Capacity Development in Conflict Scenarios: Assessing Donor Support Strategies to Local NGOs in Burundi

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NGOs have come to occupy center stage in emergency relief and development work in the past twenty years. This study looks at the efforts made by international actors—both official donors and international NGOs— in developing the capacities of local organizations in Burundi during the decade of civil strife since 1993. While the needs of democratization set the agenda for most peace building programs, the priorities of donors in conflict afflicted countries may not always lead to financial commitments, nor match the needs of emerging civil society organizations. Using field interviews and document analysis, this study analyzes the development and the challenges of civil organizations in Burundi, which are marked by the political developments distinctive to the country. Donor programs, including work in critical peacebuilding sectors of media, human rights, gender and basic education are examined in detail, and aid donors are shown to have had particular difficulty encouraging the organizational autonomy that is required for Burundian civil society organizations to become effective civic and political actors.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Capacity development (CD) is a concept that emerged in the 1980s and reflects many ideas and lessons learned from international development practices, particularly in the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It has now become a central issue in technical cooperation and is often assimilated with capacity building or institutional development, all indicating the strengthening of existing capacities in a given context.

As donors increase their funding in emergency and post-war reconstruction programs, scholars and practitioners largely agree that civil society organizations (CSOs) should be at the center stage, either in conventional development or in conflict situations. The idea of participation of civil society organizations in policy-making as well as in service delivery is in itself commendable. However, in a fragile state where ethnic cleavage has undermined private and public institutions, can local organizations contribute positively to the efforts of peacebuilding? Where civil society is deeply affected by political divisions, the work of local organizations, the coordination among them and their impact on their ground can be questioned. Moreover, donors are not
always comfortable working with traditional local organizations, which differ from western organizational models in many aspects. This research analyses the donors’ practices in supporting Burundian CSOs which have grown significantly after a civil war that erupted in 1993 and lasted more than a decade. The growth of the CSOs has paralleled with a strong presence of donors particularly International Non-Government Organizations (INGOS), which have influenced and shaped CSOs’ participation in the peace process. The purpose of the analysis is to assess the trends of the donors’ influence to the development and actions of the CSOs in peacebuilding programs from 1993 to 2005, when elections to implement peace negotiations occurred.

1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN BURUNDI

Successive periods of ethnic-based political conflicts have characterized Burundi since its independence in 1962. The latest wave of violence followed the assassination of the first elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye on October 21, 2003. Within days of his assassination, mass killings perpetrated by the Hutu occurred, retaliated later by the Tutsi army on the Hutu population. An estimated 300 to 400 hundred thousand civilians were killed and about 1.3 million (16% of the population) became internally displaced and refugees. Although Burundians traditionally did not mobilize politically around their ethnic identity prior to the colonial period, the last forty years have been marked by

cycles of violence that increased ethnic divisions which many foreign observers, as well as Burundians perceive as an elite-driven manipulation of power. Ethnicity is only one aspect of the cleavages. History has shown that alliances across clan and regional identities have been even stronger contributors to the differences in power sharing between the two ethnic groups.

After the violence in 1993, several attempts to reach compromises were undertaken to bring together Hutu and Tutsi political leaders; first under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, and after his death in 1999, headed by Nelson Mandela. The goal of the international community in the support for negotiations was 1) to establish a transitional government where both ethnic groups would share power; and 2) to restructure the army in a way that Tutsi and Hutu would be represented in equal proportions. The main challenge was to focus on talks between the Burundi army and the rebel groups operating from Tanzania and the democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to keep an armistice. A first partial peace and reconciliation agreement was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in August 2000. An important part of this Agreement was implemented as the new Transitional Government was installed in 2002. However the fighting between the National Army and the divided armed opposition groups continued. It was only in 2003 that a comprehensive peace agreement between the transitional government and the political branch of the major rebel group, the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy) was put in place. Although the other belligerent group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL) was not part of this peace agreement, the
international community in Burundi considered the signing of the Agreement as a major milestone.

The peace agreements of 2002 and 2003 explain the present political landscape, marked by two transitional governments from 2001 to 2005. Democratic elections were held in 2005 resulting into a 5 year mandate for the current president, Pierre Nkurunziza of the political party CNDD-FDD. Under the Arusha Agreement, the Army and the Senate are to be constituted of 50 percent Hutu, 50 percent Tutsi; the government is made-up of 60 percent Hutu, 40 percent Tutsi; the National Assembly has the same ratio. Although the Arusha Agreement did not represent a consensus among all political parties, the major players in the armed conflict took part in the negotiations. In the eyes of donors, the fact that members of the former armed opposition groups have joined the Transitional Government as well as and the integration of former rebel fighters into the National Army was an encouraging sign of progress in peace efforts.

1.3 EMPHASIS ON CIVIL ACTORS

During the period of civil war, the presence of international actors in Burundi increased sharply in response to the crisis. On the development front, foreign assistance gradually diminished and shifted from poverty reduction programs to peace building and relief assistance due to the political developments. As observed in many other countries affected by civil war, responses to emergencies outweigh assistance for economic recovery but provide opportunities for CSOs to flourish and engage in service
delivery. Moreover, the discussion of capacity building in development theory indicates that there is a growing focus on community-driven development and peacebuilding strategies, most importantly in post-conflict settings. Similarly, the need to reach vulnerable populations affected by the war in Burundi has prompted donors to rely on local partnerships with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as well as local civil society organizations in responding to the crisis. The situation has resulted in a remarkable surge of local civil society organizations (CSOs). AFRICARE, an American NGO working in Burundi, reported in 2000 that 49% of the more than 600 NGOs registered emerged after 1992. Eighty percent of these 600 NGOs were created after 1980\(^2\). The latest research on local civil society organizations by Sebundandi & Nduwayo (2002) indicates the existence of more than 1,400 CSOs in Burundi in 2002. The same authors report a growth rate of 80 local organizations officially approved every year in addition to unreported community associations.

The growth of CSOs and the presence of INGOS paralleled with an increasing role of these organizations in peacebuilding efforts with the support of donors. This research analyses this support as well as the dynamics of relationships that characterized aid donors and Burundi CSOs during the period of civil strife.

\[\text{2 R.P. Herisse, former AFRICARE country Director in Burundi in his reflection paper ‘Democracy, Governance and conflicts in Burundi’2000.}\]
1.4 THESIS OF THE RESEARCH

Donors have enormous impact on INGOs and civil society organizations’ priorities everywhere. This is even more strongly the case where the civil society is fragile and recovering from conflict, and where donors are focused on human relief, as in Burundi. Although the new aid paradigm emphasizes civil society actors, the findings of the research show that while many resources are spent on the public sector where the relationship donor-state and capacity building activities are well defined, the same cannot be said for civil society organizations. The minimal financial support and the typical short-term project approach to CSOs’ programs leads neither to the sustainable results sought by donors, nor the autonomy of civil society organizations that is necessary to fulfill their expected role towards state actors. Where there are acute humanitarian needs and pressing political priorities, donors find it difficult to follow their own best practices in the support given to CSOs. Moreover, the effects of war and social divisions exacerbated by poverty show that local NGOs are not equipped well enough to carry out sustainable programs of development and peacebuilding. The dependence on external aid indicates that the success of the few CSOs could be short-lived, and that the preponderance of CSOs activities could simply be oriented towards democratization themes promoted by donors, allowing access to funds and hence, survival. How dependent are NGOs and CSOs upon donors and what type of local capacity building are donors involved in? How are Burundian CSOs prepared to carry out peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts and how do they counter-balance the actions of the government? These are some of the questions that the research explores. The type of activities promoted and methods used by donors to deliver
assistance will be analyzed as evidence to test CD common principles and practices. The goal of the analysis focuses on:

a. Discovering the extent to which the key players within the donor community are engaged in local capacity development and assessing their collaboration, partnerships or linkages in delivering assistance;

b. Analyzing how the dynamics of the conflict have affected the strategies of capacity development of Burundian NGOs; and

c. Identifying the type of CD activities and the tools that are used by donors to evaluate their programs’ progress and effectiveness.

In assessing and evaluating CD strategic practices, the research will be guided by general theoretical approaches to capacity development including organizational strengthening (Horton, 2003), institutional development (North, 1990; Uphoff, 1986) and by the commonly used approaches to peacebuilding. The prevalence of international non-government organizations (INGOs) in conflict-affected African countries and elsewhere means that there exist considerable field-based reports from aid-practitioners and donors’ strategic reports on similar cases such as Burundi. These resources will serve as references to identify the common practices of donors in other emergency or post-emergency situations.
The main findings of the analysis are organized in four chapters. The first part of the findings provides a historical background on traditional civil society organizations. The purpose of this analysis is to have a perspective of non-government organizations that are generally found in Africa with respect to the expected roles and functions of civil society actors in Western models.

The second part of the findings presents an overview of donors’ policies; the new trends of development assistance to Burundi with a particular look at the features that pertain to CSOs capacity building.

The third part of the findings addresses the specific activities that donors have undertaken to develop the capacities of CSOs. The part identifies the themes around which programs and projects promoted by donors are designed and how the themes relate to the development of CSOs.

Concluding remarks to the findings are provided in the last chapter. There is a constant interest in capacity development among international development scholars and practitioners, and the results of this research with contribute to the existing body of literature on local CSOs and their capacity building in Africa. Mostly, it is hoped that the study will inspire policy making for local institutional building in Burundi.
1.5 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.5.1 Framing capacity development

The concept of capacity development is not new and it is a widely used term in the international development field. In the UN literature, capacity is described as a way in which development occurs and it is an essential part of the operational activities of the UN. Capacity development as used in this research will refer to:

‘The process by which individuals, groups, organizations and societies increase their abilities to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives; to understand and deal with their development need in a broader context and in a sustainable manner’

Commonly associated with capacity building, institutional development or organizational development, capacity development can be seen as an umbrella concept (Morgan, 1998) and has become the new ‘way’ of development. As an ‘umbrella’ concept, it builds on ideas found in development theories of the last fifty years. The emerging consensus among development practitioners is that all development activities involve some sort of capacity development. These activities are conducted over the long term, contributing to sustainable social and economic development that is demand

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3 UN General Assembly Resolution –UN, A/RES/50/120 Art.22
4 UNDP, 1997.”Capacity Development.” New York: Management development and governance division. UNDP
driven\(^5\). Understood as such, capacity development encompasses other approaches to development that foster ownership and a reduced dominant role of donor-led projects. For instance, the new institutionalism theory or the *development by the people* approach that emerged in the last two decades calls for recognition of indigenous capacities and a consideration of other factors such as the *enabling environment*, a culture which includes existing networks among institutions and organizations that favor sustainability and ownership.

The earlier institutional approach suggested building institutions from scratch using universal models imported from industrial countries. Capacity development, as a new perspective to development, responds to the structural and functional disconnect between the indigenous and formal institutions mostly transplanted from the West (Dia, 1996). Capacity development seeks to remedy the neoclassical development approaches of the 1970s which did not pay enough attention to *human resource* development. Newer development theories want to bring in the element of *social aspects* of development, and define development as a process of enlarging people’s choices in a much broader sense than proposed by mainstream economists. Capacity development in general includes various strategies and methodologies that reflect this need to move away from the alien models of the industrialized world that characterized earlier development economic concepts; and to focus more attention on how to instill autonomous and sustainable local capacities.

\(^5\) “Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” in Universalia occasional papers No 35, September 1999
The various aspects of capacity development suggest that there are different dimensions of capacity (e.g., individual, organizational, societal), each requiring a level of analysis and an entry level for a capacity intervention. Some see capacity development as (1) a development objective or target, such as targeting the development of individuals or organizational capacity. The target could also be a sector, such as agricultural or health. In both of these instances, development indicates what core capacities to develop. Others describe capacity development as (2) a process, as for example, when suggesting an approach to reducing poverty, outlining the how and the principles that characterize it. Alan Fowler (1997) provides a typology of capacity development and distinguishes capacity development as both a process and purpose (in other words, a means to an end) as shown in table 1.

CIDA Occasional Paper, Vol.1 No1, May 2000
Table 1: Concepts of Capacity Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building the capacity of an organization: organizational development</td>
<td>Strengthens the organization's ability to perform specific functions, such as refugee-camp management</td>
<td>Builds coherence within internal operations; develops the possibility of continued learning and adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the capacity of an institutional sub-sector (e.g., health, credit, emergency assistance): sectoral development</td>
<td>Strengthens the ability of the sector or sub sector to improve its overall impact</td>
<td>Develops mutually supporting relations and understanding within the sector or sub sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Alan Fowler, “Striking the Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NGOs in International Development” (1997)

The typology summarized above suggests that building capacity requires serious attention to target and purpose, as well as to the process. The concepts of capacity development, whether perceived as either objective, purpose or process, underline most importantly the recognition of the values of the peoples involved, giving them an opportunity to have a say in setting their priorities.

In general, the literature of capacity development indicates practices, methods, tools, activities, and principles that should characterize capacity development interventions as summarized below:
• Local participation and locally driven agenda: local people set their priorities
• Building on local capacities: exploring local resources
• Ownership and respect of local values: indigenous models and local culture are emphasized
• Long-term vision: ensuring continuity of projects and maximize impact
• Targeting sustainable results: improving the organization’s viability

From the donor’s perspective, these principles have implications in policy design and in the delivery of assistance. The focus of this research is to examine how these implications are applied to the case of Burundian civil society organizations.

1.5.2 Working definitions

NGOs

The term non-governmental organization (NGO) actually carries with it a specific meaning, generally noting an organization that is run by private citizens outside of the government sector. NGOs are considered actors within the private sector. In the relief and development sector, the term is used to describe civil organizations that require funding from external sources to design, implement and manage their programming in providing specialized services to government agencies, victims of emergencies and regions in need of relief and development.

7 CDHAM resource “A Guide to NGOs: A primer about private, voluntary non-governmental organizations.” Available at ReliefWeb policy &issues resources: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/
NGOs are also referred to as ‘non-profit organizations’ or ‘non-profit’ and obtain funding to support their varied humanitarian activities from numerous sources including government agencies, private organizations, foundation grants and individual contributions. NGOs that operate in humanitarian emergencies may vary in their mission, objectives, specialty, expertise or funding requirements but despite these differences, they also have similarities. A major similarity is the needy population or target group they serve. In the last thirty years, the capacity to mitigate, manage and respond to humanitarian emergencies has grown considerably. In the countries in which NGOs operate, they constitute crucial partners with government bodies, the military, national staff and the community or local organizations with whom they collaborate to carry out their work.

The term local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) will be used interchangeably and will refer to Burundi non-governmental organizations. Local NGOs will encompass ‘grassroots’ organizations, voluntary organizations, ‘non-profits’ or charities. In the development discourse, local NGOs or international NGOs can both be referred to as voluntary organizations to denote the public service and community orientation that NGOs generally have. In this study, local organizations will mean Burundi civil society organizations; and international NGOs that operate in Burundi will be referred to as INGOs.
Institutions

The term “Institution” as understood in the development theory, are the "rules of the game", consisting of both the formal practices and the informal social norms that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions. The environments in which institutions operate influence their development. By contrast, organizations are social arrangements which pursue collective goals, control their own performance, and have boundaries separating them from their environment. Donors’ initiatives in capacity development usually target institutions of the public sector (formal organizations) as well as the private sector. In the study, traditional systems in the Burundi context will be referred to as institutions whereas actors supported by donors in the private sector are referred to as organizations.

Donors

This study will refer to donors as the group of bilateral and multilateral organizations that provide development or humanitarian assistance. Given the context of political instability characterizing the timeframe studied, development activities were limited. The emphasis will be to follow the channeled assistance to build local capacities in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. INGOs have been the most visible major actors in Burundi, and have been the common intermediary between donors and local actors. Consequently their activities are reported extensively in this research due to the special role they have played in the development of Burundi civil society organizations.
2.0 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

There are theoretical approaches that constitute the framework within which the concept of CD was developed and is understood. The theories and concepts described in this first section explore the discourse on civil society of the last two decades, and the more recent concepts which highlight social institutions in development practices today. The last section of this chapter looks at the role that organizations in a civil society (INGOs particularly) play in peacebuilding initiatives.

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of a “civil society” is complex, and different schools of thought have influenced the theoretical debates and empirical research of the concept over time. The discourse on civil society is discussed in two ways: (1) an analysis of the different actors who form the organizations and associations, and (2) an analysis of the roles and functions they have performed or that have been assigned to them. Generally understood, civil society refers to a wide array of non-government and not-for-profit organizations that represent the different interests, values and purposes of private citizens. In social capital theory, the term goes beyond the category of development-
oriented NGOs that are common in the development literature and depicts instead a broader range of organizations that include community organizations, women’s associations, youth associations, professional associations, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, think tanks and, to a larger extent, all informal systems of organizations that participate in civic life\textsuperscript{8}. Civil society in this study will be used to refer to the different non-government actors considered by donors and INGOs when targeting local participation in development and peacebuilding projects. Although international non-government organizations are also described within the concept of a “civil society”, the focus of this study is on Burundi, and the use of “civil society organizations” or “local non-government organizations” will be referring to Burundi local organizations.

2.1.1 Civil society in the literature

The literature on civil society stems from different roots and contexts and many political philosophers have shaped its definitions and discourse. The concept of a civil society has come to the center stage of development and practices in the last two decades; and is viewed as a strong agent of change by development practitioners. Increased participation of civil society organizations, as many authors have argued, was considered an alternative approach to orthodox ideas of development administration. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, scholars such as Amartya Sen (1988), David Korten (1990), and John Friedmann (1992) advocated an emphasis on the capacity of local people to make and implement decisions regarding their own development. For scholars of civil society, 

\textsuperscript{8} World bank web site on participation: [http://worldbank.org/participation](http://worldbank.org/participation)
participation of individual citizens in the development process is crucial. Due to their social networks, the norms of trust and reciprocity generated by civil organizations and other grassroots groups are believed to have a positive impact on the political as well as the economic performance in developing countries by bringing accountability, and by playing the role of a democratic check on the state (Putnam, 2002).

2.1.2 The idea of a global civil society

The concept of civil society gained more momentum at the beginning of the 1990s and was sometimes reduced to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) due to the increasing role they have taken in service delivery (Howell & Pearce, 2001). As the Cold War came to an end, there was an opportunity to establish good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law as priority objectives in development. INGOs gained recognition among development academics, bilateral and multilateral agencies and emerged as a ‘global civil society’ on the international scene (Cardoso, 2003), dealing with global issues to restore and assert a new moral order in establishing values of individual autonomy and freedom.

It is also of note in donors’ literature that civil society is sometimes mixed with the third sector in donors’ approaches in reference to the same broad range of institutions and organizations they comprise (non-profit, voluntary) and interconnection of their functions (advocacy work, delivery of services). However, civil society organizations

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have a different focus and objectives than the third sector. CSOs are concerned more with the social and political implications of democratization whereas the third sector is viewed as an economic force.

In the 1990’s, the effects of globalization on poverty, inequality and political insecurities in Southern countries called for a greater political role on the part of northern NGOs to adjust to the emerging systems of global governance, debates and decision-making (Edwards, 2004a). Moreover, the various emergencies in the south influenced the ‘scale-up’ of INGOs, favored by an environment in which they were seen as important vehicles to deliver the political and economic objectives of the ‘New Policy Agenda’, adopted by official donor agencies with a focus on grassroots participation and the rules and standards of accountability. In addition to an increased involvement in donors’ decision-making, international NGOs have mobilized and created more equitable relationships with civil society in the south. By establishing stronger and more accountable mechanisms at the grassroots levels, INGOs have conducted large and well organized campaigns on development issues and have presented alternative viewpoints to those in official governments and development agencies. Their involvement in the United Nations (UN) system has been acknowledged and recommendations made for their future relations and interactions with the UN\textsuperscript{10}.

2.1.3 The relevance of context

It is argued that the concepts of civil society are not transferable to non-Western countries or other societies with different histories, levels of democracy and economic structures (Lewis, 2002). If we take the example of Africa, most authors agree that the conditions of Western-type civil society (e.g., a self-confident citizenship that has already gained some autonomy from state structures) are mostly missing in Africa. They also see the influence of civil society on political processes as limited due to the lack of political space and weak links with rural or urban CSOs. In such cases, the concept of civil society could also take into account the role of traditional institutions that have traditionally played the role of state-controller, albeit in a rudimentary fashion.

2.2 BACKGROUND ON CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPTS

The new aid paradigm that focuses on civil society is rooted in other theoretical concepts that were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Within the civil society theory of the 1980s, the development-by-the-people approach saw popular participation in development activities both as a goal in itself as well as the process through which other development goals should be designed. Theorists of this approach such as David Korten (1980; 1990) and Robert Chambers (1983) emphasized “bottom-up” development, arguing that the state is part of the problem faced by the less economically-developed countries. The earlier approach to development assistance in the 1960s and 1970s was basically “top-down,” with donor countries defining the
strategies of development with little participation from the beneficiaries in making these policies. Empowerment of the poor, devolution of power from the national level to the local and community organizations, and the participation of poor people in decision-making are factors emphasized by the people-centered development. Empowerment is understood as consciousness-raising or awareness creation and self-organization (Gran, 1983). Scholars within the people-centered development movement strongly disassociate themselves from any form of centralized control over the development process.

A major criticism raised by these authors is that aid organizations are often too bureaucratic and too concerned with their objectives, and that they know little about local conditions in developing countries. Gran’s proposed solution is to reduce significantly all types of official cooperation and emphasize instead the non-state organizations. However, Friedmann (1992) points out the difficulties of establishing non-state organizations: civil society is not conflict-free and does not have homogenous human communities; furthermore, it is difficult to establish organizations across class distinctions, gender or perceived ethnic affiliations. Friedmann proposed a strategy of an “inclusive democracy” that empowers poor people and at the same time renders the majority of citizens accountable of their actions.

Although this notion of development by the people did not gain wide approval in international debates in the 1980s, it was further developed by Mahbub Ul Haq’s reflections on human development (1995). United Nations Development Programs
UNDP) also set the tone in its *Human Development Report* of 1993, incorporating the core features of the human development strategy by inviting developing countries to do everything in their power to promote the participation of citizens, and to consider this participation as an important aspect of human development. The concept of human development has its roots in literature on inequality and poverty. It also derived from the concern that income cannot be the sole criterion of development. Prominent economists such as Amartya Sen (1988) and Paul Streeten (1981; 1994) argued that income should be regarded as a *means* to improve human welfare, not as an end in itself. To them, human welfare was the overall objective, the essence of development. This idea started as a goal of development by the people, but gradually became a new framework of research as well as development cooperation, known in the last years as *sustainable human development*. The human development approach seeks to put people back at the center of development and has the following features\textsuperscript{11}:

- Development is understood in terms of people. Each activity is analyzed to see how many people participate in it or benefit from it.
- Human development encourages people to use their acquired capabilities.
- People are regarded as the end, but means are not forgotten. The human development paradigm embraces all of society, not just the economy.

Today, most development organizations have a component of local participation in their programs, and human development is a common theme. While the perspective

\textsuperscript{11} United Nation Human Development Report, 1995
of the human development principle focuses on the “people”; the extension of this paradigm is found in the ideas of the economic theorists of the New Institutional School.

Representatives of new institutional economics wanted to study the economic phenomena within a wider societal context. Like the proponents of the civil society and the “development by the people” theorists, these economists not only bring into perspective not only economic institutions, they also emphasize the social and political institutions in this development paradigm.

Building institutions, either in the form of training or research, has always been a major purpose of technical assistance in developing countries since the 1960s\textsuperscript{12}. But the new institutional economics school differs greatly from modern neoclassical economics, which was based on narrow assumptions about rationality and knowledge. Theorists within the new institutional economics school corrected some conceptions of previous theories in the way economic behavior is understood (Martinussen, 1995). Their ideas suggest that the market is not the only institution that shapes economic behavior, but merely one among several aspects of the total incentive structure in a society. The networking systems that exist within an organization and the way in which the state institutions are organized in a country are all important features that should be considered in studying economic behavior.

\textsuperscript{12} Examples of institutional capacity building in Africa can be found in the work of Louis A. Picard (1993, 1994, and 1996).
Another new feature brought by the new institutionalism suggested that the focus on institutions should be broadened to include the private sector and NGOs, and to consider external factors that influence the development of institutions (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; 1993). In the 1990s, building institutions was understood as more than knowledge transfer and supply-driven technology (hardware). The dynamics of organizations—the social, cultural and political environments (software)—are studied in development strategies, requiring a broader systematic perspective in economic interventions. To study institutions, it is not only the question of ‘what works’ in less developed countries but also ‘what lasts’ (Morgan, 1994). The question of sustainability has become a central issue in the design of programs. To achieve sustainability, a coherent strategy for a capacity building approach should have a long-term perspective. It should also bring together different stakeholders—organizations, groups, and individuals—who should work in collaboration to find solutions.

An important contribution of the economists of the new institutional school in the development field is their attention to the element of social capital. The social capital of a country is its social institutions, its people, and their cultural values. Social capital is a fundamental value in a society in that it enables communities to prosper; it can also explain why some economic models work in one country but not another. Social institutions in a particular society can be an ‘institutional capital’ because their societal values help constitute a production factor (Kasper & Streit, 1998).
2.3 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NEW AID PARADIGM

The development and functions of civil society continue to be shaped by donors’ policy reforms in the 2000’s to the extent that civil society organizations continue to be critical in the framework of good governance and democratization. The 2000’s framework of aid is molded by the agreements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for poverty reduction and reinforced by the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness ratified by donors in 2005. Both frameworks give a central role to the civil society to participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) as imposed by donors. They also advocate continuing coordination with key institutions such as international financial institutions and the UN system that determine the economic fate of the developing world. The interaction between donors and civil society has increased greatly in the 2000’s, although the two entities perform roles and activities at different levels. For instance, the platform of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has supported civil society groups to establish national coalitions in both the developed and developing world to rally for action. Unlike the criticism directed at the organizations for their ineffectiveness that was noted by earlier authors who advocated for less involvement with large bureaucracies, civil society organizations, both national and international, have started to work closely with them. Many civil society organizations have linked their existing campaigns on health, education, HIV/AIDS, and peace to the MDGs\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{13} Development, Volume 48, #1, March 2005. p.29
The increasing participation of civil society in national poverty reduction plans comes with high expectations. Although donors put civil society at center stage, experts in the development discourse agree that the donors' strategies for local participation remain largely vague. The INGOs Action Aid and Care observe in their research paper that:

While the space for civil society to engage in national policy processes appears to be opening to some degree, the research findings highlight that there is still insufficient space available for NGOs to effectively engage in discussions concerning the disbursement and allocation of aid. To date, civil society participation in national poverty reductions strategies has tended to be rather superficial poverty diagnostic consultations with perhaps some discussion about which sectors should be priorities.\(^\text{14}\)

Further, the increasing numbers of functions that CSOs are called upon to play have raised important issues related to their accountability and legitimacy. These issues are at the heart of what should characterize civil society organizations with regard to their objectives and their relationship to both the state and the public they represent.

*The issue of accountability:* The essence of civil society organizations is that they represent the people who form them, their values, and the objectives they have set to defend. The biggest challenge that non-government organizations face is that external funding tends to impose some degree of constraint in the contractual arrangements for giving aid, such as the choice of methods of reporting, the durations of projects, and the participation of aid agencies in the form of technical assistance. Such constraints have

\(^{14}\)ActionAid and Care: “Where to Now? Implications of changing relations between DFID, recipient governments and NGOs in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. July 2006. p.1
an impact on the successful implementation of projects and on the structure of these civil organizations as well. External funding is thus necessary for the survival of civil society organizations, although it leads to financial dependency. The consequence is that in justifying their actions, these organizations become accountable first to their funders, as opposed to the people they represent.

The issue of legitimacy: Also related to the issue of accountability is the issue of legitimacy, which raises the question of ownership. The previous sections discussed the “conceptualization” of civil society and the need to apply and attribute its roles and the functions of civic actors in consideration of the different environments and regional contexts. Civil society has played an important role in eastern European countries as in Latin America in the 1960s and 1980s, but civil society organizations in African countries represent another type of function. NGOs are few and usually run by the urban elite with a very weak representation of the rural population. Those few visible NGOs are often non-profit, are externally funded, and act like consulting firms. Some critics (Pouligny 2005) fear that this commercialization of civil society, and especially advocacy or public policy work discourages other ‘true’ or more legitimate local actors that are not receiving funds from participating or becoming active.

The issues of accountability and legitimacy related to the concept of civil society form the basis for the questions posed by this study. The challenges facing civil society organizations in Burundi and their relationship with donors is not different from other developing countries, but have unique factors given the country’s historical
environment and civil war context. Before this context is discussed further in Chapters Four, Five and Six, it is important to look at other development theories that are related to the concept of civil society.

2.4 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PEACEBUILDING

The peacebuilding discourse has focused on the potential role of civil society since the 1990s with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Through the emergence of UN system-wide humanitarian interventions and new patterns of aid subcontracting, non-state and private associations have grown to embrace humanitarian or governance responsibilities. They are learning to work with newer partners such as the military, or form new patterns of relationships with INGOs.

2.4.1 Civil society and peacebuilding

Peacebuilding in development cooperation emerged in the early 1990s. This issue gained momentum in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide bringing attention to the negative effects that aid can have on conflict dynamics (Uvin, 1998; Anderson, 1999). Since the Rwandan genocide, the debates have developed around the issues of peace and development and their links to armed conflicts. Scholars have explored this relationship extensively and have developed analytical frameworks that determine potential effects of aid projects on conflict and peace. The concept of ‘do no harm’
(Anderson, 1999) or the methodology of ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment’ (PCIA) by Kenneth Bush (1998) are such examples. The development community’s involvement in the peacebuilding discourse has had several implications in the development field. First, many peacebuilding approaches and tools, such as conflict analysis frameworks (Paffenholz, 2005b), were imported into the development field. Second, development actors started to fund or implement interventions directly aimed at peacebuilding, contributing to the involvement of new actors and INGOs in conflict countries.

But unlike the traditional role of international relief organizations, NGOs that we find today go beyond caring about the victims of war; their work has extended to include prevention of conflicts and mediation, the strengthening of institutions, the promotion of human rights and more. The increasing participation and popularity of NGOs on the international development scene can partly be explained by the earlier criticisms directed towards aid organizations for their cumbersome bureaucracy and inadequacy to reach the poor in a timely manner. The belief that NGOs are closer to the population who receive aid is justified. In fact, NGOs are generally smaller-scale organizations, flexible in structure and more responsive and efficient in service delivery than state organizations (Putman, 2002).

15 Social development Papers #34, October 2006 ‘Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peace building’, p. 19
16 Proponents of civil-society and people-managed development theories of the 1980’s who criticized the bureaucracy characterizing institutions such as the World Bank.
The partnership evolving between humanitarian organizations, together with donor governments has also gained new forms of economic, social and political influence in relation to the internal affairs of countries in conflict. Mark Duffield (2002) argues that, the idea of ‘gaining influence’ is not associated with forms of territorial control or with colonialism. The influence is networked and non-territorial, it tends to be selective, unevenly distributed and of varying impact\textsuperscript{17}. The influence also attests to the growing relationship between the development NGOs and major financial institutions, and the question of dependency of development NGOs vis-à-vis donors that is often put forward in development literature.

2.4.2 Peacekeeping from below

Until the mid 1990’s, peacebuilding research debate focused on the ability of external actors (INGOs) to support internal, national actors in conflict-affected countries to enhance their peacebuilding capacities. In the last decade, the peacebuilding discourse and practices have been influenced by Lederach (1997), who shifted the attention to the role of actors from within the conflict country. Lederach brought into the literature the concept of “peacekeeping from below”. He argued for multi-track and multi-dimensional diplomacy—i.e., including all levels of society in approaches to peace-building—as well as the need to understand the cultural, structural, personal and relational dimensions and changes within war-torn societies. This discourse served as a conceptual umbrella for a range of activities, particularly among international NGOs.

\textsuperscript{17} Mark Duffield: ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a relation of global governance’. Published in Development and Change 2002, 33 (5): 10049-71
A new body of academic literature has developed with the same ideas, focusing on the need for community-driven development strategies, particularly in post-conflict environments where the government’s capacity is limited and where the platform for engaging NGOs has broadened. Many approaches and initiatives such as peace funds, dialogue projects, peacebuilding training, and capacity building programs for local actors have been tested during the last decade. Additionally, democratization has become one of the high priorities of the international community’s approach to peacebuilding. Thus, as part of the democratic agenda, we see today an array of non-state actors such as NGOs, associations, religious entities, business and grassroots organizations and communities who are involved in different peacebuilding activities.

2.4.3 Local approaches to peacebuilding

As many multilateral agencies and bilateral donors have adjusted their policy frameworks and increased the participation of civil society organizations in development projects, they have also opened a space to support indigenous approaches to peacebuilding processes.

Giving consideration to indigenous and informal traditional justice instruments in the context of peacemaking and justice in post-conflict countries is innovative. In response to the crimes of civil war and genocide, the international community referred to a legal framework focused on accountability, crafted after World War II. It is only after the 1980s that a major shift towards other intermediate mechanisms was observed as a
result of the global growth of human rights awareness. The United Nations, the Inter-American Human Rights courts and other human rights NGOs have cooperated in putting together new approaches and norms for prosecuting crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. This cooperation has resulted in the establishment of ad hoc tribunals of The Hague and International courts (for the former Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for Rwanda), of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the spread of the principle of universal retribution. Moreover, the choice of retributive justice as a strategy has been written into internationally brokered peace agreements, as in Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Burundi.

However, the uniqueness of each post-conflict society and the various political, social, economic and cultural contingencies in countries where the crimes were committed has made prosecutions difficult to file and to obtain convictions for (Rwanda is an example). Doubts about the use of trials led to a search for alternative or complementary mechanisms to avoid the dangers of both too much and too little criminal justice. The result that we witness today is a move from a de facto dichotomy (impunity or trials) to multiple conceptions of justice and reconciliation, state and non-state instruments, and legal, semi-judicial and non-judicial techniques. Kofi Annan, former UN secretary-general, officially acknowledged this evolution¹⁸:

"Due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in

conformity with both international standards and local tradition” (United Nations 2004: 12).

As part of this important development, some post-conflict societies have now turned their attention to their legacy of indigenous practices of dispute settlement and reconciliation. The argument is that traditional and informal systems of justice may be adopted or adapted to develop an appropriate response to a history of civil war and oppression in a country.

In Burundi, where societal ties have been broken by ethnic divide, the international community efforts that were undertaken resorted to traditional mechanisms of conflict management, either in response to the institutional crisis after the assassination of Ndadaye in October 1993, or in the different phases of peace negotiations. The traditional institution of Bashingantahe discussed in chapter Four, played a role in the initial phase of the peace process. Due to power clashes between elected officials and traditional authority, the Bashingantahe play a background role on a national level. Today, the institution is consulted widely for the resolution of land disputes. In neighbouring Rwanda, where the culture and the nature of the conflict are similar, the Agacaca traditional tribunal was and is still used. Other examples include the processes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as seen in South Africa or other countries.

The use of traditional mechanisms in peacebuilding projects shows the importance given to grassroots and civil society participation in bottom-up approaches
to development, along with the need to understand the crucial element of cultural
dynamics stressed by the new institutional school theorists. In reference to Lederach’s
model of “peacebuilding from below,” an illustration of the approach is given to see
where traditional actors intervene. Lederach’s illustration reflects the multi-track
diplomacy model that aims to improve communications and inter-group relations. It
capitalizes on the synergies between approaches to conflict resolution (Diamond &
McDonald, 1996), and distinguishes the different peacebuilding actors and processes
according to tracks. Participation of grassroots groups such as the Bashingantahe in
Burundi in peacebuilding occurs usually at level 3 of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid
shown in figure 1 below:
Level 3: “Grassroots Leadership” is where civil society tends to be most active and where the majority of the population is represented. People at this level identify more with such approaches as peace commissions, community dialogue or projects of trauma healing. This group can also be involved in mid-level activities such as problem-solving workshops or peace-commissions with the help of prominent local individuals. By contrast, level 1 involves high-level negotiations with prominent politicians, military and/or religious officials, led by a highly visible negotiator such as Nelson Mandela who led the final cease-fire negotiations in Burundi.
Generally, the broad range of members of civil society involved in peacebuilding work encompasses actors at the local, national and international level. Key actors included in the notion of civil society are\(^{19}\):

- Human rights organizations or advocacy groups and peace networks;
- NGOs that directly support peace processes or capacity building;
- Interest groups such as women’s, religious, youth and professional associations;
- Community-based organizations (CBOs), women and youth groups, self-help groups;
- Traditional leaders, informal networks and associations;
- Informational and educational CSOs (independent media, journalist associations, research and academic institutions and think tanks).

Civil society can make unique contributions to peacebuilding with or without external support. The rich diversity of civil society and CSOs requires a practical and empirical approach that considers these organizations’ objectives, functions, capacities, constraints and relationships to other actors. Donors interact predominantly with intermediate organizations at the national or international level, and rely on them to channel support to a broader range of CSOs or to coordinate interventions involving multiple CSOs. Donor funding is also often limited to a small group of CSOs (in particular, development-oriented NGOs), while social movements, mass organizations

\(^{19}\) Civil Society and Peace building, World Bank Document, December 2006, p.9
and trade unions are often neglected as potential partners\textsuperscript{20}. Donor preferences for financing CSOs on a project-by-project basis give CSOs limited opportunities to develop capacity, specialization, strategic planning, and long-term investments in beneficiary communities.

2.4.4 Problems associated with strategies for civil society capacity building

As part of the democratization agenda in countries affected by war, it is assumed that strengthening local civil society organizations can help prevent the outbreak of violence while promoting democracy. As seen in the literature on civil society, most scholars also agree that civil society organizations should always be at the center of any development endeavors. This applies both to conventional development or post-conflict scenarios. The international development community’s approach to resolving conflicts in Burundi has followed this trend. Donors have encouraged the promotion of grassroots organizations and have supported indigenous organizations mainly in the human rights fields and in the media.

However, the promotion of grassroots organizations in Burundi and Rwanda has proved a more difficult undertaking than anticipated due to increased distrust and social divisions. The sense of community that existed before 1994 was greatly undermined, if not extinguished, by the war. Moreover, the work involved is politically sensitive and

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. p.22
difficult to carry out. Peter Uvin\textsuperscript{21}, one of the few scholars who looked closely at the cases of Burundi and Rwanda, observes that the experience of development partners in these two countries in supporting civil society as democratization tools has been generally unsatisfactory. Uvin points out some of the major downfalls associated with these strategies for civil society that he characterizes as “institutional destruction”:

- Although development partners have engaged civil society groups in conflict-specific sectors such as justice, reconciliation, trauma and governance in development work, it is foreign NGOs that dominate those areas. As the emergency phase of post-conflict diminishes, so does the importance of NGOs since post-conflict governments begin to find their feet and assert their role as the responsible actors for sectors such as education, health or justice.

- Despite neutral and apolitical rhetoric, the goals of most development projects are political in nature. Most of the donor-supported projects are often the target of government resistance as many of the groups supported have a politicized or anti-state agenda.

- Ninety-five percent of the foreign aid development community resides in the capital city where most of the projects are directed from. Many of the grassroots organizations structures are merely token structures created to manage project

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\textsuperscript{21} Peter Uvin, \textit{Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies}, in Occasional Paper series, Issue 1/November 2006, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
benefits which continue to exist as long as the projects do. When the day-to-day project evaporates, so, too, do the grassroots structures.

- Projects are usually small, short-term and inflexible. Design criteria are not transparent; there are no clear criteria for how the local partners are selected for engagement.

- Development partners often misunderstand the domestic dynamics of civil society development. Local organizations understand the long-term dynamics much better than aid partners do and as such, the development community often works from a position of weakness. Consequently, external aid unintentionally weakens civil society and contributes to institutional destruction (Uvin, 1999).

Although social organizations are viewed as crucial partners in peacebuilding, in conflict mitigation, post-conflict reconstruction and in other development projects, associational life is often weak in post-war contexts. This means that the “strengthening” work is both vital but also potentially divisive and damaging. Uvin (1999) notes that the building of civil society requires the creation of processes that allow all people at all levels of society to engage in collective action, learn to build their own capacities and ultimately act as citizens. He argues that in examining the dynamics of many conflicts, citizenship is an important concept of civil society organization.
Despite the dissatisfaction experienced by aid donors in the context of political instability and ethnic tensions, researchers and development workers agree that foreign aid opens up possibilities for change. Most major external actors in conflict situations are committed to strengthening local capacity and have good intentions. However, the wrong capacities may be enhanced, or the capacities of the wrong people may be strengthened (Smillie, 2001). Often, local people are not engaged as partners but are rather expected to fit into the hegemonic mainstream designed from the top: i.e., the situation confers representatives of the international community a higher degree of leverage in the implementation of reconstruction projects than the local people themselves in the initial development phase (Bush, 1998). In such situations, development is reinvented and come to acquire a new role; it can be viewed as having a capacity for conflict resolution. That is, it is able to alter the balance of power between social groups in the interests of harmony where resource allocation can be perceived as threatening by one social group or another. Whether this is accurate or not, the question of humanitarian intervention has always divided critics of the global peace-keeping agenda.

This chapter has outlined the main theories that have influenced the practices of capacity development. The institutional school, together with the more recent perspectives of civil society and local participation, has provided a framework of analysis that are more appropriate to the realities of developing countries. The emphasis on local institutions gives the development workers opportunities to discover

22 Several articles in *Development* volume 48, No3 discuss this idea (p.16-57)
local knowledge in order to design solutions for poverty reduction and peacebuilding which better suit local conditions. The more recent humanitarian and armed conflict emergencies have impacted greatly the priorities of donors in developing countries, just as new approaches in the role, functions and validity of civil society actors have to be re-evaluated. The support to civil society actors in peacebuilding is commanded but it does not necessarily lead to the expected progress. The following chapters look at the specific case of Burundi to assess the impact that donors have had on local organizations in the last decade.
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

This research is an exploratory, focused comparison study. It is intended to contribute to the analysis of civil society roles in post-conflict development in general, and in the case of Burundi in particular. The research is designed to explain the patterns of behaviors and relationships existing between aid donors present in Burundi and civil society organizations, in order to assess how donors contribute to the effectiveness of local actors in the peacebuilding process.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, ownership and local participation in policy decision-making mechanisms are key elements in today’s development discourse. The analytical framework of this study is therefore based on the belief, widely held among development organizations, that the contribution of CSOs to democratic governance and peacebuilding is central to development, although many challenges and doubt exist as to their sustainability and impact. Drawing on the findings of Hadenius and Uggla (1996), the contribution of CSOs can be evaluated on the basis of three criteria: their autonomy (leading to effectiveness in influencing state actors), their multiplicity (increased number of popular organizations), and their organizational diversity (the range and variety of groups and interests that form networks).
This study tests the hypothesis that in emergency situations, donor policies encourage the criteria of multiplicity and organizational diversity, while the criterion of autonomy remains the greatest challenge. This failure to encourage autonomy results from both political and programmatic factors: the political needs on the ground require the donors to emphasize public institutions, with minimum support to CSOs which they encourage to flourish. Furthermore, the typical short-term project approach to CSOs’ programs neither leads to the sustainable results sought by donors, nor to the autonomy of civil society organizations that is necessary to fulfill their expected role towards state actors.

### 3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To explore this hypothesis, three questions were designed to examine the relationship between international organizations and CSOs in Burundi:

**Question #1:** *What types of strategies are used by major donors in Burundi to engage actively in capacity development of local NGOs and how is the delivery of assistance structured?*

Not all international organizations present in Burundi necessarily work with local NGOs. To answer this question, the donors who have a clear objective of local NGOs’ capacity building in their mandate are studied. Strategies indicated in donors’ missions
and objectives will show whether or not they address civil society strengthening and what domain of activities they promote to achieve this goal.

The second part of the question asks how the type of assistance for capacity development is delivered. This involves an analysis of service delivery, whether services are directly given to a counterpart local CSO or indirectly through another development organization or a government entity. Sub questions to question #1 imply:

a. The sampling of the donors engaged in capacity development: e.g., bilateral, multilateral or international non-governmental organization (INGO), or national NGOs;
b. The type of capacity development involved: individual, group or organizational;
c. The group (for example: women, youth, traditional leaders, political leaders) or sector the donor supports (media, health, human rights, etc.), and the criteria used in choosing the indigenous NGOs to work with;
d. Whether there is a partnership or linkage with other donors involved in service delivery or not.

**Question#2:** To what extent has the political conflict in Burundi influenced the donor’s engagement or choice of strategies in local civil society strengthening?

The answers to this question presented in Chapter Five will show how the political conflicts in Burundi influenced or motivated the type of activities that the donors
chose to conduct, such as training in conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance or post-emergency reconstruction; or the length of the intervention. The focus is to discover if the activities or project are designed with a short- or long-term goal; and to what extent the activities promoted have a significant impact on the targeted CSOs to sustain themselves in the peacebuilding initiatives.

Question #2 is closely related to Question #1. The political conflict could justify the presence of the donors in Burundi, the local groups that they donors work with, or the partnerships involved in service delivery. Indicators of the type of capacity development interventions to look for are:

a. The amount of money allocated to an activity;

b. Types of activities related to emergency and post-emergency situations;

c. Direct or indirect linkages in service delivery;

d. Duration of a CD intervention (short-term or long-term);

e. The dynamics of the political situation which dictate the necessary interventions; at the national level (certain dates or years correspond to decisive events that mark a change on the political scene or a new dynamic of the conflicts).

Question #3: What are the methods used by donors to evaluate capacity development activities at the local level?
The third question attempts to determine if the donor’s strategies to strengthen CSOs are an on-going process, and if there are tools in place used to monitor and evaluate their efforts. Monitoring and evaluating tools in capacity development prove to be crucial to ensure that capacity development initiatives actually lead to improved performance and effectiveness. The working methods used by donors to monitor their CD activities are compared to the good practices and CD principles identified in the literature review.

Findings of the research are organized according to the research questions. First, an understanding of local organizations in Burundi is necessary to grasp the notion of the role of civil society in the context of Burundi’s political system since its independence. Second, changes in donor policies as a response to the political crisis of 1994 are explained. Third, details of the interaction between donors and CSOs, expressed in prioritized activities, as well as the tools used to build local capacities are presented. In addressing the relationship between donors and CSOs in Burundi, two important issues pertaining to this research arise from the analytical framework:

**Issue 1:** The policies and assistance from the donor community in Burundi have influenced the development and actions of CSOs, but the dependency on foreign aid challenges their accountability and effectiveness.
**Issue 2:** The extent to which ethnic divisions have affected the fabric of the political and social life leads to the belief that the efficacy of CSOs in Burundi is challenged.

To support and verify these statements, the study examines the nature and characteristics of local organizations in Burundi and the different approaches adopted by the donor community to strengthen their capacities. Findings presented from Chapters Four to Chapter Six are expected to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Burundian NGOs today and shed light on the contribution of donors to address those weaknesses. The concluding remarks of the research in Chapter Seven discuss further the relationship characterizing donors and civil actors in Burundi. Major observations arising from the study are presented and questions for further research are pointed out.

### 3.2 SITE SELECTION

Burundi, once known as Urundi, is a small country (27,834 sq km) located on the northeastern shoreline of Lake Tanganyika in east-central Africa. It was controlled by Germany (1896–1912) and Belgium (1912–1962) until gaining its independence in 1962. Its population consists of four groups that are usually qualified as ethnic groups (*ubwoko*): the *Bahutu*, the *Batutsi*, the *Baganwa* and the *Batwa*. These ethnic groups speak the same language and share the same culture. Before it was colonized, Burundi was ruled as a kingdom by the *Baganwa* for over two hundred years, and has been governed as a republic under military rule from 1962. With a large population of 7 million
and very limited natural resources, most of the citizens remain economically poor, resorting to subsistence agricultural farming.

Ethnic tensions have been noticed after independence with short waves of violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi in 1969, 1972, 1988 and the civil war of more than a decade from 1993 to 2005. The violence of 1972 was characterized as a Hutu repression by the Tutsi military power. The civil war of 1993 was triggered by the assassination of a democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, and resulted in the mass killings of the Tutsi population in the countryside.

After the war erupted in 1994, the international community followed the political development in Burundi with great concern. The self-criticism among major powers after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 led to a number of initiatives which all aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict in Burundi where similar historical and political backgrounds exist. Fifteen years later, Burundi is emerging from war and is prime for a study on local level capacity building. Many donors and international NGOs are running different types of programs for both poverty reduction and post-war emergency reconstruction. Reports on those activities can be found, but analytic and research oriented accounts of what is happening on the ground are scarce.

An additional motivation to conduct research in Burundi is related to this researcher’s previous work experience in that country and her familiarity with the official languages used there (French and Kirundi). This has facilitated the contacts needed for
data collection. Given the short time to conduct the survey and interviews (two months), the scheduling of meetings and planned field trips to the different offices could not have been achieved without the use of personal contacts. Some of the individuals the researcher knew eight years ago still work for INGOs and UN organizations. Those contacts helped the researcher to identify the key informants needed and to schedule meetings for interviews to take place within the short timeframe. Personal contacts also provided key documents which would be otherwise difficult to obtain in a timely fashion.

Familiarity with the city, although there are many new geographic sites after five years since this researcher visited Burundi, allowed the researcher to travel easily in locating donors and INGOs offices. Surprisingly, many of the senior staff needed for contact within INGOs were local individuals, and this made it possible to have a perspective from people who understand both local realities and donors’ practices. The researcher’s knowledge of the local culture also facilitated the approach and communication in interviews and in acquiring the necessary information.

3.3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS

The donors in this research include multilateral and bilateral organizations that have been most visible and who have contributed to peacebuilding by funding or sponsoring programs and projects for local civil society strengthening between 1994 and 2005. After the war erupted in 1993, international actors became increasingly active in finding political solutions to the conflict in Burundi. Parallel to political negotiations, an
impressive number of international organizations came to Burundi to support humanitarian and political responses from 1994 onwards. The first significant peace treaties occurred in 2002 and 2003 followed by a favorable shift in development policies from donors who wanted to move from humanitarian assistance to a more post-conflict reconstruction development model. The peace accords of 2002 and 2003 led to democratic elections of 2005. This study’s goal is to analyze the trends of assistance, particularly the share given to local organizations from the period when international organizations came to Burundi in great numbers (1993), to the time when a democratic government was in place (2005). The researcher continued integrating and complementing data that might reflect the changes in donors’ policies in peacebuilding support after the elections, from 2005 to 2008 when the researcher administered the survey and conducted interviews.

In this research, INGOs are considered among the group of donors since they are the vehicle of donors’ assistance and most visible to the population. The perception among many individuals in small local organizations is that donors are those organizations that interact with them and provide the assistance needed.

In addition to bilateral and multi-lateral donors that show involvement in strengthening local organizations, this researcher obtained an official list of 94 registered INGOs in 2005 from the Burundi Ministry of External Affairs and Cooperation where all the international organizations register and report their mission and activities. Theoretical sampling was used to identify the donors and NGOs to study. The method
meets the criteria of the grounded theory mode of analysis (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It is based on the practical ground that the researcher knows in advance what data to collect and where to find it.

Organizations were selected following three criteria:

1. To be listed as an external donor or an INGO in Burundi and to be registered as such with the ministry of external relations and international cooperation.
2. To have a stated mandate to support local NGOs or have one or more objectives to do so in their programs and projects.
3. To have operated in Burundi for at least two years.

The criteria were applied to maximize the input and validity of information received. For the first criterion, given the multitude of new INGOs in Burundi after 1993, the researcher felt the need to rely on official records to increase the validity of the data to collect. In doing so, the first step was to consult official records within the governing authority of international organizations. The second criteria was to narrow the number of organizations to those that are related directly to the subject of the study. Third, the time-frame of two years of operation was judged to indicate a considerable level of implementation and progress of a project. If an organization wants to establish itself in the country, it would take at least a year to open an office, hire the staff, identify potential partners, conduct the necessary consultations for the project before its implementation, and address other operational concerns.
3.3.1 Selection of multilateral and bilateral donors

To obtain official documents and information on donors’ assistance to Burundi, the researcher visited the Office of the National Committee on Aid Coordination (CNCA-le Comité National de Coordination des Aides) in March 2008. This Office was created by the Government of Burundi in 2005 with a mandate to coordinate external aid and commitments made by the international community in Burundi. The CNCA is chaired by the second vice-president of Burundi and is represented by the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and Communal development, Vice-Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finances, Cooperation and Development. The CNCA’s purpose is to improve the coordination of external partners’ assistance at the level of the government itself or between the government and development assistance agencies. From this office, the researcher was able to compare the list of INGOs obtained previously through the Ministry of External Affairs in December 2006 and gather documentation on national strategic planning tools and data. The first list of 94 organizations was reduced to 57. The researcher assumed that the difference for the other 37 organizations was that they did not provide an official account of their activities to the office CNCA. They were therefore were not considered in this research.

Lists of both of donors and INGOs in Burundi as of 2005 that are considered in this research are provided in Appendix C. A sample of international organizations surveyed for the purpose of this study is represented as follows:
Table 2: Representation of surveyed international organizations in Burundi\textsuperscript{23}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Presence in-Country</th>
<th>Organizations Surveyed</th>
<th>No response</th>
<th>Direct involvement with CSOs strengthening</th>
<th>% of Valid Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral/embassies</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN organizations &amp; Multi-lateral</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign governments who may support civil society organizations directly with small grants through their embassies were not directly contacted for the research. The grants are competitive in nature and they are not prescribed within the general mandate of strengthening local organizations. Efforts were made to follow the assistance channeled through development agencies and through grants to INGOs or other international organizations. Among the 13 bilateral donors, 5 were identified through the survey to have a program to support civil society organizations (US, Belgium, France, UK and Italy). The focus on multi-lateral donors was limited to the European Union and the World Bank due to the large share of assistance in most socio-economic development and peace-building sectors. Five United Nations organizations (UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNIFEM, and OCHA) were selected to receive the survey questionnaire and be interviewed according to sector-based activities in peacebuilding. The bilateral and multi-lateral organizations contacted by the researcher are shaded in the table below.

\textsuperscript{23} A complete list of donors and International organizations in Burundi is attached in appendix C.
Table 3: Selection of Donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
<th>Development agency/Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN System [5 organizations]</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMI</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>AFVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAD</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDA</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAVI</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.2 Selection of International NGOS

After thirteen years of civil war, Burundi is slowly gaining peace. Many INGOs have certainly contributed to the seemingly “normal” existing atmosphere, although much has still to be done to recover from the war. What is striking is the number of national and international NGOs that operate in Burundi. In 1998, there were a handful of international development agencies and organizations in the capital city; today their presence is overwhelming. However, not all INGOs working in Burundi have a goal to strengthen local organizations. Among the 57 INGOs identified on the CNCA list, an examination of project documents and discussions between the researcher and senior project staff of INGOs in the capital city of Bujumbura led to the identification of 13 out

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24 Donors highlighted are those contacted directly. The development agencies listed are those represented in Burundi.
25 This situation is not unique to Burundi. Rwanda experienced the same situation shortly after the genocide in 1994.
26 The full list of registered INGOs in Burundi at the end of 2005 is attached in appendices
of 57 INGOs (22.8%) believed to have capacity-building components in their projects and programs. Eight groups of actors out of the 13 INGOs identified (61.5%) were contacted directly for interviews. Those actors are:

a. AFRICARE

b. AFVP (Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès) – French Association of Volunteers of Progress

c. SFCG (Search for Common Ground)

d. ACORD (Association pour la Coopération et la Recherche pour le Développement) – Association for Cooperative Operations Research and Development

e. AAI (Action Aid International)

f. CARE International

g. ARCANE (Appui et Renforcement des Capacités des Acteurs Non-Étatiques) – Support and Capacity Building Project for Non-State Actors

h. GLOBAL RIGHTS

Representatives from CARE International, Action Aid International and GLOBAL RIGHTS were not available for interviews. However, sufficient information on their activities related to civil society strengthening were obtained from the organizations’ web sites and from the INGO AFRICARE which works closely with these organizations for certain projects or activities.
3.3.3 Identification of civil society organizations

An existing study by Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) identified more than 1,400 civil society organizations as of 2001. Most of these organizations were established after 1980, with the movement towards democratization and after the first democratic elections in 1993, which led to the civil war and the need for civil society organizations to respond to the humanitarian crisis. A classification of these organizations and a closer look at their operations will be analyzed in Chapter Four of this study. The selection of CSOs to visit or research was guided by the 10% of the local organizations that are known to be operational and that work directly with the international community\textsuperscript{27}. Interviews with four key national scholars who have researched local organizations and who have worked with different donors were conducted and visits to selected CSOs were made to collect data. The selection of CSOs to visit was based on their visibility and their sector-based representation. The four umbrella organizations selected were:

- FORSC, the International Forum of national NGO platforms
- OAG, The Observatory for Government Action (referred to as \textit{Observatoire})
- RESO, a federation of international NGOs working in Burundi
- LIGUE ITEKA, a national human-right based NGO
- CAFOB, (\textit{Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi}) – A coalition of women’s associations of Burundi

\textsuperscript{27} The estimation is drawn from the same study.
The coalition CAFOB was contacted for a field visit and interview but the meeting did not occur due to conflicting schedules. Because the number of CSOs is overwhelming and since the goal of the study is focused on donors’ strategies to strengthen local organizations, the researcher focused primarily on international organizations. However, field visits and discussions were targeted towards coalitions or umbrella organizations of CSOs. Coalitions are an important new trend for coordination and lobbying purposes and are found within many sectors, themes of activity or groups of interest. Examples include coalitions of women lawyers, coalitions of media organizations, civil society activist organizations, and others). Chapter Four elaborates on the types of CSOs found in Burundi and the nature of activities conducted by these organizations.

3.4 METHODOLOGY

This study uses qualitative and quantitative research methods for data collection, document analysis, survey design, and data analysis. The methods borrow from different resources in social research for case studies and exploratory research (Coontz, 1999; Denzin, & Robin, 2005; Rubin, H. 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 2008). Two field visits were made in Burundi where the researcher collected most of the data, administered the survey questionnaires to local NGO staff and representatives of donors, and conducted face-to-face interviews with key participants.
3.4.1 Data collection and methods of analysis

The field visits were made in Burundi for a period of two months, in December 2006 and April 2008. Primary data was collected; and the survey and interviews were administered during this time. However, gathering secondary data on capacity development, civil society and peacebuilding was carried out during post-graduate studies and combines both the knowledge gained from peace studies and international development from 1998 to 2002. Although there are a limited number of similar studies pertinent to the relationship between international organizations and civil society in Burundi, efforts were made to explore any relevant resource that was available on local capacity building, the scholarly literature on peacebuilding and reconstruction, and field reports or professional papers from aid practitioners.

Data collection methods

To answer the research questions, the data was collected through three sources: expert interviews, survey questionnaires, and professional reports from international organizations. The questions asked on the survey and in interviews were designed to find answers to the research questions stated in the research design.

Survey questionnaire

A survey questionnaire found in Appendix A was the appropriate tool to use in order to reach the different organizations that operate across the country. The questionnaire was used to clarify the mission of the different organizations, the prioritized projects and activities, and financial data related to programs. The questions
were developed by the researcher, reviewed and approved by a committee of academic advisors at the Graduate School of Public of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. The committee members include:

Dr. Phyllis Coontz, associate professor, coordinator of doctoral studies; Dr. Louis A. Picard, professor, academic advisor; and Dr. Paul J. Nelson, associate professor, academic advisor. Dr. Nelson is the committee chair of this work. A forth committee member, Joanna Quinn is associate professor at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario. Professor Quinn has done extensive work in the country of Uganda and is familiar with the African Great-lakes region.

Closed-ended questions with multi-choice responses were used in the survey to indicate the type and mission of the organization, the group and sector of activities in peacebuilding, and indicators in identifying certain methods and tools in capacity building. Open-ended questions were limited on the questionnaire, except for the last question where the respondent was asked to express the challenges of civil society organizations and their personal opinion on the subject of the research. The time to complete the survey was approximately 30 to 45 minutes per respondent.

- **Part I** consists of 5 questions to identify the nature of the donor (bilateral, multi-lateral, or INGO), the length of their presence in Burundi, the mission or the mandate of each organization in Burundi, the local organization counterpart if one exists, and whether the donor provides direct or indirect assistance to the
organization.

- *Part II* includes seven questions to collect information on the types of programs that involve local organizations, the types of CD activities that are carried out and how the conflict in Burundi influenced these activities. Part II also addresses the length of projects or programs, the partnerships involved in service delivery and the amount of money allocated to the projects.

- *Part III* comprises six questions that address the methods used by donors in assessing the progress or the success of CD activities and programs.

**Professional reports**

Various reports were used to gather historical data and to complete the data collected from the survey as well as the other secondary information from international organizations. Humanitarian organizations and other INGOs working in Burundi produce reports that detail their priorities and activities. The selection of field reports was based on their content whether or not they contained relevant data to the research. Approximately 60% of those reports were obtained during visits to donors, INGOs and CSOs. A number of other resources also comprised of web-based documents from organizations that have available web sites. During the stage of data analysis, the reports were organized and grouped according to the relevance to the research questions. Similar case studies in the region concerning other emergency or post-
emergency countries such as Rwanda, Uganda or DRC were also reviewed to compare and discover similar trends or differences where appropriate.

Particular attention was put on discovering the links between policies in conflict-affected countries and civil society capacity strengthening. The existing development literature on governance, peacebuilding efforts and policies, rehabilitation and reconstruction policy documents and programs reports were also a major source of information. Resources such as the World Bank’s (WB) *Country Assistance Strategy* (CAS) or *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP) were also consulted. Such resources may only provide general guidelines for the development priorities in any given country or region. They are, however, tailored to the needs and circumstances of each country and can reveal a framework of assistance given to Burundi. Chapter Five of this research indicates that a systematic application of the PRSP continues to be a major tool for donors, even in countries emerging from war where special considerations particular to a country need to be addressed. The interest in analyzing such documents was to verify any existing or prescribed strategies for strengthening local NGOs in order to link them to the current practices on the ground.

The information collected from the survey questionnaire and the professional reports led to the identification of donors and INGOs who address specifically civil society capacity building as referenced in table 8 and 9 in Chapter Five.
Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were judged to be the appropriate method to gather the perspectives of experts from identified organizations who know the different development actors in Burundi and who can give a professional and more informed opinion on the strategies and actions of both donors and civil society organizations. Interviews also provided an opportunity for the researcher to gain an explanation as to missing data from professional reports and the survey. The same questions were asked to each expert interviewed to assure comparability when analyzing the answers.

Experts interviewed were identified with consideration given to their positions within the organization of interest, and to some extent, to their reputation in terms of the role played in the international development community. In total, 21 interviews were conducted: 12 donors’ representatives (UN, bilateral and multi-lateral), 5 representatives of INGOS and 4 key national scholars who are regular consultants of international organizations in matters of institution building. Donors and INGO representatives were senior staff members or program managers, knowledgeable about the general framework of operations within their organizations and the programs conducted in Burundi. The positions of people interviewed are given in Appendix A.

Two scheduled interviews with representatives of local human rights NGO and a women organizations’ network could not take place due to unexpected schedule-conflicts from the respondents. A representative of CARE International received the researcher’s letter of introduction but did not respond to the request for interview; and a
scheduled appointment with the INGO Action Aid International (AAI) was cancelled by their office due to the unavailability of staff mandated to provide information about the organization’s operations. Table 5 captures the response rate of interviews conducted:

Table 4: Response rate of interviews conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Targeted sample</th>
<th>Survey Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Lateral and UN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviews took place in the capital city of Bujumbura during the months of March and April 2008. The telephone was used to request interviews and a letter from the researcher’s academic committee members was used as a way of introduction.

All 21 interviews were conducted one-on-one and by note-taking. A statement of confidentiality was provided and permission for taking notes was sought by the researcher before the interview took place. The decision was made not to use a tape recorder based on the researcher’s knowledge of the culture: using such an instrument in Burundi is not favourable in gaining confidential information or when seeking a personal perspective from an expert. Interview sessions lasted 60 to 70 minutes and were structured according to the survey questionnaire described above. After each interview, the researcher summarized the main findings of the discussion for the interviewee upon conclusion of the meeting.
3.4.2 Data analysis

The analysis of data collected was done in several steps. The first task was to identify all the major donors present in Burundi and how they channel their funds. Second, there was a need to establish and group the domains and types of activities of intervention per each organization contacted. Third, the core of the research concentrated on identifying the links that exist between: a) donors with international NGOs; and b) donors/international NGOs with civil society organizations.

a. A review of documents and data from the sample of organizations contacted revealed that 95% of all donors support local organizations through grants to INGOs. In 5% of the cases, donors provide small grants directly to CSOs. Exceptions to the small grants are special projects supported by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and European Union where funds are allocated directly for the creation and development of local organizations to conduct certain activities. Such projects seem to be among the few successful CSOs (see the example of Twitezimbere).

b. The most popular and visible CSOs, according to the data collected from interviews and document analysis, indicates that they operate in four sectors: economic sustainability, health, human rights and the media. The four sectors correspond to the priorities identified in the national planning tools, coordinated and used by the Burundi government and donors in general. The sectors take into consideration the needs of the aftermath of war and democratic governance.
in particular. A close examination of emerging CSOs shows that a great number of local organizations are found in those four sectors. In selecting international organizations that support local capacity building, the researcher made efforts to interview at least one expert in each of the four sectors of activity.

c. Identification of the relationship between donors/INGOs and CSOs was examined through the priorities set by the donors within the context of the political instability which characterizes Burundi at present. Efforts were made to compare the policies prescribed by donors in post-conflict situations in other nations to the specific case of Burundi. Peacebuilding theories and donors’ practices applying to capacity building guided this study with an aim to explore their application and draw conclusions for the case of Burundi.

The last stage of the research consisted of organizing and integrating the collected data. As explained in the research design section, some data related to subsequent years to the period of study were incorporated into the analysis to gain more insight on a specific subject.

3.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study of capacity development best practices is an evolving process. The findings of this research contribute positively to the existing literature in the African Great-Lakes region by increasing the exposure of the many challenges faced by local
organizations. Burundi NGOs are emerging and could also benefit from this research. Scholarly reports that focus on their particular environment, their struggles and successes are scarce and it is hoped that this study contributes to this knowledge.

3.6 THREATS TO VALIDITY

There are two threats to the validity of this research. The first threat relates to the un-randomized selection of international organizations which leads to a seemingly low statistical power of independent variables. The problem may be caused by a bias from the researcher that creates a type 2 error or “omitted variable bias” in the selection of variables (King et al, 1994). However, care was taken to select and cover all major players involved in the activities of interest. In a small country like Burundi where people know “who is doing what” in the international development community, chances to overlook organizations involved with CSOs capacity building were limited. The researcher is aware that more meetings with experts could have occurred if not for time constraints; but is confident that, given the few organizations involved with CSOs capacity building, the total response rate to survey interviews of 60% is sufficient to correct this perception.

The second threat relates to the political nature of this study. Donors may not always want to disclose their strategies or intentions and the information collected may have omitted some variables due to the confidentiality involved. Omitted information could be related to the sensitivity of financial data, to political strategies that are behind
decisions to support a program, or simply to the bias that donors attribute to the performance of a country or the local political actors with whom they negotiate the assistance needed. This is very relevant to Burundi where all parties engaged in peacebuilding, whether international actors or their national counterparts, are affected by the ethnic polarization prevalent in Burundian society between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups. Donors may be inclined to help one group over another to reach a certain balance of local participation in political decision-making mechanisms; or individuals in the civil society arena represented by the ethnic group who are in power may find it easier to court international organizations for the support needed. Understanding the role played by donors in empowering civil society actors in Burundi required the researcher to take into account this political sensibility and by so doing I may have omitted asking certain questions related to donors’ perceptions of the power-play between Hutus and Tutsis and how it affects their support strategies. Although exploring this political aspect of relationships could have enhanced this study, the researcher opted to report on what is most observable in order to maintain neutrality of the information collected. In this study, the researcher also tried to keep a minimum account of political debates on the conflict in Burundi for the same reason.

The threats described may have undermined certain aspects of this research; however, it was still possible to advance the knowledge of local organizations in Burundi and their relationship to donors. The analysis of this relationship will be done in three ways: Chapter Four analyses the associative movement in Burundi; the following
chapter looks at the different external players who work with local organizations and the last chapter analyses the specifics of the relationships between the two.
4.0 ANALYSIS OF BURUNDI CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

In the literature review, we have seen the importance and the increasing involvement of local actors in development initiatives as well as in peacebuilding. The examples of South Africa or Rwanda show the emphasis put on traditional instruments in more recent approaches to resolve African conflicts. However, in researching donors’ programs and projects that support indigenous organizations in Burundi, findings indicate that there have been only modest attempts to support traditional systems. In the early years of the conflict, the international actors involved in peace negotiations called upon traditional leaders to play a role in on-going talks. However, opinions expressed by local participants interviewed reveal that failure to provide for continued support of traditional leaders from elected officials or a weak collaboration between traditional and modern systems attests to the deep ethnic divide existing in the Burundian society. The need to understand the fabric of civil society organizations existing in Burundi and their interactions with donors leads to an analysis of the development of the concept of civil society and the image that civil organizations present today. The analysis is based on findings collected by the researcher in 1999 while consulting with AFRICARE, an INGO working with Burundi CSOs, and in 2008 when more interviews with local researchers interested in the subject were conducted. The present chapter summarizes the findings and emphasizes the strengths and
weaknesses of Burundi CSOs. An analysis of ways in which international actors have addressed CSOs’ capacities will follow in Chapters Five and Six.

4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN BURUNDI

In pre-colonial Burundi, non-government organizations as known and described in the literature were non-existent; the core of civil society consisted of the family and extended family clan.\(^{28}\) It is however important to mention the traditional institution of *Bashingantahe* whose power in the Burundian society denotes not only historical political influence but also an instrument for social cohesion. As seen in the literature on peacebuilding, the role that this institution plays or could play should be understood within the more recent cross-cultural perspectives of transitional justice in post-conflict peace processes such as Burundi. The functions of the *Bashingantahe/counselors* in Burundi history were diverse; their traditional roles are described here due to the place of the institution in the Burundian society and the influence it had on the political level.

4.1.1 The institution of Bashingantahe

The *Mushingantahe* (noun: *Umushingantahe*; plural: *Bashingantahe*) is commonly described as a notable, an honest and respected person whose responsibility is to resolve conflicts in the community he lives in at all levels of societal

\(^{28}\) Ntbona, 2002
structure. Traditionally, *Umushingantahe* is an example of morality, a symbol of justice and equilibrium, truth and peace wherever he lives. These qualities are derived not from a power attributed by an administrative authority but rather by his social conduct, a sense of citizenship that dictates his lifestyle. Any candidate who wishes to be invested as *Umushingantahe* must be observed over several years and be guided by senior *Bashingantahe* before he can be sworn in as a peacemaker and guarantor of harmony in his community (Ntabona, 1991).

The body of *Bashingantahe* characterized as an institution was governed by strict rules and procedures. Zénon Manirakiza\(^29\) pointed out that the institution was discriminatory by its nature, a closed circle in which one could not enter easily. The membership was restricted to men over 25 only, and from both *Hutu* and *Tutsi* tribes. Members of the *Twa*, a minority ethnic group could not qualify because they supposedly display a certain insensibility to human sufferings (Ntabona, 1991, 1995). Although wealth was not a criterion, the very poor were excluded from being a candidate. The idea was to limit corruption in conflict settlements and also to encourage a spirit of hard work and a certain level of material independency.

\(^{29}\) A discussion with Zénon Manirakiza, professor at the University of Burundi. He is an invested Mushingantahe himself and has written many articles on the institution of Bashingantahe.
A multi-functional role

The functions of *Bashingantahe* in traditional Burundi were diverse and their power was unlimited in the sense that their authority was never contested. They intervened in disputes from the lowest levels of society to the royal palace.

**Social functions:** The institution was a structure through which society managed and resolved conflicts. Once a *Mushingantahe* was invested he was called upon to mediate conflicts in the private and public life of individuals and families. The body of *Bashingantahe* in each administrative unit served as guarantors of customs and cultural values.

**Political functions:** The network of *Bashingantahe* represented a counter-power system and provided counsel to the political representatives from the hill to the king’s palace. The *Bashingantahe* also played an important role in the initiation, investiture or deposition of the king. In a traditional monarchical system where the king was sacred and a supreme being, authority was pyramidal with a distribution of power from the top to the bottom. The closer to the king, the more sacred (see figure 2 below). The role of *Bashingantahe* was to serve as a buffer against this sacred power through a constant and institutionalized dialogue. They were not political appointees; their moral authority came from the population who invested them at the low level of the pyramid, but assisted directly by a sacred source, that of *Imana* (God).  

30 There is a saying in Kirundi translating into “voice of people, voice of God” which applies to this concept.
For ancient Burundi people, divine protection of morality went through three channels:

a. The sacred royalty;

b. *Kiranga* (religious priest considered as intermediary between God and the person), and other religious practices; and

c. The institution of *Bashingantahe* for the daily management of social life.

**Judicial functions:** In the public eye, the judicial function was the primary role of the *Bashingantahe*. They had the authority to determine the rights of victims according to custom and to decide whether a public trial should take place or not. The types of conflicts they resolved ranged from inheritance disputes, disputes over land use and ownership, disputes over cows and grazing-land, and household disputes. The techniques used by the *Bashingantahe* to resolve conflicts in all domain of Burundi
social and political life relied upon mediation, conciliation and arbitration. In public trials, the *Bashingantahe* consulted and operated as a group and used an open audience to render decisions on public issues, leaving little room for bribery.

The institution of *Bashingantahe*’s influence and power was gradually reduced by colonialism and the different republican regimes from 1963 to 1996 but it has managed to survive to this date. In the course of its historical evolution it has both changed its form and lost some of its prerogatives without losing credibility from the people in the hills who continue to resort to their wisdom.

### 4.1.2 The role of the Bashingantahe during the ethnic conflicts

During the political crisis of 1993 onwards, the killings of more than 250,000 people degraded moral and social values within the Burundian society (Ntabona, 1995). Reports from a study by the University of Burundi, complemented with interviews and surveys conducted by *Le Centre de Recherche pour l’Inculturation et le Développement* (CRID) and UNESCO in 1994 and 1996 respectively, indicate the existence of 30,000 invested *Bashingantahe*. Many of these *Bashingantahe* risked their own lives trying to rescue persecuted Tutsis.\(^{31}\) In several regions, the *Bashingantahe* also organized themselves to stop killers and looters. The *Bashingantahe* were widely sought after to

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\(^{31}\) The study by the University of Burundi was based on a national field study covering 114 communes and the capital Bujumbura. A sample of two elderly men per commune, were interviewed from structured questionnaires on cultural, historical, political, judicial and educational aspects. Additionally, public conferences were organized under the theme of ‘human rights’. Other conferences and colloquium gathering public and civil society organizations were organized to discuss the institution of Bashingantahe, its past and its reinstitution; and gather practical suggestions on how to revive it.
resolve and assist in the settlement of land and property disputes within the context of a large-scale repatriation effort of refugees from Tanzania and internally displaced peoples who came back to their villages after 10 years of exile. Today in some communities, the \textit{Bashingantahe} still enjoy the trust of local people who find it more convenient to resort to the traditional system in resolving their conflicts as opposed to pursuing formal administrative channels. The National Council of \textit{Bashingantahe} has lobbied for inclusion and involvement in the post-war policies of the government but the traditional council has no place in the law for the proposed national truth and reconciliation commission (\textit{Commission Nationale Vérité Réconciliation}). It was also absent in the negotiations between the government and the UN regarding the mandate and composition of the Burundian commission as well (Huyse & Salter, 2008).

During the early years of the conflict, various initiatives were developed by donors to strengthen this customary institution. The UN and UNESCO sponsored studies and explored initiatives to reinstate it. However, both politicians and the population showed some resistance to revive the institution. The \textit{Bashingantahe} have largely lost trust from their communities who would otherwise give them power to function the way they used to. On one hand, the Hutu-controlled government saw the council of \textit{Bashingantahe} as still controlled by the \textit{Tutsi} group; and on the other hand, traditional leaders at the local level clashed with administrative representatives who received their authority through elections. The international community in its role as a facilitator in the peace negotiations usually relies on formal structures and may not see the need to counter these sources of resistance. Unlike in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra
Leone and in most other countries that combine traditional justice and reconciliation instruments with other strategies to deal with the aftermath of civil war and genocide, the institution of *Bashingantahe* in Burundi is neither formally nor informally involved in the actual programming of transitional justice. However, many Burundians as well as local and international organizations consider the revitalization of the *Bashingantahe* as very important. The institution is still widely resorted to and trusted in rural communities. It serves as an alternative to the costly procedures and corruption of the official courts, while it is considered as a force that may stabilize society and stimulate pluralism. The Arusha agreement of 2000 explicitly refers to the importance of solidifying the *Bashingantahe*, and emphasizes their role in reconciliation at the level of the community.\(^\text{32}\)

### 4.2 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS TODAY

The political decentralization, liberalization, and accommodating laws promoting associations of individuals such as the landmark public law of April 1992 saw an outgrowth of local associations. Another important juncture of civil society organizations was the signing of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 which resulted in an impressive growth of different types of associations with different identities, ideas and opinions. At the level of their internal dynamics, urban civil society associations organized themselves around numerous and scattered groups and social spheres. This in itself

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\(^{32}\) Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Arusha: 28 August 2000, Protocol 2, Ch. 1, article 9, paragraph 8
limits the scope of their actions and their impact at the national level. In 2003, an account of 1,405 not-for-profit associations was registered by the Ministry of Interior; by 2006, the number was doubled\textsuperscript{33}. In 2008, more associations continue to grow but only 10 percent can provide an account on the objectives they assigned themselves to accomplish\textsuperscript{34}.

The consequences of the socio-economic crisis of 1993 motivated the creation of many CSOs. These were formed to resolve peacefully the ethnic and political conflict to accommodate the growing awareness of the role of women and youth in resolving the conflict, and address the new social challenges resulting from war such as caring for orphans and the dispersed/displaced population, the problem of child soldiers, and to address issues of poverty and other challenges. All these issues called for not only the government response but also civil society initiatives that prompted them to create spaces for action. The spread of AIDS is another factor that encouraged and increased the dynamic of the associative movement. The study of Sebundandi (2002) indicates that between 1993 and 1999, sixteen associations were created exclusively dealing with AIDS.

Many Burundi CSOs have become effective instruments through which certain segments of civil society can be reached; others have dissolved or changed their activities over time. A closer look at these CSOs is given in the following section. The

\textsuperscript{34} Stijn De Reu classification of Burundi operational CSOs in a thesis report conducted in Burundi in 2005. Sebundandi’s findings on are also similar and the 10% of CSOs fall within the few local organizations that attract external funds.

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study by Sebudandi and Nduwayo sponsored by UNDP (2002) classified Burundi CSOs in fifteen groups according to the sector of intervention and activities. The findings in this section draw from this study in addition to other collected data on Burundi civil society organizations. Efforts of this research concentrated on bringing out the domains of activities from local organizations that attract more donor support.

4.2.1 Classification of Burundi CSOs

The civil society organizations in the table below are categorized to distinguish which group(s) collaborated more with donors or have contributed significantly to the peacebuilding efforts.

Table 5: A Typology of Burundi civil society organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category by Activity</th>
<th>Number of associations/organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Socio-economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Socio-economic and self-help</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mutual aid and solidarity</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Humanitarian and philanthropic</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Think tank, Spiritual and Cultural expression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Education and research</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Religious denominations</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Environment and ecology</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Art, culture and sports</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Protection of human rights, advocacy, civic action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Human rights</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Special interests</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Promotion of freedom of the press and the media</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Youth organizations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Women organizations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Civic Education</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Advocacy for vulnerable groups</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. IV. Non-classified groups</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Sebudandi & Nduwayo (2002). Categories by the author.
A summary of the analysis for each group is given in the following section. Activities of these groups with a significant impact on peacebuilding efforts will be further discussed in Chapter Six.

Findings on the associative movement in Burundi can be divided into two main categories: (1) community associations, and (2) local non-government organizations. Community associations are prevalent in the first and fifth groups, while local NGOS are mostly found in the second and third groups. The latter category is the most active and visible in the area of political reconciliation and peace process and is more pertinent to the questions addressed in this research. A brief discussion of each group follows.

**Community associations**

From the sample of surveyed community associations per commune in the provinces of Burundi, members of these associations represent 3 to 5 percent of the population. The number of community associations is estimated at approximately 300 per province, or an approximate number of 5,000 groupings in the whole country (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002).

Most of these community associations were created after 1993 and are dominated by female participants (up to 60%). Approximately 70% of the associations have fewer than 30 members, the average for each group being 15 to 20 members. 80% have agriculture and breeding as their main activity, and some among them were created for common interests and with a long-term perspective. Self-help, solidarity and
economic survival are the main characteristics of the rural associative movement. The themes reoccurring in their names and objectives pertain to development, peace and motivation to work.

There is also a tendency to network among different groups in order to have a stronger voice and more influence in negotiating, for instance, to obtain better selling prices for their agricultural products, fertilizers, etc. External (foreign) development NGOs also encourage partnerships among small community organizations to better provide institutional support and coordination. Development agencies generally require them to have a certain organizational structure and impose conditions for their support. To that end, some of the groupings flow from that type of initiative, either as a requirement from a supporting donor or to attract external funding.

Community groupings play a significant role in poverty alleviation and other social functions such as consultations with other social entities or administrative structures. In their communities, we also see them more and more involved and associated in local administrative decisions which increase citizen participation. However, apart from a few associations that received considerable technical support from development agencies most of the community associations are still in their embryonic stages. The community groups in this category correspond to what Richard Holloway (2001) describes as mutual benefit-organizations. They are characterized by individuals who join together to form an organization in which they are members, where they have a governance function to elect officers and from which, as members, they
derive benefits. Such organizations may be very small community organizations in a particular geographical area—or large and national in scope. Group 1 on Table 5 above exemplifies the definition of this type of organizations.

**Local NGOs**

The research focused more on this category since their activities attract attention from donors trying to find solutions to the socio-political conflict. Burundi NGOs are mostly the product of an internal movement that responded to the needs of the moment after the war in 1993, but are also the result of initiatives and encouragement from the donor community. In fact, support for NGOs in countries affected by war has been a main focus among major donors for many years. Besides contracting international NGOs as distributors of humanitarian aid, donors have also looked to country-based civil society organizations to carry out an increasing number of roles in pursuit of development, democratization and conflict management. Among others, these tasks have included:

- assisting the government in providing social and other services;
- mobilizing social demands to put public pressure on government to be more responsive to public needs;
- monitoring the state and playing watchdog with regard to human rights and corruption;
- convening issue-specific dialogues between disputing leaders or groups; and
o working at the grassroots level in order to foster inter-group reconciliation through sectoral projects and mediated conflict resolution.

All the programs supporting NGO activities and capacity-building are initiated as a way to foster the progressive emergence of a broad civil society, one that both supplements the state in providing for public needs and makes governments more responsive to their populations.

**Group 1:** economic activity and self-help or mutual-benefit category represents roughly 38% of all organizations. These groups have grown significantly in Burundi over the last few years to support community development at the level of each province. The two groups include people who come together for different reasons: they might share the same ethnic, educational or social backgrounds or originate from the same region. With the effects of war and after the 1992 law favoring the development of private associations, the need for individuals to reduce poverty and develop their native provinces was felt. Associations engaged in diverse sectors and activities related to water and sanitation, agriculture, infrastructure rehabilitation, etc. were developed. The growth of socio-economic associations can also be attributed to the introduction of participative development that encouraged professionals such as engineers, economists and sociologists to group into associations and provide a technical link between donors, the government and community organizations.
**Group 2: Think tank; spiritual and cultural expression.** This is the second largest category as it represents 34% of all the organizations. Organizations in this category deal with the betterment of the quality of life, intellectual and physical fulfillment. In the education sector, many research, training and adult literacy centers opened around the country in the last ten years or so. Additionally, numerous private schools in the capital city and new post-secondary institutions in other provinces responded to a real need in the education sector, but also contributed in inciting local economic activities.\(^{35}\)

Religious organizations and new congregations is another category of non-profit organizations that have flourished recently as a result of the development of evangelical and charismatic movements. Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and other religious congregations have created youth and women associations that pursue social, economic and cultural objectives. These associations attracted a large membership, and responded to the need for direction and the anguish that people felt during and after the war, as well as the many deaths caused by HIV/AIDS.

Protection of the environment is another growing sector. The worldwide ecological movement has triggered very dynamic national and international programs to support the awareness and the preservation of the eco-system. Many associations were created to respond to this movement and also to attract funds from the international community.

\(^{35}\) The opening of the private university of Ngozi triggered the construction of hotels and restaurants in the province, and other dynamic economic activities.
Group 3: a) *Human rights, advocacy and civic action.*

Among this group, human rights and media-related associations have grown remarkably and have played a significant role in the peace process. Under the human rights theme, *Ligue ITEKA*, the GAPS (*Groupe d'Associations pour la Paix et le Secours*) and CADH (*Cadre d'Association des Droits de l'Homme*) played a significant role since 1993 to defend a wide range of individual, civil and political rights. There are other organizations that promote and defend prisoners' rights, children and women's rights. During the civil war, human rights organizations mobilized to denounce violence and tried to instill in the Burundian society the culture of neutrality and impartiality. Other religious and women’s organizations intervened during the crisis to provide urgent care for the displaced population and participated also in the sensitization of tolerant behavior, peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and respect for human rights.

Group 3: b) *The non-profit media organizations*

Under this group of organizations, the promotion and protection of the freedom of expression has been flourishing a great deal and has equally attracted a lot of national attention and support from the international community. Up until April 1992, the press was governed by the decree law numbers 1-136 of June 1976 issued under the first republic. Article 6 of the law stipulated that Burundian journalists had to abide by the ideology of the country’s unique political party, *Uprona*. Although the decree did not specifically impose a monopoly of the state over the radio or the press, it did ratify the control of the state’s political party over the conduct of journalists. President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza under the second republic made the law even more specific by
officially installing the control of radio and television by the state. The media at this stage were sponsored by the state and included the National Television of Burundi (RTNB), the daily French language newspaper *Le Renouveau*, the weekly newspaper in the national language Kirundi, *Ubumwe* and the Burundian Press Agency, *l’Agence Burundaise de Presse (ABP)*.

The Constitution of Burundi today recognizes freedom of the press through an amendment passed on February 28, 2005 (article 30) and Law no. 1/025, passed on November 27, 2003. Article 3 regarding the press stipulates that in order to exercise the profession, a journalist has the right to access information sources, investigate, and comment freely on the facts of public life. However, although the law conforms to international standards, its enforcement is often problematic. In reality, journalists encounter numerous difficulties when they try to approach certain political leaders for interviews or reports. The issue is more visible in the provinces, where local authorities (political, military, police) frequently and deliberately violate the laws that establish freedom of speech.\(^36\)

In principle, public and private media are equal under the law. In practice, the public media has been given preferential treatment since independence up until the new liberalization of non-government organizations. During this time, private media was non-existent and the National Radio-Television of Burundi (NRTB) and the Burundi Press Agency had a monopoly. Even with freedom of press, private media today are more and

\(^{36}\) Media Sustainability index (Africa) 2006-2007, p. 48. International Research & Exchange Board (IREX)
more associated with the actions of the government and other public institutions. However, very often it is the state-run media that suffers from censorship enforced by the ministry of communication. No information published by the state-run media can be unfavourable to a member of the government as long as he/she is in office. The public media receives state subsidies, while the private media does not.

Generally, the introduction of independent media influences the quality of public broadcasting in a positive way, as the latter no longer serves only the government’s interests but is more and more concerned with the needs of the population. Unlike in neighbouring Rwanda where the radio was used to incite violence and promote ethnic division prior to and during the genocide of 1994, Burundi has learned positively from this experience recognizing the power of the media, particularly radio, and by channelling this power to build peaceful reconciliation. A good illustration is Studio Ijambo, sponsored by the INGO Search for Common Ground (SCG) in promoting many peace reconciliation programs broadcasted since 1994. USAID was one of the major donors who funded these programs through the SCG. Common issues usually addressed are related to peaceful reconciliation and discussion of current political problems.

Despite the positive evolution in terms freedom of the press and the increasing number of independent stations, major obstacles complicate the existence of public

37 Evan Palmans in her discussion the development of public and private media in her article “Médias et Élections au Burundi: l’expérience de 1993 et perspectives pour 2005” recounts how the media have played different roles during the crisis and throughout the elections.
broadcasting as well as private stations. Among other things, the political party affiliation of some media figures or the tendency of the government to control the materials broadcasted, compromises the freedom of the press.

**Group 3: c) Women’s organizations**

Sustained conflict in Burundi for more than a decade has resulted in a disproportionate number of women being forced to play non-traditional roles as head of households and to assume other positions of responsibility for which many are ill-prepared and unsupported. An awareness of their roles and the need for their contribution to the peace process increasingly grew after 1993, and many women formed associations or coalitions to create a stronger advocacy voice. The association *Dushirehamwe*, for example, is a network that reaches several thousand women throughout the country and has more than 35 associations. One of its initiatives is the creation of *Cadre de coordination des organisations féminines pour la consolidation de la paix et la mise en œuvre de la résolution*, or “Cadre,” that addresses several issues related to human rights, youth, and conflict resolution training. Another example of coalition initiatives is CAFOB, that groups together more than 40 associations. Coalitions of associations work in areas of peaceful reconciliation, conflict resolution training, fight against HIV/AIDS and economic development. A closer look at the role of women in peacebuilding activities will be discussed in the chapter addressing CSOs’ capacity building.
4.3 OBSERVATIONS ON BURUNDI CSOS

4.3.1 Making a difference

The considerable growth of Burundi CSOs, although still nascent, has brought positive contributions to both the democratization process and peacebuilding endeavours. From the researcher's observations and findings from experts' reports, many local organizations have intervened in numerous sectors of economic and political life, although the impact of their operations remains modest. More and more CSOs are providing a space for fulfilment, self-expression and ethnic tolerance. Internal and external observers agree on the many weaknesses that face Burundi's CSOs. However, many organizations have greatly invested themselves in certain areas such as the media, human rights, assistance/protection of vulnerable and marginalized groups, and the fight against HIV-AIDS.

Sebudandi's report (2002) stated that the proportion of operational and successful CSOs is estimated at 10%, representing around 70 organizations out of 700 non-profits registered. There are several influential local organizations that have been at the forefront of bringing positive change that are worth mentioning:

- The Burundian Human Rights organisation, Ligue Iteka and the Association des Femmes Juristes (Association of Women lawyers) have established network structures at the community level to assist in the resolution of conflicts, in response to the slowness, complexity and costs of judicial procedures in the formal systems. One of
their initiatives is *cliniques juridiques*; comprised of paralegals that provide advice, try to mediate in conflicts, or that orient people toward the proper institution. They work in collaboration with *Commissions Justice & Paix* (J&P) *Commission Episcopal Justice & Paix*, a national body established in 1999 by the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Burundi (CECAB) in all Dioceses as well as in 90 of the 132 parishes of Burundi. In the domain of human rights and peaceful reconciliation processes, we see organizations of women, professionals in matters of law, and religious organizations coming together to collaborate and contribute to peace and reconciliation in their local communities. Their interventions range from non-violent conflict resolution training to raising consciousness about peaceful coexistence and human rights, to making alerts on human rights violations and to implementing the different peace agreements.

- The Women’s Peace Programme (WPP) started in 1996 as a direct response to needs identified by women and women’s organisations working for peace in Burundi, Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region. Since 1996, WPP has facilitated dialogues between women from different ethnic groups in both Burundi and Rwanda as well as in the Diaspora.

- Media organizations including private radio stations *Radio Publique Africaine* (RPA), *Isanganiro*, and *Bonesha* have managed to produce objective and well-researched reports in the last five years. RPA is very popular and broadcasts in all provinces. The radio played an important role in August 2006 and contributed to the freeing of eminent political prisoners who were accused of an attempted coup against Burundi institutions. Managers of these stations were also sent to prison after they
proved that while the government accused former president Domitien Ndayizeye of an attempted coup, the coup had been in fact plotted by the authorities in order to muzzle the opposition.

- CAP (Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix-Company for Peace Apostles), has been known for making a difference in the polarized political crisis. It is made up of Burundians from the two main ethnic groups holding positions of influence in political parties, the army, the parliament and the administration. Their objective is to develop dialogue and peacebuilding among themselves and their peers, and the group has played an influential role in the Arusha peace negotiation. For several years, this group was the only forum where grievances from both ethnic groups could be discussed. Political events in 1999 put a great strain on the trust between group members, but CAP came out strengthened by the crisis and has since been very active in organizing meetings and conferences between parliamentarians and army officers. During political negotiations, the group also extended meetings and dialogue abroad between internal groups and groups of Burundians in exile. Other organizations made visible impact within alliances. Such organizations are discussed in the section of strategic partnerships.

4.3.2 Weak representation and financial dependency on external support

A look at the number of Burundi CSOs can appear impressive considering the size of the country, but not all registered associations are operational. In their research, Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) notes that 63% of the community associations and
local NGOs surveyed have fewer than 100 members and that the degree of engagement remains weak. Even when they are operational, they remain fragile due to the fact that they have neither the resources to independently finance their activities nor the appropriate strategies to raise money (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). Most visible and sustainable local NGOs operate in the capital Bujumbura and represent 48% of the associations/organizations of the survey. Only 15% of them have representation in other provinces. The table below reflects the size as well as the operational budget of the organizations surveyed.

**Table 6: Size of CSOs' membership and operational budget in 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership #</th>
<th>% of organizations</th>
<th>Annual Budget (US$)</th>
<th>% of organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0-500</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>500-1000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-500</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,000-3,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,000-5,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-3000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-5000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20,000-50,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000-150,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000-200,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000-500,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Sebudandi & Nduwayo (2002).

The sample utilized above comprises operational CSOs, i.e., those organizations showing in their records an annual operating budget and activity reports. The sample represents about 25-30% of the 1400 organizations surveyed in Sebudandi and Nduwayo’s research of 2002. One will notice however that, even among this category, 12% of the CSOs operate with a budget less or equal to $500; and only one fifth of the CSOs have a budget in the range of $20,000 to $50,000.
Considering the existing relationship between those organizations and the donor community, some CSOs attract funding more than others with respect to their objectives and thematic issues pursued such as: human rights, HIV/AIDS, gender, humanitarian action or the environment.

Community associations grew largely to attract external funding and do not even have minimum proper funds. Only 10% of community associations are financially viable and can be considered as success models according to research published in 2002 by Stijn De Reu. 38

4.3.3 Missing link between community associations and NGOs

A characteristic of Burundi association movement is that organizations and associations operate in isolation and therefore do not have representation in the countryside. They thus fail to create links with community groups. Provincial or regional economic development associations are initiated in the capital Bujumbura or provincial main towns but often do not involve the peasants or grassroots groups. Interviews conducted by Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) indicated that local people at the collines (hills) feel this void and believe that associations headed by educated natives of the provinces are more preoccupied with politics than community development.

Partnerships among CSOs and consultations with local groups could, however, enhance their functional capacity and their visibility.

4.3.4 Friction between public administration and CSOs

The relationship between public authorities and representatives of civil society organizations is limited and even where it exists, it reflects the difficulty of the administration to break away from the tradition of state authority and control over many aspects of Burundi social, economic and political life. The role of civil society as a counter-power to political actions is hindered by the administration’s reactions which demonstrate hostility particularly when issues related to the abuse of human rights and other civic actions are raised. For instance, private journalists are jailed or intimidated for seeking information and reporting on the actions of a public official. The administration authorities at the communal, provincial or ministerial levels often ignore or misunderstand the role that civil society organizations should play, and do not hesitate to use their power to counter their actions when they feel opposed or criticized. Collaboration between the administration and local associations may exist when an activity or action concerns economic development. The fact that small community organizations do not necessarily collaborate with or receive support from larger NGOs leaves them even more isolated and with less power when it comes to negotiating with administrative entities. A tendency to restrain the growth of a strong and credible civil society by the administration is felt when, for instance, the government attempts to create structures that represent civil society but are governed by individuals who are close to power (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). There have also been instances where
CSOs functioned as a spring-board to state politics, blurring the distinction between civil society and formal politics. While many CSOs genuinely do represent the interests and needs of the local people, many are also connected with the ruling power or elite groups that promote their own vested interests. Furthermore, in cases such as Burundi or Rwanda where the political conflict is characterized by deep ethnic divides, civil society organizations directly experience the effects of conflict on the ground and position themselves within conflict politics and discourses.

4.3.5 Strategic partnerships

Although collaboration between organizations operating in the same sector is not extensive, efforts to create partnerships are emerging. Responses from the survey questionnaire and interviews conducted with representatives of OAG, FORSC, RESO and UNIFEM\(^\text{39}\) confirmed the tendency for organizations to act together and maximize collective actions. According to the representatives of CSOs interviewed the partnerships are made within or across sectors of activities, and the more regional and international partnerships or network they have, the more visible and effective the CSOs become. Data in Sebundandi’s study (2002) and the classification of Burundi NGOs by Stijn (2002) indicate that the listed local NGOs below have dynamic projects, attract resources from donors, and have the reputation to be considered successful:

\(^{39}\) See appendix A for people interviewed.
The Observatoire (OAG) was created in 1999 and groups 18 CSOs with a partnership across three sectors–human rights activists, journalists and parliamentarians–to monitor government performance. Since its creation, OAG has produced many reports and studies ranging from laws and rights on land reform, the Burundi education system, the evaluation of policies and practices in refugee repatriation, critical analysis on the management of public funds in heath and economic sectors, challenges of governance with the new elected officials, the inclusion of women in decision making, and more. Their credibility is measured by the support and increasing number of grants received by donors as well as the size of completed projects.\footnote{http://www.oag.bi/}

CAFOB (Collectif des Associations de Femmes), created in 1997 is a network grouping of 46 women’s organizations who work for peace and development and has a wide range of activities from anti-poverty advocacy, promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, advice on legal matters affecting women, to training in project management and reproductive health. In the area of peacebuilding, it has organized seminars, visited displaced persons in camps, and has participated in regional and international conferences. CAFOB has been instrumental in gaining acceptance of women at the Arusha negotiations. As a result, there is now a delegation of six women with ‘permanent observer’ status representing women in civil society, in addition to four women who are members of political parties’ delegations and the National Assembly.\footnote{Africa Development, Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 & 2, 2005}
Another women’s organization, the *Réseau des Femmes pour la Paix*, has around 40 member organizations operating in the peacebuilding sector.

- **PRAUTAO** - representing peasant solidarity was created in 2000 with 380 community organization members. The network is active and has coordination units operating in four provinces.

- Other newly created network organizations such as **FORSC**, *le Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile* and **CPAJ**, *Collectif des Associations des Jeunes* (with 24 member organizations) are very engaged and contribute toward an active and strong civil society. There are instances where initiatives to network within the same sector are made but are short lived such as the example of **CADH** - *Collectif des Associations des Droits Humains* (Network of human rights associations) or **CASSOC** - *Collectif des Associations de la Société Civile* (Network of Civil Society Associations).

Thirty percent of the organizations summarized in Table 6 above, do not belong to any local, regional or international network. Twenty-one percent have a certain level of collaboration with local partners, whereas 45% of the organizations are affiliated or collaborate with international actors/networks. Discussions with representatives of OAG and **FORSC** confirmed that strategic partnerships are crucial to the development of Burundi civil society in general, and to the success of individual organizations particularly in finding a common voice and managing advocacy efforts. Partnership is not only the key to survival of most CSOs; it is also encouraged by the international organizations that fund most of the activities.
This chapter has discussed the development of CSOs in Burundi and explored emerging groups that are contributing to or have the potential to make a difference in the peace process. Existing or new policies regarding international cooperation are focusing more and more on mechanisms that involve non-government organizations and CSOs in Burundi. Their influence continues to be vital to the development of a strong civil society that is still heavily dependent on external support. The next chapter addresses the place of CSOs in current aid policies.
In Chapter Four, we examined the type of civil society organizations that exist in Burundi. The creation and development of most of these CSOs could not have happened without the support of external assistance to encourage democratization initially and as part of the peacebuilding initiatives of the last decade. This chapter examines Question two of the research and looks at the donors’ provisions to support CSOs in the Burundi peace process and how these policies were influenced by the development of the crisis. In the literature review, we have seen that the strengthening of local CSOs is part of the donors’ new approach to promote the country-driven ownership in peacebuilding. In reference to Lederach’s peacebuilding model discussed in Chapter Two, this chapter investigates how donors reacted to the political crisis in Burundi by examining the programs and projects that were put in place to support local capacity building at the levels described in Lederach’s model.

First, the chapter gives an overview of donors’ current trends in development policies observed in fragile states, and emphasizes their specific response to the Burundi conflict. Second, strategic tools to support the peace-process in Burundi are analyzed, highlighting what efforts were put in place to engage local community and CSOs involvement in peacebuilding initiatives.
Policies described in this chapter are central to the framework of assistance that is observed in fragile states as they provide guidelines on what priorities are put forward by donors in the distribution of aid. To the benefit of civil society organizations that are working to define their place in Burundi, the new policies emphasize an increased role of civil actors not only in post-war reconstruction efforts but also in decision-making mechanisms at the government level.

The analysis of policies presented in this chapter summarizes findings of practices and guidelines of donors of assistance in Burundi following the crisis of 1993. The analysis is based on documents obtained from donors and INGOs in Burundi, together with the general literature on donors’ engagement on civil society, humanitarian relief and peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes region.

5.1 OVERVIEW OF POLICIES

5.1.1 Principles of engagement in fragile states

A review of donors’ support strategies in Burundi during the crisis shows that their policies have not differed from other countries in conflict. In general, apart from some targeted policies such as conflict prevention and reconstruction in development programs, few donors have adopted a characteristic development approach applying to what they call ‘fragile states’. However, donors have recently attempted to address the particular situation of countries where institutional capacity is lacking by developing
agreed-upon principles that should guide international engagement. The new principles involve both the coordination of donors and support for electoral, constitutional and governance activities in order to secure a legitimate and stable environment; to restore basic services including emergency relief; to increase institutional capacity building, and to nurture of an articulate civil society capable of participating in governance. A key feature of the new aid paradigm that explains the increasing attention to civil society building is that development policies have to be internally-driven, and not donor-driven and that ownership can be achieved through broad participation processes. Within this framework and discourse, civil society participation is thus expected to contribute to three interconnected results: ownership, effectiveness in serving the poor and accountability.

In addition to all the benefits that are expected to spring from participation, civil society participation is considered a high democratic value in itself. Low-Income-Countries-Under-Stress (LICUS) such as Burundi are fully drawn into the new aid paradigm, although this poses a problem in that local organizations may need to subordinate their priorities to those of the state, blurring the distinction between their respective roles.

42 The OECD-DAC principles for instance relates to twelve rules that should guide donors’ response (1) Take context as the starting point; (2) move from reaction to prevention; (3) focus on state-building as the central objective; (4) align with local priorities and/or systems; (5) recognise the political-security-development nexus; (6) Promote coherence between donor government agencies; (7) agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors; (8) do no harm; (9) mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context; (10) Act fast; (11) but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; (12) avoid pockets of exclusion (Organization for Economic Development, 2007). Together with the Paris Declaration on aid alignment and harmonization, the principles support participation of civil society in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP), a central tool that is required by donor community the needs for assistance.

We saw the difficult interrelationship between non-state actors and the government in Burundi in the previous chapter. It is not clear how this relationship could be improved under the new aid paradigm. This particular issue is discussed in the conclusion.

5.1.2 Characteristic of donors’ responses to the Burundi crisis

Politics of Stick and Carrot

An examination of the series of sanctions and pre-conditions imposed on Burundi by the donor community throughout the conflict to reach peaceful agreements indicates that foreign aid played a significant role in changing the dynamics of political negotiations during the different stages of the peace process in Burundi.

In the early stage of the conflict, most of the donors froze their aid, as a consequence of the assassination of the elected president Melchior Ndadaye. The traditional donors, Belgium and France, retained their embassies in Bujumbura while Germany’s embassy closed in December 1999. USAID, a major player in the INGOs community, suspended its assistance to Burundi. Structural adjustment credit from the World Bank was discontinued as well. Both the United States and The EU appointed special envoys for Burundi -- Howard Wolpe and Aldo Ajello respectively-- to be involved in political negotiations. While most European countries reduced or completely withdrew their direct assistance to Burundi, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway became more active. A number of international organizations, bilateral donors and
NGOs sent delegations and observers to assess the situation and give suggestions as to what could be undertaken in order to ease the crisis. During an initial period of political confusion, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Burundi (SRSG), Mr. Ould Abdullah, assisted in the coordination of outside interventions and in the assignment of specific roles to the different actors on the scene.

As the conflict evolved, bilateral and multilateral organizations in Burundi and regional countries increasingly used aid as a strategic bargaining tool. First, they imposed strict economic sanctions in the aftermath of Pierre Buyoya’s coup in 1996. Subsequently, they promised financial aid when there was stalemate in the peace negotiations. The threat of discontinuing bilateral assistance or promises to increase it became a primary and unified strategy to make positive changes to the political environment. However, observers agree that the typical donor response to post-conflict situations—cutting back sharply on foreign assistance or freezing aid entirely until a comprehensive peace is achieved--must be rejected. Burundi is one example that illustrates how this negative approach does not necessarily bring positive outcomes. After three years of regional economic embargo imposed by Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999, corruption and embezzlement became the norm when the licit economy deteriorated badly, harming the poorest the most. The International Rescue committee reported in 2003 that the economic embargo, intended to remove political and economic power from the elite, and

“...unfortunately, did not achieve its intended objectives, but resulted instead in the further consolidation of the economy in the hands of the oligarchy. The three-year embargo (1996-1999) stimulated development of a strong illicit economy benefiting those with access to political power and military protection. The distinction between public and private resources was increasingly difficult to make”45

After three years of economic embargo, a window of opportunity to resume foreign aid opened up in January 1999 with a donors’ meeting intended to reward some progress in security and the move forward in internal and external peace talks. Humanitarian aid was extended and doors opened for community and development initiatives. Another payoff came with the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 that allowed the international community to help address some of the structural causes of the Burundian conflict. The Arusha Agreement, signed by nineteen political parties, provided comprehensive recommendations to stabilize and rehabilitate a highly polarised Burundian nation. The Agreement is composed of five protocols, each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peacebuilding. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement. Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of the internally

45 International Rescue Committee (IRC) report No 57: “A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi”, p. 5
displaced population, physical and political reconstruction, and finally economic and social development.

The Arusha accords provide a framework in which the government, donors, and other actors in the peace process can work. The development community was assigned a role in overseeing the implementation of the agreement through the UN-led Implementation Monitoring Committee and the Bujumbura-based donor coordination unit for the implementation of Protocol IV of the Peace Agreement.

On the political front, the Arusha agreement provided a blueprint for power-sharing and the reform of key institutions, and prescribed a 36-month transitional period commencing November 1, 2001. Subsequent post-Arusha agreements were signed in November 2003, resulting in an expanded Transitional Government including the political party CNDD-FDD, the most significant rebel group who had not previously signed the Arusha Peace agreement previously. The remaining active rebel group, FNL-Palipehutu started to negotiate its inclusion in the comprehensive peace agreement in May 2008, and is expected to participate in future elections in 2010.

5.1.3 Effects of the Arusha Peace Agreement on donors’ behavior

In the eyes of the donors, the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement was a clear sign of progress by the warring parties to negotiate power. Donors encouraged it and pledged substantial amounts of development assistance. However, although
pledges were made to resume assistance, donors have been reluctant to disburse money for activities beyond humanitarian work\textsuperscript{46}. This may have been attributed to their concerns about the inability of the transitional government to absorb the funds appropriately\textsuperscript{47}, in part because of continuous, albeit diminishing, physical insecurity and political uncertainties after the first transitional government was in place. Moreover, even though most donors agree on the overall objectives of reconciliation and democracy, each uses different strategies and means, and decides independently on when to deliver the promised assistance\textsuperscript{48}.

The power of the donor community in general and each donor specifically has greatly dissipated because of the different messages given in terms of who is supported politically, the mechanisms for allocation of assistance and the conditions for renewed bilateral cooperation\textsuperscript{49}. The reluctance to disburse funds can be illustrated by the decrease of aid by more than half in a span of ten years. International financial assistance fell from an annual average of nearly $300 million between 1992 and 2002, to an annual average of less than $100 million, and an overall decrease of international aid to 66\%. The spokesman of the World Bank, Raymond Toye, told reporters in 2002

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Table 13, a, b and c.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Mariam Bibi Jooma “We can’t eat the constitution” in Transformation and the socio-economic reconstruction of Burundi. South Africa Institute for Security Studies paper # 106, May 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{48} International Crisis Group (ICG) 2003 report no 57: ‘A framework for responsible aid to Burundi’
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid. This underlines some of the reasons of the mixed messages due to different uncoordinated initiatives and activities: Donors may provide some budgetary assistance directly to the government, co-manage project specific assistance with the government in the areas of health and education, use UN agencies to implement community-based programs, use international NGOs to implement humanitarian and expanded humanitarian programs and support civil society organisations. If uncoordinated or not based on a coherent strategy, this number of actors creates a chaotic and often ineffective situation.
\end{itemize}
how he felt about economic recovery in Burundi, announcing a $54 million economic rehabilitation loan:

"Personally, I would venture that Burundi today is the most preoccupying country in the Great Lakes region in terms of insecurity...Therefore it is of the greatest concern to all parties to get the region back to civilian business and peaceful economic development".\(^{50}\)

From the signature of the ceasefire agreement of 2000 until 2005, there were three donor roundtables and other appeals from the transitional government where donors promised to release the promised funds, but the deadlock had yet to be broken. During the meeting held in Brussels in 2004, donors pledged US $ 1.032 billion but there is little to suggest that even 25 % of this amount ever materialized\(^{51}\). If the donors decide to disburse the promised funds and fully support peacebuilding needs, the funds would go to the priorities outlined in the PRSP in 2007 since the PRSP is the closest strategy developed that echoes many of Protocol IV priorities of the Arusha Agreement.

Data collected from INGOs and donors' reports on funding available for outlined priorities indicate that major donors in Burundi who contributed to emergency funding and the peace process are: the United States, Belgium, and France. Their assistance is directed towards the rule of law, health and education.

- Britain and France jointly fund HIV/AIDS activities together with USAID.

\(^{51}\) Juana Brachet, Howard Wolpe: Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi. WB Social Development Papers No 27, June 2005
o Other important bilateral donors include: Austria (water, sanitation and human rights); Germany (debt relief, conflict mitigation and prevention, democracy, health); and Italy (emergency assistance, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation).

o Key multilateral donors are the World Bank and the European Union. Partner sponsors are USAID/OFDA, UNHCR, UNICEF, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). Many of their key operations are implemented by international and national NGOs.

o The UN organizations provide important assistance, especially UNDP and UNICEF.

During the last decade of conflict in Burundi, each donor developed its own strategic framework of assistance, often through bilateral discussions with the government and not necessarily based on coordinated activities with other donors or with consideration to the existing situation in the country. Donors may refer to the Arusha Agreement as a guide for reconstruction but it is observed is that donors decide on what the best solutions to the conflict are based on their own mandates and priorities.
5.2 NEW TRENDS IN ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND PEACE BUILDING

Three years after the elections of 2005, Burundi is recovering from war. The next elections are set for June 2010 and there are many programs now that are in place to mark the transition from war to peace. New trends in transitional development strategies are observed in donors’ assistance, marking a shift in focus from conflict mitigation to conflict prevention and reconstruction. With this has come a stated emphasis on community development and an increased visibility of CSOs in activities of economic recovery as well as peacebuilding. The donors' transitional strategies will affect future activities and the growth of local organizations as the strategies are embedded into the national strategic framework agreed upon by both the donors and the government of Burundi.

The new trends in donors’ assistance can be summarized by four major aspects of development cooperation that emphasize civil society participation:

- The coordination of strategic tools for funding (financial instruments are meant for effectiveness),
- A focus on community development,
- The participation of civil society actors in the formulation of policies,
- The creation of an integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi, a “strategic framework” to be used by donors and the Government of Burundi.
The four aspects determine the framework of assistance currently given to Burundi. Each strategy of the framework is discussed below to understand how they affect the approach to the participation of CSOs.

5.2.1 New Strategic tools for funding

Donors may have different methods and priorities in the way they have assisted Burundi over the years, but, they have developed new partnerships between conventional diplomatic entities and non-governmental organizations to coordinate external assistance. They now utilize new financial instruments that are meant for effectiveness, e.g., grant programs for small, quick and high-impact projects such as the Multi-Donor Regional Trust Fund for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The DDR program and the security sector reform, together with the demobilization and reintegration programs, are examples of coordinated efforts supported by the UN office in Burundi in conjunction with other key international partners who fund activities for the integration of ex-combatants into Burundian society.

As a result of the new collaborative strategies, donors are funneling aid resources to new kinds of Burundi civil society actors who are participating in peace building programs in their provinces of origin or other focus regions. These actors include, but are not limited to, religious and women organizations, community leaders and the traditional Bashingantahe who remain influential in rural communities. INGOs rely on those local actors to reach the population in remote places and also to carry on the work started when the INGOs projects come to an end.
In interviews, local NGOs personnel and other informants who work for international organizations indicated that local organizations who apply for funds now are very much aware of which priority programs are on the agenda of donors, and local organizations adjust their activities accordingly. What is changed now is that all donors decide on those programs together in most cases; and civil society actors, as well as INGOs and donors, know “who is funding what”. The increased collaboration among donors, the dialogue among the various actors, and the political consultations among all the stakeholders involved in the peacebuilding process have led to a Strategic Framework for an integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi, endorsed by the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This Strategic Framework was launched in February 2007 by the Government of Burundi and its partners — both national and international — around a shared set of peacebuilding objectives. It provides a helpful guide toward reaching these objectives and toward mobilizing the necessary financial and political support. Input to the Strategic Framework was gathered from not only the Government of Burundi but also civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities and political parties to underline the importance of national ownership and of the primary responsibility of the Government and people of Burundi for the consolidation of peace and democratic development.

Going forward, women’s and civil society organizations, religious communities and the traditional institution of *Bashingantahe* have been called upon to integrate the priorities of the Strategic Framework into their missions and programs which include
among other things\textsuperscript{52}: support of good governance; support of justice and the promotion of human rights; and the support of socio-economic recovery. The support given to good governance and promotion of human rights are supposed to nurture the population and lead to socio-economic development. Those areas are where local organizations have strived with the support of donors as shown in Chapter Six.

Support of good governance includes among other things, engaging in dialogue with decision makers at all levels, and the integration of a gender perspective in government policies and programs. The gender perspective is an aspect that donors have emphasized strongly in political negotiations as well as in the programs and projects funded. All the CSOs capacity building activities reviewed for the purpose of this research show that gender is a cross-cutting theme in all peacebuilding and socio-economic activities. Support to good governance is also reflected by an ongoing and effective dialogue within civil society itself and between civil society and other actors on issues related to peacebuilding.

Donors have also stressed educational activities related to peace, a culture of democracy and cultural values promoting reconciliation under the rubric of good governance. Educational activities are integral parts of all programs where CSOs intervene, whether the programs relate to good governance, human rights or socio-economic development. Chapter Six provides the examples of educational activities and the involvement of non-government organizations.

\textsuperscript{52} From the UN document ‘Strategic Framework for Peace building in Burundi’ adopted in June 20, 2007
Support to justice, promotion of human rights and action to fight impunity

Funding under this heading includes a wide range of programs geared toward strengthening the mechanisms of advocacy for issues such as: the prevention and the punishment of gender-based violence; equal access to justice for all citizens, including offering coordinated legal assistance and support to legal literacy.

Support of socio-economic development initiatives addresses the general goal of combating poverty as well as fostering community reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. A particular focus is to encourage the socio-economic reintegration of various groups affected by the conflict: demobilized combatants, repatriated persons, displaced persons, child soldiers and those who remained in the hills, etc.

A strategic planning tool used by donors in resource mobilization and setting those stated development priorities in Burundi is the annual Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)\textsuperscript{53}. The CAP represents an inclusive and coordinated programme amongst the intervening actors in a given country and leads to the Common Humanitarian Plan (CHAP). Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the CHAP is developed at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team. This team mirrors the IASC structure at headquarters and includes UN agencies and development actors, non-IASC members, such as national NGOs, host governments, donors, and other key stakeholders in humanitarian action. The CHAP is the foundation

\textsuperscript{53} Information on this document can be found at the humanitarian relief community web site: www.reliefweb.int/
for developing a consolidated appeal or, when crises break or natural disasters strike, a “Flash Appeal”. The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the annual preparation of the consolidated appeal document. The document is launched globally each November to enhance advocacy and resource mobilization. An update is known as the Mid-Year Review and is presented in July. Donors usually provide resources to appealing agencies directly in response to project proposals. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS), managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a database where donors' contributions can be found.

Key assessment of the situation on the ground and information about donors’ activities are provided in the CAP and CHAP, and address an analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place; an assessment of needs; a statement of longer-term objectives and goals; prioritized response plans; coordinated program implementation; monitoring and evaluation expectations; and a framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary.

Another tool, the 2005 PRSP for Burundi, continues to be the donors’ central reference framework of assistance. The recent innovation is that it identifies a number of peacebuilding-related conditions which would have to be fulfilled in order to ensure the successful implementation of the proposed poverty reduction strategies. New policies introduced in the 2005 PRS peacebuilding address the topics of unequal access and the ethnic dynamics of the Burundi society; the mobilization, coordination and sound management to resources; guaranteed security of person and property; institutional
stability and effective governmental action; reduced expenditures on security and the professionalization of the security forces. These initiatives are considered to be central to the economic rebound as well as to the peace process. Through the PRSP, the government of Burundi reaffirmed the central role of women in development. As stated above, gender is one of the new key priorities emphasized by donors. No strategy will be decided on or implemented unless it clearly ensures the full participation of women in the decision-making process, in the choice of priority actions and more specifically, in their implementation.

5.2.2 Focus on community development

A new trend in donors’ strategies is the emphasis on community development. Donors have put in place mechanisms for government decentralization, and request different degrees of participation by CSOs in the implementation of programs and projects. In those programs and projects, donors usually select the participation of CSOs following set criteria. The efforts on community development are generally undertaken by state actors, usually through the Ministry of Community Development and Reconstruction or the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction. The assistance provided under the heading of community development is referred to as “strategic transitional interventions” and are supported by major donors such as the World Bank, the United States and UN organizations:

- The World Bank has several emergency loans, and the IMF has an emergency post-conflict program. The World Bank’s Program for Community Support is
supported by many bilateral donors who cannot give money directly to the government such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Germany, Sweden and Finland, among others. One successful project for community development sponsored by the World Bank is the local group *Twitezimbere*. This organization has long-standing experience in the field of participatory consultation. It has prepared a methodology document, *the Accelerated Methodology for Participatory Research* (MARP) and on *Participatory Poverty Assessment* (PPA). During the preparation of the PRSP in 2004, the execution of the community consultative component was entrusted to *Twitezimbere* and this attests to the respect that development partners in Burundi have for the local NGO\(^{54}\).

- The European Union has created its transitional support strategy in line with the latest ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. European Union’s ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) deals with emergency reconstruction and agricultural development.

- The U.S. government has three development strategies: a) one for emergencies (OFDA); b) one for transitional support (OTI); and c) one for development (USAID).

- Each UN agency has developed its strategic plan based on its mandate and works on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). It has

\(^{54}\) IMF Country Report No. 05/325-Burundi, 2005
completed the 2003 Consolidated Interagency Appeal for humanitarian assistance.

Other bilateral donors provide support on a smaller scale, through specific programs and projects. Those involved with CSOs do so by providing funds indirectly, in most cases through INGOs, or directly through competitive grants. New themes in development assistance that target community activities include the integration of displaced persons and ex-combatants in addition to new training modalities designed to enhance the collaborative capacities of formerly belligerent parties. CSOs have a limited and prescribed participation in those community activities where they have a partnership with the local administration. The partnership can involve peacebuilding activities but also economic recovery.

5.2.3 A regional approach

Over recent years, there is a developing and growing discourse that the problems in the individual countries of the African Great Lakes region (GLR) are strongly interlinked and should be understood in the context of the region when planning for peace. The countries in this region (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and DRC) face the same issues and problems such as the examples of politicization of ethnicity, the presence of refugees or militia from other countries, the spill-over of

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identity conflicts or the spread of uncontrolled arms in the region. Because of these common issues, it is argued that the efforts and approaches to solve these problems should transcend individual countries and should address regional dimensions of peacebuilding.

The belief that problems in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) are linked and the concern to find regional solutions have witnessed an increase in the regional activities of international organizations, governments, and NGOs as well as CSOs from the GLR. The promotion of regional approaches takes into account the shared characteristics of the conflicts in the region and the lessons learned in addressing them. The regional perspective also goes along with an importance attributed to CSOs in realizing peace not only in the GLR but in individual countries as well. This attention for civil society in regional approaches should be seen in the light of the general popularity of the concept in peacebuilding discourse that considers CSOs as contributing to good governance and democracy.

To that effect, in addition to diplomatic level negotiations (within the framework of Lederach's multi-track diplomacy model explained in Chapter Two), initiatives along the themes of women's empowerment and human rights were undertaken in Burundi by both INGOs and national CSOs at the regional level in peace process strategies. For instance, with facilitation by international agencies, several national CSOs were in

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56 Peter Uvin et al (2004) distinguishes actions at regional level and multi-national activities to address trans-border dynamics; and activities in several countries to address national problems that share common characteristics or that have an indirect regional impact.
regular contact with partners from neighbouring countries to exchange experiences or policy analyses. Some of these exchanges were formalized into regional platforms such as the human rights network *Ligue des Droits de l’Homme dans la Région des Grands Lacs* (LDGL) or the regional association of Catholic Bishops (ACEAC). These two organizations were involved in activities initiated by civil society organizations together with the UN and the African Union to negotiate peace in the region and to promote the exchange of ideas between civil society groups across the countries of the Great Lakes Region: Rwanda, Burundi and Congo.

Encouragement to have regional organizations or collaboration among organizations across the countries of the GLR involved in peace prevention and peace processes is based on the assumption that they can decrease the role of the international community in conflict-intervention, detect conflicts earlier and resolve them more easily. The Organization of African Union (OAU) has encouraged such initiatives and has referred to other similar initiatives such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the East African region, and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).

Regional initiatives and strategies in the African Great Lakes Region contribute positively to the scope of activities of CSOs along with building their capacities. INGOs are involved in these initiatives and seek the collaboration of local and regional civil society groups. Initiatives where donors and INGOs collaborated with CSOs at a regional level include:
Conferences and meetings on peace, democracy, good governance and development in the Great Lakes supported by the United Nations but initiated by representatives of transnational organizations

Exchange visits between the churches on peace and reconciliation initiatives

Exchange visits between universities on food security and land issues, initiated by the Swiss Cooperation mission

Regional meeting on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution chaired by UNESCO, in conjunction with the University of Burundi and CSOs.

Lobby and advocacy between human rights groups

Consultation meetings between women's organizations from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC

There are also regional programs whose aim is to strengthen a broader collaboration of regional African organizations in the African Great Lakes Region such as Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) sponsored by the World Bank; and the program ‘Femmes pour la Paix’ sponsored by International Alert which, through a series of regional trainings, established a framework that enables women to have an influence over policy making. Other programs that have a regional impact are the ‘Global Partnership for Conflict Prevention in Central Africa’ convened by the Netherlands-based European Centre for Conflict Prevention which aims to integrate civil society in diplomatic initiatives for conflict prevention at a regional level. On the
human rights front, the Burundi NGO *Ligue Iteka* chaired a research program on human rights violations in Eastern DRC and conducted training activities with local organizations in monitoring human rights in the region. For the Media, the INGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG) sponsored programs in which journalists from the region were trained collectively to produce radio programs on regional issues.

To reinforce a regional perspective in peacebuilding initiatives, donors and INGOS have created regional offices to mainstream themes and programs with a regional significance. Some examples include the Office of the Special Representative of the European Union (EU); the regional approach from the Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish governments’ support programs; the regional offices for the INGOs Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Action Aid. In Burundi, the INGO Oxfam Quebec replicates its experiences with reconstruction work from Rwanda due to the similarities that exist in both countries.

Although there is a clear desire from donors to fund regional initiatives and engage CSOs in developing regional strategies, Burundi CSOs involvement remains limited. With the exception of organizations specialized in lobbying and advocacy, CSOs often find it difficult to envision regional solutions that relate directly to their work. For many of these organizations, the focus is on reconciling the communities in their countries as they position themselves within the national discourse of conflict in their home countries. They therefore do not see an apparent need for a regional approach in their daily practices. While CSOs might agree that instability in one country has spill-
over effects on the region, not all believe that regional solution to conflicts is appropriate. Rwandese organizations can, however, assume certain comparability in Burundi on the basis that best practices can be replicated, such as the demobilization and community reconciliation in the transitional phase from conflict. Such comparison should be made carefully though. Reijntjens (1994) warned against drawing inferences from such apparent similarities, pointing out differences in the significance of ethnicity between the ‘false twins’ Rwanda and Burundi.

A clear advantage for CSOs is that such regional initiatives provide their members opportunities to network with each other, encounter sponsors, and shape ways of collaboration across borders: e.g., discussions of regionally-coordinated programs among organizations with similar goals, or the duplication of successful programs. Such interventions could target coordinated efforts between influential civil society groups such as regional media and trade networks, or focus on key issues of concern among groups to establish and promote regional programmatic co-operation.

To INGOs involved in regional efforts, regional strategies may be more of an internal organizational effort: e.g., the integration of region-specific themes in diverse country programs or the regional exchange of best practices. Some consider that programmatic regional cooperation may increase operational efficiency, for example the sharing of emergency supplies among country offices. Both national CSOs and INGOs recognize the problem for civil society groups working in synergy at a national level, let
alone the regional level.\textsuperscript{57} This remains a major challenge for CSOs to engage in activities beyond their individual borders, and may prompt the assumption that regional initiatives are an affair for international organizations.

\textbf{5.2.4 Local capacity building}

Within the scope of the new development strategies, building local capacities appears on every donor’s priority list. After the outbreak of violence in Burundi, it became vital for the regional and international community to support and rely on local actors, not only to foster positive change in the political environment but equally to deal with the social and economic consequences of the ethnic divide. As observed in other countries in conflict, two main approaches were utilized by international actors seeking to strengthen local capacities:

The first approach saw financial support channelled through the government down to the local administration. With this approach, capacity strengthening was provided to newly elected officials and investments for training were made in communal and community infrastructures.

The second approach used by donors is to bypass public structures and support directly with the population through CSOs or development INGOs. This approach is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{57} Interviews with representatives of FORSC and ARCANE
State capacity building

Prior to the conflict, there were no clear prevention mechanisms put in place in Burundi by the local leadership to address the type of crisis such as the experience lived in 1993 and thereafter, even though ethnic violence was not new (similar mass killings between the ethnic groups occurred in 1972 and 1988). As in other conflict-affected countries, aid projects prior to 1993 concentrated on state institutional building mostly undertaken by the UNDP, the European Commission (EC) and other bilateral and multilateral funders. The development of infrastructures and broad-based economic programs did not necessarily take into consideration targeted social projects that addressed conditions of injustice, improvement of ethnic relations or inclusive participative approaches that involve all levels of civil society. The late 1980s were marked by a democratization process and donors’ policies aimed at pressuring political change by encouraging multi-party elections and creating incentives of aid increase. After 1993, policies to encourage democratization continued, combined with efforts to bring peaceful political solutions that continued throughout the past decade.

Interviews and data collected from representatives of donors contacted in Burundi indicate that after 1993, the international donor community’s investment to bring peace and stability concentrated on negotiating power-sharing between political leaders to stop the escalation of violence. The international community became extensively involved in many diplomatic channels to prevent another genocide scenario such as the one in neighbouring Rwanda. The Office of United Nations Special Representative

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58 In the case of Burundi, southern provinces where most political leaders originated from were at a clear advantage.
coordinated many efforts and took the lead. In conjunction with the massive humanitarian efforts, many external initiatives were undertaken to reconcile the political antagonists and to negotiate the type of power-sharing necessary for political stability within both Burundi and the region.

State institutional building occurred at several levels: from training the elected authorities after the Arusha Agreement to specific administrative officials in key ministries involved in peacebuilding, rehabilitation, education and health. However, it should be noted that the capacity of government administrators had been weakened by corruption during the civil war, the absence of long-term investment in training, and the co-option of governmental responsibilities by international agencies and NGOs. Government officials openly admit to the discouragement of staff, a high number of whom have since been recruited by international NGOs and UN agencies. Details of state institutional building initiatives are not specifically addressed in this research, but rather on the second approach in order to address the questions of civil society strengthening.

**Subcontracting aid to NGOs**

A general strategy by donors in countries in conflict is to rely on NGOs who can quickly reach the people in need. The trend was observed in Burundi where external NGOs contributed a great deal to the process both of humanitarian intervention and the establishment of dynamic projects that contribute to sustainable peace. Throughout the

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conflict, INGOs in Burundi have represented the sole direct and constant point of contact between the international community and the Burundian population. During the years of civil war, while government energy has been focused on fighting the rebels, international NGOs have taken increasing responsibility for providing social services and have become the primary implementers of bilateral donor and UN programs.

Soon after the outbreak of violence, the inflow of development INGOs in the country went from 23 in early 1994 to more than 80 later that year. In 2007, the number has increased to around 100. Table 7 below provides information on INGOs, the donors who fund their activities, and their local partners.

60 Ould-Abdallah, 2000:16
Table 7: INGOs present in Burundi and source of funding as of 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INGOs</th>
<th>Start date of operation in Burundi</th>
<th>Funder</th>
<th>Local partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICARE*</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>USAID, FIDA, UNDP</td>
<td>Intermediary CSOs, government, community development structures</td>
</tr>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>BMZ, WFP and proper funds</td>
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Data analysis from the author, interview questionnaire and INGOs reports
The list of INGOs in Table 7 shows that five out of twenty INGOs were operating in Burundi prior to 1993, illustrating that most international organization came to Burundi after the war. The need to respond quickly to emergencies explains a large share of humanitarian influx of funds from the donors and an increased number of INGOs who came in the country with the expertise needed in such circumstances.

Most of INGOs came to Burundi after they were forced to leave Rwanda and were contracted by the UN to carry out humanitarian services. These INGOs assisted in relief operations, including health-related services and the distribution of food and non-food services items to displaced populations. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), in 2003 it was noted that during ten years of violence in Burundi,

While government energy has been focused on fighting a war, international NGOs have taken increasing responsibility for providing social services and have become the primary implementers of bilateral donor and UN programs. The majority of international NGOs operating in Burundi are humanitarian in mandate and approach, placing their emphasis on the delivery of immediate assistance to communities rather than building capacity of either the people or the government. Humanitarian assistance has undoubtedly been necessary but the absence of community development or capacity building has had the adverse effect of creating a population accustomed to handouts and steadily losing its ability to care for itself in deteriorating circumstances.

Gradually INGOs relied upon local partners in service delivery and local organizations started to learn from their international counterparts. As seen in Chapter Four, the growth of local organizations stemmed from the wave of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s as the development of local human rights and media structures became essential to this process. In addition, the restoration of Burundi political institutions after the 1993 ethnic conflict required even more local voices to advocate for human rights in general and for marginalized and vulnerable local groups in particular. These needs explain the increased visibility of INGOs and local NGOs in three identified areas of activity: Human rights, women’s empowerment and media. During the years of civil war up to the present time, the International community focused on the support of civil society in those areas of activity.

Table 8 below gives a picture of the most visible international actors who work with CSOs and summarizes their activities during the crisis from 1993. Bilateral and UN organizations included in the table are those who provided primary data and who the researcher contacted for personal interviews. Interviews were also conducted with selected INGOS representatives: SFCG, AFVP, ACORD and AFRICARE due to specific activities they conduct with Burundi CSOs. Additional data was obtained from survey questionnaires, the National NGO Coordination Group (RESO), Burundian organizations FORSC (Forum for civil society strengthening), and OAG (observatory for governmental action) whose representatives agreed to be interviewed.
Table 8: Involvement of donors and INGOs with CSOs: characteristic activities until 2005

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<th>Conflict resolution</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Human rights</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Economic activities</th>
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* Bilateral & multilateral
* UN organizations
* INGOs

* Specific objective to strengthen local civil society
* Data analysis by the author from interview questionnaire and INGOs reports
The organizations in Table 8 above represent about 30% of all INGOs present in Burundi in 2008. They are the most visible and dynamic organizations as they operate in all 16 provinces of Burundi. A large concentration of the 34 INGOs are in the capital city of Bujumbura (15); 13 are present in Gitega, the second largest city; 13 are also in Muyinga and Kirundo, the provinces bordering Tanzania where there are a large number of refugees. The other provinces count between 2 to 12 INGOs operating in different sectors. INGOs with a representation in every province are Action Aid International (AAI), Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), French Association of Volunteers of Progress (AFVP), Lawyers without Borders (ASF), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Handicap International Belgium (HI-B), Handicap International France (HI-F), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Citizen’s Network (RCN Justice & Democracy) and Search for Common Ground (SFCG).

The activities conducted as indicated in table 9 reveal that besides contracting international NGOs as distributors of humanitarian assistance, donors have also looked to international and country-based NGOs to carry out a significant number of other roles in pursuit of economic development, democratization and conflict management. In the first years of peace negotiations, many local CSOs did not have the experience nor the organization required to deal with the tasks at hand. INGOs trained most local organizations that are operational today.

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62 Throughout lists of existing donors and INGOs in Burundi and acronyms are provided in Appendix C.
Humanitarian assistance has been continuous throughout the civil war, between 1993 and 2005. Humanitarian assistance and activities related to women and vulnerable populations take a large share (20-21%) of activities as shown in Table 10, followed closely by projects in conflict resolution, health, economic development and education (17-18%).

**Table 9: Distribution of activities by INGOs from 1993-2005 by percentage of expenditures**

![Bar chart showing distribution of activities by INGOs](chart)

Data analysis by the author

All these activities are related to the needs of the aftermath of war, i.e. addressing deprivations of vulnerable populations in shelter, basic health care and food services, basic infrastructures for education, and short-and long-term activities to alleviate poverty in general.
Fewer INGOs engage in media and human rights work (8-14%), but these activities are nonetheless important and noticeable when discussing how CSOs have developed in Burundi. The issues of human rights and the media are related to the democratization process, and this is where Burundi CSOs have been at the forefront of advocacy and lobbying with the international community. Although the percentage of expenditure is low compared to other themes, capacity building of CSOs involved in human rights, media and women as a cross-cutting theme has been the most noticeable.

From the data on CSOs activities in Chapter Four and the summary of INGOs’ activities presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9, we can draw three important conclusions.

First, external support specifically targeting capacity building for CSOs is limited. A mandate to strengthen local organizations in the peacebuilding process is identified by donors and is supported by many of the INGOs operating in Burundi. However, in conflict situations with pressing emergency needs, donors’ support to civil society actors is overshadowed by political reforms emphasizing more on political actors. Although donors and INGOs’ programs and work involve local partners in one way or the other, those who have a stated objective to strengthen Burundi CSOs represent only 10% of organizations listed on Table 7. These INGOs are: AFRICARE; Search for Common Ground (SFCG); Care International; International Alert; The Association of Volunteers in International Services (AVSI); Australian Relief Program (ARP); Global Rights Burundi (GR-B); Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation (ISCO); Adventist Development and Relief (ADRA); Citizen’s Network (RCN Justice & Democracy); and
Tear Fund. Activities of CSOs capacity building in which these organizations are involved in will be discussed in details in chapter Six.

Second, even with limited funds, the themes of human rights, media and women’s empowerment are dominant in Burundi CSOs’ growth, underlying the need to strengthen the democratization process recognized by both donors and civil society actors. Democratization remains the major concern of donors, and its success would mean power sharing and less violent conflicts. Peace building efforts undertaken by international actors are directed toward this goal of democratization. Programs and projects that support the identified themes of Human rights, media and the empowerment of women activities mentioned above are outlined in Chapter Six. In contrast with other important program activity in health or education, activities that relate to women empowerment, media and human rights themes provide opportunities for INGOs to accomplish related projects within a relatively short period of time of several months to a year or two. In situations like Burundi where the political stability is uncertain and security concerns are high, donors or INGOs do not want to plan for long term projects but rather target immediate results needed for the moment. Activities conducted by INGOs in Burundi detailed in Chapter Six illustrate the focus on the three identified themes which have short-term goals.

Third, strategies undertaken by donors for peace negotiations have relied mostly on political, military and religious actors identified at the top leadership level on Lederach’s pyramid in Figure 1, with minimal involvement of level three actors (local
leaders, indigenous NGOS) who constitute the “grassroots leadership”. The recognized
Bashingantahe who already operated either at level two (Middle-range leadership) were
consulted but debates on their credibility and partiality with regards to ethnicity were
questioned. Because Burundian themselves raised questions on their participation in
peace talks; donors did not put too much emphasis on the role of Bashingantahe in
peace negotiations. Donors did however encourage the revalorization of this institution
and the traditional values they represent in building a culture of peace.

5.2.5 War’s influence on donors’ policies

Donors’ strategies adopted in Burundi have been greatly influenced by war. Throughout the 10 years of conflict, a negotiated peace agreement between the
dominant political parties was a constant condition to obtaining international assistance.
Even today after fifteen years of civil war, the development assistance framework that
exists follows the provisions of the Arusha Accords negotiated in 2002. It is evident that
the international community has been instrumental to the Burundi peace process.
However, the conditional assistance during the past years has hurt the majority of
Burundians and development workers agree that it is no longer appropriate to use
economic sanctions in a country affected by war. In its analysis of the role played by the
international community, the International Rescue Committee agrees that the
distribution of aid should have considered the impact of political and social stability by
developing a more nuanced approach and not necessarily focusing on the economic
factor. External actors have dealt with and focused more on state actors and by doing so, they have reinforced state control over the economy and indirectly, supported the unbalanced distribution of resources and discriminatory policies that consolidated power in the hands of the elite, those few who control political and economic resources. With increased political power sharing, it became clear to international actors that the Burundian conflict was mainly between those who have access to state power, and those who do not, a distinction not solely based on ethnicity but also on other social connections. For instance, it is not a secret among Burundians that regional ties (one’s native province) are crucial in getting access to resources and political power. Regional connections have been central to all political regimes after independence, and regional ties have often overlooked the question of ethnicity, believed by many non-Burundians to be at the heart of the conflict.

On a positive note, donors’ pressure on politicians to put in place democratic structures has encouraged the participation of local associations in democratic processes, and has produced dialogue between ethnic groups. Donors’ policies that contributed to the growth of civil society organizations have been observed only recently within the context of democratization primarily, and later as indispensable partners in the management and delivery of basic services in the aftermath of war. Bringing together both political parties and civil society activists from both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in various national and international meetings on the peace process has helped reduce the tensions created by the ethnic divide and opened up discussions of

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63 ICG Africa Report No.57, 21 February 2003: “A Framework For Responsible Aid To Burundi”
controversial topics on ethnic discrimination, political exclusion and other sensitive issues once discussed only privately for fear of persecution.

On the other hand, the war has also influenced a minority of civilians in negotiating resources from donors in their favor through the creation of organizations that distribute assistance to the general population along the themes favored by donors such as seen in Chapter Four. Many local civil society organizations are not represented by individuals who are close to power or who know how the international community operates. This in itself does not discredit their work, but because the war has exacerbated poverty and corruption, the general population in the countryside perceives the well-off and the new political leaders as corrupt and untrustworthy.

Donors’ support can make a difference in local institutions only if individuals are ready to understand the need for better systems in governance and take the necessary actions themselves to make it work. However, corruption is still rampant and informal discussions with participants in the research have indicated that internal politics have impacted the behavior of donors in some of the following ways:

- Donors may seem to ignore internal politics or turn a “blind eye” to the misuse of aid. This can lead to manipulation by authorities or a network of few individuals who can bargain and control certain outcomes of foreign aid. Increased support of donors for humanitarian and basic services through INGOs and CSOs has led to more money being controlled by individuals outside of the local administrative entities who traditionally distribute aid to the population. The consequence is a
weakened administration and new ways to abuse resources by individuals who get a share in the new distribution chain. Generalized poverty in Burundi has caused the population to distrust the elite, including administrative authorities. Opinions expressed by civil society groups in the PRSP process often mentioned “bad governance” as the most important reason for violence in Burundi, ahead of reasons of war, land conflicts or sickness$^{64}$. 

- The international community has adopted the Western liberal-democratic system of formal institutions in their approach to change the “bad governance”. The impact of formal institutions may be limited if it does not consider the power relations and social dynamics existing in contexts like Burundi.

- Public officials have seen their power reduced when INGOs and civil society organizations took a greater role in service delivery. In addition to the weakness created by a civil war, the ability of the state to meet the needs of its people has been reduced as well as their influence towards the population.

There is certainly research gaps related to the consequences of the centrality of civil society in the new aid paradigm. Some of the gaps are discussed in the conclusion section of this research. So far, the present chapter has focused on the trends of donors in Burundi by reviewing the strategies used to prevent the escalation of the political conflict and the initiatives undertaken to address peaceful reconciliation. The engagement of CSOs, if considered in donors’ strategies, was highlighted.

As indicated above, specific activities targeted by donors and INGOs to strengthen CSOs illustrate the link between the war and the development of local organizations. The specific capacity building activities promoted by donors are discussed in the next chapter to answer question two of the research; namely, the influence of the war on the many local capacity building programs and projects.
6.0 CHARACTERISTIC ACTIVITIES OF BURUNDI CSOS CAPACITY BUILDING

Chapter Four examined Burundi’s civil society organizations, their characteristics, and how they have evolved over the years. Chapter Five discussed the donors’ strategic assistance throughout the crisis in Burundi, as well as the general trends with regards to civil society capacity building. Chapter Six brings these two chapters together by focusing on the interaction between international organizations and CSOs in development programs and peacebuilding initiatives. Specific activities of civil society capacity building encouraged by donors are discussed based on the data gathered from the research survey and within the framework of peacebuilding. To assess how the conflict in Burundi influenced the choice of CSOs or the activities to support, surveyed international organizations were asked the same questions divided in three parts to indicate how they support CSOs.

Part one of the survey identifies the type of respondent donor or international organizations (bilateral, multi-lateral, development agency, regional organization, or INGO). The questions in part one also give information on the goal of the organization, the domain of intervention and whether the organization works directly or indirectly with the CSO(s). Only data from international organizations involved with CSO capacity building are studied. As stated in Chapters Four and Five, international organizations
that have a clear goal to strengthen local organizations represent 10% of all INGOs in Burundi. The remaining series of the survey questionnaire in parts two and three are the subject of this chapter.

Part two indicates the programs or projects that involve a local organization; the type of activities conducted under those programs or projects (institutional, organizational or individual capacity building); groups or populations targeted (women, youth, health-related, religious and others); and financial data for the programs or projects involved.

Part three of the questionnaire relates to the methods used to assess the basic principles of local capacity building discussed in Chapter One such as a locally driven agenda, indicators of local participation and ownership or targets of sustainable results.

Although some of the results from part two and three above were already addressed in Chapter Four and Five, specific data are found in this section. Reoccurring themes and relevant activities in local capacity building are discussed first, followed by an assessment of methods used.
The effectiveness of civil society organizations in achieving the roles ascribed to them (influencing policy, acting as agents of democratization or contributing to the peace process) is conditioned by several internal factors but is also shaped by international organizations and the availability of resources they contribute. While aid targeted specifically to civil society capacity building is limited, it is concentrated among a relatively small set of organizations perceived to have the potential for democratic development through engagement in public policy. Burundi’s viable and active CSOs receive considerable international assistance. The level of financial sustainability outside of this assistance is estimated at 1% for those CSOs that are believed to be solid and operational\textsuperscript{65}. The source of this percentage is constituted by annual membership fees.

The group of donors who provide significant funding to the programs or projects related to civil society strengthening outside of humanitarian assistance are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the Belgian Technical Cooperation, the UK Department for International Development (DFID); UN agencies such as UNICEF (children’s rights and development); UNIFEM (to foster women’s empowerment); the UN Commission for Human Rights (for the implementation of

\textsuperscript{65} Sebudandi & Nduwayo report, p. 49.
human rights agreements locally), and UNDP (to foster development programs and as a central agency for all UN initiatives). Individual grants related to civil society strengthening are provided through individual embassies but they are relatively small compared to comprehensive programs such as seen with development agencies, and they are meant for specific activities and in a given time. Other bilateral initiatives for indigenous support may exist, requiring a partnership between local organizations and local administrative entities in the implementation (such as sensitization activities on health issues) but those initiatives are not part of a comprehensive program to strengthen grassroots organization.

Figure 3 and 4 illustrate major programs and projects in which donors reserve funds specific to CSOs capacity building. These programs relate mostly to peacebuilding efforts and democratic governance as general goals; but also to reconstruction development activities that are geared towards post-conflict economic sustainability as seen in the second figure. The major themes are used to measure areas in which capacity is developed and also reflect the influence of the political crisis on the donors' strategic support.
Apart from partnership in service delivery for humanitarian relief and operations, considerable support and progress from INGOs in support of CSOs’ capacity can be noted in three fields: **human rights, media and the empowerment of women**.

As seen in Chapters Four and Five, themes related to peacebuilding are understood within the framework of the democratization movement of the 1980s and also as areas of development that are essential to the post-conflict reconstruction initiatives from 2000 onward. Civil society strengthening depicted on the chart takes a large share (29%) since the subject represents the programs’ goal as indicated by organizations surveyed. Together with youth projects (14%), concepts of gender diversity (10%) and conflict related activities (19%) civil society strengthening constitutes cross-cutting theme in various initiatives particularly after the implementation of the peace agreements of 2000. Women and youth are emphasized for two main reasons: 1) the two groups suffer the most from war crimes and 2) they play a central
role in promoting reconciliation and in building a culture of peace. As such, peacebuilding training activities in conflict resolution targeting women and youth are found in health, education, media or socio-economic development programs and projects.

Another area where international actors involve CSOs considerably has been in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly during the first years of political unrest from 1993 to 2000. Those themes related to humanitarian relief and socio-economic recovery are illustrated in figure 4 below. Returned refugees after 2000 required many services including food security (17%), the settlement of land issues (8%), and the establishment of sustainable solutions to fight poverty (17%). Many CSOs have been trained or received technical assistance to carry out such activities.

Figure 4: Percentage of program funds reserved for CSOs capacity building

Other significant theme

- Food security: 25%
- Fight against poverty: 17%
- Assistance to returned refugees: 17%
- Land tenure: 8%
- HIV and health related themes: 33%

Data analysis by the author
Health issues take a significant share of funds (33%). HIV has been a major concern, both as an underlying challenge in development initiatives and also as a result of war. Local organizations are deeply involved in the implementation of many health projects, particularly women organizations. This is reflected in INGOs’ programs or project goals, the growth and size of women’s organizations in the health sector, as well as their participation in all the major themes discussed above.

6.1.1 Featured INGOs and selected activities in CSOs capacity building

As we have seen in Chapter Four, not all of the donors focus on CSO capacity building in their objectives. Only 10% of donors provide CSO capacity building funds to the 12 INGOs identified in Chapter Four.

Selected activities in Table 10 below are those carried out under the heading of major themes of peacebuilding and democratic governance identified in the previous pages.
## Table 10: Featured INGOs from the survey questionnaire and selected CD activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INGO</th>
<th>Activity with local NGOs</th>
<th>Capacity type targeted</th>
<th>Program Theme</th>
<th>Local NGOs served $^{66}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICARE</td>
<td>Organizational management training</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td>38 CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict resolution training: community leaders</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training in advocacy techniques</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial management training</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support in development of strategic plans</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training in decision making mechanisms</td>
<td>Individual and group</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support in project planning, monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory project evaluation</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of CSOs networking</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Civil Society strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civic Education &amp; advocacy training</td>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND (SFCG)</td>
<td>Creation of “Studio Ijambo”: A radio production House</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Peacebuilding &amp; media</td>
<td>Networks+ Around 200 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible journalism training</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Peacebuilding &amp; media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political dialogue project</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of a women’s peace center</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal rights programme</td>
<td>Individual and group</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth-recreational &amp; communal activities</td>
<td>Individual and group</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{66}$ A list of successful CSOs per major theme is discussed below
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY FOR CO-OPERATION AND RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT (ACORD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in communication and facilitation skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in project design, funding proposals and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in social conflicts management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops in local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in advocacy skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance in food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and psychological technical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on the integration of gender and HIV issues in projects and in work places</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (IFES) &amp; GLOBAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion group activities / human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and technical support/ legal reform &amp; judicial process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in Human rights advocacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Analysis by the author

Featured INGOs are those acknowledged locally as developing the capacities of CSOs in major themes of peacebuilding; i.e. human rights, the media, conflict resolution, the empowerment of women and to some extent, the fight against HIV/AIDS when it is associated with individual rights and women’s participation in sensitization and advocacy. A more in-depth review of the INGOs that are at the forefront of CSO capacity building is described in the following section.
AFRICARE was established in Burundi after 1995 with a specific goal to support the associative movement in the area of development. From 2003 to 2008, USAID funded the project’s “strengthening of the NGO Sector” with a strategic plan covering training and technical assistance to more than 30 CSOs. For the activities that address HIV/AIDS, AFRICARE has a partnership with another active INGO, ACTION AID, for in-kind and in-cash support to the local organizations served. ACTION AID also intervenes for selected activities in project monitoring and evaluation. AFRICARE also works with the INGO Strategies for International Development (SID) for technical support in its activities to strengthen local NGOs in project planning, monitoring and evaluation. While USAID is the major donor for the AFRICARE program in Burundi to work with CSOs, other donors include United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for community development activities; United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) assistance for training women leaders; United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) support to work with displaced groups and the World Bank (WB) for training the demobilized ex-combatants.

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) established its program in Burundi in 1995 after the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 to avoid similar tensions from developing in Burundi. Through its independent Studio Ijambo, SFCG was the first INGO to have initiated reconciliation of the two ethnic groups through the broadcasting of cultural-based entertainment programs and by establishing the independent radio station Radio Isanganiro. In 2005, SFCG was at the center of a media synergy that brought together 11 media actors in a partnership to provide accurate and credible information on the
elections process. SFCG broadcasting programs have inspired the creation of other radio stations in recent years such as *Radio RPA* and others.

In partnership with International Alert and UNIFEM, SFCG took the lead in helping local women’s groups and leaders as well as youth organizations to come together in providing a space for dialogue and networking, and in providing training for specific educational activities. In 2006, SFCG’s Women’s Peace Centre and the Youth Project merged to become the Community Outreach Team (COT) to carry out community interventions and to support efforts by local individuals in the promotion of reconciliation, dialogue and collaboration. Recently, the INGO extended its programs in Burundi to include projects that address new concerns in the peacebuilding initiatives such as the reintegration and inclusion of demobilized combatants, returnees, displaced persons and ex-prisoners. SFCG is supported by many donors including USAID, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Belgian and Swiss cooperation and the European Union (EU).

**ACORD** started its operations in Burundi in 1993 and has a focus on civil society strengthening in the area of peaceful reconciliation, research in socio-economic development projects and the empowerment women. ACORD also intervenes in HIV/AIDS sensitization and has partnerships with other CSOs and INGOs to carry out its activities. ACORD plays a role of coordination and harmonization, research and methodology support in training programs carried out by CARE, AFRICARE, and the
local NGO Twitezimbere. The donors supporting ACORD activities are OXFAM International, OXFAM Novib (the Netherlands), UNICEF, DFID and others.

IFES with Global Rights has been working with civil society organizations since 2000 to support the process of reconciliation and a return to the rule of law. Through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative: Promoting the Rule of Law in Burundi, IFES formed a consortium with the International Human Rights Law Group to merge their strengths in civil society capacity building and human rights advocacy. In Burundi, they work with local actors, particularly networks of organizations to develop communication, lobbying and advocacy skills on rights and issues related to the reconciliation and democratic process. They also address issues that include constitutional governance, human rights, children’s rights, and inheritance and land law. In the capital city of Bujumbura and in other provinces, Global Rights provides training and technical assistance on the substantive and institutional capacity of human rights groups. They provide access to international human rights mechanisms and resources, and support key civil society legal initiatives, as well as public judicial processes and legal reforms. Since 2007, IFES has been providing financial support and targeted training to CSOs and key government anti-corruption institutions to address underlying corruption issues. The aim is to prevent the abuse of public funds, to develop the skills of key institutions in monitoring government spending, and in enhancing their reporting abilities. IFES supports the local organization Anti-corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory (OLUCOME), and the Burundi National Electoral commission (CENI).
6.1.2 Other significant organizations involved with CSOs capacity building

Other INGOs are involved in building the capacities of CSOs, either in conjunction with the organizations featured above, or separately carrying out activities with similar themes of peacebuilding or related to socio-economic development and reconstruction. Those organizations include multi-lateral agencies and bilateral donors who carry out specific activities directly to benefit CSOs; and INGOs whose activities are related to civil society strengthening are noticed at a lower scale. Additional featured organizations include:

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), present in Burundi since 1995 to conduct both human rights promotion and protection activities. Through its Promotion Unit, OHCHR helps to build civil society capacity to address human rights problems. It has conducted a wide range of human rights training seminars for members of the Government's human rights commission, civil society representatives, including women community leaders and members of the national human rights network, and for national human rights observers. In its activities, OHCHR Burundi coordinates closely with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Government and non-government actors.

The Belgian Development Cooperation has a program to support and involve local CSOs in the peace process, economic growth and gender equality. Unlike most other bilateral and multilateral donors in Burundi, the Belgian Cooperation provides both
direct and indirect institutional support to local organizations, including human rights
CSOs, private radio and media organizations as well as health and socio-economic self-help associations. Before war erupted in 1992, the Belgian cooperation worked closely with religious organizations. Since 2004, the focus in assistance has been more on human rights and media-related activities.

Action Aid has been active in Burundi since 1976 and has contributed significantly to the peacebuilding process, working to reinstate the traditional institution of Bashingantahe discussed in Chapter Four. In order to revive grass-roots conflict resolution mechanisms across the country, Action Aid recruited more than 300 hundred men and women and trained them on how to deal with conflict issues in line with the current law. As a result, more than 250 Bashingantahe were trained on legal and penal procedures. Other Action Aid peacebuilding projects include support to the development of an orphanage Maison Shalom\(^67\), the rehabilitation and integration of ex-combatants and other returnees from refugee-camps.

CARE started its activities in Burundi in 1994 and is active in activities related to civil society strengthening in partnership with other INGOs. This INGO was first involved with projects in the distribution of humanitarian assistance for internally displaced populations and returned refugees. Recent programs address social justice and democratization to encourage the participation of marginalized groups such as women and the Batwa ethnic group. The strengthening of the CSOs component in CARE

\(^67\)The Local NGO has received many European and American prices including the Nobel Prize for children in 2003.
projects is executed with other local and international partners to provide technical assistance in organizational services, education in human rights, the integration of concepts of gender diversity and the delivery of psycho-social services to victims of sexual violence.

International Alert was one of the first INGOs to promote peacebuilding activities during the early years of political conflict. ALERT’s work consisted of promoting dialogue between the antagonistic ethnic groups and training women’s organizations at the grassroots level to rebuild their communities and to promote their participation and the inclusion in the political peace negotiation debates. In 1995, ALERT brought together influential politicians from the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups and the Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix in a forum for dialogue and debate which paved the way for a peaceful negotiated peace process. Later, ALERT worked with the Commission for Peace and Justice of the Catholic Church in Burundi. In recent years, ALERT has been instrumental in providing advice, training and financial support in the establishment of the civil society organization The Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG), a government watchdog group composed of journalists and parliamentarians who want to raise public awareness and increase government accountability.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS Burundi) started its work in Burundi in 1963 but began implementing a justice and peacebuilding/reconciliation program in 1994. CRS intervenes primarily in the agricultural sector. As a Catholic organization, CRS works with churches in promoting peace and tolerance initiatives. It works within peace and
reconciliation committees within parishes and collaborates with other INGOs, CSOs and churches involved with reconciliation work such as Caritas Burundi, Diocesan Development Offices, the Bishops Conference various Episcopal Commissions, CARE and World Vision.

6.2 REVIEW OF METHODS AND TOOLS USED BY INGOS

The methods and tools discussed in this section are set out to evaluate research question number three, i.e. to assess practices in organizational capacity; and to measure indicators of project goal used by INGOs in CSOs’ capacity building.

INGOs are involved with local capacity building work within the individual frameworks prescribed in their scope of work. The methods and tools used to in conducting their activities may vary depending on the activity type and the results sought. When they differ, the level of education, or the location of the group or individual targeted is taken into account. In case the expertise to conduct a certain activity is not present within the organization, the INGOs sub-contract or partner with other actors with the required expertise in conducting the training or service desired. Table 11 a), b), c) and d) below represents characteristic activities conducted by INGOs, the methods used and indicators of achievements related to the major themes identified in CSOs’ capacity building.
Table 11: Characteristic activities and measure of success in Institutional organizational support

a) Group of INGOs: Human rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Methods/Tools</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion &amp; public awareness of Human rights</td>
<td>Discussion groups, Flyers, Resource center</td>
<td># of individuals reached, # Targeted groups (women, youth, CSOs, Traditional leaders), # visitors to the resource center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy reform &amp; building capacity for rural population to solve land disputes</td>
<td>Mobile legal clinics, Live radio broadcasts, Discussion groups</td>
<td># elected officials trained, Local ownership, Accountability for war crimes, Peaceful resolution of land disputes &amp; inheritance issues, Increased local awareness, Increase local participation in legal reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training-of- trainers &amp; Institutional support</td>
<td>Evaluation charts &amp; reports, Technical assistance workshops, Mediation techniques, Funds for books &amp; computers, Joint projects and activities with Human rights activists</td>
<td># of paralegals trained, # human rights practitioners, Increased capacity of Human rights CSOs and networks, Increased coverage in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation and democratic rule</td>
<td>Mobilization of women groups and network, Training in communication, advocacy and lobbying skills, Raise awareness of ethnic issues</td>
<td>Inclusion of all ethnic groups, Inclusion of women in decision-making mechanisms, Promotion of the rule of law, Social transformation &amp; peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the electoral system and promotion of good governance</td>
<td>Discussion groups, Discussion &amp; implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord, Research on the causes of conflict, Refugee repatriation initiatives, Radio broadcasts</td>
<td>Wide inter-community dialogue, Increased participation of women, Peaceful political transition, Decreased ethnic tensions, Increased awareness of democratic governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### b) Group of INGOs: Peace & Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Methods/Tools</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Support to National elections | Radio broadcasts on civic and voter education  
Face-to-face interaction  
Multi-media campaigns  
Dramas, roundtables, and live call-in programmes  
Distribution of radios  
Interactive theatre | Inclusive forums and accurate electoral information  
Increased women as voters and as candidates  
Increased transparency of elections |
| Peace and reconciliation | Creation of networks of CSOs  
Creation of partnerships between INGOs & CSOs  
Creation of private radio-production houses  
Social and cultural magazines  
Training of journalists  
Train-the-trainer programs in conflict resolution activities | Increased encounter and dialogue between different stakeholders in the conflict including women & youth  
Increased national & regional coverage of peaceful programs  
Responsible reporting  
Foster the growth of skilled conflict resolution trainers and facilitators  
Increased leadership of journalists |

### c) Group of INGOs: Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Methods/Tools</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social justice and good governance | Training in advocacy and communication skills  
Education in basic literacy skills  
Use of local and cultural and language elements  
Use of story-telling and drama  
Distribution of newsletters  
Seminars, discussion groups at the local & national levels  
On-air debates outside of government actors | Women empowerment  
Increased decision-making capacity at the local level  
Increased mutual respect  
Ethnic social inclusiveness  
Increased awareness of social barriers and peaceful solutions  
Increased grassroots voices  
Dialogue across party lines |
| Conflict resolution initiatives | Training of Bashingantahe in human rights and modern techniques  
Training of women CSOs in conflict resolution techniques  
Creation of local and regional partnerships  
Sports & other activities to encourage dialogue  
Recourse to regional & international mediators and expertise | Restructuring the traditional institution  
Promote community justice and leadership  
Inclusion & focus on women in decision-making mechanisms  
Increased mutual respect  
Increased solutions for land disputes  
Lasting solutions to national and political problems  
Involvement of key social groups in reconciliation initiatives: women, youth, religious actors, party leaders  
Peaceful repatriation of refugees |
d) **Group of INGO: Socio-economic development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Methods/Tools</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance in project design,</td>
<td>Proposal writing</td>
<td>Increased capacity of project &amp; organizational management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>Training of trainers workshops</td>
<td>Increased visibility to donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training modules for project design, implementation &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>Improve operations and quality of service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory methods at the community level</td>
<td>Increased funding level of CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-evaluation methods</td>
<td>Achieve sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periodic monitoring meetings</td>
<td>Improve formal and informal structures in community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principals of NGO fundraising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steering committees for NGO networking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS &amp; other health-related activities</td>
<td>Surveys to collect data</td>
<td>Raise awareness in how to live with AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training of AIDS educators</td>
<td>Increased women’s role in decision-making role in households &amp; community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention &amp; management of sexual violence</td>
<td>Increased assistance to persons affected with AIDS, especially orphans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical &amp; psychological support to children traumatized by war</td>
<td>Increased immunization coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of innovative practices in HIV care</td>
<td>Nutritional improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of malaria</td>
<td>Malaria prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maternal &amp; child nutrition information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Training of community leaders in micro-credits</td>
<td>Increased participatory approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation of community social infrastructures</td>
<td>Increased food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood &amp; food security initiatives</td>
<td>Integration of displaced people and returned refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency food assistance</td>
<td>Increase agricultural security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data analysis by the author from the survey questionnaire and INGOs reports*

Broadly viewed, the initiatives, activities and methods outlined above are within the field of democracy and governance. The operations carried out reflect the objectives defined in the priorities of the *Burundi Strategic Framework* and the PRSP discussed in Chapter Five. These priorities put forward a culture of peace; the inclusion of a gender perspective in programs and projects; the engagement of civil society on issues related to peacebuilding; the support of legal literacy; community mediation or the socio-economic reintegration of various groups affected by the conflict. The choice of projects and themes in the involvement with CSOs is therefore dictated and in line with the guidelines provided by donors, not only because the donors support those activities.
financially, but because the support of CSOs in the areas described correspond to the needs of the moment and the general framework of peacebuilding and democratic governance.

The INGOs whose work is devoted to strengthening the capacities of CSOs may differ in their missions but on the ground it is not always clear who does what. A close analysis of their activities shows that the projects are similar in their targeted objectives, the groups served or the services delivered. In many ways, the provisions of the Arusha Accord indicate the priorities of the peacebuilding initiatives and hence where donors’ money is available. Both INGOs and CSOs who want to remain active in Burundi adapt to these priorities and usually are aware of the type of project that is likely to be funded by the donors. In other cases, as mentioned earlier, an INGO may not have the specific skills required to conduct the project or activity and will sub-contract with other INGOs locally. This may lead to overlapping themes in the INGOs’ reports or confusion on the role and speciality of the different actors involved in a project. Generally, all INGOs maintain the original mission characterizing their organizations while watching closely the agenda set forth by the donors, and adjusting their mandate and programs when needed.
6.3 REVIEW OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT

From 1993 to 2004, donors’ funding priorities considerably influenced the agendas, activities and growth trajectories of local organizations. For instance, the availability of funds for issues of concern to women, human rights, HIV/AIDS education, or an increased role in policy making mechanisms stimulated the formation of new women’s organizations. During the war, women were called upon to embrace other non-traditional roles and became central to all activities related to the peace process. Donors largely supported their initiatives. This is illustrated not only in the policy directives of donors’ programs but also by the fact that support to women is a cross-cutting theme in all activities involving CSOs. Together with youth-related activities, the gender theme represents 20 percent of all other activities (Chart 1 in Chapter Five). In addition, more than fifteen CSOs dealing with HIV/AIDS were created between 1992 and 1999\textsuperscript{68} alone and are classified among the most sustainable local organizations, this in part due to foreign aid. In this study, HIV/AIDS is an identified significant issue in CSO capacity building and represents 33 percent of selected donors’ activities.

A similar pattern is found with human rights groups, the media and advocacy organizations that have also attracted the attention of donors in the past years. During the years of political instability, these civil society groups played a critical role in

\textsuperscript{68} Sebudandi’s report, p. 28
advancing issues related to democratization, participation in the on-going political debates and in responding to the increased need of voicing the concerns of marginalized groups. A dominant factor in budgetary allocations during the first years of conflict addressed emergency relief. Related emergency activities with the involvement of CSOs or not have been continuous from 1994 up until 2002 when a shift to peacebuilding and reconstruction development took place. Overall, funds allocated to peacebuilding programs in CSOs strengthening projects as indicated by organizations surveyed range from $ 100,000 to more than $ 5 million. Access to these funds from donors is largely through INGOs except in cases where bilateral donors support the CSOs by small competitive grants ranging from $10,000 to $100,000. Budgetary information related to CSO capacity building in peacebuilding programs is summarized below. Small competitive grants given under $50,000 are not reported here as they are isolated and not integrated within the general scope of building the capacity of CSOs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO sector Strengthening Programs</th>
<th>Budget range in US $</th>
<th># of INGOs beneficiary</th>
<th>Average duration of project(s) in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building initiatives</td>
<td>50,000 - 200,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>200,000 - 500,000</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>2 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>500,000 - 1,000,000</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>3 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy &amp; governance</td>
<td>1,000,000 - 5,000,000</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>3 – 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data analysis by the author from the survey questionnaire and NGOs reports.
The amounts in Table 12 indicate the value of contributed disbursements to the INGOs and not necessarily the official commitments from the donors\textsuperscript{69}. Overall, the European Union and USAID provide a large share of funds in projects related to local capacity building and the sector of activities discussed previously. As an illustration,

- USAID’s set of activities supports three strategic objectives, implemented by more than 18 different NGO and UN partners. Its Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) has provided $5 million in Fiscal year 2005 to date and approximately $7.6 million in Fiscal year 2004 in support of peace process advances. Programs supported include community based leadership and conflict mitigation training, vocational skills training, community conflict mitigation initiatives, and media programming.

- The EU has disbursed up to $4 million in 2005 in support of 40 local organizations. Thematic budget lines include projects related to democratic governance, training for human rights actors and institutions, media, support to youth groups in elections, and others.

- At a lower scale, due to delays in releasing funds and execution of approved projects, the UN peacekeeping funds is also a considerable supporter of local organizations. The Office’s approved projects amounts to $26.9 million for the security sector ($12.48 m), governance ($11.50 m), justice and human rights

\textsuperscript{69} Funding announced by donors in non-binding commitments (such as the allocations announced in the periodic donors’ roundtable meetings or in documents where donors agree to contribute to the pledged funds) may be higher than the amounts shown.
actions ($2.20 m). The portion allocated to women’s reconciliation processes in the community represents only one tenth of the 12 approved projects. As of 2007, the rate of project’s execution is at less than 10%.

Local capacity building is considered in most programs as a cross-cutting theme in many social projects and programs of democracy and governance. Related thematic budgets are therefore included in the funding of social services and humanitarian assistance. They represent a very small percentage compared to other programs and projects for economic development and reconstruction. Table 13 a) and b) below show that local capacity building budgets may be included in the category of social services such as education, health or emergency assistance when applicable. It should be noted that some donors have specific funds for governance and civil society. They may be administered through the government or through the traditional “Project Aid”.

| Table 13: a) Official donors’ assistance to Burundi ($ US m) from 2000 to 2004 |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Country or Organization         | 2000   | 2001   | 2002   | 2003   | 2004   |
| Germany                         | 3.0    | 3.3    | 2.7    | 4.8    | 10.4   |
| Belgium                         | 6.0    | 7.5    | 16.5   | 15.9   | 25.1   |
| United States                   | 1.0    | 4.9    | 21.2   | 49.0   | 43.8   |
| France                          | 4.8    | 4.7    | 7.1    | 4.4    | 34.8   |
| Holland                         | 4.4    | 11.7   | 9.6    | 12.7   | 23.3   |
| Norway                          | 5.3    | 5.7    | 10.2   | 12.2   | 11.9   |
| Great Britain                   | 1.7    | 1.7    | 1.2    | 3.5    | 9.5    |
| Sweden                          | 4.3    | 2.5    | 3.6    | 5.2    | 6.6    |
| Switzerland                     | 3.4    | 3.9    | 2.4    | 3.3    | 4.9    |
| Total bilateral – OECD          | 40.9   | 54.7   | 84.7   | 121.2  | 184.3  |
| AID                             | 27.6   | 2.2    | 25.0   | 27.6   | 43.3   |
| ABD                             | -0.2   | 0.0    | 0.7    | -0.9   | -13.9  |
| EC                              | 9.2    | 62.6   | 36.4   | 47.8   | 69.1   |
| IMF                             | -5.1   | -6.2   | -2.8   | -1.1   | -15.9  |
| HRC                             | 3.3    | 6.5    | 8.9    | 7.8    | 7.2    |
| WFP                             | 2.1    | 7.9    | 5.4    | 6.8    | 3.8    |
| UNDP                            | 6.4    | 4.5    | 5.4    | 6.0    | 8.9    |
| UNICEF                          | 2.9    | 2.5    | 2.5    | 4.0    | 3.4    |
| Total multilateral              | 51.7   | 82.6   | 87.4   | 103.7  | 166.4  |
### Table 14: b) Distribution of assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures &amp; Social services</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures &amp; economic services</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports &amp; communications</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive sectors</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, mines, construction</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce &amp; Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sectors</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance Programmes</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency assistance</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non specified</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15: c) Summary of Official donors Assistance from 2005-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. IDA</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EC</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. US</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Belgium</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. UK</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Netherlands</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. France</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Norway</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. IMF</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source: OECD Statistics</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net ODA (USD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral share (gross ODA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net ODA/GNI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net private flows ( US m)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi references</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (atlas USD)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In reviewing donors’ funding policies in the area of humanitarian and post-conflict financing, inconsistencies may emerge both in nomenclature and practice. Different donors interpret “humanitarian,” “reconstruction,” “recovery,” and “peacebuilding” in very different ways. Linking relief and development is broadly recognized as essential to building sustainable peace, but many donors have no mechanism for funding recovery and reconstruction work. While donors have clear authority to respond to emergencies, many have difficulty in funding reconstruction activities. As a result, some define “emergencies” expansively. Policy in this area is a source of particular frustration to INGOs, which often find themselves forced to apply for a series of short term grants, often for durations of only three or six months. Those without on-going bilateral programs will leave a country as soon as the emergency is deemed to be “over.” The resulting discontinuity is reflected in patchwork approaches on the ground and an absence of transparency in donor-partner relationships.

Despite the small budgets allocated by major donors to local organizations, INGOs have invested significantly in projects that help Burundian organizations. In 2004 alone, 33 INGOs used a budget of more than $51 million and $61 million was projected for the following year. Attracting the necessary funding has not been easy either. Comparing Rwanda and Burundi due to the broad similarities in the political and social challenges of both countries, some experts have argued that Rwanda has been treated as a “darling” by the international community, comparing it to the other “orphans” of the Great Lakes Regions: Burundi and DRC. While Rwanda benefited from substantial

post-genocide aid allocations, Burundi was largely ignored for several years before 2002 and was considered an international pariah\textsuperscript{71}. Reasons for the preferential treatment could be tied to improved economic performance, good governance or other internal and endogenous factors favouring aid effectiveness. While the conditions in Rwanda improved after the genocide due to a more secure environment, the same criteria can be hardly explained in situations where continuous political instability and civil war was present in Burundi. The reality remains that donors’ policies differ from country to country and decisions to support peacebuilding or post-conflict economic recovery remain highly strategic and political.

6.4 KEY CHALLENGES TO CSOS’ CAPACITY

The work and support by international actors to build a strong civil society in Burundi as elsewhere is viewed within the framework of the two concepts of post-conflict peacebuilding and democratic governance. The two concepts have been linked together in current development endeavor; ascribing an important role to civil society in both fields: solving deep rooted ethnic conflicts and promoting good governance. The different programs undertaken by donors discussed in this chapter have been oriented toward these two goals. In general, Burundi’s CSOs are still very young; CSOs that are successful are few and these are financially dependent on external funding which has been largely limited to humanitarian and emergency type of aid.

Many of Burundi CSOs are often run by members of the elite class: individuals who are well-educated, who held high positions in former administrations, and who have access and benefit from the funds provided by INGOs. The elite class has often been linked to their regional backgrounds shared with former administrations leaders. This does not mean that the contribution of the elite class to the growth and development of CSOs is not significant, or that they do not genuinely seek positive changes benefiting society. There are, however, organizations are not necessarily representative of the broader public interests but are, rather, business-oriented. Richard Holloway has termed this type of citizen organizations as “the pretenders” within the categories of civil society organizations (2001). The pretenders represent individuals who are trying to earn money or power for themselves, their political party or their business. We have seen in Chapter Four that the socio-economic needs arising from the crisis is one of the major factors explaining the growth of Burundi local organizations. With the many changes on the political landscape due to democratization, the elite class has moved to the private sector more than it had before the war, either for alternative means of employment or simply to seek public benefits. In fact, one of the major contributions and achievements of INGOs has been to reduce unemployment among the well-educated Burundians, former government employees or small entrepreneurs who populate the offices of INGOs and on the field across the country. By 2005, more than 2,748 positions were created due to the work of INGOs\textsuperscript{72}.

\footnote{Data from RESO, a network of INGOs working in Burundi}
Another challenge facing the growth of citizen organizations in Burundi is their relationship with state authorities. CSOs showing great leadership are often perceived as threatening by the administration since they are not under the government’s control. They are therefore sabotaged, co-opted and resented. Examples can be found with actors in the media and human rights. Local journalists working for private media were imprisoned in 2005 and 2006 for trying to expose the conspiracy behind the alleged coup against the current president. Alexis Sinduhije, the founder of the popular Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) who appeared on Time’s 100 Most Influential People in 2008, was jailed for expressing his views in the same year. Other Burundians believe that because he is a presidential candidate for the 2010 elections, his candidacy poses a threat to the incumbent president. Another journalist, Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, a critic of corruption and human rights abuse by the new administration, has been targeted by the administration more than once. Threats and harassments against Radio Isanganiro journalists have also been common since 2005 when the current administration came to power.

The challenge that most CSOs face is related to representation. Many INGOs and CSOs do their best to serve the general population but the representation in the major activities related to democracy promotion; justice/human rights remain limited outside the capital city. INGOs have tried to implement outreach programs by creating provincial offices but again, only few CSOs can compete and access that type of support. However, success in strengthening local capacity can be noticed by the

73 Off the record discussion with some leaders in the civil society community
increased participation of women in many sectors in the capital and rural areas as well where civil society is engaged. In consequence, the rate of participation of women in official institutions has been increased. Currently, the constitution calls for at least 30% of female participation in official institutions including the senate and positions in the government. Their empowerment on a national level can be noticed in the diversity of women organisations and the rate of access to primary and secondary schools for girls.

In this chapter, we have seen the activities and tools used to strengthen the capacities of CSOs. Those activities are under the themes encouraged and prescribed in the general framework of peacebuilding and democratization discussed in previous chapters. General conclusions of this research are drawn in the concluding section where we examine the central question of this research: Where do the CSOs in Burundi stand on taking up the challenges of building peace?
7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Donors in Burundi have made substantial efforts to build the capacities of local organizations. The support they have provided has been and continues to be affected by many obstacles related to existing principles and policies prescribed in the aid systems, as well as the nature and national realities of non-government organizations in Burundi. From the programs sponsored by donors discussed in previous chapters, the findings confirm that donors’ success in supporting local organizations has been limited to short term results, while the political emphasis on peace negotiations has had the greatest impact on political solutions. The program areas involving the media, human rights, gender and vulnerable groups have benefited mostly from donors’ attention, triggering civil society organizational diversity and multiplicity around those themes. Multiplicity of civil society organizations is in itself commendable and is encouraged in donors’ policies. However, the sustainability of promoted programs, as well as the autonomy of organizations that carry their implementation, remains questionable. The implications of a limited autonomy and weak sustainability raise two issues for further research: (1) civil society participation in the Burundian context and (2) perceived negative effects of donors’ incentives in the new aid paradigm.
7.1 CSOS PARTICIPATION IN THE BURUNDIAN CONTEXT

Historical developments of the notion of civil society in Burundi indicate that its participation in policy-making is relatively new. Civil society functions, as perceived in Western societies, was a foreign concept up until the country’s independence. The monarchical system that existed prior to the colonial era lasted for centuries, and created deep beliefs and varying perceptions of power relations in the different layers of the population. In the traditional system, different groups in the society had specific functions and political decision-making was ascribed to only a few, the Bashingantahe discussed in Chapter Three being among them. Democratic values introduced in the 1960’s brought the notion of elections and people started to identify themselves as belonging to ‘the majority’ or ‘the minority’ along ethnic lines.

The transition in political systems from a monarchy to a republic run by military regimes for four decades may have been a small window of opportunity for the population to participate in political decision-making, but perceptions and practices do not change overnight. Traditionally, the state in the Burundian society has been perceived as the provider or source of all resources. In reality, individuals who hold public office and those connected to them by ethnicity, place of origin, family or party affiliation have tremendous power. It is very difficult to imagine the functions of civil society acting in the Western sense as a controller of the state in such a context where social, economic and political ties are to a large degree not distinct. Given the mistrust among different groups in Burundi, perhaps building social cohesion would require
immediacy over the political role. Edwards (2004) argues that that the mandate of many CSOs to build social cohesion at the community level places limits on their role as a political player. He suggests that ‘while trust may be the lubricant of civil society, hypocrisy is the Vaseline of political influence’, Edwards proposes that, as part of their role in opposition to structures of power, CSOs are often also in opposition to politics. He argues that many CSOs choose not to engage with politics (or indeed policymaking) because this would compromise their independent status and ability to provide an alternative to state-led resources.

To support the undertaking of genuine civil society organizations in Burundi would require efforts by the donors to understand the power relationships among the different actors on the political scene and in the civil society. A genuine civil society would imply that its organizations defend the interests of all the poor and marginalized groups. To name a few organizations viewed in Chapters Three and Four, there are groups that are fighting to apply this principle of representation to advance collective interests. These groups advocate for those in need and take risks to challenge the government:

- The private radio broadcasting stations have been instrumental in informing the public on abuse of power by authorities, and have acted to speak for wrongfully convicted individuals, journalists or politicians from 2005 to the present. As mentioned in previous pages, the privately owned Radio Isanganiro and RPA have been constant targets of the ruling political party; their journalists are often
harassed, investigated and jailed but have continued their job of voicing the public’s concerns.

- Women have largely benefited from international support that paved the way for their increased political participation. Working in individual organizations or in networks, women are actively operating in the sectors of health (HIV/AIDS), peacebuilding, human rights and socio-economic development. Since 1993, women fought hard to be included in the Arusha Peace negotiations and their solidarity enabled their concerns regarding female inheritance and war crimes against women to have a much needed forum. Facilitated by UNIFEM as well as other UN and regional agencies, fifty Burundian women gathered and met with Nelson Mandela, the appointed mediator in July of 2000 to put forward their recommendations for inclusion in the Burundi Peace Negotiations. Over 50% of the recommendations were implemented in the Burundi Peace Accord. Recent elections in 2005 have shown a dramatic increase in women elected to Parliament with 36 seats out of 118 being held by women. Today, women are largely represented in government: seven senators from the two ethnic groups, a vice-president, a foreign minister and the President of National Assembly are women.

- Within the category of grassroots socio-economic organizations seen in Chapter Four, sustained projects are noticed among those that created partnerships or formed confederations. The organization PRAUTAO- solidarités paysannes is an example of such an organization, representing more than 350 community
organizations and operating in five provinces. The network of PRAUTAO member organizations work in socio-economic sectors across the country.

The greatest criticism applied to Burundian local organizations is their disconnection from the rural population that they are supposed to represent. A large number of CSOs in Burundi operate only in the capital city and do not have enough representation at the grassroots level. However, there are success stories; the cases above are a testimony that participation and representation at the base does happen.

7.1.1 On CSOs role Vis à Vis the Burundian state

Local organizations in Burundi are emerging and face many structural and developmental challenges. Besides organizational and institutional problems, a more serious challenge relates to the role that civil society should play vis-à-vis government actions. CSOs are composed of individuals who are not immune to ethnic cleavage characterizing the political conflict of the last decade. It is difficult for CSOs to remain objective in checking the actions of the government when personal experiences from the civil war and a history of oppression are clouded by ethnic feelings, oppression, poverty and corruption. The ability of CSOs to play a significant role in development and peacebuilding is dependent on several factors characterized by the social, economic and political situation of each country. Further research is needed to establish in what ways a civil society in Burundi can overcome ethnic perceptions in its functions.
This study was designed to assess whether or not CSOs in Burundi were up to the challenge to play a significant role in peacebuilding given the many obstacles that characterize the social and political landscape. Based on the findings of this study, it is clear that, while Burundi’s CSOs have made remarkable progress in the last ten years, generally, their weaknesses outweigh their strengths. Weaknesses are indicated both by the lack of resources and by the social divide and political environment in which they operate. The lack of resources can be reduced to a mere technical issue to which donors can and do contribute, but more fundamental problems regarding the core of civil society are not dealt with. While success cases also exist and can be measured by the indicators identified in Chapter Six, Burundi’s civil society is responsible for addressing the fundamental issues.

### 7.2 EFFECTS OF DONORS’ STRATEGIES ON CSOS’ CAPACITY BUILDING

The international actors in Burundi have contributed significantly to the emerging civil society organizations even though evidence from funding mechanisms, the substance of projects or their presence nationwide may indicate minimum support.

Donors’ support in finding solutions to the political conflict concentrated heavily on high profile negotiations at level one of Lederach’s pyramid, in addition to building the capacities of public institutions. Political parties were the most visible actors involved in peace negotiations while participation from civil society representatives was limited.
Understandably, donors cannot bypass public structures and institutional change at the political level is necessary. The problem is, as discussed in Chapter Five, a large population in Burundi that trusts neither political leaders nor the state itself. The war has exacerbated poverty and has increased corruption at the top of the ethnic divisions that are at the root of the conflict. The support to public structures is consequently viewed as a waste, or in the eyes of many Burundians, destined to enrich the elite who are already well off. The international community becomes, willing or not, part of the corruption machine. Donors need to understand and respond to the political dynamics of a country. Turning a “blind eye” to corruption only increases the weakness of public institutions and their accountability to the population.

Support to civil society organizations is a more recent approach. Donors have relegated this task to INGOs who invested heavily in humanitarian services, predominant from 1993 to 2002. As seen in Chapter Six, the efforts to encourage and promote pro-democracy, justice and human rights CSOs have met some success (private media, human rights and women advocacy) although representation outside of the capital is still limited. Some factors prevent INGOs from achieving even more fruitful results:

- Their projects tend to be small, lack flexibility to adapt to local environments and do not have any long-term vision that can allow adequate follow-up. One informant I interviewed indicated that a UN project invested much money in sponsoring research on local civil society but that there had not been any
follow-up on any of the recommendations suggested by members of the civil society. The expediency with which most projects operate does not leave room to understand the social and political dynamics discussed above, nor the culture and the people they work with. The general objective of peacebuilding activities involves creating an attitude conducive to sustainable peace. It is a long-term project and invariably requires major attitudinal and societal changes with a long vision. It becomes difficult and probably not that valuable to assess every small intervention in the light of this overall objective.

- The availability of funds from donors and sub-contracting deals has led to a multitude of opportunistic INGOs that compete for donors’ money. This promotes competition to the detriment of needed collaboration between INGOs. Among NGOs, a strong dynamic of self-preservation often guides their work, making them less than fully accountable to or representative of the communities with whom they work.

7.2.1 Aid harmonisation vs. ownership

Under the new aid paradigm, aid is increasingly being perceived as a collective effort. While the collective strategy may advantage donors and even governments, the drive to centralize development funds will not prioritize civil society development. Civil society will become reliant on governments for continued funding with the risk of subordinating their priorities to those of their state.
One important goal, and at the same time a challenge of aid harmonization, is the promotion of country “ownership”. The expectation is that national development strategies will provide a strategic policy framework oriented towards results that donors can support. The challenge lies in the fact that the Paris Declaration on the coordination of aid signed in 2005 does not show how this ownership can be achieved. Country ownership, as envisioned in the Paris Declaration involves having national development strategies that are not simply condensations of government priorities and objectives (e.g. PRSP) but that also incorporate the views and needs of other relevant national social sectors. The 2005 World Bank/IMF review of the PRS approach acknowledged that, while the process has expanded the space for dialogue over time, participation has remained broad rather than deep. The challenge of developing and implementing the PRS is even more daunting in post-conflict countries. The political and economic realities in these countries impose additional constraints on the capacity of their national leadership to lead the dialogue. The quality of government institutions and the capacity of the state are central to this vision; in cases where elites lack a political commitment to development, they will not truly own a national development strategy. What is at stake is thus the degree to which domestic political processes are capable of creating more legitimate, representative and inclusive, as well as more effective state institutions. We have seen that this in itself is a challenge in the case of Burundi.

75 Ibid.
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations stem from this discussion and need more research. The most important aspect of civil society capacity building is the consideration of contextual differences. In the case of Burundi, the traditional values that held societal ties have been broken; it would be beneficial for Burundians to revisit traditional values and norms that promote citizenship and national unity in order to achieve peace. Reviving the institution of *Bashingantahe* is one option. Efforts to model the institution to modern standards were initiated timidly but it needs to be incorporated in the public structures.

Another observation is that the understanding of the root cause of ethnic conflicts is complex. Donors need to create a long vision strategy in providing not only technical support but also engagement in understanding the power differentials existing in the country. Their support can emphasize more bottom-up approaches in practice, i.e., by engaging in policy planning that incorporates more local-level participation, and by developing direct approaches to work with civil society organizations rather than relying solely on the visible public institutions. Often, local participation in policies is reduced to involvement with the local governance entities. Local governance represents the administration at the local level but it is also part of the corrupted machine. There are other social networks that need to be discovered.

There is very little research on Burundi civil society. Students who might be interested in development activities in post-conflict countries, in ethnic relations or in
peacebuilding would have substantial topics to research that can bring considerable contribution to the scholarly community. There is a tendency to compare Burundi to the case of Rwanda where much attention has been directed after the genocide. But substantial differences exist in their histories, political developments, and even their people’s views on ethnic coexistence. The lack of substantial scholarly research is matched with a neglect noticed on the part of donors, whose financial support to Burundi is minimal compared to other countries in conflict, including Rwanda. Perhaps the neglect is justified by the lack of accountability of the recipient public institutions. The complex issues involved in this failure provide also a rich source of subjects to research.

Donors’ strategies to help Burundi have been driven by international standards but also by individual bilateral relations and policies. Building the capacities of civil society is an ambitious enterprise that involves Burundians first and an international community that needs to be patient and understanding.
8.0 APPENDICES

8.1 APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. **Interviews conducted:**

   - Country Director, USAID/Burundi
   - Information Officer at the European Commission
   - Program officer at DFID
   - Program Officer at the Belgian Embassy
   - Representative of AFVP (Association Française des Volontaires pour le Progrès)
   - Program Officer, UNICEF
   - Project Leader, Democracy & Governance unit, UNDP Bujumbura
   - Program Coordinator, OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
   - Program officer, OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
   - Program Officer, The World Bank
   - National Coordinator, UNIFEM
   - Program officer, ARCANÉ (Projet d’Appui et de Renforcement des Capacités des Acteurs Non Étatiques) EU consulting Project
   - Director, Search for Common Ground
   - Operations officer, AFRICARE
   - Country representative, ACORD
   - Director, FORSC
   - Director, OAG
   - Representative, RESO
   - Human rights activists, Ligue Iteka
   - Researcher, Burundi Civil Society
   - Researcher, CNCA (Government Office for the Coordination of foreign aid)
2. Survey questionnaire on Burundian NGO capacity building

Part I.

1. Select a description that fits your organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial institution</th>
<th>Multilateral organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral organization</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development agency</td>
<td>Regional organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private volunteer organization</td>
<td>National NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Start date of operations in Burundi ____________________ (month & year)

3. a. What is your organization’ role/mission in Burundi?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

4. b. Do you work with domestic/national organizations? Do you work with international organizations?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

5. How do you deliver your services? Check all that applies:
   a: Direct assistance to the government of Burundi_______
   b. Directly to the local organization ________
   c. Through another organization___________
   d. Other (specify) _____________________
Part II.

1. Name the program/project that involve a Burundian organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Program/Project (P)</th>
<th>Life of program/project From (year): To:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What type of activities do you have for the listed programs/projects above?

Institutional (CD1) ________ Organizational (CD2) ____________ Individual (CD3)_________

3. In your opinion, how has the ethnic conflict in Burundi influenced the choice of your program/project? P1-4 refers to the previous table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>No influence</th>
<th>Some influence</th>
<th>Considerable influence</th>
<th>A great deal of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Indicate below what activity you conduct in Burundi. Check all that apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict prevention (CD type1)</th>
<th>Youth related (CD type 7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution education (CD type 2)</td>
<td>Economic activity (CD type 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding (CD type 3)</td>
<td>Health-related (CD type 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance (CD type 4)</td>
<td>Religious-related (CD type 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights (CD type 5)</td>
<td>Education (CD type 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media related (CD type 6)</td>
<td>Other (CD type 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. On average, what is the duration of the primary activities you are involved in?
Six months to 1 year ____ 1-2 years _____ 2-3 years_____ 3-5 years _____ 5 years and more

6. Do you collaborate with other organizations or share partnerships with other organizations in the service delivery? Please list them:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>f.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Financial assistance for the programs/projects on to Q.4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocated budget</th>
<th>Program/project/activity name</th>
<th>From(year):</th>
<th>To:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50-100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000-150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150,000-200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200,000-250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250,000-500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$500,000-1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000,000 and more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part III.

1. Who participates in setting the priorities of the local NGO/group? Check all that apply.

   Donors’ executive staff _______
   Burundian NGO representative _____
   Other partner organization(s) _____
   Other stakeholders in the same domain of intervention _____
   A government representative _____

2. How often do you have consultation with Burundian NGO(s)/group(s) you work with?

   Daily ___ Once a week ____ Once a month ___ Every 2 months ____
   Other (indicate) ___

3. How do you determine whether your program/project is meeting its objectives/goals?

4. a. Do you have a formal evaluation built into your programs/projects?
   Yes ____ No____

   If so, what methods or tools do you use to determine the success of your program/project initiatives and the progress of your activity?
   __________________
   __________________
   __________________
   __________________

5. Does your program/project respond to policy changes and/or internal or external mandates?

   Such as: Flexibility to change the program/project design or activities (internal);
   Adaptation to other similar programs/project within the community (external)

   Example (1) _________________________________________________
   Example (2) _________________________________________________
   Example (3) _________________________________________________
   Example (4) _________________________________________________

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6. What type of challenges do you have or foresee concerning your activity or intervention? Explain:

___________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________

7. Comments:

___________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your time
APPENDIX B: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO INFORMANTS

University of Pittsburgh
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

March 4, 2008

To Whom It May Concern:

As the Coordinator of the Doctoral Program in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, I am writing to document the fact that Germaine Basita is a doctoral candidate in our program and is doing research for her dissertation in Burundi. The focus of her research in Burundi will be on exploring local NGOs’ efforts around capacity building. She will be doing this research during the Spring 2008.

If you have any questions regarding Ms. Basita’s standing in the school or the nature of her research, please contact me by e-mail at: pcoonitz@pitt.edu or by voice mail at (412) 648-2654.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Phyllis Coonitz, PhD
Coordinator of Doctoral Studies
APPENDIX C: LIST OF DONORS AND REGISTERED INGOS IN BURUNDI

1. Donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Agencies &amp; Multi-Lateral</th>
<th>Bilateral / Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Belgian Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Chinese Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>French Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Germany Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Italian Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Swiss Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2. INGOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Agro Action Allemande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>ActionAid Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>AFRICARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADG</td>
<td>Aide au Développement Gembloux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHA</td>
<td>Africa Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIM</td>
<td>African Revival Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFVP</td>
<td>Association Française de Volontaires pour le Progrès</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Austrian Relief Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Avocats Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Caritas Secours International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Comitato Collaborazione Medica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECI</td>
<td>Centre Canadien d'Étude et de Coopération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISV</td>
<td>Communita Imprengio Servizio Volontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCERN</td>
<td>CONCERN Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDAID</td>
<td>Catholic Organization for Relief and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORD</td>
<td>Christian Outreach - Relief and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DaPaDu</td>
<td>Dalla Parte Degli Ultimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Danish Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Fondation Suisse de Déminage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVC</td>
<td>Gruppo Volontariato Civile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI-B</td>
<td>Handicap International - Belgique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI-F</td>
<td>Handicap International - France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBS</td>
<td>International Bible Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Interchurch Organisation for Development Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Oxfam</td>
<td>Intermon Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCSOS</td>
<td>Institut Syndical pour la Coopération au Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Jesuit Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Global Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVIA</td>
<td>Lay Volunteers International Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF-B</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières - Belgique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF-H</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières - Hollande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAP/FPED</td>
<td>Opération d'Appui à l'Autopromotion / Fondation pour l'Étude du Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam-Q</td>
<td>Oxfam Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFED</td>
<td>Programme d'Étude et d'Échange de Formation pour le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Population Santé International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Réseau des Citoyens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>Solidarités</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>Terre des Hommes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>TearFund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO-HN</td>
<td>Transcultural Psycho-social Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSF</td>
<td>Terre Sans Frontière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VESOS</td>
<td>Village d'Enfants SOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISPE</td>
<td>Volontari Italiana par la Soliedarieta Emergente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>World Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D: POLITICAL MAP OF BURUNDI
8.5 APPENDIX E: AFRICA MAP
9.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY


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UN General Assembly Resolution: UN, A/RES/50/120 article 22.


