Link to the University of Pittsburgh Homepage
Link to the University Library System Homepage Link to the Contact Us Form

Economic Activities and Networks of Relatioships

Lee, Yong-Ju (2007) Economic Activities and Networks of Relatioships. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

Primary Text

Download (522kB) | Preview


The fundamental question I address in the dissertation is how the behavior of economic agents interacts with networks of relationships which underlie a wide set of economic situations. In Ch. 2, entitled "Decentralized Information Sharing in Oligopoly," I analyze the incentives of firms for information sharing in a decentralized environment when firms face a stochastic demand. In order to do that, I develop a two stage model of strategic network formation, where a cooperative network formation stage is played in the first stage and a noncooperative Bayesian Cournot game is played in the second stage. I derive pure strategy mixed cooperative and noncooperative equilibria that are subgame perfect and stable, and characterize the resulting network structures. Ch. 3, entitled "A War of Attrition in Network Formation," investigates the strategic behavior of agents when they face a decision on the formation of relationships. I apply a war of attrition to the dynamic network formation process when links among agents have characteristics of public goods. Agents are randomly but exogenously matched in each stage. Based on Bala and Goyal's (2000) two-way flow model, I characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes and discuss their efficiency. Finally, Ch. 4, entitled "Social Norms and Trust among Strangers," (with Huan Xie) studies the development of trust and reciprocity among strangers in the indefinitely repeated trust game with random matching. If reputation is attached to the community as a whole and if a single defection leads to the destruction of the cooperative social norm through contagious punishments, the cooperative social norm can be sustained by the self-interested community members in the equilibrium. We provide sufficient conditions that support the social norm of trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium.


Social Networking:
Share |


Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Lee, Yong-Juyol4@pitt.eduYOL4
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairDuffy, Johnjduffy@pitt.eduJDUFFY
Committee MemberGal-Or, Estheresther@katz.pitt.eduESTHER
Committee MemberTemzelides, Tedtedt@pitt.eduTEDT
Committee MemberUnver, Utkuuunver@pitt.eduUUNVER
Date: 22 June 2007
Date Type: Completion
Defense Date: 9 April 2007
Approval Date: 22 June 2007
Submission Date: 23 April 2007
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Information sharing; Interaction structure; Matching; Networks; Social norms
Other ID:, etd-04232007-165226
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 19:41
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:42


Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item