The Importance of 'Rational' Voters for Electoral Accountability in Highly Institutionalized Party Systems

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It has been argued that "institutionalization" facilitates *vertical* accountability by providing for strong national parties, with somewhat deep roots in the society. In such settings, citizens with varying combinations of societal characteristics (i.e. race, religion, income, etc.) would be able to identify which party represents their cleavage-generated interests and vote for them, or vote them out of office if they fail their 'mandate.'

Voting for the party that represents one's cleavage-generated interests would make the system more stable, since there would be regularity in the way people vote. However, that may not provide the flexibility in voting behavior necessary for vertical accountability to occur. Instead of voters with strong (affective) attachment to a party, vertical accountability would rather require voters that cast their vote based on less stable characteristics of a party such as its past performance, president's evaluation, candidates' quality, and other issues argued by *rational-choice* theorists to be more important than an affective attachment.

This dissertation research tested this hypothesis using survey data from Honduras that registered the voting behavior of different partisans during the national elections of 1997 and 2001. This research found that "rational" voters (moderate partisans and independents) did incorporate the electoral flexibility necessary for electoral accountability. They also exhibited distinctive characteristics that confirm their responsibility for electoral accountability. *Rational*

voters were more likely than *affective* voters to have higher levels of education and political knowledge and to be more critical of the president's performance, among other related attitudes.

Notwithstanding the fact that Honduras has a highly institutionalized party system, the mechanisms through which electoral accountability came about were mainly abstention to vote for one's party and, to a much lesser extent, vote-switching. Thus, voting abstention may not necessarily be an undesirable voting behavior since it may actually play a key role in the realization of electoral accountability.

In summary, this research proved that "affective" voters may provide the system with stability, but that "rational" voters are necessary for the flexibility required for electoral accountability.

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PREFACE

Even though I am this dissertation's author, I do not deserve all the credit. Most of it must go to God and my mother, for whom I am alive. To my wife Liza and my children Marcela, José, Isaac and Sara, for their immense patience, love and support. To my academic advisors Mitchell A. Seligson and Anibal Pérez-Liñan for their committed support and their vast knowledge and invaluable advice. And to others throughout the years, all to whom I owe my sincere gtude.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A major concern regarding the new democracies in Latin America is their prospect for survival and consolidation into democratic regimes (e.g. O'Donnell 1992; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). It has been argued that a primary requirement for this to happen is the development of effective and successful democratic political institutions, or "institutionalization" (O'Donnell 1998a; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). An institutionalized political system would facilitate good governance through the existence and proper working of institutions, including democratic accountability.

Democratic accountability is deemed as a central feature of representative democracies (Schmitter and Karl 1991). It encourages the government to abide by the laws and to be responsive to the interests of the people, or "representative" (Przeworski *et al.,* 1999). Governments can be held accountable through the interplay of independent powers such as the Legislature and the Courts (horizontal accountability), c*ivil society* (societal accountability), and/or through elections (vertical accountability) (Mainwaring and Welna 2003; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000; Przeworski *et al.,* 1999).[1] An *institutionalized* democratic system would

[1] For an analysis of the differences and interconnection between the *accountabilities* refer to Guillermo O'Donnell's *Notes on Various Accountabilities and their Interrelations*, in Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006).

facilitate both horizontal and vertical forms of accountability by providing effective mechanisms and institutions (e.g. courts, electoral rules, etc.) for their exercise.

Vertical accountability, more specifically, means that citizens (voters) vote to reward representative governments or to sanction unrepresentative ones (Przeworski *et al.,* 1999). According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the institutionalization of the party system aids vertical accountability in two main ways: 1) through the development of strong (national) parties with somewhat deep roots in the society, which would in turn allow voters to better identify the political ideology/platform of each option; and 2) by providing legitimate mechanisms to decide who are to govern.[2] In this way, voters can identify which party would better represent their interests so that they can vote the party in office, or vote it out if the party-in-government fails to be responsive to their interests, or "mandate" (Manin *et al.*, 1999).

There is, however, a problem with this view, particularly in two-party systems (e.g. in the United States). Political parties tend to be aligned along the left-right ideological spectrum and to have somewhat opposing views on issues (e.g. abortion, environment, taxes, etc.). They also tend to have differentiated constituencies, somewhat divided along demographic cleavages (e.g. race/ethnicity, income, religious beliefs, etc.).[3] And since political parties' position on issues does not change overnight, nor does so voters' demographics and interests, most members of a

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[2] According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995,5), four conditions must exist for a democratic party system to be institutionalized:

1. stability in the rules and the nature of inter-party competition.
2. major parties must have somewhat stable roots in society, otherwise there will be no regularity in how people vote.
3. legitimacy of elections and parties as vehicles to power
4. well organized, autonomous, national, democratic parties

[3] For a review of the sociological view of party identification, refer to Lipset (1959) and Smith (1997).

party's constituency will tend to prefer and vote for *their* particular party, election after election (e.g. individuals who are pro-choice and/or pro-environmental regulation will most likely tend to vote for the Democratic party, in the United States, election after election).

Furthermore, parties with deep roots in the society tend to have partisans better typified by the *sociological* and *psychological* approaches to party identification.[4] Thus, voters with a strong party identification (with an *affective* attachment to a particular party) will be more likely to vote for their "own" party, election after election, instead of switching parties at elections, even in the presence of unrepresentative governments (Schedler 1995).[5] Therefore, an institutionalized party system with strong parties and too deep "roots in the society" would make vertical accountability harder to realize.[6]

Also, a primarily *affective* party identification among the electorate might be conductive to more biased political perceptions and attitudes (Bartels 2002; Bond and Fleisher 2001).[7] This bias could make strong partisans less likely to criticize their party-in-government's policies and actions and to hold them accountable (e.g. the reluctance of republicans to criticize the war in

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[4] According to the *psychological* view party identification, "partisanship" is formed early in life, through the process of political socialization, and remains fairly stable throughout adulthood (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). Party identification, then, tend to become part of one's identity, and the attachment to the party becomes more *affective* rather than *rational* (Greene 2004; Bartels 2002).

5 For instance, John Podhoretz argues that, during the midterm elections of 2006, "more than 90 percent of Republican voters cast their ballot for GOP candidates, and turnout was high. GOP voters didn't revolt against the Republican Party. Independent and conservative Democrats did." (Podhoretz, John. 2006. "Double Thump: GOP Woes Deepening." New York Post, December 9).

[6] Low levels of electoral volatility may not always be the result of strong party identification. Stable voting behavior can coexist with fading party attachment among the electorate if there are no viable electoral alternatives (Schedler 1995).

[7] Party identification strongly influences partisans' evaluation of the economy as well as the President's performance, in spite of shared factual information such as macro-economic variables. As a result, [*affective*] partisan identification becomes a "filtering mechanism" that decides which information an individual chooses to receive and accept, while rejecting "opposite" views (Bond and Fleisher 2001,531).

Iraq); and might therefore make the parties more likely to care less about the potential negative effects of a poor performance when the party is in power (Schedler 1995).

This may be particularly true in the new democracies of Latin America. Most of these democratic regimes have been characterized by their 'hybrid' nature, in which democratic elements coexist with authoritarian ones and the rule of law has not been yet fully established (Karl 1995; O'Donnell 1998b; Mendez *et al.*, 1999; Taylor-Robinson 2001). In these regimes, the law does not reign supreme but the political elites (Bunce 2000; Diamond *et al*., 1999; Coppedge 1998). If supported by an "affective" majority of the electorate, political elites would be less likely to be held accountable through elections (vertical accountability) and, if there is no rule of law, they would not be held accountable through the courts either (Karl 1995; O'Donnell 1998a; Mendez *et al*., 1999). Therefore, in such scenario, strong parties and partisans might become a burden rather than a positive element for democratic deepening and consolidation (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Diamond *et al*., 1999).[8]

Hence, vertical accountability and democratic consolidation may be possible only if the parties' roots in the society are not too pervasive. In fact, vertical accountability can only be possible if a considerable portion of the electorate has weak or no *affective* party identification at all, constituting a "rational minority" instead.[9] Yet, an institutionalized party system and a

[8] Colombia and Venezuela are argued to have (had) well institutionalized parties, as it is the case of Honduras, but their democracy have suffered nevertheless due to rigid voting patterns and lack of accountability and responsiveness.

[9] The term "rational" refers to the kind of partisans (voters) portrayed by the "rational-choice" view of partisanship. According to this view, partisanship is considered to be determined more by "a running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance" (Fiorina 1981,84), preferences for party policies (Franklin and Jackson, 1983), and candidate evaluations (Rapoport 1997), rather than by an *affective* identification with a party (as argued by the *psychological* view).

"rational minority" need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, they may be complementary. While "rational" voters may be required to provide “flexible” voting, thus making electoral accountability possible, strong parties and partisans may be necessary to provide stability to the political system.

1.1 PURPOSE OF REASERCH

In light of the arguments above, it becomes evident the importance of examining how the relative prevalence and political behavior of ‘affective’ and ‘rational’ voters in the electorate play a role in the realization of electoral accountability in Latin America. And that is the purpose of this research.

Perhaps, the best country in the region to examine how important is the existence of a rational minority for electoral accountability is Honduras. Like the United States, Honduras is a two-party presidential system with a *liberal* and *conservative* divide, which has existed since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century (Bendell 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995).[10] And despite shortcomings regarding the rule of law, Honduras is considered to have the second most institutionalized party system in Latin America (Payne *et al*., 2002,143). In fact, Honduras’ two traditional parties (*Partido Liberal* and *Partido Nacional*) have such historically deep roots in

10 Uruguay, Colombia, Paraguay and Honduras "are the only four countries in which the traditional nineteenth-century parties formed the core of the party system well into the twenty century" (Mainwaring and Scully 1995,18).

society that they have obtained, combined, more than 95% of the total of valid votes in each presidential election since the mid-Twentieth Century.[11]

Despite the traditional parties' deep roots in society, Honduras has also experienced four alternate party turnovers during the past 25 years of democratically elected governments; two in favor of the Partido Nacional (PN) and two in favor of the Partido Liberal (PL). Some of those turnovers have exhibited large differences between the two major parties in terms of their respective share of the national vote. These large electoral swings may present excellent opportunities to uncover the causes and dynamics of change in the voting preferences of the electorate as a whole. Moreover, the existence of a national survey of public opinion capturing voting behavior during two consecutive elections, with a turnover of the party in power, makes possible the analysis of the voting behavior of individuals over time. All these factors make Honduras the best laboratory to conduct the proposed study.

In summary, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: (1) what are the social cleavages determining *liberal* and *conservative* party identification in Honduras (how deep the roots-in-society go)? (2) Who are and what are the differentiating characteristics of *affective* and *rational* voters in Honduras (i.e. strong partisans, moderate partisans, and independents)? (3) How pervasive is the effect of an *affective* party ID in shaping biased attitudes among Hondurans toward their political system, as compared to "rational" voters? And, (4) to what extent there exists a "rational minority" in Honduras and how has it contributed to democratic (vertical)

[11] There are three more political parties that also content in the Honduran elections: the Partido Innovación y Unidad – Social Demócrata (PINU-SD), the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDCH), and the Partido Unificación Democrática (UD). Together, they have obtained less than 5% of the total valid votes.

accountability? These major research questions are the core of this dissertation and will be addressed separately in the chapters ahead.

1.2 DATA AND CONCEPTS

1.2.1 Data

There are two main data sets on which this research project is based: 1) the Honduran official electoral statistics (HES) for the Presidential elections, from 1981 to 2005 (seven elections) and 2) a Honduras public opinion national survey (HPOS-2001) conducted in early 2001 but recording voting behavior during the 1997 and 2001 national elections.[12]

The first data set, the Honduran electoral statistics (HES), are the official electoral results reported for each election by the *Tribunal Supremo Electoral* (TSE), the national electoral board of Honduras. The HES provides the actual number of registered voters, and the counts for valid, null, and blank votes. All of these statistics are broken down by department and municipality. The counts of valid votes are also broken down by parties. These counts allow us to map the geographic distribution of the actual votes and to identify changing patterns over time (i.e. from

[12] The fact that the survey (HPOS-2001) was conducted during an electoral year provides the advantage that the individuals interviewed are being exposed to the then ongoing political campaign, which may be helpful in clarifying their own political inclinations and partisan identities. Also, having the survey conducted at a time well into the political campaign helps to capture an intention of vote that is less likely to change (i.e. more reliable prediction).

election to election). In addition, these counts can also help to 're-calibrate' the results of the survey, should major discrepancies arise.

The second data set (HPOS-2001) includes a host of variables-questions about demographics (e.g. age, education, income, etc.), party identification, voting behavior (during the past presidential election of 1997 and intention of vote in the nearly approaching presidential election of 2001), ideology, political views and attitudes, attention to media, and several other variables.[13] This survey was carried out by the company Borge & Associates, as part of a project on Governance financed by USAID, where the Principal Investigator was Dr. Mitchell Seligson (Political Science), Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University.[14]

The survey is a national stratified sample of 3,000 voting-age adults, distributed among all and each of the 18 departments of Honduras (strata), according to their internal rural/urban distribution (sub-strata).[15] Within each department, 150 individuals were interviewed, except for the departments of Francisco Morazán (FM) and Cortés (300 interviews each).[16] The interviews in each department were conducted in 6 randomly selected electoral precincts (Juntas Receptoras de Votos; JRV), with 25 interviews conducted in each precinct, except for FM and Cortes (12

[13] A comprehensive description of this survey is found in Seligson, M. 2001. Good Government and Transparency in Honduras After Hurricane Mitch: A Study of Citizens' Views.
[14] The survey data set is available through the LAPOP website: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop
[15] "The results of the survey at the national level are very accurate representations of the views of the population, with a sample "error" of only ±1.7%" (Seligson 2001,9)
[16] These two departments are by far the most populated ones; they more than double the population of any other department.

electoral precincts each). These electoral precincts (clusters) were distributed according to the rural/urban breakdown within each department (sub-strata).[17]

The sampling design just described above constitutes what is called a *complex* design, as opposed to a *simple random sample* (where interviews would be randomly scattered throughout the country). This complex design involves the partition of the country into strata and the sampling within clusters (electoral precincts within each stratum). This complexity, however, needs to be taken into account when computing statistics on the variables of interest; otherwise the resulting statistics might not be correct (Kish 1965; Kalton and Heeringa 2003).[18]

The stratification was done using the combination of two stratifying variables (i.e. departments and rural/area breakdown) to produce 36 strata (2 rural/urban regions in each of the 18 departments). However, since three departments (Gracias a Dios, Intibucá, and Valle) had 5 *rural* clusters (electoral precincts) but only 1 *urban* cluster each, due to their overwhelmingly

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[17] For example, if the rural/urban population distribution were 50/50, there should be 3 precincts in each sub-strata; 3 rural and 3 urban. However, if the rural/urban population distribution were 40/60, there should be 2 precincts selected from the rural sub-stratum and 4 from the urban one, a rough approximation of the true distribution.

[18] A simple random sample (SRS) would have its variance (V) computed as:

$$V(\tilde{y}) = s^2/n$$

A stratified sample (SS) would have to account for the population weight of each stratum ($W = N_S/N$), thus

$$V(\tilde{y}) = \Sigma W^2 \, s2/n$$

Example: total population is N=1000; stratum1 n=200; stratum2 n=800; $s^2=1500$ $s^2_1=3000$; $s^2_2=1050$

$$V(\tilde{y}) = s^2/n = 1500/1000 = 1.5 \qquad \text{(SRS)}$$

$$V(\tilde{y}) = \Sigma W^2 \, s2/n = (0.2)(3000/200) + (0.8)(1050/800) = 4.31 \qquad \text{(SS)}$$

Thus,

The design effect (*DEFF*) would be = 1.5/4.31 = 0.35. A DEFF lower than 1 indicates that if the stratifying effects are not taken into account, through the use of appropriate equations, we would be underestimating the variance and would therefore overestimate the statistical significance of some associations. The use of clusters for sampling, on the other hand, may have an opposite effect. Clusters are supposed to have higher levels of intra-class correlation (internal homogeneity) than the universe of the population and would therefore be likely to reduce the variance. Hence, it is necessary to use the appropriate formulas that would take into account the effects of stratification and clustering at the same time. Therefore, the STATA 9.0 statistical software is used for the analysis, since it allows for such considerations (*survey set* command).

rural population, those 3 departments were merged together into one additional stratum (#37), for linearization purposes, while eliminating the original ones (#18, #26, #34).[19] Therefore, the final total number of strata is 34 (36 + 1 - 3).

Table 1.1: Strata and Clusters Distribution

DPTO	Strata	Rural	Urban	Total
1 Atlántida	1	75	0	75
	2	0	75	75
2 Colon	3	100	0	100
	4	0	50	50
3 Comayagua	5	75	0	75
	6	0	75	75
4 Copan	7	100	0	100
	8	0	50	50
5 Cortés	9	100	0	100
	10	0	200	200
6 Choluteca	11	100	0	100
	12	0	50	50
7 El Paraíso	13	100	0	100
	14	0	50	50
8 Francisco Morazán	15	75	0	75
	16	0	225	225
9 Gracias a Dios	17	125	0	125
10 Intibuca	19	100	0	100
	20	0	50	50
11 Islas de la Bahia	21	75	0	75
	22	0	75	75
12 La Paz	23	50	0	50
	24	0	100	100
13 Lempira	25	125	0	125
14 Ocotepeque	27	100	0	100
	28	0	50	50
15 Olancho	29	100	0	100
	30	0	50	50
16 Santa Bárbara	31	100	0	100
	32	0	50	50
17 Valle	33	125	0	125
18 Yoro	35	100	0	100
	36	0	50	50
G.D., Lempira, Valle	37	0	75	75
Total	**34**	**1725**	**1275**	**3000**

[19] Since the resulting statistics of this study need to apply to the country as a whole (sample totals), a *linearization* technique needs to be applied (e.g. Taylor, Jackknife, BBR). However, linearization is only possible when there is more than one cluster (electoral precincts) in each stratum. This is the reason why the one-clustered strata #18, #26, and #34 were collapsed into a three-cluster stratum (#37).

Last, Table 1.2 below, shows the calculation of the population weights. These weighting factors allow each department to weight in the computation of the statistics according to its share of the country's total population.[20] All the data characteristics above were considered to set up the STATA software for the analysis[21]

[20] For example, the departments of Atlántida and Colón contain 5.46% and 3.58% of the country's total population (6.2 millions), respectively. However, the 150 interviews conducted in each of these two departments represent 5% each of the total number of interviews (3,000). Thus, the population of Atlántida would be under-represented and the population of Colón over-represented by the survey. To correct this, it would be necessary to interview 164 (5.46% of 3,000) people in Atlántida and only 107 (3.58% of 3,000) in Colón. Or, more conveniently, to weight-up the 150 interviews in Atlántida by a factor of 1.09 (164/150) and weight-down the 150 interviews in Colón by a factor of 0.72 (107/150).

[21] The settings used for STATA's *survey set* command are:
Strata Variable: strata (34 in total)
Primary Sampling Units (PSU): electoral precincts (JRV)
Population Weight: weight
Finite Population Correction (FPC): none.
The Finite Population Correction (FPC) for variance estimation is computed as f = (1 – n/N). In this analysis, it is considered to be negligible since the ratio of the number of interviews (n=3,000) over the country's total population (N=7 millions, approx.) is much lower than 0.05.
Variance Correction Estimation (VCE): Jackknife.
Since the results of the analysis are supposed to represent the country as a whole (sample totals), a replication technique for variance estimation is necessary to estimate the sampling errors. The technique used in this analysis is the so called "Jackknife" Repeated Replication method. Jackknife is considered to be a more efficient replication technique for *complex* survey data since it replicates sub-samples of the primary sampling units (PSU) within each stratum and provide therefore more efficient variance estimates than the simple replication technique (the Taylor Series linearization technique) used for simple random samples (SRS). An in-depth explanation of the computations is found in Kish (1965).

Table 1.2: Sample Design for 2001 Survey of Honduras

(1) Department .	(2) 2000 Pop. (census data)	(3) % of Population	(4) Survey N	(5) Fraction of national pop	Desired N (#5*3000)	Weight factor (#6/#4)
Atlántida	338,073	5.46%	150	0.0546	164	1.09
Colón	221,809	3.58%	150	0.0358	107	0.72
Comayagua	356,487	5.75%	150	0.0575	173	1.15
Copán	304,570	4.92%	150	0.0492	148	0.98
Cortés	905,705	14.62%	300	0.1462	439	1.46
Choluteca	403,790	6.52%	150	0.0652	196	1.30
El Paraiso	354,788	5.73%	150	0.0573	172	1.15
Francisco Morazán	1,109,162	17.90%	300	0.1790	537	1.79
Gracias a Dios	52,897	0.85%	150	0.0085	26	0.17
Intibucá	175,317	2.83%	150	0.0283	85	0.57
Islas de la Bahía	31,311	0.51%	150	0.0051	15	0.10
La Paz	152,021	2.45%	150	0.0245	74	0.49
Lempira	246,893	3.99%	150	0.0399	120	0.80
Ocotepeque	103,836	1.68%	150	0.0168	50	0.34
Olancho	421,342	6.80%	150	0.0680	204	1.36
Santa Bárbara	381,807	6.16%	150	0.0616	185	1.23
Valle	163,784	2.64%	150	0.0264	79	0.53
Yoro	471,339	7.61%	150	0.0761	228	1.52
Total	6,194,931	100%	3,000	1.0000	3,000	

Source: Good Government and Transparency report (Seligson, 2001:15)

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1.2.2 Operationalization of the Main Variable.

The central variable of this research project is the "type" of voter (i.e. affective or rational). This variable, however, needs to be constructed from two other variables: party identification (the party a person declares to identify with) and the party choice of vote (PCV), that is, the party the person voted for in 1997 and intended to vote for in 2001.

Party identification is the self-proclaimed *identification* with a political party (or none) by each individual interviewed. The 'nature' of this identification may be very diverse. It might be, for example, due to ideological compatibility, or simply 'inherited' from parents. In any case,

this 'identification' with a political party is considered to be very stable through time in most cases.[22] That is, most people identify with the same political party throughout their life, even though very few of those with a party identification might change it once, or twice, in their political lifetime.

The party choice for vote (PCV), on the other hand, is simply the political party (or no party) that individuals choose to vote for at a particular election. Party ID and PCV usually go hand and hand, since most partisans tend to vote for their party almost invariably (e.g. strong partisans). Still, moderate partisans might vote for a different party at a particular election, or abstain from voting, for some (rational) reason. Also, those who consider themselves as having no identification with a political party (i.e. independents) might have a more erratic pattern of PCV, perhaps voting for different parties at different elections. Therefore, PCV may be very different from Party ID.

The combination of Party ID and PCV can serve to uncover the 'strong' partisans and the 'moderate' partisans, which will be identified by their actual voting behavior rather that their stated strength of identification. That is, partisans who voted for 'their' party in both presidential elections (in 1997 and 2001) will be considered 'strong' partisans, and their PCV led by a rather *affective* attachment to their party. On the other hand, individuals who identified with a political party (partisans) but did not vote for their party in at least one of the two elections (1997 or 2001) will be considered 'moderate' partisans, and their PCV led more by 'rational' considerations. The PCV of "independents" will also be considered as led by 'rational'

[22] This seems to be the case in two-party systems like the US and Honduras. Multiparty systems, on the other hand, might have a lower level of stability of party ID due to the diversity of 'viable' options.

considerations, since they do not have any affective identification with a party. Table 1.3 below, summarizes and describes the concepts used to construct the main variable: voter type.[23]

Table 1.3: Main Concepts

Concept	Description	Variable	Scale
Party identification (Party ID)	The political party an individual identifies more with[24]	PARTY ID	Trichotomous variable: 1=PL; 2=PN; 3=PO3 (independent and others)[25]
Party choice of vote (PCV)	The political party an individual voted for in 1997 or planed to vote for in 2001	PCV	1. Partido Liberal 2. Partido Nacional 3. PINU-SD 4. Democracia Cristiana 5. Unificación Democrática 6. None 8. DK, NR
Strong partisans (affective voters)	Those who identify with a political party and voted for that party during the 1997 and 2001 elections	VOTER TYPE	Dichotomous variable 1 = rational voter 0 = affective voter
Moderate partisans (rational voters)	Those who identify with a political party but voted for different parties during the 1997 and 2001 elections, or abstained from voting at any of these elections		
Independents (rational voters)	Those who reportedly identify with no political party, irrespective of which party they voted for		

The basis for characterizing the strong and moderate partisans as *affective* and *rational* voters, in this research, derives from the characteristics of the Honduran political system and, in particular, from the special circumstances that characterized and defined the 1997 and 2001

[23] Several other concepts, and their corresponding indicators, will be used in this research (e.g. ideology, education, income, perception of corruption, trust in public institutions, attitudes toward democracy, etc). They will, however, be described in detail in the chapters in which they will be introduced.

[24] Party identification results from the response to the question VB4 in the questionnaire:
VB4. Which party do you identify more with?
1. Partido Liberal
2. Partido Nacional
3. PINU-SD
4. Democracia Cristiana (PDCH)
5. Unificación Democrática (UD)
6. None
8. DK, NR

[25] The category "other" includes sympathizers of any of the minor parties; PINU-SD, PDCH, and UD.

elections. Several scholars have claimed that there is complete lack of ideological difference, or of any discernible socio-economic cleavage between the two major parties in Honduras (i.e. PL and PN). Bendell (1995,7), for instance, asserts that there are not differences in ideology or platform between these two major parties. Oseguera de Ochoa (1987,101) and Anderson (1988,168) have argued that both parties are conservative; and Bowman (1999,554) argues that the militants of both parties are neither liberal nor conservative but merely *red* and *blue*.[26]

Thus, the political identification of both parties' supporters is believed to be based on a purely *affective* relationship with the parties (perhaps inherited from parents) rather than on any *real* cleavage or issue position. And while strong (affective) partisans may vote consistently for their party, moderate partisans and independents (rational voters) might be left with the party's past performance and, more importantly, the candidates' "quality" or reputation as the sole criteria for deciding which party to vote for (Rapoport 1997; Aragones and Palfrey 2004). After all, a candidate's persona is perhaps the most prominent feature in this caudillo-clientelistic presidential system (Taylor 1997; Weyland 1995; Kitschelt 2000).[27]

Regarding the circumstances that characterized the 1997 and 2001 elections, it could be argued that both elections exhibited the most extreme cases of disparate candidates in the last quarter-century of democratic elections in Honduras. As a result, these two elections resulted in large differences in the share of the total vote between the two major parties. In 1997, presidential elections were won by the Partido Liberal, which obtained the majority of the vote and an advantage of 10 percent points over the Partido Nacional. In the 2001 elections, the

[26] The color of the PLH's insignia flag is red (and white), while that of the PNH is blue (and white)
[27] Presidential political systems in early stages of "modernization" have long been thought as 'clientelist' by nature (e.g. Huntington 1968; Kitschelt 2000).

Partido Nacional won with an advantage of around 8 percent points over the Partido Liberal; a turnover of 18 percent point between the two elections.

In the absence of differences between both parties' platforms and ideology (Bendell 1995), the cause of this dramatic party turnover has been attributed to the very contrasting qualifications of the candidates at both elections (Salomon 1998; Meza *et al.*, 2002c). In 1997, the PL candidate (who won the election) was a young and successful businessman and politician educated in American Universities, while the PN candidate did not have college education but was the widow of a former military dictator. In contrast, the situation during the 2001 election was just the opposite. The PN candidate (who won the election) was a young successful businessman and politician, with a degree from Stanford University, while the PL candidate did not have a college degree and was perceived as an old-fashioned politician with an authoritarian approach to politics (Meza *et al.*, 2002c).

In light of these circumstances, partisans could be considered to be 'rational' voters if they followed the national voting pattern that favored the 'best' candidate during the 1997 (won by PL) and 2001 elections (won by PN). That is, if PL sympathizers voted for the PL in 1997 but did not during 2001, or if PN sympathizers voted for the PN in 2001 but did not in 1997.[28] Voters who voted for "their own" party during both elections (including the one in which their party had a 'bad' candidate) will be considered as 'affective' voters. The universe of options,

[28] Not voting for 'their own' party may result from either voting for a different party or abstaining from voting for any party at all. This implies that abstaining from voting can also be a 'valid' form of (rational) political behavior, since it might constitute a strategic way of allowing a 'better' candidate (from another party) to win the election, without betraying one's party by voting for another party.

however, is much larger and complicated than the one just described. A detailed definition of who are affective and rational voters is offered in Appendix A.

The type of voter (i.e. affective or rational) will play the role of either dependent or independent variable, depending on the research question being addressed by a particular chapter of this dissertation. The type of voter will serve as a dependent variable when addressing research question #2 ("Who are and what are the differentiating characteristics of *affective* and *rational* voters in Honduras?"). However, the type of voter will serve as the independent variable when addressing the research question #3 ("How pervasive is the effect of an *affective* party ID in shaping biased attitudes among Hondurans toward their political system, as compared to "rational" voters"?).

Hence, this dissertation will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 will offer an introductory description of the case, Honduras, including the political history leading to its current democratic system, and the current political institutions. Chapter 3 will explore the cleavages that determine identification with a particular party (e.g. *liberal* or *conservativ*e) among Hondurans (the depth of the roots-in-society). Chapter 4 will differentiate between *affective* and *rational* voters within the Honduran electorate, and will identify the factors that determine each form of voting behavior. Chapter 5 will explore the relationship between each 'type' of voter and the existence of bias in political attitudes, including the perception of government performance, transparency, and corruption. Chapter 6 will summarize the findings and present a picture of the "rational minority" and its role in promoting democratic accountability in Honduras.

2.0 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF HONDURAS

This chapter has two purposes. First, to provide a concise historical description of Honduras, its political system and political parties. Second, to make an introduction to partisanship, voting behavior and political attitudes in Honduras, which will in turn be analyzed empirically in the following three chapters. While this chapter is purely descriptive, it is intended to provide background information that could support the empirical analysis in the following chapters.

Hence, this chapter will be structured as follows: a very brief description of the origins of the country and its characteristics today, a brief historical account of the development of the country's political parties, review of the military governments and the democratic governments after the return to electoral democracy, the characteristics of the current political system, and lastly a theoretical review of partisanship, attitudes and electoral behavior of Hondurans during the current period of democracy, as a preamble to the empirical chapters to follow thereafter.

2.1 THE STATE OF HONDURAS

Honduras is a Central American country which was originally populated by several indigenous groups including Mayans (western Honduras), Lencas (center-southwest), Xicaques (north), and Payas (east), among others (Becerra 1988). In 1502, Honduras was discovered by Christopher

Columbus in his first landing in continental America. The colonial conquest, however, began until 1524 with the arrival of *Conquistador* Hernán Cortez. In September of 1821, after almost three centuries of colonial rule, the Honduran provinces of Comayagua and Tegucigalpa became independent from Spain. By the end of 1821, the two Honduran provinces were incorporated into Mexico, only to gain their independence again in March of 1823. In September of 1824 the two provinces merged to create the state of Honduras and became part of the short-lived Central American Federation until 1838. The country was renamed as Republic of Honduras in 1865 (Becerra 1988; Euraque 1996).

Today, Honduras consists of 18 *departamentos* (see Map 2.1 below), which resulted from the breaking down of the two original provinces (i.e. Comayagua and Tegucigalpa).[29] The country's main cities are Tegucigalpa (capital), San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba, Choluteca, Comayagua, and Puerto Cortés, among others. By 2005, its total population was estimated in 7.4 million people, of which 90% are *mestizos* (mixed race), 7% indigenous, 2% African descendants, and 1% white. The percent of the population living in urban centers is 46%. The GNI per capita is US$1,120 (Atlas methodology), and the GINI coefficient of income distribution is 0.568 (2003).[30]. In 2006, Honduras ranked 116th in the UNDP's Human Development Index, the third lowest ranking among Latin American countries.

[29] Honduras total area is 112,492 square kilometers (43,452 sq. miles), slightly smaller than the American state of Ohio.

[30] Informe del PNUD Sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2006: Hacia la expansión de la ciudadanía.



Map 2.1: Political and administrative division of Honduras

2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HONDURAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Since its beginning, the independent life of Honduras was marred by political instability resulting in revolts and civil wars framed in the classical conservative-liberal polarity. On the one hand, Liberals sought the separation of state and church, a decentralized and more democratic government, and economic deregulation and free trade. On the other hand, Conservatives sought to defend the interests of the Catholic church, landowners and artisans through a centralized government that kept the privileges traditionally enjoyed by the church and through protectionist economic regulation. Therefore, Conservatives enjoyed greater support among landowners,

peasants, and the upper class, while Liberals had more support among workers and the middle class (Booth and Walker 1999; DiTella 2004,185).

After independence, however, there have been some episodes of political liberalization, like during Gen. Francisco Morazan's Federal Republic of Central America (1824-1841). Liberals were able to seize power in the region and introduced several reforms such as the separation of state and church and freedom of press and speech, among other liberal reforms. During the middle of the Nineteenth Century, however, Conservatives seized power back when the Union was dissolved in 1841 and individual governments broke down into smaller regions dominated by local caciques and their personal militias (Mahoney 2001).

2.2.1 Honduras political parties

In 1876, the presidency of Marco Aurelio Soto marked the rise of Liberals to power and the beginning of the "Liberal Reform", which reintroduced several political and structural reforms that allowed the country function as a unified entity (Finney 1979).[31] Liberals Ramón Rosa and Marco Aurelio Soto promoted the creation of a "Progressive Party" to advance the ideals of

[31] The Liberal Reform has been regarded as a turning point in the history of C.A, giving origin to different political regimes in the twenty century; that is: radical liberalism, which gave origin to military-authoritarianism (Guatemala and El Salvador); reformist liberalism, which led to reformist democracy (Costa Rica), and finally, aborted reformist and radical liberalism, which led to traditional authoritarianism (Honduras and Nicaragua). In the case of Honduras, the political influence of American economic interests (mining and banana companies in the country) is considered to have been central to the abortion of many reforms and the halting of the country's political development (Mahoney 2001,165-166).

social progress.[32] In February of 1891, the party's first convention approved its statutes under the leadership of Policarpo Bonilla (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987).

The Partido Nacional, in turn, emerged from a split in the Liberal party. In 1891, Gen. Ponciano Leiva started a new political movement, which in 1902 was consolidated into the PN by General Manuel Bonilla. In 1919, Doctor Alberto Membreño reorganized the movement and renamed it as the *Partido Nacional Democrático* (Euraque 1996). After Membreño's death, Gen. Tiburcio Carias presided over the party, a position the held until his death in 1969 (Bardales 1980). Many of its main leaders have been conservative landowners who introduced conservative constitutions and opposed attempts to revive the Central American Union (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987).

Perhaps, the most influential leader of the Partido Nacional was Tiburcio Carias Andino. He was certainly the President that served the longest in Honduras history (1933-1949). In 1932, he was elected President for four years through free elections. In 1936, however, he called for a Constituent Assembly to change the Constitution, including abolishing the prohibition on reelection, extending the governing period of 6 years, and allowing the incumbent president to remain in office until 1943. In 1943, a Conservative-controlled Congress renewed his period for six more years (Dodd 2005).

His supporters credited him with restoring badly needed peace and order.[33] He has also been credited as the builder of the modern state of Honduras. His detractors, however,

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[32] In 1884, Dr. Céleo Arias organizes the movement *Liga Liberal*, the foundation of the PL.
[33] In December of 1941, however, the Carias Administration declared war on Germany, Japan and Italy. No armed incidents occurred of course.

considered him a ruthless dictator.[34] In 1948, he called for elections under American pressure due to the high levels of unrest and repression in the country. His handpicked successor, Juan Manuel Gálvez (PN), was elected in an election considered fraudulent. However, Gálvez restored civil liberties and political rights that allowed the continuation of the democratic rule (Bowman 1998,145-7; Dodd 2005).

Notwithstanding periods of instability and many armed insurrections during the period between the "Liberal Reform" and the Carías Administration (Becerra 1988; Taylor 1996), the creation of the political parties seems to have contributed to a considerable reduction in the volatility of power.[35] For instance, Table 2.1 shows that before 1876, Honduran rulers lasted an average of 1 year in power (55 different administrations in 55 years).[36] After the late 1870s, there were fewer cases of short-lived governments and their average life span rose to 4 years, without considering the military governments during the 1960s and 1970s. The first two columns of Table 2.1 indicate the dates for the beginning and end of each government, while the third column indicates the total number of years that each government lasted for.[37]

[34] Liberals accused him of eliminating the political opposition through a policy of "encierro, destierro, o entierro" (jail, exile, or burial) (Bonilla 1989,17).

[35] Other factors that contributed to political stability in Honduras was the merging of former rivals United Fruit Co. and the Cuyamel Co. in 1929 and the boom of banana exports by Honduras in the 1920s and 1930s (Bowman 1998,39-41).

[36] The names and periods of rulers in this period are not listed since this research is primarily concerned with the political parties and their alternation in power. However, a complete list of the rulers of Honduras may be accessed at: http://rulers.org/rulh.html

[37] The (+) and (-) signs indicate whether the duration of a government was several months longer (+) or shorter (-) than the number of years indicated. For example, Domingo Vasquez ruled for less than one year (1-), from August 1893 to February 1984; six months.

Table 2.1: Honduras Rulers (1821-2007)

From date	To date	Years	Partido Liberal (*Liberal*)	Partido Nacional (*Conservative*)	Others
9/1821	9/1824	3			Governors[a]
9/1824	1/1839	14+			Supreme Chiefs of State[b]
1/1839	6/1876	37+			Presidents and Councils[c]
6/1876	5/1883	7	Marco Aurelio Soto		
11/1883	11/1891	8	Luis Bográn Barahona		
11/1891	8/1893	2-		Ponciano Leiva Madrid	
8/1893	2/1894	1-	Domingo Vasquez		
2/1894	2/1899	5	Policarpo Bonilla		
2/1899	2/1903	4	Terencio E. Sierra		
4/1903	2/1907	4		Manuel Bonilla Chirinos	
4/1907	3/1911	4	Miguel R. Dávila C.		
3/1911	2/1912	1		Francisco Bertrand B.	
3/1912	3/1913	1		Manuel Bonilla Chirinos	
3/1913	9/1919	6+		Francisco Bertrand B.	
10/1919	2/1920	1-	Vicente Mejia Colindres		
2/1920	3/1924	4	Rafael López Gutiérrez		
4/1924	2/1925	1-		Vicente Tosta	
2/1925	2/1929	4		Miguel Paz Barahona	
2/1929	2/1933	4	Vicente Mejia Colindres		
2/1933	1/1949	16		Tiburcio Carias Andino	
1/1949	12/1954	6		Juan Manuel Gálvez	
12/1954	10/1956	2-		Julio Lozano Diaz	
10/1956	12/1957	1+			Military Junta
12/1957	10/1963	6-	Ramón Villeda Morales		
10/1963	6/1971	8-			Gen. López Arellano
6/1971	12/1972	1+		Ramón Ernesto Cruz	
12/1972	4/1975	2+			Gen. López Arellano
4/1975	8/1978	3+			Gen. Juan A. Melgar
8/1978	1/1982	3+			Gen. Policarpo Paz
1/1982	1/1986	4	Roberto Suazo Córdova		
1/1986	1/1990	4	José Azcona Hoyo		
1/1990	1/1994	4		Rafael L. Callejas	
1/1994	1/1998	4	Carlos Roberto Reina		
1/1998	1/2002	4	Carlos Roberto Flores		
1/2002	1/2006	4		Ricardo Maduro	
1/2006	--		Manuel Zelaya		

Sources of data: Becerra 1988, Rulers.org, Electionworld.org, Honduras's Presidential House webpage

a) One Governor for each of the Provinces (Comayagua and Tegucigalpa)
b) 17 different administrations; 15 Chiefs.
c) 37 different administration, among Presidents and Councils of Ministers.

Three other political parties have lately been incorporated into the electoral political system, whose "common-denominator" is arguably to oppose the hegemony of the traditional parties and the corruption and limited political openness that have characterized their administrations (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987). The *Partido Innovación y Unidad* (PINU-SD), with

a Social-Democrat leaning, joined in 1978 and has participated in every election ever since.[38] The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras* (PDCH) began its formation in 1968 but became a contending party until 1980.[39] The *Unificación Democrática* (UD) party, which was created in 1994 to allow the political participation of several disfranchised political groups (including communists and other left-wing groups); Among the latter is the *Movimiento Ciudadano,* an umbrella organization for popular and progressive groups.[40] These three "third-parties", however welcomed by Hondurans, have been unable to capture any considerable amount of support during general elections. As a matter of fact, the percent of total (valid) votes obtained by the three parties, combined, has always been lower than 5 percent.

2.2.2 The Villeda administration and the military governments

The Honduran Armed Forces have their origins in the late 1800s with the stabilization of the political system and the structuring of a national government. The Army was under the Ministry of Defense, which became the Ministry of War, Marine, and Aviation by 1929 after the acquisition of some vapors and an airplane (Isaguirre 2003). However, up to the 1950s, more than a unified army, it was a weak institution with no political leverage whatsoever (Bowman 1998).

In 1954, after Gálvez's support to the American invasion of Guatemala against President Arbenz, Honduras signed with the United States an agreement for military assistance, which

[38] Dr. Miguel Andonie Fernández began the process of inscription for the PINU party in 1970.
[39] Dr. Hernán Corrales Padilla (R.I.P) was one of its founder and first presidential candidate.
[40] Matías Funes was the presidential candidate during the 1997 elections, their first participation.

included funding and training, and marked the beginning of their professional institutionalization of the military (Bowman 1998, 146-7).[41] Two years later, the military ousted the illegitimate government of Julio Lozano Diaz (PN), in response to the popular plight and calls for new elections. In December of 1957, the military transferred power to Ramón Villeda Morales (PL), elected for a period of six years (Ruhl 2000).[42]

President Villeda Morales (1957-1963) was a very popular and progressive leader who made an unparalleled contribution to the development of human capital and infrastructure in Honduras (Bowman 1998,161-2). During his administration, expenditures for education and health were increased sharply, a Labor Code was introduced (1959), and the National Agrarian Institute (INA) was created (1961) to conduct agrarian reform. Because of his social democratic reformist agenda, Villeda won wide popular support, particularly among students, workers and peasants, and the growing urban progressive bourgeoisie. However, he also won the opposition of the landed elites, the banana companies, American conservative political groups, and the Honduran army as the allies of the Partido Nacional (Bowman 1998).

The Cold War, and particularly the Cuban revolution, had a profound effect on American foreign policy toward the region, and the increasingly stronger Honduran military, which led to the halting of the democratic process in the country (Bowman 1998). In October of 1963, after several failed attempts, conservative military leaders ousted liberal President Ramón Villeda Morales, 10 days before the general elections (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987). The main reasons for the *coup d'etat* were arguably 1) the elimination of the Guardia Civil, which was created by the

[41] In 1960, the first class of military officers graduates from the new military academy "Gen. Francisco Morazan."
[42] In 1957, Congress enacted a new Constitution, which grants institutional autonomy to the Armed Forces and creates the mighty post of Chief of the Armed Forces.

Villeda Administration and was considered by the Army as a political parallel army; 2) the Army's opposition to Modesto Rodas Alvarado (PL candidate), an ardent critic of the Armed Forces, who was likely to win the forthcoming elections; and 3) the alleged infiltration of communists inside the liberal administration (Becerra 1988,175). In their public announcement, the military stated as the reason for the coup the need to stop "the infiltration and freedom of action of far-left individuals who, in [cooperation] with state officials, have initiated a campaign of discredit against the Armed Forces as a previous step toward the creation of an environment of unrest that would allow the establishment of a totalitarian system" (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987,56).[43]

General Oswaldo López Arellano ousted President Villeda and held power for more than ten years (1963-1971, 1972-1975), interrupted only by the brief government of Conservative Ramón Ernesto Cruz (1971-72). During most of this period, the military suppressed the political parties, mostly the Partido Liberal whose leaders were exiled, while attempting to gain the support of popular sectors such as workers and peasants (Bendell 1996). The military embarked on labor laws and agrarian reforms, which included the expropriation of lands in the hands of Salvadorians for their redistribution among Honduras. This policy, as well as some border disputes and trade conflicts, caused the "soccer war" between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 (Becerra 1988). The war lasted for only a few days but a peace agreement was not signed until 1980. Oswaldo López also brought the national police under direct command of the Armed Forces. In 1975, Gen. Lopez was involved in a corruption scandal with one of the two banana

[43] The coup was led by Col. Lopez Arellano, who had served as Minister of Defense during the military government in 1956-57. He became a pilot in the US through scholarships offered to Honduras for its support during WWII. He rose to the rank of Captain during the Carias Administration (Isaguirre 2003).

companies operating in Honduras, United Brand Company. He was ousted by Gen. Melgar Castro during the same year (Ruhl 1996).

Gen. Juan Alberto Melgar Castro (1975-1978) continued the process of land reform initiated by Gen. Lopez, but he soon faced increasing opposition from large land-owners, cattle-raisers and agrarian businesses, which halted the reforms. In order to govern more effectively, Melgar Castro created several ad-hoc advisory groups (Consejo Asesor), one of which drafted an electoral law that aimed a greater openness of the political system. Arguably, the greater openness of the system would help Melgar Castro achieve his political goal of being elected president. His plans were halted by his replacing by Gen. Paz Garcia (Becerra 1988). However, his wife, Nora de Melgar, was elected Mayor of Tegucigalpa some years later and then run for president as the candidate of the Partido Nacional in the 1997 election. She lost to the candidate of the Partido Liberal, Carlos Flores Facussé.

General Policarpo Paz Garcia's rule (1978-1982) was marked by an increase in repression and violation of human rights in the mist of the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in neighboring Nicaragua in July of 1979.[44] However, his administration was primarily marked by the successful transfer of power from the military to the civilian political elites. The return to democratic rule in Honduras was seen by the Carter and Reagan administrations as important to fight back the expansion of communism in the region, particularly in neighboring Nicaragua (Binns 2000).[45] Since the stated goal of the Reagan Administrations was to bring democracy to

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[44] By 1980, several Argentine military 'advisors' were brought to Honduras to train Honduran military in counter-insurgency.

[45] The two administrations, however, had very different views of the problem and its solution. The Carter Administration perceived the upheaval in the region to have political, social, and economic causes and its solution to

Nicaragua, through "freedom fighters" (a.k.a. *contras*), it made more sense to launch the counter-revolution from a democratic Honduras, rather than the military dictatorship it was (Rosenberg *et al.*, 1986; Oseguera de Ochoa 1987).

Also, by that time, it has become evident the failure of the military administrations in improving the economy and the life of ordinary Hondurans.[46] In 1980, encouraged by the Carter Administration, as well as local popular groups and economic elites, Gen. Paz called for the election of a Constituent Assembly in charge of writing a new constitution that would serve as the basis for a democratic system of government (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987). However, once elected, the Constituent Assembly almost totally controlled by the two traditional parties (96% of seats), appointed Gen. Paz as the provisional President of Honduras to govern until a civil president was elected. Liberal Roberto Suazo Córdova was elected President of Honduras in November of 1981, defeating Ricardo Zúniga (PN) who was a former advisor of prior military governments. He was sworn in on January 1982.[47]

In summary, the era of military governments occurred between 1963 and 1982 and had three different military leaders (Generals López, Melgar, and Paz). The political parties, mainly the Partido Liberal, were originally suppressed but some of their members were progressively incorporated into their governments, particularly those associated to the Partido Nacional (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987; Ruhl 2000). The military also sought to gain the support of popular

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involve "political accommodation, social reform and economic development. The Reagan administration, instead, relied more heavily on a military solution, with the participation of the Contras. The Reagan Administration was later accused of selling arms to Iran and even facilitating drug-trafficking to fund the training of the Contras.

[46] The Military governments were also responsible for the beginning of the country's heavy indebtedness (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987).

[47] Suazo had also been elected as the president of the Constituent Assembly of 1980-1981.

sectors through agrarian and labor reforms and to avoid active opposition (Morris 1988). Therefore, the military dictatorships, although authoritarian in nature, were less draconian than their counterparts in the region regarding repression (Walker and Armony 2000).[48] Nonetheless, the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 would change things in the following years of "democratic" governments to come.

Another reason for their less-repressive character was the absence of significant revolutionary movements in Honduras, as compared to the neighboring Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (Schulz 1994; Ruhl 2000). It has been argued, however, that the authoritarianism of the military governments was inherited by the succeeding democratic governments due to the "compromise" path followed during the transition from authoritarian (military) to democratic rule (Casper and Taylor 1996; Taylor-Robinson 2001). Others have argued that authoritarianism is part of the political culture of Hondurans and that democratic consolidation will therefore be difficult to realize (Morris 1988; Salomon 1998). The following democratic government would test such theses.

2.2.3 The democratic governments post-transition (1982-present)

After almost two decades of military governments, Honduras returned to a democratic political system based on a new Constitution, which was written by the Constituent Assembly in January 11 of 1981 and entered into force in January 20, 1982. It provided for a Presidential system with

[48] The military governments were also marked by scandals of corruption and argued participation in drug trafficking. Such accusations continued well into the subsequent democratic period, which even witnessed the uncovering of cases of drug trafficking involving high-rank military officers in diplomatic missions to the United States.

a constitutionally independent executive, legislative, and judiciary. The Executive branch is headed by a President and three "Presidential Designates" elected every four years without reelection.[49] The Legislature is unicameral, formed by Deputies elected every four years through proportional representation, according to the population of each department.[50] The Judiciary is conformed by a Supreme Court of Justice, courts of appeal, and several courts of jurisdiction such as labor, and criminal courts. The Supreme Court is formed by 15 Magistrates elected by Congress for seven years (can be reelected).[51]

The Constitution of 1981 also provided for the creation of the Registro Nacional de las Personas (RNP) and the Tribunal Nacional Electoral (TNE) to allow a more effective identification of the Honduran population and to reduce opportunities for electoral fraud that had spoiled many elections in the past (Anderson, 1988). It also created the Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas (LEOP) to regulate the electoral processes as well as political actors and participation. The President was to be elected through simple plurality, while the deputies to Congress through proportional representation. The method to use was closed party lists, in which voters voted for a party rather than for individual candidates, and thus used a single ballot for the election of president, deputies, and mayors. Also stipulated in the electoral law was the conduction of general elections the last Sunday of November every four years, starting in 1981.

[49] By the 2005 election, the three *Designados Presidenciales* were substituted by a vice-President.
[50] Before 1989, the number of deputies to elect was one deputy for every 30,000 electors. Since the election of 1989, the number of deputies became fixed at 128, distributed according to the population in each department.
[51] Originally, the number of Magistrates was 9, elected every 4 years by Congress.

2.2.3.1 Roberto Suazo Córdova, PL (1982-1986)

The first democratic election of the current democratic period was held in November 29 of 1981 with the participation of the two traditional parties (PL and PN), the new Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU) and one independent candidate for the presidency. The Partido Liberal won the election and therefore the presidency and the majority of seats in Congress and municipalities. Dr. Roberto Suazo Cordoba, candidate for the Partido Liberal, was elected President of Honduras and sworn in January of 1982.

His presidency was marked entirely by its covert support to the Reagan Administration policy in the region, which included the training of the *Contras* (and Salvadorian soldiers) in Honduras by American and Honduran personnel (Bowman 1995).[52]. The most salient consequences of such policy were the economic and political empowerment of the military and the systematic violation of human rights that included torture and "disappearance" of political prisoners (Walker and Armony 2000). [53] With the support of the American Ambassador to Honduras, John Dimitri Negroponte, President Suazo appointed Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martínez as Chief of the Armed Forces, who zealously lead the "National Security" policy responsible for the unparalleled violation of Human Rights in the 1980s (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987). However,

[52] The Reagan Administration was by that time fighting the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua, which had just seized power in 1979, through contra-revolutionaries based and trained in Honduras.

[53] The support of President Suazo to the American policy for the region may have been a result of weakness of the civilian government vis-à-vis the Honduran powerful military who also enjoyed the economic and logistic support of the American government due to their prominent role in the implementation of the American policy. .However, the American government also provided the Suazo administration with considerable economic assistance that was badly needed to revive the economy (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987).

Gen. Alvarez was soon ousted by Col. Walter López, the leader of moderate high-ranking officials taking control of the Armed Forces.[54]

President Suazo was also characterized by his caudillo, authoritarian governing style and his attempts to manipulate Congress and the Judiciary, and to change the electoral rules to be re-elected (or to extend his period from 4 to 6 years) or to decide who would be his successor (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987). Nonetheless, such "institutional crisis" was successfully tackled by all parties in Congress who made the no-reelection of the president a "stone-article" of the Constitution which can not be changed under any circumstance.[55] Thus, despite the remaining authoritarian traits of the political leaders (just like those of the past), they chose to strive for a political system that would warranty an open, democratic participation of all parties. This commitment was successfully tested in the elections of 1985, which were won by the main critic of President Suazo and the American policy of support to the "Contras."

2.2.3.2 José Simón Azcona Hoyo, PL (1986-1990)

José Simón Azcona succeeded Suazo Cordova as President of Honduras from January 27, 1986 to January 27, 1990. His administration was marked by a rather passive opposition to the continuation of the Reagan Administration policy of training "Contras" in Honduras and launching attacks into Nicaragua, which threatened a full-scale war between the two countries. Because of such opposition, his administration faced several difficulties to govern effectively

[54] Notwithstanding the high levels of repression, or in part because of it, the early 1980s sough the emergence of grass-root human rights groups such as the Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CODEH) and the Comité de Familiares de los Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Honduras(COFADEH).

[55] The solution to the crisis was aided by the crucial intervention of workers and peasant organizations, the church, and the Armed Forces, who worked together to find a solution.

and deliver his campaign promises. Perhaps because of his failure to deliver even basic public services (e.g. maintenance of main highways), the Partido Liberal lost the following elections to the Partido Nacional.

2.2.3.3 Rafael Leonardo Callejas, PN (1990-1994)

Callejas, candidate of the Partido Nacional, won the presidential elections of November of 1989 and was sworn in as President in January, 1990. This election was important since it involved the first (smooth) transfer of power from one traditional party (PL) to the other (PN). Callejas had been the Director of Economic Planning during the government of López Arellano and Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Melgar Castro and Paz García military administrations. His administration had to confront severe economic problems, which were tackled by following the IMF recommendations that included currency devaluation, opening of the economy, and cutting public expenses –and public-sector jobs.

These polices of economic adjustment led to popular protests by organized pressure groups. Besides the introduction of policies of economic reform, his administration was also marked by several corruption scandals involving President Callejas himself. However, it was also the first legitimate turnover of the party in government, which produced a sense of hope in the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in the country. Yet, growing public dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living and with widespread government corruption led voters to elect again a candidate from the Partido Liberal in 1993.

2.2.3.4 Carlos Roberto Reina, PL (1994-1998)

The candidate of the Partido Liberal won the presidential elections of 1993 and ruled from January of 1994 to January of 1998. His administration was characterized by several measures that considerably reduced the political and economic power that the military had gained during the Reagan Administration (Ruhl 1996; Walker and Armony 2000). Among the measures are the substitution of the compulsory military service[56] by a voluntary one; the reduction of the budget of the Armed Forces; and the transfer of the Police and Intelligence agencies from the control of the military to that of civilians, as well as the administration of several lucrative state offices (e.g. Merchant fleet, Telecommunications). During this administration, the Partido Unificación Democrática (UD) was registered as the fifth political party. Since most of its members were leftist who were persecuted during the 1980s, their incorporation signaled a greater amount of political and ideological tolerance in the system.

2.2.3.5 Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé, PL (1998-2002)

During this administration, many reforms were adopted including judicial and penal reforms and others that further brought the military under civilian control.[57] Flores also introduced some programs of reform and modernization of the Honduran government and economy. However, in October of 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras leaving thousands of people dead and

[56] Before compulsory service was banned, recruitment was conducted through the "hunting" of young adults in the streets and any other public place by members of the Army. Those who were "captured" for service were usually treated in very harsh ways, usually involving beatings that sometimes ended up in deaths. Such brutal violation of human rights and the outrage of the population was the main reason for the abolition of the compulsory military service.

[57] The ability to cut back the political power of the military by the Reina and Flores administration was enhanced by the withdrawal of political and financial support of American administrations to the Honduran Armed Forces, due to the end of the Cold War, the leftist regime in Nicaragua, and the civil wars in neighboring countries (Argueta 2004).

displaced and billions of dollars in damages. This natural disaster had important social and economic effects including an increase in unemployment and virtually all forms of crime (Salomon 1999; Seligson 2001). These problems, however, were compounded by several other factors. Among them, a global economic recession and a fall in the international price of Honduras main exports (e.g. coffee, bananas, etc.). Crime also increased due to the deportation from the US of thousands of gang members and the alleged involvement of members of the Armed Forces and the Police in organized crime activities (Argueta 2004). All these problems, added to the lack of popularity of the candidate of the Partido Liberal for the next presidential elections, paved the way for the second electoral victory of the Partido Nacional.

2.2.3.6 Ricardo Maduro Joest, PN (2002-2006)

In 2001, the candidate of the Partido Nacional, Ricardo Maduro, won the presidential elections to govern for the period 2002-2006. Making good of his electoral campaign promises, President Maduro put under way programs aimed to increasing effectiveness in the fight against crime. Among the initiatives were the 'cleansing' of the Police and increment in the number of officers. Maduro also introduced a bill in Congress to create the "Ley Anti-maras" (anti-gang law), which was passed and implemented by the Police and the Armed Forces. The Maduro Administration also introduced important political reforms, some inherited from the prior administration. It created the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas and the Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción, involving the participation of important sectors of the society; created the office of the vice-President to replace the three *Designados Presidenciales*; and eliminated the "parliamentary immunity,"

which had prevented the trial of deputies and other public officials accused of law violations.[58] However, his administration's main achievement may be the implementation of programs of economic adjustment that allowed the country to put its finances in order and also to have a considerable part of its multilateral and bilateral debt erased by its creditors. The Maduro Administration also negotiated successfully the participation of Honduras in the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which may contribute to a more rapid economic growth. In 2005, Manuel Zelaya, candidate of the Partido Liberal, won the presidential elections and became the fifth Liberal administration since 1981.

In summary, the current period of democratic governance in Honduras has been marked by 1) the ordered alternation of power between the two traditional parties (PL and PN), 2) the slow but certain regain of control of the civilian political leadership over the military, 3) the persistence of corruption and a weak and politicized judicial system, 4) increase in most forms of crime, 5) improved management of the macro-economy but persistently high levels of poverty and inequality, 6) increased respect for human rights and civil liberties, and 7) the introduction of important political reforms that may lead to further improvement and consolidation of democracy in Honduras.

2.2.4 The Honduran democratic political system at age 25

By 2007, 25 years after the return to democratic rule, Honduras has made considerable progress toward the consolidation of democracy. The political parties have gradually but assertively

[58] Diario La Prensa, 24 de Octubre del 2003.

retaken power from the military and the democratic electoral process has been consolidated (first consolidation). However, the Honduran political system may currently be characterized as a "delegative democracy," and a "partyarchy," since several problems remain unsolved (O'Donnell 1992; Coppedge 1994). Widespread poverty and income inequality still persist, among other crucial social problems, and political parties continue to monopolize political power. This has caused dissatisfaction among the population with the outcome of the democratic governments but less with the democratic system itself (Cruz and Argueta 2007).

Nevertheless, Honduran voters continue to vote for the traditional parties even in the presence of more options with better defined ideologies and platforms (i.e. social democrats, Christian democrats, etc.), which are also perceived as more progressive than the traditional parties (Taylor-Robinson 2003). In fact, as shown in Table 2.2 below, the traditional parties have obtained the majority of the vote since 1981 while the three non-traditional parties (DC-SD-UD) have consistently obtained, combined, less than 5% of the total number of valid votes in each election. This is indeed a growing concern among Honduran political analysts, who see stagnant bi-partisanship in Honduras not as a contribution but rather as an unnecessary obstacle for democratic deepening and consolidation (Casper and Taylor 1996; Isaula 1997; Salomón 1998, Ruhl 2000; Taylor-Robinson 2001; Meza *et al.*, 2002).

Table 2.2: Percent of valid votes obtained by each party (1981-2005)

Year	PL	PN	PDCH	PINU-SD	UD	DC-SD-UD
1981	**53.9%**	41.6%	1.6%	2.5%	-	4.1%
1985	**50.9%**	45.4%	2.2%	1.5%	-	3.7%
1989	44.3%	**52.3%**	1.5%	1.9%	-	3.4%
1993	**53.0%**	43.0%	1.2%	2.8%	-	4.0%
1997	**52.7%**	42.8%	1.3%	2.1%	1.2%	4.6%
2001	44.3%	**52.2%**	1.0%	1.5%	1.1%	3.5%
2005	**49.9%**	46.2%	1.4%	1.0%	1.5%	3.9%

Source of data: Tribunal Supremo Electoral

The dissatisfaction seems to be also expressed in a low level of trust in the political parties and a progressive increase in the rate of voting abstention (Cruz and Argueta 2007). Figure 2.1 shows the increasing number of registered voters in the electoral census (dashed line and squares) at the moment of each election since 1981. It also shows a less steeper increase in the number of valid votes (dashed line and triangles). The widening gap of between the total of registered voters and the actual number of voters who did cast their vote is the rate of abstention (solid line), which increased to an unprecedented level during the 2005 elections. This might indicate that even though Hondurans continue to vote for the traditional parties, the number of those disenchanted with them may be increasing.

Figure 2.1: Votes and abstention rate (1981-2005)



Since its return to democratic rule in 1981, Honduras has exhibited the lowest 'effective number of parties in the legislature' (ENPL) in the entire Latin American region (Payne *et al*., 2002).[59] By the year 2000, Honduras also stood up in the region as the country with the lowest level of mean volatility (for both Congress and the Executive) and second, after Uruguay, in terms of the degree of party system institutionalization (Payne *et al*., 2002,132/ 143).[60] In other words, the Honduran party system has been considered as a strong, vigorous, and stable two party system, at all levels (Blair 2000,28).

Nonetheless, the two-party nature of the Honduran system runs against the predictions of the theory of electoral systems. It is well known that the methods used in the election of presidents and deputies affect the fragmentation of parties. Honduras is a medium-size proportional-representation (PR) system[61] (average district magnitude of 7.1),[62] using the *Hare* formula and largest remainders for the allocation of seats in the legislature. This would normally produce a greater fragmentation than the one observed (Payne *et al*., 2002,107). It has long been argued that PR systems, unlike plurality ones,[63] tend to promote party fragmentation and create multi-party system (Duverger 1966; Sartori 1968). The same has been argued for the *Hare*

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[59] Chile has been considered by some to have a two-party system, but it is actually a two-coalition system instead. The true ENP in Chile is around 5. The most important parties are PDC, PPD, PS, RN, and UDI.

[60] Costa Rica and Chile were third and fourth, respectively. But despite having similar levels of institutionalization, these countries have a larger average ENP: Uruguay, 3.16 (1984-99); Costa Rica, 3.15 (1998-02); and Chile, 5.04 (1989-97)

[61] Actually, Honduras has a mixed system. Legislative elections elect 128 deputies from 18 districts corresponding to the country's *departamentos*. 16 districts (*departamentos*) are multi-member and use a closed party-list PR electoral rule. The remaining two *departamentos* ("Gracias a Dios" and "Islas de la Bahia") are uni-member (due to their very small population size) and use therefore a majority system.

[62] PR systems tend to produce three or more parties, depending in part on the size of district magnitudes (Taagapera and Grofman 1985; Jones 1994).

[63] The "Duverger's law" holds that plurality systems with single-member districts will tend to produce two-party systems since voters would not waste their votes on small parties with little chance to win.

formula, as compared to the *d'Hondt* formula that is used most commonly in the region (Payne *et al.*, 2002,90).

The two-party nature of the Honduran system also runs against the trend in the region. Rapid change has been a salient characteristic of Latin American systems (Coppedge 1998). Most countries in the region have experienced an increase in fragmentation of their party systems, going from a regional average of two-and-a-half and three party systems in the 1980s, to a three-and-a-half party system during the 1990s (Payne *et al.*, 2002,119). This increase is in spite of the facts that most countries have smaller district magnitudes than Honduras, use a *d'Hondt* formula (which restrict fragmentation) and, like Honduras, have concurrent elections and closed and blocked lists for the election of deputies (Payne *et al.*, 2002,76-99).[64] Considering all of these characteristics of the electoral systems, Honduras should also exhibit at least a similar increase in fragmentation, if not greater.[65] Thus, one can say that Honduras has been an intriguing deviant case from the theory of institutional determinants of party system fragmentation.

During this period, however, there have also been several political reforms introduced through changes in the Constitution and the electoral law (LEOP). Table 2.3, below, list some of the most important reforms and the year they were ratified by Congress. These reforms have aimed to facilitating the participation of people in the electoral process and the "opening" of the lists of candidates to Congress, so that elected official become more responsive to their

[64] If elections are concurrent, there will be a "coattail" effect: voters will tend to vote for the lists of deputies from the same party they vote for president, thus restricting fragmentation (Shugart and Carey1992).
[65] A much more comprehensive description of different structural component of the political system of Honduras is provided in Payne *et al***.** (2002,306-8)

constituents rather than the party elites.[66] They also have aimed at bringing the military back under civilian control, to improve the management of public funds, and to improve the application of justice.

[66] Fused elections (electing the President and Deputies by voting for the party in a single vote-ballot) encouraged "caudillo" politics in which deputies were more loyal to the party faction leader, and/or to the President, rather than constituents (Taylor 1996, 332).

Table 2.3: Political reforms (1982-2006)

Main mPolitical Reforms[67]	Year[68]
The number of deputies to be elected to Congress is changed, from one for every 30,000 people, to a fixed number of 128 Deputies.	1988
The abolition of compulsory military service.	1995
Transfer of the institution of the Police and Intelligence agencies to civilian control, after being a dependence of the Armed Forces.	1995
Separate ballots for the election of the President, Deputies, and Mayors.[69]	1997
Introduction of "voto domiciliario" allowing voters to cast their vote where they reside rather than where they were born or registered as voters.	1997
Elimination of the all-powerful figure Chief of the Armed Forces and its substitution by a civilian Minister of Defense.	1997
Election of 15 Magistrates to the Supreme Court by Congress from a list 45 candidates proposed by a Junta Nominadora formed by representatives of the Bar Association and the Law School, national business and workers organizations, Human Rights, and the Civil Society.	2001
Creation of the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas.	2002
Substitution of the three *Designados Presidenciales* by one vice-President.	2003
Creation of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), which substituted the Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones.	2003
Elimination of the "parliamentary immunity."	2003
Introduction of the Plebiscite and Referendum.	2004
Elimination of the system of closed party lists and introduction of open list.	2005

Yet, the reform that may have had perhaps the most immediate and far-reaching effect in the country's party system is the separation of ballots for the election of president and deputies. As shown in Figure 2.2, even though Hondurans continue to vote for the two traditional parties in the presidential elections, they are increasingly splitting their votes for the legislature. Ever since the introduction of separate ballots for president and deputies, Hondurans are increasingly voting for the small parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, UD) to elect the deputies to Congress. This trend

[67] The original electoral law (Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas) was written in May of 1981 and amended several times. The Legislative Decree No. 44-2004 creates an updated version that replaces the one created in 1981.

[68] Year of ratification by congress

[69] The original ballot allowed voters to vote only for a political party or the presidential candidate of it. Deputies and Mayors in the party's closed list were elected automatically. Electoral reforms allowed voters by 1997 to vote separately for President, deputies and mayors but still in closed lists. In 2005, voters were able to vote for individual candidates for deputies and mayors through open lists

has caused the winning traditional party no longer have a majority in congress, which forces the winning party to negotiate with other parties to form post-election alliances. This new reality will make congress increasingly more deliberative and independent from the executive thus making congressional oversight over the executive (horizontal accountability) more likely.

Figure 2.2: Percent of valid votes for deputies (1981-2005)



	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
PL	53.9%	50.9%	44.3%	53.0%	49.5%	40.8%	44.8%
PN	41.6%	45.4%	52.3%	43.0%	41.6%	46.5%	40.4%
PINU-PDCH-UD	4.5%	3.7%	3.4%	4.0%	8.9%	12.7%	14.9%

The increase in vote-splitting is also causing the Honduran party system to fracture. As shown in Table 2.4, and acknowledged by most authors, Honduras has been a two-party system with an average effective number of parties (ENP) of 2.1 during the period 1957-1993.[70] In 1997, however, the year of the first election with separate ballots, the ENP started to increase to reach a value of 2.4 in the 2005 election. In other words, Honduras is no longer a two-party system but rather a two-and-a-half party system. And the party system is likely to experience

[70] The computation of the ENP was done using Laakso and Taagepera (1979) equation.

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1} \prod^2}$$; where $\prod$ = proportion of votes or seats acquired by party "i".

greater splintering since the two traditional parties continue to fail in solving the country's most pressing problems of poverty, crime, corruption, etc..

Table 2.4: Effective number of parties (1957-2005)

Characteristics	1957 [AC]	1965 [AC]	1971 [P/L]	1980 [AC]	1981 [P/L]	1985 [P/L]	1989 [P/L]	1993 [P/L]	1997 [Leg.]	2001 [Leg.]	2005 [Leg.]
Number of political parties at the level of candidates	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Cumulative percent of votes for the largest parties (PL&PN)	91.5	100	100	95.9	95.5	96.3	96.6	96	91.1	87.3	85.1
Effective Number of Parties (ENP)	2.1	2	2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4

Sources: Bendell (1995,23-25), until 1993. Updated by J. R. Argueta

2.3 PARTISANSHIP IN HONDURAS

There are three general theoretical approaches to the study of why individuals identify with and/or vote for a particular political party: the *sociological* approach, the *psychological* approach, and the '*rational choice'* approach (Kenneth and Van Deth 2005). These three approaches have been very successful in explaining different dimensions of "partisanship" and therefore need to be incorporated in an interconnected manner in this analysis.

The *sociological* approach's basic argument is that party identification is determined by social cleavages and the policy preferences that derive thereof (Lipset 1959; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Achen 1992; Smith 1997). For instance, ethno-religious cleavages, such as those of *insiders* (white Anglo-Saxon and Nordic native-born Protestants) and *outsiders* (more recent immigrants, Catholics, Jews, and blacks), have typically aligned with the American Republican and Democratic parties respectively (Lipset 2000,49). Similarly, Smith (1997,16) argues that attributes such as minority ethnicity (e.g. African Americans and Hispanics), low income, and

older age are (direct) determinants of Democratic partisanship, and that other demographic characteristics (residence on either coastline region, female gender, employment, and being a first-time voter) can lead to an indirect identification with parties via ideology.[71] Cleavages, it is argued, strongly determines ideology and partisanship.

Like in the United States, the two major political parties in Honduras (PL and PN) have been thought of as *liberals* and *conservative* and of exhibiting socio-economic cleavages that differentiate their partisans (e.g. Ropp and Morris 1984; Payne *et al*., 2002). More specifically, students of the Honduran system have argued that the PL enjoys stronger support among the working urban class and the organized agricultural workers, since the PL has been more prone to promote populist legislation that has favored these two sectors (i.e. agrarian reform, minimum wage system, right to unionize, etc.). The PL is also considered to have a strong support among the most educated and progressive sectors of the society, which are most commonly found in the urban settings (Isaula 1997). The PN, on the other hand, is considered as to enjoy stronger support among the more conservative sectors of the society, especially among landowners and non-organized peasantry (Ropp and Morris 1984).

Nonetheless, several scholars have claimed a complete lack of ideological difference, or of any discernible socio-economic cleavage between the two major parties. Therefore, the political identification of both parties' supporters is believed to be based on a purely *affective*

[71] Women, low income groups, and minorities tend to align with progressives, liberals and democrats ("the Left") in their support for greater governmental control (e.g. price controls, welfare) aimed at countervailing "concentrated economic power and protect the interests of the poor (Smith 1997,13)." In terms of Social equality, Democrats have also been more supportive of governmental interventions that favor disfranchised minorities (e.g. Blacks, Latinos). The same can be said about Public Health issues (e.g. universal access to health care, a healthier environment). On the other hand, conservatives and Republicans may pay more attention to the candidates' "character" since they focus more on moral issues (e.g. Christian values, anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage, etc.).

relationship with the parties (perhaps inherited from relatives) rather than on any *real* policy or ideological cleavage (Taylor-Robinson 2003).

None of these assertions, however, have been supported empirically. Still, some surveys of public opinion conducted in Honduras have found partisanship to be a factor to control for when assessing attitudes toward the political system (e.g. Seligson 1999; Cruz and Argueta 2007). Therefore, it is necessary to empirically explore the determinants of partisanship in Honduras, before conducting further analysis that employs partisanship as the independent variable. Specifically, it is important to examine the factors that might be determinant of the identification of Hondurans with each of the two traditional parties (PL or PN), as well as the lack of identification with any of these parties. Since cleavages are considered necessary for the emergence of new parties, or detachment from the old parties, there must exist some cleavages that would differentiate supporters of the traditional parties from no-supporters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976). Therefore, this analysis will test the hypothesis that there are cleavages determining identification with the PL, the PN, and the lack of it.

In the case of an absence of cleavages among partisans in Honduras, the *psychological* approach may offer an alternative explanation. Its basic premise is that partisan identification (partisanship) is formed early in life through the process of political socialization, and that it remains fairly stable throughout adulthood. Also, that this enduring *psychological* identification significantly shapes people's attitudes toward political objects (i.e. biased views) (e.g. Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Bartels 2002). This premise gave birth to what was latter know as "the Michigan model", which viewed partisanship as "the unmoved mover" of political attitudes and behavior (Bartels 2002,117). In this view, *partisans* tend to have a "valence" view of partisanship; as a sense of "group-belonging" that distinguishes *us* from *them* (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989;

Stokes 1999). It is this *affective* attachment to parties that makes a person's partisanship (*micro-partisanship*) to be fairly stable through time.

An alternative explanation is provided by the '*rational choice'* approach, which points out to the seemingly reciprocal relationship between partisanship and attitudes (e.g. Franklin and Jackson 1983), and to rational choice theories that emphasize more *tangible* determinants of partisanship (Fiorina 1981; Page and Jones 1979). Partisanship is considered to be determined by "a running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and past performance" (Fiorina 1981,84), preferences for party policies (Franklin and Jackson 1983), and candidate evaluations (Page and Jones 1979; Rapoport 1997), among other considerations. It is this 'rational' analysis of choices what determines one's choice for vote at a particular election, and it is the choices' changing nature (from one election to the next one) what causes some individuals to cast their votes for different parties at different elections, or to abstain from voting, thus causing swings in the preferences of the whole electorate over time (Green *et al*., 1998).[72]

It is important to note, however, that the party choice for vote (PCV) is not necessarily the same as party ID (PID), since not all people have a party identification (i.e. independents) and still vote for a particular party (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). Moreover, the electorate's choice can and do certainly change between elections, as it has been the case in Honduras. However, these electoral shifts are not necessarily the result of change in an individual's party ID (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996). The changing character of the governments' performance, candidates, policies, and issues can certainly make the voting preferences of the electorate as a

[72] These individuals are usually those without a strong party identification (i.e. moderate partisans and independent).

whole to change from election to election (i.e. electoral swinging between the PL and PN), in response to the *rational* assessment of the choices. But since it is unlikely that individuals' party ID would change back and forth between elections (i.e. the *affective,* long-term attachment to a particular party is very stable by definition), it is most likely that those voters who cause such swings are not those with a primarily *affective* party identification (i.e. strong partisans) but those who do not have such a strong affective attachment (i.e. independent and moderate partisans) and who are led mostly by 'rational' considerations, rather than affective ones.

It is important to consider the relevance of these two determinants of PCV (i.e. *affective* party ID and *rational* considerations) for vertical accountability.[73] For instance, an individual may identify her/himself as a (moderate) Nacionalista during her/his entire life, but s/he might abstain from voting for the PN, or even vote for another party, when s/he considers it a better option (because of the candidate or policies), at a particular election (e.g. elections in 1997). The same could happen to a moderate Liberal. Strong partisans, on the other hand, would almost invariable vote for their party (regardless of the candidate or policies). This rationale implies that "Independents" would vote more "rationally," since they lack an affective connection to a party that would make them vote for the same party invariable, thus preventing electoral accountability.

Consequently, this research will examine the electoral behavior of Hondurans during the 1997 and 2001 elections to test the hypothesis that it is independents and moderate partisans who are responsible for the observed alternation in power between the PL and PN and therefore for

[73] In this research, the term democracy is used loosely to mean rather the democratic regime, political democracy, or *polyarchy*, rather than the 'universalistic' conception of democracy (O'Donnell 2004).

vertical accountably. In addition, it will test the hypothesis that partisanship and PCV may differ without necessarily a change in party identification, since moderate partisans may abstain from voting or vote for another party.

The strength of an individual's identification with a party, and the relative number of each 'type' of voter (i.e. percent of independents, moderates, and strong partisans) will determine the extent to which the electorate, as a whole, has political attitudes that are biased or objective. When an *affective,* strong partisanship is the most prevalent determinant of PCV, then the electorate will be more biased, or in the case of two-party systems, more polarized (Mainwaring *et al.*, 1992).[74] At the level of the individual, a primarily affective party ID might be conductive to more biased political perceptions and attitudes (Bartels 2002). Therefore, this research will also test the hypothesis that strong (affective) partisans are more likely than moderate partisans and independents (rational voters) to exhibit bias in their political attitudes.

The testing of the hypotheses above, regarding cleavages, the types of partisans and their contribution to vertical accountability, and bias in political attitudes, will be conducted in the succeeding chapters 3, 4, and 5.

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[74] Regarding the United States, for instance, Bond and Fleisher argue that [*affective*] party identification strongly influences partisans' evaluation of the economy as well as the President's performance, in spite of shared factual information such as macro-economic variables (2001,538). As a result, they describe [*affective*] partisan identification as a "filtering mechanism" that decides which information an individual chooses to receive and accept, while rejecting "opposite" views (2001,531). Also, Bartels argues that empirical evidence suggests that "[…] partisan loyalties have pervasive effects on perceptions of the political world. In some cases, partisan bias produces actual divergence in the views of Republicans and Democrats over time; more often, it significantly inhibits what would otherwise be a strong tendency toward convergence in political views in response to shared political experience (2002,138).

3.0 CLEAVAGES AS DETERMINANTS OF PARTISANSHIP IN HONDURAS

This chapter is devoted to uncovering the ideological and socio-economic cleavages underlying the political parties in Honduras. According to the sociological view of partisanship, party ID is strongly influenced by social cleavages (e.g. Lipset 1959; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Luskin 1989).[75] The social cleavages more commonly cited are religion and ethnicity (e.g. Rae and Taylor 1970; Lipset 2000) as well as urban/rural, region, and class (e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973; Smith 1997). Among the several cleavages, however, some authors have regarded sex, race, and religion as the most fundamental and prevalent cleavages in American politics, since they have traditionally define communities, making them more homogeneous and, therefore, more prone to reinforcing their values and attitudes (Freeman 1999,169). All these cleavages, and the identities and interests that may derive thereof, have historically helped determine ideology (i.e. left-right), which in turn influences the identification with and/or vote choice for the Democratic and Republican parties in the US (Smith 1997; Lipset 2000; Achen 2002).

Like in the United States, the two major political parties in Honduras have also been thought of as *liberals* and *conservative* and of exhibiting socio-economic cleavages (e.g. Ropp

[75] According to Newton and Van Deth, "Cleavages are deep and persistent differences in society where (1) objective social differences (class, religion, race, language, or region) are aligned with (2) subjective awareness of these differences (different cultures, ideologies and orientations) and are (3) organized by political parties, groups, or movements. Cleavages are often the basis of political conflict" (2005,348).

and Morris 1984; Payne *et al*., 2002). However, while some authors have claimed a significant role of the left-right ideology in differentiating political parties in Honduras (e.g. Zoco 2006), others have claimed a complete lack of ideological difference (Bendell 1995; Oseguera de Ochoa 1987; Anderson 1988; and Bowman 1999). Nevertheless, there seems to be less disagreement regarding the two traditional parties' constituency. The PL arguably enjoys stronger support among the working urban class, organized agricultural workers, the most educated, and those residing in more urban settings. The PN, on the other hand, is considered as to enjoy stronger support among landowners and non-organized peasantry (Ropp and Morris 1984). Yet, no empirical studies have settled down these arguments.

This chapter, hence, aims at uncovering the cleavages that may differentiate between the Honduran political parties. Since this dissertation is mostly concerned with the role of the two traditional parties (i.e. PL and PN), this chapter will examine the cleavages between these two parties. The three small parties (i.e. PDCH, PINU, and UD) will not be included individually due to the very small number of sympathizers in the survey. However, they will be included as a group. Since cleavages have been considered necessary for the emergence of new parties, or detachment from the old parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976), there should exist some cleavages that would differentiate between sympathizers of the two traditional parties from those who do not sympathize with them. Therefore, in order to test that thesis, a third partisan option (PO3) will be included: those who sympathize with any of the minor parties (i.e. PDCH, PINU,

and UD), or with no party at all (i.e. independents).[76] Table 3.1, below, indicates the components of PO3 and the number of cases for each party in the survey dataset.

Table 3.1: Frequency of party ID

Party	Frequency	Percent
PL	1313	43.5
PN	1202	39.8
PO3	192	6.4
PINU-SD	41	1.4
PDCH	11	0.4
UD	5	0.2
None	135	4.5
Total valid	2707	89.7
Missing	310	10.3
Total	3018	100.0

Thus, this chapter will uncover the cleavages between the Partido Liberal (PL), the Partido Nacional (PN), and the third option (PO3). The potential cleavages to explore are those that have been commonly regarded in the literature as determinants of partisanship in the US or Honduras; namely ideology (e.g. Kim and Fording 2003, Wayne 2003; Zoco 2006), religion (e.g. Lipset 1959; Freeman 1999; Zoco 2006), gender (e.g. Greene and Elder 2001), age (e.g. Salomon 1999; Holmberg 2003), education (e.g. Ropp and Morris 1984; Egerton 2002; Knobe 1972), income (e.g. Lipset 2000, Stonecash *et al.*, 2002), geography (coastline vs. inland) (e.g. Smith 1997), and region (urban-rural) (e.g. Stonecash *et al.*, 2002).[77] Race/ethnicity will not be considered in this analysis since Honduras exhibit very low levels (.0587) of ethnic

[76] Although the PO3 group will be treated as a distinct group during the rest of this chapter, it is important to keep in mind that the individuals in this group do have very diverse political views, and that the only common characteristic among them is their lack of identification with any of the traditional parties.

[77] The case of the United States is included since the theory of partisanship has its origins in the field of American Politics, and thus refers to determinants of partisanship in the US.

fragmentation (Anckar 2000,322). Each of these potential cleavages will be analyzed separately first, and then together in multinomial logistic regressions.[78]

3.1 IDEOLOGY

Ideology (left-right) is perhaps the "cleavage" that has been most commonly associated to partisanship (Kim and Fording 2003). In the United States, as well as in most democracies in the world, parties are primarily categorized as parties of the *left* or the *right*, or variations resulting from their positioning along that continuum. Tocqueville first classified American parties by their emphasis on either ideology or interests (Lipset 2000). Other authors have lately claimed that ideology reinforces partisanship (e.g. Wayne 2003) or that it is ideology that causes partisanship (e.g. Smith 1997), which aligns voters' party/political inclinations along the left-right ideological spectrum (e.g. Libertarians, Democrats, and Republicans in the US).

This has also been argued to be the case in Latin America,[79] where party competition is considered to be commonly structured around the left-right ideological dimension (Coppedge 1998).[80] In Honduras, legislators and parties have also been placed along the left-right

[78] Most bivariate analyses in this chapter will involve one-way ANOVA tests with Bonferroni post-hoc test to be able to differentiate between each sub-group (i.e. PL, PN, PO3). However, since the variable of interest in this analysis (party ID) is a categorical variable, it will have to be used in the test as the independent variable, and the quantitative variables (e.g. age, education, income, etc.) as the dependent variable in each case. Yet, Party ID will be used as the dependent variable in the multinomial regression.

[79] DiTella (2004), however, argues that the left-right polarity differs somewhat between the US and Latin America.

[80] According to Coppedge (1998), fifty-five percent of 150 legislative elections occurred in 11 Latin American countries during the 20th century were *sufficiently ideological*, while the rest were candidate-driven or showed no clear trend. Elections are sufficiently ideological when "parties […] take clear, widely understood positions on a conventionally interrelated set of issues" (Coppedge 1998,552).

continuum (e.g. Zoco 2006). Table 3.2 below shows how Honduran legislators place themselves, their own party, and the other parties along an ideology scale of 10 points, where 1 means "far left" and 10 means "far right." The PDCH has been placed at the center-left of the ideological spectrum (mean=4.2) by other parties' legislators, the PINU-SD have been placed in the center (mean=5.2), Partido Liberal (PL) at the center-right (mean=5.7), and the Partido Nacional (PN) farther to the right (mean=8.3).[81] Yet, these mean values are not statistically different.

Table 3.2: Left–right placement of legislators and parties in Honduras (1997-2001)

Party	Self-placement			Party placement (by party's own legislators)			Party placement (by other party's legislators)		
	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.
PDCH	2	4.5	3.958	2	5	3.167	69	4.201	1.74
PINU-SD	2	4.5	0.792	2	5	1.583	69	5.172	1.78
PL	37	5.649	1.653	37	5.73	1.427	34	5.705	2.11
PN	31	7.033	1.938	31	7.867	1.479	40	8.347	1.48

Source: Zoco (2006,265)

Considering the above ideological classification of parties, it is expected that PL and PN supporters will tend to place themselves in a position similar to those depicted in Table 3.2. In the Honduran survey, one of the items (LR) asked the interviewees to place themselves along the ten-point ideology scale, where 1 is "far-left" and 10 is the "far-right" end of the continuum. Therefore, it is possible to explore how ideology relates to individuals' identification with each of the two traditional parties and the PO3 option. Figure 3.1 below shows the distribution of the sample along the ideology scale. Clearly, most Hondurans place themselves on the center and right side of the scale, while few do so in the left side.

[81] The Partido Unificación Democrática (UD) was not included in Zoco's study but it was considered as being a left-winger party.

Figure 3.1: Ideological distribution of Hondurans



Contrary to the expectation, however, there is no difference whatsoever between the PL and the PN in terms of their supporters' ideology, nor between these and the supporters of the minor parties, or those who claim not to identify with any party (PO3).[82] As shown in Table 3.3 below, their mean ideological 'value' is almost identical, about 6.9 in the scale of 10 (center-right).[83] And this is perhaps the reason why Honduras is considered to be the least polarized party system in Central America (Zoco 2006,271). A potential explanation for this apparent anomaly may be that ideology, as understood by Hondurans today, has little to do with the parties' history and policy stands but rather with some other variables yet to explore, thereby the

[82] The mean ideology among PO3 sympathizers may be misleading since this group includes partisans from the center (i.e. PINU-SD) and the left (i.e. UD). However, the number of their cases in the survey is too small to make any reliable distinction.

[83] Since the results of the analysis are supposed to represent the country as a whole (sample totals), a replication technique for variance estimation is necessary to estimate the sampling errors. The technique used in this analysis is the so called "Jackknife" Repeated Replication method. Jackknife is considered to be a more efficient replication technique for *complex* survey data since it replicates sub-samples of the primary sampling units (PSU) within each stratum and provide therefore more efficient variance estimates than the simple replication technique (i.e. the Taylor Series linearization technique) used for simple random samples (SRS). An in-depth explanation of the computations is found in Kish (1965).

lack of congruency. In fact, some authors have warned that definitions of *left* and *right* may vary across cultures, countries, regions, and time (Gerring 1997; Coppedge 1998).[84]

Table 3.3: Partisans' mean ideology

Parties	Mean ideology	Jknife Std. Err.	95% Conf. Intervals	
PN	6.9496	0.0971	6.7565	7.1427
PO3	6.9608	0.1906	6.5818	7.3397
PL	6.9049	0.0906	6.7248	7.0850

Undoubtedly, the recent political history of Honduras and of Central America in general, has helped to define ideology not much in terms of party policy stands, such as in the United States, but rather on issues relevant to the Cold-War related developments in the region (Anderson 1988). In general, the terms "izquierdista" and "derechista" (leftist and rightist) where normally used to refer to those who were pro-revolution and/or pro-socialism/communism and those who were against it, respectively. Therefore, ideology among Hondurans might be defined more by their support, or opposition, to the political system as a whole, instead of support for a particular party or policies.[85] In fact, the variable *ideology* has a statistically significant correlation with the *system support* variable ($r=0.134$; $p<.0001$) in the Honduras dataset.[86]

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[84] John Gerring has been able to document how diverse the meanings and definitions of "ideology" are, and the impossibility of a universally valid one. Thus, the importance of determining the meaning of the term for the cultural, political, and social settings were it is to be applied. Determining the position of each party, or their followers, would mean nothing if we do not know what is to be "left" or "right". However, Gerring also warns of idiosyncratic definitions that would render impossible subsequent comparisons (1997,967).

[85] A similar point is argued by Holmberg (2003).

[86] System Support attempts to assess generalized trust and support for the basic institutions of government, rather than support for the incumbent regime (Seligson 2001,53). The scale is based on five items, each measured by an ordinal scale from 1 (a great deal) to 7 (not at all). The questions were as follows:
B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial?
B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Honduras?

There may be several reasons for this meaning of ideology in Honduras. First, it was the interpretation most commonly given to it during the Cold-War period. Second, the traditional political parties completely lacked distinctive platforms (e.g. set of policy preferences that a party stands for) that could be identified as *left* (liberal) or *right* (conservative), as in the US. This might be due to the overwhelming relevance and urgency for addressing some few issues (i.e. poverty, corruption, unemployment, crime), which all parties must commit themselves to in order to attract a majority of votes. Third, the terms 'left ideology' and 'right ideology' acquired dirty and dangerous connotations during the Cold War period and, consequently, the traditional political parties intentionally avoided the use of such terms to characterize the party or its policies.

3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Several authors have called the attention to several demographic characteristics that seem to be associated with a person's party identification. Demographic attributes such as gender, income, age, and region, among others, are considered to be determinants of partisanship in the United States (e.g. Greene and Elder 2001; Smith 1997). In Honduras, however, there has been a lack of (empirical) studies on the cleavages that might influence party identification and electoral behavior (Bendell 1995). Therefore, this section explores the association between each of these

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B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Honduran political system?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Honduras?
B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Honduras?

potential cleavages and party identification in Honduras. The variables to include in section were coded as follows:

Variables	Scale	Coding
Gender	Binary	0=female; 1=male
Income	Continuous	1=lowest income bracket; 10=highest income bracket
Education	Continuous	Years of formal education
Age	Continuous	Years of age
Urbanization	Multinomial	1=rural; 2=urban; 3=largest two cities
Regions	Binary	1=Atlantic; 2=West; 3=rest of the country
Land	Continuous	Units of land owned or rented
Religion	Multinomial	1=devoted Catholic; 2=not devoted Catholic; 3=Evangelical; 4=other; 5=none

3.2.1 Gender

Gender is the most basic and the first demographic variable to be analyzed in terms of its association with partisanship.[87] Gender is also considered as one of the most resilient cleavages in American political culture (Freeman 1999). According to some theorists (e.g. Kaufmann 2004), there are marked political differences between genders derived in part from their "gender-role socialization". For instance, females are argued to "emphasize values such as cooperation, sacrifice, harmony and morality, while males value more rationalism, competition, and objectivity" (Greene and Elder 2001,65). Women are also considered to be more concerned with issues such as a cleaner environment (e.g. less polluted air and water), social welfare, the right to choose about their own bodies, etc. (Smith 1997). Consequently, women tend to cast socio-

[87] Gender is a dichotomous variable, where 1 = males, and 0 = females.

tropic votes and to identify more with the Democratic Party in the US (Freeman 1999; Green and Elder 2001; Kaufmann 2004).

In Honduras, however, gender does not seem to be associated with partisanship. It has not even been an issue mentioned in the literature. This is expected since there is no difference between the platforms and policy orientations of the traditional parties. As shown in Table 3.4, below, the gender distribution between the two major parties, and among those with other party preferences (PO3), is very similar. The difference is not statistically significant across parties.

.

Table 3.4: Party ID and gender

(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Liberal	Nacional	0.030	0.020	0.387	-0.018	0.078
Liberal	Other or none	0.045	0.039	0.718	-0.047	0.138
Nacional	Other or none	0.015	0.039	1.000	-0.078	0.108

3.2.2 Income

Lipset (2000) has also argued that, in economically developed democracies, people in the lower income groups tend to vote for the parties of the left, while higher-income groups do so for parties of the right. Also, a considerable body of literature (i.e. "median income voter") supports the underlying argument that there is an association between income and voting preferences (e.g. Barr and Davis 1966; Rice 1985). More specifically, that the median-income voter will tend to vote for the party closer to his/her preferred redistributive (e.g. fiscal) policy. Therefore, parties that promise the most redistributive policies will be more likely to win, particularly in cases of lower median income and greater income inequality (Milanovic 2000).

In countries like Honduras, with very high levels of income inequality and poverty, it seems reasonable to expect that people would tend to identify more with and vote for the party of the left (with the most redistributive policies), and less for the party supporting less redistributive policies (e.g. right-wing parties implementing orthodox economic policies). Other authors outside the 'median-voter' literature have also claimed, more explicitly, a link between lower income and support for left-wing parties (e.g. Smith 1997).

In the Honduras survey, a variable measured the monthly household income of interviewees. Figure 3.2 below, show the population distribution for the variable.

Figure 3.2: Distribution of income



Table 3.5, below, shows that there is no significant difference in monthly household income between the sympathizers of the different parties. Yet, Hondurans elected the PN candidate (in Nov. 2001) in the midst of a severe economic crisis caused by the destruction of Hurricane Mitch, a worldwide recession, and a considerable fall in the price of its main

commodity exports (Argueta, 2003). Thus, the voting behavior of Hondurans could be better explained by a retrospective consideration of the economy rather than by the median-income voter thesis. Moreover, President Maduro (PN) implemented several macro-economic policies in line with the orthodox prescriptions of the IMF, which were certainly not redistributive.

Table 3.5: Party ID and income

(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Liberal	Nacional	-0.147	0.094	0.347	-0.371	0.077
Liberal	Other or none	-0.314	0.178	0.235	-0.742	0.113
Nacional	Other or none	-0.167	0.180	1.000	-0.597	0.263

This contradiction to the median income voter thesis is explained by several authors (e.g. Turnbull and Mitias 1999; Mathis and Zech 1989) who have explicitly warned about the inapplicability of the median voter theory to Presidential elections with multi-dimensional issues (instead of local elections with an economic issue). In the case of the 2001 election, a prominent issue in the campaign was the increase in crime, and then presidential candidate Maduro was perceived as more eager and better posed to fight it back (Meza 2002c).

3.2.3 Education

In the United States, education has been commonly viewed as a variable that affects partisanship indirectly, by determining SES and subjective class identification (Knobe 1972). More recently, however, education has also been found to be directly associated to partisanship in the United States (Freeman 1999). This association has switched over time, with the better educated leaning

to the Republican Party before the 1960s, and to the Democratic Party afterward. The Democratic Party, however, is considered to attract a majority of votes among the less educated (Freeman 1999). Thus, while the Democratic Party tends to attract the least and most educated, the Republican Party may be attracting more those in the middle.

In Honduras, the PL is considered to have a similarly strong support among the most educated and some of the least educated, such as unionized workers. However, the PN is also considered as to have strong support from peasants, who also tend to have very little education, as well as more educated business people (Ropp and Morris 1984). Figure 3.3, below, shows that there is no difference between the sympathizers of the PL and PN in terms of education.

Figure 3.3: Party ID and education



Nonetheless, Table 3.6 below shows that there is a statistically significant difference in the average level of education between supporters of the two traditional parties, on the one hand,

and those of the PO3 option on the other hand. Those who identify with the two traditional parties tend to be less educated than those included in the PO3 group.

Table 3.6: Party ID and education

(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Liberal	Nacional	-0.081	0.150	1.000	-0.440	0.277
Liberal	Other or none	-1.134	0.289	**0.000**	-1.827	-0.442
Nacional	Other or none	-1.053	0.291	**0.001**	-1.749	-0.356

This is a pattern that has also been found in other countries (e.g. Britain), where the most educated were more likely to switch to small new parties as a result of dissatisfaction with the performance of the governing (larger) parties (Egerton 2002). As the individuals' education increases, so does the "switching" from the traditional parties to the new options. Further, since the PO3 group includes less-partisan individuals (e.g. "independents"), this finding also supports the argument that less-educated individuals are more partisan than the better educated and that partisanship function as a substitute for cognitive reasoning about the parties, especially among those with lower levels of education (Shively 1979; Huber, *et al.*, 2005). I argue this is also the case in Honduras.

3.2.4 Age

Age is another variable that has been associated with partisanship. Younger people tend to be more liberal and vote for the Democratic Party in the US (Smith 1997; Holmberg 2003). In Honduras, however, age has not been associated to partisanship in the literature. In fact, Table 3.7 below shows that there is no difference whatsoever in terms of age between PL and PN

supporters. However, there is a significant (negative) difference in age between the PO3 and both the PL and PN. In other words, those in the PO3 group are younger than sympathizers of the PL and PN. Clearly, third parties, or not party at all, is an option that seems to be more attractive to younger generations. This also resembles the findings in the United Kingdom, where the younger, and the more educated, tend to support more the smaller parties (Egerton 2002).

Table 3.7: Party ID and age

(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Liberal	Nacional	0.458	0.589	1.000	-0.953	1.868
Liberal	Other or none	4.405	1.136	**0.000**	1.683	7.127
Nacional	Other or none	3.948	1.143	**0.002**	1.210	6.685

3.2.5 Degree of urbanization

In the US, it is commonly known that residents of the larger urban centers (e.g. New York City, San Francisco, Boston, etc.) are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party, while residents in the rural areas (e.g. the South and Midwest) identify more with the Republican Party (e.g, Dahl and Tufte 1973). In Honduran, some authors have argued that the PL enjoys stronger support among the working urban class, since the PL has been more prone to promote populist legislation that has favored them (i.e. minimum wage system, right to unionize, etc.). The PN, on the other hand, is considered to enjoy stronger support among the more conservative sectors of the society, especially among landowners and non-organized peasantry (e.g. Ropp and Morris 1984,205/215).

Table 3.8: Degrees of urbanization

Settings	Frequency	Percent
Major cities	519	17%
Smaller urban	959	32%
Rural	1539	51%
Total	3018	100%

Table 3.8, above, depicts the three levels of urbanization in which individuals interviewed resided in.[88] Nonetheless, Table 3.9 below shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the PL and PN in terms of the level of urbanization of their supporter's place of residence. However, there is a significant difference between PO3 sympathizers and those of the traditional parties. The sympathizers of the PO3 tend to reside in more urban settings than those of the PL and PN.

Table 3.9: Party ID and degree of urbanization

(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Liberal	Nacional	0.022	0.030	1.000	-0.050	0.094
Liberal	Other or none	-0.159	0.058	**0.019**	-0.298	-0.020
Nacional	Other or none	-0.181	0.058	**0.006**	-0.321	-0.041

It is important, however, to point out that the distribution of partisans in the two largest cities of Honduras, Tegucigalpa (in the interior) and San Pedro Sula (in the north) is very different. In Tegucigalpa, a little less than 40% of the persons interviewed identified themselves with the PL, while in San Pedro Sula, almost 60% did so. In fact, elections are usually won by the PN in Tegucigalpa and by the PL in San Pedro Sula. The rest of the country also exhibits

[88] The distribution of cases across levels of urbanization resembles very closely the actual distribution in the country.

wide regional variation, as it will be shown ahead. Therefore, no generalization can be made about partisanship across the urban-rural spectrum, except for the PO3.

3.2.6 Geographic residence

Residence in coastline regions (e.g. US Pacific coast, New England) has also been associated with left ideology and identification with the Democratic Party in the United States (e.g. Smith 1997). There are also American states that tend to identify more with the Democratic Party (*blue states*) or the Republican Party (*red states*). This is also a common belief among Hondurans. People that reside in *la costa norte* (i.e. Cortes, Atlántida, Colón, and Yoro), for instance, are thought to be more liberal (ideologically and party-wise) than people residing in the interior (e.g. Morris 1988; Calix 2001).

Nonetheless, contrary to the common belief, Hondurans residing in the Atlantic departamentos tend to lean, in general, more toward the farther right end of the ideology spectrum than people in the interior. This finding makes a lot of sense since ideology in Honduras is associated with system support, and since the Atlantic region enjoys some of the highest levels of human development (except for Gracias a Dios and Colón) in the country (Cruz and Argueta 2007). Yet, there is no association whatsoever between party ID and region of residence.

There are, however, considerable differences between departments. As depicted in Figure 3.4, the difference between the percent of PL supporters and PN supporters is very large in some departments. The departments with greater prevalence of PL supporters are Ocotepeque, Colón,

and La Paz. The departments with greater prevalence of PN supporters are Lempira, Gracias a Dios, and Intibucá.

Figure 3.4: Prevalence of party ID by department



3.2.7 Land ownership

Honduran theorists have also claimed that landowners tend to identify more with the PN (e.g. Mahoney 2001). The Honduran survey also included an item asking whether the person interviewed owned or rented land, as well as the amount of it.[89] Figure 3.5, below, shows that only 267 individuals reported to owe/rent land and it was not distributed normally.

[89] The unit measure of land used was the "manzana", equal to 6800 square meters.

Figure 3.5: Amount of land owned or rented



Nonetheless, as Table 3.10 shows, the difference in partisanship between those who own or rent land (Land y/n) and those who do not is very small and not statistically significant. Yet, there is a significant difference between the PN and PL in the $\log_{10}$ of the amount of land owned or rented (Land lg). In other words, the larger the (logged) amount of land owned or rented, the greater the likelihood that the owner/renter will identify with the PN, rather than the PL.

Table 3.10: Party ID and amount of land owned

Variable	(I) party	(J) party	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Intervals	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Land (y/n)	Liberal	Nacional	-0.016	0.012	0.461	-0.044	0.011
	Liberal	Other or none	0.034	0.022	0.392	-0.020	0.087
	Nacional	Other or none	0.050	0.022	0.076	-0.004	0.104
Land (lg)	Liberal	Nacional	-0.023	0.010	**0.051**	-0.047	0.000
	Liberal	Other or none	0.004	0.019	1.000	-0.041	0.050
	Nacional	Other or none	0.028	0.019	0.432	-0.018	0.073

3.2.8 Religion

Religion is another variable that has been mentioned in the American literature as associated with both ideology and partisanship (e.g. Lipset 1959; Freeman 1999). More specifically, Christian "Protestant" religions' followers are considered to identify more with the Republican Party than Catholics (Freeman 1999). Nevertheless, as the US elections of 2000 and 2004 revealed, both "fundamentalist" Protestant and Catholic Christians (i.e. those who attend services at least once a week, regularly), tend to identify more with the Republican Party (Green *et al*., 1996).

In Honduras, like in the US, the majority of the population identify themselves as Christians. But while in the US the majority of Christians are *Protestants*, the majority in Honduras are Catholic (63%), followed by Evangelical Christians (28.3%) and non-religious (8.2%). However, while some authors have argued that there are no religious cleavages (e.g. Bendell 1995,8), others have argued just the opposite (e.g. Zoco 2006). Others have pointed out that *protestant* churches tend to be and preach political conservatism or non-activism, while the Catholic Church tend to be more openly political (Oseguera de Ochoa 1987,91-93).[90] Yet, there is no difference whatsoever in terms of ideology between the different religious groups identified in the survey. Neither there is any association between religion and support for Liberals or Conservatives. There are, however, significant difference in terms of the religious identification of those who support the PO3 group. As Table 3.11 shows, the proportion of PO3 sympathizers

[90] Other authors, however, have claimed to find religious differences between legislators of the PN and PL (e.g. Zoco 2006,270)

was significantly greater among those professing 'none' religion than among Catholics and Evangelicals.[91]

Table 3.11: Religion among PO3 sympathizers

(I) Religion	(J) Religion	(I-J) Mean Difference	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
None	Catholic (devoted)	0.1242	0.0195	0.0000	0.0695	0.1789
	Catholic (not devoted)	0.1123	0.0205	0.0000	0.0546	0.1700
	Evangelical	0.1153	0.0201	0.0000	0.0587	0.1718
	Other	0.1095	0.0643	0.8903	-0.0713	0.2902

3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

When exploring the bivariate association between ideology and demographic variables, on one hand, and identification with one of the two traditional major parties (i.e. PL and PN) on the other hand, very few variables achieved statistical significance, while most variables failed to show any association whatsoever. Nonetheless, several variables did reveal a significant difference between supporters of the two traditional parties and the PO3 option. In other words, only two demographic variables, department of residence and amount of land owned/rented, showed a statistically significant difference between supporters of the PL and the PN. Almost all, but land, gender, and ideology, were statistically different between the supporters of the two traditional parties and PO3 group. However, to be able to reach a sound conclusion, it is necessary to consider the effect of each independent variable while controlling for the effect of

[91] The dummy PO3 support variable was coded as 1=PO3 sympathizers; 0=otherwise.

the others. Therefore, a maximum-likelihood multinomial logistic regression will be run with the variable representing party ID (i.e. PN, PL, and PO3) as the dependent variable.

Table 3.12, below, shows the results of the regression for every pair of categories in the dependent variable. That is, the first two models indicate the likelihood of being a PN supporters and PO3 group member, respectively, instead of a PL supporter (reference category). The third model indicates the likelihood of being member of the PO3 group, instead of PN supporter (the reference category). Few variables differentiated between supporters of the two traditional parties (column 1 = PN). Residents of San Pedro Sula, as compared to those of the rural areas, were more likely to be PL supporters. On the other hand, those who owned/rented more land (log), who reside in the departments of Intibucá and Lempira, and those who are no-devoted Catholics were more likely to be PN supporters.[92]

Columns 2 and 3 (PO3) indicate the likelihood of being a member of the PO3 group (i.e. third-parties and independents). Individuals who are more educated are more likely to be PO3 group members rather than PL or PN supporters. Also, residents of Tegucigalpa and Intibucá are more likely to be PL supporters. On the other hand, those who are Catholic or Evangelicals are more likely to be PL or PN supporters.

The association between the logged amount of land (Land-lg) owned/rented and identification with the PN is an expected result. Some students of the Honduran political system (e.g. Mahoney 2001) have indicated an association between land ownership and support for the PN. This could be a result of the traditional support of the PL for "Agrarian Reforms", which

[92] The regression model included only the four departments that have been regarded as having a strong prevalence of supporters of the PL (Ocotepeque and El Paraíso) or the PN (Intibucá and Lempira).

have mostly centered on redistribution of idle land. Thus, while smaller landowners might have benefited from land redistribution policies and might, therefore, be more supportive of the PL, landowners who own larger amounts of land might be more likely to support the PN, which did not favor land redistribution since some of its leaders were large landowners themselves. This rationale could be the reason why the simple ownership of land failed to achieve statistical significance, while the logged amount of land did achieve it.

Regarding the third partisan option, the regression results show that the main difference between individuals the third option (PO3) and those of the PN and PL is that the former tend to be more educated and with no religious identification. Hence, it seems that individuals in this group tend to be less conventional in their views, be it religious or political.

Table 3.12: Determinants of partisanship in Honduras

Variables	Stats.	Ref. = PL		Ref.= PN
		PN	PO3	PO3
Education	B	-0.005	**0.062***	**0.067***
	S.E.	0.015	0.030	0.030
	Exp(B)	0.995	1.064	1.069
Age	B	-0.004	-0.010	-0.007
	S.E.	0.004	0.008	0.008
	Exp(B)	0.996	0.990	0.993
Income	B	0.044	0.012	-0.032
	S.E.	0.024	0.049	0.050
	Exp(B)	1.045	1.012	0.969
Ideology	B	0.012	-0.010	-0.022
	S.E.	0.022	0.045	0.045
	Exp(B)	1.012	0.990	0.978
Land (lg)	B	**0.747****	0.836	0.089
	S.E.	0.224	0.402	0.378
	Exp(B)	2.110	2.307	1.094
Gender (ref=females)				
Male	B	-0.146	-0.352	-0.206
	S.E.	0.097	0.198	0.199
	Exp(B)	0.864	0.703	0.814
Region (ref=rest of country)				
Atlantic	B	0.151	0.489	0.338
	S.E.	0.126	0.269	0.269
	Exp(B)	1.163	1.631	1.403
West	B	-0.205	0.159	0.364
	S.E.	0.156	0.340	0.344
	Exp(B)	0.815	1.172	1.439
Urbanization (ref=rural)				
Tegucigalpa	B	0.082	**0.700***	0.619
	S.E.	0.196	0.357	0.358
	Exp(B)	1.085	2.014	1.856
San Pedro Sula	B	**-0.638***	-0.362	0.276
	S.E.	0.220	0.400	0.413
	Exp(B)	0.529	0.696	1.317
Other urban	B	0.028	-0.235	-0.263
	S.E.	0.110	0.236	0.236
	Exp(B)	1.029	0.791	0.769
Religion (ref=no religion)				
Devoted Catholic	B	0.274	**-1.335****	**-1.609****
	S.E.	0.206	0.294	0.306
	Exp(B)	1.315	0.263	0.200
Not devoted Catholic	B	**0.416***	**-0.955****	**-1.371****
	S.E.	0.213	0.306	0.315
	Exp(B)	1.515	0.385	0.254
Evangelical	B	0.273	**-1.356****	**-1.630****
	S.E.	0.211	0.312	0.323
	Exp(B)	1.314	0.258	0.196
El Paraiso	B	-0.011	-0.740	-0.730
	S.E.	0.253	0.658	0.665
	Exp(B)	0.990	0.477	0.482
Ocotepeque	B	-0.444	0.012	0.455
	S.E.	0.428	0.747	0.787
	Exp(B)	0.642	1.012	1.577
Intibuca	B	**0.698***	**1.164***	0.466
	S.E.	0.292	0.510	0.502
	Exp(B)	2.010	3.202	1.593
Lempira	B	**0.573***	-0.298	-0.870
	S.E.	0.266	0.646	0.643
	Exp(B)	1.773	0.743	0.419

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this chapter helped to empirically identify several associations, or lack thereof, between cleavages and partisanship in Honduras. Perhaps the major finding is that there is no difference between the PL, PN, and PO3 in terms of party supporters' ideology. Also, that the meaning of ideology among Hondurans may not be based on policy stands, like in the US, but rather on a sense of support for the system as a whole, which may have developed during the Cold-War related developments in the region. All these findings suggest the importance of a careful review of the mainstream theory of partisanship, mostly developed in the US, when attempting to apply it to the Latin American region.

Another theoretical point to derive from this chapter is the contention that even though parties originate from cleavages in the society, they can gain a life of their own and continue to exist even long after the cleavages have fade away. I argue this is the case of the two traditional Honduran parties, which originated in the midst of the classic liberal-conservative ideological confrontation of the 18th century (LoTempo 2001) but in this day and age have no much differentiation. Therefore, it is fair to assert that identification with one or the other traditional political party in Honduras is more likely the result of an *affective* sense of group belonging, perhaps inherited from parents or significant others, rather than the result of cleavages (except, perhaps, for large landowners).

Several factors may have contributed to this fading of cleavages. First, the emergence and prevalence of the Liberal party at the end of the nineteenth century, which increased inclusiveness and marked perhaps the beginning of mass politics (Isaula 1997). Second, the emergence of the *Partido Nacional*, as a competing branch off the Liberal party, at the beginning

of the twentieth century. Third, the ability of both traditional parties' elites, mostly Spanish descendants, to win popular support from all sectors of the *mestizo* population, the overwhelming racial majority, which prevented the evolution of class-based or race-based parties (Ropp and Morris 1984; DiTella 2004:185). Fourth, the prevalence of "caudillo politics" within the political parties, which may have served as substitute for ideology (Morris, 1988; Taylor-Robinson 2001). Fifth, the inclusion of previously marginalized interest groups and the introduction of reforms during the military governments (Bendell 1995,14). Sixth, the long history of economic backwardness in Honduras, which prevented the development of extreme class exploitation and a powerful ruling oligarchy, thus allowing the implementation of reforms (Euraque 1996; Ruhl 2000; Walker and Armony 2000).

However, if party identification in Honduras is mainly determined by an affective sense of "group-belonging", which is supposed to be fairly stable through time, how was it possible for the Honduran system to have experienced such a considerable party swing between the elections of 1997 and 2001 (among others)? I argue that even though Hondurans have an affective attachment to the traditional parties, the lack of real 'anchors' (i.e. cleavages) makes it easier for them to "deviate" in their electoral behavior in response to contemporary rational considerations, without changing their affective identification. This contention is examined in chapter 4, next.

4.0 PARTY TURNOVER AND VOTER TYPES

As stated in chapter 1, the main purpose of this research is to examine how the relative prevalence and political behavior of 'affective' and 'rational' voters in the electorate play a role in the realization of electoral accountability. This chapter examines such role in the context of the presidential elections of 1997 and 2001 in Honduras. It also examines in depth the differentiating characteristics of both types of voters.[93]

Evidently, individuals' electoral preferences can and do change between elections, causing sometimes a turnover of the party in power (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996). These changes are thought to come about as a result of long term forces, such as the erosion of traditional cleavages associated with partisanship and/or, as "rational-choice" theorists argue, due to short-term forces such as candidate likeability, dramatic events like wars, the state of the economy, and so forth (Fiorina 1981; Rice and Hilton 1996; Clarke and Stewart 1998; LoTempio

[93] As a matter of recollection, *affective* voters are defined as sympathizers of either traditional party (i.e. PL and PN) who voted for their 'own' party during both 1997 and 2001 elections. *Rational* voters, on the other hand, are sympathizers of any party, as well as independents, who did not vote for the same party during both elections. The rationale underlying this categorization is the argument that the electoral results were prompted by voters who cast their votes in response to the 'quality' of the candidates (a "rational" consideration), in the absence of any ideological or demographic cleavages between sympathizers of the traditional parties. Meza *et al* summarize the differences between candidates in the 2001 election, where the defeated PL candidate was perceived as "old style, confrontational, intolerant, folkloric, disrespectful" and the winner PN candidate as "new style, purposeful, tolerant, modern, and respectful. […] All this made the *Liberales* look conservative and the *Nacionalistas* as progressive" (2002c,27-28).

2002). Yet, notwithstanding the considerable electoral volatility in elections, individuals' party identification is thought to be highly stable (Green and Palmquist 1994). Party attachments are supposed to be even stronger in systems with long established parties, when the number of parties is small, and when there are high levels of party discipline (Huber, *et al.*, 2005), such as in the cases of the American and Honduran two-party systems. So, how can electoral volatility (and electoral accountability) coexist with party ID stability? I argue this is only possible by the existence of voters whose party choice of vote (PCV) is determined by "rational" short-term considerations rather than their individual "affective" long-term party identification (i.e. a *rational* minority).[94] This chapter attempts to show that this is the case in Honduras.

4.1 ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN HONDURAS

As mentioned above, the Honduran survey being used in this research was conducted in the midst of one of the most dramatic turnovers of government in the recent democratic history of Honduras. As Table 4.1 shows below, the Partido Liberal (PL) and the Partido Nacional (PN) obtained together more than 95% of the total number of valid votes in both elections. In 1997, however, the PL won the election over the PN by more than 10 percent points. In 2001, the PL lost to the PN by almost the same margin. Not only the PN obtained more votes, but also the PL received fewer votes during the 2001 election than in 1997.

[94] The term "rational" refers to voters whose political behavior is typified by the so called "rational-choice" theory of partisanship, which emphasize short-term determinants of partisanship such as the state of the economy, candidates, etc..

Table 4.1: Votes, 1997-2001

	1997	2001
Total valid votes	1,975,973	2,174,703
PL+PN	1,885,388	2,098,011
%PL+PN	95.4%	96.5%
PL	1,040,403	962,446
% PL	55.2%	45.9%
PN	844,985	1,135,565
% PN	44.8%	54.1%
Source of data: Tribunal Supremo Electoral		

Also, the two maps below show which municipalities were won by which party in the elections of 1997 and 2001, using actual electoral statistics. In 1997, most municipalities were won by the PL while in 2001 most were won by the PN. Clearly, these results show that there were considerable shifts in the party choice of vote (PCV) between the two elections.



Map 4.1: Electoral results by municipalities, 1997



Map 4.2: Electoral results by municipalities, 2001

The shifts in PCV are considerably large and seem to occur all over the country. However, a distinctive pattern emerges when examining the shifts in the municipalities in terms of percent point difference in votes for the PL and PN during the 1997 and 2001 elections.[95] Figure 4.1 below, shows the department-level averages of the municipality-level shifts. The departamentos that showed greater shifts were those in the Atlantic region (i.e. Cortes, Colón, Yoro, Islas de la Bahia, Atlántida, and Gracias a Dios). This instability in the PCV, however,

[95] The percent shift value is equal to $[(\%PL - \%PN)_{1997} - (\%PL - \%PN)_{2001}]$. For example, if the department *Alpha* was won by the PL in 1997 by a difference of 7 percent points over the PN, but in the 2001 elections the PN won the department by a difference of 10 percent points over the PL (%PL - %PN = -10), then the shift value between 1997 and 2001 would be equal to $[(7)_{1997} - (-10)_{2001}] = 17$. Now, if department *Beta* was won by the PN in both elections, say, by a difference of 30 percent points in 1997 and by 28 percent points in 2001, then the shift value would be equal to $[(-30)_{1997} - (-28)_{2001}] = -2$. In other words, the magnitude of the shift value indicates the extent of the variation in the vote during the two elections, while the sign indicates whether the change between the two elections added more votes for the PN (positive sign) or for the PL (negative sign).

does not mean that individuals vote for different parties in different elections (only a minority does so). But, as it will be shown ahead, this volatility is rather the result of high rates of abstention among sympathizers of the traditional parties, as well as non-sympathizers.

Figure 4.1: Shifts in PCV by department



Map 4.3 below displays the geographic distribution of three levels of volatility in PCV. The departments of the Atlantic region have the highest levels, while those in the west (plus El Paraíso in the south) have the lowest.



Map 4.3: Level of volatility in PCV between 1997 and 2001

4.2 THE DYNAMICS OF PARTY TURNOVER

As mentioned before, the vast majority of partisans in Honduras identify with the PL and the PN. However, the PL seems to have a small but considerably majority over the PN, which has made possible for it to win 5 out of the last 7 presidential elections. Yet, the dynamics of such turnovers has not been explained. The Honduran survey included four items that can help figure out such dynamics. These items asked respondents 1) whether or not they voted during the 1997 elections, 2) which party (candidate) they voted for in the past elections (1997), 3) which party they planed to vote for in the approaching presidential elections (2001) and, 4) which party

they identify more with. These four variables will be used in this section to uncover the dynamics of the shifts in PCV that were responsible for the party turnover.

Table 4.2 below shows that, during the 1997 elections, a greater percent reported voting among sympathizers of the PL (73.3%) than among those of the PN (66.7%). The greater rate of abstention among PN supporters might reflect the argued disparity between the candidates, which in 1997 favored the PL candidate, Carlos Flores. It may also indicate that one cause of the volatility of PCV is abstention by sympathizers of a traditional party whose candidate is less liked than the one of the other traditional party, being both traditional parties the only parties with possibilities of winning. Another expected figure is that only 36.1% of those who have no party preference (none or are not sure) voted in 1997. Also, the table shows that the numbers of "third-party" sympathizers (i.e. PINU=41, PDCH=11, and UD=5) are too small as to provide reliable statistics.

Table 4.2: Voting by party ID, 1997

Did you vote in the elections of 1997?	Which party do you identify more with?						Total
	Partido Liberal PL	Partido Nacional PN	Innovacion y Unidad PINU-SD	Democracia Cristiana PDCH	Unificacion Democratica UD	None/ Not sure	
No	198	226	13	5	1	219	662
	15.1%	18.8%	31.7%	45.5%	20.0%	49.1%	21.9%
Yes	963	802	20	6	4	161	1956
	73.3%	66.7%	48.8%	54.5%	80.0%	36.1%	64.8%
Didn't Tell/ Too young	152	174	8	0	0	66	400
	11.6%	14.5%	19.5%	0.0%	0.0%	14.8%	13.3%
Total	1313	1202	41	11	5	446	3018
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Regarding the PCV during the 1997 elections, Table 4.3 shows that even though individuals' party loyalty was high, it was higher among PL supporters (68.7%) than among PN's (57.6%). Further, there were some individuals who voted for a candidate other than that of

their own party. For instance, 2.6% of PL supporters voted for the PN candidate, while 6.6% of PN supporters voted for the PL candidate (party-switchers). Among third-parties, it is interesting to see a much greater tendency to vote for the traditional parties,(the only ones with real chances of wining the election) particularly among supporters of the PINU, who voted for the PL and the PN in same numbers as for their own party (12.8%). Also, most independents who did vote in 1997 reported voting for the PL (19.1%). These results seem to confirm the thesis that in 1997 the PL candidate was more likeable than the PN candidate, and that many voters cast their votes for the PL, in spite of sympathizing for another party, or none.

Table 4.3: PCV by party ID, 1997

Which party did you vote for in 1997?	Which party do you identify more with?						Total
	Partido Liberal PL	Partido Nacional PN	Innovacion y Unidad PINU-SD	Democracia Cristiana PDCH	Unificacion Democratica UD	None/ Not sure	
PL	903	79	5	0	0	85	1072
	68.7%	6.6%	12.8%	0.0%	0.0%	19.1%	35.5%
PN	34	692	5	2	0	27	760
	2.6%	57.6%	12.8%	16.7%	0.0%	6.1%	25.2%
PINU	0	2	5	0	0	1	8
	0.0%	0.2%	12.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.3%
PDCH	2	2	1	5	3	0	13
	0.2%	0.2%	2.6%	41.7%	60.0%	0.0%	0.4%
NR	25	27	2	0	1	47	102
	1.9%	2.2%	5.1%	0.0%	20.0%	10.6%	3.4%
No vote	350	400	21	5	1	285	1062
	26.6%	33.3%	53.8%	41.7%	20.0%	64.0%	35.2%
Total	1314	1202	39	12	5	445	3017
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In the 2001 election, the opposite happened. Table 4.4 shows that loyalty among sympathizers of the two major parties ran higher than in 1997, but this time the PN sympathizers

were more loyal to their party (89.4%) than PL supporters (82.2%).[96] Also, a larger percent of PL supporters (4%) intended to vote for the PN than PN supporters for the PL (1%). Loyalty, however, continued to run low for 'third-party' sympathizers (except UD's), who cast more votes for the PN (13) than for the PL (8). Independents (i.e. none and unsure) also voted more for the PN (3.8%) than the PL (1.6%), a pattern that was opposite to than in 1997. In general, the intention of vote favored the PN (38.4%) over the PL (36.6%).

Table 4.4: PCV by party ID, 2001

Which party will you vote for in 2001?	Which party do you identify more with?						Total
	Partido Liberal PL	Partido Nacional PN	Innovacion y Unidad PINU-SD	Democracia Cristiana PDCH	Unificacion Democratica UD	None/ not sure	
PL	1079	12	8	0	0	7	1106
	82.2%	1.0%	19.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	36.6%
PN	53	1075	9	4	0	17	1158
	4.0%	89.4%	22.0%	33.3%	0.0%	3.8%	38.4%
PINU	5	4	13	0	0	1	23
	0.4%	0.3%	31.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.8%
PDCH	1	2	0	6	1	1	11
	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%	50.0%	20.0%	0.2%	0.4%
UD	1	0	0	0	4	0	5
	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%	0.0%	0.2%
None	155	91	8	2	0	341	597
	11.8%	7.6%	19.5%	16.7%	0.0%	76.5%	19.8%
undecided	19	18	3	0	0	79	119
	1.4%	1.5%	7.3%	0.0%	0.0%	17.7%	3.9%
Total	1313	1202	41	12	5	446	3019
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The analysis above reveals that the shift in the PCV may be the result of partisans' voting abstention, party-switching, and independents' shifting voting preferences. Taylor (2001,333)

[96] The higher rates of intention to vote are likely to be the result of the ongoing electoral campaign. However, what is of interest in this analysis is not much the level of the intention to vote but rather the relative intent between different partisans, as well as their intended choices.

have claimed that due to the high cost of switching parties in a "caudillo" political system like Honduras, disaffected voters respond to their disappointment with their own party mostly by abstaining from voting, rather than by voting for the opposition party. Still, some party-switching has been uncovered in this analysis. And the figure could even be higher, considering the *stigma* that usually accompanies party-switching. A last but very important point to keep in mind, however, is that these cases of party-switching may be more accurately called *voting*-switching, since the survey did not capture switches in party ID but rather switches in PCV.

4.2.1 Voting Abstention

A closer look to the actual voting abstention, as revealed by the official electoral results, displays patterns similar to those of PCV instability described above. Figure 4.2 shows that abstention varies across departments and that those departments which exhibit higher rates are the ones located in the Atlantic region (Islas de la Bahia, Colón, Cortes, Gracias a Dios, Atlántida, and Yoro), while the (interior) departments in the west and southeast exhibit the lowest rates of abstention (El Paraíso, La Paz, Ocotepeque, Lempira, Intibucá, Copán, and Sta. Barbara).[97] This is a trend previously identified and called into attention by Cálix Rodríguez (2001). The graph also shows that abstention was higher during the 2001 election than during the 1997 election.

[97] The abstention rates are determined by the ratio between the number of registered voters and the total number of votes cast in each municipality. The rates by department are the ratio of the aggregates of both statistics at the level of the municipality.

Figure 4.2: Abstention rates by department, 1997-2001



The reasons for such geographic distribution are puzzling since it does not follow socio-economic or otherwise political patterns of the present. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the political dynamics during the formative years of the current political system, between independence and mid-twentieth century. During some years of that period, the Atlantic region had considerable American and British influence, which foreshadowed that of the Honduran central government, which had more influence in the central departments. The western region, in turn, was heavily influenced by the Liberal and Conservative political elites of Guatemala and El Salvador, which were often instrumental in deciding who would rule the Honduran central government. Nicaragua had also some influence in the south-east. Yet, a historical analysis of this magnitude could be the topic for another dissertation and will not be further addressed in this research.

As mentioned above, the rate of abstention is directly and significantly correlated with shifts in the vote for the two major parties. The significant correlations between the shifts in PCV and the abstention rates in 1997 ($r=.376$; $p<.001$) and 2001 ($r=.324$; $p<.001$) clearly suggest that abstention may be a relevant factor affecting which of the two traditional parties wins the elections.[98] Moreover, the very high correlation coefficient between the abstention rates of 1997 and 2001 ($r=.701$; $p<.001$) indicates that abstention tend to be consistently high in some municipalities (e.g. municipalities in the departments of the Atlantic region) and consistently low in others (e.g. municipalities in some departments of the interior).

Table 4.5, below reveals that abstention during the 1997 election also contributed significantly to an increase in the percent of votes for the PL ($r=.173$; $p=.002$) and a decrease for the PN ($r=–.201$; $p>.000$). During the 2001 elections, however, abstention affected negatively the percent of the vote for the PL ($r=–.125$; $p=.017$) but benefited only marginally the percent of votes obtained by the PN ($r=.095$; $p=.054$). Although these correlation coefficients may be low, their combined affect may certainly contribute, together with the effect of party-switching, to the marginal difference in votes that caused the party turnover in 2001.[99]

[98] Bivariate correlations used data from the 287 municipalities of the country.
[99] For example, an average abstention rate of 30% in 1997 would result in an increase in votes of 5.1% for the PL and a decrease of 6% for the PN.

Table 4.5: Correlations between abstention and votes for PL and PN, 1997-2001

Bivariate Correlations			
Abstention rates 1997	Votes for PL (%) in 1997	Pearson	0.173
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.002
		N	287
	Votes for PN (%) in 1997	Pearson	-0.201
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
		N	287
Abstention rates 2001	Votes for PL (%) in 2001	Pearson	-0.125
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.017
		N	287
	Votes for PN (%) in 2001	Pearson	0.095
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.054
		N	287

But, who are those who abstain from voting? Voting abstention has been associated to a host of factors at the level of the political system and the individual voters.[100] At the micro level, the most prominent factors are the socio-economic status of the individual (e.g. Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Lijphart 1997; Blair 2000; Jackson 2003). Those who have greater resources (e.g. cognitive, economic, time, mobility) are more likely to turnout to vote. A higher turnout rate is also found among those with strong party-group linkage (Powell 1986) as well as among individual who reside in more concentrated, connected communities (Timpone 1998; Tam Cho *et al*., 2006).

This section examines how abstention is associated to demographic and political variables that have been cited in the mainstream literature. The variables used in the binary logistic regression were coded as follows:

[100] At the cross-national level, voting turnout has been associated with the electoral laws (e.g. compulsory voting, district magnitude, majority vs plurality), the number of parties, the existence of safety nets, etc. (Jackman 1987; Radcliff 1992; Blais *et al*., 2003; Martin and Plümper 2005; Hill 2006).

Table 4.6: Description of variables relevant to voting abstention

Variables	Scale	Coding
Voting abstention (Dependent)	Binary	0=did vote; 1=abstained from voting
Gender	Binary	0=female; 1=male
Age	Continuous	Years of age; 18 years and older
Urbanization	Multinomial	1=rural; 2=urban; 3=largest two cities
Region	Multinomial	1=West; 2=Center, southeast; 3=Atlantic region
Education	Continuous	Years of formal education
Economic status	5-point ordinal	(Income*wealth) 1=worse-off; 5=best-off
Ideology	10-point ordinal	1=far left; 10=far right
Traditional parties' non-supporter	binary	0=traditional party supporter; 1=non-supporter

In the case of Honduras, a binary logistic regression (Table 4.7) also revels that voting abstention is determined by demographic (e.g. age and degree of urbanization) and political variables (i.e. not being a supporter of the traditional parties), rather than socio-economic variables (e.g. education, economic status). Yet, voting abstention in 1997 and 2001 is associated with slightly different variables. When only demographic variables are included (Model 1), the variable *gender* and *age* were significantly associated with abstention in 1997 (e.g. every year increase in age, decreases the odds of voting abstention by 0.962), but not in 2001.[101] The variable *region*, however, was significantly associated in both 1997 and 2001 (the odds of abstaining from voting of those who reside in the western departments (e.g. Ocotepeque, Lempira) are lower than those who reside in the Atlantic region and the rest of the country. The variable *urbanization*, however, was not significant in any model.

Model 2 introduced socio-economic and political variables. The only significant variable in this group was not being a sympathizer or supporter of the traditional parties. This variable,

[101] While the standard errors indicate whether an independent variable is significantly associated to the dependent variable (i.e. voting abstention), the Exp(B) statistics indicates the magnitude of the change in the odds of occurrence of the event of interest (voting abstention) for every change in one unit in the independent variable.

however, was by far the main determinant of voting abstention in both elections. In 1997, non-supporters of the traditional parties had odds of abstaining that were 5.4 times those of the traditional parties' supporters. In 2001, the odds increased to 17.2 times! Yet, these results do not mean that only non-supporters of the traditional parties abstained from voting. As a matter of fact, a large percent of the traditional parties' sympathizers also abstained from voting, in proportions that were consistent with the results in each election. Finally, the Nagelkerke R square indicates the explanatory power of each model. Model 2 resulted to be the one with the highest level, explaining 21% in 1997 and almost 30% in 2001 of the variance in the dependent variable, voting abstention.

Table 4.7: Binomial logistic regression: abstainers

Variables	Stats	1997		2001	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Gender (ref=males)	B	**-0.220**	-0.143	-0.112	-0.015
	S.E.	0.093	0.122	0.092	0.134
	Exp(B)	0.803	0.867	0.894	0.985
Age	B	**-0.035**	**-0.049**	-0.001	0.001
	S.E.	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005
	Exp(B)	0.965	0.952	0.999	1.001
Urbanization (ref=rural)					
Urban centers	B	-0.071	-0.039	0.064	0.129
	S.E.	0.108	0.147	0.106	0.160
	Exp(B)	0.931	0.962	1.067	1.138
Largest two cities	B	0.204	**0.463**	0.231	0.144
	S.E.	0.130	0.174	0.127	0.192
	Exp(B)	1.226	1.589	1.260	1.155
Region (ref=west)					
Rest of country	B	**0.841**	**0.777**	**0.494**	**0.419**
	S.E.	0.131	0.172	0.132	0.189
	Exp(B)	2.320	2.175	1.639	1.520
Atlantic region	B	**0.524**	**0.669**	**0.597**	**0.639**
	S.E.	0.136	0.177	0.134	0.191
	Exp(B)	1.689	1.953	1.817	1.894
Education	B		-0.035		-0.010
	S.E.		0.020		0.021
	Exp(B)		0.966		0.990
Economic Status	B		-0.111		-0.103
	S.E.		0.069		0.074
	Exp(B)		0.895		0.902
Ideology	B		-0.014		0.024
	S.E.		0.028		0.030
	Exp(B)		0.987		1.025
Traditional parties' non-supporter	B		**1.682**		**2.848**
	S.E.		0.154		0.148
	Exp(B)		5.375		17.245
Constant	B	**0.315**	**0.873**	**-1.320**	**-2.211**
	S.E.	0.149	0.321	**0.137**	0.344
Nagelkerke R Square		**0.092**	**0.214**	**0.018**	**0.299**

4.2.2 Voting switching

Besides abstention, another form of political behavior affecting party turnover is party-switching. However, Table 4.8 below shows that partisans of both major parties prefer to abstain from voting (e.g. 15.1% and 18.8% in 1997) rather than voting for the rival party (e.g. 2.6% and 6.6% in 1997).[102] Hence, party-switching is not a common practice in Honduras, where rates are as low as those in the US. (Clarke and Stewart 1998). These results lend support for Taylor's argument regarding the preferred behavior (i.e. abstain) of voters when they are dissatisfied with their own parties (Taylor 2001). However, party-switching seems to also have contributed to the party turnover in 2001, since a larger percent of *Liberales* voted for the PN (4.1%) than *Nacionalistas* voted for the PL (1.0%). Yet, it is obvious that the PN won the election in 2001 due to PL supporters both switching and abstaining in higher percentage than PN supporters. Just the opposite had been the case in the election of 1997 when the PL won the election.

Table 4.8: Party-switching, 1997-2001

Voting behavior	1997		2001	
PL who voted for PN	34	2.6%	53	4.1%
PN who voted for PL	79	6.6%	12	1.0%
PL who abstained	198	15.1%	174	13.3%
PN who abstained	226	18.8%	109	9.1%

Uncovering the determinants of party-switching in this section is desired but the small number of "switchers", compared to the survey total, would make it difficult to obtain any significant association with the potential independent variables. The limitation is greater when

[102] Party-switching and abstention rates are not shown for the sympathizers of the smaller parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, UD) because of their small number and unreliability of their statistics. Yet, they depicted rates that were much higher than those of the traditional parties' sympathizers.

considering that PL sympathizers that voted PN may have different reasons and characteristics than PN sympathizers who voted PL. Moreover, voting for a party other than one's own is not exclusive among sympathizers of the traditional parties but it is actually even more common among sympathizers of the smaller parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, UD), whose reasons and characteristics may differ more markedly. Yet, the Honduras survey interviewed a too small a number of them as to make any analysis possible.

A solution to these small-N problems is to group the different voters into larger categories, independent of the party they identify more with. As mentioned before, the purpose of this chapter is to uncover the characteristics of those who made party turnover, and therefore electoral accountability, possible in Honduras. That is, partisans who sometimes abstain from voting for their own party (by either voting for another party or not voting at all) and non-partisans (independents) who cast their votes for any party, which might indicate the absence of a strong affective attachment to a party. I have called these voters "rational voters" since they seem to decide with party to vote for, or not to vote for, not based on "affective" attachment to a party but rather by some other reason that might be rational to them (e.g. likeability of candidates, issues, or any other "rational" consideration as argued by the "rational-choice" theory of partisanship).

4.3 TYPES OF VOTERS

The Honduran voters included in the survey were therefore categorized into larger groups. However, before doing that, it was necessary to examine each voter's voting behavior. Table 4.9

below depicts the pre-categorization analysis. Sympathizers of any of the two traditional parties who voted for their own party in 1997 and 2001 were considered as "strong" partisans and to have an "affective" attachment to the party for which they vote for consistently, despite the considerable differences in the quality of the candidates discussed previously. Moderate partisans, on the other hand, were those who did not vote for their own party in at least one of the two elections, most likely due to some "rational" consideration (e.g. candidates' likeability). The ratio of strong-moderate partisans (affective-rational voters) is about 1 to 3 for both parties. However, the percent of moderate/"rational" partisans is large enough as to have caused the party turnover occurred in 2001. Yet, a considerably large percent of these partisans (as well as independents) failed to report their electoral behavior in a way that made impossible to categorize them (i.e. unknown).

Table 4.9: Types of voters by party ID

Party ID	Frequency	Percent	Voter type
Partido Liberal	1313	100%	
Moderates	261	20%	rational
Strong partisans	776	59%	affective
Unknown	276	21%	unknown
Partido Nacional	1202	100%	
Moderates	201	17%	rational
Strong partisans	646	54%	affective
Unknown	354	29%	unknown
PINU-PDCH-UD	57	100%	
voting P3 supporter	49	86%	rational
non-voters	8	15%	non-voter
Independents	446	100%	
Voting independents	153	34%	rational
non-voters	213	48%	non-voter
unknown behavior	79	18%	unknown
Total	**3018**	**100%**	

The electoral behavior among the sympathizers of the small parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, and UD), as well as among independents, was also examined to make possible their

classification. Most sympathizers of the small parties (voting ones) were considered as "rational" since most voted for different parties or abstained from voting. But even those few who voted consistently for their own party were considered as "rational" since their voting behavior was likely to have been driven by the distinctive ideological underpinning of their parties (e.g. Social-democracy, Christian-democracy), very much unlike the traditional parties. Yet, there were some few members of this group who did not vote in any of the two elections. The percentage of non-voters, however, was much higher among independents. The fact that some individuals had not voted in these two elections raise the possibility that they were "apolitical." Therefore, non-voters should be excluded from the analysis since they do not influence the results of the elections in any way.

Table 4.10: Prevalence of types of voters

Voter Type	Which party do you identify more with?				Total
	Partido Liberal PL	Partido Nacional PN	PINU-SD, PDCH, UD	None/ Not sure	
Rational	261 19.9%	201 16.7%	49 86.0%	153 34.3%	664 22.0%
Affective	776 59.1%	646 53.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1422 47.1%
Unkown	276 21.0%	354 29.5%	0 0.0%	79 17.7%	709 23.5%
Non-voter	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	8 14.0%	213 47.8%	221 7.3%
Total	**1313** **43.5%**	**1202** **39.8%**	**57** **1.9%**	**446** **14.8%**	**3018** **100.0%**

Table 4.10 above provides the final classification of voters, as summarized from Table 4.9. As shown, almost half the population of Honduras (47.1%) has an affective attachment to one of the two traditional parties (i.e. strong partisans). The proportion is greater among *Liberales* (59.1%) than among *Nacionalistas* (53.7%) However, more than one-fifth of the population reported a "rational" electoral behavior (19.9% among *Liberales*, 16.7% among

Nacionalistas, 34.3% among independents), which was responsible for the party turnover in 2001. Yet, almost one-quarter of the population (23.5%) was reluctant to disclose enough information about their electoral behavior, while an additional 7.3% reported not to have voted in both elections, particularly among independents (47.8%).

Table 4.11 below shows the percent distribution of each type of voter by department. It also shows how the prevalence of the types of voters is correlated with the electoral shifts shown in Figure 4.1 above. Surprisingly, the correlation between the percent shift in PCV and the percent of rational voters failed, by little, to achieve statistical significance (r=.330; p=.091). The reason for this may be not only the small number of case-departments (18) but also the high prevalence of missing cases (i.e. non-voters and unknown). The fact that the correlation between the percent shifts in PCV and the prevalence of missing cases (r=.324; p=.095) is almost identical to that of rational voters might be indicative that the missing cases mask other rational voters. If that were the case, it would suggest that people are reluctant not much to disclose the party their voted for but rather their failure to vote for their own party, or not to vote at all, which is usually stigmatized in "caudillo," two-party systems like Honduras.

The percent shift in PCV was, on the other hand, highly but inversely correlated with the prevalence of affective voters (r=–.505; p=.016). In other words, the higher the prevalence of affective voters, the smaller the shift in PCV. This is a pattern that has been previously identified in other settings as well (e.g. McBurnett 1991; Kenny 1991) and proves the thesis that over-institutionalized party systems, with too-high a prevalence of strong (affective) partisans, is an obstacle for electoral accountability.

Table 4.11: Voter types by department

Departments	Electoral shift	Rational voters	Affective voters	Missing cases
Cortés	30.6	24.2	40.6	35.2
Colon	22.9	13.0	50.0	37.0
Gracias a Dios	17.4	36.0	36.0	28.0
Yoro	15.8	30.3	42.9	26.8
Islas de la Bahia	15.2	40.0	33.3	26.7
Atlántida	15.1	31.1	47.0	22.0
Francisco Morazán	11.4	26.3	38.4	35.3
La Paz	9.4	20.0	42.7	37.3
Olancho	8.0	15.0	49.0	35.9
Comayagua	7.9	18.6	28.5	52.9
Valle	7.2	17.9	55.1	26.9
Choluteca	6.5	24.9	47.2	27.9
Santa Bárbara	6.4	6.5	70.4	23.1
El Paraíso	5.8	20.7	55.7	23.6
Intibuca	4.1	27.9	58.1	14.0
Copan	2.7	14.8	63.1	22.1
Ocotepeque	2.5	23.5	49.0	27.5
Lempira	1.2	15.8	62.5	21.7
Correlation to shift:	Pearson	0.330	**-0.505**	0.324
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.091	0.016	0.095

Notwithstanding the lack of a significant correlation between the percent shift in PCV and the prevalence of rational voters at the level of the departments, it is certain that rational voters, as opposed to affective voters, are the ones responsible for shits in the aggregate PCV. Therefore, it is pertinent to know what the characteristics of rational voters are, vis-à-vis affective voters.

Very little is known about the characteristics of these groups of *deviant* electors (i.e. individuals without a strong party identification), particularly at a time when partisanship has become pervasive (Geer 2002; Brewer 2005). Yet, some authors have argued that weak partisans deviate from voting for their own party when they perceive a great difference (disadvantage) between their preferred choice and a second option (Blais 2000; Drummond 2006). This is

thought to be enhanced by the priming of candidates by the media (Medelsohn 1996), even though the media has also been found to have the effect of encouraging party identification in the short term (Pérez-Liñán 2002).

In our definition of rational voters are also included small parties' supporters who use to vote for the major parties in large proportions. This pattern has also been observed in other countries since long ago. The most common explanation is that they do not want to waste their votes, especially when they are able to identify a *lesser evil* among the larger parties (Duverger 1963). Perhaps the only thing that could be said about the third component of our rational group, Independents, is that younger individuals tend not to have a party identification of their own and to have little political knowledge (Achen 2002; Gábor 2002).

Table 4.12 below depicts the result of a binomial logistic regression using the type of voter as the dependent variable.[103] Two different models were also employed, Model 1 using demographic variables and Model 2 which added variables that are commonly associated to the strength of party identification, such as political knowledge and attention to news in the media. Model 2 also added three variables that can assess the extent to which rational voters are responsible for accountability; the evaluation of the President's performance, the effectiveness of the judicial system, and the perception of how respectful of the laws are politicians. The variables used in the binomial logistic regression were coded as follows:

[103] The Voter Type (dependent) variable was coded as 1=rational voters; 0=affective voters.

Variables	Scale	Coding
Voter Types (Dependent)	Binary	0=affective voters; 1=rational voters
Gender	Binary	0=female; 1=male
Age	Continuous	Years of age; 18 years and older
Urbanization	Multinomial	1=rural; 2=urban; 3=largest two cities
Region	Multinomial	1=West; 2=Center, southeast; 3=Atlantic region
Education	Continuous	Years of formal education
Economic status	5-point ordinal	(Income*wealth) 1=worse-off; 5=best-off
Political knowledge	8-point ordinal	0=none; 7=a great deal
Attention to news in the Media	4-point ordinal	0=none; 4=a great deal
President's performance	5-point ordinal	1=very poor; 5=excellent
Effectiveness of Judicial system	7-point ordinal	1=not at all; 7=very much
Politicians respect the laws	3-point ordinal	1=not at all; 3=very much

In Model 1, all demographic variables were statistically significant but gender. Rational voters turned out to be younger and more educated, but of lower economic status than affective voters. Rational voters were also more likely to reside in urban centers and in the Atlantic region, a.k.a. *costa norte.*

In model 2, all demographic variables but *regions* ceased to be statistically significant. However, all but one of the new variables turned out to be statistically significant. The only variable that failed to achieve statistical significance was, surprisingly, the level of attention to news in the media, which has often been associated with partisanship (e.g. Mettenheim and Malloy 1998; Valentino and Sears 1998; Niven 2001; Aragón and Palfrey 2004). Yet, those who reported higher levels of political knowledge turned out to be significantly more likely to be rational voters.[104] This is an expected finding since low levels of political knowledge has been associated to higher reliance on party banners.

[104] Political knowledge refers to knowledge of several topics that included the names of the current presidents of several countries, the functions of certain public institutions and programs, and the composition of the government.

The last three variables in model 2 also reported a significant association with being a rational voter. Rational voters, those who sometimes abstained from voting or voted for a party other than their own, were more likely to be those who perceived the President to perform less satisfactorily, the Courts to be less effective in ensuring fair trials, and the politicians to be less respectful of the laws. These three variables can be considered as to assess the degree of legitimacy of political actors and the system which, as Seligson *et al* (2003) proved in the case of Costa Rica, does matter when deciding which party to vote for or abstain from voting. In this research, however, legitimacy turned out to matter significantly more to rational voters than to affective voters.

Table 4.12: Binary logistic regression: rational voters

Variables	Stats	Model 1	Model 2
Gender	B	-0.124	
	S.E.	0.102	
	Exp(B)	0.883	
Age	B	**-0.006**	0.001
	S.E.	0.004	0.008
	Exp(B)	0.994	1.001
Education	B	**0.039**	0.006
	S.E.	0.016	0.037
	Exp(B)	1.040	1.006
Economic status	B	**-0.141**	-0.217
	S.E.	0.056	0.120
	Exp(B)	0.868	0.805
Urbanization (ref=rural)			
Urbanization 2	B	**0.301**	0.472
(small cities)	S.E.	0.119	0.250
	Exp(B)	1.351	1.603
Urbanization 3	B	**0.402**	0.255
(largest two cities)	S.E.	0.158	0.327
	Exp(B)	1.495	1.290
Regions (ref=west)			
Region 2	B	**0.594**	**0.731**
(center, south, east)	S.E.	0.140	0.322
	Exp(B)	1.812	2.077
Region 3	B	**0.766**	**0.736**
(Atlantic)	S.E.	0.141	0.317
	Exp(B)	2.150	2.088
Political knowledge	B		**0.163**
	S.E.		0.060
	Exp(B)		1.177
Attention to Media	B		-0.064
	S.E.		0.129
	Exp(B)		0.938
President's performance	B		**-0.327**
	S.E.		0.141
	Exp(B)		0.721
Effectiveness of Judicial System	B		**-0.128**
	S.E.		0.065
	Exp(B)		0.879
Politicians respect the Law	B		**-0.669**
	S.E.		0.213
	Exp(B)		0.512
Constant	B	**-0.388**	**-0.726**
	S.E.	0.222	0.904
Nagelkerke R Square		**0.049**	**0.126**

The prevalence of rational voters (i.e. those with no strong affective attachment to a party) is the factor that greatly influences the magnitude in the shits in PCV and therefore the likelihood of party turnovers. Figure 4.3 below shows the association between the average estimated probabilities of being a rational voter (averaged at the level of departments), resulting from Model 2, and the percent shifts in PCV 1997-2001. Evidently, the predicted aggregated prevalence of rational voters explains a good deal of the shifts in PCV between 1997 and 2001 (y-axis), also at the level of the department. Yet, the model cannot explain shits in PCV entirely. Other factors must be at play in determining the shifts in PCV, particularly in the case of the departments of Cortes, Colón and Comayagua. Nonetheless, these results further prove the thesis that, rather than strong partisans, it is the rational voters who do bring about electoral accountability by allowing the opposition parties win elections.

Figure 4.3: Relation of estimated probabilities and shifts in PCV.



4.4 CONCLUSIONS

Rational voters are, by definition, (weak) partisans and Independents that have abstained from voting for their own party or from voting altogether. Traditionally, these citizens, particularly Independents, have been overlooked in the study of partisanship since they have been perceived as less likely to vote consistently or vote at all. Therefore, their role has been considered as quite irrelevant, compared to that of partisans. Dennis *et al*, for instance, pointed out that…

> "Partisanship, not independence, was given primary attention in the Campbell *et al*. approach. Partisans were indeed the heroes of the Lockean-style democracy, because of their high attentiveness, motivation, participation, and principled behavior. In contrast, Independents acted more on whim or fancy, if they acted at all; and they were thus portrayed as a null case, the dismal residuum left in the wake of the more vigorous, well directed Democrats and Republicans" (1992,262).

However, they have also warned that Independents and leaners (*closet* partisans) are important political players that should not be overlooked (Niemi *et al*., 1991; Dennis *et al.,* 1992).

This chapter has been able to show that, in fact, the high levels of electoral volatility and the resulting turnover of the party in power in Honduras in 2001 were the result of shifts in the party choice of vote (PCV) of a "rational" minority of voters (weak partisans and Independents), in response to their perceptions of undesirable performance by political actors and institutions.

The likelihood of having an electoral behavior like that of rational voter was significantly associated with residing in the Atlantic region, having higher levels of political knowledge, and perceiving the President as to perform unsatisfactorily, the Courts to be less effective in ensuring fair trials, and the politicians to be less respectful of the laws. These associations were significant even when controlling for the level of attention to news in the media, which resulted not significant itself.

All these results reveal that the "rational" voters, who are responsible for the turnover of the party in power, *are* a distinctive and important type of voters. This is the type of voter that cast his/her vote not based on an "affective" attachment to any of the traditional parties, but rather based on a "rational" evaluation of the prior performance of the main political actors and institutions in the system (as well as the quality of candidates). Therefore, this chapter has proven that it is not strong partisans but rather rational voters who do make electoral accountability possible.

5.0 TYPES OF VOTERS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The prior chapter uncovered some political variables that were associated with the probability of being a "rational" voter, including perceiving the President to perform unsatisfactorily, the Courts to be less effective in ensuring fair trials, and the politicians to be less respectful of the laws. These findings imply that affective voters are significantly less critical of the government than rational voters and/or that affective voters –PL supporters at least- are biased in favor of the system. In fact, several authors in the partisanship literature have claimed that party identification is a major source of bias in the political attitudes of people (Campbell *et al*., 1960; Beck 1974; Bond and Fleisher 2001; Bartels 2002).

Thus, this chapter examines the extent to which the types of voters have attitudes toward different political objects that are conditioned by their political preferences as well as their socio-demographic characteristics. The objects of attitudes (dependent variables) will include the perception of performance of the government in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, perception of corruption, trust in the government, perception of transparency of state institutions, and

perception of the president's performance, all of which may be object of partisan bias due to their political nature.[105]

Yet, examining the attitudes of affective versus rational voters would mask important differences between supporters of the PL and the PN, respectively the party in power and the main opposition at the time of the survey. For this reason, the two types of voters used in the prior chapter, rational and affective, need to be broken down into 5 categories, or voter groups. That is 1) rational PL supporters, 2) affective PL supporters, 3) rational PN supporters, 4) affective PN supporters, 5) "third-party" supporters and independents (rational). Table 5.1 shows the number of respondents in each group.

Table 5.1: Five voter groups

Voter Type	Which party do you identify more with?				Total
	Partido Liberal PL	Partido Nacional PN	PINU-SD, PDCH, UD	None/ Not sure	
Rational	261 12.5%	201 9.6%	202 9.7%		664 31.8%
Affective	776 37.2%	646 31.0%	0 0.0%		1422 68.2%

The proposed analysis also needs to take into consideration, as controls, the demographic variables that resulted to be statistically correlated to the type of voter in the prior chapter 4. Controlling for these variables is necessary to uncover the effect of partisanship alone. Table 5.2 describes such variables.

[105] An attitude is defined as "an overall, abstract evaluation of an object, which can be primarily based on affective, cognitive, or behavioral components" (Greene 2002,178).

Table 5.2: Demographic variables for control

Variable	Type	Coding
Age	Continuous	Years of age
Education	Continuous	Years of formal education
Economic status	5-point ordinal	(Income*wealth) 1=worse-off; 5=best-off
Urbanization	Trinomial	1= largest two cities (Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula) 2=other urban; 3= rural
Region of residence	Trinomial	1=Atlantic; 2=West; 3=rest of the country

Furthermore, it has also been argued that there is a connection between partisanship and attention to biased media, which might reinforce bias. In other words, partisans of a particular party will tend to pay attention to media that present a more favorable portray of their party or that openly endorse that party (Taber and Lodge 2006). The emergence of a party-biased media, or "prensa tarifada" is also a concern among Honduran analysts (Meza *et al*., 2002b; Peraza 2001), as well as in other countries in the region (Rosenberg 2001), since it prejudices citizens' opinions by delivering politically biased information. Thus, this analysis will also control for attention to news programs in different media. The news media variables to include are:

Table 5.3: News media variables for control

Variables	Type	Coding
Radio news (Do you listen to news in the radio?)	Binary	1=does listen 2=does not listen to news
TV news (Which news program do you watch the most?)	Multinomial	1=Canal 3 "Hoy Mismo" 2=Canal 5 "Telenoticias" 3=Canal 7 "Abriendo Brecha" 4=Cable CNN 5=Others (channels 9, 11, 13, 45, 54 and 63) 6=Does not watch TV news
Newspapers (Which newspaper do you read the most?)	Multinomial	1=El Heraldo 2=La Tribuna 3=La Prensa 4=El Tiempo 5=Others (Tiempos del Mundo and HTW) 6=Does not read newspapers

The analysis in this chapter will therefore involve five multivariate regression analyses where the dependent variable will be 1) the perceived performance of the government in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, 2) perception of corruption, 3) trust in the government, 4)

transparency of state institutions, and 5) perception of the president's performance. Since these variables are measured in ordinal scales, the ordinal regression procedure will be employed. The main independent variable is Voter Groups. Yet, a second model will also include the demographic and media control variables in an attempt to uncover the bias effect of partisanship alone.[106]

5.1 PERCEPTION OF HANDLING OF POST-HURRICANE MITCH RECONSTRUCTION RESOURCES

In October of 1998, category 5 Hurricane Mitch hit Central America causing great damage mostly in Honduras and Nicaragua.[107] Hurricane Mitch has been the most damaging natural disaster in the modern history of Honduras (UNDP 1999). It affected the whole country causing considerable destruction of infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, houses, etc.), resources (i.e. livestock, crops, productive soil, factories, etc.) and the death of about 10,000 people. The damage was so great that the international community responded sending considerable amount of aid not only in the form of goods but also funds for the reconstruction.[108] Most of the aid was channeled through governmental organizations or closely linked NGOs such as *Fundación María,* headed by the First Lady Mary de Flores. Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras 10 months after

[106] For each independent variable, the reference category is the last category. For example, in the case of 'voter groups', the reference will be the group "rational others."
[107] http://www.osei.noaa.gov/mitch.html
[108] For more information refer to http://www.sdp.gob.hn/Documentos/PMRTN/PMRTN.htm

the inauguration of President Carlos Flores (1998-2002) of the PL, and thus his administration was markedly defined by the process of reconstruction (Argueta 2004).

This section examines how Hondurans perceived the handling of reconstruction works and funds in the aftermath of the hurricane and whether or not such perception is influenced by voter groups. The variables used are described in Table 5.4. The two first variables were combined ([Mitch6 + Mitch10] ÷ 2) into a third variable (Mitch610) for the purpose of constructing a single dependent variable for an ordinal regression analysis.

Table 5.4: Variables on Hurricane Mitch

variables	Scale	Coding
Mitch6: Reconstruction works have been...	ordinal	1=very insufficient; 2=somewhat insufficient; 3=somewhat adequate; 4=totally adequate
Mitch10: How did the government handle the reconstruction funds?	ordinal	1=very dishonestly; 2=somewhat dishonestly; 3=somewhat honestly; 4=very honestly
Mitch 610: The government's handling of reconstruction works and funds was..	ordinal	1=very insufficient and dishonest; 2; 3; 4=totally adequate and honestly

Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of opinions about the adequacy of the reconstruction works and the handling of funds, mostly by the government. It reveals that most Hondurans had a positive opinion, as it was also shown in a previous study by Seligson (2001).

Figure 5.1: Distribution of opinions on the handling of post-Mitch reconstruction



Table 5.5 below shows the results of the ordinal regression using the variable *Mitch 610* as the dependent variable and two different models of independent variables. The columns show the estimates and standard errors for each independent variable category, as well as the level of significance of their association to the dependent variable.[109] Model 1 includes only the multinomial variable with the 5 different groups of voters as the independent variable. In this model, only the category "affective PL" resulted to be significantly and positively associated with the evaluation of the handling of reconstruction works and funds. In other words, affective PL supporters are more likely to rate better the handling of the reconstruction than those in group 5 (supporters of third-parties and independents), the reference group.

[109] The statistics for the thresholds (constants) are not reported for the sake of simplifying the explanation of results.

Model 2 introduces, in addition to the voters groups, the demographic and news media variables to be controlled for.[110] In this model, not only the affective PL group resulted positively and significantly associated with the dependent variable, but also rational PL and affective PN groups. Within PL supporters, however, affective voters turned to be more highly and more significantly associated with the dependent variable, which means that affective PL supporters are more likely to be more biased than rational PL supporters in their evaluation of the reconstruction post-Mitch.

Yet, affective PN supporters (the opposition) also had a positive and statistically significant association, although to a lesser degree than rational PL supporters. This may most certainly be the result of the involvement of the leadership of the PN in reconstruction efforts, particularly through municipalities governed by the PN, since the destruction of Hurricane Mitch was such that required the involvement of everybody, not only the government. It must also be the result of the unification of purpose and identity among all citizens that only a national tragedy of the magnitude of Hurricane Mitch can bring about.

[110] The independent variables in model 2 are displayed in two columns due to their large number and the excessive length that would have a single column containing them all.

Table 5.5: Ordinal regression: handling of Hurricane Mitch reconstruction works and funds

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Variables	Model 2 (cont.)
Rational PL	0.128	**0.264***	Radio news	-0.014
	0.108	0.121		0.068
Affective PL	**0.367****	**0.471****	No radio news	0.000
	0.092	0.103		.
Rational PN	0.055	0.164	Channel 3	**-0.353***
	0.114	0.128		0.128
Affective PN	0.158	**0.224***	Channel 5	0.064
	0.093	0.104		0.083
Rational others	0.000	0.000	Channel 7	**0.197***
		.		0.097
Age		0.001	Cable CNN	0.082
		0.002		0.125
Education		0.005	Others	-0.095
		0.010		0.129
Economic status		0.042	No TV news	0.000
		0.034		.
Large cities		0.015	El Heraldo	0.150
		0.098		0.108
Other urban		0.035	La Tribuna	0.031
		0.070		0.108
Rural		0.000	La Prensa	-0.030
		.		0.079
Atlantic region		**-0.299****	El Tiempo	0.108
		0.081		0.138
Western region		**-0.396****	Others	-4.554
		0.081		4.798
Rest of the country		0.000	No newspaper	0.000
		.		.

*) significant at the .05 level
**) significant at the .01 level

Among the demographic variables, only the region of residence turned to be significant. Residents of the Atlantic and Western regions of Honduras were more critical (negative sign of estimates) of the handling of the reconstruction than residents in the rest of the country (the reference category).

Regarding news media, attention to radio news and newspapers did not report any significant association but attention to TV news programs did. Viewers of Channel 3 news program were more critical while viewers of Channel 7 news were more inclined than non-

viewers of TV news (the reference category) to have a positive opinion about the handling of the reconstruction works and funds.[111]

5.2 PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION

According to a study on corruption conducted in Honduras by Seligson, there is a perception of widespread public corruption in Honduras (2001,24). Almost two-thirds of the population surveyed said it was very common or common. In fact, in 2001, Honduras was given a score of 2.7 in the Perception of Corruption Index (PCI) of Transparency International, which placed the country in the position 107 among 158 countries.[112] In other words, the perceived level of corruption in Honduras was considered to be higher than that in two-thirds of the countries of the world surveyed.

The Honduran survey used in this dissertation did not include a variable to assess the overall perception of corruption but asked instead about the perception of corruption of specific public officials. The perception of corruption was measured in a scale 1-10 where 1 means "very corrupt" and 10 means "very honest." The analysis in this section, however, considered only the government officials more directly associated with the political parties (i.e. Ministers, Deputies,

[111] The Nagelkerke R square value is provided for each model at the bottom of the table. The only purpose of these values is to show the increase in the explanatory power when using model 2. Yet, the magnitude of the values is itself irrelevant since the purpose is not to explain the attitude but to examine the association with the different groups of voters.

[112] The PCI measures the perception of corruption in a 10-point scale, where 0=most corrupt and 10=least corrupt; http://www.transparency.org/

Mayors, municipal council members, and party leaders). Yet, in order to construct a single (ordinal) dependent variable for the analysis, the perceptions of corruption of the five public officials were averaged into one single 5-step variable (Corruption) measuring overall corruption of officials (Corruption = [Σ(officials)] ÷ 10).

Figure 5.2 below shows the distribution of the perception of corruption of public officials. Almost 60 percent of the Honduran population perceived them as corrupt, while only 10 percent perceived them as honest.

Figure 5.2: Distribution of the perception of corruption



Table 5.6 below shows the results of an ordinal regression, with perception of corruption as the dependent variable. While model 1 did not report any significant association, model 2 indicated that affective PL supporters were more likely than rational voters (reference category) to believe that public officials are honest. This perception was also shared by individuals with

higher levels of education and those who reside in the Atlantic and the western regions of the country. Perhaps surprisingly, the media variables did not show any significant association.

Table 5.6: Ordinal regression: perception of corruption of public officials

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Variables	Model 2 (cont.)
Rational PL	-0.102	0.025	Radio news	-0.021
	0.110	0.112		0.061
Affective PL	0.144	**0.219***	No radio news	0.000
	0.092	0.094		.
Rational PN	0.004	0.108	Channel 3	-0.052
	0.116	0.118		0.117
Affective PN	0.044	0.098	Channel 5	-0.035
	0.094	0.096		0.075
Rational others	0.000	0.000	Channel 7	-0.016
	.	.		0.086
Age		0.015	Cable CNN	0.076
		0.009		0.112
Education		**0.005***	Others	0.171
		0.002		0.117
Economic status		0.055	No TV news	0.000
		0.030		.
Large cities		**-0.199***	El Heraldo	0.155
		0.088		0.094
Other urban		0.030	La Tribuna	0.016
		0.062		0.096
Rural		0.000	La Prensa	0.111
		.		0.072
Atlantic region		**0.189****	El Tiempo	0.149
		0.073		0.122
Western region		**0.239****	Others	-0.215
		0.072		0.892
Rest of the country		0.000	No newspaper	0.000
		.		.

5.3 PERCEPTION OF TRANSPARENCY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS

The Honduras survey also asked respondents to rate how transparent were several state institutions.[113] Figure 5.3 below shows that most institutions were rated similarly, and that the President Flores was rated much higher than any other. The similarity in the evaluations of most institutions might be an indication of how little Hondurans know about the working of their state institutions (Seligson 2001). The higher rating for the President, however, may reflect the fact that the Flores administration made considerable efforts to make the handling of the resources for reconstruction more transparent than the government's usual way to do business (Seligson 2001; Peraza Torres 2001). Still, the figure also shows that the level assigned to the president was "somewhat transparent" (score of 2) and that Hondurans seem to expect greater transparency from the government.

[113] These items (pub6-pub15) used a 3-step scale where 1 = 'not transparent', 2 = 'somewhat transparent' and, 3 = 'very transparent'.

Figure 5.3: Perception of transparency



In order to construct a single ordinal dependent variable, the variables for the president and his ministers were combined into one (the executive). Figure 5.4 below display its distribution, showing that Hondurans tend to perceive the executive as little transparent.

Figure 5.4: Perception of transparency of the Executive



The results of the ordinal regression in Table 5.7 reveal that PL supporters and rational PN supporters are more likely to consider the executive as transparent, compared to other rational voters. This is another indication that partisanship does influence attitudes, particularly among affective PL partisans. The significant association of rational PN supporters, in turn, might reveal the ability of rational opposition partisans, in comparison to affective PN supporters, to acknowledge the high levels of transparency of the executive during the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.

Similarly, those with higher economic status and those who watch cable CNN were more likely to qualify the executive as transparent. On the other hand, those who reside in the two largest cities as well as the Atlantic region were less likely to rate the executive as transparent.

Table 5.7: Ordinal regression: transparency of the executive

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Variables	Model 2 (cont.)
Rational PL	**0.219***	**0.299***	Radio news	-0.052
	0.112	0.125		0.071
Affective PL	**0.404****	**0.377****	No radio news	0.000
	0.092	0.104		.
Rational PN	**0.244***	**0.264***	Channel 3	-0.019
	0.119	0.133		0.127
Affective PN	0.169	0.124	Channel 5	0.037
	0.095	0.106		0.084
Rational others	0.000	0.000	Channel 7	0.154
		.		0.095
Age		-0.001	Cable CNN	**0.362****
		0.002		0.127
Education		-0.017	Others	0.172
		0.010		0.132
Economic status		**0.066***	No TV news	0.000
		0.033		.
Large cities		**-0.281****	El Heraldo	-0.025
		0.094		0.103
Other urban		-0.099	La Tribuna	0.061
		0.070		0.109
Rural		0.000	La Prensa	-0.002
		.		0.081
Atlantic region		**-0.206***	El Tiempo	0.025
		0.085		0.129
Western region		-0.126	Others	-7.302
		0.084		0.000
Rest of the country		0.000	No newspaper	0.000
		.		.

5.4 TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

Another set of items in the Honduras survey asked respondents about how much trust they had in different public and private institutions and actors. These variables were measured using a 7-step

scale, where 1 means “no trust at all” and 7 means “complete trust”. The most trusted institution was the church, which was far more trusted than politicians and central institutions of the state. Yet, for the purpose of this analysis, only two items were considered: trust in Congress and trust in the central government (executive). Hence, one single variable was computed and recoded into a 3-step scale where 1 means “very little trust,” 2 means “some trust,” and 3 means “a lot of trust.” Figure 5.5 shows the overall distribution.

Figure 5.5: Trust in the Legislature and the Executive



The ordinal regression, in Table 5.8 below, reveals somewhat contrasting results. In model 1, only affective PL supporters resulted to be more likely than other rational voters to trust more the government. In model 2, however, the significance of that positive association is replaced by the negative association of rational PL and PN partisans. Even though the estimates are very small, they might be revealing an important feature of rational partisans. That is, the lower levels of trust in government might be a reason for the inconsistent voting pattern that

characterizes rational partisans. Among the control variables, watching news in Channel 5 and other channels were positively associated with trust.

Table 5.8: Ordinal regression: trust in the government

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Variables	Model 2 (cont.)
Rational PL	0.015	**-0.022****	Radio news	-0.031
	0.118	0.130		0.074
Affective PL	**0.312****	0.284	No radio news	0.000
	0.100	0.112		.
Rational PN	0.027	**-0.004****	Channel 3	-0.179
	0.126	0.139		0.134
Affective PN	0.014	0.016	Channel 5	**0.221***
	0.101	0.112		0.092
Rational others	0.000	0.000	Channel 7	0.104
	.	.		0.103
Age		0.007	Cable CNN	0.097
		0.002		0.135
Education		0.011	Others	**0.294***
		0.010		0.146
Economic status		-0.105	No TV news	0.000
		0.036		.
Large cities		-0.023	El Heraldo	-0.108
		0.105		0.112
Other urban		-0.004	La Tribuna	0.104
		0.076		0.120
Rural		0.000	La Prensa	0.026
		.		0.087
Atlantic region		0.017	El Tiempo	0.049
		0.088		0.151
Western region		0.051	Others	-4.462
		0.089		0.000
Rest of the country		0.000	No newspaper	0.000
		.		.

5.5 EVALUATION OF PRESIDENT'S PERFORMANCE

It has also been argued in the literature that partisanship also affects public opinions about the president's job performance (e.g. Gunther 1998; Bond and Fleisher 2001; Greene and Elder

2001). Sympathizers with the party in government will tend to give the president a higher performance rating than those of the opposition party. This section examines whether or not such trend exists in Honduras.

The Honduras survey included an item (m1) that asked respondents to evaluate the job performance of then President Carlos Flores (1998-2002), of the Partido Liberal (PL). The item was coded in a 5-step ordinal scale, where 1 means "very poor," 2 "somewhat poor," 3 "regular," 4 "somewhat good," and 5 means "very good." Yet, categories 1 and 2 were merged into a single category ("poor"), since they had very few cases each. Figure 5.6 below shows the overall distribution of responses, which reveals a somewhat favorable opinion about the performance of the president.

Figure 5.6: Evaluation of the President's performance



The results in Model 1 of the ordinal regression, in Table 5.9 below, indicates, once again, that affective PL supporters, and rational PL supporters to a lesser extent, are more likely to evaluate more favorably the performance of the president.

Table 5.9: Ordinal regression: evaluation of the president's performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Variables	Model 2 (cont.)
Rational PL	**0.247***	0.220	Radio news	**0.127***
	0.104	0.116		0.063
Affective PL	**0.597****	**0.583****	No radio news	0.000
	0.088	0.099		.
Rational PN	-0.121	-0.154	Channel 3	0.125
	0.110	0.121		0.122
Affective PN	-0.028	-0.063	Channel 5	**0.205****
	0.089	0.099		0.078
Rational others	0.000	0.000	Channel 7	0.121
	.	.		0.088
Age		**0.005***	Cable CNN	**0.301****
		0.002		0.118
Education		**0.022***	Others	-0.088
		0.009		0.120
Economic status		-0.028	No TV news	0.000
		0.031		.
Large cities		-0.012	El Heraldo	-0.032
		0.090		0.097
Other urban		0.029	La Tribuna	0.176
		0.065		0.100
Rural		0.000	La Prensa	-0.098
		.		0.074
Atlantic region		-0.156	El Tiempo	-0.015
		0.076		0.127
Western region		-0.078	Others	-0.944
		0.075		0.916
Rest of the country		0.000	No newspaper	0.000
		.		.

In model 2, however, the significance of rational PL supporters disappears, leaving only the affective PL supporters with almost the same degree of association. In addition, age and education, among demographic variables, reported positive and significant associations (the older and more educated evaluated the president more favorably). The evaluation of the president's performance also resulted to be the attitude that was more influenced by the attention

to news in the media. Those who listened to news in the radio or watched them in Channel 5 or cable CNN were more likely to evaluate the president more favorably than those who did not listen or watch news.

5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All five but one of the different attitudes examined above reported a significant and positive association with being affective PL supporters. Other groups of voters showed associations that were more diverse in magnitude and direction. Table 5.10 below shows a summary of the resulting associations between attitudes and each group of voters, both in model 1 (upper-left) and model 2 (bottom-right). The group of "rational others" voters is not included since it was the reference category.

Table 5.10: Summary of findings

Attitudes	Rational PL	Affective PL	Rational PN	Affective PN
Handling of reconstruction works and funds	.264*	.367** .471**		.224*
Perception of corruption of public officials		.219*		
Transparency of state institutions	.219* .299*	.404** .377**	.244* .264*	
Trust in government	-.022**	.312**	-.004**	
Evaluation of the performance of the president	.247*	.597** .583**		

It is clearly evident that rational and affective PL supporters are more likely to have favorable attitudes (except for trust) toward the government than rational voters (the reference category), even after controlling for demographic variables associated with being a rational/affective voter and for news media variables associated with bias in partisan views. In

other words, being a supporter of the party in power (i.e. PL) does in itself generate bias. However, the magnitude and significance of such bias was much greater among affective PL supporters than among rational PL supporters.

The positive associations found among rational PN supporters seems to signal the ability of rational opposition partisans to sometimes acknowledge good attributes of the government (e.g. transparency). On the other hand, the negative associations among rational PL and PN partisans suggest that the lack of trust in government is a reason for the lack of full commitment to their parties. Due to this lack of trust in government, it is likely that at least some of these rational partisans would become totally detached from their parties and become independents or members of minor parties, should they become 'viable,' as it happened in Venezuela (Morgan, 2007), for example.

Last, the lack of either positive or negative significant associations among affective PN supporters (except for reconstruction), and rational PN supporters to a lesser extent, indicates that there is no much difference in attitudes between members of the main opposition party, the PN, and members of the small parties and independents. Thus, being member of the party in power is the main source of political bias, especially among affective partisans.

6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter analyzes the main findings of prior chapters in an attempt to present a general picture of the role of "rational" voters in bringing about democratic accountability in Honduras. With that purpose, this section makes first a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation, then summarizes the main findings of the empirical chapters and, lastly, describes the likely theoretical implications of this dissertation's conclusions.

6.1 THEORETICAL REASONING

It has been argued that democratic consolidation can only occur through the development of effective and successful democratic political institutions, or "institutionalization" (O'Donnell 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This would allow the smooth working of the political system, including the mechanisms for horizontal and vertical accountability (Mainwaring and Welna 2003; Przeworski *et al.,* 1999).

In particular, it has been also argued that the institutionalization of the party system would facilitate vertical (electoral) accountability through the development of strong (national) parties, with "somewhat deep roots in the society" (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:5). This would

allow voters to better identify the political ideology/platform of each party so that they can realize which party represents better their interests, and 'deserve' their vote.

Yet, there was considerable problem with this view, particularly in two-party systems (e.g. in the United States). Political parties tend to be aligned along the left-right ideological spectrum and to have somewhat opposing views on issues (e.g. abortion, environment, taxes, etc.). They also tend to have differentiated constituencies, somewhat divided along demographic cleavages (e.g. race/ethnicity, income, religious beliefs, etc.). And since political parties' position on issues does not change overnight, nor does so voters' demographics and interests, most members of a party's constituency will tend to prefer and vote for *their* particular party, election after election (e.g. individuals who are pro-choice and/or pro-environmental regulation will most likely tend to vote for the Democratic party, in the United States, election after election).

Furthermore, parties with *deep roots in the society* tend to have partisans better typified by the *sociological* and *psychological* approaches to party identification. Thus, voters whose cleavages had induced them to develop a strong party identification, and therefore an *affective* attachment to that particular party (a sense of *group-belonging*), will be more likely to vote for their "own" party, election after election, instead of voting for different parties at different elections. Therefore, an institutionalized party system with strong parties and *too deep* roots in society would make vertical accountability much harder to realize, if not impossible.

In addition, a primarily *affective* party identification among the electorate might be conductive to more biased political perceptions and attitudes (Bartels 2002; Bond and Fleisher 2001). This bias could make strong partisans less likely to criticize their party-in-government's

policies and actions and to hold them accountable (e.g. the reluctance of republicans to criticize the war in Iraq).

I argued, therefore, that for electoral accountability to be possible there must be a considerable number of voters deprived of a strong affective attachment to a party. This detachment would allow them to consider their party choices for vote (PCV) with no bias but rather based on other aspects that have been deemed also important by *rational-choice* theorists, such as retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance (Fiorina 1981) and candidate evaluations (Page and Jones 1979; Rapoport 1997), among others. In other words, when parties have deep roots in society and most partisans are likely to have a strong attachment to their parties, there must be a "rational minority" capable of voting differently at subsequent elections so that electoral accountability can occur.

It was, therefore, the objective of this dissertation research to explore in detail and attempt to explain the seemingly self-contradictory theoretical view just described above, as well as the argued need for 'rational' voters. With that purpose, this research examined the case of Honduras, a two-party presidential system with a *liberal* and *conservative* divide (Bendell 1995), which also presented several favorable circumstances for this research. Honduras is considered to have the second most institutionalized party system in Latin America (Payne *et al*., 2002,143). In fact, Honduras' two traditional parties (*Partido Liberal* and *Partido Nacional*) have such historically deep roots in society that they have obtained, combined, more than 95% of the total of valid votes in each presidential election since the mid-Twentieth Century.

Yet, despite the traditional parties' deep roots in society, Honduras has also experienced four alternate party turnovers during the past 25 years of democratically elected governments; two in favor of the Partido Nacional (PN) and two in favor of the Partido Liberal (PL). Some of

those turnovers have exhibited large differences between the two major parties in terms of their respective share of the national vote. These large electoral swings certainly presented excellent opportunities to uncover the causes and dynamics of change in the voting preferences of the electorate as a whole. Moreover, the existence of a national survey of public opinion capturing voting behavior during two consecutive elections (1997 and 2001), with a turnover of the party in power, made possible the analysis of the voting behavior of individuals over time. In other words, Honduras was an ideal case for the implementation of the proposed research.

In summary, this dissertation sought to answer the following questions: (1) what are the social cleavages determining *liberal* and *conservative* party identification in Honduras (how deep the roots-in-society go)? (2) Who are and what are the differentiating characteristics of *affective* and *rational* voters in Honduras? (3) How pervasive is the effect of an *affective* party ID in shaping biased attitudes among Hondurans toward their political system, as compared to *rational* voters? And, (4) to what extent there exists a "rational minority" in Honduras and how has it contributed to democratic (vertical) accountability? These major research questions were the core of this dissertation and were addressed separately in the preceding chapters.

6.2 CHAPTERS' DESCRIPTIONS AND MAIN FINDINGS

Chapter 2 of this dissertation was basically a description of the country-case Honduras, with emphasis in its political and party system. The two main political parties of Honduras (Partido Liberal and Partido Nacional) were created about a decade before and after the turn of the nineteenth century but had their origins in the classical *liberal-conservative* debates that, in Latin

America, reached a paramount level of relevance around the time of the independence of these former colonies from Spain, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the existence of three smaller parties (PINU-SD, PDCH, and UD) that were created during the second half of the twentieth century, the Partido Liberal (PL) and Partido Nacional (PN) have remained the main political parties of Honduras, obtaining combined at least 95% of all valid votes in every presidential election since the mid 1950s.

The very deep roots in history of these two traditional parties was very often 'fertilized' by hundreds of civil wars between the two parties' followers, which caused the frequent alternation in power of these two parties as well as the short duration of their governments. This period of "fragmented rule" lasted until the 1930s, with the 16-year-long dictatorship of Tiburcio Carías. Yet, after some attempts to install democratic regimes by the middle of the century, electoral democracy was interrupted by two decades of military rule.

In 1981, however, Honduras began a period of electoral democracy that continues today. During these 25 years of democracy, Honduras has been able to institutionalize its party system (first democratic consolidation) and has made considerable progress in introducing additional dimensions of democracy, such as political rights and civil liberties (second democratic consolidation). Yet, the Honduran political system is still far from adequate. Much work remains to be done in combating corruption, poverty, crime, environmental degradation and other critical problems that threaten the county.

This research focused on this period of electoral democracy, particularly in the elections of 1997 (won by the PL) and 2001 (won by the PN). Our leading question was, how was possible such impressive party turnover (18-percent vote difference between the two parties,

between the two elections), considering the remarkable stability of party identification and voting behavior of Hondurans? Two chapters, 3 and 4, were necessary to answer this question.

Chapter 3 made an empirical examination of potential ideological and demographic cleavages that might have accounted for the seemingly stable identification with the traditional parties in Honduras. Almost no cleavage was found to be a statistically significant indicator of identification with the PL and PN, no even ideology. These findings were somewhat surprising because the two traditional parties have been considered as to have ideological origins and to have developed supporters among society groups that were benefited by the parties' preferred policies (e.g. unionized labor, business people, religious groups, etc.). Evidently, even though parties originate from cleavages in the society, they can gain a life of their own and continue to exist even long after the cleavages have faded away. Another likely possibility is that the meaning of the term 'ideology' was drastically changed in the midst of the Cold War in the region, which was somehow forced to mean the extent of support (right) or opposition (left) to the political system.

The only differences between sympathizers of the PL and PN was that *Nacionalistas*, were more likely to reside in the rural departments of Intibucá and Lempira, and to own or rent larger tracks of (log) land (large landowners may have been historically affected by the agrarian reform and trade policies of the PL). These are the only cleavages that seem to persist. And the

reason for that might be the considerable geographic isolation of large landowners and those two departments. In such settings, change may take place slowly.[114]

Several factors may have contributed to this fading of cleavages between the two major parties in Honduras. First, the emergence and prevalence of the Liberal party at the end of the nineteenth century, which increased inclusiveness and marked perhaps the beginning of mass politics (Isaula 1997). Second, the emergence of the *Partido Nacional* as a competing branch off the Liberal party at the beginning of the twentieth century. Third, the ability of both traditional parties' elites, mostly Spanish descendants, to win popular support from all sectors of the *mestizo* population, the overwhelming racial majority, which prevented the evolution of class-based or race-based parties (Ropp and Morris 1984; DiTella 2004:185). Fourth, the prevalence of "caudillo politics" within the political parties, which may have served as substitute for ideology (Morris, 1988; Taylor-Robinson 2001). Fifth, the inclusion of previously marginalized interest groups and the introduction of reforms during the military governments (Bendell 1995,14). Sixth, the long history of economic backwardness in Honduras, which prevented the development of extreme class exploitation and a powerful ruling oligarchy, thus allowing the implementation of reforms (Euraque 1996; Ruhl 2000; Walker and Armony 2000).

Hence, as the case of Honduras has made evident, cleavages are not really necessary for partisans to have a strong sense of identification with –and loyalty to- a political party. In Honduras, stable party identification and voting behavior have persisted even in the absence of

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[114] Chapter 3 also attempted to uncover the potential cleavages that might differentiate between supporters of the two traditional parties, on one hand, and non-supporters (i.e. third-party members and independents), on the other hand. Supporters of the traditional parties were more likely to have lower levels of education and to be associated to the major religions in Honduras, Catholics and Evangelicals.

cleavages. Therefore, the only plausible but very likely explanation is that identification with any of the two traditional parties in Honduras is the result of the socialization of political identities early in life, and the resulting development of an enduring "sense of belonging" and affective identification with "one's party" (Campbell *et al*., 1960). But once again, if supporters of the two traditional parties have strong affective attachments to their parties, how can electoral accountability be possible?

Chapter 4 was devoted to examine the voting behavior of individuals in the survey. Very fortunately, the survey was conducted just few months before the general election of 2001 and was able to ask individuals about the way they intended to vote in the approaching 2001 election, in addition to the way they voted in 1997. The party identification of each individual was also registered. The overall distribution was 43% for the PL, 40% for the PN, 2% for third-parties, and 15% for independents. In that way, it was possible to identify who were responsible for the party turnover occurred in 2001.

Notwithstanding the varying percentages between parties and elections, it was found that, in average, more than 90% of the supporters of the two traditional parties who did vote reported voting for their own party. Among the total number of partisans, however, between 10 and 18 percent of the traditional parties' supporters abstained from voting during one of the two elections, and less than 4% reported voting for different parties. Thus, while most partisans tend to vote for their own parties, there was a considerable portion that abstained from voting when their party's candidate was clearly not better than the candidate of the other traditional party. And only few dared to switch votes. These two groups ('abstainers' and 'switchers') of supporters of the traditional parties did certainly contributed to the party turnover occurred in 2001 but not entirely.

Another important group of voters were the 17% comprising third-party supporters and independents. Among them, not only abstention was higher but also vote switching. That is, individuals in this group that did vote tended to vote for one of the two traditional parties, usually the one that won the election.[115] It was thus found that the party turnover experienced in 2001 was the result of some supporters of the traditional parties abstaining from voting for their own party, or switching their party choice for vote (PCV) when their party was not the 'best' option. It was also the result of third-party supporters and independents that tended to vote for the eventually winning party at different elections.

Hence, this research distinguished between two different types of voters: those whose vote seemed to have been driven by their affective attachment to their party (i.e. *affective* voters), thus voting invariably for their own same party, and those whose vote choice (PCV) varied during the two elections examined, primarily driven by 'rational' considerations such as the quality of candidates, parties' past performance, and the like (i.e. *rational* voters). The number of 'rational' voters resulted to be only half of that of 'affective' voters. Yet, their size was large enough to allow rational voters basically decide which party was to govern, as a result of electoral accountability.

Clearly, the conceptualization of rational voters in this research as the ones that changed their PCV between two consecutive elections to make the party turnover occur, leaves no doubt whatsoever that they were the ones responsible for electoral accountability, not affective voters. Yet, the fact that these 'rational' voters voted in a way consistent with the turnover was not a

[115] Undoubtedly, the most likely explanation to this behavior is the intention of such voters not to 'waste' their votes voting for parties with no chance of winning (i.e. third-parties), and to influence the results of the election so that the 'best' traditional party's candidate would win.

mere accident. In a binomial logistic regression, rational voters resulted to be more likely than affective voters to have higher levels of education and political knowledge. They were also more likely to have less favorable views about the President's performance, the soundness of judicial processes, and the character of politicians, including their respect for the laws. Therefore, 'rational' voters seem to have followed that particular voting behavior based on significantly higher levels of information and knowledge about the performance of the system's institutions and actors. In other words, the party turnover that they were responsible for was "a change for the better", which ought to be a requirement for true electoral accountability.

Affective voters, on the other hand, not only exhibited lower levels of education and political knowledge but were also more likely to have more biased political views and attitudes. This was the central theme of chapter 5. The analysis in chapter 5 also revealed that the favorable bias that affective PL supporters had toward the government, ruled by the PL, was strong even after controlling for different sources of news through radio, television, and newspapers and other demographic variables that reported significant difference between rational and affective voters. In other words, their political bias was mostly the result of their party identification alone. Rational PL supporters also reported some bias but at a much lesser level that that of affective PL supporters.

6.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

The main theoretical implication of this research is the evident need to review the notion that strong partisans and parties, with somewhat deep roots in the society, are important for electoral

accountability. They were not. Required for electoral accountability were voters with weaker or no affective attachment at all that would allow them to vote for different parties at two different elections (or at least abstain from voting in one of the elections). What is needed is a "rational minority", yet large enough as to be able to tilt the balance in the desired direction.

Yet, the two types of voters identified in this research (i.e. affective and rational) should not be considered as mutually exclusive either. In fact, they may be quite complementary. While "rational" voters may be required to provide "flexible" voting, thus making electoral accountability possible, strong parties and partisans may be necessary to provide stability to the political system. These are certainly two desirable characteristics of a democratic party system. Therefore, it is important to rethink the notion that strong partisans are the only kind of voters necessary for the adequate working of democracy, and to start acknowledging the fact that "rational" voters (moderate partisans and independents) are also necessary and of paramount importance for electoral accountability to occur. This is certainly the case of Honduras and very likely also the case of every other democracy around the world.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that entirely rational or affective voters are just ideal opposite ends of a continuum. Most likely, voters will vote based on varying combinations of affection and rational considerations (e.g. strong partisans, moderate partisans, and politically engaged independents). But when these two factors are in conflict with each other (e.g. when the 'opposite' party has the best presidential candidate), partisans will likely decide their vote based on whichever factor is dominant and relatively more important to the individual. Therefore, classifying voters as 'rational' and 'affective' based on their stated strength of identification (e.g.

strong partisans as 'affective'; moderate partisans and independents as 'rational') may be inaccurate.[116] The best test to know which factor dominated during a particular election is the individual's voting behavior itself. Fortunately for this research, the characteristics of the two elections considered (1997 and 2001) and the availability of a nationwide survey with the right questions made possible the uncovering of these two types of voters among Hondurans. It was not based on their stated strength of party identification but rather on their actual voting behavior.

In is also important to highlight the mechanisms through which party turnover and electoral accountability came about. While very few partisans did vote for the 'opposite' party (i.e. Liberales voted PN and Nacionalistas voted PL), most 'rational' partisans allowed the party turnover to occur by simply abstaining from voting for their own party, when it was not the 'best' party choice. In addition, voting independents tended to vote for the eventually victorious party and thus were also directly responsible for the party turnover. Therefore, electoral abstentionism may not necessarily be a bad thing. Neither should be the existence of voting independents.

However, there seem to be two 'brands' of abstentionism: 1) the occasional abstention among partisans of the two major parties (which was in large measure responsible for electoral accountability to occur), and 2) the persistent abstentionism among most independents (which did not contribute whatsoever to electoral accountability but rather perhaps to reduce the

[116] Even though, say, rational moderate PL supporters do have some degree of affection, they chose their vote based more on rational considerations rather than on their affection for the party. Other self-described moderate PL supporters, however, might have voted based on their affection rather than on rational considerations, thus becoming an affective voter. After all, the fact that moderate partisans might have lower levels of affection toward their party does not mean that their level of 'rationalization' of issues is necessarily higher.

legitimacy of the elected government). Therefore, just like *good* and *bad* cholesterol, *occasional* voting abstention may be considered 'good', while the *persistent* abstention of disengaged citizens may be considered 'bad', undesirable and unhealthy for democracy.

Additionally, the existence of a significant portion of 'rational' voters in Honduras is not only being instrumental for electoral accountability (vertical) but also for horizontal accountability. Even though Hondurans continue to vote for the two traditional parties in the presidential elections, they are increasingly splitting their votes for the legislature. Ever since the introduction of separate ballots for president and deputies, in 1997, Hondurans are increasingly voting for the small parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, UD) to elect the deputies to Congress. This trend has caused the winning party to no longer have a majority in congress, which forces it to negotiate with other parties to form post-election alliances. This new reality will make congress more deliberative and independent from the executive thus making congressional oversight over the executive (horizontal accountability) more likely to occur. And the party system is likely to experience greater splintering as long as the two traditional parties continue to fail in solving the country's most pressing problems of poverty, crime, and corruption, among others.

Rational voters, then, play a fundamental role in the consolidation of democracy. Rational voters (moderate partisans and independents), a group of voters with distinctively *positive* characteristics, have been the ones responsible for electoral accountability in Honduras. In addition, aided by the separation of ballots, rational voters are also causing the legislature become more independent from the executive by giving the small parties more representatives and denying the winning party absolute control of both branches. By doing so, rational voters are also responsible for potentially greater horizontal accountability. Therefore, as this research has been able to prove, the prevalent view of strong (affective) partisans as "guarantors" of

democracy needs to be reviewed. In addition, it is necessary to review our attitudes toward the occasional voting abstention of partisans. This is an important and positive form of electoral behavior, since it is one main mechanism through which electoral accountability is realized. Thus, it is also hoped that this research will serve to inspire further research on the fundamental role of rational voters for the realization of electoral accountability and the consolidation of democracy.

APPENDIX A

PARTY ID AND PCV COMBINATIONS AND TYPE OF VOTER

	PARTYID	PCV97	PCV01	TYPE	N[c]
1	**1. Partido Liberal**	**1. Partido Liberal**	**1. Partido Liberal**	**Affective**	**776**
2	1. Partido Liberal	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	Racional	29
3	1. Partido Liberal	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	2
4	**1. Partido Liberal**	**1. Partido Liberal**	**4. Unspecified**	**unknown***	**96**
5	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	Rational[a]	19
6	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	12
7	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	0
8	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	3
9	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	0
10	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	0
11	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	2
12	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. Unspecified	Rational	0
13	1. Partido Liberal	4. None	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	135
14	1. Partido Liberal	4. None	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	7
15	1. Partido Liberal	4. None	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	0
16	1. Partido Liberal	4. None	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	55
17	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	7
18	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	63
19	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	0
20	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	10
21	2. Partido Nacional	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	Rational[a]	2
22	**2. Partido Nacional**	**2. Partido Nacional**	**2. Partido Nacional**	**Affective**	**646**
23	2. Partido Nacional	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	2

24	**2. Partido Nacional**	**2. Partido Nacional**	**4. Unspecified**	**Unknown***	**41**
25	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	0
26	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	3
27	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	1
28	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	0
29	2. Partido Nacional	4. None	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	1
30	2. Partido Nacional	4. None	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	184
31	2. Partido Nacional	4. None	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	1
32	2. Partido Nacional	4. None	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	39
33	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	4
34	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	1
35	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	0
36	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	4. Unspecified	Rational	0
37	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	1
38	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	4
39	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	1
40	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	4. Unspecified	Rational	0
41	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	0
42	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	0
43	**3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)**	**3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)**	**3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)**	**affective?***	**8**
44	**3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)**	**3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)**	**4. Unspecified**	**Unknown***	**2**
45	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. None	1. Partido Liberal	Rational	0
46	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. None	2. Partido Nacional	Rational	5
47	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. None	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	Rational	5
48	3. Other (PINU-SD, PDCH, UD)	4. None	4. Unspecified	Rational[b]	7
49	4. None/Independent	Any	Any	Rational	111

*) these combinations will be deleted from the analysis since the intention of vote for 2001 was not specified and therefore the type of voter is unknown. In the case #43, the type of voter is difficult to define for several reasons: 1) there is no opinion about the quality of these parties' presidential candidates, 2) these are parties with a clearly defined ideology (i.e. social-democrat, Christian democrat, "revolutionary" left), 3) they are new parties with new partisans who may not have developed an affective attachment yet.

[a]) these voters are considered 'rational' since they voted for a party other than their own in one of the elections (even though they may have voted for the "wrong" candidates).

[b]) these voters are coded as 'rational' since no matter the way they would vote in 2001, they already voted for a party other than their own in 1997.

[c]) the total number of "affective" and "rational" voters in the data set is 1,422 and 716, respectively.

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