F. C. S. SCHILLER
AND
THE STYLE OF PRAGMATIC HUMANISM

by

Mark Joseph Porrovecchio

BA, Carroll College, 1995
MAIS, Oregon State University, 1997

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This dissertation was presented

by

Mark Joseph Porrovecchio

It was defended on

May 5, 2006

and approved by

John Lyne, Professor, Communication

Ronald J. Zboray, Associate Professor, Communication

Paul Kameen, Associate Professor, English

Dissertation Advisor: Peter D. Simonson, Assistant Professor, Communication
This dissertation is a rhetorical biography of Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937), the foremost British proponent of pragmatism at the turn of the previous century. Beyond reconstructing the development and receptions of Schiller’s thoughts, this dissertation brings the resources of rhetorical criticism to bear and focuses, in particular, on his style and its significance both in his own lifetime and afterward. While spending most of his career in England, Schiller came in his time to be one of the most widely discussed figures in what is often considered a distinctly American philosophical movement. This rhetorical biography analyzes, in chronological order, the most substantial and often contested arguments that Schiller engaged in so as to promote, first, Jamesian pragmatism and, secondly, his own pragmatic humanism. These arguments were meant to defend the principles of pragmatism and pragmatic humanism against the dominant strains of Idealism then current in both British and American philosophy. But they were also supported by reference to a wide range of topics: psychical research, formal logic, science, religion, and eugenics. This dissertation examines how Schiller’s arguments exemplify the positive and negative aspects of the rhetorical category of style. More specifically, this rhetorical biography posits that Schiller’s use of the stylistic figure repetition—the reiteration of key claims so as to emphasize their importance and to engage the pathos of the audience—helps to explain why Schiller is now a largely forgotten instigator of pragmatism, conceived herein as both a philosophical concept and a historical movement. This dissertation also demonstrates how traditional methods of rhetorical criticism, often focusing on the set text or oration, can be profitably extended by way of archival materials, public documents, and a focus on the range of arguments offered over the expanse of a subject’s career.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A PRAGMATIST

The philosopher’s voice is hushed in death but the meaning of his life cannot be entombed in glib words of appraisal—time alone will reveal his true stature.¹

The pragmatic family is a rather large and diverse one. Once can assuredly point to philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey as the recognized forefathers. That lineage leads up to well known contemporary philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Hillary Putnam. Pragmatism also embraces distinguished scholars from a variety of other fields: John Patrick Diggins and Robert B. Westbrook in History, Morris Dickstein and Giles Gunn in English, Nancy Fraser and Alan Wolf in Political Science, Hans Joas in Sociology, and Michel Rosenfeld in Law. And it has a well-heeled historical ancestry that goes beyond the aforementioned forefathers. Various scholars point with confidence to the works of John Stuart Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and W. E. B. DuBois and note pragmatic themes. But pragmatists, like any other family, have their fair share of black sheep. Whether by deliberate omission, supposed transgression, or institutional forgetting, the pragmatic family album contains a number of worn pages missing particular pictures. This project hopes to reinsert one of those historical snapshots.

1.1 FORGOTTEN ORIGINS: SCHILLER AND THE NARRATIVE OF PRAGMATISM

In a letter dated three weeks prior to his death in 1910, William James wrote to the British pragmatist Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937): “I leave the cause in your hands. . . . Good-bye, and God bless you. . . . Keep your health, your splendid health. It is better than all the truths under the firmament. Ever thy W. J.” The cause was pragmatism and this is the Schiller who James once also referred to “as ‘the only clear writer’ on the pragmatic side.”2 This is the same Schiller whose influence on pragmatism was assessed by none other than Bertrand Russell, himself no fan of pragmatism: “The three founders of pragmatism differ greatly inter se; we may distinguish James, Schiller, and Dewey as respectively its religious, literary, and scientific protagonists.”3 This is the Schiller who said that “the origins of great truths, as of great men, are usually obscure, and by the time that the world has become cognizant of them and interested in their pedigree, they have usually grown old.”4 It is doubtful Schiller knew how prescient his observation would be. His involvement in the development of pragmatism—a philosophy that stressed contingency over absolutism, fallibility over certainty, and the future over the past—in the first decades of the previous century has been obscured. And it is his involvement in bringing that philosophical movement to fruition that is the focus of this dissertation.

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2 Qtd. in Kenneth Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 20-1. As a stylistic note: the terms pragmatism and humanism will remain lower case for the remainder of this dissertation, save in instances of direct quotations from other authors. Given current usage and historical justification—that pragmatism and humanism were essentially methods and not metaphysics—this standardization seems warranted.


In an age given to hyperbole, with this or that calamity placing the last great conceptual juggernaut in the dustbin of history, one need be cautious in making assessments of scholars, philosophical or otherwise. That being said, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Schiller, as Steven Mailloux argues, “is Pragmatism’s most forgotten major figure.”5 Today a search for his works often results in frustration. Many are out of print. Others are tucked away in antiquarian bookstores in the United Kingdom, often at a high cost and in less than stellar condition. Some, given their status as public domain, are now available only as cheap trade facsimiles. While the works of William James and John Dewey go through new rounds of publication at prestigious publishing houses, Schiller’s works are given no such treatment.

This dissertation is a rhetorical biography. It argues that Schiller’s substantial body of work demonstrates his historical and contemporary relevance to pragmatism. It divides Schiller’s life into periods—1882-1897, 1898-1905, 1906-1910, 1911-1919, 1920-1926, 1927-1939—and moves chronologically through the works he created during these phases in his career. It undertakes not only a study of his discourse, but of other discourses produced in response to or in reflection on Schiller’s works during these periods. This dissertation contributes to the fields of intellectual history, rhetorical history and criticism, and reception studies, by providing a case study that complements and expands upon those areas of inquiry. In addition, it contributes to the interdisciplinary study of pragmatism undertaken in recent years in communication, history, philosophy, and cultural studies.

The primary voice and promoter of pragmatism in Europe around the turn of the previous century, Schiller’s pedigree is impressive. Born on 16 August 1864 in Othmarschen, Holstein, Denmark (near what is now Hamburg, Germany) to a father who made his money via commercial interests in colonial India, it can be suggested that his was a life of comfort if not privilege. The family had a house in Switzerland, one that they retained through most of Schiller’s life and one he regularly visited in the summer with friends in tow. His early education in the 1870s was at Belsize Manor, Hampstead, and the School at University College, London. He transferred in the late 1870s or early 1880s to the Rugby Boarding School, Rugby, and then matriculated to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1882. After receiving his 1st Lit. Hum. and B.A. in 1886 and a Taylorian Scholarship in German in 1887 at Oxford, he spent a brief period of time as a tutor of German at Eaton. From the proceeds of his tutoring job, Schiller returned to Oxford, receiving his M.A. in October 1891. From 1893-1897, Schiller served as an Instructor in Philosophy and attended courses at Cornell University where, for conflicting reasons, he failed the oral component of his doctorate. Upon his return from Cornell, he became an instructor at Corpus Christi (receiving his D.Sc in 1906), a position that he held with promotions—Assistant Tutor and Fellow (1897), Assistant Tutor with Fellowship (1900), Tutor (1903), Senior Tutor and Extraordinary Fellow (1926)—for most of his career. In 1926, Schiller retired from active

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7 Belsize Manor [Hampstead], “Lower School Report of Conduct and Progress for Easter Term 1872,” Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “University College, London, School Reports,” June 1874-July 1877, Scholastic Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

8 College Minutes, Corpus Christi College, 1897; 1900; 1926; B/4/1/10, Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Schiller was comfortable mixing his vacations in Switzerland and elsewhere with his extracurricular activities at Oxford, even after his retirement (though he still kept an honorary position and room there). The 20 May 1933 minutes from his department note, Sect. V., sub. c, “D’. Schiller was re-elected Garden-Master” (College Minutes,
teaching at Corpus Christi and began dividing his time between Oxford and the University of Southern California (USC), where he was awarded a visiting lecturer position (1927), a Professorship and an honorary LL.D (1930). He took up residence in Los Angeles full-time in 1935 and married his only wife, Louise Strang (Griswold). There he remained until his death, from a long-term heart condition, on 6 August 1937.9

Schiller was named an honorary member of the Circolo di Filosofia [Rome] in 1909, the president of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in 1914, president of the Aristotelian Society in 1921, elected fellow of the British Academy in 1926, held honorary Treasurership and Membership in the Mind Association, and was a member of the British Eugenics Society in the pre- and inter-war years, frequently contributing to the journals and conferences of the latter two.10 During the span of his prolific career Schiller is estimated to have written, in the lone comprehensive review of Schiller (by New School of Social Research philosopher Reuben Abel), fourteen books and hundreds of articles and book reviews in journals such as Mind,

B/4/1/13, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1933). This is to be coupled with the observations of Ralph Tyler Flewelling: “Had a little greenhouse on campus of Corpus Christi where he germinated seeds he picked up in his travels” (in Allan Shields, “Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 55 [1974]: 291).


10 The above information is culled from: Bianca Paulusci, Rome, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 April 1909, Correspondence, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; McKie, “Dr.,” 136; Finding Aid for the F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), 1968, Department of Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles, x.
Eugenics Review, the Journal of Philosophy, and others. His reputation was so great that the likes of Henri Bergson, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell—persons not always in accord with Schiller’s philosophical views—wrote him letters of recommendation in his pursuit of the Waynflete Professorship of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy in 1910, the Wykeham Chair of Logic in 1919, and the Deputy Professorship of Moral Philosophy in 1922.

During Schiller’s lifetime, there were numerous reviews of his books and lively, often tense, exchanges with his critics and consorts. These materials suggest that Schiller’s active life as a philosopher extended up through his last years. From 1922 through 1929, in the American Journal of Philosophy, he engaged in debates with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Dickinson S. Miller (1868-1963) regarding the analysis of mind and the merits of William James’s concept of the “Will to Believe.” As late as 1936, in the British journal Mind, he mounted exchanges with C. A. Mace (1894-1971) regarding formalism in 1932 and took issue with W. T. Feldman’s (1909- ?) book on Dewey, The Philosophy of John Dewey. Before, and in between, in these journals and others, Schiller sparred with persons ranging from Max Eastman (1883-1969) to Lizzie Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) to Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957).

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11 Abel, The Pragmatic, 179.

12 Finding Aid, 11-2.

13 The issue of formalism should be emphasized, as it seems to be a component of current histories of pragmatism that is underdeveloped, and under-developed as it regards pragmatist’s interest in history (especially in Diggins). For a lucid reminder of formalism’s relation to philosophical history, see Morton G. White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (New York: The Viking Press, 1949), 11-15.

14 All three of these scholars took exception to Schiller’s promotion of pragmatism, albeit in different ways that will be discussed later. For a useful gloss on Eastman’s approach to philosophy and social causes (he became editor of the left wing magazine The Masses in 1921 but turned to anti-communist writings later in life), one is directed to “Max Eastman,” Spartacus, available from www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Jeastman.htm, Internet. Both Stebbing and Perry share the distinction of being on the formalist side of the philosophical camp and, as such, as being in the sights of Schiller; for information on their philosophical positions, see Ralph Barton Perry, The Approach to Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1905); and Lizzie Susan Stebbing. A Modern Introduction to Logic, 1930 (London: Methuen, 1950).
Though there was a respectful smattering of acknowledgements at the time of his death, the drop off in coverage in the years after his demise is dramatic. Schiller, a philosopher who was praised by James, recognized by Russell and in discussion with some of the leading minds of his era, suffered a plummeting fall from the pages of philosophy. Abel notes that, given his importance to pragmatism, Schiller “deserves to be known better.” But, only thirty years after his death, Schiller was deemed “virtually forgotten,” “scarcely read or mentioned” and “put out of mind.” The printed details bear these comments out. There is scant publication of his correspondence after his death. There exist only a handful of significant published treatments of his work. Only a few additional studies—ranging from biographic overviews to

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16 Abel, The Pragmatic, 7.

17 Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 6.

18 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “James, Schiller, and Personalism,” Personalist 23, no. 2 (April 1942): 172-181; “A Group of F. C. S. Schiller Letters,” Personalist 30, no. 4 (October 1949): 385-392; “A Schiller Holograph,” Personalist 50, no. 4 (October 1959): 388-390; Frederick J. D. Scott, “Peirce and Schiller and Their Correspondence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1973): 363-386. This is not to suggest that Schiller is not mentioned in the published letters of others. Quite the contrary, and to the point of this dissertation, Schiller is usually mentioned only in passing. In rare instances, however, the treatment is more substantial. See, for instance, the coverage in: James, William, The Thought and Character of William James, vols. 1-2, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935).

19 Abel, The Pragmatic, provides a concise documentation of works related to Schiller; Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller (interested readers may wish to consult a review of this work and Winetrout’s response, both of which suggest the extent to which one philosophic view can shade the evaluation of another: Foster McMurray, review of F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 370-9; and Winetrout, “Reply to Foster McMurray,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 379-82); Herbert L. Searles and Allan Shields, A Bibliography of F. C. S. Schiller (San Diego: San Diego State College Press, 1969), an exhaustive and invaluable chronological survey of almost all of Schiller’s works.

comparative treatments to relatively minor references to portions of his work—have been undertaken.\textsuperscript{20} And the most recent critical engagements of his work (excepting the works of John R. Shook and Steven Mailloux) are over a decade old.\textsuperscript{21}

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Nor are these instances the only ones that indicate Schiller’s excise by exclusion. The absence is palpably felt in commentaries on pragmatism. For although pragmatism suffered scorn in the decades immediately following the Second World War,\(^{22}\) pragmatism has witnessed a robust and productive reemergence on the intellectual scene since the 1980s. Richard Rorty’s *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989), Cornel West’s *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (1989), John Patrick Diggins’ *The Promise of Pragmatism* (1994), *The Revival of Pragmatism* (1998), a collection of essays edited by Morris Dickstein, Louis Menand’s *The Metaphysical Club* (2001) and numerous others have sought to reassert pragmatism’s relevance to the present day or to trace out the historical foundations underlying its development.\(^{23}\) What is lacking, though, is any sustained coverage of Schiller’s contributions to pragmatism’s history. What is striking is what little these works do contain relating to Schiller seems to suggest his continued relevance. What is unfortunate is that these snippets prove only to transition back to the accepted triumvirate, point towards the inclusion of a rather more extended family, or revise the pragmatic view in often radically different ways.

\(^{22}\) A particularly insightful and more expansive, as it covers a range of issues beyond the scope of this dissertation, argument as to the decline of pragmatism is to be found in the previously referenced: White, *Social*.

To be clear, the aforesaid are the works of learned scholars. I have no major qualms with what the authors are discussing, nor do I wish to challenge the points that they make. My point is much more specific. These substantial works have done much to reintroduce us to pragmatism; but they have done so with barely a nod to Schiller. The first of these works to refer to Schiller is West’s. Therein, Willard V. O. Quine comments on the scientific views of the “pragmatists James, Schiller, and Dewey.” But West uses this as a transition to explain Quine’s relation to certain concepts found only in Dewey’s works.24 Diggins is next to reference Schiller. He only notes that James argued in 1907 that “Pragmatists like Dewey and Schiller are not destroying all objective standards in rethinking the concepts of truth . . . .”25 Menand’s book contains three references to Schiller. In the first, referencing the period of time around the late 1890s, Menand references “James’s chief British ally, Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, at Oxford.” In the second, it is a quote from Schiller in 1902, mentioning in a letter to James that “Dewey ‘seems to be teaching a sort of pragmatism at Chicago.’” The final reference is a comment from the later critic of pragmatism, Randolph Bourne. Therein, Bourne explains that, after taking courses from James and Dewey, he “contracted what he called ‘the virus of the Bergson-James-Schiller-instrumentalism.’”26 In each case Schiller is, as they say, in the mix. But in these capable hands, he is an extraneous ingredient.

This dearth of coverage is all the more surprising when one begins to contextualize Schiller within the pragmatic milieu in the first decades of the previous century. There is ample evidence to suggest that the tripartite origins of pragmatism via Peirce, James, and Dewey should

24 West, The American, 187.

25 Diggins, The Promise, 139.

26 Menand, The Metaphysical, 350; 359, 401. James’s reply as regards the Chicago School, and Schiller’s reaction, are detailed in Chapter Three.
more rightly become quadripartite. And, chronologically speaking, Schiller should be placed prior to Dewey in explicating the basic components of pragmatism. As Winetrout notes:

Schiller was very much recognized by Peirce and especially James as a progenitor and a protector of pragmatism. . . . On certain levels he antedated both James and Dewey as an explicator of this new philosophy. Much of the source material for this conclusion was published before the key philosophical works of Dewey appeared.27

One need not rely solely on Winetrout, himself an admitted champion of Schiller’s cause. Less friendly critics concur. Bertrand Russell argues that “Dewey . . . with James and Dr. Schiller, was one of the three founders of pragmatism,” eliminating Peirce on account of his self-imposed retirement from the pragmatic scene in 1905.28 Peirce, though exiled by Russell, supports this contention by stating in 1906 that “the brilliant and marvelously human thinker, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller . . . seems to occupy ground of his own . . . between those of James and mine.”29 It was only two years earlier, and only a few years removed from his time at Cornell, that Schiller intimates as much in his letter to James (who, it should be recalled, preferred Schiller’s use of the term humanism to either the general pragmatism or Dewey’s instrumentalism). Alban Gregory Widgery (1887-1968), in his 1927 work Contemporary Thought of Great Britain, is even more pointed in asserting that Schiller’s place in the chronological development of pragmatism is prior to that Dewey: “Schiller’s thought was not a product of the discussion of Pragmatism in the first decade of the century; his work was a predisposing cause of and a leading part in that discussion.”30 However, this claim may be taken as a slightly dubious boast. Though not

27 Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 22.
28 Qtd. in Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 26.
29 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 272. As with James, Peirce’s favorable opinion was also coupled with several criticisms of what Schiller was making of pragmatism (and not, we assume, pragmaticism).
entirely out of step with the sentiments expressed, it is clear that Schiller’s literary and philosophical involvement in pragmatism proper only occurred after his four year stint at Cornell in the late 1890s and was the result of James’s nearby influence at Harvard.

1.2 THE RIGHT TO POSTULATE: SCHILLER’S VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM

His position in the pragmatic family aside, Schiller’s pragmatic humanism was a personality-driven, human-centered, philosophy. It operated as a response against the Anglo-Hegelianism of his idealist peers at Oxford, just as James and Dewey reacted to its derivations in the States.\(^\text{31}\) Taken charitably, Idealism stressed the theoretical possibility of constructing a universal metaphysic. Taken less kindly, Abel argues that Idealism was marked by “absolutism, authoritarianism, monism, rationalism, and intellectualism.”\(^\text{32}\) Schiller’s approach, in contrast, was based in the view that “all acts and all thoughts are irreducibly the products of individual

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\(^\text{30}\) Widgery, “Pragmatic,” 126.

\(^\text{31}\) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, which references Schiller in the entry on “pragmatism” but not in the index of philosophers, notes how distinctly at odds Hegelianism—and by extension Anglo Hegelianism—is with pragmatism: it is “not ‘one-sided’, like most philosophies of the past, but the ‘universal’ philosophy, embracing and ‘sublating’ (or cannibalizing) all significant past philosophies” (Inwood 343). Again, however, it is helpful to remember that Schiller, like Dewey and other pragmatists, had to wrestle with the strong tide of British Idealism that influenced philosophy on both shores. Instructive reference point are: A. M. Quinton, Absolute Idealism, David Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, British Academy (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Richard B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a historical treatment which encompasses both the American and British origins of Idealism, see David Watson, “Social Theory and Nature,” Social Science History 5, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 251-74.

\(^\text{32}\) Abel, introduction to Humanistic, 7. It should be noted that the second of the two qualities denoted is a bit of a rough fit, given the tendencies that Schiller would develop later in life regarding fascism (see also Abel, The Pragmatic, 146). These, however, will be dealt with in greater detail later. What should be noted at this point is that chief among his adversaries at Oxford was F. H. Bradley, an elder statesman of Idealism who chided Schiller with silence; as Abel states: “Bradley’s aloofness was empyreal. Even when he finally deigned to reply to Schiller’s criticisms (it is open to doubt how much he understood them), he never mentioned Schiller by name” (The Pragmatic, 5). Such a lack of consideration—though Russell has argued that Schiller liked being in the role of underdog—led Schiller to famously spoof him as “F. H. Badly” in his 1901 “Special Illustrated Christmas Number” send up of Mind (other Oxford Idealists were no less exempt—J. M. E. McTaggart (a person he knew personally) became “J. E. M. McTagrag” and T. H. Green became “T. H. Grin”).
human beings, and are therefore inescapably associated with the needs, desires, and purposes of
men.” 33 As he states in the 1907 (a reworking of arguments he had put forth in 1905) “The
Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism”:

Human interest, then, is vital to the existence of truth; to say that a truth has
consequences and that what has none is meaningless means that it has a bearing upon
some human interest. Its “consequences” must be consequences to someone engaged on
a real problem for some purpose. 34

And truth, for Schiller, is found in verification by way of application: “Hence all real truths must
have shown themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of actual
knowing, by usefulness in which they were tested and verified.” 35 Thus truth is not static nor is
it eternal. Moreover, truth is applied and useful only within a certain set “sphere of application”
by which its use is tied to its purpose in a given situation. 36

Such use, and understanding of use, is therefore the domain of humans. Humans
recognize that they make choices as to and between truths and their applications. These choices
are subject to—in contrast with what Schiller saw as the robotics of materialism or the
absolutism of the rationalists—“the permeation of all actual knowing by interests, purposes,
desires, emotions, ends, goods, postulations, choices, etc.” 37 Thus pragmatism, while not
forming a logical system to organize human action, nonetheless provides “an epistemological

33 Abel, introduction to Humanistic, 8.

34 Abel, Humanistic, 59; this and subsequent citations in this section will include references to Schiller’s
book—as many of his chapters in books were originally found in journals—as well: F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in

35 Abel, Humanistic, 61; Schiller, Studies, 8.

36 Abel, Humanistic, 63; Schiller, Studies, 9.

37 Abel, Humanistic, 64; Schiller, Studies, 11.
method which really describes the facts of actual knowing.” 38 It articulates the means by which options are decided upon, tested, and then accepted in everyday life.

But pragmatism is connected to the larger framework of Schiller’s humanism. Simply put, humanism is a philosophical approach to ameliorating human problems. Or, in his words, “it demands that man’s integral nature shall be used as the whole premises which philosophy must argue from wholeheartedly, that man’s complete satisfaction shall be the conclusion that philosophy must aim at.” 39 As a result, pragmatic humanism can be understood in two ways. Pragmatism is the method by which to apply humanism; or, framed differently, humanism is the pragmatic approach writ large. Together, then, they provide for the basis of arguing against any complete or systematic metaphysics since: (1) knowing is subject to human idiosyncrasies, and (2) knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in which it occurs. 40 The goal of eradicating human dilemmas is always predicated on the contingency of human practices.

Schiller’s pragmatic humanism also ventures into the realms beyond our cognition, if only to attempt a more scientific approach to those realms. A significant portion of his time was spent working on psychical research, with his involvement in the British SPR dating back to his days at Balliol in the 1880s. As Winetrout notes, “Schiller saw the question as not only profoundly philosophical but as downright practical.” 41 And he approached the issue of researching immortality, channeling, and mediums with a scientific rigor that sought at “getting

38 Abel, Humanistic, 65; Schiller, Studies, 11.
39 Abel, Humanistic, 66; Schiller, Studies, 13.
40 Abel, Humanistic, 72-3; Schiller, Studies, 14.
41 Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 52. It should also be noted that fellow pragmatist William James was interested (as were such intellectuals as writer Arthur Conan Doyle and metaphysician—and directly prior president of the British SPR—Henri Bergson) in psychical research. For a gloss on this topic, see William James, “Scientific Systems and Reality,” [from “What Psychical Research Has Accomplished,” The Will to Believe, 1897] rpt. in The Philosophy of William James (New York: The Modern Library, 1953), 197-203.
such a grasp of the conditions of such events that they can become predictable and ‘normal’.”

He went so far as to argue for the creation of a foundation to study immortality and “went about searching for evidence of the afterlife as deliberately as we go about our huge chemical laboratories looking for new ways to kill houseflies.”

In regards to religion, Schiller argued in 1924 that it “is not a homogeneous body of belief, but rather a medley, to which various motives and attitudes, good, bad, and indifferent, have contributed.” As such, and in-line with the previous discussion, he argued that “religious truths also will begin their careers as postulates, and will need, and will receive, verification by experience.” And, should one question the issue of God, they should go about it pragmatically as well: “‘God’ is a postulate, or rather a number of postulates, to be tested, like all postulates, by its working.” All of these areas of study were, to Schiller, necessary and compelling; and, operating from a pragmatic and humanistic perspective, seem tied to the James’s hypothesis that “there is no source of deception . . . which can compare with a fixed belief that certain kinds of phenomena are impossible.”

Schiller was also invested in, in contrast to the psychological interests of James and the educational and political interests of Dewey, the then flourishing eugenics movement. Two of

42 F. C. S. Schiller, Must, 328.

43 Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 52; 56. A recent work which has noted the late 19th century, and pragmatic, interest in spiritualistic/mystical issues is: John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

44 F. C. S. Schiller, Problems of Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), 50.

45 Schiller, Disagree, 313.

46 Schiller, Disagree, 297.

47 Qtd. in Abel, introduction to “Faith, Ethics, and Immortality.” Humanistic, 255.
his books—Eugenics and Politics (1926), Social Decay and Eugenical Reform (1932)—deal specifically with the topic and three others—Tantalus; or, The Future of Man (1924), Cassandra; or, The Future of the British Empire (1926) and Our Human Truths (posthumously, 1939)—elaborate on the topic in specific sections. While it is safe to say that most of his perspectives on eugenics have been relegated to the scrapheap, it is equally wise to suggest that Schiller’s views deserve, and will receive, further elaboration in subsequent chapters. This elaboration is not simply because eugenics is a taboo topic. Quite the opposite; it is because other pragmatists suggested in their writings tendencies tangential to (though never officially aligned with) the eugenics endorsed by Schiller. In 1929, John Dewey published The Quest for Certainty. In it, he noted that pragmatic philosophers are not concerned with a priori assumptions; they are interested in “. . . finding how authentic beliefs about existence as they currently exist can operate fruitfully and efficaciously in connection with the practical problems that are urgent in actual life.” He went on to suggest: “Science advances by adopting the instruments and doings of directed practice, and the knowledge thus gained becomes a means of the development of arts which bring nature still further into actual and potential service of human purposes and valuations.” Is it so far-fetched to assume that pragmatists would see the then-promising “science” of eugenics as a basis for turning the potential into the actual? Or, as a Peircean might

48 Though these dates indicate them as works that Schiller undertook later in his career, the timeline is deceptive. The first, dedicated to Major Leonard Darwin, the president of The Eugenics Education Society, contains essays that appeared in previous years in the Eugenics Review and the Hibbert Journal. The second contains five (out of seven) essays that were originally published in the Eugenics Review and the Nineteenth Century. It should also be noted that in the latter, Schiller suggest that it is a continuation of the former and related to his work in Tantalus or the Future of Man.


put it, are the interpretative possibilities of eugenics enough to suggest that science is guiding us closer to the “reality” of what science can provide? Though this interpretation runs up against the criticism of certain historians of pragmatism (West and Diggins especially) it is, I think, a central and underdeveloped issue regarding the status of pragmatism as a method for resolving contingent situations: to what extent does pragmatism warrant specific types of action? In the hands of Schiller, the question becomes even more pressing.

Another crucial part of Schiller’s philosophy was the manner in which he articulated it. While Peirce was known to engage in spirited and, at times, humorous arguments, he is more likely known for either his penchant for triadic groupings or especially dense semiotic discussions. And even a cursory glance at the writings of Dewey, by those either disposed to or suspicious of his arguments, will not suggest a significant emphasis on humor or wordplay. In contrast, Schiller was consistently noted as a “vigorous polemicist” who wrote in a “sprightly and spirited” style that was accessible to everyone.\footnote{Abel, introduction to Humanistic, 7.} Winetrout concurs: “the one thing on which everyone seems in agreement regarding Schiller is that he was a first-class wit—in small talk, on hikes, in classroom lectures, and in philosophic talk of the highest order.”\footnote{Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 8.}  But Winetrout also notes that even James, himself given to joking, “on more than one occasion . . . begged his English friend to go a little easy in his horseplay and polemical jeers.”\footnote{Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 22.} These dual tendencies are clearly present in Schiller’s preface to Pragmatism by D. L. Murray. He first jokes that Murray’s youth is a necessity when dealing with pragmatism and demonstrative of the

\footnote{Abel, introduction to Humanistic, 7.}
\footnote{Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 8.}
\footnote{Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 22.}
fact that old philosophers are “a justification of death from the standpoint of social progress.”

Schiller then levels the accusation that “the critics of Pragmatism have produced only caricatures so gross as to be unrecognizable, and so obscure as to be unintelligible.” In other instances, such as “Must Philosophy Be Dull?,” his fury was even more pointed when he chided his peers’ use of wordiness and sterility at the expense of interest or clarity: “The more pedestrian of philosophers wander about . . . with their heads in culs de sac; the more dashing pursue dead issues into dead ends. . . . Hence they leave behind them litter, but not literature.” This mix of style, polemics, and substance fueled Schiller’s writing at a time when the basic components of pragmatism were still being determined and debated.

Schiller also complicates the accepted and simplistic notion that pragmatism was a distinctly American philosophical movement. Given Schiller’s involvement in the development of pragmatism, and his interactions with Peirce and James, interactions which go back at least to his time at Cornell from 1893-1897, it should be clear that its founding instigators did not all originate on this (itself presumptuous) side of the pond. Schiller’s involvement in promoting pragmatism, indeed his articulation of it, complements the works of Peirce, James, and Dewey and adds nuance to our understanding of the pragmatic movement. Moreover, his interest in psychical research, an interest he shared with James, and his involvement in eugenics, extend the range of issues which pragmatism sought to entertain, even as they complicate its origins. More so, Schiller’s work tests the claim that pragmatism, beyond being distinctly


55 Schiller, introduction to Pragmatism, x.


57 The previously noted works by Simonson and Cohen tackle this issue, absent of Schiller, straight on.
American, is essentially democratic.\textsuperscript{58} A comment by James T. Kloppenberg is telling: “This view of the relation between pragmatism and democracy [that ‘it is the form of social life consistent with pragmatism’], which intellectual historians have been urging now for a decade, helps explain the resurgence of interest in pragmatism.”\textsuperscript{59}

What, though, necessitates such an urge? If it is the “distinctly American” label, we see in Schiller a rupture of the argument. If it is a claim to solidarity and freedom from cruelty in neo-pragmatists like Rorty, there looms the issue of eugenics. While it might be appealing to argue that Schiller operates as a deviation from pragmatism’s norm, I see it as more beneficial to ask how Schiller adds to the history of pragmatism which he helped to create and portions of which we now tend to ignore. Understanding why Schiller was so vigorously discussed in his time is but one part of this dissertation. Another is to examine why he is now so obviously not discussed. And, finally, the aim is to understand how the previous two questions interact, how they might relate to and enrich the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a philosophical concept. The focus now turns not whether Schiller’s contributions deserve to be considered, but how best to bring them to light.


\textsuperscript{59} I am not taking aim at Kloppenberg’s skills in explicating the nature of pragmatism, only questioning some of the extensions to which he puts it (“An Old Name for New Thinking?” in \textit{The Revival of Pragmatism}, ed. Morris Dickstein [Durham: Duke University Press, 1998], 83-127). An interesting rejoinder to Kloppenberg is found in the very same text: John Patrick Diggins, “Pragmatism and Its Limits,” 207-231.
1.3 A MATTER OF METHOD(S): EXTENDING RHETORICAL BIOGRAPHY

As stated at the onset, I propose this dissertation as a rhetorical biography. Said biography examines the persuasive processes at work in selected and relevant discourse over time by a given person. In my case, I attend to the development of Schiller’s argumentation, with particular focus on his humanistic pragmatism and the contexts in which it was created, the methods by which it was disseminated, and the reception that it received by different audiences. These processes have both public and private components. The former exist within what Lloyd Bitzer has called the realm of “public knowledge”60 and consist of the published books, reviews, and articles written by and about Schiller. The latter exist largely in archival form. They consist of letters, memos, and other extant materials that were written either by or about Schiller, but have as yet escaped general publication. They extend to include the records of the publishers who helped Schiller to publish his works, the readers who were asked to comment on those works, and unpublished correspondences which undertook, in whole or in part, to explain Schiller’s works. This rhetorical biography uses these public and private components to understand how Schiller’s attempts to persuade both failed and succeeded in his time. It also uses them to explain his absence in the development and received history of pragmatism after his death. My hypothesis is that his being alive constitutes the single most important reason he is now neglected: he was able to manage and massage his message. It also relates to my view of

the private side of the Schiller debate: when there was no sense that his public aspects were important, there was less reason for the private documents to either be created or referenced.

But suggesting that a rhetorical biography affords a clue as to Schiller’s impact on pragmatism might be cause for pause. He rarely used the term ‘rhetoric’ and he is obviously not a rhetorician in the classical sense of the term; Schiller is, patently, a philosopher. But Schiller does adhere to the more current suggestions that rhetoric lurks in places once thought out of bounds. He marshaled arguments in support of a cause. He responded to critics with aplomb not often seen in other pragmatists. And he offers a compelling example of a person who, though arguing for pragmatism, has been lost in the uptake that has carried it forward. Schiller’s was an important, if now neglected, effort to propagate first generation pragmatism. As such, this rhetorical biography is as much about reclamation as is it about simple recognition.

More generally, rhetorical biography is a species of rhetorical criticism. As a species, it differs from other forms of criticism in its focus. It is not generally construed as ideologically


based (Marxist, Feminist, Postmodernist). Traditionally, rhetorical criticism was conceived of within a fivefold schema derived from classical rhetorical texts. Invention (or inventio) is the method whereby a rhetor seeks to create, that is, invent, the arguments that will be used to persuade. Arrangement (or dispositio) provides the manner in which these arguments are ordered. Style (or elocutio) is how the arguments, once arranged, are expressed. Memory (or memoria) deals with the methods of recalling and presenting the arguments once they have been created, organized, and shaped. Delivery (or actio) deals with the various ways—impromptu or extemporaneous, verbally or orally—in which the argument can then be presented to an audience. Taken together, these five steps were suggested to be the sequential steps in the process of composing persuasive discourse. By following them, rhetors might be able to craft an effective message. By studying them, critics might be able to discern—in addition to scrutinizing situational variables such as place, topic, audience, and response—the success or failure of a given rhetorical act.


The issue of this approach to criticism being both historical and contested should be stressed. In particular, the stand alone work by Black and the two volumes, edited by Fisher and Bitzer and Black respectively, are demonstrative of the sea-change that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This form of criticism—often disparagingly, and occasionally incorrectly, labeled “Neo-Aristotelian”—has clearly been supplanted by newer forms of criticism. But that is, in part, my point: rhetorical criticism generally and rhetorical biography specifically can be updated and amended to meet the needs of communication studies scholars.
As commonsensical as that sounds, the justification still might not suffice. In 1963, Waldo Braden suggested that “rhetoric, public address, and rhetorical criticism” corresponded to the “theory, practice, and judgment in speaking.” So some might ask why this is not a study of public address. My answer is best explained by reference to the above and in reference to the genus/species distinction. With the extension beyond the spoken work granted, the tripartite division still provides an easily understood and obviously practical orientation to rhetorical criticism as a genre. But rhetorical biography, as I conceive of it and as a specific form of criticism, attempts to provide an interpretative account of historical acts of persuasion:

A historical interpretation attempts to empathize with a historical figure in order to understand the “proposed world” found in historical texts as best we can. Presuppositionless interpretation is impossible, of course, but the point of historical interpretation is to try to understand what is alien (or Other) about the text—what is not already articulated in our current thinking.

Schiller, as an object of rhetorical biography, is freed from what one instance of persuasion attempted and what one response thereto suggested. What is deemed subject to judgment, that is to say criticism, are a variety of forms of address where persuasive techniques are utilized. Such forms of address occur, not in isolation, but in response to and so as to advance additional arguments; they provide the instances that help the critic to solve “the rhetorical problem of how interpreters interact with other interpreters in trying to argue for or against different meanings.” Rhetorical biography endeavors to understand Schiller not just as a snapshot discarded, but as a partially obscured player in the historical promotion of pragmatism.


66 Mailloux, Reception, 50.
As with any form of criticism, rhetorical biography admits of a variety of methods of assessment. Thus it is best to explain what critical tools underlie this study. If any one of the traditional processes is paramount in this study, it is style. Schiller, as has already been noted, was the literary arm of pragmatism. He was a fierce polemicist, trading barb for barb and witticism for witticism. But this tool can be further refined. If any one aspect of style is key to understanding Schiller’s reception, it is the figure of repetition (repetitio). As a stylistic device, repetition is used to: (1) clarify positions, (2) emphasize their importance, and (3) to arouse an emotional response. And Schiller’s polemical sallies, especially in the formative years of pragmatism but also in his later writings, consistently returned to specific issues central to his understanding of the aims and practices of pragmatic humanism: formalism in philosophy and logic, the relation of religion and science, and the relation of theory to practice.

Granted, this focus on style is a choice. The classical canon of rhetoric clearly suggests that it is only one part in a larger matrix of concerns. But style occupies the seat in rhetoric where the manner of articulation is considered. And style is, as exemplified by Schiller, demonstrative of persuasion as more than merely method, as also the reception to that which is produced. As Mailloux notes, “persuasion refers to both a rhetorical process and a result of that process. To be persuaded is to take on a new persuasion.”67 We should add, of course, that the reverse is equally true: to not be persuaded complicates how one understands the processes of persuasion that were utilized.68 What’s more, style functions as the point in the process

67 Mailloux, Reception, 103.

68 A neglected piece of rhetoric’s rhetorical history in departments of communication makes this point, albeit in focusing solely on spoken discourse: “... a speech otherwise persuasive may fail of effect because the speaker lacks a persuasive ethos ... How many a good policy has been beaten or postponed for want of proper presentation! How many a just and able man has suffered because of an unpersuasive announcement of his purposes!” (Hoyt H. Hudson, “The Field of Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech Education 9, no. 2 [April 1923]: 174-75).
whereby what is conceived is translated into what is conveyed. “Without style or verbal expression, invention and disposition could have no effect. And it is style that provides the basis for memory and delivery.” Style, as a consequence, is surely one of the most important factors in Schiller’s arguments for pragmatism. The printed page provides only certain clues as to the methods of persuasion. It is, as it were, actio laid bare but static. Responses to those pages provide interpretative clews as to the reception of others; but, again, this is delivery in isolation. Style, conceived within the framework of this rhetorical biography, goes beyond the stationary texts to use additional sources—historical, political, philosophical, archival, and otherwise—so as to reference inventio and dispositio in service to understanding how memoria and actio were possibly shaped. In short, it the style of Schiller’s arguments that is the overriding focus of this study.

This approach to style, regarding it as both a process of constructing discourse and as a recognition of how discourse is received once constructed, is informed by work both inside and outside my discipline; it is based in the works of a professor of communication studies and a social psychologist. In some older traditions (and as is often and unfortunately still the case with the general public) rhetoric was seen as mere style, denoting a speech devoid of substance and flush with purple prose. In such conceptions, the processes of persuasion amounted to nothing more than trickery, to dazzling displays designed to dupe dolts. Recently, however, Robert


70 More recent discussions of public address and rhetorical history have emphasized the need to work in materials, bibliographic and otherwise, not often utilized in traditional acts of criticism. For one such example, see Martin J. Medhurst, “The Contemporary Study of Public Address: Renewal, Recovery, and Reconfiguration,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (2001): 495-511.

71 As should by now be clear, this approach to style is not to be confused with stylistics. This is not a linguistic or semantic project. It is an attempt to assess the relationship between Schiller’s public and private personas. Moreover, it is an attempt to understand the reactions and responses those personas engendered.
Hariman has pointed towards a more nuanced view. In discussing the rhetoric of politics as it applies to the day-to-day life of academics, and distancing himself from the negative manifestations of style noted above, Hariman suggests “relations of control and autonomy are negotiated through the artful composition of speech, gesture, ornament, décor, and any other means for modulating perception and shaping response.” But Hariman supports my more expansive conception of style by positing it as “an analytical category for understanding a social reality,” a method of analysis that is not simplistically reducible to a given artifact (a speech, or book, or so on) nor independent of the context in which it is found manifest (the circumstances of its production, the causes of its creation, and so forth).

This view of style is complimented by Michael Billig’s rhetorical approach to the psychology of argument. He argues that “a good speech is that which succeeds in its aims of persuading the audience, regardless of whether the message has been tastefully delivered or not” (italics mine). But Billig has gone on to tacitly imply that style, when it is not conceived as that which is merely ornament, operates in service to rhetoric. And he does so in reference to a group of thinkers, the Sophists, whom Hariman has approvingly noted, while referencing the one that Schiller most admired and wrote favorably about: Protagoras. As Billig states: “Protagoras possesses arguments, not slogans, and he is an adversary whose message has content as well as witty and urbane packaging.” As he goes on to argue regarding the Platonic dialogue

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73 Hariman, Political, 9.


Protagoras: “[It is] a vivid portrait of the man and his style.” Here we see Billig, who admits the link between persuasion and style has been “neglected,” and who admits of his limited awareness of the work done in communication studies, pointing towards the more robust conception of style supplied by Hariman which I endorse in this study.

But this approach to style necessarily grapples with three interdisciplinary and concomitant issues: contested notions of the term public, the questioned viability of a rhetorical hermeneutic, and the potential for an altogether too Whiggish approach to history. Regarding the first, this dissertation is an attempt to recapture Schiller’s persona within the public to which he most attended. Schiller dealt primarily with his academic ilk. And he did so in an era when authorial intent meant more than simply placing your name at the end of an article. His writings, signed philosophical arguments, were part of a trend started towards the latter part of the nineteenth century, a time when Schiller was already publishing and was beginning (at Cornell) to interact with pragmatism explicitly. This move to focus on the author within the context of

76 Billig, Arguing, 70.

77 Billig, Arguing, 289, n. 2; 10. To be clear, however, Billig’s current conception of what his work suggests in relation to style differs slightly, but does provide the entrée into Hariman’s discussion that I assert is possible: “I am afraid my specific answers to your queries [regarding whether or not style should be construed as only adornment or as a compliment to argument] might be rather disappointing. You have clearly read Arguing and Thinking closely and have noted some inconsistencies in the way I wrote about style/form. You have the advantage over me: I have not looked at the book in a number of years (out of fear of finding inconsistencies, errors, spelling mistakes or worse etc). So I am not really in a position to justify the inconsistencies. But I can say something about my present view. I know that when writing Arguing and Thinking I was concerned about the tendency within rhetoric to ignore argumentation at the expense of style. So I probably went over too far in the direction of argumentation. If faced with an opposing view—that pinned everything on the idea of argumentation—I would probably say that style is important. But in practice it would be impossible to legislate general principles how to distinguish between style and argument, form and content, in any particular instance. I am sure that I paid insufficient attention to such matters in Arguing and Thinking, especially to the attempt to be more precise about what I meant by ‘form’ and ‘content’” (personal communication, 26 October 2004, email). His more recent work verifies how his newer interests dovetail with my approach to style: “Discursive psychologists stress that analysts should observe how language is used to see what speakers/writers are doing with discourse. . . . They will examine particular uses of metaphors and, by paying attention to the contexts of these utterances, note what the users of such metaphors are doing rhetorically and pragmatically” (Michael Billig and Katie MacMillan, “Metaphor, Idiom, and Ideology: The Search for ‘No Smoking Guns’ Across Time,” Discourse and Society 16 (July 2005): 459-80; in press version, 8).
the journal or book jettisoned anonymity in favor of agency; the “effect was to transfer authority from the corporate text to the individual contributor and thus understand authority as properly the outgrowth of individual personality and competence.” 78 That such agency is complicated by other factors—such as the relative degree of anonymity still afforded by the then-common practice of providing only first initials and then a full last name—is not in dispute. But in the history under review, the arguments are signed by an author and signify a given stance within a community of philosophers. No longer was the impersonal journal seen as the agent of change; no more were unsigned articles accepted as part of a collective and anonymous judgment. Authors were responsible to their opinions, and their opinions were evaluated as much for what was said as for how it was said. The judgments rendered upon Schiller operate, then as now, as means of qualifying the extent to which his views are seen as reasoned or groundless, pertinent or obstinate.

Recent attempts to complicate publics are a welcomed expansion of what had been a largely ossified, and unquestioned, matter of course in certain circles. But an expanded vocabulary need not imply forsaking pre-existing conceptions of public(s). While Jonathan Rose purports to deal with “the actual ordinary reader,” and Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer interrogate publics by positing their counters, this work of necessity works to reclaim the intellectual public. 79 I realize that part of the problem with any conception of an intellectual


public is that it has for too long stood in, as implied or explicitly stated, as the public to which all judgments are deferred. But, in the case of Schiller, the use of an intellectual public is grounded in the practices of those offering arguments. He, in contrast to Rosa Eberly’s citizen critics, largely wrote in academic journals and sought to engage other philosophers in debates about the nature of their pursuits.80

Regarding the issue of a rhetorical hermeneutic, I believe I have established that this project references more traditional forms of rhetorical criticism even as it necessarily extends itself to newer conceptions of the same. By being grounded (or is it set adrift) in the pages of text that form this conception of Schiller, there is the danger of developing a myopic version of close-text analysis, of reading the text as text and apart from any of its historical or contextual influences. But, given the range of this project, and its focus not on any one given text of Schiller’s or any one given reading of what pragmatism is said to mean, I am hoping to trace out similarities and dissimilarities in the private and public components of Schiller’s arguments, occurrences that help to compensate for any moves towards creating what John Guillory calls “subjective universality.”81 Granted, even within a seemingly stable historical context, those situated as ‘philosophers’ or ‘pragmatists’ are free to roam about and disagree on what constitutes the context(s) to which they all ascribe. That Schiller and Rorty are pragmatists is a given. That being pragmatists invests their works with different focuses suggests what is gained

80 Rosa A. Eberly, Citizen Critics: Literary Public Spheres (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000). Unlike Eberly, I am not willing to extend the distinction between intellectual and citizen critics into discussions of re-engaging the democratic practices of the public. I would question, even in this space, her rationale for doing so. Admittedly in the spirit of “polemics,” Eberly nonetheless suggested that “historical reconstruction is a fiction” (Agora, 2 April 2004, Department of Communication, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh). Even if this claim is only for effect, it significantly undercuts any suggestion of ‘re-engaging’ a sense of public that is, as her book purports, both factual and historical.

by this dissertation. By supplementing accepted, if conflicting, contemporary understandings of pragmatism, we develop a fuller—though by no means complete—picture of it as a development in the history of philosophy. By framing Schiller’s pragmatism within the larger historical context of which he was but one part, one runs less risk of proscribing his views as either all encompassing (what holds there holds elsewhere) or fixed (what is a condition of this exchange is necessarily distinguished from the next). For me, a rhetorical biography is but one way to engage a given object of study; it is neither a master key nor a broken door. It is a pragmatic “form of cultural rhetoric studies that takes as its topic specific historical acts of interpretation within their cultural context.”82 The central point is that the interpretative aspect is double-sided: it is an explanation of what persons meant that must always be shaded by what we understand them to mean. That it can be productive is what renders it a methodological option as opposed to a theoretical dogma.83

In much the same vein, I am resisting the potential to engage in what Michael C. McGee has noted as the “Whig fallacy,” the attempt to hold past historical examples to current rhetorical practices. He argues that this bias is “counterproductive first because it tautologically reinforces a monistic view of rhetoric—but more than that, the bias undercuts an opportunity to see rhetoric functioning in relatively ‘closed’ societies.”84 Clearly, the pragmatism of Schiller’s time is not

82 Steven Mailloux, “Interpretation and Rhetorical Hermeutics,” in Reception Study, 47.


84 Michael C. McGee, “The Rhetorical Process in Eighteenth Century England,” Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition, ed. Walter R. Fisher (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1974), 99. This is not to suggest that the opposite tendency might also be problematic. As L. H. Moat notes in reference to concerns expressed by Karl Wallace: “Commenting on the reluctance of the professional critic to render a final judgment as to the worth of the speech, Wallace explains that ‘a critic is unwise to assign to a contemporaneous product values
the pragmatism of Rorty’s time. And therein lays the necessity of rhetorical biography dealing in one at-least-now-accepted, and repeated, truth: “there is no substitute for research in primary sources.” This biography, aimed at Schiller’s relevance to and absence from pragmatism, must extend beyond the paltry coverage he has obtained. It must use the archives of his work, the opinions of the same, and the documents that exist in between what was written by and about him. His arguments will be held up to the counters of his peers. The books and articles he wrote will be subject to the reviews they garnered. Even the stated positions found in those texts will be examined in light of what he argued behind the scenes in letters to publishers and to friends. The cliché “the less that is said” is hopefully then transformed into “the more that is understood.”

This rhetorical biography, as was intimated at the onset, seeks to accrue benefits in three areas: the intellectual history of pragmatism, rhetorical history/criticism, and reception studies. As regards the first, this is both the fragmented history of a man and a contribution to the fragmented history of pragmatism. Schiller speaks not to, but for, pragmatism. He accounts for its origins even as his disappearance might spark anew a dialogue over a century in the making. Secondly, Schiller provides a new resource for a historically important method of inquiry. His is not a set speech, nor is he recognized as putting forth a required set of orations. But a rhetorical biography of Schiller points to the growth in rhetorical scholarship even as he, as an object of inquiry, extends its subjects. Thirdly, this dissertation seeks to texture the former two by recognizing the calls of Mailloux (a cultural critic and a literary interpreter) and Hariman (firmly which can best be assessed, if at all, by history” (“An Approach to Rhetorical Criticism,” in The Rhetorical, 164). While the suggestion of a “final” judgment has been made more problematic as of late, it is safe to suggest that either tendency, taken too far, can warp the value of a given act of criticism.

85 To be clear, current pragmatists are willing to admit their knowledge of Schiller is as limited as those who document its history. Rorty was kind enough to reply to me: “I’ve read some of Schiller, and rather liked his defense of Protagoras, but on the whole I am not sure that he added much to James. Still, maybe I haven’t [sic] read enough of him” (personal communication, 22 May 2004, email).

ensconced in the Speech Communication tradition) and by highlighting the interplay of both. The publications penned by Schiller tell the tale of the published Schiller. They enact a routine of reflection and revision as familiar to the published author as to the public consumer; they are, in a word, tactical. But the Schiller who published was a person who puzzled over how he would be interpreted. Tucked away in letters, departmental memos, and private records are the clews as to who he was before and after the last draft was sent off to be editor. I should finally add, independent of the above noted benefits, that this is a work of valuation. I see in Schiller an untapped source of new discussion, debate, and, yes, controversy. And to be clear, this is the Schiller I see. But that is, ultimately, the point. No author choose a topic at random, at least not one who hopes to be put to print or at best not one who follows it through to the printing process. As banal as it might seem, it stands to be mentioned: I am invested in putting Schiller back into the pragmatic canon and I welcome, for hopefully good but cognizant of ill, what such an investment might incur. The structure of this venture is the last part of this chapter.

1.4 A LIFE IN THE DETAILS: THE OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

1.4.1 Evolution and the Spirit 1882-1897.

Schiller’s English upbringing was, without exaggeration, a refined one. He was trained in the best schools and excelled in his studies. This provides only the back-story. For, even as an undergraduate and graduate student, Schiller was establishing his philosophy and revising its meaning. And he was doing so amidst the powerful strains of British Idealism operative in English philosophy at the time. His Riddles of the Sphinx (1891) is a philosophical “metaphysic” cast in the garb of evolutionary science. But it is also a transitional work. In the
years prior to its publication Schiller works to reconcile his decidedly idiosyncratic views of religion with the emerging “faith” in science. In the years after its release, he attempts to merge the two into a philosophical position that avoids both abstract spirituality and mechanistic naturalism.

In the late-1890s Schiller works to turn his studies at Cornell into a long-term tutorship at Corpus Christi. More important than these career changes, though, are the theoretical insights he gained while in America. During a time that can arguably be classified as pre-pragmatic, Schiller made the acquaintance of William James and became captivated by the older mentor’s work in psychology. James’s psychology—with its blending of the personal, the social, and the spiritual—only further refined the concepts that Schiller had been working to bring together prior to leaving England. And, as he returned, Schiller set off on a path that was a complex mix of his earlier ideas and newest insights.

In Chapter Two I will tell a two-part tale. It is, in one sense, a history of Schiller’s educational beginnings. Philosophy still saw the blinding lights of Idealism trace their paths across the walls of universities in both Britain and America. At the same time, however, the halls behind those institutions’ walls were markedly different. Oxford, not yet weaned from its almost constant diet of the classics, was still truly a bastion of the Victorian elite. Cornell, by no means a Land Grant school, was operating from the American principle that elites were of different sorts: the bureaucrats who controlled the business of the institution and the professors who were charged to take care of the minds housed therein. In another sense, however, this is the history of Schiller’s introduction to what would become pragmatism. Schiller, as a student and then academic, was swimming amidst the powerful currents of the ebbing swell of Anglo-

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Hegelianism thought. This approach to philosophy extended beyond Britain’s shores and even touched upon another of the early pragmatists, Dewey. But, in Schiller’s early academic years, we can trace the interests that signal his distance from Dewey and closeness to James.

1.4.2 The Psychology of Pragmatism 1898-1905.

Schiller’s return to England coincided with the announcement of pragmatism in America. In the span of a year, James published The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897) and Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898). These two books set off a blaze of debate, in both America and Europe, which pitted the defenders of Idealism against the advocates of this new, ethical, “practicalism.” They also signaled the start of a long and valuable series of correspondences between James and Schiller. By the time pragmatism was announced to the British philosophical public in 1900, Schiller was already well on his way to articulating, and defending, pragmatism to his peers. But it is pragmatism of a very specific sort. It traces back to James’s volitionally-tinged psychology, with its subjective-centered handling of the objective world. And it points toward what even then James is calling “radical empiricism,” to the role that individuals play in comprehending and interpreting the world . . . as they conceive it.

Schiller’s strategy for promoting this cause, one that was to be repeated throughout his career, was to mix seriousness with satire. In 1901, he unleashed Mind!, a satire of the venerated Oxford philosophical journal. Not content merely to topple dead idols, Schiller chose also to focus his ire on living representatives of Absolute Idealism. In 1902, he published “Axioms as Postulates,” arguing that the will to believe was a right and a tentative, and adapting, one at that. The results, like the strategy, were mixed. Defending the novelty and risk of a world in flux
gained him a measure of popularity. But it gained him an equal measure of notoriety. James, welcoming all comers to this new approach, warns Schiller that the satire might come to impede the substance of his contributions. Schiller paid little heed to the warnings. Instead he attempted to outflank the opposition by changing the rules, and names, of the debate. If James’s **pragmatism** was the psychological method, then Schiller’s **humanism** was meant to be its expansion to cover all aspects of human inquiry.

In Chapter Three the central issue is one of proximity. While Schiller is far afield of James’s proclamations for pragmatism, he is much closer on several other counts. In the first place, the affinity he shows for James’s views and the lengths to which he goes to defend those views suggests no mere hanger-on to the cause. Point in fact, Schiller’s defense of pragmatism is as much an argument for what he brought to the cause as it is for the spaciousness which James desires. In the second place, James’s call to arms—against formalism, against abstraction, against philosophy itself—can be traced back to the influences that British philosophy had on philosophy in general. As a result, Schiller is much closer to the source of the prevalent idealistic currents. While James carries on genial disagreements with Josiah Royce in the confines of Cambridge, Schiller is doing battle with the Bradleys, McTaggarts, and Taylors who continue to hold court at Oxford and Cambridge. His distance from James likely contributed to his willingness to ignore warnings; his closeness to his chosen foes likely blindered him to the consequences.

1.4.3 **The Mettle of Humanism 1906-1910.**

Having sided with pragmatism, and then with the more expansive humanism, Schiller must demonstrate that the former leads into the latter. To do so, he adopts the exemplar Protagoras
and, with him, the dictum: “man is the measure.” These choices are well suited to his particular philosophical outlook. If James’s psychology provides the mechanism by which to understand the human consciousness, then his pragmatism provides the method by which to organize and control its functions. If the human mind can conceive of realities heretofore unproven, can postulate an existence beyond what is considered reality per se, then pragmatism can be made to undertake an examination of the world beyond philosophy per se. So conceived, philosophy’s domain is humanity’s domain. And the terminus of humanity’s potential is only a measure of the constraints it places upon itself.

This is, notably in the collection Studies in Humanism (1907) and the extended essay Plato or Protagoras? (1908), an expansive and optimistic outlook. But this attitude is advanced along shriller lines as well. Schiller becomes increasingly fixated on proving the errors of those not enamored of this way of thinking. The result is the creation of an anti-exemplar: Francis Herbert Bradley. If Protagoras suggests the potential in man, Bradley stands in for his failures. As pragmatism resolves problematic situations, Idealism devolves into tired clichés. While humanism champions optimism, Bradley’s philosophy traffics in pessimism. The serious and satirical mix uncomfortably in these, and other, debates. The humor of Mind! now approaches ridicule. The keen insight that so moved James—the unwavering defense of the progressive powers of the human mind—now stumbles over a stationary and respected object of scorn.

Chapter Four, then, is an examination of consequence. As much as James’s death in 1910 is devastating, James’s warnings had largely gone unheeded. Schiller plowed ahead, rarely stopping to consider that the sum result of his arguments would not be cowed acceptance. On page after page, though, the message was rarely altered: (1) to fall for traditional philosophy is to court absurdity, (2) to ignore circumstance and context is to divorce theory from practice, (3) to
wallow in formalism is to avoid risk as much as it is to banish novelty. But James’s voice had served a regulative function. He was a sounding board for arguments in development, an inspiration for well-lobbed refutations. And now he was gone. As much as the most telling consequence is a rebuke to professional advancement, the more lasting outcome is personal. Schiller and humanism, his passionate defense of Jamesian pragmatism, are now left to fend for themselves.

1.4.4 The Long Shadow 1911-1919.

Absent James, Schiller continues his defense of pragmatic humanism. The arguments veer from personal attacks to pointed refutations of formal logic. But there is a new counter to Schiller, one not based in his oft-repeated complaints about Idealism’s defenders and their creeds. He is now forced to defend the memory of James against competing interpretations from within the pragmatic camp. His earlier distance from pragmatism in America fueled his arguments and gained the movement (not always favorable) attention. But it is now being suggested as a divide that renders Schiller’s views out of touch with more recent development. And his only substantial philosophical work of this period, Formal Logic (1912), does nothing to allay the suspicion that Schiller’s role was and is as a defender and not promoter.

The work that Schiller undertakes during this period runs up against the realities of the past even as it is contextually anchored to the stark details of the present. The humorous invectives again prove corrosive to his career. Schiller is twice more rebuked in his attempts to gain a professorship. Not surprisingly, the jobs go to persons more suited to the ideals and Idealism of Oxford. All this transpires against the backdrop of a Europe in decline and then at
The optimism that heralded the birth of pragmatism is less in view. Its view of the future as pregnant with potential is cast in the shadows of uncertainty.

Chapter Five is a tale of the ruptures brought about by social and personal factors. I will focus on the developing split in Schiller’s scholarly persona as perceived by those he addressed. On the one side, and primarily among his few European devotees, we are told that “in the sleepy world of modern philosophy F. C. S. Schiller stands for an idea which is very simple, and has for that very reason been long forgotten: the idea that theories should lead to practical results.” On the other, we are told that Schiller’s Formal Logic “lacks the sympathy of reinterpretation which his subject demands; and its frequent lack of fairness to the older point of view, as well as its neglect of all the more concrete modern discussions of Logic . . . go far towards destroying the seriousness and usefulness of the understanding.” These tumultuous years bring into stark relief the status of pragmatic humanism. It is a salve for those wanting hope, an irritation to those seeking more.

1.4.5 The Risks of Doubt 1920-1926.

World War I proves a turning point, as a mere matter of dates or as a more profound pivot, in Schiller’s pragmatic humanism. He retains an interest in previous subjects—science, religion, and logic—but suggests that pragmatism is meant to discuss other issues of import. This shift is telling. One notes that his studies in humanism have been translated into problems, not just of contingency, but of belief. This is a seemingly Jamesian question of the will and what it can


accomplish. But there is now an edge to such queries of accomplishment. Questions of survival, of the future of man, now occupy as much if not more space than issues of seers and science.

The figure of Tantalus seems ominous. After Zeppelin attacks, decimated cities, and depictions of barbarous battlefield tactics, Schiller questions the degree to which man is the measure of crafting his own pragmatic, and humanistic, destiny. The end to war only signals, for Schiller, piecemeal adjustments and no long term solutions. Tantalus, having given up his father Zeus’s secrets, is destined to be denied food or drink as he suffers in a pained pool of his own making. England, and the world, are ripe for a solution to this ebb in human potential. Schiller, in short, returns to reflect upon Darwin as he casts his gaze towards the unsteady glow beyond the caverns of contemporary philosophy.

In Chapter Six I will emphasize the developing gap between what Schiller’s pragmatic humanism argued for and what Schiller saw as happening to the world around him. Schiller still pursues with vigor his other interests, jabbing and jesting with his cohorts and critics. But the present day seems to be slipping beyond his grasp. For Schiller, modern man is Tantalus, precariously perched on the brink of becoming “more bestial than any beast.” 90 This is Schiller, the skeptic of science, making predictions hedged by only the slightest of qualifications. This is a pragmatist searching for a way in which the possibilities of humanity can be translated into practical results. But it is a search tinged with a heretofore unexpressed degree of doubt. The

90 F. C. S. Schiller, Tantalus, 65-6. The full quotation shows Schiller’s ambivalence: “. . . I would not presume to predict that he will save himself: history affords no unambiguous guide. It seems to show that something worse and something better than what actually happens is always conceivable, and that neither our hopes nor our fears are ever fully. If so, poor Tantalus, hoping against hope, fearing against reason, may muddle along for a good long while yet, without repeating either his ancient error of imagining that he could sup with the gods, or his modern folly of using his reason, as Goethe’s Mephistopheles declared, only to become more bestial than any beast!”
progressive nature of Schiller’s pragmatism, set against the stark depictions of a war that didn’t end all wars, seems all the less secure in its provisionality.

1.4.6 Out of the Light, Into the Cave 1927-1939.

At sixty-two, with no prospect of promotion and failing health, Schiller has resigned his post at Oxford. But he does not remain idle. Schiller is now a transnational talent, splitting his time between America and Britain, afforded a chance to lecture at places such as the College of the Pacific, Claremont, and the University of Southern California. He is allowed the luxury of expanding upon those topics which mean the most to him, to reiterate the themes that have dominated his philosophy for the past several decades. In 1935, he permanently transitions from England to California with the help of his new wife. Though still drafting articles and reviews for the *Personalist*, he resigns his post at USC. His new life is, as they say, short-lived. He dies in California only two years later, on August 6, 1937, at the age of seventy-three.

Schiller’s arguments during this time are slowed by the decline in his health and by the aggressive travel schedule he maintains. But his focus does not waver in those arguments he does offer. He continues to question the promotion of traditional logics. Though the shift has been from the formal to the symbolic, Schiller continues to assert that a reduction of thinking to form without context is the creation of thinking without consequence. In their place Schiller attempt to provide a productive *Logic for Use* (1929). He remains confident that the “real” world extends beyond the domain of accepted philosophy. In *Social Decay and Eugenic Reform* (1932), Schiller urges that a love of wisdom demands the reform of the social circumstances which give rise to the development of individuals. In *Must Philosophers Disagree?* (1934) he
argues that such a love should extend also to consider the implications of recent science and current educational practices.

Taken generally, Chapter Seven would seem to focus on the summation of a prolific career. But there is more. There are final attempts by him to salvage the Jamesian wing of pragmatism of which Schiller felt himself the chief representative. These arguments face a solid wall of criticism raised by the American pragmatists reared on the semiotics of Peirce, a differently interpreted James, and the social scientific instrumentalism of Dewey. There is also a sense of paradox, of conflicted resignation, in the posthumous Our Human Truths (1939). The Idealism Schiller had long fought lay dead in no small part due to his work. But the cause of pragmatism he long championed was now in the hands of others. His final comments, then, are a mix of hope and doubt. The hope that pragmatism will continue to face up to the diversity of its interests; the doubt that the world he sees is the one best suited to that challenge.

1.4.7 Conclusion: The Pragmatism of Appearances.

Chapter Eight is, then, an attempt to pull together all of the topics Schiller dealt with—logic, science and history, psychical research, and eugenic reform—during the course of his career. It is an attempt to explain the appearance of pragmatism today as it is refracted through the pragmatism that Schiller helped to instigate. By examining Schiller’s reception while alive, we might more fully understand the important role he played in bringing pragmatism to the attention of the philosophical public. By examining the philosophical narrative that emerged after he died, we might more clearly understand the role Schiller’s reception played in his removal from pragmatism’s history. The result is both revisionist and interpretative. It is the first in that it proposes an alternative to the historical narrative about pragmatism that developed from the
1940s through the 1970s. It is the second in that it argues for what Schiller, reintroduced to the fold, can add to a range of current discussion in which pragmatism plays a role.

This gathering of strands is, as it were, tied to the methods of this rhetorical biography. It focuses on the style of Schiller’s arguments as much as their content. And it emphasizes the repetition of key themes as much as it scrutinizes specific instances of argument. It attends to his works, as published and as privately poured over. It lets Schiller have his say, but rarely asserts that his version of pragmatism is the final word. This dissertation, as an act of interpretation, is predicated on what my acts, as an interpreter, are able to discern. In that sense, this final chapter is much the same as pragmatism itself.

You see, pragmatism is like all theoretical constructs. It suffers and succeeds in the narratives told, often with insight and occasionally with style, by way of the interpretations offered. Is pragmatism prophetic or is it public and private? Is the suggestion of pragmatism as American and democratic the result of American and democratic hopes in those who put quill to well? As a theoretical tradition, it is most certainly all of those things. But it has, until lately, been told as a tale with a truncated cast. Schiller affords us a chance to examine anew what the past and the present have to say . . . about themselves and each other. In parsing out the distinctions between old and new pragmatism, Kloppenberg’s comments are telling in their relation to the appearance(s) of pragmatism:

Just as people in the past selected parts of their experience to record and preserve in the records that they left us, we select parts of the past to examine and we choose how to tell our stories. But to admit that interpretation is important is not to claim that everything is interpretation. It is crucial that we historians be able to distinguish what happened from what did not, and what was written from what was not, and our discursive community must test its propositions in the widest range of public forums.91

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It appears, then, that the insights gained from examining Schiller’s role in pragmatism accrue sanction, not only from what his documents detail, but from what pragmatism’s defenders demand. And, well aware of the daunting task they have undertaken, I tip my hat to them and offer this work as a humble extension of their own.
I care only about the question whether he [Lotze] does or does not argue from the interactions to a unity which explains them, and is their ratio essendi [basis for being], while they are its ratio cognoscendi [basis for cognition]. For I contend he has no right to argue thus.¹

Suggesting the trajectory of a writer’s thoughts is as much about guessing as it is about knowing. When that writer is little known, and even less obliged by the records kept, it is often the guess that wins out. But, by holding to those records and using them as a guide, one stands a better chance that one makes a reasoned estimate. Such is the hope with these years in Schiller’s life.

The public Schiller was, as is still often the case with fledgling academics, not often in view. He published very little till he had his degree in hand. The private Schiller was, to be fair, buried in books. Yet those private documents which do exist, coupled with the public ones that have received little scrutiny, help to craft a picture of Schiller attempting to picture a philosophical view bigger than the one he received. It is against, and eventually beyond, Idealism that we find Schiller to be struggling. It is between, and then within religion and science, that he comes to find the answers.

This is, to be accurate, the pre-pragmatic era. Peirce’s contributions had yet to be reclaimed. The Metaphysical Club had yet to be recovered. Even the term, pragmatism, had yet to be crafted. For much of this period, Schiller is at work in England and under the influence of the dominant strain of British philosophy, Absolute Idealism. It is from this vantage point that he crafts his first work, Riddles of the Sphinx (1891). But, shortly thereafter, he finds himself within the developing grasp of American philosophy. The influence comes less from his

conflicted tenure at Cornell. It has more to do with the ideas issuing from a nearby school, Harvard. For it is the psychology, and the support, of William James that offers Schiller the first inkling of how to harmonize his contested British training with his idiosyncratic philosophic leanings. In these years the fundamental components of pragmatism are already in place; it is no stretch to add that the essentials of Schiller’s pragmatic humanism are also in view.

2.1 THE GROOVES OF A BRITISH EDUCATION: SCHILLER’S EARLY YEARS

Schiller’s records only allow as much access as their details provide. And prior to Schiller’s entry into Balliol, they yield little. They do draw up one childhood fact: as a young lad Schiller was not a great writer. The future stylist was, in a word, a “poor” writer. Whether this deficiency in writing was due to having spoken German as a child, one cannot say. But the scant information available suggests that it was more a matter of concentration, not comprehension. The “Lower School Report of Conduct and Progress for Easter term 1872” from Belsize Manor, Hampstead, finds the eight-year-old Schiller receiving “highly” and “very satisfactory” marks in Geography and History, and “progressing rapidly” in English; but, as regards Writing, he is “not careful, but improves.”

This problem follows him in his transfer, at age ten, to the School at University College, London, in 1874. As regards Schiller’s “conduct, diligence, and progress” in subjects such as Latin and Arithmetic, English and Geography, he usually places one (out of three), occasionally two, and averages in the middle to upper portion of his class. But his Writing skill is noted as a

2 Scholastic Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
“lit. slow,” his marks for diligence and progress are both three, and he is ranked thirty out of thirty-one boys. What a difference a year makes. By the “Third Month of Lent Term [April] 1875” his Writing records have improved and, save for an extended absence in the second month of the Summer Term [June], he consistently receives ones and twos in the three evaluation areas, and averages near the top of his class in all subjects save Math.3

The anecdotal evidence suggests that this improvement carried over into Schiller’s time at the Rugby Boarding School, Rugby. In 1880, at age sixteen, his father received this report from the Headmaster, Thomas William Jex-Blake:

My dear Sir
I am thoroughly content with your son. He has done a good term’s work; and a good Examination for his age.
He has an excellent understanding, and many aptitudes: is pleasant to teach or to deal with: and shines in confidence.
He is a little desponding if any part of his work falls below a high standard, e.g. Verification; but this is not reasonable, for he does his worst work well, considering his age, and is a very promising boy.
The Reports sent in to me, are
Math. Has ability but wants accuracy.
Altogether we should be thankful.

Yours sincerely4

If anything, there was little semblance of the fellow who had been a little slow at the School at University College. “While at Rugby he showed decided symptoms of intelligence, so he was picked as a probable winner in the scholastic race and put in training for the classical

3 “University College, London, School Reports,” June 1874-July 1877, Scholastic Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

4 Thomas William Jex-Blake, Rugby, to Ferdinand Schiller, Sr., 20 December 1880, Scholastic Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
These scholarships provided the monies—in the form of prizes for which classmates would compete in the recitation of classical verses and the like—that covered one’s stay at the school. Should the student be particularly adept, these competitions could help pave his (girls were not admitted until 1976) way into one of Oxford’s colleges by way of what was known as the Balliol Scholarship. Both of which happened. “Much as Schiller detested making verses in a dead language, he did it so well that he got a Major Exhibition. This gave him three hundred and fifty dollars for five years as well as four hundred and fifty dollars in Exhibitions from Rugby.” On 17 October 1882, Schiller matriculated to Balliol.

It is difficult to overstate the import of Schiller’s arrival at Balliol. Slosson manages to do so. At the same time, however, he accurately assesses the world to which Schiller was being entrusted. Having secured the scholarship, Schiller was free to continue his education at a good school.

But it also meant that he had sold himself to run in a harness for another four years at Balliol and was obliged to master a philosophy which he already felt to be a fraud. T. H. Green had died just before Schiller came up and had been sainted for the greater glory of Balliol, and it seemed to the tutors good pedagogy to set their pupils to begin the study of philosophy with Green’s “Prolegomena to Ethics.” Most of the boys confronted with this abstruse introduction came to the conclusion that it was a wonderful metaphysics because they could not see any sense in it. Schiller very curiously came to the opposite conclusion from the same premise.

That the eighteen year old Schiller, like many eighteen year olds, might have been a bit of a rebel is hardly far-fetched. That he had already pronounced as “a fraud” philosophy, one assumes of

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6 Not that the costs associated with Rugby were exorbitant. Around the time of Schiller’s stay, and Jex-Blake’s tenure, the tension between students headed for a university career and those who were destined to agrarian or commerce-based occupations were still being worked through. For more on this period of time, see J. B. Hope Simpson, “Recovery,” *Rugby Since Arnold* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 101-31.


8 Slosson, *Six*, 200.
the idealistic sort, is less likely. It is far more even-handed to say, given what the records do and do not say, that Schiller rapidly came to view Balliol, and Oxford by extension, as out of step with his developing philosophical views. Key to this developing schism were three men who stood large in the dealings of Oxford at the time: Benjamin Jowett, Thomas Hill Green, and Francis Herbert Bradley. And all three men were witness to what is best expressed, as one reads through the commentaries on them and Oxford at the time, as a Jamesian ‘buzzing confusion’: a conflicted reliance on the classics in the Examination System, the emerging influence of Darwinian evolutionary theories, and a newly articulated social/philosophical approach by way of German, rather than English, exemplars.

Like the competitive system at Rugby, Oxford found itself beholden to a system far different than the one that had existed at the start of the 19th century. Then, the passing of exams was heralded with scraps of paper barely worth the printing. But, by the 1870s, the examinations were part and parcel of an undergraduate student’s life, with Balliol emerging as the leader in Greats system. The Greats represented, in the views of many, the culmination of the Victorian education. It was a two part examination system which exemplified what it meant to be a truly “cultured” University student: (1) Classic Moderations, or Mods., with a focus on “language and literature”; and (2) Literae Humaniores, or Lit. Hums., with a focus on “history and philosophy.”

Concomitant with this development was the bureaucratic system by which it was carried out. Reams of paperwork were published for both studying and heralding the examinations. Localized examination agencies were set up throughout the country. And Oxford, in 1882, cemented the rise of the system with the opening of the opulent and self-evidently titled

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Examination Schools. The writer John Ruskin, returning to his alma mater, responded in a manner not out of step with the views Schiller would express later in life. He “found the influence of examinations all-pervasive as compared with his undergraduate days, [and] thought it ‘expressive of the tendencies of the age’ that Oxford had spent a vast sum on a highly ornamental building ‘for the torture and shame of her scholars.’”

Jowett (1817-1893), within this milieu, provides the organizational foil to Schiller’s developing antagonisms. As a tutor since the 1840s and the Master of Balliol from 1870-1893, Jowett was beset with the task of adapting Balliol to the realities of the time. He had, in essence, to meld his own views to a world that had witnessed the publication of Darwin’s *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859). His answer was a novel synthesis (no pun intended) of religious belief and progressive interpretation. In 1860, Jowett and several peers published *Essays and Reviews*. Therein, he “argued that the Bible must be interpreted like any other book, if it is to be understood properly.” Rather than cast a death knell for religion (as some harsh critics assumed), Jowett saw this as a corrective in favor of religion in an age of reason. Like other religious men of the time, “he believed the greatest danger to religion was to be found, not in reason or science, but rather in the possibility that intelligent and good men might reject what is true in Christianity because of the implausible form in which it was presented to them . . .” At the same time, Jowett was perhaps most responsible for instilling in


Green, his student, an interest in German philosophical thought. But by the time of Schiller’s arrival, Jowett can be found already to exclaim:

‘I have been reading German philosophy,’ he writes on August 10 [1881]—‘an old love to which I return. It has died in Germany and come to England. But it is with regret I see the amount of genius that has been spent in spinning imaginary systems. Yet I seem to get something from them, though not what their authors intended.’

One of Jowett’s “disciples” puts the point of difference humorously such: “They say at Oxford that both Jowett and T. H. Green plunged into the whirlpool of German metaphysics, that Green was permanently engulfed, but that Jowett at least made his escape.”

Whether an escape or retreat for the old don, his younger pupil was not simply taken over by Hegel. If anything, Green (1836-1882) is seen molding a Hegelian skin around the particular needs of his British context. Like Jowett, Green attempts to make sense out of the classical and religious traditions of Oxford while, at the same time, adapting them to the implications of: (1) an enlarged (Germanic) philosophical viewpoint, and (2) a new scientific (Darwinian) worldview. And it is no oversimplification to suggest that these changes in Oxford coincided with the dates that Green spent there. The question is what approach did Green take? In a gloss, Green took to enlarging and abstracting the more traditional religious notion of God so that it was “in someway immanent within all creation, possibly evolving in creation.”

A God made Good, or Absolute, could thereby envelop, or subsume, the changes suggested in a Darwinian account of nature. It could respond to the objections of those who wished to enshrine the Lockean and Humean (British) approaches over and against the Kantian and Hegelian (German)


14 Lionel A. Tollemache, Benjamin Jowett: Master of Balliol (London: Edward Arnold, nd), 70.

counterpoints. Green labeled the promoters of the former view “sophists” and, in 1868, chastised them. As W. H. Walsh explains:

In an all too brief characterization of the type of thinking involved Green mentions four points: that it works with sharp dichotomies which a sounder philosophy would leave fluid; that it ‘abhors the analysis of knowledge’, meaning, I think, that it takes the facts of the cognitive and conative situations as revealed in immediate consciousness as final and uncontroversial; that it accepts certain key ideas without further investigating their origins or establishing their validity through critical examinations; finally, that it must ‘ultimately be skeptical and destructive’, the first because it is in too much of a hurry to be consistent, the second because ‘its dichotomous formulae are inadequate to comprehend the real world of morals, religion and law’.

In the period of time between his entrance into the school in 1855 and his death in 1882, Green worked—as student, fellow, tutor and then professor—to develop this more fluid philosophy and to bring it to fruition within the halls of Oxford. And Green, like his mentor, sought out ways to apply his philosophical approach. While Jowett primarily attended to the governance and dominance of the school with which he came to be so intimately associated, Green branched out to engage in political reforms such as the temperance movement. Philosophy at this time was, to be sure, active inside and outside the walls of Oxford.

In contrast to Jowett’s and Green’s philosophical approaches, Bradley (1846-1924) seems out of sorts. To push this point too far would be unfair as Bradley. For, unlike the previous, he was the young heir to the academic groundwork laid by Jowett at Balliol and the philosophical

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outline that Green articulated. When A. M. Quinton suggests, that alongside the public and academic work of Green, Bradley “looks pretentious and self-indulgent,” he is upholding oft-raised impressions but not holding to manners. That being said, it is not at all easy to develop a positive picture of the man. Often sickly and by even sympathetic accounts somewhat reclusive, Bradley existed in a realm that was, for good and ill, largely cut off from the day to day affairs of Oxford life. Even Philip MacEwen, in a book dedicated to an exploration of Bradley’s thoughts, couches his analysis in ambivalence. He labels his work an “example of trying to understand Bradley as much as possible on his own terms.” What, then, of those terms? Like Green, Bradley was an inheritor of the German infusion into Oxford’s canon fostered by Jowett. Unlike Green, and owing to his particular circumstances—tenured as a Merton Fellow in 1870, he taught no classes and remained in that position till his death—Bradley pushed the implications of Absolute Idealism (or British Hegelianism, and sometimes intellectualism) further in the metaphysical direction and was it’s times most heralded exponent. In simplified form, something detractors and defenders both admit particularly difficult when discussing Bradley, the most crucial component of his philosophy, and the one that will undergo substantial analysis later, is this: that which is real is not contradictory. As Philip Ferreria explains:

Indeed, the difference between what is understood as ultimately real and what is not (that is to say, “appearance”) is most often stated by Bradley in just these terms. The real, we are told, is real precisely because it contains no contradiction or inconsistency. Its


diverse aspects and differentiated elements are such as to always be both wholly intelligible and completely necessary. . . . he believes the internal structure of reality to always possess a “reason why” and a “because” that would—if we could apprehend it—provide a complete satisfaction to our fundamental need to know.  

This is Green’s criticism of the “sophists” taken on a far larger scale. It denigrates the argument from experience even as it privileges the experience of the isolated thinker. This is a metaphysical system posited, not on the traditional views of British empiricists, but on an evolutionary synthesis postulated, though not as yet experienced, by the mind.

In reviewing the preceding, it is difficult nowadays to understand the impact this philosophic and academic arena would have on a newly minted and freshly rewarded student such as Schiller. But, if we recall my comment as regards the buzzing confusion of these times, we can also reach some conclusions. By the time Schiller reached Balliol’s halls, Absolute Idealism had become the operative mode of philosophic thought at Oxford. In response to the crisis of religious conscience aroused by Darwin and in answer to the political needs of the times, Absolute Idealism—still intermingled with connecting strands of classical thought from Aristotle and others—exerted its will upon the new rows of students. And what will. As Quinton argues, it “arose in something very like a philosophical vacuum,” and “exercised full intellectual authority in Britain in the three decades between 1874 and 1903.” But a vacuum may be an imperfect metaphor. Subject to the philosophical right of way given to Absolute Idealism, Schiller is seen to be pushing against the walls of the halls in which he excelled.


21 Quinton, Absolute, 5.
2.2 KEYS TO THE RIDDLE: SCHILLER’S FORMATIVE WRITINGS

Unlike his early years, there is more public and private documentation related to Schiller’s time at Balliol. The Balliol Register, for its part, summarizes these details: Schiller received a 1st in Classic Moderations in 1883; a 1st in Literae Humanitores and his B.A. in 1886; and he was a Taylorian Scholar in German in 1887.22 These items alone attest to the fact that, as much as he may have found the processes surrounding him fraudulent, he excelled in giving his getters what they wished. Yet the varied writings found in his diary and notebooks23 suggest the Schiller was dealing with at least three concomitant issues: (1) his frustration with his training at Balliol as it related to, (2) the hypocrisy of the established views of religion, and (3) the philosophical implications of, and problems with, holding to them in the world post-Darwin.

One note, upon first glance, seems rather banal. But, upon inspection, it points to frustrations that Schiller would carry with him throughout his career:

May 8: Happy Thought. [words crossed out] The Use of Radicals after Death. To suggest novelties in punishment to His Satanic Majesty. (c.s) ‘Ah’ exclaimed Mr. Stockton (Tyndall) “the whole teachings of that school (Jenkinson-Jowett-Broad-Church) have always seemed to me nothing more than a few fragments of science imperfectly understood, obscured by a few fragments of Christianity imperfectly remembered.” You forget that Dr. Jenkinsons Christianity is really a new firm trading under an old name + trying to purchase the goodwill of the former establishment.” (Leslie).

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23 A note regarding the transcription of notebooks and letters: in all cases I have attempted to hold to the original formatting, spelling, and punctuation found in these documents. In cases where the transcription cannot be guaranteed, it is indicated with (?); all other instances of parenthetical comment are the original authors. Where the document contains what seems to be an obvious error, it is indicated with [sic]. In cases where the information is crossed out but illegible, it is indicated by [ ] containing either a partial/potential transcription or an explanation. Any abbreviation of the text is noted by way of ellipses. Additional [ ] include information, such as full names or biographic dates, that might aid the reader in understanding the materials therein. In cases where such information would detract from the flow of the document, additional material will be provided in footnotes. At least one symbol needs additional clarification. In certain cases authors used “?” as shorthand for “the.”
'It is simply our modern atheism trying to hide its own nakedness, for the benefit of the more prudish part of the public, in the cast off grave clothes of a Christ, who, whether he [sic] rises or no, is very certainly, as the angel said ‘Not here.’ (New Republic)’

Several issues of context are needed. **Stockton (Tyndall)** is Prof. John Tyndall, a contemporary of Benjamin Jowett’s. The **Jenkinson** referred to is Jowett, in which he is recast as the offspring of the earlier Balliol Headmaster Richard Jenykins. And **Broad** and **Church** are Schiller’s references to those liberal minded Anglican religious leaders, like Jowett, common at Balliol and known as Broad Churchmen (as opposed to their conservative counterparts, the High Churchmen). The [Robert] Leslie referred to is a student named William Money Hardinge, who is alleged to have had a homosexual affair with a candidate for proctorship, Walter Pater, whose ascension Jowett blocked after having been his friend. The whole affair, with the “coded” names in place, was written about by another Balliol student and philosopher, William Hurell Mallock, in his work *The New Republic: Culture, Faith, and Philosophy in an English Country House* (1878).  

Why such entry? Not only does it take aim at the prevailing religious views at Balliol, but it suggests a certain aversion to what they suggest philosophically. And why the comment, initialed by him, about the use of Radicals (which many of the Broad Churchmen were seen to be)? It is clear that Schiller was in on the message of the satire, otherwise his entry would not have included Tyndall, Broad, or Church in parentheticals. A later entry suggests that Schiller saw hypocrisy in the piety of those who wished to downplay the humanity of others so as to erect

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24 F. C. S. Schiller, 8 May 1883, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

25 Pater is the subject of several websites. The details of this “affair,” on which the above is appreciatively based, can be found in: Laurel Brake and Ian Small, eds., “Estrangement and Connection: Walter Pater, Benjamin Jowett, and William M. Hardinge,” *Pater in the 1900s*, available from [www.uncg.edu/eng/elt/pater/index.html](http://www.uncg.edu/eng/elt/pater/index.html), Internet.
their own conscriptions: “June 6-June 7: There is only one commandment + that is ‘Don’t be found out.’ It includes all others for with a future life, we may be sure that God will find out punish wickedness + without it it is all we want.”

Again, we should stop to contextualize this comment. John Jones notes that, as early as 1881, Jowett had developed a reputation “as a pompous know-all” that was summed up in an anonymous broadsheet:

First come I. My name is J-W-TT,
There’s no knowledge but I know it.
I am Master of this College.
What I don’t know isn’t knowledge.

But how does this relate to Schiller’s notebook entry? There is an aphorism ascribed to Jowett which reads: “Be a reformer. Don’t be found out.”

Clearly, or at least relatively so, we can assert that something about the Broad Church reformer(s) struck Schiller as flawed. Less than a year later, Schiller injects a bit of levity into his ruminations. And it already demonstrates his talent for mixing humor and criticism as regards such solemn, for some, matters: “January 24: ‘Yes he was a very pious man, but his faith was of the kind that moves laughter.’ (c.s.).”

These points are actually quite in line with the more robust theory of humanism that Schiller would develop in later years. What good is any standard that, conscientiously applied, ends in us doing more harm than good? As Schiller states in January 1884:

For although in the abstract we should never do wrong for any purpose whatever, yet as soon as we translate thought into action we find that it is impossible not to be

26 F. C. S. Schiller, 6 June-7 June 1883, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

27 Jones, Balliol, 222.

28 Jones, Balliol, 224; also in Abbott and Campbell, The Life, 1, 78.

29 F. C. S. Schiller, 24 January 1884, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
perpetually sinning. I mean that as Absolute Good + Absolute Evil do not exist on Earth we cannot do an absolutely good or absolutely bad action, . . . This doctrine ceases therefore to be immoral as soon as we realize that we are what we are in consequence of our own actions, either in this life. If it is objected that it makes Value identical with + dependent upon Knowledge I would answer that it undoubtedly explains the fact that Virtue is so dependent. . . . Unless some such principle as that of the ends justifying the means is adopted all moral action is rendered impossible.  

For Schiller absolute injunctions, even those couched in the most benevolent of terms, turn out to be flaccid in the world of everyday experience.

But Schiller was already, informally and formally, moving beyond the realm of everyday experience. His early interest in psychical research is clearly in view. In a lengthy entry, dated 20 June 1884, Schiller relays his involvement in a “slate writing séance” featuring the medium William Eglington (1858-1933). 31 He was accompanied by another young academic, All Souls’ Fellow William Chadwick Oman (1860-1946). The premise is that the medium, acting under the influences of spirits (ethereal, not potable), provides the writings of the dead upon the slate. Schiller’s explanation includes a description of the room as well as a diagram. After several

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30 F. C. S. Schiller, 3 March 1884, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Schiller goes on: “For cases are perpetually arising in which we approve of actions in fact we consider them to be among the noblest actions of mankind – which when analyzed are seen to be contrary to the letter of the Moral Law. Hence either we must extend the moral law to include these cases which is impossible as they represent circumstances of the exact contrary, or abandon the Moral Law, or Reconcile Theory + Practice by some such Principle as the one I am defending. . . . it is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the Moral Law can be universally applied only in a [sic] an Ideal + Perfect World + that it will not work in the world in which we must live act + suffer.”

31 The medium at the center of this entry, Eglington, was a rather scandalous fellow. A galvanizing figure in the early days of the SPR, charges of fraud and deception led to serious debate as to the scope and methods of Society. By 1886 many within the SPR saw Eglington as symptomatic of the problems researchers faced in trying to legitimize their area of inquiry. For an even-handed account of the historical development of psychical research, and one that discusses the religious and philosophical issues to which it can be seen as a response, one is directed to Janet Oppenheim, The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985). To be clear, interest in psychical research and/or spiritualism affected both upper and lower classes of society, often in glaringly different ways. For a sympathetic reading of the latter’s reaction to psychical research see Logie Barrow, Independent Spirits: Spiritualism and English Plebeians, 1850-1910 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
failed attempts, and two minor engagements with other spirits, another spirit manifests itself and provides the following message upon the slate:

We are glad to be able to give you this convincing proof of our power under conditions that are impossible as far as is at present known. Spiritualism must be of value to you in your daily lives if you will but apply it; and it will bring you much comfort in the hour of need. 32

Schiller leaves impressed as to the believability of the sitting, commenting on the manner of the message’s inscription and how it diverged in form from the other two manifestations. And he concludes his entry stressing that his account, written a day after the sitting, was undertaken without recourse to embellishment.

The details of this entry are warranted on several counts. First, this is the earliest account of Schiller’s lengthy involvement in psychical research. As such, it establishes his willingness to explore issues of religion and philosophy in ways not commonly accepted then or now. Second, and in reference to the discussion preceding it, it helps to contextualize how Schiller responded to the circumstances of his surroundings. As difficult as it may be to now fathom, increased interest in psychical research corresponded with the rise of Absolute Idealism and, more generally, with crisis of conscience experienced by those coming to terms with unsteady mix of religion and science in Victorian England. Schiller’s interest in psychical research, then, is an alternative to the philosophical and religious approaches dominant at Oxford at the time. It also contains a crucial component related to his philosophy: the application of ideas. This spirit or, more likely, Eglington, supplied two young academics with the suggested extension of the philosophy prevalent at the times. Schiller took the message to heart. He signaled the authenticity of his interest when, by the end of 1884, he was listed as an associate to the British

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32 F. C. S. Schiller, “Record of a Séance,” 20 June 1884, Notebook #12, n.p., 1882-1896, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
As of July 1885, Schiller is holding to an inter-active view of religion and philosophy in accord with his entry date 3 March 1884 (“we are what we are in consequence of our own actions”). As he states, “Religion is a kind incarnate Philosophy, materialized in institutions. . . . Philosophy differs fr. a theory in that the end of the one is Action of the other is Knowledge.”

What, then, is the “theory” of which he is speaking? It would seem to be that other frustration of the time, science. “Science can never become a religion for it is of its essence to be tentative, hypothetical, aims up at Knowledge, whereas Rel. is necess. Dogmatic, aiming at action. . . . Sci can never consider any thing certain must always be ready to examine + accept new facts conflicting with the old or rather the old interpretation. Hence it cannot afford a bias for action.”

By being theory bound, science is static, tentative. But then Schiller adds this: “Really the interpretation of the fact is far the more important thing + we can hardly take a step without theorizing.” The point seems conflicted, even contradictory, at first glance. Yet it again points to Schiller’s developing philosophical views. Here action is interpreting, is theorizing; it is the step after science, as Schiller defines it, where the speculation has been turned into the consequence of acting on what has been considered. But it is Schiller’s entry eight days later which gives a clue as to what is to come: “I don’t think Christianity will perish, it is the only

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34 F. C. S. Schiller, 14 July 1885, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
alterative to pessimism.” Schiller is stating his conflict plainly. In a religion without God and in a science without action, one is reduced to being, for the one, a player in a partially written play, for the other, a victim of chance. Is there an alternative?

It seems that there is. In an undated diary entry from December 1886 the twenty-two year old Schiller, fresh off receiving a First in his Lit. Hum., is finding a way out of the grips of pessimism. He finds the revolution in his thinking striking: “A mighty change has come over the spirit of my dream since the last phil. entries in this book.” And it is, again, a contextual solution born of his recent experiences. As he goes on to state:

It is not that Pes. can be disproved or that its practical impos. is anything of an arg. agst. its truth, but it necss. disposes us to seek of pess. a positive solution wh. shall not be unworkable if one can be found that will explain the facts. And the one condition any such a positive solution I had long recognized to be the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Of this doctrine I have lately acquired a far greater practical certainty (tho’ already always theoretically holding it) owing chiefly to some Planchette writing expr. carried on last summer. Nor will I deny that a first in Greats made many things appear in a somewhat diff. light, tho’ the changes had commenced before this. The result is that I have become a convert to Optimism + inclined to hold that all will end well + that all’s well that does so.

Schiller realizes this is not a logical proof given the world around him: “. . . this view cannot be disproved in any world wh. contains evil + hence Optimism must in the last resort be a matter of Faith (not of Hope, for we must act on (practical) certainties + not on probabilities).”

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35 F. C. S. Schiller, 22 July 1885, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

36 F. C. S. Schiller, December 1886, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The catalyst for this change, aside from the personal factors he goes on to mention, is reading Herbert Spencer’s Data of Ethics (1879).
He also realizes, as a guide to action, optimism promises only tentative guidance. But, by being tentative, it is also open to revision and improvement. At the end of the month, he adds a supplement which reads, in part:

Evol. can no more explain why certain actions shd. call forth moral feeling any more than why others shd. give rise to intellectual or other pleasurable feeling. . . . almost everything has been considered R or W. at diff. times + in diff places + that cases may arise in wh. it is almost imposs to tell wh. side is right + wh. wrong. . . Hence the instability + variation in our judgments of R. + W. If we wish to oppose a certain proposal we first show say we don’t like it + it wd be unpleasant for us, if pressed give reasons for thinking it unwise + finally work ourselves up into calling it wrong. “Criminal folly’ is the strongest epithet we give to it. But it is true that the we are usually way in the habit of regarding some thgs as is [sic] as merely pleasant or painful, of others as wise or foolish + others as right + wrong + it is only (mainly bec to show a thg is painful is the most obvious way of preventing it, then to show it is foolish + it is only in the minority of cases third time that we need fall back on the triarii [third line of Roman defense] of dissuasion, the mor. judg.) . . . Hence it follows that what we call moral. is susceptible of growth + change + that many things wh. are obviously seen to be conducive to the objective end are yet not recognized as Duties. . .

This theory still holds to some vestiges of Spencer’s ethical theory. But the comment on Duties points to the fact that Schiller sees this theory as extending beyond Kantian metaphysics. He concludes: “this doctrine of Ethics wd. correspond [inserted: “is an extension of”] to the

37 F. C. S. Schiller, 29 December 1886, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. It is in this supplement that Schiller expresses several disagreements with Spencer. At one point Schiller writes: “It is then true neither in apriori theory nor in historically [sic] fact that Evol. tends to increase Hap. (H. Spencers doctrine that it must bec. all activities tend to become pleas. false bec. his does not theory of pleas. false. + he does not consider pleas. activ. wh. become indifferent + mechanical).” The argument that Schiller is critiquing is found in the chapter “Relativity of Pain and Pleasures”: “Pleasure being producible by the exercise of any structure which is adjusted to its special end, he will see the necessary implication to be, that, supposing it consistent with maintenance of life, there is no kind of activity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued, and that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions” (Herbert Spencer, The Data of Ethics [1879, reprint; New York: American Home Library, 1902], 215).

38 As an example, Schiller argues towards the end of this supplement: “just as we believe that there exists an Absolute Truth, corresponding to our rational faculty, although [word crossed out] all truth to the latter at present is only relative, so we must believe that there exists an Absolute Right + Wrong corresponding to our own [word unclear] consciousness altho’ to it R + W are as yet relative.” This comment seems to correspond to Spencer’s distinction between Absolute Ethics (“for the ideal man under the implied ideal conditions”) and Relative Ethics (“by the actual men under existing conditions”) as relates to the division of ethics more generally into the categories of personal and social (Data, 326-7).
Kantian doctrine of Knowledge + Noumenal [that which can be conceived but not experienced] R. + W wd like Noumenal Truth be merely a limiting conception while ordinary actual Moral. like ordinary phenomenal Truth wd be based on experience.”

On a metaphysical level, Schiller is grappling with a rather large question. It is a question that Spencer raised in First Principles: “To understand how Science and Religion express opposite sides of the same fact—the one its near or visible side, and the other its remote or invisible side—this it is which we must attempt; and to achieve this must profoundly modify our general Theory of Things.” On a personal level, Schiller is working through the tensions found in his diary entries of 14 and 22 July 1885. Such work call for the integration of an unruly mass of materials—his psychical research experience, the process of the Greats, the works of Spencer and Kant—so as to develop a clearer philosophical picture. It is an attempt that finds him within proximity of, if not amidst, the Idealists—a division of what is experienced and what is felt—and still at a distance from the pragmatism and humanism he would later develop.

39 Herbert Spencer, First Principles (1860, reprint; New York: American Home Library, 1902), 36). As with the Data of Ethics, Schiller also disagrees with several of the implications that Spencer draws here. An undated notebook entry, entitled “Herbert Spencer’s First Principles: Casual Reflections,” takes issue with a lot of the definitional ground that Spencer stakes out as regards the relations of religion and science. But Schiller, in support of my contention that he is attempting to merge what were conflicted strains in his previous writings, adds: “Not only is it probable that the recognized ‘facts of Science’ form but an infinitesimally small portion of the Truth, + thus that their antagonism with Religion is apparent only, but more than this it is safe to hazard the assertion that it is not the known facts but only the current theories to explain them that are at present antagonistic to Religion. What believers in Religion can doubt that the true + ultimate Science will some day be revealed to the intelligence of those who have made themselves worthy to receive it, as but another another [sic] aspect of the true + ultimate Religion?” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Note Four,” n.d., Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

40 The degree to which Schiller is still beholden to, but struggling with, Idealist concepts is clear in this entry from 1887: “If Idealism proves anything it proves that the Kosmos exist not only in Mind but in our Mind + the process from the 2nd to the 1st tho’ sheltering itself under the convenient conception assertion that the > ind the < is really surreptitious. Yet if we once admit that the Kosmos exists in our indiv. mind the old difficulty recurs wh. has ever been the stronghold of realism viz how can there be a Kosmos at all wh. exists only in our mind? And if the it exists in the indiv mind how can it be shared by more than 1? Upon these diff. the analogy of the mesmeric hallucination throws some light. For while the mesmerism will can [sic] constitute a Kosmos for his subject he can equally easily make the subjects part of one another’s kosmos, wh. is precisely what is the case in the world acc to Idealism. In pt. of fact we have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings: it is an ideal wh. like all
Such labors will culminate in 1891’s *Riddles of the Sphinx*. But life has a way of interrupting weighty exposition.

The mundane issue of money interrupted the process of writing. In 1887, after receiving his Taylorian Scholarship, Schiller sought out a position teaching German at Eton that might supply him with the necessary funds to return to Oxford, complete his thesis, and receive his M.A.\(^{41}\) Little is known of his time at Eton. P. Hatfield, Eton College Archivist, provides this information: “He was in fact here from January 1888 to July 1889 as Foreign Language Assistant. Dr. Warre, the Head Master, reporting his engagement to the New Governing Body in February 1888.”\(^{42}\) If we take Schiller at his word, from the very beginning it was just a job, and not a particularly enjoyable one at that. In 1888, only three months into his stay, he writes: “... I

\(^{41}\) In advance of securing the position, Schiller solicited the recommendations of his wards at Rugby and Balliol. The first, T. W. Jex-Blake, wrote of Schiller:

Mr. Canning Schiller was under me at Rugby for several years, till ’82, + was one of the ablest boys I had in the VI\(^{th}\) Form during 13 years of Headmastership. He had singular freshness of mind, and genuineness of character; and I expected great things of him. Those who have known his Oxford work, can speak more certainly of him; but he always had my good will + esteem, + I think highly of his powers + aims.

The second, Jowett, announces:

I have a high opinion of Mr. Schiller, who has been an Exhibitioner of Balliol College + has obtained a First Class both in the 1\(^{st}\) + 2\(^{nd}\) Public Examinations. He is a young man of excellent character, who possesses a great deal of natural vigour + ability. He is a good classical scholar + also I should think, an unusually good German scholar. He is frank + pleasant in his manners + popular among his fellows. I have no means of estimating his powers as a teacher; but I think that in other respects as far as I can judge, he would be a very good master in a Public School. He was himself educated at Rugby.

(Thomas William Jex-Blake, 9 October 1887; Benjamin Jowett, 18 October 1887; Recommendations, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

\(^{42}\) Personal communication, 25 November 2003, email.
desired to be a master of those that know, but have become only a master of those that don’t know.”

Nor was he appreciably more impressed with the abilities of his colleagues: “+ if one wanted to examine yr. know of Germ. one wd have to ex. it under a microscope.”

Perhaps it was best for all involved that Schiller took this “temporary” position for “just long enough” to secure the funds he needed to complete his M.A.

But Schiller found at least two other ways to fill his time at Eton. The first shows his developing use of psychical research within his philosophical framework; the second demonstrates his ire at supposed affronts.

While Schiller was at Eaton he was most assuredly reading the pages of the Proceedings and the Journal for Psychical Research and, particularly, the developing theories of Cambridge classics professor Frederic William Henry Myers (1843-1901). Along with SPR founder and Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), and others, such as author and founding member of the Fabian Society—a precursor to the Labour Party in Britain—Frank Podmore (1856-1910), Myers represented the first and most active generation of psychical researchers. All of them saw the psychical as one potential way in which to harmonize the religious leanings of their Victorian upbringing with the newer approaches to science.

But it was Myer who unabashedly mixed the two together, arguing that his psychology was “a science of the soul.”

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43 F. C. S. Schiller, 29 March 1888, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

44 F. C. S. Schiller, 26 October 1888, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


46 Oppenheim, The Other, 152.

47 Oppenheim, The Other, 155.
One of Myers’s earliest projects is discussed in the January 1887 Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. In “Automatic Writing” he argues that it demonstrates varied states of consciousness. While Myers believes such automatism can have both intentional and telepathic underpinnings, he urges that it may also indicate an evolutionary leap by which “thoughts and feelings thus found issue which were in some respects deeper than the subject’s ordinary consciousness.”\(^{48}\) Such leaps would not signal a secondary automatic impulse—as when the routine of learning to play a piano becomes instinctual through repetition—but, rather, a primary impulse heretofore thought beyond the realm of recognized volition.\(^{49}\) Central to Myer’s claim is a very specific case study: a letter dated 22 January 1887 in which Schiller, his brother, Ferdinand Nassau Schiller, and sister, Lisbeth, retell an instance of automatic writing.\(^{50}\) The Report of the General Meeting three months later is appreciative, even sympathetic, but asserts that the conclusions must remain tentative until the mechanism(s) underlying automatism—which includes “table tilting, trance speaking, and the like”—are better understood.\(^{51}\) In March of 1888, Myers again insists on the importance of the topic and, again,


\(^{49}\) Myers suggestions, that what we take to be consciousness is only really a limited example of a myriad of states of consciousness, involved him a bind. On the one hand, it pointed to the suggestion of a soul that lives on, and beyond, what is presently conceived as reality. In this regard, Myer’s work would seem resonant with Schiller’s already developing belief in immortality. On the other hand, by positing instances of automatic writing as showing heretofore unknown primary impulses, he threatened to break down the very personality so central to a claim for immortality. Simply put, what exactly lives on? The problem, and one upon which Schiller and others would speak, is that Myers was never able to answer that question. For a discussion of this problem in Myer’s work, see Oppenheim, The Other, 261.


utilizes a letter (dated 18 September 1887) from Schiller that recounts an instance of writing in line with his theory.\textsuperscript{52}

In March of 1889 Thomas Barkworth responds with a letter to the editor of the \textit{Journal of the Society for Psychical Research} entitled “Duplex versus Multiplex Personality.” He wonders if Myers, rather than shining light on the multiplicity of personality, might be taking a split in personality too far. Noting that Myers, in moving beyond cases of automatic writing, had to rely on the testimony of persons with recognized mental conditions, Barkworth wonders if the “spirit” being channeled may only be an indication that “something has got loose in the[ir] head[s].” Better for Myers to recognize a “Duplex Personality” and one that is still taken as part of the “irreducible Ego.”\textsuperscript{53} A month later Myer’s responds. He believes that Barkworth’s attempt to save the Ego has led him to conflate it with the personality. For though the Multiplex personality “splits up our psychical being into a number of co-ordinate personalities” it does no harm to the idea of a persisting Ego; rather, it points to the fact that the Ego “finds at different moments very different channels or capacities of self-manifestation.”\textsuperscript{54} Barkworth, for his part, finds this an unacceptable continuance of conflation. A personality does not vary on a whim; it

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{52} Frederic W. H. Myers, “Further Cases of Automatic Writing,” \textit{Journal of the Society for Psychical Research} 3 (March 1888): 232. It should be noted, however, that the letter in question refers to a Mrs. Ellis. It is likely that this is Edith Lees Ellis (1861-1916), the wife of Havelock Ellis, though it is possible that it is Sally Mills Ellis (Mrs. Richard Cobb), a woman who corresponded with Charles S. Peirce.

\textsuperscript{53} Thomas Barkworth, “Duplex versus Multiplex Personality,” Letter to the Editor, \textit{Journal of the Society for Psychical Research} 4 (April 1889): 60. Barkworth’s criticism about Myer’s data was representative of the general view taken by other psychologists, and psychical, researchers at the time. As Oppenheim notes, it wasn’t that his references lacked for breadth. Rather, it was that the “quality of source materials all provided grist for the mill of Myer’s inventive talents, and he eagerly used the evidence that came to hand. He used it, however, not to refine his own research methods, nor to devise more judicious experiments, but to suggest the analogies that were crucial to the development of his argument” (\textit{The Other}, 256).

\textsuperscript{54} Frederic W. H. Myers, Letter to the Editor, \textit{Journal of the Society for Psychical Research} 4 (April 1889): 60; 63.
\end{footnotesize}
“is not a mood or state.” To rend the Ego apart by reference to varied personalities is to destroy that which purportedly transcends one state of consciousness.55

In October 1889, Schiller steps in to attempt a mediation of the dispute and meditation on the terms under consideration in a letter to the editor entitled “Multiplex Personality.” He frames the crux of the debate thus: “What must be the inner constitution of the self so as to include the phenomena of multiplex personality, and in what sense can we speak of ‘secondary selves’?”56 Schiller sees the problem with Myers’s and Barkworth’s argument as the result of materialistic interpretations of personality; that is, that multiple personality is an effect of “peculiar physical conditions,” which render them only minor variations. These variations are then viewed as the changes that the self undergoes in response to physical conditions, rather than as distinct and separate secondary selves that exist in reference to a primary self.57

Schiller suggests that the explanation lies in a non-materialistic interpretation whereby the psychical can actually influence, change, or control the physical; where, for instance, “a hypnotic suggestion can destroy something so physical as the pain of organic disease.”58 Such a non-materialistic focus shifts the grounds and terms of the previous debate. Schiller wishes to distinguish individuality, which is the character of “being an ‘individual’” possessed by all


57 Schiller, “Multiplex,” 147. The problem with the materialistic interpretation, as Schiller sees it, returns us to the initial Myers article. As Schiller states, “there seem to be an indefinite number of ‘secondary selves,’ and indefinite potentialities of multiplex personality inherent in each of us, and our present methods seem not to have exhausted their numbers so much as to have limited their available paths of externalization.” As an example, Schiller asks how one squares the materialistic account with the fact that automatic writing is seemingly capable of producing as many “secondary selves” as the body is capable of rendering digits to their service? His point is that these secondary manifestations are not seemingly reducible to physical explanations.

58 Schiller, “Multiplex,” 147.
matter, as being less than the designation of personality. This use of personality, in contrast to the materialistic term body, could be further improved upon by reference to a Transcendental Ego, which would be inclusive of the non-materialistic components of: “the phenomenal self or normal consciousness”; “the ‘secondary selves’.” 59 If such a transcendent personality is recognized as “the ideal or aim of the evolution of the other two” it renders Barkworth’s worries moot insofar as the physical is a component part of a larger whole. 60 This discussion points to the increasing importance Schiller places on the persistence of personality. 61 Another discussion started just a few months later points to how persistent Schiller can be.

Sometime between 1897-1899, Schiller set to work on translating a part of Johann Eduard Erdmann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie [1865, revised 1878]. The 1890 English edition, A History of Philosophy, edited by Williston Samuel Hough, was a sprawling three volume set in which Schiller is listed as being “late Exhibitioner of Balliol College, Oxford” and having contributed “The Ancient Philosophy (vol. i, pp. 1-222).” 62 That same year, an anonymous note in Mind finds faults with some of the translation (there were six translators involved in the project), and also with some of Erdmann’s choices or omissions regarding


60 Schiller, “Multiplex,” 148. Framed differently, Schiller argues that our physical existence remains only a component of the ideal to which we strive. And if then the physical self is a movement toward a secondary, ideal, form, then “we no longer fear that our true self possesses an amount of reality varying with the chances of this mortal life.”

61 Not that Barkworth and Schiller were alone in trying to come to terms with the psychology of Myers. Other early supporters of Myers research, in aim if not always in method, were psychologists Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920), of the University of Geneva, and William James. James’s work, his Psychology in particular, will be of some significance later in the chapter.

62 Johann Eduard Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, vols. 1-3, ed. Williston S. Hough (1878; translation; London: Swan Sonneschein, 1890). Hough (1860-1912), was a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan from 1888-1889, a time at which both John Dewey and George Sylvester Morris (1840-1889) were on staff. At the time of the book’s publication, Hough was a professor at the University of Minnesota (1889-1894), arriving there a year later than Dewey did for his brief one-year stint.
specific philosophers. But the review argues nonetheless that the book is a “matter for real congratulation” generally and is “specially welcome” as regards its discussion of philosophy since Hegel. The reviewer in the Oxford Magazine, J. E. H., also offers the volumes high praise... at first. He notes that the “excellent work... deserves to be ranked first amongst all contemporary writings, and places all students of philosophy under a great obligation.” But, like the Mind review, there is the issue of the translations. And “the worst offender is Mr. Canning Schiller,” who seems only to have been picked due “to his name and his possible nationality.”

Schiller takes umbrage at this review. Though his initial letter is lost, one can gather the tone of it from editor Alfred Denis Godley’s (1856-1925) response on 5 June of 1890:

Dear Schiller,

In re your complaint of the review.

Any letter that you send to the Magazine on the subject I shall be happy to publish: and if the reviewer replies, as I suppose he would, I will put in your answer if it is not too long – e.g. not over half a column. In this way you will certainly have more communication with the reviewer than you would possibly have had otherwise, and you will also have an opportunity of justifying yourself to the public.

I confess I am unable to see that the circumstances are in any way exceptional (I only wish that incompetent reviewing was exceptional), or such as to warrant any


65 J. E. H., review, 350. H. goes on to state that the errors, of which he lists several, would lead a reader “to need a strong imagination who should suppose himself to be reading English.” Now, not being proficient in German nor having the original in my possession, it can still be suggested that Schiller’s irritation with such accusations is not unfounded. In each case listed—pages 131, 132, 140, and 192—H. has either truncated the actual passage or revised the structure of the sentence which he quotes. The example on page 140 suffices to demonstrate the alterations. H. quotes: “Besides, Aristotle also formulates the antithesis of the first for us, and as such, so that what comes last in the analysis comes first in the genesis.” The quotation as it is found in the actual text is: “Besides, Aristotle also formulates the antithesis of ‘the first for us,’ and ‘the first as such,’ so that what comes last in the analysis, comes first in its genesis.” While no one will claim either version a fluid one, it nonetheless suggests that H. was not as careful as Schiller would have liked on the way to making his ad hominem attack.
departing from the usual practice in such matters. I know very well that the review was written without any sort of animus against you personally.\(^{66}\)

This, then, is the first occurrence on record suggesting that Schiller was prickly about criticism directed towards him. And he sees the circumstances of the review as not only exceptional, but suspicious: “I think it rather hard that the censorship should be exercised upon a reply a well merited castigation of an article which unfortunately escaped a much need bowdlerization, especially when its grossest incompetence was so gross that it could not but arouse suspicions that it was not accidental.” He labels Godley’s hesitancy to publish a response as editorial “protection” for J. E. H.’s “misdeed.” Further, he questions the editor’s claim that it was simply a sign of incompetence: “I did not understand your assurance to cover concerning J.E.H.’s good faith to cover the possibility of his having been the instrument of 3rd parties, especially as you could not give it me [sic] when I first asked you about it.” Thus Schiller urges that his revised response to the review be published, a version of which retracts suggests of “malice” and “casts direct imputations only on J.E.H.’s intellect.”\(^{67}\)

Godley replies that he is willing to print Schiller’s letter, but only insofar as it deals with actual mistakes. He is unwilling “to print reflections on the honesty of the Magazines reviewers: if they were to be exposed to the annoyance of being accused – and quite groundlessly – of want of good faith, I should never get any one to review books at all.”\(^{68}\) Schiller’s response two days later is more subdued but nonetheless unconvinced. He will accept Godley’s word that the

\(^{66}\) Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\(^{67}\) F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford College, to A. D. Godley, 8 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\(^{68}\) Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
review was not meant to be “malicious”; but he still wonders whether the reviewer was “used as an instrument of third parties.” If not intentional, the review at the very least suggests to Schiller “incompetence so gross” that the readers would be astonished.69 Seemingly exasperated, Godley replies two days later that the course of action is as he first stated it would be. Schiller should write a letter and, should the reviewer feel the need, he will respond to Schiller in kind.70 All this over a review of a translation of another person’s work and one begins to get a sense of what Schiller, with a more robust and personal philosophical view, will do when critics impinge on his work. Such speculation will, however, have to wait.

2.3 ‘IDEALISM WITH A DIFFERENCE’: SCHILLER’S RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX

Upon returning from Eton to Oxford, Schiller sets about finishing his advanced degree and, in 1891, receives his M.A. This is also the year that sees Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution published under the anonymous moniker A. Troglodyte. Many of the themes developed in the previous pages—the relation of religion to science, the choice between pessimism and optimism, the concept of immortality, the unifying nature of the Transcendent Ego—are found here in expanded form. Here also is the first clear instance of Schiller’s complaints regarding logic. And another theme, first noted in his 1884 diary, reemerges so as to unify his discussion of all of them: the practical. This work importance is twofold: (1) it

69 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford College, to A. D. Godley, 10 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

70 Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 12 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. As of this time, I have not been able to locate any further correspondence, private or public, regarding the matter.
provides a rather clear, though admittedly idealistic, precursor to pragmatism, and (2) it does so independently of the psychological work that James was conducting in America.

What is striking, though, is the paucity of coverage that this work has received, even from some of his more contemporary biographers. Rueben Abel, the most sympathetic of commentators, while full well recognizing that “Schiller’s Goliath was the Absolute Idealism of Anglo-Hegelianism” represented by Green, Bradley and others, finds no place for the work in his summary of Schiller’s philosophy.71 Herbert Searles and Allan Shields, in noting that it was in its time taken to be the work of “a genius of 25 years” go on to posit that it “still bears close reading” but for reasons not expressed.72 Kenneth Winetrout, in urging that Schiller deserves to be more well known, suggests that one reason is that he (alongside James, Dewey, and Mead) showed a “ready willingness . . . to treat big and thrilling problems that gave early pragmatism both a warmth and vigor that is all too often missing in philosophy.”73 This, then, is the work of genius, developed within the stronghold of Idealism, which provides the pivot where Schiller changes from being a student to a philosopher, a mere critic of his learning to a proponent of what came to be pragmatism. But it is more. It is the resolution of the tensions, first advanced anonymously in his notebooks and then by degrees in his involvement in the Myer’s debate, of his academic training. As such, it deserves this more detailed analysis as it stands in closer relation to his subsequent philosophy than his previous commentators suggest.


Schiller explains, in the third person, that this work originates from a felt lack in current philosophy:

It was the sense of this want, of the absence of any interpretation of modern results in the light of ancient principles, which prompted the author to given what is substantially a philosophy of Evolution, the first perhaps which accepts without reserve the data of modern science, and derives from them a philosophical cosmology, which can emulate the completeness of our scientific cosmologies.\(^74\)

Such a project is predicated on seeking accord between science and religion. It seeks to strip away the demarcations whereby “science is defined as the knowledge of the manifestations of the Unknowable”, “God has become an unknowable Infinite, and Faith has been degraded into an unthinking assent to unmeaning verbiage about confessedly insoluble difficulties.”\(^75\) So what, then, are the Riddles? It “is merely the articulation of the question, What is man or what is life?—and concerned merely with the relation of man to his Cause [“God”], to his Environment [“the world”], and to his Future [“immortality”].”\(^76\) The answer can be framed in four ways: Agnosticism, Scepticism, Pessimism, or Evolutionary Metaphysics.

Agnosticism is of two sorts: the scientific type espoused by Spencer and the epistemological view championed by Kant. Both lead, for Schiller, to enlightened but dead ends. And both are open to a general complaint Schiller first raised in Schiller’s 1884 and 1885 notebooks. To claim “I do not know” involves one in an infinite, and impossible, regress: “If we were purely thinking beings, it would obviously be the right attitude towards matters not known. But as we have also to act, and as action requires practical certainty, we must make up our minds

\(^{74}\) F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891), vii. It should be noted that, in a footnote appended to this very discussion, Schiller references Spencer, and not Darwin, as a “typical representative of modern ideas which have failed to obtain due notice at the hands of the metaphysicians” (n. 1). Not that Schiller takes Spencer full cloth, as was previously noted and as will be seen in the subsequent discussion of Agnosticism.

\(^{75}\) Schiller, Riddles, 3.

\(^{76}\) Schiller, Riddles, 9.
in one way or the other, and our acts must belie the professions of our theory.”77 The objections against the two sorts are variations on this very problem. By casting out God, Spencer eliminates potential cause from the unity he seeks, deferring it to a realm that can’t be known; Kant, by vouching for God, renders the belief moot in a theory that can’t prove the personal belief. Here again, Schiller seeks to refine his discussions of 1885-1886:

The fact is, that this demand for an impossible suspense of judgment is based upon a confusion of scientific and philosophic certainty. In science, certainty=great probability, and impossibility=an off chance; and hence in pure (as opposed to abstract or applied) science, certainty is neither frequent or necessary. But in philosophy, which is the science of life, we require from our theory practical certainty in addition to its theoretic probability, and as we must act, we must act often on very slight probabilities.78

Schiller also takes the Agnostic position to be contradictory in its move from what is known to what is not. In doing so, Agnostics enact a shorthand taken as revelation, but operating on groundless faith. Simply put, what is not known isn’t. To profess your belief in it (‘the Unknown which somehow you know’) is as much the same as assuring that it can never be known (‘it is Unknowable but you know that it is such’). Better that they should “no longer be allowed to decorate their first principle with an initial letter, for to spell it with U, is to like it to reality in the known world, to attribute existence to it, to make an adjectival negation of knowledge into substantial fact; in a word, to hypostasize it.”79

77 Schiller, Riddles, 17.

78 Schiller, Riddles, 19. Schiller goes on to say: “The mental attitude in short required in scientific research, is the very opposite to that required in a theory of life; and in philosophy there is no room for the scientific suspense of judgment” (Riddles, 20). Compare these comments with what Schiller said on 14 June 1885: “Science can never become a religion for it is of its essence to be tentative, hypothetical, aims up at Knowledge, whereas Rel. is necess. Dogmatic, aiming at action. You can’t act on probabilities, but in action must consider your principles true even if only pro hoc vice. Sci can never consider any thing certain must always be ready to examine + accept new facts conflicting with the old or rather the old interpretation. Hence it cannot afford a bias for action” (Notebook #11, 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

79 Schiller, Riddles, 25.
For Schiller, Scepticism is the necessary and more productive outcome of Agnosticism. It recognizes the extent to which “I do not know” can be taken and admits of its implications; “for it is Agnosticism perfected and purified from prejudice.”80 Everywhere one looks, there seem to be indications which approve the Sceptic’s tenor. Concepts such as Matter, Space, Time, and Energy are accepted as fact, but of how many different, and changing, definitions do they admit? The farther one goes back, the clearer it becomes that these concepts—whittled away by savages and refined by scientists—have never stayed put, never admitted of a facticity that permits close inspection:

For all reality is immersed in the flux of Becoming, which glides before our eyes in a Protean stream of change, interminable, indeterminate, indefinite, indescribable, impenetrable, a boundless and groundless abyss into which we cast the frail network of our categories fruitlessly and in vain.81

So the sceptic trumps the agnostic. The historical record demonstrates not that we “do not know” but that “we cannot know.” And here we meet the sceptic perfected, the Idealist. The idealist takes the belief that we cannot know and postulates beyond it. “For according to the most recent researches of logicians, all significant judgment involves a reference of the ideal content recognized as such—and it is this which we express in judging—to an unexpressed reality beyond judgment.”82 And where practice demonstrates that we get along well enough with only flawed approximations of judgment, it is only the case that sceptics have not pushed hard enough beyond the theoretical to show how the practical is subject to the same.

But, for Schiller, this must lead to Pessimism. For to admit, as most sceptics do, that in practice our knowledge and judgment appear to work is not the same as saying that they do

80 Schiller, Riddles, 57.
81 Schiller, Riddles, 79.
82 Schiller, Riddles, 87.
work. The pessimist takes the view that we cannot know and infers that “the world contains nothing which admits of rational interpretation.”\textsuperscript{83} And if we take the four main aims of life, the corners which square the consideration of the Riddles, we find the pessimist’s answers at every turn.\textsuperscript{84} Happiness, the reaching of or adaptation to a desired end, is foreclosed by the chances of fate and circumstance. As much as good men may prosper, equal amounts fail. Goodness, our conduct as held to standards of morality, is just as tenuous. For what standard can hold that does not become an imposition on the doer or an ideal always just out of reach? Aesthetics, or our discrimination of beauty, seems at first a respite from the futile pursuit of happiness and goodness. But it is no less subjective nor fraught with difficulty. By developing a discriminating temper, we recoil at that which falls outside of it. Filling the void are those not wanting to avoid the vulgar but rather to reform it: “It is not from the resignation and retirement of the aesthetically-minded that the great ‘reforms’ of history have received their impulse, but from the moral enthusiasm or party spirit of men whose every step was marked by brutal utilitarianism or unbeautiful fanaticism.”\textsuperscript{85} Intellect, or Reason, provides no better comfort. For a developed reason only makes us more acutely aware of just how far we are from any ideal standard which, by the pessimist account, it is already foolhardy to aspire.

Schiller suspects that the inevitable fall into Pessimism is based in the rejection of metaphysics, “of a systematic examination of ultimate questions, and of its bearing upon the

\textsuperscript{83} Schiller, Riddles, 97.

\textsuperscript{84} This is one of the most sustained discussions in the work. For reference sake, the division of these themes is thus: Happiness, 98; Goodness, 123; Aesthetics, 125; Intellect, 128. The first and longest argument, regarding Happiness, recalls Schiller’s diary entry of December 1886 in its dismissal of Spencer’s arguments regarding the same in the Data of Ethics. The primary sub-topics by which Schiller shows the imperfections of Happiness are: (1) the Individual and (a) the physical environment, 102, (b) the social environment, 103, and (c) the self, 103; (2) the Race and (a) the physical environment, 105, (b) the social environment, 105, and (c) the psychological, 106.

\textsuperscript{85} Schiller, Riddles, 127.
theory and practice of life.”86 But he also asserts that the basis of metaphysics is in need of repair if it is to provide an account which frames theory and practice in a positive manner. The only irrefutable basis upon which to build a system is this: “The existence of the Self [or soul] is at present asserted only as the basis of all knowledge, and in this sense it cannot be validly doubted.”87 Such a system “would be realized when all our explanations made use of no principles which were not self-evident to human minds, self-explanatory to human feelings.”88 This metaphysics (which Schiller calls “concrete,” as opposed to the “pseudo” or “abstract”) must be based in the workings of evolutionary science but also, by being philosophical, a corrective on those workings; “in other words, they must proceed from the phenomenally real to the ultimately real, from science to metaphysics.”89 Such a method is a species of the historical method and supplies it with a corrective on past attempts at metaphysics. It, rather than using the lower to explain the higher, proceeds by “the assertion that historical research leads us from the more complex to the simpler, and ‘explains’ complexity by deriving it from simplicity.”90 In this way, the flux of Becoming, the bane of previous metaphysical systems, is seen as “the process which works out the universal law of Evolution.”91

86 Schiller, Riddles, 133.
87 Schiller, Riddles, 139. See also his complaints against the denial of anthropomorphism in the works of: Hume (139), Kant (140), and what reads as an account, though with no name affixed, of Bradley (143).
88 Schiller, Riddles, 149.
89 Schiller, Riddles, 163.
90 Schiller, Riddles, 177.
91 Schiller, Riddles, 179-80.
What are the implications of this metaphysics? There are four, with the first implying the results of the second and third. First, and in a suggestion which both downplays and also asserts the role of humans in the process just described, it is teleological:

The end to which it supposes all things to subserve is not the good for man, and still less for any individual man, but the universal End of the world-process, to which all things tend, and which will coincide with the idiocentric end and desires of the sections of the whole just in proportion to their position in the process.92

Secondly, it is teleology which is predicated on progress. If the evolutionary approach is to be seen against the pessimist denial of metaphysics, it must be on the point that the end of the world-process is an ideal one. So, as society is more and more perfected, the individual is as well. This point, however, suggests more than it first appears. For the world-process subsumes the world—and with it the individual and society—in its realization of the universal end. The limitations that I (as what Schiller calls “the phenomenal self” wherein resides ego but only as consciousness) see now as a higher stage in evolution must, by virtue of the process, exist as a potentiality for me at a still higher stage. The limitations of Time and Becoming, so vexing to the past metaphysics, are points to be overcome.93 And, in being overcome, they give rise to the promise that the limitations of Matter, by virtue of Force, will transcend into Spirit (into what Schiller calls “the Transcendental Ego”).94 Such transcendence also carries with it implications.

92 Schiller, Riddles, 203. This process is seen by Schiller as evolutionary for other reasons as well. As he explains, “the lower is prior to the higher historically, but the higher is prior metaphysically, because the lower can be understood only by reference to the higher, which gives it a meaning and of which it is the potentiality . . . things must be explained by their significance and purpose instead of by their ‘causes,’ by their ideals instead of by their germs, by their actualities instead of by their potentialities” (Riddles, 197-8).

93 Schiller, Riddles, 262. For the relation of the Ego to consciousness, see Riddles, 306-7.

94 Schiller, Riddles, 274-5. The discussion here borders on arcane. But the argument is made clearer by reference to the concept of Will. Schiller asks “how can there be effort without any intelligence and will?” At this stage in our evolution, the constraints of time, space and matter are only potentially permeable. He believes that an evolved intelligence would have the force to transcend the limitations of ordinary space and time. He argues here against the concept of “monads” (or “atoms”) as offered by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) and Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). He suggests that they view them as “constituting the material universe,” where as he
If our potential suggests the ability to transcend the normal perimeters of reality (the world as we know it), it also suggests that our relation to the world process is different from other metaphysical systems. At the stage of transcendence the phenomenal self ceases to be and is imbued “with all its powers and latent capabilities of development, the ultimate reality which we have not yet actually reached.”

Third, this form of teleological process implies a place for and a relationship with God. If we are to ward off a fall back into pessimism, we must ask: what caused the World Process? Any answer other than God, leads us back to the previous metaphysical systems. So Schiller argues:

For being non-phenomenal, the idea of coming into existence, or Becoming, which is a conception applying only to the facts of the phenomenal world, would not here be applicable. If, then, God is such an existence, such a conception of God satisfies both the requirements of our demand for causation and solves the difficulty which the conception of a First Cause presents, if taken in an absolute sense.

holds that they are ascribable to “the direct action of divine force” (Riddles, 277). The argument is, to my mind, exceedingly complex. But it seems to center on Schiller’s acceptance of transeunt (or, producing an effect beyond the mind) force. Charles Dunbar Broad (1887-1971) argues that Leibnitz held to a form of causation wherein “the state of each monad at each moment is completely determined by the immediately preceding state of that same monad in accordance with purely immanent causal law” (Leibniz: An Introduction, ed. C. Lewey [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975], 100). Lotze himself states, “if the ruling monad is that soul which forms our ego, and whose internal motions we are seeking to understand, the interior of the other monads at least to us inquirers remains absolutely closed; we are acquainted only with the reciprocal actions in virtue of which they appear to us as matter, and only under that designation and with the claims founded upon it can we make use of them in the investigation of particular processes” (Microcosmus, 1, 162). Schiller has no qualm with causation nor with an established relation between monads and the ego. Rather, his complaint is that immanent form/absolute closure negates: (1) our ability—in the move from phenomenal to Transcendental—to overcome the current material boundaries of the world-process, and (2) our growing relation to the Deity in the continuation of the same process (see Riddles, 279). Framed more simply, if the force necessary to develop in successive stages—even as all three authors agree that the first cause is to be regarded as God—is entirely within the monad or atom, then there is no ability for monads to develop towards, or in relation to, something.

95 Schiller, Riddles, 281. For confirmation of these powers, of the relation between the phenomenal and Transcendent, Schiller references the work that F. Myers’ had done in the “experimental psychology” of multiple personalities; see Riddles, 282-3.

96 Schiller, Riddles, 310.
But this view of God is regulated by the demands previously expressed. If previous systems failed by attributing cause to the unknowable, Schiller contends that this view of God is limited to answering only the issue of cause itself.\footnote{In the appendix “Free Will and Necessity” Schiller clarifies the notion of causation, as it relates to indeterminism over determinism: “If we are to mean anything definite by the use of necessity in connection with causation, we must imply something analogous to the feeling of compulsion which we experience when we use the world ‘must.’ If necessity does not imply a reference to our feeling of compulsion, it either means nothing, or two very different things, and the question of free-will and necessity cannot be profitably discussed” (Riddles, 463). Since free will and necessity are parts of the world-process, both represent stages of potentiality. But freedom is of a higher sort than necessity, more clearly aligned with the realization of the world-process; for where necessity implies what must be done (as a compulsion) freedom implies what ought to be done because one can (a moral act).} In so crafting a finite God, one attributes to God only the activity necessary to craft the process, freeing the concept of a Deity from the issues—such as the existence of evil, the reality of pain—that it is part of the world-process to sort out. To otherwise ascribe infinite powers to God is, in the words of Schiller, to transform the world into “an unintelligible freak of irresponsible insanity.”\footnote{Schiller, Riddles, 319.}

This further implies that our relationship to God, as part of the process, is a personal one. If God is freed from responsibility for evil and pain, we become the responsible actors in the process:

The assertion, therefore, of the finiteness of God is primarily the assertion of the knowableness of the world, of the commensurateness of the Deity with our intelligence. By becoming finite God becomes once more a real principle in the understanding of the world, a real motive in the conduct of life, a real factor in the existence of things, a factor none the less real for being unseen and inferred.\footnote{Schiller, Riddles, 361. This corresponds to the interesting diary entry of 7 March 1887—the one which Schiller amended not to include the final phrase—in that it is a direct refutation, or challenge, to Lotze’s conception of the Deity. Lotze said: “In point of fact we have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings; it is an ideal, which, like all that is ideal belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite but like all that is good appertains to us only conditionally and hence imperfectly” (Microcosmus, 2, 687).}

God, in short, becomes a pluralistic concept which the many may share and not a monistic abstraction which all must accept. It is a concept which aids us in overcoming the world as it is, in a progressive process of which we are important players.
Fourth, if the process does not warrant against the development of our potential, what is to suggest that this world is but one stage in the world-process? What is called for is not the dismissal of the consciousness we experience as phenomenal selves, but the expansion of life to include the continuance of our egos after death. And as ego is a form of consciousness, one which admits of variations, so to would there be variations in what constitutes our personal immortality. The conditioning factor would be memory. For “it is only by means of memory that we can identify ourselves with our past; it is only by memory that we can hope to enjoy the fruits of present efforts in the future.”\textsuperscript{100} As we do in life, as a phenomenal fact, so too will we do beyond death, as a continuation of the world-process.

Schiller concludes that this system seeks to obtain “a harmonious society of perfect individuals, a kingdom of Heaven of perfected spirits, in which all friction will have disappeared from their interaction with God and with one another.”\textsuperscript{101} But this ideal of harmony implies a further change, a change in the nature and function of God. In what manner, though, Schiller cannot say. For this metaphysics, like all metaphysics, is yet trapped in the realm of the phenomenal self. It can seek to obtain truth, but must give pause to the limitations of thought, of consciousness. Thus, like all belief systems, it must proceed on Faith: “what though he show what truth must be, if truth there be, he cannot show that truth there is.”\textsuperscript{102} For it is only faith that proceeds to pass beyond pessimism; and only faith as acted upon that demonstrates belief.

\textsuperscript{100} Schiller, \textit{Riddles}, 399-400. Schiller bases this argument on both progressive and (flawed) hereditary grounds. In the first, those that lead lives of sloth contribute nothing to the world process; hence their memory of the process is faint and their continuance much the same (\textit{Riddles}, 401). In the second, the pre-existence of our selves is warranted by the analogy of familial perpetuation. Just as parents transmit traits to offspring in the continuance of survival, so too is it possible for them to transmit the requisite spiritual traits for the continuance of a pre-existing spirit (\textit{Riddles}, 420).

\textsuperscript{101} Schiller, \textit{Riddles}, 432.

\textsuperscript{102} Schiller, \textit{Riddles}, 455.
And here Schiller returns to the distinctions between science and religion of some years past, to the difference between theorizing faith and philosophizing belief:

It is a mistake to suppose when all has been said all has been done; on the contrary, the difficult task of translating thought into feeling, of giving effect to the conclusions of reason, and of really incorporating them with our being, still remains. And it is this incompleteness of mere thought which philosophy recognizes when it leaves us with an alternative. This guards against the delusion that intellectual assent is sufficient for life. Because philosophy is practical, mere demonstration does not suffice; to understand a proof is not to believe it. And in order to live rightly, we must not only assent that such and such principles are conclusively proved, but must also believe them.¹⁰³

Uncertain though our faith in the process might be, Schiller argues that belief may be enough to make it so. What is certain, however, is that this is the culmination of Schiller’s academic tensions.

The book generated a number of reviews, both popular and philosophical, in 1891 and 1892. The National Observer calls it “a book of considerable force and interest” wherein the author’s “thinking is genuine and his writing good.”¹⁰⁴ The Guardian, disagreements notwithstanding, applauds it willingness to explore theological issues even if it finds the “interesting” style “at time florid and rhetorical.”¹⁰⁵ Nature suggests that the book treats the Riddles with “considerable, though frequently misguided power.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Schiller, Riddles, 457.

¹⁰⁴ Review of Riddles of the Sphinx, by F. C. S. Schiller, National Observer, 22 August 1891, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1887-1900, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. At one point the reviewer mentions that portions of Schiller’s argument “in some respects . . . not unlike the Leibnitian doctrine of Monads.” Schiller underlines “some respects” and writes above it: “It is simply L. made consistent.”

¹⁰⁵ Review of Riddles of the Sphinx, by F. C. S. Schiller, Guardian, 17 February 1892, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1887-1900, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

¹⁰⁶ C. Ll. M., review of Riddles of the Sphinx, by F. C. S. Schiller, Nature, 6 August 1891, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1887-1900, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. In a section where the reviewer makes reference to a “hog.” Schiller underlines the word and then writes the initials of the reviewer to the right of it.
The Critical Review, notes that the book is written “with the freshness of a discoverer,” but faults it for “a tendency to make human faculty the measure” of all things and for not in the end providing answers to the metaphysical questions posed at the onset. But two longer notices more clearly shed light on the nature of the academic reception, positive and negative, that this work received.

In the October 1891 Mind, T. W. sees the work as methodologically conflicted but inferentially provocative. He first notes the dominant idealistic influences in this work’s approach to evolution—“The process of evolution, though all its stages, consists in the perfecting of individual existences by their grouping into more and more perfect societies”—while also emphasizing what was to later become a more pragmatic method—“The characteristic of the concrete metaphysical method is to be consistently and consciously ‘anthropomorphic,’ explaining everything from individual existences viewed as analogous to ourselves.” The resulting pluralistic Idealism of this metaphysic is “defective” in its “rejection of ‘epistemological’ and ‘psychological’ methods.” At the same time, however, he praises Schiller for seeing “clearly the weaknesses of an attempt to found a philosophical theory on the objective assumptions of physical science.”

Yet the work yields insight in its discussions of monads (a spiritual substance out of which material properties are produced) and immortality.

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107 Alexander Macalister, review of Riddles of the Sphinx, by F. C. S. Schiller, Critical Review, n.d., Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1887-1900, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Next to the comment regarding the “man as measure” Schiller has entered in his own hand: “of course.” As regards not answering the metaphysical questions posed, Schiller writes: “Certainly not ‘the patient reader’ of this review—muddled, inaccurate, + unreliable.”

108 T. W., review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 16, no. 64 (October 1891): 538.

109 W., review, 539.

110 W., review, 540.
The former are held to produce, through their interaction, the appearance which we label the “external world”; the latter occurs when the memory of former, always persisting, is of “sufficient concentration of consciousness” to fuse that persistence into a personal form.111

French’s review in the September 1892 *Philosophical Review* also questions the method and applauds what it infers. He sees the work as an attempt “to construct a modern metaphysic on the foundation of the latest results of science.”112 These new developments create the wedge which allows for the suggestion of Idealism; that is, they point towards a non-phenomenological [a reference to the noumenal monads] cause for the world which implies a transcendent Deity.113

And French, while greatly complicating the prose, arrives at a summary similar to T. W.:

The one ultimate reality, God, appears to us as the material world; the other ultimate realities, the Transcendental Egos, appear as our present phenomenological selves. The cosmos of our experience is a stress or interaction between God and the Egos. . . As the Egos are ultimate realities, God cannot annihilate them; the most that can be done is to bring them into harmony with the Divine Will. . . In so far as the self is spiritually developed, and has attained to its ideal, the Ego, it will persist into the future.114

French ends by noting that the “style is clear, and the careful analysis of contents is a commendable feature of the book.” The only criticisms are twofold: (1) its “avowed contempt for epistemology and . . . uncritical acceptance of individualism seem to us sources of real weakness to the work as a whole,” and (2) it arouses repugnance by “appearing anonymously and with a fancy title.”115

111 W., review, 540.


113 French, review, 560.

114 French, review, 561.

115 French, review, 561-2.
The bias against anonymity aside, what both reviewers single out for praise is what is in line with the tenor of the times: a religious source which gives sense and purpose to an experienced world. What they both question is the non-Absolute form which gives rise to it: a personalized conception of the source. Looking back, we can see the process by which Schiller came to these conclusions, even if we rarely see—in a nuanced jab at Jowett or a loutish lob at J.E.H.—the style that would come to carry them forward. In 1884, Schiller’s philosophical view was one of rebellion against the abstractions of Balliol; the emphasis was on how the ethical and moral were matters of practical consequence. In 1885, Schiller began to struggle with what science suggested, with what it did to complicate his view of, literally, religious practice and philosophical knowledge. 1886 and 1887 found Schiller, by reference to Spencer’s enveloping evolution as against strictly materialistic interpretations of Darwin, crafting an Idealism that promised not only personal connection with the spiritual, but our continuance within it. The intervening years culminated in a work that, as a later commentator suggested, was “Idealism with a difference.”116 It was a view which, not to put too light a point on it, demanded to be tested. While the following academic test was not a good one, the philosophical sparring, and company, proved invaluable.

2.4 A TRIP ABROAD: SCHILLER’S “EDUCATION” AT CORNELL

When Schiller arrived at Cornell in 1893, the Sage School of Philosophy was barely two years old. But it was developing the trappings of a full-fledged American institution. It housed a psychological laboratory that had been started in 1891 by Frank Angell (1857-1939), a former

student of Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Lepzig.\textsuperscript{117} It had just begun the publication of the Philosophical Review. It already attracted scholars with distinguished reputations. But we have little to reference as regards Schiller’s arrival at Cornell save his own words. On his “Application of Graduate Student,” Schiller lists the dates on which he received his B.A. and M.A. He also provides a brief overview of the work he did pursuant to those degrees. In an apparent nod to the displeasure he felt at Eton, he only references this period of time by saying: “+ after an interval of 2 years (during which I translated the 1st part of Erdmann’s Hist. of Philosophy).” He lists his Ph.D. interest areas as: “Philosophy (with special reference to Metaphysics + Logic)”; “Ancient Philosophy”; and “Psychology.”\textsuperscript{118} The form is endorsed on the bottom by three of the young department’s faculty members: James Edwin Creighton (1861-1924, Professor of Modern Philosophy, first president of the American Philosophical Association), William Alexander Hammond (died 1938, Professor of Ancient Philosophy, graduate of Harvard, editor of the Philosophical Review) and Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927, Chair of the Psychology Department, head of the psychological laboratory, and editor of Mind).\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} Frank Angell’s tenure was brief. A year after having taken the post, he departed Cornell for the newly formed Stanford University in California (“Welcome,” Department of Psychology, Cornell University, 2006, available from \url{http://comp9.psych.cornell.edu}, Internet; “Memorial Resolution: Frank Angell [1857-1939],” Stanford Historical Society, 2006, available from \url{http://histsoc.stanford.edu/pdfmem/AngellF.pdf}, Internet). German psychologist Wundt (1832-1920) founded the first experimental psychological laboratory. Frank Angell is not to be confused with his cousin, James Rowland Angell (1869-1949), who was also a psychologist. Like Frank, James Angell studied with Wundt. Unlike Frank, he also studied briefly with William James and went on to teach with Dewey at Chicago. For more information on J. R. Angell, readers are directed to Donald L. Kneessi, “Datelines: James Rowland Angell,” PSYography: Internet Source for Biographies of Psychologists, 2006, available from \url{http://faculty.frostburg.edu/mbradley/psyography/datelnes_jamesangell.html}, Internet.

\textsuperscript{118} F. C. S. Schiller, “Application of Graduate Student,” 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca.

\textsuperscript{119} The historical overview and the bibliographic material related to those endorsing Schiller’s application are found in: Morris Bishop, \textit{A History of Cornell} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 276-8.
We also have little in the way of detail regarding his time once he arrived and before he unceremoniously left Cornell. The Balliol College Register simply lists him as “Union Soc. Instructor in Philosophy.” Abel says, “he left Oxford to go to Cornell, where he was an instructor in logic and metaphysics (succeeding Frank Thilly), and did additional graduate work.” It is Marett alone who attempts a contextual, if breathless, assessment of what led him to Cornell and what it was that he found:

Hitherto little else than a metaphysician, classically trained and familiar with German philosophy—too familiar, in fact, to be able to regard it as verbally inspired—he now breathed the atmosphere of what was philosophically no less than geographically a New World. Here, for instance, there were psychological laboratories the like of which were not to be seen in Oxford. . . . he found in the American Universities a greater readiness to bring the physical sciences and the humanities together within one universe of discourse than was possible in Europe wherever the scholastic tradition survived. Now, too, he began his lifelong friendship with William James, philosophically his alter ego.

There is something to this description. While there is no evidence of him working in the psychological laboratory of Titchener, there is evidence to suggest that he was attempting to use the American venue as a place to work through the ideas expressed in Riddles. In three specific debates, occurring in the pages of Mind and the Philosophical Review, Schiller sought to test his arguments regarding Idealism against the defenders of its practices. In other articles, he worked to draw out the implications of a world not cut off from God or the progressive hand of man. Freed from the constraints of the Oxford system, his authorial voice and philosophical viewpoint become more refined. It is where the ‘Idealism with a difference’ begins to transform into


pragmatism with a humanistic purpose. And this transformation coincides with the beginnings of what was to become an intense and reciprocal friendship with James.

Properly speaking, the first of these debates begins a year prior to Schiller enrolling and teaching at Cornell. In May 1892, David G. Ritchie (1853-1903, a former teacher of Schiller’s at Balliol, then of St. Andrew’s in Scotland) asked “What is Reality?” in the Philosophical Review. Ritchie is intent on proving “that the vulgar are being deceived by words, and that not ‘Realism’ but ‘Idealism’ corresponds to what the plain man really holds, if he can only be induced to go behind deceptive forms of ordinary speech and think the matter thoroughly out.”

Central to this argument is the view that science extends, rather than contradicts, ordinary belief, as it posits coherence as that which creates an “intelligible system.” And such a system must point towards the integration of its discrete parts if coherence is to be maintained. Thus any sense of dualism between reality and ideality is collapsed into the system; “Science leads us to Monism; and Monism, to be philosophic, must be idealistic.”

This view of coherence points to the fundamentally moral, and teleological, nature of reality, a nature which ordinary language often betrays. When a commoner says something is a “real jam” they are pointing towards a gap in attaining something. This gap posits what is and, in doing so, implies its opposite. There remains, however, one “formidable objection” to these


124 Ritchie, “What,” 271. This view of coherence is based in a distinction between what is objective and subjective in common experience. Several pages earlier, Ritchie claims that “the experience of other persons” provides a test of the coherence “in our own experience.” But to know this test one must think through the relations between objects in reality (Ritchie, “What,” 267; 269).

125 Ritchie, “What,” 274. By reality Ritchie is discussing the perception of objects as they exist in space and time; by ideality, he is referencing those relations which fall outside the parameters of the same (see Ritchie, “What,” 272).

suggestions: the sole reality of the individual. Rather than posit individual as self—that which stands in relation to other objects—Ritchie asserts that it is that which extends beyond such relations. For Ritchie it is the subject logically implied in all knowledge, the “Transcendental Ego” or “ultimate reality” which we can never know as an object, and which therefore can never be reduced to the relations implied in discussions of self.127 Ritchie argues that this explanation goes beyond the “uncritical metaphysics” of both the ordinary and scientific explanations of reality via the more encompassing explanation of philosophy.128

In September of the same year, Schiller begins “Reality and ‘Idealism’” by extending compliments to Ritchie regarding the clarity of his views, the precision of his phrases, and the intelligence of his organization. But Schiller supposes it too much to assume that a Neo-Hegelian’s substance would match his style. Specifically, Schiller argues that Ritchie makes a mistake common to idealist metaphysics: he reduces all discussion, and understanding, of reality to thought. But thoughts are often contradictory, if not outright incoherent, as experienced in time—historical traditions, for example—and between persons—those who hold at any given time different traditions. Thus, “upon Ritchie’s own showing rationality is not an ultimate test.”129 What, then, the measure?

For Schiller, the measure is practice. And, in contrast to Ritchie, he argues that the problem of incoherence is not removed by way of an overarching system of reality. It is worked through by way of use . . . in the everyday humdrum version of the same. Quoting James, “whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life, are things of whose

129 F. C. S. Schiller, “Reality and ‘Idealism,’” Philosophical Review 1, no. 5 (September 1892): 539.
reality I cannot doubt.”¹³⁰ Such use renders Ritchie’s deference to the Transcendent open to scorn as only a debating device:

This free and easy appeal to the Deity, in the midst of a discussion of human knowledge, in order to silence an opponent and to fill up any gap in argument, ought surely to be as severely reprobated as the medieval practice of ascribing any ill-understood fact or bit of knowledge to the agency of the devil.¹³¹

Even if the “individual” is not always the isolated self, it is a “hypothesis and an ideal, as well as a characteristic of reality.”¹³² And the allowance for it to work itself out as a process and a hypothesis, signals a productive move away from “the crudeness of our ‘universal laws’” and “nearer to the subtlety of nature.”¹³³

In March of 1893, Ritchie replies to Schiller’s “very vigorous and skillful attack.”¹³⁴ A central conceit of his complaint in “Reality and Idealism” is to align Schiller with others who seem to share his views. As Ritchie argues:

It may serve the convenience of those interested in the problem, if I add, that in writing my paper I had in view, not merely the widespread reaction (in Great Britain at least) against what has been called Neo-Kantianism, but in particular a recent work entitled Riddles of the Sphinx (noticed and analyzed in the REVIEW, Vol. I, No. 5), a work with which I may assume that Mr. Schiller is acquainted and with which I should imagine he is in substantial agreement.¹³⁵

Ritchie takes on Schiller, and Schiller, for assuming that the basis of reality is reducible to the character of the self. To him, this is an appeal to faculty (and faulty) psychology, suggesting

¹³⁰ Schiller, “Reality,” 540.

¹³¹ Schiller, “Reality,” 542.

¹³² Schiller, “Reality,” 544.

¹³³ Schiller, “Reality,” 545-6.


¹³⁵ Ritchie, “Reality,” 193. Given that the second edition, noting Schiller’s authorship, didn’t come out until 1894, we should applaud Ritchie’s prescience and leave it at that.
that one can talk of the real as if it meant anything one wanted it to mean; “before I discuss what a griffin or a chimera is, must I presuppose that the griffin and the chimera exist?” More seriously, this appeal to whatever one thinks to be real pushes Schiller into league with the mentally defective and the scientifically discredited, towards the appropriation of “past traditions” of which he can give no reference as actual experiences, and involves him in quibbling over details in Ritchie’s work that he chooses to ignore in his (meaning: the author of *Riddles*) own. In the final analysis, Ritchie turns Schiller’s argument for practice and use into arguments of never ending doubt. For, if everything is “becoming” it can only be doing so out of one state and towards another; to be otherwise and as Schiller states it, it forms “a basis for a skepticism which negates itself the moment it is taken quite seriously.”

Despite Ritchie’s protests, and in the very same issue, Schiller still feels that he has understood Ritchie even if Ritchie doesn’t like the interpretation. If anything is amiss, it is that he “supposed that we were discussing something more interesting than the philological meaning of the word ‘reality,’ and dealing at least with propositions and ‘ideal contents,’ if not with the reality which is beyond and provokes them.” Moreover, and given that Ritchie was no more clear, it seems unfair to argue that Schiller is being “uncritical” or relaxed in his approach to philosophy or to terms. As to Schiller’s trafficking in the defective or scientifically suspect, again, it would help if the errors Ritchie charges him with were not “ones which [Ritchie’s] own

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137 Ritchie, “Reality,” 197-8; 200.


treatment involves.”  

He is also willing to defend his honor and that of the author of the

*Riddles of the Sphinx,* noting that neither of them (him) suggested that the individual existed out of time; rather, it is that the individual demonstrates flexibility in time.  

In the end, Schiller sees their disagreements as insurmountable, as much for Ritchie’s insistence on the monopoly of ideals as for the literal expanse of “the broad Atlantic.”

As with Ritchie, Schiller uses his present time at Cornell to test the views of another person from his British past. However, Schiller’s relationship to James Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) was slightly different. Schiller was a relative peer and had in fact spent time with McTaggart; he was a friend of Schiller’s brothers and had vacationed with the Schiller family. But their proximity growing up stands in marked contrast to the chasm developing between their philosophical views. While Schiller resisted his Idealist teaching, McTaggart sought to make

140 Schiller, “Reality,” 204.

141 Schiller, “Reality,” 205.

142 Schiller is not done jabbing at his mentor and his schooling. In a review of Ritchie’s *Darwin and Hegel,* considered by many one of his greatest works, Schiller cannot resist some parrying. He says that it, representative as it is of “that not inconsiderable band of English Hegelians (mostly Oxonians),” gives “an excellent idea of the educational value and character of that school” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of *Darwin and Hegel,* by David G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Review* 2, no. 5 [September 1893]: 584). But his more salient comments are directed at those who would dispose of the views expressed in *Riddles:* “The Darwinian-Hegelian alliance is directed, on the one side, against realist and monadist tendencies in metaphysics, which, just because they stand closer to modern science, are indisposed so lightly to sacrifice to scientific specialization the moral and religious ideals of mankind, and, on the other, against the Evolutionism of Herbert Spencer and his friends, who, whatever their philosophic shortcomings, are at least prepared to take a comprehensive view of the scientific data” (Schiller, review, 585). More to the (his) point, Schiller notes that these arguments recycle points he has already addressed. To wit, Ritchie attacks views (such as those in *Riddles*) which revolt “against the tendency to reduce reality to thought, the individual to thought-determination” (review, 590). Satisfied, and lacking space to do more, Schiller tips a smarmy nod to Ritchie, saying the work is “a delightful one to read” (review, 590). His tone is more muted, the framing more religious, but his views not dampened, in a letter some four months later to Florence Thaw (wife of Alexander Blair Thaw), an American involved in psychical research and a life-long friend of Schiller: “... Of eternity I dare not speak: I can well conceive that an unimagined wealth of new experience may be reserved for us, + have myself experienced the sensation of floating in boundless space (wh. however afterwards turned out to be closed) under anaesthetics. But I have sufficient faith in the rationality of our present world to believe that truth will persist throughout all possible modes of existence + will never be belied by experiences which confound our reason” (F. C. S. Schiller, Cornell, to Florence Thaw, 15 January 1894, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
sense of it. Even before Schiller arrived at Cornell, McTaggart was attempting to revise Hegel’s metaphysic so as to amend it to the implications of British Idealism. This process led him, in 1894, to push beyond Hegel in a series of articles in Mind. McTaggart frames his project thus:

The conception of the dialectic process as eternally realized involved the assertion that the universe was fundamentally perfect, and that Hegel’s attempt to explain away the obvious imperfection around us, by treating it as a delusion, had failed to bring the perfection of reality, and the imperfection of appearance, into harmony with one another.

And so he takes as his task a way out of Hegel’s delusion. He finds no solution in the works of Bradley.

Thus he returns to Hegel’s central premise that the real is rational. We can rule out its counter, that the real is irrational, on the grounds that a rational argument cannot use irrationality

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143 In 1892, McTaggart questions the relationship of Hegel’s categories. And in their relations, Hegel’s dialectic is open to criticism; each stage does not demonstrate a certain degree of difference from the others rendering them not progressive or fluid but, to a degree, self contained; “we have seen that in the dialectic the relation of the various finite ideas to one another in different parts of the process is not the same.” The result is that the Hegelian dialectic as set forth by Hegel “does not completely and perfectly express the nature of thought” (James Ellis McTaggart, “The Changes of Method in Hegel’s Dialectic,” Mind 1, no. 1 [January 1892]: 65; 67; 71).

In 1893, McTaggart modifies his position. He now argues that Hegel’s categories do grow out of each other. But they are, and this seems to be a retention of the qualms of a year previous, markedly different from a “temporal succession.” For if the Absolute Idea is to be seen as a culmination of each successive category, it exists outside of time “eternally in its full perfection.” Leading from this suggestion all sorts of conclusions follow. If the Absolute Idea is outside of time how can it then effect changes in time? Or if the dialectic of Hegel proves to be superior to time metaphysically, it may mean that time “however suited it may be to the finite thought of every-day life . . . is not an ultimate reality.” These implications leave McTaggart glum. We are forced into a retreat towards the eternal which remains, despite time, perfect, in contradiction of the facts of our existence. “In so far as we do not see the perfection of the universe, we are not perfect ourselves. And as we are part of the universe, that too cannot be perfect. And yet its perfection appears as a necessary consequence of Hegel’s position” (James Ellis McTaggart, “Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. [I.],” Mind 2, no. 8 [October 1893]: 490; 494; 496; 506).


145 His argument here centers on Bradley’s search for non-contradiction. To force Bradley’s dichotomy between reality and appearance necessitates either: (1) a search “for the apparent imperfection, some cause whose existence will not interfere with the real perfection”; or (2) accepting that the individual is but an appearance, a distortion, which cannot help but be a meager approximation of the real. But neither position gets around the problem of a real that is perfect containing, as appearance or as reality, imperfections (McTaggart, “Time,” II, 191-2). Nor is the remedy found in the assertion of a positive cause of imperfection or an a priori argument for the “essential rationality of the universe” The former would assert that out of something perfect came something incomplete, the latter would posit irrationality as so transient a thing that it loses its force as an opposition to rationality (McTaggart, “Time,” II, 194-5).
as its conclusion. So in what form, then, would such rationality exist? Would the assertion of duality do better at matching the “chequered condition of the actual world?” Surely not, as unity cannot be found and independence cannot be had in plurality. Thus we turn to monism as a form and posit irrationality and rationality, not as independent, but as related. It is at this point that McTaggart engages in a bit of theoretical gymnastics: to go beyond Hegel one must subsume themselves within his system. He opines that we should take Hegel’s dialectic and the imperfection of the world not as contradictions, but rather as contraries which we are at present unable to resolve. In doing so, we actually advance along the lines of thought put forth by Hegel; “for, as has been said, the dialectic always advances by combining on a higher plane two things which were contradictory on a lower one.” That we can’t see this yet only suggests we have yet to obtain a plane where such synthesis is possible.

Schiller’s response to this theorizing would have to wait until the 1895. The records indicate that, aside from a full schedule of teaching and studying, Schiller was engaged on at least two other topics in 1894. First, the new edition of Riddles came out. The only change made to the book is that it now, to Ritchie’s surprise perhaps, contained Schiller’s name. Second, it would seem that another object was occupying Schiller: the University of Chicago. In a diary entry occurring sometime prior to October of 1894, he makes this humorous comment:


147 McTaggart, “Time,” II, 197.

148 Yet how are they related? McTaggart again encounters problems. If it is stated that they are united in time, that renders them part of a finite, not infinite, reality. If we state that they are balanced, this would extend our consideration of them beyond our observation. If we state that their relation is one of ultimate cause, we see its violation in the processes of change (McTaggart, “Time,” II, 198-200).


150 McTaggart, “Time,” II, 204.
“Phil² at Chicago is Dewey + Strong with occasional Tufts of wool. (cs)” Clearly, Schiller is aware of the details of the University, at the time only a few years old, and its leading philosophical/psychological (it helps to recall that the terms had yet to take on distinctive features for British philosophers) figures: Dewey, the newly appointed chair of the philosophy department, Charles Augustus Strong (1862-1940), former student of James and the associate professor of psychology who was to leave the following year for Columbia, and James H. Tufts (1862-1942), recent professor and future philosophy department chair. That these figures, among others, would come to be associated with the developing “Chicago School” of pragmatism needs be deferred for later. But his punning does seem indicative of a developing preference for what the American, as opposed to British, system of education had to offer. As he notes a few lines later, “A varsity cd make g t success by giving superior pedigrees. (CS).”²⁵¹ Contextually, it helps here to remember that *varsity* is etymological shorthand for a British university.

In January 1895, Schiller concerns return to McTaggart with “Metaphysics of the Time-Process.” He starts his reply with a kindly query as to whether or not his “interesting investigation . . . has obtained the attention it merits, [for] the problem he so ably has handled is of such vital importance . . . that no apology is needed for a further discussion of his results.” Schiller even grants that, with “almost scholastic ingenuity,” McTaggart has proven that “there is

²⁵¹ F. C. S. Schiller, 1894, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Schiller was also interested in Chicago more generally. Towards the start of 1895, he seems to be taken, if by analogy, by the heights of its vistas and the breadth of some of its tales: “Discuss® of / ‘tall’ stories of / W. “And (said CS) by / time they get to Chicago they are 30 stories high.” Nor did its scientific feats escape his punning pen: “Prof. Hale’s little boys last prayer, ‘Goodbye, God, we’re going to Chicago!’” (F. C. S. Schiller, 1895, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). The Hale in the latter entry is likely George Ellery Hale (1868-1938), the University of Chicago astronomer who was in the process of having a telescope built in what was to become the Yerkes Observatory.
no known way of reconciling the (admitted) existence of the Time-process with the (alleged) ‘eternal perfection of the Absolute Idea.”¹⁵² But before McTaggart nestles to his bosom the positive position of an as yet unknown synthesis, Schiller must ask one more question: why would one even hope to find a resolution of actual time in Hegel, or in “all systems of abstract metaphysics”?¹⁵³

As abstractions, metaphysics—Hegel, Spinoza, Plato or otherwise—derive their force from being “out of time” and can no better explain time than they can deal the distinction between the conceptual and the practical. But the former are, as Schiller suggested in dealing with Ritchie, held to the latter; the “abstractions of metaphysics, then, exist as explanations of the concrete facts of life, and not the latter as illustrations of the former, and the Absolute Idea is not exempt from this rule.”¹⁵⁴ And the abstractions of philosophy can improve their form if they take note of their scientific counterparts, if they are pointed back to reality even if they must abstract initially from it. Framed in this way, abstractions are not the contours of super-structures. They are hypotheses which are subject to further tests by the concrete facts of existence.¹⁵⁵ Such an applied approach to questions turns its back on answers beyond our reach. But it turns towards a “future for hope, a future for philosophy, and a philosophy for the future.”¹⁵⁶

These debates with Ritchie and McTaggart, taken generally, yield suggestions as to Schiller’s developing manner of argument. But they contain something much more specific and, as regards the future of Schiller’s philosophy, much more important: the integration of Jamesian


¹⁵⁵ Schiller, “The Metaphysics,” 42.

psychology into the worldview Schiller expressed in *Riddles of the Sphinx*. Recall that Schiller utilized James’s arguments as regards the constitution of reality in his response to Ritchie in September 1892. This argument is, as has been stated previously, pre-pragmatic. It comes seven years prior to the term *pragmatism* even being uttered. It is from James’s 1890 *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. II, in the section “Belief,” in the chapter entitled “The Perception of Reality.” In Schiller’s argument with Ritchie, he also references James’s contextual definition of reality: that is, “reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life.” But there is more. In between James’s definition of reality and his suggestion of the “intimate and continuous” nature of the same is this comment: “The fons et origo [source and origin] of all reality, whether from the absolute or practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves.”

We will put off a discussion of how important this personal, subjective, attribution of reality is to Schiller’s philosophy. But we can formulate a more complete picture of the relationship—by virtue of when they were written and what they focused on—between Schiller’s debates with Ritchie and McTaggart. The former is the first articulation of the Jamesian as it relates to

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158 William James, “The Perception of Reality,” *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), 295; this section is also contained in: Horace Standish Thayer, ed., “Selections from *The Principles of Psychology*,” in *Pragmatism: The Classic Writings* (New York: New American Library, 1970), 157-74. Schiller’s phrasing (he also collapses the section and chapter title so as to read “Belief and the Perception of Reality”) differs slightly from James’s language. In his argument with Ritchie, Schiller quotes James as stating “that is adjudged real which has intimate relation to our emotional and active life” (Schiller, “Reality,” 540). The cause for this discrepancy is not clear. The previously mentioned reference by Schiller—though the page number is not attributed (in *Principles*, 2, 298) and the quotation is not italicized as in the original—is a word-for-word quotation. Nor can it be the result of confusing the two volume *Principles* with the shorter *Psychology: Briefer Course* (New York: Henry Holt, 1892), because: (1) Schiller is explicit in referencing the title, volume, and page number, and (2) this section is not included in the abridged version of *Principles*.

Schiller’s philosophy; the latter is the application of those insights into the now established battle with British Idealism.  

These theoretical insights were cemented by another, more concrete, occurrence.

Whether the end of 1895 or the start of 1896, Schiller met William James. On 9 January 1896, James sent Schiller this note:

Dear Mr. Schiller,

Many thanks for your Riddles which I shall, I know devour with voracity, though probably not with promptitude for reasons connected with the course of life, that you probably know as much about as I do.

It seems a swindle that my remarks should have made you give me the book. I shall certainly give you my next one if such a thing exists. I was just thinking of ordering your volume when it arrived. Many thanks, once more!

Yours sincerely

How and when the meeting leading up to this letter came to be is uncertain. Herbert L. Searles states that “Schiller had met William James somewhere around 1895.” Winetrout agrees that “James and Schiller met for the first time in the mid-1890s,” but we must decide against Winetrout’s elaboration that this occurred “when Schiller spent some time in the James household during the Christmas holiday.”

160 This is not mere conjecture on my part. As should be clear from previous discussions, Absolute Idealism was a British interpretation of primarily German exemplars, one which was often framed as a turning away from the naïve realism of British “empirical” philosophies. To where does James go to warrant his discussion of reality? His footnotes approvingly reference Hume’s arguments against Kant as providing the most appropriate understanding of a “lively and active” conception of reality.

161 To be clear, Schiller had correspondence with James dating back at least two years prior. On 1 January 1894, James replies to “Mr. Schiller” [it will take until 9 June 1896 for James to argue that they should drop the formality of the title “Mr.”] that, on account of a bout of tonsillitis, “I especially regret not meeting you” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 1 January 1894, The Correspondence of William James, vol. 7, eds. Ignas K. Skrupkels and Elizabeth M. Berkeley [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000], 481.

162 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 9 January 1896, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.


two of Ralph Barton Perry’s *The Thought and Character of William James*. And, by the honest mistake of referencing a letter from November 1895, rather than one of the date 19 January 1897, Winetrout blend two perfectly demonstrable facts: (1) they did meet on or around the end of 1895 as evidenced by James’s letter of January 1896, but (2) Schiller, as we shall see, spent the Christmas holiday of 1896, not 1895, with James.165

Regardless the actual chronology, 1896 was busy for Schiller at Cornell. He publishes several essays,166 though one in particular begs close inspection for the reaction it arouses from James. In May, Schiller took on one of British Idealism’s most intimidating reference points. In “Lotze’s Monism,” Schiller sought to establish five propositions: (1) Lotze’s own principles do not suggest the “unity of things,” (2) his argument for such unity disrupts his actual insights, (3) that it does not solve the questions which it sought to answer, (4) it stand in contrast to a “the religious conception of God” and with Lotze’s treatment thereof, and (5) even if it is connected to such a conception it adds nothing of value. Schiller supposes that the reasons for such problems are easily explained: by moving through the process of a subtle and creative argument, one, the writer or the reader, is lead easily to accept a conclusion which “certainly would not

165 The mistake is located in Winetrout’s reference to Perry’s text where he suggests the letter is on page 164 (F. C. S., 33, n. 15). The actual page containing the reference to the 1897 note is found on 166 of volume 2 (Ralph Barton Perry, ed., *The Thought and Character of William James*, vols. 1-2 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935]).

166 One essay, “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a Priori,” finds Schiller grappling with the possibility of new dimensions. But through it all he places emphasis on the supremacy of use over truth. While the idea of a fourth dimension is of conceptual value, “the supremacy of the old geometry remains incontestable, because of its greater simplicity and consequent facility of application” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a Priori,” *Philosophical Review* 5, no. 2 (March 1896): 174; 176). And that simplicity and facility renders judgments as to use psychological modes of discrimination: “we form our notion of real space by fusing together the data derived from visual, tactile, and motor sensations. That fusion is largely accomplished by ignoring the differences between several deliverances and by correcting the appearances to one sense by another” (Schiller, “Non-Euclidean,” 177). The implications of this approach are clear. If all sense of space is psychological, it renders any discussion of geometry, either Euclidean or non-Euclidean, certain only to the extent that it remains an abstraction; “in short, as applied, a geometry is not certain, but useful” (Schiller, “Non-Euclidean,” 178).
have passed muster at the beginning.” 167 These problems have a clear source. And they are tied to a criticism which Schiller would apply more generally in years to come: the a priori. Lotze treats the Absolute, in its unity “as prior to, and more real than, the plurality of things it serves to connect.” 168 Thus understood, Schiller turns to the five arguments proper.

As regards Schiller’s first proposition, nothing proves that unity is necessary for interaction, save to the extent that unity is conceived of as being inclusive of things, not an all inclusive thing in itself. Indeed, interaction implies the coexistence of things which exist within a plurality; “in every case in which we predicate the coexistence of several things, we imply that they directly or indirectly act on one another.” 169 The problems within the second are the result of not seeing the problems in the first. Given that Lotze had to posit the unity of the Absolute, he asserted that the influences of one on another (the question of causation, or what is here referred to as transeunt action), were actually subsumed within and the result of the unity itself (referred to here as immanent action). But Schiller suggests this is the translation of what is psychologically apparent in our lives—that “we can change, because we are conscious beings with a feeling of our identity”—which holds no warrant. 170 For if the Absolute is a unity it cannot, like ourselves, recognize or even tender the suggestion that it might distinguish and adjust to transeunt actions imposed on it; there is nothing beyond Lotze’s Absolute. An additional difficulty arises in Lotze’s suggestion of commensurability. While it is true that nothing is strictly speaking incommensurable, that does not suggest its origins in an unchanging

169 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 228.
170 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 231.
unity; “the supposed origins of a commensurable world out of an infinite number of commensurable and incommensurable elements is [post-Darwin] thinkable.”171 As to the third, and given the results of the previous two, Schiller’s answer is succinct: “the Absolute is not a principle of explanation that has any scientific or philosophical value.”172

Turning to the fourth and fifth propositions, dealing with the conception of God as it relates to the Absolute, Schiller is quick to point out how readily Lotze’s argument breaks down. And the reason is simple: conceptions of a Deity differ from conceptions of an Absolute. Whereas a God directs and guides, “the Absolute could have no plan and guide nothing.”173 And at every point that Lotze attempts to explain the Absolute as if it were a Deity, it suggests the tension of merging two concepts not fitted for each other. In its struggle to propel itself through “a succession of phases” it demonstrates an “internal instability,” lurching adjustments in motion that lead Schiller to the comparison of a drunkard.174 If it must contend with the nature of evil, Lotze must stand quiet or else allow that it admits of possibly two Absolutes. And such silence would be enough if all that was called for was honesty. “But one has the right to expect that a philosopher whose arguments lead him into such manifest bankruptcy should be prompted to reexamine and possible revise his premises; and this Lotze fails to do.”175 More generally, and a touch more kindly, Schiller suggests that Lotze’s foray into a theological Absolute is of philosophical value; it shows “the futility of the a priori proofs of God’s existence” and the

171 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 234.
172 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 237.
173 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 238.
174 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 239.
175 Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 241.
necessity of formulating “the proofs a posteriori, and basing them, not on the nature of existence in the abstract, but on the nature of our empirical world.”\textsuperscript{176}

This push away from the abstract Absolute and toward the empirical merits the support of his new ally, James. In June 1896, James writes: “My dear Schiller [I propose that we cease Mistering each other?] I should in any case have written to you to day even had I not received your letter, simply to express the pleasure with which I have just read your article on Lotze in the last Phil. Rev. You carry me with you in all your positions.” James goes on to say that his admiration is as much related to the essay’s “classical simplicity and directness of style and arrangement” as it is to the actual content. Like Schiller, James is not ill-disposed to an idealistic conception of reality; rather, it is the intrusion of an a priori Absolute: “The idealistic hypothesis can stand on its own legs, and need not be that of an absolute thought in any case.”\textsuperscript{177} This is followed three months later with James’s impressions of the \textit{Riddles} which he had received at the start of the year:

I must sit down whilst the warm fit is on me, + express my very great delight. How strange that a book so capitally written, so “live,” so original, so bold, should be so little known! That I myself who am so exceptionally in accord with its fundamental positions, should until now have [no. red [sic] its contents! But don’t fear! It will be known + little by little quoted, and then some fortune will be made. It is too rich as it now stands. It is a young man’s work – he puts in at once all his system. When you dole out benefits the small change of many of your chapters more technically and formally, attention will be drawn to the whole thing. The speculations of the last chapter are foreign to my range – I am too timid – but they have struck me very much. I only mean this for a general hurrah, so I go into no detail. I can foresee a more or less systematic siege of monism + absolutism on my own part for the rest of my days (so far as I may retain ability to do anything) and it cheers and enlivens me immensely to

\textsuperscript{176} Schiller, “Lotze’s,” 243-4.

\textsuperscript{177} William James, Chocorua, NH, to F. C. S. Schiller, 9 June 1896, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
find a Gleichgesinente Menschen [akin to an “equal man”] of such superior power to follow. 178

The last of these notes is important in that it highlights the extent to which Schiller and James are in agreement. But it also suggests that the range of Schiller’s argument, particularly as it leans towards the issue of Immortality, extends beyond that of James. And it is clear that James is hoping that Schiller will place his views into style—“more technically and formally”—so as to broaden its appeal with interested readers. Such quibbles aside, it was only three months later that Schiller finally spent that Christmas holiday with the James and his wife. Reflecting on it afterward, in a letter to the previously discussed psychical researcher Frederic Myers, James had this to say: “Schiller spent the Christmas holiday with us, and I find him a peculiarly delightful fellow. His philosophy and mine run abreast in an altogether gratifying way to me.” 179

Others, however, are interested in discussing Schiller’s peculiar take on Lotze. In the January 1897 Philosophical Review, W. J. Wright praises the originality of Schiller’s paper, hoping “that other writers of equal knowledge, and equally facile pens, may be stimulated to contribute their views upon this important philosophy.” 180 The praise is short-lived. Wright argues that Schiller leads readers “into a maze of misconceptions.” 181 And, if one takes Schiller at his word, Wright accuses him of being a modern primitive, trusting all that the senses suggest. This is flawed, counters Wright, because “merely given experience tells us nothing of action or

178 William James, Beebe’s [Heights; Keene], NY, to F. C. S. Schiller, 15 September 1896, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

179 This is the note that caused the confusion as to when Schiller spent time with James. This version is found in Winetrout, F. C. S., 20; the longer version that Winetrout references is found in Perry, The Thought, 2, 166.


interaction.”¹⁸² Thus Schiller is wrong to accuse Lotze, on the basis of a naïve empirical psychology, of not justifying the Absolute. Point in fact, Lotze’s system does justify itself because it extends beyond the range of Schiller’s arguments. The Absolute so shapes things as to appear orderly and uniform, and does so by way of phenomena which “are made to appear in our minds, and bear witness to the immanence [as opposed to transeunce] of the One in the Many.”¹⁸³

Schiller is glad to have (at) Wright’s reply in the very same issue. First, because it allows him to reiterate that his “immanent” criticism was not intent on “wrecking” Lotze’s philosophy; rather it was directed “against his Monism alone, and the method whereby he reaches it.”¹⁸⁴ Second, because it allows him to clarify his points. His argument against the necessity of unity was based on the necessity of interaction; thus, for him, a plurality of coexisting objects in reality calls into question a unity meant to subsume them. More specifically, his argument was that Lotze failed to see how that would bear on the consequences of asserting unity, against the reality of the world: “he did not perceive the necessity of passing from the affirmation, ‘There is a world’ to ‘ergo, there is interaction.’”¹⁸⁵ All of this relates to Wright’s complaint that Schiller misreads Lotze. Schiller responds that it is actually the case that Wright selectively reads Lotze so as to justify the Absolute.¹⁸⁶ To this point, Schiller queries:

¹⁸⁴ Schiller, “Reply: Lotze’s,” 62.
¹⁸⁵ Schiller, “Reply: Lotze’s,” 62.
¹⁸⁶ There is some difficulty in summing up the argument that Schiller is raising against Wright, particularly because Wright truncates his reference to Lotze. The full passage that Wright quotes, in the edition that Schiller uses, is as follows, with the portions Wright omits in brackets: “[From so unknown a Supreme Cause] we cannot venture [Wright substitutes undertake] to deduce the [process of the creation of the] world, [and set it forth in concrete description; just as little can we attempt to determine beforehand the particular order of Nature, in which
What, moreover, does Professor Wright have to say to the passage immediately preceding the paragraph from which he quotes, in which Lotze claims that ‘the fact that there are reciprocal actions (interactions) will compel us to believe in a real unity of all things, and a common source whence they have flowed’?\textsuperscript{187}

In this way, Schiller sees Lotze as admitting the necessity of the parts which would warrant any attempt at constructing a unified system. And these parts, so casually dismissed by Wright, are not some “primitive” retreat from the glory of the Absolute. They are, for Schiller, a damning indictment of deductive abstraction. They cast into doubt any Absolute which renders that which creates it absent, “a One which is no longer compatible with the existence of the Many.”\textsuperscript{188} As with James, Schiller does not want to conflate a desire for order with the perception of complexity.

### 2.5 A TRIP, ABROAD: SCHILLER’S DEPARTURE FROM AMERICA

In the months that follow these philosophical salvos, Schiller is involved in complexities of a more academic sort. They culminate, most basically, in Schiller failing his orals and returning

\[\textbf{187} \text{ Schiller, “Reply: Lotze’s,” 63. To be fair, Schiller’s reference is also slightly amended. The full line is as follows: “If, then, after an examination of the content of Nature, and of the purposiveness of its creations, we could still be in doubt whether, after all, it had not possibly originated in solitary and unconnected beginnings, the fact that there are reciprocal actions will, on the other hand, compel us to believe in a real unity of things, and a common source whence they all flowed.” Schiller finds, it would seem, Wrights omission of this comment damning because the paragraph in which his evidence is found, and to which Schiller responds so harshly, begins with the comment: “In endeavouring to track the consequences of this conviction, we must beware of requiring from it more results than it can yield” (italics mine, Lotze, \textit{Microcosmus}, 1, 445). Schiller’s concern, then, is roughly paraphrased as follows: both Lotze and Wright ignore the consequences of what is argued as found in the evidence from which they abstract their conclusions.}\]

\[\textbf{188} \text{ Schiller, “Reply: Lotze’s,” 64.}\]
to begin a career at Corpus Christi. Until recently there has been very little detail as regards specifics. Slosson offers two scenarios: (1) puff chested from the offer of a job at Oxford, Schiller chose not to take the exam seriously; or (2) being so sharp a mind and already so far along the path to pragmatism, Schiller “turned the tables” on his unhappy examiners.\textsuperscript{189} Marett suggests that “he received the call to Oxford for which his soul longed and his friends had long prayed and, it may be, schemed.”\textsuperscript{190} Abel says that Riddles “was unsuccessfully offered for his Ph.D. thesis.”\textsuperscript{191} Winetrout simply says that “he failed the doctorate oral in philosophy.”\textsuperscript{192} Cornell’s published history, for its part, provides an amusingly succinct tale: “[Schiller] failed his orals for the Ph.D. and was bidden to take a make-up. He decided not to bother; he strolled under the window of the room where his committee waited to examine him, and then strolled significantly away. So at least the story ran; and he was certainly not reappointed.”\textsuperscript{193}

The internal documents regarding Schiller’s termination at Cornell are no more definitive. In a letter drafted by the Committee on Graduate Work and Advanced Degrees to the Dean of the University Faculty at Cornell University, it is stated that Schiller was given an oral examination in Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics, and Psychology on 26 May 1897. But “the committee found unanimously that Mr. Schiller had failed to satisfy the requirements of the examination.” Being shocked at the “wholly unexpected and unforeseen” result, and hoping to “eliminate the accidents of an oral examination,” they arranged for Schiller to retake the exam in writing on 2 June 1897. On that date Schiller arrived late and declined the examination, stating

\textsuperscript{189} Slosson, \textit{Six}, 202.
\textsuperscript{190} Marett, “Ferdinand,” 6.
\textsuperscript{191} Abel, \textit{The Pragmatic}, 7.
\textsuperscript{192} Winetrout, \textit{F. C. S.}, 7.
\textsuperscript{193} Bishop, \textit{A History}, 339.
that, among other things, having secured a position at Oxford meant that any degree from Cornell would only have “sentimental value.” The same afternoon a note was received by the chairman of Schiller’s committee which stated that, “owing to circumstance of which you have heard and which I should have been delighted to explain to you fully if you had called, it will be impossible for me to take an examination of the length you announce to me in the postal card I have just received.”¹⁹⁴ In two letters dated 4 June 1897, Schiller disputes the Committee’s findings. In the first, addressed to the President of the University, protests that his committee has not informed of their decision regarding his exam and that he has heard rumors to the effect that he “was supposed to have withdrawn his candidature.”¹⁹⁵ In the second, to Professor White,

¹⁹⁴ Committee on Graduate Work and Advanced Degrees, to the Dean of the University Faculty at Cornell University, 7 June 1897, 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca. There is another issue, central to this situation, which frustrates in the lack of decisive detail. It is the issue of Schiller’s thesis. As was then, and still is, the case, a student must submit a thesis prior to undertaking comprehensive examination. In the letter referenced above, the committee indicates this was the case: “Mr. Schiller’s thesis having been approved by the Professor of Moral Philosophy (Professor Seth) . . . the committee proceeded, on May 26th, to the usual oral examination.” But there is no record of this thesis at Cornell. Further, the occasionally suggested thesis—Schiller’s 1891 Riddles—seemingly makes little sense. Why would a recently inaugurated college, attempting then to establish its pedigree, accept a book that had already gone through two rounds of publication? There is, however, a potential/partial answer. In 1975, Frederick J. Down Scott was working on an article regarding the relationship of Schiller and Peirce (see Frederick J. D. Scott, “Peirce and Schiller and Their Correspondence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 [1973]: 363-386). He queried the Cornell Graduate School as to the title of Schiller’s thesis. On 15 July 1975, he received a reply from Dean William W. Lambert, stating: “I have read the meager folder and I am sorry to report that there is no information in the folder as to what the contents or title of the thesis were” (William W. Lambert, Ithaca, to Frederick J. Down Scott, 15 July 1975, 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca). An internal memo, between (one assumes) a managerial assistant referenced only as “Nancy” and Lambert on 7 July, is a touch more telling. Nancy writes: “Barbara Kretzmann (wife of Philos. Prof. Kretzmann) is researching the Sage School and says ‘mystery surrounds the Cornell activities of Schiller.’ He wrote ‘Riddles of the Sphinx’ prior to his thesis oral and one can only guess that his Committee challenged his using it or part(s) of it for his thesis. . . .” (Nancy, Ithaca, to William H. Lambert, 7 July 1975, 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca). Lambert replies on the back of the original memo: “I find this most fascinating.” These details seem to contradict the committee memo stating that Schiller had successfully defended his thesis. But the thesis may be part of a larger story. As will be seen shortly, there is a clear sense that Schiller was working hard to secure a position away from Cornell in significant advance of the date of his oral examination. If that is the case, it is possible that the failure of his orals trumped any need to deal with the matter of his thesis. It would also explain why there is no record of his thesis on file.

¹⁹⁵ F. C. S. Schiller, to [Jacob Gould] Schurman, 4 June 1897, 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca.

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Schiller states in part: “I understand that no report was sent in my case . . . The whole proceeding strikes me as equally irregular in form + discourteous in substance.”

Slosson’s first scenario and Schiller’s committee’s report seem nearest to the truth. The private documents suggest that Schiller was campaigning to secure a position, in America or Britain, as early as 1895. In Schiller’s files there is a recommendation dated 16 June 1895. It reads:

Mr. C. Schiller B.A. of Christ Church Balliol College, Oxford was my colleague and assistant at Eton for a period of five school terms (Lent 1888 – Mid-summer 1889). During this time he was mainly engaged in the teaching of German, both in the Army Class and the general body of the school. As head of the German department I had ample opportunities of making myself acquainted with his work and forming an opinion of his acquirements.

Mr. Schiller is an excellent German scholar, having in fact a perfect command of the language, and is an able and successful teacher. He speaking + writes German as fluently as English, but has also made a thorough study of the literature and philology, as is shown by his having gained the Taylorian scholarship at Oxford. I can only add that in my opinion he is a man admirably fitted to fulfil the duties of a lecturer or professor of German language and literature at an English University.

R. A. Ploetz M.A.
Magd. Coll. Oxon
Senior German master at
Eton College

His correspondence with James does nothing to eliminate the suspicion of a campaign. In a letter of 9 June 1896, James notes that he is “I am sorry you want to leave America but on the whole am not indignant. . . . Wishing you success – though as an American. I hate to lose

196 F. C. S. Schiller, to [Ernest Ingersoll] White, 4 June 1897, 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca.

197 R. A. Ploetz, Eton College, 16 June 1895, Recommendations, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
In September of the same, and when Schiller would have been on a vacation abroad, James hopes he “will come back to this country, which after all has its good ‘pints.’”

An even clearer indication Schiller was seeking the help and counsel of those outside of Cornell is this letter from James on 22 January 1897:

Dear Schiller,

I have just got yours of the 16th forwarded from L. I write by the same mail to the “President” of Corpus Christi – though that seems to me an incredible title – 2nd thoughts I will put “Head” on the outside and apologize inside for my ignorance. I shall wait to be asked before writing to Low. I recommended you last week to Prof. King of Oberlin (who had written for advice) as the best man I know who was out of place. He replied that he had his eye on you already. O. would be a good sociological study, though I fear you are not gospel-hardened enough to stand such an environment.

I am up here for the holiday week – thermometer 6 yester morn, and I with “pink eye” – so no more.

Yours ever

Only two months shy of his first scheduled examination, Schiller is all but certain that he is leaving. James’s response to this news exposes the depths of his feeling for his younger protégé. In a letter dated 6 March 1897 James exclaims:

I am shocked and outraged at what you tell me of Cornell no longer requiring your services. Their finances must be very much straitened indeed to make them confront such a decision. If only we could get you here! You and I could then found a regular school of pluralism, and sweep the country. . . . It cannot be that you will lack employment for long, and I will write you testimonials by the yard, whenever you apply to me for such a thing. You are certainly one of the two or three constructive philosophers in the country.

198 James, 9 June 1896.

199 James, 15 September 1896.

200 William James, Keene Valley, NY, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 January 1897, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. Initially it seems possible that the “Low” mentioned is Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson (1862-1932), who at the time was a Fellow and Professor of History at King’s College, Cambridge. More likely, given the textual evidence, is that it is Louis Dyer (1851-1908), former professor of Greek at Harvard and then professor of Classics at Oxford. Of the King there is less doubt. He is Henry Church King (1858-1934), a former graduate student at Harvard and philosophy professor at Oberlin.

201 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 6 March 1897, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
But the question is why he is leaving. Schiller replies on 16 April that the issue is not financial; rather, it is the fact that Titchener wants to promote another student. As a consequence, Schiller has already sent in applications to both Corpus Christi and Columbia.202

Whatever the intrigue involved, it is clear that Schiller was no mere victim of the situation. Even if his time at Cornell was limited due to a rift with Titchener, Schiller had been contemplating a departure a year prior to his defense. For at least several months, he had been actively seeking James’s help to secure an alternative place of employment. So, in April, with applications already sent in, the upcoming oral exam was likely less on his mind. By the time of the oral retake in June, the positive response from Corpus Christi made the idea of taking another exam so as to get a doctorate—it was of no use at Oxford and would do nothing to keep him at Cornell—even less appealing. This is confirmed in a letter that Schiller must have sent out in the days immediately prior to the protest at his “irregular” treatment at Cornell. Given James’s response, there was no mention of the failed orals or the written follow up he failed to take. Rather, it was to inform James that Schiller had secured a position at Corpus Christi. On 5 June 1987, James’s writes: “I heartily congratulate you on the appointment, though I am very sorry that we are to lose you. I was always hoping you might become an inveterate yankee.” And it looks as if Schiller was also trying to arrange a final meeting before he went abroad. “There is nothing I should like better than to have a long talk with you before you go, but I can make no

202 F. C. S. Schiller, Ithaca, to William James, 16 April 1897 [“Calendar” letter summary], The Correspondence of William James, 8, eds. Ignas K. Skrupkelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000], 595. This summary also lends more credence to the idea that it is Dyer, not Dickinson, referenced in the letter dated 22 January 1887. As it notes: “WJ’s letter about Schiller to Louis Dyer made a great impression at Oxford.”
But we do know that time spent not studying for a written exam was being put to good use. Schiller was working on one last ‘American’ article prior to his departure, the June 1897 “Darwinism and Design” in the Contemporary Review. Schiller begins by asking: what difference it makes in our attitude towards life if we “believe it to be inspired by intelligence, or hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind mechanical forces.” Noting that the most contemporaneous argument from design argues “from the existence of adaptation to the existence of an adapter,” Schiller posits a concomitant problem: the existence of defect commits a supporter of this view to accept said defect as part of the design. In response, the Darwinian argument removes the idea of intelligence, replacing it with adaptation meant only to secure survival. Instead of being a crushing blow to the intelligence camp, he sees this as only a newer argument from design with Natural Selection standing in the place of the (or a) Deity. This leads Schiller to advance several questions: (1) if survival is the ultimate within a Darwinian scheme, is it wrong to suppose that intelligence was developed for that purpose; (2) if variation is to supplant intelligence, is it begging the question to ask from whence it originated; (3) if these variations are subject to the demands of nature, what then is the basis for ruling out a priori demands imposed from beyond nature? His most basic point is that questions such as these demonstrate the Darwinian account cannot be said to be the death blow to arguments from

203 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 June 1897, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.


design or to arguments as to cause. Indeed, the natural world demonstrates that species persist and resist change just as much as they degenerate “under the impartial operations of variability and natural selection.”

None of which is meant to suggest that the Darwinian account is without use. Its significance “has been to establish once and for all the reality, universality, and importance of natural selection as a condition of organic life.” But it equally important to point out that there are rhetorical underpinnings to Darwin’s account. As much as it was meant to explain natural selection, “there is abundant autobiographical evidence that Darwin himself elaborated his theory in support of evolutionism against creationism.” And to put forth an account that squared with such an interest, Darwin necessarily had to posit “indefinite accidental variation,” leaving to the side any question as to why it happened. The result, then, was the creation of a methodological simplification that was useful, but not true, that provided a productive way to look at facts, but should not be mistakenly made into the facts themselves.

To Schiller, such an understanding more accurately does justice to Darwin’s account of natural selection, even as it makes clear that said account in no way rules out a teleological explanation of evolution itself. What remains, however, is the question of how the Darwinian account of selection and the teleological account of cause can be squared with existence of progression, of persistence, of degeneration. To Schiller, the answer is that “the power that makes for progress, a power which we may suppose to work for nobler ends, can render natural

selection also a pliable instrument of its purpose, a sanction to enforce the law of progress, a
goad to urge on the laggards.” As a productive account, natural selection shows us adaptation
at work while teleology suggests “a power that intelligently adapts means to ends”; as a negative
account, natural selection weakens antiquated arguments from design that suggested things were
as they should be and points us to the hope “that everything is being made perfect.” Both, in
service and support of each other, thereby help man to fashion a world not ready made with an
attitude more optimistically inclined.

This article is of note for several reasons. First, as a parting shot it is aimed, not back at
America, but towards England. This point shouldn’t be minimized. In these years it would be
premature to even speak of his style of pragmatism, as it is not until he returns to England that
this all coalesces into something akin to that name. But it is proper to speak of the views that led
to pragmatism, of the groundwork that Schiller had done in America. For, aside from the work
he had done prior to arriving in America for the Journal and Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research—already a professed believer in a world big enough for a Deity—and a lone
response to the family acquaintance McTaggart—already a decidedly non-Hegelian as regards
abstract metaphysics—in Mind, Schiller’s philosophical confidence was gained in the pages of
the in-house journal, Philosophical Review. Second, this can be seen as more than a shot; it can
be taken as a printed statement of his views to that point in time. And it is a statement that
encompasses both Evolution and the Spirit. It is the former as both a historical process and as a
progressive ideal; it is the latter as the suggestion that belief can promote both the process and
the ideal. Finally, and while it would be hasty to call it Jamesian, it is an indication of the


direction in which Schiller would take his philosophy in the years ahead. Those years were surely on his mind as, with summer upon him, Schiller set sail on his return trip home.
The suspicion is in the air nowadays that the superiority of one of our formulas to another may not consist so much in its literal ‘objectivity,’ as in subjective qualities like its usefulness, its ‘elegance’ or its congruity with our residual beliefs. Yielding to those suspicions, and generalizing, we fall into something like the humanistic state of mind.¹

They are the most mundane matters of record: in 1897 Schiller traveled across the sea to bring his philosophical views back to Oxford; James traveled across the country to bring his “will to believe” to American philosophers. These two details yield a near perfect demonstration of the gulf that separated the two men. The division was, by turns, literal and figurative. But it was not philosophical. James had as much as noted their “metaphysical” kinship in the years previous, in the years leading up to James’s publication of The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897) and the lecture Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898). It was, first, a physical distance that placed Schiller beyond the birth of one term with which he was to be identified for the rest of his life: pragmatism. And it was, second, at an emblematic distance—entrenched once again in the citadel of Oxford—that Schiller would marshal the term(s) to describe, and the style to defend, the philosophical disposition he shared with James.

Those terms would culminate in Schiller’s own statements as to the nature of pragmatism and, then, pragmatic humanism. Here, too, there is a sense of difference. And it is a difference as regards strategy. James’s goals leaned towards inclusion and pluralism, to harmonizing differences. Schiller’s arguments tilted towards the subjective side of Jamesian psychology, towards a highly personalized conception of reality and an outright disdain for monism. Some

¹ William James, “Humanism and Truth,” Mind 13, no. 52 (October 1904): 460.
could be brusque. Schiller’s spoof Mind! (1901) was a leering jab at his elders at Oxford as much as it was a satire of philosophy proper. Others were more calculated. “Axioms as Postulates” (1902) forsook mockery to suggest the range to which pragmatic thinking could be extended. And some were simply twice told tales slipped into sturdier boards. Humanism: Philosophical Essays (1903) culled together both the pre- and proto-pragmatic essays that were thematically similar if not systematically developed. This, too, was demonstrative of Schiller’s tendencies. James was already urging Schiller to dedicate his time to more formal treatment of his (and James’s) pragmatic views. But Schiller—whether due to his temperament, his workload as a tutor, or a bit of both—chose a different approach. In countless journal articles and reviews, he attempted to wear down the opposition by sheer volume of argument. In doing so, he often sided with polemic aimed at living targets: minor nuisances such as Harvard psychologist Hugo Münsterberg and formidable Idealists such as Oxonian Francis Herbert Bradley. In these heady days, such tactics provide dividends even as they portend negative consequences.

3.1 ‘TO HOPE TILL HOPE CREATES’: THE BIRTH OF PRAGMATISM

The arrival of James’s 1897 work, The Will to Believe, on the philosophical scene was cause for commentary. Dedicated to Peirce, it provides the first published discussion of the concept of radical empiricism. James offers this definition:

I say ‘empiricism,’ because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modifications in the course of future experience; and I say ‘radical,’ because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as a
hypothesis, and . . . it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square.²

Several points are worth note. First, this is not the sort of empiricism that the Absolute Idealists loathed and dismissed. It is not the objective before the eye but the subjective nature of that which lies beyond us. The irony is that this suggests a similarity with Idealism. But the radical aspect of this concept undoes the comparison. It is not modification so as to justify unity; rather, it is modification as a consequence of subsequent experience. And this concept extends in none too subtle ways from James’s The Principles of Psychology. Therein, and in the 1892 Briefer Course, James defined psychology as the “description and explanation of states of consciousness as such.” These states are related to the Empirical Self, or Me, which James further divides into the Material Me and the Social Me. But to these he adds the Spiritual Me, “the entire collection of consciousness, my psychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely.”³ Here, again, one can see the tinge of Idealism. But it is not of an absolute sort.⁴ Like Schiller’s arguments during the late 1880s with Barkworth and Myers, this is Idealism pinioned by experience and bracketed by personality. Consciousness resides within the individual; it is not beyond the individual. Thus understood, a (radical) empirical examination of experience frames a psychological understanding of the consciousness of individuals therein. Now, this might seem a slight quibble between two antiquated philosophical positions. Then, this was nothing less than to cleave the head off the established philosophical idol.

² William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1897), vii-iii.

³ William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt, 1910; 1892), 1; 181.

⁴ Recall James’s comments to Schiller in 1896: “The idealistic hypothesis can stand on its own legs, and need not be that of an absolute thought in any case” (William James, Chocorua, NH, to F. C. S. Schiller, 9 June 1896, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).
Interested readers take note of James’s radical propositions. In September, the Dial posits who the audience for The Will to Believe would be. Though subtitled “essays in popular philosophy,” James’s message is clearly directed at the philosophical, not general, public. The distilled message? That a credulous belief in science binds one to a flawed sensitivity as regards matters of religion, of faith, of life and death. For its part, the review supposes James’s interest in non-sanctioned practices demonstrates the limits of such belief; “the author’s chapter on ‘Psychical Research’ affords evidence that he carries his own principle of believing the things that we want to believe a little farther than most clear-sighted thinkers are willing to carry it.”

James, like Schiller before and after him, is chastised for pushing against the boundaries of sanctioned philosophy. The will to believe is mis-translated by suspicious readers into believing whatever you will.

A month later, Schiller provides an effusive counterpoint in Mind. Never was Schiller seen, before or after, to dote so heavily (sweetly, we might say) upon a philosopher. He calls James’s volume “admirable” and a “delight,” noting “the grace of his style, the raciness of his phrases, the stimulus of his originality, in short the deftness of the manipulations whereby he is

5 Review of The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, by William James, Dial 23, no. 6 (16 September 1897): 149-50. Others were no less skeptical as to James’s overall philosophical viewpoint; see Dickinson S. Miller, “‘The Will to Believe’ and The Duty to Doubt,” International Journal of Ethics 9, no. 2 (January 1899): 169-95. As Perry notes, on many other subjects Miller and James were allies and, on a personal level, friends (Ralph Barton Perry, ed., The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 2 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935], 240-1). But he tells a truncated story as regards the relation of James, Miller, and Schiller. This is taken up in the subsequent discussion of Schiller’s 1902 “Axioms as Postulates.” Suffice it to say at this point that, written in James’s hand at the bottom of a typed letter to Schiller, James comments: “Miller’s article was a great disappointment to me—a complete ignoratio elenchi—with not one of my positions even touched.” The reference is confirmed in Schiller’s own hand along side the written comments, where he notes: “on the W. t. Bel in the Journ of Ethics” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 January 1899, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). The Miller essay produced two follow up responses, one for and one seemingly against, by Henry Rutgers Marshall and William Caldwell, respectively: Henry Rutgers Marshall, “Belief and Will,” International Journal of Ethics 9, no. 3 (April 1899): 359-73; William Caldwell, “The Will to Believe and the Duty of Doubt,” International Journal of Ethics, 9, no. 3 (April 1899): 373-8. Perry includes a letter where James agrees with Marshall’s interpretation (see The Thought, 2, 242); the “seemingly” issue as regards Caldwell will be taken up while discussing his 1900 article, “Pragmatism.”
wont to charm the heavy indigestible dough of philosophic discussion to rise up into dainty shapes that need be disdained by no intellectual epicure.”6 But Schiller is as much calling into question the ambiguity of James’s prose as he is celebrating it: “he pretends only to express his personal feelings.”7 If that is the case, to whom then should additional praise be directed? Schiller suggests that James comes from a lineage of thinkers, particularly the German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, who questioned rationalism and lead to what James has termed, radical empiricism.8 So, in turning his back on the “infallible a priori tests of truth,” Schiller is wont to insist that James’s views are not “altogether new and indisputably true”; rather, he is the latest philosopher to note that wisdom is grounded in human experience. The rationalist route once more stands exposed as futile for, “if then there existed absolute truth, of which man was not the measure, it would be most natural that the human mind should prove inadequate to its comprehension.”9

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6 F. C. S. Schiller, review of The Will to Believe; and other Essays in Popular Philosophy, by William James, Mind 6, no. 24 (October 1897): 547.
7 Schiller, review, 547.
8 Schiller, review, 548.
9 Schiller, review, 550. Aside from the tone of high praise, there is one other aspect of the review worth note: Schiller, the philosopher who is to be later and often chastised for being too subjective, lodges the same complaint against James. Here, he argues that James’s highly personal views of experience, when applied to the work both do in psychical research, would lead away from the promising methods of science, methods which might serve to legitimate “a much and maliciously maligned subject (Schiller, review, 553). While it pays to recall that early pragmatists sought philosophical arguments for correcting/revising scientific practice, this stands out—and the analysis in subsequent chapters will bear this out—as a singular event in the work of Schiller.

For a relevant selection demonstrating Peirce’s stance as regards science, particularly his discussion of the potential pitfalls which impede the Rule of Reason—“never block inquiry”—see Charles S. Peirce, “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism,” 1896; 1899, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940; Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), 42-59. For his discussion discounting the need of science or philosophy to anchor themselves to “metaphysically real classes,” see in the same collection Peirce, “Philosophy and the Sciences,” 60-73. A particularly insightful discussion of the scientific tendency to ignore or convert materials it has trouble comprehending so as to craft “simplicity and consistency” is found in James; see William James, “The Powers and Limitations of Science,” 1897; 1920, in The Philosophy of William James, ed. Horace M. Kallen (New York: The Modern Library, 1953), 197-214. Dewey also questions the tendency—in ancient as opposed to “new experimental science”—to rely on speculative, and to his way of thinking.
The responses from James and his wife, Alice, were almost as buoyant as the review. On 18 October, Alice James writes:

You are the wise man who speaks the just word! I have just read your review of the Will to Believe in Mind – it came this morning – and I must tell you how it has rejoiced me. You have read with sympathy and you interpret more skillfully than any one the faith my husband holds. There has been much praise of the book of a general sort but nothing that has caught its true worth as you do. For your generous praise I am truly grateful and I find myself regretting afresh that we have known you only to lose you.¹⁰

Atop the note, in William’s hand, is the notation: “My wife on reading your review could not control herself and blossomed out in this.” For his part, James responded five days later:

Did you ever hear of the famous international prize fight between Tom Sayers + Heenan the Benicia Boy, or were you too small a baby in 1857? The Times devoted a couple of pages of report + one or more eulogistic editorials to the English Champion, and the latter, brimming over with emotion wrote a letter to the Times in which he touchingly said that he would live in future as one who had been once deemed worthy of commemorations in one of its leaders. After reading your review of me in the October Mind (which only reached me 2 days ago) I feel as the noble Sayers felt, and think I ought to write to [George Frederick] Stout [the editor of Mind] to say I will try to live up to such a character. My past has not deserved such words, but my future shall. Seriously your review has given me the keenest possible pleasure. This philosophy must be thickened up most decidedly – your review represents it as something to rally to, so we must fly a banner + start a school. Some of your phrases are bully: “reckless rationalism,” “Pure Science is Pure Gook,” “infallible a priori test of truth to sever us from the consequences of our choice,” etc etc. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.¹¹

¹⁰ Alice James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 October 1897, Box One, Folder Twelve, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

¹¹ William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 23 October 1897, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford;
This letter is an early and important suggestion of the reciprocity of influence that was growing between James and Schiller. The psychologist cum philosopher, chastised for muddled thinking in the Dial, has found philosophical companionship. This friendship, spurred on by Schiller’s jaunty turns of phrase, is substantial enough to push James forward. The letter suggests, no less, Schiller’s part in foisting the banner so soon to fly in the face of the philosophical status quo.

He doesn’t have to wait long. Less than a year later, James’s gives his 1898 Berkeley lecture entitled Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results. This, and its subsequent publication in the same year, provides for a rallying cry refined into a philosophical statement of purpose: “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involves . . . Our conception of these effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.”

Expressed “more broadly” by James than by the person to which it is attributed, Peirce, pragmatism (or its discarded co-moniker, practicalism) reduces philosophical statements “to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience.”

What, then, is the significance of James’s works for Schiller? James has become a philosophical touchstone who provides Schiller with the organizational schema to frame his ‘Idealism with a difference.’ In retrospect, this strikes one as a significant moment in the development of Schiller’s philosophy. Which it certainly is. But a rhetorical biography errs the more it holds to the grooves already made, albeit sporadically, in the historical tale of Schiller.


12 William James, Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results, The Annual Public Address before the Union August 26, 1898 (Berkeley: University Press, 1898), 6.

13 James, Philosophical, 7.
As by his supporters’ telling, the Riddles of the Sphinx is a youthful work distanced from Schiller’s later writings. By the evidence, it is in that metaphysic that we already see the emerging views to which Schiller would later affix the pragmatic and humanist descriptions. On his opponents’ slight, Schiller took on Jamesian views and became their mouthpiece. Point in fact, he saw in the arguments of James, particularly in Principles and The Will to Believe, support for his already established contention that treating a priori assumptions as unassailable truths was both philosophically flawed and psychologically crippling. In Philosophical Conceptions he gained the term of art that would, for a time, serve to frame his philosophical project.

The rhetorical point is that Schiller’s commentators have often taken in the big picture but failed to scrutinize its component parts. His philosophy demonstrated a distrust of abstraction, even as it defended a personality-based account of reality, prior to meeting James. In Schiller, James found a like-minded thinker and a source of encouragement. As the letters indicate, James, while agreeing with the basics of Schiller’s already developed philosophy, was encouraged to further refine his psychological thinking. But the process, again, was reciprocal. James was also a mentor by which Schiller’s philosophy was revised. The chief innovation undertaken was methodological. In James, Schiller gained the volitional primacy of psychology, the radical empiricism of pragmatism, by which to continue his assault on intellectualist metaphysics.14 This is a proto-pragmatic step in completing the merger of science, religion, and

14 Schiller’s later reflections on this time period serve to justify this assertion. Commenting on Dickinson Miller’s criticism of James, Schiller says: “James’s principle was being misconstrued (by ignoring its demand for empirical verification) as an incitement to make-believe, instead of as an analysis of the psychological processes of acquiring beliefs” (Perry, The Thought, 2, 241). Perry notes that he found this quotation “among James’s papers” but it also exists in seemingly identical, transcript, form in Schiller’s papers as well; see F.C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Charles Augustus Strong, 21 February 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. A further version is also found in: F. C. S. Schiller, “William James and the Making of Pragmatism,”
philosophy that Schiller began in the 1880s. And it is an advance that will be tested as Schiller turns to consider psychical research in the upcoming years.

3.2 MYSTICISM AND MÜNSTERBERG: TESTING THE NEW ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

Schiller’s approach in two debates occurring in 1898-1899 is worth noting. The topic, psychical research, is a long-standing interest. But his arguments demonstrate two changes. Fresh off the rapid developments of recent years, Schiller is found to be more thoroughly integrating the Jamesian into his philosophical worldview while junking the remnants of his idealist training. When Schiller sparred with Ritchie in 1892, he noted James’s psychology approvingly. Now Jamesian empiricism is the criteria by which Schiller’s philosophy takes on needless abstraction. As a consequence of this new found theoretical vigor, Schiller also displays increasing self-assurance in defending his views and attacking others. In 1890, his jabs at the reviewer J. E. H. and the Oxford Magazine editor Godley were boisterous, but teetered on the cusp of paranoia. Now his complaints retain that energy, but are offered up with a confidence that borders on bravado.

In the first debate, the topic is very close in substance to the one he discussed with Barkworth and Myers. But, in a letter to the editor that appeared in the Journal of Psychical Research, Schiller’s criticisms of the views of St. George Lane-Fox[-Pitt] (1856-1932; an early inventor of an electric incandescent light) are more pointed and decidedly more polemic than

in Must Philosophers Disagree? (London: Macmillan, 1934), 97-8 [itself a reprint of an article appearing in the Personalist in 1927].
witnessed in those discussions of automatic writing and levels of consciousness. Then, Schiller sided against Barkworth even as he took Myers to task for the terms he used. Now, there is no grasping for a Transcendental Ideal that would provide an answer for all sides. What does Lane-Fox say that raises Schiller’s ire? In February 1898, Lane-Fox states, “I object to such phrases as ‘Spirit Identity,’ ‘Discarnate Souls,’ and the like, as misleading or, at any rate, valueless, not so much because they convey finite ideas that are false as because they convey very little meaning at all”; “I say that the phrase ‘Spiritual Identity’ is either absurd or else it is vague or misleading.”

He derides such a notion as only a “pernicious delusion, having a baneful influence in this world and responsible for much of the egotism, greed and malignity with which our present lives are afflicted.”

In a follow-up letter in March, Schiller describes this “self-confident” attack as proving nothing more that Lane-Fox’s “metaphysical prejudice against personality.” Giving some ground to get his own, Schiller admits that he is “the last to complain of a precise use of terms.” But he goes on to suggest that the assumption of a stable personality is not a retreat to obsolete philosophy. Lane-Fox can look to Lotze or, more recently, James for theories which suggest the same. And, recalling his discussion with Myers and Barkworth, Schiller argues that his support of the concept of a “spirit” is just as likely to be attacked by materialists as it is to be

15 St. George Lane-Fox, “The ‘Spirit Hypothesis’ and Mrs. Piper,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 8 (February 1898): 184-5. Mrs. Piper is Leonora Evalina Simmonds Piper (1857-1950), the Boston medium who attracted the support of Oliver Lodge, William James, and Schiller among others. At one point, Piper claimed to act as the medium for the departed spirit of one of Schiller’s interlocutors from the previous chapter: F. Myers. Lane-Fox was one of many who doubted her abilities as a manifestation of psychical power.

16 Lane-Fox, “The ‘Spirit,’” 186.


18 Schiller, “The Validity,” 204.
advanced by them. So what, then, is the issue? Schiller assumes that is a question of confused priorities for the critics, disputing the solidity of personality and distancing themselves from the suggestion of the transience of accepted experience: “The phenomenal world must be conceived as a state of consciousness, and the succession of conscious states may take us into a succession of worlds.”19 At present, such a hypothesis cannot be rejected outright. And the use of the term “spirit,” far from having no meaning, seems to be of enough (confused) meaning to cause Lane-Fox to attack it. But, again, Schiller is loathe to ask for precision at the expense of exploration. The “adoption of too rigid a terminology” would, at present and as regards the spirit hypothesis, merely constrict further the range of options open to those inquiring into psychical phenomena.20

Precision is of little value if the respondent misunderstands the meaning. In a response to Schiller in April, Lane-Fox is not arguing that individuality, “a connected sequence of experiences, phenomenal or psychic, which experiences are interdependent and correlated, although extending over wide ranges of spirituality” terminates after death.21 He is arguing that it is faulty to attach to it any notion of a stable spirit; any conception of an “unchangeable ‘spirit’ occupying a definite position in space is an incongruity resting on the old fallacy that a cause is identical with its effect.”22 Schiller, too, is now willing to give up an argument of terms, seeing as how Lane-Fox now seems even more “unintelligible” than when he first voiced his objections to the spirit hypothesis.23 But, if Schiller understands the argument, it still sidesteps the question

19 Schiller, “The Validity,” 204.

20 Schiller, “The Validity,” 205.


22 Lane-Fox, Letter, 225.

of whether or not a spirit can be said to have a personality in the sense that we would attribute it
to a living being. The thrust of his response deserves to speak for itself:

He talks about a “persisting individuality after death,” but admits no identity.
Individuality “implies a connected sequence of experiences” (aware of itself as such or
not ?) “phenomenal or psychic” (are these exclusives?), “which are interdependent and
correlated,” but not “anything that can properly be called identity . . . between one stage
of individual existence and another.” That is, state A causes another B, but there is no
identity between A and B. Thus the “persisting individuality” is the fact that the world
goes on, but the father is not the son. Truly a profound and inspiring dogma, the
philosophic import of which I refrain from discussing. I will permit myself only one
question, which it irresistibly suggests, and that is— Has Mr. Lane Fox any personal
identity? If he has, what does it consist in? If he has not (and I suppose he ought not to
have on his own theory) how does he hold himself together and prevent his successive
states of consciousness (‘stages of individual existence’) from getting lost, strayed, or
stolen? Perchance he keeps a big diary and traces in it the individuality of ‘Mr. Lane Fox
from day to day.”

Not knowing whether this is to be described as “sublime” or “ridiculous,” Schiller decides it best
to leave the questions of Lane-Fox, his theory, and his (apparent) lack of a personality for
someone else to deal with.

In his reply in June, Lane-Fox is humble(d) enough to suggest he has “not yet succeeded
in expressing” his “sound” position. Rather than make much ado, as Schiller suggests, about
the issue of personality, he had failed to see it as an issue of import. The main point is that there
is nothing permanent about personality, be it as to the person or as to a spirit. Personality, like
all things save truth, is continuously undergoing change via “the process of evolution.” And it
is here that Lane-Fox expresses a sentiment more aligned, in point and not brevity, with the

24 Schiller, “Mr. Lane,” 231-2.

25 Others also question Lane-Fox’s odd amalgam of terms. The anthropologist Richard Hodgson (1855-
1905), tongue firmly in cheek, asks if “his lack of personal identity may explain this violent attack by Mr. Lane Fox
upon himself” (Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 8 [May 1898]: 232).

26 St. George Lane-Fox, “Spiritualism and Spirit Identity,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for
Psychical Research 8 (June 1898): 255.

27 Lane-Fox, “Spiritualism,” 256.
Schiller of several years back who talked of a Transcendent Ideal: “in proportion as the mind becomes more enlightened, and becomes a true vehicle of truth, so it becomes less egotistical and loses in degree the essentials of personality, or, in other words, it becomes relatively freed from the false sense of isolation, greed, bigotry, vanity, hate, and lust.” 28 So much closer to Schiller that he is willing to end on a note sounded by Myer, that “the growth of knowledge depends on the organized extension of the threshold of sensibility to wider regions of understanding and experience.” 29

But, in the final salvo offered in July, Schiller stands his ground. Even if there are shades of the old Schiller in the Lane Fox discussion, the new Schiller does not see himself in “a rambling discussion of half-revealed metaphysical dogmas.” 30 Schiller instead wants to again focus on whether or not personality exists, as manifest in spirit form, after death. And Schiller’s insistence on this point is not now lessened by Lane-Fox’s attempt now only to humbly explain what he had originally insisted upon. “If personality is tough enough to survive death it must be credited with the power to persist in its new phase of existence.” 31 All this might strike the reader as a mere matter of course. Yet it sets the stage on several key fronts. First, it is precisely the issue of personality that should be highlighted. As was noted, the need to dwell in discussions of monads, of Transcendent Egos, is gone. The psychology of James has done away with the need

28 Lane-Fox, “Spiritualism,” 256.

29 Lane-Fox, “Spiritualism,” 257. C. C. Massey suggests that Lane-Fox’s criticism may be more with the manner of Schiller’s argument than with any of its specific parts: “The motive of Mr. Lane Fox’s [February] letter appears to be contempt for what, many years ago, in addressing my friends the Spiritualists themselves, I ventured to call ‘a bourgeois conception of immortality’” (Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 8 [June 1898]: 257).


to traffic in terms of the old Idealist guard. But it is personality—the lived and continuing presence of personality—that is amplified. And it is Schiller’s enactment of personality, as advanced in a challenge to his (and James) views as to the nature of verification, which is about to be tested against a much less apologetic foil than Lane-Fox.

In January 1899, Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) publishes “Psychology and Mysticism” in the Atlantic Monthly. It pays to recall that he was the psychologist brought to Harvard, partially at James’s urging, who eventually took over duties in its psychology laboratories. Trained—like the aforementioned Angell at Cornell—by Wundt, Münsterberg is a consistent foe of all supernatural phenomena. He feigns to examine what the relation of psychical research is to that of psychology; that is, what role psychical research can play in answering psychological questions. Throughout, he refers to said research as mysticism—“the belief in supernatural connections in the physical and psychical worlds”—and maintains that it provides nothing that cannot be disproved by the methods of psychology. As regards spirits interacting with the living, “the scientist does not admit a compromise: with regard to this he flatly denies the possibility.” Nor can the psychical research respond that many things now understood were once “ridiculed” as preposterous; “it is wrong and dangerous from beginning to end, as it is in its last consequences not only the death of real science, but worse,—the death of real Idealism.”

32 Münsterberg, as much as he was a psychical skeptic, was a glorious self-promoter. Bruce Kuklick is a bit restrictive in arguing that James had only a “single disagreement,” albeit a supernatural one, with Münsterberg on psychological issues (The Rise of American Philosophy [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977], 188). As shall be seen, there were several points upon which he and James diverged. But Kuklick’s coverage of Münsterberg’s psychology and careerism is concise and highly readable; see particularly Chapter Eleven, “Hugo Münsterberg,” 196-214).


34 Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 75.

35 Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 76. He uses the words of Frank Podmore to suggest that even psychical researchers admit that “well known causes” are behind most psychical experience (77). In a strange case of
though Münsterberg is quick to acknowledge that he has never actually taken part in psychical research, he is equally nimble when it comes to the reason: “I believe that the facts, if they are examined critically, are never incapable of scientific explanation.”

Schiller retort, published as an 1899 supplement to the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, reads as a confident counterpart to his squabbles earlier squabbles with Godley. More confident, perhaps, because this is the defense of an emerging philosophy and not a singular instance of translation. It is, whatever other factors may contribute, an example of his personality coming to the defense of his and James’s understanding of the philosophical conception of the same. Referring to Münsterberg as “the lord of I don’t know how many thousands of dollars worth of psychological machinery” and his article as rife with “misrepresentations and misconceptions,” Schiller seems at a loss as where to begin. How is something which is “supernatural” to be connected? Is it not the case that “psychical researchers,” not the slur-term mystics, set out to demonstrate with the tools of science that

commenting when the argument’s good, Schiller is in this very same month reviewing Podmore’s recent book, Studies in Psychical Research. Therein, while also chastising Podmore for being too willing to accept the words of those who purport to be spiritualists, Schiller makes comments seemingly directed at Münsterberg (though it is unclear which article came out first). The public, when contenting “itself with assurances that all the high priests of Science concur in the condemnation” of psychical research, are only being given an “antiquated” take on materials which the scientific method has yet to explain much less been turned to examining (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Studies in Psychical Research, by Frank Podmore, Mind 8, no. 29 [January 1899]: 102; 105).

36 Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 78. Readers may, at this point, notice an interesting definitional ambiguity: what does real mean for Münsterberg? The answer remains unclear, especially when he turns to discuss how real facts and real Idealism relate to the realm of real life. Actually, they never achieve parity. The psychical elements of our existence are subordinated to the physical constructs that determine their function. Remove the constructs and you remove the ability to posit both teleological and logical outcomes of human action (Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 81-2). The facts, “the truths of science,” and Idealism, “the truth of life,” must exist at a distance from one another. If the first confronted the latter “we are under the illusion of psychologism”; if the latter upon the first “we are under the illusion of mysticism” (Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 85).

nothing supernatural per se actually exists? How is it possible to argue that new truths are found while, at the same time, arguing that he has actually proven that the claims of mystics are now overturned? “This triumph of science over ‘mysticism’ which Professor Münsterberg here discovers is a triumph only over his own absurd conception of mysticism, while the new facts triumph, not over science, but over the prepossessions of the scientists who arrogated to themselves the monopoly of truth.” The larger issue is that Münsterberg, in having to uphold a haphazard Idealism where psychology and reality dare not meet, only commits himself to a course of study that sanctions the a priori against their possible harmony in the methods of science.

In May, James writes to Schiller regarding the Münsterberg article. James’s tone is cheerful and congratulatory:

Your review of Münsterberg’s unimaginably asinine not[e] was is the sweetest thing in that line I ever read – I believe no more classic a model of that kind of composition was ever written, with its humor, irony, + long all durecheinander. You are in sooth an almost God like being. The trouble is, I fear, that poor M. himself won’t feel hurt. Not that he has no sensibility to irony, humor, + logic as formal modes of thought, but that he is so

38 Schiller, “Psychology,” 350.

39 Schiller, “Psychology,” 356.

40 Schiller, “Psychology,” 357. Suffice it to say, this was the kind version of Schiller’s opinion. A truncated version of a poem he wrote, entitled “T. Mystix + / Prof. of Münsterberg in Atl. Mon,” deals more humorously with certain portions—his supposed ability to rapidly assimilate large collections of scholarly material, his willingness to travel long distances if only an occasion meriting it would arise—of Münsterberg’s article:

Come listen my men while I tell u again, T mark's + I pray u don’t scoff –
By wh. u may kn. wheresoever u go, T warranted genuine prof.
Let us tak'em in order, T 1st is his taste, Wh. is meager + and [sic], tho’ queer.
Next his style, wh. is vile, when written in haste, For it’s German + puffed up with beer.
His habit of gettings up books you’ll agree, Ye he once read a shelf-full at afternoon tea, And rev'd 'em / foll'd day!
T 4th is his slow sin pack'd his trunk, Sh'd u happen to ask him to come
He'll send an excuse in / deuce of a funk, And he cannot afford such a sum!
T 5th is his fond sin for technic terms, Wh. in public he constantly spouts
And believes ye they're crushing to 'mystical' worry, A senti open to doubts. . .

(F. C. S. Schiller, January 1899, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
fatuously stuck in his silly metaphysics as to be beyond the reach of any material effect 
from them in this case. The Real life, which deals with teleologic categories, excludes 
psychical research, because it offers phenomena in time, + the real life is timeless. 
Science excludes them because they are mystical. So there is no place for them in God’s 
great universe at all. Happy M., to be the owner of so convenient a philosophy!  

As if emboldened by this response, Schiller files an October review of Münsterberg’s 
Psychology and Life. It is a glimpse into Schiller turning his personal dislike (of theory) into a 
personal attack. Schiller’s view of Münsterberg’s style: “a popular tone with professional 
dogmatism”; of his grasp of the English language: “the book reads like a bad translation from the 
German, of which tongue the English reader desirous of understanding it, will require a 
competent knowledge”; of his choice of editors: “he should at least have chosen his literary 
advisers among his colleagues in the English department of Harvard University, instead of 
leaving to his laboratory assistants the ‘helpful retouching of his language.’” Schiller’s view of 
the actual content of the work is not much better. It traffics in facts which are, in fact, 
“absurdities,” deals in antitheses which are “unsound,” and thereby demonstrates the “irritation” 
produced “when the consequences of inadequate assumptions manifest themselves.”

41 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 19 May 1899, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. A month prior, Schiller had reviewed James’s recent work, Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine. Schiller applauds him for positing interesting hypotheses—that the brain may function as an organ for the transmission of consciousness, that there may be variance in the character of beings that are immortal—ripe for future study. But, with a seeming eye on the just concluded tussle with Münsterberg, he again urges James to apply the modern methods of science to a topic which, as currently conceived, “forms one of the darkest and dustiest of the lumber-rooms that are the province of philosophy” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine, by William James, Mind 8, no. 30 [April 1899]: 262).

42 F. C. S. Schiller, review of Psychology and Life, by Hugo Münsterberg, Mind 8, no. 32 (October 1899): 540.

43 Schiller, review, 543.
James’s initial response to the review, on 11 October, is more of the same: “I am glad you have pitched into M.g.’s philosophy too. It seems to me awful trash.” But his response eight days later is more detailed and contains within in it both criticisms of content and of style:

I think you might easily with a page or two more have made your article on M.g. in Mind more effective. You treat his absurd apriori dogmatism of Science too much as a separate doctrine; and all are about equally valuable. He would be more sensitive himself to an attack along the whole front, than on this one position. I am grievously disappointed in the sort of philosophic rubbish he is hatching out; though likely much of his psychologic work may prove valuable by being so . . . discussable. I think your tone in the Mind article . . . reprehensible for its patronizing quality. Only the Mysticism article deserved that tone.

44 William James, De Veer Gardens, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 October 1899, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. As regards the change in address, reports indicate that James was in Europe at the time due to a decline in health. In his 19 May letter James was already planning the trip abroad, noting “I shall leave probably about the middle of July and go with my wife for six weeks to some German Badort. After that, whether England or Germany I know not. I must write two courses of Gifford lectures within the year (have done practically nothing as yet on that job and am now in my spring condition of brain tire) so I feel I as if I must place myself in good conditions for work and stay there.” In the letter dated 11 October his condition seems no better for the respite: “I composed this morning an introduction to the first lectures, advertised to be given at 4 P.M. of Monday January 15th, with others to follow. You see what a sprint I must make, the which, with sleep bad, eyes bad, brain bad, heart bad, no excitement, fast walking, sudden movements or energy of any sort allowed (- I must return again to Nauheim in April) doesn’t dispose me to play the part of a lion of however small size. Therefore don’t expect me at Oxford at present!” And, in a note that suggests just how non-personal academic jousting can be, James reports that Miller, also a friend of Schiller’s, is letting his eldest son stay with him.

The lectures—two sets of ten—that James refers to were delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1901-1902 and were eventually published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience. He thanks Schiller, alongside Flournoy and others, for “documents” used in crafting the lectures. What those documents were is not clear. But it is clear that James, alongside his young mentor Schiller, is still very much urging against the Absolutism that troubled them in the works of persons such as Münsterberg. In a 1902 postscript, thus not part of the lectures proper, James is found to conclude:

Upholders of the monist view will say to such polytheism (which, by the way, has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only, all is saved. . . . Common sense is less sweeping in its demands than philosophy or mysticism has been wont to be, and can suffer the notion of this world being partly saved and partly lost. . . . I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it. For practical life at any rate, the chance of salvation is enough.


45 William James, De Veer Gardens, to F. C. S. Schiller, 19 October 1899, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. In October, Schiller also published “Philosophy at Oxford” in the Educational Review. The article is relatively lighthearted in tone. It is a comparison of the relative positives and negatives of the systems of education in America—graduate study v. too much freedom to choose subjects—and Britain—directed examinations v. outdated philosophical models and overburdened tutors—while also a chance to swipe, albeit quickly, at F. H. Bradley (F. C. S. Schiller, “Philosophy at Oxford,” Educational Review 18 [October 1899]: 209-22). James replies,
These two letters are indicative of what will become a pattern in James’s mentoring of Schiller: praise for attack, comments as regards criticism, and cautions as to style. Coupled with his laudatory tone as regarded Schiller’s earlier response to Münsterberg, James’s seems unsure of how far is too far as regards “flying the banner” of pragmatism.\textsuperscript{46} That question isn’t going away. Schiller’s output in the next several years veers from razing his peers to raising the British banner of pragmatism.

\textsuperscript{46} The ambivalence James’s feels regarding the treatment of Münsterberg is also seen in a letter in July of 1900: “I am deep in Münsterberg’s last volume. I wholly fail to assimilate its chief thesis, but it is a prodigious example of audacious and clever system-building . . . Fundamentally rotten, all the same, though, in my humble opinion. So systematically rotten, that I shouldn’t at all wonder if he became the leader of a great German school of thought. That seems the essential requisite in Germany. (Don’t publish this opinion miscellaneously till I publish it myself!)” (William James, Geneva, to F. C. S. Schiller, 21 October 1900, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).
3.3 TO CARE (NOT) A WIT: THE SATIRE AND SUBSTANCE OF SCHILLER’S EARLY PRAGMATISM

The New Year, and new century, brings with it the first published British discussion of pragmatism: William Caldwell’s article “Pragmatism,” published in the October 1900 Mind. Caldwell (1863-1942), a professor of philosophy at McGill University of Montreal for the major portion of his life, is part of a rather large and varied assemblage of “Personal Idealists” active at the turn of the century. And this is not his first foray into such matters. Caldwell had published, less than a year prior, “The Will to Believe and the Duty of Doubt,” an article that sided with Miller’s critique of James’s philosophical positions. Perhaps “sided” is the wrong term. In that article and this one, Caldwell is seen struggling to synthesize the more recent philosophic developments with the traditional idealist tenets. Such a struggle is understandable, so long as one recalls that it is not Idealism, generally conceived, but Absolute Idealism, as exemplified in the works of Royce in America and Bradley in Britain, that James and Schiller rally against. Sympathetically framed, Caldwell is attempting a synthesis whereas Miller had sought a dismissal. And what a blending of personages Caldwell attempts! On one hand, Caldwell can

47 Caldwell (1863-1942), a professor of philosophy at McGill University of Montreal for the major portion of his life, was part of a rather large assemblage of what are termed “Personal Idealists.” In addition to “Pragmatism” and “The Will to Believe and the Duty of Doubt,” Caldwell contributed other articles detailing the development of this new strain of philosophy, such as: “Philosophy and the Activity of Experience,” International Journal of Ethics 8, no. 4 (July 1898): 460-80 [detailing the rise of philosophies—including James’s—that emphasize the practical]; “Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development,” American Journal of Sociology 5, no. 2 (September 1899): 182-92 [relating to the debate regarding social psychology involving John Dewey and James Mark Baldwin]. Taking in influences from both America and Britain, Caldwell spent his career attempting to merge pragmatism and Idealism (culminating in his 1913 book, Pragmatism and Idealism). As is discussed in Chapter Five, Schiller reviews the work. In doing so, Schiller grants Caldwell his pedigree: “Professor Caldwell enjoys the distinction of having been the first to introduce Pragmatism to the notice of the British public by his paper in Mind for October 1900” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Pragmatism and Idealism, by William Caldwell, Hibbert Journal 12, no. 3 [April 1914]: 704). Interested readers are directed to an informative overview of Caldwell’s career found in: Kenneth Westphal and John R. Shook, introduction to Pragmatism and Idealism (1913): William Caldwell & Response and Reviews, Early Critics of Pragmatism Series, ed. John R. Shook, vol. 4 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii-xx.
turn to the work of F. H. Bradley as warrant for the inclusion of the practical, an inclusion that we shall see hotly debated. On the other, he can note that at this juncture the critical arrows are being thrown at persons such as Georg Simmel, now not seen as so close a member of the pragmatist fold. Caldwell’s range suggests just how permeable the borderlands were for this new ethical/pragmatic approach to philosophy.

Caldwell’s view, not unlike James’s and Schiller’s, is that pragmatism is a renewed approach to philosophy; “I prefer on the whole to think of the use that philosophy may make of certain facts that have been emphasized and reemphasized by recent psychology and epistemology than of a new philosophy.”\footnote{William Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” \textit{Mind} 9, no. 36 (October 1900): 434.} And it is, on this view, an approach that “with the help of a few assumptions may be generalized into important philosophical truth—truth not only about the relation of reason to will but about the relation of thought to reality.”\footnote{Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 436.} Primary among those assumptions is recognition that pragmatism is not mere method, but a “theory of reality” to which philosophy will more and more attend.\footnote{Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 437.} As a theory, it recalls—if not always knowing or admitting it does—views espoused by philosophers as dissimilar as Hegel and Hume; views which, at their base, “engaged upon nothing but the one problem of investigating the real meaning for our human experience of alleged ideas and facts and principles and beliefs.”\footnote{Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 439.} As a theory, it also essentially updates or improves concepts like Kantian Pure Reason by refurbishing them as purposeful, or \textit{teleological}, grounds for actions.\footnote{Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 441.} Pragmatism finds, in the scientific discoveries so doted upon by Peirce, no reason not to embrace metaphysics: “metaphysic, we
might say, is nothing if not practical; it is the one science that goes to work without any presuppositions, the one science that endeavours to find out what things really are as distinct from what they appear to be from particular or prescribed points of view.”

Granting that pragmatism “taken at face value, taken as a working principle . . . is good as far as it goes,” Caldwell then suggests its deficits. It is at this point that we should pause. For here lies what eventually becomes, especially in the case of quarrel between Schiller and Bradley, the major sticking point that divides pragmatism from Absolute Idealism—the move from the practical to the abstract. And Caldwell’s overriding correction is, as we shall see, Bradley’s biggest critique: the lack of warrant for supposing the practical (or useful) as more important than the theoretical (or ideal). More strongly put, Caldwell questions to what extent James’s emphasis on will, his “psychological philosophy of action,” paradoxically holds us in stasis. On the one hand, we “as yet have no rational theory of the possibility of [the future] being essentially different from present or past”; on the other, psychical energy “is so far from being different from physical action and reaction that it is by the progress of science being every day more and more closely assimilated to the type of reflex action.” Caldwell’s solution to this problem is “a philosophy of the real” wherein “the only possible aim of all theories is to explain the activity and the evolution that is in process all around us—that is in fact the essential nature of all reality.” Caldwell’s comments again suggest that his can be seen as honest attempt to place pragmatism within the context of its times. His argument above references what for James,

53 Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 433.
54 Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 444.
55 Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” 449.
and Schiller, was a matter of clear importance: not to withhold from discussion any idea that can
be believed. Caldwell’s solution, taken in that light, only amends it to say, why discount a unity
that as yet cannot be perceived? What is striking is not how far Caldwell goes to amend
pragmatism to Idealism; it is how far pragmatism does go before, on a dash, it turns away from
Idealism of this sort.\(^{58}\) While not always clear in retrospect, Caldwell accurately captures the
contractions of pragmatism’s birth.

This is the flux within which Schiller is operating. Now an international concept,
pragmatism is seen as a threat to and potential ally for Idealism—personal, absolute, or
otherwise. Schiller, however, doesn’t take Caldwell’s bait. Rather, he baits the idealists with
(sometimes blue) parody. His staging ground is rather isolated: Corpus Christi’s own Pelican
Record. Taking its name from the bird affixed to the college’s crest, it covers a range of topics
from club meetings to lyrical verse to historical pieces. The Pelican Record is not, to be clear,
the Philosophical Review or Mind. But it serves a clear purpose for Schiller. Therein, in the
years leading up to the publication of Mind!, Schiller teases out the philosophical implications of
trying to forge the alliance of which Caldwell hoped.\(^{59}\) Two snapshots will serve to orientate us.

\(^{58}\) It cannot be stressed enough that Caldwell is attempting a harmony of what, in the hands of Schiller and
others, became a rupture. While he chastises James for not going far enough, for not turning his method into a
working metaphysic, he critiques Bradley for not discussing issues of religion. Caldwell’s reasons here are very
similar to those put to James. Questions of God and religion “never do become clear and tangible and
comprehensible until we see that they are largely questions about the reality or the unreality of certain practical
tendencies in human experience.” Caldwell’s essay stands as a road not taken in a historical discussion that was
only getting started.

\(^{59}\) The warm up actually began in 1899 with: “How Fear Came to St. James,” Pelican Record, Signed, ΣΧ,
4 (March 1899): 177-180; and “On Feminine Highmindedness,” Pelican Record, Signed, ΣΧ, 5 (December 1899):
45-48. The former regards “Smith, X. Y. Z. No. 1,256485,” a resident in the “Terratic Asylum in spirit land” who
still despairs his inability to pass examinations—thirteen times!—in his previous life. The latter is a rumination on
“megalopsychic woman,” of whom “10,000 mathematicians would demand exactness in vain.” It was also extended
In December 1900, Schiller penned “Platonic Dialogues: A Sequel to the ‘Republic,’” and, in December 1901, “The ‘True History’ of Crete.” The first, “found on papyrus recently discovered in the belly of an ancient crocodile of literary tastes,” finds Plato, Socrates, and Kephalos holding forth.60 The most humorous point comes in a comment from Socrates directed at Kephalos: “How can you, being a man, have children of your own to love until you have first loved the children of others?” It is not the response, but the footnote which gives a sense of Schiller’s humor in these instances: “An indignant scholastic—probably an Alexandrine—has here written in the margin, ‘Look at the Greek, Socrates; look at the Greek.’”61 The second tale begins with Schiller pondering the meaning of Cretan inscriptions, only to discover that he is hungry. So settling in for a wait at a nearby restaurant, Schiller turns his attention to a bit of idle spiritualism, “a little amateur table-turning.”62 It is at this point that another spirit’s presence is felt, and sets about unlocking the secrets of Crete: the myth of the Minotaur, that Daedalus was a “Director of Naval Construction” who embezzled money, and so forth.63 These points lead Schiller to conclude that what he has provided is spotty history at best. What is of interest, and humor, is the infernal name of the spirit who unlocks these secrets: “I felt a new spirit animating the table, and it soon spelt out its name, M-I-N-U-S.

‘What are you?’

‘K-i-n-g.’

‘Of what?’

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60 F. C. S. Schiller, “Platonic Dialogues, II. A Sequel to the ‘Republic,’” Pelican Record, Signed, ΣΧ, 5 (December 1900): 168.

61 Schiller, “Platonic,” 171.


K-r-e-t-e.’
‘Anything else?’
‘H-e-l-l.’

‘Really, I beg your pardon; I thought you were a mathematical symbol.’

These stories, like the sparring with Lane-Fox, might at first seem mere trifles, several spoofs that add up to some in-joking, well fed on the Classics education of Oxford. But they are, as with the emphasis on personality in the former, of importance in understanding Schiller developing blend of educated insight and stylistic burlesque. To this point, Schiller’s punning—also on issues and figures of philosophy—was kept to his notebooks, much as his initial forays into philosophical quarrels were largely relegated to the pages of the in-house Philosophical Review. Without these snapshots, Mind! arrives like a fragmentary grenade upon established standards. With them, however, the blow is softened just a touch. But it is also now hinted at, the looming and leering salvo at his peers being subject to several test runs on several test subjects.

And, clearly, Schiller relishes the months of preparation leading up to the 1901 release of Mind! Though the volume contains the contributions of others, it is clear that this is a labor, misguided some might say, of love and loathing. A 5 April 1901 note from James suggests that Schiller had asked him to contribute. But James opts out, saying, “If there ever was any comedy in me, its now extinct. I ought to be saying my prayers, and not going to face the Maker with lewd jests upon my tongue. No! Count me out. . . Keep it mulling and possibly matter will


65 According to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “The Critique of Pure Rot” was written by philosopher Carveth Read (1848-1931) and “Realism and Idealism” was written by philosopher [Victoria] Lady Welby [-Gregory; 1837-1912] (Wallace Nethery, “Schiller in the Library,” Personalist 45 [July 1964]: 326-8).
accrete. Royce might contribute.” A few days later, James raises the same conflicted stance he did with Münsterberg, this time dealing with Bradley: “I think the parody on Bradley amazingly good—if I had his book here I would probably revive my memory of his discouraged style and scribble a marginal contribution of my own.” 66

And what of the final product? Some general indication will have to suffice. The frontispiece, colored a bright pink and protected with thin gauzy paper, proclaims to be a “Portrait of Its Immanence the Absolute.” Upon pulling the cover sheet aside, one finds the page blank. The instructions for use suggest the tone of what is to come: “turn the eye of faith, fondly but firmly, on the centre of the page, wink the other, and gaze fixedly until you see It.” And why the pink paper? Simple: “It is, of course, the pink of Perfection.” The work purports contributions from F. H. Badly, T. H. Grin, I. Cant, and Vera Welldon. And while it contains much in the way of acute satire concerning antiquated traditions, it also contains a heady skewering of those very much alive. Two portions of “The M.A.P. History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy,” serve as representative samples:

A staid Merton Fellow, named B-----,
Fell in love with the Absolute madly;
A big book he wrote
Its perfection to note:
The Absolute looked at him, sadly.

An excellent Master, called C-----,
His beard so unfrequently pared,
That it grew to such length,
And imparted such strength

66 William James, Lamb House, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 13 April 1901, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. The letter can also be found in: James, Letters, 2, 142-3. In the letter James goes on to add: Bradley “is really an extra humble-minded man, I think, but even more humble minded about his reader than about himself which gives him that false air of arrogance.”
That no one to tackle him dared.67

That these are dealing with Bradley and Edward Caird (1835-1908, brother of Scottish theologian John Caird), the man who replaced Jowett as Headmaster of Balliol, would be obvious to anyone in eyeshot of these pages then and within the reach of a standard history of British philosophy text now. That it came with “the much-needed warning that a sense of humour is the salvation of a true Sanity of Mind!”68 seems to stack the deck in favor of those whose sanity could withstand a barely anonymous—the editor was “A. Troglodyte,” the one already unmasked in the 1894 edition of Riddles—upstart, one bent on overturning the long-standing ideals of Oxford.

Reception by the trade papers and popular press didn’t call for sensitivities of the same sort. And the responses suggest that, out of the Oxonian pale, the reviewers were of varying temperaments. The Literary Guide notes that the “comic ‘double’” provides “a number of parodies in the style of most of the famous philosophers, [and] contains also a very serious vein of ridicule, directed against the ‘Absolutism’ which seems just now to be so fashionable in English philosophy.”69 The Guardian calls it “a medley of parody, pure chaff, and other agreeable nonsense” which uses “the crazes of pseudo-philosophy” for its “excellent fooling.”70


68 Schiller, Mind!, 4.

69 Review of Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. A. Troglodyte, with the co-operation of The Absolute and others, Literary Guide, December 1901, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1901, Box Fourteen. F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

70 Review of Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. A. Troglodyte, with the co-operation of The Absolute and others, Guardian, 24 December 1901, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1901, Box Fourteen. F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Others aren’t as completely taken in by the fun. Literature calls it an “elaborate burlesque of its learned namesake” that though “ingenious . . . never seems to know when to stop”; the fact that it has been published, says the reviewer with a wink, “is a new riddle of the Sphinx.”71 The Cambridge Review also suggests that as a full sitting “one gets tired of it, but as one turns over the leaves, one finds much that is amusing.”72

The Morning Post adds a bit of context to the discussion. Noting that as “profoundly learned as some of the contributions to the quarterly periodical Mind have been, it is not the place where he would look for anything demanding immediate attention.” Thus, the Post fears readers are apt to mistake it for the real thing! Once inside, however, one is treated to “a fine quiverful of shafts of varying degrees of sharpness in their points, mostly intended for the metaphysicians.”73 Schiller seems, on the whole, satisfied with the reactions his parody generates. In a letter to Florence Thaw, he notes that “some of it is very hard reading + all of it has to be read in such a way as to remember that it never is either wholly frivolous or wholly serious. Still I think as a whole it is distinctly funny, + calculated to revive interest in

71 Review of Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. A. Troglodyte, with the cooperation of The Absolute and others, Literature, 14 December 1901, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1901, Box Fourteen. F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

72 Review of Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. A. Troglodyte, with the cooperation of The Absolute and others, Cambridge Review, 5 December 1901, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1901, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

73 Review of Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. A. Troglodyte, with the cooperation of The Absolute and others, Morning Post, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1901, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
philosophy!" If interest alone was the goal in this instance, then philosophy is his purpose in the next endeavor.

The 1901 “Axioms as Postulates,” published in the multi-authored Personal Idealism, was in development since at least the time of Dickinson Miller’s review of James’s Will to Believe. Indeed, if one is to take Schiller at his word, this essay grew explicitly out of his dissatisfaction with Miller’s article, with the tendency to overlook the necessity of verification. On the back of James’s letter of 27 January 1899, the one where he expressed “disappointment” with Miller’s review, Schiller has jotted down: “D. S. Miller asked me to reply to his art as W. J. wd not. I said he had misunderstood W. J. + M appealed with the above result [the result referenced is not included]. This led me to write Axioms as Postulates to remove the misunderstanding.”

James is aware that Schiller is working on the essay given his correspondence with Schiller in 1900. But James is also aware of the book proper given his acquaintance with members of the Personal Idealism movement at Oxford. After much jesting

74 F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Florence Thaw, 25 November 1901, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

75 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 January 1899, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. As was previously noted, the Perry reference that leaves this information out is found in The Thought, 2, 241, and relies on a typescript also housed in the Schiller Archives. Perry’s work, for whatever reason, makes no reference to this point, even though it is contained in almost identical form in a typescript letter from Schiller to Charles Augustus Strong to which he refers.

76 Reference to James appraisal of the work’s progress can be found in: William James, Lamb House, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 9 January 1900; and William James, Bad Nauheim, to Schiller, 30 September 1900, Box One, Folder Thirteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; truncated reference is found in Perry, The Thought, 2, 150.

77 Perry makes an interesting reference to James’s relationship with the Personal Idealists. He suggests that James’s “kinship” with the authors of Personal Idealism was a function of the “first or voluntaristic phase of James’s pluralism”; to which he then adds that James’s interests in “Personal Idealism belong to a later chapter” (The Thought, 2, 213). Yet there is something amiss here, especially if one considers that he contextualizes this interest as occurring within the The Will to Believe (1897) and Personal Idealism (1901) era. While Perry does index Personal Idealists, five of which contributed essays to the book, they are hardly suggestive of the “later chapter” discussion Perry implies. Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), the non-contributor, is limited to a footnote related to a
and jabbing, this work is a return to academic form . . . if only for the moment. Moreover, it stands as Schiller’s first extended discussion of his views post-Will to Believe, of the Riddles unlocked by Will.

Schiller begins with a truism—each person’s experience of the world is personalized by their experience of it. Left as is, this surely signals an arbitrary approach to knowledge, an

letter to James from English philosopher George Croom Robertson (1842-1892, then-editor of Mind) in 1881 (see The Thought, 1, 714). Henry Sturt (1863-1946) is indexed once, in a letter from James to Schiller in 1903 (see The Thought, 2, 375). A footnote to that letter directs readers to a subsequent reference which occurs, not surprisingly and not indexed, in the chapter related to Schiller. And it is here that Personal Idealism is given its full berth in: (1) a series of footnotes, and (2) James’s and Schiller’s 1902-1903 letters—which will be discussed subsequently—regarding the book (see The Thought, 2, 494-9). It is in this section that the rest of the Personal Idealists are noted: Robert R. Marett (also indexed twice), William Ralph Boyce Gibson and F. W. Bussell (indexed once), George Frederick Stout, G. E. Underhill, and Hastings Rashdall (not indexed).

What is amiss? Simply put, and politely I hope, Perry has to organize his way around the British Personal Idealists so as to get beyond what is purportedly a “first phase” in James’s philosophy. What did Perry wish to get around? The complications the Personal Idealists create when moving James into line with American pragmatism of the Deweyian sort and New Realism of the Perryian sort. There is textual evidence supplied by Perry to back up this claim. When suggesting that he will discuss Personal Idealism later, Perry brackets that by reference to two persons: (1) Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), a professor of philosophy at Boston University who held to decidedly “common sense,” thus radical, views of religion; and (2) Thomas Davidson (1840-1900), an independent Bostonian scholar with idealistic Hegelian leanings. I realize that these are persons closer in proximity who, by their philosophical stances and personal relationships with James, provide robust comparative examples. But it seems worth noting that they are not those Personal Idealists to which Perry feigned reference in his initial suggestions. Simply put, and in line with later discussions of Perry, to shore up his arguments he had to stay more thoroughly upon these shores.

But the British Personal Idealists also provide for comparative examples in line with the discussion Perry implied he would include. Sturt, in his biting criticism of Oxonian philosophy, has this to say about “Axioms as Postulate”: it “startled the world by its advocacy of a principle which might have been traced already in the work of Prof. William James and of several continental writers, and has now become famous under the names of Pragmatism and Humanism. This essay . . . appears to me to have opened a new chapter in British thought” (Henry Sturt, Idola Thaeatri [London: Macmillan, 1906], 3). That said, Sturt was not above (or is it below) asserting later in his career, “if the cosmic synthesis which men frame have any possibility of attaining truth, the cosmos must be dominated by a single intelligence” (Henry Sturt, The Principles of Understanding [Cambridge: University Press, 1915], 289).

Pringle-Pattison supplies a contextual assessment of the impact of the Personal Idealists and Personal Idealism: “It is well known that the revolt against Mr. Bradley’s Absolutism was one main cause of the Pragmatist movement. . . . The accusation originally brought against Mr. Bradley by the Personal Idealists, who were the forerunners, and in some cases the pioneers, of Pragmatism, was based, in their own words, upon his ‘way of misunderstanding human experience’ . . . or, in Mr. Schiller’s more drastic phraseology, ‘his inhuman, incompetent and impracticable intellectualism’ (Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, The Gifford Lectures, Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the Years 1912 and 1913 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1929], 225). But Pringle-Pattison aligns more with the pluralism of James and Schiller. As against the abstractions of Idealists, or the unity desired by Sturt, he praises James for his approach to the psychology of adaptive states of self: it “seems to me an infinitely truer way of representing the march of our conscious life than the conventional idea of an unchanging self or Ego outside of the succession altogether.” And he sides with Schiller’s suggestions that such a succession lends itself to a desire for and belief in a future life where personality persists (Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of Immortality, The Gifford Lectures, Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the Year 1922 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922], 98-9; 130-1).
isolated view more akin to Schiller’s conception of Idealism than to pragmatism. But Schiller goes on to suggest that there are two caveats:

The first of these is that the whole world in which we live is experience and built up out of nothing else than experience. The second is that experience, nevertheless, does not, alone and by itself, constitute reality, but, to construct a world, needs certain assumptions, connecting principles, or fundamental truths, in order that it may organize its crude materials and transmute itself into palatable, manageable, and liveable forms.  

Schiller recognizes that this point, that reality is made by the shaping of our experiences, is open to attack. To exclaim that ‘what I experience is what I experience’ seems only to circle back around and again suggest the initial truism. But it is the simplicity of this assertion which provides the clew as to Schiller’s argument. For in science, as in history, what is of consequence is not some ready-made, pre-existing, form which we yearn to discover. What is crucial is the extent to which one or another experience succeeds in moving forward our understanding of reality. And experience is tested by experimenting with it. Not always in the rigid manner assumed of the sciences, nor always clearly in view of the one doing the testing. “I observe that since we do not know what the world is, we have to find out. This we do by trying.” And so often as we may succeed, it is just as likely that we will fail. But that, in and of itself, is more matter for future experiment, more qualification to the world we work so eagerly to understand. For experimenting is not a merely flight of speculative fancy, it occurs within and find resistance from experience.

78 F. C. S. Schiller, “Axioms as Postulates,” in Personal Idealism, ed. Henry Sturt (London: Macmillan and Co., 1902), 51. Sturt continued in later writings to attack the presumptions of many of the Oxford Idealists but also, as shall be seen, some of the components of pragmatism that Schiller espoused.


Schiller sees this resistance as demonstrative of the Aristotelian notion of ύλη, or potentiality.\(^81\) Nothing is given and we must, as a consequence, assume as a “methodological necessity” that “the world is wholly plastic, i.e. to act as though we believed this, and will yield us what we want, if we persevere in wanting it.”\(^82\) But, again, to act upon faith is not to so personalize experience as to remove it from experiment. The principles that will guide us are formed through use.

They will begin their career, that is, as demands we make upon our experience or in other words as postulates, and their subsequent sifting, which promotes some to be axioms and leads to the abandonment of others, which it turns out to be too expensive or painful to maintain, will depend on the experience of their working.\(^83\)

Against this approach to axioms, Schiller posits either “old empiricism” or “epistemological apriorism.” The first is a naïve and false psychology, mistaking an interpretation of nature for the actual workings of nature. Taking the regularity of particulars (the setting of the sun, the rising of the moon) for an indication of order, the old empiricism reduces the complexity of the world to a crude form of induction.\(^84\) The second is no less pernicious as it places the art of supposition in the place of induction. But to assume something is universal and necessary is not the same thing as to demonstrate that is as such. Moreover, a postulate can seek to obtain both and do so within, and not without, experience. For what is postulated as universal extends beyond the past to lay claim to the present and the future, regardless of whether or not it is proven right or wrong.\(^85\) And what is posited as necessity is simply a demand we place upon

\(^{81}\) Schiller, “Axioms,” 60.

\(^{82}\) Schiller, “Axioms,” 61.

\(^{83}\) Schiller, “Axioms,” 64.

\(^{84}\) Schiller, “Axioms,” 65-7.

\(^{85}\) Schiller, “Axioms,” 69-70.
“intelligent purposive volition” and not, as with an aprioristic account, that which adheres to the workings of a reality of which we can only dimly conceive.\textsuperscript{86} For apriorism finally reduces to: (1) a refusal to admit of experience, (2) a deceptive cover under which the arbitrary assumptions of the author are made to look settled and final, or (3) a lumbering assemblage of antiquated period pieces gathered from Plato, then Hume, and finally Kant.\textsuperscript{87}

Out of time (literally), apriorism can claim no help from the psychological experiences in time. Better left to James’s “Museum of Curios,” Schiller hopes to bid adieu to Kantian epistemology with a query:

Oh mighty Master of both Worlds and Reasons, Thinker of Noëmena, and Seer of Phenomena, Schematiser of Categories, Contemplator of the Pure Forms of Intuition, Unique Synthesizer of Apperceptions, Sustainer of all Antinomies, all-pulverising Annihilator of Theoretic Gods and Rational Psychologies, I conjure thee by these or by whatever other titles thou hast earned the undying gratitude of countless commentators, couldst thou not have constructed a theory of our thinking activity more lucidly and simply?\textsuperscript{88}

The temporal tonnage of so much commentary, apriorism bravely battles to make a history for itself only to deny itself a history yet to be made. And it does so in the face of a troubling fact: Kant proposed that Practical Reason was superior to Theoretic Reason.\textsuperscript{89} How, then, to square the most recent master’s own suggestion with the continued resistance to his words? Simply, choose. If preference be given to the latter, “it may postulate as it pleases, as pathetically or ridiculously as it likes,” talking about knowing the unknown until the Real is blue in the face.\textsuperscript{90}

Or, in choosing the former, we escape from Kant by way of Kant, and assert that “it is our

\textsuperscript{86} Schiller, “Axioms,” 70-1.
\textsuperscript{87} Schiller, “Axioms,” 71; 73; 75.
\textsuperscript{88} Schiller, “Axioms,” 78-9.
\textsuperscript{89} Schiller, “Axioms,” 87.
\textsuperscript{90} Schiller, “Axioms,” 89.
practical activity that gives the real clue to the nature of things, while the world as it appears to
the Theoretic Reason is secondary—a view taken from an artificial, abstract and restricted
standpoint, itself dictated by the Practical Reason and devised for the satisfaction of its ends."91

But there are further considerations in understanding the move from postulates to axioms.
First, “mere postulating is not in general enough to constitute an axiom.”92 Rough and wild,
aprioristic or empiricist, postulates of all sorts will find their way into experience. But to obtain
axiomatic status, they must “have obtained a position so unquestioned, useful, and
indispensable” so as to be considered as such.93 Yet, just as quickly as they assume said status,
they must admit of more tests which can, and often do, downgrade them. Or, more positively,
we use them as foundations upon which to build, picking and choosing amongst them as
experience dictates, never enshrining them in sham categories or supposing it possible, or even
possible, to list them all and for all time.94 Framed in this light, all manner of rigid posturing
grows relaxed and useful. Formal Logic, to push a bad pun, takes off its coat and decides to stay
awhile. The Principle of Identity, rather than some supersensible combination of Being and
Non-Being, becomes an assumption of consciousness from which we derive the conception of
our identity; it “is a free creation of a postulating intelligence which goes beyond its experience
to demand the satisfaction of its desires.”95 For, without the assumption of self, no further
possibility related to it is possible. The abstract Self serves, then, as a frame of reference which

91 Schiller, “Axioms,” 90.

92 Schiller, “Axioms,” 91.

93 Schiller, “Axioms,” 92.


95 Schiller, “Axioms,” 98.
in experience we use to make distinctions between that which is and that which is not similar.96 But this is a practical, not theoretic, abstraction. “Identity being a practical postulate, modeled on the immediacy of felt self-identity,” necessarily supposed the capability of prediction.97 To suggest “that which is itself is itself” can go no further; to posit “that which is might also be what it is not” engages the faith in development and adaptation. But predication also supposes an opposite. The abstract self, even one that is capable of adaptation, necessarily admits of a (limited) range of features. That which falls beyond those features—in the experiential sense, otherwise we retreat to apriorism—is contrary to the abstraction. “The ‘external world’ is a postulate, made to extrude inharmonious elements from consciousness.”98

So what is to be had by this approach? First, a realization that all of this proceeds according to the very suggestions put forth. What Schiller offers is a generalized history, making complex developments into more palatable positions for the sake of argument. To do them justice, these positions must be subjected to the tests of their merits. Second, and complicating the first, is the very real problem of never being able to know, exactly, the origins of some

96 Schiller, “Axioms,” 100.
98 Schiller, “Axioms,” 105. Other “axiomatic concepts engender similar revisions: Other axiomatic concepts undergo similar revision. Contradiction becomes the admission of stability; the Principle of the Excluded Middle becomes one of distinction; Hypothesis becomes the search for an explanation (106-7). Causation becomes a search for control, as Sufficient Reason becomes a need for justification (108-9). Certain concepts become more readily distinguished. Real Space, as opposed to Theoretic Space, is a tool that forces us “to correlate the visual and tactile images of objects, into a single perceptual or real space, in which we suppose ourselves and all objective realities to be immersed” (112). Time can be broken down into the subjective (“a matter of immediate experience”), objective (a corrective on “our subjective estimates of the flow of successive time”), or conceptual (“demands for constancy which objective Time will not show”) (116-7). Still other concepts remain mere postulates. Teleology, the assumption of “a certain conformity between nature and human nature,” confronts the scientific explanations which as yet have not found it to be plausible (118-9). Schiller argues that this is partially due to the religious tinge given to most teleological explanations. Rather than treat it “as a method whereby to understand the complex relations of reality,” they point to some divine or mystical Creator out there, beyond the grasp of the physical sciences (119). The Goodness of God, and even Immortality, also remain mere postulates. Having yet to find methods to treat of them whereby they may necessitate changes to even the nature of experience, Schiller is not above supposing them worthy of consideration (122).
postulates. Thus, we have to be content with moving an idea forward; “the true nature of a thing is to be found in its validity—which, however, must be connected rather than contrasted with its origin. ‘What a thing really is’ appears from what it does, and so we must study its whole career.”99 Finally, to admit the strengths of testing even in the face of partial history is to, all the same, return philosophy to its primary focus: human interest and a love of knowledge that does its best to move that interest forward. “Genuine thinking must issue from and guide action, must remain immanent in the life in which it moves and has being.”100 The deceptions of old empiricism only gave way to the smug intellectualism of apriorism, both to the discredit of human reasoning. If philosophy is to be more than “a trivial game which may amuse but can never really satisfy” it must see doubt as the starting, not stopping, inquiry.101 In Schiller’s view errors, like the old, die out. A philosophy willing to admit of potential and progress is a philosophy of the young; “their natural sympathies are rather with a philosophy that makes the blood run warm than with one that congeals the natural flow of thought by the chilling vacuity of its abstractions.”102

James’s review of Personal Idealism, published a year later in Mind, recalls his hesitant tone regarding Münsterberg. But more than just praising and criticizing matter and method, which it certainly does, it is also predictive as regards Schiller. He notes that the whole work suffers from a problem of articulating the nature of personal Idealism. By “being so experimental, it has to be unacademic, informal and fragmentary; and this, from the point of

100 Schiller, “Axioms,” 128.
101 Schiller, “Axioms,” 129.
view of making converts, is a bad practical defect.”\textsuperscript{103} At the same time, James sees personal Idealism as “a distinct new departure in contemporary thought, the combination, namely, of a teleological and spiritual inspiration with the same kind of conviction that the particulars of experience constitute the stronghold of reality as had usually characterized the materialistic type of mind.”\textsuperscript{104} And he groups it with a more general form of thought which he labels “Empirical Evolutionism.” As to who gives a solid account—out of a list including Josiah Royce, Charles Peirce, and Lotze—of this fledgling evolutionism, “Mr. Schiller in his Riddles of the Sphinx, and more acutely still in his various essays, has given to it a more consistent form.”\textsuperscript{105} As to the one who could give personal Idealism a clear showing, “Mr. Schiller might compass it, if he would tone down a little the exuberance of his polemic wit.”\textsuperscript{106}

The larger press is divided, but also notes aspects of Schiller’s polemic criticized by James. The \textit{Western Press} suggests that this book “is one of the most valuable metaphysical

\textsuperscript{103} William James, review of \textit{Personal Idealism}, ed. Henry Sturt, \textit{Mind} 12, no. 45 (January 1903): 94.

\textsuperscript{104} James, review, 97.

\textsuperscript{105} James, review, 94.

\textsuperscript{106} In letters James emphasizes his approval for the project, but also the work that remains in bringing it to fruition: “It is an uplifting thought that truth is to be told at last in a radical and attention compelling manner . . . [but] the attention of many will find a way not to be compelled—their will is so set on having a technically and artificially, and professionally oppressed system, that all talk carried on as yours is on the basis of principles of common sense activity is as remote and little worthy of being listened to as the slanging each other of boys in the street” (William James, Torquay, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 April 1902, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also James, \textit{The Letters}, 2, 164); “It is a supersplendent thing, a big synthetic program for endless fillings in and a genuinely vital piece of philosophizing, which ought to insure your recognition as a leader of thought. It inspires me greatly, and I should like to spend the rest of my life building it out” (William James, Torquay, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 April 1902, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford); “I think the essays all vulnerable in spots, but have enjoyed them immensely, especially Maret’s, Bussell’s and Gibson’s. But they make me feel the same need of a systematic and radical metaphysics affirming that whole point of view . . . Pray spend the \textit{rest} flower of your young life in composing such a thing, while I will similarly spend the dregs of mine” (William James, Chorcorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 6 August 1902, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, \textit{The Thought}, 2, 495-6 ).
works of recent years,” written with “a lucidity which is rarely found in philosophical works.” The Birmingham Post urges it for readers interested in “what young Oxford thinks.” The Daily Chronicle is of a similar mind when it notes that this work may be taken to represent “the coming generation of Oxford tutors.” But it is less inclined to see this as positive when it comes to Schiller. He stands as a “disquieting” representative of less than enjoyable polemics. What are its features?

Their style, for one thing, is somewhat aggressive and highly charged with a species of light-heartedness which is apt to breed sadness in the reader . . . with what appears to be a certain levity of thought and a dogmatic assurance which the dialectical power displayed seems scarcely to warrant.

Schiller’s essay, in particular, is “very ingenious and amusing, but it hardly satisfies.” One is led to question: what would satisfy? The conclusion suggests the answer is the object of the Personal Idealist’s ire: “Oxford may rely for a season . . . on that not yet wholly demolished work, ‘Appearance and Reality.’”

The Oxford Magazine takes up where the Chronicle left off. It singles out Schiller’s essay as “certainly the most important.” But how quickly a compliment turns into a rub: “Here we have the doctrine of Pragmatism, if we may say so, in all its rude and naked glory.” The review also discusses the book generally. It is suggestive of the lively thought of those who, within the walls of Oxford, are both teachers and thinkers. As such, it signals to the outside

107 Review of Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Sturt, Western Press, 1 September 1902, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1902, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

108 Review of Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Sturt, Birmingham Post, 3 October 1902, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1902, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

109 Review of Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Sturt, Daily Chronicle, 18 August 1902, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1902, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
world that the university is a place for action as well as thought. But the magazine has already chosen sides even as it applauds the face-saving qualities of the one put forth in the volume. As it states:

The inspiration for Personal Idealism is rather to be found in the type of thinking represented by James’s Will to Believe or [James] Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism [1899]; and we venture to doubt whether this mode of thought is as philosophically satisfying as it appears to most of the essayists.\(^{110}\)

So Schiller, with his co-authors, is to be praised for the directions he suggests; but they are all to give better accounts if the teachers are to make gains on the thinkers, “on the methods that prevail.” What then to throw into the philosophical mix? What best tactic to take in advance of a mentor’s warnings and critical receptions still weaned on the Idealism you sought to laugh at and then argue with? A clear instance of choosing sides and the manner in which you will attack them. An instance of calling the opposing side’s views, in a word, worthless.

Schiller frames his satirical 1902 essay, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism,” as a dialogue between himself, Plato, and Aristotle in the “supernal Academe where the Divine Plato meditates in holy groves.” It happens as a consequence of Schiller again using “the idealistic art of waking oneself up out of our world of appearances and thereby passing into one of higher reality.”\(^{111}\) Here, in the upper regions Plato holds court and Aristotle, whom Schiller thought would appear “bumptious and conceited” but has been “reduced to his true proportions,” attends to his master’s needs.\(^{112}\) It is not his first trip either. For upon

\(^{110}\) Review of Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Sturt, Oxford Magazine, 3 December 1902, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1902, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Ward (1843-1925) was a Cambridge professor of Logic and Philosophy, and the abovementioned work was presented in 1896-1898 as the Gifford Lectures, at the University of Edinburgh.


\(^{112}\) Schiller, “Useless,” 197.
appearing to them, Schiller is asked if he has relayed Plato’s advice from his previous visit. Schiller replies in the affirmative, but regretfully informs Plato that “everybody to whom I spoke disbelieved that I had really conversed with you, and thought that I had dreamt it all, or even invented the whole matter.” Plato for his part, and here Schiller ratchets up his none too subtle jabs at Idealism, can’t believe that Schiller’s pupils would deny “a world so much better, more beautiful, coherent, and rational, and in two words, more real, that that in which they lived.” Schiller argues that they will not believe it because what he has “experienced is not directly part of their experience.”

Plato can hardly believe that people would turn their backs on such higher knowledge. But Schiller responds, and in doing so gains the assent of Aristotle, that it has never been clearly shown how such abstract knowledge allows men to live better even if it be granted that “knowledge is one and the True and the Beautiful must also be useful.” Further, it is the case now that “only an utterly vulgar and ill-educated mind is even interested in the practical consequences which theoretical consequences may chance to have.” Aristotle is asked his opinion of all this. To which he enjoins, “I do not hold it true that speculative wisdom (ορόνησις) is the same as practical wisdom (σοφία), or that the latter has naturally developed out of the former. . . . They are quite distinct, and have nothing to do with each other.” Noticing that Schiller is visibly taken aback, Aristotle goes on, “I confess to an overstatement. It is not quite true that σοφία and ορόνησις have nothing to do with each other. There is a connexion, because

113 Schiller, “Useless,” 198.
114 Schiller, “Useless,” 199.
practical wisdom has to provide speculative with the material conditions of its exercise.”\textsuperscript{116}

Which is not to suggest that the supernal Aristotle concedes the speculative to the practical.

Rather:

The object of practical wisdom is the good for man and the transitory flow of appearances in the impermanent part of the universe. But the good which is the object of our practical pursuit is peculiar and restricted to man. It is different for men and for fishes, and although I do not deny that man’s is the higher and that therefore fishing is legitimate sport, I feel bound to point out that there are many things in the world far diviner than man.”\textsuperscript{117}

Schiller can barely stand this discussion, and Plato seems to fare about the same. He weakly replies that his humble servant shows “that true enthusiasm which proves that you are not merely a logical perforating machine for windbags and other receptacles of gaseous matter.” But Plato wants to push the discourse onward. Schiller only regrets that “James” is not there to lend him support in refuting Aristotle. “James,” asks Plato. Schiller replies, “A philosopher, Plato, of the Hyperatlanteans, not one of the ‘bald-headed little tinkers’ who are philosophers, not by grace of God but by favour of some wretched ‘thinking-shop,’ and a man (or shall I rather call him a god?) after your own heart.”\textsuperscript{118}

Absent his god, Schiller sets about presenting his opinion. After first noting that Plato, who held to no distinction between the True and Good, and Aristotle, who placed the speculative as above the practical, differ, Schiller puts forth a third view; “Is it not possible to maintain with

\textsuperscript{116} Schiller, “Useless,” 201.

\textsuperscript{117} Schiller, “Useless,” 202.

\textsuperscript{118} Schiller, “Useless,” 203. James had cautioned Schiller that, in earlier form, the article “should be pubd simultaneously with a fuller account of the principle it announces. Lacking that, it is too brief to be effective.” He goes on to say, “as to W. J. You calling him a god begins to satisfy even Mrs. W. J.’s philosophical desire for praise.” She sees herself as a goddess already. But you will please remember that it is C.S. Peirce, who invented both the thing and the word pragmatism, therefore, if divine honours go with it, he is the candidate for apotheosis. The poor fellow needs it, too, more than I’ (William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 10 May 1901, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).
you [Aristotle] the practical and the speculative reasons are different and opposed to each other, but that the former is superior, so that in the end we must believe and practically act on what we do not know to be true?” Aristotle grants that is possible, but ridiculous. Schiller admits that it is not his view, but only that of “the Great Scythian, Kant.” Aristotle recalls the “queer little hunchback of a barbarian” who had once visited, “but would not stay and could not say anything intelligible.” So Schiller posits the Pragmatists’ view: “there is no opposition between speculative and practical wisdom because the former arises out of the latter and remains always derivative and secondary and subservient and useful.”

The discussion carries on for a bit more, with Aristotle unconvinced and Plato intrigued by this purportedly useful philosophy. But Schiller abruptly states that he must return from slumber to his pupils. That pleases Plato, as it will interest him to see how Schiller vanishes! But, before he goes, Plato wonders if Schiller can tell him what is the “practical application of...

119 Schiller, “Useless,” 205.

120 This section of the dialogue serves, first, to use Aristotle as a foil for a further elaboration of pragmatism’s merits. Aristotle is not impressed with Schiller’s arguments. So he queries, “do you deny that the good which is the aim of practical reason is merely human?” In no way, Schiller replies, for it is also the case that the true is also only human. As with Protagoras, “that which appears to each is” and any agreement between people is an agreement of similarity, not personal experience. But what then, responds Aristotle, of the perception of “the divine order of things?” Schiller turns the question on him, asking how he derives his impression of “the real world” of which he is no longer a part. It is past perception that allows Aristotle to retain an impression, and it is contemplation that allows him to conceive of its opposite, a “world of ultimate reality.” Schiller’s reply is simple: “No doubt; you are speaking of what Plato would call the world of Ideas. But still that does not affect the argument. The world and the truth and the good we were discussing are those relative to us.” Schiller argues that pragmatism is, further, one and the same in practical and theoretical matters: “In neither can the truth or falsehood of a conception be decided in the abstract and without experience of the manner of its working” (Schiller, “Useless,” 206-7; 210).

It, secondly, utilizes Plato and Aristotle as a vehicle for jabbing at a certain Oxford Idealist. Plato wonders if what is in theory false is in practice of no use? Schiller agrees. Well, replies Plato, “you are very far then from agreeing with a statement I found lately in a book by one of your Oxford Sophists who seemed to be discussing much the same questions, that ‘the false is the same as the theoretically untenable’? You would rather say that it was ‘the same as the practically untenable’?” Schiller responds, “Of course. Or rather that the theoretically untenable always turns out to be practically untenable.” But Aristotle presses the Oxford point: “The sophist whom, with difficulty, I read seemed to see no way from the one to the other.” Which allows Schiller to signal Bradley in all but name: “I don’t suppose he wished to. It would have upset his whole philosophy, and unfortunately he is getting old” (Schiller, “Useless,” 211).
the ‘truths’ you have championed?’ That is simple. So long as what he knows of the realm where Plato and Aristotle live is useless to his wards, it will remain to them false! But isn’t there a way, Plato protests, that Schiller can make the truth of these visits apparent to people in the real world?

Certainly. Could you not appear at a meeting of the Society for Psychical Research and deliver a lecture, in your beautiful Attic, on the immortality of the Soul? That would be useful; it might induce some few really to concern themselves with what is to befall them after death, and lead them perhaps to amend their lives. I know the Secretary of the Society quite well, and I think we could arrange a good meeting for you!”

Bosh, responds Plato, “it would be too degrading.” Besides he retains little actual interest in the daily workings of the real world. Perhaps, Plato offers, he could do something personally for Schiller that would then be convincing to others. Of course, responds Schiller, he could tell him the winners to a horse race or which stocks to buy. “Money talks, as the saying is, and none dare doubt but that it speaks the truth. In this manner I might get men to credit the whole story of my visit to you. For my credit would then be practically limitless.” He must be joking, Plato retorts, for who would believe a being such as him to be interested in such matters?

Surprisingly, responds Schiller, quite a few. “They think that there is far more education in death than ever there was in life, and that even the greatest fool, as soon as ever he is dead, may be expected to be wise enough to know all things.” Then they are selfish fools, opines Plato. Yes, concludes Schiller. But isn’t that perhaps his point. “Whatever knowledge cannot be rendered somehow useful cannot be esteemed real.”

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121 Schiller, “Useless,” 212.
123 Schiller, “Useless,” 214.
Taken together, “Axioms as Postulates” and “Useless Knowledge” announce Schiller’s decision in favor of pragmatism (not personal Idealism) and polemics (not academic pleasantries). The first refashions Schiller’s notion of hypothesis. By expanding the concept to encompass the Jamesian notions of empirical verification, it becomes here the principle of postulation. The second is easy to read as mere satire. But it is more a multi-faceted argument as regards personality. In the approaching figure of Protagoras, personality will be configured as the volition-based standard of what is useful and true. In the manner of Schiller, personality is a demonstration of rhetorical style, of the tactics that will be used to champion the advances of the first. It is a stage play of targets (Bradley the ‘Oxford Sophist’) and heroes (Iames the ‘Hyperatlantean God’). But it is no mere nickelodeon. It is pragmatism growing, in the space of a few short years, larger than pragmatism can allow. It is pragmatism becoming an ethical and psychological overlay meant to encompass the whole activity of man.

125 Recall Schiller’s very specific use of the term hypothesis in his debate with Ritchie; see F. C. S. Schiller, “Reality and ‘Idealism,’” Philosophical Review 1, no. 5 (September 1892): 544-6.

126 Others, in camps developing similar projects, note the same developing strands of a philosophical movement. Addison Webster Moore (1866-1930), a former student of John Dewey and later professor at the University of Chicago, wrote: “Your very interesting letter and Article on ‘Useless Knowledge’ reached me a few days ago. I discovered your article in Mind a few days after I sent you my paper and read it with great interest and gratification. It is I think three or four years since I remarked to Mr. Dewey that beyond a small circle out here in the Middle West working along the lines of “Pragmatism”, you were the only one I knew of who seemed to be fully aware of the Logical + Epistemological implications in the “teleological psychology” which has taken the center of the stage. Its “influence” is, of course, felt Everywhere. But in most cases it is “felt” only enough to inject a vein of grotesque inconsistency into the expositions of the “orthodox” Epistemology. e.g. Royce’s Gifford Lecture” Addison Webster Moore, Chicago, to F. C. S. Schiller, 15 October 1902, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The fact of this letter’s existence amends the details relating to communications between Moore and Schiller in 1903; interested readers are directed to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “A Schiller Holograph,” Personalist 50, no. 4 (October 1959): 388-90. Schiller and James were agreed in their views of the epistemological ramifications of pragmatism. As James states, “I agree with what you say in your letter, about pragmatism being more important as a method than as a philosophy, and methods are for handling concrete cases” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 November 1902, Box One, Folder Fourteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 497).
3.4 WHAT MORE CAN PRAGMATISM BE? THE ORIGINS OF SCHILLER’S HUMANISM

1903 finds Schiller facing the consequences of his actions. In the space of a few short years, he has gone from questioning Lotze, to laughing at Caird, to reclaiming Protagoras. He has essentially merged his ‘Idealism with a difference’ with the views espoused by James. But he is still primarily seen as the caustic, overzealous, British defender of James’s pragmatism. And he is in the midst of a movement that is growing in strength and number. In April, James writes to Schiller that “. . . it appears now that under Dewey’s inspiration, they have at Chicago a flourishing school of radical empiricism of which I for one have been entirely ignorant.” And therein lies Schiller’s dilemma: how best to continue the cause while defending his own ground? Schiller sets upon two tactics. First, he pushes for the adoption of a term meant to go beyond pragmatism. In a letter dated 24 April 1903, one senses the delicacy of Schiller’s proclamation to James:

I have been inspired . . . with THE name for the only true philosophy! You know I never cared for ‘pragmatism’ . . . it is much too obscure and technical, and not a thing one can ever stampede mankind to. Besides the word has misleading associations and we want something bigger and more extensive (inclusive). . . . why should we not call it HUMANISM? . . . Not that we need drop “pragmatism” on that account as a technical term in epistemology. Only pragmatism will be a species of a greater genus,--humanism in theory of knowledge.  

127 James comments are here based on having read Studies in Logical Theory (1903), to which Dewey contributed and of which there will be a later discussion. James goes on to add, in a comment that seems to favor Schiller, that he was unaware of the development in consequence of their style: “[I have] been led to neglect it altogether by their lack of ‘terseness,’ ‘crispness,’ ‘raciness,’ and other ‘newspaporial’ virtues, though I could discern that Dewey himself was laboring with a big freight, towards the light. They have started with Hegelianism, and they have that temperament . . . which makes one still suspect that if they do strike Truth eventually, they will mean some mischief to it after all, but still the fact remains that from such opposite poles minds are moving towards a common centre, that old compartments and divisions are breaking down, and that a very inclusive new school may be formed” (William James, Asheville, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 April 1903, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 374-5).

128 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to William James, 24 April 1903, in Perry, The Thought, 2, 489-90. It is only several days after this announcement that James once again writes about developments at Chicago: “The Chicago
On the one hand, he is seeking James’s endorsement. On the other, he is attempting to stamp the next phase of pragmatism’s development with his personalized mark. So, secondly, Schiller must engage in a sophisticated promotional game. He must continue to attack those who threaten the specifics of pragmatism. At the same time, he must work to extend the domain it can be seen to encompass. Schiller attempts to cover both points in July 1903.

In keeping with the primary object, Schiller first must lay out the range of operation for this as yet unnamed approach. In “The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics,” he accuses the “Hegelizing ‘idealists’” of bringing on “the death of morals. For the ideal of the Absolute Whole cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere of human agents.”¹²⁹ As against that, philosophy should treat “Thought as a mode of conduct, as an integral part of active life”; reconceptualized, conduct becomes “the all-controlling influence in every department of life.”¹³⁰ Note then that Schiller must take the pragmatic method of philosophy and expand it. Instead of bowing to a pure intellect in search for an understanding of faith, it places faith and all other activities into the orbit of reasoning that is human. The alternative, “a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe

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Schiller thus defines pragmatism, as against Peirce’s ‘test by effects” or James’s de-emphasis of “the essential priority of action to thought,” as “the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities.” The Good is no longer abstracted; it is human good. The means to reach our goals are no longer beyond our grasp; they are within our reach. Philosophy, thus refined, bears an ethical imprint which demonstrates: (1) that the universe is not indifferent to our pleadings as our pleadings create what we conceive as our universe, (2) the skepticism engendered by a universe beyond our control is an illusion, and (3) with indifference and illusion cast aside, there is “stimulus to our feeling of moral responsibility” for the world we create.

This is a world where “each sees Life as what he has it in him to perceive, and variously transfigures what, without his vision, were an unseen void.” This is a world that, for Schiller, holds ample room for faith and reason, for trial and error. But is not a world for everyone. And, in keeping with the secondary object, Schiller must now take on those that would threaten such an ethical system. More specifically, he must pick a target of such renown that the implications for the future of philosophy are clear. Schiller chooses Bradley.

It helps to recall that Schiller’s ire for Bradley has roots far longer than his attachments to pragmatism. In the 1880s, Schiller was already scribbling against the supposed transgressions of the Broad Church idealists, detecting a subtle mix of hypocrisy in act and idiocy in thought. Jowett’s assumed aloof manners with his Balliol wards, or Green’s abstract reasons for social

131 Schiller, “The Ethical,” 437.
132 Schiller, “The Ethical,” 437.
133 Schiller, “The Ethical,” 440-3.
134 Schiller, “The Ethical,” 444.
reform, as much as they may be off putting to a young scholar, are less likely to draw the umbrage of a maturing philosopher. But Bradley was different; and the extent of their differences were jeeringly hinted at in “‘Useless’ Knowledge.” Largely heard but not seen, Bradley was the opposite of the tutor Schiller. He taught no classes, prepared no classroom lectures. Yet he told philosophers that reality can bear no contradiction and, given that, the contradictions in everyday life render our experienced world mere appearance. If this be a simplification of Bradley’s prolific outpouring, it is the reality of what Schiller saw in him.135

And it is the view he takes in his first engagement. Schiller contextualizes his July 1903 “On Preserving Appearances” within the confines of Oxford. This is no slight matter, for Schiller sees Bradley’s antithesis between “appearance” and “reality” as arising out of the divide between the “thinking” and “doing” of philosophy. In contrast with the philosophy which has

135 Schiller’s perception of Bradley is more than a mere flight of fancy. As was noted, Bradley was a prolific writer. Up to the point of Schiller’s essay, Bradley had penned three books: Ethical Studies (1876), Principles of Logic (1883), and Appearance and Reality (1893). In addition, he had just started a series of articles dealing with “The Definition of Will.” It seems unlikely that the concept of “will” sprung preformed from his mind; clearly, Bradley had been reading the recent literature in philosophy and was well aware of the arguments being espoused by James, Schiller, and others. But, as was the cause of much consternation on the part of Schiller, he rarely dealt with specific figures in current philosophical literature, often dropping cryptic references to those whose work he was critiquing. In the first of the articles, he does make reference to James’s work; specifically, to Chapter Twenty-six of his 1890 The Principles of Psychology! Herein Bradley argues against limiting the volition of an idea: to demand its terminus in my satisfaction (what he labels “mere desire” as opposed to “volition”) or in my life (as opposed to “the idea of an event after my death”) is to isolate that idea within the limits of my mind and body (F. H. Bradley, “The Definition of Will. No. I,” Mind 11, no. 44 [October 1902]: 469). In the second article, Bradley does feign to discuss Schiller, though without reference to his name proper. Specifically, Bradley argues that a “fact in experience” is that which serves to clarify the operation of agency, that is, the connection of the idea to the action it supposes. Phrased differently, one must make a “distinction between an awareness of activity and of agency.” The concept of “axioms as postulates . . . may in its way be useful, though one would seek in vain for any serious attempt to realize the meaning and result of that gospel which it preaches” (F. H. Bradley, “The Definition of Will. No. II,” Mind 12, no. 46 [April 1903]: 170; 169).

James’s awareness of Bradley dates back just as far, even if his opinion is decidedly less dismissive. As early as August 1886, James is seen to be noting, and criticizing, the works of Bradley. In a foreshadowing of his relationship with Schiller, James notes the “impatience” in Bradley’s writing; but he also is engaged by its “stimulating and exciting nature,” by the display of the man in his “sarcasms” (J. C. Kenna and William James, “I. Ten Unpublished Letters from William James, 1842-1910 to Francis Herbert Bradley, 1846-1924,” Mind 75, no. 299 [July 1966]: 310; the two quotations are from two separate letters to the English philosopher Croom Robertson, and can be found in: Perry, The Thought, 1, 601; 604). And as early as 1898, in a letter to Bradley, James mentions Schiller: “Have you read the ‘tychistic’ speculations of Chas. S. Pierce [sic] . . . He, [Charles Bernard] Renouvier, and F. C. S. Schiller of Oxford are the only genuine pluralists with whose manifested existence I can console myself” (qtd. in Kenna, “I. Ten,” 316).
“sprung invulnerable” from the “subtle brain” of Bradley, Schiller finds himself “immersed in the struggle of teaching and having a certain responsibility in seeing to it that what is called thought involves thinking and affords proper training in mental precision and clearness . . . find[s] that this antithesis has become a considerable nuisance, and also, it must be confessed, a bit of a bore.”136 But what is his specific objection? And here he ventures tentatively, making explicit note of Bradley’s preferred manner of rejoinder:

I venture to assert with the utmost trepidation, and at the risk of being crushed, like the rest of Mr. Bradley’s critics, by a sarcastic footnote to his next article, that in putting forward his fundamental assumption that ‘ultimate reality’ is such that it does not contradict itself, and in erecting this into an absolute criterion, he builds in part on an unsound foundation which has not reached bottom rock, in part on an airy pinnacle, a sort of what in Alpine parlance is called a gendarme, which will not bear the weight of the mountains of paradox which are subsequently heaped upon it.137

Schiller sees this argument against contradiction as being as much tactical as metaphysical, as a way for Bradley to argue the reality of his position against the appearance of another’s. But when one turns to what Schiller supposes Bradley to actually mean, the result is much the same; “it is an abuse of language to describe our use of incompatible statements about the same reality as an inherent contradiction in the reality itself.”138 Not that Schiller would suggest junking contradiction. It suggests itself as “unpleasant” and we work as best as possible to avoid it and move towards “harmony.”139 But contradiction is not our sole recourse on the road to harmony, any more than our current existence is only “apparent” because it contains contradictions. And

this forms the second of Schiller’s objections: Bradley takes the (apparent, if only to Schiller) failure of his theory as a sign of the (real, if partially to Bradley) defectiveness of the world.140

Which would leave us with what? Bradley’s Absolute “is only used to cast an indelible slur on all human reality and knowledge.”141 It frames human striving as a skeptical and foolhardy endeavor, always feigning to find reality. But what, then, does this say of Bradley’s own theory? If, in fact, we live in appearance, does his skepticism not cast doubt on the suggestion of the Absolute? Would it not be more practical to view all such schemes of the Ultimate or Absolute as “attempts, more or less successful, to supplement some unsatisfactory feature in our primary experience.”142 But this is a view of which Bradley is not likely to partake.143 Though full well he should. For Schiller urges that Bradley’s reality is that of a pessimist, a phantom world inhabited by “the nightmares of a mind distraught.”144 Better to turn to philosophy that seeks to craft better reality than we currently experience, and not turn to a “pet antitheses” framed as a gloomy prognostication.145 For the time being, there is no response from Bradley.

143 Schiller even indulges in the act of offering Bradley five pragmatic qualifications meant to repair his philosophy: (1) that which is deemed Ultimate must have a real use, must never allowed to shift into transcendence of which the world can only approximate; (2) that said approximation must be accepted, no matter how flawed, as real should we so choose to aspire to something more; (3) what is immediate is, in a practical sense “more real, i.e. more directly real, than the ‘higher realities’ which are said to ‘explain’ it”; (4) this more directly real immediacy “forms the touchstone whereby we test the value of our inferred realities, and if they can contribute nothing valuable to its elucidation, their assumption is nothing but vanity and vexation of the spirit;” (5) “Ultimate Reality must be absolutely satisfactory. . . . So long as the most ultimate reality we have reached falls short in any respect of giving complete satisfaction, the struggle to harmonise experience must go on” (Schiller, “On,” 350-2).
But Schiller worries about another sort of response. It is not James’s view of the initial attempts to expand the range of pragmatism; if anything, James’s reaction to both of these articles is succinct and approving: “I don’t see how truth could be more broadly and convincingly set down and I should think they would have great effect. But things must also get into books to be effective.”  

No, Schiller is still worried about the approval which might give sanction to a book promoting the term proper for this new approach. And the initial reply in this case isn’t favorable: “‘Humanism’ doesn’t make a very electrical connexion with my nature—but in appellations the individual proposes + the herd adopts or drops. I rejoice exceedingly that your book is so far forward, + am glad that you call it Humanism—we shall see if the name sticks. All other names are bad, most certainly—especially pragmatism.”  

With a month or less before the release of the book, Schiller seems panicked by the wait and see approach of James. “What I want to know from you is how the name ‘Humanism’ now strikes you + whether you agree as to its relation to Pragmatism +c?” And he is willing to do a bit of selling to secure approval: “Of one thing I feel fairly sure viz. that it will puzzle the enemy considerably. They had only just become alive to the necessity of bringing up their big guns to dispose of ‘pluralism’, when it turned out that ‘pragmatism’ + ‘personal Idealism’ were the keys to the position they had to attack, + now behold the real citadel is Humanism + they have a

146 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1903, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

147 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 July 1903, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 500.
choice between being scholastics + barbarians! The approval, like the response from Bradley, will have to wait.

Uncertainty not withstanding, Schiller’s praise of James adorns the dedication of Humanism: Philosophical Essays (1903): “To my dear friend, the Humanest of Philosophers, William James, without whose example and unfailing encouragement this book would never have been written.” The work is largely a collection of previously published essays—such as “Metaphysics of the Time-Process” (1895), “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a Priori” and “Lotze’s Monism” (1896), “Darwinism and Design” (1897), “Useless’ Knowledge” and “On Preserving Appearances” (1903)—that chart out Schiller’s developing viewpoints. Not that this collection was Schiller’s intended result. Circling back to his recent squabble with

148 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to William James, 9 September 1903 [Draft], Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

149 Nor always the reactions he hoped to garner. An indication of the troubles to come is found in a pre-publication reader report. On 15 February 1903, Henry Jones filed a handwritten report for Macmillan from Glasgow, Scotland. The report regards the upcoming publication of Humanism: Philosophical Essays. Jones says “at the present time I should expect that anything which came out under Dr. Schiller’s name would command some attention.” He argues each of the essays are “the work of a very competent writer & thinker, and if not always original are stated expressed with great freshness of force.” Jones goes on to criticize Schiller, though, in that he is “led away by his controversial tendencies + says things he shd not say.” Towards the end of his report, Jones offers the following advice regarding its publication:

I think the book would be certain of a moderate success. Dr. Schiller’s name at present would secure that; and the completeness of the articles would deserve it. . . . On the whole, therefore, I shd advise you to publish them. But if I thought Dr. Schiller capable of taking advice I shd like him not to re-publish them. Only I do not think he is, + I think it wld be an error to presume to advise him.


It should be noted that Jones had, and would continue to have, firsthand knowledge of Schiller’s work. Jones (LL.D, Litt.D) served as a member of the British Editorial Board of the Hibbert Journal to which Schiller was a frequent contributor. He had also incurred Schiller’s wrath in a review in 1895 of his work, A Critical Account of the Doctrine of Lotze. In that review, Schiller claimed that this “zealous” defender of the Hegelianism of Bradley suffers his subject with a work that is not “easy reading; he commingles exposition and criticism in a manner which greatly detracts from clearness of impression, and his method involves a good deal of repetition” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of A Critical Account of the Doctrine of Lotze, by Henry Jones, Philosophical Review 4, no. 4 [July 1895]: 436).
Bradley, he apologizes that “the work of a college tutor lends itself more easily to the conception than to the composition of a systematic treatise.”\textsuperscript{150}

The initial reactions from friends give Schiller reason to be pleased, and optimistic, as regards his attempts at pragmatic expansion. Howard Vincenté Knox (1886-1960) reports:

Very many thanks for your book, which I am reading with great pleasure. I think the essays decidedly [sic] gain by being brought together in book form. The title is decidedly good, and will, I think prove attractive. Your preface brings out the advantages of the name very well. It is also an advantage that it has a cognate verb + adjective, with equally favourable associations – “humanise” + “humanist.” “Pragmatic,” on the other hand, is not quite a happy epithet to apply to oneself. [Alfred] Sidgwick tells me that Sturt has asked him to review the book, for the January number of “Mind.” I do not think that task could be in better hands. Sidgwick is pleased with the book, and his review is more to be in general agreement with its aims.\textsuperscript{151}

Even James, despite his label leeriness, is upbeat: “. . . read your book this A.M. . . . I am charmed by the elegance of the whole presentment. . . . Altogether I ‘voice’ a loud ‘hurrah’—first cries of allégresse [joy]!”\textsuperscript{152} But Schiller continues to press James with the issue of endorsement, asking “whether you might not say a word to draw attention to Humanism on your

\textsuperscript{150} F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912), xi. Please note that references to specific pages are from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition of the work.

\textsuperscript{151} Howard Vincenté Knox, London, to F. C. S. Schiller, 25 October 1903, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Knox would prove to be one of Schiller’s greatest confidants in the upcoming years. A future staff member at Corpus Christi and Manchester Colleges, Knox had a distinguished record. As Ellen Kappy Suckiel goes on to note, “Knox was a captain in the British army, who served in both the South African and First World Wars.” What’s more, he provided a more even-tempered foil to Schiller, especially as regards the support for William James in the early years of pragmatism. For a concise review of Knox’s career, interested readers are directed to Ellen Kappy Suckiel, introduction to The Philosophy of William James (1914): H. V. Knox & Responses and Reviews, Early Defenders of Pragmatism Series, ed. John R. Shook, vol. 5 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii-xx. Suckiel is also to be thanked for bringing to readers’ attention an article which traces Knox’s correspondence with William James based, it seems, in Schiller’s introduction of his friend Knox—though he had written of him in letters prior to that date—to James during the latter’s 1908 visit (to provide the Hibbert Foundation lectures at Manchester College on “The Present Situation in Philosophy,” lectures which would be later published as the 1909 book, A Pluralistic Universe). Please see Marjorie R. Kaufman, “William James’s Letters to a Young Pragmatist,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24, no. 3 (July-September 1963): 413-21.

\textsuperscript{152} William James, Salisbury, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 November 1903, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. It should be noted that Perry provides a copy of James’s letter of the previous evening, before he had finished reading the book (Perry, The Thought, 2, 501-2).
side, whether signed or anonymously (e.g. in the Nation or the Psych. Rev.) (The Nation does not yet seem to have acknowledged it, so I suppose the N. Y. Macmillan Co. has not yet imported it). It is of course of capital importance that you shd pronounce on the appropriation of ‘Humanism’ as a label.” 153 This is Schiller, so recently experiencing a surge in self-assurance, expressing a crisis of confidence.

Endorsement or not, the shorter critical notices that ring in 1904 generally confirm his friend’s initial reactions. And, even more than with Riddles, many of these notices issue from the daily presses. The Birmingham Post lays down the critical and cliché gauntlet regarding “one of the most significant books published for some years.” It argues that “‘humanism’ is a force to be reckoned with in the present tendencies of philosophy.” 154 Others, in whole and part, take up the challenge of that swelled appraisal. The Spectator applauds the book for its “refreshing vigor” and its style, of which “the phraseology of modern music alone is equal to the appreciation of a volume such as this.” It concludes by noting that, beyond students of philosophy, this book is “one which the ‘ordinary reader’ cannot fail to enjoy.” 155 The Manchester Guardian notes that readers “will not find any essentially new doctrine in this volume,” but that the materials contained herein are a “lively” attempt by Schiller to get the lay public “to observe what fools these philosophers are.” The “these” under consideration are all who, unlike Schiller, James, and Peirce, cling to absolutist doctrines of the past. The review also

153 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to William James, 24 November 1903 [Draft], Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

154 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Birmingham Post, 29 January 1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

155 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Spectator, 30 January 1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
notes that Schiller has, taking his cue from Protagoras, finally settled on the term humanism. In so doing, Schiller questions the definitions of pragmatism set forth by both James and Peirce.\textsuperscript{156}

Not that all the notices are as positive. The \textit{Morning Post} sees this volume as Schiller’s attempt to “Americanise the metaphysical world” by casting aside the British strains of philosophy so long held in awe. But this collection of “unusually, if sometimes perversely, able essays . . . could not fairly be accused of avoiding either abstraction or pure thought, nor yet of being manifestly practical.”\textsuperscript{157} What is apparent to the \textit{Dublin Press} is that this volume breaks with the expectations of “courteous humanism both in temper and in style,” and that it devolves into abstractions akin to those found in Bradley and Spencer. Schiller is obviously not taken with such a viewpoint. Scribbled on his copy of the review is this retort: “the most grotesquely ignorant Rev. so far . . . Cd anyone so miss the point!”\textsuperscript{158}

A longer notice, from a normally supportive front, makes mention of additional problems. F. N. Hale’s review is couched in the suggestion that, this being the organ of the SPR, “a metaphysical discussion in these pages would be an offence devoid alike of precedence and of justification.”\textsuperscript{159} So he instead establishes that Schiller’s humanism, like that of James’s pragmatism, is an outgrowth of Empiricism as found in Mill. With a focus squarely on the first,

\textsuperscript{156} Review of \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, by F. C. S. Schiller, \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 19 January 1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{157} Review of \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, by F. C. S. Schiller, \textit{Morning Post}, 7 January 1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{158} Review of \textit{Humanism: Philosophical Essays}, by F. C. S. Schiller, \textit{Dublin Press}, 12 November 1903, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1903, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

Hale suggests that Schiller’s “Humanism aims to be humane; and in his sedulous avoidance of scholastic jargon, he has been tempted to smoothe over difficulties none the less imperative for being scholastic. This book must be regarded as a programme rather than a proof. But it is addressed to a popular audience, and as such it must be judged.”160 And what is the judgment? Taking Schiller’s discussion of immortality as the test, Hale asserts that “the fundamental paradox of Pragmatism comes to light in a particularly glaring fashion, and challenges discussion in these pages.”161 The problem is this: belief in a postulate does not constitute the actuality of the thing postulated. Moreover, it is the problem of pragmatism suggesting the practical need to believe, but providing no measure of what beliefs are or are not actual (in the present) or possible (in the future). In concluding his argument, and turning Schiller’s, Hale suggests that “it seems plain that the hypothetical future life can no more enter into our actual experience than Mr. Schiller’s experience of the cogency of his argument enters into my actual experience.”162

160 Hales, review, 502.

161 Hales, review, 504.

162 Hales, review, 504. Not that Hale is the only one to question the extent to which humanism can be applied. For, as Knox had suggested, Sidgwick’s review arrived in April. He notes Schiller’s “wit and incisiveness, and his entire freedom from the manners of the owl and the tricks of the ostrich, are well known to the readers of this journal. Probably, however, there is a real connexion between the Humanist theory and the literary virtues so characteristic of Mr. Schiller and Prof. James.” But Sidgwick, like Hale, questions the matter of judging humanism’s successful application and he, like James, suggests the need for further elaboration. Sidgwick suggests that, “as is natural with a far-reaching theory which is still taking shape, the essence of ‘Humanism’ is not quite easy to find. . . . [It] seems to be that Humanism is based upon Pragmatism but extends beyond it; or is the application of the Pragmatist method to all philosophical questions.” But, and this relates to Hale’s comments of the same text, the question that is raised is how thoroughly a matter of reason such as application is construed to be. If Humanism is to be applied to areas of inquiry such as Ethics and Religion, it may need to become or defer to “something more full-blooded, something less exclusively an affair of reasoning” (Alfred Sidgwick, review of Humanism: Philosophic Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 13, no. 50 [April 1904]: 262-8). These calls for systemization clearly have an impact on Schiller’s thinking. In a letter to Florence Thaw, Schiller captures both the critical suggestions and his continued view that a defiant tone can support it: “. . . I am so glad you liked ‘Humanism’; it is not the big systematic book I shd like to have the leisure to write, but it has served its immediate purpose of bringing a sort of Armageddon between the old + the new philosophy. We are bound to win in the end, but it will be a hard fight + one that may last for another 20 years. For is not the stronghold of the Absolute fortified as cunningly + defended as desperately as Port Arthur?” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 28 December 1904, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
After such a discouraging reply from an assumed ally, Schiller nonetheless has reason to feel hopeful. The desired endorsement finally comes, though not in a public forum as had been hoped. In February, James write to Schiller that “‘Humanism’ (the term) which did not at first much ‘speak’ to me, I now see to be just right. Vivat et floreat [grow and flourish]!” But the praise comes with further warnings. James suggests that some of the more critical notices seem to be “the pouring out of a long smothered volcano of irritation at your general tone of belligerency and flippancy.” As regards Schiller’s humanist project and the methods by which he plies his (and James’s) belief in pragmatism, he is no less clear:

Apropos of your reviewer’s animosity to your jokes, I confess that I am both startled and shocked to find lately how antipathetic they are to certain temperaments. One man recently said to me “I hate him”—another: “he is intolerable and odious.” Poor Schiller—so good a man! It is well to know of these reactions which one can provoke, and perhaps to use the knowledge for political effect. Now that you are the most responsible companion in England of what is certainly destined to be the next great philosophic movement, may it not be well (for the sake of the conversion effect) to assume a solemn dignity commensurate with the importance of your function, and so give the less excuse to the feeble minded for staying out of the fold.

James’s conclusion is also his hope: “Buckle down now to s’thing very solemn and systematic. Write your jokes by all means, but expunge them in proof, and save them for a posthumous no. of Mind!” This, for all James’s previous vacillation, is his most succinct avowal of support. It is

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163 An observation on archival decorum is necessary at this point. By comparing the original documents, the letters, with their presentation, as transcribed, in Perry’s volume, two things become clear. First, Perry had no qualms writing on the original documents, making comments on when and where to cut the material he used and/or underlying entire sections with colored pencil. This, as a matter of decorum, speaks for itself. Two, what is more important is how he chose to use portions of the text at his disposal. At the end of the portion quoted above and provided in Perry’s text on page 502, the term “incomplete” is found in brackets. Now, it would be easy to see this as a comment to the reader that the selection transcribed was only a part of a longer passage, if not for the fact that he supplies that information by use of ellipses in other cases of transcription. The question then becomes: what is meant by incomplete? It can’t mean that Perry only had access to the portion transcribed, as one finds in Perry’s own hand, at the exact place where the above quotation ends the phrase “stop copying” and finds atop page one the comment “Copy 1st 4 pages.” It is meant as neutral conjecture to suggest that, in making editorial choices, Perry was cognizant of what his omissions would mean to his larger project of explaining James.

164 William James, Tallahassee, to F. C. S. Schiller, 1 February 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 502.
a respected philosopher suggesting, after full well attributing the birth to Peirce, the causeway to Schiller. But it is also the most pointed warning. Sensing that both he and Schiller now have hold of a movement, James calls for the one thing of which Schiller has less and less: restraint. First impressions, as Schiller regards his foes and his foes regard him, are already tending to calcify.

3.5 ACTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES: SCHILLER’S PLACE WITHIN THE PRAGMATIST MILIEU

Schiller’s initial attempts to extend pragmatism and give cause to humanism have achieved at least one objective: they have gained the assent of James. But the larger project of propagating this undertaking is undercut by past wrongs, real and imagined. Though still championed for his style by some, Schiller is as much dismissed on account of it by others. The tactical approach of making his career is being offset by the tactics employed; attacking theoretical foes while building philosophical bridges is paying few dividends. What’s more, in a still growing area of philosophical inquiry, Schiller finds himself depicted as the extreme variation of the philosophy he seeks to champion.

Joseph Alexander Leighton (1870-1954) suggests his March 1904 “Pragmatism” is a general discussion. But it actually provides both a critique of Schiller and a comparison of his work to that of Dewey. Leighton sees Schiller as “at once the most pugnacious and the most

165 Not that this is the only discussion of pragmatism and humanism that is going on around this time. In the same month, the American Philosophical Association Presidential Address of Josiah Royce (1855-1916), “The Eternal and the Practical,” is published. Royce’s argument, in short, is that the processes of thinking, which pragmatism values so highly, conflict with the necessities of action, which pragmatism also rightly endorses. And why is this so? Royce opines that it a confusion regarding evolution as it relates to pragmatism. If, as Royce claims, it all boils down to evolution then pragmatism, at least its pure form, wanders into a version of apriorism that it so


facetious protagonist of pragmatism.”¹⁶⁶ He chides Schiller for making much hay over James’s articulation, and his own subsequent recognition, of the theories of pragmatism. Leighton then provides this commentary on Schiller and the wider application of pragmatism he espouses in Humanism:

Mr. Schiller’s jaunty onslaughts on Kantian apriorism, Bradleian absolutism and all other forms of intellectualism are always interesting reading. But the magniloquent and extravagant claims, the ‘superior’ air and the confident dogmatism pall on one. These qualities of Mr. Schiller’s writing, together with his repeated and often tasteless sallies of wit, tend to bring into disrepute a doctrine which deserves a more thorough and serious treatment. When the witticisms, jibes and other ‘literary’ flights of fancy are discounted there is left a residuum of philosophical argument and it is with this that I shall deal.”¹⁶⁷

But these arguments strike Leighton as pushing too hard and too far. Leighton declares that “it is already evident that pragmatism with Mr. Schiller has passed the stage of a tentative method for


¹⁶⁷ Leighton, “Pragmatism,” 149.
the examination of philosophical concepts and has become a dogmatic metaphysic.” 168 In so thoroughly pushing for the human, “Mr. Schiller is an extremist”; he reduces everything to a form of social contract and leaves no room for “an objective cosmic order in his system.” 169 Leighton, in comparing John Dewey et al.’s Studies in Logical Theory (1903) to Schiller’s views, finds “certain presuppositions common to this [functional] view and to pragmatism.” 170 These commonalities are twofold: (1) the emphasis on the harmonizing of experience, (2) the evolutionary character of reality. 171 But both views, in Leighton’s estimation, “involve problems in regard to reality that can neither be brushed aside as ontological and antiquated or settled off-hand by the evolution method.” 172 At least one attending reader seems inclined to suggest that the problem is far graver than even Leighton supposes; it is a problem which amounts to not actually practicing philosophy at all.

In July 1904, Bradley decides to respond more fully to the pragmatists, in print and by name, in Mind. In his essay “On Truth and Practice”—the title itself a sly pun on the distinction so recently under attack—Bradley wants to be explicit in his criticisms and careful in his

168 Leighton, “Pragmatism,” 152.


170 Leighton, “Pragmatism,” 154. The reasons for comparison extend farther than perhaps even Leighton would oblige. Dewey’s contribution to the book, the four-part “Thought and Its Subject Matter,” took as one of its primary objects of critique a person familiar to Schiller: Lotze (see in Chapter Two: F. C. S. Schiller, “Lotze’s Monism,” Philosophical Review 5, no. 3 [May 1896]: 225-45). One later commentator notes how, “throughout his exposition, Dewey uses the logical theories of Lotze and transcendentalism as foils for his own doctrine.” The commentator goes on to point out that “F. C. S. Schiller, the noted English pragmatist and humanist, welcomed the book with an enthusiasm second only to that of James” (George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey [Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1973], 83; 85). It suffices to note—though this issue will return in subsequent discussions—that it was likely a favorable opinion based in the similarity of arguments as much as it was in the suggestion of allied concern. That distinction, though seemingly slight, is of import as regards the conclusions reached in Chapter Eight.

171 Leighton, “Pragmatism,” 154-5.

172 Leighton, “Pragmatism,” 156.
praise. If past references to Schiller were only implied, they are more explicit here. The first reference plays for ambiguity but leaves none:

This paper was written in the early summer of 1903, and has been left much as it was. The renewed and repeated “manifestoes” of the protagonist of Personal Idealism (even Personal Idealism, it seems, was an “audacious manifesto”) do not to my mind show any serious endeavour to deal with their subject. And to my mind they betray no consciousness of some difficulties which are so well known as even to deserve the name traditional. I have however since that date made acquaintance with the interesting volume called Studies in Logical Theory. There is much in the position taken here by Prof. Dewey and the other writers which seems to me suggestive and valuable. On the other hand that position as a whole has not become clear to me. Schiller is rendered the protagonist, and barely throughout named, of a collection of essays while Dewey and his peers are due praise for the value of what is not clear. Why at least the hint of recognition? Their relation, as Bradley sees it, to Bradley’s philosophy of truth and practice. Moreso, their purported role in the new philosophy which “loudly advertises itself as the destroyer of Intellectualism, and it claims to find the being and the truth of things in will and in practice. And sweeping away the feeble obstacle of senile theories and teachers [a reference to a

173 Not that Bradley had been idle. He had, in January of 1904, finished his three-part series on “The Definition of the Will.” In it, Bradley again makes observations that, in light of the previous rejoinder from Schiller, seem likely directed at him. Bradley notes, for instance, that the will is a “psychical process certainly not original or ultimate or self-explanatory.” He goes on to suggest the relationship of “facts in experience” to the notion of will: “. . . if the will of the individual presupposes dispositions which by him are unwilled, his will originates in that which is eternal” (F. H. Bradley, “The Definition of Will. No. III,” Mind 13, no. 49 [January 1904]: italics mine 29; 56). Prior to the publication of this article, James had received a proof copy from Stout. James then wrote to Bradley on 16 July 1904. His comments as regards the developing antagonism between Bradley and Schiller are relevant: “I was astonished when I was last at Oxford, to learn that you & Schiller had never met face to face. I imagine that you have never yet done so, and that your imaginations have been somewhat at work, representing mutally monsters. When you write of Schiller’s ‘advertising’ himself, it tallies so little with my apprehension of Schiller’s character that I must say nay. He is boyish in temperament, and far too fond of puns and practical jokes (which have hurt him as a philosopher in the reading eye more than they have ever hurt anyone else) and he is too polemic and fond of shindy . . . but he is, I think, not conceited in any reprehensible sense, and his writings have been absolutely objective” (Kenna, “I. Ten,” 318).

And what is the nature of this new philosophy? Bradley believes it to be a criterion of the “merely practical.”\footnote{Bradley, “On Truth,” 309-10.} He sees a host of problems with this standard, not the least of which is what this position would mean if accepted in contrast to Idealism. For him, the “new gospel of personal individualism” (and note here the term use) is far too interior:

At least if my ideas and my will, or the will and the ideas of any man or set of men, are to be the measure of truth, then, so far as I see, the reality cannot lie beyond the private ends of the individuals. And to realize the self by self-surrender to the supreme will, must, I presume, be set down as at one irrational and immoral.\footnote{Bradley, “On Truth,” 315.}

This interiority also influences the nature of practice. As against the “personal idealists” and their rough and ready version, Bradley wishes to suggest that practice is “to consist in my alteration of existence.”\footnote{Bradley, “On Truth,” 318.} And such a view essential fuses theory and practice together in a manner inconsistent with pragmatic suppositions.\footnote{Bradley, “On Truth,” 317.} It, moreover, casts into doubt the pragmatic claim that the truth resides in the individual. For, if one accepts the interiority hypothesis, they render truth a purely subjective concept; “the doctrine that the world and my nature are of such a
kind that all truth must be practical, appears itself, so far, to be a truth which is theoretical and therefore no truth.”¹⁸⁰ Even if the pragmatists wish to circumvent this problem by defining truth as a “working hypothesis,” Bradley wishes to know how distinct hypotheses are related.¹⁸¹ His suggestion is that the pragmatists must either scrap their philosophical position or embrace it’s thoroughly subjectivist, and negative, implications. “If the follower of the new way desires to be consistent, he must take courage, it seems to me, to face his obvious conclusion. Reality and truth are what I want and are that which at any time I choose to make them.”¹⁸²

But even Bradley won’t attribute such an “insane doctrine” to “Prof. James and his followers.” Is it at this point that Schiller, the “self-elected leader of our Personal Idealists,” come into the picture. And it is to him and James that a further suggestion is directed:

The one thing I cannot doubt is that we ought to have more explanation and less self-advertisement. It does not really help us when we hear from Mr. Schiller a perpetual cry that there is no other philosopher but Prof. James and that Prof. James has a prophet. And it does not help to hear from Prof. James (on his part not to be outdone) that, if Mr. Schiller would not exhaust himself by excess of facetiousness, he would produce a philosophy as probably classical as it would be certainly inspired.¹⁸³

And it is to James that a final, pointed, warning is also issued: be careful of the company you keep. For “a writer can be discredited by the extravagance and the vulgarity of his disciple, if at least he does not see his way to disconnect himself from it.”¹⁸⁴ Better that both men turn to


¹⁸¹ Bradley is here making the suggestion that there must be a unity which overlies any conceptualization of distinct parts. While pragmatists may assert that “reality in the end is will, and that intelligence has somehow a secondary position,” the further assumption of a “plurality of wills” implies something beyond will as operative (Bradley, “On Truth,” 326-7).


¹⁸⁴ Bradley, “On Truth,” 330. Not that Bradley is done telling the eminent psychologist what he thinks of his follower: “In the view of the Personal Idealist [and Bradley has by this time produced a summary judgment of all those who wrote in the text of the same name] no object counts for any more than a worthless means to one’s own
philosophy that quaffs the fresh nectar of “a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life” than to bury themselves in the sordid mess of merely doing.  

James’s initial reaction to this article is an upbeat one. Having, it seems, received an advanced copy he comments to Schiller in June: “Hurrah for Bradley’s attack. I don’t know what it is to be an attack upon, but if it be an attack upon the Schiller-Dewey School in favor of the older notion of ‘truth’ as copying a standard, so by then the Lord will have delivered him into our hands.” He believes, as regards “tactics,” that “the more of us there are to make reply the better—and independently. But everything will depend upon what B.’s paper actually is.”  

After the essay’s actual release, James’s response changes in what seems a fear as to Schiler’s reaction. Schiller notes that he has begun to draft a response to Bradley. But James cautions, “It would be time wasted to polemize with him in details, so remote is he from the subject, spending his great subtlety on inventing one straw-caricature after another of what you may mean, + refuting that, instead of spending five minutes in sympathetically imagining what you do mean.”  

Days later, he urges Schiller to send along a copy of his draft response to Bradley. While James isn’t sure that Schiller will agree with everything he has written in his response, he hopes

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186 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 12 June 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 502.

187 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 July 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
“to have helped somewhat to a clearing of the atmosphere.” As regards Bradley, James makes little mention of him in his response, as he “seems to me almost entirely irrelevant.” Two weeks pass, and it seems that Schiller has not sent an advance copy of his article. James yet again urges Schiller to allow him to review Schiller’s response: “by all means send me your type-written copy. I am ‘dying with curiosity,’ etc.” And James again claims, in what seems to be a plea for perspective in what he fears Schiller will unleash, the “irrelevance” of Bradley; “he has evidently not tried to understand the position of those he criticizes.” James fears seem well-founded given the draft he receives from Schiller later in the week. His tone is one of panic.

While he admires the “strictly argumentative part,” and personally enjoys Schiller’s “irony and flights of metaphor,” he fears the rest will ruin it as an advance of disciplined “party politics.” James reminds Schiller how his past writings seem, to critics, “in ‘bad taste’ in the way of polemical jeers and general horseplay.” He urges:

Solemn as an owl, and tender as a dove, should be your watchword from now on if you are to outrive these arrears of debt to the proprieties. Now I believe that the Oct. Mind will be the first artillery fire of an important general engagement, in which it behoves [sic] us to risk no disadvantage of any sort. . . . Bradley has put himself [inserted: “flagrantly”] in the wrong by his personalities + sarcasms; and the important point is that he should be left there high and dry.  

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188 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, [c. 15] July 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. As regards Bradley, James goes on to note that he makes little mention of him in his response, as he “seems to me almost entirely irrelevant.”

189 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, [c. 1] August 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. James again claims, in what seems to be a plea for perspective in what he fears Schiller will unleash, the “irrelevance” of Bradley; “he has evidently not tried to understand the position of those he criticizes.”

190 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 9 August 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 2, 503-4.
James then goes on to list parts he wants expunged. His tone grows more insistent. “What I earnestly beseech you to do therefore is (no matter what literary cost) to suppress those pages... . Your paper’s total forensic effectiveness will be 4 times greater without than with it, and that is what the cause demands.” James then decides to attempt another tactic. Two days later, he writes to Stout, the editor of Mind, asking him—and repeating the comments about “beseeching” Schiller to set aside his “literary” pride—“to not have Schiller’s article on Bradley set up in type until my letter to him shall have arrived.”191 All of James’s attempts were for naught.192 Judging from the evidence, Schiller did not revise the article according to James’s wishes.

Nor could the work behind the scenes stave off yet another slight to Schiller’s case. Two months prior to the release of James’s and Schiller’s responses to Bradley, in August 1904, H. Heath Bawden (1871-1950) publishes “What is Pragmatism?” in the Journal of Philosophy. It can be read as a continuation of the plaints of Leighton. But it is more than that. Bawden (1871-1950)...

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191 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, [c. 11] August 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

192 It should be made clear that James was by no means the only person worried about the tone of Schiller’s essay. Knox also wrote him—after reviewing a proof copy of Bradley’s essay, a draft of Schiller’s response, and soliciting the advice of Sidgwick—saying:

As regards the mere matter of treatment of your case, I must say that I agree with Sidgwick in thinking that the opening + closing portions rather detract from the forcibleness of your article as a whole. If I might venture a suggestion, it would be that you should condense the introduction into as short a foot-note as possible, stating that your remarks as to youth strength + virility were not meant as personalities, and also that [inserted: “lest they should be misinterpreted”] they had been deleted in “Humanism.” [also written in light pencil, likely by Schiller, is this phrase: “no only the old age references”] In this way you would come to close grips with Bradley at once, and this I think would heighten the effect of your onset. I must say, by the way, that I should be strongly tempted, in your place, to say something apropos of Bradley attributing “vulgarity” to you. His having done so is a beautiful card for you to play, as it at once puts him beyond the pale of humour... so far as objections to personalities are concerned. For you to allude to this saying of his in a very polite + frigid manner, would be a tremendous personal score. N.B. I think perhaps it would be as well not to say Bradley’s methods of defense are decidedly of an offensive nature. ... Further, I think that a studied air of seriousness throughout the paper would... at such an important juncture as the present, be more likely to secure the sympathy of your readers. ... Give not occasion to them that blaspheme, to say that though flippest! I honestly think that in the end the gain to the good cause will repay you for this sacrificing the genial offspring of your mother wit.

(Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 July 1904, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
a graduate of the Chicago School and student of Dewey, is attempting to even further
distance Schiller from pragmatism proper—either Jamesian or Deweyian. The argument is made
easier for Bawden by picking upon the new term that Schiller is bandying about: humanism.

“The word pragmatism and the mode of thought for which it stands seem to have come to stay,”
says Bawden. Yet “however ‘habitual’ humanism may have become with Mr. Schiller, it still
seems to ‘sporadic and inchoate’ with most of us, even after having read his book [Humanism],
to supplant the concise and persuasive term made current by Professor James.”  
And Bawden, a former student of one of those under discussion, avers that Dewey even surpasses James. He
is clearly a pragmatist even if he is one of a different stripe than James. And Bawden puts the
difference into sharp relief: Dewey attempts “to get a method which will enable us to state the
logic of experience”; James’s approach, and the phrase seems to be an unsympathetic code for
metaphysics, is more of “a cosmology.” The thrust of Bawden’s argument is more pressing
for its brevity: James, then Schiller, extend in a tenuous idealistic orbit away from Dewey.

Regardless his place in the constellation of Bawden’s pragmatism, James response to
Bradley is published two months later, in October 1904, in Mind. He begins “Humanism and
Truth” noting that he received an advance copy of Bradley’s previous article from the editor
[George Fredrick Stout]. James took “this as a hint . . . to join in the controversy over
‘Pragmatism’ which seems to have seriously begun.” First he makes clear his conception of

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194 Bawden, “What,” 424. In a case of time healing some wounds, Schiller finds in Bawden’s later writings views to which he responded favorably.

195 William James, “Humanism and Truth,” Mind 13, no. 52 (October 1904): 457. In a letter of [1]6 October 1904, James acknowledges that Bradley plans a response to this essay. And, in a suggestion he will also make to Schiller adds, “I quite agree that the Humanistic view needs a volume and not a series of articles to expound
pragmatism. “I myself have only used the term to indicate a method of carrying on abstract
discussion. The serious meaning of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete difference to
some one which its being true will make. . . . All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that
truths should have practical consequences.” As against this narrow definition, James calls
attention and consents to Schiller’s wider version, Humanism, wherein “the truth of any
statement consists in the consequences, and particularly in there being good consequences.”
In essence, the broader version still makes use of the narrow one as its method. James goes on to
note that Schiller’s views (as expressed in Personal Idealism and elsewhere) are solely his own.
In much the same way it is with “Dewey and his school (who never use the word pragmatism).”
And with both it is the case that he agree generally with their contentions, but has never drawn
out the implications found in their respective works.

James then goes on to note that Schiller and Dewey have been subject to hostility in
recent months, though none so close at present as the “elaborate indictment” of Mr. Bradley. Of
which, he states:

Mr. Bradley in particular can be taken care of by Mr. Schiller. He repeatedly confesses
himself unable to comprehend Schiller’s views, he evidently has not sought to do so
sympathetically, and I deeply regret to say that his laborious article throws, for my mind,
absolutely no useful light upon the subject. It seems to me on the whole an ignoratio elenchi [ignoring the argument], and I feel free to disregard it altogether.

In my opinion it needs discussion to bring out what it means” (Kenna, “I. Ten,” 321). The date listed by
Kenna on the letter is the 6th, but James states that he is replying to a letter of the 16th. It should also be added here,
but will be discussed later, that this essay appears in James’s 1909 collection, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to
Pragmatism.

196 James, “Humanism,” 457.
198 James, “Humanism,” 458.
James would rather open up a free discussion of the subject. And he again returns to the similarities found in Schiller and Dewey, in their leading to what he terms “the humanistic state of mind.” Such a habit of mind carries with it the inventions of the past even as it pushes towards the events of the future. And with inclusion comes toil, as “we struggle to work in new nouns and adjectives while altering as little as possible the old.” That such an openness should be adopted by so many is countered by the challenge it poses to those holding the older views. What, then, be their response? If it is a relapse into the accepted, that provides no answer. If it a response that “anything goes,” it is they who attach the merely to make their case of straw. That the absolutist should as passionately argue their case as against the humanist only goes farther in proving one of the latter’s points: the truth is what we make it when we need to show its value; “the temper which a saying may comport is an extra-logical matter.”

In a move that swings most directly towards Bradley, James then takes on the question of what “correspondence” means. As he states, “it is not self-evident that the sole business of our mind with realities should be to copy them. . . . Why may not thought’s mission be to increase and elevate, rather than simply to imitate and reduplicate, existence?” Taking the standard of comparison necessary in appraising a world of experience, the inferential leap is made that the world of experience must be compared to something outside itself. Yet is there any warrant for this move beyond experience? Humanism supplies an answer, no, and a reason: there is an additive component to “making” reality as well as a suggesting of fixity within the same. To

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199 James, “Humanism,” 460.

200 James, “Humanism,” 462.

201 James, “Humanism,” 466.

“discover” things implies additions to the content of the world, to what James calls “the world of fact.” But these discoveries, working pragmatically, extend rather than deduct from that world; “they copy nothing that pre-existed, yet they agree with what pre-existed, fit it, amplify it, relate and connect it, build it out.” Absolutism would have it the other way round: it is out there, to be brought to bear in here. Which leads James to make a candid admission: “The denial of such a Notion by Humanism lies probably at the root of most of the dislike which it incurs.”

Following James in the very same October issue of Mind, Schiller offers his defense and his opinion. He takes the direct references in “Truth and Practice” as a sign “that the long-dominant sect of Absolutists are at last arousing themselves to face the new movement which is promising to supercede their doctrines.” But he has regrets. Schiller regrets, first, that his comments that “the minds of ‘great authorities’ grow less elastic and less hospitable to new ideas” was taken as an insult; and, second, his opposition of the old with a new view which is made for “men of action, the ‘strong and virile,’ was taken as a further insult.” But clearing the air is not to dismiss settling a score. For while Schiller admits that his views are in need to criticism (even as the “double-barrelled” name Personal Idealism should be set aside for “Humanism”), he pointedly remarks that “to sling ink is not necessarily to throw light, and the mere airing of infuriated prejudices is likely to end only in the discovery of a mares’ nest.” As such, he lights into his response to Bradley.

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203 James, “Humanism,” 473.
204 James, “Humanism,” 471-2.
207 Schiller, “In,” 527.
The first issue is one raised also by James: Bradley admits of not understanding what he then sets out to refute. The result being that what Bradley “had refuted with much superfluous subtlety was a mass of misconceptions which he had developed into misrepresentations, and finally distorted into absurdities entirely irrelevant to my position.” And this misapprehension grows, as guide or guard, qualified appendages to move about. Bradley is discussing that which is merely practical, as opposed to that which might be cater to our entire nature, all to the effect of suggesting:

He has, e.g., wholly ignored or dismissed as unessential such cardinal doctrines as the presence of limiting conditions in each experiment and the voluntary acceptance of a basis taken as factual, the distinction of postulate and axiom, the selection and verification of postulates by subsequent experience, and the psychological and social criticism which inevitably purifies the passing wishes of the individual.

The result of these gaps is that Bradley can never quite explain the relation of “truths” to “facts,” here the former are determined by the latter, there the latter approximate the former.

The second point concerns the relation of “truth”—Schiller accepts the slide into “theory” as equivalent—to “practice.” Schiller is wont to stand alongside Bradley and agree that “every possible side of our life is practical”; he grows perplexed, though, when he is told “yet in a sense they are also not practical.” If the Intellectualist is going to again qualify his terms to the point that the original statement has no force, then Schiller is willing to step in supply the Humanist retort: “there can be no independence of theory (except in popular language) and no opposition to practice, because theory is an outgrowth of practice and incapable of ‘independent’

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208 Schiller, “In,” 528.
209 Schiller, “In,” 529.
210 Schiller, “In,” 530-1.
211 Schiller, “In,” 532.
existence.” This relates to another point that James addressed: pragmatism and humanism as “anything goes” approaches to philosophy; more specifically, Bradley raising it as “insane” and then acting as though it were relevant. Schiller deals with this in summary fashion:

In any case Mr. Bradley could do his followers a great service if, instead of so crudely travestying my argument, he supplied them with an alternative to it, and showed them how to deal with the empirical existence of the infinite variety in ends and ideas. Or does he not admit this to constitute a scientific problem, and is it merely in “appearance” that our views diverge?  

What Schiller asks for is an alternative, not an old argument against Protagoras that even Plato dismissed as effete.

He lastly responds to two of Bradley’s tactical maneuvers. He quickly dismisses Bradley’s concept of Will—both the depersonalized “process of passage from idea to existence” and “the self-realization of an idea”—as either pragmatist in intent or a version of flawed deism whereby that which creates is separate from that which is created. But Schiller will linger on some of Bradley’s strategic devices. Instead of reference to the Absolute, he provides discussions of God. This strikes Schiller as unfortunate, as he “always respected Mr. Bradley’s philosophy for never seeking to curry favor with the ‘orthodox’ by playing on ambiguous phrases.” But, if it is religion Bradley wants, it behooves him not to label those who do not share in his views doctrinaire infidels. And, if Bradley continues to dress his theory up in religion, it would play into the very issues James discussed in Varieties of Religious Experience and the Will to Believe; namely, that science and religion are of value to the extent that they

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212 Schiller, “In,” 533.
213 Schiller, “In,” 536.
214 Schiller, “In,” 536.
215 Schiller, “In,” 538.
show their value. But Schiller isn’t sure of the conversion. He is confused as to why Bradley backtracks from his new found faith and into the “ineffable mystery of life” in his conclusion.

Schiller concludes by noting that Bradley is, in any case, slowly moving towards a recognition of the other side of things—the problems of infinity, the potential in pluralism—even if he still views these as challenges to overcome, rather than arguments to which he should respond. And Schiller takes this also as a sign of progress, forecasting a time “when the stronghold of the Absolute is once declared an open town, no longer cramped within walls, nor serving as a strait prison for the human soul . . . refurbished and extended for those to dwell in whose tastes its habitations please.” Bradley may be right that philosophy is hard. But praise be the day when the “‘dignity’ of philosophy” need not hide behind “unintelligibilities and aimless world-play.”

Within a month, Schiller has already written to James to explain himself. James replies that Schiller is “superabounding in truth, acuteness, humor, gall, wrath—I think delusions about the state of the enemy’s mind.” He urges Schiller to recognize that, for humanism to take hold, a more systematic discussion must occur. Until then, it seems likely that some responses are simply “innocent” misunderstandings, “although that is a thesis that requires some Will to Believe.”

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216 Schiller, “In,” 539.
217 Schiller, “In,” 540.
218 Schiller, “In,” 540-1.
219 Schiller, “In,” 541.
220 Schiller, “In,” 542.
221 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 2 September 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
letter. Schiller, for his part, has “a bad conscience” about the whole situation. He suggests that, given his trip to Switzerland, he simply did not have the time to make the requested revisions (Schiller notes that Stout sent him, without comment, the postcard that James’s had sent attempting to put off the article).

But Schiller also thinks the paper stands as a tactic suited to the situation. He hopes Bradley will shift his tone now that Schiller has “called his bluff” as regards the “overbearing brutality” of Bradley’s standard argumentative approach. Additionally, “as far as Engl. is concerned it is too early to be merely conciliatory, + that a decisive defeat of B. will have an inspiring effect on our weaker-kneed followers.” That leaves James to “influence the sincere but puzzled waverers, who seem to exist on your side.” Taken together “they may succeed where neither w.d have done separately.”

James, for his part, wants to be done with the whole matter. Seeing that Schiller is “still harping on my unfortunate attempt at diverting your lightening from Bradley’s head,” James comments, “would that I had never raised my voice on the matter or given you all this peek!” But Schiller is still not done clearing the air, or a path, for humanism.

222 F. C. S. Schiller, Engadin, to William James, 2 September 1904 [Draft], Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

223 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 14 September 1904, Box One, Folder Fifteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

224 Nor are others in defending or explaining it. In response to Schiller’s humanism, and as against McTaggart’s 1896 Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, Sidgwick enters the fray. See Alfred Sidgwick, “Applied Axioms,” Mind 14, no. 53 (January 1905): 42-57. In the same month, James yet again makes a plea to Schiller for elaboration and clarification, noting: “I am sure that I don’t half understand our own position yet, need to apply it to many cases + details first, etc.” He also suggests the effects of Schiller’s style: “There can be no question that your jibes on the one hand, and a certain old fashioned or Germanic polemic Schwulst on the other . . . have alienated many readers whose taste is hypersensitive . . . their taste doesn’t quite relish your jokes, and some of your other ways.” As a consequence, James urges: “One of them is mentioning my name too often—cut that out! Another is being obsessed too much by F.H.B. Cut him out also!” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 23 January 1905, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). James also is intent on trying to bridge the widening divide.
In an April 1905 piece in *Mind*, “The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism,’” Schiller wishes “to give reasons for partially dissenting from the delimitations which Prof. James has proposed.” For it was through James that Schiller was brought to Peirce, and through both that he sought a way to connect the former’s insight, into “the willingness to believe,” into accord with the latter’s suggestion of consequence, by way of generalizing both with the question: “What must be the nature of mind in which practical consequences can become determinants of truth?” For, in the most restricted sense, Schiller feels that the Peircian definition amounts to nothing more than a truism. In the wider sense, an unmodified Jamesian account remains too general. Thus, Schiller provides seven different definitions of wider pragmatism, which are “equivalent” and can be generalized thus: “our attributions of ‘truth’ and our recognitions of ‘reality’ are established and verified by their working, and sooner or later brought to the definite test of experiments which succeed or fail, i.e., give or deny satisfaction to some human interest, and are valued accordingly.” Moreover, this wider definition admits of many philosophical systems and, save for “all but a few metaphysical phrases which have no genuine sphere of application,” “must gradually win its way to universal acceptance.”

Schiller’s definition of humanism faces, similar to Peirce’s narrow definition of pragmatism, the charge of being a truism. But, given the nature of philosophy, it is in fact

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226 Schiller, “The Definition,” 236.


228 Schiller, “The Definition,” 238.
contested whether or not “the nature of man must be presupposed in all man’s reasonings.”

And it is through humanism that pragmatism can be regarded “as merely a special application of a principle which he applies all around, to ethics, aesthetics and theology, as well as to the theory of knowledge.” Thus it is possible “to accept pragmatism as an epistemological method and analysis, without expanding it into a general philosophical principle.” And though Schiller suggests humanism may form then a “metaphysic,” he goes on to suggest it would not be metaphysical in the classic sense:

There is no reason, therefore, to anticipate that the adoption of Humanism (or even Pragmatism) will at all diminish the number and variety of systems. Personally, indeed, it would seem to me to argue abysmal conceit and stupendous ignorance of the history of thought to cherish the delusion that of all philosophies one’s own alone was destined to win general acceptance ipsissimis verbis [the self same words], or even to be reflected, undimmed and unmodified, in any second soul.

That similarities exist, as between him and James, is a given. That marked distinctions exist, as between him and Dewey, should also be noted. In both cases, they should be heralded. “For

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229 Schiller, “The Definition,” 238.
230 Schiller, “The Definition,” 239.
231 Schiller, “The Definition,” 239.
233 These similarities seem, in large part, to be the cause of a January 1905 article “Prof. James on ‘Humanism and Truth.’” In that article, the Oxford logician and Platonist Horace William Brindley Joseph (1867-1943) takes the same tactic as Bradley in not referencing, but discussing, the relation of James’s pragmatism to Schiller’s humanism. His conclusion is that James, in advancing a case against intellectualism, supports an irrational view of philosophy (H. W. B. Joseph, “Prof. James on ‘Humanism and Truth.’” Mind 14, no. 53 [January 1905]: 28-41). James, for his part, responds in the April issue that his views coincide with those of Schiller and Dewey. More to the point, he complains that Joseph allows purportedly obvious abstractions get in the way of serious discussion: “Mr. Joseph, faithful to the habits of his party, makes no attempt at characterizing them, but assumes that their nature is self-evident to all” (William James, “Humanism and Truth Once More,” Mind 14, no. 4 [April 1905]: 197).
really, if there is to be healthy progress in philosophy, we must have more tolerance, less party-
spirit, no cast-iron creeds, and (in a word) no more absolutism.” 234

Here, then, we arrive at the end of what was a long, and by turns conflicted, series of
years. The calling out of Bradley carried with it the calling on of his friend and mentor

234 Schiller, “The Definition,” 240. In this same issue, Knox took aim at Bradley in “Mr. Bradley’s
‘Absolute Criterion.’” Challenging Bradley’s notion that what we take to be reality is mere “appearance” (an issue
Bradley promoted extensively since his 1893 work Appearance and Reality), Knox also makes reference to
Sidgwick’s earlier “Applied Axioms” article (Howard Vincente Knox, “Mr. Bradley’s ‘Absolute Criterion,’” Mind
14, no. 54 [April 1905]: 210-20; see especially 213). Sidgwick also responds, in part to a query from Bradley, as
regards his article in January and his opinion of Schiller’s Humanism. He states, “I am glad to note that Mr. Bradley
still thinks it better not to mention what the phrases were which led him to fancy that I regard Mr. Schiller’s view as
assured beyond the need of further improvement . . . the question remains how far the pragmatist method will
continue to fulfil its promise. Will it help us not only to grow tired of empty oracles, but also to make other
movements forward?” (Alfred Sidgwick, “Mr. Bradley’s Dilemma,” Mind 14, no. 54 [April 1905]: 294).

In addition, Schiller’s essay spurred on a rather sustained discussion with the Scottish Absolute Idealist
Alfred Edward Taylor (1869-1945). In July of the same year, Schiller writes “Empiricism and the Absolute.” In
this article Schiller praises Taylor for attempting to move beyond the standard forms of Oxford intellectualism. But
he argues that Taylor’s attempt (in his 1903 Elements of Metaphysics) “to convey nutritious novelties from an alien
system into his own has only inflicted damage on both” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Empiricism and the Absolute,” Mind 14,
no. 55 [July 1905]: 355). In January of 1906, Taylor replies that Schiller, in his April 1905 article, is not “justified
in censuring many of his brother-students whether on the score of the amount of controversial matter to be found in
their productions or on that of the tone and temper in which their controversies are conducted” (A. E. Taylor, “Truth
and Consequences,” Mind 15, no. 57 [January 1906]: 86). And then, in an extended postscript, Taylor responds to
Schiller’s July 1905 article. James, answering a query from Schiller as regards Taylor’s character, has this to say:
Taylor is “companionable enough, apparently, but hasn’t eaten of the fruit of the tree of life, a logic hopper and
ratiocinator, as I imagine, to the end, with no perceptions of his own. . . . I hope you won’t spare him. In spite of his
marvelous power of straight clear writing, he seems to me really very crude” [note that Taylor was being considered
to succeed James at Harvard] (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 January 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). In a follow-up letter, James goes on to praise the “cleverness” of Taylor’s writing and urges
Schiller to be as receptive as possible to what Taylor offers in the way of debate. But, he continues, “his way of
taking your meaning is simply silly. . . . I confess that I am staggered by the tight little contracted character of the
rationalist mind” (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 30 January 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).

Schiller goes on to respond to Taylor’s complaints generally (“The Ambiguity of Truth,” Mind 15, no. 58
[April 1906]: 161-76) and specifically (“Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism,” Mind 15, no. 59 [July 1906]: 375-
90). James responds regarding the July 1906 article: “Your article in Mind on Taylor is, I think, the most
completely effective thing you’ve written and is the first thing to put Absolutism [inserted: “squarely”] on the
defensive, as the little subjective fad wh. it is really is, in spite of its aristocratic lineage” (William James,
Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 July 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The Thought, 1, 824).
James.\textsuperscript{235} This drawing of lines was not mere theatrics. Knox humorously sums up his and
Schiller’s heightened sense of the gains at stake in the upcoming years:

Here lies F. H. Bradley –
I don’t mean that he’s dead!
I merely refer
To the things he has said.\textsuperscript{236}

Bradley, like Jowett and Green before him, was the cagey promoter of a sham philosophy. And
it was the goal of Schiller to expose the worldview he promoted for the “dialectical nightmare”
that it was. But this extreme sense of duty also suggests the differences in Schiller’s and James’s
temperaments. James, courting a variety of views, saw their gradual confluence in the methods
of pragmatism. Schiller, castigating those that would dismiss the call, refashioned pragmatism’s
range so as to snatch it from the maw of Absolute Idealists. And for the gain of James’s consent
under the awning of humanism, Schiller was dealt the deficit of his mentor’s unheeded warnings:
the continued insistence by critics that he did damage to the very cause he so acutely felt it his
job to proclaim. While he will not go it alone, Schiller will nonetheless preach pragmatism’s
truth in the manners of his humanism.

\textsuperscript{235} It should be added that it also initiated a series of exchanges with Charles S. Peirce. On 30 April 1904,
Schiller admits that his views of Peirce’s pragmatism were based on James’s explanation of them and, given
Peirce’s clarification, “need modification.” Peirce responds in detail in a May 12\textsuperscript{th} draft, and notes as regards James
and him: “. . . he seems to have great difficulty in understanding me, as I have in understanding his picturesque
language, which is not altogether unlike his father’s. Somewhere (if my memory does not betray my confidence) he
not long ago spoke of himself and me as taking a view opposed to yours, and I was much tempted to write to him
that your notion of pragmatism was more in harmony with mine than his. Perhaps I did so write.” But in
subsequent letters he did send, dated the 13\textsuperscript{th} and the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, his opinion is different. In the first, he exclaims: “I have
no hope of finding you nearer to me because you want your philosophy to be the quintessence of the whole man, I
want no such thing.” In the second, he is a bite more direct: “I, for my part, am no humanist. I am one of the
despised followers of Duns Scotus. . . I share, for instance, his decided taste for terms of art which are not likely to
be taken up by the mob of belle-lettrists. Candied science offends my esthetic sense. I like it nude and severe.”
(Frederick J. Down Scott, “Peirce and Schiller and Their Correspondence,” \textit{Journal of the History of Philosophy} 11,
no. 3 [July 1973]: 369; 371; 372; 378). Scott goes on to suggest that the draft comment is the truest, insofar as
Peirce seems closer to Schiller in overall philosophical temperament. Interested readers are directed to the article so
as to make their own determination.

\textsuperscript{236} Howard Vincentè Knox, Grindelwald, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 April 1905, Correspondence, Box One, F.
C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
Our only hope of understanding knowledge, our only chance of keeping philosophy alive . . .
lies in going back from Plato to Protagoras, and ceasing to misunderstand
the great teacher who discovered the Measure of man’s Universe.¹

Schiller faces, in the next four years, a range of options. Heeding the call of James, he can give
over his time to building on the promises of humanism. He can retreat from active duty and seek
to substantiate his claim that pragmatism can be remade as an epistemic template for the whole
of human action. Or he can take the wounds of past battles as a sign of engagement, as an
indication that the cause is for now and the treatise is for later. Schiller chooses neither path
exclusively, though he errs in consequence towards the latter. His work can be seen as an
idiosyncratic sort of pragmatic sense-making: utilizing historical pivot points as verification for
the present needs, as predictive of future results. In attempting to substantiate the promises of
humanism, Schiller installs an exemplar. He then places venerable historical figures into a stage
play meant to mirror the current battle between humanism and Absolute Idealism. In attempting
to substantiate the merits of the cause, he recycles the past debates as proof of the cause’s current
preeminence. And in attempting to silence those who have questioned his agenda, he returns
again and again to the key points which he has already elaborated upon.

In his chief works from this period, particularly Studies in Humanism (1907) and Plato or
Protagoras? (1908), there is a clear sense that Schiller is now at home within the subjective
swells of Jamesian pragmatism. But it is still clear that the grooves in Schiller’s humanism trace
back even farther, to the empirical forms of philosophy that T. H. Green had once labeled

“sophistry.” In Green’s time, as in Schiller’s, this empirical and compartmentalized view of reality—a particular sort of faculty psychology by which the world must bend, incrementally, to the wills of those who postulate—strikes some as paradoxically anti-intellectual. By being so submerged within the interior walls of (the) mind, there is a danger that the postulates never admit of contact with (their) social counterparts. But there are social counterparts for Schiller’s philosophy. In James, Schiller continues to find a source of inspiration. In Bradley, he still finds the rot of an Idealism trading in abstractions. And there are real consequences to Schiller’s postulates. In ignoring James’s pleas that he goes gently and systematically about his work, he fails to arouse empathy equal to his soon-to-be-departed mentor. In continually broad-siding Bradley, he comes to be seen as a shrill outlier in academic philosophy. The results, both good and bad, are thus: the fate of Schiller’s humanism is more and more a measure of his choices.

4.1 MEASURED STUDIES: PROTAGORAS AND THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HUMANISM

Schiller’s first task in January 1906 is to clear the argumentative ground by setting the historical stage. In “Plato and His Predecessors,” a sprawling review of five different books related to Greek philosophy, Schiller meditates on how history accords favor even as it provides only for selection. As he states, “all historical accounts, moreover, rest more or less on selection and combination of the available material, emphasizing what seem to the historian the essential features; and these often have to be supplemented by a conjectural filling-up of the gaps in our evidence.”2 In discussing Austrian philosopher Theodor Gomperz (and his 1905 Greek

Schiller notes—and here we see clearly the sense-making approach that Schiller is undertaking—how he seeks to point “out the contributions to the making of science that we owe to the Greek thinkers, and aptly to illumine their doctrines by modern scientific analogues.” Schiller goes so far as to assert that traces of Darwin’s views of evolution can be found in fragments of Anaximander, though suggests this type of “scientific promise” begins “to languish shortly after Aristotle had codified knowledge and apparently provided the sciences with a firm platform for more extensive operations.” And is at the hands of the Sophists that this decline was partially meted out: “The natural acuteness of the Greek mind and the great practical value of forensic and political speechifying no doubt tended to an over-development of dialectical habits of thought.” But this is only a partial explanation. The decline was also a result of the changing political climate. Therein, the Sophists came to be regarded as specialists in “bad reasoning” and their successes in “logic along with rhetoric and grammar” were ignored.

Indeed, Schiller regards the Sophists as having been potential allies of the scientists and having a powerful influence in the works of Protagoras, in that his oft-quoted maxim points to “both the subjective and objective factor in human knowledge and the problem of their connexion.” The cause of distortion, then, is too willingly accepting Plato’s stacked deck approach to Protagoras. By raising dialectic to a science, Plato necessarily excised the components of Protagoras’ maxim that accord well with “instructive observations and

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3 Schiller, “Plato,” 64.
4 Schiller, “Plato,” 73.
5 Schiller, “Plato,” 74.
6 Schiller, “Plato,” 75.
7 Schiller, “Plato,” 76.
experiments,” with “the problems and methods of scientific measurement.” And this, then, is the problem of interpretation, of taking at face value what can only be captured in snippets. How are we to know what Plato meant divorced of context? Why are we to assume a historical continuity where no such roadmap exists? What we know, then, is that our use of Protagoras or Plato is conditioned on what we are trained to think of (what we think we know of) them. And statements regarding history are thus assertions to be defended, in a word, rhetorically. But these are meta-assertions in so far as Plato sought to lay out his theory of the Ideal over many years and through various versions; Schiller traces it from the “early theory” of “True Being” to the “later theory” where “Ideas are models for sensible phenomena.” That Schiller should suggest a pragmatic route to redress these changes is obvious given his disposition(s). That Plato, as interpreted, would never have consented to such a choice is understandable given his.

This review has a profound impact on James, as a matter of tactical argument and as a justification for the continued use of humanism. In February James exclaims: “The Plato article is grossartig [akin to “great”], one of the boldest, straightest and of course most impressive as being ‘scholarly,’ things that you have ever written. So simple! I find it most instructive.” As much as Schiller relies on the continued support of James, James continues to find guidance through Schiller as well. But it is what comes next that shows how James’s temperament to seek

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8 Schiller, “Plato,” 78.

9 Schiller, “Plato,” 82; 86.

10 William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 February 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. A few days later, and James is still praising the review: “Your article on Plato chimes still through my head. Keep on diversifying yourself in this way and you will lead everything!” (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 February 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).
confluence is matched, and enhanced, by Schiller’s attempts to wage a larger, humanistic
campaign:

I must be very damp powder, slow to burn, and I must be terribly respectful of other
people, for I confess that it is only after reading there [sic] things [James’s is referring to
recent journal articles by Dewey and the Italian Giovanni Papini] (in spite of all you have
written to the same effect, and in spite of your tone of announcing judgment to a sinful
world) that I seem to have grasped the full import for life and regeneration, the great
perspective of the program, and the renovating character for all things of Humanism; and
the outwornness as of a scarecrow’s garments simulating life by flapping in the wind of
nightfall, of all intellectualism, and the blandness and deadness of all who worship
intellectualist idols, the Royces and the Taylors, and worse than all, their followers, who
with no inward excuse of nature, (being too unoriginal really to prefer anything) just
blunder on to the wrong scent, when it is so easy to catch the right one, and then Truth!¹¹

It pays to linger on the complexity of this letter. James grants humanism it’s due. But he grants
it on the basis of arguments offered by persons other than Schiller.¹² The question is why? Why,
after previously granting Schiller’s term of art the right of way would it be Papini and Dewey
that convince James? I believe the answer relates to the differences in James’s and Schiller’s
temperaments. Simply put, Schiller’s style of argument works against him even as regards
James. James still seeks to build a program while Schiller, as against James’s advice, seeks to
destroy the opposition. But scorched earth rarely yields growth. In Dewey and Papini, James
sees the flowering of pragmatism upon the ground Schiller razes. This is for now a qualified

¹¹ William James, Del Monte, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 April 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see
also James, Letters, 2, 245.

¹² James clearly was treated, even by critics, as the meeting point for most (if not all) approaches to
pragmatism. As a consequence, he became more and more aware of the stylistically dry American Dewey, the fiery
Italian Papini (1881-1956), and a host of others. There also existed, in James’s larger communion with views of
varied sorts, his discussion with the opposing side. James had a sympathetic temperament when it came to a
colleague and friend like Josiah Royce, the clever Alfred Edward Taylor, and even the sworn enemy of his friend,
Bradley.
victory; but it is a victory. As much as Schiller is paying the price for his insistence, he is
gaining ground in moving the man who inspired him to his side.13

Schiller, for his part, is flush with the confidence that humanism will continue to
command attention and confute the opposition. In 1907, he releases Studies in Humanism. Like

13 It is perhaps this renewed respect for humanism that leads James to observe with limited comment the
debates between John E. Russell and Schiller. Russell is a rarity in that, in later years, he moved towards
pragmatism. In October 1906, however, he wishes to debate the pragmatic assessment of, ahem, being lost in the
woods; more simply put, that pragmatists cannot will themselves to not be lost, that their ideas must correspond in
some degree with reality if their ideas are to prove useful in experience (John E. Russell, “The Pragmatist’s Meaning
praises Russell for using a concrete example, but still asserts that being ‘lost’ is a matter of perception related to
purpose (F. C. S. Schiller, “A Pragmatic Babe in the Woods,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 [17 January 1907]: 42-
4). Russell publishes a paper two weeks later in which he elaborates on his basic complaint, commenting that
“pragmatism saves one from doubt only if he happens to be already or happens to become a pragmatist. Pragmatism
is unable to make one a pragmatist, because its conception of truth is one which makes it impossible to produce a
reasoned conviction that this doctrine is true” (John E. Russell, “Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic
Doubt,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 [31 January 1907]: 61). In April, Schiller replies that Russell’s “pathetic
appeal,” while inching ever closer to pragmatism, still remains at a distance so long as he holds to the claim that
9 [25 April 1907]: 235-8). In the same issue, Russell replies that doubt is to be preferred to a philosophical method
which removes doubt for only those that wish or want to be pragmatists (John E. Russell, “A Reply to Dr. Schiller,”
Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 9 [25 April 1907]: 238-43). It is at this point that James enters into the fray, albeit in
an indirect way. In May, he submits a series of letters between him and Russell that he feels “sharpen . . . the most
prevalent stumbling block” as regards criticisms of pragmatism: the concept of truth. The letters are a polite
exchange of diverging opinions that culminate in no conversion. They do, however, reinforce the fundamental
differences: intellectualists claim against pragmatists that the truth is fixed whereas pragmatists claim against
intellectualists that the meaning of an object is testable and revisable (William James; John E. Russell, “Controversy
About Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 11 [23 May 1907]: 289; 295-6).

Then, in what must be a philosophic rarity, Schiller/Russell/Schiller reply to each other all in the same
August number of the journal. Schiller fears that Russell’s willingness to refuse a cure is more pertinently an
instance of subjectively choosing to ignore the problem of an objective stance on reality (F. C. S. Schiller,
“Pragmatism Versus Skepticism,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18 [29 August 1907]: 482-7). Russell would rather
conclude that his doubt, as to pragmatism’s wares, as to the meanings that it attaches to concepts such as “truth” and
“verification,” is as much a matter of faith as is pragmatism’s suggestions to the contrary (John E. Russell, “A Last
Word to Dr. Schiller,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18 [29 August 1907]: 487-90). Schiller concludes by pleading
sincerity in attempting to establish a rapport with an “intellectualist,” one who remains unaware of how much will is
involved in doubting the benefits of pragmatism (F. C. S. Schiller, “Ultima Ratio?” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18
[29 August 1907]: 490-4).

James waits until the inkwells are spent before commenting in private to Schiller. But then he only has
cursory comments as regards so much pluming. In August he exclaims: “Poor R. is honest and sincere but
absolutely stone-blind to everything, after the he had seen that the object thought must be “as” the object. No use!
but some readers will take it in. Keep it up!” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 31 August 1907, Box
One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections,
Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). Two months later he ventures a cause for the doubt: “Russell must be
about 70, a dear good honest man, dry in teaching, and utterly stupid as to what you and I mean. Hopeless!”
(William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 October 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).
its predecessor, the book provides previously published but expanded essays: October 1904’s “In Defence of Humanism” has been reworked as “The Truth and Mr. Bradley”; April 1905’s “The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism’” has been expanded to include arguments that Schiller had raised in the same month in the Italian journal Leonardo; January 1906’s “Plato and His Predecessors” has been revised and renamed “From Plato to Protagoras.” And, like

14 It is clear that both Knox, whom Schiller singles out for praise in reviewing the work, and James viewed advanced copies of the book. James, in particular, is pleased to see that Schiller is using his exemplar-via-critic wisely: “I’m particularly rejoiced that Plato is to occupy so central a position. . . . The most effective way of turning the tables on our particular adversary [sic] is to fling Plato’s Theatetus right into their teeth [Humanism contains a new chapter, entitled “The Papyri of Philonous,” providing two dialogues related to Protagoras]! They treat us now as little street boys and ignoramuses, of which I indeed am one, but they can treat you as such no longer . . .” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 August 1907, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). Knox, for his part, respond after having received the published work: “I am promising myself the treat of reading it through solidly, but so far have only been able to dip into it. These dips, however, decidedly give me the impression that the essays read even better in book form than in proof. I really think you have written a great book. . . . It is most exhilarating to be living in this time of philosophical regeneration, and assuredly the as-yet-unregenerated are falling on evil days . . .” (Howard Vincentè Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 10 February 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

As a means of comparison it is interesting to note how Dewey makes use of Protagoras and Plato. First published a year after Studies in Humanism, Dewey’s and Tufts’s Ethics references both persons in its introduction. Note the term use:

Conduct or the moral life has two obvious aspects. On the one hand it is a life of purpose. It implies thought and feeling, ideals and motives, valuation and choice. These are processes satisfied by psychological methods. On the other hand, conduct has its outward side. It has relations to nature, and especially to human society. As Protagoras put it, in mythical form, the gods gave men a sense of justice and of reverence, in order to enable them to unite for mutual preservation.

(John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, revised ed. [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908; reprint, 1932], 4). What is interesting is that the “mythical form” Dewey and Tufts reference is provided by Plato in his Protagoras. And in later discussions within Ethics (notably, “The Moral Development of the Greeks”) it is this emphasis on Plato that remains, primarily as a counterpart to Dewey’s and Tufts’s views of ethics.

Later discussions, by Dewey alone, continue the use of Plato as Dewey’s and thus pragmatism’s foil. But, in contrast to Schiller, they contain few references to Protagoras. They do, however, draw out strikingly similar implications to the ones that Schiller was advancing as early as 1902’s “Useless Knowledge.” In Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Dewey makes this observation: “. . . is it not possible to say of Aristotle’s Forms just what he said of Plato’s Ideas? What are they, these Forms and Essences which so profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and theology, save the objects of ordinary experience with their blemishes removed, their imperfections eliminated, their lacks rounded out, their suggestions and hints fulfilled?” (John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged ed. [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1948], 105-6). Or compare Dewey’s 1929 Gifford Lectures, published as The Quest for Certainty, particularly the chapter on “The Play of Ideas,” with Schiller’s 1896 “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a Priori.” Therein, Dewey notes: “Mathematical conceptions as expressions of pure thought have also seemed to provide the open gateway to a realm of essence that is independent of existence . . . the Euclidean geometry was undoubtedly the pattern for the development of a formally rational logic; it was also a marked factor in leading Plato to his doctrine of a world of supersensible and superphysical ideal objects” (John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty
Humanism. Schiller apologizes for any lack of systemization, noting “that the conditions under which I had to work greatly hamper and delay the composition of a continuous treatise.” But, in explaining the scope of the book, it seems that Schiller remains cognizant of the qualified endorsement that James had offered the year previous. He notes that the book’s topic proper, Truth, and the range of its interests—particularly, freedom and religion—have been necessitated by two concomitant developments. The first is the “converging novelties” of writers such as Peirce, Knox, Sidgwick, Dewey, and James. The second is chiefly that which gave rise to such novelties: Absolutism. As a result of “the intensity of intellectualist prejudices” these novel thinkers have been compelled “to attack in self-defence, to press on our counter-statements in order to engage the enemy along his whole front.” The nature of the Humanistic cause seems paradoxically, in Schiller’s view, to originate in the critic’s perceptions of the cause they criticize.

As before, the popular press takes notice. The Westminster Gazette labels Schiller “a Modern Protagoras.” It argues that the philosophical content of the volume “may prove to be one of the most interesting and important in the history of British thought.” The Sheffield Daily Telegraph is just as convinced of its worth, no less of the author’s merit. “Dr. Schiller is clear in statement, admirable in illustration, witty in style, and bold in attack.” The attack of

[New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960], 140-1). The overall point is thus: Dewey carried forth the implications of the Sophistical line plumbed by Schiller without need for continued reference to the particular Sophist.


16 Schiller, Studies, ix-x.

17 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Westminster Gazette, 10 August 1907, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. A clue as to the enthusiasm of the review may be found in the marginalia. The only comment is this: “H. Sturt.” Sturt, to recall, is the editor of the volume Personal Idealism. One good turn, as they say, deserves another.
long held assumptions “in the hands of this master of expression, [are] extremely stimulating and enjoyable.” 18 The Nation is less enthusiastic. It complains that the present volume is unlikely to make converts to the pragmatic cause. Further, some of the essays contained therein “are unworthy of so permanent a place.” But, criticisms aside, it concludes that Schiller’s “suggestive” arguments will engage “readers of every variety or philosophical opinion.” 19 The Edinburgh Evening Post is less than guarded in its stylistic criticisms. It urges the writer to “walk somewhat more warily,” lest “those who combat dogmatism” become that which they attack. 20 The Baptist Times and Freeman, while full well in accord with Schiller’s views, helps to explain the varied receptions of Schiller’s position:

He may at times be arbitrary, capricious and sublimely self-confident, but he is racy, brilliant, full of dash and go, breaking on us, as we pursue the even tenour of our thought, with sallies of wit and flashes of humour, so that to those who will take the trouble to master subjects which necessarily demand rigorous and prolonged thought the perusal of his essays will be a source, not of instruction only, but of delight. 21

18 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 7 March 1907, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Here is an interesting case of Schiller responding, and not responding, to the praise of this work. There is an asterisk next to, and underlining of, the comments regarding his clear statements and witty style. Later on, the reviewer also expresses, and Schiller again underlines, “the keen enjoyment” felt upon repeated readings. What is curious, given Schiller’s readiness to respond to the most minor of inconsistencies in negative reviews, is the phrase that immediately follows and stands without underlining: “. . . not lessened by the fact that we have not always been sure whether we understood what the writer really meant or not.”

19 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Nation, 9 May 1907, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

20 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Edinburgh Evening Post, 13 July 1907, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. At one point the reviewer makes the unfortunate comment that “we should have to study the essays to comprehend them in their entirety.” Schiller’s response: “What a hardship!”

21 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Baptist Times and Freeman, 15 March 1907, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Reception is a matter of perception. What for one is admirable is for the next unworthy. And the longer philosophical notices bear this perceptual divide out.

A. K. Roger’s June 1907 review in the *Journal of Philosophy* is equally focused on Schiller’s style and method. Though he tips his pen towards Schiller’s “suggestiveness” of the “fruitful and stimulating” power of pragmatism, he is inclined also to raise his brow: Schiller adopts “polemical mannerisms” and “can hardly be called sympathetic at any time towards his opponents,” all the while advancing “the genuine importance to the constitution of reality of our human action, and of the thinking which makes it possible and effective.” But in advancing this cause, Schiller raises questions as to the nature of pragmatism. Is it to be considered a metaphysic? If not, or perhaps because, Schiller “has so strong a leaning towards marking the psychological explanation all-inclusive,” he threatens to make it as such by implication. But of what value? Roger’s suggests that Schiller adopts a view more telling than might initially be presumed. On the one hand, Schiller treats metaphysics as “merely personal; one may amuse himself after this fashion if he sees fit, or, if he please, may eschew it altogether.” On the other, though, it may be the case “that Mr. Schiller’s previous disparagement of metaphysics may have been due to a sense of the slight practical value really attaching to the particular metaphysics which he individually affects.” So Schiller is caught in the bind of either advancing a metaphysic without knowing it, or of knowing that which he advances is of little

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23 Rogers, review, 330.

24 Rogers, review, 329-30.

25 Rogers, review, 333.
worth. For Roger’s part, either answer is suggestive of pragmatism’s defect: by putting aside a question of why it came to be, one is little satisfied in arguments about how to make it better.  

G. F. Stout’s review in the October 1907 Mind calls attention to the ambiguity inherent in Schiller’s project. His initial focus is on the distinctive quality of Schiller’s humanism; namely, “his view of the part played by subjective activity in the development of Knowledge.” As such, belief is constituted via both the factual and the fictional, not in the process of jettisoning the latter as one proceeds to more and more of the former. Such beliefs, if “considered in abstraction from subjective interest and activity, are all equally coherent or incoherent.” Context thus provides the arena in which what is true is derived from the degree to which it satisfies some need. But such a view of truth, in Schiller’s hand, carries with it both bias and ambiguity. The bias is “against all theories which seem to him irrelevant or hostile to the progressive satisfaction of human needs.” Without progression there is no way to test, to further refine, initial tendencies. But there is a concomitant vagueness in the relation of progress to reality. How, Stout asks, is it possible for “primary reality” to be at once, and as experienced,

26 Rogers, review, 334.

27 G. F. Stout, review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 16, no. 64 (October 1907): 579.

28 Stout, review, 580.

29 Stout notes that Schiller does supply qualifications. “The ’making of truth’ is a phrase which serves to give rhetorical emphasis to the distinctive features of Mr. Schiller’s theory as contrasted with opposing views.” One cannot simply say that what satisfies me in any context is that which is true for me. One must test their assumptions, revise their postulates, and admit that the facts of a situation will render “a decision between alternatives to be imposed on him instead of being made by him” (Stout, review, 582-3).

30 Stout, review, 583-4.
both true and false? Not finding a satisfactory answer to this question, Stocks argues that Schiller’s view might lead to blindered self-interest trafficking in the illusion of a social theory.  

In the Philosophical Review the following Spring, Henry Barker’s review initially focuses on Schiller’s style. He hazards an opinion regarding Schiller’s polemic approach to pragmatism and humanism:

Mr. Schiller’s method is largely controversial, and he can hardly be blamed for adopting what is, as he says, the natural method for the exponents of a new doctrine to use in bringing out the advantages of their doctrine over the old one. At the same time such a method has serious drawbacks; not the least serious of which is, that it leads to an undue exaggeration of the novelty of the new doctrine, and a corresponding failure to do justice to the real, and perhaps important, truth contained in the old.

Another potential blind spot in the controversial approach is that it not only downplays past theories, but that it also renders contemporary adversaries as if of straw; “Mr. Schiller’s ‘intellectualist’ seems to me quite as mythical as he would doubtless affirm Mr. Bradley’s pragmatist to be.” The resulting are salvos launched across the bows of largely unreal philosophical frigates.

But Barker also questions the theoretical implications borne on the lips of controversy. For, even if one takes Schiller at his word as regards the pragmatist’s and humanist’s dismissal

31 Stout, review, 585.

32 Stout also posits two causes of these defects: (1) Schiller—and this was a point brought up in the conclusion of Roger’s review of the same—assumes a restricted view of the concept of a priori. By so strenuously focusing on the future-tense elaboration and revision of postulates, he necessarily sidesteps the fact that the initial premise must have had some backing, even if it were flawed (Stout, review, 586); (2) Second, Schiller fails to provide an adequate explanation of “the practical application of his theory.” If a thing is true to the extent that it is workable, a serious defect encroaches on the sanctity of the self when in communion with others. For, if the same data, experienced by different people, imposes upon them different postulates derived from the same primary reality, a fissure appears in Schiller’s theory. “My interest in others becomes a veiled form of self-interest and my world becomes cold, dull, and heartless” (Stout, review, 586; 587).

33 Henry Barker, review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Philosophical Review 17, no. 3 (May 1908): 324.

34 Barker, review, 325.
of metaphysics, one cannot ignore the metaphysical problem that arises from those two fraternal camps. “Nothing, I think, could more clearly indicate Mr. Schiller’s failure to grasp the real meaning of the metaphysical problem which his theory of knowledge, like any other, has to answer, than the persistence with which he confuses reality with our knowledge of it.”35 For there is to Barker a clear distinction between what we know and how we know it, the fusing of the two being seemingly more aligned with the Intellectualists that Schiller despises than with the methods he espouses. Given the 1908 date of Barker’s criticism, he might be reading these criticisms back into Schiller’s Studies in Humanism. He might, in fact, be focusing on the latest arsenal of arguments by which Schiller, and others, tests Bradley’s views of reality.

4.2 ‘THE HEIGHT OF THE EMPRESS OF CHINA’: THE CRITICISMS OF PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM

In April 1907 Bradley returns to the pages of Mind with the article “On Truth and Copying.” It picks up where Schiller’s challenge for “no more absolutism” left off. In contrast to several of his earlier essays, this one puts forth a fairly concise argument: the act of copying is but an abstraction of “one aspect out of the concrete known whole”; “both truth and reality go beyond the perceived facts” which are but inferences as to the composition of that whole.”36 So how then to reconcile the relation of the true, the factual, and the real? The answer lies in the differences between what we take to be real, the perceived, and what is actually the truth, the ideal. Truth, as perceived, is not reality in that it is rendered defective, inferential, all the while

35 Barker, review, 329.

striving to become that which is the ideal form, the real. Thus the defect lies in what we take as factual. This defect in turn suggests the problem with a pragmatic approach to truth: it constricts both the true and the real within the realm of the individual and his satisfaction. But real truth must extend beyond the immediate; it must extend to encompass “the Universe and all reality.”

While the thesis of this essay is clear cut, his intended reader remains ambiguous. At first glance, this is seemingly directed to James. In a footnote, Bradley is found to be referencing his previous July 1904 article “On Truth and Practice.” And he pleads against the notion that that article be taken “as a statement of my view as to the ultimate nature of truth.” Then, in a section entitled “Note on page 168”—the page where he began discussing those theories which “subserve something else [other than ‘the Universe and all reality]”—he begins a four page discussion of the “points really or apparently at issue between Prof. James and myself.” They agree that truth does not consist in “mere practical results”; moreover, “that all truth has practical and again aesthetic consequences.” But they disagree as to the criterion for and range of truth. For Bradley, a “truth that makes no difference to truth . . . is therefore not true at all.” This truth-as-relates-to-truth equation most clearly demonstrates two components of Bradley’s philosophy: (1) the push to non-contradiction, and the resulting move toward (2) judgments as to truth in the intellectual/theoretical, as opposed to useful/practical realm.

Then Bradley makes an interesting concession: there is a prejudice that “tends everywhere to result in one-sided attempts at consistency.” Although this would initially appear

to be a qualification of his rule of non-contradiction, it works to more clearly divide the theoretical and practical. For he goes on to assert that, “unless ultimate theoretical truth itself may be inconsistent, it is better for practice not to identify our working ideas with ultimate truth.”\textsuperscript{41} But the question to be asked, again, is whether or not this is really addressed to James? In the pages that follow, Bradley engages in two interesting strategies which seem to suggest that he is speaking to James while addressing Schiller. First, he asks James to clarify key points in his previous article [“Humanism and Truth”]. But, second, Bradley suggests that James should be aware that he inspired attacks on his behalf. And it was those attacks—he labels them “periodical manifestoes” and “prophetic outcries”\textsuperscript{42}—which brought forth the criticism.

His critics are waiting to supply criticism in kind. And the difference in temperaments is highlighted in the comments from Knox and James. Knox notes that Schiller is planning a response to Bradley. But Knox goes on to comment that, as regards the difficulties with Bradley’s “correspondence” view of reality, he is sure Schiller will “rub that in.”\textsuperscript{43} Only a week later, and after having received suggestions from Schiller, Knox refers to Bradley as “a lying braggart.”\textsuperscript{44} James’s approach is much less strident, appealing to Schiller to let the whole matter alone:

You ask if what I am going to ‘reply’ to Bradley. But why need one reply to everything and everybody? B’s article is constructive rather than polemic, is evidently sincere, softens much of his old outline, is difficult to read, and ought, I should think, to be left to

\textsuperscript{43} Howard Vincentè Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 April 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
\textsuperscript{44} Howard Vincentè Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 April 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
its own destiny. . . . I confess I think that your goodium certainimis injures your influence. . . . I feel absolutely certain of the supercessive power of pragmato-humanism, if persuasively enough put forth. So let poor sick Bradley be, for Heaven’s sake!  

It would seem, in an odd case of transference, that Schiller takes James’s advice . . . and gives it to Knox! For it is Knox who replies to Schiller at the end of the month: “Many thanks for your suggestions re Bradley note. I . . . will probably adopt your suggestions as to softening down the actual wording of the note, though it is difficult to conceal one’s opinion of that shifty beggar.”

Knox’s reply takes up little more than a paragraph; but another is ready to supply a lengthy rejoinder to Bradley.

That interlocutor is John Dewey. And his July 1907 article, “Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas,” is, at least initially, polite. It purports to deal with Appearance and Reality (1893); but it makes clear references to the recent arguments by Bradley. Dewey counts Bradley as one of preeminent philosophers to have pushed forward the “disintegration of intellectualism of the epistemological type, and towards the substitution of a philosophy of experience.”

But once he has brightened philosophy’s room with courtesy, Dewey sets about darkening Bradley’s

45 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 19 April 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. The reason for this response is as likely to be James’s continued plea for understanding as it is his focus on another matter: the impending June 1907 publication of his Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. Though the book is based on Lowell Lectures (at Columbia University) in December 1906 and January 1907, the preface was being prepared at the time of James’s April letter to Schiller. That being said, only three days later James is found trying to assuage Bradley as regards his intentions: “Schiller writes me that he is ‘replying’ to you. ‘Why reply?’ say I, either of us, any more to each other? The world is wide enough for both types of formulation, and they are so difficult to transpose into each other’s key, their terms are so incongruent, that the gain isn’t worth the trouble” (Kenna, “I. Ten,” 324).

46 Howard Vincente Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

47 Indeed, Knox’s response is little more than a continued (from his April 1905 “Mr. Bradley’s ‘Absolute Criterion’”) insistence that Bradley explain where he has been shown to be wrong about the defects in Bradley’s theory (Howard Vincente Knox, “Some Remarks on a Recent Footnote by Mr. Bradley,” Mind 16, no. 63 [July 1907]: 475-6).

doorstep with criticism. He goes on to ask how it is that this same philosopher can also argue that the “philosophical conception of reality must be wholly based on an exclusively intellectual criterion.” The answer begs for a comparison. Bradley is to Dewey what Lotze was to Schiller. He exists as a midway point more negatively called “uncritical pragmatism,” but here described thus:

Mr. Bradley’s Absolute Experience, resting ultimately upon a rationalistic conception of the criterion of truth, is a temporary half-way house into which travelers from the territory of Kantian epistemology may temporarily turn aside in their journey towards the land of a philosophy of every-day experience.

This leads to all sorts of problems in the hostel (world) of Bradley. The first of which is the necessity of contradiction in forming a wedge between appearance and reality. But to create this chasm, Bradley must necessarily admit that our knowledge of reality is rife with contradictions. So what then is to judge the appearance from the reality if the former is defective? It is an Intellect, divorced from theory and out of reach of practice; “the unquestioned assumption of Mr. Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly separate activity (the ‘intellect alone’ which has become satisfied), that to say it has autonomy is that that it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with other activities.”

This isolation also accounts for another problem. Bradley’s theory cannot conceive of an ultimate criterion of use (what Dewey calls “operation”) that is really relative and instrumental. Here he raises a suggestion voiced earlier by Schiller: “it may be that the contradictions which,

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according to Mr. Bradley, inhere in thought, do not belong to its proper character . . . but are found because it has been looked at wrongly."\textsuperscript{54} Which is to suggest that what Bradley has called merely practical may turn out to be more theoretically robust than what he offers. But what if we turn to the matter of consistency, to that which is premised as making reality distinct from appearance? Here again, Dewey finds Bradley at a loss. For practical activity is often predicated upon “removing the undesirably inconsistent, and in securing fulfillment.”\textsuperscript{55} So it would seem to align with Bradley’s reality rather than his appearance. But what if the “practical man,” for his part, decides to deny any eternal notion of self-consistency? What effect would that have in him resolving his problem? Dewey’s humorous response is, in part, this: “I fail to see what difference this doubtless wholly amiable trait of reality has to do with what I am here and now concerned with. You might as well quote any other irrelevant fact, such as the height of the Empress of China.”\textsuperscript{56} Dewey ends by suggesting that application is the key to understanding truth. Because truth is seen in “those ideas which are actively employed in the mastery of new fields, in the organization of new materials. This is the essential difference between truth and dogma; between the living and the dead and the decaying.”\textsuperscript{57} But recall that

\textsuperscript{54} Dewey, “Reality,” 325-6. Voiced, but not referenced, as relating to Schiller. This would be less puzzling if not for other instances where, in making comments related to the recent debates, Dewey does make mention of persons involved in the discussion who were countering Bradley. In one case, Dewey discusses how Bradley demands that absolute reality be purged of any inconsistency. He mentions, \textit{not} Schiller or James, but Knox and Sidgwick (see Dewey, “Reality,” 324, n. 1).

\textsuperscript{55} Dewey, “Reality,” 327.

\textsuperscript{56} Dewey, “Reality,” 328. He goes on to discuss how this issue of irrelevance plays out in Bradley’s theory. As Dewey sees it, the most basic problem with Bradley’s theory is that it only goes so far in removing the “out there” temper that Intellectualism promoted. And, by being trapped on the theoretical outer reaches, Bradley can’t help but reflect back and refract into his theory a sense of truth as dislocated. But he then grafts these dislocated strands onto a theory which looks towards experience: “Just as to say an idea was true all the time is a way of saying \textit{in retrospect} that it has come out in a certain fashion, so to say that an idea is ‘eternally true’ is to indicate \textit{prospective} modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated. Its meaning, therefore, is strictly pragmatic” (Dewey, “Reality,” 339).

\textsuperscript{57} Dewey, “Reality,” 342.
Bradley’s is a half-way house, a stopping point, between the two. Not fully at home in either, it serves none of its wards well.

In the very same issue as Dewey, Schiller chooses to discuss “Mr. Bradley’s Theory of Truth.” He writes of what a “philosophic Rip Van Winkle” might make of Bradley’s last article:

He would find that all the positions taken up in Prof. James’s Will to Believe, which were almost universally execrated in 1897, were almost universally conceded in 1907... He might interpret many passages therein as meaning that Mr. Bradley was only waiting for Prof. James to give him a little encouragement and to disavow his disreputable entourage in order to capitulate gracefully and to declare that he himself had been a pragmatist, and even a humanist, all of his life, and had only dissembled his affection for those modes of thinking from deference to the sacred memory of Hegel. 58

As a member of said entourage, Schiller feels it best to make sense of this generous offering from Bradley, “to distinguish between appearance and reality.” 59

What follows is a cross-referencing cavalcade of contempt. 60 First, Schiller notes that Bradley “treats with scorn” the idea that truth copies reality, but grants ways in which truth might be said to correspond with it if taken “from a lower point of view.” 61 Schiller argues, however, that this concession is largely moot, as “the only ‘copying’ or ‘corresponding’ objected

59 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 402-3.
60 James and Knox continued to act the roles of critic and inciter all the way up to the article’s publication. In May, James complains, “It was so easy to let Bradley with his approximations and grumblings alone. So few people would find these last statements of his seductive enough to build them into their own thought. But you, for the pure pleasure of the operation, chase him up and down his windings, flog him into and out of his corners, stop him + cross reference him and counter on him, as if required to do so by your office... I don’t believe there are three persons living who will take it in with the pains required to estimate its value. B. himself will very likely not read it with any care. It is subtle and clear, like everything you write; but it is too minute” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 May 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also James, Letters 2, 280). Knox, in June, provides a different sort of interpretation: “I think you have shown that the over-wily serpent, B, has tied himself into an unholy knot. Whatever the absolutists may do, they cannot wriggle themselves out of the position of asserting both that ‘correspondence’ is impossible and that Human truth, in order to be truth at all, must correspond...” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 June 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
61 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 402.
to is that in which one of the terms claims to transcend human experience.”62 Second, Bradley clarifies his view of the Absolute as neither “philosophic God” or “all-absorbing, all-paralyzing metaphysical monster,” but rather “the perfectly harmless conception of a totality of fine mind.”63 But the process is still not finished. Schiller is wont to suggest that even if it is now a lower-case absolute, relegated as phrased to “finite” existence, there is a unity “still presupposed as pre-existent.”64 Third, he rejects naïve or intuitive realism “for the reason that it breaks down over the existence of Error.”65 On account of this admitted breakdown, Schiller remains silent. Fourth, Bradley puts forth what to Schiller is a truism amounting to “whatever is irrelevant to and interferes with the process of truthseeking’ must be suppressed.”66 From a humanist perspective, it is more a question of if such things are always irrelevant or, more still, what would occur if ever “truth-seeking is forwarded by them.”67 Finally, he once again reasserts that in the end truth has “practical and aesthetic consequences” and might be deemed in some sense true by working.68 To which Schiller replies that these arguments are only “grudgingly” concluded and not “admitted emphatically at the outset.”69

It seems that, for every qualification offered, Schiller finds a further qualification.

What’s more, Schiller notes that Bradley, when read against Bradley, commits himself to as

62 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 404.
63 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 402.
64 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 405.
65 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 402.
66 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 403.
67 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 405.
68 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 403.
69 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 405.
many frank admissions still against pragmatism. He still suggests that pragmatists view truth as
an “external means” in violation of the eternal, never clarifying what exactly external means;
alternately, Bradley suggests that they claim that truth, and knowledge, and reality are “external
to the one real end.”70 Both issues suggest, at least to Schiller, Bradley’s continued need to force
into dichotomies things properly explained in relation to each other and then, as need suits,
“claim the right of reducing them to each other.”71 More seriously, Bradley fails to entertain any
notion of verification, any notion of which severely undercuts: (1) referencing pragmatism’s
merely practical test, and (2) expanding it beyond proportion into a metaphysic only to burst its
purported hubris.72 All of which lead Schiller to conclude that, for all his concession, Bradley
still hovers in the airy realm of the Absolute. This makes it far less shocking when Bradley
retreats back into a depersonalized space where absolute (meaning, abstract) truth corresponds
with reality.73 But it in no way explains how all of this is reconciled with Bradley’s concessions
to a world below abstract (meaning, absolute) truth, how those ideas that work and are useful are
related to an ideal which “manifestly transcends our experience.”74 To brush such problems
aside as a “difficulty” is not enough. And, for this member of James’s entourage, it only lessens
his will to believe in Bradley’s truth.75

70 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 405.
71 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 406.
72 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 406.
74 Schiller, “Mr. Bradley,” 408.
75 Still others are still not sure that these sorts of answers justify pragmatism as against Absolute Idealism.
One of these, surprisingly, is Perry. In this same month, he also disputes the pragmatist notion of truth, albeit for
different reasons than Bradley. Perry states, “That the truth when sought and found is satisfying, no will be disposed
deny; but to say that the satisfaction element is identical with the truth element is another matter. And it would
seem to me that the frank empiricism of the pragmatist here provides a disproof of his conclusion” (Ralph Barton
James had not been standing idly by. While Dewey and Schiller were busy tackling Bradly, James too had been attempting to shore up the cause against renewed attack. Beginning in March and continuing through August 1907, James engages in a quarrel with James Bissett Pratt in the *Journal of Philosophy* regarding the pragmatist conception of truth; specifically, regarding the notion of verification. 76 James also releases *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* in June 1907. The book is based on a series of lectures that James delivered at the end of 1906 at the Lowell Institute in Boston and start of 1907 at Columbia University in New York. James sets it up as a defense of the “tough-minded” pragmatist way of thinking as against the “tender-minded” thinking ascribed to rationalistic systems. This confrontational arch allows James easy, and largely generous, references to Schiller. He treats the desire to “spank” Schiller as a suggestion of the divide between the pragmatic and rationalistic tempers of mind, of the desire for a world of experience as against the retreat into abstractions. 77 He also comes to Schiller’s defense, explaining that Schiller’s call for a world that is “plastic” is in accord with the pragmatic, as against rationalistic view, that reality “is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.” 78

76 For details of these communications, see William James, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” *Journal of Philosophy* 4, no. 6 [14 March 1907]: 141-55; James Bissett Pratt, “Truth and Its Verification,” *Journal of Philosophy* 4, no. 12 [6 June 1907]: 320-4; and William James, “Professor Pratt on Truth,” *Journal of Philosophy* 4, no. 17 [15 August 1907]: 464-7). It should be noted, as a matter of cross-reference, that James’s initial article is what lead to the series of letters between him and J. Russell in the same year. Pratt (1875-1944), a former student of James turned realist, went on to publish a critical 1909 work entitled *What is Pragmatism?* Interested readers are directed to a concise overview of his life and work in: Andrew Christie, introduction to *What is Pragmatism?* (1909): James B. Pratt & Responses and Reviews, Early Critics of Pragmatism Series, ed. John R. Shook, vol. 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii-xxvi.


78 James, “Lecture VII: Pragmatism and Humanism,” *Pragmatism*, 257. There is one instance, however, that suggests a regulative, and critical, qualification to Schiller’s defense of pragmatism. This interpretation is in line with the previous analysis (particular in Chapter Three) where it was argued that James’s psychology and empiricism were fused together so as to move forward pre-existing philosophical positions Schiller developed pre-Cornell. Tucked into the preface, and absent any contextual reference, James states: “To avoid one
The year to this point has seen a flurry of activity. Several debates with eager opponents and the release of two books meant to spur on the cause. The resulting mood is initially one of optimism for both James and Schiller. James champions the two line approach—the one first posited by Schiller years earlier—commenting: “I’m glad you relish my book so well. You go on playing the Boreas [the Greek wind god who brought the cold north air], I shedding the sunbeams, and between us we’ll get the cloak of the philosophic traveler! . . . All our positions, real time, a growing world, asserted magisterially, and the beast of intellectualism killed absolutely dead!”79 But, as of October, in response to the negative reviews Schiller Studies has received, James is less sanguine. “I think, Schiller, that such reviews, of which you can’t complain on the score of manners, show the advantage of more conciliatory tactics. They are absolutely uninstructive, and add to the confusion lamentably, but would justify themselves, if asked to, by alleging the need of castigating your swagger and ‘side.”80

misunderstanding, at least, let me say that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth as ‘radical empiricism.’ The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist” (James, Pragmatism, ix). Even then, it is a mild rebuke amongst otherwise supportive (even protective) discussions of Schiller.

79 William James, Chocorua, to F. C. S. Schiller, 13 May 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also James, Letters, 2, 290.

80 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 October 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. Schiller, for his part, seems more willing to play the role Knox sees for him. In a letter to Thaw, he sums up this attitude thus: “But my fears foresee that for the next twenty years will have to be spent still in warring down the broken but obstinate hosts of Intellectualism, who will dispute every inch of the way + will have to be driven out of every hole + corner of the whole field of philosophy. It may be of course that by continuing to pile more shows of absurdity onto the burden of the camel of intellectualism we (and a good many more have been prepared + placed in position then since ‘Studies’ were written), we may suddenly succeed in breaking its back, but on the whole this seems less likely. ‘La ne elle garde meurt, elle ne se rend pas’ [variation of “the guard dies, it does not surrender”], will be true as usual, + we shall have to look to the new generation, + exceptional people such as you!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Florence Thaw, 31 August 1907, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
And, as 1908 draws closer, the tough-minded James is treated to a dose of the tonic offered to Schiller. The first reviews of James’s *Pragmatism* are out in the periodic literature. They are a mixed lot. Schiller tempers the blows by leading the way. While quibbling with specific points, he nonetheless confesses that “the readers of Mind will hardly expect from the present reviewer anything else than whole-hearted appreciation of one who is avowedly his leader.”

In November, Charles Montague Bakewell (1867-1957), former student at Harvard and then professor of philosophy at Yale, is less appreciative. He questions the value, indeed consistency, of the pragmatic method. And he lobes at James a criticism James had placed upon Schiller: “I think it lacks body. It needs the support of some more systematic philosophy than that which is here but roughly sketched.”

In January 1908, McTaggart criticizes James’s writing, suggesting that “though always picturesque, [it] is far from lucid.” Then, after asserting that James holds that Truth “is a quality of nothing but beliefs”—while ignoring wholesale the issue of verification which had been emphasized as recently as his 1907 debate with Pratt—he accuses James of asserting his conclusions without meeting the arguments of the other side.

In the same month, J. R. Angell initially offers a respite from the criticism. As a former student of James, recent past president of the American Psychological Association, and then professor of

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81 F. C. S. Schiller, review of *Pragmatism*, by William James, *Mind* 16, no. 64 (October 1907): 598.

82 Charles M. Bakewell, review of *Pragmatism*, by William James, *Philosophical Review* 16, no. 6 (November 1907): 634. It is instructive that he chastises James for propping up “the Schiller-Dewey view”—which Bakewell never defines—“as if the message were well out and were a matter of common notoriety” (Bakewell, review, 624, n. 1). This criticism is interesting considering James’s own suggestion, in a preface to the book under review. James suggests that readers look to: (1) Dewey’s *Studies in Logical Theory* for American currents of pragmatism; and (2) then adds, “probably the best statements to begin with, however, are F. C. S. Schiller’s in his ‘Studies in Humanism.’” So far so good. But James also began this reading list with a warning: “Much futile controversy might have been avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we got our message fairly out” (James, *Pragmatism*, viii; vii).

83 John Ellis McTaggart, review of *Pragmatism*, by William James, *Mind* 17, no. 65 (January 1908): 104; 105.
psychology at the University of Chicago, Angell is clearly conversant with the gradations of pragmatism. He notes that one is hard pressed to find a recent “intellectual movement which has so stimulated the philosophic blood in the veins of English and American philosophers.” But, like Bakewell, Angell questions the youthful insistence of this new philosophy. He hopes that, with time, it will give up those traits—“impatience, precipitancy, and a certain raw enthusiasm—which dash its “good sense” against the frustrations of theoretical “paradox.”84

Nor do the general commentaries provide cause for celebration. Also in early 1908, Arthur Lovejoy (1873-1962) publishes an article which purports “to discriminate all the more important doctrines going under the name pragmatism which can be shown to be not only distinct, but also logically independent inter se.”85 Of these, ten through thirteen are relevant to this discussion:86

10 That ‘axioms are postulates’ as valid as any human judgment can ever be, resulting in the (a) negative judgment that no truth is necessary, and (b) positive judgment that our presuppositions are true to the extent that we use them towards future ends;
11 That “axioms are necessities” by which voluntary choice is fixed;
12 The “equal legitimacy of postulates” both (a) physical and (b) psychical; and
13 That objects are what we propose them to be.

Lovejoy places these within two thematic schemes: ten through twelve are “pragmatist theories of knowledge” whereas thirteen represents “the pragmatist theory of meaning.”87

84 James Rowland Angell, review of Pragmatism, by William James, International Journal of Ethics 18, no. 2 (January 1908): 226; 235. Angell, for his part, also supplies a plausible rationale for two potentially related tendencies: (1) the different strategic approaches of Schiller and James, and (2) why persons such as Bakewell ignored James’s suggestions (i.e., pragmatism being a work in progress): “Professor James is far less successful as a wrecker than he is as a builder. His criticisms of rationalism . . . are couched in a slap-dash fashion, whch makes most diverting reading, but in the reviewer’s judgment they are often quite wide of the mark” (Angell, review, 229, n. 1).


He cautions that thirteen—a variation of the argument that “something cannot be lost unless a person perceives of something which must be found”—blurs the lines between truth and reality.\(^88\) Lovejoy suggests that some of Schiller’s writing run the risk of this interpretation. But he sees more value in the other view attributable to Schiller, ten, and suggests that it has “real epistemological bearing.” Then, in a rare instance of privileging Schiller over James, Lovejoy adds that ten is more “thoroughgoing” than the view, eleven, he attributes to James.\(^89\) And Lovejoy also offers both men some advice. Twelve, which can be seen as a blending of Schiller’s and James’s views in ten and eleven, might provide the best form by which pragmatism can advance:

In its more cautious and critical forms, the argument from the practical inevitableness of certain scientific to the legitimacy of certain ethico-religious postulates must be regarded as a distinct type of pragmatist epistemology, and perhaps the one which—if pragmatism out to have practical bearing—best deserves the name.\(^90\)

In light of his criticism, Lovejoy’s parting argument is that what pragmatism needs most is “clarification of its formulas and a discrimination of certain sound and important ideas.”\(^91\)

In the continuing battle to gain ground, outsiders still look in and, from far different and conflicting perspectives, offer criticisms dressed as advice. James now knows what it feels like to be treated like Schiller.

In 1906, James needed Dewey and Papini to see the light. But Schiller’s example fires James’s ire at the start of 1908. James takes the advice as no complimentary call for mere

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\(^88\) Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 36.

\(^89\) Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 34-5.

\(^90\) Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 36.

clarification. On 17 January, he exclaims: “I find myself at last growing impatient with the critics of ‘Pragm’, and beginning to share your temper towards the reigning Oxford influences.” He then gets specific, “McT., e.g. in this months Mind means to be perfectly annihilating, but some of his interpretations wd. be discreditable to my terrier dog. Ditto Lovejoy in the J. of P. I’m getting tired of being treated as 1/2 idiot, 1/2 scoundrel . . .”92 James seems possessed by the polemic spirit of Schiller, whereas only months previous he was waffling between endorsing “conciliatory” practices and suggesting the merits of a two-pronged approach. He continues in a letter a week later: “I agree with you in full that our enemies of the absolutist school deserve neither respect nor mercy. Their stupidity is only equaled by their dishonesty.”93 If the call is for more argument, James is clear as to how he will conduct it. “Don’t think, my dear Schiller, that I don’t see as if in a blaze of light, the all embracing scope of your humanism, and how it sucks my pragmatism up into itself. I doubt I shall trouble myself to write anything more about

92 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 January 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

93 An article a month later only increases one’s sense of why James was so frustrated with the parsing spirit of the critics of pragmatism and humanism. The Idealist A. R. Gifford provides an example of what happens when one interprets two positions in such a way as to only do an injustice to both. His primary complaint is that ύλη, as a “limitative concept,” cannot be construed as either before or after an “initial act of the cognitive construction of truth.” He then discusses how the “potentiality” arguments found in Schiller’s works come into conflict with the objective aspects of a Jamesean approach. Against this conflict, Gifford advances an argument favoring the determinate nature of meaning. To do so, however, he uses the objective components of James against Schiller. The result is that James’s objectivity is recast as providing the determinate points necessitated in the absolute advance to an ideal; Schiller’s view is posited as the antithesis, indeterminate potentiality, which is self-contradictory and chaotic. Where either James or Schiller would have held to these interpretations of them is the most obvious question. Another is what Gifford would offer as an alternative to the pragmatism he finds so “futile” until it junka “a form imposed by a cognitive agent” (A. R. Gifford, “The Pragmatic YΛΗ of Mr. Schiller,” Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 4 [February 1908]: 102; 104).

In May, Horace Kallen (1882-1974) provides a response that takes aim at both Lovejoy and Gifford. Kallen’s thesis is expected—Gifford’s argument basically comes down to a misreading of a pluralist position through a monist one—though several of his comments are worth noting. He turns the Lovejoy argument back upon the idealists, saying, “Mr. Gifford appears to be a non-pragmatist, but, one would gather, one of the thirteen varieties of absolutist or monist.” Kallen also makes note of the impositions of Gifford’s term use: “to speak of an indeterminate item is to impute to Dr. Schiller a meaning that can not be found in any of his utterances.” He also chastises Gifford for assuming that ύλη must be merely “psychical,” saying this is only probable on “the presuppositions of the homeopathic philosophy, which destroys all difference in the one arch-hooligan, the absolute” (Horace M. Kallen, “The Pragmatic Notion of ύλη,” Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 11 [May 1908]: 294; 296; 297).
pragm[...]. If anything more about truth, it will be on the wider humanistic lines.”⁹⁴ But it is a narrower view of James’s work which will occupy Schiller’s pen.

In April 1908, James sails for Europe to deliver a series of eight Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College, Oxford, in the following month (these lectures will be published in 1909 as A Pluralistic Universe). At the same time, Bradley publishes two essays in the same issue of Mind. In the first, “On Memory and Judgment,” he wants to “throw light on the ultimate value of memory as a test of truth.”⁹⁵ A central feature of this complex essay is the relation of memory to doubt, and doubt as it relates to judgment; phrased simply, memory must be taken as secondary in making judgments lest he who judges should lapse into doubt. Bradley’s thinking on this issue becomes clear when he applies this thesis to the nature of “memory-judgments.” These still operate as present judgment, though of past judgments in memory, and remain independent of the influence of memory.⁹⁶ To be clear, Bradley is not here asserting that a present judgment is infallible. It should be followed up, and modified, by subsequent judgments. Until that point, however, it is treated as infallible. Doubt in judgment can only be involved in instances where that doubt belongs to the process of a judgment of “some wider ideal whole.”⁹⁷ For a whole judgment must maintain its independence, its character as “an ideal determination of reality.”⁹⁸ This ideal feature of true judgments relates to Bradley’s continued insistence on the divide between the practical and the theoretical. While practical judgments are subject to

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⁹⁴ William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 26 Jan 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.


transient psychical complexities, the theoretical are not. A true judgment, as an ideal, “is unchanged however much places and times alter.”

Bradley begins his second article by noting that he has been of late reading the works of Messrs. James and Dewey. In an instance of both appealing for understanding and pleading ignorance of what he has written, Bradley then goes on to state: “I may mention here that Dr. Schiller’s unceasing manifestoes have for some time past failed to attract my attention. In what follows I am concerned therefore solely with Profs. Dewey and James.” As regards latter, Bradley asserts “that Prof. James’s Pragmatism is essentially ambiguous, and that he throughout is unconsciously led to take advantage of its ambiguity. It can at discretion be preached as a new Gospel which is to bring light into the world, or recommended as that old teaching of common sense which few but fools have rejected.” In response to criticism, James cannot offer anything “beyond one-sided prejudices, and a blind appeal to theoretical consistency, and an uncritical faith in the ultimate reality of some undiscussed Law of Contradiction.” Instead of these flaccid appeals, Bradley offers this option:

His alternative, I submit, is to develop his theory of first principles. Assuredly I am not alone in the desire that he would turn his back for a time on sporadic articles and on popular lectures, with their incoherence and half-heartedness and more or less plausible ambiguities, and would work in the way in which a man who seriously aims at a new philosophy is condemned to work, and with a result which I at least feel sure would repay his honor.


Like Bakewell and Lovejoy before him, Bradley has provided James with a bit of his own advice.

As regards Dewey, he is no less opinionated. Dewey may focus on the practical over the theoretical, insist that “theory is only an instrument.” But he “has no right to teach that something is only a means, unless one is prepared to state the end to which it conduces and by which it is measured.” Against this, Bradley posits that “theory implies a theoretical want and its satisfaction” and, absent this, Dewey’s “entire argument from origin appears to me to be worthless.” Bradley can agree with a judgment being true based on its results, but note where those results are placed: “the truth of an idea is inseparable from its theoretical results.” Here again, then, arises Bradley’s distinction of the practical from the theoretical, or more recently, the psychical from the true. For though there is a “general tendency” to regard the true idea as “the idea which works best even externally,” one cannot as a result “arrive at the ultimate knowledge of the main tendency of things.” Is it any wonder then that Bradley should end by placing his burdens upon Dewey: “Pragmatism is true, if at all, because it can successfully deal with all ultimate issues.” Or is there anything more to the fact of a footnote, referencing James though in the discussion mainly of Dewey, which states: “This point [the distinction between the actual and the possible or future] has been dealt with by me many years ago. I have ventured to remark that the uncritical identification of the real and the possible is a leading characteristic of English

empiricism. I would now venture in addition to invite the attention of Prof. James to this point.”

James, true to his word, is done dealing with Bradley in the pages of journals. But Schiller is more than willing to take up these two articles in the July 1908 Mind. And he finds it odd that Bradley should hold forth on pragmatism, yet hold back in directly addressing him. Noting that his credentials suggest his relevance, he nonetheless agrees that “in philosophy, as elsewhere, personalities do not always harmonize. Prof. James seems to find discussion with Mr. Bradley as little to his taste as Mr. Bradley does discussion with him.” Further, Schiller takes Bradley on his word that “he has long ceased reading anything I write—ever since 1902, judging from the internal evidence,” documenting at least nine charges that Bradley has never directly answered. Be that as it may, Schiller delights in the exclusion. For he can, in a seeming reference to the “Useless Knowledge” essay of years past, now “think of Mr. Bradley as an influence like Plato or Aristotle, no longer subject to human frailty and impassive to mere human criticism. One can write so much more freely.”

Schiller begins by asking three question about Bradley: (1) has he always been a pragmatist, (2) is he now a pragmatist, or (3) is he becoming a pragmatist? The first can be dropped without comment, as the decade of discussion suggests it to be false. The second question stands about the same. But, as regards the third, there are conflicting reports within the selfsame document, “Memory and Judgment.” As Schiller notes:

110 F. C. S. Schiller, “Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist?” Mind 17, no. 67 (July 1908): 371.
For in controversy writers often say both more and less than they mean. Nor is it a serious objection to this course that Mr. Bradley has taken pain to assure us was written four or five years ago (p. 153 n.). If so, it must have been composed just about the same time as his famous caricature of humanism [“On Truth and Practice”] in N.S. No., 51, in which he professed to be quite unable to see the point of the new doctrines. It is significant, therefore, that he should have withheld it from publication then, and doubly so that he should propound it now.  

What do its contents reveal? In support of his fledgling pragmatism, Bradley now: (1) discusses psychological and psychical issues germane to both pragmatism and humanism, (2) further distances himself from the abstraction of the Absolute, (3) admits of interest as it relates to judgment, and (4) even suggests that satisfaction is of some relation to truth. In refutation of the new Bradley, though, are several other items. While he does downplay the Absolute in practice, “the absoluteness of Truth is maintained in all its theoretic rigor.”

But it a shadow of its former self, reduced to the moment of judgment. If this is all that remains of Bradley’s theoretic realm, “the infallibility becomes irresistibly comic, when it is such a little one, so overweighted with its name, so ludicrously ephemeral.” And note what actually happens when one carries out Bradley’s argument. First, a statement is treated as true. But, second, that truth is then treated by Bradley to the test of reflection upon its satisfaction. This places Bradley in a bind. “If this be taken strictly, it identifies ‘truth’ with validity. For it implies that there is no ‘truth’ until there has been ‘reflection.’” The truth of the statement (1) is abstracted from any actual context, whereas the test (2) is treated as grounded in experience. So where would that leave one tempted by a Bradleian state of mind? Forever doubting. If it is

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113 Schiller, “Is,” 372.
115 Schiller, “Is,” 373.
recalled that Bradley took memory to work “generally” in experience, that leads towards the second interpretation of truth. But if one seeks ultimate truth, memory fails us in that it cannot lead to that which is infallible. This suggests to Schiller “that the skeptical ‘moment’ in Mr. Bradley had been gaining at the expense of the absolutistic, and prepares his readers for the astounding licence of his ‘practical’ creed.”

Schiller next turns to Bradley’s arguments as to why pragmatism is ambiguous. He finds Bradley in a cautious yet boastful mood, “careful as ever to avoid contesting the primary affirmations of Pragmatism, and eager as ever to content that if there is any truth in Pragmatism, he has said it all years ago.” Schiller notes that many of Bradley’s current comments are, at worst, irrelevant, and, at best, suggestive of continued misunderstanding. The former are best seen in light of Bradley’s curiosity as to the relation of pragmatism to ethics and aesthetics. Schiller answers simply: there is none; “the mystery is to understand why any one should think that the adoption of a pragmatic theory of knowledge should alter his tastes and affect any man’s enjoyment of aesthetic and ethical values.” The latter are more varied, though the difference between his and the pragmatic use of theory is telling. Bradley’s interpretation suggests abstraction, “a belief in a purely theoretic, independent and useless knowledge, which is conceived to be ‘higher’ than the useful variety, and can be easily made to glide over into an assertion of a transcendent truth.” Set against this is a pragmatic definition of theory as psychical and biological, the act of knowing as it applies to interests of the knower.

118 Schiller, “Is,” 376.
120 Schiller, “Is,” 377.
121 Schiller, “Is,” 379.
The problem that arises for Bradley is trying to move the pragmatic into accord with the abstraction. “Mr. Bradley seems to think that even though the cognitive functions must be admitted to have arisen out of practical necessities, they may yet have become ‘independent’. How, he never explains, and nothing would conduce more to making intellectualism intelligible that that some one should undertake to fill up this gap.”\(^\text{122}\) But the irrelevant and the misconceived are both indicative of Bradley’s problem in changing his stripes:

Mr. Bradley, after a long course of privateering under the Absolute’s Flag, at last hoists the Jolly Roger, and avows himself a sceptic. The ‘theoretic truth’ which is unattainable by man is retained simply and solely in order to discredit theoretically the ‘practical creed’ men are forced to live by. And as it is assumed that the latter is hopelessly inconsistent, we are further told it does not matter how blatantly contradictory are the ideas we choose to live by. Any old nonsense will do—with a sardonic sneer at religion. Thus the doctrine is not only (1) skeptical but also (2) intellectually demoralizing.\(^\text{123}\)

So Bradley is isolated, stuck in a bind of his own making. In junking the Absolute, he none the less needs its abstractions to posit a truth. In grasping at pragmatism, he can manage the mere practices of those consigned to appearance. But, in moving to scepticism, there is not, and need not be, any appearance of resolution.\(^\text{124}\)

One senses, at this juncture, that Schiller is moving forward with the tactics he first endorsed in 1903 and expanded upon in 1906. Having gained James’s agreement on the

\(^{122}\) Schiller, “Is,” 379-80.

\(^{123}\) Schiller, “Is,” 381-2.

\(^{124}\) Knox offers these observations on the article: “The only fault I have to find is that you treat B’s art. on “Memory + Judgment” too seriously! However, I don’t suppose anyone except Sidgwick + myself will be very likely to make just that objection so the objection is not objective. But I also must say that even B has seldom, to my knowledge, written worse piffle (?) than in this art. The whole blessed thing, read in one way, is abject truisim; and when taken as disputable is the silliest nonsense. It is always the worst kind of nonsense which wears the wooly fleece of truisim : for it despair of gaining entrance on its own merits. The unwary, seeing the thing in its true aspect, say, How True! And when they glimpse the mis-shapen form beneath, they cry, How Wonderful! And since to utter things that are both wonderful and true is to be a genius, why, there you have a philosophical reputation all complete. . . .” (Howard Vincentë Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 July (?) 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
overarching term humanism, Schiller moves on to expand its range while challenging pragmatism’s critics. And now, with even James’s acknowledging that Schiller’s tactics have their place, Schiller is ready to redouble his efforts on both counts. But one also senses James’s retreat to the background with Knox’s energetic and indulgent emergence as the young supporter to the older Schiller. James continues to offers conflicting advice. But his notable increase in frustration suggests he is tiring of the “academic” battle and the tactics of “sunbeams” and “lightning.” Knox, over twenty years Schiller’s junior, has both a positive and negative effect on Schiller. On the one hand, Knox urges him to push through the project while continuing to amplify its merits. On the other, this endorsement plays into some of Schiller’s worst habits of exposition. In the end, however, it is the specter of loss that casts its pale over Schiller’s latest attempts to gain his way.

4.3 CONJURING UP PROTAGORAS, SETTING UPON BRADLEY: THE HISTORICAL RANGE OF HUMANISM

On the heels of his recent engagement with Bradley, Schiller chooses to amplify the range of humanism by returning to the exemplar he had been discussing as early as 1902, Protagoras. And, in a variation on recent squabbles, the players are historical even as the implications are clearly contemporary. On 15 March 1907 Schiller delivers a lecture to the Oxford Philological Society. An expanded version of this lecture, entitled Plato or Protagoras?, is then published in

125 The use of Protagoras as the humanistic stake in the idealistic heart is discussed in Chapter Three; see F. C. S. Schiller, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism,” Mind 11, no. 42 (April 1902): 196-215. But the first real use of Protagoras as an exemplar occurs in Schiller’s review “Plato and His Predecessors” (Quarterly Review, January 1906) and its subsequent republication in Studies as “From Plato to Protagoras” (1907). It was in discussing this book earlier in this chapter that attention was drawn, in a footnote reference, to Dewey’s comparative use of the sophists generally and Protagoras particularly.
pamphlet form in early 1908. The work reads as an example of textual criticism. But there, lurking in his explication of what the time-honored *Theaetetus* actually suggests, we catch a glimpse into the reasons James’s felt as recently as 1907 that this exemplar was well-suited to be flung into the faces of their critics.\(^{126}\) And we also see to what a large extent this archetype is meant only to serve as Schiller in the guise of antiquity. In laying bear Protagoras, Schiller comes to suggest more about himself.

The preface to this work is an interesting example of Schiller asserting one thing and arguing another. He suggests that the essay poses a primarily “literary question” though it seeks to develop “some interesting and novel issues of both a literary and of a philosophic character.”\(^{127}\) Next, Schiller makes what seems to be a rather straightforward statement of thesis, though he again shifts back to the philosophical import of the discussion:

> For the philosophical significance of the *Theaetetus* has been very strangely misconstrued. It contains no tenable account of knowledge. It contains no refutation of Humanism. It refutes nothing but an extreme, and probably exaggerated or misapprehended, form of sensationalism. Nothing of all this has, apparently, been perceived.\(^{128}\)

He uses these statements, placing Protagoras in the seat of humanism, to then level an accusation at Theoretic Reason placed in the guise of Plato. What’s more, he makes an interesting qualification so as to indulge a rather large generalization: “Whether or not, therefore, it is possible to exhume from it the lost teachings of Protagoras, it is clear that in the study of Plato’s

\(^{126}\) Recall that James, in anticipation of the release of Studies, said: “The most effective way of turning the tables on our particular adversarys [sic] is to fling Plato’s *Theaetetus* right into their teeth! They treat us now as little street boys and ignoramuses, of which I indeed am one, but they can treat you as such no longer . . .” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 August 1907). And James’s enthusiasm for the project is not lessened once it is released. He comments that the Protagoras pamphlet “ought to clinch the nails in the absolutist coffin” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 March 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).


\(^{128}\) Schiller, *Plato*, 5.
great dialogues, and particularly in the *Theaetetus*, lies the master key to the understanding of the whole intellectualist position in philosophy.”\(^{129}\) The work is, thus, literary and philosophical. It is a trusted account of Plato but only an incomplete picture of Protagoras in the mouth of Socrates. It offers, in short, a literary salvo against a philosophic position, taking the former as an Idealist and the latter as humanism’s touchstone.

Schiller sees fifth century Greece as a hotbed of philosophical discoveries and as the site of the first sustained clash between the intellectualist and humanist traditions. The first group represents “a learned caste whose academic spirit is always largely occupied with ritual observances for giving his due (and not infrequently a good deal more) to the Demon of Pedantry”; the second group reacts against this trend in realizing “that he is the Spectator of all, that the whole world’s infinite complexity exists in relation to him.”\(^{130}\) But what is known of second is largely diffused through the warping lens of the first. The Protagoras and Socrates we get are the ones that Plato intends. But Schiller’s treatment of Plato seems equally intentional. He dismisses the “conventional view” that the Protagoras Speech is a wholly fabricated exercise meant to either (1) “represent current developments of Protagoreanism made by his disciples” or (2) “to embody his own reflections on the problem of putting a reasonable interpretation on an obscure dictum.”\(^{131}\)

In their place, Schiller puts forth an alternative: “It credits Plato with an honest desire to state his opponent’s case and assumes merely that he has not fully grasped an alien point of view for the appreciation of which his whole type of mind unfitted him, and which even so he has

\(^{130}\) Schiller, *Plato*, 7.
\(^{131}\) Schiller, *Plato*, 9.
grasped much better than the generality of intellectualists have done down to the present day.” 132

Reference to the preface is here again essential. The alternative once again pushes beyond the dialogues proper to jab at current forms of intellectualism. But more telling is the extent to which Schiller is willing to suggest a revision to his initial qualification. Here, Plato is taken to have an accurate understanding of Protagoras’s works, advancing by his refutation both the merits of humanism and the problems of intellectualist interpretation thereupon. The literary device of begging the question, of the extent to which we can trust our knowledge of Protagoras based on Plato, even the further suggestion that our understanding of him is subject to the “one-sided” uses of Plato, is put to the side . . . all in the space of only five pages. Reframed as such, Schiller concludes that the Protagoras Speech provides a surprising novelty: an accurate defense of Protagoras’s teachings found in the misinterpretation of them voiced by Socrates. Further, it contains “the solution of the problem with which Plato wrestles vainly in the same dialogue, that of Truth and Error.” 133

Schiller suggests the conventional interpretation is flawed on at least two counts. It is flawed in that it creates for Protagoras followers he didn’t have. It also distorts the historical timeline so as to obscure an important fact: as Aristotle would come to contend with his master Plato, so too would Plato have had to grapple with the contentions of Socrates. 134 Schiller then sets about explaining how we should take Plato’s gift of “genuine Protagoreanism.” Here, again, Schiller makes do with a bit of his view of philosophy, as rashly interpreted by critics, so as to make quick work of objections to Protagoras’s “Homo Measura dictum”: “it is not an

132 Schiller, Plato, 10.
133 Schiller, Plato, 10.
134 Schiller, Plato, 11.
irresponsible freak of subjectivism.” And why not? Because the subjective is, by nature, a reflective process of working through a problem, whereas “objectivisms and optimisms always are initially unreflective, and frequently remain so to the end.” But this seems to be an extra-textual interpretation and one relying heavily on an argument from opposites. And it provides a rather rough transition into Schiller’s next point: that the subjective nature extant in Protagoras’s dictum proves that the arguments provided in the Protagoras Speech by Plato are, in fact, those Protagoras offered in support of his dictum. How? First, to Schiller it is impossible that Plato, a student of Socrates, would have had no training in the arguments of Protagoras. Second, it would make no sense for Plato, so knowing, not to advance the real arguments in support of the dictum. Third, if Plato had chosen to breach decorum and create sham arguments, he would not have advanced counter arguments in the guise of Socrates that so utterly fail to respond to Protagoras.

All of this rests, again, on a rather shifty interpretation of Plato’s aims. The logic of the argument is stated thus:

If, therefore, there can be found in the Speech arguments which the Theaetetus does not refute, we may be sure that they were not of Plato’s invention. And if Plato thinks he has refuted them and it can be shown that he is wrong, this confidence will be strengthened; there will remain no reasonable doubt but that he has tried in his Speech to represent a real opponent’s views, that he has failed to understand him, and therefore failed to dispose of him, as he supposes.

Consider that the conventional view is flawed in that it assumes a bogus, or at least non-authoritative, version of Protagoreanism. But here the alternative utilizes an argument against it

135 Schiller, Plato, 12.
136 Schiller, Plato, 12-3.
137 Schiller, Plato, 12-3.
138 Schiller, Plato, 14.
that suggests the conventional view fails because it is unconvincingly bogus. Plato, like a
Bradley of antiquity, can neither advance nor retreat once set upon by Schiller. All three parts of
the speech—166A-C, 166D-167D, 167D-168B—confirm for Schiller his assumptions: “The
anti-intellectualism, the emphasis on the practical side, the defence of pay for intellectual work . . .
these are all characteristics we might expect to find in the veteran teacher whose mission it was
to guide the education of a democratic age.” More basically, they confirm for Schiller that a
formal claim of truth is in reality simply one proving itself to be more valuable. But isn’t this
then moving beyond Protagoras to again advance Schiller’s argument? Admittedly, yes.
Schiller notes that Protagoras only calls that which is more valuable “better,” not “truer.” And
he brushes aside this point by suggesting that Protagoras “did not yet perceive that all ‘truths’ are
‘values’” and, besides, “the difference between Protagorean and modern Humanism concerns
only a subordinate point of terminology.”

What, then, does Plato make of Protagoras’s distinctions? Schiller is terse: nothing.
Instead of respecting the arguments which he gives (back) to Protagoras, Plato uses a “master-
stroke of dialectical manipulation” when he suggests he will only discuss the dictum and not the
arguments made in support of it. When attempting to voice through Socrates (in 171E-172C)
an argument against Protagoras, Plato allows Socrates to misinterpret the argument that was so
recently advanced by Socrates as being Protagorean. But these are, to Schiller, points of
philosophic not literary import, points which lead him to again qualify the extent to which he

139 Schiller, Plato, 16.
140 Schiller, Plato, 17-8.
141 Schiller, Plato, 19.
142 Schiller, Plato, 21-3.
either (1) trusts Plato or (2) necessarily needs Protagoras. For all of this raises support, prior to the fact, for a Humanist interpretation of truth. As he goes on:

Whether Protagoras would have replied in this way [that the pragmatic testing of truth is by its consequences] if the point had been brought to his notice, we are not, of course, in a position to say; but enough has probably been said to show that if we read the Theaetetus critically and do not credulously swallow every claim that Plato closes to make without verifying it, there can be no question of a refutation of the argument of the Protagoras Speech by the subsequent criticism.  

Here Schiller places himself in the position of agreeing with Plato only to the extent that the alternative view makes sense. And to do so he must then return to the issues of Truth and Error. But Plato is then found to be placing upon Protagoras conditions which he cannot himself meet. “Whether or not Protagoras had really denied the possibility of Error, Plato’s theory of knowledge must irremediably collapse, if it cannot account for the existence of Error.” The next move Schiller makes is also strategically important. He moves beyond Protagoras so as to argue against Plato himself. Because Plato views error as an objective quality, he cannot conceive of a philosophy in which one can truly know error because an object is either true or it is false.  

Against Plato, Schiller argues that Error is actually: (1) not an abstraction, but a condition relative to purpose, and (2) derives not from an objective state, but from a psychological aim. More simply, that which claims towards truth falls into error when in consequence it does not achieve the desired result. It is “only a mind so thoroughly corrupted with dialectic and corroded with skepticism [which] will base on its existence a charge that to recognize these facts is to

143 Schiller, Plato, 24.
144 Schiller, Plato, 25.
145 Schiller, Plato, 26.
146 Schiller, Plato, 27.
abolish the conception of Truth.” By argument’s end it seems that we have moved beyond even Plato and are now advancing against Bradley. The argument is an Encomium to Protagoras and the spirit which Schiller finds in his dictum. But it is as much a deliberative exercise in taking down a notch those in whose company Schiller sees the vestiges of Plato being contemporaneously kept.

Others hold suspicions of a different sort. In a July 1908 review of Schiller’s pamphlet in Mind, Greek scholar John Burnet (1863-1928) is as succinct with his assessment as Schiller is creative with his interpretation: “this seems to me to show that he did not fully understand it.” Burnet suggests that Schiller confuses the literary form of the dialogue with his own demand that it provide philosophical refutation. Second, Schiller can’t get his facts straight or conveniently misuses them to make his case for Protagoras’s persecution. “Schiller becomes pathetic over this instance of successful persecution, but the story is in a high degree of doubt.” Third, Schiller ignores extant information which suggests the key items supposed to be lacking—actual texts of Protagoras—were in fact available at the time when Plato wrote the dialogue. Most tellingly for Burnet, Schiller’s insistence on picking an intellectualist target is off the mark. “If we ask why

147 Schiller, Plato, 28.

148 It is striking that, as this pamphlet was coming to press, James’s reiterates the claim that Schiller had originally made to him as regards tactics in advancing against the critics. Such comments suggest that James’s frustration—especially as regards the Oxford intellectuals whose criticism had grown irritating—now more aggressively shades the strategies he supports: “Your tactics are doubtless much the best ones for Oxford, where to smash the malevolent adversary is the thing required, mine the best for America, where to convert the perplexed truth seekers is the problem. Let us each stick to his line!” (William James, Biburg, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 June 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). Whether or not proximity influenced this assessment we know not. But it pays to recall that only a month earlier, between 8-28 May 1908, James had been at Oxford delivering lectures.

149 John Burnet, review of Plato or Protagoras: being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the ‘Theaetetus’ with some Remarks upon Error, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17, no. 67 (July 1908): 422.

150 Burnet, review, 422.
Plato should have written the passage at all, the answer is probably that he thought Protagoras really meant something of the kind. On the face of it, he had merely intended to attack the mathematical and astronomical science of his day."^{151} Here, then, Schiller seems lacking in a clear sense of what “humanism” meant then even if he is willing to suggest what it means now. Burnet posits that it was the Humanists of Plato’s time who were flatlanders, and that Plato may have more readily agreed with Protagoras in revolt against, not support, of them. In that sense, Burnet concludes, it “may be that Plato himself was more of a ‘humanist’ than Mr. Schiller seems to suppose.”^{152}

Schiller’s reply in the next issue of *Mind* begins by highlighting the most positive thing Burnet had to say about his argument—that there is no refutation of the Protagoras Speech offered by Plato—as signaling agreement with him “as to the main philosophical contention of the pamphlet.”^{153} His next argument is a continuation of the dodging technique Schiller utilized in the pamphlet itself. He argues that the unsettled nature of Greek history renders any judgments of veracity only plausible at best and suggests, contra the Plato scholar, that he will continue to prefer his interpretation over Burnet’s.

Schiller then moves on to address the substance of Burnet’s criticism. Noting Burnet’s insistence that the persecution story of Protagoras is now roundly doubted, Schiller counters that, where veracity is in question, one good fiction can counter another. Specifically, the historical record provides arguments for the persecution and subsequent destruction of Protagoras’s texts

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^{151} Burnet, review, 423.

^{152} Burnet, review, 423.

^{153} F. C. S. Schiller, “Plato or Protagoras?” *Mind* 17, no. 68 (October 1908): 519.
and also arguments that suggest the work lived on long past its author’s demise.\textsuperscript{154} That Schiller prefers the former while chastising Burnet for utilizing the latter reduces to a mere matter of opposites. He almost admits as much when he defends his preference by stating, “Now, while I would not deny the bare possibility of the after-dinner story [a supposed retelling by Eusebius of a work by Porphyry referencing Protagoras], and am willing to admit that ‘Diogenes Laertius’ [a retelling of Protagoras’s persecution that is also relayed by Sextus Empiricus and Timon of Philus] is very uncritical and vastly inferior to more recent histories of philosophy, I cannot but think that \textit{vain for vain} his is far more credible and better attested that any of this third-hand stuff of Eusebius.”\textsuperscript{155} He then turns these dueling yarns to another of Burnet’s criticisms, that Schiller mistook Plato’s view of the argument of Protagoras. Schiller argues that, rather than an attack on the science of the times, Protagoras’s argument was probably—like those of fellow Sophist cum teacher Gorgias—launched as “an annihilating skit upon Eleatic metaphysics.”\textsuperscript{156} Schiller then grants in humor what he won’t in substance. Even if he were to take Burnet’s argument, derived as it is from the questionable work of Eusebius, at face value, it would still end up advancing Schiller’s cause. For Burnet argued that Plato was more in agreement with Protagoras than Schiller knew. If so, Schiller would be inclined to “extract not a little satisfaction for the idea that Protagoras also had been among the teachers of Plato.”\textsuperscript{157}

Schiller next addresses Burnet’s claim that he forced apart for the sake of argument persons who were taken as similar in the written history; specifically, that Plato’s rival Isocrates

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\textsuperscript{154} Schiller, “Plato,” 519.
\textsuperscript{155} Schiller, “Plato,” italics mine, 519.
\textsuperscript{156} Schiller, “Plato,” 520.
\textsuperscript{157} Schiller, “Plato,” 520.
\end{flushright}
called even Plato a Sophist. Schiller responds that Burnet “does not mention that curiously enough Isocrates is called a pupil of Protagoras, and that therefore the admitted rivalry between him and Plato would supply a special motive for Plato’s attack on Protagoras.” Moreover, it is clear why persons such as Plato and Aristotle would take umbrage at the terms and teachings of Sophists. Sophists sought to upset the Theoretic in favor of the Practical. As Schiller states:

They aspired only to be purveyors of a practical education for actual life, which was largely concerned with rhetoric, and (like our Oxford ‘Greats’ School) aimed only at a gentlemanly acquaintance with fashionable philosophic puzzles that should suffice to enable men to give them a wide berth in after life. That such a view should be an affront to Plato seems beyond question to Schiller. That Plato, at the same time, should have been slow to grasp the nuances of that education seems no less clear.

In tracking out Plato’s developing arguments about and against Protagoras—assuming a timeline that is confirmed in the most recent Loeb editions of H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb—Schiller argues that “Plato realized the philosophic importance of Protagoras slowly and progressively and comparatively late in life.” Schiller goes so far as to assert that in the time between writing the Cratylus and the Theaetetus something novel happened. Absent an extant copy of Protagoras’s work, Plato produced a clear caricature in the former. Chastised by the followers of Protagoras, Plato seeks to amend his sketch and answer in substance what the previous argument lacked. This response to Burnet’s criticisms is a subtle blending of the conventional and alternative arguments found in the pamphlet under discussion. In that argument, the conventional was at least partially based on the sham creation of “disciples of

158 Schiller, “Plato,” 522.
159 Schiller, “Plato,” 522.
160 Schiller, “Plato,” 523.
161 Schiller, “Plato,” 524.
Protagoras” whereas the alternative was that Plato gave, through Socrates, voice to “genuine Protagoreanism.” Here “the doctrine survived in the memory of a few friends” to which Plato is obliged to respond in a latter work for his negligence in a previous one.162

Schiller ends his discussion by addressing the conclusion of Burnet. He consents in spirit to Burnet’s “counter-theory,” that Plato came to understand but too late the inability of Intellectualism to deal with matters of Error. He even assents to the idea that such late stage Platonic theory has been obscured by subsequent generations of Platonists “because they were themselves interpreted in the illusive light of his discarded doctrine.”163 But Schiller cannot, on historical grounds he suggests, go all the way in agreeing with Burnet. In a funny example of a respond in kind and not reply, the Plato scholar—who started his review of Schiller by stating that Schiller had not understood the argument he examined—needs to provide more evidence to Schiller. Then he might be willing to ask not, which of the two great Greeks is to be preferred, but, rather, acquiesce to both being accepted.

This quibble over interpretations is novel for several reasons. First, it suggests that Schiller is willing to adopt a measure of plasticity in his historical constructions that he seems rarely willing to give to opponents in contemporary arguments. Next, Schiller is found, especially in light of the arguments of Burnet, to be applying his pragmatic dictum in a manner that is both consistent and shocking. Consistent in that it allows him to measure the truth of tale according to what he finds most useful. Shocking in that, when faced with compelling counters, Schiller chooses to avoid them or merge them into his own arguments. Against the Platonic scholar he can advance no specific detail, provide no clear piece of evidence, so he defers to the

162 Schiller, “Plato,” 524.

163 Schiller, “Plato,” 525.
position of doubt only to advance an argument of optimism.\textsuperscript{164} The question is eerily similar to one which was raised regarding Bradley: to whom is Schiller speaking? If pragmatism and humanism were component parts in development long before the addition of Protagoras to the printed record in 1902, what need this nail in the historical coffin? It would only be conjecture to suggest that Schiller was creating his Hegel or Plato, a match point in a battle that has only increased in the number of people taking and settling scores. The question is answered in his continued engagements with Bradley. But is aided by the James staying true to his word in two clear instances.

The first case occurs in April 1909. After having returned from Europe, and having again delivered the Oxford lectures on 6-30 November 1908 at Harvard, James publishes \textit{A Pluralistic Universe}. It is a discussion which rarely references Schiller’s humanism. But it adheres to James’s January 1908 promise that if he were to write “anything more about truth, it will be on the wider humanistic lines.”\textsuperscript{165} And those wider lines contain, in strangely hard to find places, a

\textsuperscript{164} Several years later another series of arguments arise as to Schiller’s interpretation. In October 1910, C. M. Gillespie grants that Schiller is right to suggest that Plato gave voice to what he understood Protagoras’s teachings to mean. But he concludes that “there is no justification whatever for the view that Protagoras taught that truth is a ‘value’ or any similar Pragmatist doctrine.” Gillespie’s arguments boil down to two points resulting from Schiller’s literary approximations of both Plato and Protagoras: (1) it is not that Plato ignores Protagoras’s real argument; rather, (2) it is that Schiller ignores Plato’s real argument about Protagoras! Schiller is right about Plato being wrong, but he is wrong about getting Protagoras right (C. M. Gillespie, “The Truth of Protagoras,” \textit{Mind} 19, no. 76 [October 1910]: 492). In April 1911, Schiller responds. He initially applauds Gillespie for reducing “the dimensions of Plato’s victory over relativism to quite moderate and reasonable proportions, and evinces an eminently sane and sound judgment on philosophic controversies which posterity has hitherto been far too content to view as mirrored in the \textit{mirage} of Platonic eloquence.” But he still insists that Plato misunderstands the fundamental Protagorean tenents and, more generally, their relation to Schiller’s discussion of intellectualism vs. humanism. “Mr. Gillespie’s theory greatly restricts the scope of the problem. It deals only with the relation of the Protagoras Speech to the criticism which follows. It is in no sense a general theory of the relations of Platonism to Protagoreanism” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Humanism of Protagoras,” \textit{Mind} 20, no. 78 [April 1911]: 182; 188). In a debate over fragments, Schiller here again moves between the specific text and his general arguments in a manner seemingly more fluid than is warranted, at least by his critics.

\textsuperscript{165} William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 26 Jan 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
renewed interest in the import of radical empiricism.\textsuperscript{166} They are adjustments to, if not revisions of, James’s comments in \textit{Pragmatism} where he suggested that pragmatism and radical empiricism had “no logical connexion.”\textsuperscript{167} In “The Thing and Its Relations,” James notes that Schiller, among others, has successfully met the challenge of refuting Bradley.\textsuperscript{168} But this comment serves not to then discuss pragmatism. It is meant to more thoroughly discuss the implications of radical empiricism’s theory of knowledge as against Bradley’s “odious” “polemic writing.”\textsuperscript{169} Likewise, “The Experience of Activity” tackles Bradley’s views and places pragmatism and radical empiricism closer as a consequence.\textsuperscript{170} The sum assessment may seem meager: four year old essays, collected in a new work, meant to modify ambiguous comments in a two year old book. But it contains less a focus on Schiller and more the components within James’s philosophy which mattered to Schiller. Lest we forget, the lectures were delivered at Oxford, and were ushered forth with a suggestion to Oxford. That suggestion? From “the seedbed” of Idealism, “ancient English empiricism” may be finding more a robust

\textsuperscript{166} I say “strangely hard to find” for good reason. As originally formatted, \textit{A Pluralistic Universe} contained three appendixes. Subsequent editions, also containing \textit{Essays in Radical Empiricism}\textsuperscript{(1912)} and under the supervision of Perry, removed two of them, “The Thing and Its Relations” and “The Experience of Activity,” on account of the fact that they are also contained in the subsequent book and in previously published articles (the former is a reprint of a January 1905 \textit{Journal of Philosophy} essay; the latter a \textit{Psychological Review} article of the same date).

\textsuperscript{167} James, \textit{Pragmatism}, ix.

\textsuperscript{168} Specifically, Bradley’s content that the relation between things as experienced cannot be real (William James, \textit{A Pluralistic Universe}, in \textit{Essays in Radical Empiricism} and \textit{A Pluralistic Universe}, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909; reprint, 1947), 108-9).

\textsuperscript{169} James, \textit{A Pluralistic}, 121,

\textsuperscript{170} “It seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for anything, it ought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience, to be able to avoid such tangles [of metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological questions], or at least to simply them somewhat (James, \textit{A Pluralistic}, 159).
voice “in a controversy over what is known as pluralism or humanism.”

Three months later, the most eminent of Oxonian gardeners seems even farther afield.

In July 1909, Bradley begins by asserting “that in the case of facts of perception and memory the test which we apply, and which we must apply, is that of system.” Yet, even with a system, “there are no judgments of sense which are in principle infallible.” Bradley once again emphasizes the potential of memory, and in this case perception, to be faulty as applied to judgments. But Bradley also suggests a revision to his previous arguments: “that there are given facts of perception which are independent and ultimate and above criticism, is not to my mind a true conclusion. On the contrary, such facts are to my mind a vicious abstraction.”

The key word here, however, is perception. What I perceive, though fallible, must be melded into a consistent system so as to organize what I call “my world.” That we may treat it as infallible only implies that to do otherwise would entail “the loss of my personal identity.”

Yet, again, this seems to be a further distancing from his previous positions positing the distinction between appearance and reality.

Two qualifications, however, suggest the struggle that Bradley is having in amending his views to a fallible world view. First, Bradley responds, in a footnote no less, to the objection that what he is presenting is a system which is merely “practical.” He states that it can only be taken as such “if you take ‘practice’ so widely as to remove the distinction between practice and

171 James, A Pluralistic, 3.
theory.”176 Second, the issue of perception is again important. For although “all sense-judgments are fallible . . . our immediate experience is not fallible.” So we seem to be separated by our perceptions from that which we experience. But “my real personal self which orders my world is in truth inseparably one with the Universe.”177 Phrased differently, the world which I perceive is defective, thus I strive to make it consistent. But the Universe of which I am part is not defective, and so our striving for consistency suggests our connection to that unity.

The theory and practice remain apart; but, by all accounts, they have moved much closer. Even Knox can’t believe the change:

Most interesting, too, about F.H.B. The change of front in this last art. of his quite takes one’s breath away; for he has definitely given Infallibility the chuck discourteous. This is so patent that my wife, who lays no claim to technical philosophy, on glancing at the art. before I had looked at it myself, said “Why, you might have written this!” His assertion at the end that he is “at bottom” “one thing in substance and in power” with the Absolute is too obviously shoved in for the sake of saving his face. . . .178

If those revisions surprise Schiller and Knox, the October follow up is no less amazing. Bradley first suggests that “the criterion of truth, I should say, as of everything else is in the end the satisfaction of a want in our desire.”179 This, in itself, is no real modification; it is simply a reiteration of the truth of “the general working of ideas” as practical, and as opposed to the philosophical end of satisfying “the intellect.”180 But Bradley also admits “that all sides of our

178 Howard Vincentè Knox, to F. C. S. Schiller, 2 July 1909, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
180 Bradley, “Coherence,” 490.
nature press for satisfaction, and, if left unsatisfied, will manifest themselves so in idea.”¹⁸¹

However, in asserting the necessity of satisfaction in idea, Bradley asserts that not all types of satisfaction can be described as true. As the aim of the intellect is truth, it remains within the old domain of theory just as working remains aligned with practice. Thus the struggle for consistency and coherence obtain as we get closer to the ideal, what he here calls the “Immanent Reality.” Perceptions, as to experience and reality, remain defective. But “the immanent Reality, both harmonious and all-comprehending, demands the union of both its characters in the object.”¹⁸² This, then, is the goal of a system: to advance by more and more consistent forms of judgment so as to come closer and closer to the consistency found in Immanent Reality.

What comes next is rather striking. It reads as a personal defense of consistency in the face of contradiction. Initially he lashes out, and the term seems accurate, at those who claim qualification as a part of philosophy. The flavor of this point is contained here:

And, when you revolt against the conclusion that ‘this’ appears to be a mere unspecified universal, when you insist that your object was something other than such illogical trifling and child’s play—our answer is obvious. What are you doing, we ask, here on this road? You were told plainly that on this road what is sought is ideas, and that nothing else here is current. You were warned that, if you enter here, you are committed to this principle. If you did not understand, whose is the fault?¹⁸³

He goes on to suggest that precision is instead the rule; “for worse or for better the man who stands on particular feeling must remain outside of philosophy.”¹⁸⁴ Bradley even notes that what he offers as philosophy, that his attempts to provide support for an ultimate theoretical principle, are defective. “But to remedy that defect by importing bodily into philosophy the ‘this’ and

¹⁸¹ Bradley, “Coherence,” 491.
‘mine,’ as they are felt, to my mind brings destruction on the spot.” He can’t, as much as his arguments suggest otherwise, discard the belief that theoretic truth must be consistent.

Philosophy must be unified, not pluralized; alternatives suggest a lower stage admitting of a higher resolution. But he wavers, noting that this view “may be called an attempt, possibly in the end an unsuccessful attempt, to escape from the fallacy of false alternative.” Yet such alternatives dog him even as he seeks to explain, one could say will, into being this “higher unity which is supra-relational.” So he must qualify that which sustains him by noting, “that any particular truth of ours, as we conceive them, should be unconditioned and absolute, seems hardly probable.” For all his claims against “feeling,” the paradox of believing in an improbability can hardly be called consistent.

One who remains consistent is James. Having left the battle in frustration, he ventured into the warring camp to discuss his pluralistic universe. James’s second contribution to the fray is October 1909’s *The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism*. It contains previously

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188 Bradley, “Coherence,” 508.
189 But James initially takes it as a sign of clarity as regards differences. On 23 November 1909, he writes Bradley: “I have only just attained to the reading of your October Mind article, and am very glad that you have put yourself down in such pithy and pregnant form. If everyone could be as brief, how it would help understanding!” But, only two days later, he supposes it is a sign of intractable difference: “The thought of you in the wilderness of error when you are so near to becoming the Moses that can lead your people out is intolerable to my sympathetic mind” (Kenna, “I. Ten,” 326; 327). Bradley, on 4 January 1910, replies: “I see little use in my writing a reply to the effect that I am misunderstood—so far as I see. The more I see of the controversy the lower opinion I have of it.” He goes on, in a comment as well taken as directed to Schiller as himself, that “the reader usually, I think, concludes that the person who complains is in the wrong” (Perry, *The Thought*, 2, 643). Two weeks later, James seems wearied by the failure to reach accord: “It is enough to make the angels either weep or explode with laughter at how hard it is for two philosophers to coalesce. . . . Sooth to say, I am tired of the truth question . . . So I commit it to the waves of time, be time real or not, to work their will upon it” (Kenna, “I. Ten,” 329-30). To which, in closing, Bradley replies on the 28th: “As to the angels, perhaps they see that philosophy gets on quite as well by misunderstandings as by anything else. After all, anything is better than agreement without real understanding” (Perry, *The Thought*, 2, 644).
published essays. But, like A Pluralistic Universe, it puts materials old and new to good use along the wider lines James promised to explore. It is a renewed insistence on solidarity. It is a refusal to take the opponents’ bait and force distinctions between himself, Dewey, and Schiller. It also provides tributes to the primacy of Schiller’s philosophical approach. The first instance is by implication. He takes Schiller’s old family friend McTaggart to task. James sees him as representative of how authors use the cover of abstraction to distort opposing claims. James states:

A polemic author ought not merely to destroy his victim. He ought to try a bit to make him feel his error—perhaps enough to convert him, but enough to give him a bad conscience and to weaken the energy of his defense. . . . violent caricatures of men’s beliefs arouse only contempt for the incapacity of their authors to see the situations out of which the problems grow.  

The second instance is by tribute of form: the book ends with a dialogue between an anti-pragmatist and a pragmatist. The antagonist recoils at the “abominable hair-splitting and sophistry” of the pragmatist. The protagonist ends with a wistful look to future generations. He hopes that they can see clear to stay clear of the antagonist’s hysteria, “wedded by education and tradition to the abstractionist manner of thought.”

190 “As I myself understand these authors, we all three absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the object (provided it be an experienceable object) to the subject, in truth relation” (William James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism [New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909; reprint, 1914], xvii).

191 James, “Abstractionism and ‘Relativismus,’” The Meaning, 255. Schiller’s review of the work take particular note of James’s “extremely subtle” style of critique: “He always envisages his critic as primarily a human being and not a heap of bad syllogisms.” But he then parses out, in line with James’s previous agreement on split tactics, the differences in England and America. The English critical eye is “myopic” and “hardly ever seemed to see the connexion between two consecutive sentences in the texts it wandered over, and frittered itself away in niggles and quiblings of a ‘dialectical kind.’” In consequence, “it is evident that Prof. James’s apologetics are not at all well fitted to pacify critics of this sort, just as Americans have not the patience to follow closely the point-to-point confutations which the British method demands” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism, by William James, Mind 19, no. 74 [April 1910]: 259).

192 James, “A Dialogue,” The Meaning, 297; 298.
In the January 1910 *Mind*, James’s “polemic author” replies to Bradley’s two essays. Schiller sees them as representative of the confusion that exists in the realm(s) of Idealism, though he fears they may not be as well consumed as they once were. And he can’t help but notice the changes to Bradley’s philosophy. But he also can’t help suggesting that they, in the first moving towards pragmatism, sound an assured retreat back into Idealism. Schiller still feels that this creates an unstable mix of the pragmatic, the sceptical, and the absolute. And he sums up the problem thus:

In the privacy of Mr. Bradley’s soul these discrepant elements doubtless all live happily and harmoniously together, but as the outside observer cannot place himself in the central point of vision where the kaleidoscopic patterns delight the eye, and can see only the clashing bits of glass, their public performances present as pretty and instructive a problem in the detection of their coherence as any philosophic analyst could desire.193

He chooses, however, to first focus on the latter article, as it provides the most “illuminating” indications of Bradley’s “candour, clarity, and contrition.”194 He notes that Bradley explains away the truth/satisfaction problem by positing truth as a special kind of satisfaction, finding its fruition in the intellect. But Schiller notes that this still posits the intellect as at a distance from use. And he argues that “a philosophy which prides itself on making this abstraction at once becomes a vain beating of the air in order to bottle the ghost of the living intellect in the empty forms of potential thought.”195 Schiller next notes the difference between the two articles, how in the first Bradley seemed willing to forgo a search for absolutes as futile but, in the second, manifests “a relapse into the old absolutism” even more strident that some of his earlier works.196

More than strident, the views expressed see Bradley at his skeptical worst; “all judgment is condemned to the Sisyphean and self-contradictory task of trying to include all reality in a single affirmation (which if successful would be a tautology), and yet knowing that its very distinction of a subject and predicate compels it disserve the unity of reality it is suicidally try to express.”197

Here, then, is the most fundamental difference between the two articles: in the first he attempted to explain knowledge as applied, in the second knowledge as abstracted. Taken in the former, that which coheres and that which is comprehensive are judged based upon what is relevant and what is necessary for the resolution of a problem.198 Taken in the latter, however, they collapse into contradiction. What is comprehensive will not be that which coheres, thought the first must by its nature be inclusive of the second.199

What, then, the cause of this dilemma? Schiller argues that it is, at base, a psychological misunderstanding on the part of Bradley:

A sheer misconception of the essential function of cognition. A failure to perceive that it is not our business in thinking to dissipate ourselves in the vain attempt to embrace everything at once, but that we should aim rather at concentrating ourselves upon the relevant and at abstracting from whatever can distract us from our immediate purpose.200

Such a flaw, though certainly not exclusive to Bradley, is what leads him to the frustrations of his latter article. Schiller refers to Bradley’s assault as “the substitution of a compulsory inconvertible paper currency for the gold of living truth in intellectual exchanges.”201 In its place, Schiller posits a humanistic account which affirms that “a principle is merely an empty

form, if it is taken apart from its application and its use." But such application and use is forever absent in an account such as Bradley’s. In such a philosophy those who apply and use function as imperfect filters for the Absolute; “personality is cast for the rôle of the devil, and must be regarded as the principle which ‘distorts and vitiates’ our truth.” Schiller ends, not by raising the bar, but by suggesting the result of what has been a long and arduous battle of wills. All Bradley’s qualifications and concessions have done is to further isolate him, and his philosophy, from the rest of the world he has ceded to pragmatism.

This response, though quick with illustrative turns of phrase, is short on the type of rapid fire assault that James’s had so often, and so insistently, warned Schiller about. By Schiller’s standards, even those found in his response to Burnet, this is a subdued affair. And it suits James even if it stands as out of character for Schiller. James proclaims: “The article on Bradley is one of the finest things you have ever written, a calm . . . tone, without jibes, that I think becomes you so well.” True to form, James urges him on: “Keep it up Schiller; your clearness and smoothness in these articles are wonderful.” With Protagoras in tow and Bradley in recession, now would seem the time to advance yet again the cause of humanism. But there are other matters with which to attend.

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202 Schiller, “The Present,” 42.

203 Schiller, “The Present,” 44.

204 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 4 December 1909, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

205 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, [16 January?] 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
4.4 BRITTLE METTLE: THE PERSONAL TOLLS OF HUMANISM’S BATTLES

In the span of little more than a decade, with all his sparring and proselytizing, Schiller had remained a tutor. It is that fact which he made reference to in apologizing for the lack of systemization in both Humanism and Studies in Humanism. Schiller remained locked into a routine of teaching to small groups of undergraduates at Corpus Christi. It is a situation which Slosson vividly describes:

If Mr. Schiller had remained in America he would now be lecturing to one or two hundred students at the time, largely teachers who had come from all parts of the country expressly to hear his ideas and who would in turn transmit them to their students. But in that room there were only these fifteen boys, many of whom doubtless had no special interest in logic or in Schiller’s views of logic and who took his lectures simply because they were required for examination, after which they could be forgotten.206

The key out was a professorship, which came with a decrease or release from teaching, and often with an endowed chair at one of the many Oxford colleges. And so it was, in the same month that Schiller struck the somber note as regards Bradley, that he began his eager quest for Magdalen College’s Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysical Philosophy, the oldest of Magdalen’s four like-named professorships (the others being in Physiology, Chemistry and Physics).

The rest of the month was witness to lots of activity, as Schiller solicited letters, and built up his application materials.207 By February, and after reviewing the list of recommendations,  


207 Schiller even planned, but seems to have abandoned based on archive evidence, a request for a letter from James Ward:

Dear Prof Ward,
I have always regretted that our interesting conversation 2 years ago in S. John’s Common Room was interrupted just as you were about to tell me what you thought of pragmatism. Consequently I am uncertain whether you will not consider my present letter + request an act of presumption. But as you probably know the Waynflete chair of Moral Metaphysical Phil is now vacant, + so I venture to ask you whether you wld be disposed to say a word in my favor with the Electors who are not for the most part a very expert body + so will be more disposed to listen to the opinion of other experts. Cook Wilson is the only expert at present

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James is found to exclaim: “A tip-top list of printed testimonials do you send me! I hope you can get mine from the Vice-Chancellor [likely the one James sent as regarded Schiller’s move from Cornell back to Oxford] and print that. . . . The list of rival names you sent me is a strong one—but God will (or ought to) know his own!”

It is not clear who all of these rivals were. That said, the testimonials Schiller secured were likely just as strong. Names by now familiar to readers—James, Dewey, Knox, Sidgwick, even J. Russell—mix with a substantial list of other renowned academics—Bertrand Russell, Leonard T. Hobhouse, Henri Bergson—of the time. But, even at this point, something must be (or seem) amiss. James responds late in the month that he “cannot believe that the Committee of electors will consider the details of our recommendations so curiously. . . . I pray every night for your election. Heaven speed it!”

Whether by heaven or not, Schiller’s application arrives in the electors’ hands by the end of the month, just as James is leaving for a trip to Europe.

In his letter of application, Schiller champions his involvement in the development of pragmatism. And he does not sidestep the antagonism that it has wrought, though he posits that “this stage of its history may however be regarded as past, because it has now, after a severe struggle, made good its footing.” As regards pragmatism’s chief merits, he asserts: “Perhaps it may be most profoundly conceived as a refusal to adopt the abstraction from personality on which Logic has hitherto proceeded, and as a demand for the reversal of the consequences which

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208 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 February 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

209 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 February 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
have flowed from this fundamental assumption.” Such revision, rather than suggesting radical revision to the State or the state of philosophy, exerts a conservative influence in reducing “the alienation of academic life from national life.” Suggesting that such a project befits Oxford, he submits these materials for their consideration.

In April of 1910 James, having arrived in Europe, wants to know if “the electors have spoken and to what effect?” And he adds contexts to his fears of a month earlier when, in a moment of praise he raises an oft-repeated word of caution: “after reading your testimonials and knowing that neither he [James references A. E. Taylor, one of the candidates and the person who James feared was in line to replace him at Harvard in 1906] nor any other could muster anything half as imposing, I fell to believing that with every allowance made for ill will on acct of punning, polemic virulence, anti-absolutism and your whole criminal record, they simply would not dare to choose an inferior man. Heaven grant they may have been cowards!” As late as the third week, Schiller strikes a conflicted stance. In a letter to Thaw, he offers:

They may elect any day tho’ I don’t expect them to do so until after the term has begun, or even before the middle of May. It seems to be the general opinion (at least among my friends) that my test[2] give me a very strong claim + that to pass me over wd be a ‘scandal’ + so as James wrote to me in a delightfully boyish letter + justify a belief that “with every allowance for ill will on account of punning, polemic virulence, anti-absolutism + your whole criminal record, they simply wd not dare to choose an inferior man.” None venoms [let us come], but it will be a gain to have produced even a ‘scandal’, as things go, + anyhow I shall get the next professorship after that.212


211 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 April 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

212 F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Florence Thaw, 18 April 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Then scandal it shall be. Sometime in the next few days, the electors’ hand down their decision.

The Waynflete Professor will be John Alexander Smith. 213 James expresses outrage and writes in a letter to Schiller: “I shake Oxford + its ways from the soles of my shoes—whatever one may say of America, such an election would have been out of the question in any of its institutions of learning. A real scandal!”214 Schiller, for his part, seems angered yet resigned to the event.215

As with most situations, there are other things with which to occupy one’s time. In Schiller’s case, they are both expected and unexpected.

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213 Smith (1863-1959), was a student at Edinburgh and Balliol Colleges. At the time of his appointment he was a Jowett Lecturer of Philosophy at Oxford. By securing the Waynflete post, Smith also gained the fellowship at Magdalen College. Smith retired in 1936. To get a sense of Schiller’s established views of Smith, one must rely on a letter some five years earlier from Knox. In it, Knox states: “Mind, when you go back, that you gently insist on J. A. Smith delivering his philosophical soul before the Philosophical Society, to the end that we may hurry it to Hades. It would be great if you could arrange for him to read the paper when James was present. Having seen him sat on by H. Sidgwick, it would be lovely to see him jumped on by James” (Howard Vincente Knox, Grindelwald, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 April 1905, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

214 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 April 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

215 Schiller’s letter to Thaw sometime after the election provides his perspective on the events. It reads as if his understanding of what has transpired is informed by the part he played in it:

... As regards the Waynflete election the scandal lies not so much in their electing Smith, who was the only one of the candidates who had not published anything + about whose works therefore there could not be two opinions. He was therefore the least qualified, even if none of the electors had uncovered what a fraud he is, + yet this was precisely the reason why he was preferred. It was an election of the very worst, old Oxford, type, done to affront public opinion + to express contempt for public performance. Personally I thought just this result all but inevitable when to a weak non-technical board on which the only philosopher was a violently partisan friend of Smith’s (who also had written next to nothing, during his tenure for 20 years of the chair of Logic) was added an old Ex-prof of Greek who had read no phil for 40 years + was interested only in the text of Aristotle. But I did not know how the trick was done until lately, when I heard that this person was actually put on as philosophically impartial! The truth being that he was jobbed on as a friend of the prof. of Logie by one of our word wire pullers in Council, for that himself quite sterile too, for this very reason. The trouble in Oxford is that we are for most purposes ruled by quite a small ring of politicians who have very little academic distinction themselves + dislike it in others.

Of course I am not personally any worse off (except for the time spent in collecting testimonials last term), + I shall go on with my work as planned, seeing the new edition of Riddles through the press + pushing on with the new book on Logic as much as possible this summer.

(F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Florence Thaw, [April/May?] 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
The predictable takes the form of another essay from Bradley in the April 1910 *Mind*. “Appearance, Contradiction, and Error” is a watered down affair, vacillating between a desire to be understood and a defense against those who do not understand.216 James, fighting back illness in England, just lets it go: “Incidentally I tried to read Bradley’s article, but whether the fault be his or mine, I couldn’t follow its subtleties with any comprehension, and postponed it to a later day.” And he again cautions, in light of recent events, for Schiller to do the same:

Miller wrote years ago of Bradley that ‘he pinches and cuffs his reader like a nasty-tempered child.’ Don’t you keep-a-doing something of the same sort to Bradley? And isn’t that apparent ‘hatefulness’ of temper in you (in addition to that punning vice!) perhaps the real ground for J. A. S.’s election in stead of F. C. S. S.’s? . . . You have the best of him in point of truth; he is, I fear, a dying man; why then not let your tone be brotherly and kindly? [Such a tone in this article might also heap coals of fire on the electors, if any of them were influenced by the reasons I have suggested.] 217

And Schiller does let Bradley go, for now. He is too busy with moving the humanist cause forward to let the setbacks of April, or roadblocks of Bradley, stop him. He is preparing a new edition of his *Riddles* and working on a long in development treaty on logic. It is the former, a

216 The sentence is not meant to be a pun. Bradley pleads that he feels his views “still seem partly misunderstood” (F. H. Bradley, “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction,” *Mind* 19, no. 74 [April 1910]: 153). But he adds, in a manner suggesting a heretofore unseen sense of weariness: “I am not seeking here to argue with any one who wishes to criticize rather than to understand. I address myself to those whose interest in these topics is impersonal, to those who desire to make their own way, however imperfect, in which these matters are apprehended” (Bradley, “On Appearance,” 153).

217 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 April 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
systematic treatise that will silence his critics, that James hopes for: “The thing for you now is to heap coals on the electors by getting out your logic at the earliest possible date. Stop all occasional and polemical writing for that purpose! I wish I could say, ‘stop new editions of Riddles,’ but that would be too much.” 218 Even then, James seems pleased with Schiller’s most recent articles (for the year to this point, Schiller has only published three journal articles and only a couple of reviews). 219 A failure behind him, and with James’s continuing support, Schiller is set to recover his ground.

But the unpredictable intervenes. And it is difficult to estimate how these cursory details can do justice to the events that occur in the months of May through August 1910. James, already feeling frail departs from England on a trip to Germany to recuperate. But the trip seems only to weaken him further. So he ventures only so far as England with his wife. In July, his wife Alice posts to Schiller from Sussex:

William is here, very ill and weak. He can neither write or converse. His nights are dreadful and the hours one long fortitude. The Nauheim experiment has been all disaster and every move seems to diminish his [word unclear] strength. Dr. Mackenzie, his doctor, has been a very angel of helpfulness and wisdom. He regards William’s condition as one of acute neurasthenia complicated and intensified by his poor heart. We are to sail on Aug 12th from Liverpool on the Express of Britain. Henry goes with us.

William bids me give you his blessing and tell you that you will have the brunt of the good fight henceforth.

I “keep hope to the future” for him for he never was more vital in spirit, or wiser in thought than now. Help me, our dear friend, to believe that his work here is not yet done. 220

218 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

219 Aside from Schiller’s review of The Meaning of Truth, it is clear that James was reading Schiller’s work at this point. One instance is of note. In April, Schiller published an article entitled “National Self-Selection” in the Eugenics Review. James responds favorably: “I relished your Eugenic paper greatly, and am glad you are extending thus the area which your wing’s cover” (William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 4 May 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).

220 Alice James, Sussex, to F. C. S. Schiller, 25 July 1910, Box One, Folder Twelve, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.
Schiller’s reply is likely to have been almost instantaneous: a desire to go and visit with James.

But James’s reply back is insistent:

Dearest Schiller -- Your offer to come to London to see us is lovely, but my condition had better go without a meeting. Five minutes would mean little; + anything more serious would add too much to the fatigue of my journey, rather hazardous at any rate, to L’pool. . . . I leave the ‘Cause’ in your hands, yours and Goldstein’s in Germany—I don’t feel sure about Kallen yet, tho he’s a noble fellow. Good bye + God bless you! Keep your health, your splendid health! It’s better than all the ‘truths’ under the firmament. Ever thy

A little more than two weeks later, on 26 August 1910, James died at his home in Chocorua, New Hampshire. Alice wrote after his death to Schiller, thanking him for his kind words of condolence in August. She explains the delay in responding saying, “I was . . . grateful when your beautiful August letter reached me, but I was also dumb and inarticulate, dwelling in some silent land of grief. Speech or language seemed impossible . . . I only speak of myself more that you may understand why I have given no sign to one as near and dear to William as yourself – dear to me too as his friend.” She goes on to say, “No one could imagine – but you – (and because you do I tell you!) the heartfelt sorrow of many, many letters from far and near, from all sorts . . . of men and women, who wrote to me because they loved him.” That Schiller understood this sentiment, indeed felt it much the same if perhaps more deeply, requires no
conjecture. The man who had given verification to his ideas, who had supplied criticism to match his personality, was gone. All that was to come for Schiller would now come after James.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{223} It might seem a minor footnote that Schiller’s engages in one last exchange with Bradley in \textit{Mind} in October 1910. But it is a telling one. For Schiller argues that, in Bradley’s last essay, both he and James are finally vindicated. But in raising the flag, it seems that Schiller is suffering his loss. It is a response that seems weighted down by the sadness, and yes anger, of James’s death. In so far as Bradley suggests that his is a way out of skepticism, Schiller remains unconvinced. Schiller unleashes, in the guise of some rationalist offered Bradley’s bargain, an avalanche of criticism:

It seems to me a skepticism aggravated by a dialectical nightmare. I certainly do not want a metaphysic which starts with an initial confession that its fundamental presupposition is inexplicable, which plunges from paradox to paradox at every step, which glories in a notion of truth that makes every truth (including presumably its own assertions!) a sort of error and every reality a sort of illusion that can equally well be denied, which has to leave the concrete facts of existence unexplained and to abandon them and the sciences and practical life and indeed everything except what it is pleased to call ‘philosophy’ to ‘practical makeshifts’ and ‘working conceptions’ of the worst pragmatic sort, and in the end, after all these outrages on reason, has to ‘agree fully that difficulties are left which, if you like to say so, must be swallowed’, to doubt whether the most consistent man is he ‘who on the whole attains to greatest truth’, and in short is habitually subject to fits when it seems ‘clear that the Universe is too much everywhere for our understanding.’

(F. C. S. Schiller, “Absolutism in Extremis?” \textit{Mind} 19, no. 76 (October 1910): 534-5). That’s not all. Mr. Bradley is then found to shift the burden of this babble onto the backs of his brethren. Trapped in a corner, Bradley in the end can only offer appeals to tradition and the selfsame ignorance of others. So Schiller, in full gallop, pronounces the terms of Absolutism’s surrender: “It means a revolution in the methods of metaphysical debate. It means an explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the personal equation in metaphysics. In means equal rights to a hearing for all views that find believers. It means an end to philosophic bigotry, arrogance, and intolerance” (Schiller, “Absolutism,” 536). In its place, Schiller pronounces that humanism will be the new way: “So philosophic controversy must henceforth enter on a new era, in which doctrines will prevail, not by coerciveness, but by attractiveness, satisfactoriness and convenience” (Schiller, “Absolutism,” 537). In the place of abstract reasoning, there will be psychological motivations. In the place of universal, there will be recognition of the particular. And, in a nod to Dewey, there will be an understanding that “it is the situation which generates the judgment, and not the judgment which ordains the situation” (Schiller, “Absolutism,” 540). Taking Bradley’s weariness for weakness, and with an anger rarely seen before or since, Schiller rams the mettle of humanism into Bradley’s brittle bastion of bias.
A revelation that carries with it no spiritual enlightenment, that forms no stimulus to spiritual progress, but merely fixes a status quo, is a futility and in no credible sense a revelation at all.¹

At the start of the century, distance had placed Schiller beyond the reach of pragmatism’s development in America. But he nonetheless remains a visible presence as the decade closes and a new one begins. Schiller continues to wear upon, some might say wear down, the Idealist Bradley. He extends James’s psychological conceptions with postulates of his own making. He even, from his outpost amongst hostile idealists, reformulates the grounds for the debate itself. With James’s blessing, and Protagoras as his historical touchstone, Schiller continues to broaden pragmatism’s reach. His humanism, acting as pragmatism writ large, bridges the gaps between method and action, speaking to the whole of man’s activities. But the loss of James, a sympathetic and critical peer, robs Schiller of a crucial guide in refining his own method. And the actions of the world around him, soon to see the collapse of Empires and the division of Dominions, less and less resonate with his optimistic philosophy predicated on man’s ability to create a better world.

In this new decade there are clearly advances. In Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem (1912), Schiller offers sustained criticisms of formal logic divorced from actual context. In “Philosophy, Science, and Psychical Research” (1914), he continues to test the edges of what constitutes reality. In “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof” (1917), Schiller promotes a progressive understanding of the ends of the scientific method. But there is also a growing

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semblance of fissures in the magnificent edifice he is constructing. His march continues unabated as support begins to ebb. Coupled still with the continuing invective of their promotion, his proclamations struggle to gain converts even as he loses no allies. And Schiller’s growing interest in eugenics, though a novel extension, indicates that not all humanity measures up to humanism’s maxim: “man is the measure.” The consequences, particularly to his career and his reputation, suggest that Schiller’s theoretical insights continue to be tempered by, indeed tethered to, the practices that he chooses.

5.1 REVISED RIDDLES: RETOUCHING HUMANISM’S EARLY TEMPLATE

This decade begins, not with the new, but with the ideas of Schiller’s youth. Though the revised edition of Riddles comes out in November 1910, it only starts to generate critical interest after the turn of the year.² This is the version of the text where the Riddle’s keys are turned from evolution to, as the subtitle posits, “A study of the philosophy of Humanism.” But, even after

² Not that trusted friends wait to respond. Knox jots off a poem to Schiller only days after the book is released: In his Riddles of the Sphinx

Schiller tells us what he thinks
About this most imperfect World,
And he straightens out the kinks.
He tells of Evolution
With its many missing links,
He treats of Friendship and of Love
And the Meaning of the Minx;
He leads us to gaze into Hell
From precipices’ brinks,
Yet bids us to take heart of grace
From the last results of “Stinks”.
“Heed not the cavern’s mirk,” he cries,
“See Heaven through the chinks!”
Don’t think to catch him nodding!
But perchance – perchance he winks.

(Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 November 1910, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
updating the book, one senses that Schiller feels at a distance from the work. The two new appendices aren’t actually new; rather, they are works that Schiller had presented in 1908 ("Science and Religion") and published in 1909 ("Choice") respectively. The preface, though, is instructive in how it frames this distance. Schiller does not regret the concepts of nearly twenty years past. Rather, Schiller pleads that he no longer has the need to craft an idealistic philosophy. As a consequence of pragmatism and humanism, his views have undergone “enormous development and expansion”; his approach has become one of “greater modesty.”

Certainly not modesty as regards style; rather, it is diffidence as regards any project which would claim to obtain the traditional fruits of a so-called metaphysic. If anything, and with a nod to the exuberance of his youth, the new edition attests “the stability of the author’s personality.”

The reactions to the book in the shorter popular notices are interesting. They recall the degree to which reception is a matter of perception when it comes to philosophical positions right out the gate or long on their course. The Manchester Review notes that the earlier version “abundantly proved his remarkable critical ability, his originality, and his mastery of an attractive style.” That spark is still found by another reviewer in the present version where, “in spite of his many changes, the clear, buoyant quality of the original work is preserved, together with its essential doctrines.” Others note the change in tone, that “the alterations made consist

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4 Schiller, Riddles, ix.

5 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Manchester Review, 19 January 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

6 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, n.a., 11 May 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
in a general toning down of the more ambitious and daring portions.”

Yet others contend that the alterations point to the failings of Schiller’s mature position: “his work, while of considerable value on the negative or destructive side, fails, or is at least inadequate, on the positive or constructive side.” The Quest is more cautiously interested in how the book reads as “the Humanist attempt to solve the Riddles of the Sphinx.”

The longer philosophic reviews continue the mixed popular reactions. In the May 1911 Journal of Philosophy, Columbia University Professor Walter Pitkin (1878-1953) willingly grants the newness of this edition so as to better question its content. In contrast with those who assume Schiller to be “a flighty radical, fresh as May dew and no less evanescent,” Pitkin argues that his “philosophy reveals a mind respectful of the past and unshakable in its faith that the great questions were correctly put and answered centuries ago.” And this philosophy of Humanism is most certainly not Pragmatism. Where pragmatists localize events and hold off synthesis,

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7 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, n.d., April 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

8 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, n.d., 17 February 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Not that this summary is without commentary thereon. And it is another instructive example of Schiller responding to responses to his philosophical views. Towards the start, the review quotes Schiller as stating Pragmatism “has rendered more or less out of date every earlier work on metaphysics.” Schiller adds the notation “^” directly after this and then, in the margins, writes: “and R of S I.” Towards the middle of the review there is this passage: “The next Riddle to be considered is the dualism of the Spirit and Matter; this Dr. Schiller solves by assuming that they are ‘aspects’ of the same fact—an intellectual category again; we should prefer to say modes of the same reality” (underlining is in Schiller’s hand). Next to these comments Schiller writes: “diff”? A bit later the review questions Schiller’s conception of transcendental egos, noting that “this pluralistic view is not new.” Schiller simply comments: “muddled.” But then, a few lines down, the review claims that this viewpoint reduces the “Deity to the status of a Demiurge at best.” Schiller responds: “Some muddled fools.”

9 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Quest, n.d, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, [1911], Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Not that this summary is without commentary thereon. And it is another instructive example of Schiller responding to responses to his philosophical views. Towards the start, the review quotes Schiller as stating Pragmatism “has rendered more or less out of date every earlier work on metaphysics.” Schiller adds the notation “^” directly after this and then, in the margins, writes: “and R of S I.” Towards the middle of the review there is this passage: “The next Riddle to be considered is the dualism of the Spirit and Matter; this Dr. Schiller solves by assuming that they are ‘aspects’ of the same fact—an intellectual category again; we should prefer to say modes of the same reality” (underlining is in Schiller’s hand). Next to these comments Schiller writes: “diff”? A bit later the review questions Schiller’s conception of transcendental egos, noting that “this pluralistic view is not new.” Schiller simply comments: “muddled.” But then, a few lines down, the review claims that this viewpoint reduces the “Deity to the status of a Demiurge at best.” Schiller responds: “Some muddled fools.”

10 Walter B. Pitkin, review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 11 (May 1911): 299. His comments, as later chapters will demonstrate, are strikingly prescient.
humanists hope to reconcile philosophy, science, and religion. Where pragmatists see meaning in the particulars, humanists hope to draw meaning out of life as a whole. Pitkin cannot escape a curious conclusion: “the resulting philosophy is perverse intellectualism if everything in the world is either reduced to that idea or else so interpreted through it that whatever proves unintelligible in terms of it is pronounced unreal.”

Schiller, the progressive pragmatist, is for Pitkin the “conservative intellectual,” fretting over a descent into pessimism. The new Riddle is thus a cautionary one. In much the same way as Schiller lambasted Bradley for his descent into pessimism, others now see Schiller as the irritated gatekeeper wanting to stave off its influence.

Author Sydney [Philip Perigral] Waterlow (1878-1944) is no less critical. In October of the same year, he reviews the revised edition for the International Journal of Ethics. He takes aim at Schiller’s claim that the views expressed show a stability of thought all the while claiming that an attempt at metaphysics has been abandoned; specifically, the difference between what is taken as phenomenally and ultimately real, between what appears to us as contradiction and what we seek to obtain ideally. Moreover, he finds Schiller’s manner distasteful. As a popularizer of philosophy, he abandons precise terms and resorts to wording that “is uniformly flabby and pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric.”

11 Pitkin, review, 300-1.

12 Pitkin, review, 302.


14 Waterlow, review, 110.
Waterlow justifies his criticisms of Schiller’s “self-conscious swagger” on the grounds that it is Schiller who now suggests that all metaphysics claim to a personal rather than universal origin.\(^\text{15}\)

In January 1912, Perry also questions the metaphysical modifications to Schiller’s work in the *Philosophical Review*. And he, like Waterlow and unlike Pitkin, also acknowledges the limitations by which Schiller introduces the new version: “Since [1894, the date of the previous 2nd edition] the author has been engaged in defending and propagating his ‘humanistic’ version of Pragmatism. The speculative metaphysics of the Riddles, has thus stood outside the main current of his thought, and is now re-published with some misgivings.”\(^\text{16}\) After carefully noting the changes in the current edition, Perry suggests two characteristics of the book. First, Schiller “writes himself down among the apostles of a metaphysical spiritualism or activism. He belongs, in other words, to the school of Bergson, [Rudolph] Eucken, [Theodor] Lipps, [Alain] LeRoy [Locke] and Papini, rather than to the school of James and Dewey.”\(^\text{17}\) Second, Schiller shows “an inclination to adopt that syncretistic [a combination of different forms of belief or practice] version of metaphysics that is so popular with contemporary German idealists of romantic proclivities.”\(^\text{18}\) It is as regards the second of these that Perry notes what sounds like disillusion: “And it may not be out of place to remark that the discrediting of philosophical faith reflects the bias of middle-age, as truly as that faith itself reflects the bias of youth.”\(^\text{19}\) While

\(^{15}\) Waterlow, review, 111.


\(^{17}\) Perry, review, italics mine 113. As with Pitkin’s appraisals, this is a suggestive comment. As will become clear, Perry and Schiller develop competing historical conceptualizations of Pragmatism, particularly of James’ contributions thereto.

\(^{18}\) Perry, review, 113.

\(^{19}\) Perry, review, 113.
Waterlow took a change in metaphysics to be a personification of philosophy, Perry attaches a
decline of spiritual sympathy to Schiller’s loss of metaphysical moorings.

None of these longer notices were likely pleasing to Schiller. Yet he chooses, given the
record, to personally respond to Waterlow. We do not have the original letter. But it can be
inferred that Schiller’s response to this review did nothing to reduce Waterlow’s suspicions
about his personality. It did, however, obtain some measure of correction. In a letter dated 22
March 1912, Waterlow grants that there are “3 misprints which unfortunately occur” and for
which he “sincerely” apologizes. These mistakes are matters of word choice and order.
Waterlow, however, goes onto say: “As to the other alleged ‘glaring inaccuracies’ on which you
say that my criticism is based, I fear I can not meet your complaint in any way that would satisfy
you. Writers whose language is, like yours, habitually vague + misleading are always surprised
when the critic attributes to them some definite position.”

This, obviously, does little to quell Schiller’s indignation, especially considering that it is
Waterlow who is now accusing him of being vague and misleading. Five days later, Schiller
replies:

Your apology for the misquotations in your review hardly seems adequate: it amounts to
saying that you were careless, not in quoting, but in proof-reading. I am glad however to
hear that you consider them ‘unfortunate’, though you do not seem to realize either how
‘unfortunate’ they are in view of the tone of your review, or that you appear, still more
unfortunately, to base arguments on the worst of them.

20 Sydney Philip Perigal Waterlow, Sussex, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 March 1912, Correspondence, Box
Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research
Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

21 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Sydney Philip Perigal Waterlow, 27 March 1912, Correspondence, Box
Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research
Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Schiller then lays down the demands: “Go into the evidence for my ‘inconsistencies’ +
‘contradictions’ to [sic] fully + publicly in the pages of Mind, + prove them up to the hilt, if you
can.” Schiller promises to meet any such challenge in kind. To not do so, he avers, would be to
cede his initial argument; “you shd feel yourself in duty bound to substantiate your charges, + not
content yourself with merely abusing the plaintiff’s attorney, or (what indicates a still more
desperate plight) lapse into silence (or anonymity) as soon as you are challenged.” The end to
the matter came in a correction posted to the next International Journal of Ethics. In it, the editor
dutifully publishes the errors for which Waterlow initially apologized. But the editor goes on to
note that “Schiller declines to accept” Waterlow’s explanation that his larger grievances fall with
these errors.22 No matter. The riddles reborn are now meant to withstand the targets of
humanism’s domain. There are errors of a logical, not metaphysical, sort looming on the
horizon.

5.2 DESTRUCTIVE DEFENSES: HUMANISM’S CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC

Originally called [The] Problem of Formal Logic, this work stands as perhaps his most
galvanizing work.23 It can be read as a more insistent development of the themes brought forth
in “Axioms as Postulates.”24 To wit, truth-claims studied in practice render thinking more, but


23 The original, or working, title of the book is evidenced by contract letters sent to Schiller from
Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

24 The similarities, and extensions, found herein are easy to read in compliment to “Axioms as Postulates.”
As but one example, the discussion of Causation (F. C. S. Schiller, “Axioms as Postulates,” in Personal Idealism, ed.
Henry Sturt [London: Macmillan and Co., 1902], 108) is here given a whole chapter; see Schiller, “Causation,”
not absolutely, certain than in abstraction. Or, as Schiller pleads: “It is NOT possible to abstract from the actual use of the logical material and to consider ‘forms of thought’ in themselves, without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of meaning.”25 And it is also a project irritated by the same source of apologetics found in Humanism and Studies: his actual teaching of formal logic. Such practice in service to long-held theory leads Schiller to conclude that “it is a very difficult subject to teach without loss of self-respect.”26 Moreover, Schiller sees

Formal, 272-309. Additional concepts discussed in “Axioms”—such as Excluded Middle and Contradiction—are similarly expanded. Other concepts, most notably the Syllogism and Fallacies, undergo similar inspection. It should be made clear, however, that Schiller was not alone, nor claimed as such, in the development of arguments for an informal as against formal logic. Particularly in the case of the syllogism, Schiller notes here and elsewhere his debt to Alfred Sidgwick’s “epoch-making criticisms”—arguments which predate Schiller’s Formal Logic but would compass reference while writing “Axioms”—in books such as Alfred Sidgick’s 1901 The Use of Words in Reasoning (Schiller, Formal, 198; see also, for a more general critique of formal logic referenced in the previous chapter, Alfred Sidgwick, “Applied Axioms,” Mind 14, no. 53 [January 1905]: 42-57).

And Sidgwick’s work along these lines goes back farther still, to books such as Fallacies: A View of Logic from the Practical Side (1883). Therein, he states: “Nothing could well be more confusing than an attempt to apply the cumbrous machinery of the Syllogism to arguments met with in real life. And whoever has tampered with his mother-wit by substituting a clumsy Logic depending on elaborate mnemonics, must no doubt pay the penalty in loss of power, so long as the mischief remains” (Alfred Sidgwick, Fallacies: A View of Logic from the Practical Side [London: K. Paul, Trench, 1883; reprint, New York: D. Appleton, 1884], 289). Or, more generally put forth in Distinction and Criticism of Belief (1892), he urges: “the validity of any distinction is relative to the purpose for which it is used at the time, or that the question whether a given distinction is valid can be decided only by reference to the purpose for which it is used on a special occasion” (Alfred Sidgwick, Distinction and Criticism of Belief [London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892], 142). Like Schiller, Sidgwick has received limited attention, even from those attentive to Schiller’s contributions to the critique of formal logic. As Peter Radcliff has noted, “[Reuben] Abel’s book on Schiller ignores Schiller’s acknowledgement of indebtedness and the numerous references to Sidgwick. On one occasion, Abel mentions a criticism that Sidgwick makes of Schiller. The other reference is particular unfortunate [in that it implies Sidgwick, along with Knox, joined Schiller’s already started battle]” (Peter Radcliff, “Alfred Sidgwick on Meaning,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 4, no. 3 [July 1966]: 230). More recent works on Sidgwick’s contributions are: Steen Flemming Nielson, “Alfred Sidgwick’s ’Rogative’ Approach to Argumentation,” in Argumentation at the Century’s Turn, eds. Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen, and Sacha Raposo, CD-ROM, 1999 (also available at: www.trentu.ca/ossa/p39.htm); Douglas Walton, “Alfred Sidgwick: A Little Known Precursor of Informal Logic and Argumentation,” Argumentation 14 (2000): 175-9.

A few short years later, another of Schiller’s associates, one directly associated with “Axioms as Postulates,” also offers up a complimentary take on formal logic. Sturt, in his The Principles of Understanding: An Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism (1915), encompasses the spirit of both Schiller and Sidgwick when he protests: “The whole notion of a priori laws of thought is an anachronism, the ghost of formal logic haunting our schools long after its real life has ended. . . . The conservative logicians of the present day still hold to it that there must be a priori laws of thought; though, having lost faith in the syllogism, he cannot tells what they are” (Henry Sturt, The Principles of Understanding: An Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism [Cambridge: University Press, 1915], 3-4).

25 Schiller, Formal, ix.

26 Schiller, Formal, ix.
the continued reverence for formal logic as spilling out into the social realm, and the results are shockingly severe: “Its fruits are dogmatism, intolerance, pedantry and contentiousness, timidity of thought, and a cowardly avoidance of risks.” 27 While some of the combined results—
dogmatic timidity any one?—seem to clash, Schiller urges that “Society . . . needs to encourage activity and boldness, instead of holding up to the human mind the irrelevant model of a static truth from which all risk has been expunged.” 28 What form this encouragement to “not abstract from actual use” is to take remains undefined.

Several personal correspondences suggest the positive impression that Schiller’s challenge cast upon his friends and acquaintances. 29 But it is a book clearly meant to

27 Schiller, Formal, 406.

28 Schiller, Formal, 408.

29 Simon Nelson Patten thanks Schiller “heartily for the book.” He goes on to add, “I hope your book will break some of the old traditions that have made logic useless” (Simon Nelson Patten, Philadelphia, to F. C. S. Schiller, 6 March 1912, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Patten (1852-1922) received graduate training in Germany before returning to the States (he was born and educated in Chicago) to head the Wharton School. A philosopher and economist, his work intersected with the Progressive Movement and eugenic reform. In his letter, Patten refers to a book he is writing as being more “social” than Schiller’s in focus. It is likely, given the date of the letter, that he is referring to The Social Basis of Religion (1911).

Alfred William Benn declares, “The general result was to convince me that it is impossible to be a logician” (Alfred William Benn, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 October 1912, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Benn (1843-1915), a British philosopher, actually goes on to engage in what is a nuanced discussion of the ramifications of discarding formal logic: “But this conclusion puts me in great difficulties. For its reached be a series of abstract reasonings resting on certain implications; and one fails to see why these should not be extricated and built up into something like a system of proofs + of what practically comes to the same thing – of disproof. Now your objection to Formal logic on practical grounds seems to be its claim to prove and disprove, which claim you make responsible for theological persecutions. This last is a suggestive topic. It seems an extraordinary paradox that intellectualists, who of all men are approved to trust most to pure reason . . . should rely on compulsion as the ultimate means of conviction. One might rather expect the believers in Survival-value (which I have always understood to be the Pragmatist’s test of truth) forcibly to eliminate their opponents, thereby depriving adverse opinions of survival-value in the most effective manner. Besides experience shows that it is people like the Determinist [sic] who preach persecution, not the Aristotles. Again you would have to discountenance the teaching of arithmetic no less than that of formal logic; for by setting up a type of abstract truth the same for all mankind it grievously [?] discourages Personalism. And what are we to say about the practice of our criminal courts (criminal indeed!) which even deprive people of life or liberty on the miserable plea that their so-called guilt has been proved? Well might those baleful intellectualists the Athenians have created logic on the type of their legal proceedings!”

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demonstrate the warmness of another friendship. The book is inscribed thusly: “To the Memory of the Last Great Liberator of the Human Spirit, William James.” And it is a letter from Alice James that we should linger upon. She states:

Your Formal Logic came yesterday and I laid it on William’s desk with the thought of how eagerly he would have welcomed it, torn off the cover and settled himself to a first quick survey. This morning where I could be alone I opened the book and found the oh, so beautiful dedication . . . I can do nothing else till I have tried to express to you my deep gratitude, not only for this dedication but for all the understanding and agreement and comradeship and last of all for the comfort he took in feeling that the work he loved was in good hands. Once that last summer where he made some reference to his unfinished work he added “But there is Schiller.”

She goes on to say that, given what she can understand of the work, she “can seem to see how it dovetails with pragmatism or humanism and liberates afresh the human spirit.” Such a loving tribute from the wife of Schiller’s mentor surely serves to boost Schiller’s resolve that the course chosen is the right one. But such a reaction can hardly be expected to be typical given the course to this point.

Schiller’s opinion can be gleaned from a letter he wrote several weeks prior to psychologist and philosopher George Stuart Fullerton (1859-1925). In it, Schiller states: “. . . may I point out to you that tho’ I do not, perhaps, bring forward any arguments for Humanism (such not being within the scope of the work) I do bring some new directions against the traditional logic, which go to show that it is intellectually untenable bankrupt. This creates a new situation to this extent that until they are met neither Pragmatism nor antiprag can appeal to the ‘rules of logic’ as e.g. settling anything (cf p. 250). If the syllogism is a petitio + the laws of thought are nonsense, it is not rationalism but irrationalism to rely on them, + they w± only discredit common sense + science if the latter really relied on them” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to George Stuart Fullerton, 7 October 1912, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

30 Alice James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 March 1912, Box One, Folder Twelve, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

31 Moreover, that it is a path agreeable to and compatible with the view expressed in James’s recent posthumous collections: Some Problems of Philosophy (1911) and Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912). Schiller, curiously, does not review the latter work. But in his review of the former, he ends with what amounts to the understandable imposition of his present interests onto the writings of James. After noting that James also disagreed with any notion of “fixed” truths, Schiller adds: “. . . he also realized that, to state the facts adequately, there would need to be a new logic that would start by recognizing every thought as an act of responsible choice . . . To what now passes as ‘logic’ James felt so strong a repugnance that he did not always shrink from describing himself as ‘almost blind logically’ (p. 183). But his blindness was that of the true philosopher who after enjoying the vision of true reality has to descend again into the Cave and content with monstrous shadows in the gloom” (F. C. S. Schiller,
The shorter notices, from both the popular and academic press, veer from suggesting the book’s importance to questioning its value. Book Monthly puts it a bit mildly when it states that “the positions taken up in Formal Logic will arouse much discussion.” Some, such as the Academy, take Schiller as a particular, and positive, special case: “the special importance and interest of Dr. Schiller’s treatise lies in the fact that it is the work of a professional teacher, who admits that he has passed through the fog of disillusion to the light of discovery.” The Dublin Daily Press can’t understand why Schiller expends so much time arguing against already outdated versions of Formal Logic; clearly, it seems, his “pragmatism has run away with him.”

The Nation attempts to explain the reason why Schiller is still tackling supposedly dead topics. It argues that “Dr. Schiller, in common with all (or nearly all) teachers of formal logic at Oxford, and the vast majority elsewhere, is ignorant of the work that has been done on the subject during the last sixty-eight years.”

review of Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, by William James, Mind 20, no. 80 [October 1911]: 573).


34 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Dublin Daily Press, n.d., Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, [1912], Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The tone throughout is one of incredulousness. They find it a “pity” Schiller “should think it necessary to expend so much literary energy in flogging a lot of dead horses.” Schiller replies with what appears to be the comment “2 live asses.” After questioning Schiller’s belief that the work of Alfred Sidgwick—particularly his criticism of syllogisms—is in any way earth-shaking, the review says that “criticism may be left to the reader.” Schiller replies “therefore / writer is incapable of it!”

35 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Nation, 18 May 1912, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The review suggests that Schiller complains that “all formal logic is worthless.” Schiller underlines worthless and writes above it “meaningless.” The review then suggests that it likely a critic of formal logic will not state its “case better than it

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Nothing and much bad reasoning.”

Science Progress aims to pose a more constructive challenge. It notes that Schiller’s style is “vigorous” and that his claims are “relevant.” But it questions why, “in so large and bulky a volume, that there has not been an attempt at definite and positive construction. Or is pragmatism merely a revolt from the current academic intellectualism?”

In August 1912, the longer notices from his academic peers begin to flow in. Max Eastman offers, in the Journal of Philosophy, a critical (in more than one sense) review similar in substance to that found in Science Progress. The thrust of Eastman’s critique is thus: while it is a book that will give instructors who wade through the difficulties of the subject “the same comfort that profanity would,” Schiller “so little succeeds in exemplifying” the pragmatic (or value) theory of knowledge that is his cause. As Eastman sees it, Formal Logic is flawed because it is based on an unsound premise: to do something new, one must destroy that which is old. Such a stance is as intellectualist as the worst of those Schiller has criticized in the past. He asks, rhetorically, if this is “not the typical academic assumption that fills our libraries with rubbish and gas?”

Far better, claims Eastman, if Schiller had identified how the new could improve the old, how the latter still exerted useful influences upon a search for the former.

has been stated by its advocates.” Schiller underlines this passage, places an asterisk next to it, and then writes along the bottom of the page: “Wd it not be presumptuous to try to outdo 50 generations of logicians?”

Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Tablet, 18 May 1912, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Underneath the word “Nothing” Schiller draws an “=" followed by: “Formal Logic?”

Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Science Progress, January 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

Max Eastman, “Mr. Schiller’s Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 17 (15 August 1912): 463; 468.

Eastman, “Mr. Schiller,” 464.
In December, Schiller responds in the same journal. His most basic issues of contention are ones of term; what, in Eastman’s view, is formal logic, as he views it or as he sees it misconstrued by Schiller? No answer is to be found. Absent a response, Schiller asserts that it is formal logic’s attempts at consistency, independent of any practical application, that render it an ideal best suited to be done away with if one wants to get at actual reasoning. He sees Eastman, like B. Russell, as an intellectualist who would depict those who oppose formal logic on its own inconsistency as adopting the “anything handy as true” approach. Schiller also struggles to understand how it is that Eastman can claim to be defending a position similar to his, when Eastman so obviously is setting out arguments that play into an anti-pragmatic attitude. He

40 There is an intriguing comment at the start of this article; though one that deserves—given the focus of this project—only this contextual elaboration. Schiller states: “Professor Howison is said once to have remarked to William James, ‘James, philosophers always say they want ‘recognition’; but what they really want it praise.’ I find, however, that I myself am too perverse, hardened, or unphilosophic to want either, and so am a little disappointed with Mr. Eastman’s review of my ‘Formal Logic’” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Problem of Formal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 25 [5 December 1912]: 687). George Holmes Howison (1834-1916) was an American philosopher who taught briefly at Harvard in the late 1880s but spent the majority of his career (and founded the philosophy department) at the University of California, Berkeley. On several occasions, he traveled to Europe: to do advanced study in Berlin in the early 1880s and to visit England in the early 1900s. It is during this latter visit that he made an acquaintance with Schiller. Howison wrote to a friend of his experiences at a meeting which he attended: “there was a ‘Symposium’ on question whether a metaphysical System is possible, by a Mr. Leigh (who read a flippant anti paper), Mr. Fairbrother (who read a somewhat wooden one in the affirm.), & our friend Schiller (who was brightly on the fence)” (qtd. in John Wright Buckham and George Malcolm Stratton, George Holmes Howison: Philosopher and Teacher [Berkeley: University of California, 1934], 114). This friendship played a key part in James delivering his “practical consequences lectures” there in 1898. It was likely integral, as Chapter Seven will discuss, to Schiller’s several lecture engagements at Berkeley. It also signals the extent to which Schiller was seen as a companion to like-minded philosophers in America. But there is more; it suggests the degree to which Schiller supposed the support of the right idea would, as with James’s views, win out in the end. As Buckham and Stratton continue: “And, wit as he is, even in a dreadfully solemn periodical, he begins his own paper discussing logic with the following anecdote of Howison which Schiller had received direct from James: ‘I hope it happened as related,’ Schiller writes privately to Howison” (Buckham and Stratton, George, 115). The book also contains, in select passages, further proof that James’s influence on Schiller, and on others in England, was in view to persons such as Howison.

41 Schiller, “The Problem,” 688.

42 Schiller, “The Problem,” 689.

43 Schiller, “The Problem,” 690. It should be noted that the slander of “intellectualist” seems oddly placed as regards Eastman. It is more likely that Eastman is, at least at this point in time, more correctly placed within the social camp of the Chicago School (as against the psychological camp of James and Schiller). To wit, Eastman made reference to an alternative approach to that of Schiller: John Dewey’s 1910 How We Think (for reference, see Eastman, “Mr. Eastman,” 468).
suspects a traitor in his midst, one who is “really an intellectualist masquerading as a pragmatist in order to reduce pragmatism to absurdity and to sow dissensions in its camp.”

Traitor or not, Eastman cannot forgo a reply in the very same issue on the very next page. And his tone is strident: “I studied his book and made an earnest effort to tell the truth about it. . . . As I did my best, however, I am not going to try again.” What Eastman does do is tackle two points raised by Schiller. First, Eastman argues that Schiller’s conception of his understanding of formal logic was predicated on, not the topic itself, but the criticism of the book. Second, Eastman suggests that both he and Schiller are in agreement on the priority of value over truth, even if the latter is inclined to see them as divided on the subject. In the main, though, Eastman is as displeased with Schiller’s reply as Schiller was with Eastman’s criticism. Implying that Schiller engages in fallacious reasoning (ad hominem being the likely label), Eastman suggests such extraneous reasoning is what leads people “back into the text-book where we could classify it, and call it by a Latin name, and get all those other medieval satisfactions out of it.”

A possible explanation for why one, seemingly from the pragmatist camp, would choose to criticize a work supporting Pragmatism is found in another review this year. In September 1912, Bulgarian born philosopher Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff (1887-1976) reviews the book for the Philosophical Review. He finds time to both implicitly praise and explicitly question what has been called by others Schiller’s “destructive scheme” to lay waste to formal logic. As to the former, he notes how Schiller suggests that syllogisms can be used to study doubtful points and

44 Schiller, “The Problem,” 691.
46 Eastman, “Rejoinder,” 693.
that the distinctions between Inductive and Deductive logic are of little practical use. But he also suggests “that a body of thought pragmatically so worthless should for twenty centuries have dominated the human mind, is surely a paradox, which Dr. Schiller does not recognize as he should.”

The book, overall, “does full justice to his keenness and directness of attack, but it lacks the sympathy of reinterpretation which his subject demands; and its frequent lack of fairness to the older discussions of Logic which do not adopt the pragmatic formula, go far towards destroying the seriousness and usefulness of the undertaking.” Tsanoff, straddling the positives and negatives found in Schiller’s work, nonetheless arrives at a similar conclusion to that of Eastman: insistence, even that which advances insights, can be overwhelmed by the tone of one’s distinctions. Taken together, Eastman and Tsanoff posit the limits of Schiller’s

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47 Radoslav A. Tsanoff, review of Formal Logical: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Philosophical Review 21, no. 5 (September 1912): 603. Two years prior Tsanoff earned his doctorate from Cornell; two years later he would take a position at Rice University in Houston, Texas, where he would remain for the remainder of his academic career.

48 Tsanoff, review, 604.

49 Tsanoff, review, 604.

50 Four months later, R. F. Alfred Hoernle offers a further glimpse into how people view Schiller’s text. First, Hoernle contextualizes Schiller’s attack from within Britain, noting that “it is taught to larger numbers of students than any other philosophical subject, and that to many of these students it is the only glimpse of philosophy they ever get.” And he grants Eastman’s claims to the positive functions of logic while nodding to Tsanoff’s arguments against Schiller’s polemic insistence. The problem, as he sees it, is one of results. “For Pragmatism has, perhaps, so far been too lavish of promises and too chary of fulfillment—spendthrift in criticism, niggardly in reconstruction. It has lived in an atmosphere of perpetual polemics. That is probably why, for the last two or three years, the movement has not advanced much” (R. F. Alfred Hoernle, review of Formal Logical: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 22, no. 85 [January 1913]: 102; 110). It should be noted that this lag in progress corresponds with the time of James’s death.

And feeling that sort of pressure, whether real or imagined, to carry on the mantle of Pragmatism, Schiller suggests no retreat on the points—Formal Logic’s fundamental uselessness, the psychological as against social approach to the reform of the same—under debate. In February 1913 letter he suggests to another critic: “my way of dealing with the doctrine that ‘Logic’ is concerned with the ‘products’ of the processes of reasonings is to show that these are just words, + forms for meaning + not meanings. From this it follows that ‘logic’ . . . is not in fact concerned with, or relevant to, actual thinking. If you had persevered to the end of my book you w’d have learnt also that why ‘logic’ cannot concern itself with actual meaning, + seen that your supposition that it is merely ‘natural logic fortified’ is groundless” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to [Paul V. M.] Benecke, 16 February 1913, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
conception of producing a systematic work. By working to destroy, rather than to rebuild, Schiller is seen as giving up the most basic of Pragmatism’s contentions: that which is held as true proves useful. A smoldering pile of debris may be fodder for some of the popular press; but it is refuse to be pushed aside by philosophers, pragmatist or otherwise.

If anything, Schiller’s additional public output at this time only furthers the sense of the divide between the popular and philosophic press. Towards the end of 1912 he brings out new editions of Humanism and Studies in Humanism. Both are well received in the general notices. So well received that it seems as if the scholarly debates were occurring in a vacuum. Noting that the reprints of Humanism and Studies in Humanism come on the heels of Schiller’s “purely destructive criticism” in Formal Logic, the Athenaeum sees them as constructive signs of the contemporary “demand for philosophic literature of the highest class.” It notes that they both, in their way, continue to lead the charge against those idealists who tend “to ignore minds in the plural.” In light of Schiller’s continued salvos against these idealists, the review concludes thus:

51 During 1912, Schiller also contributes introductions to two books. The first continues his attack on logic. In discussing the positive qualities of Harold P. Cooke’s Maurice the Philosopher, a Dialogue, or, Happiness, Love, and the Good, he praises it for forswearing hard and fast distinctions; “that every well-conducted reasoning inevitably starts and ends with certainty is the pathetic delusion of Formal Logic, and is manifestly false. The fun, the zest, the motive and the meaning of all reasoning lies in seeing whether a conclusion, which we have ‘demonstrated,’ is actually going to come true” (F. C. S. Schiller, introduction to Maurice the Philosopher, a Dialogue, or, Happiness, Love, and the Good, by Harold P. Cooke [Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1912], viii). The second continues the attack on Oxford’s intellectualist training even as it raises the issue of James’s legacy. In praising Murray for being a “young” devotee who is receptive to novelties, he suggests a commonality that they share: “Mr. Murray has (like myself) enjoyed the advantage of a severely intellectualistic training in the classical philosophy of Oxford University . . . The aim of this training is to instill into the best minds the country produces an adamantine conviction that philosophy has made no progress since Aristotle. It costs about £50,000 a year, but on the whole it is singularly successful.” (viii) But he goes on to suggest why a youthful approach in Pragmatism is also necessary to augment the groundwork laid by his mentor. “William James’s Pragmatism, great as it is a work of genius, brilliant as it is as a contribution to literature, was intended mainly for the man on the streets. It is so lacking in the familiar philosophic catchwords that it may be doubted whether any professor has quite understood it. And moreover, it was written some years ago, and no longer covers the whole ground” (F. C. S. Schiller, introduction to Pragmatism, by D. L. Murray [New York: Dodge Publishing, 1912], vii; ix). Murray (1888-1962), a person seemingly well-versed in the works of James and Schiller, went on to a prolific career as a fiction writer and literary reviewer for the Times Literary Supplement. Readers interested in an overview of his philosophical work are directed to John R. Shook, ed., introduction to Pragmatism (1912): David L. Murray & Response and Reviews, Early Defenders of Pragmatism Series, vol. 3 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii-xvii.
“We wish the critics good luck, though we fear that they will find Dr. Schiller hard to tackle in
the field of metaphysics.” The Dial sees the work as establishing Schiller as the British leader
(with Dewey the American) of the pragmatic movement, full of “that happy sense of humor and
of human values which characterized James, and which causes his books to attract a large lay
public.” The Expository Times sees Schiller as not merely a leader, but also a prophet: “All
that Schiller prophesied for Humanism—even for that word as a better title for the philosophical
movement than Pragmatism—has come to pass. The future is with this movement, and with this
as its name.” The reactions of the critics at large point to two possible stances. They could
simply be unaware of the criticisms of Schiller’s peers. Or, perhaps, the popular press’s glowing
notes of praise are indicative of a general perception, a perception that the criticisms of Schiller’s
works are representative of how philosophy is generally practiced.

Regardless, Schiller’s arguments with his peers in the next two years do little to remedy
the divide in reception. He pushes his humanist agenda forward by continuing to raze logic
while attempting to protect the legacy of James. In 1911, Schiller publishes “Error” in the

52 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays and Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Athenaeum,
30 November 1912, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection
191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.

53 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Dial, 1 July 1913, Newspaper and
Magazine Clippings, 1913, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

54 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Expository Times, January 1913,
Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1913, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

55 Not that this supposition should be read as constructing an either/or dichotomy. At least one critic at the
time seems to share the optimistic view as regards Schiller’s mission. In so doing, University of Chicago’s Willard
C. Gore raises issues that both Hoernlé and Eastman discussed, albeit in less favorable ways. He notes that
“humanistic criticism and interpretation are applied with something of the fervor and conviction of a new gospel”;
such passion suggests that “a relatively large amount of energy is still being consumed in freeing humanistic modes
of thought from the trammels of a highly institutionalized intellectualist tradition” (Willard C. Gore, review of
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. In it, he seeks “to distinguish between Truth and Error.” Schiller suggests that “all correction of error is self-correction. There is no undisputed error, until it is admitted by the mind that made it. Until then there is only conflict of opinion, and to describe either view as an error is a partisan begging the question.” This view, obviously, contradicts any notion of formal validity and places the criterion of judgment squarely within the psychological realm of humanistic logic. Philosopher Lizzie Susan Stebbing takes exception to this article in the July 1912 Mind. To wit, she argues that his explanation: (1) fails to distinguish between truth and error, and (2) fails to provide a clear explanation of how “working” secures that distinction. If it is not the case that pragmatist’s truth criterion takes “working” to imply that which is “truth,” and/or if it cannot demonstrated in any clear way what they mean by their criterion, then these deficits renders Pragmatism “useless or irrelevant, or at best a truism.”

Schiller responds in October. He takes aim at Lizzie Susan Stebbing for promoting the conversion of the pragmatic maxim “all truths work” into “all that works is true,” thereby

56 F. C. S. Schiller, “Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1910-1911): 144. The article, a version of a May 1911 speech before the International Congress of Philosophy in Bologna, was also published as: F. C. S. Schiller, “Error,” Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia, 1 (1911): 140-53. The copy being used is of the former, with marginalia in Schiller’s hand, located in: F. C. S. Schiller, “Error,” 1911, Printed Copies of Articles, Pamphlets, etc., Box Thirteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

57 Schiller, “Error,” 151.


59 Stebbing, “Pragmatism,” 472. As was the convention of the time, many authors signed their articles with first initials only. Given this, and the rarity of female philosophers at the time, Schiller throughout his responses to Stebbing refers to her as a man. In 1931 he reflects back on this exchange as he attempts to lure her into another: “If Ms. Stebbing reacts, by all means encourage her. She is the most bloodthirsty of Amazons, but now that I know her real sex, I shall be polite and decorous. (Did I ever tell you the story of our first encounter in Mind about 1913? She had asserted, boldly but mistakenly, that pragmatists simply converted ‘all truths are useful’ and signed L.L.S. [sic] Unwarned by Stout, I took her as a man and challenged her to quote her assertions . . .)” (F. C. S. Schiller, [Pontresina], to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, [October] 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
posing that Pragmatism cannot account for a difference between truth and error.\textsuperscript{60} Noting that Stebbing seems to be appropriating the falsehood promulgated by the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore as early as 1902, and ignoring his own disclaimer as to its validity in 1903, Schiller goes on to suggest that the possibility of a disinterested, and hence useless, form of truth has never existed. Moreover, Stebbing is guilty of selective appropriation. Schiller’s own work never asserted that “a desire to have a thing true sufficed to make it true.”\textsuperscript{61} And Stebbing further obscures the pragmatic doctrine by either ignoring or misapplying James’s arguments, even as she in at least one instance ascribes to James (wrongly) an opinion belonging to Schiller that is misinterpreted.\textsuperscript{62} Schiller is at least willing to assent to Stebbing’s claims if she is suggesting that “Pragmatism does not know of any \underline{formal} criterion which will distinguish absolutely between truth and error.”\textsuperscript{63} However, if she wishes to assert that such a standard exists, Stebbing finds herself in the company of none, as no one has yet to find a standard which can set the distinctions between truth and error definitively.

Not liking the company that Schiller leaves to her, Stebbing asserts in the April 1913 \textit{Mind} that her aim was “to call attention to the fact that unless the dictum \underline{were} simply convertible it failed to provide a criterion.”\textsuperscript{64} After noting that the essentials of Schiller’s critique are of no matter to her criticism, Stebbing takes him at his word. Noting that Schiller

\textsuperscript{60} F. C. S. Schiller, “The ‘Working’ of ‘Truths,’” \textit{Mind} 21, no. 84 (October 1912): 532.

\textsuperscript{61} Schiller, “The ‘Working,’” 533.

\textsuperscript{62} Schiller protests Stebbing’s collage approach to what pragmatists mean. In doing so, he directs her to a comment he made in 1911: “We have \underline{never} asserted or imagined that it is possible to pass from the dictum ‘all truths work’ to ‘all that works is true,’ \underline{but} have always understood the methodological nature of postulates, and been only too painfully aware of the vogue of errors and lies” (Schiller, “The ‘Working,’” 534).

\textsuperscript{63} Schiller, “The ‘Working,’” 535.

\textsuperscript{64} Lizzie Susan Stebbing, “The ‘Working’ of ‘Truths,’” \textit{Mind} 22, no. 86 (April 1913): 250.
argues that a desire to have something be true does not necessarily make it so, Stebbing posits that the assumption of the truth of his statements on Pragmatism are demonstrative of the desire he rules out of hand. But, without a criterion to prove their validity, Schiller has no way to respond. The larger point is that this line of analysis renders his argument “inconsistent.” If something is true because it works, but some things that work can be in error, there is no means by which to consistently apply the standards of Pragmatism.

In October, Schiller begins by noting that Stebbing is a “formidable antagonist.” But Schiller sees Stebbing as “nonsensical” in her blending of different arguments from different authors meant to serve her ends. To accept her assertions is to accept positions he finds untenable. First, for Schiller, “working” assumes degrees of meaning and contextual difference as it is applied to one or another situation. Hence any “‘truths’ remain (preferred) truth-claims, and retain an infinite appetite for assimilating further ‘confirmation.’” But, second, Schiller thinks that, in searching for a “criterion,” Stebbing conflates true and absolute. This is the larger failing of her argument. If intellectualists have failed to provide, and pragmatists only assert the move towards, a criterion of truth, it does not follow that both are a priori designations. In contrast to the works of idealists like Bradley or newer logicians like Stebbing, pragmatism does away with the need for any ultimate standard for truth and error. Instead, pragmatism moves forward by “comparing the values of different truth-claims, and discarding the less valuable as


66 Stebbing concludes this line of thought by wondering if the “absurdity of proffering a ‘formal definition of truth which includes ‘error’” [is not] surpassed by the absurdity of proffering a criterion of truth which fails to distinguish truth from error” (Stebbing, “The ‘Working,’” 252-3).


68 Schiller, “Their ‘Criterion,’” 534.
Schiller’s conclusion, then, is to note that Stebbing has foisted her view of truth onto the very doctrine that seeks to repudiate that view. In doing so, she forgoes affording those of her ilk a “notion of truth they can use.”

Earlier in 1913, Schiller pens a review in *Mind* of Ralph Barton Perry’s dauntingly titled book, *Present Philosophical Tendencies: A Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism and Realism, Together With A Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James* (1912). He prefers to junk naturalism and focus on the latter three topics, “as these seem to be also the three main interests of the author himself.” Schiller is surprised that Perry, a self-described New Realist, is so close to hitting Pragmatism’s most fundamental marks, yet falls back on—perhaps on account of his relative youth—the position, once proffered by “the terrible cant,” that there is a “strictly theoretic value of ideas.” But such a pure valuation does not exist in Pragmatism and it certainly isn’t found in the works of James. It is in vain, therefore, that Perry seeks to find metaphysical distinctions in the tenets of Pragmatism. And Pragmatism seeks—through James, Schiller, and Dewey—to repudiate “the antagonistic dogmatisms” of Realism and Idealism that

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69 Schiller’s point here is subtle. It is not that a priori designations do not exist; rather, it is that such conceptualization form the “prejudice” with which we judge things to be true or false. Hence, the continuing necessity of testing truth-claims against each other (Schiller, “Their ‘Criterion,’” 536).

70 Schiller, “Their ‘Criterion,’” 537-38.


72 Schiller, review, 281.

73 Schiller chastises Perry’s interpretation of James. If anything, Jamesian realism is predicated on a continuum of experience “and not on a conceptualized substitute for the immediate experience of continuity” (Schiller, review, 282).
such a metaphysical apparatus would impose. Schiller supposes all these “flaws” are the result of Perry attempting to prove his realism by the “proof of the failure of Idealism.”

Perry’s begins by noting that his October 1913 reply in Mind almost never occurred. Noting that at first he felt it “not probable that there will be any profit in replying” to Schiller, Perry wisely reconsiders on account of his “feeling of discontent” regarding the review. This malaise is the result of Schiller misreading his work. More specifically, the review obscures how Perry’s arguments about realism and Idealism set the stage for his New Realism. But Perry also objects to Schiller’s reading of his reading of James. The issue is not whether or not Schiller and James are in accord with each other generally; it is, rather, the degree to which their views are realist-ic (James) and in line with Perry’s arguments or subjectivist-ic (Schiller) and out of step with both Perry and James in a metaphysical sense. For a response that almost wasn’t, this proves a spirited start to a debate that isn’t over.

74 Schiller, review, 282-83.
75 Schiller, review, 283.
76 Ralph Barton Perry, “Realism and Pragmatism,” Mind 22, no. 88 (October 1913): 544.
77 There are two objections that Perry raises: (1) Schiller downplays as “academic” the fact that Perry’s arguments focus on exactly “the question at issue between Idealism and realism,” not on simply the failures of Idealism; and (2) Schiller chooses to ignore that Perry’s defense of realism is predicated on rejecting a key tenet of Idealism: the ability to postulate, ala Bradley, “unknowable realities.” Such details show that Perry’s realism, as against traditional realism or Idealism, focuses on the primacy of “appealing to the nature of the mind” if one wants to draw a connection between the object as considered and the capacity by which it is observed (Perry, “Realism,” 545-6).
78 Given the specificity of the last of his complaints, it is peculiar that Perry would then end by suggesting that Schiller sidestepped the overall goal of the book: “to summarize and criticize current tendencies as a whole” (Perry, “Realism,” 547-8). That said, it isn’t odd that Perry would be pushing James towards Realism—the revisionist project that culminates in his 1935 The Life and Thought of William James—and away from Schiller. For, even at this late date in the development of early Pragmatism, all manner of pragmatic conceptualization were being bandied about. In the same October issue, John Elol Boodin published “Pragmatic Realism—The Five Attributes.” Seeking to speak generally, Boodin explains that, “In using the term pragmatic, I do not mean to commit myself to any of the special doctrines which have recently passed on that name. I mean that any reality must be conceived as the difference it makes to our reflective purposes.” What follows is a discussion of the five attributes—being, time, space, consciousness, and form—which are “ultimate or irreducible kinds . . . all make a difference to our creative purposes, whether they make any difference to each other or not. Hence they involve no
But it is the end to what has been a busy two years. In that time Schiller has advanced humanism as much by repetition as by anything else. New editions of three books came out, editions which only intensified the fissures between Schiller and his critics and, in some cases, his fellow pragmatists. The sole original work, *Formal Logic*, the treatise that James had urged him to complete, failed as a systematic statement of humanism even as it succeeded in pushing the battle for humanism into new directions. And it is on that point that one should perhaps linger. For, in the upcoming years, Schiller will both double back and move forward. He will reclaim an interest in psychical research. But he will also more fully engage the newest avenues which breathe life into his philosophy: the necessity of Eugenics, the waywardness of Logic, and the memory of James. Though there is little new to say, there are newer reasons to say it.

5.3 ADVANCE ON ALL FRONTS: EUGENICS, LOGIC, AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

The start of 1914 finds Schiller turning to eugenics. To be clear, this isn’t Schiller’s first foray into eugenics. Starting in the previous decade, Schiller addresses a range of eugenic arguments, ones not always in evidence in contemporaneous discussions of the term. Indeed, if not for the use of said term and the clear classist and racist reference points, some of these discussions
would seem within the range of contemporary concerns. In 1908, in the *Oxford and Cambridge Review*, Schiller takes on the cause of reforming the scholarship system at Oxford. He challenges the notion that the school is engaged in the “wasting of scholarships upon those whose fathers can well afford to send their sons to college.” As Schiller conceives it, making scholarships a rarified thing—attractive to the many, but available to the few—spurs on two positive results: (1) they raise “the standards of intellectual aspiration and achievement” amongst all who seek them, and (2) they offset the slide into charity that has befallen the Continent, the unchecked effect of which would be “that in a couple of hundred years’ time not only the Japanese and the Chinaman but also the Negro may be the superior in sheer intellect of the enervated European.”

Two years later, in the *Eugenics Review*, he applies the concept more widely, supposing that nations should be reformed along eugenical lines. For Schiller, this societal application is consistent with pragmatism-as-method. As he states:

> The Eugenical State, being aware of its liability to err, will guard against error in advance by incorporating into its structure provisions for detecting and correcting errors it may


80 Schiller, “Eugenical,” 50; 56.

81 This essay is, in many ways, a demonstration of Schiller’s view that his is a consistent, though developing, philosophical worldview. Like the individual in *Riddles* who took part in the continuation, if not completion, of what he had termed in 1891 “the world process,” Schiller defends his eugenical position as both individualistic and social: “Individualism, as I conceive it, does not involve a denial of society, though it does imply doubts, generated by reflection and experience. . . . Now it is quite consistent with this to believe that there ought to be a social ideal, if it is added that individuals are the people who ought to believe in it and are the right instruments for realizing it” (F. C. S. Schiller, “National Self-Selection,” *Eugenics Review* 2 [April 1910]; reprint, [London: Eugenics Education Society, 1910], 9). The article was covered in both *T. P.’s Weekly* and *Public Opinion* (see “The Economic Value of Archbishops,” review of “National Self-Selection,” by F. C. S. Schiller, *Public Opinion*, 22 April 1910, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1910, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “How Society Spoils the Broth,” review of “National Self-Selection,” by F. C. S. Schiller, *T. P.’s Weekly*, 6 May 1910, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1910, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
commit. It will value individuality highly enough to grant its members freedom of
discussion and experiment upon all questions which are felt to be not yet settled.  

This liability to error leads him to slightly alter his educational concerns of 1908. In the
pamphlet “Practicable Eugenics in Education” (1912), published by the London-based Eugenics
Education Society, his focus is not other races. Schiller worries about problems internal to
Britain (and, one assumes, Europe). While scholarships should still supply “the highest classes
with an ideal and a personal incentive to self-improvement,” the sole focus cannot be on
financial rewards for the elite. Eugenics must be expanded to cover the entirety of a liberal
education. It must address the whole person, physical as well as mental, to craft persons who
earn rather than presume the status of being elite. Such an expansion is meant to offset the
problems of the “present sham nobility,” with its laxity and corruption borne of “unhallowed
unions of wealth and politics.”

Clearly, then, Schiller’s concerns predate the publication in January 1914 of “Eugenics
and Politics” in the Hibbert Journal. This essay, however, is the spike point in what becomes an
increasing preoccupation.

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82 Schiller, “National,” 17.

83 F. C. S. Schiller, “Practicable Eugenics in Education,” in Problems of Eugenics
Education Society (1912), 11.

84 In the same month, he takes place in a symposium with Leonard Darwin and Charles John Bond, a doctor
and co-founder of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, entitled “Our Critics Criticized.” The three are responding to
negative comments as regards eugenics. Schiller, for his part, again reasserts the essentially pragmatic nature of the
endeavor: “The eugenist, therefore, must claim what is conceded without a murmur to every politician, to every man
of business, and to every political theorizer however cranky, viz., the right to have the courage of his opinions and to
act upon them, if he will count the cost and forecast the risks, and abide by the verdict of experience” (F. C. S.
Schiller, “Our Critics Criticized,” Eugenics Review 5 [January 1914]; reprint, London: Eugenics Education Society,
1914], 15).

As is now sufficiently clear, I see this preoccupation as a continuation of, not deviation from, his
pragmatism. However, like past commentators’ treatments of Riddles of the Sphinx or his interest in psychical
research, this area of Schiller’s life is taken as decidedly non-philosophical. Given the extent of coverage Schiller
gave to eugenics, it is interesting to note how his biographer, Abel, chose to handle the topic. In 1955, Abel offers
these accounts of Schiller’s eugenic views. First Abel notes that “His interest in eugenics, while no one disagreed
with him in theory, was likewise considered rather extreme, and at least on the borderline of properly philosophic
eugenics notwithstanding, has been on advancing pragmatism as the methodological arm of humanism and as against Absolute Idealism. But this signals a chapter in his life where he seeks to broaden humanism’s reach by applying it **socially**. If formal logic enhances social evils, it is eugenics which stands as a possible measure of repair and progress. Schiller’s turn to eugenics as a practical outlet for pragmatism is not as off-putting as it might seem. To begin with, eugenics is experiencing some of its highest standing at this point in the century. It is a movement that seeks to reconcile, as Schiller had tried previously with Science and Religion, strains of the new and old:

> In their own eyes the eugenicists were both radicals and guardians of tradition; radicals because they considered themselves to be attacking many hallowed doctrines that had been shown to be wrong by modern science, and guardians of tradition because their aim was to keep Britain mentally and physically ahead of the rest of the world.\(^85\)

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\(^85\) Lyndsay Andrew Farrall, *The Origins and Growth of the English Eugenics Movement, 1865-1925* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1985), 4. Farrall goes on to note how the *Eugenics Review* (founded in 1907 as the publication arm of the Eugenics Education Society which was created two years prior), one of the main organs of eugenics dissemination in England during the movement’s first two decades of the century, sought an increased reliance on academic articles. Such articles, whose content Farrall analyzes, suggest that eugenicists were “more interested in social reform than in the study of human genetics” (Farrall, *The Origins*, 238). Such social reform measures also saw there way into public policy in the form of Britain’s Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 and the Elementary Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Act of 1914. The implementation of both acts—whose general focus was to educationally segregate “low grade defective” children known as “imbeciles” and “idiots” from the general school population—was restricted as a consequence of the First World War. But the mere existence of the legislation served as a politically sanctioned rallying point for the diverse grouping of interests of which eugenicists spoke in the first two decades of the twentieth century. As Mathew Thomson suggests, “mental defectives became defined as the central eugenic threat facing the nation. . . . the problem of mental deficiency provided a focus for a series of more general moral, social and demographic anxieties” (Mathew Thomson, *The Problem of Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain c. 1870-1959* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988], 20-1).
And 1914 is a particularly opportune, and troubling, time to attempt such a merger. The political scene in Europe is in disarray. Such uncertainty proves a useable catalyst for the eugenicists. They suggest that the destructive tendencies at play are those which eugenics, at its most high-minded, might remedy. Before the year is out war will be declared and Britain’s so-called

While the scientific evidence was assumed, ala polymath Francis Galton (1822-1911), to be in evidence and served to generate implied warrant for eugenic reform, many of those who spoke on behalf of eugenics proceeded along social and political lines, ala Schiller. Galton’s development of the theory of eugenics (he coined the term in his 1865 Hereditary Genius) served as a rallying cry which many prominent thinkers, both in England and abroad, saw as convincingly demonstrated in the social circumstance of a world encountering great industrial and political shifts. For an overview of Galton’s own views readers are directed to Francis Galton, Essays in Eugenics (London: Eugenics Education Society, 1909). For a surprisingly wide-ranging discussion (given the source) of the history of eugenics, readers are directed to Robert A. Peel, ed., Essays in the History of Eugenics (London: The Galton Institute, 1998). It should be noted that there is a significant difference in involvement in eugenics generally and membership in a specific eugenics organization. As even those sympathetic to eugenics are wont to note, membership in the Eugenics Education Society never breached the 800 member mark. Such divergence between official and popular support can create problems for scholars assessing the influence of eugenics. An interest case in point is to be found in the works of Celeste Condit and Marouf Hasian. Hasian, Condit’s advisee, published a work about eugenics that unequivocally states “[Francis] Galton’s ideas of artificially regulating human heredity gained popular acceptance after the turn of the century, finding large followings in the United States, Britain, German, and other countries” (Marouf A Hasian, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought [Athens, Ga. University of Georgia Press, 1996], 21). But Condit, in a work only three years later, states that “Eugenics was a prominent and visible, if not widely popular, discourse during the first three decades of this century [in the United States]” (Celeste Michelle Condit, The Meaning of the Gene [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999], 27). Though “popular acceptance” and “widely popular” do not match up perfectly, a caveat seems necessary: the extent to which readings of the rhetorical history—Condit’s was a qualitative and quantitative study and Hasian’s was a qualitative “ideographic” one—differ imposes limits on how one assesses an object of study.

Only four months prior, in August, the Treaty of Bucharest had ended the Second Balkan War which had followed right on the heels of the First Balkan War, began in October 1912. In the unstable political environment that was then European politics—a heady mix of Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and British interests—Britain still sought to maintain its role as controller of the continent. As Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson note, Britain’s diplomacy skills were spread thin; “though Britain seemed to be restored to her role as arbiter of Europe, she could not take a detached view even when her interests were not directly engaged” (Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, 2d ed., The Making of the Twentieth Century Series [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003], 123).

The relation of eugenics to these political problems extends back into the previous century. Britain’s central rival, whether real or imagined, in control of the continent and its interests abroad was Germany. This sense of tension stretches back to the resentments made to fester by the South African Boer War beginning in October 1899, conflicts in which the depiction of Germans as “Huns” had become prevalent. The British public, surveying the instability in what had been assumed the preeminent culture in the world, started to fret. As George Robb notes, “ever since the late nineteenth century, many Britons had been preoccupied with fears of national and racial decline, seeing their country’s flagging performance in the Boer War as unmistakable manifestations of racial decay” (George Robb, British Culture and the First World War, Social History in Perspective Series [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002], 7-8). It was not difficult to wrestle these gloomy prognostications from the actual facts in evidence. The war, which ended in 1902, came with huge costs to Britain’s standing. Though Britain gained the
dominion over Europe will be thrown into doubt. It is from within this unstable context that Schiller offers these eugenical arguments.

Schiller explains that eugenics can “be conceived as the application of biology to social life, as a sort of social hygiene on a large scale; and so it seems destined to make trouble in a world which has long grown used to unhygienic, dirty ways.”

Its value lies in disabusing people of the notion that betterment is the rule and progress is assured. With the increase of “an industrial system which exploits men as if they were machines,” with the antagonisms inherent in “the relations of capital and labour,” eugenics affords a pragmatic tonic to those lulled into complacency; it, like Malthusianism before it, might help society to see the danger and “enable our forethought to avert it.”

What is this danger? In one sense, it is to champion quantity at the expense of quality, to ignore what science and nature so fully well demonstrate:

For some bodies are intrinsically better than others, stronger, fairer, healthier; and some minds are strong, ampler, and happier than others. It is better to be born an Achilles than a Thersites, and a Plato than an idiot. Is it not worth while, therefore, to get for oneself one of these superior equipments for the purposes of living, or otherwise to learn how to make the best and the most out of the bodily and mental qualities one is endowed with?

surrender of the Boers, more than 100,000 troops were injured and more than 22,000 troops died—with many of both groups being laid low by disease rather than actual conflict—at a financial cost of over £217 million. And the Afrikaners, through a series of negotiations, were allowed to still claim a political presence in South Africa; the realization, then, was that “the British, for all their sacrifices, had not really secured their total predominance in South Africa” (G. R. Searle, “The Boer War,” A New England? Peace and War: 1886-1918 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004], 283).


89 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 242-3. The reference here is to those theories associated with the work of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), the economist who posited in the 1798 An Essay on the Principle of Population that, left unchecked, the population—meaning, in his conception, the poorer classes—would become disproportionate to the foodstuff necessary to sustain it.

90 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 244.
On the other hand, the danger is to mistake pity for progress. Schiller rails against propping up the “weaklings, wasters, fools, criminals, lunatics” who drain society. But this is exactly what societies, as presently organized, have done. “They have made no systematic and intelligent efforts at improving the human race or preventing its degeneration.” They engage in anti-eugenical practices such as war and slavery. The first cuts down those members of society which society should protect; the second allows “the inferior race to survive under the rules of conquerors” who themselves will not produce at a rate equal to their conscripts. Nor can societies appeal to any instinctual, biological, sense of progress. There must, Schiller contends, have been a time when that was the case, when the survival of the fittest—the fleetest of foot, the farthest of gaze—was the condition by which civilization advanced.

But that time has since past. “In the main, then, sociological development has superseded physiological as the foundation of social progress, and this has doubtless, on the whole, been a gain, though it has brought into being the phenomenon of social contra-selection and the elimination of the fit.” But it is a mistake to simply assume the higher strata of society supplies the question and the lower strata supplies the answer to the dysgenic tendencies of today. Schiller contends the real culprit is “the whole trend of social legislation.” Placing a burden upon the middle class, in the form of taxes, to pay for social reform schemes, society ends up

91 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 245.
94 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 249.
diminishing that class and furthering the gap between the upper and lower classes. By such ill-advised plans, society works “to tax the middle classes out of existence.”  

The eugenic problem, then, is essentially a social problem. And, for Schiller, no progress will be made in advance upon that problem until a fundamental change occurs in how people conceive of society: “the biological unit of human life is neither the individual nor the State, but the family.”  

But the promotion of the family is beset from all sides. Individualism misunderstands the function of the individual. “His proper place, whether for the male or the female, is that of a vehicle, a functionary entrusted with the transmission (or otherwise) of the hereditary qualities (good or bad) of his germ plasm.”  

Socialism errs in one of two directions, either in failing to meet the expectations of the individual, or in pummeling into submission those individuals necessary to the continuance of society. Political Philosophy, borrowing uncritically from the lessons of the Greeks, ignores the familial unit in favor of individual.  

Feminism involves itself in contradiction; “it does not appear to have considered that if the emancipation of women means (incidentally) a refusal to bear children, only those societies will survive which do not emancipate their women.”  

Along none of those paths is progress to be found. It is found, instead, in reconceptualizing the relation of politics to society:

There is no saying, therefore, how powerful an instrument of good the family may not become, if the ultimate aim of statesmanship is conceived, not as the meaningless triumph of abstractions like ‘the State’ and ‘the’ individual, but as such an ordering of

95 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 250.
96 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 252.
society as will tend to the survival of the better families, that is, stocks, rather than of the worse, and to elimination, as smoothly and painlessly as can be arranged, of those which are diseased or defective or tainted.\textsuperscript{100}

But for any such improvement to begin, those championing eugenics must look elsewhere for models, as Europe and “democracies especially” seem ill-suited to take hold of reforms disruptive of “inertia of habit and stupidity.”\textsuperscript{101} No, it is China and Japan that offer contemporary champions of the family unit, and provide social schemes receptive to the best that “Western science” offers. And even if it is impossible for Schiller to predict “the spiritual effects of Europeanisation on the fabric of their beliefs and institutions,” they stand in far better a position than their European counterparts.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, if Western societies are to be saved, they should seek, in a like-minded fashion, to cultivate the best of ideas from wherever they come. To do otherwise or, rather, more of the same is to exhibit “all the marks of senile dementia and progressive paranoia.”\textsuperscript{103}

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\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{100} Schiller, “Eugenics,” 257-8.
\textsuperscript{101} Schiller, “Eugenics,” 258.
\textsuperscript{102} Schiller, “Eugenics,” 259.
\textsuperscript{103} Schiller, “Eugenics,” 259. Reviewers take what they want from the article, though generally in the positive. The North Wilts Guardian calls it “outstanding” and of “extraordinary importance” (Review of “Eugenics and Politics,” by F. C. S. Schiller, North Wilts Guardian, 2 January 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). The Christian World praises it as “sensible and timely” in its recognition of the merits of the familial unit (Review of “Eugenics and Politics,” by F. C. S. Schiller, Christian World, 1 January 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). So, too, does the Irish World Mail comment affirmatively on Schiller’s call, which will “startle” and “challenge,” to protect the family (Review of “Eugenics and Politics,” by F. C. S. Schiller, Irish World Mail, 31 January 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). The Glasgow Evening Times praises it for emphasizing that “eugenics has become the most momentous issue in politics” (Review of “Eugenics and Politics,” by F. C. S. Schiller, Glasgow Evening Times, 14 February 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
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In January 1914, Schiller also marshals his arguments against the usual philosophical evils. Schiller’s eighteen page essay in *Mind*, “Aristotle’s Refutation of ‘Aristotelian’ Logic,” argues that Oxford has rendered a disservice to Aristotle’s conception of logic by focusing too narrowly on the *Posterior Analytics*, thus tending to “narrow the scope of ‘logic’ to the sterile and impotent contemplation of an impossible ‘ideal,’ which is utterly irrelevant to the realities of human knowing and insuperably obstructive to all progress of logical theory.”

Schiller argues, after an extended discussion of fallacies or *paralogisms* (which he takes Aristotle to argue as being, paradoxically, general conditions violated in particular cases or particular cases violated generally), that these demonstrate that formal rules when applied to concrete cases lose their absolute qualities. He extends these distinctions to Aristotle’s discussion of contradiction in *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> But it is clear that Aristotle is conscious of no contradiction, or even paradox. His doctrine in all these passages is the same, and it seems to him plainly true. The general validity of a principle does NOT in itself guarantee its application to any specific case. What is true in general may be falsified in the case.

Though these seeming breaks from formal logic may shock some, Schiller suggests that they actually indicate strength in Aristotle’s theory: in the abstract realm of pure science universals may be held as true but, in the actual world of practice, it is unworkable to hold to any such standard. Even in “the Snark-hunting” realm of pure mathematics, it is impossible to suggest

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104 F. C. S. Schiller, “Aristotle’s Refutation of ‘Aristotelian’ Logic,” *Mind* 23, no. 89 (January 1914): 1. Schiller argues that the traditional conceptualization of Contradictory Opposition—that a universal rule cannot be contradicted in a particular case without nullifying the rule—stands “as one of the pillars of ‘Aristotelian’ Logic.” But he goes on to suggest that the rule, when applied by Aristotle “to actual reasoning in the *Topics*,” is less secure; that is, the universal is transformed into the general, and the specific into the special which may render a generally true condition false in certain special cases (Schiller, “Aristotle’s,” 2-3).


that “qualifications are [not] needed.” Schiller is led to conclude that the theoretical Aristotle was tested by the practical Aristotle: "it is clear as his subject becomes more and more concrete it forces him farther and farther away from his formal doctrine, until he comes into direct opposition to it.” Schiller concludes that, even when an Aristotelian law works in abstract, it resists working in practice, being theoretically sound but in application barren.

This insistence on testing theory by way of practice is given even greater expression in Schiller’s July address upon being elected the President of the Society for Psychical Research. He begins by noting the seeming contradiction of having a philosopher lead a scientific organization:

For the philosophic temper seems to be contemptuous of the minute details which count for so much in science, and impatient of the slow but unceasing advances which constitute the normal progression of science. They contrast too much with the procedure of the speculative method, with its spectacular flights, gorgeous guesses, and hazardous predictions, which it flatters itself can be guaranteed by reasoning a priori. But he calms himself with the knowledge that many of the Society for Psychical Research’s past presidents—Henry Sidgwick, William James, Henri Bergson—have taken to the demands of the job and promoted the inquiry into psychical phenomena. And since the society has not suffered by its association with philosophy, the question then becomes which philosophical temperament is best suited to the future of psychical research? There are at least three: (1) the Owl, which “loves obscurity, gets on the wing when the day’s work is done, and pursues its prey in the dark”; (2) the Lark, seeking “preliminary exploration, which heralds man’s conquest of new

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108 Schiller, “Aristotle’s,” 14. Preempting Orwell, he marvels that in centuries of teaching this form of thought “no one should have arisen who could put two and two together and discover[ed] that the logical calculus has made them five!” (Schiller, “Aristotle’s,” 18).

 realms of knowledge”; and (3) the Pelican, “which does not selfishly seclude itself in the contemplation of the eternal and immutable and indifferent, but tries to be useful and beneficial to men.”110 Schiller concludes that it is best to pursue in the spirit of the Pelican, but in the wake of the ground clearing of the Lark.

Having noted what temper is required, Schiller proceeds to analyze the methods by which the work of the society can be carried forth. He notes, in reference to Bergson, that the path is not in the main logical: “The evidence of psychic phenomena, which we collect, is primarily historical, and has to be ascertained according to the canons used by the historian and lawyer, rather than by the methods of the laboratory experimenter.”111 The lessons of history, psychical and otherwise, are singular; they resist attempts to “multiply evidence” or assail critics with the “accumulating weight” of experience.112 And the passage of historical time contradicts the progressive nature of science. “In other words we must recognize it as an intrinsic limitation of historical evidence that it can hardly ever be, and can never remain, scientifically adequate, and that therefore our evidence also can never be made scientifically cogent, so long as it remains historical.”113

What can be done to cross this seeming impasse? The first thing is to recognize that almost all knowledge is, in fact and origin, historical. Even if events do not repeat themselves, events occur so as to either establish a higher degree of probability that a law is (more probably) true or in need of revision; in short, historical events can lend themselves to better attempts at

111 Schiller, “Philosophy,” 194-5.
112 Schiller, “Philosophy,” 195.
113 Schiller, “Philosophy,” 196.
prediction. But psychical research is beset by an additional problem, one that distinguishes it from other sciences. Scientists can limit the need to appeal to the predictive function of history by engaging in controlled experiments.\textsuperscript{114} It behooves psychical researchers, then, to “aim, not so much at establishing any particular ‘supernormal’ event, say a message from the departed, did veritably happen at a particular time, but at getting such a grasp on the conditions of such events that they can become predictable and ‘normal.’”\textsuperscript{115} In this way, Schiller aims to make psychical research, like all science, more probable and, like all theories held suspect, more palatable to those critics who demand proof. But Schiller urges for more. He seeks to make Psychical Research \textit{pragmatic}, insofar as it contributes to all “genuine knowledge” by increasing “our power over the course of events.”\textsuperscript{116}

But there are obstacles to this call. They are largely of a psychological sort.\textsuperscript{117} Schiller argues that the paucity of psychological methods suited to psychical research exposes “the general inadequacy of the conceptions with which we have to operate in analyzing phenomena that are offered to us.”\textsuperscript{118} Chief among these are notions of “the soul.” As Schiller sees it, “the soul” is a wholly elastic as a term of art:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 198.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 199.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 201.
\item \textsuperscript{117} There is an additional obstacle worth brief note. Schiller references a point humorously made in \textit{All Men Are Ghosts} (1913), by the British Unitarian Lawrence Pearsall Jacks (1860-1955). Therein ghosts discuss the purported existence of humans. The ghosts doubt the tenacity of claims about humans based on the triviality of the questions posed in the human world (Schiller, “Philosophy,” 202). And so it has been the case in most instances of attempting to establish communication with spirits: the questions are intimately connected with our interests, but “the flaw in these questions lies in the one-sidedness, blindness, and egotism of the standpoint from which they are asked” (Schiller, “Philosophy,” 204). Rather than seek an understanding of the spiritual realm so as to establish communication respective of both spheres, the demand has been placed on spirits to act according to our dictates. Framed in such a way, what could possibly recommend answers from beyond? And what arrogance it is to assume that spirits lay waiting to answer to our every beck and call.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 207.
\end{itemize}
It embraces or expresses, in varying proportions, the notions of a principle to explain life, consciousness, spontaneous mobility, breathing, sleeping, dreaming, and possibly others. It is conceived as material or immaterial, as simple, multiple, or both at once, as the real man, or as a shadow reflect, as separable from its body and capable of inhabiting others, usually surviving death and often pre-existing birth.\textsuperscript{119}

Of all these varied meanings, Schiller conceives the worst to have been ascribing to “the soul” a sense of substance, of immutability. Such a conception flies in the face of “the course of inner experience.”\textsuperscript{120} We learn about and experience things \textit{in process} and to make the soul thing-like is to respond to the difficulties of conceiving a soul by making it into something it is not.

Similar challenges beset our understanding of “reality.” It can be seen to mean the formal aspects of an “object of discourse,” the psychological sense in which “anything is ‘real’ that is experienced,” or the pragmatic notion that “the ‘real’ is the important.”\textsuperscript{121} But psychical research, like all that aspires to be scientific, deals with reality that is at once spread across all these definitions. And, Schiller posits, psychical research more honestly takes the challenges of science to heart. In working over “the rubbish heaps of all the sciences for residual products of value,” it asks whether “the distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ is as rigid and absolute as we commonly assume.”\textsuperscript{122} By such provocations, psychical research might deal a blow to “the accounts of ultimate reality given by the various philosophies and religions.”\textsuperscript{123} A view incapable of historical verification, let alone present-day improvement, is a curio made curious by its lack of usefulness.

\textsuperscript{119} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 209.

\textsuperscript{120} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 211.

\textsuperscript{121} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 212-3.

\textsuperscript{122} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 214-5.

\textsuperscript{123} Schiller, “Philosophy,” 217.
By its attempts to refine and improve its methods, psychical research might also remind the sciences of their essentially pragmatic character. Each new discovery has been an advance on one front as much as it has been a defeat for another. “For the sciences must all conceive themselves as progressive. Hence they cannot regard their ‘truths’ as final, but must continually labour to improve their statement and to extend their sway.”

Taken together, these promising paths suggest that psychical research is not “trivial, hackneyed, or devoid of the most varied connections with life, science, and philosophy.” Though the challenges aforementioned stand in the way of success, they in no way suggest this as a task not worthy of being taken up.

That is, essentially, the rationale behind each of these three articles: risk is no excuse not to try. A continent on the decline might suffer a larger measure of pessimism. But is it not better to seek out potential avenues for an optimistic rebirth? Logic may seem a historical riddle resolved in the complex ledgers of Oxonian thinkers. Yet will it not admit of alternative answers tendered on the back of actual practice? Science’s propitious predictions more and more throw down against older and less secure narratives of religion. But need the increased fortunes of science signal the death knell for spiritual curiosity? And in each case—in his support for eugenic, logical, and psychical reforms—Schiller brackets the more speculative question of “what if” with the more headstrong “why not?” With man as the measure there is nothing out of

124 Schiller, “Philosophy,” 118.

125 Schiller, “Philosophy,” 220.

126 And pessimism was likely a general feeling given the political situation in Europe. In the previous month, on 28 June 1914, Austrian-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated. The resulting months leading up to Britain’s 4 August declaration of war—on the side of France and Russia, as against Austria-Hungary and Germany—laid bare “the sense of rising tension . . . which ended in the breakdown of the European state systems” (Steiner and Neilsen, Britain, 233). While Schiller would continue his philosophical crusade in journals and books, he would do so for the next several years against a backdrop of war.
bounds, nothing that admits of retreat. But there are, lurking amongst his glorious guesses, persons still willing to hold his speculations in check.

5.4 BATTLE LINES: CREATING NEW ENEMIES, REFUSING OLD FOES

In recent years, Schiller’s pragmatic humanism has taken in a widening range of interests. Such a project cannot, as Schiller must well know, be without consequence. And, in July 1914, there are two instances of philosophic quid pro quo: a response to Schiller’s approach to Aristotle, and a reply from Schiller to Perry.\(^{127}\) In *Mind*, George Robert Thomson Ross argues that Schiller’s Aristotelian math suspect. Ross believes Schiller’s whole argument is a dodge; he asserts that Schiller misinterpreted Aristotle to misrepresent Formal Logic. In discussing “general truths” and particular cases, Ross argues that the conditions of the latter imply why the former are general and not universal; Aristotle “no doubt would have admitted that when the god honoured was a ‘fiendish’ god and the rites by which he were honoured were ‘beastly’ it was not right to

\(^{127}\) Three months prior, Schiller also had cause for reflection. He reviewed Caldwell’s 1914 book *Idealism and Pragmatism*. As was noted in Chapter Three, Schiller notes Caldwell’s credit for introducing pragmatism to the British in his article “Pragmatism” (October 1900, *Mind*). But he questions Caldwell’s mixture of Idealism and Pragmatism. What’s more, Schiller criticizes his willingness to too quickly assign an American stamp to the latter: “But for the accident that the greatest genius America has ever produced happened to become a professor, there would have been as little academic Pragmatism in America as anywhere else. The American temper would (like the British) simply have continued to be flouted in academic circles, to find (intellectualist) ‘philosophy’ unpalatable and unintelligible, and to leave it severely alone. Which is, after all, the attitude of most minds to the subject everywhere, and of most of the best minds in the Anglo-Saxon world. As a matter of fact, therefore, its supposed conformity with the national temper has been the greatest obstacle, not only to the spread, but even to the intelligent appreciation, of Pragmatism. It made Pragmatism such an object of dread and detestation everywhere to all who shared the professorial bias that they completely lost their heads over it.” That being said, he is willing to grant that American remains the most receptive to Pragmatism, whatever its form, as it is there that philosophy as taught—not merely thought—is made to demonstrate relevance to everyday life (F. C. S. Schiller, review of *Pragmatism and Idealism*, by William Caldwell, *Hibbert Journal* 12, no. 3 [April 1914]: 705).
honour such a god.” 128 In much the same way, a syllogism is initiated by a major premise; but, Ross contends, “the major premise of a syllogism then is not a statement made without the qualifications that are necessary to a belief in its truth.” 129 Ross fears none of this will matter much to Schiller, as he is willing to privilege the risks of thinking without bothering to consider the consequences of testing. Applying the nautical metaphor, Ross suggests it is the tests Schiller finds so dubious that makes the boats seaworthy and “may let us visit strange scenes and give us quite as much excitement as we want. Apparently, however, according to Mr. Schiller, when we do real thinking we go to sea in a sieve.” 130

In contrast, the sinking feeling to which Schiller attends, in the same number of Mind, is Perry’s regard for his opinions. He regrets not getting Perry’s “approval,” and he further states that his stance was meant to be sympathetic to realism, as it—and this reflects back on his comments in the review—also works to combat the problems of Idealism. 131 Dismissing Perry’s anxious need to distinguish Idealism from Realism as unnecessary, Schiller is still more concerned to understand what it is that Perry takes these two terms to mean. Moreover, by attaching both highly ambiguous terms to the lumbering frame of a metaphysic or a method, one renders both terms of equal value, valueless, and the same sort of meaning, meaningless. 132 And he still fears the source of all this trouble is Perry’s belief, as advanced if not admitted, that “by

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132 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 388.
clearing away this idealistic argument he has somehow strengthened the position of realism.”

Yet, if each is equally suspect in their ambiguity, what is the victory in championing one vague view over another? As regards Perry’s pet project, the relation of object to its observation, Schiller also is suspicious. It is one thing to argue that a thing exists independently (‘independence of the immanent’), quite another to define what is meant by that ‘independence’, and quite another to suggest this then proves the opposite state, dependence, and allows for one to generate the conditions en toto that produce or describe the one or the other.134

Schiller’s last two arguments are focused on, first, the definition of pragmatism and, second, the conceptual understanding of James’s philosophy. Had Perry noted that the pragmatic criticism of traditional philosophy “is essentially a denial of the finality of the distinction between the ‘theoretic’ and the ‘practical’ interests,” and that its force lies in the psychological (and we could add biological) causes for action rather than metaphysical fictions, his argument may have developed “a unity and connexion” which it currently lacks.135 As regards Perry’s “exegesis” of James, Schiller posits that Perry distinguishes James so as “to only read his own realism into, and out of, James’s works.”136 Central to that misdiagnosis-cum-revelation is Perry’s own inability to note the true novelty of James’s work: the notion that many of the a priori notions of previous philosophy were “fiction, and futile fiction, to be swept away.”137 It is only in the works of Henri Bergson, Schiller concludes, that Perry may find a person capable of

133 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 388-9.
134 Schiller implies that by these technical gymnastics Perry’s realism is slipping into some sort of Platonic Idealism wherein “a transcendent reality” envelops the parts into the whole (Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 390-1).
135 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 392-3.
136 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 393.
137 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 395.
translating James’s vision into a metaphysic worthy of Pragmatism. To distort James’s theories otherwise is “to reduce it to mere banality.”

In October 1914, Schiller responds to Ross’s “logical” distortions in the pages of *Mind*. Schiller’s first general argument is that his “universal” rules and “unconditional” truths are as dubious as what Ross called “abstract.” More to the point, none seem safe from falling apart upon application. As Schiller notes:

> All actual cases of ‘truth,’ whatever the principles they appeal to, are individual and fully equipped with a specific context, i.e., consist of assertions made under special circumstances, and as the abstract formula or rule is merely a potential reservation . . . no principle or law can be presumed a priori to be valid in any particular application.

Given this, Schiller is in complete agreement with Ross that a major premise of a syllogism is conditional and wonders whether Ross is mistaking him for those whose “traditional interpretations have erroneously assumed” the unconditional nature of the premise. It is bad form, then, for Ross to argue that Schiller holds all Formal Logic to be gibberish, as all pragmatists are willing to assume a better stance once one is given to them. It is to that end that Schiller hopes Ross, after having found no “formal difference” between truth and falsehood—recalling here Schiller’s complaints against Stebbing—would be willing to undertake the search for some “real” distinction between the two.

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138 The example of Bergson is in line with Schiller’s assumptions about Perry’s “metaphysical” New Realism. But it also seems strategic. In the battle with Perry, Schiller attempts to offer up another philosopher in the place of his mentor James. A useful primer to Bergson’s view of metaphysics can be found in: Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955).

139 Schiller, “Prof. Perry’s,” 395.


141 Schiller, “Prof. Ross,” 561.

142 Schiller, “Prof. Ross,” 563.
And while Ross remains silent on this point, Perry wants to continue his discussion with Schiller in the April 1915 *Mind*. While Perry wants to reclaim the initial dispute’s three main issues—realism, Pragmatism, and William James—it is the issue of James’s that stands primary.\(^{143}\) Perry posits that Schiller’s joy at the broad range of James’s thought has not been supplemented by any existing overview of his diverse writings. After referencing extensively from the works of James, Perry notes: “James is not to be summed up in this or in any other paragraph, nor does his philosophical work consist in any *aperçu* [an immediate impression; a brief survey or sketch] which Bergson has caused to ‘blossom in the metaphysical sphere.”\(^{144}\) Perry concludes that James’s popularity is ill-served as long as “some at least of his ‘followers’ have much to learn before they appropriate him as their own.”\(^{145}\)

In October of the same year, and feeling the sting of being accused of misunderstanding James, Schiller returns the volley with a parry and thrust.\(^{146}\) Schiller chastises Perry for asserting

\(^{143}\) Regarding realism, Perry suggests that Schiller has missed his central point; that is, he is arguing for realism because Idealism has failed to establish “the necessity and universality for things of their relation to an apprehending, experiencing, or cognizing mind” (Ralph Barton Perry, “Dr. Schiller on William James and on Realism,” *Mind* 24, no. 94 [April 1915]: 240). On that point Perry feels that Schiller is simply mistaking a chance observation for a constant component of what is observed and, as such, assigning it a pragmatic stamp of approval. As regards the flexibility of terms, Perry sees Schiller as falling victim to the self-accepting fallacy: “I had hoped to earn Dr. Schiller’s approval by a painstaking effort to explain just what I meant by ‘independence’. For he had repeatedly complained that the term had been left undefined. But it now appears that he doesn’t want it defined” (Perry, “Dr. Schiller,” 242). As to the nature of pragmatism, Perry asserts briefly that Schiller is still wrong to claim interest as the best measure of truths, as the value of any one truth is “a different thing from the several specific values themselves” (Perry, “Dr. Schiller,” 244).

\(^{144}\) Perry, “Dr. Schiller,” 248.

\(^{145}\) Perry, “Dr. Schiller,” 249.

\(^{146}\) Schiller also feigns to discuss the other topics. He grants that advances have been made in the exchange. But he refocuses attention on the flexibility of the terms *realism* and *Idealism*, suggesting that any attempt to create a palatable argument out of their purported tension is only an indication of a larger argument “against philosophy” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Realism, Pragmatism, and William James,” *Mind* 24, no. 96 [October 1915]: 516). But arguments are to be had. As regards the continued mind/object issue, Schiller retorts that Perry’s handling of the issue in no way answers to his stance on the issue. What’s more, his use of terms is curiously self-fulfilling; Perry describes facts “in terms that support his theory” (Schiller, “Realism,” 518). The larger issue is, then, a matter of proof. On this account, Schiller feels safe in asserting his pragmatism against Perry’s realism, especially as it counters a tendency to mistake what is perceived for how it is perceived (referencing the distinction
that he called for “a completely elaborated alternative to James’s work.” A challenge to interpretation was, thus, turned into a call for lifelong study. But here Schiller engages in a form of argument similar to the one he used in discussing Protagoras. He sets up a straw man, asserting that Perry should be judged by a peer, and devolves his argument into an attack on asides (of his), not on content (of Perry). Ending with a digression, Schiller grants the positive parts of Perry’s views of James, while noting that his own equation of James to Bergson should not be faulted for the “technicalities” of suggesting their connection.

This retreat into personal attacks is unseemly. But it is more understandable if one considers it alongside an argument from the July 1915 *Mind*. The topic is not the new realist, but the old idealist, Bradley. In this case, Schiller pounces on a less vital, though still living, philosophical opponent. And it suggests that a transference of tactics is occurring, a changing of guard. One foe is retreating and is now less a potential hindrance to Schiller’s cause. Another foe is emerging and challenging not only the cause but the Godhead for its tenets. Support for this interpretation is found in Schiller’s letters. As early as 1914, Schiller is again scrutinizing Bradley’s latest views. But little, to his mind, in the way of novelty is found. After sending along a copy to a recent acquaintance, Tobias Ballot Muller, he receives this response:

> As for Bradley’s book, it is very convenient to have his ‘Mind’ articles handy in convenient form. Besides, the new matter in it interests me greatly. How little he has grasped the fundamental contentions of your pragmatic logic is almost pitiable to see. If only he would stop pulverizing a conception of ‘practice’, which no one accepts, + devote some attention to the problem of meaning, he would be spared much futile polemical

between what is considered a truth-claim and a value-claim, or what is in the world and in the mind regarding the world). Perhaps the largest issue is one of Schiller’s most consistent complaints: the isolation of truth in a transcendent realm out of reach and, hence, out of touch, with reality. To proclaim these as theoretic, as opposed to fancy, seems worrisome to Schiller at the very least (Schiller, “Realism,” 522).

147 Schiller, “Realism,” 523.

148 Schiller, “Realism,” 524.
against what he takes to be pragmatism. [along the side of the page he adds: “Bradley’s scrupulous avoidance of any reference to your person highly amused me!”] On p. 1 he still defines truth as “that which satisfies intellect” -- + it is a satisfª of “a special kind.” As you say, he makes striking concessions when he gets down to details; while his interesting personal beliefs certainly have a humanist look about them.149

If this is change, it is change so incremental as to be merely bothersome. Perry and logic, eugenics and psychical research, are of more concern in a world that has as of late tipped into war. It is as if Schiller had finally gained the sense that James had arrived at years earlier: Bradley is an ill man, stuck in a philosophy which he won’t abandon, and should be left to the judgment of history. But Schiller still can’t resist commenting on this latest variation in what is by now a repetitive storyline.

And the five years since Schiller’s last sustained joust with Bradley have not been kind, if reviews of his latest book, Essays on Truth and Reality, are any indication. And the answer to a question Schiller posed in July 1908—“Is Mr. Bradley becoming a Pragmatist?”—seems all but (not quite) affirmative in July of 1915. Schiller lays out a couple of caveats regarding his latest essay, caveats which an interested reader might first assume are old jabs now lobbed as casual

149 Tobias Ballot Muller, Stellenbosch, to F. C. S. Schiller, 1 May 1914, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Schiller’s acquaintance with Muller seems only to date back to 1913; but it is a friendship that grew quickly. In a letter to Thaw in July 1913, Schiller says: “. . . As for phîI have just been reading an enormous [word unclear] + most complete work on pragmatism extant, written in Dutchman by an Afrikander I must get him to publish it in English.” In an interesting additional comment, Schiller suggests that he may have mis-judged the tone of Caldwell’s book: “There is also another pro-pragmatist book coming out by Prof Caldwell of Montreal” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 4 July 1913, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). In a follow up letter in August, Schiller suggests the rapidity with which the friendship is developing: “My Afrikander came + stayed a day with me at Oxford; a very nice + intelligent young man. He had not got the English version of his book [word crossed out] back yet from the Edinburgh prof. who after giving him a degree on it, was now proposing to read it!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 15 August 1913, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Whatever the intensity of this friendship, it was abruptly ruptured: On 23 October 1918 Muller, “South Africa youth leader, minister of religion and champion of Afrikaans, dies in Philippolis during the influenza epidemic” (“23 October 1938: This Day in History,” South African History On-line, available from http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/chronology/thisday/2004-10-23-29_extra-dates.htm, Internet.
observation. He notes that “the badness of philosophic criticism,” which is in part due to “the common habit of critics to perform their responsible functions by reading the preface and then proceeding to discourse about familiar doctrine’s in the author’s last book, instead of reviewing the new one.” As a result, Schiller comes to Bradley’s defense, stating that many of the negative reviews may in fact be due to this trait. But he goes on to explain that his defense is also based in the fact that he owes Bradley a debt. Not in the sense of misstating his arguments against Bradley, nor in the sense that he was unwilling to point to areas where Bradley’s idealism wandered towards pragmatism. Rather, Schiller wasn’t capable of seeing just how far Bradley would come in vacating the defenses he mounted against pragmatism only five short years ago, nor of seeing just how much of this pragmatic spirit underlay Bradley’s philosophy as far back as 1883. In fact, it was the perceptive James who saw fit in the teens to let Bradley work this out himself: “it was much better to leave Mr. Bradley to puzzle things out for himself, as he would then in the end convert himself to something remarkably like pragmatism, though very likely he would never forgive those who had forced this development upon him against his will.”

Thus Schiller won’t rehash those old quarrels, as they remain in this collection largely unaltered and still show “that what is attacked is not any pragmatism any one has ever held, and also that each successive outburst is the precursor of further concessions to the genuine article.” Instead, Schiller wishes to examine the components of the book which are new, the preface and concluding chapters, and which might lead to a reappraisal of Bradley’s philosophy.

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And original ideas abound, in both topics covered and old positions seemingly abandoned, that would initially suggest a sloughing off of some of Bradley’s most prized distinctions. Here, though, Schiller cautions: “Not that Mr. Bradley formally withdraws what he said before; in view of the infinite elasticity of his Absolute in accommodating any amount of incongruities in their ‘relative truth,’ that would be quite unnecessary. He simply adds some surprising novelties.” 154

This grafting leads to some interesting conclusions. Bradley makes a distinction between the Absolute and God, in that the former cannot be worshipped while the latter remains an imperfect vestige of religious consciousness, the first still remaining infinite and the second essentially functioning as a practical (read: varied) concept put to various purposes. But Schiller questions the extent to which this reasoning can be seen as pragmatic:

It not only seems to make mere emotional satisfactoriness the primary source of religious ‘truths,’ and makes no mention of any empirical testing, but sanctions the complete autonomy of every sort of truth-claim and a complete disregard of the duty of synthesizing the various sorts of ‘truths.’ So long as they do not claim to be absolute, ‘truths’ have a licence to be as inconsistent as they please.” 155

As Schiller sees it, Bradley is dogged by his apparent need to make practical use out of the appearances he once set so skeptically against reality. But he can’t get past the divide and so must instead: (1) ascribe a useful function to “fictions” pragmatists merely declaim as truth-

154 Schiller, “The New,” 351. The most shocking of these novelties is agreement from Bradley where none had been given by others before: “the bearing of dream-experiences on the problem of reality.” If, as Bradley’s argument goes and as Schiller’s references to his own work suggest, our dreams and waking life suggest two types of reality set to different sorts of purposes, does this not suggest the plurality of which Schiller and James have urged, does it not mark—as much as Bradley’s newfound willingness to dabble in the Society of Psychical Research—a wholesale pragmatic embrace? Unfortunately, no. Bradley is still cautiously insistent as regards the potential of “a single Absolute embracing and harmonizing the whole Universe” (Schiller, “The New,” 360-1).

155 Schiller, “The New,” 353-4. For Schiller, this is the sort of “ultra-pragmatism,” the collapse of what is true into what works, that all critics, including Stebbing and at one time Bradley, are tempted to posit but can in no place find. And it is paradoxically less than that as well. This approach also speaks of an immature pragmatism or a severely enfeebled Idealism, where Bradley is “willing enough to describe all ‘relative’ truths as useful ‘fictions’; but he still thinks that absolute truth ought to exist, and so clings to the belief that the Absolute must have it, seeing that no one else can” (Schiller, “The New,” 355).
claims; and (2) further distance himself from the reality of the Absolute by advocating "theoretical skepticism" against the progressive pursuit of experimentation.  

So where does this leave Bradley? Schiller can’t help but suggest that these seeming points of agreement can only be coincidence; “for have we not Mr. Bradley’s word for it that he does not read what I write?” Nor can they be seen as full-blooded pragmatism “so long as a thinker continues to cast a slur on human knowledge as being ‘practical makeshift’ or ‘fiction.’” What there is, then, is the fractured world of New and Old Bradley co-existing together with clarity falling prey to inconsistency. On the one hand, truths are useful, selective, and personal, attending to and being made by the active man. On the other, the Absolute, so qualified and curtailed as to no longer seem a monster, still yet to be found in any way useful. In a rare note of what can be read as sympathetic dismissal, Schiller ends:

> The epistemological value of the Absolute therefore is no longer negative. It has risen to zero. The Absolute no longer vetoes every intelligible account of human knowledge. Hence the pragmatist strike against the Absolute must be solemnly cut off. . . . And to quarrel with a prodigal father about an issue of this kind seems to be worse than irreverence, an irrelevance. Rather let us agree that the Essays in Truth and Reality are as fine a sepulchral monument as the Absolute deserves, even though it be of necessity a cenotaph.”

Rather than seek an advance upon a position lacking one, Schiller no longer dogs what has become a sleeping lie. There are other topics with which to attend. But, whereas the philosophical came to dominate the social in the past year, it is the world at war which increasingly crowds Schiller’s humanism in the upcoming years.

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156 Schiller, “The New,” 357.
5.5 UNCERTAIN FUTURE AND CLEARER METHODS: REFINING SCIENCE AMIDST A WORLD AT WAR

Stuart Wallace notes that Schiller saw the war as demonstrating “the philosophical bankruptcy” of Idealism, as “meaningless” in abstract as the war was appearing to be in reality.\(^{161}\) He also notes that Schiller “although critical of British policy . . . never openly campaigned against the war” for fear of the consequences it may have had for his career.\(^{162}\) Both points are certainly true. But they are true only as far as they go. It is more accurate to suggest that the war was but one more instance that showed Idealism to be wanting. It is more precise to assert that Schiller did not openly criticize the war because his feelings regarding it fell outside an easily put right or wrong dichotomy. His writings at the time, both public and private, demonstrate a continued attempt to broaden the social avenues of humanism. And, to do so, he must rely on explanations of his philosophical beliefs that are contextually anchored to a world in the grip of an “unnecessary” war.

The first clear indications of Schiller’s opinions of the war came in both a review and a letter. The April review of John Dewey’s \textit{German Philosophy and Politics} (1916) in \textit{Mind} initially strengthens the first of Wallace’s contentions; that is, it supports a view that abstract philosophy is of little value when put to a test such as war. Wallace makes mention of the passage where Schiller suggests that other factors are always at play—“appeals to honour, glory, loyalty, religion, plunder, and (now) ‘nationality’”—in sending countries into conflict.\(^{163}\) What

\(^{161}\) Stuart Wallace, \textit{War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-1918} (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988), 53; 55. As an example—and a particularly congruent one given the previous chapter—of such Idealistic abstraction, Wallace uses a speech by Waynflete Professor J. A. Smith!

\(^{162}\) Wallace, \textit{War}, 47.

\(^{163}\) Wallace, \textit{War}, 47.
Wallace doesn’t note is how the discussion surrounding this comment clarifies Schiller’s argument. Schiller praises Dewey’s dissection of the bankruptcy of German Idealist philosophy. But he also criticizes Dewey’s emphasis on that philosophical strain being a primary cause of Germany entering the war. Any notion, philosophy included, that is taken too far can lapse into the deficits it seeks to correct. As he explains in preferring Pragmatism over Rationalism:

> For the world we are trying to inhabit and control is too vast, too variable and too subtle to be caught within the bounds of any rigid system, and every step we advanced was to be won only by the unceasing correction of the human fictions that were discarded as ‘errors’ so soon as a more serviceable substitute for them could be devised. Yet these ‘errors’ reigned in their day as ‘truths,’ and our reigning truths are fabricated out of the same stuff by the same hands; is it necessary then, or wise, to delude ourselves by conceding absoluteness to our present dynasties?  

If Pragmatism is to be true to itself it should be suspicious of any and all claims to truth. It should, in short, act as method and advance as such.

A letter in the same month adds to the sense that Schiller is suspicious, not so much of German motives, but of governments’ thirst for and appeals to war. He begins by saying “. . . the whole duty of man has come to be to be sacrificed by ‘the State’ in a variety of horrible ways. I fervently hope that America may remain at peace + a refuge for civilization [American entered the war exactly a year later, on 6 April 1917], whence it may again spread over the world when the general madness has spent itself.” Of this, though, Schiller has doubts. And he is somewhat prescient in his fears. “But I am afraid it will not be in my time, + I can see no guarantee in the nature of things why men should not turn earth into a hell if they please – as at present they do.

In fact I expect things will get worse before they get better – the civil wars + revolutions are still to come . . .”

As the Civil War was for Americans of the stripe of James, so this war now is for Schiller. Later in April, the conflict is the focus of a letter he writes to Thaw. He suggests that “this life is a poor thing + this world incurably diseased unless they can be taken in a wider contest.” The appeals which he mentioned in his review of Dewey, even as they trump supposed philosophical justifications, are equally lacking, revealing themselves “as not only essentially immoral but also as equally irreligious.” He then suggests the larger turmoil at the base of his complaints:

Conceive e.g. a dialogue between two intelligent spirits who, as soldiers, have just been successfully massacring each other? [sic] How can they explain to each other or to themselves what it was all about + what was the good of it? [sentence crossed out] Will they not realize that what they have done + suffered has inevitably hindered their spiritual development, + that neither in this world nor in any other can the spirit be freed by cultivating hatred by insuring (?) itself to lies, brutalities + deceits + making itself an agent of destruction? The zeal therefore with which men are fighting everywhere seems to me irrefragable proof that they have no religion + have lost even the half belief in a better world which they professed. It follows that they will make this world progressively worse. This war has put civilization back 2000 years, + shown that at heart + in their moral nature the generality of men are still on the level of savages. (NB I always suspected this, + held that the apparent moral progress in modern times was due to the construction of artificial checks which in this war have been sedulously broken down by the rules). The next war, which will probably be the Semi-Finals in the World Dominion Stakes, will be come pretty soon + be as much worse as this as this [sic] war than those of the 19th century. In the Finally [sic] (between whom?) civilization will go under altogether + be blasted even out of the deepest ‘dug-outs’ to which the new troglodytes will have been driven by high explosives + air bombardments. If it shd chance that by this time some disastrous discovery has given man control over the immense stores of inter-atomic energy, he will probably contrive to blow up the earth altogether, to substitute for it a swarm of planetoids inhabited by microbes! A good riddance perhaps, but not what was intended by the lunatics who brought it about!!

165 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 6 April 1916, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

166 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, April 1916, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
For Schiller, this war is a test, a challenge to the optimism he so long has preached. It is a crushing amalgam of spiritual despondence and human senselessness. For these reasons, it is perhaps understandable that Schiller turns, first, to those who would profit by its wreckage and, second, to those methods which have till now offered him the most hope.

In June, Schiller warns the readers of the Journal of the Society for Psychical Research that the terrible strain of war is giving rise to the prognostications of prophets. It is an equal opportunity affliction, with both sides touting prophesies supposing to explain in whole or in part the war. But Schiller remains skeptical. He believes that “war-prophesies belong to the same stratum of beliefs and make their appeal to the same condition of war-neurosis, and the ordinary sociologist would not hesitate to dismiss them as unworthy of scientific attention.” “But,” he continues, “our Society exists for the express purpose of raking over the rubbish-heaps of California, Los Angeles.

In a letter dated from January 1917, the same general malaise, and quarrelsome tone, is present. But, with American having asked the Allies to state their intentions for peace, there is also hope. Schiller notes that Wilson “sees a good deal further than the public does anywhere, + he sees the deadly peril of in which the technical developments of modern warfare have placed all civilization, + the necessity of reorganizing international relations radically, in order to avert the danger. If so, he is the only great man in the political world at present, + it is extremely humorous that I shd have to direct your [postal stamps suggest she is again in the United States, in New York] attention to this possibility!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 28 January 1917, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

Later in the year, in March, Schiller is more convinced in the power of Wilson, even if now somewhat naively optimistic as well. As he states, “Wilson . . . will have more power than any man ever had in the world’s history + can determine the future of mankind, for ages to come. If he decides for a ‘just’ i.e. moderate settlement with general disarmament, cutting off the claws of all the govts, freedom of the seas (including prohibition of submarines) + a restoration of the rights of neutrals, he can make the prop of warfare look so nugatory that peace will prevail by common consent” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 23 March 1917, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
orthodox science, and must not shrink from the search for truth in unlikely places.”167 His task is
to go over the piecemeal documentation given to him by the SPR. Even with little to go on, “it
must be confessed that the evidence was so bad that it did not seem to warrant further
investigation.”168 Most of the materials, even those deemed “the more verifiable cases,” were so
riddled with inconsistencies of date and fact that even a brief check of their information was
enough to conclude them false.169 A typical example of Schiller’s attitude to the written record
is as follows:

Now the facts about ‘Mme de Thebes’ (as gathered from an examination of her
Almaknacks for 1912, 1914, and 1915) appear to be these. Like all ‘prophets’ she is fond
of predicting wars and catastrophes, and after the 1911 crisis [a military territorial dispute
in Morocco between France and Germany precipitated by the arrival of a German
gunboat] it would have been remarkable if she had refrained from doing so, especially as
political circles in Paris, with which she appears to be more or less in touch (probably on
their feminine side), seem to have been far more conscious of the critical condition of
European peace than those in London. Her prophesies, however, are mostly couched in
vague general terms, and she often ‘hedges.’ Moreover, the claim to a ‘fulfilment’ of her
previous predictions which she annually makes are frequently very ‘thin.’ She also
makes a considerable number of egregious blunders.170

Schiller’s conclusion, based on the prescience of people such as this, is succinct: “In view of this
material it certainly does not become easier to believe that the human race is growing in
enlightenment and increasing in critical intelligence.”171

A month later, the 1868 prophesy of a Serbian peasant named Mata is brought to
Schiller’s attention. The man, standing and screaming in the middle of a village street, is
purported to have accurately predicted the savage murder of the Prince of Serbia [likely King

168 Schiller, “War,” 186.
170 Schiller, “War,” 190-1.
171 Schiller, “War,” 192.
Alexander I of the House of Obrenovich who, after his murder in June 1903, was replaced King Peter I of the House of Karageorgievich. After being arrested and put in jail, Mata had other visions which he put down on paper. By none too clear a route, the story ended up being relayed by a M. Chedo-mille Mijatovich, in both a 1903 contribution to the SPR and a 1906 book. But these prophesies, focusing largely on a person who will rise from amongst the people to save and unite Serbia against foreign conquest and terror, meet with the same sorts of problems as those listed in the previous article. Schiller admits that the prediction of invasion would have seemed likely in 1868, but chalks up the tale of a hero arising from the people to a mere expression of “commonplaces of patriotic aspiration everywhere.” Both stories add up to more of the same: easily discounted and publicly ridiculed examples of psychical research in action. But they are turned to the promotion of belief in a time of war. That Schiller should be dismissive of their message only suggests that appeals to the war spirit are no less possible in the study of spiritual matters.

In 1917, Schiller is tired of puncturing the prophets of prediction. He returns to something that does not defy logic: his belief that logic is in need of reform. And, in “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof,” his contribution to Charles Singer’s Studies in the History and Method of Science, Schiller again sounds what has become his most insistent criticism: “Among the obstacles to scientific progress a high place must certainly be assigned to the analysis of scientific procedure which Logic has provided.” What follows is a sprawling, sixty-five page,


174 F. C. S. Schiller, “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof,” in Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 1, ed. Charles Joseph Singer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), 235. Singer (1876-1960) was an early historian of science. He held a lectureship (1920) and then honorary chair (1930) at the University College of the
treatise that can be read as an extension of his discussions in Formal Logic. The question is why? Why would Schiller repeat his complaints now? The answer lies in the fact that Schiller is seeking a reform to logic that does justice to the demands of science. If Absolute Idealists preach empty forms and war has engendered senseless acts, it is more understandable that Schiller would now appeal for a logic which answers “the need for inquiry into meaning and into the conditions of its communication.” The paper proper thus sets about the task of examining how better to explain the actual relation of logic to the sciences, so as to better accord interplay between both.

University of London, guest lectured at Berkeley and was offered a post at John Hopkins. He authored A Short History of Science to the Nineteenth Century (1941) and edited the original, five volume A History of Technology (1954-1958).

To be clear, Schiller had not let up his attacks on Formal Logic in the pages of journals. In October, Arthur Mitchell penned an article entitled “What Is Formal Logical About?” He questions critics of logic who claim “is a false account of thinking or reasoning” (Arthur Mitchell, “What is Formal Logic About,” Mind 26, no. 104 [October 1917]: 429). What follows, however, is a rather muddled discussion of what Mitchell takes logic to be. So unclear is the discussion that Schiller seems to be shocked into a polite dismissal that focuses on logic generally and Mitchell barely at all. Schiller asserts that formal logic “has been compelled to abstract from meaning altogether, and to make itself a literally meaningless science” (F. C. S. Schiller, “What Formal Logic is About,” Mind 27, no. 108 [October 1918]: 423).


To Schiller, the first and most obvious issue is that the traditional theory of proof does not correspond to the actual process of scientific discovery. Rather, it mirrors the procedures set forth by the Greeks for the purposes of dialectical debate. The problems implicit in grafting these dialectical rules onto applied subjects are manifold. For one, they assumes a rigidity of terms irrespective of shifts from one frame of reference to another. Now, in everyday situations, Schiller full well recognizes that we will accept the “valid ‘fiction’” of set terms. But a progressive science is not the same; “the meaning of terms often develops so rapidly that such verbal reasoning does not suffice. Hence the mere occurrence of verbal contradiction in a scientific reasoning is no proof that the argument is unsound. It may show merely that its terms are growing.” But traditional logic denied said growth by way of a novel trick. It assumed the absolute certainty of the initial principles whereupon “no possibility of a growth of assurance in the progress of reasoning could be entertained.” In sum, the limitations of its range became, for traditional logic, the proof of its design.

Traditional logic also works against an accord with science by an equally ingenious route. Logicians state that the act of discovery is so obviously psychological that it simply cannot be

\[177\] The cause of this error is also its source: “For Aristotle had no sooner worked out the classical formulation of the rules of dialectical proof than he proceeded to extend their scope by applying them to the theory of science, in the Posterior Analytics” (Schiller, “Scientific,” 238). The resulting problem, then, was to mistakenly assume the fixed terms of debate could be extended to actual acts of discover; it was to confuse an abstract or theoretic notion with an applied or practical one (Schiller, “Scientific,” 239). But instead of noting the limited scope of the abstract and developing better methods of dealing with the applied, the argument was reversed. It was logic that was seen as more perfectly conceived and the sciences that were taken to be beneath it. In a perverse sense, the initial usage proved all too perfect. “The Aristotelian logic may be said to have achieved its purpose. It was able to regulate dialectical discussion” to the extent that science labored “for nearly 2,000 years after Aristotle” largely undisturbed (Schiller, “Scientific,” 240).

\[178\] Schiller, “Scientific,” 241. This is not to say we cannot, in both the everyday and in science, strive for more and more certainty; rather, it is to assert that “if nothing is true absolutely, and every truth has originated humbly in a guess that has grown into a successful hypothesis, it can always be suggested that after all it may benefit a little more verification” (Schiller, “Scientific,” 243).

\[179\] Schiller, “Scientific,” 244.
dealt with logically. But this rests on a confusion of two distinct aspect of discovery: “the actual procedure of the individual discoverer, and the generalized description of the attitude of mind and procedures of discoverers, as they appear to subsequent logical reflection.”\footnote{Schiller, “Scientific,” 253.} The first case is, as a matter of history, obviously fraught with difficulties. The temptation is to tout the tale at the expense of the actual happenings. The further back the story recedes in time, the more likely the gloss on the relevant details. The second case, however, demands no such specificity of detail. For, Schiller contends, it is possible to develop a working account of the “procedure of discoverers, which may serve as a guide and model to subsequent discovers.”\footnote{Schiller, “Scientific,” 254.} That this account will not be certain, that it will be subject to revision, only suggests a practical desire to junk the search for certainty in order to develop plans for subsequent acts of discovery.\footnote{This focus on the act of discovery is central to Schiller’s revised view of science. Schiller makes clear the distinctions between “the discover” in science and “the prover” of traditional logic: (1) whereas the former desires to know, the prover wishes to demonstrate what follows from what; (2) the discover deal in the haphazard and often repeated struggles against the inertia of the tried and true, and the prover demonstrates how the causal sequence elegantly lays out the successive steps; (3) the first is hounded by doubt and frustrated in false leads, and the second assumes a stable starting point (Schiller, “Scientific,” 255-8). While some will complain that this artificially raises the psychological distinctions between the discover and the prover so as only to make the case for the first against the second, Schiller is not deterred. He argues that the options—in what is discovered, how it is discovered, and how it is then treated—distinguish a real living account from a real True account. Moreover, it provides a suggestion of what inquiry is really about and how logic should so conceive it: Logic, therefore, should regard as its duty to inquire (1) how the inquirer is furnished with an adequate supply of theories for analyzing and testing the apparent facts of his subject, (2) what methods are used to sift hypotheses and to select the more valuable, and (3) if it can, to add some hints as to how theories and methods ought to be handled. (Schiller, “Scientific,” 260). That traditionalists would recoil from the relaxed suggestions above is a given. And they do so by way of a common complaint against Pragmatism. Is it not, goes the criticism, that the testing of theories reduces to “whatever works is true?” Schiller’s response is that the key lies in studying the contexts where working is to be examined and in recognizing that not everything which works is regards as strictly true. Fictions, methodological assumptions, lies, hypotheses all work, but in different ways and towards different ends (Schiller, “Scientific,” 266-8). Truth and falsehood, fact and fiction, are dependent on their context for the assertions as to their working. What harm is there in statements that are only probable? What risk is found in admitting that what is provided is a starting point? By probable stances one proceeds a beyond starting point; by absolute stances one moves not at all.}
Implicit in this revised view are those resources which “form the scientific capital which is necessarily risked in research if it is to yield interest. It comprises (a) approved principles, (b) known facts, and (c) established meanings of words.” The first can only be taken in a hypothetical, not absolute sense. The second, like the issue of what works, is relative to context. Like principles, facts are subject to the demands of the work being done and remain plastic; “the ‘facts’ will not only look different but may really be different from different points of view, and for different purposes.” The third returns us to the notion of “the everyday.” In most cases “one cannot of course overlook the obvious fact that the employment of words is primarily determined by their established meanings, and that these greatly limit our freedom to use them as we please.” But as actual meanings shift, so too do the limitations on the words. In other words—itself a phrase resistant to traditional logic—formal logic has no method of dealing with the phrase “a squared circle.” But in context of boxing, and in light of that usage, the phrase can be explained.

By placing the absolute into the dustbin, a revised logic places the responsibility on the discoverer to push forward science. “If he fails, he can no longer plead that it is not his fault, seeing that he has kept every letter of the law and broken no logical rule . . . in whatever way he fails, his personal failure is pro tanto [as far as it goes] a failure of science to progress.” But the risk of failure is the price of novelty, and the success of novelty is progress:

We simply must have a science that can handle human life and meet human needs, and does not degenerate into a game with arbitrary and fantastic rules which depart from the

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183 Schiller, “Scientific,” 274.
185 Schiller, “Scientific,” 278.
actual conditions of life in any direction and to any distance unrestrained imagination carries them, and our logic must deign to study such a science. If to do so it has to ‘scrap’ its antique ‘ideals’, to abandon its pose of an inhuman, impassible, infallible aloofness, and to interest itself in the doubting, questioning, guessing, trying, risking, blundering, correcting, achieving that makes up the sum of human knowledge, it will receive an ample reward in the gratitude of man for a logic that has entered his service, and in the salutary influence which it will exercise upon his actions.”

Transformed, Schiller sees philosophy as attending to the necessities of life, and science as the method by which we attain answers for life.

But “the actual conditions of life,” once grasped, recede into the background, into history. So, in an April 1917 review of Francis Sydney Marvin’s Progress and History (1916) in the Hibbert Journal, Schiller engages in a discussion of history-as-selection. Noting that the text, as a collection of essays, struggles to find an appropriate definition of the first term, Schiller settles first on the historical one proffered by R. R. Marett: “‘change, in some sense, for the better’.” Such a definition might strike some as entirely too optimistic. So Schiller posits a moral description of the same, one offered by L. P. Jacks: “‘that process by which a thing advances from a less to a more complete state of itself. Now whether this process is a desirable one or not depends on the nature of the thing which is progressing.’” We can take the two to represent, as is implied, Schiller’s view of history. Combined, then, a pragmatic perspective would takes the evolutionary definition and subject it to the valuating one, in that what is better is that which


188 At least one friend agrees with Schiller’s assessment: “I read last night with approval yr art. on the logic of scientific discovery with interest + approval. I always thought formal logic out of touch with the live organism of thought. You never walk into the same river twice. At best logical theory experiments with a few cougelations [sic] or cycles fished out of the streams which tends whither it will” (Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 January 1918, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).


190 Schiller, Progress, 512.
advances towards a desirable end. But, and this relates to “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof,” a desirable end is not found in divorcing the context from its application. As such, Schiller criticizes approaches which are too heavily tilted to pure science and divorced from “the effects of applied science in transforming the conditions of life.” Such conditions qualify Schiller’s progress-as-positive thesis. As he noted, any attempt to test, to verify, carries with it the risk that there will be failure. Thus it is foolhardy to cast out the opposite of progress; as “it is not only vain, but positively perilous, to search out verbal spells that promise to bridge over the stupendous abysses of the natural world and to insure man against unavoidable risk of returning, as a prodigal son, to his parents, Chaos and Black Night.” Though a step forward is a productive one, it does not magically remove the possibility of a step in the opposite direction.

Such regressive nightfall is surely a reflection of the continuing rumblings of war. And its effect on Schiller—his continued push for a logic as used and for social habits improved—is bracketed by the voices of his friends. In May 1917, on a cheap looking piece of parchment, Knox jots this note to his friend at Oxford, while he himself is at war:

. . . there is very little time for writing (and still less for reading) in my present existence. However, in spite of the strenuous life, and the small opportunities for exercise, I am wonderfully well; and I wouldn’t exchange my present lot for anything on earth. I have been very needy (?) at times, but only once (before the real work began) had to lie up. Notwithstanding all which, the only thing I live for, so far as my private feelings are concerned, is the thought of getting out of it all, and bringing my remaining years to a peaceful close in quiet domesticity. In retrospect my experience of the psychology of the War will doubtless be quite interesting. The thing that has surprised me most is to find that everything from the outset has appeared to me perfectly natural – including the fact that other people are doing their best to kill you. (When I say “you” I mean “me”, which contradiction surely goes to prove that human individuality is mere appearance). As I write for instance, I find myself taking a mild interest in distinguishing between the crackling of bursting shrapnel, and the “Kerrump” of the more aggressive High Explosive, both of which, again, are very distinct from the sound of our own batteries

191 Schiller, Progress, 513.
192 Schiller, Progress, 514.
with which the enemy appear to be arguing; and I can hardly believe there was a time when I imagined that these things were not merely interesting but exciting. . .”

Here again we find Schiller at a distance. As with James and the rise of pragmatism in America, Schiller is once more placed beyond the scope of the events upon which he ruminates. His duty to career and country is, in contrast to Knox, being worked out in galley proofs and against formal ones. Schiller’s stake in individuality is not tested by the “interesting” experiences of Knox. So he continues to attend to that issue which is, figuratively and literally, closer to home: eugenics. This cause is to Schiller what battles and bombardments are to Knox; its consequences might reshape the appearance of the landscape which is Schiller’s purview.

In the July 1917 issue of the *Eugenics Review*, Norah March claims that “the War has just precipitated, not inaugurated, this national effort for the better preservation of child life.” In another article in the same issue, Mrs. Scharlieb argues that the suggestion of quality at the expense of quantity as regards birth and death rates is an erroneous one. As regards the first, Schiller’s question is not about preservation; rather, he wants to know what is eugenic about such

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193 Howard Vincenté Knox, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 May 1917, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. A subsequent letter dated 23 December 1917 fills in more details of his war career: he is assigned to a Balloon Regiment but, on account of some injury, given light duty and allowed to take an extended Christmas break before returning. As was previously noted, he was a Captain in the British Army who had also served in South Africa. After the war, Knox was often referred to in journal articles by his military title.

194 Norah March, “The Eugenic Aspects of Baby Week,” *Eugenics Review* 9 (July 1917): 95. March finds support for her views in the comments of J. Arthur Thomson. He suggests eugenics is not a clear cut issue. And “to have prolonged the life of a constitutionally doomed infant may not be too heavy a tax to pay on the profit of having saved a score or half a hundred from gratuitous enfeeblement for life.” Those engaged in programs such as Baby’s Week are trying give the already slighted a better chance at a better life. To claim one stratum as superior and another as inferior is to traffic in delusion. “That the ‘lower strata’ babies, who are brought by their mothers to the clubs, are often unnecessarily depressed by the limitations of the available ‘nurture’ has been proved experimentally by the results of more enlightened care.” Thomson concludes that such schemes provide a useful function that recommends their continuance (J. Arthur Thomson, Letter to the Editor, *Eugenics Review* 9 [July 1917]: 235; 236).

195 Mrs. Scharlieb, “Save the Children: Review Article, being a Report on the Physical Welfare of Mothers and Children in England and Wales,” *Eugenics Review* 9 (July 1917): 111. “Mrs. Scharlieb” is likely Dame Mary Dacomb Scharlieb (1845-1931), a person worth special study herself. A Catholic doctor who had worked in India, she both criticized eugenics and argued for the traditional role of women in the home, going so far as to fear the negative influences education could have on women.
schemes for preservation. On that point, he finds March’s argument lacking. Schiller notes “that one of the chief obstacles to improvement of human race, and a possible source even of its degeneration, is the wide prevalence of a deficient, or at any rate greatly diminished, rate of reproduction in the upper strata of human societies, as compared with the lower.”¹⁹⁶ To the extent that Baby Week programs only seek to foster the unselective improvement of children’s lives, they in no way seek to incur eugenical benefits. As regards the second, Schiller sees the argument as being a question of selection. If the birth-rate is low, “there cannot be much selection”; if both the birth- and death-rates are high, “there may be a considerable amount of selection.”¹⁹⁷ None of this is to suggest that Baby Week is to be condemned. But Schiller cautions:

The Eugenics Education Society should beware of lavishing upon the schemes of politicians an unreserved critical approval. The world has suffered more than enough from the effects of well meaning ignorance. And our function is surely to study the enormous complexities of the problems of social biology, and to warn politicians and enthusiasts that they should look before they leap.¹⁹⁸


¹⁹⁷ Schiller, “The Eugenics,” 234.

¹⁹⁸ Schiller, “The Eugenics,” 234. One of Schiller’s contemporary advocates was also taken with his cautious stance on eugenics. Slosson notes that Schiller’s “wit and power of analysis are doing good service” in support of eugenics. More specifically, Schiller “does not fall into the common fallacy of unconsciously assuming that the upper classes necessarily consist of superior individuals” (Edwin E. Slosson, Six Major Prophets [Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1917], 218; 223). But he also notes what he considers a change in Schiller’s overall philosophical style. Slosson suggests that, in the course of twenty-five years [dated from the first publication of Riddles of the Sphinx in 1891], Schiller’s Humanism has aged alongside him. He was once at pains “to tell the universe what he thinks of it” while he now seems more interested in translating those thoughts into action (Six, 227). Slosson (1865-1925), who was editor of the Independent and the 1920s Science Service, was one of the leading popularizers of science in the first decades of the previous century. He was introduced to Schiller by John Dewey. Dewey wrote to Schiller: “You will find him admirably equipped by previous study for his mission [the publication above], and a sympathetic, clear + effective reporter to his public of your important contribution to our philosophic activity” (John Dewey, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 21 April 1910, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Letters suggest that Slosson had planned to have the book published as early as 1914 but was delayed as a consequence of other projects (see Edwin E. Slosson, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 12 May 1914, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). The records of correspondence suggests that it was at Slosson’s urging that Dewey wrote a review of Schiller’s 1912 Formal Logic
C. D. Whetham responds to Schiller’s cautions, having been involved in three gatherings of varied type and composition. He goes on to note:

The children of the upper classes who were present had obviously a greater advantage, whether by inheritance or nurture, in freedom from such defects as adenoids, decayed teeth, etc. They were also larger, heavier, and better nourished. It was also clear that in each class, where children of labourers were concerned, awards tended to go to the youngest, probably because there had been less time and opportunity for the special defects of unguarded childhood to develop.\(^{199}\)

Whetham’s comments seem to square with both Schiller’s questioning of the unselective nature of such events and March’s suggestion of fostering general improvement. As Whetham concludes, “the local committee in each case held in [sic] it in their hands to make the celebration of permanent eugenics advantage or not, but that in nearly every case the mothers were encouraged in their efforts to bring up their children to be as healthy as circumstances permit.”\(^{200}\)

The arguments above again suggest that Schiller is, at this stage, a committed eugenicist. But they also suggest that he is a pragmatic eugenicist. It pays to recall that his arguments here dovetail with the ones he offered in “Eugenics and Politics” and are also consistent with his approach in “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof.” Relative truths do not simply imply that anything goes. Approximate steps carry with them both the risk of failure and the chance of success. And context varies content. If something has failed it behooves interested parties to look for a better path. In Schiller’s constricted social milieu, with nary the “Kerrump” of High Explosives, baby pageants are a test case for the promotion of progressive social biology. In his

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insistent philosophical approach, to not seek out a better alternative is to feign confidence in practices which have not been tested. Schiller’s social and philosophical approaches accord most cleanly the more both seek to improve the conditions—as he sees them—of actual life.

This confluence of the social and philosophical can be read into Schiller’s first academic work of 1918, “Cassandra’s Apologia,” in Mind. Framed as a dialogue between Apollo and Cassandra, a figure he will utilize in a later writing, it amounts to a simple and satirical defense of the premise that undergirds his social and philosophical arguments: the superiority of relative (practical) as opposed to fixed (theoretical) truth. It is no surprise that Apollo advances the latter position in admonishing Cassandra: “You had better betake yourself to a wholly contemplative life, and devote yourself to the prevision of eternal truth which you are privileged to behold.”

Such a stance troubles Cassandra, as it places her above the pains of mere mortals. So much the better by Apollo’s account. He is offering to make her “prescience painless and [her] life endurable by imitating” him.

But Cassandra won’t bow to this argument, or to Apollo’s curse that no one will believe her even though what she foretells will come true. Her reasoning? Experience influences the outcome of events and thus knowledge is only “a confident belief that is not doubted.” Apollo bristles at this suggestion for, independent of what anyone thinks, “the true is true and the false is false.” Cassandra counters that “the truth does seem to be affected by what men believe about it. The belief that something will happen seems to make it happen, or else to make people take

202 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 86.
204 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 88.
measure to frustrate it.”

Such nonsense, retorts Apollo, doesn’t change the fact that no one will believe her. What then, Cassandra replies, if she acts in support of the false so only to get people to endorse the true? This upsets and confuses Apollo, as it “would set at naught” all the punishment he intended to inflict upon her and lead him to doubt that she believes what she says. And why, wonders Cassandra, would he doubt her? “Because you act so differently. And I suspect that your acts are better witnesses to your beliefs than your words. For it is easier to deceive by words than by deeds.” This pleases Cassandra. “It seems to me, Apollo, that you are now speaking like a pragmatist.”

Apollo is unfamiliar with the term. Understandably so, as it won’t be understood for at least “another 3,000 years” and, even then, “men will say that it is nothing new and that they have always been pragmatists.” Which doesn’t faze Apollo, as the past and the present are only of concern to mere mortals. So Cassandra asks if there would be any harm in predicting Apollo’s future. So be it, rejoins Apollo, if only for her amusement. “Well then I prophesy that you too will be changed—into a butterfly, Apollo, but will still remain a Parnassian.” Even if it were true, reasons Apollo, at least he would still be beautiful and still be a god.

“There will be no gods left on Olympus and the rest will fare worse than you.”

“I must say, Cassandra, that though of course I know your prophesies are jokes, they are in the worst possible taste. Go home to my temple and devote yourself to your priestly functions. I am sure my sacred image has not been dusted for a week.”

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205 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 89.

206 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 90.

207 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 90.

208 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 90-1.

209 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 91.

210 Schiller, “Cassandra,” 91.
A play on words that signals a potential change in actions, Schiller transposes dusty idolatry with natural beauty.211 Where beliefs are concerned, no one, even Gods, can be sure of their fate. But better to be uncertain and to try than to be sure and rendered thus dustily discarded.

And uncertainty is certainly the mood in the months that follow. Of particular interest are the letters he receives from Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare (1856-1924). Conybeare, a well-recognized British religious scholar and former professor at Oxford, began as a war supporter. But, as the war progressed, his views changed, changed so much so that he eventually came to feel that Britain had been tricked into war and was now being held in lockstep to the demands of France and Russia. His frank expression of these views led him to be castigated by his peers. And they are views, that on account of at least one telling, Schiller himself held.212 With America having entered the war only a few months earlier (in April 1917) and battles along the Western front still being fought, these letters are instructive. In January, Conybeare writes to Schiller:

Imbeciles is the only word wh. suits our statesmen. . . . So far Wilson has only made war on the 30 millions odd of his fellow cits who are ag. the war & follow [Robert] LaFollette [1855-1925, then Wisconsin Republican senator who voted against the war and the future Treaty of Versailles, future founder of and candidate for president of the Progressive Party], whom I suspect to succeed Wilson at next presid.1 election. Meanwhile the congress to be elected I believe this next autumn will be much morr [sic] divided that the present one. They seem literally to have thousands of professors, schoolteachers, labour leaders, journalists in jail, and have arrested Italians & other nationalities 2 & 300 at a time.213

211 The joke here is an etymological one. The Parnassius phoebus pseudorotgeri, the technical name for a type of butterfly, is also known by two other names: Rotger’s False Parnassian and Small Apollo.

212 Wallace, War, 144.

213 Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 January 1918, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. He also doubts the fortitude and intentions of the Americans. He quotes a friend who suggests that the “Am. have neither the bulldog tenacity of the English nor their interest in the war.” And he questions American commitments to the war effort: “I believe the Lumber men in the west merely wanted to sell their stuff & got at Goethalls [likely George W., engineer of the Panama Canal and then, from 1918 to 1919, Division Chief of Purchase, Storage and Traffic for the U.S. Army]. They boast of having
Two months later, the Central Forces—representing Germany, Austro-Hungary, and others—sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Soviet Russia. Conybeare’s views are no less insistent, as he points to the details of recent campaigns and political upheavals still in development. \(^\text{214}\) Even with the consolidation of Allied command in April, Conybeare continues his pessimism. \(^\text{215}\)

All of this reads, though, as Conybeare’s lament without any sense of Schiller’s opinion. What is striking is the one place where Conybeare does make reference to a point of agreement between them. It is a point that has nothing to do with war at all:

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\text{I have lately read a lot of metaph}^{25}. \text{ Your own Humanism + Studies, [Bernard] Bosanquet’s aesthetics . . . Bosanquet’s phrase that at a certain phase of organic evoln consciousness is granted by the Absolute is old Theol in disguise. The only tenable position in him is that one must judge nature by what she has achieved so far. There is evidently a small margin of brand new reality in each successive stage of consciousness . . . I see no gain in supposing that what comes to us piecemeal is a rehashing up of what a conscribed 1 ½ million men, but have no great coats or rifles or Howitzers or big guns to accompany them. They swaggered about the six million tons of steel shipping they wld launch by end of 1918. The estimate has already fallen to two, + it appears that however much our junta lied about it the we only launched 1100000 this last year.”}
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\(^{214}\) Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 30 March 1918, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. His concerns here are with others besides the Americans: “... I am impressed by the fact that the French have so far done so little. Mssr. Sollas (?) from Toul [ancient walled city in France] writes (24 all) that French there think more of Paris being shelled that of our losing 5000 prisoners! Does Henri-Philippe Petain [1856-1951, Commander-in-chief of French forces, future leader of the Vichy government in World War Two] dread another irruption thro’ the trouee de belfort [the Belfort Gap, a strategic location in France]. I fancy so.”

\(^{215}\) “... if we go much further back in Artois [former province that hosted most of the frontline fighting during the war] we will get our feet wet, + it looks very much as if [General Erich] Ludendorf [1865-1937, deputy chief of staff under Hindenberg] wld bag our whole army, perhaps a million. If so we shall understand how a worm feels when the sun catches him out on the crown of an asphalted road in the dog days” (Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 April 1918, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). His prescience attests to the scrutiny with which he is watching war developments: “... It looks more today as if the Germans wld work around Americans from Montdidier, but in this weather they can do little. Evidently Czernin [1872-1932, then Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, full name: Ottokar, Count Czernin Von und zu Chudenitz] tried fresh negot w. France before beginning the offensive [he is referencing what came to be known as “The Sixtus Affair” which led to Czernin’s forced resignation 14 April]” (Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 6 April 1918, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
priori exists in an absolute. There I agree w. you. It is ignotum per ignotius [to explain a thing not understood by one still less understood].

Why so conspicuous? In one of the longest uninterrupted sets of correspondence that Schiller has during the war, it is the only comment related to philosophy. And what does it suggest? For all the mystery, uncertainty, and gloom, Schiller still clings to the developing, changeable nature of the world around him.

But there is a catch. What Schiller longs to believe is less in less in evidence. Two months after the general armistice is signed, in February 1919, Schiller writes to Thaw: “So you did not get my letter! No doubt the Censor was to blame who is so anxious not that America shd keep in good spirits that he lets nothing depressed or depressing reach you! No wonder then that you can discern the birth of a new heaven + a new earth, while to us it looks as though European civilization were tottering on the brink of the bottomless pit.” Not that the censor could keep out doubt. Later in the year, less than a month after the signing of the Treat of Versailles, he exclaims to Thaw: “If I c’d think of any corner of the earth which looks likely to be [sic] remain at peace + free from revolutions for the next 15 years, I wd retire to it at once. But I don’t believe that any such place exists!”

Not that Oxford seems the place. Sometime in the next several months Schiller, now fifty-five years old, applied for the Wykeham Professorship of Logic. The majority of the

216 Conybeare, 6 April 1918. The British philosopher Bosanquet (1848-1924), was a University College and St. Andrew’s professor, Gifford lecturer (1911-1912), and Idealist contemporaneous to Bradley (though also inspired by Green).

217 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 19 February 1919, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

218 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 26 July 1919, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
materials in his application file are only cosmetically altered. Indeed, many of the
recommendations posted therein are the same as from the Waynflete file, with Schiller having
jotted down revisions and extensions to the texts prior to submitting the final copy. But Schiller
has amended the appeal, towards the end, regarding the role of philosophy:

At present we are only just beginning to realize how fatal the alienation of academic life
from national life is to both, and how necessary it is to provide for the progress of a
science, as well as for the continuity of its tradition. In Oxford we are never likely to
forget the latter; but it is because I believe myself capable of contributing to the former
that I venture to offer myself for the Chair of Logic.\footnote{219}

In August, with little fanfare, Schiller is denied the position.\footnote{220}

A war to end all wars has finally ended. But the pale it casts over the social landscape
will have a profound influence on Schiller’s subsequent writing. A career path that has resisted,
and been made resistant to, promotion is still on hold. The life of teaching, frustrating Schiller’s
attempts to state his case plainly, will continue to bear down upon him. The only path open to
Schiller which still rumbles forward is the philosophy of humanism and the causes which it
champions. What remains to be seen, however, is if humanism—his pragmatism—is capable of
withstanding the consequences of this past decade. More bluntly, is Schiller still willing to
believe things can be made better? As the 1920s dawn, Schiller redoubles his efforts to refine
philosophy and apply it socially. The risk is that neither will benefit the novelty of their
interplay.

\footnote{219} F. C. S. Schiller, [Letter] to the Electors to the Wykeham Professorship of Logic & Recommendations
[Proof Copies], for The Wykeham Professorship of Logic, 1919, Recommendations, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller
Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.

\footnote{220} The position had been held by John Cook Wilson (1849-1915) from 1899 till his death. The man to
receive the professorship was Harold Henry Joachim (1868-1938), former lecturer at Balliol and fellow at Merton.
Civilization has become an instrument, not of the progressive improvement of the human race, but of its deterioration.\(^1\)

Two plus decades of insistence have worn grooves into Schiller’s worldview. A philosophy once so enamored of fluidity and change is gradually calcifying into repeated complaints and depressed predictions. The more tangible ramifications of Schiller’s repetitive recalcitrance are both professional and personal. His career, despite a range of honors and reviews which praise his fearless style, remains in a holding pattern. He still labors as a tutor attending to his charges, as much if not more than he does as a philosopher refining his theories. His publications, though still offered up at a rapid pace, fail at systematic elaboration. Even as his statements continue to achieve some measure of popular acclaim, they are more and more resisted by peers who regard him as an impertinent interloper drawing outside the lines. And his health declines alongside, if not in consequence of, these developments.

His philosophic target remains the logic of abstractions. In essays such as “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1920) and “Hypothesis” (1921), and “Psychology and Logic” (1924), Schiller continues to press hard against conceptions of science and logic that resist the demands of the everyday experiment which is practice; the book Problems of Belief (1924) even manages to find support in the popular and critical presses. But as his adversaries and their methods change, rarely do his responses. The results are gaffes in his arguments and gaps in his philosophy. Schiller finds himself, in essays such as “Mr. Russell’s Psychology” (1922) and “Our Natural

\(^1\) F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenics versus Civilization,” Eugenics Review 13, no. 2 (July 1921): 387.
Relativity” (1924), stumbling as he attempts to take in advances in the views around him. His social philosophy, so recently shocked by a savage and devastating war, still seeks to obtain a better and more just world. But in books like Tantalus; or, the Future of Man, Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, and Eugenics and Politics (1924) his queries carry the growing tinge of despair. Moreover, the solutions Schiller offers take on a warped edge: they speak to the whole man, but not to all mankind. Schiller still argues that the novelty of humanism carries with it a measure of doubt, the risk of failure. And everywhere he sees this manifest: in the beliefs we take to be true, in the world we struggle to understand, in the future we seek to create. But it is in the descent of a vocation Schiller struggled so long to craft that the perils of humanism are perhaps most poignantly seen.

6.1 REPEATING WHAT IS TRUE: THE CANONS OF HUMANISM AND ‘PERSONALITY’ OF JAMES

It is hard to envision a better world when one is still responding to oft repeated criticisms regarding humanism and pragmatism. But, as 1919 draws to a close, Schiller is found preaching to an indifferent choir. The task is especially vexing when one considers that some criticisms contain off-handed and unintended compliments. Schiller’s work to this point has, at least in some instances, placed humanism alongside if not above pragmatism as the operative term for the philosophy of practice. Now, however, some are willing to accept the predominance of humanism so as to only cast aspersions on pragmatism generally and Schiller specifically. A case in point: Schiller’s essay in the September Journal of Philosophy, “Methodological Teleology.” The specific target? In April, John Martyn Warbeke (1879-1950) accused
pragmatism of being medieval; specifically, Warbeke argued “that Pragmatism is a descendent of a medieval Church doctrine and that its antecedents consorted with those thinkers who tried to make gold from sulfur and believed in the seven days of creation.”

Not that Warbeke is completely opposed to epistemological alchemy. He supposed pragmatism may, like the work of the sophists, prove of value. He even assented to humanism as pragmatism’s fundamental term, with the human being the central concept, and ascribes this label and view to both James and Schiller. But his complaint regarding Schiller, and we can already see the response before we see the comment, is that this approach relegated all knowing, all truth, to use. If what is useful is true, and what is true is good, then all manner of valuations are permitted (nay, created ex nihilo), being as they are anchored not to a standard but to those who issue the claim of use.

Schiller begins his response with an interesting admission: pragmatism may not have yielded any great discoveries. But he is sure that Warbeke’s comments constitute only the latest in a line of “new errors” regarding “the Pragmatic Method.”

Securing a point often raised in defense of pragmatism—that it operates as a theory rather than an epistemological revelation—he goes on to deride any suggestion that said method offers or suggests “a teleological

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2 John Warbeke, “A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism,” Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 8 (10 April 1919): 207. In August, Bryn Mawr Philosophy Professor Ethel E. Sabin [Smith; 1887-1991] disagrees with Warbeke’s assertion that humanism is the unifying term for pragmatism. She also suggests that there are fundamental differences between the Jamesian and Schillerian humanism and the “functional or philosophical behaviorism” of Deweyian and Jamesian pragmatism. And she tends to grant preference to latter, in so far as the “humanistic wing has not broken with the dominant idealistic tradition . . . [while] the consistent pragmatists, namely the functionalists, instrumentalists or behaviorists have departed from the Kantian tradition which considered knowing as a process of constituting objects by adding to sense data a relationship to a self, mind, consciousness or ego—name it as you will—and have by this departure outgrown their Humanism, which even in James was only a thread in a vastly more significant whole” (Ethel E. Sabin, “Pragmatic Teleology,” Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 18 [28 August 1919]: 488-9).


constitution which guarantees satisfaction to human desires.”\(^5\) Central to this argument is another that Schiller had offered elsewhere and far earlier, that any axiom provides, not truth, but provisional postulates, subject to further confirmation and revision.\(^6\) This type of posture is foreign to Warbeke and assures that his argument follows out of step with the theory he critiques. For, given pragmatism’s assumption of interaction between that which is comprehended and those who comprehend it, reality can only suffice to be understood when it is “supposed that the two are to some extent and in some sense commensurable.”\(^7\)

Schiller further notes that a supposition of truth carries with it a rather clear assumption: “every claim to know logically implies that the truth-claim enunciated is better than any alternative that could have been alleged.”\(^8\) Thus, what is claimed to be true, to be known, is an assertion of what one feels to work best given the conditions they have evaluated. That a person might, from this position, then assert that something is good or bad only demonstrates that from a truth-claim follows a necessary value-claim. That persons should hope for, and strive towards, a harmony of these value-claims only further demonstrates that the condition of truth (as fact, not claim) is not yet achieved. It is on this point, concludes Schiller, that Warbeke grounds his errors

\(^{5}\) Schiller, “Methodological,” 549.

\(^{6}\) See Chapter Three: F. C. S. Schiller, “Axioms as Postulates,” in Personal Idealism: Philosophic Essays, ed. Henry Sturt (London: Macmillan and Company, 1902), 47-133. This reference, and subsequent ones, is not meant as a salvage operation for interested readers; rather, it is part of an increasingly complex strategy on Schiller’s part. For recall that, in the 1910 edition of Riddles (the study of humanism, instead of evolution), Schiller staked its release on the fact that, aside from whatever aspects he found out of date, he found the arguments of 1891 (the first edition) as demonstrating “the stability of the author’s personality” (F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study of the Philosophy of Humanism, 3d ed. [London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1910], ix). These references serve, then, as an indicator of the bookmarks that Schiller sets up in his newest arguments that suggest their origin in arguments far older. Charitably, this is an instance of consistency; none too charitably, it is an instance of recycling old arguments in new contexts... a decidedly non-pragmatic argumentation tactic.

\(^{7}\) Schiller, “Methodological,” 551.

\(^{8}\) Schiller, “Methodological,” 552.
into, so to speak, the ground-less foundation of Euclidean logic.\textsuperscript{9} To him, this is a Protagorean fiction of the “most tyrannical sort.”\textsuperscript{10}

Warbeke’s retort, in the February 1920 \textit{Journal of Philosophy}, is as grand as Schiller’s critique is damning. Noting the advance of the varied sciences in laying bare the mysteries of the world, Warbeke asserts that what is interpreted must be, of fact, an assessment of the “a priori in the sense of committing ourselves for the time being to a whole system of interpretation.”\textsuperscript{11} As such, pragmatism is as metaphysical as the next philosophical theory, is as interested in “a systematic effort to coordinate our most general assumptions into logical coherence.”\textsuperscript{12} What follows is a point-by-point turning of Schiller’s arguments against him in pursuit of this point. Of specific interest are the value-claims that Schiller makes (in the previous essay and others) about the truth-claims. The point being, Warbeke sees in Schiller an attempt to reach the Protagorean truth, an attempt that avoids any suggestion that an error can be \textit{pragmatic} in nature.

In August 1920, Schiller feels the need to respond one last time in the \textit{Journal of Philosophy}. The simplest way to frame his reply is to say that Warbeke begs the question while failing to see his point. The more contemporary view might suggest that Schiller attempts ‘to school’ Warbeke in the history of the arguments he uses. Starting with Plato and Aristotle, and working through three points and several sub-points, Schiller argues that metaphysics entertains the possibility of: science that is completely dependent on it, science that secures metaphysics in


\textsuperscript{10} Schiller, “Methodological,” 553.


\textsuperscript{12} Warbeke, “A Theory,” 122.
its results, and science which serves metaphysics via both subject matter and method. The attempts to work through the implications of these metaphysical issues—how do we know what we know—place us in front of Kant’s nimble stylus. But this position complicates any discussion of metaphysics. By nature of entertaining a priori questions one inevitably has to ask “what is real?” before they can proceed to ascertain that it, the real, is, in fact, real.

The resulting historical confusion—questioning what is beyond question—only led, in Schiller’s view, to ascribing to valuations the qualities of truth. But, without experience, such valuations could not occur as no context could be drawn which would fuse the question to the answer. Again, the Kantian problem arises. If there is an epistemic basis for truth, it had to be the case that “the only one would stand.” Further, this ‘only one’ could not be empirical and would have to reside in he who discerned it: Kant. Isolated and true, it appears as but one of Schiller’s (axioms as) postulates; fused to experience, however, it is tested by those that might value it as truth. It is in this give and take role that metaphysics operates as “an integral function of life.” Thus the object proper is: “all experience, personal as well as scientific, and the method is to evaluate the latter in the light of the former, until the conflicting purposes and principles of the sciences are interpreted into a harmony.” Regardless the expanse of this proposed enterprise, Schiller has interpreted Warbeke out of debating.

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14 Schiller, “The Place,” 458.

15 Schiller, “The Place,” 460.

16 Schiller, “The Place,” 461.

17 Schiller, “The Place,” 462.
But he is not done attempting to explain how what is true and what is valued are selfsame. Two months later, in October, Schiller takes part in a symposium in *Mind*. He is joined by Bertrand Russell and Harold H. Joachim, the man who had the year previous secured the Wykeham Professorship. Schiller authors the initial essay entitled “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” In it, he suggests three possible definitions of meaning: “(1) as an intrinsic property inherent in objects, (2) as a relation, (3) as a contribution to reality made by the subject.”

Noting that the first is likely to err on the side of projecting meaning onto objects only after “they are used” and that the second relies too heavily on the Platonic idea of the subject as “merely a spectator,” Schiller opines that the third may provide the answer: “What if meaning . . . [is] essentially an activity or attitude taken up towards the object by a subject and energetically projected into them like an a particle, until they, too, grow active and begin to radiate with ‘meaning’?” In this way, the spectator of the second definition is now transformed into an agent, one whose gaze presupposes that “whatever our interest lights upon shall have a

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18 Actually, the thrust of these papers was first presented at the Oxford Philosophical Congress on 26 September 1920. The details of the presentation—at which Russell was not present—and other panels are detailed in: W. P. Montague, “The Oxford Congress of Philosophy,” *Journal of Philosophy* 18, no. 5 (3 March 1921): 118-29. William Pepperell Montague (1873-1953), Harvard graduate and Columbia professor of Philosophy, was an advocate of what is termed the New Realism movement involving Perry and others.

Russell (1872-1970) was at this point without an official position, having been dismissed from Trinity College, Cambridge, for his anti-war views in 1916. But the following year sees the release of his *The Analysis of Mind* (1921). Therein, Russell is found to dabble in a curt caricature of empiricism: “There is a psychological school called ‘Behaviourists,’ of whom the protagonist is Professor John B. Watson, formerly of John Hopkins University. To them also, on the whole, belongs Professor John Dewey, who, with James and Dr. Schiller, was one of the three founders of pragmatism. The view of the ‘beaviourists’ is that nothing can be known except by external observation” (Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* [New York: Macmillan, 1921; reprint, 1949], 26). Joachim, as was noted in Chapter Four, held the Wykeham Chair of Logic at Oxford for which Schiller had also applied.


meaning.”22 Such meaning “is essentially personal” and renders objects unstable insofar as “it is not possible to fix this meaning absolutely and irrespective of their use.”23 Thus any value placed on an object is conditioned by the meaning that it has been imbued with by an agent. And value, like meaning, gains more semblance of inherence, of objectivity, the more “communication is achieved and agreement is reached.”24

Russell begins by agreeing with Schiller on several points: meaning is not inherent in objects, meaning is personal and dependent on the agent, meaning is not entirely intellectual. But he questions how Schiller can disagree with “the view that the meaning of words is derived from that of images.”25 This is particularly troubling to Russell as it is Schiller who argues that things can be known that are not objects; “All of the words in which Dr. Schiller endeavours to describe his unobservable objects imply that after all he can observe them.”26 Saying that these things are “‘experienced from within’” does little good either, as it seems impossible for any thing to be “experienced without being an object.”27 At this point, Russell ventures to describe images as signs which guide persons to action: “The whole essence of the practical efficacy of ‘thought’ consists in sensitiveness to signs: the sensible (or imaginal) presence of A, which is a

24 Schiller, “The Meaning,” 397. This stands as one of the few instances where Schiller: (1) uses the term “communication,” and (2) makes arguments that suggest his—however partial—agreement with an interactive component of humanism. The degree to which Schiller also considered this objective is less clear; though it will not remain as such once Schiller undertakes a consideration of “hypothesis.”
25 Bertrand Russell, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’: A Symposium,” Mind 29, no. 116 (October 1920): 398. Here Russell is taking on an assertion raised in the previous essay by Schiller. Therein, he states: “Mental images then are very obliging; you can mean with them pretty nearly what you like. Which no doubt is one reason why we are so ready to employ them. There is one thing, however, which it is impossible, or at least improper, to do with them. We cannot make them pivotal from our theory of Meaning” (Schiller, “The Meaning,” 393).
sign of the present or future existence of B, enables us to act in a manner appropriate to B." 28

In this way, the imaginal stands in for or approximates an object, conditioning a specific—“the image or word ‘means’ that object”—or general—“the meaning of the word or image in general”—action regarding that for which the image specifically or generally stands. 29


29 Russell, “The Meaning,” 404. Joachim is relegated to a footnote on account of the fact that he, for whatever reason, chooses to ignore Schiller’s arguments and focuses on Russell exclusively. In his response, Joachim argues that he will “stand aside” the general debate, if only to focus on the questions Russell’s arguments raise for him; namely, that “if I accept the framework within which his account is developed and consider his actual statements, I find him asserting what nobody, least of all a man of his ‘habit in the use of words,’ can possibly think” (Harold H. Joachim, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’: A Symposium,” Mind 29, no. 116 [October 1920]: 404-5.). The first point of contention is Russell’s focus on the process of visualizing, and division of it into the act, “calling up,” and the result, “the visual picture” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 406). This division suggests that the result is a tangible product of the mind, a real object as opposed to an imagined occurrence. Joachim argues this confuses the more common notion that “meanings” are “‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ with little or no resemblance to what they symbolize” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 409). The second point of conflict relates to the issue of belief. If what one believes is a proposition, “an actual fact,” consisting of either words or images, it should be possible to “call up an ‘imagination image’ in the hearer or reader” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 410-1). But how does one translate the phrase “Anthony loved Cleopatra” into this matrix? Joachim argues that the resulting impression upon the hearer or reader of the message would be “an Image loved an Image” as the terms ‘Anthony’ and ‘Cleopatra’ exists as images in the mind of the person hoping to impress them upon the mind of another (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 411-2). In attempting to carve out “a theory which claims to reject ‘everything mythological,’” Russell only ends up with the “products of indefensible abstraction, of loose thinking and uncritical acceptance of the catchwords of popular Psychology” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 414; 405).

The fallout from this intellectual triad took the form of a series of exchanges between Schiller and C. A. Strong. The response was no doubt inspired by Schiller’s rejoinder to the symposium itself in April 1921. Noting that the symposium “reads like a triangular duel, in which each participant aims at something different, and, according to the other, misses it, and hits a phantom” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Mind 30, no. 118 [April 1921]: 185). In the response, he takes aim at several of Russell’s points of agreement with him and makes several arguments that could be read as partially supportive of Joachim. Strong objects on the side of Russell, noting that the arguments of Schiller and Joachim can be discounted by expanding the “sensationalist-behaviourist theory.” In the experience of a sensory event, it literally becomes part of us, “occurring at that point of the person’s central nervous system” (C. A. Strong, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Mind 30, no. 119 [July 1921]: 313; 316). Schiller questions Strong’s nerve in proposing his answer as “the” answer to Schiller’s objections, as it is “plainly one out of several that are about equally capable of assimilating the experienced facts.” Moreover, Schiller argues that Strong’s argument reduces experience to mechanical physicality. To ignore the meaning that a person assigns to an event is either to suggest it is an “illusion” or to “gratify a traditional bias,” which in either case is to dodge a “pitfall in the path of all intellectualism” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Mind 30, no. 120 [October 1921]: 444; 447).

Strong discounts this dismissal. He argues, “In perceiving, that is, a sensuous state (of sound, taste, smell, vision) is used as a sign of the object; it conveys the object only in the form of ‘meaning’; and it does so because we adopt the motor attitude appropriate to the object.” Strong also uses James to discount Schiller, arguing that what is meant by an idea corresponds, either rightly or wrongly, to what is sensed by the person conceiving of the idea, by the personal experience of “the knowing relation” (C. A. Strong, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Mind 31, no. 121 [January 1922]: 70). Schiller him-self is troubled by Strong’s account of the-Self. Schiller wants to from where are (our) senses derived. And he suggests that Strong establishes a false dichotomy of the soul; it “is either a product of ‘sensations,’ or a metaphysical ‘substance.’” If it is a sensation, from where does it derive? If it is from a person,
Several questions arise from Schiller’s and Russell’s philosophical positioning. The most salient of which has direct bearing on Schiller’s humanism: to what extent is meaning a creation of mind? And, so as to avoid a descent into the depths of image-as-object particulars raised by Russell, the question can be further narrowed: to what extent are valuations personal? While Schiller argues that the goal of harmony is admitted on all sides, he takes—and here we can refer back to the Warbeke discussion—the given goal as something continuously in dispute and subject to revision. The assumption of a fixed (a priori) standard or a known (teleological) end point is to trust in what we can’t know and presume what we can’t guarantee. Only the active, and continuous, participation in supplying, refuting, and revising meaning can be said to constitute the Warbekean alchemy of transforming the object-as-conceived into the object-as-valued. But how then is this highly personal act transformed into a social one?

Schiller supplies the answer less than a year later in “Hypothesis,” his contribution to the war-delayed second volume of Singer’s Studies in the History and Method of Science (1921). For Schiller the answer is still postulation, even if now he reverts to the more Jamesian hypothesis; the method is still pragmatic, even as he now ascribes to it a voluntaristic label. He begins by noting that man’s way in the world is circumscribed by both the fear and courage it engenders. By the former, exemplified in traditional approaches to logic, man is held back “by the fabricated order of the social life, and kept drugged by the traditions, conventions, creeds, and mechanisms of a social routine”; by the latter, as found in the voluntarist approach, man is impelled to recognize that “he must react, must show initiative, must attack the problems of his

how can the person not be aware of its existence? Schiller argues that Strong wants us to infer its existence. But if we infer a state of being for an object, we necessarily suggest that the object is inferred by the ‘I’ that examines it. Thus the object observed is not independent of its observation; it is a subject of “the reflective return of an active being on his track” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of ‘Self,’” Mind 31, no. 122 [April 1922]: 185; 188).
life, must experiment boldly, and manipulate and alter conditions, ‘speculating’ and running risks.”

These contested tempers, one within the lines and the other transcending their borders, are seen to clash in no area “more copiously and instructively than in the treatment of Hypothesis.” By their comparison, Schiller suggests, one clearly sees where there is adventure and, conversely, nothing gained.

Of the intellectualist, or orthodox, views of Hypothesis, Schiller takes the examples of Bosanquet (and recall here Conybeare’s comments of a few years past). Bosanquet’s definition, “any conception by which the mind establishes relations between data of testimony, of perception or of sense, so long as that connection is one among alternative possibilities, and is not referred to reality as a fact,” strikes Schiller as oddly inanimate. It refers to the thing under consideration (context) but not the act of consideration (attitude), and it forces the distinction between that which is considered (hypothesis) and that which somehow exists beyond it (fact). But one might well consider that the divide between object and attitude, hypothesis and fact, is a tenuous one:

The history of scientific conceptions is full of illustrations, though none, perhaps as instructive and romantic in its vicissitudes as the history of the ‘atom’, a metaphysical invention in its initial stage, long rejected by the best scientific opinion as unprofitable, then revived and turned into a good working-hypothesis of chemistry, criticized anon as

30 F. C. S. Schiller, “Hypothesis,” in Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 2, ed. Charles Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), 414. Schiller argues that these tendencies ebb and flow through the course of a normal life. But they find their personification in the different attitudes taken up as regards logic seem hardly fluid. “To an intellectualist logic it will seem self-evident that thought must play for safety and endeavour to proceed by valid steps to an assured conclusion.” The fear is of going beyond the borders of what the rules demand, of rendering one’s thoughts invalid for want of proof. But “to a voluntaristic logic this attitude seems merely superstitious. It demands not words but deeds.” It takes courage as the counterpart of risk and deplores the cowering rule watchers: “knowing is an adventure, in which to progress we must not be content to take our stand always on firm ground” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 415).

31 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 416.

32 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 416.

33 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 417.
unverifiable and barely holding ground, as a convenient fiction against its ‘energetic critics; until finally by a dramatic revolution the hypothesis of atomic dissociation explained the facts of radio-activity, and incidentally, turned the atom into a fact in the very act of exploding it and depriving it of the ultimateness and indivisibility its very name had implied for ages.34

How strange the power of a fiction to remove from the ledgers of science it’s equally, at least at one time, tenuous brothers the ‘electron’ and ‘quanta.’ How seemingly haphazard the transfer from one context to another, gaining and losing ground, on the suppositions of science.35

As against the orthodoxy, Schiller indicates the direction in which hypothesis should humanistically develop.36 For him, Hypothesis is “a mental attitude or distinctive activity.”37 It

34 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 418.

35 Given these counts against Bosanquet, Schiller finds J. S. Mill’s definition a touch better: “any supposition which we make (either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is likely to be true” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 418). But Mill’s focus on the act of supposing also carries problems. In restricting the forms that hypothesis can take, his is more an explanation of use than a description of process. And this use aligns it, as with Bosanquet, with the rigidity of traditional conceptions of logic. For if his ‘facts which are known to be real’ can be reached via a hypothesis, there is then no necessity for those facts in the first place. Further, if a hypothesis is taken to be, or is likely to be, true (in a strictly logical sense), that implies that it was chosen from amongst other options. But in what sense true and to what end those other alternatives? In short, Mill’s restrictions on use create contradictions in use; “alternative hypotheses therefore must always be admitted to be possible in principle, even where there are none actually contending for acceptance” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 419-21). Mill’s problems are not entirely his though. They spill over from Newton’s conception of vera causa. And Mill recognizes that something is suspect when he argues that: (1) there must be some purpose underlying the choice of one experiment over another, (2) alternative hypotheses must be allowed (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 423-4). But Mill, Schiller urges, fails to take the implications of these arguments as heralding requisite revisions of his theory.

36 Not that Schiller claims novelty for these views. In advance of this revised mindset, he points to persons such as scientific polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), logician John Venn (1834-1923), and philosopher C. Read. And it is Whewell who pushes beyond the orthodoxy “in emphasizing the ‘colligation of facts’ by a new conception as the really creative act in scientific induction” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 425). Here the emphasis is on selection and sagacity instead of deduction and verification. Theories obtain a higher degree of truth a posteriori rather than a priori. Venn also advances by taking supposition as a purposive act, “as an attitude, that of putting forward a conception or mental picture tentatively and doubtfully, in the hope it may turn out to be true” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 427). And it is Read who recognizes the function of verification of which previous theorists only dimly guessed: no hypothesis “is of any use that does not admit of verification (proof or disproof) by comparing the results deduced from it with facts or laws. If so framed as to elude every attempt to test it by facts, it can never be provided by them, nor add anything to our understanding of them” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 428).

37 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 429.
is this attitude which works against the intellectualist bent to take facts where they lie. That this attitude should not inspire the rank and file of logicians is no surprise:

> It is not a thing to be easily caught and tamed by rules and regulations. It is not a procedure that lends itself to formal description. Its reasoning cannot possibly be made to seem ‘valid’. Nor can it be made ‘safe’. It inevitably takes risks, and so must be condemned as ‘dangerous’. Of course, it is dangerous, with all the danger inherent in life and action. But does this justify its condemnation? Only, surely, if there exists a safer and better way for logic to pursue. But logic can hardly any long cling to two of its favourite delusions which prompted it to condemn Hypothesis. The first is that formally valid reasonings are possible; the second that they are safe. This is a form of logic resistant to the most deeply held strains of the same. At the same time, “it reveals the essential creativeness of human intelligence. It pervades all mental life and penetrates every logical notion.” By forgoing a retreat to true premises, it searches for meanings which become truer over time. In abandoning the clichéd search for a root cause, hypothesis becomes a principled player “in an inquiry relevant to some doubt or dispute.” It takes Plato at his word and views “hypotheses (= things laid down, supports to stand on), i.e. as ‘stepping-stones and starting-points.’” But it does away with his methods. Rather than “assuming that they can be converted into full truths only by metaphysical deduction,” Schiller argues that they can “be established empirically, by the success of their working.”

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38 As he explains in further distancing the voluntaristic view from the traditional, hypothesis “feels free to anticipate reality by its guesses, to question it, to experiment, to distrust and doubt appearances, to rearrange the world, at least in thought, to play with it, and with itself” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 429).


40 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 432.

41 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 434.

42 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 435.

43 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 435. No longer held up by extravagances, every science is freed to find “conceptions that would give it a real grip of its subject-matter and enable it to analyze it and to deduce consequences which could be verified in fact” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 436). As examples, he references both physics and psychology. For years, physics has tripped over its articulation of radiation. Not for want of trying, but for lack of explanations adequate to square with new advances. With a refreshed view, physics is free to find new
This new spirit of Hypothesis, this desire “to think the new,” might “conduce to greater sympathy with the non-scientific forms thereof, as well as to leniency in regulating those which are employed in scientific enterprise.”\(^{44}\) For what separates the nature of supposing, the willingness to test, save the methods at hand and the purposes in view? Regardless the application beyond science, its nature remains the same: “the sole essential of a scientific hypothesis is that it should \textit{work}—relevantly of course to the problems of science.”\(^ {45}\) Hypotheses should provide: (1) meanings that can be applied, (2) tested, and (3) chosen because they work best in a given context. And inquiry carried along these lines should regard facts as: (1) the materials which are used, (2) relative to the hypothesis undertaken, and (3) often flexible enough to transcend any one given inquiry. Schiller realizes this approach to science, stressing “the attitude of doubt, the entertaining of hypotheses, the holding of judgments in suspense, is irksome, and even intensely repugnant, to many minds.”\(^ {46}\) It preaches action but often seems to prefer thought. For him, that is the danger of mistaking blind motion for intelligent action. Man must be courageous, but he also must be “circumspect.”\(^ {47}\) He must not fear failure and realize he can plan against it. “And a spirit of \textit{fortitude}, which, though it does not revel in risks, see the terms to explain new phenomena and return to old explanations to see if they shed new light on new discoveries. In psychology, the case is worse. There are warring camps with differing views and terms. A renewed interest in finding “something new and suitable,” a steadying view of the problems a unified science has gone through, and a willingness not to be led by “antecedent prejudices” might lead to a psychology that is \textit{practical} because it can be \textit{applied}” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 440-2).

\(^{44}\) Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 442.

\(^{45}\) Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 442.

\(^{46}\) Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 445.

\(^{47}\) Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 445.
necessity of running them, and is willing to accept them, should not be beyond the compass of a reasonable logic.”

This, then, is the terminus of the philosophical justifications sought in light of a world war fought. It reads as much—and in pace with the Warbeke and Russell pieces—as a justification as it does an explanation. But it is a justification in keeping with the procedures Schiller has been outlining, and testing, ever since James’s passing: fortitude in the face of risk, novelty in the place of absolutes, and a theory of practice rather than a practice of ideal theorizing. But is it an advance? Does it move beyond, say, the works in Humanism, or the

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48 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 446.

49 The argument that these ruminations are based in large part on the effects of the war is not idle speculation. Conybeare’s continued correspondence with Schiller attests to this. In May 1921, with the repercussions of German war guilt still being determined, Conybeare writes: “. . . He is anxious that Germany shd refuse the latest conditions, because if they do, the French will have got their money, have eased their financial position – and they are fast spinning down the . . . grooves of change into bankruptcy – + having got it will still invade the Ruhr [this seems a reference to the decision in January, as part of the ‘war guilt’ clause of the Treaty of Versailles, to set official German reparations at a sum of 269 billion gold marks, a sum later reduced to 132]. On the other hand if Germany merely fold her hands now, it will cost them 2 million a yr to occupy the Ruhr with their troops + they will barely get that sum by selling the products of the Ruhr workman, supposing the attitude of a cow whose lactial glands are not working . . .”

But the larger stake that the Britain has in maintaining its relative interests throughout the world are also at issue: “I have read the Milner Report on Egypt [seeking to re-establish British-Egypt relations, by Alfred Milner, First Viscount Milner (1854-1925). During the war Milner was also a member of George’s War Cabinet. Milner was also an advocate of eugenics and a renewed dominance of Britain in world affairs]. It presents British policy clearly. We want Egypt for the same reason the Gs wanted Alsace lorraine [territory bordering Germany and France that reverted to France at the end of the war] . . . as a strategical springboard, as a military étape on the road to India, + we are to have an air road across Europe + the Mediterræan Middle East to India + thro’ India on to Australia. It is a grandiose project, but air communicae are fragile + carry little weight, however useful for intimidation of Orientals. Moreover Orientals can learn the art of aviation from Japan and the spectacle of our planes passing to and fro, + occasionally dropping bombs on their cities will not tend to make asiatics friendly to Gr Britain. The terms of the new alliance between Turkey + Afghanistan are menacing, & Egypt will join in that alliance + probably Persian + the Arabs as well. To the north of our line of communæ will lie a Germany + Russia united in enmity to us, and Japan will complete the cordon at its far Eastern end.”

Nor less the instability of Britain’s relationship with North America: “I am not surprised therefore at the reluctance being now shown by the Canadians to entangle their future in our schemes for the defense of an East India, remote + having no interest for them, whether they be French or Anglo-Saxon. Still less will the S. Africans & Bohrs be disposed to aid us in the far East. Australia alone from fear of Japan may consent to join us in an oriental imperialist policy, but wld the English democracy ever go to war with Japan in defence of an empty Australia? The Yanks care as little for our security in India + Asia as they do for Europe, + our attempts to cajole them into buttressing our position in the Middle East by taking an [] mandate was promptly seen thro in Washington + rejected. . . .” (Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 May 1921, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
salient if biting criticisms of Bradley?  As was said prior, Schiller is here covering the same ground even if his context and his reasons have changed. He is still willing to test the mettle of humanism. Yet he never finds it lacking. His reasonable logic, even as it now turns to present fears and a past friend, is as good as his personal fortitude requires it to be.

Schiller publishes “Eugenics versus Civilization” in the July 1921 Eugenics Review. Recalling his comments to Thaw in 1919, Schiller argues here that revolutions, more so than war, pose a grave threat to civilization. “For, as we see it operating to-day in Russia and elsewhere, it simply wipes out the classes which produced the intelligences that controlled the intricate web of mechanisms called Civilization.”50 The question, then, is to explain the relationship between eugenics and civilization, and how the one might serve to improve the other in light of threats it faces. First, Schiller wants to do away with the “caricatures” peddled about regarding eugenics:

Neither as a science nor as an art is Eugenics committed to a ‘low’ view of human nature. It is not a form of materialism. It is not blind to whatever is not physical. It is not pledged to treat man as merely an animal. It is not a crude and silly attempt to intrude the methods of the stock-breeder into realms where they must ludicrously fail. Its past reveals that it was first conceived by the most idealistic and ascetic of philosophers, Plato, and its future points to a higher and nobler scheme of morals than is now in operation anywhere.51

And it is the eugenic goal of “improving the conditions of the human race” that is offered in aid to civilization, so as to advance “a state of mankind which is superior to, and exclusive of, ‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery.’”52 But recognition of it is not born within a person. “It has to be impressed upon him by education and social training to which he is subjected, and if he likes it, it

51 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 382.
52 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 382.
is an acquired taste. . . . At any rate I would bid you recognize that the transmission of Civilization is effected, in very complex ways, by education, in a social order.” 53 Should said transmission be stunted, civilization is threatened.

But what end Civilization? Schiller is succinct: the Good life or, more pessimistically, a fear that a life other than the one we lead—say, savagery or barbarism—would be worse. This leads to a further question: what is the Good to which Civilization puts itself? Here, Schiller maintains that the good, however defined, is a matter of social agreement; further, eugenics and civilization are fused in a search for that contested end:

Both are rooted in the notion of the good, but neither of them knows what the good is, and both are vitally affected by the doubts and disputes that beset the good. If we cannot tell what the good is, we can neither know how to better the human race, nor decide whether Civilization is or is not a good thing. . . . For a little reflection will show that, just because Eugenics and Civilization are in the same boat, whatever conception of good is involved in the one will be involved in the other; so that the two views, whether ultimately right or wrong, will always be comparable. 54

But, for Schiller, history affords instance after instance which suggests that societies have been dysgenically organized to the detriment of Civilization. While many societies have promoted an ideal to which they aspire, their social circumstances are so organized as to contradict, if not outright work against, that ideal. Through acts of war and the discrepancy of birth rates between higher and lower classes, societies turn against those progressive ideas which they suppose to be the Good. “In other words Civilization has been become an instrument, not of the progressive improvement of the human race, but of its deterioration.” 55

54 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 384-5.
55 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 387.
What, then, will steer Civilization towards a better course? First, Schiller argues we should not despair the fact that history is littered with examples of societies fostering their own deterioration. For the historical record also suggests the opposite, suggests historical societies in no way stood to protect, preserve, or promote weaker stock. And, if only by conjecture, we seek to determine the difference between the historical and the modern society, it would be this: “a society which has the power over nature that we have can corrupt its way upon the earth to an indefinite extent,” but it also has the intelligence at its disposal to correct its way.56 Urged on by the lessons of experience, Civilization is beginning “to know what it is doing, whereas until now it was unconscious of its eugenical ineptitude, and did not ascribe the maladies from which its suffered to its own action.”57 To know, for Schiller, means to test society’s conceptions of the good against what this experience suggests in much “the way of deciding whether a certain foodstuff, say a new fungus, is good to eat.”58 In short, society must proceed tentatively. It must experiment “with opinions about the good-for-man,” so as to foster the likelihood “that Eugenics and Civilization should reach an agreement about the principles on which the former should reform the latter.”59

Three months later, in a review in the October 1921 Quarterly Review, Schiller turns away from the future to reflect on the mentor from his past. To call his reaction to James’s son Henry (Harry) James’s The Letters of William James, a new edition of The Principles of Psychology, and the new Collected Essays and Reviews a review is to only partially explain its

56 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 389.
58 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 393.
59 Schiller, “Eugenics versus,” 393.
Schiller's interest in the publication of James's letters was, not surprisingly, long-standing. The letters to Schiller from James's son attest to this. As early as 1911 James is found to be requesting materials from Schiller:

“If you would send on such letters of my father’s as you may have at your convenience, addressing them to me here, I shall be much obliged. [Horace] Kallen showed me some which you sent him, and wanted to return them. I did not write you about them then for we were not then ready to make use of them. But now I’m beginning to collect my father’s letters and shall be glad to have them. How long it will take – how long I shall want to keep them I cannot say, and if there is anything that you want to have returned for any reason at any particular time, I hope therefore you will let me know. The ‘Biography’ as you call it will be chiefly a collection of letters, and the form of it, depending partly on whether my uncle gets well enough to carry out a hope of the family’s and his, is uncertain” (Henry James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 June 1911, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).

A year later, James comments on his progress retrieving correspondences: “People do not all send them as promptly as you did, and there are still people to whom I have not yet applied, though I don’t think the list of them is important. Their names occur or are suggested as I go through the materials that’s been received. I’ve published a general request for letters and am doing it once again; but I do this simply to leave no stone unturned, not because I expect valuable returns from printed notices. As the letters come in I’m sorting and classifying them in a preliminary way and having more or less copying done; but the real question of just what use to make of the materials still remains to be dealt with.” He also mentions that his work will not deal with the larger history of his family as it is his uncle, Henry, who is working on such a project. As regards this, James notes: “At Uncle Henry’s request we have not said anything about this, for he doesn’t want to be questioned concerning it, and a year ago there were moments when it seemed doubtful whether he would be able to put the thing through at all. He has a right to ask this, and in telling you I trust to your discretion. Your interest is such that my mother and I want you to know just what is going on. Only half a dozen other people do!” (Henry James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 April 1912, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).

It seems, though, that the war puts off the publication until 1920. In December of that year James comments on W. R. Thayer’s reaction to the volume: “There are a few people of whose judgment on the book I stand in awe and you are one of them. If you belabored it I should quail. When you praise it, including my part, so generously, I feel much elated. To tell the truth I’ve never had any misgivings about the letters themselves. It would have been hard to destroy their value.” And he goes on to offer his own take on those who take too much time trying to compare his father to his uncle: “... comparisons between my father and uncle are often unfortunate for these reasons, first, that almost nobody can be a sympathetic critic of both, and next because the differences between them were so endless as to make their brotherhood of blood an accident that is irrelevant to most things in their lives and works, an inadequate occasion for dwelling on contrasts that can seldom be expressed without making of one brother a pretext for strictures on the other. They cared a great deal for each other. On the other hand I believe the public will see them most clearly if it doesn’t bother to think of them together. The effort to do that seems usually to result in exaggerating the qualities by which they differ – e.g. my father’s ‘Americanism’, my uncle’s ‘detachment’” (Henry James, New York, to W. R. Thayer, 4 December 1920, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).

Little more than two weeks later, James writes to Schiller to note the book is done and that Schiller’s letters will be returned to him unless he wishes to keep them in James’s care at Cambridge. At the same time, he notes the flurry of works which go on to form the substance of Schiller’s review a year later: “The two volumes which I have edited, ought to be delivered to you at about this time, and I hope you will like them. At the same time, Longmans are publishing a volume of miscellaneous papers that Perry has put together, and a bibliography which he has annotated. My hope is that the three books which thus come out this month, will prove to make my Father’s whole work accessible to the public will see them most clearly if it doesn’t bother to think of them together. The effort to do that seems usually to result in exaggerating the qualities by which they differ – e.g. my father’s ‘Americanism’, my uncle’s ‘detachment’” (Henry James, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 December 1920, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). The person referenced above is likely William Roscoe Thayer (1859-1923), historian and former President of the American Historical Association.
Schiller’s appreciation for James and the reasons for that respect. What first strikes Schiller is how the letters reveal James’s personality. In contrast to other methods of examination, James’s letters rank amongst those where authors “dare to be themselves, and reveal themselves. They are the most interesting and delightful of persons; for, after all, there is nothing men relish more than personality. They come out in their letters better than in autobiographies, which always tempt to a pose, or in biographies, which nearly always tone down personality, and blur its outlines.”

And as selected and arranged James’s son, this sample exemplifies “the vital fact that the best sort of letter is literally a ‘correspondence,’ and reveals, not only the writer, but also his endeavour to attune himself to the demands and interests of another, and so, indirectly, the person written to.”

For Schiller, the personality revealed is as much the same as it was in other venues; “there is no noticeable difference between his books and his letters,” nor “in speech.” In each, he was “always original, racy, vitalizing, virile, utterly devoid of any sort of hauteur, humbug.

Early in the next year, James writes to both thank Schiller for his work in reviewing the book and to respond to what seems a query regarding the nature of some letters not published in the two volumes:

I have just received your letter, and am extremely grateful to you for writing as you do, and can only say that the trouble you have taken about your notices is a great service to the Book. I am only sorry that your own contribution to the Quarterly Review must wait until July [it was actually pushed back to October]. I am very eager to read it. You speak very kindly about my parting the two volumes. As for the ‘more’, that’s indeed a problem. I could easily publish more of the same sort that is in these two volumes, but it would merely amplify and add quantity.

With respect to purely polemic letters of which there are a few, but not very many, I don’t feel confident of my ability to handle them, and I’ve also been inclined to think that these will have to be dealt with in some way that will take account of what remains of the other side of the polemic correspondence—letters of men much younger than my father, in many cases. I may be wrong, but it seemed to me that there will probably be a better opportunity to do that sort of work a few years hence than there is now.

(Henry James, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 February 1921, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).


and pretence, and genuinely interested in any human soul that crossed his path.”64 This accidental philosopher, asked to be more serious by his students and more systematic by his peers, was celebrated and savaged for his use of language. He displayed a talent for taking a critic’s terminology and turning “it into a vehicle of his own meaning.”65 At the same time, his use of language was an affront to those critics, “a sacrilegious attempt to break through the academic ring, and to appeal to the people.”66 But what lay more closely at the center of both celebration and suspicion of James was his recognition of the human, the personal, in all matters of philosophical inquiry. As Schiller states:

Moreover, the value of the personal cannot be denied without denying value altogether. And this is a prospect no philosophy can really face. For values permeate reality so vitally that wholly to cancel them would be the ruin of the cosmos. Yet they spring from personality, and enter the world with it. It is supremely valuable itself, and demonstrably the source of all the values that are recognized. The Good, the True, the Beautiful, nay even the Real, for us at least, are more or less obviously creations of our discriminating and valuing personality; and to expunge them all seems a hopeless enterprise.67

James saw this and it led him where his interests dictated, often beyond the borders of polite philosophy or sanctioned topics. “He was a life-long psychical researcher, who neither gave up hope nor lapsed into credulity; thus showing (like Henry Sidgwick) that it is possible to live in close proximity to pitch and not be defiled, that interest in the abnormal need not degenerate into morbidity.”68 Santayana would rob James of his individual genius and label him “one of those somewhat obscure sages whom early America produced”; but Schiller would retort alongside

64 Schiller, “William,” 27.
67 Schiller, “William,” 34.
James that such a myopic tale ignores “so incalculable a confluence of qualities that no one can predict it or take the credit for it.”

Grasping at new outlooks can be taxing especially when those vistas, once so startling new, begin to recede from view. Schiller notes that James, plagued by doubt and thoughts of suicide, came to confront the advancing march of a new generation with a new banner. “The essential trouble with James, as with so many of his generation, was the withering of the spiritual values, of God, freedom, and immortality, under the devastating onset of Naturalism.” The spirit of free play with the objects of man’s design was in danger of being wiped out by “the meaningless evolutions of matter determined by a mindless mechanism.” But James rallied to respond and to take strength from the very lessons of Naturalism. “An intelligent and living being is not merely an automatic victim of natural selection,” so James’s argument went, “it is not merely selected, but itself selects.” This response remains incomplete, though it remains for Schiller—whether under the title pragmatism or humanism—the best response to Naturalism thus far. Though partial, “it will continue to appeal to all who really feel the pressure of religious problems, in a way that neither theological dogmatism, nor the verbal dialectics of a priori metaphysics, nor mere emotional revolt, can emulate.”

Even at this point, and with the spread of many pages to blur the connections, it is striking how closely this appreciation of James dovetails with the views, both publicly pushed and privately proffered, of Schiller. All the elements praised—the confrontation with

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philosophical absolutes and mechanical naturalism, the umbrage taken at unsanctioned prose—read as if they were a sympathetic appreciation of Schiller himself. It assumes the place of a figurative snapshot of the James that Schiller knew. It also operates as a framing device meant to suggest who Schiller is at this point. On the one hand, he is the destroyer of the Platonic tradition in logic, cleaving the a priori under with the dulling edge of his humanistic hypotheses. On the other, Schiller is the builder of a new world, a new man, comfortable enough to assert a Platonic ideal so little in evidence. And, in facing a new world of obstacles, it is still more; the James that Schiller celebrates is the philosopher Schiller hopes to be. Those hopes are to be tested in the following years. Not in how well they approximate James; but in how well they serve Schiller in keeping the causes of humanism and pragmatism alive.

6.2 CLARIFICATIONS, CAVEATS, AND CONSEQUENCES: THE LIMITS OF SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY

In the next few years Schiller’s continues promoting the merits of humanism, first, by questioning some of those most well known to critique its merits and, second, by once again extending its range in a series of set pieces. At the same time he questions, in the form of two books, the ways in which both philosophy and society will (or can) be moved forward. The results, like the tactics, bear a resemblance to attempts of the past. While there is some novelty, and some success, it is more the case that Schiller risks nothing in these newest presentations of his philosophical system. It is, to be sure, an increasingly paradoxical stance: the champion of the attempts to explicate the “buzzing confusion” of a Jamesian universe is more and more stable in his style, his views, and his arguments.
If past arguments tackled the merger of pragmatism and humanism to science (“Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof,” etc.) and history (review of Progress and History) separately, his latest argument attempts to discuss them together. In the October 1922 Mind, Schiller takes part in the symposium “Are History and Science Different Types of Knowledge?” with British philosophers R. G. Collingwood and A. E. Taylor. It is Collingwood who offers his opinion first. And Collingwood, arguing from a “point of view of the theory of knowledge or logic,” asserts that the distinction is “illusory.”74 Noting that the Aristotelian distinction of history, as a view of the particular, and science, as a view of the universal, holds much sway, Collingwood nonetheless is inclined to see it as a duality irreparably thrown into doubt by Plato. As such, and against the more recent developments in philosophy, he questions the view that “science is not knowledge at all but action, not true but useful, an object of discussion not to epistemology but to ethics.”75 Instead, Collingwood sees science as an interpretative framework; “to live the life of a scientist consists in the understanding of the world around one in terms of one’s science.”76 It is much the same with historians; “their work is interpretation of individual fact, the reconstruction of historical narrative.”77 The former is often assumed to be a work in progress

74 R. G. Collingwood, A. E. Taylor, and F. C. S. Schiller, “Are Science and History Different Kinds of Knowledge?” Mind 31, no. 124 (October 1922): 443. Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943), a philosopher and historian, spent almost the entirety of his career at Oxford, first as an elected fellow in 1912 and then as the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in 1935. He is perhaps best known to modern readers for his The Idea of History (1946), but also achieved acclaim for his historical Roman Britain and the English Settlements (1936).


76 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 447.

whereas the latter is thought to be a collected and finished study; but the duality falls apart once
“both are regarded as actual inquiries.”78

Taylor weighs in next, arguing that the two are different. The difference resides in the
fact that each, when dealt with in pure form, point to different ends: science, towards nothing but
the affirmation of “a formal logical implication” between premises and their conclusion; history,
towards affirmation of “the truth of a categorical proposition.”79 Whereas one does not judge the
scientist by his conclusions (literally) after the fact, one is disposed to questions the historian’s
facts in confirmation of his conclusions. Hence one finds Taylor dividing the output of science
into knowledge and the results of history into information. And history is not disinterested, it
discerns the moral of the story and therein finds “the universality of the particular”; but science
is, and it discovers in its domain, “the particularity of the universal.”80 The latter, then, in
Taylor’s view holds to a Cartesian expression of “clear and distinct ideas.”81 The former, in its
turn, seeks out the psychology of “the doers of historical deeds” so as to better recognize those
features in our current state.82 It is on this point where history trumps science, where disinterest
is disadvantage. Taylor argues that a “man may be a thoroughly ‘scientific’ psychologist with all
the latest theories and laboratory facts at his fingers’ ends, and yet he might be quite incapable of
telling a story of human actions.”83 Further, the historians’ work is no dabbling in literary prose.
It is a documentation of facts brought to bear in the current situation, a “success in making us

79 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 452.
80 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 455.
82 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 457.
‘understand’” conditions of the past in the present “which cannot be got by any devotion to ‘scientific method.’”^84

The final word is Schiller’s. He resists the Hegelian notion that result of “the three-member Symposium is supposed to be that the first string develops his Thesis, the second harps upon the Antithesis, while upon the third performer devolves the onerous duty of finding (if one can) the Higher Synthesis which resolves their discords.”^85 He suggests that, while he favors more of what Collingwood had to say, his major contention is that “both reveal that they do not quite understand pragmatism.”^86 His purpose is thus defined: “In order to really understand the nature and function of Science and of History, we must discover why they become objects of human interest and to what ends they minister, and then define them accordingly.”^87

While any and all predilections may lead persons to study one thing over the other, none are sufficient to warrant their study. Hence, science is a matter of “prediction and control” and

^84 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 459; 458.


^86 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 460. This comment seems most directly applicable if one considers both Collingwood’s suspicions regarding the “useful” view of science and Taylor’s dismissal of the science of psychology. However, in the run up to the actual publication of these arguments it seems that it is Taylor, not Collingwood, which Schiller is most focused upon. In a letter in May, British philosopher Herbert Wildon Carr (1857-1931) writes to Schiller in seeming tactical agreement: “I have received Taylor’s proof and a letter in which he does not take exception to anything you say of him, but strongly protests at what he call your prose of the Deus en Machina in the first paragraph. Perhaps you might think it wise to remove anything unimportant which could be the cause of irritation. He write me a letter which shows that he is very angry but with out any definite objection. I am always for reasonableness even with unreasonable people” (H. Wildon Carr, Chelsea, to F. C. S. Schiller, 30 May 1922, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Less than a week later, Carr again responds to Schiller, making explicit mention of Schiller’s contention: “No, there is nothing that Taylor precisely objects to and I should not write to him if I were you. He takes these things very seriously and your genial remarks meant to brighten discussion irritate him and seem like mocking at sacred things. . . . I am sending you my copy of the proof so that you can keep one copy and return one. I have penciled the kind of alteration I suggest . . . . There is justification enough for it in your second paragraph which says that both the preceding papers have failed to understand the pragmatic position. It is the pragmatist position which in this case is the central interest” (H. Wildon Carr, Chelsea, to F. C. S. Schiller, 1 June 1922, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

^87 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 461.
history’s purpose is to provide “the power over things that comes from knowledge of the past”; thus both “minister to our need of controlling a reality that kills us if we don’t.”88 Both, then, must cooperate with each other in understanding the past and working to predict the future. It is here that Schiller takes Collingwood to task. For if science is to have a basis, it must be in its historical record: “For the ‘pure’ principles must be used, and the ‘pure’ science must be applied.”89 But it is no less true that the past is not pure. “Its history is only a hypothetical reconstruction, often highly imaginative, out of utterly inadequate materials.”90 But Schiller sides with science in the end. In searching towards a definitive, it grasps the threads of the historical past and does what history cannot: experiments. “Hence verification is a much more potent weapon in Science than in history” though no verification is to be taken as absolutely true.91 For Schiller, then, science and history are partial reconstructions; the former just happens to be on firmer ground than the latter.

This stance, especially if one keeps in mind that science was meant to include both logic (for Taylor, not Schiller) and psychology (for Schiller, not Taylor), is made clearer by reference to a debate started six months prior. In the May 1922 Journal of Philosophy, and likely with The Analysis of Mind (1921) fresh on his, Schiller deigns to discuss “Mr. Russell’s Psychology.”92

91 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 466.
92 As with many of Schiller’s polemics, this one certainly had some basis in his relationship with James Russell, as has been stated previously, was no advocate of pragmatism. But, as should also be noted, he showed a certain sympathy for pragmatists. In fact, he attributed the basis for The Analysis of Mind to William James; explicitly, that is, from James’s radical empiricism. Yet, as previous and future discussions make clear, Schiller was likely to have little patience for what Russell thought James meant. That said, Russell both applauded Schiller for being a free-thinker and lambasted him for being an imprecise philosopher. As Russell B. Goodman notes—in reference to the abovementioned book and Schiller’s own Formal Logic (1912)—Bertrand had this to say: “I am in a state of fury because Schiller has sent me a book on Formal Logic which he had the impertinence to write. He
In a rare nod to expertise, Schiller notes that he disagrees with Russell specifically but also agrees with him generally: philosophy should be experimental, experience is to be learned from, philosophers should not hide what they mean to say, and psychology is a subject which it would serve all philosophers to learn. Given that, his complaints are equally well laid out: a suspicion of Russell’s psychological pluralism, and a doubt about observation that purports to be outside that which it observes. As to the first, Schiller worries that what is taken as a whole is actually predicated on a specific observational mode Russell champions, analysis. And analysis suffers from the deficit that “an external observer is not well placed to appreciate the biological significance of intelligent action.” As to the second, he worries that what is chosen for observation suffers from what the observer chooses to observe. The resulting problem is one of confusion; “what is datum for one method will be result for the other, and the continuity, which the one labors vainly to attain, the other can take for granted.” He ends by suggesting that perception, contra Russell, is not a fictive event, but an actual experience. These challenges suggest, not a dismissal, but a scrutiny of the “fundamentals” of Russell’s suggestions.

neither knows nor respects the subject, and of course writes offensive rot. . . . I don’t really dislike Schiller. I am the only human being who doesn’t—because though he is a bounder and a vulgarizer of everything he touches, he is alive, adventurous and good-natured” (Russell B. Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James [Cambridge: University Press, 2002], 12).


94 Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 282.

95 Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 285.

96 Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 286. In another instance that suggests Schiller’s deference to the intelligence of Russell, he appreciatively acknowledges two additional points made by Russell: (1) observation does not equal ‘knowing’ that which is observed, and (2) that the split between those who observe and what they observe is not an easily divided conceptual framework (Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 288-9).

97 Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 290-91.

98 Schiller, “Mr. Russell’s,” 292.
In his November response, “Dr. Schiller's Analysis of the Analysis of Mind,” Russell takes the bait willingly and graciously. Noting that the differences in opinion constitute a retreat from logical argument (each side holds to different rules and, hence, argues via different methods), Russell suggests that his reply will “be of the nature of rhetoric rather than logic.”\(^9^9\) But he is not to be withheld by courtesy even if he is willing to grant a point to make a different one. Arguing that pragmatism, like futurism, relapses into an age worthy of forgetting, Russell asserts that “self-knowledge [is] very precarious and deceptive.”\(^1^0^0\) He questions how we know what we know and label it as such, asserting that analysis is the only way to arrive at an assent to analysis as the best method.\(^1^0^1\) Russell is willing to take on Schiller’s claim that the objects of study resist the methods of analysis. As he sees it, that which is termed a “wall” creates separate parts but is understood by reference to what those parts comprise.\(^1^0^2\) However, experience writ large resists specific understanding(s). No matter what we take to be experience, “in regards to most occurrences of our lives, we are as unconscious as Newton’s apple.”\(^1^0^3\) More generally, Russell is arguing against a progressive or evolutionary understanding of experience in favor of a more basic one; “there will be no beginning of a genuine science of psychology so long as people are obsessed by such complex facts as growth and progress.”\(^1^0^4\) His ending is more pointed. Russell notes that Schiller’s focus on the value-claim nature of experience obscures for


\(^1^0^0\) Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 646.

\(^1^0^1\) Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 647.

\(^1^0^2\) Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 648.

\(^1^0^3\) Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 649.

\(^1^0^4\) Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 650.
him, unlike his former teacher, the fact that he is also a subject of the choices he makes; this leaves the British Schiller out of the fold of “James’s American successors” who more obviously influenced Russell’s work.105

In April 1923, Schiller lobs a return volley in “Analysis and Self-Analysis.” This reply is notable on several counts. First, it is again clear that Schiller respects Russell’s intellect. But, second, Schiller seems to bristle at Russell’s version of pluralism as much as he does the suggestion that his reading of James places him outside the development of psychology. And notice how this irritation leads him to counter Russell by retreat to an oft-repeated accusation: he sees no reason to “refrain from continuing so exemplary a controversy, even though it should continue to elicit . . . ‘only rhetoric rather than logic.’”106 By this turn of phrase, Schiller is able (or attempts) to focus the rhetorical exchange on the problems with Russell’s use of logic. This is a clear retreat to safer ground, a seeming attempt to gain in a debate that has, till now, focused on issues of analysis and psychology, on what constitutes pluralism, on what counts as knowing.

Schiller suggests that logic corresponds to either experiential knowing or to formalism. The former provides for a removal of formal logic, whereas the other is “of verbal meaning, which is not, strictly, actual meaning at all.”107 Schiller believes Russell obfuscates pragmatism’s experiential knowing with mere emotional leaning. Regardless of this misplaced bias against pragmatism, he wishes to assure Russell that analysis is fine so long as it works in practice.108 But if Russell’s analyses do work, and can get at those “simple” and “elemental” meanings that

105 Russell, “Dr. Schiller’s,” 651.
have thus far remained elusive, it must establish the reasons for such a privileged status; “before, therefore, we surrender to the charms of Mr. Russell’s analyses, we are entitled to demand from him reasons for thinking that they are better than the others, and indeed the best.”

This leads Schiller to question one of the central tenets of Russell’s psychological views: self-analysis. Here Schiller invokes the historical difficulties that philosophy has had in explaining how the object of contemplation can be the subject himself. Schiller’s suggestion, that “a genuine personal self must be both subject and object with no insuperable gulf between them,” is ill-suited to Russell’s analytic framework. His conclusion is that Russell’s views fail by their exclusion of what pragmatism readily notes: the effects that experience has on the conceptualization of what one does. A self which is not privy to those feelings born out in practice is an abstraction only valuable to the abstractions of theory. But this conclusion raises as many questions as it answers: how can a self not known to self be (per Russell) a self that creates reality? For this, Schiller finds no answer; to him, Russell chooses not to respond.

The comment regarding the abstraction of personality stands as an obvious, and oft-repeated, commonplace in the Schiller canon. The larger issue is the manner in which he shifts the ground so as to raise that issue. Regardless of what one makes of Schiller’s philosophy, his response to Russell—as opposed to his discussion with Taylor and Collingwood—is a caveat in the most unfortunate sense. It limits the extent to which Schiller is willing to push his


pragmatism and humanism. Moreover, it qualifies Schiller’s ability to move his philosophical arguments beyond the general range of issues he has spent the past decades discussing. This is not a witty dissection of the emptiness of the syllogism. This is not a pithy dismissal of the value of an Unknown Mover. And consider how the ease of Schiller’s previous discussion leads him to conclusions which would seem to warrant more generosity to Russell. Consider that in discussing science and history, he is very clear as to what recommends science: it experiments. Why, then, should Schiller be so put off by self-analysis? Whatever the problems, self-analysis is clear not reducible to the formal logic to which Schiller attempts to saddle Russell. It is experiential, not abstract. It is pluralistic, not monistic. It resists accepted answers, rather than embraces them. The cause of such a gaffe seems shockingly clear. The problem with Russell’s analysis of mind is, simply, that it is not in accord with Schiller’s philosophical worldview.

Not that there weren’t other potentially mitigating, not eliminating, factors at play. Towards the end of 1922, Schiller applies for the Deputy Professorship of Moral Philosophy. And, unlike the previous attempts, one senses Schiller’s frustration. Now, at the age of fifty-eight and in failing health,¹¹² he is growing tired of a routine of tutoring that stretches back to 1897. His comments at the end of his letter of application sound a weary note. Schiller urges that he has “never had the leisure, or the occasion, to elaborate my ideas on moral philosophy in the way I should have liked.” He continues by saying that, at his age, this professorship would

¹¹² Schiller’s medical records, partial though they are, show that he visited Dr. Stocker Harris at the Clinical Research Association, Ltd., London, in May 1923 for a diagnosis on a growth “the size of a pea.” Though the growth was found to be “only fatty and fibrous tissue,” the subsequent report states that it shows “no evidence of new growth” (Laboratory Reports No. 10, 781-2, Medical Records, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
allow him the time to do so “if I should be so fortunate as to be appointed it.”

But the result is the same: Schiller is denied the position. This third failed attempt likely strikes Schiller as a final insult. In the months leading up to the decision, Schiller had expressed optimism that it would come to pass this time. He had been particularly intent to put his best face forward to the Electors who had rebuked him before.

But one exchange is telling. H. Wildon Carr, while preparing a letter of recommendation, writes to Schiller:

I want the testimonial to be perfect and entirely satisfactory to you. If you do not mind penciling in what you would like me to say, you need not fear any hesitation on my part to sign it. I will then rewrite it for you. What I constantly hear remarked is that you cannot be serious, as I know how serious you are the paragraph about the genial humour was put in to say so, but strike it out altogether if you think it will be a disservice. Also if I seem to have omitted any special qualifications to which I could testify insert them.

Schiller, even when actively grooming his persona in the pages of others, cannot escape the double-edged sword his polemic has become. And, as late as May 1923, Schiller is despairing the institution to which he had provided service for over two decades. He decries the denial as the work of “the Hegelian Ring” that has sought to keep Idealism in and outsiders out “for the past 25 years.” Schiller exclaims: “It is evidently time that I retired -- + took to writing.”

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114  In July 1922, Dewey responds to a note from Schiller, saying “I was glad to receive your note . . . and to learn that there is such a good prospect of your getting a professorship” (John Dewey, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 July 1922, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

115  H. Wildon Carr, Chelsea, to F. C. S. Schiller, 31 July 1922, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

116  A fuller portion of the text is as follows: “. . . You ask for news about myself: well it is neither much nor good. I did not think I had a chance for the deputy professorship, but it was a revelation to find how perfectly the Hegelian Ring was organized. They took no risks + put up only one candidate, which presupposes a caucus + a
What comes next is not retirement even as there is more writing. At first, Schiller retreats to deal with those topics—humanism, logic, and psychology—with which he is most comfortable. Then Schiller advances to reform the world he finds around him, only to stumble again on ideas which seem to elude him.

6.3 ALL TOO HUMAN: THE FLUCTUATING RELEVANCE OF HUMANISM

In 1924, John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940) publishes Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements. Schiller finds himself included amongst some of the country’s leading thinkers. Several of the contributors, such as Bosanquet and Russell, have been of recent interest to Schiller. Others, such as McTaggart and Read, are long-standing acquaintances. Still others, such as Hobhouse (1864-1929), have come to Schiller’s aid in his past attempts to gain a professorship.117 It is a tight fit for Schiller. The editor Muirhead has little regard for pragmatism. Little wonder, given his seeming approval of Idealism’s central thesis: “the logical priority in human experience (theoretical, moral, aesthetic and religious) of the idea of an order or perfection that goes beyond and supplements the fragmentariness of its time appearances . . .”

nominalism by it, for otherwise lots of people w4 have applied. In a sense the Ring deserved its success as for the last 25 years (ever since Caird was defeated for the same chair in 1897) it has worked unremittingly + in a very far-sighted + insidious manner. The opposition w4 neither [phrased inserted unclear] organize nor see the inwardness of the the [sic] moves in the game. At the present moment they are trying to get enacted a recommendation they have smuggled into the Report of the Commission which w4 force Colleges to appoint as Tutors only such persons as were approved of by the majority in the Faculty + with the intention, in subjects like theology + phil4, of stereotyping the teaching for all time. It is evidently time that I retired -- + took to writing” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 6 May 1923, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

117 The second part of the series, published a year later, also contains an impressive roster of philosophers: James Ward, A. E. Taylor, G. E. Moore, and R. F. Alfred Hoernlé being among them.
His summary judgment of pragmatism’s response? That pragmatists, like Neo-Realists, are actually a part of that which they rally against:

[I]t is doubtful whether the men who led the attack from either side really understood the position they were assailing, while it would not be difficult to show that these theories themselves, so far as they aimed at offering alternative philosophies were in reality assuming the existence of just such an ‘objective control’ coming from the ideal of a consistent world of thought and experience as they sought to disown. 118

In an unlikely case of guilt by theoretic association, Schiller and Perry are seen as brethren in confusion.

It is perhaps understandable, given editorial asides and the circumstances of the past several years, that Schiller’s contribution takes the form of a question: “Why Humanism?” But his answer resists his personal travails so as to continue the arguments most recently offered. Schiller sees humanism as providing the answer to an all too common problem: the retreat from the human in matters of philosophical inquiry. For philosophers are “ashamed” to deal in the vulgar matters of their humanity. And it should surprise no one that “the philosopher’s nature should shrink from encountering the real, unequipped, unfortified, and undisguised: he feels it to be ‘all too human’ to be exposed to the encounter.”119 So instead they withdraw into a realm that is more than human, an absolute realm where the minor matters of men matter not.

But it is a ruse. Not in philosophy or science, in logic or psychology, is it possible to remove human agency from discussions of truth. But that is exactly what is attempted under the latter two titles. Under the awning of empirical science Psychology—and seemingly in reference

118 J. H. Muirhead, ed., “Past and Present in Contemporary Philosophy,” in Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, First and Second Series (London: George Allen, 1924; reprint, 1954), 315-6. At the very least, decorum dictated that Muirhead make this a stand alone chapter and not, as was originally intended, a general introduction. His reasoning seems sage: “when it was completed I felt that it implied a certain view of the course of the recent development of philosophy which some at least of the other contributors would reject” (Muirhead, Editor’s Preface, in Contemporary, 12).

to Russell—sought to explain away the ones doing the explaining. “Psychological descriptions were to catalogue the contents of the mind in terms derived from external observation, and as if they were objects in the external world. The fact that they weren’t, and behaved quite differently, was to be ignored.”120 Philosophy was even more egregious in sloughing off humanity. “It was called upon in the sacred name of Logic to disavow its origins after the flesh, all its human relations and attachments, and all earthly aims.”121 Such attempts are not simply beyond human comprehension; they are beyond usefulness in human acts of comprehension. Human knowing and thinking, if asserted to be factual, can be treated scientifically and studied without the taint cast upon them by abstract and idealistic systems.122

Humanism thus arrives as a “systematic protest against the artificial elimination of the human aspects of knowing in the intellectualist versions of logic and psychology.”123 As a voluntaristic (read also: activistic) method, humanism “prefers to take ‘reason’ as it empirically finds it, and to study it in life, active and free, and not in vitro, dead, bottled up, and preserved in spirits.”124 It stands in marked contrast to both Rationalism and Empiricism. Humanism counters the former’s assertion that, since all knowing has yet to be ascribed to experience, its truer cause must exist a priori. It challenges the latter’s notion that humans, standing at a distance from nature, must necessarily or passively receive impressions from said nature. To both, humanism raises up the possibility that ‘final’ knowledge never quite is; that “it will be the product of the continual interplay and interaction of the knower and his world, and will owe its

character to both.”\textsuperscript{125} Such a view takes strength from the methods of science, from the warding off of finality by way of postulation and experimentation. When viewed this way, and not warped to fit the useless rules of the logician, the scientific method posits truths that are “essentially improvable and progressive.”\textsuperscript{126} Insofar as humanism maintains advantage by its simplicity and inclusiveness, and by its affinity for science, it wards off alternatives marred by complexity and rigidity.\textsuperscript{127}

But what of this guidance? What is meant by terms such as truth, usefulness, and working? The easy, and incorrect, complaint of the critics is that humanism collapses into the lax maxim that “anything useful or anything that works (say a lie!) is true.”\textsuperscript{128} But a truth-claim is not simply a truth, any more than a lie or a barb is not a truth-claim, and the usefulness of each is a matter of context. “Any means to any end is useful for that end. What is of use, therefore, is primarily a question of psychical fact. It depends on the end adopted and the means chosen.”\textsuperscript{129} In much the same way, what works varies dependent upon: (1) the context in which working is to be viewed, tested, and revised, and (2) the temperaments of those who are to view, test, and revise in light of their context. To Schiller, this variation in context and temperament brings up an important metaphysical point as regards humanism: “the decisive rôle of human activity”

\textsuperscript{125} Schiller, “Why,” 399.
\textsuperscript{126} Schiller, “Why,” 400.
\textsuperscript{127} Schiller claims that Correspondence, Intuitional, and Coherence theories all set their sights too high and provide results too lowly to be of use. In placing their hopes in something beyond experience, they break down at just the points where they should offer some guidance to matters in experience (Schiller, “Why,” 402-3).
\textsuperscript{128} Schiller, “Why,” 404.
\textsuperscript{129} Schiller, “Why,” 405.
admits of a view of “the real” that is “ambiguous, and obliging, and submissive to our interpretations.”

Humanism is, then, less a dogmatic definition of reality and more a “method of solving the problems of human knowing.” It admits of a plurality of views regarding the plasticity of the world that “tends to individualism.” In this last regard, humanism is much like other philosophical attempts to describe reality. But rather than conjure up something beyond him, or divine some source outside his experience, Schiller’s humanism admits of that which his interests allow. He concludes:

Hence metaphysics seem doomed to remain personal guesses at ultimate reality, and to remain inferior in objective value to the sciences, which are essentially ‘common’ methods for dealing with phenomena. Nevertheless Humanism, though it cannot forget that it is itself a method, will regard the efforts of metaphysicians with tolerance and respect, and will not deny them at least aesthetic value, where their constructions show artistic merit.

Schiller, pointing towards the benefits of the scientific method, nonetheless suggests affinities to the metaphysics with which his method shares contested philosophical space.

If the former essay provided the question and the answer, the next one provides the scope. Also in 1924, Schiller contributes “Psychology and Logic” to William Brown’s Psychology and the Sciences. Schiller begins by noting the goal of improving “the relations between the sciences” comes up against the divides they raise against each other:

Instead of co-operating they are too often raiding each other’s territory, instead of agreeing they are dissenting in a babel of discordant tongues, and even in their internal politics they display little unanimity. Many of them, and notably, theology, ethics and


\[131\] Schiller, “Why,” 408.

\[132\] Schiller, “Why,” 408.

psychology, seem to be essentially medleys of discrepant schools and points of view that carry on their intestine conflicts from age to age.\textsuperscript{134}

In psychology, in fact, there are no less than nine different schools of thought. Of these, Schiller prefers two: (1) the pragmatic one that does not “abstract from the purposive or teleological character of the mental life we actually live,” and (2) the psychical one that does not “reject a priori all the evidence which points to possible extensions of every-day experience in the direction of the supernormal and transcendent.”\textsuperscript{135} His preferences aside, should all the different approaches to psychology—from the Mechanist to the Psycho-analytical—signal the end of psychologies claims to science, to the goal of some unity amongst the sciences? Simply put, no. “For a science is a method not a dogma, an exploring expedition into the unknown not a sessile

\textsuperscript{134} F. C. S. Schiller, “Psychology and Logic,” in Psychology and the Sciences, ed. William Brown (London: A and C. Black, 1924), 53. The contributions to this book were based on lectures delivered at Oxford in the Fall of 1923. Other lecturers included John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, fellow of New College, Oxford. Haldane (1892-1964) was a geneticist who, based in part on his area of research, became an outspoken critic of eugenics and its supposedly scientific underpinnings. Thomas Walter Mitchell, the former president of the Society for Psychological Research, also contributed to the lectures. Mitchell (1869-1944) was a doctor and long time editor of the British Journal of Medical Psychology. The Spectator sees this work as helping to correct the perception that psychology is “the pallid step-daughter of philosophy (scholastic philosophy at that), and considered unworthy of attention by serious scientists.” It continues: “All the lectures contained in this book are well worth reading, and help to break down the water-tight doors which by shutting off branches of science from one another act as all too effective barriers to clear thinking” (Review of Psychology and the Sciences, ed. William Brown, Spectator, 16 May 1925, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1925, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

Brown (1881-1952) was the Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford, as well as a practicing psychologist and psychotherapist. He was a student of William McDougall (1871-1938), the man responsible for bringing experimental psychology to Oxford, and succeeded him as the Wilde Reader after the former left for a position at Harvard after the outbreak of World War I. But experimental psychology met resistance at Oxford and it took Brown until 1936 to get psychology officially recognized. It was in that year that the Institute of Experimental Psychology, with Brown as director, was founded. Readers interested in a brief history of psychology at Oxford at this time, from which the above information was drawn, are directed to Jessica Ratcliffe, “New Acquisition: Experimental Psychology Instruments,” Spera: The Newsletter of the Museum of the History of Science no. 11 (Spring 2000), available from \url{www.mhs.ox.ac.uk/sphaera/index.htm?issue11/artic15}, Internet. Like Schiller and Mitchell, Brown also shared an interest in psychical research.

\textsuperscript{135} Schiller, “Psychology,” 54.
tyranny, a market-place stocked with goods for the service of mankind, not a battlefield on which human values are destroyed.”136

As a test case, Schiller seeks to resolve the divide that exists between Psychology and Logic. The path is not easy, as the “ordinary logician, for reasons best known to himself, is very suspicious of Psychology” whereas the psychologist “is apt to shrink from a conflict, and prefers to cultivate those sides of his subject which are most remote from Logic and least accessible to attack.”137 Is the standoff a result of incompatible goals? While psychology claims to descriptive, it cannot in actual practice ignore “the occurrence of values, or more precisely of value-claims” which adhere as “psychical” facts like any others.138 Some logicians claim to go beyond the descriptive to become normative, evaluating facts and “differentiating the good from the bad, and appreciating them accordingly.”139 If, however, you remove the evaluative component of logic, it ceases to be normative and comes to be as descriptive as psychology. In that way, Schiller urges, logic asserts itself as “merely a psychological description of cognitive process.”140 But here, again, logic comes up against a problem: “non-cognitive processes seem to intervene at every step in our thinking.”141 How one thinks is as much a matter of when one thinks; it is not a process occurring absent the conditions which surround it.

It is at this point that some logicians devise at least two desperate strategies to disentangle logical processes from their psychical constraints/conditions. Schiller takes, ahem, the example

136 Schiller, “Psychology,” 55.
137 Schiller, “Psychology,” 56-7.
138 Schiller, “Psychology,” 58.
139 Schiller, “Psychology,” 59-60.
140 Schiller, “Psychology,” 60.
141 Schiller, “Psychology,” 61.
of Bradley as symptomatic of the first of such maneuvers. There is no way for Bradley to deny a psychical component to questions of logic. “So he first admits of the entanglements in the handsomest terms.”142 But then these constraints are taken to be “merely irrelevancies, corruptions of the purity of thought, and frustrations of its aim.”143 In just such a way the psychological, that is the non-cognitive, is taken to task for corrupting the logical, the cognitive. But notice what the sum result is? Logic is no longer taken, at best, to be human. It is reduced to “an inhuman metaphysic, which is conversant only with a ‘reality’ which passes all understanding.”144 Yet Bradley’s pessimism is precisely the problem with the formulation of logic he provides. The abstractions he takes to be a taint upon Logic are taken up, formed, and argued by him as facts subject to his psychical insistence; they are derived from within, not divined from without. The second maneuver is to conceive Logic as “a science of words (λόγοι) . . . as an outgrowth of Grammar.”145

Here, at least initially, there is firmer footing. Taking its cue from the Greeks, “Logic emerged from the rules that regulated dialectical debated.”146 And, Schiller admits, in debate it helps to have meanings settled prior to debating them. But, in psychology, that assumption runs into problems; “terms, as we use them in our actual knowing, can change, or develop, their meaning.”147 Thus logic faces a choice. It can warm itself in the splendor of abstract Truths and

142 Schiller, “Psychology,” 63.
143 Schiller, “Psychology,” 64.
144 Schiller, “Psychology,” 65.
145 Schiller, “Psychology,” 66.
146 Schiller, “Psychology,” 67.
147 Schiller, “Psychology,” 68.
fixed meanings and render itself “a strictly meaningless science.”¹⁴⁸ Or it can choose to embrace its descriptive counterpart, psychology, and “inquire what men really mean by what they say, how they try to convey their meaning, and how far they succeed, whether they attain truth, and what sort of truth they achieve.”¹⁴⁹ In accepting the latter, logic and the logicians who espouse it must make a concession; they must “give psychological fact authority over verbal convention.”¹⁵⁰ But they stand to gain ground in the realm of all sciences which seeks to promote progress over against puzzling postures. Such questions of ambiguity, and the ability to overcome it, are taken further in two slim books released in the Spring of 1924.

The first, Problems of Beliefs, provides a continuance of the philosophical discussion. And it is a discussion that is introduced with a social lament as regards the diminutive size of the work: “it is no longer possible to write . . . big books on philosophic subjects. The deplorable decline of European civilization . . . together with the ‘dry rot’ which nearly everywhere infests the high places of the academic world, are rapidly bring about a situation in which there is no audience for anything that cannot be ‘filmed’ or ‘broadcasted.’”¹⁵¹ But the topic proper, the nature of belief, is given a definition that is at once old and new. Using James’s The Principles of Psychology as his guide, Schiller determines that a belief is “a psychic attitude towards a proposition” which forms, for him, “an ultimate and characteristic fact of human nature.”¹⁵² It is

¹⁴⁸ Schiller, “Psychology,” 69.

¹⁴⁹ Schiller, “Psychology,” 69.

¹⁵⁰ Schiller, “Psychology,” 70.

¹⁵¹ F. C. S. Schiller, Problems of Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), v.

¹⁵² Schiller, Problems, 13. If this definitional framework strikes one as familiar, it is obviously because of its source in James’s 1890 treatise. But it is more. It is a reference to the exact same section, in the exact same chapter, “The Perception of Reality,” that Schiller has been making use of for the over thirty years (in Chapter Two, see David G. Ritchie, “What is Reality?” Philosophical Review 1, no. 3 [May 1892]: 265-83; F. C. S. Schiller, “Reality and ‘Idealism,’” Philosophical Review 1, no. 5 [September 1892]: 535-46; David G. Ritchie, “Reality and
then Schiller’s task to note the variances in what constitutes a belief so as to better understand their import.153

In the second half of the book he suggests that the test of a belief is its use in action. But he goes further in suggesting that the value of an action is validated to the extent that it either promotes or reduces survival. What’s more, beliefs themselves are subject to a form of socio-natural selection. They are either championed or discarded as regards their value in promoting survival. Within such a matrix, humans become part of the evolutionary process of forming the world. In a comment that harkens back to the “world-process” of Schiller’s Riddles-era prognostications, Schiller urges: “our preferences and our acts are contributing to the shaping of the world, and sharing in the unceasing process of creation, which . . . is continuously manifested in the all-pervasive creativeness which engenders more or less momentous novelties in every region of the universe . . .”154 How we fare in this world, to borrow from another earlier text, is a matter of both Darwin and Design.

And the book fares fairly well. Schiller’s friend Alfred Sidgwick claims that “Chap X [entitled ‘Belief and Action’] is the best treatment of that difficult subject I have ever seen, + of course the book all through is full of good things.”155 And the popular press responds in kind for

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153 Schiller deals, in the subsequent chapters, with these variations: implicit (III, 30-40), debatable (IV, 41-52), half (V, 53-73), and dishonest beliefs (VI, 75-86), as well as make-believe and fictions (VII, 87-93).

154 Schiller, Problems, 189.

155 Alfred Sidgwick, Cornwall, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1924, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. He does, however, have one criticism for Schiller: “But in view of the way in which pragm has been misrepresented by our opponents I could wish your chapter on “The Will to Believe” [IX] had kept
the most part. The Inquirer calls it “an excellent psychological study which all can understand.”

Though not as revolutionary as a work of Kant, “on its own plan it serves its purposes excellently, and is full of homespun truth and practical insight.”\textsuperscript{156} The Egyptian Gazette gushes that “the whole subject is treated by a master-mind with a lucidity of reasoning and a sureness, but lightness, of touch that compel attention.”\textsuperscript{157} C. J. C., in the Halifax Laurel, claims that it “is worthy of a place in any student’s list of books.”\textsuperscript{158} The Church Times, however, is of a decidedly negative opinion. Noting dismissively that Schiller has all the talent necessary for a popular audience, the review goes on to explain the reasons for the book’s likely acclaim:

He has a bright attractive way of stating platitudes as if they were the latest discoveries reserved to Dr. Schiller by way of copyright. His naïve belief in scientists, his invulnerable prejudices against logic, his airy contempt for all philosophers who are not pragmatists, and his dogmatic manner, will not make him unpopular with the British public.

If only that vulgar appeal provided something substantial. The review concludes that the “book lacks unity . . . [the chapters] fail to lead the reader anywhere.”\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{156} Review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Inquirer, 26 September 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{157} Review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Egyptian Gazette, 11 September 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{158} C. J. C., review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Halifax Laurel, 25 October 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{159} Review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Church Times, 8 August 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
The critical reviews initially concur with the Church! G. Lowes Dickinson, in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, applauds the work for a searching account of how persons formulate conclusions. But, as regards its pragmatic thrust, Dickinson argues that the book “has nothing new to report” in its “further attack on those forms of Idealism against which Mr. Schiller has so long been tilting.”\textsuperscript{160} But other critical reviews offer a clear measure of appreciation, the likes of which Schiller has not recently received. In Mind, G. Galloway suggests that Schiller “unduly magnifies the subjective factor in belief at the expense of the objective.” That said, Galloway urges that the book “deserves to be widely read, and that not merely by philosophers but by the intelligent public.”\textsuperscript{161} In the Journal of Philosophy, Sterling P. Lamprecht is even more glowing. Noting that the book is really a continuation of themes Schiller has been developing for year, he urges that the “compact and eloquent development” of the enterprise is “the clearest and most satisfactory statement of the issues involved in the humanistic contentions.”\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{160} G. Lowes Dickinson, review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 24 (1924): 196-7. Dickinson also makes a comment as regards Schiller’s decision against pessimism: “Mr. Schiller is himself enough of a pessimist to hold that optimism requires the admixture of a good deal of pessimism before it becomes anything but frivolous.” Schiller takes exception to Dickinson’s comments, seeing his criticisms as proof of how obstinate and intractable belief can be. Specifically, he questions Dickinson’s treatment of belief in immortality as a “merely intellectual” product and not, as Schiller sees it, a “half-belief” the likes of which are “camouflage for deep-seated cravings and prejudices” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Half-Belief in Immortality,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 21 [October 1924]: 322-3).

\textsuperscript{161} G. Galloway, review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 33, no. 132 (October 1924): 442-3.

\textsuperscript{162} Sterling P. Lamprecht, review of Problems of Belief, by F. C. S. Schiller, Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 10 (May 1925): 273. Not that he is an uncritical supporter of the humanist approach. After noting that the work further shows how “humanism stands in marked contrast . . . with the viewpoints of the leading American pragmatists, William James and Professor Dewey,” Lamprecht provides this comment based in a contrast between the two Americans: “Dr. Schiller like William James has a keen sense for the confusion in most human thinking of psychological motivations and logical requirements; but unlike Professor Dewey he has not developed a logic of experimental inquiry and a technique for finding pertinent evidence. One would not be overstating the contrast between humanism and American instrumentalism if one said that humanism was an arrested pragmatism which had a clear theory of the origin of human beliefs, but had no critical theory of evidence at all” (Lamprecht, review, 274; 278).
If the first book is criticized for philosophical digression and subjective myopia, Tantalus; or, the Future of Man makes clear that it aims to remedy a purportedly objective social dilemma. And what a dilemma. Though Schiller bristles at being called a pessimist, it would be easy to conclude it a fitting label. Simply put, the world has ceased to be progressive. Biologically, “it is no longer essential for a member of a society that collectively controls the conditions of existence to develop any high degree of personal capacity.” Morally, “humanity is still Yahoo-manity. Alike in mentality and in moral, modern man is still substantially identical with his palæolithc ancestors.” And civilization does nothing to stop the downward spiral; “as it is presently constituted, [it] is very definitely a deteriorating agency, conducing to the degeneration of mankind.” The alternative is to “exercise the danger by an adequate reform of human nature and of human institutions.”

And the choice among alternatives must be made carefully. Attempting reform by bringing religion to the masses is doomed to failure. The “Yahoo has been dosed with Christian ethics for two thousand years, and they have never either impressed or improved him.” No, the reform will be brought about through eugenical reform, reform which must first obtain “a

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163 “If it is called ‘pessimism’ to point out the methods by which men may escape destruction, because men do not care to adopt them, I suppose it must be ‘optimism’ to rush violently and open-eyed down a precipice, and to expect to be saved by a miracle. Certainly that would appear to be the belief upon which human affairs are at present conducted” (F. C. S. Schiller, Tantalus; or, the Future of Man [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1924], vi).

164 Schiller, Tantalus, 17.

165 Schiller, Tantalus, 31. The term “yahoo” is by now a familiar one. But it is interesting to note its satirical and literary origin: Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726). The term there, and here, is meant to derogatorily denote creatures of human form but animal intellect.

166 Schiller, Tantalus, 36.

167 Schiller, Tantalus, 48.

168 Schiller, Tantalus, 50.
powerful, enthusiastic, and intelligent public sentiment.”\textsuperscript{169} Its watchwords will be toleration and improvement, not intolerance and perfection. It will move slowly, “guided by the results of experiment and the fruits of experience.”\textsuperscript{170} It will secure, “by the elimination of defectives at the bottom of the social scale, and by the increase of ability at the top,”\textsuperscript{171} a possible way out of the mire that is the condition of Tantalus.

Tantalus receives mixed reviews. In Light, C. V. W. Tarr provides what amounts to a spiritualist overview, rarely stopping to condemn or praise Schiller on any one point. He notes that Schiller holds “that there is no biological basis for human progress” so man must amend his situation by means of eugenic reform. And he suggests that this approach could be supplemented by use of a “new psychology” which promises further proof of miracles and immortality.\textsuperscript{172}

The Daily News is more positively inclined. It summarizes:

\textbf{Dr. Schiller’s brief essay, with its delicately tonic and astringent flavour, is immensely more valuable and infinitely more readable than most of the massive efforts at prophetic politics that have lately dropped heavily from the Press. His thesis, put briefly, is this: Man’s evolution has ceased; but, considered socially, it is busily going on. Unfortunately it is going swiftly and determinedly in the direction of certain destruction.}

\textsuperscript{169} Schiller, Tantalus, 53.

\textsuperscript{170} Schiller, Tantalus, 59.

\textsuperscript{171} Schiller, Tantalus, 61.

\textsuperscript{172} C. V. W. Tarr, review of Tantalus; or, The Future of Man, by F. C. S. Schiller, Light, n.d., Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. It is helpful to again suggest that Schiller’s views as to eugenics cannot be easily lumped into contemporary understandings of the same. A comment he made around this time is suggestive of this point. In reviewing J. Kaup’s Volkshygiene oder Selektive Rassenhygeine [People hygiene or selective races-hygiene] in April, Schiller notes that Kaup is “more specifically hostile to the ‘race-hygiene’ of certain German Darwinians, who have contaminated scientific eugenics with the mad race-theories of Gobineau, and have moreover conceived of Darwinism in a somewhat shallow way. Prof. Kaup is very sensible of the political dangers with which the doctrine of Nordic superiority is fraught in a country with the very mixed population actually found in Germany: a professor of Hygiene in the capital of a country like Bavaria inhabited chiefly by Alpines, does well to be so. As moreover they happen also to be Catholics, this may have a bearing on his hostility to Darwinism. It must be confessed however that his judgment on the eugenical movement in England is much more lenient; he commends it for recognizing ‘breeding’ in the educational as well as in the biological sense” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Volkshygiene oder Selektive Rassenhygeine, by J. Kaup, Eugenics Review 16, no. 1 [April 1924]: 58).
His solution does give some measure of pause. With its eugenic hope for salvation, the review finds in this reform tract “a rather startling blend of Christ and Nietzsche.”\(^{173}\) The Westminster Gazette doesn’t see the blend but, rather, a choice between “Christianity and Eugenics.” While admitting that it would be wrong to call Schiller a pessimist for simply diagnosing the decline of civilization, it goes on to suggest that his call for eugenic reform is no better as a solution. The condemnation is humorously pointed: “. . . for this part of the discussion his critical faculty appears to have been abandoned in the left-luggage bureau.”\(^{174}\) The Spectator, for its part, is the most dismissive of Schiller’s calls for reform or doom. They call his appeal to eugenics “a rather ill-backed ‘white-hope’” formulated in a manner that “is not convincing.”\(^{175}\)

We find Schiller, in these articles and books, doubling back over topics—here logic and science, there eugenics and belief—as if trying to gain some ground in what has become, as of late, a repetitive exercise. His books and his essays now seem to merge seamlessly into and out of the social and the philosophical, moving here to attack yet again the barrenness of logic and there to assert the novelty of pragmatism and humanism. The reviews, to fuse criticisms together, suggest the flux his reception undergoes: Schiller is an eloquent dabbler in white hopes, a popularizer lacking evidence for his popular philosophy. And, as the year draws to a close, we find him yet again circling back. This time, it is to the literary exemplar who once suggested the

\(^{173}\) Review of Tantalus; or, The Future of Man, by F. C. S. Schiller, Daily News, 16 September 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\(^{174}\) Review of Tantalus; or, The Future of Man, by F. C. S. Schiller, Westminster Gazette, 6 September 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\(^{175}\) Review of Tantalus; or, The Future of Man, by F. C. S. Schiller, Spectator, 5 September 1924, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1924, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
promise of his enterprise: Protagoras. The argument offered, though, suggests the instability of Schiller’s philosophy, a seemingly half-hearted attempt to meld the novelties of his humanism to more complex realities that lie beyond its reach.

In October 1924, Schiller pens the short essay “Our Natural Relativity” for the University of Southern California-based Personalist. He argues that Protagoras’s maxim still offers the basis for a larger attitude toward the world. In its time it was “denounced as anarchic, skeptical, subjectivist, destructive of cosmic order and the unity of the universe.” The philosophy that rose up in its place was its exact opposite: real considerations took a back seat to abstractions, universal conceits obscured practical matters. But the science of today offers to reinstate Protagoras’s maxim by way of its practices; “it is a characteristic merit of Science that when it makes a mistake, it always goes on to correct it.” In noting that variations exist, science now holds to a more relative standard of verification.

So far so much the same. The difference comes in attempting to marry Protagoras to a far newer revelation. In noting that (his) philosophy is matched to modern scientific conceptions such as “Einsteinian relativity,” Schiller stumbles. And he does so in suggesting how such the “revolutions” in physics and science should arouse little concern. First, he argues that “most of the relativity which sciences now recognize makes little or no difference for practical purposes.” Second, where relativity is of import today, it has already been integrated into our lives. In either regard, relativity “and the theoretical triumphs that it has won in modern science


178 Should one wish to raise an objection as to the merits of science and its self-correcting methods, it would stand only as a qualified objection. Granted, Schiller may here (now) sound naïve. But he was—alongside pragmatists ranging from Peirce to Dewey—not alone in that optimism.

179 Schiller, “Our Natural,” 236.
have simply brought our theory into agreement with our practice—to the benefit of both.”\textsuperscript{180} But do his views to this point bear out either one or two? This decidedly optimistic report is in line with the joys of novelty, but seems to sidestep the questions of risk.\textsuperscript{181} In repeating his views over and over, Schiller seems to downplay what he has warned others about. In not doubting his own optimism, he errs in not testing his own understanding.

6.4 OF CERTAIN ENDS: BRADLEY, EUGENICS, AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ENGLAND

Schiller had often challenged others for not questioning their assumptions. And late in 1924 an intriguing staging ground is set when a figure Schiller so often confronted was finally silenced. It is a test of the one now gone as much as it is a test for the one still living. Only weeks prior to Schiller’s article on relativity, on 18 September, Francis Herbert Bradley died of blood poisoning. The death of such a fiercely galvanizing figure was met with an enormous amount of commentary. But these commentaries, as much as they discuss the merits of Bradley’s views, serve a more important function as relates to Schiller. Three of the learned scholars who discuss Bradley’s philosophy provide criticisms, criticisms that sound strangely similar to ones that Schiller had voiced for well over a decade. That these philosophers are not pragmatists or humanists only adds to the suggestiveness of their reflections. And that they, like Bradley, rarely

\textsuperscript{180} Schiller, “Our Natural,” 237.

\textsuperscript{181} Recall that less than ten years ago Schiller worried that if “some disastrous discovery has given man control over the immense stores of inter-atomic energy, he will probably contrive to blow up the earth altogether, to substitute of for it a swarm of planetoids inhabited by microbes!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, April 1916, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
reference Schiller seems demonstrative of the paradox of his career at this point. Schiller’s critiques prove useful when assessing a dead philosopher; but it is more practical to cast aside the antagonist who first uttered them while Bradley was alive.

In January 1925, A. E. Taylor provides an encomium in *Mind*. The Bradley depicted here is one who, in private letters and published materials, strove to express his convictions clearly and examine the views of others fairly. Taylor, though, is well aware that there is something of an alternative picture of Bradley:

Among those who knew Bradley only by his books, I have found the curious impression that he was by temperament a recluse, avoiding the society of his fellow men, wrapped in his solitary studies, and devoid of any wide knowledge of life and affairs, in fact a philosopher of the type satirized in [philosopher Christian Johann Heinrich] Heine’s well known lines [likely: “Experience is a good school, but the fees are high”]. Nothing could be further from the truth.182

Nor was he that flimsy depiction of a metaphysician, who passes “his time in day-dreaming about unreal abstractions and knows nothing of the actual world of life and men.”183 He proved an asset to his college by virtue of his lengthy tenure and willingness, in spite of his health, to act on its behalf. Bradley, then, was one of the “few philosophers who have less deserved the reflections which are constantly being made by writers of the Pragmatist type against the so-called cold-blooded ‘intellectualism’ of the Idealist.”184 Taylor concludes by noting the mystical element in Bradley’s view of religion, a view that could just as well sum up what so attracted and repelled persons examining his philosophy: “At best we are trying to see *per speculum in genigmate* [in a glass darkly]; our analogies from human nature at its best are the best guides we

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can have, but they are analogies and nothing more, and they will always fail us if we press them too closely.”\textsuperscript{185}

The next three essays in \textit{Mind} seek to question, not praise, Bradley. In doing so they substantiate an assumption that Schiller repeatedly \textit{had} tested: the flaws in Bradley’s conception of philosophy. James Ward touches on “Bradley’s Doctrine of Experience.” Note how his criticisms mirror those offered by Schiller. Regarding the divide between the felt defect and the demand for unity: “There is no denying the originality and ingenuity of all this. But in truth it is just the originality and lack of simplicity which makes one suspicious. What if Bradley’s impasse exists only for him?”\textsuperscript{186} Or as regards Bradley’s attempt to explain how the defects of immediate experience are related to the need for a higher unity: “It has to do with it for Bradley only because of his unsubstantiated assumption that experience involves two inexplicable ‘aspects,’ as he calls them, which can only be speculatively combined.”\textsuperscript{187} Ward traces all of this to Hegel, to a need for a Reality that is experienced rubbing against the defective nature of our ability to articulate it.\textsuperscript{188} This need leaves Bradley “afflicted or gifted with a double personality. At any rate he strikes us as a man of two moods, and speaking therefore in two voices. We may say generally that his epistemology is skeptical and his ontology mystical, as [psychologist Harald] Höfding [1843-1931] has already remarked.”\textsuperscript{189}

G. F. Stout deals with “Bradley on Truth and Falsity.” And he both implicitly raises and explicitly praises Schiller’s criticisms on these counts. On the one hand, he notes that Bradley’s

\textsuperscript{185} Taylor, “F. H.,” 12.


\textsuperscript{187} Ward, “Bradley’s,” 28.

\textsuperscript{188} Ward, “Bradley’s,” 29.

\textsuperscript{189} Ward, “Bradley’s,” 34.
primary contention is flawed: “if a metaphysical proposition is untrue at all it must be absolutely false without any admixture of truth. Truth about the absolute as such must be absolute truth and error about the absolute must be absolute error.”\textsuperscript{190} The result is that “his central doctrine [regarding truth and falsity] is not that there is always the chance of our being more or less wrong; we have no possible chance of being entirely right or entirely wrong.”\textsuperscript{191} On the other hand, he notes that “Mr. Schiller seems to me to be quite right in insisting on relevance to the special interest of the subject in making or hearing a statement.”\textsuperscript{192} But Bradley ignores this. The result is that any relative idea is found lacking. For Bradley, and in a disruption of the partially true and partially false, the matter is resolved by absorbing A and B into a unity that exists, as Ward discussed regarding experience, within a “supra-relational unity” at once above and below them.\textsuperscript{193} Such a unity, in the real world of practice and the actual conduct of science, simply does not exist.

G. Dawes Hicks (1862-1941) discusses “Mr. Bradley’s Treatment of Nature.” He notes that Bradley spent little time speculating about the physical universe, supposing the domains of science and philosophy to be for the most part exclusive of each other. But Bradley did assume a view of nature; simply and problematically, that it was a psychical condition. Here Bradley again runs into the problem of totality; that is, of creating an inclusive category into which all can be shown to exist. Hicks questions this assumption. And he does so, in line with Schiller, because it renders the physical world “not, as such, real, but an appearance within reality, a


\textsuperscript{191} Stout, “Bradley,” 40.

\textsuperscript{192} Stout, “Bradley,” 41.

\textsuperscript{193} Stout, “Bradley,” 49-50.
partial and imperfect way in which the Absolute is manifest.”194 But such a stance creates a contradiction within his own theory. As Bradley noted, appearance is taken to mean imperfection and defect. But, on the other hand, he “is no less persistent in his contention that ‘Reality itself is nothing at all apart from appearances.’”195 This leads Hicks to question the very same plea as Stout. If it may be, what then leads us to say it must or, moreover, is? Bradley’s theory, as a result of these problems, would render science “theoretically barren and nugatory, and the use that metaphysicians could make of its results would be negligible.”196

In April 1925, Muirhead responds to the previous discussions in Mind with “Bradley’s Place in Philosophy.” Given his recent siding with the idealistic side of philosophy, it is not shocking that he finds the previous criticisms unseemly. While Taylor’s piece must have “deeply moved” many, and the criticisms were “valuable as bring out different sides of his philosophy,” there was something missing. In short, the three writers’ criticisms “would have gained something if they had tried to set them in the broader light of Bradley’s philosophy as a whole.”197 He sees that context as being the development of a line of thought developing in Hegel, carried through by Green and Caird, and reaching fruition in Bradley. Muirhead argues:

Neglecting differences of emphasis what was central in the teaching of these men was the implication in self-conscious knowledge and action of the idea of a whole or organized system, as the criterion of what we must hold to be true and good. Implicit in all man’s thought and conduct is the reference to a world of completely harmonized experience, to be one with which is the end imposed upon him by his nature as a rational being.198

194 G. Dawes Hicks, “Mr. Bradley’s Treatment of Nature,” Mind 34, no. 133 (January 1925): 60.

195 Hicks, “Mr. Bradley,” 67.

196 Hicks, “Mr. Bradley,” 69.


198 Muirhead, “Bradley’s Place,” 175.
In providing the latest manifestation of this approach, Bradley incurred concomitant risks.

Muirhead sees this as the paradox of his genius. On the one hand, he wrestled with the very nature of reality itself, attempting to draw more nuanced arguments into a discussion of first principles. On the other, he lent credence to attacks which claimed that his views reduced to: “not only is nothing as it seems but nothing is more than seeming.”

Muirhead understands this reading, though he feels it an unfair one. In reference to Ward, though certainly applicable to Schiller as well, Muirhead provides a private comment from Bradley regarding a critic who took the above view: “When we say ’Not only that but so much more: that you must not merely say that,’ he seems to take this as a denial of ‘that,’ whenever it suits him.” The point is a powerful one, in that it suggests more a hope and less a plea that the universe is in some way understandable.

It is lastly Schiller’s chance to respond. In the same April 1925 issue and regarding the same criticisms as Muirhead, he discusses “The Origin of Bradley’s Scepticism.” He notes that the set of papers, authored by philosophers at Cambridge, “tactfully abstain from dwelling on the final embarrassments of Bradleyan philosophy,” though all must be aware of “the imminence of skepticism with which Bradley not infrequently regaled his correspondents.” This skepticism leads Bradley to contend “that whatever the ostensible subject of a judgment may be, its real

199 Muirhead, “Bradley’s Place,” 182.

200 Muirhead, “Bradley’s Place,” 183.

201 F. C. S. Schiller, “The Origins of Bradley’s Scepticism,” Mind 34, no. 134 (April 1925): 217. There is a sense in which all participants are being careful, even in criticism, to assume the niceties of dealing with the recently departed. See, for instance, Schiller’s own comments on the page noted above: They “assuredly have not erred on the side of severity, and deserve commendation for the leniency and courtesy with which they have performed their onerous task. They have said may things which are true, and none which are rude.” Take, as another example, this comment by Muirhead: “The picture of his friend drawn by Prof. A. E. Taylor must have deeply moved others besides myself, and both in what it has given us and in what it has refrained from giving does honour to the writer” (Muirhead, “Bradley Place,” italics mine, 174).
subject is always, in the end, the Absolute.” Schiller argues that Bradley’s mistake is easily traceable. “This confusion may be shown to be a subtle case of the confusion between the judgment and the proposition.” In other words, by abstracting a judgment from the conditions which render it true or false, it is no longer an actual judgment. Thus abstracted, it is merely a verbal form, a proposition, which refers to nothing other than an isolated case removed from context. As Schiller suggests:

For the judgment means that in view of all the circumstances present to its maker’s mind and judged relevant by him, he has judged it best to make his judgment. It claims truth as being the best reaction to the circumstances which evoked it and as the truest response to the conditions under which it was pronounced.

But this does not mean, in reference to the issues raised by Stout, that the judgment is partly false; rather it is true within the context of its operation. And given a specific context, where things are judged to be more or less relevant, there is involved the matter of selection.

Schiller urges that Bradley recognized this. The problem, though, is that he develops two inconsistent views of the process of selection. Early on, selection is a “‘mutilation’ and a source of error” which makes inferences impossible; in later works, selection becomes “quite essential” to both judgments and inference. If it is the first, how is a view of the totality possible? If it is the second, it admits of only a partial view of the totality “and cannot be accused of failing to

204 Schiller, “The Origins,” 220.
205 Schiller, “The Origins,” 221.
206 Schiller, “The Origins,” 222.
include the whole of reality, seeing that this is precisely what it is conscious of trying not to do, but to avoid.\textsuperscript{207} The bind of either of these options is clear. By Bradley’s own showing the first will never provide the full view. The second will never attempt that view. But on both counts, “the logical roots of Bradley’s scepticism are without exception rotten.”\textsuperscript{208} By preferencing abstractions over experience, he in the end can distinguish nor explain either. While worded more forcefully than the comments of Ward, Stout or Hicks—and displaying none of the sensitivity of Taylor or Muirhead—it is interesting company to keep. Finally, after years of criticism for criticizing Bradley, Schiller is given some small measure of due by those who waited until there would be no response from the one criticized.

It is only conjecture to suggest that Schiller felt frustrated by such off-handed confirmation. But, aside from suggestions as late as 1925 that his health was still on the mend,\textsuperscript{209}

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\textsuperscript{207} Schiller, “The Origins,” 223.
\textsuperscript{208} Schiller, “The Origins,” 223.
\textsuperscript{209} His correspondence suggests that his health took a bad turn sometime near March 1924. A typewritten note in March (this a year after Schiller had a malignant growth checked at a London clinic) demonstrates that Schiller had a condition requiring bed rest. This condition is clarified in 1934: “Pneumonia in 1924, dilated heart and raised blood pressure discovered at this time” (Case Notes of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, 30 July 1934, Medical Records, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). The March note advises that Schiller should: “At present rest almost completely, though he may be propped up in bed so as to be able to read. He may get out of bed for the commode and while the end is being made. When he has completely recovered should not hurry and should avoid physical strains and mental worry as far as possible. He should take adequate rests, especially before meals” (Directions and Diet List for Doctor Schiller, 24 March 1924, Medical Records, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

In a letter dated 14 April 1924, W. Osborne Brigstocke notes that he has received Problems of Belief, but goes on to say “I hope you are really convalescent” (W. Osborne Brigstocke, Bedford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 14 April 1924, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). A note received a day later, from Leslie Joseph Walter, urges: “We were delighted to hear . . . that you have safely “turned the corner” and are now well on the road to renewed health. Your nephew, Mr. Harris, was in a few days ago + he confirmed this good report. I hope you won’t make the mistake of returning to work too soon but will devote a good interval to the full recovery of your health + strength” (Leslie Joseph Walker, Durham, to F. C. S. Schiller, 15 April 1924, Correspondence, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

David Leslie Murray, the author of Pragmatism (1912) for which Schiller wrote the preface, notes that he will write a review of Problems for the Guardian. He ends by saying: “I hope you continue to convalesce” (David
there is the matter of his scholarly record. Indeed, his philosophical output at this time has slowed to a trickle. So, sensing perhaps that better fields lay literally and figuratively beyond the scope of philosophy proper in England, Schiller continued to press the social issues taken up previously in Problems and Tantalus. 210 The first attempt, Cassandra; or, The Future of the British Empire (1926), is part of the same series as Tantalus. And it is no less gloomy in outlook or pensive in forecast. But it is also suggestive of Schiller’s tendency as of late to plumb his back catalog for relevant comparison and insight. He notes that, where Riddles was a youthful attempt to change the world, Cassandra is the attempt of an older man; an old man who “who has tried his hand at remoulding the scheme of things, and done his best and done his work, and failed, as intelligence mostly fails, in the unequal struggle with stupidity.” 211 As he has failed, so too has Britain in its quest to maintain its prominence. In the past, they maintained supremacy at

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210 The documents suggest he is near a full recovery by September 1925. Schiller makes this comment to Thaw from his summer vacation in Switzerland: “. . . Still I have said enough to show that I am having a good holiday + in consistently better shape physically that last year.” The letter goes on to suggest the actual date line by which the two books were completed, and his appraisal of them and the two previous ones: “. . . since I we got here on the 19th Aug. I have sent off the MS of 2 books . . . . My first book is a little one, like Tantalus, + in the same series. Name, ‘Cassandra or the Future of the British Empire.’ It ought to sell well, especially in America; even better than Tantalus, which has done shamefully well (considering how slight it was) + been translated into French + German. (Problems, tho’ a much better book, has not done so well, tho’ not badly.) The second is called ‘Eugenics + Politics’, [words unclear] largely of old material, + will be about the size of Problems. Needless to say you will receive both in due course, + probably fairly soon” (F. C. S. Schiller, Zermatt, to Florence Thaw, 5 September 1925, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

sea and superiority on the Continent “with an attitude of aloofness from the squabbles of European Powers.”²¹² But, as a consequence of war, colonial and labour disputes, industrial and financial loss, England stands defeated in the international sphere of influence. The only solution is an integrative one. Rather than reclaim preeminence, Britain must seek to promote a World State along the lines of the American plan of influence; “American power is a product, not of violence and conquest, but, in the main, of industry and peace.”²¹³ By no means assured, it is at least a plan which could stave off England’s slide into irrelevance.

Schiller’s acquaintances greet the book appreciatively.²¹⁴ Carveth Read responds in glowing fashion. “Many thanks for Cassandra: I agree with it all completely. It’s the most

²¹² Schiller, Cassandra, 17.

²¹³ Schiller, Cassandra, 80.

²¹⁴ One reply Schiller receives is actually in reference to a previous article. In April 1925 Edward Douglas Fawcett read an off print version of Schiller’s Eugenics Review article, “The Ruin of Rome and Its Lessons for Us.” In it, Schiller suggests that the downfall of Rome—ravaged by warfare, bureaucratic ineptitude, and foolhardy population schemes—can be spared Britain if it adopts a policy favoring economic and eugenic reforms. Central to this proposal is the use of the “professorial class” which knows the necessity of such reforms but nowadays “speaks in such technical terms as not to divulge it” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Ruin of Rome and Its Lessons for Us,” Eugenics Review 17, no. 1 [April 1925]: 9). Fawcett comments: “Thanks for the pamphlet read with much interest. In the cases of advanced states the important cause of decline is doubtless discouragement of the brainy classes when, current creeds failing, they come to consider life unsatisfactory. If this clan ceases to breed or favours the 1 child regime, the able administrators + discoverers may be far to seek: routine idiots replacing them. . . . Xitania, (which a “thin” creed which never yet has risen to the level required by Plato’s remarks about a God Rep. Bk II) helped to console the men, buffeted by the world, + so won temporarily. It would have failed utterly, had it not taught continuance in such form as “any feller” could understand. Men could breed potential angels! Worth the trouble. . . . [But] are there other factors, as yet unsuspected by most writers, connected with the population side of stock decline? In other words is there must we allow for influence from the side of ‘souls’ pressing toward rebirth? If, as you in R of Sphinx + McTaggart – to cite 2 prominent thinkers only – hold, there obtains a plurality of lives, a great deal may hinge on this factor. Operating on in subtle psychical ways it may escape our notice. But it must count, if you, McTaggart + Schopenhauer with the majority of mankind perhaps, are right? This hypothesis of plural lives cannot be used only in Riddle’s S” (Edward Douglas Fawcett, Gingolph, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 May 1925, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). At the start of 1926 he responds to Cassandra: “. . . “Cassandra” suggests eugenics — no; she will not be heard. Our barbarians may yet wreck us --- unless we have the dictature de forte [dictatorship of the strong] + the democratic nonsense ended. Democracy, which has tainted [page is cut off at this point]” (Edward Douglas Fawcett, Clarens, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 January 1926, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
directly practical thing you have done – a fine fruit of the Pragmatist Philosophy.”

His friend Thaw is more to the conspiratorial point:

The little book arrived safely some time ago but I am only now able to write to thank you. It seems to us most wise + true. Of course I know nothing at all about such matters -(but Blair knows everything)- it all seems reasonable to me. I appreciate the dangers + tho it hurts at first to think of the world entirely as founded on money + the Bankers – it certainly seems as if it were the only way.”

Jane (MacDowell), Fredrick Conybeare’s wife, also offers praise. But it is of a depressed sort: “. . . Cassandra arrived on Thursday . . . by the time I reached page 62 I was reduced to a state of abject misery I was obliged to put it away for the day. Everything you said seemed to me so detestably true.”

Read continues: “. . . Really the outlook is almost desperate. No doubt an old man, remembering the lights of other days and exaggerating their brilliancy, is subject to illusion as he looks around at the Jack-o’-lanterns of the present; but I cannot with such reflections persuade myself that our politicians are not a poor lot . . .” (Carveth Read, Solihull, to F. C. S. Schiller, 10 February 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

These comments are based in, what seems, textual reflection on their longstanding relationship. As she concludes her letter, Thaw notes:

I am glad the time will soon come – for I am 62 – when I shall go to another existence. Only the young can cope with such a world as we have round us today. I was looking over old letters which have been locked up in a safety deposit box for 20 years – we came upon a letter from you at Cornell Univ. written in Jan 1894 – before we went to California. I am going to quote one of the fine + reassuring things which you wrote [when 25 years old]!

‘Of eternity I dare not speak: I can well conceive that an unimagined wealth of new experience may be reserved for us . . . But I have sufficient faith in the rationality of our present world to believe that truth will persist throughout all possible modes of existence + will never be belied by experiences which confound our reason.’

Isn’t that grand stuff! without that faith in the universe where should we be!

(For reference to this letter, see Chapter One and F. C. S. Schiller, Cornell, to Florence Thaw, 15 January 1894, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

Like Thaw, she turns to the thought of the afterlife: “. . . I suppose this only shows how good it is if it made the impression on others it did on me, no time would be wasted before measures were taken to stop the slide. But I am sure no one except stupid people like myself will pay the least attention to it. So we will so calmly and cheerfully go to destruction. Unless things hurry up y much I’ll not be here to see it. Some consolation” (Jane Conybeare, Ventnor, to F. C. S. Schiller, 21 March 1926, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
Friends are one thing. The same cannot be said for the popular press’s reactions. It receives less than glowing notices from a popular press that had, to this point, been largely in his court. In that way, Cassandra stands out in the history of Schiller’s popular reception. The Times suggests that Schiller is prone to drawing “hard and fast lines” while leaving “it open how far he takes himself quite seriously.”218 The Sheffield Telegraph feels that many of Schiller’s prophesies are unnecessarily gloomy and pessimistic; that being said, they go on to suggest that “this is hard reasoned pessimism that provokes discomposing reflections.”219 The Scotsman hopes that Schiller proves a “false prophet” and questions how his supposed remedies—notably, a World State—are to actually be brought about.220 The Spectator notes that Schiller is “a first rate modern philosopher [who] still deigns to take an interest in the affairs of men.”221 Whether meant as a compliment or not, it questions the plausibility of Schiller’s predictions. The Daily Sketch provides the most positive slant. Regardless of whether the reader agrees with Schiller, “it is impossible not to be impressed by the very clear exposition of the Empire’s present

218 Review of Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, by F. C. S. Schiller, Times, 18 February 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

219 Review of Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, by F. C. S. Schiller, Sheffield Telegraph, 22 February 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

220 Review of Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, by F. C. S. Schiller, Scotsman, 22 February 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

221 Review of Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, by F. C. S. Schiller, Spectator, 20 February 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
situation.” This is, again, a clear case of perception influencing reception. While friends take
the bad news on faith, the reviewers seem depressed by what they hope is a pessimistic joke.

The second attempt is more a reiteration than a new line of attack. Eugenics and Politics, coming soon after Cassandra, is offered as “lighter literature,” a “by-product of a busy academic
life.” The book is dedicated to Leonard Darwin (1850-1943), son of Charles and then
president of the British Eugenics Society. It contains, save one early draft and an addendum,
reprints of articles that Schiller had published—such as “Eugenics and Politics” (1914) and
“Eugenics versus Civilization” (1921)—in the Eugenics Review and the Hibbert Journal. His
stated goal is a comprehensive reform of the whole of society. But it is no blast to the structure
of society; it must be conservative and gradual. Schiller argues that “the evolution of eugenical
sentiments, eugenical institutions, and eugenical men will be gradual and slow, perhaps too slow
to save the human race; it will not be due to any tour de force of Platonic superman.”

Yet again, friends are quick to supply affirmations. Darwin, after receiving the book,
thanked Schiller for the honor: “I am here for a short rest, and I wish I could make you
understand how much the receipt of your book, with its charming dedication, cheered me up. It
was like a hot drink on a journey, warming the heart and sending one on with renewed
vigour.” Alfred Sidgwick responds: “Many thanks for the “Eugenics”, which I have found

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222 Review of Cassandra; or, the Future of the British Empire, by F. C. S. Schiller, Daily Sketch, 27 January 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


224 Schiller, Eugenics, 200.

225 Darwin, though, is growing weary: “I am in truth getting too old for the job, and sincerely wish I could
hand it on to younger hands. But till that happy event occurs, your encouragement is most helpful, and it will ever
remain as a pleasant memory. My book comes out soon, and I feel that it would have been better if I could have waited for a few years before publishing – but then it would never have been published. With ever enduring
gratitude for this encouraging token . . .” (Leonard Darwin, Salcombe, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 March 1926,
interesting + persuasive. I gather that there is nothing to be actually done till sufficient money can be somehow raised for purposes of endowment, + that this is unlikely to be done by any government in our time.”

The American architect Henry Rutgers Marshall (1852-1927) replies: “It is delightful to note the general tone of optimism that pervades your *Eugenics and Politics* which I have just read with very great pleasure.” There is even unexpected approval from a former combatant on psychical matters, St. George Lane-Fox. Judging from the tone, the debates of several decades past are settled: “I have also received your latest book on Eugenics’ for which very many thanks. It is a book about which I can only make the superfluous comment ‘My thoughts exactly, but how I wish I could express them as well.’”

*Eugenics and Politics* also receives a goodly amount of attention from the press; still mixed but slightly more agreeable than with the previous prognostication. From the midst of the proponents at the *Eugenics Review*, Read is again in a chipper mood. He positively comments on the manner and method of exposition:

Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

226 Alfred Sidgwick, Cornwall, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 April 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

227 Marshall continues: “There is hope indeed for a future for our race; but as I look back I am struck by the faces – those who are born into an era of Loss of Civilization are in the main utterly inappreciative of the fact that they are losing or have lost. As I write we are all immensely concerned in relation to the general strike by which a minority of the lower type is trying to tyrannize those of a generally higher type in your (?) relatively civilized people. May ‘the best’ win out, without a civil war and without a governmental compromise” (Henry Rutgers Marshall, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 4 May 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

228 Lane-Fox then trades inspiration stories with Schiller: “It is interesting to me as well as picturesque to hear you say that a reading of Plato’s Republic first discovered the Eugenist [sic] in you. If any book first stirred my Eugenic conscience it was an abridged version 2nd Edition of Malthus ‘On Population’ – read whilst I was at Eton” (St. George Lane-Fox [Pitt-Rivers], Dorset, to F. C. S. Schiller, 14 April 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
We are glad to find that the Master’s style has not greatly deteriorated . . . whilst his sense of fair-play in dialectic (perhaps from having learned cricket) and, above all, his common sense have vastly improved. Hence his proposals are modest . . . but his advice (Plato hints) is academic; and that, alas! Has little momentum outside the academy. 229

The Pioneer praises the essays contained as “a delight,” as a clear-headed expose that destroys “a number of popular bugbears” propped up against eugenics. 230 The Sheffield Telegraph, while suggesting the absence of any consideration of economic factors, nonetheless finds Schiller’s tract “fairly and moderately stated . . . without pedantry and with extreme caution.” 231 The Journal of Education suggests that the book is written in “what we may be pardoned for calling a marked and unmistakable Oxford manner.” Yet it supposes that “there are no doubt many readers who will find a good use for these clever intimations of the eugenic point of view.” 232 The Tablet finds the Schiller’s overall tone pessimistic. But the “clearly and gracefully written book” finds some accord with the religious minded, insofar as Schiller does argue for the

229 Carveth Read, review of Eugenics and Politics, by F. C. S. Schiller, Eugenics Review, 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. This positive review should have been no surprise to Schiller. In a March 1926 letter, Read wrote: “Many thanks for Eugenics and Politics. I have read it through with entire agrmnt. It argument has any force you ought to convince the nation. But ah! The average man! Who shall get an idea into his head? And the present House of Commons is worse than the average man. It has always been getting worse and worse. The country knows it. . . . Some of your chapters I had seen before; not, of course, the Dialogue with Plato (a happy thought!) nor the discussion of the Fall of the Roman Empire. I hate the Romans, and the Republic, perhaps, more than the Empire, which was the punishment of its crimes. What can be expected of our civilization that owes them so much? ‘Tis the herd of swine rushing down a steep plain (?). Is it too late to emigrate to N. Ireland? . . .” (Carveth Read, Solihull, to F. C. S. Schiller, 28 March 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

230 Review of Eugenics and Politics, by F. C. S. Schiller, Pioneer, 12 September 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

231 Review of Eugenics and Politics, by F. C. S. Schiller, Sheffield Telegraph, 25 June 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

positive roles that spirituality and the family play in eugenical reform.\textsuperscript{233} The \textit{International Journal of Ethics} is also ambivalent. It argues that “the pragmatism or humanism which is naturally connected with Dr. Schiller’s name is not apparent in these essays: for they are as absolute in tone as any Idealism”; but “the Essays are amusingly written and full of ‘hits’ at contemporary foibles and prejudices.”\textsuperscript{234} The \textit{Times of India} provides the most critical, and suggestive, of the divided reviews. It too views Schiller’s retorts to eugenic criticisms as lucid and brimming with “common sense.” But in pushing for a eugenic state Schiller is open to a complaint: “The essays are full of evidence that the author has missed by the very nature of his career, immediate contact with many of the realities of life.”\textsuperscript{235} Such a comment will prove prescient.

But it is likely to have struck Schiller as impertinent if accurate. That said, it is likely that Schiller missed the irony in the \textit{Times’} conclusion: a philosophy predicated on experience, on practice, on use, is derided for lacking the requisite measure of each. In such a way, this complaint mirrors the objections raised regarding the \textit{Problems of Belief}. Thus, as 1926 draws to a close, his social and philosophical views remain, in the eyes of interested critics, open-ended. Again, this is likely to have struck Schiller as being as it should. For how can a world in

\textsuperscript{233} Review of \textit{Eugenics and Politics}, by F. C. S. Schiller, Tablet, 9 October 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


\textsuperscript{235} Review of \textit{Eugenics and Politics}, by F. C. S. Schiller, \textit{Times of India}, 8 August 1926, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1926, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Another review, in \textit{American Political Science Review}, continues what seems an ongoing theme. While it views the work as “prophetic and messianic” it questions the solution: “the remedy is the eugenical state (Chap. II), though exactly what this is the author does not make clear” (Harry Barth, review of \textit{Eugenics and Politics}, by F. C. S. Schiller, \textit{American Political Science Review} 20, no. 4 [November 1926]: 905-6).
the making ever be made whole, complete? But this is also ironic insofar as the Jamesian “buzzing confusion” Schiller has hoped to solve is, in the eyes of critics, actually the solution suggested.

There are also consequences less speculative than philosophical theory and social reform. These consequences, however, are based in how Schiller had conducted such philosophical and social inquiries. His goals of systematic treatises, goals urged on by James nearly two decades past, were repeatedly put on hold as a result of his tutoring. The resulting *Formal Logic* was systematic, but destructive. The subsequent *Problems of Belief* was productive, but meager. And his hopes for a professorship, and the freedom it would have allowed developing his ideas, were dashed by the manner in which he promoted both. So, with no endowed chair in his future, and with his health having declined, it perhaps understandable that Schiller should exclaim in 1926: “... I shd like to retire this year, but there are considerable advantages in hanging in another year or two, + the matter will finally depend on how college politics develop.”

Schiller is either being a touch disingenuous (recall his volleying for a position at either Harvard or Corpus Christi in the 1890s) or things develop more rapidly, and for the worse, than he expected. For, in May, the Corpus Christi College Minutes provide this comment:

> It was agreed with regard to the possible retirement of Dr. Schiller (a) that Dr. Schiller should be left absolutely free to choose the date, the college unanimously expressing its sense that it would elect Dr. Schiller on his retirement either to an Emeritus Fellowship under the new statutes or to an Extraordinary Fellowship under the old statutes + allow Dr. Schiller to retain his present rooms. (b) that arrangements for the teaching of Philosophy for the next year, if necessary, be made by the Tutorial Body.  

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236 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 18 April 1926, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

237 College Minutes, Corpus Christi College, 22 May 1926, B/4/1/13, Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
Not that all is lost. In giving up his twenty-plus year career as a College Tutor, he retained his residence at Oxford under the Extraordinary Fellowship. But other opportunities, and different audiences, were now open to a man freed of the rigors of a career he had, in all practical senses, made and decided to give up. Such fortunes lay, not in the England to which he had once returned, but in the America which he had once unceremoniously left.  

238 The specifics of Schiller’s next several months are provided in a letter dated 18 June 1926 to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Southern California, regarding “the interesting suggestions” offered by Flewelling; namely a visiting lecture at that school: “. . . I am handing in my resignation tomorrow, and shall be a free man, open to ‘temptations’. . . . I realize that it may be difficult to make arrangements at such short notice . . . though I have never been far West and have always heard very fascinating accounts of California. So there is evidently much to be considered. Meanwhile here are my plans. From now till July 22nd I shall be in Oxford examining in ‘Modern Greats’. On the 24th of July I go to Switzerland for a holiday . . . and have to be back in time for my boat to America (August 23rd, Southampton). But if I decide to stay after the Congress [the Sixth International Congress in Philosophy at Cambridge in September] and into December I may change my boat so as to arrive only shortly before the Congress, and to get rather more of a holiday (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, June 18 1926, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Flewelling was the Chair of the School of Philosophy. As Manuel P. Servin and Iris Higbie Wilson explain: “The department of philosophy was fortunate in obtaining Ralph Tyler Flewelling to succeed Dr. [James Harmon] Hoose in 1915. A graduate of Boston University, Dr. Flewelling was the author of several books and founder of a philosophical journal called The Personalist. An energetic and highly respected professor, Flewelling organized a separate School of Philosophy in 1919 and obtained philosophers from European centers of higher learning to serve on its staff. With the acquisition of a highly specialized library and continued curriculum expansion, the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California achieved recognition in a wide range of academic circles” (Manuel P. Servin and Iris Higbie Wilson, Southern California and Its University: A History of USC, 1880-1964 [Los Angeles: Ward Ritchie Press, 1969], 79). Several of the philosophers who were on staff at various times during Schiller’s tenure would have been well known to him: the British Idealist H. Wildon Carr (1857-1931), and Canadian Joseph Alexander Leighton are all listed as honorary fellows as late as 1930, with others, such as the German-born R. F. Alfred Hoernlé (1880-1943), having served at various times as visiting professors.
The more pedestrian of philosophers wander about in them with their heads in culs de sac; the more dashing pursue dead issues into dead ends: in both cases because their predecessors have omitted to post ‘not a through street’ signs. Hence they leave behind litter, but not literature. This is called the History of Philosophy.¹

Freed from the constraints of a tutorship, Schiller’s final years are a mix of travel and reiteration. Save for the last couple years, Schiller maintains a fairly stable travel schedule. He spends his summer and fall in England, at his quarters in Oxford and at the family residence at Betchworth, and then several weeks at Pontresina in Switzerland. His winters and springs are spent in America visiting friends, giving lectures, and teaching at the University of Southern California. It is only in 1935, after suffering a significant decline in health and taking a wife, that Schiller finally moves full-time to Los Angeles. No longer healthy enough to teach, he obtains emeritus status at USC in 1936. In the midst of publishing a series of articles, Schiller dies late in the summer of 1937.

This travel routine has the effect of limiting his writing. Previous years had been spent fretting over the lack of a systematic treatise. But Schiller only manages one comprehensive statement: Logic for Use (1929), meant as the productive rather than destructive sequel to Formal Logic. His other books during this period, Social Decay and Eugenical Reform (1932) and Must Philosophers Disagree? (1934) are collections of previously published articles. A similar slowing occurs where Schiller has achieved most of his notoriety with his peers. Quarrels in the pages of the Journal of Philosophy and Mind diminish as he takes to writing smaller articles in smaller journals. His most aggressive output—hundreds of reviews and

several articles—are reserved for the pages of Flewelling’s *Personalist* and often composed while in transit between America and England. The drama of previous years, though not entirely gone, is surpassed by attempts at précis of his social concerns, of pragmatism’s lineage, of his career. His retreat from teaching at Oxford is in large degree self-imposed. And it is an exile that grants some measure of comfort and closure. But it is also a much more isolated end than Schiller felt he deserved.

### 7.1 WANDERLUST: RECLAIMING JAMES

Regardless the route or exact date, it is clear that Schiller arrives at Harvard in early September 1926 to attend the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy and present two papers (subsequently republished in the proceedings the following year). This return to America carries with it a return to the most belabored issue of Schiller’s career, alongside the more recent considerations of philosophy as a mechanism for social control and reform. The first paper, “Fact and Value,” is presented alongside papers by Wilbur M. Urban (1873-1952) of Dartmouth and Leonard J. Russell of Birmingham. The presentation seeks to destroy the very distinction of its title. For, to Schiller, any fact worth considering is one that has obtained its status by means of valuation. The “philosophic sciences” should, rather than seek to parse out distinctions between the objective fact and its subjective value, admit that the two shade into each other. And while Schiller holds that such a view seems “so simple and so obvious that it hardly seems worth while come 3000 miles to say it,”\(^2\) he is full well aware that it is likely to be met with the

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accusation that he is wrong. But is that not, he concludes, the very valuation of the facts in dispute that he claims to uphold?

The second paper, “Communication on Philosophy and International Relations,” is presented alongside Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) of Cologne and G. Kuwaki of Tokyo. 3 Schiller notes that, as far back as Plato’s philosopher-king and Aristotle’s sage, philosophy has entertained the notion of exerting a controlling influence on society. Whereas the first scheme was fantastic and the second useless, philosophy is again in a position “to look further ahead, to take a wider view of the circumstances of life as a whole, to perceive the trend of events, to prepare men’s minds betimes for what is coming, to influence them to act as reasonably as their nature permits.” 4 And it is to America that Schiller looks. For America, by way of film and finance, already wields great influence internationally. And its philosophers, “mostly pragmatists, more or less,” might provide a third method of persuasion, “of mediating between the distracted peoples of the earth and of setting their feet firmly in the paths of peace.” 5 The paper makes no mention, however, of the method by which Schiller would see this solution achieved.

3 I am indebted to Hiroshi Ezawa, Professor Emeritus at Gakushuin University and a member of the Science Council of Japan, for information regarding the latter panel member. As Ezawa states: “G. Kuwaki (Gen-yoku Kuwaki, 1874-1946) is an elder brother of [physicist] Ayao Kuwaki (1878-1945). I don’t know if they had more brothers or sisters. Incidentally, Tsutomu Kuwaki (1913-2000), who appears in my article (in the caption to Fig.4 and in ref. [5]), is a son of A. Kuwaki, and he himself was a philosopher. G. Kuwaki was a professor of philosophy, first at the Kyoto Imperial University and then at the Imperial University of Tokyo (now, “Imperial” is removed), being an eminent leader in philosophy in Japan. He is said to have established a foundation for the study in Japan of Western philosophy. He wrote "Introduction to Philosophy" which was used as a standard text book for a long time, and books on the history of philosophy and studies on Kant. The "Culturism" he advocated gave a direction to the so-called Taisho democracy. (Taisho refers to the period 1913-1927)” (personal communication, 29 November 2005, email). The article Ezawa refers to in his note is: “Impacts of Einstein’s Visit on Physics in Japan,” Association of Asian Pacific Physical Societies Bulletin 15, no. 2 (April 2005): 3-16.


Nor do the records indicate exactly what transpires after these presentations in September. But a general schedule can be put together. It is likely that Schiller set off to deliver a lecture at USC, a lecture that was published a year later in the Personalist as “William James and the Making of Pragmatism.”6 The lecture itself has a rather complex life. Both Schiller and Flewelling refer to it as having been delivered at the International Congress in September. But the table of contents provides no listing of such a presentation. It is likely, then, that it was presented extemporaneously and then drafted into publishable form for the Personalist.7 Nor was this to be the last use of the lecture. It was published in the latter collection Must Philosophers Disagree? (1934) and is significantly modified in a lecture that he delivered at the College of the Pacific in that same year. This essay is an important step in what becomes an increasingly insistent program to canonize James as the preeminent figure in the development of pragmatism, past as well as present.

6 That Schiller traveled to USC and then to Clark College in Massachusetts is gleaned from his letter in June to Flewelling. Speaking on the issue of the “temptations” brought about by his resignation, Schiller notes: “Besides yours, the only one assailing me at present is an invitation to deliver one lecture at Clark University sometime between November 29th and December 11th. That leaves a considerable gap to fill between September 20th and then, if I stay in the U.S.A.; and it occurs to me that it might suit you to fill it, or some of it” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, June 18 1926, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

7 The question remains, however, where it would have been presented at the Congress. The likely place is made clearer by a comparison of documents. In the introduction, Schiller states: “At the recent Congress of Philosophy at Harvard I was considerably surprised to hear what very modest and apologetic estimates were put on American achievements in philosophy by some of the spokesmen of American in welcoming the representatives of foreign countries” (F. C. S. Schiller, “William James and the Making of Pragmatism,” Personalist 8, no. 2 [April 1927]: 81; F. C. S. Schiller, “William James and the Making of Pragmatism,” in Must Philosophers Disagree? and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [London and New York: Macmillan, 1934], 93). There is, indeed, an opening session welcoming delegates. But the far more likely place where these types of comments would have occurred is during “History of Philosophy,” Division D, “Contemporary Philosophy: Report on Present Tendencies in Different Countries,” Section 4. And who is it that presented the report on American philosophy? None other than Frank Thilly, the man who Schiller replaced during his ill-fated tenure at Cornell and who had by this time returned to Cornell (Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, ed. Edgar Sheffield Brightman [London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927], xiii).
Claiming that “Pragmatism was one of the major events in the history of thought,” Schiller includes it in the company of such discoveries as: (1) the Absolute, (2) Pure Spirit, (3) Universals, (4) Formal Logic, (5) the Self, (6) the Critical Problem of epistemology, (7) the Problem of Value, and (8) Darwinism. But, like most important discoveries, pragmatism suffers the insult of its novelty and the ignorance of a pedigree that stretches back to Protagoras. Here Schiller is speaking of James, yet lingers on the aspects of discovery in a manner that also suggests himself:

The first hundred times or so that a new idea is ventilated, it is simply disregarded, and treated as though it had never been; the one hundred and first time, when some forceful genius gets the world by the long ears and makes it listen, the learned can always show that it was anticipated long ago. So they are satisfactorily confirmed in their conviction that there is nothing new under the sun! Nevertheless Pragmatism was as new as anything could be in the fog-laden atmosphere of philosophy.

The comment is forceful, if curious. The version of pragmatism that is most associated with Protagoras is Schiller’s humanism. And it is Schiller who has operated as the “genius” that “anticipated long ago” this connection. But, obviously, Schiller doesn’t mean to suggest that he is a mere follower. So why this passage? The implication is that he is trying to trace out a historical lineage—from Protagoras, through James, to himself—that shows the long-standing dismissal pragmatic-like thought has suffered at the hands of the traditionalists.

Even within the purported pragmatist camp. For here comes his first attempt at an erasure and revision. Peirce is discounted because “the doctrine was fathered upon him” whereas James operates as “its real progenitor.” Schiller’s placement, and that of his contemporaries, is also subtly set forth. Though Schiller claims no status of “disciple” as late as

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8 Schiller, “William,” 81-2; Schiller, Must, 93-4.
9 Schiller, “William,” 82-3; Schiller, Must, 94-5.
10 Schiller, “William,” 83; Schiller, Must, 95.
1897, he suggests that he felt in 1899 that his friend Dickinson Miller “had seriously mistaken James’s meaning.” 11 Others sensed the import of James as well. Dewey, and note here the language, “had the perspicacity to detect the philosophy that was contained in James’s psychology and to derive the philosophy of his ‘instrumentalism’ independently from that fountain head.” 12 The shifty nature of this argument is made clearer by reference to the dates attached to the comments about Dewey’s independent philosophy. Dewey had “caught on” by 1914 (when Knox published his The Philosophy of William James) even though the reference to James’s psychology dates it back to the publication of James’s work in 1890. The timeline is muddled, it seems, for effect. Though Dewey got it sooner, he developed an “independent” philosophical view. Though Schiller got it later, he more obviously understood pragmatism’s history and the “real progenitor’s” meaning and was able to defend it against attack.

What aspects were there to which Schiller had to provide aid? Contra critics such as Stebbing, Schiller had to bolster the issue of what counts for verification and proof as regards the truth and a truth-claim. And for him that amounts to the empirical side of James’s pragmatism. How, then, do Schiller, Dewey, and Peirce fit into the championing of James’s gift? Schiller, in “Axioms as Postulates,” seeks to expand the will to believe and “by so universalizing it I could render its recognition easier and more palatable.” 13 Dewey, for his part, gives the academics what they want: burdensome technicality respected but not understood, foisted under the unduly “cumberous” label “instrumentalism.” 14 Peirce, poor soul, is reduced to a description offered up

11 Schiller, “William,” 85; Schiller, Must, 97.
12 Schiller, “William,” 84; Schiller, Must, 96.
13 Schiller, “William,” 86; Schiller, Must, 98.
14 Schiller, “William,” 90; Schiller, Must, 102.
by Alice James: “For years C. S. P. had appealed to William for help until at last he acquired the habit of tugging that poor derelict though troubled waters.”\textsuperscript{15} The question, one assumes, is rhetorical. Would one choose a universalizing and palatable, cumbersome and technical, or derelict view of pragmatism?

But Schiller again feigns modesty even while asserting his role in pushing the movement forward. He “found it quite easy” to adapt to the use of the clunky term pragmatism as the general, and instrumentalism and humanism as the specific, term(s) for the movement. Indeed, he suggests that there are perhaps as many pragmatisms as there are persons who champion its cause.\textsuperscript{16} Not so fast. For here Schiller perfects the merger of James into his Humanism. James, like Protagoras, respects “the humanistic truth”: “every center of experience should be heard from, because it may yield a contribution to the common store.”\textsuperscript{17} This is the (overly) optimistic blending of the general and the particular, the fusion of individual views to a social process by which truth-claims that are verified achieve more and more axiomatic status. How, though, the derelict and the technical philosophers fit into this rosy picture remains in doubt.

This attempt to gather diverse strands underneath his humanist awning was not reserved for members of the pragmatist fold. After his stay at UCLA, Schiller travels back across the

\textsuperscript{15} Schiller, “William,” 91; Schiller, Must, 103.

\textsuperscript{16} As with the previous chapter, this seemingly banal comment has a historical reference point, one that points to an important episode in Schiller’s developing humanism. In 1908, Lovejoy published an article (actually, two articles) seeking to discriminate the variations on the pragmatic theme. That article(s), and a book review by McTaggart, led James to finally agree with Schiller that members of the idealist camp were “dishonest.” Moreover, it finally convinced James of the worth of Schiller’s humanist campaign. For reference to this episode in Chapter Four, see John Ellis McTaggart, review of Pragmatism, by William James, Mind 17, no. 65 (January 1908): 104-9; Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II,” Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (January 1908): 29-39; William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 January 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 26 January 1908, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.

\textsuperscript{17} Schiller, “William,” 93; Schiller, Must, 105.
country to present his paper “Some Logical Aspects of Psychical Research” at a symposium held at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, from 29 November to 11 December. The symposium attracts a wide range of presenters, ranging from proponents to opponents and those in between. Notable among them are author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930) and politician Sir Oliver Lodge (1851-1940) representing supporters, and magician Harry Houdini (1874-1926) as a critic. This article can be read as a companion piece to the previous one. It is an attempt to place himself amidst the historical developments of psychical research, urging again for humanistic novelty and against flawed traditions.

Schiller begins by noting that his interest in psychical research, begun in 1882, has been conducted for 44 years “without either giving up the subject as hopeless or extracting from it any overbelief and turning it into a religion.”¹⁸ But his insistence on its worth as an area of inquiry is also an extension of his belief that the traditional training in logic and science is lacking. In turning away from flawed notions of proof, his early work in the Oxford Phasmatological Society—which was absorbed in the Society for Psychical Research—ensured that he “never became enslaved to the fatuities of the traditional logic, and became more capable of conceiving the idea of a humanist logic that interested itself in the actual reasonings of men and their practical difficulties in obtaining truth.”¹⁹ Schiller’s logic, then, tests the limits of what is traditionally considered scientific, junking the a priori in search of that which becomes truer by testing. But it accrues sanction by the very fact that science as practiced—in the downfall of

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¹⁹ Schiller, Some Logical,” 217.
Euclidean geometry or the rupture in Newtonian physics—exemplifies the first canon of his logic: “that nothing is incredible if the evidence for it is good enough.”

But what becomes truer and is seen to be good enough is a matter of quantity; it is subject to the demands of “a logic which is willing to let empirical evidence accumulate.” And, on this count, Schiller’s interest in psychical research contains a criticism. Lacking experimental control, psychical research is left to take the worst form of philosophy, the “one proves all,” and vainly assert it as proof of the legitimacy of its endeavors. As Schiller explains:

It is moreover a further consequence of this lack of experimental control over the phenomena that the severest and most trustworthy of all the tests of truth, the pragmatic, cannot as yet be supplied in Psychical Research. We cannot as yet maintain that psychic phenomena “work” so obviously and so surely that their reality is practically beyond dispute, and that disbelief in them has become mere silly, like disbelief in telegraphy.

Such validation must be sought if it wishes to enter into discussions of legitimate science. Here Schiller urges caution against surrendering too quickly to any one theory of any one sort of psychical phenomenon. Why? In the first place, these phenomena engage the mind in conceiving heretofore unexamined possibilities. In the second, “the hypotheses also by which we seek to apprehend them are similarly ill-defined.” The widest possible ground should be covered in both seeking to find objects to study and in attempting to develop theories as to their occurrence. But, in the third and in line with his view of logic, this searching out of materials to test and hypotheses to apply is the mark of all sciences. A robust science like physics continues

20 Schiller, Some Logical,” 219.


22 Schiller, Some Logical,” 220-1.

23 Schiller, Some Logical,” 223.
to encounter data which defies its established assumptions and psychology, one of the oldest of sciences, still struggles to define the terms of its inquiries. Why should psychical research proceed any less impeded by changing concepts and terms of art? And here Schiller references a hope of seemingly Jamesian overtones: “It seems probable enough that the facts will continue to seem bizarre . . . but our faith in Scientific Method should embolden us to believe that, if we go on, we shall find a way, even through the thickest jungle. It is the scientific will to find a way which has hitherto been lacking.” Thus, Schiller concludes, not with a program, but with a “profession of faith.” It is a belief that the road ahead may prove difficult but, in the end, supply materials that are useful.

The two presentations that Schiller provided at the International Congress can be read as rather staid extensions of already standing arguments: the errors of abstraction and the social application of philosophy. But the two lectures are different. They rather insistently insert Schiller into the historical mix of pragmatism and psychical research. It is also clear that they function as a form of retrospective sense-making meant to improve his place within those movements. The published disparagement of Peirce, not heretofore seen, draws Schiller closer to James. The comments regarding Dewey are more reminiscent of his private letters than his past reviews of Dewey’s works. And by combining his historical interest in psychical matters with his more recent attempts to formulate a humanistic logic, Schiller seeks to further extend the reach of his particular version of pragmatism. In both, he exemplifies his claim that “every age demands a new history of the past.” But to what end a past picture for a philosopher with a forward thinking program? A “practical desire for guidance which inspires our interest in the

24 Schiller, Some Logical,” 225.

future, as in the past." If pragmatism can be seen to move seamlessly into humanism, it
eliminates both Peircean obscurity and Deweyian technicality. If psychical research is aided,
indeed informed, by humanism, it further extends the practices which he professes. All history is
aided by what we recall and how we articulate it. These lectures clearly suggest that Schiller
remembers his own place well. The question is not how true the tales are, but whether they will
prove useful.

7.2 ON WHAT GROUNDS: THE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF HUMANISM

Whatever the actual date of the Clark University lecture, Schiller was back at Oxford by
the start of 1927. And correspondences he received provide tantalizing hints as to the overall
trip. At some point, perhaps as a result of such a taxing schedule, Schiller’s health had
suffered. But it is a letter from Fawcett that is more intriguing:

Glad you had such a rare time + steered clear of a Professorship with possibly an
American heiress to follow ------ then the domesticities + and [sic] no Logic! Oh! Yes,
Knightly + I admire your work in Logic, but should prefer even to that another
installment of the lucubration of you + your old crony, the Sphinx. Would the
monadology + the pluralism hold today? And can the white world, which you suspect to
be on the primrose path of decadence, dispense with a metaphysics which will endorse
meliorism? . . .

26 Schiller, introduction, xi.
27 “I hope the New Year finds you more or less restored to health, and that you are not presuming too much
thereon. And for the remainder of the year, too, (No! I did not say, or at any rate write, “the year two”), all health
and prosperity to you, and confusion to our enemies. (Not that they could be much more confused than they are at
present; confound them, all the same.) . . .” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 1 January 1927,
Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
28 Edward Douglas Fawcett, Clarens, to F. C. S. Schiller, 3 January 1927, Correspondence, Box One, F. C.
S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
The letter references a variety of interesting possibilities. In the first place, it suggests that Schiller was already entertaining an offer to teach at USC. In the second, there is the implication that Schiller had met a potential paramour. It is likely that this love interest was future wife Louise Strang Griswold, then an assistant art professor at USC. And the trip was successful enough to prompt Flewelling to exclaim, “We miss your genial countenance in the office and since the mountains have been several times covered with snow we have wished that you might be here to enjoy their beauty. . . . You see I am trying to whet your appetite so that you will hurry that work which you have on hand and return to us." That return will have to wait. The work that occurs in between suggests both the complexities of the history Schiller is creating.

These complexities have to do with the very practice he recently endorsed: selection of what will count as history. And it is seen in Schiller’s “profession of faith” as regards the concept of eugenics. The previous years have seen the publication of a significant amount of articles, and also books, that address what he saw as the deterioration of society. This wing of his social philosophy has, as was mentioned previously, been downplayed by past writers as non-philosophical. And for a philosopher like Schiller, one who stressed the application, testing, and revision of views (even when he did not do what he preached), the interest in eugenics is no

29 Details of Schiller’s relationship with Griswold remain vague. The assumption that the “heiress” was Griswold is based on a note she inserted in a letter Schiller sent to Thaw in 1935. She states in response to Thaw’s description of Schiller, “Everything you said of him is indeed true. – as I have known for nearly ten years” (Louise Schiller, n.d., in F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Florence Thaw, 18 May 1935, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). And it is clear that she was teaching at USC at the time Schiller visited by reference to a reappointment letter she received from USC in June 1927 (Rufus Bernard von KleinSmid, Los Angeles, to Louise Strang Griswold, 17 June 1927, Personal Correspondence, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

30 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 28 March 1927, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
more shocking than the interest in psychical research. Rather than accepting things—be they social, logical, or spiritual—as is and when there is a felt problem, it is best to explore and test options that might craft a more productive result. But there are difficulties.

In the April 1927 Eugenics Review, Schiller reviews of C. P. Blacker’s Birth Control and the State. He proffers an optimistic goal for eugenics: “a capacity for indefinite increase is inherent in all living beings.” How? Following from Blacker’s suggestion:

The medical profession should appeal to the Ministry of Health to permit instruction in birth-control to be given to the poor women from whom it is at present withheld. That is only a small step towards the removal of a great social maladjustment, but it is a practicable step, and perhaps as far as it is at present possible to go.

Taken alone, this might sound progressive. But the “all” that is being offered the solution is not the “all” that offers it. Schiller, attending to the problem of overpopulation and endorsing Blacker’s plan, also adds that the specific problem are “the classes which at present proliferate like rats and rabbits.” This exposes another of the paradoxical aspects of his general philosophy: the difficulty of upholding the social context of humanism while stressing above all else the empirical, and personal, aspects of pragmatism. What the individual finds lacking is not merely theoretical (and thus an abstraction); it is the actual practices that constitute, at least for Schiller, the “social maladjustment.”

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31 F. C. S. Schiller, review of Birth Control and the State, by C. P. Blacker, Eugenics Review 19, no. 1 (April 1927): 61. “C. P.” is Dr. Carlos Paton Black (1895-1975) who, like Schiller, was educated at Eton and Balliol. At the time he was registrar at the Department of Psychological Medicine at Guy’s Hospital in London. Actively involved in the British Eugenics Society (being its director in the mid-1940s) and in national (he was an advisor to the Ministry of Health) and international populations debates (he help a position in the International Planned Parenthood Federation), Blacker is perhaps most notorious for endorsing the continued test of one of the sterilization drugs first used by the Nazis.

32 Schiller, review, 62.

33 Schiller, review, 62.
There is need here for pause as regards the difficulties inherent in Schiller’s eugenic position. The concept of eugenics, far from deserving praise, suggests the need for nuance. And two caveats, which will be extended later, deserve mention here. One of the most troubling aspects of eugenics is the racism that it both utilized and engendered. As latter documents will show, Schiller was indeed a racist. His suspicions regarding Africans and East Indians are clearly stated. But this negative treatment of race did not extend to one of the most consistent arguments often raised in support, and discussion, of eugenics: the concept of “racial purity.” As Schiller notes in his April 1928 review of American plant geneticist Edward Murray East’s *Heredity and Human Affairs* (1927), it helps to “put the ‘race’ fanatics in their place. . . . Professor East shows that crossing is conducive to variability and that this increases the prospects of better adaptation to a wider range of conditions.”34

Another, equally troubling, aspect is that of class. Schiller’s comments in the Blacker review clearly make a distinction between higher and lower classes. On this point, he is more ambivalent. But he also argues that higher social position in many cases was a detriment to eugenic goals. As he states in his July 1928 review of William Townsend Jackson Gun’s *Studies in Hereditary Ability* (1928): “Mr. Gun’s pedigrees are highly selective, and do not tell the whole story, and urge that persistent prominence in ‘leadership’ may be due to inequality of opportunity, hereditary position and wealth, rather than any hereditary ability.”35 Neither of these points is meant to suggest that Schiller is freed from the positions he espouses in other places. But they should help to more accurately: (1) contextualize Schiller’s eugenic positions as


against others current at the time, and (2) place those positions into clearer relationship with his other philosophical positions.

But there is more. This restrictive turn in his philosophy carries, abovementioned problems noted, the suggestions of benefits. The individual view, that volitional and testing self, is not to be denied merely because the accepted social views sanction against it. And here again we must turn to an area which philosophers have, for the most part, deemed outside the discussion of Schiller’s philosophy: psychical research. At about the time that Schiller’s review of Blacker’s book came out, Clark University (Worcester, Mass.) releases The Case For and Against Psychical Belief, a collection of the lectures offered at their symposium along with several additions submitted by those not in attendance. The response in July from England, from the Society for Psychical Research, is not a good one. While Theodore Besterman congratulates Clark University for taking the lead in American university study of psychical research, his summary conclusion is clipped: “We regret, however, that more thought and care were not devoted to the preparation.”

Besterman provides a laundry list of typos, and a salvo of further criticisms: the lack of a clear definition of the primary terms, the liberal focus on too contemporaneous a case study, and the arguments by persons who hardly qualify (Houdini) as

36 Theodore Besterman, review of The Case For and Against Psychical Belief, ed. Carl Murchison, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 24 (July 1927): 105. Besterman (1904-1975) was active in the society, serving at various times as editor, librarian, and research officer. He published works on a wide range of subjects, ranging from translations of the works of Voltaire to studies of parapsychology. As regards the latter, he was a supporter of the writings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1875), one of the founders of the Theosophical Society. Blavatsky was a spiritualist whose claim of psychical powers eventually found her dismissed as a fraud by key members, such as anthropologist R. Hodgson, of the Society for Psychical Research.

37 Most of the works deal, some in great detail with what is referred to as the 1923 “Margery Case.” Margery is one Mina Crandon (1888-1941), a Boston socialite married to Dr. Le Roi Goddard Crandon of the Harvard Medical School, who claimed to be a medium. She became the center of a controversy—the details of which are readily available from sources other than the Clark University publication—involving the Harvard Department of Psychology and Scientific American magazine. Like Blavatsky, opinions regarding her claims were hotly disputed at the time. Later in her career, when it was found that she had been given a planted thumb imprint (on a wax mold meant to pick up traces of spirit) by an associate, she effectively retired from mediumship.
credible or whose arguments (provided by the only two female contributors) are “literary, rather than scientific, performances.” He applauds the discussions of William McDougall and Oliver Lodge, and notes Schiller’s application of pragmatism to psychical research. But the two authors, excepting Houdini, who are openly hostile to psychical research are chastised for providing, in the case of the University of Wisconsin psychologist Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944), not “a single word of specific criticism,” or, in the case of Stanford University psychologist John Edgar Coover (1872-1938), “very surprising remarks” which suggest his inability to form a cogent argument.

Besterman’s review, from inside the Society for Psychical Research, reads as though it is offered by one personally attacked. Schiller’s commentary in the same month, in The Nineteenth Century and After, is far different. And “The Truth About Psychical Research” is reflective of tendencies that complicate those found in his support of Blacker. Human beliefs, according to Schiller, split into liberal and conservative sides: “There is always a liberal party, progressive and adventurous, willing to run risks and to speculate, and a conservative, loyal to traditions and tested truths.” The conservative bias, however, runs deeper. But, in deference to comfort, it downplays novelty. Nor do the institutions meant to shape belief work to overcome this bias. The university, for example, functions to ward off “too many novelties in our stock of ideas” as

38 Besterman, review, 105.

39 Besterman, review, 106.

40 Besterman, review, 107. Both men have careers worthy of review. Jastow, who co-authored an article in 1884 with Peirce and was an intimate of James, helped to found Wisconsin’s Psychology Department. Coover, along with being a psychology professor, was the first and only permanent Thomas Welton Stanford Psychical Research Fellow at Stanford University.

they might prove upsetting to everyday life. Not that this is always and everywhere the case.

Schiller sees the publication of the book as suggestive that the conservative bias might be changing.

But the book reveals as much need for caution as it does for congratulations. All sides in the matter seem to harbor views so radically disposed to dismiss their contrary that no détente seems likely. Is there not, Schiller asks in the rare role of mediator, a way to navigate toward more temperate waters? Schiller believes that there is; and it should shock no one that it resides within the vestibule of one of his pet projects: “everything hinges upon scientific method; and what this is is a logical question.” And the answer resides in both camps disengaging their conservative biases in favor of more liberal ones. Both sides “should change their logic, and

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42 Schiller, “The Truth,” 55. In a previous chapter it was mentioned that Schiller’s views of education had been downplayed as merely “amusing” by at least one of his biographers and barely mentioned by others. While the items there listed suggest that the accusation is based on scant attendance to the actual record of Schiller’s writings (which discuss education as it relates to topics ranging from eugenics to logic), it should be pointed out that Schiller educational views were far from fixed and, at times, readily flexible. While here he takes to task universities for downplaying novelty, only two months prior he was of a slightly different opinion. In a talk to the University of Liverpool’s Department of Education, Schiller argues: “Shall we say then that liberal education means, in idea, a general education that is non-professional and non-specialist, and aims at harmoniously developing human capacities, in general, without any reference to any particular use or mode of life? But I must be allowed to guard myself by two reservations. In the first place, it must not be assumed that because a certain training is professional it is necessarily banausic [practical], and can have no liberalizing effect on the mind. . . . Secondly, we must not allow ourselves to think that because liberal education is not an adaptation to any particular mode of life it is therefore devoid of use” (F. C. S. Schiller, The Pragmatic Value of a Liberal Education, A Lecture Delivered in the Department of Education at the University of Liverpool, 20 May, 1927 [Liverpool: C. Tinling and Co., 1930], 5). He goes on to suggest that a liberal education, among other things, helps to develop the proper habits of mind. Though it is not impossible to reconcile novelty and habits of mind, it would seem that different contexts yield slightly different appraisals.

43 “As one reads the extremists on either side it seems hard to conceive that there can be a case for the other, so sincere do they seem and so confident that they have fully proved their own” (Schiller, “The Truth,” 56). Schiller’s general complaint is that defenders of psychical phenomena pile on example after example of critics being unwilling or unable to face the facts of the psychical research. But the critics are able to do the same, pointing out how a selective showing of the other side’s evidence is meant to hide as much as it reveals (Schiller, “The Truth,” 58-9). As examples, Schiller notes how Conan Doyle downplays disbelief as a media hyped exaggeration and Houdini takes his stock and trade as demonstrative of the subject’s lack of veracity.

44 Schiller, “The Truth,” 60. Here, again, Schiller repeats the claims that he made in 1914: “One of the greatest handicaps of psychical research arises from the insufficiency of the scientific control of conditions which renders adequate experimentation difficult or impossible” (Schiller, “The Truth,” 61; for the specifics of his previous version of this argument, see again Chapter Five: F. C. S. Schiller, “Philosophy,” 191-220).
observe the method they actually use in knowing, rather than that which theoretical logicians have ascribed to them.” Such observations initially privilege the critics. They are right that the science of psychical research does not yet “work.” But the proponents would then be spurred on to actually prove the value of what they hold to be “true.” Such motivation would then move psychical research into more of an accord with the scientists.

The complexities of Schiller’s approach should now be more apparent. Turned to the social, it suggests gradations as to what constitutes value. Turned to the individual, it suggests variations as to what counts as truth. Combined, they seem to be in conflict as neither side of the ledger seems capable of even the slightest degree of stability. But the answer, for Schiller, lies in the relation of the social to the individual. If history is selective it is because it is individual. If the individual is to be effective it is because the selection accords with the most useful social needs. And those needs, as applied to eugenic reform, to psychical research, to philosophy, are anchored to a test that implicates both the individual and the social: control. Schiller’s attempts to push forth pragmatism and humanism now seem strangely reminiscent of his attempts to forge a metaphysic in 1891. Then, the spirit struggled more and more to craft confluence in the world


46 Not that Schiller downplays the steps necessary to bring about this change. He provides a list of three necessary changes. First, “adequate material equipment should be provided, even though this may require the building of special laboratories.” If the research is to become legitimate it must seek to create environments where the manner of control is more rigidly regulated. But, second, those examined with better research tools should be subject to what the results dictate. “If fraudulent, they ought not to be allowed to prey upon the public; if genuine, they ought not be left to depend upon its capricious favours.” Finally, like any subject worthy of serious study, those embarking in a career should be provided with the training and the pay commensurate with their task. Schiller realizes all of this boils down to money. Until such time as those funds are made available, “it must remain in doubt, not only what the real facts are, but also whether the human race in general is genuinely concerned to know the truth about its nature and destiny” (Schiller, “The Truth,” 64-6).

47 This is not an inference on my part. In discussing the commonalities on both sides of the psychical research debate, Schiller makes this very observation. And it is an observation in keeping with similar arguments made by his American counterparts, most notably Dewey. He urges that what both the scientist and the psychical researcher desire, “alike for practical reason and theoretic reasons, is power over phenomena, so that he can control them and make them happen or not, as suits his purpose” (Schiller, “The Truth,” 63).
process. Here, individuals work to achieve tighter and tighter control over the social forces they seek to understand and influence. But there is a further catch: for Schiller’s (individual) philosophy to gain credence it has to vie with competing (social) systems. He claimed that pragmatism was big enough to admit of varying species. He must contend, however, with those who see his understanding of the genus as flawed.

Though in fact merely coincidence, the person with which he must now compete also echoes back to the previous decades even as he has been a subject of discussion only a few months past: Dickinson S. Miller. In April, while Schiller was discussing “social maladjustment,” Miller was still questioning the status of James, the figure so central to Schiller’s history of pragmatism. In his April 1927 *Journal of Philosophy* review of Julius Seelye Bixler’s *Religion in the Philosophy of William James* (1926), Miller praises James’s appreciation of life even as he dismisses most of his formulations about the same.48 He claims that James was “the most important . . . figure in American philosophy” even if most of James’s actual philosophy was “unsound.”49 His primary example is the “will to believe.” Why, Miller asks, believe for the sake of believing, when it is far better “to know what is really there”?50 The problem with such a position is not, as James assumed, that one takes cold comfort in “rules of logic or science”; no, the harm is that a faith in something that “does not exist or is not certain” ends up warping “ourselves to what does and is.”51 And even James could not hold to his own

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48 At the time, Bixler (1894-1985) was a Professor of Religion at Smith College and eventual went on to teach at Harvard Divinity School. This book is a version of the dissertation he wrote while a doctoral student at Yale University.


50 Miller, review, 205.

51 Miller, review, 210.
principle. For there existed in his works the tension between wanting to believe and wanting to more accurately understand phenomena. So it was that James traced out beautifully the general tendencies of his thought, but would slip into ambiguity where Miller would have wanted more precision. But even then, Miller admits, such detail “would probably have dimmed and enfeebled those perceptions which were the means of his principal service.”

In August, Schiller responds with “William James and the Will to Believe.” First, Schiller asserts that the will to believe avoids being mere subjectivism by being tested against “the empirical consequences of a belief.” It is just this empirical testing that Miller abhors, as it resists a static world of facts to which man must submit. Second, though related to the empirical demands of the first, Miller is “reprehensible” in questioning “the religious value of James’s philosophy.” The will to believe in matters of religion resists the deterministic cosmological system that Miller seems to endorse. As do, Schiller contends, the needs of most people of faith. While Miller may wish to “know” a religious system in which all has been, is, and ever shall be laid out in intricate order, the “faith” of the view that James’s provides is more in keeping with the complexities of religion. “I would submit that [’creation out of nothing’] and free-will and alternatives and miracles and novelty all belong together, and suggest far too coherent an interpretation of very insistent facts of experience to be dismissed without examination.” Given these points, Miller’s initial appreciation of James’s continued importance seems of depreciated value to Schiller.

52 Miller, review, 206.
Logic would dictate that Miller respond. Not surprisingly, his November 1927 reply chides Schiller for the same deficiency he found in James. Miller remarks in “Dr. Schiller and Analysis” that Schiller’s contented “himself with a few general remarks and judgments from a distance instead of offering exact and conclusive refutations of what tried their best to be exact and conclusive analyses.” But he also takes aim at Schiller’s style. Specifically, Miller addresses the “inexactness” to which Schiller submits language generally and metaphor specifically. Miller posits that the process of error cannot be the same as that of truth, otherwise we persuade “ourselves that a certain road is the way to our destination because it promises the most agreeable hours on the journey.” Further, he notes that the use of terms such as ‘rigid’ and ‘static’ in no way comport with a realistic view of the world, and must be a metaphysical strategy meant to denote something other than what Miller meant. All of these problems lead Miller to wish that Schiller “had given fresh aid by coming to closer quarters with his theme.”

In March 1928, Schiller feels the need to clarify his position in “William James and Empiricism. Noting that the tension, steeped though it is in admiration, between himself and Miller has existed for over thirty years (enough to even make him question a will to believe in

56 Dickinson S. Miller, “Dr. Schiller and Analysis,” Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 23 (10 November 1927): 617. Miller’s complaint is buffeted by details. He undertakes to question the precision of the specific terms Schiller had used: premises, admit, infer, belief. As to the first, he notes that his arguments as to James’s continued relevance are in no way premises from which one can draw negative conclusions as to James’s arguments. As to the second, he argues that admitting a range of beliefs as the basis for a “will to believe” does not imply admitting that those views are in any way correct. As to the third, he suggests that an inference drawn from a right (which supposes “a choice and excludes necessity”) assumes an end, not a condition of being susceptible to making a choice. As to the fourth, Miller argues that belief, as a condition to be tested, accords with a hypothesis, but not with a condition of thinking that is to be immediately accepted without the verification of the hypothesis (Miller, “Dr. Schiller,” 619).

57 Miller, “Dr. Schiller,” 620. Miller actually goes a bit farther in his castigation of Schiller. He also questions Schiller on a range of additional issues: the selective use of quotations, the misapplication of arguments concerning science, a contradiction of terms that leads to “‘fancy-language . . . [that] runs off the track,’” the fallacy of begging the question, the mistake of assumption contained in asserting freedom without law, the confusion of analyzing a fact with contradicting it and of asserting free-will without noting its suggestion of causation.

58 Miller, “Dr. Schiller,” 624.
pragmatism), Schiller nonetheless feels the prior essay “does not yet satisfy [his] curiosity.” He notes that his response to Miller’s arguments was faulty only in that he “was not trying to dissect it into a series of syllogisms.” Schiller further argues, and this applies to many of Miller’s points, that a statement of fact is really only a purposeful charge of contextual belief; “every valuable result may be improved on and bettered, every ‘truth’ seems doomed to be dogged by ‘error’ on its path, and finally to suffer degradation into ‘error’ when we advance beyond it.” Simply put, Schiller is suspect of Miller’s neat and tidy use of terms (and critical condemnation of Schiller’s use of them). His is a use of convenience, insofar as what is useful avoids “advancing metaphysical pretensions and falling foul of other useful principles.” He wishes to advance a worldview in line with James, a version of empiricism that stakes its claim to “experiment without fear, prejudice, hindrance, or remission.”

This quarrel with Miller stands in stark contrast to his discussion of psychical research. There he attempted to show scientists and psychical researchers the middle road. Here he seeks to demonstrate that Miller is leading the reader down the wrong path. Why the difference? It again seems to be an issue of genus and species. For Schiller, the overriding and governing philosophical contention is that his humanism is an outgrowth of Jamesian pragmatism. It follows that the ends to which it is directed, be they eugenics or psychical research, are meant to


63 Schiller, “William James and Empiricism,” 162. It should be noted that this discussion actually seeped into 1929. But, for the purposes of this paper, those arguments took on a repetitive frame and serve only to repeat the objections already discussed.
demonstrate the validity of the approach. Already, however, we have seen that the social and individual components of his philosophy create an unsteady mix. But the argument with Miller adds another layer to the analysis. The individual is the philosophical in Schiller’s worldview and the philosophical must show adherence to pragmatic humanism. And when Miller attacks the central tenet of James’s philosophy as Schiller conceives it—the empirical—the argument is more than merely a quibble over details. It is an argument about what constitutes humanism, what warrants its intervention into areas of human activity, and what justifies Schiller’s assertion as to that relationship. Recall that in 1899 Schiller said: “James’s principle was being misconstrued (by ignoring its demand for empirical verification) as an incitement to make-believe, instead of as an analysis of the psychological processes of acquiring beliefs.” Nearly thirty years later, it is now Schiller that has to answer charges that his conceptualizations are mere fancy.

7.3 QUESTIONS OF LORDS AND LOGIC: SOCIAL CONTROLS AND SYSTEMATIC STATEMENTS

As the summer begins, Schiller’s thoughts turn to his schedule for the remainder of the year. It included at least one (unpublished) lecture. In July 1928, Schiller completed a manuscript entitled “The Psychology of Ghosts.” Schiller’s notes suggest it was then delivered to the Clerical Club in December of the same year. The contents, ranging over twenty-two handwritten pages, are suggested by the very title. What is more interesting is the manner in

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64 Ralph Barton Perry, ed., The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), 241; F.C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Charles Augustus Strong, 21 February 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
which he frames the discussion, both in the document itself and in a revised preface. The script suggests the recent time off has done nothing to quell his distaste for the profession he has left behind. But these comments can also be read as a response to the squabbles of the past months. He derides Oxford philosophers as “asses” so “hidebound” to convention that they scarcely look beyond the standard dogma. The reason:

Now all these are worshippers of the great idol of Respectibility + have their reward. For Respectibility means camouflage + fashion + prosperity. But it also means wearing an oppressive armour of conventions + traditions which enslave the spirit + ultimately crush it. Thus the academic man only becomes truly free when he is pensioned off. And by then he has often become so crushed + slavish that he hugs the chains that fettered him.65

The independent minded, instead, find in their freedom from the strictures of respect an allegorical sympathy for those spirits no longer tied to the terrestrial plane. It is clear that Schiller views himself as the anti-worshipper, as the pensioned off thinker freed from status and constraint.

Even if such a view is more posture than fact, it did free him to consider the possibilities of travel abroad. This is suggested in a letter from Knox on 27 August, itself a response to one from Schiller two days past. In it, Knox humorously queries: “[L. P. Jacks] did not know anything about your California plans. What are you to do there, when are you leaving, and how long are you going to stay? Are you going to preach pragmatism at Los Angeles, or study the “stars”?66 The details of this trip are further clarified in a letter Schiller writes to Flewelling

65 F. C. S. Schiller, “The Psychology of Ghosts,” July 1928, Register of Manuscripts, Box Six, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The preface, which revises slightly some of Schiller’s introductory comments, states: “Not the least among the curses which academic life entails is the obligation to worship the great idol of Respectability, which is the condition of security + success. For it means wearing an oppressive armour.”

66 Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 August 1928, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. This letter is also suggestive of several other details. Judging from the content, Schiller has been trying to help Knox financially. Additionally, Knox’s wife, Alice, has recently been ill. “I am sorry that I must be obdurate in resisting your generous endowment. I most certainly do not need any
three days later: “It is very good of you to offer me another chance of [sic] University of S. California in 1930, and I much appreciate the honour. But, as you yourself suggest, one is reluctant to bind oneself at my age, so far ahead, and I should prefer to defer consideration of your offer until I get to Los Angeles next winter.” He suggests an aggressive touring schedule upon his arrival in February 1929: staying in Los Angeles during “the second semester,” visiting Berkeley at the start of the Summer, with a trip to Yale in September, and a return to England by 1 October.67 The schedule is as was said aggressive, especially so for a person whose health was so recently on the mend. But it is also indicative of a new novelty in Schiller’s life: freedom. No longer held in tow by a busy tutorial schedule, he is now free to choose—to travel, to lecture, to visit, to teach—to a degree heretofore impossible.

Before leaving, however, Schiller drafts and publishes an article in the Eugenics Review.68 Appearing in January 1929, “Eugenical Reform—1. Of the House of Lords” is the endowment for giving you much help as is my power to give; and so fail to see where the ‘throwing you over’ comes in! All the same, your persistent desire to help me warms the cockles of my heart . . . Alice is very much better, and sends you her kindest greetings . . . Thank you once more for all you have done for me.”

67 F. C. S. Schiller, Pontresina, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 30 August 1928, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

68 Schiller is also busy reviewing books for the Eugenics Review. One review from this month is of note. In his review of Whither Mankind (1928), by American historian Charles Austin Beard (1874-1948), Schiller comments on the science essay by Bertrand Russell. Schiller feels that Russell “has definitely and unequivocally come over to the Instrumental Theory of Knowledge, or, in other words, to American Pragmatism”; moreover, he has come over to the eugenic camp when he states, “Unless new incentives are discovered to induce [intelligent individuals] to breed, they will soon not be sufficiently numerous for maintaining a highly technical and elaborate system” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Whither Mankind: A Panorama of Modern Civilization, ed. Charles A. Beard, Eugenics Review 20, no. 4 [January 1929]: 269). Two of Schiller’s friends are less sure of either point. Sidgwick, commenting on another article from this time, says: “. . . I never now read anything of B. Russell’s. He is hopelessly pre-pragmatist I think, + his cleverness therefore is only annoying” (Alfred Sidgwick, Cornwall, to F. C. S. Schiller, 15 July 1928, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Knox, commenting on the book specifically, says: “. . . I have just read B. Russell’s essay in “Whither Mankind”, and found his volte face in respect to pragmatism versus intellectualism rather startling. . . . I fancy he will come out more and more as a behaviorist, rather than as a humanist. For a behaviorist is really only a pragmatist who has lost his soul, and doesn’t know where to find it. That, I think, is the sense in which Russell will identify thought with action” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 March 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S.
first in a series of articles that will eventually be continued in The Nineteenth Century and After. And it forms the starting point of what he sees as a widespread reform of the entire British system. Schiller believes the House of Lords, as opposed to the House of Commons, is favorable to eugenic reform. The House of Lords, acting as a check on the power of the Commons, could be made to cater to serious social needs rather than be a receptacle of special titles handed out to aged flunkies, “ex-directors of industry, eclipsed actors, extinct movie stars and the like.”

These reforms must, however, be squared with the hereditary principle by which families ascend to a seat based on their familial lines and also with the practice of handing out peerages to notable newcomers.

Central to both is keeping the matter of ascension in the hands of families, rather than individuals. If eugenical sentiment were such that a person should be given a peerage as recognition of their “social distinction,” so be it; conversely, if a family fails to demonstrate said distinction, that may be grounds for “the lapsing of a peerage.”

In either the familial or social forms, the function of the peerage is to spur competition which favors the better being chosen and maintained in the House. It is also possible to endow eugenical peerages “to ensure that their holders would always be able to support their dignity, and so should not be forced, as at present, to have recourse to the eugenically reprehensible, and often biologically ruinous, expedient of marrying heiresses.” Such an endowment would only further the competitive nature of peerage. Families would work hard to keep the distinction of the peerage.

Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


70 Schiller, “Of the House,” 240.

would help to reverse the tendency found in those of sufficient money but no distinction: no motivation to demonstrate ability where social promotion is a given.

Schiller realizes all this may sound far fetched. But he counters that this attempt to create “the new eugenical nobility” is actually a historically sound one:

For, properly regarded, the idea is merely that the hereditary ability of the community should be organized in hereditary clans, each privileged to depute its worthiest member to a senate as its contribution to the collective wisdom of the community, in order that there may be formed an effective and respected Second Chamber, capable of exercising an intelligent control over the transient impulses of the mob and of the ephemeral governments that emerge from the turmoil and deceptions of a General Election.  

It harkens back to the ‘Conscript Fathers’ of Ancient Rome while utilizing the modern advances of eugenical science. And said science accrues benefits by checking the defects of the House of Commons. It would, in the first place, turn the House of Lords from a vestige of snobbish immorality (“drunk as a Lord”) into an example to be emulated by society at large. In the second place, it would reestablish the veneration of the family along eugenical lines. This “modern scientific equivalent for ancestor-worship” would both subsume the individual within the ties of his clan and awaken in society a larger measure of respect for the geniuses in their midst. As a final result, it would finally set in motion a visible platform upon which to develop a truly eugenical society. But more than that. Negative eugenics is “child’s play,” it sanctions only elimination and not progression. Positive eugenics is not so easily undertaken or readily acknowledged. It “is a stupendously difficult undertaking” that goes beyond the “the painless

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extinction of bad stocks whose existence is only a curse to themselves and others.”76 It is, concludes Schiller, the desire to transform human lives “gradually into something higher and better.”77

Shortly after the publication of this article, Schiller must have departed for America. The records of Schiller’s schedule upon arriving in 1929 remain fragmentary at best. Though several documents indicate that Schiller accepted a Professorship at USC upon arriving,78 it helps to recall that he had told Flewelling he wanted to wait to consider “another chance” at USC “in 1930” until he had arrived. He had added that he was putting off making a decision until he determined “how I like the sea journey, and can talk the matter over with you, President [sic] von Kleinsmidt [sic] and Carr.”79 Other records indicate that upon his arrival he “delivered . . . a course of ‘Special Lectures’ in the University of California at Los Angeles and at Berkeley, in the first part of 1929” that formed the basis for his upcoming book.80 Even without an official teaching position, Schiller remains busy. In May, Schiller delivers a lecture at Scripps College, Claremont, CA, entitled “Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion.”81 By June, he is again in

76 Schiller, “Of the House,” 244.

77 Schiller, “Of the House,” 244.

78 Given the details, it is likely that Knox misread Schiller when he commented: “. . . We were very interested to hear about your accepting a Professorship at U.S. Cal. for part of the recent year, but we are both very sorry that you should be so much away from Oxford. We will strictly observe your injunction as to silence on the subject” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 April 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

79 F. C. S. Schiller, Pontresina, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 30 August 1928, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


81 It should hardly be surprising that Schiller sees all these concepts as comporting with each other. For Schiller defines humanism “as the systematic and methodological working out of the perception that every thought
Berkeley teaching a summer course. In August his upcoming book is in the proof stage back in England. And, by 1 September, he has traveled—likely “East, via Canadian Pacific, for choice, so as to see the Canadian Rockies, and compare them with the Alps”—to take part in the Ninth International Congress in Psychology at Yale. After the Congress, Schiller goes to Boston

is a personal act of which some thinker is the author and for which he may be held responsible”; and he defines religion “as the soul’s aspiration towards an ideal wherewith to rectify and transfigure the actual” (Schiller, “Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion,” Must, 308; 312).

82 The dates of Schiller’s arrival at Berkeley can be estimated by reference to a letter from Knox from June 1929. It carries a correction on the envelope that changes the address from Los Angeles to “Faculty at Berkeley” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 June 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). His time at Berkeley in 1929, as with his later lecture there in 1933, remains vague due to the sparse holdings that remain. As Karen Marie Leitsch, managing services officer for the Department of Philosophy, noted in response to a query: “The answer unfortunately is that our Library does not have what you are looking for...we only keep departmental [sic] records of past faculty for about five years, so the information on the person you are inquiring about is long since gone. Honestly I don’t know where to refer you from here either...” (personal communication, 21 December 2005, email). As an aside, his future wife Louise set up a philosophical essay contest in his name that the department continues to this day (though it looks as if the date that it is listed as started “in his honor,” 1933, is actually 1938).

83 In August, Knox informs Schiller: “...I have now received the whole [Knox helped to proof drafts of the book for Schiller and the publisher] of your Logic from Bell, in the paged proofs. Thanks you very much for having them sent to me. The book is certainly a great achievement – The funeral of the Absolute, undertaken by F.C.S.S., and attended by the screaming Relative. . . .” He goes on to inquire about Schiller’s “summer course at Berkeley” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 3 August 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

84 F. C. S. Schiller, Pontresina, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 30 August 1928, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Schiller goes on to explain that, after the Congress, he planned to visit “with friends in New England, and possibly a few visits to Eastern Universities.”

85 Schiller’s report on the Congress is rather pedestrian. He, along with another commentator, notes the incredible size of the meeting (over a thousand, with close to ninety-percent being Americans), the limiting effect it had on presentations (there were close to four hundred persons on thirty-one panels), and the presence of notables such as Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) and Karl Spencer Lashley (1890-1958), then of the University of Chicago (F. C. S. S., “The Yale Congress of Psychology,” Mind 39, no. 153 [January 1930]: 129-30; A. T. Poffenberger, “Report of the Ninth International Congress of Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 23 [November 1929]: 634-7). One additional comment deserving mention is offered by E. G. B., speaking in the third person: “The program seemed to him to show the increasing dominance of the physiological, behavioral psychology in America. The day of behaviorism in America is over. It has accomplished its purpose, and American psychology now takes of physiological or behavioral data wherever its problems need. The same tendency seems to be not nearly so marked abroad, so that American psychology is now apt to have a flavor different from most of the European psychology” (E. G. B., “Ninth International Congress of Psychology,” American Journal of Psychology 41, no. 4 [October 1929]: 686).
where he was able to meet the person who had been at the center of the controversy that helped fuel the symposium and the book *The Case for and Against Psychical Research*, the medium Mina (referred to as “Margery”) Crandon. By the start of November, he returns to Oxford.86

Within weeks his new book, *Logic for Use*, was released.87 As was the case previously, Schiller apologizes, explaining that it was “delayed by that tragedy of academic organization which renders it impracticable for an academic teacher to publish his thoughts while he is still actively teaching.”88 He also cautions that this work is part of a project still in development. As such, it forms but one part of what can be called no “more than an ‘introduction.’”89 But it is an introduction meant to usher in a new kind of philosopher:

> For it is a charter of freedom for the philosophic imagination, emancipating it from its long thraldom to a sterilizing intellectualism. It gives him the right to try alternatives, to experiment freely . . . to win the inestimable prize of a philosophy that satisfies to the full the demands of his whole soul.90

86 Schiller’s arrival date, which remains tentative, is less interesting than the details of his visit with Crandon. In a letter to Katherine Freeman, he describes his involvement thus: “. . . you may be interested to hear that after the Yale Congress of Psychology I went to Boston and had six sittings with the famous ‘Margery’ Crandon, which were enough to stagger the most obstinate sceptic. The sittings were aimed at scientific proof, not at edification, and we got a great deal that not only seemed to exclude fraud, but also proved identity. For our best results . . . we not only got the usual print of ‘Walter’s’ thumb (W. being the medium’s control + deceased brother) but also at our request 1) wrinkled specimens of W’s thumb, sometimes both on the same tablet (these were all take out of an unopened box by me, marked, put into the hot water + taken out of the cold by me). Thus excluding any possibility of using a model + 2) the prints of what the head of police in the Boston navy yard declared to be those of children of 4 and 2! And all this with no one in the room but Capt. Fife, and myself, and no one with myself alone with the medium. I expect there will be considerable stir over these experiments (which were new) and I shall be accused of being either insane or senile or a liar! . . . I would not say of course that the proof is absolute for science always asks for more . . . but never in the course of my 47 year career as a psychical researcher have I encountered anything so impressive” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Katherine Freeman, 1 November 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

87 He writes to Flewelling that his “Logic has been out here three weeks now” and was shipped to the American publisher in October (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 3 December 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

88 Schiller, *Logic*, v.

89 Schiller, *Logic*, vi.

As a consequence, it is not written for “the sort of professional who despises what he can understand even more than what he cannot”; rather, it is meant “to interest students . . . in the cognitive operations of the mind.”

The responses from friends are understandably positive and contain some insight into the circumstances surrounding the book as well. Fawcett notes “How awfully dull the S.P.R. has got – I couldn’t stick it: I do trust you will be able to brighten things a bit as you do so effectively the [sic] discussion of logic in your delightful Logic in [sic] Use. What I can’t understand is the stubborn opposition to you at Oxford.” But Fawcett also suggests that the book has been presented in lecture form for some time when he goes on to note: “Of course it is awkward to have to rewrite lectures (though I cancelled two big books honestly; in fact all my stuff published before Imaginism was launched in 1916).” William McDougall is also thinking of Schiller’s alma mater when he writes from Oxford: “I have just finished reading with much enjoyment your Formal Logic, + am therefore in a position to congratulate you heartily upon. It must do a lot of good, especially up here.”

Another acquaintance, George A. Briggs, provides a favorable contrast of Schiller to Dewey: “The book, Logic for Use, came today. I shall dig into it at once. It came quite

91 Schiller, Logic, vii.

92 Edward Douglas Fawcett, Canton De Valais, to F. C. S. Schiller, nd, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. He goes on to make what appears to be a reference to Schiller’s psychical experiences in Boston and a slight to a person known to be too gullible when it comes to the same: “. . . “Margery” sittings do promise well; but I prefer your appreciation to Conan Doyle’s who will take anything offered on a hook.”

93 William McDougall, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 3 August 1930, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. McDougall goes on to suggest several issues with which he disagrees. McDougall (1871-1938) was a British psychologist who was brought to Harvard by William James. At the time, he was on faculty at Duke University.
opportunely as I had just finished The Quest for Certainty. That book in my opinion is much the
biggest thing Dewey has done. But what a relief it will be to go from his style to yours."

Read, whose work Schiller has referenced in the past, is full of praise: “Many thanks for your
Logic for Use, which reached me about a month ago. I have read it thro’ firstly carefully and
warmly congratulate you on the achievement. It is a great advance upon Formal Logic, good as
that was. You certainly make out an unanswerable case against the common formal logic, and I
wonder what sort of reply its professors will make – if any. . . .” Another friend thanks
Schiller for the “splendid little book” and notes that “no less a person than Dr. T. N. Carver, the
Harvard economist, has asked for the loan of it, but he can’t have it just yet.”

94 George A. Briggs, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 December 1929, Correspondence, Box One, F. C.
S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles. He goes on to supply his opinion as to the causes of Dewey’s difficult
writing style: “I am venturous enough to believe that I know some of the reasons why Dewey is so difficult to read.
I refer to two mechanical defects. The first is his frequent awkwardness in forming his sentences with reference to
the little connectives which, as a friend of mine says, may be likened to flanges on car wheels because they keep the
train of thought from jumping off the track. Then too, at times he seems willfully to shun the use of transition
devices.” Briggs went on to publish a review of the book. It is, not surprisingly, a glowing one. He says that
Schiller takes the syllogism and “removes accumulations of frictional superstitions, trues it bearings, reassembles it,
and makes it work for modern man.” And he does so with “a delightful literary style . . . [which] makes logic
interesting” (George A. Briggs, review of Logic for Use, by F. C. S. Schiller, [1930], Newspaper and Magazine
Clippings, 1927-1930, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections,
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

95 Carveth Read, Solihull, to F. C. S. Schiller, 31 December 1929, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S.
Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University
of California, Los Angeles. In a subsequent letter, Read reflects: “I have looked into Logic for Use from time to
time, and am amazed at the quantity of work put into it and the quantity of thinking. Of course, you are younger
than I am. But I can hardly believe that I could ever have worked so persistently at one subject. I have always got
tired of every subject and been glad to turn to something else, with the result that nothing has really been done at all”
(Carveth Read, Solihull, to F. C. S. Schiller, 3 July 1930, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers
[Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California,
Los Angeles).

96 Donald Henry Mugridge, Arlington, to F. C. S. Schiller, 31 December 1929, Correspondence, Box Two,
F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles. An additional comment, though an aside, is interesting as well: “Professor
Irving Babbit informs me that you and he once shared a stateroom on a trans-Atlantic voyage.” Mugridge was a
historian known for his work compiling Civil War photographs while employed at the Library of Congress.
The shorter notices are not as glowing. In the *New Republic*, Paul Weiss—who will go on to help edit a collection of Peirce’s papers—argues that Schiller’s pragmatism is already out of date. While James helped to bring pragmatism to the fore, “the history of the subject since his time has largely been an attempt to reformulate and understand Pragmatism in terms of Peircian, rather than Jamesian, conceptions.” Schiller attacks this approach. But the attack is subject to a succinct dismissal:

Schiller’s claims, though ambitious, remain questionable and unfulfilled. His criticisms . . . are a mixture of abuse, ad hominem arguments and an application of the formal logic to which he so violently objects. He thoroughly confounds theory with application, logic with psychology, activity with result and what ought to be with what is. Wit he has, and some originality, deftness and industry, but they hardly suffice to make one feel that the acceptance of Pragmatism is imperative.97

The *Times Literary Supplement* is more kind. It faults Schiller for not, a la the past complaints of Stebbing and others, clearly delineating what counts as “true.” But that type of comprehensiveness is not its virtue; “it may be in the end found that it is in its insistence on relevance to concrete situations, on verifiable consequences of theories and on the indefinite perfectibility of all human views of reality . . . that the value of Pragmatism consists.” As such, this book “should be studied by philosophers and scientific researchers.”98  

In the *International Journal of Ethics*, E. F. Mettrick pities that this is less than what Schiller had promised and likely to generate no new reactions. It will be “pleasant reading to many,” but will merely kick up the

97 Paul Weiss, review of *Logic for Use*, by F. C. S. Schiller, *New Republic*, 26 March 1930, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1927-1930, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Weiss (1901-2002), a philosopher who studied under Whitehead at Harvard before earning his doctorate in 1929, went on to become the Sterling Professor of Philosophy at Yale University (1946-1969). His reasons for praising the Peircean formulations of pragmatism will become clear later in the chapter.

drumbeats of “old foes.” 99 And Merrick wanted and expected more from Schiller; “for there is no living philosopher with such a grasp of the processes of thought as he, and the constructive third quarter of the present volume gives promise that it would have been the greatest book on logic for a century.” 100

The longer notices suggest a paradox. On the one hand, Schiller’s logic could have been more; on the other, it can’t help but reflect the limitations of its creation. In the April 1930 Mind, L. J. Russell suggests that Formal Logic, the abstraction, has become something of a windmill for Schiller, the polemicist. This creates two problems: (1) Schiller has become so endeared of the form he attacks that he can’t see it as only one made up for attack, and (2) his alternative, for all its talk of righting the wrongs of thousands of years, is actually “quite sober and respectable.” 101 The resulting book struggles to reinvent logic while hampering the progress for which it pleas. In his attempt to move beyond arguments in abstract, Schiller provides suggestions that would instead hamper progress by being too “obscurantist, reactionary, and conservative.” 102 Russell hopes that Schiller, perhaps invigorated by “the more promising atmosphere of Southern California,” can finally lay out a theory of logic “more closely related to practice.” 103


100 Mettrick, review, 561.


102 Russell, review, 220.

103 Russell, review, 221. Knox consoles Schiller regarding this review: “. . . That was a rotten review, by the way, of your book by L.J. Russell. I have just had a letter from Sidgwick, saying that he had expected something better from L.J.R.” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 April 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
In the July 1930 Journal of Philosophy, Eleanor Bisbee (1893-1938) notes how Schiller’s “constructive” counter to his “destructive” Formal Logic is marred by the sparring tendency: “But the controversial habit is so strong! It is in this new book with the same verve and wit which make Schiller’s criticisms so readable, although here it rather hampers the reader’s effort to focus on the announced exposition.”¹⁰⁴ There are benefits, however, if readers can look past Schiller’s labeling of formal logic as Cloud CuckooTown. And they mirror the suggestions of the Times: “the ideal of voluntarist logic is not to prove, but to improve knowledge.”¹⁰⁵ In this pursuit, and with a healthy “spirit of adventure,” Schiller’s process mirrors the basic aspects of Dewey’s reflective thinking model, with one crucial difference: “Schiller does not identify thinking and final action. . . . this voluntaristic transition from thought to action is the judgment.”¹⁰⁶ But she notes a lack of clear criteria in assessing this “Will to Believe,” this “Right to Postulate.”¹⁰⁷ If man is the measure what is to measure man? An appeal to Darwinism “offers no criterion, no absolute guide.”¹⁰⁸ Perhaps this open-endedness is meant as a benefit, a willingness to test his theories by his own logic. Or might it be that a focus on ends and selection shows how clearly Schiller’s logic is a reflection of the times, of an era where the premises for belief have been replaced with warrants for action.¹⁰⁹ The interesting thing is that Schiller would likely not quibble with this assessment of a book “vigorous and rich in

¹⁰⁵ Bisbee, review, 440.
¹⁰⁶ Bisbee, review, 441.
¹⁰⁷ Bisbee, review, 442.
¹⁰⁸ Bisbee, review, 443.
¹⁰⁹ Bisbee, review, 443-4.
suggestion.” Not with its logic being subject to the continued demands of the times, or with the suggestion that it is a creation of the man and the times in which he finds himself.

The comments of friends surely did nothing to offset the criticisms of peers. Two attempts at reform in the space of a year and neither likely to arouse, judging by reactions, a renewed calling to the cause of humanism. But Schiller’s newfound wanderlust is perhaps a salve. For, as soon as the reviews started coming, Schiller is already preparing to return to California. And it appears from the scant documentation that Schiller teaches two courses, one in Logic and the other in Practical Ethics, during the Spring 1930 semester. The first, judging from the introductory notes, is meant to supply a critique of Formal Logic as handed down from Aristotle. As Schiller concludes, “I will confess to a [sic] I don’t be. 

110 Bisbee, review, 443.

111 Knox has been notably quiet, save for the comments made as regards Russell in April, regarding the book and Schiller’s travels. The reason is a sad one. At the end of January, Knox informs Schiller that his wife, Alice, had died: “The immediate cause of death was pneumonia, but she was spared the severe suffering of advanced pneumonia by the fact that she had not, after a prolonged period of ill-health, sufficient strength to hold out against the first onset of the disease. She feel into a deep sleep at about 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 14, and did not wake again. She passed away at 7.20 p.m. on Wednesday. Her breathing was never very painful to watch, and at the end grew quieter and quieter, till it ceased all together. . . . I have missed you very much in this past week” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 January 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). In the intervening months, Knox worked to settle his wife’s estate. It also appears that Schiller once again extended an offer of help to Knox as he coped with the loss of his wife. In March, Knox replies to Schiller: “. . . As you realize, my life will need much readjustment. But, though it was . . . just like your kind self to offer to help me in making an entirely new start in California, I feel, myself, much more disposed to make the break as little as possible” (Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 10 March 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

112 This is also the semester when Schiller was involved in the dedication of the new philosophy building, the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Hall. This event was crucial to the development of USC as a modern university. As Servin and Higbie note, “Just as important as the inauguration of the School of Public Administration was the establishment at the same time of the School of Philosophy. Expansion in Philosophy was made possible by the gift of Mrs. Seeley W. Mudd and her son Dr. Seeley G. Mudd in honor of Colonel Seeley Wintersmith Mudd. Receiving more than one-quarter of a million dollars, the University constructed the campus’ most esthetic building to house the School of Philosophy and the Hoose Library. By the time the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Hall was dedicated during the Semicentennial Celebration in 1930, the Depression had hit the nation” (Manuel P. Servin and Iris Higbie Wilson, Southern California and Its University: A History of USC, 1880-1964 [Los Angeles: Ward Ritchie Press, 1969], 114).
supersede Ar\textsuperscript{2} Log., until it can be shown t\textsuperscript{4} \textsuperscript{5} syst\textsuperscript{m} fails as an instruct. of coerc\textsuperscript{0} + a criterion of vict\textsuperscript{2}. Hence to arg. for such fail. is to attack F. L. in a vital spot, + we shall see how it may be done.”\textsuperscript{113} The second, given what appear to be final exam questions dated May 1930, seeks the more traditional route of examining the moral implications of ethical theory.\textsuperscript{114}

And he caps this semester abroad off as an honored—he had recently received his honorary Fellowship and Doctor of Law degree—guest among new colleagues.\textsuperscript{115} At a bit past 7 o’clock on 5 June 1930, after a full day of activities, Schiller presents the first in a series of presentations meant to cap the day’s events: the dedication of the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Memorial Hall of Philosophy at the University of Southern California.\textsuperscript{116} But the celebration, in

\textsuperscript{113} F. C. S. Schiller, Logic Seminar, 1930, Introductions, Syllabi, and Exams, Box Eight, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{114} F. C. S. Schiller, Practical Ethics, May 1930, Introductions, Syllabi, and Exams, Box Eight, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. There is also what appears to be a rough draft chapter outline for a book on the subject in the folder containing the notes for the 1934 version of this course. Potential chapters included: Ethics as a Special Science, Ethics as a Vital Problem, Ethics and Casuistry (F. C. S. Schiller, Prac\textsuperscript{e} Ethix, Analysis, [1934], Courses, Box Nine, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

\textsuperscript{115} “I am sending under two covers the evidence of your election to an honorary Fellowship and to the Doctor of Laws degree. I do not know what you will do with them, but then that is your problem, not mine” (Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 July 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). This information in part clarifies the suggestion found in two of Schiller’s death notices, and the letter from Knox, that he was made a professor in 1929 (see “Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Philosopher, Dead,” \textit{New York Times}, 8 August 1937, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “Death Beckons to Philosopher,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, 9 August 1937, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). It seems more accurate, given the date of the letter, that the Professorship was conferred on Schiller at the end of the 1929-30 academic year.

\textsuperscript{116} He references the classical origins, and the English derivations, of education. But he plays to his audience in celebrating the American experiment in democratic education. And it is an experiment that resonates with his views. How? By banishing the figures of cloaked terminology of the classic and English, by questioning the very virtues of contemplation that Aristotle endorsed and denied to an “uncomprehending multitude.” Philosophy provides to all who seek it a partial, yet productive, means to “light the faltering and reluctant steps of men” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Some Problems of Mass Education,” Supplement, \textit{Personalist} [July 1930]: 37; 41).
more than one sense, is short-lived. In a mere matter of days, Schiller is already heading back to Europe and his yearly sojourn in Switzerland. Articles and reviews continue to come out while Schiller vacations. But his upcoming projects suggest that he is turning his attention to the renewed calls for social reform. If his logic fell short, his plans for eugenics are about to gain significant elaboration.

7.4 PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGMENTS: THE SOCIETAL AND THE SYMBOLIC

After the less than celebratory reaction his Logic for Use received, it is perhaps understandable that Schiller attends to another of his projects. And while Schiller by no means gives up on discussions of logic, it is clear that he is now more interested in mapping out what society would look like should it adapt to the cause of eugenics. The first of these articles, the 30 August “Eugenical Reform—The Plutocracy,” in The Nineteenth Century and After, is meant to segue out of the argument started in the Eugenics Review in January of the previous year. What he asserted then was that the House was essentially in a state of disrepair, that it functioned only as

117 His travel to, and arrival in, Switzerland is based on letters from Schiller and Flewelling. On June 1930 Schiller telegrams Flewelling while at sea (F. C. S. Schiller, S. S. Homeric, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 17 June 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). In July, Flewelling notes that he longs to join Schiller on his annual summer vacation in Switzerland (Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 July 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

118 One of the articles to come out during this period is something of a synthesis piece. The July 1930 “Psychology and Psychical Research” continues the call for détente between science and psychical research. While it is clear that psychical concepts, such as the soul, are normally assumed to be antiquated throwback to superstitious times. That needn’t be the case if all sides adopt more even-handed views of each other. If both science and psychology adopt a more pragmatic notion of their functions, they would see that their antagonisms have been largely unnecessary. Psychical research should cultivate “a willingness to put their notions to the test of scientific working”; while science should take the “marvelous alacrity” with which their time tested assumptions have been revised as an indication that their methods aren’t sacrosanct (F. C. S. Schiller, “Psychology and Psychical Research,” Monist 40, no. 3 [July 1930]: 452).
a “stronghold for the plutocracy, and little more than a clubhouse for the rich.”119  But, reasons Schiller, all forms of government that claim the mantle of capitalism exhibit plutocratic tendencies. And it is plutocracy, in all its forms, that provides the greatest challenge to the endorsement of eugenics in society. For it lies partially hidden, like “an iceberg,” in some countries; in others, it spreads its powers “like a fungus”; and still yet, “like a termite,” it bores into and corrupts all political mechanisms it touches.120  To win the public battle, eugenics must transform the plutocracy into an organ of its reforms.

But the conversion will be difficult. Unlike the plutocrats of the past, tied to familial obligations and mores, the modern plutocrat is free to exert his influence outside government so as to then wield that influence in manipulating governments. In European democracies, he is likely to buy a title so to rise in the ranks of “nobility.” In America, the case is different. There the plutocrat will buy legislation.121  And both engender a curious weakness born of their wealth. The energy expended gaining influence is replaced upon receiving it, replaced with a lethargic regard for their secured station. Robbed of any need to work, the rich man is “condemned to be a drone, and a vicious drone at that.”122  Sitting, isolated by his very wealth, he sees no reason to propagate. Having no skill other than spending money, he is given no job. Thus, through a

119  F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenical Reform—The Plutocracy,” The Nineteenth Century and After 108, no. 642 (August 1930): 243. Schiller frames the manner in which this essay is an outgrowth of the first succinctly: “It makes a convenient starting point for an attempt to sublimate snobbishness into a basis for positive eugenics, to transform our present ‘nobility’ into a real aristocracy, and to stimulate everywhere an appreciation of aristocracy in the original and proper sense of the word—i.e., a regard for human excellence. Its intention was so to modify public opinion that institutions aiming at the improvement of the human stock could grow in it. Thus the reform of the House of Lords was to be a starting-point on the path to progress, the easiest, and perhaps the nearest, to a very distant goal.”

120  Schiller, “The Plutocracy,” 244.

121  Schiller, “The Plutocracy,” 246.

process which initially demonstrates the spirit and determination necessary to succeed, all those of ability rise to the top and thereupon wither.

What is the solution? Simply, education. More specifically, a eugenical education of the young generally and of those of inherited influence specifically:

For unlike tribal training, eugenics is essentially an affair of the future. It looks to the future to redeem the past. It is full of promise. It is an adventure. It is pervasive of all the activities of life. It demands an all-round training of all our powers. It connects up directly and intimately with the most pressing problems in the lives of the young. It must moreover evoke personal pride and the spirit of emulation; yet its ideal is social and not selfish. Its appeal is to anyone who feels he is good for anything. What can be better calculated to appeal to the psychology of youth?

But the “anyone” above must come with conditions. It must be a selective process in which the elite are competitively trained in the high ideals of eugenics, in all its physical, intellectual, and moral facets. At the same time, “the appeal of eugenics education will be universal: that is, it will reach all the classes which generate ability.”Finally, it will be a progressive affair. It will adapt as it goes and increase in prestige as it attracts to its fold the talented who can turn plutocracy into aristocracy fitted to the “progress of humanity.”

If the plutocrat wields warped influence from without, the bureaucrat works to corrupt democracy from within. In the September 1930 “Eugenical Reform. II. The Democracy,” Schiller argues that, in the employment of bureaucracy, modern democracies align themselves with “as potent and insidious an enemy to the freedom and equality of ideal democracy as plutocracy itself.”Touted as “expert government,” it works behind the scenes to become

“masters in the art of guiding, and hoodwinking, the rules for whom they are supposed to take their orders.”127 The victims in all this are: (1) the leaders, who are reduced to puppets of the pencil-pushers, and (2) the people, who are pushed this way and that by the rigged elections and behind the scenes deal-making that leads up to them. The need, then, is to examine the areas where the public will most likely see the dysgenic effects of democracy at work. Once exposed, it is more likely that the public will clamor for eugenic reforms.128

The first problem is “that civilized societies are doing practically nothing to prevent the deterioration of their germ plasm by the free breeding of the most undesirable sections of their population.”129 In the name of charity and benevolence, society continues to foist large sums of


128 Schiller’s optimism as regards eugenics operates as a response to his increasingly pessimistic views of democracy (for confirmation of this point see, in this chapter, Schiller’s comments introducing the 1932 Social Decay and Eugenical Reform). That said, he is not alone amongst pragmatists in attempting to find a way out of the mire, socially or philosophically. Three years previous, Dewey had published The Public and Its Problems. And, to be clear, Dewey is not at any point positing eugenics as a potential salvation. But he finds similar causes when he speaks of “the void left by the disintegration of the family, church and neighborhood.” And Dewey also questions how best to study the democratic experiment. His answer? “All intelligent political criticism is comparative. It deals not with all-or-none situations, but with practical alternatives; an absolutistic indiscriminate attitude, whether in praise or blame, testifies to the heat of feeling rather than the light of thought” (John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems [New York: Henry Holt, 1927; reprint, Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946], 110; 215). Schiller did not review this book. But he did review, at around the time these eugenics articles were being written, Dewey’s 1929 The Quest for Certainty (based on the series of Gifford Lectures which Dewey delivered in the same year at the University of Edinburgh). In this work, Dewey’s focus is less on the social and more on the philosophical. But, again, he is tackling issues which would countenance comparisons to Schiller or visa versa. Dewey announces that traditional philosophy has worked from the assumption that reality is somehow antecedent to our knowing it. He finds this in error. “All of these notions about certainty and the fixed, about the nature of the real world, about the nature of mind and its organs for knowing, are completely bound up with one another . . . They all flow—such is my basic thesis—from the separation (set up in the interest of the quest for absolute certainty) between theory and practice, knowledge and action” (John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty [1929; reprint, New York: G. P.Putnam’s Sons, 1960], 23-4). Schiller’s review is glowing. He opines: “I have nothing but admiration for the sustained and unrelenting vigour with which its arguments is driven home, and am at a loss to find anything to disagree with.” No doubt due, in part, to how similar this all sounds to him: “I have personally been greatly gratified by a large number of undersigned coincidences between Prof. Dewey’s contentions and my own” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of The Quest for Certainty, by John Dewey, Mind 39, no. 155 [July 1930]: 374; 375). The point is hopefully clear: two pragmatic philosophical positions starting from similar causes and complaints, and arguably pointed towards similar ends, splitting upon the point of method. The shocking nature of this divergence as regards method is made clearer in the subsequent discussion of “coloured labor” in this essay.

money on “the breeding and supporting of lunatics and ‘morons.’” 130 The second problem is the growing threat of over-population. No country is exempt from this threat, though one is perhaps equipped to turn it into an advantage. America used cheap immigrant labor to build up its economy. And that increased global standing might engender another benefit. If America continues to prosper financially and decides to restrict unchecked immigration, she may have the resources to entice the talented from Europe, turning the continent “more and more into a pleasure resort.” 131 Both problems could be resolved by means of negative and then positive eugenics. By the elimination of the unfit in both the higher and lower classes, the worker pool could be reduced and hence refined.

There is, however, a third problem which reclaims the aristocratic impulse of the previous articles and promotes positive eugenic reforms: “the competition between European and coloured labor.” 132 For, although “the European work is, pretty obviously, the better man,” his market position is being undermined by “the short-sighted and unscrupulous capitalists” who are spurring on globalization. 133 The need for massive amount of cheap labour has several effects: (1) the grueling work for low pay is unbecoming the white worker and so he readily gives it over to his coloured inferior; but, in so doing, he ushers in (2) population shifts concomitant with the influx of the cheap labour. So what is to be done? The idea of force is obvious, but as short-sighted as the causes of the problem.

The temptation to exploit and enslave the coloured labour, rather than to exterminate it, would prove irresistibly attractive to a large and potent faction of the whites; the result

130 Schiller, “The Democracy,” 399.
133 Schiller, “The Democracy,” 403.
would be class wars among the whites, to be followed later by successful slave revolts. These would doubtless be fomented and supported by states not ruled by whites—at present China and Japan—and likely to be more numerous and powerful in the future.\footnote{Schiller, “The Democracy,” 404.}

The more prudent policy, then, is to increase the worth of the white labourer through eugenic reform. “Let them breed \textit{better men}, and thereby both preserve their position at the head of the human race and set a good example of true—that is, eugenical—progressiveness to the whole world.”\footnote{Schiller, “The Democracy,” 404.}

Schiller realizes that his proposals suffer from a promotional problem. As much as the overall goal is the productive increase in humanity, much of the program is based on negative measures. So he seeks out, in the 30 October “Eugenical Reform. III. The Intelligentsia,” those who might aid the eugenic cause. The intelligentsia are “the people who are interested in ideas,” and their chief occupation is journalism.\footnote{F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenical Reform. III. The Intelligentsia,” \textit{The Nineteenth Century and After} 108, no. 644 (October 1930): 517.} But they seem ill-suited to the cause. Journalists are often hard to prod in new directions. Instead, they adopt an indignant posture. The journalist “usually finds it the path of least resistance to ridicule a new idea in an airy, irresponsible but ignorant way, rather than to take the time and trouble to expound it seriously, or even to report it fairly.”\footnote{Schiller, “The Intelligensia,” 518.}
So where would Schiller turn for the support that the intelligentsia is unlikely to provide? Politicians are ‘yes’ men to such a variety of interests that support from them would be support for nothing. “Considered as a class he is not, in modern democracies, a leader of public opinion, but a follower, even when he is popularly hailed as a leader.”

The clergy, though showing more potential historically for advocacy, are now outdated and obsolete; “it is precisely in matters of faith and morals that we can no longer look for guidance to the clerical professions.”

Their dogmas seem quaint, their style of life seems too cloistered, and their views of current social problems reflect the detached manner in which they view modern life. Doctors fare better, but only to the degree that their specialized knowledge does not hamper their support. On the plus side, they are “extensively aware of the evils which result from the dysgenical practices of our present civilization”; on the other hand, “they are inclined to lay a somewhat exclusive and one-sided stress on the physical items in the eugenical programme.”

Schiller is led to the conclusion that educators are the best vehicle for fostering eugenical support. They work directly with the young. They are most intimately connected with the full development of the young. As supporters of eugenics, “they could impress on their pupils the unitary nature of education as a harmonizing of all faculties, a realizing of all possibilities, a training for all-round fitness.” In the end then, the intelligentsia will provide “nothing more than partial and half-hearted support.”

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139 Schiller, “The Intelligensia,” 523.

140 Schiller, “The Intelligensia,” 523.

141 Schiller, “The Intelligensia,” 524.

142 Schiller, “The Intelligensia,” 524.
focus of their occupations. Better to turn to those professionals who might shape the mind, as well as the body, in pursuit of eugenic ideals.

No more systematic discussion of Schiller’s eugenics views exists. In four articles, he lays out what is essentially a plan for social reform. If logic is the theory which Schiller finds lacking, eugenics is the practice which demands to be tested. They form two essential components of Schiller’s pragmatic humanism. The best minds would be turned to an appreciation of logic built on use, in a society structured to best use its varied, valuated, individuals. But it is, for all its optimism, an endlessly qualified plan. It is, to steal a page from the Times of India, a call to action divorced from “the realities of life.” Government will work better, if the House of Lords is reformed. The leaders of society will guide judiciously, if they are made to see the errors of their ways. Democracies will remain leaders, if their precarious grasp of economics, politics, and colonies is tightened. And, time and again, it is left to the educators, the philosopher kings, to work from within to craft a eugenic society without these deficits. Schiller’s willingness to believe here now seems like a mere dream.

But duties proper rouse him to something of a clarification. In the first week of September, Schiller attends the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy at Oxford. Giving his recent preoccupation with eugenics, and his startling suggestions as regards “coloured labor,” it is important to note the focus of the short paper he presents: “Is the Distinction between Moral Rightness and Wrongness Ultimate?” Schiller notes that the terms “right” and “wrong,” and to a lesser degree “morality,” exist in a relatively few languages, and that the use of functional equivalents in other languages causes a large degree of variance. This, however, does not lead Schiller to suggest they should be abandoned. On the contrary, and in context, they should be used:
I can see no objection to recognizing the distinction wherever we can find it, and using it pragmatically for all it is worth. If it works well and helps to control human propensities to any appreciative extent, we shall regard it as valuable or even invaluable. If it works ill and gives its conscientious sanction to atrocities and obstinately thwarts the progressive re-adjustment of former ‘duties’ to changing conditions of life, we shall regard it as a nuisance, and undertake the education and enlightenment of errant and backward consciences. If it does both, in different persons, we shall discriminate, and insist that the value of a ‘conscience’ depends on the moral value of the possessor. 143

Here, then, amidst an etymological and philosophical discussion, we find a possible warrant for Schiller’s views as regards eugenic reform. Like truth, the value of individuals is variable. As such, they are subject to very tests by which we judge the value of any other concept, be it formal logic, psychical research, or otherwise. This striking comment shows the extent to which humanism is willing to extend its “right to postulate,” to turn itself towards adjustments of a coarsely human sort. But Schiller, the educator, now directs his attention to details involving a more mundane issue of courses.

Three days after the Congress, he queries Flewelling: “[can] you send me a copy of the School of Philosophy announcement, together with any (secret?) information you might have about the date of the second semester.” 144 Flewelling informs Schiller that USC has “a larger registration in philosophy than we have had before in recent years.” 145 Flewelling urges Schiller

143 F. C. S. Schiller, “Is the Distinction between Moral Rightness and Wrongness Ultimate?” in Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, ed. Gilbert Ryle (Oxford: University Press, 1931), 321-2. A report on the Congress provides additional details. Schiller is mentioned as an anomaly of the sorts: “Not a single man from either Oxford or Cambridge read a paper, with the exception of Dr. Schiller, who would be the first to admit that he is no ‘true copy’ of either.” Schiller is also involved in an aborted attempt, towards the end of his presentation, to resolve the diversity of languages—English, French, German, and Italian— used at the Congress: “To Dr. Schiller this difficulty seemed particularly grave; in some of these languages, he pointed out, there were no equivalents for words that stood for fundamental ideas in the others. . . . He was for appointing an ‘International Committee on Nomenclature’ which would list the chief philosophic terms in use, with their translation or equivalents in the various tongues. But whatever the merits of this proposal, it did not advance beyond a ‘first reading’” (Brand Blanshard, “The Seventh International Congress of Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 22 [October 1930]: 604; 605).

144 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 8 September 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
to report for teaching on Monday, 2 February 1931: “if you are here at that time, you will probably have better classes than if you come in a few days late. I have difficulty getting my Englishmen to understand the desirability of being on hand, though of course I do not remember that I have had any trouble with you on that score.”

It is likely that Schiller made Flewelling’s deadline. On 2 January 1931, Schiller notes that he “starts for Antwerp this evening . . . as today is the first good day for an age, it looks as though we should have a good passage.”

What occurs once Schiller arrives in Los Angeles remains unclear based on the documents extant. It is possible that he teaches a course on Plato’s Republic. But, in consequence, all that is clear is that Schiller returns to England, and to Betchworth, by the start of June. Shortly thereafter he embarks on his annual summer vacation at Pontresina. While there, Schiller’s health again suffered. But his health was good enough to complete another

146 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 30 September 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

147 F. C. S. Schiller, Betchworth, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 2 January 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

148 What Schiller taught that semester is unknown, though there is on file an undated manuscript for a course (or lecture) on Plato’s Republic. His introduction to students sets the tone, “As / Rep. is probably / 1st Φ bk a g1 many of u have ever read, it is evid2 t we have to treat it as far as poss. as an Intro3 to Φ4. For this purpose it is not allog5 suited, b, as u + I can’t ^2 the wisdom of / board of Studies t4 has enacted it, we had better make the best of it” (F. C. S. Schiller, Plato’s Republic, n.d., Courses, Box Nine, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

149 On 6 and 19 June 1931—the transcripts of the letters are almost word for word the same so it is unclear which version was sent—Schiller writes that he has planned out his series of Forum lectures for the upcoming year. These lectures will give him “occasion to develop further the argument begun long ago on Darwin and Design.” These lectures—The Metaphysical of Change, The Meaning of Biological History, The Development of Man and Man’s Future on Earth—will eventually form a series of articles in the Personalist (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 6 June 1931; 19 June 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

150 The records note: “attacks of cardiac breathlessness at Pontresina in 1931” (Case Notes of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, 30 July 1934, Medical Records, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
essay, “The Sacrifice of Barbara.” And, in October 1931, Flewelling notes that he sent Schiller the typescript for approval. He hopes, lacking a response from Schiller, “that the article was free from ringworms and other bacteria.” Regardless its condition, it is published in that month’s *Personalist*. And what it suggests about Schiller’s philosophical views is revealing. Simply put, it betrays the extent to which Schiller’s creative output was growing soft around the edges, lacking both the incisiveness of his wit and the directness of his previous disputations. Schiller’s travel schedule, his health, his recent focus on eugenics, may all have been contributing factors. But Schiller’s choice to have this article published is not in question. Nor is its focus on one of the newer developments regarding a topic he had long entertained: logic. Specifically, the new Symbolic as against the old and despised Formal.

Judging from Schiller’s past arguments against formal logic, it would seem plausible that he would welcome any attempt to move beyond it. The response is a bit more complicated. It recalls Schiller’s 1923 tussle with Bertrand Russell regarding psychology and self-analysis. On the one hand, Schiller continues to abuse formal logic as “a pretty harmless and moderately entertaining word game”; on the other, though, he claims the new logic as a “fanatic Formalism” bent on subjecting students “to suffer untold agonies.” Why such a posture as regards a logic that, in Schiller’s own words, is dedicated to destroying that which he has long disparaged? The

151 In September, Schiller provides an update as regards his health: “I’ve been exercising, indeed a little too hard, for I found I had strained my heart, and have been ordered to go a bit slow. Still, I feel very fit” (F. C. S. Schiller, Pontresina, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 1 September 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

152 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 13 October 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. He ends by saying that the faculty will “be glad to have you with us again and to feel the bolstering that your presence will give us.” In a postscript, he adds: “we will need you here on the ground February 1 at the time of registration if we are going to be able to have any classes for you.”

simple answer is that he sees the new logic as merely “a more perfectly formal form of Formal Logic.” As such, it is only a further distortion of actual thinking. But there are other considerations lurking in this article. One of those he references as a representative of the new logic is Stebbing, the critic who in years past accused Schiller of reducing pragmatism to “all that is useful is true.” That a personality should cloud Schiller’s judgment of new developments in logic might, at first glance, seem enough to dismiss his purple protestations. That dismissal, however, is couched in a further consideration:

I notice that Miss Stebbing makes constant and effective use of conceptions like relevance, selection, purpose, context . . . . Now in itself it is no matter for regret when the practice of philosophers is better than their theory. But in what are professedly theories of Symbolic Logic some little apology would seem to be needed for the intrusion of these strange and extraneous notions.

Stebbing, proponent of symbolic logic and critic of pragmatism, is trying to import pragmatic principles into a logic resistant to them.

Schiller’s argument can thus be read as speaking in two voices: as an objection to continued abstraction and, it would seem, as a protest to the use of concepts over which he assumes ownership. It was a protest that Schiller hoped would provoke a response. But it didn’t. So Schiller sent a copy of the article to Stebbing. Still no reply. And in December


155 And the prose is purple, if literate, even for Schiller. Consider this passage meant, more simply, to suggest Formal Logic’s resistance to the protests of actual thinking: “On earth, of course, the Titans had long been in revolt, piling Pelion on Ossa [a reference to the myth that two giants, the Alcaide Otus and Ephialtes, piled one mountain on top of another in an attempt to reach Olympus; the phrase is akin to a daunting and fruitless labor], and performing other gigantic feats of engineering; but the realms of Eternal Truth had seemed unshaken, even when certain sages began to think ‘dangerous thoughts’” (Schiller, “The Sacrifice,” 233).


157 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, [December 1931], Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Flewelling thinks it unlikely she ever will. Why would she, he reasons, “you could scarcely expect any one who has already felt the tip of your lance to pose for another stroke of lightning—if you allow me to swap metaphors in the middle of stream!”¹⁵⁸ Flewelling’s response to Schiller’s attempts to drum up a debate is courteous, if not entirely convincing. The more likely reason that Stebbing did not respond is that she didn’t feel it necessary.

But Schiller was busy enough with other matters as the year drew to a close. Back at Oxford, he was readying for his trip to Los Angeles. And he was preparing for the courses he was to teach. As late as Christmas Day, Schiller writes to Flewelling about the course (Philosophy 100) he is planning to teach in the Spring 1932 semester: “re the introductory course I hope I’m right in supposing that it is really one for people who have not had any philosophy before (virgin souls in fact), and not a continuation of your course in the previous semester: for it I am wrong it is too late to remedy it.”¹⁵⁹ And he was putting the finishing touches on the introduction to his newest collection of essays.

The release of Social Decay and Eugenical Reform coincides with Schiller’s return to America near the start of 1932. It is a slim volume of little more than one hundred and fifty pages. It consists almost exclusively of the articles he has released in recent years in the Eugenics Review and The Nineteenth Century and After. In the introduction he penned the previous December, Schiller argues that it a tome born of “deepest depression”; but it is inspired by the desire “to progressively affect the human race in such a way as to improve its intrinsic

¹⁵⁸ Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 December 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

¹⁵⁹ F. C. S. Schiller, Betchworth, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 25 December 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
qualities and render it more and more capable of improving its conditions of life.”

He frames the book “as a continuation of my *Eugenics and Politics*, which supplies its historical and sociological background, and of *Tantalus; or, The Future of Man.*” The reviews, few though they are, are appreciative of the continued effort. The *London Observer* opines, “the grim truth that our civilization is ‘breeding downwards’ and saddling its own capacity with a growing burden of subsidized unfitness, is driven home with merciless force in Professor F. C. S. Schiller’s ‘Social Decay and Eugenical Reform.’” Another review suggests that this program is offered with “literary charm . . . rare grace and intellectual power.” At odds with previous negative reviews on similar subjects, and in contrast to the aforementioned blind spots in his social program, portions of the popular press seem to prefer Schiller’s dream to their reality.

Schiller’s peers respond in kind. In March several friends, including the British pragmatist Murray and author Upton Sinclair (1878-1968), write to acknowledge receipt of the book. Others have already had a chance to read it. Darwin appreciates Schiller’s continued interest in championing the cause in the face of critics: “. . . great men seem to delight in throwing cool water on Eugenics, or in giving such equivocal support as to be harmful. I am so


163 Review of *Social Decay and Eugenical Reform*, by F. C. S. Schiller, n.a., [1932], Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

164 David Leslie Murray, Sussex, to F. C. S. Schiller, 2 March 1932, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Upton Beall Sinclair, Pasadena, to F. C. S. Schiller, 18 March 1932, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
Hastings Berkeley also comments on the uphill battle Schiller is fighting: “I fear that the advent of positive Eugenics is yet a long way off: our grandchildren may perhaps see the dawn of this very difficult but very necessary job.”

Clarence Gordon Campbell, a member of the American Eugenics Society and President of the American Eugenics Research Association, is effusive in his praise: “I have read it with much pleasure. There is not a dull phrase in it and many a chuckle. In the general Excellence of all the chapters, the one on the Intelligentsia breaks the newer ground and is both incisive and true in its analysis.”

Schiller’s close friend Thaw, reflecting on her experience as a eugenics supporter, also provides a positive assessment: “I find that I am bound to say that we ought to be far from discouraged. Here in the US as to ‘negative’ eugenics and as to the average, quite moderately well to do family, there has been, it seems to me, as much progress as could possibly be expected.” Thaw’s response helps to contextualize the bind of Schiller’s reception. In matters

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165 Leonard Darwin, Sussex, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 March 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

166 Hastings Berkeley, [France], to F. C. S. Schiller, n.d., Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

167 Clarence Gordon Campbell, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 13 April 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

168 Florence Thaw, Washington, to F. C. S. Schiller, 25 April 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The letter provides other details indicative of Thaw’s personal involvement in eugenics: “As to the old, American, poorer [...] farmers, in the West and South the less said the better. And as to the more recent unskilled laborers from all parts of Europe, and mostly crowded into the larger cities—this including of course always many Irish—I consider it rather wonderful that so many active eugenic (or birth control) clinics have been started recently and are being started. . . . I have been reminded of my quite early interest in this side of the subject . . . by the recent, but quite close, acquaintances we have had the good fortune to make with Margaret Sanger (1883-1966) who has been here for some months to help personally towards getting a Federal bill introduced that would annul the old bill of 50 years ago which reads that no mail of any kind, even between doctors for instance can sent [sic] by post! They fully expect the new bill to be at least introduced. And you would be rather amazed as well
social and philosophical, those closest to him continue to praise his acute insights and critical
daring. But the reaction of the larger public is decidedly mixed. His most recent attempt at
picking a philosophical battle goes unheeded. A call for the comprehensive, eugenical, overhaul
of society is met with some measure of popular praise. But it receives nothing in the way of
philosophical consideration. Schiller’s reaction, judging from what comes next, is to double
back. He now attends to the larger picture, to the humanistic frame upon which he has hung all
these other endeavors.

7.5 PARSING OUT PRAGMATISM: HISTORY AND HUMANISM, PEIRCE AND
JAMES

Unlike the previous year, Schiller’s schedule is fairly clear throughout 1932-1934. While in
America, he teaches several courses. He gives lectures at USC and also the College of the
Pacific. Upon returning to Europe, he splits his time between England and Switzerland. He also
dedicates time to an increasing number of reviews in the pages of the Personalist
and to several
articles published in a variety of journals, several of which blossomed into debates. And, in

169 A survey of the documents available provides for at least these courses: Philosophy 100 (1932),
Practical Ethics (1933), Pragmatism (1933-1934).

170 The most sustained of these debates occurred between Schiller and the British Analytic philosopher
Cecil Alec Mace (1894-1971). And it is a debate which shows some seepage from the previous one with Stebbing;
that is to say, Mace, along with Stebbing and others, was part of the Cambridge School of Analysis popular in
England in the 1930s and responsible for the publication of the journal Analysis. In January 1932, Schiller agrees
with Mace’s call “to divide the field of logic, and to recognize that there are (as I have maintained) two logics.”
appreciates the accord, but questions Schiller’s analysis. As an example, he notes that Schiller discerns in Formal
1934, he releases his final collection of essays. This is a rather mundane survey of the facts at hand. For, mixed into this schedule, is a renewed preoccupation with the themes he had been developing in 1926-1927; specifically, with laying out the historical importance of humanism and pragmatism. And the lacuna is understandable. For several years previous, he had been occupied with setting up his last systematic treatise, *Logic for Use*, and laying out his eugenical reform proposals. Now, freed of those obligations, he continues his project of reiteration. And it is a project that gains renewed momentum in light of several challenges. On the one hand, a six volume collection of Peirce’s papers was being released. On the other, Perry put out a collection of James’s letters. Both, to varying degrees, called into question the history Schiller was telling. And both more easily aligned themselves with the three preeminent strains of pragmatism currently in vogue: (1) the social/instrumental form referred to as the Chicago School and led in reputation if not always fact by John Dewey, and (2) the New Realism as advanced by scholars such as Perry that reconceptualizes James, and (3) the logical wing just under construction by scholars such as Hartshorne and Weiss that ties back to Peirce.

Logic little consideration of actual thinking. Mace sees this as a trivial oversimplification, as logic deals with facts and “in the absence of thinking there would be no study of any facts whatever.” That being said, it is possible to establish logical connections divorced from a specific context. In as much as any phrase, divorced from its original context, is a metaphor, the phrase “it follows” serves as an approximation of the causality between p and q. But that “the causal relation” does not provide grounds for the analysis or for any factual consideration of the same (C. A. Mace, “Formalism,” *Mind* 41, no. 162 [April 1932]: 208; 210). This second argument allows Schiller to shift his analysis to an almost exclusive critique of Formal Logic. If Logic is not concerned with actual thinking, save to the extent that it is a necessity, how then does it deal with “formal relations” as they are expressed verbally? Or, in preferring the causal to the factual, Mace opens himself to the more general complaint that Formal analysis “does not envisage or imply any actual train of thought” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Formalism Again,” *Mind* 41, no. 164 [October 1932]: 481; 482). Mace is not sure that Schiller recognizes just how much he agrees with him. He grants that traditional logic is a dubious area of study, grants even more that it is far too afield of practical concerns. What he does not tenor is Schiller’s “root and branch attack on the formal sciences as a whole.” And to suggest that one has no right to entertain formal questions because they are not applicable to current concerns is to perhaps misunderstand the large terrain which philosophy covers (C. A. Mace, “Formalism--A Rejoinder,” *Mind* 41, no. 164 [October 1932]: 483). It is on this defense of the formal that Schiller offers a brief parting shot in January 1933. He sees Mace’s insistent defense of “the pursuit of a pure an inapplicable science” as “the beau idéal of a wild-goose chase, and an exact expression of a pseudo-science that has cast off all connection with reality” (C. F. S. [sic] Schiller, “The Defence of Formalism,” *Mind* 42, no. 165 [January 1933]: 130).
The exact dates of Schiller’s Forum Lectures are not clear but, given his correspondence, they had been in the works since the previous summer and were delivered during the Spring term. And, in a nod to the historical project he was undertaking, Schiller suggests that they gave him “occasion to develop further the argument begun long ago on Darwin and Design.”\footnote{F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 6 June 1931, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.} Set in light of that early article, with its sanction of science but respect for an “intelligent design,” they indicate that Schiller is again attempting to articulate a worldview open to the fluidity he had found so engaging in the works of James. But they also suggest, in the ends to which they lead, the effect that the long shadow of years had cast upon that youthful project.

The first lecture, “The Metaphysics of Change,” makes clear that there is a metaphysical underpinning to his arguments. But it is, as he has already noted, an individualized and subjective one: “strictly speaking, there must be as many metaphysics as there are philosophers, and none of them can be valid for all types of personality, and conclusive, whether as coercive or as satisfactory, for any but their authors.”\footnote{F. C. S. Schiller, “The Metaphysics of Change,” \textit{Personalist} 13, no. 3 (July 1932): 178.} And Schiller hopes to, in the course of these four lectures, “first establish their principles and proceed to their application.”\footnote{Schiller, “The Metaphysics,” 178.} A central feature of his argument is the view that change, rather than being a mediating state of what is and what will be, is in fact the most plausible state of being. In contrast with the clunky and dichotomous apparatus of learned philosophies, common sense show that we “directly experience it in our own persons.”\footnote{Schiller, “The Metaphysics,” 183.}
What is obtained with this self-based, variable theory of change? First, no law is “necessarily eternal or immutable.” Absent that restriction, nothing is perforce impossible; novelties can and do exist. But they throw into doubt “the confidence of our predictions.” Causality, the barren building block of worried logicians, will not lock into place according to pre-ordained sequences. That only suggests that, as much as the potential for ruin surrounds us, “the possibility of novelty and indetermination entitles us also to determine their frequency and extent empirically.” But, second, given that it is human novelty we are talking about, Schiller would be loathe to suggest “that individual behavior is completely determinate.” Things will happen that cannot be predicted and that will escape our grasp. But that does not “stop us from using determinism as before, wherever we can, as a principle of method.” Finally, change and time, it would seem, move forward. We should study our history for clews to our present, just as we should delight in “the anticipations of the wildest mythologies and to the fancies of the bizarrest philosophies.” The mixed and conflicting theories—it is constant, or decreasing, or increasing, or variable—as to the nature of the universe in physics give rise to a final validation of Schiller’s views. The old, unchanging laws are being warped within the changing approaches to change itself.

This view of change is informed by Darwinism, but not enslaved to overly deterministic versions of the same. In “The Meaning of Biological History,” Schiller celebrates the fact that,

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through the combination of “Heredity, Variation, and Natural Selection . . . Darwinism undertakes to derive all the varieties of organic life.”\textsuperscript{181} It accounts for why the fitter survive (they “leave more descendants than the unfit, and transmit to them their superior qualities”) and why novelties (“the principle and source of innovation” which “produce the one-way course of the real”) occur. But that does not rule out Design and the reasons are readily apparent. First, natural selection cannot be made to account for those traits which are selected; “a living organism must always be presumed to be endowed with sufficient organs to live, before any question of its surviving better can arise.”\textsuperscript{182} Secondly, adaptation cannot account for the fact that interaction also influences the selection process; “the survival of one species will not depend only on its own efforts, but also on those of others.”\textsuperscript{183} These points would lead one to conclude, thirdly, that natural selection is “the mechanism whereby an already existing adaptation is automatically adjusted to the changing conditions of life.”\textsuperscript{184} But, by being automatic, it cannot be imbued with some sort of teleological function as well.

The mistake is based in a rhetorical, and largely effective, move on the part of science. By choosing the master word “evolution”—as opposed to “epigenesis,” or the development of new characters out of an undifferentiated base—scientists were able to induce a view of biological process that was mechanical, denying both novelty and progress.\textsuperscript{185} In spite of this mechanical view, progress was seen to occur on the heels of novelty. So science had to shift its argument by: (1) keeping the term it chose and inserting the meaning of the term it discarded,


\textsuperscript{182} Schiller, “The Meaning,” 272.

\textsuperscript{183} Schiller, “The Meaning,” 273.

\textsuperscript{184} Schiller, “The Meaning,” 274.

\textsuperscript{185} Schiller, “The Meaning,” 274-5.
and (2) operating from the assumption that that development was a progressive (meaning: positive) “law” that had “culminated in man.” Yet there were still problems. That which was observed as progressive was not a law at all. It was a result. And that which occurred was not, in fact, always positive. The biological process was left wanting in support for its claim of defeating, or taking over from, theological explanations of teleology.

This is where the philosopher should enter into the fray, not braying about the death of God or bemoaning a mechanical universe. Rather, philosophy should entertain the human implications of accepting the scientific and/or teleological viewpoints. But any implication is always shaded “according to our purposes in dealing with it.” And is it not more in keeping with our interests, our purpose, in the universe that Evolution should not exclude teleological action? Schiller’s solution is meant also to suggest a moral basis of any historical study. The Historical Method is not merely a matter of laying out all the details in a chronological row. For facts never simply are and are never simply enough:

When it discovers facts it is always in a rich historical setting, and its history is always more than a mere sequences of uncomprehended events. A historical study must be singularly dull and uninspired if it yields no inkling of the causes that were operative in bringing about the historical process, and if it suggests no guidance for the future.

What Darwinism was for Darwin is not what it is for Schiller. Past assumptions, even those novel enough to upset long standing tradition, are not grand standing idols before which we

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187 Schiller, “The Meaning,” 278. Schiller takes as his example Darwin’s own explanations of “accidental variation.” Darwin used this “methodological assumption” as a means of demarcating his object of study, natural selection; that is, “he was not going to assume that the variations subject to natural selection had any definite direction” (Schiller, “The Meaning,” 276). The point, Schiller argues, is that what Darwin called “accidental” was taken to exclude “the operation of intelligence from the sphere of biological history” (Schiller, “The Meaning,” 277). It was, in essence, a novel assumption that he made given the purpose of his study. That doesn’t mean, however, that it is suited to any and every use of Darwinism that has come after.

should cower. They should be tested against the potential new uses to which they can now be
directed.

Schiller realizes that the possibility of Design does not exclude the potential for random
occurrences. As he suggested, the view one takes is largely a matter of the value one finds in
taking it. So, in “The Development of Man,” he wants to examine the value of those variations
which “participate in the uniqueness of all historical events,” those “novelties” which “start new
departures.”¹⁸⁹ The most basic novelty is life itself. But there is a large gap between a living
single-cell organism and the higher levels of species. The latter exhibit consciousness.¹⁹⁰ And
this self-awareness is profound. For consciousness, whatever its source, not only implies
variation, it entails it; “that is, a conscious being cannot be trusted to exhibit completely uniform
reactions.”¹⁹¹ Consciousness, in short, gave to life what in man has come to be known as reason,
“a power of adjusting action the particular and peculiar circumstances of each vital situation.”¹⁹²
But novelties do not guarantee that the departures they engender will be positive.

Take, as an example, the development upon which “any enduring social structure”
depends: “the mutual adjustment of the behavior of its individual members.”¹⁹³ It has been seen
in various familial forms—the nomadic tribe, the hunting party, the patriarchal family—
throughout history. But even as that development has been extended to include international
relations, there has been no decrease in the possibility that tension will rend apart the structure of


¹⁹⁰ It pays here to recall Schiller’s rather narrow, and eugenical, definition of these concepts only two years
previous: “the value of a ‘conscience’ depends on the moral value of the possessor” (Schiller, “Is the Distinction,”
322).

¹⁹¹ Schiller, “The Development,” 34.

¹⁹² Schiller, “The Development,” 32.

¹⁹³ Schiller, “The Development,” 41.
That is because societies have not found a way to eliminate the novelty of the individual acting against the good of the society. In that regard, we are no better than even “social insects.” For even bees and ants “are apt . . . to nourish and cherish social parasites that are destructive of the community.” There may, however, be one possible “psychological variation” suited to curbing such destruction: the ability to formulate value judgments.

In “Man’s Future on the Earth” Schiller admits to his bias. He acknowledges that, as much as he argued against an absolute argument for Design, he still cannot shake “the suspicion that the variations which have mediated progress were not really accidental.” How, then, to explain the admixture of the good and the bad, the social and the anti-social, in the previous discussion of novelty? Simply, “the factors making for degeneration are always found to co-exist with those making for progress, and the facts nearly always permit themselves to be interpreted as incidents in either process.” Novelties, as pivot points, assure no clear outcome. Perhaps that is why the human hand must guide novelties towards more desired, though by no means secure, conclusions. “It may mean that we are not forced into progress against our will, though we can progress if we will. In other words, to effect progress our assent is really needed.”

To Schiller, the current state of affairs suggests such a need. For the economic, political, and moral foundations which have for so long bolstered democracy are on the wane. If the democratic experiment, in Europe and American, goes by the boards, what will chance to replace

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194 Schiller, “The Development,” 42.
196 Schiller, “Man’s,” 120.
197 Schiller, “Man’s,” 121.
it? “It is fashionable and easy to answer: some form of government that will practice social planning instead of leaving men to find the ways to their ends by cut-throat competition.”

And these forms already exist, albeit in incipient states. Communism seems ready to reduce man to a form of “social insect”; and while this could certainly “arrest man’s deterioration” it would also “put an end to any significant history of man.” What alternative is there to this solely negative form of eugenics?

There is, however, conceivable a second and more intelligent mode of planning, of which Italian Fascism may be the harbinger. It does not fly in the face of natural selection, and try to reduce all to the same lowly level; it is selective, that is, aristocratic, in method, and aims at raising man above his present level. Thus it is essentially an attempt by human society to direct its own development, to supersede mere survival-values by ethical values of equal or greater survival value and substituting for natural selection a selection of what is judged to be the best to grow a super-man.

But the requirements for its successful execution are monumental. There would have to be the implementation of eugenical policies which would “arrest the contra-selection at present going on in the whole civilized world.” The elimination of the practices which give rise to “morons and lunatics” would have to be coupled with the study of practices which would aid in the “self-repair” of the “competent and intelligent.”

But Schiller doubts that humans are capable of enacting such schemes unless they counter that doubt with a leap of faith. Faith, not sought in a world found to be lacking, but in the novelty that lies beyond immediate experience, in “worlds upon worlds of dream, imagination, and aspiration, which supplement, transmute, and transcend the physical

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198 Schiller, “Man’s,” 123.
199 Schiller, “Man’s,” 123-4.
200 Schiller, “Man’s,” 125.
201 Schiller, “Man’s,” 125.
202 Schiller, “Man’s,” 125-6.
universe.” This leads Schiller to what he calls “the threshold of religion.” But it is inspired by a belief that has been implied throughout these lectures; “namely, that everything will be what it turns out to be in virtue of what it has been through!” Schiller suggested that novelty carries risks, and implies consequences, for mankind. To succeed is to progress; to fail is to despair. Even in articulating the limits of imagination, Schiller is not willing to forsake our capacity to try.

Schiller finds other developments more trying. Towards the end of the Spring semester, Schiller starts to notice that some are revising the history he has been telling. The first of these challenges comes by way of someone new and someone old. The former is Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000), the professor of religion and philosophy then at the University of Chicago. The second is Paul Weiss, philosophy professor at Bryn Mawr and the man who provided the scathing review of Schiller’s Logic for Use in 1930. Together, they edit the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. I: Principles of Philosophy (1931). And Schiller uses his latest publishing home, the Personalist, as a forum in which to challenge this and subsequent volumes. The challenge is both personal and public, as it sets Jamesian “tough-minded” pragmatism against a person Schiller now feels is being tendered unfair credit. The first salvo, in April 1932, is relatively tame. As Schiller sees it, James was a giving friend willing to oblige Peirce with honors not always becoming him. He notes that the contents of this volume are meant to “represent Peirce as a system-making philosopher. They prove, I think, that system-building was not his forte, though they evince on every page the working of an independent mind that could

203 Schiller, “Man’s,” 129.

204 Schiller, “Man’s,” 129.
not be coerced to flock in herds.” Moreover, they do not furnish enough evidence to decide the question of “how far Peirce had gone beyond enunciating the pragmatic principle.” For every decidedly pragmatic notion, there exists “other passages which are unpragmatic, and show how hard it is, even for an innovator, to emancipate himself from a tradition.” This is not the last comment he will have for Peirce, but it will have to do for now. The summer is quickly approaching and Schiller must again set off for Europe.

Judging from the documents, it is a summer largely spent preparing for his return to America. Upon returning in January, Schiller delivers the [George Holmes] Howison Lecture, “Theory and Practice,” at the University of California, Berkeley. In February,
Schiller teaches his Pragmatism course for the first time. But, during the semester, he also ventures to the College of the Pacific, in Stockton, CA, to deliver a lecture entitled “Must Philosophers Disagree?” on 8 March 1933. This is not a specific complaint about any one philosopher. Nor is it written as an explicit defense of humanism. But it is a rather clear indication that, in front of a receptive audience, Schiller is at pains to paint himself as a promoter of that to which philosophy should aspire. Here he champions the divergence of opinions, a divergence which he has often courted, as a chief benefit of philosophy. By virtue of “its toleration of differences and disagreements” philosophy “completes and transcends science, and aims at a higher ideal.”

How does philosophy aim at this ideal which subsumes science? Simply put, by embracing the all encompassing influence of personality. While science will aim for an objective approach to phenomena, it removes from view the idiosyncrasies which guide it practices and admits of its discoveries. In doing so, science declines the view that “actual experience is always grouped around a personal self” and obscures the fact that its laws are tied to those actual experiences. For those experiences form particular cases which, when applied generally as “laws,” are “judged by their success in predicting the flow of events.” A personality-driven and particularized philosophy has thus the right to call itself “the study of all the data.”

false and misleading. It is false that there is such a thing as ‘pure theory’ which has no bearing upon practice” (“Theory,” Must, 181).


211 Schiller, “Must,” 97.

212 Schiller, “Must,” 98.

Not that philosophy always shows itself equal to Schiller’s definition. No, for philosophy to subsume science, it must: 1) admit of no abstractions, 2) acknowledge the role of personality in the development of philosophies historically. Living people give rise to as many rich as well as bankrupt philosophies. It is as foolhardy “to depict the kaleidoscopic succession of philosophies as steps in a logical development” as it is foolish to not question philosophers until they are dead.\textsuperscript{214} The first takes convenience at the expense of historical accuracy; the second ensures the convenience will seem more accurate. The consequences of this revised view of philosophy will not be hard and fast. Philosophy will have to admit of a flexible history written with different philosophies in mind. And it is ultimately minds, not abstractions, which matter most to Schiller. For the personalities of philosophers point to the philosophies that they will profess and protect. Anguished over in seclusion, adorned in “a technical language of their own,” is it any wonder that philosophers will disagree about philosophy?\textsuperscript{215}

What is, therefore, most sorely needed in Philosophy is the institution of thorough and systematic discussion of the great questions in dispute between the different sorts (not schools!) of philosophers. The protagonists in these discussions should be selected, not so much for their age, infirmities and reputation, but for their open-mindedness, honesty and good temper.\textsuperscript{216}

Dead philosophers should tell no tales and old ones seem unlikely to change theirs. In Schiller’s final analysis, the hope for a more useful philosophy is with the young.

If this is the case, why is Schiller attempting to sell this view of philosophy? Because, by his logic, his is a living philosophy. His disagreements are active protests against those who would violate the two rules he sets forth, who would deny the progress of the world by: (1) the

\textsuperscript{214} Schiller, “Must,” 100-1.

\textsuperscript{215} Schiller, “Must,” 103.

\textsuperscript{216} Schiller, “Must,” 104-5.
abstraction of philosophy, and/or (2) the reduction of its important developments to mere historical curios. It is on these two counts that his April 1933 review of the second Peirce volume, *Elements of Logic* (1932), should be read as a continuation of the first.\(^{217}\) For Peirce is now being configured as an unclear historical artifact, as “the mystery man of modern pragmatism.” And he is being reduced to the role of providing cumbersome abstractions:

For on the whole Peirce belonged to the school of logicians who attach importance to the archaeology of their subject, and think that a science already overburdened with an untamed multitude of technical terms can be enriched by multiplying their number and changing their formulations.\(^{218}\)

Burdened by its focus, the contents of this newest volume reveal “little trace of pragmatism or its influence.”\(^{219}\) The language is telling. Read one way, it supposes the absence of the source in the supposed source materials. Read another, it suggests the absence of pragmatism in the place

\(^{217}\) Here, again, Schiller makes only one addition to the text. After having criticized Peirce for not recognizing the wider application of logic, Schiller actually provides faint praise. In the sentence starting “No repugnance is shown towards the traditional conception of logic as a formal analysis of ‘propositions,’” Schiller adds, “though its inherent verbalism is made clearer than usual” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 2: Elements of Logic*, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, *Personalist* 14, no. 2 [April 1933]: 140; review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 2: Elements of Logic*, Draft, Books by various authors reviewed by Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Box Ten, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). It should be noted, however, that he was already worrying over the details of the book in the summer of 1932. In July 1932, after having visited New York the previous month and having returned to Oxford, Schiller is concerned about some comments he wants to put in his review of the Peirce collection. He supposes that even Flewelling’s “leniency” won’t let some of them stand (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 5 July 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Flewelling responds several weeks later, “if you want to put it in, ‘O. K. by me,’ as the boys say. I think my reputation can stand it quite as well as yours” (Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 July 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). In August, though, Schiller is still cautious: “Thanks for the permission to make the joke . . . I doubt whether I shall have the nerve to make it however!” It should also be noted that my suggestion that Schiller had this review in mind while he was preparing his lecture at the College of the Pacific is based in the correspondence. In the same letter, Schiller goes on to suggest his plans for the upcoming year: a Symposium entitled “Must Philosophers Disagree?” and a series of lectures on pragmatism “in such a form that they could be published” (F. C. S. Schiller, Betchworth, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 4 August 1932, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

\(^{218}\) Schiller, review, 140.

\(^{219}\) Schiller, review, 140.
where it mattered most to Schiller: logic. For a living philosopher preaching an applied art, the manipulations of Peircean logic seem too obtuse.

And it is worth noting the developments that occur in the upcoming months for this living philosopher. Early in the summer, while in Oxford, Corpus Christi extends a courtesy to their former tutor: “Dr. Schiller was unanimously re-elected to an Extraordinary Fellowship under clause 22 (ii) d of the Statutes of 1882 from October 1st 1933 to September 30th 1940.”220 In July 1933, Schiller comments to Flewelling about his recently renewed fellowship: “I have been re-elected . . . for seven years, which is longer than I’m likely to require!”221 This is Schiller aware, and seemingly humorously so, of his own mortality. On that count, his protests of the past several years suggest urgency on his part. But there are other issues which are again troubling him. In August 1933, after detailing his worries about Russia and Italy, Schiller reports to USC colleague Louis J. Hopkins:

Meanwhile the rest of the world is getting crazier and crazier; everywhere economic nationalism is strangling more trade and appealing more strongly to mass stupidity. But I was cheered a little. . . the sterilization programs of the German Nazis may do good, as may their campaign against some forms of pseudo-scientific literature and book-burning. One can never feel quite sure whether there [sic] Dictators are as crazy as they profess to be or are only playing down to the silliness of their supporters.222

This, then, is the world in which Schiller lives. The humble and the horrific mix uncomfortably therein. Aware of his precarious health, Schiller works to get out statements that obtain some measure of respect for him and his work. Germany, already in the grips of National Socialism, is

220 College Minutes, Corpus Christi College, 20 May 1933, B/4/1/13, Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

221 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 2 July 1933, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

222 F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Louis Hopkins, 22 August 1933, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
codifying a policy whereby undesirable classes are stunted. But that, for Schiller, is merely a current political development. As such, Schiller hopes that those potential saviors of the world in which he lives comport with the worldview which he preaches. It is a world, in short, where his social and philosophical views continue to make demands of him. But it is also a world that provides a routine inspiring to some normalcy. He returns again to California at the start of 1934 to teach the second Pragmatism course. And a world still offering an indication of heretofore unspoken novelty: romance. Upon his return to California at the start of 1934, one finds Schiller penning a rather flush letter to Louise Griswold. Given its date of 2 February, it must have been a romance in development for some time. He explains to her that, due to the necessity of meeting with Hopkins and others, “I shall not be able to come out at all tomorrow + nor to see you for 2 long days! Terrible! I’ll come out early on Sunday though!” The letter is signed “In greate haste but ever thine, Canning.”

The reason for his anguish over the delay is understandable. For only five days after the note was sent, Schiller had to be in Stockton to deliver his latest College of the Pacific lecture. That lecture, “William James, the Maker of Pragmatism,” is really an extension of the one that appeared in 1927. In this way, it serves as a bridge between his previous and present efforts to tell pragmatism’s and humanism’s tale according to his views, as against those being proffered by Weiss and others. And there are clear indications that the discussion is being updated to fit the new climate. It is here that he starts to refer, ambiguously now but specifically later, to

\footnote{F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Louise Luqueer Griswold, 2 February 1934, Personal Correspondence, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.}
James’s sympathy for “cranks.” 224 It is also the place where he contrasts James’s style of philosophy with that of other American philosophers: “I believe that his way of writing was part of a fully considered policy, part of a deliberate protest against the paralyzing Germanism which he saw creeping into American academic life, together with German scholarship and ideals of research, desiccating the professor and alienating him from the people.” 225 And it is here where he protests against claiming pragmatism as an American philosophy. While he gives full measure to the discovery of James, Schiller finds it “to be very unsound and dangerous doctrine to argue from the character of a people to that of a philosopher belonging to that people.” 226 No, pragmatism is larger and older than America; “actual human life and actual knowing are everywhere pragmatic.” 227 Pragmatism, like all great discoveries, is far older than the latest person who brings it to the people. The last one to lay claim to making that discovery is William James. 228

But, in April 1934, the one being claimed as its founder is still Peirce. And the title of the third volume, Exact Logic, provides an indication of his first complaint: Peirce praises exactness.


228 Only several weeks after this lecture, Schiller receives a note from Knox. The implication is that Schiller has been discussing the struggles of recent months. Regaining a touch of whimsy after the loss of his wife, Knox comments: “Here is a motto for the pragmatist that has just occurred to me:- You might use it in a lecture entitled ‘Auditory Ambiguities, vulgarly called Puns’ –

With Life’s severest problems
Let us wrestle hard and long.
If we cannot find right answers,
We at least can write the wrong”

(Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 February 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
As Schiller explains, “Peirce . . . always delighted to pepper his pages with weird symbols, before which he knew that the ordinary philosopher would simply stand aghast and grovel.” As with his logic meant to supplement traditional approaches, so too with his mathematical acumen. If, Schiller reasons, a mathematical symbol is taken in pure form as exact, then it can never be altered and is thus useless. If taken in the applied sense, it is clear that it must be subject to revision and thus not exact at all. So what, then, are persons to make of Peirce’s logic? Bluntly put, that it suffers the oddities of an author who “has a tantalizing habit of introducing some obscure and often irrelevant technicality and riding off on it . . .” More simply stated, Peirce is a victim of his time, trading in outdated notions (such as contradiction meaning “false” and not “meaningless”) that it took a person such as A. Sidgwick to show as lacking. But Peirce gets it right in one regard. He anticipated Schiller’s own conclusion that Formal Logic was a meaningless science.

229 In this review Schiller adds two clarifications—one is a specific citation and the other is an actual quotation—to the original text. But he also adds a comment. After arguing that Peirce never offers a clear definition of the word exact, he offers: “If, moreover, the vague word, ‘stability,’ is to be construed at all strictly, logic would seem to disqualify itself for the apprehending of progressive knowledge. for a strictly stable meaning would surely be immutable” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 3: Exact Logic, eds.Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Personalist 15, no. 2 [April 1934]: 175; review of Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 3: Exact Logic, Draft, Books by various authors reviewed by Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Box Ten, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

230 Schiller, review, 175.

231 Schiller, review, 176.

232 Schiller makes sure that such an interested party like Sidgwick would be kept aware of his latest work. And the result seems to be effective: “Very many thanks for sending me the Personalist for a whole year. The first No. arrived the other day, + I am glad to note that you are writing a series of articles for it, + also that there are several other coming articles that I am sure will interest me. Your notice of Peirce, by the way, gives me quite a new notion of him. I had always thought of him as the first person who had definitely expressed the essence of pragmatism + who therefore was free from the illusion of safe ‘exactness’ of expression. But I don’t think I have ever come across any of his own writings. . . .” (Alfred Sidgwick, Cornwall, to F. C. S. Schiller, 6 May 1934, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). This letter also contains the following comment: “As to Analysis, I fear that is devoted to Stebbingism . . . Those people are determined to keep pragmatism misunderstood, + so to escape all fear of conversion to it.” It is a discussion which continues into late 1934. In the
As with previous years, no sooner does this review come out then Schiller is again returning to Europe with, it seems, Louise in tow. This summer, however, is different. His precarious health is discussed in a medical report from July 1934. It notes that Schiller leads “a moderately quiet routine of life at present; travels extensively; not much active exercise apart from a little walking; appetite and digestion good; sleeps somewhat irregularly . . . tobacco and alcohol nil.” But idle as he is, his health is in decline. His present symptoms include “attacks of breathlessness at nights during the past three years—condition rather more troublesome recently.” The diagnosis is “hypertensive heart disease; myocardial insufficiency, bundle branch block [sic]; chronic nephritis.” As a result of his “considerably enlarged” heart and “deficient

October issue of Mind Schiller challenges the arguments of Lewis Samuel Feuer (1912-2002) in a short discussion notice, a notice which is an extension to a discussion that began in the previous year. The argument is in keeping with his previous comments: Symbolic logic, rather than be a corrective, is an unnecessary extension of Formal logic. Schiller’s conclusion aptly summarizes his opinion: “I agree that philosophers are not to be blamed for the complexities of the world, though I deplore that so many have introduced unpardonable complexities into their own systems” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Unity of the Universe Again,” Mind 43, no. 172 [October 1934]: 471). Feuer was to receive his doctorate, with a dissertation entitled The Philosophical Analysis of Space and Time, from Harvard University in the upcoming year, and his later works show an interest in ideological and social movements. He taught at Vassar and Berkeley among others.

Sidgwick, for his part, is more interested in discussing the stranglehold of one of Schiller’s more recent nemeses: Stebbing. Responding to Schiller at the start of the same month, Sidgwick explains: “. . . The October Mind hasn’t yet reached me, but there ought to be an article in it which I hope you will like. There should also be a short paper in ‘Analysis’ but I rather suspect they will reject it as conflicting too much with Miss Stebbing’s habits of thought” (Alfred Sidgwick, Ambleside, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 October 1934, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). We do not have Schiller’s response, but Sidgwick’s next letter suggests the tone of the discussion: “. . . I agree with all you say about the symbolic people. I sent one short contribution to their Journal ‘Analysis’ + they put it in. Then I sent another on ‘Interests + Purposes’ + they have silently avoided printing it, though it was perfectly non-contentious + civil. Miss Stebbing appears not to welcome any difference of opinion – perhaps afraid of losing some of her disciples. They do seem rather a puzzling crowd” (Alfred Sidgwick, Ambleside, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 October 1934, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

233 In Schiller’s July 1934 preface, written in Oxford, to Must Philosophers Disagree? he provides no dedication, but inserts this comment: “I am greatly indebted to my friend, Mrs. Louise Strang Griswold, for help in proofreading and indexing” (Must, vii).
circulatory reserve,” his doctor recommends that Schiller should “as far as possible . . . avoid physical strain in any form.”

Schiller does make some changes to his schedule as a result. As he notes in an August letter to Hopkins: “Contrary to expectations we are exploring Norway this year, instead of returning to our old Swiss haunts, the reason being that the Doctor would not let me go so high (heart).” He then travels to Prague to attend the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy, during the first week of September. While there he presents, alongside Flewelling, a paper entitled “How is ‘Exactness’ Possible.” And it is shortly thereafter that Schiller sees the publication of his last book, Must Philosophers Disagree? As per usual, Schiller receives notes of thanks from friends regarding the publication.

234 Case Notes of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, 30 July 1934, Medical Records, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

235 F. C. S. Schiller, Stalheim, to Louis Hopkins, 21 August 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

236 In his Mind report on the Congress, Schiller can’t help but comment about his presentation and the newer forms of logic. Note how an initial claim of approval and solidarity transforms into a dig: “This question [the title of his presentation], being unanswerable, worried the logicians . . . Nevertheless, the adherents of ‘logical positivism’, an attractive combination of pragmatism and logistics, which seemed so abundantly endowed with ‘hybrid vigor’ . . . seemed a great advance on the other sorts of Formal Logicians . . . even though they have not yet apparently found a way of avoiding the pitfalls presented by the occurrence of ambiguity and nonsense” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Prague Congress,” Mind 44, no. 173 [January 1935]: 130). Reference to the published version of his presentation makes clear that Schiller’s praise is, punningly, a formality: “I am driven to the conclusion that logistics is an intellectual game. It is a game of make-believe, which mathematically trained pedants love to play, but which does not on this account become incumbent on every one” (F. C. S Schiller, “How is ‘Exactness Possible?” Our Human Truths [New York: Columbia University Press, 1939], 344-5).

237 Hopkins comments: “‘Must Philosophers Disagree’ came yesterday. I have already read the chapters on ‘Herbert Spencer as a Moralist’ ‘William James’ and ‘William James and the Making of Pragmatism’ and I am especially glad to have chapters 18-19-20 + 21 in book form as I had kept the numbers of the Personalist that had them and can now throw them away. Thank you for having it sent to me” (Louis Hopkins, Pasadena, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 October 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad provides a longer reply and a shading of Jamesian reflection: “With regard to the disagreement of philosophers, it does seem to me that you are saying they need not disagree anything like as much as they do, and that ultimately there may come a time, if they think straight enough and take enough pains to express themselves clearly, when on many matters they need not disagree at all. All of which is, I submit, a way of saying that your
The critical notices the book receives are varied in their focus. In the December 1934 *Journal of Philosophy*, A. E. Moore notes that this “somewhat miscellaneous collection” comes well equipped with Schiller’s expected “controversial wit” and “‘humanistic’ approach” to philosophical topics. The essays “are lively, suggestive, though sometimes repetitious variations on familiar ‘humanistic’ themes, well calculated to enlist the attention and sympathy of that ‘wider public’ with which the author is mainly concerned, though hardly likely to convince those ‘academic recluses.’” In the May 1935 *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*, G. N. M. T. praises how Schiller unites the disparate materials “by a deliberate avoidance of technicality of style, which so often reduces, as he observes, the writing of philosophers to ‘verbalism and not literature’). These readable essays, written in Dr. Schiller’s delightful style, are certainly the latter.” And he notes that it is to be expected that Schiller answers the title in the affirmative. For Schiller, “each philosophy is . . . the product of an individual personality, stamped by that personality’s history and character, and intelligible in light of that alone.”

answer to the question “Must philosophers disagree?” is in the negative. As to the justice of your censure, I am entirely on your side as against the great mass of contemporary philosophers, who consider you to be wicked because you are so rude to them” (Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad, Hampstead, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 November 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Joad (1891-1953) was a British philosopher who at the time chaired the Philosophy Department at Birbeck College, University of London. A realist of the stripe of B. Russell, he later experienced a conversion to Christianity, a topic which occupied the main of his later works.


239 M., review, 720.


241 T., review, 82.
In the October 1935 *Mind*, John Leofric Stocks (1882-1937), then a philosophy professor at the University of Manchester, provides the most searching of these short reviews. And he focuses on the third, Speculative, section. While Schiller jokes that he has “lived down the indiscretions” of attempting a metaphysic in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, Stocks wonders if the overall content of this section suggests “Dr. Schiller is in fact returning to metaphysics.”\(^{242}\) And he hopes that this book, at least in its third part, is a sign of things to come: “Now that retirement (or shall we say semi-retirement) from teaching has given Dr. Schiller increased leisure we may hope that he will find an opportunity of working out his metaphysical views more fully. His pen has evidently lost nothing in freshness and vigor.”\(^{243}\)

But leisure is not the order of the day, or the world. As Schiller prepares for his journey back to California, there are other things on his mind. The situation in the Europe that he is preparing to leave is a tenous one at best. In August Hitler’s status as Fuehrer is made “official” by a plebiscite. At the same time, Hitler continues to make demands as regards Germany’s right to arm itself and to disputed territories in the Saar Region [land bordering both Germany and France]. At the start of October, both King Alexander I and Foreign Minister Louis Barthou of France were assassinated at Marseilles by a Croatian revolutionary. In this climate European countries are attempting a variety of tactics to avert any conflict. One such country is Austria, which, wracked by unrest, has adopted a Fascist government structure friendly to Italy and signed an alliance with Hungary and Fascist Italy. Schiller provides his take on these developments in a letter to Hopkins in November:


\(^{243}\) Stocks, review, 524.
As for our air force increase, it seems to me more probable that we are really trying to equal the French, who are admittedly twice as strong, than to guard against the Germans, who are only half as strong! Austria is still a danger spot. I fear the government there is turning out 1) Jews and 2) Nazis from their professorships and filling their places with priests!  

The juxtaposition of Jews and Nazis is jarring to a contemporary reader. But works that Schiller has been preparing during his time in Europe will soon make the references clearer.

### 7.6 PERRY AND THRUST: FINAL COMMENTS

Schiller arrives in the United States in February 1935. The records suggest that Schiller teaches no more courses at USC. But, for a man recovering from an illness and a long voyage, it had already been a busy year. He had completed two pieces in January 1935—an article and a Library Lecture (eventually delivered on the radio)—that suggest the events of the past months had a profound impact on him. Set against his latest reviews of the Peirce papers, in January and April, they help to demonstrate just how closely bound the philosophical and social, the theory and practice, of Schiller’s humanism have become. Freed of full-time teaching Schiller is not taking the route hoped for by Stocks. But he is filling in the details of his system, even as he hopes to advance against those that are seeking to erase him from the pragmatic metaphysics they are creating.

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244 F. C. S. Schiller, Betchforth, to Louis Hopkins, 12 November 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

245 This date is based on estate records required by the Franchise Tax Commissioner. These state: “The return also shows that Dr. Schiller arrived in the United States February 5, 1935” (Murray M. Chotiner, Los Angeles, to F. R. Reynolds, 12 September 1938, Correspondence Relating to FCSS’ Estate, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
Schiller publishes “Ant-Men or Super-Men?” in the January 1935 *The Nineteenth Century and After*. He continues to articulate the ideas he was developing in the previous summer (he had mentioned in his letter to Hopkins in November that he was finally able to complete this piece). And the issue Schiller raises is a basic one: given that man is a social creature, the question arises as “to what sort of society his social nature can, or should, give rise.”246 The most relevant part of his answer deals with the political situation in Europe, which he frames as the struggle to balance a Conservative deference to tradition and a Liberal belief in “the policy of reaching social agreement by reasonable discussion or debate rather than by authority and force.”247 The lessons as of recent history show routine winning out over an equal measure of originality. And it has been a deceptive rhetorical campaign. Under the banner of Liberalism, the forces of Conservativism waged a punitive (first world) war against Germany and her allies. The results are a circus mirror version of tradition, rife with distortions:

> Everywhere a narrow and bigoted conception of nationality broke up not only the political but also the economic aggregates that were essential to human civilization and prosperity, and forced mankind back into barbarism, follies and superstitions that it had seemed to have outgrown long ago. It was a signal example of the bitter irony of history that a war which had been ostensibly fought to render the world safe for democracy should lead not only to a widespread abandonment of democratic institutions, but also to a state of affairs in which there was no safety for life, property, or justice, and to a recrudescence of personal rule in its most ruthless and tyrannical forms.248

The results were to be expected. The public, to whom the forces of Liberalism and Conservatism preached, turned their backs in disgust at the machinations of politics. Absent said support, governments collapsed into a motley pile of authoritarian governments: (1) Bolshevised Russia

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with its rule “by open force and secret police”; (2) Fascist Italy with “the dramatic sense of the people” that is developing into “a political theory of sorts”; and (3) Nazi Germany, “the maddest of all the dictatorships, based on the pseudo-science of fantastic race theories and the barbarism of anti-Semitic Judenhetzen.” 249 These governments responded to the vacuum created by the leaders of the democratic nations. They stepped into the chaos and offered citizens “a more rational and planned order” by which the dictator can shape his citizens into a reflection of the nation. 250 And note that this amounts to something like an inverted Conservatism. The rationale is an individual that reflects rational society, not a society that reflects its rational citizens.

And it is, ultimately, the citizen who absorbs the impact of these new experiments in government. For each form of rule calls for a specific sort of citizen; it must, in short, “breed, or somehow mould, the sort of man it wants, the man who would be fit for its purposes, would believe in its ideals, could enjoy life in it, or could at least endure it.” 251 The Communist government desires an Antman, he who is “infinitely laborious, self-sacrificing, and submissive to his social order.” 252 But, absorbed into the colony, this is a man without thought for anything but the colony. “For dealing with novelties he will not be equipped, and so his unintelligence will make him unprogressive.” 253 The Nazi government desires a Superman:

Already one of the new dictatorships, the German, has declared in favour of eugenics, alike in its negative or sanitary form, which aims at purifying the stock, and, in its positive and more ambitious form, which aims at creating a real aristocracy and a better

type of man. No doubt many centuries may elapse between this declaration and the realization of its programme, but it is none the less significant that the ideal of eugenics should now have been officially adopted and proclaimed in a great modern State.\textsuperscript{254}

For this to work, however, the appropriate steps must be taken. A eugenical State, to inspire the masses in its direction, “will have to be elevated into some sort of biological religion and equipped with appropriate rituals and myths.”\textsuperscript{255} And it will have to, as in the case of Hitler, commit itself “to the policy of developing leadership, a quality which the democracies are more and more failing to do.”\textsuperscript{256} Rather than “grind down individuals” as in the case of Communism, Fascism promises to “utilize the progressive possibilities latent in human individuality and to cherish the individuals from whom it will derive the impetus to progress.”\textsuperscript{257} This “New Liberalism” gives rise to hope. But, should we fail to learn from our mistakes, “the avenging Furies of our past misdeeds may turn us back again into the beasts we were.”\textsuperscript{258}

The January 1935 Library Lecture, “Goethe and the Faustian Way of Salvation,” also speaks specifically to the issues Schiller raised in his letter to Hopkins. And it helps to temper what, initially, sounded like a contradictory endorsement of Nazism. He notes that Germany and Austria are attempting, along with the purge of various intellectuals (the list again includes both Nazis and Jews), to craft a new form of philosopher king, one who instructs as well as leads by example. But he cautions: “It is much too early to say of course what the results of this experiment will be. It has been initiated with much brutality and ruthlessness; and at present it looks quite probable that it will succeed only in ruining the German universities as seats of

\textsuperscript{254} Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 99.
\textsuperscript{255} Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 99.
\textsuperscript{256} Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 100.
\textsuperscript{257} Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 100-1.
\textsuperscript{258} Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 101.
learning.” And he adds: “Much the same may be said at present of a still more grandiose
scheme, the German legislation on eugenics.”\textsuperscript{259} The comments of the summer past are now
easier to understand. Schiller counts as intellectuals both Nazis and Jews. And he sees the
experiment in Germany as just that, an applied test of possible solutions that is as yet unfinished.
That these policies are eugenic binds him to support them in spirit. That they have already
suggested negative underpinnings leads him to critique their specifics.

In January, Schiller also continues to entertain questions regarding the past. Schiller
waives even less time dispensing judgment regarding the fourth volume of the Peirce papers:
calling this volume \textit{The Simplest Mathematics} must, in view of it contents, be regarded as a

\textsuperscript{259} The full text of this section makes the distinctions clear: “Quite recently the new regime in Germany is
showing signs of materially altering this system [the exclusion of the German university]. It is not merely purging
the Jews, Liberals, and Socialists, which is what the Austrian government is doing also (with the additional purge of
Galleys, Box Five, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

Attentive readers will here note that the reference again makes a distinction between Germany and Austria.
The comment again reflects the whirlwind of changes that European states are undergoing. Though Michael
Burleigh’s coverage extends into 1936, it helps to explain why Schiller would discuss both Nazis and Jews when
referencing the German and Austrian governments. Simply put, Austria was suspicious of Nazi Germany’s motives.
More specifically, the Fascist government reacted quickly and violently to attacks coordinated by Nazis in the early
to mid 1930s. As Burleigh explains: “the new Christian Social leader Engelbert Dollfuss converted a technical
dissolution of parliament into authoritarian rule by emergency decree.” The reaction to this policy: “The Austrian
Nazis responded to curbs on their activities and closure of their institutional apparatus with terrorist bombings.”
Dollfuss then checkmates, facing censure now from both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany; he “purged Nazi
sympathisers from the civil service, teaching and corporate sector.” But the bravado was short lived. Dollfuss was
assassinated by Nazis and his replacement, Kurt von Schushnigg, realized the tightening clasp of Italian and German
authoritarianism. In 1936, he signed an agreement with Germany, effectively granting Austria to the increasing
sphere of Nazi influence (Michael Burleigh, \textit{The Third Reich: A New History} [New York: Hill and Wang, 2000],
273-5).

Two last points as regards chronology: (1) the date of the lecture is bracketed as the archival version
provided looks to be a galley proof used by Louise Schiller in preparing the essay for inclusion in \textit{Our Human
Truths}. It also appears that, in preparing it for publication, Louise Schiller had confused it with another article (“The
Ultra Gothic Kant”) prior to inserting the reference to the Forum Lecture. The much shorter script for the radio talk,
which is also included, is hand dated 24 April 1935. These records also correct another ambiguity: the actual date
of a letter sent to Hopkins, the typescript copy of which is “March 10, 1935.” By comparing the content of these
materials with the content of that letter is it clear that the date is a typo, with the letter most likely being sent in
October. (2) Burleigh also clarifies the legislation to which Schiller is referring: “In late July 1933 the Nazis
introduced the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Progeny, with effect from 1 January 1934. If in many
respects the law mirrored earlier draft legislation, the crucial difference was that sterilization could now be
compulsory” (Burleigh, \textit{The Third}, 354).
somewhat cruel jest.”260 For Peirce, the son of a mathematician is so enamored of math that it becomes a limitation rather than a strength. “It did not avail to induce him to cultivate exactness of expression, and it very much encouraged his tendency to take refuge in needless technicality and to meet all demands for lucid explanation with an arrogant impatience.”261 Shackled to a dichotomous manner of thinking—as per traditional logic, things must be either true or false—Schiller even goes so far as to pay a small compliment at the end of a rather brusque dismissal: “Hence Peirce’s subservience to mathematics fully accounts for the sterility of his logic and for his inability to contribute to the pragmatic theory of knowledge towards which he had taken the first step.”262

In April 1935, Schiller turns to the fifth edition of the Peirce papers. Its focus is pragmatism and here Schiller’s critiques cuts closer and he digs deeper into his personal experience as one of its advocates. If the previous reviews were curt, then this one is most clear in its dismissal of Peirce as the founder of pragmatism. And the tactics Schiller uses are worth noting. He relies on James’s description of Peirce’s Harvard lectures—“flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness”—as the entry point into a discussion of Peirce’s own ruminations on the Metaphysical Club. Given the impressive collection of thinkers who made up this group, Schiller is led to say:

This account bids to settle the vexed question of the genesis of Pragmatism; for under these conditions the whole credit for its origination can hardly be assigned to any single

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261 Schiller, review, 79.

262 Schiller, review, 79.
member, and James’s generosity in attributing so much to Peirce appears in its true light.\textsuperscript{263}

Then Schiller feigns modesty by suggesting that Peirce’s role cannot be accurately assessed even now. But he is willing to tender a few observations. If not for James’s willingness to take the few strands that Peirce had offered and mold them into a more comprehensive philosophy, pragmatism would have died before it even started. That Peirce should quarrel with James for this, after James had been kind enough to attribute to him the status of an originator, “seems decidedly ungracious and ungrateful.”\textsuperscript{264} When it comes to Peirce’s views of Schiller, gone is even the slight courtesy of letters from decades past.\textsuperscript{265} After “excessive laudation” Peirce senses that Schiller too is moving beyond his fragments; so he “changes tone” and even engages in “false references” to suggest his views are being highjacked.\textsuperscript{266} Not that it would be easy, given Peirce’s “lengthy and tortuous lucubrations,” to make off with his personal views of Pragmatism and Pragmaticism.\textsuperscript{267} For Schiller is not sure that even Peirce was clear as to what he meant. It is only “under Providence and with William James as his interpreter” that


\textsuperscript{264} Schiller, review, 170.

\textsuperscript{265} It pays to recall that, in 1905, Schiller was willing to suggest to Peirce that his understanding of pragmatism—as it was derived from James—needed “modification.” While that may have been a mere courtesy, the tone of these comments suggests no such desire for revision along Peircian lines. The letters between Peirce and Schiller were initiated as a result of James and Schiller defending pragmatism and humanism in a series of articles, articles which partially responded to complaints of Bradley. For the substance of these discussions, refer to Chapter Three: William James, “Humanism and Truth,” \textit{Mind} 13, no. 52 (October 1904): 457-75; F. C. S. Schiller, “In Defence of Humanism,” \textit{Mind} 13, no. 52 (October 1904): 525-42; F. C. S. Schiller, “The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism,’” \textit{Mind} 14, no. 54 (April 1905): 235-40. For the substance of the letters between Schiller and Peirce, refer to Frederick J. Down Scott, “Peirce and Schiller and Their Correspondence,” \textit{Journal of the History of Philosophy} 11, no. 3 [July 1973]: 363-86.

\textsuperscript{266} Schiller, review, 170.

\textsuperscript{267} Schiller, review, 171.
pragmatism truly flourished. Trading in views that are by turns untenable and naïve, Peirce seems to Schiller the luckiest man to have never explained himself clearly. Clearly, Schiller is hoping to fare better by comparison. As the semester draws to a close, Schiller delivers a library lecture entitled “The Humanistic View of Life.” He ends the lecture by saying: “I have said nothing about myself. That is a great oversight; but some [sic] else will have to make it good. Do not despair however; for so far as I know the part of my biographer is not yet filled!” Nor, as yet, is his goal of setting his story, and history, straight.

But first there is his last trip to Europe. And it is a trip where he is accompanied by a wife. Schiller and Louise, the friend who he thanked in Must Philosophers Disagree?, married sometime during this semester. And as they ready for the trip in May, Schiller writes ahead to Washington to schedule a visit with his close friend Thaw. On 20 June, Schiller and Louise

268 Schiller, review, 173.

269 F. C. S. Schiller, “The Humanistic View of Life,” 3 May 1935, Manuscripts and Galleys, Box Five, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. The finding aid incorrectly dates this as “13 March.” This lecture is eventually published in the posthumous Our Human Truths.

270 At the end of his letter to Thaw, Schiller comments: “I enclose a letter from Louise, which shows well what kind of woman she is, + how fortunate I am to have got her to marry me” (F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Florence Thaw, 18 May 1935, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Louise’s note to Thaw is clearly respectful of the friends she has with Schiller: “How glad I am that I am to have the privilege of meeting you after all! Canning’s visits with you mean so much to him – and you are all such very old, close, + excellent friends – that I was in any case planning to stop with my sisters in Cambridge while he went to you, realizing that any outside person would more or less spoil the short “snatch” each year, in spite of the best of intentions. But you have so sweetly made me feel that I am not an outside person!!” (Louise Schiller, n.d., in F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Florence Thaw, 18 May 1935, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). She also provides suggestions as to his failing health and their relationship: “Of course I have the added responsibility of trying to safe-guard that precious + precarious spark of life. Tho’ he will not have told you, he has been none to well recently, - and I endeavor to assure him of rest and quiet to equip him for his university obligations. It is a comfort to my heart, which loves him so, to be able to do little things to relieve some of the strains on him. You as a woman can understand this, I know. We have been close companions for many years in work and play, and have grown to care for each other very deeply.”
set sail for Europe. The joy of a wife by his side is countered by what proves to be five difficult months. In July, Schiller writes to Flewelling about a recent decline in health. He notes that doctor’s orders crimp any further teaching plans: “You will realize that under these circumstances I cannot be very definite about undertaking work for the second semester.” In August, while recuperating at the Grand Hotel on the Jersey Shore, he suggests that he is only capable of committing to some Forum Lectures. But his health doesn’t seem to improve and his doctors indicate that he should avoid the use of stairs permanently and undergo a period of bed rest. These problems result in a sad decision: he decides to sell off his belongings at Oxford and make the move to California permanent. They stay briefly at Betchworth before arriving at Oxford in September. The strain of clearing out his room only exacerbates his condition.

271 The date is again based on a review of estate documents (Chotiner, to Reynolds, 12 September 1938).
272 F. C. S. Schiller, Betchworth, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 20 July 1935, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
273 F. C. S. Schiller, Jersey, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 25 August 1935, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
274 Schiller’s brother, Philip Maximilian (1868-1946), writes from their vacation spot in Switzerland: “Anyway I hope that you got safely to Oxford + did not feel too tired – the [phrase unclear] is to prevent Canning from doing more than the minimum when he gets there. You did right to keep him in bed after his bad night which simply meant that he had done too much. He will not realize that for some months to come he ought to do no more than sit or lie on sofa [sic] with an occasional crawl + that as soon as ever he feels tired he should stop doing whatever he is doing and rest. His constitution is so sound that if he will only follow that simple rule he can have a comfortable life for years to come. And he must learn that whatever he does he must do very slowly + never hurry over anything + with (?) e.g. get out of his chair to greet friends but let them come to him also when he is talking he ought to sit and not stand. I shall be glad when your sojourn in Oxford is over” (Ferdinand Philip Maximilian Schiller, Pontresina, to Louise Schiller, 5 September 1935, Personal Correspondence, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Another letter to Hopkins, the typescript date is again suspect given the details, provides Schiller’s account of his time while back at Oxford: “This is the first day I have got up for breakfast and the eleventh since we left Betchworth . . . . You may gather that I am much better, but the doctor kept me in bed for five weeks and even now imposes a permanent tabu on stairs. So my Oxford rooms (48 steps up) have become uninhabitable, and I have to clear them out” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Louis Hopkins, 25 August 1935, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
October, after having cleared out his dwelling, he and Louise spend some time in London
relaxing before returning to Betchworth to arrange passage. He reacts with surprise when he
receives word that he is scheduled for a regular course to teach. He finds it “hopelessly
optimistic.” Schiller protests that he does feel better. But his doctor bars him from any sort of
teaching; “so it seems to be sick leave or emeritus, either of which I should greatly
appreciate.”

Not finding any direct route to New York with a doctor on board, Schiller explains that
they will try to book a ship through the Panama Canal so as to leave England before the cold
season starts. The search must have been successful, as they arrive in California by mid-
November. And it must have proved recuperative. For the next year is marked less by his
health than by his choice to engage in two final debates. Both are with the beacons of
pragmatism’s present (Morris of Chicago, Weiss of Bryn Mawr and Perry of Harvard) over the
contested founders from pragmatism’s past. The jousting was started prior to Schiller’s
departure for America by an October 1934 review in the Personalist of Must Philosophers
Disagree?

275 F. C. S. Schiller, London, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 4 October 1935, Correspondence, Box One, F. C.
S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.

276 F. C. S. Schiller, Betchworth, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 10 October 1935, Correspondence, Box One,
F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.

277 Schiller, Betchworth, to Flewelling, 10 October 1935.

278 The date is again based on a review of estate documents (Chotiner, to Reynolds, 12 September 1938).

279 At that time, Schiller comments to Flewelling: “Morris’s review of my book I found disappointing
because it only repeats Chicago clichés, without giving any reasons. So I am writing a short article . . . entitled
“Must Pragmatists Disagree?” (Schiller, London, to Flewelling, 4 October 1935). Schiller’s expression of
displeasure is based, perhaps, in the fact that he had come to view Morris as an ally. In September 1934, while still
in Prague after having attended the International Congress of Philosophy, Schiller wrote to Hopkins: “I came first in
Section A . . . and was followed by an excellent paper by C.W. Morris of Chicago, which compared Pragmatism
The reviewer is Charles William Morris (1901-1979), a student of Mead at Chicago prior to taking a post there himself. Morris notes the magnitude of Schiller’s debt to James. But that is not meant as a compliment: “Candor requires me to say that I do not believe that Professor Schiller has in any substantial way advanced the status of the ideas he defends beyond what James had done.”

What’s more, Schiller isolates himself by his “animosity to mathematics and formal logic.” Rather than take these as areas for productive reconstruction, he seeks to defame and destroy them. The results are unfortunate and, again, of Jamesian influence:

As logicians and mathematicians like [German-born Logical Positivist Rudolf] Carnap [1891-1970] and [Austrian set theorist Hans] Hahn [1879-1934] are beginning to show, one can assimilate the formal sciences within an empirical and even pragmatic view, but one cannot push them out of existence by the quixotic lance, Personal Meaning. Schiller has both exaggerated the claims and underestimated the significance of the new logic. Like James, he is too afraid of desiccation. The phobia of the formal is the reverse side of the obsession with the personal.

Morris went on to publish a collection of Mead’s lectures entitled Mind, Self, and Society (1934). He later helped, based in part on the works of Peirce, to usher in the study of semiotics.

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281 Morris, review, 390.

282 Morris, review, 390.
Morris admits that “James and Schiller are a ... valid part of the pragmatist-humanist-empiricist
tradition.” But he also fears that they are likely to become mere curios. If that tradition is not
mindful of recent developments, if will become “of historical interest only, or merely an
intellectual gymnasium where athletes of the mind attempt to reinvigorate timid and tired
persons.” The comment is shocking. Two years before his death and several decades later,
Schiller is accused of becoming the Bradley he attacked.

Schiller had been drafting a response since the review came out. In the January 1936
Personalist he publishes “Must Pragmatists Disagree?” The anger of his rebuttal belies the
decrease in his health. He questions why it is that, while Jamesian pragmatists “gulp down every
extension or new application of pragmatic principles made by Professor Dewey, with relish and
without a qualm,” those of the Chicago School attack them, “rehearsing a few rather obvious
platitudes and ancient clichés, the application of which to the objects of their criticism is never
specified.” But Schiller does question Morris’s specific complaints. Where, Schiller wonders,
is the basis for an argument that either he or James ignored the “social aspect” of meaning or that
Schiller reduced meaning to “a wholly private affair”? Morris is simply “naïve” to assert that
suggesting the difficulty of conveying meaning is the same as arguing it is wholly private.

283 Morris, review, 390.
284 Morris, review, 390.
285 F. C. S. Schiller, “Must Pragmatists Disagree?” Personalist 17, no.1 (January 1936): 56. It pays to recall
the glowing tone of praise that Schiller had displayed in reviewing the majority of Dewey’s works. Almost to the
one, his only complaints were to do with style. As regards substance, he was found to agree and even urge for
similarities which demonstrated more agreement that critics were willing to give to pragmatists (as representative,
see the review of The Quest for Certainty in this chapter).

286 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 58. In a scathing reference to his own authority, Schiller reminds (or
informs) Morris that “the modern discussion of meaning started with Lord Russell’s Aristotelian Society Paper on
How Propositions Mean in 1919 and the Symposium in Mind on the Meaning of Meaning (for which I supplied the
title and the first paper) in 1920” (n. 2).
Where does Schiller show animus to math? It seems entirely disingenuous to claim this as Schiller, being a pragmatist, has hoped to engender “the philosophic appreciation of scientific method.”287 The only thing Schiller agrees with is his disrespect for symbolic and formal logics. But it is based on his well-documented arguments that: (1) “formal validity is untenable,” (2) “the basic unit of all the formal and symbolic logics, the proposition appears to be non-existent,” and (3) “the fundamental fact about Formal Logic is that it rests on an abstraction from real (i.e. personal) meaning.”288

Schiller faults these attacks as the result of misdirected respect. Morris “still seems to regard Peirce as the exemplar and standard to whom pragmatism should conform.”289 Perhaps he will revise his view in light of the printed record:

In the first place Peirce himself reveals that James had exaggerated his (Pierce’s [sic]) share in the founding of pragmatism, and that many other members of the Harvard Metaphysical Club besides Peirce and James deserve part of the credit. It appears moreover that Peirce himself had greatly changed his interests in the twenty years that elapsed between 1877 and 1899: he did not exactly withdraw what he had said, but he became very unwilling to sanction any further extension or application of his own principle. Particularly, he had fallen completely under the spell of the old elusive ideal of mathematics, that of “exactness,” and reprobated any attempt to carry pragmatism beyond the points he had himself formerly reached.290

This makes it all the more strange that followers of Dewey, who urged the “constant reconstruction of beliefs,” would claim lineage in the works of Peirce, who lapsed back into formalism and was himself not fan of Dewey.291 Regardless, Schiller puts out the challenge that

287 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 60. Schiller goes on to humorously add that the argument against math, if understood as applied not abstracted, “is about as impossible as to show disrespect towards the Equator.”

288 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 60-1.

289 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 62.

290 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 62.

291 Schiller, “Must Pragmatists,” 62-3. The none-too-ambiguous reference to Dewey’s work, specifically Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), reads as a further protest that the followers of Dewey overlook the similarities
Morris meet his arguments. Then, perhaps, the question that is this essay’s title will be answered in the negative.292

In the July 1936 Personalist, Morris argues that Schiller’s “position is often wrong, and misleading or one-sided when not positively wrong.”293 While he does agree that the social aspect of knowing is almost a truism, he argues that the ways in which that meaning is understood vary widely. To compare “the psychology of [Auguste] Comte, Dewey, and Mead” to “the psychology of James or of English empiricism (including Schiller)” is to gloss over substantial differences.294 In particular, Schiller’s understanding of the social is severely limited by his privileging the personal. In that regard, Morris suggests that the goal “is not to express an exclusive devotion to either personal meaning or social meaning in isolation, but to investigate the place each plays within the knowledge process.”295

He also questions Schiller’s understanding of the sciences. Math functions as a “linguistic aid” in understanding “the propositional consequences which follow from the

he shares with Schiller. And, given Schiller’s recent attempts to substantiate the social wing of his humanism, it must have struck him as a rude oversight. In that work, Dewey comments: “As long as ends are not thought of as individualized according to specific needs and opportunities, the mind will be content with abstractions. . . . But when attention is concentrated upon the diversified concretes, recourse to all intellectual materials needed to clear up the special cases will be imperative. At the same time that morals are made to focus in intelligence, things intellectual are moralized. The vexatious and wasteful conflict between naturalism and humanism is terminated” (italics mine; John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy [New York: Henry Holt, 1920; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957], 174).

292 Before turning to that response, I would like to offer an argument regarding this one. This text contains one typo, noted above, and one incorrectly cited quotation. While those, in themselves, are not issues that would trouble most readers, they seem to have occupied a central place in Schiller’s reviews of other people and in editor’s (Flewelling in particular) comments regarding his own attentiveness to detail. Editors, of course, miss mistakes. But that is not the point. This argument, crafted by Schiller, was either rushed into the mail or not thoroughly proofread by him. My supposition is that the attack upon his originality and relevance brought out his anger and, as he often called it, the “Printer’s Devil.”

293 Charles W. Morris, “Professor Schiller and Pragmatism,” Personalist 17, no. 3 (July 1936): 295.

294 Morris, “Professor,” 295.

295 Morris, “Professor,” 295.
acceptance of a certain initial proposition.” 296 It does not need a social application or use to be valuable. A “point” in geometry does not need an object to which it points. Nor should formal logic be expanded beyond its limits. It should be regarded as “the study of the formal dimensions of linguistic meaning: it does not study non-linguistic objects nor psychological events.” 297 Thus it is unreasonable to argue that features within a given formal system should extend beyond that system; a formal system “carries no warrant for the applicability of what is demonstrated to existence beyond the system.” 298 If pragmatism is to be anything beyond a quaint curio, it must incorporate these new developments “in logic and the philosophy of science.” 299

In the same issue of the Personalist, Schiller is “greatly pleased to find how numerous and important the points of agreement” are between the two of them. 300 So pleased, in fact, that he is willing from the start to grant that the relation of the personal to the social, and the relation of pragmatism to new ideas in logic, are important. But Schiller’s concern is the interaction between the personal and social, and reducing the potential for actual misuse in actual interactions. 301 “What we want to know is not whether under specially favorable circumstances

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296 Morris, “Professor,” 296.

297 Morris also raises two other objections to Schiller’s approach: (1) “formal validity is ever more than hypothetical . . . and would admit that an element of probability enters as soon as an empirical meaning is given to the terms in the formal system”; and (2) Schiller attributes to recent advances in logic “those psychological and logical confusions which encrusted the classical versions of formal logic and which he himself helped to puncture” (Morris, “Professor,” 297).

298 Morris, “Professor,” 299.

299 Morris, “Professor,” 300.

300 F. C. S. Schiller, “Comments by F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 17, no. 3 (July 1936): 300.

301 Schiller explains his view of these social interactions by asking a question: how does person A undertake to communicate with person B? That question raises what is primarily a psychological problem for A, the problem of “how to effect contact between two minds, so that they may share their meanings.” Should A succeed, B will attempt the same and, should both be successful, their interaction may rise to the level of “social meaning”;
meaning can be conveyed by a set of symbols, but whether we have succeeded in conveying our meaning in the various emergencies of life.” 302 Granted, such emergencies occur in a social setting. But, again, any social meaning is the result of the interactions of individuals. Any review of the machinations of propaganda during the war or as a consequence of the rise in dictatorships suggests as much, suggests that “discoveries are made by individuals (set no doubt in a social context which more often hinders than helps them), and that society can exploit or suppress them only after they have been made.” 303

This complex relationship carries implications for both pragmatism and the sciences. And, for Schiller, those implications emphasize the particular. If, as Morris suggests, pragmatism is to develop a deeper rapport with math and logic so as to craft a more useful science, it has to be “cognizant of particular cases, and so of personal differences between them.” 304 But this respect for the sciences should not devolve into a slavish devotion to their theories. It should instead proceed according to the best of their methods, testing their worth and revising their value according to their usefulness. This approach lays the ground work for a theory of meaning; but it is also the first step in what should become a more robust theory of truth:

No doubt it is meaningless to discuss the truth of an assertion until its meaning has been ascertained; yet, once assured of this, we always desire to know also its value, i.e. whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false.’ For meaning does not spring up in vacuo; it arises in a

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302 Schiller, “Comments,” 301.

303 Schiller, “Comments,” 302.

304 Schiller, “Comments,” 304.
context and as an incident in a train of thought; it has a purpose, it claims value, it points forwards to a use. Thus the same psychological background exists both for meaning and for truth.\(^{305}\)

Here Schiller hopes he reads Morris right in suggesting there can be a “science of personality.” For if science is understood “as a technique for calculating the course of events, there can be a science of the individual and the personal—and indeed nothing else, because all events exhibit individuality and dependence on personality.”\(^{306}\) It is not, as Morris contends, that Schiller privileges the individual over the social. It is that the social Morris so clearly appreciates is subject to the particulars, good or otherwise, of those that compose it.

Three months prior, in the April 1936 Personalist, Schiller chose to engage in the defense of another individual, James. In the same breath, he continued his attack on Peirce. The review of Perry’s two volume The Thought and Character of William James starts favorably enough. Schiller is “congratulating” Perry on the publication of the work, noting how likely this venture is to be a “literary success” and “an invaluable addition to American philosophic literature.”\(^{307}\) Then, almost without warning, an enormous qualification: “. . . I do not feel sure that he has made the right selections and so distributed his lights and shades and emphases as to produce a portrait which is a good likeness. It looks a little like an unconscious confession of a failure to achieve a final synthesis of James’s personality that in his concluding chapter he is impelled to recognize no less than four William Jameses.”\(^{308}\) Schiller sees these—a “neur-asthenic” and “radiant” James, a third which is the “enriched” melding of the previous two, and finally “the

\(^{305}\) Schiller, “Comments,” 304.

\(^{306}\) Schiller, “Comments,” 305.


\(^{308}\) Schiller, review, 198.
James of experience and discipline”—as the idiosyncrasies that mark James a genius. Perry’s description(s), however, “may be read as though he thought James was rather lucky not to end up in a lunatic asylum.”309 Surely, this wasn’t Perry’s intention. A solid writer, though one not always in accord with James’s view, Perry must have simply failed to “penetrate the central core from which James’s multiple personalities could be seen to spring, and this again, perhaps, betokens merely a defect of sympathy.”310

Schiller localizes the cause of this defect: a misguided appreciation for the accepted history. And that history tells a tale that leads back to Peirce:

Many had suspected also that Peirce was at bottom a crank, though no doubt the greatest of those James delighted to pet. . . . He bore Peirce’s querulous lecturing angelically, and made desperate attempts to get him appointed to Harvard. . . . I venture to suggest that James, the supreme psychologist that he was, understood what was valuable in Peirce better than Peirce himself, and treated him both generously and discriminatingly.311

Schiller’s Peirce, a heady brew of supposition and factual detail, turning away from pragmatism and bogged down in symbolic logic, becomes “a peg” on which James charitably hung his own doctrine. The matter, for Schiller, is obvious; “it is pretty clear that Peirce can not have been more than [pragmatism’s] putative parent.”312

309 Schiller, review, 198.

310 Schiller, review, 198. Schiller goes on to claim a variety of different problems: an aversion to James’s style and his disregard for academic protocol, a grafting of Perry’s views of logic and psychology onto James’s, and a tendency to “minimize both the originality and the importance of James’s pragmatism, and to make little serious effort to place it in its historical context with respect either to its opponents or to its supporters” (Schiller, review, 199).

311 Schiller, review, 199.

312 Schiller, review, 199. It should be noted that Schiller’s review only makes one reference to the fact that he is subject to a chapter: “The index is elaborate, though not exhaustive, to judge a little mechanical test I tried upon it. I found that out of 41 references to myself, it had listed only 18” (Schiller, review, 200). The likely reason is that Perry’s treatment of him is restrained, even courteous. Perry does remark right from the start that “the difference between James and F. C. S. Schiller is inescapable,” isolating what Schiller and James had agreed upon in their correspondences; namely, that Schiller starts from the subjective and James from the objective view of things. But he seems to have difficulty explaining what, exactly, beyond divergent starting points is at issue. He says that isolating the differences is “not easy because their philosophical doctrines are so inextricably interwoven with
Schiller next turns to the sixth and final volume of the Peirce papers. Schiller finds his views of metaphysics, taken from fragments and occasionally divorced from their original context, “pretty vague and almost contradictory.” Peirce has become, in the eyes of Schiller, the “Humpty Dumpty” the editors (and, one assumes, Morris) wish they could be put back together. But it is, and will continue to be, tough going and questionably motivated. Schiller even uses Perry’s work to critique Hartshorne’s and Weiss’s, noting James’s reference to Peirce as a “crank” and “failure.” He then uses the words of James’s as a means to dismiss this latest volume:

Now in my own dealings with cranks I have found that perhaps the most reliable mark of the genus crank is a constitutional inability to give a straight answer to a straightforward question. The crank will always stray from the point into some favorite hobby of his own. Judged by this test, James’s judgment is amply justified in this volume.

And Schiller’s summary conclusion is a condescending jab at James’s square peg: “Is it not tragic that so professorial a mind should never have been summoned to adorn a professorship?” It is not likely that Schiller was trying to hand out compliments.

Nor is Perry ready in the October 1936 Personalist to fold to Schiller’s “misstatements.” In a short summary, Perry points out what stands in need of correction: (1) he has never “plainly”

313 Schiller, review, 200.

314 Schiller, review, 201.

315 Schiller, review, 201. After Schiller’s death, Hartshorne had occasion to reflect on Schiller’s philosophy. While he notes that Schiller had “something of the enfant terrible about him, a desire to shock or startle,” Hartshorne’s comments regarding Schiller’s criticism are even handed: “Schiller tried to show that Peirce was much less important than James, whom of course he admired immensely. I never objected to the admiration, but I thought there was a trace of malice in his depreciation of Peirce, a little perversity. However, Schiller was partly right; Peirce had great weaknesses and has sometimes been overrated I suppose.” But to these comments is also added: “His writings seemed lively and interesting, rather worth reading, but I didn’t read them a great deal ever” (in Allan Sheilds, ”Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller.” Personalist 55 [1974]: 294-5).
expressed disapproval of James’s style; (2) nor expressed “condemnation” of James merger of psychology and philosophy; and (3) James, as much as he expressed an “incapacity” for exact thought and a disregard for formal logic, nonetheless demonstrates a “very considerable amount of exact thinking.”

Verifiable by reference to his text, Perry hopes these points will clarify his position. Schiller replies in the same issue. He grants Perry point one, noting: “[that] I did not refer to any specific passage in Professor Perry’s book shows that my feeling was only an impression, and I am only too glad to learn that I was mistaken.” But on points two and three he will not budge. He did provide documentation and it still suggests exactly what he said it did. To suggest, as Perry did, that James’s had “metaphysical infidelities” does imply that he failed to make a distinction between psychology and philosophy; “otherwise, it rather loses its point.”

To suggest, as Perry also did, that James’s showed—even if only by his own incapacity—a “pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought” is “harsh, and probably mistaken.” Schiller takes this last comment as an insult. He doubts James would be “flattered” by Perry’s claim that he occasionally achieved “exact thought.”

This defense of his friend and mentor’s reputation or, more accurately, the James that Schiller knew, is the last of Schiller’s articles for 1936. Indeed, it signals the end of his academic debates in the pages of philosophy journals. The remainder of the year compasses rest

316 Ralph Barton Perry, “Perry to Schiller,” Personalist 17, no. 4 (October 1936): 422. Both Perry’s and Schiller’s replies were already in the works as soon as the April review had been published. In a letter at the start of April, Schiller informs Hopkins that he has received two letters from Perry, the substance of which form Perry’s three complaints. The most striking part is that Perry asks Schiller to clarify “the internal relations of the Harvard department of philosophy” (F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Louis Hopkins, 8 April 1936, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).


318 Schiller, “Schiller,” 423.

319 Schiller, “Schiller,” 423.
and recuperation, but also reflection and preparation. He and his wife suffer bouts of ill health, with Louise requiring a brief hospital stay. They are forced to convalesce at home in Los Angeles through most of the Spring and Summer. And it is likely that a trip to Canada to secure an extension on Schiller’s visa never materialized. But Schiller maintains his interest in the increasingly conflicted realm of international affairs, to the point that he is drafting a book on the Europe situation and working on a revised version of Cassandra. He is also working on papers for the upcoming International Congress of Philosophy, to be held in Paris in 1937. As

320 Schiller’s letters to Flewelling in April and May 1936 are all from his and his wife’s Los Angeles address. He discusses Louise’s hospital stay in April and the trouble that they have getting around without his wife being able to drive. One note, in particular, speaks to their condition: “We are still in a condition of a besieged garrison, unable to get out, as my wife cannot drive a car until she gets a surgical support and cannot do the latter till she gets downtown, as they won’t send out to fit her, and cannot get downtown until she consents to use a taxi” (F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, 22 April 1936, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

321 Schiller explains, “we have been staying quietly here all the time . . . but we are also preparing to go to Victoria B. C. so as to return with an immigration visa, if necessary” (F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Louis Hopkins, 30 June 1936, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Judging from the documents, however, the trip never came to pass as Schiller’s health again declined. In a letter to lawyers in London, Louise comments that Schiller several times planned to secure “resident alien status,” but was “blocked over and over again by illness so severe that he could not leave his bed, to say nothing of going to a border to re-enter” (Louise Strang Schiller, Los Angeles, to William and James, 20 January 1938, Correspondence Relating to FCSS’ Estate, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

322 In October, Schiller writes to Schiller regarding the situation in Germany: “My idea about Germany was that the best thing that could happen would be that the Saar should be permitted to vote German next January, and that then Hitler should have to make his peace with Hewry [sic] in order to get a loan and pay off the French. But the economic frontier is so bad that one would not be surprised if Nazism moved in the direction of Communism and became indistinguishable from it. Already one cannot send a check within Germany, without signing a declaration that the transfer is not a hidden way of getting money out of the country, and how German business people can carry on I don’t understand” (F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Louis Hopkins, 13 October 1936, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

323 “I have been asked by my publishers to bring an (enlarged) Cassandra up to date . . . Just now I am finishing ‘The Abyssinian Crisis’, which ends with the suggestion that the Italians will get big loans in Paris and London to develop their conquest. The last chapters are entitled [sic] ‘The Collapse of the League of Nations’, the Decline of the Birth Rate’ and ‘Armageddon II’” (Schiller, Los Angeles, to Hopkins, 30 June 1936).
much as Schiller is aware of the frailty of his health, he remains optimistic that he is as yet not
done telling his tale.

7.7 DEPARTING SHOTS: SUMMARY AND APPRECIATION

The year starts with an indication that Schiller has not yet declined his role as pragmatism’s
“literary” provocateur. In a continuation of the queries as regards philosophers, pragmatists, and
their disagreements, Schiller now asks: “Must Philosophy Be Dull?” in the January 1937
Personalist. His answer is to be expected: “I do not recognize the duty of dullness, and I am
even skeptical of the dullness of duty.”324 But Schiller realizes this will not stand without further
clarification. The real question, as he sees it, is whether there are: (1) “logical” reasons that it
must, and/or (2) “moral” reasons that it ought to be dull. The answers to both questions are tied
up in how one conceives philosophy and its relationship to the sciences. Rather than isolate
itself or rush too quickly to embrace science, Schiller sees it as a matter of compliments: “I
should prefer to assign to philosophy a useful and important function and an independent
standpoint of its own, which enables it both to benefit by the work of the sciences and to benefit
them.”325 Philosophy seeks to obtain the “full” picture while science, with her specialized
niches, full well supplies “partial” glimpses of the larger whole. Philosophy, thus considered, is
justified in its threefold quest of: (1) “abstracting from the details, the dull details, of the special
sciences”; (2) exploring “the field of metaphysical poetry, that is of philosophical poetry”; and

324 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 28.

325 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 30.
(3) “taking into account those parts or aspects of reality which the sciences exclude for methodological reasons.” 326

None of this is to disparage science her role. It is simply a recognition that the scientific search for the objective and the disinterested is a fiction. That being said, it is a fiction that works within its limits. Scientists seek to craft more accurate predictions. But that search is conditioned by interests that render each case “infinitely particular, individual and unique.” 327 So all attempts to translate a particular case into a universal law are bound to falter. It is at this point that philosophy should come to the aid of science, should explore the role that personality plays in shaping scientific discoveries. Instead, philosophy trades in the same abstractions that both should work to remove. “Academic philosophy” is riddled with “bombastic technicality and impenetrable obscurity.” 328 Settled into its place in the Tower, it repeats as if by incantation the historical fictions of a disinterested past. These are protective, not progressive, rites meant to ward off any semblance of real world application.

The results are not merely dull; they are depressing. Worn into the grooves of routine and safety, each philosopher is left alone to develop their historical tale to suit their speculative whims. When surprised by a fellow traveler their personal isolation makes discussion nearly impossible. When discussion does occur, philosophers seek the safety of academic small talk. “Philosophers shrink from their big and thrilling problems, and confine themselves to a number of technical questions about which they can discourse, harmlessly and endlessly, with a show of

326 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 31.
327 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 33.
328 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 35.
erudition.” But all it is is a show. Such questions—“What is thought—without a thinker? What is mind—without consciousness?”—can’t be answered and, suggests Schiller, aren’t meant to be answered as protectively posed. The compunction to be dull is merely a social and psychological, not logical, one. If philosophers must act this way, they ought to realize they will not “be benefiting themselves, hurting their foes, or performing a single service to humanity.”

The upcoming months are marked by a decided drop in what has already become a slower pace. Schiller continues to craft reviews from his home in Los Angeles, and finishes writing “How Far does Science need Determinism?” for the International Congress of

330 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 38.
331 Schiller, “Must Philosophy,” 39.
332 The majority of these reviews come out in January, though several others are published in April, July, and October. Most are reserved for the Personalist, while a few also appear in Mind. Two that appeared in January are of note. The first, a review of The Great Chain of Being (1936) by Arthur Onken Lovejoy (1873-1962), is a positive review spiked with a critical aside. Schiller notes that Lovejoy’s thesis—that the Idea of the Good in the Republic and the Demiurge in the Timaeus have been mistakenly conflated in the course of history—is presented in a “very learned book” and demonstrated “with the utmost patience and lucidity.” Why, then, this curious ending: “it hardly needed his running fire of sarcastic comment to convince his readers that the attempt to combine them is only calculated to bring contempt upon theology and philosophy alike” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, by Arthur O. Lovejoy, Personalist 18, no. 1 [January 1937]: 85).

The second, a review of Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead (1936), is noteworthy for Schiller’s observation on tributes to aged philosophers:

One of the queerest of academic inventions is the German Festschrift. When an eminent professor reaches the age of 70 or (as in this case 75), his academically most prominent pupils combine together to advertise their discipleship by writing a volume of essays in his honor. But what are they to write about? About their master’s writings? No, that is not a safe thing to do, till he is dead. Ever since Fichte got into trouble trying to expound on Kant, this danger has been generally recognized. Popularize their master’s works? That is partly open to the same objection, and, besides, would not do enough to enhance the prestige of the contributors. A Festschrift must be written by professors for professors, pour épater the layman. So its contents are likely to be severely technical. But not important; for its contributors are unlikely to waste their best stuff on a work for which they cannot hope to obtain more than a fraction of the credit.

It is also interesting for its curt dismissal: “on the whole the reader of these essays comes away with a comforting impression that the School of Whitehead is not likely to produce a large crop of exasperating novelties.” Perhaps he spoke too soon. One of the contributors was Willard V. Quine (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead, ed. F. S. C. Northrop, Personalist 18, no. 1 [January 1937]: 86; 87).
Philosophy. But he does not attend the Congress, to be held 1-6 August in Paris, and the reason is clear. After a brief period of good health, Schiller suffers a precipitous decline in health in April. As his brother, Ferdinand Nassau (1866-1938), explains in a letter to Louise at the start of May:

It seems to me judging by the account of the last illness that Canning has had pneumonia – all the symptoms you mention are those of pneumonia – and if this is the truth, and that he was in no danger when you wrote, it sounds almost miraculous that he should have come through it. Naturally, we are feeling as anxious as possible and the state of suspense must remain for some considerable time yet. Apart from that it is also [an] ordeal that the physical strain of nursing him must make the greatest demand on your strength, and the situation then is about as full of anxiety as it can be. Unfortunately there is nothing that can be done in pneumonia except efficient nursing, and in that respect there is no better than you. I can’t tell you how sorry I am for you – Give him my love + take that which [sic] part which is yours.

It is not, given his already frail health, an illness from which he recovers. Exactly three months after the letter was written, on 6 August 1937, Schiller dies at the age of seventy-three.

Not that it stopped someone so known for his insistence. In what would likely have raised a smile, commentators past and present give him three more days. And they gave him...
yet more. On 28 November 1937, Dewey reads a brief statement at the New School for Social Research. He praises “the work which he did both in Great Britain and this country in loosening the strait jacket in which Aristotelian logic had confined scientific method.”

Though some may quibble with his “dominantly psychological” view of philosophy, they still “owe him a great debt.”

The British social anthropologist Robert R. Marett (1866-1943), a co-contributor to Personal Idealism, recalls the singular nature of Schiller’s focus: “Apart from his interest in a few side-issues . . . he concentrated wholeheartedly on a single problem—how the logical process of truth-seeking is influenced by its psychological conditions.” And Marett is well death provide the accurate date (“Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Philosopher, Dead.” New York Times, 8 August 1937, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Dr. Ferdinand Schiller, Philosophy Teacher, Dies,” New York Herald-Tribune, 8 August 1937, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). A more official source confirms this date. In a letter dated 14 March 1938, from the attorneys William and James, London, to Murray M. Chotiner, Louise Schiller’s Los Angeles attorney, regarding Schiller’s estate, they include this comment: “. . . the full exemption of $1000.00 is allowed for the period of time from January 1st, 1937, to the date of death, August 6th, 1937” (William and James, London, to Murray M. Chotiner, 14 March 1938, Correspondence Relating to FCSS’ Estate, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

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337 John Dewey, “F. C. S. Schiller: An Unpublished Memorial by John Dewey,” [28 November 1937] ed. Allan Shields, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 3 (1967): 52. Shields, who edited this memorial on the basis of materials found in the UCLA Archive, notes how peculiar it is that this tribute was never published: “One curiosity in this regard might be mentioned. In 1950, the writer distributed a questionnaire among international philosophers inquiring about Schiller and his philosophic writings. Dewey replied that he had never known Schiller personally, and had never met him.” The questionnaire, which is also referenced in Chapter One, is: Allan Shields, “Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 55 (1974): 290-7. While it is quite likely that Dewey didn’t meet Schiller, the other comment is contradicted by evidence. As was demonstrated in Chapter Five, Dewey had a personal relationship with Schiller. Otherwise, Dewey’s introduction of Slosson to Schiller and the familiar tone of his correspondence regarding said introduction would make little sense. For reference, see John Dewey, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 21 April 1910, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. And that personal relationship extended for at least two years. On Slosson’s urging, Dewey wrote a review of Formal Logic (1912). See John Dewey, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 March 1912, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.


aware that this approach has been criticized for applauding as useful a test of truth that is nowhere found completely stated. But he augurs this as being perhaps even more of a statement of Schiller’s convictions. To assume you have found the test is to give up the search. “We make truth, Schiller would say, just as we make beauty or moral goodness, by striving to realize it more and more.”

The Oxford philosopher James Ivor McKie notes the novelty of his views. Schiller, whose ideas were already forming prior to meeting James, was not simply a disciple of Jamesian pragmatism. Indeed, it is James who has suggested that Schiller “opened his eyes to the philosophical importance of those ideas, and had known how to develop that side of them.” He also notes that, in person, Schiller’s conversations were positively striking “in the ingenious turns he would give his thought, in its unfailing combination of subtlety and boldness, and in a certain flavor of the Citizen of the World.” The man who lured him to California, Flewelling, also praises the novelty of Schiller’s approach. With his mix of the critical and comical he brought pragmatism to the shores of Britain. Pragmatism, like his attack on the logic of the times, was a bracing reproach to the “insularity of British philosophy.” But it became more; it also signaled him as, in the development of Humanism, “the foremost advocate of a consistent pragmatism.”

Hopkins, his colleague at USC, argues that Schiller’s prescience was combined with a surprising sense of modesty. When Schiller first remarked that the nature of scientific discovery

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342 McKie, “Dr. F. C. S.,” 137.
was tentative and subject to modification, scientists insisted that the atom could not be divided and that energy in the universe was fixed. Both, in keeping with Schiller’s foresight, were revised within his lifetime. Such a gap between what he supposed and what was soon accepted, Hopkins offers, is a measure of the man:

In this instance as in others many of Dr. Schiller’s friends felt that he was never given the credit that he was entitled to for his pioneering work in clarifying the concepts of science; but so far as I could see Schiller, himself, was never very much interested about the credit for any of his ideas. He was always more interested in reaching a correct conclusion than in any thought of who should have the credit for it. Even when he felt that a conclusion was true, he never showed any great elation over it for he realized, as few have, that our most cherished truths change with changing conditions.\(^{345}\)

When a colleague from England said, upon hearing of Schiller’s death, that “the world has thus lost a great man, while philosophy in all its branches has lost a pre-eminent master,” Hopkins extends the compliment further; he opines, “We have lost a great friend.”\(^{346}\)

Lost, yes; but not yet gone. Amidst these tidings of farewell, Flewelling posthumously publishes the series of articles Schiller penned on the personalistic implications of humanism. These four essays in the *Personalist* are his final attempt to summarize the relation of his humanism to philosophy in general and to the world. The first of these, the October 1937 “Humanisms and Humanism,” suggests the expansive range that Schiller gave to his philosophy. It is a range best framed by philosophy’s relation to science. If the latter provides the particular, it is the former which seek to obtain some measure of the universal. The world is awash in “ambiguous phenomena” where the disputed claims of differing sciences may all, in part, be true.\(^{347}\) Here philosophy can help “to interpret the conflicting deliverances of the various

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\(^{346}\) Hopkins, “Dr. Schiller,” 15.

This “combing and interpreting function of philosophy” Schiller deems to be humanism.  

In providing this wider perspective, Schiller’s humanism is not novel. There are many other attempts under the awning of “humanism” to understand human experience. But Schiller’s philosophical humanism, a variation on the dictum of Protagoras, asserts “the human value of philosophy, and systematic antagonism” to Absolutism and Naturalism. It “regards as its central concern the problems of human life and experience and of the real world with which we believe ourselves in contact.” It is neither radically nor moderately skeptical; for it views doubt as “the chief stimulus to inquiry, to research, and so to discovery.” But Schiller adds that said doubt is: (1) limited only by that which we investigate, and (2) not meant “to diminish our confidence in the truths we accept or take for granted.” If all knowing is

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348 Schiller, “Humanisms,” 357.

349 Schiller, “Humanisms,” 359.

350 Schiller provides four other humanistic variants. The first is the historical, and literary, battle pitting “pure” Latin against “local vernacular.” A second type recalls the first in that some American educators are calling for a return to a classically style education. A third, religious, variation finds certain sects of Unitarians turning away from theism. A fourth, political, strain argues for a form of humanistic communism. But it is the final one that Schiller finds questionable. This type attacks Schiller’s philosophy (and pragmatism) by co-opting the term humanism to sow confusion. As he explains: “They treated ‘humanism’ quite differently. Having none of James’ chivalrous scruples [who chose to raise Peirce’s awkward son after the father abandoned him], they adopted it themselves! Not long after the appearance of my Humanism (in 1907) a noted absolutist, Professor J. S. Mackenzie, took the name Lectures on Humanism for his own version of the absolutist doctrine, and subsequently (1922) Lord Haldane also gave the name The Philosophy of Humanism to one of his books” (Schiller, “Humanisms,” 364).


conditioned by man, Schiller concludes, no conception of knowing can escape the nature of that condition. 355

The second piece, the January 1938 “Logic: A Game, or An Agent of Value,” is a parting shot at the hazards of formal logic, plied as “a sort of intellectual game with weird symbols.” 356 What is shocking is that such antiquated ideas resisted revision for so long. Schiller again pleads for a logic which responds to the actual conditions of everyday life. For does not actual life confound the esotericism of intellectualism at every turn?

For in point of fact, our thinking is volitional through and through. It is set going by desires and purposes; it is drive onwards by the urgency of problems. It pursues ends which appear to it as goods, and is pervaded and steered by values of all kinds. Truth itself moves us, not because it is distant and unattainable, disinterested and dispassionate, but because it is near and dear to our heart: it is felt to be a value and worth achieving, even at the sacrifice of nobler aims and lesser values. 357

Actual knowing is guided and blinded by selection and choice. A new logic must be made on those accounts and not in deference to ancient tomes. Formal logic, that “aged and toothless hag,” that “pernicious witch,” must be “left to mumble in obscurity and to die in peace”; for “so long as Formal Logic is not eradicated root and branch, we can have no logic that is more than a trivial play with words.” 358 And, by being more responsive to the reality of our knowing, a new logic is less certain of itself, less boastful of its powers. But this new, humanistic, logic is more conducive to a progressive and advancing view of knowledge. In place of the safety of

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355 The extent to which Schiller subsumes all scientific practice to humanism is made clear in his comments regarding Relativity. His viewpoint is sympathetic but reserved. The first as regards Relativity’s decisive blow against Absolutist theory in physics; the second in supposing it must eventually find its way around to reducing, as per Protagoras, all said relativity to “the psychological differences between man and man” (Schiller, “Humanisms,” 368).


absolutes, it takes as its maxim that, “though every truth has its day, sufficient for the day will ever be the truth thereof.”

The third essay, the April 1938 “Ethics, Casuistry and Life,” is a rumination on the concept of ethics. For Schiller, the study of ethics is the study of human nature as a whole. It is a study of how all the supposed seats of ethical action—“instincts, impulses, desires, volitions, thoughts, cognitions, etc.”—work to serve functional ends. For his point of view, then, a “Humanist ethics will take pains, and pleasure, in tracing out how in fact these entities enter in to human actions and determine man’s behavior.” It comes as no surprise that Schiller sees this as the exception to the traditional outlook, an approach worn into grooves that ignore their exceptions. Such a view of ethics is an attempt to set, in advance, a template upon conditions not yet in evidence based on opinions already calcified. To codify moral conduct is, in essence, to disavow the need for reflection prior to action in the form of pre-made rules.

The alternative, then, is to apply as per Aristotle the particular case so as to advance the moral action:

Just as scientific laws are formulas drawn from events in order to predict events, so moral laws are formulas extracted from right actions to facilitate more moral actions. Thus a principle formulated ahead of its application to a case is only tentative. It is not certain a priori that it will apply to the next case upon which it is tried. It is always capable of further growth, and should never be allowed to grow rigid. We should always remember that circumstances alter cases, and that cases elicit and develop principles.

Thus the humanist approach would be to combine scientific flexibility with legal acuity. It is to transform the instances of “past experience” into a body of moral “case-law” to be reviewed, that

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361 Schiller, “Ethics,” 175.
is, reflected upon, by experts. From the principles of past cases judges can extract which precedents have a bearing on the current case. While this is not fool-proof, it is subject to further revisions in future cases. And it stands, in Schiller’s estimation, as infinitely better than creating new laws “made by blundering, harassed, and frequently corrupt, politicians.”362 While not without its problems, and needing more elaboration, this at least advances a suggestion of “how the problem of right action may be handled in the concrete, and rescued from stupid rigorism and empty formalism.”363

The fourth and final piece, “The Relativity of Metaphysics,” is published in July 1938. It returns Schiller to the place where his publications started in 1891: metaphysics. And it is as much his view that he discusses as it is a caution to all who struggle to come to terms with this, “the loftiest and most arduous region of the philosophic field.”364 For in all metaphysics, the grand and the small, there remains one constant: the individual. And to take on, or be taken in by, another’s metaphysic is to settle for something always too lose or too snug. “We should be aware, therefore, of a philosopher who retails in absolute and universal truth, good for all, and for all purposes: he is a vendor of panaceas, and, most probably, a fool or a fraud.”365 But in taking view of another metaphysic we may gain, personally, a view which can be made to comport with our views and ends. And that is all, in the end, the humanist would urge of philosophers; that is, “to drop some hints concerning the ways in which metaphysics may be

362 Schiller, “Ethics,” 177.


constructed, so that every one who chooses may be able to construct his own, to suit his case, and to suit himself."

But this final piece is novel in a way not heretofore seen: Schiller extends his hand to the Idealists he has so long dogged. Schiller begs them to consider the distinction between our waking and dreaming lives. In the latter, we find things that “have a great family resemblance to the world of waking life.” But we also find in them that we have different powers, see different people, and are capable of experiencing—not just envisioning—heretofore unexperienced events. Normally, and in the main course of our lives, we take these things at face value; that is to say, we “wake up” and slough off that other part of our life as “only a dream.” But not always. In rare cases, dreams have been regarded “as valuable revelations and visions of higher realities” and found themselves integrated “into the fabric of all the great religions.” What of these, empirical, cases? On what grounds do we take some dreams to be divine and other to be vulgar slumber? Dreams demonstrate that Idealism may be true in three ways: (1) we can create, out of mind, a reality independent of what we normally take to be reality; (2) what we take to be reality may in fact be part of a larger course of events to which we have yet gained an appreciative view; (3) we may be privy to an extension into the future of what we normally take to be our lives’ terminus. In so ably tipping his hat to what was so often taken as an foe, Schiller believes he has shown the merits of a humanist approach to metaphysics. Its relativity and optimism condone all attempts and only asks that they be judged

according to what benefits they might bring . . . to those that create them and consider them worthy of pursuit.

In 1939, the last tribute to Schiller’s life is offered up by his wife Louise. *Our Human Truths* is a posthumous collection of already published essays and lectures delivered late in his career. But the documents show that she labors over its publication intensely.370 From questions as to the title,371 to issues of formatting,372 to even issues of attribution,373 Louise attends to

370 Note: A comparison of galley proofs, rough drafts and typescripts allows the reader to attribute specific notations made on each: (1) Schiller’s comments are found in black ink, Louise’s notes are made in pencil, and (3) the editor’s marginalia are in red ink.

371 In the planning stages at least six titles were considered: (1) *Truth with a Smile* (Ida M. Lynn, New York, to Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, 13 December 1938, Correspondence regarding the publication of *Our human truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles); (2) *Essays by F. C. S. Schiller* (Henry Wiggins, New York, to Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, 11 August 1938, Correspondence regarding the publication of *Our human truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles); (3) *Philosophical Essays* (Henry Wiggins, New York, to Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, 19 November 1938, Correspondence regarding the publication of *Our human truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). (4) In a letter dated 6 April 1938 the Assistant Editor Ida Lyn suggests amending *Our Human Truths* to include a subtitle: “Essays, Solemn and Facetious” (Ida M. Lynn, New York, to Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, 6 April 1938, Correspondence regarding the publication of *Our human truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). It had also been potentially titled: (5) *Philosophy in Practice* (Louise) and (6) *A Philosopher at Large* (Columbia University Press).

372 Louise’s attention to certain details is interesting. In the draft of “Plato’s Phaedo . . .” she notes that the copy editor, in red, was down capping terms like “Ideal” and “Becoming.” She writes, on the page dealing with the winged horses of Spirit and Desire, that “Idea, as Plato uses it, is set over against ideas, and as a technical term should boast a ‘cap’” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Plato’s Phaedo . . .,” Draft Copy, *Our Human Truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). In the draft of “Fascisms & Dictatorships” that ends with “. . . plenty of fools’ paradises to live in!” the editor writes: “wouldn’t it be wise to avoid ending the paragraph with a preposition.” Louise replies: “Yes, wise but stodgy – you must grant him licenses I think.” Later where Schiller refers to “National Government” as equivalent for British government, the editor states: “this seems to lack clarity.” Louise replies: “refers throughout to the ‘National Government.’ Perfectly clear unless you’re hunting for trouble!” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Fascisms & Dictatorships,” Draft Copy, *Our Human Truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). On a proof copy of the table of contents dated 7 August 1939 there are no sub-headings (materials were eventually grouped under headings of Philosophy, Literary Criticism, Philosophy in Practice, Political Philosophy, and Logic). Louise, seemingly in reply to a comment by one of the editors, states: “It means . . . opening the sections with a section title between them. Surely you can see that a list like this as you have is just a muddle” (Table of Contents, Revised Proof, 7 August 1939, *Our Human Truths*, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
specifics in letters back and forth to the editors. The shorter notices are respectful of the effort. Paul Clark suggests that the collection demonstrates Louise’s “reflective insight and appreciation of her distinguished husband.” The *Ocean Beach News* recommends this book, brimming with “sparkling wit and vivid and picturesque language,” to all who “enjoy intellectual stimulation.” The *Garrett Tower* calls these essays “a plea for breadth of interest, lucidity of thought, a delightful humor, and most of all for the relating of all thinking to the human enterprise.” Albion King admits that a review of this sort of book is hardly ever “objectively critical. One takes up the last book of a revered teacher, recently deceased, with reverence, knowing what to expect and finding no disappointment on any page.” That being said, Schiller takes on a variety of subjects “with urbane humor and a finely polished literary style.”

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373 A letter dated 11 April 1939 makes a telling comment as regards whether or not to include Schiller’s degrees on the title page: “The implication that he is not well enough known not to need identification would be unfortunate and misleading.” (Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Ida M. Lynn, 11 April 1939, Correspondence regarding the publication of Our human truths, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

374 Louise attention to details seemed to wear on the editors. In a letter from dated 13 December 1938, Assistant Editor Ida M. Lynn notes that the following: “If you want this book to seem definitely old-fashioned in this respect [word spellings], as you imply in your letter, we might make an exception in this respect, but I do not think it would be wise to do so. I fear that the average reader would simply consider it a mistake” (Ida M. Lynn, New York, to Mrs. F. C. S. Schiller, 13 December 1938, Correspondence regarding the publication of Our human truths, Box Twelve, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

375 Paul Clark, review of Our Human Truths, by F. C. S. Schiller, Maysville Public Ledger, 20 April 1940, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

376 Review of Our Human Truths, by F. C. S. Schiller, Ocean Beach News, 8 March 1940, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

377 Review of Our Human Truths, by F. C. S. Schiller, Garrett Tower, April 1940, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

378 Albion King, review of Our Human Truths, by F. C. S. Schiller, Christian Century, 27 March 1940, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1931-1941, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
One longer notice also attends to the book in a respectful manner. But it also suggests that the criticism and praise that Schiller invoked were of the same source. As such, it provides a useful segue into the evaluation of Schiller that will form the final chapter. Max Carl Otto (1876-1968), a philosopher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who taught alongside Kallen, reviews the book in November 1940 *Journal of Philosophy*. He begins by noting he had the misfortune of never having met Schiller personally. He then goes on to provide this description of Schiller and his posthumous collection of essays:

For he strides in its pages as he did in life, talking, gesticulating, laughing at you, kicking intellectual rubbish, as it seemed to him, out of the way, brushing traditional difficulties aside, and going directly to the business at hand. Aside from the living, sparkling quality of its style, the book is a good medium through which to get to the heart of the author’s philosophy.  

Otto notes that Schiller’s philosophical position is thoroughly humanistic both in its emphasis on the human facet in all forms of knowing and in its personalized take on Protagoras’s maxim. On this last point, and in the face of some critics, Schiller “probably finds more in the dictum than its originator thought of putting into it.” This liberal borrowing has both a positive and negative aspect. As the first, it signals “the vital, dramatic, often exciting character of his thinking”; as the second, it betrays “a philosophic bias” which has “a self-perpetuating tendency which, unless scrupulously watched, will render its champion peculiarly susceptible to judging everything from a restricted point of view.” Simply put, what is rousing about Schiller’s insistence on man as the measure is also what leads to a telescoping view as to all forms of assessment.

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380 Otto, review, 658.

381 Otto, review, 659.
But Otto is careful to note that Schiller’s views, as much as they simplify the problems of philosophy, also suggest the merits of his case. His is not a call for complete skepticism, the charge of which Otto finds “nothing short of weird.”\(^{382}\) Nor is his ransacking of Absolutism without merit if we grant, as Otto suggests, that the abstractions of that philosophical camp “may have been a reasonable theory in a pre-scientific epoch.”\(^{383}\) Yet in answering to the most consistent charge against pragmatism, that it is just a “happy-go-lucky” theory which takes what it wants and does whatever it will, Schiller’s arguments start to deal in tricks of light. While Otto notes that Schiller’s pragmatism is not the stuff of pure subjectivity, it is less clear to what extent it traffics in some form of objectivity.\(^{384}\) And it is here where Schiller’s measure is also his blind spot: “he used up so much energy in vanquishing absolutes and in defending relativity that he had little of it left for the indispensable task of indicating by what specific means the desired objectivity is to be gained.”\(^{385}\)

This is not, to Otto, an oversight or an error. The focus on the personal “was his besetting idiosyncrasy. It was the heart and soul of his method.”\(^{386}\) The human inside the man was the key to understanding all problems, philosophical or otherwise, in Schiller’s worldview. It led him to espouse eugenics and to suppose authoritarian governments might help to release what till now remained locked up in our human stock. This led Schiller to ignore, opines Otto, the powerful conditioning force of our environment. The man who could parse out philosophical

\(^{382}\) Otto, review, 660.

\(^{383}\) Otto, review, 661.

\(^{384}\) Otto, review, 663.

\(^{385}\) Otto, review, 664.

\(^{386}\) Otto, review, 665.
distinctions regarding terms of art failed to see those distinctions in his terms of life. The reasons are not hard to find.

Perhaps this is natural when those of us who appraise social affairs do so from a privileged station of detachment. We are not obliged to make the suggested program work practically, or to use available, imperfect means. We need only look to the perfection of our conceptual blueprint, and see to it that we have provided theoretically for what we happen to value. In other words, Mr. Schiller’s social philosophy seems to me academic in the bad sense of the term.387

And Otto mourns that judgment. For it was Schiller who insisted that philosopher’s look up from their speculations to address the practical sides of life. And it was Schiller who infused into the banal halls of philosophy a sense that all was not said and done. Yet there remains a sense that he retained the measure of what should be done by, to, and with others, regardless their status or station. This infused his work with “philosophic genius”; but it also instilled it with “a haughty humor, with more bite than fun.”388 In taking the risks that genius takes, Otto supposes that Schiller made as much as he missed. And he will always be sought out by those willing to “look reality in the eye, feeling, deep down . . . that reality is made to be remade by those who have the faith, the insight, and the courage to meet the test.”389

F.C.S.S. August 6-1937
Into the cold white dark of death he went
Silent, upon whose lips no malice lay . . . .
(Wisdom and laughter had their mingled way) . . . .
Only a sigh to mark the breath which spent
His little strength. Yet to that sigh was lent
The weary benizen [sic] of every day,
And all the words he nevermore would say,
And the still moment of a sacrament.

387 Otto, review, 666.
388 Otto, review, 667.
389 Otto, review, 668.
The quiet giving of his gentle hands
For all distress, took nothing for his own;
The pen, which to the measure of the world had grown,
Fell, and the fingers empty lay. Now stands
His spirit clear and free and high,
And naught of all he did can ever die,
Deathless—and nevermore to die. 390

390 Louise Schiller, “F.C.S.S. Aug. 6-1937,” 1 January 1938, Poetry and Prose, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer (Strang) Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. There are several variations of this and other poems contained in the file. Two of them attest to specific aspects of their relationship. In her preface to Our Human Truths, Louise had made mention of Schiller’s last trip, in 1935, to Jersey in England. In 1939 she wrote:

F.C.S.S.
The winding road along the sea, With flowers on the sand!
As on we passed he took my hand—The road that brought my love to me.

His eyes were blue as is the sea, Wind deeds his flower of life;
As on we passed he said “my wife”---The road that brought my love to me.

There in the village by the sea, Within the cool-arched hall,
“Till death us part” he said to me; And as we passed he kept my hand,
Along the road beside the sea, With flowers on the sand.

And now death has my all.

(F Louise Schiller, “F.C.S.S.,” 1939, Poetry and Prose, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer [Strang] Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). Flewelling had also noted, and Schiller had expressed delight regarding, the garden that the Schillers had at their home in Los Angeles. Schiller had even brought back some of the varieties of plants he found in California to grow at the nursery at Corpus Christi. In 1939 Louise also wrote this poem:

F.C.S.S. Revenant.
The flowers you loved so much are opening now
Here in your windy garden on the hill;
In careless clusters all the wild things fill
The air with colour much as trumpets blow
A golden triumph. Scarlet brilliant glow,
And tossing sprays of lilac lupin bloom,
Blue penstemon from distant peaks, and broom,
Romero, sage and ceanothus grow.

Over these flash the humming-birds; here play
The slower wings of butterflies; and sweet
The blended songs of lark and finch, and gay
Tip-tilting mocking-bird, can freely meet.
Here, my beloved, must thy tender spirit dwell,
Smiling at every flower and wing it loved so much.

(Louise Schiller, “F.C.S.S. Revenant,” 1939, Poetry and Prose, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise Luqueer [Strang] Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).
8.0 CONCLUSION: THE PRAGMATISM OF APPEARANCES

It is human to err but logical to be infallible.

Althg always anxious to hear some new $\Phi^2$ in Oxf. any old $\Phi^2$ will do! ...

T. 1st + most important $\Phi^2$ ab $\Phi^2$ every $\Phi^2$ is to ascertain whether its author had a sense of humour. (F.C.S.S.) $\Phi^2$ will never be purged of absurd $\Phi^2$ until $\Phi^2$ acquire a sense of humor. ...

The epigrams above are a purposeful segue into the conclusion of this admittedly lengthy discussion. To a philosopher so enamored of his, and his fellow humans’, ability to craft a world always in the making, these provide pointed emphasis to what are the most essential complaints in his philosophy: the relentless pursuit of those who claimed that arguments could be set apart from context, set against the backdrop of an education that privileged such a view and promulgated it in arid tomes brimming with abstract language. These must be added, of course, to the foundation from which they derived their power: Schiller himself. For his philosophy was at its base his philosophy. And the evidence amply demonstrates that, as much as his critics accused Schiller of neglecting the objective side of reality, the reality was that they objected all the more to the subjective shadings he brought to pragmatism and humanism.

Moreover, these epigrams begin to suggest answers to the challenges put forth at the start of this study: (1) why was Schiller so vigorously discussed in his time; (2) why is he now so obviously not discussed; and (3) how do the previous two questions interact, and how might they

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1 F. C. S. Schiller, Notebooks #1 and 16, n.p., n.d., Holograph Notebooks, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
relate to and enrich the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a philosophical concept. Such questions warrant further elaboration. This explanation will develop out of the concerns raised in the introductory chapter. Those concerns amounted to the claim that Schiller’s arguments with other intellectuals provided the basis for a rhetorical biography.² Those concerns can now be scrutinized via the issues illuminated in the subsequent chapters, through an actual examination of the arguments that Schiller used to advance the cause of pragmatic humanism.

Specifically, the conclusion will call attention to three issues. The first issue to be discussed is the mystery that underlies this entire project: the relatively brisk erasure of Schiller from pragmatism’s record. The introduction suggested that the trend to remove him has continued almost unabated up to the current renaissance in pragmatic thought. But it is just that, a trend. As such, it is important to look to the histories which fuse the pragmatism of Schiller’s time with the pragmatism of our times. These histories provide indications as to why the appearance of pragmatism came to mean an exclusion of Schiller. But these are not the only causes at play. Thus the second section will focus on how detailed assessments of Schiller’s work have, even when positive, undercut any resurgence in scholarship related to Schiller. As a result, an alternative approach to Schiller will be put forth. This revised interpretation attends to both the contents of this study, Schiller’s interactions with other philosophers, and the method by which it has developed, rhetorical biography. Schiller’s style of pragmatism, read far larger and more continuously than previous commentators sought to allow, implicates his removal in subsequent histories of pragmatism. The final issue is the summation of this study. It is an

² “Rhetorical hermeneutics avoids epistemological debates . . . . But it does not try to avoid ‘irreconcilable disputes’[: . . . rather, it attempts to take such historical disputes as a rhetorical focus of study” (Steven Mailloux, “Interpretation and Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Studies [London: Cornell University Press, 1998], 63).
attempt to provide answers to the three research questions mindful of all that has transpired.

Central to this section is the argument that Schiller’s use of repetition, while initially proving invaluable to pragmatism’s cause came to cloy upon its continuation.

8.1 ALL THAT IT MUST BE: CLEARING THE WAY FOR AN AMERICAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The construction of a pragmatic canon began prior to Schiller’s death. His squabbles with Perry and Morris, with Weiss and Hartshorne, signal that an argument was being created which sought to divide pragmatism into individual (referred to elsewhere as psychological) and social camps at the exclusion of the former. It is true that the outbreak of World War II initiated a rupture in philosophy from which pragmatism struggled to recover. But it is also the case that interested parties kept working to finalize the doctrines which form the basis for present day pragmatist discussions. These disputes, by and large, signal what is important in an increasingly varied debate. To what extent is pragmatism American? In what ways is it democratic? Is it inclusive of other approaches? Is it even a specific method or philosophy proper? And the debates over these questions are carried on with an almost conscious disregard for the part that Schiller could play in them, should he so be allowed.

Not that it was always the case that Schiller’s name would have to be begs into
record. As early as 1912, pragmatism was considered a multi-faceted movement involving a
variety of players.⁴ David Leslie Murray explains that “it is a collective name for the most
modern solution of puzzles which have impeded philosophical progress from time immemorial,
and it has arisen naturally in the course of philosophical reflection.”⁵ His biography
encompasses James, Schiller, and Dewey, but also names such as Knox, Sidgwick, and Sturt. As
late as 1925, Joad describes the situation similarly:

Pragmatism is the name given to a number of different, though allied, tendencies in
modern thought. These tendencies originated chiefly in America, the name Pragmatism
being first applied to them in 1878 by a writer named C. S. Peirce. The works of William
James are pragmatic in character . . . [and] the Pragmatic method has been further
elaborated by Professor Dewey in the United States and by Dr. Schiller in Great Britain.⁶

Now, granted, both of these authors are British. And Murray’s book was introduced with a brief
preface by Schiller. But a fellow Brit, Widgery, goes even further in 1927 to suggest the

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⁴ It pays to recall that twelve years earlier the drift of pragmatism was seen as even more fluid than any of
the most recent histories would suggest. For a review of these discussions, see Chapter Three and specifically:
William Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” Mind 9, no. 36 (October 1900): 433-56. For a less integrative and more critical
reading of what pragmatism meant during this time, see Chapter Four and specifically: Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The


⁶ C. E. M. Joad, Introduction to Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 67. It should also be
noted that Kallen’s The Philosophy of William James first appeared in this year. It provides a bevy of historical
details as regards James’s emerging philosophy. As sympathetic as it is to James, it cuts short any who might follow
upon the trail he cut. In Kallen’s estimation, the legacy of James’s philosophy is that what it accomplished so
radically changed the conditions upon which it operated: “The generation which was the generation of William
James is gone. The world they lived in is gone, and gone because they lived in it. The days of the pioneer are over.”
The argument here is seemingly conflicted. It supplies in the same breadth a corrective and a supplement to the
rugged American tale of pragmatism, even at such an early date as 1925. It is the first in that it suggests that the
American myth is a romantic claim now made nostalgic. But it is the latter in that Kallen asserts the romance of
James’s notions are a potential saline to the the-current world of standardization: “the folkways of a society
regimented by scientific generalization and machine-made uniformities in its work, its play, its arts, its religion, are
upon us” (Horace Kallen, introduction to The Philosophy of William James [New York: Modern Library, 1955], 48;
53). Taken together, James’s philosophy is an antiquated elixir made potent by its potential to remedy new
problems. The question, though, is to what extent the philosophy of a man now over a decade passed has been
amended to deal with these present realities. Begging pardon, dead men tell no tales and provide no directions;
those who take up their cause remain their best, if still limited, reference points.
expansiveness of pragmatism. Widgery is no wide-eyed advocate of this trend in philosophy, averring even at that date that “the controversies it aroused and the interest it evoked are almost forgotten.”\textsuperscript{7} Yet he grants that pragmatism’s creation was the result of “a variety of circumstance,” involving J. Ward, G. F. Stout, and Schiller in Europe, James in America, and extending to entertain strains of thought found in the works of the French metaphysician Bergson and Italian Idealist Benedetto Croce (1866-1952).\textsuperscript{8}

The situation is far different in the years after Schiller’s death. As close as a year after his passing and as much as thirty years thereafter, the parentage of pragmatism is being developed in books dedicated to specific founders, pragmatism proper, and philosophy in general. In Joseph Ratner’s \textit{John Dewey’s Philosophy} (1938), neither Schiller nor pragmatism finds reference in the index. But one of the three indexed references to James is illuminating in the shifting, indeed sifting, tide. Read against the ‘variety of circumstances’ mentioned in the decades previous, it is striking. Ratner casts a fairly wide net when he comments that Idealists and English Realists, following in the line of thinking initiated by British empiricist George Berkeley (1685-1753), reduce all qualities to dependent perceptions of mind. The curative to this “vicious” manner of thinking? Ratner opines:

\begin{quote}
The attack on Berkeley’s \textit{method} and so on all modern philosophy that led into it and all that developed out of it was initiated by C. S. Peirce—the logical father of pragmatism. The new \textit{method} of philosophy, both as a critical and constructive instrument, was developed to some extent by William James and was carried out practically to its full critical and constructive \textit{methodological} limits by Dewey. This method is a new
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{7} Alban Widgery, “Pragmatist Humanism,” in \textit{Contemporary Thought of Great Britain} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 120. As the title of both the chapter and book suggest, Widgery emphasizes the British development of pragmatism in the works of Schiller.

\textsuperscript{8} Widgery, “Pragmatic,” 121.
contribution to philosophy, and, we may well be proud, a distinctively, even exclusively, American contribution.  

While one might be appreciative of the glowing praise, the historical tale being told here emphasizes the American end of the grand experiment of pragmatism. 

Two years later, Justus Buchler (1916-1991) published *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings* (1940). Contra Ratner, Buchler attends to Schiller. And the person deserving the methodological credit isn’t Dewey. What does he make of pragmatism after Peirce? “In the versions of James and Schiller, a huge pragmatist offspring flourished early in this century. But the seeds of confusion and superficiality caused it to die as suddenly as it had been born.” 

Peirce’s pragmaticism is being reclaimed as the true pragmatism, replacing popular pragmatism. And what is popular pragmatism? Not something Buchler wishes to indulge in: “an anti-intellectualistic revolt, an embrace of the ‘will to believe’ pathetic in its methodological feebleness . . . an interesting manifestation of the general empirical temper.” 

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9 Joseph Ratner, introduction to John Dewey’s Philosophy (New York: Modern Library, 1938), 44; f. *. Ratner (1901-1979) received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1930 and went on to teach there and at the City College of New York.

10 An interesting anomaly, born perhaps of proximity, is published first in 1938 and in revised form in 1945. Benjamin Athorp Gould Fuller (1870-1956), a student at Oxford in 1902-5 and later a colleague of Schiller’s at USC, released *A History of Philosophy*. While making reference to the by now standard origin of term in Peirce, he ranges far wider to suggest that James’s philosophy was influenced also by the German sociologist Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875), physicist Mach, and English statistician Karl Pearson (1857-1936). Moreover, Fuller devotes subsequent sections covering pragmatism to first Schiller and then Dewey. Of the former, he opines: “With many of James’s conclusions F. C. S. Schiller . . . was in agreement. Some of them he developed independently, in others James’s influence may be seen” (B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy*, revised ed. [New York: Henry Holt, 1945], 468-9; references to Fuller’s friendship with Schiller, started while at Oxford, are found in: Allan Shields, “Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller,” *Personalist* 55 [1974]: 290-97).

11 Justus Buchler, introduction to *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings* (New York: Routledge, 1940); reprint, *Philosophical Writings of Peirce* (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), xi. The breathless claims for the virility of true, Peircean, pragmat[ic]ism read interestingly against the old claims of flaccidity that Schiller vaulted at Bradley. Especially so, when one notes the list of different novelties that Buchler provides to Peirce: supporting a view of evolution “in which the concepts of chance and habit play a major rôle,” championing of “philosophy on a scientific basis,” rejection of the self-evident a priori “in which cognition is a fetish” (Buchler, introduction, ix-x). I have no reason to take these aspects away from Peirce’s philosophy; I do question how novel they are when set against other philosophers who argued for the same or similar causes. Buchler received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1939 and was a professor there and then at SUNY, Stony Brook.
Little more than a decade later, in 1949, Philip Paul Wiener (1905-1992) published *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*.\(^\text{12}\) Though its title is general, the interior is clearly meant to be in keeping with the American nature of the movement described. In that regard, it is also more penetrating. It provides separate chapters discussing the Metaphysical Club, Chauncey Wright (1830-1875),\(^\text{13}\) Nicholas St. John Green (1830-1876), and Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935) decades before Menand’s unified treatment. It even recognizes Schiller in three instances as part of a far larger story with which a “history of pragmatism in the twentieth century would have to do justice.”\(^\text{14}\) But one cannot escape the implication that Schiller is excluded from being a founder on account of his not being American. Nor will one of those founders complain. Dewey, in his foreword, comments on Wiener’s contribution:

> He has not merely contributed to the understanding of a significant distinctively American philosophical movement, but he has also provided a formation and exemplification of an enlightened and liberal method for dealing with the philosophical activity of any historical period.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{12}\) Wiener stands out as the one historian of pragmatism who might have had actual contact with Schiller as a student. He received his doctorate from USC in 1931 and went on to be a professor at the City College of New York and then at Temple University.

\(^{13}\) Wright, and his paltry coverage, is worthy of a sidebar. Edward H. Madden notes, again years ahead of Menand, that “Wright is a pivotal figure in American philosophy—with him began the ‘golden age’ of Peirce, James, Dewey, Royce, and Santayana” (Edward H. Madden, *Chauncey Wright and the Foundations of Pragmatism* [Seattle: University of Washington, 1963], v). Madden suggests that Wright’s “contributions to philosophy of science, religion, ethics, and metaphysics” have led to a renewed interest by “historians of American philosophy.” Thankfully, he references the opinion of one of them. That historian? None other than Madden himself. The collection in which his words appear is an important one, self-promotion notwithstanding. It includes a nice survey of Wright’s works and a reprint of William James’ s 1875 Nation article, “Chauncey Wright” (Edward H. Madden, ed., *The Philosophical Writings of Chauncey Wright*, The American Heritage Series [New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958]). For whatever reason, Madden’s groundwork is not mentioned by Menand in *The Metaphysical Club*. Madden, for his part, thanks Perry and Wiener for their input in the preface to the 1963 work.


The digging is thus deeper but it is also narrower. It admits of a larger historical range, but adheres to an already sanctioned foundation.

Will Durant’s 1953 edition of The Story of Philosophy is not a discussion of pragmatism proper. It is meant to be a far-ranging, popular, and admittedly partial account of the major personalities in philosophy from ancient to modern times. As such, the quibble here is slightly different than the ones that came previously. There is no issue with his choices as regards contemporary European—Bergson, Croce, and Russell—and American—Santayana, James, and Dewey—philosophers. What one finds, however, is that the discussion specific to the rise of pragmatism references persons in an intriguing fashion. Durant directs interested readers to James’s Pragmatism. But who does he reference for further details? “Flournoy has a good volume of exposition, and Albert Schinz’s Anti-Pragmatism is a vigorous criticism.”16 The issue is thus one of selection. Durant points to James and not Peirce. But, in furthering the Jamesian line alongside the Deweyian one, he references two persons even more on the margins than Schiller. But, by their reference, Durant comes so close to issues which tie Schiller to James that

16 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 382, f. 49. To be clear, my argument here is rather specific. Durant is referring here to University of Geneva psychologist Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920), whose interest—alongside James and Schiller—in the work of Frederic Myers’s psychical theorizing was briefly recounted in Chapter Two. Durant is also referring to Schinz’s book Anti-Pragmatism: An Examination into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy (1909). But he also references James’s son Henry’s collection of his father’s papers. Those volumes, as well as those by Perry, clearly lay out the extensive and humorous lambasting that Schinz (1870-?) received at the hands of James and Schiller. Their personal letters traded in caricatures—both in crude captions attached to pictures of African natives and in actual discussions of “Schinzy”—that go beyond the overwhelmingly negative published reviews of persons such as Dewey, Schiller, A. W. Moore, and others. If, then, Durant’s reference to all this “delightful gossip” were to be contextually clear, it would include, even in passing, a reference to Schiller.

Durant (1885-1981), whose full name is ironically William James Durant, led a rather varied existence. After considering a life as a Jesuit, Durant was a reporter and a librarian. He received his doctorate, and briefly taught at, Columbia University in 1917. But for the vast majority of his life, based largely on the popularity of The Story of Philosophy (originally published in 1926), Durant was free to work in New York and then California as an independent scholar writing the multi-volume The Story of Civilization. Those interested in the sad case of Schinz, then a professor of modern languages at Bryn Mawr, are directed to Peter Manicas, introduction to Anti-Pragmatism (1909): An Examination into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy, Early Critics of Pragmatism Series, ed. John R. Shook, vol. 2 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vi-xvi. This introduction, like the rest of those in the series, is followed by the full text of Schinz’s book as well as a useful selection of reviews that includes two by Schiller.
the former’s absence is startling. And, as if to add insult to omission, Durant concludes that “the most eloquent and subtle of our living thinkers belongs almost wholly to the cultural traditions of Europe.”

The first volume of William Barrett and Henry David Aiken’s *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (1962) provides an interesting accounting of philosophy, both in America and in Europe. Philosophy at the turn of the century in England is a stage-change from the obstinate idealist Bradley to the gradually awakening Russell. The former, a tinge of sarcasm worthy of Schiller seems present in the description, deals in an outdated realm where “no fact is left unredeemed and where the Absolute Reality remains blessedly secure beyond the ravages of time and change and history”; the latter, shocked by the ravages of the first war, found it no longer possible “to go on living in a world of abstraction.” But a sage from the frontier need not experience such calamities to see the light:

Of course it did not require wars and concentration camps to make some philosophers feel that their sheer sense of fact was violated by the beautiful structure of Idealism. . . . James too found that Idealism stuck in his gorge, it simply did not resemble the world of

17 Durant, *The Story*, 396. Not that this is to suggest that Durant is praising this distillation. Raising, again, the claim to an American view of philosophy, he suggests that James and Dewey, whatever their attachments to the European tradition, are part of the process by which Americans have “selected for survival and imitation among ourselves, rather the initiative individualist and the acquisitive pioneer than the meditative and artistic souls.” That one could compass both individual and artistic forms of thought seems not to have occurred to Durant.

18 The chronology between volumes is also curious. While this volume suggests as its focus “The Fate of Philosophy in the Twentieth-Century,” the overall historical emphasis seems to be reversed: the first volume covers “Pragmatism and America’s Philosophical Coming of Age” while the second details “The Rise of Analytical Philosophy in England.” This is an inversion insofar as the first—going from Peirce, to James, to Dewey, to Santayana—comes prior to a discussion in the second that includes as its entry point a detailed elaboration of Bradley.

19 William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1962), 21; Russell, qtd. in Barrett and Aiken, 22. Barrett (1913-1992) received his doctorate from Columbia and then taught at the University of California and New York University. Aiken (1912-1982), received his doctorate from Harvard and went on to teach there and then Brandeis.
fact in which we live. . . . the philosophy of the twentieth century, we have seen, takes shape as a revolt against Idealism.  

Where is Schiller in all this? Surely, the erasure is only a temporary one, as the first volume then moves into a discussion more specific to the history of pragmatism. No. In the thirty plus page introduction to “Pragmatism and America’s Philosophical Coming of Age” there is a laundry list of persons both European and American—Kant and Darwin, Morris and Perry, Royce and Santayana—but not a single reference to Schiller. The “great pragmatic triumvirate” of Barrett and Aiken tenders not even a passing dismissal to a person implicated in the passing of Idealism and the coming of pragmatism.  

Joseph Leon Blau’s William James: Pragmatism and Other Essays, published in 1963, continues Schiller’s erasure even as it extends his deference to James at the expense of Peirce. It is also clear that the reference points from which it draws have been those groomed by the previous discussions of the subject. In the brief “Works About William James” there are references to Blau, to Perry, and even to Otto. But there are no references to Schiller or Knox. And who is the James that Blau sees? Surprisingly, one betraying no small similarity, save in explicit reference, to Schiller. James was derided in his early writings for his style, for making complex philosophic issues seem within reach of everyone. But why, reasons Blau, is it “necessary for a good book to be dull.” And in those books James demonstrated that a person’s philosophy is as much a guide to that person. So who was this man? Simply:

He was a man whose training in the hard-headedness of science never completely subdued his soft-hearted belief that men are not merely automata, strictly determined in a mechanical world, but are, to some degree, the makers and shapers of their world. . . . he

20 Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, 1, 71. The triumvirate even inspires cringe-worthy analogies: Peirce is Socrates, James is Plato, and Dewey is Aristotle (Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, I, 49). With no room for Protagoras in the triadic schema, Schiller is surely left out on account of space.

21 Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, 1, 71.
was a man who was eternally ready to lend a sympathetic ear to the wildest of theories because he could not be convinced that all wisdom was of the academy or that there was only one clearly marked road to truth.\textsuperscript{22}

With minor emendation this is a James who, five decades deceased, retains all the components of a peer no longer discussed for seemingly the same reasons.

Reasons which, it would seem, continue to implicate him in a discussion of pragmatism, American or otherwise. And, finally, that is the case. In 1968, Horace Standish Thayer publishes \textit{Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism}. It is a wide-ranging book, covering in detail both American and European strands of pragmatism. But it is in this work, the most detailed treatment of Schiller to this point, that one of his epigrams comes back to haunt humanism’s ghost. Thayer begins promisingly. Schiller was “the most famous pragmatist outside the United States,” was regarded at the start of the century as “the equal of James,” and garnered with James more attention in Europe than “any other pragmatists.”\textsuperscript{23} But then the compliments stop. Thayer grants that Schiller’s view were in development prior to meeting James. But that means that Schiller was not a founder of pragmatism. Schiller tried to convince James of the soundness of the term humanism. He is, in sum, a close pal and ally of James but not, on Thayer’s account, a pragmatist.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} Joseph Blau, introduction to \textit{William James: Pragmatism and Other Essays} (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), x; xv. Blau (1909-1986) received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1944 and went on to teach philosophy and religion there.


\textsuperscript{24} There is a rather novel rhetorical tactic that occurs within a few lines of this comment by Thayer. While Schiller is cast out as a founder for deriving view in advance of meeting James, he is also dismissed for co-opting the ideas of Royce and James in “Axioms as Postulates” . . . after admitting to his inspiration in the works of James. What then is to be made by this comment regarding that essay: “While a significant contribution to the literature of pragmatism, it can scarcely be judged as an original and fundamental philosophic influence on the history of pragmatism” (Thayer, \textit{Meaning}, 274). Such a confluence of value assessments—issuing from a respected personality in the history of pragmatism—must surely be an objective judgment not informed by any subjective influence.
If not, then what? He compliments Schiller’s *Riddles*: it is “highly original, containing many fresh insights and novel bits of scholarship, and is gracefully written.” Thayer spends precious time providing the details of British Idealism, lucidly drawing in figures such as Lotze and Hegel, Bradley and A. E. Taylor. He provides specifics as regards Schiller’s views on psychology, logic, and philosophy. And Thayer even reaches conclusions with which the present author can find no qualm: Schiller took criticism personally, pursued logic past the point of necessity, and was, in light of these things, largely ignored in his last years. All this for a non-pragmatist. But Thayer’s own subjectivity is laid bare in a startling question: “What conclusions are suggested in a final stock-taking of this lively but no longer living philosophy of humanism?” By virtue of the framing, Thayer confirms that for his critics, Schiller was his philosophy. And he and it were, in Thayer’s estimation, a bad joke:

For one always suspects a lurking mockery in Schiller’s discourse and a trap readied to be sprung in those portions of his philosophizing that most tempt criticism. The trap one fears is that of being taken in, innocently and soberly made the prey of a jest and parody of philosophic seriousness. However, if this uneasy feeling is at all justified, nothing so thoroughly condemns a philosophy as the suspicion that it is not intended to be taken seriously.

But Thayer doesn’t like the punning. The majesty of his solemn pragmatism—innocent and sober, fearful and suspicious—cannot suffer fools lightly. So, in a role reversal, he and it will purge Schiller as an absurdity.

In 1970, the joke is still on Schiller. Thayer won’t even feign to include him in the “classic” writings. The book doesn’t suggest that it is American-specific, but the index and the introductory justification do. It contains no reference to Europe or pragmatism’s supporters.

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there. This exclusion from the references is coupled with the implication that Schiller doesn’t fall under the “classic” label. Thayer describes this criterion: “the original and formative expressions of this philosophy articulated by its most eminent spokesmen.” Though there is “considerable literature” on other European and American “pragmatists and sympathizers . . . [they] could not be included here.”28 And while it is clear that all the persons listed—Peirce, Dewey, James, Mead, and Lewis29—count as pragmatists, the extent to which all of them provide classic, original, and formative expressions of pragmatism is reasonably open to question.

Also in 1970 Morris, one of Schiller’s final combatants, publishes The Pragmatism Movement in American Philosophy. Given its title, there is no reason to quarrel with Schiller receiving no mention in the index. Morris is dealing, to be fair, with the American exemplars Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead. But, given Morris’s firsthand knowledge of the history he is telling, the omission is clearly revisionist. Recall that he claimed Schiller as part of the empiricist tradition of James. Recall also that he criticized both James and Schiller for being too afraid of the formal in philosophy. What, then, to make of Morris’s first chapter, “The Occasion for American Pragmatism”? Specifically, how is one to construe the four factors that underlie its arrival: “1) the prestige which science and the scientific method enjoyed during the mid-nineteenth century; 2) the corresponding strength of empiricism in the then-current philosophy; 3) the acceptance of biological evolution; 4) the acceptance of the ideals of American


29 “Lewis” is Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) who received his doctorate from Harvard in 1910 and then taught at the University of California before returning to teach at Harvard. He is known for promoting what he termed “conceptual pragmatism.”
democracy.”30 This is as much an alteration as it is a synthesis; for Morris is tilling the same well-kept field as Wiener did before him. He is working to smooth the edges of pragmatism’s history even as it stands in America. Here empiricism traces back directly to the British, to Hume and Mill, and then leaps forward to James and his “extreme emphasis on the category of experience.”31 Was it not this strain of pragmatism which Morris saw, in 1935, as threatening to relegate pragmatism to a mere curio? Here there is no such risk or threat. The American pragmatists only “differ somewhat” in helping to craft “one of the major philosophical achievements of the last hundred years.”32 But Morris laments that pragmatism, as an expression of “American culture,” has waned in influence in recent years. He hopes his then is a partial corrective. And, in an unintentionally suggestive finale, he hopes to have shown that “American pragmatism is much more than the voice of its historic occasion.”33 Much more than he and many more capable have been willing to entertain.

That last line, a jab really, regarding the history of Schiller’s erasure might seem facile if not for the cumulative evidence. But there is another side to this historical tale. It is one that qualifies Buchler’s dismissal even as it grants the germ of his thesis. The simple fact is that the


31 Morris, The Pragmatic, 7. Twenty years earlier, John W. Yolton argues that Schiller is a central player in pragmatism’s relation to empiricism. Schiller, alongside the Personal Idealists such as Sturt and pragmatists such as James and Dewey, sought to amend the classic tenets of empiricism so as to combat Idealism and naturalism. At the same time, Schiller imported traces of the Idealism that he sought to refute. While Yolton faults Schiller for not fully appreciating the distinction between that which “is given” and the act of “knowing,” Yolton suggests Schiller’s “Kantian modifications of empiricism . . . even where they are fallacious . . . serve to reveal the extent of the empirical and idealistic elements in many forms of present-day pragmatism” (John K. Yolton, “F. C. S. Schiller's Pragmatism and British Empiricism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11, no. 1 [September 1950]: 44).

32 Morris, The Pragmatic, 141. But it is again a history which ranges so close to Schiller as to cast his reflection upon the discussion. Pragmatism’s quibbles with Bradley are here referenced, but the counterpoints offered are only Addison Webster Moore and John Dewey.

33 Morris, The Pragmatic, 152.
vast majority of those who argued for, or showed even passing interest in, the psychological
emphasis in pragmatism were dead or had moved on to other topics by the time of Morris’s 1970
celebration of America’s philosophy. Schiller’s early ally, the personal idealist Henry Sturt, had
died in 1946. Of the English pragmatists, those most explicitly tied to the writings of James and
Schiller, Knox was dead by 1960 and Murray by 1962. The Swiss psychologist and psychical
researcher Flournoy, to whom James expressed a debt of gratitude alongside Schiller, died in
1920. Even sympathetic American philosophers, such as there were, did not live to see fit to
challenge these perspectives. Flewelling, the American personalist who had befriended Schiller
and gotten him to travel to California in 1926, died in 1960.

Other countries had, admittedly, only provided limited endorsement. The Italian
pragmatists—so robust in the creation of the journal Leonardo that they drew both Schiller’s and
James’s attention—veered towards Fascism and then turned to religion in their later works;
Papini died in 1956 and Giuseppe Prezzolini in 1982.34 In France, sympathy for pragmatism was
never very high. But those who had showed an interest in pragmatism, such as sociologist Émile
Durkheim and Marxist philosopher Georges Sorel, died in 1917 and 1922 respectively. Others,
such as philosopher Maurice Blondel and mathematician Édouard Le Roy turned, like their
Italian counterparts, toward religion in the later years of their lives. The former died in 1949 and
the latter in 1954.35 In Germany, pragmatism was met with marked disdain. Until the 1960s,

34 For a general account of the pragmatist movement in Italy, one which preferences the more Deweyian
sort of “logical pragmatism” that was undertaken by mathematician trained Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) and law
student Mario Calderoni (d. 1914) as well, readers are directed to Giovanni Gullace, “The Pragmatist Movement in
Italy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23, no. 1 (January-March 1962): 91-105. For an account which more
exclusively focuses on Vailati—his distance theoretically from Papini and James and closeness to Peirce in
developing a logical theory of meaning—readers are directed to C. P. Zanoni, “Developments of Logical

35 Interested readers are directed to Neil Gross’s contextual assessment of the French reaction to
pragmatism, focusing particularly on Durkheim’s “Pragmatism Lectures” of 1913-4 but also on other French
intellectuals such as LeRoy and Blondel. His central thesis is that the relationship between pragmatism and the
with the arrival of Jürgen Habermas (1929- ) and Karl-Otto Apel (1922- ), the majority of thinkers argued that it was a watered down version of their brand of Idealism.\textsuperscript{36} And here, most of all, the social situation can only be described as increasingly grim. Thankfully, none of the three philosophers praised by James and Schiller were around to witness the destruction of the 1930s and 40s. The Austrian Wilhelm Jerusalem, who had translated James’s Pragmatism in 1908, died in 1923. Rudolph Eisler, the philosopher and sociologist who had published selections from Schiller’s Humanism and Studies in Humanism as Humanismus: Beiträge zu einer pragmatischen Philosophie (1911), died in 1926. Julius Goldstein, the man who James in his last letter to Schiller also “left the cause to,” died in 1929.

Any theory, philosophical or otherwise, is bound up in the persons who craft its trajectory. And the lineage of pragmatism’s Jamesian line was cut short by a variety of factors somewhat different French la pragmatisme can only be properly understood in reference to religious currents at play during that time (Neil Gross, “Durkheim’s Pragmatism Lectures: A Contextual Approach,” Sociological Theory 15, no. 2 [July 1997]: 126-49). Another approach to Durkheim’s lectures, one that places specific emphasis on how he disagreed with the “psychological pragmatism of the sort associated with William James,” is found in Robert Prus, “Emile Durkheim Engages the Pragmatic Divide: Reconceptualizing the Sociological Tradition in Pragmatism and Sociology,” Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meeting, Philadelphia, 13-6 August 2005. There is at least one instance where a scholar traces the connection of pragmatism and French philosophy back to an even earlier date. In The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain, Oberlin Professor of Theology Walter Marshall Horton (1895-1966) suggests: “the left-wing Pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey was indeed the legitimate offspring of nineteenth century empiricism, utilitarianism, and positivism; but the right-wing Pragmatism of James, Schiller, and other religious thinkers owed its origin to a more complex union of tendencies . . . if we are to understand the relation of Pragmatism to preceding philosophies we must study the vitalistic and voluntaristic tendencies of German Idealism, and not confine our attention to the Anglo-Saxon side of the family tree. If, then, it is permissible to cite such men as Kant, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Maine [Marie François Pierre Gonthier] de Biran [volitional philosopher, 1766-1824], [Jean Gaspard Felix] Ravaisson[-Mollien, archelogist and philosopher of “consciousness and will,” 1813-1900] and [Charles Bernard] Renouvier [pluralist philosopher who influenced James in the 1870s, 1815-1903] when making a list of the forerunners of pragmatism, it is equally permissible to cite the name of Bautain” (Walter Marshall Horton, The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain [New York: University Press, 1926], ix). Louis Eugène Marie Bautain (1796-1867) was a French philosopher who explored, occasionally at peril to his standing as a professor, the connection of faith to reason. He taught at Strasburg and the Sorbonne and received his Holy Orders in 1828.

\textsuperscript{36} Interested readers are directed to an exceedingly rich treatment, one that extends consideration to other figures central to the German reaction to pragmatism: Hans Joas, “American Pragmatism and German Thought,” in Pragmatism and Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Though Schiller is not mentioned, the chapter contains a compelling discussion of pragmatism’s fortunes in Germany and America in the years after WWII.
not solely the domain of the American historians of pragmatism. 37 It is conjecture to suggest that

37 Another area, developing alongside the histories of pragmatism thus covered, that held potential for taking up Schiller’s cause was the field of American sociology. In 1938, Robert K. Merton published Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England. In the preface to the 1970 edition, he explains that the book was meant to fill a gap in the sociology of the times; specifically, the “study of the behavior patterns of scientists and of science as an evolving social institution” (Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England [1938; New York: Harper and Row, 1970], vii). The book is worthy of review on its own merits. What is of interest here is the slim pragmatic thread Merton picks up in 1938, only a year after Schiller’s death: “Whatever the faults of pragmatic analysis, it has amply justified its contentions by forcing us to realize that every ‘fact’ in a naturalistic system is a selection from the unorganized whole of implicit or avowed human criteria” (Merton, Science, 229). The footnote for this claim references—not Peirce, James, or Dewey—but Schiller and his 1907 Studies in Humanism. In the Appendix to the 1990 collection of Merton’s works, Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science: The Merton Thesis, K. E. Duffin and Stuart W. Strickland provide an abbreviated outline of the 1938 work. Though Schiller is removed from their discussion of the page where he was referenced, his imprint is not: “In science, these [utilitarian] values expressed themselves in a neglect of the unique and variable, an interest in things for what they made possible rather than for what they were in themselves, and a reduction of phenomena to common manageable units” (K. E. Duffin and Stuart W. Strickland, “Appendix: The Principal Theses of Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England: An Analytical Synopsis,” in Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science: The Merton Thesis ed. I. Bernard Cohen, [New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990], 388). Another work—one that Merton had reviewed and commented on in manuscript form—came out a year earlier: Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action. Though it touches on a broader range of sociological issues than Merton’s work, and contains no reference to Schiller, the comments as regards scientific theory would be amenable to a discussion of Schiller (no less Dewey): “True scientific theory is never the product of idle ‘speculation,’ of spinning out the logical implications of assumptions, but of observation, reasoning and verification, starting with the facts and continually returning to the facts. . . . Only by treating theory in this close interrelation with empirical problems and facts is any kind of an adequate understanding either of how the theory came to develop, or of its significance to science, possible” (Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937; reprint, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949], vi). Merton’s interests never led him back to that comment or to Schiller. Parsons never discovered him. But another sociologist provided a brief reference. C. Wright Mills’ 1942 University of Wisconsin dissertation, A Sociological Account of Pragmatism (published in 1964 under the title Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America), provides only one reference to Schiller; humorously, it is to the letter James wrote describing Peirce as “a hopeless crank” (C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz [New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1964], 135). But, in a postscript where Mills reflected on his dissertation, he makes a comment worth noting: “It is perhaps not indispensable, but it would certainly be interesting and in all probability revealing, to examine the non-American refractions and criticisms of pragmatism. In Italy, especially, as well as in England, France, and Germany, there has developed, since the time of William James, a literature on this topic” (Mills, Sociology, 466). Whether by training, interest, or both, his comments are suggestive of at least two inferences. (1) In Italy, especially and as was discussed previously, there flourished a “logical” form of pragmatism under the auspices of Calderoni and Vailati. The emphasis is surely not on Papini, and would not lead in consequence to Schiller. (2) As with Thayer, Schiller is relegated by terms of art to a refraction, and not originator, of pragmatism.

There is, however, a further supposition which stands to be considered: Mills found the Jamesian style pragmatism, in a word, un-American. In a 1938 letter to Ernest Manheim, Mills makes this claim:

Here, through Mr. Mumford, the ‘genteel tradition’ speaks. It is my belief that Mr. Mumford has not gotten hold of the vital intellectual core and animus of pragmatism. He has missed the intellectual challenge which it undoubtably presents. By pragmatism I do not mean the doctrines of [William] James. James is no genuine pragmatist. The tradition runs from Charles Sanders Peirce to [John] Dewey and [George Herbert] Mead. These are the carriers of that pragmatism which is larger than a specific philosophic doctrine. Peirce, and later Dewey, ‘denounced’ [James’] doctrine. He is not in the middle of the living stream. . . . That traditional interpretation of pragmatism which locates James as the center of diffusion for the doctrine is, I believe, mistaken and intellectually unfortunate.
the situation in Europe, the situation which gave rise to Schiller’s increased interest in eugenics, also contributed to the decline of the individual/psychological view of pragmatism. But the decades immediately proceeding Schiller’s death provide institutional details too apparent to discount. Pragmatism’s history was being written almost exclusively by the professional American philosophers who rose through the ranks, first as students and then often as professors, at Columbia and Harvard.38 The exceptions—Abel at the New School, Winetrout at American Institutional College, Searles at USC, and Sheilds at the University of Northern Iowa—did not

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38 There is a variation on this argument that has already been raised. In Chapter Four, there is reference to Slosson’s comment that, “if Mr. Schiller had remained in America he would now be lecturing to one or two hundred students at the time, largely teachers who had come from all parts of the country expressly to hear his ideas and who would in turn transmit them to their students” (Edwin E. Slosson, Six Major Prophets [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1917], 196). White has also suggested, albeit to a different end, that the educational environment at Oxford—lacking the graduate students and scientific laboratories of the sort found in America—had an impact on the propagation of his philosophy (Stephen Solomon White, “A Comparison of the Philosophies of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940, 72-3). Herbert Searles avers: “It had always been a mystery to me that Schiller did not receive the attention given to the other three leaders in the general area of pragmatic thought; but that mystery is lessed by the fact that most of his productive life was spent at Oxford, which was unfriendly to his viewpoint, and in the later period spent in the U.S.A., he proposed nothing new” (in Shields, “Some Impressions,” 293).

There can be no doubt that Slosson, White, and Searles are all correct, to a degree. Lacking the students, the facilities, and the support, Schiller’s philosophy stood at a distinct disadvantage as compared to persons such as Dewey and Perry, at institutions such as Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia. But this argument is subject to qualification on two ends. From the American side, there were an ample assortment of graduate student trained by James, not the least of which is Perry, who went on to both write Schiller out of the equation and to reconfigure James’s philosophy so as to exclude its more individualistic components. From the British side, the situation is somewhat different. First of all, Schiller did influence philosophers—in Germany, Italy, and England—but a myriad of other mitigating factors (already discussed at some length) seem more plausibly significant than simply a lack of graduate students or facilities for doing psychological experimentation. Secondly, and to the point of the next section, Schiller’s interest in psychology, dating as far back to his interactions with Titchener at Cornell in the 1890s, rarely, if ever, extended beyond the psychology of James save in matters of emphasis (see Chapter Two). That said interest could have been a contributing factor is more to the point of the overall complaint: individual/psychological pragmatism of the sort promoted by James and Schiller was offset by the histories being written.

None of which is to suggest that the American system of “building philosophy” was not a magnificent example of “professionalizing” the way in which the love of wisdom was conducted, providing the grooves and active participants in crafting pragmatism’s history. A particularly acute discussion of that system, specifically as it applies to Harvard, is found in: Bruce Kuklick, “Building a Graduate School, 1890-1912,” in The Rise of American Philosophy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 233-58.
have: (1) careers of the same trajectory, or (2) interests that ranged to encompass the history of pragmatism proper. As a consequence or a coincidence or a measure of both, the results are clear. Whether written or read, there were less and less counterpoints from those trained in the views Schiller had fought to defend. And those few counterpoints that were offered, whether in blame or partial praise, suffered from the dynamics of their production.

8.2 ALL THAT IT ONCE WAS: THE STYLE OF PRAGMATIC HUMANISM

Schiller’s entry into the philosophical fray was, as with the previously surveyed histories of philosophy and pragmatism, context specific. And, aside from the deep friendship he formed with James and later Flewelling and Hopkins, Schiller’s context was an overwhelmingly European one. Whereas earlier chapters stressed his distance from the emergence of pragmatism in America, they also implicated that remove as a perspective-setting one. The groundwork Schiller did in articulating first pragmatism, and then humanism, in Europe ran up against the tendencies that had started there and then been adopted in America. In that regard, he was attempting to undercut Bradley’s First Principles while James adopted a posture of genial annoyance with the variations found in persons such as Royce. And in such a way, he was closer to the historical and philosophical currents that pragmatism sought to remove. But such proximity, as much as it fueled his attacks on Idealists in his midst, also engendered a myopic regard for the battles to be fought and the causes to be championed. The paradox is that Schiller, as much as he struck closer at the perceived sources of philosophy’s ills, was farther from the currents that would eventually prevail as useful.
The problem that has developed, however, is one of coverage, the ways in which Schiller has been portrayed in previous detailed examinations of his philosophy. To wit, none have undertaken a biography of Schiller until the present. What have been presented are thematic treatments where specific parts of his philosophy are highlighted. Some of these are exceptionally nuanced. They explore aspects of Schiller’s philosophy, by reference to more traditional versions at play during a given time or in comparison to more recognized pragmatists. They note specifics such as his battles with Bradley, or the turn in his later writings to argue against symbolic logic. But even with these strengths they are occupationally blindered. As has been suggested previously, commentators interpret Schiller’s philosophy narrowly. They ignore aspects of his philosophy that answer the challenges they put forth. They argue for the novelty of his philosophy while undercutting it with traditional examples. They reframe his philosophy in a manner that only engenders further arguments against its resurgence. The remainder of this section will examine these varied treatments and end with an analysis that goes beyond the arguments put forward thus far.

The first sort of occupational hazard occurs when a writer, obviously an expert in a certain sort of thinking, takes on a thinker of another sort of thinking. Sometimes the clash is

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39 I should pause to note that I am taking previous examinations, even those with which I disagree, as honest attempts to explore Schiller’s philosophy. The problems that develop relate to comments by Medhurst regarding the necessity of primary documents (see Chapter One: Martin J. Medhurst, “The Contemporary Study of Public Address: Renewal, Recovery, and Reconfiguration,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (2001): 495-511). The advances in technology since the time some of these treatments were written have made research and access to archival materials easier. And, in at least one important instance, some of the materials related to Schiller weren’t even available to researchers prior to 1949. While a doctoral student at USC, Allan Shields undertook to research Schiller. When he contacted Brooke Whiting of the Department of Special Collections Library at UCLA to inquire about any holdings related to Schiller it might have, Shields was initially told that there were no such materials. Weeks later, however, Whiting called Shields back. As Shields explains: “they had discovered three trunksful of Schiller effects and literary remains located under a stairwell (storage) and that the materials had been waiting for accession at a later, less busy time. No records of receipt had been made” (Allen Shields, “Building the Bibliography of F. C. S. Schiller,” 25 September 2003). Records of these materials were only made available in finding aid form in July 1968 by Julia Jones of the Department of Special Collections. These materials were referenced in Shields dissertation (written at USC) in 1951, and given wider exposure in the 1968 bibliography he co-authored with Herbert Searles.
dramatic, the force of the confrontation culminating in ideas or issues that neither thinker would have brought to the table without the other. My cautious estimation is that George Stack’s 1982 “Nietzsche’s Influence on Pragmatic Humanism” is not that sort of interaction. Stack, an emeritus professor of philosophy at the State University College of New York at Brockport, is a Nietzsche scholar. His essay deserves, first, praise and, second, a healthy degree of doubt. As to the first, and given that I am no Nietzsche scholar, I can’t quibble with Stack’s assessment that Schiller’s work demonstrates marked similarities to, and does owe a debt to, Nietzsche. In fact, I freely acknowledge him two points: (1) Schiller utilized Nietzsche in his writing, and (2) Schiller's later works cover a varied list of topics. In both instances, Stack does justice to Schiller’s texts and shows sensitivity to what his texts say and to what they, admittedly, lack.

Now as to the doubt. First, Schiller acknowledges the import of Nietzsche and does so more candidly than Stack seems to recognize.40 Second, Stack displays ample talent at ‘arguments by quotation’ which, in certain cases, are patently incorrect or curiously misattributed.41 Third, Stack argues persuasively, if occasionally from oversight or error. Stack


41 Stack references Quarterly Review articles from January 1913 and January 1915. But the two references are actually both from the 1913 article referenced in the previous footnote. How is this possible? Simply put, Stack bases his arguments here on a typo made by Salter. The more damning suggestion would be that he bases his argument here only on Salter’s book’s discussion of Schiller. When one looks to the actual articles from the Quarterly Review in 1915, there is indeed an article on Nietzsche. But it is: (1) written in July, not January; (2) deals with Nietzsche’s relation to German education, not to translations of him; and (3) is written by A. W. G. Randall, not Schiller. If one looks to page 157 in the bounded collection, the discussion is of “war, wounds, and disease.” Not only does Stack take Salter at his word, he takes Salter’s words and makes them into Schiller’s. He attributes to Schiller a comment made by Salter only to further the argument that Schiller was hiding his debt to Nietzsche (George J. Stack, “Nietzsche's Influence on Pragmatic Humanism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 20, no. 4 [October 1982]: 402, n. 113; 405). Schiller’s comments in 1913, as used by Salter and commented on by
ignores Schiller's Must Philosopher's Disagree? revision of the Quarterly Review article—the 1913 one that exists, not the 1915 one that does not. Stack also mangles dates to interesting effect where he speaks of "being convinced" of Schiller's cribbing "useful fictions" from Nietzsche. The edition of Riddles of the Sphinx that Stack refers to can only be either the 1891 or 1894 edition, not the "second edition" he claims as 1910. And, in both of those, the appendix "Free Will and Necessity" appears (he is unknowingly referring to one of the two additional appendices that were added to the 1910 third edition of the text). These points are telling, in that they derail Stack's argument regarding Nietzsche’s Will to Power (1896), though it does mean that Schiller most likely read Beyond Good and Evil (1886) at least five years before the first edition of Riddles of the Sphinx came out. All of which is rather funny given Stack's insistence on the date 1910 . . . the very same year Schiller's entry on Nietzsche came out in the Encyclopedia Britannica!

Finally, while taking Schiller to task for ‘copying’ Nietzsche, Stack also engages in another odd tactical approach: the similarities in Schiller's arguments suggest that he “cannot be said to have misunderstood him entirely” or, alternatively, Schiller “retained only the surface insights and left many details behind.” But, if we grant that he noted the strengths and weaknesses of Nietzsche’s arguments far more candidly than Stack asserts, this simply means

Schiller in his review of the same, can be found in: William Mackintire Salter, Nietzsche, the Thinker: A Study (New York: Henry Holt, 1917), 513, n. g; 514, n. i.

42 Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 381 [see first full paragraph].


44 Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 396; 395. Being the Nietzsche scholar, and already having (mis-)referenced Salter, Stack is surely aware that his questions regarding the similarities between Nietzsche and pragmatism are not novel. As far back as 1912 the issue was being debated in journals such as the Philosophical Review and the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (for reference to these discussions—which are the basis for Stack’s claim that Schiller “excuses” himself—see again Salter, Nietzsche, 496, n. 1).
that Schiller was willing to go—either wrongly or rightly, which is not the point of this analysis—beyond Nietzsche where he felt it his prerogative. Stack rightfully questions the extent to which Schiller used, even attributed his ideas to, Nietzsche. And he is to be thanked for pointing out where these similarities lie. But Stack seems more interested in flogging a dead horse only to revive the one he is riding, forgetting to saddle his interests and bridle his facts. No one will ever claim that Schiller inspires the debate that Nietzsche does; though that is not to say that the Taylorian Scholar of German should be dismissed because he doesn’t hold to Stack’s scholarship of Nietzsche.

The second sort of blind spot is one that Schiller warned about. It should be familiar to anyone who works within a specialized field of study. Well skilled in the tools of a given professional trade, it is easy to hold to demarcations even as one studies ideas that seek to revise, overcome, or remove them. This sort of oversight is engendered by the two men principally responsible for keeping Schiller’s name alive in the years after his death: Abel and Shields.46

45 There is, of course, a wonderfully academic phrase for this problem: trained incapacity. Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929), the Norwegian born sociologist and economist, is to be thanked for developing this concept. But it is Kenneth Duva Burke (1897-1993), the literary critic, who provides the explanation of this “state of affairs whereby one’s very abilities can function as blindness.” As Burke notes, there is a narrow margin dividing the ability to discriminate and the inability to comprehend: “We thus have orientation discussible as either training or incapacity, depending upon its outcome in correct or faulty means-selecting. And our own judgments as to the adequacy of the means selected in any given instance might depend upon our particular sense of the appropriate” (Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 3d ed. [Berkeley: University of California, 1984], 7; 10).

46 Another example of this approach is found in White’s 1941 University of Chicago dissertation. This work—in which White thanks Morris, Hartshorne, Dewey, and Louise Schiller—is worth attention for its attempt to draw out comparisons between these two pragmatists. White is clearly conversant with the works of Schiller, Dewey, and other writers on pragmatism. But he stumbles, in my estimation, in holding too closely to distinctions between what constitutes philosophical and non-philosophical interests. This dichotomy is made most clear in his concluding chapter. Therein, White asserts three contrasts between the two philosophers: (1) Dewey upheld a scientific whereas Schiller provided a metaphysical theory of truth; (2) Dewey’s was a logical approach whereas Schiller’s was a psychological approach; and (3) Dewey’s test was social while Schiller’s was individual. The first clearly misconstrues what Schiller meant by both terms, blurring the distinction between a personalized worldview and a willingness to construct the social experiments necessary to test it. The second is accurate to the extent that it holds to a division which Schiller sought to destroy, with the reconstructed result being that a logical end was always conditioned by some psychological (hence personal) valuation. The third is the long-standing objection Schiller faced (even from James, though it pays to recall that James himself stated that they started at opposite ends yet arrived at the same middle point: that the nature of truth was relative to the interests of those that fashioned it).
And it would be surprising if not for a very simple fact: both men were, by training, philosophers. As such, their thematic calls for a renewed appreciation of Schiller are qualified by the contours of what that training provided. While it has already been discussed how both men chose to view Schiller’s forays into eugenics and psychical research as either minor diversions or non-philosophical interests, the focus here will be on how they interpret arguments that are decidedly philosophical.

Abel’s 1955 *The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller* is the first comprehensive thematic statement of its kind. It is also the first attempt to provide a bibliographic resource of Schiller’s and his commentators’ writings. In it, Abel ranges over the entirety of Schiller’s philosophy—his logic, his views of science, metaphysics, religion, and his interest in psychical research and eugenics—to reach a two page summary of his credit to philosophy, put thusly: “The core of Schiller’s permanent contribution to philosophy is his emphasis on the creativity of human beings.”47 Readers will not be surprised to find this author in agreement with that

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47 Reuben Abel, *The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller* (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1955), 148. It should be noted that, in the course of the book, Abel took exception to his own estimation. Earlier on, he is found to exclaim that “Schiller’s treatment of logic is no doubt his most significant achievement” (Abel, *The Pragmatic*, 75). Another first was his 1966 *Humanistic Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller*, to this date the only English-language compilation of Schiller’s essays (from *Mind!, Humanism, Studies in Humanism*). The general introductions, to the book and the sections, break little ground in Abel’s estimations of Schiller. Though, again, he chooses to reframe the fundamental importance of Schiller’s philosophy: “The distinctive aspect of Schiller’s world view is his statement that ‘reality’ is plastic, incomplete, and piecemeal” (Reuben Abel, *Humanistic
assessment. But the road to that appreciative estimation is one that keeps to the tended path.

Abel’s assessments of Schiller’s logic are the most detailed. But Abel tends to equivocate over several chapters as to how he should frame his arguments about the same. The clearest instance of this sort of hedge is found in Abel’s estimation that Schiller did not understand the difference between analytic and synthetic statements. As an example of the first he offers the simple mathematic equation “two plus two equals four”; of the second he offers “man is a featherless biped.” My response is blunt: Schiller did not misunderstand these distinctions. Rather, he failed to see the utility of any statement that was not subject to the test of experience. So when Abel goes on to suggest that “Schiller failed to realize that pure probability propositions are susceptible of formal statement, and can be demonstrated as thoroughly as any other proposition in pure mathematics,” an interesting form of conversion is occurring. Schiller’s argument against pure/a priori/formal statements is turned into a failure to recognize the same.

Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller [New York: Free Press, 1966], 37). It should be noted, however, when Abel quotes Dewey, in a letter to James, as feeling that he was closer to Schiller—“in his later writings”—as regards a theory of truth, that: (1) the actual letter is from 1907, and (2) the full text of the letter is more indicative of the uncertainty that Dewey felt regarding the variations of pragmatism at play at that time (Abel, Humanistic, 152; see the full letter in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 2 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935], 528-9). The slightest of changes can be seen, though, in Abel’s estimation of psychical research. In the first he makes the argument that it is unfortunate that Schiller “did not take any interest” in psychoanalysis, though the truth is that his few comments regarding it were critical and dismissive (Abel, The Pragmatic, 141). In the second he is instead inclined to suggest that “it is in the realm of religious philosophy that Pragmatism probably scores its greatest success” (Abel, Humanistic, 255). In both he thankfully acknowledges that, though always on the outskirts of accepted study, Schiller could count as allies in said study a slew of respected thinkers.

In keeping with my promise to tread cautiously, I am going to keep to Abel’s definitions and put aside the issue of whether or not he, or Schiller, provides the “right” conception of terms. The issue at hand is how well Abel holds to a discussion of what he understands Schiller to mean. For Abel, a synthetic statement “has meaning only in terms of matter of fact”; an analytic statement is one that “has meaning independently of matter of fact” (Abel, The Pragmatic, 77).

Abel, The Pragmatic, 88.

The interesting thing is that Abel actually states a version of my complaint as against Schiller only pages earlier regarding mathematics: “He believes that it originates in the same type of need, functions for the same type of purpose, and is subject to the same type of verification by experience” (Abel, The Pragmatic, 79). Further clarification of my position comes from two essays that Abel did not reference in his evaluation of Schiller’s logic.
Another version of disciplinary myopia occurs in Allan Edwin Shields’s unpublished 1951 USC dissertation, “An Exposition and Critique of Humanistic Voluntarism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937).” Though ranging over a variety of components of Schiller’s philosophy, by far the most space is dedicated to a discussion of Schiller’s logic as it was put forth in numerous essays (many of which have already been discussed) and his books Formal Logic and Logic for Use. And it is on the basis of these writings that Shields grounds many, though not all, of his conclusions. His assessment as to “whether or not Humanistic

These essays are justified for inclusion in that they directly relate to other components of Abel’s analysis: (1) Kant, and (2) symbolic logic. In offering his definition of an analytic statement, Abel makes a curious statement: “Kant, of course, thought that ‘7+5=12’ was a synthetic rather than analytic statement. However, Schiller refers explicitly to this view of Kant’s only casually (in Logic for Use, p. 433) and does not realize that the human operation of counting logically presupposes the number system” (Abel, The Pragmatic, 162, n. 10). But Schiller had commented that Kant’s categories were an attempt to logically prove relations that Hume had already taken as impossible, to show “that subjective additions to the given were not confined to the causal postulate.” But this, claims Schiller, is the most damning component of Kant’s plan, a sort of etymological alchemy:

To all this epistemological machinery he gave a perverse, obscure, misleading and ambiguous name, ‘the a priori.’ Until Kant an a priori argument had meant one that argued from cause to effect, and the apparently non-empirical factor in knowledge had been credited to the ‘innate idea.’ True, there had been some confusion as to how such ideas were inborn; but this confusion was only aggravated by Kant. The a priori became the central mystery of his system. It claimed to be logical, not chronological; but the Transcendental Aesthetic is full of passages which make no sense unless ‘priority’ is understood as temporal.

So, wonders Schiller, which is it? Is the a priori the new “innate idea” or is it a logical conception “severed from all reference to the temporal order of events” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Ultra-Gothic Kant,” Personalist 17, no. 4 [October 1936]: 388-9)?

In another place, he argues that Schiller “failed to realize . . . that he agreed with much that symbolic logic has done” as well as with the work of logical positivists and analytic philosophers (Abel, The Pragmatic, 86-7). The previous chapter, particularly in the discussion of Stebbing, dovetails with the spirit of that assessment. But my agreement is tempered by the fact that Schiller, even in later writings, was still questioning some of the very distinctions Abel wishes to honor. In a response to Russell’s critique of empiricism, Schiller argues that he does not recognize “that for a ‘proposition’ to acquire any actual meaning it must be given relevance to some actual problem, and that until this has been done, it has neither truth nor falsity, simply because the question of meaning takes precedence over that of cognitive value” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Must Empiricism Be Limited?” Mind 45, no. 3 [July 1936]: 304). Both arguments support the argument that Schiller disagreed with, rather than misunderstood, the issues Abel raises.

It is important to note that Shields full well recognizes, though does not draw the implications from it that I do, the narrow range of his critical assessment. In introducing his evaluation, Shields suggests: “There are, it seems, at least three standards that can be used for criticism of Humanistic Voluntarism; 1) Schiller’s, 2) some other philosophy’s, or 3) a combination of the two.” He then adds that his evaluation will focus “only on those concepts which are of central importance” so as “to show the internal weakness of a philosophy” (Allan Shields, “An Exposition and Critique of Humanistic Voluntarism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller [1864-1937].” [Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, June 1951], 225). As will become apparent, this admission provides both for the benefits of his work and the limits of its conclusions.
Voluntarism was concealing an important logical theory, method, and approach to philosophy, or epistemology” is succinct: “that 1) Schiller’s criticism of formal logic missed the mark, 2) that his logic is not a logic, and 3) that there are other serious defects in his logical theory in particular and his philosophy in general.”

In this section we will entertain the first two, and return to the third a bit later. Evidence for the first claim is found “in the fact that no formal logician (including Bradley) admitted to the relevancy of the criticism to his logic.” This contains a germ of truth that should by now be apparent to even the idlest reader. Schiller’s polemic was often harsh, occasionally wrong, and at times seemingly clouded by personal disagreements. Even so, that a person criticized chose not to grant the criticism seems wholly prejudicial to the one making the critique. But it leads into Shield’s explanation of his second point. The crux of which is that a logic cannot be based in psychology because logic “is a formal body of principles which can be used but whose validity or sources is not dependent on such use, or the fact that we adopt the propositions of logic as premises in our reasoning. Logic provides formulae.” One need not look far to see that Schiller explicitly dismisses this standard as the method by which to judge his logic. In Schiller’s Logic for Use he asserts from the beginning “that Logic should be a theory of actual reasoning, and that a logic theory which cannot conceivably be applied to life and used in


54 The case of John E. Russell, and his discussions with James and Schiller in 1906 and 1907, seems to be a partial exception to Shields’s criteria (see Chapter Three). There also remains the specter of Bradley. Though he never claimed to have changed his positions per se, the debates detailed in Chapters Three and Four suggest otherwise. While it would be wrong to attribute all of this change to Schiller, it is clear that the general onslaught of criticism was directed by pragmatists, like Schiller and James, and their allied contemporaries, such as Sturt, Sidgwick, and Knox.

scientific inquiry cannot be possibly right.” This, then, is an instance of Shields engaging in the same approach used by Abel: taking disagreement with the excepted protocols as an indication of misunderstanding them.

The third sort of thematic inconsistency, like the previous ones, issues from an honest desire to assess a philosophical figure. In contrast, however, it seeks to align a past position with a more recent one. The strategy is familiar to anyone with an acquaintance of argumentation theory: in instances where a topic is unfamiliar, arguments from a known topic are advanced so as to provide a warrant by analogy. But it should also be clear that this tactic works best when: (1) the unknown is viewed by the audience as relatively similar to the known quantity, and (2) the audience has a favorable perception of that quantity. If not the first, then the audience will suspect the proponent of forcing the issue. If the first but not the second, the unknown will only taken on the negative perceptions engendered by the known.

Winetrout, a professor of the philosophy of education, is primarily a popularizer. He dedicated himself to writing variations of the same basic plaint in several journal essays in the

56 F. C. S. Schiller, Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1929), vi. This, to be quite clear, exempts from register: (1) the relation of Schiller’s—not to mention Sidgwick’s, Knox’s, and Sturt’s—work to the development of what is now termed “informal” logic (for a reference to the work that Sidgwick and Schiller did in this regard, readers are directed to John Passmore, “Some Critics of Formal Logic,” in A Hundred Years of Philosophy, revised ed. [New York: Basic Books, 1966], 158-74), (2) a multiplicity of other pragmatist conceptions, such as the “reflective thinking method” as espoused by John Dewey in How We Think (1910). It also sidesteps the fact that in Chapter Two, “The Definition of Logic,” Schiller specifically disagrees with Shields conception: “a Logic which repudiates psychology repudiates meaning, and lapses into nonsense” (Schiller, Logic, 23). As before, my goal is not to champion Schiller or Shields over as against the others in matters of logic theory; rather, it is to show that the frame of references assumes, rather than proves, the warrant for each argument being made.

Shields also refers to one of Schiller’s last essays on logic, “Multi-Valued Logics—and Others.” The content of Schiller’s complaints is as clear here as it was six years previous. A useful logic substitutes “judgments for propositions as the subjects of logical discourse, frankly seeks the co-operation of psychology and is willing to be a handmaid to the sciences.” It asserts that accepted truths, prized by the logics of antiquity and Idealism, are no more than conditional valuation. And, in a sign of humorous indignity at the continued advance of symbolic logic, Schiller suggests that even our most basic needs can’t be reduced to mathematic symbols: “If we take the certainty that ‘eggs are eggs’ as an a priori warrant of the quality of our breakfast eggs, we court disappointment” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Multi-Valued Logics—and Others,” Mind 44, no. 4 [October 1935]: 471; 482).
1950s and 1960s: Schiller deserves to be read more often. Whether analyzing Schiller’s open-ended conception of truth, or suggesting the similarities found between him, Dewey, and James, Winetrout’s journal essays suggest a fascination with Schiller’s disappearance given his seminal role in promoting pragmatism. In his 1966 book *F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism*, Winetrout also engages in a thematic analysis, though one that relies on a comparative study of Schiller’s and other pragmatists’ philosophical views. This book continues his plea for a renewed appreciation. But this appeal is subject to several odd instances of oversight. Some are rather trivial. But others suggest that Winetrout’s celebration of Schiller comes at the expense of Schiller’s actual role in promoting pragmatism. In successive arguments, Winetrout shifts Schiller from attacking Idealism in Europe to being aligned with

57 The general reason that Winetrout offers for a renewed appreciation of Schiller seems a back-handed complaint about the then-current state of philosophy: “...we might turn to F. C. S. Schiller to help us in our time to develop ‘a philosophy which remains in touch with life, and strenuously participate in the solution of its problems’” (Kenneth Winetrout, “F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937): Some Centennial Thoughts,” *Personalist* 45 [July 1964]: 314).

58 Even in these instances, Winetrout seems captivated—almost to the point of not recognizing that his keen interests are perhaps cause for other people’s irritation—by the way Schiller expresses his views. While discussing Schiller’s conception of truth, there are a number of digressions such as: “Schiller’s pen is not a dry pen, a dull pen. There is fun in his books. One source of delight is his comments on his fellow philosophers” (Kenneth Winetrout, “Aspects of F. C. S. Schiller’s Concept of Truth,” *Educational Theory* 6 [April 1956]: 106). In discussing the relevance of Dewey, he concludes by saying: “this year’s Dewey centennial observations would have been a little more exciting, have more outsiders in attendance, if Schiller had not been so completely rejected by some now dead and some still living pragmatists... He reads better and faster than Dewey—indeed, faster and better than almost anyone who bears the title of philosopher,... But it is not just his style. Here also one can find the real meat of humanism, of pragmatism” (Kenneth Winetrout, “Must Pragmatists Disagree? Dewey and Schiller,” *Educational Theory* 10 [January 1960]: 63). It is only in discussing Schiller’s relationship to James that Winetrout seems to reach a qualified conclusion relating to Schiller’s fate: “it is not quite clear if his being more or less at odds with the philosophical fashion put him into eclipse, or if his state of near-oblivion is to be explained as the result of a deliberate boycott on the part of the Dewey segment of pragmatism” (Kenneth Winetrout, “William James and F. C. S. Schiller: An Essay in Honor of Schiller’s Centennial Year 1964,” *Educational Theory* 14 [July 1964]: 138).

59 For a person so willing to extend a frank admission of Schiller’s interest in eugenics, it is somewhat incredible that Winetrout would state: “Schiller had many ideas of reform that ranged from running eugenical baby shows to subsidizing members of parliament so they could propagate superior minds and bodies” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 45). Readers to this point will recognize the latter statement as accurate. But the former comment seems to be based on merely reading the title of Schiller’s 1917 “The Eugenics of ‘Baby Week’” correspondence in the *Eugenics Review*. 
existentialism in America. The results are clear: by moving Schiller from his base of operation, Winetrout removes the distinctive nature of his place in pragmatism. And, given that he is writing at a time when existentialism was eclipsed in mainstream Anglo-American circles by the social and analytical wings of philosophy, Winetrout incurs unfortunate, if unintended, results: robbed of that which made Schiller distinct, and placed within an American wing of philosophy suffering decline alongside pragmatism, Schiller is “twice removed” from any semblance of a place in a history which has already forgotten him.

In each of the four previous instances, Schiller’s work is framed in a thematic manner. Stack picks out Nietzschean nuances, Abel and Shields tend to focus on the logical components, 

60 This is particularly clear in his discussion of James and Schiller. In the space of several pages, Winetrout shifts Schiller’s role quite explicitly. First, he notes “Schiller was recognized by Peirce and especially by James as a progenitor and protector of pragmatism.” Then, while signaling the individual/psychological dimensions of Schiller and James, Winetrout inserts this comment: “This existentialist dimension in pragmatic philosophy has been rather thoroughly buried.” He furthers the blurring of social varieties of philosophy when he argues that his “point is that the existentialist, the personalist, and the individualist emphasis in early pragmatism gets buried beneath a persistent and comprehensive social consideration.” The shift from pragmatism to existentialism is finalized: “the basic quality in existentialist philosophy is its holding that the particular is more significant than the universal.” This after commenting only one paragraph prior: “Writing history is an all too open invitation to insert into the past that from the present which one would like to find there” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 22-5).

61 This shifting—from pragmatism to existentialism and back—reduces the ability to actually “place” Schiller within pragmatic history. Winetrout returns to signaling the pluralistic tendencies of Schiller as extensions of James—aggressively so in passages on pages 85 and 94—and the subjectivist emphasis as against Dewey—in the whole of “Schiller’s Philosophy as Subjectivism”—but he then collapses Schiller back into the pragmatic fold as if unaware of the disjunction, as a matter of mere placement or actual chronology, that results: “. . . the ready willingness in James, Dewey, Mead, Schiller and sometimes in Pierce, to treat big, thrilling problems that gave early pragmatism both a warmth and a vigor that is all too often missing in philosophy” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 145). What is striking is that Winetrout then engages in a switchback that actually suggests the problem he is exacerbating. He remains surprised that “Schiller’s niche in the 1960’s is scarcely more than an urn holding forgotten ceremonial ashes” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 146). If so, and here I full well agree, how likely is this sort of encomium to change things when he follows this up by suggesting, and note the final merger that occurs, this: “The hard core of existentialism (or to use a term more correct historically in the present context, personalism) in James and Schiller was buried beneath indifference to personalism by those who thought themselves followers of John Dewey” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 159).

62 Oddly enough, the only response I can find to this book paradoxically supports the types of philosophy that Winetrout dismisses and my own suspicions as to its effectiveness. Foster McMurray notes that Winetrout argues that “philosophy tends to be either of two different kinds of interest or content, such that a choice of one means having little or no commerce with the other” (Foster McMurray, review of F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism, by Kenneth Winetrout, Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 370). Winetrout’s by turns funny and candid reply directly follows: “Reply to Foster McMurray,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 379-82.
and Winetrouth highlights the relevance of individualistic/subjective aspects of Schiller’s work. The former takes a largely critical view based on specific aspects of Schiller’s philosophy; the latter three reach more positive assessments. What is missing in each of these is the wider scope of Schiller’s philosophy. This scope is hinted at by way of the introductory epigrams, all of which were sketched prior to 1900. There is only passing recognition that all of Schiller’s major scholarly pursuits were in place early in his career: his interest in psychical research dates back to the early 1880s, he began writing on eugenics in the 1890s, and the fundamental complaints against formal logic were in view by the early 1900s. They developed alongside, and interacted with, each other. His interest in psychical research can be seen as a fringe preoccupation; but Schiller took it to provide a potential rapprochement between religion and science. His interest in eugenics may be viewed as non-philosophical; but Schiller urged it as an

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63 For psychical research, see Chapter Two: F. C. S. Schiller, “Record of a Séance,” 20 June 1884, Notebook #12, n.p., 1882-1896, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “New Members and Associates,” Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 1 (December 1884): 117; “Oxford Branch of the Society for Psychical Research,” Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 1 (May 1885): 375. This interest in psychical research is tied to Schiller views of religion. And that interrelation seems to have occupied Schiller’s thinking from early in life. In 1900, a questionnaire was prepared by the British and American Societies for Psychical Research entitled “Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life.” Schiller’s 1901 personal response to the questionnaire is informative: “[I have] always [felt] (i.e. from the age of 8 or so) there must be a fut. Life (Life (reason Ilc) if the universe was to be rational – though of course I c’d not always have expressed it so clearly.” Ilc refers to his previous answer that it must exist because of “the cruelty + futility of the struggle if there is no future life.” He explains that those feelings “are now, + have been from childhood, very much moulded by my philosophic opinions.” Later, in the addendum relating to questions V. and VI., Schiller further elaborates: “I have doubted long + intensely (15-30 roughly) whether the world was rational. Nevertheless I have never seriously doubted the doctrine of immortality as far as I myself was concerned, having from the first (7 or 8) a deep seated feeling that my earthly existence was neither the beginning nor the end of my career. The agonizing question therefore was never ‘Is there a fut. Life?’ but ‘Of what sort is it?’ ‘Is it better better worth living than the present?’ Hence I sh'd long have preferred extinction, if I could have believed it possible, + I sh'd like to know + intend to try to find out” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Personal response to the questionnaire of the Society for Psychical Research on human sentiment regarding a future life,” n.p., 1901, Manuscripts and Proofs of Misc. Items, Box Seven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).

applied test of his philosophy. His suspicion that a logic for use was psychological at base can be viewed as an irrational fear of the formal; but Schiller understood the form of a statement to be predicated on valuations.

These sorts of interpretations are downplayed in the previous discussions for a variety of reasons. Chief among them is the nature of their design. Thematic treatments, especially those issuing from field-specific interests, tend to obscure the larger picture. In that way they helped to subtly advance the history told by the philosophers in the first section. An adversarial expose from outside the pragmatic fold is as good as a caustic dismissal from within. A sympathetic treatment that is based on the conventions that were being questioned is less likely to question those conventions. A revisionist picture meant to restore one’s place in the canon may actually do further damage to that figure’s position in history. This is not to suggest that each of their arguments don’t merit consideration or that this rhetorical biography does not run, in being less field specific, similar risks. Rather, it is to suggest that their observations can’t be taken as the sole or even primary reason that Schiller fell so quickly from the scene. There is, however, one aspect common to all their observations which gives way to the revised assessment that is about to be offered: Schiller’s style.

In the introduction it was suggested that style was being conceived of as both a process of constructing discourse and as a recognition of how discourse is accepted once constructed. In this section the focus is on how the former implicates the latter. Clearly the pragmatic histories in the previous section suggest the erasure of Schiller. But even here, in four specific attempts to

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64 The two components again suggest that style operates as “an analytical category for understanding a social reality” (Robert Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995], 9). But that understanding is predicated on how the social reality is constructed. This conception of style operates, then, as a matter of both ethos and pathos. In crafting an argument one wishes an audience to view the world and the rhetor in a certain way. How that message is received implicates how an audience views the world and the rhetor.
reinsert Schiller into the philosophical discussion, it is obvious that the construction of his arguments has been emphasized in attempting to interpret his philosophy. Whether promoting cobbled together Nietzsche, or misinterpreting logic, or being aligned with fading existentialism, all four augur that his manner of philosophizing: (1) brings Schiller to the attention of his peers, (2) leads to their interest in his work, and (3) demands the consideration of others.65 Could it be the case that his philosophical persona is the more salient fact in his rise and then fall?66 That it is not any one component of his philosophy, but the manner in which they were held together?

Recall that I suggested we would return to the third conclusion that Shields reached: that there are serious defects in Schiller’s logic and his philosophy in general. In explaining this

65 I wager that some readers will view my assertion as more in keeping with those (Abel, Winetrout, and to a lesser extent Shields) who wish to promote renewed interest in Schiller. But Stack, who clearly wishes to defame Schiller as a plagiarizer of Nietzsche, also fits my thesis. Stack provides this assessment of Schiller’s reception while in at Oxford: “His vitriolic attacks on Bradley, as well as his undiplomatic manner and attitude, made him an object of dislike at Oxford. Before the pragmatic movement gave sanction to his thought, and before he became part of it, Schiller was not taken too seriously and was considered as a clever literary gadfly. However his flair for philosophical polemic earned him a reputation as an enfant terrible” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 370). But, at least as Stack tells it, Schiller began importing Nietzsche into his works as early as Riddles of the Sphinx (1891): “To be sure, he had modified Nietzschean themes, has couched Nietzsche’s assertions in his own rhetorical style . . .” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 399). He suggests that all this was for naught, as Schiller was “overshadowed by James and Dewey and relegated to a minor role in the drama of pragmatism” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 372). If all three of these are the case, why then this concluding observation: “Much of what Peirce, James, and Dewey found stimulating, provocative, insightful, and challenging in Schiller’s writings was derived from the thought of Nietzsche. If my analysis . . . is valid, then the history of the pragmatic movement in philosophy must be rethought or revised” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s.” 406). The portrait is a confused one:

(1) Schiller is a clever literary gadfly who, prior to finding pragmatism, was
(2) providing a rhetorically stylized and plagiarized version of Nietzsche that was
(3) overshadowed by his peers, even though
(4) it was sufficiently integrated into their arguments to demand a rethinking of pragmatism.

My minor point is that this thematic treatment clearly exposes problems that can be resolved in a chronological one. Many of Stack’s contentions—which were previously discussed in some detail—devolve under the scrutiny that a thorough-going historical treatment can offer. My major point is that, for all his inconsistency, Stack focuses on Schiller’s reception as demonstrated by his style of presentation. Critical as he is of Schiller’s arguments, his focus remains largely on the rhetorical forms they take.

66 Searles, who co-authored Schiller’s bibliography with Shields, also reaches similar conclusions in two articles he published in the 1950s. In the first, he opines: “Just as James had been misunderstood because of his brilliant, concrete and dynamic vocabulary . . . Schiller had to contend with his critic’s misunderstandings of his volitionally toned vocabulary” (Herbert L. Searles, “Pragmatism Today,” Personalist 32 [1951]: 148). In the second, he concludes in Schiller’s favor in one specific way as regards history’s judgment: “As a writer of philosophical prose, I think it has already been decided in his favor” (Herbert L. Searles, “The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 35 [1954]: 24).
position, Shields goes on to point to the “subjectivist” components of Schiller’s philosophy as a key factor in this assessment. Then he inserts this comment: “Schiller’s essential method of procedure is persuasion and not conviction.” That a method focused on “definite formulae” would find this off-putting is understandable. That it begs consideration when the focus is on the rhetorical, and stylistic, aspects of Schiller’s philosophy is also clear. But Shields supplies more. Only pages earlier Shields had noted Schiller’s most important contributions to pragmatism and philosophy:

Schiller’s primary contributions lay not so much in the positive effect his logical theory had, as in the negative effect of his criticism of the idealists of formal logic, and of the generally stuffy atmosphere which was prevalent at the turn of century in England and on the continent. His was a yeoman’s labor in controversy with some of the top philosophers who were, so to speak, held over from the previous era. . . . More than this, Schiller was widely read as a popular philosopher. No doubt this was largely due to his literary style, rather than his Humanist philosophy. But perhaps most important, it was in no small measure due to Schiller’s propaganda that William James, and hence, Pragmatism, became, for a period of over ten years, one of the most discussed philosophies in both England and America.

There is much to consider in the transition between assessments. On the one hand, Schiller is faulted for adopting an approach that stressed winning converts to pragmatism’s fold. On the other, he is credited for both combating Idealism and bringing pragmatism to the attention of America and Europe. His larger impact, his “popular” side, was due to his style more than his philosophy.

This stylized, individualistic, approach sought to lay low the older forms to make way for the new theories. And it developed, as was put forth at the start of this section, in the context of his European surroundings. John Passmore notes the adversarial nature of this style:

67 Shields, “An Exposition,” 236. As evidence of this contention, Shields points to a surprising source: Schiller’s debates with J. Russell! The fact that this person was eventually moved to the pragmatist side seems, though a small victory, counter-intuitive as support for defect.

Schiller’s main work . . . was his lively defence of the pragmatic theory of truth. Himself an Oxford man, he was in revolt against the smugness and rigidity which, to his apprehension, Oxford encouraged and even extolled. His very style was a protest, the flippancy of his manner and the violence of his polemics induced even James to advise him to pay more attention to the academic proprieties.\textsuperscript{69}

Such a reactive style is not likely to engender lukewarm reactions. On the positive side, Flewelling comments that such polemics ruptured the “insularity of British philosophy.”\textsuperscript{70}

Schiller is thus “an iconoclast who took pleasure in the smashing of some very respectable fetishes, but he was more than that. He had the power so seldom possessed by idol-smashers, of putting something better in the place of the idol.”\textsuperscript{71} On the negative side, Schiller’s pleasure is turned into a perversity. McKie suggests that Schiller betrayed “a certain obstinacy in discussion, which an ungenerous critic might ascribe to a willful, even if only partial, blindness to the other fellow’s point of view.” This defect was coupled with a “perversity of style, not fairly describable, perhaps, either as a love of paradox or as a disregard for precise expression, but capable of looking like both.”\textsuperscript{72} In both cases, the assessments are not a matter of specific theories nor arguments; the evaluations are directed to the elements of Schiller’s style. What remains to be seen is the degree to which style factors into Schiller’s placement in the history of pragmatism.

\textsuperscript{69} Passmore, “Pragmatism and its European Analogues,” in A Hundred, 115. Wilbur Long’s comments regarding Schiller form an effective supplement to Passmore. He notes that Schiller claimed his polemic attacks were the result of “the climate of the time.” He also notes that Schiller was “better as a polemical critic than as a constructive and systematic mind.” And he implies that those stylistic traits, harnessed to the context of the time, were at play in reducing Schiller’s importance: “I considered Schiller a brilliant mind, amazingly informed and keen in debate, whose merits have been unusually discounted by posterity. . . . Much of what he fought for has become the common belief in our age, but he has received no credit for it” (in Shields, “Some Impressions,” 292-3).


\textsuperscript{71} Flewelling, “F. C. S.,” 8.

\textsuperscript{72} J. I. McKie, “Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937),” Mind 47, no. 185 (January 1938): 137.
8.3 ALL THAT IT CAN BE: REPETITION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN PRAGMATIST HISTORY

The answers to the three research questions are made easier by reference to the above discussion of style. The focus throughout has been on Schiller’s reception during his life. It is only in the conclusion that we have turned to his reception thereafter. But in both, in his squabbles with idealists and obfuscation at the hands of pragmatists, the style of Schiller’s pragmatic humanism has remained paramount: the development of his ideas, the venues in which they were discussed, and the reactions they engendered. Such details go a long way in validating this project. But a biography is only rhetorical in so far as it helps to establish “what is not already articulated in our current thinking.” That is to say, this project is predicated on persuading interested readers that Schiller remains relevant; it is not aimed at convincing critics that he was always right. The final portion of this study is, then, both a presentation of results and a suggestion of their consequences.

8.3.1 Why was Schiller so vigorously discussed in his time?

Schiller was such a central figure during the foundational years of pragmatism for both positive and negative reasons. Both relate to a species of style referenced in the introduction: repetition.

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74 The thrust of this point is made clear by reference to Kloppenberg’s comments at the close of Chapter One: “Just as people in the past selected parts of their experience to record and preserve in the records that they left us, we select parts of the past to examine and we choose how to tell our stories. But to admit that interpretation is important is not to claim that everything is interpretation. It is crucial that we historians be able to distinguish what happened from what did not, and what was written from what was not, and our discursive community must test its propositions in the widest range of public forums” (James T. Kloppenberg, “An Old Name for New Thinking?” in The Revival of Pragmatism, ed. Morris Dickstein [Durham: Duke University Press, 1998], 116).
Recall that repetition, like style, is traditionally conceived of from within the parameters of a set speech or text. Here, however, the assumed domain has been far larger: the entirety of Schiller’s philosophical career. This expansion has been warranted on several grounds. First, the stylistic elements of Schiller’s arguments have been in place since his time at Cornell. From the jottings in his notebooks which mocked the Broad Church Idealists, to the indignation expressed to Alfred Godley regarding a negative review of his contribution to Erdmann’s History of Philosophy, to his squabble with W. J. Wright about Lotze’s Monism, Schiller was already establishing the polemic which he then turned to a defense of pragmatism and humanism.

Second, it has also been noted that his chief interests were also in place around this time. Third,

75 This is certainly the case in the classical treatments. As Cicero states: “For there is sometimes force and in other cases charm in iteration of words, in slightly changing and altering a word, and in sometimes repeating the same word several times at the beginning of clauses and sometimes repeating the same word several times at their end” (Cicero De Oratore III, Loeb Classical Library, p. 165). George Campbell takes this further in suggesting the connection of this force to persuasion: “Passion naturally dwells on its object: the impassioned speaker always attempts to rise in expression; but when that is impracticable, he recurs to repetition and synonymy, and thereby in some measure produces the same effect. The hearer perceiving him, as it were, overpowered by his subject, and at a loss to find words adequate to the strength of his feelings, is by sympathy carried away with him, and enters into all his sentiments” (George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, book III [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963], 340).

76 F. C. S. Schiller, 8 May 1883, Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

77 Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 5 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford College, to A. D. Godley, 8 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Alfred Denis Godley, Magdalen College, to F. C. S. Schiller, 12 June 1890, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

and as yet not noted, the two taken together saw little substantial retreat throughout the remainder of his career. Thus Schiller provides a perfect case study of how both style and repetition are merged in the construction and reception of discourse.

The positive aspects of Schiller’s stylistic repetition should be obvious. As was noted in the introduction, repetition (repetitio) is used to: (1) clarify positions, (2) emphasize their importance, and (3) to arouse an emotional response. When turned to the causes of pragmatism and humanism, “dwelling on the point” (commoratio) of the challenge to the established tenets of Absolute Idealism was not only useful, it was necessary if pragmatists hoped to gain adherents (1 and 2). At the same time, Schiller saw the need to extend pragmatism’s and humanism’s range. So he turned to psychical research, eugenics, and logic. This “working out” (exergasia) of the applications of the new philosophy was meant also to broaden its appeal (3). This is in part the “popular” side of his philosophy that Shields referenced. And it is attested to in many reviews that his books received in the non-philosophical press. While not always glowing, there are numerous notices that praise Schiller, as a philosopher, for seeking to interact with a larger public. Simply put, in the formative years of pragmatism, its promotion—whether

79 Taking a cue from the singular instances referenced in the classical texts, repetition serves to motivate/persuade audiences that a concept is worth considering and acting upon. But, by way of amplification, repetition also serves to increase the sense that the concept is large enough to engender those changes in thought and action: “Repetition may be resorted to . . . when the object is to deepen the impression, and the magnitude of the theme will justify it.” By what route? The goal is “to seize upon the most prominent thought and hold attention upon it a long time” (E. O. Haven, Rhetoric: A Textbook [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1873], 210-11).

This “working out” is also what initially drew other European philosophers to pragmatism, where pragmatism was understood, aside from the variation being developed in France, as the creation of James and Schiller more than Peirce and James. The Italian Papini, acknowledging Schiller’s debt to James, was lead to say: “In the sleepy world of modern philosophy F. C. S. Schiller stands for an idea which is very simple, and has for that very reason been long forgotten: the idea that theories should lead to practical results” (Giovanni Papini, “F. C. S. Schiller,” in Four and Twenty Minds, trans. by Ernest Hatch Wilkins [New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1922], 62).

80 Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Manchester Guardian, 19 January 1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays, by F. C. S. Schiller, Dial, 1 July 1913, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1913, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles
psychological or social—was crucial to its survival as a legitimate counter to the Idealist strains of philosophy found in both England and America.

So, too, should the negative aspects of this repetition be visible. The very aspects of repetition that gained Schiller an initial measure of acclaim, came to grate on his reputation. Once James had died, the psychological wing of pragmatism was stunted. The social and logical wings of pragmatism experienced continued growth in the works of Dewey and Mead, and then figures such as Perry and Morris. Aside from a few supporters, such as Knox and Murray, Schiller was left to defend his conception of the Jamesian line of pragmatism in the form of humanism. Schiller was still discussed because he continued to discuss, to debate, and to defend his claim to the pragmatic pedigree. But the repetition, like his stature, underwent a transformation. Claims once found to be novel challenges now took on an aspect of tedium (“like speech”; homiologia), the refreshing tonic against logic began to seem tiresome (“the same saying”; tautologia). The very tendency which earned Schiller a measure of success as a popularizer gained him an equal dose of disdain from those who would determine his place in pragmatism’s history; that is to say, his intellectual public, other philosophers. Recall that Waterlow lambasted Schiller’s “self-conscious swagger,” his use of language that “is uniformly flabby and pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric.”

The amplification of a “will to believe” and a “right to postulate” came to be seen, like the

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commonplace disparagement of style, as mere repetition ("upon, to remain"); epimone). And later attempts to seek some degree of reconciliation—a willingness to again consider metaphysics, an attempt to provide a suggestion of Idealism’s worth—looked like a stumbling retreat.

82 Recall again that Morris all but stated that Schiller had become outdated. He claimed that Schiller’s Jamesian wing of pragmatism was in danger of becoming “of historical interest only, or merely an intellectual gymnasium where athletes of the mind attempt to reinvigorate timid and tired persons” (Charles W. Morris, review of Must Philosophers Disagree?, by F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 16, no. 4 [October 1935]: 390). This argument lead to Schiller’s attack on the “Chicago School” and its unwillingness to entertain anything but the Deweyian position in pragmatism (see also F. C. S. Schiller, “Must Pragmatists Disagree?” Personalist 17, no. 1 [January 1936]: 56-63; Charles W. Morris, “Professor Schiller and Pragmatism,” Personalist 17, no. 3 [July 1936]: 294-300).

Though Schiller’s complaints regarding the “Chicago School” struck Morris as impertinent, they have some basis in the actual documentation extending throughout Schiller’s career. As was noted in Chapter Eight, Schiller’s most basic complaint about Dewey had nothing to do with his philosophical positions; it had to do with his style. In a 1904 review of Studies in Logical Theory, Schiller notes that Dewey’s work “represents an independent attainment of the pragmatist point of view” with which he is in “fundamental agreement.” His criticism, however, is that the work is encumbered by “the strictly academic style,” “suffers from a certain amount of repetition,” and is not “fascinating in point of style” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Studies in Logical Theory, by John Dewey, Mind 13, no. 49 [January 1904]: 101; 105-6). And less than a year before Morris’s attack on his book Must Philosophers Disagree? Schiller was still defending Dewey’s work against supposed misinterpretations. He finds W. T. Feldman’s The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis to be written in a “rather patronizing tone” and, despite its “conscientious documentation and diligent ‘research,’” “disappointing” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis, by W. T. Feldman. Mind 44, no. 174 [April 1935]: 248). The fault, as he sees it, is that Feldman (a realist) is prodding Dewey (a logician) on points he doesn’t properly understand. Feldman responds that Schiller bases his argument in “the fine art of misquotation” (W. T. Feldman, “The Philosophy of John Dewey,” Mind 44, no. 176 [October 1935]: 550). Schiller’s terse reply is that all his points are amply demonstrated by reference to Feldman’s text (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Reply,” Mind 45, no. 177 [January1936]: 130).

Nor was Schiller necessarily at odds with the other American pragmatists even when he disagrees with the applications of their philosophies. In 1933, Schiller reviewed Kallen’s Individualism: An American Way of Life (1933). While Schiller clearly suggests that he believes it unlikely that democracy—by this point Schiller is full well in the midst of his eugenic/authoritarian stage of social philosophizing—will prove the salvation that Kallen portends, he augurs that the book “will obtain an extensive and enthusiastic hearing” (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Individualism: An American Way of Life, by Horace M. Kallen, Personalist 14, no. 4 [October 1933]: 302). The point is that Schiller’s anger at the American wing of pragmatism was a rather specific sort of indignation, based in criticizing: (1) those, like Morris, who would not provide him a place at the table of maturing pragmatism, or (2) those, like Perry and Weiss, who sought to distort and/or reframe James’s place in pragmatism’s lineage.

8.3.2 Why is he now so obviously not discussed?

In the introduction, I put forth a hypothesis central to this answer. It was that Schiller being alive constituted the single most important reason he is now neglected, that he was able to manage and massage his message. The facts of this project amend that estimation. In 1906, Sturt made this comment:

There is an extreme form of Voluntarism which is not content that man should bear part in moulding in his world, but would have him create it altogether. This Fichte’s line of thought we find implied, I believe in Mr. Canning Schiller. If it be so, my comment once more must be that a good tendency has overreached itself. The power of man, at least, has always the limitation that it cannot create something out of nothing.  

Sturt’s comments are suggestive of a theme that reoccurs in Schiller’s writings: personality. Taken narrowly, the concept implicates Schiller’s deeply held belief—bolstered by the philosophical and psychological suggestions of James—in the volitional power of humans to bend the world to their will. This is a conceptualization from which Schiller did not sway even as it was considered antiquated prior to his passing. But, considered more expansively, it also implicates the issues of reception brought forth in answering the previous question. In involves, on the one hand, the actual personalities entrusted to write pragmatism’s history after Schiller’s death. Given the social realities of the time, with pragmatism considered naïve and analytic philosophy on the rise, a “will to believe” lacked the requisite objectivity and rigor of method. On the other hand, it relates to Schiller’s style and how he, as a persona, was construed once he could no longer respond. Bluntly stated, to polemically accuse the new generation of

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84 Henry Sturt, *Idola Theatri* (London: Macmillan, 1906), 142. This is the same work in which Sturt argued that Schiller’s Riddles marked a turning point in British philosophy. The comparative reference is to German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) who, operating in the time between Kant and Hegel, is seen as a chief representative of idealist philosophy.

85 An extra-textual argument is to be had by reference to Schiller’s relationship to McTaggart. One of Schiller’s earliest criticisms of Idealist philosophy centered on the works of this family friend and idiosyncratic neo-
philosophers of being slavish sheep and/or fanciers of a new formalism is unlikely to be repaid with kind mention once the body has cooled.

As has been amply pointed out, Schiller spent the latter portion of his career doing two things: (1) defending his conception of Jamesian pragmatism, and (2) reiterating the components of his humanism. The second is inextricably linked to the first. This fact is pointed out in Dewey’s tribute to Schiller three months after his death. While Dewey praised Schiller for his

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86 Though this line of argument has already been discussed, it pays to recall just how interrelated were James’s and Schiller’s developing philosophical views. First, Schiller’s views of pragmatism and humanism are heavily influenced by the theories of psychology and empiricism articulated by James (see James’s definition of psychology, and his discussion of the Empirical [or Material and Social] Me and the Spiritual Me in: Psychology: Briefer Course [New York: Henry Holt, 1910; 1892], 1; 181; see also his definition of radical empiricism in The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [London: Longman, Green and Co., 1897], vii-iii).

But, secondly, James’s elaborations are based on suggestions brought forth by Schiller. That James should argue, given the times, that a Spiritual Me provides some stability to a variety of different selves is not the point. This is the Idealism without the Absolute on which James and Schiller both agreed. The point is that the relative self relates to a larger realm, a wider empiricism, in the relative world of social experience. And it is here where James, in the intervening years between the publications of Principles/the abridged Briefer Course and the Will to Believe, that we see Schiller’s influence. James’s next work, the 1898 second edition of Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine, contains a reference to the transmission theory espoused by Schiller in Riddles. James notes that “Schiller’s conception is much more complex” than his own. But the quotation which James provides relates to the interaction of the material and spiritual selves: “matter is an admirably calculated machinery for regulating, limiting, and restraining the consciousness which it encases” (William James, Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine, 2d ed. [New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1898], 66-7; for a more detailed discussion of Riddles and James’s psychological theories readers are directed to Chapter Two; as regards radical empiricism one is directed to Chapter Three).
assault on the teaching of logic in Britain, he also provided an argument as to why Schiller was
to be cleaved from the canon. He notes Schiller’s attraction to James. But Dewey then goes on
to put forth an argument that implicates Schiller’s dismissal, a la Morris. He comments that
Schiller claimed that a work should gladly suffer its own provisionality by proving itself out of
existence. Dewey grants that point as regards Schiller’s “dominantly psychological” approach to
philosophy and an approach to logic stamped with “mentalism and subjectivism.” The tribute
is an interesting one: Schiller’s assault on logic proved largely correct but that which sprung up
in its place was not to his liking.

Nor was the James that developed after Schiller’s death likely to have met with his
approval. The primary instigator of this revised James was Perry. Others have commented on
the fact that Perry’s James was tailored to be a version that led fluidly into Perry’s New
Realism. What has been ignored is how subtly the specter of Schiller was dissipated. Indeed,
it is easy to miss what Perry leaves out. Consider his introduction the 1947 edition of Essays in
Radical Empiricism; A Pluralistic Universe. In the preface he makes note of the changes
undertaken: “Four essays which appeared in the earlier edition of Essays in Radical Empiricism
are here omitted—IX, X, and XI because they are primarily controversial in nature, and XII


88 It is interesting to note that Dewey’s contribution to the canon of James is in the place most likely not to
cause him disturbance: he, alongside William H. Kilpatrick, produced an introduction to a new 1939 edition of Talks
to Teachers on Psychology. Their own quibble is with James’s view that schooling was by and large a “repellant”
and “dull” exercise (William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, new ed. [New York: Henry Holt, 1939], vi-
viii).

89 “[Perry’s] writing on James suffered because they tried to show that James was a metaphysical realist.
The reason for this misinterpretation was that, for Perry, parts of James’s greatness lay in his ‘anticipation’ of Perry
and other neo-Realists. But whatever distortions were created by Perry’s desire for a usable past, he quickly saw
that, properly interpreted, James’s radical empiricism would liberate American philosophy from its bondage to
Absolute Idealism” (Kuklick, The Rise, 340). One can find no clearer reference to the challenge Perry faced in
“distorting” James so as to purge Schiller.
because it dates from earlier years before the doctrine of Radical Empiricism had been matured." But consider the titles of the first two or the last one: “Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?,” Humanism and the Truth Once More,” and “Absolutism and Empiricism.” Each of these essays correspond to ones that Schiller wrote around the same time regarding the same topics. Brothers-in-arms are, in Perry’s masterful hands, held at arm’s length.

Consider also his introduction to a new 1948 edition of Psychology. He praises the work thusly: “Like the physiologist who refuses to reduce the living organism to the terms of chemistry, James refused to reduce the peculiar functions and capacities of conscious mind to a mental chemistry.” Here the organizing spiritual component of consciousness, the one that tended towards discussions of psychical research and immortality, is erased. In its place is the analogy to the scientist, to a search within the objective realm for factors which do not render the human purely mechanical. The shift is away from controversy and towards synthesis, a retreat from the subjective towards the objective end of psychology. It recalls the discussions of Shields and Abel, wherein the psychological and personalistic are not construed as another way, but as the wrong way.

Wrong, also, according to the needs of the time. Morton White and Winetrout may indeed be right that the 1930s were a time when the rise of formalism eclipsed the practical nature of pragmatism. The next three decades were a time when pragmatism needed to be

90 Ralph Barton Perry, preface to Radical Empiricism: A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947), v.

91 There is no need to belabor the point, other than to add that to the first one can add Schiller’s “Is Absolute Idealism Solipsistic?” (Journal of Philosophy, 1906), to the second—which is referenced in Chapter Three—one can add the larger discussion to which Schiller contributed “The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and Humanism” (Mind, 1905), and to the third there is Schiller’s “Empiricism and the Absolute” (Mind, 1905).

distilled into a heady brew rising to meet the challenges brought on by the Cold War and the turn to analytic philosophy. The social histories worked hard to make American philosophy just that, American. The resulting shift then tends to skew towards those that can be framed as American (recall the “existential” struggle of Winetrout) or reframed as an acceptable precursor (the traditional canon of British empiricism which James modified to suit his groundbreaking *Psychology*). The good tale told well proved both useful and persuasive; contemporary accounts that recover the history of pragmatism retell the narrative put in place at this time.93

Here again, though, we confront Schiller’s personality and style. For, even supposing that the crafting of American pragmatism was (1) consciously done in response to (2) the realities of the time, Schiller is in no small measure to blame for his removal. That which kept him in play while alive certainly contributed to the silence when he was dead. Schiller’s writings are littered with breaches, humorous though they may be, of decorum. And the consistency of his interests suggests that he disregarded the limitations of the “opportune moment” (kairos).94

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93 The introduction provides ample contemporaneous examples of Schiller’s exclusion. But other texts prove informative as well, especially as relates to the changes brought about by war and new philosophical pursuits. In *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920*, Kloppenberg candidly admits that his story of leaves out persons such as Bradley and Schiller. Yet his treatment of James deserves consideration. In a lucid section entitled “Political Reform and the Role of Intellects,” he presses the fact that James considered dabbling in political issues outside the scope of proper philosophical inquiry. He is thus able to conclude that “the philosophers of the via media were not reformers” (James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1986], 161). The problem, however, is that Chapter Three amply demonstrated that James’s chief complaints to Schiller, aside from style, were that he: (1) developed a systematic statement, and (2) expanded the social applications of pragmatic humanism (readers are directed to James’s favorable note: “I relished your Eugenic paper greatly, and am glad you are extending thus the area which your wing’s cover” [William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 4 May 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Department of Special Collections, Cecil H. Green Library-Bing Wing, Stanford University, Stanford]).

94 Decorum relates to the appropriateness of the presentation whereas kairos relate to the timing of the presentation. But, as regards both, repetition is important: “The difference between judicious and injudicious repetition is not so much in the amount of repetition as in the selection of the place for it, and in the skill or the want of skill with which it is managed” (Adams Sherman Hill, *The Principles of Rhetoric*, new ed. [New York: American Book Company, 1895], 312). Complaints about Schiller, as far back as his debates with Bradley, note that he is prone to stylistic violations such as: vulgarity (“deliberately foul language,” aischronologia), excessively ornate language (“exceedingly, to work,” periergia), pomposity (“self-aggrandizing language,” bomphiologia), exaggeration (hyperbole), and avoiding the issue under discussion (“other, kind,” heterogenium). So, once the
In an odd twist, Schiller’s personality-driven humanism could not sustain itself once that personality was gone. By the time of his death, Schiller was no longer the announcer of a new philosophy, but an annoyance to those carrying it forward. Schiller—the idealist tinged dabbler in eugenics and psychical research—was as much a hard sell as a tough fit in this era where pragmatism struggled under the dismissive labels of optimistic and popular (as regards vulgar taste, not philosophical reception).

8.3.3 How do the previous two questions interact; how might they relate to and enrich the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a philosophical concept?

To this point, his contemporary relevance has been only been posited enthymematically; that is to say, the object has been to understand Schiller in context of his arguments, not by the imposition of current issues. But what he can offer to the current discussion of pragmatism is manifold. On the most basic level, Schiller helps to more completely fill in the origin tale by virtue of the role he played. After Peirce and before Dewey, Schiller served as one of the two primary linchpins of pragmatism. His were the most consistent, and insistent, arguments against the formalism and abstraction prevalent in both British and American philosophy. As against critics such as Lovejoy who desired for uniformity,95 Schiller championed a plurality of methods that might prove useful and, as such, pragmatic. As against foes such as Bradley who would render the world mere appearance, Schiller urged for a world that waited merely for our initial ground-clearing had been done to establish pragmatism (and humanism) as a proper object of consideration, many of his even potentially valid arguments were discounted. When he challenged the depictions of James and Peirce being bandied about towards the end of his career, he often employed the tactic of referencing his firsthand knowledge of James’s philosophy (“again, to put in mind,” anamnesis). But it backfired. He was instead seen as trying to argue for his position, vainly repeating old arguments (battologia) rather than advancing new ones.

95 Readers are again directed to Chapter Four: Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 29-39.
intercession on its behalf. If not for such arguments, often biting and occasionally off-putting, the attention then displayed and scrutiny now paid to pragmatism might be far different. Not that reading Schiller back in takes much effort when one considers where our interests and his meet.

At the intersection of both Philosophy and Rhetoric, Schiller’s exemplar Protagoras greets a renewed interest in the interaction between rhetoric and sophistry, the classical tension between the Actual and the Ideal as regards conceptions of truth. Such interest can force a rather hard dichotomy: textual rigor versus imaginative interpretation. A colorful example of this sort of debate occurs between Edward Schiappa and John Poulakos. In the 1990 Philosophy and Rhetoric article “Neo-Sophistical Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?,” Schiappa urges for a “historical reconstruction of sophistic doctrines."96 He does so by reference to an admittedly difficult sticking point: the term rhetoric does not appear in the works of the Sophists. As such, Schiappa posits that the reconstruction proceed by examining the “incipient ‘rhetorical theories’” that were developed in individual Sophist’s extant texts.97 In the same issue, Poulakos points to a more interpretative view in “Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa.” He argues that a close-text approach locks the Sophists in amber of a suspect sort; he sees Schiappa’s approach as a celebration of the Sophists “after mummifying them by academically sanctioned methods."98 But is this not the same sort

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97 Schiappa, “Neo-Sophistical,” 209.
of quarrel into which Schiller stridently placed himself when he held up his imaginative
Protagoras to the glare of the Greek scholar Burnet?99

And the process of contesting and reclaiming the Sophists continues to the present day,
and is furthered by references to pragmatism. A more recent discussion of a specific Sophist,
Gorgias, takes exception to the methods of both Schiappa and Poulakos. In Gorgias: Sophist
and Artist (2001), Scott Consigny takes an alternative view from a person not unfamiliar to
current pragmatists, Stanley Fish. He uses Fish’s “interpretative community” as the basis for
establishing “the criteria for assessing any reading.”100 And Mailloux, in Reception Histories:
Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Studies (1998), places, albeit incidentally, each of
the above debates within the grooves of this very project when he comments: “As notable as the
return of sophistic rhetoric, there has also been a significant renewal of American
pragmatism.”101 Schiller, to my mind, stands as a provocative source of further discussion as
scholars continue to parse out the relationship between Plato, Aristotle, those that came before,
and those that came after.

In the area of science, his work on the tentativeness of scientific discoveries aligns with
work being done in the Rhetoric of Science/Inquiry, the Philosophy of Science, and the History
of the Philosophy of Science.102 Rorty, for instance, bases many of his pragmatic arguments on

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99 See Chapter Five: F. C. S. Schiller, Plato or Protagoras? (Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1908); John Burnet,
review of Plato or Protagoras: being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the ‘Theaetetus’ with some
Remarks upon Error, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17, no. 67 (July 1908): 422-3; F. C. S. Schiller, “Plato or
Protagoras?” Mind 17, no. 68 (October 1908): 518-26.

100 Scott Consigny, Gorgias: Sophist and Artist (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 17.

101 Mailloux, Reception. 21.

102 “Axioms as Postulates,” which has already been referenced in this chapter, stands as the clearest
argument of this sort offered by Schiller. But two others also deserve consideration; see Chapters Five and Six: F.
eliminating the dichotomy between the objective and subjective. In his contribution to The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences (1987), “Science as Solidarity,” Rorty avers: “We need a way of explaining why the scientists are, and deserve to be, moral exemplars which does not depend on a distinction between objective fact and something softer, squishier, and more dubious.” In the same collection, Charles W. Anderson contributes “Human Sciences and the Liberal Polity in Rhetorical Relationship.” He readily aligns pragmatism with liberal and democratic themes thought to adhere in conceptions of science and politics. And, with Rorty, he bases his extensive analysis on refuting those who would “see the task of science and scholarship as putting an end to argument through the discovery rationally unassailable principles or empirically validated truths about the nature and destiny of man.” Schiller would likely add substance to Rorty’s call to remove the objective veil. And, complicating matters, Schiller supplies a far earlier attack on ideas that, given Anderson’s concerns, have yet to be answered.


105 Anderson’s concerns are not solely his own. Others also hold to fears that Schiller attempted to do away with some seventy years ago. As a further result, the reintroduction of Schiller into the discussion of what pragmatism means might also help theorists overcome deficits in their understanding of the same. As against Deweyian versions of the fact-value distinction, Steve Fuller argues that by use of concepts from the Scottish Enlightenment we can improve pragmatic understandings of what constitutes a norm. On this ground, he suggests that his analysis is “logically prior” to the pragmatic and, by being much clearer, overcomes pragmatism’s “shortcomings.” But what, pray tell, is the payoff? Simply put, that it goes beyond “codifying” norms as “regularities” in the pragmatic account. Instead, Fuller argues that norms “are rarely the most efficient means by which a given agent could pursue her ends” and it is thus “essential that we know the social environments in which these imperatives were operative.” All good points given that he, like Anderson, is worried about those wrong-headed philosophers still dealing in Kantian “unconditional” norms (Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge [Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1993], 263-8).

It should be added, of course, that the sorts of questions raised by Anderson and Fuller increasingly spill out into the popular press. A recent debate on the theory and practice of science—with a specific emphasis on “purely theoretical” versions of physics—can be found in: John Hogan, “Einstein has left the Building,” New York
There are also elements of Schiller’s arguments in support of eugenics that are still being considered. I realize it may at first seem odious to suggest we revisit eugenics. The history of intolerance promoted under than awning inspires well-deserved revulsion. But such loathing can also inspire a rather hasty examination of the historical ledger. In Chapter Five, Hasian’s *The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought* (1996) and Condit’s *The Meaning of the Gene* (1999) were discussed as regards the discrepancy between popular support and numerical membership in various eugenics ventures. Here, again, their work proves invaluable. Hasian, in discussing the controversial issues raised by Human Genome Project, sounds a pessimistic alarm: “what we will have to deal with is a return visit by a revised form of eugenics that is just beginning to be critiqued.” Less ominously, though no less critically, Condit offers this observation as regards gene therapy: “Good bets can be placed on our eventually overcoming what appear now to be insurmountable obstacles to gene therapy. However, the good bet also holds that they will not be overcome with a single magic bullet, but rather in fits and starts with techniques adapted to particular conditions and organs.” Schiller’s defense of eugenics was racist, sexist, classist, and based in flawed science. But these and other contemporary and contentious debates on issues ranging from stem cell research to genetic engineering hold to variations on themes advanced by Schiller and others. Schiller may remain a historical

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108 Other smaller issues are now also discussed, albeit without the label of eugenics, as commonsensical. In 1930 Schiller suggested that the children of the wealthy need to be taught to value that wealth; as recently as 2005 that very same issue, using similar arguments, was addressed in a local newspaper: F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenical
footnote; but his involvement in the discussions that lead to these contested scientific advances can add another important historical element: context.

In the area of religion, Schiller’s belief in immortality, in a future life, may strike some as quaint holdovers of a Victorian sort. But his willingness to explore what is taken on faith by a variety of religions suggests a wider view than his conservative Anglican upbringing would support. What’s more, the connection of pragmatism to religion is a strong and varied one. One need only look to a contemporary collection that explores the connections between pragmatism and religion to see its variety, but also Schiller’s potential for input. In Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism (1995), editors Robert Hollinger and David Depew hug to the well told narrative. Two essays, however, stand out as regards the connection between pragmatism and religion. The first, Casey Nelson Blake’s “The Perils of Personality: Lewis Mumford and Politics after Liberalism,” provides for a comparative instance of exclusion. Mumford, it pays to recall, is the one dismissed by Mills for his understanding of pragmatism. Blake argues that Mumford, taking Herman Melville as his exemplar, confronted the emptiness of American liberalism and tried to find a way out of the resulting “inescapable sense of loss.” His answer was religion; but it was “a religion of culture . . . conceived as [an] inherently dynamic, self-critical, and self-limiting form of human endeavor.”

109 James’s “philosophizing was unabashedly psychologistic,” was an attempt to take the ideas in The Principles of Psychology and “to revise and radicalize the tradition of British psychological empiricism.” It is Dewey who makes the decision to retreat from “the idealistic versions of democratic Hegelianism” in the 1890s (Robert Hollinger and David Depew, eds., Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism [Westport: Praeger, 1995], 5; 8-9).

with a different sort of loss, also turned to towards the spiritual when confronting the riddles of the world.

The second essay draws us even closer to a discussion of Schiller. Konstantin Kolenda’s “American Pragmatism and the Humanist Tradition,” like the works of Mailloux, can’t resist the pull of the American nameplate. Kolenda provides a passing reference to Schiller, noting that he demonstrated “the capacity of philosophy to produce intellectual delight.” What is unintentionally, I assume, illuminating is what occurs after this reference. The very next section is entitled “The Humanism of Pragmatism.” But the delightful Schiller is nowhere to be found. Kolenda, in discussing the open religious systems of pragmatism a few pages later, transforms the nameplate into the familiar template utilized in many discussions of religion and pragmatism: Peirce, James and Dewey.111 Blake and Kolenda remind us that the places where Schiller’s thoughts might inspire contemporary resonance are at once easy to see, yet hard to find.

In both religion and science, working Schiller into the dialogue—and enriching the same—is not difficult given the currency of his interests. It would be interesting to imagine Schiller’s response to two claims made by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989): (1) “the underlying strategy of James’s utilitarian/pragmatist philosophy of religion is to privatize religion”; (2) “But since religion has aims other than gratification of our need to predict and control it is not clear that there need be a quarrel between religion and orthodox, atoms-and-void science.”112 The first, as others have elsewhere noted about Rorty’s pragmatism generally, seems in keeping with his project to, ahem, privatize pragmatism. The second, however, raises

112 Rorty, Contingency, 149-50.
an issue which Schiller would complicate: to what extent do religion and science work together to create a subjective/predictive appraisal of how to control society?

Humorously, a person who takes umbrage at Rorty’s views of science and religion is none other than Schiller’s old foe, Hartshorne. In Rorty & Pragmatism (1995), he calls Rorty’s views “vaguely generalized metaphysical agnosticism.” And then, sounding partly like the aging Schiller, Hartshorne explains his views in context of a world awash in threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical destruction: “My ethics, which has a metaphysical aspect, tells me that . . . we are obligated to do the best we can with a situation one would not have chosen to be in, but which has been brought about by freedom, the source of both good and evil.”113 Though Schiller’s was a thoroughly personalized metaphysic, it was no less an attempt to navigate a tenuous world than Hartshorne’s. Schiller offers a window into far more optimistic debates about the limits of faith and reason.114 He affords us a compelling historical instance of trying to reconcile what are now, more and unfortunately more, seen as divided by an ideological chasm.

113 Charles Hartshorne, “Rorty’s Pragmatism & Farwell to the Age of Faith & Enlightenment,” in Rorty & Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics [Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 1995], 24; 27-8. Rorty acknowledges the inspiration he found in Hartshorne’s work while he was a student at Chicago. But he then responds in a manner not unlike Schiller, urging that Hartshorne—with the religious and scientific—finds too much objective correspondence in reality for his taste (Richard Rorty, “Response to Hartshorne,” in Rorty, 33).

114 Readers are directed to Chapter Two: F. C. S. Schiller, “Darwinism and Design,” Contemporary Review 71 (June 1897): 867-83. As with eugenics, Schiller’s concerns have proven contemporary relevance. One of the more recent references—albeit lifted almost verbatim from the Oxford English Dictionary—to Schiller, intelligent design, and the above article is found in: William Safire, “Neo-Creo,” New York Times Magazine, 21 August 2005. To be clear, the text that Safire references does not include the title of the article, as it references the articles 1903 republication in Humanism; please see Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2d ed., s. v. “Intelligence, Draft Additions,” September 2003. At the very least, the proper date was supplied in newspaper and journal articles that picked up on Safire’s reference in the months that followed (as an example, see “By Accident or Design?” Globe and Mail, 28 September 2005). For a related argument-cum-book review about the current controversy surrounding intelligent design, readers are directed to Judith Shulevitz, “When Cosmologies Collide,” New York Times Book Review, 22 January 2006. Readers skeptical as to its relevance need only refer to the subtitle: “If Darwinism is such a powerful explanation, why won’t creationism go away? Perhaps some of the fault lies with evolutionists themselves.”
Schiller also point historians of pragmatism to the numerous other actors whose roles have been obscured. No historical treatment, rhetorical or otherwise, should or likely can deal in all the details, discuss all the personalities. But realizing the centrality of Schiller’s involvement in pragmatism necessarily extends the possible inquiry into others who have been forgotten. Within pragmatism proper, the likes of Goldstein, Knox, and Papini admit of other stories worth considering, other aspects of pragmatism in need of retelling. Outside of pragmatism, Personal Idealists such as Sturt, logicians such as Sidgwick, and psychologists such as Myers provided instances of productive interaction, and at times conflict, which have been downplayed. The contemporaneous history of pragmatism admits of an ever expanding diversity of players. By being so generous in adopting, it seems fair that it should be the same in rediscovering.

With the research questions answered and potential areas of future research addressed, we can turn to a final consideration of rhetorical biography. The introduction argued that this was a species of a much larger genus, rhetorical criticism. It was further noted that both are under-utilized as critical tools for examining historical artifacts, debates, and personalities in what has come to be known as the study of “the history of ideas.” The goal, then, has been to highlight the utility of these critical methods by way of contemporary revisions. Those revisions have been twofold: (1) the expansion of the traditional canon of style, specifically the figure of repetition, to encompass more than the set speech or text, and (2) the use of reception studies to buttress the analysis of the arguments undertaken by, and about, Schiller. While Schiller’s style—with its emphasis on polemic and the reiteration of key topics—played an important role in the origins of pragmatism, it was those very same tendencies that resulted in a shift away from him once he died. And it is by reference to the arguments themselves—public and private, altered and unaltered, assuredly trivial and surprisingly topical—that we obtain a greater measure
of certainty as regards the importance of those rhetorical strategies. The result, I argue, is a more thorough understanding of the importance rhetorical choices make in crafting persuasive arguments.

These observations are all as much subjective appraisals as they are renderings of the objective details. And no assessment, particularly one that lays claim to pragmatism, can obscure the valuation inherent in this endeavor. After all is written, Fish can still argue that pragmatism implies nothing and Kloppenberg is free to press the democratic connections. Because pragmatism—as a historical movement, as a philosophical method, as a contemporary object of inquiry—is not predicated on any one argument. Rather, pragmatism is a concept that will continue to be rhetorically negotiated by the participants and their arguments. Thus the aim of this project may seem paradoxically meager and grand. As much as this is the study of one man, it is also a plea for a wider view than currently held as regards pragmatism. And this appeal runs up against an obvious obstacle. Welcoming back into the fold a person who so notably banished others requires a degree of tolerance. But such tolerance, insofar as it remains cognizant of the costs and benefits of defending Schiller’s pragmatic humanism, is useful. For a revised history of pragmatism is meant to expand, not restrict, the options of those who find merit in its claims.

The Agnostic
The man, who knows, he cannot know
Knows all, he knows, + all, he knows, not too
Oh wondrous knowledge let him go,
He knows too much, I know, for me or you.115

115 F. C. S. Schiller, Notebook #1, n.p., n.d., Holograph Notebooks, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
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