

**ATTITUDES TOWARD MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CZECH
REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA**

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How can we account for the strikingly different political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks in the post-communist era, despite a half-century of shared political history and similar political institutions? In order to answer this question, I examine what motivates ordinary citizens to support or reject the EU in two new member states of post-communist Europe. In this study I investigate the structure of political attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, finding that while utilitarian cost-benefit analyses matter, various manifestations of identity (both European and national) play crucial parts in structuring attitudes toward the EU. Moreover, using historical evidence and data from an original survey conducted in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, I reveal that the manifestation and importance of identity in support for EU membership is contextually-based. The counterintuitive role that identity is shown to play in shaping attitudes toward the EU according to context is a novel finding in political science that merits further research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	XII
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 A MOST SIMILAR SYSTEMS DESIGN: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA.....	6
1.2 A ROADMAP.....	12
2.0 THE CONTEXT: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA.....	18
2.1 KEY INDICATORS.....	19
2.1.1 Czech Republic.....	19
2.1.2 Slovakia.....	21
2.2 HISTORY THROUGH WORLD WAR I.....	22
2.2.1 The Czech lands	22
2.2.2 The Slovak lands	28
2.3 INTERWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE VELVET DIVORCE: 1918-1993.....	32
2.3.1 Interwar period: the First Republic.....	32
2.3.2 World War II: Nazi protectorate in Czech lands and Slovak puppet state.....	33
2.3.3 Postwar period: Communist takeover	38

2.3.4	Prague Spring: 1968	39
2.3.5	Normalization	41
2.3.6	Soviet reforms and the Czechoslovak student march: 1989	41
2.3.7	Communist capitulation and transition to democracy: the Velvet Revolution	42
2.3.8	The split of Czechoslovakia: the Velvet Divorce	44
2.3.9	Summary	46
2.4	1993 TO 2004	47
2.4.1	Czech Republic	47
2.4.2	Slovakia	50
2.5	THE BID FOR THE EU	55
2.5.1	Czech Republic	55
2.5.2	Slovakia	60
2.5.3	Summary	63
2.6	CONCLUSION	63
3.0	REVISITING THEORY AND PROPOSING PREFERENCES	65
3.1	LITERATURE REVIEW	66
3.1.1	The structure of political attitudes	66
3.1.2	Attitudes toward the European Union	67
3.1.2.1	Utilitarian self-interest: multiple definitions	69
3.1.2.2	Threat and the many faces of identity	71
3.1.2.3	Other variables: party cues and ideology; political awareness and political knowledge	74

3.1.3	Predispositions and attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia	76
3.1.3.1	Czech and Slovak attitudinal differences – and the role of identity	77
3.1.3.2	Differences in support for EU membership in the Czech Republic and Slovakia	78
3.2	THEORIZING SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA	81
3.2.1	Self-interest.....	82
3.2.2	Self-interest and contextual differences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.....	84
3.2.3	What else might matter?	87
3.2.3.1	Group identification	88
3.3	PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A MODEL OF ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA.....	108
3.4	CONCLUSION	110
4.0	THE STRUCTURE OF CZECH AND SLOVAK ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EU.....	112
4.1	RECAPPING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENTING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES.....	113
4.1.1	Survey respondents and procedure.....	116
4.1.2	Measures	118
4.1.3	Analytical methodology	124

4.1.4	Results and discussion	125
4.1.4.1	One-way analysis of variance: results and discussion	125
4.1.4.2	Multiple regression analysis.....	134
4.2	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION	144
5.0	CONCLUSION.....	147
5.1	THE LANDSCAPE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA.....	148
5.2	LIMITATIONS.....	156
5.3	CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS.....	157
5.4	CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR	160
5.5	CONCLUSION	163
APPENDIX A	164
APPENDIX B	200
APPENDIX C	205
BIBLIOGRAPHY	227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 ANOVAs for independent variables and dependent variable.....	127
Table 4.2 Regression model.....	136
Table A.2.1 Survey non-interviews.....	168
Table A.2.2 Survey interview dates (2006).....	169
Table A.3.1 Survey items.....	169
Table A.4.1 Distribution of ethnicity.....	174
Table A.4.2 Distributions of demographic variables.....	175
Table A.4.3 Distribution of party identification.....	177
Table A.4.4 Distribution of region.....	178
Table B.1.1 Parties classified by Kopecky and Mudde’s 2002 EU orientation typology	201
Table B.2.1 Measures.....	203
Table C.1.1 Factor analysis.....	208
Table C.1.2 Attitudinal dimensions extracted from factor analysis, by country.....	212
Table C.1.3 Rotated factor loadings, Czech sample.....	219
Table C.1.4 Rotated factor loadings, Slovak sample.....	220
Table C.2.1 Regression analyses.....	222
Table C.2.2 ANOVA of political knowledge and ideology.....	225

Table C.2.3 ANOVA of political awareness and ideology..... 225

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Czech and Slovak Support for EU Membership, 1995-2003	10
Figure 1.2 Czech and Slovak Support for EU Membership, 2002-2003	11
Figure 2.1 EU membership “a good thing”	59
Figure 3.1 Intergroup bias: social competition and consensual discrimination.....	102
Figure 3.2 Applying SIT to the Czech Republic and Slovakia.....	104
Figure 3.3 A model of attitude structure toward EU membership.....	109
Figure 3.4 Recap of hypotheses	110

PREFACE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the years since communism collapsed, the newest democracies of Europe have faced multiple transformations, from the initial transition to democracy to the more recent “return to Europe.” With democratic credentials in hand, many post-communist European countries formalized their return to Europe by joining the European Union (EU). Membership in the EU, a supranational entity that regulates the economic, political, and even social standards of its members, served to solidify the transition from communism to democracy and offered economic benefits that small states normally lack as lone actors in the world market.

But change comes at a price that often has consequences for democracies. Citizens can “throw [out] the rascals” whom they perceive to bring them misfortune, or simply refuse to go along with what leaders want. With the collapse of communism, elites had to persuade citizens to endure paths to democracy and a market economy that were often more painful than citizens had expected. By 1993, the EU was beginning to develop strict accession standards (the Copenhagen Criteria) that were applied to post-communist Europe beginning with Agenda 2000 in 1997. Thus, little more than ten years after the fall of communism, elites in many post-communist European states found themselves further strengthening their efforts to convince their citizens to undergo more economic and political transformation due to these strict accession standards of the EU. At the same time, membership in the EU could have been – and in some cases was – an easy sell. After more than forty years of economic and social restrictions,

political repression and relative isolation, the package offered by the EU -- the freedom to travel, the reward for personal initiative via an expanded market, and “official” status as a Western-style democracy (not to mention the opportunity to [re]join Europe) – was a difficult offer to refuse. In the end, citizens in ten post-communist Europe were sufficiently convinced to vote in favor of membership in the referendums of 2003, and much of Europe is now formally reunited within the supranational EU.

But the decision to join the EU did not remove it as a salient political issue within the domestic political space of its new members. The EU’s rigorous demands on member states and the constant bargaining among levels of governance continue to provide a platform around which politicians and parties can distinguish themselves to constituents. Take, for example, the response to the attempt to create and adopt a European Constitution in 2005. As the signatories to and agents of the 2005 EU Constitution, each member state’s government had the implicit charge of selling the painstakingly-crafted Constitution to its population. But the Constitution also provided an issue around which opposition parties could position themselves, criticizing it as too long, too far removed from the people, and against national interests. Not surprisingly, major EU officials themselves declared the EU “in crisis” after the French and Dutch populations rejected the proposed Constitution in referendums (*BBC News*, 18 June 2005). Despite declarations by the EU and national governments that the EU must be brought “closer to the people,” opposition parties are well-placed to use the popular sentiments described above to gain leverage against pro-EU governments. The ultimate result of the relationship between domestic member-state politics and EU directives is a scenario in which, as long as the EU is present, opposing parties and politicians will continually appeal to constituents using the EU as a platform to define themselves for re-election purposes (in the manner of Fenno 1978). In turn, as

politicians refer to their positions vis-à-vis the EU, they can help provide structure to citizens' attitudes.

More generally, the EU is more than just an institution and supplier of governance. Though it is often referred to as an elitist project that does not have widespread public support, it is a body that could not exist without legitimacy¹ in the form of some implicit popular support from its citizens (de Vreese CES WP#116). As Sharpf (1997) argues, a “democratic deficit” has emerged from a lack of legitimacy in that EU decisions are not sufficiently responsive to European public opinion. Hooghe (2003) further established the gap between elite opinion and public opinion on European integration in areas where political elites and national publics are willing to grant power to the EU. This gap is important as institutional reforms have altered the EU in the direction of a representative democracy (Gabel and Anderson 2002). Legitimacy maintained through referenda on issues of membership, key policies, endorsement of treaties, and constitutional documents has become increasingly common in EU governance since the Danish 1992 rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht, highlighting the importance of public acceptance of EU initiatives (de Vreese CES WP#116).

The authorization of power holders is not limited to popular referenda, however, but also depends (at least indirectly) on legitimization via national elections. In order to ensure that citizens believe that the EU represents them, member state governments must monitor whether citizens support crucial EU policies, and political leaders must appeal to citizens to go along with controversial initiatives. If voters disagree, they may punish politicians and parties by

¹ I define legitimacy as the popular acceptance of a governing body as an authority. Robert Dahl (1989) likens legitimacy to a reservoir: as long as legitimacy remains at a certain level, stability is maintained; if it falls below this level, stability is endangered. Without at least a minimal amount of legitimacy (or without sufficient tanks and guns, the source of stability in totalitarian communist Europe), a governing body is likely to experience deadlock or collapse.

considering EU performance records in their voting decisions in national elections. The important role of the European Council², while helping to legitimize EU decisions, also leaves the member-state governments vulnerable to such punishment for Council decisions (de Vreese CES WP#116). In the most basic sense, the EU remains viable on the condition that it has public support; since it does not have a mode of supranational law enforcement, public support and acceptance of its presence is a condition of its survival (Caldeira and Gibson 1995). Because the EU relies on public support for its legitimacy, how citizens think about the EU is important to the success of the European project.

Scholars have investigated the predictors of attitudes toward the EU as early as the first round of enlargement in 1972 (Shepherd 1975). These studies have told us that with knowledge of where a citizen stands in the socioeconomic hierarchy, one can reliably predict whether that citizen supports the EU (Cichowski 2002). For example, Gabel (1998b, 1998c) has found that the higher one's socioeconomic status, the more likely s/he is to support EU membership. However, these economic approaches minimized the EU's supra-national, "Europeanizing" character, and scholars began to examine the roles that other variables, such as national and European identities, play in opinion toward European integration (de Vreese CES WP#116). These new models were bolstered by the finding that the combination of factors that predicts a given citizen's attitudes varies from study to study, likely because of "irreducible" contextual factors like the "stickiness of national identity" that can both reinforce and undermine support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 427, 424). The role of national identity is a particularly tricky variable in any model of attitudes toward EU membership as "the impact of

² The European Council, which consists of the elected heads of state from each EU member state (along with the President of the European Commission), sets the EU policy agenda and is generally considered the engine of European integration.

identity on political attitudes is neither automatic nor uniform” (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 424). When Europeans, East and West, judge the EU according to a specific mixture of rational calculations and affective attachments, predicting the conditions under which citizens will support the EU becomes a complicated endeavor.

This project is broadly concerned with what motivates people to support or reject the EU in two member states of post-communist Europe, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While I examine the universal factors that drive political attitudes toward the EU in this study, I also attempt to show that in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, national identity, particularly the interplay of national identity with national context, plays a central role in predicting differences in attitudes toward membership in the EU.

For this study, the cases have been selected so as to maximize experimental variance and minimize extraneous variance (see Peters 1998 for a detailed discussion of the use of these terms in comparative politics). In other words, the two particular countries selected share many attributes (i.e., extraneous variance is minimized) – including attributes that other scholars might point to as possible indicators of EU support -- and yet their citizens’ attitudes toward the EU differ dramatically. For example, some scholars might argue that differences in political institutions explain why we see variance in attitudes within different countries. However, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the political institutions are arguably more similar to each other than are any other two cases of post-communist Europe, and yet the attitudes of each country still differ considerably. Equally important, there are also many key factors that we can observe, such as post-World War I histories and types of (and proportions of) minorities, that differ between the two countries. Thus, using a “most similar systems” design (Przeworski and Teune 1970), I employ the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which allows me to hold a

number of alternate explanations constant. As countries that shared a federal government for more than a half century and continue to feature similar political institutions and similar status as new EU member-states, the considerable differences in the level of support in the Czech Republic and Slovakia make these cases a virtual laboratory for examining factors that contribute to national differences in political attitudes.

In the next section of this chapter, I further develop and justify the most similar systems design of the study, briefly explaining why I selected the Czech Republic and Slovakia as my countries of analysis. I will finish the chapter with a detailed roadmap of this study.

1.1 A MOST SIMILAR SYSTEMS DESIGN: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

For post-communist countries, the story of the “return to Europe” is compelling—it makes intuitive sense that East Europeans might want to formalize their return to Europe by becoming part of the EU. But if we want to isolate the motivations behind the desire for (and in some cases, reluctance toward) this return, we need to examine how ordinary citizens make up their minds about the EU – that is, we need to study attitudes toward the EU at the individual level and not (rather, not simply) at the aggregate level. It would be fallacious, for example, to assume that the same explanation for why certain collectivities support EU membership more than others also holds for why certain individuals support EU membership more than others. Instead, the relationships that we might observe in aggregates may not apply to individuals. In the classic example of what I have just described, the “ecological fallacy,” Robinson (1950) found a positive relationship between the level of English literacy of an area and the number of foreign-

born residents in the US. However, at closer inspection he found that the foreign-born residents were not more literate in English than average, but instead the immigrants had chosen to reside in areas that happened already to have high literacy rates. In order to avoid the ecological fallacy, we should examine not only why certain collectivities support the EU, but also why individuals within such collectivities do or do not support it.

This is not a straightforward endeavor, though, because individuals do not live in a vacuum. Attitudes to the EU are contextual, determined in large part by the history and politics of each country (Marks and Hooghe 2003).³ As Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue, “countries are irreducible political contexts that interact with individual attributes to produce political effects – in this case, support for or opposition to European integration” (427). As B. Guy Peters (1998) writes,

The most interesting questions in comparative politics appear to be the most difficult to research effectively. Part of the basic logic of comparative politics is that the context within which politics takes place is important for shaping the behavior observed. Similarly, the behavior of aggregates – whether nation-states or institutions – should be closely related to the behavior of the components of those aggregates. Finding the means of making those linkages is not always easy, but must be part of the ongoing agenda of comparative analysis (204-5).

In order to control any extraneous complexity involved in a multicountry study of context and political attitudes, I restrict my study to a careful most similar systems design (MSSD, Przeworski and Teune 1970) in which I employ the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. With these cases, we can hold constant often-cited explanatory variables that operate at the aggregate level, such as political institutions or initial transition to democracy. But there are important differences between the two countries, such as socio-demographic characteristics like

³ While nothing can be definitely “proven” in a soft science like political science, factors like historical context can play a major role in a quantitative and/or quasi-experimental analysis by including them in the analytical methodologies used to assess data. I will handle the role of context in my analysis by hypothesizing about it, operationalizing it, and analyzing it.

religion and ethnic minorities, which may prove relevant to differences in political judgment-making and, ultimately, political outcomes. This MSSD allows the comparison of aggregate-level relationships between the Czech Republic and Slovakia (by holding certain aggregate-level variables constant). At the same time, my collection of individual-level data permits me to engage in individual-level analysis as well, making cross-level inferences possible while protecting against the ecological fallacy.


Political attitudes vary in significant ways in the aggregate between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. For example, longitudinal survey data collected since the “Velvet Divorce” of Czechoslovakia in 1993 show that Czech citizens tend to vote predictably according to socioeconomic interests, measured by perceptions of the present and future economy and household income. Slovak citizens, in contrast, tend to vote according to symbolic issues, such as patriotism and other affectively-based group attachments, regardless of their socioeconomic status (Whitefield 2002; Krause 2001; Evans and Whitefield 2000; Rose et al. 1998; Bútorová et al. 1998). Slovakia has witnessed the development of a political system in which parties are elected on patriotic and nationalistic platforms (Whitefield 2002; Krause 2001, 2000; Evans and Whitefield 1998), whereas in the Czech Republic parties maintain popular support according to standard left-right ideological cleavages (Whitefield 2002; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Večerník and Matějů 1999; Vlachová 2000; Večerník 1996). Despite having had an independent, democratic state in which to operate for over a decade, parliamentary parties in Slovakia are still difficult to categorize on the standard ideological spectrum for domestic issues.⁴ Those parties that seem to fit “left,” “right,” or “center” descriptions simply have not been able to amass enough votes to

⁴ Newspaper analyses of the Slovak election of September 2002 rejoiced in the election of a “center-right” government because it was strongly pro-NATO and pro-EU. But when the positions of members within major parties are compared, particularly on domestic issues, there is wide variety of placement that ranges all across the ideological spectrum.

have any practical power in the parliament. In the Czech Republic, however, the situation is reversed; the current government and its opposition are respectively clearly leftist and clearly rightist.⁵

Equally compelling differences can be seen in attitudes toward EU membership. These we can examine systematically across the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In contrast to party systems, for which such a systematic, controlled comparison is rendered unmanageable by important differences in how the parties are defined between the two countries, we can compare attitudes to the EU because there is only one EU to which both countries belong. While membership in the EU remains constant across both cases (that is, both countries ostensibly and formally are equal members of the EU), attitudes toward the EU vary: that is, each country's population's support for the EU consistently has been at different levels relative to each other over the past fifteen years. As Figure 1.1 indicates, Czechs have consistently exhibited the lowest levels of support for EU membership among the applicant countries, while Slovaks' support for integration has been considerably higher.

⁵ This is not a new development; left-right opposition has characterized the Czech parliament since its inception (Klíma 1998).



Source: Eurobarometer (CEEB 6; CEEB 7; CEEB 8; CCEB 2001.1; CCEB 2002.2; CCEB 2003.2).
 Question: “If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of [our country’s] membership of the European Union, would you personally vote for or against membership?” “Yes” answers only; sample includes only respondents aged 18 and older.
 Note: Eurobarometer data do not exist for this question in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Dashed line on graph is speculative based on data before and after this period.

Figure 1.1 Czech and Slovak Support for EU Membership, 1995-2003

Although both publics voted overwhelmingly in favor of membership in the 2003 referenda, Figure 1.2 shows that in the run-up to the referenda most Czechs only supported membership “a little bit,” while the majority of Slovaks were “strongly supportive” (Pohlman 2004).⁶ At the other end of the spectrum, more Slovaks were more likely to “strongly

⁶ This trend has been consistent since 1996 when both countries applied for EU membership. Though the data provided here were not gathered at the same historical moment, they are the best data we have; publicly-available

disapprove” of EU membership compared to the Euroskeptical Czechs who, like their pro-EU countrymen, were more hesitant to take a strong position. EU membership does not seem to resonate similarly in both countries when it comes to popular opinion. Czechs appear to be largely ambivalent, while Slovaks are comparatively certain.




Figure 1.2 Czech and Slovak Support for EU Membership, 2002-2003

surveys that allow respondents to indicate their level of support on a 6-point Likert scales have not been conducted simultaneously in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Dichotomous answer categories (e.g., support or reject EU membership) do not illuminate the differences in level of support, so a more nuanced survey was necessary.

As Figure 1.1 indicates, the difference in aggregate level of support for EU membership (that is, the difference between all levels of support compared to all levels of rejection) hovers around ten percentage points. While this overall difference is likely statistically and substantively significant, its real impact can be imagined in the case of a popular vote. A ten percentage point difference may mean the difference between popular approval of a major policy with large consequences or maintaining the status quo. What is more interesting in terms of this project is differences in the magnitude of support (demonstrated in Figure 1.2) rather than the dichotomous choice to either support or reject EU membership. Whether this ten percentage point difference in overall support may or may not have a meaningful impact on outcomes, the difference in degree of support between both countries may be an indication of a different set of considerations (or predispositions) underneath the surface that informs attitudes toward EU membership.

1.2 A ROADMAP

This project's overarching goal of mapping political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is necessitated by the fact that we simply do not know with any certainty what the ingredients of attitudes toward the EU are in either of these new member-states. Existing research only tells us which considerations, or predispositions,⁷ matter generally to attitudes toward the EU, whether across cases, time, or issues.

⁷ Predispositions are general, abstract, stable mental categories that organize an individual's attitudes. Predispositions can be thought of as the "old, generic knowledge" that is used to interpret new, specific information (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1100). Alvarez and Brehm (2002) refer to predispositions as "inclinations to judge an object in a particular way" (15). Predispositions are the durable foundations of beliefs, encompassing core values,

. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the social, economic, and political histories of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The chapter also summarizes the characteristics of these two cases that make them particularly useful places in which to examine the sources of differences in attitudes toward the EU. These characteristics are thought to condition the structure of citizens' attitudes toward the EU via predispositions such as national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

In order to construct a realistic map of attitudes toward the EU, in Chapter 3 review the existing literature and propose hypotheses to test in the subsequent chapter. In the first section, I evaluate and synthesize strands of research regarding pan-European attitudes toward the EU with in-depth qualitative studies of Czech and Slovak political culture. This section outlines theory about the sources of attitudes toward the EU that “travel” from West Europe to the East, though with varying success. The mixed success of these hypotheses across cases is a price of this “concept traveling”—the more cases we attempt to cover with these explanations, the broader and more general the explanations must necessarily become (Sartori 1970). In order to review the conclusions of existing studies with greater depth (and thus with more validity), I propose to examine them with fewer cases.

The second section of Chapter 3 discusses existing studies of political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and what they reveal about attitudes in a new context, post-communist Europe. A comparison of Czechs and Slovaks in this literature indicates that both groups of citizens generally think about the same considerations when evaluating political issues, with the exception of identity (Deegan-Krause 2003a). This research shows that Czechs and

group attachments, affective judgments, impressions, and expectations (15). Predispositions matter because they simplify, or structure, preferences into a small number of dimensions. These dimensions serve as ideological constraints on citizens' political attitudes, such that an individual's positions on a broad range of issues are related to each other in consistent and identifiable ways (Gabel and Anderson 2002; see also Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985).

Slovaks appear to contemplate similar pros and cons when thinking of the EU, but that Slovaks have one additional sentiment that distinguishes them from their Czech neighbors: the need for positive national identity, fueling an attraction to the positive identity benefits that come with the solidification of a new status quo, one in which Slovakia might become formally recognized as equal to neighbors that have long been superior in the European status hierarchy (for a discussion of the role of national identity in voting behavior in Slovakia, see Deegan-Krause 2003a and Gyárfášová 2000).

I argue that the role identity plays in support for EU membership across context is the likely explanation for differences in Czech and Slovak attitudes toward the EU. Czechs believe they have always been part of Europe, viewing the EU as a natural extension of their own identity. In contrast, in a post-communist Europe, Slovaks seem to view the EU as an opportunity to solidify their post-communist social standing in the world, substantiate their view of themselves as equal to the West, and to make concrete a European identity that has eluded them for centuries (Gyárfášová 2000; Henderson 2002). What is notable in this comparison, particularly from the view of political psychology, is that it provides the groundwork for an exegesis of the contextual conditions under which national identity may either support or take away from support for EU membership. Moreover, this comparison substantiates previous studies of Czech and Slovak attitudes (and their attitudes toward the EU) that generally conclude that the difference in these groups' attitudes lies in the role of identity (Deegan-Krause 2003a). From these two perspectives, this study contributes to both the comparative political science literature and the political behavior literature simultaneously.

The next section of Chapter 3 situates the study in the social-psychological underpinnings of the “self-interest versus identity” paradigm in EU studies. In this chapter I discuss the various

conceptions of self-interest that exist in studies of comparative politics and political psychology as well as the roles that perceived group threat – both realistic and symbolic – have in attitudes toward EU membership. I also discuss other implications of identity than those that have been formally tested in the existing literature on the EU member states. Specifically, I discover that the hostility toward other groups that we normally find when we study identity (that is, what psychologists refer to as “ingroup favoritism”) is not the only consequence of a salient social identity. Social identity theory (SIT) also predicts “outgroup favoritism,” which we can observe when a particular group actually prefers (and/or wants to become part of) another. Social identity theory specifically predicts the conditions under which identity is manifest either as ingroup favoritism or outgroup favoritism, and predicts how groups behave in each condition. This theory, along with evidence from contemporary Slovak history, suggests that the tendency of Slovaks to view the EU as an opportunity to reset their post-communist European social standing and to solidify a newfound European identity that has eluded them for centuries (Gyárfášová 2000; Henderson 2002) is a manifestation of outgroup favoritism. Together with theory about self-interest, social identity theory can be used to formulate specific hypotheses about differences in attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

With this review of theory, I propose a model of political attitude structure toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I set forth a series of hypotheses that explicitly take context into account. In accordance with extant literature, I expect that positive self-interested economic evaluations and a feeling of pan-European identity are positively associated with support for EU membership, while perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat are negatively associated with endorsement of EU membership. I propose that context regulates some of these expectations, particularly the relationship of self-interested evaluations and perceptions of realistic threat to

support for EU membership, altering the strength of the relationship. In marked contrast to the existing literature on attitudes toward the EU, I propose that national identity, particularly national pride, may actually enhance support for EU membership. I use expectations from social identity theory to make the case that context shapes whether national pride has either a positive or negative effect on EU membership. I propose that national pride dampens support for EU membership in the Czech Republic, while it actually promotes support for EU membership in Slovakia. If I find support for these hypotheses in the resulting analysis, then this study may significantly alter our understanding of mass support for EU membership.

Chapter 4 begins with an account of the operationalization of hypotheses and the methodology of the survey experiment and follows with an empirical test of my models of attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The chapter first describes the original survey instrument designed and implemented for this project and the measures created from the survey items. I first explore the attributes of the people sampled in the pooled Czech and Slovak dataset and note instances of missing cases for any variables of interest. Next, using the instrument designed for this project, I conduct analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the structure of my explanatory variables and other indicators (for example, political values) between each group, providing a picture of the general contours of attitudinal differences vis-à-vis the EU between Czechs and Slovaks. Multiple linear regression is then used to test a static model of predispositions associated with attitudes toward the EU in the pooled sample. To examine whether there are differences in the way that key predispositions such as identity influence views of joining the EU that are specific to Czechs and Slovaks, interaction terms are used (e.g., country*identity). I find support for the majority of my hypotheses, particularly my hypothesis that national pride may both enhance and decrease support for EU membership. This

finding is an important one as it points to a new avenue of research in the comparative study of support for EU membership.

In Chapter 5 I recap my theory and findings and also discuss the theoretical and policy implications -- namely, how a model of attitude structure that specifies the role of national identity adds to the literature on the changing nature of representation and mass-party linkages in the European Union. The counterintuitive role that identity is shown to play in shaping attitudes toward the EU according to context is a novel finding that merits further research. As the literature increasingly addresses questions of representation, policy making, and the future political dynamics of the EU (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999), specification of how citizens' attitudes toward the EU are structured (and more precisely, the role of identity in those attitudes) will help scholars evaluate the character and quality of representation in EU policy making (Gabel and Anderson 2002) as well as routes to persuasion that politicians can manipulate in order to pass preferred policies.

2.0 THE CONTEXT: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

This chapter retells the past and current histories of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This chapter's goal is to provide the historical content for the contextual component of the theoretical approach that will be proposed in Chapter 3 and to set the stage for the propositions to be examined later. I describe historical and current social, political, and economic contexts because these are likely to condition the predispositions that organize an individual's attitudes toward the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

Why is context so important? Context shapes the longstanding beliefs and values – the predispositions -- that inform attitudes. According to Zaller (1992), predispositions are, at least in part, distilled from a person's lifetime experiences, including childhood socialization and experience with policy issues. This experience includes such things as earning a living, paying taxes, racial/ethnic discrimination, and one's social and economic location. In other words, predispositions are at least in part conditioned and bound by the mores of the national, social, economic, and historical structures that surround the individual. Because predispositions are conditioned by one's experience with that context, it is essential in the present study to understand the historical and current context of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the chapters that follow, I intend to show that while Czechs and Slovaks evaluate membership in the EU through a similar set of predispositions, context may explain why some of these considerations vary in strength or even direction vis-à-vis support for EU membership. In

particular, I aim to show that the relationship of national identity and pride on EU membership varies according to context.

I begin this chapter by introducing the two countries central to my project, providing current information on their populations and other demographic and economic data. The chapter then recounts the histories of the Czech and Slovak lands, beginning from the time of the first written histories of these nations through their tenure as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the interwar inception of Czechoslovakia, the tumultuous interlude of World War II, communism, and the transition to democracy. I proceed to discuss the events of a democratic Czech Republic and Slovakia since the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and conclude the chapter with a report on the current governmental structure of each country, their respective economies, and their divergent roads to EU membership. All of this is designed to highlight the surprisingly divergent historical legacies of these outwardly similar nations. It is this dissonance that will provide the necessary variation for my empirical research.

2.1 KEY INDICATORS

2.1.1 Czech Republic

The Czech Republic, estimated population 10.2 million, is situated to the west of Slovakia in Central Europe and borders Germany, Austria, Slovakia, and Poland.⁸ The Czech lands are

⁸ The facts and figures in this section are reported from the U.S. Department of State's Country Background Note for the Czech Republic, which can be found online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm>. Supporting figures can be found at the *Economist's* country briefing for the Czech Republic, found at <http://www.economist.com/countries/CzechRepublic/>.

divided between Bohemia and Moravia. Bohemians (who, in Czech, are literally called “Czechs”) originate in the eponymous western Czech region and compose approximately 90% of the Czech Republic’s population at 9.25 million citizens. Moravians, originating from the region of Moravia in eastern Czech Republic, number approximately 380,000 citizens. The vast majority (95%, nearly 10 million) of Czech citizens is ethnically and linguistically Czech with large Roma and Polish minorities (171,000 citizens, and 52,000 citizens, respectively). Other Czech minorities include Silesian (11,000), German (39,000), Ukrainian (22,000), and Vietnamese (18,000). A number of ethnic Slovaks remained in the Czech Republic after the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia and comprise 3% of the total Czech population with 193,000 million citizens. The border between Slovakia and the Czech Republic is open for former Czechoslovak citizens (U.S. Department of State 2005, Background Note: Czech Republic).

Though religious freedom was established in law following the collapse of communism in 1989, a large segment of the Czech population claims to be atheist (40%) and 16% claim to be agnostic. The major religious denominations are Roman Catholic (39%) and Protestant (3%). There are only a few thousand members of the Jewish community remaining in the Czech Republic after World War II. Literacy is high in the Czech Republic at 99.8%, and the workforce (5.13 million) is employed mainly in the fields of industry, construction, and commerce (54%), followed by government and other services (41%) and agriculture (4.7%).

2.1.2 Slovakia

Slovakia is situated to the east of the Czech Republic in Central Europe; it shares borders with Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, and Ukraine.⁹ The capital of Slovakia is Bratislava. The May 2001 census indicated that there are about 5.4 million citizens of Slovakia. The same census indicated that ethnic Slovaks comprise the majority of the population (85.8%) with a large Hungarian minority (9.7%) based mainly in the southern and eastern regions. Other ethnic groups in Slovakia include Roma (officially 1.7%)¹⁰, Czechs (0.8%), Ruthenians (0.4%), and Ukrainians (0.2%) (U.S. Department of State 2005, Background Note: Slovakia).

Like in the Czech Republic, the Slovak constitution guarantees religious freedom. Unlike their Czech counterparts, however, far more Slovaks claim a religion: 69% claim to be Roman Catholic, 9% claim to be Protestant, 4% are Greek Catholic, .9% are Orthodox, and 13% report no religious affiliation (.6% claims to be “other” and 3.5% is unknown). Of the pre-WWII population of 120,000 Jews, only 2,300 remain. Though the official state language is Slovak, Hungarian is widely spoken in the southern regions that border Hungary. Literacy is also high in Slovakia at 99%, and the workforce (2.1 million) is employed mainly in the fields of industry, construction, and commerce (61%), followed by financial, commercial, and health services (18%), government and education (15%) and, lastly, agriculture (6%). Despite its modern economy and society, Slovakia has a significant rural population: about 45% of Slovaks live in villages of less than 5,000 people, and 14% in villages with fewer than 1,000 people.

⁹ The information in this section are reported from the U.S. Department of State’s Country Background Notes for Slovakia. This website can be found online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3430.htm>. Additional supporting figures can be found at the *Economist*’s country briefing for Slovakia, found at <http://www.economist.com/countries/Slovakia/index.cfm>.

¹⁰ Watchdog groups in Slovakia estimate that actual Roma population is somewhere between 6% to 10% (U.S. Department of State 2005, Background Note: Slovakia.).

2.2 HISTORY THROUGH WORLD WAR I

2.2.1 The Czech lands

The history of the Czech lands has been one of bright periods of culture and influence interspersed with dark periods of foreign domination. Because the Czechs truly shone on the European stage during the former (and because the latter never lasted long enough to dampen their national spirit), they emerged from World War I as a confident nation with a firm conviction of their claim to a seat at the European table.

In the 6th century, Slavic people began to migrate to the Czech lands, displaced from the southwest by German Langobard and Thuringian tribes. According to legend, Jan Čechus, a chieftain, guided them there—hence the name “Czechs” (Čechy). The Sámó Empire arose in the 7th century, the first empire to be created by the western Slavs. The Sámó Empire was followed by the Greater Moravian Empire in the 9th century. During this time, the Christian missionaries Constantín (who later took the religious name Cyril) and Methodius wrote down the Slavic language for the first time (Agnew 2004, 11). The Přemyslid dynasty arose in the 9th century, when Bohemia began to develop as an independent state. At that time, construction began on Prague Castle, and Prague became the seat of the dynasty. Prince Václav (the fabled “Good King Wenceslas” who later became the patron saint of Bohemia) was a ruler of this monarchy (Sayer 1998; Teich 1998; Agnew 2004).

Shortly after Prince Václav’s death, the German king Otto conquered Bohemia and it became part of the Holý Roman Empire (HRE). However, Bohemia was recognized by the HRE as the Bohemian Kingdom with its own royal line (the Přemyslids) more than two hundred years later. Under the rule of the “iron and golden” King Přemysl Otakar II, the Czech (Bohemian)

Kingdom expanded beyond Bohemia and Moravia into Austria and Slovenia (Agnew 2004, 22; Sayer 1998; Teich 1998).

The Germans began to colonize the Czech lands after John of Luxembourg, the Holy Roman Emperor (and husband to the last Přemyslid daughter, Eliška Přemysl), was elected the King of Bohemia in 1310. He made Prague the seat of the Holy Roman Empire. The Bohemian Kingdom reached the height of its power and prestige under the reign of Charles (Karel) IV (1346-1378), the second Luxembourg to take the throne of Bohemia and son of John of Luxembourg and Eliška Přemysl. Charles IV was crowned Holy Roman Emperor in Rome in 1355. During his reign, he established Charles University (the first university north of the Alps), and built the Charles Bridge, St. Vitus Cathedral, Prague's New Town, and Karlštejn Castle (Agnew 2004). The prestige of Bohemia was confirmed in the constitutional charter issued by Charles IV that created the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, complete with its own diadem (crown). Charles IV clearly set out the relationship of the Kingdom of Bohemia to the HRE in the Golden Bull for the Empire, accepted in 1355-56, which stipulated that the rule of Bohemia held the first place among the electors. Some of the articles of the Golden Bull remained in force until the final end of the HRE in 1806. The political entity of the Kingdom of Bohemia existed in the same territorial form until 1635 (Sayer 1998; Teich 1998; Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004).

The Black Plague that ravaged Europe from 1347-1352 decimated the Kingdom of Bohemia. This period of turmoil in Europe was followed by religious tumult, the beginning of the Protestant Reformation, in the Czech lands. In 1402, Jan Hus, preacher and rector of Charles University, started a church reform movement against the corruption of the Catholic Church a century before Martin Luther. King Václav IV gave Hus' group control over higher education in

Prague in 1409, prompting German teachers and students to leave and form their own university in Leipzig. Václav and Hus parted ways in 1412, however, when the king agreed to sell indulgences in Prague by representatives of the Council of Pisa's pope, John XXIII. Hus denounced the sale of indulgences and was excommunicated by the Pisan pope in October 1412 (Agnew 2004, 41-42). On July 6, 1415, Jan Hus was burned at the stake in Constance, making him a religious and national martyr to the Czech people. In 1419, Hus' followers, the Hussites, began a rebellion in Prague against the royal empire, but they were defeated in 1434. In 1485 a religious conciliation was finally reached at Kutná Hora, and the Czech lands became an area of religious tolerance (Agnew 2004; Sayer 1998; Teich 1998).

In 1526, Ferdinand I of Habsburg became the King of Bohemia, marking the beginning of the Habsburg Dynasty. In 1583, Habsburg Emperor Rudolf II moved the court to Prague. This time marked another era of culture in the Czech lands. Jan Amos Komenský, the author of many books on education, is attributed with writing the first children's book, and in 1609 Johannes Kepler, an astronomer, published the Laws of Planetary Motion (Agnew 2004).

This period of cultural progress was cut short in 1618 by the Thirty Years' War, a protracted confrontation between the German Protestant princes and the Holý Roman Emperor that ultimately evolved into a battle between France and the Habsburg monarchy (Agnew 2004, 68). With the Battle of White Mountain (Bílá Hora) in 1620, Bohemia and Moravia were brought under the rule of the Habsburg Empire (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004, 67). The period between the Battle of White Mountain and the reforms of Marie Teresie came to be known as the "time of darkness" in Czech national mythology (Agnew 2004, 75). The Thirty Years' War devastated most of Central Europe and shattered Bohemia's economy. Czechs lost their rights and property and were forced to convert to Catholicism and adopt German customs.

Leading intellectuals went into exile and German became the language of education and literature (Agnew 2004; Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

In 1740, the peaceful reign of Marie Teresie marked the beginning of the Enlightenment in the Habsburg Empire and the “time of darkness” began to lift for the Czechs. Empress Marie Teresie instituted compulsory education and a network of schools. Under the rule of her son, Emperor Josef II, a large degree of religious freedom was brought back to the Czech lands after more than 150 years of intolerance (Agnew 2004). Around the same time (1787), Mozart’s *Don Giovanni* premiered under his conductorship at the Estates Theater in the Old Town in Prague and the Czech National Revival, a period in which the Czech intelligentsia tried to raise the level of the Czech language and forge a Czech national culture, began (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

A great deal of cultural progress took place at that time. The first Czech revival newspaper was published. The first industrial exhibition in Europe began in Prague’s Klementinum. The National Museum was opened in Prague. The historians in the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences studied the historical separateness and unique traditions of Bohemia (i.e., the Czech lands). The symbolic value of the Czech language even became important among the nobility as patriots challenged the aristocrats to “prove their love of their homeland through supporting Czech,” prompting Count Franz Joseph Kinský to comment that “if the mother tongue of a Frenchman is French and of a German, German, then the mother tongue of a Czech must be Czech” (Agnew 2004, 100). At the same time, Holy Roman Emperor Leopold II created a chair of Czech language and literature at Charles University in 1791 as literary history began to demonstrate that Czech had once been the language of high culture (Agnew 2004).

The Czech National Revival also took on a political dimension, with Czech revivalists pushing for Czech autonomy under the absolutist Austrian regime. As the Bohemian nobility began to follow the nationalist lead of Czech bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, a Czech political style began to emerge in contrast to the gentry political style of Poland and Hungary. This new Czech political style, in the words of Rothschild (1974), “came to be characterized by bourgeois rather than aristocratic traits: practicality and rationality, instead of audacity and romanticism” (76). By 1848 “the Czechs had developed social, cultural, and political self-consciousness to a degree hard to imagine at the beginning of the century...[as] they called for recognition as a separate, equal nation within Austria, and for equality between Czech and German in the Bohemian crownlands” (Agnew 2004, 116). They continued to push for recognition as Austria reverted to military-backed absolutism from 1849 through 1859 in an attempt to ward off the brewing counter-revolution across Europe (Agnew 2004, 126).

However, to the frustration of the Czech revivalists, Czech pleas for a Hungarian-Austrian-Czech triadism fell on deaf ears, and the Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary (composed of the two independent states united under one rule) was established in the *Ausgleich* of 1867 (Sayer 1998; Teich 1998; Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004). Despite the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Czechs continued to seek reform within the empire, not for radical change such as statehood per se. As Rothschild (1974) affirms, “fearing that a disintegration of Austria-Hungary would only result in their own incorporation into a Greater Germany, the Czechs’ aspirations were initially directed toward a federalistic reform of the empire, entailing a substantial degree of autonomy for themselves” (76). Together with Czech nationalists such as František Palacký, Bohemian landowners issued a programmatic declaration in 1868 that Bohemia had historical and conditional rights just as valid as those of Hungary. In

this declaration the Czechs stated that they would no longer participate in politics until Bohemia was granted a similar status as Hungary within the empire. This declaration led to negotiations that produced the Fundamental Articles of 1870 that allowed for limited Bohemian autonomy. The attempt at compromise failed as German liberal and Hungarian leaders forcefully opposed the move. The failed compromise in 1870 led Czechs into a mode of passive resistance, continuing their political boycott and seeking foreign sympathy and support.

This period of passive resistance ended when a compromise was reached between the Austrian president-minister Count Edouard Taaffe, Bohemian nobles, and Czech nationalists in 1879 and the Czechs returned to the legislature (*Reichsrat*). The Czechs began every legislative session with a formal reservation of Czech state right, but they supported the government in return for small concessions, such as a new Czech language ordinance in the bureaucracy and the lowering of the tax qualification to vote (which led to more Czechs becoming eligible to vote) (Agnew 2000, 2004). In short, the Czech national consciousness was kept alive (at least in part) in the decades leading up to World War I by Czech participation in the government administered by Austria. Czechs represented themselves in the national assembly and thus were able to assert themselves as part of a European empire.

In summary, the Czech nation had enjoyed some level of self-rule from its historical beginnings until the First World War (though to varying degrees depending on the historical forces of the moment). Pre-20th century Czech influence peaked during the Holy Roman Empire (particularly during Charles IV's reign in the mid-14th century) and ebbed during the Thirty Years' War in the mid-17th century. It then peaked again at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Throughout the millennium, Czechs played a prominent role in shaping European history and made salient contributions in religion (the Protestant Reformation

effectively began with Jan Hus), culture, and science. This helped foster a feeling of self-confidence within the Czech nation and instilled in Czechs a sense of Europeanness that would prove to be extremely important during and after their exile from Europe during communism.

2.2.2 The Slovak lands

In the thousand years leading up to the 20th century, the Slovak people followed a much different path from the Czechs. From 1000 AD when the Slovak lands were conquered by the Kingdom of Hungary until after the 20th century, the Slovaks were a nation without a state. The subordinate position of the Slovak lands did not radically change until the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic in autumn 1918, and the Slovaks had, by that time, fallen far behind their Czech neighbors (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Leff 1977). Cut off from the rest of “civilized” Europe and considered little more than a backwater in a second-rate Empire, the Slovaks never came close to the cultural, religious, and scientific achievements of their neighbors. The result was an “inferiority complex” – with respect to both the Czechs and Europe as a whole – that continues to afflict Slovaks to this day, with far-reaching consequences for Slovak attitudes and behavior.

Little is known about the Slovak nation before the founding of the Greater Moravian Empire in the early ninth century. In addition to all of present-day western and central Slovakia, it included parts of Poland, Hungary, and Germany in a voluntary union of Slavic tribes who spoke related dialects.¹¹ The Greater Moravian Empire today plays a major role in how Slovaks

¹¹ In the early tenth century the Greater Moravian Empire invited Cyril and Methodius to spread Christianity in the kingdom; their lasting legacy to the Slovak nation, however, was their creation of a Cyrillic (Slavic) alphabet that opened the doors for Slavic-language speakers to write down their own histories.

understand themselves, and it is cited in the 1992 Slovak constitution as the foundation and predecessor to modern statehood for the Slovaks. That the Slovaks needed to reach so far back to find such an antecedent speaks volumes about their plight. The Empire was not to last long, however, as invaders and internal division within the ruling class forced its collapse after only eighty years of existence (Cohen 1999).

Following the dissolution of the Greater Moravian Empire in the early tenth century, the Slovak lands were conquered by the nomadic Magyar raiders (present-day Hungarians) and incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary in 1000 AD by King Steven (Istvan) of Hungary where they remained for the next millennium. Retelling the history of Slovakia during this period is difficult because there are few sources documenting the historical development of the Slovak region within the Hungarian Empire (Cohen 1999). Moreover, it is unclear to what extent Slovaks even had a national history during these centuries; although Slovak history has often been portrayed as a “thousand-year struggle for the survival of the Slovak nation,” in many respects a Slovak national identity did not begin to crystallize until the end of the 18th century (Henderson 2002, 2; Leff 1997).

What historical sources do indicate is that the Slovak experience as part of the Hungarian Monarchy seemed to be tolerable for centuries, at least until the 18th and 19th centuries. By the 19th century, the Hungarian Empire’s concerted efforts at Magyarization (Hungarianization) made the Slovak experience difficult, as Hungary closed Slovak schools and limited the career advancement of Slovaks who failed to assimilate (Leff 1997; Cohen 1999). When faced with forced Magyarization, many Slovaks emigrated -- nearly 20% of Slovaks fled to the US in the last half century of Hungarian rule -- or assimilated into Hungarian culture. For others, however, a rising call to return to their roots (and the clergy) rang true.

In this respect, Magyarization inadvertently helped create the Slovak National Movement, which was founded in the 18th century by Slovak religious leaders. The aim of the Slovak National Movement was to foster a sense of national identity among Slovak people who had been ruled by a foreign empire for, at that time, eight hundred years. A key component of the Slovak National Movement was Anton Bernolák's 1792 codification of a Slovak literary language, which was reformed by L'udovít Štúr in 1846. In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was formed, uniting the respective Hungarian and Austrian kingdoms. As one might expect, Slovak nationalism grew even stronger as language and education policies favoring the use of Hungarian (an example of a Magyarization policy) became more entrenched (Cohen 1999). Importantly, this Slovak nationalism was tinged not with arrogance but with aspiration. This desire for Slovaks to finally prove their worth as a nation remains important in Slovak identity to this day.

At the beginning of the 20th century, demands for the democratization of political and social life began to threaten the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Slovaks saw in this trend toward democracy the possibility of easing ethnic oppression and inching toward self-determination by, for example, seeking the right to vote. In 1906, having won the franchise, the Slovaks were finally able to attain seats in the Assembly of the Empire. This alarmed the Hungarian-led government and measures were taken to curtail the increasing Slovak autonomy. One measure was the passing of an education act, the Apponyi Act, named after education minister Count Albert Apponyi. This key component of the Magyarization process sought to promote a Hungarian way of life by requiring four years of compulsory schooling with the Hungarian language as the medium of instruction. In a related key event in early 20th century Slovak cultural history, the Slovak desire to have Father Andrej Hlinka, founder of the Slovak People's

Party (SLS), consecrate a local church drew ire from the Hungarian Empire, and government officials decreed that their own nominee consecrate the church instead. The public uproar arising from this decree was put down by force, and fifteen Slovaks died in the repression (El Mallakh 1979; Mikus 1995).

Despite this resistance, Hungarian attempts to completely assimilate the Slovaks might have succeeded if not for World War I and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When the war began in 1914, the Slovaks found themselves fighting against the Slavic Serbs and Russians for a Hungarian state to which they felt little loyalty. At the same time, Slovaks who openly opposed the war were subject to harsh oppression by their Hungarian rulers (Henderson 2002). This was a microcosm of a millennium of Slovak history, with Slovaks at the mercy of foreign powers. Yet the national aspirations of the Slovak people remained strong, and were articulated most vocally by a diaspora centered in the United States. It was the Slovaks living in exile that held on to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state as a way to finally provide autonomy to the Slovak nation (Cohen 1999).

To summarize, the historical path of Slovakia was far different from its Czech counterpart. In stark contrast to their Czech neighbors, Slovaks' history is one of foreign subjugation lasting for a thousand years until after 1918. The Czechs entered the interwar period a self-confident nation that viewed its newfound independence as a restoration of Czech influence and autonomy. Slovaks, on the other hand, found themselves still searching for validation after a thousand years of statelessness. This disparity would not disappear just because the two nations united to form a single state.

2.3 INTERWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE VELVET DIVORCE: 1918-1993

2.3.1 Interwar period: the First Republic

The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30, 1918 (signed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania by the first Czechoslovak president, the Czech Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, and representatives of Slovak exile organizations such as Milan Ratislav Štefánik) established the country of Czechoslovakia. On October 28, 1918, the new Czechoslovak Republic, with its capital in Prague, was declared with the support of the Allies (Rothschild 1974, Agnew 2004).

The new Czechoslovakia, or the “First Republic,” was a democracy that had its central powers constitutionally vested in the unicameral National Assembly. It was the only East European country to maintain democracy throughout the interwar period. The First Czechoslovak Republic also had a democratically elected president, held elections based on universal suffrage with direct and secret ballots, and had an independent judiciary. The constitution provided for the protection of fundamental civil and political rights of all citizens on a completely equal basis, as well as the special protection of religious and national minorities. Czechoslovakia’s relative political stability was inherited from the traditions of the Habsburg (Austrian) Monarchy. The economic situation was largely positive, since Czechoslovakia was left with the lion’s share of the industry of the Habsburg Empire (Wolchik 1998; Agnew 2004).

However, this optimistic picture obscures many differences between the Czech and Slovak parts of the new Czechoslovakia. Slovaks were greatly outnumbered by their Czech counterparts. The Slovak economy was more agrarian and less developed than the Czech economy, so incomes in Slovakia were a fraction of those in Bohemia and Moravia. Religiously, the majority of Slovaks were practicing Catholics while the Czech leadership believed in limiting

the power of the Church. To make matters worse, the Slovak people generally had less education (due to their subordination and forced Magyarization under the Hungarian Empire) and less experience with self-rule than the Czechs. Furthermore, despite the official line that Czechoslovakia was a marriage of equals, Slovaks found their national identity minimized in favor of a Czech-inspired Czechoslovak identity. These disparities, compounded with centralized governmental control from Prague in the Czech lands, fostered Slovak discontent with the structure of the new state (Cohen 1999; Leff 1997).

During the interwar period, the Czechoslovak government did attempt to industrialize the Slovak lands. It was less than successful, though, due in part to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Slovak resentment over what was perceived as economic and political domination by the Czechs led to Slovak dissatisfaction with the federation and growing support for extreme nationalist movements. Father Andrej Hlinka and his notorious successor, Father Jozef Tiso, were joined by many Slovaks in demands for de facto equality between Slovaks and Czechs and more autonomy for Slovakia. In other words, Slovaks had come to the realization that Czechoslovakia as such was not the culmination of the Slovak national aspiration; rather, it simply seemed to be little more than the continuation of centuries of Slovak oppression at the hands of others.

2.3.2 World War II: Nazi protectorate in Czech lands and Slovak puppet state

Upon President Masaryk's death in late 1937, Edvard Beneš became the new president and was faced with the daunting task of dealing with a rising Germany. German Chancellor Adolf Hitler's strategy to gain territory involved exploiting the existing Sudeten German minority in Czechoslovakia as a pretext for German penetration into East Central Europe. In early 1938,

neither Britain nor France (the other major European powers) wanted war. France, not wanting to face Germany alone, subordinated itself to Britain, and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain became the major spokesman for the West (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

Chamberlain believed that Sudeten German grievances were fair and that Hitler's intentions were limited. Both Britain and France advised Czechoslovakia to concede. Beneš, however, resisted pressure to move toward Sudeten autonomy. According to Čornej and Pokorný (2000), “up the last minute Czechoslovakia wanted to defend itself,” supported by two popular mobilizations in May and September 1938 that had a “unanimously enthusiastic response among the Czechoslovak population” (56). Despite these attempts to defend Czechoslovakia, Hitler demanded that Chamberlain administer the immediate return of the Sudetenland to the Third Reich under threat of war, claiming that the Czechoslovaks were murdering Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain referred the demand to the British and French governments and both governments accepted. Unwilling to confront Hitler, Britain and France issued an ultimatum, making the French commitment to Czechoslovakia contingent upon Czechoslovakia's acceptance of Hitler's plan (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

Czechoslovakia, abandoned by its allies, could not sustain a direct fight with Germany. Faced with an ultimatum and under extraordinary pressure from all three European powers, President Beneš exceeded his constitutional authority and accepted the conditions imposed upon him without parliamentary assent (Čornej and Pokorný 2000, 56). On September 30, 1938, Czechoslovakia ceded Sudeten territory to Germany in the infamous Munich Agreement (in whose negotiations the Czechs were not even allowed to participate). On October 5, 1938 Edvard Beneš abdicated and on October 22 went into exile in Great Britain. The Munich

Agreement created an ingrained distrust for the Western Allies and long-term deep depression at what Czechoslovakia perceived to be its own weakness (Čornej and Pokorný 2000, 56).

Meanwhile, Slovak leaders had a different plan for dealing with Germany. Hlinka's Slovak People's Party seized the weakening of the Czechoslovak state and, along with other Slovak civic parties, publicly demanded autonomy for Slovakia and soon began to collaborate actively with the Nazis. On October 6, 1938, Father Jozef Tiso (successor to Father Andrej Hlinka in the SLS party) took full control of Slovak governmental and executive power from the federated, renamed Czecho-Slovakia in the Žilina Agreement (Cohen 1999; El Mallakh 1979; Mikus 1995). Hitler began to demand not only Slovak autonomy within the restructured Czecho-Slovakia but also complete Slovak independence. On March 14, 1939, the Slovak Autonomous Assembly, in accordance with Hitler's demands, declared itself an independent Slovak state (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

Hitler had ambitions on the Czech lands as well. Despite Czechoslovakia's capitulation in the 1938 Munich Agreement, the Nazis invaded on March 15, 1939 and occupied the Czech lands, renaming it "the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia." The occupation brought shock and humiliation, and Czechs showed their unhappiness by participating in public gatherings to mark Czech national celebrations. In the October 28, 1939 demonstration to mark the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, Jan Opletal, a medical student, was shot and killed by a German police officer, and on November 17th (now "International Students Day") the Nazi occupiers closed all institutions of higher learning and many students were sent off to concentration camps (Čornej and Pokorný 2000). By this time, President Beneš had already fled Czechoslovakia and established a government in exile (as well as the first resistance organization) in London (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Czechoslovakia).

The legacy of the Munich Agreement was much different in the Slovak lands. Slovakia saw an opportunity for autonomy in Czechoslovakia's cession of Sudeten territory to Germany and soon became a Nazi puppet state under the leadership of Slovak priest Josef Tiso in 1939. A clerical nationalist, Tiso hoped to establish Slovakia as a nationalistic, Christian, corporatist state. Under the Salzburg Compromise of July 1940 (between Tiso and his opponents who actively advocated a Nazi regime), power was divided among Tiso's clerical leaders as well as pro-Nazi Slovak guards. Under Tiso's rule, Slovakia experienced a considerable economic boom due to the aid of German investments and technical advice. Slovakia became something of a showcase for Hitler's new order (El Mallakh 1979; Mikus 1995).

Tiso's pro-Nazi administration's first task was to oppress political opponents and Jews in a fascist regime. On September 9, 1941, the Slovak fascist state passed a Jewish "codex" codifying anti-Jewish legislation that had already been put forward in the first years of the regime in a parallel to the German Nuremberg Laws. Between March and October 1942, two-thirds of the Jewish population (57,628) and thousands from the Roma population of Slovakia were deported to Poland, ostensibly for resettlement. Of course, many of these deported Jews and Roma died at concentration camps during the Holocaust (Cohen 1999; El Mallakh 1979).

The fascist regime held power in Slovakia through most of the Second World War with little consequent opposition. Eventually, however, on August 29, 1944, a resistance movement composed of Slovak communists, army officers, and democrats, as well as Russians, Jews, and some allied forces rose up against the fascist Slovak state in what is now called the Slovak National Uprising. This movement was long in the making: as early as 1939, Slovak democrats had initiated a "whispering campaign" to alert the acquiescent Slovak population to the true nature of the Tiso regime. The goal of the democratic resistance was the restoration of the

Czechoslovak Republic but with greater Slovak participation in government. Czechoslovak president-in-exile Edvard Beneš endorsed the plan for the Slovak National Uprising earlier that year in March 1944 (El Mallakh 1979; Mikus 1995). By October 1944, however, the uprising was defeated by Nazi troops and Slovakia became officially occupied by Germany (Čornej and Pokorný 2000). At this point, approximately 13,500 more Jews were deported, of whom 10,000 died (U.S. Department of State 2005, Background Note: Slovakia; Cohen 1999).

In the Czech lands, opposition came much earlier. In addition to the national demonstrations (such as the 1939 demonstration in which Jan Opletal was killed), the Czech resistance began to gather knowledge in the area of Nazi military intelligence. After the Czech government-in-exile-led assassination of the leading SS officer of the Protectorate, Reinhard Heydrich, on May 27, 1942, the Nazis began arresting and deporting citizens from the so-called Czech protectorate and annihilated Lidice and Ležáky, two Czech villages they suspected of aiding in the assassination (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

The German leadership surrendered to the Allied Powers on May 8, 1945, marking the end of World War II in Europe. Czechoslovakia was reestablished with its pre-1938 borders largely intact (with the exception of Ruthenia, which was ceded to the USSR). Edvard Beneš, who had led the Czechoslovak liberation movement abroad during the German occupation and was the second president of Czechoslovakia, again became head of state (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004).

After returning, Beneš issued eponymous decrees that laid the foundation for the expulsion of over two and a half million Sudeten Germans (Čornej and Pokorný 2000). In December 1946, Jozef Tiso went on trial for treason and collaboration with the Nazis and was executed in April 1947.

The Second World War was thus an unmitigated disaster for Slovakia and Slovak nationalism. Slovaks had pounced on the opportunity provided by Hitler to create their own state, and it took four years before Slovaks realized the consequences. Their pro-Nazi regime was deeply embarrassing in retrospect and was self-defeating for Slovak national aspirations. Not only did the stains of Nazism make it impossible for Slovaks to celebrate their short-lived state, it also lowered the status of Slovaks even further in the eyes of the world. While the war itself had little effect on Czech nationalism, its aftermath would further showcase the disparity between Czechs and Slovaks.

2.3.3 Postwar period: Communist takeover

Because Soviet troops were the main liberators of Czechoslovakia, the influence of the Soviet Union grew strong in the postwar period. The Communists won 37.9% of the vote in the 1946 elections and took many of the important governmental posts. In February 1948, the Communists organized a wave of mass protests and strikes, provoking a crisis in the government and forming a new one in which they assumed a dominant position. President Beneš resigned and was replaced by the Communist party leader Klement Gottwald. This was viewed in the West as a coup by the Soviet Union, particularly after the mysterious death of Tomáš Masaryk's son three weeks after Gottwald became president (Wolchik 1998).

The new leaders of Czechoslovakia molded the political system in the image of the Soviet Union's institutions and practices. Although other political parties were allowed to exist, power was entrenched in the Communist party. Communist Czechoslovak elites crafted the legal system and the judiciary to fit their political aims and formed a secret police force to stifle opposition. In the 1950s, mirroring developments in the rest of East Europe and the Soviet

Union at the time, the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia put leaders from their own party on trial – “show trials” – in which they were accused of being enemies of Communism. Many were ultimately put to death or imprisoned. In addition, the Czechoslovak economy became centrally planned under Communist rule as the government confiscated the property of private citizens and put it into the hands of the state. Farming was collectivized as well. The Communist leadership of Czechoslovakia began a campaign to politicize all aspects of life, from education and culture to arts, science, and even leisure (Wolchik 1998; Agnew 2004). In 1960, the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia promulgated a new constitution that renamed the country “Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Czechoslovakia).

2.3.4 Prague Spring: 1968

In an attempt to reform the rigid Soviet-style Communist system, Slovak leader Alexander Dubček, as well as intellectuals and other party leaders, initiated reforms in early 1968 in what ultimately became known as the “Prague Spring,” or “socialism with a human face.” Dubček and his fellow reformers wanted to improve the economy through decentralization, but more importantly, they wanted the needs of the Slovaks to be recognized in the common state.

One of Dubček’s first initiatives as president was to outline the policy changes he intended to make in a statement known as the “Action Program.” One facet of the Action Program was the introduction of greater autonomy for the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, calling for a “socialist federal arrangement” that established the “legal coexistence of two equal nations in a common socialist state” (Agnew 2004, 255). This arrangement was agreed upon by the Czechs, and legislation federalizing the state was passed in the summer and went into effect in October 1968. The reforms of the Action Program were also meant to create a socialist system that could

be considered appropriate for a developed, European country, in which there would be no more censorship, greater intellectual freedom, and political and social pluralism (that is, an end to the Communist monopoly of power). However, conservatives in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) feared that they might lose their political power if the reforms went through, so they appealed to fellow Warsaw Pact countries (the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) for “brotherly” help. Warsaw Pact forces (led by the USSR) invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 in order to crush the reforms, as the USSR’s other Soviet satellite regimes became convinced that Dubček allowed too much political pluralism (Agnew 2004; Wolchik 1998; Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

The presidium of the CCP approved “a proclamation to all Czechoslovak people” in which it condemned the occupation. Shortly thereafter, Soviet soldiers arrested five members of the party presidium and flew them to the USSR where, under pressure, they were forced to sign the “Moscow Protocol” that legalized the Soviet occupation. Later an agreement was signed on the “provisional” presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, a period that lasted for more than 20 years. In April 1969, a hard-line Communist Slovak, Gustav Husák, was elected to replace Dubček as the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party with the assistance of the Soviets, and he immediately began to eliminate nearly all traces of the reforms and punish those who had supported them, with the exception of the federalization law, which went into effect in 1969. In other words, while many of Dubček’s reforms were undone, the move to grant more Slovak autonomy under the regime remained in effect (Agnew 2004; Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Wolchik 1998).

2.3.5 Normalization

The 1970s thus became known as the period of “normalization,” and the political arena became stagnant for almost 20 years. The population became politically apathetic as citizens believed that no progress or reform could occur under Communist rule. However, many historians, philosophers, and writers still actively opposed the regime. By working and planning underground and through journalistic and scholarly work, they formed opposition groups such as Charter 77 in 1977 (calling for the restoration of civil and political rights; the now-famous Václav Havel was a signatory) as well as VONS (the Committee to Defend the Unjustly Persecuted). These Czech-based opposition groups called on the Communist leadership to respect human rights and allow more civic freedom. Neither group, however, was allowed to function publicly, and dissidents often were condemned to prison sentences or forced manual labor (Wolchik 1998).

2.3.6 Soviet reforms and the Czechoslovak student march: 1989

By the late 1980s, mounting economic problems in the Soviet bloc became severe enough that Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge the problem openly while calling on citizens to adopt austerity measures. These economic difficulties, along Gorbachev’s reforms (“glasnost” [“openness”] and “perestroika” [“reconstruction”]), ultimately forced the end of the Communist hard line. Realizing that the Soviet Union could no longer afford to prop up the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe either financially or militarily, Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops while also pushing for reform in the political and economic systems of Communist Europe. Disagreement within the Communist party between the Communist regimes

of Europe and the Soviet Union (and within these as well) was widespread in 1988, and Czechoslovakia was no exception. In August 1988, Czechoslovak citizens demonstrated en masse to mark the anniversary of the 1968 invasion. The following year, police dispersed numerous mass protests against human and civil rights violations (Wolchik 1998; Agnew 2004).

The beginning of the end of the Communist era in Czechoslovakia was November 17, 1989, when the security forces attacked an officially approved student march in Prague's Wenceslas Square (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Czechoslovakia). This student march marked the 50th anniversary of the execution of Czech university students by the Nazis. The military crackdown on this march sparked nationwide protests, and prominent Czech and Slovak demonstrations were staged in the regional capitals of Prague and Bratislava. Václav Havel, by now a well-known playwright and active opposition leader, helped establish the Civic Forum in the Czech lands, an umbrella opposition group to the Communist leadership. The Public Against Violence led the protests in Slovakia, marking the Slovak push toward independence and democracy. These individual national pro-reform groups, along with others, demanded the resignation of the Communist government and the punishment of those who used force against innocent citizens (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004).

2.3.7 Communist capitulation and transition to democracy: the Velvet Revolution

The Communist leadership capitulated as Husak and party chief Miloš Jakeš resigned from power in December 1989. The official transition to democracy from communism occurred with the election of Václav Havel to President of the Czechoslovak Republic on December 29, 1989. The collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia was astonishingly quick (according to some estimates it took only ten days) due to the unpopularity of the Communist regime, the lack of

military or economic support from the USSR to prop up the regime any further, and the rapid, effective organization of opposition groups into a viable political alternative. This transition became known as the “Velvet Revolution” because it occurred without fighting or bloodshed (Wolchik 1998; Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

In December 1989, a coalition government was formed to aid in the transition, with a minority of ministerial positions going to Communist party members. The transitional government was composed of members from Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, and these groups assisted in the first democratic elections since 1948. These elections took place in June 1990 without incident and with higher than 95% turnout. Civic Forum and Public Against Violence won in landslides in their respective republics and won a majority in the federal parliament. The new parliament took decisive steps toward securing a democratic future for Czechoslovakia, successfully moving toward fair local elections in November 1990 that ensured massive changes at the county and town levels. Also in 1990, Václav Havel was reelected president and the country was officially renamed “Czech and Slovak Federative Republic” in a bid to assuage Slovaks who wanted the name to reflect equality between the two nations. In 1991, the parliament approved legislation allowing the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and Soviet forces completed their withdrawal (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Czechoslovakia).

In common with resistance groups throughout the region, Civic Forum proved to be an effective opposition group to the former Communist regime but a largely ineffectual governing party. Civic Forum dissolved in mid-1991 and several new parties developed in its place, the most successful of which has been Václav Klaus’ Civic Democratic Party (ODS) (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

2.3.8 The split of Czechoslovakia: the Velvet Divorce

The democratic rebirth of Czechoslovakia brought problems that affected Slovaks and Czechs in differing ways. Besides the debate over what to officially name the post-communist Czechoslovakia, free-market reforms engineered by then-finance minister Václav Klaus between 1990 and 1992 tended to benefit the Czech republic more than the Slovak republic.¹² Combined with the ever-present Slovak desire for greater autonomy, this led to serious problems in the government that became manifest in 1992. The question of how much authority the federal government should have in relation to the power of governments of the two republics became a burning issue, and one that the Federal Assembly could not resolve until after the 1992 election. While public opinion on both the Czech and Slovak sides indicated that the majority wanted to retain a common state, mutual suspicion of each other, grounded in historical memory of previous critical moments in their relationship, was “more likely to reinforce negative images and expectations (for the Czechs, that the Slovaks ‘always’ took advantage of their life-or-death crises, for the Slovaks, that the Czechs would never take them seriously until the knife was against their throats)” (Agnew 2004, 301). In other words, the uneasy relationship between Slovaks and Czechs within the larger state remained an increasingly-important factor as the post-communist government sought to define itself (Leff 1997).

In the election of June 1992, Klaus’ rightist ODS won handily in the Czech lands on a platform of economic reform. Vladimír Mečiar’s populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) became the dominant party in the Slovak republic, winning through his appeals for

¹² Klaus’ reforms were of greater benefit to the Czech republic because it was more industrialized than the Slovak republic, less tied economically to the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe, and less dependent on some key industries (such as arms) that policy reorientations toward the West tended to weaken.

greater Slovak autonomy. In the 1992 election, it appeared that Czech voters supported a center right government that favored more rapid economic reform while their Slovak counterparts supported Slovak separatists and left-wing parties that favored slower free-market reforms and the retention of some aspects of the socialist economy. Mečiar, who became the Slovak Prime Minister, was opposed to the rapid privatization of the public sector proposed by Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus. The relationship between Mečiar and Klaus reached a deadlock as neither was willing to compromise. They found common ground only on a proposed separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands. Klaus was all-too-willing to wave goodbye to the Slovaks, who threatened his liberalization policies and contributed little economically to the country. Mečiar, meanwhile, saw a rare opportunity to achieve that which the Slovak nation had desired for a millennium – full sovereignty (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Czechoslovakia; Agnew 2004).

Thus, the results of the 1992 election – and the disagreement between Mečiar and Klaus on the issue of economic reform – spelled the demise of a Czech and Slovak federation despite lukewarm support for a split among Czechoslovak citizens from both republics (Čornej and Pokorný 2000). Federalists like Czechoslovak President Václav Havel were left helpless against the increasingly strong push in the parliament toward a Czechoslovak split. Slovak deputies in parliament blocked Havel's second bid for the presidency in 1992, and in response Havel resigned from the post in July of that year to avoid presiding over the dissolution (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Wolchik 1998).

In July 1992, the same month Havel stepped down from the presidency of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak parliament voted 113 to 24 in favor of the republic's sovereignty. By the end of 1992, Klaus and Mečiar had worked out an agreement that would formalize the divorce of Czechoslovakia into two autonomous countries. The law was passed (but just barely)

on December 27, 1992, and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist effective January 1, 1993. On that day, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were peacefully and simultaneously founded in this so-called “Velvet Divorce” (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

In the time since the split, relations between the two countries have been cordial (despite occasional disputes about the division of federal property and governing the border). Both states gained immediate recognition from the US and European countries (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

2.3.9 Summary

From the inception of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 through the Velvet Divorce of 2003, the Czech and Slovak lands shared a central government (with federated regional powers) and in many respects shared a common experience under communism. But the nations clearly diverged in their responses to World War II and more subtly, in their understanding of the relationship between their respective histories and identities and the political world around them. Like the period leading up to it, Slovak history from WWI until the split of Czechoslovakia was dominated by a continuous desire for more autonomy and recognition. During this same period their Czech neighbors were focused on concerns such as democratic freedoms and economic growth.

2.4 1993 TO 2004

2.4.1 Czech Republic

Despite stepping down as Czechoslovak President six months earlier, Václav Havel was elected the first president of the Czech Republic on January 26, 1993. The chair of the strongest party, Václav Klaus of ODS, was appointed as Prime Minister. The Czech Republic inherited Czechoslovak membership in the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It signed an affiliation agreement with the European Community (later called the EU) in October 1993 and became a member of the OECD one month later (U.S. Department of State 2005, Background Note: Czech Republic; Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

In many ways, the Czech Republic from its inception resembled a “normal” (Western) European country. In general, Czech society accepted the wide-ranging changes and price shocks in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution with a “calm spirit” (Čornej and Pokorný 2000, 90). The government was aware of the social and economic consequences of reform and tried to keep the population informed. Public support for the rightist government was reaffirmed by local elections in November 1994, but as social and economic inequality began to grow, enthusiasm for the reforms dampened. Consequently, Czech public opinion took a turn to the left. In the parliamentary elections of May-June 1996, rightist ODS remained the strongest party (29.6% of the vote) but the leftist Social Democrats (ČSSD), led by Miloš Zeman, finished close behind with 26.4% of the vote (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

As significant problems with the Klaus-led “Czech way” of transforming the economy became publicly apparent, the government became increasingly unpopular. Corruption in the

transformation process became the focus of both citizens and outside observers. Eventually, internal party conflict brought down the government, and Václav Klaus resigned on November 30, 1997. President Havel again became the guarantor of continuity and stability in Czech politics after Klaus' absence. An interim government was set up in December 1997 until new elections took place in June 1998 (Čornej and Pokorný 2000). During this interim period, the Czech Republic was formally invited to negotiations regarding joining the EU; this began in March 1998 and were completed in 2002, after which accession was offered.

The June 1998 elections ushered in a new era in which the leftist ČSSD emerged as the strongest party (with 32% of the vote), followed by rightist ODS (28%), KSCM (Communists, 11%), the KDU (Christian Democrats, 9%) and US (Freedom Union, 8.6%). Unable to create a majority government¹³, the ČSSD forged an “opposition agreement” with ODS, by which ODS guaranteed some level of tolerance towards a Social Democratic minority government. In return for this tolerance, ČSSD agreed to a reform of the electoral laws designed to benefit large parties in the hopes that forming majority governments would be easier in the future, thus potentially eliminating a similar situation (minority ČSSD government) from happening again in the future (Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004). This pragmatic agreement between the two parties was renewed in 2000.

The new ČSSD government, led by Zeman, was confronted with difficult challenges, not the least of which was to reverse economic decline and rising unemployment. The government became increasingly successful in attracting foreign investors and stepping up bank privatization.

¹³ A “majority government” refers to a stable coalition of two or more parties to form an absolute majority in a legislature or parliament. An “absolute majority” requires more than half of all the members in the legislature, including those absent and those present but not voting.

In March 1999, the Czech Republic, together with Hungary and Poland, was accepted into NATO (Čornej and Pokorný 2000).

In April 2001, Vladimír Špidla was elected chair of ČSSD after Prime Minister Zeman stepped down as party boss. In June-July 2002, Špidla and ČSSD gained the most votes in the parliamentary election but only won 70 seats in the 200-seat parliament. Špidla formed a coalition with a centrist alliance of the Christian Democrats (KDU) and Freedom Union (US). The Communists came in third place in the election with 41 seats, by far their best result since the Velvet Revolution (BBC News 2005, Timeline: Czech Republic).

In December 2002, the Czech Republic was formally invited to join the EU. In February 2003, the Euroskeptic (and self-described “Euro-realist”) Václav Klaus was elected president, succeeding Václav Havel. In June 2003, Czechs voted in favor of joining the EU in a popular referendum. On May 1, 2004, the Czech Republic became one of ten countries to join the EU (BBC News 2006, Country profile: Czech Republic).

In summary, though the post-communist, post-divorce Czech transitions (particularly the transition to a free market) have been bumpy at times, the Czech path has been relatively linear in the direction of a full, free democracy and a successful, internationally competitive market economy. From the collapse of communism through the Velvet Divorce and up until the present, the Czech political space has been characterized by the left-right (liberal-conservative) split common to advanced industrial democracies. Leftist and rightist parties consistently dominate electorally, while nationalist, populist parties garner little, if any, support. As we will see, Slovak politics took a far different turn.

2.4.2 Slovakia

To the dismay of international observers, Vladimír Mečiar's party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), continued to rule Slovakia for five years after the split of Czechoslovakia. Immediately following the split in 1993, the Slovak Parliament elected Michal Kováč of HZDS as president and Mečiar as prime minister.

Before long, Mečiar's autocratic style fostered international (as well as some national) concern about the direction of Slovakia as a democracy. Under Mečiar's tutelage, Slovakia was criticized for excessive nationalism and for the slow pace of economic privatization. By the end of January 1993, just weeks after the Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia, Mečiar had begun to tighten control over the media. His disagreements with President Kováč (also a HZDS member) soon led to additional conflict within the government. Mečiar's decision to proceed with a controversial dam project with neighboring Hungary was referred to the International Court of Justice in 1993. At the same time, the large Hungarian minority began to complain of discrimination and requested educational and cultural autonomy. This instability boiled over in March 1994 when Mečiar was charged with corruption for allegedly funneling state privatization funds into his party's bank accounts. That same month, President Kováč proposed a no-confidence vote that toppled the Mečiar government, and a new coalition led by Jozef Moravčík of the Democratic Union formed in its place. However, just eight months later in November 1994, Mečiar became the head of another governing coalition following new elections (Cohen 1999).

Slovakia became internationally branded as a corrupt and autocratic nation during this period because of Mečiar's strong-arm tactics to manipulate parliament, electoral laws, the media, and the secret police. In 1995 a new law restricting the official use of any language other

than Slovak (for example, Hungarian) brought about international condemnation, which was only partly assuaged in March of that same year when the Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers signed a treaty that resolved border disputes between the two countries and the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In April 1995 President Kováč signed a bill that relinquished presidential control of the domestic intelligence agency, the Slovak Information Service (SIS), under pressure from Mečiar, who claimed to be a victim of an SIS investigation. In June 1995 President Kováč was stripped of his role as commander-in-chief and his authority was transferred to the government. In August 1995, in a now notorious unsolved incident, President Kováč's son was kidnapped, tortured, forced to down whisky, and then dumped across the Slovak border in Austria. It has been alleged that Mečiar and his chief of the SIS, Ivan Lexa, masterminded the kidnapping, though a police investigation yielded no concrete results. After the abduction, Lexa was granted amnesty by Mečiar (Cohen 1999; Furlong 1999).

In March 1996 a report on human rights by the US State Department was highly critical of Slovakia, citing incidents of intimidation of political opponents, abuse of police powers, and government manipulation of the state-owned media. A law dealing with subversion, the Law on the Protection of the Republic, was approved by the parliament in March 1996, despite strong criticism from the opposition regarding its effects on rights of freedom, rights of assembly, and freedom of information. Mečiar's image as a dangerous man was reinforced by one televised incident in which he was shown lunging at a Slovak journalist (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Slovakia; BBC News 2004, Strongman of Slovak Politics).

Consequently, the EU rejected Slovakia's application for EU membership on political grounds at the Luxembourg summit in 1997; this was especially difficult for Slovakia given that nearly all of its post-communist neighbors (including the Czech Republic) were invited to begin

negotiations at that time. Many have argued that this EU rejection of Slovakia spurred Slovaks to support EU membership for their country even more, as Slovak citizens again felt ostracized from the rest of the European continent (Haughton 2004).

Mečiar's run finally ended with the January 1998 elections, when HZDS won about 27% of the vote but was forced into the opposition because it could not find any willing coalition partners. Mikuláš Dzurinda, chair of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), formed a reform-minded government coalition that pledged to strengthen democracy and put Slovakia back on the path to European integration in the wake of Mečiar's premiership. It was only this broad-based (and somewhat unlikely) coalition of liberals, centrists, ex-communists, and ethnic Hungarians that managed to oust Mečiar from power in 1998.

In May 1999, after a fourteen-month period in which Slovakia had been without a head of state, Rudolph Schuster defeated Vladimír Mečiar for the post of president in Slovakia's first-ever direct election. This election was considered by many to facilitate Slovakia's western integration. In the same month, the Dzurinda government introduced austerity measures designed to cut the budget deficit and restore confidence in the currency. Under Dzurinda's leadership, in 1999 the parliament also passed a law that improved the status of minority languages in the hopes of improving Slovakia's chances for EU membership. Prime Minister Dzurinda made it publicly clear that EU membership was a top foreign policy goal, and in February 2000, the EU invited Slovakia to begin accession negotiations. In February 2001, the parliament approved far-reaching changes to the country's constitution, a key step toward gaining membership in EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The new constitution decentralized power in Slovakia, increased the authority of the state audit office, strengthened the independence of the judiciary, and gave greater recognition to minority rights.

These reforms enabled Slovakia to enter the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), close virtually all chapters in EU negotiations, and make the country a strong candidate for NATO accession. On the final day of the EU summit in Helsinki, Finland in December 1999, Slovakia was among seven countries to be invited to EU candidacy. Despite these successes, the popularity of the coalition parties began to decline sharply and several new parties emerged on the political landscape. These parties quickly gained high levels of support in public opinion polls (BBC News 2003, Timeline: Slovakia).

The 2002 parliamentary election winners surprised many international observers, who had expected some of these new parties (like Robert Fico's populist party Smer) to gain more votes than they actually did. A last minute surge in votes for SDKU gave Dzurinda a mandate for a second term, and SDKU formed a new coalition government with three other center-right parties: the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), the Christian Democrats (KDH), and Alliance of New Citizens (ANO, a business-friendly party led by TV mogul Pavol Rusko). The coalition has focused on ensuring a strong performance of Slovakia within NATO and the EU, fighting corruption, attracting foreign investment, and reforming social services, such as the health care system. Dzurinda's coalition also overhauled the pensions and benefits systems, cut costs and increased labor flexibility, and simplified the tax system. Unemployment fell from a peak of around 20%, and though it remained high, Dzurinda's economic reforms won the country praise from international organizations (BBC News 2006, Country profile: Slovakia).

In December 2002, the EU summit in Copenhagen formally invited Slovakia to join. In May 2003, Slovak citizens voted a decisive yes in a referendum on EU membership (BBC News 2006, Country profile: Slovakia), and Slovakia joined the in 2004.

It is difficult to summarize Slovakia's progress in the post-1993 era because there seem to have been two distinct phases: the Mečiar phase and post-Mečiar phase. Slovakia's path after the Velvet Divorce was tumultuous for many years, sharply changing course with genuine and rapid progress following the 1998 election when a coalition government forced Mečiar's HZDS party into the opposition. During the 1993-1998 period, many of the democratic reforms inherited from the federated Czechoslovakia were rolled back by Mečiar, which fostered international consternation and isolation. The post-1998 progress made by the Dzurinda governments on all fronts (political, economic, international, and social) is mitigated, however, by the fact that Mečiar's party still enjoys a great deal of electoral support (though nothing approximating previous levels) and that, more generally, the electorate still supports a number of parties that are neither leftist nor rightist, but populist and nationalist. Thus, the black mark of the Mečiar period was ultimately—but tenuously—overturned by pro-democracy and pro-EU parties in the post-1998 period.

Yet these divergent choices are in some ways two sides of the same coin. Basking in autonomy for the first time in a millennium, Slovaks were won over by Mečiar's promises of Slovak greatness. As his regime deteriorated into near-autocracy, Slovaks seemed to have come to the realization that the best way for Slovakia to achieve greatness was to turn toward Europe. Like the fascist WWII Slovak state, Mečiar's Slovakia was actually moving further and further from external validation. Slovaks eventually saw Europe – and especially the EU – as the best chance to finally achieve validation.

This shift can be seen in data from the Eurobarometer's Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) surveys from 1995-1997, shown in Figure 1.1 (see Chapter 1). As Figure 1.1 illustrates, aggregate levels of public support for EU membership were nearly

identical among Czechs and Slovaks in 1995 and 1996. Starting in 1997, however, Slovaks began to support EU membership at dramatically higher levels while Czech support showed more modest increases.

2.5 THE BID FOR THE EU

Reunification of the European continent was a goal of both the European Union and former communist countries for many reasons. For the EU, absorbing the former communist states meant assuring democratic consolidation (and thus peace and stability) on the continent as well as gaining new markets for Western European exports. In a postmodern sense, the reunification of Europe meant creating a new European citizenship: no longer should there be an iron curtain dividing Europe, but Europe now would be a continent of diversity and democracy, composed of citizens from many different nations within one European Union. For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, EU accession was a common goal that nonetheless seems to have been pursued with different motivations.

2.5.1 Czech Republic

Even before negotiations to join the EU began, the Czech Republic had an important relationship with the EU. For example, since 1989 the EU has become the Czech Republic's largest trading partner with more than a 65% share of its foreign trade, and EU member states have been the largest investors in the country. Prior to its accession to the EU, the Czech Republic shared the longest part of its border with EU-member countries, making it geographically closer to the EU

(Čornej and Pokorný 2000; Agnew 2004). More importantly, however, ordinary Czechs seem to have always felt that they belong to European civilization and shared its cultural values, since they have been a substantial part of European history (as I will discuss further in the next chapter).

In its Opinions since the Czech Republic began negotiations for EU membership in 1996, the European Commission has continued to affirm that the Czech Republic fulfilled the political criteria. Since that time, the Czech Republic has made considerable progress in further consolidating and deepening the stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (European Commission 2002, Regular Report; European Commission 2002, Towards the Enlarged Union).

In June 1993, the European Union's member states declared in Copenhagen, Denmark that the new democracies of post-communist Europe could join the EU if they fulfilled a number of convergence criteria. These so-called Copenhagen criteria mandated that applicant countries have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, have a functioning market economy, and accept all of the *acquis communautaire* (i.e., the rights and obligations of all EU countries). In 1996, the Czech Republic applied for membership. Both parties began official negotiations on March 31, 1998 after the member states approved the European Commission's positive Opinion on the Czech Republic's application in Luxembourg in December 1997 (European Commission 2002, Regular Report; European Commission 2002, Towards the Enlarged Union). The relatively minor issues noted by the European Commission in 1998 for the Czech Republic to focus on to prepare for EU membership included strengthening freedom of the press, corporate governance, and the financial system.


Full integration into the EU had been supported by a majority of parliamentary parties in the Czech Republic, and unwaveringly by governments headed by ČSSD, the Social Democrats. Former President Václav Havel is perhaps the most famous pro-EU elite, arguing for membership in the EU on ethical and moral grounds. Believing that state sovereignty was of secondary importance, Havel held that European integration was important for political reasons (e.g., to prevent another World War); Havel also believed that European integration was the natural course for the Czech Republic (e.g., from the standpoint of a shared European culture) (Linden and Pohlman 2003). According to Peter Bugge (2000), Havel believed that Czech membership in the EU was the logical extension of Europe's status as "one civilization, based on a shared culture" that post-communist countries had already belonged to "until they were brutally forced to depart from their natural path. Their 'return to Europe' was thus historically legitimate as a return to where they had already belonged" (14).

That said, despite Havel's firm embrace of the EU, the Czech Republic is (and has been) arguably the most skeptical of the EU of any post-communist country. This skepticism's most prominent advocate is President Václav Klaus, whose rhetoric has garnered a great deal of support among the electorate. While Klaus has been pro-integration for economic reasons, he is supremely concerned with the potential loss of Czech sovereignty and other political and economic hardship due to European-level directives (Bugge 2000; Green 2003; Linden and Pohlman 2003). His infamous objections during the EU negotiations brought the EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek to tell Klaus, "it is not the European Union which wants to join the Czech Republic" (Rhodes 1998, note 41).

Skepticism of the EU is not only evident at the elite level. Paradoxically, though it was widely considered a frontrunner for EU membership prior to accession, citizens have

consistently been less than enthusiastic about joining. There has been a vociferous public debate over EU membership in the Czech Republic since the early 1990s through the present. Czech support for EU membership had typically hovered below 50% from 1997 until 2002, when public support finally surpassed the 50% mark, even soaring to the unprecedented 70th percentile in 2003, the year of the referendum on EU membership (Gazdik 2003). Trends in Czech public opinion toward the EU from the Eurobarometer surveys¹⁴ are displayed graphically in comparison with Slovak public opinion in Figure 1.1 (which was displayed in Chapter 1) and Figure 2.1 below.

¹⁴ The Eurobarometer surveys are less than ideal because the same question is not asked for more than around six years in a row, making longitudinal comparison difficult. Also, the Eurobarometer survey questions on attitudes toward EU membership do not include enough response categories to show the intensity of support or rejection for EU membership. Instead, the questions typically only include responses such as “would vote in favor; would not vote in favor; don’t know; would not vote” or “EU membership is a good thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad; don’t know” instead of more nuanced and helpful response categories like “strongly support, support somewhat, neither support nor reject, somewhat reject, strongly reject.” Lastly, the results of the Eurobarometer surveys do not always correlate with other national or regional surveys (like CVVM polls in the Czech Republic or FOCUS polls in Slovakia); other surveys tend to find greater differences between the two countries. However, these surveys cannot be compared so easily because they are not longitudinal and are only sometimes comparative. Despite these problems, the Eurobarometer surveys provide the best source of longitudinal, comparative data on attitudes toward the EU.



Source: Eurobarometer (CCEB 2001.1; CCEB 2002.2; CCEB 2003.2; EB 62; EB 63; EB 64). Question: “Generally speaking, do you think that [country’s] membership of the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” Figure shows percentage of people who answered, “A good thing.” Percent listed for 2005 is the average of data from the Spring 2005 and Fall 2005 EBs (63 and 64).

Figure 2.1 EU membership “a good thing”

Despite their frequently-voiced skepticism, on June 13-14, 2003, the citizens of the Czech Republic overwhelmingly voted “yes” in the binding referendum on EU membership. According to the Czech Statistical Office, 77% voted affirmatively, and turnout was higher than expected at 55% (Green 2003). The Czech Republic became a member of the EU on May 1, 2004.

2.5.2 Slovakia

One of the principal strategic goals of Slovakia after establishing its independence – but particularly after the Mečiar era -- was EU membership. Unlike its Czech counterpart, however, and despite increasing levels of direct foreign investment from EU-member countries, Slovakia experienced many more roadblocks on the path to EU membership.

Initially, Slovakia was marginalized from the mainstream of integration processes due to domestic political developments under the third Mečiar government (1994-88). The international image of Slovakia had deteriorated and several demarches had been delivered to the Slovak government. Despite official declarations that integration was a goal, the government and former Prime Minister Mečiar were the primary obstructions to EU membership. In July 1997, the European Commission recommended that the EU begin negotiations with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Estonia, but not with Slovakia because it did not fulfill the political criteria. Other reasons cited by the Commission included the instability of constitutional institutions and the shortcomings in the functioning of democracy (Gyárfášová 2003).

The elections of 1998 changed the political environment and opened the door to an invitation for EU membership. Under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Dzurinda, the relationship between Slovakia and the EU had improved significantly after the December 1999 Helsinki summit. In February 2000, Slovakia opened accession negotiations with the EU and made substantial progress on closing chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, and by summer 2001, Slovakia had concluded twenty chapters, comparable to the Czech Republic and other candidate countries that had started negotiations two years earlier. The path to EU membership was reconfirmed in the 2002 Slovak parliamentary election that resulted in a coalition

government that excluded Mečiar and his party, HZDS, as well as SNS, the Slovak National Party (Gyárfášová 2003). Particular issues that the European Commission highlighted for Slovakia while preparing for membership included macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform (including addressing the relatively high unemployment rate, large budget deficits, rising inflation, and agricultural inefficiency).

Compared to the other Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), the public debate about European integration has been relatively quiet in Slovakia. Gyárfášová (2003) argues that this is because of the developments on the domestic political scene until 1998, when “the question stood not as whether we want to join the EU but if the EU wants us to join” (4). Consequently, in the Dzurinda governments following Mečiar’s regime the priority was to catch up in the membership process, not to question it.

At the party level, there had been broad consensus on European integration almost from the time of independence. Accession was approached as a goal without any alternative. Opposition to the EU was presented in terms of the way government negotiated with the EU rather than criticizing membership itself, in contrast to the Czech Republic where opponents like Václav Klaus have questioned whether EU membership was good at all. Discussion on EU membership in the media from the mid-1990s until Slovakia’s accession was very unstructured and unspecific, and elite-level debate was practically devoid of any anti-EU arguments. The only anti-EU presence in the Slovak government came from the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), one of the parties in the ruling coalition. KDH tried to bolster its profile as a conservative party and called for defending Slovakia’s sovereignty in the EU. But these initiatives appeared to be rhetorical, and the position failed to gain any support either among other political elites or among the public. Other parties feigned support for the EU, such as

Mečiar's HZDS "declares pro-EU views in order to make themselves seem as internationally recognized," functioning as "phony Europhiles" (Gyárfášová 2003, 6). In short, anti-EU positions have appeared to fall on deaf ears in Slovakia.

In sharp contrast with their Czech neighbors, public support for EU membership among Slovaks has been consistently steady and high, and always at least several points higher than their Czech counterparts since the Eurobarometer began asking about support for membership in 1995. Relying on Slovak polling agency FOCUS data, Slovak sociologist Olga Gyárfášová finds even higher Slovak support than the Eurobarometer, at the level of 70 to 75% (Gyárfášová 2003, 8).¹⁵ Also, citizens' expectations of the future economic and social benefits of joining the EU have generally been high (Gyárfášová 2003). It could be argued that this high level of support has been relatively shallow at the same time, since there is little public debate on EU membership and, as Gyárfášová (2003) argues, has been encouraged by the consensus among major political parties and the elite. However, the high levels of support in combination with little public debate might be indicative of other considerations prominent in Slovak political culture, such as a desire to assert a high status as a nation.

The referendum on EU accession was held on May 16-17, 2003 in Slovakia. Turnout was 52% and 93% of votes cast were in favor of membership¹⁶ (Gyárfášová 2003, 10). Slovakia

¹⁵ Some have questioned whether this continuously high level of support is a popular reaction to being excluded from an invitation to begin negotiations on EU membership in 1997. However, support for the EU was high prior to 1997 and then again even after the referendum on EU membership and even after joining – in short, it has been consistently high from the mid-1990s.

¹⁶ Although it was the first valid referendum in Slovakia since 1993, there was widespread embarrassment about the low interest of citizens to vote on such an important issue, especially when so many citizens have been historically in such high favor of joining the EU. Low turnout for important elections appears to be a trend not only in Slovakia but in the its neighboring post-communist countries as well. Some analysts have attributed the low turnout to the lack of public debate on EU membership, dissatisfaction with the current government, apathy, and a belief among the public that there are enough other people voting "yes" that one's own vote is not necessary (in essence, when it comes to voting on important issues, Slovaks are "free riders"). All in all, "the voting (and above all – non-voting) has shown the absence of conflicting positions in regards to membership in the EU," that the absence of discourse

had voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining the EU, and Slovakia officially became an EU member on May 1, 2004.

2.5.3 Summary

In summary, the Czech and Slovak paths toward EU membership diverged sharply, at least in the mid- to late-1990s when the Czech Republic was invited to begin negotiations but Slovakia was passed over. But by 2003, both countries had made similar progress toward closing negotiations despite their different start dates. Though both countries are now part of the EU, the attitudes of their electorates remain roughly the same as they were before joining (and even before becoming invited). Slovak support for the EU (at least as measured in surveys) has and continues to be at least several points higher than Czech support for the EU, from the time of the Mečiar period (through 1998), when Slovakia was passed over for an invitation in 1997, the referendums on EU membership in 2003, and after joining.

2.6 CONCLUSION

At important points in the histories of the Czech and Slovak nations, different goals, motivations, and aspirations have dominated. While Czechs, from a very early stage, progressed as a “normal,” self-confident European nation, Slovaks have developed a desire for autonomy and validation as a nation.

has had a demobilizing effect on voters who are otherwise highly supportive of EU membership (Gyárfášová 2003, 10).

In this project, I assume that an individual's predispositions are conditioned by the national, social, historical, and economic context that surrounds each person. Because context is so important to predispositions (and thus attitude structure and attitude change), I have dedicated this chapter to outlining Czech and Slovak history from their first mention in historical sources. The history and other socio-demographic information outlined here will play a major role toward building hypotheses to come. In the next chapter, I will outline the existing state of the literature on attitudes toward EU membership and propose a theoretical framework for testing in Chapter 4.

3.0 REVISITING THEORY AND PROPOSING PREFERENCES

The goal of this chapter is to propose a model of attitudes toward EU membership that illustrates the role of context in structuring attitudes toward EU membership. There are two main sections in this chapter, the literature review and the theoretical framework. In the first part of this chapter, I describe existing theory about attitudes toward EU membership across Europe. I also present the current research findings on political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as relevant theory from political and social psychology in an effort to build a model of political attitudes in these two countries. I propose that while Czechs and Slovaks evaluate membership in the EU through the lens of a shared set of considerations, context plays a crucial role in focusing this lens affecting the structure of attitudes toward EU membership. As I set forth my hypotheses, I describe the ways in which context is likely to affect support for EU membership. I conclude by formulating a model of attitudinal structure toward EU membership to test in the subsequent chapter.

3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1.1 The structure of political attitudes

Most scholars of political attitudes (including those studying attitudes toward the EU) start from the position that policy orientations are structured by underlying dimensions that account for covariation in these positions (Gabel and Anderson 2002, 896). These underlying dimensions can be termed “predispositions,” which are general, abstract, stable mental categories that organize an individual’s attitudes¹⁷. Predispositions can be thought of as the “old, generic knowledge” that is used to interpret new, specific information (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1100). Predispositions (or attitudinal dimensions) encompass principles and values, group attachments, affective judgments, and household and sociotropic socioeconomic expectations, which may be affective or cognitive in nature (or both) (Goren 2004, 2001; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Kinder 1998; Zaller 1992).

Consistent with a long tradition of research on mass political behavior, previous studies have conceived of these dimensions or predispositions as constraints on citizens’ policy positions, such that citizens’ positions on a broad range of issue are related to each other in consistent and identifiable ways (e.g., Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985; Gabel and Anderson 2002). As Peffley and Hurwitz (1985, 872) posit, we can determine that pattern of attitudinal constraint exists “[w]hen one can successfully predict an individual’s specific attitudes from a knowledge of the individual’s superordinate or abstract ideas (or vice versa).”

¹⁷ An attitude is a person’s favorable or unfavorable evaluation of other people, objects, and issues (Petty, Priester, and Briñol 2002). Attitudes are important because they are an important mediating variable between exposure to new information and behavior.

This constrained organizational structure has been termed a “belief system,” which Philip E. Converse defined as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (1964, 207).

Lingering questions about the structure of attitudes have inspired much research over the past several decades, particularly in the context of the United States. One conclusion of this research includes the finding that seemingly contradictory predispositions may both come into play when making political judgments (e.g., *more than one* predisposition may matter when making a particular judgment) (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Zaller 1992; Hochschild 1981). In other words, attitudinal structure is multifaceted and complex. Similar conclusions have been reached by scholars of attitudes toward EU membership more recently: utilitarian self-interested calculations may be offset by the variety of identity concerns that come to mind when considering European integration, thus complicating our understanding of political attitudes (Marks and Hooghe 2003). Such scholars have started to suggest that contextual differences in national identity may play a central role in this attitudinal complexity (Marks and Hooghe 2003). As I discuss in the next section, recent research seems to advocate an examination of context in order to better understand the complicated structure of attitudes toward the EU and why the degree of support differs from country to country.

3.1.2 Attitudes toward the European Union

Temporal and geographical variations in the level of popular support for EU membership indicate that the attitudes of citizens of EU member states are intricate. Unsurprisingly, scholars have found competing, often contradictory, explanations for support for EU membership. Research on the content of attitudes toward EU membership first compared public attitudes in

the original member states with member states of successive rounds. This earlier literature found that West Europeans primarily base their attitudes toward EU expansion on economic utilitarian self-interest or cost-benefit calculations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; see Dalton and Eichenberg 1998 and McLaren 2002 for good reviews). More recent studies have begun to examine symbolic psychological factors, such as feelings of national threat and group antipathy arising from national identity, in the composition of attitudes toward integration. For example, such studies have found that citizens view the EU, which institutionalizes modes of political, economic, and even social interconnectedness among European nations, as a threat to their national identity since they fear that increased contact with other cultures might weaken their own national identity and culture (McLaren 2002; DeMaster and LeRoy 2000; Taggart 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2004). Studies on attitudes toward EU membership in the member states of 2004 also found that both rational cost-benefit analyses and/or perceptions of threat to national culture and traditions explained attitudes to the EU (Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Kucia 1999), while more recent studies suggest that national identity plays the most important role structuring attitudes toward EU membership (Marks and Hooghe 2003). However, the relative impact of different explanations varies by study and by case (see Hooghe and Marks 2005 for a comprehensive summary). Thus we return to the original puzzle of this project: why does the strength of support for EU membership vary between these two countries? Do more persuasive explanations exist that are obscured by large multi-national surveys?

In this section, I summarize the findings of extant literature on the content of attitudes toward EU membership in both old and new member states. I then discuss the theoretical contribution of a focused study of two cases, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, to examine how context likely plays a role in attitudes toward the EU.

3.1.2.1 Utilitarian self-interest: multiple definitions

The definition of self-interest has long been contested by scholars and seems to differ according to each tradition in political science. The most precise definition arising from political psychology defines self-interest as “the short-to-medium term impact of an issue on the economic/material well-being” of the individual’s own personal life (or that of his or her immediate family) (Sears and Funk 1990, 148). According to this pure definition, self-interest excludes long-term self-interest, nonmaterial aspects of well-being (such as spiritual fulfillment, social status, self-esteem, or belonging), and interests that affect the well-being of the individual’s group but not specifically the individual. Self-interest may be retrospective (e.g., having recently lost one’s job) or prospective (e.g., expectations of a tax cut) and objective (e.g., the researcher’s assessment that having children in public schools gives one an interest in school funding) or subjective (e.g., the individual’s perception that his own financial situation has deteriorated as a result of being part of the EU). When defined in this manner, scholars of American political opinion have found self-interest to matter very little (see Sears and Funk 1990 for a good discussion). But does this necessarily hold true for European publics?

While students of the role self-interest plays in support for EU membership have defined self-interest in different ways, nearly all have found self-interest to matter. Gabel (1998b, 1998c) employed a definition similar to that proposed by Sears and Funk (1990), positing that *pocketbook* utilitarian cost-benefit analyses are the primary ingredients of EU attitudes, consistent with a prospective, objective self-interested viewpoint. He hypothesized that citizens form attitudes that are consistent with their occupation-based economic interests (1998b, 1998c): the higher one’s socioeconomic situation, the more likely s/he is to support EU membership (see also Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Whitten 1997). Gabel found robust support for this

pocketbook hypothesis in both the original member states and in states that joined in later rounds (up to 1998). This finding has been widely supported in subsequent studies of both West and East European member states. McLaren (2004), labeling self-interest “egocentric utilitarianism,” found that individuals with higher job skills and educational achievement are more likely to support EU membership on the basis that they will personally benefit from European integration in the years to come.

Likewise, research on CEE member states indicates that citizens who have been most hurt by market liberalization, such as farmers and pensioners, do not view the EU as a solution to their economic problems, but rather as an institutionalized obstacle to future personal economic satisfaction (Kucia 1999; Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson (2004) similarly found that socio-economic variables that proxy pocketbook self-interest, such as income and education, are positively associated with attitudes toward the EU in post-communist member states.

Other scholars of EU public opinion have broadened the definition of self-interest to include short- and long-term *sociotropic* economic evaluations (i.e., evaluations of the sociotropic domestic economy) and short- and long-term cost-benefit analyses of the country’s membership in the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995). Survey data from as early as 1950 revealed a growing hostility toward European integration based on the sociotropic costs of pan-European free trade (Preston 1997, Shepherd 1975). More recently, Carey and Burton (2004) reported that support for the EU rises as material gains within a country increase through the liberalization of the EU market. McLaren (2004) used objective measures of the actual benefits received in a country from the EU, which she termed “sociotropic utilitarianism” (e.g., the country’s budget balance with the EU and the intra-EU trade balance) to

predict support for EU integration in West Europe (see also Anderson and Reichert 1996; Carrubba 2001).

Citizens in new member states also have been found to base their EU support on whether they think the domestic economy would benefit or suffer from EU membership overall (Cichowski 2000). The situation was roughly the same for post-communist countries as it was for countries in the second round of EU enlargement (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) (Cichowski 2000; Duchene 1982; Tsoukalis 1981; Vaitos 1982). Furthermore, Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson (2004) found that aggregate-level indicators of the sociotropic economy, such as GNP per capita, predict EU attitudes in post-communist EU member states.

3.1.2.2 Threat and the many faces of identity

While many researchers have found utilitarian economic considerations to play a primary role in attitudes toward EU membership, others have found that “perceptions of national identity are by far most powerful in structuring views on European integration” (Marks and Hooghe 2003, 3). According to a long tradition in psychology, identity is a basic need, essential to self-esteem, and is an automatic attachment that all humans form (Tajfel and Turner 1979, see also Bobo 1983; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Funk 1990). Identity is manifest in myriad ways, ranging from group antipathy, a feeling of aversion or repugnance toward groups other than one’s own (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004) that can take the form of economic protectionism (e.g., realistic threat) or cultural protectionism (e.g., symbolic threat) to more accepting, inclusive forms of identity, such as pan-European identity. The multiple faces of identity found to matter in the literature on attitudes toward EU membership are described in this section.

Research on group antipathy has two main foci: realistic threat and symbolic threat (Huddy 2003).¹⁸ *Realistic threat* theory holds that when individuals evaluate policy proposals, they consider societal-level needs instead of their own personal material needs (see Funk 2000 for a summary). In the literature on attitudes toward EU membership, scholars have found that negative sociotropic economic evaluations (evaluations of the sociotropic domestic economic situation) and negative cost-benefit analyses of the country's membership in the EU (i.e., one's perception of the costs and benefits of EU membership for his/her country) are associated with a rejection of EU membership (Preston 1997; Cichowski 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995).

Similarly, the political behavior literature has focused on negative consequences of group attachments and identity in theories of *symbolic threat*, the threat that other cultures pose to one's own culture and way of life, or more generally, a threat to one's group identity or group esteem (Huddy 2003; Bobo 1983; Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin et al. 1990; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears et al. 1979; Stephan and Stephan 1996). Existing research on attitudes toward EU integration has similarly focused on feelings of threat to one's national identity¹⁹ (Taggart 1998; McLaren 2002, 2004; Carey 2002), theorizing that perceiving threat to one's identity is associated with a rejection of EU membership. Specifically, these studies found that the stronger one's *national identity*, the less likely s/he is to support being part of the EU or support European enlargement (Breakwell 2004). Carey (2002) found that national attachment in conjunction with national pride has a significant negative effect on support for the EU. Similarly, Christin and Trechsel

¹⁸ Such perceived threat can be "realistic" in that it considers a practical, economic threat, such as the elimination of jobs by people of another nation or culture, or "symbolic" in that it considers a more abstract threat to one's culture, traditions, and language.

¹⁹ National identity is defined as the social/national categories, attributes, or components of the self-concept that are shared with others and therefore define individuals as being similar to others in a nation-state (Monroe, Hankin, and Van Vechten 2000).

(2002) found in the case of Switzerland that the stronger one's national attachment and pride, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

Others have examined the role of identity in attitudes toward EU membership from a different angle. The underlying assumption of these studies is that citizens who identify as European are likely to support the European (EU) project. Buch and Hansen (2002) found that Danes' opposition to EU membership rests primarily on the fact that few Danes appear to have a *European identity*. Similarly, White et al. (2002) found in potential applicant countries that the less citizens considered themselves to be European, the less likely they were to support EU membership for their country. The general conclusion is that the stronger a person's European identity, the greater his or her support for EU membership (Citrin and Sides 2004, Carey 2002; Risse 2002).

Hooghe and Marks (2005) probed the nature of identity in an effort to understand how it can reinforce or undermine support for European integration. They found that citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities (e.g., the territory of Europe or EU) are predisposed to be less supportive of EU membership than those who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms. Maddens et al. (1996) found that people who consider themselves to be exclusively Belgian or exclusively Flemish are more likely to reject multi-level governance than those who identify as both Belgian and Flemish. Similarly, Kriesi and Lachat (2004) found that people who identify strongly with their national community and who support exclusionary norms are more likely to reject European integration. Identity may have a "double-edged character": national identity can contribute to or diminish support for European integration, depending largely on how context has shaped it (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 433).

Quantitative analyses of the role of *national identity* in support for EU membership have produced inconsistent (and sometimes incoherent) results. According to Hooghe and Marks (2004), these conflicting results are due to a paradox: while the strongest territorial identities are national, people often identify with several territorial communities simultaneously. For example, quite often individuals have multiple, overlapping identities, such as Catalan, Spanish, and European (Diez Medrano 2003; Marks 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2004). Consequently, national identity and European identity may actually reinforce each other instead of compete for primacy in an individual's attitude structure (Citrin and Sides 2004; Klandermans et al. 2003; Risse 2002; Duschene and Frogner 1995).

In short, identity is complex, as shown by the conflicts in the literature, and its impact on political attitudes is neither automatic nor uniform (Kreisi and Lachat 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). The relationship between one's identity and support for EU membership appears to be shaped by context (Diez Medrano 2003; Strath and Triandafyllidou 2003), and extant literature has called for further research into the how context shapes the way identity affects attitudes toward EU membership.

3.1.2.3 Other variables: party cues and ideology; political awareness and political knowledge

Researchers have also theorized that left-right ideology and political cues such as party identification mediate the effects of economic calculations and identity-based concerns on support for EU membership (Anderson 1998; Ray 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Though several studies have found little evidence that left-right ideology plays a strong role influencing attitudes toward EU membership (see Ray 2003; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), others have found that attitudinal structure about policies in the EU space are fundamentally governed by a

left-right ideological continuum (Gabel and Anderson 2002) and may play a role in attitudes toward EU membership in social democratic societies (Marks 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Ray 2004). According to these studies, the ideological lens through which citizens evaluate public policy is the same through which they evaluate support for EU membership. Since European integration has become a left-leaning project in many countries because it brings the prospect of continental-wide regulation (Hooghe and Marks 2005), left-leaning citizens in post-communist Europe may be more likely to support EU membership.

Similarly, scholars of attitudes toward the EU have found that individuals who say that they support a particular party will tend to follow that party's position on European integration (Marks and Hooghe 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Ray 2003b; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Anderson 1998). This follows literature on American political behavior that posits that citizens are cued, at least in part, by political elites (Zaller 1992). Because the most visible and consequential political organizations that connect elites to the public in Europe are political parties, it is plausible that parties may cue public sentiment toward EU membership. While I do not set forth specific hypotheses as to how party cues and ideology might affect support for EU membership, I will include these potential factors in my regression model as control variables.

Another important variable that is widely considered to play key roles in political attitudes concerns the role of political sophistication (Zaller 1992; Goren 2004; Gabel 1998c; Inglehart 1970, 1990). Political sophistication refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered. Political sophistication is important to attitudes because only the politically sophisticated "pay enough attention to elite discourse to find out the ideological implications of different policies" (Zaller 1992, 113).

Conversely, the politically unsophisticated either miss important political information altogether or are unable to connect information about issues to their predispositions.²⁰

The concept of political sophistication is often operationalized as a combination of political interest or awareness (self-described or objective) and cognitive capacity for understanding politics, often measured via an education proxy but more precisely measured by simple tests of neutral factual information about politics that gauge the amount of political knowledge a person has (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10; Zaller 1992, 113). Because of the central role that political sophistication is thought to play in attitude structure, I will include two variables, political interest and political knowledge, to control for its effects on support for EU membership in the regression analysis. The operationalization of these variables will be described in Chapter 4.

3.1.3 Predispositions and attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Extant literature tells us that a range of dimensions, including utilitarian self-interest and identity-based concerns, predict attitudes to the EU across Europe. But scholars such as Deflem and Pampel (1996) also found that country differences in support for European unification are more important than individual factors such as income or education (see also Hooghe and Marks 2005; Carey 2002). Studies such as these have stressed the need for research into the role that context plays in shaping opinion toward the EU, particularly in how it interacts with identity (and, as we will see in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, with self-interest) to foster or suppress support for EU membership. As two countries that share a half century of political history as

²⁰ This assertion has been challenged in recent years by Goren (2005), who argues that one need not be politically sophisticated to be able to interpret one's position on political issues via one's predispositions.

well as a number of institutional similarities, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are cases in which these shared contextual elements permit us to isolate other facets of context that may affect how attitudes toward EU membership are structured. Despite similar institutional and historical experiences (at least during the decades of communism and the initial transition to democracy), the populations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are widely considered to relate to their national identities in different ways that may affect how they think about the EU.

3.1.3.1 Czech and Slovak attitudinal differences – and the role of identity

The existing scholarship on political attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks illuminates this puzzle by highlighting the role of identity. While Czechs and Slovaks seem to have supported democracy at similar levels through the 1990s, scholars such as Kevin Deegan-Krause (2003a) have found that the values that motivated that support for democracy were fundamentally different. Specifically, Deegan-Krause has argued that the cultural and political implications of national identity composed the fundamental difference in support for democracy between Slovaks and Czechs. He writes that

although the responses of Slovaks and Czechs on survey questions using generic references to nationalism, national pride, and patriotism show almost identical results, more specific questions about the meaning of those concepts reveal significant differences. Although Czechs endorse nationalism just as strongly as Slovaks, their understanding of the term shows significantly less connection to specific grievances and anxieties and the same pattern appears in the analysis of the differences in the rhetoric of public figures in the two countries. The political success in Slovakia of leaders who emphasized the insecurity and injury aspects of nationhood had no significant analog in the Czech Republic (65).

Moreover, Deegan-Krause argues (2003b), Slovaks were vulnerable to the increasingly authoritarian rule of Vladimír Mečiar's populist party HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) in the 1990s because of feelings of national humiliation that stretched back centuries. "Nationalism was particularly useful to HZDS," he concludes, "because it cut across economic

and religious cleavages and ensured a divided opposition” (2003b, 77). Indeed, the outside reputation of the country was of almost primal importance to Slovaks of all backgrounds, notwithstanding other, more cognitively-based considerations like economic/class-based self-interest. Support for Mečiar only dissipated when it became clear to Slovaks that his regime was damaging Slovakia’s reputation in Europe and elsewhere. In stark contrast, the main political cleavage in the Czech Republic has remained the standard left-right liberal-conservative ideological continuum found in most advanced industrial democracies (Deegan-Krause 2000, 2003a; Brodský 2000; Leff 1997).

3.1.3.2 Differences in support for EU membership in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

As with support for democracy, the valence (or intensity) of support for EU membership also differs sharply among Czechs and Slovaks, and scholars have similarly attributed these differences to the role of identity. Survey data have shown that Czechs have been largely muted in their support for the EU, likely because the majority of Czechs evaluate membership in terms of whether their material status quo will improve upon after joining (Brodský 2000). In contrast, Slovaks have tended to strongly support membership, for reasons largely tied to Slovak identity (Gyárfášová 2000).

Vladimír Krivý (2003) argues that Slovak attitudes toward the EU are an extension of the basic political cleavage found in Slovakia: authoritarianism vs. political liberalism. Using data from a 1998 GfK survey, he found that Slovak citizens’ attitudes toward the EU are primarily explained by economic and material concerns (38% of respondents), a desire to strengthen democracy in Slovakia (democratic values, 29% of respondents), and integration into the Western world (26% of respondents) (108). Using data from the same survey, he found that 67% of Slovaks would like the influence of the West to be increased in their country (105).

Krivý explains that the authoritarianism vs. liberalism cleavage is manifest in these attitudes as a question of identity; that is, Slovaks cleave according to a desire to be part of the West versus a desire to “find their own way.” Those who voted against HZDS fall into the first camp, while Mečiar’s supporters – believing that Slovakia must jealously guard its newfound sovereignty – comprise the latter.

Other studies of Slovakia and the EU have also focused on the importance of identity. Karen Henderson (2002), in her manuscript aptly titled *Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility*, writes that the EU has represented a chance for Slovakia to “bolster the country’s self-esteem by demonstrating that it was a state as good as any other and hence an essential element in the European integration process” (89). This view of the EU as a vehicle for enhanced national self-esteem is grounded in Slovakia’s historical trajectory, which was particularly called into question in the 20th century: “Slovaks...were unclear about what their newly independent state represented in terms of history and values. This affected...Slovak efforts at European integration” (88). Henderson argues that EU membership is viewed by ordinary Slovaks through the lens of their shared identity, which she describes as characterized by a kind of national inferiority complex. And because Slovaks view the EU as a way to get past this national inferiority complex -- as a way to “bolster the country’s self-esteem” (2002, 89) -- the EU represents a vehicle to improve the Slovaks’ evaluation of their own national identity.

These assertions about Slovakia are not new. Sociological and comparative political accounts over the years have described a tendency in Slovak culture to affirm its dignity as a nation (Leff 1988, 1997; Holý 1996). As illustrated in Chapter 2, Slovakia has long been the poorer, less educated, and less powerful neighbor of the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Poles. Luba Zaloudkova (2001) writes that

because of a lack of political experience and continuity in terms of pluralistic political values and norms (long-standing Hungarian dominance and suppression of the Slovak lands and later an insufficient acceptance of Slovak political issues from the side of Czech political forces during the Czechoslovak federation), Slovak political culture could be characterized by a search for national identity (20).

Moreover, as early as 1990, a leading Slovak newspaper, *Kultúrny Život*, published a prominent statement that declared that Slovakia must be “able to win recognition within the family of other nations as a respected and equal member *who is highly regarded by all others*” (1990, 36, italics added).

Taken as a whole, previous literature indicates that Slovak identity is not manifest as a desire to protect one’s culture from others but instead takes the form of an aspiration for greater respect from outsiders. Slovaks do not necessarily seem to believe that their ethnic group or country is better than others; they do not seem to think of themselves as the favored in-group that is superior to out-groups. If anything, Slovaks may feel what social psychologists call “outgroup favoritism” (Rubin and Hewstone 2004) in their desire to catch up with the West and join the EU, which I will discuss in greater detail later. Slovaks seem to want the political and social recognition that their neighbors have enjoyed throughout history (Henderson 2002).

In contrast, national identity plays a much different role in the Czech Republic, due to a cultural consensus of self-confidence in the content of Czech identity. Jirí Brodský (2000, 3) writes that “Czech identity has been...constructed as an identity of a democratic, civilized, well-educated, and cultured nation, i.e., a nation that has always belonged to Europe, that has always been European...” He continues that the slogan “return to Europe,” much used in the early 1990s, “epitomized a ‘return to the normal order of things’ for Czechs. It was a return to Europe, to which they have always felt they belonged, and with which they have always claimed to have strong cultural and historical ties” (3). These sentiments are reflected in popular commentaries

in the media. The Czechs' consensual vision of themselves as an inherently democratic, well-educated, and highly cultured nation is cited as the reason for its current success in the post-communist era: "it was the Czech culture which preserved continuity" (*Lidové Noviny*, January 15, 2000). The "return to Europe" that was a natural response for Czechs may have been more of an aspiration to Slovaks, which likely affected how these different populations reacted to potential EU membership.

3.2 THEORIZING SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

In the first part of this chapter, I reviewed the existing literature on attitudes toward EU membership across Europe and described the state of research on political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the second part, I discuss the ways in which existing studies on attitudes toward EU membership may be complemented (or even invalidated) by context and by theory from social psychology. First, I reveal how context may regulate how strongly self-interest and realistic threat affect support for EU membership. Then, using social identity theory, I describe how context plays a key role in determining whether national pride weakens EU support (as previous literature has found) or actually fosters support for EU membership.

After describing the theoretical mechanisms proposed in both the extant literature on support for EU membership as well as social identity theory, I develop hypotheses about attitudinal structure toward EU membership that I will test in the next chapter. For each predisposition, I will set forth a base hypothesis predicting its general effect on EU support. For

hypotheses where context is likely to affect the original hypothesis, I will make a specific, subsequent country-level hypothesis predicting differences between Czechs and Slovaks.

3.2.1 Self-interest

When self-interest is defined in the manner of Sears and Funk (1990), scholars of American political opinion have found it to matter very little (Huddy 2003; see Sears and Funk 1990 for a good discussion). In contrast to the American findings, however, existing studies of European public opinion conclude that self-interest is a primary concern for Europeans when thinking about the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998b, 1998c; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; McLaren 2004). Most of the European research operationalizes self-interest using individual socioeconomic indicators (e.g., occupation, income or class) as proxies for measures of pocketbook self-interest. It is unclear from these studies whether self-interest matters more for Europeans than it does for Americans or whether the disparate findings are due to different operationalizations.

In order to gain an understanding of whether (and how) self-interest matters to EU support, I will expand the precise definition of self-interest most often used in the American political psychology literature to employ the broad conceptualization that is used most often in European politics. I define *self-interest* as the perceived short-to-medium term impact of an issue on one's economic or material well-being, and it may include both pocketbook and sociotropic economic assessments. In keeping with the existing behavioral literature on attitudes toward EU membership, self-interest may reflect both pocketbook (e.g., individual) and sociotropic (e.g., country-level) economic calculations, and it may be retrospective (using past personal economic experience as frame) or prospective (looking toward the future).

To operationalize self-interest, I eschew the demographic items used in previous studies of public opinion toward the EU (such as occupation) in favor of more proximal measures of the personal impact of the EU on an individual.²¹ Such proximal measures include survey questions that directly ask respondents to evaluate whether they think they will be better or worse off from becoming part of the EU.²² A more accurate operationalization of self-interest may reveal that (as in America) self-interest matters very little to Europeans in their views on the EU. However, it is also possible that, with the increased precision that comes from using more specific measures, we might find in this project that self-interest may matter even more than what has been found in previous EU studies that used proxies as measures (see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004 for further argumentation). In the model I will also control for variables that others have used as proxies for self-interest, however, such as occupation and level of education.

The literature on attitudes toward EU membership posits that positive pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations are associated with support for EU membership. Because “European integration is perceived by most citizens to shape their economic welfare,” citizens who positively evaluate their present and future pocketbook and sociotropic economic situations

²¹ Another problem with using aggregate indicators as proxies of individual self-interest is the strong likelihood of a spurious relationship, committing the ecological fallacy. For example, we might observe citizens voting against the current government when the sociotropic economy is faltering and falsely infer that individuals are voting on the basis of pocketbook evaluations. In such cases, evidence from the individual level may show that variables that are totally unrelated accounted for vote choice.

²² As mentioned earlier, self-interest may be retrospective or prospective in nature. Retrospective evaluations are likely to matter to support for EU membership because the better one perceives his or her own pocketbook or sociotropic economic situation to be, the more accepting one is likely to be of making the emerging market economy more concrete via the EU. Prospective economic evaluations are likely to matter in that they directly measure how the respondent expects his or her economic situation in the near future, one that is likely to be affected directly by membership in a free trade organization such as the EU. While scholars have found retrospective and prospective to matter in different ways on other political issues (MacKuen et al 1992), with regard to support for EU membership no discernable difference has been found. This conclusion (and working assumption of this project) will be examined in the empirical section of this project by testing whether the retrospective and prospective economic evaluation items cohere statistically. If these items do cohere statistically, then we can have some evidence that prospective and retrospective economic evaluations are more similar than they are different with regard to my sample. For the purposes of developing hypotheses, I will note no difference between retrospective and prospective evaluations.

are likely to regard EU membership in a positive light (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 422). To test the veracity of this proposition across both the Czech Republic and Slovakia (that is, without respect to potential contextual differences), I propose the following hypothesis:

H1: The more positively one evaluates his/her (pocketbook and sociotropic) economic situation, the more likely one is to support EU membership.

3.2.2 Self-interest and contextual differences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Does context affect the likelihood that self-interest will matter more or less to support for EU membership? Hooghe and Marks (2005) posit that pocketbook self-interest is likely to play a role when there are (1) clear, substantial costs and benefits to EU membership, (2) severe and ambiguous threats, and (3) threats that are politicized; to the extent that these conditions are not present, group identities may play the decisive factor in determining attitudes (see also Sears and Funk 1990, 1991). In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is difficult to assess the presence of the first and second conditions because the costs and benefits are too general to ascertain (and the potential costs and benefits themselves are debatable). But the third condition can be assessed, and we can do that by examining the political context in which self-interest is or is not politicized in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Moreover, the third condition -- whether the potential threats are politicized -- is, in a sense, reflective of whether self-interest is likely to matter.

This is the case firstly because the information provided by political elites is a primary source from which Czechs and Slovaks learn about the potential costs and benefits of EU membership. This is also the case because politicians do attempt to structure the debate in the public eye: for example, in the Czech Republic, particular parties and politicians took the

opportunity of EU membership to take a position (pro- or anti-EU) on the issue whereas in Slovakia, elites generally agreed that the benefits of joining the EU far outweighed any potential costs. Thus, to understand whether ordinary people view the EU through the lens of pocketbook self-interest, we must explore how the costs and benefits have been discussed by political elites.

In the Czech Republic, the lack of elite-level consensus about the costs and benefits provided a platform for parties to distinguish themselves. ODS, the Civic Democratic party led by Václav Klaus, adopted a firmly Euroskeptic (or, in Klaus' view, "Eurorealist") platform, arguing that membership would stifle free markets, lead to higher costs of living and also higher unemployment rates. At the same time, the pro-EU campaign made virtually opposite claims, arguing that EU membership would bring lower unemployment, lower prices, better-quality products, the benefits of using the euro for businesses and for individuals, and additional financial support from the EU for the country as a whole (Hanley 2004). Thus, the two sides made fundamentally contradictory claims with some validity, and no one really knew what the outcome would be over time.

Thus while the threats were objectively ambiguous, they were not severe enough to provoke fear of a catastrophe, even by ODS' standards, and therefore the first and second conditions do not seem to be met. But what can be confirmed is that the third condition – that the threats must be politicized – has been met in the Czech Republic. That is, the pocketbook costs and benefits of EU membership have been politicized in the Czech Republic, primarily because of the salience of the issue brought by President Václav Klaus and his party, ODS, since the issue of EU membership first became a possibility in the mid-1990s (Hanley 2004). And it continues to be politicized today; in reaction to the now-tabled referendum on the European Constitution, in mid-2005 President Klaus wrote an explosive anti-EU introduction to a highly

popular pamphlet on the pros and cons of ratification (Klaus 2005). In short, because elite-level debate is structured around the pocketbook costs and benefits of EU membership, we have some reason to expect that self-interest may matter in the Czech Republic when it comes to attitudes to the EU.

In Slovakia, we see the virtual absence of elite-level debate about the issue of EU membership – a “consensus without a discussion” (Gyárfášová 2000, 20). A noted Slovak sociologist wrote in 2000 that “there is no ongoing dialogue between the advocates and opponents of Slovakia’s integration. Slovakia continues to lack what is referred to as a desirable stage on the way to EU membership, that is, a broad public debate that would matter-of-factly evaluate the pros and cons of Slovakia’s EU integration” (Gyárfášová 2000, 15). The only major party that had been Euroskeptic, Vladimír Mečiar’s HZDS, shrugged off its anti-EU posture and jumped on the European bandwagon after it became clear that public opinion and all other relevant political forces were united behind a pro-EU banner. Instead of debating the pros and cons of membership in the EU, the Slovak political powers focused debate on the behavior of the domestic government, making discussion of the EU of an “ornamental” rather than a fundamental nature (Gyárfášová 2000, 18). The real economic costs and benefits of EU membership, which are verifiably debatable, never played a key role in Slovak debate as they did in the Czech Republic. Self-interest thus never was politicized as it was in the Czech Republic and consequently, it seems that it may not have become as salient in the minds of ordinary Slovaks when considering EU membership as their Czech counterparts.

With this in mind, I propose a hypothesis about the interaction of context and self-interest in the Czech Republic and Slovakia:

H1a: The (positive) relationship between self-interest and support for EU membership is likely to be stronger among Czechs than among Slovaks.

3.2.3 What else might matter?

If self-interest does not matter—or does not provide the entire explanation—then what else matters? Sears and Funk (1990) answer this question, positing that group identification is the basic reference most people use to evaluate policies when self-interest is not called to mind (see also Hooghe and Marks 2005). Social psychological theories that focus on group identification, ranging from social identity theory to realistic group conflict theory, attempt to explain such cases (Huddy 2003). Many scholars maintain that the mechanism of identity is critical to political attitudes generally and attitudes toward the EU specifically, as I will outline in this section.

Regarding attitudes to the EU in particular, Hooghe and Marks (2004) concur with Sears and Funk (1990): to the extent that the conditions under which self-interest is hypothesized to matter “are not present, group identities are likely to be decisive” (2). Why is this the case? Social identity theory provides an answer: because identity is fundamental to a person’s understanding of him/herself and the world, identity provides a virtually automatic mechanism through which an individual understands political phenomena (Huddy 2003). This mechanism plays a vital role when considering membership in the European Union since the EU is not simply an international organization intended to lower trade barriers or reduce the costs of intergovernmental bargaining; it is an actual polity in the making and consequently challenges the central values of national identity and sovereignty. Marks and Hooghe argue that “emotional or ‘gut’ commitments can be extremely powerful in shaping views toward political objects, particularly when other cognitive frames of reference do not transparently apply,” and its position in shaping attitudes toward EU membership is similarly important (2003, 6; see also Chong 2000; Kinder and Sears 1981).

3.2.3.1 Group identification

As Hooghe and Marks (2004) observe, “humans and their ancestors evolved an emotional capacity for intense group loyalty long before the development of rational faculties, and such loyalties can be extremely powerful in shaping views toward political objects” (2). Identity is a powerful filter for how individuals view the world around them, as it forms the basis from which one can compare oneself to others. Research has examined the political role played by group membership, particularly group identification, which is defined as the internalized sense of belonging to a group (Huddy 2003). Group identification typically takes the form of social identity, the “self awareness of one’s objective membership in the group *and* a psychological sense of attachment to the group” (Conover 1984, 76, italics original). In other words, social identity involves the incorporation of group membership into how an individual understands him/herself (in psychological terms, the group membership is incorporated into the “self-concept”) (Huddy 2003).

Different strains of psychological theory attempt to explain the relationship between group identification and the political behavior that originates from it (Huddy 2003). These types of theories closely mirror hypotheses developed separately in the literature on attitudes toward EU membership. For example, realistic group conflict theory recalls hypotheses about the role of sociotropic evaluations on political attitudes, and social identity theory is related to hypotheses about the roles of pan-European identity and national identity on attitudes toward EU membership. In the next sections, I will describe and discuss the realistic approach to group identification, *realistic group conflict theory*, as well as the symbolic approach, known as *social identity theory*, in an attempt to formulate testable hypotheses. I will also describe how the

multiple faces of national pride and European identity are likely to affect support for EU membership.

3.2.3.1.1. Ingroup favoritism: realistic threat

A core premise of theories about social identity in the social psychology literature is that the group a person belongs to or identifies with (the “ingroup”) is a central component of an individual’s conception of who s/he is (Huddy 2003). Because people strive to have a positive self-concept, they are necessarily motivated to evaluate the group/s that form the basis of their group identity positively²³ (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). And in order to have a positive evaluation of their own group (i.e., the ingroup), people normally, though not always, are motivated to evaluate other groups (“outgroups”) homogeneously and negatively²⁴ (Brewer 2001; Rubin and Hewstone 2004).

Preferring one’s own group (preferring one’s “ingroup”) thus often results in evaluating outgroups negatively. This negative evaluation is generally manifest as *group antipathy*, a strong feeling of aversion or repugnance toward outgroups (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Research on group antipathy has two main foci: realistic threat and symbolic threat (Huddy 2003).²⁵ The theoretical basis for predictions about realistic threat is realistic group conflict theory (RGCT), which assumes that people are part of groups because it is in their material interest to do so. Ergo, realistic group conflict theory posits that hostility toward other ethnic or

²³ The self-concept or self-esteem is both inherently psychological and social. Rubin and Hewstone (2004) explain that self-esteem is partly conceptualized as a social phenomenon because it is (1) shared by members of the same group, and (2) it is dependent on relations with other groups. Thus, self-esteem is at the base of intergroup relations and consequently, at the base of social identity.

²⁴ Empirical evidence demonstrates that group members seem to feel better about themselves after engaging in discrimination of outgroups (Brown 2000).

²⁵ Such perceived threat can be “realistic” in that it considers a practical, economic threat, such as the elimination of jobs by people of another nation or culture, or “symbolic” in that it considers a more abstract threat to one’s culture, traditions, and language.

national groups is a function of the perceived threats that other groups pose to the resources of one's own group. This same relationship works at the country level; hostility toward citizens of other countries is often a function of the perceived threats that other countries pose to the resources of one's own country. In many ways, when examined at the country level (e.g., between countries), hypotheses arising from theories of realistic threat and sociotropic cost-benefit evaluations are practically equivalent. Because they are virtually indistinguishable in predictions regarding country-level support for EU membership, from this point on I will treat realistic threat (and the theory it originates from, RGCT) and sociotropic evaluations as identical.²⁶

Closely paralleling the EU literature's propositions about sociotropic evaluations, RGCT contends that when individuals evaluate policy proposals, they consider societal-level needs in addition to (or even instead of) their own personal material needs (see Funk 2000 for a summary). For instance, previous research on attitudes toward immigration shows that concern for the resources of the dominant ethnic group (that is, realistic group conflict) tends to predict hostility toward immigration at least as much as concern for one's own personal resources (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997). This echoes the literature on attitudes toward EU membership in which scholars have found that negative sociotropic economic evaluations and negative cost-benefit analyses of the country's membership in the EU (i.e., one's perception of the costs and benefits of EU membership for his/her country) are associated with a rejection of EU membership (Preston 1997; Cichowski 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995).

²⁶ Despite being called "realistic threat," the threat posed need not be actually present; it only needs to be perceived.

For new EU countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, membership brings real benefits but comes with real costs. As post-communist members of the EU and certainly as the members with poorer citizens, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have a lot to gain from the EU. Although structural and regional funds have been relatively limited in the face of an EU budget crunch, new member-states have been able to take advantage of relatively low production costs and highly educated workforces to attract foreign investment. In this sense, Czechs and Slovaks should have positive prospective sociotropic evaluations, which should lead to support for EU membership.

But other factors indicate that Czechs and Slovaks have reason to be wary of the costs of membership, mostly stemming from possible negative externalities of free trade. First, the coming flood of foreign imports threatened to drown the sales of domestically-produced goods. At the same time, economic competitiveness mandated the deregulation of labor markets along with the continued dismantling of the communist-era social welfare systems, creating the frightening prospect of higher unemployment coupled with a tattered safety net (Lungescu 2005). These potential costs may be overshadowed by accompanying economic benefits in the long term, but in the short-term they threaten both economic stability and the survival of governments, which often respond by blaming the EU for economic troubles that emerge.

I thus propose the following hypothesis:

H2: The more one perceives realistic threat with regard to membership in the European Union, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

While theory about realistic threat attempts to explain threat at the group (as opposed to individual) level, the group that one belongs to – and thus seeks to protect – may be manifold. For this project, my hypothesis concerns the perception of realistic threat with regard to EU membership, with the implicit assumption that that threat comes from outside one's country but

from within the EU. Thus, the realistic threat perceived may come from other states or from the European Union itself, and the threat perceived is to be at the country level, holding roughly across all strata within the country. To substantiate this assumption, I will introduce control variables in my analysis to account for any potential confounding relationships between other groups (whose members might also perceive realistic threat) and support for EU membership, such as age group and rural/urban.

3.2.3.1.2. Ingroup favoritism: realistic threat and contextual differences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

While EU membership posed clear realistic threats to both countries as described above, there were two additional salient sociotropic costs to EU membership that were largely confined to the Czech Republic, bringing context to bear on the relationship between realistic threat and support for EU membership. First, the need to adopt and implement massive amounts of EU regulations associated with the *acquis communautaire* (the body of EU law to which each new member-state accedes) (and the accompanying need to create new mechanisms and bodies to administer EU funds and policies) was particularly burdensome in the Czech Republic (Jacoby and Černoch 2002), more so than in Slovakia, due to the Czech Republic's internal politics at the time. The process by which applicant countries submitted evidence of harmonization was extremely tedious and resource-consuming, and the lack of a well-formed regional governance mechanism set forth in the constitution impeded the EU's willingness to consider Czech EU membership further. Moreover, a lack of interest in regional policy by the ODS-led government in 1996 led the European Commission to issue a strongly-worded assessment clearly stating the need for the Czech Republic to establish a regional policy. This opinion, along with a change to

a caretaker government in 1997 following the resignation of the Klaus government, is viewed as eventually paving the way for regional policy reform (Jacoby and Černoč 2002).

Second, and more importantly, the fear of foreigners buying up property played a much larger role in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia. Reverberations from the Nazi-era annexation of the Sudetenland – and the subsequent wholesale expulsion of Germans after World War II -- still echo loudly throughout the Czech Republic, and the threat of a new wave of German “invaders” from expellee communities with potential claims on Czech land became highly publicized. While this concern may have been shared by some Slovaks, the lack of geographic contiguity—along with the absence of the long shadow of history—likely lessened the importance of this concern in Slovakia. This example shows how realistic threats that are politicized become more “real” because they are made salient in the public realm. In this way, politicization mattered to realistic threat just as politicization mattered for self-interest.

Thus, with the expectation that the realistic costs of membership might be perceived as higher by Czechs than by Slovaks, we may expect that context affects the relationship between realistic threat and support for EU membership in the following manner:

H2a: The (negative) relationship between perceived realistic threat and support for EU membership is likely to be significantly stronger among Czechs than among Slovaks.

3.2.3.1.3. Ingroup favoritism: symbolic threat

In contrast to realistic threat, symbolic threat (which I also refer to as “cultural threat”) suggests that people are more concerned with the threat that other cultures pose to their identity and their way of life (Bobo 1983; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Stephan and Stephan 1996). In other words, symbolic threats concern threats to group identity or group esteem

(Huddy 2003). A prediction of social identity theory, symbolic threat differs from realistic threat in that it considers group antipathy to be the result of symbolic competition between one's ingroup and outgroups. Threats that foster such symbolic competition can be defined as "some action or communication that directly or indirectly seems to undermine the value of being a group member" (Grant and Brown 1995, 198). Symbolic competition, like material competition, is motivated by one's need to positively distinguish one's group from an outgroup; the difference here is that instead of seeking to protect and promote the material or economic status of one's group, a person seeks to protect his/her ingroup's social norms, culture, and very identity from the influence of outgroups (Huddy 2003).

Symbolic threat describes what many scholars of support for EU membership have found in West Europe; that is, group antipathy arising from strong national identity, caused by fantasies of the degradation of one's own culture at the hands of another culture's members (consider, for example, the radical right-wing anti-EU sentiment in Austria, France, Denmark, and Italy that is the ostensible result of fears of cultural degradation from being part of the EU) (Hooghe et al. 2002; Taggart 1998; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Recent studies have shown mixed support for the notion that those who strongly identify with their national group²⁷ experience negative feelings toward outgroups, perceiving threats to their culture and way of life (Buch and Hansen 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002, 2004). Scholars using direct measures of symbolic threat have found that the more acutely a person perceives *symbolic threat* (i.e., a threat from other cultures to his/her own culture and way of life), the less likely s/he is to

²⁷ Given that the central motivation underlying identification with a group is positive self-esteem (Tajfel 1981; Rubin and Hewstone 2004), social identity typically fosters a positive evaluation of one's own group and a correspondingly negative evaluation of another group, cultivating intergroup bias.²⁷ In fact, much of the political psychology literature assumes that the stronger the group's identity, the more that group dislikes outgroups (Brown 2000). As social identity scholar Leonie Huddy (2003) concludes, "[N]egative attitudes toward an outgroup are most often pronounced among those who strongly identify with the ingroup" (525).

support EU membership (Taggart 1998; McLaren 2004). Other studies that have attempted to operationalize symbolic threat using broader measures of national identity strength, however, have produced contradictory results. Some have found that the stronger one's national identity, the less supportive s/he is for EU membership (Breakwell 2000; Carey 2002). Still others provide evidence that a strong national identity might actually promote European identity and thus indirectly heighten support for EU membership (Van Kersbergen 2000). Overall, support for the proposition that having a strong, positive national identity and/or perceiving symbolic threat lessens support for EU membership has been mixed.

Given the lack of clarity in the literature, I take my cue from studies that have reached the broadest consensus and propose the following hypothesis:

H3: The more one perceives symbolic threat, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

As with realistic threat, I assume here that any symbolic threat perceived by Czechs or Slovaks comes from other states or from the European Union itself. In other words, I maintain that the threat perceived is to be at the country level, and I will test that by including control variables in the regression to account for other (sub- or cross-national) groups whose members might perceive symbolic threat with regard to EU membership. Such control variables include religion and ethnicity.

3.2.3.1.4. Group favoritism and national pride

Recalling the previous sections on realistic and symbolic threat, the most common (and intuitive) manifestation of ingroup favoritism is national pride. Huddy (2003), along with a long line of social identity theorists, posits that the group a person belongs to or identifies with ("the ingroup") is a core piece of an individual's idea of who s/he is (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel

1981). Because people seek to have a positive self-concept, they are necessarily motivated to evaluate their ingroup positively, which generally results in a sense of national pride²⁸. If one identifies primarily and strongly with one's national group, it is natural for one to view EU membership negatively (as it brings with it the threat of encroachment on one's national identity) (McLaren 2002; Marks 1999)

The literature on attitudes toward EU membership similarly focuses on the relationship of national pride to support for EU membership, theorizing that the stronger and more positive one's national identity, the less likely s/he is to support being part of the EU or support European enlargement (Taggart 1998; McLaren 2002, 2004; Breakwell 2000). Carey (2002) found that national pride has a strong, significant negative effect on support for the EU. Similarly, Christin and Trechsel (2002) found in the case of Switzerland, the stronger one's national attachment and pride, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

In order to test the general consensus in the existing literature on the relationship of national pride to attitudes toward EU membership, I propose the following hypothesis:

H4: The stronger one's national pride, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

Because this hypothesis has been found to hold when examined across multiple countries (and thus has become the standard in existing research on support for EU membership), it is important to test here. However, in the next few paragraphs, I will propose that this hypothesis does not always hold when context is taken into account. As I will describe in the next section, both contextual evidence and theory from social psychology provides information that compels the reevaluation of this "one size fits all" hypothesis. I expect that by explicitly modeling country context into the equation, different relationships will emerge between national pride and

²⁸ I use the terms "positive national identity" and "national pride" interchangeably.

support for EU membership, specifically, that national pride may both undermine and promote support for EU membership, depending on context.

3.2.3.1.4.1. Group favoritism, national pride, and contextual differences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

To recap, group antipathy is theorized to arise from a perception of threat either to the monetary resources (realistic threat) or identity and esteem (symbolic threat) of one's ingroup. Realistic threat is predicted by realistic group conflict theory, while symbolic threat is predicted by social identity theory (SIT). But SIT's predictions as to what may arise from group antipathy are not limited to symbolic threat or outgroup antipathy. In other words, to focus only on symbolic threat would be to neglect the range of possible predictions from SIT, as there are manifestations of social or national identity that might matter to attitudes toward the EU beyond outgroup antipathy (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1987).

Until now (and as described above), scholars undertaking quantitative analyses of the causes of EU support have equated "national identity" with either group antipathy or national pride that makes group members evaluate outgroups negatively. The dearth of research on other SIT-derived hypotheses is most likely related to the fact that the scholarship on EU support consists largely of EU-28 studies (that is, studies that examine all or most of the EU member states together). In such wide-angle pictures of the entire European populace, important and interesting contextual interactions may not be easily visible. I propose that by applying specific theory on outgroup favoritism from SIT to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we may thus illuminate and explain how national pride may either lessen or foster support for EU membership depending on country context.

To reiterate, theory from psychology predicts that both realistic and symbolic threat arises from a need to protect one's ingroup status because one prefers one's ingroup to other groups (i.e., ingroup favoritism). *Ingroup favoritism* (i.e., the condition in which a group of individuals who share a particular identity obviously prefer their own group to other groups) is what intuitively comes to mind when one thinks of national identity. But that is not the only possible expression of group identity. An often-overlooked but fascinating manifestation of social or national identity is *outgroup favoritism*, which is what emerges when members of an ingroup actually prefer an outgroup (Rubin and Hewstone 2004; Niens and Cairns 2003; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Given that people identify with a group because it helps them create a positive self-concept (that is, "positive self-esteem"; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1969, 1981), how does this paradoxical situation occur and how does it sustain itself?

In order to answer this question, I describe the fundamentals of social identity theory (SIT) in order to explain how ingroup and outgroup favoritism work. Explaining outgroup favoritism is particularly important because the concept is counterintuitive, given that common understanding of the term "social identity" translates to hostility toward other groups.

The social-psychological component of SIT explains that individuals try to achieve a positive social identity by comparing their ingroup²⁹ with other groups ("outgroups") in a behavioral strategy called "social competition" (Rubin and Hewstone 2004; Jost et al 2004; Turner 1975). The goal for both the individual and the group in social competition is to find relevant comparative elements that provide positive outcomes for the ingroup in order to foster individual and collective self-esteem. When one compares one's ingroup with outgroups, one develops a system of orientation for self-reference, allowing the individual to create and define

²⁹ I consider that the essential criteria for group membership is that the individuals concerned define themselves and are defined by others as a group (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

his/her place in society. Social identity thus comprises those aspects one's self-image that derive from the social categories to which one perceives oneself as belonging (Tajfel and Turner 1979). When group members perceive that their group is superior to other groups vis-à-vis social competition, the natural consequence is the development of a *positive social identity* (or what we might call *national pride*). However, when there are perceived deficiencies in the social comparison process, group members are faced with a problem: how to escape from their disadvantaged position and develop a positive national identity (i.e., national pride).

SIT also sets forth the conditions under which social competition is likely to occur in the system component. Three sociostructural variables, the permeability of group boundaries, the stability of the intergroup status system, and the legitimacy of the system, shape the likelihood that a given group will engage in social competition. How a given group behaves in the presence of outgroups is also thought to be dependent on the societal component, or the structural context — in particular, the configuration of groups that interact with each other (Rubin and Hewstone 2004). The resulting relations that exist among groups within a particular situation vary according to the specific historical, cultural, political, and economic context that contains and defines the groups and their status system.³⁰ Depending on the system, intergroup relations are characterized by different types of intergroup bias, including *social competition* and *consensual discrimination*.

I have already implicitly discussed what is perhaps the best-known form of intergroup discrimination, “social competition.” Social competition describes the striving of individuals to attain the most superior position in a system of social relations, manifest as direct competition to change the relative positions of the ingroup and outgroup (Brown 2000). Social competition

³⁰ Because the combinations are myriad and most are outside the scope of the puzzle at hand, I only discuss manifestations of social identity that we are likely to see in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

characterizes a system in which members of both groups think that their own group is superior to other groups (e.g., ingroup favoritism resulting in group antipathy). Social competition, the usual form of discrimination observed, is predicted to occur when intergroup boundaries are permeable and the intergroup hierarchy is unstable and illegitimate (Rubin and Hewstone 2004).³¹

Why is this the case? When boundaries between groups are permeable, it is relatively easy for members of low-status groups to move to high-status groups. For this reason, members of low-status groups are less likely to feel “trapped” in such groups; if they remain, it is likely because they refuse to accept their group’s place in the hierarchy and seek to boost it through social competition. Similarly, when the intergroup hierarchy is unstable, there is hope for a hierarchical shift and thus low-status groups are not likely to become resigned to their position. Finally, when the intergroup status hierarchy is perceived to be illegitimate, low-status groups will not accept their status and will seek to overturn the illegitimate hierarchical outcome. In systems defined by social competition, both groups will likely have positive identities—the “high status” group for obvious reasons, and the “low-status” group because it refuses to accept its low-status due to the system’s instability or illegitimacy (Rubin and Hewstone 2004; Tajfel and Turner 1979).


The other form of discrimination within an intergroup system is “consensual discrimination,” present in cases in which there is a consensus as to the intergroup status hierarchy. When social competition creates winners and losers and the terms of the competition

³¹ Permeable group boundaries allow the individual to move from one group to another, while impermeable group boundaries restrict the individual from changing groups. Stability refers to the individual or collective perception of possible future changes of the ingroup’s status in comparison to another group. Legitimacy refers to individual or collective perceptions of the justification of the group’s status; group status that is perceived to have been reached by fair means is considered legitimate (Niens and Cairns 2003).

are perceived as legitimate, fair and stable, the losing group may acquiesce to the superiority of the winning outgroup and consider itself to be legitimately inferior. From the low-status group's perspective, it has only itself to blame for its position, and thus is less likely to think that they "deserve" to change their position or that such a change is even possible. In such cases of consensual discrimination, "the subjective and accorded prestige are identical" and both groups (in and out) favor the high-status group over the low-status one (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 37; Rubin and Hewstone 1998; Brauer 2001). In summary, low-status groups will show outgroup favoritism (i.e., consensual discrimination) when intergroup status is stable and legitimate and they will show ingroup favoritism (i.e., social competition) when intergroup status is unstable and illegitimate.³² In response, the low-status group is likely to have an underdeveloped social identity (which they seek to change via different strategies, ranging from social creativity to social change) (Huddy 2004; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Figure 3.1 below illustrates the two systems of social competition and consensual discrimination.

³² It should be clear that consensual discrimination is observably synonymous with outgroup favoritism, the internalized acceptance of the status quo from the position of low-status groups. As intergroup status hierarchies become more stable and legitimate (as, for example, the East/West European hierarchy became before the fall of the Iron Curtain), social competition should decrease and consensual discriminations should increase (in this case, meaning that East Europeans should begin to accept their fate as "backwards") (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In reality, social competition and consensual discrimination are likely to co-occur to some extent because status systems are unlikely to be either completely stable or unstable (Tajfel 1978a, 87-88; Rubin and Hewstone 2004).

(A) Social Competition



(B) Consensual Discrimination




Figure 3.1 Intergroup bias: social competition and consensual discrimination

What are the options for a low-status group in a system of consensual discrimination that has an underdeveloped identity? Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that the need for positive distinctiveness drives social identity, which means that group identity is likely to arise among members of a high-status group because membership positively distinguishes ingroup members from outgroup members. This also means that we cannot be sure that group identity will actually develop at all among members of low-status groups. Because of this, low-status groups must adopt an identity management strategy in order to avoid or reduce the impact of their outgroup favoritism, such as developing an identity around other positive group attributes (social creativity). Another option, structural conditions permitting, is to actually change the group's negative image (social change) (Huddy 2004). Because the particular form of intergroup bias (i.e., social competition or consensual discrimination) is dependent on the sociostructural

attributes of the system, such social change is only likely to occur when (a) conditions (i.e., stability and legitimacy of the existing intergroup status system) change and (b) the low-status group engages in social competition to actively change the status quo amidst the sociostructural change (Turner 1999).

3.2.3.1.4.2. Group favoritism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia


Before proceeding further with SIT's predictions, I examine how well the theoretical scenarios fit with what can be observed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I thus evaluate the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's relationships to the EU (and to Europe in general) in terms of the stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations, the factors that condition whether social competition or consensual discrimination emerges.³³

In terms of stability, the Czech Republic has enjoyed a relatively stable and relatively equal relationship with the rest of Europe for centuries. Forty years of communism and the subsequent "return to Europe" has destabilized the relationship between the Czech Republic and the rest of Europe. In response to this flux in the Czech/European intergroup status system, Czechs have reasserted their joint national-European identity and are thus frustrated that anyone would not consider them part of Europe. In terms of legitimacy, Czechs continue to perceive the status hierarchy (of which they were an inferior part as citizens of Soviet satellite states) developed during communism as illegitimate. Czechs seem to blame the Soviet Union and communism (rather than any deficiencies in the Czech nation) for the Czech "exile" to the wrong side of European history for much of the 20th century. Consequently, due to the instability and

³³ Though I am examining these proposed relationships in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, I do not intend for these relationships to hold only in these contexts. Rather, I chose the Czech Republic and Slovakia as cases to illustrate how these relationships likely function across countries of the EU.

illegitimacy of the relationship between the Czech nation and the rest of Europe in the post-communist era, Czechs seem entrenched in a phase marked by *social competition* in which they have national pride, arising from a national identity that observers have claimed existed prior to the formation of the EU, and as such is not dependent whatsoever on EU membership.

(A) Czech Republic: Social Competition



(B) Slovakia: Consensual Discrimination




Figure 3.2 Applying SIT to the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Like its Czech counterpart, the Slovak state similarly was confronted with joining Europe in the aftermath of communism. However, unlike the Czechs, Slovakia's inferior position in Europe during communism was not much different from its position throughout the millennium preceding it. Not surprisingly, Slovaks began to see their low-status position in the European social hierarchy as generally legitimate (though peppered with brief periods in which Slovaks

glimpsed a chance to change their status, such as during World War II). As Tajfel and Turner (1979) point out, subordinate groups often seem to internalize a wider social evaluation of themselves as inferior or “second class,” particularly after the status hierarchy has remained stable for a great period of time. Thus it seems that Slovakia’s relationship to the European status hierarchy has been rather stable and legitimate, insofar as Slovaks do not view themselves as inherently European and (somewhat grudgingly) accept the superiority of West Europeans. Owing to the combination of the stability and legitimacy of the European intergroup status system, Slovaks seem to have been caught in a status quo marked by *consensual discrimination* in which they have had a less than fully-formed (and certainly not positive) social identity.

If historically Slovakia has had an underdeveloped social identity, then ordinary Slovaks must continually find a way to cope, given that a basic function of identity is to compare favorably with other groups to serve the purpose of self-esteem. Because low-status groups are just as motivated to create a positive social identity as members of high-status groups are to protect their positive social identity, low-status group members such as Slovak citizens develop “identity management strategies” (Niens and Cairns 2003, 491; Rubin and Hewstone 2004; van Knippenberg 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1979). As previously mentioned, various identity management strategies can be created to cope with this situation, ranging from individual-based strategies (such as to leave the group) to cognitive-based strategies (for example, instead of comparing themselves to the high-status group, low-status group members compare their present situation with their worse situation in the past). Although identity management strategies provide low-status group members with the means to accept their stable low-status position, ultimately social competition is the only route to increased self-esteem (Turner 1999, 24; Turner and Reynolds 2001, 140).

When communism collapsed, post-communist European countries struggled to find their own path to democracy in a changing European order. This radical shift in the European hierarchy provided the opportunity Slovakia needed to slowly realize its own national identity. The EU is an entrenchment of that new European order, and this is precisely why the EU matters so much to Slovakia and not to the Czech Republic. Only when the intergroup bias system had become unstable or illegitimate (i.e., in the wake of communism) could Slovaks make gains in their relative status. The national identity, or national pride, that finally was allowed to develop after the collapse of old European boundaries could become a permanent change. Consequently, it was in Slovakia's interest to support EU membership, as this would further institutionalize a post-communist European order in which Slovakia would no longer be invisible.

With the end of the old communist order and the divorce of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had the chance to forge its own path (and thus own identity) as an independent democratic country. The EU brings with it the chance to solidify that new order. The nascent national pride that Slovaks began to develop throughout the 1990s can become institutionalized via the EU, ergo, is likely that for Slovaks, national pride is positively associated with support for EU membership. In contrast, the Czechs had long felt European with a decorated history of cultural development, so an entrenchment of their European status via the EU did not represent an institutionalization of any real change as it did in Slovakia. In this way the Czech Republic represents the typical case studied in the existing literature on attitudes toward EU membership in which national pride is associated with lower support for EU membership.

I thus propose the following specific hypotheses arising from these contextual differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia:

H4a: In the Czech Republic, national pride is negatively associated with support for EU membership.

H4b: In Slovakia, national pride is positively associated with support for EU membership.

3.2.3.1.5. Pan-European identity

My final hypothesis is one that increasingly dominates studies of attitudes to the EU: that pan-European identity is positively associated with support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Buch and Hansen 2002; White et al. 2002). This is the intuitive converse of the symbolic group antipathy hypothesis that strong positive national identity leads to a desire to protect one's culture from outgroups, which in turn is negatively associated with support for the EU.³⁴ Scholars have consistently found that when people self-identify as European, they are more likely to support EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Buch and Hansen 2002; White et al. 2002). At its most basic level, this makes sense because the EU is in many ways the institutionalization of a pan-European identity. As Hooghe and Marks (2004) conclude, "the European Union is also a supranational polity with extensive authority over those living in its territory. It is therefore plausible to believe that European integration engages group, and above all, national identities" (4). In other words, the EU by its very nature joins many cultures under

³⁴ However, as I discussed earlier, the relationship between national and European identity may not be zero-sum. As Hooghe and Marks (2004) found, national identity in some cases actually reinforces European identity, which is associated with greater support for the EU. Why is this the case? The answer is that individuals often identify with several territorial communities simultaneously (Citrin and Sides 2004; Klandermans et al. 2003). In the case of Spain, for example, citizens were found to feel simultaneously and strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European (Diez Medrano 2003; Marks 1999). Similarly, Haesly (2001) found positive associations between Welsh and European identities and between Scottish and European identities, while Klandermans et al. (2003) found that farmers who identified as European also identified nationally in a kind of cumulative pattern. This relationship has been conceived as a marble cake, in which multiple identities are intertwined (Risse 2003). In short, national and European identities are not necessarily separate; the national and the European are parts of the same identity for some people.

one structure, and consequently, if one feels that one shares a European identity with a nation hundreds of miles away, then one quite plausibly might support being part of a European Union.

I thus propose that regardless of context:

H5: Individuals with a stronger pan-European identity are more likely to support EU membership.

3.3 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A MODEL OF ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

In proposing hypotheses informed simultaneously by comparative literature on attitudes toward the EU and on attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, psychological theory, and contextual information about the Czech Republic and Slovakia, I have attempted to illustrate not only which hypotheses should be tested, but also the mechanisms by which they operate. I have developed the following hypotheses, as exhibited in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 below.




Figure 3.3 A model of attitude structure toward EU membership

H1: The more positively one evaluates his/her (pocketbook and sociotropic) economic situation, the more likely one is to support EU membership.

H1a: The (positive) relationship between self-interest and support for EU membership is likely to be stronger among Czechs than among Slovaks.

H2: The more one perceives realistic threat with regard to membership in the European Union, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

H2a: The (negative) relationship between perceived realistic threat and support for EU membership is likely to be significantly stronger among Czechs than among Slovaks.

H3: The more one perceives symbolic threat, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

H4: The stronger one's national pride, the less likely one is to support EU membership.

H4a: In the Czech Republic, national pride is negatively associated with support for EU membership.

H4b: In Slovakia, national pride is positively associated with support for EU membership.

H5: Individuals with a stronger pan-European identity are more likely to support EU membership.

Figure 3.4 Recap of hypotheses

The hypotheses described above will be tested in Chapter 4.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In the first half of this chapter, I revealed the state of the literature on public opinion toward the EU. In the second half, I set forth several EU hypotheses seeking to explain support for the EU generally and, more specifically, how context might affect these predicted relationships. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, I first describe the methodology and data I will use to examine my

hypotheses. Using a random, representative survey conducted in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2006, I use analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple regression techniques to test my hypotheses regarding the structure of attitudes toward EU membership. With careful testing, I will be able to explore which, if any, relationships are found predominantly among citizens of a particular country and paint a picture of attitudinal structure toward EU membership in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

4.0 THE STRUCTURE OF CZECH AND SLOVAK ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EU

This project deals with several related research questions, the most significant of which inquires about the structure – i.e., the linkages between predispositions and attitudes, otherwise known as “ideology” (Converse 1964; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Barker and Tinnick 2006) – of attitudes toward EU membership in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Apart from this primary objective, I hope to contribute to two important ongoing debates in the literature. First, this project will shed light on the relative importance of more affectively-based identity concerns versus more rational, economic-based self-interested calculations to political attitudes. Second, I hope to show how identity affects attitudes toward the EU in ways that scholars have previously ignored. This chapter’s analysis will provide evidence for each of these separate—but related—objectives.

Thus far in this project, I have set the foundations for my study of the structure of attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia by discussing the national contexts in which current political attitudes exist. In the previous chapter, I proposed several hypotheses grounded in the most plausible theoretical mechanisms derived from existing research. In this chapter, I test these hypotheses using data from a random, representative large-scale survey that I conducted in 2006 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. I expect to find that while Czechs and Slovaks evaluate EU membership via a shared set of considerations, context affects the strength and, in some cases, direction of the relationship of these considerations with support for EU

membership. Empirical support of these expectations would contribute greatly to our understanding of the effects of national context on political attitudes. It would also expand our grasp of the relative roles played by identity concerns as well as rational, economic-based calculations on attitudes toward the EU.

In the next section I will set the stage for this chapter's analysis by recapitulating my expectations and discussing alternative hypotheses. I will then describe the survey data, the operationalization of relevant variables, and the methodology I use to evaluate my hypotheses. Next, I will present and interpret the results of my analysis and conclude this chapter by summarizing the findings and situating them within the previous explorations of this project.

4.1 RECAPPING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENTING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

Based on my examination of the national contexts in which Czechs and Slovaks hold political attitudes and a review of the literature on attitudes toward EU membership, I proposed a number of hypotheses in Chapter 3 and discussed these at length. These hypotheses were summarized in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. In this chapter, I will test the hypotheses and discuss how they fared in the empirical analysis in the results and discussion section later in the chapter.

In addition to these hypotheses, I will test additional alternative hypotheses as well as control for a number of potentially confounding relationships. The most important alternative hypothesis involves Anderson's (1998) "parties-as-proxies" proposition. According to Anderson, the EU is too abstract and complicated for ordinary people to comprehend, so in place of evaluating the EU, they adopt their most-preferred party's position as a proxy for their own.

Similarly, scholars have found that political orientations in CEE more generally seem to be driven almost wholly by elites (Deegan-Krause 2000, 2001) or, alternately, that structural problems in the transition from communism to democracy were manipulated by elites to shape popular opinion, making certain issues more salient in some countries than in others.³⁵ In this case, we might find that an attachment to a particular party mediates attitudes toward the EU, in that the position of one's preferred party toward the EU is adopted as one's own position toward the EU. On the other hand, scholars have also argued that partisanship is weak at best in post-communist Europe (Whitefield 2002), and thus it might be expected that the role that partisanship plays in structuring Western Europeans' attitudes toward the EU may be absent in CEE.

Another important alternative hypothesis concerns the role of political sophistication or political knowledge in mediating the relationship between predispositions and political attitudes (Zaller 1992; Goren 2004; Gabel 1998c; Inglehart 1970b, 1990). Political knowledge is thought to encompass the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered. Political knowledge is important to attitude constraint, or attitudinal structure, in that only the politically sophisticated "pay enough attention to elite discourse to find out the ideological implications of different policies – in Converse's terms, to learn 'what goes with what'" (Zaller 1992, 113). The concept of political sophistication is often operationalized as a combination of political awareness or interest (self-described or objective) and cognitive capacity for understanding politics (often measured via an education proxy), though it has also been measured by simple tests of neutral factual information about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10). Delli Carpini and Keeter define political knowledge as "the range of factual

³⁵ The use of nationalistic rhetoric as a manipulative tool by Slovak elites in the 1990s is a prime example of the latter (Evans and Whitefield 1998).

information about politics that is stored in long-term memory” (1996, 10), emphasizing factual information as distinguished from political attitudes or beliefs. Measures of political knowledge must be direct, neutral, and factual, actually measuring what people know.

Apart from the variables derived from these alternative hypotheses, I also include several control variables in my model to ensure that the model is properly specified. Variables tested as possible controls include standard socioeconomic indicators such as *Gender, Age, Religiosity, Level of education, Occupation, Ideological self-identification, Ethnicity, and Size of community* (i.e., whether it is urban or rural). I include these variables to ward off potentially spurious relationships between my independent variables of interest and the dependent variable. For example, some of these variables (e.g., occupational status) have been utilized by scholars as proxies for other explanatory variables. Previous studies of attitudes toward EU membership have used indicators of income, class, or occupation as a proxy for pocketbook self-interest (Cichowski 2000; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; White et al. 2002). I have deliberately included more proximal and direct measures of pocketbook self-interest evaluations in my survey and I would expect these variables—rather than the control variables described above—to show up as significant in my analysis. However, because the direct variables and the proxy variables are theoretically related, the significance of each might be understated in a model in which both are included. Therefore, if direct measures of pocketbook self-interest show up as significant despite the presence of a correlated control variable (such as occupational status), the direct measure will have passed an especially conservative test. Likewise, if these direct measures do not appear to be significant, we may need to take this outcome with a grain of salt.

4.1.1 Survey respondents and procedure

Data were collected using an original CATI-based telephone survey designed by the author and conducted by Factum Invenio, a.s. in Prague, Czech Republic from August 3-17, 2006 using native Slovak- and Czech-speaking interviewers. The purpose of the survey was to investigate the attitudinal dimensions that inform attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia among adults age 18 or older. The survey included 507 adult respondents in Slovakia and 500 adult respondents in the Czech Republic. The samples were obtained using a quota procedure, selecting according to gender, age, education, region³⁶, and size of place of residence based on the 2001 census. Potential respondents were selected randomly from the database and subsequently checked to make sure they fit into the quota. If a potential respondent agreed to participate then the interview was conducted. Response Rate 1³⁷ for samples in both countries³⁸ was 32%, with 3,122 calls made to eligible reporting units and 1,007 surveys conducted (AAPOR 2008). 1,351 calls were made to households that did not fit into any quota and were deemed ineligible (with 699 in Czech Republic and 652 in Slovakia).

Most respondents in the Czech sample were ethnically Czech (97%) with a 2% Slovak minority (see Appendix A, Table A.4.1). Slovak respondents came from a more diverse mix of ethnic backgrounds, with a 90% Slovak majority, 6% Hungarian minority, and 2% Czech minority. More than half of respondents in each sample were women, and more than half

³⁶ The distribution of respondents by Czech and Slovak region can be found in the Survey Appendix 4 Table 4.

³⁷ Response rate is defined by AAPOR (2008) as the number of complete interviews with reporting units divided by the number of eligible reporting units in the sample. Response Rate 1, referred to by AAPOR as the minimum response rate, specifically is the number of complete interviews divided by the number of interviews (complete plus partial) plus the number of non-interviews (refusal and break-offs plus noncontacts plus other) plus all cases of unknown eligibility (unknown if housing unit, plus unknown, plus other).

³⁸ Response Rate 1 for the Czech sample was 32% with 500 complete interviews and 1,051 refusals. For the Slovak sample, Response Rate 1 was also 32% with 507 complete interviews and 1,064 refusals (see Survey Appendix 2 Table 1).

married (Appendix A, Table A.4.2). Respondents in each group also had similar educational and occupational profiles. Over half of both groups had not completed high school, about a third had finished high school, and nearly 10% had gone to or graduated from college. A little over a third reported being retired and about one-fifth reported being professionals in executive or creative fields. Additionally, about one-third of each sample reported living in a rural environment, almost a quarter in a city, and the rest in small or medium-sized towns. Respondents in both samples most commonly said they lived in cities of 20,000 people or more. A comparison of these data with the key indicators (where comparison was possible due to available population data) presented in Chapter 2 indicates that this sample approximates the same geographic distributions in the Czech and Slovak populations.

Despite such demographic similarities, respondents differed in religious affiliation, $X^2(8) = 178.704$, $p < .0001$ (Appendix A, Table A.4.2). More than half of Czechs claimed no religious affiliation, compared to 15% of Slovaks, whereas 70% of Slovaks reported being Catholic compared to only 38% in the Czech sample. Slovaks reported attending religious services more frequently than Czechs did, with more than one-third of Slovaks attending church at least once a week compared to less than 10% of Czechs, and almost two-thirds of Czechs reporting never attending religious services compared to less than one-third of Slovaks (Czech $M = 2.20$, $SD = 1.98$ and Slovak $M = 4.36$, $SD = 2.69$), $F = 2.276$, $p < .027$. Respondents in the Slovak sample also reported more people living in the household ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.54$) than Czechs did ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.34$), $F = 6.957$, $p < .008$, and tended to be somewhat younger ($M = 43.91$, $SD = 16.85$) than Czechs ($M = 47.01$, $SD = 17.92$), $F = 87.447$, $p < .056$. Czechs and Slovaks also differed in political ideology, $X^2 = 18.782$, $p < .005$. Although about one-fifth of both samples identified their party ideology as left or extreme left, about one-third of Slovaks described their

ideology as being in the political center (compared to about one-quarter of Czechs), whereas about one-third of Czechs said they were on the right (compared to about one-quarter of Slovaks). On an index of correct answers to several political questions, Czechs also showed higher levels of political knowledge ($M = 4.28$, $SD = 1.543$) than Slovaks did ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 1.62$), $F = 40.108$, $p < .0001$. The distributions of respondents on these variables mirrors actual population estimates in both countries according to the key indicators reported in Chapter 2 for variables where comparative population estimates could be found.

The distribution of party identification between the Czech and Slovak samples reflected the differing party systems in the respective countries (see Appendix A, Table A.4.3). The party with the most support in the Czech sample was Václav Klaus' center-right Civic Democratic party (ODS), while among the Slovaks surveyed, Robert Fico's populist Smer (Direction) party had the most support. The party with the second-highest level of support in both samples was the applicable center-left party: the Social Democrats (CSSD) in the Czech sample and the Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU) in the Slovak sample. About a quarter of respondents in both samples said they would not vote or were undecided were an election to be held tomorrow.

4.1.2 Measures

Respondents who accepted the invitation to participate in the phone survey were asked to complete 46 questionnaire items³⁹. The survey took about twenty-five minutes to complete. The questionnaire items spanned substantive dimensions thought to underpin attitudes toward EU

³⁹ Full survey text is located in Survey Appendix 5.

membership, ranging from pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations to questions gauging the nature of Czech and Slovak social identity. Where possible, the items used in this survey were taken from existing large-scale, published surveys in post-communist Europe, such as the Eurobarometer and New Democracies Barometer, to ensure the measures' reliability and validity (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). Most items used were Likert items, with response choices on a 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree) or 6-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 6=strongly agree). The survey items were used (either in original form or after transformation) as measures as discussed in the following paragraphs. In this section, I will first discuss the survey items by dimension and then describe any transformations made to the survey items to create measures for analysis.

The dependent variable is a collapsed Likert item that gauges **attitude toward EU membership**. The wording of the original question (Q2) is “Do you approve or disapprove of EU membership for your country?” Response categories ranged from 1 to 6, with 1=strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove somewhat, 3=disapprove a little, 4=approve a little, 5=approve somewhat, and 6=strongly approve. To simplify interpretation, the dependent variable was recoded into a variable with four categories: 1=strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove somewhat/a little, 3=approve somewhat/a little, and 4=strongly approve.

Other questionnaire items were designed to measure the dimensions hypothesized to inform attitudes toward EU membership in Chapter 3: **economic evaluations**, **European identity attachments**, **national identity attachments** (which can be conceived of in negative or positive terms), **perceptions of realistic threat**, and **perceptions of symbolic threat** (see Appendix B, Table B.2.1). Questions that measured political knowledge and political awareness were included to help account for the confounding effects that political sophistication and

awareness may have on political attitudes. Demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and occupation, were used as control variables in the regression analysis to account for possible effects of these factors on support for EU membership.

Survey items were grouped into distinct measures according to the dimensions that I expected to matter to attitudes toward EU membership (see Appendix A, Table A.3.1). The first dimension theorized is economic in nature and comprises pocketbook self-interest and sociotropic economic evaluations. The items in the economic dimension include *Retrospective pocketbook evaluation*, *Prospective pocketbook evaluation*, *Retrospective sociotropic evaluation*, and *Prospective sociotropic evaluation*. The next several dimensions concern identity. The first identity-based dimension, geographic and historic European identity, includes the items *European: geography*, *European: history*, and *European: other countries' perceptions*. The second identity dimension, cultural European identity, includes two items, *European: culture* and *Culture east/west*. Two items comprise the third identity dimension, Closeness to Europe: *Close to Europe* and *Personal importance of EU*. The fourth identity dimension, negative social identity, includes the items *Ashamed*, *Less proud*, *Looks down on us*, *Inferior citizen*, *Inferior country*, and *International reputation*. The next dimensions concern national pride and cultural and economic protectionism. The *national pride* dimension encompasses the items *Rather be citizen* and *Better country than others*. The next dimension concerns symbolic threat (a propensity to protect one's culture) and includes *Television should give preference*, *Exposure damages our culture*, *EU weakens identity*, and *Foreigners improve society*. The third dimension has to do with realistic threat (economic protectionism) and is comprised of the items: *Limit imports*, *Membership takes jobs away*, *Government spends too much on EU*, and *Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land*.

Additional survey questions were included to represent awareness of/interest in the EU, actual knowledge of political information, and political values. The political awareness dimension is comprised of three items meant to measure attention to the issue of EU membership: *Talk EU*, *Read EU*, and *Watch EU*. Political knowledge is operationalized as the sum of six items measuring knowledge about politicians in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and abroad (*Polknow items 1 through 6*). The political values dimension includes items about *Valuing income*, *Valuing responsibility*, *Valuing ownership*, *Valuing taxes*, *Valuing Parliament*, and *Valuing democracy* (Dictatorship-democracy). Lastly, I included a battery of demographic items to be used as controls in the regression analysis: party identification, religiosity, religious affiliation, marital status, level of education, occupation, ideological self-placement, gender, age cohorts, ethnicity, household size, rural-urban, and community size.

Several of these survey items were transformed into appropriate analytical measures. One kind of transformation was made to account for potential bias introduced by large amounts of missing data. Several variables exhibited high levels of missing data (60 or more observations missing) -- for example, *Government spends too much on EU* (132 missing) and *Inferior country* (66 missing). In order to preserve the integrity of such variables (that is, to minimize a potential loss of a substantial number of cases) and account for any potential bias created by missing data patterns, I created dummy variables to account for each response option, where “don’t know” responses or missing observations were coded as an additional response category (rather than being excluded from the analysis as “missing”) and compared to the reference group (McKnight et al 2007, 44, 91; Rubin 1976). Modeling missingness by employing dummy variables (for variables with high levels of missing data) helps obtain unbiased estimates of regression

parameters (McKnight et al 2007). Dummy variables were created for *Culture east/west*, *Government spends too much on EU*, *Inferior country*, and *Ideological self-placement*.

To reduce the number of variables and create more reliable measures of key theoretical constructs, I also created multi-item scales comprised of variables that cohered for both Czechs and Slovaks. Items that reflected shared dimensions according to theoretical expectations and preliminary analyses⁴⁰ were evaluated for internal reliability. Items with adequate internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha of .50 or higher) for both Czechs and Slovaks were averaged into scales. If respondents had data present for 3 out of 4 items, responses were averaged for the scale.

Data were also transformed to create a political knowledge index. Previous research on the effect of objectively-measured political knowledge on political attitudes uses an index of individual political knowledge items to account for overall political knowledge in political attitude models (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). For this sample, the internal reliability of five political knowledge items asked of both Czechs and Slovaks was .68 for the pooled sample (McIver and Carmines 1981; Cronbach 1951). In order to create a political knowledge index, I summed the number of correct responses for the six political knowledge questions for each respondent.

Another data transformation involved the recoding of most preferred political party into a variable representing that party's stance on the EU. Scholars who have researched the effect that party cues have on support for EU membership have classified parties by their positions on the EU (Anderson 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Consequently, I have classified the party identification question from the survey instrument into a new variable

⁴⁰ Preliminary analyses for these scales can be found in Supplemental Analyses Appendix 1.

that groups parties according to Kopecký and Mudde's (2002) typology of stance on the EU (see Appendix B, Table B.1.1). Kopecký and Mudde, distinguishing diffuse from specific support for European integration, propose four types of party positions on EU membership: Euroenthusiasts, Euroskeptics, Europragmatists, and Eurorejects. Euroenthusiasts approve of EU membership and are optimistic about the EU's development. Europragmatists are not supportive of the broad project of European integration but are positive about the EU as it stands in order to serve specific national or sectoral interests. Euroskeptics favor European integration in principle but criticize the EU's actual development. Eurorejects both criticize the idea of integration as well as the specific form it has taken in the EU. Parties that were coded⁴¹ as Euroenthusiast for Czechs were the Social Democrats (CSSD), the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU-CSL), and the European Democrats (SNK-ED); for Slovaks, Euroenthusiast parties included Smer (Direction), the Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU), the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), Democratic Party (DS), Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO), and Democratic Movement. Czech Euroskeptic parties included the Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Independent Democrats (NEZ-DEM), while in Slovakia there was only one Euroskeptic party, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). The only Europragmatic party in the Czech Republic was the Green Party (SZ), while in Slovakia there were two: the Slovak Green Party (SZS) and the People's Party/Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS, the successor to Meciar's HZDS). Euroreject parties in both contexts were those on the far-left or those that were ultra nationalist: in the Czech Republic, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM); in Slovakia, the Slovak National Party (SNS), Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), and the Left

⁴¹ Parties were classified according to Kopecký and Mudde's (2002) taxonomy using information from each party's platform as well as party voting behavior. Many of the parties listed here were already classified in Kopecký and Mudde 2002.

Bloc. One Czech catch-all independent party, Movement Independent, could not be classified and were put into the “other/missing” category.

Interaction terms were also created for variables that were theorized to have an interactive relationship with Czech or Slovak context or that were shown to be more correlated (at .6 or higher) with the dependent variable for Czechs than for Slovaks or vice versa. Variables used in interaction terms were centered before they were multiplied by the Czech/Slovak dummy variable (coded 0 or 1) to create interaction terms. Also, where variables had a curvilinear relationship with the dependent variable, I created quadratic terms to model the non-linear relationships in a linear regression framework.

4.1.3 Analytical methodology

I first performed analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine any significant differences between Czechs and Slovaks on the independent and dependent variables. I then employed ordinary least squares (OLS) linear multiple regression on the pooled Czech and Slovak sample to assess the extent to which independent variables (including scales, interaction terms, quadratics, and dummy variables) and control variables predicted attitudes toward EU membership. Only variables significant at $p < .05$ or marginally significant at $p < .10$ were included in the final regression model. All quantitative analyses were performed using the statistical program SPSS 11 for Mac OS X. Further details about the analysis are discussed in the next section.

4.1.4 Results and discussion

4.1.4.1 One-way analysis of variance: results and discussion

In order to understand whether and how Czech and Slovak attitudes toward the EU may differ, I analyzed survey responses on items theorized to predict support for EU membership using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA technique allows the examination of differences in group means and extracts the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to group membership (in this case, Czech or Slovak) (Knoke, Bohrnstedt, and Mee 2002, 113). If the null hypothesis were true, the means in the two groups would not differ significantly. ANOVA does not require ordinal data: it can be considered a special case of multiple regression analysis in which the predictors may be categorical (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).

Table 4.1 presents means and standard deviations for the Czech and Slovak samples and results from ANOVAs for each item used in the remaining analyses. First, it shows that although both groups on average reported that they agreed with the idea of joining the EU, Slovaks were significantly more likely than Czechs to endorse EU membership. Both groups tended to have somewhat optimistic or favorable views of the economy and tended to consider themselves rather geographically and historically and culturally European. They also both tended to place their countries in the lower-middle of a 3-point international reputation continuum (recoded to 1=highest and 3=lowest) and to consider themselves inferior citizens compared to the rest of Europe. They also similarly valued responsibility, with both groups somewhat agreeing that the state should be responsible for everyone's economic security.

This table also indicates where Czech and Slovak attitudes diverged. Both groups viewed their country as belonging to both eastern and western cultures; however, Czechs felt closer than

Slovaks to western culture. Respondents in both groups also tended to agree that they felt close to Europe although they were less likely to see the EU as personally important. However, Slovaks were more likely to feel close to Europe and view EU membership as personally important. Moreover, Czechs and Slovaks differed on most negative social identity items. Both groups tended to agree that they felt ashamed of their countries; they tended to somewhat agree that they were less proud of their country than they would like and tended to think that the rest of Europe looked down on them. However, Czechs were more likely to admit feeling ashamed or less proud of their country or to view their country as inferior compared to the rest of Europe. Compared to Czechs, Slovaks were more likely to agree that the rest of Europe looks down on them.

Table 4.1 ANOVAs for independent variables and dependent variable

Note: variables demonstrating statistical significance are shaded in light gray

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks		F	Sig.
	N	Mean (SD)	n	Mean (SD)		
Dependent variable						
EU Approval (4-point scale)	478	2.91 (.837)	483	3.26 (.792)	44.550***	.000
Economic variables						
Economic evaluation scale	471	3.18 (.593)	486	3.20 (.606)	.296	.587
Identity variables						
<i>Geographic and historic European identity</i>						
Geographic European identity scale	499	4.23 (.732)	507	4.18 (.816)	1.127	.289
<i>Cultural European identity</i>						
Culture east/west	457	3.28 (1.140)	454	2.85 (1.089)	33.861***	.000
European: culture	497	4.04 (1.459)	507	3.87 (1.504)	3.318	.069
<i>Close to Europe</i>						
Personal importance of EU	490	2.60 (0.834)	477	2.92 (0.885)	34.431***	.000
Close to Europe	482	3.11 (0.794)	493	3.22 (0.748)	5.248*	.022
<i>Negative social identity</i>						
Ashamed	496	4.38 (0.961)	499	3.92 (1.295)	41.023***	.000
Less proud	494	3.42 (1.394)	499	2.88 (1.519)	34.194***	.000
Inferior country	478	2.67 (0.490)	463	2.52 (0.550)	18.763***	.000
Europe looks down on us	481	3.40 (1.291)	490	3.62 (1.286)	7.019**	.008
International reputation	479	1.95 (.413)	489	1.90 (.489)	2.275	.132

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks		F	Sig.
	N	Mean (SD)	n	Mean (SD)		
Inferior citizen	475	2.23 (0.482)	489	2.21 (0.466)	.303	.582
<i>National pride</i>						
Better country than others	482	2.86 (1.211)	483	2.55 (1.257)	15.253***	.000
Rather be citizen	497	4.21 (1.208)	501	4.01 (1.359)	6.486*	.011
<i>Protectionism (realistic threat)</i>						
Limit imports	490	3.73 (1.279)	489	2.20 (1.257)	356.383***	.000
Government spends too much on EU	454	3.96 (1.182)	421	3.50 (1.277)	29.914***	.000
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	496	3.18 (1.515)	497	2.79 (1.513)	16.200***	.000
Membership takes jobs away	472	2.49 (1.354)	489	2.32 (1.362)	3.787*	.052
<i>Protectionism (symbolic threat)</i>						
EU weakens identity	482	2.90 (1.393)	481	2.43 (1.346)	27.609***	.000
Foreigners improve society	492	3.33 (1.264)	497	3.63 (1.240)	14.449***	.000
Exposure damages our culture	493	3.14 (1.467)	495	3.39 (1.439)	7.187**	.007
Television should give preference	497	3.66 (1.334)	502	3.43 (1.425)	6.915**	.009
Political awareness variables						
Political awareness scale	496	2.01 (.781)	503	2.24 (.805)	22.124***	.000
Political values variables						
Value ownership	477	2.88 (1.0)	425	2.56 (1.106)	19.230***	.000
Value income	485	2.86 (1.085)	485	2.55 (1.173)	18.171***	.000
Value Parliament	447	3.00 (1.753)	430	2.61 (1.581)	11.835***	.001
Dictatorship-democracy	490	3.84 (1.466)	494	3.62 (1.627)	5.389**	.020

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks		F	Sig.
	N	Mean (SD)	n	Mean (SD)		
Value taxes	452	2.77 (.923)	454	2.89 (.964)	3.934*	.048
Value responsibility	477	2.14 (1.035)	476	2.24 (1.1)	1.962	.162

*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05

Czechs and Slovaks also differed significantly on nearly every item relating to national pride and protectionism/symbolic and realistic threat (Table 4.1). Czechs and Slovaks both tended to express pride in their national citizenship but were neutral as to whether their country was better than others. However, Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to express pride in their national citizenship and say that their country is better than others. With regard to items about realistic threat, both groups tended to strongly agree that government spends too much on the EU. They tended to be neutral as to whether foreigners should be allowed to buy land and tended to somewhat disagree that EU membership would take jobs away. Czechs tended to strongly agree that foreign imports should be limited, whereas Slovaks tended to disagree with that statement. With regard to items about symbolic threat, both groups tended to be especially likely to agree that television should give preference to domestic programs. Paradoxically, they also tended to agree both that foreigners improve society and that exposure to foreign books and films damages the national culture. On average, they only somewhat agreed that EU membership weakens national identity.

Overall, Czechs reported stronger protectionist sentiments than Slovaks reported. They were more likely than Slovaks to agree that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in their country, that EU membership weakens their national identity, that government should limit foreign imports in order to protect the domestic economy, that government spends too much

complying with EU regulations, that television should give preference to domestic programming, and that EU membership takes jobs away. In contrast, Slovaks were more likely than Czechs to believe that foreigners improve their society, although they were also more likely to agree that exposure to foreign films, music, and books damages their own culture. Additionally, Czechs and Slovaks varied in paying attention to EU politics. Although both reported being somewhat inattentive to EU news, Slovaks were more likely to have watched news stories about the EU on television, spoken with friends or family about the EU, or read articles about the EU, as measured by the Political awareness scale.

In terms of political values, Czechs and Slovaks also differed significantly. Czechs and Slovaks both tended to value private ownership over state-owned business, to value incomes based on individual achievement over income equality, and to value democracy over dictatorship, but Czechs reported higher levels of approval than Slovaks for these values. Slovaks and Czechs also both tended to disapprove if Parliament were abolished and to value paying more taxes if it meant that more people have services they need, but Slovaks held those values more strongly than Czechs did. Czechs and Slovaks did not differ significantly in their evaluation of the value of responsibility. These differences paint a picture of the Czech respondents as people who believe in the free market and do not attend to the EU as much as their Slovak counterparts, who appear to endorse a more collectivist approach to politics and care more deeply about membership in the EU.

What insights do the ANOVAs give us into the veracity of my hypotheses? While the ANOVAs cannot tell us the extent to which each proposed independent variable is associated with attitudes toward the EU, it can begin to illuminate aggregate-level differences between Czechs and Slovaks. Full tests of my hypotheses will occur in the regression analysis that

follows. We cannot use an ANOVA to test Hypothesis 1 (that positive self-interested evaluations are associated with support for EU membership) or Hypothesis 1a (that self-interest matters more to Czechs than to Slovaks with regard to EU membership); however, we can conclude that there are no significant differences between Czechs and Slovaks regarding economic evaluations (measured via the economic evaluation scale).

We also cannot use ANOVA to properly test Hypothesis 2 (that the more one perceives realistic threat, the less likely one is to support EU membership) or Hypothesis 2a (that the [negative] relationship of perceived realistic threat to support for EU membership is likely to be stronger for Czechs than for Slovaks) -- but we can conclude that Czechs did perceive more realistic threat vis-à-vis EU membership than did Slovaks. On all four measures of realistic threat, Czechs perceived a statistically significantly higher amount of threat than their Slovak counterparts perceived.

In Hypothesis 3, I proposed that the more one perceives symbolic threat, the less likely one is to support EU membership. While this hypothesis cannot be confirmed via ANOVA, this analysis does provide evidence that on the whole, Czechs and Slovaks were significantly different with regard to how much symbolic threat they perceive. For example, the ANOVAs showed that Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to perceive that the EU weakens their national identity and that television should give preference to domestic programming, and were less likely than Slovaks to agree that foreigners improve society. While Slovaks perceived more symbolic threat than their Czech counterparts on one remaining item: *Exposure damages our culture*, it is clear that on the whole, Czechs perceived more symbolic threat than did Slovaks. Perceiving different amounts of symbolic threat does not necessarily equate with a reduction in

support for EU membership, however. This finding must be put in proper perspective, and this hypothesis will be tested in the following regression analysis.

I also proposed in Hypothesis 4a that in the Czech Republic, national pride is negatively associated with support for EU membership, while in Slovakia, national pride is positively related to support for EU membership (Hypothesis 4b). ANOVA cannot tell us whether any potential differences between Czechs and Slovaks with regard to national pride may matter on attitudes toward EU membership, but it can indicate whether any potential differences exist. The findings here are mixed. Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to prefer their current citizenship and say their country is better than others, indicating that on these standard measures, Czechs are more proud of their country than are their Slovak neighbors. However, Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to have negative perceptions of their national identity (feeling more ashamed, less proud, and inferior as a country), while Slovaks were more likely than Czechs to perceive that the rest of Europe looked down on them. Czechs thus appeared more likely than Slovaks to have both national pride as well as some negative feelings about their country's status, while Slovaks are more apt to perceive themselves as having a negative identity as viewed by others. These nuanced findings from the ANOVA will be probed in greater depth in the regression analysis.

In Hypothesis 5, I proposed that the stronger one's pan-European identity, the more likely one is to support EU membership. This too cannot be evaluated via ANOVA, but we can at least conclude that Czechs and Slovaks did not differ significantly with regard to feeling a geographic-based European identity. Cognitively, both identify with Europe. However, while Czechs are more likely than Slovaks to feel culturally western, Slovaks feel a greater affinity and closeness to Europe than do their Czech neighbors. These interesting differences notwithstanding, the

regression analysis will examine whether Czechs' and Slovaks' perceptions of European identity has any bearing on support for EU membership.

What do the ANOVA findings tell us about similarities between Czech and Slovak attitudes in general? First, they reveal that Czechs and Slovaks are not significantly different with regard to their scores on self-interest/economic evaluation measures or in their feeling of geographic European identity. The ANOVA also shows how Czechs and Slovaks are different in general. On the whole, Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to feel protective of their national economy and culture and were less likely to pay attention to EU politics as much as the Slovak counterparts. In contrast, although Slovaks were more apt than Czechs to feel that the rest of Europe looks down on them, they seemed to feel a stronger pull than Czechs toward Europe, were more open to foreigners, and were more likely to be politically aware of the EU, although they were also more likely to say that exposure to foreign films, music, and books damages their own culture.

An additional ANOVA was run to examine the way in which party cue – that is, different parties' views on European integration – was associated with endorsing membership in the EU. People who said they would vote for Euroenthusiast parties (n=376) were the most likely to endorse EU membership (M=3.24, SD=.807). Those who would vote for Euroskeptic parties (n=183) were the next most likely to endorse joining the EU (M=3.14, SD=.857). Those supporting Euroreject (n=60) and the Europragmatic (n=53) parties were the least likely to support joining the EU (respectively, M=2.82, SD=.725; M=2.77, SD=.891). People who were undecided about their party affiliation (n=132) had mean levels of support for joining the EU (M=3.10, SD=.800) in the same range as the Euroskeptics, while people who would not vote (n=110) had mean levels of support for joining the EU (M=2.75, SD=.804) in the same range as

the Euroreject or Europragmatic party members. Means and standard deviations for each party within each party cue grouping are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1.1. It shows that the most popular party in the Czech sample, ODS, is classified by Kopecký and Mudde (2002) as Euroskeptic. In Slovakia, both the most and second-most popular parties, Smer and SDKU, are Euroenthusiast.

4.1.4.2 Multiple regression analysis

Items that were significant or marginally significant correlates of support for EU membership were entered into a series of multiple regression analyses. I estimated my models using an ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression framework. Since initial correlational analyses showed that the majority of independent variables had a strong linear effect on the dependent variable, an OLS regression was a logical choice.

Due to the sensitive nature of some items included in the survey instrument (e.g., negative social identity questions), some variables had significant amounts of missing data. My strategy for dealing with missing data was to create dummy variables incorporating the missing data into the regression (in order to account for any bias generated by patterns in the missing data; see McKnight et al 2007), or in cases where modeling the data in was not possible, to delete those missing cases listwise. Because my main goal is to measure attitude structure, on theoretical grounds I hesitated to impute or otherwise substitute missing values, thus generating attitudinal scores where none truly existed. Moreover, since the sample size was still sufficiently large to run regression estimations after modeling in missing data where appropriate, it was safe to proceed after deleting remaining missing cases listwise.

The regression analysis reported (Table 4.2) maximized sample size (e.g., minimizing missing data) and accounted for the greatest amount of variance. The model includes control

variables that existing research has found to predict attitudes toward EU membership, such as age, gender, and occupation, as well as *Political knowledge* (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), *Political awareness* (Zaller 1992) and *Party cue*, with party groups combined to represent party position on European integration (Anderson 1998). The model includes the control variables found to be significant in the previous iterations of the final model, as well as independent variables that were shown to be statistically significant in the final model.⁴²

⁴² Adding additional variables that were did not have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable would have improved the overall fit (R-squared) of the model, but would have come with the important disadvantage of reducing the overall sample size in the regression, which would have introduced some (likely systematic) error into the model. Thus, a model with only statistically significant independent variables was the preferred one to report.

Table 4.2 Regression model

Variable	β	t	Sig.
(Constant)		5.381	0.000
Czech (Slovak referent)	-0.148***	-4.062	0.000
Ideological self-placement (extreme left referent)			
left	0.071	0.838	0.402
center	0.101	1.081	0.280
right	0.160 ⁺	1.698	0.090
extreme right	0.029	0.657	0.511
don't know/missing	0.042	0.560	0.576
Occupation (administrative referent)			
untrained	0.029	0.881	0.378
professional	0.027	0.697	0.486
entrepreneur	0.046	1.313	0.189
unemployed	0.041	1.227	0.220
student	0.002	0.060	0.953
retired, housewife, disabled	0.049	1.206	0.228
Marital status (unmarried referent)	0.07*	2.096	0.036
Level of education	0.064 ⁺	1.951	0.051
Male gender	-0.072*	-2.202	0.028
Party cue (Euroenthusiast referent)			
Euroreject	-0.056 ⁺	-1.702	0.089
Euroskeptic	0.000	-0.010	0.992
Europragmatic	-0.070*	-2.154	0.032
undecided	0.037	1.091	0.276
would not vote	-0.067 ⁺	-1.943	0.052
other/missing	-0.033	-1.021	0.308
Economic evaluation scale	0.111**	3.178	0.002
EU weakens identity	-0.197***	-5.917	0.000
Personal importance of EU	0.167***	5.142	0.000
Inferior country (equal referent)			
inferior	-0.077*	-2.279	0.023
superior	-0.047	-1.465	0.143
don't know, missing	-0.012	-0.369	0.712
Better country than others	-0.056 ⁺	-1.726	0.085
Rather be citizen	0.063*	1.998	0.046
Rather be citizen X Czech	-0.069*	-2.230	0.026
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	0.352 ⁺	1.936	0.053
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land, quadratic	-0.330 ⁺	-1.808	0.071
<i>R-Squared</i>			.268
<i>Adjusted R-Squared</i>			.239
<i>Sample Size (n)</i>			823

*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 ⁺ p < 0.10 (marginally significant)

The regression model (reported in Table 4.2) includes control variables from the initial models that were significant (see Appendix C, Table C.2.1) along with significant or marginally significant independent variables. This model accounts for 27% of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R-squared=.24).

How well do my hypotheses fare in this analysis? In Hypothesis 1, I expected positive self-interested economic evaluations to be positively associated with support for EU membership. This hypothesis was supported by the regression model: a one-unit increase in the economic evaluation scale is associated with an 11% increase in support for EU membership. In Hypothesis 1a, I proposed that this positive relationship between economic evaluations and support for EU membership is likely to be stronger among Czechs than among Slovaks. This hypothesis was not supported in the regression analysis, as there was no interactive effect between context and economic evaluations that could be significantly related to support for EU membership. This finding echoes the ANOVA that found no statistically significant difference between Czechs and Slovaks with regard to economic evaluations.

Hypothesis 2 proposed that the more one perceives realistic threat vis-à-vis EU membership, the less likely one is to support EU membership. As an extension to Hypothesis 2, I proposed in Hypothesis 2a that the negative relationship between perceived realistic threat and support for EU membership is likely to be significantly stronger for Czechs than for Slovaks. Neither of these hypotheses were borne out per se in the analysis. Despite a lack of support for these hypotheses, a related relationship was found that was more nuanced than the original expectations: realistic threat, manifest as *Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land*, was found to have a curvilinear relationship with support for EU membership. In other words, people who thought that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land neither strongly approved nor

strongly disapproved with EU membership. This item behaved such that groups that strongly agreed or disagreed with joining the EU were less concerned about foreigners buying land.

Hypothesis 3 concerns symbolic threat: I proposed that perceptions of symbolic threat were negatively associated with support for EU membership. The perception of symbolic threat, operationalized as *EU weakens our identity*, brings about a 20% decrease in willingness to join the EU. Thus, my expectation about symbolic threat was borne out in the regression.

In Hypothesis 4, I put forth the oft-studied expectation that the stronger one's national pride, the less likely one is to support EU membership. Even though this hypothesis has been found to hold in multi-country studies, I posited that a refinement was justified. Based on contextual information and social identity theory, I proposed two specific hypotheses. The first of those two specific hypotheses is Hypothesis 4a, that in the Czech Republic, national pride is negatively associated with support for EU membership. The second, Hypothesis 4b, sets forth that in Slovakia, the relationship is reverse: national pride is positively associated with support for EU membership. Using multiple indicators of the same concept, national pride, I found support for all three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4 is the oft-cited expectation found in the extant literature that national pride leads to a decrease in support for EU membership. I critiqued this hypothesis, positing that though it has withstood testing in previous studies, its "one-size fits all" nature may not stand up to a test that explicitly models context into the analysis. My critique was both correct and wrong, as the regression analysis shows, and this is in large part due to the conceptualization of national pride. One particular aspect of national pride that represents perception of country status, *Better country than others*, was found to be a marginally significant predictor of attitudes toward the EU in the Czech and Slovak sample, giving further support to the "one-size fits all"

expectation that I critiqued. Perceiving that one's country is better than others is associated with a 6% decrease in support for EU membership in the pooled sample of Czechs and Slovaks.

However, I also found support for the contextual national pride hypotheses with regard to a different aspect of national pride: preferring one's own citizenship. Hypothesis 4a was somewhat confirmed with the finding that the measure *Rather be citizen*, interacted with Czech citizenship, leads to a decrease in support for EU membership. A one-unit increase in agreement with *Rather be citizen* is associated with an approximate 1% (.6%) decrease in support for EU membership in the Czech Republic (for interpretation of dummy variables in interaction terms in linear regression, see Jaccard and Turrisi 2003, 34). This is a particularly interesting finding: an external-facing, status-based measure of national pride, *Better country than others*, leads to lower support for EU membership. Simultaneously, a more internal, affectively-based national pride measure, preferring one's own citizenship, exerts an additional slight force pushing down support for EU membership for Czechs. In other words, external, status-based national pride does seem to be associated with a lowering of support for EU membership across both countries, but it also has an additional (or substantiating) "lowering" effect when conceptualized as citizenship preference in the Czech Republic.

A different relationship was found when testing Hypothesis 4b. For Slovaks, preferring one's own citizenship has the opposite effect of actually enhancing support for EU membership. I found that a one-unit increase in agreement with the statement *Rather be citizen* leads to a 6% increase in support for EU membership in Slovakia. Together with the finding regarding Hypothesis 4a, this means that for Czechs, preferring one's own country is negatively associated with support for EU membership, while this feeling of national preference for Slovaks leads to an increase in support for the EU. Thus, national pride in its varying forms likely influences

support for EU membership according to context as well as across samples. These findings also show that conceptualization – and operationalization -- matters. While this analysis shows that national pride does lead to less support for EU membership on the whole, it is only when it is operationalized as an evaluation of one's own country's status ranking relative to other countries. When national pride is measured as something more affective and internal, such as preferring one's own citizenship, it functions in a different way in the structure of attitudes toward EU membership.

The fabric of identity with respect to support for EU membership is shown to be more nuanced with further probing. In this analysis, I also found that feeling that one's country is inferior to the rest of Europe (*Inferior country*) leads to a decrease in support for EU membership. More precisely, perceiving that one's country is inferior is associated with an 8% decrease in support for EU membership. Though this finding was not a specific expectation of my theory, it fits with the general line of reasoning that groups that perceive themselves to be in an inferior position in the broader status hierarchy would not be inclined to support an institutionalization of that system; rather, they would seek identity management strategies such as seeking an opportunity to reverse the status quo. At minimum, this finding gives further credence to the theoretical implications of outgroup favoritism in social identity theory.

Lastly, in Hypothesis 5, I posited that pan-European identity is associated with support for EU membership. This expectation was borne out in the regression. A one-unit increase in *Personal importance of the EU*, a manifestation of identification with Europe, is associated with a 17% increase in endorsement of EU membership. Confirming a growing body of research on the predictors of support for EU membership, this study reaffirms that feeling European lends support for EU membership.

The reported regression model shows how the effects of the control variables were mitigated by significant independent variables. In earlier models, center- and right-identifying ideologies were significant, positive predictors of support for EU membership, while in the second model, the inclusion of the political knowledge, awareness, and party cue variables reduced the significance of center-identifying ideology beyond the $p < .05$ threshold.⁴³ In the final model, in the presence of significant independent variables, only right-identifying ideology was marginally significant at $p < .10$. Similarly, professional and entrepreneurial occupations both had a significant positive relationship with support for EU membership in preliminary models, but this relationship washed out in the third model. Being married and male both retained significant effects on endorsement of EU membership from the initial models to the final reported model, and higher levels of education remained a marginally significant predictor of support for EU membership as well. A Europragmatic party cue (compared to a Euroenthusiast party cue) had a significant, negative effect on support for EU membership in the final model, and both a Euroreject party cue and a position to not vote had a marginally significant negative effect on endorsement of EU membership.

Including these variables allows us to test alternative hypotheses found in the literature. Alternative hypotheses such as political awareness and political knowledge were not supported in the final specified model and can thus be rejected. Only some party cues remained significant in the final model (including Europragmatic and Euroreject cues), indicating that perhaps only certain (but not all) party allegiances may exert an independent effect on support for EU membership. Consequently, the parties-as-proxies alternative hypothesis (Anderson 1998) cannot be rejected.

⁴³ These initial models can be found in the Supplementary Analyses Appendix.

Other control variables had significant relationships with the dependent variable in this model. Previous research found that gender is associated with support for EU membership, and this was also found to be the case in this analysis (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b). Extant literature has also found that left-right ideological self-identification has a significant relationship with support for EU membership (Anderson 1998, Steenbergen and Jones 2002; McLaren 2002, Diez Medrano 2003). I found some support for this hypothesis, finding that right ideological self-placement is marginally associated with an increase in support for EU membership. Lastly, numerous scholars have found occupation and education to have a significant impact on attitudes toward the EU (Gabel 1998b, Anderson and Reichert 1996; Carey 2002; McLaren 2002). Education was found to be a significant predictor of support for EU membership, but occupation has no predictive power in this model. It is worth mentioning that occupation and education have been used by other scholars as proxies for more proximal measures of economic evaluations. The finding that my measure of economic evaluation remained highly significant while being tested along with occupation and education further supports the claim that economic evaluations strongly predict attitudes toward EU membership.

Comparing the findings of the regression analysis to the ANOVAs provides additional nuance to our understanding of the fabric of attitudes toward EU membership, particularly with regard to identity concerns. This regression analysis showed a difference in the direction of the relationship between national pride (*Rather be citizen*) and support for EU membership for the Czech and Slovak samples. The ANOVAs also showed significant differences between Czech and Slovak respondents that supplement the regression findings. The ANOVA showed that Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to prefer their current citizenship (*Rather be citizen*); in the regression, this same variable lent support for EU membership among Slovaks while it had a

negative impact on support for EU membership for Czechs. In the same vein, the ANOVAs also revealed that Czechs were more likely than Slovaks to have external national pride (e.g., *Better country than others*) and to feel protective of their identity vis-à-vis the EU (*EU weakens identity*). However, despite the asymmetric strength of external national pride and identity protectiveness in the Czech population, both variables (*Better country than others* and *EU weakens identity*) have an across-the-board negative impact on support for EU membership in the regression for the pooled sample. Thus, the complexity of Czech and Slovak identity revealed in the final regression analysis complements the nuanced picture that emerged from the ANOVAs.

To summarize, these analyses indicate that positive economic evaluations (both sociotropic and pocketbook) and European identity (manifest as feeling that EU membership is personally important) make one more likely to support EU membership in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while perceiving sociotropic threat (*EU weakens our identity*), feeling that one's country is inferior to the rest of Europe (*Inferior country*), and perceiving that one's country is better than others (*Better country than others*) is associated with a decrease in support for EU membership across both contexts. Perceptions of realistic threat had a marginally significant curvilinear relationship across both Czech and Slovak samples, as people who thought that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land neither strongly approved nor strongly disapproved with EU membership. Contextual differences emerged from this regression as well. For Slovaks, a feeling of preference for one's own citizenship makes one more likely support EU membership, while for Czechs, preferring Czech citizenship is associated with rejection of EU membership.

4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I examined several hypotheses grounded in existing research using a two-pronged analytical framework using data from an original random, representative large-scale survey that I conducted in 2006 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. With these analyses I attempted to address three important research streams in political behavior and European politics. The first and most important question asks whether citizens (in this case, citizens of nascent democracies) have political attitudes that are structured according to an organized belief system, which allows citizens to make political judgments in a consistent and predictable fashion (Converse 1964). Through analyses that look at this from different angles -- beginning with an exploration into differences in the structure of attitudes between these two groups and culminating in a regression predicting support for EU membership -- I have found evidence that Czech and Slovak attitudes toward EU membership are structured in predictable, repeatable ways.

In this chapter, I also sought to illuminate the debate on the importance of affectively-based identity concerns relative to economic-based self-interested calculations to political attitudes. Two conclusions may be extracted from the analyses presented in this chapter. First, contrary to previously established theory, my analyses indicated that purely self-interested (i.e., pocketbook) calculations were not significantly distinguishable from sociotropic economic evaluations, and a measure combining pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations was found to both cohere across contexts and play a very significant role in support for EU membership. Second, my analyses found that identity-based concerns played as strong a role as self-interested calculations in structuring attitudes toward EU membership across multiple analyses. If anything, identity-based concerns played a more important role, if we consider the various ways in which identity (e.g., feeling that one's country is better than others, feeling that

one's country is inferior to the rest of Europe, and feeling close to Europe) exerted largely independent effects on endorsement of EU membership.

Lastly, I aimed to show that identity affects attitudes toward the EU in ways that scholars have previously ignored. While I found support for the widely-held expectation that national pride (operationalized as *Better country than others*) leads to lowered support for EU membership, I also found ways in which a different conceptualization (operationalized as *Rather be citizen*) may actually enhance support. Specifically, in Chapter 3 I hypothesized that national pride would be associated with support for EU membership via a theorized outgroup favoritism mechanism. Though counterintuitive to the widely-held expectation that national pride leads to lowered support for EU membership, this final regression showed that preferring their own Slovak citizenship made Slovaks more likely to support EU membership. This suggests that for Slovaks compared to Czechs, preferring one's citizenship is positively related to the desire to join a powerful supranational political and economic organization. Given historical evidence (see Chapter 2) that suggests that Slovaks have lacked the cultural, economic, and political opportunities that Czechs have had to develop their relatively high-status place in the European hierarchy, this finding may lead one to conjecture that in Slovakia, a preference for one's citizenship means supporting EU membership as an effort to solidify the new status quo in which Slovakia is no longer in the outgroup position. This study found evidence that national pride may, to paraphrase Marks and Hooghe (2005), both undermine and support for EU membership

My analyses also shed light on how Czechs and Slovaks relate to their own national and European identities in different ways. Compared to Czechs, Slovaks were more open to outside cultural influence (shown through the ANOVA results for the protectionism items). Interestingly, according to my survey measures, Czechs were found to have more negative

perceptions of their national identity compared to Slovaks, while they were also more wedded to their national identities than their Slovak counterparts (drawn from the ANOVAs). This strong, negative, exclusive Czech national identity was in turn was associated with a decrease in support for EU membership in the final regression analysis. It appears that a more inclusive, open conception of national identity and national pride (which seems to be present among Slovaks) is associated with support for EU membership. In contrast, having an exclusive, protective national identity (in which group members wish to protect their identity from outside influence, such as in the case of the Czech Republic) leads one to be less likely to endorse EU membership.

5.0 CONCLUSION

This project begins with a question: how can we explain differences in the magnitude of support for EU membership in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, despite a shared half-century of political history and similar political institutions? In my search for an explanation, I investigate the structure of political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, confirming previous findings that both utilitarian cost-benefit calculations as well as European and national identity concerns play crucial, predictable roles in structuring attitudes toward the EU. However, using social identity theory, I also find that in certain contexts national pride may actually enhance support for EU membership—a finding unprecedented in the literature on EU support and a potential game-changer in our understanding of attitudes toward EU membership. I find the counterintuitive role of this key variable to be crucial in explaining differences in level of support for EU membership between these two countries.

In this conclusion I summarize the main themes of and findings from each chapter of this dissertation. After outlining the limitations of this study, I situate the contributions of this study within the fields of comparative politics and mass political behavior and discuss potential implications of this study for future research.

5.1 THE LANDSCAPE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

A great deal of research has been conducted over the past decades to explain attitudes toward EU membership. The majority of these studies have used large-scale, multi-country datasets in order to develop theory and test hypotheses. While these studies have been able to elicit a set of general hypotheses to predict attitudes toward the EU across tens of countries, they have not been able to explain specific outcomes in differences of the magnitude of support for EU membership by country. Moreover, these general hypotheses found to predict support for EU membership have been challenged empirically as more and different countries have become candidates for membership. The lack of specificity and mixed success of these hypotheses across cases is a cost of such “concept traveling”—in other words, the more cases attempted to be explained, the more general the explanations must become (Sartori 1970).⁴⁴ In addressing these limitations, scholars have begun to call for studies that take into account the role of national context in formulating more specific hypotheses to address country-level differences (Hooghe and Marks 2005). In order to closely examine the nuances that come with examining national context, I proposed to examine the role of context in shaping attitudes toward EU membership in two countries uniquely suited for comparison, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

⁴⁴ The “conceptual traveling” problem has been rediscovered most recently in the democratization literature in which it became evident “that broad comparison requires a use of categories that is sensitive to context” (Collier and Mahon 1993, 845). Sartori (1991, 247) illustrates the conceptual traveling problem with his example of the “cat-dog”. Both cats and dogs are mammals, but if cats and dogs are pooled together as the conceptually stretched (and non-existent) cat-dog, hypotheses about them will be rejected, distorting our understanding of real dogs and real cats. The underlying perspective behind Sartori’s concept is that “broad comparison is difficult, that political and social reality is heterogeneous, that applying a category in a given context requires detailed knowledge of that context, and that it is easy to misapply categories” (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846).

In Chapter 2 I describe the social, economic, and political histories of the Czech Republic and Slovakia from their first written histories through membership in the European Union. The divergent historical legacies of these outwardly similar nations provide the variation necessary for the most similar systems design of this project. By shaping such predispositions as national identity, historical experience is thought to condition the structure of citizens' attitudes (Zaller 1992) toward the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

The early historical path of the Slovak people differed from their Czech neighbors. By 1918, Czechs had enjoyed periods of cultural renaissance and European leadership (albeit interspersed with somewhat darker periods), while Slovaks' history was one of foreign subjugation lasting for a thousand years. Even as the two nations joined together in the First Czechoslovak Republic, this historical disparity remained: the Czech people remained a self-confident nation that viewed newfound independence as a restoration of Czech influence and autonomy, while Slovaks found themselves still searching for validation after a millennium of statelessness. Despite having shared a central government and, in many respects, a common experience under communism, the starkly divergent responses to World War II (and, later on, to EU membership) demonstrates a persisting difference in the national goals and self-perceptions of Czechs and Slovaks.

The first section of Chapter 3 outlines theory about the sources of attitudes toward the EU among West Europeans and examines how well these have "traveled" in studies involving East Europe. It also includes a discussion of existing studies (in this case, qualitative rather than quantitative) of political attitudes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This body of research has found generally that both groups of citizens tend to think about the same considerations when

evaluating political issues with the exception of identity, which seems to manifest differently in each context (Deegan-Krause 2003a).

In light of this research, I surmise that context – in particular, context’s interaction with national identity -- is a likely explanation for differences in the level of Czech and Slovak support for EU membership. Czechs seem to feel that they have always been part of Europe, viewing being part of the EU as their birthright as Europeans. While this feeling of Europeanness – a sign of their confidence in their own national status as full-fledged Europeans – does not appear to lead to an outright rejection of EU membership, the confidence and pride that Czechs have in their own national identity appears difficult to disentangle from their European identity. For Czechs, being European is just as much a part of them as being Czech, and becoming part of the EU changes nothing about how “European” Czechs are, either in their own minds or to the outside.⁴⁵ In contrast, as citizens of a newly independent state, Slovaks seem to have been searching for an opportunity to change the status quo such that they are viewed as equal with the rest of Europe. Potentially because of their long history of subjugation by their neighbors, Slovaks seem to have been seeking a positive sense of identity in the post-communist era in which it is regarded no longer as weaker or lesser. If this is the case, once given the opportunity to be considered candidates for EU membership, Slovaks were more likely to evaluate it positively as it would solidify a new, more equal status quo (Gyárfášová 2000; Henderson 2002).

With these tentative expectations in mind, I further situate the study in the social-psychological underpinnings of the “self-interest versus identity” paradigm found in many in EU studies. In my review of the EU literature, I find a broad, clear consensus that self-interest has a

⁴⁵ It is worth noting that this also fits the general pattern found in existing studies of EU membership across West Europe: national pride is associated with a decrease in support for EU membership.

strong relationship with attitudes toward the EU. I also find a consensus that identity strongly affects attitudes toward EU membership, but that the relationship remained murky from traveling from context to context. In an attempt to investigate this further, I delve deeper into the implications of national identity, particularly national pride, as a potential explanation for why aggregate levels of support vary by country. Using social identity theory, I introduce how context affects the manner in which national pride affects social group behavior. The hostility toward other groups that we normally find when we study identity (“ingroup favoritism”) is not the only consequence of national pride. Social identity theory also predicts “outgroup favoritism,” which occurs when a particular group actually prefers (and/or wants to become part of) another. Social identity theory specifically predicts the conditions under which identity is manifest either as ingroup or outgroup favoritism as well as how groups behave in each condition. This theory, along with historical evidence, suggests that for Slovaks, EU membership may be viewed as solidifying the creation of a new status hierarchy first promised by the collapse of communism (Gyárfášová 2000; Henderson 2002) – a manifestation of outgroup favoritism. For Czechs, a people who had long viewed themselves as equal with their West neighbors, EU membership would not effect such a large change in their place in the European status hierarchy.

At the conclusion of Chapter 3, I use social identity theory together with theory about self-interest to formulate specific, testable hypotheses about differences in attitudes toward the EU in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These hypotheses include expectations regarding the effects of both self-interest and identity on attitudes toward the EU and reflect existing literature on support for EU membership. My main contribution, however, is in the new hypotheses I propose that examine how context affects these putative relationships. I argue that context

shapes whether national pride serves as a brake or as an enhancement of support for EU membership; specifically, for Czechs, national pride is thought to be associated with a decrease in support for EU membership, while for Slovaks, national pride is likely to be associated with an increase in support for EU membership.

The first section of Chapter 4 describes the methodology and data I used to test my hypotheses. Using an original random, representative survey conducted in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2006, I employ analysis of variance (ANOVA) to explore differences between Czechs and Slovaks in the independent variables hypothesized to affect support of EU membership. I then use multiple linear regression to test the final model of predispositions associated with attitudes toward the EU in the pooled sample. I employ interaction terms (e.g., country*identity) to evaluate possible differences in the way that national context might influence the relationships between key predispositions like identity and support for EU membership.

The results of the analyses partly reflect findings similar to existing research on EU membership but also challenge previous research in compelling ways. In agreement with extant literature, I find that both identity-based concerns and self-interested calculations strongly structure attitudes toward EU membership. Like many others, I find that identity-based concerns play a more important role than self-interest. This is not very surprising when one considers the various ways in which identity (e.g., national pride, negative national identity, and feeling close to Europe) exerts largely independent effects on endorsement of EU membership.

Importantly, however, I find that identity affects attitudes toward the EU in ways that scholars have previously ignored. The final regression model shows that for Slovaks, preferring their own citizenship made them more—not less--likely to support EU membership. The key to

this counterintuitive relationship is context. According to the regression, simply being Slovak flips the relationship: for Slovaks compared to Czechs, preferring one's citizenship is positively related to the desire to join a powerful supranational political and economic organization. This is one of the first pieces of direct evidence for Hooghe and Marks' suggestion that identity may have a "double-edged character": national identity can contribute to or diminish support for European integration depending on context (2005, 433).

Two factors suggest why this counterintuitive finding is the case. The first is historical evidence, indicating that Slovak national identity is less developed than Czech national identity and that the collapse of communism and reorganization of Europe brought about an opportunity for Slovaks to finally gain the recognition they had sought for more than a thousand years. Though the EU represents a constraint on Slovakia's newfound sovereignty, it more importantly ensures an equal status to the rest of the countries in the EU – and in a sense, gives Slovakia more freedom as a sovereign nation, insofar as it meant being an equal to the rest of the countries in the EU than it would have were it shut out of the EU.

The second factor supporting this counterintuitive finding is social identity theory. Social identity theory holds that people identify with other people in a group in order to serve the basic function of self esteem (among other reasons), and thus individuals are motivated to evaluate their group positively compared to other groups. When a group perceives itself to be a high-status group, superior in reputation overall compared to other groups, that group is likely to have negative evaluations of outgroups. However, when the group that one belongs to is an outgroup, members are faced with a dilemma: how to evaluate themselves positively while knowing that they are at the bottom of the group status hierarchy? I argue that this is precisely the position in which Slovakia found itself until the post-communist era: until the system changed -- until

Slovakia could be its own country -- it was in a position of lower status. EU membership changed that by presenting the opportunity for Slovaks to lock in a new post-communist, equal status with the rest of Europe. Even with the potential constraints to Slovakia's newfound sovereignty, the EU represents joining Europe as an equal, a break from its long history as a lesser group. In the post-communist era, being Slovak means being higher-status than before, as newly equal with the rest of Europe. Insofar as EU membership represent solidifying the post-communist European order, this finding indicates that membership in the EU could be a consequence of, and thus closely related to, being proud to be a Slovak citizen.

This project found this counterintuitive relationship to hold only for Slovaks. This is because the Slovak position within the European country status system has long been sufficiently different from the Czech position. EU membership for Czechs has a different meaning, one that has been found across Europe more generally, as a threat to national identity. Czechs' confidence in their status relative to other European countries means that membership in the EU changes little status-wise. If anything, joining a pan-European political, social, and economic regime might make cultural influence from other European countries more likely, thus threatening Czech identity. If this is the case, then for Czechs, having a strong national identity means being less likely to support membership in the EU.

The results of this analysis also imply that national identity and European identity may actually reinforce each other in lending support for EU membership. This is particularly clear with the Slovak respondents. Compared to Czechs, Slovaks are more open to outside cultural influence and tend to view the EU as more important (shown through the ANOVA results for the protectionism and European identity items). A more inclusive, open conception of national identity and national pride appears to be unique to Slovaks in my analyses, and the combination

of pan-European identity (shown through the ANOVAS) and national pride (shown through the ANOVAS and regression) is associated with support for EU membership. In other words, evidence from both the ANOVAs and regression suggests that pan-European identity and national pride can exert largely independent, positive effects on support for EU membership depending on context. This implication supports the few existing studies that have found that when Europeans conceive of their own territorial identity in inclusive terms (that is, an identity encompassing both their national identity as well as pan-European identity), they are more likely to support EU membership compared to citizens who view their identity as encompassing national identity only (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Maddens et al. 1996; Kriesi and Lachat 2004).

It is worth discussing the two hypotheses I proposed that are not borne out in the data analysis. Both of these hypotheses relate to the crucial hinge specifying when national identity functions either as a brake or enabler of support for EU membership: context. Earlier in this project, I proposed that the relationship of economic evaluations to support for EU membership would be stronger for Czechs than for Slovaks, as Czechs appear to have had a more vociferous national-level debate on the costs and benefits of EU membership than did their Slovak counterparts. Similarly, I posited that the effect of perceived realistic threat would be stronger for Czechs than Slovaks due in part to the politicized influx of foreign purchases of Czech lands. Neither of these relationships hold when tested using an interaction of context and self-interest and realistic threat. In other words, context does not emerge as a significant interaction between the self-interest and realistic threat and support for EU membership in these two cases; the relationship between self-interest and realistic threat and support for EU membership remains the same regardless of whether the context was the Czech Republic or Slovakia. In light of these findings, I conjecture that the differences between the two contexts simply are not as different as

they may seem when looking at them from up close— the differences in politicization of either realistic threat or self-interest simply may not be strong enough to matter.

5.2 LIMITATIONS

This study is designed to minimize extraneous variance and maximize experimental variance. Using a most similar systems design (MSSD; Przeworski and Teune 1970), I select two countries that shared many attributes, including attributes that other scholars might point to as possible indicators of EU support, but vary in the dependent variable—the magnitude of support for EU membership. As countries that shared a federal government for more than a half-century and continue to feature similar political institutions and similar status as new EU member-states, the variation in level of support in the Czech Republic and Slovakia make these cases a virtual laboratory for examining factors that contribute to national differences in political attitudes.

Even with a careful research design, certain limitations remain in this study. Using survey data exclusively means that external influences cannot be controlled, as both the independent and dependent variables were measured at the same time within the same survey instrument. Additionally, as the data are cross-sectional in nature and not experimental, causal mechanisms can not be identified using my survey-based analytical measures. In lieu of experimental data, theory must explain the relationships found in the analysis. Lastly, the timing of the survey possibly biased the instrument. The survey was conducted from August 3-14, 2006 in the Czech Republic and August 5-17 in Slovakia. The survey was fielded immediately before the resignation of the Czech leftist government following ten weeks of post-election negotiations to form a new ODS-led (rightist) coalition government to be headed by Mirek Topolanek. It is

conceivable (but very unlikely, given the stability of attitudes toward the EU in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia over time) that the government instability following the June 2006 elections may have negatively affected mass perceptions related to EU membership. Future surveys should be fielded around major scheduled political events in order to eliminate this potential source of bias.

5.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The most noteworthy and remarkable contribution of this study is the support it finds for the proposition that context significantly interacts with predispositions in the structure of attitudes toward EU membership. This finding is a potential game-changer in the study of attitudes toward EU membership. Though this result is relatively unprecedented in the literature, the conclusions of this project are foreshadowed by Hooghe and Marks (2005) who surmised that “citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are predisposed to be considerably more Euro-skeptical than are those who conceive their national identity in inclusive terms” (424). In line with Hooghe and Marks’s supposition, I find solid evidence that identity both contributes to and takes away from support for EU membership; the key to how identity matters is context. Strong national identity does not necessarily result in anti-EU sentiment, but nor does it preclude it. This potentially groundbreaking finding deserves replication and further study in new contexts. Future studies of attitudes toward the EU must consider the contradictory effects that national identity may have on support for EU membership.

The findings of this project also speak to the literature that has developed on the post-communist transition to democracy in Central and East Europe. The so-called “triple transition”

that these former Soviet satellite states underwent in the 1990s entailed the transformation of the polity, economy, and civil society. This project's conclusions underscore the importance of the link between the processes of developing national identity and the social transition from Soviet rule, which in turn affects the economic and political transitions: as citizens in democracies vote for politicians and policies, campaigns built around identity in a changing system ultimately influence the nature of the simultaneous political and economic transitions (insofar as elected officials shape the political and economic spheres). The processes of triple transition are simultaneous, convergent, and mutually-reinforcing – just as state structures can constrain political, economic, and societal transformations, they are in turn shaped by these transformations (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002, 548). The role of national identity in political attitudes, undeniably important in a democracy, merits further attention in the study of the triple transition from communism as it offers a new theoretical lens with which to view regime transitions and their post-communist peculiarities.

Scholars continue to debate the role of the EU in shaping the larger context of Europe: while few maintain that the EU is little more than an international trade regime, the extent and nature of the EU's role in Europe remains a key topic of discussion by scholars and policymakers (as well as by voters in European referenda). Mainstream political science research accepts that the EU has developed into a political entity that encapsulates established territorial communities, activating social identity for its citizen members. If the EU necessarily engages identities, then a study of how citizens' conception of their identities affects their orientations toward the EU seems well-justified. Moreover, the future of proposed EU institutional reforms depends, at least in part, on public support. As past reforms have moved the EU in the direction of a representative democracy, citizens have increasing access to EU policymaking through myriad

supranational and subnational channels. Consequently, understanding what powers the attitudes of citizens of the EU is essential to being able to predict the direction of mass-driven reforms. Policymakers with goals of maintaining popular support for the EU should take heed to the implications of this study's findings.

The broadest contribution of this study to the field of comparative politics relates to theories of representation. Specifically, a model of attitude structure that elucidates the complex role of national identity adds to the literature on the changing nature of representation in the European Union by illuminating another avenue for mass-elite linkage. As the literature increasingly addresses questions of representation, policy-making, and the future political dynamics of the EU (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999), specification of how citizens' attitudes toward the EU are structured will help scholars evaluate the character and quality of representation in EU policy making (Gabel and Anderson 2002). This cuts to the heart of a long body of research in the representation literature regarding how well politicians actually represent the desires of their constituents (i.e., the congruence between citizen preferences and party positions) (Miller and Stokes 1963, correction by Erikson 1978). Whether politicians try to persuade constituents to go along with disagreeable policies or simply seek to represent the interests of their constituencies, the enumeration of a more precise model of political attitudes offers politicians (as well as scholars) the opportunity to better understand how to serve citizens' interests.

Lastly, this project has real-world implications for the observer's understanding of the future of the EU. The French and Dutch votes against the proposed European Constitution in 2005, the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, longstanding British hostility, and growing populist party hostility to the EU in Austria and parts of East Europe all suggest that public

attitudes are and will be very important. The EU has done a very poor job of bringing along societies in support of what they have done and what they want to do. It is likely to be a very different looking EU in the next few years and changing public attitudes – and national context – will be one reason. The results of this project must not only become crucial considerations by future academic studies of support for EU membership, but should be addressed by policymakers and other institutional stakeholders who seek to shape the future of the EU itself.

5.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

This study addresses the longstanding debate in mass political behavior regarding the relative importance of self-interest versus identity-based concerns in political attitudes. While the American literature has found that self-interest tends to play little role in shaping political attitudes, the literature on European attitudes has consistently found that self-interest plays a significant role in political attitudes, particularly attitudes toward EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2005), suggesting that context may also influence the extent to which self-interest may matter.

Given that this finding substantiates the literature on attitudes toward the EU more generally, there are (at least) two possible reasons that can explain why it is discrepant to the American literature: first, my measures of self-interest (broadened to include both sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluations) may be so broad that they capture variance that they might not have otherwise if comprised only of pocketbook economic evaluations. However, in the final analysis, even including controls for demographic variables that are often used to proxy pocketbook self-interest (such as occupation or education) and controls for theoretically related

variables like realistic threat, self-interest was found to be a highly significant predictor of attitudes toward EU membership for both Czechs and Slovaks. Thus, it is possible but unlikely that my measure itself was biased to garner more significance in the regression that it really might deserve.

A second reason for why self-interest appears to matter in these contexts but not in the US is that in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, self-interest may have fulfilled all of the conditions that are considered to make it salient: there were clear costs and benefits, severe and ambiguous threats, and politicization insofar as a vote on EU membership was on the immediate horizon (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Sears and Funk 1990, 1991). In Chapter 3 I make the case that self-interest was more politicized in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia, but this expectation is not borne out in my analyses. It is plausible that even with more politicization of self-interest in the Czech lands, the issue itself may have been so inherently politically salient that differences between each country's national-level internal dialogues may not have mattered. The level of politicization across Europe with regard to this ever-present issue, in addition to the clear costs and benefits and severe, ambiguous threats to all applicant countries, may have been sufficient to make self-interest a key ingredient in attitudes toward the EU.

This project also speaks to the extant literature on group conflict. A shared conclusion of studies of attitudes toward EU membership, reminiscent of the majority of group conflict studies, is that national pride leads to a decrease in support for EU membership: the more pride one has in one's country, the less likely s/he is to support EU membership. In contrast, I argue that national pride can have the opposite relationship – it can actually enhance support for EU membership. While national pride does not necessarily lead to a decrease in support for EU membership, the findings of this project serve as a call to examine the role of context in teasing

out the conditions under which national pride serves as a brake or a support for endorsement of EU membership. Group conflict is not the inevitable result of group competition and, as this study shows, it is not the only result of national group competition within the sphere of the EU. This project shows that one mechanism explaining why the direction of the relationship between national pride and support for EU membership varies by context can be found in social identity theory, particularly the role of outgroup favoritism.

The evidence found for the conclusion that group competition need not necessarily lead to group antipathy may be tied in part to how national identity – specifically, national pride – is conceptualized. In this project I sought to capture each of the various ways that identity may plausibly affect support for EU membership, including not only measures of national pride and pan-European identity but also negative evaluations of one's own national identity. The surprising finding that a positive feeling of national identity – national pride – may actually enhance support for EU membership suggests that a reconceptualization of national identity in the EU literature might be in order. In particular, future research should focus on distinguishing aspects of national pride, specifying how each aspect may contribute to a different outcome vis-à-vis support for EU membership. For example, it may be useful for scholars to create a typology in which national pride is understood via aspects of strength (weak or strong national pride) and exclusivity (pride in an identity that is conceived of exclusive of other, broader territorial identities or inclusive of them) (Hooghe and Marks 2005) in order to create more precise hypotheses that take context into account.

Another avenue to refining the conceptualization of national identity in the EU literature is to precisely delineate the boundaries between national identity, European identity, symbolic threat, and realistic threat. Though I attempted to make such distinctions in this study, a project

focused specifically on exploring these differences would benefit the greater literature. As Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue, identity is complex and its impact on political attitudes is neither automatic nor uniform; refining the concept of identity to account for its complexities would undoubtedly improve our predictive powers in future studies.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The findings from this project are potentially groundbreaking and warrant replication and further study. The conclusion that context shapes the particular impact of national identity demands further investigation by political scientists. In addition, the findings from this project suggest that social identity theory should be employed with greater ferocity when studying attitudes toward the EU. When examining identity, scholars should more closely examine the mechanisms and predictions offered by social identity theory. The results from this study are also of benefit to European policymakers who seek to understand national differences in support for EU membership. While it is possible to derive a “one size fits all” model of the predictors of support for EU membership by looking at all the EU countries at once, the price of such a model is theoretical specificity at the country level (see Sartori 1970). This project refined the existing broad models in such a way that country-level differences can be modeled and explained. Finally, while large-n cross-national studies may never be able to fully take context into account, they should be much more aware of—and much more explicit about—the potential for context to influence causal relationships.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY

A.1 PRETEST ANALYSIS

A pretest of many of the questions used in the final survey was conducted in 2004. For this pretest, I distributed, collected, and translated questionnaires that employed principles of cognitive interviewing (Beatty and Willis 2007) with a semi-random, semi-representative sample of Czech (n=23) and Slovak (n=25) citizens. The purpose of this pretest was to identify the range of concerns that ordinary Czechs and Slovaks raised when thinking about EU membership in a semi-structured questionnaire environment. The information gleaned from these questionnaires was used to create a final survey instrument that was used for the ANOVAs and regression analysis in this project. The text of the pretest questionnaire can be found in Survey Appendix 6.

Respondents in the first sample (e.g., those who were administered the questionnaires) were selected via a snowball strategy, according to age group, level of education, and gender.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ I designed, pretested, and conducted these questionnaires while a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in 2004. Question order, framing, and translation were checked by Mr. Jiří Vinopal, a survey methodologist at the Center for Public Opinion Polling at the Institute of Sociology,

Many of the respondents were based in each country's capital (Prague and Bratislava), though other urban and more rural areas were represented as well. In these nine-page questionnaires, I encouraged people to openly express their opinions at length and in their own words using techniques from cognitive interviewing.⁴⁷ I thus was able to 'poke' at the underlying rationale/s for their responses too, providing a cogent account of what the respondents believed is important to their political attitudes that could allow me to improve the final survey instrument I employed in 2006. To analyze these qualitative data, I coded responses and searched for patterns in order to identify and organize the variety of predispositions that inform attitudes toward EU membership. Because the purpose of this effort was only to identify the range of predispositions relied upon by Czechs and Slovaks for the sake of improving the subsequent survey instrument, the lack of representativeness is unproblematic.

In both the Slovak and Czech samples, *pocketbook self-interested evaluations* appeared to play a minor role in how citizens evaluated their own attitudes toward the EU. The frequent mentions of *sociotropic evaluations* in respondents' responses about EU membership in the questionnaires from both ordinary Czechs and Slovaks indicate that sociotropic evaluations appear to be to be far stronger ingredients than pocketbook evaluations in attitudes toward the EU, yielding two conclusions. The first is that sociotropic evaluations do appear to be a powerful tool that citizens, Czech as well as Slovak, use to help them decide whether to support EU membership. This appears to be constant across both samples and consistent with previous studies of the newest applicant states that find that utilitarian predispositions are important across

Academy of Sciences in Prague, Czech Republic, and by his academic counterpart at the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, Slovakia, Ms. Katarina Strapcova.

⁴⁷ The specific question to be analyzed on the questionnaire was "How satisfied are you with EU membership for [country]?" The questionnaire immediately proceeded to the following instructions: "Please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?" The questionnaire text can be found at the end of this Survey Appendix.

the board in all countries (Cichowski 2000). But given that respondents from both countries' samples both discussed the sociotropic benefits of EU membership in roughly equal numbers, how can we explain why Slovaks support the EU more than their Czech counterparts? The other conclusion that can be derived is that something else must also matter to attitudes toward the EU, namely, identity-based concerns.

The cognitive-based questionnaire results indicated that identity has a nuanced and complex role in the structure of attitudes toward EU membership. At least for some Czechs, a feeling of "Europeanness" (or *European identity*) was reported by respondents to be practically automatic. It is apparently socialized and probably widespread, given its emphasis among the respondents in these samples and according to sociological accounts of Czech culture (Holý 1998). From the responses discussed here, it seems that an attachment to a pan-European identity does come to mind when Czechs consider the EU, but this sense of European identity is mediated by the perception that West Europeans "look down their noses" at Czechs due to their communist past. As a reaction to that feeling, some Czech respondents stubbornly and vociferously defended what they consider to be their European birthright and, accordingly, they feel entitled to EU membership. To these Czech respondents, membership in the EU neither validated nor invalidated their European identity –these respondents viewed their Europeanness as prior, as a solid reality that EU membership would not change in any meaningful way.

In contrast, Slovaks indicate some sort of European identity as well, but it pales in strength (and importance) to that of Czechs and it seems to differ in nature. The Slovak respondents in this small sample indicated that the European identity that they had felt prior to joining the EU stemmed only from geography, from knowing that their country appears on a map of Europe. But the Slovak respondents did not "feel" European (i.e., naturally and innately

European) in the manner of their Czech counterparts. As a result, the European identity that the Slovak respondents reported feeling was muted and appeared less secure.

According to the responses of the Slovaks from these samples, this muted and insecure European identity appears to be the result of a Slovak identity that has shifted in the aftermath of communism and the opportunity for self-rule. As discussed in Chapter 2, an explanation for Slovakia's comparative lack of confidence in its Europeanness and in its identity in general, lies in the Slovak historical experience. This account makes sense, given that the previous pinnacle of Slovakia's history was the fascist, nationalist puppet regime during World War II that subsequently became a taboo subject for most Slovaks. Evidence from these questionnaires indicate that this weak Slovak identity may motivate support the EU in that Slovaks may view EU membership as a way to solidify their aspiration of external acceptance in a new post-communist status quo.

Crucial to this conclusion is that the Slovak respondents associate "feeling European" with being part of the EU. In other words, according to the Slovak respondents, becoming part of the EU may mean solidifying their newfound (and hard-fought) feeling of Europeanness. This is a markedly different perspective from that of the Czech respondents, who seem to inherently "feel European" and view EU membership as a natural extension of that.

The results provide a preliminary explanation for why support for EU membership varies in intensity between the two most similar new member states. Since the sample was neither representative nor random, it cannot be generalized to the entire population. But it serves as a solid foundation for examining how hypotheses might be operationalized and tested using a large random, representative dataset of Czech and Slovak survey responses.

A.2 SAMPLING PROCEDURE, RESPONSE RATE, AND INTERVIEW DATES

Survey sampling procedure : quota sampling (sex, age, education, region and size of place of residence – based on 2001 census)

Contacts were selected randomly from Factum Invenio’s database and phoned using native Czech and Slovak speakers.

Table A.2.1 Survey Non-Interviews

Disposition	Czech Republic	Slovakia
Refusal	699	652
Not interested, busy	352	412
Does not fit in quotas/ineligible	440	794

Response Rate 1⁴⁸ for samples in both countries⁴⁹ was 32%, with 3,122 calls made to eligible reporting units and 1,007 surveys conducted (AAPOR 2008). 1,351 calls were made to households that did not fit into any quota and were deemed ineligible (with 699 in Czech Republic and 652 in Slovakia).

⁴⁸ Response rate is defined by AAPOR (2008) as the number of complete interviews with reporting units divided by the number of eligible reporting units in the sample. Response Rate 1, referred to by AAPOR as the minimum response rate, specifically is the number of complete interviews divided by the number of interviews (complete plus partial) plus the number of non-interviews (refusal and breakoffs plus noncontacts plus others) plus all cases of unknown eligibility (unknown if housing unit, plus unknown, plus other).

⁴⁹ Response Rate 1 for the Czech sample was 32% with 500 complete interviews and 1,051 refusals. For the Slovak sample, Response Rate 1 was also 32% with 507 complete interviews and 1,064 refusals.

Table A.2.2 Survey interview dates (2006)

Czech Republic		Slovakia	
August:	Frequency	August:	Frequency
3	13	5	8
4	9	6	1
6	2	9	24
7	139	10	45
8	147	11	42
9	96	13	48
10	47	14	64
11	12	15	98
13	11	16	121
14	24	17	51

A.3 SURVEY ITEMS

Table A.3.1 Survey items

Question Text	Question Shorthand	Number	Response range	Response coding
Economic dimension				
Would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were two years ago?	Retrospective pocketbook evaluation	Q3	1=much worse, 5=much better	1-5
Would you say that a year from now you will be better or worse off financially?	Prospective pocketbook evaluation	Q4	1=much worse, 5=much better	1-5
Would you say that over the past two years the country's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?	Retrospective sociotropic evaluation	Q10	1=much worse, 5=much better	1-5
Do you expect that the economy to get better, get same, or stay about the same in the next year?	Prospective sociotropic evaluation	Q12	1=much worse, 5=much better	1-5
Identity dimension				
<i>Geographic and historic European identity</i>				

Question Text	Question Shorthand	Number	Response range	Response coding
Based on the following definitions, is your country European: Geographical location	European: geography	Q18a	1=no, it is definitely not European; 5=yes, it is definitely European	1-5
Based on the following definitions, is your country European: History	European: history	Q18b	1=no, it is definitely not European; 5=yes, it is definitely European	1-5
Based on the following definitions, is your country European: Other countries' perceptions	European: other countries' perceptions	Q18d	1=no, it is definitely not European; 5=yes, it is definitely European	1-5
<i>Cultural European identity</i>				
Based on the following definitions, is your country European: Culture	European: culture	Q18c	1=no, it is definitely not European; 5=yes, it is definitely European	1-5
What culture would you say that Czech Republic belongs?	Culture east/west	Q7	1=certainly to eastern culture, 5=certainly to western culture	1-5
<i>Closeness to Europe</i>				
How close do you feel to Europe?	Close to Europe	Q21	1=not close at all, 4=very close	1-4
How important is the issue of EU membership to you personally?	Personal importance of EU	Q17	1=not at all important, 4=very important	1-4
<i>Negative social identity</i>				
There are some things about Czech Republic that make me feel ashamed.	Ashamed	Q22b	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
I am often less proud of Czech Republic than I would like to be.	Less proud	Q24a	1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree*	1-5
Everyone in the rest of Europe looks down at us.	Looks down on us	Q24c	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
In terms of status, how do you personally feel as a Czech in comparison to citizens of other European countries?	Inferior citizen	Q26	1=superior, 3=inferior	1-3

Question Text	Question Shorthand	Number	Response range	Response coding
Do you think Czech Republic is inferior to, superior to, or equal to other countries of the EU?	Inferior country	Q14	1=superior 3=inferior	1-3
Where would you place Czech Republic's International reputation?	International reputation	Q45	1=highest position, 10=lowest position	1-10
National pride				
I would rather be a citizen of Czech Republic than of any other country in the world.	Rather be citizen	Q22a	1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree*	1-5
Generally speaking, Czech Republic is a better country than most other countries.	Better country than others	Q24b	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Protectionism—realistic threat				
Czech Republic should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.	Limit imports	Q5	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
EU membership takes jobs away from people who were born in Czech Republic.	Membership takes jobs away	Q6	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Government spends too much money complying with EU regulations.	Government spends too much on EU	Q8	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Czech Republic.	Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	Q9	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Protectionism—symbolic threat				
Czech television should give preference to Czech films and programs.	Television should give preference	Q13	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.	Exposure damages our culture	Q15	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Foreigners improve Czech society by introducing new ideas and cultures.	Foreigners improve society	Q16	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
EU membership weakens our identity as Czechs.	EU weakens identity	Q19	1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	1-5
Political Awareness: How many days in the past week did you...				
Talk about EU membership with family or friends?	Talk EU	Q20	1=0 days, 4=6-7 days	1-4
Read about EU membership in a newspaper?	Read EU	Q23	1=0 days, 4=6-7 days	1-4
Watch news stories about EU membership on television?	Watch EU	Q25	1=0 days, 4=6-7 days	1-4
Political Values				

Question Text	Question Shorthand	Number	Response range	Response coding
Incomes should be made more equal, so there is no great difference vs. Individual achievement should determine who much people are paid	Value income	Q39	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	1-4
Individuals should take responsibility for themselves and their livelihood vs. The state should be responsible for everyone's economic security	Value responsibility	Q40	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	1-4
State ownership is the best way to run an enterprise vs. An enterprise is best run by private entrepreneurs	Value ownership	Q41	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	1-4
Government should cut taxes even if it means reducing spending on education, health care and pensions vs. Even if it means people like myself pay more in taxes, government should spend more on education, health and pensions	Value taxes	Q42	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	1-4
If Parliament was closed down and parties abolished, would you:	Value Parliament	Q43	1=strongly disapprove, 6=strongly approve	1-6
Where would you like our political system to be?	Dictatorship-democracy	Q44	1=dictatorship, 10=democracy	1-10
Control/Demographic variables				
If parliamentary elections were held next week, which party would you vote for?	Party identification (Party ID)	Q11	categorical	Varies by country - see Appendix
In the past year, how often did you go to religious services?	Religiosity	Q27	1=never, 8=several times a week	1-8
What is your religious affiliation?	Religious affiliation	Q28	categorical	1-8
What is your marital status?	Marital status	Q29	categorical	1-5
What is the highest level of education you have completed?	Level of education	Q30	1=no formal schooling, 8=post-graduate degree	1-8
What is your occupation?	Occupation	Q31	categorical	1-12
In politics, people often use the terms 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself?	Ideological self-placement	Q32	1=extreme left, 5=extreme right	1-5
What is your gender?	Gender	Q33	categorical	1-2
What is your age?	Age cohorts	Q34	1=age 18-24, 7=age 75+	1-7

Question Text	Question Shorthand	Number	Response range	Response coding
What is your ethnicity?	Ethnicity	Q35	categorical	Varies by country - see Appendix
How many people are in your household?	Household size	Q36	1=1 person, 9=9 people	1-9
What kind of environment do you live in?	Rural-urban	Q37	1=rural environment 4=city	1=4
How many people live in your community?	Community size	Q38	1=less than one thousand, 5=twenty thousand or more inhabitants	1-5
Political knowledge: Know what job or political office s/he holds (number correct)				
Office of Václav Klaus/Ivan Gasparovic (answer: President)	Polknow item 1	Q46a	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1
Office of Cyril Svoboda/Jan Kubis (Minister of Foreign Affairs)	Polknow item 2	Q46b	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1
Office of Tony Blair (Prime Minister of Great Britain)	Polknow item 3	Q46c	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1
Office of Pavel Nemeč/Stefan Harabin (Minister of Justice)	Polknow item 4	Q46d	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1
Party of Jiří Paroubek/Mikulas Dzurinda (answer: CSSD/SDKU)	Polknow item 5	Q46e	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1
Party of Zdenek Skromach/Viera Tomanova (answer: CSSD/Smer)	Polknow item 6	Q46f	0=incorrect answer, 1=correct answer	0-1

* Item responses were recoded in reverse order for analysis to aid interpretation

A.4 RESPONDENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF KEY INDICATORS

Table A.4.1 Distribution of ethnicity

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks	
	N	Valid %	N	Valid %
Ethnicity - Czech sample				
Czech	484	96.8	--	--
Slovak	10	2.0	--	--
Polish	2	0.4	--	--
Other	2	0.4	--	--
No answer	1	0.2	--	--
Romany	1	0.2	--	--
<i>Total</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>100.0</i>	--	--
Ethnicity - Slovak sample				
Slovak	--	--	457	90.1
Hungarian	--	--	32	6.3
Czech	--	--	11	2.2
Ukrainian	--	--	3	0.6
Ruthenian	--	--	2	0.4
Other	--	--	1	0.2
No answer	--	--	1	0.2
<i>Total</i>	--	--	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Table A.4.2 Distributions of demographic variables

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks	
	N	Valid %	N	Valid %
Gender				
Female	264	52.8	270	53.3
Male	236	47.2	237	46.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Marital status				
Married	291	58.2	278	54.8
Single, never married	106	21.2	121	23.9
Widowed	49	9.8	65	12.8
Divorced	49	9.8	32	6.3
Separated	4	0.8	9	1.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>499</i>	<i>99.8</i>	<i>505</i>	<i>99.6</i>
Highest level of education				
Grade school or no formal schooling	60	12.0	37	7.3
Some high school	237	47.4	239	47.1
High school with exam	154	30.8	177	34.9
Some university	10	2.0	9	1.8
University with degree or post-graduate	39	7.8	45	8.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Occupation				
Retired	145	29.0	163	32.1
Trained worker/tradesman	66	13.2	54	10.7
Executive professional	52	10.4	66	13.0
Student/vocational training	50	10.0	50	9.9
State administration	47	9.4	34	6.7
Creative professional	44	8.8	52	10.3
Entrepreneur/freelance	34	6.8	22	4.3
Untrained worker	20	4.0	12	2.4
Unemployed	14	2.8	20	3.9
Housewife/home duties	10	2.0	13	2.6
Public administration	9	1.8	11	2.2
Permanently disabled	7	1.4	9	1.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>498</i>	<i>99.6</i>	<i>506</i>	<i>99.9</i>
Community size				
Less than 1,000 inhabitants	97	19.4	70	13.8
1,000 – 2,000 inhabitants	43	8.6	50	9.9
2,000 – 20,000 inhabitants	139	27.8	130	25.6
Greater than 20,000 inhabitants	221	44.2	257	50.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Rural/urban				
Rural environment	157	31.4	162	32.0
Small town	120	24.0	111	21.9
Medium-sized town	100	20.0	119	23.5
City	119	23.8	115	22.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>496</i>	<i>99.2</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Age cohort				
Age 18-24	62	12.4	87	17.2
Age 25-34	77	15.4	77	15.2
Age 35-44	99	19.8	107	21.1
Age 45-54	81	16.2	83	16.4
Age 55-64	90	18.0	90	17.8
Age 65-74	48	9.6	48	9.5
Age 75+	43	8.6	15	3.0

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks	
	N	Valid %	N	Valid %
<i>Total</i>	500	100.0	507	100.0
Household size				
1 person	56	11.2	62	12.2
2	144	28.8	122	24.1
3	98	19.6	92	18.1
4	140	28.0	126	24.9
5	39	7.8	66	13.0
6	9	1.8	28	5.5
7	6	1.2	7	1.4
8	2	0.4	2	0.4
9 people	0	0.0	2	0.4
<i>Total</i>	494	98.8	507	100.0
Religious affiliation				
None	259	51.8	74	14.6
Roman Catholic	190	38.0	357	70.4
Other	28	5.6	27	5.3
Calvinist/Reformed Christian	9	1.8	7	1.4
Greek Catholic	4	0.8	17	3.4
Lutheran	1	0.2	12	2.4
Orthodox	1	0.2	9	1.8
Jewish	1	0.2	0	0
<i>Total</i>	493	98.6	503	99.3
Church attendance				
Never	325	65.0	146	28.8
Less frequently than once a year	23	4.6	21	4.1
Once a year	34	6.8	37	7.3
Several times a year	62	12.4	68	13.4
Once a month	5	1.0	15	3.0
Two to three times a month	6	1.2	23	4.5
Once a week	30	6.0	130	25.6
Several times a week	13	2.6	62	12.2
<i>Total</i>	498	99.4	502	99.0

Table A.4.3 Distribution of party identification

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks	
Party Identification - Czech sample				
Civic Democrats (ODS)	164	32.8	--	--
Social Democrats (CSSD)	94	18.8	--	--
Would not vote	70	14.0	--	--
Undecided	63	12.6	--	--
Green Party (SZ)	29	5.8	--	--
Community (KSCM)	25	5.0	--	--
Christian & Democratic Union (KDU-CSL)	19	3.8	--	--
Independent Democrats (NEZ/DEM)	2	0.4	--	--
Movement Independent	1	0.2	--	--
European Democrats (SNK-ED)	1	0.2	--	--
<i>Total</i>	<i>468</i>	<i>93.6</i>	--	--
Party Identification - Slovak sample				
Direction (Smer)	--	--	148	29.2
Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU)	--	--	98	19.3
Undecided	--	--	79	15.6
Would not vote	--	--	47	9.3
Slovak National Party (SNS)	--	--	26	5.1
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	--	--	22	4.3
Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	--	--	21	4.1
People's Party/Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS)	--	--	16	3.2
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)	--	--	9	1.8
Slovak Green Party (SZS)	--	--	8	1.6
Democratic Party (DS)	--	--	6	1.2
Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)	--	--	4	0.8
Democratic Movement	--	--	2	0.4
Left Bloc	--	--	2	0.4
Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)	--	--	1	0.2
<i>Total</i>	--	--	<i>489</i>	<i>96.4</i>

Table A.4.4 Distribution of region

Variable	Czechs		Slovaks	
	n	%	n	%
Region - Czech sample				
Moravia-Silesia	63	12.6	--	--
Prague	61	12.2	--	--
South Moravia	56	11.2	--	--
Central Bohemia	53	10.6	--	--
Region of Usti nad Labem	39	7.8	--	--
South Bohemia	30	6.0	--	--
Zlin	29	5.8	--	--
Plzen	28	5.6	--	--
Olomouc	28	5.6	--	--
Hradec Kralove	27	5.4	--	--
Pardubice	25	5.0	--	--
Vysocina	25	5.0	--	--
Liberec	21	4.2	--	--
Karlovy Vary	15	3.0	--	--
<i>Total</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>100.0</i>	--	--
Region – Slovak sample				
Kosice	--	--	80	15.8
Presov	--	--	74	14.6
Nitra	--	--	66	13.0
Zilina	--	--	63	12.4
Banska Bystrica	--	--	63	12.4
Bratislava	--	--	58	11.4
Trencin	--	--	57	11.2
Trnava	--	--	46	9.1
<i>Total</i>	--	--	<i>507</i>	<i>100.0</i>

A.5 TEXT OF SURVEY

This is an invitation to participate in a telephone research survey. This study will survey a random selection of Slovak citizens and ask them to respond to a survey over the phone. If you are willing to participate, this survey will ask about your age, level of education, gender, and occupation, as well as your opinions toward political issues. All responses are confidential, so there is no foreseeable risk to you. This survey is conducted by Lisa Pohlman from the

University of Pittsburgh in the United States, who can be reached by email at imp7@pitt.edu, if you have any questions.

1. Do I have your permission to participate in a survey?
Yes
No
2. Do you approve or disapprove of EU membership for your country?
Strongly disapprove
Disapprove somewhat
Disapprove a little
Approve a little
Approve somewhat
Strongly approve
3. Would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were two years ago?
Much better
Better
Same
Worse
Much worse
4. Do you think that a year from now you will be better or worse off financially?
Much better
Better
Same
Worse
Much worse
5. How much do you agree with the following statement? “Slovakia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.”
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
6. How much do you agree with the following statement? “EU membership takes jobs away from people who were born in Slovakia.”
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree

Agree
Strongly agree

7. What culture would you say that Slovakia belongs to, the eastern (Byzantium, Russia) or the western? Culturally Slovakia belongs...
- Certainly to western culture
 - Rather to western culture
 - Equally close to western as well as to eastern culture
 - Rather to eastern culture
 - Certainly to eastern culture
8. How much do you agree with the following statement? "Government spends too much money complying with EU regulations."
- Strongly agree
 - Agree
 - Neither agree nor disagree
 - Disagree
 - Strongly disagree
9. How much do you agree with the following statement? "Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Slovakia."
- Strongly disagree
 - Disagree
 - Neither agree nor disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly agree
10. Would you say that over the past two years the country's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?
- Much better
 - Better
 - Same
 - Worse
 - Much worse
11. If parliamentary elections were held this weekend, which party would you vote for? (Slovakia)
- a. Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)
 - b. Democratic Party (DS)
 - c. Democratic Movement
 - d. Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)
 - e. Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)
 - f. Left Bloc
 - g. People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)
 - h. People's Union
 - i. Slovak Democratic Christian Union

- j. Slovak National Party (SNS)
 - k. Direction (Smer)
 - l. Party of the Democratic Left (SDL')
 - m. Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)
 - n. Slovak Green Party (SZS)
 - o. Undecided
 - p. I would not vote
12. Do you expect that the economy to get better, get worse, or stay about the same in the next year?
- Much better
 - Better
 - Same
 - Worse
 - Much worse
13. How much do you agree with the following statement? "Slovak television should give preference to Slovak films and programs."
- Strongly disagree
 - Disagree
 - Neither agree nor disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly agree
14. Do you think Slovakia is inferior to, superior to, or equal to other countries of the EU?
- Inferior
 - Equal
 - Superior
 - Don't know/can't tell
15. How much do you agree with the following statement? "Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging out national and local cultures."
- Strongly agree
 - Agree
 - Neither agree nor disagree
 - Disagree
 - Strongly disagree
16. How much do you agree with the following statement? "Foreigners improve Slovak society by introducing new ideas and cultures."
- Strongly disagree
 - Disagree
 - Neither agree nor disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly agree

17. How important is the issue of EU membership to you personally?
Not at all important
A little important
Somewhat important
Very important
18. Based on the following definitions, is your country European?
- a. Slovakia's geographical location
No, it is definitely not European
I do not think it is very European
I am not sure
I think it is somewhat European
Yes, it is definitely European
 - b. Slovakia's history
No, it is definitely not European
I do not think it is very European
I am not sure
I think it is somewhat European
Yes, it is definitely European
 - c. Slovakia's culture
Yes, it is definitely European
I think it is somewhat European
I do not think it is very European
No, it is definitely not European
I am not sure
 - d. Other European countries' perceptions of Slovakia
No, it is definitely not European
I do not think it is very European
I am not sure
I think it is somewhat European
Yes, it is definitely European
19. How much do you agree with the following statement? "EU membership weakens our identity as Slovaks."
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

20. How many days in the past week did you talk about EU membership with family or friends?
6-7 days
3-5 days
1-2 days
0 days
21. How close do you feel to Europe?
Not close at all
Not very close
Close
Very close
Can't choose
22. How much do you agree with the following statements?
- a. I would rather be a citizen of Slovakia than of any other country in the world.
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
- b. There are some things about Slovakia that make me feel ashamed.
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
23. How many days in the past week did you read about EU membership in a newspaper?
6-7 days
3-5 days
1-2 days
0 days
24. How much do you agree with the following statements?
- a. I am often less proud of Slovakia than I would like to be.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
- b. Generally speaking, Slovakia is a better country than most other countries.

Strongly disagree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

- c. Everyone in the rest of Europe looks down at us.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

25. How many days in the past week did you watch news stories about EU membership on television?
6-7 days
3-5 days
1-2 days
0 days
26. In terms of status, how do you personally feel as a Slovak in comparison to citizens of other European countries?
Superior
Equal
Inferior
Don't know/can't tell

Now I would like to ask you some questions that will be used in statistical processing.

27. In the past year, how often did you go to religious services?
several times a week
once a week
two or three times a month
once a month
several times a year
once a year
less frequently than once a year
never
don't know
refused to answer
28. What is your religious affiliation?
Roman Catholic
Lutheran

Reformed Christian, Calvinist
Greek Catholic
Orthodox
Jewish
Other
None
Don't know

29. What is your marital status?
married
widowed
divorced
separated (not living with legal spouse)
single, never married
30. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. No formal schooling
b. Grade school
c. [Some] high school (without leaving exam/"maturita")
d. High school with leaving exam/"maturita"
e. Some university (bachelor's degree, if applicable)
f. University with degree ("graduate" degree, which would be a masters degree)
g. Post-graduate
h. Post-graduate degree (PhDr, PhD)
31. What is your occupation?
a. In state administration
b. In the local/municipal government
c. Untrained worker, carrying out assistant manual tasks in agriculture, industry, services
d. Trained worker/tradesman (repairman, shop assistant, equipment operator, handicrafts)
e. Executive professional (secondary education; admin/healthcare officer, educator...)
f. Creative professional (university education; technician, doctor, teacher, lawyer, scientist, artist, computer engineer...)
g. Entrepreneur/free lance
h. Unemployed
i. Student/in school/vocational training
j. Retired
k. Housewife/home duties
l. Permanently disabled
32. In politics, people often use the terms "left" and "right." Where would you place yourself?
extreme left

left
political center
right
extreme right
other
don't know
no answer

33. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
34. What is your age?

35. What is your ethnicity?
a. Slovak
b. Hungarian
c. Romany
d. Ukrainian
e. Ruthenian
f. Czech
g. Polish
h. German
i. Other
36. How many people are in your household?

37. What kind of environment do you live in?
a. rural environment
b. small town
c. medium-sized town
d. city
e. can't decide
38. How many people live in your community?
a. less than one thousand inhabitants
b. 1 to 2 thousand inhabitants
c. 2 to 5 thousand inhabitants
d. 5 to 20 thousand inhabitants
e. 20 to 50 thousand inhabitants
f. 50 to 100 inhabitants
g. Bratislava or Kosice

Now I will read to you a set of contrasting opinions about public problems. Please say which alternative you agree with, whether strongly or somewhat:

39.

a) Incomes should be made more equal, so there is no great difference

1. Definitely agree
2. Somewhat agree

OR

b) Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid

3. Definitely agree
4. Somewhat agree

40.

a) Individuals should take responsibility for themselves and their livelihood

1. Definitely agree
2. Somewhat agree

OR

b) The state should be responsible for everyone's economic security

3. Definitely agree
4. Somewhat agree

41.

a) State ownership is the best way to run an enterprise

1. Definitely agree
2. Somewhat agree

OR

b) An enterprise is best run by private entrepreneurs

3. Definitely agree
4. Somewhat agree

42.

a) Government should cut taxes even if it means reducing spending on education, health care and pensions

1. Definitely agree
2. Somewhat agree

OR

- b) Even if it means people like myself pay more in taxes, government should spend more on education, health and pensions
3. Definitely agree
 4. Somewhat agree
43. If Parliament was closed down and parties abolished, would you:
- Strongly disapprove
 - Disapprove somewhat
 - Disapprove a little
 - Approve a little
 - Approve somewhat
 - Strongly approve
44. On a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high 10, where 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy, where would you like our political system to be?
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
- Dictatorship Democracy
45. Where would you place Slovakia's international reputation, where 10 is the best reputation and 1 is the worst reputation?
- 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- Highest position Lowest position
46. Now I have a set of questions concerning various public figures. I want to see how much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers, and the like. To help me do that, I would like to ask you some questions about your knowledge of politics. Most people will not know the answers to many of these; if you don't know, don't worry about it, just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. The first is a) Ivan Gasparovic (CR=Václav Klaus). Do you happen to know what job or political office he now holds?
- a) Ivan Gasparovic (CR=Václav Klaus)
 - correct answer: President
 - incorrect answer
 - don't know
 - b) Jan Kubis (CR=Cyril Svoboda)
 - correct answer: minister of foreign affairs (in CR, correct answer could also be former minister of foreign affairs)
 - incorrect answer
 - don't know
 - c) Tony Blair (CR=Tony Blair)
 - correct answer: Prime Minister of Great Britain

incorrect answer
don't know

d) Stefan Harabin (CR=Pavel Nemeč)

correct answer: minister of justice (in CR, correct answer could also be former minister of justice)

incorrect answer
don't know

e) What political party does Mikulas Dzurinda belong to? (CR=Jiří Paroubek)

correct answer: SDKU (CR=CSSD)

incorrect answer
don't know

f) What political party does Viera Tomanova belong to? (CR=Zdenek Skromach)

correct answer: Smer (CR=CSSD)

incorrect answer
don't know

A.6 TEXT OF PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE

May 2004

Dear Sir or Madam:

My name is Lisa Pohlman, and I am a PhD candidate at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in the United States. I am developing a questionnaire to understand how citizens think about politics in the Czech Republic. To write the best survey possible, I would like to get reactions from people now to see if I'm on the right track.

If you are willing to participate, this survey will ask about your age, level of education, gender, and occupation, as well as your opinions toward political issues and values that matter most to

you in life. All responses are fully confidential, so there is no risk to you. This questionnaire will ask you different kinds of questions. For many of the questions, I would like for you to give me your comments regarding your thoughts as you answered the question; for example, which thoughts came to mind as you prepared your answer, what you thought about the question's purpose, how the question was worded – just anything that comes to mind. Feel free to comment anywhere on the questionnaire as you read it. Please take as much space as you need to write your comments on the document. Please say what you really think – this is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. You are helping me to understand how people will use this questionnaire and how I can improve it.

This research is funded by a Mellon Pre-Doctoral Fellowship from the University of Pittsburgh and by an Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board in Washington, DC, an independent, nongovernmental grant agency.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at imp7@pitt.edu.

Do you agree to participate in this questionnaire?

yes

no

Are you a citizen of the Czech Republic?

yes

no

What is the date you completed this questionnaire?

How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you...

- very interested
- somewhat interested (in Czech, "interested enough")
- hardly interested
- not at all interested

How satisfied are you with the level of democracy in the Czech Republic?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

In politics, people sometimes speak of "left" and "right." Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Left
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Right
(Or, write number here: _____)

What do the words "left" and "right" mean to you in the political sense?

"Left": _____

"Right": _____

Is there a particular political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties?

- yes
- no

If so, which one?

- ODS
- CSSD
- KSCM
- KDU-CSL
- Koalice

__ Other (please fill in here: _____)

Now, I would like for you to explain how you chose your answers to the previous two questions. What thoughts went through your mind as you considered your answer; e.g., about the questions themselves, about the characteristics of the parties, of personal experiences, etc? Please be as specific as you can.

What *issues* do you consider important when deciding which party to vote for?

Which *values* do you consider important when deciding which party to vote for?

In your opinion, how is Czech Republic's current economic situation?

- very good
- good
- slightly good
- slightly bad
- bad
- very bad

How do you expect your country's economic system to be in five years' time?

- very good
- good
- slightly good
- slightly bad

- bad
- very bad

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

In your opinion, how is your household economic situation nowadays?

- very good
- good
- slightly good
- slightly bad
- bad
- very bad

And how do you expect your household economic situation to be in five years' time?

- very good
- good
- slightly good
- slightly bad
- bad
- very bad

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with social welfare policy in the Czech Republic?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little

- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with EU membership for the Czech Republic?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with NATO membership for the Czech Republic?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with the Czech Republic's policy toward the Roma?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with the Czech Republic's taxation policy?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

How satisfied are you with the Czech Republic's official policy toward the war in Iraq?

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- satisfied a little
- dissatisfied a little
- dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

“Sometimes politics seems so complicated that I can't really understand what is going on.”

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know/I can't decide

“The less that government involves itself in the economy, the better it is for the Czech Republic.”

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know/I can't decide

“The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.”

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know/I can't decide

“Whatever the circumstances, the law should always be obeyed.”

- strongly agree

- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know/I can't decide

Should the government be more concerned with:

protecting a wide range of civil liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, religion, assembly, etc.)

or

maintaining order?

Now, please take a few minutes to explain your answer. What exactly were the considerations that came up in your mind while answering this question? What were your thoughts?

Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?

yes (which one?) _____

no

How religious would you say you are?

not at all religious

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

very religious

10

How important are your religious beliefs in your life?

very important

important

not important

not important at all

What was the last grade of school or university that you completed?

In what year were you born?

19 _____

What gender are you?

male

female

What is your occupation?

On an average weekday, how much time do you spend listening to programs about politics and current events on television?

____ hours

On an average weekday, how much time do you spend listening to programs about politics and current events on the radio?

____ hours

On an average weekday, how much time do you spend listening to programs about politics and current events in the newspaper?

____ hours

Here are some questions that many people don't know the answer to. If you don't know, just write down "I don't know," and then move on.

Which party controlled the Chamber of Deputies in the parliament of the Czech Republic prior to the 2002 election?

How many Senators are in the parliament?

Which party in parliament is the most conservative in the Czech Republic?

Which branch of government determines the constitutionality of a law?

What is the political office currently held by Stanislav Gross?

How long did it take for you to complete this questionnaire?
_____minutes

APPENDIX B

MEASUREMENT

B.1 PARTY CLASSIFICATION

Table B.1.1 Parties classified by Kopecky and Mudde's 2002 EU orientation typology

Slovakia			CATEGORY	Czech Republic		
Party	<i>n</i>	Mean (SD)		Party	<i>n</i>	Mean (SD)
SDKU (Slovak Democratic Christian Union)	98	3.66 (0.641)	EURO-ENTHUSIAST	SNK-ED (European Democrats)	1	4.00 (N/A)
Democratic Movement	2	3.50 (0.707)		KDU-CSL (Christian and Democratic Union)	19	3.47 (0.513)
SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition)	21	3.48 (0.512)				
DS (Democratic Party)	5	3.40 (0.548)				
Smer (Direction)	139	3.11 (0.823)		CSSD (Social Democrats)	86	2.86 (0.828)
ANO (Alliance of the New Citizen)	4	2.50 (1.000)				
SZS (Slovak Green Party)	8	3.13 (0.641)	EURO-PRAGMATIC	SZ (Green Party)	29	2.79 (0.902)
LS/HZDS (People's Party / Movement for Dem. Slovakia)	16	2.56 (0.964)				
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement)	21	3.48 (0.680)	EURO-SKEPTIC	ODS (Civic Democrats)	160	3.09 (0.871)
				NEZ-DEM (Independent Democrats)	2	2.00 (0.707)
SNS (Slovak National Party)	25	3.12 (0.600)	EUROREJECT	KSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)	24	2.50 (0.659)
Left Block	2	3.00 (1.41)				
KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia)	9	2.78 (0.833)				
N/A			OTHER	Movement Independent	1	2.00 (N/A)

B.2 MEASURES

In an effort to reduce the number of variables and create more reliable measures of key theoretical constructs, I created multi-item scales comprised of variables that were found to cohere for both Czechs and Slovaks in principal axis factor analyses that were run separately for

Czechs and Slovaks (described in the Supplemental Analyses Appendix). The factor analysis extracted dimensions shared by both Czechs and Slovaks (via factor analysis of the pooled sample as well as analyses of the Czech and Slovak samples separately), while also revealing additional dimensions that were unique to either the Czech or Slovak samples. Items that reflected shared dimensions were evaluated for internal reliability. Items with adequate internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha of .50 or higher) for both Czechs and Slovaks were averaged into scales as described below. If respondents had data present for 3 out of 4 items, responses were averaged for the scale..

Table B.2.1 (below) shows the final measures used in the ANOVA and regression analyses, including the scales described above.

Table B.2.1 Measures

DIMENSION		Item or Scale	Response Range
ECONOMIC		1. Economic evaluation scale Mean of at least 3 of these 4 items: <i>(a) Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation; (b) Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation; (c) Retrospective Sociotropic Evaluation; (d) Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation</i>	1=much worse; 5=much better
IDENTITY	<i>Geographic/ Historic</i>	2. Geographic European identity scale Mean of at least 2 of these 3 items: <i>(a) European: geography; (b) European: history; (c) European: other countries' perceptions</i>	1=definitely not European; 5=definitely European
	<i>European cultural identity</i>	3. Culture East/West <i>west only</i> <i>both west and east</i> <i>don't know</i>	0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes
		4. European: culture	1= definitely not European; 5=definitely European
	<i>Closeness to Europe</i>	5. Personal importance of EU	1=not at all important; 4=very important
		6. Close to Europe	1=not close at all; 4=very close
	<i>Negative national identity</i>	7. Inferior country <i>superior</i> <i>inferior</i> <i>don't know</i>	0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes
		8. Less proud	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		9. Looks down on us	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		10. Ashamed	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		11. Inferior citizen	1=superior; 3=inferior
		12. International reputation	1=highest; 3=lowest
	<i>National pride</i>	13. Better country than others	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		14. Rather be citizen	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
	<i>Protectionism (realistic threat)</i>	15. Limit imports	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		16. Government spends too much on EU <i>(ref = strongly agree)</i> <i>strongly disagree</i> <i>disagree</i> <i>not disagree/agree</i> <i>agree</i> <i>don't know</i>	0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes 0=no; 1=yes
		17. Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		18. Membership takes jobs away	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
	<i>Protectionism (symbolic threat)</i>	19. EU weakens identity	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		20. Foreigners improve society	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		21. Exposure damages our culture	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree
		22. Television should give preference	1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree

DIMENSION	Item or Scale	Response Range	
POLITICAL AWARENESS	23. Political awareness scale Mean of at least 2 of these 3 items: (a) <i>Talk EU</i> ; (b) <i>Read EU</i> ; (c) <i>Watch EU</i>	1=0 days; 4=6-7 days	
POLITICAL VALUES	24. Value ownership	1=definitely agree with the first; 4=definitely agree with the second	
	25. Value Parliament	1=strongly disapprove; 6=strongly approve	
	26. Value income	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	
	27. Dictatorship-democracy	1=dictatorship 10=democracy	
	28. Value responsibility	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	
	29. Value taxes	1=definitely agree with the first, 4=definitely agree with the second	
DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTROL VARIABLES	30. Male gender (<i>ref = female</i>)	0=no; 1=yes	
	31. Level of education	1=none; 8=postgraduate	
	32. Rural-urban	1=rural; 4=city	
	33. Community size	1= <1,000; 5= >20,000	
	34. Party ID (<i>ref = euroenthusiast</i>)	<i>euromember</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>euromember</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>europragmatist</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>undecided</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>would not vote</i>	0=no; 1=yes
	<i>other/missing</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	35. Married	0=no; 1=yes	
	36. Religiosity (frequency of service attendance)	1=never; 8=several/week	
	37. Religious Affiliation (<i>ref = no religious affiliation</i>)	<i>Catholic</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>Lutheran/Calvinist</i>	0=no; 1=yes
		<i>Orthodox/Greek Cath.</i>	0=no; 1=yes
<i>other/Jewish</i>		0=no; 1=yes	
<i>don't know/missing</i>		0=no; 1=yes	
38. Occupation (<i>ref = administrative</i>)	<i>untrained</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>professional</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>entrepreneur</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>unemployed</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>student</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
<i>retired/home/disabled</i>	0=no; 1=yes		
39. Ideological self-placement (<i>ref = extreme left</i>)	<i>left</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>center</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>right</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>extreme right</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>don't know/missing</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
40. Age cohorts (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; 65-74; 75+)	1=18-24; 7=75+		
41. Ethnicity (<i>ref = other</i>)	<i>Czech</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>Slovak</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
	<i>Hungarian</i>	0=no; 1=yes	
42. Household size	1=1 person; 9=9 people		
43. Political knowledge scale (<i>sum of correct responses to Polknow items 1-6</i>)	0=0 correct answers; 6=6 correct answers		

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES

C.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS

As mentioned in Measurement Appendix 2, I created multi-item scales comprised of variables that were found to cohere for both Czechs and Slovaks in principal axis factor analyses that were run separately for Czechs and Slovaks. The primary purpose of this factor analysis was to reduce the number of variables and create more reliable measures of key theoretical constructs. The factor analysis extracted dimensions shared by both Czechs and Slovaks (via factor analysis of the pooled sample as well as analyses of the Czech and Slovak samples separately), while also revealing additional dimensions that were unique to either the Czech or Slovak samples. Items that reflected shared dimensions were evaluated for internal reliability. Items with adequate internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha of .50 or higher) for both Czechs and Slovaks were averaged into scales as described below. If respondents had data present for 3 out of 4 items, responses were averaged for the scale. In this section I will discuss the results of the factor analysis, indicating which variables might be contenders for further testing to become scales. I will also discuss any interesting findings that come from this analysis.

I first conducted principal axis factor analyses on 31 variables that were hypothesized to structure attitudes toward EU membership using varimax rotation (Kim and Mueller 1978). Items loading highly on the first factor measured both retrospective pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations and prospective pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations (with factor loadings of .42, .67, .27, and .57 for the pooled sample, respectively). Cronbach's alpha for the four items was .63 for Czechs and .55 for Slovaks. However, because there were more missing data on prospective economic evaluation items than on retrospective items, the prospective items reduced the sample size for the analysis, regardless of whether the sample was pooled or analyzed separately for Czechs and Slovaks.

Thus, a second set of factor analyses was run in which items with a large amount of missing data were removed from the analysis to increase the sample size.⁵⁰ These factor analyses included 26 items and were run separately for the Czech and Slovak groups. I used the Kaiser criterion for extracting factors, allowing the factor analysis to extract dimensions with an eigenvalue exceeding one. Varimax rotation of the factor scores was used to make them more interpretable.⁵¹ Factors were interpreted in terms of items that loaded at or above .40 on each factor, though item loadings nearing .30 could also be considered candidates for significance (de Vaus 2002, 190). Factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction yielded similar results.

The second set of factor analyses conducted separately for the Czech and Slovak samples extracted nine factors for each group. Table C.1.1 below presents results for items loading

⁵⁰ Several variables with high levels of missing data were not submitted to the factor analysis. Those variables included Prospective pocketbook evaluation (130 missing observations), Prospective sociotropic evaluation (98 missing), Government spends too much to comply with EU (132 missing), European: other countries' perceptions (196 missing), and Inferior country (66 missing). When I ran the same factor analysis with the variables with high missing data included, nearly half of the available sample (222 cases) was deleted listwise, potentially distorting the factors extracted. However, the shared factors extracted in the factor analysis presented here also emerged from the factor analysis that included variables with high levels of missing data.

⁵¹ Promax rotation of the factor scores yielded similar results.

relatively highly on factors for Czechs or Slovaks, presenting data for these groups side-by-side for comparison.⁵² The full factor analyses for each group are presented in Tables C.1.3 and C.1.4. Table C.1.1 shows that similar items loaded on four of the nine factors for both samples and thus represented shared attitudinal dimensionality between the Czech and Slovak groups. Shared factors included *economic evaluation* (comprised of Retrospective pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations), *European geographic identity* (identification with Europe geographically, historically, and according to other European countries' perceptions), *political awareness* (frequency of talking about the EU, reading news about the EU, and watching news on TV about the EU), and *European cultural identity* (one item only: European: culture).

⁵² Variables that did not load strongly on any factor are displayed in italics at the end of Supplemental Analyses Appendix 1.

Table C.1.1 Factor analysis

	<i>Czechs (n=355)</i>	<i>Slovaks (n=322)</i>
Factor 1: Retrospective Economic Evaluation		
Retrospective pocketbook evaluation	0.60	0.57
Retrospective sociotropic evaluation	0.42	0.52
Factor 2: European Identity (Geographic)		
European: geography	0.69	0.67
European: history	0.70	0.71
European: other countries' perceptions	0.25	0.29
Factor 3: Political Awareness		
Talk EU	0.42	0.26
Read EU	0.68	0.67
Watch EU	0.50	0.61
Factor 4: European Identity (Cultural)		
European: culture	0.53	0.64
Factor 5: National Pride		
Rather be citizen	0.57	-0.57
Limit imports	0.31	0.37
Better country than others	0.34	–
Television should give preference	–	-0.36
Factor 6: Economic Protectionism / Realistic Threat		
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	0.41	0.66
Television should give preference	0.38	–
Membership takes jobs away	–	0.40
Close to Europe	–	-0.37
Factor 7: Western Individualism		
Value income	0.46	0.50
Dictatorship-democracy	0.40	–
Culture east/west	–	0.41
Inferior citizen	–	-0.38
Factor 8: Negative Social Identity		
Looks down on us	-0.48	-0.55
International reputation	-0.49	–
Factor 9 (Czechs): Close to Europe		
Personal importance of EU	0.44	–
Close to Europe	0.46	–
Factor 9 (Slovaks): Negative International Identity		
International reputation	–	0.65
% total variance explained	31.3%	32.7%

The next four factors had some of the same items loading highly on the factor for both groups, but also included different items depending on Czech or Slovak context. These included factors about national pride, protectionism, individualism, and negative social identity. The

national pride factor was similar in both groups in that it included *Rather be citizen*⁵³ and an item about protecting the national economy: *Limit imports*. The Slovak national pride factor included one additional item, *Television should give preference*, while the Czech factor included one other item, *Better country than others*. To reflect these differences in factor structure yet reflect the base of the factor (national pride), the Czech version of the national pride factor will be referred to as the economic nationalism factor and the Slovak version will be termed the symbolic and economic nationalism dimension. The sixth factor, the protectionism dimension, extracted one item in common between the two contexts (*Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land*), but in the Czech sample, the protectionism factor also included the variable *Television should give preference* while the Slovak factor included *Membership takes jobs away* and a negatively-correlated item, *Close to Europe*. The Czech factor will be referred to as the symbolic and realistic threat dimension, as it encompasses sentiment spanning perceived realistic (*Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land*) and symbolic threat (*Television should give preference*). The Slovak version of the protectionism factor will be termed the realistic threat dimension as it references realistic threat items (sociotropic economic items like *Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land* and *Membership takes jobs away*). However, the Slovak version does have an affective component insofar as Slovak respondents who felt closer to Europe perceived less realistic threat.

The seventh factor with a shared element for the Czech and Slovak samples represented individualism. The shared element is the item *Value income*, which gauged agreement with the statements “Incomes should be made more equal, so there is no great difference” or “Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid.” For Czechs a second item that

⁵³ The national identity variable loaded negatively for Slovaks and positively for Czechs, a relationship that will be discussed in greater detail later.

loaded on this factor also included a preference for democracy versus dictatorship (*Dictatorship-democracy*), as indicated by responses to the question, “Where would you like our political system to be?” (1=complete dictatorship to 10=complete democracy). The Czech version of this factor will be referred to as the political individualism dimension. For Slovaks, the individualism factor included the items *Culture east/west* and *Inferior citizen* [compared to rest of Europe]. These items read “What culture would you say that Slovakia/Czech Republic belongs to, the eastern (Byzantium, Russia) or the western?” with response categories along a five-point Likert scale (1=certainly to eastern culture to 5=certainly to western culture) as well as “In terms of status, how do you personally feel as a Czech/Slovak in comparison to citizens of other European countries?” (1=inferior, 2=equal, and 3=superior). The negative loading of the latter item on the scale seems to indicate that Slovaks with more individualistic attitudes tend to perceive Slovak culture as inferior. For Slovaks, this factor will be termed the Western individualism factor to account for the cultural dimension inherent in the Slovak dimension.

The last factor that had some shared meaning between the Czech and Slovak samples (Factor 8) pertained to negative social identity; the item that loaded highly on it measured agreement with the statement “Everyone in the rest of Europe looks down on us.” In the Czech sample, this item also clustered with the item “Where would you place Slovakia’s/Czech Republic’s international reputation, where 10 is the best and 1 is the worst reputation?” In Slovakia, however, this item (*International reputation*) loaded on its own factor, indicating that it meant something different for Slovaks. The final factor differed in its entirety between Czechs and Slovaks. For Czechs, negative social identity seems to encompass a perception about what other in Europe seem to think about the Czech Republic, in addition to a more objective evaluation of where the Czech Republic stands status-wise internationally, perhaps especially

vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. These two perceptions together seem to create a meaning of negative social identity that is based on a Czech perception of how the rest of Europe perceives their place within the European status hierarchy.

In Slovakia, these items represented different attitudinal dimensions, however, and comprise the factors for negative social identity and negative international identity (Slovak Factor 9). Split apart into two separate dimensions in this way, negative social identity for Slovaks appears to represent a feeling about Slovak identity vis-à-vis Europe, whereas negative international identity seem to refer to how Slovaks perceive themselves as viewed – and ranked – by the rest of the world. Put differently, negative social identity is not a feeling just about how Slovaks perceive themselves; it is a feeling about how Slovaks perceive Europe to perceive them. The same relationship exists for negative international identity, a dimension in which Slovaks perceive their reputation as viewed by the rest of the world (distinct from Europe).

The final factor differed in its entirety between Czechs and Slovaks. As mentioned above, for Slovaks it represented negative international identity. For Czechs, this factor reflected a close-to-Europe feeling (including the items *Personal importance of EU* and *Close to Europe*). Factors with unique contextual meaning are shown in Table C.1.2.

Table C.1.2 Attitudinal dimensions extracted from factor analysis, by country

Factor	Variation	
	Czech	Slovak
Factor 1: Economic evaluation	N/A	N/A
Factor 2: European identity (geographic)	N/A	N/A
Factor 3: Political awareness	N/A	N/A
Factor 4: European identity (cultural)	N/A	N/A
Factor 5: National pride	Economic nationalism	Symbolic and economic nationalism
Factor 6: Protectionism	Symbolic and realistic threat	Realistic threat
Factor 7: Individualism	Political individualism	Western individualism
Factor 8: Negative social identity	Negative national and international identity	Negative national identity
Factor 9 (Czechs): Close to Europe	Close to Europe	--
Factor 9 (Slovaks): Negative international identity	--	Negative international identity

In addition to showing whether scales might be used in an effort to reduce data and simplify the resulting analyses, the factor analyses revealed interesting similarities and differences between the Czechs and Slovaks. The factor loadings for the first factor included retrospective pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations representing a dimension about economic attitudes that was separate from other dimensions (such as protectionist attitudes or evaluation of national identity).

The second factor related to social identity. As discussed in Chapter 3, social identity is multidimensional. While several factors in the factor analysis related to European identity, the second factor, European geographic identity, was one of only two with the same items for both samples. The three items that clustered on this factor measured agreement with statements about how European the Czech Republic or Slovakia is according to geographical location, history, and other European countries' perceptions of the Czech Republic or Slovakia. Given the relatively

objective nature of these benchmarks, this factor seems to refer to a more objective (and less subjective) evaluation of whether each respondent viewed his/her country as European. The reliability coefficients calculated for these three items (.56 in the Czech sample, .61 in the Slovak sample) indicated that these items cohered well across samples, so the items were averaged into a *European geographic identity scale*. European identity, particularly that rooted in an objective awareness of European geography, history, and perceptions, has been found to predict attitudes toward the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005). This scale should provide a robust measure of European identity with which to examine its effect on EU attitudes.

The other identity-related factor that was consistent across both samples included an item that measured agreement with the question “Based on the following definition, is your country European? Culture.” For both Czechs and Slovaks, this factor seemed to represent a shared sense of cultural European identity as distinct from geographic/historic European identity of affective closeness to Europe.

The third factor extracted for both samples consisted of three items that measured political awareness: frequency of discussing EU membership with friends and family in the past week (*Talk EU*), frequency of reading about EU membership in the newspaper over the past week (*Read EU*), and frequency of watching news stories on television about EU membership in the past week (*Watch EU*). The scale created from these three items had high internal reliability⁵⁴, with an alpha of .57 in the Czech sample and .61 in the Slovak sample, and the items were averaged into a *Political awareness scale*. Political awareness reflects interest in learning about political events and may be distinct from political knowledge, an objective

⁵⁴ Methods factors (e.g., items that cluster because they share a common question format) may also contribute to the high internal reliability of this scale, which uses questions that have the same format and frequency stimulus.

measure of how much one knows about the current political structure in one's country. The latter variable will be used as a control in the regression analysis.

The remaining dimensions found in the factor analyses largely related to conceptions of identity. Two of these dimensions suggest how Czechs and Slovaks may view their national identities vis-à-vis outside economic and cultural influence. The fifth factor contained a shared core in both samples representing national pride ("I would rather be a citizen of [Czech Republic/Slovakia] than of any other country in the world"), understood partly in terms of protecting the national sociotropic environment ("[Czech Republic/Slovakia] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy"). These two shared items clearly represent a perception of economic nationalism (or national economic pride and protectionism), but this factor takes on two different forms. For Czechs, this dimension seemed to be weighted in the direction of affective nationalism or national pride, as this factor also included the item *Better country than others* in the Czech sample. However, for Slovaks, the inclusion of one other item, *Television should give preference*, indicates that the Slovak lens of national identity may extend beyond economic nationalism to include symbolic protectionism ("symbolic threat"). This suggests a Slovak conception of national pride that encompasses a desire to protect both the economy and the culture. The finding that national pride includes only economic nationalism and national pride items for Czechs leads one to conjecture that Czechs may view national pride as distinct from cultural or symbolic protectionism because they already feel secure in their cultural identity. Consequently, for Czechs, national pride may be a standalone construct, complete with its own distinct affective and threat-avoidance components. However, for Slovaks, national pride seems to be grounded in more than just economic protectionism: it may also include cultural protectionism. As we saw in Chapter 2, Slovakia was

a cultural backwater of Europe until relatively recently, while culture in the Czech lands has developed (albeit with some interruption) for hundreds of years. Given this dichotomy, the differences in the components of this factor—reflecting Czechs’ pride in their culture as opposed to Slovaks’ fear for their culture—should come as no surprise.

Conceptually related to the national pride factor, another factor representing a more purely protectionist sentiment among Czechs and Slovaks included an item that *land should be protected from foreigners*. For Czechs this was combined with the item *Czech television should give preference to Czech films and programs*, while for Slovaks this factor includes the item *EU membership takes jobs away from people born in Slovakia*. These findings suggest that protectionist feelings resonate in both the Czech and Slovak samples, but they take a different form in each. The factor loadings indicate that the core of protectionism seems to be a realistic threat-type of concern about foreigners buying land, but in the Czech sample it is accompanied by a symbolic threat concerning Czech culture. In other words, in Slovakia protectionism centers more around realistic concerns about sociotropic economic threats, while in the Czech Republic protectionism may be more encompassing. It is also possible that Czech concerns about protecting Czech films and programs represent perceptions of Western media as a realistic threat to the Czech film industry. Two points that might be derived from comparing these similar factors include: (a) national identity is intertwined with perceptions of national threat (both realistic and symbolic) and (b) realistic and symbolic threat may not be as distinguishable among Czechs and Slovaks as existing research might predict.

The next factor representing individualism that emerged in both samples similarly shared a core item but was associated with different items depending on national context. In both samples, the shared meaning for individualism is represented by an item (*Value income*) about

individual responsibility in society. However, in the Czech Republic, individualism seems to be political in nature, encompassing a belief about individual responsibility in society along with a view of the level of freedom individuals should have in a political regime. In contrast, the factor for individualism in the Slovak sample seemed to combine the core belief about individual responsibility in society with identity-based concerns about whether Slovakia belonged to the East or to the West; individualism in Slovakia thus seemed to represent a notion of perceived “Western” individualism. As we saw with the Czech and Slovak flavors of national pride, historical context seems to be informing whether Czechs or Slovaks view individualism in its basic sense or through a filter of feelings of inferiority to the West.

The last factor that had some shared meaning between the Czech and Slovak samples pertains to negative social identity. In both samples, the factor includes an item that measures agreement with the statement “Everyone in the rest of Europe looks down on us.” In the Czech Republic, this item also clusters with the item about international reputation. In Slovakia, however, this item loaded on its own factor, indicating that it meant something different for Slovaks. For Czechs, negative social identity seems to encompass a perception about what others in Europe seem to think about the Czech Republic, in addition to a more objective evaluation of where the Czech Republic stands status-wise vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. These two perceptions together seem to create a meaning of negative social identity that was both perceived (and relatively subjective) as well as observed among Czechs in terms of the European status hierarchy. In Slovakia, these items represented different attitudinal dimensions, however, and comprise the factors for negative social identity and negative European identity. Split apart into two separate dimensions in this way, negative social identity for Slovaks seems to represent a relatively subjective feeling from within the group about how the rest of Europe perceives

them, whereas negative international identity means something more objective and relational, a position within the European status hierarchy.

One final factor emerged for the Czech sample only: a close-to-Europe feeling, as measured by a direct question asking about feeling *Close to Europe* as well as a question about the *Personal importance of the EU*, thus emerged for Czechs but not for Slovaks. For Slovaks, it is likely that this same factor structure did not emerge because feeling close to Europe is distinct from the personal importance of the EU. For Slovaks, feeling close to Europe was associated with the realistic threat dimension, correlating negatively with it.

A number of observations can be made regarding differences in the attitudinal fabric of Czechs and Slovaks regarding attitudes toward the EU. First, Slovaks and Czechs appear to share some core attitudinal dimensions, like the economic evaluation dimension, geographic and cultural European identity, and political awareness, signifying that there are some similarities in how political attitudes are structured across contexts. Noteworthy is the fact that the economic evaluation factor that extracted here included both sociotropic and pocketbook items, although existing political behavior theory posits that sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluations are conceptually distinct. In spite of these hypothesized distinctions, these factor analyses showed that these items held together in factor analysis and in a scale, as confirmed by a high Cronbach's alpha.

While Czech and Slovak attitudes share some common dimensional structure, the fabric of attitudes in each context is enriched with unique nuances, particularly in the realm of identity concerns. Protectionist sentiment and national identity seem to be interwoven in somewhat different ways for Czechs and Slovaks. For Slovaks, national pride is associated with economic as well as symbolic protectionism, while for Czechs an affective feeling of national pride seems

to be more strongly associated with economically-based protectionism. On the other side of the coin, protectionism seems to span both the economic and symbolic for Czechs while it appears to be largely economic-based for Slovaks. A value placed on individualism is present in both the Czech and Slovak context, but appears to be more strongly associated with a preference for democracy among Czechs, but with a perception of identification with Western culture among Slovaks. For Czechs, a feeling of closeness to Europe seems to be a more distinct dimension of the attitudinal fabric than it is for Slovaks. Lastly, for Czechs, how one is viewed by Europe and the international world seem to be viewed as two sides of the same coin, whereas for Slovaks, these are two distinct dimensions. The attitudinal fabric of the Czech Republic and Slovakia seems to be spun from similar fibers, but the particular pattern differs according to context.

Table C.1.3 Rotated factor loadings, Czech sample (n=355)

	<i>Retrospective economic evaluation</i>	<i>European (geographic) identity</i>	<i>Political awareness</i>	<i>European (cultural) identity</i>	<i>National pride</i>	<i>Cultural and economic Protectionism</i>	<i>Political individualism</i>	<i>Negative social identity</i>	<i>Close to Europe</i>
Retrospective pocketbook evaluation	0.60	-0.05	-0.01	0.13	-0.02	0.00	0.14	0.09	0.11
Retrospective sociotropic evaluation	0.42	0.23	0.13	-0.04	-0.12	-0.11	0.03	0.21	-0.01
European: geography	0.05	0.69	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.00	0.15	0.08	0.16
European: history	0.00	0.70	0.03	0.18	-0.02	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.19
European: other countries' perceptions	0.11	0.25	0.03	0.00	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.35	0.31
Talk EU	0.16	0.00	0.42	-0.14	-0.14	0.18	-0.16	-0.03	0.35
Read EU	0.01	0.05	0.68	0.20	0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.00	0.05
Watch EU	0.01	0.00	0.50	-0.11	-0.01	-0.09	-0.05	-0.02	0.08
European: culture	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.53	0.00	-0.07	-0.13	0.02	0.04
Rather be citizen	-0.01	0.05	-0.08	-0.03	0.57	-0.02	0.02	0.10	0.06
Limit imports	-0.15	0.01	0.14	0.02	0.31	0.16	-0.11	-0.01	-0.13
Better country than others	0.00	0.01	0.08	-0.02	0.34	0.24	-0.03	0.26	0.05
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	-0.06	0.06	-0.10	-0.09	0.07	0.41	-0.02	-0.10	-0.04
Television should give preference	-0.34	-0.10	-0.02	0.02	0.17	0.38	0.08	0.15	0.07
Value income	0.11	0.02	-0.07	-0.03	-0.05	0.00	0.46	0.04	0.06
Dictatorship-democracy	-0.02	0.20	0.00	-0.15	-0.03	0.03	0.40	0.15	0.00
Looks down on us	-0.05	0.01	0.09	-0.03	0.04	0.12	-0.27	-0.48	-0.27
International reputation	-0.08	-0.12	0.03	-0.04	-0.11	-0.01	-0.04	-0.49	0.03
Personal importance of EU	0.01	0.14	0.20	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.13	0.44
Close to Europe	0.09	0.26	0.07	0.06	0.03	-0.10	0.12	0.06	0.46
<i>Membership takes jobs away (did not load)</i>	-0.17	-0.13	-0.13	0.03	0.26	0.16	-0.14	0.00	-0.04
<i>Culture east/west (did not load)</i>	-0.02	0.14	0.02	-0.09	-0.21	-0.18	-0.17	0.17	0.04
<i>Foreigners improve society (did not load)</i>	0.04	0.17	0.09	-0.14	0.14	-0.21	0.29	-0.02	0.21
<i>EU weakens identity (did not load)</i>	-0.20	-0.20	0.16	0.01	0.19	0.26	-0.21	-0.06	-0.24
<i>Less proud (did not load)</i>	-0.24	-0.05	-0.09	0.11	-0.09	0.12	-0.05	-0.27	-0.12
<i>Inferior citizen (did not load)</i>	-0.30	0.11	0.09	-0.08	0.08	0.22	-0.02	-0.29	-0.15
Sum squared loadings	.979	1.366	1.067	.488	.817	.712	.752	1.002	.963
% of variance	3.8%	5.3%	4.1%	1.9%	3.1%	2.7%	2.9%	3.9%	3.7%

Table C.1.4 Rotated factor loadings, Slovak sample (n=322)

	<i>Retrospective economic evaluation</i>	<i>European (geographic) identity</i>	<i>Political awareness</i>	<i>European (cultural) identity</i>	<i>National pride</i>	<i>Economic protectionism/Realistic threat</i>	<i>Western individualism</i>	<i>Negative social identity</i>	<i>Negative international identity</i>
Retrospective pocketbook evaluation	0.57	0.10	-0.08	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	0.23	0.03	-0.07
Retrospective sociotropic evaluation	0.52	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.15	-0.08	0.23	0.20	-0.02
European: geography	0.01	0.67	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09	0.08	0.03	0.00
European: history	0.12	0.71	0.06	0.11	-0.14	0.03	0.05	-0.06	-0.07
European: other countries' perceptions	0.00	0.29	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.33	-0.08
Talk EU	0.12	0.14	0.26	0.15	0.15	0.11	0.08	-0.09	0.10
Read EU	0.03	0.08	0.67	0.01	0.08	-0.12	0.01	0.07	-0.10
Watch EU	-0.08	-0.05	0.61	-0.05	-0.09	0.07	0.10	0.04	-0.05
European: culture	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.64	-0.01	0.00	0.07	0.07	-0.08
Rather be citizen	0.03	0.10	0.02	-0.09	-0.57	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.11
Limit imports	0.21	0.07	0.03	-0.15	0.37	-0.13	0.02	0.07	-0.13
Television should give preference	-0.10	0.00	-0.03	0.25	-0.36	0.00	-0.18	0.00	0.03
Membership takes jobs away	-0.37	-0.09	-0.17	-0.02	0.06	0.40	0.02	-0.07	0.00
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land	-0.06	0.07	0.09	0.04	-0.05	0.66	-0.09	0.07	0.05
Close to Europe	0.08	0.22	0.06	0.06	0.07	-0.37	0.22	0.23	0.11
Culture east/west	0.13	-0.05	0.10	0.10	0.08	-0.01	0.41	0.05	-0.04
Inferior citizen	-0.08	-0.11	-0.02	-0.03	0.09	0.03	-0.38	-0.11	0.10
Value income	0.17	0.16	0.01	-0.20	0.17	-0.20	0.50	-0.04	0.13
Looks down on us	-0.16	0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.08	-0.13	-0.55	0.14
International reputation	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.10	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.10	0.65
<i>Personal importance of EU (did not load)</i>	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.19</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>-0.27</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.10</i>
<i>EU weakens identity (did not load)</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>-0.11</i>	<i>0.26</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.27</i>	<i>-0.03</i>
<i>Less proud (did not load)</i>	<i>-0.17</i>	<i>-0.17</i>	<i>-0.02</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.23</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>-0.06</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>0.16</i>
<i>Foreigners improve society (did not load)</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.27</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>-0.07</i>
<i>Better country than others (did not load)</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.12</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.20</i>
<i>Dictatorship-democracy (did not load)</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.20</i>	<i>0.20</i>	<i>-0.09</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>-0.19</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>-0.27</i>
Sum squared loadings	1.023	1.345	1.064	.622	.932	1.137	.878	.781	.72
% of variance	3.9%	5.2%	4.1%	2.4%	3.6%	4.4%	3.4%	3.0%	2.8%

C.2 REGRESSION ANALYSES

Before testing my hypotheses about the impact that the independent variables have on support for EU membership, I first developed a regression model, hereafter described as the base model,

that incorporated either control variables that previous research has found to be associated with attitudes toward the EU or control variables that were found to be significantly related to the dependent variable in correlational analyses. This model accounts for 15% of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R-squared: 13%). Model 1 and subsequent models can be viewed in Table C.2.1 below. Only the final regression model (Model 3) is reported in the main text of this dissertation (see Chapter 4), but all models and a discussion of them is provided here as further background.

Table C.2.1 Regression analyses

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	β	t	Sig.	β	t	Sig.	β	t	Sig.
(Constant)		11.044	0.000		11.564	0.000		5.381	0.000
Czech (Slovak referent)	-0.185*	-2.032	0.042	-0.205***	-5.801	0.000	-0.148***	-4.062	0.000
Ideological self-placement (extreme left referent)									
left	0.154	1.805	0.071	0.112	1.331	0.183	0.071	0.838	0.402
center	0.199*	2.114	0.035	0.173	1.846	0.065	0.101	1.081	0.28
right	0.302**	3.178	0.002	0.23*	2.428	0.015	0.16 ⁺	1.698	0.09
extreme right	0.061	1.433	0.152	0.046	1.091	0.275	0.029	0.657	0.511
don't know/missing	0.086	1.102	0.271	0.064	0.82	0.412	0.042	0.56	0.576
Age cohorts	0.05	1.105	0.269	--	--	--	--	--	--
Occupation (administrative referent)									
untrained	0.035	1.076	0.282	0.038	1.192	0.234	0.029	0.881	0.378
professional	0.079*	2.044	0.041	0.081*	2.118	0.034	0.027	0.697	0.486
entrepreneur	0.077*	2.249	0.025	0.079**	2.338	0.02	0.046	1.313	0.189
unemployed	0.025	0.764	0.445	0.041	1.257	0.209	0.041	1.227	0.22
student	0.062	1.528	0.127	0.056	1.506	0.132	0.002	0.06	0.953
retired, housewife, disabled	0.016	0.36	0.719	0.043	1.09	0.276	0.049	1.206	0.228
Marital status (unmarried referent)	0.07*	2.097	0.036	0.094**	2.855	0.004	0.07*	2.096	0.036
Level of education	0.109***	3.295	0.001	0.102**	3.083	0.002	0.064 ⁺	1.951	0.051
Male gender	-0.123***	-3.741	0.000	-0.105**	-3.31	0.001	-0.072*	-2.202	0.028
Religiosity	0.003	0.075	0.94	--	--	--	--	--	--
Community size	0.056	1.75	0.08	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ethnicity	-0.029	-0.316	0.752	--	--	--	--	--	--
Political knowledge index				0.044	1.281	0.201	--	--	--
Political awareness scale				0.029	0.902	0.367	--	--	--
Party cue (Euroenthusiast referent)									
Euroreject				-0.087**	-2.697	0.007	-0.056 ⁺	-1.702	0.089
Euroskeptic				-0.003	-0.072	0.943	0.000	-0.01	0.992
Europragmatic				-0.103***	-3.211	0.001	-0.07*	-2.154	0.032
undecided				-0.01	-0.299	0.765	0.037	1.091	0.276
would not vote				-0.11***	-3.2	0.001	-0.067 ⁺	-1.943	0.052
other/missing				-0.016	-0.506	0.613	-0.033	-1.021	0.308
Economic evaluation scale							0.111**	3.178	0.002
EU weakens identity							-0.197***	-5.917	0.000
Personal importance of EU							0.167***	5.142	0.000
Inferior country (equal referent)									
inferior							-0.077*	-2.279	0.023
superior							-0.047	-1.465	0.143
don't know, missing							-0.012	-0.369	0.712
Better country than others							-0.056 ⁺	-1.726	0.085
Rather be citizen							0.063*	1.998	0.046
Rather be citizen X Czech							-0.069*	-2.23	0.026
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land							0.352 ⁺	1.936	0.053
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land, quadratic							-0.33 ⁺	-1.808	0.071
<i>R-Squared</i>	0.135			.159			.268		
<i>Adjusted R-Squared</i>	0.117			.139			.239		
<i>Sample Size (n)</i>	952			951			823		

*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10 (marginally significant)

The base model showed, first, that even in the presence of other demographic variables, Czechs were less likely to support joining the EU than Slovaks were. Age was not significantly

associated with attitude toward EU membership; however, male gender was associated with a 12% increase in support for EU membership in the pooled sample. Previous research has also found that gender is associated with support for EU membership (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b). Extant literature has also found that left-right ideological self-identification has a significant relationship with support for EU membership (Anderson 1998, Steenbergen and Jones 2002; McLaren 2002, Diez Medrano 2003). The base model shows that center and right-identifying respondents were 20% and 30% more likely to support EU membership, respectively, compared to extreme left-identifying respondents. Numerous scholars have found occupation and education to have a significant impact on attitudes toward the EU (Gabel 1998b, Anderson and Reichert 1996; Carey 2002; McLaren 2002), and this base model both were found to be significant. Compared to respondents in administrative occupations, professionals were 8% more likely to support EU membership and entrepreneurs 8% more likely to support EU membership. A one-unit increase in level of education was associated with a 10% increase in support for EU membership. Lastly, being married was found to be significantly positively related to endorsement of EU membership, with a one-unit increase leading to a 9% increase in support for EU membership. Ethnicity, community size, and religiosity were not significantly associated with support for EU membership.

Table C.2.1 also presents a second regression that adds three important control variables, political knowledge, political awareness, and party cue, to the base model. In this regression, political knowledge and awareness were not significant, but certain values of the third variable, party cue, were significant. However, in preliminary analyses, when political knowledge and political awareness were each entered into the model one at a time along with significant control variables, each was significantly related to support for EU membership, until left-right ideology

was entered into the model. These results suggest that ideology mediated the relationship between political knowledge and awareness and attitudes toward EU membership.

In the first step of a preliminary two-step analysis, I put political knowledge and political awareness into the model one at a time along with significant control variables (minus ideology) from the base model and found each to be significantly related to support for EU membership, even in the presence of other control variables. Once I put left-right ideology in the second step, political knowledge and awareness became insignificant.

Results from ANOVAs in which ideology was used to predict political knowledge and political awareness bear this out (Tables C.2.2 and C.2.3). On the whole, respondents who did not have a particular ideology (don't know or no answer) showed the least amount of political knowledge. This table also shows that Slovak respondents had lower mean scores than their Czech counterparts on political knowledge across all ideological points, except the extreme left. Similarly, respondents in the pooled dataset who did not have an ideological position reported being the least politically aware. Slovaks also had higher mean scores on political awareness than Czechs across all cuts of the ideological spectrum, except the extreme left. Thus, political knowledge and political awareness apparently had a relationship with ideology in that when one is not politically aware or knowledgeable, one is not likely to hold an ideological position. This can help explain why political awareness and political knowledge wash out as predictors of support for EU membership once ideology is entered into the regression.

Table C.2.2 ANOVA of political knowledge and ideology

	Czechs			Slovaks			Total		
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD
Extreme Left	12	3.83	1.193	11	3.91	1.578	23	3.87	1.359
Left	96	4.61	1.364	105	3.96	1.420	201	4.27	1.428
Center	119	4.58	1.441	171	3.69	1.657	290	4.06	1.629
Right	172	4.52	1.416	121	4.16	1.522	293	4.37	1.469
Extreme Right	12	4.42	1.505	10	3.80	1.476	22	4.14	1.490
Don't Know	57	2.96	1.581	57	2.53	1.513	114	2.75	1.556
No Answer	32	3.37	1.641	32	2.56	1.343	64	2.97	1.543
Total	500	4.28	1.543	507	3.66	1.624	1007	3.97	1.614

Table C.2.3 ANOVA of political awareness and ideology

	Czechs			Slovaks			Total		
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD
Extreme Left	12	2.361	1.087	11	2.333	0.843	23	2.348	0.956
Left	96	2.083	0.775	105	2.411	0.779	201	2.255	0.792
Center	119	2.085	0.749	168	2.227	0.799	287	2.168	0.781
Right	171	1.968	0.763	121	2.437	0.821	292	2.162	0.819
Extreme Right	12	1.944	0.529	10	2.150	0.938	22	2.038	0.731
Don't Know	56	1.762	0.857	56	1.756	0.570	112	1.759	0.725
No Answer	30	2.044	0.761	32	1.922	0.758	62	1.981	0.756
Total	496	2.009	0.781	503	2.245	0.805	999	2.128	0.802

The second regression model reported in Table C.2.1 shows that both ideology and party cue predicts attitudes toward EU membership in the presence of other control variables. Compared to Euroenthusiasts, one is less likely to support EU membership if one identifies with a Euroreject party (9% less likely), Europragmatic party (10% less likely), or has decided not to vote (11% less likely). Moreover, ANOVA results show that Czechs and Slovaks are significantly different vis-à-vis party cue at $F=7.14$, $p < .08$, so it is may be plausible that the different party cues that dominate each context matter to attitudes toward the EU in ways that are unique to each context. Model 2 also shows that a centrist political ideology was not

significantly associated with endorsement of joining the EU once the party cue variable was entered into the analysis. However, other demographic variables that were significant in the base model were also significant in Model 2.

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