigrant groups tend to be susceptible to various risks such as discrimination (which may result in violence), lack of education, inadequate housing, and poverty. European states and the EU as a whole have a vested interest in ensuring the security of all people living in Europe. If the immigrant laborers fear for their physical safety or are living in urban slums then they are less likely to be efficient at work. The vulnerability of immigrants may also depend on the region they are immigrating from. A Sub-Saharan African, for example, who just barely survived the crossing to Spain by boat, is likely to be worse off than a Turk who studies in Europe and becomes an immigrant by overstaying his or her visa.

The focus of this paper is to examine the relationship between immigration and human security. The European Union was chosen as a microcosm for the situation worldwide because it simultaneously shows interest in human security as a concept and has many countries with self-identified immigration issues. Although immigration policies can be coordinated at the EU level³, member states still maintain the authority to formulate them. For this reason, two case studies (France and Spain) were chosen from within the EU to allow for comparison and in-

³ The EU has more influence over asylum and refugee issues than immigration (European Union Policy towards a Common European Asylum System). Coordination is the stated goal at the EU level, though this seems to occur only on a limited basis.

depth analysis of how immigration and human security are interrelated. To facilitate comparison, a specific immigrant population was also selected (North Africans⁴, who emigrate in large numbers to both France and Spain). This thesis will, therefore, attempt to answer the following questions:

- 1) What do the cases of North African immigration to France and Spain reveal about human security concerns in the EU and what implications does this have for policymaking?
- 2) Could French and Spanish immigration policies be better coordinated through the European Union in order to address these threats to the human security of immigrants?

Definition of concepts: review of the literature

There are several concepts that need to be defined, drawing from immigration literature, to maintain consistency throughout this paper. To begin, the UN defines immigrants as “persons outside of their country of birth or citizenship for at least 12 months, for any reason and in any legal status” (Martin, Martin, & Weil, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, an individual will be considered an immigrant from the time they leave their country of origin if they intend to stay in Europe for a prolonged period of time. The purpose of this is to include human security risks faced by some immigrants on the trip to the European continent. For the case of Spain this distinction is particularly important because of the dangerous means by which entry is obtained. All references to immigrants in this paper refer specifically to North African immigrants unless otherwise noted.

⁴ Based on HDI indicators, North Africans represent fairly “average” immigrants; as World Bank development statistics indicate, the situation they faced in their own countries was not as bad as in Sub-Saharan Africa, but more challenging than in East Asian or other Middle Eastern states like Turkey (World Bank, 2009).

As explained in the 2005 Human Security Report, a study put forth by the Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, “human security is a relatively new concept, now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations” (p. viii). Use of the concept shifts traditional conceptions of security from the nation state to the individual. Human security has generally been defined in two ways. The narrow definition, freedom from fear, was promoted by the Japanese government and is most often cited to protect individuals from violent conflict, in particular from violence that comes from within their own state (Remacle, 2008). In this regard, genocide, civil war, discrimination and segregation (the extreme example being apartheid in South Africa) are human security risks. The broad definition of human security is far more inclusive and combines freedom from fear and freedom from want. This definition has been utilized by the Canadian government and many scholars to add development concerns to the list of human security risks, such as poverty, environmental degradation, hunger, and disease (*Ibid.*).

In this paper, the broad definition of human security will be employed to capture all aspects of insecurity faced by immigrants. The specific human security risks expected to be found in France and Spain includes the following: discrimination, xenophobia, possible violence toward immigrants, unemployment, and low quality of housing. Immigrants facing a combination of these risks will be less secure than groups that are free from these problems, specifically the citizens of the host state. It should be noted that for some immigrants, life in Europe is substantially more secure than in their countries of origin. For migrants moving from one EU member state to another, the difference is less drastic. Nonetheless, using a human security lens to address immigration in the EU turns the attention from how states are affected to

the day to day struggles of immigrants. This perspective is rarely addressed in human security or immigration literature. From research, it seems that three books⁵ have been published in recent years that link human security and immigration, which is vastly less than the wealth of literature discussing immigration from a national security perspective.

Also essential to this project is an understanding of the terms ‘policy’, ‘policymaking’, and ‘policy analysis’. In this paper, the definition of ‘policy’ will be a government plan to address one or more immigration-related issues. By leaving the definition fairly broad, policies that affect immigrants, even if they are not being singled out, can be included. Examples of immigration-related issues include: terms of legal entry, integration⁶ and assimilation, access to public services, protection from discrimination, reuniting of families, and extradition. Logically, policymaking is the process by which the government (or EU institutions) creates policies. Because policymaking can vary according to government structure and is affected by variables like public opinion, there will be discussion of this process in the case studies. The paper will also treat bilateral agreements with immigrant-sending states and the creation of organizations or government bodies as part of the policymaking process because these actions also intend to achieve some political agenda. Dunn (2008) defines policy analysis as a “process of multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, critically assess, and communicate information that is useful in understanding and improving policies” (p. 1). In order to understand immigration policy and to make recommendations about where it is best addressed, it is important to look at what types of policies are being enacted in member states (drawing from the French and Spanish

⁵ These works are “Migration, regional integration, and human security,” edited by Kleinschmidt, “Migration, globalization, and human security,” edited by Graham and Poku, and “Human trafficking, human security, and the Balkans,” edited by Friman and Reich.

⁶ Social integration policies are those that lead to improvements in human security of immigrants, though it is important to also consider other policies that could make immigrants less secure, such as issuing work permits that will force immigrants to seek employment through illicit channels.

cases) as well as at the EU level. From there, it must be determined how effective these policies are in achieving their desired outcome. Particular attention will be paid to those that address human security of immigrants⁷. As a result of analyzing immigration policies in the EU, Spain, and France, it should be possible to draw conclusions about where to best address human security concerns of immigrants.

Finally, there is some relevant theory that should be addressed as a foundation for the case studies. Theory-building to explain the political effects of immigration has been limited until recently. According to Janoski, Alford, Hicks, et. al. (2005), there are four types of theory that can be used to describe immigration in host states: “(1) power resources or power constellation theories, (2) state-centric and institutional theories, (3) cost-benefit or economic theories, and (4) cultural and racial/racialization theories” (p. 631). Of these, the most powerful and relevant for consideration as we move into a discussion of France and Spain are the theories of power resources, cost-benefit theories, and cultural/racial theories. Power resources theory explains that politics reacts to immigration by balancing “political party power, ethnic organization, and...business and trade union power” (*Ibid.*, p, 631). This is clearly the case in most European states where the interests of various actors and the cleavages created by immigration must be juggled. Cost-benefit theories are also relevant because the Spanish economy in particular relies on foreign labor to maintain its agricultural sector. Therefore, actions to restrict immigration must involve balancing the need for labor. Because Europe is predominantly composed of a single ethnic group, racial theories may explain some of the reaction of the public against immigrants of another racial group. Cultural theories explain why European citizens and immigrants have a hard time associating within a single society. Janoski,

⁷ The effectiveness of all major policies enacted by the French and Spanish governments will be considered because many of them may have direct or indirect implications for the human security of immigrants. It will be noted which do in the chart included in Appendix B.

et. al. discuss the role of negative public opinion through the “Freeman and Money’ Theory of nonsalience and interest-group domination of immigration policies” (2002, p. 639).

Case studies

France

Immigration Profile

France is the oldest and second largest⁸ immigrant recipient country in Europe, as it began inviting foreigners in during the 1800s (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 154; Oommen, 2002, p. 87). Since the end of its colonial period, marked by the conclusion of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962, it has received significant numbers of immigrant from North Africa and West Africa. Almost immediately, French society began to see the effects of this immigration. In 1974, rent strikes were held by a group of immigrants against SONACOTRA⁹ as they were frustrated by French policies established to deal with them and, in particular, with their living conditions (Ireland, 1994, p. 55). The use of strikes would continue to be a popular way for immigrants to voice their frustrations, although they tend to be problematic for France’s economy. During the “hot summer” of 1981 in Lyons, North African immigrants looted, stole cars, and carried out other stunts to scare the public and otherwise disturb the peace (*Ibid.*, p. 78). In 1989, three Muslim girls were forbidden to attend school because they insisted on wearing the Islamic headscarf, or *hijab*. This ordeal became the first in a series of incidents called the *affaire du foulard* in French (*Ibid.*, p. 90). Widespread urban riots broke out in March 2005 on the outskirts of most major cities across France, which represented a “major upheaval for French society” (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 2). These immigrants took to the streets and burned cars

⁸ Basic demographic data about France is available in Appendix 1.

⁹ SONACONTRA is an agency that builds and manages public housing for immigrants.

among other things in protest of housing situations in the *banlieues*. In the 1980s the groups SOS Racisme and France Plus participated in the *Marche pour l-Egalité et contre le Racisme*, the March for Equality and against Racism (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 89). Throughout this whole historical period, the various associations created by immigrants from the Maghreb have contributed to cases that have disrupted French society.

Today, France has a significant Muslim minority population with many immigrants from former French colonies in North Africa. The BBC estimated that in 2004 there were between five and six million Muslims living in France, which comprised approximately 8% of the total population (Muslims in Europe, 2005). France currently has the largest Muslim minority in Europe in terms of percentage of total population (*Ibid.*). In 2006, Laurence & Vaisse estimated that France had five million persons of Muslim origin, out of a total of 61 million people living there (p. 1). Over time, the number of immigrants from North Africa has consistently grown, as has the percentage of immigrants making up the total population of France. While the numbers vary greatly depending on the definitions of terms such as “immigrant” and whether or not estimates of illegal immigrants are included, the consensus seems to be that the rapid growth of the 70s and 80s has slowed some. While the persistent influx of North African immigrants may be viewed as purely negative in nature, the reality is that immigration does play an important demographic role in France as in several other European states like the UK and Germany. In the years to come, low birth rates amongst those of European descent will cause population growth to stagnate or become negative. France will continue to require some immigration for its economy, but to a lesser extent than other European states because of its comparatively higher birth rate (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006 p. 26). Because immigrants tend to have higher birth rates, they help the population of Europe grow, thereby facilitating economic growth as well.

Along with immigrants from North Africa, France also hosts Sub-Saharan Africans, Turks, and Eastern Europeans. According to the Institut national d'études démographiques, in 2007 there were 7,877 new immigrants from Eastern Europe compared to 83,606 from Africa (By year, nationality, and continent, 2009). The Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques gives more specific data by country. In 2003, there were 28,554 new immigrants from Algeria, 22,339 from Morocco, and 9,425 from Tunisia, bringing the North African total to 60,318 (Flux d'immigration permanente par motif). There were also 8,613 entrants from Turkey and 26,923 immigrants from non-Maghrebi Africa (*Ibid.*). While North Africans remain the most substantial immigrant group in France, the numbers from other regions are noteworthy.

There are some additional social effects of North African immigration that deserve additional attention as they contribute to not only the human security of immigrant but also the way in which French society functions. The influx of North Africans has diversified the French population, which is something the French are not necessarily in favor of. As suggested by Messina & Lahav (2006), the French have a very specific and well-defined concept of what their own nationality is as a result of “their monarchical gestation, Revolutionary birth, and Republican apotheosis” (p. 413). The French seem to believe, as indicated by public opinion and protests, that their very identity is being threatened by immigration. The fact that so many immigrants are Muslim has been one of the most difficult issues, as it tends to contradict the French notion of secularism, or *laïcité*¹⁰. Due to the fundamental differences in religion, culture, and other characteristics, migrants from the Maghreb have more difficulty assimilating¹¹ into French society than other immigrant groups, such as Eastern Europeans. As a result of

¹⁰ Benhabib (2004) has defined *laïcité* as “neutrality of the state toward all kinds of religious practices, institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from official public spheres” (p. 186).

¹¹ Assimilation is defined as the “process by which a social or ethnic minority adopts the dominant values and the traditional behavior of the society into which it is inserted” (Stovall & Van Den Abbee, 2003, p. 220).

immigration, Islam has now become the second most prominent religion in France, which means it will only continue to be a factor in the future (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 13). The conflict between Islam and the secular French state has fueled two conflicts that are fundamental to a discussion of immigration in France: the problems of the *banlieues* and *l'affaire du foulard*.

In France the principle of equity is fundamental and citizenship is interpreted in a strict and universal manner. This explains why it is so important to the French to have immigrants integrated into their society, as difficult as it may be (Oomen, 2002, p. 4). At the same time, France expects immigrants to take the initiative to assimilate and provides them with relatively little assistance (*Ibid.*, p, 159). It is assumed that they wish to become citizens and do to that they have to be able to prove that they have made the necessary effort to learn French and have become part of French society. Upon arriving in France, many Muslim immigrants head straight to large cities like Paris or Marseille where they seek the familiar in *banlieues* such as Clichy-sous-Bois (*Ibid.*, p. 160). Although this makes their transition easier at first, it impedes the assimilation¹² process over the long-term, in effect reinforcing the negative perception of immigrants held by French citizens. Though steps have been taken to make these neighborhoods less like ghettos (through urban renewal policies), that stigma remains. The *banlieues* are often overcrowded and plagued by a “mix of everyday violence, gang-type social systems, an indigenous code of conduct and honor, the assertion of ‘masculine’ identity, and an emphasis on territoriality” (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 36).

In March 2005, widespread riots broke out in these neighborhoods across France. The violence was fueled by legitimate concerns over the ability of French citizens born to immigrant

¹² Stovall & Van Den Abbeele (2003) explain that assimilation or integration implies the intervention of public institutions in order to help make individuals part of the “imagined community” (p. 221).

parents to have access to the job market, government pressure placed on immigrants to integrate, and poor quality of housing available in the *banlieues* (*Ibid.*, p. 2). As evidenced by Money (1999), immigrant populations tend to have bigger families and more people live together in tight quarters, which often causes the condition of the buildings they live in to deteriorate more quickly (p. 123). Public services, such as transportation, medical care, and the education system, are also affected by immigration. If these services are not properly expanded to meet the increased needs of a population that is teeming with new crowds of immigrants, it logically follows that they would be overworked, overburdening, and overcrowded. Of course, in urban areas such as the *banlieues*, these effects are even more apparent, especially since they are usually the most neglected by the government. In an article in *Le Figaro*, Rioufol (2007) wrote that “immigration ceases to be an opportunity for France when it leads it to school dropouts, the exclusion of the poor, ethnic violence, Islamic communitarianism, and the fracture of French identity.¹³” (p. 1). The violence of 2005 has become the hallmark low-point in the French battle to “control” immigration.

Related to the issue of the *banlieues* is the case of the *affaire du foulard*. In response to perceived threats against the concept of *laïcité* in France the government banned religious symbols from being worn in public schools (law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004). Although the ban stands for all religious symbols such as crosses or yarmulkes, the most divisive prohibited symbol is the *hijab* (*foulard*). Not allowing Muslim women and girls to wear the *hijab* in schools runs contrary to their cultural and religious practices. According to the BBC, the Quran does not require that Muslim women wear a veil (Religion and ethics, 2009). Rather, it instructs them to dress modestly especially in the presence of strangers. It was believed that efforts like

¹³ Translation is the author’s own work.

the ban on headscarves would reduce discrimination, but some Muslims perceive it as an attack on their faith. Some Muslim women have resorted to wearing the veil as a political statement in response to the ban. Recently, the French government also began working on a policy to prohibit wearing of the *voile integrale*, or the *niqab*¹⁴, from public places, such as in hospitals or on public transportation vehicles like buses (France moves toward partial burqa ban, 2010). The ban affects fewer than two thousand young women in France today, but is yet another reminder of the struggle between Muslim immigrants and *laïcité*. Many of those choosing full covering are second or third generation immigrants or new converts to Islam (War of French dressing). The rector of the Paris Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, believes that the appearance of the *niqab* in France can be attributed to the influence of salafism, a radical branch of Islam (*Ibid.*).

Immigration in France also has a fundamental economic component. Immigration is often spurred on by the demand the economy has for labor, and when this demand cannot be fulfilled by native workers, the need for immigration increases significantly (Cornelius et al., 1994). Without enough people to fill the required jobs, the French economy would not be able to sustain steady growth. This predicament is a common characteristic of many of the economies in Europe, which is a result of being highly developed and having a native population that is reluctant to perform certain jobs. Immigrants are often more than willing to accept undesirable employment, as finding any job at all is highly beneficial for them.

France's economy shows obvious signs of being affected by immigration in several facets. Messina and Lahav (2006) claim that France has received sizeable economic gains from immigrant labor (p. 152). First of all, the French economy has become dependent, to a certain

¹⁴ Although the French refer to this garment as the *burqa*, the ban actually relates to the full covering worn in the Gulf region which has a slit for the eyes, called the *niqab*. *Burqas* like those worn in Afghanistan are not worn by Muslim women in France (War of French dressing, 2010).

extent, on immigrant labor from the Maghreb. From a human security point of view, workers do face risks when they immigrate to find employment. The sectors of the economy that most immigrants work in are often temporary jobs, such as construction (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 76). These sectors are highly susceptible to any fluctuations in the economy, which can serve as a warning sign for a state when things begin to become uncontrollable. Since these jobs are less secure, when a recession occurs immigrants are often among the many that lose their jobs, which we have seen with the recent economic crisis as in the past. Between 1980 and 1982, the unemployment rate for foreigners rose substantially: from 9% to 19% for foreigners in general, with Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians having rates of 28%, 29%, and 34% respectively (*Ibid.*). When immigrant groups go on strike in protest of living or working conditions, this can cause problems for the productivity of the industries that employ significant numbers of migrant workers. In the past these strikes were frequent and sometimes long-lasting, which amplified the effects they had on France's economy. Overall, France's economy has benefitted from the source of labor that immigrants provide, but there are some clear signs that immigration can be problematic at times, such as during strikes.

Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion

The policymaking process in France is as complicated as in most other states. In order to understand how and why France has developed certain immigration policies, it is prudent to first analyze the variables that impact their formation. By considering the political structure, internal political cleavages, and public opinion in France, the differences between France and Spain can also be accounted for as their policies are compared.

Like most other European states, the long-established French political system, which in many aspects dates back to the French Revolution, has undergone relatively frequent changes in

existing political parties since the 1960s. Nonetheless, French political parties can still be categorized into right, center, and left wings. It is true that the lines between these divisions are somewhat blurrier than they have been historically (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 167). The three largest parties in France are the Socialist Party (PS), Union for the Republic (RPR), and Union for French Democracy (UDF). All three of these parties have undergone name changes, the loss of splinter factions, and/or mergers with other similar parties (Baldersheim & Daloz, 2003, p. 70). No single party has dominated the French political scene, but there have been periods when blocks of parties or coalitions have retained control for significant periods of time.

The reason for the transformation of parties seems to lie at least partially in the social changes the country has experienced in recent decades. The French party system underwent a series of splits as recently as the 1990s. For example, the splinter party MDC (Mouvement des Citoyens) emerged from the umbrella of the PS (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 20). Since the 1960s, the French have become less religious and more highly educated. Catholicism still keeps some voters on the 'right' side of the fence simply on principle, but the strengthening of secularism, *laïcité*, appears to be affecting political ideologies and therefore affiliations (*Ibid.*, p. 171). While religion and social class cleavages persist, Franklin, Mackie, & Valen have ruled out generation as an explanatory factor in the changes in vote choice (1992, p. 173). Additional cleavages in France include: Eurosceptics versus Europeanists and self-employed versus employees (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 45). Despite these cleavages, there is still some unexplained variability in political parties.

Beyond the social changes that occurred in France beginning in the 1970s, there is still some party structure mutability left unexplained. Why exactly did the stability of the French

system change in the 1960s? Without delving too deeply into French history, it is likely that increased involvement in the European Union or reaching a certain level of economic development encouraged it. It seems probable that French citizens are voting more on the basis of issues and that as issues evolve so do political parties. In 2002, the centripetal French political system withstood a difficult shock. In the presidential elections of that year there were 16 candidates, the most ever, and voting patterns were particularly unpredictable. Left wing parties failed to form a strong enough coalition and did not gather enough support to move beyond the first ballot. In their place up against the right was none other than the right wing extremist party Front National, whose charismatic leader had charmed the disillusioned youth, the unemployed, blue collar workers, and corporate executives (Baldersheim & Daloz, 2003, p. 77). Those who voted for Le Pen mostly did so out of protest because they felt that they couldn't identify with either the left or the right at the time. Social cleavages, with a few exceptions mostly related to immigration and unemployment, played less of a role in that election.

Overall, the French seem to identify mostly strongly with the French state rather than some other entity. When asked, most people will say they are French, followed by European or a member of a department. Interestingly, the fact that EU citizenship has become as or more important than local identities (and in some countries even national identities) is causing some to reconsider power politics. The balance of power between the EU and its member states increasingly plays a role in discussions of issues formerly only addressed at the national level. Oomen (2002) states boldly that "Europe is both the cradle and the graveyard of the nation-state", suggesting that the EU may be altering traditional conceptions of power or identity (p. 26). These variables may explain some of the political changes in France.

The response to the perceived threats of immigration has come in the form of the development of the racist right wing party *Front National* in France. There are some indications that immigration of particularly non-white Muslims is indeed causing social cleavages within Europe; the problem of the French banlieues is the most iconic example; non-white and predominantly Muslim “ghettos” on the outskirts of Paris have been the setting for violent protests on the part of immigrants against the French government and policies they believe to be discriminatory and repressive. Immigration in Europe may be contributing to the formation of two new types of social cleavages. First, there is sufficient evidence that there is a cleavage between immigrants and non-immigrants. As will be examined below, this is very apparent when considered in the case of the *affaire du foulard*, or the headscarf affair, in France. Lack of sufficient integration into society sets immigrants apart, regardless of their citizenship status. Second, there may also be a cleavage between immigration proponents and immigration opponents. This cleavage is less clear and may become develop in time as the need for immigrant labor becomes evident to the general public. For now it is best considered in terms of those who are radically opposed to immigration (supporters of right-wing extremist parties) and those who are either marginally opposed, neutral, or in favor.

Immigration in France is most certainly contributing to changes in social cleavages, as is clearly affirmed in Baldersheim & Daloz (2003, p. 5). They explain that these changing cleavages in turn explain the shifting party patterns in France as well in other European states (*Ibid.*, p. 14). The immigration-induced cleavages in France are consistent with those described in the previous section: immigrants versus non-immigrants and immigrant opponents versus the rest of society. The *affaire du foulard*, assimilation problems, and the violence in the banlieues in 2005 all indicate that a serious rift is forming between immigrants and non-immigrant,

regardless of the citizenship status of the former group. To overcome this cleavage would require the French government to be more proactive in targeting the welfare of immigrants with social programs and in educating citizens about the true causes of problems like unemployment. The biggest challenge to this is, of course, political opinion. This brings us back to theories about immigration in recipient states. As per power resources theory, France must delicately balance all sides in order to maintain some semblance of stability. Negative public opinion could be overcome if France were to allow for formation of more interest groups, yet this runs contrary to the principles that established the 5th Republic. France generally dissuades interest group formation by giving them little to no funding and “keep[ing] them at arm’s length” to limit their influence (Janoski, Alford, Hicks, & Schwartz, 2005, p. 648). Without support, few such groups have cropped up on their own, including the Federation of Association of Solidarity with Immigrant Workers (*Ibid.*, p. 633).

There is also a cleavage between opponents of immigration and those who are less vocal about the issue or are apathetic. The existence of the Front National indicates that a certain portion of the population holds radical views about immigration, thus contributing to a cleavage. Since its formation in the 1970s, FN has run with slogans like “Give France back to the French” and “Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people without work” (Oommen, 2002, p. 89). Although Jean Marie Le Pen argues that the FN is not xenophobic or racist some citizens that vote for the party do have these attitudes (*Ibid.*, p. 123). FN has perpetuated the “us” versus “them” fallacy. Racial and cultural theories contradict Le Pen’s claims: public opinion makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and/or they have no desire to integrate into a society that treats them with hostility. Overall, the French case exemplifies the theories and descriptions of cleavages caused by immigration presented in the

literature. Cleavages in French society began a natural process of evolution before recent waves of immigration had any impact. For this reason it is possible that they were susceptible to interference by politically contentious issues. France reacts to immigration by balancing the interests of powerful groups and parties within the state. Racial and cultural theories help explain public opinion and assimilation problems which complicate the balancing act the government must perform. Overall, immigration in Europe has caused social cleavages to change in France, impacting the French political system. The radical Front National has drawn in disillusioned voters from the left and right. New cleavages have cropped up between immigrants and non-immigrants as well as between immigration opponents and the rest of society.

French opinion of immigration from the Maghreb has remained fairly consistent. Even after its colonial period ended, the French attitude toward North Africans remained the same: they were viewed as inferior and drastically different from the native population. This “colonial syndrome” led to the permanent association of immigrants with the “violent, repressive, and undemocratic” Muslim (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 215). The reaction of the French in response to immigration from the Maghreb has always been marked by racism, xenophobia, and discrimination. The French fear that their culture will be gradually diluted or eventually overshadowed by that of the incoming group (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003 p. 199). In the 1980's, a SOFRES MRAP poll found that 49% of French citizens questioned felt that North Africans were too different and would not be able to integrate into French society (Feldblum, 1999). The same poll also showed that those interviewed believed the number of immigrants to be too high. By the early 1990's, nearly one third of French voters were sympathetic to the anti-

immigrant cause of the *Front National*¹⁵ political party (Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994, p. 165). In many other countries in Europe, and in the United States, public opinion is increasingly against immigration, which seems to be linked to the sheer numbers of immigrants. Nicholas Sarkozy became the French President in 2006, and part of his platform called for tighter border controls (Matlack, 2007). Nonetheless, public opinion seems to have improved somewhat in the last few years. A poll in 2006 by Harris Interactive found that the French had the best public opinion of immigration among the major EU powers, with 47% of people claiming there were too many immigrants in France (French take the most supportive stance..., 2006). Fewer problems with discrimination and racism are being reported by the immigrants themselves, yet it is important not to underestimate the “extent of public dissatisfaction with and also xenophobic resentment toward France’s Muslim population” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 198).

Immigration policies

The French government has responded to North African immigration in a variety of ways. In response to the demographic effects of immigration from the Maghreb, the French government enacted policy that aimed at controlling or limiting the numbers of immigrants, regardless of legality, that entered the state. In response to the effects caused by Islam, there are several policies that can be described as being religious in nature. There are several general social policies that deal with the remaining social effects of North African immigration in France. Finally, France has enacted some policies to address the economic needs of the country as they are related to foreign labor. Messina & Lahav (2006) summarized French policy well by stating that it has not “shied away from confrontation with the very regimes that the government is

¹⁵ An extremist right wing party that was established by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972. In 2002, the party managed to gather enough votes to make it the second round of the presidential election, which reflected a disturbing extremist undercurrent in French politics (France: key facts and figures).

suspected of coddling” (p. 265). This is very true for many of the policies France has utilized in an attempt to control the social effects of North African immigration as the government wishes to exert some control over the effects of immigration while recognizing that there is some need for it to continue.

Policies of immigration control have evolved since immigration became an influential factor in French society. Policy went from being liberal and encouraging immigration in the late 1950's to being protectionist and restricting immigration in the 1970's (Ulman & Eichengreen, 1993, p. 225). When the influx first started, the government was very open to the idea and even encouraged immigrants to come to France because there was a clear economic need. In the late 1960's, agreements were made with Morocco and Tunisia that granted immigrants work contracts before they ever left home, but Algerian immigration was already beginning to be restricted due to conflicts over the end of the French colonial period there (Money, 1999, p. 111). Illegal immigration was allowed, or at least not openly discouraged, until it became clear that there were consequences to accepting immigrants into French society (Vogel & Moran, 1991, p. 114). At first, policy revolved around naturalizing foreigners and granting amnesty to those who had entered illegally. According to Ireland (1994), “France, in effect, *created* an ethnic minorities problem with far-reaching effects” by establishing this trend in the early years (p. 31). Immigrants began to expect that if they managed to stay within France long enough, they would be accepted and naturalized, and thus receive permission to stay permanently.

In 1972, the French government finally made drastic policy changes as public opinion was very anti-immigrant in light of the effects French citizens had begun to face (Money, 1999, p. 106). The government decided to close France off from further immigration, a task that would prove to be impossible. In order to stop inflows, policies that tightened border controls were put

in place, as well as other internal controls, such as “arbitrary identification checks and expulsion of undocumented immigrants” (Money, 1999, p. 154). In 1974, the Giscard Circular, or bill, attempted to reduce the number of immigrants coming in by suspending any new immigration and putting family reunifications on hold, but these measures were found ineffective and too harsh so they repealed in 1975 (Ireland, 1994, p. 48).

Another strategy the French attempted was the so-called *Aide de retour* of 1977, which tried to encourage North and Sub-Saharan Africans to return to their countries of origin, basically through bribery (Ireland, 1994, p. 49). This too was changed and partially nullified later as very few immigrants agreed to leave. In the 1980's, the development of restrictive policies continued as public opinion continued to worsen, and the anti-immigration political party *Front National* was created. The Barre-Bonnet Laws were established to tighten restrictions against illegal migrants and also made deportation easier (*Ibid.*, p. 57). Following the elections in 1981, François Mitterand became the new president and the Barre-Bonnet laws were strengthened and extended. Mitterand, a socialist, promised to “maintain tight controls over new and illegal immigration” (Money, 1999, p. 114). In 1986, the Pasqua law was enacted, which outlined conditions for entry into France, and would be expanded in 1993 to also dictate that family reunification was dependent on legal residence of the immigrant for two years (Money, 1999, p. 114).

Another period of “zero immigration” began in 1993 when the French Nationality Code was revised (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 149). Access to French citizenship became more difficult, which was intended to discourage immigrants from coming with the intention to stay permanently and eventually become French, which contradicts the encouragement of assimilation that had taken place in the early years when naturalization was a common

occurrence. Riots were frequent during the early 1990's, but the government felt that it could not act to appease the immigrants because public opinion would have surely plummeted (Ireland, 1994, p. 93). Instead, they put in place anti-ghetto legislation and provided government housing in acceptable location, which fueled the disruptive behavior of a group of immigrants that simply refused to assimilate to French customs and culture (Ireland, 1994, p. 97). More recently, the strict Pasqua laws are still in place, and policy continues to be protectionist (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 207).

Nicholas Sarkozy, who called the mostly North African rioters of 2005 “scum,” was expected to continue to maintain tight immigration controls (Apter, 2007). His government has been working to adhere to immigration quotas and to prioritize acceptance of immigrants on the basis of how easily they can be integrated into French society (Integration elusive for France's Muslims). Immigrants with professional degrees are also allowed to enter the country more easily than uneducated migrant workers. In 2007, Sarkozy established the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development to fight illegal immigration, encourage development of immigrant-sending states, promote integration of immigrants, and to preserve French culture and heritage (Le Ministère: Missions and role, 2008).

Aside from immigration-controlling policies, there are several others that deal specifically with the effects that Islam has had on France. According to Laurence & Vaisse (2006), “the campaign being led to demand that Muslims distance themselves from Islam presupposes the very thing that it seeks to denounce, namely that religious sentiment necessarily leads to a lack of national identity and ethnic separatism” (xiii). The Islamic presence in France made itself known long before immigration ever became an issue in France. The Mosque of Paris was established in the 1920's, along with the Muslim Hospital and the Muslim Institute.

The institutions were supposed to interpret Islam according to the ideals of the French republic (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 217). Since then, the construction of new mosques must be approved by the government, and they often are only allowed in the *banlieues*, not in the city center (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006). Determining where they can build and when gives the French some control over the visibility of the Muslim religion in its cities. However, mosques are not the most problematic emblem of Islam that the French have encountered.

Ireland (1994) demonstrated that Muslims in France “largely resisted both homeland and French efforts of coordination and control,” which is made clear by *l’affaire du foulard*, or the scarf affair (p. 70). In response to the expulsion of the three scarf-wearing Muslim girls from school in 1989, the government reaffirmed the principle of *laïcité*¹⁶ while still leaving some room for interpretation of what constitutes religious symbols or clothing (Benhabib, 2004, p. 185). In 1994, it was determined that the law was not specific enough as the problem continued. The Bayrou guidelines gave students permission to wear discreet symbols that could be easily hidden, such as a necklace with a cross, but religious attire like the Muslim veil was not acceptable (Benhabib, 2004, p. 190). The Stasi Commission met in 2003 to study the French concept of *laïcité* and determine how much of a threat headscarves were to secularism. The Commission argues that it is important to look at this issue in the context of the historical evolution of *laïcité*; France did not just decide to ban headscarves in schools on a whim. France began the transition to secularism in state and public institutions in 1793 in the midst of the second French Revolution and the Reign of Terror (Kreis, 2000).

In the present day, relatively few Muslim choose to wear the *hijab* in France, which may be the reason that the few who do face greater discrimination and societal pressure. In 2004, the

¹⁶ See footnote # 4 on page 7 for a definition.

French National Assembly voted to ban the wearing of all religious symbols in elementary and secondary schools (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 163). The goal of law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 was to take a step toward protecting the public sphere, beginning with schools where young Muslim children could be educated in French values away from the influence of their families and religion (Ulusoy, 2007). The idea is that by taking the veil out of the picture, French society will be more tolerant of the Muslim minority, thus facilitating integration and curbing the xenophobic trend¹⁷. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) directly has found the law of 15 March 2004 to be compatible with its stated objectives and has not made any efforts to overturn it. The devastating riots that occurred around Paris in 2005 happened after the ban was put in place, indicating that the ban may have contributed to security threats (outright violence in the streets in the face of integration problems) rather than reducing them. Finally, in 2009 the French government began drafting a policy to ban full-veils of the *niqab*-type in public arenas. It is expected that the ban will be written into law sometime in 2010. Although there may be some sort of backlash from the Muslim community, some Muslims in France agree that wearing the *niqab* is extreme (War on French dressing).

Despite its secular policies, France has shown concern about alienating its Muslim population, and it has made efforts to make up for the inequality experienced by many by establishing a French Council of the Muslim Religion in 2002. This council ensures that Muslims have official representation that can negotiate for them on important issues (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 8). Another way in which the French government compensates is by making sure that the brightest of the immigrant youth are placed into the best universities in the country, which is similar to affirmative action in the United States. Overall, French policy toward the

¹⁷ Increased support for the radical right party *Front National* reflects this trend (Wolfreys, 2010).

effect of Muslim immigration has been repressive most of the time, but also shows signs of tolerance, as long as the religion respects *laïcité*.

The next set of policies concerns a variety of other effects that immigration from the Maghreb has on the French society, specifically, problems relating to integration that have contributed to racism, discrimination, and xenophobia in France. In 1968, the Grenelle Accords were one of the first instances where policy was used in response to a social effect of immigration, and in this case it was the development of ghettos, called *bidonvilles*, that prompted action (Ireland, 1994, p. 41). The accords destroyed these shanty towns and called for the creation of *habitations à loyer modéré*, or low-rent housing (*Ibid.*, p. 42). By the late 1970's, public housing was once again an issue as there were not enough homes available and the conditions in them were often inhospitable. The "Seventh Plan," which lasted from 1975 to 1981, attempted to allow more family reunification while simultaneously reducing illegal immigration (*Ibid.*, p. 48). Then Mitterrand took over the presidency, and the situation improved somewhat. His main goal was to create policies that would help integrate those immigrants already in France into society, and he did so by establishing liberal family reunification policies, strengthening protection against discrimination, eliminating deportation without due process, offering one last chance for regularization of illegal migrants, and creating the Association Law to allow foreign associations to be formed more easily and to make them eligible for public aid (*Ibid.*, p. 61-63).

The Socialist party continued this trend by emphasizing common ground and understanding between French citizens and foreigners and also by highlighting immigrant issues. In a move that targeted North Africans, the French Nationality Code was revised, and made more restrictive, in 1987 under Jacques Chirac (Feldblum, 1999, p. 19). In order to protect French

nationalism, the revised Code included the concept of having a *volonté*¹⁸, or desire, to be French, which implied that immigrants must truly want to become French and be willing to sacrifice at least part of their former identities. In 1990, a High Council for the Integration of Immigrants was created as a response to social unrest. A 5-year plan was also devised to reduce the problems growing in the suburbs, such as financial disparities and segregation of certain immigrant groups (Ireland, 1994, p. 94). Debate over the Nationality Code flared up again in 1993 when further revisions were demanded in light of the apparent threat of Muslim North African immigration that had become more obvious as tensions escalated. This time around, much harsher changes were called for, most of which were directly linked to the issues of naturalization and citizenship of Franco-Algerians and their children (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 154). In 1998, the Guigou bill changed the Nationality Code once again by dictating that a youth who has immigrant parents but was born in France will be eligible for French citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, 18, if they have lived in France for five years prior to their eighteenth birthday (Feldblum, 1999, p. 153). These young adults were also granted the opportunity to forfeit their right to citizenship if they should choose to.

In recent years, a few more policies have been established that can be viewed as beneficial for immigrants. In 2003, Sarkozy partially eliminated the law that stated that non-citizens could face expulsion from the country after serving time in jail for crimes committed in France (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 189). Sarkozy also encouraged the creation of priority education zones in areas that have large immigrant populations in order to justify the appropriation of additional funding to problematic areas (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 184). An

¹⁸ Feldblum (1999) describes *volonté* in this context as referring to “both the individual’s manifestations to participate, and to the imperatives of the collective will which dictates that sameness overrides difference” (p. 74).

anti-discrimination agency, HALDE, was created in 2004 to help provide legal counsel and mediation services to all persons facing such issues, including immigrants (*Ibid.*, p. 61). While social policy in France has varied greatly both in effectiveness and in intended outcome, there certainly has been no shortage of action on the part of the government to respond and attempt to control the far-reaching effects of North African immigration.

When it comes to economic policies of immigration, France has often been less active than with social policy. The first obvious economic policy was the expulsion of a group of North African workers in 1968, in response to a workers strike by immigrants that was particularly problematic (Ireland, 1994, p. 41). By simply forcing the strikers to leave, it was assumed that immigrants would understand the consequences and not risk striking again. Of course, this was a complete failure as strikes continued to be the preferred method of protest among migrant groups since they realized that it would get the government's attention. In the late 1960's and into the 70's, the government began to decentralize its economic base within Paris in an effort to alleviate the growing problems the city faced, such as strain on public services and the immense growth of the *banlieues* brought on by immigration (Money, 1999, p. 125). Paris is still a hub of economic activity today, but other regions of the country benefitted from the decentralization and the immediate concerns of overburdening Paris were pacified to some extent.

The policy process continued when the Marcellin Circular, 1972, attempted to merge the procedures for obtaining work permits and being granted residency (Money, 1999, p. 111). The same year, the Fontanet Circular was enacted which sought to tighten the rules for hiring foreign labor and to regularize the employment of illegal migrants that took place frequently (Ulman and Eichengreen, 1993, p. 234). It also "subordinated recruitment of foreigners to domestic labor market conditions by requiring employers to advertise available positions for a minimum of three

weeks at the National Employment Agency before requesting an immigrant worker” from the National Immigration Office (Money, 1999, p. 111). Employers rejected the policy as it made things too difficult for them, and it was not successful. All immigration of workers into France was stopped from 1974 to 1975, and when the ban was lifted, new laws controlling flows were continually put in place to make rules stricter for incoming immigrants seeking employment (*Ibid.*, p. 112). Work permits became more and more difficult to procure throughout the 1980's, especially for non-Europeans. The Auroux Laws of 1992 gave more labor rights to immigrants, which allowed the habitual labor strikes to become more civilized (less violence in the streets) and easier to resolve (Ireland, 1994, p. 62). The French economy slipped into a recession in 1992-1993, which aggravated immigrant-related issues. However, the government focused on controlling the out-of-control social problems that ensued. Today, certain types of jobs are prohibited for non-EU nationals, or even from all foreigners, such as positions in the private sector, civil service jobs, state enterprises, and freelance professions (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 80).

Assessment of human security

Overall, it seems clear that there are some basic human security concerns in France regarding the North African immigrant population. Although immigrants may be better off than they were in their home countries, full freedom from fear and freedom from want are not being achieved at the same level as they are for French citizens of non-immigrant backgrounds. Beginning with freedom from fear, there are challenges relating to the conflict between Islam and the secularism of the French state. Muslim women and girls in particular are asked to forgo wearing veils in school and the *niqab (voile integrale)* in other public places. Inevitably, some women are likely to be afraid of the religious and familial repercussions of abiding by French regulations. Women living in *banlieues* may be forced to remain within them for shelter and girls may be

homeschooled or sent to Islamic schools instead of being allowed to mix with students of different backgrounds. This will hinder integration of the Muslim female minority and does not achieve the French goal of assimilation of its immigrant population into French culture. Granted, there is only so much the government can do to eliminate fear. The solution may be for the government to provide assistance to families that cannot afford to send their daughters to private Islamic schools, which will allow the government to maintain secularism in the public sphere but will not force women to abandon religious practices.

Similarly, the very existence of the *banlieues* and the social and political problems rooted within them are cause for concern over the protection of human security, both in terms of freedom from fear and freedom from want. Although the violent riots in these neighborhoods have mostly resulted in property damage, there is always the risk that innocent bystanders will be injured or killed when cars are set fire and Molotov cocktails thrown. Many of the perpetrators of these acts of violence were French citizens whose parents had immigrated. Because they do not feel the French government recognizes and is doing enough to help them (in terms of unemployment and supplying adequate social services to the *banlieues*) they choose to express themselves in ways the government cannot ignore. As a result, public opinion amongst non-immigrant French citizens remains quite negative, which in turn makes policymaking in favor of immigrants more difficult. France seems to be stuck in an immigration trap in which policymaking seems to be unable to appease both sides. It may be that without some sort of international cooperation or regulations coming from a higher power (the EU), immigration policy in France will remain virtually paralyzed.

Spain

Immigration Profile

Spain's historical experiences with immigration differ significantly from those of France. It was a country of emigration throughout the early 1970's; Spaniards often immigrated to other countries including France to serve as guest workers. Spain became a country of immigration relatively recently because of three historical events: its authoritarian leader General Franco died 1975, Spain transitioned to democracy, and it was admitted into the EU in 1986. The workers returning to Spain from other European countries helped boost the economy and the demand for labor grew dramatically. Immigrants from nearby North African countries and others in Latin America with which the state had strong historical ties were attracted to this development and began to arrive in droves.

Discussions of immigration in Spain are most often characterized by a numbers game: how many are coming, from where, and what percentage entered illegally? Because the numbers¹⁹ are so often in flux it is hard to pin these figures down, but it is important to consider the estimates to understand how immigration in Spain has evolved. From 1983 to 1993, the number of foreigners in Spain increased 105%, from 210,350 to 430,422 (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 175). Legal immigration continued to increase steadily throughout the 1990s as evidenced by various statistics. Then from 1998 to 2000, there was a drastic increase from 57,000 to 600,000, in part because of economic growth and pro-immigration policies in Spain (Matlack, 2007). This surge made Spain one of the leading immigrant-importing countries in Europe. In 2003, "Spain received more than a third of the immigrants to the 25 EU member states" as a whole, with the African total alone reaching 433,000 (Carling, 2007b, p. 8). As of early 2007, 11% of Spain's

¹⁹ See basic immigration data compared with France in Appendix 1.

total population of 44 million people was foreign-born, compared to 12.9% in the United States (Matlack, 2007). In an interesting historical twist, numbers of immigrants arriving in Spain have recently decreased from 13,000 in 2008 to just more than 7,000 last year due to the economic crisis (Bryant, 2010). It took a severe global economic crisis to slow down rates of new arrivals, but the effects of immigration remain. It is assumed that the numbers will increase again once the Spanish economy recovers, but policymaking may be able to affect how soon this happens and how high the numbers will be.

Moroccans have long constituted the largest non-European immigrant group with 681,829 registered immigrants as of December 2008 (Estadísticas). In 2003, Ecuadorians²⁰ surpassed Moroccans temporarily (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 332; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Recent data shows that they are once again the dominant group: as of 2009 there were 4,715,757 foreigners living in Spain, including 758,174 Moroccans, 728,580 Romanians, 441,455 Ecuadorians, and 288,255 Colombians (Tedesco, 2010, p. 2). The large number of Romanians is due to the 2007 EU enlargement which now allows them to travel freely within Europe.

There are no entirely reliable statistics for the numbers of unauthorized immigrants in Spain, only a multitude of educated guesses based on what little data is available. What is clear, however, is that there are fewer illegal immigrants today than in the past, in part due to legalization policies enacted by the Spanish government. Total numbers increased by an estimated 3.4 times between 1990 and 1998 and 2.0 times between 1998 and 2005 (Estadísticas). Geddes (2000) estimates 200,000 to 300,000 arrived in Southern Europe in 1993 alone (p. 24). In 1996, the *Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración*, or the Permanent Immigration

²⁰ For more information, see: Hall, Anthony. "Globalized livelihoods. International migration and challenges for social policy: the case of Ecuador".

Observatory, estimated that in 1996 Spain had between 50,000 and 65,000 illegal migrants enter the state, but according to King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis (2000), these numbers were on the low side (p. 260). The total number of unauthorized immigrants in Spain prior to the financial crisis was approximately 800,000 (Arango & Martin, 2005). The government legalized approximately 600,000 immigrants since 1986 through four different programs, with a significant proportion of them being of Moroccan origin (*Ibid.*). Because of the Schengen agreements, once immigrants entered Spain (legally or not) they are able to move about Europe as they please. For this reason, Spain has endured political pressure from neighboring countries (France in particular) and the EU to better control its borders.

There are aspects of North African immigration in Spain that should be considered further to develop a full profile of the situation in the country: unauthorized immigration and integration. To begin, we must return to the contentious issue of illegal immigration and move beyond the numbers. Unauthorized immigration is extremely problematic in Southern Europe and occurs in higher volumes than in the North due to closer proximity to the Maghreb. Complex smuggling networks, called the “Moroccan Mafias,” are sometimes arranged by highly organized criminal groups, while others are planned by simple fishermen (Carling, 2007b, p. 223). Regardless of how they work, these networks often manage to bring those who can afford it into Spain. From Spain, these migrants are able to move relatively easily to other parts of Europe, thanks to the Schengen agreements. Other groups reach Spain in *pateras*, which are rickety little boats that capsize easily, therefore making them a dangerous choice only attempted by the most desperate (King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis, 2000, p. 260). There are two routes that those in *pateras* often take: across the Strait of Gibraltar or from Western Morocco to the Canary Islands. Crossing the Strait is more dangerous due to rougher waters, but is much quicker as

reaching the Canary Islands can take from 20 hours to upwards of a few days, depending on the weather (Carling, 2007b, p. 25). Another more difficult, but less dangerous, way to arrive in Spain is by entering the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta. Many try to simply climb the fences that separate the cities from Morocco and die in the process. Others secure forged documents and make it into the cities, where they wait until passage to the mainland can be arranged (*Ibid.*, p. 24). Between 1997 and 2001, approximately 4,000 Moroccans died attempting to reach Spain (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 563).

Integration problems in Spain are not as problematic as in France, though that is not to say they do not exist. Immigrants are less concentrated than in France, which makes integration problems less acute. There is also considerable regional variability in Spain, which has encouraged tolerance of diversity. Spanish policy has never been to make immigrants become Spanish, and citizenship requirements are based primarily on lineage or legal residency in Spain (Información sobre el desarrollo del reglamento..., 2005). To explain the Spanish xenophobia toward Muslims that is seen in Spain, one must look back to the centuries the peninsula spent under control of the Moors (Encarnación, 2004, p. 172). This perceived dark period of Spanish history is something that the state will not let be forgotten. The Spanish also recall the harsh treatment of the Moors as they were expelled from the continent. However, this has not prevented Spaniards from reacting toward immigrants from North Africa with violence on occasion, such as occurred in 2000 in the city of El Ejido (*Ibid.*, p. 172). The 11 March 2004 bombings of the Atocha train station in Madrid were linked to a Moroccan al Qaeda cell, which has also contributed to anti-immigrant sentiments.

Although immigrants are generally able to integrate into Spanish society more easily than in France, they do face some challenges. Immigrants are often unable to afford suitable housing,

and are often isolated in poorer neighborhoods, keeping them isolated from the rest of the population as in the French *banlieues* (King et al., 2000, p. 120). Migrants benefit from the welfare system and social services in Spain and their children are allowed access to public schools. As a result, they are frequently blamed for utilizing resources that belong to Spanish citizens. Crime is another social effect of migration from the Maghreb, and in 1991 it was recorded that 15% of all crimes were committed by foreigners, with a vast majority of those being petty theft (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 367). The social effects of North African immigration in Spain are just beginning to be understood, but it is very clear how the public feels about them.

Most of those who do not stay in Spain use it as a country of transit on their way to places like Italy or France. Their primary motivation is economic: they move in order to better provide for themselves and their families. Despite persistent high unemployment rates in Spain over the last twenty years, migrants have increasingly come for this reason, as is supported by the amount of remittances sent back to Morocco: from Spain alone in 2006 the total was \$691,848,000, a substantial portion of the Moroccan GDP (Moroccan migration to Spain, 2007; Morocco, 2009). In comparison, Spain gave Morocco \$4.3 million in bilateral development assistance in the same year (Humanitarian donor profile, 2009).

The Spanish economy also appears to be significantly impacted by North African immigration as it is dependent on foreign labor. Following its transition from being labor-exporting to being labor-importing, the Spanish economy experienced a boom, and the need for immigration expanded overnight. When many Spaniards repatriated, they no longer wanted to work in the low-paying service and agricultural sectors, which left a void in the labor market that desperately needed to be filled (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 342). Spain's economy gradually

became more open, and began to rely more heavily on certain industries, such as tourism, trade, and shipping (King et al., 2000, p. 9). These sectors of the economy require a more flexible labor force that can work seasonally, jumping from profession to profession as the market demands. Jobs in these sectors are often low-paying, insecure, and can be relatively dangerous. Nonetheless, immigrant workers are more willing to accept these positions. Agricultural work is another popular option for many immigrants as they can move around the agricultural regions in Southern and Western Spain, harvesting seasonal crops. In the case of illegal migrants, they really have no other choice as they are usually unable to secure other types of work (King et al., 2000, p. 10).

The Spanish economy began to promote its large supply of cheap labor in order to increase foreign investment. When gaps in the labor market began to appear, Spain filled them with immigrants to continue to fuel growth. Workforce participation rates of Spanish women in Spain are relatively low at 34% compared to the EU average of 59%, further increasing reliance on immigrant labor (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 363). Finally, Spain has a low birthrate, and it will continue not to provide enough labor to meet its needs in the future. The population in Morocco is relatively young, with 23% of the population between 0 to 15 years old and 76% between 16 and 64 years old (Moroccan Migration to Spain, 2007). This age structure is favorable for providing Spain with a lasting source of foreign labor to meet its needs into the future. According to Josep Oliver from the Autónoma University in Barcelona, the Spanish have collectively “decided not to have children, and without knowing it, [they] decided to have immigrants” (Huddled against the masses, 2006). Many immigrants send money home to support their families, making some developing states dependent on remittances from Spain. As long as North African development is not sufficient to meet the needs of its population, there will

continue to be migrants. Although Spain's economy clearly has a need for foreign labor, it is experiencing some noticeable effects of bringing in so many immigrant workers.

Whether or not they are the actual cause, foreign workers in Spain are often blamed for the depressed wages and unemployment of the native workforce. Unemployment is a serious problem in Spain, in 1999 more than three million people were out of work, and rather than look at the real issues behind the problem, many people choose to simply blame the foreigners that come in looking for work (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 179). In reality, job competition with immigrants is neither the cause of high unemployment among Spaniards nor is it as big of a problem as citizens perceive it to be and "as a rule, immigrants take jobs disregarded by the native workforce, jobs that tend to be less stable, less skilled, less protected, and less paid," (King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis, 2000, p. 7, 264). Immigrant labor complements native Spanish labor in the market.

The last complaint of Spanish citizens is that immigrants are a drain on the welfare system. The government has stated that the tax and social security contributions made by immigrants more than cover the costs of services they use. In the early 1990s, tensions between natives and immigrants on all above these issues increased. It is possible that this could occur now in the post-financial crisis environment if the Spanish economy is unable to make a quick recovery. For the moment, conflicts have been minimal. Overall, the Spanish economy is better off having immigrant labor, even though the stigma placed upon these foreigners by the native population makes the situation seem to be more problematic than it actually is.

Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion

Unlike in France, contemporary Spanish politics are based on a constitution and history that only go back as far as the late 1970s. It is also lacking a revolutionary past, which has played a considerable role in French politics. From the end of the authoritarian Franco regime to the present parliamentary democracy, Spain has been engaged in an evolutionary political process. Spain was able to complete its transition to democracy in spite of having a feeble political party system (McLaren, 2008, p. 19). The Spanish Constitution created a federalist system with significant power delegated to the autonomous communities. After a couple decades of change, the political system does appear to be somewhat stable at this point, though outside forces like the European Union may have facilitated progress. At the national level, Spain has a two-party system with one dominant party on the left (PSOE, the Socialist Party) and another on the right (PP, the People's Party) (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 327). The PP has evolved over time from a coalition government that included the Popular Alliance and other smaller center-right parties. This shows that political parties in Spain are not static, but it is unclear if they transform or disappear as often as in France.

There are also strong regional parties in Spain, which is reflective of the country's internal cultural diversity which led to the creation of the Autonomous Communities. Regional political parties have been long established: "around 1900, the Catalan... and significant parts of the Basque middle classes and peasantry turned to regionalist and separatist parties to fight the parasitic central administration identified with the economically backward center of the nation" (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 42). More recently, the regional parties have been rejuvenated by a trend toward ethno-nationalism that spread throughout Europe as well as in response to repression the regions experienced under the Franco regime (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992,

p. 328). Regionalism in Spain has contributed a couple sets of cleavages: industrial versus agricultural economies, cleavages according to socioeconomic status, and cleavages based on language. In Spain, the industrial center is Barcelona, though cities in the Basque country and other places in the North also have strong economies. In comparison, the south and center of the country are still more focused on agriculture. This influences political participation as the two sides have varied interest. Closely related are cleavages based on socioeconomic status. Those living in the more economically prosperous regions of Spain tend to be better off than those living in the agrarian South. Finally, there are social cleavages based on language, though this is most visible within regional politics. While the majority in Catalonia speaks Catalan, those who do not may not choose a party based on this fact.

As in France, social changes have contributed to the development of political parties. From the time of the ‘Spanish miracle’ under Franco’s liberalization plan and continuing with the economic growth of the 1980s, Spaniards have turned away from agriculture and are better educated than before (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 330). In the 1980s segments of the population returned from abroad where they had been participating in guest-worker programs. This led to the Europeanization and modernization of Spanish society. Spain too became more secular, though much more modestly than France. Cleavages that play an important role in Spanish politics, based on data from the 1980s, include: linguistic divisions (tied to the regions), age, occupation, religion, class identification, and political ideology (*Ibid.*, p. 41, 332-336).

There is significant attention paid to regional cleavages in Spain, especially in certain regions like Catalonia. The high degree of autonomy given to the communities reflects a higher degree of respect for multiculturalism. The “decay” of the nation state which is causing political changes in France may also be occurring in Spain, but it is unclear to what degree. In spite of

conflicts and negative opinions toward immigration, Spain does not have a radical right-wing anti-immigrant political party like France's Front National (Encarnación, 2004, p. 169). Given that immigration is one of the most important issues on the Spanish political agenda, this is somewhat surprising without consideration of the historical and political reasons behind it. Encarnación's explanation is that the political culture that was established in Spain post-Franco was deliberately crafted to discourage political extremism (2004, p. 12). Its recent experience with Fascism keeps extremist parties at bay, with the exception of the Basque "Eskadi ta Askatasuna," or ETA (*Ibid.*, p. 177). Spain does have minor political parties on the far left and right, but most of them are fragmented and none of them are concerned with immigration issues.

Immigration seems to have a much more modest impact on social cleavages in Spain than in France, as is evidenced by the comparatively sparse literature on the subject. Party politics were still developing when immigration issues began to develop in Spain. As indicated by McLaren, "there appear to have been no major potentially divisive societal cleavages to represent in the new Spanish democracy" after its formation (2008, p. 140). Thus, at least at the beginning, it was more important to consider the role of the elites and the interests they claimed to represent. Because Spain started with relatively minor cleavages to begin with, it has not been possible for immigration to cause sweeping changes. Larger internal concerns put immigration on the back burner for nearly a decade and only in recent years do they seem to be affecting politics. Coupled with a mild political arena and historical warning against radicalism, Spain appears to be avoiding some of the problems with immigration that have cropped up in France. However, it does seem that there is potential for a social cleavage between immigrants and non-immigrants to develop if conflicts between the two sides increase. If public opinion becomes increasingly pessimistic or should increasing numbers of immigrants eventually lead to a drain

on social services, then it is possible that the situation in Spain could change to more closely resemble that of France and we may see more significant changes in cleavages appear (Encarnación, 2004, p. 176).

France reacts to immigration by balancing the interests of powerful groups and parties within the state. Racial and cultural theories help explain public opinion and assimilation problems which complicate the balancing act the government must perform. In Spain, the power resources argument also rings true, but the Spanish society is more easily appeased than the French for various historical and cultural reasons. Cost-benefit theories play a larger role than cultural or racial considerations because Spaniards do not view immigration to be as serious of a problem as do the French. New cleavages have cropped up between immigrants and non-immigrants as well as between immigration opponents and the rest of society. In Spain, immigration does not seem to have made as dramatic an impact. One could argue that the beginning of a cleavage between immigrants and non-immigrants is forming as instances of violence have occurred from both sides.

In Spain, immigration from less desirable areas, including North Africa, has become a “social fact” and is considered problematic by Spanish society (Wrench, Rea, & Ouali, 1999, p. 176). North African immigrants are excluded from society by Spanish citizens, further lessening any hope that they could eventually integrate into society. Of all immigrant groups, the least accepted are North African Arabs, and 58% of Spanish citizens agreed that social integration of the group was poor (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 359). In 1991, 33% of Spaniards believed that there were too many foreigners in their country, but by 1994 the percentage had decreased to 28 (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 358). As of 2006, the number had risen drastically to 68% of Spaniards believing there were too many immigrants in Spain, partially because of the terrorist

attacks in March 2004 (France takes the most supportive stance..., 2006). Spanish citizens have always been quick to blame foreigners for making social and economic problems in Spain worse. Sixty percent of Spaniards blame the government for their immigration woes (Huddled against the masses, 2006). Another 54% believe that immigration is the most serious problem Spain currently faces (Crawford, 2005, p. 6). Finally, a very recent poll by Harris Interactive taken in the summer of 2007 found that 42% of Spanish citizens feel that immigration is helping their country (Matlack, 2007). It seems clear that the Spanish are against the effects of immigration, but many do acknowledge that it is helping Spain to have these foreigners there. Perhaps because of its toleration of regional differences, Spain seems most concerned with balancing the opinion of its citizens with its need for immigrant labor to fill gaps in the market. In periods of relatively low (for Spain) unemployment, public opinion tends to be neutral to favorable toward immigration in Spain. However, the worse the numbers get, the more the public calls for increased immigration controls. It is in these periods that power resource theory becomes applicable in the balancing of interests among groups. Spain conducts cost-benefit analysis to determine how to appease public opinion while still maintaining sufficient levels of immigration to fulfill the needs of the labor market.

Immigration policies

Immigration policy in Spain has traditionally been different from that of France. Until recently, the Spanish motto seems to be exactly as *The Economist* described it: “when immigration policy fails, try giving up” (Huddled against the masses, 2006). Although the Spanish began to devise some sort of rough outline of their intended immigration policy before the first *pateras* ever arrived, the efficacy of their policies is rather questionable. Nonetheless, Spain’s situation in many cases serves as a direct contrast for how France chooses to deal with its

immigration problem. Social policy in Spain can be divided into two categories: policies that respond to the demographic effects of immigration, and the very limited category of policies that intend to deal with integration of immigrants.

The first policy enacted by Spain was not motivated by the effects of immigration, as at the time the influx was only just beginning. This is still worth mentioning because it forms the basis for the rest of Spain's immigration policy. The *Ley de extranjería*, also known as the *Ley Orgánica* or Organic Law, was established in 1985 as a prerequisite for membership of the European Union. There were a few different versions of the law²¹ but with respect to the anticipated social effects of immigration, it originally outlined basic rules for entry and residence of foreigners (King et al., 2000, p. 266). Since Spain began to admit immigrants rather quickly, developing policies to control immigrant inflows was its main priority for many years. To deal with those who had already entered, regularization programs registered those who had non-European origins in 1985-1986 and again in 1991-1992 (King et al., 2000, p. 108). The 1991 program mostly benefitted Moroccan immigrants, who also faced a new visa requirement that same year, along with migrants from the rest of the Maghreb (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 350). The goal was to make it more difficult for North Africans to come into Spain, and while it may have stopped some, others began to consider illegal ways of entering.

Spain's relationship with the Maghreb was always a factor in how it established immigration policy, and in how restrictive it chose to be. Spain constantly was afraid of destabilization in the region as that would have inevitably caused them more problems not only with immigration but also in its economic and political relationships with the states of the

²¹ The *Ley Orgánica 7/1985* is the original, but the *Ley Orgánica 4/2000* made some of the most significant changes.

Maghreb (Gillespie & Youngs, 2001, p. 132). In 1993, Spain encouraged Morocco to help stop the smuggling of soon-to-be illegal immigrants who attempted to cross the Strait of Gibraltar in *pateras* (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 337). As the 1990's went on, Spain continued to strengthen its border controls, deport some illegal entrants (always as a last resort), and expand the visa requirement to other states. In 1996 another regularization program was attempted, this time to help the family members of immigrants, but it was not very effective and few people took advantage of it (King et al., 2000, p. 259). The government established the Integrated System of External Vigilance in 1999 to guard the southern borders from immigrant arrivals by *patera*. This system was basically an advanced radar that could detect the small boats and would warn the *Guardia Civil* in advance of their arrivals so that the immigrants could immediately be taken into custody when they reached the shore (Carling, 2007a, p. 325).

Progress continued with the revision of the Organic Law in 2000 (*Ley Orgánica 4/2000*) to recognize immigration as a permanent social phenomenon. Foreigners also received more social rights in Spain and a new regularization method was established which would allow immigrants to register provided they had lived in Spain for two years without interruption and had also registered in their municipality (Laubenthal, 2007, p. 114). Unfortunately, this revision was partially revoked the following year when the conservative *Partido Popular* regained control of the Parliament, and illegal immigrants lost some of their rights and deportation once again became acceptable (*Ibid.*, p. 115). A new revision of the old laws was adopted, Article 31.3, which established stricter rules for obtaining residency. Despite the apparent harshness of these policies, Spain was still frequently criticized by other European states, including France, for being too lenient. The 600,000 illegal immigrants that received amnesty in 2005 support this argument (Crawford, 2005, p. 6).

There are fewer illegal immigrants in Spain today due to all of the regularization and amnesty programs, but the flows keep coming. From 2000 to 2007, more than one million people received amnesty from the Spanish government (Matlack, 2007). This certainly must appear as an incentive to North Africans and other immigrants that are considering leaving their countries of origin. Even after the 2004 Atocha bombings²² and external pressure from the EU, Spain implemented another round of regularization in 2005. Attempts at bilateral cooperation²³ beginning in 2001 and continuing past the elections of 2004 attempted to reduce the burden of regulating migration flows on Spain, which was fairly successful as the problem grew. The Spanish and Moroccan governments have had strained relations from time to time over migration-related issues, including a lack of cooperation on the part of Morocco in adhering to bilateral agreements (Arango & Martin, 2005). The Plan Africa,²⁴ designed to work on development of immigrant-sending countries in hopes of reducing immigration flows, has been criticized for having the wrong motives and not achieving its goals, though it was not an outright failure (Bidaguren and Aurre, 2006). The concept of co-development behind the plan was praised across Europe as being a step in the right direction when it comes to addressing immigration. Spain recently launched a second Plan Africa with hopes of improving upon the shortcomings of its predecessor and fostering greater cooperation with African states (Plan África 2009-2012, 2009). Even though Spain appears to have attempted to control immigrant flows in response to the demographic effects it is experiencing, in the end these policies have not

²² Spain has worked on the terrorism issue primarily through bilateral talks with Morocco (McLean, 2005).

²³ Bilateral agreements were made with Morocco, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Peru.

²⁴ According to Bidaguren and Aurre, “the African Plan reduces the importance of vital questions in relation to the priority destination of Aid to Less Developed Countries and to those sectors most sensitive to achieving sustainable human development (health, education, gender, environmental sustainability...) and on the contrary, it puts special emphasis on the use of financial facilities and resources to defend investment interests and Spanish sales, the migratory control and the fight against the terrorism” (2006).

done much to slow down the influx. Instead, they seem to just be covering the problem up, and not very well at that.

Social policy that focuses on integration of immigrants into society has been rather limited in Spain, especially compared to France, as immigrants are able to be absorbed relatively easily. The original *Ley de extranjería* did mention the rights of foreigners in Spain, although only in a restricted fashion as the problem was not yet a serious concern for the government (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 192). It was not until it became clear that the flows of immigration were only going to increase and that these new foreigners were going to continue to affect Spanish society that any purely social policies were established. The Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants was created in 1994 and intended to show the government's intention of reducing barriers to integration and fighting the negative reactions of the native population (King et al., 2000, p. 270). In 1996 and 1997, the government set aside more resources for the agencies that were responsible for integration of foreigners. A study was commissioned in 1998 to study the immigration and refugee phenomenon, and plans to revise the *Ley de extranjería* were established (King et al., 2000, p. 272). With the Organic Law 4/2000, immigrants won more social rights and their overall situation improved. The revisions gave immigrants the same basic rights as Spanish citizens, except for the right to vote, and also provided for reunification of families (Torns, 2000). While parts of the law were changed later, such as the fact that illegal immigrants lost many of the rights that had been given to them, legal immigrants still benefitted from it. While xenophobia, discrimination, and racism are concerns of the Spanish government, more action is taken on these issues at lower levels, such as in trade unions or employers' organizations, than with actual government policies (Wrench et al., 2000, p. 13). The government tries to balance the problems immigrants are facing with the benefits the economy

receives from them. Giving too much to the immigrants upsets Spaniards, but kicking out all the foreigners would devastate the economy, which Spaniards would hate even more. This delicate balancing act will most likely continue as the government does not appear to have much other choice.

While France's responses to economic effects of immigration could be considered only mildly active in terms of numbers of policies, there have been even fewer enacted in Spain. Since the economic effects were mainly positive in Spain, there was less of a need to formulate policies. According to Tedesco (2010), "Spain can be considered a successful model of labour integration" because "the labour market's capacity for absorption" reduces the need for government intervention (p. 3). The main action that Spain has taken was to restrict immigrants "to a specific labor market segment: the black economy of illegal foreigners" (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 179). The *Ley de Extranjería* of 1985 outlined specific conditions for work permits to help regulate what kinds of jobs immigrants could take as a means of protecting native workers from unemployment. During the recession in the early 1990's, more Spaniards became willing to settle for jobs in construction and other less secure positions, which tapped into the sources of employment usually left to immigrants (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 35). In light of this situation, the government adopted the Resolution of 4 May 1993, which established a system of quotas, *contingentes*, for foreign labor. This system was specifically designed to only allow in the number of workers that Spain has an economic need for while still being able to integrate them into society (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 364). The quota for 1993 was set at 20,600 permits, and in the years that followed it remained close to that initial number (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 181). The quota system did not succeed in reducing the hiring of illegal immigrants, nor did it manage to control the influx, but it did cut down on the need for regularizations. According to a Spanish

policymaker, “other EC member states talk about the need for a zero-immigration policy, but this is completely unrealistic for Spain” because there is too clear of an economic need for foreign labor (Geddes, 2000, p. 25). For this reason, Spain has carefully sculpted its economic policies to allow immigration to continue but it also takes the situation of native labor into account.

In recent years, there has been discussion of implementation of a circular migration policy in Spain. Circular migration is defined by the EU as “a tool that can both help address labor needs in EU member states and maximize the benefits of migration for countries of origin, including fostering skills transfers and mitigating the risks of brain drain” (Circular migration and mobility..., 2007). Work permits established for the *Contingente* system are sometimes not used by immigrants, thus operating in the informal sector of the Spanish economy when they do find employment (Moroccan migration to Spain, 2007). The contracts for migrants to work during the strawberry harvest have only been implemented since 2005, but already have proved that CM is feasible on a small-scale (Plewa, 2008). In Cartaya, Spain in 2005 only 5% of the contracted workers returned to their countries of origin. After the government reconsidering its strategy, only married female workers with children were recruited and they were not allowed to bring their families with them during subsequent contracts. This provided them with an incentive to return home and 85% of the 4,563 workers did so (Newland, et. al., 2008). This important lesson teaches us that CM can work provided we find the right incentives to encourage workers to return home when it is time.

According to the EU, CM has the potential to address migration-related issues simultaneously in a more structured manner (Circular migration and mobility..., 2007). CM considers cyclical migration to be a naturally occurring phenomenon and aims to work with it while still providing some controls to maximize stakeholder benefits. Developing states receive

assistance through remittances and developed states can benefit from a renewable supply of labor that fits the needs of their labor markets. CM departs from traditional migration control policies that view immigration as “linear” and “static” (Workshop on creating development benefits..., 2008). The primary benefits of the policy are regulation of the supply of foreign labor to fill gaps in the Spanish labor market and the strengthening of human and economic capital for immigrants who will return to their country of origin and assist in its development. It is described as a “win-win-win solution” because it maximizes benefits for the stakeholders and minimizes conflict between them (Pastore, 2008). For example, the Spanish civil society will feel less threatened because integration of immigrants is not a goal of the policy and they will be taking only the jobs that Spaniards themselves refuse to do.

Given that migrants continue to arrive in Spain and that there has only been limited success in achieving ‘immigration control’ through other policies, it seems that Spain was considering a different approach through circular migration prior to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. When the financial crisis hit, Spanish immigration policy changed significantly and is described as being more similar to other European states today than it ever has been. For the first time, immigrants and Spanish citizens were competing for the same jobs, such as harvesting strawberries (Burnett, 2009). The Spanish government began offering to pay immigrants their unemployment benefits as a lump-sum if they agree to return to their countries of origin for the next three years, giving the Spanish economy time to rebound and citizens a chance to get back to work (Abend, , L., 2008; Tarvaine, 2010). As the unemployment rate among immigrants has grown to about 30% (compared to 19% among Spanish citizens), a few thousand immigrants, mostly Latin Americans, have taken Spain up on this offer (Immigration: economic impact on EU rules).

The think tank FRIDE released a report that summarizes the change in Spanish policy very well:

The PSOE government has adopted one of the most progressive immigration policies of all EU member states, and this has had a positive impact on its foreign policy. However, since the financial crisis, the integration of immigrants in Spain has rapidly decreased. Before, immigrants were seen to play a leading role in the country's economic growth. In February 2007, Spain's Council of Ministers approved the Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration 2007–2010, with a budget of over EUR 2000 million dedicated to managing migration flows and integration processes. Yet in September 2008, the same government proposed a Voluntary Return Plan. (Tedesco, 2010, p. 1)

According to the Earth Times, “the eastern town of Vic announced that it would no longer allow undocumented immigrants to register as residents, barring them access to health care, education and other social services” (Tarvaine, 2010). In Spain it is illegal to prevent anyone, even illegal immigrants, from access to basic social services, which Prime Minister Luis Zapatero reiterated in response to the announcement (*Ibid.*). Localities are frustrated by the burden of trying to help their residents while also abiding by national regulations that require them to provide for immigrants and their families. The People's Party has reopened the immigration debate and is considering adopting a “contract of integration” that would require immigrants to adopt Spanish culture (*Ibid.*). Ironically, this contract seems very similar to the age-old French integration policies that have led to conflicts in the *banlieues* across France. Spain is also extending prison sentences for those who enter the country illegally, increasing the number of repatriations, and making it more difficult for those authorized to enter to bring their families with them, therefore making it more difficult for them to settle permanently. For Spain, the economic crisis may have just given the government a free-pass to match its immigration policies with the European model²⁵. By reducing “advantages for Latin American immigrants” and imposing more restrictive measures it can achieve the immigration control it now desires and

²⁵ Spanish policy is now more compatible with two EU measures: the Return Directive (June 2008) and the Pact on Immigration and Asylum (September 2008) (Tedesco, 2010, p. 4).

still maintain good relations with immigrant-sending countries by “blam[ing] the new limitations on Brussels” (Tedesco, 2010, p. 1).

Assessment of human security

As in France, immigrants in Spain do have to contend with some human security concerns. Interestingly, some of the most obvious examples of insecurity found in France are not true of the Spanish case. Because there is less forced integration and immigrants are able to adjust at their own pace, there seems to be less conflict between the locals and immigrants. Yes, there are still specific cases of violence or discrimination that should be addressed, but up until 2008 at least, immigrants in Spain seemed to have fewer reasons to be fearful. Unfortunately, these immigrants are less secure today than they were prior to the financial crisis because of higher unemployment and increased frustrations on the part of native Spaniards. As the economic climate has pushed the Spanish government to change its policies to resemble those in other European states, the security of immigrants has also changed to become more reflective of the circumstances in other places like France. In light of the current situation, there are some specific aspects of human security that could be addressed to undo the damage caused by the financial crisis. Naturally, any action will encounter sour public opinion as a response; therefore, the government will have to balance protecting human security of immigrants with resolving issues faced by Spanish citizens. Now that Spanish policies and immigrant struggles more closely parallel other states like France, there may be a greater incentive for the Spanish government to cooperate, potentially through the EU.

The role of the European Union

Immigration did not affect the entire region when the European Community was established in 1958. By the time the community became the European Union in 1993, however, newer member states were beginning to experience larger inflows of immigrants thanks to the economic success of the European Economic Community. Member states agreed to consider immigration issues supranationally after the establishment of the Schengen accords in 1985 and 1990. These agreements represent “an effort to arrive at a common border control policy and to work toward a common immigration policy” (Bookman, 2002, p. 197). With the establishment of free movement of people, it became clear that immigration was no longer an isolated problem affecting individual states.

Initially, the member states handled immigration issues mainly through intergovernmental cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty, 1992, created two additional pillars that included areas that EU member states wished to cooperate on, but were not quite ready to put beneath the original community framework (Wallace, Wallace, & Pollack, 2005, p. 460). Pillar Three is Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which includes issues that until Maastricht had been tied to state sovereignty, such as immigration and asylum policy. Initially, JHA’s structure was loosely intergovernmental, but as progress was made, instruments and institutions were developed, and states found it easier to make collective decisions, they agreed to move slowly toward further integration with regard to certain issues (*Ibid.*, p. 459).

In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty brought the Schengen acquis into the EU’s institutional framework and transferring part of JHA (migration-related policies) from Pillar Three to Pillar One (Kostakopoulou, 2001, p. 77; Wallace et al., 2005, p. 459). An emphasis on intergovernmental decision-making remained for a while, since the states clearly had a vested

interest in shaping how EU immigration policies would affect them individually (Geddes, 2000, p. 111). Nonetheless, for the first time, immigration matters fell under EU competencies (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 349). At the 1999 Tampere Summit, EU leaders developed a strategy to implement the JHA framework set out by the Amsterdam Treaty. They adopted the resulting Hague program²⁶, “which sets the objectives for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU for the period 2005-2010” (Towards a common European Union immigration policy, 2007). This program outlined objectives for making progress on issues such as asylum and immigration. In 2002, the “Comprehensive Action Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings” was adopted, demonstrating the commitment of EU member states to act together (Wallace et al., 2005, p. 474). By the time the global financial crisis hit, the EU had eliminated internal border controls, adopted a common visa policy, synchronized external border controls and asylum standards, promised to cooperate on illegal immigration, and developed a fund to cover immigration policy-related expenses.

In response to the recent global financial crisis, the European Union recognizes that new policies are needed to deal with the new challenges faced by immigrant-receiving member states. In the summer of 2008, the Return Directive and the Pact on Immigration and Asylum were created to serve this purpose. The Return Directive is designed to be “a step towards a European immigration policy” and “will encourage the voluntary return of illegal immigrants but otherwise lay down minimum standards for their treatment” (Parliament adopts directive on return of illegal immigrants, 2008). The EU rules for returning illegal immigrants to their home countries were clearly outlined and states were forbidden from enacting immigration policies that are stricter than those at the EU level (however, they are allowed to be more lenient). Regarding deportation of unauthorized entrants, member states must give immigrants a period of time in

²⁶ The Hague program was confirmed in 2004.

which they may leave the EU voluntarily before a removal order is issued (*Ibid.*). Once an illegal immigrant is removed from the EU, he or she is banned from reentering for a minimum of five years, unless an individual state chooses to waive the ban. Children and families are to be treated with special consideration in the deportation process. Finally, the Return Directive also includes provisions for changes in policy in the event of emergencies and for preventing immigrants from being forced to return home if doing so would put their lives in danger.

The Pact on Immigration and Asylum was intended to increase cooperation on immigration issues among European states and to allow for greater coordination of policy (European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 2008, p. 4). The eventual goal is to work toward fully integrated immigration policies, but given the degree of variability in immigration patterns across Europe, this will be a significant challenge. Although the Pact lists a multitude of specific objectives, there are a few that are of particular interest to this study. Relevant to the Spanish case study, regularization of immigrants must now be done on a case-by-case basis rather than through sweeping regularization policies such as Spain had utilized in the past (*Ibid.*, p. 7). The EU also wants to cooperate with immigrant-sending nations, which will give the EU a voice in discussions that were mostly bilateral in the past. Finally, the EU will take steps to protect the rights of immigrants from abuses in the workplace and to prevent them from being exploited. This goal essentially indicates that the EU will concern itself with aspects of the human security of immigrants, though without using the term.

In 2009, high unemployment continued to linger in most European states and the EU agreed to authorize charter flights to take illegal immigrants back to their home countries (EU leaders say illegal entrants can be sent home on charter flights, 2009). Although human rights organizations balked at this decision, the governments of Italy and France insisted it was

necessary to prevent conditions from deteriorating in their own countries. Other EU members such as the UK have also made use of the flights (*Ibid.*). In February 2010, the EU called for increased funding to modernize border security, which is coordinated and maintained through the Frontex²⁷ agency (EU bids to revamp immigration controls, 2010).

All of these recent changes in EU policy have considerably altered the way immigration is handled in the European Union. For the first time, a concerted effort is being made to coordinate policies at the supranational level, rather than the empty dialogue that has taken place in the past. Although member states are given some degree of flexibility in enacting policies and tailoring them to their individual circumstances, the EU has determined that it alone can decide how strict enforcement of deportation regulations will be. This bodes well for a discussion of the protection of human security of immigrants in the European Union.

According to the European Commission, “the main objective [of the EU] is to better manage migration flows by a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and demographic situation of the EU” (Towards a common European Union immigration policy, 2007). Despite the recent progress and steps taken to further integrate migration issues at the supranational level, the EU remains somewhat constrained by state sovereignty. Certain states are concerned about the difficulties of implementing a unified immigration policy within the Union. Issues such as funding, extent of borders of some states, definitions of state citizenship, and the relative newness of the problem in particular states make the topic even more complicated. In addition, member states continue to engage in cooperation outside the EU framework, such as the so-called G6 which deals with illegal immigration among other things²⁸

²⁷ Frontex was established in October 2005 to patrol over 30,000 miles of the EU border, both land and water (EU bids to revamp immigration controls, 2010).

²⁸ Established in 2003 as the G5, it became the G6 in 2006 when Poland joined the original members: Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain (EU G6 nations agree to fight terrorism and illegal immigration, 2006).

(Wallace et al., 2005, p. 466). Spain and France also coordinate policies through the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy organized by the Commission.

Policy Analysis: effectiveness of French, Spanish, and EU policies

In order to determine at which level policymaking is most effective, many individual policies enacted by France, Spain, and the EU were all considered. Each of these policies had to be related to immigration and could not exclude the North African group. Policies only intended for North African immigrants were included. The process for evaluating policies was conducted by following a series of steps. First, the intended outcome of each policy was determined by looking through immigration literature, newspaper articles, and government descriptions online (especially in the case of the EU). The next step was to determine the outcome of the policy: what effect(s) did it actually have? Finally, by comparing the intended outcome with the actual result, the effectiveness of each policy was graded on a 5 point scale. Those policies that achieved their intended outcome received a score of 5 while those that were completely ineffective received a 2. Policies that achieved the opposite of what they intended to received a score of 1. It must be noted that a considerable amount of the research into French and Spanish policies was conducted as part of an undergraduate thesis. For this reason, when adding additional policies for those countries and conducting research on the EU, the same methodology used previously was maintained in the interest of consistency and to avoid having to repeat the entire process. Although the methods are relatively basic and no statistical analysis was completed, it is still possible to draw useful comparisons. Even though recent policies created in 2008 and 2009 may not have reached their full effects yet, they were still assigned

tentative scores because of the important changes they reflect. In a couple cases a “?” was assigned to a recent policy because there was no data from which to determine a score. The full results of the policy analysis process are included in Appendix B, though Table 1 below summarizes the results.

Table 1

Source of Policy	Policy Type	Mean Effectiveness	Affect on Human Security
France	Economic	2.9	Positive & Negative
France	Immigration Control	3.3	One, Negative
France	Integration	4	Positive
France	Religion	2.9	Positive
Spain	Economic	2.6	Positive & Negative
Spain	Immigration Control	3.4	Mostly Negative
Spain	Integration	3	Positive
EU	Policy Coordination	3.3	One, Positive
EU	Immigration Control	4 (only one policy)	Positive & Negative

By looking at the effectiveness of various types of immigration policies, there are a few patterns that are worth pointing out in the cases of France, Spain, and the EU, as well as some overall trends. Beginning with France, it appears that policymaking improved with time. For example, the French government did not have much success controlling immigration with early policies like naturalization and amnesty, so they issued laws to focus specifically on curtailing unauthorized flows, such as with the Barre-Bonnet Laws or the Pasqua Laws. These policies were much more effective as they de-incentivized entering without permission, whereas granting amnesty had the opposite effect. Another example of successfully adapting policies to achieve a desired outcome is in the realm of protecting *laïcité*, or religious policy. The French government has found that promoting secularism required action rather than just making suggestions. Early policies to reaffirm *laïcité* or to revise guidelines explaining secularism did not prevent the

increasing visibility of Islam. Therefore, the French government went one step further and banned headscarves in schools. For some this went too far, while others clamored that it was not enough. It seems that the government is listening to the opinions of the latter group, as it now may ban full coverings in public. Overall, economic policies have not done much to achieve immigration-related objectives. It seems that the most effective types of policies in France are immigration control and integration.

It is also evident that certain policies are intrinsically linked to human security, though they can affect positively or negatively. Economic policies have mixed effects on human security depending on the intention of the policy. A policy that seeks to slow or reduce growth of a heavily populated urban center, such as Paris, improves human security by increasing the effectiveness of resources devoted to public services. On the other hand, economic policies like the Fontanet Circular, which made it more difficult for illegal immigrants to obtain employment, causes immigrants to become less secure. If they are unable to find employment, they may not be able to provide for themselves and any dependents they may have. These immigrants could also seek illicit employment, resorting to prostitution or dealing drugs out of desperation. Integration policies appear to have the greatest positive impact on human security. Because these policies are designed to improve the situation of immigrants in various respects, they naturally do more to improve their security. Unfortunately for immigrants, there have been far fewer integration policies than immigration control policies, most likely because of low public opinion and political will in France.

Immigration policymaking in Spain has had less time to evolve than in France, but nonetheless there are some identifiable trends. As in France, economic policies have had little to moderate success. Interestingly, the recent policy of contracting workers for seasonal harvest

was proving to be quite successful before the economic crisis forced the program to be cut significantly. This provides some credibility to ideas about circular migration being a solution for controlling flows into Spain. The key difference between French and Spanish immigration control policies is that Spain has often resorted to regularization of illegal immigrants. By “fixing” the status of immigrants deemed to be a problem by other EU members, Spain was able to maintain economic growth and avoid being accused of doing nothing. These policies were effective in this regard, but because they encouraged unauthorized immigration to continue, their scores were reduced. Unlike in France, Spain has not enacted any policies of a religious nature, simply because Spain does not have a secular tradition. There have only been two policies enacted to improve integration of immigrants: the 1994 Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants and the recent Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration (2007-present). Although they were both moderately effective, the primary reason for the scarcity of this type of policy is the natural ability of the Spanish society to absorb immigrants with relatively mild side effects. It is probable that public opinion and political will also prevented any additional action from taking place.

Human security of immigrants was affected by many policies in the case of Spain. The initial economic policies the government enacted negatively impacted security of immigrants because they were more concerned with addressing high unemployment of citizens. As the Spanish economy strengthened post-EU accession, new policies did not have this negative effect until the recent Voluntary Return Plan. This policy is sending immigrants back to countries that are less secure than Spain to begin with because of development problems. It may further contribute to insecurity for immigrants in the long-term if they are unable to find employment in their home countries or are unable to return to Spain at the end of the three year return period.

Immigration control policies in Spain that regularized unauthorized residents improved the security of those immigrants substantially. Once they were granted amnesty from the government, they no longer had to fear extradition and would be able to secure employment with greater ease. Integration policies have also helped to improve the immigrant human security for reasons similar to those in France. As a whole, fewer policies in Spain had negative effects on human security in Spain than in France. Cultural, historical, and societal differences between the two countries most likely account for this difference.

Returning to the theories introduced in the beginning of this paper adds value to a comparison of policies enacted in France and Spain by outlining additional similarities and differences between them. Of the four categories of theory, power resources or power constellation, state-centric and institutional, cost-benefit or economic, and cultural and racial, three are important to the cases. Power resources, cost-benefit theories, and cultural/racial theories all offer some explanatory value. The balance between political parties, Muslim immigrant groups, the general public, and business that hire these workers is a constant struggle in France. In line with theories about power, it is difficult for the French government to enact immigration policies because of these stakeholders, each with a certain amount of power and influence. Even though this conflict constrains policymaking, the government has still enacted policies that one group finds unappealing, such as the ban on religious symbols.

In Spain the struggle for power does not seem to have played as important a role in immigration policy formation in the past like in France. Power does in part explain why Spain has been able to adopt lenient immigration policies, however. Because of the need for immigrant labor and the ability of the country to absorb foreign workers, groups in Spain have not been adamantly against immigration except in times of economic crisis. In these periods, Spain's

lenient policies become stricter out of necessity. As Spain's policy becomes more similar to the rest of Europe, it remains to be seen if the same conflict we see in France will become a problem. With more restrictive immigration policies there may be a backlash from immigrant groups. Cost-benefit theories are also relevant because the Spanish economy in particular relies on foreign labor to maintain its agricultural sector. Therefore, actions to restrict immigration must involve balancing the need for labor. The same is seen in France, though the French economy will be less dependent on foreign labor than some of its European neighbors because of its higher birth rate. Europe is predominantly composed of a single ethnic group, which makes racial theories relevant as they explain some of the reaction of the public against North African immigrants, among others. Some immigrants from other racial groups enter Europe to work in professions requiring high skills levels, but many others work predominantly in low-paying sectors that citizens generally avoid. The tensions in Europe are most definitely less severe and less violent than many other examples of racial strife.

Cultural theories explain why European citizens and immigrants have a hard time associating within a single society. Although religion is the biggest factor separating North African immigrants from the French and Spanish, there are also cultural differences. Geographic proximity and history have brought particularly Moroccan culture closer to that of Spain. France's colonial legacy in Algeria has also left its mark. Overall, all three of these types of theories characterize immigration in Europe, though to different degrees depending on the individual case study.

EU immigration policymaking is different from that of Spain or France by virtue of the intergovernmental cooperation that must occur for it to take place. Immigration policies enacted at the EU level have had limited to moderate success. They have been able to increase dialogue

between member states and to encourage them to cooperate. Although integration of immigration policies has faced resistance, it appears that the economic crisis may have encouraged member states to reconsider it as a viable solution. The ultimate objective for many is to control or stop immigration, which they may be able to do in aftermath of the economic crisis. It is unlikely that this will be sustainable, however. In time, some European states like Spain will need immigrant labor to once again fill gaps in their labor markets.

Human security of immigrants has not been affected by EU policies until recently. With efforts to reduce trafficking of immigrants in 2002, human security of migrants improved because they were less likely to be forcibly taken into Europe. This, unfortunately, does not mean that they did not willfully agree to be smuggled in or attempt to enter unlawfully by some other means. The two EU policies enacted in the summer of 2008 also impacted the security of immigrants. The Return Directive negatively affected human security in that it allowed for imprisonment of unauthorized immigrants unwilling to voluntarily return to their countries of origin. The Pact on Immigration and Asylum, on the other hand, improves the security of immigrants by protecting their rights and preventing any EU member state from implementing unnecessarily harsh punishments. With the Pact balancing out the potential negative effects of the Directive, human security of immigrants has finally been addressed at the EU level.

Overall, it appears that the most effective types of immigration policies tend to be immigration control and integration. Immigration control receives the most popular support and has the greatest breadth of any one type of policy. It also appears that states tend to improve upon their policies over time. Without further integration and more policies to analyze, it remains unclear if policymaking at the EU level can be as or more effective than national policies. Human security has not been addressed as well at the EU-level as it had locally, but

again this is an issue that needs to be readdressed if and when the EU enacts further immigration policy. It seems that both France and Spain have been able to address human security concerns, but there is room for improvement. Spain has not had a need for prolific integration policymaking as in France, but in the future it may well need to follow the French example. The main criticism of French policy is its steadfast protection of secularism which is causing conflicts with Muslim women. Despite low public opinion, France does need to continue to work on integration, particularly in the *banlieues*. Violent rioting has already happened over tensions with second-generation immigrants and there is potential for a recurrence of such outbursts if more is not done to address their needs.

Conclusions

French vs. Spanish immigration policy

For many reasons, French and Spanish immigration policies have been traditionally quite different. France has been coping with immigration for much longer and as a result has had time to try different strategies. Ultimately, the prevailing determinants of policymaking are public opinion, the protection of secularism, and political will to take action. Spain has less history to rely on and a very different policymaking environment. As in France, public opinion and political will continue to play a major role in shaping immigration policymaking in the future. Because Spain is divided into autonomous communities with some very strong regional personalities, the Spanish government has learned to cope with diversity by decentralizing power. This practice and strong growth since the late 1980s have allowed Spain to absorb immigrants the way France was able to in the 1970s or 1980s.

The financial crisis has had the effect of forcing Spanish policy to become more similar to the strict European standards held in many other EU member states. Although the political and historical background of Spain allowed the state to maintain lenient policies from the 1980s until 2008, the government can no longer justify them in the face of high unemployment amongst both the general population and immigrants. The key difference between France and Spain at this point is this: in France rioting and protests continue to be the primary outlet for concerns over immigration, whereas in Spain this occurs to a much lesser degree even in the face of an economic crisis. The easiest explanation is that Spanish culture allows for a *laissez-faire* approach to immigration, yet low public opinion during recessions does indicate that they care about the issue enough to consider it a problem. It seems that in Spain North African immigrants become a scapegoat for the woes of society whereas in France they are viewed to be a persistent risk to the protection of *laïcité*.

Prospects for cooperation at the EU level

Spain and France have already taken steps to cooperate on immigration issues through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and by agreeing to recent EU initiatives, like the Pact on Immigration and Asylum, to further address the issue at the EU level. If the past is any indication, however; efforts at the EU level will be slow to make progress as member state sovereignty and interests take precedence. The EU has intended to make immigration a priority for quite some time, since it began addressing asylum issues in the late 1990s, but it has been unsuccessful in achieving full integration at the supranational level. If the EU is going to be able to do so, right now seems to be the ideal time. Because of economic conditions, there is increased support for immigration control across the continent. Comparatively, immigration policies across the board are more similar now than they have ever been, with states like Spain

introducing more restrictive policies. The approval of the Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Return Directive provide us with concrete evidence of the renewed momentum with which member states want to address the issue.

Despite indications that the EU will be able to finally achieve integrated immigration policy, there are some potential problems and drawbacks that may cause problems down the line. Even though member states interests are in line right now, once European states achieve economic recovery, this may well change. Right now, the Pact on Immigration and Asylum does allow for more lenient immigration polices than those outlined by the EU. This will accommodate some states that are more dependent on immigration to change their policies later. A potential problem would be the reaction of states that choose to maintain rigid policies. As long as the Schengen zone affords for free movement of people, immigrants will be free to move amongst European states. The preferred destinations of France, Germany, and the UK may eventually be unable to sustain further growth in their immigrant populations, despite having relatively lower birthrates. Many people are fearful of Europe becoming “Eurabia” and they will continue to support measures that limit the odds of this occurring (Tales from Eurabia, 2006). The best way for the influx to be controlled is to maintain some sort of uniformly restrictive policy for the EU as a whole.

Future of immigration policy and human security in Europe

The issue of human security at the EU level raises some interesting questions. In their report issued for European Union High Representative Javier Solana in 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities addressed the need for a human security paradigm to be the basis for European security. This report, entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, became the foundation

for the compilation the group produced which elaborated on the ideas promoted in the report. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities contains fifteen studies on a variety of security-related issues deemed to be essential in the formation and practical application of such a doctrine within the European Union.

The authors emphasize the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, a regional focus, use of legal instruments, and appropriate use of force. In order to establish the doctrine in the EU through institutional embedding and resourcing they will need democratic control, bottom-up accountability, and financing. The motivations for pursuing a human security doctrine lie primarily in principles of morality and legality, as well as in the enlightened self-interest of the EU. The authors believe that the EU should move from focusing on defense to focusing on security, ideally human security. Glasius and Kaldor establish that the ‘holistic’ security concept already advocated in Europe, which focuses on protection of human rights, could be more narrowly defined through human security to make it clearer when action needs to be taken toward protecting security. Although they admit that the achievement of a human security doctrine will be an ongoing process, they demonstrate that through integration the EU has already begun to take steps that will allow for its encouragement.

There are several issues that make adoption of a human security doctrine in Europe difficult. First, the definition of human security must be agreed upon. Different actors in Europe have used the term in different ways, from the narrow freedom from fear definition to a very broad one encompassing, and practically equaling, human rights. Second, the practical implementation of such a doctrine could be either as simple as renaming existing initiatives to include the human security label, or it could involve reinventing them entirely to give them a

new focus. Depending how human security is defined, many EU initiatives, such as the European Security Strategy (2003), may already be working toward the promotion of human security. Finally, specific goals mentioned in the report, like the creation of a human security response force, will require substantial resources from member states that may not be willing to give them.

Despite the problems with the doctrine, the report and subsequent text that promote it do offer legitimate reasons why adopting a human security doctrine makes sense for Europe. With further integration and a more clear identity in the world, thanks to changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU could potentially become the champion of the protection of security of individuals. Its very existence demonstrates that the nation-state need not be main actor on all issues, and perhaps those related to human security, like immigration, should have a different focus as well. Although some scholars still promote the concept of a human security doctrine in Europe, progress has stalled since the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities put forth its recommendation. Other more pressing matters, such as ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the economic crisis, and EU expansion, have taken precedence. It may perpetually remain on the back burner until an EU leader with substantial political clout decides to resurrect it.

There are a relatively limited number ways in which the role of human security and immigration policy might play out in the EU. The first would be essentially maintenance of the pre-economic crisis stalemate. Unable to reconcile differences in immigration policymaking, EU member states will not allow for complete integration at the EU level, leaving the Union to only occasionally reiterate the importance of cooperation. Likewise, without a renewed interest in the human security doctrine, most likely due to its overly broad definition and perceived lack of utility to policymakers, the concept will not be employed by the EU. The second prospective

outcome would include substantial gains on integration of immigration policymaking. With recent successes on this front in 2009, there seems to be hope for continued progress. As integration progresses, the EU will have more control over the types of policies used to control immigration flows or to improve integration. The EU could impose general policies and require EU member states to implement them, which would allow states to make adjustments to fit their specific needs.

In a much less likely scenario, immigration policymaking would continue to be implemented only at the national level and the EU would find justification for adopting a human security doctrine to be used to address concerns in other areas besides immigration. These other applications might include environmental policy (a favorite among many Europeans) or support of external actions of the EU, including interventions by the Rapid Reaction Force. Finally, the last outcome would be increased integration of immigration policies at the EU level and adoption of a human security doctrine. Achieving both of these goals would allow for better protection of immigrants across the EU through mutually agreed-upon policies. Nonetheless, there still remain difficult questions about how to implement a human security doctrine and how it could be used to reconcile protection of EU citizens and foreigners living amongst them. The reality is that for the time development of such as doctrine is constrained by numerous intervening variables, particularly state sovereignty. It also remains unclear if immigration policymaking would be more effective or better able to handle human security concerns that individual states can. The EU's strong record of protecting human rights and creating common asylum policies are helpful indicators, but it still remains to be seen the EU has the strength to replicate those successes.

In the meantime, additional research needs to be conducted to determine if any other EU member states have found more effective immigration policies or are better able to promote human security. States such as the UK and Germany are known to receive very large numbers of immigrants each year. Italy may also present an interesting case as discrimination against immigrants is quite prevalent. As this study focused on North African immigrants, it may be worth repeating to investigate the human security issues faced by other immigrant groups, such as Sub-Saharan Africans. Future studies should include field research that would be better able to describe and evaluate the security of immigrants across the EU. As patterns of immigration evolve and political environments change, there will be a need for continual updating of the research as well. Though there is a lot to be learned from comparative case studies such as this one, they are clearly only one small piece of the puzzle. As researchers continue to study this subject, it will be the drive to better understand immigrants and the challenges they face that will fuel the studies that may one day affect the policymakers' decisions.

Appendix

Appendix A:

	France	Spain
Population (2010)	62.6 million	45.3 million
Remittances (2008)	15,908 million USD	11,776 million USD
Net migration rate (2005-2010)	1.6 migrants/1000 pop	7.9 migrants/1000 pop
Immigrants as % pop. (2010)	10.7%	14.1%
Women as % immigrants (2010)	51.3%	47.9%

(France, 2010; Spain, 2010)

Appendix B:

*Explanation of rankings:

- 5: policy fully achieves intended outcome
- 4: outcome mostly achieved
- 3: outcome partially achieved
- 2: outcome not achieved, neutral result
- 1: policy had opposite result of intended outcome

** Human security considerations begin the moment an immigrant leaves his or her home country with the intention to immigrate into another. The determination of whether or not a policy has an effect on human security is made under the assumption that a policy is entirely effective (ranked with a 5). It is important to note that the effect on human security is less pronounced in policies ranked with lower scores.

Where	Policy	Year	Policy Type	Intended Outcome	Effectiveness Rating*	Impact on human security?***
France	Expulsion of workers	1968	Economic	End worker's strike	2	yes, negative

France	Decentralization of Paris	1960s-1970s	Economic	Alleviate strain on public services and slow growth of <i>banlieues</i>	3	yes, positive for immigrants in Paris
France	Laws controlling immigration flows	1970s	Economic	Reduce hiring of immigrants	3	yes, negative
France	Marcellin Circular	1972	Economic	Link work and residency permits	3	yes, positive
France	Fontanet Circular	1972	Economic	Reduce hiring of illegal immigrants	2	yes, negative for illegal immigrants
France	Ban on immigration of workers	1974-1975	Economic	Gain control over immigration of labor	3	no
France	Auroux Laws	1992	Economic	Reduce strikes	4	yes, positive for less time off work, negative for less voice over issues
France	Bilateral agreements with Morocco & Tunisia	1960s	Immigration control	Increase immigration by granting work permits	5	no
France	Naturalization and amnesty	1960s	Immigration control	Reduce illegal immigration	1	no
France	Giscard circular	1974	Immigration control	Reduce # immigrants	2	no
France	"Aide de retour"	1977	Immigration control	Encourage return to country of origin	3	yes, negative
France	Barre-Bonnet Laws	1980	Immigration control	Reduce illegal immigration	4	no
France	Pasqua Law	1993	Immigration control	Reduce legal immigration	4	
France	French nationality code revisions	1993	Immigration control	Make citizenship harder to obtain to reduce immigration	3 or 4	no
France	Sarkozy's quotas and prioritization of integrable immigrants	2006-present	Immigration control	Limit entry of immigrants that do not easily integrate	3 or 4	no

France	Favoring professional immigration	2007-present	Immigration control	Control legal immigration with preferences	4	no
France	Grenelle Accords	1968	Integration	Eliminate <i>bidonvilles</i> (ghettos) in favor of public housing	5	yes, positive
France	"Seventh Plan"	1975-1981	Integration	Allow family reunification, reduce illegal immigration	3 or 4	yes, positive for family reunification
France	Mitterrand's integration policies	1980s	Integration	Increase integration of immigrants into society	4	yes, positive
France	French nationality code revisions	1987	Integration	Promotion of nationalism	3	yes, negative
France	High Council for the Integration of Immigrants	1990	Integration	Reduce social unrest within immigrant communities	3 or 4	yes, positive
France	Guigou bill	1998	Integration	Dictate citizenship requirements for children of immigrants	5	yes, positive
France	Creation of HALDE	2004	Integration	Provide legal counsel for immigrants	4	yes, positive
France	Priority education zones	2000s	Integration	Increase funding for schools with many immigrants	4	yes, positive
France	Creation of Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development	2007	Integration and immigration control	Improve integration, reduce entry, promote national identity	3	yes, positive, integrated immigrants more accepted in society
France	Regulation of mosque construction	1920s	Religion	Reduce visibility of Islam	3	no
France	Reaffirmation of <i>laïcité</i>	1989	Religion	Resolve <i>affaire du foulard</i>	2	no
France	Bayrou guidelines	1994	Religion	Resolve <i>affaire du foulard</i>	3	no

France	Creation of French Council of the Muslim Religion	2002	Religion	Reduce inequality, ensure representation of Muslims	4	yes, positive
France	"Affirmative action" for immigrant youth	2002	Religion	Ensure Muslim youth receive education	4	yes, positive
France	Law 2004-228 (ban on religious symbols in schools)	2004	Religion	Resolve <i>affaire du foulard</i> by banning headscarves in schools	4	yes, negative (fear for some)
France	Ban on the <i>voile integrale</i>	2010	Religion	Resolve <i>affaire du foulard</i> by banning full veils in public places	?	yes, negative (fear for some)
Where	Policy	Year	Policy Type	Intended Outcome	Effectiveness Rating*	Impact on human security?***
Spain	Restricting immigrant labor to pre-determined sectors	1980-present	Economic	Reduce unemployment for citizens	2	yes, negative
Spain	<i>Ley Orgánica 7/1985</i>	1985	Economic	Reduce unemployment for citizens	2	yes, negative
Spain	Resolution of 4 May 1993 (<i>Contingente</i> quota system)	1993	Economic	Reduce non-integrable immigration with quotas	2	no
Spain	Work contracts: strawberry harvest	2005-present	Economic	Promote circular migration of labor, reduce permanent immigration	4	yes, positive, multiple contracts
Spain	Voluntary Return Plan	2008-2009	Economic	Reduce immigrant population for the next three years	3	yes, negative
Spain	<i>Ley Orgánica 7/1985</i>	1985	Immigration control	Outline rules for entry and residence	5	no
Spain	Regularization	1985-1986	Immigration control	Reduce # illegal immigrants in Spain	3	yes, positive
Spain	Visa requirement for Moroccans	1991	Immigration control	Reduce immigration	3	no

Spain	Regularization	1991-1992	Immigration control	Reduce # illegal immigrants in Spain	3	yes, positive
Spain	Bilateral agreement with Morocco	1993	Immigration control	Reduce smuggling of immigrants	3	yes, positive
Spain	Regularization	1996	Immigration control	Reduce # illegal immigrants in Spain by reg. of families	3	yes, positive
Spain	Integrated System of External Vigilance	1999	Immigration control	Reduce entry by <i>patera</i>	4	yes, positive
Spain	<i>Ley Orgánica 4/2000</i>	2000	Immigration control and integration	Automatic regularization of illegal entrants and increased social rights	3 (social portion revoked)	yes, positive
Spain	Amnesty programs	2000-2007	Immigration control	Reduce # of illegal immigrants in Spain	4	yes, positive
Spain	Article 31.1	2001	Immigration control	Reduce immigration with residency conditions, combat illegal immigration	3	no
Spain	Plan Africa	2006-2008	Immigration control	Development assistance and cooperation with Africa to reduce immigration to Spain	3	no
Spain	Plan Africa	2009-2012	Immigration control	Development assistance and cooperation with Africa to reduce immigration to Spain	?	no
Spain	Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants	1994	Integration	Reduce barriers to integration, reduce xenophobia, racism, discrimination	3	yes, positive
Spain	Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration	2007-2010	Integration and immigration control	Improve integration and better manage flows	3	yes, positive

Where	Policy	Year	Policy Type	Intended Outcome	Effectiveness Rating*	Impact on human security? **
EU	Maastricht Treaty: Creation of JHA	1992	Policy coordination	Begin cooperation on immigration policy among others	3	no
EU	Amsterdam Treaty	1999	Policy coordination	In part, to bring immigration matters under EU jurisdiction	3	no
EU	Tampere Summit: Hague program	1999/2004	Policy coordination	To increase cooperation on asylum and immigration	3	no
EU	Comprehensive Action Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings	2002	Policy coordination	Cooperation on controlling illegal immigration and trafficking	4	yes, positive
EU	Return Directive	2008	Immigration control, policy coordination	Harmonize rules for expelling illegal immigrants and allow for imprisonment of those who refuse	4	yes, negative
EU	Pact on Immigration and Asylum	2008	Policy coordination	Protect human rights of immigrants, cooperate with imm. sending states at EU level, some EU control over national policies, eventually integrate policies	3	yes, positive

Bibliography

- Abend, L. (20 October 2008). Spain tries to buy out immigrants. *Time*.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852000,00.html>.
- Apter, J. (2007, September 17). *L'immigration and Sarkozy's France*. Catalyst. Retrieved November 23 2007 from <http://83.137.212.42/siteArchive/catalystmagazine/Default.aspx?LocID0hgnew0za.RefLocID 0hg01b001006009.Lang EN.htm>.
- Arango, J. and Martin, P. (Spring 2005) *Best Practices to Manage Migration: Morocco-Spain*. *IMR*, Vol. 39, No 1: 258-269.
- Baldersheim, H., & Daloz, J.-P. (Eds.). (2003). *Political leadership in a global age: The experiences of France and Norway*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004, June). *The Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migrations*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved November 25, 2007 from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=230>.
- Benhabib, S. (2004). *The Rights of Others*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bidaguren, J. and Aurre, E.B. (25 September 2006). The Plan Africa 2006-2008- Issues for Debate. *FRIDE*,. <http://www.fride.org/publication/330/the-plan-africa-2006-2008--issues-for-debate>.
- Bookman, M.Z. (2002). *Ethnic Groups in Motion: Economic Competition and Migration in Multiethnic States*. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Bryant, L. (2010, January 21). *Immigration to Europe drops amid global economic downturn*. Retrieved March 2010, from The Sofia Echo:
http://sofiaecho.com/2010/01/21/845676_immigration-to-europe-drops-amid-global-economic-downturn
- Burnett, V. (2009, March 15). *Fruit Picking Causes Strife in Andalusia as Natives' Job of Last Resort*. Retrieved March 2010, from New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/world/europe/16andalucia.html?_r=2
- By year, nationality, and continent*. (2009, October 22). Retrieved March 2010, from Institut Nationale d'études démographiques:
http://www.ined.fr/en/pop_figures/france/immigration_flow/from_1994/
- Carling, J. (2007a). Migration control and migrant facilities at the Spanish-African borders. *International Migration*. (vol. 41, number 2). 316-343.
- Carling, J. (2007b). Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain. *International Migration*. (vol. 45).

“Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and Third Countries”. (16 May 2007). *European Union: Memo/07/197*.

Cole, A., Le Gales, P., & Levy, J. (Eds.). (2005). *Developments in French politics 3*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cornelius, W.A., Martin, P.L. & Hollifield, J.F. (Eds.). (1994) *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Crawford, Leslie. (October 2005). Spaniards Want More Action on Moroccan Migrants. *Financial Times*. 6, 18

Dunn, W. (2008) *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 4th edition.

Encarnación, O. G. (2004, Fall). *The politics of immigration: Why Spain is different*. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 167-185.

Estadísticas. *Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración*. Retrieved 1 April 2009 from <http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/>.

EU bids to revamp immigration controls. (2010, February 24). Retrieved March 2010, from EU Business: <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/immigration.2us/>

EU G6 nations agree to fight terrorism and illegal immigration (27 October 2006). *WorkPermit.com*. Retrieved 1 November 2009 from http://www.workpermit.com/news/2006_10_27/eu/eu_g6_immigration-terrorism_agreement.htm.

EU leaders say illegals can be sent home on charter flights. (2009, October 31). Retrieved March 2010, from Expatica: http://www.expatica.com/ch/news/local_news/EU-leaders-say-illegals-can-be-sent-home-on-charter-flights--_57718.html

European pact on immigration and asylum. (24 September 2008). Council of the European Union.

European Union Policy towards a Common European Asylum System. (2006, February). Retrieved March 2010, from Freedom, Security, & Justice: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/asylum/fsj_asylum_intro_en.htm

Feldblum, M. (1999). *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Flux d'immigration permanente par motif. (2003). Retrieved March 2010, from Institut nationale de la statistique et des études économiques.

- France. (2010, January). Retrieved April 2010, from International Organization for Migration: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/western-europe/france>
- France: *key facts and figures*. (2007, April 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6547841.stm>.
- Franklin, M., Mackie, T., & Valen, H. (1992). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- French take the most supportive stance toward immigration while the British take the least supportive stance. (2006, October). *Harris Interactive*. Retrieved November 26, 2007 from <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1107>.
- France moves toward partial burqa ban. (2010, January 26). Retrieved March 2010, from CNN: <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/01/26/france.burqa.ban/index.html>
- Geddes, A. (2000) *Immigration & European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Gillespie, R. & Youngs, R. (Eds.). (2001). *Spain: The European and International Challenges*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Glasies, M. & Kaldor, M. (Eds.) (2006). *A human security doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities*. London: Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.
- “Huddled against the masses”. (14 October 2006) *The Economist*. vol. 381, issue 8499. pg. 58-59.
- Human Security Report Project at the Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia. (2005). *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- “Humanitarian Donor Profile: Spain”. (April 2008) Development Initiatives. Global Humanitarian Assistance,. Retrieved 2 April 2009 from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/pdfdownloads/Spain%20donor%20profile_final.pdf.
- Información sobre el desarrollo del reglamento de la ley orgánica 4/2000...* (2005, October). Retrieved March 2010, from <http://www.intermigra.info/extranjeria/archivos/legislacion/Instrucciones.pdf>
- Ireland, P.R. (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Policies in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Janoski, T., Alford, R., Hicks, A., & Schwartz, M.A. (Eds.) (2005). *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- King, R., Lazardis, G., & Tsardanidis, C. (Eds.). (2000) *Eldorado or Fortress?: Migration in Southern Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Kostakopoulou, T. (2001). *Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration in the European Union: Between Past and Future*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kreis, S. (2000). Lecture 13: The French Revolution: The Radical Stage, 1792-1794. The History Religion & ethics : Islam. BBC. Retrieved 9 October 2009 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/hijab_2.shtml.
- Laubenthal, B. (2007) The Emergence of Pro-Regularization Movements in Western Europe. *International Migration*, vol. 45.
- Laurence, J. & Vaisse, J. (2006). *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*. New York: The Free Press.
- Martin, P., Martin, S., & Weil, P. (2006). *Managing migration : the promise of cooperation*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Matlack, C. (10 May 2007) How Spain Thrives on Immigration. *Business Week Online*. http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2007/gb20070509_505675.htm
- McLaren, L. M. (2008). *Constructing democracy in Southern Europe: A comparative analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey*. Milton Park: Routledge.
- McLean, R. (2005, January 20). *Juan Carlos's visit focuses on immigration and terrorism: Spain-Morocco ties on the mend*. Retrieved April 2010, from NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/20/news/20iht-spain_ed3_.html
- Messina, A.M. & Lahav, G. (Eds.). (2006). *The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Le Ministère: Missions and role*. (2008). Retrieved March 2010, from Ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire: http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_org&numrubrique=311&numarticle=1331
- Money, J. (1999). *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- “Morocco”. (23 April 2009) The World Factbook. Retrieved April 2010 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html>

- Moroccan Migration to Spain. (August 2007) *UN-INSTRAW*. United Nations.
http://www.un-instraw.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=345&lang=en&task=view&Itemid=449
- Muslims in Europe: country guide (23 December 2005). BBC News. Retrieved 9 October 2009 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm>.
- Newland, K., Rannveig A., Dovelyn, and Terrazas, A. (September 2008) Learning by Doing: Experiences of Circular Migration. *Insight*. Migration Policy Institute.
- Oommen, T. K. (2002). *Pluralism, equality and identity: Comparative studies*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Parliament adopts directive on return of illegal immigrants*. (2008, 18 June). Retrieved March , from European Parliament:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20080616IPR31785>
- Pastore, F. (3-4 March 2008). *Circular Migration: Background note for the Meeting of Experts on Legal Migration*. Rabat.
- Plan África 2009-2012* . (2009, November 4). Retrieved March 2010, from Ministerios de asuntos exteriores y de cooperación:
http://www.maec.es/es/Home/Paginas/planafrica2009_12.aspx
- Plewa, P. (May 2008) *Migrants in Spanish Strawberries. Immigration Reform: Implications for Farmers, Farm Workers, and Communities*. Retrieved April 4 from http://migration.ucdavis.edu/cf/files/conference_may_2008/plewa-migrants_in_spanish_strawberries.pdf.
- Rebac, L. (2009, December 30). *Integration elusive for France's Muslims*. Retrieved March 2010, from Passport: <http://www.boston.com/news/world/blog/2009/12/-the-grand-mosq.html>
- Remacle, E. (September 2008). *Approaches to human security: Japan, Canada and Europe in comparative perspective*. *The Journal of Social Science*, 66.
- Rioufol, I. (2007, September 21). L'immigration, ultime tabou. *Le Figaro*.
- Spain*. (2010, February). Retrieved April 2010, from International Organization for Migration: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/southern-europe/spain>
- Stovall, T., & Van Den Abbeele, G. (Eds.). (2003). *French Civilization and its Discontents: Nationalism, Civilization, Race*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Tales from Eurabia - Tales from Eurabia; The West and Islam. (2006, June 24). *The Economist* .

- Tarvaine, S. (2010, January 26). *Spain's economic crisis revives debate on immigration*. Retrieved March 2010, from Deutsche Presse Agentur.
- Tedesco, L. (January 2010). *Immigration and foreign policy: the economic crisis and its challenges*. FRIDE Policy Brief.
- Torns, T. (8 April 2006). The New Law on Foreign Persons: a difficult but necessary beginning. *European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line*, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/04/feature/es0004183f.htm>
- Towards a common European Union immigration policy (2007). *Freedom, Security and Justice*. Justice & Home Affairs: The European Commission. Retrieved 27 October 2009 from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm.
- Ulman, L. & Eichengreen, B. (1993). *Labor and an Integrated Europe*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution
- Ulusoy, A. (December 2007). The Islamic headscarf problem before secular legal systems: factual and legal developments in Turkish, French and European human rights laws. *European Journal of Migration & Law* (vol. 9, issue 4, p. 419-433).
- Vogel, U. & Moran, M. (Eds.). (1991). *The Frontiers of Citizenship*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Wallace, H., Wallace, W., & Pollack, A. (2005). *Policy-Making in the European Union*. (5th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- The war of French dressing; France's ban on the burqa. (2010, January 16). *The Economist* .
- Wolfreys, J. (2010, March 24). *Did Sarkozy boost the Front National?* Retrieved April 2010, from Guardian: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/24/nicolas-sarkozy-front-national>
- “Workshop on Creating Development Benefits Through Circular Migration”. 8-9 September 2008. European Commission and the Government of Mauritius.
- World Bank. (2009). *Middle East and North Africa: World development indicators* . World Bank.
- Wrench, J., Rea, A., & Ouali, N. (Eds.). (1999). *Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Integration and Exclusion in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.