THE IMPACT OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS ON LATIN AMERICANS' VOTING BEHAVIOR (1980-2004)

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Are leftist parties the beneficiaries of the failure of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin America? This dissertation examines the impact that economic reforms implemented in Latin America during 1980s and 1990s had on the shift to the Left of many countries in the region. In particular, it seeks to answer three research questions: a) what particular features of market-oriented economic reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited left- leaning parties' electoral performance? b) What are the determinants of Latin Americans' vote for left-oriented parties? And c) how does the linkage between the micro and macro level of analysis work?

A combination of methodologies was used to answer these questions. First, a macro-level analysis was performed using data from 17 countries covering the period from 1985 to 2004. The dataset includes the percentage of votes received by leftist parties, the level of neoliberal reforms implemented in each country, economic variables which appraise economic well-being and political variables that account for the political context. Second, an individual-level analysis was carried out with survey data from Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay to answer the question about the factors that lead Latin American voters to choose a leftist party.

This investigation leads to three main conclusions. First, more market reforms did not produce more votes for political parties on the left. More than neoliberal economic reforms, the key variable to understand the increase in the Left is unemployment. Left-leaning parties in Latin America do increase their electoral chances when unemployment is high. Second, Latin Americans are not voting Leftist parties because they are against neoliberal policies. The current shift to the Left is more a result of popular discontent with the economic situation than anything else. Finally, the electoral possibilities of success that leftist parties have by capitalizing on social discontent depend on the number of "untainted opposition" parties available in the political system. In countries like Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties embody the only "untainted opposition," it was easier for them to capitalize on popular discontent than in Mexico, where a party on the right also represented an "untainted opposition."

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Since the final years of the Twentieth Century, many Latin American countries have elected governments that identified themselves with the ideological Left. In 1999, Hugo Chávez, a former coup plotter, was elected President of Venezuela after campaigning against the "Washington consensus" model, and promising to upend the old social order and improve the lives of the poor. Brazil also veered toward the left with the victory of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in the 2002 general elections. Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, the PT candidate, was elected President and it is highly probable that he will be reelected in the second round of the 2006 election. In Argentina, a left-wing political faction of the Peronist Party headed by Néstor Kirchner won the 2003 election; while in neighboring Uruguay, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) a left-leaning coalition party which has steadily increased its electoral participation since it was founded in 1971, finally gained the presidency in 2004. Chile has been governed by a center-left coalition since its return to democracy; the chair of the government has alternated between social democrats and socialists, and in the 2005 election a female socialist candidate became President. Also in 2005, Bolivians decided to grant Evo Morales, the presidential candidate of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), and an important leader of the coca producers' union, the chance to govern one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America. More recently, at the end of 2006, Nicaragua and Ecuador have chosen leftist political parties to be in charge of the government. Daniel Ortega, former president of Nicaragua from 1985 to 1990, and leader of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) was reelected as president in November 2006. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa won the presidency in the second round of the election with the support of leftists' political parties and indigenous movements.

The movement of Latin America towards the Left led journalists, political analysts and political scientists to look for explanations. The most widespread of these suggests that Latin Americans' vote for political parties on the left is a backlash against the neoliberal model implemented in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. The Economist magazine states this argument as follows: "Rightly or wrongly, voters blamed the slowdown on the free-market reforms known as the Washington consensus. As happens in democracies, they

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started to vote for the opposition- which tended to be on the left." (The Economist, May 20th 2006). However, this is not the only answer. Others have pointed out that, behind this shift to the left, there lies primarily a need for a change. Popular discontent at traditional parties unable to solve problems of poverty, corruption and inequality led Latin Americans to vote for political parties perceived as being more likely to deliver a better standard of living. To put it simply, Latin America's shift to the left is rooted less in ideological stances than in a desire to punish incumbents for poor economic performance.

Alternative arguments question the very existence of a movement towards the Left. First, by pointing out that other countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, have recently elected governments that positioned themselves close to the ideological Right. And second, by arguing that the differences between left-wing governments are more significant than the similarities. It is common to read that Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay belong to a moderate left or "right left" (Castañeda 2006), close to a social democracy; while Bolivia and especially Venezuela are regarded as a "radical," "populist," or "wrong left" (Castañeda 2006).

This project will disentangle what is true in each of these arguments. What is the impact that market-oriented economic reforms have had on the vote for leftist parties in Latin America? Are Latin Americans voting for the Left depending on their ideological stances or because parties on the Left merely benefit from voters' discontent towards traditional parties? Not all countries in the region moved to the left after the implementation of economic reforms in the '80s and '90s. In reformist countries such as Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, leftist parties did not increase their share of the vote. Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal reforms, a central question is what particular features of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited left-leaning parties' electoral performance. Are purely economic outcomes, such as inflation or unemployment, more important than market-oriented reforms in understanding the vote for leftist parties? Are economic factors relevant in understanding the movement of some countries to the left only under certain political conditions?

Macro factors, however, do not explain the totality of the phenomenon, and the increase in the leftist vote may be better explained by analyzing the micro foundations of voting behavior. In the view of many scholars who study voting behavior and public opinion, perceptions are what really count when trying to understand why citizens act the way they do. Individuals make their political decisions based on the way they perceive reality rather than on any objective reality. As a consequence, economic assessments can by no means be considered objective. Citizens can judge the country's economic performance negatively even though macro indicators show that the economy is doing fine. The same may happen

with Latin Americans' perceptions of neoliberal economic reforms. The perception of economic reforms, or the opinion about them, may be not related to the actual level of reforms. It is possible that, contrary to conventional wisdom, in countries where fewer reforms have been implemented, inhabitants are more tired of them, and consequently, change their voting behavior in favor of political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-oriented policies. In order to test whether perceptions about reforms are more important for understanding the vote for the Left than the actual level of reforms, it is necessary to run an analysis at a micro rather than a macro level.

Latin Americans can vote Left because they want more state intervention in the economy, a more egalitarian economic distribution, or more investment in social policies. After a decade of neoliberal economic reforms, they may be claiming that it's "time for a change" (Schlesinger 1986), and consequently, may behave in a policy-oriented way. Alternatively, it is possible to argue that voters are not policy oriented, they only care about outcomes, and they are voting Left because the neoliberal model failed to deliver sustainable economic development and to overcome the endemic problem of unemployment. These two explanations are not incompatible, both can be true. Latin Americans may be voting Left because they do not want more market-friendly economic policies, and also because they are punishing incumbent parties for poor economic performance.

It is true that not all countries in the region are voting for parties on the Left. And it is also correct to say that not all the governments usually identified as "leftist" are the same. Some are closer to the center or could be considered social democrats, while others tend to the radical left. Some have a more populist style, while others represent an institutional left. Or to use Castañeda´s classification (2006), there is a "Right left" which is "modern, open-minded, reformist, and internationalist, and it springs, paradoxically, from the hard-core left of the past," and the "Wrong left" born of "the great tradition of Latin American populism, is "nationalist, strident and close-minded." However, I argue that despite their differences, they share certain characteristics that make the classification conceptually relevant. In particular, left-leaning parties, or "left-of-center" parties as Panizza named them (2005), in Latin America can be described by their emphasis on economic redistribution, poverty reduction, and social policies in general. Rather than getting into a discussion that compares leftist parties in Latin America, the next section discusses the current meaning that the Left-Right ideological dimension has in Latin America and defines what a Left leaning political party is for this project.

1.1   THE CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA

There is debate over the validity that a Left-Right ideological dimension could have after the fall of the Soviet bloc. Those that argue that the ideological dimension has disappeared point to the crisis of ideologies, the lack of a true antagonism in the way problems can be stated, the possibility of a Third Way, and the loss of descriptive value that the dimension has undergone. Because the existence of the Left depends on the existence of the Right, and vice versa, the breakup of the Soviet bloc undermined the Left, and consequently endangered the whole dimension (Bobbio 1995).

If the validity of the ideological dimension has been disputed around the world, the sense of unease is even greater in Latin America where scholars have argued that voters make limited use of ideological labels (Echegaray 2005). Since Converse (1964) there has been a great deal of debate about how readily voters rely on ideology when voting, and to what extent citizens organize their political opinions around the ideological dimension. The same doubts are cast regarding the importance of ideology in predicting Latin Americans' voting behavior. Echegaray (2005) considers ideological clues to be an irrelevant source of guidance for Latin American voters, but he does not empirically test this contention.

Contrary to Echegaray, I argue that the ideological dimension is meaningful in Latin America; it represents an important methodological and analytical tool for analyzing politics in the region. First of all, around eight out of ten Latin Americans were able to place themselves in the ideological dimension from 1996 to 2004 (Latinobarómetro 2004). This percentage varies depending on the country; left and right ideological labels mean more to Chileans and Uruguayans than to Argentineans. But, as a first appraisal, ideological thinking is part of Latin Americans' political behavior. Second, previous research has also shown that elite groups and citizens are linked by ideological commitments (Luna and Zechmeister 2005a). Country differences are also relevant in that respect; Chile and Uruguay present higher levels of ideological congruency, while Ecuador ranks very low. Regardless of these differences, what this research indicates is that ideology is indeed a relevant category to understand political representation in Latin America.

Finally, there is empirical research pointing to ideology as a relevant voting clue for Latin Americans (Cameron 1994; Carreirao 2002a; Singer, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Electorates use the overarching continuum between Left and Right, or from Liberal to Conservative in the United States, as a shortcut to processing political information and making their electoral decisions. It is not necessary to have high levels of political sophistication in order to vote ideologically. On the contrary, ideology can be understood in its weak meaning as a heuristic tool used by citizens to simplify information, evaluate political alternatives and make political decisions more efficiently and precisely (Downs 1957; Sartori 1976). In Latin America, ideology, mainly understood in its weak meaning, is a relevant determinant of voting behavior (Singer 2002; Zechmeister 2006).

The research on the meaning of the Left-Right ideological dimension is more extended in Western Europe and the United States (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990) than in Latin America. However, recent studies have made substantive progress on the study of what Left and Right means in the region (Luna 2004a; Luna and Zechmeister 2005a; Luna and Zechmeister 2005b; Zechmeister 2006). For example, Luna and Zechmeister (2005b) have found that what defines the placement of parties and electorates on the Left is a strong emphasis on deepening democracy, the defense of state intervention in the economy, a secular profile in religious and moral topics, and a profound concern for social issues.

Apart from these common characteristics, there is no doubt that the meaning of being a left-leaning political party varies among countries and even within the same country. For example, Castañeda (1993) classifies the Latin American left into four parts: the traditional communist parties, the populist left, political and militaristic organizations, and reformers. Each of them has a particular set of defining features. Leftist parties also differ over time. The breakdown of the Soviet bloc had an enormous impact on the way in which leftist parties positioned themselves in the ideological dimension in Latin American and elsewhere. In Latin America, scholars have distinguished two moments of the Left. The first one goes from the end of World War II up to 1990; it is highly influenced by the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Allende government in Chile from 1970 to 1973, and the revolutionary victory in Nicaragua in 1979. The second stage of the Left starts with the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990 and the collapse of the communist world (Castañeda 1993; Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005). Regardless of the difficulty implied in finding the main characteristics of left-leaning parties in Latin America, the task is necessary for the conceptual clarity of this project.

Starting from their most general feature, leftist parties emphasize equality. Bobbio (1995) argues that equality is the only principle capable of differentiating Left from Right regardless of time. The distinction between right and left comes from the French Republic, where those representatives that were more egalitarian and radical placed themselves on the left, and those more conservative representatives, supporters of the aristocratic order, sat on the right. The defense of policies that improve equality among citizens is a trait that leftist parties share.

A second characteristic is the emphasis placed on deepening democracy. Leftist parties want to increase the accountability of elected representatives, to control political corruption, to strengthen popular participation, augment popular control over collective decision-making, and enhance the use of direct democracy mechanisms (Castañeda 1993; Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005). This position towards democracy represents a change in Latin American leftist parties before and after 1990. Before 1990, most of them dismissed democracy in favor of revolution. As Roberts points out, "two responses to formal democratic institutions predominated in the Latin American left: outright rejection because democracy was an instrument of bourgeois class domination, or rationalized participation on instrumental grounds" (1998: 18). Nowadays, leftist parties in the region have reclaimed democracy as an integral character for their project. This change came about partly because of the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the failure of revolutionary means, and partly because of the traumatic experience of dictatorships (Castañeda 1993; Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005).

The debt crisis that the region suffered in the early 1980s and the way in which the neoliberal revolution undermined state-led models of economic development (Roberts 1998; Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005) have led Latin American leftist parties to agree that the state, by itself, cannot manage the economy. It is also necessary to respect the rules of the market. There are no recipes indicating the proportion of state to market intervention the combination should have, but it is clear that both components, income redistribution and correct market operations, are necessary to reduce inequalities and to improve competitiveness, social spending and the control of inflation (Castañeda 1993). Leftist parties tend to favor state intervention in order to provide public services, to redistribute income, and to articulate social policies for equalizing social opportunities, whilst keeping fiscal accounts under control (Rodríguez Garavito, Barret and Chávez 2005; Luna and Zechmeister 2005b).

In conclusion, there are some commonalities that make leftist parties substantially different from parties on the right of the ideological dimension, or even from centrist parties. In this project, Latin American political parties are classified in the Left-Right ideological

dimension following Michael Coppedge's classification (1997). *Right* parties are: "1) Parties that target heirs of the traditional elite of the nineteenth century without moderating their discourse to appeal to middle- or lower- class voters; 2) Parties that employ a fascist or neofascist discourse; and 3) Parties sponsored by a present or former military government, as long as they have a conservative (organicist, authoritarian, elitist, looking to the past) message and are not primarily personalist vehicles for particular authoritarian leaders". *Center-Right* parties are "parties that target middle- or lower- class voters in addition to elite voters by stressing cooperation with the private sector, public order, clean government, morality, or the priority of growth over distribution". *Center* parties are: "1) Parties that stress classic political liberalism – broad political participation, civic virtue, the rule of law, human rights, or democracy – without a salient social or economic agenda; and 2) Governing parties whose policies are so divided between positions both to the left and to the right of center that no orientation that is mostly consistent between elections is discernible."

Center-Left parties are "parties that stress justice, equality, social mobility, or the complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to alienate middle- or upper – class voters." *Left* parties are "parties that employ Marxist ideology or rhetoric and stress the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working class by capitalists and imperialists and advocate a strong role for the state to correct social and economic injustices. They may consider violence an appropriate form of struggle but not necessarily. They do not worry about alienating middle- and upper- class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals."

In addition to these categories, Coppedge classifies parties that are not classifiable in the left-right dimension as "personalist" or "other bloc." *Other Bloc* parties are "any parties that represent an identifiable ideology, program, principle, region, interest, or social group that cannot be classified in the left-right or Christian-secular terms." *Personalist* parties are the ones that 1) "base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their leader rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent to permit a plausible classification of the party in any other way, or they are 2) Independents; or are 3) unusually heterogeneous electoral fronts formed to back a candidate".

Two remarks should be made. First, one of the Coppedge's criteria to define a Left party is that "they do not worry about alienating middle- and upper- class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals." This criterion was relaxed to classify the parties during the 1990s and 2000s because the implementation of the neoliberal model has weakened the organized labor movement and other traditional social bases of leftist parties, and led them to appeal to broader electorates in order to increase their chances to govern. Second,

Coppedge's classification is far from perfect and can be easily criticized, but it is by far the most complete, systematic and exhaustive ideological classification of Latin American parties available. What's more, a classification of this type should be broad enough to encompass changes in ideologies over time, but it also needs enough precision to be relevant. Coppedge's classification fulfills both criteria.

As a result, in this project, a leftist party is understood according to Coppedge's definition of a Left and a Center-left party: a left-oriented party stresses justice, equality, social mobility, or the complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to alienate middle- or upper- class voters, or employs Marxist ideology or rhetoric and stresses the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working class by capitalists and imperialists and advocates a strong role for the state to correct social and economic injustices. This definition matches the characteristics stated before as the defining features of the Left in Latin America.

1.2   MACRO AND MICRO EXPLANATIONS TO VOTING LEFT

This project combines a macro perspective with a micro perspective to explain the recent increase for leftist parties in Latin America. Specifically, it seeks to answer three concrete questions. The first one is: under what economic and political conditions have leftist parties increased their electoral support? Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal reforms, a central question is what particular features of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited left-leaning parties' electoral performance. My argument is that economic reforms by themselves are not sufficient conditions to produce an increase in the vote share for leftist parties. Only when economic reforms generate an increase in unemployment, can left-of-center parties capitalize on the discontent with the situation and enlarge their share of the vote. In other words, when economic reforms fail, this indirectly benefits leftist parties.

The macro level perspective represents an incomplete answer to the phenomenon which should then be complemented by an analysis of the micro foundations of voting behavior. Therefore, the second question is the following: what are the determinants of Latin Americans' vote for left-wing parties? There is no study that accounts for the factors that explain this voting behavior from a micro level perspective. Is the vote for leftist parties

another example of economic voting theory according to which voters punish the incumbent party for bad economic results? Are electorates in Latin America mainly choosing leftist parties because their candidates are more appealing? Or, alternatively, are Latin Americans becoming more ideological and policy-oriented by voting Left as a reaction to the neoliberal paradigm in economic policy?

I expect that voters behave differently depending on the role that left-leaning parties had performed. Where leftist parties were always outside the government and represent a credible opposition, voters will vote for them as a way of trying something different. In other words, I do not expect to find Latin American voting in favor of the Left because they have become leftist in their policy positions. My expectation is that Latin Americans are voting Left because they are just punishing traditional parties that failed to produce economic welfare.

The third question is: how does the linkage between the micro and macro level of analysis work? Are the explanations of the increase in the vote for left-oriented parties at the macro level compatible with the explanations of why voters chose a leftist party from an individual perspective? By looking at the two levels of analysis, I will be able to discuss the theoretical connections between both of them and see if they are compatible or compete with one another.

My central argument is that the recent increase of leftist parties in Latin America comes about as a result of voters punishing political parties that were unable to improve the economic well-being of their electorates. Most Latin Americans have faced economic hardship during successive governments under a variety of political parties, and recent research demonstrates that voters have long-term economic memories (Benton 2005) and punish not only the incumbent party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that governed before the incumbent came to power. Left-of-center parties took advantage of this popular discontent and capitalized on social and economic dissatisfaction when they were outside the governing coalitions and remained in the opposition. As a result, by voting left-oriented parties, Latin Americans seem to be looking for credible political alternatives to the status quo rather than becoming anti-market in their policy positions. If this argument is correct, macro and micro evidence should support it.

1.3   A LOOK AT WHAT FOLLOWS

The rest of this dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 examines if the shift to the Left in Latin America that started during the last years of the Twentieth Century is something new, or if similar ideological cycles have occurred in the region before. In order to find comparative evidence that might help us to understand the recent electoral increase of the Left, the chapter examines the electoral performance of Latin American ideological blocs from the end of World War II up to 2004. The analysis finds that the recent electoral increase of the Left is not a novelty; ideological cycles have existed in Latin America previous to the current one. Moreover, the Left was the prevalent ideology in the region not so long ago. In addition, the factors that influenced a previous shift to the Left in the region look very similar to the ones that may be influencing the present veer toward leftist parties.

Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal reforms, but not all of them shifted to the Left, a central question is what particular features of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have helped leftist parties' electoral performance. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of neoliberal reforms on the vote for leftist parties and explores if purely economic outcomes, such as inflation or unemployment, or certain political conditions are more important than market-oriented reforms for understanding the vote for the Left. In order to answer these questions, it uses a pooled data set of Latin American presidential elections from 17 countries. Regressions results indicate that more market reforms did not produce more votes for left-wing parties; there is no linear relationship between the so-called "neoliberal model" and the Left's vote share. Overall, the unemployment rate is more important than reforms to explain the increase in the vote for the Left.

Leaving aside the macro level of analysis, and starting with the micro level of analysis, Chapter 4 describes the main theories that explain voting behavior from the individual perspective and these are then going to be tested in Chapter 5 to explain leftist voting in Latin America. These theories are: economic voting theory, social class cleavages, prospect theory, partisanship theory, and the cleavages created by political processes. Chapter 4 describes each of said theories, summarizes the major research done in Latin America using each of them, and goes over the main hypotheses and variables by which the theories are going to be tested.

Chapter 5 uses a most-different system research strategy and tests the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter in three country cases: Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. First, it

describes the three country cases and why they comprise a most-different system design. And second, it shows the empirical evidence from the three of them, which points in the direction that Latin Americans are not voting for left-of-center parties because they are against neoliberal reforms. Electorates in the region are voting Left because they are looking for new political alternatives that might provide an improvement in people's economic well-being. In addition, this individual level analysis presents ample evidence that Latin Americans are not random voters as other studies have pointed out. Regardless of the differences in voting behavior between Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans, all of them take into account the economic performance of the incumbent, party attachments and ideological considerations while voting.

The final chapter discusses the results and draws comparative conclusions from the analyses performed separately at the macro level and the individual level.

2.0   LATIN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL CYCLES IN THE POST-WAR ERA

"Disappointment is the universal modern malady… It is also a basic spring of political change. People can never be fulfilled for long either in the public or in the private sphere. We try one, then the other, and frustration compels a change in course. Moreover, however effective a particular course may be in meeting one set of troubles, it generally falters and fails when new troubles arise. And many troubles are inherently insoluble. As political eras, whether dominated by public purpose or by private interest, run their course, they infallibly generate the desire for something different. It always becomes after a while "time for a change." (Schlesinger 1986).

The 21st Century started with the Left in charge of Latin American politics. Venezuela elected Hugo Chávez president in 1999. In Brazil, the *Labor Party* (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) came to power in 2002, leading Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva to the presidency. A left-wing faction of the *Peronist Party* headed by Néstor Kirchner won the 2003 presidential elections in Argentina. In Uruguay, the *Broad Front* (*Frente Amplio*), a coalition party identified with the Left, won the 2004 presidential and congressional elections with a majority vote. Evo Morales also reached the presidency of Bolivia with the majority of votes in the 2005 elections. In Chile, the *Concertación* won the 2006 presidential election bringing Michelle Bachelet, a member of the Socialist Party who campaigned in favor of a more egalitarian income distribution, to the Presidency. Manuel López Obrador, the presidential candidate for the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (*PRD*) in México, lost the presidential election held in July 2006 for less than 1% of the votes in a very controversial dispute. At the end of 2006, Nicaragua brought Daniel Ortega back to the Presidency; and in Ecuador, Rafael Correa was elected in the second round of the election with the support of leftists' political parties and indigenous movements. This electoral trend in favor of leftist's parties is also perceived by looking at Latinamericans' ideological selfplacement. The AmericasBarometer data for 2006 reveal a slight shift to the left within populace since 2004. The regional average in 2004 was 6.17 and 5.77 in 2006 (Seligson 2007).

Although some journalists and political analysts refer to this shift to the Left as something new, this chapter will show that the rise of the Left in Latin America is not as novel as many claim. There have been other moments in Latin American history when the Left took the lead. Moreover, the factors that once caused the predominance of the Left in the region may also be producing the current prevalence of the Left.

There is a great deal of evidence that ideological swings and ideological cycles occur in American politics (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995; Stimson 1999; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Change is a part of politics. Governments change, and the alternation of political parties in the government is one desirable feature of democracies. If alternations, swings and changes of political parties are a part of political life, it might well be the case that these changes are shifts in the ideological leanings of the voters. Perhaps shifts in "ideology", understood as self-placement in an ideological dimension, do not occur, but more subtle changes do. For example, Stimson (1999) does not call it "ideology" but rather refers to the "public mood," which can be briefly describe as a set of preferences, and finds that it follows clearly observable cycles in American politics, and these cycles have an impact on the kind of policies that politicians enact. In other words, in the United States "dynamic representation" exists: elected organs of the government are highly responsive to changes in the public mood (Stimson 1995). The existence of cycles implies that there are political eras in which liberalism is predominant, and that after a while, a conservative era takes over. The logic is as follows: the longer an electorate has experienced liberal policies, the more probable it is that it will choose a conservative government. Conversely, the electorate is likely to choose a liberal government after a number of years living with conservative policies.

Are ideological cycles also a part of Latin American politics? In a region generally defined as unstable, volatile, and prone to institutional breakdown, is it possible to identify cycles? There is no reason to suppose that the ideological cycles that scholars find in other parts of the world do not take place in Latin America. However, there is no scholarly work demonstrating this effect. One possible reason for the existence of this vacuum is the scarcity of public opinion data to build historical series on. A deeper reason is that so much of Latin America has, for so long, been dominated by imposed political regimes that voting behavior mattered little. Since the mid-1980s, however, when Latin America shifted over to electoral democracy, the voting record has become more widely accessible.

However, if cycles are ubiquitous in politics, why should we pay attention to them? The reason to search for prior ideological cycles, from the perspective of political science, is a comparative one. In recent years, it has become very common to read journalists and political analysts' reports arguing that the "neo-liberal era" is over and claiming that the movement of Latin-American governments to the left is a novelty for the region. Most analysts are mainly interested in understanding the impact of market-oriented economic reforms pursued during the 1980s and 1990s in the recent increase in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America. The only way to know for certain if there is any novelty in this

electoral phenomenon and to understand its causes is to examine the ideological history of the region. It is possible that leftist parties obtained an important share of the vote in previous periods of the region's history for similar, or maybe different, reasons. It would not be a surprise to find that leftist parties increased their share of the vote in a particular period of Latin American history, and that after a while, rightist parties took the lead, and vice versa.

To sum up, this chapter examines the ideological evolution of Latin America since 1945 in order to find comparative evidence that might help us to understand the recent electoral increase of the Left. Is this increase in the vote for leftist parties something new in Latin America? How many cycles have occurred in the region's history since 1945? To answer these questions, the chapter analyzes the electoral performance of Latin-American political parties from the end of the World War II up to 2004, and finds that the recent electoral increase of the Left is not a novelty. Moreover, the factors that influenced a prior shift to the Left in the region are similar to the ones that may be influencing the current increase in the vote for leftist parties.

The first section of the chapter defines what is meant by an "ideological cycle." The second section presents and discusses Latin American ideological cycles since 1945. The third, and final, section of the chapter focuses on the last two decades (1980-2004), and explores the different degrees to which reforms were implemented in the region, as well as the degree to which leftist parties have increased their share of the vote.

2.1   THE DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGICAL CYCLE

Ideological trends, in general, can be of three different types: constant, unidirectional, or cyclical.[1] Figure 2.1 displays them in graphical form.

Figure 2.1 Examples of Ideological Trends

A constant is the absence of movement. In the history of the ideological distribution of votes, a constant would be graphically represented as a horizontal line. In that case, we should expect no differences in the share of the ideological blocs from 1945 to 2004. The second type of ideological trend is unidirectional. One case of this type would be, for example, a steady increase in the vote share that the ideological left receives, while the center and the right monotonically lose votes. The last is the cyclical type. Stimson (1999) understands a cycle as a public opinion trend that is eventually followed by a reversal of the

same. One caveat needs to be made regarding this last type: a cyclical ideological trend does not imply a regular trend of any kind. Cycles can be asymmetrical; they behave in different ways, have various shapes, and do not start or finish in the same place. Common sense, and primary historical knowledge, would lead us to expect more ideological cycles than any of the other types of trends in the history of Latin America. But this is a presumption that needs to be tested.

2.1.1   The Classification of Political Parties in the Ideological Dimension

We have the definition of cycle. Now we need to define what we mean by an *ideological* cycle. The first clarification to make is that an ideological cycle here is an electoral cycle because it is defined by the percentage of votes that leftist parties, center parties and rightist parties obtain in each congressional election.[2] The electoral ideological cycle may represent a public opinion cycle too. In other words, voters may alter their ideological preferences, and these changes are reflected in their vote.

The first step towards analyzing the existence of ideological cycles in Latin America is to place all Latin American political parties that received votes in congressional elections from 1945 to 2004 into three categories: left, center and right. Political parties are classified in the Left-Right ideological dimension using Coppedge's indicator of the ideology of Latin American political parties. Coppedge (1997) was the first scholar to classify Latin American political parties in a systematic way using the ideological dimension. Before him, other scholars studied specific types of political parties such as communist parties (Caballero 1986), populist parties (Conniff 1982), or Christian democratic parties (Mainwaring and Scully 2003). They also classified countries by their party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), or compiled impressive amounts of information about Latin American political parties (Alexander 1988; Ameringer 1992; Coggins and Lewis 1992; Alcántara and Freidenberg 2001). Coppedge's classification represents an improvement over these previous studies in that each Latin American political party, including minor ones, is sorted into an ideological bloc in a comprehensive and exhaustive way that makes a rigorous comparative analysis possible.

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[1] These three types of trends are not exhaustive. It is also possible to find random movements or fluctuations, but these kinds of movements are not usually described as trends. A random trend sounds meaningless. If a trend is random, it does not look like a trend.

[2] In those elections where there are different electoral results for the two chambers (senate and deputies), we use the results for the lower chamber (deputies).

Coppedge's ideological indicator has two dimensions: Christian-Secular and Left-Right. *Right wing* parties are: "1) Parties that target heirs of the traditional elite of the nineteenth century without moderating their discourse to appeal to middle- or lower- class voters; 2) Parties that employ a fascist or neofascist discourse; and 3) Parties sponsored by a present or former military government, as long as they have a conservative (organicist, authoritarian, elitist, looking to the past) message and are not primarily personalist vehicles for particular authoritarian leaders". *Center-Right* parties are "parties that target middle –or lower- class voters in addition to elite voters by stressing cooperation with the private sector, public order, clean government, morality, or the priority of growth over distribution". *Center* parties are: "1) Parties that stress classic political liberalism –a broad political participation, civic virtue, the rule of law, human rights, or democracy –without a salient social or economic agenda; and 2) Governing parties whose policies are so divided between positions both to the left and to the right of center that no orientation that is mostly consistent between elections is discernible." *Center-Left* parties are "parties that stress justice, equality, social mobility, or the complementary distribution and accumulation in a way intended not to alienate middle- or upper –class voters." *Left wing* parties are "parties that employ Marxist ideology or rhetoric and stress the priority of distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working class by capitalists and imperialists and advocate a strong role for the state to correct social and economic injustice. They may consider violence an appropriate form of struggle but not necessarily. They do not worry about alienating middle –and upper class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals" (Coppedge 1997).

In addition to these categories, Coppedge classifies parties that are not readily classifiable in the left-right dimension as "personalist" or "other bloc." *Other Bloc* parties are "any parties that represent an identifiable ideology, program, principle, region, interest, or social group that cannot be classified in the left-right or Christian-secular terms." *Personalist* parties are the ones that 1) "base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their leader rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent to permit a plausible classification of the party in any other way, or they are 2) Independents; or are 3) unusually heterogeneous electoral fronts formed to back a candidate" (Coppedge 1997).

Several observations regarding Coppedge's classifications are necessary.

First, one of the Coppedge's criteria to define a Leftist party is that "they do not worry about alienating middle –and upper class voters who are not already socialist intellectuals." This criterion was relaxed to classify the parties during the 1990s and 2000s. It should be noted that for the purpose of this chapter and the next, I work with three ideological

categories: Left, Center, and Right. The Left is composed of left and center-left political parties, while the Right is made up of right and center-right parties. The main reason to reduce the five categories defined by Coppedge to three is that I am interested in tackling the main ideological trends and cycles in Latin America, not the more subtle movements between center-right and right, or between left and center-left. This chapter is not about how polarized Latin-Americans party systems are. The main aim is to explore the ideological cycles between Left and Right, regardless of how extreme each of them may be.

Second, Coppedge (1997) only classifies political parties until 1995. Using his criteria, the classification was extended to political parties that participated in parliamentary and presidential elections until 2005.[3] This expansion takes into consideration the movements in the ideological dimension that some parties made either because they were in power, on the opposition, or simply because they redefined their ideology.[4] The expanded classification uses information extracted from handbooks,[5] political party websites, and consultations with experts from several countries.[6]

It can be argued that some of the ideological movements over time could be produced by having a different team recoding political parties from the mid 90s. In order to maximize coding reliability and reduce the possible differences implied by the need to update the dataset, I proceed in the following way. First, whenever it was possible, I include two country experts for each country. Second, it is important to mention that most parties remained classified in the same way that they were in Coppedge's classification. Only when both coders agreed that a party moved away from Coppedge's original classification, I decided to change the party's ideological placement but not before 1994. In that sense, I respect Coppedge's original classification as much as possible. Finally, and as a result of that, there

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[3] In section 2.2, only the results of congressional elections are taken into account. The exception is the results for the Peruvian elections before 1978 which are based on presidential rather than legislative votes.

[4] For example, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) was classified by Coppedge as a center-left party until 1994. But in 1994, the PSDB won the presidential election under the candidacy of Fernando H. Cardoso with the support of the PFL (Partido do Frente Liberal), indicating that the party has already moved to the center. As a president, Cardoso and his party implemented policies more in line with a party with center-right ideology. Since then, PSDB is classified as CR (center right). The same happens with the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)* in 2000.

[5] Alexander (1988); Coggins and Lewis (1992); Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001).

[6] The extension of this classification was done by Germán Lodola and Rosario Queirolo. The following country experts were consulted: Germán Lodola and Belén Amadeo (Argentina), Lucio Renno and Rachel Meneguello (Brazil), Daniel Moreno Morales and Vivian Schwarz (Bolivia), Francisco Díaz and Juan Pablo Luna (Chile), Laura Wills and Miguel García (Colombia), Mitchell Seligson, Juliana Martínez, and Harold Villegas Roman (Costa Rica), Grisel Lerebours (Dominican Republic), Agustín Grijalva and Pablo Andrade (Ecuador), Cynthia McClintock, Ricardo Córdova and Margarita Correa (El Salvador), Dinorah Azpuru and Margarita Correa (Guatemala), José René Argueta and Margarita Correa (Honduras), Luis Jiménez and Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Zepeda (México), John Booth and Margarita Correa (Nicaragua), Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and José Costa (Paraguay), Cynthia McClintock and Luis E. González (Perú), Juan Pablo Luna, Fernanda Boidi and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay), Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Margarita López-Maya (Venezuela).

are several countries cases where Coppedge's classification remained almost[7] unchanged as Peru and Paraguay.

Third, the chapter uses two different samples of countries. In section 2.2, it uses a sample composed of countries for which we have reliable data for the whole period of study (1945-2004): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. This section works with the results of congressional elections. On the other hand, section 2.3 works with the result of presidential elections in a more recent period of time (1980-2005) for which it is easier to gain access to reliable data for the whole region. As a result, the sample is wider and includes 17 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Fourth, Coppedge classifies each political party using two dimensions, the ideological and the religious dimension. The latter identifies if the party is secular or religious. In this study, the religious dimension is not taken into account; therefore, the blocs are left, center and right, independent of whether the parties are Christian or secular.

Finally, some political parties are impossible to sort as leftist, centrist or rightist. In those cases, the party, and its share of the vote, is excluded from the analysis but remain in the denominator to not alter the real share of the vote that each ideological bloc has. Examples of those political parties are personalist parties where the charisma of the leader is more important than any ideology (e.g. Cambio 90 in Perú), or parties with an identifiable ideology or program that cannot be interpreted with the left-right dimension (e.g. the Argentine Partido Justicialista during most of the period under study), or parties for which there is not enough information available to know their orientation.

Coppedge was able to classify into the left-right dimension, "97 percent of the vote cast in all but 5 elections (all in Argentina and Ecuador). Less than 10 percent of the vote is unclassified in all but 14 elections, and less than 1 percent is unclassified in 58 percent of the elections" (Coppedge 1997). These percentages are high given that Latin American party systems are usually described as being highly volatile and weakly institutionalized. Scholars commonly define political parties in the region as highly personalistic and clientelistic (Ames 2001). For the period under study (1945-2004), the results of the classification are similar to those mentioned by Coppedge. Argentina and Ecuador are the countries in the region with the highest percentage of the vote unclassified. This means that in those countries, political parties that were not possible to classify in the left-right ideological dimension as the Partido

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[7] With the exception of the coding of new parties.

Justicialista or the Partido Roldolsista Ecuatoriano, obtained a significant percentage of the vote. During Fujimori´s government, Peru was another case in which a high percentage of the vote was impossible to categorize (59%) due to the presence of Cambio 90, among others. Excluding these exceptions, the classification of Latin American political parties into ideological blocs is quite comprehensive.[8]

2.1.2 Data and Methods

After classifying each party into an ideological bloc, we tally the percentage of vote obtained by each bloc in all the legislative elections held from 1945 to 2004. In order to build a series, we assume that the ideological distribution obtained in a legislative election remains unchanged until the next election. For example, in the Bolivian election of 1960, the left obtained 77 percent of the vote, the center 0, and the right 23 percent. Therefore, the result for 1961 is also 77 percent, 0 percent and 23 percent, respectively. In 1962, Bolivians had another election, and the vote share of each ideological bloc changed. This methodological rule was followed for every country with two exceptions: when the country was under authoritarian rule and when the election was considered fraudulent by the country experts consulted.[9] In both cases, the solution was to substitute the result by dots in the dataset and exclude the country from the Latin American average of that year.

Electoral results are taken from different sources. To cover the period from 1945 to 1995, we use the electoral results in the Coppedge (1997) dataset. Since 1995, the main source of electoral data has been the Political Database of the Americas (PDBA) at Georgetown University. Complementary sources were consulted to fill in blanks or verify the information: www.observatorioelectoral.org, Nohlen (2005), and the web pages of electoral offices in each country.

The final step was to build an average that represents the electoral weight that each ideological bloc had in every year from 1945 to 2004. The average only includes countries for which we have reliable data: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In addition, when those countries were under dictatorships or elections were suspected of being fraudulent, the country was excluded from the average. Following these criteria, the dataset excludes Brazilian congressional

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[8] A table listing the political parties in each country that do not fit into the left-right dimension from 1980 to 2005 appears in Appendix A. The table also indicates the percentage of the total vote that these unclassified parties obtained in the presidential elections.
[9] An election is considered "fraudulent" when there is doubt that the real electoral results are significantly different from the official ones.

elections from 1965 to 1985 because they were carried out under an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, the dataset includes Mexican elections since 1961. Despite most scholars agreeing that Mexican elections during those years had a certain level of fraud, I decided to include them because scholars also agree that the country underwent a process of democratization and political liberalization, and the regime allowed some ideological competition.[10] However, I also run the analysis excluding Mexican elections occurred from 1961 to 1990, and the results do not change significantly.[11]

The 1970s is the decade in which the greatest number of countries were under authoritarian regimes, and for that reason, the averages for that decade have been built with fewer countries. In 1977, the average is only comprised by four countries.

2.2   CYCLES IN DECADES

For most of the twentieth century, Latin America alternated between liberal democracy and authoritarian regimes. By 1945, the region was undergoing a period of democratization, social and political participation had increased almost everywhere, and in most countries, the incorporation of the labor movement into the political arena was already finished (Collier and Collier 2002). However, the trend towards democratization was far from stable. First, populist regimes hostile to political competition in Argentina and Brazil, and later, a new wave of authoritarian regimes in the 1960s, interrupted the optimistic post-war period. Despite the fragility of the period, the end of World War II was chosen as the starting point for the analysis of Latin American political cycles. The reason is that the beginning of the Cold War brought with it the appeal of alternatives to liberal democracy such as communism, socialism, and later the Cuban Revolution, which had a huge impact on the ideological alignment of Latin American political parties.

Figure 2.2 shows the trends, swings and cycles of the ideological blocs in Latin America since 1945. The first unexpected finding is the general ideological distribution: while Left and Right always obtain between 20% and 50% of the votes, the Center fluctuates, most of the time, around 10% and 20%. Latin America's ideological distribution looks more

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[10] Mexico fulfils the first three rules set out by Przeworski et al. (2000) to define a democracy, but it does not pass the "alternation rule."

bimodal than normal. The highest point reached by the Right was in 1949. Conversely, the lowest point of the Left was in 1949, and the highest in 1970. The Center hit its peak in 1976 and 1977. During those years, most of the countries were under dictatorships. Therefore, the average only takes into account the results of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela. However, this might indicate two different ways in which the region dealt with the "socialist threat," political polarization, and radicalization during the 1960s. One was the breakdown of democratic institutions, and subsequent authoritarian regimes. The other was the institutional ability of centrist parties to channel demands, and manage popular discontent.

The ideological cycles in Latin America were mainly between the Right and the Left. In Figure 2.2, the dotted line (representing the Right) and the thick unbroken line (representing the Left) cross each other several times; they appear to be highly and negatively correlated: when one goes up, the other goes down. In other words, the most important ideological movements in Latin America have more to do with the Left and the Right than with changes in the vote share obtained by the ideological Center.

Using an average for the whole region brings with it the risk of obscuring the differences between countries. Latin American ideological distribution can be bimodal because every country, or most of the countries in the region, has a bimodal distribution too, or can hide different types of distributions. In this case, the average fits into the first alternative. Generally speaking, most of the countries included in the average have a bimodal ideological distribution (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The exceptions are Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico.[12]

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[11] Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows Latin American ideological cycles excluding these Mexican elections. The main difference between this figure and Figure 2.2 is that the predominance of the Left in the second cycle is longer and more pronounced when these controversial Mexican elections are excluded.

[12] The graphs for each country are shown in Appendix A.

Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University)

Figure 2.2 Ideological Cycles in Latin America (1945-2005)

A bimodal distribution indicates that Latin American political history has not been dominated by one ideology. Only the Left obtained over 50% of the vote, and it did so in a single year: 1970. The region has not been predominantly leftist or rightist at any moment since the end of World War Two. Neither has the Center prevailed. Politics in the region have alternated between Right and Left, without either gaining the upper hand. This bimodal ideological distribution does not yet enable us to say that the region had a strong ideological polarization during most of the post-war period, which is one of the hazards for the stability and consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sani and Sartori 1983). The dearth of public opinion and elite's data to measure ideological polarization in a systematic way through the whole period of study prevents us from making that argument.[13] Although the polarized image can be overstated, the vacuum of the Center is real.

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[13] For the same reason, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) were not able to measure ideological polarization, but taking into account the analysis of the case-studies presented in their book, they categorize Costa Rica as a low polarization system; Colombia, Paraguay, and Argentina as systems with moderately low polarization; Venezuela, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador had moderately high polarization; and Mexico, Peru and Brazil as highly polarized systems. In this classification made in 1993, there are more countries with moderately high to high polarization than countries with low polarization.

There are four main ideological cycles during the period of study: 1946-1956, 1969-1976, 1979-2000, and an ongoing one since 2001.[14] The first and third cycles have the Right as the leading ideology, while in the second and fourth, the Left is predominant. The first cycle is dominated by the Right, starts at the end of World War Two (WWII), lasts until 1956, and comes as a response to the unstable economic conditions of wartime. During the war years, the state took more responsibilities and intervened more in the regulation of the economy in diverse ways: providing services like electricity, and handling problems such as import shortages and dollar inflation. Social expenditure grew during wartime, and so did inflation. For important sectors of the population, their salaries and wages were undermined by the rise in the cost of living, thus generating popular discontent that was expressed in social upheavals. Income inequality also increased during those years (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). This was the economic situation of the region when the Second World War ended. The war had a strong and negative economic impact in Latin America because it disrupted the region's traditional markets. This trade disruption was joined by a pessimistic mood towards the export-led model, and the two factors together encouraged a greater commitment to an alternative development model: import substitution industrialization (ISI).

The years after WWII were optimistic times in Latin America. In economic terms, this period of the region's history was marked by a general confidence produced by the inward direction that the regional economies had undertaken during the war, plus the expectation of the reopening of European trade (Halperín Donghi 1993). But this enthusiasm for the economic future brought conflicts regarding the best way to distribute wealth and power in the society, bringing the defenders of industrialization up against those who supported the export-oriented model. The dilemma between export-led growth and the inward-looking model was solved mostly in favor of import substitution industrialization.[15] But by the middle of 1950, when almost all the countries in the region had undertaken the first stage of industrialization, the hopeful mood of 1945 was over (Halperín Donghi 1993). The main reason for this change was the ending of beneficial conditions for international commerce.

The ideological cycle that starts up immediately after the end of the war shows the Right increasing its share of the vote until 1949, while the Left loses votes until that year. After 1949, those trends were reversed: the Left started to win votes while the Right lost

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[14] From 1956 to 1969, and from 1976 to 1979, there are more random movements between Left, Center and Right than specific trends.

[15] Not all Latin-American countries opted for ISI, and they embarked on a process of industrialization in different ways. Bulmer-Thomas (2003) considers that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay adopted an inward-looking development model, while Colombia, Venezuela and some of the smaller republics did not.

them, and the trend continued until 1956. Despite those swings, the Right was predominant during the whole cycle. The prevalent development model was the ISI. Was there something different in economic terms before and after 1949 that might have caused the swing of ideological trends in Latin America? Among the many things that might have affected the cycle, the frame of mind produced by the deterioration in international trade conditions could be relevant. The new international economic order primarily benefited the developed countries. Latin American countries did not take advantage of this new order due to their inward-looking policies, their concentrated commodity lottery based on primary products, and the protection that developed countries established on agriculture (Bulmer-Thomas 2003).

In terms of politics, the background to the first cycle is the Cold War. The power of the Soviet Union in Latin America was not strong, and the predominance of the United States was beyond question. But the Cold War implied more than a confrontation of real power; it was also an ideological conflict, and in that respect, "the forces of communism appeared more robust" in the region (Halperín Donghi 1993). The United States took several measures to maintain their supremacy in Latin America. First, through control of the Organization of American States (OAS). Second, through their determination to repel any internal threat of foreign inspiration in the Americas, and later the classification of communist activities as "internal threats." Finally, by the 1954 intervention in Guatemala to oust President Jacobo Arbenz from the government. In a way, those efforts were exaggerated because the region was supportive of liberal democracy. Socialism, at least before the Cuban Revolution in 1959, was mainly seen as a device to incorporate social reform into the political agenda.

The second cycle also came about in the context of the Cold War; it started in 1969 and had ended by 1976, but the political and economic circumstances of the 1970s were very different from those of the first cycle. This second cycle coincided with disenchantment with the ISI model, and was accompanied by "the socialism threat." In addition, the shape of this cycle is different from the previous one. At the beginning of the cycle, in 1969, the Right obtained 46% of the vote and the Left 36%. The following year, in 1970, the Left surpassed the Right (52% and 32% respectively) and continued to outdo the Right throughout the whole cycle. But what made this cycle different was the progress of the Center. As from 1970, the Center started to gain votes while Left and Right lost them, and in 1976, it became the prevailing ideology in the region.

Dissatisfaction with the economy became widespread in the 1960s. Countries that had adopted the inward-looking model suffered from balance of payments crises, inflationary pressures, and labor strife, while those that had chosen the outward model, also experienced

balance of payments crises plus extreme vulnerability to international economic instability. A general sense of failure existed despite the positive growth rates obtained during the 1950s and 1960s, an improvement in several social indicators such as life expectancy, and the classification of most Latin American countries as "middle-income" or "upper-middle income" by the World Bank. A possible explanation for the sense of failure and the increasing popular discontent can be found in the rising inequality in income distribution, the high levels of unemployment, and an increasing informal sector living in urban areas (Bulmer-Thomas 2003).

The above economic scenario was an opportunity for governments and politicians to gain votes by capitalizing on social discontent. Voters clamored for social reforms, and political and social tension grew in the first half of the 1970s. In general, between 1969 and 1976, politics in the region were under a strain. After the Cuban Revolution, which redefined Latin America-US relationships, socialism was seen as a possibility for some countries in the region, or at least, for some social and political groups within it. As a result, U.S. intervention in the region increased, even by supporting military regimes. In summary, the high levels of social and political turmoil, in combination with increasing inflation and the threat of socialism, contributed to the collapse of civilian governments in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). As Halperín Donghi points out the "more institutionalized form of armed intervention in political life responded to the increasing fear of socialist revolution (…)" (1993: 298).

The singular shape of this cycle might be explained by looking at the history of those years. Many countries in which the Left had an important share of the vote during the first years of 1970s, like Chile, became authoritarian regimes. This is not a coincidence: one of the goals of military regimes was to stop communism or the threat embodied by leftist parties. As a result, there might be a selection bias in the ideology of countries that remained democratic during the 1970s. Those Latin American countries where the Left did not represent a challenge were not subject to the breakdown of their democratic regimes. But this argument is not true for all countries: in Costa Rica and Venezuela, the Left had a significant share of the vote but there was no democratic breakdown. Therefore, this argument only explains part of the phenomenon.

Another explanation for the increase of the Center is methodological. During the first years of the 1970s, many Latin Americans governments changed over from being democratic to authoritarian, and countries under dictatorships do not count on the ideological averages of the region. Despite the fact that most of the authoritarian regimes of that time were close to the Right, we excluded them from the average because it is impossible to know the popular

support that those regimes received. The average for 1976 and 1977, the years in which the Center became the majority bloc, are made up of only four countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela. The Center became prevalent because Colombia and Mexico have a centrist government with a majority share of the vote. It is difficult to think how the Left and the Right would have behaved without the breakdown of democracy in so many Latin American countries, but one possibility is that the Left would have had the same fate even without the authoritarian regimes.

The third cycle is the longest of the four; it started in 1980 and finished in 2000. It is the result of several years under dictatorships. During those twenty years, the Right always had a larger share of the vote than the Left, but the cycle had ups and downs. For example, in 1989, Latin America was equally divided between the Left and the Right, neither of the blocs was dominant. The prevalence of the Right during that period witnessed the wellspring of neoliberal economic reforms and the return to democracy in the region.

The prevailing economic model in the region changed after the debt crisis of 1982 that was produced by Mexico's threat to default. During the second half of the twentieth century, Latin American countries had become increasingly dependent on foreign borrowing to afford state spending. At the beginning of the 1980s, the debt-led growth model was no longer sustainable due to the decline in bank lending to state-owned enterprises, and the opposition generated by an emerging consensus in favor of an undersized state and liberal economics (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). This new consensus was named "Washington Consensus" by the economist John Williamson in 1990s. Williamson (1990) described it as a set of ten policies: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights. Those policies were implemented in various degrees and times in Latin American, but every country of the region put into practice some of these reforms during the 1980s and 1990s.

The neoliberal reforms were implemented by authoritarian regimes (Chile) as well as by democracies (Bolivia, Dominican Republic). In term of politics, redemocratization was the distinctive feature of the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, almost every country was moving from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Democracy brought an outburst of political and social mobilization. Political parties in general, and leftist parties in particular, recovered their right to compete freely in elections. Those transitions to democracy took the whole decade, and in some cases like Chile and Paraguay, the process lasted into the 1990s. After the process was complete, and democracy was established in the region, other issues emerged on the political agenda. While some of those topics were new like how to consolidate

democracy, others were old and recurrent: how to make the economies grow, how to reduce the increasing levels of poverty, how to transform Latin American countries into developed ones.

The implementation of the "neoliberal model" was painful. Results started to appear during the 1990s with some improvement in living standards, increasing growth rates, and most importantly, the lowering of inflation. In contrast to that progress, income inequality remained, and the informal sector increased (Bulmer-Thomas 2003; Portes 2003; Huber and Solt 2004). By the end of the cycle, a series of financial crises (Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, and the Russian default in 1998) shook the model's foundations and brought into doubt its advantages.

The fourth, and last cycle, starts at the beginning of the 21st century. So far it has been only possible to identify the turning point of the cycle. The future path that it might take, and its potential end, remains unknown. This latest cycle is accompanied by a negative feeling towards the neoliberal model. Latin America seems full of disillusionment towards the model that has prevailed during the past two decades. Concurrently, the Left started to increase its share of the vote in several countries in the region. The young fourth cycle that started in 2001 shows the predominance of the Left (see Figure 2.2). The convergence of these two events raises the question of a possible causal relation between them: is the increase in the vote for the Left caused by the failure of neoliberal reforms?

The second cycle (1969-1976) also has the Left as the prevailing ideology, and it has as a background an immense wave of popular discontent with the economic situation, an experience of failure of the previous economic model (ISI), rising inequality in income distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). These factors are similar to the ones that are currently being blamed for the "reform fatigue."[16] I will argue that the economic and social consequences of neoliberal reforms, not the reform policies by themselves, influence the electoral fortune of political parties benefiting the Left. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 3.

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[16] "Reform fatigue" is a concept appointed by Sebastian Edwards (1997) that encompasses citizens' tiredness with the sacrifices required by economic reforms in their respective countries.

2.3 NEOLIBERALISM AND LEFTIST PARTIES FROM 1980S TO 2000S

In order to determine whether Latin American leftist parties have benefited from a failure in market-oriented economic reforms, it is necessary to examine two conditions that lie behind this assertion. First, that the economic reforms implemented during the 1990s in all Latin American countries have failed. Second, that leftist parties are increasing their share of the vote in the region. Only if these two conditions are proved to be true, is it worth proceeding by testing the causal relationship between neoliberal economic reforms and leftist votes. This section deals with the first two conditions. The impact of market-oriented economic reforms on the vote for the Left in Latin America is the topic of Chapter 3.

2.3.1 Condition 1: The Washington Consensus failure

During 1980s and 1990s, the "neoliberal model" based on the so-called "Washington Consensus," was implemented to various degrees in Latin American countries. To be more rigorous, the market oriented economic reforms started to be implemented in the 1980s, or even earlier in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia (Morley, Machado and Pettinato 1999).[17] In the course of this chapter and those following, "Washington Consensus," "market-oriented economic reforms," "structural reforms," "neoliberal model," or "orthodox policies" are used indistinctly, and it is assumed that all of these terms refer to the same set of policies described by Williamson as "Washington Consensus." To remind the reader, the set of policy reforms grouped as "Washington Consensus" can be summarized in fiscal discipline, public expenditure restrictions, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.

As shown in Figure 2.3, the implementation of these reforms in Latin America has varied in terms of pace and timing. Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay started this process early, in some cases even before the debt crisis of the 1980s (Edwards 1995; Morley, Machado and Pettinato 1999; Lora, 1997/2001) but they did it at different speeds: in Uruguay and Colombia reforms were milder and carried out in a more gradual way than in Chile and Argentina. In contrast, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru started the process later (in the mid-90s) and rapidly became deep reformers. Finally, Brazil, Costa

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[17] Morley et al. (1999) point out that most of the rise in the trade and financial reform indexes during the 1970s are due to the policies implemented in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia.

Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela not only started the reforms later, they also adopted less structural reforms (Lora, 1997/2001).[18]

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[18] This classification by timing and speed is made by Lora (1997). He distinguishes between Early Reformers (Argentina, Chile, and Jamaica), Gradual Reformers (Colombia and Uruguay), Recent Reformers (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Dominican Republic), and Slow Reformers (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela).

Source: based on Lora (1997)

Figure 2.3 Timing and Speed of Market-Oriented Economic Reforms in Latin America

The implementation of the Washington Consensus in Latin America also varied depending on the area of reform. Two leading researchers in the field: Eduardo Lora from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and Samuel Morley from the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC) have developed indexes to measure the degree to which different reforms were implemented in the region. Lora (1997, 2001) measures the advance of market-oriented economic reforms from 1985 to 1999 using a *structural reform index* that encompasses the progress of neoliberal policies in five areas: trade liberalization and exchange rate unification, privatizations of state companies, financial liberalization, tax reform, and deregulation of the labor market. Morley and his colleagues (1999) go further than Lora by expanding the index back to 1970, including an index of control of foreign capital transactions, and changing other reform indicators.[19] Despite these differences, they arrived at very similar results to those found by Lora: the major reformers are Chile and Uruguay from 1970 to 1982; Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay from 1985 to 1990; and Brazil, Peru, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador after 1990.

Morley et al. (1999) distinguish between *structural reforms* and *macroeconomic reforms*. The former are defined as "the changes in regulations, tariffs, tax rates or the control of capital transactions that affect decisions at the micro level," while macroeconomic policy reforms "involve fiscal deficit control, changes in monetary policy, and exchange rate management" (Morley, Machado and Pettinato 1999). The authors argue that the success of macroeconomic policies in lowering the inflation of Latin American countries is out of question, but there is not enough evidence to attribute the same achievement to structural reforms.

Since then, many scholars have undertaken the task of measuring the success or failure of the Washington Consensus (Dutch 2003; Escaith and Morley 2001; Huber and Solt 2004; Kuczynski and Williamson 2003; Lora and Panizza 2002; Lora, Panizza and Quispe-Agnoli 2004; Stallings and Peres 2000), and many others had analyzed the impact of a particular policy reform (Lora 1997). Regardless of the differences between those studies, they agree that after two decades of reforms implementation, the expected result of economic development was achieved neither in terms of sustainable economic growth nor in social indicators improvement.

However, in order to evaluate fairly the success or failure of economic reforms it is necessary to sort out their different goals and dimensions. The neoliberal model was

implemented to introduce fiscal discipline, stabilize monetary policy, and through these mechanisms, it was expected that orthodox policies would generate economic growth. The reforms were successful in introducing fiscal discipline and monetary stability in most Latin American countries but they failed to generate the ultimate goal: sustainable economic growth.

Table 2-1 Economic Indicators in Latin America (1980-2004)

	1980-1984	**1985-1989**	**1990-1994**	**1995-1999**	**2000-2004**
Inflation	66	496	367	16	8
Growth*	0.81	2.65	4.86	2.54	1.93
Unemployment	7.78	7.41	7.66	9.12	9.82

Source: International Monetary Found and World Development Bank
*Annual percent change in gross domestic product, constant prices in US dollars.
Results are presented in averages.

Curbing inflation was one of the achievements of market-oriented economic reforms. There is no disagreement on this point. As shown in Table 2-1, inflation has been going down since the mid-90s and the regional average for the first years of this decade (2000-2004) was only a single-digit figure (8%). But some argue that the decrease in inflation rates should be accredited to macroeconomic policy rather than to structural reforms (Morley, Machado and Pettinato 1999).

Economic growth did not have the same fortune. Between 1990 and 1999, the region's growth was higher than during the lost decade (1980's) showing the immediate positive impact of structural reforms, but it diminished to 1.93 for the 2000-2004 period. Even scholars who had claimed that neoliberal reforms had produced economic growth (Lora 1997/200), later acknowledged that the positive and immediate impact was not sustainable: "the reforms had only a temporary effect on growth. Our estimates imply that in the period of fastest reform, 1991-1993, reforms accelerated annual growth by 1.3 percentage points. However, when the reform process started decelerating, the growth effect dropped substantially, and in the period from 1997 to 1999 it accounted for only 0.6 percentage point of additional growth" (Lora and Panizza 2002).

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[19] The main changes introduced by Morley et al. are made in the privatization and domestic financial reform indexes "to reflect only the presence or absence of government intervention" (1999: 10).

Opponents of neoliberal reforms usually claim that the main problem with the reforms is the social consequences that the model produced rather than the insignificant economic improvements generated in the region. They argue that the main drawbacks are the increase in poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and the percentage of Latin-Americans working in the informal sector. During the last years, several scholars have tested these claims. Huber and Solt (2004) found an improvement in poverty reduction during 1990s but poverty in the region remained above the level of 1980s. One of their main conclusions is that countries with higher levels of neoliberalism and more aggressive tactics of liberalization are associated with rising inequality and poverty. In other words, radical and rapid reformers hurt the poorest segments of society. They also noticed an increase in the informalization of Latin American's economies. In most Latin American countries, unemployment rates increased because of market liberalization, public sector cutbacks and privatization. Most formal workers who lost their jobs moved to informal sectors of the economy, and as a result, informal workers became the largest class in every Latin American country (Portes and Hoffman 2003, Sabatini and Farnsworth 2006). Governments had no money to compensate the losers of economic adjustment because they had to follow frugal fiscal policies,[20] producing high levels of popular discontent.

Although this evidence looks pretty conclusive, an alternative view alleges that the negative social impact of the Washington Consensus was minor. Lora, Panizza and Quispe-Agnoli state that "in spite of all the fuss about the employment implications of trade liberalization and privatization, there is very scant evidence to support it" (2004: 15). However, examining the same studies that they reviewed, we found that the majority concluded that the neoliberal model had, at least, some detrimental effect on the social conditions of Latin Americans. Narayan and Petesch (2002), and the work by SAPRIN (2002) present qualitative evidence about the negative impact of reforms on poor people. From a quantitative perspective, Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) show that some reforms had the effect of increasing inequality and worsening income distribution among lower income sectors. In the opposite direction, MacKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) signal that privatization did not have a negative impact on employment. In conclusion, the impact of market-oriented economic reforms on the social welfare of Latin Americans remains open to question.

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[20] Some scholars argue that targeted compensation programs presented relief for certain social groups (Weyland 2002) and they certainly did that in Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, but those policies were not universal, they were not implemented in all countries, and even in countries where they were implemented like Venezuela, they did not overcome the low levels of support for neoliberal restructuring.

Scholars agree that inflation and unemployment are among the economic conditions with the greatest impact on voters' decisions (Hibbs 1979; Powell and Whitten 1993). Inflation, as Okun states, undermines "the foundations of habit and custom" (1975: 383), generates uncertainty about the future, and decreases voters' purchase power by increasing the cost of products and services. A vast body of evidence shows that Latin Americans care about inflation, and reward governments which control it (Lora and Olivera 2005; Remmer, 2003). Unemployment has an impact not only on those voters that are unemployed or underemployed; it also affects a larger number of voters that become afraid of losing their jobs. Since inflation was brought under control in most of the region after the mid-90s, it is highly probable that Latin-Americans judged unemployment to be more serious than inflation and voted against the political parties that implemented the reforms that produced it. In conclusion, there is some evidence to support the first statement that the neoliberal economic reforms implemented in Latin America after the debt crisis of the 1980s have failed to produce sustainable growth and unemployment.

Regardless of the objective outcomes of the neoliberal model, Latin Americans' disenchantment with it can be seen everywhere. Even the strongest supporters of the model have recognized that the outcome was not the one that they were hoping for. International organizations, which strongly supported the "neoliberal model" such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have acknowledged that the reforms did not produce the expected results, and they now suggest four different types of reforms to overcome this failure: "crisis proofing, completing first-generation reforms, advancing second-generation reforms, and improving equality" (IDEA 2004). Furthermore, many scholars who supported the "Washington Consensus" as the way to achieve development later moved away from this idea, and became its critics: Jeffrey Sachs (2005), Joseph Stiglitz (2002) and Dani Rodrik (2001) are examples of this. Not only has the international community shown signs of so-called "reform fatigue". The lack of public support for the Washington Consensus can also be seen among the general public, there is a widespread loss of confidence in the benefits of pro-market reforms among opinion leaders, and a less proactive stance toward reforms is the current mainstream tendency among Latin America's policymakers (Lora 2004; Panizza and Yañez 2005).

2.3.2 Condition 2: The Left had increased its share of the vote in all Latin America

The evidence is not so conclusive to support the second statement that Latin American leftist parties are getting more votes in the last wave of elections than they did in the 1980s or 1990s. Or, to put it differently, the statement is true *only* by looking at the *average* share of votes for leftist parties in Latin America, but it is not the pattern followed *by every country* in the region. On average, the Left increased its share of the vote from 1980 to 2005, the mean of their vote during the 1980s was 29.5%, for the 1990s was 29.3%, and during the first presidential elections of the 21st Century it has been 33.9%. This trend is also shown in Figure 2.2. During the last part of the third ideological cycle, during the 1990s, the Left started to increase its share of the vote. But it is at the beginning of 2000s when it gained more votes than the Right.

One could take as a pattern the recent victories of leftist parties in Bolivia (2005), Chile (2006), Uruguay (2004), Argentina (2003), Brazil (2002), and Venezuela (1999), but not all Latin American countries have recently elected candidates from the Left or have leftist parties that increased their share of the vote (e.g. Colombia in 2006 and 2002). As Figure 2.4 shows, there is not a unique recognizable trend in the vote for the Left in Latin America from the 80s to the last election. According to their tendency in the vote for left parties, Latin American countries can be classified into four different categories:[21] Continuous Increase, U Trend, No Change, and Continuous Decrease.

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[21] The percentages presented on Figure 2.4 group the vote received by left and center left parties in presidential elections.

Continuous Increase

"U"- Trend

Continuous Decrease

No Change

Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University)

Figure 2.4 Evolution of the Vote for Left and Center-left Parties in Latin America since 1980s

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador are categorized as countries with Continuous Increase in the vote for leftist parties in presidential elections. This increase in the share of the vote was not linear for all countries; in particular, Brazil's time series has ups and downs that are an effect of the way in which the PSDB under the government of Fernando H. Cardoso was classified.[22] Despite this variation, the share of the vote for leftist parties in the Southern Cone of Latin America has increased since the return of these countries to democracy in the early 1980s. In Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador the increase is less pronounced but still relevant.

The second category is the "U" Trend. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua belong to it. In these five countries, leftist parties had an important share of the vote during the 80s which went down during the 90s (in a similar way to the Continuous Decrease countries), but leftists regained their electoral appeal in the last presidential elections causing Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador) and Evo Morales (Bolivia) to the presidency, and a new leftist party in Costa Rica (Partido Acción Ciudadana) to obtain 26% of the votes in 2002. In Nicaragua, the recent recovery of the Left is less impressive than in these countries but is still significant.

The No-Change category is formed by those countries in which leftist parties received a small percentage of the votes during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. In Paraguay, after the return to democracy, leftist parties were almost non-existent, and they never gained more than 0.5% of the vote in presidential elections. Colombia and Honduras are cases with more variation than Paraguay, but leftist parties never gained a significant amount of votes. From 1982 to 2002, the highest gain that leftist parties obtained in Colombia was 12.74% in 1990. (see Figure 2.4).

Dominican Republic and Peru show a trend of Continuous Decrease in the share of the vote that leftist parties have had since the 1980s. In comparison with the rest of Latin America, the Left in these two countries had a significant share of the vote during the "lost decade" which shrunk during the decade of the neoliberal model implementation. Furthermore, during the last presidential elections, leftist parties received a minimal percentage of votes (see Figure 2.4).

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[22] PSDB started to move from left to right before the 1994 election. As a result, the leftist ideological bloc lost one of their components. However, the PT compensated this effect by increasing its electoral share of vote election through election since 1989.

As this preliminary diagnosis indicates, different countries present different trends. The increase in voter share that leftist parties received in presidential elections since the 1980s in the Southern Cone and to a lesser degree in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador; and the recent increase in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua cannot be generalized to the whole of Latin America.

2.4   CONCLUSION

Ideological cycles have existed, and exist, in Latin America in the same way that they exist in American politics. The alternation of Left and Right in power since 1945 indicates that none of these ideologies was hegemonic, and the current predominance of the Left can be understood as the beginning of another cycle. Even though the predominance of the Left is not as new as many think, it is interesting to analyze which factors explain it.

The Left was also the prevalent ideology in the region from 1969 to 1976. Those years were full of dissatisfaction with the economy, unhappiness with the ISI model, rising inequality in income distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector. These factors are similar to those currently blamed for the "reform fatigue" in Latin America. Consequently, one possible argument to test empirically is that these factors favor the vote for the Left. Or to frame the argument based on more current events: the failure of the neoliberal model has lead to the increase of the Left in Latin America.

Although leftist parties are not increasing their electoral support in every Latin American country, this chapter presents evidence that the Left is the current predominant ideology in the region. On the other hand, there is evidence indicating that the implementation of market-oriented economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s has failed to achieve sustainable economic growth and employment. In order to answer if there is a causal relationship between the failure of neoliberal policies and the increase in the vote for leftist parties, it is necessary to carry out a multivariate analysis. The next chapter does that by analyzing the impact of neoliberal reforms, economic variables that measure the economic results of the reforms, and political variables in the vote for leftist parties in 17 Latin American countries.

3.0 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS THAT BENEFIT LEFTIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Are leftist parties the beneficiaries of the failure of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin America? The recent electoral success of the left in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Chile (2006), Bolivia (2005), Uruguay (2004), Argentina (2003), Brazil (2002 and 2006), and Venezuela (1999), has led journalists, political analysts and political scientists to formulate this question. As was shown in Chapter 2, academic consensus states that the neoliberal economic reforms implemented in Latin America after the debt crisis of the 1980s have largely failed to produce sustainable economic growth and employment (Dutch 2003; Escaith and Morley 2001; Huber and Solt 2004; Kuczynski and Williamson 2003; Lora and Panizza 2002; Lora, 2004; Stallings 2000). As a result, presidents such as Evo Morales or Hugo Chávez who have campaigned against the "neoliberal model" may have benefited from its malfunction. But the previous chapter also indicates that not all countries in the region moved to the left after the implementation of economic reforms in the 1990s. In reformist countries such as Paraguay and Dominican Republic, left-of-center parties did not increase their share of votes.

Taking into consideration that most Latin American countries implemented neoliberal reforms during the 1990s, but that only in some of them have left-leaning parties come to power since the late 1990s, a crucial question is what particular features of these reforms, and what economic and political conditions, if any, have helped leftist parties' electoral performance? Are pure economic outcomes, such as inflation or unemployment, more important than market-oriented reforms in explaining the vote for leftist parties? Did voters turn to the left because they rejected neoliberal policies on ideological grounds or did they just react to the poor outcomes generated by those policies? Are economic factors only relevant for understanding the movement of some countries to the left under certain political conditions? And do political conditions, like

having a leftist incumbent, affect the electoral possibilities of leftist parties? This chapter uses a pooled data set of Latin American presidential elections to address these questions.

Regression results indicate that more extensive market reforms per se did not produce more votes for left-leaning parties; there is no linear relationship between the so-called "neoliberal model" and the Left's vote share. On the other hand, the unemployment rate has proved to be more important than reforms in explaining the increase in votes for the Left. Leftist parties gain votes when unemployment rises. This leads to the hypothesis that it was not the reforms themselves but their impact that led to the rise of the Left. In particular, we can hypothesize that only if the rise in unemployment is a result of the market reforms could we argue that neoliberal economic reforms *indirectly* benefited left-of-center parties. If this proves to be the case, then we can understand why not all neo-liberal reforms produced leftist governments.

The first section of this chapter discusses previous research done on the political consequences of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin America, and puts forward a set of hypotheses that test the impact of neoliberal reforms, economic conditions, and political context on the electoral fortunes of leftist parties in the region. The second section describes the variables and statistical techniques used in the empirical analysis, and the third section discusses the statistical results. The last section concludes and emphasizes the importance of looking at the micro level of analysis in order to find more definitive explanations for the recent increase in votes for the Left in Latin America.

3.1   MARKET REFORMS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The question of whether the implementation of market-oriented economic reforms in Latin America has produced an increase in votes for the Left is connected with two scholarly research

agendas: the literature on the implementation of the "neoliberal model" in Latin America, and the voter choice studies, in particular, the research on economic voting.

Students of Latin American politics have produced an impressive amount of work trying to explain the conditions under which the implementation of harmful economic reforms in the region during the 1990s was possible (Corrales 2002; Gibson 1997; Lodola 2005; Murillo 2001 ; Stokes 2001a ; Stokes, 2001b; Weyland 2002). The wealth of this production is the result not only of the quantity of studies but especially of the variety of perspectives used to explain this period of Latin American political and economic history. On the other hand, the research that explains the consequences of these reforms has only started to flourish more recently (Lora and Panizza 2003; Lora and Olivera 2005; Portes and Hoffman 2003; Remmer 2003; Wise and Roett 2003).

Within this latter group of research, two studies ask questions similar to the ones pointed out here. Remmer's article (2003) analyzes the electoral fortunes of Latin American incumbents from 1982 to 1999 in an attempt to tackle the political consequences of neoliberal reform. She finds that those governments which had controlled inflation were rewarded by the electorate. On the contrary, when the incumbent party's economic performance was poor, the electorate punished it by voting for another party. These findings show that economic voting also works in Latin America but does not add anything new in relation to the electoral impact of market-oriented economic reforms because Remmer doesn't include a measure of neoliberal reforms as an independent variable.

Lora and Olivera's article (2005) is the first study that tests the impact of neoliberal reforms on the electoral fortunes of the incumbent party. Using their structural reform index (SRI), they analyze the effect of market-oriented economic reforms on the incumbent party's electoral results in Presidential and Legislative elections in 17 Latin American countries from the mid 1980s till 2002. Their major finding is that Latin Americans "dislike pro-market policies *irrespective* of their results" (33).[23] They also find that the electorate rewards incumbents that control inflation. Ideology enters into their analysis as an independent variable, and it is only significant in legislative elections: "while the electorate dislikes privatization measures, it is more tolerant of them when the largest party in the legislature has a pro-market ideology" (40).

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[23] My italics

Even though Lora and Olivera's paper advances knowledge about the political impact that the neoliberal model had in Latin America, we still do not know if the implementation of those reforms has caused (or partially caused) the recent increase in the vote for the Left. Their dependent variable is the incumbent's share of the vote, not the vote for leftist parties.

Leftist parties can be the beneficiaries of the neoliberal model's failure because they traditionally oppose market-oriented economic reforms, and they are more supportive of state intervention in the economy. This argument leads to the hypothesis that higher levels of economic reforms generate an increase in the share of the vote for left-leaning parties. But the idea that the mere existence of neoliberal reforms is sufficient to increase leftist votes assumes that voters are policy oriented, and don't like market-oriented economic reforms regardless of their results, which is, in fact, the main finding of Lora and Olivera's paper (2005). However, there are many cases that counter this argument. The Dominican Republic and Paraguay are two countries that highly liberalized their economies, and leftist parties are not precisely in an ascending phase. On the contrary, Uruguay is one of the least reformed countries in Latin America, yet the Left won the 2004 presidential elections. Hence, I predict:

> H1*: Higher levels of economic reforms, by themselves, do not produce an increase in the share of the vote for leftist parties, but,*

> H2*: Higher levels of economic reforms, accompanied by higher levels of failure of these reforms, lead to an increase in the vote for leftist parties.*

The comparative literature on voting behavior in Latin America mainly focuses on economic voting theory and electoral turnover, while research about partisanship vote is performed mainly by case studies. Although Latin American countries, along with other low-income democracies, have been subject to less economic voting research than the United States and Western Europe (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), the results provided by comparative studies indicate that the economy is an important determinant of Latin Americans' vote (Echegaray 2005; Remmer 1991; Remmer and Gelineau 1993; Krueger, 1994; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Anderson et al. 2000; Molina 2001). There is extensive evidence that economic voting exists in Latin America, the economy affects electoral outcomes, and it is a major explanation for the high electoral volatility and turnover rate that exist in the region. But we do not know what economic conditions favor the vote for the Left.

Evidence from developed countries indicates that leftist governments are more concerned with economic goals such as full employment and a more egalitarian income distribution, while right-wing parties favor low inflation and tax control (Hibbs 1979). More recent research in industrialized democracies found that support for right-wing governments is enhanced by low inflation and hurt by high inflation, while support for left-leaning governments increases by lower than average unemployment (Powell and Whitten 1993). For Latin America, Stokes states (Stokes 2001b) that in situations of high inflation and growth, the electorate will vote in favor of efficiency-oriented policies, and under high unemployment, they will choose security-oriented policies. Generally, left-of-center parties support security-oriented policies while right-wing parties are in favor of efficiency-oriented policies. Consequently, I hypothesize that:

> H3: *In Latin America, high levels of unemployment will raise the votes for leftist parties when the incumbent party is not leftist. On the other hand, high levels of inflation will hurt left-leaning parties' electoral chances.*

The impact of the economy on electoral outcomes is a phenomenon that receives academic consensus. James Carville's famous phrase "It's the economy, stupid" is a good synthesis of the importance that is usually given to economic factors to explain the fortune of political parties in electoral times.[24] Nonetheless, scholars have found it extremely difficult to replicate in cross-national studies the economic voting effects found over time within countries. This puzzle was solved by adding political conditions to the economic conditions to explain how elections work. Powell and Whitten recommend that to "explain differences in retrospective economic voting across nations and over time we must take into account the political context within which elections take place (1993: 409). Following this approach, this project adds the ideology of the incumbent as a political condition, and hypothesizes that,

> H4: *If a leftist party is the incumbent, and it has a poor economic performance, the share of the vote for the left will decrease in the following election as a consequence of the erosion of being in charge of the government.*

To sum up, these hypotheses add to prior research by testing the argument that the increase in the vote for leftist parties is the political response to the implementation of neoliberal reforms, and pinpointing alternative causes that explain this partisan vote. In the next two

sections, I describe the variables used in the model, the data, and evaluate the previous hypotheses empirically.

3.2   DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To test these hypotheses I use pooled data from seventeen Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The analysis covers the period from 1985 to 1999.[25] The decision to start the analysis in the 1980s, and not before or after, is based on two reasons. First, the 1980s is considered the decade of democratic transitions in Latin America; before that time most Latin American countries were under authoritarian regimes that did not allow free elections. Second, the 1980s is considered the "lost decade" in economic terms and represents a natural baseline before the bulk of neoliberal economic reforms were implemented.

The dependent variable is computed in two ways: as the share of the vote that left and center-left parties obtained in each presidential election, and as the change in the share of votes for the left and center-left parties from one presidential election to the previous one. I decided to analyze only presidential elections for two reasons. First, Latin American countries have presidential regimes, and in most of them (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), legislative elections are concurrent with presidential elections which makes the former highly influenced by presidential campaigns. Second, within US literature, which is the most widely-researched area regarding this topic, there is scholarly disagreement over the existence of a macro-level relationship between the health of the national economy and national congressional vote (see the discussion between Erikson 1990 and Jacobson 1990).

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[24] He was Bill Clinton's political advisor during the 1992 presidential campaign.

[25] I was constraint by the time frame of one of the main independent variable, structural reform index, which goes from 1985 to 1999. In Lora and Olivera (2005), the authors expanded their index of structural reforms (SRI) until 2002, but data for 2000-2002 is not publicly available.

Political parties are classified in the Left-Right ideological dimension following Coppedge's criteria (see Chapters 1 and 2 for the definition of the ideological categories). The level of economic reforms is measured by the structural reform index (SRI) built by Lora (Lora, 1997/2001). This index gives scores to policies based on their degree of economic liberalization in five different areas: trade, tax collection, financial markets, privatization, and labor markets. Countries receive an average annual score between 0 and 100 on each of these five policies. Those with most state-centric policies score 0 whereas the most market-oriented ones receive 100. To generate the overall SRI, scores for each policy area are averaged. Based on the SRI, two different variables are used in the analysis: the SRI mean for the previous period of government and the SRI change from one election to the previous one.

The argument that more reforms lead to more votes for leftist parties rests on two possible ideas. The first one is that Latin Americans have an aversion to neoliberal reforms. Lora and Olivera's (2005) article shows evidence in favor of this. The second idea is that market-oriented economic reforms have failed, and as a consequence, voters will punish those who support them, and favor those against them. In order to assess the economic success or failure of market-oriented economic results, I use three economic variables: inflation, economic growth, and the unemployment rate. These variables are commonly used in the economic voting literature. The inflation rate is measured on the basis of changes in the consumer price index and logged[26] to control for variations produced during hyperinflationary years. Economic growth is the percentage change in GDP based on constant local currency. The unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. The data comes from World Development Indicators 2005 and BADEINSO-ECLAC 2005. All three variables are included in the analysis in three forms: as the mean for the previous government period (inflation mean, growth mean, and unemployment mean), as the election year value (inflation election year, growth election year, and unemployment election year)**,** and as the change in the value between election years (change in inflation, change in growth, and change in unemployment).

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[26] Because it is not possible to obtain the log of a negative number, I use the following formula to calculate the logs : if I>0, LN (1+I); and if I≤0, -1*LN(1+|I|). I am grateful to Aníbal Pérez Liñan for suggesting this formula to account for deflationary years.

To capture the influence of political context on the vote for leftist parties, I include the ideology of the incumbent.[27] As the hypotheses on the previous section stated, having a leftist incumbent may impact the electoral chances of leftist parties. The incumbent's ideology is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the incumbent belongs to a left or center-left party and 0 in the remainder of the cases.

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[27] I tried to include a measure of ideological polarization but I was unsuccessful on finding a proper one. Ideological polarization is usually measured using voters' self placement in the ideological dimension (Sani and Sartori 1983), but public opinion data is not available for every election year of each country. I also tried with an alternative indicator of ideological polarization built by Coppedge (1998). It takes into account the share of the vote that each ideological bloc has, and measures the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system. Polarization ranges from zero when all votes are in one ideological extreme to 100 when half of the vote is at each of the ideological extremes, and it is a measure of the system ideological polarization at the time of the election. The formula to calculate the relative center (MLRP) is right % + .5 center-right % - .5 center-left % - left %, and the formula to calculate the ideological polarization is |1-mlrp|*right % + |.5-mlrp|*center-right % + |-.5-mlrp|*center-left % + |-1-mlrp|*left %, where mlrp = MLRP/100. But this measure of ideological polarization is problematic because it is not totally independent from the vote share that each ideological bloc gets. The correlation between polarization and the percentage of vote is 0.51 with the Left, -0.47 with the Center, and 0.02 with the Right. As a result, I decided not to include it to avoid endogeneity.

Table 3-1 Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables					
% vote for left	85	28.92	23.32	0.00	84.50
Change in left vote share	68	1.43	17.57	-45.56	40.24
Economic Reforms					
Structural reform index	59	47.44	9.87	27.20	69.50
Change in Structural reform index	46	5.81	14.77	-80.30	26.30
Economic Results					
Inflation mean	62	3.56	1.59	0.22	8.31
Inflation election year	62	3.24	1.95	-0.69	9.37
Growth mean	62	3.15	2.26	-3.50	7.75
Growth election year	62	3.10	3.75	-7.00	11.00
Unemployment mean	59	8.16	3.50	3.17	19.00
Unemployment election year	59	8.37	3.77	2.00	19.00
Political Variables					
Ideology incumbent	76	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00

Source: based on Lora and Olivera (2005), Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University), World Development Indicators 2005, and BADEINSO-ECLAC 2005

Table 3-1 shows the descriptive information for each variable included in the model. I use OLS regression models with robust standard errors.

3.3   ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

The most straightforward way to check if there is a causal relationship between the degree of market-oriented economic reforms implemented in a country and the vote for left-leaning parties is to look at the evolution of both variables. Figure 3.1 illustrates that there is not a unique pattern for all Latin American countries. There are some countries in which both lines correlate in a positive direction; they have high and positive correlation coefficients: Argentina (0.94), Chile (0.86), Ecuador (0.52), Guatemala (0.99), Mexico (0.95), Nicaragua (0.99), El Salvador (0.99) and Uruguay (0.98). In the rest of the countries each variable moves in a different direction: Bolivia (-0.24) and Colombia (-0.46); or in an opposite direction: Costa Rica (-0.74), Dominican Republic (-0.99) and Peru (-0.91); or the share of the vote for leftist parties and the structural reform index (SRI) have a positive but low correlation: Brazil (0.32), Honduras (0.43), Paraguay (0.47) and Venezuela (0.45). What's more, for the whole region, the share of the vote for leftist parties and the structural reform index are minimally and negatively correlated (-0.02).

Figure 3.1 Market-Oriented Reforms and Vote for Left in Latin America, 1980-2005

With this preliminary evidence, I expect that the structural reform index will not be significant in the models that predict the vote for leftist parties in Latin America. Table 3-2 reports regression results from several models run using STATA that test the effect of market-oriented economic reforms, economic outcomes, and political variables on the share of the vote that leftist parties obtain in Latin American countries. All the regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered by country.

Table 3-2 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the share of the vote for leftist parties in Latin America

Dependent variable: Percentage of vote for the ideological left

Independent variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Structural reform index (SRI)	0.108	0.063	-0.015	0.060	0.254	0.2151
	(0.236)	(0.433)	(0.979)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.244)
Inflation mean	3.923		3.803	3.864	3.865	3.799
	(3.892)		(4.287)	(4.066)	(4.042)	(4.236)
Inflation election year		1.976				
		(4.189)				
Growth mean	0.711		0.733	1.403	0.961	1.689
	(1.811)		(1.910)	(1.705)	(1.706)	(1.709)
Growth election year		0.061				
		(0.869)				
Unemployment mean	**1.566****		**0.900**	**2.002****	**1.545****	**1.992****
	(0.749)		**(5.596)**	**(0.766)**	**(0.748)**	**(0.774)**
Unemployment election year		1.414				
		(0.845)				
Unemployment*SRI			1.378			
			(11.319)			
Unemployment*Ideology incumbent				-4.503		**-4.629***
				(3.226)		**(2.592)**
Ideology incumbent*SRI					-0.852	-0.908
					(0.801)	(0.824)
Ideology incumbent	12.483	12.092	12.428	**48.146***	49.002	**88.094***
	(9.702)	(10.143)	(9.623)	**(25.065)**	(32.980)	**(44.241)**
Constant	-10.373	2.902	-4.089	-14.087	-17.839	-22.154
	(22.912)	(34.641)	(54.352)	(22.027)	(21.409)	(21.167)
Number of observations	53	53	53	53	53	53
R-squared	0.15	0.11	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.22
F-test	2.92**	1.73	2.41*	3.84**	3.35**	3.18**

Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, **** significant at 1%

In agreement with the expectations of H1, and the preliminary evidence shown in Figure 3.1, Model 1 presents evidence that higher levels of economic reforms, by themselves, do not produce an increase in the vote for the Left. Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 lend some further credibility to this finding: the level of economic reforms implemented in Latin America doesn't have a direct impact on the increase in the vote for left-leaning parties in the region.

But market-oriented economic policies may have an impact on the vote for the Left in an indirect way. Previous research indicates that the main problem with the reforms is the social consequences that are produced: an increase in poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and the percentage of Latin Americans working in the informal sector (Huber and Solt 2004, Portes and Hoffman 2003). Building on this evidence, economic reforms could have had an *indirect* effect on the vote for the Left through these negative social and economic outcomes. The regression results in Model 1 indicate that there is a degree of truth in this argument. Within the economic variables, the one that reaches statistical significance is the closest to being understood as an indicator of a social outcome: unemployment. More unemployment leads to an increase in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America. On the contrary, inflation and growth are not significant. This result is that expected by H2, which pointed out that the failure of neoliberal reforms leads to an increase in the vote for the Left. But it is not the combination between the level of reforms (SRI) and the failure of these reforms measured by the unemployment rate that benefit leftist parties electoral chances. The interaction term in Model 3 does not reach significance, indicating that leftist parties benefit from poor economic outcomes rather than from the implementation of neoliberal reforms.[28]

The regression results of Model 1, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 are consistent with my expectations in H3. In line with European partisan literature, high levels of unemployment have been found to truly benefit left-of-center parties, even after controlling by the ideology of the incumbent. Unemployment is significant when it is measured as the average unemployment for the whole period of the previous government. However, high levels of inflation do not hurt the Left as was expected. Neither inflation nor growth has a systematic connection with the vote for the Left. Neither of these two variables is significant under any specification.

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[28] The significance of interaction terms was tested using the lincom command in STATA.

The political context influences the electoral chances of the Left as I expected in H4. Models 4 and 6 indicate that for left-leaning parties, being in charge of the government is significantly and positively related to its electoral fortune. But the significance of the interaction term between incumbent's ideology and unemployment in Model 6 also shows that when the leftist incumbent had a poor economic performance, the share of the vote for the left will decrease in the following election, which reinforces H3 and H4.

In order to confirm these results, I run the regression model with a different measure of the vote for leftist parties. Table 3-3 presents the results of a model using the change in the vote for the Left from one election to the previous one. Note that all independent variables, where possible, are also measured as changes in the value from one election year to the previous one.

Regression results reinforce some arguments, but they also reveal some contradictory findings. On the reinforcing side, they again show that more neoliberal reforms do not generate more votes for the Left. Moreover, Models 1 and 3 indicate that an increase in unemployment has a significant and positive impact on the fortune of leftist parties. On the other side, under this model specification, being in charge of the government significantly diminishes the electoral changes of left-leaning parties in the following election regardless of the implementation of market-oriented policies.[29]

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[29] In order to test the robustness of these results, I dropped two cases from the dataset: Brazil 1998 and Dominican Republic 2000 that may represent a methodological problem. Since the 1998 elections, the Brazilian *PSDB* is classified as center-right instead of center-left as it was before. The same happens with the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)* in 2000. Both political parties changed their ideology after being in charge of the government. Leaving them in the analysis may increase the negative effect that being an incumbent can have on the future electoral performance of the left, but even after dropping these cases, the results remain the same. I have also

Table 3-3The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the change in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America

Dependent variable: Change in the vote share of the left

Independent variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Change in structural reform index	-0.056	-0.056	-0.043
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.112)
Change in inflation	0.883	0.823	0.810
	(1.618)	(1.575)	(1.696)
Change in growth	0.056	0.036	-0.017
	(0.432)	(0.409)	(0.466)
Change in unemployment	1.549*	1.577	1.535*
	(0.846)	(0.905)	(0.869)
Ideology incumbent*change unemployment		-0.513	
		(2.233)	
Ideology incumbent*change in SRI			-0.488
			(0.704)
Ideology incumbent	-28.577***	-28.888***	-24.036**
	(7.141)	(7.729)	(9.619)
Constant	7.225**	7.185***	7.148**
	(2.433)	(2.350)	(2.489)
Number of observations	42	42	42
R-squared	0.46	0.46	0.46
F-test	5.02***	5.14***	4.12**

Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, **** significant at 1%

* "Ideology incumbent" is still significant when we drop Brazil 1998 and Dominican Republic 2000.

checked for collinearity problems in the data, but there is anything to be concerned about. The correlation matrix for each regression model is shown in Appendix B.

The strategy of pooling different Latin American countries risks masking the real effects of certain independent variables on the share of the vote for leftist parties. In order to control for the possibility that the impact of some variables is cancelled out by the interaction with the diversity of national contexts, I run the regressions including country-fixed effects, and some results change. Using country dummies wipes out the significant relationship between unemployment and leftist vote, keeps the positive impact that being in charge of the government has for leftist parties' prospect, and reveals a hidden relationship: when a leftist party was the incumbent and it implemented market-oriented economic reforms, the share of the vote for the left decreased in the following election. In other words, Latin Americans punish leftist parties when they implement neoliberal policies. This finding goes against H4 which stated that when leftist incumbents have a poor economic performance, their electoral chances will diminish. Neither high levels of inflation, nor high levels of unemployment or low levels of growth hurt left-leaning parties' electoral chances. The erosion of being in charge of the government occurred independently of the economic performance, it is mainly the result of implementing market-friendly reforms. On the other hand, the implementation of neoliberal reforms by rightist or centrist parties does not raise the vote for leftist parties.[30]

These different results can be partially explained by the smaller N that the regression models have, by the different specification of the models, or simply by pointing out that it is necessary to go beyond the macro-level analysis to fully understand under what economic and political conditions leftist parties increase their share of the vote in Latin America. This represents another piece of evidence signaling the need to explore the individual level for substantive determinants of left voting.

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[30] These models do not use robust clustered error. Regression results are shown in Appendix B.

3.4   GOING BEYOND THE MACRO LEVEL

The main purpose of this chapter is to test the argument that the neoliberal model implemented in the 1990s has a positive impact on the vote for left-of-center parties in Latin America. The findings are conclusive: more market-oriented economic reforms do not produce more votes for political parties on the left. Despite the fact that Lora and Olivera (2005) found that Latin Americans dislike pro-market policies irrespective of their results, and punish incumbents for implementing those reforms, this macro analysis shows that there is no clear and direct connection between that dislike and voting for leftist parties.

From the basis of this evidence alone, however, I cannot conclude that free-market policies have no effect on the vote for the Left. The structural reform index measures how much a country has liberalized its economy, but it does not say anything about how voters perceive those reforms. The perception about economic reforms, or the opinion about them, may be not related to the effective level of reforms. It is possible that in countries where fewer reforms have been implemented, inhabitants are more tired of them, and as a consequence they change their voting behavior in favor of those political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-oriented policies. To test whether the perceptions about reforms are more important to understand the vote for the Left than the effective level of reforms, we need a micro-level analysis rather than a macro-level one.

A second purpose of this chapter is to test under what economic and political conditions left-of-center parties increase their share of the vote. The main finding is that unemployment help leftist parties' electoral chances. The positive effect that unemployment has on the vote for the Left can also be understood as an indicator of the indirect effect of market reforms. Regarding the political conditions that benefit leftist parties, the effect of being in charge of the government is not clear. When leftist's governments had high levels of unemployment, the electoral chances of leftist parties are hindered. But only a micro-level analysis can shed further light on the reasons why leftist parties have recently increased their share of the vote in Latin American countries.

Macro economic and political explanations are relevant to understanding what macro conditions are favorable to the Left, but they also enable us to answer questions regarding the

factors that influence voters to choose a leftist party. The assumption that explanations at the macro level also work at the individual level (the so-called "ecological fallacy") is one of the dangers implicit when researchers want to link the individual and the collective. In order to know what are the determinants of Latin Americans' vote for leftist parties, if Latin Americans are voting against reforms, or moving ideologically towards the left, or if they are just punishing the incumbent governments for poor economic results, it is necessary to ask these questions at the individual level. The following chapters do that.

4.0 MICRO EXPLANATIONS FOR VOTING THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin American voting behavior is usually understood as being highly volatile and unpredictable due to the lack of strong party and ideological identifications. Latin Americans seem mainly to base their vote choice on short-term factors such as economic conditions (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Cantón and Jorrat 2002) and candidate image (Echegaray 2005; Weyland 2003). It is within this context that the recent victories of leftist parties have become puzzling. If ideology and party identification are not relevant voting clues in Latin America (Echegaray 2005), why are voters choosing parties identified with the ideological Left? Is the vote for leftist parties another example of economic voting theory according to which voters punish the incumbent party for poor economic results? Are electorates in Latin America mainly choosing leftist parties because their candidates are, on average more appealing than are the candidates from parties of the center and right? Or, alternatively, are Latin-Americans becoming more ideological and policy-oriented by voting for the left because ideology does indeed matter and voters are rejecting the neoliberal paradigm?

It is important to take note that this is not the first time in the history of Latin America that leftist parties have won elections. As Chapter 2 showed, the Left was also the prevalent ideology during part of the 1960s and 1970s. The main difference between now and then is that in the 60's and 70's the meaning of voting Left was clearer than today. For example, when Salvador Allende, the leader of the Chilean Socialist Party, won the presidential national election in 1970, his voters identified themselves with a socialist ideology, and they were largely in favor of nationalizing major companies, broadening the public sector, and other "leftist" policies (Baviskar 2004). At present, the meaning of voting Left is not so clear. Did Brazilians vote for Inácio "Lula" da Silva because they had become more leftist or were they just punishing Fernando H. Cardoso (the incumbent president) for not reducing unemployment?

In the view of many political analysts, the current increase in the vote for the Left in Latin America is a consequence of "reform fatigue." Simply stated, this argument says that because voters are tired of market-oriented economic reforms and their consequences, they are voting in favor of parties that allow more state intervention in the economy. Data from the Latinobarómetro 2002 (The Economist 2002) supports this argument, and indicates that the percentage of those who strongly agree or agree that the state should leave economic activity to the private sector had diminished from 1998 to 2002 in all Latin American countries with the exception of Mexico.

On the other hand, the aggregate analysis displayed in Chapter 3 shows that the implementation of neoliberal reforms did not favor leftist parties in Latin America. At least at the macro level, there is no relationship between the level of market-oriented reforms implemented and the share of the vote that leftist parties receive in presidential elections. Only when the incumbent was a leftist party and implemented market-friendly policies, the percentage of vote for leftist parties diminished in next election. This does not necessary mean that neoliberal reforms, and in particular, their failure to produce sustainable economic growth and employment, have nothing to do with the recent voting behavior of Latin Americans. These findings only prove that the relationship does not exist at the aggregate level, but it may be possible to find it at the individual level.

In the view of many scholars who study voting behavior and public opinion, perceptions are what really count when trying to understand why citizens act in the way they do. Individuals make their political decisions based on the way they perceive reality rather than on any objective reality. Yeric and Todd explain that "the real" world is distorted by the individual to fit the already existing elements of the cognitive structure" (1983: 39). This assertion is further reinforced by Dutch, Palmer and Anderson's (2000) finding that public evaluations of the national economy are shaped by an individual's information differences as well as by a variety of political and socioeconomic factors. As a consequence, economic assessments can by no means be considered objective. Citizens can judge the country's economic performance negatively even though macro indicators show that the economy is doing fine. The same may happen with Latin Americans' perceptions of neoliberal economic reforms. The perception of economic reforms, or the opinion about them, may be not related to the actual level of reforms. It is possible that, contrary to conventional wisdom, in countries where fewer reforms have been implemented,

inhabitants are more tired of them, and consequently, they change their voting behavior in favor of political parties that traditionally oppose efficiency-oriented policies. Independently whether or not these perceptions are false, it is important to test their impact on the vote for the Left, as a result, it is necessary to run an analysis at a micro rather than a macro level.

The individual level analysis also allows one to test the impact of other voting determinants, like the economic evaluation, on the vote for the Left in Latin America. At the aggregate level, only unemployment is a significant factor to explain the vote for leftist parties. Evidence presented in Chapter 3 indicates that as the unemployment rate increases, the electoral chances of leftist parties surges too. The relevance of the economic voting theory can be further appraised by a micro level analysis because electorates may react to economic promises rather than to past performance; and because individualistic pocketbook-oriented reasoning, which is not captured by any sociotropic aggregate measure, may be at play.

The array of possible voting determinants of Latin Americans is much broader than the one set out up to now. In Fabián Echegaray's (2005) book, which can be considered the most comprehensive attempt to tackle Latin Americans' voting decisions, economic and extra-economic factors are found to be important voting clues. At the aggregate level, Echegaray finds that candidate appeal is the most important clue in shaping support for the incumbent party at the ballot box, while economic variables rank second. At the individual level, the results are different: in addition to economic voting, partisan inclinations are found to be relevant. The variation between the relevant voting clues at the aggregate and individual level can be explained by the different model specifications. While the aggregate model includes variables to measure candidate voting, in the individual level model those variables are absent. What is more, while the aggregate model has been tested in forty-one competitive presidential elections held in Latin America between 1982 and 1995, the micro level analysis only examines one election in each of three countries: Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. Although Echegaray's study is quite complete, it is not devoid of problems. One of the most serious is that his theoretical foundations disregard ideology and partisanship as important voting cues for Latin-Americans, but later he finds that partisanship is influential at the individual level in countries with a high level of political institutionalization like Uruguay. In conclusion, to fully explore the voting determinants of Latin Americans, partisanship and ideology should be included in the explanatory models.

Taking into account the research on voting behavior done on Western Europe and the United States, and building on the results of previous studies about Latin American voting, I will test five theories to explain the rise of the Left in Latin America: *economic voting theory*, *social class* cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); *prospect theory* (Kahneman and Tversky 1979); *partisanship theory* (Campbell 1960)*;* and *the cleavages created by political processes* (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). In particular, the individual level analysis aims to understand what the role is of economic evaluations (economic voting theory), risk propensity (prospect theory), class structure (social class cleavage theory), partisanship, and ideology and policy issues (cleavages created by political processes) in the recent rise of the Left in Latin America. At the same time, I will be testing if Latin Americans are policy-oriented (ideology and policy issues are significant determinants of the vote), outcome-oriented (economic evaluations are the significant predictors of the vote), or both. The following sections briefly describe each of the said theories, summarize the major research done in Latin America using each of them, and go over the main hypotheses and variables by which the theories are going to be tested.

4.1   ECONOMIC VOTING

The literature on voting behavior in Latin America is dominated by the economic voting explanation. Economic voting theory states that if the economy is doing fine, voters will reelect the incumbent party; while in bad times, citizens will punish the incumbent at the ballot box. The theory has taken four major forms: pocketbook vote, sociotropic vote (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), retrospective vote, and prospective vote (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). These distinctions lead to four possible combinations in which citizens can appraise the economic situation: evaluating how good or bad the economic situation of the country has been during the past (retrospective sociotropic), taking into account voters' expectations of how the country's economic situation is going to be in the future (prospective sociotropic), thinking on how good or bad their family's economic situation has been in the recent past (retrospective pocketbook), or considering their expectations for their family's economic future (prospective pocketbook).

Economic voting theory has noticeably proved its predictive power in the stable economic and political contexts of the United States and Western Europe (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1982; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Lewis-Beck, 1986; Lewis-Beck, 1988). And there is a consensus regarding the idea that Americans and Europeans respond "to changes in general economic conditions much more than to changes in the circumstances of personal economic life" (Kinder 1998).

In Latin America, scholars have tested the relationship between economic downturns and voting for incumbent parties in single-country case studies (Canton and Jorrat 2002; Domínguez and McCann 1995; Mora y Araujo and Smith 1984; Remmer and Gélineau 2003; Roberts and Arce 1998; Seligson and Gómez 1989; Weyland 1998, 2003), and through comparative studies (Echegaray 2005; Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Remmer and Gelineau 1993), but the evidence is far from conclusive. Economic evaluations matter for Latin-Americans depending on the election. For example, Weyland found that Venezuelans were Pocketbook voters from 1989 to 1993 (Weyland 1998) , but Sociotropic voters when they elected Hugo Chávez in 1998 (Weyland 2003). Cantón and Jorrat (2002) and Echegaray (2005) also find that the impact of the economy on Latin Americans' vote choice varies across countries and elections. Despite these distinctions, scholars confirm that voters in Latin America tend to treat elections as plebiscites on the economic performance and capabilities of the government.

If economic factors are important determinants of the fortune of incumbents, are there any specific economic conditions that favor leftist parties in comparison with centrist or rightist parties? The aggregate analysis presented in Chapter 3 shows that leftist parties gain votes when unemployment increases. But at the individual level of decision, when do voters favor leftist parties? Following the economic voting explanation, I expect that voters who evaluate negatively the economic situation will punish the incumbent. In countries where the incumbent is a leftist party, citizens will reward or punish it depending on the economic performance. But in countries where leftist parties were never in charge of the government and represent a "credible" or "untainted" opposition, electorates which are economically dissatisfied with the economy will cast their vote in favor of them.

> H1: *The more negatively a voter evaluates the national economic situation, the greater the probability he or she will vote for the opposition. In particular, voters who are discontented will reward leftist parties when they were not in charge of the government.*

To put it simply, if a voter has a negative economic evaluation (x1) and leftist parties represent a "credible" or "untainted" opposition (x2), he or she will vote for the Left (y).

The variables to test the economic voting theory are four: retrospective sociotropic vote, retrospective pocket-book vote, prospective sociotropic vote and retrospective sociotropic vote. *Sociotropic vote* measures the evaluation of the country's economic situation; the higher the value, the worse the evaluation. *Pocketbook vote* measures the evaluation of the family's economic situation; the higher the value of the variable, the worse the family's economic assessment is. *Prospective* measures the expectations regarding the economic future, while *retrospective* measures the evaluation of the country economic situation in comparison with the past. The measurement of these variables is fully described in relation with each dataset in next chapter.

4.2   PROSPECT THEORY

Another explanation as to why individuals vote for the Left comes from prospect theory. Prospect theory states that individuals act in a risk averse or risk acceptant way depending on whether they are in the domain of losses or in the domain of gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If an individual considers himself in the domain of losses, the theory expects that he/she will behave as risk acceptant. On the contrary, individuals under the domain of gains behave more conservatively, are less willing to gamble with their profits, and become risk averse.

Scholars who study Latin America have started to test prospect theory in different political phenomena. Weyland (2002) applied this theory in order to understand why politicians implemented market-oriented economic reforms and why citizens supported these reforms in some Latin American countries and not in others. In the voting behavior subfield, many Mexicanists have used prospect theory to understand why Mexicans keep voting for the "known devil," (meaning the PRI), instead of voting for the opposition parties (Domínguez and McCann 1996); Magaloni 1997). Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) also used prospect theory to understand the 1997 midterm Mexican election result in which opposition parties became majority in the lower chamber. They found that risk acceptant voters were more likely to support

the opposition when they perceive economic decline, whereas risk adverse Mexicans tend to stick with the PRI despite being unhappy with economic performance.

This explanation can help us to understand why Latin Americans vote for leftist parties. In countries where the Left has been outside the government for many years, electorates that make a negative assessment of the government economic performance will vote for it if they are risk acceptant. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: *When the incumbent is not a leftist political party, and leftist parties belong to the opposition, risk acceptant citizens, more than risk adverse ones, will choose the Left at the voting booth. The propensity to vote for the Left will increase if a voter is in the domain of losses and if he or she is risk acceptant.*

Simplifying, if leftist parties represent a "credible" or "untainted" opposition (x2), voters are risk acceptant (x3), and consider themselves in the domain of losses, which is equivalent as having a negative economic evaluation (x1), they will tend to vote for leftist parties (y).

Prospect theory is going to be tested through different variables that capture voters' risk propensity. One set of variables tackles citizens' opinions about how different political parties would manage the economy, deal with the issue of job creation, negotiate with other countries, organize public security, and control social unrest. Another set of variables measures how risky it is to vote for different candidates. Finally, the question that is commonly used to gauge risk propensity asks respondents to agree with one of the two following aphorisms: "Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer" ("Better the devil you know that the saint you don't") or "El que no arriesga no gana" ("Nothing ventured, nothing gained").[31]

4.3   SOCIAL CLASS CLEAVAGE

An alternative theoretical approach links the existence of social cleavages with voters' behavior. This explanation has been developed principally for the Western European political parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the stability of party systems in Western Europe is a

consequence of the historical roots that political parties have in class, religion, and nationality cleavages. The social cleavage literature was extended in various ways. This study examines two of those extensions.

The first one is the "class causal linkage proposition" which states that the social position that an individual has in society determines his/her political preferences (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Class-based clues will explain the vote for the Left through social class: belonging to the working class increases the probability of voting for Left parties while being part of the capitalist class reduces this probability.

This hypothesis goes against the generalized understanding of Latin American voting behavior as being highly volatile and unpredictable due to the lack of strong party and ideological identification (Remmer 1993; Ames 2001). It is also contrary to the literature which points out that class-cleavages do not matter as social bases of the vote in Latin America except for the Chilean case. Moreover, the Chilean case is also open to debate. Scholars agree that in the pre-authoritarian Chilean party system, class cleavage had an important role; but in the post-authoritarian period, class-based voting appeared less relevant and there is no consensus about how determinant they are in predicting behavior at the ballot box (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Torcal, 2003). Another argument that undermines the relevance of social position as a possible voting predictor are the severe transformations during the 1980s and 1990s that affected Latin Americans' well-being and structure of production which would have weakened social class identities (Echegaray 2005).

Nevertheless, there are two reasons for testing this hypothesis. First, the previous characterization of party systems as unstable cannot be applied to all Latin American countries or political parties since many countries, such as Uruguay and Chile, have highly institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Second, most of the studies that test social cleavage as an explanation of voting behavior and find no evidence rely on aggregate data. In particular, the work by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) uses very crude proxies (union density, informal sector) to measure the structure of sociopolitical cleavages. Moreover, more recent research indicates that social class matters as a vote's predictor (Roberts 2002 for the Venezuelan

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[31] A slightly different question is asked in Brazil, but the meaning is the same. Further description of the variables is in Chapter 5.

case under Hugo Chávez, and Canton and Jorrat 2002 for the Argentinean case using survey data). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

> H3: *The position that a person occupies in the social structure determines his/her vote. Workers and members of the popular sectors are more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who belong to the dominant sectors are more likely to vote for rightist parties.*

In reality, there is no doubt that classical social class cleavage explanation has been brought into question by the structural transformations of national economies and the contraction of the working class. Przeworski and Sprague (1986), for instance, argue that in the mid-1980s the support for leftist parties in Europe weakened due to the shrinking of the working class, but political leaders had the opportunity to appeal to a broader electorate by addressing other issues. Leftist parties always had to attract support beyond the working class in order to win elections; in other words, their electorates include workers, plus people from other social classes. Kitschelt (1994) also demonstrates in his study of European social democracy that the electoral prospects of the Left are not necessary undermined by the social transformations and policy constraints associated with market-oriented reforms. Party leaders can appeal to new electorates and become allies of new social sectors.

Latin America after the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms resembles the description made by Przeworski and Sprague, and Kitschelt for Europe. In most Latin American countries, the working class remained stagnant or has shrunk as a result of market liberalization, public sector cutbacks and privatizations that were implemented during the 1990s. Most of the formal workers that lost their jobs moved to the informal economy and, as a result, informal workers became the largest class in every Latin American country (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Evidence of the shrunk that the formal workers' sector suffered in Latin America is abundant. In Bolivia, formal workers were 31.4% of the EAP in 1989 and 24.8% in 1997; in Costa Rica they were 60.1% in 1981 and only 49.9% in 1998; and in Mexico they were 63.1% in 1984 and 47.3% in 1998 (Portes and Hoffman 2003, based in ECLAC). As a counter effect, informal employment increased from 44.6% of the Latin American urban EAP in 1990 to 47.9% in 1998 (Portes and Hoffman 2003).

Taking this into account, the recent increase in the vote for leftist parties may not be explained by the social class cleavage theory because the class that traditionally voted for the Left, the working class, has diminished. An alternative explanation is possible. Building on the diagnosis made by Portes and Hoffman (2003) about the changes in Latin American social structures, I argue that informal workers are increasingly voting for leftist parties. Preliminary evidence from Venezuela shows that getting the support from the augmented informal sector is becoming an efficient strategy for winning elections in Latin America (Roberts 2003). Hence,

H4: *Voters who belong to the informal sectors will be more likely to vote for the Left.*

Social class cleavage is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: dominant class, petty bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers, and non-employed. This categorization is built on Portes and Hoffman's (2003) definition of Latin American class structure. These scholars argue that it is better to add a separate category for informal workers to understand Latin America social structure. Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not.[32]

4.4   CLEAVAGE CREATED BY POLITICAL PROCESS

In determining which theory and voting clues best explain the vote for leftist parties in Latin America, it is essential to include ideology. Ideology is regarded as one of the most influential voting clues. Electorates use the overarching continuum between left and right, or from liberal to conservative, as a shortcut to processing political information and making their electoral decisions. Since Converse (1964) there has been a great deal of debate about how readily voters rely on ideology when voting, and to what extent citizens organize their political opinions around the ideological dimension. The same doubts are cast regarding the importance of ideology to predict Latin Americans' voting behavior. Echegaray (2005) considers that

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[32] A more comprehensive variable description is found in next chapter.

ideological clues are an irrelevant source of guidance for Latin American voters, but he does not empirically test this contention. Differing from Echegaray's position, this study will test the impact of ideological clues on the vote for leftist parties. Three main reasons make the inclusion of ideology reasonable.

First of all, around eight out of ten Latin Americans were able to place themselves in the ideological dimension from 1996 to 2004 (Latinobarómetro 2004). This percentage varies depending on the country; left and right ideological labels mean more to Chileans and Uruguayans than to Argentineans. But, as a first appraisal, ideological thinking is part of Latin Americans' political behavior.

Second, previous research has also shown that elite groups and citizens are linked by ideological commitments (Luna and Zechmeister 2005a). Luna and Zechmeister' research combine elite and mass survey data to create indicators of representation for nine nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. The level of representation is quantified by how much congruency exists between congressmen and voters' policy preferences. In order to measure the extent to which political parties and their constituents have clear and consistent preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions, they use survey data from two different sources: the survey of Latin American legislators carried out by the University of Salamanca in 1997 and the 1998 Latinobarómetro survey. Using these measures of policy preferences, they build the representation scores and find that country differences are also relevant in that respect. Chile and Uruguay present the highest levels of ideological elite-mass congruency in the region, while Ecuador ranks in the lowest position. Mexico and Brazil are also among the countries with low levels of ideological congruency; Mexico scores lower than Brazil. Regardless of these differences, and some dubious matching that the authors performed between indicators at the mass and elite level, what this research indicates is that ideology is as a relevant category to understand political representation at least in some Latin American countries.

Finally, there is empirical research pointing to ideology as a relevant voting clue for Latin Americans (Cameron 1994; Torcal 2003). Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) point out: "class emerges as a major cleavage in party systems to the extent that parties of the left emphasize class issues," and they called this phenomenon the cleavage created by political processes (Przeworski

and Sprague 1986; Torcal 2003).[33] This theoretical approach to cleavage formation pays attention to how cleavages are created by political elites and political factors. The Left/Right ideological division can also be considered a cleavage created by political process. In other words, politicians can activate this cleavage as a way to get votes. All this suggests that it is appropriate to test for ideological clues:

> H5: *Ideological self-placement is likely to determine the vote for the left irrespective of social and structural determinants.*

An alternative way to test the ideological cleavage is to analyze if policy positions are determinants of voting behavior. Voting for the Left is usually associated with support for government involvement and regulation of the economy, income redistribution, and an increase in social spending (Inglehart and Klingerman 1976; Fuchs and Klingerman 1990; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). In addition, and due to the difficulty in obtaining survey data that deals with citizens' perceptions and opinions towards market-oriented economic reforms, the analysis of policy preferences is the best way to approach this issue. Consequently, I hypothesize that:

> H6: *Those Latin Americans who support government involvement and regulation of the economy, income redistribution and an increase in social spending will be more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who are against these policy issues will be more likely to vote for rightist parties.*

Ideology is measured by the ideological self-placement of the respondent in a dimension that ranges from "0" meaning Left, to "10" meaning Right. Different policy issues are also used as independent variables to test the ideological cleavage: support for regional integration, support for privatization, support for agrarian reform, opinion about government responsibility, support for social spending, and position towards the dichotomy inflation/unemployment.[34]

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[33] Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) test the existence of these political cleavages in the Chilean case with three cultural-ideological divisions that can be used by political leaders to articulate conflict: the authoritarian/democratic cultural division, the perception of social inequality, and religious differences.
[34] Further details on variable measurement can be found in next chapter.

4.5   PARTISANSHIP

Since *The American Voter* (Campbell 1960), the influence of party identification became one of the central theoretical concepts in voting research. Partisanship or party identification "acts to filter individual's views of the political world, providing them not only with a means for making voting decisions but also with a means for interpreting short-term issues and candidacies since parties are central actors in most political conflicts" (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993).

In Latin American voting behavior, party identification does not always work as a strong predictor of the vote. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) point out that in Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia, between 60% and 70% of citizens mention a party preference, while in Brazil no more than 40% declare themselves to have a party identification. In addition to cross-national variation, there is cross-party variation in each country. Preliminary evidence from Brazil (Samuels 2004) indicates that the PT receives more party preferences than the rest of Brazil's parties do.

What is the relevance of partisan clues in explaining the vote for leftist parties in Latin America? Extant research indicates that Latin American leftist parties help structure party systems along ideological lines and they are associated with higher levels of representation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005a). Consequently, partisanship can be more important to predict the vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. Hence, I hypothesize that:

H7: Partisanship is a more relevant voting clue for those who vote for leftist parties than for voters who choose centrist or rightist parties.

A strong party identification can influence other voting clues. For example, a Brazilian who feels very close to the PT, may evaluate the economic performance of the government through their partisanship "lenses," and be more negative on his/her assessments of Fernando Enrique Cardoso's economic performance. It is probable that for those who have party identification, economic evaluations weigh less than for those with no partisanship.[35]

H8: *Voters with party identification are less likely to take into consideration economic evaluations than those without party preferences.*

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[35] Partisanship is measured by a question that asked respondents what their party identification was.

These alternative, but not exclusive, explanations have never been tested together for Latin America. In that sense, this study will make two contributions. First, it will shed light on which factors are involved in determining the recent rise of the Left in Latin America. In particular, it will compare the possible impact of neoliberal economic reforms as against other more traditional voting clues like economic evaluations, class identifications and partisanship, and also against new ones like propensity risk. Second, and more broadly, it will tell us about the most important voting determinants for Latin American electorates because it will test the five theories over the 1980-2004 period for three country cases: Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay (Chapter 5).

5.0   LATIN AMERICANS ARE VOTING LEFT: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL, MEXICO AND URUGUAY

Methodologically, an ideal scenario to understand why Latin Americans are voting for left-of-center political parties would be to have one public opinion poll for every election that was held in each Latin American country from 1980 to 2004. Moreover, in this ideal research strategy, all surveys would include the same variables to test all the theories proposed in Chapter 4. But survey data accessibility in Latin America, as well as in many other regions of the world, is far from ideal. A vast majority of surveys that explore voting determinants are carried out by private pollsters who are mainly interested in predicting electoral results, and as a consequence, these surveys lack the appropriate questions to examine voting theories. Taking into account these constraints, I decided to follow a most-different systems research strategy (Przeworski, and Teune 1970) and thereby test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 in three country-cases: Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. For each of these three countries I was able to obtain surveys covering almost the entire period under study; furthermore, these surveys have similar questions that allow me to replicate the same explanatory model in Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay. Moreover, in two of the countries, left-of-center presidents were elected (Brazil and Uruguay), while in Mexico, a right-of-center candidate was elected.

The most-different systems design works by testing relationships at the individual level across a range of very different countries. Przeworski and Teune (Przeworski and Teune 1970) conceive this design to determine how robust any relationship among variables is, independently of other contextual variables. If Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans evaluate negatively the economic situation of their countries, favor anti-market policies and vote for left-of-center parties, we might be able to infer that behind this leftist electoral trend, there is evidence of Latin Americans' economic discontent. On the contrary, if Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans are voting left-of-center parties for different reasons, we would be more confident that perceptions

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about market-oriented economic reforms are not crucial at the individual level to explain the vote for the Left in Latin America.

My central argument is that the recent increase of leftist parties in Latin America comes about as a result of voters' punishing political parties that were unable to improve the economic well-being of their electorates. Most Latin Americans have faced economic hardship during successive governments under a variety of political parties, and recent research demonstrates that voters have long-term economic memories (Benton 2005) and punish not only the incumbent party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that governed before the incumbent came to power. Left-of-center parties took advantage of this popular discontent and capitalized on social and economic dissatisfaction. In Brazil, after the experience of the PSDB government, the most "credible" opposition was embodied by the PT. The search for new alternatives has led Uruguayans to vote for the Frente Amplio, a left-leaning coalition party which represents the only "credible" or "untainted" opposition after a long succession of Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional governments. Mexico represents a different example for the same phenomenon. The electorate's search for something new ended up with their favoring the two credible and untainted opposition parties: PAN, a center-right political party and the PRD, a leftist party. A "credible" or "untainted" political party is a party that was never in charge of the government and cannot be held responsible for the country's welfare. To summarize, leftist parties capitalize social discontent when: 1) they represent a credible or untainted opposition, and even more so when 2) they are the only untainted opposition in the political system.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the three country cases and why they comprise a most-different system design. Sections two to four present the empirical evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay respectively. The concluding section discusses the findings in a comparative way.

5.1   MOST-DIFFERENT SYSTEM: BRAZIL, MEXICO AND URUGUAY

Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are all cases of *Continuous increase* of the Left,[36] but the electoral trajectories followed by left-of-center parties since the 1980s in each country differ. In Brazil, leftist parties gained access to the government in 2002. Before that, in 1994, the Partido Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), a social democrat party, carried Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency. However, when the PSDB was elected to Brazil's national government, it had already moved to the right of the ideological scale. Therefore, the first time that a left-of-center party gained access to Brazil's national government after the return to democracy was in 2002 through Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva, the long-time leader of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). In Mexico, leftist parties, in particular the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), have increased their share of the vote during the 1990s, and by doing so, have helped to raise competitiveness in the Mexican electoral arena. The PRD received almost a fifth of the votes cast in the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections, and in 2006 it lost the presidency by just 1% of the votes in a highly controversial vote count. In Uruguay, leftist parties have progressively increased their electoral participation since the return to democracy in 1984, and after twenty years of democracy, in 2004 a left-leaning coalition called the Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA) won the presidency. All these leftist parties, PT, PRD, and EP-FA, are examples of professional parties: they care about party building, they have relatively strong party organizations, and they mobilize political support in addition to social support. In that sense, they are more similar to Concertación in Chile than to Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia or Hugo Chávez's party, the Movimiento Quinta República in Venezuela. They are usually categorized as the "institutional" left in Latin America, contrary to the "populist" left represented mainly by the Movimiento Quinta República.[37]

Regardless of these commonalities, there are several differences between these countries that make the case selection relevant. I will only refer to those characteristics that are pertinent for the purpose of this research: differences in their party and political systems, differences in the level of economic reforms, and differences in their economic well-being. These three sets of

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[36] See Chapter 2 for the complete trends' classification.
[37] Following the same general idea, Castañeda (2006) classifies these cases into Right Left or Wrong Left, but he consideres that the PRI is a case of Wrong Left.

characteristics correspond to the three groups of independent variables tested in Chapter 3: political variables, economic reform variables, and economic variables.

The differences between Brazilian, Mexican and Uruguayan party and political systems are large. Brazil is usually defined as a case of party underdevelopment and weakly-established political institutions (Ames 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring, 1999). Its multiparty system has been described as "highly fragmented, electoral volatility is comparatively high, more than one-third of sitting legislators change parties during a term, and individualism, clientelism and personalism rather than programmatic appeals dominate electoral campaigns" (Samuels 2006). Scholars believe that mass partisanship in Brazil is comparatively weak (Mainwaring, Menneguello and Power 2000), but recent research challenges this view and indicates that Brazilians have higher levels of party identification than many other new democracies, and mass partisanship is particularly strong among PT voters (Samuels 2006).[38]

For a long time, Mexico was characterized as a weakly-institutionalized political system (Mainwaring 1999) with single-party dominance in the shape of the long-ruling Partido Institucional Revolucionario (PRI). The PRI was in charge of the national government from 1929 to 2000, and opposition parties were unable to win a majority in the lower chamber of congress until 1997 when the single, dominant-party system was broken in favor of a multiparty system. It was not until 2000 that the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), a right-leaning party, ousted the PRI from the presidency.

Uruguay has had a very stable party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), with three major political parties, Partido Colorado (PC), Partido Nacional (PN) and Frente Amplio (FA), and one minor party, Partido Independiente (PI). It was with the emergence of the Frente Amplio in 1971 that the party system experienced a major change evolving from a two-party system to a multiparty system (Gillespie and González 1989; González 1991). Mass party identification is commonplace; an average of two-thirds of Uruguayans reported their party identification since the return to democracy.[39]

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[38] It is still possible that Samuels finds high levels of mass partisanship within PT voters because the 2002 survey was conducted at the end of Lula landslide, and a result, PT partisanship might be overrepresented. I thank Barry Ames for pointing out this caveat.

[39] This percentage is particularly high for the region. According to data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), in Peru (2001) only 26% of the population has party identification, while in Brazil (2002) the 34% identifies with a particular political party and in Mexico (2000) is the 50%.

To put it simply, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are dissimilar in their levels of party system institutionalization, numbers of political parties, and mass partisanship. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) classify Brazil as an inchoate party system, Mexico as a hegemonic party system, and Uruguay as an institutionalized one. Several things changed by the end of the 1990s - one is that Mexico can no longer be considered a hegemonic party system. In terms of the number of parties, Mexico and Uruguay have experienced important transformations by becoming multiparty systems and raising their level of party competition. Recent research shows that the number of parties affects the way in which voters hold governments accountable; multiparty systems strengthen voters' ability to punish several parties at a time, and therefore, popular discontent may be lower in countries with more permissive electoral rules that allow small parties to gain congressional representation (Benton 2005). Regarding partisanship, Mexico and Uruguay have higher proportions of their populations with party attachment than Brazil. By having diverse party systems and political systems, these countries made an appropriate case selection to test voting-behavior theories.

Market-oriented economic reforms were also implemented very differently in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Brazil and Mexico are classified as slow reformers: they started reforms later and adopted less structural reforms; while Uruguay is considered a gradual reformer: reforms were adopted earlier, but they were milder and carried out in a gradual way (Lora, 1997/2001). The differences in the reforms pursued in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay also depend on the area being reformed. Brazil presents some of the highest privatization reform and labor reform indexes. On the other hand, Mexico ranks low on their tax reform and labor reform indexes, but high on the financial reform index. Finally Uruguay has one of the lowest levels of privatization in the region but one of the highest indexes of trade reform (Lora, 1997/2001).

There are many indicators available to compare the economic well-being of Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans. To keep the comparability with the macro-level section of this study, I choose to compare two indicators: inflation and economic growth. Inflation[40] was an enormous problem in all Latin American countries during the 1980s and mid-1990s, and it was finally brought under control at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. Among the three countries, Brazil was the one that suffered most from a hyperinflationary crisis: it experienced three-digit inflation from 1980 to 1994. In Mexico and Uruguay hyperinflation was a less

common malady, affecting the former in 1983, 1987 and 1988, and the latter in 1990 and 1991. In terms of economic growth, the three countries experienced several ups and downs during the period of study. Brazil and Mexico have been experiencing an increase in their growth rate since the beginning of 2000s. In Uruguay, from 1999 to 2003 economic growth was negative. The 2002 economic crisis worsened the situation, the percentage change in GDP based on constant local currency for 2002 being -10.8.[41] This state of affairs was overcome in 2004 with a positive growth rate of 4.5.

Next section examines why Uruguayans voted for the Left.

5.2   URUGUAY: THE LEFT AS THE ONLY UNTAINTED OPPOSITION

In the Uruguayan party system, two political parties are considered left-of-center: Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista (FA)[42] and Partido Independiente (PI). The Frente Amplio (FA) was founded in 1971. It emerged as a coalition of leftist political parties that received support principally from young people, urban sectors, intellectuals, and the middle and upper-middle classes (Gillespie 1986). The coalition was formed mainly by the Socialist Party, Communist Party, Christian Democrat Party, and splinter groups from the Partido Colorado (Movimiento Pregón and Movimiento por el Gobierno del Pueblo, PGP) and Partido Nacional (Movimiento Popular Nacionalista). The other current left-leaning party is the Partido Independiente which is an offshoot of the Nuevo Espacio.[43]

The other two major political parties: Partido Colorado (PC) and Partido Nacional (PN) (also called "Partido Blanco" or the "Blancos") are more closely identified with the center-right. The Partido Colorado has more in common with "the Latin American liberal parties, being more

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[40] Based on IMF data
[41] Based on IMF data
[42] For the sake of simplicity I will use Frente Amplio or FA instead of Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista. Furthermore, Frente Amplio is what most people call it.
[43] Nuevo Espacio was the right wing of the Frente Amplio, namely the alliance between the Christian Democratic Party and the Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo (PGP). This alliance campaigned as part of the Frente Amplio in 1971 and 1984; in 1989, it became independent from the Frente Amplio and formed a new party, the Nuevo Espacio. In 1994 and 1999, the Christian Democratic Party campaigned again with the Frente Amplio, one faction of the PGP ran with the Partido Colorado, and the other group of the PGP remained as the Nuevo Espacio. In 2004, one

liberal, cosmopolitan, urban-centered and anti-church than the Blancos, who became the Uruguayan conservative party" (González, 1991: 13). The Partido Nacional is more associated with the Catholic Church and rural areas, but it is more economically liberal than the other two. The Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional have almost parallel histories; both were established in 1830, so are almost as old as the country itself, both are multi-class parties and between the two they held office from the country's independence until 2004. For this reason, both are called "traditional parties."

The military coup in 1973 prohibited all political party activity; however, the political parties managed to survive the eleven years of the authoritarian regime by operating below the government's surveillance. The country returned to democracy in the 1984 general election when, much to the military regime's surprise, the party system had evolved into one that relied on a class-based electorate. The Partido Colorado received votes mainly from older, less-well educated people, housewives and retirees, the Partido Nacional was the most catch-all party of the three, and the Frente Amplio maintained its support among young people and voters with high school diplomas and college degrees, but also received high levels of support among workers, especially blue-collar workers (González 1991).

Until the mid-1960s, Blancos and Colorados together won about 90 percent of the vote; the party system was clearly a two-party system. With the emergence of the Frente Amplio in 1971, the party system started to change from a two-party system to a multiparty system (Gillespie and González 1989; González 1991). Over the last thirty years, the Frente Amplio has increased its electoral successes from election to election. As shown in Table 5-1, the two-party system changed first into a "two-and-a-half" party system in 1971, then into a three party system in 1984, and to a multiparty system in 1989. In 2004, the Frente Amplio obtained the majority of votes, and as a result of the low vote share obtained by the Partido Colorado, the Effective Number of Parties shrank to two-and-a-half.

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faction of the Nuevo Espacio became part of the Frente Amplio again, and the other ran alone with the name of Partido Independiente.

Table 5-1Vote share in presidential elections, 1971-2004 (%)

	1971	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004
Partido Colorado	40.9	41.2	30.3	32.3	32.8	10.6
Partido Nacional	40.2	35.0	38.9	31.2	22.3	35.1
Nuevo Espacio/P. Independiente (*)			9.0	5.2	4.6	1.9
Frente Amplio	18.3	21.2	21.2	30.6	40.1	51.7
Others minor political parties	0.6	2.5	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.7
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Effective Number of Parties (**)	2.75	2.92	3.33	3.30	3.08	2.49

(*) In the 1971 and 1984 elections, the Nuevo Espacio was part of the Frente Amplio. From 1989 to 2004, the Nuevo Espacio was an independent party. In 2004 one faction of the party decided to become part of the Frente Amplio using the name Nuevo Espacio, the rest remained independent and ran with the name of Partido Independiente.
(**) The Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is calculated using the Laakso and Taagepera (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) formula: $ENP= 1/\Sigma p_i^2$. The formula is based on the number of votes.
Source: Corte Electoral del Uruguay.

Scholars who work on the Uruguayan party system group political parties in two ideological families: "traditional parties" and "challengers" (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000). The former are made up of the Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional, both right-of-center parties; while the challengers are Frente Amplio and Partido Independiente, both left-of center parties that, until 2004, were never in charge of the national government. Figure 5-1 shows the electoral evolution of these two ideological families.[44]

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[44] Luna 2004a argues that only the "traditional family" exists as an ideological family because Nuevo Espacio's leaders are closer to the traditional parties' leaders than to those of the Frente Amplio. However, he presents evidence that Nuevo Espacio's voters are closer to the FA than to the PC or PN. Therefore, it is not so clear that they don't belong to the same ideological family.

Figure 5.1Electoral evolution of Ideological Families in Presidential Elections (1971-2004)
Source: Corte Electoral del Uruguay.

The progressive increase in the vote for the Left (challengers) is puzzling enough to require an explanation. Several explanations for the incremental electoral success of the Left, as well as for the decrease in voting for traditional parties, have been offered. These explanations include the generational effects (Aguiar 2000; Canzani 2000; González and Queirolo 2000) and the ability of the Left (mainly the FA) to retain party traditions (Canzani 2000; Monestier 2001; Moreira 2000); an increasing ideological moderation and pragmatism of the FA (Garcé and Yaffé 2004; Buquet and de Armas 2004), and popular discontent capitalization (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b).

There is a sufficient amount of evidence to show that leftist parties benefit from a generational effect. This characteristic of the Frentista electorate is not new; since its foundation, the FA has been a political party which is highly attractive to young people. Moreover, different scholars point out that the electoral growth of the Left is mainly produced by a generational replacement, in which the new voters' preference for the FA supplies an inertial increment of 1%

per year.[45]   Not only did the FA successfully obtain votes from young people, but it also demonstrated the ability to retain party traditions (Monestier 2001; Moreira 2000). In other words, those who were young supporters of the FA in 1971 continued to vote for it in 2004. With each successive election, leftist parties continued to win young voters who remained in the party as they became older; the age effect coincides with a cohort effect. But this explanation does not answer *why* the Left is so successful in capturing new voters and keeping the older ones in their ranks.

The explanation that points out the ideological moderation and increasing pragmatism of the Left argues that leftist parties incrementally gained more votes because their leaders chose to moderate their political stances in order to capture voters from the ideological center. One way to test the validity of this argument is to analyze the ideological identification of FA voters. If FA's electorate or the leftist parties' electorate in general became more centrist over time, we can argue that the Left has grown by capturing votes from the center. Table 5.2 shows that the FA electorate is more centrist in 2004 than it was in 1989, but those that vote for left-of-center parties are not significantly more centrist in 2004 than they were in 1989. In addition, aggregate evidence shows that during the 1990s the electorate has become more leftist in ideology (Table 5.2). The mean ideological self-placement of the electorate in 1989 was 5.8,[46] and fifteen years later it was 5.0. Considering this preliminary evidence, we can argue that the increase in the vote for leftist parties cannot be fully explained by the ideological moderation of their leaders because the electorate also moved to the Left ideologically. As a result, it is necessary to look for alternative explanations.

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[45] See Aguiar (2000) and Canzani (2000) for the Uruguayan case and Abramson and Inglehart (1992) about generational replacement.

[46] In a ten point scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Table 5-2 Mean ideology by different electorates (1984-2004)

	1984*	1989		1994		1999		2004	
	Mean	Mean	Std Dv.	Mean	Std. Dv.	Mean	Std. Dv.	Mean	Std. Dv.
Frente Amplio	3.1	3.0	1.4466	3.8	1.4589	3.5	1.6857	3.4	1.8112
Left-of-center parties	3.1	3.6	1.7246	4.0	1.4718	3.6	1.6628	3.6	1.8634
All the electorate	4.8	5.8	2.4624	5.7	2.1192	5.5	2.5294	5.1	2.5732
(N)	(855)	(1310)		(1646)		(1228)		(1470)	

*Source: Gonzalez, Luis E.(1993). This mean only represents the electorate in Montevideo.
This post-electoral survey was carried out in March 1985, after the 1984 national election.
** In the 1984 election, the Nuevo Espacio was the right wing of the Frente Amplio.

As argued in other studies (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b), the "popular discontent capitalization explanation" states that leftist parties capitalize on popular discontent with the traditional political parties that have been in charge of the government since the nation's independence. Since the Left was never in charge of the government, it represents an "untainted" or "credible" opposition. The next sections present evidence from multivariate analysis that supports the popular discontent capitalization explanation.

5.2.1   Data and variable description

The Uruguayan data comes from five pre-election surveys carried out by two well-known public opinion polling firms in that country. The 1984 and 1989 surveys were carried out by Equipos/Mori, and the 1994, 1999 and 2004 by CIFRA, González, Raga y Asociados.[47] The 1984 survey includes 400 respondents and covers only the urban population, as it was carried out only in the Uruguayan capital, Montevideo. The other four are national surveys that include

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[47] I would like to thank the directors of CIFRA, Luis E. González and Adriana Raga, and of Equipos/Mori, Agustín Canzani and Ignacio Zuasnábar, for giving me access to this data. In the case of González and Raga, they also generously allowed me to include some specific questions from the 2004 survey.

between 1,200 and 1,500 respondents.[48] All the data was collected by personal, door-to-door interviews in the respondents' homes.[49] The comparison between the proportions intending to vote for leftist parties in these surveys with the proportions that actually voted for the left when the elections were held, strengthen the validity of the analysis. In the 1989 presidential election, 30% of the electorate vote for leftist parties and the pre-electoral survey registered 35%; in 1994, 36% voted for the Left and the survey's proportion was also 36%; in 1999 the electoral result was 45% and the survey one was 52%; and finally in 2004, the election result was 54% and the survey predicted a 60%. Despite the overrepresentation of leftists' voters in almost every sample, a very well-known problem for Uruguayans' pollsters, the survey data used in this chapter represents with enough precision Uruguayan voters' preferences.

The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the intention to vote for a left-of-center party, value 1 means that the person intended to vote for the Left: Frente Amplio and Nuevo Espacio/Partido Independiente; while 0 represents the vote intention for the remaining political parties. The explanatory variables are described following the theories discussed in Chapter 4.

I have used two independent variables, *sociotropic vote* and *pocketbook vote*, to test the economic voting theory. *Sociotropic vote* measures the evaluation of the country's economic situation; thus, the higher the value, the worse the evaluation. *Pocketbook vote* measures the evaluation of the family's economic situation. *Pocketbook vote* is not included in the 1984 model, and *sociotropic vote* is absent from the 1989 model because these questions were not asked in those surveys. The *Retrospective Sociotropic, Prospective Sociotropic, Retrospective Pocketbook* and *Prospective Pocketbook* variables measure citizens' economic assessments of the country and their own situation in comparison with the past and economic expectations for the future.

Social class cleavage is tested in two ways. First, I used a set of five dummy variables (Model 1); each dummy represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: *dominant class, petty bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers,* and *non-employed.* The social class classification is the one built by Portes and Hoffman (2003): *Dominant class* is

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[48] The four national surveys were weighted to correct for an overeducated sample when aggregate statistics are presented, but not when binary logit coefficients are shown. Binary coefficients and their significance do not change by weighting the data.
[49] Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA.

conformed by capitalists (proprietors and managing partners of large/medium firms), executives (managers and administrators of large/medium firms and public institutions), and elite workers (University-trained salaried professionals in public service and large/medium private firms). Members of the *Petty bourgeoisie* are "own-account professionals and technicians, and micro entrepreneurs with personally-supervised staff." *Formal workers* are vocationally trained salaried technicians and white-collar employees (non-manual formal proletariat) plus the skilled and unskilled waged workers with labor contracts (manual formal proletariat). Finally, the *Informal workers* are those "non-contractual, waged workers, casual vendors, and unpaid family workers." The *Non–employed* are unemployed people, retired people, students and housewives; this category is used as base category. I entered each category into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to this category and 0 when he/she does not.

I then measured social class as socioeconomic status (SES) (Model 2) and consider three indicators simultaneously: occupation, education, and income. I performed a factor analysis with these three variables measuring occupation, education, and income and extracted only one factor in each election year (1984: Eigenvalue=1.657; 1989: Eigenvalue=1.687; 1994: Eigenvalue=1.597; 1999: Eigenvalue=2.081; 2004: Eigenvalue=1.627).[50] I saved the values of this factor as a new variable named *socioeconomic status (SES)* and entered it into the model as an independent variable.

Ideology is the independent variable I used to test the political cleavage; I measured it by situating the ideological self-placement of the respondent in a dimension that ranges from "1" meaning left to "10" meaning right. The non response rate for this variable is very low: in 1989 it is 9%, in 1994 is 10%, in 1999 is 5%, and in 2004 only 2%. *Partisanship* was asked in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 surveys; therefore, it is only included in the models for those years. Uruguay is a Latin American country with strong partisanship, an average of two-thirds of Uruguayans reported their party identification in 1994 and 1999. It is important to include *partisanship* in the models for control if the rest of the explanatory variables are still relevant after including it. It incorporates five dummies: identification with the PC, identification with the PN, identification

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[50] For the 1984 and 1989 models, income was measured as family income. For the 1994 and 1999 models, I use the household-level instead of family income because there is no measure of family income in the 1994 survey and to keep the comparability with the 1999 survey. In the 1999 survey, income and household level are correlated at 0.47 (p<. 001).

with the NE/PI, identification with the FA, and no party identification. No party identification serves as reference category.

Other variables are included in the model as control variables: *age, education, family income, household level,* and *urban voter (residence). Age, education* and *family income* have a straightforward interpretation; low values denote young people, low education, and low income. *Household level* is an ordinal variable that classifies the interviewees in three categories based on an indicator of their household. It takes the value of 1 for low socioeconomic level, 2 for medium socioeconomic level, and 3 for high socioeconomic level. *Urban Voter* is a dummy variable representing the region in which the respondent lives; it takes the value of 1 when the person lives in Montevideo and 0 when he/she lives in a rural area or in other smaller cities and towns.

Prospect theory is going to be tested through two questions that ask respondents to agree or disagree with two aphorisms: "Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer" ("Better the devil you know than the saint you don't") and "el que no arriesga no gana" ("Nothing ventured, nothing gained"). The two variables were combined into a single measurement named "Risk propensity" which ranges from 1 (high risk averse) to 5 (high risk acceptant). Risk averse respondents are those that preferred the known devil and disagreed with the maxim "Nothing ventured, nothing gained," while risk acceptant Uruguayans are those that preferred the unknown saint and agreed with the above mentioned proverb. Intermediate values were given to citizens that answered the risk taker option in one question but the risk averse alternative in the other.

5.2.2   Results

I present individual-level explanations for voters' behavior in each post-authoritarian election by using one Binary Logit for each election year. All the regressions in Table 5-3 reach statistical significance.[51] Overall, the models are useful for explaining the factors that lead Uruguayans to vote for left-of-center parties. The coefficients of each variable are reported with their robust standard errors in parentheses.

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[51] The 1984 survey has a smaller N than the others because it was carried out only in Montevideo.

What are the important factors that determine the vote for leftist parties in Uruguay? Moreover, why do voters *increasingly* vote for the Left? Let me start to answer these questions by looking at those variables that reach significance in every election: ideology, party identification and area of residence (urban voter).

Ideology is a significant determinant of the vote for the Left in all the elections; a one-unit increase in conservative ideology (one space to the right in the ideological scale that ranges from 1 to 10) *decreases* the probability of voting for leftist parties in comparison to voting for center and right-of-center parties. In conclusion, the Uruguayan case provides evidence to confirm Hypothesis 5: *Ideological self-placement is likely to determine the vote for the left irrespective of social and structural determinants.*

Party identification is also a strong predictor of voting behavior in Uruguay; it reaches statistical significance in every election. This finding is not a surprise - scholars have already pointed out the importance of partisanship in Uruguayan politics (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). What's more, party identification is significant for every political party; there is no cross-party variation, partisanship is not more important in predicting the vote for leftist parties than for right-of-center or center parties as Hypothesis 7 states.

At this point, it is necessary to make a caveat. The discussion regarding the possible endogeneity problem between ideology and partisanship, or put it differently, that partisan affiliation or ideology have each partly caused the other, either because people leaning one way ideologically choose particular parties or because those loyal to particular parties come to accept certain ideologies, is an old one in the voting behavior literature. Since Campbell (1960), many scholars have defended the prevalence of partisanship over ideology as a leading voting clue. On the contrary, others scholars, starting from Downs (1957), have pinpointed the importance of ideology because it works as a shortcut or heuristic tool to identify the preferred political party. In any case, the two variables are conceptually different, and what's more, they are not always highly correlated. In Uruguay, ideology and party identification are *only* highly correlated for those with party attachment to the Frente Amplio. In 1994, the correlation was -0.55, and in 1999

and 2004 increased to -0.58.[52] Taking into account these values, the endogeneity problem can be dismiss.[53]

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[52] All the correlation values are reported in Appendix C.

[53] It is also possible that the decision to vote for the Frente Amplio may lead the voter to declare himself/herself as leftist to avoid cognitive dissonance. In that case, there would be reciprocal causation between vote and ideology. I thank Aníbal Pérez-Liñan for pointing out this issue, which is a certain possibility in the Uruguayan case. However, it is relevant to keep ideology as an independent variable in the model to compare the three country cases. In Brazil and Mexico, ideology is not always a relevant voting predictor. As a result, the relationship between ideology and vote is an empirical question rather than an endogeneity problem.

Table 5-3 Vote determinant for Leftist parties in Uruguay (1984-2004) (Model 1)

Model 1: using different indicators of social class cleavage					
Independent Variables:	**1984**	**1989**	**1994**	**1999**	**2004**
Economic Voting					
Sociotropic Vote	0,369	-	0.534***	0,248	0.465**
	(.303)		(.136)	(.193)	(.148)
Retrospective Sociotropic	-0,095	-	-	-	0,035
	(.254)				(.172)
Prospective Sociotropic	0,262	-	-	-	0,157
	(.199)				(.219)
Pocket-book Vote	-	-0,012	0,088	0,042	0.336**
		(0.130)	(.150)	(.202)	(.162)
Retrospective Pocket-book	-	0,174	-	-	-0,079
		(.121)			(.184)
Prospective Pocket-book	-	(.329)	-	-	-0,215
		(.130)**			(.226)
Social Class Cleavage (1)					
Dominant Classes	-0.037	-0,161	-0,439	-0.915	0,867
	(.487)	(.275)	(0.345)	(.562)	(.627)
Petty Bourgeoisie	-0,578	0,007	-0,569	0,437	0,003
	(.715)	(.466)	(0.422)	(.470)	(.395)
Formal Workers	0,205	0,093	-0,049	0,162	0.437
	(.360)	(.206)	(.482)	(.374)	(.275)
Informal Workers	-0,567	0,025	0,015	-0,378	0,139
	(.426)	(.303)	(.262)	(.405)	(.317)
Education	0.274**	-0,006	0.204**	0,123	-0.139*
	(.135)	(.078)	(.088)	(.116)	(.075)
Household level			-0,177	-0.446**	-0,152
			(.157)	(.218)	(.177)
Family income	-0,042	0.000	-	-	
	(.079)	(.043)			
Ideology	-	-0.812***	-0.654***	-0.792***	-0.710***
		(.079)	(.097)	(.084)	(.086)
Age	0.202***	-0.136***	-0,009	0,001	-0,006
	(.059)	(.033)	(.007)	(.008)	(.007)
Urban Voter	-	1.159***	0.899***	0.853**	0.783***
		(.176)	(.232)	(.282)	(.236)
Partisanship (2)					
Partido Colorado	-	-	-2.651***	-3.781***	-2.309***
			(.412)	(.661)	(.469)
Partido Nacional	-	-	-2.634***	-2.364***	-2.613***
	-	-	(.393)	(.418)	(.340)
Frente Amplio			4.525***	3.954***	4.861***
			(.566)	(0.662)	(1.042)
Nuevo Espacio/P.Independiente	-	-	2.999***	3.902**	dropped
			(.927)	(1.533)	
Prospective theory					
Risk propensity	-	-	-	-	0.436***
					(.099)
Constant	-2.429	1.971**	0,318	3.248**	2,236
	(1.714)	(0.791)	(0.976)	(1.137)	(1.442)
Pseudo R squared	0,17	0,48	0,74	0,75	0,52
Wald chi2	22.8**	132***	252***	217***	188***
Number of observations	312	1219	1577	1062	1388

(1) Includes: retired, students, housewives, and unemployed.
(2) Inludes those that do not have partisanship or do not want to express it as the reference category.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1) a left-leaning party,
or (0) to a non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
The null hypothesis of the Wald-chi test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to cero.

Urban Voter is also significant in all the elections. Since their inception, leftist parties have been identified as urban parties. The Frente Amplio has been extending its electorate to more rural regions of the country, and in the 2004 national election it obtained the majority of vote in seven[54] of the nineteen municipalities. Despite this remarkable electoral growth outside Montevideo, the capital city, the urban-rural cleavage continues to influence the party for which Uruguayans vote; leftist parties mainly receive the preferences of urban Uruguayans.

Risk Propensity is only tested in 2004, and as a result, I cannot argue that it was always a strong predictor of the leftist vote, but the evidence from the 2004 election shows that Uruguayans with higher levels of risk acceptance had a higher probability of voting for left-of-center parties than those who were risk averse. In other words, regression results confirm Hypothesis 2: *when the incumbent is not a leftist political party, and leftist parties belong to the opposition, risk acceptant citizens will choose for the Left at the booth.*[55]

In addition, there are some variables that are significant in some elections but not in others. One of them is age. The changes found from one election to the other are unexpected if we take into account the social bases of leftist parties in the past. Age was significant in the first elections after the return to democracy, but it is no longer significant in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Table 5-4 shows that being young increased the probability of someone voting for the FA or NE in the 1984, 1989, and 1994 elections. This characteristic of the leftist electorate in Uruguay is not new; since its foundation, the FA has been a political party which is highly attractive to young people. Not only did the FA successfully obtain votes from young people, but it also demonstrated the ability to retain party traditions (Monestier 2001; Moreira 2000). In other words, those who were young supporters of the FA in 1971 continued to vote for it in 1999,

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[54] Canelones, Florida, Maldonado, Montevideo, Rocha, Salto, and Soriano.

[55] I also tested Prospect Theory in the 1999 election with an alternative indicator: an individual's judgments about the opposition's governing capabilities. This indicator was used by Cinta (1999) to assess uncertainty in the 1997 Mexican congressional election, and he found that Mexicans voted for the party whose governing capabilities they were more certain of. I find the same results for the 1999 Uruguayan elections. Uruguayans that considered Tabaré Vázquez, Frente Amplio's presidential candidate, the most capable candidate to improve the country's situation ("más capaz de sacar al país adelante"), significantly tended to vote for the Left. On the contrary, those that believed Jorge Batlle (PC) or Luis A. Lacalle (PN) were the most capable, tended to vote for the PC or PN respectively. Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) argue that this variable is highly endogenous to the voters' party preferences. In other words, Uruguayans sympathetic to the opposition are more likely to positively evaluate their party's capacity to govern. I agree with them, it makes sense that those voters who think that a candidate is the better prepared to govern, will vote for them. However, because it is a variable highly used in the literature that tests Prospect Theory, I run the analysis. Results are available upon request.

and this is the reason why age is not more significant in 1999. With each successive election, the FA continued to win young voters who remained in the party as they became older; the age effect coincides together with a cohort effect.

The economic voting theory finds support in the Uruguayan case. In other words, voters' economic assessments are significant determinants of the vote for leftist parties in all Uruguayan elections following the return to democracy with the exception of the 1984 and 1999 elections.[56] There is evidence to support Hypothesis 1: *the worse a voter evaluates the economic situation, the greater the probability s/he will vote for the opposition. In particular, voters who are discontented will reward leftist parties which were not in charge of the government.* As argued in other studies (González 1999; González and Queirolo 2000; Luna 2004b), leftist parties capitalize on popular discontent with the traditional political parties that have been in charge of the government since the nation's independence. Since the FA and the NE or PI were never in charge of the government, they represent an "untainted" or "credible" opposition.

Uruguayans are sociotropic oriented rather than egotropic oriented or pocketbook voters. This finding is consistent with most of the literature on economic voting in Western countries which states that voters take into account their society's economic well-being more willingly than their own welfare. In terms of the temporal distinction on voters' orientations, Uruguayans tend to be closer to "bankers" considering the future expectations of the economy (prospective vote), than "peasants" thinking about what the economy was like over the previous years.[57]

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[56] One of the main differences between the results with imputed data and the results without imputation is in the relevance of economic voting theory in the 1984 election. Using the data without imputation, sociotropic vote and prospective sociotropic reach significance, but using the imputed data, these variables are no longer significant.
[57] The distinction between "bankers" and "peasants" was introduced by MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992).

Table 5-4 Vote determinant for Leftist parties in Uruguay (1984-2004) (Model 2)

	Model 2: using socioeconomic status as an indicator of social class cleavage				
Independent Variables:	**1984**	**1989**	**1994**	**1999**	**2004**
Economic Voting					
Sociotropic Vote	0,395	-	0.518***	0,306	0.481***
	(.287)		(.134)	(.194)	(.148)
Retrospective Sociotropic	-0,085	-	-	-	0,004
	(.247)				(.169)
Prospective Sociotropic	0,273	-	-	-	0,128
	(.191)				(.209)
Pocket-book Vote	-	-0,059	0,091	-0,041	0.408**
		(0.130)	(.145)	(.207)	(.161)
Retrospective Pocket-book	-	0,183	-	-	-0,092
		(.122)			(.179)
Prospective Pocket-book	-	0.328**	-	-	-0,226
		(.129)			(.218)
Social Class Cleavage					
SES (socioeconomic status)	0.177	-0.142	0,003	-0.275	-0.050
	(.162)	(.104)	(.103)	(.189)	(0.117)
Ideology	-	-0.819***	-0.647***	-0.790***	-0.686***
		(.079)	(.100)	(.088)	(.083)
Age	-0.257***	-0.141***	-0.014**	-0,005	-0,005
	(.053)	(.029)	(.007)	(.008)	(.006)
Urban Voter	-	0.184***	0.952***	0.915***	-0.667**
		(.175)	(.227)	(.284)	(.229)
Partisanship (1)					
Partido Colorado	-	-	-2.705***	-3.542***	-2.369***
			(.416)	(.666)	(.482)
Partido Nacional	-	-	-2.588***	-2.274***	-2.651***
	-	-	(.381)	(.434)	(.339)
Frente Amplio			4.465***	3.900***	4.833***
			(.558)	(.641)	(1.039)
Nuevo Espacio/P.Independiente	-	-	3.024***	3.889**	dropped
			0,891	(1.535)	
Prospective theory					
Risk propensity	-	-	-	-	0.419***
					(.097)
Constant	-1,696	2.119**	0,928	2.998**	1.100
	(1.620)	(0.686)	(0.810)	(0.999)	(1.130)
Pseudo R squared	0,10	0,41	0,77	0,76	0,55
Wald chi2	6,4	59.9***	142.6***	76.2***	103***
Number of observations	312	1219	1577	1062	1388

(1) Includes those that do not have partisanship or do not want to express it as the reference category.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1) a left-leaning party, or (0) to a non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
The null hypothesis of the Wald-chi test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to cero.

At the aggregate level, the key question is if the number of people with a negative perception of the country's economic situation has grown over time. The percentage of Uruguayans who negatively evaluated the economy increased from 50.5% in 1994 to 69.3% in 2004. As these evaluations of the country's economic health worsened, the main beneficiary of this phenomenon continued to be leftist parties for representing the "untainted" or "credible" opposition.

The impact of economic assessments on voting decisions can be diluted by the effect of party identifications. As Hypothesis 8 states, voters with party identification might be less likely to take into consideration economic evaluations than those without party preferences. I tested this argument for the 2004 election using an interaction term between partisanship and retrospective personal economic evaluations (retrospective pocketbook). The evidence shown in Table 5-5 indicates that having a party identification influence the way in which voters take into account their personal economic situation but not in the expected direction. Those Uruguayans with party identification are more likely than those without party identification to take into consideration the evolution of their own economic situation when they decide to vote left. Using the lincom command, both coefficients reach significance but the coefficient of those with party identification is bigger than the coefficient of those with no party attachment (0.896 and 0.428 respectively).

This result needs to be explained looking at the different party identifications. Having a party attachment to the Frente Amplio, Partido Nacional or Partido Colorado makes a difference in terms of how voters weight their own economic situation in their voting decisions. Results reported in Table 5-5 indicate that in 2004, negative retrospective evaluations of the personal economic situation increase the chances of voting leftist parties. But more important, these chances are amplified when voters feel close to the Frente Amplio and reduced for voters attached to the Partido Nacional. Despite the interaction term between retrospective pocketbook and Partido Nacional's attachment does not reach significance in the model, it is significant using the lincom command (the coefficient is 1.022 and the standard error is .575). Nevertheless, these chances of voting left are more influenced by party identifications than by retrospective pocketbook evaluations.

Table 5-5 Retrospective Pocketbook and Party Identification as determinants for Leftist parties in Uruguay (2004)

Independent Variables:	2004	
	(1)	(2)
Economic Voting		
Retrospective Pocket-book	**0.896*****	**0.380****
	(.112)	**(.129)**
Social Class Cleavage		
Dominant Classes	0.212	1.032
	(.641)	(.633)
Petty Bourgeoisie	-0.199	-0.336
	(.231)	(.347)
Formal Workers	0.380**	0.352
	(.158)	(.221)
Informal Workers	0.332*	0.288
	(.199)	(.265)
Education	0.012	-0.029
	(.037)	(.054)
Household level	0.051	-0.053
	0.227	0.385
Age	-0.017***	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Urban Voter	**-1.066*****	**-0.877*****
	(.127)	**(.184)**
Partisanship		
Partido Colorado		-3.190
		(2.079)
Partido Nacional		**-5.282****
		(2.216)
Frente Amplio		**8.926*****
		(1.089)
No partisanship	**0.845***	
	(.447)	
PC partyid*Retrospective Pocket		0.003
		(.589)
PN partyid*Retrospective Pocket		0.641
		(.586)
FA partyid*Retrospective Pocket		**-.794*****
		(.113)
No partyid*Retrospective Pocket	**'-.467****	
	(.174)	
Constant	0.587	1.051
	(.501)	(.651)
Pseudo R squared	0.13	0.57
Wald chi2	194***	238***
Number of observations	1368	1368

*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01

Note: Dependent variable is Left, a binary measure of whether the respondent intended to vote for a (1)
a left-leaning party, or (0) to a non-leftist party. Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard
errors in parentheses. The null hypothesis of the Wald-chi test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to cero.

An alternative, and more straightforward, way to analyze the combined effect of party identifications and retrospective economic evaluations is looking at the predicted probabilities shown in Table 5-6. In 2004, a voter who identified himself with the Partido Nacional and considers that his own economic situation has improved during the last government has a probability of voting left of 4.1%. This probability will increase to 8.4 for those who consider themselves poorer than five years ago. For a Colorado adherent, the impact of getting poorer is similar than for a Blanco sympathizer: the probability doubles when the voter considers his/her economic situation is worse off. The same phenomenon happens among those Uruguayans without party identification. The only situation when the personal economic situation has no impact on the decision to vote left is among those who feel close to the Frente Amplio.

In conclusion, in 2004, those Uruguayans who feel that their economic situation has been impoverished increase their probability to vote for leftist parties, regardless of their party identification. The probabilities of voting left are influenced by party identifications: they are higher for those that lack party identification, moderate for those that despite feeling themselves as "colorados" are disappointed with their party past performances, and low for the "blancos" who still trust on their party, but independently of the base on which each sector starts, the probabilities are doubled when the voter feels economic deterioration. This evidence reinforces the argument that Uruguayan leftist parties grow by capitalizing social and economic discontent.

Table 5-6 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties depending on Party Identification and Retrospective Egotropic Economic Assessments (2004)

Party Identification	Retrospective Egotropic Economic Evaluations		
	Better off	Same	Worse off
Partido Colorado	15.4	21.0	27.9
Partido Nacional	4.1	5.9	8.4
Frente Amplio	99.8	99.9	99.9
No Party Identification	42.6	64.5	81.7

Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of Uruguayan electorate done by Cifra, González, Raga y Asociados. Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with the same variables as Model 1 and 2 in Table 5-5. Except for the identified variables, all variables are held constant at their means.

Finally, the Uruguayan results reinforce the extended idea that social class cleavages are almost irrelevant to understand voting behavior in Latin America. The social class cleavage theory was tested with two different models. Model 1 tests the existence of social class cleavages with a set of variables that includes a series of dummy variables measuring occupation, a variable measuring education, and another one measuring the household economic level or family income[58] (see Table 5-3). The results of Model 1 refute Hypothesis 3: the position that a person occupies in the social structure does not determine his/her vote. In Uruguay, workers and members of the popular sectors are not more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who belong to the dominant sectors do not necessarily vote for rightist parties. Hypothesis 4 is also refuted: voters who belong to the informal sector are not more likely to vote for the Left.[59] Education is significant to explain the vote for the Left in 1984, 1994 and 2004. In 1984 and 1994, highly educated citizens had a higher probability of voting for the Frente Amplio; while in 2004 this effect was reversed: low education leads to more votes for the Left. Socioeconomic level was only significant in 1999: citizens with a low economic level had a higher probability of voting for the Frente Amplio.

The second model to test the social class cleavage is based on a single variable named socioeconomic status (SES) which considers the three indicators simultaneously: occupation, education, and income. I performed a factor analysis with these three variables measuring occupation, education, and income and extracted only one factor in each election year (1984: Eigenvalue=1.657; 1989: Eigenvalue=1.687; 1994: Eigenvalue=1.597; 1999: Eigenvalue=2.081; 2004: Eigenvalue=1.627). I saved the values of this factor as a new variable named *socioeconomic status (SES)* and entered it into the model as an independent variable. Table 5-4 shows that socioeconomic status is not a relevant voting predictor.[60]

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[58] Not all surveys have both measures. The household level is an ordinal variable that captures the classification made by the interviewer of the interviewees' households. It takes the value of 1 for low socioeconomic level, 2 for middle socioeconomic level, and 3 for high socioeconomic level. Family income is the self-reported income of the family. In the surveys where both variables are available, I prefer to use family income because it is reported by the interviewee.

[59] I also include unemployed people as an independent dummy variable but it does not reach significance.

[60] This is another difference between imputed and non imputed data. Using the data without imputation, SES reaches significance in 1984, 1989, and 1999. This difference can be explained by the large percentage of people that do not

These two ways in which the social class cleavage is tested do not rule out the possibility that social class has an indirect impact on voting left acting entirely through partisan affiliation or ideology. It might be possible that social class predicts ideological leanings or partisan affiliation, variables that determine the vote for leftist parties in Uruguay. However, the correlation between these independent variables contradict this possibility.[61] Social class does not have a positive and high correlation with ideology or party choice. In other words, social class is not a key variable neither to predict leftist vote, nor to predict party identification or ideology.

In conclusion, Uruguay is not a case of the class-cleavage party system. Since the FA's foundation in 1971, its electorate has not only been made up of working-class people; it has received support from students, intellectuals, and the middle and upper-middle classes (Gillespie 1986) The vote for leftist parties has increased among different social sectors, not only formal and informal workers. I understand this change as an indicator of the FA's transformation into a catchall party. In particular, after the 2002 economic crisis, which is considered the severest economic crisis in Uruguayan history and one which affected all socioeconomic sectors, citizens' economic discontent grew. As a result, in the 2004 election citizens voted for left-of-center parties irrespective of their socioeconomic status because they were considered the "untainted" opposition.

5.2.3   Discussion

Bearing in mind the value that each theory has to explain the rise of the Left in Latin America, we can summarize the Uruguayan results in the following way. First, the traditional social-class theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) does not explain the vote for the Left in post-dictatorship Uruguay. The FA became the largest party and won the general election in 2004 because it expanded its electoral base beyond the traditional, left-urban-middle class coalition,

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report their income; as a result, SES has many missing values. By imputing those missing values, the significance of SES in those elections vanishes.
[61] All the correlation matrixes for each regression model are shown in Appendix C.

without losing the support of these social sectors. The vote for the Left is a multi-class vote rather than a working class one.

Second, the FA formed a coalition that is ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms of class. This finding is extremely puzzling because, although ideology is an important factor in explaining voting behavior, social class is not. This result goes against the common understanding that ideology and social class are matched: workers are on the left, and the dominant sectors are on the right. In Uruguay, this attachment between social class and ideology does not hold as it is shown in Table 5.7. Furthermore, as Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) show, this attachment between social class and ideology does not hold in post-dictatorship Chile either.

Table 5-7 Ideology and social class in Uruguay (2004)

Social classes	Left	Center	Right	Don't know	Total
Dominant	35.7	35.7	28.6	-	100
Petty bourgeoisie	35.3	44.1	20.6	-	100
Formal workers	44.4	37.3	16.4	1.9	100
Informal workers	39.4	34.7	23.1	2.8	100
Unemployed	42.8	35.8	18.9	2.5	100
All (1)	38.0	36.2	23.3	2.5	100

(1) Includes retired, housewives and students.
Source: 2004 pre-electoral survey from CIFRA

One possible explanation for this unexpected combination of ideology and catchall parties may be that ideology works as a political cleavage used by political parties to mobilize support, as Torcal and Mainwaring suggest. In other words, the ideological cleavage is a political cleavage that becomes active when politicians use it to get votes; it is not a structural cleavage determined by social class. Ideology is a relevant predictor of vote even after controlling for partisanship. Moreover, partisanship is also an extremely important vote determinant in Uruguay for leftist and non-leftist parties. This clear distinction in two ideological families might be reinforced by politicians' agendas.

Third, economic voting theory and prospect theory work to explain the increase in the vote for the Left in Uruguay. Leftist parties have gained votes from those dissatisfied with the country's economic situation because they have never been in charge of the national government and citizens cannot blame them for economic hardship. By being in the domain of losses, Uruguayans take more risks: they vote against the "known devil" and in favor of the "unknown saint." Table 5-8 indicates that among those that intended to vote for leftist parties in 2004 there was a higher level of risk propensity than among those that were going to vote for "traditional" parties. Voting for a party that was never in charge of the government implies higher levels of uncertainty than voting for the parties that had governed the country since its independence.

Table 5-8 Risk and Vote Choice (%)

Risk Propensity	Leftist parties	Non-Leftist parties	All
High Risk Averse	1.09	12.48	5.60
Risk Averse	0.48	4.40	2.04
Neutral	27.02	56.15	38.57
Risk Acceptant	6.15	4.59	5.53
High Risk Acceptant	65.26	22.39	48.25
N	829	545	1374

Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of the Uruguayan electorate carried out by Cifra, González, Raga y Asociados.

Moreover, the probability of voting for the Left in 2004 also increased with the disenchantment with the economic situation, but not all voters who feel discontent with the economy would "gamble" their vote. Table 5-9 shows that a risk averse citizen with a negative evaluation of the country's economy has a probability of voting Left of .42, while a risk-taking voter with the same negative evaluation doubles the probability of choosing the less known opposition (.84). In other words, individuals with a lower risk-taking attitude prefer to stick with the "devil they know" despite their economic discontent.[62]

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[62] This explanation follows the same logic as (Morgenstern 2001). These scholars found that risk propensity directly and indirectly affects voting behavior in the 1997 Mexican congressional election. The indirect effect is produced by

Table 5-9 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties depending on Risk Propensity and Sociotropic Economic Assessments (2004)

Risk Propensity	Economic Evaluations		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Risk Averse	5.7	17.4	42.6
Neutral	13.9	36.3	66.7
Risk Acceptant	30.4	60.6	84.4

Note: Data is from the 2004 pre-electoral national survey of Uruguayan electorate done by Cifra, González, Raga y Asociados. Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with the same variables as Model 1 in Table 5-3. Two changes were made in order to produce predicted probabilities: 1) Risk propensity and Sociotropic were merged into three categories to use the prtab STATA command, and 2) Frente Amplio party identification and P. Independiente party identification were dropped from the model. Except for the identified variables, all variables are held constant at their means.

In conclusion, more than voting against neoliberal reforms, Uruguayans are punishing political parties that produced economic hardship. Uruguayan evidence reinforces Benton's (2005) argument that Latin Americans have long memories and punish not only the incumbent party for the material suffering; they also rebuke parties that governed before the incumbent. Left-of-center parties in Uruguay (or the challengers), and in particular the Frente Amplio, took advantage of this popular discontent and capitalized on social and economic dissatisfaction towards the "traditional parties."

5.3   BRAZIL: VOTING LEFT IN A WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEM

It can be considered that left-of-center parties in Brazil have reached the presidency twice since the return to democracy in 1985. The first time was in 1994 with the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), the second time in 2002 with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). However, there is evidence that when PSDB reached the national government, it was no

affecting the importance of economic assessments. I included an interaction term between risk and sociotropic to test

longer a party on the left of the ideological spectrum, and it was elected as a centrist political party. If this second classification of PSDB is followed, leftist parties only won the Brazilian presidency in 2002.

The PSDB was formed in 1988 from a dissident faction of the Partido do Movimiento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB). The members of PMDB that set up the PSDB were considered the left-wing of the former, they supported redistributive policies, and during their first years of existence, they voted more times with the left than with the right (Power, 2001/2002). As a result, PSDB was considered a center-left party in its origins. However, the PSDB moved rightward even before taking office. In 1994, PSDB in coalition with PFL (Partido do Frente Liberal) won the presidential election and led Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former finance minister of Itamar Franco, to the presidency. Cardoso immediately took a market-oriented approach, and started to implement an ambitious plan of neoliberal reforms that included privatizations and free-trade policies. Market-oriented policies were accompanied by the "Plano Real", a currency reform that was impressively successful in reducing inflation, and became the major achievement of Cardoso's government. This movement to the right of the ideological spectrum was also present among PSDB legislators. Power (Power, 2001/2002) shows that in 1990 the mean position of PSDB legislators in the 10 points ideological dimension was 3.52, in 1993 it was 3.81, and in 1997, three years after being in charge of the executive, it was 4.77 and for the first time, it was slightly to the right of the congressional mean.[63] To sum up, the PSDB was created as a left-of-center party but it was elected in 1994 as centrist, and it was reelected in 1998 as a right-of-center one.

Therefore, the first time that a leftist party was elected to preside the Brazilian national government was in 2002 with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The PT was created in 1980 from the "bottom-up," and "united a hodgepodge of Marxists of all shades of reds, liberation theology-oriented Catholics, base community activists, moderate intellectuals, and union and social movement leaders" (Samuels 2004: 1002), as well as left-wing congressmen and members of the Movimiento Democratico Brasileiro. Despite the ideological heterogeneity of its members, the PT was clearly identified as "socialist" and an advocate of radical land reform, workers'

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for the indirect effect of risk but it was not significant.
[63] In the ten point's ideological dimension, "1" represents the extreme left and "10" the extreme right.

government, repudiation of external debt, nationalization of the country's banks and mineral wealth (Meneguello 2002; Samuels 2004).

In 2002, Inácio Lula da Silva, PT's presidential candidate, won the election with 61.3% of the vote. Many scholars have pointed out that this success of the PT can be explained by the ideological transformation that the party has experienced since its formation, in particular since the 1994 electoral defeat (Meneguello 2002; Samuels 2004). The "deradicalization" of PT can be traced through its party platform that changed from supporting "economic socialism" in 1982 to favoring "democratic socialism" or "democratic revolution" with an emphasis on making the state more transparent and accountable in 2002. PT's 2002 presidential campaign even insisted that a PT's government would keep price stability and budget surplus, while fighting unemployment and poverty. There were no references to the nationalization of natural resources in the 2002 presidential platform. Regardless of the ideological moderation, and after four years in charge of the government, PT can still be considered a left-of-center party.

To sum up, leftist parties have been in charge of the Brazilian national government only once since the end of the authoritarian regime. Figure 5.2 shows the electoral evolution of left, center and right-wing parties in Brazilian presidential elections. In 1989, the stacked bar does not reach 100% because Fernando Collor and his party were classified as Personalist. In the following election, 1994, the centrist PSDB won the election. Four years later it was reelected, but in 1998 the PSDB was considered a right-of-center party. Finally, in 2002, PT won the presidential elections, and for the first time since the return to democracy, a leftist party took over the Brazilian national government.

Figure 5.2 Electoral Evolution of Ideological Blocs in Brazilian Presidential Elections (1989-2002)

Are the factors that led Brazilians to vote for leftist parties in 1989, 1994 or 1998 similar to the ones that persuaded them to vote for Lula in 2002? There is a wide range of studies explaining why Brazilians vote the way they do, and assessing the impact of partisanship (Carreirao and Kinzo 2004; Kinzo 1992; Samuels 2006), ideology (Carreirao 2002a; Singer 2002), economic evaluations (Baker 2002; Camargos 2001), personalism and candidates' personal attributes (Meneguello 1995; Carreirao 2002b), and political discussion within social networks (Baker, Ames and Renno 2006) on voters' decisions. Most of these works analyze the vote for political parties; there is no research done on the factors that influence Brazilians to vote for a particular ideological bloc.

One possible explanation for this lack of research on ideological voting is that Brazilian electoral behavior is usually considered highly volatile and weakly determined by ideology or partisan identifications. If that is the case, voting for the Left would be indistinguishable from voting for the Right. However, recent research would tend to counter this point. Carreirão and Kinzo (2004) argue that partisanship is a relevant predictor of voting for the ideological bloc to which the party belongs. Samuels (2004) found that party attachment is important to explain the vote for PT. Singer (2002) and Carreirao (Carreirao 2002a) claim that despite not all Brazilian

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voters being able to place themselves on the ideological scale, ideology is a significant vote predictor for many Brazilians, in particular those with more education. Furthermore, Singer (2002) finds evidence that in the 1994 national election, Brazilians voted for the candidate who was closer to their party's ideological position.

This section explores the determinants of voting Left in the weakly-institutionalized and highly-fragmented Brazilian party system. I argue that the vote for leftist parties in Brazil is an indicator of social and economic discontent, as it is in Uruguay. Voting for PSDB in 1989 or PT in 1994 was voting for a credible opposition. Neither of them was in charge of the government; therefore, it makes no sense for voters to punish them for hyperinflation, unemployment or poverty. In 1994, Cardoso's short term as President Itamar Franco's finance minister gave him more popular support than rejection, and in 1998 Cardoso was reelected as a result of his successful plan to reduce and control inflation. Nevertheless, Brazilians that were disappointed with the country's economic situation voted against him. Four years later, inflation was no longer a serious problem, and voters were disappointed with the economic consequences of Cardoso's implementation of market-oriented reforms. Therefore, they would keep voting for the left, now embodied by the PT and other leftist parties but no longer by the PSDB.

5.3.1 Data and variable description

The data that is analyzed in this section comes from different national surveys. In order to analyze the factors that explain the vote for leftist parties in 1989, 1994 and 1998, I use three pre-election national surveys carried out by Datafolha. The 1989 survey was carried out in September, and includes 2,083 cases; the 1994 survey was done during August and includes 10,459 cases; and the 1998 survey includes 4,380 cases and the data collection occurred during July. To test the hypotheses in the 2002 presidential election, I use data from Brazil's 2002 National Election Study (BNES), a national post-election voter behavior survey which includes 2,513 respondents. Finally, to complete the analysis, I also use data from a 2002 four-wave panel study of eligible voters in two mid-sized Brazilian cities: Caxias do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul) and Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais). Only data from the first wave of the panel, which was conducted

during March and April 2002, is used.[64] In all the surveys, data was collected by personal, door-to-door interviews in the respondents' homes.[65] As is the case for Uruguay, Brazilian survey data also fits very well the proportion intending to vote left with the proportion that actually voted left. The 1989 survey predicted a 34% of votes for the left and the actual percentage was 46%; in 1994 the survey's proportion was 36% and the actual vote was 30%; the 1998 survey anticipated that 43% of Brazilian will vote for leftist parties and the real percentage was the same 43%; finally, the 2002 survey was carried out after the election and 68% of the respondents said that had voted left, but the actual percentage was 77%.[66]

The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the intention to vote for a left-of-center party, value 1 means that the person intended to vote (or voted in the case of the post-election survey) for the Left. The following political parties were classified as left-of-center in each presidential election: in 1989 PDT, PT, PSDB, and PCB; in 1994 PT and PDT; in 1998 PT, PPS and PSTU; and in 2002 PT, PSB, and PSTU. I explored the following independent variables, each of which fits within one of the theories discussed in Chapter 4. Several of these variables are composite indices.

The Sociotropic vote and *Pocketbook vote* in the 1994 and 1998 surveys, measure respondent's evaluation of the *Plano Real* for the country and for voters' own life. Higher values correspond to negative evaluations. *Prospective inflation*, *Prospective unemployment* and *Prospective purchasing power* measure prospective economic assessments; higher values mean that inflation, unemployment, and purchasing power will decrease. In the 2002 panel survey, *Retrospective Sociotropic, Prospective Sociotropic, Retrospective Pocketbook* and *Prospective Pocketbook* measure citizens' evaluations of the country and their own economic situation during the last year, and economic expectations for the following twelve months.

Social class cleavage is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation: dominant class, petty bourgeoisie, formal workers, informal workers, and non-employed. The definition of each category follows Portes and Hoffman (2003) classification which was described in section 5.2.

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[64] Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA.
[65] I want to thank Rachel Meneguello and Simone Aranha from the Center for Studies on Public Opinion (CESOP) at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP) in Brazil for giving me access to Datafolha and BNES data. I am also very grateful to Barry Ames, Andy Baker and Lucio Renno for letting me use their 2002 Panel Data.
[66] This result is counterintuitive because post-election surveys usually overrepresent the winner.

Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Non-employed people (the unemployed, retired, students and housewives) are taken as the base category. To capture the other dimensions of the socioeconomic status, I include *Education* and *Family Income*. Higher values mean higher levels of education and higher family income.

Ideology is measured in two ways. The first one is the respondent's self-placement in the ideological dimension. In the 1989 survey, the ideological dimension goes from 1 (left) to 7 (right), and in the 2002 survey it goes from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Finally, the 2002 panel survey measures ideology with a question with five answer categories: left, center left, center, center right, and right. The second way to measure an interviewee's ideology is through a series of questions asking citizens' opinions toward a series of policy issues: state interventionism, redistribution, socialism, state regulations of private firms, agrarian reform, nationalization, and privatizations. Higher values in each of these policies correspond with liberal positions, which I expect to be negative correlated with the vote for leftist parties.

Partisanship is tested using a set of five dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of partisanship: party identification with left-of-center parties, party identification with parties at the center, party identification with right-of-center parties, party identification with parties that cannot be classified in the left-right dimension and those that lack partisanship. Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Those that have partisanship to unclassified parties are the base category in the regression.

Prospect theory is tested through different variables that capture how risky it is to vote for different candidates. In the 1998 survey, the *Risk Propensity Lula* and *Risk Propensity FHC* are composite indices that include the following *hypothetical* questions about the perceived risk implied by a Lula or FHC governments: if unemployment increased under Lula/FHC, if the Real remained stable under Lula/FHC, and if the country experienced chaos under Lula/FHC. The propensity risk indexes for the 2002 election combines variables that measure which is the most trustworthy candidate, the most honest candidate, the candidate with most experience, the one with the best governmental plan, the best prepared for the task, the candidate that will generate more jobs, and the one who would keep inflation low. Higher values correspond to higher levels of risk. The 2002 panel survey asks respondents to agree with one of the two following

aphorisms: "É melhor ter um pássaro na mão do que dois voando" ("A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush") or "quem não arrisca, não petisca" ("Nothing ventured, nothing gained"), which is a common question used to measure risk propensity.

Finally, Age (the higher the value, the older the respondent), and urban voter (a dummy in which 1 is urban and 0 is rural) are added to test for the existence of alternative cleavages. In the 2002 post-election survey, the urban voter variable captures if the respondent lives in a state capital or not, rather than if the place of residence is urban or rural.

5.3.2   Results

From the individual perspective, there are four main voting behavior theories to explain the vote for leftist parties in Brazil since 1989: economic voting, risk propensity, partisanship and ideological identification. Table 5-10 shows the regression results for each democratic presidential election since the end of the authoritarian regime.

The first thing to notice is, as Camargos (2001) pointed out, that Brazilian vote choice is not irrational, random, or merely the result of electoral campaigns as it is sometimes described. In each presidential election model, at least five variables attain statistical significance. Overall, the models are useful for explaining the factors that determine voters' behavior in Brazil, in particular the vote for left-of-center political parties. Brazilians, when voting, take into account short-term factors such as economic evaluations, as well as long-term ones such as partisanship and, to an inferior degree, ideological identifications.

Ideology is a significant predictor of the vote for the Left in one of the two instances in which I was able to include a direct measure of it: the individual self placement on the ideological scale. In 1989, a one unit increase in ideology (one space to the right on the ideological scale) decreases the probability of voting for a left-of-center party rather than voting for a center or rightist party. However, in 2002, the ideological self placement does not reach significance. As a result, the evidence is not conclusive to support Hypothesis 5 which states that *Latin Americans who identify themselves with the Left will vote for leftist parties,* or to reinforce Singer's (2002) argument that ideological self-placement is one of the most important factors to explain Brazilians voting behavior.

Singer (2002) points out that Brazilians have more stable ideological identifications than party identifications, and argues that voters use the ideological dimension as a shortcut to distinguish between political parties.[67] Singer finds that Brazilians who are identified with the Left and those identified with the Right are not very different in terms of their opinions towards the role of the state in the economy or even egalitarianism. The majority of both like state interventionism, and want a country with more economic and social equality. What really differentiates the two is the best way to achieve equality. Those identified with the Right want the state to be in charge of the process; while leftists favor social mobilization as the best method to accomplish social equality.

Following Singer's research, I put it to the test whether policy issues that usually discriminate Left from Right are irrelevant among Brazilians. To do so, I include a series of variables that measure Brazilians' opinions towards: state interventionism, redistribution, socialism, state regulation of private firms, agrarian reform, nationalization, and privatizations. The results shown in Table 5-10 indicate that only one of these variables is a significant determinant to vote for a left-of-center political party: opinion towards privatization. These results refute Hypothesis 6 which states that *Latin Americans who support government involvement and regulation of the economy, income redistribution and an increase in social spending will be more likely to vote for leftist parties, while those who are against these policy issues will be more likely to vote for rightist parties.* Despite ideology is sometimes a relevant voting predictor, almost none of the policy issues traditionally associated with the ideological distinction explains why Brazilians choose a leftist party. These results strengthen Singer's argument that Brazilians cannot explain what they mean by Left or Right, but despite that, they are able to place themselves, political parties, and candidates on the ideological dimension. In other words, ideology, understood in its "weak" meaning, is sometimes important to explain Brazilians' voting behavior.

Party identification is also a strong predictor of voting for leftist parties in Brazil; it reaches statistical significance in every election. Brazilians identified with a leftist political party tend to vote for a left-of-center party in presidential elections. On the contrary, those identified with a party that belongs to the ideological center or the ideological right do not necessarily vote within the same bloc. This finding goes along with Carreirão and Kinzo (2004), who had pointed

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[67] The correlations between partisanship and ideology are very low in Brazil. See Appendix C.

out that partisanship is a relevant predictor when the outcome to explain is the vote for an ideological bloc instead of a particular political party. I go further by adding to their statement that in Brazil, party identification is a significant vote predictor *mainly* to explain voting for the Left.

To sum up, party identification is not significant for every ideological bloc. As stated in Hypothesis 7, partisanship is more important to predict the vote for leftist parties than for right-of-center or center parties. The data which is used to analyze the 2002 presidential election was collected after round one of the election; as a result, and given the weakness of Brazilian parties, endogeneity might be a problem. For example, PT partisanship could be the result of voting Lula instead of voting Lula the result of PT partisanship. Ames (2007) overcomes this endogeneity problem for the 2002 election using panel data. By using partisanship values in wave 1 and voting behavior in wave 3, he finds that PT partisanship become weaker as a voting determinant while PSDB and PMDB partisanship loses its significance. [68]

One important exception is the 1994 election, when partisanship was significant for every ideological bloc, including for those that lacked any party attachment. In 1994, Brazilians identifying with a left-of-center party tended to vote within the leftist bloc; while those identified with a centrist party, right-of-center party, and those with no partisanship, had a significantly higher probability of voting for a center or rightist party. This finding is surprising because many scholars have pointed out that in the 1994 presidential election, "party identification did not translate into support for the candidates of major parties (Meneguello 1995: 637), or the election was mainly determined by economic evaluations of the *Plano Real* (Carreirão 2002). Contrary to these authors, Singer (2002) has also found that in addition to economic voting, the 1994 decisions were influenced by ideology and party identifications. The regressions results presented in Table 5-10 confirm Singer's findings: in the 1994 presidential election, economic evaluations were powerful voting determinants but partisanship was relevant too.

Economic voting theory also helps us to understand why Brazilians vote for leftist parties. Since the return to democracy, leftist parties seemed to have capitalized on Brazilians' economic discontent. In order to test the influence of economic assessments on vote decisions, I use two questions that asked Brazilians to evaluate how good or bad the *Plano Real* had been for themselves (pocketbook vote) and for the country as a whole (sociotropic vote). At the time of

the 1994 presidential election, the booming results of *Plano Real* had just started to become noticeable. Brazilians who negatively evaluated the new monetary policy, tended to vote more for left-of-center parties than for center or rightist ones. The same happened in the 1998 election. Citizens who were discontented with the results that *Plano Real* had on their own lives, or in the country's well-being, voted for left-of-center parties, while those that made a positive evaluation reelected the government. The positive signs on the sociotropic and pocketbook coefficients in Table 5-10 indicate that the worse the economic evaluation, the higher the probability to vote for the Left.

Camargos (2002) describes the Brazilian electorate as more sociotropic than pocketbook oriented, and more prospective than retrospective. Table 5-10 indicates that prospective economic assessments have an important influence on voting for leftist parties. In the 1998 presidential election, Brazilians that thought inflation and unemployment were going to increase, and purchasing power was going to shrink, tended to vote for the Left.

In conclusion, voters' economic assessments, the ones related to the country's welfare as well as the ones related to their own pockets, are significant determinants of the vote for leftist parties in Brazil. As Baker (2002) states, when voting, Brazilians take into account the economic dimension. The Brazilian case presents more evidence to support Hypothesis 1: *the worse a voter evaluates the economic situation, the greater the probability s/he will vote for the opposition. In particular, voters who are discontented will reward leftist parties which were not in charge of the government.*

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[68] I thank Barry Ames for pointing out this problem.

Table 5-10 Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Brazil 1989-2002

Independent Variables:	1989	1994	1998	2002
Economic Voting				
Sociotropic Vote	-	0.526***	0.207***	-
		(0.048)	(.067)	
Pocket-book Vote	-	0.415***	0.506***	-
		(0.041)	(.061)	
Prospective Inflation	-	-	-0.240***	-
			(.074)	
Prospective Unemployment	-	-	-0.203***	-
			(.056)	
Prospective purshasing power	-	-	0.175***	-
			(.062)	
Social Class Cleavage (1)				
Dominant Classes	-0.835*	-0.759***	-	0.230
	(.434)	(.243)		(.447)
Petty Bourgeoisie	0,214	-0,142	-	-1.622***
	(.178)	(0.093)		(.612)
Formal Workers	0,103	-0.001	-	-0.027
	(.139)	(.062)		(.149)
Informal Workers	0.429**	0.021	-	0.271*
	(.207)	(.068)		(0.161)
Education	0.104***	-0.122***	-0.043	-0.006
	(.039)	(0.041)	(.028)	(.015)
Family income	-	-0.092***	-0.001	-0.000
		(0.024)	(.000)	(.000)
Ideology				
Ideological selfplacement	-0.134***	-	-	-0.027
	(.036)			(.018)
Opinion state interventionism	0,036	-	-	0.001
	(.082)			(.011)
Opinion redistribution	0,035	-	-	-
	(.081)			
Opinion socialism	0,088	-	-	-
	(.063)			
Opinion state regulations	-	-	-	-0.006
				(.016)
Opinion agrarian reform	-	-	-	-0.174
				(.126)
Opinion nationalization	-	-	-	-0.002
				(0.016)
Opinion privatizations			-0.147***	
			(.051)	
				First part

	Second part			
Independent Variables:	1989	1994	1998	2002
Age	0.159**	-0.008***	0.003	-0.016***
	(.065)	(.002)	(.003)	(.004)
Urban Voter	-0.507***	-0,054	-	-0.024
	(.169)	(.052)		(.139)
Partisanship (2)				
Left	2.658***	1.135***	1.664***	1.115**
	(.281)	(.093)	(.168)	(.532)
Center	0,303	-0.485***	0.151	-1.524
	(.283)	(.105)	(.166)	(1.745)
Right	-0.102	-0.892***	-0,077	-0.844*
	(.304)	(.153)	(.160)	(.504)
No partisanship	0.446*	-0.261***	0.133	-0.449
	(.234)	(.089)	(.136)	(.491)
Prospective theory				
Risk propensity FHC/Serra	-	-	0.201***	0.090***
			(.019)	(.009)
Risk propensity Lula	-	-	-0.187***	-0.092***
			(.022)	(.012)
Risk propensity Ciro				0.042***
				(.012)
Constant	-1.422**	-1.064***	-1.695**	0,833
	(.569)	(.174)	(.387)	(.764)
R squared	0,21	0,14	0,35	0,39
Wald chi2	189***	1123***	520***	242***
Number of observations	1771	8617	3644	1878

(1) Includes: retired, students, housewives, and unemployed.
(2) Inludes those with partisanship to political parties that cannot be clasified
 into the left-right ideological dimension.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors

Prospect Theory was tested for the 1998 and 2002 presidential elections using voters' judgments about candidates' governing capabilities. The results shown in Table 5-10 indicate that Brazilians that considered Lula a low risk candidate tended to vote for leftist parties; while those that believed FHC ranks lower in the risk propensity index, tended to reelect him or vote for another non-leftist party. By 2002 the "golden age" of *Plano Real* was over, and Brazilians had gone through major unemployment problems. The same results are found for the 2002

election: Brazilians who considered Lula the most capable candidate, or to put it differently, the less risky one, significantly tended to vote for the Left. On the contrary, those that believed José Serra (PSDB-PMDB), or Ciro Gomes (PPS-PDT-PTB) were the most capable, tended to vote for a non-leftist party. As it was pointed out before for the Uruguayan case, I consider this way of testing Prospect Theory problematic. People can decide to vote left and later they think Lula is a low risk candidate. However, it is the best proxy available to test the theory for the Brazilian case, and it is frequently used by other scholars (for example Cinta 1999).

The evidence from the Brazilian case reinforces the prevalent idea that social class cleavages are not relevant to predict voting behavior in Latin America. Neither occupation, nor education[69] nor family income, are stable significant predictors of voting for left-of-center parties. Education was significant only in 1989 and 1994 but in different directions. In 1989, voters with high education had higher probabilities to vote Left, while in 1994 those with low levels of formal education and low income tended to vote more for leftist parties. Income was only significant in 1994. Workers, formal or informal, are not significantly more inclined to vote for the Left than those who belong to the "dominant" classes with few exceptions. In 1989 and 1994, those that belong to the dominant classes tended to vote for the Right. The same happened with the petty bourgeoisie in 2002. On the contrary, informal workers were more inclined to vote for the Left in 1989 and 2002. In other words, Brazilian evidence, in general, disproves hypotheses 3 and 4, the position that a person occupies in the social structure does not determine his/her vote.[70]

Leftist parties are usually more appealing for young people, and traditionally have more electoral strength within urban electorates. The Uruguayan case supports this traditional view of left-of-center parties' cleavages. However, in Brazil, and despite PT and other leftist parties' electoral support in major cities, only in 1989 the level of urbanization of the place of residence was relevant to explain the vote for the Left. Neither the age of the respondent is a consistent

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[69] Barry Ames pointed out that in the 2002 election education mattered in a different way: neighborhood education dominates individual-level education. To put it differently, poored neighborhoods votes Lula, and middle class people in poor neighborhoods also voted Lula. This effect cannot be seen with the 2002 data shown in Table 5-10 because it does not discriminate between neighborhoods.

[70] By imputing missing data, some variables reach significance. In 1989, dominant classes, informal workers and age become significant. In 1994, nothing changes; maybe because the sample size is large enough even with missing data. In 1998, opinion toward privatization reaches significance and education loses it. Finally, in 2002, informal workers, age and party identification (with leftist parties and rightist parties) reach significance, while ideology loses

explanatory factor in Brazil. In 1989, the vote for the Left was associated with older people; while in 1994 and 2004, younger voters were more inclined to it.

5.3.3 Discussion

The analyses of the factors that influence Brazilians to vote for left-of-center political parties have several commonalities with the Uruguayan case. First, the traditional social-class theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) does not explain the vote for the Left in post-authoritarian Brazil. The vote for the Left in Brazil is a multi-class vote rather than a working class one.

Second, in a similar way to Uruguayan leftist parties, leftist parties in Brazil, and mainly the PT, have formed a coalition that is ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms of class. This result goes against the common understanding that ideology and social class are matched: workers are on the left, and the dominant sectors are on the right. In Brazil, as in Uruguay, this correspondence between social class and ideology does not hold. It is clear that the meaning of left and right categories has changed, but despite this transformation, these categories are still significant to predict voting behavior even in countries with weakly-institutionalized party systems like Brazil. In other words, the Brazilian case provides evidence in favor of Torcal and Mainwaring's (2001) idea that ideology works as a political cleavage used by political parties to mobilize support.

Third, economic voting theory also explains the increase in the vote for the Left in Brazil. Brazilians' dissatisfaction with the economic situation has benefited leftist parties because they were recognized as credible opposition. Immediately after the return to democracy, the Left in Brazil embraced political parties ranging from social democratic center-left PSDB to the socialist PT. All of these leftist parties were accepted by the electorate as credible or untainted opposition because, till then, they had not been in charge of the national government. By 1994, the PSDB was no longer considered a left-of-center party: Fernando Henrique Cardoso had served as Finance Minister on the Itamar Franco's government, the PSDB made an electoral alliance with the PFL, and had gradually "replaced a traditional social democratic line with a more market-

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it. These changes do no follow a particular pattern of missing data as it was the case with income in the Uruguayan

oriented approach" (Power 2001/2002 :625). As a result of their movement to the right, the PSDB no longer capitalized on social discontent; on the contrary, it captured votes from Brazilians who approved of the results of *Plano Real,* while those Brazilians that were dissatisfied with the economic situation tended to vote for leftist political parties, in particular for the PT.[71]

Fourth, prospect theory is also important to explain why Brazilians vote for the Left. Table 5-11 indicates that among those that intended to vote for leftist parties in 2002 there is a higher level of risk propensity than among those that were going to vote for non-leftist parties. Voting for the Left implied a higher level of risk because leftist parties had never been in charge of the national government.

Table 5-11 Risk and Vote Choice in 2002 Brazil (%)

Risk Propensity	Leftist parties	Non-Leftist parties	All
High Risk Averse	45.71	50.46	48.54
Risk Averse	7.41	8.76	8.22
Risk Acceptant	8.71	8.37	8.51
High Risk Acceptant	38.17	32.40	34.74
N	1538	2259	3797

Note: Data is from the first wave of the 2002 panel survey carried out in Caxias do Sul and Juiz do Fora by Ames, Baker and Renno. The first wave of the panel was collected during March and April 2002.

Voting for a leftist party not only implied higher levels of risk acceptance, it also depends on how strongly voters believe they are in the domain of losses. To put it simply, the probability unhappy of a Brazilian voting for a leftist party in 2002 increased when the voter had a high level of risk acceptance and strongly felt that he/she was in the domain of losses, which is translated into a negative evaluation of the country's economic situation. Table 5-12 shows that a risk

datasets.
[71] For the 1994 election, when regressions are runned using the vote for PSDB versus the vote for PT as dependent variable, it is the PT that capitalized the vote of those disappointed with their own economic situation or Brazil´s economic situation. Also parties identified with the right get votes from those economically unhappy, this shows that

taking citizen with a negative evaluation of the country's economy has a probability of voting Left of .54, while a risk averse voter with the same negative evaluation reduces the probability of choosing the less known opposition to .37. This evidence reinforces what Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) pointed out for Mexicans, and I previously showed for the Uruguayan case, that risk averse citizens prefer to stick with the "devil they know" than "gamble" their vote with the inexperienced Left.

Table 5-12 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties in 2002 Brazilian election depending on Risk Propensity and Sociotropic Economic Assessments

Risk Propensity	Retrospective Sociotropic Evaluations		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
High Risk Averse	36.9	41.4	46.0
Risk Averse	39.2	43.8	48.5
Risk Acceptant	41.6	46.3	51.0
High Risk Acceptant	44.1	48.7	53.5

Note: Data is from the first wave of the 2002 panel survey carried out in Caxias do Sul and Juiz do Fora by Ames, Baker and Renno. The first wave of the panel was collected during March and April 2002.
Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with the same variables than the model presented in Table 5-8.

To make a long story short, the analysis of Brazilians' voting behavior has shown that the vote for leftist parties has nothing to do with voting against neoliberal reforms in themselves. None of the policy issues were significant predictors of the vote for leftist parties, not even the opinion towards privatizations, one of the most controversial and unpopular market-oriented reforms. By voting Left, Brazilians are punishing political parties that produced economic hardship regardless of any policy stance. They did not vote for Lula looking for a reversal of privatizations or more state intervention in the economy, they voted for leftist parties because they were the only "untainted" opposition.

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the possibility to capitalize economic discontent depends on how many alternatives are available in the political system. See Appendix C, Tables C-2 and C-3.

5.4 MEXICO: BETWEEN TWO CREDIBLE OPPOSITIONS

During the last two decades, Mexican politics pivoted around a democratization process different from the one experienced by Brazil and Uruguay. While Brazil and Uruguay in the mid-1980s left behind authoritarian regimes led by the military, the Mexican political system started to move towards democratization by increasing party competition and undermining the dominance held by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the long-ruling party since 1929. As a result of this, many scholars have pointed out that the most relevant political dimension to understand Mexicans political behavior is the pro-regime/anti-regime cleavage rather than the left-right ideological dimension (Domínguez and McCann 1995, Domínguez and McCann 1996, Greene 2002, Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a, Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999).

The pro-regime/anti-regime cleavage was summarized by Domínguez and McCann (1995) with the following question: "Am I for or against the party of the state and its leader?" These authors argue that Mexicans voting decisions can be analyzed through a two-step model. First, Mexicans decide if they are against or in favor of the PRI. Second, and only those who are against the PRI, they decide between the opposition parties depending on their policy preferences and social cleavage attachments.

From 1929 to 2000, the "party of the state" was the PRI, whose traditional electoral base is stronger within rural areas, among older Mexicans with low levels of formal education, peasants, public employees, and owners of large businesses (Ames 1970, Lawson 1999, Klesner 2004). The opposition, or those that were "against the party of the state" until 2000, was represented by the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the National Action Party (PAN). The PRD was founded in 1989 by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former PRI member who splintered from the party before the 1988 presidential election and ran for president in that election with a coalition of political parties named National Democratic Front (FDN). After the 1988 election, Cardenistas merged with the Mexican Socialist Party to create the PRD, a left-of-center political party with strong electoral support in southern states, among Mexicans with low income but a high literacy rate, skeptical of economic reforms but interested in politics (Bruhn 1999, Domínguez 1999, Klesner 2004, Lawson 1999).The PAN is older than PRD, it was founded in

1939 and combines a socially conservative strain linked to the Catholic Church with a younger fiscally conservative tendency (*neopanistas*) associated with northwestern business interest in favor of free markets (Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Lawson 1999, Shirk 2005). PAN's electoral base is urban, catholic,[72] educated and mostly belongs to middle classes.

Ideologically, PAN and PRI can be considered parties on the right half of the ideological dimension, while PRD is a left-of-center party. But there is some discussion regarding the meaning of the ideological dimension in Mexican politics. First, during most of the 1980s and 1990s, the ideological dimension was considered a "second level" dimension, subsumed to the regime cleavage. Second, some scholars argue that during the 1990s, the left-right dimension was defined in non-economic terms. Being leftist in Mexico only meant to be in favor of opposition and change, while being on the right corresponded to supporting the status quo. Again, the prevalent dimension was democracy versus authoritarianism rather than an economic policy one (Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999). But Moreno (1999) also recognizes that Mexicans who placed themselves on the left were stronger supporters of economic equality and state intervention in the economy, while those that placed themselves on the right were in favor of economic liberalism. Finally, and as a result of the previous arguments, Mexican politics have been structured by two dimensions. Following the ideological dimension based on economic policy, the PRD is placed on the left and PRI and PAN on the right; while the political-regime dimension positions PRD and PAN together (Magaloni and Poiré 2004b).

Regardless of these caveats, PAN and PRI are parties on the right side of the ideological dimension, and there is no doubt that PRD can be taken as a leftist party (Moreno 1999, Zechmeister 2006). What's more, it was expected that as soon as the PRI's dominance ended, the regime dimension would disappear and the ideological dimension would regain its importance on Mexican politics (Greene 2002). PRI's dominance was gradually becoming weaker. Until 1982, the party of the state always filled no fewer than 80% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; opposition parties had to wait till 1997 to win a majority in this Chamber. Until 1989, no opposition party won a gubernatorial election, but in 1997 Cárdenas was chosen as the first elected mayor in Mexico City. Finally, PRI's dominance ended in 2000 when it lost the presidency to PAN.

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[72] Against this image of PAN as the party that receives more votes from religious people, Moreno (2003) provides evidence that the most religious segment of the Mexican population votes for PRD.

It is proper to ask why the right-wing PAN and not the left-wing PRD beat the PRI in 2000. Considering that the economic crisis and the failure of the free market economic model to provide for stable economic growth had eroded the PRI's long term support, these same factors could have buttressed the electoral chances of parties in pro of economic equality and state intervention in the economy. In that sense, Mexico represents a different case from Brazil and Uruguay because the party that finally defeated the long-ruling party was a party on the right-of-center ideological dimension, rather than on the left. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of vote obtained by each ideological bloc in the presidential elections from 1982 to 2006.[73] In each of these presidential elections, rightist parties at least doubled the percentage that leftist parties gained. Only in the past 2006 election were leftist parties close to winning the presidency with a plurality of vote, but they finally lost to the right-wing PAN.[74]

Contrary to the Brazilian and Uruguayan cases where only leftist parties finally represented a "credible" or "untainted" opposition, in Mexico, voters had two alternatives to vote for the "untainted opposition." Despite the PAN and PRD having governmental experience at the state and city level, none of them had been in charge of the national government before 2000, and as a result, Mexicans couldn't blame them for material scarcity. Why then, if both parties represented a "credible opposition," was PAN the one that got the credit in 2000?

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[73] The center does not show up in this graph because there are no parties classified as centrist that received votes during those elections.

[74] The 2006 presidential election was extremely competitive: PAN obtained 14,027,214 votes and PRD 13,624,506 votes. As a result, during the following days, PRD's presidential candidate Manuel López Obrador, argued that the election was fraudulent, and mobilized Mexicans to protest against the result. The danger of post-election mobilization if the presidential election was too close was predicted well before by Eisenstadt and Poiré (2005).

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
Figure 5.3 Electoral Evolution of Ideological Blocs in Mexican Presidential Elections (1982-2006)

Some reasons can be mentioned. First, several students of Mexican politics have emphasized the relevance that Prospect Theory has to explain why voters elected the PRI for so many years. Their argument is that Mexicans believe that voting for the inexperienced opposition was a highly risky enterprise, and as a result, they keep voting for the "known devil." Between PAN and PRD, the former was considered more competent to manage the economy, fight crime, and reduce corruption. In conclusion, it was less risky to vote for PAN than for PRD (Cinta 1999, Domínguez 1999, Klesner 2004, Magaloni 1999, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a). Other scholars pointed out that campaign effects were extremely important in defining the 2000 Mexican presidential election. Fox's personal characteristics (PAN's presidential candidate in 2000) as well as the high levels of campaign exposure increased PAN's electoral chances (Bruhn 2004, Domínguez 2004, Lawson 2004, Lawson and McCann 2004, Moreno 2004). To put it simply, PAN was preferred to PRD in 2000 because it was considered the party with higher probabilities to defeat PRI and more capable to be in charge of the national government.

With PRI's defeat, the regime cleavage was superseded as expected (Bruhn 1999, Greene 2002). As a result, and as long as elections leave aside their transitional character, it is highly probable that other voting clues will become relevant to understand Mexican voting behavior.

For example, it is probable that with democratization, the left-right dimension will recover its policy distinction, or that voters will pay more attention to retrospective and prospective economic assessments than before (Poiré 1999).

This section explores why Mexicans vote for leftist parties, whether those voting determinants have changed over time or not, and if voting for the Left is related to anti-market economic policies. I argue that voting Left in Mexico was always a way to vote for the "untainted" opposition that Mexicans cannot blame for the severe backlog of unaccomplished social demands. Contrary to Magaloni (1999) who argues that the "uncertain opposition," those that were outside the government and inexperienced, had fewer probabilities of being elected; I argue that those parties that were always in the opposition have the opportunity to capitalize on social discontent. In Mexico, PAN and PRD had this chance before 2000, but after 2000, only the PRD has remained in that position.

5.4.1   Data and variable description

Three different national surveys are used to test the hypotheses for the Mexican case. First, for the 1988 presidential election, I will use a Gallup/ECO pre-electoral survey. The survey was conducted from May 12 to June 1 1988; it is representative of all the adult Mexican population and includes 2,960 face to face cases.[75] Second, to analyze the 1994 election, I use Warren Mitofsky's national exit poll which includes 5,635 cases.[76] Third, the vote for leftist parties in the 2000 presidential election is analyzed through the Post-Electoral Cross-Section survey carried out as part of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study.[77] This survey includes 1,199 cases collected from July 6 to July 9 at respondents' homes.[78] As for Brazil and Uruguay, the proportions intending to vote left according to the Mexican data correspond very closely with proportions

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[75] This survey was obtained through the Roper Center. I am really grateful to Jorge Domínguez and James McCann who helped me to reconstruct the codes for several variables on the dataset.

[76] Many thanks to Alejandro Poiré for giving me access to this data.

[77] Participants in the 2000 Mexico Panel Study included (in alphabetical order): Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and *Reforma* newspaper.

[78] Missing values were imputed using ICE imputation method from STATA.

actually voting left when the elections were held, ensuring the validity of the analysis. In 1888, the survey predicted 23% of votes for the Left and the actual percentage was 31%. For the 1994 exit poll and the 2000 post-electoral survey, it is only possible to separate the vote for PRD (not for others leftist parties), and the comparisons between the survey and election proportions are the following: 15% to 20% and 15% to 19% respectively.

Each of these surveys has been used by other scholars: the 1988 survey by Domínguez and McCann's key study of 1995; the 1994 Mitofsky survey by Poiré 1999; the Mexico 2000 Panel Study has been the data source for *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election,* the most comprehensive book analyzing the 2000 election edited by Domínguez and Lawson (2004). However, none of these studies ask the same question that is raised here: why Mexicans vote for leftist parties.

The dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the vote or vote intention (in 1988) for a left-of-center party, the value 1 means that the person voted (or intended to vote) for the Left, and 0 captures all other answers. The following political parties were classified as left-of-center in each presidential election: in 1988 FDN, PMS, and PRT; in 1994 and 2000 only PRD because it was not possible to separate the vote for other leftist parties that have been put together under the "other" category. The explanatory variables are described next.

Sociotropic vote and *Pocketbook vote* in the 1988 survey explore respondents' current economic assessments of the country and their own situation. Higher values correspond to negative evaluations. The 1988 regression model also has a measure of *Prospective inflation* and *Prospective unemployment*; higher values mean that inflation and unemployment are expected to decrease in the following *sexenio* (six year term). *Prospective Sociotropic* in 1988 measures citizens' expectations for the economy at the end of the next government's term in power (next sexenio). Higher values correspond to negative expectations. The operationalization of *Retrospective Pocketbook* and *Prospective Pocketbook* depends on the survey. In the 1988 survey, both variables measure citizens' evaluations of their own economic situation during the last year (*Retrospective Pocketbook)* and the economic expectations for the following twelve months (*Prospective Pocketbook).* The 1994 and 2000 surveys only ask *Retrospective Pocketbook* and *Retrospective Sociotropic.* In 1994, the comparison is made with the previous

six years (before Salinas's government), while in the 2000 survey it is against the previous twelve months. In all cases, higher values equal negative evaluations.

Social class cleavage is tested using dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of social class defined in terms of occupation following Portes and Hoffman's classification (2003). Because the Mexican surveys did not ask respondents' occupation with the level of specificity that the Brazilian and Uruguayans surveys did, it is not possible to distinguish between formal and informal workers. As a result, only one dummy named "Workers" is entered into the model. The other two dummies in the model are "dominant class" and "petty bourgeoisie". Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. Owing to the same problem of lack of specificity, it was also impossible to construct a dummy named "dominant" for the 1994 election. To capture the other dimensions of the socioeconomic status, I include *Education, Family Income* (1994), *Household socioeconomic status* (1988 and 2000) defined by the interviewer's judgment of the house, and *Household SES* defined by a houseware index which consisted of the ownership of radio, water heater, television, telephone, cellular phone, and oven (2000). Higher values means higher levels of education, higher family income, and higher socioeconomic status.

As in the Brazilian case, *Ideology* is measured in two ways. The first one is the respondent's self-placement in the ideological dimension. This indicator is only available in the 2000 survey and it ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The second way to measure an interviewee's ideology is by a series of policy issues. This option is used to analyze the 1988 presidential election. The 1988 survey asked about foreign investment, imports of foreign products, payment of foreign debt, and privatizations. Higher values in each of these policies correspond to leftist positions.

Partisanship is tested using dummy variables; each dummy represents one category of partisanship: party identification with left-of-center parties, party identification with right-of-center parties, and those that lack partisanship. Each category is entered into the model as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the person belongs to it and 0 when he/she does not. The 1994 survey does not have a question about party identification, and the 1988 survey only asks for the "preferred political party" which is slightly different from party identification but is taken as a proxy in the model.

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Prospect theory is going to be tested in different ways depending on the presidential election. For 1988, respondents were asked two questions. First, if Mexican economic conditions would improve, remain the same, or worsen if the opposition were to gain power. Second, if the country's social peace would be undermined if the opposition were to win the election. In both variables, higher values mean that citizens distrust the capabilities of opposition parties to lead the country along a good path.   The 1994 survey captures Mexicans' risk propensity by asking the voter what was the main reason for his vote, and giving him as an option the popular saying "más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer" (translated as "better the devil you know than the saint you don't"). The question asking the reason for their vote was phrased in the following way: "The presidents that have governed Mexico for the past sixty-five years have come from the PRI. Which of the following reasons motivated you to vote for the party you chose today? The PRI is still the best choice, in politics it's "better bad but known than good but unknown," voted opposition to protest, want the opposition to win." A dummy variable named Risk propensity was coded with 1 when the voter answered this option, and 0 for the remaining answer categories. It is important to mention that in this survey, the answer to the voting question was secret (the respondent marked a separate sheet and deposit it in a box), which diminishes the risk of contamination.

In 2000, Risk propensity was again measured by respondents' preference for one of two traditional aphorisms: "Better the devil you know than the saint you don't" and "Nothing ventured, nothing gained."[79] This preference was entered into the model as a dummy that takes the value of 1 when respondents mentioned "Better the known devil" and 0 when they chose "Nothing ventured, nothing gained." In addition, to explain the 2000 presidential election, a set of three indexes tackling Labastida, Fox and Cárdenas's capacities to govern were added. Each index combines respondents' opinions on the capacity of each candidate to manage the economy, fight crime and public insecurity, and improve the educational system. Higher values in the index mean worse evaluations of the candidates' abilities to govern. As it was pointed before, this way to test Prospect theory through voters' opinions towards candidates' capacities is less valid than the one that measure voters' preferences for traditional aphorisms.

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[79] In Spanish the exact wording is: "Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer" y "El que no arriesga no gana."

Finally, and to keep comparability with the Brazilian and Uruguayan cases, Age (the higher the value, the older the respondent), and urban voter (for the 2000 election a dummy in which 1 is urban and 0 is rural, and for the 1988 a variable that ranges from 1 for the most rural areas to 5 for the most urban ones)[80] are added to test for the existence of alternative cleavages. In the 1994 exit poll survey, the urban voter variable does not exist.

5.4.2   Results

Mexicanists have endlessly pointed out that the most important factor to understand Mexican voting behavior during the last two decades is the regime cleavage, or in other words, voters' position in the pro-PRI/anti-PRI dimension. As a result of this, the relevance of the ideological dimension in Mexicans' voting decisions was undermined. If it really is true that the ideological dimension is not relevant, the factors that lead Mexicans to vote for leftist parties must be different from the ones that influence Brazilians and Uruguayans to vote for the Left. The results presented in Table 5-13 are remarkable in showing that Mexicans' vote for the Left differs from other Latin Americans'. The following paragraphs discuss these differences and a few similarities. I will start with one of these similarities.

Social class theory showed no explanatory power to understand the vote for left-of-center parties in Brazil and Uruguay. The same happens in Mexico. The position that a person occupies in the social structure does not determine his/her vote. Only those who belong to the petty bourgeoisie are significantly less likely to vote for the Left.[81] Even more, workers are not more likely to vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. On the contrary, in 2000, workers tended to vote more for rightist than for leftists. This evidence refutes Hypothesis 3. The generalized idea that in Mexico, workers, and in particular, public servants, tended to vote for the PRI (Klesner

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[80] The exact values are: 1 (1000-5000), 2 (5001-20000), 3(20001-100000), 4 (100001-1000000), and 5 (more than 1000000).

[81] I also try interactions between urban and social class in order to test for the argument that social class has a different impact depending on voters' place of the residence. Only the interaction between petty bourgeoisie and urban residence reaches significance for the 1988 election. Despite belonging to the petty bourgeoisie diminishes the chances of voting left, these chances are even lower when the bourgeoisie live in rural areas than when they live in urban ones. In other words, urbanization has a positive, but indirect effect, on leftist parties' fortune. Results are shown in Appendix C, Table C-5 and C-6.

2004, Lawson 1999) neither finds support in the 1994 election: public servants have a significant and positive influence on voting left, while being a private employee increases the chances to vote for a non-leftist party.[82] The other way to test for the existence of social class cleavages is through education and indicators of the material well-being of voters. Regression results indicate that Mexicans who vote for leftist parties have high levels of formal education but low income. As Klesner (2004) pointed out, they can be described as the "politically engaged poor."

Contrary to what happens in Uruguay, the vote for the Left in Mexico is neither associated with younger voters, nor with citizens living in urban areas. Age and Urban Voter do not reach significance in any of the three presidential elections analyzed. In Mexico, the traditional support that left-of-center parties usually receive from workers goes to the PRI. In conclusion, sociodemographic cleavages were not important explanations for voting one ideological bloc. Other scholars have found that within those characteristics only region[83] is a relevant and consistent voting predictor in Mexico; citizens who live in southern states and Mexico City have a higher probability of voting for PRD (Magaloni 1999, Poiré 1999, Klesner 2004).

In order for political cleavages to become active, politicians need to emphasize them. Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) point out that political cleavages are created by political elites as a way to get votes. The ideological cleavage only becomes relevant if political leaders and political parties structure political conflict in ideological terms. As mentioned before, Mexican politics revolved around a regime cleavage at least until 2000. During that time, the ideological dimension remained inactive, or at least, as a minor-league dimension (Domínguez and McCann 1995, Domínguez and McCann 1996, Greene 2002, Klesner 2004, Klesner 2005, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a, Moreno 1998, Moreno 1999). Regression results demonstrate that - Mexicans' ideological self-placement does not determine their vote. In 2000, individuals who placed

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[82] To keep the comparability among the models in the three country cases, I did not include public servants and private employees as independent variables in Table 5-13. However, the model that includes these two dummies is shown in Appendix C, Table C-4. The impact of being a public servant or private employee on voting left is only tested for the 1994 election because the 1988 and 2000 surveys do not ask if the respondent work for the government or in the private sector.
[83] Region was not included in the model shown in Table 5-13 to keep comparability with the Brazilian and Mexican models.

themselves on the left side of the ideological dimension did not significantly differ in their vote from those that placed themselves on the right.[84]

One possible explanation for this finding is the existence of strategic voting in the 2000 presidential election. Because the prevalent cleavage was Pro-Pri / Anti-Pri and not an ideological one, Mexicans who identified themselves as leftist strategically voted for PAN because they thought that PAN had higher probabilities to beat PRI than PRD. The relevance of this explanation can be overstated because the survey was conducted after the election and citizens could have falsely declared their vote as a result of a bandwagon effect. However, the self-reporting error is small.[85]

An alternative way to test the ideological cleavage is to analyze if policy positions are determinants of voting behavior. In the 1988 presidential election, only one of the four policy positions reaches statistical significance; Mexicans who considered that the next government should stop the payment of the country's foreign debt were more likely to vote for the Left. Surprisingly, the opinion towards privatization of state companies is not a significant voting predictor. Moreover, in the 2000 presidential election, Mexicans' opinion towards the privatization of the electric company is not a significant voting predictor for leftist parties. This result indicates that Mexicans that vote Left, at least in 1988 and 2000, did not refuse market-oriented economic reforms.

To sum up, the Mexican case refutes hypotheses 5 and 6, ideological considerations were not relevant voting determinants among Mexicans, at least until the 2000 presidential election. This can be explained because party leaders, who are one of the most reliable voting cue providers, have not been interested in priming an ideological debate, focusing instead on the idea of alteration and change (Estrada 2005). It is highly probable that after the 2000 pivotal election, the ideological cleavage has become more influential and achieved more explanatory power in the 2006 presidential election; I have no data to test for that.

Scholars who study Mexican politics are skeptical about the role that partisanship plays in Mexicans' voting decisions. Kesner (2004) states that partisanship used to be stronger among

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[84] This finding holds even by looking at vote determinants by political party (PRD, PAN and PRI). See Table C-7 in Appendix C.
[85] As it was mentioned in the 2002 Brazilian election analysis, this is a problem of one-shot surveys taken after the election. People could have decided their position on the PRI after deciding for other reasons which candidate they

PRI voters than among PAN or PRD voters, but regardless of the party, party identification was not especially strong in Mexico, and besides its importance has tended to decrease with time. In the same way, Magaloni and Poiré (Magaloni and Poiré 2004b) argue that partisan attachments were weak in the 2000 presidential election. On the other hand, Estrada (2005) and Moreno (2003) provide evidence that party identification is more stable than ideological self-placements and vote choice in Mexico. The coefficients shown in Table 5-13 contribute to the idea that partisanship is an inconsistent explanation for the voting preferences of Mexicans. Partisanship with a leftist or rightist party was a significant predictor of the vote in 1988; individuals who identified with a left-of-center party were more likely to vote for a leftist party, while those attached to a party on the right, significantly tended to vote for a rightist party. [86] But in the 2000 election, having a right-wing partisanship or no party identification reach significance, while party identification with leftist parties do not, indicating that many Mexicans with attachments to left-wing parties did not vote for PRD or other left-oriented parties and strategically voted for PAN.[87] The regression results disprove hypothesis 7 which states that partisanship can be more important to predict the vote for leftist parties than for rightist ones. The Mexican case indicates that in elections where competition is between a long-ruling party and the opposition, party attachments leave their central place to strategic voting decisions that favor the party with higher probabilities of winning.

Mexico might be the country case for which the interplay between economic voting theory and prospect theory has been most fully studied (Cinta 1999, Magaloni 1999, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a, Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001, Poiré 1999). Scholars have explained that Mexicans kept voting for the PRI despite its poor economic performance because they are risk averse, and consequently, they avoid voting for the inexperienced opposition. Table 5-13 indicates that the economic voting explanation works for some presidential elections but not for all. In the 1988 election, Mexicans did not take into account the prospects for the nation's

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preferred. Only panel data designed to test this time-sequence counter-argument, could provide more definite answers.

[86] Having a left-wing partisanship does not reach significance using the non imputed data in the 1988 election. It is one of the few changes between the imputed and non imputed Mexican datasets. The others changes generated by the imputation are the following. In 1988, retrospective pocketvote and no partisanship lose significance. In 1994 there are no changes in the variables studied. And in 2000, being a formal worker reaches significance, while Capacity of Labastida loses it.

[87] Results from a multinomial logit provide evidence that party identification with a leftist party increases the probability of voting PRD instead of PRI in 2000 but with a significance level: <.10. See Table C-7 in Appendix C.

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economy or personal finances when making their voting decisions (Domínguez and McCann 1995). The 1994 election, however, provides strong evidence supporting hypothesis 1: Mexicans who were economically dissatisfied with the economy cast their vote in favor of leftist parties. Poiré points out (1999) that in the 1994 Mexican elections, retrospective evaluations were crucial factors in determining the vote. Table 5-13 demonstrates the same finding. Finally, in the 2000 elections, economic assessments neither favored nor undermined leftist parties' electoral chances. As other scholars have pointed out, PRI's defeat in 2000 has nothing to do with the economy; on the contrary, the economic achievements of Zedillo's presidency were acknowledged by most Mexicans (Lawson 2004, Magaloni and Poiré 2004a).

Prospect theory plays an important role in understanding why Mexicans kept voting for the PRI, and the barriers that leftist parties (as well as other opposition parties) had to overcome in order to be seen as a sure alternative. In 1988, voters who considered that voting for the opposition did not represent any economic risk for the country, were more likely to vote for the Left. The same happened in 1994, risk acceptant Mexicans were more likely to choose leftist parties. However, risk propensity does not achieve significance in 2000. One of the reasons might be that Mexicans who were risk takers voted for the rightist PAN instead of for the PRD.[88] On the contrary, expectations of the competence that each candidate would have in managing the country were highly significant in the 2000 presidential election. Those who considered that Labastida or Fox were highly capable of managing the economy, fighting crime, and dealing with the educational system, voted for rightist parties; while those that believed Cárdenas was the candidate with higher capabilities, voted PRD. To put it simply, voters evaluated who was the most capable candidate and voted for him.[89]

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[88] But regression results show that in 2000, both PRD and PAN voters were more risk takers than PRI voters. See Table C-7 in Appendix C.
[89] Similar to the Uruguayan and Brazilian case, these variables are prone to be endogeneous.

Table 5-13 Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Mexico 1988-2000

Independent Variables:	1988	1994	2000
Economic Voting			
Sociotropic Vote	0.010	-	-
	(.121)		
Sociotropic Retrospective	-	0.721***	0,076
		(.056)	(.179)
Sociotropic Prospective	0,124	-	-
	(.117)		
Pocketbook Vote	0,162	-	-
	(.142)		
Pocketbook Retrospective	-0.139	0.331***	0,105
	(.086)	(.061)	(.184)
Pocketbook Prospective	dropped (2)	-	-
Prospective Inflation	0,015	-	-
	(.121)		
Prospective Unemployment	-0,081	-	-
	(.121)		
Social Class Cleavage			
Dominant Classes	-0.266	-	-0,231
	(.492)		(.843)
Petty Bourgeoisie	-0.749**	0,167	-1.130*
	(.291)	(.154)	(.738)
Workers	0,093	0,136	-0.815**
	(.170)	(.083)	(.356)
Education	0.165***	0.145***	0,079
	(.045)	(0.038)	(.152)
Household SES	-0.298**	-	-0,027
	(.120)		(.199)
Household SES (houseware index)	-		-0,162
			(.116)
Family Income	-	-0.186***	-
		(.046)	
Ideology			
Ideological selfplacement	-	-	-0,018
			(.055)
Opinion external investment	0,094	-	-
	(.089)		
Opinion payment of external debt	0.448***	-	-
	(.172)		
Opinion open economy to imports	0,022	-	-
	(.162)		
Opinion privatizations	0.161	-	0,033
	(.171)		(.075)
Distribution	-	-	-0,012
			(.058)
			First part

		Second part	
Independent Variables:	**1988**	**1994**	**2000**
Age	-0,012	0.032	0,013
	(.008)	(.035)	(.010)
Urban Voter	0.030	-	0,093
	(.052)		(.199)
Partisanship			
Left	1.545**	-	1.165
	(.703)		(.971)
Right	-2.233***	-	-3.647***
	(.700)		(.895)
No partisanship	-0.989	-	-1.690*
	(.756)		(.921)
Prospective theory			
Economic Risk if opposition wins	-0.772***		
	(.135)		
Social Risk if opposition wins	-0.117		
	(.162)		
Risk Propensity (1)		-0.560***	-0.229
		(.137)	(.424)
Capacity of Labastida to govern			0.148
			(.095)
Capacity of Fox to govern			0.378***
			(.093)
Capacity of Cárdenas to govern			-0.274**
			(.115)
Constant	-0.636	-3.933***	-0.243
	(1.168)	(.189)	(2.230)
R squared	0,45	0,10	0,68
Wald chi2	316***	408	139
Number of observations	1914	5635	950

(1) Risk propensity in 1994 is measured by a dummy variable coded 1 for those who said
 "better the devil you know" and 0 for the rest. In 2000, it is measured by a question that ask
respondents to agree with one of the two following aphorisms: (1)"Better the devil you know,
that the saint that you don't" or (2)"Nothing ventured, nothing gained."
(2) Dropped due to collinearity.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01
Note: Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

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Table 5-14 indicates that the 2000 Mexican pivotal election is similar to their counterparts in Brazil and Uruguay because among those who voted for leftist parties, the percentage of risk acceptant voters is higher than among those that voted for non-leftist parties. Voting for the Left, as happens in the 2002 Brazilian election and the 2004 Uruguayan election, implied a higher level of risk.

Table 5-14 Risk and Vote Choice in 2000 Mexico (%)

Risk Propensity	Leftist parties	Non-Leftist parties	All
Risk Acceptant	81.6	69.2	71.0
Risk Averse	18.4	30.8	29.0
N	136	779	915

Source: Post-election survey, Mexico 2000

However, the 2000 Mexican election partially reinforces the theory. On one side, the probabilities of voting for a leftist party increased when the voter is risk acceptant, but on the other side, these probabilities diminish when the voter considers him/herself in the domain of gains, which is translated into a positive evaluation of the country's economic situation. Table 5-15 shows that a risk averse citizen with a highly negative evaluation of the country's economy has a probability of voting Left of .023, while a risk taker voter with the same negative evaluation increases the probability of choosing the PRD to .027. In addition, a risk acceptant Mexican with a highly positive evaluation of the economy has a probability of voting Left of .059, while a risk averse voter diminishes this probability to.052. In other words, and contrary to what happens in Brazil and Uruguay, the probability to vote Left diminishes with bad economic evaluations. This counterfinding can be explained because there is more than one "credible opposition," one on the Left (PRD) but another on the Right (PAN), and the electorate attributed fewer capabilities to the former than to the later.

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Table 5-15 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Leftist Parties in 2000 Mexican election depending on Risk Propensity and Sociotropic Economic Assessments (%)

Risk Propensity	Retrospective Sociotropic Evaluations				
	Highly positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Highly negative
Risk Acceptant	5.9	4.9	4.0	3.3	2.7
Risk Averse	5.2	4.3	3.5	2.9	2.3

Source: Post-election survey, Mexico 2000
Cells entries are predicted probabilities of hypothetical individuals voting for left-of-center parties from a logit with the same variables than the model presented in Table 5-13.

Mexico's regression results indicate that when more than one political party represents a "credible" and "untainted" opposition, and despite leftist parties being part of that opposition, risk acceptant citizens won't necessarily choose the Left at the voting booth as hypothesis 2 states. In that scenario, voting decisions are made taking into consideration not only the credibility of the opposition, it is also important to judge the capacity to govern that each political party is able to demonstrate.

To put it briefly, the factors that lead Brazilians and Uruguayans to vote for leftist parties do not concur with the ones found in the Mexican case. During the last two decades, Mexicans made their voting decisions following different considerations to other Latin Americans. The idea that there is a movement to the left in the region, and Latin Americans may be punishing governments for the implementation of market-oriented reforms becomes questionable based on the evidence provided by the individual level analysis. Next section discusses this argument in further detail.

5.4.3   Discussion

Mexico has undergone a democratization process in which voters decided their vote using a "two-step" model (Domínguez and McCann 1995). First, they asked themselves if they were in

favor of or against the PRI. Second, and only among those that decided they were against the PRI, they took into consideration other voting cues. Could people decide their position on the PRI after deciding for other reason which party or candidate thet preferred? Conceptually, it is possible. However, the "usual suspects" to explain voting behavior do not work so properly in the Mexican case. Sociodemographic cleavages are not significant determinants of the vote for leftist parties in Mexico. The Mexican case provides additional evidence that in Latin America, the social class cleavage theory does not work. Neither pro-state nor anti-market policy opinions are crucial determinants of voting for left-of-center parties. It seems that there is no anti-neoliberal reforms cleavage in Mexico. On the other hand, party identification, ideological identification, economic assessments and considerations about how risky it is to vote for a certain political party are all influential factors on voters' behavior, but still weaker than in other countries of the region. All of them have faded in comparison with the regime cleavage during the 1988, 1994 and 2000 Mexican presidential elections. It remains to be analyzed how this has changed in the first non-regime cleavage election of 2006.

As a result, Mexican leftist parties face a double task. First, they have to convince voters to stop supporting the long-ruling party. Second, they have to persuade anti-PRI Mexicans to cast their vote in favor of the opposition on the left instead of the opposition on the right. The Mexican case shows that when the political system has two credible oppositions, the Left is not necessarily the one that is going to receive more support. The ability a party has to capture the votes from a discontented electorate depends on two elements: the skill to articulate an antigovernment message and the capacity to reduce the uncertainty voters usually have towards inexperienced parties. Domínguez (1999) argues that in the 1997 congressional election, "the PAN was defeated because it failed to articulate a clear antigovernment message, for truly convinced opposition voters, the PRD was the only credible option" (19). In the 2000 presidential election, the situation was the reverse, convinced opposition voters chose PAN because it was the more credible opposition as well as the less uncertain option. Again, it remains to be analyzed what happened in the 2006 presidential election when the Left was the only credible opposition.

5.5   CONCLUSION

The most-different system research design made it possible to understand why Latin Americans vote for leftist parties in different political and economic contexts. Table 5-16 summarizes the findings from each of the individual level analysis. When a positive or negative significant relationship is indicated between the predicting theories and voting left, this does not mean that every independent variable that test that voting theory in every election year reach significance and in that direction; the table just summarized the general pattern. The theories that better explained the vote for leftist parties in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are the economic voting, political cleavage, partisanship, and prospect theory. On the contrary, social class cleavage does not predict leftist vote.

The first thing to notice is that Latin Americans are not voting for left-of-center parties because they are against neoliberal reforms. The study of each country suggests that espousing pro-state anti-market options has nothing to do with left voting, but does not necessary mean that parties' positions on "neoliberal" policies, for or against, have no impact on voters. What it really means is that the impact of certain policies stances or anti-neoliberal discourses is not determining of Latin Americans' voting decisions. Electorates in the region are voting Left because they are looking for new political alternatives that might provide an improvement in people's economic well-being. The relevance that economic voting theory has to explain leftist vote indicates that Latin Americans might be punishing traditional parties that failed to provide material security to their electorates, and these parties usually are the ones that implemented market-oriented economic reforms, but this castigation is less driven by policy stances than by economic outcomes.

Table 5-16 Summary of individual-level analysis findings

Predicting theories	Uruguay	Brazil	Mexico
Economic voting	√	√	√ (only in 1994)
Social class cleavage			
Political cleavage	√	√	
Urban-rural cleavage	√		

Partisanship
    With leftist parties
    With rightist parties
	
	√
	√
		
		√
		
			√

Prospect theory	√	√	√

Second, the possibilities of leftist parties capitalizing on Latin Americans' social discontent depend on the number of "credible" or "untainted" oppositions. In countries like Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties embody the *only* "credible opposition," it is easy to capture votes from those unhappy with the status quo. But in countries where more than one "credible opposition" exists like in Mexico, leftist parties have to win over the vote of voters who take into account other considerations, mainly the party's capacity to govern. Prospect theory predicting power to explain voting behavior in the region points to the importance that reducing uncertainty has for left-leaning parties electoral chances. As far leftist parties succeed in reducing the uncertainty that voters might have in voting an experienced party, they will be able to capture the votes of dissatisfied Latin Americans.[90] But it is important to remember that despite it being crucial that they reduce the uncertainty that the electorate feels towards inexperienced parties, the same lack of experience is what makes them more "untainted."

Third, although ideology is an important factor in explaining voting behavior, social class is not. This result goes against the common understanding that ideology and social class are matched: workers are on the left, and the dominant sectors are on the right. The evidence from Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay show that this attachment between social class and ideology does not hold in Latin America. Left-oriented parties in the region have formed a coalition that is ideologically center-left, but is catchall in terms of class.[91] Despite that ideology and social class

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[90] One way that leftist parties in the three country cases presented in this chapter have managed to reduce voters' uncertainty is to gain governmental experience at the local, city, municipal or state level. Another alternative is to become more pragmatic and less radical in their party platforms.
[91] This relationship is less articulated in Mexico.

are not significantly related, ideology remains as an important voting predictor. One possible explanation for this unexpected combination of ideology and catchall parties may be that ideology works as a political cleavage activated by political parties and politicians to mobilize support, it is not a structural cleavage determined by social class.

Finally, the individual level analysis presented in this chapter provides ample of evidence that Latin Americans are not random voters. Regardless of the differences in voting behavior between Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans, all of them take into account the economic performance of the incumbent, party attachments and ideological considerations while voting. This represents good news for a region demanding a more accountable democracy. Furthermore, the same search for an "untainted opposition," or the vote cast in favor of change regardless of how risky it is, can be seen as a healthy indicator that voters still care about democracy and they keep on looking for institutional ways to fulfill their needs rather than going for undemocratic ones.

6.0   CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines the impact that neoliberal economic reforms implemented in Latin America during 1980s and 1990s had on the shift to the Left of many countries in the region. In particular, it seeks to answer three concrete research questions: a) what particular features of market-oriented economic reforms, and what economic and political conditions, have benefited left-leaning parties' electoral performance? b) What are the determinants of Latin Americans' vote for left-oriented parties? And c) how does the linkage between the micro and macro level of analysis work?

A combination of methodologies was used to answer these questions. First, a cross national regression analysis was performed using data from 17 countries covering the period from 1985 to 2004. This dataset, in addition to containing the percentage of votes for each ideological bloc during that period, includes variables that measure the level of neoliberal reforms implemented in each country, a set of economic variables which appraise economic well-being, and a series of political variables that account for the political context. Second, an individual-level analysis performed in a most-different system design was used to respond to the question about the factors that lead Latin American voters to choose a leftist party. The three country cases analyzed are Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. I was able to obtain survey data for each election held from 1980 to 2004 in each of these countries, and carry out a multivariate analysis testing the influence of different factors on the intention to vote for leftist parties.

Examining voting choice both from the macro and micro perspectives has the advantage of overcoming the flaws present in each approach. The aggregate-level examination offers insights into the impact different levels of market-oriented economic reforms, as well as macro-economic conditions and different political contexts have on the electoral fortunes of leftist parties. To put it differently, it has the benefit of assessing the impact of objective conditions on political behavior. But it also has an important shortcoming: individuals do not always behave by

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taking into account objective conditions; on the contrary, they often act depending on their perceptions. This is the reason why it is so important to complement the investigation with an individual-level analysis.

The micro-level perspective takes into account the reasoning processes through which individuals make decisions at the ballot box, and makes it possible to examine how macro-level conditions (reforms, inflation, unemployment, etc.) are perceived and valued by citizens (Echegaray 2005). For example, it may be that in a particular Latin American country few neoliberal economic reforms have actually been implemented but because of an intense campaign against these reforms, the electorate perceives them to have been deep and highly harmful. Perceptions about reality do not necessarily coincide with objective reality. But the micro analysis also has some problems; one of the most important is the danger of respondents giving spurious answers (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). By comparing the results of the individual level of analysis with the macro level of analysis, the concerns about spuriousness can be overcome, or at least, reduced.

Several conclusions can be derived from this investigation. First, ideological cycles have existed in Latin America in the same way that they have existed in the more advanced world. Latin America experienced four ideological cycles since 1945. The beginning of each cycle correlates with pessimistic popular moods, popular discontent and dissatisfaction with particular developmental models implemented in the region. Left and Right have switched their predominance since 1945, neither of them being the leading ideology throughout. The Left was prevalent from 1969 to 1976, a period in Latin American history that happens to be full of dissatisfaction with the economy, unhappiness with the ISI model, rising inequality in income distribution, high levels of unemployment, and a growing informal sector. Despite during some of those years the region had positive growth rates, the sense of failure and unfulfilled expectations were widely spread.

The Left became predominant when social discontent was widespread, which is something that also happened at the beginning of the new wave, in the 2000s. Despite leftist parties not increasing their electoral support in every Latin American country, the Left is the current predominant ideology in the region. If before the 1969-1976 leftist predominance, the dissatisfaction was with the ISI model; at the beginning of 2000s, the disappointment was with the model promoted by the Washington Consensus. Many things have changed on the Left from

the 60s and 70s to the 2000s, but perhaps the most relevant one is the attitude towards democracy. Leftist parties in Latin America moved from supporting revolutionary change and underestimating democracy as a bourgeoisie tool, to defend democratic participation, compete in elections, and claim for deepening democracy in the region. The current leading role of the Left in the region implies a different, and more positive, prospect for democracy.

Second, despite discontentment at the neoliberal model, this does not necessarily mean that more market reforms produce more votes for political parties on the left. The cross-national analysis provides strong evidence against that argument. Even though Lora and Olivera (2005) found that Latin Americans dislike pro-market policies irrespective of their results, and punish incumbents for implementing these reforms, this macro-level analysis shows that there is no direct connection between that dislike and voting for leftist political parties. The key variable to understand the increase of leftist parties' electoral chances is not the level of neoliberal reforms implemented in each country, the central variable is unemployment. Left-leaning parties in Latin America do increase their electoral chances when unemployment is high. This finding matches the research on the economic conditions that benefit leftist parties in Europe. On the other hand, the implementation of market-friendly reforms by leftist parties hurts their electoral chances in the following election. Leftist parties, when they reach government, lose votes when unemployment increases and also when they implement neoliberal policies.

Third, the previous finding is confirmed by the results extracted from the multivariate analysis in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Latin Americans are not voting left-of-center parties because they are against neoliberal policies. Policy positions are not among the most influential factors in determining voters' decisions. For example, Brazilians that vote for the Left are not significantly more in favor of state intervention than Brazilians that vote for other ideological blocs. Not even their positions towards socialism or egalitarianism determine their vote. Despite Latinobarometro' data has shown that the percentage of pro-market Latin Americans has diminished during the last years, pro-market or pro-state policy stances are not influential factors for Latin Americans when casting their vote.

Electorates in the region are voting Left because they just want to try new alternatives that might improve their economic well-being. If Latin Americans punish traditional parties that implemented structural reforms, this is less a result of their policy stances against neoliberalism or the market than of bad economic outcomes. In other words, voters are more outcome-oriented

than policy-oriented. This evidence reinforces the argument that voters, in order to make politicians accountable, do not necessarily need to be policy-oriented, it is enough for them to be outcome-oriented. The congruency of the findings extracted from the two levels of analysis, the macro and micro, make them more trustworthy. The current shift to the Left in Latin America is more a result of popular discontent with the economic situation than anything else. In particular, espousing pro-state anti-market options has nothing to do with voting Left.

Finally, and in this context, the electoral possibilities of success that leftist parties have by capitalizing on social discontent depend on the number of "untainted opposition" parties available in the political system. In countries like Brazil and Uruguay where leftist parties embody the only "untainted opposition," they only needed to overcome voters' natural resistance to voting for inexperienced parties. On the other hand, Mexico's recent history shows how leftist parties can have a hard time when they have to compete with another "untainted opposition" as was the case between PRD and PAN. It is the interplay between macro and micro factors that better explains voting decisions. Voters' economic discontent, a micro level explanatory factor, can be capitalize by leftist parties depending on how many parties are seen as untainted opposition, which is a party system characteristic, a macro level factor.

This argument can be generalized beyond these three country cases. In Bolivia, the recent success of Evo Morales indicates than another "untainted opposition" has become credible enough to merit the chance to govern one of the poorest countries in the region. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez also embodied a new and distinctive alternative from the traditional COPEI and Acción Democrática (AD). Regardless of the differences between these leftist parties and the more institutionalized Frente Amplio or Partido dos Trabalhadores, they share with them their character of "untainted opposition."

Aside from answering the three specific research questions, this dissertation also contributes to a broadening of our understanding of political behavior, and especially voting behavior, in Latin America. There is a predominant scholarly preconception that depicts Latin Americans as random and unpredictable voters. Voting behavior in the region was traditionally underestimated as a result of unconcealed exchanges of support for particularistic benefits. In addition to the clientelistic motives, candidates' attributes and campaign influence are usually mentioned as relevant voting clues followed by electorates in the region. This project does not dismiss the importance of these factors, which is very well proved for some countries, but the

individual-level analysis presented here indicates that other voting clues are also very influential in the way Latin Americans process their voting decisions. Brazilians, Mexicans and Uruguayans take into account the economic performance of the incumbent, as well as their party attachments and ideological identification while they make their decisions at the ballot box. To put it simply, Latin American electorates are more discriminating than scholars have sometimes considered, and as a consequence, are capable of make politicians accountable.

Perhaps as importantly, another by-product of this dissertation is that their findings can be taken to be good news for the future of democracy in the region. Despite the fact that Latin America finished its transition to democracy some years ago, it still needs to consolidate and improve the quality of its democracy (Roberts 1998). In order for democracies to work properly, they need certain amounts of popular support (Easton 1953), and recent research has shown that support for democratic political institutions and democratic systems depends on which side of the winning-losing equation citizens are (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2005). Citizens that have voted for a party that lost the election (losers) tend to have lower levels of support for democracy than winners. As a result, democracies could become unstable if losers are continuously ignored in the political game, excluded from the political process, and if they are always the same people. Furthermore, the gap in support for democracy between winners and losers does not exist at all times for all types of voters. Losers' ideology matters: voters on the extreme left expressed more negative evaluations of the political system than those on the right. To make democracy strong and stable, it is better to have alternation in power and it is preferable to incorporate minorities (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2005).

Taking all these arguments into account, the findings of this dissertation represent good news for democracy's prospect for two reasons. First, they show how Latin Americans have changed governments incorporating left-oriented parties into the political game. The future of democracy can be in danger if certain political actors are always on the losers' side. For many years, several leftist political parties in the region played as losers in the electoral game. Moreover, some of them dismiss democracy as a valid method to achieve power. Therefore, the arrival of left-leaning parties to the government of several Latin American countries, rather than being a cause of concern, should be considered an indicator of a healthy democracy and a mechanism to strengthen democratic support among citizens. Second, the results of this project show that when Latin Americans have institutional and democratic ways to channel their

discontent, they go for them. At least in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, voters prefer to vote for "untainted parties" rather than looking for non-democratic alternatives to achieve their demands.

Latin Americans are capable of making their political leaders accountable, remove them from office when they do not accomplished what was expected, and change those in charge of the government by voting for "untainted parties." The success of "untainted parties" in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay implies an increase in institutionalization, in political representation, and a sign of political maturity (López 2005). In a region demanding a more accountable and responsive democracy, the examples of Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay show a particular way this can be done. The recent shift towards the Left in Latin America has helped to intensify and strengthen democracy in the region by incorporating losers into the political game.

It is uncertain what might happen after leftist parties have been in charge of national government for a while. Several scholars have anticipated that this "Left Turn" will endure (Castañeda and Navia 2007, Cleary 2006). Cleary points out that "the future of the left in Latin America will in large part depend on its ability to strike a balance between the pragmatic need for moderation and the moral imperative to pursue strategies of poverty reduction, redistribution, and development (2006: 48). Castañeda and Navia (2007) also agree that moderation is the clue for the Left to stay in power.

Their condition of "untainted" parties is lost immediately after gaining access to the government. As a result, two possible scenarios can be imagined. In the first one, leftist governments succeed in significantly improving the material well-being of Latin Americans and reducing the prevalent social and economic inequalities, and as a result, they keep governing for several years. However, Castañeda and Navia (2007) argue against this scenario. They consider that even if leftists' parties do not improve the living conditions they will be better positioned that rightist, because 80% of the populace in Latin America is under the median, so there is public for redistributive appeals.

In the second scenario, Schlesinger is right: "People can never be fulfilled for long either in the public or in the private sphere. We try one, then the other, and frustration compels a change in course. Moreover, however effective a particular course may be in meeting one set of troubles, it generally falters and fails when new troubles arise. And many troubles are inherently insoluble. As political eras, whether dominated by public purpose or by private interest, run their course, they infallibly generate the desire for something different. It always becomes after a

while "time for a change" (Schlesinger 1986). In this scenario, after several years, we would expect another ideological shift in the region, this time to the right.

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APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 2

The data presented in Section 2 of Chapter 2 shows the vote share obtained by each ideological bloc (Left, Center and Right) in congressional elections from 1945 to 2004. A few clarifications about some countries' electoral results are necessary:

Argentina: Includes congressional elections as well as results for national constituent elections.

Brazil: Excludes the congressional elections that were carried out during the military regime because not all parties were allowed to compete.

Bolivia: Before 1956 there was no opposition participation and no universal right to vote (the law is from 1952), as a result, elections held before 1956 are not included in the dataset.

Perú: The 1956 election is not included because experts said it was a fraudulent one.

Table A-1 Political parties unclassified in the Left-Right dimension (1980-2005)

Country	Political Party	Presidential Election year	Percentage of vote
Argentina	Partido Justicialista	1983	40.2
	Partido Justicialista	1989	47.3
	Blanco de los Jubilados	1989	1.9
	Partido Justicialista	1995	49.8
	Partido Justicialista	1999	38.1
	Alianza Social Cristiana	1999	0.3
	Frente por la Lealtad (Menem) (PJ)	2003	19.5
	Frente Nacional y Popular (Rodriguez Saa) (PJ)	2003	12.1
	Union y Libertad (Rodriguez Saa)	2003	2.0
	Alianza Unidos o Dominados (Mussa-Suarez)	2003	0.2
Bolivia	Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (MITKA)	1980	1.2
	Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari Uno (MITKA-Uno)	1980	1.3
	Partido de la Union Boliviana (PUB)	1980	1.2
	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari (MRTK)	1985	1.1
	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberacion (MRTKL)	1985	2.1
	Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)	1989	12.2
	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberacion (MRTKL)	1989	1.6
	Frente Unico de Liberacion Katarista (FULKA)	1989	1.2
	Union Civica Solidaridad (UCS)	1993	13.8
	Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)	1993	14.3
	Union Civica Solidaridad (UCS)	1997	16.1
	Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)	1997	17.2
	Union Civica Solidaridad (UCS)	2002	5.0
	LyJ (Libertad y Justicia)	2002	2.7
	Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)	2002	0.4
	Frente Patriótico	2005	0.3

	Agropecuario de Bolivia (FREPAB)		
	Unión Social de los Trabajadores de Bolivia (USTB)	2005	0.3
Brazil	Partido da Reconstrucao Nacional (PRN)	1989	30.5
	Partido da Reconstrucao Nacional (PRN)	1994	0.6
Chile	Partido Union de Centro Centro Progresista (UCCP)	1989	15.4
	Partido Union de Centro Centro Progresista (UCCP)	1999	0.4
Colombia	Movimiento Unitario Metapolitico (MUM)	1986	0.6
	Movimiento Unitario Metapolitico (MUM)	1990	0.6
	Movimiento Unitario Metapolitico (MUM)	1994	1.1
	Independiente	1998	27.1
	Partido Verde Oxigeno	2002	0.5
	Movimiento Defensa Ciudadana	2002	0.1
	Mov.Pol. Comunal y Comuni Colombia	2002	0.1
	Movimiento Participacion Comunal	2002	1.5
Costa Rica	Unión General	2002	0.2
Ecuador	Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)	1992	22
	Accion Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana (APRE)	1992	3.1
	Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares (CFP)	1992	1.3
	Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)	1996	26.3
	Accion Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana (APRE)	1996	4.9
	Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares (CFP)	1996	27.2
	Alianza	1996	3
	UCI	1996	1.2
	Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana (PRE-APRE-UPL)	1998	26.6
	Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais (MCNP)	1998	14.8
	Autentica (MIRA)	1998	5.1
	Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)	2002	11.9
	TSI	2002	3.7
	Movimiento Patria Solidaria (MPS)	2002	1.1
	MIAJ	2002	0.8

Guatemala	Movimiento Emergente de Concordia-Frente de Unidad Nacional (PUA-MEC-FUN)	1985	1.9
	Movimiento de Accion Solidaria (MAS)	1990	24.1
	Partido Democratico de Cooperacion Nacional (PDCN)	1990	2.1
	Movimiento Emergente de Concordia (MEC)	1990	1.1
	Partido Liberador Progresista (PLP)	1995	5.2
	Partido Progresista (PP)	1995	1.6
	Partido Reformador Guatemalteco (PREG)	1995	1.1
	Partido Liberador Progresista (PLP)	1999	3.1
	DSP	2003	1.4
	UN	2003	0.4
	MSPCN	2003	0.4
Mexico	Partido Social Democrata (PSD)	1982	0.2
	Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN)	1988	31.1
Paraguay	Partido Humanista Paraguayo	2003	0.1
Peru	CAMBIO 90	1990	29.1
	Frente Popular Agricola del Peru (FREPAP)	1990	1.1
	CAMBIO 90	1995	64.4
	Frente Popular Agricola del Peru (FREPAP)	1995	0.8
	Union por el Peru (UPP)	1995	21.8
	Movimiento Obras Civicas (MOC)	1995	2.6
	Frente Popular Agricola del Peru (FREPAP)	2000	0.7
	Union por el Peru (UPP)	2000	0.3
	Peru 2000	2000	51.0
Venezuela	Movimiento Integracion Nacional (MIN)	1983	0.3
	Convergencia Nacional	1993	30.4
	Integracion, Renovacion y Nueva Esperanza (IRENE)	1998	2.8
	Movimiento Integracion Nacional (MIN)	2000	1.1

Source: based on Coppedge (1997) and Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University)

Figure A.2 Ideological Cycles in Latin America (1945-2005) (excluding Mexico)

Figure A.2 Ideological cycles by country: 1945-2005

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APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 3

Table B-1 Correlation matrix with variables included in the regression models of Chapter 3

	Left	SRI	Inflation mean	Growth mean	Unemployment mean	Ideology incumbent	deological polarizatior
Left	1.0000						
SRI	-0.0187	1.0000					
Inflation mean	0.2149	-0.3724	1.0000				
Growth mean	-0.1339	0.2532	-0.5316	1.0000			
Unemployment mean	0.2079	0.0227	-0.1478	0.0973	1.0000		
Ideology incumbent	0.2510	-0.1977	0.0884	-0.1454	-0.0510	1.0000	
Ideological polarization	0.5204	-0.0024	0.1216	-0.0141	0.3679	0.1336	1.0000

	Left	SRI	Inflation election year	Growth election year	Unemployment election year	Ideology incumbent	deological polarizatior
Left	1.0000						
SRI	-0.0187	1.0000					
Inflation election year	0.1492	-0.5844	1.0000				
Growth election year	-0.1189	0.0085	-0.2845	1.0000			
Unemployment election year	0.1802	0.1422	-0.2035	-0.2547	1.0000		
Ideology incumbent	0.2510	-0.1977	0.1199	0.0186	-0.0478	1.0000	
Ideological polarization	0.5204	-0.0024	0.0530	0.0853	0.1972	0.1336	1.0000

	Left change	SRI change	Inflation change	Growth change	Unemployment change	Ideology incumbent	deological polarizatior
Left change	1.0000						
SRI change	-0.1373	1.0000					
Inflation change	-0.0915	-0.1972	1.0000				
Growth change	0.0058	-0.0655	-0.2863	1.0000			
Unemployment change	0.2473	0.0201	-0.2321	-0.2553	1.0000		
Ideology incumbent	-0.5598	0.1290	0.1084	-0.0683	-0.0232	1.0000	
Ideological polarization	-0.0703	-0.1390	0.0066	0.1416	-0.1128	0.1336	1.0000

Table B-2 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the change in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America, fixed-effects model with country dummies

```
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      53
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,    30) =    5.07
       Model | 19293.2374    22  876.965338            Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual | 5191.87993    30  173.062664            R-squared     =  0.7880
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6325
       Total | 24485.1174    52  470.867642            Root MSE      =  13.155


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval ]
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
SRI          |   48.67155   30.50736     1.60   0.121    -13.63278    110.9759
Inflatio mean|  -.8069082   2.134532    -0.38   0.708    -5.166205    3.552388
Growth mean  |  -1.891331   1.558109    -1.21   0.234    -5.073413    1.290751
Unemploy mean|   1.622153   1.048466     1.55   0.132    -.5190995    3.763406
Ideology     |   70.16343   29.02355     2.42   0.022     10.88942    129.4374
Ideology*SRI |  -189.7464   64.78485    -2.93   0.006    -322.0547   -57.43806
         arg |   10.69577   12.59309     0.85   0.402    -15.02275    36.41428
         bol |   15.08116   11.13972     1.35   0.186    -7.669193    37.83151
         bra |   63.27268   12.58751     5.03   0.000     37.56555     88.9798
         chi |     13.054    12.0653     1.08   0.288    -11.58664    37.69463
         col |  -8.897001   11.17802    -0.80   0.432    -31.72557    13.93157
         cri |   55.65963   11.30303     4.92   0.000     32.57577    78.74349
         dom |    21.3134   16.57562     1.29   0.208    -12.53853    55.16533
         ecu |   25.81703   10.86037     2.38   0.024     3.637196    47.99686
         mex |   7.884819   11.06138     0.71   0.481    -14.70554    30.47518
         per |  -.8182358   12.69203    -0.06   0.949    -26.73882    25.10235
         pry |  -9.355123   10.78966    -0.87   0.393    -31.39054     12.6803
         uru |   25.86677   12.01664     2.15   0.040     1.325513    50.40802
         ven |   34.37295   13.22014     2.60   0.014     7.373826    61.37208
         nic |   12.96475   16.98315     0.76   0.451    -21.71947    47.64898
         slv |   9.831182   11.23462     0.88   0.388    -13.11297    32.77534
         hon |   -6.19534   10.84163    -0.57   0.572     -28.3369    15.94622
       _cons |  -14.80944   23.37782    -0.63   0.531    -62.55332    32.93445
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

. lincom sri+ideogy*sri

 (1) meansri + ideosri = 0

```
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -141.0748   57.43712    -2.46   0.020    -258.3771   -23.77256
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table B-3 The impact of market reforms, economic outcomes and political variables on the change in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America, fixed-effects model without dummies

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =         53
Group variable (i): country2                    Number of groups   =         17

R-sq:  within  = 0.3740                         Obs per group: min =          2
       between = 0.0199                                        avg =        3.1
       overall = 0.0132                                        max =          4

                                                F(6,30)            =       2.99
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4056                         Prob > F           =     0.0208


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
SRI          |    48.67155   30.50736     1.60   0.121    -13.63278    110.9759
Inflatio mean|   -.8069082   2.134532    -0.38   0.708    -5.166205    3.552388
Growth mean  |   -1.891331   1.558109    -1.21   0.234    -5.073413    1.290751
Unemploy mean|    1.622153   1.048466     1.55   0.132    -.5190995    3.763406
Ideology     |    70.16343   29.02355     2.42   0.022     10.88942    129.4374
Ideology*SRI |   -189.7464   64.78485    -2.93   0.006    -322.0547   -57.43806
        _cons |    1.629437   24.86044     0.07   0.948    -49.14235    52.40123
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   20.633715
     sigma_e |   13.155328
         rho |   .71099041   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(16, 30) =      5.46              Prob > F = 0.0000
```

(1) sri + ideology*sri = 0

```
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -141.0748   57.43712    -2.46   0.020    -258.3771   -23.77256
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

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APPENDIX C

CHAPTER 5

Tables C-1 Correlation matrixes with variables included in regression models of Chapter 5

MEXICO
2000 Election

	retrpoc	retrsoc	dominant	pettyb	workers	educ	nse
retrpoc	1.0000						
retrsoc	0.4339	1.0000					
dominant	-0.0400	-0.0609	1.0000				
pettyb	-0.0322	-0.0320	-0.0190	1.0000			
workers	-0.0259	0.0045	-0.0878	-0.2351	1.0000		
educ	-0.1878	-0.0981	0.0501	0.3058	0.0082	1.0000	
nse	0.0747	0.0275	-0.0753	-0.1193	0.0891	-0.2343	1.0000
ideology	-0.0517	-0.0427	-0.0208	-0.0316	-0.0059	-0.0412	0.0364
distrib	0.0070	-0.0113	0.0604	0.0069	0.0074	0.0648	-0.0534
privat	-0.0413	-0.0782	0.0548	0.0529	-0.0186	0.0816	-0.0556
age	0.1173	0.0470	-0.0307	0.0207	-0.0445	-0.3741	-0.0322
urban	0.0076	0.0201	-0.0543	-0.0559	0.0571	-0.1200	0.2504
leftpi	0.0398	0.1011	0.0007	0.0413	0.0385	0.0037	0.0383
rightpi	-0.1430	-0.2012	0.0271	-0.0408	-0.0351	0.0027	-0.0158
nopi	0.1454	0.1600	-0.0327	0.0108	0.0155	-0.0312	-0.0273
risk	-0.0124	-0.0142	0.0256	0.0774	0.0326	0.2510	-0.0496
Labastida	0.0902	0.1589	-0.0334	0.0326	-0.0121	0.0496	0.0264
Fox	0.0036	0.0289	-0.0261	-0.0318	-0.0195	-0.1741	0.1414
Cardenas	0.0048	-0.0250	0.0114	-0.0422	-0.0172	-0.1036	0.0497

	ideology	distrib	privat	age	urbarura	leftpi	rightpi
ideology	1.0000						
distrib	0.0641	1.0000					
privat	0.0507	0.1529	1.0000				
age	0.0743	-0.0351	-0.0045	1.0000			
urban	-0.0630	0.0303	0.0192	0.0056	1.0000		
leftpi	-0.1843	-0.0319	-0.1107	0.0007	0.0352	1.0000	
rightpi	0.2071	0.0142	0.0742	-0.0085	-0.0462	-0.6211	1.0000
nopi	-0.0766	0.0052	0.0122	0.0225	0.0219	-0.1455	-0.6355
risk	-0.1447	-0.0461	0.0424	-0.0784	-0.0554	0.0756	-0.0941
Labastida	-0.1229	0.0122	0.0344	0.0074	0.0114	0.1464	-0.1864
Fox	0.0306	-0.0286	-0.0960	0.0204	-0.0098	0.1659	-0.1966
Cardenas	0.1633	0.0569	0.0510	0.0638	-0.0795	-0.3994	0.3037

	nopi	risk	Labastida	Fox	Cardenas
nopi	1.0000				
risk	0.0327	1.0000			
Labastida	0.0909	0.3440	1.0000		
Fox	0.0998	-0.3040	-0.1685	1.0000	
Cardenas	0.0081	-0.0798	0.1697	0.1800	1.0000

MEXICO
1994 Election

```
             |     left retrsocio retrpock   pettyb  workers education
income
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
        left |   1.0000
    retrsocio |   0.2814   1.0000
   retrpocket |   0.2195   0.5492   1.0000
       pettyb |   0.0188   0.0319   0.0233   1.0000
      workers |   0.0227   0.0101  -0.0154  -0.2652   1.0000
    education |   0.0559   0.0853   0.0699   0.1910   0.0888   1.0000
       income |  -0.0169   0.0353  -0.0159   0.2033   0.0492   0.5498   1.0000
          age |   0.0168   0.0452   0.0700   0.0366  -0.0156  -0.3395  -0.0638
     RiskPrope |  -0.0707  -0.0620  -0.0562  -0.0214  -0.0118  -0.0267  -0.0591

             |      age RiskPrope
-------------+------------------
          age |   1.0000
     RiskPrope |  -0.0165   1.0000
```

MEXICO
1988 Election

	sociotr	sociopro	pocketbo	prospock	prosinfl	prosunem	dominant
sociotr	1.0000						
sociopro	0.2465	1.0000					
pocketbo	0.2266	0.1903	1.0000				
prospock	0.2330	0.2107	0.2879	1.0000			
prosinfl	-0.1658	-0.4237	-0.1020	-0.1409	1.0000		
prosunem	-0.2088	-0.3814	-0.0761	-0.1720	0.4788	1.0000	
dominant	-0.0116	-0.0361	-0.0323	-0.0189	0.0332	0.0049	1.0000
pettyb	-0.0181	-0.0583	-0.0589	-0.0324	0.0245	0.0134	-0.0749
workers	-0.0073	0.0239	0.0344	-0.0287	0.0309	0.0019	-0.1422
educatio	-0.0408	-0.0883	-0.1882	-0.1176	0.0452	0.0340	0.0199
nse	0.0072	0.0785	0.1895	0.1068	-0.0740	-0.0763	-0.0525
exterinv	0.0436	0.0791	0.1104	0.0971	-0.0474	-0.0396	-0.0564
exterdeb	0.0347	0.0184	0.1017	0.0911	-0.0349	-0.0172	-0.0154
privatiz	-0.0137	-0.0088	0.0067	0.0034	-0.0130	-0.0377	-0.0591
imports	-0.0096	0.0168	0.0320	0.0079	-0.0196	0.0162	-0.0020
age	0.0585	0.0164	0.1199	0.1787	0.0150	-0.0218	0.0421
Urban	-0.0027	-0.0320	-0.0647	-0.0037	-0.0248	0.0158	0.0105
leftpi	0.0928	0.0672	0.0802	0.0567	-0.0486	-0.0537	-0.0216
rightpi	-0.1228	-0.1106	-0.1025	-0.0949	0.0689	0.0707	-0.0118
risksoci	-0.0071	0.0195	0.0334	0.0284	-0.0241	-0.0119	-0.0272
econrisk	-0.1669	-0.0933	-0.0358	-0.1087	0.0913	0.0739	0.0273

	pettyb	workers	educatio	nse	exterinv	exterdeb	privatiz
pettyb	1.0000						
workers	-0.2429	1.0000					
educatio	0.4384	-0.1552	1.0000				
nse	-0.1858	0.1807	-0.3888	1.0000			
exterinv	-0.0341	0.0017	-0.0744	0.0537	1.0000		
exterdeb	0.0077	-0.0133	0.0037	0.0376	0.1274	1.0000	
privatiz	-0.0673	0.0401	-0.1528	0.1657	0.0820	-0.0239	1.0000
imports	0.0369	-0.0088	0.0611	-0.0071	0.2109	0.0784	0.0124
age	-0.0060	0.0228	-0.3389	-0.0005	0.0071	0.0141	-0.0493
Urban	0.0792	-0.1011	0.2472	-0.1633	-0.0489	0.0183	-0.1587
leftpi	-0.0111	0.0569	0.0162	0.0556	0.0735	0.0818	0.0390
rightpi	0.0234	-0.0379	-0.0115	-0.0506	-0.0781	-0.0749	-0.0325
risksoci	-0.0235	-0.0203	-0.0838	0.0318	-0.0210	-0.0284	0.0124
econrisk	0.0125	-0.0412	-0.0027	-0.0390	-0.0534	-0.0546	-0.0027

	imports	age	urban	leftpi	rightpi	risksoci	econrisk
imports	1.0000						
age	-0.0239	1.0000					
urban	0.0196	0.0327	1.0000				
leftpi	0.0413	-0.0366	0.0040	1.0000			
rightpi	-0.0406	0.0058	-0.0143	-0.7204	1.0000		
risksoci	-0.0163	0.0382	-0.0331	-0.0674	0.0592	1.0000	
econrisk	-0.0184	0.0233	-0.0013	-0.2085	0.1775	0.2028	1.0000

BRAZIL
2002 Election

ideology	dominant	pettyb	formal	informal	educ	income
dominant	1.0000					
pettyb	-0.0159	1.0000				
formal	-0.0953	-0.0702	1.0000			
informal	-0.0761	-0.0560	-0.3369	1.0000		
educ	0.0934	0.1241	0.2538	-0.0592	1.0000	
income	0.2484	0.2295	0.0925	-0.0253	0.3994	1.0000
ideology	0.0100	-0.0070	-0.0539	0.0127	-0.0757	-0.0298
age	0.0170	-0.0002	-0.1913	-0.0381	-0.3873	-0.0046
urban	-0.0376	0.0142	0.0192	0.0081	0.1399	0.1251
leftpi	-0.0272	-0.0118	0.0707	-0.0027	0.0782	-0.0020
centerpi	0.0750	-0.0039	0.0025	-0.0184	-0.0195	0.0023
rightpi	0.0320	-0.0125	-0.0432	0.0049	-0.0813	-0.0462
nopi	-0.0027	0.0225	-0.0268	-0.0071	0.0032	0.0398
risklula	0.0696	0.0255	-0.0350	-0.0110	0.0327	0.0780
riskciro	-0.0164	-0.0460	-0.0543	-0.0136	-0.1168	-0.1428
riskserr	-0.0174	-0.0259	0.0002	0.0085	-0.0012	-0.0590
libeadm	0.1058	0.0406	0.0282	0.0359	0.2636	0.2059
liberegu	0.1301	0.0673	0.0048	0.0082	0.2758	0.2301
libenat	-0.0388	-0.0447	-0.0328	-0.0222	-0.1127	-0.1216
agrarianref	0.0170	-0.0040	-0.0286	0.0087	-0.0369	-0.0291

	ideology
ideology	1.0000
age	0.0215
urban	0.0175
leftpi	-0.1176
centerpi	0.0047
rightpi	0.1400
nopi	0.0054
risklula	0.0900
riskciro	-0.0049
riskserr	-0.1812
libeadm	-0.0082
liberegu	-0.0523
libenat	0.0237
agrarianref	0.1029

	age	urban	leftpi	centerpi	rightpi	nopi	risklula
p157	1.0000						
urban	-0.0382	1.0000					
leftpi	-0.0876	0.0593	1.0000				
centerpi	0.0089	0.0033	-0.0225	1.0000			
rightpi	0.0729	-0.0215	-0.3012	-0.0166	1.0000		
nopi	0.0144	-0.0336	-0.6630	-0.0365	-0.4889	1.0000	
risklula	0.1094	0.0417	-0.3343	0.0238	0.1208	0.2148	1.0000
riskciro	0.0200	-0.0017	-0.0446	-0.0468	-0.0841	0.1094	0.1541
riskserr	-0.0093	0.0130	0.2050	0.0108	-0.2348	-0.0018	-0.0799
libeadm	-0.1088	0.0222	-0.0123	0.0398	0.0062	0.0074	0.1161
liberegu	-0.0469	-0.0449	-0.0342	0.0125	-0.0087	0.0351	0.1360
libenat	0.0294	-0.0214	0.0329	-0.0033	-0.0394	0.0048	-0.0773
agrarianref	-0.0397	-0.0281	-0.0972	0.0123	0.0159	0.0785	0.0865

	riskciro	riskserr	libeadm	liberegu	libenat	agrarian ref
riskciro	1.0000					
riskserr	0.0703	1.0000				
libeadm	-0.0375	-0.0392	1.0000			
liberegu	-0.0462	-0.0407	0.2632	1.0000		
libenat	0.0625	0.0851	-0.1205	-0.2259	1.0000	
agrarianref	0.0365	-0.0686	-0.0382	-0.0023	0.0093	1.0000

BRAZIL
1998 Election

	sociorea	egoreal	preal	inflatio	unemploy	pp	privatiz
sociorea	1.0000						
egoreal	0.5984	1.0000					
preal	0.5151	0.5927	1.0000				
inflatio	-0.1752	-0.1930	-0.2119	1.0000			
unemploy	-0.1659	-0.2008	-0.2155	0.3011	1.0000		
pp	0.2034	0.2245	0.2354	-0.2120	-0.2729	1.0000	
privatiz	0.1452	0.1360	0.1264	-0.1089	-0.1000	0.0575	1.0000
educ	0.0036	0.0176	0.0294	0.0932	-0.0357	0.1047	-0.2065
income	-0.0279	-0.0218	-0.0137	0.0768	0.0202	0.0270	-0.2016
age	0.0518	0.0829	0.0804	-0.0860	0.0353	0.0061	-0.0071
pileft	0.1428	0.1855	0.1444	-0.0374	-0.0889	0.1117	0.0667
picenter	-0.0315	-0.0319	-0.0226	0.0099	-0.0163	-0.0244	0.0104
piright	-0.0903	-0.1150	-0.1099	0.0976	0.1068	-0.0764	-0.0920
nopi	0.0038	-0.0051	0.0241	-0.0612	-0.0203	0.0347	0.0013
riskfhc	0.3632	0.3793	0.3756	-0.2816	-0.3368	0.2512	0.2067
risklula	-0.1635	-0.1899	-0.1725	0.0842	0.0759	-0.0831	-0.1776

	educ	income	age	pileft	picenter	piright	nopi
educ	1.0000						
income	0.4186	1.0000					
idade1	-0.3028	-0.0413	1.0000				
pileft	0.1290	0.0713	-0.0900	1.0000			
picenter	-0.0284	-0.0359	-0.0237	-0.1615	1.0000		
piright	0.0725	0.0791	-0.0445	-0.1730	-0.1485	1.0000	
nopi	-0.0611	-0.0738	0.0892	-0.4118	-0.3536	-0.3788	1.0000
riskfhc	-0.0547	-0.0914	-0.0177	0.2133	-0.0503	-0.1474	0.0044
risklula	0.0245	0.0404	0.0613	-0.2799	0.0488	0.1125	0.0591

	riskfhc	risklula
riskfhc	1.0000	
risklula	-0.2070	1.0000

BRAZIL
1994 Election

	sociotro	egotropi	dominant	pettyb	formal	informal	educ
sociotro	1.0000						
egotropi	0.5740	1.0000					
dominant	-0.0369	-0.0333	1.0000				
pettyb	-0.0237	-0.0364	-0.0378	1.0000			
formal	0.0163	0.0551	-0.0797	-0.1940	1.0000		
informal	-0.0318	-0.0600	-0.0656	-0.1595	-0.3366	1.0000	
educ	-0.0102	0.0410	0.1013	0.1094	0.2248	-0.1467	1.0000
income	-0.0477	-0.0134	0.1516	0.1204	0.1264	-0.1342	0.4985
age	0.0811	0.0814	0.0163	0.0142	-0.1203	-0.1152	-0.2363
urban	-0.0533	-0.0464	-0.0088	0.0149	-0.0245	0.0658	-0.1286
pileft	0.0710	0.0561	-0.0037	0.0179	0.0730	-0.0239	0.1514
picenter	-0.0525	-0.0761	-0.0226	-0.0085	-0.0104	0.0393	-0.0921
piright	-0.0438	-0.0475	0.0070	0.0267	-0.0061	0.0379	-0.0091
nopi	-0.0016	0.0315	0.0180	-0.0091	-0.0292	-0.0319	-0.0146

	income	age	urban	pileft	picenter	piright	nopi
income	1.0000						
age	-0.0914	1.0000					
urban	-0.1540	0.0142	1.0000				
pileft	0.0863	-0.1168	-0.0563	1.0000			
picenter	-0.0631	-0.0128	0.0461	-0.2147	1.0000		
piright	-0.0211	0.0082	0.0750	-0.1238	-0.0917	1.0000	
nopi	0.0064	0.0718	-0.0163	-0.5486	-0.4062	-0.2343	1.0000

```
             | dominant   pettyb   formal informal    educ  ideology     age
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
    dominant |   1.0000
      pettyb |  -0.0655   1.0000
      formal |  -0.1109  -0.2894   1.0000
    informal |  -0.0542  -0.1413  -0.2393   1.0000
        educ |   0.0832  -0.0551   0.3016  -0.1433   1.0000
    ideology |  -0.0134  -0.0059  -0.1159   0.1019  -0.2878   1.0000
         age|   0.0435   0.1201  -0.1189  -0.0197  -0.1396   0.1284   1.0000
       urban |  -0.0064   0.0327  -0.1629   0.1831  -0.2614   0.1012   0.0406
      idleft |  -0.0350  -0.0318   0.1482  -0.0420   0.2036  -0.2551  -0.0605
     idcenter |   0.0022   0.0381  -0.0680   0.0489  -0.1385   0.0716  -0.0445
      idright |   0.0443   0.0276  -0.0085   0.0004  -0.0426   0.1021  -0.0457
     nopartyi |  -0.0081  -0.0138  -0.0308  -0.0188  -0.0043   0.0393   0.0850
     stateint |  -0.0620   0.0492  -0.0641   0.0720  -0.1836   0.0868   0.0234
  egalitarian |  -0.0940  -0.0373  -0.0153   0.0141  -0.2177  -0.0103  -0.0506
    socialism |  -0.0797   0.0121  -0.0924   0.0495  -0.2601   0.0364   0.0727

             |    urban   idleft  idcenter   idright  nopartyi  stateint
egalitarian
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
       urban |   1.0000
      idleft |  -0.1347   1.0000
     idcenter |   0.0939  -0.1533   1.0000
      idright |   0.0977  -0.1375  -0.1372   1.0000
     nopartyi |  -0.0415  -0.4204  -0.4195  -0.3764   1.0000
     stateint |   0.0716  -0.0076  -0.0250   0.0221  -0.0320   1.0000
  egalitarian |   0.0536   0.0506   0.0085  -0.0024  -0.0683   0.0939   1.0000
    socialism |   0.1470   0.0373   0.0055   0.0289  -0.0572   0.0817   0.1490

             |  socialism
-------------+---------
    socialism |   1.0000
```

URUGUAY
1984 Election

```
             | sociotr   sociotrp sociotrf dominant   pettyb    formal
    informal
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
     sociotr |  1.0000
    sociotrp |  0.3428   1.0000
    sociotrf | -0.0360   0.0653   1.0000
    dominant |  0.0249   0.0059   0.0218   1.0000
      pettyb |  0.0482   0.0091  -0.1416  -0.0577   1.0000
      formal |  0.1283   0.1369  -0.1138  -0.1240  -0.1073   1.0000
    informal | -0.0372  -0.0814   0.0281  -0.1116  -0.0966  -0.2077   1.0000
        educ |  0.0579   0.0662   0.0230   0.3262   0.1692   0.0839  -0.0814
      income |  0.1153   0.0466   0.0888   0.2351   0.1641   0.0332  -0.0359
         age | -0.0478  -0.0872   0.0069  -0.1189   0.0167  -0.2753  -0.0343

             |   educ    income     age
-------------+---------------------------
        educ |  1.0000
      income |  0.4327   1.0000
         age | -0.4389  -0.2015   1.0000
```

URUGUAY
1989 Election

```
            | pocket   pocketpast pocketfut dominant   pettyb    formal
informal
------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
     Pocket |  1.0000
  Pocketpast|  0.2940    1.0000
   pocketfut|  0.2310    0.3826    1.0000
   dominant | -0.1066    0.0067   -0.0103    1.0000
      pettyb| -0.0678   -0.0323   -0.0048   -0.0612    1.0000
      formal|  0.0202    0.0017    0.0052   -0.1761   -0.1154    1.0000
    informal|  0.1239    0.0182    0.0389   -0.1068   -0.0700   -0.2014    1.0000
        educ| -0.2281    0.0057   -0.0126    0.3262    0.1398    0.0418   -0.0519
      income| -0.3417   -0.0796   -0.0064    0.2818    0.1881    0.0274   -0.0730
    ideology| -0.0985   -0.1875   -0.2067   -0.0859   -0.0243   -0.1104   -0.0430
         age|  0.0485    0.0866    0.1039   -0.0707   -0.0340   -0.2308   -0.0693
       urban|  0.0520    0.1345    0.1156    0.0231    0.0121   -0.0110   -0.0461


            | educ     income   ideology   age      urban
------------+-----------------------------------------------
        educ|  1.0000
      income|  0.5118    1.0000
    ideology| -0.2654   -0.2162    1.0000
         age| -0.3870   -0.1475    0.1859    1.0000
       urban|  0.1423    0.2343   -0.2016    0.0416    1.0000
```

URUGUAY
1994 Election

	sociotr	Egotropic	dominant	pettyb	formal	informal	educ
sociotropic	1.0000						
Egotropic	0.3644	1.0000					
dominant	0.0010	-0.1246	1.0000				
pettyb	0.0179	-0.0382	-0.1138	1.0000			
formal	-0.0518	-0.0110	-0.1011	-0.0840	1.0000		
informal	0.0867	0.0874	-0.2201	-0.1830	-0.1626	1.0000	
educ	0.0743	-0.1369	0.4449	0.0454	0.0275	-0.0791	1.0000
nse	-0.0205	-0.1712	0.1980	0.0621	-0.0417	-0.1380	0.3004
ideology	-0.2659	-0.0828	-0.1422	-0.0548	-0.0012	-0.0188	-0.2691
Age	-0.0728	0.0101	-0.1228	-0.0366	-0.0586	-0.2205	-0.3596
urban	0.2205	0.0161	0.0334	-0.0069	-0.0176	0.0401	0.1545
colorados	0.0101	0.0092	-0.0575	0.0444	0.0375	-0.0379	-0.1409
blancos	-0.3449	-0.1216	-0.0220	-0.0204	0.0224	-0.0692	-0.0682
nespacio	0.0282	-0.0094	-0.0100	-0.0161	0.0093	0.0142	0.0575
frente	0.2768	0.0629	0.1261	0.0213	-0.0142	0.0412	0.1819

	nse	ideology	Age	urban	colorados	blancos	nespacio
nse	1.0000						
ideology	-0.1103	1.0000					
Age	0.0270	0.1781	1.0000				
urban	0.1199	-0.2788	0.0144	1.0000			
colorados	-0.0424	0.3420	0.1093	-0.1321	1.0000		
blancos	-0.0273	0.2443	0.1243	-0.2134	-0.2734	1.0000	
nespacio	0.0006	-0.0289	-0.0311	0.0332	-0.0584	-0.0570	1.0000
frente	0.0492	-0.5494	-0.1089	0.2423	-0.2797	-0.2729	-0.0583

	frente
frente	1.0000

174

URUGUAY
1999 Election

```
             |sociotropic Egotropic dominant pettyb formal informal    educ
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
 sociotropic |   1.0000
   Egotropic |   0.4046    1.0000
    dominant |   0.0663   -0.0817    1.0000
      pettyb |   0.0423   -0.0438   -0.1303    1.0000
      formal |   0.0130    0.0323   -0.1541   -0.1965    1.0000
    informal |   0.0554    0.0691   -0.1165   -0.1486   -0.1756    1.0000
        educ |   0.0599   -0.1272    0.4008    0.0994    0.0308   -0.1085    1.0000
         nse |  -0.0700   -0.1799    0.1939    0.0721   -0.0210   -0.2360    0.3992
    ideology |  -0.2850   -0.1289   -0.1690   -0.0165   -0.0905    0.0057   -0.2675
         Age |  -0.1212   -0.0064   -0.0996   -0.0116   -0.2128   -0.1449   -0.2601
       urban |   0.0881    0.0118    0.0742   -0.0568    0.1016   -0.0964    0.2294
    colorados|  -0.2678   -0.1340   -0.0855    0.0661   -0.0934   -0.0598   -0.0899
     blancos |  -0.0186    0.0143   -0.0390   -0.0149   -0.0611    0.0089   -0.1145
    nespacio |  -0.0013    0.0214    0.0197   -0.0193    0.0130    0.0263    0.0651
      frente |   0.2590    0.0778    0.1434   -0.0232    0.0501    0.0218    0.2050


             |     nse   ideology    Age     urban  colorados  blancos
nespacio
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
         nse |   1.0000
    ideology |  -0.0570    1.0000
         Age |   0.0894    0.2128    1.0000
       urban|   0.1614   -0.1908   -0.0012    1.0000
    colorados|   0.0142    0.3339    0.1521   -0.0167    1.0000
     blancos |  -0.0261    0.3073    0.1368   -0.1471   -0.1810    1.0000
    nespacio |   0.0084   -0.0132   -0.0641   -0.0098   -0.0583   -0.0532    1.0000
      frente |   0.0287   -0.5823   -0.1305    0.1690   -0.2956   -0.2697   -0.0869


             |   frente
-------------+---------
      frente |   1.0000
```

	sociotr	egotr	sociotrp	egotrp	sociotrf	egotrf	dominant
sociotr	1.0000						
egotr	0.4811	1.0000					
sociotrp	0.4073	0.2613	1.0000				
egotrp	0.4156	0.4517	0.5470	1.0000			
sociotrf	0.0830	0.0465	0.0497	0.0270	1.0000		
egotrf	0.0318	-0.0223	0.0315	0.0145	0.6761	1.0000	
dominant	-0.0107	-0.0143	-0.0323	-0.0168	0.0079	0.0275	1.0000
pettyb	-0.0613	-0.0837	-0.0225	-0.0227	0.0035	-0.0168	-0.0303
formal	-0.0347	-0.0725	-0.0125	-0.0108	0.0095	0.0351	-0.0599
informal	0.0433	0.0253	-0.0184	-0.0010	0.0314	-0.0243	-0.0394
educ	-0.0542	-0.2325	0.0331	-0.0357	-0.0067	0.0889	0.1230
income	-0.1542	-0.3294	-0.0360	-0.1122	-0.0391	0.0935	0.0836
age	-0.0058	0.0680	-0.0850	-0.0171	-0.0262	0.0203	0.0119
urban	-0.1354	-0.1209	-0.1917	-0.1844	0.0190	-0.0381	-0.0057
ideology	-0.3594	-0.2261	-0.2458	-0.2568	0.0386	0.0396	0.0117
pc	-0.2485	-0.1498	-0.1856	-0.1395	-0.0245	-0.0034	0.0764
fa	0.3353	0.1875	0.2399	0.2309	-0.1179	-0.0771	-0.0005
pn	-0.1710	-0.1249	-0.1398	-0.1426	0.0061	0.0001	-0.0237
pi	-0.0539	-0.0159	-0.0154	-0.0345	0.0691	0.0523	-0.0050
risk	0.2751	0.1637	0.2063	0.2047	-0.0551	-0.0636	0.0166

	pettyb	formal	informal	educ	income	age	urban
pettyb	1.0000						
formal	-0.1948	1.0000					
informal	-0.1281	-0.2530	1.0000				
educ	0.2564	0.1377	-0.0956	1.0000			
income	0.2369	0.1604	-0.1679	0.5420	1.0000		
age	-0.0576	-0.1742	-0.1588	-0.2099	0.0041	1.0000	
urban	-0.0601	-0.0321	0.0819	-0.2412	-0.2748	-0.0568	1.0000
ideology	-0.0005	-0.1017	-0.0316	-0.1660	-0.0704	0.1420	0.2609
pc	-0.0025	-0.0271	-0.0813	0.0222	0.0956	0.1432	0.0410
fa	0.0069	0.0759	0.0065	0.1487	0.1005	-0.1003	-0.2272
pn	0.0074	-0.0345	-0.0039	-0.0540	0.0144	0.0912	0.1730
pi	-0.0162	-0.0031	0.0159	-0.0252	-0.0117	0.0130	0.0487
risk	-0.0060	0.0801	0.0503	0.1243	0.0441	-0.1046	-0.1361

	ideology	pc	fa	pn	pi	risk
ideology	1.0000					
pc	0.2890	1.0000				
fa	-0.5838	-0.2153	1.0000			
pn	0.3523	-0.1261	-0.3293	1.0000		
pi	0.0136	-0.0148	-0.0387	-0.0226	1.0000	
risk	-0.3852	-0.1894	0.3917	-0.2329	-0.0159	1.0000

Table C-2 Vote determinants for Leftist, Centrist and Rightist parties: Brazil 1994

```
Multinomial logistic regression                    Number of obs   =       7259
                                                   Wald chi2(28)   =    1320.61
                                                   Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -5752.9423                  Pseudo R2       =     0.1238

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |              Robust
   vote1994  |    Coef.    Std. Err.      z     P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
1            |
   sociotro  |   .7166289   .0563737    12.71   0.000    .6061384    .8271194
   egotropi  |   .4763334   .045325     10.51   0.000    .387498     .5651689
   dominant  |  -.6659137   .2569904    -2.59   0.010   -1.169605   -.1622218
     pettyb  |  -.0372546   .1033532    -0.36   0.719   -.2398231    .1653139
     formal  |   .0700682   .0694617     1.01   0.313   -.0660742    .2062106
   informal  |   .0252829   .0779761     0.32   0.746   -.1275475    .1781133
     escola  |  -.0663233   .0441658    -1.50   0.133   -.1528867    .0202401
     income  |  -.100152    .0253458    -3.95   0.000   -.1498288   -.0504752
        age  |  -.0102091   .0021126    -4.83   0.000   -.0143497   -.0060685
     metrop  |  -.1013905   .0594817    -1.70   0.088   -.2179725    .0151915
     pileft  |   .9775217   .1058016     9.24   0.000    .7701544    1.184889
    picenter |  -.6503059   .1210536    -5.37   0.000   -.8875666   -.4130452
     piright |  -.9551164   .1724239    -5.54   0.000   -1.293061   -.6171718
       nopi  |  -.3511498   .1024856    -3.43   0.001   -.5520178   -.1502818
      _cons  |  -1.18761    .1989661    -5.97   0.000   -1.577576   -.7976434
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
3            |
   sociotro  |   .4782562   .0863758     5.54   0.000    .3089627    .6475497
   egotropi  |   .5327773   .0704603     7.56   0.000    .3946777    .670877
   dominant  |   .3471727   .2788504     1.25   0.213   -.1993641    .8937095
     pettyb  |   .2706725   .1550622     1.75   0.081   -.0332438    .5745888
     formal  |   .2182989   .1125672     1.94   0.052   -.0023287    .4389264
   informal  |   .0374862   .1320176     0.28   0.776   -.2212635    .296236
     escola  |   .2042433   .067447      3.03   0.002    .0720495    .336437
     income  |   .0287637   .0411713     0.70   0.485   -.0519307    .109458
        age  |  -.0112295   .0031435    -3.57   0.000   -.0173906   -.0050683
     metrop  |  -.1238476   .0943653    -1.31   0.189   -.3088001    .061105
     pileft  |  -.9629114   .1944036    -4.95   0.000   -1.343935   -.5818873
    picenter |  -.8921971   .193341     -4.61   0.000   -1.271138   -.5132557
     piright |   .1302757   .19995       0.65   0.515   -.2616191    .5221705
       nopi  |  -.1257342   .1508619    -0.83   0.405   -.4214182    .1699497
      _cons  |  -3.084176   .3009603   -10.25   0.000   -3.674048   -2.494305
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Outcome vote1994==2 is the comparison group)
```

Note: basecategory is Center (2). 1=Left and 3=Right

Table C-3 Vote determinants for PT vs PSDB: Brazil 1994

```
Logit estimates                              Number of obs   =       6230
                                             Wald chi2(14)   =     1003.49
                                             Prob > chi2     =      0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -3554.7435            Pseudo R2       =      0.1598


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
 leftvscleft |    Coef.    Std. Err.      z     P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    sociotro |  .8363418   .0625167    13.38    0.000    .7138114    .9588723
    egotropi |  .5303508   .0474103    11.19    0.000    .4374284    .6232733
    dominant | -.6964798   .2603067    -2.68    0.007   -1.206672   -.186288
      pettyb | -.0791637   .1056063    -0.75    0.453   -.2861483    .1278209
      formal |  .0438037   .0720213     0.61    0.543   -.0973554    .1849627
    informal | -.0088396   .0811584    -0.11    0.913   -.1679071    .1502279
      escola | -.1092117     .04577    -2.39    0.017   -.1989192   -.0195042
      income | -.1177339   .0264048    -4.46    0.000   -.1694862   -.0659815
         age | -.0115901   .0021621    -5.36    0.000   -.0158278   -.0073524
      metrop | -.1240236   .0615802    -2.01    0.044   -.2447186   -.0033286
      pileft |  .9417786   .1090291     8.64    0.000    .7280856    1.155472
    picenter |  -.407692   .1254809    -3.25    0.001    -.65363    -.161754
     piright | -.9533296   .1771813    -5.38    0.000   -1.300598   -.6060607
        nopi | -.3390601   .1054741    -3.21    0.001   -.5457855   -.1323346
       _cons | -1.072413   .2046623    -5.24    0.000   -1.473543   -.6712817
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Note: 1=PT and 0=PSDB

Table C-4 Public Servants and Private Employees as Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Mexico 1994

```
Logit estimates                             Number of obs   =        5148
                                            Wald chi2(8)    =      422.68
                                            Prob > chi2     =      0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -1972.0632           Pseudo R2       =      0.1050


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Socio retros |   .7303168   .0586992    12.44   0.000     .6152685    .8453651
Pocket retro |   .3368253   .0634698     5.31   0.000     .2124268    .4612238
Public servan|   .2868267   .1312981     2.18   0.029     .0294871    .5441662
Private emplo|  -.2649063   .1193069    -2.22   0.026    -.4987436    -.031069
Education    |   .1526883   .0403259     3.79   0.000     .0736509    .2317257
Family income|  -.1700864   .0464568    -3.66   0.000      -.26114   -.0790327
Age          |     .02512   .0370665     0.68   0.498     -.047529     .097769
Risk propensi|  -.5533622   .1440563    -3.84   0.000    -.8357073   -.2710171
Constant     |  -3.916979   .1952623   -20.06   0.000    -4.299686   -3.534271
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table C-5 Conditional Effects of Social Class and Urban residence as Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Mexico 1988

```
Logit estimates                              Number of obs   =        1118
                                             Wald chi2(25)   =      309.45
                                             Prob > chi2     =      0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -335.47576            Pseudo R2       =      0.4572

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
       left  |    Coef.    Std. Err.     z     P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sociotropic  |   .1251676   .1412171    0.89   0.375   -.1516127    .401948
Socio prospe |   .0750286   .1469054    0.51   0.610   -.2129007   .3629579
Pocketbook   |   .1232409   .1719371    0.72   0.474   -.2137496   .4602314
Pocket retr  |  -.276755    .1173671   -2.36   0.018   -.5067903  -.0467198
Pocket pros  |   .0156333   .1127974    0.14   0.890   -.2054457   .2367122
Pros Infla   |   .0525935   .1481269    0.36   0.723   -.2377299   .3429169
Pros Unemp   |  -.0940617   .1557235   -0.60   0.546   -.3992741   .2111508
Dominant     |   .7268661  1.305754     0.56   0.578   -1.832365   3.286097
Pettyb       |  -2.747407   .8476972   -3.24   0.001   -4.408864  -1.085951
Workers      |  -.1075957   .4844125   -0.22   0.824   -1.057027   .8418355
Education    |   .151038    .0633039    2.39   0.017    .0269647   .2751114
Household SES|   .3991405   .1593386    2.50   0.012    .0868426   .7114385
External inv |   .1763878   .1151534    1.53   0.126   -.0493087   .4020844
External deb |   .6831332   .2164736    3.16   0.002    .2588527   1.107414
Privatization|   .0171694   .2195686    0.08   0.938   -.4131772    .447516
Imports      |  -.0110356   .210222    -0.05   0.958   -.4230631   .4009918
Age          |  -.0072525   .0103587   -0.70   0.484   -.0275551   .0130501
Urban        |  -.0637694   .0875805   -0.73   0.467   -.2354241   .1078853
Left partyid |  2.310419    .3988662    5.79   0.000    1.528655   3.092182
Right partyid| -1.635774    .3614262   -4.53   0.000   -2.344156  -.9273918
Social risk  |  -.022635    .2113157   -0.11   0.915   -.4368061   .3915362
Economic risk|  -.8855176   .1662672   -5.33   0.000   -1.211395  -.5596398
Urban*domi   |  -.1899563   .3762914   -0.50   0.614   -.9274739   .5475613
Urban*pettyb |   .5156078   .2144702    2.40   0.016    .095254    .9359615
Urban*work   |   .0052276   .1427871    0.04   0.971   -.27463     .2850853
       _cons | -1.719218   1.417801    -1.21   0.225   -4.498057    1.05962
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

```
. lincom  pettyb+ 1*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |    -2.2318   .6613673    -3.37   0.001    -3.528056   -.9355437
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. lincom  pettyb+ 2*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + 2 urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -1.716192   .4982144    -3.44   0.001    -2.692674   -.7397096
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. lincom  pettyb+ 3*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + 3 urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -1.200584   .3886174    -3.09   0.002     -1.96226   -.4389082
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. lincom  pettyb+ 4*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + 4 urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -.6849764   .3818693    -1.79   0.073    -1.433427    .0634737
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. lincom  pettyb+ 5*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + 5 urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        left |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         (1) |  -.1693687   .4823068    -0.35   0.725    -1.114673    .7759352
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table C-6 Conditional Effects of Social Class and Urban residence as Vote determinants for Leftist parties: Mexico 2000

```
Multiple imputation parameter estimates (5 imputations)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              |              Robust
         left |    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Pocket Retros |  .0167324   .1871702     0.09   0.929    -.3501145    .3835793
Socio Retros  |  .0578038   .1910028     0.30   0.762    -.3165548    .4321624
Dominant      | -.2867133   .8690095    -0.33   0.741    -1.989941    1.416514
Pettyb        |  -1.78555   1.530505    -1.17   0.243    -4.785285    1.214185
Workers       |   .116147   .7109281     0.16   0.870    -1.277247    1.509541
Education     |  .0764626   .1532817     0.50   0.618     -.223964    .3768892
House SES     |  .1040962   .2069157     0.50   0.615    -.3014512    .5096435
Household SES | -.2050185   .1207877    -1.70   0.090    -.4417581    .031721
Ideology      | -.0074665    .058439    -0.13   0.898    -.1220049    .1070719
Distribution  | -.0215421   .0584346    -0.37   0.712    -.1360717    .0929875
Privatization |  .0578279   .0733977     0.79   0.431    -.0860289    .2016847
Age           |  .0141725   .0108503     1.31   0.191    -.0070937    .0354387
Urban         |  .2437974   .2753365     0.89   0.376    -.2958523    .7834471
Left partyid  |  .9955689   1.032145     0.96   0.335    -1.027399    3.018537
Right partyid | -3.952733   .9758226    -4.05   0.000     -5.86531   -2.040156
No party id   | -1.904283   .9957418    -1.91   0.056    -3.855901    .047335
Risk propensi |   -.40491   .4385576    -0.92   0.356    -1.264467    .4546471
Cap Labastida |  .1373143   .0989931     1.39   0.165    -.0567086    .3313373
Cap Fox       |  .2989826   .0921042     3.25   0.001     .1184616    .4795035
Cap Cardenas  | -.2911759   .1112584    -2.62   0.009    -.5092383   -.0731135
Urbanpb       |  1.215525   .8026654     1.51   0.130    -.3576702     2.78872
Urbanwork     | -.5814307   .3952225    -1.47   0.141    -1.356053    .1931912
_cons         |  .2050171   2.272772     0.09   0.928    -4.249535    4.659569
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
902 observations.

. lincom pettyb + 1*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         left |    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) | -.5700249   .9010851    -0.63   0.527    -2.336119    1.196069
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. lincom pettyb + 2*urbanpb

 ( 1)  pettyb + 2 urbanpb = 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         left |    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) |  .6455002   .7549877     0.85   0.393    -.8342486    2.125249
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table C-7 Vote determinants for PRI, PAN and Leftist parties: Mexico 2000

```
Multiple imputation parameter estimates (5 imputations)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |              Robust
    vote2000 |    Coef.   Std. Err.     z    P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
2            |
Pocket Retros|  .1299369   .1275424    1.02   0.308   -.1200416    .3799153
Socio Retros | -.1218722   .1370301   -0.89   0.374   -.3904462    .1467017
Dominant     | -1.720107   .9741628   -1.77   0.077   -3.629431    .1892174
Pettyb       |  .2158165   .4839626    0.45   0.656   -.7327328   1.164366
Workers      |  .2020926   .2325078    0.87   0.385   -.2536144    .6577996
Education    | -.0607943   .1063785   -0.57   0.568   -.2692922    .1477037
House SES    | -.1283108   .1310041   -0.98   0.327    -.385074    .1284525
Household SES|  .1499512   .0881773    1.70   0.089   -.0228732    .3227756
Ideology     | -.0464133   .0387831   -1.20   0.231   -.1224268    .0296002
Distribution | -.0347595   .0383843   -0.91   0.365   -.1099913    .0404724
Privatization|  .0293176   .0361906    0.81   0.418   -.0416147    .1002498
Age          | -.0216733   .0078604   -2.76   0.006   -.0370794   -.0062672
Urban        | -.0367908   .1376478   -0.27   0.789   -.3065754    .2329939
Left partyid |  16.05492   9.794335    1.64   0.101   -3.141623   35.25146
Right partyid| -7.769797   10.21737   -0.76   0.447   -27.79547   12.25588
No party id  | -7.563647   10.29911   -0.73   0.463   -27.74954   12.62224
Risk propensi| -1.248808   .2530436   -4.94   0.000   -1.744765   -.7528518
Cap Labastida|    .46842   .1052643    4.45   0.000    .2621057    .6747343
Cap Fox      | -.4259293   .1097241   -3.88   0.000   -.6409845   -.2108741
Cap Cardenas | -.0537626   .0640827   -0.84   0.401   -.1793623    .0718372
_cons        |  8.668556   10.60927    0.82   0.414   -12.12523   29.46234
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
3            |
Pocket Retros|   .180163   .2201768    0.82   0.413   -.2513756    .6117017
Socio Retros | -.0155661   .2104725   -0.07   0.941   -.4280847    .3969525
Dominant     | -1.941096   1.044064   -1.86   0.063   -3.987424    .1052329
Pettyb       |  .0859886   .8271688    0.10   0.917   -1.535232    1.70721
Workers      | -.6427966   .4095755   -1.57   0.117    -1.44555    .1599567
Education    | -.0058396    .172838   -0.03   0.973   -.3445959    .3329167
House SES    | -.0971048   .2349722   -0.41   0.679   -.5576419    .3634323
Household SES| -.1042746     .13028   -0.80   0.423   -.3596187    .1510695
Ideology     | -.0394487   .0640103   -0.62   0.538   -.1649065    .0860092
Distribution | -.0599482   .0683585   -0.88   0.381   -.1939283    .0740319
Privatization|  .0927982   .0769751    1.21   0.228   -.0580703    .2436667
Age          | -.0019306   .0127142   -0.15   0.879    -.02685     .0229889
Urban        |  .0795846   .2356399    0.34   0.736   -.3822611    .5414304
Left partyid |  16.94386   9.622723    1.76   0.078   -1.916329   35.80405
Right partyid| -11.32746   9.932884   -1.14   0.254   -30.79555   8.140637
No party id  | -9.443033   9.946343   -0.95   0.342   -28.93751   10.05144
Risk propensi|  -.929965   .4459082   -2.09   0.037   -1.803929   -.0560009
Cap Labastida|  .4720721   .1304486    3.62   0.000    .2163975    .7277467
Cap Fox      |  .0607289   .1334532    0.46   0.649   -.2008346    .3222924
Cap Cardenas | -.3136043    .140569   -2.23   0.026   -.5891144   -.0380941
_cons        |  9.217649   10.24027    0.90   0.368   -10.85291    29.2882
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
948 observations.
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Note: basecategory is PRI (1). 2=PAN and 3=Leftist parties

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