THE POLITICS OF COALITION BURDEN-SHARING:
THE CASE OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

By

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ABSTRACT

Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states contribute differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the burden-sharing outcome of coalition countries? This dissertation investigates these questions by reviewing the contributions of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan to the U.S.-led War in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2010.

Conventional wisdom focuses on neo-realist and strategic culture theories to analyze a country’s coalition behavior. The neo-realist theory of international relations suggests a systemic level explanation, and argues that the distribution of power in the international system determines the coalition behavior of states. Strategic culture theorists reject systemic level explanations, and argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the same international system, behave differently. They embrace a domestic level analysis, which emphasizes national strategic decision makers, their belief systems, and the organizational culture of the military—in short a ‘national style’ of coalition behavior.

This study demonstrates that both neo-realism and strategic culture fail to offer sufficient explanations for analyzing and predicting the coalition behavior of states. Taking a middle ground, it proposes a neo-classical realist model of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through domestic political and
culture-induced processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors for states. My theoretical model examines the effect of three systemic variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action; and three domestic level variables – domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability – in explaining the politics of coalition burden-sharing. I test the model in the cases of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan.

My research provides empirical support for the integrated burden-sharing model. It shows that among the coalition countries in Afghanistan, Britain pursued a policy of ‘punching above the weight.’ The British forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand province were overstretched, with few troops and few resources. By contrast, the German forces in Kunduz had mostly pursued a risk-averse strategy. This was due to the imposition of national caveats or restricted rules of engagement, which constrained the ability of the German forces to participate in offensive military operations against the Taliban insurgents. Pakistan joined and supported the war in Afghanistan by severing diplomatic relations with the Taliban; and deploying up to 150,000 troops along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Despite providing critical logistical support, and conducting numerous military offensives against Al Qaeda and Taliban militias in its tribal areas, Pakistan was widely labeled as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals. This was due to Pakistan’s overt contribution to the war on terrorism, and its covert support for various Afghan-focused insurgent groups.

This dissertation concludes with a brief discussion on the theoretical and policy implications of coalition burden-sharing.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents M.A. Hamid and Hazera Begum, and my wife Tasmin Sultana. Of course, I remain solely responsible for any errors.
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>NATO Allied Command Europe</td>
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<td>AICGS</td>
<td>American Institute for Contemporary German Studies</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>APTTA</td>
<td>Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>Center for Defense Information</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>German Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC-A</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>German Christian Socialist Union</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>NATO Defense Capability Initiative</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDA</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FDP</td>
<td>German Federal Democratic Party</td>
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FM 3-24  Field Manual 3-24
GAO    U.S. Government Accountability Office
GC HQ  UK Government Communications Headquarters
GMF   German Marshall Fund of the United States
IED   Improvised Explosive Devices
IFOR  NATO Implementation Force
IISS  International Institute for Strategic Studies
INTERFET  International Force for East Timor
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
ISC  UK Intelligence and Security Committee
ISI  Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of Pakistan
JeM  Jaish-e-Mohammad
JI  Jemaah Islamiah
JTAC  Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, UK
JUI  Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
KFOR  Kosovo Force
KMTC  Kabul Military Training Center
KSK  German Kommando Spezialkräfte
LeT  Lashkar-e-Tayyeba
MI5  Military Intelligence, Section 5 (The Security Service)
MI6  Military Intelligence, Section 6 (Secret Intelligence Service)
MMA  Muttahida Majlish-e-Amal
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding
MP  Member of the Parliament
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non Government Organization
NSA  National Security Agency
NWFP  North West Frontier Province, Pakistan
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
PCRU  UK Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PML  Pakistan Muslim League
PML (N)  Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif faction)
PML (Q)  Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)
PPP  Pakistan Peoples Party
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
QRF  Quick Reaction Force
RAF  UK Royal Air Force
RC  Regional Command
RC-North  ISAF Regional Command North, Afghanistan
RC-South  ISAF Regional Command South, Afghanistan
RPG  Rocket Propelled Grenade
RUSI  Royal United Services Institute
SAS  UK Special Air Service
SBS  UK Special Boat Service
SDR  UK Strategic Defense Review
SDSR  UK Strategic Defense and Security Review
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOCA  UK Serious Originated Crime Agency
SOFs  Special Operations Forces
SPD  German Social Democratic Party
TE-SAT  Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend report
TNSM  Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
TSO  The Stationary Office
TTP  Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAE  United Arab Emirates
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
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<td>UBL</td>
<td>Usama bin Laden (also spelled Osama bin Laden)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
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<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UOR</td>
<td>Urgent Operational Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:

THE CHALLENGES OF COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN AFGHANISTAN

Coalition burden-sharing is one of the central features of modern warfare in the 21st century. Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states contribute differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the burden-sharing outcome of coalition countries? The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these questions by reviewing the varying level of contributions by Britain, Germany, and Pakistan to the U.S.-led coalition warfare in Afghanistan (2001-2010). States’ burden-sharing behavior can be observed in three phases of a coalition’s life span: formation, maintenance, and disintegration. This dissertation focuses on burden-sharing during the first two stages of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

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1 The terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ refer to multilateral military cooperation. However, there are conceptual differences between them. Strictly speaking, alliances are defined as formal, treaty-based arrangements, while coalitions are defined as ad hoc security agreements among states. While most coalitions are built to fight a war, most alliances are, by contrast, formed for defensive purposes, that is, to prevent a war. This dissertation argues that instead of looking at the differences between alliances and coalitions in irreconcilable terms, it is more useful to consider alliances and coalitions as part of a security continuum, in which formal alliance members may join a wartime coalition, and wartime coalition members may become part of an alliance system, or act like a formal ally. Chapter Two discusses the conceptual differences between alliances and coalitions, and addresses the issue of coalition burden-sharing.

2 According to Glenn Snyder, one of the leading alliance and coalition theorists, during the formation phase, prospective coalition members bargain and negotiate their burden-sharing commitment for contingent scenarios. By contrast, during the maintenance phase, allies bargain over the crisis-time burden-sharing role, such as war plans. Snyder does not address the issue of coalition disintegration, but George Liska, another leading alliance theorist, discusses how peacetime alliances or wartime coalitions may disintegrate by the “internal strains and external pressures” as well as over unequal distribution of gains and liabilities among the members of the alliance. Writing in the context of the Cold War era, Holsti et al suggest that alliance duration and disintegration may be associated with a number of factors, such as, the advent of nuclear weapons, disarmament politics, the end of the external threat which created the alliance, and certain alliance attributes, such as, size, structure, purposes, and ideology. See Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 3; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 175; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrance Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 25-28.
The Afghanistan War coalition included both NATO and non-NATO allies, who made direct and indirect contributions. Direct contributions include troops and military assets deployment in Afghanistan, whereas indirect contributions include military deployment in the Afghan-Pakistan borders, as well as, basing access, and overflight rights to U.S. and NATO forces in non-Afghan theaters.\(^3\) Between 2002 and 2010, the number of countries joining the U.S.-led military coalition increased significantly from 18 countries in 2002 to nearly 50 countries in 2010. The number of coalition troops on the ground in Afghanistan also increased significantly from 5,000 in 2002 to nearly 40,000 in 2010.\(^4\) This figure does not include troops and military assets deployed outside Afghanistan for the prosecution of the war on terrorism.

Among the Afghanistan War coalition countries, Britain maintained a strong combat role by consistently supporting the U.S. efforts to create and manage the coalition. This was done in two phases of the War: by participating during the initial airstrikes and covert operations to topple the Taliban regime, and later deploying a 9,500-strong military force to the Taliban-controlled Helmand province.\(^5\) In contrast to Britain’s robust combat role, Germany maintained a principally non-combat and peace-keeping role by deploying a 4,900 strong military force in the relatively peaceful Kunduz province.\(^6\) While the British forces took active part in combating the Taliban insurgency, the German forces were restricted to mostly non-combat stabilization missions.

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\(^4\) See Appendix 1.A for a list of countries contributing troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 2002-2010.


Unlike Britain and Germany, Pakistan did not deploy any military force in Afghanistan. However, Islamabad’s security cooperation was critical for the U.S.-led war efforts in Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. By 2010, Islamabad deployed more than 120,000 military forces in the Taliban insurgent-prone Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), and its adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (previously North West Frontier Province). This troop deployment was geo-strategically important, as senior Al Qaeda and Taliban commanders, used the FATA as a safe haven for attacking the U.S. and NATO forces [International Security Assistance Force, ISAF] in Afghanistan. Pakistan made three other contributions: it provided U.S. forces access to its military bases; it authorized the use of its territory for the trans-shipment of military logistics for NATO forces in Afghanistan; and finally it offered tacit support for the escalation of U.S. drone strikes in the FATA. Despite such critical security cooperation, Pakistan maintained clandestine supports for three Afghan Taliban groups –the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin network. While Pakistan hoped support for these Afghan Taliban groups would offer greater strategic depth in future Afghanistan, to counter any undue Indian influence in the post-Taliban

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7 C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004)
era, the U.S. and NATO viewed this clandestine support as state sponsorship of terrorism, and detrimental to the overall coalition war efforts.\textsuperscript{12}

This brief discussion of the British, German, and Pakistani contribution (or lack thereof) demonstrates the challenge of coalition cohesion and its effect on burdensharing behavior of coalition members. Burden-sharing is defined here as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group [or coalition] in the process of accomplishing a common goal.”\textsuperscript{13} This dissertation examines the burden-sharing behavior of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, where the common goals were: defeating the transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda; denying it a safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan; toppling the Taliban regime for hosting the Al Qaeda militants, and suppressing the Taliban insurgency.\textsuperscript{14}

The issue of coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan is important and interesting. This has raised important questions about NATO’s alliance cohesion and the joint war fighting


\textsuperscript{14} There are compelling reasons for analyzing the Al Qaeda and Taliban-focused counterterrorism strategy. Most scholarly and policy works on terrorism and national security focus on the evolving threats from Al Qaeda, and its associated groups, including the Taliban. Prominent terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman offers a typology of four Al Qaeda related threats to international security. This typology includes: (a) Al Qaeda Central; (b) Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates; (c) Al Qaeda Local’s Dispersed Cells; and (d) Al Qaeda Network. Hoffman notes that Al Qaeda Central is composed of the remnants of pre-9/11 Al Qaeda organization and its core leadership, with a few “new players”, based in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border area. The second category — Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates—refers to Al Qaeda-trained or -inspired terrorist and insurgent groups in various places, including Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan. The third category refers to Al Qaeda-trained or indoctrinated individuals, including Europe’s Muslim youths, who have either fought in Algeria, Chechnya, the Balkans, and recently in Iraq, or recruited into Al Qaeda’s local cells. The fourth category includes “homegrown Islamic radicals” in North Africa, Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, who are mostly ideologically inspired, than actually recruited by Al Qaeda. Hoffman argues that “The most salient threat posed by these four categories continues to come from Al Qaeda Central and its affiliates and associates.” See Bruce Hoffman, “From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency,” \textit{Current History}, Vol. 105, No. 695 (Dec. 2006), pp. 424-426. Interestingly, the European and U.S. national security and counterterrorism strategies have also prioritized fighting the Afghanistan and Pakistan-based Al Qaeda Central. See: The White House, \textit{National Strategy for Combating Terrorism} (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council); The European Council, \textit{The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy} (Brussels: The European Council Presidency and CT Coordinator, 2005); UK Government, \textit{UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward} (London: The Cabinet Office, 2009).
capability of traditional NATO allies in an ad hoc military coalition.\textsuperscript{15} It has also raised serious questions about the political resolve and military capability of non-NATO allies in sharing the military risks of the Afghanistan War.\textsuperscript{16} Broadly speaking, these questions relate to the command and control of the overall mission, the national restrictions over the use of force, and the political-military support of coalition partners. Political and military assessments of the Afghanistan War highlight the challenges of burden-sharing between the U.S. and its allies in the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{17} For instance, in a political analysis of the Afghan War, Nasreen Ghufran, a South Asian scholar, describes Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound” where NATO countries demonstrated “signs of rift” over military burden-sharing:

The ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is becoming war weary, and signs of a rift are emerging within the alliance over the issue of \textit{burden sharing}: some countries such as the U.S., U.K., the Netherlands, and Canada operate in the dangerous southern and eastern areas of the country, whereas other countries appear less willing to expose their troops to armed conflict.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{bellamy_williams} According to Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul D. Williams, “Coalitions of the willing are groups of actors that come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises. They may operate with or without formal authorization from regional or other international organization. Since NATO’s Kosovo campaign in 1999, coalitions of the willing have undertaken peace operations in Afghanistan, the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], East Timor, Haiti, and the Solomon Islands. In these cases, pivotal states constructed coalitions to serve two primary purposes: share the material costs of the operation (the primary goal in East Timor) and provide a degree of legitimization (the primary goal in Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands).” See Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), p. 169.
\end{thebibliography}
While Ghufran discussed NATO’s intra-alliance rift over burden-sharing, others have gone on to analyze the cause of such rift. The 2010 issue of *Military Balance*, an annual assessment of world’s military capabilities and defense economics, published by the London-based think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies, offers a succinct analysis of the coalition burden-sharing challenge in Afghanistan. It says:

Afghanistan remained a thorny operational challenge for NATO in 2009, with security and stability in the country still lacking. Operations continued to be hampered by an inability to hold territory and by the absence of a truly common and comprehensive approach among allies and the international community at large. Elusive success means that a number of problems are resurfacing which threaten to undermine NATO’s political and military cohesion. Questions about burden-sharing are increasing once more as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) becomes visibly Americanised . . . persistent caveats, interoperability problems and capability shortfalls suggested that not all allies were willing or able to make the same kind of contribution in quantitative terms.\(^{19}\)

Despite the importance of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and the persistent challenges to the U.S.-led coalition fighting the war, there is a lack of scholarly work analyzing alliance contributions to the Afghanistan War. My dissertation addresses this research gap by presenting and testing a theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing. My theoretical model takes a neo-classical realist position, which incorporates the insights from both neo-realist and strategic culture theories.

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Conventional wisdom focuses on the neo-realist and strategic culture theories to explain the politics of coalition burden-sharing. Neo-realists argue that the structural distribution of power in the international system determines a country’s coalition behavior. Strategic culturalists reject the international level explanation, and argue that the domestic political culture, norms, and elite perception determine a country’s attitude toward military coalitions.

The neo-realist and strategic culture theories offer useful insights into coalition politics. However, they tend to be mutually exclusive, and without the help of one another, they cannot provide adequate explanations for analyzing the burden-sharing decisions and outcomes of coalition countries. In contrast to the neo-realists and strategic culturalists, my burden-sharing model takes a neo-classical realist position, and argues that international structural constraints are channeled through the domestic political processes to determine states’ burden-sharing behavior in ad hoc coalitions. First, I examine the effect of three international level variables – alliance dependence, threat perception, and collective action. Next, I explore the effect of three domestic level variables and constraints – domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability—in analyzing the decision processes on the Afghanistan War coalition.

My theoretical model modifies the existing burden-sharing decision models developed in two recent studies of coalition warfare: the Bennett et al. study on the First Iraq War coalition (1990-1991); and the Auerswald study on NATO’s Kosovo air campaign (1999). I argue that the existing models provide a useful starting point for analyzing the complex decision process of

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coalition countries. But they cannot sufficiently explain why coalition members act differently in responding to the needs of combat and non-combat operations. My dissertation addresses this theoretical gap by offering a better model for analyzing burden-sharing behavior in wartime coalitions.\textsuperscript{22}

This dissertation has seven chapters. Chapter Two presents a conceptual discussion on alliance, coalition, and burden-sharing. Chapter Three reviews the existing theories of coalition politics, and presents a theoretical model for analyzing coalition burden-sharing. The next three chapters test the empirical validity of my integrated burden-sharing model.

Chapter Four analyzes the British decision process on Afghanistan. It finds that among the non-U.S. coalition members, Britain maintained a strong burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. This was evident in London’s proactive diplomacy, a modest stabilization role, and an interest in fighting the Taliban insurgency. Four factors influenced the British decision process—two systemic level factors and two domestic level factors. First, Britain’s ‘special relationship with the United States and its alliance solidarity with NATO created a strong commitment to multilateral missions. NATO’s invocation of Article 5 collective defense mechanism further reinforced this alliance solidarity, encouraging a strong coalition role for Britain. After alliance solidarity, balance of threat presented the second systemic level incentive to encourage Britain’s entry into and support for the coalition. This study shows that Al Qaeda, WMD proliferation, Taliban insurgency, and drug trafficking posed four inter-related threats to

the British and international security. Britain pursued a strategy of balancing against the threats by joining the coalition, and providing robust supports for the U.S.-led war efforts, especially in the insurgent-prone Helmand province. These systemic incentives of alliance solidarity and balance of threat were channeled through the British domestic political processes, in which two factors played a crucial role: the office of the chief executive and the military force. As the chief executive, prime ministers Tony Blair and his successors Gordon Brown and David Cameron enjoyed royal prerogative in the declaration of war and the use of force. The discretionary power, coupled with elite consensus in the British parliament, made the British prime ministers so powerful that they ignored any dissenting public opinion, and directly looked into the military capability in shaping London’s Afghanistan policy. In the final stage, as the capability of the British forces increased in Helmand, with more troops and more resources, and the introduction of a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the British military pursued a robust burden-sharing strategy in Afghanistan.

Chapter Five examines Germany’s risk-averse strategy in Afghanistan. First, it describes Germany’s military and non-military contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. It then analyzes why Germany gradually increased military and civilian boots on the ground, but resisted the NATO pressures for participating in the offensive military operations against the Taliban insurgents. It argues that two international systemic and three domestic level factors influenced the German burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. First, the NATO-centric alliance commitment, and the balance of threat presented two systemic incentives to encourage Germany’s coalition participation. Second, these systemic incentives were transmitted through the unique German political processes, in which the German chancellors’ power to use force in foreign policy was seriously constrained by the constitution (Basic Law) and the parliament.
Unfavorable public opinion acted as the second constraint discouraging Germany’s participation in offensive military operations. Despite such negative constraints, both the mainstream political parties, and the German public supported a defensive reconstruction role for the German forces in Afghanistan. Finally, the German military’s weak counterinsurgency capability—defined by the lack of deployable, suitable, and interoperable forces—had seriously affected Berlin’s ability to participate in combat military operations against the Taliban insurgents. These weaknesses began to remedy in 2008 and 2009—in response to the growing dangers posed by the Taliban insurgency in northern Afghanistan, where most of the German troops were located. In 2009, due to pressures from the commanders on the ground, the German government relaxed some of the rules of engagement, and authorized the German forces to use force against insurgents. In 2010, the United States recognized the weaknesses in German mission, and sent additional troops into the German area of operation to engage the insurgents, and to train the Afghan national security forces.

Chapter Six analyzes Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior. First, it shows Pakistan’s diplomatic, military, and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. Then, it explains the Pakistani decision process on Afghanistan. It argues that two systemic incentives encouraged Pakistan to join and support the coalition. These are alliance dependence and balance of threat. Pakistan’s dependence on an informal alliance with the United States had strongly influenced its decision to join the coalition. Pakistan did so to avoid any direct confrontation with the United States, and to reap the benefits of U.S. foreign aid. Although Pakistan gradually increased its forces along the borders with Afghanistan, its divergent threat perception had a negative effect on the U.S. and NATO war goals in Afghanistan. From 2001 until 2010, Pakistan supported the U.S. and NATO assessment that Al Qaeda’s foreign militias, and indigenous
Pakistani Taliban groups posed the most pressing threats to Pakistani security. Despite such shared threat perception, Pakistan had reportedly supported various Afghan Taliban groups.

Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban groups was premised on the belief that it would provide Islamabad a strategic depth in a future conflict with India. This chapter argues that the positive and negative incentives of alliance dependence and the balance of threat perception were transmitted through the Pakistani political processes. In Pakistan’s domestic politics, the chief executive and the military forces made and shaped the ultimate decisions regarding the country’s Afghanistan policy. Because of a longstanding military rule, Pakistan’s civilian institutions lacked any effective control over the foreign policy formulation process. Instead, the military and its powerful intelligence agency ISI gained strong power in shaping the country’s foreign policy. After the departure of Musharraf from presidency, and the restoration of democracy, since 2008, the civilian and military elites in Pakistan had supported the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, without sacrificing their perceived national interests. As the War in Afghanistan progressed, the United States and its NATO allies found that conflicted national interests and competing priorities between the Pakistani and U.S. war goals had seriously affected Islamabad’s burden-sharing behavior.

Chapter Seven discusses the theoretical implications of the research. The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation provides support for my coalition burden-sharing model. I show that once joining a military coalition, states make varying level of contribution to support the coalition. I concur with neo-classical realists that variation in states’ burden-sharing behavior can best be analyzed by incorporating the domestic level intervening variables into the analysis.
of foreign and security policy. 23 My research shows the limits of the collective action theory, which suggest that the United States is likely to bear most of the burdens of the Afghanistan War, while others are likely to ride free. I argue that most NATO member states, such as Britain and Germany were not free-riders in Afghanistan. The U.S. offers of incentive or coercive pressures played a negligible role in defining the alliance behavior of principal members in the Afghanistan War coalition. Instead, the domestic factors, such as legal-constitutional provisions in the case of Germany, and prime ministerial influence in British defense policy, were significant factors in shaping the major NATO allies’ coalition commitment. This might not be the case for other coalition countries, not studied in this dissertation. I conclude this chapter with a note on further academic and policy oriented research on coalition burden-sharing.

23 Bennett et al., Friends in Need; David Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice;” Baltrusaitis, Friends Indeed?
CHAPTER TWO

COALITION BURDEN-SHARING: CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSIONS

This chapter discusses the concepts of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. It has four sections. The first section examines the conceptual differences between alliances and coalitions. The second section reviews the definitional and measurement issues in coalition burden-sharing. The third section provides a brief historical account of coalition burden-sharing in U.S. foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era. The fourth section discusses how this dissertation measures coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan.

I. Alliances and Coalitions: Conceptual Differences

The terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ are often used interchangeably. Strictly speaking, alliances are defined as formal treaty-based multilateral security arrangements between two or more countries to counter a common threat. By contrast, coalitions are defined as ad hoc cooperation and coordination among nations addressing a common threat or security issue. The distinctions between them are often ignored or thought to have little analytical value. For instance, Christopher Bladen conflates alliances with coalitions and notes, “Alliances, like coalitions in broader form, grow out of coercive and conflict situations.”¹ Stephen Walt also uses the term interchangeably: “states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.”² Others propose a broader definition of alliance and

coalition to allow for such a conflation. For instance, in their discussion of alliances, Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan note that “There is little to gain from a restrictive definition, and a broad one offers the distinctive advantage of enlarging the scope” of a scholarly review.³

Although the terms alliance are coalition are used interchangeably, there are at least three major differences between them. The first difference involves the formalization versus ad hoc nature of military cooperation; the second involves the defensive versus reactive nature of military cooperation; and the third relates to the coverage of single issue versus multiple issue areas.

First, alliances refer to formalized and institutionalized cooperation arrangements, whereas coalitions are defined as informal agreements between states.⁴ According to Robert Osgood, an alliance is “a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force.”⁵ Holsti et al offer a similar definition emphasizing the formalization of the alliance process: “an alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”⁶ Why are formal and institutional arrangements the prerequisites for military alliances? George Modelski argues that the conception of alliance connotes “military collaboration concerned with a third power” and because such collaboration

⁴ Some scholars note that alliances are not always formalized agreements. They can also include informal relations among states. For instance, Friedman argues that although an alliance is usually understood as a formal treaty-based arrangement among states, it also refers to an informal process of the community of nations. He writes: “alliance is usually revealed in the form of a treaty with or without protocols and letters explaining intentions and obligations. In this version it is static and formal...alliance is also part of a general process, and in this version, is informal, functional, and dynamic.” See Julian R. Friedman, “Alliance in International Politics,” in Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 15.
⁶ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* p. 4.
requires “preparedness for joint military action and the actual involvement in hostilities on the same side...they are more frequently formalized” in treaty-based agreements.  

Glenn Snyder proposes a similar explanation: “The formalization adds elements of specificity, legal, and moral obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal alignments.”

In contrast to alliances, military coalitions are mostly informal and of ad hoc nature. As Terry Pudas notes, “Ad hoc coalitions are unique in that they are based on temporary agreements and normally are less formal than standing alliances.”

Although the purpose of creating wartime ad hoc coalition is to maximize the power of allies against an adversary, Wayne Silkett argues that intra-alliance “friction and inefficiency” are the inevitable outcome of a coalition, which often weaken the coalition military strategy.

Christopher Coker and Andrew Pierre offer a similar view. They stress that avoiding friction and inefficiency and fighting a successful coalition war requires political cohesion, which is the central challenge in most military coalitions.

I agree with Sylkett, Coker, and Pierre that achieving the political cohesion is critical to fighting a successful coalition war. This was evident in NATO defense ministers’ meetings, and international conferences on Afghanistan, where the United States and its coalition partners worked on creating a common stance on Afghanistan.

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Jonathan Colman offers a similar perspective on intra-coalition friction. Colman notes that “while coalitions are often sought for the purposes of burden-sharing and legitimacy, they also invite conflicting interests from coalition partners and inhibit the effective coordination of policy. Burden-sharing may be fine in theory but it can hinder war-planning.” See Jonathan Colman, “The Challenges of Coalition Building: The Vietnam Experience, 1964-1969,” *RUSI Analysis* 2010.

Second, alliances are formed for defensive purposes, for instance, to prevent a war. But, coalitions are formed in response to a war or a war like scenario.\(^\text{12}\) According to Glenn Snyder, alliances are formalized military agreements for the use of force in “specified circumstances.”\(^\text{13}\) Bueno de Mesquito and Singer offer a similar definition of alliances: they are coordinating mechanism for dealing with “specified contingencies.”\(^\text{14}\) These two definitions of alliances, couple with Osgood’s conceptualization of alliances, mentioned before, as agreements pledging the use of force indicates that alliances are peace-time and pre-war military agreements. By contrast, most definitions of coalitions emphasize the nature of ad hoc military cooperation created in response to an existing or specific contingency.\(^\text{15}\) Unlike alliances, which may survive even after a crisis is over; most coalitions are likely to disintegrate in the aftermath of the specific contingency, which has formed it. A classic example is the First Iraq War coalition (1990-1991), which dissolved after the Iraqi forces were forced to withdraw from Kuwait. George Sprowls notes that “Coalitions are relatively short-lived alignments to meet a particular contingency and rapidly disintegrate once that situation is resolved.”\(^\text{16}\) This is true for most of the cases. However, the Afghanistan War coalition and the Second Iraq War coalition appear to be two notable exceptions. The Afghanistan coalition was formed in October 2001, and continues to operate as of writing this dissertation in December 2010. The Iraq coalition originated in March 2003, and the combat phase of the war lasted until mid-2010, when the United States declared an end to the war.


Third, coalitions are mostly conceived as dealing with a single issue area, such as to deal with an emerging threat. In contrast, alliances have a much broader scope, which is not limited to wartime threat, but includes a broad range of security relationship, such as, peace time defense cooperation, joint military exercise, arms trade etc. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD):

Coalitions are different from alliances inasmuch as they tend to be more loosely structured and often focus on a single objective. Alliances are more often agreements to promote the allies’ security in whatever situations arise for an extended period.¹⁷

In summary, alliances and coalitions share a basic characteristic – they are both concerned with multilateral military cooperation. However, they have some sharp differences. Instead of looking at these differences in irreconcilable terms, alliances and coalitions can be broadly understood as part of a three-dimensional security strategy. The three dimensions are: formalization, time horizon, and coverage of issue area. When states join a peacetime formalized security arrangement, which includes a wide range of military cooperation issues, such agreement falls into the category of an alliance. By contrast, when states join a formal or informal wartime military agreement, with the explicit purpose of fighting an adversary, it would fit the definition of an ad hoc coalition. The lines between these two concepts will be blurred, if members of a peacetime alliance enter into a war, or if wartime coalition members establish a post-war alliance to institutionalize their security cooperation. Because of these blurring lines and conceptual similarities, this dissertation will use many of the insights drawn from the

II. Coalition Burden-sharing: Definitional Contours and Measurement Issues

There is no universally accepted definition of burden-sharing. This dissertation defines burden-sharing as the distribution of military and non-military risks of fighting a coalition war. Military risks include the dangers of combat operations, whereas non-military risks include the economic costs of a war, and the hazards of participating in non-combat reconstruction and development operations. Non-military risks also include diplomatic and political frictions among the coalition members over the goals of the war, and the means to achieve it.

An important challenge in coalition politics is the lack of a standard operating procedure to determine how the military and non-military risks of a coalition war would be distributed among the coalition members, or whether one type of risk is more important than the other. This study shows that the nature of a military operation, the international environment in which it is carried out, and the domestic political culture of a coalition member are all likely to influence whether the military risks would be privileged over the non-military risks. In the Afghanistan War context, the most important issue was whether America’s principal NATO and non-NATO allies, such as Britain, Germany, and Pakistan were sharing the military risks of fighting the Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies. Thus, participating in combat operations, and gaining success in such operations appeared to be the key benchmarks, upon which some coalition partners’ burden-sharing contributions were evaluated.
How do the alliance and coalition literatures conceptualize burden-sharing? According to George Liska, one of the most prominent alliance theorists, burden-sharing is about “sharing liabilities” among members of an alliance or coalition. Liska’s conceptualization of burden-sharing as liabilities sharing is quite vague, and does not offer any insights into the types of liabilities to be shared by allies and coalition partners. A broader definition is offered by former U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who notes that burden sharing is the “fair distribution of political, manpower, materiel and economic costs of maintaining our [U.S.] alliance postures.” Weinberger’s definition should be understood in the context of allied commitment to the security of the transatlantic alliance, in which the United States and its West European allies were committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense against the threats from former Soviet Union and its communist allies. It thus refers to a cost sharing mechanism within the structure of a formalized and institutionalized military alliance.

Although Weinberger emphasizes the issue of “fair distribution” of costs, most of the alliance and coalition literatures demonstrate the challenges of equitable or fair sharing of costs and the risk in pursuing a common defense policy. The measurement problem is pertinent here. Should burden-sharing commitment only focus on military contribution, or include non-military contribution as well? These questions dominated the U.S. national security discourse during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In a broad overview of burden-sharing assessment in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a DoD report on allied contributions emphasized the diverse forms of cost-sharing measures, such as “defense spending, military manpower, and cash

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contributions to offset stationing costs.”

The report stressed that such military contributions are tangible and measurable. But there are other non-military – largely social, economic, and political contributions – which are intangible, and thus cannot be quantifiably measured. These non-tangible contributions include “political and financial support for shared international goals; the social, economic, and political costs of hosting foreign troops; and in-kind contribution to mutual defense.”

A close look at the burden-sharing literature suggests two types of cost and risk distributional issues – one related to treaty-based alliance commitment, and the other related to informal coalition commitment. Writing in the context of U.S. and NATO’s alliance commitment, Forster and Cimbala define burden-sharing as the “distribution of costs and risk” in the attainment of a common security goal. These risks may be military and non-military. Forster and Cimbala stress that NATO’s central purpose is to promote collective security. They observe that in the context of NATO:

[B]urdens that have to be shared include costs of raising and supporting arms of service, deploying them overseas, and using them in combat or peace operations.

Costs of military intervention are not only economic. Wars and other military operations can influence public opinion and, in some cases, cause governments to fall.

Forster and Cimbala’s remark touches on an interesting issue – the political and indirect costs of alliance commitment, such as eroding public support and collapse of government, as a result of a country’s military contribution to “wars or other military operations.” This was

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particularly salient during the course of the Afghanistan War, in which the Dutch coalition government collapsed over the issue of its Afghan war commitment.22 Similarly, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair had to leave power in 2007 due to his controversial decision to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.23 The Dutch and the British cases show the political cost of coalition burden-sharing. They highlight that the political commitment of a troop contributing nation’s incumbent government is important in creating and managing a wartime coalition.

While most of the burden-sharing literature has tended to focus on the NATO alliance, there is a growing body of scholarly works on burden-sharing in ad hoc coalitions and multilateral operations for conflict prevention and crisis management. In their analysis of burden-sharing during the First Iraq War, Bennett et al focus on three types of coalition contributions: political, economic, and military.24 Daniel Baltrusaitis adopts this three-tiered conceptualization of burden-sharing, and applies it to the discussion of the Second Iraq War


coalition. This dissertation is largely modeled on the Bennett et al, and the Baltrusaitis studies on coalition burden-sharing. It uses the term diplomatic contribution, instead of political contribution. This semantic change is premised on the fact that coalition countries are constantly engaged in diplomatic negotiations and bargaining to coordinate their activities and to avoid the possible frictions among themselves.

Why care about multilateral coalition operations? Forster and Cimbala offer an interesting note:

Multilateral operations introduce unique burdens, including the responsibility for developing and maintaining coalitions, compromising on the use of force, establishing clear and agreed upon mission objectives, determining operational command and control, which heretofore have received little attention, assessing financial viability, and assuming the burdens of reconstruction after hostilities have eased.

A closer look at the two major post-9/11 coalitions – in Afghanistan and Iraq - demonstrates the validity of the Forster and Cimbala remarks. In both cases the challenges of equitable or fair burden-sharing were present during the formation and maintenance of the coalitions. Critics in the United States often alleged that their European allies were not doing enough. They wanted Europe to contribute more troops and participate more in combat operations to fight the terrorists and insurgents. The European leaders often ignored such critics, and resisted the pressures of more troop commitment and more kinetic operations.

The typology of alliances or coalitions has important bearing upon the burden-sharing role of members. Liska notes that there are two major types of alliances: defensive and offensive. Defensive alliances are built for deterrence purposes, and aimed at opposing a common threat, while offensive alliances are built for coercive purposes, and aimed at changing the status quo.  

This difference between defensive and offensive alliances has important implications for coalition burden-sharing. Peacetime defensive burden-sharing behavior stresses the need for proportional defense expenditure, whereas coercive coalition commitments emphasize the need for more substantive cost- and risk-sharing, which may include troop contribution for combat war fighting purposes, economic aid for sharing the war-related costs, and diplomatic initiatives to induce or coerce a country for joining a coalition or abandoning a rival coalition. This study shows that the Afghanistan War coalition combines the attributes of both offensive and defensive alliances. Although it was primarily created to fight terrorism, it later embraced the defensive reconstruction and stabilization operations.

What are the principal tasks of a military coalition? How did the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan come into being to perform one or more of those tasks?

Osgood’s analysis on the functions of alliances is worth discussing here to understand the accomplishments of the Afghanistan War coalition. Osgood stresses that alliances are created to accomplish four principal tasks: “accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies, and international order.”  

First, an alliance increases the cumulative power of the allied countries vis-à-vis any perceived threat. Second, it can be used to suppress any internal dissent and ensure the regime survival of a weak ally. Third, an alliance commits its member states to a

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27 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, p. 30.
28 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, p 21.
policy of mutual respect for sovereignty and restraint in the use of power against each other. Finally, an alliance can play an important role in creating a stable international order.\textsuperscript{29}

The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan appeared to serve two of the four purposes described by Osgood: external power accretion, and the maintenance of international order. It aggregated the power of the coalition countries for the stated purpose of combating terrorism and containing insurgency. One can rightly argue that the coalition in Afghanistan served another purpose, by acting as an instrument for legitimizing multilateral operations, which is not mentioned in the Osgood’s typology of alliance functions. It was obvious that the formation of the coalition was critical for the United States to demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{30} However, the motivation for ‘accretion of external power’ played an important role in creating the coalition. This was evident during the discussions among the members of Bush administration’s war cabinet. The war cabinet discussed whether the United States should only encourage countries with strong military power, and the ability to stabilize the international order by fighting transnational terrorism. In \textit{Bush at War}, Bob Woodward writes:

Rice [Condoleezza Rice, U.S. National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State during the Junior Bush administration] turned to the allies who were clamoring to participate. Getting as many of them invested with military forces in the war was essential. The coalition had to have teeth…But Rumsfeld [The then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld] didn’t want other forces included.

\textsuperscript{29} Osgood, \textit{Alliances and American Foreign Policy}, p 21-22.

for cosmetic purposes. Some German battalion or a French frigate could get in the way of his operation. The coalition had to fit the conflict and not the other way around. They could not invent roles. Maybe they didn’t need a French frigate.\footnote{Bob Woodward, \begin{em}Bush at War\end{em} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 179-180.}

Woodward also writes that in building the coalition, the U.S. policy makers were cautious in making sure that coalition members do not constrain the autonomy of U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan. Speaking about former Vice President Dick Cheney, Woodward comments:

Cheney countered that the coalition [against terrorism] should be a means to wiping out terrorism, not an end in itself—a view that others shared. They wanted support from the rest of the world, but they did not want the coalition to tie their hands.\footnote{Woodward, \begin{em}Bush at War\end{em}, pp. 48-49.}

The quotes from Woodward show a mixture of hawkish and dovish attitudes toward the Afghanistan War coalition. The doves in the Bush administration wanted to encourage greater participation from coalition partners. For them two issues were of most importance: U.S. leadership of the coalition and coalition partners with an ability to fight and fit to the conflict.

In summary, coalition burden-sharing is defined by multiple concepts. Some scholars call it liabilities sharing. Others call it cost, or risk sharing. This study adopts the second conceptualization. It defines burden-sharing as the distribution of the costs and risks associated with the military and non-military operations of a coalition war. Although some alliance theorists offer a dichotomy between offensive and defensive alliances, the Afghanistan coalition shows the attributes of both types of alliances. This was evident in the coalition operations aimed at
capturing or killing Al Qaeda and Taliban militias, as well as reconstruction and stabilization operations in the areas, recovered from terrorist and insurgent control. Since the United States was the key leader of the coalition, this study examines a target country’s coalition contribution from U.S. perspective.

III. Coalition Burden-sharing in U.S. Foreign and Security Policy

Coalition burden-sharing occupies a central position in U.S. military and foreign policy planning processes. A glaring example is the U.S. Military’s Joint Vision 2020, which recognizes the importance of multinational coalition operations in the 21st century. It also emphasizes the need to achieve dominance in full spectrum of warfare, and close partnership with allies and coalition members with varying level of technological capability. Although the origin of wartime military coalitions can be traced back to the Greek city states, military alliances and coalitions dominated the history of international relations during the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars, and the post-War era. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of its archrival – the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the lone superpower in the international system. This ‘unipolar moment,’ has brought the United States an opportunity to conduct unilateral military operations. Nevertheless, most recent U.S. Presidents – from George H.W. Bush to Barack H. Obama – have demonstrated a preference to build or maintain military coalitions for the pursuit of foreign and security policy. This is evident in the U.S.-led coalitions during the First Iraq War (1990-1991), the NATO air campaign in Kosovo (1999), the War in Afghanistan (2001-present), and the Second Iraq War (2003-2010).

In all of the four cases listed above, the United States constructed the coalitions and made the disproportionately largest military contributions. Yet, allies and coalition partners also made significant military and non-military contributions to the wartime coalitions. For instance, during the First Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Egypt, and Syria made significant military contributions by deploying nearly 200,000 troops, who have joined the 697,000 U.S. troops to compel the Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait. The economic contribution of coalition partners was also quite significant. The top five economic contributors to the First Gulf War were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, Germany, and United Arab Emirates. They incurred most of the costs for the military operations against the Iraqi forces. During the Kosovo campaigns, the U.S. air and naval forces carried out most of the airstrikes. However, the French, German, and Italian military services also assumed significant burden-sharing role during the campaigns.

The United States continued its lead role in post-9/11 military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but encouraged a strong role for the coalition partners. By November 2010, 48 countries contributed to nearly 131,000 troops to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Of the 131,000 troops, the United States alone contributed 90,000 troops, which constitutes nearly 70% of foreign forces in Afghanistan. By contrast, the NATO Member States and non-NATO allies contributed the remaining 40,000 troops, which accounted for 30% of the foreign forces in Afghanistan. During the Second Gulf War coalition against Iraq, the U.S. forces dominated the

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war. At the peak of the foreign forces in Iraq War II in November-December 2005, there were an estimated 183,000 international troops in Iraq. Of the 183,000 foreign troops, the United States contributed nearly 160,000 troops. This accounted for 87% of all troops in the Iraq War. By contrast, coalition partners contributed only 20,000 of the peak time troops, which constitute only 13% of the total foreign troops in Iraq.\(^38\)

The measurement of coalition contribution by looking at the absolute number of troops can be misleading. This is due to the fact that, when compared with the absolute number of U.S. troops, coalition contribution by individual countries seems only a small fraction of the total number of foreign troops in Afghanistan. However, deployed troop as a percentage of total active forces could give an alternative measure, and perhaps a better picture of coalition burden-sharing behavior.\(^39\) For instance, by early 2010, the United Kingdom deployed nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. This was more than 5% of UK’s active military forces. During the same time the United States deployed 67,000 troops, which was only 4% of its active military forces. Two other coalition partners – Canada and the Netherlands – had also contributed nearly 4.5% of their active military forces, which was slightly higher than the U.S. military contribution, when compared with the Afghanistan deployment as a % of total active military forces in contributing nations.\(^40\) By the end of 2010, the active versus deployed force ratio changed significantly for the United States, while coalition troop ratio remained almost the similar. This was due to the fact that in 2010, the United States sent more than 30,000 troops in 2010, making the total U.S.

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troops to Afghanistan nearly 100,000.\textsuperscript{41} This was 6.7% of the total U.S. active force deployed in Afghanistan.

The foregoing discussion shows the importance of coalition operations in U.S. foreign policy, and the issue of troop commitment as a measure of coalition burden-sharing. This study shows that although troop commitment offers a simple and measurable indicator of burden-sharing, it does not capture the intricate challenges involved in a military coalition. I argue that a comprehensive analysis of coalition politics requires a much broader discussion on what the troops are asked to do, and not to do; and how they partner with the civilian actors in a conflict zone. The diplomatic and political contribution made by the heads of states is also important in understanding coalition burden-sharing. It is in this context, the next section discusses how we measure burden-sharing outcomes during the Afghanistan War.

\textbf{IV. Measuring Burden-Sharing Outcomes in Afghanistan}

This dissertation examines three types of burden-sharing during the Afghanistan War: (a) diplomatic contribution to the coalition war efforts; (b) participation in offensive military operations to combat terrorist and insurgent groups; and (c) defensive civilian and military operations to stabilize Afghanistan. Stabilization covers a wide range of activities. Two such activities are the most important: economic reconstruction and development projects through the provincial reconstruction teams; and rebuilding the Afghan military and police.

First, diplomatic contribution is measured by looking at the bilateral and multilateral meetings, and international conferences dealing with the War in Afghanistan. I examine whether a country pursues a proactive or a reactive diplomacy. The entrepreneurial role of key decision-makers

makers and the organizational capability of a country to host an international conference are two major indicators of proactive versus reactive diplomacy.

Second, offensive military contribution is measured by three major factors. These include troop deployment, area of operation, and participation in offensive military operations. First, I examine the absolute number of troops deployed by a country; and the deployed force as a percentage of a country’s active combat force. Next, I explore whether the deployed forces are located in the relatively peaceful areas, with low Al Qaeda and Taliban militia activities, or the restive areas with high militia activities. Finally, I investigate whether a coalition country leads or participates in combat operations, targeting the Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents. 42 These latter two issues—troop deployment in hostile areas, and participation or leadership in combat operations—are considered the most challenging tasks, involving the greatest risk-sharing in coalition operations. This is due to the fact that troop deployment in hostile areas and participation in combat operations expose the military personnel to the dangers of enemy actions, which may result in serious casualties and fatalities.

My discussion on coalition contributions in offensive military operations draws heavily from the literature on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 43 I offer a range of combat

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43 For a discussion on counterinsurgency in Pakistan, see: C. Christine Fair, Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004); Seth G. Jones, and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010). For a discussion on the ISAF counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, see Theo Farrell, and Stuart Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 665-683; Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa
performances a country may demonstrate in ground offensives. These include: weak or negligible, improved, and strong combat roles. A weak combat role is defined by the inability of security forces to defeat the terrorists and insurgents in a given military operation. By contrast, a strong combat role is defined by the ability of military forces to defeat the enemy, and to hold the areas controlled by the enemy. In between these two outcomes, improved combat role captures the learning and adaptation in military forces. It indicates that a country’s military forces has learned from its past mistakes, and makes significant progress in defeating the insurgents, and in holding (controlling) the areas. As shown in this dissertation, the British, German, and Pakistani forces went through a process of learning and adaptation, which resulted in improved combat performance in the years between 2008 and 2010.

Third, defensive reconstruction contribution is measured by looking at the civil-military initiatives to support the process of stabilization in Afghanistan. For the NATO ISAF troop contributing nations, reconstruction contribution includes the delivery of development aid, the training of Afghan national police, and the armed forces, and the construction of infrastructures, such as bridges, dams, schools, and hospitals. For Pakistan, a distinct measure of reconstruction contribution is applied. This includes the hosting of Afghan refugees, and the coordination of refugee repatriation processes, the provision of aid commitment to Afghanistan, and the level of bilateral trade with Afghanistan.


The preceding discussion shows that coalition burden-sharing can take three major forms: diplomatic, offensive military, and defensive civil-military reconstruction contributions. Did coalition partners, especially, in Afghanistan give an equal priority to each of these three types of burden-sharing? The answer is no.

Interestingly, coalition burden-sharing is often equated with sharing the military risks of combat operations. The United State, Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands shared this view, and since 2006, they shouldered most of the military burdens of offensive operations in eastern and southern Afghanistan. In contrast, Germany and Italy opposed the importance of combat operations, and insisted that defensive stabilization operations were as important as the offensive military operations. The effect of such German and Italian view was enormous. They adopted a risk-averse strategy, and resisted the U.S. and NATO pressures for redeployment in southern Afghanistan. As the War in Afghanistan progressed, it became apparent that the domestic political constraints, such as, the legal-constitutional provisions, and public opinion, had often influenced how a coalition country defined its Afghanistan mission.

How did the United States, as the coalition leader manage the competing demands of offensive and defensive operations in Afghanistan? The U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine,

released in 2006, suggests that combat and stabilization operations are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they should be understood as mutually reinforcing. Widely known as a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the 2006 doctrine suggests a three-staged clear-hold-build strategy for coalition operations. This means that the U.S. and coalition forces should first concentrate on clearing an area from insurgent control. This phase will be dominated by offensive operations. Next, they will assist the indigenous forces to hold the territory to extend the writ of the local government. In the final stage, coalition countries should invest their civil-military resources for the building the areas, recovered from insurgent control. In essence, this clear-hold-build strategy was tested in the Iraq War, and later became the mantra of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

In summary, this chapter accomplishes four tasks. First, it shows that the conceptual differences between alliances and coalitions. Second, it defines coalition burden-sharing as the distribution of the military and non-military costs and risks among ad hoc coalition partners fighting a joint war. Third, it discusses why coalition warfare remains a salient feature in U.S. foreign and security policy. Fourth, it shows that states’ burden-sharing behavior can be observed in three areas of cooperation: diplomatic contribution, participation in offensive military operations, and involvement in defensive reconstruction and stabilization operations.

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CHAPTER THREE

COALITION BURDEN-SHARING: A THEORETICAL MODEL

There is a vibrant debate in the alliance and coalition literature regarding the sources of a state’s coalition behavior, and the determinants of a state’s burden-sharing commitment. The neo-realist theory of international relations suggests a systemic level explanation, and argues that the distribution of power in the international system determines the coalition behavior of states.¹ Strategic culture theorists reject such systemic level explanation, and argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the similar international system, behave differently. Taking a domestic level analysis, with an emphasis on national strategic decision makers, their belief system, and organizational culture of the military, proponents of strategic culture suggest a ‘national style’ of coalition behavior.² This chapter shows that neither neo-realism nor strategic culture offers sufficient explanations for explaining and predicting the coalition behavior of states. Taking a middle ground between neo-realism and strategic culture, it proposes a neo-classical realist explanation of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through the domestic political, and culture-induced, processes to produce a unique burden-sharing behavior for states.³

³ For a general discussion on neo-classical realism, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), pp. 144-177. An excellent analysis of coalition burden-
Although the neo-classical realist theory of IR has gained some currency in recent years, it is yet to provide a satisfactory answer to the challenges of coalition politics in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. This chapter addresses this research gap by modifying the existing theoretical models of coalition burden-sharing, and by offering a better theoretical model. My theoretical model specifies three international systemic variables—alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action, and argues that any of these systemic factors will present an incentive to encourage a state to join and to support the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. After the systemic level incentives are controlled for, the domestic level intervening variables are likely to influence the decision process and the burden-sharing commitment of coalition members. I specify three domestic level variables and structural constraints – domestic political regime, public opinion, and national military capability. Like other neo-classical realists, I do not reject either the neo-realist or the strategic culturalist explanations; instead, my theoretical model refines them by offering a better causal process to predict and explain the complexities of coalition politics in Afghanistan. I argue that the discussion of coalition burden-sharing must start at the systemic level, but it should incorporate the domestic level cultural-political constraints, to analyze the variations in burden-sharing behavior of coalition members.

This chapter proceeds in several stages. The first section presents the neo-realist, and strategic cultural explanations of coalition burden-sharing. Next, it argues why a neo-classical

sharing from a neo-classical realist perspective can be found in Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, *Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2010). Although Baltrusaitis does not claim to be a neo-classical realist, his analysis clearly falls into the category of neo-classical realism, as he shows how domestic level factors act as a causal link between systemic incentives and unit level state behavior. Also see Patricia Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2010, pp. 111-136.

realist theory offers a better and richer explanation of coalition politics. The fourth section examines two existing models of burden-sharing, and discusses their limitations. The next section offers a better specified neo-classical realist model of burden-sharing. My theoretical model suggests that international systemic incentives are channeled through the domestic political-cultural processes to produce diverse coalition behaviors and outcomes for states. The sixth section discusses the research method, and case selection issues. It also discusses the limitations in this study, and the theoretical contribution of this dissertation.

I. Neo-Realism and Coalition Burden-Sharing

Neo-realism offers a systemic level theory of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. The central premises of neo-realism are the anarchic nature of the international system and the effect of the distribution of power in the international system in shaping states’ behavior. According to Kenneth Waltz, the most influential neo-realist theorist, “[A] theory of international politics … can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change.” For neo-realists, the interactions of states and the outcomes of such interactions are the dependent variable, whereas the nature of the international system—whether bipolar or multipolar—is the independent variable.

There are two major variants of neo-realism: defensive realism, and offensive realism. Defensive realists argue that states do not necessarily seek to maximize their relative power;
however, if threatened, states would pursue a policy of increasing their military power. The Waltzian balance of power theory is essentially a defensive neo-realist theory.\(^7\) In his seminal work, *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argues that states either rely on their own power, or join a formal alliance to ensure their security. The first refers to internal balancing, while the latter refers to external balancing. The formation of alliances and counter-alliances for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power are, Waltz argues, the defining feature of international politics.\(^8\) The problem with a defensive realist strategy is that other states might misconstrue the defensive motivation of states, and seek to maximize their power, and thus create an offense-defense a security dilemma.\(^9\)

Offensive realists offer an alternative view. They argue that great powers are always uncertain about how much power would make them secure. This uncertainty motivates them to ensure their security by achieving a hegemonic status now, and by preventing others from challenging their power later. The leading proponent of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer, argues that “A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively.”\(^10\) Stephen Brooks takes a similar position, and argues that in the anarchical international system, states always seek to “advance their power over other nations, taking military advantage of weaker states whenever they have the chance.”\(^11\)

The central difference between defensive and offensive realism is simple: the first argues that states seek to survive in an anarchical system; while the latter stresses that states, especially

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\(^7\) Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 118.

\(^8\) Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.


great powers, are not content with the existing status quo or survival; instead, the international system offers them an incentive to gain power at the expense of others.\textsuperscript{12} Despite such a difference, the most common point among the defensive and offensive realism is their emphasis on the systemic sources of state behavior. Unlike classical realists, such as, Hans Morgenthau, who believe that the struggle for power among nations originate from \textit{animus dominandi} – men’s lust for power to dominate others;\textsuperscript{13} defensive and offensive realists argue that the search for security is “forced by the anarchic structure of the international system.”\textsuperscript{14}

In analyzing the burden-sharing behavior of coalition countries, Bennett et al, Daniel Baltrusaitis, and David Auerswald discuss the effect of three systemic level explanatory variables, derived from the neo-realist theory of IR.\textsuperscript{15} These are alliance dependence, balance of power/balance of threat, and collective action.

\textit{Alliance Dependence}. Alliance dependence presents the first system-induced incentive or constraint to shape a state’s coalition decisions. A central feature on alliance politics is the dilemma of alliance dependence. In the context of an ad hoc military coalition, alliance dilemma presents a unique problem: if a state joins an ad hoc coalition, it might be entrapped for the duration of the conflict; if it does not join the coalition, it might be abandoned.\textsuperscript{16} Entrapment


\textsuperscript{14} Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” p. 151.


\textsuperscript{16} Glenn Snyder calls this “alliance security dilemma,” whereas Michael Mandelbaum calls this fear of entrapment and fear of abandonment. See: Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," \textit{World
refers to a situation of involving in an unwanted conflict – a scenario in which one becomes entangled in a conflict, in which alliance interest prevails over national interest. In contrast, abandonment implies a situation, in which an alliance partner may defect by withdrawing from the alliance, or by aligning with an adversary, or by failing to share the burden of alliance commitment.17

According to Glenn Snyder, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment create a security-autonomy trade-off. For instance, a possible remedy for abandonment would be increasing alliance commitment, which would enhance one’s security. However, increased commitment to an alliance might result in entrapment and possibly dragging onto an unnecessary war, reducing one’s autonomy of actions.18

Alliance dependence was a standard picture of the Cold War era international politics, dominated by the U.S.-led NATO and the USSR-led Warsaw Pact countries. This dissertation shows that although the Cold War ended, the basic principles of alliance dependence may still be applicable to formal and informal alliance members. For instance, Britain would find transatlantic alliance solidarity with NATO and the United States, rather than alliance dependence, guiding its foreign policy. Similarly, unified Germany would assert alliance commitment rather than alliance dependence as a defining feature of its transatlantic relations. Given the fact that both Britain and Germany are formal treaty-based NATO members, they would strongly share the idea of the indivisibility of alliance security, codified in Article 5 of the

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17 This dilemma of entrapment and abandonment is more precarious for formal treaty-based alliance members than ad hoc coalition members. This is due to the fact that unlike alliance members, coalition members do not have any pre-existing commitments to support the coalition leader. See: Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 180-182.

North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty holds that the security of a member state is the security for all. Or, an attack on one is an attack on all.\(^{19}\)

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the invocation of Article 5 made it obligatory for the NATO members to join the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism. For the United States, no such obligatory provision exists for encouraging non-NATO countries, such as Pakistan, to join the coalition. Instead, as this dissertation discusses, the United States adopted a quiet diplomatic approach to encourage Pakistan’s participation in the coalition.

What is the causal link between alliance dependence and a country’s incentive to participate in a coalition? The answer is straightforward: alliance leaders often use carrots and sticks to persuade a country to take a specific course of action. A state might be offered some incentives to join an ad hoc coalition. Conversely, it might be threatened with the withdrawal of certain benefits, if it does not join the coalition. Since the United States is the leader of the Afghanistan War coalition, the effect of alliance dependence can be measured by looking at the extent to which a state allies with the United States in fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

In the Afghanistan War context, alliance dependence can be measured by a state’s economic, military, and political ties to the United States, “or other assistance that would be hard to replace.”\(^{20}\) Thus, NATO members in the Western Europe are likely to align strongly with the United States due to their longstanding political and security ties, and their dependence on the

\(^{19}\) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty says, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm), accessed March 2, 2011.

\(^{20}\) Bennett et al., *Friends in Need*, p. 13.
U.S. nuclear umbrella.\textsuperscript{21} By contrast, non-NATO allies, such as Pakistan would be expected to contribute to U.S. and NATO forces’ operations in Afghanistan by providing basing access and logistics transshipment through the Pakistani territory.

Unlike the traditional NATO allies, Pakistan is likely to be dependent on U.S. economic and military assistance for its support in the fight against terrorism and insurgency. Although not a formal alliance member in NATO, but an informal ally in the Afghanistan War coalition, Pakistan is likely to face the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment: if it fails to provide strong support for U.S. counterterrorism strategy, the U.S. might align with India, and thus abandon Pakistan. In contrast, if Pakistan fears entrapment, it might offer the less controversial nonmilitary assistance, instead of providing direct military support to the war on terror.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Balance of Power and Balance of Threat.} Both classical and neo-realists argue that states join alliances and coalitions as a balancing strategy. Hans Morgenthau defines alliances as an instrument of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{23} Kenneth Waltz argues that in the anarchical international system, states pursue a self-help strategy, which encourages a balancing behavior by forming alliances against a powerful state. Both Morgenthau and Waltz see alliance formation as a strategy to maintain balance of power.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{22} C. Christin Fair, \textit{The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India} (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004).

\textsuperscript{23} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace}.

\textsuperscript{24} Although Waltz argues that states join alliances as a balancing strategy, he stresses that systemic pressures offer little incentives for states to cooperate with each other. This is due to two reasons: first, states are always concerned about relative gains from cooperation; and states are also concerned about being dependent on an ally, which would constrain their autonomy of actions.
Stephen Walt offers a refined notion of balancing. In his seminal work, *The Origins of Alliances*, Walt proposes the theory of balance of threat to better understand alliance behavior.\(^{25}\) Walt argues that states do not necessarily balance against a power; rather they balance against a threat. He introduces the differences between balancing and bandwagoning: Strong states are likely to join an alliance to balance against a threat, while weak states are likely to bandwagon with a dominant threat to ensure their security.\(^ {26}\)

In Walt’s view, the differences between balance of power and balance of threat are important. The first posits that states want to aggregate their national power by forming alliances to challenge a powerful state. By contrast, Walt argues that states align or re-align to defend against an existential or perceived threat. The mere possession or accumulation of material and military power does not make a state a rival state, or a target of balancing activity. Instead, several factors contribute to the rise of a threat: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions of a state.\(^ {27}\) Walt’s balance of threat theory explains why France and the United Kingdom aligned to balance against the threat of an expansionist and revisionist Germany during the First and Second World Wars.

Using Walt’s balance of threat theory, Patricia Weitsman has shown that variations in threat perceptions can explain states’ varying level of attitudes toward alliance formation and burden-sharing commitments. Weitsman argues that a state perceiving a strong threat will contribute more toward a coalition than a state perceiving less threat. In *Dangerous Alliances*, Weitsman writes, “Low levels of threat will produce certain alliance patterns, while moderate

\(^{25}\)Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.
and high level will yield different results. By examining the actual level of threat from one state to another we can forecast the types of alliances that will materialize.”

Weitsman argues that symmetric threats, what I call convergent threat perception, play an important role in analyzing alliance cohesion and burden-sharing behavior among coalition members. In a more recent article on alliance cohesion Weitsman writes, “Cohesion is fostered and maintained during wartime by clear objectives, threats that are perceived similarly by member states, and when attention is paid to cultural differences; even in the absence of a unified chain of command…” In brief, Weitsman provides a better specification of the balance of threat theory by saying that the level of threat posed by an enemy, and the level of threat convergence among coalition partners have strong effects on coalition burden-sharing.

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, there are fewer traditional military threats, which would qualify as existential threats to the security of the United States and its NATO allies. However, two principal security threats dominate the discourse of U.S. and transatlantic security: international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. For instance, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) notes that “the rise of non-state terrorist network is one of the defining characteristics of the last decade.” Regarding WMD proliferation, the QDR says, “Today, the United States faces a greater danger from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups, which seek

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to acquire and use WMD.” This is a standard view of international security shared by the United States, and its European allies.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the question is the extent to which the actual or perceived threats from terrorism, insurgency, and WMD proliferation influence the burden-sharing behavior of coalition countries in Afghanistan. It would be expected that convergent or symmetric threat perception—defined as the existence of similar types and levels of external threats—would encourage the United States and its coalition partners to pursue a strong burden-sharing behavior. The reverse would also be true with divergent threat perception resulting in weak military cooperation in Afghanistan.

**Collective Action.** In the analysis of coalition burden-sharing, the notion of collective action is an offshoot of the neo-realist theory of hegemonic stability. Prominent neo-realists Robert Gilpin and Stepen Krasner identify the effect of the structural distribution of power on international stability. They argue that the presence of a hegemon or a preponderant power in the international system can stabilize the system. Although Gilpin and Krasner popularized the notion of hegemony, the famous economic historian, Charles P. Kindleberger, offers the most

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articulate theory of hegemonic stability. In his magnum opus, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, Kindleberger provides three attributes of a hegemon: the control over vast economic resources, the ability to provide leadership in the international system, and the willingness to share the responsibility of maintaining the global order.\(^3^5\)

Neo-realists argue that the causal link between hegemony and stability is straightforward: the dominant country in the international system serve as a coordinator and enforcer of the rules of the international economic and political system. Great Britain assumed this role during the nineteenth century, and the United States acted as a hegemon during the post-war era. Under British and U.S. hegemonic systems, the international economy was relatively stable, with the expansion of economic openness, the rise of multinational corporations, and the creation of international trading regimes. Neorealists claim, the absence of hegemony had a negative effect on the international economic and political system. During the inter-war period, the absence of a hegemonic state gave rise to protectionist trade policy, and a massive economic depression.\(^3^6\)

The relative decline of U.S. economy in the 1960s and 1970s resulted into the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system and the introduction of the flexible exchange rate system, which raised concerns about the stability of the world economy.\(^3^7\)

Drawing on the neo-realist assumption of hegemony, neo-liberal internationalists advance the collective action theory. In international security, collective action refers to group motivation for the pursuit of a common security goal, which is defined as a public good. The public good is non-excludable, which means that once the good is provided by joint action, no state can be


refrained from enjoying the benefit of it.\textsuperscript{38} The theory posits that in dealing with international security threats such as transnational terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the dominant power and a few interested states are likely to make disproportionately larger contribution, while small states will be free-rider. The leading collective action theorist Mancur Olson calls this free riding behavior a “tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small.”\textsuperscript{39} Bruno Frey agrees with Mancur Olson, and writes that, “A world without terrorism is a public good from which all countries can benefit. But each country has an incentive to free ride: the most favorable policy for each country is to let the others carry the costs of fighting terrorism and come to its own arrangement with the terrorists.”\textsuperscript{40}

Another major collective action theorist, Russell Hardin, suggests that several factors affect the pursuit of a public good. These are the size of a small interested group; the group’s perceived benefit from the desired public good; and non-monetary nature of the good. First, a small group of countries (defined as the K-group) interested in pursuing the public good may be more efficient in promoting transparency, and reducing the coordination problems among the group members.\textsuperscript{41} As the size of the small interest group pursuing the public good increases, there will be increasing lack of transparency, and a higher degree of coordination problems. The free-riding possibility may also amplify with the increasing size of the K-group. This is due to the fact that additional members may think that they can enjoy the public good without making any contribution to the pursuit of it. Second, some group members may value the good higher


\textsuperscript{41} Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” p. 636.
than others and willing to pay more to see it provided. This may create an incentive for others within the group to ride free. Third, if the public good under question cannot be monetized, it may be hard to get the group members motivated for the pursuit of the good.

In analyzing coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan, a key question is how coalition members view the provision of a public good and a private good. A public good is non-excludable, whereas a private good is excludable. The first is accessible to all members of a community, whereas the second is available to only select members of a community. For most of the NATO countries involved in the Afghanistan War, the public good is securing the world from the threats of Al Qaeda’s transnational terrorist network; and the private good is establishing NATO as a relevant security alliance in the post-9/11 era, or establishing a strong relationship with the United States to reap the benefits of its economic and military aid. Consistent with the collective action theory’s assumptions, we would expect that the pursuit of public and private goods would strongly determine whether a coalition member would tend to ride free or make important contributions to support the coalition, regardless of a hegemonic state forming and leading the coalition.

In summary, neo-realisters argue that international systemic constraints and incentives strongly determine the burden-sharing behavior of states. Three systemic level constraints and

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42 For a discussion on counterterrorism as a public good, see Frey, Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot, pp. 57-58. This discussion is heavily game-theoretic.


incentives are pertinent here: alliance dependence, balance of power or threat, and the free-riding motivation of a collective action effort. The foregoing discussion shows that the membership in a formal alliance, or the offensive power and intention of an enemy would strongly encourage a state to join a coalition, and to support the unity of the coalition by making a strong burden-sharing contribution. In contrast, the presence of a hegemonic state or a strong coalition leader may encourage most of the coalition members, or non-hegemonic states, to ride free, unless the pursuit of public and private goods presents an incentive to share the military and non-military risks of a coalition war.

There are two major shortcomings of the neo-realist explanations of coalition politics. First, they cannot explain why countries under a particular systemic constraint behave differently. Second, they completely ignore the domestic level political and cultural constraints, through which systemic incentives and pressures are filtered to shape states’ decisions on burden-sharing. It is in this context, we now turn to the strategic culture theory, which offers a domestic level explanation of coalition burden-sharing.

II. Strategic Culture and Coalition Burden-Sharing

In contrast to the systemic theory of neo-realism, strategic culture offers a domestic level theory of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. On coalition burden-sharing, the strategic culture theorists argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the similar systemic constraints and incentives, behave differently to a military coalition. Explaining the diverse attitudes of states to a military coalition requires, strategic culture experts suggest, a cultural understanding of war. It also requires an appreciation of how the cognitive beliefs and historical learning
influence the strategic decision-making process of a given country. While the neo-realists are interested in drawing law-like generalizations to analyze international politics, strategic culture theorists emphasize on the ‘cultural context’ and the ‘national styles’ of strategy adopted by states.

According to Colin Gray, one of the leading proponents of strategic culture, “[C]ulture shapes the process of strategy-making and influences the execution of strategy, no matter how close actual choice may be to some abstract or idealized cultural preference.” He also notes that “Strategic culture matters deeply for modern strategy, because the culture of the strategic players, individuals, and organizations influences strategic behavior [of states].” Christopher Coker offers a similar view. Writing in the context of the War in Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting there, Coker notes that each state has a distinct military culture, which may produce a national style of coalition warfighting. Hence, the challenge for ISAF is to coordinate the military policies of member states “to mitigate the friction between the different national strategic cultures.” Others note that cultural differences have not only shaped the way the ISAF member states fought the War in Afghanistan, such differences have also shaped the conflict between the United States and the Al Qaeda in the war on terrorism. Mikkel Ramsussen sums up the differences as a clash between two distinct ‘warfare practices:’ the first involves, “the high-tech warfare of the United States,” and the

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48 Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place,” 16.
second involves “the network based terrorism of al-Qaida.”

Ramsussen details the discourse of technology-intensive military transformation, and its effect on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

Theo Farrell notes that military transformation, what he calls ‘technological fetishism,’ explains only a part of U.S. strategic culture. A broader understanding of U.S. strategic culture should also include two aspects of U.S. war practices: casualty aversion and illegal pragmatism. Farrell argues that after the Vietnam and Somalia debacles, during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras respectively, the U.S. policymakers have been keen on the effect of battlefield casualty on public support for a military mission. This has resulted into a risk aversion strategy, in which the United States avoids the deployment of ground troops for humanitarian peace keeping purposes. In Farrell’s analysis, the third component of U.S. strategic culture focuses on legal pragmatism. This was revealed in the way the Bush administration justified the use of force in Iraq in its pre-emptive military doctrine. Farrell argues that there is a sharp difference between pre-emptive and preventive use of force. In essence, the Bush administration twisted the interpretation of international law to justify its military intervention in Iraq in 2003.

There is a vibrant debate in the strategic culture literature regarding the methodological approach suitable for analyzing international politics. On one spectrum of the debate epistemologists define strategic culture as a ‘context,’ which helps an analyst to understand and explain the strategic behavior of states. Colin Gray is the most prominent advocate of this ‘culture as

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52 According to Farrell, pre-emptive use of force can be used to counter an imminent threat; and such force use is permissible under international law. However, preventive use of force addresses an emerging threat. Since preventive use of force may constitute an act of aggression, it is strongly prohibited in international law. See Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” pp. 9-10.
context’ approach. Gray argues that “Strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behavior and itself as a constituent of that behavior.” On the other spectrum of the debate, positivists define strategic culture as a ‘cause’ to explain the strategic behavior of states. For positivists, culture and behavior are separated, and the former causes the latter. Alanstair Ian Johnston is the leading proponent of this positivist approach. Unlike the epistemologists, who are interested in the debate on what constitutes actor and behavior, and how they are intertwined; the positivists are interested in the empirical study of the causal effect of strategic culture on state’s attitudes and behavior.

This study sides with the positivist school of strategic culture, although it does not consider strategic culture as an independent variable. Instead, it treats strategic culture-induced variables and constraints as intervening factors through which systemic incentives and constraints are transmitted to shape the strategic decision of states, and the outcomes of their interactions. An important task in analyzing the effect of strategic culture on strategic behavior is to specify the key intervening variables, and their role as the transmission belt between international systemic incentives and state behavior.

In analyzing coalition burden-sharing, at least three domestic level intervening variables can be deductively drawn from the theory (or multiple conceptions) of strategic culture. These are: domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability. These three (intervening) variables fit neatly with Colin Gray’s emphasis on “strategic players, individuals, and organizations” as the key sources of strategic culture. Following Gray’s analysis, one could

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54 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” p. 50.
55 Ibid, p. 56; Gray further develops his conceptualization of strategic culture in a monograph titled *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy*, which argues that a comprehensive analysis of strategic culture should take into account of (a) strategic culture; (b) public culture; and (c) military (organizational) culture. See Colin Gray,
argue that the chief executives in the domestic political regime are the key strategic players; and public opinion is nothing but the collective attitudes of individuals; while military services constitute a crucial component of state level bureaucratic organizations involved in the use of force for foreign policy purposes. Each of these intervening variables, and the possible interactions among them, is likely to have a discernible effect on a state’s coalition behavior in Afghanistan.

**Domestic Political Regime.** Domestic political regime acts as the first intervening variable in shaping a state’s coalition decisions. There is a rich body of domestic politics literature, which shows that key decisions regarding a state’s burden-sharing behavior are taken by the chief executive of an incumbent government. Hence, the strength of a chief executive’s decision-making power vis-à-vis other organs of the government will play a decisive role in shaping a state’s coalition contribution. This means that the legislative or judicial oversight may act as a constraining factor in shaping a chief executive’s decision power on foreign policy issues, including participation in a military coalition.
Most domestic political regime theories examine the distribution of power among various political institutions such as the chief government executive and the legislature. In an analysis of states’ crisis time bargaining behavior, Susan Peterson defines executive strength as the relative autonomy of the office of chief executive from legislative pressures.\textsuperscript{59} Auerswald defines executive strength in relation to the entities that have the “power to terminate office tenure.”\textsuperscript{60} Two such entities are more relevant: the mass public and the legislature. In Auerswald’s analysis, the support of the general voters as well as the members of the legislative assembly is crucial for a president, prime minister, or premier in a liberal democratic country. As discussed below, Sarah Kreps discards the importance of public opinion, and shows that elite consensus among the parliamentary parties matter more than public opinion.\textsuperscript{61}

Auerswald’s typology of executive strength is useful in predicting coalition burden-sharing. He suggests three types of executive strength—strong, weak, and medium. Each type of chief executive is likely to pursue a distinct burden-sharing policy toward a military coalition. First, a strong chief executive with less legislative oversight and strong elite consensus is likely to favor the use of force, if such a decision serves the national interests, or if such a decision is taken to please the domestic constituents. Second, a weak chief executive with varying degree of legislative control and elite disagreement will be constrained to take a bold decision on the use of force, and avoid participating in the coalition for fear of losing the election. Third, a medium executive will craft a policy that balances between the competing demands from legislature, elite consensus, and public opinion.

\textsuperscript{59} Peterson, \textit{Crisis Bargaining and the State}.
\textsuperscript{60} Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” pp. 641.
The effect of executive strength on coalition burden-sharing should be broadly understood by how the foreign policy elites define a state’s national interests, and the costs-benefits of a burden-sharing decision in the pursuit of a national interest. This means that the mere existence of a strong executive in a U.S. allied country would not necessarily imply that the chief executive will take a decision to deploy military forces for the prosecution of U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Instead, the opposite could happen, where a strong executive firmly opposes the idea of use of force. As Nora Bensahel writes, this might happen when “domestic leaders face strong incentives to maintain fully autonomous control of their armed forces, since military operations place the lives of their citizens at stake.”

In assessing the effect of domestic political regime on states’ burden-sharing behavior in the Afghan War coalition, a pertinent question is whether elite fragmentation and legislative pressures constrained the executive autonomy of decisions. Once the chief executive’s decision power is determined, the next task is to determine how an incumbent government weights between the international expectations and domestic public opinion in pursuing its coalition policy.

Public Opinion. Public opinion may act as a second domestic level constraint on coalition behavior of states. In one of the most influential writings on public opinion, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that “Policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against an overwhelming public consensus.” He identifies two broad approaches to public opinion: the bottom-up approach and the top-down approach. The bottom-up approach suggests that public

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opinion influences foreign and security policy, whereas the top-bottom approach suggests powerful elites influence public opinion. 64 Risse-Kappen argues that neither approaches offer sufficient explanations for analyzing the divergent effects of public opinion in comparable liberal democratic states. Risse-Kappen’s theory posits that public opinion determines foreign and security policy in liberal democracies in an indirect way, by influencing the “coalition building processes among elite groups.” 65

What is the effect of public opinion on coalition warfare? There are at least two competing hypotheses. The first suggests that the mass publics are sensitive to battlefield incidents, especially troop casualties. They want to bring the troops home, and most governments are likely to comply with such public demands. 66 The second hypothesis posits that if the foreign policy elites, represented by the principal policymakers, as well as the senior politicians from major parliamentary parties, reach a consensus on a foreign policy issue, such elite consensus will encourage a government to bypass public opinion and take a decision in the name of greater national interests. The latter is essentially a realist argument, which ignores public views on foreign policies. The central premise of bypassing or dismissing public opinion is simple: the mass publics are thought to lack sufficient knowledge of an impending or ongoing crisis. 67

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65 Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign policy in Liberal Democracies,” p. 510


Recent studies of public opinion and alliance cohesion find support for the realist theory. Kreps’ study shows that declining public support had not effect in shaping the coalition contribution of four major NATO countries—Canada, France, Germany, and Italy—in Afghanistan. Douglas Kriner and Graham Wilson reach a similar conclusion in their study of British contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Kriner and Wilson argue that public opinion has no measurable effect in determining British foreign and security policy regarding the use of force in Afghanistan. Why do some governments ignore public opinion? Kreps argues that elite consensus on alliance solidarity and the pursuit of public good may be too strong to ignore the effect of public opinion.

The studies by Kreps, Kriner and Wilson specify public opinion by looking at two major issues: domestic public opinion on the use of force, and its unintended consequence on civilian lives and properties; and public sensitivity toward troop casualties. Since NATO has declared 2014 as the conditional deadline for the withdrawal of ISAF troops, public opinion data on several issues are also important. These include: opinion data on immediate troop withdrawal; combat operations; and economic reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Military Capability. Military coalitions are often perceived as a unique mechanism to aggregate the national power of coalition members. This capability aggregation hypothesis dominates the alliance and coalition literature. Walt notes that “States seek to counter threats by


69 Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” pp. 201-203. Kreps also discusses how elite consensus on the costs of defection has influenced the decision making processes in major NATO countries.
adding the power of another state to their own.”70 Liska presents two alternate meanings of capability aggregation: an affirmative and a negative meaning. He notes that, “Put affirmatively, states enter into alliances with one another in order to supplement each other’s capability. Put negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one’s independence.”71 Glenn Snyder offers a similar perspective by equating alignment with capability aggregation: “Alignments are akin to structure, however, since they have to do with how resources and capabilities are aggregated in the system.”72

In the context of alliance politics and coalition burden-sharing, the term capability may have multiple meanings. These include tangible and intangible resources, such as natural resources, military power, diplomatic skills, topography, and national morale etc. To what extent does such a broad conception of capability fit the need of a peacetime alliance entering a war, or a military coalition formed to fight an adversary?

Snyder addresses this question by offering a better specification of military capability. He notes that most scholars define capability as “the amount of military forces and resources transformable into military forces that are controlled by individual states.”73 He argues that capability is “what a state can accomplish with its military forces against particular other states.”74 This latter conceptualization of capability stresses that aggregation of resources does not necessarily imply capability. Instead, it is “a potential result of using forces rather than an inventory of forces and resources. It denotes the potential outcome of a military interaction and thus forms an explicit link between system structure and interaction between units.”75

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72 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 22.
73 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 28
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
How do we measure military capability for coalition purposes? Following NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative, this dissertation suggests that efficient burden-sharing involves several attributes of a country’s military forces and assets, such as deployability, interoperability, and suitability.76 First, deployability is defined as the speed at which a country is able to deploy the requisite military forces, such as conventional and Special Forces, suitable for the war goals. Second, interoperability refers to the ability of military forces and equipments to be used for joint operations. Third, suitability refers to the availability of military troops and assets for defensive and offensive operations.

For strategic culture theorists, the effect of military capability should be understood in the context of a country’s military culture. There are two major approaches to the study of military culture: one looks at the national level, the other at the organizational level. The national level strategic culture looks into effect of a country’s military culture on its strategic decision process.77 By contrast, the organizational level military culture looks into the effect of various military services, such as the air force, army, marine, and navy, on the strategic decisions on use

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76 According to NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), alliance military capability has five attributes: (a) mobility and deployability; (b) sustainability; (c) effective engagement; (d) survivability; and (e) interoperable communications. My definition of coalition capability combines sustainability, effective engagement, and survivability to refer to suitability. For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Handbook, (NATO Publications, October 8, 2002), chapter 2. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm, accessed January 3, 2011.

of force. The organizational culture theorists also focus on the comparative study of military doctrines and use of force practices in analyzing the strategic behavior of states.

The foregoing discussion suggests that a broad conceptualization of military capability has little utility in understanding and explaining coalition politics. It presents two distinct theory-driven conceptions of military capability: a realist conception of capability, which focuses on deployability, suitability, and interoperability; and a strategic cultural understanding of capability, which stresses on the national and organizational level military cultures. This study combines the insights from these multiple conceptions of capability to account for the coalition behavior of states. Such a broad definition of capability sacrifices parsimony to offer a better and richer explanation of domestic level national military capability. Table 3.1 summarizes the six explanatory variables discussed above.

In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests a strategic cultural explanation of coalition burden-sharing. It deductively draws three domestic level variables – political regime, public opinion, and national military capability – which influence the coalition behavior of states. For strategic culture theorists, an analysis of states’ coalition behavior starts at the domestic level. There are two major shortcomings with such cultural explanation of coalition politics. First, it ignores the influence of systemic incentives and constraints, which creates the demand for joining and supporting a coalition. Second, it fails to show the role of domestic

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political and cultural factors as a transmission belt through which the systemic incentives are channeled.

**Table 3.1 Summary of Systemic and Domestic Level Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Key Concepts</th>
<th>Leading Proponent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alliance Dependence</td>
<td>• Economic, political, and military ties to the United States and NATO</td>
<td>Mandelbaum (1981); Snyder (1984)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Fear of entrapment versus fear of abandonment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Power/Balance of Threat</td>
<td>• A hostile actor’s aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions</td>
<td>Walt (1987), Waltz (1979), Weitsman (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>• Pursuit of collective good; small group with shared interests; and free-riding behavior of minor participants</td>
<td>Hardin (1993), Olson (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Level Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Political Regime</td>
<td>• Chief executive’s decision power vis-à-vis legislature, elites, and public opinion</td>
<td>Auerswald (2004), Paterson (1996); Kreps (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>• Public attitudes toward the use of force; casualty sensitivity, troop withdrawal, combat role of deployed forces; non-combat stabilization role of deployed forces</td>
<td>Kreps (2010), Kirner and Wilson (2010); Risse-Kappen (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capability</td>
<td>• The actual inventory as well as the power projection ability; deployability, suitability, and interoperability of military forces and assets; Military culture, organization culture</td>
<td>Walt (1987), Snyder (1984), NATO (undated); Farrell (2005); Legro (1995)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study argues that neither neo-realism nor strategic culture theory can sufficiently explain the coalition behavior of states. The problem with neo-realism, as discussed before, is it infers a direct causal connection between systemic changes and unit level behaviors. In doing so,
neo-realism ignores the role of domestic level constraints in deflecting the system-induced pressures and constraints. Such domestic level constraints often produce diverse foreign policy behaviors under similar systemic incentives, which cannot be explained by neo-realism. Strategic culture has its own problem. It ignores the existing distribution of power in the international system as a given constraint, and focuses, instead, on the cognitive, historical, and domestic level factors shaping the strategic behavior of states. A neo-classical theory of coalition politics can overcome these imitations by providing a better theory of foreign policy. Neo-classical realism argues that international systemic incentives and pressure are filtered through the domestic political processes to shape the foreign policy behavior of states. The basic premises of neo-classical realism and its utility in analyzing coalition burden-sharing are discussed below.

III. Neo-Classical Realism and Coalition Burden-Sharing

Neo-classical realism offers a middle ground between neo-realism and strategic culture theories. Drawing on the insights from both theories, it argues that foreign policy analysis must involve an interaction between international systemic incentives and domestic political processes. This would offer “a much richer explanatory account of why states choose certain foreign policies over others.” Like neo-realists and strategic culture theorists, neo-classical realists are interested in explaining the foreign policy of great powers. They concur with the neo-realists that international systemic incentives and the relative distribution of power should be the starting

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81 Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?” p. 524.
point for analyzing international politics. However, the central contention is that strategic culture and domestic politics act as an intervening variable in determining what specific foreign policy actions a state will pursue in international politics. Neo-classical realists reject the primacy of cultural factors in determining state behavior. As Colin Dueck argues, “Culture is best understood as a supplement to and not a substitute for, realist theories of strategic choice.”

Dueck also notes that “when political-military cultures come under intense international pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end.”

Aaron L. Friedberg, a leading neo-classical realist, notes that “Structural considerations provide a useful point from which to begin analysis of international politics rather than a place at which to end it. Even if one acknowledges that structures exist... there is still the question of how statesmen grasp their contours from the inside, so to speak.” Gideon Rose agrees with Friedberg, and contends that a neo-classical realist theory of foreign policy examines how systemic pressures are filtered through the intervening variables at the unit level.

In analyzing the politics of coalition burden-sharing, Bennett et al, and Daniel Baltrusaitis discuss the effect of three systemic level independent variables, such as alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action. Although they never claim to be neo-classical realists, their study on the First and Second Iraq Wars (1990-1991, and 2003-2010) show how systemic incentives interact with the cognitive and domestic level variables--historical learning, public

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82 According to Gideon Rose, neo-classical realists reject “the notion of a smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt” through which international systemic incentives and constraints are transmitted to determine unit-level behavior. See Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 158.

83 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 20.


86 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 146.
opinion, and domestic political regime—to determine the burden-sharing behavior and outcomes of states. This is essentially a neo-classical realist theory of burden-sharing, which concludes that international systemic pressures are channeled through the domestic political processes to determine the coalition behavior of states.

Neo-classical realists agree with the neo-realists on one principal issue, that an analysis of the strategic behavior of states must begin at the systemic level. The central difference between the two theories (neo-realism versus neo-classical realism) concerns the causal pathways in which the international systemic incentives and constraints are transmitted. Neo-realists assume a direct causal link between the distribution of power at the international system, and the unit-level (state) behavior. Neo-classical realists reject such direct causality, and argue that system-induced incentives and constraints are transmitted indirectly through the domestic level strategic cultural factors. Although they incorporate the strategic cultural issues into the analysis of foreign policy behavior, neo-classical realists consider culture-induced variables as epiphenomenal, or only of secondary importance. It is in this context, we need to examine how neo-classical realists specify the intervening variables, and the extent to which such specification imitate the strategic culture-specific variables.

Neo-classical realists identify several intervening variables to connect the dots between systemic incentives and unit level behaviors. The most common intervening variables are domestic political regime, elite perception, elite consensus, social cohesion or fragmentation, and the mobilization power of the state. In their analysis of coalition burden-sharing during the U.S.-led Gulf War, Bennett et al argues that “leaders of executive branches should be more likely than

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87 Bennett et al., *Friends in Need*; Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics.
88 The most notable neo-classical realists are Thomas Christensen, Colin Dueck, Aaron Friedberg, Melvyn Leffler, Randall Schweller, William Wohlfforth, and Fareed Zakaria.
other domestic actors to want to participate in a coalition, if only because they are directly exposed to pressures from other coalition members, especially the United States.”

In *Coalition Politics and the Iraq War*, Baltrusaitis takes a similar approach, and specifies domestic political regime as the relative autonomy of foreign policy executives from legislative, public, and elite pressures. Although the chief executive’s decision power vis-à-vis other administrative organs of a government, and the civil society have drawn considerable attention among the contemporary coalition theorists, analysts of grand strategy and balance of power have reminded that elite perception will significantly influence the executive authority.

In *Reluctant Crusaders*, Dueck shows how the elite belief systems on liberal internationalism and limited liabilities in international commitments have structured the U.S. grand strategy. Melvyn Leffler specifies elite belief system as elite perception drawn from the national leaders’ historical experience. In *A Preponderance of Power*, Leffler argues that during the post-war era the United States sought to create a liberal trade regime, because of its leaders’ experience with the fragile free trade system and the rise of totalitarian states in the pre-WWII era. Following Leffler’s analysis, William Wohlforth argues that the material distribution of power cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the superpower tensions during the Cold War era. Instead, Wohlforth contends, one has to understand the perception of U.S. and Soviet policymakers to fully grasp superpower behavior during the Cold War. Wohlforth writes, “rapid shifts in behavior may be related to perceived shifts in the distribution of power which are

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89 Bennett et al, *Friends in Need*, p. 17.
not captured by typical measures of capabilities.”

Coalition theorist Patricia Weitsman also emphasizes the role of perceived threat, in contrast to actual threat, in shaping a country’s alliance and coalition behavior.

Like Dueck, Leffler and Wohlforth, Randall Schweller agrees on the role of elite perception, and adds that government or regime security, social cohesion, and elite cohesion, also act as important intervening variables in shaping the strategic behavior of states. In Unanswered Threats, Schweller shows why states do not always balance against a dangerous threat, and imprudently choose to bandwagon or underbalance against the accumulating power of an opponent. Schweller’s findings contradict the defensive neo-realist theory of balance of power, which assumes that states are coherent actors, which always seek to balance against the dangerous threats to survive as autonomous entities.

One common theme that runs across the strategic culture and neo-classical realists is the inclusion of mass public opinion in foreign policy analysis. Theo Farrell’s analysis of U.S. strategic culture stresses that public sensitivity to troop casualty has strongly influenced U.S. strategy of humanitarian military interventions. This is essentially a bottom up approach to public opinion, which claims that mass public attitude (mass public opinion as understood by the

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94 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, pp. 3-4.
95 Schweller, Unanswered Threats.
96 Schweller draws his conclusions from the empirical studies of five cases, Anglo-French relations during the interwar period, French behavior from 1877 to 1913, and the War of Triple Alliance, involving Paraguay on one side, and Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay on the other. See Schweller, Unanswered Threats. Also see, Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
97 Farrell writes, [U.S. politicians] pulled the plug on the [Somalia] operation in anticipation of an adverse public reaction...politicians and senior military officers most keenly feel this sensitivity to casualties, having experienced the political fallout from Vietnam. ...casualty aversion is all too evident in U.S. strategic culture, from the emphasis on “Full Dimensional Protection” in joint military doctrine, to the political refusal to deploy U.S. ground troops in risky humanitarian interventions (as in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999). See Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Power,” p. 9.
elites) influences the government actions. Thomas Christensen has also discussed the importance of public opinion, albeit with a top-down approach, advanced by neo-classical realists. In his study on the Sino-Amrican conflict, Christensen explains the importance of the ability of U.S. and Chinese policymakers to mobilize mass public support behind their grand strategies. In *Useful Adversaries*, Christensen writes that the political mobilizational power of an incumbent government acts as a “key intervening variable between international challenges facing the nation and the strategies adopted by the state to meet those challenges.”

Neo-classical realists also offer a distinct conceptualization of military power and state power. Unlike neo-realists and strategic culturalists, who emphasize on the material and cultural definitions of power, neo-classical realists are interested in the political capacity of a state to mobilize its power for national security purposes. In his analysis of the growth of America’s world power, Fareed Zakaria explains the importance of state power, rather than military capability, in foreign policy. Zakaria defines state power as “the portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends.” Zakaria’s conception of state power should be read in conjunction with Christensen’s mobilizational power to understand how the domestic level decision makers overcome the political constraints to convert the material capability into deployable and usable capability in the pursuit of national security interests.

The foregoing discussion suggests that neo-classical realism offers a better explanation for analyzing the foreign policy processes, including the coalition burden-sharing decisions of

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states. It shows that by combining the theoretical insights from neo-realism and strategic culture, neo-classical realism examines how international systemic incentives are channeled through the domestic and culture-induced political processes to determine the behavior of states. In closer inspection, the key innovation in the neo-classical realist theory is the transmission belt between international system, and unit-level behaviors. This transmission belt is composed of various domestic level intervening variables, and the causal linkages between them in shaping the foreign policy choices of states. What are the constituents of the transmission belt, and how do they connect the systemic and domestic level variables to determine the coalition behavior of states? Recent studies on coalition warfare have used theoretical models to answer this question. This leads us to an examination of the existing theoretical models, and their shortcomings, which will create a context for offering a better theoretical model of burden-sharing.

IV. Integrated Models of Coalition Burden-Sharing: The Bennett et al. and Auerswald Models

There are two major theoretical models in the study of coalition burden-sharing. These are (a) Bennett et al Model;100 and (b) the David Auerswald Model.101 In their analysis of the 1990-1991 Gulf War (referred to as the First Iraq War), Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, present a decision making model to analyze coalition contribution based on the perception of public good.102 The Bennett et al. model uses three systemic variables – collective action, balance of threat, and alliance dependence; and two domestic level variables – historical learning, and domestic institutions and politics. Their model presents three coalition contribution

100 Bennett et al., Friends in Need.
102 Since coalition burden-sharing presents a unique set of problems, which are different from the traditional foreign policy issues, such as, trade or arms negotiations, the extant literature on foreign policy analysis has little utility, and hence ignored here.
outcomes: (a) no contribution; (b) contribution with public or state support; (b) no contribution in area(s) with public or state support.\textsuperscript{103} In contrast to the classical alliance theories, Bennett et al define their model as a typological theory, which identifies four types of coalition behavior: (a) states ride free; (b) states keep distance; (c) states reveal their preferences and pay up; and (d) states are entrapped and forced to pay anyway.\textsuperscript{104}

The Bennett et al. model finds empirical support for a wide range of case studies, which are divided into four major groups: major military contributors, major financial contributors, major political contributors, and a non-contributor. The major military contributors examined in the Bennett et al. study are: the United States, Britain, Egypt, and France. The major financial contributors are Japan and Germany. The leading political contributors are Turkey, Syria, former Soviet Union, and the Middle Powers – Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries. Iran was the only non-contributor in the Bennett et al. study.

The principal contribution of the Bennett et al. Model is that it addresses a gap in the existing theories of coalition warfare by providing a better conceptualization of the notion of ‘burden-sharing.’ It does so by specifying the conditions under which states are likely to commit troops, financial aid, and diplomatic support for the execution of a collective action. A more recent study by Daniel Baltrusaitis, a disciple of Andrew Bennett, tests the utility of the Bennett et al. model in analyzing coalition burden-sharing in the Second Iraq War.\textsuperscript{105} Baltrusaitis refines the Bennett et al. model by better specifying the ‘domestic institutions and politics’ variable using Susan Peterson’s typology of executive-legislative relations.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{103} Bennett et al., \textit{Friends in Need}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{104} Bennett et al., \textit{Friends in Need}, pp. 22-24.


\textsuperscript{106} Peterson, \textit{Crisis Bargaining and the State}. 68
politics in Iraq, Baltrusaitis finds empirical support by analyzing the coalition contributions of South Korea, Germany, and Turkey.

Using a theoretical framework, similar to the Bennett et al. model, David Auerswald develops an integrated decision making model to analyze the coalition behavior in NATO’s Kosovo air campaign (1999)—*Operation Allied Force*. Auerswald’s decision model uses two international level variables—collective action and balance of threat; and two domestic level variables—public opinion, and government structure. Auerswald excludes the alliance dependence variable from the model, by arguing that it is not applicable in the Kosovo case for one principal reason: “Abandonment [one of the principal assumptions of alliance dependence hypothesis] was not seen as a viable U.S. option.”

Instead, the Clinton administration worked toward the enlargement of NATO and the process of re-defining NATO’s strategic concept in the post-cold war era. The central goal of the Clinton administration was to allow for out-of-area operations, which indicated a strong NATO policy of the United States.

**Limits in the Existing Theoretical Models.** There are several caveats in the existing models of burden-sharing. The Bennett et al. model on coalition burden-sharing in the First Iraq War (1990-1991) suffers from three major problems: two related to the explanatory (also defined as independent) variables and one dependent variable. First, it includes the ‘strategic belief and historical learning’ as an independent variable at the domestic level, but does not specify whose beliefs and learning matter more: foreign policy elites or the chief executives? Second, although the decision framework in the Bennett et al. model includes the ‘public opinion’ bloc, their study does not offer any systematic analysis of the public opinion data and the effect of public attitudes.
on coalition burden-sharing. Third, their model presents a broader definition of ‘burden-sharing’ which includes a wide variety of military and non-military contributions, such as troop deployment, economic assistance, and diplomatic cooperation etc. Their description of the military contribution do not offer any analysis of the major combat and non-combat operations, nor do they offer any analysis of whether the addition of new members had any discernible effects on the coalition operations.

The Auerswald study has several limitations, as well. First, the Auerswald model has a narrow scope. It only applies to the “wars of choice,” a conflict defined by the assumption that “no group member’s survival is threatened.” This limits the generalizability of the model by constraining its ability to analyze the “wars of necessity,” in which the existential security or core national interests are at risk. For instance, one cannot utilize the Auerswald model to explain Saudi Arabia’s participation in the First Iraq War (1990-1991), in which the U.S.-led multinational forces fought against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. This is due to the fact that Iraq’s forceful annexation of Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent threatening activity in the Gulf region jeopardized Saudi interests in the region, and thus making Saudi participation in the War a necessity.

The second limitation with the Auerswald model is its exclusion of the question of why non-alliance members may join a coalition. Instead, it solely focuses on the question of why members of a peacetime alliance engage in a coalition military operations in a third country. This is problematic, because, the model assumes that a small group of core countries, defined as “K

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108 Auerswald argues that “Threats to survival should shift the relative emphasis away from the domestic-level variables toward the international level.” See Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” p. 643, fn. 48.
110 Baltrusaitis, Friends in Deed?, p. 108.
Group,” and their shared interest in the provision of a collective good (in this case stabilization of Kosovo and revitalizing the importance of NATO) are affected by the domestic institutional structure. From the structural realist and collective action perspectives, the reverse should be true: the core group will put pressures on, or present incentives to the prospective coalition countries to make increased burden-sharing contribution. Thus, in the Auerswald model, the bloc “K Group” should have preceded the ‘government and institutional structure’ variable, and not vice versa.

The third limitation in the Auerswald model is its exclusion of an important explanatory variable -- alliance dependence. Auerswald justifies this exclusion based on the evidence that the United States under Clinton administration played a strong alliance policy by investing its political capital in NATO’s expansion, and by redefining NATO’s strategic concept. The problem with the logic is that the NATO-centric transatlantic alliance may not imply that the United States will always be committed to utilizing NATO as a vehicle for pursuing its interest. Nor, does it indicate that it will allow NATO to have a strong role in every coalition operation. In fact, the reverse may also be true, in which NATO is neglected by the United States. Evidence shows how the United States ignored NATO during the formative years of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War II. In Afghanistan, NATO did not assume a direct military role until August 2003, when it took over the command of the UN Security Council mandated International Security Assistance Force.\footnote{Although the United States constrained any broader role for NATO in Afghanistan, the alliance played an important role in securing U.S. airspace by deploying seven NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) aircraft from October 9, 2001 until May 16, 2002. In Afghanistan, NATO did not assume any formal military command role until August 2003, when the Joint Dutch-German command of the International Security Assistance Force was handed over to NATO. Prior to that ISAF was commanded on a rotation basis among NATO contributing countries. See “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism,” NATO International} In Iraq, the United States ignored the oppositions from its key NATO allies—France and Germany—prior to the invasion of Baghdad in 2003.
There are at least two other limitations, which relate to both the Auerswald and the Bennett et al. models. The first concerns the exclusion of the ‘capability’ variable from both studies, and the second focuses on the time frame covered in the existing studies.

I argue that the inclusion of the military capability variable could provide important insights into the relative military contribution of alliance members to the coalition warfare. Military coalitions are defined as capability aggregators, since they allow forces from participating countries to engage in joint war fighting. Since the mere inventory of military assets and forces in a country’s national arsenal does not imply that they can automatically be integrated into a coalition operation, it is important to examine the effect of military capability on coalition burden-sharing.

Finally, the existing studies on coalition behavior cover only conflicts with limited duration. For instance, the Auerswald study examines coalition contribution for the Operation Allied Force, which lasted for less than three months (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999). On the other hand, the Bennett et al. study on the First Iraq War covers only seven months of actual war (August 1990-Feb 1991). By contrast, the Baltrusaitis study on the Second Iraq War examines burden-sharing for a relatively longer period of 4 years (2003-2007). The biggest problem with such short-span conflict analysis is that their limited ability to account for in-country and cross-country variations in burden-sharing behavior over a longer time frame.

In summary, the existing models of coalition burden-sharing provide a useful starting point for analyzing the complex decision processes that explain the decisions of major countries.
in the formation and maintenance of a wartime coalition. But, they cannot sufficiently explain the divergent contributions made by coalition countries during a long war, such as the War in Afghanistan. My dissertation addresses this theoretical gap by offering a modified model for analyzing burden-sharing behavior in wartime coalitions.

V. A Modified Coalition Burden-Sharing Model

Having observed the limitations in the existing theoretical models, I present a better burden-sharing model for analyzing coalition behavior during the War in Afghanistan. My burden-sharing model incorporates three systemic level variables and three domestic level variables discussed before. I argue that the three systemic level variables—alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action—are independent variables; and the three domestic level variables—domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability—are intervening variables.

I make several unique contributions to the study of coalition burden-sharing. First, in contrast to the Bennett et al, and Auerswald models, my burden-sharing model includes a new intervening variable—military capability to explain the outcomes of coalition burden-sharing. Second, I depict a theoretically-driven causal pathway that connects the systemic and domestic factors in the analysis of coalition burden-sharing. Third, I show the feedback effects of burden-sharing outcomes at a particular historical point on subsequent foreign policy decision processes. Such findings contradict the conventional theories of foreign policy analysis, which end with an assessment of a particular foreign policy action, and do not investigate the after-effects of that action.112 My research shows that in the context of the Afghanistan War coalition, an analysis of

the feedbacks is useful to determine how the outcomes of military actions at an early stage of
the war are fed into the decision process to change the course of a state’s coalition policy. 113
Figure 3.1 presents the model.

Taking a neo-classical realist position, I argue that under the conditions of international
systemic pressures or incentives (e.g. alliance dependence, balance of threat, or collective
action), the chief executives and the national security elites make the critical decisions of
whether or not to join a wartime coalition. After joining a coalition, they also decide whether or
not to deploy troops in the combat zones without any national caveats. My theory is
straightforward. The burden-sharing decisions are taken at three decision points: chief executive
as the leader of the domestic political regime, domestic public opinion, and national military
capability.

The first decision point is the chief executive. A strong chief executive with no legal-
constitutional restrictions, fewer legislative oversights, and strong elite consensus, is likely to
ignore public opinion and directly look into the stock of national military capability to join and
support a coalition. By contrast, a weak chief executive, who confronts rigid constitutional
provisions, a hostile legislature and fragmented elites, is likely to avoid the coalition. In between
these two, a medium executive with qualified support from the elites or the legislature will
balance between the competing demands of elite consensus and unfavorable public opinion.

Paper prepared for the panel America’s Mid East Policy at the WISC Conference in Istanbul, 24-27 August 2005;
113 There is a rich body of literature that focuses on military learning and adaptation in the conduct of war. See
Organizational Adaptation: Combat, Stability, and Beyond, Ph.D. Dissertation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Pittsburgh, 2010); Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the
Note: Illustrative examples of burden-sharing outcomes are shown in parentheses.

The second decision point is public opinion. I take a realist “top-bottom” approach to public opinion, and argue that public opinion does not have any independent effect on foreign policy. Instead, the office of the executive and foreign policy elites shape public opinion on national security issues. Both strong and weak chief executives are likely to bypass the public opinion. An executive with overwhelming legislative support or elite consensus will be tempted to bypass public opinion, if the mass public opposes a foreign policy decision. The logic is straightforward here: either the mass public is considered unreliable and uninformed, or the elite
consensus will drive the government to take a policy first and shape public opinion later. While an assertive president or prime minister may care little about eroding public support for a war, due to an overwhelming elite consensus, public opinion is likely to give some feed-backs to the existing policy, which will result in some “lip service,” or rhetorical speeches, instead of altering the course of a state’s burden-sharing behavior.

Unlike the strong executive, who cares little about unfavorable public opinion, a weak executive will pay a strong attention to public opinion in making key decisions on the use of force. The logic of such action is as follows: weak government leaders will be more concerned about their re-election prospects; lacking elite support or parliamentary approval, they will consider it a politically risky strategy to deploy military forces for coalition purposes. In contrast to these two extreme positions, the medium chief executive is likely to care about public opinion to the extent that balances between the competing demands of systemic pressures and domestic audiences.

The third decision point is military capability. If a coalition country possesses a deployable, interoperable, and suitable military force, and has access to vital military assets and resources, it has the potentiality to play a robust burden-sharing role. At least three factors may determine the issues of deployability, interoperability, and suitability. These include a compatible military doctrine, sufficient troops and resources, and experience of joint exercises with multinational forces. A country lacking these qualities in its military arsenal is unlikely to pursue a strong burden-sharing role. The inability of a chief executive and the foreign policy elites to mobilize the public support behind a coalition policy is also unlikely to produce a strong burden-sharing commitment.
Having discussed the nuts and bolts of my burden-sharing model; I now concentrate on the methodological discussion.

VI. **Methodology and Case Selection**

This dissertation investigates the politics of coalition burden-sharing during the U.S.-led War in Afghanistan (2001-2010). Since the dominant theories of IR—neo-realism and strategic culture—cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the coalition behavior of states, this study presents an alternative – neo-classical realist – explanation of coalition burden-sharing. Taking a neo-classical realist position, it modifies the existing theoretical models of burden-sharing, and provides a better model. This study argues that the modified model of burden-sharing presents a better causal process to analyze the decision processes that influence the burden-sharing behaviors and outcomes of coalition members. It then tests the empirical validity of the burden-sharing model in a comparative qualitative case study of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan. This study is, therefore, an academic exercise in theory-building and theory-testing.

*Case Selection.* There are several reasons for choosing Britain, Germany, and Pakistan as the country cases for this study. They all joined the coalition in 2001, and provided crucial military and non-military supports to maintain the coalition until 2010. By deliberately excluding the country cases, which did not join the Afghanistan coalition, or shirked away from the coalition, this study suffers from one caveat: it cannot establish the causal processes that explain the lack of coalition cohesion. Despite such shortfall, the focus of this study on the first two stages of a coalition’s lifetime – during the formation and maintenance of a coalition – offers two advantages in analyzing coalition cohesion. First, it offers a better explanation of the underlying
reasons that influence a state’s decision to join and to support a coalition. Second, it clearly specifies the decision process that influences a state’s burden-sharing behavior and outcome in the coalition.

What methodological criteria are adopted to choose the country cases in this study? In their seminal work on qualitative research, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett suggest several criteria for the selection of cases. These include: the selection of cases “to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem;” cases representing “instances of the same subclass” or “from different subclasses;” and cases with features of a most- or least-likely case, a crucial case, or a deviant case.” These criteria of case selection, outlined by George and Bennett, have become a standard benchmark for case study research.

Following George and Bennett, this study chooses cases to provide control and variation. It investigates the coalition contribution of countries during the post-9/11 era, in which the international system was dominated by the unmatched military power of the United States, and its key NATO allies. During the nine years of the Afghanistan War coalition (2001-2010), the structural distribution of power in the international system was constant, with no shifts in the balance of power. Thus, the systemic influence on coalition behavior of states was controlled.

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115 An excellent piece on the role of the United States as a provider of hegemonic stability is offered by Robert Kaplan. See Robert D. Kaplan, “A Gentle Hegemony,” *Washington Post*, December 17, 2008; Several pieces of evidence show why the United States is said to have “unmatched” military power. According to Bernd Debusmann, the United States accounts for five percent of the world’s population, around 23 percent of its economic output and more than 40 percent of its military spending. America spends as much on its soldiers and weapons as the next 18 countries put together… The U.S., for example, has 11 aircraft carriers in service; the rest of the world has eight. China is building one but analysts say it won’t be completed before 2015. See Bernd Debusmann, “U.S. Military Power: When is Enough Enough?” *Reuters*, February 5, 2010. [http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/02/05/u-s-military-power-when-is-enough-enough/](http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/02/05/u-s-military-power-when-is-enough-enough/), accessed December 21, 2010.
116 For further discussion on U.S. preponderance and the global balance of power, see Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations* (Oxford and New York:
Despite such controlled international environment, there were significant variations in the dependent variable – the burden-sharing contributions of coalition states.

This study disaggregates coalition contribution into three variables: (a) diplomatic contribution; (b) offensive military contribution; (c) defensive civil-military reconstruction contribution. Based on the performance of a coalition state, each type of contribution has several possible outcomes. First, diplomatic contribution has two possible outcomes: proactive diplomacy, and reactive diplomacy. Second, offensive military contribution has three possible outcomes: weak, improved, and strong. Third, reconstruction and stabilization operations have two possible outcomes: weak and strong. The use of only a few categories of variances in the dependent variable offers a parsimony that fits well with my research goal.\textsuperscript{117}

Since the central debate in the Afghanistan War coalition is why some countries share more military risks than others, my dissertation concentrates on the second and third type of coalition contributions — the offensive military, and defensive civil-military contributions — made by Britain, Germany, and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{118} Why, then, this study includes the discussion of diplomatic contribution? The answer is simple: the lack of political consensus may cause a

\textsuperscript{117} George and Bennett remind that the choice between parsimony and richness in identifying variances in the dependent variable is determined by the research purposes in a given study. See George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences}, p. 85.

coalition to fall apart. Hence, it is important to investigate the extent to which the coalition members in Afghanistan used bilateral and multilateral meetings, and other diplomatic channels to achieve the political cohesion of the coalition to avoid the frictions over military strategy being employed.

The country cases chosen for this study are unique in their attributes: they represent several sub-classes, yet may well be considered deviant cases. For instance, the Afghanistan War coalition was composed of two types of states: NATO members, who joined the coalition out of alliance solidarity; and non-NATO states, which were offered various incentives – positive and negative – to join the coalition. Britain and Germany represented the NATO members, whereas Pakistan represented a non-NATO ally of the United States. Despite, such representativeness, Britain, Germany, and Pakistan were all deviant cases, as they were the largest providers of military troops to the Afghanistan War coalition. For instance, by the end of 2010, Britain and Germany deployed 9,500 and 4,500 troops to Afghanistan, respectively, which were the second and third largest contingent of coalition forces under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command. During the same time, Pakistan deployed, under its own command, more than 120,000 troops along the Afghan borders to suppress insurgency and terrorism in its tribal areas, which had emerged as a safe haven for Afghan insurgents.

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There are several advantages and disadvantages of a deviant case analysis. The most important benefit of deviant cases is their utility in probing for new and unspecified variables.\textsuperscript{121} This is exactly what this study wishes to accomplish. It introduces a new variable—military capability, and better specifies the public opinion variable— to the coalition burden-sharing model, and probes their utility in predicting and explaining the decision process and the outcome of coalition burden-sharing.

Despite the advantage in probing for new variables, deviant cases have a serious problem of lack of representativeness. According to John Gerring, “The representativeness of a deviant case is problematic, since the case in question is, by construction, atypical.” However, Gering notes, such problem “can be mitigated if the researcher generalizes whatever proposition is provided by the case to other cases.”\textsuperscript{122} This study addresses the concerns of generalizability by testing the burden-sharing model in cases, with significant variations in the dependent variable. For instance, among the coalition countries, Britain had pursued a robust military strategy by taking significant risks of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda militias. Germany was mostly reluctant to pursue an offensive military strategy, and instead adopted a risk-averse strategy. Although Pakistan did not deploy troops to Afghanistan, it carried out several military operations to fight Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, while maintaining clandestine support for various Afghan insurgent groups.

One might possibly question whether the country cases in this study lack any empirical puzzle. Such question may be founded on an over-generalized observation that Britain has


always been a most-likely case of a strong coalition partner; Germany a case for a risk-averse ally, and Pakistan an ally with conflicted goals. Since none of them behaved, one might argue, in a way that would counter their predicted generalized behavior, what research purposes are then served by the choice of case selection?

The answer to this question is simple: although the country cases examined in this study can be over-generalized – Britain as a strong contributor, Germany as a weak contributor, and Pakistan as a reluctant contributor – there are significant, and quite puzzling, within-case variations in each of the coalition countries. A central goal of this study is to explain and predict these within-case variations, as well as cross-case variations. This is done by adopting a historical approach to longitudinal study. In a longitudinal study, researchers can conduct controlled comparison of a case by dividing it into two cases -- before-case and after-case.\(^\text{123}\) This study examines how the introduction of more troops and resources, and the introduction of a population-centric doctrine changed the British, German, and Pakistani coalition behaviors. Using changing domestic military capability as an intervening variable, this study, therefore, examines the before- and after-effect of military capability on the burden-sharing outcomes.

Finally, I also select cases on a key intervening variable – domestic political regime – specified by the decision power of the chief executive vis-à-vis other actors in the domestic political institutions. Following David Auerswald’s analysis, I categorize three possible types of executive power: strong, weak, and medium.\(^\text{124}\) Since a weak chief executive is unlikely to join a coalition, I exclude any case on this variable. Instead, I focus on two types of chief executive power: strong and medium. Germany was selected as a case of a medium power, in which the

\(^{123}\) George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 81.

\(^{124}\) Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice.”
legal-constitutional provisions, legislative politics, and civil society constrain the ability of an incumbent government to pursue a strong coalition policy. In contrast, Britain and Pakistan were selected as the cases of strong executives, albeit for two different reasons. In the British case, the longstanding practice of royal prerogative and discretionary power has historically allowed the prime minister to use force with less political constraints. In the Pakistani case, the practice of frequent military interventions, and weak democratic institutions, have allowed the military and its intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) to centralize the decision power to the office of president or the chief marshal law administrator. Lacking any significant constraint or political-judicial oversight, the Pakistanis presidents and military chiefs were expected to determine their Afghan policy without paying attention to the public opinion and civil society institutions.

Data Collection. This study is about developing and testing a neo-classical realist theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing. In the study of IR and foreign policy analysis, neo-classical realists offer a number of techniques for data collection and analysis. Thomas Christensen suggests the importance of adequate knowledge about a country or area under study.\(^\text{125}\) Randall Schweller and Fareed Zakaria have used archival research and primary source materials to generate their data.\(^\text{126}\) Others have emphasized the importance of foreign language skills, and historical background of a nation or region being studied.\(^\text{127}\) The central purpose of such language skill, primary data, and historical background is required, neo-classical realists argue, to precisely understand how elite belief systems, leadership perception, and historical

\(^{125}\) Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 248  
^{126}\) Schweller, \textit{Deadly Imbalances}; Zakaria, \textit{From Wealth to Power}.  
^{127}\) Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” p. 166.
learning act as intervening variables between systemic incentive and states’ foreign policy outcomes.

Following the neo-classical realist tradition, data for this research were generated from the primary and secondary sources. These include academic journals and books, memoirs, print and electronic media reports, and military and civilian documents on the War in Afghanistan. A limited number of interviews were conducted with academic scholars and practitioners, to understand the mental maps of the strategic decision makers in the countries under question. Data for this study were also generated with face-to-face, and telephone interviews with retired and active government officials from the British, German, Pakistani, and U.S. security and intelligence services. The interviewees offered important insights into the perception of Al Qaeda’s terrorist threat to Europe and the United States, and the varying level of inter-governmental cooperation among coalition countries in Afghanistan.

**Research Method.** The empirical chapters in the dissertation employ three techniques of the qualitative research method: structured, focused comparison, and process-tracing.¹²⁸

This study is structured, because it investigates the same sets of questions in the country cases, and uses a logical sequence to answer those questions. This involves standardized data collection and data analysis, which allows for the systematic comparison of the three cases.¹²⁹ For instance, each case study in this dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part provides a historical description of a country’s military and non-military contributions to the

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¹²⁸ For a discussion on the methods of process tracing and structured focused comparison, see George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, chapter 3, pp. 67-72; chapter 8, pp. 151-180; chapter 10, pp. 205-232.

Afghanistan War coalition. The second part employs the integrated burden-sharing model to analyze a country’s coalition contributions. The third part offers a summary and conclusion.

This dissertation is highly focused. It asks only three research questions, which concern the formation and maintenance of coalitions, and the decision-processes that influence states’ coalition contributions, and burden-sharing outcomes. According to George and Bennett, “Situating” one’s research in the context of the literature is key to identifying the contribution the new research makes. Following this principle, this study is theoretically located in the neo-classical realist school of IR, and empirically in the literature on coalition burden-sharing. It discusses neo-classical realism and its rival theories in detail; and examines the relative merits of existing burden-sharing models. Taking a neo-classical realist position, it develops and tests a theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing.

Following the method of process-tracing, this study historicizes a country’s burden-sharing behavior, and shows the causal links between various international and domestic level variables. The adoption of a neo-classical realist position offers a crucial advantage here. It allows the theoretical model to link “clearly specified independent, intervening, and dependent variables in a direct causal chain.” The use of historical data to build case study research, and to specify dependent, independent, and intervening variables, is a standard practice among the neo-classical realists. Social science research has also emphasized the importance of historicizing in small-n case analyses.

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130 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, p. 67.
131 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, p. 70.
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett suggest that process-tracing is “an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development.” They contend that an important part of the process-tracing task is to show how the intervening variables affect the outcome of a particular phenomenon. Following the methodological dictum of George and Bennett, this study offers a better specification of the domestic level intervening variables, deductively drawn from the theory of strategic culture. It shows how the systemic factors are transmitted through the domestic level intervening variables to produce a wide range of burden-sharing behavior for states. One needs to remember that there are at least three types of causal processes: linear, complex, and path dependent. My burden-sharing model uses the third type of causal process, in which the sequencing of events and the identification of key decision points help understand the policy choices made by a country during a war.

The research design employed in this study has several shortcomings. First, it concerns the study of a U.S.-led coalition. The study of other coalitions, led by the United Nations, or a regional power, may offer useful insights into, and a better test for, the integrated burden-sharing model. Second, the cases chosen for this study do not examine non-coalition countries, that is countries which did not join the Afghanistan War; or which joined the coalition, yet offered a few hundred troops and resources to support the coalition. The inclusion of such country cases could enable a researcher to examine the generalizability of the modified burden-sharing model. Third, this research briefly touches on the issue that the United States was waging two wars – in Afghanistan and in Iraq – with two distinct coalitions. It argues that the Iraq coalition had distracted the Afghanistan War efforts, especially for the coalition leader – the United States, and

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135 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, p. 207.
136 Ibid, p. 207.
137 Ibid, p. 212.
its principal ally – the United Kingdom. It also argues that counterinsurgency lessons learned in Iraq, and later applied to Afghanistan, and Pakistan, had significantly influenced the burden-sharing behavior of the Afghan coalition members. In the next phase of the research, I plan to address these three unanswered issues to enhance the utility of my burden-sharing model. However, one needs to be aware that time and resource constraints are likely to determine the choice and case selection in any qualitative case study.

Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, this dissertation makes several crucial contributions. First, drawing on the insights from neo-realism and strategic culture, it offers a neo-classical realist explanation of coalition burden-sharing. In doing so, it contributes to a collaborative research agenda, as suggests by John Glenn, which seeks to bridge between realism and strategic culture.138 Second, it modifies the existing theoretical models of burden-sharing and offers a better model for predicting and explaining coalition behavior. The refined model introduces a new intervening variable – military capability; and better specifies the public opinion variable. It then tests the empirical validity of the model in the cases of three core countries, which had formed and supported the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Finally, this study contributes to the foreign policy literature by showing the feedback effects of foreign coalition outcomes on the strategic decision processes.

138 Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture;” Glenn, Howlett, and Poore, Neorealism and Strategic Culture. Gideon Rose also offers the utility of neo-classical realism in bridging the gap between realism and constructivism. See Rose, “Neoclassical Realism.” Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan follows the suits in her recent study on British foreign policy. See Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).
CHAPTER FOUR

BRITAIN:
PUNCHING ABOVE THE WEIGHT

Britain’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides a compelling case to test the burden-sharing model. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, British Prime Minister Tony Blair reassured U.S. President George Bush that Britain would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the American people to fight the war on terrorism. ¹ In less than four weeks, on October 7, 2001, Blair committed troops to the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Al Qaeda and deny it a safe haven in Afghanistan. ² Since then, Britain had emerged as the United States’ “most enthusiastic junior partner” in the war on terrorism.³ Between 2001 and 2010, the War in Afghanistan underwent profound transformations from a strong focus on combating Al Qaeda terrorists to a tough mission of countering Taliban insurgency. During this time, the British forces in Afghanistan remained firmly committed to this changing posture of the War. This was evident in the deployment of the British forces to the Taliban insurgent-prone Helmand province in 2006. Critics have often claimed that Britain was


² According the British Ministry of Defense, the central purpose of British cooperation in the U.S.-led Coalition in Afghanistan is fourfold: denying Al Qaeda an Afghan base; denying Al Qaeda a base outside Afghanistan; attacking Al Qaeda internationally; and forming an international coalition to continue the fight against Al Qaeda. See: Ministry of Defense, “Operations in Afghanistan: Background Briefing,” http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBackgroundBriefing.htm, accessed November 4, 2010.

“punching above its weight” in Afghanistan, with many of its NATO allies doing too little to share the coalition burden-sharing.  

The British case is puzzling for at least three reasons. First, compared to other major NATO countries, especially France, Germany, and Italy, Britain contributed more troops, and allocated a relatively large share of its defense budget for the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. Second, despite growing public dissatisfaction over the Afghan mission, Britain was deeply committed to the cohesion of the Afghan War coalition by reinforcing troops on the ground, and redeploying them in the restive southern Afghan province of Helmand. Third, as the number of British troop fatalities increased amidst controversies over equipment deficits, the British government had literally two choices: to reduce forces or to provide more equipments and logistics. Prime Minister Blair and his successors Gordon Brown and David Cameron chose the second option: providing more equipments and logistics to ensure that British soldiers were well-resourced to get the job done.

What explains Britain’s firm commitment to the formation and maintenance of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan? Conventional wisdom focuses on the realist and historical explanations. By contrast, this chapter takes an integrated approach to analyzing British policy in Afghanistan. It examines the effect of the interactions between international systemic and domestic level factors in shaping British contribution to Afghanistan War.

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Realists emphasize on the role of power and prestige in British foreign policy. They argue that British policy in Afghanistan was the product of an interventionist foreign policy, which sought a great power status in international politics. Taking a realist position, Christopher Hill argues that since the end of the Second World War, British foreign and security policy has been premised on Winston Churchill’s doctrine of the ‘Three Circles of Power.’ Prime Minister Churchill envisioned a great power status for Britain and an assertive role for British military in shaping the world order. In essence, the notion of three circles of power refers to three geographical areas in the world – the former British colonies, Canada and the United States, and Europe. Afghanistan has long been a place of “Great Game,” a buffer zone between the rival British and Soviet empires. Hill contends that Britain’s Afghanistan policy is thus a natural consequence of a realist foreign policy of interventionism. Oliver Daddow concurs with Hill and argues that Churchill’s successors, from Anthony Eden and Harold Mcmillan to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, had largely embraced the notion of the circles of power, and during their regimes, any major rethinking in foreign policy was undermined by their “global power

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5 In 1954 former British civil servant Oliver Franks observed that “it is part of our habit and furniture of our minds to be a great power.” According to Christopher Hill, critics of the orthodoxy, from both right and left, have tended to share these dominant assumptions: that Britain has the right, need and obligation to make a difference on the big issues of international relations; that we can perform on a broad front. See: Christopher Hill, “British Foreign Policy Priorities: Tough Choices,” The World Today, vol. 66, no. 4 (March 23, 2010), pp. 111-114. [http://tridentreplacement.net/node/1649](http://tridentreplacement.net/node/1649), accessed November 11, 2010.

6 In 1948, British Prime Minister Churchill contended that an assertive, and if required interventionist foreign policy should operate through three circles: the British Commonwealth and Empire; the English-speaking world – Canada, the U.S., and British Dominions; and the United Europe. Churchill remarked, “As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies . . . The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprise. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe . . . Now if you think of the three interlinked circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them.” See Winston Churchill, “What Will Happen When They Get The Atomic Bomb?” Conservative Party Conference, Llandudno, Wales, October 9, 1948, in Winston S. Churchill, Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches (New York: Hyperion, 2003), pp. 448-449

pretensions." Daddow contends that, in recent years the search for a great power status has resulted in a “chronically over-stretched and under-equipped” mission in Afghanistan.

Historicists make a similar case. They stress that Britain’s military and non-military contribution to the War in Afghanistan was an expression of the historical Anglo-American special relationship. In the British foreign policy discourse, special relationship refers to the extraordinary level of post-war security cooperation with the United States, especially in the areas of nuclear technology, and intelligence sharing. James Sperling argues that the special relationship played an important role in influencing British foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why evoking the special relationship? Sperling notes that having lost its imperial status and the global reach, Britain “retains a heightened sense of obligation for the maintenance of global order and to assume responsibility for it.” American hegemony in the post war era and the Anglo-American special relationship provided Britain an opportunity to use or at least evoke the longstanding alliance with the United States. Britain used this relationship to formulate and execute its Afghanistan policy. For Britain and the United States, the Afghanistan intervention was necessary to combat international terrorism and counter nuclear proliferation – two most pressing threats to international security.

The realists and historicists provide useful insights into Britain’s Afghanistan policy, but they cannot predict the varying level of burden-sharing commitments made by Britain to the Afghanistan War coalition. This chapter analyzes Britain’s coalition behavior from a third

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9. Daddow, “Dodging the Bullet and Ducking the Question.”
perspective. Using the integrated burden-sharing model, it argues that Britain’s contribution to Afghanistan has to be understood as a complex interaction between international systemic incentives and domestic political processes.

Following the tradition of neo-classical realist theory of IR, this chapter argues that transatlantic alliance commitment and the threat of international terrorism presented two systemic level incentives for Britain to join and support the Afghanistan War coalition. These systemic incentives were transmitted through the British domestic political processes, in which the office of the prime minister exercised the discretionary power to use military force in Afghanistan. In doing so, Prime Ministers Blair, Brown, and Cameron enjoyed the elite consensus, and bypassed the dissenting public opinion. Once the political decisions regarding participation in coalition was taken by the chief executive, the strength of UK’s military capability strongly shaped Britain’s burden-sharing commitment to Afghanistan.

This chapter has three sections. The first section examines Britain’s diplomatic, military, and reconstruction contributions to the war in Afghanistan. The second section tests the utility of my integrated burden-sharing model in analyzing the British contribution in Afghanistan. The third section summarizes the central research findings.

I. Britain’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan

This section examines Britain’s diplomatic, military, and post-war reconstruction contributions to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. First, it finds that, since 2001, Britain had pursued a proactive diplomacy to form and support the Afghanistan War coalition. Next it argues that, backed by a strong diplomacy, Britain was firmly committed to the offensive counterinsurgency and
defensive stabilization operations in Afghanistan. This was evident in the Helmand Province, where the British forces were leading and participating in military operations to contain the Taliban insurgents, and reconstruct the areas, secured from the Taliban.

**Diplomatic Contribution.** Britain pursued a proactive diplomacy to form and manage the coalition in Afghanistan. This was evident in Britain’s crucial role in coordinating the diplomatic meetings on Afghanistan. After convening several high profile international meetings, the successive British prime ministers had paid visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that the coalition war efforts were moving in the right direction.

Prime Minister Blair played a crucial role in forging a common European policy at the beginning of the Afghanistan War. On September 11, 2001, he spoke with the world leaders to discuss the international community’s response to the terrorist attacks in the United States. Among the world leaders, Blair spoke with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and Russian President Putin.12 After speaking with the European leaders, Blair flew to New York and Washington, and met President Bush to learn about the U.S. war plans in Afghanistan.13 By the time Blair was meeting Bush, the United States had moved 100 warplanes to military bases with close distance from Afghanistan. The purpose was to strike Afghanistan, if the Taliban regime refused to transfer Al Qaeda leader Laden to the U.S. authority.14

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12 White and Wintour, “Blair Calls for World Fight Against Terror.”
On October 7, 2001, the U.S. and British military forces attacked Afghanistan. At that time, Blair stressed that there were three equally important components to the Afghanistan War: military, diplomatic, and humanitarian. On the military front, the United States provided bulk of the forces and commanded the operation, while the British and other coalition forces rallied behind the U.S. forces to support the war. Blair claimed that there was a massive international diplomatic support behind the military actions against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. He asserted that Britain was offering financial support for alleviating the Afghan refugee crisis.15

Four weeks after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan, major European leaders were disappointed at the unilateralist tendency in U.S. foreign policy. Although France, Germany, and Italy offered military support to the campaign in Afghanistan, the United States was virtually acting alone, and rejected any broad-level support from NATO and its European allies. 16 Against this backdrop, on November 4, 2001, Blair hosted a mini summit of European leaders to discuss the potential European support for prosecuting the War in Afghanistan. Blair was very optimistic about the prospects for success in the military campaign. He said, “We want this campaign brought to a conclusion as swiftly as possible, but it has to be a successful campaign, in other words with the attainment of our objectives.”17 Blair’s mini-summit was attended by leaders from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain—the leading European countries which had offered troops and military support for the war on terrorism. The mini-summit had two major goals: to coordinate the European response to the War in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and to encourage George Bush to accept more European help in the war.\textsuperscript{18} Looking back at the course of Afghanistan War, it is safe to say that Blair’s European mini-diplomacy failed to change U.S. military strategy. This is due to the fact that until 2003, NATO did not have any formal role in Afghanistan, and until 2006, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not pursue any offensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. As Sarah Kreps observes, until 2006, the United States had dominated the combat operations in Afghanistan, and bypassed a large coalition participation to avoid the coordination problems of military operations.\textsuperscript{19}

After organizing the European mini-summit, Britain attended and hosted several international meetings on Afghanistan. In late November 2001, Britain participated in the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan to provide support for the newly constituted interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. The Bonn Conference devised a three-tiered political transition process for post-Taliban Afghanistan. The transition process began in 2002 and completed in 2005. First, in 2002 the grand council of Afghan tribal elders met and elected Karzai as the interim Afghan President. Second, in October 2004 Karzai won the first presidential election in Afghan history. Third, in September 2005, Afghanistan held the first national parliamentary election, which nominated mostly independent candidates with little or no background in a democratic process.\textsuperscript{20}

Under Blair’s leadership, Britain co-hosted the first London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2006. Dubbed as “Bonn II”, the conference was a follow up to the 2001 Bonn


Conference, where the international community pledged their support for Afghan reconstruction. The 2006 London conference was crucial on several aspects: it devised a five-year plan, the Afghan Compact, as a long term strategy for the reconstruction and development.\(^{21}\) The Afghanistan Compact focused on several priority areas, such as, security, governance, counter-narcotics, and development.\(^{22}\) On security, it planned for the creation of an ethnically representative Afghan national army of 70,000 troops, which was later capped to more than 140,000 troops. On governance, it aimed to build an efficient public administration, with increased access for women in the political process. On counter-narcotics, it planned to cut the production of and supply of opium from Afghanistan. On economic and social development, the Compact aimed for accelerated economic growth, water and electricity supply, and the promotion of better education and healthcare services throughout Afghanistan. In terms of post-war reconstruction financing, the conference was a great success: it generated nearly $10.5 billion aid commitment for Afghanistan for the period up to 2011.

Blair’s diplomatic efforts were not confined to mini summits and international conferences. He made several trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the British forces, and encourage Afghan and Pakistani governments to help the coalition fighting terrorism. After the fall of the Taliban regime, he was the first western leader to visit Afghanistan in January 2002.\(^{23}\) In November 2006, he paid the second visit to Afghanistan, to bolster British military


Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, continued to pursue a strong diplomatic role for the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. In August 2009, Brown unveiled a new Afghanistan strategy, which called for a reconciliation process for Taliban and increasing the size of Afghan army to accelerate the transfer of security responsibility to indigenous Afghan forces. As a follow-up to the 2006 London Conference, in January 2010, Brown co-hosted the second London Conference, which started the process of Afghanization, a term that refers to the gradual transfer of security responsibility from international forces to the indigenous Afghan forces. The second London conference had three principal aims: to create a reintegration fund for encouraging Taliban militias to reject violence; to foster better governance; and to persuade Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, such as Iran to participate in stabilizing Afghanistan. Critics say at the second London Conference, Prime Minister Brown wanted to assure the skeptical

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British public that London had an exit strategy for Afghanistan, and that the British forces would not stay there for an indefinite period. From the coalition war perspective, these conferences were important to forge political cohesion among troop contributing nations, and to distribute the financial burdens of military operations and stabilization among participating nations and international institutions.

Between 2008 and 2010, Brown made three visits to Afghanistan. The purpose was to boost the domestic support for the war and to express Britain’s continuing commitment to Afghanistan. Compared to his earlier two visits, Brown’s March 2010 visit was more important for the British military in Afghanistan, which had lacked critical military equipments and logistical supplies. During the trip, Brown announced that Britain would send 200 new patrol vehicles to replace the lightly-defended Snatch Land Rovers. The new vehicles would be delivered by late 2011. In addition, Britain would invest £18 million for the defense against improvised explosive devices (IED) or roadside bombs. The British government would spend the money on equipment and training for the Afghan forces. Britain would also send 150 new army and police instructors to train the Afghan police.

When the Conservative Party came to power in May 2010, Prime Minister Cameron followed the path of his predecessors and paid two visits to Afghanistan. During his first visit in June 2010, Cameron encouraged the Afghan President Karzai to develop a political strategy to incorporate reconciliation with the Taliban; to speed up the training of Afghan security forces,

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and to ensure better coordination among civil-military-development personnel in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{31} During his second visit in December 2010, Cameron focused on the issue of logistics supply for British forces. The prime minister announced that he planned to complete the withdrawal of British forces by 2015. In the meantime, Britain would inject more military logistics and resources to support the coalition war efforts. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced to double the drone capability in Afghanistan, and placed an order for 5 Reaper drones. The MoD also announced that 100 Warthogs armored vehicles would be deployed to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{32}

In summary, Britain pursued a strong diplomatic role toward the formation and maintenance of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. This was evidenced in Blair, Brown, and Cameron’s summits with the European and international leaders, where they discussed the future of Afghan reconstruction and development, as well as the war strategy. The London conferences, as well as the British prime ministers’ visit to Afghanistan indicated a proactive diplomacy in pursuing British strategy in Afghanistan.

\textit{Offensive Military Contribution.} Backed by a strong diplomacy, Britain had gradually moved toward adopting a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Three factors illustrate Britain’s move toward a counterinsurgency role in Afghanistan: the decision to deploy forces in the insurgent prone Helmand province; the gradual escalation of military force in Helmand; and the sustained military offensives against hostile Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.


First, consistent with ISAF’s changing strategy, Britain’s area of operation in Afghanistan changed over time. Between 2002 and 2006, the British forces mainly operated in Kabul, and the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north-east. The Kabul contingent had three functions: (a) to coordinate Britain’s military strategy in Afghanistan with the British Embassy in Kabul, and the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A); (b) to provide in-theater administrative support for British forces; and (c) to contribute to local security and force protection in Kabul. In April 2006, the British forces were redeployed to the Helmand province, where they assumed the rotational command responsibility for Regional Command South (RC-South). RC-South comprised the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul. Britain’s Helmand deployment was necessitated for two reasons: to suppress the growing Taliban insurgency; and to share the risk of combat operations with the American forces. Prior to UK’s Helmand deployment, coalition force presence in the province was negligible, and this had resulted in a sharp increase in narcotics trade and Taliban insurgent activities. Figure 4.1 shows the British forces’ area of operation in Afghanistan’s Helmand province.

34 “Interview with COL Mark Neate, March 26, 2008,” Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 3.
35 Coalition forces in RC-South came from the United Kingdom, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, UAE, and the United States.
36 According to a testimony by Adam Holloway, the British Member of the Parliament, there were only 40 U.S. troops based at Lashkar Gah, Helmand, prior to the deployment of British forces in southern Afghanistan. See: UK House of Commons, “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 June 2008, Westminster Hall, David Taylor in the Chair,” Column 176 WH, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080617/halltext/80617h0001.htm, accessed March 14, 2011.
Figure 4.1 The British Forces’ Area of Operation in Southern Afghanistan

According to the UK Ministry of Defense, the British forces took charge of Helmand to ease the burden of U.S. forces, which were overwhelmed with the demands of fighting two wars simultaneously—in Iraq and Afghanistan. The British Army’s organizational preference for combat operations might also explain why the British forces went to the insurgent prone Helmand province. Anthony King notes that as the Iraq mission was coming to an end, the British Army was planning for a major combat role in Afghanistan to win the inter-service rivalry. Anthony King writes,

[T]he army seized on Helmand as a potential operation in 2005 because political and military leaders believed that the British commitment to Iraq was coming to an end. The inference was that the army needed a major new operation (preferably an intense one) in order to defend its budget against potential deployments by the other services.

Second, with the changing area of operation, British military boots on the ground increased significantly from 1,800 in 2002 to 5,500 in 2006, and ultimately to 9,500 in 2010 (See Figure 4.2). This means that by the end of 2010, the United Kingdom deployed more than 5% of its active military force in Afghanistan. This was only second to the United States, which deployed nearly 6.7% of its active military forces (100,000 out of 1.48 million) in Afghanistan.

Initially, Britain deployed nearly 2,000 troops during the first six months of the Afghanistan War. At one point, in the summer of 2002, Britain had nearly 2,100 soldiers in Afghanistan. In the next two years (2003-2004), the British troop presence declined significantly

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37 These were the views broadly shared by the British Ministry of Defense. See UK Defense Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2005-2006, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, JC 558, Para 45.
to only three to six hundreds. This was perhaps due to British forces’ participation in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which diverted many of the critical resources necessary for the successful prosecution of the Afghanistan War.\textsuperscript{39} Since 2005, Britain and other coalition members had steadily increased their troops, as part of a strategy of counterinsurgency and nation-building.

![Figure 4.2 British Contribution to ISAF, 2002-2010](image)

Sources: Military Balance; SIPRI Yearbook, various issues.

Third, an inevitable consequence of the extended area of operation, and increasing troops was the British military’s participation in offensive military operations. Since 2001, the British forces in Afghanistan participated in numerous military offensives to counter the Al Qaeda terrorists, and the Taliban insurgents. When the U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, the British forces were among the first to provide critical support to target the Al Qaeda

\textsuperscript{39} UK House of Commons, “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 June 2008, Westminster Hall, David Taylor in the Chair,” Column 176 WH.
leadership, and to topple the Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{40} This initial campaign against the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces were carried out under the U.S.-led \textit{Operation Enduring Freedom} (OEF) command. However, since December 2001, the large majority of U.K. forces in Afghanistan were deployed under the UN-backed ISAF command. In fact, when the ISAF was created as a stabilization force, the United Kingdom was the first country to lead the rotational command of ISAF from December 2001 until May 2002.

A closer look at Britain’s coalition strategy in Afghanistan shows that, the British military operations progressed in four stages. These are:

- State I (October 2001-July 2002): A strong counterterrorism role;
- Stage II (August 2002-March 2006): The neglect of Afghanistan due to the diversion of resources in the Iraq War, which began in March 2003;
- Stage III (April 2006-Late 2007): A weak and limited counterinsurgency role in Helmand;
- Stage IV (Early 2008-Late 2010): A strong counterinsurgency role in Helmand.

In the first stage, the British forces participated in the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, which toppled the Taliban regime and significantly weakened the Afghan-based Al Qaeda terrorist group. This stage lasted for about ten months between October 2001 and July 2002, which saw some of the most intensive ground offensives, followed by the initial aerial bombings. The United States dominated this stage, with a strong support from a loose coalition of countries, including the United Kingdom. The central goal of the U.S. and coalition forces was to combat

terrorism, and not fighting insurgency. The U.S. military officials wanted to pursue these goals with a light footprint, and avoid the ‘Soviet mistake’ of injecting more ground troops. 41 It was also perceived that nation-building would not be the goal of coalition forces in Afghanistan. 42

Several high profile military campaigns illustrate the British military’s strong burden-sharing role during the initial months of the Afghanistan War. When the War began with the Operation Crescent Wind (October 2001), the British military provided support to U.S. airstrikes over key Afghan provinces -- Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Zaranj and Balkh. 43 The Royal Navy submarines fired Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Royal Air Force provided reconnaissance and air-to-air refueling capabilities. The American forces flew missions from the British Indian Ocean Territory in Diego Garcia. In November 2001, the British marine commandos helped secure the Bagram Air Field. Soon, the United Kingdom deployed Task Forces Jacana, a battlegroup of 1,700 troops based around Royal Marines from 45 Commando. According to the British Ministry of Defense, the British forces “destroyed bunkers and caves” and provided humanitarian assistance during the early days of the Afghan mission. 44


After the initial airstrikes weakened the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda leadership, the British Special Forces participated in several ground offensives in southern and eastern Afghanistan. In late November 2001, troops from the British Special Air Service launched Operation Trent in southern Afghanistan to collect intelligence and destroy opium facilities. At that time the Special Boat Service soldiers were collaborating with the U.S. Special Forces in the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi to suppress a Taliban prisoners’ uprising. In mid-December 2001, the Royal Signals soldiers collaborated with the U.S. and German Special Forces in the Nangarhar province to capture the Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden. Laden escaped the military campaign in the Tora Bora Mountains, and possibly infiltrated into Pakistan via the Khyber Pass.

After the fall of the Taliban regime, in March 2002, the U.S. and coalition forces launched Operation Anaconda, the first large-scale ground offensive, in which the British and allied Special Forces moved into the Paktia province to eliminate the residual Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. From April to July of 2002, the British Special Forces led Operation Jacana in the Khost and Paktika provinces. The purpose was to ‘clear and search’ the areas dominated by Al Qaeda and Taliban militias. This brief discussion of military campaigns provides an example of British contribution to the U.S.-led OEF mission.

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During the second stage, the British military backtracked from its Afghanistan commitment. This was accompanied by the U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in 2003, where the United Kingdom initially deployed nearly 46,000 troops. The Iraq War diverted the resources needed for the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. The second stage of British operations in Afghanistan lasted from mid-2002 to early 2006. This period saw the decline of British troop presence in Afghanistan to 300, up from 1,800 in 2002. Due to a strategic neglect, caused by the Iraq War, the British forces were engaged in limited scale non-combat stabilization operations in Kabul and northern Afghanistan.

The process of stabilization in Afghanistan began on a limited scale in January 2002, when the United Kingdom led the first contingent of the ISAF. Since then, most of the British forces were deployed under the ISAF mission. The ISAF was created as a multinational coalition force, agreed in the Bonn Summit, and mandated by the UN Security Council. Its initial purpose was to provide assistance to the newly constituted Afghan Transitional Authority of Hamid Karzai, and to maintain the security of Kabul and its surrounding areas. In August 2003, NATO formally took over the command of the ISAF, but did not adopt an offensive military posture until 2006. From an operational perspective, until 2006, there was a strict division of labor between the U.S.-led OEF mission, and the NATO-led ISAF mission. The first was conceived as a counterterrorism force, while the later was created as a peacekeeping force. This strict division worked well until early 2006, when the two missions began to merge to ensure a unified command in Afghanistan. Since 2006, a dual hatted U.S. military commander had been in charge of both the OEF and the ISAF missions, and the priority of the war moved to fighting insurgency, rather than just combating terrorism. This change in the military strategy was necessitated by the increasing Taliban insurgent attacks in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
The third stage in the British military operation in Afghanistan began in April 2006 and continued until the end of 2007. This stage saw the deployment of British forces in the Helmand province. During the first two years in Helmand, the British forces commanded and participated in several high profile military campaigns, which had mostly targeted in clearing areas controlled by the insurgents, but failed to hold those areas after the removal of the insurgents.49 The epic battles in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas illustrate the British forces’ limited success in counterinsurgency operations from 2006 to 2007.

The town of Musa Qala was a tough battlefield for the British forces, as well as for coalition forces from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, and the United States. The coalition forces launched two major military operations in Musa Qala—the Operation Snakebite (May-Oct. 2006), and the Operation Snakepit (December 2007).50 During the Operation Snakebite, the British platoon house near Musa Qala came under sustained attacks from Taliban fighters and their local collaborators. The platoon house was created as isolated coalition outposts composed of several civilian or military compounds. The British forces were drawn into the conflict to respond to a request from Helmand’s provincial governor Mohammed Daoud. The governor needed support from NATO forces to extend his rule into a city of nearly 20,000 people. Since Musa Qala was a strategic center for opium production and heroin trade, the British forces in Helmand conceived of fighting narcotics facilities as an additional goal of the operation. In October 2006, the battle ended indecisively, with a truce brokered by the tribal elders. Under the

49 Data on Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan are generated from various press reports, and military reports from NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the British Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).
terms of the truce, the British forces would withdraw from Musa Qala, and the Taliban would re-enter the town.\textsuperscript{51}

The fragile peace deal in Musa Qala lasted for only four months. In February 2007 the Taliban militias resurfaced, and regained control of the town. In early December 2007, the British and other NATO forces launched the second campaign—\textit{Operation Snakepit} to regain control of Musa Qala.\textsuperscript{52} The \textit{Operation Snakepit} saw the deployment of about 6,000 troops—3,000 from the U.K., 1,500 from other NATO members, and 1,500 from the Afghan security forces. On December 12, 2007, the British forces declared their victory in Musa Qala. NATO’s decisive victory in Musa Qala was marked by the Taliban retreat from the area. After the Taliban retreat, the Afghan and UK forces recovered a huge cache of small arms, explosives, and a large bomb factory—all used as Taliban military logistics. They also destroyed £150 to £200 million worth of heroin.\textsuperscript{53}

Like Musa Qala, Sangin was a strategically important town in Helmand. The first battle of Sangin was \textit{Operation Augustus}, which began in July 2006.\textsuperscript{54} It was part of a broader coalition-led combat operation named \textit{Operation Mountain Thrust}, which involved an estimated


300 British troops, supported by 700 U.S. and Canadian troops. The British Ministry of Defense characterize *Augustus* as a “cordon and search” operation, in which UK helicopters came under Taliban rocket propelled grenade attacks. The British forces responded to Taliban attacks with missiles and several rounds of 30mm cannon. The military offensive weakened the Taliban force, but failed to expel them from the Sangin valley.

In April 2007, the British forces launched *Operation Silver* in the northern Sangin Valley, and *Operation Silicon* in the southern Sangin Valley. These operations were part of a large-scale coalition military campaign named *Operation Achilles*. Its main aim was to suppress the Taliban insurgency to stabilize Afghanistan. By May 2007, the British forces secured the Sangin Valley with the support of the Afghan and NATO coalition forces. The tactical victory in Sangin paved the way for the reconstruction and development of an important area of Helmand.

Like Musa Qala and Sanign, the Kajaki dam area was important to the British and NATO forces for two reasons. First, it provided the water for the irrigation of the Helmand Valley. Second, it supplied the electricity for the whole Helmand province. Prior to the deployment of British forces to Helmand in April 2006, the Kajaki dam area was guarded by a weak Afghan police presence, backed by an American contractor. Mortar attacks by Taliban militants near the

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57 About 6,000 NATO and Afghan troops were involved in *Operation Achilles* in the northern Helmand. Among them an estimated 1000 NATO (mostly UK) and Afghan troops were involved in *Operation Silver*, and another 1,000 forces in Operation Silicon to retake the control of Sangin Valley. Raymond Whitaker, “The Battle of Sangin: British Forces Lead Fight to Recapture Key Town,” *The Independent*, April 8, 2007. [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-battle-of-sangin-british-forces-lead-fight-to-recapture-key-town-443819.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-battle-of-sangin-british-forces-lead-fight-to-recapture-key-town-443819.html), accessed June 3, 2010.
dam area were a frequent phenomenon, which seriously threatened the servicing of the dam, and the maintenance of one of the two turbines. In 2007 and 2008, the British forces led two military campaigns targeting the Kajaki dam. In February 2007, during Operation Volcano, the Royal Marines engaged the Taliban in a fierce battle. The Taliban forces fired from small arms, mortars, and rockets. The British forces responded heavily with air assets, artillery attacks, and lightweight mortars. In the end, the British forces cleared the Kajaki area, and maintained a troop presence to prevent the Taliban from re-taking it.

This brief description of the British forces’ operations in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki districts show the flaws of pursuing a strategy that mostly focused on clearing areas, and not holding them. As I discuss in this chapter, the British forces lacked enough boots on the ground and adequate equipment and logistics during the early stages of their Helmand campaign. This capacity gap had seriously affected their performance in Helmand until 2007.

The fourth stage of British military operations in Helmand was marked by improved success in clearing, holding, and building territories. At least four high profile military campaigns illustrate the improved burden-sharing role of the British forces. The first concerns the British forces’ participation in a large-scale route clearing operation from Kandahar to Helmand. The remaining three focuses on military operations in the Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marjah districts.

In August-September 2008, the British and other NATO coalition forces launched the Operation Eagle Summit to transport a turbine from Kandahar airfield to the Kajaki dam area in Helmand. The Eagle Summit was a big success, and it is considered to be the largest route

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clearing mission the British military had carried out since the Second World War. After the transportation of the turbine, the British forces concentrated on the protection of the Kajaki dam. They were supported by the Afghan National Police force, and a British private security contractor. Despite that, the lack of security had constrained the possibility of bringing a third turbine to the Kajaki dam area, which was needed for its full-scale operation.

After participating in Eagle Summit, in December 2008, the British forces led Operation Sond Chara in Nad Ali district. The operation saw the concentration of nearly 1,500 British forces, supported by the multinational forces from Denmark and Estonia. The purpose of the operation was to provide security for the Lashkar Gah and its surrounding areas. According to a BBC report, the Royal Marines fought a WWII-style trench battle in Nad Ali, which secured the Taliban stronghold after intense fighting with the insurgents. Later, in the summer of 2009, the British forces launched Operation Panther Claw, which saw the deployment of nearly 3,000 British troops to establish the control of the Babaji and Nad Ali districts—the two most critical Taliban strongholds. The operation saw the use of massive airpower and ground forces, which had a decisive effect in weakening the Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan.

In February 2010, the British and coalition forces undertook Operation Moshtarak – a large-scale military offensive in the Taliban controlled Marja district. According to an ISAF

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press release, Moshtarak was a joint operation involving some 15,000 troops, led by five brigades of the Afghan forces, and supported by the coalition forces from Britain, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, and the United States.\textsuperscript{65} The British forces contributed attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and Special Forces to the Marja operation. Using a strategy of force concentration, instead of force dispersal, they gained significant success in securing and holding territories controlled by the insurgents. After the initial success in defeating the Taliban insurgents, the British and coalition forces moved toward building the areas.\textsuperscript{66} According to NATO military commanders, Operation Moshtarak was a great success story for the UK and coalition forces. They had successfully held the territory for a year, reopened schools and local markets, and reduced the flow of narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{67}

The foregoing discussion shows the British forces’ participation in coalition military operations in Helmand. The British forces paid a heavy price for its Helmand campaign. During the nine years of the Afghanistan War (October 2001-December 2010), the United Kingdom lost 348 soldiers.\textsuperscript{68} After the American troop fatalities (1,446), this was the second largest coalition troop fatalities in Afghanistan. Of the 348 British soldiers killed, nearly ninety percent were killed in enemy actions in the Helmand province. Figure 4.3 shows the British troop fatalities in Afghanistan. It shows that most of the soldiers were killed in Helmand.


In summary, since 2008, the British forces had pursued a strong offensive military strategy in Helmand province. The route-clearing operation from Kandahar to Helmand and subsequent military offensives in the Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marja districts illustrate this strong burden-sharing role. A strong burden-sharing role is defined here as a successful offensive against terrorists and militants. According to British defense experts, the injection of more troops and equipment, and the adoption of a population-centric counterinsurgency enabled the British forces to achieve significant success from 2008 onwards. This success came at a high price, with increasing fatalities from combat operations.

**Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution.** Britain also made a modest contribution to the non-combat stabilization mission in Afghanistan. Three major areas of
stabilization operations are important for our discussion: military and police training, provincial reconstruction, and economic development.

First and foremost, Britain was strongly committed to the U.S.-led process of rebuilding the Afghan armed forces. Canada, France, Germany and New Zealand were the other major coalition countries involved in the process. The initial goal was to build the Afghan army of 70,000 troops, which was later extended to nearly 140,000 troops. This indigenous Afghan force would take over the security responsibility by 2014, when NATO forces plan to begin withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Afghan military training focused on three types of soldiers: commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers.69 After seven weeks of initial training, recruits in the Afghan army were divided into two groups: soldiers with leadership potential were given a junior non-commissioned officers’ training; while the remaining soldiers were given advanced individual training. After the officers, trainers, and soldiers are trained separately, Canada offered validation training for enhancing the compatibility of various ranked soldiers. In a similar vein, France offered in-service training for Afghan soldiers.

Since March 2003, the British military trainers were engaged in mentoring the junior non-commissioned officers for the Afghan National Army. It was later supplemented with junior officers’ training program in Kabul, and operational mentoring and liaison teams in Helmand. Seasoned British non-commissioned officers trained the Afghan military mentors. The training module focused on battle lessons and indoor classroom lessons on fire and manoeuvre, military skills, map reading, sentry duties, and command training. The training also focused on various

types of patrolling: ambush, planned attack, team attack, pair attack, and company attack. In addition to training non-commissioned officers, the British trainers selected Afghan officer candidates for a 20-week rigorous training for commissioned officers. The officers’ training module included basic military skills, leadership, command and management of capabilities.

The entry level training of Afghan military forces took place at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC), with several military schools out of Kabul. The British military opened an infantry school outside Kabul to teach Afghan soldiers how to use their weapons in support of other military units. The school, which conducted ‘train the trainer program,’ had three wings. The first wing provided platoon commanders’ training. The second wing offered non-commissioned officers’ training for platoon sergeants. The third wing provided training in reconnaissance and support weapons, such as mortars, heavy machine guns, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade), and SPG anti-tank missile.

Overall, the reconstruction of Afghan military forces went well, with a few systemic problems in the Afghan army. These problems concerned the low morale and high desertion rate, and a sharp divide between the commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The British and coalition forces addressed these issues in their mentoring process. But, the Taliban insurgents

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often took opportunity of the systemic problems in Afghan military, to persuade them to join the insurgent rank and file.

Apart from training the Afghan armed forces, the British military was also engaged in training the Afghan police in defusing road side bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Soldiers from the UK Counter-IED Task Force trained up the Afghan police members into an explosive hazard reduction team. The purpose of the training was to improvise the Afghan security forces’ ability to detect and defuse the roadside bombs, which became a powerful weapon of Taliban insurgents.

After military reform, the second major stabilization role focused on reconstruction and development at the provincial level. Since 2003, the British civil-military experts had operated three provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The British-run PRTs incorporated a ‘comprehensive approach’ which focused on interagency collaboration among the development, foreign, and defense ministries. As a result, the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) were resourced together to operate the British PRTs in Afghanistan.

Britain established its first PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif in July 2003, and handed over its responsibility to the Swedish forces in March 2006. Under the British command, the Mazar PRT focused on improving the security sector reform, by mentoring the Afghan national security forces, and monitoring the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former Afghan insurgents. While many PRTs worked only on quick impact projects to win the hearts and minds

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of the local population, the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif also focused on improving the security by targeting the Afghan capacity building.

According to Jackobsen, the British-led Mazar PRT is a success story, and there are several reasons for its success.\textsuperscript{75} First, the British government focused on a pre-deployment consultation with NGOs, UN, and the grassroots community. Second, when confronted with fighting between two warlords—the Uzbek militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Tajik leader Mohammad Atta, the British forces negotiated a ceasefire and facilitated partial disarmament, that showed their diplomatic skills in a volatile situation. Third, the British PRT personnel understood the local conflict dynamics, which enabled them to shape the environment. Fourth, the British security forces undertook joint patrolling with Afghan police, and often served as back up forces.

After the initial success in Mazar-e-Sharif, in 2004, the United Kingdom established the second PRT in Mymana, Faryab province. Later, the responsibility for the Maymana PRT operation was handed over to Norway in 2005. Under the British command, the Maymana PRT combined the military, development, and diplomatic resources to establish governance and security in the Faryab province.

In 2006, Britain assumed responsibility for the Lashkar Gah PRT in Helmand. The Lashkar Gah PRT was established by the American forces in 2004. Unlike other NATO-run PRTs, where civilian experts represented a small component of the overall PRT staff, the British PRT in Lashkar Gah was an exception. For instance, by the end of 2010, the Lashkar Gah PRT

\textsuperscript{75} Peter Viggo Jackobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient, \textit{DISS Report} (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), pp. 32-33.
was manned by 165 personnel, including 80 civilian officials. According to the British Ministry of Defense, the U.K. PRT in Lashkar Gah implemented more than a hundred quick impact development projects to win the hearts and minds of Taliban sympathizers and local population. These quick projects encompassed a wide range of development programs, and included the construction of schools and windmill-powered wells, emergency food distribution, and water infrastructure works.

The third leg in British stabilization mission focused on economic development projects led by DFID. Andrew Mitchell, Britain’s international development secretary, succinctly assesses the role of DFID in Afghanistan: “While the military is there [in Afghanistan] to bring much-needed security, peace will only be achieved through political process backed by development.” This assessment fits into the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign of a counterinsurgency strategy, adopted by the British forces. The DFID projects in Afghanistan fell into three broad categories: stabilizing insecure areas, stimulating the economy, and extending the effectiveness of Afghan government. As part of a donor coordinated counter-narcotics program, the U.K. government provided wheat seeds, fertilizer, and expert advice to promote legal farming. The DFID claims that in the designated food zones, where farmers grow wheat seeds, there was a 37% drop in poppy cultivation in the year 2009. At that time, Afghanistan as a whole registered a 10% decrease in opium production.

Support for the diverse development projects came from a sustained flow of British aid to Afghanistan. According to Brookings Afghanistan Index data, between 2002 and 2008, Britain was the third largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, after the United States and Japan. During this time, Britain provided Afghanistan with $1.3 billion aid to help the reconstruction and stabilization operations in the war-torn country. This figure excludes the $188.9 million UK aid committed but not disbursed to Afghanistan during the years 2002-2008. How does the British development aid to Afghanistan compare with the country’s military costs of the war in Afghanistan? According to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the cost of UK’s military operations in Afghanistan increased from £750 million in 2006-07 to £1.5 billion in 2007-08, and eventually to £2.6 billion in 2008-09. Thus, compared to the war funding, British development aid to Afghanistan was much lower, but increased over the years from £154 million in 2006-07, to £166 million in 2007-08, and to £207 million in 2008-09. In July 2010, the British government decided that it would reduce its global aid commitment, but increase aid for Afghanistan from £500 million to £700 million over the next four years. This would constitute roughly 40% increase in British aid to Afghanistan. British aid to Pakistan also increased from £236 million for the period 2005 to 2008, up to £480 million for the period 2008 to 2011. This increasing aid flow made Pakistan one of Britain’s largest aid recipients, and reflects the British government’s comprehensive approach to an Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

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84 Helm and McVeigh, “Foreign Aid Diverted to Stabilize Afghanistan.”
What are the effects of British aid and development support in Afghanistan? The government as well as its development ministry claimed improvement in school enrollment, and expansion of healthcare centers and social justice as crucial indicators of success. However, the British parliamentarians, and the aid agencies often reported serious shortcomings in the government’s use of aid money for counterinsurgency purposes. In 2008, during a House of Commons debate, Adam Hollow MP from Gravesham noted serious deficiencies in the coordination between British military and development efforts in Afghanistan. Mr Holloway stressed that the DFID had a policy of investing in long-term development in a country, which did not fit with the military’s need for short-term quick impact projects. To support his claim, Mr. Holloway, quoted a military officer saying, “the military secure areas, but the civilians are way behind the military effort…we are lagging behind the rhetoric…The problem is that the DFID do not see themselves as part of our foreign policy.”

The British NGO Oxfam GB criticized the military’s use of development aid for counterinsurgency purposes. In October 2010, in written evidence to the British Parliament, the Oxfam observed that “there is scant evidence to support the notion that using aid for short-term counter-insurgency objectives, force protection, or to win hearts and minds is actually effective.” The Oxfam observed that although the DFID had spent the lion share of its foreign aid outside of the Helmand province (which has been Britain’s principal area of operation since 2006), the FCO and other departments had prioritized “short term security objectives” of

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87 Oxfam claims that it has been active in Pakistan since 1973 and in Afghanistan since 1982. By the end of 2010, Oxfam was working in 20 of the 34 Afghan provinces, while Oxfam’s international strategic partners had development operations in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. See UK Parliament, “The UK’s Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan: Written Evidence from Oxfam GB,” October 7, 2010. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/afpak/afpak04.htm, accessed January 14, 2011.
counterinsurgency campaign, and spent aid money inefficiently. This had resulted in the diversion of aid money that could benefit the Afghan needs and the recipient community. Oxfam concluded that the use of aid money for civil-military reconstruction activities had militarized the domain of humanitarian aid agencies. Based on its field reports, Oxfam recommended that the British government ensure “military actors and assets should only deliver humanitarian aid as a last resort,” while civilian NGOs should be the main actor in development process.88

In summary, the foregoing section analyzes Britain’s military and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. First, it shows that Britain pursued a proactive diplomacy to consolidate the European position on Afghanistan, and to ensure that a NATO-centric multilateral crisis management mission is in place under the U.S. leadership. Second, it shows that Britain deployed a sizable military force in Afghanistan, especially in the Helmand province. The British forces’ Helmand campaign shows the military risks of fighting the Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban insurgents. Finally, it argues that participation in offensive military operations was only part of Britain’s burden-sharing commitment in Afghanistan. Britain’s coalition role also included a sustained interest in reconstruction and development activities. Although the British military wanted to use development aid for security purposes, the British development agencies criticized the militarization of development aid.

II. Explaining Britain’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan

This section employs the integrated burden-sharing model to analyze Britain’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. First it reviews the effect of three international factors—allying

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88 The UK's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan: Written Evidence from Oxfam GB,” October 7, 2010.
dependence, balance of threat, and collective action—in shaping British choices in Afghanistan. It argues that among the systemic factors, transatlantic alliance commitment and balance of threat presented two strong incentives to the British government to pursue a robust coalition policy in Afghanistan. Next, it investigates how the systemic incentives were channeled through the three domestic level factors – political regime, public opinion, and military capability—in producing a unique burden-sharing role for Britain. This section shows that among the domestic factors, only political regime and military capability played a strong role in shaping Britain’s burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan.

**Alliance Dependence.** Alliance dependence did not present any systemic level incentive to persuade Britain to join and support the coalition in Afghanistan. Instead, alliance commitment strongly structured British choices in Afghanistan. Speaking about Britain’s burden-sharing behavior during the war on terrorism, General David Petraeus, the Commander of U.S. Central Command, and U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, described the United Kingdom as America’s “most trusted and important coalition partner” in Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^89\)

This was evident in British political, military, and economic contributions to the Afghanistan War, which began in October 2001, and continued through December 2010. There is no evidence that Britain made these contributions under pressures from the United States and NATO, or it did so in return for any economic gains or military aid. Instead, at least two aspects of Britain’s alliance commitment provided a strong incentive to support the Afghanistan War. The first focuses on the Anglo-American special relationship, and the second concerns Britain’s commitment to NATO as a guarantor of transatlantic security.

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According to Theo Farrell, one of the unstated reasons for which the British forces were in Afghanistan was to ensure the “reputation and relationship with the US.” Farrell suggests that although Britain was not dependent on the United States or NATO, its concern for the reputation of its bilateral relationship with the United States played a strong role in shaping London’s Afghanistan policy. Patrick Porter makes a similar argument. He stresses that “Britain shoulders a heavy burden [in Afghanistan] because of it [the Anglo-American special relationship].” Porter suggests that London sought to project a military-strategic power via a coalition with America. Military officials concur with Farrell and Porter. In 2009, the then British army chief General Sir Richard Dannatt, argued that the United Kingdom should increase its military contribution to Afghanistan to enhance the credibility of its strategic partnership with the United States. General Dannatt also noted that the Anglo-American special relationship “offers a degree of influence and security that has been pivotal to our [British] foreign and defense policy.”

How has the special relationship evolved, and what incentive did it present to encourage Britain’s coalition contribution to Afghanistan? I address these questions in two stages. First, I describe the evolution of special relationship in the intelligence, military, and political domains. Next, I discuss the causal link between special relationship and British contribution to Afghanistan.

91 Porter, “Last Charge of the Knights?” p. 356.
92 Ibid, 361.
The Anglo-American special relationship has evolved and strengthened mostly in the domains of intelligence and military cooperation. For instance, the American National Security Agency (NSA), and its British counterpart General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) work very closely and monitor the flow of communications and electronic intelligence.\(^\text{94}\) The British domestic and external intelligence agencies – the MI5 and the MI6 – also maintain strong and institutionalized cooperation with their American counterparts—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is widely held that the CIA station chief in London attends the weekly meetings of the British Joint Intelligence Committee meetings. An obvious result of such strong intelligence cooperation is, the British Weekly Survey of Intelligence and American Presidential Daily Brief would “probably look very similar most weeks.”\(^\text{95}\) Critics contend that the Anglo-American intelligence partnership is interdependent, and founded on reciprocal benefits. The British intelligence services share their vast linguistic expertise and networks of outposts in the British Dependent Territories. In return, they get access to the U.S. intelligence resources and technical capabilities. Despite such reciprocity, it is said that “more than half the budget for GCHQ is paid for by American taxpayers.”\(^\text{96}\)

In the military domain, the special relationship is strong and extensive. The two countries share common bases, military weapons, and technology. At the end of 2010, nearly 10,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly from U.S. Air Forces, were deployed in the United Kingdom.\(^\text{97}\)


U.S. Strategic Command has a ballistic missile early warning system and Spacetrack Radar located at the Royal Air Force Fylingdales (RAF) Moor station in North York Moors. In 2003 the American and British governments agreed to use the RAF Fylingdales station for the purpose of U.S. National Missile Defense tracking facility. In 2004, the British government agreed to site American missile interceptors at RAF Fylingdales Moor. Those decisions are still valid today as of January 2011. Finally, Britain is reliant on the United States for the acquisition and maintenance of its submarine-based nuclear deterrence. As a RUSI analysis suggests, collaboration on “a strategic nuclear deterrent programme with the US is a significant part of the UK’s close strategic relationship with the US.”

The Anglo-American special relationship in the intelligence and military domains has been cemented and strained by the personal relations of key leaders from both countries. This includes the wartime close relationship between Churchill and Theodore Roosevelt; and later the ideological affinity between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In recent years, Blair’s warm relationship with Bill Clinton and George Bush had consolidated the Anglo-American relationship. While Churchill, Thatcher, and Blair maintained the close relationship with American presidents in projecting an assertive foreign policy, other British leaders downplayed the importance of America’s special place, and defined the bilateral relationship as ‘close,’ and ‘normal’, not ‘special.’ For instance, the tenures of Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and John

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99 Critics argue that “Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent is not independent – the Trident missile system was built by an American firm and, technically, it is leased to Britain.” It is also said that Britain does not have the infrastructure to run its nuclear arsenal – the missiles are even serviced in the US.” Graeme Baker, “Military Might Reflected in Slashed War Budget,” New Zealand Herald, October 23, 2010. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/afghanistan/news/article.cfm?id=12&objectid=10682548, accessed November 10, 2010.
Major were marked by serious tensions in relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{101} For them, the bilateral relations with the United States were a ‘natural relationship’ based on shared culture, history, and foreign policy goals.

To what extent has the special relationship influenced Britain’s foreign policy of coalition contribution? The answer is straightforward. The two countries have developed a deep and long-standing commitment to coalition operations in the areas of mutual interests. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United Kingdom and the United States shared a common interest in defeating Al Qaeda, and denying it a safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A close look at the British strategic reviews supports this thesis of collaboration in the areas of mutual interest. For instance, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the \textit{1998 Strategic Defense Review} (referred hereto as \textit{1998 SDR}) emphasized greater European burden-sharing as a pre-requisite for engaging the United States in European and transatlantic security.\textsuperscript{102}

For Britain, coalition operations in Afghanistan required a strategy involving proactive diplomacy, sustained offensives, and reconstruction activities. The \textit{2002 New Chapter to the Strategic Defense Review} notes that the British actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere should be understood as part of a broader mission “to eliminate terrorism as a force in international

\textsuperscript{101} To begin with, although McMillan had close relations with young American President John F. Kennedy, McMillan’s refusal to send British troops to Vietnam angered American President Lyndon Johnson, and created strains in Anglo-American relationship for about 15 years. It is widely known that Heath-Nixon and Major-Clinton relations were so sour over serious disagreements over foreign and security policy. For instance, during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Nixon failed to inform Heath of putting the U.S. armed forces on high alert of readiness. Twenty years later, in 1993, the two countries experienced another low point in their relations, when Clinton extended a moratorium on nuclear tests in the deserts of Nevada, and urged Major to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In both cases, British Prime Ministers found their American colleagues—in this case Presidents—caring less about the British national interests, something not reflective of a special relationship. See: “US and UK: A Transatlantic Love Story?” \textit{BBC News}, November 17, 2003. \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3264169.stm#btp}, accessed November 10, 2010.

\textsuperscript{102} UK Ministry of Defense, \textit{The Strategic Defense Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World}, p. 11.
affairs.” The New Chapter to SDR also notes that Britain’s “ability to operate alongside the US (and with other partners, particularly in Europe but also elsewhere) will be key to future success” in the war on terrorism. The 2003 and 2004 Defense White Papers assert that Britain should seek to shape the outcome of coalition operations; and greater interoperability with the U.S. forces would be a ‘major focus’ of UK’s military transformation.104 The 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review (referred hereto as 2010 SDSR) has a similar emphasis on coalition operations. It notes that, Britain seeks to contribute to “international military coalitions to focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States.”105 The 2010 SDSR also stresses that Britain’s intelligence and military capability are most likely to benefit U.S. and coalition operations.106

Is Afghanistan the only case where Britain’s credibility and reputation to its principal ally had to be secured? The answer is no. The Anglo-American special relationship had also influenced Britain’s burdensharing decisions during the two Persian Gulf Wars: the First Iraq War (1990-1991), and the Second Iraq War (2003-2010).107 For prime ministers Thatcher and Blair, the United Kingdom and the United States had two mutual interests in the Persian Gulf: to

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secure the flow of oil from the Gulf region; and to enforce Iraqi compliance with international nonproliferation regime. It is in this context, Britain deployed the second largest military forces (nearly 50,000) in both Iraq Wars.

How has Britain’s commitment to NATO influenced its Afghanistan mission? The answer is simple. According to the 1998 SDR, the end of the Cold War has transformed the international security environment, in which there is no direct threat to the territorial security of Europe and the United Kingdom. Despite the absence of a territorial threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO has not lost its relevance. Instead, its peace support operations in Bosnia have shown that a revitalized NATO can play a significant role in international security. The defense review stresses that “the fundamental purpose of defending the freedom of all its [NATO] members remains as simple.” With regard to military participation in allied operations, the strategic review makes it clear that “Under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Britain would assist any NATO Ally or Allies under armed attack in Europe or North America by taking appropriate action, including the use of armed force.” It also notes that “The full range of Britain's military capabilities, including our [British] nuclear forces, is available to NATO.” Thus, Britain’s long-standing commitment to the collective security of the NATO alliance encouraged a strong coalition contribution in Afghanistan and other conflict prone areas.

108 During the Gulf War, the U.S. and multinational coalition-led operations forced Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to withdraw troops from Kuwait, and to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty. While restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty was an important goal of the U.S.-led Gulf War coalition, ensuring the sustained inflow of Gulf oil and maintaining the balance of power in the Gulf region was the key motivating factors for the United Kingdom and other coalition members. During the second Gulf War (Iraq War, 2003-present), Tony Blair made the controversial decision to support U.S. invasion of Iraq on faulty and politicized intelligence assessment that Saddam Hussein had covert weapons of mass destruction program, and that was the main reason for Iraq’s non-cooperation with international weapons inspection teams.


112 Ibid.
Two questions in the UK-NATO relations are important in understanding British contribution to the NATO-led ISAF mission. The first involves how Britain responded to NATO’s strategic transformation in the post-Cold War era. The second focuses on whether those relations have presented Britain with any systemic incentive to support the coalition in Afghanistan.

During the post-Cold War era, Britain remained strongly committed to the North Atlantic Alliance. London’s policies on three issues illustrate the preeminence of NATO in British defense policy—NATO’s eastward enlargement, Europeanization, and adaptation. First, on the question of enlargement, Britain is a strong supporter of eastern enlargement and an institutionalized relationship with Russia. The Blair and Brown governments have seen three waves of enlargement in 1999, 2004, and 2009, with a total 12 East European nations joining NATO. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, it was decided that Georgia and Ukraine would be extended full membership of NATO. Britain offered bilateral defense cooperation to all NATO member aspirants. This defense cooperation was based on the assumption that an “enlarged and effective NATO contributes to enhanced security and stability in Europe.”

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114 During the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1999, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO. During the second wave in 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO. During the third wave in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined NATO.

engaging Russia in the transatlantic security dialogue. Since then Russia has participated in North Atlantic Council discussions, but cannot vote on NATO policy.

On Europeanization, Britain has strongly supported the process of European Security and Defense Policy, while remaining firmly committed to NATO. Following the failure of the EU to effectively manage the crisis in Kosovo, Britain supported the development of NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the Berlin Plus Agreement in enhancing EU-NATO cooperation. The purpose of CJTF and Berlin Plus Agreement is to allow the EU to use NATO, and by extension, American resources in EU-led crisis management operations.

Finally, Britain has strongly supported NATO’s transformation. In the post-Cold War era, NATO has prioritized improved alliance capability to deploy a rapid response force, which can be deployed in five days and sustain itself for 30 days and longer with re-supply. This requires improved air- and sea-lift capabilities to transport allied troops, and military assets and equipments across the globe. The NATO Response Force is a multinational and multi-service readily deployable and technologically advanced force with three components: a command and control structure, an immediate response force of 13,000 troops from NATO allies, and a Response Forces Pool to supplement the immediate response forces, when necessary.

\[^{117}\text{Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2005, p. 128.}\]
\[^{120}\text{The idea of NATO Response Force evolved in several stages. It was first announced in NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit. It reached the full operational capability of up to 25,000 troops at the 2006 Riga Summit, and was subsequently modified in later NATO summits. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The NATO Response Force,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm, accessed January 17, 2011.}\]
Britain is a strong supporter of NATO’s military capability and transformation agenda. Over 95% of British national military capabilities are available for NATO; and Britain is the lead nation for NATO’s multinational ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, one of NATO’s six high readiness force (land) headquarters, deployed in Afghanistan in 2006. Britain has also provided one of the three maritime high readiness headquarters for NATO. More tellingly, British aircrafts comprise nearly 25% of NATO airborne early warning force.\textsuperscript{121}

Britain’s commitment to NATO has had a strong effect on its Afghanistan mission. Nearly all of Britain’s strategic and security reviews place an importance on NATO as a premier security alliance. The \textit{2002 New Chapter to SDR} presumes that NATO’s alliance military capability development and strategic partnership with the EU and Russia will play a strong role in addressing the threats to international security. The \textit{New Chapter} also asserts that NATO has played a key role “in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, including from the threat of international terrorism.”\textsuperscript{122}

Why has Britain maintained a strong commitment to NATO? And, what explains its commitment to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan? There are at least two possible answers: one focuses on NATO as a guarantor of European and Euro-Atlantic security; and the other highlights NATO as a vehicle for projecting Britain’s global interests.

First, Britain gives utmost priority to the security of Europe, and it sees a strong NATO as an ultimate guarantor of European security. Thus, participation in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere enhances the credibility of the alliance in maintaining security in an


uncertain era. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the United Kingdom and other NATO allies re-affirmed their commitment to rebuild a strong Afghan national security force, which would be able to defend Afghanistan. Second, Britain has always pursued a global responsibility, and it regards NATO as a vehicle for projecting its global ambitions. The 2008 UK National Security Strategy stresses that “we expect our Armed Forces to operate in most cases as part of NATO or in coalitions.” The 2010 SDSR takes a similar stance on NATO. It asserts that Britain “will continue to contribute to NATO’s operations and its Command and Force Structures, to ensure that the Alliance is able to deliver a robust and credible response to existing and new security challenges.” James Sperling notes that when it comes to dealing with international security issues, Britain gives more importance to NATO than the EU. This is due to the fact that since the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain has perceived its strategic partnership with the United States as an inevitable element in projecting power outside Europe. Moreover, NATO provides an institutional forum to maintain a close partnership with the United States, and “an opportunity (rather than the ability) to influence U.S. foreign policy in times of crises.”

In summary, Britain’s commitment to the United States and NATO presented a systemic incentive to join and maintain the coalition in Afghanistan. Malcolm Chalmers’ note is very relevant here. An expert on British defense policy, Chalmers stresses that “the UK did not see Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a counter-terrorist strategy; it saw it as part of an Alliance commitment.” Like Sperling and Porter, Chalmers note that the Anglo-American special

125 Sperling, “Permanent Allies or Friends with Benefits?” p. 32.
relationship has developed a longstanding commitment to deploy military forces in areas of mutual interest. Additionally, Britain’s commitment to NATO as a guarantor of European and transatlantic security has supported NATO’s capabilities and enlargement in the post-Cold War era. The 1998 and 2010 strategic defense reviews made it clear that alliance commitment presented a unique incentive for Britain to participate in the U.S. and NATO-led coalition operations around the world, especially in Afghanistan. To what extent has the balance of threat provided an additional incentive to encourage Britain’s participation in the Afghanistan War coalition? This question is discussed below with a reference to the threats posed by Al Qaeda’s transnational terrorist network, WMD proliferation, Taliban insurgency, and narcotics trafficking.

**Balance of Threat.** After alliance commitment, balance of threat presented the second systemic level incentive for Britain to join and support the coalition in Afghanistan. Threat is defined here as the actual and perceived threat from state and non-state actors. My burden-sharing model predicts that convergent threat perception—the presence of similar threats facing the United States and its NATO allies—would encourage Britain to pursue a strong coalition contribution to Afghanistan. By contrast, divergent threat perception would reduce the chances for greater contribution, unless Britain faces domestic and external pressures to keep its commitment.

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Evidence suggests that transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda, and Taliban militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan did not pose an existential threat to British, U.S., or NATO security. Despite that, during the Afghanistan War (2001-2010), the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO shared the perception that Al Qaeda’s radical ideology and its transnational Islamist militants posed the most pressing threat to international security. During the same time, growing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan posed a significant threat to the British and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This resurgence in Taliban activities, coupled with the threat of opium trade, encouraged Britain to maintain a strong support for coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Four threat assessments show the incentives for Britain to join and support the Afghanistan coalition. The first two focus on Al Qaeda related threats, and the rest concentrate on Taliban-related threats.

The first threat relates to WMD terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the British and American officials publicly addressed the concerns over Al Qaeda’s intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction for a catastrophic terrorist attack. On September 14, 2001, former prime minister Blair spoke about the potential threat of WMD terrorism. During a parliamentary debate, he stressed that Al Qaeda terrorists were fanatics, with the ability and intentions to commit mass murder. He warned that:

We know, that they [Al Qaeda fanatics] would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons. It is time that this trade was exposed,
disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the events of 11 September, and we should act on the warning.\textsuperscript{128}

Former CIA director George Tenet confirms such fear about Al Qaeda’s WMD intentions.\textsuperscript{129} In his memoir \textit{At the Center of the Storm}, Tenet warns that Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal is to detonate a nuclear device in an American city.\textsuperscript{130} He claims that on two separate occasions – in 1998 and 2000 – Al Qaeda leaders attempted to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan. In a significant breakthrough in August 2001, Al Qaeda’s top leader Osama bin Laden, and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar met with senior Pakistani nuclear scientists involved in charitable activities for Afghan refugees.\textsuperscript{131} Tenet writes that the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders’ meeting with the Pakistani scientists indicated Laden’s interests in acquiring nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{132} Tenet also writes about the Taliban’s interests in acquiring biological or chemical weapons and their delivery methods.\textsuperscript{133}

In 2002, U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld stressed that the United States did not have any “hard evidence” that Al Qaeda or Taliban forces possessed weapons of mass destruction. However, he indicated that extensive searches by the U.S. forces had discovered

\begin{flushright}


\textsuperscript{130} George Tenet, \textit{At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA} (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 259-280.


\end{flushright}
“diagrams, materials, reports” that pointed to Al Qaeda’s intention to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction.\(^{134}\) Despite the lack of hard evidence, the speculation over Al Qaeda and Taliban militants acquiring, or aspiring to acquire WMD materials continued to surface in scholarly reports and intelligence assessments. In 2009, a U.S.-based think tank report stressed that the rise of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan might increase the potential for Al Qaeda and Taliban to seek WMD capability to inflict casualties on U.S. and NATO forces.\(^{135}\) In 2010, the annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community reported that the United States and the international community were concerned about terrorists gaining access to WMD. The threat assessment also reported that U.S. intelligence community did not know if any country was deliberately providing WMD support to terrorists.\(^{136}\)

After the perceived danger of WMD terrorism, Al Qaeda’s successful terrorist attacks and foiled plots around the world forged a shared threat perception with the United States. General Petraeus, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, spoke about the effect of such shared threats on coalition operations. In June 2010 during a remark on land warfare, he observed that:

> Of course, I don't have to explain to anyone here the *common threats* that emanate from the CENTCOM AOR (Central Command Area of Responsibility). 9/11, 7/7, and the 2006 jets plot were masterminded by, or linked to, extremists now

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operating in the same zone along the Durand Line. Elsewhere, al-Qaeda in Iraq, which blew up hotels in Amman, Jordan and may have sought to attack next month's World Cup in South Africa, is the same group that inspired the attack against the Glasgow Airport in 2007.137

General Petraeus’ assessment makes several claims. He argues that Al Qaeda symbolizes the threat of global Islamist terrorism. He also notes that the United States and the United Kingdom are the main victims of Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks.138 With regard to the Afghanistan coalition, Petraeus argues that the Durand Line— the disputed frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan— has emerged as a sanctuary for Al Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban sympathizers. The annual reports from the British intelligence oversight committee, as well as the periodic threat levels released by the British intelligence agencies indicate the heightened threat from Al Qaeda.

The UK Intelligence and Security Committee (referred hereto as ISC) had consistently reported that between 2001 and 2010, the threat of Islamist terrorism remained much higher, compared to the domestic threat of Irish insurgency. In its 2001-2002 annual report, the ISC claimed that that prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the British and American intelligence agencies had achieved some “notable successes against UBL (Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden) related terrorism.”139 However, “the scale of the threat and the vulnerability of Western

138 This is evidenced by the two high profile terrorist attacks (9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, and 7/7 attack in London) and the foiled plot to blow out transatlantic airlines in 2006.
states to terrorists…was not understood.”140 In 2003, the ISC reported that the threat from 
Islamist terrorism heightened after the October 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia, which killed 
more than 200 people, including 24 British citizens. The parliamentary oversight committee 
blamed the domestic intelligence agency MI5 for “a serious misjudgment, when it did not raise 
the threat to general UK interests in Indonesia from SIGNIFICANT to HIGH.”141 The 2004 ISC 
report claimed that the British intelligence agencies had identified “increased number of 
[Islamist] terrorists, together with their sympathizers and financiers.”142 

As General Petraeus remarked, the July 2005 London bombings and the 2006 
transatlantic airline bombing plot revealed that homegrown terrorists and their international 
connection was a real threat to the British and global security.143 During the 2005 bombings, four 
suicide attacks were carried out in the London transport system, which killed 52 people, 
including four Al Qaeda-affiliated perpetrators, and injured more than 770 people.144 A year 
later, in August 2006, Al Qaeda-associated terrorists planned to blow at least seven transatlantic 
airliners with liquid explosives. The airliners were scheduled to leave London for four American 
and two Canadian airports. Intelligence sharing among the British and U.S. agencies thwarted the

141 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2002-2003, Presented to Parliament by the Prime
142 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2004-2004, Presented to Parliament by the Prime
143 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2005-2006, Presented to Parliament by the Prime
Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2006); Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report
2006-2007, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2008);
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/; accessed February 4, 2011; The
attacks were perpetrated by four Al Qaeda associated individuals: Mohammed Siddique Khan, Hasib Hussein,
Shazad Tanweer, and Jermaine Lindsay. For an official account of the investigation on the 2005 London bombings,
see UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London:
plot. Initially the British police arrested 24 people, of whom 3 were convicted in a lengthy trial that ended in 2009.\textsuperscript{145}

The 2005 London bombings and the 2006 airline bombing plot exposed the vulnerability of the United Kingdom to threats from international terrorism, in which the British citizens were strongly involved. In January 2007, during oral evidence to the parliamentary oversight committee, the then chief of Britain’s external intelligence agency MI6 stressed that “we have to think creatively to illuminate… the interface between al-Qaeda and radicalized British Muslims, essentially to catch the connection between… the domestic aspect of the threat and the overseas aspect of the threat.”\textsuperscript{146} The 2009 and 2010 ISC reports presented a consistently heightened threat assessment. They claimed that individuals and groups affiliated with and motivated by Al Qaeda continued to pose serious threats to British national security and overseas interests.\textsuperscript{147} In November 2010, Sir Malcom Rifkind, the chairman of British Intelligence and Security Committee remarked that Britain was no longer concerned about the state-centric threat. Instead, international terrorism had emerged as the top priority for British national security.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{145} This was the largest counterterrorism trial in Britain’s history, which involved strong cooperation between American and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency had collaborated with the British Scotland Yard, Secret Service (MI5), and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the lengthy investigation and prosecution process. See: John F. Burns, “British Court Convicts Three in Plot to Blow Up Airliners,” \textit{New York Times}, September 7, 2009. \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/europe/08britain.html?ref=2006transatlanticaircraftplot}, accessed February 4, 2011.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 2006</td>
<td>Severe [a terrorist attack is highly likely]</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 10, 2006</td>
<td>Raised to Critical [an attack is expected imminently and indicates high level of threat]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13, 2006</td>
<td>Lowered to Severe [a terrorist attack is highly likely]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 2007</td>
<td>Raised to Critical [an attack is expected imminently and indicates high level of threat]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 2007</td>
<td>Lowered to Severe [Attacks are still highly likely, but no longer though to be imminent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2009</td>
<td>Lowered to Substantial [the treat of a terrorist attack remains a strong possibility and may occur without warning]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2010</td>
<td>Raised to Severe [a terrorist attack is highly likely]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 24, 2010</td>
<td>• Northern Ireland – Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National – Lowered to Substantial</td>
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Notes: Pre-2006 data on the threat levels are not publicly available. In September 2010, the MI5 first issued Irish terrorism related threat level

The third threat assessment concerns the rise of Taliban insurgency. It captures the dangers posed to the British and coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to the Brookings Afghanistan Index data, since 2004, there was an average 100 attacks per week in 2004, which increased to 200 attacks in 2006, 400 in 2008, and eventually to 700 in April 2010. Figure 4.4 shows the Taliban insurgent attacks by type and by weeks. Three types of attack were more

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prevail: (a) attack by mortar, rocket, and surface to air attack; (b) Ambush, grenade, RPG, and other small arms attack; and (c) bombs (IED and Mines) explosion. \(^\text{152}\) The U.S. and coalition fatalities from IEDs increased significantly. In 2001, there was no reported fatality (of U.S. and coalition forces) from IEDs. \(^\text{153}\) In 2002, only 9 troops were killed in IEDs. This number increased to 58 in 2006, 280 in 2009, and 372 in 2010. After IED attacks, the second most important cause of coalition troop fatalities was hostile armed attacks carried out with rockets, grenades, and/or mortars. Accidental death or death caused by mechanical failure was the principal cause of coalition fatalities until 2004, and since then, it had gradually declined. \(^\text{154}\) These insurgent attacks related data indicate that, once the British and other coalition forces were deployed in Afghanistan, they had a strong incentive to support the U.S.-led coalition to suppress the Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda allies.

The growing insurgent attacks were responsible for increasing troop fatalities for the UK and coalition forces. This had provided an impetus for keeping the foreign forces in Afghanistan to fight the insurgents and simultaneously to train the Afghan national security forces. Between 2001 and 2010, nearly 2,400 U.S. and coalition forces were killed in Afghanistan. More than a quarter (nearly 647) of all fatalities took place in the Helmand province, in British-controlled area of operation, and its adjacent areas controlled by the U.S. and NATO forces. Since 2006, the UK and coalition troop fatalities in Helmand increased significantly, from 31 in 2006 to 79 in 2008 to 288 in 2010. Figure 4.5 shows the coalition troop fatality data for Helmand. As stated before, the British military and civilian personnel suffered nearly half of all Helmand fatalities (299 out of 647). The U.S. troops and civilian personnel suffered roughly the equal fatalities.

\(^{153}\) Ibid.  
\(^{154}\) Ibid.
(304) in Helmand. Troop fatality data generated by *BBC News* show that nearly 90% of all British fatalities in Afghanistan occurred in Helmand, and most of them due to enemy attacks.

**Figure 4.4 Taliban Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-April 2010**

![Taliban Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-April 2010](image)

Source: Adapted from Brookings Afghanistan Index, October 2010, p. 10.

**Figure 4.5 UK and Coalition Troop Fatalities in Helmand, 2003-2010**

![UK and Coalition Troop Fatalities in Helmand, 2003-2010](image)

Source: iCasualties.org.
According to Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, Helmand was a “tough nut to crack” for the British forces. Several factors contributed to the resurgence of Taliban insurgency in Helmand. Farrell and Gordon stress that insurgents in Helmand were more supportive and loyal to the Taliban ideology, and more cohesive compared to the Taliban insurgents in other Afghan provinces. Besides, the prevailing socio-economic conditions in Helmand created a fertile ground for the rise of Taliban activities. These included widespread corruption, criminal activities, and the presence of a massive narco-trafficking network embedded within the higher echelon of society and government.

The United Kingdom and its key NATO allies had two principal options to deal with the growing insurgency in Afghanistan: to withdraw troops, or to deploy additional troops to fight the Taliban. As described in the earlier section, Britain, and a handful of NATO allies chose the second option. The central logic behind such force escalation was to increase the pressures on the Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda collaborators, and to enable the Afghan security forces to take responsibility for the country’s security. The British government had come under increasing pressures from the domestic populace to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. The government responded to such pressures by asserting the importance of a strong military presence to secure the areas from Taliban control, and to extend the authority of the nascent Afghan government beyond the capital Kabul. Britain’s 2010 National Security Strategy: Report on Progress provides a compelling case for staying in Afghanistan:

To leave Afghanistan now would not only abandon the Afghan people, it would give AQ [Al Qaeda] a strategic victory…helping them to attract more adherents.

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and adding significantly to the threat they can pose to the UK people and our interests abroad. While AQ is in some difficulties, we must keep up the pressure to degrade severely their capability, and to make a lasting and significant reduction in the threat they pose.157

Eight years ago, in 2002, the British policymakers made a similar justification for continued military presence in Afghanistan. After the Al Qaeda leadership was weakened and the Taliban regime toppled, in March 2002, the then British defense secretary Geoff Hoon spoke about the necessity to remain in Afghanistan to get the job done. At that time, Hoon claimed that:

The recent Operation ANACONDA in the Paktia province, led by the United States, tackled one group of Al Qa’ida terrorists and Taliban fighters. They showed that these people are still in Afghanistan in large numbers and that they are heavily armed. Left alone, these groups would threaten all that the Afghan people and their supporters in the international community have achieved so far and would strive to retain Afghanistan as a base for training and organizing terrorism. They do not recognize the Afghan Interim Authority and will work to destabilize the situation across Afghanistan.158

The fourth threat concerns the illicit drug trade, and its connection with terrorism and insurgency. Despite the Afghan government’s anti-drug policy, and the international

community’s support behind it, Afghanistan remained the world’s largest opium producing country. In 2002, Afghanistan produced 76% of world’s opium. This increased to 82% in 2006, and 88% in 2010. During this time, Helmand remained the largest opium producing province in Afghanistan. In 2004, Helmand produced nearly 22% opium produced in Afghanistan. This increased to 58% in 2009. In January 2010, participants at the London conference on Afghanistan expressed their concerns about the deadly links between “the narcotics trade, the insurgency and other criminal activity, including corruption and human trafficking.” The London conference also called for the continuation of the Paris-Moscow process in countering the threats of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorist financing.

For Britain, illicit drugs trafficking from Afghanistan posed a direct national security threat to Afghanistan and coalition countries operating there. According to the 2009-2010 British organized crime threat assessment report, “drug trafficking is carried out primarily for criminal gain, but in Afghanistan it is also directly linked to the insurgency by providing financial and logistical support, enabling attacks on British and other coalition forces.” An additional harm is caused by the corrupting influence of drug traffickers to the reconstruction and stabilization operations of UK and NATO forces. The trafficking of heroin into the United Kingdom posed another threat — a direct threat to the public health and wellbeing of heroin consumers.

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According to the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), more than 90% of the heroin sold in the UK comes from the opium poppies grown in Afghanistan. This is processed and trafficked into Britain and other European countries via several ‘route countries, such as, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Far East. The SOCA conducted operational intelligence in Afghanistan, and offered mentoring and support to Afghan authorities into the investigation and prosecution of Afghan drug traffickers. This complemented the works of the British and NATO forces engaged in counter-narcotics operations in Helmand and other provinces. As the lead country for the counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan, Britain was engaged in targeting the disruption of drugs production and trafficking from Afghanistan. The British counternarcotics efforts also focused on the discontinuation of drug processing by combating the spread of precursor chemical used for converting morphine into heroin. This offensive anti-drug strategy was coupled with a defensive strategy that included the provision of alternative livelihood assistance for poppy farmers to engage them in productive economic activities.

In summary, the foregoing discussion shows several global threats facing Britain and its allies -- the threat of WMD terrorism, Al Qaeda’s high profile terrorist attacks, growing Taliban insurgency, and drug trafficking. I argue that Al Qaeda’s intent to acquire WMD materials, and its high profile terrorist attacks were perceived by the United States and the United Kingdom as the most urgent threat to international security. Britain joined the Afghanistan War as an act of alliance solidarity with NATO, enshrined in the Article 5 collective defense provision of the Washington Treaty. After joining the coalition, the continued threat of Al Qaeda and Taliban

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presented a serious challenge to coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Britain and its NATO allies responded to this challenge by deploying more forces and taking a proactive counterinsurgency strategy. Finally, the growth in opium and heroin production in Afghanistan posed a direct threat to British and coalition strategy. Britain agreed with its allies to deal with the drug trafficking threat by investing in offensive and defensive strategies designed to stem the flow of opium and heroin from Afghanistan. To what extent did Britain perceive the tasks of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as a collective good, for which it could ride free? I address this question below to investigate if the free-riding motivation played any role in determining Britain’s Afghanistan policy.

**Collective Action.** Collective action did not present any systemic incentive in shaping British policy on Afghanistan. The collective action hypothesis posits that a core group of countries will support the coalition leader in the pursuit of a public good. But, in the long run, these core group members, and junior coalition partners will tend to ride free. This free-riding motivation is the central premise of the collective action theory. In the context of the War in Afghanistan, the public good is the reduced strength of Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgent at present and future. If the collective action hypothesis is correct, America’s junior partner Britain would demonstrate a free-riding behavior, or most likely to make a contribution lower than expected. At the same time, the United States would to play the dominant role and bear most of the military burdens of offensive and defensive operations. Evidence shows that while the United States shared most of the burdens of offensive and defensive operations in Afghanistan, Britain did not ride free.
As discussed before in this chapter, Britain pursued a proactive diplomacy, and a strong coalition role in Afghanistan. At least three pieces of evidence support this robust coalition policy, which shows the weakness of the free riding hypothesis in predicting Britain’s coalition behavior. The first two concern the number and location of troops, while the rest focus on the economic and human costs of the war. We shall cautiously interpret this, as the British case does not represent the more than 45-nation strong coalition countries, many of which may rode free in Afghanistan.

First, as the conflict with the Taliban escalated, Britain supported NATO’s strategy to increase ISAF forces in Afghanistan. In 2009, Britain had nearly 9,000 troops in southern Afghanistan, which was 5.1% of its active forces. At that time, this was the highest percentage of active forces deployed by a coalition country, followed by 4.24% of its U.S. forces, 4.3% of Canadian forces, and only 1.74% of German forces in Afghanistan.\(^\text{168}\) Second, Britain not only maintained a higher level of troop commitment, but deployed its forces to the hostile Helmand province. The decision to deploy its forces to Helmand indicated that the British government was willing to share the risks of offensive military operations in Afghanistan, whereas Germany and Italy had resisted the NATO pressures for redeployment in the insurgent-prone southern Afghanistan.

Third, maintaining a large contingent of military force, and equipping them with the right military logistics put an enormous pressure on British economy. Since 2001, the British war funding for the Afghan mission increased significantly, which accounted for a large share Britain’s military spending. Figure 4.6 shows Britain’s cost of war in Afghanistan. It shows that,

\(^{168}\) Appendix 4.A presents the data on military expenditure, active-deployed force ratio for top ISAF troop contributing countries.
Britain’s total cost of the Afghan war was less than £1 billion during the first five years—from 2001 until 2005. However, since 2006, the British war-funding for Afghanistan increased rapidly from £738 million in 2006 to £3.5 billion in 2009-2010.

Source: UK Ministry of Defence; SIPRI Yearbook.

As the war progressed, it put a huge pressure on Britain’s defense budget. In 2009-2010, the United Kingdom spent nearly 9% of its total defense budget to resourcing the Afghanistan War. This was significantly higher, when compared with the combined budgets of France, Germany, and Italy for the Afghanistan War. According to SIPRI defense spending experts:

For most countries, the cost of these [Afghanistan] deployments represents a relatively small share of their overall military spending. Germany budgeted €570 million ($792 million) for operations in Afghanistan in 2009, and France €330 million ($458 million), while Italy budgeted €242 million ($336 million) for the first 6 months of 2009. For Germany this represents 1.7 per cent of total military

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\[169\] In 2009-2010 fiscal Britain’s defense budget was $62.4 billion, which was nearly 2.8% of its GDP.
spending and for France less than 1 per cent, while for Italy the implied annual cost is 1.8 per cent of total military spending. The costs are much more significant for the UK, which budgeted £3.5 billion ($5.4 billion) for Afghanistan operations for the 2009/10 financial year, 9.2 per cent of total military spending. British spending on Afghanistan has increased exponentially from just £46 million ($75 million) in 2003/2004, especially since the deployment of forces in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand in 2006.\(^\text{170}\)

Fourth, the human cost of the war was also enormous. Among the coalition countries, Britain suffered the second largest troop fatalities in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2010, coalition forces lost 2,281 soldiers in Afghanistan. The United States lost the highest number of troops (1,446), followed by the United Kingdom (348). Together the U.S. and British forces suffered nearly 80% of all fatalities. The British Special Forces suffered the worst loss since WWII. Nearly 80 members of the British Special Forces were killed or seriously injured in Afghanistan. This accounted for one sixth of full combat capability of British SOF.\(^\text{171}\)

Why did the free riding motivation not present an incentive for Britain? The answer is straightforward. Like the United States, Britain perceived fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban as a public good, and maintaining alliance solidarity with NATO as a private good. The pursuit of public and private goods fit very well with British foreign policy, which has always had a global ambition. For instance, the 2010 defense and security review begins with an assertion that “Our


country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions.”172 It then goes on to say that “We remain fully committed to succeeding in the difficult mission in Afghanistan, and there will as now be extra resources to meet the full costs of that campaign.” 173

British defense expert Michael Codner observes that Britain had two options in Afghanistan: either to act as a “normal European country that does not take hard power seriously,” or to project a great power status that requires considerable “financial and human costs.”174 Obviously, Britain pursued the second strategy, which required a significant political, military, and economic investment, and a huge human sacrifice. Why would Britain invest so heavily in Afghanistan? Codner argues that the quest for great power status had strongly shaped Britain’s coalition participation in Afghanistan, as well as past missions in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq.175 He concludes that Britain is likely to pursue a strong coalition strategy in Afghanistan until 2014. This is evident in the fact that the Afghanistan war has dominated the 2010 strategic defense review process, which had struggled to cut the defense expenditure, while ensuring that the Afghanistan mission remains well-resourced.176

In summary, among the three systemic factors discussed above, the free-riding motivation of collective action did not present any incentive to encourage Britain’s participation in the Afghanistan War coalition. The United Kingdom did not pursue a risk-averse strategy, nor did it demonstrate a free riding behavior in Afghanistan. Instead, it partnered with the United States in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-building tasks. The preceding

173 Ibid.
175 Codner, “British Troop Levels in Afghanistan.”
discussion shows that alliance commitment and balance of threat presented two systemic incentives to pursue a strong coalition policy. How were these systemic incentives transmitted through the domestic political processes? The remainder of this chapter will answer this question by looking at three domestic level decision points: political regime, public opinion, and military capability.

**Domestic Political Regime.** At the domestic level, the office of the chief executive is the first and most important decision point. My integrated burden-sharing model argues that in making crucial decisions on the use of force, and coalition participation, the central issue is whether the chief executive enjoys considerable discretion over the making of foreign policy, or whether constitutional provisions and legislative politics constrain his or her decision-making power. David Auerswald’s typology of chief executive strength is useful here. Auerswald identifies three types executive strength: strong, weak, and medium. Each type of executive is likely to pursue a distinct burden-sharing policy. My theoretical model suggests that a strong executive is likely to bypass public opinion and look at the stock of military capability before choosing a country’s coalition contribution. For the purpose of this chapter, the focus is on the decision making power of Prime Minister Blair, and his successors Brown, and Cameron.

The British governments under Blair, Brown, and Cameron (until December 2010) fell into the category of a strong executive, in which the prime minister and his war cabinet enjoyed significant discretion in the use of force in Afghanistan. At least two factors explain this discretionary power of British Prime Minister’s office. The first relates to the lack of constitutional and legislative constraints. The second concerns the bipartisan elite consensus on
the use of force. The lack of constitutional and legislative constraint was evident in the way Blair handled his Afghanistan War decisions. As Britain’s chief executive during the first seven years of the Afghanistan War (2001-2007), Blair was mostly responsible for the decisions to join the war, and to maintain a strong coalition support. His presidential style executive power pursued a strong diplomacy to forge the cohesion of the Afghan War coalition, and to build elite consensus in the parliament to support the war.

Blair’s decisions to join and support the coalition did not confront any constitutional restrictions or parliamentary opposition. Instead, Blair enjoyed the discretion given by Britain’s uncodified constitution, and elite consensus in the British Parliament. As Peter Hennessy remarks, “War is intensely prime ministerial activity. Nothing defines or can offer so much historical insight into, the unique role of the [British] PM as his or her responsibilities and powers during war or the preparations for it.”\(^{177}\) The basis of this prime ministerial power derives from the fact that constitutionally, Britain’s Prime Minister can act through royal prerogative in declaring war against other countries.\(^{178}\)

Blair used the royal prerogative in deploying forces in Afghanistan, and a few other countries.\(^{179}\) In *Blair’s Wars*, John Kampfner argues that Blair lacked any foreign policy credentials in the New Labour Party, and had no substantial background in parliamentary debates on defense and foreign policy issues. Despite that, Blair’s foreign policy showed an anomalous


\(^{179}\) Among the foreign policy decisions made by Tony Blair, the decision to join the Iraq War in 2003 was undoubtedly the most controversial one. It is largely portrayed as an illegitimate invasion of a country for its alleged weapons of mass destruction program, which did not exist when the coalition forces and weapons inspectors searched for evidence after toppling the Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party regime in early 2003. For an interesting discussion on the Chilcot Inquiry, see “The Iraq Inquiry,” [http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/background.aspx](http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/background.aspx), accessed December 2, 2010. Also see, Michael Savage, “The Case Against Blair,” *The Independent*, January 21, 2011.
behavior: five wars in six years, aand none of these five wars could be defined through the traditional concepts of national interest or repelling an invader. Instead, a rare combination of pro-Americanism and moralism guided Blair’s foreign policy and his penchant for using force.

According to Paul Williams, Blair and his New Labour Party was overtly Atlanticist in its foreign policy orientation. This Atlanticism in foreign policy meant a strategic alignment with the United States in the war on terrorism. At the tactical and operational level, the strategic alignment resulted into a strong military commitment to the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. In Williams’ words,

Like many of its predecessors, Blair’s government decided that UK’s interests were best served by remaining America’s closest ally and encouraging ‘effective US leadership’ to strengthen international institutions. It sought to do this by becoming a trusted voice within Washington politics. The underlying rationale was clear well before 9/11. As Blair put it, the UK would be stronger with the US if it was at the heart of European decision-making, and it would be stronger in


Europe because of the special relationship with the US. This strategic alignment culminated in Blair’s announcement in the aftermath of 9/11 that the UK would ‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the US.\footnote{Williams, \textit{British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005}, p. 29; I am thankful to Paul Williams for further explaining me U.K.-U.S. special relationship in general, and Tony Blair’s foreign policy to support the U.S.-led strategy in the war on terrorism, in particular. Author’s interview with Paul D. Williams, October 28, 2010.}

Among the NATO leaders, Blair made a distinct contribution to the Afghan war coalition. As described before, he pursued a proactive foreign policy. His shuttle diplomacy at the beginning of the war is solid evidence.\footnote{“Blair’s Shuttle Diplomacy Vital for Building Coalition,” Breaking News.i.e. October 6, 2001. \url{http://www.breakingnews.ie/world/blairs-shuttle-diplomacy-vital-for-building-coalition-25757.html}, accessed October 29, 2010.} Between September 19, 2001 and October 6, 2001, Blair visited Germany, France, the United States, Belgium, Russia, Pakistan, and India. His high profile visits to Europe was aimed to ensure that European NATO countries remain at the heart of coalition operations. His meetings with the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Russian President Putin were important to help “smooth the ground of invasion” in Afghanistan.\footnote{Williams, \textit{British Foreign Policy under New Labour}, p. 49; Anthony Seldon, \textit{Blair} (London: Free Press, 2004)\footnote{“Blair Praises Pakistan’s Decisions,” \textit{CNN.Com}, October 5, 2001. \url{http://edition.cnn.com/2001/World/asia/2001/ret.blair.musharraf/index.html}, accessed October 29, 2010.}} During his shuttle diplomatic visits to Islamabad and Moscow, Blair reportedly presented the evidence that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network were behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was complicit in the attacks for hosting and supporting the Al Qaeda network.\footnote{“Blair Praises Pakistan’s Decisions,” \textit{CNN.Com}, October 5, 2001. \url{http://edition.cnn.com/2001/World/asia/2001/ret.blair.musharraf/index.html}, accessed October 29, 2010.} The India trip was critical to ensure that the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan did not distract the larger coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Blair describes that the central purpose of his diplomatic blitzkrieg was to form a strong coalition, and to maintain political cohesion of the coalition, which would fight in Afghanistan. In his memoir, Blair writes:
I saw my role as that of galvanizing the maximum level of support. I know that when the immediate impact of the event diminished, there was always a danger of backsliding; and I also knew the key thing was to assemble as broad a coalition of support for action as possible.\footnote{Tony Blair, \textit{A Journey: My Political Life} (New York and Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), p. 351.}

While Blair wanted to galvanize international cooperation to form the U.S.-led coalition, his cabinet offered a prompt support for the deployment of British troops to Afghanistan. This is evident in the fact that “The decision to deploy them [British forces] was taken after only two post-9/11 Cabinet meetings, none of which made any relevant debate.”\footnote{Paul Williams, \textit{British Foreign Policy under New Labour}, p. 50; Tony Blair’s war cabinet was composed of Prime Minister Blair himself, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Defense secretary Geoff Hoon, Chancellor Gordon Brown, Home Secretary David Blunkett, House Leader Robin Cook and International Development Secretary Clare Short. As Kampfner argues Blair’s war cabinet had little role in deliberating on the British participation in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. It was Tony Blair who “led Britain into war in Afghanistan almost single-handedly.” See Kampfner, \textit{Blair’s Wars}, p. 129. For a details description on Blair’s war cabinet members and other high ranking officials in the cabinet, see: “Blair’s War Team,” \textit{BBC News}, October 8, 2001. \url{http://newscdn.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1550579.stm}, accessed October 30, 2010.} Once Blair helped the United States form the coalition, his administration provided unstinting support to attain its core goals of fighting terrorism and insurgency. As the coalition war efforts expanded in response to growing terrorist and insurgent activities, Blair stressed the importance of staying in Afghanistan. During a trip to Afghanistan in 2006, he said:

> The roots of the Taleban, al-Qaeda, this type of global terrorism around the world, are deep and where they gained a foothold in a country like Afghanistan, it is going to take time to banish that for good.\footnote{“PM Vows to Standby Afghanistan,” \textit{BBC News}, November 20, 2006. \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6164722.stm}, accessed October 29, 2010.}

After Blair’s departure, Prime Minister Brown (June 2007-May 2010) inherited a war on terrorism, which demanded more troops and more resources. Like Blair, Brown supported the
transatlantic alliance, which was fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. As a *New York Times* article describes, Brown “embraced the Afghan commitment as his own, making frequent visits to troops there and promising them whatever equipment they need.”189 During a parliamentary debate in July 2009, Brown justified the Afghanistan invasion as a strategy to “prevent” international terrorism. He claimed that the British troops on the ground possessed a “high morale” in the fight against Taliban insurgents.190 In response to the critique that British forces in Helmand lacked the necessary equipments, especially helicopters, Brown noted that the number of helicopters and the helicopter capacity had increased by 60% and 84%, respectively.191

As the United Kingdom was facing the global economic crisis, Brown could possibly reduce Britain’s coalition commitment to Afghanistan. This would require a drastic troop withdrawal, or a scaled down mission in Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that the Brown cabinet did not consider such options at all. Instead, his administration remained firmly committed to the U.S. security posture of “troop surge” in Afghanistan. This was premised on the belief that like the troop build-up in Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan would work. During Brown’s rule, the British troop level in Afghanistan increased by one third, from nearly 7,500 to 9,500 troops.

Brown’s successor Cameron came to power in May 2010. Like Blair and Brown, Cameron strongly supported the Afghan mission. This was evident in the strategic defense

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review, released by the Cameron administration. Cameron’s defense review cancelled some of the big ticket weapons purchase, but made sure the Afghan war was well resourced.192

The foregoing discussion shows the how the discretionary power enjoyed by Blair, Brown, and Cameron influenced Britain’s burden-sharing commitment to Afghanistan. An alternative, yet complementary, to this discretionary foreign policy process could be deliberating the burdensharing decisions at the war cabinet. This had never happened. Blair’s war cabinet rarely met for debating the Afghan war decisions. When the cabinet met, it only had a few discussions on the British and coalition strategy in Afghanistan. By the time Brown came to power in mid 2007, the war in Afghanistan was in the midst of a mess, with growing Taliban insurgency, corruption in the Afghan government, increasing NATO troop casualty, and meager success in the British-led counter-narcotics strategy.

Senior military experts and British parliamentarians called for the creation of a war cabinet, which would coordinate the inter-departmental efforts in Afghanistan, and communicate to the British public the UK war efforts in Afghanistan.193 This debate over the creation of a war cabinet came in a moment, when top NATO commanders on the ground provided a grim picture of the coalition efforts, and called for a major troop surge—as much as 40,000 addition troops to join the existing 60,000 strong U.S. and NATO forces—to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Evidence shows that the Brown administration did not form a war cabinet to deliberate coalition decisions on Afghanistan. In early May 2010, the Cameron government

formed the first ever UK national security council, which held some discussions on Afghanistan and other key security issues. It is too early to assess the council’s decision-making role on Afghanistan.

What role did the British opposition parties play in the parliament? Was there any strong resistance to constrain Britain’s Afghan policy? Or, did a consensus among major political parties strengthen the prime ministerial power in the execution of Afghan policy? Elite consensus among Britain’s major political parties offers the best possible answer to these questions. In the Afghanistan War context, elite consensus refers to the agreement among the New Labour and Conservative party leaders on the necessity to support the U.S.-led coalition fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. A *New York Times* report puts this very succinctly:

> [Compared to the Iraq War], The Afghan war has not generated any similar controversy, at least as far as Britain’s need to fight there; both Labour and Conservative have justified the war on the basis of denying Islamist terrorists a base for attacks on Britain.

The cabinets of Blair, Brown, and Cameron enjoyed a stable elite consensus. Prior to the deployment of British troops, Blair got the full support of the opposition Conservative leader Duncan Smith, who was well known for his “Republican party connections” in Washington. The other major political figure in the Parliament – the Liberal Democratic Party leader Charles Kennedy was consulted by the Prime Minister. Kenney did not express any dissent with regard to

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194 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a minor role during Blair and Brown administrations. In 2010 the Conservative-LDP coalition came to power, which did not alter the course of Britain’s Afghanistan policy.  
Britain’s coalition role in Afghanistan. He had reportedly asked Tony Blair to ensure that the United Kingdom does not give any “blank cheque” to the United States with regard to the military actions in Afghanistan.197

The British parliamentary debate over equipment shortage also demonstrates the nature of consensus that existed among British political parties. During a House of Commons debate in July 2009, the then opposition Conservative leader Cameron accused Prime Minister Brown of cutting the helicopter budget by £1.4 billion. Cameron alleged that Brown cut this budget during his tenure as the Chancellor of the Exchequer (head of the British treasury). Cameron also criticized the NATO countries for not providing adequate equipments for their forces on the ground in Afghanistan. This shows that the British elites did not debate whether or not the British forces should remain in Afghanistan, or whether or not they should be deployed in combat missions in the Helmand province. Instead, they debated whether the British forces were well equipped for the job they were asked to do. After the conservative-liberal democrat coalition government came to power in May 2010, the Cameron cabinet enjoyed the support of the major opposition party –the New Labour-- in pursuing its Afghanistan policy. This indicates the presence of a strong elite consensus to support Britain’s Afghanistan policy.

Why elite consensus? The British foreign policy elites from the Conservative, and the New Labour parties agreed on the two systemic incentives described before. The first incentive concerns transatlantic alliance solidarity, and the second incentive relates to the balance of threat. This is a standard picture of elite perception in the United Kingdom. On alliance solidarity, the British elites believe in the centrality of NATO in pursuing a multilateral crisis management strategy. Senior leaders from the major political parties agree that a strong alliance with the

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197 Dilon, “Tony’s Phoney War Cabinet.”
United States is a key to maintaining Britain’s global ambitions. On the nature of international security threats, members of the British foreign policy elites largely agree on the risks posed by Al Qaeda, Taliban, and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan. They also agree on the need for a robust British contribution to Afghanistan. Thus, elite consensus on alliance commitment and balance of threat consolidated the British prime minister’s authority to decide the nature and scope of Britain’s coalition contribution to Afghanistan.

In summary, the office of the British prime minister enjoyed significant discretionary powers as well as a strong political consensus to join and support the war in Afghanistan. Unlike the constitutional and legislative constraints faced by the German chancellor, there were no major constitutional, legislative, or judicial restrictions on the British prime minister’s executive power, which could constrain Britain’s fighting and stabilization role in Afghanistan. This lack of political constraints ensured that Britain would pursue a strategy, which would be consistent with its alliance commitment, global ambitions, and perceptions of international threat. The absence of any institutional constraint meant that the British government could ignore the mass public opinion, and instead, rely solely on elite opinion in choosing its Afghanistan policy. This leads to an important question of whether public opinion had any measurable effect on Britain’s Afghanistan policy.

198 Conservative leader Liam Fox’s views, which largely represent his party’s stance on Afghanistan, are relevant here. In 2009, Fox said, “Afghanistan must be, and will be, our military’s main effort under a future Conservative Government…If Afghanistan is lost, it will be lost at home by political leaders—not by our gallant men and women on the frontline. We need to act decisively. Failure is not an option….” See Rt Hon Liam Fox, “If Afghanistan Will be Lost, It Will be Lost at Home,” September 28, 2009. http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/09/Liam_Fox_If_Afghanistan_will_be_lost_it_will_be_lost_at_home.aspx, April 10, 2011.
Public Opinion. My coalition burden-sharing model predicts that a strong chief executive is likely to ignore public opinion in choosing his (or her) country’s Afghanistan policy. This is essentially a realist position on public opinion, which claims that the government and the foreign policy elites shape the public opinion, and the strategic decision makers are likely to ignore public opinion in pursuing a specific foreign policy.

In analyzing the effect of domestic public opinion on coalition policy, this chapter examines the British opinion data on several issues. These include public attitudes toward the invasion of Afghanistan, the use of force, troop level, and Afghan reconstruction. It finds that a large majority of the British public supported the Afghanistan invasion, and a small but significant minority of the British public continued to support the Afghanistan mission. It also finds that as the Afghanistan War progressed, a large majority of the British public opposed the war, and demanded immediate troop withdrawal. For strategic culture theorists, these two seemingly contradictory trends in public opinion—a strong support for the initial intervention, and a strong opposition to the latter state of the war, can be explained by the elite opinion. The British foreign policy elites have historically favored a global role and a military interventionist foreign policy for the United Kingdom. This self-image of global responsibility has historically led the British foreign policy elites and the key decision makers to ignore any dissenting public opinion on foreign policy. Britain’s Afghanistan policy was no exception. Despite declining public support for the war, the successive British governments did not withdraw troops, nor did they shirk away from the coalition commitments.

At least four discernible trends can be traced regarding the British public attitudes toward the Afghanistan War. First, initially a large section of the British public supported the Afghanistan invasion and the use of force so long it did not cause civilian casualties, and disrupt
the provisions of humanitarian assistance. Second, since the 2006 troop surge, opposition to the war increased; with more than one-third of the British public had shown favorable attitudes toward British presence in Afghanistan. Third, since 2009, a large majority of Britons expressed their doubt about the Afghan mission, and thus demanded troop withdrawal. Fourth, public support for the post-war reconstruction efforts increased in 2008, but decreased in 2009.

Regarding the invasion of Afghanistan, in late September 2001, the Gallup Poll found that an overwhelming majority of the British people (75%) supported an extradition process and trial of those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On October 12, 2001, just five days after the U.S. and coalition forces began bombing in Afghanistan, a Guardian/ICM poll found that 74% Britons supported the bombing. In less than three weeks, the support for bombing declined to 62%. This declining support for the war was attributed to reports of civilian casualties, and concerns over a humanitarian disaster. At that time a large majority of British people (54%) wanted a pause into the bombing, and more flow of foreign aid to Afghanistan.

There is a paucity of opinion data for the years between 2002 and 2005. Since 2006, the British public support for Afghanistan War fluctuated over time, but opposition to the war was always greater than support for the war. For instance, in 2006, 53% Britons opposed the war.

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202 Travis, “Majority Want Bombing Pause.”

203 Miller, “World Opinion Opposes.”
while only 31% supported it. Opposition to the war declined to 47%, while support increased to 46% in July 2009. This was perhaps, due to the fact that more British people saw their troops making a positive effect in Afghanistan. In December 2010 an opinion poll found public opposition to the Afghan War increased to 57%, while support for the war declined to 34%. At least two factors may explain this increasing opposition to, and declining support for, Britain’s Afghanistan mission. The first involves increasing troop casualty, and the second concerns Britain’s disproportionately larger coalition efforts, compared to major NATO allies, such as, France, Germany, and Italy.

With increasing troop fatalities, and no signs of a decisive victory against the Taliban, more Britons wanted their troops back home, and only a few supported a troop buildup in Afghanistan. In 2009 and 2010, 27% Britons supported maintaining the current troop levels. During this time, support for troop buildup declined sharply from 11% in 2009 to 7% in 2010. Most importantly, more Britons demanded the reduction or withdrawal of British forces from Afghanistan. In 2009, 60% Britons supported troop reduction or withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 2010, this increased to 65%. On the question of a withdrawal deadline, in 2010 an overwhelming majority of Britons (73%) opined that the British forces should begin

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205 Notron-Taylor et al., “Public Support for War in Afghanistan Is Firm, Despite Deaths.”
208 Ibid.
209 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2009, p. 34.
withdrawal immediately, or in 2011, if the conditions permit.\textsuperscript{211} By contrast, only one fourth of those polled (26\%) opined British forces should stay in Afghanistan as long as it took to finish the task of stabilizing the country.\textsuperscript{212}

As the overall public support for the use of military force eroded, there was a sharp decline in the support for UK’s civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In 2007, 69\% Britons supported a strong reconstruction role for their country.\textsuperscript{213} This registered a sharp increase to 81\% in 2008, and a marked decrease to 48\% in 2009.\textsuperscript{214} The German public opinion data show a similar trend in declining public support for reconstruction activities. This might indicate that the British people became more concerned about the economic depression at home, and civilian and military casualties in Afghanistan. This might also indicate that the growing militarization of reconstruction activities, and the dangers to British aid workers had negatively influenced public opinion.

Several questions emerge from the public opinion data presented above. The first question involves why a large majority of Britons supported the Afghanistan invasion in the first place, and why at least one-third of them supported the mission at any time between 2006 and 2010. The second question concerns why the public support for the war eroded over time. The third question examines whether the British government responded to the declining public support and growing call for troop withdrawal.


\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{213} German Marshall Fund of the United States, \textit{Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007}, p. 32

First, regarding support for the use of force, Alister Miskimmon suggests that the British strategic culture provides the best possible answer. Miskimmon argues that the British public and foreign policy elites share a common view that the UK has a global responsibility to conduct multilateral operations to promote international peace and security. This sense of global responsibility might have encouraged a sizable part—in this case nearly one-third—of the British public to support the Afghanistan War. This sense of global responsibility is the product of the country’s colonial history, and a strong multilateral foreign policy in the post-war era. In Miskimmon’s words:

The UK’s colonial past, coupled with its institutional embedding in the international community, has created a sense of responsibility and global outlook in the minds of the British public and political elites regarding the UK’s international responsibilities for peacekeeping and crisis management. There are no obvious ‘no go areas’ for the UK armed forces in the way that the German armed forces are constrained.215

Second, on the question of declining public support for Britain’s Afghan mission, there are several explanations. They focus on the absence of tangible progress, casualty sensitivity, corruption in Afghanistan, and public distrust over Britain’s Iraq policy. Speaking about the lack of tangible progress, in 2008 Simon Jenkins, a senior columnist for the British daily, The Guardian, argued that the British forces “went there [in Afghanistan] to punish the Taleban, to capture Osama Bin Laden. We [British forces] failed to capture Osama Bin Laden, we failed to

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punish the Taleban - we should leave." 216 On troop casualties, Jenkins notes that “British soldiers are dying and British taxpayers are spending an awful lot of money on them dying. There is no good reason for this war anymore.” 217 In 2010, a report of the European Security and Defense Assembly (ESDA) expressed a similar view. The ESDA report observed that “The substantial decline in [British] public support has been fuelled not only by the number of fatalities but also by the fact that the campaign has lasted so long and that the aims of the war, few of which have been achieved, seem blurred.” 218

While public dissatisfaction over the long war in Afghanistan was perhaps fuelled by a lack of measurable progress, there is no empirical validity of the casualty sensitivity hypothesis. In a study on the effect of public opinion on war, Kriner and Wilson find no association between troop fatalities and public opinion. Their study shows that British support for Afghanistan war began to decline long before a spike in troop fatalities was registered in 2006. 219 Moreover, public opposition did not increase in a substantial proportion, despite the fact that troop fatalities more than doubled from 51 in 2008 to 108 in 2009. 220 In 2010, a report from the European Security and Defense Assembly suggests the relatively stable public support might indicate that

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220 In 2008, nearly 48% Britons opposed the Afghanistan war. This registered a slight increase to an average 55% throughout the year 2009, and eventually declined to 52% in early 2010. See European Security and Defense Assembly, Assembly of the European Union, *Afghanistan – Explaining the Reasons for the War to the Public: Report Submitted On Behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by John Greenway and Marco Zacchero, Rapporteurs*, p. 17 (Appendix 2).
former Prime Minister Brown and his foreign secretary David Miliband had a successful communication strategy, which reached out to the people and explained that the Afghanistan mission was vital to British national interest.221

There were other reasons for declining public support as well. Corruption in the Afghan government, and distrust over the New Labour’s Iraq policy were two major contributors to declining British support for the Afghanistan War. According to the 2009 Transparency International corruption perception index, Afghanistan ranked as the second most corrupt country in the world. Critics claim that the Karzai government did little to fight rampant cronyism and bribery, which had fuelled the Taliban insurgency.222 The American and British officials routinely warned that the state-sanctioned corruption and the proliferation of drug trade had a negative effect on the public perception of the Afghan war.223

Finally, the British media reports frequently discussed the negative effect of Iraq War on the Afghanistan War. Senior politicians in the United Kingdom also endorsed such views. In 2008, during a House of Commons debate, Conservative party parliamentarian Adam Holloway observed that after the fall of the Taliban regime, “there was a massive opportunity to make progress and goodwill on the part of the Afghan people to accept and foreign aid.”224 He then contended that “we were not concentrating on Afghanistan or more generally on al Qaeda.

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224 UK Parliament, “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 June 2008 (pt 0001), Westminster Hall, David Taylor in the Chair, Column 175 WH.”
Instead, we were focusing on a crazy and quite unnecessary invasion of Iraq.”225 The Liberal Democratic Party leader Nick Glegg shared the same view. Clegg warns that after losing “its moral credibility with the war in Iraq,” Britain was losing the public support for the war in Afghanistan.226

The foregoing discussion shows the varying level of British public opposition to the war, and the sources of such public opposition. Did unfavorable public opinion have any effect on British policy in Afghanistan? My burden-sharing model predicts no effect from the unfavorable public attitude. Such prediction is based on a top-down approach to public opinion, which claims that the government and foreign policy elites influence public attitudes, not the other way. History provides a strong support for such top-down approach to public opinion in analyzing British foreign policy process.

Writing as early as in the 1930s, a prominent British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, argued that members of the British public were yet to attain the judgment on foreign policy, which largely inhibited them from key foreign policy decisions. Contemporary authors, such as, Kenneth Younger and Christopher Hill, have also discussed how public opinion had little or no effect in shaping British foreign policy on three important issues in the post-war era: the military intervention during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1960s European integration policy, and the 1960s nuclear deterrence policy. In the first case, when the Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Eden and a few Cabinet Ministers secretly authorized a

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225 Ibid.
military intervention in the Suez without consulting the mass public or the informed public. In the second case, the mass public had no strong opinion on either British support for, or opposition to, the European Economic Community. In the third case, the popular campaign for nuclear disarmament was dampened by the British government’s firm commitment to a strong nuclear deterrent capability.227

Evidence supports the prediction of my burden-sharing model. Both Blair and Brown enjoyed strong executive power, and thus neglected the unfavorable public attitude toward the Afghanistan War. Instead of reducing Britain’s troop commitment to Afghanistan—as expected by a large number of British public—both Blair and Brown increased the military and non-military contributions to coalition operations. After assuming office, Cameron made it clear that there would be no change to Britain’s Afghanistan policy, and his administration would support the U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan.228 In response to the growing public demand for troop withdrawal, Cameron ensured that the British forces would remain in Afghanistan until 2014, the conditional deadline for the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan government.

Why did Blair and his successors choose to bypass public opinion? Sarah Kreps argues that elite consensus explains why the British policymakers were insulated from the public opinion, and remained committed to their Afghanistan mission.229 Kreps defines elite consensus

as bipartisan agreement and the absence of any coherent opposition to the government policy. She notes that:

[W]hether states increase their commitment to NATO operations in Afghanistan has little to do with levels of public support…Leaders have not responded to the public’s foreign policy preferences by withdrawing troops. Rather, they have done just the opposite and increased support for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan by easing restrictions—or caveats—on the types of operations their militaries can conduct, extending their deployments, and increasing their troop numbers. The UK experience is representative, as it has steadily increased troops deployments to Afghanistan as public opinion has remained low…The reason why there is less of a connection between public support and withdrawal decision than might be expected is because of high degrees of elite consensus in the political leadership of troop contributing countries.230

There are other cases, in which the British government ignored public opinion, but relied on elite consensus to pursue a policy of military intervention. The Kosovo campaign in 1999 was a glaring example. As Andrew Dorman writes, “Although domestic public opinion was not convinced of the need for Britain to become involved [in Kosovo] Blair had … ensured that all three major political parties in parliament supported the proposed NATO action…”231

In summary, consistent with the prediction of my burden-sharing model, public opinion did not have any effect in shaping Britain’s alliance commitment in Afghanistan. Armed with the royal prerogatives and backed by the elite consensus, Blair and his successors exercised a strong

230 Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion,” pp. 197-198, emphasis added.
control over the decision process on coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan. Once they made initial decisions on the course of Britain’s Afghan policy, the final decision point was the strength of British military force—its ability and willingness to pursue a policy desired by its civilian commanders. The rest of this chapter discusses the effect of Britain’s military capability on its Afghanistan policy.

**Military Capability.** After the chief executive power, military capability was the most important decision point to shape Britain’s Afghanistan policy. My theoretical model predicts that the strength of a country’s military force would significantly influence its burden-sharing role. In the context of Afghanistan, a strong military capability would allow Britain to make a robust contribution to fighting terrorism and insurgency, and securing the population centers.

How do we measure the strength of British military force, and what effect did it have in shaping Britain’s burden-sharing role in Afghanistan?

Since, the United Kingdom is a NATO member state, the strength of British military can be measured by looking at the concept of NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative (DCI). According to the DCI, three defining features of a country’s military forces are pertinent for coalition operations. These are suitability, interoperability, and deployability. First, suitability refers to the ability of British conventional or Special Forces to achieve their desired goals in fighting enemies and securing the population centers in its area of operation. Second,
interoperability refers to ability of British forces and equipments to integrate into joint operations, carried out by multinational forces in Afghanistan. Third, deployability refers to the speed at which military assets and boots can be deployed for coalition purposes.

This chapter has shown that the British contribution to the War in Afghanistan progressed in four stages: (a) a strong counterterrorism role (October 2001-July 2002); (b) a strategic neglect of Afghanistan due to participation in the Iraq War (August 2002-March 2006); (c) a weak counterinsurgency role in Helmand (April 2006-late 2007); and (d) a strong counterinsurgency role in Helmand (early 2008-late 2010). I argue that in each of the four stages, the issues of suitability and deployability had significantly influenced the outcome of British military operations, and subsequent burden-sharing decisions. By contrast, interoperability did not appear to be a problem, largely due to the British forces’ longstanding experience in joint military exercise with the NATO forces. Hence, I exclude the discussion on interoperability, and instead focus on the effects of deployability and suitability on British burden-sharing role. I explain how improved military capability—defined by the adoption of a counterinsurgency doctrine and the deployment of more troops and more resources—had positive effects on British military operations from 2008 onwards. An analysis of the effect of military capability on Britain’s burden-sharing outcomes is important here to understand how lessons from a particular outcome, especially a weak military operation, had influenced the British decision process.

233 The British and American forces, along with a handful of allied forces have longstanding experience in addressing interoperability issues. This is largely due to NATO military doctrines and standardization programs, and joint military exercises among the ABCA countries, (America, Britain, Canada, Australia and later New Zealand). For instance, the 1998 SDR stressed that: “International operations have become the norm, and the Armed Forces regularly train alongside our allies to hone their interoperability. It clearly makes sense to have consensus on what the key technologies of the future are and how interoperability will be maintained.” See: UK Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review, p. 103.
The first stage of British military intervention in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and lasted until July 2002. During this time, the United Kingdom deployed up to 1,800 military boots, Nimrod surveillance aircrafts, and C-17 aircraft carriers, and fired Tomahawak cruise missiles in Afghanistan. The British commandos and conventional forces played a crucial role in defeating the Al Qaeda and overthrowing the Taliban regime. As Sarah Kreps describes, by late 2001, the United Kingdom “was the only state other than the United States to participate in combat operations.” By all criteria, the British military had a suitable, interoperable and deployable force to support the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In summary, Britain’s strong military capability had contributed to a robust burden-sharing role during the initial air campaign—the *Operation Crescent Wind*, and the subsequent ground offensives—*Operation Tora Bora*, and *Operation Jacana*.

The second stage began in August 2002, and lasted until April 2006. During this stage, Afghanistan became a forgotten war, largely due to the U.S. and UK-led Iraq invasion in March 2003. During this time, the British forces in Afghanistan were concentrated in Kabul, and the northern province of Balkh. Their main focus was to provide security to the nascent Afghan government in Kabul, and to contribute to reconstruction and stabilization operations in the Mazar-i-Sharif PRT in Balkh. Due to limited soldiers, resources, and equipments, and a lack of counterinsurgency doctrine, the British forces pursued stabilization operations on a limited scale. This limited stabilization role focused on training the Afghan security forces, and investing in a few quick impact projects.

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The third stage began in April 2006 and lasted until late 2007. This period saw the deployment and expansion of British troops in Helmand, from 3,100 in April 2006 to nearly 8,000 by 2008. Despite this troop escalation, the British forces lacked sufficient manpower and adequate resources, which had tremendously hampered the conduct of offensive operations in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas. Experts on British defense and security policy contend that the British forces were not available in adequate numbers, nor were they suitable for the counterinsurgency operations. This lack of deployability and suitability had resulted in a weak burden-sharing role for British forces in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008.

Regarding the lack of a suitable military force, David Betz and Anthony Cormack notes that:

Two of the factors that characterize counterinsurgency are its manpower-intensive nature and its generally extended duration. Counterinsurgency is a light infantryman’s war; but the structure of the British armed forces is not suited to maintaining this sort of commitment. Policy decisions, going back to the end of the Cold War, have tended to favor other parts of the military other than the infantry. Much of the investment in technology, in recent years, has been founded on the premise that enhanced technological capabilities in the fields of killing power and battlefield awareness will enable a lighter infantry footprint.

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237 As described in the first section of this chapter, the British forces were fewer in numbers, and had few helicopters and other logistics, which had constrained their ability to clear the areas controlled by the Taliban militias in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas—all in the Helmand province. When they were able to clear an area, they could not hold it for a long period of time due to inadequate troop presence.
On the issue of deployability, Betz and Cormack highlight the adverse effect of manpower shortages on Britain’s Helmand campaign. They write:

In the case of Afghanistan, manpower has also been lacking in the context of the strategy the British forces have been tasked with implementing. Early deployment in “platoon houses” that were intended to afford a British presence among the people, resulted in the Taliban being able to concentrate and launch repeated assaults at company level, which were repelled with the employment of substantial amounts of airpower. This is self-defeating because British forces remain unable to clear and hold territory on the needed scale.\(^{239}\)

The shortage of critical equipments, especially combat helicopters, had also affected the British mission in Helmand. In 2008, Stuart Tootal, the retired commanding officer of the 3rd Parachute Regiment, criticized the British government for not deploying enough helicopters, which could save the lives of many soldiers.\(^{240}\) In 2009, the House of Commons Defense Committee acknowledged the adverse effect of helicopter shortages in Afghanistan. The Committee observed:

[H]elicopter capability is being seriously undermined by the shortage of helicopters, particularly medium-lift support helicopters, capable of being deployed in support of operations overseas. We believe that the size of the fleet is an issue, and are convinced that the lack of helicopters is having adverse


consequences for operations today and, in the longer term, will severely impede the ability of the UK Armed Forces to deploy. 241

The fourth stage in Britain’s Afghanistan mission began in early 2008, and continued as of 2010. During this time the military campaign in Helmand received more troops and more equipment, which increased the ability of the British forces to conduct successful offensive and stabilization operations. This robust burden-sharing role was evident in British military operations in Garmsir, Nad Ali, and Marza districts, where the coalition forces focused on translating short term tactical gains into long term success by investing in development and stabilization operations.

According to Farrell and Gordon, several factors contributed to the success of British military from 2008 onwards. These included a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the deployment of more troops and resources, and a comprehensive civil-military approach. First, since late 2007, the British forces in Helmand (especially the 52 Brigade) adopted a three-staged counterinsurgency doctrine, which focused on holding and building an area after securing it from Taliban control. 242 This is widely known as a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, first developed in 2006 by the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), 243 and later codified in 2009 in the British Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency. 244 Both army field manuals incorporated the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stressed on the need for adapting to

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complex threats from insurgents and irregular warriors. The effects of these new doctrines were enormous. The British forces focused on protecting the population centers, and supporting the Afghan national government to extend its writ into remote areas. Their operations were supported by the renewed strength of the Afghan national army, which grew from 50,000 in 2007 to 80,000 in 2008, and eventually to 150,000 in 2010.245

Second, after the introduction of a new doctrine, the deployment of more troops and resources had positive effects in shaping the British forces’ Helmand campaign. The number of British forces increased from 8,000 in 2008 to 9,500 in 2010. The withdrawal of British forces from Iraq made it possible to reprioritize the Afghanistan mission. As Farrell and Gordon write, “the Mastiff armored vehicle, was originally acquired for Iraq within five months under the UOR (Urgent Operational Requirements) scheme; some of these units were redirected to Afghanistan.”246 Better counterinsurgency training, supported by collective debriefing of soldiers, had also brought positive effects on the ground.247

Third, the implementation, albeit on a slow speed, of a comprehensive civil-military approach had allowed the development, foreign, and defense ministries to coordinate their activities in Helmand. Farrell and Gordon note that the DFID’s post-conflict reconstruction unit (later renamed to Stabilization Unit) slowly recognized the need to develop programs for working in conflict zones.248 This was a paradigm shift for the development ministry, which was created for fighting poverty in a civilian space, and not promoting development in a war zone. The FCO had also needed to retool itself from a state-centric strategic diplomacy to a non-state

245 For data on the annual growth of Afghan National Army, see: Livingstone, and O’Hanlon, The Brookings Afghanistan Index, p. 6.
247 Ibid.
centric tactical diplomacy. The latter required the British foreign ministry personnel in Helmand to engage tribal leaders into the development process. Finally, the MOD personnel learnt how to coordinate the military operations with the works of the civilian development and foreign ministries in a conflict zone.

The preceding discussion shows the improved ability of British forces to share the increasing risks of fighting the Taliban and stabilizing the insurgent-prone areas. What explains the decision to improvise the capacity of the British forces, and what is the causal link between this improved capacity and robust burden-sharing role in Helmand?

According to Anthony King, prior to 2008, the deployment of few troops and a strategy of forced dispersal had resulted in serious disasters in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas. The British government learned from its past mistakes and increased its troops and resources to fight the Afghanistan War. Since 2008, the deployment of more troops and more resources had allowed the British forces to adopt a strategy of force concentration, in relatively small areas.249 Using the strategy of force concentration, the British soldiers gained important success in securing and holding territories. This was evident in three major operations -- *Operation Sond Chara* (December 2008),250 *Operation Panther’s Claw* (June-August 2009),251 and *Operation*

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249 The main argument is that initially the British forces in Helmand adopted a flawed strategy of force dispersal. This required the small battle groups of British forces to be dispersed into remote areas to conduct offensive operations to combat the Taliban insurgents. Due to inadequate manpower, the British-run forward operating bases (FOBs) and mobile operations groups (MOGs) had struggled to clear an area, but failed to hold it. This was a standard picture from 2006 until 2007. Since 2008, the British forces had adopted a strategy of forced concentration, which had allowed the Helmand campaign to see some successes in securing and holding areas, and paving the ways for reconstruction works. See: Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 311-332.

Moshtarak (February 2010). These operations were focused on the Taliban-controlled Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marja districts. King argues that “the success of the British campaign in Helmand is likely to depend now on concentrating forces in these areas so that they can be secured permanently.”

Despite these important successes, the British military did not have sufficient troops on the ground to achieve more gains in fighting the Taliban insurgency in Helmand. Recognizing the inability of the United Kingdom to deploy more forces, in September 2010, the United States sent more marine soldiers, to take security responsibility of northern Helmand from the British forces. As a result in late 2010, nearly 1,000 British Royal Marines were redeployed from Sangin to Central Helmand. For critics, the relocation of the British troops showed their weaknesses in Helmand. Senior NATO commanders defied such critics, and insisted that the relocation of British troops from northern to central Helmand was a “routine piece of battlefield relocation.”

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In summary, Britain’s contribution to sharing the military burdens in Afghanistan had evolved in four stages. In the first stage, from October 2001 to May 2002, the United Kingdom played a strong burden-sharing role. This was evident in the deployment of a strong military force, which had participated in the U.S.-led combat operations to defeat the Al Qaeda militants, and to topple the Taliban regime. In the second stage, between 2003 and 2006, Britain’s war efforts in Afghanistan were marked by a low level commitment, with British forces concentrating in Kabul multinational brigade, and a small provincial reconstruction team in Mazar-i-Sharif. In the third stage, although the British forces were deployed in a large scale to Helmand, it was not until 2008, when they began to show marked improvement in offensive and defensive operations.

Finally, the British forces learned from their past mistakes, and adapted to the growing challenges of counterinsurgency operations. My research has shown that from 2008 to 2010, the British forces had pursued a strong burden-sharing role in Helmand. Several factors contributed to this belated success. The list includes the deployment of more troops and resources, the introduction of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, and the employment of a comprehensive civil-military approach to reconstruction and development. Following Anthony King, I argue that there was a causal link between a strong military and a robust counterinsurgency strategy. A strong military, defined as the deployment of adequate number of troops and sufficient resources, had allowed Britain to adopt an operational strategy of forced concentration in a relatively small area. This, in contrast to a strategy of force dispersal, had gained critical successes in securing and holding territories in the military operations in Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marja districts, which were the Taliban strongholds, and the centers of opium production in Helmand.
III. Summary and Conclusion

The British case study illustrates the utility of my integrated burden-sharing model. Britain joined the Afghanistan War coalition in 2001 and provided unstinting support to manage the coalition until 2010. Britain’s overall contribution to the War in Afghanistan includes a proactive diplomacy, a modest reconstruction role, and an evolving counterinsurgency strategy. As a major NATO member, and key U.S. ally, the United Kingdom had contributed the second largest contingent of coalition forces to Afghanistan, and deployed them to the volatile Helmand province. Since 2006, the British troops in Helmand increased up to 9,500, who were exposed to frequent insurgent attacks, and responded to these attacks with more troops and more resources.

This chapter investigates the British decision process on Afghanistan. It examines why Britain joined the Afghanistan War coalition, and why it pursued a strong burden-sharing role to support the coalition. It also discusses how Britain’s decision process and the military capability shape the effectiveness of its burden-sharing outcomes. My research shows that two international systemic factors provided strong incentives to encourage Britain’s participation in the coalition. These were transatlantic alliance commitment, and the threats of international terrorism.

First, Britain was strongly committed to its special relationship with the United States and its multilateral alliance relationship with the NATO. These bilateral and multilateral relationships had created a strong sense of alliance commitment, and global responsibility for multilateral crisis management operations. These pre-existing alliance commitments were further solidified after NATO invoked Article 5 collective defense provision. The invocation of Article 5 made it an obligation for Britain to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.
Second, the threats of international terrorism presented the second international level incentive to encourage Britain’s coalition participation. Two particular terrorist threats were important in this context: the first involved transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda, and its intention to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the second involved the Taliban insurgents and their connection to drugs trafficking. The incidents of high profile terrorist attacks, such as the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, and the London bombings of 2005 had showed the persistent threats posed to the British citizens and interests at home and abroad. In addition, the resurgence of Taliban attacks, and the growth of opium production in Afghanistan demonstrated the threats posed by the Taliban to the British forces.

This chapter argues that these international systemic incentives were transmitted through the British domestic political processes and state-level military constraints to create a unique burden-sharing behavior. Within the domestic political processes, the roles of the chief executive and the military force had strong effects in shaping Britain’s Afghanistan policy. Figure 4.7 shows the British decision process and burden-sharing outcomes in Afghanistan.

First, Prime Minister Blair and his successors, Brown and Cameron, enjoyed royal prerogative in the declaration of war, and the use of force in foreign policy. There was virtually no domestic legislative or judicial constraint in Britain, which could restrict the prime minister’s power on use-of-force decisions. Although the British parliament debated on Afghanistan and Iraq Wars issues, my research shows that there was no war cabinet from 2001 to 2010, which could deliberate decisions on force deployment. The effects of the lack institutional restraints were enormous. As Kampfner describes, Blair singlehandedly dragged Britain into the War in
Afghanistan. Elite consensus among the major political parties had further strengthened the power of the British prime ministers. Using this literally unlimited power, the British governments of Blair, Brown, and Cameron continued to pursue their Afghanistan policy that lacked any massive public support.

Figure 4.7 The British Decision Process on Afghanistan

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256 Kampfner, *Blair’s Wars*, p. 129.
Second, after the British prime ministers ignored public opinion, they looked into the military forces to pursue their Afghanistan policy. At this point, the strength of British military forces and assets in Afghanistan determined the outcome of London’s burden-sharing behavior. As shown in Figure 4.7, and discussed in this chapter, the burden-sharing outcomes gave important feed-backs, which were taken into subsequent decision process to shape Britain’s Afghanistan policy. This chapter shows that when the British forces were deployed in Helmand in 2006, they did not have a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, and they lacked enough troops and equipments to pursue a strong offensive and defensive burden-sharing role. This lacks in doctrine, troops, and resources had contributed to serious capacity gaps. The effect was repeated failures in securing territories from Taliban controls. The scenario turned to change since 2008, when the introduction of a population-centric doctrine and the insertion of more troops and resources brought critical successes in clearing, holding, and building territories.

In September 2010, the American marines relieved the British forces from northern Helmand. This had allowed the largely overreached and overstretched British forces to concentrate in central Helmand. In October 2010, the UK’s newly released strategic and defense review ensured that the massive budget cuts in the country’s defense expenditure would leave its Afghanistan commitment intact. This means that the British forces are likely to be well-resourced, at least until 2014, when the international coalition forces are expected to hand over the security responsibility to the indigenous Afghan forces. As the Dutch forces left Afghanistan in 2010, and the Canadians have declared to withdraw in 2011, there are intense domestic pressures in the United Kingdom to scale back its military operations in Afghanistan. Despite such domestic pressures, the UK is likely “punch above the weight” in Afghanistan, at least to demonstrate that it is a global actor with the ability to project power in out of area operations.
CHAPTER FIVE

GERMANY:
AN ALLY WITH A RISK-AVERSE STRATEGY

Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides an interesting case to test the integrated burden-sharing model. Germany joined the coalition in 2001 by declaring “unlimited solidarity” with the United States, and gradually reinforcing troops on the ground. Despite that, German burden-sharing behavior in the Afghan War appeared to be a puzzling phenomenon for its NATO allies. There were two facets of this puzzle: first, the deployment of German armed forces, *Bundeswehr*, in Afghanistan marked a gradual shift in German strategic culture, by slowly departing from a strategy of restraint in the use of force to a strategy of graduated force escalation. This was evident in the removal of some of the national caveats, which allowed the German forces to use force against the Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies. Germany defined such escalation as a critical tool of its multilateral crisis management strategy. Second, despite repeated requests from the United States and other NATO allies, Germany strongly resisted the redeployment of *Bundeswehr* forces into the restive southern Afghanistan, and avoided any plan for offensive military actions against the Taliban insurgents. In resisting NATO’s pressures for a combat role, senior leaders in the German government repeatedly defined their mission as a defensive reconstruction strategy, and rejected a combat mission for the *Bundeswehr*.

What explains the puzzling phenomenon in Germany’s preference for a non-combat stabilization mission, and its antipathy to combat operations? Conventional wisdom focuses on the international systemic and strategic culturalist explanations in analyzing Germany’s burden-
sharing behavior. In contrast, my burden-sharing model provides an integrated theory of coalition contribution. It claims that Germany’s Afghanistan policy has to be understood as interplay between systemic incentives and domestic politics. I examine the effect of three systemic variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action – in structuring Germany’s options for Afghanistan. Next, I assess how the system-induced policy options were transmitted through three domestic level variables – political regime, public opinion, and military capability—in creating German burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan.

From a neo-realist perspective, the unified Germany would adapt to the post-Cold War realities, and resort to the use of force in the pursuit of foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have long predicted that the end of the Cold War would give rise to an assertive Germany, which would lead a European coalition and balance against U.S. power.1 Grunther Hellmann has observed that Germany’s increasing preference for the use of military power in peacekeeping missions demonstrates the attributes of a ‘normal power.’2 Others find limits to the neorealist and normalizing theses. For instance, Hanns Maull argues that defying the neo-realist

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1 Kenneth Waltz wrote that an “impatient” Germany leading a European coalition can possibly challenge the balance of power in the post-Cold War era. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41. In a similar vein, Mearsheimer wrote that a unified Germany would challenge NATO’s Cold War-era security posture, which saw German militarism as a threat to European security. He also argues that a nuclear Germany in the post-Cold War era might serve as a stabilizer in Europe. See John M. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; John M. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), pp. 35-50.

and normalizing schools’ predictions, post-Cold War Germany has emerged as a civilian power, and discounted the use of force in the pursuit of foreign policy.³

In contrast to the neo-realist scholars, proponents of the strategic culture theory argue that Berlin’s defense and security policy are deeply rooted in German political culture, which rejects the use of force, while maintaining a strong commitment to a multilateral crisis management strategy.⁴ Ben Lombardi contends that Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission has become a “hostage to German politics.”⁵ Others agree with such pessimistic account of Berlin’s political constraints in shaping Germany’s counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.⁶ For instance, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer argue that the “missing link” between the Berlin-based politico-strategic leadership and the operational-tactical level leadership in Afghanistan has produced a dismal counterinsurgency performance for Bundeswehr forces.⁷


⁵ Ben Lombardi, “All Politics is Local: Germany, the Bundeswehr, and Afghanistan,” International Journal, Vol.63, No. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 605.


contend that the root of the problem lies in the Berlin-based political leadership of the Bundeswehr, which “does not support a far-reaching debate and changes toward a comprehensive German COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy.”

In short, the strategic culturalists stress that “the key determinants of German security and defense policy operate at the domestic level.”

Although the neo-realist and strategic culture theories provide useful insights in analyzing German foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, they tend to be mutually exclusive, and cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the German burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. Taking a neo-classical realist position, this chapter argues that an integrated burden-sharing model better explains Germany’s strategic decision process on coalition contribution to Afghanistan. The burden-sharing model suggests that the threat of international terrorism and the need to maintain alliance solidarity with NATO presented two systemic incentives for Germany to join and maintain the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. These international systemic incentives were channeled through the peculiar German domestic political process, which severely constrained the power of the chief executives to initiate a combat role, but supported a strong non-combat stabilization role for the German forces in Afghanistan. In brief, I show that the peculiarities in German domestic politics as well as the legal-constitutional provisions strongly shaped the deployment of Bundeswehr by limiting its area of operation and constraining it offensive capabilities. I conclude with a note that NATO allies, especially the

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8 Noetzel and Schreer, “Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking,” p. 16.
United States, are recognizing the dilemma in German politics, and adapting to the changing security landscape in Afghanistan.

This chapter has three sections. The first section examines the German contribution to the War in Afghanistan. The second section tests the empirical validity of my burden-sharing model to the German case. The third section summarizes the central findings.

I. Germany’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan

This section examines Germany’s military and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. It shows that between 2002 and 2010, Germany pursued a strong diplomacy toward the coalition. This was evident in German diplomatic efforts at the Bonn (2001) and Berlin (2004) conferences, its increasing volume of foreign aid, and sustained focus on the Afghan police reform. During the nine years of Afghanistan War, Berlin steadily increased its military boots on the ground, making it the third largest ISAF troop contributing country. During the same time, Germany gradually increased its economic aid and civilian assistance to maintain the coalition. Despite an increasing military and civilian commitment, Germany did not respond to the allied calls for sharing the risks of combating Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents. Instead, it showed a keen interest in stabilizing Afghanistan through non-combat operations.

**Diplomatic Contribution.** On the diplomatic front, Germany invested its political capital in forging a common European stance on fighting terrorism, and coordinating the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan. After the U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan, the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Schröder invested their political credibility in organizing two
high profile international conferences on Afghanistan. The first conference, held in Bonn, on November 27-December 5, 2001, established the framework for an interim Afghan government, and laid the foundation for an international security force to be deployed to Kabul.\textsuperscript{10} The second conference, held in Berlin, on March 31-April 1, 2004, offered international legitimacy to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission. The Berlin conference was also notable, as it provided for the construction of additional provincial reconstruction teams, and committed $8.2 billion for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan for the fiscal years 2004-2007.\textsuperscript{11}

After assuming office in 2005, Chancellor Merkel continued to offer German political support for Afghanistan in various international conferences. Under Merkel’s leadership, Berlin participated in Tokyo (2002, 2006), Paris (2008), London (2006, 2010), and Kabul (2010) conferences on Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{12} The effects of these international conferences were enormous. Between 2001 and 2010, they generated an estimated $36 billion foreign aid toward the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Although these international meetings were regarded as UN-sponsored donor conferences, they had provided a venue for coordinating the


political, military, and economic strategies of the United States and its coalition countries. The conference declarations and their implementation progress show that Germany and coalition countries made several crucial contributions to these diplomatic gatherings. First, at the Bonn (2001) and Tokyo (2002) conferences, they created the basis for a legitimate government for Afghanistan. Second, at the London (2006), Tokyo (2006), and Paris (2008) conferences, they re-affirmed the legitimacy of ISAF and OEF operations in Afghanistan, and specified the role of the coalition forces in providing security, governance, and reconstruction assistance to the nascent Afghan government. Third, at the London (2010) and Kabul (2010) meetings, they envisioned the complete transfer of security from international forces to indigenous Afghan security forces by the end of 2014.

**Offensive Military Contribution.** Germany made several important military contributions to the War in Afghanistan. However, it was not until 2009, when the German forces adopted an offensive military posture, albeit on a limited scale, to fight the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Prior to that, the German forces had mostly focused on defensive military operations.

Germany assumed the rotational command of ISAF and commanded a regional contingent of ISAF troops. It also deployed sensitive military assets, and contributed to NATO’s rapid reaction capabilities. In February 2003 Germany and the Netherlands jointly assumed the lead nation status for the ISAF. After NATO took ISAF command in August 2003, Germany was the first NATO country to assume ISAF’s rotational command. Since June 2006, Germany had been the lead country in the Regional Command North (RC-North) to command all multinational forces deployed in northern Afghanistan. RC-North comprised nine provinces, which border the
Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Figure 5.1 shows the location of German troops in Afghanistan.

Figure 5.1 The German Forces’ Area of Operation in Northern Afghanistan

Among the major NATO countries, Germany deployed the third largest contingent of ISAF troops. During the first five years (2002-2006), Germany maintained strict rules of engagement prohibiting the use of force against Taliban insurgents. Since 2007, the Bundeswehr forces began to respond to growing Taliban activities, which led to the relaxation of some of the strict rules of engagement in July 2009. In 2009-2010, Germany appeared to adopt an offensive military posture, with increased participation in kinetic operations targeting the Taliban insurgents in northern Afghanistan.

Data on German troop levels in Afghanistan presents an interesting picture. Since January 2002, German boots on the ground in Afghanistan increased significantly, from 1,200 in 2002 to 2,800 in 2006, and eventually to 4,900 in 2010. By the end of 2010, Germany deployed nearly 2% of its active military forces to Afghanistan. This was significantly lower than the United Kingdom, and the United States, which deployed nearly 5% and 6.7% of their active forces, respectively, to Afghanistan in 2010. Despite such lower active-deployed force ratio, the German troop level in Afghanistan increased more than four times over the years (See Figure 5.2). This troop surge was a response to growing insurgent activities, and allied calls for increasing troop commitments to stabilize Afghanistan.

The *Bundeswehr* forces in Afghanistan were divided into two military missions: the NATO-led ISAF command, and the U.S.-led OEF command. Nearly all of the German forces in

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Afghanistan were deployed to the northern region under the ISAF command, while only a handful of 100 German Special Forces were attached to the OEF command. In order to bolster the intelligence capability of the ISAF, in April 2007, Germany deployed six Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts. Since July 2008, it had also deployed a contingent of NATO Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which replaced the Norwegian QRF. The strength of German QRF increased from 200 troops in 2008 to 350 troops in 2010. Until 2006-2007, the ISAF and the OEF maintained a strong division of labor, with the former working on reconstruction and development, and the latter conducting offensive military operations against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. This has led to the emergence of a “two-tier coalition,” in which the mostly European-led ISAF troops, including the German forces, had focused on non-combat peacekeeping missions in northern and western Afghanistan.\(^{15}\) In contrast, the bulk of the U.S.-led OEF forces, with the assistance of ISAF forces from Britain, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands conducted kinetic operations in eastern and southern Afghanistan.

German military deployment in Afghanistan was defined as an “out of area” operation, requiring parliamentary mandate for the deployment and subsequent extension. Since 2002, each year the German parliament Bundestag had voted to extend the mandate of the Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission. The mandates for the ISAF and the OEF missions, as well as the Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts had to be approved separately from the Bundestag members. Critics argue that the post-war German political culture has demonstrated strong preferences for a pacific and anti-militaristic foreign policy, which rejects the use of force. This had resulted in the

smooth parliamentary approval of *Bundeswehr*’s ISAF mission; while support for the OEF mission and the *Tornado* jet deployment remained controversial. This is due to the fact that military deployment to the ISAF mission was sold to the German public as a non-combat stabilization mission. However, there were concerns that the German Special Forces and the *Tornado* reconnaissance jets could be used for combat purposes, and thus possibly violate the constitutional mandate of *Bundeswehr* mission.

As a result of such domestic opposition, chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel had consistently defined Germany’s Afghan mission as a purely stabilization mission, with no combat role for the German military.¹⁶ For the United States and its NATO allies, such definition of defensive stabilization mission came with an unwanted consequence: the imposition of restrictive rules of engagement or national caveats, which constrained the ability of the *Bundeswehr* troops to carry out offensive operations.

Three examples illustrate the effect of national caveats on Germany’s Afghanistan mission. First, the German forces were required to carry an instructional handout with detailed rules of engagement. The rules were mainly designed to minimize the use of force and firepower. Until 2009, one of the rules instructed German soldiers to warn potential enemy targets in English: “United Nations – Stop, or I will fire!”¹⁷ The warning should also be given in Afghan Pashtun and Dari languages. German soldiers were also forbidden to shoot a fleeing enemy. Former German military chief of staff Wolfgang Schneiderhahn called such national caveats

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¹⁶ Both Schröder and Merkel had led coalition governments. Schröder’s Social Democrat (SPD)-Green coalition ran Germany from 1998 to 2005. In 2005 Angela Merkel came to power and ran a Grand Coalition of Christian Democrat (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrat (SPD) until 2009. Since 2009, Merkel had run a coalition government of Christian Democrat (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrat (FDP).

“well intended but unrealistic” in the context of Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission. Critics say that such rules often limited the operational capacity of soldiers to react in a tactical situation.  

Second, during the four years of deployment (2007-2010), the six Tornado jets were not allowed to participate in combat operations. Third, unlike the Norwegian QRF soldiers who were focused on pro-active combat operations, the German QRF soldiers were prohibited from carrying out offensive operations targeting militants and insurgents. From a joint warfare perspective, such restrictions on the use of force were criticized as a risk-aversion strategy, which eroded the efficiency of the Afghanistan War coalition.

Largely due to the national caveats and tightened rules of engagement, the German ISAF forces did not participate in any military offensive in Afghanistan until 2007. However, due to increasing insurgent attacks, and a growing need to use lethal force to respond to such attacks, since 2007, the German government had re-defined its Afghan mission as a ‘war-like situation,’ and an ‘armed conflict.’ Such definitional change had accompanied the silent dropping of some of the national caveats, which allowed the German forces to engage in combat operations against Taliban and other hostile forces in northern Afghanistan.

Several military operations show Germany’s slow progress toward an offensive military posture in Afghanistan. In 2007, the German, Norwegian, and Afghan forces launched Operation Harekate Yolo (Straightening Path) to stabilize Badghis, Faryab and Badakhshan provinces. Germany provided the leadership and planning, while Norway provided the combat troops, and

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18 Quoted in Boyes, “New Rules Let Germans in Afghanistan Stop Shouting and Start Shooting.”
Afghanistan offered the support troops.\textsuperscript{21} The operation was largely successful in clearing the areas of Taliban insurgents, but failed to hold it due to limited troop presence.

In May 2008, the German-Norwegian-and Afghan forces launched \textit{Operation Karez} to secure the insurgent-prone areas in the Badghis province. The German government delayed the authorization of the military operation on the ground that the area was too close to the Italian area of operation. Later, when Berlin authorized the operation, the Norwegian and Afghan forces had advanced, and the German forces were of little use.\textsuperscript{22}

In July-August 2009, an estimated 300 German QRF troops and 1,200 Afghan troops launched \textit{Operation Oqab} in Kunduz. The goal was to clear the insurgent-prone areas; and to hold them for the peaceful conduct of the Afghan presidential elections.\textsuperscript{23} Another goal was to provide the security for the NATO’s northern supply route. During the operation, the German QRF soldiers cordoned off the area, while the Afghan forces searched for guns and rebels.\textsuperscript{24}

In late 2009 and early 2010, the German patrol teams in the Chachar Dara district in Kunduz came under attack from Taliban insurgents.\textsuperscript{25} In response, the German forces, along with the U.S. and the Afghan security forces, launched combat operations to secure the Chachar Dara district from Taliban control. After the operations, it was reported that, some moderate


Taliban insurgents laid down their arms as part of a NATO strategy of disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR).26

This brief description of tactical operations of German ISAF troops in Afghanistan demonstrates that the Bundeswehr was slowly adopting an offensive counterinsurgency posture in Afghanistan. Until 2009, the German military forces were constrained by national caveats to carry out combat operations in Afghanistan. With the relaxed rules of engagement, approved in July 2009, the German forces were allowed to participate in combat operations against the Taliban militias.27 Critics suggest that weaknesses in the Afghan national security forces and increasing dangers from the insurgent attacks had prompted this changing security posture, adopted by the German forces in northern Afghanistan.28 Despite such incremental changes to a combat posture, Germany’s contribution to Afghanistan was largely defined as a non-combat stabilization mission.

**Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution.** In contrast to a weak offensive military role, Germany had mostly pursued a strong defensive stabilization role in Afghanistan. Berlin’s Afghanistan mission was focused on three sets of activities: economic development, police training, and military reconstruction efforts.

The first area of German stabilization contribution is development assistance. Germany gradually increased its economic assistance for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. After the United States, Britain, and Japan, Germany was the fourth largest bilateral

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donor to Afghanistan. German contribution to Afghanistan increased gradually from $120 million per year in 2002 to $300 million per year in 2008. In January 2010, Chancellor Merkel declared that Germany would double its annual development aid for Afghanistan from the initially planned $330 million to $645 million until 2013. This aid increase was part of a German strategy of ‘development offensive’ in northern Afghanistan, where the German military adopted a defensive stabilization strategy, compared to the offensive military strategy of the British, Canadian, Dutch, and U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan. The German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development was the lead agency for Afghan economic assistance. The German aid to Afghanistan was targeted in four critical areas of reconstruction: basic education, energy generation, job creation, and water supply.

The second area of stabilization assistance was police training. Germany was the lead nation for training Afghan national police. Since 2002, Germany had maintained a bilateral Police Project Team, which deployed German police experts and provided financial assistance for the capacity building of Afghan police forces. Since June 2007, the German police training mission in Afghanistan had evolved into the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan). The number of German police boots on the ground increased from an average of 40 trainers in 2002 to 200 in 2009. During the same time, German annual financial assistance for Afghan police cooperation increased from $18 million in 2002 to $48 million in 2008, and

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31 Ibid.
eventually to $115 million in 2010. Building on the German police training initiative, the European Union launched the EUPOL mission in June 2007. Two years later, the EUPOL Afghanistan launched projects on improving the policing standards in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif provinces. The EUPOL also contributed to developing the anti-corruption prosecutors’ office of the Afghan government. Critics suggest that the German cooperation in the area of police training was understaffed and under-resourced. The German police trainers were criticized for not leaving their training compound; and the German financial contribution to Afghan police reform was considered insufficient.

The third major area of Berlin’s stabilization mission in Afghanistan was civil-military reconstruction. Germany was the lead nation for two provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs): one in Kunduz and the other in Feyzabad. In December 2003, Germany took over the Kunduz PRT from U.S. control. In March 2004 it opened a new PRT in Feyzabad. Like other NATO-led PRTs, the German PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad were aimed at expanding the writ of the Afghan government by providing security and governance, and creating a safe zone for humanitarian aid agencies to operate.

As part of their stabilization mission, the German forces in Afghanistan made an important contribution to the training of Afghan military and the disarming of the former Taliban militias. During the 2010 London conference on Afghanistan, Germany declared that it would

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expand the size of the *Bundeswehr* military trainers in Afghanistan from 280 to 1,400 troops. According to *Der Spiegel*, the most popular German weekly, German army’s training strategy would change to follow a new U.S. training strategy. The new strategy emphasized international instructors “to live with the Afghan troops and train them in the course of [an ongoing] military operations.”35 This new model of training was quite different from the standard German model, in which the German forces would train their Afghan counterparts “in the safety of a base or from armored vehicles.”36 This new training model involved more risks, but the German forces adopted it.37 The *Spiegel* report also noted that a German government strategy paper showed Berlin’s plan for partial hand over of security responsibility to the Afghan forces in early 2011. This transfer of security responsibility would concentrate on several districts in the northern regional, which were under the German area of operation.

Germany also partnered with the Afghan and NATO allies to facilitate the process of disarming and reintegrating the Taliban militias. In January 2010, two days before the scheduled London Conference on Afghanistan, Chancellor Merkel pledged that Germany would contribute $70 million to a $500 million initiative for the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) of Taliban insurgents.38 The aim of the DDR program was to offer cash support to former Taliban insurgents to lay down arms, sever connections with Al Qaeda and Taliban militias, and stop fighting the Afghan and NATO security forces. The program also envisioned reintegrating the former Taliban militias into the mainstream Afghan society.

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37 “Afghan Reinforcements: Germany Pledges 500 Extra Troops Plus Big Aid Increase.”
38 Ibid.
The discussion on Germany’s contribution to the War in Afghanistan would be incomplete without a brief reference to the troop fatalities. In assessing Germany’s military burden-sharing, an important question would be: Did the German forces suffer a high level of fatalities during their nine years of the Afghanistan War? The answer is no. Since 2002, Germany lost 46 soldiers in Afghanistan (See Figure 5.3). Nearly a quarter of those 46 soldiers died in accidental incidents, such as helicopter crashes, and other non-hostile actions, like the handling of live ammunitions. This was in sharp contrast with the U.S. and British forces, which lost nearly 1,446 and 348 soldiers, respectively, but most of them in hostile enemy actions. Although Germany suffered a much lower troop fatality in Afghanistan, when compared with the U.S. and UK troop fatality data, Afghanistan was the deadliest military mission for the German forces in the post-Cold War era.

![Figure 5.3 German Troop Fatalities in Afghanistan, 2002-2010](image)

In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that until 2010, Germany had mostly pursued a risk-averse strategy, which focused on defensive reconstruction operations, and ignored the task of fighting the insurgents. As described below, due to historical sensitivity as
well as political constraints, Germany had strongly opposed the idea of deploying forces for combat missions. Despite such domestic constraints, the German forces had gradually changed their Afghan mission from a purely non-combat stabilization mission to a very limited combat mission.

II. **Explaining Germany’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan**

This section tests the validity of my burden-sharing model to analyze Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. First it examines the effect of three international systemic level, and three domestic level variables in shaping Germany’s burden-sharing behavior. Following the neo-classical realist tradition, it argues that the systemic pressures of alliance commitment and balance of threat were transmitted through the prisms of the German domestic political process to produce a unique burden-sharing behavior. It claims that despite strong public opposition, the presence of strongly guarded elite consensus in the German parliament provided the legal mandate for the *Bundeswehr* mission in Afghanistan. However, the legal-constitutional limits on the use of force in out of area operations, as well as the lack of a counterinsurgency capability seriously constrained Germany’s ability to participate in offensive military operations in Afghanistan.

**Alliance Dependence.** Alliance dependence did not present any systemic level incentive to the German decision makers. The alliance dependence theory suggests that reliance on a formal, treaty-based alliance system presents a unique dilemma for a state: if it joins the alliance, it might be entrapped; if it avoids the alliance, it might be abandoned. Alliance leader may use the offer of incentive or coercive pressure to persuade a state to join a wartime coalition. This
was a standard picture of Cold War era international politics, dominated by the tight competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union and their rival military alliances – NATO and Warsaw Pact. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and NATO’s changing strategic concepts suggested that Germany would no longer be dependent on NATO for its military security. \(^{39}\) Instead, it would be a leading provider of security for the transatlantic alliance insofar as security had to be provided.

Most defense analysts argue that in the changing security landscape of the post-Cold War era, the German leaders have responded to NATO’s out of area missions as an issue of alliance commitment and solidarity rather than alliance dependence. \(^{40}\) Germany’s Afghan mission provides strong support for such alliance commitment and solidarity thesis.

The politics of the Afghanistan War coalition shows that alliance dependence did not structure German decision on Afghanistan. Prior to deploying the Bundeswehr troops to Afghanistan, Germany was not confronted with the danger of abandonment by the United States, or entrapment in the U.S.-led coalition. Instead, the German leaders were conscious of their longstanding commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance, and framed Berlin’s Afghan


policy within the context of alliance solidarity.41 For NATO, alliance solidarity has two principal meanings: indivisibility of the security of alliance members; and collective responsibility in the defense of national and alliance territory. For the purpose of this chapter, Berlin’s sense of alliance solidarity was evident in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. In response to the attacks, the German Chancellor Schröder declared ‘unlimited solidarity’ (uneingeschränkte Solidarität) with the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism. This alliance spirit was later manifested, when Germany strongly supported NATO’s Article 5 collective defense mechanism.42 The effect of supporting NATO’s collective defense provision was enormous. It recognized the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States as an act of armed attack on a NATO member state, and legitimized an armed response from NATO members against Al Qaeda and its state sponsor - Afghanistan.43

The German chancellor’s rhetorical stance on solidarity with the United was translated into a concrete military contribution, when Germany pledged the deployment of military forces in Afghanistan. In justifying the deployment of German troops, Chancellor Schröder and other proponents of his Afghanistan policy insisted that Germany was committed to a multilateral crisis management strategy. They also argued that Berlin’s Afghan deployment should indicate

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41 Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid argue that Germany’s Afghanistan policy may be less focused on “strategy or even national interest than on alliance solidarity. See Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 87.
42 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 82. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949. NATO E-Library Official Texts. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed January 4, 2011.
to the international community as well as its NATO partners that Germany was a “reliable ally, able and willing to make contributions to international security alongside allies and partners.”

Alliance solidarity is a historical phenomenon in U.S.-German relations. During the five decades of the Cold War (1945-1990), Germany was the central focus of U.S foreign policy in Europe. During that time, after the British military forces, the German Bundeswehr enjoyed the closest relationship with U.S. forces. The ideological confrontation between Soviet communism and Western liberalism cemented that relationship. The end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany brought profound changes to the geopolitical and geostrategic realities of European and international politics. While dependence on U.S. security umbrella was a matter of defense priority for Germany and its West European allies during the Cold War, such alliance dependence was no longer a foreign policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Instead, Germany and its European allies embraced a policy of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which would guard against any unilateralist tendency in U.S. foreign policy. The French-German opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 only highlighted the changed mood of the post-Cold War realities, and the fear that unilateralism was taking a firm root in U.S. security policy under the

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44 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p. 85.
46 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, pp. 188-192. In the German foreign policy lexicon, ‘effective multilateralism’ refers to a strong belief in multilateral institutions, such as, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN) in addressing international security issues. The term ‘security’ broadly used here to refer to the social, political, economic, environmental, and territorial threats. See: German Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines for the Area of Responsibility of the Federal Minister of Defense. Berlin, May 21, 2003, pp. 4, 8-9.
Bush administration. It also signaled that while Germany expressed solidarity with the United States, it would not participate in any military adventures in Iraq.

As stated above, the nature and meaning of alliance solidarity changed in German security policy. During the Cold War era, this meant unquestioned solidarity with and greater dependence on U.S. leadership. During the post-Cold War era, unquestioned solidarity was replaced by potential balancing against U.S. hegemony. As evidenced during the Second Iraq War debate (2003), Germany pursued this balancing act by aligning with France and Russia, and by projecting a strong commitment to multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and the European Union in resolving international disputes. Despite such aberrations in the U.S.-German relations during the Iraq Crisis, Germany’s unswerving support for NATO as the premier military alliance was the bedrock of German defense posture in the post-Cold War era. This was evident in the 1994 and 2006 versions of the defense white papers, which defined German armed forces as an alliance army, and German preference for NATO-coordinated military response to international security threats.

The 1994 German Defense White Paper describes the Bundeswehr as an “alliance army.” The White Paper notes that:

47 Dettke, Germany Says “No”: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy.
The Bundeswehr is an alliance army. It makes a major contribution to NATO's main defense forces and reaction forces. Military integration is being enhanced. European and U.S. forces are being linked together by multinational structures. Common goals and similarities in the way Allied forces view themselves are also manifesting themselves in structures, as a token of solidarity within the Alliance. Burdens and risks are being shared fairly, because responsibility is being borne by all the Allies and all are benefiting.\textsuperscript{51}

Twelve years later, the 2006 version of the white paper reiterated Germany’s principled position on alliance solidarity. Between 1994 and 2006, the strategic landscape in the international security system changed significantly. This change was evident in NATO’s alliance security agenda, which focused on terrorism, crisis management, proliferation, and a strategic partnership with Russia.\textsuperscript{52} In 2006, Germany was a principal member of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. It was no surprise that Germany continued to define its Afghanistan mission as a contribution to the UN-backed and NATO-led ISAF mission. The 2006 \textit{Defense White Paper} emphasizes this spirit of multilateralism in German foreign policy:

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National security planning calls for networked structures in Germany and close multinational coordination. German security policy is committed to effective multilateralism, based on the conviction that the challenges to international security can only be mastered together with partners. The observance and strengthening of international law as well as the multilateral orientation of German foreign and security policy are values that are explicitly anchored in the Basic Law.  

The forgoing discussion suggests that alliance solidarity, not alliance dependence, can explain Germany’s entry into the Afghanistan War coalition. Once Germany joined the coalition, there were pressures from the United States and other NATO allies for increased troop commitment and redeployment of German forces to southern Afghanistan. This was more evident in NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit, and subsequent NATO summits and meetings of NATO defense and foreign ministers. In 2008, the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that NATO’s ISAF mission emerged as a “two-tier alliance,” in which countries like the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands did most of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency fighting, while others like Germany were reluctant to engage in any offensive military operation. In Gates’ words:

I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security.

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and others who are not. I think that it puts a cloud over the future of the alliance if this is to endure and perhaps even get worse.\(^55\)

Secretary Gates made such a blunt remark during a testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 6, 2008. During the testimony Gates stressed that Germany, among other nations, should lift the national caveats, and share the increasing risk of combat operations in Afghanistan.\(^56\) Gates was later joined by his British and Canadian counterparts at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on February 7-8, 2008. Both the British and the Canadian defense ministers pressed Germany to accept more military risks in Afghanistan.\(^57\) Germany received more pressures in 2009, when the U.S. President Barrack Obama declared a large escalation of 30,000 U.S. troops, and expected his European counterparts to provide 5,000-7,000 troops to match the U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan.\(^58\)

In addition to pressuring Germany for a higher troop contribution and redeployment in risky areas, NATO requested that Germany deploy a small contingent of combat forces to replace the 350-man strong Norwegian contingent to the NATO Quick Reaction Force (QRF).\(^59\) Former German defense minister Franz Josef Jung rejected the U.S. and NATO pressures for a


combat role for Bundeswehr in southern Afghanistan. Jung remarked that “We have agreed on a clear division of labor. I really believe that we really must keep our focus on the north.”  

Although Germany refused to deploy its armed forces for combat operations, it authorized an additional troop surge, including the deployment of a Bundeswehr contingent of 200 troops to NATO’s rapid reaction force. Prominent German defense expert, Franz-Josef Meiers, argues that Germany’s decision to increase its troop commitment and expand its non-combat stabilization role in Afghanistan was not a response to the pressures from the U.S. and NATO officials. Instead, it reflected Germany’s alliance commitment and acceptance of the challenging tasks of rebuilding Afghanistan.

In summary, alliance dependence cannot explain the German contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. Instead, alliance commitment and alliance solidarity best explain Germany’s entry into the Afghanistan War. Out of solidarity with the United States and the NATO alliance, Germany supported the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense mechanism. The invocation of Article 5 made it an imperative for Germany to join the UN-mandated and later NATO-led ISAF mission. If alliance dependence had any effect, we would

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have expected that Germany would respond to the allied pressures for redeploying \textit{Bundeswehr} forces into southern Afghanistan and participating in combat operations. However, Germany did not respond to such pressures, due to an independent foreign policy which focused on a risk-aversion strategy. As described below, Germany did not move toward a combat burden-sharing role and abandoning its risk-aversion strategy, until the \textit{Bundeswehr} troops in northern Afghanistan were confronted with a resurgent Taliban threat.

\textit{Balance of Threat.} After alliance solidarity, balance of threat presented the second systemic level incentive to encourage Germany’s participation in the Afghanistan War coalition. The balance of threat theory predicts that states join a formal alliance or informal coalition to balance against the offensive power of a state or a non-state actor. In the context of the Afghanistan War coalition, the presence of similar threats to the United States and its NATO allies would generate greater incentives for transatlantic burdensharing. By contrast, the lack of similar threats would minimize the chances of greater burden-sharing.

The transnational threat posed by radical Islamist groups Al Qaeda and Taliban did not present any existential threat to German security. However, Germany found that Al Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, as well as subsequent attacks around the world posed a direct threat to secular western values and lifestyle. Thus, consistent with the predictions of the balance of threat hypothesis, Germany was expected to join and support the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan. Similarly, growing Taliban insurgent attacks directed against the German forces would increase Germany’s vulnerability, requiring \textit{Bundeswehr} to adopt an offensive counterinsurgency strategy.
At least four terrorism related assessments show the incentive for Germany to join and support the Afghan War coalition. The first three assessments examine the threat to German and transatlantic society from the German-based radical Islamist groups. The fourth concerns threats to German forces in northern Afghanistan.

The first threat concerns Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell, which was instrumental in the planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Concerns over Al Qaeda’s German-based cell surfaced in the media after it became apparent that some of the key planners of 9/11 attacks were based in the second largest German city Hamburg, where they formed a clandestine network of militant Islamists intent on attacking the United States. At least eight members of the Hamburg Cell played a crucial role during the 9/11 attacks. They were all radicalized in Germany, possessed strong anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments, and travelled to Afghanistan to meet Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Laden found the Hamburg cell members fluent in English, extremely westernized, and recruited them for attacking the United States. Prominent American political scientist Peter Katzenstein’s remark on the effect of 9/11 on German security is worth noting here:

September 11 had a big effect on Germany. This is not surprising. The evidence is clear that terrorists used Germany as a major staging area for the September 11 attacks. Three of the four pilots of the planes attacking the World Trade Center

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64 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, four of the key Hamburg Cell members are Egyptian origin Mohammed Atta, Yemeni-origin Ramzi Binalshib, Lebanese-origin Ziad Jarrah, and UAE-origin Marwan al Shehhi. The report also notes that prior to forming the cell, Atta, Binalshib, Jarrah, and Shehhi did not received any funding support from Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda leadership. However, once they joined the Al Qaeda’s plan to use civilian planes for inflicting terrorist attacks, they received funding from Al Qaeda to cover their expenses from a trip from Afghanistan to Germany, and from Germany to the United States. See: National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 153-173.
and the Pentagon came from Hamburg. German solidarity with New York and America was very strong. A quarter of a million people showed up at a demonstration for New York in front of the Brandenburg Gate, the largest of scores of such demonstrations that occurred all over the country. Germany had a legislative history of forceful counter-terrorist policies. And the government was fully aware of both its own and Germany's vulnerability.65

Second, although most of the Hamburg Cell members were either arrested or prosecuted by the German or U.S. authorities, Islamist activism and international terrorism remained a serious concern for German security.66 German interior ministry reports and public opinion polls indicate such heightened threat posed by Al Qaeda.

According to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, transnational Islamist terrorism posed a serious threat to German and international security. The Ministry reports show that, between 2002 and 2008, the number of Islamist militants in Germany increased gradually from 30,000 in 2002 to 35,000 in 2008. About ninety percent of all Islamist activists in Germany belonged to the Turkish-origin Muslim immigrants. The rest of the ten percent belonged to three

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sub-groups: Arab-origin groups, including Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah supporters; Pakistani origin Tablighi Jamat movement; and Chechen separatists.  

The interior ministry reports note that while the large majority of these Islamist activists were non-violent, a small group of these Islamists maintained a strong connection to Al Qaeda and the international *jihadi* movement. The reports stress that although the U.S. and NATO-led coalition forces broke down Al Qaeda’s core leadership structure in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda remained a serious threat to international security. The incidence of several high-profile terrorist attacks around the world – in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), and London (2005)—showed the deadly nature of Al Qaeda’s terrorist threat.  

The interior ministry assessments also revealed that although German-based Islamist groups did not pose greater threats than other Europe-based Islamist groups, such threats should not be under-estimated. Most intelligence assessments indicate that Islamist militancy in Germany was fueled by several factors. Among these radicalizing factors, the most notable were the anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sentiments, anti-American zeal, as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reports also claimed that members of Al Qaeda in Iraq and other Al

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68 Literally speaking, in the discourse of political Islam, the term *Jihad* refers to holy war, and *Jihadi movement* refers to a violent armed struggle, which endorses the use of terrorism as a political tool.
Qaeda supporters were active in Germany and other European countries, and posed a serious threat to German security.\textsuperscript{70}

Third, the German public perception also indicates a heightened sense of insecurity from Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism refers to “the more radical stream of Islam,” which supports the use of violence for institutionalizing Islamic law around the world. It also refers to the use of violence as a tool to resist U.S. and Western political influence in the Muslim countries. During the formative periods of the Afghanistan War (2002-2005), an overwhelming majority of the German people reported that radical Islamism posed a serious threat to Europe and the United States in the next ten years. According to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, polls conducted between 2002 and 2005 found that an average 62% Germans thought Islamist radicalism posed an ‘extremely important threat’ to transatlantic security. During the same time, nearly one in every three Germans thought that radical Islamists posed an ‘important threat’ to EU and U.S. security.\textsuperscript{71}

The fourth terrorist threat concerns the German military forces in Afghanistan. It came from a resurgent Taliban, and various Al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups. During the first five years of Germany’s Afghanistan mission (2002-2006), northern Afghanistan was a relatively peaceful area. However, since 2007, the German and NATO forces in Kunduz and other northern provinces confronted a growing number of terrorist and insurgent attacks. Insurgent strikes on the German and NATO forces increased ahead of the 2009 German parliamentary elections (See


Figure 5.4). Apparently, the Taliban insurgents wanted to influence the German public opinion by inflicting casualties on German soldiers, in an attempt to force the German government to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Media reports confirm the rise in insurgent activities in Kunduz and its neighboring provinces. According to the Afghan government and NATO assessments, insurgents in northern Afghanistan belonged to three major militant groups: Islamic Movement Uzbekistan, the Pakistan-based Haqqani Taliban Network, and the Hezbe-Islami Gulbuddin Network. Chechen and Uzbek origin militants were also among the northern Afghan Taliban.

Source: iCasualties.org.

Figure 5.4 German and Coalition Troop Fatalities in Kunduz, 2006-2010

Source: iCasualties.org.

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At least four factors contributed to this growing Taliban activity in northern Afghanistan. First, under pressure from U.S. and NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the south moved to northern Afghanistan to diffuse the threat and dilute the effectiveness of NATO’s counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan. Second, since German forces in the north were not engaged in offensive military operations in the first five years, Taliban militias took the opportunity of Germany’s weak counterinsurgency strategy to maximize their influence in the German area of responsibility. Third, corruption in the Afghan government, especially in the police also created an inroad for Taliban emergence in the north. Fourth, after NATO’s southern supply route in Pakistan came under repeated terrorist attacks, the United States opened a northern route of NATO supplies via former Soviet territories and the Central Asian Republics. Taliban forces found this northern network of NATO supplies as an important target of terrorist attacks.

This brief discussion of actual and perceived threat suggests that during the Schröder and Merkel governments, the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism presented a systemic pressure for Germany to take a strong stance at the domestic and international fronts. At the domestic front, Germany used its law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial instruments to investigate and prosecute various terrorist cells, including the Islamist terrorists, such as the Hamburg Cell. At

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74 Mohammad, “Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan,” p. 9; Richburg, “As Taliban Makes Comeback in Kunduz Province, War Spreads to Northern Afghanistan.”
76 Lawrence, “Taliban Return to Northern Afghanistan.”
77 For a detailed discussion on the NATO northern distribution network, see: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Northern Route Eases Supplies to US Forces in Afghanistan,” ISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 16, No. 23 (August 2010).
the external front, Germany allied with the United States and other NATO countries to form and maintain the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan.

Both the Schröder and Merkel governments defined their Afghanistan mission as part of a multilateral strategy to counter the threat of Al Qaeda and Taliban. In fact, it was Schröder’s defense minister Peter Struck, who claimed in 2003 that German national security was being defended along the Hindu Kush—the mountainous regions covering northern Afghanistan. Struck’s successors remained largely supportive of that assessment, and did not alter the course of German policy by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, or limiting Germany’s support for the ISAF mission. This was evident in two defense ministry reports, one published during the Schröder regime, and the other during the Merkel regime:

The 2003 Defense Policy Guideline stresses that fighting international terrorism has emerged as a top priority for the German armed forces. The most recent defense publications also make a similar assessment on the heightened threat of international terrorism, and Germany’s commitment to balance against the threat. The 2006 Defense White Paper claims that:

[T]he most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks... Germany cannot escape this danger, there having been repeated instances where also German citizens have lost their lives in such attacks...Since November 2001,

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Germany has been contributing naval and special forces, among other assets, to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to combat international terrorism.81

While the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines and the 2006 White Paper justified the deployment of German forces in fighting international terrorism, it was not until 2009, when Berlin changed the rules of engagement, and authorized the Bundeswehr forces to take a proactive counterinsurgency strategy. These changing rules of engagement indicate a response to the heightened threats posed by the Taliban insurgency. In the end, such threat convergence caused Bundeswehr forces to take the increasing risks of combat operations.

In summary, balance of threat presented an important incentive to encourage Germany’s participation in the Afghanistan coalition. The existence of Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell and its involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks produced a shared threat perception, cementing Germany’s alliance commitment to join the war in Afghanistan. Although Germany joined other NATO countries in Afghanistan in 2002, domestic political constrains limited the ability of the Bundeswehr to share the military burdens of fighting the Taliban forces. Since 2007, growing insurgent attacks targeting the German forces provided an incentive to circumvent those domestic constraints, and allowed the Bundeswehr to use lethal force against the Taliban insurgents. As insurgent attacks in northern Afghanistan grew in 2009 and 2010, the German forces began to develop an offensive counterinsurgency strategy, by using force to repel the Taliban militias. Unlike the previous years, they also began to show a greater willingness to share the risks of fighting the Taliban insurgency.

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**Collective Action.** The free-riding motivation of collective action did not present any systemic incentive to influence Germany’s burden-sharing decisions. According to the collective action hypothesis, the dominant power in the international system is likely to bear most of the burdens of a collective good, while others will tend to ride free. During the Afghanistan War, the collective good was defeating the Al Qaeda terrorist network, and denying it a safe haven in Afghanistan. The two other components of the collective good were toppling the Taliban regime, suppressing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal area.

If the collective action theory is correct, we would expect that the United States would bear all or most of the military burdens of combating Taliban and stabilizing post-Taliban Afghanistan, while Germany and other NATO countries would ride free. This was not the case. Since the U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, several NATO allies, including Germany, joined the U.S. war efforts by contributing conventional and special forces to the U.S.-led OEF mission, and the UN-mandated (and later NATO-led) ISAF mission. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether all the coalition members had made substantial contributions. But, it can be reasonably expected that some of the small coalition members did not have the ability and the willingness to make a robust contribution to the Afghanistan coalition. Despite that, their participation was important to show that the coalition was large, and it enjoyed the political support of a significant portion of the international community.

As described in the preceding section, Germany was not a free-rider in Afghanistan. It made significant military and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War. The German participation in the Afghanistan War was significant, when compared with Germany’s checkbook diplomacy during the First Iraq War (1990-1991), and its non-participation in the Second
Iraq War (2003-present).\textsuperscript{82} Germany bore a large part of the financial burdens of the first intervention in 1990, but strongly opposed the second military intervention in Iraq in 2003.\textsuperscript{83} By contrast, Germany not only committed troops in the Afghanistan War, but also coordinated international economic and military efforts at the Bonn and Berlin summits, as well as other high profile summits to steer the process of post-war reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

Several factors explain Germany’s strong contribution to Afghanistan. Like the United States, the United Kingdom, and other key NATO allies, Germany perceived fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban as a collective good, and made sustained efforts to the achievement of the public good, through direct military and non-military burden-sharing. There were other motivations as well. The achievement of the private good was important for German elites. In the Afghanistan War, the private good was maintaining the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance by supporting a strong role for NATO in Afghanistan. This was evident in several NATO summits, and defense ministers’ meetings, in which Germany responded to allied requests for troop increase, albeit limiting the remit of the German forces to the northern part of Afghanistan.

In summary, among the three systemic factors discussed above, the free-riding motivation of collective action dilemma cannot explain the German contribution to Afghanistan. Germany did not demonstrate a free-riding behavior in the Afghanistan War by avoiding the ISAF mission. Instead, it maintained the third largest military contingent to ISAF. However, one

\textsuperscript{82} Germany did not send any troops during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; but later it offered basing and overflight rights and trained Iraqi forces. For a detailed discussion on German policy on Iraq War, see Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, “Germany: Non-Coalition, but Cooperating,” in \textit{Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice}, (Boulder and London: First Forum Press, 2010), pp. 89-148.

\textsuperscript{83} Germany contributed a total $11.5 billion to the First Iraq War coalition, of which 60 percent went to the United States. This was equal to one third of the budget for German military forces. Grunther Hellmann, “Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks: Germany and Alliance Burden-Sharing in the Gulf War,” in \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, edited by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 168.
could possibly argue that until 2007, Germany’s risk-averse strategy in Afghanistan revealed a free-riding tendency, by delegating the burdens of fighting insurgency to the American, British, Canadian, and Dutch forces. This chapter shows that in the absence of a free-riding motivation, alliance solidarity and balance of threat motivation provided two systemic incentives to encourage Germany to join and maintain the Afghan War coalition. As the burden-sharing model suggests, these systemic incentives were transmitted through the domestic political structures to produce a unique burden-sharing behavior for Germany. The remainder in this chapter examines the effect of German domestic politics on the *Bundeswehr* mission in Afghanistan.

**Domestic Political Regime.** At the domestic level, the first decision point is the chief executive. My theoretical model suggests that states’ burden-sharing decisions are taken by the chief executives at the domestic front.\(^{84}\) Hence, the nature of a country’s political regime, and the chief executive’s foreign policy authority would significantly shape its contribution to a wartime coalition. In the context of Germany’s Afghanistan policy, we are interested to see how Chancellors Schröder and Merkel confronted with two stark choices: a combat counterinsurgency role and a non-combat stabilization role.

The nature of a domestic political regime can be measured by looking into the chief executive’s decision-making power in the domain of foreign and security policy. Several government institutional factors influence the chief executive’s decision power in Germany. These are legal-constitutional provisions, parliamentary and judicial oversight, and elite consensus. Measuring legal and constitutional provisions is a straightforward task. One can look into the texts of the German laws and constitution, and examine the discretionary power given to

the office of chancellor in the use of force. Such legal texts will also define the parliamentary and judicial oversight of the government’s security policy. Finally, elite consensus is measured by the level of agreement between the governing and opposing political parties in Germany.

David Auerswald suggests that chief executive’s decision-making power can be divided into three categories: strong, weak, and medium. Drawing on Auerswald’s analysis, I argue that each type of executive power is likely to have a distinct burden-sharing preference for a wartime coalition. First, a strong chief executive is less likely to care about public opinion, and express a strong willingness to use military force for coalition purposes. Second, a weak chief executive is likely to fear losing elections if the conflict goes bad causing high troop casualties. This will encourage the weak executive to avoid joining the coalition in the first place. Third, in between these two possibilities, a chief executive with medium power may enjoy elite consensus, but confront two major obstacles—legal restrictions, and parliamentary oversight. The interplay of these domestic factors will strongly influence the way a country decides on and contributes to a coalition-led conflict. As the preceding section suggests, the systemic incentives of alliance commitment and balance of threat will transmit through the domestic political factors and national military capability to shape Germany’s contributions to Afghanistan.

The German governments under Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-present) demonstrate the third type of regime characteristics (medium executive), in which the chancellor and his (or her) war cabinet retain considerable discretion over the foreign policy decisions. However, the chancellor is constitutionally required to share the power with the parliament, Bundestag, in deciding the use of force in the execution of foreign policy. There are few

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countries in the world, in which the parliament enjoys such use-of-force power. The effect of such power sharing arrangement is enormous: it constrains the power of the chancellor and his or her war cabinet to flexibly deploy the armed forces and military assets for overseas missions.

My research found that Chancellors Schröder and his successor Merkel confronted at least three sets of domestic challenges, which structured their Afghan decisions. The first relates to the constitutional restrictions on the use of force for out of area operations. The second concerns the Bundestag oversight of force deployment decisions. The third involves party politics. As discussed below, these three sets of challenges are closely inter-related and not mutually exclusive.

The first challenge came from the constitutional provisions. The Bundeswehr is widely regarded as a constitutional army. This is due to the fact that the German constitution, Basic Law, provides the domestic sources of legitimacy for the overseas deployment of German forces. The constitution is so powerful that deployment decisions can be challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court, and must be vetted in the Parliament. Historically, Germany has been  

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86 For instance, the British Prime Minister does not have to seek a parliamentary mandate for the use of force. A mere notification to the Parliament is suffice. Similarly, the U.S. President enjoys considerable war powers, and his national security council has rarely been constrained by the Congress in major deployment decisions. However, the 1973 War Powers Resolution restricts the power of the U.S. President to use military force without congressional approval. The Resolution requires the President to notify the Congress of a military action within 48 hours of the use of force. Without any congressional authorization, a president is required to terminate the use of force after 90 days. Historical evidence shows that U.S. presidents have often bypassed the congress in the use of force. For a concise analysis of the U.S. president’s war powers, see Noah Feldman, “Our presidential Era: Who can Check the President?, New York Times, January 8, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/magazine/08court.html?pagewanted=print, accessed April 1, 2011. Another piece by Feldman is also relevant here. See, “Whose War Powers?” New York Times, February 4, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/magazine/04WWLN_lede.t.html? r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx, accessed April 1, 2011.

87 The German Federal Constitutional Court can decide whether the deployment of military forces and logistics are appropriate and consistent with the German constitution. For instance, in July 2007, the Constitutional Court dismissed the left party’s complaint that the Bundestag’s approval of the deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance aircraft in Afghanistan violates the constitution of Germany. The Court ruled that the deployment is constitutional, as it is part of NATO’s ISAF mission and thus consistent with Germany’s alliance commitment to NATO. See
defined as a ‘civilian power,’ and the German foreign policy has been described as a product of the ‘culture of restraint.’ This has largely resulted in the characterization of the *Bundeswehr* as a ‘territorial army,’ whose central purpose is to ensure national and alliance defense, and not to engage in a war of aggression. During the Cold War era, the German governments maintained this civilian nature of foreign policy and did not venture into the deployment of military forces for any non-territorial, foreign intervention purposes. This was largely due to Germany’s limited sovereignty in the foreign and security policy domain during the Cold War era.\(^{88}\)

After the restoration of German sovereignty and the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, the *Bundeswehr* participated in several overseas missions in the post-Cold War era. The list includes, the peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian missions in Iraq (1991-1996), Cambodia (1992-1993), Georgia (1994), Somalia (1993-1994), former Yugoslavia (various times between 1992 and present), and East Timor (1999-2000). In the post-9/11 era, Germany’s Afghanistan mission emerged as one of the most notable out of area operations for the *Bundeswehr*. Data on gradual troop increase and the adoption of an offensive military posture in northern Afghanistan show the importance of Germany’s Afghan mission.\(^{89}\)

The Basic Law provides for the deployment of *Bundeswehr* for international peace keeping and crisis management purposes listed above. The German Constitutional Court, in its July 12, 1994 decision clarified that *Bundeswehr* forces can be deployed for overseas military operations in the spirit of the collective security and defense commitment, enshrined in the German constitution the Basic Law. According to Article 24 (2) of the Basic Law,


\(^{89}\) Appendix 5.A provides a list of major German military deployments in the post-Cold War era.
With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and security a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.90

Although the German forces participated in several post-Cold War peace missions in NATO, and ‘out of area’ operations, the legal and constitutional restrictions strongly constrained their burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. At least three aspects of Germany’s Afghanistan mission illustrate this. The first shows the concentration of German forces in the relatively stable areas. The second demonstrates the effect of restricted rules of engagement on the operational efficiency of German soldiers. The third shows the possibility for intrusive domestic legal oversight for a German soldier’s military actions in Afghanistan.

First, the German constitution prohibits the deployment of Bundeswehr in a war of aggression; however German military can participate in multilateral crisis management and peace keeping missions.91 With regard to the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan, the German public as well as the political elites understood two consequences of such constitutional provisions: one, the German forces could not participate in offensive military operations; and two, they can only participate in defensive reconstruction and stabilization operations. Broadly speaking, such strict interpretation assumes a dichotomy in military operations: offensive versus defensive military actions, and suggests that, when deployed, the German forces be solely focused on defensive operations. The deployment of German forces, as well as the location of

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two German PRTs, in the relatively stable northern Afghanistan illustrates how constitutional rules and their rigid interpretations might have shaped Germany’s Afghan mission.92

Second, since the German Basic Law prohibits *Bundeswehr* deployment for offensive purposes, the German government placed several ‘national caveats,’ which constrained the ability of the soldiers and military assets to participate in offensive operations.93 For instance, the German forces were widely criticized for not leaving their armed personnel carriers while on patrol, and not leaving their bases at night. Another problem was that German rules of engagement strongly discouraged the use of force, except for self-defense and for providing emergency relief to other allied forces. As described before, restrictions also applied to the German contingent of NATO Quick Reaction Forces and German military assets. For instance, the German medevac helicopters were required to return to the base before sunset.94 The German *Tornado* reconnaissance airplanes could be used for close air support combat operations, and only be deployed for offensive operations to provide emergency relief to other allied forces.95

Third, there were additional legal risks associated with operations involving the German soldiers. Any incident of civilian casualty in Afghanistan, involving a German soldier’s military action, was likely to trigger a legal inquiry in Germany. In such a case, the legal inquiry would be initiated by the Potsdam public prosecutor, and be followed up by the public prosecutor of the

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95 Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 75.
German soldier’s native region in Germany.\textsuperscript{96} Ironically, in both cases, public prosecutors in Germany, with no experience of the Afghanistan mission, had to deal with the legal case, making it an unnecessary legal restriction on the operational flexibility of soldiers on the ground.\textsuperscript{97} One such example was a trial in German courts following an alleged incident of civilian casualty involving German soldiers.\textsuperscript{98} This brief discussion of constitutional restrictions shows the limits of the German chancellors’ power in deploying military forces and assets.

The second challenge to the German chancellor’s executive power on use-of-force decisions came from the German Parliament, Bundestag. Obviously, parliamentary challenge is an offshoot of the legal-constitutional restrictions described above. German law requires that the federal government’s decision to deploy military forces must receive a “constitutional stamp” from the parliamentary majority.\textsuperscript{99} German foreign policy making process regarding its Afghanistan strategy shows that both Schröder and Merkel governments were constrained by the parliamentary politics in shaping their policy.\textsuperscript{100}

From the very beginning of Germany’s Afghanistan policy, Chancellor Schröder’s decision regarding the deployment of the Bundeswehr confronted the constitutionally designed...
limits of parliamentary approval. This was evident when Schröder faced stiff opposition, even among his Social Democrat Party members, to a pledged deployment of 3,900 troops for the war on terrorism.\(^{101}\) The opposition was so strong that Schröder wanted to test the strength of his Afghanistan policy in a historically rare ‘no-confidence’ vote in the parliament.\(^{102}\) In doing so, Schröder tied the question of *Bundeswehr* deployment to the future of his ruling SPD-Green party coalition.\(^{103}\)

On November 16, 2001, the German parliament voted on the twin issues of *Bundeswehr* deployment and the political fate of the Red-Green coalition. In the end, the parliament voted 332 to 326 in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. The result of the vote showed how polarized the German political elites were on the question of Afghanistan deployment.\(^{104}\) Elite fragmentation was also evident by the fact that over seventy Parliamentarians “who had supported the motion added to their vote a written explanation, mainly to qualify that they had substantial doubts about the military deployment, but voted ‘yes’ in order to keep the [ruling] coalition in power.”\(^{105}\)

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\(^{101}\) Among the 3,900 soldiers, 1800 soldiers from naval forces, including naval air forces, will be deployed in the Horn of Africa, 800 will be deployed in Kuwait to operate nuclear, biological, and chemical detection tanks Fox, 500 will be deployed as air transport forces, 450 as logistical support forces, 250 as a medical unit, and only 100 Special Forces be deployed as an anti-terrorism unit in Afghanistan. See Dettke, *Germany Says “No”*, p. 130.

\(^{102}\) Previously the *Bundestag* had tried only twice to pass no-confidence votes—the first in 1972 and the second in 1982. In the first instance, the SPD leaders failed to replace Chancellor Willy Brandt with a CDU leader. In the second instance, the CDU/CSU and FDP leaders in the parliament replaced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with Helmut Kohl. The German constitution provides for a system of ‘constructive no-confidence’ voting system, which requires that in removing the sitting Chancellor, the parliament must also simultaneously agree on a successor for the Chancellor position. See “Germany: the Chancellor and the Cabinet,” [http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4967.html](http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4967.html), accessed January 1, 2011.

\(^{103}\) By tying the future of his coalition government, Schroder presented a dilemma for his SPD parliamentarians, who opposed the military deployment: either to collapse their own government or to support a mission they oppose.


\(^{105}\) Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, p. 86.
Six years later, when the Merkel government decided to deploy six *Tornado* reconnaissance aircrafts in 2007, the decision confronted a group of hostile parliamentarians. In the end, the *Bundestag* approved the decision by 405 to 157 votes, with eleven abstentions. Although the *Tornado* jets were capable of carrying laser-guided bombs, and surface-to-surface missiles, they were not allowed to participate in combat operations. German defense minister Franz Josef Jung said, “The [Tornado] mission is clearly and explicitly reconnaissance. These are the only capabilities we will use and no others” Critics in the German parliament raised the concern that the reconnaissance jets would relay geographical coordinates for potential bombing targets, and thus “could become complicit in attacks that result in civilian deaths.”

The *Tornado* debate illustrates the German government’s balancing strategy between two competing demands: NATO’s call for contributing more troops and resources which could be used for offensive purposes, and Berlin’s pressure to keep a defensive posture for *Bundeswehr*’s Afghanistan mission. In the end, the German chancellors were forced to accept the parliamentary constraint in structuring the remit of the *Bundeswehr* troops and assets. In early December 2010, the *Der Spiegel* reported the effect of parliamentary politics in dealing with a NATO request:

NATO has called on Berlin to contribute up to 100 personnel to a planned international deployment of AWACS reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan.

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Berlin looks set to refuse the request because the mission would probably require a parliamentary mandate, for which it would be hard to muster support.110

After the constitutional and parliamentary constraints, the third challenge to Germany’s Afghanistan mission came from the political parties and their attitude toward the use of force. Hence a brief discussion of the parliamentary parties, and their position on Afghanistan, will help explain how the German political parties structured the debate over Afghanistan policy, and thus influenced the chancellor’s use-of-force decisions.

The lower house of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, was divided among four major groups, comprising six political parties: The conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian faction-- the Christian Social Union (CSU); the center left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party; the far left Die Linke, and the center-right the Federal Democratic Party. The conservative CDU/CSU union and the center-left SPD were the largest political parties. Chancellor Schröder’s SPD led a coalition government with the Green Party from 1998 to 2005. Later Chancellor Merkel’s CDU/CSU led a grand coalition with the SPD from 2005 to 2009. In the 2009 federal elections, Merkel’s CDU/CSU union emerged as the largest party and formed a coalition government with the liberal FDP. This short description of German political parties suggest that coalition government is the norm in Germany, and historically either the CDU/CSU union or the SPD has formed the government with other junior parties, such as the Green or the FDP.

Broadly speaking, most of the German political parties, with the exception of the far left Die Linke, supported Germany’s mission in Afghanistan. Supporters of the Afghanistan mission

made two arguments: one, it was a humanitarian peace mission and Germany had a moral responsibility to take part in the mission; and two, the German national security and vital interests were protected by joining the war against international terrorism. Most of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP leaders shared this view. By contrast, the far left Die Linke opposed the Afghanistan War on the ground that the Bundeswehr mission was not to secure peace, but to fight a war. They also reasoned that the war would antagonize the Afghans, and make Germany less secure. The pacifist Green Party was divided between two factions—one supporting the Afghanistan mission, and the other opposing it. Critics of the war in the Die Linke and the Green Party were also joined by some leaders of the CDU/CSU and the SPD in opposing the German military intervention in Afghanistan.

There were two effects of German party politics on the parliamentary mandate over Afghanistan policy. First, critics of the Afghanistan mission had largely failed to stop the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan. Second, despite a subsequent failure to compel the withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan, parliament members opposing the war had strongly limited the power of the German chancellor to shape the country’s use of force for offensive operations. The effect on Afghanistan strategy can be illustrated by the fact that each major deployment decision in a war had to be approved separately by the German Parliament. This meant that each year the German deployment to the NATO-led ISAF and the U.S.-led OEF missions had to be approved and extended by the Bundestag deputies (parliamentarians). The decisions regarding the deployment of some sensitive military assets, such as the Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts, also needed separate parliamentary approval.

On several occasions, the German parliamentarians selectively supported some force deployments, while blocking the other force deployments. For instance, between 2001 and 2010,
all of the deployment and extension decisions regarding the German contingent of ISAF troops were passed with an overwhelming majority. However, the deployment of Tornado jets and the extension of the OEF mission received a significant blow in the German Parliament. This means that although the Tornado jets and German SOFs deployed to the OEF mission were capable of using lethal force against the Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents, they were not permitted to be used for combat operations.

As described before, in March 2007, the decision of the Merkel government to deploy six Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts in northern Afghanistan created a heated debate in the parliament. Although the decision was approved at the end, it was opposed by nearly 30% of the Bundestag deputies. Out of 573 votes on the issue, 157 deputies voted against the deployment. This was the second largest divisive issue, after Chancellor Schröder’ November 2001 decision to deploy military forces as part of the war on terrorism was opposed by 326 parliamentarians – roughly 49% of the Bundestag deputies.111

The negative votes on the Bundeswehr deployment in 2001 and the Tornado jet deployment in 2007 could not alter the German governments’ decision on force deployments. However, under pressures from opposition parties, in 2008, the Merkel government made some changes to Berlin’s contribution to the U.S.-led OEF mission. Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid explain how the Bundestag debate shaped the government decisions:

The maximum number of soldiers involved in the operation (OEF) was reduced from 1400 to 800, and the allocation of 100 Special Operations Forces for Afghanistan was discontinued. Approval for the ISAF mandate, which is

111 By comparison, opposition to Bundeswehr deployment has rarely generated more than 20% veto from German parliamentarians. Appendix 5.B provides a list of Bundestag voting decisions on the German military mission in Afghanistan.
negotiated separately, has gone steadily down, although its confirmation has never yet been in serious jeopardy.\textsuperscript{112}

Why did Germany decide to withdraw its Special Force contingent to the OEF mission? The answer lies with the way Germany characterized the international and domestic legitimacy of the OEF mission. The German critics argued that the OEF lacked international legitimacy, as its deployment was not authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution. In addition, since the OEF was engaged in offensive military operations against the Taliban militias, participation of German Special Operations Forces (KSK commandos) in such combat operations was not authorized by the German constitution.

In summary, the German chancellor’s power to use force in Afghanistan was challenged by three domestic sources: constitutional constraints over the use of force, intrusive parliamentary oversight of \textit{Bundeswehr} mission, and party politics in the German parliament. Once cleared by the parliamentary mandate, and supported by the selective voting patterns of German elites, the German chancellors looked into the public opinion to get cues of their use-of-force decisions. The next sub-section examines the influence of public opinion on Germany’s Afghanistan mission.

\textit{Public Opinion.} Domestic public opinion constitutes the second decision point in shaping Germany’s coalition policy in Afghanistan. The integrated burden-sharing model suggests that the strength of the chief executive’s decision power influences whether or not public opinion be counted. As the chief executives with medium decision power, both Schröder and Merkel were able to garner enough elite support to pursue the Afghanistan mission. However, due to a

\textsuperscript{112} Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 82.
political culture in the restraint of force, both of the German chancellors were expected to care about public opinion in making a crucial decision: whether to allow the German military to use force against the Taliban insurgents, or to pursue a purely defensive stabilization mission.

The burden-sharing model predicts that since the Schröder and Merkel governments had medium executive power, Germany would follow a two-pronged strategy, which balances between elite consensus and unfavorable public opinion. Evidence supports the predictions of the burden-sharing model. First, consistent with the expectations of the German elites, who supported the war; Germany gradually increased its troop level in Afghanistan, and ignored the public opposition to such troop surge. Second, in line with the expectations of the mass public opinion, Germany maintained a strictly defensive posture for the Bundeswehr, with minimal or no combat role for the German troops, at least until 2009. One could possibly argue that due to legal-constitutional restrictions, Germany had no other options but to pursue a non-offensive military mission in Afghanistan. Hence the relationship between public opinion and a defensive mission in Afghanistan is just a coincidence, and does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship. I argue that such an observation is misleading. This is due to the fact that under the leader of Chancellor Merkel’s, the CDU/CSU-led coalition government sought to have more discretionary power in the use of force.113 However, due to the lack of public and legislative support, it failed to gain such power. Hence, public opinion played an important role in influencing Germany’s options in Afghanistan.

In determining the effect of domestic public opinion on Germany’s coalition policy in Afghanistan, this chapter reviews opinion data on four major issues. These relate to the use of

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force as a counterterrorism strategy, troop levels, casualty sensitivity, and Afghan reconstruction. First, regarding terrorism, an overwhelming majority of Germans thought international terrorism as a serious or important threat to the EU and U.S. security. \textsuperscript{114} Despite such heightened threat perception, most Germans opposed the use of military force for combating terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. Scott Erb’s remark on German public mood in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is worth noting here. Erb claimed, “57 percent [Germans] believed that a counterattack by the United States on those responsible [for the 9/11 terrorist attacks] would be justified. The same percentage, 57 percent, also rejected the idea of German participation in such a counterattack.”\textsuperscript{115} Peter Katzenstein also notes about the fragile public support for the Afghan War: “in September 2001, 58 percent favored Germany’s military participation in the war against terrorism, a figure that by November 2001 had dropped to 35 percent,”\textsuperscript{116} Defying such public opposition, in November 2001 the German parliament approved the decision on force deployment. Once Germany deployed the \textit{Bundeswehr} forces to Afghanistan, public discontent over such force deployment increased over the years. In 2007, opposition to Germany’s combat role in Afghanistan was 75%, which declined to 62% in 2008, and rose to the highest 86% in 2009 (See Figure 5.5).\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{115} Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{116} Katzenstein, “Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11,” pp. 6-7.
\end{flushleft}
Second, on the troop level, the German public strongly opposed the idea of troop increase, and instead preferred troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 2009 and 2010, only 7% Germans supported troop increase in Afghanistan. During the same time support for the maintenance of current troop level declined sharply from 35% in 2009 to 24% in 2010. By contrast, support for troop reduction increased slightly from 16% in 2009 to 17% in 2010. Most importantly, support for the withdrawal of German forces increased significantly, from 41% in 2009 to 50% in 2010. On the withdrawal question asked in 2010, nearly 45% Germans wanted their forces be brought home by 2011, while another 35% want immediate troop withdrawal. By contrast, only 20% Germans polled in 2010 wanted the country’s Afghan mission to continue, and they opposed the idea of setting a deadline for troop withdrawal.  

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Despite such minority supports for the Afghan mission, a large majority of the German public continued to oppose the war.

Third, as the war related incidents of casualties and fatalities increased significantly since 2007, there were growing public dissatisfactions over the Afghanistan War. Between 2002 and 2010, 49 Germans lost their lives in Afghanistan. Another 202 soldiers and 4 policemen sustained injuries of various degrees. Of the 49 killed, 46 were army personnel and 3 police personnel. Although this troop fatality pales in comparison with other major NATO countries, such as the United States, and the United Kingdom, such NATO-centric comparison does not capture the level of sacrifice Germany made in Afghanistan. In order to get a better picture, we need to look at the historical data for German troop fatalities in overseas missions. Compared to Germany’s other post-Cold War era missions, the Afghanistan mission produced the largest casualties and fatalities for German soldiers. Previously, only 2 German soldiers died in overseas missions: one in Cambodia in 1991 and the other in Georgia in 2001. Public opinion experts suggest that, increasing details of media reports on fallen soldiers had sparked a heated debate on the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.

Fourth, in contrast to consistently opposing the use of force, and insisting on the reduction or withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, most Germans supported civilian economic reconstruction and the training of Afghan security forces. Support for reconstruction efforts were

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recorded 57% in 2007, 84% in 2008, and 55% in 2009. The declining support for economic reconstruction in 2009 might indicate that the post-war reconstruction mission in northern Afghanistan became an increasingly risky task, largely due to the escalation of insurgent attacks on German soldiers.

Public opinion data presented above raises an important question: why did the German public oppose the use of force and support a nation-building role for the German military forces deployed in Afghanistan? Foreign policy experts suggest the German public’s attitude toward the use of force has historically been influenced by a unique political culture, which discredits the past history of German militarism, and opposes the re-militarization of the German state.

Kerry Longhurst argues that post war public opposition to militarism has to be understood in the context of Stunde Null, a political culture that implies “the total physical, moral and psychological devastation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of the Second World War.” Two factors shaped this pacific and anti-military nature of German public sentiment. At the external front, allied occupation destroyed the sources of German military and its industrial base to implant a peaceful and democratic foreign policy for Western Germany. At the domestic front, the German public legitimized the allied pressure for demilitarization, and overwhelmingly supported a new identity for the German state through economic reconstruction and development. This brief narrative of post-war German history indicates why most of the

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124 Stunde Null means zero hour. It implies a unique German political culture, which stresses that the past is over, and will never re-appear. See Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p. 26.
Germans supported a defensive reconstruction strategy, while opposing an offensive military posture for their forces.

Opposition to the combat mission in Afghanistan was also fueled by the way the German people characterized their national interest vis-à-vis American interests in Afghanistan. For many German critics, “the operation [in Afghanistan] is often seen not as a German choice, but as a decision made by the Americans to serve their own national interest.” Critics also view that the Afghanistan War “is a waste of resources, not a German problem.” Thus, public opposition to the War in Afghanistan was perhaps associated with the anti-American sentiment. In the foreign policy domain, this anti-Americanism was demonstrated in public opposition to troop build-up.

The preceding discussion shows that the German public’s opposition to the use of force is rooted in a political culture of pacifism and anti-militarism. To what extent did the German decision makers respond to the anti-militaristic (or pacifist) public sentiment?

Data on Germany’s troop deployment and incremental fighting role suggest that public opinion had little or no effect in shaping the German decisions on Afghanistan. This is evident by the fact that despite weak public support for troop increase and strong support for immediate troop withdrawal, successive German governments made two unpopular decisions: (a) to increase the German military presence from 1,200 troops in 2001 to nearly 5,000 troops in 2010; and (b) to stay in Afghanistan until 2014, when NATO forces transfers over the security responsibility to the indigenous Afghan forces.

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126 Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 80.
128 In 2010, a German government report revealed that, Germany supports NATO’s Lisbon Summit (November 2010) decisions on Afghanistan. At Lisbon, NATO leaders decided that the process of transformation in Afghanistan will begin in 2011 and complete in 2014, with the full transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces. Some
What explains this apparent disregard for public opinion? Sarah Kreps argues that elite consensus among the German government and opposition parties explain its enduring commitment to alliance cohesion in Afghanistan. Kreps measures elite consensus by convergence among major political parties on the issue of Afghanistan mission. She argues that since public opinion was largely unfavorable to the Afghanistan mission, the major opposition party SPD could perceive it a wise electoral strategy to diverge from the ruling coalition of CDU/CSU. By diverging from CDU/CSU, the SPD parliamentarians could offer two policy options: to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan; or to withdraw German soldiers from NATO’s ISAF mission. Ideally, any of these policy preferences would be consistent with the German public opposition to the Afghanistan War. However, the SPD did not pursue a strategy of diverging from the CDU/CSU policy in Afghanistan. Instead, the parliamentary voting pattern suggests that most SPD members supported the renewal and extension of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.

Elite consensus was strongly influenced by two systemic level incentives: alliance solidarity and balance of threat.129 In the German context, this means that despite negative public opinion, Germany’s longstanding commitment to NATO and its preference for a multilateral strategy offered strong incentives to pursue a robust coalition policy.

Scholarly research and German policy statements confirm the effect of alliance commitment and threat convergence in cementing elite cohesion, and thus shaping Germany’s

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Afghan policy. For instance, drawing on an interview with a senior leader in German military, Kreps notes that NATO’s invocation of Article 5 collective defense commitment was a “sufficient condition” for explaining Germany’s participation in the war on terrorism in general, and its military deployment in Afghanistan. A government report, released in 2010, also describes Berlin’s contribution to Afghanistan as part of a multilateral strategy taken “within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the international community.” The report claims that the aim of German foreign policy was to improve the security, governance, and development of Afghanistan. The progress report also indicates the effect of shared threat perception in shaping Germany’s mission in Afghanistan.

Although Germany’s alliance solidarity with NATO, and shared threat perception forged elite consensus, the effect of public opinion was not completely negligible. This was evident by the fact that consistent with the popular expectations, Germany increased its commitment to the economic reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, while resisting the NATO allies’ pressures for assuming a strong offensive military strategy. In resisting the pressures from NATO, the civilian leadership in Germany placed numerous restrictions to constrain the ability of German forces and military assets to participate in kinetic operations against the Taliban militias. As Hacke notes:

In the case of Afghanistan, the political leadership categorically wants to avoid any German involvement in combat because the Afghan mission is unpopular and

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because of the tendency to emotional pacifism amongst the people as a reaction to German history.  

In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that under Chancellors Schröder and Merkel, Germany adopted a pragmatic strategy of balancing between its international commitments as well as domestic pressures. Internationally, Germany’s commitment to NATO and UN’s multilateral crisis management strategy called for a strong civilian and military role in Afghanistan. However, the domestic political factors, such as, constitutional restrictions, and unfavorable public opinion discouraged an offensive role for the German military forces in Afghanistan. The result was a compromise strategy with three components: (a) increased troop commitment; (b) restrictions on offensive operations; and (c) increased civil-military reconstruction efforts. What role did the German military forces play in executing a strategy devised in Berlin? How did the German military capability influence the country’s burden-sharing outcome in Afghanistan? These questions on the relationship between military capability and burden-sharing behavior are important to ascertain whether feedbacks from certain burden-sharing outcomes are taken into the German decision process on Afghanistan.

**Military Capability.** In analyzing Germany’s coalition policy on Afghanistan, the third decision point is military capability. My burden-sharing model predicts that a strong chief executive ignores public opinion and takes a straight decision on the use of force in the pursuit of foreign policy. By contrast, a weak executive refrains from taking a politically risky decision on the use of force. In between these two forms of executives, the medium executive, such as, the

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German chancellor balances between the competing demand of elite opinion, and mass public opinion, to shape the use-of-force decisions. At this point, regardless of public support or opposition, the crucial determinant is the strength of military capability. A strong military capability, lacking any national caveats, is likely to contribute to a robust military burden-sharing behavior, whereas weak capability is likely to result in a dismal burden-sharing performance.

According to NATO, at least three factors determine the strength of the military capability: suitability, interoperability, and deployability. States with suitable, interoperable, and deployable military forces are likely to have a strong counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity. Measuring capability is a straightforward task in the context of the ISAF and OEF missions. First, suitability refers to the availability of well-trained conventional forces or Special Forces, and appropriate military assets, such as helicopters and reconnaissance jets. These forces and assets were needed to fight Al Qaeda or Taliban militants, and stabilize Afghanistan. In addition to appropriate forces and assets, suitability also includes survivable, sustainable, and effective forces. Survivability is defined by the ability to protect forces from short term and long term threats. Sustainability implies the ability to maintain and supply forces in forward bases. Effectiveness refers to the ability to efficiently engage enemy forces.

Second, interoperability refers to the ability of military services and assets to work together in a coalition environment. Joint military exercises and joint defense procurement can develop interoperable forces among alliance nations. Interoperability can also be enhanced

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135 According to NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), alliance military capability has five attributes: (a) mobility and deployability; (b) sustainability; (c) effective engagement; (d) survivability; and (e) interoperable communications. My definition of coalition capability combines sustainability, effective engagement, and survivability to refer to suitability. For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Handbook, (NATO Publications, October 8, 2002), chapter 2. [http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm), accessed January 3, 2011.
through assembling compatible command, control, communication, and information (C^3I) systems. In the Afghanistan War context, interoperability would only be an issue for the German forces, if they avoid participating in joint military operations with other coalition forces. Third, deployability refers to the military preparedness or combat readiness. It implies the ability to rapidly deploy military forces and assets in alliance territories as well as out of area operations.

Did Germany possess a suitable, interoperable, and deployable military force, which could contribute to a strong burden-sharing behavior? There are two contrasting answers to this question. The German government claimed that the process of military transformation had focused on the deployment of a compatible and interoperable armed force to fulfill its alliance commitment.\textsuperscript{136} In contrast, critics contend that German military transformation had failed to develop a deployable, interoperable, and sustainable military force, which had strongly constrained its counterinsurgency capacity in Afghanistan. For instance, Franz-Josef Meiers observes that “German armed forces remain the least deployable, projectable, and sustainable of the leading allied powers.”\textsuperscript{137} Christian Hecke makes a similar observation: “Today and for the foreseeable future, the German armed forces remain the least deployable, mobile and sustainable of NATO’s and the EU’s leading armies.”\textsuperscript{138} These pessimistic remarks show a weak military capability, which may fail to produce desired outcomes in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{137} Meiers, “Crossing the Red Lines? The Grand Coalition and the Paradox of German Foreign Policy,” p. 15; Frank Gardinger, “German-American Disagreement on How to Deal with the Threat of Terrorism: The Role of National Political Culture and Implications for Transatlantic Relationship,” \textit{AICGS Advisor} (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, December 2008), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{138} Hacke, “Germany’s Foreign Policy Under Angela Merkel,” p. 2.
In short, most German experts suggest that Germany lacked a strong counterinsurgency capacity in Afghanistan. This capacity gap had seriously affected the operational performance of the Bundeswehr forces. In 2008, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer note that:

[T]he Bundeswehr is critically short of specialized units which are in high demand during counterinsurgency operations. These include highly trained regular combat infantry, military assistance units and a greater number of special forces. The Bundeswehr also faces a chronic lack of platforms such as those required for tactical air mobility. In addition, legal restrictions heavily constrain the ability of German armed forces to operate according to multinational requirements: for example, air mobility is limited since fighting and transport capabilities have to be used according to the same operational restrictions as are applied to flight regulations during peacetime in Germany.139

Benjamin Schreer argues that capacity gap is only part of the problem. He contends that German burden-sharing role in Afghanistan was seriously constrained by three other factors: the absence of a counterinsurgency doctrine, the lack of political strategic leadership, and the absence of historical memory of fighting insurgency and small wars.

First, compared to the American and British counterinsurgency doctrines, the German military had no comparable counterinsurgency doctrine. In fact, Germany not only lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine, the German military and strategic community perceived counterinsurgency as an operational concept for reconstruction and development, and not as a strategic concept for the defeat of insurgent forces. Schreer notes that in the German political

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discourse, counterinsurgency is a loaded term, a synonym for U.S.-dominated offensive military operations in Afghanistan, which should be avoided.\footnote{Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 98.}

Second, the lack of a counterinsurgency doctrine was further complicated by the absence of strategic leadership to improvise the counterinsurgency capability of German military. Schreer notes that German defense ministry had rarely made any political, economic, and personnel investment to develop the \textit{Bundeswehr’s} counterinsurgency capability.\footnote{Ibid., p. 99.} An additional problem in the Afghanistan mission was the lack of inter-agency collaboration among various participating federal ministries.\footnote{For instance, lack of coordination between the defense and development ministries has long plagued the operation of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects in northern Afghanistan. In 2009, the newly appointed Development Minister Dirk Niebel announced that his ministry would make a strong effort to cooperate with the defense ministry’s operations in northern Afghanistan. See “Entwicklungspolitik – Niebel will Afghanistan-Hilfe an Bundeswehreinsatz koppeln,” \textit{Zeit Online}, December 28, 2009 \url{http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/niebel-will-afghanistan-hilfe-an-bundeswehreinsatz-koppeln/1655346.html}, accessed January 3, 2011.} The newly created Joint Commitment Staff, \textit{atzführungsstab}, was expected to address the interagency coordination problems in the long run, but in the short run, the \textit{Bundeswehr’s} capacity gaps limited the possibility for a strong offensive strategy in Afghanistan.

Third, compared to other western military forces, such as the American, British, and French forces, which have had a strong record of fighting insurgency, the German military lacks any historical experience in fighting small wars and counterinsurgency campaigns. This is due to the fact that during the Cold War era, the \textit{Bundeswehr} operated under a strictly defined conventional military doctrine, which focused on deterrence and territorial defense against a large-scale military aggression. Thus, fighting an unconventional war or insurgency was deliberately excluded from German military doctrine. After the Cold War, although the
Bundeswehr was deployed in several peacekeeping missions, those missions rarely posed any classical insurgency-related challenges to the German forces. This lack of historical learning was compounded by public skepticism toward the effectiveness of counterinsurgency in dealing with Afghanistan. Schreer notes that the German elites have often cited the American failure in Vietnam, and the Soviet disaster in Afghanistan to refer to the danger of having a German counterinsurgency doctrine for Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{143}

Since 2007, the German forces in Afghanistan addressed these persistent problems – the lack of doctrine, absence of leadership, and lack of historical memory in two ways. First, by taking a bottom-up approach, the German commanders in northern Afghanistan pursued a strategy of incremental force projection by demonstrating “a greater willingness to conduct offensive operations against insurgency elements.”\textsuperscript{144} Second, although there was no collective or institutionalized memory for fighting an insurgency, the German military appeared to have learnt from its experience in dealing with the increasing insurgent activities in northern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{145}

As described before, \textit{Operation Harekate Yolo} illustrates this changing military attitude toward the offensive military operations. In May 2007, an estimated 2,000 Afghan and ISAF troops (mostly the German and Norwegian troops) launched a ground offensive against the Taliban insurgents in the Badakhshan, Badghis, and Faryab provinces. The goal was to secure and stabilize the areas from Taliban control, and move to the phase of reconstruction and development. The \textit{Harekate Yolo} was a significant operation for the German military. As

\textsuperscript{143} Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 99.
\textsuperscript{144} Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 105.
counterinsurgency experts John Nagl and Richard Weitz note, “It was “the first large scale ground offensive conducted by the German military since World War II.””\textsuperscript{146} The German forces provided strategic leadership and logistic support, while the Norwegian forces contributed most of the combat element. The U.S. and Afghan forces attached to the mission provided the support role.

The first stage of the combat operation was quite successful. It cleared the area of Taliban insurgents, and paved the way for reconstruction and development. However, the second stage of the operation was not successful. This was due to the fact that the Berlin-based political and military leadership imposed tight operational restrictions on the German forces, which prohibited them from providing long term troop presence required for holding and building the secured areas.\textsuperscript{147}

The lessons of the \textit{Operation Harekate Yolo} suggest that the German military forces in Afghanistan were capable of pursuing an offensive counterinsurgency strategy. However, it was the political restraints imposed from Berlin, which constrained the German forces’ ability to pursue offensive military operations. As discussed before, political constraints also limited the ability of the German Special Forces, Quick Reaction Forces, and \textit{Tornado} jets to participate in offensive military operations. Such political constraints worked until 2007 in creating a largely defensive reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.


\textsuperscript{147} Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” pp. 105-106.
stated before, due to pressures from soldiers on the ground, in July 2009, Germany began to designate its Afghan mission as a warlike situation and eliminated some of the national caveats imposed on German forces. Such relaxed rules of engagement improved the German forces’ sustainability, interoperability and deployability. This had resulted into a changed circumstance, in which the German troops would increasingly assume the military risks of fighting the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.

Recognizing the weaknesses in Germany counterinsurgency capacity, the United States sent 2,500 soldiers to Kunduz in 2010. Among the 2,500 U.S. soldiers 1,000 were deployed for training Afghan security forces, and the rest on counterinsurgency operations. Critics observe that additional U.S. troops in the German area of operation would increase the pressure on Germany for taking more military risks of counterinsurgency. Otherwise, the German forces in northern Afghanistan would find themselves playing a supportive role.

In summary, Germany’s weak counterinsurgency capability has contributed to an insufficient burden-sharing role for the Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan. Although Germany deployed several offensive military resources in Afghanistan, the lack of political leadership and legally constrained rules of engagement deprived the German forces of the opportunity to share the increasing risks of combat operations. However, since 2009, relaxed rules of engagements and political authorization for the use of force caused some improvements in the ability of the German forces to take more military risks of counterinsurgency. In 2010, the deployment of 2,500 U.S. troops to northern Afghanistan put an additional pressure on German the forces. The German forces now have two options: to take more risks of fighting the Taliban insurgents, or to

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play a supportive reconstruction role. The political constraints analyzed in this chapter indicate that Germany is less likely to choose the first option, and continue the path of a reconstruction mission.

III. Summary and Conclusion

Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides support for my burden-sharing model. In shaping Berlin’s Afghanistan policy, the German leaders were confronted with two systemic pressures: alliance solidarity and balance of threat. As a principal NATO member and a key U.S. ally, Germany joined the Afghanistan War by sending Bundeswehr forces in 2002, placing most soldiers under the UN-mandated ISAF command, and only 100 Special Forces under the U.S.-led OEF command. Germany also played an important role when NATO assumed ISAF command in August 2003. NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment made it obligatory for Germany to join the coalition. However, Article 5 cannot predict what specific role a NATO member would play in the coalition, and whether it should remain supportive of the coalition. Germany’s alliance solidarity, defined as its longstanding commitment to NATO and transatlantic alliance, provides answers to these questions. After alliance solidarity, the threat of Islamist terrorism provided an additional incentive to support the Afghanistan War coalition. Evidence of the terrorist threat can be traced in the existence of Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell, which was responsible for the planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Another piece of evidence comes from the resurgence of Taliban activities in Bundeswehr-controlled northern Afghanistan.
This chapter shows that the systemic pressures of alliance solidarity and balance of threat were transmitted through the German domestic political process, which strongly shaped the country’s Afghanistan policy. Figure 5.6 presents the German decision process regarding its burden-sharing role in Afghanistan.

**Figure 5.6 The German Decision Process on Afghanistan**

First, Chancellor Schröder and his successor Merkel were bound by the constitutional limits in designing their Afghan policy. The German constitution provides for the use of force for collective security purposes, but prohibits participation in a war of aggression. War is a loaded term in German political culture, which equates combat operations with a war of aggression. As
a result of such constitutional restrictions and a distinctively cultural connotation of war, the German parliament had to approve the force deployment decisions. In November 2001, Chancellor Schröder confronted stiff opposition, including a vote of no-confidence, in deploying troops to Afghanistan. Subsequent decisions on military deployment were approved in the parliament without any major political risks for the Schröder and Merkel governments. However, the parliamentary mandate restricted the use of force for combat operations. Instead, it authorized the use of force, including firepower, only for self-defense, and support for allied troops. As a result of such restrictive mandate, the German government imposed national caveats, and sold the Afghan mission to a skeptical public as a purely peace-keeping mission.

Second, in the parliament, the German government enjoyed a relatively stable elite consensus in getting the legal mandate for Bundeswehr deployment. However, due to a largely pacific political culture, German public rejected the use of force, while providing support for a defensive reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. This chapter has shown that the German government chose a balanced approach to elite consensus and public opinion. First, both Schröder and Merkel maintained a defensive stabilization role for Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan. Second, they countered NATO allies’ pressures to redeploy Bundeswehr forces into the restive southern Afghanistan.

Finally, unlike the major NATO allies, such as Britain, and the United States, Germany lacked a strong military and a counterinsurgency doctrine. The imposition of tight rules of engagement further limited its ability to fight the Taliban insurgency. Such capacity gap was compounded by the lack of political and strategic leadership needed to transform the Bundeswehr from a territorial army to a rapidly deployable force with the ability to project power in out of area operations.
Recognizing Germany’s capacity gap, in 2010 the United States sent 2,500 soldiers in northern Afghanistan to fight Taliban and train Afghan forces. The deployment of U.S. soldiers to the German controlled northern Afghanistan showed the weakness in Berlin’s burden-sharing strategy. It is likely that until the much publicized 2014 deadline, when NATO forces are expected to transfer security to Afghan forces, the Bundeswehr will achieve only incremental progress in developing a full-fledged counterinsurgency capability. During this time (2011-2014), training for the indigenous Afghan forces would be the only area, where the German military is likely to make an increased contribution.¹⁴⁹ This is due to the fact that unlike fighting the Taliban insurgency, rebuilding the Afghan forces can avoid the public outcry and political risks for an incumbent German government. NATO allies are slowly recognizing such German predicaments and adapting to the changing security situation in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER SIX

PAKISTAN:
AN UNCERTAIN PARTNER WITH CONFLICTED GOALS

Pakistan’s contribution to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan offers an interesting case to test the burden-sharing model. On September 13, 2001, President Pervez Musharraf joined the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.\(^1\) In less than two weeks, a U.S. Department of Defense joint task force negotiated with the Pakistani government a broad set of issues on which Pakistan could cooperate with the United States during the war in Afghanistan.\(^2\) When the U.S.-led coalition countries invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Pakistan provided the U.S. forces with access to air and land bases, blanket overflight and landing rights, and other critical logistical supports. Soon, the Pakistani forces entered the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to seal the borders and capture or kill Al Qaeda militias fleeing Afghanistan. Between October 2001 and December 2010, the Pakistani forces carried out several high profile counterinsurgency campaigns in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (previously North West Frontier Province). The purpose of these military campaigns was two-fold: to stabilize Pakistan’s north-west region, and to complement the U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. In 2004, the United States adopted a strategy of using unmanned aerial vehicles (widely known as drones) to target the terrorist and insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal


\(^2\) The DoD task force began negotiating Pakistan’s cooperation on September 24, 2001. See C. Christine Fair, Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 15.
area. Since 2008, the drone strikes had sharply escalated, and continued to expand its target areas. Pakistan either tolerated the drone strikes, or provided tacit intelligence and political support to carry out the U.S. drone strikes.

The Pakistan case is puzzling for several reasons. First, Pakistan’s participation in the Afghanistan War coalition marked a sharp departure from its friendly relations with the Taliban regime in Kabul. Second, although Pakistan overtly supported the U.S. and coalition war goals in Afghanistan, it did not completely abandon the Afghan Taliban militias residing in its territories. Instead, the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies had reportedly maintained a clandestine support with various Afghanistan-focused Taliban groups. Third and more interestingly, as the U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province increased, Pakistan openly criticized the drone strikes, but provided tacit support to carry out the strikes.

What explains the puzzling phenomena of Pakistan’s entry into, and dubious support to, the Afghanistan War coalition? Conventional wisdoms focus on the neo-realist and strategic culture theories to analyze Pakistan’s coalition contribution. Simply speaking, the neo-realists look into the international level explanations, whereas the strategic culturalists focus on the domestic level and ideational factors in analyzing Pakistan’s coalition behavior. This chapter argues that the neo-realist and strategic culture theories offer partial explanations for analyzing Pakistan’s coalition behavior. In contrast, a neo-classical realist theory provides better explanations for analyzing and predicting Pakistan’s foreign and security policy toward the Afghanistan coalition. Taking a neo-classical realist position, my burden-sharing model offers an integrated framework to analyze Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. My analytical model examines the effect of three international systemic incentives: alliance dependence, balance of threat, and the free-riding motivation of collective action in shaping
Pakistan’s policy choices. It then investigates how the systemic incentives are transmitted through the domestic political processes to determine Pakistan’s coalition burden-sharing.

For the neo-realists, the distribution of power in the South Asian sub-system, and Pakistan’s quest for a strategic parity with India would play a dominant role in structuring Islamabad’s policy preferences. Writing in the context of India-Pakistan nuclear proliferation, Kenneth Waltz once argued that Pakistan needed nuclear weapons to balance against India’s conventional military superiority. The same line of argument is used to explain Pakistan’s decisions to participate in the war on terrorism. In his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, former Pakistani President Musharraf claims that he was compelled to join the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism to defend Pakistan’s national interests, and to counter India’s hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. Speaking of his decision process, Musharraf reasons that continued support for the Taliban regime could endanger Pakistan’s national security by prompting a collision with the United States, and by allowing India to take an advantage of such conflict. By contrast, the decision to join the coalition would not only remove such dangers, but also enable Pakistan to protect its nuclear arsenal, and defend its interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Leading Pakistan

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observers share a similar argument. Former Pakistani diplomat Shahid Amin notes that, “Realpolitik clearly demanded that Pakistan abandon its erstwhile support for the Taliban regime and join the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terror.”

Rand national security experts Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair argue that although Pakistan joined the Afghanistan War coalition, Islamabad’s India-centric military doctrine often acted as a barrier to a full-fledged cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. They argue that Pakistan needed both “carrots and sticks” to provide effective support for the coalition. In the Afghanistan context, these carrots and sticks would include a mix of economic and military aid, as well as performance-based conditional assistance.

Strategic culture theorists provide an alternative explanation. Contrary to the international systemic factors, strategic culturalists focus on the domestic level factors, and historical experience in analyzing Pakistan’s foreign policy decision-making process. Prominent Pakistani defense analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi contends that Pakistan’s dominant elite and their collective beliefs, norms and shared experience matter more in shaping its foreign policy. Peter Lavoy concurs with Rizvi, and contends that although Pakistan joined the coalition under threat from the United States, the strategic belief of Pakistan’s military-political leadership, its armed forces, and their support for the presence of foreign military assets were the driving forces behind Pakistan’s decision to join the coalition.

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7 For a list of such carrots and sticks, see: Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010), p. 134; In an earlier article, Seth Jones wrote about the importance of carrots and sticks in changing Pakistan’s policy of state-sponsored terrorism. See: Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2007): 15-32.


forces, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) would ultimately determine the country’s Afghanistan policy.\textsuperscript{10}

Feroz Khan offers a similar view. He argues that Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions are not determined by a “net assessment of threat based on reality;” instead it’s “image of the self,” and the “image of the adversary” create a strategic milieu that explain the foreign policy choices for Pakistani leaders.\textsuperscript{11} Khan stresses that, historically, Pakistan’s image of the adversary has focused on India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. India poses a long-standing threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity, whereas Afghanistan’s rejection of the Durand Line undermines the sanctity of Pakistan’s western borders. Pakistan’s national security elites have sought nuclear deterrence with India, and a friendly regime in Afghanistan to mitigate its key security predicaments. The ruling elites in Islamabad believe that the latter goal—the pursuit of a friendly regime in Afghanistan—will provide it with a strategic depth in the event of a nuclear conflict with India.\textsuperscript{12} This quest for strategic depth has resulted into a policy that encourages Pakistan’s military and intelligence leadership to see various Afghan Taliban groups as a potential ally in future Afghanistan.


\textsuperscript{12} Hassan-Askari Rizvi describes Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth. He notes, “Pakistan’s territory lacks depth and the main railroad link from south to north (Karachi to Peshawar) runs parallel to the India-Pakistan border; at several points it is within 60 miles of the Indian border or the Line of Control in Kashmir. Three Pakistani cities (Lahore, Sialkot, Kasur) are situated very close to the border, and there are hardly any natural barriers like rivers and mountains on the India-Pakistan border, especially in the Punjab area. No Pakistani military airfield with the exception of Quetta is more than 150 miles from the Indian border. Such a situation creates serious handicaps for the security managers because an adequate defense of these population centers and communication lines calls for confronting the troops of the adversary right on the border or in the adversary’s territory.” See: Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” pp. 311-312. On the issue of Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan, see: Ahmad Rashid, \textit{Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia} (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 25.
This chapter shows that the neorealist and strategic culture theories provide a useful starting point for analyzing Pakistan’s coalition contribution. However, each of them tends to ignore an important level of analysis, and hence fails to provide sufficient explanations for analyzing why Pakistan joined the U.S.-led coalition, yet emerged as an uncertain partner in the war on terrorism. Combining the theoretical insights of neo-realism and strategic culture, I offer a neo-classical realist explanation of burden-sharing behavior. I argue that Pakistan’s dependence on a bilateral alliance with the United States, and its changing perception of Al Qaeda terrorist threat provided two systemic incentives to join and support the Afghanistan War coalition. These systemic incentives were channeled through the domestic political processes, in which Pakistan’s chief executive’s decision power and the strength of its military capability strongly determined the course of its Afghanistan policy. I develop a neo-classical realist model of burden-sharing, and show a better causal process linking the systemic and domestic level intervening variables to predict and explain the burden-sharing behavior of Pakistan.

This chapter has three sections. The first section details Pakistan’s diplomatic, military, and reconstruction contributions to the War in Afghanistan. The second section tests the burden-sharing model in analyzing Pakistan’s contributions. The third section summarizes the key research findings.

I. **Pakistan’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan**

This section examines Pakistan’s military and non-military contributions to the war on terrorism. It has several interesting findings. First, it shows that Pakistan has mostly pursued a reactive diplomacy toward the U.S.-led coalition. Next, it shows the challenges to Pakistan’s
counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The third focuses on Pakistan’s indirect economic contribution, such as hosting a large refugee population, and increased trading exchange, to support the Afghan reconstruction and stabilization process.

**Diplomatic Contribution.** Pakistan was a frontline state in the war on terrorism. President Musharraf joined the U.S.-led coalition, and wanted to make a strong political contribution to the war on terrorism. His concept of ‘enlightened moderation’ stressed that the Muslim nations in the world should reject terrorism and focus on internal socio-economic development. At the same time, the Western countries, especially the United States, should focus on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the Indo-Pak Kashmir dispute. 13 Although Musharraf’s vision for a proactive diplomacy gained some currency among the Muslim nations at the Organization of Islamic Conference, Pakistan largely pursued a reactive diplomacy to support the Afghanistan War coalition. A reactive diplomacy is defined here as one, in which a country merely responds to the principal actors in the international system. It is beyond the scope of this research to provide a comprehensive account of Pakistan’s diplomatic contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. Instead, it focuses on the key summits and meetings among the Afghan, Pakistani, and U.S. presidents. The purpose is to examine how Pakistan dealt with the U.S. and Afghan concerns over key issues regarding the war on terrorism.

Pakistan’s reactive diplomacy was evident in Islamabad’s interactions with Kabul and Washington in addressing the issues of fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban, and contributing to Afghan reconstruction and development. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks

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13 For a brief discussion on Musharraf’s ideas on enlightened moderation, see: Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, pp. 297-299.
in the United States, Musharraf condemned the terrorist attacks, and called for international cooperation to suppress the “modern day evil” of terrorism. Soon after the attacks, Musharraf came under serious pressures from the U.S. government, to join the coalition against terrorism. On September 13, 2001, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage handed a list of seven demands to Pakistan’s ISI chief General Mahmoud Ahmad, who was then visiting Washington on an official trip. The list stressed that Pakistan should stop Al Qaeda at the border, provide the United States with unconditional landing permission, offer land and naval access to U.S. forces, break diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, and cut off recruits and supplies to the Taliban. Armitage reportedly threatened—an allegation he denied—that if Pakistan failed to comply with the U.S. demands, it would be bombed back to the stone age. Fearing a strong reprisal from the United States, Musharraf complied with the U.S. demands by breaking off diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, and joining the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.

Under the administration of President Musharraf, Pakistan claimed that it was playing a constructive role as a coalition partner. Initially, Musharraf pursued a failed diplomacy to persuade the Taliban leader Mullah Omar to transfer Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the U.S. authorities. After the U.S.-led coalition forces began a massive bombing of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the anti-Taliban militias, belonging to the Northern Alliance joined them in a ground offensive. By December 2001, the Taliban regime completely collapsed, and the United

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17 Musharraf described this was a rational, rather than emotional decision. His reasoning process was described in a memoir. See: Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 201-203.
18 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 216.
Nations moved ahead to form an interim government for Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted that the moderate Taliban be included in a post-Taliban regime. Pakistan also noted that the Pashtun communities needed to be well represented in the Afghan government to balance against any domination by the Northern Alliance leaders. The Bonn Summit in December 2001 elected Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader, as the head of an interim Afghan government, but the interim administration also included many powerful Northern Alliance leaders.

As the War in Afghanistan progressed, Musharraf met with Presidents Bush and Karzai and pressed for a common position on the war in Afghanistan. In early 2002, Musharraf visited Afghanistan and expressed his willingness to fight terrorism and contribute to Afghan reconstruction. In 2003, a Tripartite Commission was formed to promote dialogue among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States. The purpose of the Commission was to discuss issues of common concern, such as cross-border terrorism and insurgency perpetrated by the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.

During his bilateral and trilateral meetings with the Afghan and U.S. presidents, Musharraf stressed that Pakistan was committed to the U.S. and coalition strategy in Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistan supported the conduct of Afghanistan’s October 2004 presidential elections. It assisted the Afghan authorities in the conduct of votes in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Pakistan also deployed its military forces to fight a growing insurgency in its Waziristan tribal agency. President Bush admired the contribution made by

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Musharraf, and especially, the Pakistani military forces in the fight against terrorism. In December 2004, during his meeting with Musharraf, Bush said:

[Pakistani] army has been incredibly active and very brave in southern Waziristan flushing out an enemy that had thought they had found safe haven…His army has suffered casualties and for that we want to thank their loved ones for the sacrifice that their family has made.\(^{23}\)

Musharraf continued to claim that his country was pursuing a constructive role during the war on terrorism. However, cross-border insurgent attacks, and Afghan criticism raised important questions regarding the credibility of Pakistani claims. In September 2005, during a visit to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, Musharraf met CENTCOM chief General John Abizaid, and stressed the need for continued cooperation in the fight against terrorism. During his meeting with General Abizaid, Musharraf claimed that Pakistan was supporting the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.\(^{24}\) Despite the U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas, insurgent attacks on U.S. and NATO forces increased significantly during the summer of 2005. For instance, attacks from improvised explosive devices (IED) were responsible for one in every five coalition troop deaths.\(^{25}\) The U.S. and NATO officials often claimed that the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban groups were responsible for these increasing attacks on coalition forces.

The Afghan President Karzai bluntly held that Pakistan was sponsoring insurgents in its territory. In February 2006, during a visit to Islamabad, Karzai insisted that top Taliban leaders


were using Pakistan as a safe haven for attacking Afghanistan. Musharraf rejected the allegation. In March 2006, Bush met Karzai in Kabul and agreed on Pakistan’s need to improve its security measures against Al Qaeda and Taliban. After his Kabul visit, Bush met with Musharraf in Islamabad, and asked the Pakistani president to be tough on terrorism. During a joint press conference, Bush said he went to Pakistan “to determine whether or not the president (Musharraf) is as committed as he has been in the past.” Karzai went public again in May 2006, when he said that the Pakistan-based madrassa (Islamic seminary) students were going to Afghanistan to wage a holy war. In June 2008, Karzai bluntly said that Pakistan’s military intelligence was fuelling terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. Frustrated by the cross-border Taliban attacks, Karzai warned that he would send Afghan troops to Pakistan to fight the Taliban militias.

Islamabad’s diplomatic response was two-fold: to deny any state-sponsorship of terrorism; and to accuse Afghanistan of destabilizing Pakistan. In March 2006, Musharraf told that Karzai gave him “old and outdated” information on Taliban leaders. In September 2006, Musharraf warned that the problem of Taliban insurgency was rooted in Afghanistan, and Karzai

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26 The Afghan and U.S. presidents were perhaps concerned about the resurgence of Taliban, and the growing insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. Since 2002, troop fatalities from improvised explosive devices (IED) registered a sharp increase. In 2002 and 2003, IED-caused deaths accounted for only 10% and 2% of all U.S. and coalition troop fatalities. This increased significantly to 23% in 2004 and 18% in 2005. See Brookings Afghanistan Index, October 2010, p. 11.


needed to do more to improve the security situation in his country. In his memoir, Musharraf writes, “Pakistan’s own stability is linked with peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan government needs to focus more on improving security inside its own country instead of blaming others.” Musharraf accused that Afghanistan and India were fomenting insurgency in Pakistan’s resource-rich Balochistan Province.

As the disputes between Karzai and Musharraf grew, normalization of Afghan-Pakistan relations became a top priority for the United States. On September 27, 2006, Karzai and Musharraf met with Bush at the White House. The U.S. officials claimed that the purpose of the meeting was to defuse the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to devise a long-term common strategy for the prosecution of the war on terrorism. Hussein Haqqani, currently Pakistani ambassador to the United States, and then a faculty member at the Boston University, offered a pessimistic analysis of the Karzai-Musharraf-Bush meeting. Haqqani noted that such personal diplomacy could only produce results if backed by “meticulous intelligence work and diligent diplomacy at a lower level.” Afghanistan and Pakistan lacked such operational cooperation at the lower level. The lack of such cooperation would continue to affect coalition operations against terrorism. A positive change in the Af-Pak relations was expected in August 2007, when Kabul hosted a joint Afghan-Pakistan peace jirga, (tribal council). The peace jirga was attended by 700 people, including senior political, religious, tribal, and business leaders.

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32 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 272.
35 Quoted in Kessler and Abramowitz, “Bush Brings Afghanistan, Pakistan to the Table.”
from both countries. The purpose of the jirga was to adopt a common approach to dealing with Afghanistan.

Under the government of Asif Zardari, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan improved significantly, albeit at the behest of U.S. diplomacy. In 2009, Pakistan joined several trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and the United States to review the progress in the war on terrorism, and to identify mutual areas of cooperation. During a trilateral meeting in May 2009, Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan to reform the old transit trade agreement. The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton termed the MoU a “historic event”, which would bring more foreign investment to both countries. The MoU allowed shipping trucks to be transported to each other’s territories. Diplomatic relations between Kabul and Islamabad further improved in September 2010, when a U.S.-Afghan-Pakistan trilateral meeting was held in Istanbul to discuss agricultural cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This agricultural dialogue was followed by the signing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) in October 2010. The APTTA would boost transit trade and regional economic growth in both countries, and draw more foreign investments.

Prior to the trilateral meeting in Istanbul and the trade agreement in Kabul, President Karzai visited Islamabad in March 2010 to improve the relations between two neighboring countries. What explains such diplomatic move by Karzai, who was overtly critical of Pakistan’s role only a few years ago? According to Teresita Schaffer, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Karzai made a strategic move to normalize the relations with Pakistan.

As U.S. President Barack Obama declared that U.S. troops might begin withdrawal in 2011, if the conditions on the ground permit, Karzai had “concluded that it is in his interest to work more closely with the Pakistanis.”

The United States considered such improvement inAf-Pak relations essential to the success of U.S. and coalition-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan’s archrival, India, was concerned that Karzai’s Pakistan visit would alter the balance of power, by marginalizing Indian interest in Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan’s northern neighbors were also concerned that the diplomatic thaw in Af-Pak relations might bring Taliban to the negotiating table, which would be detrimental to the interests of non-Pashtun Afghans, such as the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups. The U.S. officials, including former special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, met with their Indian counterparts to assuage New Delhi’s security concerns. They stressed that improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan need not be perceived as detrimental to the Indian national interest.

In summary, Pakistan pursued a reactive diplomacy to support the Afghanistan War coalition. Islamabad’s most crucial contribution was to sever the diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. This was a U-turn in Pakistani foreign policy, which had patronized the Taliban since 1996. After the fall of the Taliban regime, Pakistan did not host any major international conferences, like the Bonn Summit or the London Conferences on Afghanistan. Instead, it stayed

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40 Chandrasekaran, “Neighboring Countries Wary of Thaw in Afghan-Pakistan Relations.”
on the sideline, and mostly responded to the U.S. war strategy in bilateral and trilateral forums attended by Kabul and Washington. Pakistan consistently denied that it hosted the three major Afghan insurgent groups—Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin network. For U.S. and NATO leaders, Islamabad could make a strong contribution if it would have acknowledged the existence of these groups, and have brought them into a process of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

**Offensive Military Contribution.** In the military realm, Pakistan pursued a dual approach to support the Afghanistan War coalition. This dual approach consisted of providing the United States with access to vital military assets, and deploying the military forces to fight terrorism and insurgency in the Pak-Afghan border areas. While access to the military assets offered important support to the U.S.-led *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF), the Pakistani forces’ weak combat performance had often undermined the coalition success in Afghanistan. Recognizing the deficiencies in Pakistan’s military operations, the United States relied on the increased use of armed drones to target the terrorist sanctuaries in the FATA. Pakistan openly criticized the attacks, but secretly supported them with targeting intelligence and a blanket approval.

Pakistan’s military contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition can be grouped into four categories: (a) granting the United States access to military assets for coalition purposes; (b) increasing troop deployment along the Pak-Afghan borders; (c) sustained military offensives in the Pak-Afghan border areas; and (d) support for U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These four categories of contributions are analyzed below.

First, Pakistan responded to the U.S. demands for counterterror cooperation by providing U.S. military forces and intelligence operatives blanket flyover and landing rights, and access to
Pakistani military bases. Pakistan also cut the logistical supply to the Afghan Taliban regime. The Musharraf government gave the United States access to Pakistani ports to deliver foods, water, and other non-lethal supplies to the coalition forces in landlocked Afghanistan.41

**Figure 6.1 The Pakistan Army Disposition**


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41 Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation With Pakistan and India*, p. 15.
Second, as the U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan in early October 2001, Pakistan deployed its military and paramilitary forces, and intelligence operatives along the Afghan-Pakistan borders. It set up nearly 1,000 border posts and interdicted hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban militants fleeing from Afghanistan.\(^\text{42}\) Pakistan also conducted nearly 80 military operations in the northwest tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. Figure 6.1 shows the disposition of the Pakistan Army in the FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It indicates that the XI Corps and its 7\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} infantry divisions are mainly responsible for prosecuting the war on terrorism in the border areas.

Figure 6.2 shows Pakistan’s troop deployment figures from 2001 to 2010. It reveals that two major types of Pakistani forces were deployed in the tribal areas: the paramilitary Frontier Corps and the regular armed forces. A salient feature in Pakistani troop deployment in the tribal areas was the increased deployment of the Pakistan Army, which was involved in a protracted war against the Al Qaeda terrorist group, and the Taliban insurgents. At least two factors contributed to this growing deployment of the Pakistani Army to the border areas near Afghanistan. First, the paramilitary Frontier Corps was limited to only 60,000 personnel. As a result, additional troops had to be generated from the regular armed forces, since the civilian police forces were not capable of clearing areas occupied by insurgents. Second, the Frontier Corps was poorly resourced and lacked the sophisticated weapons to fight the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. The Pakistani government recognized this capacity gap in the paramilitary

force, and addressed this gap by deploying more conventional and Special Forces from the Pakistan Army.

Figure 6.2 The Pakistani Forces Deployed to the Afghanistan Border Areas

![Bar chart showing the deployment of Pakistani forces to the Afghanistan border areas from 2001 to 2010.](chart)

Source: Adapted from Brookings Pakistan Index, January 30, 2011.

Third, the Pakistani forces were engaged in frequent military offensives against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias. Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair find that between 2001 and 2010, Pakistani forces conducted nearly a dozen major operations in the FATA and NWFP.\(^{43}\) Broadly speaking, these operations had three principal goals: (a) to capture or kill senior Al Qaeda leaders and to help overthrow the Taliban regime; (b) to capture or kill senior leaders of Al Qaeda affiliated foreign fighters, such as the Arab, Chechen and Uzbek militias; and (c) to clear the areas controlled by the Pakistani Taliban groups, such as Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrek-e-Taliban

\(^{43}\) For a detailed discussion on the Pakistani offensives in the Afghan border areas, see Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, pp. 33-84.
Pakistan (TTP), and Maulana Sufi Mohammed’s Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).  

Pakistan’s operations against the militants in the tribal area began in support of the U.S.-led OEF mission. These operations were concentrated in several tribal agencies (administrative districts), such as Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. In October 2001, the Frontier Corps soldiers in the Bajaur Agency engaged the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias fleeing Afghanistan. In December 2001, when the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan were engaged in the Battle of Torabora to hunt down Al Qaeda leader bin Laden, the Pakistani forces arrested a number of fleeing Al Qaeda and foreign militias in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies. After the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, and the Battle of Kandahar in December 2001, the U.S.-led OEF forces launched Operation Anaconda, the first major ground offensive in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province, in March 2002. Across the border in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan reinforced its troop deployment to stop the infiltration of fleeing militants. In 2002, soldiers from Pakistani military, Special Armed Services Group, and the Frontier Corps launched several offensives in North and South Waziristan Agencies, Khyber Agency, and the Balochistan Province.

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44 A summary of the major Pakistani military operations in the war on terrorism is available in Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 76.

45 In the context of the Afghanistan War, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was conceived as a U.S.-led offensive counterterrorism mission. By contrast, the UN-backed and later NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was launched as a defensive stabilization mission. The two missions merged in 2006, when ISAF completed the expansion of its area of operation to include the whole of Afghanistan. The two missions are now commanded by U.S. General David Petraeus.

46 For a detailed discussion, see Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, “Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and the War against Terrorism –Part Two,” Terrorism Monitor, August 11, 2008; Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 41-45.
In a nutshell, in 2001 and 2002, Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led OEF mission was extremely important in achieving two principal goals of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Using access to Pakistani military bases, and airspaces, as well as ground transportation routes, the United States launched an effective military campaign that destroyed Al Qaeda’s training facilities, and toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military offensives also complemented the OEF mission in Afghanistan in capturing and killing Al Qaeda and foreign militias. Despite making such important contributions to the OEF mission, Pakistan’s support had limited effect in containing the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban insurgency. As described above, during the earlier phases of the war on terrorism, the Pakistani internal security operations in the northern border areas were mainly focused on capturing or killing the Al Qaeda militants. One of the major limitations of such Al Qaeda-centric operations was that both the Pakistani and U.S. governments overlooked the urgency of containing the Taliban militias, and protecting the population in the tribal areas. According to Jones and Fair, Pakistan’s military offensives in North and South Waziristan, and the adjacent tribal agencies can best be characterized by ad hoc ‘internal security’ operations. This means that Pakistan did not employ a coherent counterinsurgency strategy, which would clear the areas controlled by the Taliban insurgents, and secure the population centers for reconstruction and stabilization purposes.47

In June 2002, the Pakistani forces began Operation Al Mizan to suppress the Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban insurgents in South Waziristan.48 It was a large-scale military campaign that involved nearly 80,000 Pakistani forces from the paramilitary Frontier Corps,

47 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 44-45.
48 According to Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, the Pakistan-led Operation Al Mizan in the FATA coincided with the U.S.-led Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed two infantry divisions, comprising 74,000 troops in the Waziristans, whereas the U.S.-led forces deployed nearly 12,000 troops across the borders in Afghanistan. The operation resulted in the death of 302 militants, 221 soldiers, and the arrest of 656 militants. See: Ashraf, “Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and the War against Terrorism.”
Special Arms Services Groups, and army infantry, aviation, engineering, and signals corps. The campaign lasted until 2006, and involved several tactical operations targeting the Al Qaeda and Taliban compounds, and training grounds.\(^{49}\) Several assassination attempts against Musharraf and the growing insurgency in the FATA encouraged Pakistan to conduct such a prolonged military campaign.

The initial phase of *Al Mizan* focused on capturing or killing the Al Qaeda militias. In 2003, the local administration in South Waziristan identified several tribesmen hosting a few Al Qaeda militants. The Pakistani forces engaged the Al Qaeda militants and their tribal hosts in a fierce battle. Using guerilla warfare tactics, the militants attacked the Pakistani army camps in Wana, and ambushed the Frontier Corps soldiers. In retaliation, the Pakistani forces launched three major tactical offensives: *Operation Wana* in March 2004, and *Operation Shakai Valley* in June 2004, and *Operation Dila Khula* in September 2004.\(^{50}\) Soldiers from the Pakistan Army, Air Force, Special Operations Task Force, and Frontier Corps were deeply involved in the operations. They targeted the Chechen and Uzbek terrorists, and the local Taliban militias belonging to Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP. The effect of the operations was enormous. They destroyed the terrorist command and control, propaganda machine, and logistic network. The Al Qaeda and Taliban militias suffered 350 fatalities and 800 arrests. The Pakistani forces had to pay a heavy price during these operations. Nearly 300 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the South Waziristan campaigns in 2004.

After the tactical offensives in South Waziristan, the Pakistani forces concentrated on North Waziristan. The military operations in North Waziristan targeted Al Qaeda terrorists and

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\(^{49}\) Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, pp. 46-56.

\(^{50}\) These tactical offensives were part of a much broader and strategic offensive named *Operation Mizan*. For a discussion on the three tactical offensives, see: Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, pp. 268-271.
their compounds in the towns of Mir Ali and Miran Shah, where they used an effective propaganda campaign against the Pakistani forces. The terrorist propaganda depicted the Pakistani forces as infidels fighting an American War.\textsuperscript{51} The Pakistani and U.S. forces used precision airstrikes to target Al Qaeda hideouts in North Waziristan.

Jones and Fair argue that \textit{Operation Al Mizan} had low success. The Pakistani forces in North and South Waziristan failed to clear the areas from Al Qaeda and Taliban control, and did not have enough force to hold territories recovered from terrorists and insurgents. This inability to hold territories often resulted into a flawed strategy of singing peace deals. For instance, between April 2004 and September 2006, the Pakistani government signed two peace agreements with the Taliban insurgents. The peace deals gave the tribal leaders and Taliban militias a de facto control over the tribal territories. In return, they gave a non-verifiable assurance that the Arab and foreign militias belonging to Al Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban militias would not be allowed to operate from their territories.

In January 2008, the Pakistani forces launched \textit{Operation Zalzala} in South Waziristan. The Pakistan Army used tanks, bulldozers, and artillery to destroy the areas controlled by Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network. The government forces applied the method of collective punishment, which alienated local tribesmen. Under the provisions of collective punishment, members of an entire group suffer a severe punishment for the misdeed of a tribal or group member. The operation also displaced 200,000 people. Due to such adverse humanitarian consequences, \textit{Operation Zalzala} is considered an unsuccessful campaign, which ignored winning the hearts and minds of people. After Zalzala, the Pakistani forces focused on the northern most Bajaur Agency, where they began \textit{Operation Sher Dil} in September 2008, which

\textsuperscript{51} Musharraf, \textit{In the Line of Fire}, p. 272.
lasted until the next year. Prior to the Bajaur operation, local pro-Taliban militias unleashed a reign of terror, in which they killed government forces, and destroyed security check points. The government responded heavily by deploying the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps soldiers. The Pakistani forces used aerial bombings, bulldozers, and tanks to destroy the terrorist and insurgent camps. They also raised local tribal fighters to fight against anti-government militias and foreign militias. The *Operation Sher Dil* gained some tactical successes. For instance, the major Taliban-controlled areas were cleared, and the Taliban fighters suffered a huge blow. However, the Pakistani security forces failed to hold the territories after clearing them.

So far, I have discussed Pakistan’s military offensives in the FATA bordering Afghanistan. These operations had mostly targeted the foreign Al Qaeda terrorists, and their local collaborators. The next two operations were carried out in the Swat Valley and its adjacent areas, located in the geopolitically important Pakhtunkhwa province. The Pakistani Taliban groups were the principal targets of these operations. Between 2007 and 2009, the Pakistani forces launched a three-staged *Operation Rah-e-Haq* in the Swat Valley. During the first stage, in November 2007, the local police conducted cordon-and-search operations. During the second stage, in July 2008, the search and cordon continued, while the military used attack helicopters and artillery strikes to destroy the terrorist camps. In the third stage, in January 2009, the military enforced a shoot-on-sight curfew. The Pakistani Taliban group TNSM retaliated fiercely, forcing the government to sign a peace deal, known as the Malakand Accord.\(^5\) Like the earlier peace deals in North and South Waziristan, the Malakand Accord agreed to institute Islamic law and

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justice system in the Swat Valley. In return, the Taliban would stop attacking the Pakistani forces. *Operation Rah-e-Haq* was a serious failure for the Pakistani government. Instead of fighting terrorism and insurgency, the government was accused of pursuing a policy of appeasing the religious militants. The U.S. and its NATO allies severely criticized the Swat deal as it would provide a breathing space for the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias.

After *Operation Rah-e-Haq*, the Pakistani forces launched *Operation Rah-e-Rast* in May 2009. This time the targets were the Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban insurgents in Swat, Buner, and Lower Dir. The Pakistani forces took a heavy-handed approach, and used helicopter gunships, fighter aircrafts, and artillery strikes to destroy Taliban targets. Although the Taliban militias were defeated in some areas, the operation displaced many local people, and alienated the tribesmen due to the provision of collective punishment. After clearing the major insurgent strongholds, the military retained some soldiers to hold the territory. After the military offensives were over, the greatest challenges were resettling several hundred thousand internally displaced people, and providing them with civilian-led development assistance.

In June 2009 the Pakistani security forces concentrated on South Waziristan to defeat Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network. The anti-TTP offensive—*Operation Rah-e-Nijat*—began in the fall of 2009 and lasted for a few weeks. After the failed offensives and fragile peace accords in South Waziristan in the previous years, the purpose of *Rah-e-Nijat* was to eliminate Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network, which had spread a reign of terror with numerous suicide attacks throughout the country, and systematic attacks on military and police targets. The United States had also targeted the TTP for its strong connection to fueling the insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone strike. In January 2010, his successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in another drone strike. The Pakistani forces
achieved a modest success in securing some areas controlled by the TTP militias. However, holding those areas appeared to be a challenging task.

In 2009 and 2010, the Pakistani forces engaged in a sustained offensive in 2009 and 2010, in the Kurram and Orakzai agencies in FATA. The operation in Kurram began in September 2009 and ended in June 2010. By contrast, the offensives in Orakzai began in March 2010 and ended in June 2010. In both operations, the Pakistan Frontier Corps and the armed forces clashed with local Taliban and foreign Al Qaeda fighters. The government security forces used helicopter gunships and fighter jets to crush the insurgency. In the end, the security forces claimed success in clearing the areas, and holding them. Compared to the earlier failures in North and South Waziristan, and the Swat Valley, the military offensives in Kurram and Orakzai agencies proved to be more successful. This was due to increased pressures from the United States, and increasing level of intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Pakistani forces. The U.S. provided military equipments had also had positive contribution toward these operations.

The fourth and final military contribution involves Pakistan’s secret support for the U.S. drones strikes in the FATA. Between 2001 and 2004, the emergence of FATA as a terrorist sanctuary alarmed the U.S. policymakers. In order to destroy the terrorist safe haven in FATA, they had to choose between two strategies: to attempt military incursions, or to launch precision airstrikes from pilotless combat aircrafts, such as the Predator drones. The first option was very dangerous, as Pakistan vowed to resist any military incursions into its sovereign territory. The second option was relatively safe, as it could avoid putting military boots on the ground, and thus reduce the likelihood of more U.S. troop casualties.
Since June 2004, the United States had increasingly used Predator drones to strike the Pakistani tribal areas. My research shows that between June 2004 and December 2010, the United States carried out nearly 230 drone strikes, which killed at least 1,337 people, including militants and innocent civilians.\textsuperscript{53} Although the Bush administration introduced the drone strikes in Pakistan, the total number of such strikes, and their target areas increased significantly after Obama assumed U.S. presidency. During Obama’s tenure, in 2009 and 2010, the U.S. forces carried out nearly 80% of all drone strikes in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{54} Pakistan provided tacit support to facilitate the drone strikes. The Pakistani government criticized the drone strikes openly, but offered secret support to coordinate the attacks. The tacit support included the contribution of Pakistani intelligence agents to share secret information on drone targets. The drones, which were engaged in targeting Pakistani territories, were reportedly flown from Pakistan’s Shamsi airbase, where employees from private contractor Blackwater/Xe Services were believed to load the missiles into the unmanned aircraft systems.

In summary, until 2009, Pakistan had mostly pursued a weak counterinsurgency strategy in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa Province. Initially, the U.S.-led OEF mission in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s internal security (counterterrorism and counterinsurgency) operations in the Afghan border areas focused on Al Qaeda militants, and spared the Taliban militias. This strategic neglect of the Taliban, coupled with the inability to hold territories, had resulted in growing

\textsuperscript{53} According to Brookings Pakistan Index data, between 2004 and 2010, the U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan killed between 1,337 and 2,152 people. For a yearly breakdown of the total deaths from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, see Livingston and O’Hanlon, \textit{Brookings Pakistan Index}, p. 8.

Talibanization of the country, especially, in the FATA. The United States responded to the terrorist sanctuary in FATA by increasing the drone strikes to kill senior leadership of Al Qaeda and Taliban. While the drone strikes had selectively targeted the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, the Pakistani ground offensives had more ambitious goals: to clear the territories, and to establish the writ of the government.

Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution. Pakistan’s contribution to the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan was sharply different from the contributions made by the United Kingdom and Germany. Whereas the British and German governments were deeply involved in rebuilding the Afghan national security forces, and reconstructing the provincial level economy, the Pakistani government had made three distinct contributions. These included a relatively small commitment of foreign aid for Afghan reconstruction; the hosting of a large number of Afghan refugees, and the increasing volume of bilateral trade.

First, after the fall of the Taliban regime, the flow of foreign aid provided direct support to the Karzai regime to reconstruct Afghanistan. In November 2001, Islamabad co-hosted an NGO meeting on Afghan reconstruction, co-sponsored by the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. NGO participants at the Islamabad meeting found that the Pakistani government officials were not seriously involved in the discussion process, despite the fact that Islamabad had a huge stake in post-war developments in Afghanistan.\footnote{Noor Ul Haq and Asifa Hasan (eds), \textit{IPRI Factfile: Post-Taliban Reconstruction in Afghanistan} (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, December 31, 2005), p. 36-41.} Pakistan had also participated in several international donor conferences on Afghanistan. Despite attending such international meetings, Pakistan did not commit a huge
economic aid to Afghanistan. Perhaps its economy was too weak to offer a generous amount of foreign aid to Afghanistan. According to one estimate, since 2001, Pakistan had contributed a meager $300 million to Afghan reconstruction efforts. These pales in comparison with India’s more than $1.3 billion aid to Afghanistan. For the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, although Pakistan’s financial assistance to Afghanistan was significantly smaller, Pakistan made a crucial contribution by hosting a large Afghan refugee population.

Second, the United Nations and Pakistani officials recognized the importance of hosting a large refugee population. After the U.S. and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, an estimated 300,000 Afghans took refuge in Pakistan. These new refugees joined the existing 2.7 million Afghans refugees, who had fled to Pakistan since the Soviet forces invaded Kabul in 1979. In 2003, a tripartite agreement among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. At that time, the goal was to complete the repatriation process by 2005, which never materialized.

According to the UNHCR Pakistan, by 2003, nearly 1.9 million Afghan refugees were voluntarily repatriated. In 2008, Pakistan hosted nearly 1.8 million Afghan refugees. The large majority of them lived in over 80 refugee camps, mostly located in the Pakhtunkhwa province, and 12 in the Balochistan province – both close to the Afghan borders. The Punjab Province – far


57 The Afghan refugees constituted the largest refugee population in Pakistan. In contrast to the 3 million Afghanistan refugees, Pakistan was also a hosting nearly 2,000 non-Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. They were of Somali, Iraqi, and Iranian origin. See The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “About UNHCR Pakistan, http://un.org.pk/unhcr/about.htm, accessed February 20, 2011.
from the Afghan border— also hosted an Afghan refugee camp.\(^{58}\) In 2008, the UNHCR estimated that it could take three to five years to complete the repatriation of Afghan refugees. The UNHCR would seek $135 million for hosting the refugees in Balochistan and the Pakhtunkhwa camps.\(^{59}\) The *World Refugee Survey 2009* reported that Afghan refugees in Pakistan lived a sub-standard life in Pakistani slums and refugee camps, and they lacked the legal rights to own properties. The *Survey* also reported that Afghan refugees in the Pakhtunkhwa province were mostly involved in the transportation business, but they lacked any legal permission to own trucks.\(^{60}\)

Senior leaders in the Pakistani government had frequently noted the issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In February 2011, Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mahmoud Qureshi told the *Gulf News*:

> We hosted Afghans during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), we hosted the Mujahideen, we opened our doors to Afghanistan. And, we protected millions of refugees, and even today there are more than three million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. We are contributing to Afghanistan's reconstruction both in financial and human terms and we share a long border, common religion, common tribes and culture - but India does not.\(^{61}\)

Qureshi’s remark shows that Pakistan not only projects itself as a strong coalition partner in Afghanistan, it also claims to have contributed more than India to Afghan reconstruction and


\(^{59}\) The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, *World Refugee Survey 2009 – Pakistan*.

\(^{60}\) United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, *World Refugee Survey 2009 – Pakistan*.

development processes. Although the Afghan President Karzai once rebuked Pakistan for sponsoring the Taliban, the official document in the Afghan foreign ministry recognizes Pakistan’s crucial contribution. According to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

The assistance of Pakistan government in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan in various areas have helped Afghanistan overcome some hard-ship.

For the time being a huge number of Afghanistan refugees are still in Pakistan and the government of Pakistan in collaboration with the Afghan Ministry of Refugee and Repatriation and the UNHCR work for the volunteer and peaceful return of Afghans.\(^62\)

Third, after contributing a small amount of foreign aid, and hosting a large refugee population, Pakistan’s increasing volume of trading exchanges with Afghanistan had certainly had a positive effect on Afghan economy. This increasing bilateral trade can be attributed to intergovernmental cooperation. For instance, during Musharraf’s 2002 visit to Afghanistan, Islamabad and Kabul formed a joint ministerial commission to promote strong economic and trade relations between the two countries. Both Musharraf and Karzai discussed starting off airflights between the two countries, and the use of Pakistani sea ports for materials to be used in Afghanistan reconstruction.\(^63\) Although a tense relationship between Karzai and Musharraf developed later, especially in 2006, Pakistan consistently remained the top trading partner for Afghanistan.

According to a report by Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, in 2006, bilateral trade between Kabul and Islamabad stood at about $2 billion. This included $1.2 billion of Pakistani


\(^63\) Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Unchanged.”
export to Afghanistan, and $700 million of Afghan export to Pakistan. These figures do not include transit trade between the two countries.\(^{64}\) The report also claimed that in 2006, an estimated 60,000 Pakistanis worked in Afghanistan. Of them, more than 10,000 crossed the borders on a daily basis.\(^{65}\) The signing of the transit trade agreement in 2010 was believed to increase the bilateral trade between the two countries, which would contribute to the stabilization of Afghan economy. The Afghan-Pakistan-U.S. tripartite negotiations over agricultural cooperation held in Turkey in 2010 would also contribute to Afghan economic development.\(^{66}\)

In summary, Pakistan made three major contributions to the Afghan War coalition. First, President Musharraf broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, and provided the United States with overflight and landing rights, and access to military bases. During his tenure, Musharraf had largely pursued a reactive diplomacy that responded to the U.S. demands for increased cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province. Musharraf also contributed to the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan tripartite commission to find common grounds on the coalition goals in Afghanistan. After Musharraf left office, President Zardari continued the path of his predecessor. Second, Pakistan deployed its military and paramilitary forces and intelligence operatives to seal the borders with Afghanistan, and to fight a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas. Pakistan had also provided tacit support to facilitate U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa province. Third, after diplomatic and military efforts, Pakistan had contributed to the Afghan reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Unlike the NATO countries, such as Britain and Germany, which had

\(^{64}\) Rubin, and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 17.
committed a huge foreign aid, supported the reconstitution of Afghan security forces, and engaged in economic reconstruction at the Afghan provinces, Pakistan had made three distinct contributions to Afghan reconstruction process. The most important Pakistani contribution was hosting 3 million Afghan refugees, of which more than half did not return to their homeland, and were residing in more than 80 refugee camps in Pakistan. Pakistan committed a small amount of foreign aid, but remained the largest trading partner of Afghanistan. Since 2001, Pakistan’s imports from and exports to Afghanistan increased significantly, and this would complement the coalition goal of post-war reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

II. Explaining Pakistan’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan

This section uses the integrated burden-sharing model to analyze Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. It shows how the international systemic incentives were transmitted through the domestic political processes to determine Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior. First it examines three systemic level factors—alliance dependence, balance of threat, and the free-riding motivation of collective action—to see if they presented any incentives to join and to support the Afghanistan War coalition. Next, it reviews how the system-induced incentives were channeled through three domestic level factors – the office of the chief executive, public opinion, and military capability – in shaping Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan.

Alliance Dependence. Alliance dependence presented the first systemic level incentive to influence Pakistan’s coalition policy. Pakistan is not a member of the U.S.-led NATO alliance. But, it is considered a strong non-NATO ally in the war on terrorism. Lacking a formal
membership with NATO, Pakistan was free from NATO’s Article 5 collective security commitment, which made it an obligation for an alliance member to contribute to the Afghanistan War. Despite that, Pakistan’s dependence on the informal and bilateral alliance with the United States offered a strong incentive to shape Islamabad’s decisions regarding Afghanistan.  

According to Bennett et al, alliance dependence presents a dilemma for a state: if it joins a coalition effort, it might be entrapped; if it does not join the coalition, it might be abandoned. Entrapment refers to a situation, when “one becomes entangled in a conflict central to an ally’s interests but peripheral to one’s own in the hope that the gains in preserving the alliance will outweigh the risks and costs of future war.” In contrast, abandonment implies a situation, “whereby one’s ally realigns with one’s adversary or fails to fight the adversary.” The politics of abandonment and entrapment worked well during the Cold War era, when the ideological confrontation between the two superpowers strongly shaped the foreign and security policy of NATO and Warsaw Pact members.

A close look at the U.S.-Pakistan relations, especially in the post-9/11 era, suggests that Pakistan faced the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment: if it failed to provide strong support, the United States might realign with India (and thus abandon Pakistan). In contrast, if

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69 Bennett et al, Friends in Need, p. 12.
Pakistan feared entrapment, it might offer the less controversial military and nonmilitary assistance, instead of providing direct combat support to the war on terror.\footnote{Fair, \textit{The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India}, pp. 14-15.}

How do we measure alliance dependence, especially, in the context of a U.S.-led wartime coalition? Bennett et al, and Seth Jones suggest that alliance dependence is measured by a state’s economic, military, and political ties to the United States, or aid dependence on the United States.\footnote{Bennett et al, \textit{Friends in Need}, p. 13.} It is often associated with two strategies: carrots and sticks. A state might be offered some positive incentives to join a coalition. Conversely, it might be presented with some negative incentives, such as the withdrawal of certain benefits, or the threat of use of force to compel it to join the coalition.\footnote{Bennett et al, \textit{Friends in Need}, pp. 12-13; Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” pp. 26-27.}

Pakistan was presented with at least two systemic incentives: a negative incentive and a positive incentive. The negative incentive came as early as September 2001, in the form of a coercive pressure from the United States to abandon the Taliban regime and to join the coalition of the willing in Afghanistan. This was evident in 2001, when the Bush administration threatened Pakistan to “be prepared to be bombed,” and to “be prepared to go back to the Stone Age”, if it did not join the U.S.-led coalition.\footnote{“U.S. Threatened to Bomb’ Pakistan,” \textit{BBC News}, Sept. 22, 2006.} Former Pakistani President Musharraf wrote in this memoir that he had war gamed the United States as an adversary, and determined that Pakistan could be attacked by the U.S. forces if Islamabad took a firm decision not to join the coalition.

The positive incentives for joining the U.S.-led coalition were also significant. Initially, the United States lifted several sanctions which prohibited the provisions of U.S. foreign assistance to countries of nuclear proliferation concern, and where a military coup had ousted a
civilian government. Later, in 2004, the United States granted Pakistan the “non-NATO ally” status, making Islamabad eligible for “priority delivery of defense material” as well as other military assistance.

Figure 6.3 Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY 2002-FY 2011

Source: Adapted from *Brookings Pakistan Index*, January 31, 2011, p. 29.

The sustained flow of U.S. military aid provided an important incentive for continued Pakistani support to the coalition. Between 2001 and 2010, the United States provided Pakistan with nearly $20 billion direct aid. Of the $20 billion aid, $14 billion was given as security-related

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74 Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, p. 11, fn 3-4.
aid, and the rest of the $6 billion as economic aid. Figure 6.3 presents the trend in U.S. overt foreign aid to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{77} It shows that the U.S. aid had mainly reimbursed Pakistan’s combat operations and military support in the Af-Pak border areas. In 2009, a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed how the U.S. aid had covered Pakistan’s counterinsurgency expenses. The GAO report notes:

[U.S. aid covered] a broad range of Pakistani military operations, including navy support for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; air force support for combat air patrols, reconnaissance and close air support missions, airlift support, and air traffic control; army military operations in the FATA…These activities include Operation Al Mizan, a major deployment of the Pakistan Army to combat Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants in the North West Frontier Province and the FATA that began in 2001 and has continued in various phases to date.\textsuperscript{78}

In addition to reimbursing for Pakistan’s military operations in the FATA, the United States was providing anti-terror assistance to “fortify” Pakistan’s military and law enforcement capacity, especially, the capability of Pakistan’s interior ministry, its counter-narcotics force, and the Frontier Corps in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa regions.\textsuperscript{79} The U.S. support for Pakistan also included plans for the enhancement of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps capability, by raising 16 Corps units, each with 650 personnel, capable of carrying counterinsurgency operations in the FATA. It also included the creation of border coordination centers along the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders,

\textsuperscript{78} GAO, \textit{Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Areas with Afghanistan}, p. 19.
and the provision of equipments, such as, bullet proof helmets, and bulletproof vests for Pakistani security forces.\textsuperscript{80}

As Obama came to power in the United States, he declared a quick end to the Iraq War, and prioritized fighting the War in Afghanistan. Obama’s unique contribution was to declare a comprehensive Af-Pak strategy, which reinvigorated U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan, and gave an equal emphasis to fighting the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s FATA. Compared to the Bush administration, which mainly focused on security related operations in the FATA, Obama increased the economic aid for Pakistan to ensure the development and stabilization of FATA. The stabilization of FATA was considered critical to the overall success of the War in Afghanistan. Obama’s emphasis on FATA had two effects on the flow of U.S. aid to Pakistan. First, compared to the previous three years, U.S. economic and non-security related aid to Pakistan nearly tripled in 2009. Second, the increasing volume of economic aid narrowed the gap with the security-related aid. For instance, the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar bill passed by the U.S. Congress in 2009 ensured that the United States would strike a balance between the security and development needs in Pakistan. This was emphasized in the bill’s stated goal of building democratic institutions and economic reconstruction of Pakistan. The bill imposed tight conditions upon Pakistan, requiring it to improvise its fight against the terrorist and insurgents in the FATA, and ensuring civilian supremacy over military leadership.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{80} GAO, \textit{Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Areas with Afghanistan}, 20.

In summary, Pakistan’s dependence on the United States presented it with a strong incentive to join and to support the Afghanistan coalition. Between 2001 and 2010, the United States offered Pakistan two incentives: a positive incentive, and a negative incentive. The positive incentive included a sustained flow of security-related and economic aid. Pakistan needed this aid to modernize its military capability and to fight the insurgency in the FATA. The negative incentive prompted Pakistan to join the coalition, and encouraged that it provide continued support to the coalition. The United States threatened the use of force to compel Pakistan to abandon the Taliban regime. As the War in Afghanistan progressed, the U.S. forces conducted limited cross-border attacks and violated Pakistani sovereignty to press that the Pakistani forces remain proactive against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias operating in the border. The United States also escalated the drone strikes in the FATA to eliminate the senior leadership of Al Qaeda and Taliban.

After alliance dependence, did balance of threat present any incentive to encourage Pakistan’s participation in the coalition? This question is addressed below with reference to the various state and non-state centric threats to Pakistani national security.

**Balance of Threat.** After alliance dependence, balance of threat presented the second systemic level incentive to influence Pakistan’s coalition contribution. Following the analysis of Patricia Weitsman, my burden-sharing model suggests that symmetric threats or convergent threat perception forges coalition cohesion by encouraging a fair distribution of burdens among the coalition members.82 Did Pakistan and the United States face similar kinds and levels of threat, which could encourage a strong Pakistani support for the U.S.-led coalition? The answer

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is no. Historically, both Pakistan and the United States have had conflicting perceptions of international threats. These conflicting perceptions have often adversely affected their mutual cooperation. For instance, with regard to the traditional state centric threat, the United States perceives China’s military modernization and resource-focused diplomacy as a source of “complex global challenge,” and India as a major regional ally in South Asia. By contrast, Pakistan does not consider China as a threat, while it has always perceived India as a top national security threat. This India-centric threat perception has historically influenced Pakistan’s military preparedness, force structure, and above all, the Afghanistan policy.

During the nine years of the Afghanistan War (2001-2010), the United States and Pakistan differed quite sharply on the nature of non-state threats, especially from various factions of the Taliban insurgents. The United States perceived Al Qaeda terrorists, Taliban militants, and

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84 Pakistan’s India-focused threat perception is premised on three core beliefs: (a) India has a conventional military superiority over Pakistan, and Indian armed forces are in a constant state of readiness to divide the Pakistani state; (b) India’s clandestine agents are instigating an ethnic separatist insurgency in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province; and (c) India’s alignment with the post-Taliban Afghanistan is part of a hostile strategy to isolate Pakistan in Central and South Asia. Pakistan’s threat perception vis-à-vis India is best captured in the words of a senior Pakistani scholar Farrukh Saleem, who wrote that: “In effect, some 80 to 90 per cent of our military assets are deployed to counter the threat from India. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and sees its inventory of 6,384 tanks as a threat. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian air force and sees its inventory of 672 combat aircraft as a threat. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and notices that six out of 13 Indian corps are strike corps. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and finds that 15, 9, 16, 14, 11, 10 and 2 Corps are all pointing their guns at Pakistan. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and discovers that the 3rd Armoured Division, 4 Rapid Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade have been deployed to cut Pakistan into two halves. The Pakistani army looks at the Taliban and sees no Arjun Main Battle Tanks (MBT), no armoured fighting vehicles, no 155 mm Bofors howitzers, no Akash surface-to-air missiles, no BrahMos land attack cruise missiles, no Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, no Sukhoi Su-30 MKI air superiority strike fighters, no Jaguar attack aircraft, no MiG-27 ground-attack aircraft, no Shakti thermonuclear devices, no Shakti-12 kiloton fission devices and no heavy artillery.” See: Farrukh Saleem, ‘Where is the Pakistan Army?’ The News, April 26, 2009. http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=174334, accessed March 10, 2010.
their local sympathizers belonging to a broad category of transnational Islamist militancy, and wished to fight all of them with equal importance. Pakistan did not share such threat perception. While it agreed on the threat posed by the Arab and foreign-origin Al Qaeda terrorists, it disagreed on the threat posed by two major factions of the Taliban insurgents – the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan perceived the first group a potential ally in Afghanistan, whereas the second group as a serious threat to its internal and national security. 85

These differences over threat perception had a negative effect on Pakistan’s coalition contribution. 86 The United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan alleged that Pakistan had tolerated the presence of three Afghan-focused Taliban groups—the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin faction, and the Haqqani Network. The Pakistani military and its premier intelligence agency ISI had also reportedly collaborated with these Taliban groups in the planning and execution of terrorist and insurgent attacks against Indian and NATO targets in Afghanistan. By contrast, Pakistan had consistently targeted the Pakistani Taliban groups—especially the TTP and TNSM in South Waziristan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

If divergent threat perception explains Pakistan’s reduced commitment to the Afghanistan coalition; what, then, accounts for Pakistan’s entry into the coalition, its military support to the U.S.-led OEF mission, and its support for U.S. drone strikes in the Af-Pak border area?

There are three possible answers, some of which have already been discussed in this chapter. First, the coercive pressure from the United States prompted Pakistan’s entry into the

coalition. Pakistan had long supported the Taliban regime, and did not want to withdraw this support when the United States decided to invade Afghanistan. As President Musharraf claimed, the United States had used the threat of bombing to compel Pakistan to join the coalition.

Second, after joining the coalition, Pakistan agreed with the United States on the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s foreign militants, especially, the Arab, Chechen, and Uzbek militias, who had infiltrated into the FATA, fleeing the attacks in Afghanistan. Such threat convergence encouraged Pakistan to pursue intelligence and military-led operations to balance against the terrorist threat in the border areas near Afghanistan.\(^{87}\) Pakistan’s cordon and search operations in 2001 and 2002 in support of the *Operation Enduring Freedom*, as well as the Pakistani armed forces’ *Operation Al Mizan* in the 2002-2006 years show how shared threat perception had positively influenced Pakistan’s coalition contribution.

Third, the growing incidence of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings in Pakistan exposed Islamabad’s heightened sense of vulnerabilities from terrorism. This Pakistani threat perception converged with the pre-existing U.S. perception that Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups posed the most pressing threat to international security. Pakistan responded to the growing threats of conventional terrorist and suicide attacks by taking a two-pronged strategy: a pro-active counterinsurgency strategy in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province, and clandestine support for U.S. drone strikes.

Rhetorical statements from Pakistani political and military leadership confirm the threat convergence, and its effect on Pakistan’s coalition behavior. In his memoir, Musharraf notes that

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\(^{87}\) Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair argue Pakistan’s military offensives and intelligence-led operations in 2002 and 2003 had mostly targeted Al Qaeda and spared the Taliban militias. This was due to the fact that the United States perceived the Taliban a “spent force”, while Pakistan was not interested in fighting the Taliban, which was created and nurtured with the active support of Pakistani military. See Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in *Pakistan*, p. 45.
a key reason for joining the U.S.-led coalition was Pakistan’s fear of Talibanization. This is what prominent Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid describes as descending into chaos.\(^{88}\) Musharraf observes that Pakistan was a frontline state in the fight against terrorism because it “had been a victim of sectarian and external terrorism for years, and certainly had no desire to be “Talibanized.”\(^{89}\) Musharraf’s successor, President Zardari made a similar case to justify Pakistan’s commitment to the war against terrorism. In September 2008 Zardari stressed that, “The war on terror is Pakistan’s war, and we are its greatest victims…We are confronting the terrorist threat in our tribal areas as well as in our cities. Soldiers are arrayed in the field against the Taliban and al Qaeda…”\(^{90}\) Later, in June 2009, during an interview with Der Spiegel, the ISI chief General Ahmed Shuja Pasha noted that “Terror is our enemy, not India.”\(^{91}\)

These rhetorical statements reflected the growing dangers posed by terrorism and insurgency. Figure 6.4 shows the data. It reveals that, since 2007, terrorism and insurgency-related fatalities in Pakistan registered a sharp increase, when compared with the fatality data for the pre-2007 years. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, nearly 6,000 civilians were killed in terrorism and insurgency related incidents in Pakistan. This was nearly three times higher than the 1,600 civilians killed in the years between 2003 and 2006. Similarly, between 2007 and 2009, nearly 2,300 Pakistani security personnel were killed in terrorism and political violence. This was a three-fold increase from the 600 security personnel killed in the years between 2003 and 2006.

\(^{89}\) Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 223.
\(^{91}\) Susanne Koelbl, ‘Pakistan’s New Intelligence Chief: “Terror Is Our Enemy, Not India,” Interview with Der Spiegel, June 1, 2009. [http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,599724,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,599724,00.html), accessed March 9, 2010.
Pakistan took a heavy handed approach to dealing with terrorism and insurgency. For instance the number of military and paramilitary forces deployed to the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province increased more than twofold from 60,000 in 2002-2003 to 150,000 in 2009. As the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan gradually increased, Pakistan also increased its military boots on the ground. Unlike some of the NATO countries, which placed national caveats to restrict the use of lethal force, the Pakistani forces were not restricted by such caveats to operate in the tribal area. Instead, Pakistan’s increasing tendency to use lethal force had killed a huge number of terrorists and insurgents. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, more than 13,000 terrorists and insurgents were killed in Pakistani operations. This was more than twelve times higher than the total 1,000 terrorists killed between 2003 and 2006.

The escalation in suicide attacks might also have contributed to Pakistan’s support for the coalition strategy, especially, U.S. drone strikes in the Pak-Afghan border region. Figure 6.5 shows the possibility for an association between suicide terrorism in Pakistan, and Islamabad’s
increased support for the U.S. drone strikes. For the United States, the surge in drone strikes was associated with the increasing level of insurgency in Afghanistan, which had targeted the U.S. and NATO forces. These strikes were premised on the belief that by successfully eliminating the Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, the United States could minimize the likelihood of future attacks on U.S. mainland, and U.S. citizens and interests overseas.\textsuperscript{92} For Pakistan, although the drone strikes violated its sovereignty, it offered a direct benefit by punishing the TTP terrorists, who were responsible for most of the suicide attacks. This mutual interest might have encouraged Pakistan to support the escalation of the drone strikes.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure6.5.png}
\caption{Trends in Suicide Terrorism & Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2002-2009}
\end{figure}

Source: Author’s database.

Does the upward trend in suicide attacks and drone strikes indicate causality? Or, was it just a mere coincidence? I argue that the growing trends in suicide terrorism and drone strikes may indicate a cyclical relationship. This means that increasing suicide attacks had contributed to

\textsuperscript{92} Critics have long argued that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan might have had counterproductive effects, by fuelling anti-Americanism and retaliatory terrorist strikes in the United States. Such concerns appeared a reality in May 2019, when Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born naturalized U.S. citizen conspired to set off a car bomb in New York’s busiest Times Square area. Senior officials in the Pakistani government speculated that the Times Square bomb plot was perhaps a planned retaliation by Pakistani Taliban group Tehrek-e-Taliban. See Zahid Hussain and Tom Wright, “Suspect’s ties to Pakistan Taliban Probed,” \textit{The Wall Street Journal} May 6, 2010. \url{http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703322204575226472828026444.html}, accessed September 20, 2010.
a surge in drone strikes, which in turn had led to a further escalation of the suicide attacks. For Pakistan, this is essentially a cyclical relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism. Figure 6.6 shows the cyclical relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan.

Figure 6.6 Terrorism-Counterterrorism Dynamics in Pakistan

A brief narrative of the Red Mosque incident and its effect shows how this cyclical relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism evolved in Pakistan. In 2007, the Pakistani special forces engaged with armed Islamists in a fierce battle to take control over the Red Mosque from pro-Taliban clerics Maolana Abdul Aziz Ghazi and his brother Maolana Abdul Rashid Ghazi (Maolana is a title given to Islamic religious scholars).\(^93\) The battle ended with more than 100 killed, mostly pro-Taliban militants, and a few security personnel. The storming of the Red Mosque had a direct effect on Pakistan’s war on terrorism. The government’s earlier peace agreement with the Waziristan-based Taliban forces broke down, and Taliban-directed

suicide attacks increased sharply in the Pakhtunkhwa province, and the FATA regions—partly in response to the Red Mosque incident, and partly in response to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaigns in the FATA.\textsuperscript{94} Most of the Taliban-directed attacks in Pakistan had targeted the security forces, law enforcement officials, and innocent civilians, prompting a strong counterterrorism and counterinsurgency response from the Pakistani government.\textsuperscript{95}

The drone strikes were mostly unpopular among the Pakistani people, due to concerns over sovereignty and civilian casualties. However, the Pakistani government provided tacit support for these strikes. The nature of this tacit support included a blanket approval for all U.S. drone strikes, and intelligence sharing on specific high value terrorist targets.\textsuperscript{96} The central purpose of the Pakistani government’s support for the drone strikes was to punish the Pakistani Taliban (especially Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network) for subverting the Pakistani state. The desired outcome of such drone strikes was a less cohesive insurgent network with limited ability to threaten the social fabric of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{94} According to Imran Khan, a Pakistani cricketer-turn politician, and the founder of Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) Party, the origin of suicide bombing in Pakistan can be traced back to Pakistan’s militarized counterterrorism strategy and its overt support for U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. During an interview with Democracy Now, Khan opined that “Well, there was no terrorism in Pakistan, we had no suicide bombing in Pakistan, ’til Pakistan sent its troops on—under pressure from the US. Musharraf, General Musharraf, capitulated under the pressure and sent Pakistani troops into the tribal area and Waziristan. So it was that that resulted in what was the new phenomenon: the Pakistani Taliban. We had no militant Taliban in Pakistan, until we got in—we were forced into this US war on terror by a military dictator, not by the people of Pakistan. And people never owned this war. People always thought that this is not our war, and quite rightly, because we did not have any terrorism in Pakistan, as subsequently grew.” For a detailed transcript of the interview, see: ‘Pakistani Opposition Politician Imran Khan on US Drone Attacks, the “Massive Human Catastrophe” in the Swat Valley and the Escalation of War in Afghanistan,’ Democracy Now, June 24, 2009. http://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/24/pakistani_opposition_politician_imran_khan_on, accessed March 9, 2010.


For Washington, Islamabad’s policy of tacit support for the drone strikes was necessary, but not sufficient in eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants. This was due to the fact that Pakistan’s clandestine support for the Afghan Taliban had adversely affected the coalition war strategy in Afghanistan. Pakistan nurtured a friendly attitude toward the Afghan Taliban groups to gain a strategic depth in future, especially, after the U.S. and NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan. A strategic depth would allow it to counter any Indian incursion into Pakistani territory. Thus, Pakistan’s differences with the United States over the threats of Afghan Taliban had seriously undermined the purpose of the Afghanistan War coalition.

In summary, balance of threat presented the second systemic incentive to encourage Pakistan’s coalition participation, albeit on a limited scale, when judged from U.S. expectations. The U.S.-Pakistan threat perception converged on the nature of threat posed by the Al Qaeda and various Pakistani Taliban groups. Such threat convergence presented a systemic incentive for improved intelligence sharing and joint targeting against the South Waziristan-based Pakistani Taliban group TTP, whose principal leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in August 2009, and Baitullah’s successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in another drone strike in January 2010. Despite such threat convergence, the United States and Pakistan continued to differ on the nature of threat posed by the Afghan Taliban groups. Such differences had seriously constrained Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition.

**Collective Action.** The free-riding motivation of the collective action theory did not present any systemic level incentive to determine Pakistan’s coalition contribution. The concept of collective action refers to group motivation for the pursuit of a collective good, which is non-
excludable. In analyzing international cooperation, the collective action hypothesis assumes shared policy preferences for a public good, such as regional stability, and a terror-free world. The theory also posits that, in dealing with international security threats, such as Al Qaeda and Taliban, large states and great powers are likely to make substantial contributions, whereas small states and weak powers will tend to be free riders. If the collective action hypothesis is correct, we would expect the United States to carry most of the burdens of counterterrorism, while Pakistan would be a free-rider.

Pakistan did not face the incentive of free-riding in the war on terrorism. As described in the previous section, although the United States offered it a huge financial aid, Pakistan did not ride free. Instead, it made diplomatic, military, and economic contributions to support the coalition goals. Despite the strong public opinion against cooperation with the United States, Pakistan continued to be the main transit country for fuel and logistical supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. It had also deployed more than 100,000 regular army in the western border with Afghanistan—a decision which required to reduce troops along the eastern border with India. Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the northwestern border areas had serious implications. It further radicalized a section of the Pakistani society, fuelling more terrorist attacks against the Pakistani civilians and security


98 According officials in the U .S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), until 2009, 80% of non-lethal supplies bound for U.S. forces in Afghanistan were transported via the Pakistani port of Karachi and on Pakistani routes. After several high profile Taliban attacks in the U.S. and NATO supplies in the Pakistani route, especially the December 2008 attack on a NATO convoy, which destroyed 160 trucks, the United States introduced the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which relied on the use of the rail, road, and water routes of the former Soviet republics for the transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. By early 2010, nearly 30% of cargoes flowing into U.S. forces in Afghanistan were shipped through the NDN. Despite that, Pakistan accounted for nearly 50% of Cargo supplies for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
forces. The effect was growing suicide attacks, and frequent terrorist attacks, which destroyed the fabric of the Pakistani society.

Pakistani analysts claim that the cost of the war on terrorism to Pakistan was much higher than the economic aid it received from the United States. According to Talat Masood, a respected defense analyst, the cost of the war to Pakistani economy was $28 billion, measured by the depressed economic growth rate.99 Former Pakistani finance and foreign minister Sartaz Aziz offers a similar estimate. Aziz finds that the direct and indirect economic cost of the war on terrorism to Pakistan was 2083 billion Rupees (equivalent to $26 billion) from 2004 to 2009. This indicates an average $4.3 billion annual cost, which is substantially higher than the $2 billion annual concessionary aid Pakistan received from the United States since 2001.100 Aziz notes that the indirect costs were much higher (83%) than the direct costs (17%) of the war. The indirect costs accounted for the loss of exports, foreign investment, and industrial outputs; whereas the direct costs comprised the costs associated with the values of human lives lost or injured, the value of property or infrastructure destroyed or damaged, and the security spending.101

Several factors explain why Pakistan did not ride free, and instead incurred a huge cost of the war on terrorism. These involve the pursuit of two private goods: fighting terrorism in its own territory and securing U.S. foreign aid. Since the terrorist group Al Qaeda and its various Taliban associates posed a direct threat to Pakistan, the leadership in Islamabad perceived

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fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban an important private good. However, without a direct U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan was not willing or able to pursue this private good with a large-scale military deployment to the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province. In the end, Pakistan was deeply involved in the pursuit of fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban, which seemed quite contradictory with its sympathetic attitude toward the Afghan Taliban groups. The pursuit of another private good had also motivated Pakistan to support the coalition. This was evident in Pakistan’s interest in securing a non-NATO ally status, which had brought a huge inflow of U.S. aid, and military equipments, such as the much awaited F-16 fighter aircrafts.102

In summary, among the three systemic factors, the free-riding motivation of collective action did not present any systemic incentive to structure Pakistan’s coalition behavior. By contrast, alliance dependence and balance of threat presented two systemic incentives to encourage Pakistan’s support for the Afghanistan War coalition. How were these systemic incentives transmitted through Pakistan’s domestic political processes, and the constraints posed by its military capability? The remainder of this chapter answers this question by reviewing the effect of Pakistan’s domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability on its Afghanistan policy.

**Domestic Political Regime.** At the domestic level, the office of the chief executive is the first decision point in explaining Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. My burden-sharing model predicts that a chief executive with strong decision making power will

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ignore the mass public opinion, and look at the military capability to design its Afghanistan policy. By contrast, a weak regime is likely to care more about unfavorable public opinion, and it would avoid any involvement in Afghanistan. In between these two possibilities, a chief executive with medium power will balance between the competing demands of elite opinion and mass public opinion.

In Pakistan, President Musharraf enjoyed a centralized decision-making power. After his departure, President Zardari and his army chief Kayani exercised a strong control over the Afghan policy. Compared to the British and German cases, where the legal-constitutional provisions and parliamentary politics determined the institutional decision power of the chief executive, the Pakistan case shows the otherwise. In Pakistan, democratic institutions mattered less than the military, which played an important role in defining the power of the chief executives in making foreign policy decisions.

In a western democratic country, at least three factors determine the power of the chief executive to determine its policy on coalition burden-sharing. These include legal-constitutional restrictions, legislative oversight, and elite consensus. In the British case discussed before, Prime Minister Tony Blair and his successors Gordon Brown, and David Cameron were considered to be strong executives due to three reasons: they enjoyed the royal prerogative to declare war, and support a coalition; the parliamentary oversight process did not constrain their ability to design the Afghanistan mission; and the elite consensus among major parliamentary parties served Britain’s Afghanistan policy well. By contrast, in the German case, Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel were categorized as the medium executive. This was due to the fact that, although they enjoyed elite consensus on the Afghanistan War, their decisions on
Germany’s military contribution were seriously constrained by the constitutional limits, and parliamentary oversight process.

Pakistan has never had a western-style democratic government. Thus, the three criteria for measuring the strength of a chief executive described above do not apply to Pakistan. Instead, the relative importance of the country’s armed forces, and its premier intelligence agency ISI vis-à-vis the civilian leadership have historically defined the role of its chief executive in the decision making process. This is due to the fact that, since its independence from the British colonial rule in 1947, a large part of Pakistan’s political history has been dominated by the military-controlled governments. The frequent military interventions have often been justified as a necessary cure to deal with Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient civilian leadership. The Pakistan Army’s meddling into politics has created a parochial political culture, in which the military dictators or military-backed civilian rulers exercise strong control over the country’s foreign and security policy. By contrast, the civilian rulers, who lack the Army and ISI support, have a weak control over the country’s foreign policy making process.

During the nine years of the Afghanistan War (October 2001-December 2010), Pakistan was ruled by Pervez Musharraf and Aisf Zardari. Both Musharraf and Zardari were strong chief executives, who had ignored the public opposition to the war, and decided to support the U.S.

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war efforts in Afghanistan. As a military dictator, Musharraf centralized the executive power. His control over the military forces and the ISI gave him enormous power to decide Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. By contrast, Zardari shared some of the decision-making power with his Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani. Unlike Musharraf, Zardari lacked the military support, but his decision-making power came from the parliament, where his People’s Party led a coalition government. Zardari was previously imprisoned for eleven years, and was charged with corruption cases. These negative issues – the lack of military support, and corruption allegations—could make Zardari a weak executive. However, due to the restoration of democracy after Musharraf’s resignation, Zardari was constitutionally a powerful president, and exercised his effective control over the Prime Minister through the disciplines of party politics.

How did Musharraf come to power, and how did he exercise his political control? Answers to these questions would offer useful insights to Musharraf’s decision process. Musharraf was the army chief, when he came to power in October 1999, by orchestrating a military coup against the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Soon he formed a national security council to run the country. Musharraf held the position of the head of state until August 2008. Initially, he assumed the position of the Chief Executive for the first two years. Since June 2001, he held the position of the President of Pakistan. During his tenure as

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107 Musharraf declared himself president in June 2001. He promulgated a legal framework order to activate the 1973 Constitution, and pave the way for parliamentary elections in 2002. On January 1, 2004, Musharraf won a confidence vote that extended his presidency until 2007. On October 6, 2007, Musharraf won a controversial presidential election. However, the Pakistani Supreme Court said it was yet to decide whether Musharraf’s candidacy was legal. The legal debate arose over the issue of whether Musharraf could run the election while being
a president, Musharraf abrogated the Constitution, issued several presidential decrees, and ruled the country with a relatively strong control. He retained the position of the chief of army staff until November 2007. In November 2008, Musharraf appointed his confidant General Ashfaq Kayani as the army chief. Prior to assuming the position of army chief, Kayani had held the position of the director general of ISI.

During his reign as Pakistan’s chief executive and president, Musharraf confronted strong political oppositions from two major parties – Benajir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Despite such opposition, Musharraf managed to co-opt a group of Islamist parties. He forced Bhutto and Sharif to leave the country, and imprisoned their senior party leaders. Musharraf held parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2008. To ensure effective control in the parliament, his political strategy split Sharif’s Muslim League to form the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam). Musharraf exerted his political influence to patronize a coalition of Islamist parties—Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which acted as the main opposition party in a defunct parliament.

According to Pakistani defense expert Shuza Nawaz, Musharraf exercised a “highly personalized decision-making process,” in which he ignored the key institutions, such as the

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108 The PPP is a center-left political party, and PML (Nawaz) is a center-right party.
110 For an excellent discussion on how this political co-option works in Pakistani politics, see: Ayaz Amir, “The Problem of Spine in Pakistani Politics,” Dawn, September 26, 2003. According to Amir, historically, Pakistani military dictators have established their political control with the support of four influential sections of the civil society: (a) a section of the political elites which declares the dictator as a savior; (b) a pliant judiciary that legitimizes the dictator’s rule; (c) a group of the country’s best legal scholars, who work with the judiciary to provide a legal cover for the military coup; and (d) the spontaneous support of a section of media journalists who praise the junta as “the messiah” – the savior of the nation. For further discussions on Pakistan’s party politics, see Haris Gazdar, “Letter from South Asia: Pakistan’s Precious Parties,” Economic and Political Weekly, February 9, 2008, pp. 8-9. Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The Military and Politics in Pakistan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vo. 26, No. 1-2 (1991), pp. 27-42. 
parliament and the cabinet, in choosing Pakistan’s key policies on Afghanistan. Evidence supports the dominant role played by Musharraf in deciding Pakistan’s entry into and support for the Afghanistan coalition. Regarding entry into the coalition, Musharraf claims “I made a dispassionate, military-style analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons.” He notes that he feared “There would be a violent and angry reaction if we [Pakistan] didn’t support the United States.” Musharraf suggest that three factors influenced his decisions on Afghanistan. First, Pakistan’s weak economic and military strength, and heterogeneous society would not be able to survive a direct military confrontation with the United States. Second, if Pakistan ignored participation in the coalition, its arch-rival India could have taken an advantage by undermining Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir. To make things worse, the United States could invade Pakistan to destroy its nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are Pakistan’s strategic assets against India’s conventional superiority, and Pakistan had an abiding interest not to jeopardize its nuclear security. Third, Pakistan had long supported the Taliban for geo-strategic reasons. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, supporting the Taliban government in Afghanistan would no longer serve Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests. Instead, it would have invited a military confrontation with the United States. Musharraf concludes that Pakistan’s “self-interest and self-preservation were the basis” of his decisions.

The foregoing discussion shows Musharraf’s decision to join the Afghanistan War coalition. Between October 2001 and August 2008, Musharraf made two other decisions to

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114 Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, pp. 204.
support the coalition. These included deploying the Pakistani armed forces to the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa Province, and to support the U.S. drone strikes. What was the logic behind Musharraf’s troop deployment in the tribal areas? Why did he support the drone strikes? On the first question, Musharraf claims, he deployed military and paramilitary forces to combat the Al Qaeda terrorists and stop the Talibanization of Pakistan. He also stresses that his military forces knew where the threat was coming from, and they took “very deliberate decisions” based on the intelligence on where the threat was high and where it was low.115 On the second question, Musharraf never publicly claimed that he supported the drone strikes. He had, perhaps, reluctantly accepted it under compulsions from the United States.

Did Musharraf count on his cabinet or the parliament in deciding Pakistan’s policy in the war on terrorism? Musharraf claimed he did.116 Critics reject such claim. In August 2009, nearly a year after Musharraf resigned from presidency, a seasoned Pakistani politician noted that, Musharraf never “took his cabinet into confidence on several key issues, including the war on terror.”117 This means that during his tenure as Pakistan’s President, Musharraf had almost single-handedly decided the country’s policy on contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. Such decision-making style was consistent with his conviction that “decision-making is an individual process” and the role of the leader matters more, “irrespective of any amount of discussion” on a particular issue.118

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Like Musharraf, Zardari also exercised strong control over the decisions on Pakistan’s coalition contribution. His personalized style of decision making had two implications. First, he ignored the 1973 Constitution, and ignored the powers of the parliament and the prime minister. Second, he directly coordinated the military and security issues with the Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani. According to Shuja Nawaz, Zardari’s personalized decision process showed that Pakistan lacked “the institutional mechanism for national security analysis and decision making with a clear central command authority.” Nawaz contends that this lack of institutional mechanism was evident in the fact that the cabinet committee on defense had rarely discussed key security issues, such as the plight of refugees and internally displaced people in the conflict-ridden Swat Valley. In addition, the chairman of the chiefs of staff was often ignored in making important decisions on security issues. Former Pakistani diplomat Javaid Husain argues that, the personalized decision process is nothing but the result of longstanding military rule. Echoing Nawaz, Hussein stresses that the frequent military takeovers in Pakistan have meant that the executive branch, not the parliament, controls the foreign policy making process.

119 According to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of the government. The Constitution holds that the president will act with the advice of the cabinet or the prime minister. It also holds that the prime minister can act directly or through the federal ministers. Despite such constitutional provisions, successive prime ministers in Pakistan have often been thwarted by military juntas and assertive presidents to establish effective control over the country’s domestic and foreign policy. For instance, during Musharraf’s ten years’ of rule (October 1999-August 2008), Pakistan had five prime ministers – none of whom enjoyed any significant decision making powers. Since November 2002, Musharraf’s prime ministers were Zafrullah Khan Jamali (November 21, 2002-June 26, 2004); Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain (June 30, 2004-August 20, 2004); Shaukat Aziz (August 20, 2004-November 15, 2007); Muhammad Mia Soomro (November 16, 2007-March 25, 2008); and Yousaf Raza Gilani (March 25, 2008-present). The first four belonged to Musharraf’s PML (Quaid) Party, whereas the last belonged to Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party. Although Zardari made some amendments to the Constitution to share the power with Prime Minister Gilani, the latter did not hold any significant power on the foreign policy process, especially on Afghanistan. This was due to Zardari’s centralization of power in the realm of foreign and security policy.

120 Nawaz, “In Pakistan, Great Expectations … As Yet Unfulfilled.”
121 Ibid.
122 The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan provides for a strong role for the parliament in the foreign policy making process. The Parliament can pass non-binding resolutions on foreign policy, and hold hearings in the standing committees on foreign affairs, or ask questions to the chief decision-makers. This can enable the parliament to play
After President Zardari, General Kayani was the most important decision maker on Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Although Kayani showed an interest to depoliticize the military, he was deeply involved in a power struggle with the civilian government. In January 2008, he passed an official directive, which ordered military officers to refrain from contacting politicians. In February 2008, he ordered the withdrawal of military officials from civilian administrative positions. Despite making such key decisions to distance the army from politics, Kayani retained considerable power in shaping the country’s crucial decisions on foreign and security policy.

At least three pieces of evidence illustrate the influence of General Kayani on Pakistan’s domestic politics. First, in September 2008, Kayani appointed Lt. General Ahmed Shuja Pasha as the new director general of the ISI. By making the appointment decision on Pasha, Kayani resisted the interior ministry attempt to transfer the control of ISI into the civilian government. Second, in November 2009, Kayani pressured President Zardari to transfer the control of nuclear command authority to the office of the prime minister. The transfer of the nuclear command an indirect role in the foreign policy process. However, the parliament has rarely assumed such important role due to repeated military interventions, which have weakened the role of parliament in overseeing critical issues of defense and foreign policy. See: Javaid Husain, “The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan,” PILDAT Briefing Paper, No. 12 (2004), p. 8.


Second, in November 2009, Kayani pressured President Zardari to transfer the control of nuclear command authority to the office of the prime minister.

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authority indicated the military’s perception that Zardari was too unreliable to maintain the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Third, President Zardari believed that the military was involved in a coup to overthrow him. This trust deficit between the president and the army became more apparent, after the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that the 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance was unconstitutional. The Ordinance dropped the corruption charges against Zardari and some of senior ministers in PPP government.128

Did the Pakistani Army influence the country’s current Afghanistan policy? If yes, how did it do so? The answer is straightforward. The Pakistan Army continued to exert a strong influence over the country’s Afghanistan policy through its powerful intelligence agency ISI.129 The ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan affairs was nothing new. During the Afghan War against the Soviet forces (1979-1989), the Pakistani ISI and the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) actively supported the Afghan mujahideens (resistance fighters). The two agencies provided the Afghan mujahideens with funds, weapons, and training to expel the Soviet forces

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from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{130} In the same vein, the ISI had developed strong contacts with Islamist militant groups to counter the Indian forces in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{131}

After Pakistan joined the war on terrorism, President Musharraf tasked the ISI to support the war efforts against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. The Pakistani government asserts that the ISI had made a strong and positive contribution to support the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. Despite such Pakistani claims, the United States and its NATO allies allege that the ISI had maintained a policy of selectively supporting some Afghan-focused Taliban groups, which had undercut the U.S. and coalition strategy in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{132} Media reports indicate that the United States escalated the drone strikes to counter the rise of Taliban insurgency, which had enjoyed a direct support from the ISI. In September 2008, two months after the United States intensified the drone strikes in Pakistan, the \textit{Time} magazine revealed:

Many in Washington even suspect that members of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence spy agency are actively supporting Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and may be tipping them off about planned attacks. So while U.S. strikes on Pakistani

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soil may be controversial, the theory goes, they are the only option for tackling a threat the Pakistani security forces are unable to neutralize.\textsuperscript{133}

Why and how did Pakistani army support the Islamist groups as an instrument of foreign policy? To answer this question, one needs to look into the Pakistani elites, who articulate the role of Islam in defining their national identity. According to Feroz Khan, Pakistan is a Muslim country, and thus, Islam has a strong role in its foreign policy. Khan contends that:

The Pakistani military and strategic elites are from the same stock. Since the birth of the Pakistani army there have been three sources of motivation: Regiment, Nation, and Faith. A soldier fights for his Nation (Pakistan) and upholds the pride of his Regime (British tradition), and he sacrifices in the cause of Islam (in the name of God)…The Pakistani Army derives its strength and morale from all these sources, but most importantly its over-arching cause is the omnipresence of God in every facets of a Muslim life. When a soldier dies in the line of duty, he is revered for having embraced the highest form of death—Shahadat.\textsuperscript{134}

In summary, President Musharraf, and his successor Zardari maintained a strong control over the country’s Afghanistan policy. Due to a long history of military intervention in domestic politics, Pakistan’s civilian institutions, especially the parliament, and the ministry of foreign affairs, lost their influence in the foreign policy making process. By contrast, the army and its premier intelligence agency ISI consolidated their power in the foreign policy decision making process. Backed by the support of the military and the ISI, Musharraf exercised a personalized


\textsuperscript{134} Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan,” p. 4; a similar view is found in Husain Haqqani’s seminal work on political Islam in Pakistan. See Husain Haqqani, \textit{Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military} (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
decision process to make Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. Zardari lacked the trust of the military, and the control over the ISI. However, like Musharraf, he also bypassed the institutional channels, such as the constitutional provisions, the parliament, and the cabinet ministers, and directly coordinated with Army Chief Kayani in deciding Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. Bypassing the democratic oversight mechanism, Musharraf and Zardari supported the Afghanistan War coalition in a way that balanced between two competing factors: U.S. demands for a broad-based cooperation in the war on terrorism, and Pakistan’s interests in selectively fighting some terrorist groups, while supporting the others in an attempt to achieve a strategic depth in Afghanistan. How and why did the Pakistani leaders ignore the unfavorable public opinion, and continue to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism? The remainder of the chapter addresses this question.

Public Opinion. My burden-sharing model predicts that Pakistan’s powerful chief executives will ignore the public opinion in choosing the country’s Afghanistan policy. Evidence supports the prediction of my theoretical model. Both Musharraf and Zardari regimes encountered strong public oppositions to the war on terrorism. A deep sense of anti-Americanism, coupled with a strong influence of political Islam, fueled such public resentment. Despite growing oppositions at home, neither Musharraf nor Zardari altered the course of their policy of supporting the Afghanistan coalition. This is largely due to three factors described above: the systemic incentives of alliance dependence and convergent threat perception, and the lack of institutionalized restraints in the foreign policy making process.
Why did public opinion play no role in shaping Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan? I answer this question in three stages. First, I present the data on Pakistan’s public opinion regarding the war on terrorism. Second, I examine why the Pakistani public had consistently opposed the U.S.-led coalition war in Afghanistan and U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. Finally, I discuss why unfavorable public opinion did not have any effect on Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan.

I examine the Pakistani public opinion on several issues. These include: (a) the Musharraf government’s decision to join the Afghanistan War coalition; (b) the U.S.-led war on terrorism; (c) Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States on the war against terrorism; (d) U.S. drone strikes in the tribal areas; and (e) Pakistani military offensives in the FATA. Together, they offer a broad overview of Pakistani public attitudes toward the war on terrorism. Most of the data came from media reports, and opinion polls conducted by the International Republican Institute, and the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

First, Pakistan’s pro-Islamist and centrist political parties opposed the decision made by Musharraf to bandwagon with the United States in the war on terrorism. Opposition to the war was significantly higher in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, as well as near the Pakistani military bases, where the U.S. forces were granted access for logistical support. For instance, on October 9, 2001, two days after the U.S.-led OEF forces began bombing on Afghanistan, Pakistan’s border towns saw a massive show down of pro-Taliban demonstrations. The demonstrators rejected the military invasion of Afghanistan as an aggression on a Muslim nation. At that time, Musharraf claimed that a vocal minority was involved in the protest, while the large

majority was behind his decision to join the war on terrorism. Later, on October 15, 2001, nearly 4,000 protesters in southwestern Jacobabad city clashed with Pakistani security forces. The protest took place on the eve of U.S. secretary of state Collin Powell’s visit to Islamabad. Powell’s visit was aimed to bolster the public standing of Musharraf, who had just granted the U.S. forces access to two airports for coalition operations in Afghanistan. Despite such grassroots opposition, in December 2001, opinion leaders in Pakistan viewed the coalition operation in Afghanistan worth the risk it posed to their government.

Second, as the war progressed, the Pakistani public continued to harbor unfavorable attitude toward the Afghanistan war coalition. Figure 6.7 presents the data on Pakistani public opinion attitude toward the U.S.-led war on terrorism. It shows that, in 2002 a plurality of Pakistani public opposed the war, while a small minority supported it. Since then, the majority of Pakistanis continued to oppose the war. In 2003, opposition to the war on terrorism increased to 74%, and then continued to decline until 2006, and increased again to 56% in 2009. By contrast, support for the war remained constant (16%) in 2003 and 2004, and then increased in the next two years to 22% and 30% respectively, and then declined sharply to 13% and 16% in 2007 and 2009.

Third, since 2006, a growing number of Pakistanis viewed that their country should not cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism. Figure 6.8 presents the data on Pakistani attitude toward cooperation with the United States. It shows that in September 2006, 43% Pakistanis opposed cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. Such opposition more than doubled to 89% in January 2008, and remained as high as 80% in July 2009. By contrast, during the 2006-2009 period, support for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation declined from 46% in 2006 to 18% in 2009.

Fourth, a large number of Pakistanis expressed their displeasure of the U.S. drone strikes in their sovereign territory. Figure 6.9 presents the Pakistani opinion data on drone strikes. It shows that in 2009 and 2010, the majority of Pakistanis (56%-58%) considered such strikes unnecessary in fighting extremist groups. During this time, an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis (90% or more) thought that drone attacks killed too many civilian people. On the question of their government’s involvement behind the drone strikes, in 2009 a slight majority
(58%) of Pakistanis believed the drone strikes were carried out without the approval of the Pakistani government. This registered a nine percent drop to 49% in 2010, indicating a growing number of Pakistanis suspected their government might have approved of the drone strikes.

Source: International Republican Institute, 2009.

Fifth, in 2009 and 2010, nearly one in two Pakistanis (49%-53%) supported their army-led counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Although support for the use of their army in the fight against extremism was higher (60%) in Punjab, a large number of people (42%-43%) in the tribal area had also supported such campaigns.\textsuperscript{139} Most Pakistanis also favored a reduced role for the United States in fighting terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For instance, in 2010, 53% Pakistanis favored that the United States should provide financial and humanitarian aid to Pakistan where extremist groups operate. This was down from 72% support in 2009.\textsuperscript{140} Regarding the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, a large majority of Pakistanis (65%-72%) viewed that Coalition forces be withdrawn from the country as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{141}

It is hard to generalize the opinion data presented above. However, several discernible features can be drawn from the data. The most obvious is that, a large majority of Pakistanis expressed their opposition to the U.S.-led war on terrorism. They recognized that U.S. drone strikes were killing too many civilians, and such strikes were unnecessary in fighting terrorism. A large majority of Pakistanis also disagreed that their country should cooperate with the United States in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. They also wanted reduced U.S. involvement in fighting extremism in Pakistan. On the whole, with the exception of opinion leaders, and senior leaders in the governments, the majority of Pakistanis opposed their country’s entry into and support for the Afghanistan War coalition.


\textsuperscript{140} The Pew Global Attitudes Project, \textit{America’s Image Remains Poor}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
The Pakistani public’s unfavorable attitude toward cooperation with the United States stemmed from at least two inter-related factors. The first concerns a strong sense of anti-Americanism. The second concerns the role of political Islam in domestic and foreign policy. On the first issue, Pew opinion data reveal that most Pakistanis had consistently shown unfavorable view toward the United States. In 2002, 69% Pakistanis had a negative view of the United States, which decreased to 56% in 2006, then jumped to 68% in 2010.\textsuperscript{142} Such unfavorable view originated from the belief that the United States cared little about Pakistan’s long-term national interests. General Musharraf refers to the historical memory of Pakistani people to explain the root causes of anti-Americanism and opposition to Pak-U.S. counterterror cooperation. In 2009, during an interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel, Musharraf told:

> From 1979 to 1989, we fought a war with the US in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. And we won mainly because of ISI…But then the US left us all alone with 30,000 mujahedeen brought by them. Even Osama bin Laden was brought by the US, who else? They all came to fight the Soviet Union. So, did anybody in Washington develop a strategy for what to do with these people after 1989? No, nobody helped Pakistan for the next 12 years until 2001. We were left high and dry, with 30,000 mujahedeen holed up, no rehabilitation, no resettlement for them. No assistance was given to Pakistan — instead sanctions were imposed against us. Forty F-16s, for which we had paid money, were denied to us. Four million Afghan refugees had also come to Pakistan. The mujahedeen coalesced into al-Qaida and our social fabric was being completely destroyed. This is why

\textsuperscript{142} The Pew Global Attitudes Project, \textit{Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan}, p. 16.
the people of Pakistan felt used by the Americans, and this is why Pakistanis dislike the US and this war [on terrorism].

Second, the process of Islamization also influenced the public attitude toward the war on terrorism. Pakistan was founded as a state on the basis of its Islamist identity. However, its founder Muhammad Ali Zinnah maintained a secular policy for the nascent state. Since the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), successive governments in Pakistan have used Islam as a “legitimizing and unifying force for the evolving nation.” Zia’s regime coincided with the anti-Soviet Afghan war, during which the Islamist parties, such as the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) played an active role in organizing the Afghan resistance forces (Mujahideens). After the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, in the early 1990s, the JUI-run Pakistani madrassas in the Af-Pak border areas collaborated with the ISI and the Afghan Pashtuns to create the Taliban movement. During the 1990s, Pakistan’s Islamist parties, especially the JI, had supported various armed groups operating in the Kashmir Valley. The JUI-trained Taliban movement controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, whereas the JI-supported militants engaged in a protracted low intensity campaign against the Indian forces in Kashmir.

After Musharraf joined the war on terrorism, Pakistan abandoned its old policy of supporting the Taliban, and sponsoring the Kashmiri militants. This had angered the JUI and the JI, which had joined other Islamist parties to form a combined Islamist platform—the

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145 Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism, and the Building of a Nation, p. 132.
Muttahida Majlis–e Amal (MMA, Combined Action Forum). During most of Musharraf’s military regime, the MMA was criticized by the mainstream People’s Party and Muslim League (Nawaz) as Musharraf’s ‘blue-eyed party.’ Despite their connection with Musharraf, leading MMA leaders, especially from JUI and JI, continued to take an anti-American stance, and opposed Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism.¹⁴⁷ In fact, Pakistan’s mainstream Islamist parties, which had participated in the electoral politics during the Musharraf regime, had denounced Musharraf for abandoning the country’s Islamic identity, and supporting the United States in the war on terrorism. A major weakness of these mainstream Islamist parties was that they had no control over the extremist Islamist groups, such as, Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban network, TTP. The TTP had introduced suicide terrorism, and was involved in an aggressive campaign of terror, targeting the Pakistani security forces and state institutions. The TTP used its terrorist attacks in retaliation for Pakistani military offensives in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa province.

Why did Musharraf and Zardari disregard public opinion, and continue to support the United States in the fight against terrorism? Part of the answer lies in the systemic level incentives, and part in the character of Pakistan’s domestic political regime discussed before. Among the systemic factors, alliance dependence and convergent threat perceptions provided two strong incentives for Pakistan to join and support the U.S.-led coalition. As Musharraf and Zardari centralized the decision making power into the office of the president, they bypassed the parliamentary politics, and the public opinion to respond directly to the systemic incentives. Neither of the presidents could ignore the U.S. pressure for supporting the coalition, nor could

they shirk from the coalition by withdrawing Pakistani forces from the Pak-Afghan borders. As public concerns over the drone strikes surfaced in the media, the Musharraf and Zardari governments took a shrewd strategy: they openly criticized the strikes, but privately supported them.148

In summary, the Pakistani public was extremely critical of the war on terrorism. They opposed Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S.-led *Operation Enduring Freedom*, and consistently demanded an end to Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in the war on terrorism. The distrust over U.S. strategic interests, coupled with the influence of political Islam, strongly influenced such public attitude toward the war. Presidents Musharraf and Zardari ignored the skeptical public sentiment at home, and instead responded to the systemic incentives in joining the U.S.-led coalition. How did Pakistan’s military capability structure the country’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition? This question on the effect of Pakistan’s military capability on coalition burden-sharing is addressed below.

**Military Capability.** At the domestic level, military capability represents the final decision point in explaining a country’s coalition contribution. My burden-sharing model suggests that a determined chief executive looks at the stock a country’s military capability to determine whether his (or her) country will pursue a precisely defensive or offensive strategy, or a mix of both, to serve the coalition purposes. If the country possesses a strong military force, it

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can assume a greater burden-sharing role, unless its national interests diverge with coalition interests. By contrast, if the country has a weak military force, it is likely to assume a poor burden-sharing role, unless it provides vital logistical support, such as access to airfields, bases, sea ports, which are located near the coalition battlefield,

Following the definition of NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative, this dissertation measures the strength of military capability by looking at three inter-related issues: deployability, suitability, and interoperability of a country’s military forces and assets. Since Pakistan is not a NATO member, and it did not contribute troops to Afghanistan, the criterion of interoperability is not relevant here. However, the issues of deployability and suitability remain extremely important.

In the context of Pakistan’s coalition contribution, deployability refers to the speed at which Pakistan’s armed forces and military assets could be deployed to the tribal areas in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province to counter the Al Qaeda terrorists, and the Taliban insurgents. By contrast, suitability refers to the availability of military, paramilitary, and special operations forces for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency purposes. For Pakistan, the deployability and suitability of its security forces for unconventional war (counterterrorism and counterinsurgency) purposes was always conditioned by the nature of its relations with the arch-rival India. This means that a potential conflict with India would give Pakistan an incentive to prepare its soldier for a conventional enemy-centric war, instead of a population-centric unconventional war in the tribal area. The potentiality for such a conflict with India would also

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prompt Pakistan to redeploy its forces from the western borders with Afghanistan to eastern borders with India.

What military burdens did Pakistan share as a member of the Afghanistan War coalition? What effect did Pakistan’s military capability have on its burden-sharing role, and the subsequent decision processes on the Afghanistan coalition? On the first question, this chapter has already identified four major military contributions made by Pakistan. These are:

(a) Strong logistical support for the United States and NATO;

(b) Increasing troop deployment in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province;

(c) Sustained military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province; and

(d) Tacit support for drone strikes in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

Among the four contributions listed above, the first and the second—logistical support and troop surge—were precisely contingent upon the political consent of Pakistan’s federal government. Both contributions were strong and significant, when judged in light of the U.S.-led coalition countries fighting in Afghanistan. Although the NATO logistics supply had come under frequent attacks by the Taliban and Al Qaeda militias, Pakistan remained the largest transit route for NATO’s non-lethal supplies, such as foods, water, vehicles. Nearly 80% of NATO supplies for coalition forces in Afghanistan was passed through Pakistan. \(^{150}\) This was an irreplaceable contribution made by Pakistan. The size of the troops deployed by Pakistan along the Afghan border areas was also significant, and as large as the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. By

the end of 2010, NATO had an estimated 131,000 troops in Afghanistan. At that time, Pakistan had a roughly equal size of troops in its tribal area bordering Afghanistan.

The fourth contribution—support for U.S. drone strikes—was directly associated with Pakistan’s weak capability. As described below, Pakistan lacked an effective counterinsurgency capacity, which resulted in numerous failed offensives. Pakistan also lacked the indigenous combat drone technology. Due to such deficiencies in offensive military capability, Pakistan was unable to conduct the drone strikes on its own. Although the Pakistani government criticized the drone strikes on the grounds of sovereignty breach, senior leaders in the government privately acknowledged the utility of the drone strikes, as such strikes often complemented Pakistani counterinsurgency operations.

If military risk-sharing is used as a benchmark for evaluating coalition burden-sharing, then the Pakistani forces’ military offensives in the tribal areas were perhaps the most important contribution made by Islamabad to the Afghanistan War coalition. Although the decisions to launch operations were taken by the chief executives, in consultation with the army chief, it was the capability of the Pakistani military that significantly determined the outcome of the operations. An analysis of the outcome of such operations is important to examine if they provided any feedback to the decision makers to alter the course of Pakistan’s coalition policy. Given the fact that, Pakistan and other coalition countries were engaged in a protracted war against terrorism, it is reasonable to expect the effect of certain feedbacks on Pakistan’s decision process.151 In the military jargon such feedbacks are usually defined as learning and adaptation.152

The analysis below focuses on the effect of military capability on Pakistan’s security operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Since we defined military capability, in terms of deployability and suitability, the central question is whether Pakistan had a readily deployable and suitable security force, which could contribute to a strong counterinsurgency mission in the tribal area. In order to answer this question, we need to look into the inter-linkages among Pakistan’s military doctrine, military capabilities, and operational performance in the tribal areas.

The consensus view is that Pakistan lacked an official counterinsurgency doctrine, and the Pakistani security forces were ill equipped to fight a protracted insurgency. This lack of doctrine and the capacity gap had significantly determined the outcomes of, and subsequent decisions on, Pakistan’s military offensives in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province.\(^\text{153}\) Sameer Lalwani identifies two major outcomes in Pakistani counterinsurgency operations: repeated failures from 2002 to 2008, and modest success from 2009 to 2010.\(^\text{154}\) Jones and Fair offer a similar view. Their study shows that Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations in 2009 and 2010

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had medium success, compared to the low success in most operations from 2002 to 2008.\textsuperscript{155} Success in the counterinsurgency campaign is defined as the ability of the security forces to ‘clear, hold, and build’ territories occupied by insurgents. This three-staged clear-hold-build counterinsurgency doctrine is derived from the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), developed by General David Petraeus, and applied in Iraq, and later tested in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{156}

How did the lack of doctrine and the lack of capacity shape the outcome of Pakistan’s security operations in the tribal area? Several causal processes can be identified to answer this question.

First, the Pakistani military was reluctant to develop a formal counterinsurgency doctrine, which had severely constrained its ability to fight the Pakistani Taliban militants, and their Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda allies. The linkage between a doctrine and the outcome of military operations is pretty straightforward. A counterinsurgency doctrine provides for a comprehensive civil-military strategy for defeating and containing an insurgency, and protecting the population. The most glaring example of a modern counterinsurgency doctrine is the U.S. doctrine, codified in FM 3-24. It departs from an enemy-centric strategy, and focuses on a population-centric strategy. The western counterinsurgency doctrines, including the U.S. doctrine, stress the need for “political over military solutions, population security over enemy targeting, ground forces over air power, and small rather than large force deployment for missions (such as patrols, intelligence-gathering, and development assistance).”\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{155} Jones and Fair,\textit{ Counterinsurgency in Pakistan}, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{157} Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” p. 4.
Pakistan not only lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine; it had consistently resisted the U.S. pressures for developing an official doctrine on the ground that its main threat came from India, not from the tribal areas. According to Ahmed Rashid, in 2008 the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen had failed to persuade Pakistan to build a counterinsurgent force of two brigades to two divisions to fight the insurgency in the FATA. The Pakistan Army rejected the proposal, saying a potential war with India would dominate its military preparedness. This means, the Pakistani military continued to prioritize defending the plains of Punjab and Sindh from a potential Indian aggression, rather than fighting an insurgency in the mountains of FATA.

The Pakistani military’s reluctance to adopt an official counterinsurgency doctrine stemmed from its unfriendly relations with India. The two countries fought three conventional wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and a conflict over Kashmir in 1999 (the Kargil conflict). Tensions between them escalated in 2001 and 2008, after the Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) launched two high profile terrorist attacks in India. After the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, New Delhi threatened a military action against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in the attack. Pakistan denied any responsibilities for the attack, but banned the LeT and the JeM in January 2002. It also cracked down on the top LeT and JeM leaders. This did not assuage the concerns of India, which deployed nearly 700,000 troops along the Pakistan border by May 2002. Islamabad

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159 Ibid.
responded by deploying nearly 400,000 troops along the India border during the same time.\textsuperscript{161} Tensions defused after international mediation persuaded the two countries to withdraw their troops during the fall of 2002.\textsuperscript{162}

In November 2008, after the LeT attack on Mumbai, India threatened a military attack on Pakistan, which alerted the Pakistani military for a possible redeployment along the Indian border.\textsuperscript{163} Although the situation did not escalate too much, the Pakistan Army continued to perceive a high level threat due to India’s offensive military doctrine. In 2004, India departed from its longstanding defensive military doctrine to an offensive military doctrine. The new doctrine, widely known as the ‘Cold Start,’ is a limited war doctrine, which plans for a swift retaliatory conventional strike in Pakistan to destroy Pakistan’s vital military assets, including the nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{164} The Pakistani military asserts that its long history of conflicts with India, coupled with the latter’s offensive military doctrine provided a reasonable justification for not abandoning a conventional military doctrine, in favor of a new population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine.\textsuperscript{165}


With no counterinsurgency doctrine to follow in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistan Army had emphasized on targeting the enemy, not securing the population. It also deployed large infantry battalions, rather than small military units for massive fighting and excessive use of force purposes.\textsuperscript{166} Using a conventional war doctrine during the military operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani forces deployed “heavy artillery, helicopter gunships, and fighter-bombers to blanket the [target area] with firepower.”\textsuperscript{167} These enemy-centric operations had often produced collateral damage, killing innocent civilians and their property, and displacing many people. In most cases, although the initial ground offensives and massive firepower cleared the target areas, the Pakistani military lacked enough forces to hold the territories. The result was a serious disaster. On several occasions, the conventional ground offensives were followed by ceasefires and fragile peace agreements (in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009). The militants used these peace agreements as a window of opportunity to regroup, and prepare for future conflicts with the security forces. Until 2008, the net result of Pakistan’s military campaigns in the tribal area was repeated failures to contain the insurgency. Table 6.1 summarizes the outcomes of Pakistan’s major counterinsurgency operations.

Second, the lack of capacity had also influenced the outcome of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s conventional military forces deployed in the Afghan border areas lacked knowledge of the tribal culture, demography, terrain, and language.\textsuperscript{168} They were also seen as intruders into the tribal society, and an occupying force in the tribal area, which had alienated the local population. This lacking in the conventional

\textsuperscript{166} Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 35-36; Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” p. 4; Kilcullen, “Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorist: Pakistan, 2006-2008.”
\textsuperscript{167} Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” p. 3.
military forces could be offset by the paramilitary Frontier Corps soldiers, who were mostly
drawn from the tribal agencies, and thus familiar with the demographics, social structures,
terrain, and language of the tribal region. However, the Frontier Corps was not trained as a
combat force. Its operational doctrine and strategy focused on patrolling the frontiers and
countering cross-border smuggling – which were mostly non-kinetic operations. As a result,
fighting insurgency was largely an unfamiliar task for the Frontier Corps personnel. In 2008, the
Pakistani Army agreed to allow 70 U.S. officers to train the Frontier Corps soldiers in
counterinsurgency warfare. The Pakistani army chief Kayani also ordered the paramilitary force
to be better equipped to fight the insurgency in the FATA.169 Third, the capacity gap in Pakistani
security forces had seriously affected their morale and commitment to fight the Taliban
insurgents. Media reports indicate that many Army and Frontier troops deserted and defected in
the midst of counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban. Some soldiers in the FATA
recognized that the Taliban militias shared the same Islamic religious belief with the majority of
Pakistanis. They doubted whether fighting the Tablian would be consistent with their Islamic
motto, which focused on Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad (Faith, Piety, and Holy War) as the three
pillars of the Pakistan Army.

Fourth, the Pakistani military’s capacity gap could be overcome by enlisting the tribal
lashkars (fighters) or the deployment of civilian police. The civilian police deployment was
simply impossible, given the limited human resources, equipment, and training possessed by the
police. However, the lashkar option was tested by the Pakistani military. Since 2008, the
Pakistani security forces had enlisted the support of armed tribal lashkars in waging a successful

counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal regions. The tribal lashkars scored moderate success in pushing the Taliban out of the tribal areas, and supporting the Pakistan army’s counterinsurgency operations. However, the lashkar tactics had its own weaknesses. For instance, the tribal fighters were lightly armed, and could only sustain a low-intensity conflict against a fragmented Taliban cell. Confronting a cohesive Taliban insurgency was not the task of the tribal lashkars, and doing so would require a massive ground support from Pakistani army, which was not available. Moreover, the Pashtun tribal code forbids a tribal man fighting “under another clan’s leadership.” This tribal code limited lashkar recruitment along certain clans. In the long run, inter-tribe rivalry, and defections also appeared to be a major problem among the tribal lashkars.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the lack of an official counterinsurgency doctrine and the lack of well equipped forces had resulted in serious debacles in Pakistan’s military operations in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province. This was a standard picture of Pakistani operations from 2002 to 2008 (See Table 6.1). Things began to change in 2009 and 2010, with medium success in counterinsurgency operations in Swat and South Waziristan.

170 Evidence of tribal lashkars’ participation in the fight against the Taliban insurgency can be found in the military operations in South Waziristan, Orakzai, Swat, Lakki Marwat, Khyber, Hangu, Buner, Bajaur, Kurram, Peshawar, and Dir. See, Lalwani, *Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment*, p. 39.
### Table 6.1 Summary of Pakistan’s Key Counterinsurgency Operations, 2001-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Peace Deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.-Nov. 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bajaur Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (Several Months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-March 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.-June 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-Oct. 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2009-June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kurram and Orakzai Agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows three types of outcome of a counterinsurgency operation: success, failure, and peace deal. The names inside the cells represent administrative districts from the FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, where the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces were involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign from 2002 to 2010.
What contributed to the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations in 2009 and 2010? To what extent were the lessons from the past operations taken into the decision process to effect positive changes in Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior? Lalwani identifies two major factors—a bottom-up counterinsurgency approach, and a higher force ratio—in explaining Pakistan’s changing burden-sharing decisions and outcomes. First, after the successful operation in Bajaur in 2008, the Pakistani military went through a process of “learning by doing,” and gradually adopted a hybrid approach.171 The hybrid approach combined the insights from a conventional war doctrine and blended it with a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. Since, the Pakistani military did not have a formal counterinsurgency doctrine, an informal, ad hoc, and hybrid counterinsurgency strategy emerged from a bottom-up approach, which focused on incorporating the knowledge and experience of the junior army officers. Lalwani writes, “[C]aptains through colonels, who had drawn lessons from successful bottom-up experimentation in the Bajaur campaign (late 2008-early 2009), were brought into the decision-making process.”172 This bottom-up counterinsurgency doctrine emphasized on the collection of detailed intelligence on the terrain, militant leaders, and their support base; separating the civilian population from the militant targets; conducting psychological operations, and intelligence sharing with the United States.

Second, using the hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, the Pakistani military launched Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat (May 2009), and Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan (fall 2009). In both operations, the Pakistani military maintained higher troop levels to clear and hold territories. In Swat, the army cleared out the population before targeting the terrorists. It used

dispersed force to flush out the militants from the capital city Mingora. After the clear phase, the military moved to hold the areas, and resettle the displaced people. The next major offensive was in South Waziristan, where the Pakistani military relied on the deployment of 30,000-60,000 troops to eliminate the 10,000-15,000 strong Pakistani Taliban, TTP. Since the major target of the operation was Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban TTP, the Pakistani forces neutralized two powerful factions—Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. The move was criticized by the United States and NATO, but Pakistan used the age-old ‘divide and rule’ policy to weaken and to defeat the TTP. The Pakistani military used psychological warfare campaign by distributing leaflets, denouncing false jihad. It targeted the terrorist leadership and sanctuary, using operational intelligence data from the United States. In less than two months, the military defeated the TTP. However, several challenges remained significant. The civil-military actors had to decide how to re-settle the displaced people. They also needed to explore how the security forces would hold the territory.

In summary, since October 2001, Pakistan had made four principal contributions to share the military burdens of Afghanistan War coalition. First, Pakistan provided access to military bases, airspaces, and more importantly, offered largest route for the transfer of NATO logistics. Second, Pakistan’s deployment of nearly 150,000 military and paramilitary troops along the Afghan border was large enough to compare with the U.S. and NATO’s estimated 140,000 troops deployed by 2010. Third, since 2002, Pakistan had engaged in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in the FATA and its adjacent Pakhtunkhwa Province. This protracted counterinsurgency campaign brought two outcomes: limited success until 2008, and higher success in 2009 and 2010. My research finds that from 2002 to 2008, Pakistan’s neglect for a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine and weak military capability produced low
success, in which the Taliban-controlled areas were often cleared for a brief period, without follow-up operations to hold and build those areas. After going through a process of ‘learning by doing,’ in 2009, the Pakistan Army adopted a hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, which blended the insights from the enemy-centric conventional military doctrine with population-centric counterinsurgency doctrines. This hybrid doctrine was developed as a bottom-up approach, in which junior army officers (from captain to colonel) with operational experience in the FATA were incorporated into the decision-making process. The net result was positive. Drawing the lessons from the Bajaur campaign (2008), in 2009 and 2010, the Pakistani military launched two successful campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan. The Swat and South Waziristan campaigns showed the Pakistani army’s improved capability for clearing and holding territories, previously controlled by the insurgents. Despite such successes, Pakistan was yet to develop a political solution to deal with the insurgency. Finally, as the United States escalated the drone strikes in the FATA, Pakistan offered quiet approval and intelligence support on selected targets to coordinate such strikes.

III. Summary and Conclusion

Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides support for my burden-sharing model. Pakistan joined the coalition in 2001 as a non-NATO ally, and provided diplomatic, economic, and military supports to maintain the coalition. Pakistan’s military contribution to the coalition included logistics support for the U.S. and NATO forces, counterinsurgency campaigns in the northwest tribal areas, and support for U.S. drone strikes. Although Pakistan did not contribute any boots on the ground in Afghanistan, it had set up nearly 1,000 military posts along
the Afghan borders to interdict Al Qaeda and Taliban militants and deployed up to 150,000 troops by 2009 in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. These Pakistani troops included conventional ground and air forces, special operations forces, and the paramilitary border forces.

In 2009 and 2010, senior Pakistani diplomats to the United Nations claimed that Pakistan had lost more than 20,000 civilians and 2,500 military personnel during the war on terrorism. Pakistani experts estimate the total cost of the war to be $28-$50 billion.173

This chapter examines the Pakistani decision process on Afghanistan. It asks a central research question: Why did Pakistan join the Afghanistan War coalition, and why did it maintain a dubious role to support the coalition? My research finds that two international systemic incentives encouraged Pakistan to join and support the coalition. These were an alliance dependence on the United States, and balance of threat.

First, Pakistan’s dependence on an informal and bilateral alliance with the United States offered two inter-related incentives—a negative incentive and a positive incentive—to participate in the Afghanistan War coalition. The negative incentive included the threat of punitive military actions, and the positive incentive included economic and military assistance. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Bush administration threatened Pakistan to take military actions if Islamabad did not cut off the diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Pakistan joined the coalition as early as September 2001 to avoid a potential collision with the United States. Initially, Pakistan provided critical logistical support for the

173 Military analyst Talat Masood gave the $28 billion estimate. By contrast, Pakistani Ambassador to the UN Amjad Sial gave the $50 billion estimate on the cost of war on terrorism to Pakistan. Sial’s estimate may not have subtracted the roughly $20 billion military and economic aid given by the United States to Pakistan from 2001 to 2010. See: Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, No. 5, February 4, 2010; Statement by Ambassador Amjad Hussain B. Sial, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Sixth Committee during 65th UN General Assembly on agenda item 107: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (6 October 2010).”
coalition forces in Afghanistan, without charging any user fee or signing any formal agreements, which is a standard procedure for giving such privileges.\(^{174}\) However, since 2001, the United States had provided economic and military aid to Pakistan to encourage its continued coalition support. This U.S. aid included the $20 billion economic and military assistance, Pakistan received from 2001 to 2010. The lion share of this aid, nearly $14 billion, was given to reimburse for Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal areas. Pakistan also achieved the non-NATO ally status, which allowed it to receive sensitive military technologies for its contribution to the war on terrorism.

Second, after alliance dependence, balance of threat presented the second systemic incentive to encourage Pakistan’s support for the coalition. My research finds that Pakistan agreed with the United States on the threat posed by the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban groups, but disagreed on the threat posed by the Afghan Taliban group. This convergence and divergence in threat perception had strongly influenced Pakistan’s contribution to the coalition. The United States and its NATO allies found that Pakistan was proactively pursuing the first two groups—the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, while secretly supporting the third group—the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s support for the third group was premised on the belief that the Pashtun-origin Afghan Taliban group could be an ally in future Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from the country.

This chapter has shown that these systemic incentives of alliance dependence and balance of threat were channeled through the Pakistani domestic political processes and capability constraints, in which the chief executive and the military power had a strong effect on the

\(^{174}\) Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, p. 15.
country’s coalition behavior. Figure 6.10 presents the Pakistani decision process regarding the Afghanistan War coalition.

**Figure 6.10 The Pakistani Decision Process on Afghanistan**

First, President Musharraf and his successor Zardari enjoyed strong executive power, and ignored the unfavorable public opinion in deciding the country’s Afghanistan policy. Both of them exercised a personalized decision-making process, which lacked any effective institutional constraints from the constitution and the parliament. This personalized decision process stemmed from a parochial political culture, in which the Pakistan Army and its powerful intelligence
agency ISI had effectively marginalized the ministry of foreign affairs and the parliamentary committees on defense and external affairs, in the foreign policy making process. The effect of such parochial political culture was straightforward: presidents Musharraf and Zardari bypassed the domestic institutions, such as the cabinet meetings, and the parliamentary debates and almost unilaterally decided to support for the Afghanistan War coalition. One of their most important decisions was to share the military burdens of the Afghan War coalition by conducting counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and its neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

Second, after Musharraf and Zardari decided to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Pak-Afghan border regions, Pakistan’s military capability was the ultimate determinant of such operations. This chapter has shown that Pakistan lacked a formal population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, which had severely constrained the ability of its forces to clear, hold, and build territories, occupied by the Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda allies. As a result, until 2008, most Pakistani operations in the tribal areas, especially in North and South Waziristans, and the Swat Valley had produced weak or low success against the insurgents. The signing of ceasefires and peace agreements with the militants had further worsened the scenario, as the Taliban militias used the peace deals as an opportunity to regroup and launch fresh attacks. Things began to change in 2009, when the Pakistani military applied a bottom-up approach to fight the insurgency in Swat. Drawing on the lessons from past operations, the military deployed greater number of military personnel to clear and hold the territory. The operations in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 and 2010 had shown that improved capability and an operational counterinsurgency doctrine would produce important success in defeating the Taliban and securing the population.

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175 Omar Sharifi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Toward Afghanistan From 1947-2008,”
In summary, from 2002 to 2008, the military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas had primarily focused only on clearing areas. Because of a lack of doctrine, and the capacity deficits, military offensives during that time had ignored the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phases of counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistan Army learnt from its past mistakes, and adapted to the deteriorating security situations by introducing a hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, and investing more resources to conduct security operations in the tribal areas. The result was a resounding success against the Taliban insurgents in 2009 and 2010. This success was evident in the ability and willingness of the Pakistani forces in Swat and South Waziristan to clear and hold territories. The U.S. and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus praised Pakistan’s success in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border areas. He also stressed the need for more coordinated military operations in both sides of the Durand Line.176

Pakistan’s success in future military offensives in the tribal areas would depend on investing in civilian-led development and stabilization operations. The United States recognized this civilian aspect counterinsurgency operation, and since 2009, it began to invest more in civilian reconstruction efforts. This included resettling hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced by the military operations. Since 2009, the United States had also intensified the drone strikes in the tribal areas of FATA, and threatened to conduct similar strikes in the Quetta city of the Balochistan Province, where the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar was believed to be sheltered. Although Pakistan had tacitly supported the drone strikes in the FATA and its adjacent areas, it is likely to resist such drone strikes in the Quetta city to protect the Afghan Taliban leader. Unless Pakistan abandons its support for the various factions of Afghan Taliban groups,

especially the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, it is likely to be defined as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION:

THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation examines the external and domestic sources of a country’s coalition behavior. It argues that neither neo-realism nor strategic culture theories of IR provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the varied level of coalition contributions made by states. It claims that a neo-classical realist theory of coalition politics better explains the diverse coalition commitments made by states. Taking a neo-classical realist position, this study presents and tests a coalition burden-sharing model. The burden-sharing model suggests that international systemic incentives are transmitted through the domestic political processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors and outcomes for states. The empirical findings from Britain, Germany, and Pakistan support the utility of my burden-sharing model.

The empirical findings in the preceding three chapters offer some theoretical and policy implications. On the theoretical ground, this study shows the utility of middle-range theories of foreign policy, which shows the causal linkages between international systemic factors and the domestic level intervening variables to predict and explain the foreign policy behaviors of states. K. J. Holsti once defined foreign policy as the study of “actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions – usually domestic—under which those actions are formulated.”1

In a similar vein, Robert Putnam has defined foreign policy as a two-level game, played by

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actors at both the international and domestic-levels.\textsuperscript{2} The findings in study support the Holsti and Putnam theses that foreign policy decision processes involve a dynamic interaction between domestic and international level factors.

I. Theoretical Implications

This study specifies three external level independent variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action; and three domestic-level intervening variables – domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability, and shows a unique causal process that predict contingent generalizations from state behavior. The theoretical implications of this research can be discussed in reference to the independent and intervening variables.

\textit{Alliance Dependence Changes over Time.} Alliance dependence was a salient feature during the Cold War era international politics. The geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union, and the existence of the rival alliances—NATO and Warsaw Pact – made it difficult for countries to shirk from alliance commitment. This is no longer the case in the post-Cold War era. My research shows that alliance solidarity, instead of alliance dependence, presented an important incentive for Britain and Germany to participate in the Afghanistan War coalition.\textsuperscript{3} The effect of such change—from alliance dependence to alliance solidarity—is enormous. It means that major U.S. allies in the NATO may no longer be amenable to the U.S. pressures and demands for greater burden-sharing in coalition operations.

\textsuperscript{3} For an interesting discussion on NATO’s alliance solidarity, and its potential to form a risk community, see Veronica M. Kitchen, \textit{The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security And Identity} (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); Also see, M.J. Williams, \textit{NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar} (London and New York: Routledge, 2009)
This was evident in the fact that, in response to U.S. requests for troop surge, and participation in offensive military operations, only a handful of NATO countries responded positively, while others continued to ignore it. There is one caveat to such broad generalization. In the absence of a more detailed analysis of all or most of the ISAF coalition countries in Afghanistan, it is hard to reject the utility of alliance dependence as an explanatory variable in predicting coalition behavior.

In contrast to the major NATO allies, such as Britain, and Germany, small NATO countries, or NATO aspirants are likely to be influenced by alliance dependence. Non-NATO allies are also likely to respond to the incentives and constraints presented by the dependence on the United States. Pakistan is a glaring example of this. This study finds that Pakistan’s dependence on the U.S. aid, and its fear of abandonment by the United States had influenced its decision to join and to support the coalition. Pakistan also feared entrapment into a U.S.-led coalition. This is why it did not allow a large U.S. military footprint in its territory, nor did it contribute troops to Afghanistan. This means that the classical dilemma of abandonment versus entrapment may continue to shape the coalition behavior of non-NATO allies, and countries dependent on U.S. military and economic aid.

*States also Balance against Non-State Threats.* Stephen Walt once argued that states do not necessarily balance against a power, they balance against a growing threat.\(^4\) Walt’s balance of threat theory refers to the traditional power struggle between rival states, seeking either to defend their security or to expand their influence. Do states also pursue a balancing act against the offensive power of a non-state threat? The answer is yes. This study shows that Britain,

Germany, and Pakistan confronted the threats from two major non-state actors: the transnational Islamist group Al Qaeda, and the various Taliban insurgent groups.

Although Al Qaeda did not represent any monolithic terrorist group, nor did the Taliban, a fair degree of collaboration and cooptation is assumed between the Al Qaeda core and affiliated groups and the Taliban insurgents. For instance, the British authorities found that one of the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings had received terrorist training in Pakistan. The German and U.S. authorities found a strong connection between Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell and the core leadership of Al Qaeda. Pakistan has seen a strong collaboration between the South Waziristan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Walt suggests that several factors contribute to the rise of a threat. These are aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. Although Walt used these factors to show the gravity of threat from a traditional state actor, such criteria can still be used for the non-state actors. This is evident in European intelligence reports, which claim the existence of thousands of Al Qaeda affiliated or radical Islamist individuals, who have the aggressive intentions, and the ability to execute terrorist attacks in Europe. In 2008, the Europol report on terrorism stated that the Afghan-Pakistan border areas continued to provide a sanctuary for European and global Islamist terrorists. For Pakistan, although the various Kashmiri militant

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groups have historically received political and military supports from Islamabad, the post-2001 influx of Al Qaeda and Taliban militias from Afghanistan posed a serious threat to its internal security. The existence of thousands of Taliban militias and sympathizers, and Al Qaeda’s foreign militias in Pakistan has had a negative effect: the rise of suicide bombings, and subversive attacks against the state institutions.

This brief discussion suggests that terrorists and insurgents can pose threats to national security. States are likely to balance against such threats by using a range of military and non-military options. That being said, the role of state-centric threat has not diminished. India still figures highly in Pakistani military preparedness. China is perceived by the United States as a regional contender of power and influence.

**Free-Riding May Not Be a Generic Problem of Coalition Operations.** By 2010 the United States deployed up to 100,000 troops and shared the largest burdens of offensive and defensive operations in Afghanistan. This does not mean that coalition partners shirked from their commitment or tended to ride free in Afghanistan. This was evident in the data on economic and human costs of the war on terrorism, shared by Britain, and Pakistan. In 2009-2010, Britain’s war related funding in Afghanistan rose to $6 billion, which was nearly 10% of its defense budget. At that time, Pakistan’s war on terrorism-related costs was estimated at $4.3 billion, which was higher than the annual $2 billion U.S. aid it received for the military operations in the Taliban-infested tribal areas. ⁹ Troop fatality data also indicate the greater risk-

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⁹ For different estimates on Pakistan’s cost of the war on terrorism, see Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan,” *Terrorism Monitor* (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, No. 5, February 4, 2010; Also see “Statement by Ambassador Amjad Hussain B. Sial, Deputy Permanent Representative of
sharing by coalition partners. The United States lost nearly 1,500 troops in the nine years of the war on terrorism. During this time, Britain lost 350 troops, and Pakistan lost 2,500 troops.

Does this mean all countries in the Afghanistan War coalition maintained a fair distribution of the economic and military burdens of the coalition operations? The answer is no. A comparison between Britain and three major European countries would show this issue of the burden-sharing problem. In 2009-2010, while Britain spent nearly $6 billion in Afghanistan, France spent only $500 million, Germany $800 million, and Italy $350 million. This was 10% of the total defense budget for the UK, and less than 6% of the combined defense budgets of France, Germany, and Italy.10

Data on offensive military operations might indicate the free-riding tendency among a number of states, such as Germany and Italy, which have historically resisted redeploying forces into southern Afghanistan. In fact, only a handful of coalition countries in Afghanistan – the United States, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands – fought fiercely for coalition purpose. By contrast, a large majority of states did not participate in offensive operations, either because they cared less about military offensives, or because they believed in the utility of a defensive stabilization mission. Some countries might have deliberately decided not to participate in military offensives to avoid the troop casualties, and domestic public dissatisfactions.

The foregoing discussion shows that some countries tend to share more burdens than others. For coalition leaders, this is likely to persist in future operations, and diplomatic

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coordination with allies should target achieving greater cost and risk-sharing commitments from the coalition partners.

**Domestic Politics Matter.** This dissertation shows that under conditions of similar systemic incentives, differences in domestic political regime can explain why countries choose a wide range of options to support a coalition. Using David Auerswald’s typology of the domestic political regimes, my research identifies three categories of chief executive strength: strong, weak, and medium. I argue that the chief executives’ strength should be understood in terms of their relative autonomy from legal-judicial-parliamentary constraints, as well as the pressures from mass public or foreign policy elites.

The British case represents a strong chief executive, in which Prime Minister Tony Blair and his successors Brown and Cameron enjoyed royal prerogative in the declaration of war, and the use of force in foreign policy. None of them confronted any major legislative or judicial constraints, which could restrict decisions on Afghanistan. Enjoying the elite consensus in the parliament, the British prime ministers literally ignored public oppositions to the War in Afghanistan, and continued to support the U.S. and coalition efforts.

The German case shows a medium type of executive, which had enjoyed elite consensus on the deployment of military force, but lacked the constitutional and parliamentary mandate to use force for offensive purposes. As a result of such restrictive mandate, the German government imposed national caveats, and sold the Afghan mission to a skeptical public as a purely peace-keeping mission. It was not until 2009, when the German government dropped some of the national caveats. It did so, not because of an offensive counterinsurgency doctrine, but because of the pressures from tactical level commanders.
The Pakistani case shows a strong chief executive. Unlike Britain and Germany, where the chief executive’s power was determined by the presence or absence of legal-constitutional constraints, Pakistani presidents did not confront any such institutional barrier to decision making. My research shows that President Musharraf and his successor Asif Zardari exercised a personalized decision process, which ignored the national security council or the parliament in choosing the country’s coalition policy. Unlike liberal democratic countries in the West, Pakistan has a parochial political culture, in which the army and its powerful intelligence agency ISI strongly influence the country’s foreign and security policy. This strong influence of the army and the ISI stems from Pakistan’s India-centric threat perception, the Kashmir dispute, and its past involvement in Afghanistan.

The effects of such diverse executive strength are enormous. In the British case, it means that successive British prime ministers – from Tony Blair to David Cameron—remained committed to an Anglo-American special relationship, will be the most enthusiastic supporter of U.S.-led coalition operations. Due to the royal prerogative they enjoy over the use of force, the British prime ministers will continue to pursue a personalized foreign policy style to determine whether and how to share the burdens of a coalition operation. For Germany, the case is quite different: any coalition leader, including the United States, has to recognize the institutional constraints placed on the German chancellors. Due to a strong pacific and anti-war political culture, Germany is likely to be less enthusiastic about coalition operations, unless they are defensive in nature, and authorized by a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. In the Pakistani case, the army and the ISI are likely to seek a strategic depth in Afghanistan, especially after the U.S. and NATO forces leave the country. This means Pakistan does not see any incentive in cutting the relationship with the three Afghan Taliban groups—the Quetta Shura
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin network. Despite harboring support for the Afghan Taliban groups, Islamabad is likely to pursue a strong counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda and an ad hoc counterinsurgency strategy against the indigenous Taliban—the Pakistani Taliban network.

**Public Opinion Hardly Matters.** Contrary to the popular myth that democratic countries respond to public opinion, this dissertation find that public opinion has a mixed, and often negligible effect, on the decision process of the coalition countries. In general the large majority of the domestic publics in Britain, Germany, and Pakistan opposed their country’s troop deployment, and demanded immediate troop withdrawal. In Britain and Germany, unfavorable public opinion stemmed from the concerns over civilian casualties in Afghanistan, and the safety of their troops. In Pakistan, public disapproval of the war was associated with the historical distrust over U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world, and U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan. Despite unfavorable public attitudes toward the U.S.-led Afghanistan War, the British, German, and Pakistani governments gradually reinforced their troops in Afghanistan. Among the three cases, only Germany paid attention to mass public opinion, which favored a defensive reconstruction role for the Bundeswehr forces in northern Afghanistan.

**Military Capability and Organizational Learning Matter.** My research shows that countries with a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, adequate troops, and sufficient resources are more able to pursue a strong burden-sharing behavior. The most interesting finding is that, in Afghanistan, this strong burden-sharing role commenced around 2008. Between 2002 and 2008, the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani forces in their tribal
areas, went through a process of failure, learning, and adaptation.\textsuperscript{11} After the tactical level commanders and their experiences were taken into the decision process, the outcome of the long war in Afghanistan changed slowly with securing, holding, and building territories, previously occupied by the Taliban insurgents.\textsuperscript{12}

The NATO Lisbon summit in 2010 declared that 2014 is a conditional deadline for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{13} This dissertation shows that by 2014, Germany will continue to pursue a defensive strategy, with limited participation in offensive operations. After the Dutch government withdrew its forces in August 2010, and Canada planning to withdraw its troops in 2011, Britain will be the only major coalition partner in Afghanistan willing and able to fight the insurgency. Should Pakistan change its attitude toward the Afghan Taliban groups? If history is any guide to future, the answer is no. Its quest for strategic parity with India would provide it an incentive to keep the Taliban connection tight.

\section*{II. Policy Implications}

Several policy implications flow from the central research findings in this study. They focus on the U.S. leadership in the transatlantic alliance, threat assessment, the issues of caveats, security concerns of a reluctant ally, recognition of domestic constraints, public diplomacy and military capability and doctrines.

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Emphasis on U.S. Leadership. The United States has led the coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is likely to lead future operations around the world. This leadership role comes from the unprecedented military capability and the global reach of the U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{14} The U.S. allies in NATO, such as, Britain, France, and Germany are most likely to partner with the United States in sharing the burdens of coalition operations. Since alliance dependence may have reduced role in the post-Cold War era, an emphasis transatlantic alliance solidarity would better serve the U.S.-led coalitions. For out of area operations, the political and military support of the regional actors would be crucial. The United States will need to provide military and economic aid to encourage the participation of non-NATO allies and informal allies.

Streamlining the threat assessment process. The empirical evidence in this study shows that states are interested in balancing against a perceived threat.\textsuperscript{15} Success in coalition operations would require a shared understanding of the threat, and a fair degree of consensus on how to deal with the threat. It is likely that non all coalition partners will share the same level of threat perception. A multinational threat assessment process might remove some of the divergent threat perceptions. This would facilitate greater alliance solidarity, and improve the chances for wartime contribution for coalition purposes.

Shared understanding of the national caveats. The Afghanistan War coalition suggests that each troop contributing country has its own national caveats. These caveats are designed in their national capitals, and are often kept secret. According to Auerswald et al, coalition

countries may develop a process that allows them to understand each other’s caveats. It will help them plan and coordinate ground offensives with countries that have minimal or no caveats.\textsuperscript{16}

**Addressing the security concerns of a reluctant ally.** The Pakistani case shows that some countries will be reluctant to fully cooperate with the coalition due to irreconcilable differences over the national security interests. Pakistan has at least two major security concerns: peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, and legitimization of the Durand Line—the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For obvious reasons, Pakistan would give more priority to addressing these concerns than supporting a U.S.-led coalition. It is important for the United States and its key allies to recognize such security predicaments, and seek diplomatic resolutions of both issues.\textsuperscript{17}

**Recognition of domestic constraints.** The domestic institutional constraints are likely to discourage some countries to participate in offensive operations. This means that some governments would show two opposing behavior: reluctant to participate in offensive military operations, but interested in defensive and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Coalition leaders need to understand this dichotomous attitude toward a multilateral mission, and make contingency plans to avoid any political friction over the military and non-military burden-sharing.\textsuperscript{18}

**Importance of public diplomacy.** Public diplomacy involves communicating with a foreign public. It uses persuasion, rather than coercion to garner the support of the international

\textsuperscript{17} C. Christine Fair discusses this issue in more detail in her research monograph. See C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004)
\textsuperscript{18} For an excellent discussion on how ISAF acts as mechanism to mitigate the frictions over military strategies, see Christopher Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Cooperation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 151, No. 5 (2006), pp. 14-19.
community for one’s foreign and security policy. ¹⁹ Military coalitions need to have a better public diplomacy campaign to ensure that the domestic publics in coalition countries are well informed of the goals of a military intervention, the strategy being applied, and the measures taken to protect civilians.

**Emphasis on doctrine and capability.** Military doctrines provide important guidelines about the goals of a mission, and the ways and means used to achieve those goals. It is important for coalition countries to have compatible military doctrines to attain the goals of a mission.

This study finds that the War in Afghanistan is a perfect example of “mission creep” – a term that refers to the expansion of a military operation from its original goals. In 2001, the U.S.-led coalition invaded the country to defeat Al Qaeda, and to deny it a safe haven, and to topple the Taliban regime. After these initial war goals were achieved by 2002, the U.S.-led coalition had slowly embraced the notion of nation-building in Afghanistan. ²⁰

The mission creep in Afghanistan had required a doctrinal transformation: from an enemy-centric counterterrorism doctrine to a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. The first focuses on capturing and killing the enemy, while the second concentrates on securing, holding, and building the civilian population centers. The coalition members in Afghanistan did not adopt a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine until 2008-2009. The British, German, and Pakistani cases show that the adoption of such population-centric doctrine brought important success for coalition operations in Helmand, Kunduz, and the Af-Pak border areas, respectively.

¹⁹ A leading proponent of public diplomacy, Joseph Nye Jr., has strongly advocated that the United States uses public diplomacy and soft power to attain its foreign policy goals. Nye argues that the combination of soft power or persuasion, and hard power of coercive power will make it a smart power, which is critical to winning the war on terrorism. See Joseph Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *Annal of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, No. 1 (2008), pp. 94-109.

Once a compatible military doctrine is adopted, the next task is to deploy suitable and interoperable forces to achieve the coalition objectives. Success in military coalitions does not come simply from the aggregation of forces, as conventional wisdom might dictate, but the appropriated deployment of military forces and assets from the host and coalition nations. This means, some missions might require more conventional and special operations forces from coalition countries, while others might require more indigenous forces. Since failures are an inevitable part of coalition operations, it is important that coalition countries make the best use of the centers of lessons learned.

III. Summary and Conclusion

Military coalitions are an enduring feature of international politics. This dissertation examines the international and domestic sources of a country’s coalition behavior. It shows that neither the international factors nor the domestic factors alone can explain why countries join and support a coalition. Instead, the interactions of external and internal factors provide better explanations of a country’s coalition policy. This means, under conditions of international systemic incentives, variations in a country’s domestic political processes can better explain why it joins a coalition and how it contributes to support the coalition. Within the domestic political processes, the chief executive’s decision power and the ability of a country’s military forces are the most important factors. Academic theorists should further explore the complex decision processes of the chief executives. The focus should be on how the institutionalized versus personalized decision process affect the outcome of a country’s burden-sharing behavior. The military analysts should examine the effect of military doctrines and capabilities on coalition operations. The two streams
of research should not proceed in isolation of each other. Instead, there is much room for bridging the gap, as Alexander George says, between the scholarly and policy communities. This dissertation is simply a step toward that bridge.
### APPENDIX 1. A U.S. and Coalition Countries Providing Troops to ISAF, Jan. 2002-Dec. 2010

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<sup>a</sup> Source: CDI
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<tr>
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<td>31 countries with 5,500 troops</td>
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Note: NATO member states are shown in bold letters.

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## APPENDIX 4.A Selected NATO Countries: Economic and Military Strength, 2009

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<th>Defense Budget</th>
<th>Military Expenditure as % of GDP</th>
<th>Active Military Strength</th>
<th>Military Forces in Afghanistan as % of Total Active Military Strength</th>
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<td>$690.3 billion</td>
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<td>67,000*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$1.47 trillion</td>
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<td>1.4%</td>
<td>65,722</td>
<td>2,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$2.26 trillion</td>
<td>$62.4 billion</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>175,690</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$3.4 trillion</td>
<td>$46.5 billion</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>250,613</td>
<td>4,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$2.87 trillion</td>
<td>$47.8 billion</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>352,771</td>
<td>3,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$1.51 trillion</td>
<td>$23.0 billion</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>293,202</td>
<td>2,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$860 billion</td>
<td>$13.0 billion</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>46,882</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>$465 billion</td>
<td>$8.63 billion</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$1.23 trillion</td>
<td>$24.2 billion</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>54747</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$1.03 trillion</td>
<td>$11.7 billion</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>128,013</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>$960 billion</td>
<td>$9.9 billion</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>510,600</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$337 billion</td>
<td>$4.58 billion</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>26,585</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>$2.44 trillion</td>
<td>$5.94 billion</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>24,025</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>$205 billion</td>
<td>$3.19 billion</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>17932</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *In 2010, the United States deployed additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. This made the total number of U.S. troops to 100,000, which was 6.7% of the nearly 1.5 million U.S. troops. Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010* (London: Routledge for IISS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Bundeswehr Deployment in Overseas Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Missions</th>
<th>German Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) (1991-1996)</td>
<td>Air Force performed all flights for UNSCOM personnel for almost six years; German experts participated in inspections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Operation (Chapter VI) in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993)</td>
<td>One medical unit (about 150 soldiers) and a field hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Georgia (1994)</td>
<td>Ten soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Humanitarian Intervention (Chapter VII) in Somalia (USOM) (1993-1994)</td>
<td>1,700 soldiers (about 600 naval and 120 air force personnel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) (Established by the UN Security Council with the task of supporting the political transition toward independence (1999-2000)</td>
<td>The Bundeswehr dispatched transport aircraft and medical personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bundeswehr Deployment in Overseas Peace Enforcement Missions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of sanctions against Yugoslavia as part of the WEU/NATO &quot;Sharp Guard&quot; operation</td>
<td>Two naval vessels; Three reconnaissance aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation &quot;deny flight&quot; to implement the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>484 soldiers; Three NATO AWACs reconnaissance aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO planning for the extraction of UN-PROFOR in Bosnia in 1994, which had the purpose of protecting and supporting the Franco-British Rapid Reaction Force</td>
<td>14 Tornado aircraft; Up to 12 transport aircraft; Naval units provided for &quot;Sharp Guard&quot;; Medical unit with 530 men and a field hospital in Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1995 NATO intervention against Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>German Tornado aircraft flew their first combat missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO air war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999</td>
<td>14 Tornado aircraft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. German participation was challenged by the opposition and part of the ruling coalition (FDP) but subsequently cleared by the Constitutional Court.
2. The Bundestag cleared the operation with a vote of 386:258 (with eleven abstentions) on June 30, 1995, but the government ruled out the deployment of ground troops on historical grounds.
3. Contrary to all previous missions (including UNOSOM II, which took place with a mandate from the UN Security Council based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter), in this case there was no mandate from the UN Security Council to legitimize German participation. The Bundestag cleared German participation with a vote of 500:62, with eighteen abstentions, on October 16, 1998.

### APPENDIX 5.B German Parliamentary Debate over Military Deployment in Afghanistan, 2001-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parliamentary Votes on Military Deployment</th>
<th>Elite Consensus or Fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Nov. 16, 2001: The sharply divided Bundestag voted to deploy German forces to Afghanistan</td>
<td>332 MPs voted for; 326 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 2002: Bundestag extends the ISAF mission in Kabul; endorses the joint Dutch-German lead in ISAF; and approves the deployment of up to 2,500 <em>Bundeswehr</em> soldiers in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Bundestag approved the mission with an “overwhelming majority”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2003 | Oct. 24, 2003: Bundestag approved extension of German forces under ISAF, not OEF, in Afghanistan  
  - Nature of mission: 1800 Bundeswehr personnel stationed in Kabul; another 230 will be sent to Konduz; additional German troops be deployed to give ‘protective component’ to the economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond Kabul | SPD-Green coalition got the support of the main opposition CDU/CSU; few dissenting votes – only FDP and Left parties voted against |
| 2004 | Sept. 30, 2004: Bundestag approved the extension of German forces’ mission in Afghanistan | Bundestag approved the mission with an “overwhelming majority” |
| 2005 | Sept. 28, 2005: German Parliament approved an extension and enlargement of Bundeswehr’s mission in Afghanistan  
  - Mandate includes –  
    - one year extension of Afghanistan mission, including the deployment of an addition 750 German troops, who will join the existing 2250 troops  
    - Assumption of command in the northeastern sector of Afghanistan (ISAF-RC-North), which would require opening a new base in Mazar-i-Sharif city | Bundeswehr mission was approved by an “overwhelming majority” of MPs |
| 2006 | Sept. 28, 2006: German Parliament approved the Bundeswehr’s ISAF mandate, which allowed the deployment of upto 3,000 German soldiers  
  - Nov. 10, 2006: Bundestag approved Bundeswehr’s OEF mandate, which allows the deployment of up to 1,800 soldiers in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East for a year  
  - Bundestag also extended the deployment of 100 SOF commandos (KSK) in Afghanistan | 436 MPs voted for, 101 against, and 26 abstained during the Nov. 10, 2006 voting |
| 2007 | Sept. 19, 2007: Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet agrees to renew the mandate of 3000 troops and 6 Tornado spy jets in Afghanistan for one year.  
  - Oct. 12, 2007: Bundestag approved a one-year extension of the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan  
  - April 2007: Germany sent Tornado reconnaissance jets to Afghanistan  
  - Germany currently has 3,000 troops under the ISAF command, in northern Afghanistan  
  - March 9, 2007: German Parliament voted to send 6 to 8 Tornado jets to Afghanistan; The Tornado mission will cost an additional 35 million Euro. | In the 613-seat Bundestag, 454 voted for, and 79 against the Afghanistan mission; 48 MPs abstained; Only the Left Party opposed the mission, while Green party supported it  
  - On the Tornado vote, 405 MPs voted for, 157 against, and 11 abstained |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Oct. 16, 2008</td>
<td>Bundestag approved the extension of German forces’ presence in Afghanistan, and decided to send an additional 1,000 troops; Mission extended for 14 months, until Dec. 1, 2009. The 100-strong German SOF, will be withdrawn from OEF; German officials noted that although the German SOF were attached to OEF, they were not taking part in any combat mission. 442 MPs voted for, 96 against, and 32 abstention; Fairly “non-controversial debate” (Belkin 2008: 20).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Dec. 3, 2009</td>
<td>Bundestag approved the extension of German troops presence in Afghanistan until Dec 13, 2010; Foreign minister Westerwelle said the debate on troop size is inappropriate, as Germany and other NATO allies in Afghanistan are set to debate the right strategy in Afghanistan, and that the upcoming London conference in January 2010 is not a “donor conference” but a strategy conference. July 2009: 300 German forces engaged in a combat mission in Afghanistan, defined as the first German ground offensive since WWII (SHAFR, Sept. 1, 2009; Pond, Aug. 7, 2009). 445 of 593 votes cast, a large majority of Bundestag MPs approved the extension of Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan. Little opposition against the mandate; one FDP leader in the state of Schleswig-Holstein says, “I will, as in the past, vote against it.” He added that Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission is duplicitous, and that if the Germans are serious, they will “need to be in Pakistan too.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Feb. 26, 2010</td>
<td>Bundestag voted to increase 850 troops to join the existing 4,500 German troops in Afghanistan (500 for additional troops, 350 as a flexible contingent) Large majority of CDU/CSU, FDP, and opposition SPD agreed on the extension; Out of 622 MPs, 429 voted in favor of the surge; 111 voted against; 46 Abstention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of parliamentary votes supporting or opposing the deployment of German armed forces is shown, whenever such date are available from print and electronic media sources. In other cases the phrase ‘overwhelming majority’ is used to refer to the large number of supporting votes as opposed to fewer vetoes on deployment decisions.


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