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The process of European political unification that began in the mid-twentieth century has taken for granted a certain idea. This is that Europe is composed of ethnonational units. My research shows that some of the central, though largely unexplored intellectual roots of the European Union challenged this idea. German-speaking Jews from the Habsburg Empire, in the period between the 1880s and the Second World War, formulated an idea of Europe that was intended to cut across ethnonational distinctions.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German nationalism had been the gateway for Central European Jews to membership in a European civilization defined by liberal Enlightenment values. Yet the crisis of liberalism at the close of the nineteenth century saw liberal national movements turn into exclusive, ethnonational ones. The cosmopolitan, Enlightenment idea of Europe gave way to an idea of Europe whose membership was confined to sovereign ethnonational components. The multinational Austrian dynastic state and its Jews had little to gain from this development: Jews were not only unwelcome in the ethnically-defined nation state, but by extension, in all of Europe. I show that in response to the national disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, Austrian Jewish liberals, pacifists, Zionists, Diaspora nationalists, and Austro-Marxists formulated a strikingly similar cluster of European ideas. All conceived of Europe as a cultural and intellectual community constituted on the basis of a decentralized, multinational polity in which national affiliation(s) or lack thereof would be defined by individual choice. Though they offered divergent
immediate solutions to antisemitism, their shared dilemma and common intellectual and cultural resources united them in imagining Europe as the long-term solution to the Jewish predicament.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The process of European political unification that began in the mid-twentieth century has taken for granted a certain idea. This is that Europe is composed of ethnonational units. This dissertation shows that some of the central, though largely unexplored intellectual roots of the European Union challenged this. Jewish intellectuals from the Habsburg Empire, in the period between the 1880s and the Second World War, formulated an idea of Europe that was intended to cut across ethnonational distinctions. The Jewish intelligentsia of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Austria promoted this vision of Europe across the political spectrum and despite vast ideological differences. They did so long before support for European unification became mainstream in Europe. In fact, it took two world wars to build consensus in Europe that nationalism was dangerous and that national sovereignty needed to be reigned in. However, I show that such consensus existed decades earlier among Austrian Jews.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German nationalism had been the gateway for Central European Jews to membership in a European civilization defined by liberal Enlightenment values. Yet the crisis of liberalism at the close of the nineteenth century saw liberal national movements turn into exclusive, ethnonational ones. The cosmopolitan, Enlightenment idea of Europe gave way to an idea of Europe whose membership was confined to sovereign ethnonational components. The multinational Austrian dynastic state and its Jews had little to gain from this development: Jews were not only unwelcome in the ethnically-defined nation state, but by extension, in all of Europe. However, they had much to gain from the rejection of ethnonational boundaries and the construction of a unified Europe. Though they offered divergent immediate solutions to antisemitism, their shared predicament and common intellectual and cultural resources united them in imagining Europe as
the long-term solution to the Jewish predicament.

The result was a shared vision of Europe as a supranational, pluralist, liberal polity in which national identification could be the choice of the individual and, consequently, could be flexible or even optional. I establish this thesis by examining ideas of Europe among pacifists, Zionists, Austro-Marxists, and purportedly apolitical writers. Despite the ideological borders between them, members of these groups agreed that European unity founded on tolerance and multinational coexistence and based in a cultural understanding of nationhood, was the solution to their shared predicament. The idea of Europe promoted by these groups rested on an investment in liberalism as the source of Jewish emancipation and integration.

Liberalism, for Viennese Jewish liberals and progressives, entailed a combination of Francophile and especially Anglophile political thought and commitment to the German enlightenment ideals of Bildung and Kultur. Theirs was a standard nineteenth-century perspective which embraced the civilizing mission of education and cultural development, modernity, economic advancement, productivity, political participation, and individual freedom. In the case of Jewish intellectuals in particular, it focused on the freedom to define oneself extra-nationally, as, for example, a Central European cosmopolitan. Thus one of my major findings is that, in their struggle against ethnonationalism, Austrian Jewish intellectuals rejected the connection between liberalism and the nation state and instead posed a connection between liberalism, multinationalism, and cosmopolitanism particularly as exemplified in the Habsburg Monarchy. And while they were not alone in championing peaceful multinational coexistence and the idea of European unity before 1945, they were unique in their ecumenical approach thereto. In other words, while certainly European unity was a goal among groups such as pacifists and socialists, these groups were united by shared ideological convictions, not a predicament (ethnonationalism and racial antisemitism) shared by intellectuals of conflicting ideological commitments.

That Jews who were invested in the ideal of multinational coexistence such as that embodied in the multinational Habsburg Monarchy would also favor European unity might seem fairly obvious. However, there is scarcely any literature on Jewish ideas of Europe in the vast literature on European unity that has grown alongside the process of European political unification since the second half of the twentieth century. What does exist, moreover, has
reached the opposite conclusion. In *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Gerard Delanty outlines the problem that the national idea posed for European Jews. An idea of European political unity premised on alliances between sovereign nations was, he notes, problematic for Jews because

> With regard to the problem of European identity this had the implication that an identity of a more universal nature would have to reconcile itself to the particularist assumptions of culture. Anti-semitism is the most potent instance of this hostility of national culture to trans-cultural influences. Nineteenth century cultural nationalists believed that civilization was based on national-historical cultures: the foundation of Europe was the nation-state. The Jews were excluded from the community because they were supposed to have been a people without a nation.¹

The Jewish response, Delanty argues, was to abandon the optimism with which they had regarded the idea of Europe in the eighteenth century. “Over the course of the nineteenth century,” he continues, “Jewish historical consciousness became increasingly disenchanted with Europe and the West and particularly after 1870, the East was regarded by many to be of greater potential. It is possible,” he concludes, “that Jewish ambivalence about Europe was related to the growing link between nationality and antisemitism after 1870.”²

One could draw this conclusion from the emergence of Zionism, particularly Zionist movements that promoted emigration to an idealized East in Palestine as a weathervane for Jewish sentiment generally. However, Zionists were a small minority of European Jewry. Furthermore, at least in Austria (which produced such central Zionist figures as Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau, and Nathan Birnbaum, among others) the thesis does not even hold for most Zionists. The definition of Europe as composed of ethnonational states that excluded Jews more often gave rise to cosmopolitan reactions, to Jewish ideas of Europe that, to reiterate, cut across national boundaries. Chapter Three will argue that this holds for Zionists as well, who sought to accommodate the national idea of Europe as a platform for Jewish inclusion in, not rejection of, Europe.

²Ibid.
1.1 THE IDEA OF EUROPE: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW

A very brief overview of the historiography on the European idea will provide the backdrop for discussing more specifically the ideas of Europe that Austrian Jews challenged. The literature on the European idea has been largely devoted to finding precedents for European integration. This includes work on the history of pre-EU attempts at European unification as well as history of the idea of Europe which seeks to explain how and when Europeans came to conceive of unity in European culture. Scholars debate about when exactly people within a region roughly corresponding to what we now call Europe began to perceive the cultural, political, and intellectual traditions described above as their common heritage. Some suggest as early as the Holy Roman Empire, others the mid 15th century with the Ottoman threat, and the much-cited Denys Hay argues for the mid 16th century.\(^3\) There is, however, agreement within this slightly triumphalist narrative that Europe is a project that has been in the making for almost three millennia. The Greeks gave Europe its name; the first assertions of a particularly European communal life and political culture resting on notions of the polis, liberty, and the rule of law; and the philosophy which is credited with later European scientific innovation. The Romans spread Greek ideas to most of what is now considered Western Europe; contributed what would become the term civilization to European political and social vocabulary; and left an enduring legal tradition. Christianity provided religious unity to this region and reinforced Greek and Roman ideas of European exclusivity by grounding them in the moral authority of the scriptures. Finally, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment helped reconceptualize this exclusivity in terms of the superior rationalism and scientific accomplishment of European civilization.\(^4\)

Different aspects of this common heritage are reflected in literature from the mid nineteenth century forward corresponding to different religious, political, and nationalist agendas. For the purpose of simplicity, the major ideas can be categorized as follows, though they often overlap: The first group is modern ideas of Christian Europe, which form the backbone

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of contemporary arguments against Turkish membership in the EU. The second includes ideas of European unity as the end goal of modern political movements that in one way or other draw on the Enlightenment secular idea of Europe. These include Socialist and pacifist ideas as well as functionalist ideas of Europe as a capitalist economic community. Third is the idea of Europe as a family of nation states, which often incorporates the idea of Christian Europe if the nation is understood as a Christian one. The fourth group includes various geographic ideas of Europe which tend to focus on the attempt to define the religious or ethnic boundaries of Europe, and relatedly, to distinguish between Europe and Asia.

Jews, as noted above, are almost entirely absent from all of these categories except when they are included as contributors thereto. And in such cases their Jewishness is taken as irrelevant and not discussed. Thus, for example, the Christian idea of Europe largely rests, according to Denys Hay, on Josephus’ attempt to reconcile the Greek idea of the world as divided into Europe, Africa, and Asia, with the Hebrew Bible by associating each of these regions with one of Noah’s sons. Likewise, the European ideas of Jewish Marxists like Otto Bauer (the subject of Chapter Four) tend to be discussed with no reference to their Jewishness and the same goes for Jewish pacifists such as Alfred Fried (the subject of Chapter Two). References to Europe’s “Judeo-Christian” heritage only further obscure Jewish contributions. “Judeo-Christian Europe” suggests an unproblematic continuum, obscuring any tensions between Jewish and Christian perspectives. The following pages are, however, filled with such tensions.

Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently wrong with concentrating on the ideology rather than the heritage of Jewish thinkers in discussing their ideas of Europe—indeed, this dissertation is not a call to ethnic or religious determinism in the history of the European ideas. It must, however, be recognized that ideas of Europe have tended to be tied to attempts to define Europe according to the identity or interest of one group of Europeans. Thus one must ask why there is so little literature that seeks to understand whether Jews had any particular interest in defining Europe one way or another. Two ideas of Europe in particular, the religious “Abendland” idea and the nationalist idea of Europe as a family of nation states

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are particularly important examples because these ideas and the ideologies that underpinned them were the major negative impetus for Austrian Jewish visions of European unity. We now turn to a discussion of these two ideas and an introduction to Austrian Jewish responses.

1.2 THE ABENDLAND IDEA OF EUROPE

In German-speaking Central Europe, Christian ideas of Europe were tied up in the discourse about the “Abendland” (land of the evening), the defense of which was a regular theme of conservative rhetoric in the first half of the twentieth century.7 Abendland ideology was part of the broader rejection of nineteenth-century optimism and faith in progress in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century.8 Dagmar Pöpping has described its vision of Europe as an anti-modern Utopia. The Christian academic elites who articulated the Abendland idea saw themselves as defending Europe from the calamities of modernity, including mass democracy, the involvement of labor unions in politics, women’s emancipation, and liberalism, which was held responsible for the “totalitarian disease of communism,” for secularization, and for the collapse of traditional hierarchies and values.9 They took on the liberal press, which they argued was responsible for the defects of a culture subservient to big capitalism and Jewry,10 drawing on corporatist, antiparliamentarian, antiliberal, and anti-Western theories opposed to the “ideas of 1789.”11 This became a central component of the Christian Democratic Union’s Cold War rhetoric, but had much earlier roots.12 In fact, Pöpping argues that the Cold War Abendland discourse provided an acceptable means for expressing conservative German nationalism, anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and anti-socialist views after the Holocaust and thus represents a continuity between pre- and post-1945 conservative German ideologies.13 It is the pre-1945 manifestation that concerns us here.

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10 *Ibid.*., p. 103.
In Abendland circles, the First World War and the collapse of the German and Austrian empires were interpreted as punishment for these empire’s misguided concessions to Enlightenment ideals, particularly liberalism, reason, humanism, and progress. The remedy, they argued, was not to return to the past order—the movement was not conceived as a political one, but rather as a “party of the spirit.” Rather Abendland circles aimed to reestablish a pre-modern, anti-individualist atmosphere based in “timeless religious values” that would pave the way for a new mentality.

The Abendland idea of Europe was inherently unwelcoming to Jews because it was precisely Enlightenment ideals that had made Jewish emancipation and integration possible. Furthermore, the Abendland idea of Europe excluded Jews not only by virtue of its rejection of modernity and liberalism, but also by Pöpping argues, because it incorporated German nationalism. Though Abendland circles appealed to the “young European generation” (a reference to Mazzini) to put aside “narrow-minded nationalism” in favor of the “community of fate of the Abendland,” this did not mean that their vision of Europe was part of a broader Christian universalist worldview. Abendland circles were not concerned with Europe’s competitiveness or self-sufficiency among competing nations and continents, though they were distressed by Spengler’s diagnosis of the disintegration of Europe into a universal, capitalist, global society. In posing themselves as defenders of Europe, they focused on preserving what they understood as European culture, and they defined this quite narrowly.

This cultural understanding of Europe was well illustrated in the work of Hermann Platz (1880-1945), the central figure in the 1920s in the Abendland circle associated with the Union of Catholic Academics; the young conservative, radical nationalist, and anti-republican circles around the Ring-Bewegung journal; and the Europäischen Revue of the Austrian Prince Karl Anton von Rohan. Platz described the Rhine as the “mythical current” in the center of Europe which endowed those who lived along it with a particular Europeanness. His political program was to integrate this Abendland idea—combining elements of antiquity,

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14 Pöpping, Abendland, p. 87.
15 Ibid., pp. 22, 102.
16 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
17 Ibid., p. 11.
18 Ibid., pp. 8,11.
19 Ibid., p. 16.
Christendom, and the Roman-German legacy—into leading Central European spiritual and political circles so that Europe could once again become the “soul of the world and experience its third rebirth.”

Pöpping concludes from this that his Abendland idea was a spiritually and emotionally infused landscape which permeated all areas of private and public life and was spatially tied to the territorial domain of Charlemagne. Quite explicitly, Platz and others drew from all of this that Germans were the only legitimate heirs to the Abendland tradition and therefore ought to play the leading role in a united Europe. Abendland discourse, therefore, was not simply a Christian movement, but was connected with German nationalist hegemonic interests in Europe. As Pöpping insightfully notes, if the Abendland discourse had been a purely religious one, it would not have achieved such prominence. It was precisely German nationalism that served as a basis for the ecumenical Protestant and Catholic collaboration behind the most successful Abendland circles.

Austrian Abendland proponents such as Karl Gottfried Hugelmann (1879-1939) were careful to note that not simply “Germany,” but Grossdeutschum (larger Germandom, including Austria) was the heart of the Abendland. A devout Catholic and National Socialist, he advocated a combination of an idealized Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa concept, to which we shall turn shortly. He regarded a German-dominated Central Europe as the “organic element” of the Abendland idea.

Not all Austrian Catholic conservatives were as convinced by Hugelmann’s inclusion of ethnonationalist and antisemitic elements. Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1828) had formulated the vision of a cosmopolitan Catholic mission as the Habsburg imperial idea (Staatsgedanke) at the very beginning of the 19th century. Schlegel argued that the Austrian Empire was the true heir to the Holy Roman Empire because the Habsburgs united numerous nations under one dynasty. In the late nineteenth century and the interwar period, Catholic intellectuals

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21 Ibid., p. 102.
22 Ibid., p. 16.
23 Ibid., p. 17.
24 Ibid., p. 18.
25 Ibid., p. 18.
like Ignaz Seipel, the Christian Social leader and twice chancellor in the 1920s, thought that Austria’s Catholic mission was to mediate between conflicting Central European nationalities and could even serve as the basis for a Danubian federation or “mitteleuropäisches Commonwealth.” Finally Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972), founder of the Pan-European Union, and Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874-1929), himself partly of Jewish heritage, also drew on Catholic cosmopolitan imagery in arguing that cosmopolitan Austria, rather than nationalist, protestant Prussia represented the ideal German identity, which could promote multinational coexistence and lasting European and ultimately global unity and peace.

These were, however, minority interpretations—“they remained a small group, easily overwhelmed by nationalist sentiments. Catholic cosmopolitanism never took off.” What some interpreted as a variety of Christian universalism was, for most, tied up with ethnonationalism. The undercurrent of antisemitic German ethnonationalism, more than the Catholic or Protestant aspects of Abendland ideology, made the vision of the Abendland as the basis for a German Christian led Europe unwelcoming to Jews. Over the course of the interwar period Abendland circles increasingly became explicitly antisemitic and most welcomed Hitler’s rise to power in the 1930s. Most of the Austrian Jews discussed here responded with secular ideas of Europe, but Christian ideas generally posed less of a threat to them than those informed by ethnonationalism. The idea of Europe as a family of ethnically homogeneous nation states was the crux of their predicament and it is to these ideas that we now turn.

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28 Pöpping, Abendland, p. 126.
30 Pöpping, Abendland, p. 118.
32 Pöpping, Abendland, p. 28.
1.3 THE NATIONALIST IDEA OF EUROPE

The nationalist idea of Europe is a product of the nineteenth century, during which Renaissance and Enlightenment European ideals fused with the ideal of European political unity. The idea of modernity, an expression of Christian humanism and the Enlightenment value system grounded in reason, progress, and science became associated with the nation state, which came to be seen as the basic building block of European political unity. This process, in Gerard Delanty’s formulation, resulted in an idea of “Europe as the embodiment of the Christian humanist ideal of the West, [which] is anchored in the nation-state that is the carrier of European modernity.”

The nationalist ideal of Europe as a family of modern nation states was pervasive by the mid nineteenth century. However, neither nationalism nor the attendant nationalist idea of Europe necessarily excluded Jews until the 1880s, because depending on how the nation was understood, this could be an inclusive, even pluralist community. Nationalist movements, it must be remembered, were associated with the political left in the first half of the nineteenth century. Mazzini’s Young Europe movement is the classic mid-nineteenth-century example.

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) founded the radical secret society Young Italy in 1831 and Young Europe in 1834. His republican platform called for the creation of a unitary Italian republic and ultimately a United States of Europe composed of national republics. Though inspired by the Jacobin model, Mazzini saw 18th century republicanism as excessively individualist and instead emphasized “association,” specifically in the form of nationalism. Mazzini’s anti-clerical, democratic, movement for Italian national unity failed in its uprisings, but it attracted as many as fifty thousand members. Though liberals disagreed with Mazzini and other radicals about the form of government—most liberals favoring constitutional monarchies—they shared a commitment to shifting the balance from dynastic and religious to national loyalty. In the charter of Young Europe written in 1834, Mazzini laid

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33Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, p. 75.
34Ibid., p. 75.
36Ibid., p. 80.
37Ibid., p. 91.
out the principles for European unification stating that “...every man and every people has a special mission; the fulfillment of which determines the individuality of that man or of that people, and at the same time bears a part in the accomplishment of the general mission of humanity.” This humanitarian mission was embodied in a shared “faith in liberty, equality, and progress.”

Thus, to reiterate, the national republic encapsulated the principles upon which Europe was based. Membership in a nation was critical to membership in Europe, but this did not pose much of a problem for Jews as long as the nationalism was liberal.

Joining the German nation in the mid-nineteenth century meant affirming liberal political principles, acquiring the language, and gaining familiarity (and appreciation) for German culture (understood most importantly as literature). As Pieter Judson has pointed out, this did not entail taking on an ethnicity and thus bore little resemblance to the futile attempts at national assimilation at the close of the century. As Judson notes, all of the nationalist movements within the Habsburg Monarchy sought not so much to distinguish themselves from each other in terms of ethnic difference, but to assert the authority best to represent the liberal principles they all claimed as their own nationalist values. They all, in other words, saw their own nationalist movement as the true embodiment of cultural development, modernity, political participation, and economic advancement.

The liberal values in the civilizing mission of the Germanization discourse were education, productivity, and active masculine individualism. These values had nothing to do in particular with the German nation but rather with upward mobility. Thus learning German, if Germanness was essentially defined by liberalism, did not mean becoming German.

The 1848 understanding of Deutschtum, Gregor Thum notes, since it meant a cultural and political commitment, could be taken on by other ethnic groups. And because the nationalist movements of this period were legitimized through liberalism, the German imperialist project of spreading Deutschtum eastward had to be couched in terms of a mission to raise the level of humanity and civilization. Liberalism, nationalism, and imperialism were, therefore, com-

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patible.\textsuperscript{40} The major point of contention between liberal national movements during the 1848 Revolution was the form of polity they advocated. Czech nationalists like Frantisek Palacky promoted reforming the existing multinational Austrian state, while German nationalists argued for German unification in a new, national empire. The conflict, then, in Judson’s view, concerned first and foremost the promotion of the existing order (multinational Austria) and a new order (united German national empire).\textsuperscript{41}

There was nothing explicit about liberal, mid-nineteenth-century German nationalist ideology that excluded acculturated Jews, and some of the central “forty-eighters” were Jewish. Jews participated in both the German and Austrian contingents, on both sides of the \textit{Grossdeutsch} and \textit{Kleindeutsch} debate over whether a united Germany should include the Habsburg Monarchy (\textit{Grossdeutsch} solution) or not. The German Jewish delegate to the 1848 parliament, Ignaz Kuranda (1812-1884), contributed to the German imperialist vision of the East as Germany’s frontier.\textsuperscript{42} However, while he participated in the discourse on the East that in part shaped modern German national identity, he was also uncomfortably aware of his colleagues’ concern with ethnic boundaries. Liberals were wary of accusations that their movement was a Jewish one and were hesitant to allow Jews leadership positions, though no official barriers existed.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the liberal nationalist idea of Europe as a family of nation states was, if not unequivocally, at least in principle, open to Jews.

However, the united German national empire that failed to emerge from the 1848 Revolution, once achieved had tremendous implications for the Jews. Austria’s defeat at Königgrätz in 1866 and Prussian unification of Germany in 1871 “meant that the centre of gravity of European politics shifted decisively from Metternich’s Vienna to Bismarck’s Berlin. . . . From Hegel and Fichte through Lagarde and Treitschke to Chamberlain, Bernhardi, and Naumann, the claim that Germany was destined to dominate Europe became increasingly strident...”\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42}Thum, “The German Frontier in the East and the Liberal Revolution of 1848”.


\textsuperscript{44}Timms, “National Memory”, p. 906. Others have been less willing to discuss Lagarde’s thinking as representative. H. C. Meyer has described Lagarde’s \textit{Mitteleuropa} idea as “a strange mixture of Prussian dynastic conservatism, anti-Semitism, and radical nationalism.” Thus while Lagarde was a major figure, his
Though ideologically, it should have followed from the ideal of *Deutschtum* that the German Empire could include non-Germans, this was, from the Empire’s inception forward, a point of contention. Bismarck was dubious of national minorities and particularly distrustful of the Polish population from the outset.\(^45\) The concept of a Central Europe united under and dominated by Germany found its clearest expression in the 1915 bestseller, *Mitteleuropa*,\(^46\) by Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), which advocated the union of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires after the war. The text is remarkable for its self-assured, blasé proposals for managing multinationalism within *Mitteleuropa*. Naumann seems to assume that other ethnic groups will simply assimilate, as if entirely unaware of the heated national conflicts in late nineteenth-century Central Europe.\(^47\) His discussion of the inclusion of Jews is exemplary:

> The Jewish question is more of a social than a national question in the stricter sense of the word, because nowhere in Central Europe is the Jew as such state-seeking. . . . What the Jew justly demands is recognition as a citizen, nothing more! In which national community he chooses to seek this recognition is his own business.”\(^48\)

Though Naumann notes elsewhere that Germany has something to learn from Austria about managing multinational coexistence,\(^49\) here, as in his discussions of other minority groups, he seems simply to assume that as long as Germans are considerate to others, they will accept that “*Mitteleuropa* will be in its core German”\(^50\) and that though *Mitteleuropa* will be practically supranational, it will be culturally national.

Though Naumann’s understanding of *Deutschtum* was cultural, not racial like that of the Pan-Germans, and his motivations were imperialist rather than ethnonational, there

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\(^{47}\) Thum, “Mythische Landschaften”, p. 185.

\(^{48}\)”Die Judenfrage ist mehr soziale Frage als Nationalitätenfrage im engeren Sinn, denn nirgends in Mitteleuropa kann der Jude für sich allein staatsbildend auftreten. Was der Jude mit Recht verlangt, ist bürgerliche Anerkennung, nicht mehr! In welcher Volksgruppe er sich diese Anerkennung suchen will, ist seine Sache.” Naumann, *Mitteleuropa*, p. 72.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Quoted in Thum, “Mythische Landschaften”, p. 185.
are problems with his equation of German Austria with German Mitteleuropa. This is because it seems he sees the multinational status of Mitteleuropa as a phase gradually to be passed through on the way to a more homogeneous German Central Europe. That this transition would be achieved gradually and naturally due simply to what Naumann saw as the inevitable appeal of Deutschtum to other groups rather than through a campaign of national assimilationist pressure, does not make it equivalent to the Austrian idea. Though German was unquestionably the language and culture of power and upward mobility in the Habsburg Monarchy, multinationalism was conceived as one of that empire’s permanent features. That the emperor Franz Joseph famously owned the military uniform worn by each national group within the empire and wore it when visiting the appropriate region is illustrative.\textsuperscript{51} Cross-cultural or supranational identity as well as minority national aspirations seem less welcome in Naumann’s German dominated Central Europe.

Thus the Mitteleuropa idea—though nominally transnational in that Naumann encouraged Germans to think of themselves as “German Central Europeans,” citing the model of German Austrians in the Habsburg Monarchy—fit very much into the mold of a Europe of nations. Mitteleuropa would be a multinational region, but it would represent the German national component of Europe. German Jews had little room for negotiation in this environment. They either attempted to become accepted as part of the German nation or they found themselves outside of the nation and, by extension, excluded from Europe. As we shall see, the situation in Austria was more complicated.

This brief outline of the two major competing categories of European ideas—Christian and nationalist—provides some context for the Austrian Jewish responses discussed in the body of the dissertation. However it must be remembered that the figures discussed here did not formulate their ideas of Europe primarily in reaction to these competing ideas, but in response to the ideologies that underpinned them. That is, Austrian Jewish ideas of Europe represented, first and foremost, cosmopolitan reactions to the failure of liberalism and triumph of ethnonationalism in Central Europe, not participation in an international debate about European unity. Though I show that Austrian Jewish intellectuals did intervene

in international debates about European unity, perhaps more significant is that they did so as an ecumenical community of cosmopolitan Jewish Central Europeans. I attempt to reconstruct the cultural and political environment, the unique Jewish predicament, and the intellectual resources that Austrian Jewish intellectuals shared in formulating this idea of European unity. While this has important implications for the literature on the European idea, my primary contribution is, therefore, to the historiography on Jewish intellectuals of the late Habsburg Empire and interwar Central Europe. We now turn to a brief overview of that context.

1.4 AUSTRIAN JEWISH COSMOPOLITANISM

If, as Gerard Delanty noted, the idea of a Europe of nations clashed with the “trans-cultural perspectives” of supranational communities like the Jews,\(^{52}\) then the Jews of Austria-Hungary provide the ultimate example. The Jewish intelligentsia of Germany and of Austria-Hungary embraced transnational ideals in response to ethnonationalism.\(^{53}\) However, as Malachi Haim Hacohen argues, “cosmopolitanism had different patterns in Germany and Austria.”\(^{54}\) As mentioned above, German and Austrian Jewish emancipation was tied to the liberal German nationalist movement before 1848. After the revolution, however, while the German states embarked on the project of national unification, Austria undertook the challenge of managing multinationalism, most immediately searching for ways to accommodate the Czech and Hungarian national aspirations. The shift in trajectories culminating in Austria’s expulsion from the German confederation in 1866 and the Ausgleich with Hungary in 1867 created very different environments for the Austrian and German Jewish intelligentsias. While German Jews had little option but to reaffirm their assimilationist aspirations—“integration through Bildung into a national culture considered cosmopolitan on account of its humanism”—in an increasingly hostile climate, German acculturated Aus-

\(^{52}\) Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, p. 75.


\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 118.
The Habsburg Empire’s multinationalism allowed for a more complex Jewish self-definition. “Austrian Jewish intellectuals toyed with broader options, including loyalty to the imperial transnational ideal, even against the German nationalists. The ambiguity of the Austrian-German nation, the existence of a multinational imperial order, and the intelligentsia’s multinational origins made Austrian Jewish political ideals more diverse than German Jewish ones.”

When, in the late nineteenth century, nationalists in both Germany and Austria-Hungary abandoned liberalism, Jews in the Habsburg Monarchy at least found themselves in a multinational state ruled by a dynasty which had as little to gain from ethnonationalism as they did and actively promoted supranational, imperial loyalty (however unsuccessful this was outside the Jewish community). “The ambiguity of Austrian nationality” Malachi Haim Hacohen notes “gave Jews an opportunity missing elsewhere for negotiating Jewish national identity. Jews were the only ethnic group to adopt enthusiastically the official Staatsgedanke.” This transcended ideological differences:

The politics of Jewish identity was notoriously contentious, but poor Galician traditionalists and refined Viennese assimilationists, orthodox rabbis and liberal scholars, Zionists and socialists, all declared their loyalty to the dynasty and the supranational empire. . . . The Austrian Staatsgedanke seemed to offer a patriotism whose underlying rationale was not ethnonational but multinational, making Jewish participation unproblematic.

One example of the resulting divergence in German and Austrian Jewish political thought is the legal theory of Hermann Heller (1891-1933) and Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). Heller, a German Jewish legal scholar and major influence behind the Weimar constitution, focused on developing the theoretical relationship between social democracy and the nation state. He was an advocate of European unity, which he hoped would safeguard national cultures. Heller formulated this position in opposition to Kelsen who drafted the Austrian constitution which was enacted in 1920. Kelsen, an advocate of international law, fashioned a looser, vaguer, and more pluralist vision of the state that placed less emphasis on national sovereignty. Also as an advocate of some sort of supranational polity such as a World State. Kelsen’s interests

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55 Hacohen, “From Empire to Cosmopolitanism”, p. 118.
56 Ibid., p. 118.
were motivated by the ideal that individual human rights (not nations) be represented by an international legal body.\textsuperscript{59}

One could doubtless point to many exceptions, but Heller and Kelsen illustrate well the political climates in which they worked and, as the following chapters show, Kelsen’s investment in pluralism made him typical of the progressive Viennese Jewish intelligentsia. As Hacohen argues, the Central European Jewish intelligentsia wrote under the impression of the triumph of ethnonationalism and the collapse of Central Europe. They set forth two models of Austrian cosmopolitanism. The first emphasized the Enlightenment heritage, universal humanity, and internationalism. The second stressed the imperial idea of supranational unity in multinational diversity. Both recognized that the Habsburg Empire advanced cosmopolitanism by mediating between universal humanity and cultural particularity.\textsuperscript{60}

Against this background, this dissertation makes the argument that the Monarchy and its cosmopolitan \textit{Staatsgedanke} served as a starkly different model not only for Jewish identity, but for Jewish ideas of Europe than that of the German nationalist ideas, including the \textit{Mitteleuropa} idea. Austrian Jewish ideas reflected these values and were thus in opposition to the prevailing idea of a Europe of nations.

\subsection*{1.5 METHOD AND SOURCES}

Like Jewish attachment to Austrian cosmopolitan ideals, Austrian Jewish ideas of Europe spanned the political spectrum. Thus this dissertation is structured around the European ideas of leading Jewish figures within Austria’s liberal pacifist, Austro-Marxist, and Zionist movements. That the avowedly a-political writers discussed in the last chapter shared their vision of Europe simply underscores the idea’s ideological flexibility. Differences in class and region—some of these key figures were from wealthy, assimilated Viennese families, others from poor, Yiddish-speaking Galician backgrounds—are evident but do not undermine the common features of their thinking about Europe.


\textsuperscript{60}Hacohen, “Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism”, p. 111.
All, however, were acculturated and most were secular. The liberal Viennese rabbi Adolf Jellinek (1821-1893), a generation older than most of the figures discussed here, certainly shared their liberalism and the ideal of cosmopolitan _Deutschum_. The situation was different among the orthodox intelligentsia in the eastern provinces of the Empire. Though the orthodox rabbi and _Reichsrat_ member, Joseph Bloch (1850-1923), was committed to supra-national Austrian identity—"If one could construct a specifically Austrian nationality," he wrote "Jews would form its foundation"—he was less concerned with Europe. In his magnum opus _Israel und die Völker (Israel and the Nations)_ , which argues for Jewish inclusion in Austria, there is no mention of Jewish inclusion in Europe. Bloch and the orthodox generally were more concerned with the immediate problem of preserving the relationship between the dynasty and the Jewish community (as protection against rising antisemitism) than with Jewish integration in a modern, liberal, secular Europe.

While Bloch shared a concern with multinational coexistence with the key figures discussed here, multinationalism was not a stepping stone for progressive cosmopolitanism as it was for others. The dissertation’s key figures—Alfred Fried, Oscar Jászi, Max Nordau, Theodor Herzl, Alfred Nossig, Nathan Birnbaum, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer, Stefan Zweig, and Joseph Roth—represent the spectrum of thinking about European unity that grew out of Jewish cosmopolitan responses to ethnonationalism. Given that the vision that I argue they shared was cosmopolitan, one might rightly ask if there is anything particularly Jewish about it.

Versions of this question are central in the historiography on Central European Jewry. Most famously, Stephen Beller has turned the question on its head by arguing that _fin de siècle_ Viennese culture was, in fact, Jewish culture: Gentile Austrians contributed to Viennese Jewish culture, rather than the reverse. He makes the argument by pointing, for example, to the traditional Jewish emphasis on education in explaining the boom in nineteenth-century Viennese intellectual and cultural creativity. Marsha Rozenblit goes

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63 Josef Samuel Bloch. _Israel und die Völker_. Berlin; Wien: B. Harz, 1922.

further in the attempt to pin down a specific Austrian Jewish identity and, therefore also specifically Jewish culture. She characterizes the Austrian identity described above not as ambiguous (as Hacohen does) but as rooted in a “tripartite identity.” This means that Jews had three, coexisting identities—Jewish by nationality, Austrian by dynastic loyalty, and German, Hungarian, Czech, and so on, by local acculturation.\footnote{Marsha Rozenblit. \textit{Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I.} Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.} There is, undoubtedly, some truth to this, but one has to note that the very attempt to pin down an identity, even the flexibility of three coexisting identities, is in tension with the rejection of such essentialism shared by all among the Viennese Jewish intelligentsia, cosmopolitan Zionists included. Thus while I argue over the course of the following chapters that an Austrian Jewish idea of Europe emerges, it is the rejection of national essentialism, the refusal of ethnonational identities, that is the basis of that idea.

Each chapter introduces the key figures and texts, situates these in their historical and intellectual environments, and then discusses the spectrum of ideas of Europe against this background. Most of the texts used are published, though manuscript sources, especially correspondence and journals, are also used. This is because ideas of Europe, though sometimes alluded to in letters, journals, and short, journalistic pieces, were more often developed as part of major theoretical works having to do with the relationship between the nation, the state, and the international community; or in nostalgic reflections in memoirs. Different aspects of the formative context—the crisis of liberalism and rise of ethnonationalism in Central Europe—are highlighted in the chapters as relevant. As much as possible, the ideological movements within which each key figure operated are sketched, but undoubtedly my discussion of pacifism will irritate peace historians, as will my discussions of Austro-Marxism and Zionism historians of those areas, not to mention my attempt to analyze literary figures in the final chapter. My purpose is to look broadly across fields for responses to a predicament that transcended them just as, I will argue, did the idea of Europe that emerged therefrom.

Chapter Two\footnote{Chapter Two is the first body chapter, the introduction having been labeled Chapter One in compliance with Pitt ETD formatting.} is focused on ideas of Europe and proposals for European integration in the pacifism of Austrian Jewish liberal internationalists. The central figure is Alfred
Fried, Nobel Peace laureate and founder of the German Peace Society. Fried saw European integration as a necessary precursor to peace and began his work in Germany rather than Austria because he saw Germany as the main impediment to European integration. The divergent trajectories of Germany and Austria after the Austro-Prussian War—the former toward state-sponsored national homogenization and the latter toward state-sponsored supranational dynastic loyalty—were reflected in the relative success of Fried's ideas in both empires. After limited success in Berlin, Fried returned to Vienna, where he found support and inspiration among social reformers including the Monists and the Freemasons and developed an early functionalist program for European integration.

The end goal of this program of gradual economic, social, cultural, and ultimately political integration was an Esperanto-speaking “Pan-Europe.” Oscar Jászi, a Hungarian Jewish sociologist and historian drew on similar sources in proposals for a Danubian federation which he hoped would spur European integration. His and especially Fried’s ideas were subsequently borrowed by the Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his Pan-European Union—the flagship movement for European integration in the interwar period. However, I argue that Pan-Europe cannot be fully understood independently of Fried’s attempt to challenge the idea of Europe as composed of ethnically homogeneous nations, a concern that was not Coudenhove-Kalergi’s.

Chapter Three examines cosmopolitan Zionist visions of Jewish autonomy or statehood as platforms for Jewish membership in a Europe based on Enlightenment liberal values. Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau imagined a decentralized Jewish state in which German language, art, and opera were the common currency of a diverse population. I argue that they had transposed a standard 1848 liberal idea of Europe—an idea challenged by the rise of ethnonationalism—to the Jewish state. They believed that this state in turn would help reform Europe and allow for Jewish inclusion. This resuscitation of an earlier European idea, I argue, was one of the long-term goals of their Zionism. The chapter further shows that despite ideological differences between Zionist factions—those like Alfred Nossig who imagined an independent Jewish state, like Hans Kohn, who envisioned a bi-national Jewish/Arab state, or like Nathan Birnbaum, who sought cultural autonomy within Europe—all shared a cosmopolitanism and a common goal of Jewish membership in a united Europe defined not
by ethnonational components, but by shared Enlightenment heritage. In a sense, although immediate responses to anti-Semitism differed, all Zionists sought a place where Jews could be cosmopolitan Europeans.

Chapter Four deals with the Marxists Viktor Adler and Otto Bauer. Since national disintegration posed a common threat to both the Habsburg state and to the Social Democratic Party, the goal of Austrian Marxists was to protect both. Thus, during the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy when liberalism was in crisis, Austro-Marxists aimed their reforms not at undermining the empire, but at buttressing it. Otto Bauer proposed a plan to democratize and decentralize the empire as a federation in 1906. He saw this federation as a building block toward a “United States of Europe.” Otto Bauer’s ideas of the nation, socialism, and Europe, were crucially dependent on the German liberal nationalism of 1848. I show that unlike the Zionists, Bauer and Adler viewed a culturally defined German nation as the path to Jewish membership in Europe. Nevertheless, they shared the idea that European integration would be the answer to the Jewish predicament.

Chapter Five explores nostalgia for the multinational Habsburg Monarchy as an inspiration for ideas Europe in the work of the writers Stefan Zweig and Joseph Roth. The supranational Austrian idea, though insufficient to prevent the national disintegration of the empire, underlay the common cosmopolitanism of the figures discussed in the first three chapters. It represents a synthesis of ideological opposites and is grounded in the elevation of the German enlightenment ideas of Kultur and Bildung over the idea of national sovereignty. Roth’s eulogies to the Habsburg Empire express indifference toward ideological coherence and a celebration of multinational coexistence based on such indifference. Stephan Zweig’s biographies construct a canon of great Europeans based on the Enlightenment ideal of the person of culture. His choices of “European” qualities represent a vision of Europe shared by Austrian Jews across the political spectrum, as shown in the previous three chapters.
2.0 THE AUSTRIAN JEWISH ORIGINS OF “PAN-EUROPE”

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In 1909, Alfred Fried, an Austrian Jewish publisher and founder of the German Peace Society, created a division within the society for the purpose of producing propaganda for the idea of “Pan-Europe.” The idea grew from a study Fried had conducted and published on the Pan-American Union, an organization of Latin and North American diplomatic representatives in Washington, D.C. that promoted economic integration, standardization of transport, and cultural and educational exchange.1 Although Fried was to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911, his ideas went generally unnoticed outside pacifist circles. Years later, however, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi explicitly cited Fried’s work as the inspiration behind his own Pan-European Union, the institutional basis of the most prominent movement for European integration in interwar Europe. Curiously, despite the ultimate impact of Fried’s ideas, history has not been kind to him: Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi has been called “the ideological father of a modern, unified Europe”2 while Fried’s seminal writings on unification have been forgotten.

Fried remains an enigma. Petra Schönemann-Behrens describes him as someone who never quite fit in anywhere. Despite being the chief publicist and theoretician of pacifism in German-speaking Europe, he never held a leadership position in the German Peace Soci-

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ety. He was a secular Jew without strong ties to the Jewish community, a leftist with no party affiliation, and an intellectual without academic training. His roots were in the Bildungsbürgertum (educated members of the middle class), but he was never fully accepted in those ranks despite a lifetime of aspiration. He even remained an outsider within the peace movement.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore two related historical and historiographical phenomena: first, the discrediting of Fried and his like-minded collaborators in the early twentieth century and, second, the lack of recognition of his foundational role for European unification in contemporary scholarship. The chapter seeks to challenge the latter, historiographical evaluation, and to explain and contextualize the former. Put briefly, my argument is that Fried’s ideas were originally discredited not because of their substance, but because they were motivated by concerns that were foreign to the mainstream political and intellectual movements of his time. First, Fried’s ideas arose as a particularly Jewish response to the rise of ethnonationalism in the multinational Habsburg Empire. Second, particularly after 1903, his ideas were based on scientific, sociological organicism. Both elements were anathema to the neo-romantic national movements that dominated fin de siècle Central and East European politics. Although the substance of those ideas was later adopted, almost without revision, by Coudenhove-Kalergi, Coudenhove-Kalergi embedded them in a vision of Christian Europe based in European national identity. Contemporary literature has taken for granted that the formative context of twentieth century European unification was Coudenhove-Kalergi’s, not that of his very differently oriented predecessor. By recovering the original contexts of Fried’s idea of Europe, I hope to challenge this evaluation.

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3It cannot be sufficiently stressed how rare this was—most secular Austrian Jews continued to move in almost exclusively Jewish social and professional circles. Fried once noted the dearth of leading Jewish pacifists, saying that he knew only one, who was French.

4Bildungsbürgertum refers to those among the middle class who owed their status to education rather than capital. They tended to be university educated and to work in the professions, the clergy, as teachers and professors, and as high-ranking members of the civil service. Their vocations as well as the various certificates served as evidence of their Bildung. See Gerald Holton. “Einstein and the Cultural Roots of Modern Science”. In: Science in Culture. Ed. by Peter Louis Galison, Stephen Richards Graubard, and Everett Mendelsohn. Edison, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2001, pp. 1–44, p. 12.

2.2 ALFRED FRIED

Alfred Fried (1864–1921) was born in Vienna to an educated bourgeois Hungarian Jewish family. His mother’s side was known in Hungarian literary and musical circles. Not much is known about his father’s side, but it seems safe to assume that it was more traditional and religious since Fried’s paternal uncle was devoutly Orthodox.\(^6\) Fried’s father, however, had bourgeois entrepreneurial ambitions. Immediately after the couple married in 1863, he moved them to Vienna so that he could pursue a millinery business.\(^7\) The business seems to have been quite successful. Seven years after arriving in Vienna, the family moved from the middle-class third district to the wealthy villa district of Doebling.\(^8\) To a certain extent, this trajectory was typical for late 19th century Viennese Jewry: after restrictions on Jewish residency in Vienna were lifted during the 1848 Revolution, Vienna’s Jewish community consisted mostly of immigrants who arrived in waves from the Czech lands and Hungary. They came to Vienna—at once the center of the supranational, cosmopolitan empire and the center of German language *Kultur* which Jews associated with modernization and progress—in search of economic and social advancement.\(^9\)

The family’s choice of residences was unusual. Most of Vienna’s Jews—the assimilated as well as the Orthodox—were concentrated in the second district (called Leopoldstadt or “Matzoh Island”), the ninth district, and the first district or “inner city”.\(^10\) Choosing the mostly non-Jewish, middle-class third district and the overwhelmingly non-Jewish, wealthy Doebling district demonstrates greater concern with social class than with building ties to the Jewish community. Indeed, Fried later wrote that he “experienced almost nothing of Jewish belief” during his upbringing.\(^11\) During the day, he was sent to a private boarding

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\(^6\)&#x2002;Fried received a letter from this uncle in Hungary congratulating him on his first book. Schönenmann-Behrens, “‘Organisiert die Welt’”, p. 39.

\(^7\)&#x2002;Ibid., pp. 14-16.


\(^10\)&#x2002;On Jewish demographic distribution in Vienna, see Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna*.

\(^11\)&#x2002;Schönenmann-Behrens, “‘Organisiert die Welt’”, p. 19. This is not to say that Fried did not identify with the Jewish community. As a teenager, he wrote in his diary: “Today I came across [Heinrich] Grätz, *History of the Jews*, and brought it home from the shop, and began to read it. It will interest me and it is time that I knew about the history of my people (Volk).” Quoted in ibid., 27ff.
school and, at home, had a private tutor. Fried described these years as the best of his life. However, he also faulted the boarding school for glorifying war and for inciting militarism among its students. He even noted that the most popular game in the school yard was “Prussians and French.” Fried blamed this largely on the lack of Austrian textbooks:

Along with my enthusiasm for war, I developed hatred for the French. This resulted from the fact that lessons and children’s books with an Austrian perspective did not yet exist. It was editions from the German Reich that came into our hands.12

In contrast, Fried’s home was liberal and humanist. Fried cited this general orientation and, more specifically, the fact that his parents did not shelter him from news of the horrors of war and their empathy with its victims as an important source for his pacifism.13

However, the period of prosperity did not last. Fried’s father lost everything during the Stock Exchange crash of 1873 and the family was forced to leave Doebling and move to Leopoldstadt, the largely Jewish district where the majority of poor, recent East European Jewish immigrants lived. Fried finished school there and the family managed to send him to Gymnasium. He only attended three of the four required years. In 1879, he left to apprentice with a book seller. The reasons for his departure are not entirely clear. It is possible that his parents were simply unable to afford the tuition.14 Fried did not elaborate on this period of his life in his memoir, but it must have been difficult. As the oldest of nine siblings, the expectations of him were tremendous, particularly as after 1873 his father was never able to secure stable work again.

Fried continued his studies at home in the little spare time he had while apprenticing. He read widely in history and literature, studied Latin, learned stenography, and hoped to solve the family’s problems by becoming a successful writer. He wrote in the journal he briefly kept when he was fifteen: “I want to learn, to study, I must, I must pull myself out of the mire of ignorance and dilettantism.”15 After failed attempts to get poems published and discouraging responses to his writing, he decided to concentrate on securing a more traditional stable living in publishing. Nevertheless, he continued to idealize what he called

13Ibid., pp. 5-6.
14Schönemann-Behrens, “‘Organisiert die Welt’”, pp. 20-21.
15Quoted in ibid., pp. 24-45.
“geistigen Menschen” or “Edelsmenschen”—those who devoted themselves to the moral and cultural progress of humanity at the expense of their material well-being.¹⁶

During this time, Fried saw an exhibit of paintings of the Russo-Turkish war by Wallil Wassiljewitsch Werescagins. Later, he would identify this event as providing the single most important impetus for his pacifism:

I went on a Sunday afternoon, without any specific expectations, only in order to see a collection which was much discussed in the newspapers in the Künstlerhaus, where Werescagin [sic] exhibited his paintings of the Russo-Turkish war. This exhibition visit gave my life its decisive direction. There I learned to hate war. There I was made clearly conscious of how horrible and abominable war was. Still today, after four decades, I feel so strongly the outrage that flared up in me as I viewed these paintings. . . . And finally the painting that unleashed my anger the most: Alexander II . . . far from the shooting, observed the course of the battle from Plewna. Below, the death and pain of thousands; above, the master and lord followed the whole thing like an interesting theater piece.¹⁷

Although Fried did not act on his newfound opposition to war until a decade later, it influenced his early political orientation:

Throughout this period, my pacifism remained latent. It exhibited itself mostly through the fact that my political convictions leaned toward the left, made me interested in free thought and democracy, and cultivated in me an active opposition to all things conservative and nationalist.¹⁸

Fried only became an active pacifist in the early 1890s, upon reading the work of Bertha von Suttner, the leader of the Austrian Peace Society and a strong critic of nationalism and religious intolerance. Before that time, he had relocated to Germany (1883), but was not politically active. Nevertheless, the liberal and progressive circles in which he was raised were highly conducive to pacifism. In fact, although no Austrian peace society existed in the 1880s, the support for pacifism among liberal and progressive circles explains much about Fried’s own pacifism. In fact, I will argue that when Fried first attempted to champion pacifism in Germany in 1890, he failed miserably precisely because his particularly Viennese brand of pacifism was out of place in Germany. To see this, we must spend some time on the Viennese context in which Fried was raised.

¹⁶Schönemann-Behrens, ““Organisiert die Welt””, p. 29.
¹⁷Fried, Jugenderinnerungen, p. 12.
¹⁸Schönemann-Behrens, ““Organisiert die Welt””, p. 33.
In Vienna, pacifism found supporters among a loose circle of social reform movements constituted mostly by assimilated, liberal Jews. In the increasingly chauvinist, militarist, and racist climate of late nineteenth-century Central Europe, Viennese cosmopolitan reformers like Joseph Popper-Lynkeus proposed to secure societal progress by social and political reforms promoted through what Ingrid Belke has termed “enlightenment-progressive reform associations.” These collections of progressives along with the Social Democrats (to whom I will return in Chapter Four) attempted to resuscitate liberalism and to resist both the flight into mysticism of the aesthetes and the xenophobia of German Austrian nationalist groups. These progressive movements were so marginalized that leading progressive figures like Rudolf Goldscheid, Julius Ofner, Max Ermers, Ludo Hartmann, Edgar Herbst, Franz Kobler and Wilhelm Börner were for a long time absent from the literature on late nineteenth and early twentieth century Austrian intellectual history. However, over the last two decades or so, due to work of Carl Schorske, William Johnston, Steven Beller, Allan Janik, Pieter Judson, Scott Spector, Malachi Haim Hacohen, Mary Gluck, Klaus Hödl, Péter Hanák, and others, fin de siècle Vienna has become well known for the modernist aesthetic and progressive social reform movements that arose among its largely Jewish cosmopolitan liberal and progressive bourgeoisie. In fact it has now become necessary to stress how very marginal these movements were.

This is important to keep in mind, since, as I argue in this chapter, it is precisely the marginality of Fried’s worldview, based as it was in the marginalized liberal Jewish bourgeoisie, that was at once the source of his innovative attempt to cut across national divisions in Europe and the reason that his ideas could not gain broad support until they were incorporated into Coudenhove-Kalergi’s understanding of European culture as defined by “the culture of the white race which has sprung from the soil of antiquity and

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20Ibid., p. 4.

Christianity.”  

This, as we shall see, is a vision of Europe with which Fried would have radically disagreed.

At any rate, one would expect that due to the multiplicity of progressive movements, differing versions of pacifism would have been endorsed by the differing members of the liberal Jewish bourgeoisie. However, as Mary Gluck’s study of the generational divide in Budapest has shown, despite fundamental ideological differences, circumstances imposed solidarity. At the turn of the century, the generation of those who attended university in the first decade of the twentieth century rebelled against what they saw as the repressive Victorian moralism and the utilitarian ethics of their parents’ generation. Their parents were optimistic, tolerant, accommodationist and were concerned with societal opinion and visible measures of success. They believed in the values of the liberal bourgeoisie and idealized aristocratic high culture.

By the time the younger generation attended university, however, liberalism in Budapest and in Vienna had proved impotent—nationalism had become too powerful a force—and these students dedicated themselves to a critique of respectable society and championed contempt for conventions. While the older generation was inclined toward primarily French and English writers as intellectual sources, the younger generation was oriented toward the metaphysical neo-idealism of the German philosophical tradition. However, as Gluck concludes,

The growth of an increasingly conservative, chauvinistic, and intolerant political climate in prewar Hungary could not help but isolate the old liberal middle class and create between them and the rebellious younger generation a certain sentiment of solidarity, if not in philosophical and aesthetic matters, at least on political and ethical issues.

Put differently—and as will become clear in the remainder of this dissertation—despite ideological differences, Jewish reactions to the Jews’ necessary exclusion from a Habsburg Empire increasingly defined along enthonational dimensions were remarkably similar, at least

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23Mary Gluck. Georg Lukács and his Generation, 1900-1918. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 76-82. We shall see this more explicitly in the case of Hans Kohn in the following chapter.

24Ibid., p. 84.
in their appeal to the idea of Europe as the solution to the problem of exclusion. This also
holds true for members of Fried’s generation, nestled between the two mentioned above.
However, thinkers like Fried and his Hungarian counterpart Oscar Jászi neither accepted the
older generation’s unbridled faith in the liberal status quo nor rebelled wholesale. In reaction
to the Dreyfus affair, the rising popularity of the Christian Social Party (which culminated in
Karl Lueger’s mayorship of Vienna in 1897), and the rise of nativism and illiberal nationalism
throughout the empire, they sought to resuscitate and reform liberalism rather than reject
it. They also turned to France and England for inspiration, but found it in the new field
of sociology (see the following section). This was not a disciplined choice. Rather, given
the ideological flexibility of turn of the century Viennese Jews—another theme that will
emerge in this dissertation—they merely appealed to a theoretical infrastructure that could
obviate their predicament. In fact, a certain ecumenical spirit was necessary among the
largely Jewish, liberal, assimilated middle class at the turn of the century because, as Carl
Schorske so incisively wrote in reference to the Viennese aesthetes, “[they] were alienated
not from their class, but with it from a society that defeated its expectation and rejected its
values.” (Original emphasis.)

Fried and Jászi represent well the agenda of those among the bourgeoisie who sought
to spread social, political, and cultural reforms, but who, unlike the Social Democrats—the
subject of Chapter Four—did not support the abolition of capitalism. Ingrid Belke describes
them as “anything but extremists, one could best compare them with the English ‘Radicals,’
the more so as they often pointed to the Anglo-Saxon example for their program.” Jászi,
in fact, self-consciously made this connection by calling himself a radical liberal. Both Fried
and Jászi saw the French revolutionary principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity as the
basis of all progressive politics and believed that social progress had to begin with improving
the living standards among the disadvantaged. Their primary concerns were, therefore, to
place restrictions on large scale manufacturers and land owners, to institute protections for
workers and small tradesmen, to promote state welfare for the sick, elderly, and disabled, and
to champion improvement of public education, continuing education for workers, reform of

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criminal law, and general, secret, and direct suffrage (achieved for men in 1907). This is not to imply that the movement was unified. In fact, the social, political, and cultural reformers of this middle generation belonged to nothing more than a loose grouping of movements some of which, like the Fabians, had a broad reform program, while others, like the temperance movement or the anti-dueling movement, were more limited. Some progressives, like Fried, kept up appearances with Viennese high society, others, like the vegetarians, wore linen and grew long beards.

Fried himself was a member of a number of progressive groups including those opposed to dueling and capital punishment. He also promoted Esperanto. However, the two most important movements to which he belonged were the Freemasons and the Monists. Fried was a Mason and a member of the Socrates Lodge in Vienna. Because Freemasonry was illegal in Austria from 1868-1919, Austrian Masons had to create what were called “border lodges” just over the border in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy, where Freemasonry was allowed. Their presence in Vienna was through associations oriented towards charitable and social reform and the association affiliated with Fried’s lodge was the most progressive in the city. Freemasons would become some of Fried’s strongest supporters in Vienna. Even later, they would provide key early support for Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement, although Coudenhove-Kalergi left Freemasonry because he wished to appeal to a broader, less liberal audience. Had Coudenhove-Kalergi been based in Germany, he might have found more support since German Freemasonry was less liberal and more nationalist. Indeed, as I will discuss in the next section, Fried himself expected to find supporters amon

27 Alfred H. Fried. Das Tagebuch eines zum Tode Verurteilten. Berlin: Karl Duncker, 1898. Hoover Institution Archives, Alfred Fried Collection, Box 4. Also in 1898, he began a book project based on a questionnaire on capital punishment circulated among European “Kulturträger” (bearers of culture). He hoped to assemble a collection essays against capital punishment by prominent European public intellectuals, though he did not always get the response he expected—Max Nordau and Ernst Haeckel, for example, did not oppose the death penalty. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt”, pp. 81-82. He gave up the project and instead wrote a novel in the form of the diary of prisoner in the last few days before he was executed. Fried, Das Tagebuch.


the German Freemasons in the 1880s and was disappointed.  

The Monists, similarly, were an inspiration for Fried and, in Vienna, many were also pacifists.  

Fried was particularly inspired by Ernst Haeckel, a German Monist who translated Darwin and conducted his own extensive research on natural selection. It is likely that what Fried knew of Darwin’s theory, he knew through Haeckel. Although, as we will see further on, Fried’s interpretation of the theory of evolution was unorthodox, he sought the support of Haeckel and other Monists in Germany and, as with the German Freemasons, failed to gain it. When, for example, Fried sent out a questionnaire on the death penalty hoping for a collection of denunciations of capital punishment from prominent European intellectuals, Haeckel turned out to be in favor of execution.

Organized Austrian Pacifism emerged in this context; that is, in the context of Viennese progressive social reform movements. Bertha von Suttner, the founder of the Austrian Peace Society, defined pacifism as the movement to cultivate the conditions for peace, including opposition to the arms race in late nineteenth century Europe, especially William II’s expansion of the German navy and his plans for an air-force. Her best selling novel, *Lay Down your Arms!*, written in 1889, was an impassioned attempt to effect a shift in public opinion against the idea of war as heroic or patriotic and to incite moral indignation against all warfare. But Suttner placed even greater emphasis on the crusade against nationalism, religious intolerance and social injustice and the fight for human rights, especially women’s

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31 Austrian Monism is discussed as an important context for Karl Popper’s work in Malachi Haim Hacohen’s biography and in several articles on Central European Jewish cosmopolitanism. Hacohen, *Karl Popper*; Hacohen, “From Empire to Cosmopolitanism”; Hacohen, “Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism”.

32 Niles Robert Holt. “Ernst Haeckel’s Monistic Religion”. In: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971), pp. 265–80. Robert J. Richards’ recent biography of Haeckel suggests that he has been misunderstood and that his ideas have been incorrectly linked to later German racist and eugenist discourses. This suggests that the evaluation of Austrian and German Monism as ideologically opposed (the German being far more conservative than the Austrian) may need to be nuanced, though Fried’s experience suggests that in important ways it holds. Robert J. Richards. *The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the Struggle over Evolutionary Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

rights. She was also active in the fight against antisemitism. Fried shared these priorities and agreed that the goal of the peace movement should be to bring about the circumstances that would obviate war by cultivating international social justice associations.

Pacifism had a long history outside of Central Europe, where it arrived quite late. The pacifist and internationalist movements based in British and American free trade liberalism and Quakerism served as models. Quakerism was the first tradition in which pacifism found firm roots. The Quakers were the most active promoters of peace among Christian sects; they refused to countenance any form of warfare including defensive war and were conscientious objectors. They were, furthermore, committed to political action to promote the reforms that would eliminate the need for war. Quakers were the leading group in most English and American peace societies in the early 19th century.

Free-trade liberals were the second group from which pacifists drew support beginning in the early nineteenth century. “Secular and utilitarian in its assumptions, this school of thought condemned warfare, to use the words of one of its principal figures, James Mill, as ‘the pestilential wind which blast the property of nations’ and ‘the devouring fiend which eats up the precious treasure of national economy.’” Free-trade would ensure lasting peace because it would build international commercial interdependence.

These two groups dominated pacifism in the first half of the nineteenth century and since Quakerism and free-trade liberalism did not have strong followings in continental Europe, the peace movement remained mostly confined to England and America. The crowning achievement of this early pacifist movement was a series of peace congresses held in the wake of the 1848 revolutions. Held in Brussels, Frankfurt, Paris, and London, they produced such famous expressions of European solidarity as Victor Hugo’s call for a United States of Europe (at the Paris convention in 1849). Nevertheless, the English were still largely over-represented at all of the congresses.

Pacifists also found continental allies among nationalists inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini

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36 Ibid., p. 6.  
around mid-century. As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, one of Mazzini’s principles was that warfare would cease in Europe if only national aspirations were unhindered by reactionary statesmen. Those inspired by him argued that peace would be perpetual if only humanity were divided into a family of national groups each under republican governance.  

The collection of these Austrian social reform and international peace movements form the background to Fried’s pacifism. Fried was already in Berlin (to which he relocated in 1883) when Suttner founded the Austrian peace Society in 1891. After being inspired by Lay Down Your Arms! and finding out that Suttner had founded the peace society, he contacted her and got her support in founding the German Peace Society. He spent the next twelve years (until 1903) in Germany fighting an uphill battle. Suttner’s brand of moral pacifism failed miserably in Germany. Fried reacted by radically reformulating his pacifist program. He did not reject Suttner, but sought a synthesis between moral pacifism and purely utilitarian pacifism through the vehicle of “organicist sociology”. When he returned to Vienna in 1903, he developed a “revolutionary pacifism” as the basis for Pan-Europe, with the support of the Viennese progressive social reform groups discussed above. Thus far we have outlined the major sources of inspiration for Fried’s pacifism in his formative Viennese context. These progressive social reform movements shaped his worldview and also ultimately supported him when he developed “revolutionary pacifism” as a platform for Pan-Europe. However, it was the negative experience in Imperial Germany, where his ideas found little audience, that prompted him to reevaluate his pacifism and to reformulate it as a movement based in the promotion of transnational European integration. Fried’s struggles in Germany are discussed briefly below and constitute the final context for his Pan-European idea, which is the subject of the following section.

39Chickering, Imperial Germany, p. 7.
2.4 MORAL PACIFISM IN GERMANY

Fried founded the German Peace Society, but within a year, he was expelled from it. From the start, the Austrian, with his close ties to Bertha von Suttner, opposed the strong nationalist tendencies of his German colleagues. The fact that Fried was probably difficult to work with may have contributed to his expulsion. Roger Chickering described him as “combining relentless zeal with no tact whatsoever”, though Schoenemann-Behrens is more positive, describing him as having “a deep-seated optimism, fighting spirit, and refusal to give up even in seemingly hopeless situations.” Moreover, Fried published what was considered risque or even pornographic literature. In fact, the controversy about Fried’s alleged publication of pornography began in the right-wing, antisemitic press. Furthermore, the other members of the Peace Society probably knew of these publications and found them problematic only when they wanted Fried to resign. Bertha von Suttner had to defend him before the German pacifists and convince him not to stop publishing pacifist literature. He remained active in pacifism, but was a marginal figure who was never accepted in Berlin bourgeois society.

From this point on, Fried was often asked by his German colleagues to convert to Christianity. In 1909, for example, Otto Umfried, an Evangelical pastor and leading German pacifist, made the “intimate suggestion” that Fried convert since his being Jewish jeopardized the effectiveness of the peace movement’s propaganda. Fried refused, replying that

It is not the religious community that ties me to Jewry, because I have experienced almost nothing of Jewish belief in my education and Jewish belief is alien to my world-view. What causes me to hold out is the current social situation of the Jews. In this time of repression and persecution, I would see freeing myself from a community to which I belong through birth and heritage as desertion during war-time. As an intellectual, I believe I have the duty to persevere with the oppressed minority.

He did not believe that his conversion would help the peace movement anyway:

I could certainly benefit personally from conversion, because my Jewishness has always

40Chickering, *Imperial Germany*.
41Schöenemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt?”, p. 28.
been a hindrance in my career and always will be. . . . But I would never have become a pacifist if I had not found it greatly gratifying to fight and to swim against the current, if I had not felt a personal calling to combat the medieval [mentality] that is still hegemonic in our time.\textsuperscript{44}

Fried closed the letter with the biting implication that his fellow pacifist had taken the antisemitic characterization of the peace movement as an international Jewish conspiracy to heart. In fact there were only one or two Jews in the whole continental movement—surely this was not too many.

With the exception of Heilberg, I cannot think of a single one. In France there is only one, Moch, who is having as much difficulty as I am here. Otherwise, I know of no one. What harm can that do to the movement? Social Democracy does not suffer because Marx and Lasalle were its creators. Suttner, fortunately, is entirely free of suspicion of Jewishness and of Jewish heritage.\textsuperscript{45}

The German Peace Society in Berlin suffered from its decision. Without Fried, it quickly became mostly inactive and the movement became splintered. This would not change until after the First World War.

Fried did not find his place in the new order—he was not the head of a central committee in the capital and he had fundamental disagreements with many of the leading German pacifists. Most of the peace societies founded after the splintering of the movement in 1893 were formed by local leaders of the Progressive party. Many of these were little more than reading groups made up of a handful of people who met to discuss world peace. Whatever their content, they nevertheless succeeded in recruiting more than five thousand members for German peace societies by 1900. However, much of their motivation seems to have been patriotic or nationalist; namely, to get impressive numbers on paper in order to show the international peace movement that pacifism was not a hopeless cause in Germany. Fried liked to refer to the new groups as “potemkin peace societies.” Indeed, many ceased to meet (but did not officially dissolve) soon after they were created.\textsuperscript{46}

Similarly, the central committee in Berlin continued to exist on paper, but did not fulfill its role of coordinating the movement. The society’s journal, \textit{Monatliche Friedenskorrespon-}

\textsuperscript{44}My translation of the original as quoted in Hamann, \textit{Bertha von Suttner}, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{45}My translation of the original as quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{46}Chickering, \textit{Imperial Germany}, pp. 52-54.
denz edited by the expelled Fried was essentially the extent of the Berlin committee’s contact with the other societies. Fried did not help—he criticized the movement fiercely and openly for its incompetence and called for the central committee to be moved to Frankfurt, where the local peace society was stronger. In 1899, Fried was fired as editor of the *Monatliche Friedenskorrespondenz* and founded his own journal, *Die Friedens-Warte*, which became a well respected journal in academic and pacifist circles internationally, was supported by the Carnegie endowment, and by 1914, had circulation of nearly 10,000.\(^{47}\) In 1900, consensus was reached that Berlin was a hopeless location for the movement’s headquarters\(^{48}\) and the central committee was moved to Stuttgart, where support for pacifism was strongest.\(^{49}\) Fried continued to edit *Friedens-Warte* and founded a number of other journals and associations, but he never established strong footing in Germany.

Fried’s move back to Vienna in 1903 signaled at once the failure of his efforts to build a peace movement in Germany and a major shift in his own pacifist thought.

Fried became convinced that the peace movement would never be taken seriously—not only by political and business leaders but also by the public and the press—if it were known for representing an assortment of marginal progressive movements such as vegetarianism, antivivisectionism, an international language, or opposition to dueling, antisemitism, and sexism. He therefore redirected his primary focus away from winning over public support for progressive causes and espousing moral indignation against warfare. Instead, in line with British free trade liberalism, he focused on economic interdependence as the first step toward building the legal, political, and cultural foundations for peace.

Thus Fried redirected the brand of pacifism he championed in Germany away from Suttner’s variety of moral pacifism toward what he called scientific pacifism. Nevertheless, his dream of a cosmopolitan European and ultimately global community using a common language, devoid of ethnonationalism and religious intolerance remained the same. Scientific pacifism was a trojan horse: it attempted to achieve widespread acceptance of the pacifist goals Fried had been pursuing for years by repackaging them in the authority of social science.

\(^{47}\)Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, p. 80.
\(^{48}\)“In the state of Prussia in 1913 there were only eighteen local peace societies, and of these only nine were located east of the Elbe River. In the rest of Germany there were seventy-eight.” *ibid.*, p. 60.
\(^{49}\)*Ibid.*, pp. 54-58.
Scientific pacifism would promote communities of economic interest which would create a high level of international interdependence and establish international arbitral agreements to oversee the new economic community. Thus the core task became the promotion of transnational integration in Europe. Fried tied pacifism to internationalism in practical rather than idealistic terms. The budding internationalist movement, underpinned theoretically by organicist sociology, became the vehicle for pacifism.

2.5 ORGANICISM AS A BASIS FOR PAN-EUROPE

Organicist sociology appealed to Fried because it offered a theoretical foundation that imbued his ideals with scientific certainty. His organicist perspective led him to conceive of European unity not as a utopian ideal, but as a path to institutionalizing the conditions for peace. This section discusses the influence of the sociologist, Jacques Novicow, on Fried’s thinking about the process of European integration. It then outlines Fried’s idea of Europe, its boundaries, its constitutive elements, and its political and institutional form.

In 1902 Fried had outlined the goal of the Friedens-Warte writing that:

The ideas of the emerging Europe, the association of cultured peoples (Kulturvölker), the promotion of law as the foundation of international relations, the promotion of an international politics dictated by the laws of morality, the emphasis of every moment which unites nations and promotes solidarity among them, shall, as before, be voiced loudly in these pages.50

This emphasis on the moral foundations of unity and the cultivation of solidarity was not incompatible with Victor Hugo’s call for a United States of Europe at the International Peace Conference in Paris in 1849.

A day will come when the only fields of battle will be markets opening up to trade and minds opening up to ideas. A day will come when the bullets and the bombs will be replaced by votes, by the universal suffrage of the peoples, by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign senate which will be to Europe what this parliament is to England, what this diet is to Germany, what this legislative assembly is to France. A day will come when we will display cannons in museums just as we display instruments of torture today, and are amazed that such things could ever have been possible.51

51 Hugo, My Revenge.
By 1905, however, Fried had come to regard Hugo’s romantic language as filler in place of concrete plans for building the circumstances that would produce the identity of European brotherhood that Hugo invoked. He considered this to be dilettante, utopian pacifism and called it a “sentimental dream which lowers the credit of scientific pacifism.”

In 1905, Fried had begun publishing on what he called the “System of Revolutionary Pacifism” in *Friedens-Warte.* Revolutionary pacifism dictated that the economic and technological linkages that already existed in Europe could lead to political interconnectedness if a system of international law ensured stable relations among states. The primary tasks of pacifism that followed from this were first, to combat the conditions in which violence, rather than law, were seen as an acceptable means to resolve disputes. Second, to explicate through pacifist propaganda that international anarchy was the cause of war. And third, to promote international organization on all levels of society. As Sandi Cooper succinctly put it, Fried thought “[p]acifists should stop wasting time advocating proposals that made them ridiculous. Their only logical work was to undertake a multifaceted campaign to educate elites and governments to what was patently clear: national egoism was an absurd, counterproductive atavism in an already internationalized economic and cultural world.”

By “revolutionary pacifism” Fried distinguished his stance from “reformist pacifism,” a term already given to pacifism that focused on disarmament and sought to prevent, shorten, or mitigate violent conflict. Fried had come to see reformist pacifism as the misguided focus on the treatment of symptoms of an underlying political condition whose very foundations must change. Even arbitration was peripheral in Fried’s new platform because it was not itself a solution but was, at most, an indicator of the status of international law. Arbitration would only be able to achieve full effectiveness in conditions of fully developed international organization.

Fried’s primary influence in this reorientation was, as Sandi Cooper has shown, the Russian sociologist, Jacques Novicow. Novicow was born in Constantinople in 1849 to Greek...
and Russian parents and spent most of his life in Odessa, though he published exclusively in French and was considered a prominent French sociologist. He attended universities in Russia and Italy where he studied classics. He was a secular freethinker, having given up Orthodoxy in favor of the ideals of the Western liberal tradition. He was privately wealthy and was able to devote himself to the study of the causes of war, on which he published two major studies, and became recognized in Europe as the leading authority in the social scientific theory of warfare.\textsuperscript{57} He and Fried became lifelong correspondents and Novicow was among the pacifist leaders who nominated Fried for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911.\textsuperscript{58}

Novicow was a leading figure in French organicist sociology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Organicism did not constitute a distinct sociological school, but was a name given by a number of sociologists to a theory of society that they recognized one another as sharing, and which derived from Herbert Spencer’s evolutionism. Following Spencer, organists argued that social evolution was a specific case of organic evolution. The principle of evolutionary development applied equally to biology and sociology and consisted in differentiation and organization. This allowed organicists to place society on an optimistic developmental trajectory from simpler to more complex forms and they focused their efforts on documenting the history of such development and predicting its future progress.\textsuperscript{59} Daniela Barberis has summarized their project as follows:

The conception of society as an organism emphasized the solidarity of all its elements and, at the same time, essentialized the inequalities among these elements—they were seen as founded in the form and structure of society itself. The emphasis was on the harmony of the various formative elements of society when society was in its ‘normal’ state. Organicism produced a functional understanding of society, an understanding that made possible the classification of certain phenomena as pathological. Accordingly, organicist authors sought to describe the normal and the pathological states of society and to develop a social pathology and a social therapeutics.\textsuperscript{60}

Because, as Barberis has shown, organicists posited an epistemological continuum between the biological and social sciences, they based their argumentation on analogies from biology rather than in the development of a coherent theoretical system. This left them open

\textsuperscript{57} Cooper, \textit{Patriotic Pacifism}, p. 141.  
\textsuperscript{58} Schöneweck-Behrens, ""Organisiert die Welt"", p. 197.  
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 61.
to the attack from Durkheimian sociologists that organicist thinking was a collection of vague formulae and could not consistently deliver specific prescriptions for particular sociological problems. Furthermore, critics argued that there were inherent authoritarian implications in organicism, since it viewed society as an organic whole within which the individual was not autonomous. Even worse, their critics argued, organicists saw society—and the state as a part thereof—as a living entity and not a mechanical invention based on human contracts.

Connected to the charge of latent authoritarianism, organicism has been misunderstood as Social Darwinist. However, organicists were not concerned with race but with society. If they conflated “society” with anything it was the nation, which they understood not in racial terms, but as a stage of social organization. Furthermore, organicists disagreed with the focus on competition and conflict as the engine of progress in nature, focusing rather on examples of cooperation and harmony. Organicists like Novicow did not argue that struggle and competition did not exist, only that, in Barberis’ formulation, “industrial and intellectual struggle had replaced physical combat and . . . intellectual contests promoted peace and paved the way for a federation of European nations.” Novicow, in fact, wrote a book discrediting Social Darwinism.

The charge of authoritarian tendencies was unjustified for Novicow, a pacifist and leftist liberal. However, neither he nor organicists as a group managed to supply their critics with a coherent or decisive defense since the organic metaphors they used, however ingenious, could always be countered with others. By the first years of the nineteenth century, organicism was a declining trend in sociology and was mostly discredited by the First World War.

For Novicow, the most liberal of the French organicists, organicism was the basis for a pacifist program in which Europe, rather than the nation, was understood an an organism and the national state system in Europe was considered an abnormal, pathogenic condition. European integration, in this formulation, was as a step toward a “normal” or balanced and harmonious state in the European organism. In 1900, Novicow published a book titled La

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61 Barberis, “In Search of an Object”, p. 55.
62 Ibid., p. 56.
64 Barberis, “In Search of an Object”, pp. 62-64.
Fried’s enthusiasm for Novicow’s work prompted him to propose that the Friedens-Warte address its audience as “Federalists” instead of “Friends of Peace.” (Suttner disagreed and prevailed.) Nonetheless, Fried’s pacifism became dedicated in no small part to the attempt to popularize and build on Novicow’s ideas in German-speaking Europe.

Fried argued, after Novicow, that human history was on an evolutionary trajectory that led from primitive, atomized groups of people to ever higher levels of organization. Organization, or interdependence, would lead to stability, prosperity and peace in large, federated regions like Europe. Nationalism, from this perspective, was a form of backwardness:

Only the most primitive stage of organization is achieved through antagonism. There the intellect is not the decisive factor, not the will to progress, but an instinctive association against anything external. In this lower stage of evolution solidarity is achieved by means of hostility instead of reconciliation. Thus nationalism is an instrument created by disorganization, and can serve only disorganization. The one-sided emphasis of nationalism creates that very oppression of the nation which it is supposed to remove. Only by the political organization of all mankind can each nation attain its full freedom and become an active agent of human progress.

Fried proposed that the only constructive nationalism would be to serve one’s nation by seeking to prevent it from getting into conflicts with other nations. He used Novicow’s term, “international anarchy” to describe conflict between nations and argued that an analogy between such conflict and competition between species for survival of the fittest was misguided. Instead, he asserted that the struggle for survival occurred differently on the biological and sociological levels. Different nations within the human race should not be confused with different species and human evolution did not follow a path of violent competition, but rather ‘social organization:’

...the whole course of world-history is a process of constantly increasing organization, [and] an uninterrupted line of progress leads from isolate primitive man up to modern Pan-Americanism. [Militarists] do not realize that this evolution of the human race in

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68 Fried, The Restoration of Europe, p. 34.
70 Fried, The Restoration of Europe, p. 34.
71 Ibid., p. 34.
history is simply the expression of a universal natural law that leads from chaos to worldorganization as from cell to Homo Sapiens. Evolution is always the outcome of association and organization.\textsuperscript{72}

Fried did not deny the importance of struggle in human evolution, but he regarded violent conflict as its most primitive form. As societies evolved and became more integrated, struggle would take the more constructive form of economic and intellectual competition.\textsuperscript{73} His proposed method was not to convince Europeans of their shared consciousness and incite a mass movement for unification, but rather to focus on building an economic and legal infrastructure. If Europe’s economies were well integrated and a common legal code existed to police international relations, Fried hoped that Europeans would begin to re-conceptualize national sovereignty and prioritize their common interests. Thus interdependence and common interests would \textit{obviate} war and eventually lead to shared European consciousness.

As mentioned in the introduction, Fried established a Pan-European Bureau in 1909 as an office within the Peace Society to generate propaganda about the benefits of regional integration. Pan-Europe would be a loose federation of states whose economies were integrated, whose transportation systems were standardized, and in which cultural and educational exchanges were extensive. The Pan-European government would be in charge of administering a common legal system and resolving disputes through diplomacy. Although the central government would have little power, Pan-Europe would be stable, because “communities of interest” would transcend national divisions.

Fried’s inspiration for Pan-Europe was the already existing Pan-American Union, founded in Washington DC in 1890 and including the United States and seventeen Latin American nations. Fried published a lengthy analysis of the Union in 1910.\textsuperscript{74} The Pan-American Union sought to encourage economic integration, standardization of transport, cultural and educational exchange—the same goals Fried proposed for Europe. The last section of \textit{Pan-Amerika} was dedicated to a discussion of how the Pan-American Union could be used as a model for Pan-Europe and he wrote therein that

\textsuperscript{72}Fried, \textit{The Restoration of Europe}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{73}In reference to Fried’s \textit{Die Moderne Friedensbewegung} Virginia Iris Holmes, ““The Invoilability of Human Life”: Pacifism and the Jews in Weimar Germany”. Dissertation. SUNY Binghamton, 2001, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{74}Fried, \textit{Pan-Amerika}. 

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Europe must finally become Europe. ... It must cease to be a mere geographic expression, it must be a cultural idea, a social concept. This may still sound utopian, but it is not at all. ... [Europe] must undertake a different form of political and economic life. This is not as difficult today as it was a few decades ago. ... First, many complex alliances have already been implemented within Europe, and second, an authoritative example exists in the Pan-American movement that could simply be replicated. ... Instead of wasting the strength of all the nations on armament that does not achieve true security but instead retards all opportunities for development, the European states must standardize their infrastructure, facilitate their transportation, internationalize their governments and ensure stability through mutually established security treaties. ... A greatly empowered Pan-America will exist along side an equally powerful Pan-Europe—not opposite or in opposition to it, but in conjunction with it.  

Fried had been making this argument since at least 1908 in connection with his campaign to build a social, educational, economic, and transport infrastructure as the basis for enduring peace and stability. Specifically, pacifists were to focus on raising consciousness among leaders in Europe’s industrial, commercial, and government circles about the benefits of regional integration. The hope was that as economies became increasingly integrated, states would have too many common interests to benefit from going to war and would instead focus on creating a common legal system, standardizing transport, promoting cultural exchange and ultimately relinquishing national sovereignty in favor of federation. 

Fried no-longer saw it as his task to campaign for popular support of his ideal for European unity. With the reorientation of his pacifism toward a utilitarian, economic-based theory, Fried also sought an academic rather than a popular audience. As Daniel Porsch has shown, beginning in 1903, Fried began to argue that pacifism would have to be based in academia and in associations of social reformers and would grow through the influence of scholars over political and economic leaders rather than through a popular movement. Over the next few years, this strategy paid off. Membership in the German and Austrian peace societies increased, more international peace congresses were organized, and Friedens-Warte became a recognized academic journal with financial support from the Carnegie en-

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75 The term “geographic expression” was a pejorative implying backwardness and unfitness for statehood. Metternich had used it at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to express his dim view of Italian popular demands for national liberation since ”Italy” was a mere ‘geographic expression’. Fried used the term to diagnose the division of Europe among nation states as primitive. On Metternich’s usage, see Herwig, *Hammer or Anvil?: Modern Germany 1648-Present*. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1994, p. 74.


77 For reference to a similar quote, see Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, p. 111.

78 Ibid., p. 111.
Andrew Carnegie published an article in *Friedens-Warte* in 1907 promoting European economic integration and arguing that such integration was necessary if Europe were to remain economically competitive with the United States.80

The polity Fried had in mind was not the ‘great sovereign state’ that Victor Hugo had invoked—a national government, simply stretched to encompass all of Europe. Fried did not see European integration primarily as a political process, but rather a “process of social evolution.”[original emphasis.]81 International organization would not lead to a federation with a political central government that would limit the independence of the constituent states. If the project of building a large, federal state were undertaken in the short-term, it would fail for lack of a sufficient foundation in regional interdependence.82 Thus he argued that “It is a mistake always to look upon the United States of America as a model for Europe. . . . At most we look forward to an association of the states of Europe, in which self-interest, not compulsion, produces and maintains association.”83

One might expect that Fried was influenced by or at least condoned the ideas of the Russian anarchist, Bakunin, who also called for a United States of Europe. Indeed they shared the goal of a loose federation of European communities of interest, but Fried believed in gradual, organic change and was opposed to attempts—violent or otherwise—at sudden overthrow of the existing order. This too was the influence of Novicow, who framed his book *La Fédération de l’Europe* explicitly as a challenge to Bakunin’s United States of Europe. Novicow argued that Bakunin, in calling for the overthrow of governments which opposed federation, promoted “a pure utopia which could only appeal to those who live in complete ignorance of social science.”84 Organists believed that society was a living being and that the state was a vital part of that being. The idea that society could exist without government was preposterous to them. Fried’s “revolutionary” pacifism referred to radical and original ideas and was not a call to revolutionary action.

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82Ibid., p. 115.
The tendency to presume similarities between quite different visions of European integration is due to a paucity of precise terminology. The term ‘federalism’ was as overworked then as it is now. Novicow used it reluctantly in his argument for transnational European integration, but could not find a better term for the polity he envisioned. His and Fried’s views were best summarized and distinguished from those of others who promoted federations by a contemporary, Edward Krehbiel (a professor at Stanford), in 1916. Krehbiel distinguished between “internationalist,” “federalist,” and “cosmopolitan” strains of the international peace movement and outlined their different ideas of European unity. All three groups agreed that diplomacy and international law were effective during peace time, but that once these ran counter to the interests of the nation—during times of crisis—they were invariably ignored. Thus, the sovereignty of nations had to be limited and the European state system reorganized.85

“Internationalists” according to Krehbiel, “hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not, as yet, feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly.”86 Internationalists therefore proposed “a sort of confederation, a coöperative union of sovereign states, a true concert of powers.”87 Krehbiel’s primary example was Fried and the Pan-European idea.88

Federalists also, according to Krehbiel, “believe that nationalism is out of date; that as long as it and national sovereignty exist, war and its ills will continue, that international law can never remedy these evils, . . . that the fundamental step toward eliminating war is an organization with power, above the several states, which shall determine what is right and just in any case.”89 Federalists, Krehbiel continued, believed that nations should retain local autonomy in order to cultivate “their own qualities and institutions, their Kultur.”90 In fact, federalists believed that the survival of Kultur depended upon the end of absolute sovereignty because it was precisely in the condition of sovereignty that wars “in which one

86Ibid., p. 219.
87Ibid., p. 219.
88Ibid., p. 220.
89Ibid., p. 220.
90Ibid., p. 221.
tries to suppress the *Kultur* of the other”\(^{91}\) occur. Federation, furthermore, requires a shift in patriotism from the nation to humanity.\(^ {92}\) (Federalism thus conceived is the subject of Chapter Four on the Social Democrats, particularly Otto Bauer.)

Krehbiel described cosmopolitans as those who “would obliterate all national boundaries and have a world government and world citizenship.” “Cosmocracy” he wrote, “is not very widely advocated.”\(^ {93}\) This could be said not just of pacifists, but, certainly in Austria-Hungary, generally.\(^ {94}\)

This categorization is useful in understanding differences among those who promoted transnational integration and the term “internationalist” does best describe Fried. Given, however, that internationalists, federalists, and cosmopolitans shared a vocabulary and the goal of a peaceful, post-national Europe and world, it is perhaps not surprising that there was considerable overlap in their arguments. Fried, for example, used the United States, Switzerland, and the German Federation as positive examples for the process of global integration and argued that closer ties between these federations was the way forward.\(^ {95}\) And Novicow called for a European federation, though he insisted that “the European federation shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the [constituent] countries.”\(^ {96}\) The individual characteristics of each country, Novicow asserted, must be protected so that “[i]f the French prefer to live in a republic, the English in a parliamentary monarchy, and the Russians in an absolute monarchy, that is their business…”\(^ {97}\) Precisely because Novicow hoped that a European federation could be achieved within his lifetime, the sense in which he used “federation” was “the most conservative”—he did not want to arouse fear among the nations and he saw “the agreement of the governments as the foundation stone of the federal construction.”\(^ {98}\) Novicow was aware that the word federation was loaded, but none other existed that would have been clearer or more precise. Besides, he argued, “[t]he word Union would

\(^{91}\)Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society*, p. 221.
\(^{92}\)Ibid., pp. 221-222.
\(^{93}\)Ibid., p. 222.
\(^{94}\)In his discussion of Karl Popper’s cosmopolitanism, Hacohen stresses that it was incredibly rare. Hacohen, *Karl Popper*.
\(^{97}\)Ibid., p. 14.
\(^{98}\)Ibid., p. 15.
further horrify fearful minds and the title “European Union” is protean and meaningless.”

This was written in 1900—Fried’s “Pan-Europe” in 1909 was intended as a solution to the problems that organicist internationalists found in the vague “European Union” and the federalist “United States of Europe”.

We must, however, return to Fried’s assertion (in the passage from Pan-Amerika) that Europe “must be a cultural idea, a social concept.” The integrated, yet highly pluralist regional polity informed by organicist sociology represents Fried’s idea of Europe as a “social concept.” He devoted less writing specifically to Europe as a “cultural idea,” however, his perspective comes through in a book on Berlin and Vienna and in the rejection of romanticism and mysticism that is pervasive in his work.

Fried’s conception of mysticism and neoromantic nationalism as pernicious and his devotion to the German Enlightenment ideals of Bildung and Kultur was entirely typical for German-speaking Jews of his generation in Europe. The cultivating ethical emphasis and the cultural and humanist inclinations of the Bildungs idea were clearly evident in Fried’s assumption that Germany could lead European integration if only the Kaiser would focus on spreading humanizing and enlightening Kultur rather than building his military. When, however, Fried was disappointed in Germany not only by the Kaiser and Bismarck, but by the nationalism of his German pacifist colleagues, he revised not only the theory and method of his pacifism, but also his understanding of the cultural foundations of Europe. The German Enlightenment was no less important, but Fried now argued that German Kultur was alive in Vienna while it was simply parroted with little success in Berlin.

In Wien-Berlin: Ein Vergleich (Vienna-Berlin: A Comparison), published in 1908, Fried argued that the two cities were fundamentally different. Though they shared the German language, their values, cultures, lifestyles, and aesthetic tastes were opposite so that “as someone born in one of the two cities, one cannot become acquainted with the other.” While in both cities, German literature, Wissenschaft (science, scholarship), and art were studied and Schiller, Beethoven and Mozart were celebrated, this did not imply a

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99 Novicow, Die Föderation Europas, p. 15.
102 Ibid., p. 1.
shared worldview.\textsuperscript{103}

Fried’s description of Berlin can be reduced to the conclusion that it was a young city of cultural neophytes with poor aesthetic taste, militarist tendencies, and a ruthless habit of prioritizing above all else order, efficiency, and productivity. “A Ringstrasse\textsuperscript{104} (ring street)” wrote Fried, “would be entirely impossible in Berlin because it does not lead somewhere, but only goes in circles.”\textsuperscript{105} Berlin was designed for practicality; Vienna for beauty.\textsuperscript{106} The statues in Berlin were of military men; statues in Vienna were of poets, musicians, and artists.\textsuperscript{107} And the list continued: In Berlin the streets divided; in Vienna they connected people.\textsuperscript{108} In Berlin one \textit{resided} in one’s apartment while in Vienna one \textit{lived} there.\textsuperscript{109} In Vienna, people strolled along the streets, in Berlin people hurried through the streets as if an alarm had sounded.\textsuperscript{110}

The Viennese and Berliners, clearly, had conflicting views of time. The Viennese worked, but if they regarded time as money, the logical conclusion was not to waste too much of it on work. In Berlin, patriotism and work were conflated. Berliners thus scheduled their leisure around work. In Vienna, conversely, one went for a walk when it was nice outside, not only in the evening and on Sunday afternoon.\textsuperscript{111} And so on for two hundred and forty pages.

This litany of objectionable tendencies among Berliners was not a benign matter of taste because it translated into irrational nationalism. Fried commented that “the vehemence, bitterness, and intransigence that is apparent in Berlin, is unthinkable in Vienna.”\textsuperscript{112} Berlin was a place with no neutral political ground and people of different persuasions, classes, and

\textsuperscript{103}Fried chose not to delve into German and Austrian readings of the German intellectual tradition here. I suspect that he did not feel qualified to do so, not having finished Gymnasium or attended university. Fried, \textit{Wein-Berlin, ein Vergleich}, p. 6.


\textsuperscript{105}Fried, \textit{Wein-Berlin, ein Vergleich}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{106}ibid. Fashion sense was connected: The Viennese had their clothes tailored and dressed well not out of personal vanity, but because they considered themselves as accessories in the city’s beauty. Berliners, on the other hand, shopped at large, tacky department stores (because they could not recognize the difference in quality) and had a long way to go before they achieved the elegance of the Viennese. Viennese shoppers were also more ‘honorable’ because they did not engage in impulse buying like the Berliners, but bought only what they needed and knew to find the best quality. ibid., pp. 20–27.

\textsuperscript{107}ibid., p. 15.

\textsuperscript{108}ibid., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{109}ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{110}ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{111}ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{112}ibid., p. 80.
races were unable to interact. In ecumenical Vienna, on the other hand—even under Karl Lueger—“Jews and antisemites, socialists and feudalists, Germans and Czechs are pleasant to each other in coffee houses, restaurants, street cars, and trains..."\textsuperscript{113} This evaluation of early twentieth-century Vienna as a bastion of reason and moderation (possessed, apparently, even by antisemites) is optimistic to say the least, but it makes Fried’s point: Germany was the home of intolerance; Austria of pluralist civility. This was a judgement of Germany (represented by a Prussian stereotype) as backward in terms of civilization and \textit{Kultur} because the unthinking duty to work and to the nation took on a mystical zeal that prevented multination coexistence. In the words of Samuel Max Melamed, whose history of the peace idea Fried relied on in his \textit{Handbuch der Friedensbewegung (Handbook of the Peace Movement)}\textsuperscript{114} “Reason and logic promote peace; romantic mysticism and romantic irrationalism promote war.”\textsuperscript{115} If Germany was European, certainly after Fried’s disappointment there, it was not the cultural model for Europe. That honor belonged to multinational Austria.

Fried had tried to argue in \textit{Wien-Berlin} that a community’s level of culture or civilization was inseparable from the \textit{Bildungs} idea that the cultivation of \textit{Kultur} in all levels and dimensions of life was the highest achievement. Fried’s idea of Europe as a “cultural idea” was premised on this principle. Fried never explicitly outlined the physical boundaries of Europe. This is because he defined membership by \textit{Kultur} rather than by nationality or geography:

\textellipsis it must be considered that in the gradual development of an inter-state union, not all states that constitute geographic Europe will be able to be incorporated initially. The states with the highest cultural development will initiate the process.\textsuperscript{116}

Following from the major sources Fried drew on and the positive examples he used, it seems he believed that France, Austria, and (at least at first) Germany, along with Russia should initiate the process of European integration. England, he argued, would constitute its own federation within its empire. While Fried’s positive evaluation of Russia might seem surprising, it must be remembered that Novicow and another of Fried’s collaborators, Jean de

\textsuperscript{113}Fried, \textit{Wien-Berlin, ein Vergleich}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{114}See especially volume four Fried, \textit{Handbuch}.
\textsuperscript{116}Fried, \textit{Handbuch}, p. 114.
Bloch, were from the Russian Empire and that the Russian Tsar had called for the First Hague Peace Convention in 1899. In his introduction to the German edition of Novicow’s *La Fédération de l’Europe*, Fried wrote

> From the supposedly so backward Russia, we West Europeans have received so many liberating ideas that it will no longer be a surprise if we find in the following book a spirit imbued with such originality and vigor, clarity and superiority, that it joins company with the best that Western scholarship produces today.\(^{117}\)

Fried was not, however, concerned exclusively with Europe, but in the long term, envisioned a world composed of large regional federations. “Today,” he wrote, “the federation of states can no longer involve Europe exclusively, but rather must include all cultured states (*Kulturstaten*).”\(^{118}\) The implication that all cultured states must federate is not that states outside of geographic Europe should join Pan-Europe but that cultured nations outside of Europe should initiate their own regional integration. It seems the only cultured nation outside of Europe besides England was the United States. Though he opposed ideas of Europe modeled closely after it as being too centralized,\(^ {119}\) he argued that “[o]utside of Europe the United States alone really belongs in the European group.”\(^ {120}\) (England would have its own federation, but was, apparently, nonetheless European.) Thus during the First World War, Fried rejected the idea that a Third Hague Peace Conference in the immediate aftermath of the war should establish the terms of peace in Europe because “[t]he Hague Conferences include all the nations of the world; to refer the further organization of Europe to all of them would be a mistake.”\(^{121}\) Instead, in 1917, Fried wrote to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ottokar Czernin, suggesting that Austria, due to the Empire’s multinational legacy, was specially qualified to negotiate the future organization of Europe. He wanted Czernin to initiate diplomatic negotiations on post-war international relations and territorial agreements before a peace treaty, which would decide these issues in the interests of the victors.\(^ {122}\) This, he argued, would only lead to further antagonism and more “civil war” in

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\(^{117}\) Alfred H. Fried. “Preface”. In: *Die Föderation Europas*. Akademischer Verlag für soziale Wissenschaften Dr. John Edelheim, 1901.

\(^{118}\) Fried, *Handbuch*, p. 114.

\(^{119}\) Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, p. 108.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p. 100.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p. 100.

Europe.

For Fried, then, the geographic boundaries of Europe did not reflect an idea of Europe as composed of racial or national units. His Europe was a secular community of “cultured states” in which membership was defined by the German Enlightenment ideals of Bildung and Kultur. The focus of his pacifism was to promote the construction of an international social and economic infrastructure to provide a foundation for this cultural community. The ideal government of Europe would be pluralist and decentralized and the Habsburg Empire (or a reformed idea of it) served as a model. Major support for this idea of Europe came from the Viennese social reformers discussed above and “the time when small civic societies exerted political influence through scholars and dignitaries in the nineteenth-century style was finally past.”

For Fried and his largely Jewish group of supporters in the liberal social reform movements, a Pan-Europe in which extensive integration checked national sovereignty provided a solution to the Jewish predicament. In response to the national disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, they proposed a modernized multinational polity in which Jews could avoid the exclusion they faced in the nation state.

After the First World War, however, with Europe divided among nation states, this platform found no supporters. Furthermore, the war was taken as evidence for the bankruptcy of pacifism, though as Sandi Cooper has noted, Fried and other pacifists had argued that precisely because of the existing interconnectedness in Europe any future war would be of devastating magnitude and that the arms race in Europe would inevitably lead to such a war. As Fried wrote in 1915

The present war is the logical outcome of the kind of “peace” that preceded it... Pacifism, which public opinion... has declared a failure... has in reality been fully justified by the war. Because we saw that war was bound to result from this condition of national isolation, we worked, warned and sought to develop the forces or organization as a preventative. We had no illusions; we were engaged in the struggle against a catastrophe which we clearly foresaw. ... We never doubted that the opposing forces were stronger. ... We saw the war coming.

During the war, such appeals fell on deaf ears. Fried died in Vienna in 1921 at the age of fifty seven, destitute and isolated.

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124 Quoted in Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism, p. 140.
2.6 PACIFISM AND PAN-EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR ONE

In the interwar period, a revised and reoriented pacifist movement found broader support in Austria and Germany than it had before the First World War. The new and pressing problem of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe’s new and reconfigured nation states was in part responsible for the shift in German pacifism away from the social sciences and transnational integration toward law and human rights.\textsuperscript{125} The national division in Europe also introduced a whole new spectrum of concerns and a profoundly changed political climate in which the Pan-European idea attracted far wider support than it had during Fried’s career. However, this support came only when Fried’s Pan-European idea was, ironically, adapted to support ideas of Austria and Europe that, yet again, excluded him.

In the early 1920s, a flurry of publications and new organizations called for European political, economic, and cultural unity. These movements, it is widely argued, derived from pessimism about the future of Europe as a great power after the war. Europeans felt threatened by the rising economic power of the United States and Japan and the political menace of Communist Russia and sought to reconstruct Europe as a stable power and ensure its leading position in the world.\textsuperscript{126} According to Katiana Orluc, “European consciousness arose in the interwar period in the context of shock and loss—shock at the cruelty of the First World War and loss of the “occidental culture” of a Europe that, prior to 1914, had existed as something self-evident.”\textsuperscript{127}

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s version of Pan-Europe reflected these concerns. His book, \textit{Pan-Europa},\textsuperscript{128} was widely read and his Pan-European Union led the flagship movement for European unity in the interwar period. He conceived of Europe as composed of sovereign nations and envisioned Pan-Europe as a regional league of nations including continental

\textsuperscript{125}Hans Wehberg, a follower of Fried’s and a scholar of international law took over leadership of the peace movement in Weimar Germany. For more on the shift in focus from transnational integration to international human rights that followed, see Porsch, “Die Friedens-Warte”, pp. 63-78.


\textsuperscript{128}Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. \textit{Pan-Europa}. Wien; Leipzig: Pan-Europa-Verlag, 1924.
Europe, and excluding the Soviet Union. This league had two purposes. The first was to
defend against political, military, and economic threats from the outside, mostly from the
United States and the Soviet Union. Coudenhove-Kalergi referred explicitly to the Pan-
European Union as a foreign policy program. After Fried, he considered conflict within
Europe as civil war, but his defensive perspective on Europe’s relations with the rest of the
world was not in line with Fried’s pacifism. Secondly, Pan-Europe was intended to protect
and cultivate Western culture. Like Fried, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s concept of European culture
was cosmopolitan, though it was rooted less in the German Enlightenment tradition and more
in Europe’s Catholic heritage.

As mentioned above, the first audience for Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European Union
was his Masonic lodge in Vienna. However, he soon realized that wider support would require
an appeal to more conservative ideologies that the classically liberal Freemasons would not
support. He also initially attracted some Social Democratic supporters including Karl
Renner, but his strong anti-Soviet rhetoric cost him that support by the end of the 1920s. The
Freemasons and Social Democrats were no great loss for Coudenhove-Kalergi, who went
on to garner far more influential supporters from a succession of Christian Social Austrian
chancellors to the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, and Winston Churchill.

According to the program of the Pan-European Union, published in 1936, the movement
was to promote

1. a European league of states with the mutual guarantee of equal rights, security, and
independence of all states of Europe;
2. a European court of justice for the settling of all conflicts between European states;
3. a Military alliance with a common air force to safeguard peace and symmetrical dis-
armament;
4. the step-by-step creation of a European customs union;
5. the common development of European economies;
6. a common European currency;

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7. the fostering of the national cultures of all European peoples as the basis for the European cultural community;
8. the protection of all the national minorities of Europe against denationalization and repression; and
9. the cooperation of Europe with other groups of peoples within the framework of a world league of nations.¹³³

Coudenhove-Kalergi included Fried’s focus on the foundations of Pan-Europe in the cultivation of an integrated economic infrastructure as is clear in points four, five, and six, however, his economic proposals were more specific and were intended as a short-term, rather than a long-term, “organic” process. Coudenhove-Kalergi was confident that the foundations for a “United States of Europe” already existed and thus took up topics such as an international court of justice that Fried had put aside as premature.

Coudenhove-Kalergi had more success than pre-World War One proponents of transnational integration because the post-war climate of insecurity was more conducive. However, even more importantly, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe represented a far lesser challenge to the status quo than Fried’s Pan-Europe had. Coudenhove-Kalergi was not as uncompromisingly pacifist as is clear from his aggressive anti-Bolshevism and his proposal in point three above for a European military alliance and common air force. This is not how Fried hoped disarmament would proceed. More importantly, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s conception of Pan-Europe was not a challenge to national sovereignty, as illustrated in points one and seven. While Fried did not propose to curtail national sovereignty immediately, he did hope for its erosion in the future. Coudenhove-Kalergi, on the other hand, thought of the nation as the lasting basic component of Europe.

This support for the pervasive contemporary understanding of Europe as a family of nation states did not mean that Coudenhove-Kalergi sympathized with the ethnonationalist Pan-Germans in Austria. Rather, Coudenhove-Kalergi supported the attempt of Christian Socials to use the Catholic, Babenberg, and Habsburg legacies as the basis for a new Austrian national identity. The Austrian nation thus conceived was still considered a German nation, but a better, more cosmopolitan one than Weimar and later Nazi Germany.¹³⁴

¹³³Quoted in Gehler, “A Visionary”, p. 177.
Kalergi’s idea of Catholic, aristocratic Austria was not antisemitic. Quite the opposite, his father had written a book denouncing antisemitism through the ages, which Coudenhove-Kalergi republished with an introduction on interwar antisemitism in 1929. He opposed the exclusive nationalist Pan-German movement as much as Fried did. But while Fried opposed the Pan-Germans because they represented for him one example of the general problem of nationalism, for Coudenhove-Kalergi, they exemplified only the wrong conception of the Austrian nation.

Coudenhove-Kalergi, as a member of the Catholic aristocracy, did not need to challenge to the status quo in order to promote an idea of Europe that included him, he only needed to support a definition of the nation that did. His personal opposition to antisemitism aside, his support for a conservative, nativist definition of the Austrian nation represented a dramatic shift away from the ideas in which his Pan-European movement were originally rooted. The Austro-Fascist regime of Engelbert Dollfuss that Coudenhove-Kalergi supported after the Austrian civil war in 1934 did not explicitly discriminate against Jews, but, as Steven Beller has noted, “official tolerance masked a large degree of informal antisemitism.” Once the Catholic and aristocratic heritage were made the basis for nationhood, Jews again became unwelcome—the state was understood ultimately as for bodenständig (native, indigenous) Austrians. By supporting this definition of Austria and imagining Europe as a community of sovereign nations, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe became fundamentally incompatible with the idea that inspired it. Instead of offering a supranational solution to the Jewish predicament, Coudenhove-Kalergi reinforced the very national exclusion that Fried attempted to circumvent though Pan-Europe.

137 Ibid., p. 224; Ibid., p. 224.
2.7 CONCLUSION

Fried has received little popular or scholarly attention, though his achievements were impressive. Substantial literature exists on fellow Nobel Peace laureate Bertha von Suttner, founder of the Austrian Peace Society.\textsuperscript{138} However, Fried, whom Suttner described as “my most zealous fellow-combatant”\textsuperscript{139} has received little attention beyond histories of the German Peace Society which he founded.\textsuperscript{140} The literature that does exist has not always been kind to Fried. Daniel Gasman’s damning introduction to the English translation of Fried’s \textit{Handbuch der Friedensbewegung}, for example, accuses Fried of being a naive German nationalist and Social Darwinist, one who took at face value the pacifist utterances of European statesmen, most importantly those of the German Emperor.\textsuperscript{141} From a presentist perspective, Fried’s organicist formulation of pacifism may seem pseudo-scientific and potentially reactionary, but at the time it was not incompatible with a progressive liberal and cosmopolitan worldview. Furthermore, as we have seen, Fried’s was an explicitly anti-Social-Darwinist position.

Similarly, in a dissertation on Jews and Weimar German pacifism, Virginia Iris Holmes describes Fried as a sexist and speciesist.\textsuperscript{142} If he stood out from his contemporaries in these areas it was likely as a progressive, so it is unclear whether we learn something distinctive about Fried, or rather about late nineteenth-century gender norms in his rhetoric. Fried was indeed a critic of the brand of moral pacifism embraced by the women’s movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which he saw as dilettantish and utopian. However, Fried supported woman suffrage; chose a female role model in Bertha von Suttner (despite her moral pacifism); published in at least one feminist journal;\textsuperscript{143} and fought for women’s

\textsuperscript{138}For a good recent biography, see Hamann, \textit{Bertha von Suttner}.
\textsuperscript{140}An excellent recent German dissertation dedicated to his biography begins to remedy this situation, see Schöinemann-Behrens, “"Organisiert die Welt"”.
\textsuperscript{142}Holmes, “"The Involiability of Human Life"”.
\textsuperscript{143}Fried published as a number of articles and booklets including this one in the series \textit{Kultur und Fortschritt (Culture and Progress)}, devoted among other topics to the “women’s question” Alfred H. Fried. “Internationalismus und Patriotismus”. In: \textit{Kultur und Fortschritt: Neue Folge der Sammlung "Sozialer Fortschritt", Hefte für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik, Frauenfrage, Rechtspflege und Kulturinteressen} 160 (1908), pp. 3–12.
inclusion in the German Peace Society (women were excluded from the pre-existing Prussian society). Furthermore, his opposition to moral pacifism was not directed specifically at the pacifism of the women’s movement but, as we have seen, applied equally to that of Victor Hugo.  

The most comprehensive and well researched work on Fried is a recent dissertation by Petra Schönemann-Behrens. Schoenemann-Behrens reconstructs meticulously the Austrian Jewish context for Fried’s biography and points out Fried’s influence on Coudenhove-Kalergi, but does not discuss this, Fried’s idea of Europe, or his proposals for European transnational integration in detail. Roger Chickering’s work on the German Peace Society and Sandi Cooper’s study of continental pacifism include important sections on Fried’s contribution to pacifist institution-building, journalism, and theory. Pacifist internationalism and investment in European integration are an important theme in their work, however, Fried is just one of the many figures discussed in their reconstructions of the complex and fractured web of pacifist schools and neither focuses in detail on Fried’s thinking about Europe or on the Jewish predicament as a context for Fried’s work. Thus Fried’s conception of Europe and its formative Austrian Jewish context, the intellectual roots of the pan-European idea, and the relevance of his proposals for European transnational integration for the Jewish predicament in turn-of-the-century Central and Eastern Europe have remained largely unexamined.

This chapter has attempted to explain Fried’s neglect in the literature on the European idea and his failure ever to garner mass support for his ideas by explaining that his ideas were anchored in the marginal intellectual trend of organicism and represented the concerns of the marginal, largely Jewish Viennese progressive social reformers.

Jacques Novicow’s organicist sociology, in which Fried’s Pan-European idea was based, was thoroughly discredited by the First World War. Fried was successful in establishing pacifism as an academic discipline in Germany and Austria, but not as a branch of sociology and not based in a federalist program for European integration, but oriented toward law and

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144 For Fried’s views on the pacifism of the women’s movement, see Fried, “Die deutsche Frau”.
145 Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt”.
146 Ibid., pp. 167-68.
147 Chickering, Imperial Germany.
148 Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism.
particularly focused on human rights. Fried’s Pan-European idea addressed the predicament of the marginal, liberal cosmopolitan Jewish intelligentsia in the heyday of nationalism in homogenizing Imperial Germany and during the national disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy. Fried, as a Jew who refused to convert, could not appeal to wider support among Christian conservatives or Pan-German nationalists. Coudenhove-Kalergi, though himself half-Japanese, was at least Catholic and descended from Habsburg nobility.

What ultimately proved effective after the First World War was the combination of scholarly authority and the appeal to the mystical and protectionist trends of the day. The historiography has reinforced the contemporary judgment of scientific pacifism and the defeat of Jewish social reformism. However, the ideas of Fried and other liberal Jewish pacifists and federalists like Oscar Jászi were foundational to thinking about European integration in the interwar and post World War Two periods. Their social scientific foundations had been discredited and the First World War undermined the credibility of their pacifism, but elements of their ideas are now institutionalized in contemporary assumptions about the purpose of European unity, the content of Europe, and the methods that guide the integration process. Their ideas cannot therefore be left out of the historiography because some of the problems they sought to address are obsolete and because elements of their thinking have been discredited in social scientific and pacifist circles. This body of work and the concerns it addressed are a formative context for interwar and post-1945 movements for European integration and, as such, are historiographically important.

We now turn to another body of ideas on European unity neglected in the historiography on the European idea. It is to be found in the work of Austrian Zionists. Although Fried disagreed with their immediate solution to the Jewish predicament, as we shall see, he shared their hope that a united Europe could solve the predicament of Jewish exclusion.
3.0 ZIONIST COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE JEWISH RESUSCITATION
OF EUROPE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

At first glance, Jewish nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may seem like the wrong place to look for transnational thinking on Europe. After all, the argument of this dissertation is that Jewish transnational thinking on Europe arose in the Austrian Empire precisely because the empire was transnational. For Central and East European Jews in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German nationalism had been the gateway to membership in a European civilization as defined by liberal Enlightenment values. Yet the crisis of liberalism at the close of the nineteenth century turned liberal national movements into exclusive, ethnonational ones. Consequently, the cosmopolitan, Enlightenment idea of Europe gave way to an idea of Europe reduced to its individual ethnic components.

The multinational Austrian dynastic state and its Jews had little to gain from this development. So for Austria’s Jews, the empire became both an example and a bulwark of transnational European civilization. As romantic nationalism came to dominate German political thought, Austria’s German speaking Jews began to look elsewhere for contemporary validation of their liberal world-view. This took shape among those thinkers associated with the Vienna Spätaufklärung (late Enlightenment) who attempted to revive the idea of supranational European civilization and the idea of the European person of culture based on the ideals of progress, modernity, and the individual in the face of what they saw as regressive, backward-looking nationalism—or what Hans Kohn called “group egoism.” Thus Zionists—those who believed that Jews constituted a separate nation—would seem to be
the exception to the rule that Austrian Jews were, for the reasons described above, deeply loyal to the multinational empire and constituted, with the cosmopolitan aristocracy, the only Habsburg subjects that actually subscribed to the transnational Austrian idea. How could Jewish nationalism represent anything but an exception?

Austrian Jewish nationalism is not an exception because most Austrian Zionists valued the same things about the empire as Jews of other political persuasions. Indeed many Austrian Zionists—those who called themselves cultural Zionists—were not focused on emigration, but called for Jewish national autonomy within Austria. They cultivated Jewish languages and culture and promoted social welfare and education within the Habsburg multinational polity. Of course, Austria-Hungary also produced Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau, the two most prominent thinkers in political Zionism—the movement that called for Jewish emigration and the founding of a Jewish nation state. However, their promotion of emigration did not imply much of a departure from or rejection of their formative context. The idea that the Jewish community constituted a nation did not, in fact, mean that Zionists played a lesser role in the work of Vienna’s progressive social reformers (discussed in the last chapter). They moved in much the same circles as people who did not discuss the “Jewish question” openly, like Alfred Fried. Fried and Max Nordau corresponded about social reform causes such as the death penalty issue discussed Chapter Two. In the Russian or German empires, ethnonationalism was more influential on Jewish intellectuals because it was ubiquitous and because (especially in the Russian Pale of Settlement) the political options seemed more constrained, as the states in which they operated were conceptualized as national (though both were de facto multinational). In Austria, however, it seemed more

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1Cultural Zionists were inspired by Ahad Ha’am (Asher Ginsberg) in Russia. Cultural Zionism will be discussed in the second half of the chapter.


4On Vienna’s largely Jewish circle of social reformers see Belke, Die sozialreformerischen Ideen.

5See Hoover Institution Archives, Alfred Fried Collection, Box 2, Folder “Max Nordau”
reasonable to think in broader and more pluralist terms. And this was no less the case among Zionists than among socialists, progressives, or liberals.

The argument of this chapter is that even those Austrian Jewish intellectuals who became prominent Zionists still saw themselves as Europeans and were invested in European unity despite their assertion of Jewish nationalism. Those who emigrated to Palestine saw themselves as part of a European Diaspora. Evidence for this includes the persistence of liberalism in their thought. Because Enlightenment liberalism and specifically emancipation were key to their membership in Europe, the persistence of liberalism in their thought—even when this required an ideological balancing act—is evidence of the value they placed on being European. As we shall see, they quiet explicitly argued that Anglophile and Francophile liberalism and the German Enlightenment legacy maintained Europe whereas illiberal ethnonationalism threatened to destroy Europe. Even when some of these Zionists became convinced that emancipation had failed or that assimilation was impossible, they continued to make judgments about the ideal form of government based on Enlightenment or liberal values of progress, the ideal of modernity, the focus on the individual, and universal rather than (ethnic) group ethics. These values were emblematic of European civilization, and thus it is not surprising that a central focus of their Zionism was the question of how and where Jews could best be, in Hans Kohn’s words “good Europeans.”

The chapter is structured in two sections. The first looks at the Enlightenment legacy and its expression in the Jewish political nationalism of Alfred Nossig, Theodor Herzl, and Max Nordau. These figures were concerned with the legal and political questions surrounding Jewish emancipation and the possible solution in a Jewish polity. The second section

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6I do not wish to imply that Jewish intellectuals in these three states operated in closed intellectual spaces. There was extensive exchange between Russian, Austrian, and German Jewish intellectuals. However, it must be noted that Russian and German Jews dominated Zionist Revisionism—an explicitly exclusive, ethnonationalist movement. When Austrian Zionists took inspiration from Russian Jewish movements, it was, as noted above, in the form of Ahad Ha’am’s humanist, cultural Zionism. Likewise, Austrian influence on Russian Jewish politics tended to be moderate and non-state-seeking. For example, the non-territorial national idea of Otto Bauer (the Austro-Marxist key figure of Chapter Four) was the major influence behind Simon Dubnow’s advocacy of Jewish autonomy within Russia.

7The term “political Zionism” describes to the politically oriented branch of the Zionist movement, under Theodor Herzl, from the First World Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897 forward. Thus “Jewish political nationalism” is used here to avoid confusion since this section includes pre-1897 Zionism. However, for the purposes of this chapter, this distinction does not play a significant role. The purpose is to contrast Zionists (pre and post Herzl) with a political agenda to those in the next section whose focus was cultural. Thus, at points in the chapter, the term, “political Zionism” is used loosely in order to avoid cumbersome language.
explores the Jewish cultural nationalism of Nathan Birnbaum and Hans Kohn. These figures sought a way around the dichotomy between assimilation and emigration through the cultivation within Europe of Jewish culture, particularly Jewish literary heritage. They attempted to balance an a-political, mystical and illiberal cultural nationalism with political liberalism and multinationalism. When their attempts to keep the two separate failed, both abandoned Zionism.

### 3.2 HISTORIOGRAPHY

Before moving on, it is necessary to address an historiographical debate on the role of the Central European context and of liberalism in pre-state Zionism. In the literature on “Central European” Zionists from Herzl and Nordau to Buber and Kohn, a general theme has been their debt to a purported Central European liberalism and pluralism. In general, Central European liberalism tends to be invoked to mean one or both of two sets of ideas. The first set includes the Enlightenment tradition—both the German Aufklärung and the German Jewish Haskala—and German liberal nationalism, particularly its 1848 manifestation. Walter Laqueur’s discussion of Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau as Central European liberals is a prominent example of this usage. In Laqueur, Central Europe stands for the enlightened liberal cosmopolitanism in the work of Herzl and Nordau and is contrasted with Vladimir Jabotinky’s illiberal ethnonationalism. In much of the literature, in fact, Central European liberalism is deployed in making a contrast between a civilized Western Zionism and the illiberal ethnonationalism of Jabotinski and the Zionist revisionists. Of course,

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8Again, the term “cultural Zionism” has been avoided here because, while it describes Kohn in its strict sense, some might prefer to describe Birnbaum primarily as a “Diaspora Nationalist” and as a “Yiddishist.” While the different character of his and Kohn’s Zionism is discussed in this section, the point is that they both sought a cultural rather than a political solution to the problems of antisemitism and assimilation.


this is not merely a feature of the historiography—pre-state Western Zionists had the same idea: “Western Zionism, the philosopher Shmuel Hugo Bergman wrote in retrospect, was the last flicker of the humanist–nationalist flame at the very moment when anti-humanism was triumphant over all the world.”

Indeed, there can be little debate about whether figures like Herzl and Nordau were liberal nationalists, only about whether they were right in seeing liberal nationalism as morally superior to romantic ethnonationalism.

The second characterization of Central European liberalism includes multinationalism and pluralism in Austria-Hungary and Europe’s multinational empires generally. In this literature, the concern is less with Deutschtum or liberal German nationalism as a vehicle for liberal cosmopolitanism. Rather the focus is on liberalism as the foundation for multinational coexistence. Dan Diner’s article “Jewish History as a Paradigm for European History” is a good example on a Europe-wide scale. Diner argues that Jewish history offers a window onto a major trajectory in European history. That history illustrates the transformation of Europe (starting with the French revolution) from multinational and imperial to homogenizing and national. This process caused a transformation in Jewish self-perception from religious and non-territorial to national and territorial. The process took different paths in Western and Eastern Europe. In the West, Jews focused on citizenship and equality; in the East on group rights and protections. Both were attempts of a non-territorial community to come to terms with the nation state by building Europe-wide communities, and as such constitute a precedent for the post-WWII European integration process. Yet both the attempt to achieve equality through citizenship in a liberal state and the attempt to secure rights as a minority group failed. The result for those Jews who survived the Holocaust was either migration as refugees or membership in the Jewish nation-state. With the creation of the state of Israel, which is of Europe, but not in (geographic) Europe, Jewish history as European history ends according to Diner. Ironically, in becoming national, the Jews became like other Europeans, but also lost their membership in Europe. Austria-Hungary

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was Europe’s multinational empire par excellence, so it is not surprising that Diner’s slightly romanticized idea of the Jews as the ultimate Europeans in their non-territoriality goes hand in hand with romanticized ideas about the Habsburg Empire as a model of multinational coexistence. Examples include Milan Kundera’s discussion of the Jews as the glue holding multinational Central Europe together, or Diana Pinto’s argument that the Jews constitute the foundation for a new European identity.14

Yfaat Weiss has problematized the liberal Central European legacy in the case of Brit Shalom, an association of Cultural Zionists that advocated a bi-national state in Palestine from 1925-1933. Its members included well-known public intellectuals such as Robert Weltsch (editor of the Jüdische Rundschau, the preeminent Zionist newspaper at the time), the philosopher Samuel Hugo Bergman, Gershom Scholem (scholar of Jewish Mysticism), Hans Kohn, and Arthur Ruppin (sociologist and former head of the Palestine Bureau, a representation of the Zionist organization in Palestine that coordinated settlement activities). It also had similarly prestigious sympathizers, like Martin Buber (who lived in Germany). Weiss argues that the origins of Brit Shalom’s pacifism have been incorrectly located in a vague and romanticized idea of Central European liberalism and moderation. She takes the cases of Arthur Ruppin and Hans Kohn and argues that their formative experiences in the German Empire and in Habsburg Prague were quite different and should not be homogenized. She discusses Ruppin’s formative experience in Posen on the Prussian frontier and Kohn’s in Prague and argues that their support for binationalism in Palestine can be read as attempts to find a solution to the national conflicts in their home regions. The differences in their Prussian and Prague experiences—particularly the fact that Kohn was part of a minority community whereas Ruppin was not—helps to explain why Kohn represented the left-wing and Ruppin the conservative factions within the Brit Shalom movement. Their Zionism, Weiss concludes, was not a continuation of a liberal Central European perspective; it was a reaction against ethnonationalism in Prussia and Prague. If anything, according to Weiss, Central Europe was a negative, not a positive inspiration for their pacifism.

... the standard historiographic reading ascribes to the Brit Shalom members the attributes

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of Central European liberalism and moderation. Meticulous examination of the formative experiences of representatives of Brit Shalom’s two wings—Hans Kohn standing for the radical wing, and Arthur Ruppin as spokesman for the consensual position—reveals this position to be greatly deficient, being both too general and superficial. Neither Kohn nor Ruppin derived their inspiration from liberal Central European moderation, because no such thing existed.\textsuperscript{15}... it was not the liberal spirit of Central Europe but the liberal Jewish criticism of the illiberal turn to ethnonationalist practices in that geopolitical sphere which gave rise to a synthesis in the spirit of conciliatory Zionism.\textsuperscript{16}

Weiss is correct, at least partly. Pacifist Cultural Zionism was certainly intended in part as a response to the negative experience of being Jewish in interwar Central and Eastern Europe’s homogenizing nation states. However, her conclusions are not unproblematic. She postulates the contemporary ideological climate as the sole formative context for the figures she studies, but, especially for intellectuals, this seems unjustified. In other words, Weiss overlooks the possibility that the Central European experience was multidimensional. It is true that ethnonationalism ruled supreme in Central Europe’s nation states in the interwar period. However, it is equally true that Pacifist Cultural Zionists were keenly aware of (and attached to) the legacy of 1848 liberal Deutschtum and the supranational, moderate liberal Austrian idea. Crucially, these legacies were central to their identity as Europeans since the Enlightenment, liberalism and specifically the process of emancipation had given Jews membership in European civilization. As Dan Diner has shown, to reject this legacy completely and opt for territorial ethnonationalism meant the end of life in Europe. Thus nationalism was problematic to Pacifist Cultural Zionists not simply because they had a moral objection to the kind of politics they saw in homogenizing, interwar nation states. On a personal level, their membership in Europe was dependent on the Enlightenment liberal, moderate tradition and underlay their identity as European exiles or colonists in Palestine. This did not mean these Zionists could not be critical of that tradition. After all, Kohn identified the struggle to negotiate a position along the continuum as the paradigmatic modern Jewish experience.\textsuperscript{17}

Rather, it means that, from a historiographical viewpoint, following Laqueur’s, Diner’s,

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 98.
and Weiss’s attempts to identify the core of the Zionist position in a particular set of theses unnecessarily leads to the pathologizing of any action or claim that is not in accord with those theses. It leads to the idea that there is an essential position which is mediated through one or more non-essential ones, and by being so mediated is perverted. However, it seems more historically accurate to follow Kohn and recognize the necessity of the continuum. In other words, it seems more accurate to stop identifying an essential position which stands in contradistinction to non-essential ones, a true and good inspiration versus negative ones, and deal directly with the multiplicity of positions. In this light, the notion that the work of Central European Zionists is riddled with “contradictions” is simply an artifact of an overly reductive historiography. Once the relevance of multiple contexts and meanings is made clear, these seeming “contradictions” become explicable. And so, in a national context, Zionists were trying both to accommodate nationalism and remain cosmopolitan Europeans—that was a position that required a lot of ideological flexibility. But they were careful to walk a fine line in which their mysticism and romantic nationalism did not really undermine political liberalism. As Christian Wiese has argued, this may partly explain Kohn’s insistence that his Zionism was a purely cultural phenomenon. His rejection of Enlightenment rationalism was confined to the realm of culture and did not threaten political liberalism. And as George Mosse has shown in the case of Robert Weltsch:

Robert Weltsch . . . has recently reminded us that early in the twentieth century his generation felt that “what was important . . . was not the farewell to Europe, but instead a greedy acceptance of all that Europe had to give us.” Even more significantly, he adds that for a German Jew, even for a Zionist, “Europe inevitably meant Germanness.”

I would argue that the need to retain a basis for Jewish Europeanness helps to explain the attempt to maintain mystical, illiberal Zionism on the cultural level along with liberalism on the political level. And there is little question that in this sense, Austrian Zionists perceived Central Europe—one meaning of which was interchangeable with cosmopolitan Deutschtum and European political liberalism—as a positive example for their moderate Zionism.

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3.3 JEWISH POLITICAL NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

3.3.1 Zion and the “Continental Union”

Alfred Nossig, a little known but highly controversial Zionist from eastern Galicia, is a good case to start with because he illustrates well the complexities of Austrian Zionism’s relationship to liberalism and the idea of a federal or integrated Europe. Nossig, like Nathan Birnbaum, was an established Jewish nationalist before Herzl published *A Jewish State*. The bulk of Nossig’s writing was devoted to his attempt to extend the social sciences to include study of the Jews as a national group, though he also founded a colonization organization to promote small-scale settlement in Palestine and was involved in failed attempts at diplomatic negotiations aimed at securing support for the founding of a Jewish state. He established an office for Jewish statistics and published statistical studies of European Jewry. He was also a pioneer in the field of eugenics and wrote studies in Jewish eugenics arguing, not surprisingly, that Jews were an eugenically superior race. As we shall see, however, none of this was incompatible with an investment in European unity.

In a much-cited article, Ezra Mendelsohn uses Nossig as an example in a discussion of conversion from assimilation to Zionism among young people in Eastern Galicia at the turn of the century. The general trajectory that Mendelsohn outlines is useful, but his use of Nossig as an example of that trajectory reduces the complexity of the latter’s Zionism. Mendelsohn is too quick to view both Nossig’s Polish assimilation and his Zionism as a rejection of liberalism and of Europe.

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20 Nossig was assassinated in 1943 by the Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto on suspicion of collaboration with the Gestapo.

21 Nossig, according to Shmuel Almog, “himself a political Zionist, was constantly critical of Herzl, but his criticism did not stem from ideological differences, as was the case with Ahad Ha’am... His misgivings were more akin to those of Nathan Birnbaum, who, too, had anticipated political Zionism and been overshadowed by Herzl.” Shmuel Almog. “Alfred Nossig: A Reappraisal”. In: *Studies in Zionism* 7 (1983), pp. 1–29, p. 4

22 *Ibid.*, p. 4

23 Nossig succeeded in recruiting Martin Buber, Leo Motzkin, Nathan Birnbaum, and Chaim Weizmann for the committee to establish this office for Jewish Statistics. See Leo Motzkin Collection, Central Zionist Archives, A126/248 (1902): Materials related to the Bureau für Statistik des Jüdischen Volkes and the Jüdischer Friedensbund.

Nossig was born in the Galician city of Lemberg/Lwów (now Lviv in Ukraine) in 1860 into one of the leading Jewish families among the German-speaking, professional, liberal elite and attended a German language school (most of whose students were Jewish). His father was a member of the society Shomer Yisrael (Guardian of Israel), whose program Mendelsohn has summarized as “equality of rights for Jews, the modernization of Galician Jewry, loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty and devotion to German culture. By expressing these views the Guardian of Israel placed itself clearly in the tradition of the Galician Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) movement, which flourished in the early 19th century.” However, this second generation of enlighteners, as Mendelsohn refers to them, while perpetuating the ideology of the Haskalah, neglected its application to Jewish religion and culture. A local historian described the situation as follows:

Rappaport, Krochmal, and Erter [the foremost Galician Enlighteners] are the creators of Hebrew Enlightenment in Galicia and beyond her borders; after them came a new generation for whom the language of the prophets had no charm, who abandoned Hebrew culture, and who drew their strength direct from European culture, in this case from Germany.

But by the end of the nineteenth century in Lemberg/Lwów, the liberal values of Nossig’s father’s generation were thoroughly discredited. Their liberalism and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty had become increasingly untenable after 1867, when the Poles received the right of home rule and the region became a textbook case for what Rogers Brubaker has called nationalizing nationalism. Nation building movements in pre-World War I and interwar Poland and elsewhere in East Europe centered on replacing foreign urban elites and restricting the considerable role of the Jews in their economies.

Nationalization policies exposed Jews to the society at large by dismantling their community autonomy. For young people, the most important factor in this shift was the compulsory state school system. There they learned Polish and many students began to acculturate. Increasingly, lower-middle-class and proletarian Jews, long the vanguard of Orthodoxy and

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26 Quoted in ibid., pp. 521-22.
Yiddish language and culture, were abandoning tradition, but were not integrating well.29 They were still very much attached to Jewish culture, but their lifestyles—their dress, language, and identification—were changing.30

The situation was no less dramatic for the German acculturated Jewish elite. Nossig’s father lost his leadership position in the Jewish community because he failed the new Polish language exam. To Nossig’s generation—the sons of the German-speaking elite—their parent’s Kaisertreu world-view and devotion to German Kultur appeared at best anachronistic. Nossig, having little of the Jewish cultural and religious baggage of the Yiddish-speaking, Orthodox youth of the lower middle and working classes, became an ardent, romantic Polish nationalist. He wrote cloying nationalist plays and songs celebrating Polish national heroes and argued that the Jews and Poles had a shared destiny as two of Europe’s persecuted nations. But all of this began to change in the late 1880s when Nossig and scores of his contemporaries, having faced rejection from anti-Semitic classmates, teachers, and coworkers, affiliated with the modern Jewish political organizations that were founded by Jewish socialists, Zionists, and religious communities in the late nineteenth century.31

Thus, Mendelsohn concludes, Nossig’s Zionism, like that of his fellow-Zionists, represented a wholesale rejection of the previous generation’s faith in emancipation. Emancipation being an Enlightenment legacy, this also entailed rejection of liberalism along with the abandonment of German Kultur and along with it, European civilization. However, much of Nossig’s work contradicts this thesis: Nossig was instrumental in founding one of the two


30While Mendelsohn restricts his discussion to language and customs, Schatz includes a lengthy discussion of ideas such as Messianism and the role of education in Jewish culture over a long period. Schatz, The Generation, p. 34.

major European transnational integration movements that were the Pan-European Union’s competition in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{32}

In Berlin in 1900, Nossig began to campaign for French-German rapprochement in the hope that this would form the basis for European integration. In a booklet titled \textit{French-German rapprochement and the Continental Union} published in 1900 Nossig called for a system of treaties to unite the continental powers of Europe in order to compete with England. The choice of \textit{Continental} as opposed to \textit{European} Union was explicitly to exclude England from Europe. The text is as much a diatribe against English imperialism and colonialism as it is a call for world peace and European unity. Nevertheless, the texts begins with a call for world peace. Like Alfred Fried, Nossig first dismissed utopian pacifism, its champions (such as Dostoyevsky) and its methods (like conscientious objection). He then outlined his own plan for what Fried would come to call scientific pacifism a few years later. Integration would be achieved through the gradual building of a system of alliances between Europe’s continental powers governed by arbitration and international courts. Like Fried, Nossig saw peace and integration as long-term goals: “World peace, like all other international work, can only be realized through a long, consistent, and systematic political process.”\textsuperscript{33}

Nossig’s argument, sadly, lacked these qualities. In his booklet, militarism, imperialism, and colonialism took on entirely different characteristics depending on who deployed them. Nossig bemoaned British imperialism and colonialism and the naval power on which they rested. He accused other German pacifists of being naive in their Anglophilia. England, to which Nossig referred as a “sea serpent … which wants to encircle the entire world”\textsuperscript{34} conducted its international politics on entirely different principles from those which governed interactions between members within its own society. England, in its dealing with other states, was the most abusive, violent, power-hungry, and bellicose of all countries. And Chamberlain was not an unsympathetic personality, but a representative of an unsym-

\textsuperscript{32}Jean-Michel Guieu. “Le Comité fédéral de Coopération européenne: L’action méconnue d’une organisation internationale privée en faveur de l’union de l’Europe dans les années trente (1928-1940)”. In: \textit{Organisations internationales et architectures européennes (1929-1939)}.
Centre de recherche "histoire et civilisation de l’Europe occidentale". 2003, pp. 73–91, pp. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{33}Alfred Nossig. \textit{Die deutsch-französische Annäherung und die Kontinentalunion}. Verlag von Hermann Walther, 1900.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 11.
pathetic, English doctrine.\textsuperscript{35} Nossig detailed English offenses against continental Europe beginning with a discussion of Grotius and Selden and continuing to his present.

All bets were off, however, when it came to the colonialism and imperialism of continental European states. The basis of Nossig’s plan for French-German rapprochement was the suggestion that France be compensated for Alsace-Lorraine with some of Portugal’s colonies in Africa.\textsuperscript{36} He also argued that the continental powers, most importantly Germany, should expand the navy in order to check English expansion (thus contributing to the arms race that Fried and the German Peace Society campaigned against). Nossig’s work was motivated by some of the very same concerns that framed the interwar and post-WWII European integration debates. Like Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Nossig’s interest in European integration was related to fear of American and British dominance in the world, though Nossig regarded Russia as part of Europe and Coudenhove-Kalergi did not. The fact that Nossig was writing in 1900 and Coudenhove-Kalergi in the 1920s and 1930s is probably not irrelevant in explaining this difference. In fact, Nossig’s booklet can be read as a call for the building of a continental European empire. He did not explain why Anglo-imperialism was incompatible with this vision, while the imperialism of other European countries did not present a problem.

Nossig also shared with Coudenhove-Kalergi the view that the Austrian Empire was a model for multinational coexistence in Europe. The Austrian Empire was, for Nossig, an example of peace by virtue of its attempts to mediate conflict and preserve multinational coexistence within its borders. This made Franz Joseph a friend of pacifism.\textsuperscript{37} Nossig opposed the idea of Austrian Anschluss with Germany and argued that one of the benefits of Continental Union would be its ability to reaffirm the transnational Austrian idea.\textsuperscript{38} This discussion of Austria as a model is the closest Nossig came to outlining the specific character of relations he envisioned within the Continental Union. Again, the text is more about the balance of power between continental Europe and England in global affairs than about Europe itself.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., pp. 20-23.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 42.
Indeed, despite his positive evaluation of peace in Austria, the text is informed more by a militarist perspective than a pacifist one. Nossig, though he did not exactly advocate war, wrote from the stance that it was always imminent and that measures such as armament should be taken accordingly. This contrasted with the stance of Fried and pacifists who thought international relations were fundamentally harmonious rather than bellicose and thus believed that peace was an eminently achievable project.\(^{39}\) Fried’s book from 1920 on the German Kaiser and World Peace covers much of the same ground as Nossig, but there is a fundamental difference in the ethos of optimism versus pessimism. It seems that Fried challenged the Imperial German context more than Nossig did.\(^{40}\) This is clear from Nossig’s other views too—he was a eugenicist and regarded the Jews as fundamentally different and as a nation in an ethnic sense, a position to which Fried did not subscribe. Their personal histories, particularly the different regions in which they grew up, probably go a long way towards explaining the difference.

What motivated a Zionist to take on French-German rapprochement and advocate European integration? Nossig claimed that as an admirer of both French and German culture, he was an impartial figure well suited to mediate between the two.\(^{41}\) But beyond this qualification, he saw a solution to the Jewish predicament in a united Europe. His plan was not dissimilar to Herzl’s. The Continental Union would include an area of Jewish settlement in Ottoman Palestine. The Union would administer Christian holy cites and the Jews would have autonomy in the remaining territory.

The old conflict over Palestine could perhaps find a natural and peaceful solution in a measure that would allow the land’s erstwhile owners, the Jews, to colonize it. Of course the holy places would be extra-territorialized and would be protected by the Christian states and the Church. In this way the Continental States would not only peacefully fulfill their political interests in a conflict-ridden area, but also dispose of the local problem of Jewish overpopulation. The Oriental question in foreign affairs and the inner Oriental question could be solved simultaneously.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{39}\) For a definition of militarism and a discussion of the basic differences in perspective between militarists and pacifists, see Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, pp. 385-87.

\(^{40}\) Fried, *Der Kaiser*.

\(^{41}\) Nossig, *Die deutsch-französische Annäherung*.

\(^{42}\) *ibid.*, p. 43. The presentation of Zionism as an aid to Europe’s states in solving their “Jewish problem” was not unique to Nossig, but a common argument that the Zionist leadership aimed especially at states, such as the Russian Empire, in which Jews were not emancipated. See Orbach, “Zionism and the Russian Revolution of 1905”, p. 7
Nossig’s idea of Europe can be summarized as follows. He envisioned Europe as an imperial, continental power that would ensure that those European nations for which he had an affinity—Germany and to a lesser degree France—would lead a process of continental European unification which would protect Austria from multinational disintegration, guarantee and include a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, and protect against economic and military competition from England. This entailed a double standard in regard to imperialism. First, English colonialism was wrong whereas continental European colonialism was justified. Secondly, colonization within Europe was unacceptable, but disputes between European powers could be settled through the redistribution of overseas territories.

It would be easy to highlight the contradictions in Nossig’s argument. It is, of course, well known that nineteenth and early twentieth century liberals usually did not think that their principles applied universally. J. S. Mill was quite explicit about this. The principle that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection” did not apply universally. Because “… a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end perhaps otherwise unattainable… Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians…” Accordingly, when Nossig criticized the English for attempting to take over the world, the grievance was probably less with the practice of overseas colonialism as with greed when it came to sharing the wealth with other European powers. The fact that Nossig was not explicit about this in expressing his moral indignation about English imperialism indicates that he expected that his German-speaking audience shared his concern with Germany’s standing in Europe. Nossig shared with German nationalists the view that the Germans should play a prominent role in any movement for European unity. This was, as discussed in the introduction tied to a conception of Deutschtum as cosmopolitan and thus as a unifying force that transcended ethnic differences. Friedrich Meinecke, for example, argued in 1908 that German national feeling, at its best, was inseparable from the cosmopolitan ideal of a humanity that transcended nationality. If Nossig thought German cosmopolitan nationalism ought to be the unifying force in Europe,

including the British empire in Europe was threatening.

Nossig’s Zionism\textsuperscript{45} and his promotion of European unity were at odds with the ethnonationalism that prevailed in the early twentieth century. However it was typical for nineteenth century liberal nationalism, particularly Mazzini’s 1848 liberal nationalism and European federalism. Nossig saw no problem in blending this earlier, more cosmopolitan nationalism with participation at the cutting edge of racial social science with all of its ethnonationalist overtones. Thus, as argued above, Nossig did not reject his father’s liberal and Kaisertreu world-view categorically. His belief that emancipation had failed did not rule out liberalism and specifically liberal nationalism as one inspiration alongside others. Liberal nationalism and specifically the legacy of nineteenth century liberal nationalist ideas for a federal Europe are clearly evident in Nossig’s Continental Europe.

Perhaps we should be less insistent on ideological consistency in the politics of people with a complex web of identities and loyalties tied to the multinational context in which they lived. As discussed in the historiography section above, it is tempting to try to identify one position along the romantic nationalist—liberal trajectory as the true or essential position and other, perhaps contradictory positions as mediating but not really coexisting equally with that essential position. This reduces a complexity that was integral to the Jewish predicament in Central Europe at the turn of the century. The ambiguity of Nossig’s own identity is well summarized in a description by one of his friends.

The more I observed Nossig, his behavior, his work, his inclinations, the more contrasts and contradictions I found in him. The root of his soul: a poetic Jewishness; the source of his innermost hidden life: the national revival of the [Jewish] people; his bearing, his manners, his behavior toward other human beings, his entire outward mask: a perfect Pole, […]; his culture, his work-style and meticulousness: a really true German.\textsuperscript{46}

Indeed, over the next two decades Nossig seems to have changed his mind about England and become more optimistic about the prospects of peace. In the mid 1920s, he sent out appeals for a European Peace Society (Europäisches Freidensbund/Union pour la paix européenne) to be launched in Germany, France, England, and Poland which would found a Committee for the Common Interests of the European People (Comité pour les intérêts

\textsuperscript{45}On Nossig’s conversion to Zionism and his position in the movement, see Mendelsohn, “From Assimilation to Zionism”.

\textsuperscript{46}Quoted in Almog, “Alfred Nossig”, pp. 3-4.
communs des peuples européens). It would be dominated by representatives of the German Democratic Party such as Walter Schücking, Otto Nuschke and Wilhelm Heile. Schücking was one of the advocates of international law who supported Fried’s failed attempt to establish a Pan-European Office in 1909 and in whose work Fried’s “International Organization” and “Organized Pacifism” was carried over into the 1920s and 1930s (Fried died in 1921).\textsuperscript{47}

As with so many of the political projects that Nossig started, this one too was characterized by Nossig’s loss of a leadership role in this movement—Nossig was always between movements, always founding new ones, and, often due to personal conflicts, leaving them for new endeavors. However, there is evidence that he continued to pursue peace and transnational integration: in 1929 he was involved in the founding of an interfaith pacifist association (Alliance des Confessions pour las Paix) in Germany and France.\textsuperscript{48}

Nossig’s political Zionism was not a wholesale rejection of his father’s generation’s devotion to liberalism. Nor was it a rejection of Deutschtum. German language and culture continued to be the vehicle through which to express cosmopolitan Europeanness. His Zionist program was, in some respects, not much of a departure from the stance of most German speaking Jews in the face of ethnonationalism. But like every other modern Jewish political movement, Zionism represented an attempt to revise a position that was no longer realistic. This was Jewish identification with German liberal nationalism. With the crisis of liberalism, Jews were no longer welcome in these movements. Herzl, Nordau and Birnbaum had similar experiences with German nationalist fraternities at the university of Vienna and it is to these three that we turn next.

\subsection{3.3.2 The Jewish State as a European Diaspora}

Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau were largely responsible for making Zionism into a mass movement with international clout and bargaining power in international relations. Together, they founded the World Zionist Organization in 1897. This section poses the question of whether Herzl and Nordau, despite their assertion of nationalism and promotion of emigra-

\textsuperscript{47}Schöenemann-Behrens, ““Organisiert die Welt””, pp. 165, 168.
\textsuperscript{48}See Leo Motzkin Collection, Central Zionist Archives, A126/248 (1902): Materials related to the Bureau für Statistik des Jüdischen Volkes and the Jüdischer Friedensbund.
tion, saw cosmopolitan Europe as a model and ideal. Their thinking on European unity is discussed against the background of the liberal German nationalism, which served as a starting point for both.

Herzl is much better remembered than Nordau. As a correspondent and later literary editor of the Vienna’s Neue Freie Presse, one of German-speaking Europe’s preeminent liberal newspapers, he was a well known public intellectual before he became a Zionist. In 1896, he published Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State), a booklet outlining in fairly vague terms a liberal, pluralist Jewish state. The booklet acknowledged no debt to the two decades of Zionist literature by other Jewish intellectuals from Leon Pinsker to Nathan Birnbaum and Alfred Nossig because Herzl had not read this literature (and was not concerned about the oversight when it was brought to his attention). Judenstaat propelled Herzl essentially overnight into the forefront of the Zionist movement. There he remained until his death in 1904.

While Herzl was the charismatic and articulate leader and diplomat of Zionism, Nordau was the movement’s chief theorist. Also an important public intellectual, Nordau—a liberal author, social critic and physician—is best known as the author of Degeneration. Published in 1892, the book was, in Steven Aschheim’s words, “a veritable diatribe of cultural criticism that characterized virtually every modernist fin-de-s’ècle current as a symptom of exhaustion and inability to adjust to the realities of the modern industrial age.” He took the work of figures such as Nietzsche, Wilde, Baudelaire, Wagner, and Ibsen as evidence of a process of degeneration through which the abandonment of reason and progress would result in an immoral and irrational pre-Enlightenment form of society. Nordau was also a correspondent for Neue Freie Presse in Paris, where he spent most of his life.

Both Herzl and Nordau were from Pest and both left as young men, not to return. They came from the German acculturated bourgeoisie, a minority group among Hungarian Jewry most of whom were avid Hungarian patriots by the close of the nineteenth century. For both,

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52 Ibid., p. 646.
the choice of German over Hungarian reflected less a national preference than the appeal of cosmopolitanism over nationalism. In broad terms, acculturation to Hungarian meant joining a nation; acculturation to German meant (aspiration to) membership in a Weltkultur and Weltsprache (world culture and world language) and access to a cosmopolitan European civilization. Nordau wrote in retrospect “When I reached the age of fifteen, I left the Jewish way of life and the study of the Torah... Judaism remained a mere memory and since then I have always felt as a German and as a German only.”\(^\text{53}\) And Herzl famously wrote that “if there is one thing I should like to be, it is a member of the old Prussian nobility.”\(^\text{54}\) He did not draw attention to his Hungarian roots and regarded with disdain Jewish assimilation in Hungary. He described old friends and acquaintances who spoke Hungarian as “unrivaled Hungarian dolts”, i.e. provincial philistines, and refused to speak the language when he visited.\(^\text{55}\)

Part and parcel with Herzl’s and Nordau’s preference for German over Hungarian came identification with liberalism. This was partially in keeping with their fathers’ generation of devoted liberals, who had reconciled their Jewishness with membership in a secular, transnational Enlightenment European republic of letters. The older generation negotiated between attachment to Judaism and to secular, cosmopolitan Europe, whereas the younger generation faced a Europe of nations as unwilling, ethnically Jewish outsiders.

Theodor Gomperz (1832-1912) is a prime example of the older generation. A highly respected professor of classics at the University of Vienna, he was a Liberal parliamentarian and a friend and translator of John Stuart Mill who maintained unfaltering faith in the Enlightenment. Nonetheless, at the end of his life, he wrote to his wife that he wished that his sons “with God’s help, and despite whatever views they might have about religion, ritual, etc., go to temple wherever it be...every year on the anniversary of my death to say Kaddish, although this seems to go against the grain of my high-minded, areligious, republican Enlightenment.”\(^\text{56}\) Likewise in Galicia, leading members of the community of


\(^{55}\)Ibid., p. 49.

Jellinek’s generation were described by a young Zionist, Yehoshua Thon, born in 1870, as “… certainly not assimilationists, at least not in the sense that this term was later understood. On the contrary, all of them had a certain love for Judaism, and there were not traitors among them. But they lacked a common approach to Jewish problems. Judaism was regarded as a special subject, and not one to be singled out for particular interest or discussion. A man is born a Jew, and naturally remains one.”\(^{57}\) For this generation, German nationalism provided access to a liberal, cosmopolitan Europe.

Liberalism and nationalism had converged in the 1848 revolutions in the German Confederation. The short-lived Frankfurt Parliament had drafted a classical 19th century liberal constitution based on the principles of individual freedoms, respect for private property, secular education, freedom of press, religion, assembly and speech as well as equality of the sexes, free education, a progressive income tax, and a people’s militia. An imperial monarch was to be the head of state, but his power would be checked by an elective assembly and a responsive ministry. The more radical reformers also called for separation of church and state, deposition of hereditary rulers, elimination of royal armies and bureaucracies, abolition of monasteries, and the creation of a German federal union modeled after the United States.

The nationalism of the liberal reformers of 1848 was quite cosmopolitan in the sense that the state they envisioned was not religiously or ethnically homogeneous. It was to incorporate non-German speaking regions, include Jews, and allow for private Catholic education. Of course, this toleration had strings attached. The Frankfurt parliamentarians proposed including non-German areas against the national aspirations of their inhabitants and acceptance of Jews was premised on assimilation. But most Jews were eager to oblige since Germanness meant improvement and membership in a secular, cosmopolitan, humanist community.

However, this trajectory became highly problematic in the last decades of the nineteenth century with the rise of illiberal mass political movements. In Vienna, a process similar to the illiberal turn in East European nation building movements (as Nossig experienced) was under way. Beginning with the \textit{Ausgleich}, particularly in Galicia and later across the Empire,

\(^{57}\)Mendelsohn, \textit{“From Assimilation to Zionism”}, p. 522.
ethnonationalism and racial antisemitism was on the rise. Two movements in particular, Georg von Schönerer and Pan-Germans and Karl Lueger and the Christian Socials, had benefitted from the recent extension of suffrage and found mass support for their xenophobic and anticapitalist platforms. Like their East European counterparts, these movements centered on replacing foreign urban elites and restricting the considerable role of the Jews in their economies. John Boyer has described the Christian Socials as a precapitalist Bürgertum attempting to regain control over what they saw as their city.\textsuperscript{58} In 1897 the Christian Social party acquired power in Vienna with Karl Lueger as mayor. Their Catholic and nativist ideology was opposed to the cosmopolitan artistic and literary culture supported by the liberal upper middle class, which was largely Jewish. Christian Social antisemitism rested on resentment of Jews as capitalists, as patrons of the cultural movements they objected to, and as a source of non-Catholic immigration to Vienna.

After the pogroms of the 1880s in Russia, the Dreyfus affair in France, and Karl Lueger’s election in Vienna, the pressure increased for assimilated Jewish intellectuals to articulate a position on “the Jewish question.” Some found the answer in socialism and most, like Alfred Fried, reaffirmed their devotion to the Enlightenment ideals of universal truths and unstoppable progress and saw the upsurge in antisemitism as a throwback to a medieval prejudice which would not last. But all were faced with a profoundly ambivalent situation because they themselves identified as Austro-German Europeans, but they were increasingly identified by others as members of a different racially defined national group.

This situation was compounded for many, including Herzl, who had internalized antisemitic stereotypes and thought of unassimilated, East European Jewish men as effeminate, cowardly, materialistic, and pragmatic rather than intellectual or idealistic.\textsuperscript{59} Jewish women, conversely, were seen as masculine largely because many worked outside the home while the men studied.\textsuperscript{60} Max Nordau addressed this issue in a speech at the first Zionist Congress.

\textsuperscript{59}Kornberg, \textit{Theodor Herzl}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{60}There is an extensive literature on antisemitic gender stereotypes, use of these by German assimilated Jews against East European Jews, and the shift in gender roles within the Jewish community that coincided with the process of emancipation and upward mobility in Central and Western Europe. See Stefanie Schüler-Springorum. “Jüdische Geschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte”. In: \textit{Transversal} 1 (2003), pp. 3–15; Klaus Hödl. \textit{Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt: Galizische Juden auf dem Weg nach Wien}. Vienna: Böhlau Verlag,
He argued that the assimilated Jew “has abandoned his specifically Jewish character, yet the nations do not accept him as part of their national communities. He flees from his Jewish fellow, because anti-Semitism has taught him too, to be contemptuous of them, but his gentile compatriots repulse him as he attempts to associate with them.”

Indeed, in his years at the University of Vienna, Herzl had been a German nationalist. He was a member of the pan-German student fraternity, Albia, until growing antisemitism in the group forced him to leave. Jacques Kornberg, Herzl’s most recent biographer, has argued that German nationalism was a template for Herzl’s Zionism. But since most German nationalism had generally taken a profoundly illiberal turn by the end of the nineteenth century, there has been some controversy in the Zionist historiography as to how, if at all, Herzl could have been a German nationalist and how this could have inspired his Zionism.

Herzl’s first biographer, Alex Bein, argued that Herzl was an Austro-liberal who opposed German nationalism and found ways to explain away Herzl’s affiliation with Albia and German nationalism in his early writing. Carl Schorske, in his influential article on Herzl, Schöenerer, and Lueger, explained Herzl’s Zionism as part of the growth of anti-liberal mass politics. But for Herzl (unlike Schöenerer and Lueger) illiberal characteristics, such as charismatic leadership and appeals to historical myths and to mystical and religious aspirations, were political tools. For Schorske, illiberal political moves were simply instruments for Herzl, while his political goals were grounded in a liberal, rational, social-reformist idea of the state. Similarly, McGrath has pointed out that Herzl was a German nationalist when the movement was still made up largely of liberals and left when the non-Jewish Austrian liberals gave in to the ethnonationalist, pan-German elements. Finally, Kornberg has argued that Herzl never deviated from liberalism, neither as a German nationalist nor as a Zionist. . . .

Herzl wished to create a Jewish state that he envisaged as a multilingual Switzerland; he was far less interested in resurrecting the Jewish nation as a collective or supra-individual entity.


61Quoted in Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, p. 4.


63Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, Chapter 3.

Even the Jewish flag, with its seven stars for the seven-hour working day, was to appeal to the social and economic—not the nationalist—aspirations of the masses. Herzlean Zionism was more statist than nationalist and unrelentingly liberal and rationalistic, combining nationalism with cosmopolitanism.”

That German nationalism, both its liberal and völkisch varieties paradoxically necessitated Zionism by excluding Jews and simultaneously gave pre-state Zionism much of its ideological content is well covered in the historiography. Austro-German liberal nationalists abandoned liberalism and became anti-semitic ethnonationalists, but, of course, their new definition of German nationalism was the only one available to Zionists. Discomfort with the idea that German nationalism, including both its liberal and romantic aspects could have influenced Zionism stems from what Brian Vick has called the “the thesis of xenophobic continuity between early [German] nationalists and National Socialists.” However, until the crisis of liberalism in the late nineteenth century, nationalism and liberalism were not seen as fundamentally opposed trajectories—the ultimate direction that völkisch nationalism took was unknown.

Vormärz German nationalism and the idea of Deutschtum was inseparable from liberalism. Herzl and Nordau’s Jewish nationalism was an attempt to resuscitate this form in the face of illiberal mass politics. Political Zionism embodied an attempt to give Jews the chance to make liberal nationalism viable again as an entry ticket into a Mazzinian European state system. This project involved first imagining a Jewish state that was the embodiment of liberal cosmopolitan European culture. Second, promoting philosemitic stereotypes meant to counter antisemitic stereotypes about unassimilated, East European Jews.

Thus far, I have argued that Herzl and Nordau sympathized with an idea of Deutschtum (what Brian Vick has called vormärz nationalism) that incorporated both liberal political thought and romantic nationalism. Vormärz nationalism served as a platform for a Mazzinian idea of Europe and for Jewish membership therein based on Jewish nationhood. Furthermore, Herzl imagined and Nordau defended a Jewish nation that was liberal and Anglophile at a time when other Austrian intellectuals were abandoning liberalism in favor

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65Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, p. 53.
66Lavsky, Before Catastrophe; Mosse, Germans and Jews; Laqueur, A History of Zionism.
of ethnonationalist and religious political movements. Their idea of the new Jewish nation was premised on an idea of Europe that blended the liberal ideology of the previous generation with a romantic nationalist idea of Jewish manhood and a futuristic ideal of technological progress. It was aimed both at building a Jewish nation outside of Europe and at resuscitating liberalism in Europe.

We now turn to a discussion of how these themes played out in Herzl’s major texts and in Nordau’s defense of them. Herzl produced two systematic overviews of the Jewish nation he hoped to build. The first, *Judenstaat, (The Jewish State)*, was a short book published in 1896 which asserted that as a people Jews required a territorial homeland and that such a homeland with the ensuing concentration of world Jewry there would end antisemitism in Europe.68 The second, *Altneuland, (Old-New Land)*, was published six years later.69 Herzl’s last major work, it was a futuristic utopian novel set in Palestine in 1923. Here he took readers on a tour of that future Jewish society (it was not referred to as a state). Friedrich, a jaded young Jewish lawyer, and Kingscourt, a Prussian nobleman cum American businessman, leave Vienna for an isolated island. On their way back to Europe twenty years later, they stop in Palestine and are astonished to find a liberal, cosmopolitan, multicultural Jewish society at the cutting edge of technology and science. The nation that Herzl imagined in *The Jewish State* and in *Old-New Land* was, according to Kingscourt, a collage of things European:

> Here’s another copy of a good thing. This is evidently modeled after the Imperial German Health Department. I don’t have to ask the natives about it. I know Old-New-Land quite well. It’s a mosaic. A Mosaic mosaic. Good joke, what?”70

Of course, Herzl was selective in his choice of the cultural, political, and economic elements of Europe in creating this mosaic. He favored linguistic and cultural pluralism, but most of the symbols of high culture in his work, from opera to literature, were German. He had already eliminated Hebrew as an option in *The Jewish State*:

> It might be suggested that our want of a common current language would present difficulties. We cannot converse with one another in Hebrew. Who amongst us has a sufficient

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68 Herzl, *Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage.*
69 Theodor Herzl. *Altneuland.* 1900.
acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language! Such a thing cannot be done. Yet the difficulty is very easily circumvented. Every man can preserve the language in which his thoughts are at home. Switzerland affords a conclusive proof of the possibility of a federation of tongues. We shall remain in the new country what we now are here... the language which proves itself to be of greatest utility for general intercourse will be adopted without compulsion as our national tongue. Our community of race is peculiar and unique, for we are bound together only by the faith of our fathers.\footnote{Theodor Herzl. \textit{A Jewish State}. New York: Federation of American Zionists, 1917, p. 38.}

If one can judge from \textit{Old-New Land}, that language would, not surprisingly, be German. A member of Palestine’s New Society advised his international guests that “...at some of the popular theaters there are Yiddish farces. They are amusing, but not in very good taste. I should recommend the opera.”\footnote{Herzl, \textit{Old New Land}, p. 95.} Though the opera that they chose did have a Jewish theme—the story of Sabbatai Zvi—it was at a grand, European style opera house, there is no indication that it was in Hebrew as the German-speaking guests understood it, and it was necessary to buy white gloves on the way because: “...now they were back in civilized society, and in the desperate predicament of accompanying ladies to the theater. One must behave like a civilized human being.” The post-opera discussion about Sabbatai Zvi was about the universal lessons in his story and naturally employed quotes from Goethe.\footnote{Ibid., p. 105.}

Such a “faux-aristocratic aesthetic,” as Michael Stanislawski put it, was typical for Austria’s bourgeoisie and was a persistent theme in Herzl’s ideal European society. It not only applied to his futuristic fiction, but to the Zionist congresses, the outward appearances of which were of great importance to him. At the first congress in Basel, for example, Herzl sent Nordau back to his room to change. He had appeared in a frock coat and Herzl insisted that if people were to “expect only the finest things from the Congress and the utmost solemnity”, Nordau (and everyone else) would have to wear swallow-tails and white tie.\footnote{Theodor Herzl. \textit{The Diaries of Theodor Herzl}. Ed. by Marvin Lowenthal. The Universal Library, 1962, p. 224.}

But although German language and high culture were pervasive and were used to explore specifically Jewish themes in Herzl’s work, this did not so much confer German or Jewish ethnic or national content. Rather, it mediated the universalist message that underlay all cultural production. Again, the little Jewish ethnic or cultural specificity that appeared in \textit{Old-New Land}, in form of Yiddish theater, Herzl disparaged. Herzl’s promotion of a
multicultural and polyglot society was qualified: If the Jewish nation was to be a haven for European cosmopolitans, its languages should be those spoken by Europe’s transnational intelligentsia. He simply did not consider Hebrew and Yiddish to be civilized languages.

This was more than cultural arrogance; it was highly political. Herzl and Nordau both saw the revival of Yiddish and Hebrew language, literature, and theater as manifestations of a benighted nationalism that was at odds with enlightened, West European nationalisms, particularly Deutschtum. The politics Herzl envisioned were decidedly liberal, pluralist, and humanist. His examples were mostly of Venice, England, and Switzerland. They illustrated a society based on the rule of law and social progress through industriousness, technology, science, and education, or what Schorske has called “garden variety Victorianism.”

Indeed, Old-New Land reads as a utopian implementation of J.S. Mill’s On Liberty. Mill’s central principle—that individual freedom could be infringed upon only in order to prevent harm to others—pervades Herzl’s book. Whether Herzl read Mill is unclear, but they shared a tendency to seek a middle ground between radical utilitarianism and romanticism, and between pure individualism and Fabian socialism. Vormärz nationalism also shared these characteristics, so the appeal to Herzl is not surprising.

Herzl, like the early English Whigs, was inspired by the Venetian Republic. He wrote, in The Jewish State: “I think a democratic monarchy and an aristocratic republic are the two most superior forms of a State, because in them the form of State and the principle of government are opposed to one another, and thus preserve a true balance of power.” Herzl did not envision the Jewish state as a homogeneous Jewish nation state resting on Jewish specificity, whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious. Indeed, citizenship was open to all, even the curmudgeonly Prussian tourist. Instead the state would be pluralistic and would be governed much as the Habsburg monarchy was. The aristocracy, however, would be merit based. As Schorske described it:

For the future Jewish social order, something like the British ideal of a politically effective and responsible aristocracy remained with him. “Politics must be made from above”

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75 Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, p. 6.
76 Ibid., p. 174.
77 Herzl, A Jewish State, p. 37.
78 Schorske does not discuss in detail what was entailed in this “British ideal” or the other influences of British political thought mentioned in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture. This dissertation would
remained his principle, but the class that made it must be permeable, not closed, like the Austrian Aristocracy. . . . “Every great human being will be able to become an aristocrat among us,” Herzl wrote.  

This standard humanist definition of aristocracy carried over into Old-New Land, in which there was no state. In its place was a voluntary organization called the New Society, which Herzl used interchangeably with commonwealth. The New Society had a president and a parliament, but no professional politicians. The highest qualifications for office were education, professional accomplishment, and reluctance to hold office. What laws governed the New Society were there to ensure the rights and freedoms of the individual. The model, again, was liberal Europe: “Everyone is free here, and may do as he chooses… We punish only those crimes and misdemeanors which were penalized in enlightened European states. Nothing is forbidden here that was not forbidden there.”

While social deviance was not punishable, a person’s character was judged largely upon his or her contributions to the collective. There was nothing so unfortunate as ostentatious wealth, but it was ignored rather than confronted. An over-dressed opera attendee may have money, [and] he may spend as much of it as he pleases; but no one takes off his hat to him for that reason. Of course, if he were a decent sort, we should gladly accept him. . . . He did not care to assume the duties of our commonwealth. He therefore lives here as a stranger. He may move about freely like any other stranger, but no one respects him.

While bad behavior could get one ostracized, industriousness, solidarity, and intelligence qualified people of all classes and nationalities for status and leadership in the New Society. A member of parliament explained that they “[made] no distinctions between one man and another. We do not ask to what race or religion a man belongs. If he is a man, that is enough for us.”

For example, David, an indigent, East European boy whom Friedrich had helped in 

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79 Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, p. 173.
80 Herzl, Old New Land, p. 98.
81 Ibid., p. 104.
82 Ibid., p. 66.
Vienna became an educated, industrious member of the New Society and was eventually elected president. David exemplifies Herzl’s underlying argument that the poverty of East European Jews is the result of racial discrimination and that their talent and initiative will result in rapid upward mobility once this obstacle is removed:

The man whose name we shall propose to you . . . is one of the new men who have made this old soil of ours fertile and beautiful again. He walked behind the plow with his father as a boy, but he has also sat behind books. He has a wholesome capacity for public affairs, but does not let them swamp him. . . . if he is present, he will be the last to apply my words to himself, so genuine is his humility. He is very capable in his personal affairs, and made his way up from very modest beginnings. If we elect him, we shall not only be honoring a man of high merit, but shall also give our youth an incentive to aim high. Every son of Venice could become a Doge. Every member of the New Society must be eligible for its highest office.83

The New Society incorporated all of what Herzl saw as the best European artistic, architectural, musical, and literary legacies, the political heritage of the Enlightenment—especially its nineteenth century English liberal incarnation—and the latest technological innovations from Europe and the United States. The autonomous Jewish people, endowed with a new sense of pride and self-confidence, would combine these legacies, principles, and tools in a progressive, efficient, peaceful, cosmopolitan society. Complementing this Anglophile political liberalism were the priorities of Deutschtum—beauty and wisdom:

We are a commonwealth. In form it is new, but in purpose very ancient. . . . We are simply a large co-operative association composed of affiliated co-operatives. . . . Yet all of us feel that more is involved than the purely material interests of an industrial and economic co-operative association. For we establish schools and lay out parks; we concern ourselves not only with utilitarian things, but with Beauty and Wisdom as well. For Beauty and Wisdom, too, benefit our commonwealth.84

All of this would be built with industriousness and speed that even the Prussians could not match.85 Having been excluded in Europe, the Jews would build their own liberal society based on law, education, and labor that would surpass its European models. As Schorske concluded, “Herzl’s Zion reincarnated the culture of modern liberal Europe.”86

83Herzl, Old New Land, p. 286.
85Herzl, Old New Land, p. 143.
86Schorske, Fin-de-Si`ecle Vienna, p. 173.
achievement would serve as a platform for Jewish membership in the European state system.

Although Herzl’s utopia was purportedly a basis for national renewal it did not base its claim or statehood on Jewish ethnic cohesiveness. There is only one mention in the text of such romantic nationalist concepts as the “Volk personality.” Rather, Herzl wanted his “testament to the Jewish people” to be “So Build your State, that the stranger will feel contented among you.” As with the case of religious minorities in On Liberty, minorities in Old-New Land should have no restrictions placed on their practices or expression, and their participation in society should not be contingent on conformity in national or religious practice or identity.

Romantic nationalism nonetheless played a role in this vision of a state in which citizenship was based on choice rather than race similar to that of aristocratic aesthetics in that it informed his personal political style. Herzl had acquired a romantic idea of politics as “an arena of heroic deeds, courage, manly discipline, self-sacrifice, decisive leadership, and self-effacing obedience. Thus Zionist politics was to transform Jews from wary, calculating survivors lacking physical courage, into ‘real men.” Herzl was so concerned with putting forward the image of the new manly Jew that he was uneasy about writing a utopian novel. He had discussed his ideas with Alphonse Daudet, who suggested a novel, pointing to the power of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Herzl’s response had been that he preferred to write a “man’s book, not a novel.” The desire to reach a very broad audience prevailed. Jacques Kornberg has argued that Romantic nationalism may have characterized Herzl’s personal political style—he approved of dueling—but it did not carry over into the realm of ideas. And for Herzl, not all contributions were equal—ideas were far more important. Herzl’s experiences as a student and German nationalist in the 1880s had exposed him to German völkisch nationalism and Darwinism, both of which were at odds with the liberal humanism of Austro-liberalism. Herzl’s Zionism mixed romantic nationalist male political theater and liberal political principles. This was because Herzl, according to Kornberg, borrowed from radical German nationalism’s style, not its content.

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87 Herzl, Old New Land, p. 106.
88 Herzl, The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, p. 318.
89 Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, p. 53.
90 Herzl, The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, p. 11.
91 Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, p. 54.
This is an excellent point, but it requires some qualification. It is true that the political thought behind the system of government Herzl envisioned was firmly liberal. However, romantic style controlled access to power. This is particularly clear in the case of gender.

Herzl’s stance on women’s equal participation in the New Society was hardly progressive. He seems to have felt that he had to include equal rights for women in the New Society, so women were emancipated, allowed to hold public office, and to work outside the home. If he did read Mill, that may explain why. The pressure may also have come from concern for his audience. He associated with Viennese progressives who supported women’s rights and, in rare cases were themselves women. A good example is Bertha von Suttner, whom Herzl sent to the first Hague Peace Conference as a reporter for the Zionist paper Welt and who, as discussed in Chapter Two, was a leading pacifist, women’s rights activist, and a leader of the organized Gentile opposition to antisemitism in the Austro-Hungarian empire.\footnote{Herzl, *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, pp. 312-15.} But Herzl unfailingly assured his readers that the women in *Old-New Land* knew better than to use their rights.

Sarah, the wife of a prominent man in the New Society describes her Muslim friend Fatma’s situation as follows:

\ldots [she] never leaves her home. Surely, peaceful seclusion is also a form of happiness. I can understand that very well, though I am a full-fledged member of the New Society. If my husband wished it, I should live just as Fatma does and think no more about it.”\footnote{Her husband does not wish it because he represents a modern, Western, progressive ideal—most Viennese progressives favored woman suffrage—though as discussed below, Herzl’s liberalism was tied up with the ideal of active male individualism. One gets the sense from the female characters of *Old-New Land* that ideally emancipated women would choose domesticity.} \ldots I understand, said Friedrich thoughtfully. “In your New Society every man may live and be happy in his own way.” “Every man and every woman,” said Sarah.\footnote{Herzl, *Old New Land*, p. 97.}

Women’s equal participation in the New Society would have impinged upon Herzl’s vision of the new Jewish man. He was much more comfortable with conforming the Jews to bourgeois gender norms, which prescribed female domesticity. At least on gender, Herzl’s utopia was not a more progressive version of Europe but very much the European status quo. The implication of his stance on domesticity was that nation building should take precedence over the struggle within the community to improve women’s status. The idea that
reform movements should take a back seat to national movements was stronger in imperial Germany than elsewhere in Western Europe. In Germany, the women’s movement silenced its demands on the collective in favor of national unity especially in times of crisis such as the First World War. The same applied to the Freemasons. As discussed in Chapter Two, the German branch cut off ties with the French one over the Alsasce-Lorainne issue, while the Austrian branch did not. While the transnational women’s movement managed to keep its international alliances largely intact during the war, the German contingent withdrew, arguing that national interests were more important than their own. Herzl seems to have expected the same from Jewish women and in this was more in line with völkisch German nationalism than with Austro-liberal social reformers. Thus his political style cannot be seen as entirely separate from the content of his political thought.

Of course Herzl’s romantic nationalism threw up similar barriers to men who did not conform. Physical fitness was not only necessary in order to build the agricultural and industrial infrastructure; it was an important element of a man’s character. This was Herzl’s attempt at philosemitic stereotypes of manhood meant to counter the antisemitic, effeminate image of the Jewish man discussed above. Girls stayed home with their mothers.

We content ourselves with making our young people physically fit. We develop their bodies as well as their minds. We find athletic and rifle clubs sufficient for this purpose, even as they were thought sufficient in Switzerland. We also have competitive games—cricket, football, rowing—like the English. We took tried and tested things, and tested them all over again.

The ideal worker on the land was educated as well as strong and fit. There was no romantic idea of the peasant as the national essence.

Whoever would attempt to convert the Jew into a husbandman would be making an extraordinary mistake. For a peasant is in a historical category, as proved by his costume which in some countries he has worn for centuries; and by his tools, which are identical with those used by his earliest forefathers. His plough is unchanged; he carries the seed in his apron; mows with the historical scythe, and threshes with the time-honored flail. But we know that all this can be done by machinery. The agrarian question is only a question of machinery.

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95 His deprecating speculation about the role of physical handicap in Kaiser Wilhelm’s leadership style is a good example. See (Herzl, The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, p. 197)
96 Herzl, Old New Land, p. 79.
97 Herzl, A Jewish State, p. 8.
Herzl’s opinion of religion was as low as his opinion of the peasant. Religion was not an essential expression of the nation. In *The Jewish State* Herzl was explicit that, in line with liberal humanist principles, the state would be secular:

> Faith unites us, knowledge gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples... Every man will be as free and undisturbed in his faith or his disbelief as he is in his nationality. And if it should occur that men of other creeds and different nationalities come to live amongst us, we should accord them honorable protection and equality before the law. We have learnt toleration in Europe. This is not sarcastically said; for the Anti-Semitism of today could only in a very few places be taken for old religious intolerance. It is for the most part a movement among civilized nations by which they try to chase away the specters of their own past.98

This sentiment did not change in the time that passed between *The Jewish State* and *Old-New Land*. When religion was mentioned in *Old-New Land* it was usually in the service of a point about the society’s pluralism—rabbis and priests discussing their common values and their equal status for example.

Despite his distain for bourgeois Viennese society—it’s hopeless materialism, superficiality, and duplicity is the point of departure for the novel—Herzl’s utopia was based firmly in the values of the middle-class intelligentsia. Though his New Society was social reformist and offered a solution to the victims of capitalism, Herzl was no champion of the people. He and Nordau, along with their liberal heroes like J. S. Mill, were overtly paternalistic.

As members of the aesthetically inclined intellectual Viennese bourgeoisie, they thought the most important contributions to society were the ideas behind its laws and institutions. These came from the educated bourgeoisie and thus it was their right to make policy decisions. Left to their own devices, Herzl suspected that peasants and artisans would opt for an isolationist, primitive society based on atavistic nationalism.

To this end, Herzl used an economic principle in *Old New Land* that he hoped would keep the peasant and worker politics in check. The new villages in *Old-New Land* were organized according to what Herzl called the “mutual” principle: a “happy medium between capitalism and collectivism.”99 Most things, from newspapers to major industries are run by “mutual companies” in which subscribers, workers, and advertisers were joint owners. Such

companies employed the latest technologies—usually innovations developed in Europe and the United States and put to even more progressive and efficient use in Palestine. Public transportation, for example, was by electric trains suspended above the streets so as not to interfere with traffic. In rural areas, “mutual corporations” allowed peasants to buy the latest agricultural machinery and gave them an interest in the stability of the local economy. One’s profits depended on one’s input, so that one was free to enrich oneself through hard work, but not able to oppress others in the process. This technocratic planning was supposed to obviate unrest among the agricultural and trade workers. Herzl did not expect them to be enlightened; but he went to great lengths to consider how to prevent them from promoting reactionary politics.

In a lecture to peasants whom he hoped to discourage from voting for a nationalist candidate who would have placed restrictions on immigration, Herzl’s hero, David, cautions them against taking credit for the prosperity of their modern village:

Your hands made it indeed, but your brains did not conceive it. You are not so ignorant, thank Heaven, as the peasants of other times and countries; but you do not know the origins of your own happier circumstances. True, you worked with all the fervor of Jewish love for the sacred soil. That soil was unproductive for others, but for us it was good soil. . . . [other] settlers were able to create only the old type village. But you have the New Village. And that, my friends, is not the work of your hands only. . . . Don’t imagine I am jesting when I say that Neudorf [New Village] was built not in Palestine, but elsewhere. It was built in England, in America, in France, and in Germany. It evolved out of experiments, books, and dreams. . . . Individual Jews participated in these labors, but by no means Jews alone. What resulted from the common endeavors ought to be claimed by no one nation for itself. It belongs to all men. . . . The New Society rests . . . squarely on ideas which are the common stock of the whole civilized world. . . . It would be unethical for us to deny a share in our commonwealth to any man, wherever he might come from, whatever his race or creed. For we stand on the shoulders of other civilized peoples.\textsuperscript{100}

Overall, the Jewish state was to be a fortress of Europe in Asia:

We should there [in Palestine] form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral State remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence. The sanctuaries of Christendom would be safeguarded by assigning to them an extra-territorial status such as is well-known to the law of nations. We should form a guard of honor about these sanctuaries, answering for the fulfillment of this duty with our existence. This guard of

\textsuperscript{100}Herzl, \textit{Old New Land}, pp. 142, 143, 147, 152.
honor would be the great symbol of the solution of the Jewish question after eighteen centuries of Jewish suffering.”

This did not go over well with the leaders of Russian cultural Zionism. Ahad Ha’am (Asher Ginsberg, 1856-1927), one of the leading figures of Russian cultural Zionism, had broken with Herzl after the first World Zionist Congress in 1897. While allowing that a Jewish state might be appropriate at some point in the future, Ahad Ha’am argued that the immediate goal was to build a firm foundation in modern Jewish culture and to stem the loss of identity that was the price of national citizenship. Integration on the West European model, he argued in 1891, amounted to “Slavery in Freedom.” Instead of a Jewish state, Ahad Ha’am envisioned a concentration of Jewish scholarly and artistic elites in Jerusalem who would cultivate a ‘new Judaism’ which would radiate out to the Jewish Diaspora. Even more than Herzl, he shunned romantic and mystical tendencies in nationalism and rejected the irrational—Locke, Hume, and other British empiricists were among the writers he most respected. However, Ahad Ha’am sought not only to address the desperate situation of East European Jews, but to combat what he saw as the equally dangerous trend of assimilation in Western Europe. While he did not reject Western civilization—Chaim Weizmann remarked in 1896 that “Ahad H[a’am] makes a very pleasant impression as a European”—he argued that Jewish participation therein depended on a strong, cultural, Jewish national identity. Political infrastructure, he argued, was insufficient.

In 1903, Ahad Ha’am accused Herzl of ignorance of Judaism. This resulted in a fiery exchange of published open letters in the Zionist press. Max Nordau’s defense of Herzl makes clear that Herzl and Nordau’s Eurocentrism was quite explicit, not unconscious. Nordau’s response to Ahad Ha’am’s critique reads as follows:

Altneuland is too European. There are newspapers, theater, opera-houses for which one dons white gloves. Everywhere Europeans, European mores, European inventions. Nowhere

101 Herzl, A Jewish State, p. 12.
any specific Jewish traces. Indeed! *Altneuland* is a piece of Europe in Asia. Here Herzl pointed precisely to what we want, what we are striving for. We want the reunified liberated Jewish Nation to be a modern cultured nation (*ein Kulturvolk*)—to remain as modern and as cultured as we already are and as much as we can possibly become. In this we are not aping anyone, we are merely developing our own property: we have contributed more than our share to European culture, which is thus ours to the same degree it belongs to the Germans, French or English. We hold that there is no contradiction between what is Jewish—what is ours as Jews—and what is European. Ahad Ha’am might see European culture as foreign—we will make it accessible to him. But we will never concede that the return of the Jews to the land of their fathers is a return to barbarism, as our enemies slanderously claim. The Jewish people will develop its own culture alongside and within general Western culture, just like any other civilized nation, not from the outside in an uncultured Asiatic society, as Ahad Ha’am seems to desire.\(^{107}\)

For Nordau, the physical place of the Jewish State outside of geographic Europe was not problematic because he defined Europe culturally as membership in a transnational network built on liberal political principles, Enlightenment values, and cultural, mostly literary, accomplishment. This cultural community could not be dismembered either by war among European nations or by the various attempts to define Europe’s geographic borders (usually with the purpose to exclude Slavs and East European Jews). In a holograph of an article titled “Literary Alliances” written during the First World War, Nordau took on Edmund Gosse for proposing that England and France strengthen their ties and both reject all things (culturally) German.

I am afraid Mr. Gosse has given himself away when he proposed to regulate methodically the literary relations between peoples. . . . Mental creations are not commodities the incorporation of which may be hindered by prohibitive duties and favored by a differential tariff. . . . The intellectual workers of England, France, and Italy have always been in touch. . . . Russia occupied Germany since a hundred years. France and England got their information of the Russian literary pioneers through Berlin. . . . The nineteenth century began to realize Goethe’s ideal of a world–literature. Traveling was made easy, a knowledge of foreign languages became part of general culture, the press widened its horizon. . . . All this has little to do with sympathies and antipathies of the nations. Germany is now hated in France and England, yet the books of Bernhardi and Prince Bulow are translated and command a big sale. . . . What wins foreign readers for a book or a whole literature are other than political conditions. . . . Let another Goethe or Heine appear in Germany, let them give the world a new “Faust” or “Book of Songs”, and they will be, probably not at once, but certainly after the way, read, celebrated, admired in England, however grieved Mr. Gosse may shake his head over such perversity.”\(^{108}\)

\(^{107}\)Max Nordau, “Ahad Ha’am über Altneuland”. In: *Die Welt* 7 (1903), pp. 1–5.
\(^{108}\)Nordau, Max. Holograph titled “Literary Alliances.” Archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Re-
All this has been taken as evidence that Herzl, Nordau and other early Central European political Zionists were simply frustrated integrationists or even assimilationists\textsuperscript{109} before they discovered Zionism. However, I think Stanislawski has correctly argued that it is more accurate to describe Jewish liberal bourgeois intellectuals as having “no clear, conscious, or sustained ideological position on the Jews or the so-called Jewish problem. . . . In the first place, then, figures such as Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau and the young Vladimir Jabotinsky acted as if their Jewishness had no bearing on their lives, their careers and their world-views, their Kultur.”\textsuperscript{110}

Herzl’s Zionism defined Jews by the external circumstances that brought about their shared predicament and common socio-economic trajectories because this was his Jewish experience. Indeed, Herzl did not define the Jews by essential cultural or religious qualities and he argued, ironically, that their very extra-nationalism was responsible for their success in nation building.

\begin{quote}
Only we Jews could have done it. . . . We only were in a position to create this New Society, this new center of civilization here. One thing dovetailed into another. It could have come only through us, through our destiny. Our moral sufferings were as much a necessary element as our commercial experience and our cosmopolitanism. . . .”\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

In conclusion, Herzl, Nordau, and other assimilated Austro-German Zionists were not attempting to create something altogether new in Palestine. It was an idealized version of what they already had by the early 1880s and which had been eroding since then. Their integration into Austrian-German culture was not wishful national assimilation; it put them in a precarious position, but it was their formative cultural environment and it shaped their identities. They saw Deutschtum, like their contemporaries across the political spectrum, as a component of and contribution to European civilization. They were not looking for somewhere to jettison Europeanness; they were looking for a Jewish state in which to

\textsuperscript{109}An assimilationist in the Jewish historiography is understood as someone who actively seeks the total dissolution of the Jewish community through assimilation into the dominant ethnic or national group. Since the term assimilationist has been used historically as a pejorative in debates between different Zionist camps and between Zionists and their critics, and because the term is too strong to describe the sentiment of the vast majority of Jews that have been described as assimilated, the term “integrationist” has been deployed as a more neutral and accurate descriptor of Jews who showed neither interest in their heritage nor willingness to renounce it.

\textsuperscript{110}Stanislawski, \textit{Zionism and the Fin de Si`ecle}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{111}Herzl, \textit{Old New Land}, p. 82.
avoid ethnonationalism and in which to continue to cultivate the Jewish contribution to cosmopolitan European civilization. Herzl and Nordau were Austrian Germans with very little connection to their Jewish heritage. Their vision was specifically Jewish in that it addressed the exclusion from Europe that they shared with other European Jews.

In the end, Austrian political Zionists were trying to build a new platform for Jewish membership in a Mazzinian Europe. Nossig’s Jewish nation, reflecting his formative experience in Galicia, contained more romantic and ethnonationalist elements. This is not surprising since, as Yfaat Weiss points out, Zionists tended to reproduce the regional dynamics of their home regions in their own nationalism.

Political Zionism has been called radical assimilationist because it sought integration for the Jews by “normalizing” them or making them like their host nations. This is a good point, but is incomplete. However, the figures discussed in this chapter began as assimilationists who sought both national assimilation and membership in a supranational, cosmopolitan polity (Austria) and cultural/intellectual community (Europe). When this was refused them, they sought to become national through Zionism and, Austria being no-longer viable, saw this as a platform for membership in Europe both as a polity and a cultural/intellectual community. Since the Empire was increasingly incapable of constraining nationalism and antisemitism, Herzl, Nordau and Nossig accepted that the nation would have to be the basic unit, but, as cosmopolitans, they sought a new supranational community in place of multinational Austria. In Kornberg’s words:

Zionism served as a circuitous route to honor and acceptance, for the direct route was blocked by the rise of political antisemitism. Zionism served as an unservile mode of Jewish assimilation, though which the Jews would no longer seek to be embraced by Gentiles as compatriots. Jews, transformed, would now win—even command—gentile recognition and respect as equals in the European state-system.”

Some approximation of this observation appears in much of the literature on Herzl and the political Zionists, but what exactly the “European state-system” meant remains unclear. In other words, what Zionists meant by Europe was not at all a given. The European state system refers to a particular idea of Europe which itself was highly contested and, along with liberalism, out of fashion at the turn of the twentieth century. This is because it refers to a

112Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, p. 8.
liberal, 1848 idea of Europe as made up of nations based on Mazzinian nationalism. Political Zionists were thus engaged as much in defining Europe as they were in defining the nation because the two concepts were interdependent. Just as their definition of the nation was at odds with contemporary racially and spiritually defined nations and was instead inspired by Anglophile liberalism and the liberal nationalism of the previous generation, the Europe in which they sought membership was also a product of 1848 and was a direct contestation of the post-1880s definition of Europe as a biological and spiritual family. This is not to say that their thinking was anachronistic. It was an attempt to reintegrate liberal nationalism into modern, mass politics. However, its formative context was the small, marginal, largely Jewish Viennese liberal and progressive intelligentsia.

Mazzini had argued that independent, liberal nations were the prerequisite to European unity. The basis of unity would be a system of alliances between free and stable nation states. This was the basis of Alfred Fried’s pacifist program and it underlay Herzl’s plan for Europe as well. Herzl, like Nossig, believed that Europe’s nations had a legitimate concern about competition from Jews that could only be eased through Jewish independence. In Old-New Land the visitors are told how this happened:

Jewish university graduates, men trained in the technological institutes and commercial colleges, used to flounder helplessly; but now there was ample room for them in the public and private undertakings so numerous in Palestine. The result was that Christian professional men no longer looked askance at their Jewish colleagues, for they were no longer annoying competitors. In such circumstances, commercial envy and hatred gradually disappeared. … In countries where there was a tendency to restrict Jewish immigration, public opinion took a turn for the better. Jews were granted full citizenship rights not only on paper, but in everyday life. … Only after those Jews who were forced out of Europe were settled on their own land, the well-meant measures of emancipation became effective everywhere. … Toleration can and must always rest on reciprocity. Only when the Jews, forming the majority in Palestine, showed themselves tolerant, were they shown more toleration in all other countries.

The Jewish state, in other words, was intended as much to provide a liberal state for the Jews as to resuscitate liberalism in Europe.

Austrian cultural Zionists took a very different route to a similar goal. Their response to the nationalism that pulled apart Austria-Hungary was to cultivate an alternative to the nation state. Instead of seeking entry into the European state system, they wanted entry into a European cultural community. For their perspective, we now turn to Nathan Birnbaum
3.4 JEWISH CULTURAL NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

3.4.1 Natan Birnbaum’s Yiddish-Speaking Europe

The central themes of liberal ideology, Deutschtum, and multinationalism, played an equally important role in the thinking of two Austrian Jewish cultural nationalists, Nathan Birnbaum and Hans Kohn. However, they prioritized these themes differently than Herzl and other Zionists who sought a political solution to antisemitism. As discussed above, the latter envisioned a Jewish nation state that was pluralist rather than integral nationalist and embodied the values of European civilization. Herzl was explicit that the Jewish state be pluralist and that Arabs have rights as a cultural group—it was assumed that liberal values could transcend difficulties in Jewish-Arab relations. Herzl’s Zionism was also intended as a solution to inter-ethnic enmity in Europe. By resuscitating liberalism in Europe, the Jews would be able to join in building a Mazzinian European community based on a web of political allegiances. Thus, they thought that Zionism could also resuscitate liberalism in Europe.

Cultural Zionism was a trend within Zionism, not a unified or organized movement. Prompted less by the absence of full legal equality than the threat of assimilation, cultural Zionists sought to articulate a modern Jewish identity rooted in the Jewish cultural, particularly literary, heritage. It also tended to differ with political Zionism on the following three points. First, it was more open to ideas that challenged liberal rationalism, namely romanticism and mysticism. This manifested itself in the distinction between cultural Zionism as ostensibly inspired from within the Jewish tradition and political Zionism, inspired by non-Jewish national movements. Second (and related), when drawing on the *Haskalah*, Cultural Zionists tended to prefer the first generation of Jewish enlighteners rather than the second. This, as discussed in the last section, is because the first generation was responsible for the revival of Jewish secular and religious learning, especially Hebrew literature. Third,
Cultural Zionists tended to be more concerned with multinational coexistence than with cosmopolitanism. Of course, this is a simplification riddled with exceptions and the differences between political and cultural Zionism have often been overestimated, especially by Zionists themselves. Still, Austrian cultural Zionists, though also steeped in the same Enlightenment values as Political Zionists, were inspired by figures like Ahad Ha’am and Martin Buber as well as the example of East European Yiddish-speaking Jewry generally. This is certainly the case for Birnbaum and Kohn, also prominent examples of a cultural Zionism that was not rooted in narrow and exclusive Jewish texts.\footnote{The details of their influences will be discussed as relevant below, but a few sentences on their major contributions is useful to begin with. Ahad Ha’am saw the central goal of Zionism as the cultivation of Eastern rather than Western European Jewish cultural and religious life. Ahad Ha’am himself was agnostic and his idea of nationalism was, like Herzl’s indebted to nineteenth century positivists with the addition of the Jewish Haskala. But religion was, for Ahad Ha’am, a manifestation of Jewish culture. Thus his Zionism centered on cultivating Jewish language and literature, Jewish (religious) education and the transmission of Jewish knowledge, see Laqueur, \textit{A History of Zionism}, pp. 162-164. Buber had also been influenced by Ahad Ha’am, but parted ways with him in his focus on mysticism and in his adoption of anti-liberal, irrational nationalist ideas from the German \textit{völkisch} nationalist movement in pre-WWI Prague, see Mosse, \textit{Germans and Jews}, pp. 85-89. Birnbaum published a book on Ahad Ha’am in 1903 under his pseudonym, Mathias Acher, see Mathias [Nathan Birnbaum] Acher. \textit{Achad ha-am: Ein Denker und Kämpfer der jüdischen Renaissance}. Jüdischer Verlag, 1903. Buber was the leading thinker behind the Prague cultural Zionists and Kohn wrote a biography of him and edited a collection of his writing, see Hans Kohn. \textit{Martin Buber, Sein Werk und seine Zeit; Ein Versuch über Religion und Politik}. Hellerau: J. Hegner, 1930; and Ahad Ha’am. \textit{Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic: Basic Writings of Ahad Ha’am}. Ed. by Hans Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1962. Buber and Birnbaum themselves were not as close, though Buber did contribute an essay to a volume published in honor of Birnbaum’s sixtieth birthday, see Martin Buber. “Eine chassidische Busspredigt”. In: \textit{Vom Sinn des Judentums: Ein Sammelbuch zu Ehren Nathan Birnbaums}. Ed. by A. E. Kaplan and Max Landau. Frankfurt am Main: Hermon-Verlag, 1924, pp. 105–108.}

At any rate, Austrian cultural and political Zionists shared an objection to Jabotinsky’s Zionist revisionism, a product of the 1920s, to the Russian \textit{Hoveve Zion} (Lovers of Zion) settlement movement, and to political ethnonationalism generally. Cultural Zionists also shared the goal of Jewish acceptance in Europe, but not at the cost of Jewish cultural identity and not through a Jewish nation state. They saw statehood as premature and as a superficial solution to a deeper problem that needed to be addressed culturally and spiritually. This is because for them the threat was assimilation, the disappearance of the Jewish people.

For them, the multi- or bi-national state could provide the framework through which the Jews could cultivate their autonomous cultural contribution to European civilization. Yet the tension between romantic nationalism and liberalism was central for both groups.
For political Zionists the tension was between narrow, ethnic, state-seeking nationalism and liberal, pluralist ideals as a basis for individual rights. For Cultural Zionists it was between their romantic and mystical idea of the Jewish nation and the political liberalism that underlay the multi or bi-national polities they advocated.

This divergence implied a different understanding of cosmopolitanism. Martin Buber and Hans Kohn after him were at once firmly committed to universalism and to Jewish nationalism. Yet the idea that the Jews cultivate their own nationally specific contribution to European culture implied a compromise position between the purist Enlightenment liberal idea of cosmopolitan Europe and national ideas of Europe. The present section explores how cultural Zionists reconciled romantic nationalism with a cosmopolitanism rooted in Enlightenment liberalism. It then discusses the implications of this for the idea of Europe.

Kwame Anthony Appiah has defined cosmopolitanism as comprised of two basic positions. First is the familiar idea of global citizenship and the second is tolerance of religious and national or ethnic difference. He calls this universalist perspective that also acknowledges local or national identity “rooted” cosmopolitanism. This definition describes Birnbaum’s and Kohn’s cultural Zionism well. In fact, in his memoir, Kohn described the appeal of Zionism in his youth (with some embarrassment in retrospect) as a search for ‘roots.’ Birnbaum was also looking for rootedness for cosmopolitan European Jews, a search that took him from political Zionism to Yiddishism, and ultimately to Orthodox Judaism. Appiah’s “rooted cosmopolitan” may describe Birnbaum’s and Kohn’s views well, but it is a bit of an anachronism because their views were at odds with cosmopolitanism as it was generally understood at the turn of the twentieth century. Cosmopolitanism then was essentially a purist Enlightenment liberal position, firmly rooted in faith in universal truths. Appiah’s perspective, conversely, is relativist. Although the idea of global citizenship often implies a belief in a universal ethics, Appiah’s understanding of this is much more circumscribed than it was for most self-identifying cosmopolitans at the turn of the century. Tolerance

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of difference is a necessary component of cosmopolitanism for Appiah because he considers Enlightenment liberalism (however personally appealing) too specific to embody universal ethics.

Relativism of Appiah’s sort is the basis for a series of recent re-evaluations of 19th and early 20th century cosmopolitans and their movements. Malachi Hacohen’s discussion of Karl Popper’s cosmopolitanism is a good example. Hacohen points out that, from the relativist perspective, Popper’s insistence on Enlightenment liberalism and his intolerance for any national or religious diversity actually undermined his cosmopolitanism.\footnote{Hacohen, \textit{Karl Popper}.} Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann has made a similar point about Freemasonry in Germany.\footnote{Hoffmann, \textit{The Politics of Sociability}.} As discussed in the last chapter, Hoffmann argues that the German Freemasons’ cosmopolitanism actually represented an attempt to universalize a particular blend of liberalism and German nationalism. Their idea of a cosmopolitan society was decidedly German and the squabbles between German and French Masons makes clear that the matter of leadership in the cosmopolitan society they imagined was very much tied up in nationalist struggles. In other words, German and French Masons were both supporters of European transnational integration, but both imagined the process as being led by their own nation. Even more than in Popper’s case, it is clear here why a cosmopolitanism that insists on a specific ideology or a national interpretation of a transnational heritage actually undermines cosmopolitanism.

The Austrian Cultural Zionists discussed here negotiated this problem through opposition to the nation state. Their idea of Europe was national in that they conceived of Europe as composed of national-cultural groups, but their idea of Europe was also multinational and cosmopolitan in that they rejected the idea of Europe as composed of (and led by) nation states. This compromise was possible because the Enlightenment tradition did not need to be rejected if one disagreed with political Zionism’s particular brand of cosmopolitan universalism. Both political and cultural Zionists drew on the Enlightenment tradition, but on different aspects from different periods.

A typical cultural Zionist program was the \textit{Mikra kodesh} society in Lvov led by the German-educated Rabbi, Joseph Kobak. Ezra Mendelsohn has described its goal as
giving the city’s religious young men access to secular studies like German language and literature along with an education in their Jewish heritage. Yehuda Leib Landau, one of the society’s leaders, stressed the importance of the Enlightenment legacy, but criticized its interpretation by assimilationists. The first generation of Zionist ‘Enlighteners’ in Lvov in the 1860s had been primarily interested in culture, specifically the renaissance of Hebrew letters and it was this Enlightenment legacy which they considered the true one. The second generation stressed rights and modernization of the Jewish community in the 1880s. This rights-based, political Zionism was, according to Cultural Zionists, a false interpretation of the Enlightenment legacy.\footnote{Mendelsohn, “From Assimilation to Zionism”, pp. 527-529.} Accordingly \textit{Mikra kodesh}

\ldots espoused a purely cultural programme, expressing the hope that “God may grant to the Jewish students and to all of your youth a love for our people and their religion, a love for their language and their literature, and a sympathy for all things relating to our nation\ldots”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 529.}

Birnbaum, born in Vienna in 1864, began university as an advocate of integration, but founded the first Zionist student organization at the University of Vienna in the early 1880s. He was a prominent politically-oriented Zionist until differences with Herzl and misgivings about a political solution to the Jewish predicament in Eastern Europe caused him to leave the movement after the first Zionist congress in 1897. He became a leading figure in the cluster of overlapping attempts (including cultural Zionism, Yiddishism, or Jewish autonomism) which sought to build a movement based on Jewish cultural and spiritual renewal. By the outbreak of the First World War, he had become disillusioned with such attempts and made his final ideological shift, adopting Jewish Orthodoxy. He died in 1937 as a leader of the Orthodox Agudas Yisrael movement.

Kohn had a similarly complex political career. His political career began in Prague a generation after Birnbaum’s. Influenced by Buber and Ahad Ha’am, he became a cultural Zionist as a teenager and emigrated to Palestine after the First World War where he became a prominent member of the pacifist Brit Shalom movement which advocated a bi-national Jewish-Arab state. In the early 1930s he became convinced that nationalism and liberalism were fundamentally incompatible, left Zionism and moved to the United States, where his
theoretical work on nationalism began what is now an interdisciplinary field of study.\textsuperscript{120}

Both Kohn and Birnbaum were more concerned with Jewish national content than were Herzl or Nordau. This meant that they posited an essential cultural difference between Jews and others—a dichotomy Herzl had rejected—which they tried to reconcile with political liberalism. I now deal with their cultural nationalist phases and their ideas of Jewish cultural and spiritual revival as a basis for Jewish membership in a European cultural community.

Birnbaum’s nationalism was both a basis for Jewish inclusion in Europe and an argument for Jewish distinctiveness. He believed that only by cultivating an autonomous, authentically and uniquely Jewish nation, could the Jews expect inclusion in the group of “cultured peoples” that constituted European civilization. In his own words:

\textit{...we must strive for the solution of social problems so that our entry into the European community of nationalities will not be slowed nor lead into stray paths, but that our spiritual and civil abilities will be enlisted in participation in the field of inter-national relationships. And once we resume our standing among the nationalities, as equal among equals, we can hope that other proud nationalities will draw upon our feeling of compassion in true and genuine socialism, in a socialism of love, and that in this way, they will borrow from us just as they drew upon our moral laws two thousand years ago.}\textsuperscript{121}

In order to explain how Birnbaum came to this position, it is necessary to devote a little time to his formative Zionist years and to the idea of the Jewish nation that he developed. As with Herzl, understanding the character of Birnbaum’s Zionism is key to understanding his idea of Europe since for him the Jewish nation was a component of Europe.

Birnbaum was a complicated and fascinating figure. He has been much maligned and neglected since his death largely because he was politically adventurous. He attained leadership positions in three antagonistic modern Jewish political movements—early political Zionism, Yiddishism, and the Orthodox Agudas Yisrael movement—making him somewhat of an embarrassment to each one in retrospect. He explained his changes of heart in a 1910 collection of articles and argued that what mattered was his devotion to activism on behalf of the Jewish community.

\textsuperscript{120}The only biography of Kohn to date is Kenneth Wolf. “The Idea of Nationalism: The Intellectual Development and Historiographical Contribution of Hans Kohn”. PhD thesis. University of Notre Dame, 1972, however, Kohn is a bit of a “hot topic” at the moment and several studies are in the making, including an intellectual biography by Adi Gordon of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

...it will now be possible for everyone to follow the path that I have laid down and to observe the inner coherence between the last and the first stages. One will more easily understand that I had two main phases between which lay a kind of intermediate time with its unavoidable bumps and fluctuations. I passed through this and indeed have always remained on one and the same unbroken line in the struggle for Jewish life.\textsuperscript{122}

Hans Kohn agreed and, in a tribute to Birnbaum on his sixtieth birthday in 1924, wrote:

Nathan Birnbaum [...] belongs to those who have allowed us to see deeper the tragedy and the uniqueness of our Jewish nation (Volk). He showed us many paths and has been our teacher in many things. Even if we cannot always follow him, his life still remains one of the greatest examples of the uniring search for deeper truth, for brighter clarity, and of the inner struggle within Judaism in our time.\textsuperscript{123}

Franz Rosenzweig, whose own turn to religiosity made him more sympathetic, described Birnbaum as “the living exponent of Jewish intellectual history.”\textsuperscript{124}

Indeed political experimentation was typical in Birnbaum’s time,\textsuperscript{125} but was not generally as easily forgiven when one was prolific and became a leading figure in each movement one joined before abandoning it to lead its competition.\textsuperscript{126}

Birnbaum coined the term Zionism and, like Nossig, was a Zionist leader and prolific writer in the 1880s and 1890s only to be overshadowed by Herzl upon his arrival with the publication in 1896 of \textit{The Jewish State}. Their disagreement was both personal and ideological.

The personal antagonism between the two was due in large part to Herzl’s refusal to acknowledge (or read!) the twenty odd years of Zionist literature that preceded his own or to accord Birnbaum the credit and position in the Zionist movement that he and his supporters

\textsuperscript{122}Nathan Birnbaum. \textit{Ausgewählte Schriften zur Jüdischen Frage}. Vol. 1. Czernowitz: Verlag der Buchhandlung Dr. Birnbaum Dr. Kohut, 1910, Vorwort.


\textsuperscript{125}As mentioned above, Jewish young people were quite politically fickle in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Central and Eastern Europe. This has been attributed on the one hand to the fact that political associations were as socially as politically active and because none of the various political movements offered a solution markedly more realistic to the dire predicament in which Jewish young people found themselves. The predicament was more unifying than the various political ideologies. For two takes on this trend, see Schatz, \textit{The Generation}; and Mendelsohn, \textit{Zionism in Poland}.

\textsuperscript{126}Collected volume in honor of Birnbaum’s 60th Birthday including essays by major figures such as Hans Kohn and Leo Hermann even after Birnbaum had abandoned Zionism for religious Orthodoxy speaks to his stature during his lifetime. See A. E. Kaplan and Max Landau, eds. \textit{Vom Sinn des Judentums: Ein Sammelbuch zu Ehren Nathan Birnbaums}. Frankfurt am Main: Hermon-Verlag, 1924.
considered only fair. The major studies of Zionism tend to put Birnbaum’s differences with Herzl down to jealousy.\textsuperscript{127} Birnbaum was notoriously difficult to get along with, as evidenced in his own correspondence, but the literature more likely just reflects Herzl’s own analysis of the situation. In a diary entry during the first Zionist congress, Herzl wrote:

This Birnbaum, who had dropped Zionism for Socialism three years before I appeared on the scene, poses himself and imposes himself as my “predecessor.” In shameless begging–letters, written to me and others, he represents himself as the discoverer and founder of Zionism, because he had written a pamphlet like many another since Pinsker (of whom too, I had of course been unaware).\textsuperscript{128}

Jess Olson has recently offered a more balanced analysis of Herzl’s and Birnbaum’s split.\textsuperscript{129} He points out that neither of the two was very tolerant of dissenting opinions and both felt entitled to leadership of the Zionist movement. Olson suggests that Birnbaum’s \textit{Die jüdische Moderne}, “[w]ritten, as it was, at the same time as Herzl’s \textit{Judenstaat} [was possibly aimed] at the greatest enabler of its very attitude, none other than Herzl himself.” In fact this becomes clear toward the end of the text when Birnbaum fumes that the public had not listened to him. Instead, “[a] newcomer of distinguished name and equipped with the total \textit{Voraussetzungslosigkeit} [literally “presuppositionlessness”, in certain contexts including here “groundlessness”] of the novice had to come. He appeared in Dr. Theodor Herzl.”\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, he claimed of \textit{Judenstaat} that “[the public] had already heard all of it, perhaps not more literarily written, but often in more detail, more coherent, more systematic and with a deeper knowledge of Judaism…”\textsuperscript{131}

It is questionable whether Birnbaum’s Jewish credentials were all that different from Herzl’s. Certainly Birnbaum went to great lengths to cultivate them and wanted to be thought of as East European rather than German, drawing attention to the fact that though he grew up in Vienna his family hailed from Eastern Europe. Of course this applied to the vast majority of Viennese Jewry including the most assimilated, upper-middle-class

\textsuperscript{127}See, for example Vital, \textit{The Origins of Zionism}, p. 270.
\textsuperscript{128}Herzl, \textit{The Diaries of Theodor Herzl}, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{130}Nathan Birnbaum. \textit{Die jüdische Moderne}. Leipzig: Literarische Anstalt, 1896, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., p. 32.
intellectuals—Freud’s mother, for example, spoke more Yiddish than German.\textsuperscript{132}

Though Yiddish was not Birnbaum’s mother tongue as is clear from the German orthography of his Yiddish, he mastered the language, publishing and conducting extensive correspondence in it.\textsuperscript{133} In 1908 he convened the first international Yiddish language conference in Czernowitz, the capital of the eastern-most province of Cisleithania. At any rate, when Birnbaum converted from political to cultural Zionism, he put a great deal of work into reformulating ideas and changing his own lifestyle. He had not intended to abandon political Zionism, but to effect a shift in Zionism generally. Thus he was upset when Herzl, a novice, simply sauntered onto the scene, stole his thunder, and splintered the movement. Still, the dispute was over more than personal Jewish credentials, intellectual debt and leadership of Zionism. Birnbaum did not see the core of the Jewish predicament as deriving from a new form of ethnonationalism that impeded a legitimate process of national assimilation. Herzl had hoped that a Jewish state (or otherwise independent society) in Palestine would restore the prospect of assimilation for those Jews who chose to remain in Europe.\textsuperscript{134} Birnbaum, however, argued that national assimilation was impossible for reasons deeper than antisemitism. Instead of assimilating, Birnbaum believed, the Jews would simply become rootless cosmopolitan Europeans and this would leave them on unequal footing with Europe’s other nations. The solution for him was not a Jewish state in which to safeguard liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism, but the revival of the cultural, linguistic, and spiritual content that he believed would give the Jews a claim to the status of one of Europe’s “cultured nations.”

Birnbaum contrasted the aspirations of integrated Jews like Jellinek with the kind of

\textsuperscript{132}The Viennese Jewish community was the result of recent migration. Around the mid 19th century, there were only between 2,000 and 4,000 Jews in the city. These were the few privileged Jews who had an imperial patent of toleration—without it, a Jew could not live in the capital, Rozenblit, \textit{The Jews of Vienna}, p. 21. In 1848, after this residency restriction was lifted, an influx of Bohemian and Moravian Jews entered the city. By the end of the 1860s, this first wave of migration brought the Jewish presence in Vienna to around 40,000, \textit{ibid.}, p. 17. Soon after, a second wave of migration, this time of Hungarian Jews, overtook the Czech Jews and brought the Jewish population to 118,000 by 1890; and finally, in the decades leading up to World War I, a mass migration of Galician Jews brought the number close to 200,000, see \textit{ibid.}, p. 21. By the outbreak of the First World War, Vienna’s Jewish community numbered almost 200,000, making the city home to Western and Central Europe’s largest Jewish community, see \textit{ibid.}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{133}For examples of Birnbaum’s Yiddish, in which the letter \textsuperscript{134}Herzl, \textit{Old New Land}, p. 178.
assimilation expected by ethnonationalist movements. While Jews sought, and even after World War One, continued to seek assimilation into a cosmopolitan European civilization on a secular, Enlightenment liberal model—the modern variant of Heine’s attempt to join “Europe” through conversion—the kind of assimilation demanded by their host societies was decidedly national.

If we compare the so-called assimilated Jews with their surroundings, we find that the similarity of perspectives and attitudes is only to be found in those . . . circles of ideas and sentiments that are common to all European people of culture; however, they are almost completely absent in the realm of the national specificities. . . . All of this is to say that the attempt at national assimilation has simply had the effect of Europeanizing the Jewish people.

In other words, the Jews, as Jess Olson has argued in summarizing Birnbaum “failed to understand that their notion of assimilation into European society—which was really the creation of a new cosmopolitanism—was as alien to a national sensibility as their abandoned faith.” Furthermore, “What the German, Frenchman, Czech, or Hungarian desired was not some kind of strange “European” Jew but a fellow German, Frenchman, Czech, or Hungarian.” Actually, by 1896, Jewish national assimilation was no longer welcome due to pervasive völksch nationalism. But the point, that Jewish attempts at national assimilation tended to result in a very cosmopolitan interpretation of nationhood, is well taken. Birnbaum found the lack of Jewish content among these cosmopolitans distressing and came to see political Zionism as a purely “mechanical” solution to the Jewish question. He was convinced that the cultivation of Jewish cultural and ethnic awareness was more important than state-building. Thus even though Birnbaum’s ultimate goal was acceptance for the Jews in Europe, the term “European” could be a pejorative because it evoked the secular, liberal cosmopolitanism that Birnbaum saw as a dead end and as the problem with Herzl’s political Zionism.

Rejecting Herzl’s focus on the acquisition of a Jewish homeland, Birnbaum instead fo-

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135 The eminent Viennese Rabbi, Adolf Jellinek responded to Yehuda Leib Pinsker’s early Zionist writings in 1882, with the argument that “We are at home in Europe and we feel that we are sons of the country in which we were born and brought up . . . We are Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Magyars, Italian and so on, down to the marrow of our bones . . . We have lost the sense of Hebrew nationality.” Quoted in Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*, p. 135.

136 Birnbaum, *Die jüdische Moderne*, p. 3.

137 Olson, “The Late Zionism of Nathan Birnbaum”, p. 251.
cused on race as the basis for Jewish national revival. However, Birnbaum’s use of the term was unusual and was unconnected with the eugenicist discourses and the more general ethnic or race-inspired romantic nationalism of the period. Birnbaum’s use of race was, rather, similar to Buber’s “community of blood”. They both distanced themselves from the kind of racist nationalism espoused by Chamberlain and Weining.138 For Buber the “community of blood” was supposed to evoke the continuity of the Jewish spiritual community. Likewise Birnbaum’s use of race was decidedly a cultural, not a biological phenomenon and he often used the term “racial culture” synonymously with race. Development of the race concerned culture, not breeding.

If Birnbaum’s use of the term was unorthodox and required him to distance himself from racist nationalists, why did he argue that race was the elemental component of the nation? I think it was basically a rhetorical strategy. It allowed him to claim a firm basis for Jewish nationality—firmer than simply “Jewish culture.” Furthermore, he argued that Jewish culture was in a state of neglect and its cultivation was the central focus of his Zionism. Thus perhaps it would have been hard to argue that Jewish culture in its current form, could constitute the basis of nationhood. Recourse to race allowed Birnbaum to avoid three pitfalls that more common definitions of nationhood posed for the Jewish case.

First, it allowed him to dismiss the Marxist argument that proletarian internationalism would solve the Jewish predicament. Birnbaum’s objection here was particularly aimed at Social Democrats like Otto Bauer.139 Bauer and Karl Renner formulated plans around the same time to reform the Habsburg empire as a multinational federation in which national groups would have autonomy independent of territory. This was very appealing to cultural Zionists and was the basis upon which Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe (Bundists) developed their autonomist platform. However, Bauer himself, though Jewish, did not see the Jews as a nation and preferred to count them among whichever nation they were acculturated in (in his own case, German-Austrian). Bauer will be discussed in the next chapter.

Second, it deflected the disqualification of Jews for nationhood on Fichte’s linguistic definition of nationality. The Jews did not have one common language. The promotion of

138 Olson, “The Late Zionism of Nathan Birnbaum”, pp. 252-53.
139 Birnbaum, Die jüdische Moderne, p. 10.
the Yiddish language was one of Birnbaum’s primary projects from the mid 1890s until the First World War, but to regard Yiddish or Hebrew as the basis of Jewish nationality would exclude a good part of the Jewish community. Indeed, the Habsburg census conducted in the Bukovina, where Birnbaum moved in 1908, classified Yiddish as a dialect of German and thus succeeded in maintaining an official “German” majority in the capital city, Czernowitz. This was of no small importance given that the Austrian constitution granted autonomy to each national group along with funding for social, cultural, and educational infrastructure.

Third, defining Jewishness through race was a way of avoiding the other commonly understood requirement of nationhood: territory. The Jew were not concentrated in one geographic region to which they could claim historical rights as the autochthanous population. Of course, this applied to most ethnic groups in the Habsburg Empire, but it applied especially to the Jews, who not only lived in ethnically-mixed regions, but in regions across the empire that were not contiguous. Race had the implication of immutability. It was not well defined, but it did carry a certain weight as a characteristic less contingent than ‘culture’ or language.

Furthermore, racially defined culture gave Birnbaum firm ground for arguing for Jewish inclusion in Europe, because Europeanness was already commonly understood in cultural terms. The rhetoric about European civilization, although hard to pin down, always had a significant cultural content. Besides political thought and Christianity, literary, musical, and artistic heritage were widely understood as a constitutive of Europeanness. Moreover, individual nations could participate in a common civilization and culture. Birnbaum argued that a community of civilized nations would not conflict with each other if they were fully autonomous. National assimilation was impossible (as discussed in the previous section) because nations were based on race, but civilization was not based on race, but on culture. Thus the Jewish nation needed to cultivate its own cultural contribution in order to be European and to avoid the antisemitism that arose from minority status, from rootless cosmopolitanism, and from attempts at national assimilation.

In the wake of the cessation of antisemitic friction, those economic peculiarities which total assimilation to European (hybrid) culture causes, will fade away. ... Then, for the first time, the full modern power of the Jewish people will be free and will likewise take part in the classical “Culturboden” of Europe and especially in the annexation of the Near Eastern,
namely the Semitic nations, into the European family of peoples.\textsuperscript{140}

This was simply a cultural route to the same goal as Herzl’s of Jewish acceptance through independence. Herzl also had an unconventional definition of race. As quoted above: “Our community of race is peculiar and unique, for we are bound together only by the faith of our fathers.”\textsuperscript{141} He, however, used the term not to lend weight to an argument for Jewish cultural or ethnic specificity, but quite the opposite, to dismiss the idea of an essential Jewishness (notice that it is not even “our faith” but “the faith of our fathers.”) But again, the goal was essentially the same. While Birnbaum sought Jewish inclusion in geographic Europe and Herzl imagined a European Jewish nation in diaspora, they both borrowed the Mazzinian idea that Europe was made up of national groups that needed to be independent before joining together in a supranational community. Birnbaum just chose a \textit{cultural} reading of this where Herzl focused on politics.

They, along with most of their liberal contemporaries, also shared the tendency to Orientalize the Jews of the Middle East. It is unclear what exactly Birnbaum meant by “Semitic nations” in the quote above. However, it certainly included the Jews of the Middle East. He described “Asian” Jews as follows:

Of the daring complexity, the restless drive for creativity and thought, the fermenting problematic nature of our modern European world, not a trace has penetrated this group. It is fully Oriental, and therefore, in complete contrast to the second, much larger group which has its home in Western and Central Europe, plus those in European overseas colonies who have attached themselves linguistically to the various European peoples.\textsuperscript{142}

Where Birnbaum did differ from liberals and political Zionists was in his estimation of East European Jews. Herzl and Nordau, who had no appreciation for Yiddish language or Jewish religious orthodoxy, are notorious for considering East European Jews purely as refugees in Europe. Yet Birnbaum regarded East European Jews as the source of the cultural renewal that was the basis of his Zionism. But while he regarded them as more authentically Jewish than West European Jews, who had become as he rather unflatteringly put it, “byproducts” of European civilization, this authenticity did not make them any less

\textsuperscript{140}Birnbaum, \textit{Die jüdische Moderne}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{141}Herzl, \textit{A Jewish State}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{142}Nathan Birnbaum. “Die jüdisch sprechenden Juden und ihre Bühne”. In: \textit{Die Welt} 5.41 (1011 1901).
Nothing is more fallacious than to throw the group of which we are now speaking into the same pot with the first Oriental one. The error is approximately—but only approximately—the same as if we were to deny the Russians and Poles themselves their European character and to count them among the Asians. . . . Just as the Eastern Slavs represent a living link of European civilization, which through them has been mightily enriched with values, ideals, methods and personal qualities, just as they carry within themselves the effervescing desire for progress and upward mobility which distinguished them from the Asiatics and qualifies them as Europeans—so it is similarly with the Jews who live among them. It matters not that the former, in their state institutions and character of their churches, the latter in their ghettos, houses of prayer, and schools—drag along with them old Oriental elements. What matters is that both possess the desire for striving outward from old to ever new things and forms, for eternally organizing anew, and for self-improvement. Whoever does not want to believe this, especially of the Jews of Slavic Eastern Europe, really should look more closely at how, in all areas, they narrow down ever more the familiar Orientalism, which, by the way, also remains to some degree in all other European nations, how they breach the chains of superstition, how they override the confines of primitive economic forms, how they develop a working and fighting proletariat—finally, what a powerful impulse lives within them for a cultural language. For this, some turn to German, Russian, or Polish; others, before our astounded eyes, create in Hebrew the elastic idiom that modern man requires. Finally, and what is magnificent, the inherited mass dialect, “Jewish” [Yiddish], steadily aspires upward toward becoming a cultural language and does so not at all slowly.

Birnbaum protested against Herzl’s “mechanical” attempt to “buy” a Jewish homeland through diplomacy and declared that he had found a more authentic basis for Jewish nationality in the Yiddish language, Orthodox spirituality, mysticism, and East European Jewish folkways. Ultimately, he came to prioritize Orthodoxy, but that phase of his life is beyond the scope of this study. In the period discussed here, behind what might appear to be romantic nationalist rhetoric lurks the old Enlightenment ideal shared by Herzl and Nordau of a place for the Jews in a cosmopolitan, civilized Europe.

3.4.2 Multicultural Central Europe Abroad

Hans Kohn’s intellectual trajectory was quite different from Birnbaum’s. Initially, they shared the crisis common to all Zionists, namely, the point where they had to define the border between the irrational and neo-romantic elements and the liberal principles in their

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143 Birnbaum, *Die jüdische Moderne*, p. 16.
144 Birnbaum, “Die jüdisch sprechenden Juden”.
145 For a full biography of Birnbaum, see Jess Olson’s recent dissertation Olson, “Nation, Peoplehood and Religion”.

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nationalism. But while Birnbaum ultimately abandoned both and espoused Orthodoxy, Kohn began as a cultural Zionist heavily influenced by Buber and völkisch nationalism ultimately to abandon it for liberalism. But in their cultural Zionist phases, they shared much and Kohn understood the basic contradictions that Birnbaum tried to deal with and the ideological fluctuations those contradictions caused.

Kohn tried to characterize Birnbaum’s position in an article written in 1924, a year before Kohn emigrated to Palestine. This was a decade after Birnbaum traded cultural Zionism for Orthodoxy:

Birnbaum’s Judaism strives to differentiate. It is a movement related to the regionalism of strains of French or German conservatism… [But, at] the same time, Birnbaum adheres to a principle of nationalism that is, though not completely clarified, a turn toward the future (and for Birnbaum at the same time a turn to past, to the time before the appearance of political-territorial nationalism in the nineteenth century). He frees nationality from political territory; for him it is a cultural and spiritual principle that does not need a mechanical connection to territory. Diaspora nationality, free of the spacial-mechanical, is not something abnormal, but rather one of humanity’s futurist forms of culture.146

Similarly,

Birnbaum, like Moses Hess and simultaneously with Martin Buber, demonstrated to us the meaning and importance of eternity in Judaism. To him, the Jews are not a nation like the nations of the earth (die Völker der Erde), especially the nations of Europe, for whom certain elements… like land and language are missing… The Jewish Volk is neither able to nor wants to be like them… Through its freely chosen act of covenant with God it differentiated itself from them. The nations of the earth are owned by their instincts and the idols of time, power, independence, nationalism… Israel, however, belongs to God. The Jewish nation is in an abnormal situation compared with that which is the norm for other nations. But to seek to normalize it through a simple, mechanical solution is to overlook the fact that its “abnormality” is not a historical accident, is not meaningless, but rather is the result of an “abnormality” in the character of Judaism itself.147

As Kohn noted, the themes he identified in Birnbaum’s Zionism and his return to religiosity could equally characterize the early work of Martin Buber. In many respects, as George Mosse has shown, their variant of cultural Zionism did, as Kohn pointed out, resemble German nativist conservatism or völkisch nationalism. The past that Kohn refers to was, for Buber, the Hasidim. Similarly for Birnbaum, it was the traditional Jewish communities

146Kohn, “Um die Ewigkeit”, pp. 57–58.
147Ibid.
of Eastern Europe among whom “pulses real, dynamic Jewish life.” This focus on an idealized past was “meant to signal the end of the alienation of modern man. The modern Jew was to be “uprooted” only to become rooted again in a neo-romantic mysticism... embodying a Judaism which was not rationalized, not fossilized, and surely not quiescent.”

“Europe” was, in this formulation, a negative representation of modern alienation and exclusive nationalism. I have, however, argued above that Birnbaum’s cultural Zionism can be seen as a cultural manifestation of Herzl’s goal of Jewish membership in a Mazzinian Europe. This is because for Buber and his young disciples in Prague, anti-intellectual, neo-romantic nationalism, which Kohn described as “not knowledge but life,” was a platform not for exclusive nationalism but for pacifist humanism. Buber’s writing and the religious romanticism that he represented was fairly impenetrable, but, his formulation of his goal for the young generation was “to become human in a Jewish way.” It seems to encapsulate this sentiment. If, as Walter Laqueur put it, “this sounds not very precise, it is a fairly typical example of what irritated many of Buber’s contemporaries: the dark hints, the mysterious phrases concerning subjects which above all needed precision and clarity.” But it is suggestive of a basic theme in cultural Zionism in which Jewish soul-searching and cultivation of “Volk feeling”—elements common to and inspired by völkisch nationalism—were intended as a platform for universal, humanist cosmopolitanism, which tied it right back to the liberalism it ostensibly refuted.

Kohn’s own cultural Zionism and specifically his alignment with the radical, pacifist branch of Brit Shalom in Palestine in the mid 1920s was a product both of the influence of Buber and Ahad Ha’am and his experiences as a prisoner of war during the First World War. Kohn joined the mostly Czech Prague infantry regiment of the Austro-Hungarian army and in 1915 was taken prisoner by the Russians and remained in Russia, mostly in Siberia, until 1920. He described these as “the decisive years of my life,” Kohn’s life-long interest in nationalism and movements for national independence in Eastern Europe and Central and

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148 Kohn, “Um die Ewigkeit”, p. 58.
149 Mosse, Germans and Jews, p. 86.
150 Ibid., p. 85.
151 Kohn, Vom Judentum.
153 Ibid., p. 168.
154 Kohn, Living in a World Revolution, p. 89.
Southwest Asia grew out of his experiences during the Russian Revolution and his years in Siberia. The war’s devastation prompted Kohn’s conviction that Zionism should be a movement for peace and human understanding.\footnote{See Kohn, \textit{Living in a World Revolution}, pp. 80-122; Wiese, “The Janus Face of Nationalism”, p. 113.}

\textit{Die politische Idee des Judentums}, published in 1924, was Kohn’s attempt to form a political platform out of his spiritually-based, pacifist and humanist Zionism. He had already discussed what he saw as the difference between the “nation” as a community of descent and shared history and the “nation-state” with its inherent tendency toward aggressive nationalism in essays written in 1919 and 1920.\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} This was a distinction Otto Bauer had developed and which was very influential among Jewish Diaspora nationalists.\footnote{See Otto Bauer. \textit{Die Nationalitaetenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie}. Wien: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1907.} In \textit{Die politische Idee des Judentums} Kohn further refined his idea of the nation as an anti-essentialist response to exclusive nationalism. He did this by attacking its definitional categories, particularly “milieu” and “race”, neither of which, he argued “gives us a deeper insight [into the Jewish nation].”\footnote{See, for example, his discussion of the political dynamics that sparked the First World War as “not fundamentally different” from those behind the Peloponnesian Wars as described by Thucydides, Kohn, \textit{Living in a World Revolution}, p. 83.} “Race,” he wrote, “is useless because “pure” races do not exist…” To support this, he turned to the ancient Greeks, a constant theme, especially in his later work.\footnote{Kohn, \textit{Die politische Idee des Judentums}, p. 8.} “The ancient Volk closest to the Jews in characteristics—the Greeks—were” Kohn pointed out “a mixture of races (Rassenmenge). Nevertheless there is an unmistakable Greek character…” His other example was an early hint at his Anglophilia: “The English are a Volk of different races, but are certainly completely unique.”\footnote{Kohn, Hans. “Untitled Manuscript.” Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York. Hans Kohn Collection, Box 1, Folder 17.}

Kohn was more sensitive to the contemporary implications of the term “race” than Birnbaum had been a decade earlier. He seems to have meant basically the same thing when he used the term \textit{Stamm} (stock, heritage), though he claimed it invoked “a deeper and more primordial bond than nation.”\footnote{Kohn, Hans. \textit{Die politische Idee des Judentums}, p. 8.} Kohn, as we see below, was not a social Darwinist like Nossig and was more suspicious of it than most of this contemporaries across the po-
itical spectrum. He criticized the use of Darwin’s theory to assert that “adaptation and its requirements transform and determine the mind (Geist).”\textsuperscript{162} Kohn argued that on the contrary:

Too many other nations (Völker) have inhabited the same land or similar neighboring lands to Israel, but none of them are known for similar phenomena. Parallels to the development of Israel have been discovered from the beginning until Persia, similar traditions and legends, customs and doctrines; nowhere has there been the same thing created out of this [shared] material."\textsuperscript{163}

A highly developed national culture and spirituality were, Kohn argued, far more important than political power and territory.

Jews and Greeks were small Völker unimportant in power and domain. Jewish Palestine, like Attica, was little more than city-states whose political influence was obsolete against great empires. Nonetheless precisely these two Völker achieved world-transforming (weltumgestaltende) importance. The land of Palestine exhibits only one quality which could be rediscovered in Jewish character.\textsuperscript{164}

Having thus argued against the nation-state and for the position that Jewish nationalism had the responsibility to offer a better example, Kohn, as secretary of Brit Shalom, outlined a bi-national state inspired by Switzerland and the Habsburg monarchy. Arabs and Jews were to be represented in autonomous political bodies, which would administer the educational, welfare and religious infrastructure in each community. These political bodies would, in turn send representatives to a common representative body responsible for legislation and the economy.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, the state would be neutral and would play an integral role promoting peace in international relations:

Historically and geographically, Palestine is a land of peace. ...it should be a neutral country under the protection of the League of Nations, a site of national and international peace, which through history and location should, in the near future, also become the seat of the League... A Palestine that is peaceful and prosperous in its internal life, and autonomous in its cultural diversity, that also outwardly always guards and spreads peace, neutrally, inviolably and unarmed, can be the League of Nations; first great achievement on the arduous path towards its true form and mission.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{162}Kohn, \textit{Die politische Idee des Judentums}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{163}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{164}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{165}Wiese, “The Janus Face of Nationalism”, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{166}Quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 112.
This was quite explicitly also intended as a solution to the nationalist conflict in Central and Eastern Europe that had, in part, inspired his Zionism and which had made life in Prague, where he would have preferred to stay, impossible. He saw his opposition to the nation-state as an integral part of pacifism generally, because pacifist convictions “are only meaningful if they are also upheld as they apply to internal interests.” 167 But contrary to Yfaat Weiss’ suggestion, this negative evaluation of Central Europe was not the exclusive influence. The members of Brit Shalom saw themselves as representatives of a particular experience of European civilization, the direct product of the liberal legacy based in Central Europe. Even as he criticized European exclusive nationalism and sought to cultivate a uniquely Jewish response to it, Kohn was as unequivocal as Nordau about the place of the Jews in Europe:

Jewish culture unquestionably is one of the foundations of today’s all encompassing Mediterranean, European, and American civilization.” 168

That Europe and the Mediterranean represented one civilization was useful in that it included Palestine. That America was also part of it helped when he moved there as we shall see shortly. Along the same lines, Leo Hermann, a friend and fellow Prague cultural Zionist, characterized Zionism as “a specially oriented Teilerscheinung (component phenomenon) in the greater European expansion.” 169

In these Jewish experiences, Jewish nationalism was intended as a force of inclusion rather than exclusion. The content of the Jewish contribution that Kohn alluded to and which he hoped to revive was a variant of the ethical monotheism that Hermann Cohen had formulated in the late nineteenth century and which he found in Ahad Ha’am’s “Jewish Ethic.” 170 In Kohn’s interpretation, this concerned a messianic duty to infuse nationalism with a pacifist, pluralist message and to bring peace to humanity. First and foremost, this meant setting an example for peace and coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. In an essay on the “Arab question,” Kohn wrote:

170 Wiese, “The Janus Face of Nationalism”, p. 113; Ahad Ha’am, Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic: Basic Writings of Ahad Ha’am.
Let us not be beguiled by nationalist chauvinism; having been the slaves of yesteryear, let us not become the imperialists of tomorrow. Jewish nationalism was always a moral nationalism; duties and not rights: responsibility to humanity. Let us remain serious and clear and true to ourselves! Let us guard against any fetishism, let us guard ourselves above all against the fetishism of the national master race!\footnote{171}

The radical, pacifist wing of Brit Shalom represented a very small minority within Zionism both in the Yishuv\footnote{172} and internationally. When revisionism and mainstream Labor Zionism proved unconvinced about the viability or desirability of Kohn’s utopian internationalist state, he left, claiming that it had betrayed liberalism.\footnote{173}

That Kohn should have been surprised that a mystical movement influenced by the very neo-romantic völkisch nationalism that it opposed should have failed a liberal political movement may seem puzzling. But this was a contradiction that had existed within liberal nationalism from the start. Indeed, Kohn’s own characterization of Mazzini’s liberal nationalism bears a great resemblance to his own articulation of Zionism (with the exception that he preferred Greece to Rome):

The great passion of Mazzini’s life […] in which his deep religious mysticism found its expression, was not Italy but unity. … Unity of man was to overcome the dispersion of modern man in an industrialized mass civilization through an identity of thought and action, fused into a wholeness by a faith which would give a new heart and center, meaning and end, to man’s manifold activities and self-contrarities. Unity of nation was to bind all free individuals of democracy into a community of liberty and equality and by the unity of feeling and thought counteract the atomization, the egoism, and the competitive struggle which threatened to undermine modern society. Unity of mankind was to assure the peace and collaboration of all nations working in harmony under a common law of progress toward the common goal of a better world. Rome was, to Mazzini, the symbol of this threefold unity, the eternal source of inspiration to bind all men for the realization of God’s ends.\footnote{174}

Kohn’s Zionism had been an attempt at a cultural rather than a political form of this liberating, unifying nationalism and, as Christian Wiese has suggested, he thought that a nationalism grounded in neo-romantic, irrational, spiritual culture could coexist with liberal, pluralist politics.\footnote{175}

\footnote{171}{Quoted in Wiese, “The Janus Face of Nationalism”, p. 114.}
\footnote{172}{The pre-state Jewish community in Palestine.}
\footnote{173}{Ibid.}
\footnote{175}{Christian Wiese, in the Question and Answer session after his talk “The Janus Face of Nationalism: The Ambivalence of Zionist Identity in Robert Weltsch and Hans Kohn.” suggested that Kohn’s conviction}
Though Kohn had had doubts about Zionism several years earlier, his break with the movement came in 1929 after the outbreak of violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. His reaction was similar to Ahad Ha'am’s response to Jewish violence in 1921, when he famously wrote:

A Jew and blood. Are there any two more extreme opposites? My God! Is this the end? Is this the goal for which our fathers toiled, and for which the generations suffered? Is this the dream of a return to Zion, of which our people has dreamt for centuries? That now we come to Zion only to soak its soil with innocent blood? Do we really want to become just another small Levantine people in an oriental corner of the world, a people competitive with other peoples in spilling blood, in revenge and violence? If that is the Messiah, I do not want to experience his arrival.176

Kohn had worked for the World Zionist Organization in London for several years before he moved to Palestine in 1925 and, by the late twenties, when he began to have serious doubts about Zionism, he spent more time in London and traveling around Europe and the United States on lecture tours than he did in Palestine. His disillusionment is expressed well in the reflections of his life-long friend and fellow Brit Shalom member, Robert Weltsch:

In retrospect, it must be admitted that the ideas characterizing German Zionism... have failed when confronted with reality. ... The notion that a developing nationalism must not necessarily mutate into an aggressive form, and that... spiritual renaissance, moral renewal, personal human dignity and national creativity can also—and in fact only—be realized in the context of peaceful co-existence with other free peoples, was an illusion.177

Kohn described his turning point and his intention in visiting the United States in a letter to John Haynes Holmes in 1930.178 He wrote:

I wish to thank you for your readiness to help in arranging my lecture tour in America. But I am afraid that you are under a misunderstanding. I do not wish to come to America for the purpose to mix into American Zionist politics nor to attack the attitude of American Zionism or of the New Palestine. I wish to come to America in the first place to lecture before bodies interested in foreign policy, institutions of political science etc. on two subjects: the political and social transformation of the East and its different aspects and the meaning of Nationalism in our epoch, its historical function in reshapening (sic) humanity,

that nationalism could be a purely cultural phenomenon separate from liberal political thought allowed him to believe for as long as he did that the illiberal content of his Zionism would not conflict with his liberal politics.

177 Ibid., p. 130.
178 Holmes (1879-1964) was an American Unitarian minister and pacifists who helped found the NAACP and the ACLU. He was an advocate of peace between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. (See John Haynes Holmes. Palestine to-day and to-morrow: A Gentile’s Survey of Zionism. Macmillan, 1929)
its rise, its decline and its prospects. In the second place I wish to speak before Jewish intellectuals, University students and younger Rabbis not on political questions but on the idea of Judaism, on modern Jewish thinkers and philosophers like Achad Ha’am, Martin Buber, A.D. Gordon etc., on the religious movements in contemporary Jewry, in short I wish to give the bases for a deeper understanding of the eternal forces, of the spiritual and ethical values of Judaism. Perhaps they will be enabled thus in an indirect way to grasp the fundamentals of our Zionism. I shall thus have nothing to do with the powers-that-be in official American Zionism. I do not wish to lecture before Zionist bodies. I think therefore that your apprehensions are mistaken. I do not wish to come to America as a Zionist, I do not wish to be labelled (sic) or announced as such, I do not wish to interfere in actual Zionist politics but (sic) I wish to come as a student and lecturer of political science and of Judaism. . . . I have left a career of about 20 years and I am in a certain sense of the word at a turning point in my life. If ever, a visit to America at this moment could become of importance to me.

In 1934, Kohn took a faculty position at Smith College in Massachusetts. He became a staunch critic of all forms of nationalism. Kohn had already published a biography of Buber in 1930 in which, for the first time, he took issue with Buber’s ethics. But there was less of a need to break with Ahad Ha’am, whose work, as mentioned above, was in part inspired by the nineteenth century positivists and whose variant of Cultural Zionism was, in broad terms, more in line with liberal political thought. Later in life, Kohn expressed more sympathy with Herzl’s liberal Zionism and connected it to Ahad Ha’am’s. In his memoirs, Kohn reflected that:

Under the influence of Ahad Ha’am, we were cultural rather than political Zionists. . . . But it should be pointed out that the leader of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl (an immensely attractive personality, according to those who knew him), sketched in his last novel, *Altneuland*, a vision of the future which was not essentially very different in its conception from Ahad Ha’am’s insistence on the ethical relationship of the Jewish people to its neighbors. In that novel, which he regarded as the legacy he left to his movement, Herzl did not envisage a Jewish state, but a New Society, in which the Arabs prospered and multiplied, as did the Jews. Herzl castigated self-centered nationalism and anti-Arab sentiments and attitudes as a negation of his aspirations. I believe today, as I did then, that only such a vision of a New Society can bring about a fulfillment of Zionism in the Middle East, and I hold fast to the prophetic tradition of Judaism which Ahad Ha’am rightly stressed.

Kohn’s move to the US was the culmination of a process of profound disillusionment about which he was not unconflicted. Kohn’s correspondence with Arnold Toynbee is a window onto the disappointment he felt at giving up his Zionist ambitions for multinational

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179 Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York City, Hans Kohn Collection, AR 259, Folder 3/2 (Microfilm reel 7).
coexistence in Palestine and in Europe. Kohn admired Toynbee and saw his work as a model for non-nationalist or world history:

The historian can protect himself [from the danger of becoming the handmaiden of nationalism] only by critical self-awareness of his inevitable bias, by as wide a circumference of human sympathy as possible ... and by broadening his won horizon through the comparative method of studying and presenting history. ... The British historian Arnold J. Toynbee has provided us with a contemporary example of such a universal, comparative approach in his Study of History.181

Kohn and Toynbee met in London during the year that Kohn spent there before emigrating to the United States, where they crossed paths again just after Kohn had arrived. Toynbee wrote to congratulate Kohn on his position at Smith College and voiced mixed feelings about moving to the United States that apparently rang very true for Kohn. He made a note that it should be kept as it was “very dear letter” to him. Toynbee wrote:

I am both glad and sorry at your news about your appointment at Smith, and I think I can understand how you must feel about it yourself, for I once had to contemplate the possibility of taking a chair in the North Eastern United States after I visited from my Byzantine Chair in London in 1924. ... On the balance, though, I feel sure that you are to be congratulated... So I hope you may not find yourself too seriously isolated—though of course, for us Europeans, when we speak frankly, to live on this side of the Atlantic, even in the least un-European part of the U.S. is in some sense an exile. ... All the same, one sees some very successful cases of happy adaptation [..] So I can wish you the best of happiness and success with a sincere expectation that you will find them.182

Kohn made a very concerted effort to avoid feeling like a European in exile: he developed and promoted the idea of a common European and American civilization. In his teaching as well as in contributions both to European and American books and journals, Kohn argued for “the unity of Atlantic culture.”183 Also, much as Stefan Zweig had done, he set about defining this civilization by great literary and political figures who, not surprisingly, aligned

well with the dichotomy between Western/civic and Eastern/ethnic nationalisms for which he became famous.\textsuperscript{184} England, for example, was represented by J. S. Mill in Kohn’s well known \textit{Prophets and Peoples} and Treitschke represented Germany. Of course Humboldt, who was a great influence on Mill, would also have been an option, but that was not the point Kohn wanted to make. On Hegel and Marx, he wrote in his memoirs:

To these two post-Kantian giants of German thought, we remain as indebted as we are to the Hebrew prophets or to Plato and Aristotle. Elements of their thinking will inextricably remain part of the Western mind. But as heirs to the Enlightenment we cannot return to a “new” Middle Ages of religious or secular dogmatism concerning the course of history and the salvation of man.\textsuperscript{185}

It is almost as if, after the early influence of Deutschtum and \textit{völkisch} nationalism had failed him, he redefined Europe by Anglo-American liberalism. He became a staunch liberal, rejected nationalism completely, and felt he needed to apologize for his period as a cultural Zionist:

In few other cities was nationalism as living and all-pervasive a force as in Prague at the beginning of the twentieth century. This experience of my youth predestined me, so to speak, to develop an awareness of the importance of nationalism. Rationally, the conflict between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia should have been solved by compromise. . . . But in the case of Bohemia such a reconciliation of opposite claims, which would have been in the ultimate interest of both groups and would have assured a common future on a reasonable basis, was frustrated by visions and ambitions carried over from the past—and often from a narrow interpretation of that past—and by the emotions aroused by such visions. History was too powerful to allow common sense to prevail.\textsuperscript{186}

In the last decades of his life, Kohn also expressed nostalgia for the Habsburg monarchy. Its multinationalism produced not only cosmopolitanism, but also some of the more intense nationalist conflict in Europe,\textsuperscript{187} but Kohn continued to see the key to overcoming nationalism in its multinational structure.\textsuperscript{188} Consequently, he helped found the “Habsburg–Monarchy–Committee” to promote the study of its history.\textsuperscript{189} All of this, however, happened

\textsuperscript{184}For a recent discussion of the development of Kohn’s dichotomy in the context of his personal itinerary from Prague to the United States, see Liebich, “Searching for the Perfect Nation”.
\textsuperscript{185}\textit{Kohn, Living in a World Revolution}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{186}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{187}Hacohen, “Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism”.
\textsuperscript{188}\textit{Kohn, Living in a World Revolution}, pp. 11,17,18.
\textsuperscript{189}Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York. Hans Kohn Collection, Box 2, Folder 27
in the entirely different context of post–Second World War America and so remains beyond the scope of the analysis developed here.

More important for this chapter is the question of Kohn and Birnbaum’s contributions as cultural Zionists to the idea of Europe before the Second World War. For a variety of reasons, some quite pragmatic and strategic, they feared that a political Jewish state without a grounding in a profound sense of Jewish nationhood would not be viable. In this conviction, they were closer to Mazzini’s expression of nationalism than was Herzl, whose political views led him to neglect most of its romantic aspects. However, they parted ways with Mazzini’s vision in their insistence on a bi-national state inspired by the multinational Habsburg and Swiss models rather than the national sovereignty that Mazzini advocated.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Insistence on Europeanness is a theme that cut across ideological differences between Central European Zionists. For political Zionists like Herzl and Nordau, the Jewish state was imagined as a liberal haven for cosmopolitan Jews and as an example that could resuscitate liberalism in Europe. For cultural Zionists like Birnbaum and Kohn the same goal of a politically liberal polity coexisted with the attempt to rebuild Jewish cultural nationhood. This latter, cultural, project was, paradoxically inspired both by the liberal, humanist example of Ahad Ha’am and by precisely the German *völkisch* nationalism that Zionist bi-nationalism and autonomism were supposed to counteract.

Yfaat Weiss has correctly argued that we cannot assume that Central European Zionists were liberal or moderate. However, as we have seen, her argument—that whatever moderation these Zionists possessed was formulated counter to Central European illiberalism, an illiberalism that they themselves reproduced as often as they challenged—must be complicated. Austrian Zionists did indeed represent and reproduce their formative environments, but their Central European formative contexts contained both compelling moderate, liberal examples and illiberal, mystical and ethnonationalist ones. Furthermore, these opposing traditions were often linked in surprising ways. In other words, these figures were ideologically
complex, reflecting and reacting to their multidimensional Central European context. In different ways and to degrees, all of them blended liberalism and romantic nationalism. Liberalism was foundational to their pluralist idea of Europe and thus could not be abandoned even by those who simultaneously held illiberal and anti-Western beliefs. They were willing to transgress ideological boundaries in the service of an idea of Europe as a cultural and political solution to Jewish exclusion.

In this ideological flexibility and in their idea of Europe, they shared much with Alfred Fried and Oscar Jászi. These two, even more than Herzl and Nordau, had no tolerance for neo-romantic nationalism or for mysticism in any form or amount. This underpins the difference between Fried’s and Nossig’s ideas of European unity. Nossig’s was embedded in the pervasive conception of Europe as composed of racially distinct and basically antagonistic nations, his professed pacifism notwithstanding. This is why the Jews required a separate homeland as a basis for membership in Europe. Fried, conversely saw nationalism as an insalubrious historical phase and imagined Jews as members in a Europe composed of cosmopolitan, pluralist states with limited sovereignty. Fried was a traditional liberal on the “Jewish Question”; he believed in assimilation and thought that separate Jewish politics only fanned antisemitism. This fundamental difference concerning Jewish autonomous or integrated membership in Europe aside, Fried shared much with Austrian Zionists. Their tendencies to concentrate on sweeping theoretical and literary tracts at the expense of concrete organizing both united them and made them typical Viennese intellectuals. Most importantly, they shared a common idea of a liberal, pluralist Europe and the conviction that this should be achieved through liberal social reforms.

The idea shared by Austrian Jewish Zionists and liberal internationalists that multinational polity was feasible in modern form and that nationhood need not coincide with territory was, surprisingly, most systematically and compellingly made by their Austro-Marxist rivals. Their work, particularly that of Otto Bauer, was devoted to reforming nationalism into a benign, non-territorial and essentially apolitical concept focused on culture. Since most Jewish intellectuals, especially those who lived into the interwar period,

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190Herzl, remember, insisted that the New Society would include people of different nationalities with group rights
realized that nationalism was inescapable, many focused their efforts on accommodating it. Austro-Marxists stood at the theoretical forefront of the search for ways in which national aspirations could be satisfied without dividing the Habsburg Empire and all of Europe among exclusionary nation states. It is to Austro-Marxist ideas of the nation and of the nation in Europe that we now turn.
4.0 AUSTRIAN JEWISH SOCIALISTS AND THE “UNITED STATES OF EUROPE”

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The last chapter explored Zionist reactions to the predicament integrated Jewish intellectuals faced in the conservative, ethnonationalist and nativist political environment of fin de siècle Austria-Hungary. I argued that Austrian Zionists who championed nationalism did so in a way that was highly subversive of mainstream nationalism at the time. Their purpose was to delineate a nationalism that would be the basis for cosmopolitanism and multinational coexistence in a united Europe. Their ideas of this Europe strongly resembled those of the liberal internationalists discussed in Chapter Two, Alfred Fried and Oscar Jászi. In other words, despite ideological differences between liberals and Zionists and between competing Zionist factions, each subscribed to an idea of Europa composed of the same basic elements.

The first element was a 1848 conception based on the ideals of vormärz of nationalism and on the German Enlightenment ideals of Bildung and Kultur. According to these, Europe would not be purely cosmopolitan and so negate the notion of nationhood, but nationhood would be defined by cultural and intellectual heritage rather than by ethnicity or race. Second, liberalism would be the guiding political influence. Anglophilia played an important role and the political thought of J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and the Fabians were consistent models. The third shared element was faith in technology-driven progress and socialist-inspired ideas for efficient, equitable societies. The fourth was loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy as a model for multinational coexistence and political pluralism particularly in contrast to the push for national unity and homogeneity in Imperial Germany. Of course, at the most detailed level of description, differences between positions emerge, but these differences amount to different
weights given to particular elements within the grander, shared idea of idea of Europe. They are a matter of nuance, not substantial disagreement.

In this chapter, I argue that the same pattern emerges in the work of Austro-Marxists, particularly the movement’s chief theorist, Otto Bauer (1881-1938). By advocating total assimilation, Austro-Marxism offered a response to the Jewish predicament that could not have been more different than that of the liberals, who chose not to address it, and the Zionists, who chose modern Jewish nationhood. Nevertheless, at the core of their response was still the same European idea. But other similarities existed. In general, the political thought of Austro-Marxists fell between radicalism and reformism, between liberalism and communism, between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and was formulated as much in opposition to the Russian example as to Anglo-American liberalism and capitalism. If this characterization sounds familiar, it is because it applies equally well to the figures studied in the last two chapters. For all, a default Austrian Jewish political liberalism, which consisted in *vormärz* nationalism and Anglophile liberalism was blended with varying amounts of the illiberal, romantic nationalism, nativism, and mysticism that were ubiquitous at the time, as well as with socialist ideas meant to address the ills of industrialization and capitalism. And so, just as with cultural Zionism, Austro-Marxism was engaged in synthesizing opposites. Since national disintegration posed a common threat to both the Habsburg state and to the Social Democratic Party, the goal of Austro-Marxists was to protect both. Thus, during the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy when liberalism was in crisis, Austro-Marxists aimed their reforms not at undermining the empire, but at buttressing it. This cultivated the slightly awkward situation in which Austro-Marxists were the Empire’s staunchest defenders besides the conservative German-Austrians. As Rudolf Kjellén remarked: “Nothing can show more clearly the abnormal state condition of the Danube monarchy than the fact that the strong parliamentary progress of Socialism could be regarded as a gain for the state.”

The term “Austro-Marxism” describes a theoretical orientation among Austrian socialists from the late nineteenth century through the interwar period. Bauer’s biographer, Otto Leichter, described it as “a geographical coordinate of a number of marxist theoreticians . . .

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who, coincidentally, grew up in the environment of the Austrian labor movement, spent their youth predominantly under the influence of the special problems of the old multinational state, and were therefore influenced by it in their political activity."\(^2\) The term, as used by Bauer himself, did not imply a movement of ideological coherence. However, the preoccupation with the “nationalities question” did unify the members of the movement because it went against Marxist doctrine, which asserted that nationality was simply a hindrance to socialist development.\(^3\) The movement’s members belonged to Austria’s Social Democratic Workers Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs / SDAPÖ). The party was organized by Viktor Adler (1852-1918) out of splintered factions in 1889. Adler’s major followers, the movement’s major theorists and politicians, were Otto Bauer, Karl Renner (1870-1950), and Max Adler (1873-1937).\(^4\) Karl Renner was born to a Catholic peasant family in Moravia; Renner and Bauer to the Prague and Viennese Jewish bourgeoisie, respectively. Adler was baptized Protestant in 1878 as a young man.\(^5\) At the university of Vienna, Adler was an ardent assimilationist and German nationalist. He served as a deputy in the Reichsrat from 1905 to 1918 and was among the Social Democratic leaders behind the passage of universal male suffrage in 1907. Under his leadership, Austro-Marxists became the major opposition to Karl Lueger’s Christian Socials. Social Democrats opposed religious control over schools and impediments to divorce. They organized strikes for labor legislation and, in the 1920s and early 1930s, when they held power in “Red Vienna”, implemented a comprehensive system of social services and building projects that transformed the city. During the Habsburg period, neither Adler nor his fellow Austro-Marxists saw their socialism as subversive of the empire. In 1889, Adler remarked positively that “Except for France and England, Austria has perhaps the most liberal laws of all Europe, so much so that it resembles a republic which has a monarch in place of a president at its head.”\(^6\) Their support

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 333-35.
\(^4\) Viktor Adler and Max Adler were not related.
\(^5\) Herzl considered conversion a generation later when it was a less realistic response to antisemitism, which by then had become primarily racial rather than religious. Though the majority of Austrians were Catholic, most Jews who converted chose Protestantism since Catholicism was associated with conservative, nativist politics and Jews tended to associate Protestantism with Deutschtum and more moderate, liberal politics. See Malachi Hacohen’s discussion of Karl Popper’s conversion to Protestantism. Hacohen, *Karl Popper.*
of decentralization and the attempt to buttress the empire against the rise of nationalism ultimately failed. Adler died in 1918, only five months after World War One had ended and the Empire disintegrated. Otto Bauer, Adler’s successor, was a Viennese lawyer, author and prominent Austro-Marxist. Bauer’s father was a wealthy Viennese Jewish industrialist who moved among the city’s elite—Freud, for example, was a family friend and Bauer’s sister was Freud’s famous patient, “Dora”. The 1905 Russian Revolution convinced Bauer, at the time in law school, that the problem of nationalism in Austria-Hungary could not be ignored by Austrian socialists. In addition to revolt against autocratic rule, non-Russians within the empire had demanded national liberation. Bauer took this as a warning that nationalism could splinter the party and the Habsburg Empire. In 1906, he published a book on this problem entitled Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy), a book I will return to shortly. In 1907 he began working in the secretariat of the Social Democratic party, which had been founded that year with the granting of general male franchise and the first democratically elected parliament in Cisleithania. In that year, he also founded and served as editor of Der Kampf, the theoretical journal of Austrian Social Democracy.

Like Kohn and Joseph Roth (see Chapter Five) Bauer served in the Austrian army during the First World War and was captured in the early months of the war by the Russian army. He spent three years in Russia as a prisoner of war and was released after the Bolshevik revolution. After Adler’s death Bauer succeeded him as foreign minister and the party’s foremost intellectual and tactical leader. After the war and the empire’s collapse, the Austro-Marxists and Bauer in particular shifted their support from multinationalism to national self-determination. Bauer argued that “with the collapse of its rule over the other nations, German-Austria’s historical mission was ended, for the sake of which she had hitherto borne the separation from the German Motherland.” This could be taken as evidence that Bauer’s German nationalism took precedence over (and essentially invalidated) his advocacy of multinationalism. In fact, during his brief time as foreign minister in Karl Renner’s government, Bauer advocated Anschluss with Germany. He resigned in 1919 when it was

7 Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage.
exposed that he had signed a secret *Anschluss* agreement with Germany. However, it must be noted that the German nation he wished to join was an entirely different species than that of the Pan-Germans. This will become clear in the discussion to follow. Furthermore, as Anson Rabinbach has shown, Bauer’s position was based on the belief that the Austrian Republic was simply not viable. German-Austria, with its population of 6.5 million, was, in Bauer’s view, “of itself an impossible state. It is a possible federal state within a federation, but it is not a state which could persist alone, because it has no self-enclosed area, and because it is much too small to maintain its large industry.”  

Indeed, after 1918 important industries were located in neighboring states and Czech, Hungarian, and Yugoslav food blockades exacerbated a near famine situation.

Leaving political office did not, however, lessen Bauer’s influence in the party. In 1924, he republished *Die Nationalitaetenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, arguing that its concrete suggestions for reform of the Habsburg monarchy were equally relevant to the problem of nationalism and national minorities in interwar Central and Eastern Europe. By this time, however, the Austro-Marxists were severely weakened. In 1919, they formed a national coalition government with the Christian Socials, only to leave it in 1920. From this point until the civil war in 1934, they governed only in Vienna—illiberal nationalist politics were pervasive in the rest of the country and the Social Democrats were the only political force still in favor of a parliamentary and democratic republic. Bauer’s tactical errors and political failures in the interwar period have been the subject of some controversy. During the Socialist uprising of February, 1934, Bauer fled to Brno, in Czechoslovakia and ultimately to Paris, where he died in 1938.

Yet my purpose here is not to evaluate Otto Bauer’s career—I will merely address relevant issues as they come up in the chapter. My purpose is to assess Bauer’s idea of the nation and of the multinational polity as a platform for an integrated, socialist Europe. Apart from serving as another instance of a Jewish response to the rise of nationalism and a window to

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11 For an analysis of Bauer’s leadership of the Social Democrats in interwar Austria, see Rabinbach, *The Crisis of Austrian Socialism*. 
their idea of Europe, Austro-Marxist ideas for national autonomy and multinational coexistence represented the most influential program among a wide spectrum of Austrian federalist reform proposals in turn of the century Austria-Hungary. They challenged both liberal internationalist, Pan-German, and ultimately Nazi ideas of German hegemony in Europe.

To echo a theme sounded earlier, the Austro-Marxist program illustrates, perhaps as well as can be, the fragmented ideological climate of turn-of-the-century Austria. Austro-Marxists dismissed nationalism as disguised class conflict when it concerned East Europeans, but they themselves tended to be ardent German nationalists. Their work focused on national and class groups, but they saw individual liberty as the culmination of their socialism. Most of them were Jews, yet they did not apply the principles of national cultural autonomy to the Jewish community. They were staunch supporters of the supranational Austrian idea, yet they advocated Anschluss with Germany after the First World War. William Johnston’s evaluation of Karl Renner sums it well:

> Few thinkers embodied so attractively the Austrian propensity for molding opposites into a living whole as this peasant proprietor who turned Marxist, only later to regret being deprived by treaty of the family farm. He was the very example of what Lenin would call petit-bourgeois contradictions.\(^\text{12}\)

This serves as the context of Bauer’s idea of the nation.

## 4.2 OTTO BAUER’S IDEA OF THE NATION

Like Hans Kohn, Bauer was convinced that nationalism could be reformed so as to be conducive to multinational coexistence. However, Bauer’s focus was broader, taking on the very idea of the nation rather than the particularly Jewish nation. In his most important book, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy)*,\(^\text{13}\) published in 1906, Bauer proposed a theory of the nation based on two core concepts: the community of character (*Charaktergemeinschaft*) and the community


of fate (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*). His main contention was that national character was not a timeless essence, but a contingent and ever-changing product of shared history. It was only the former, ill-conceived definition of the nation that led to exclusive nationalism. He believed that the nation newly defined would thus be conducive to integration and multinational coexistence and would be the basis for reforming the Habsburg monarchy into a democratic federation. An Austrian federation would, in turn, be the model for a Europe composed of multinational corporations. Bauer sought to replace the dichotomy between uncompromising, “naive cosmopolitanism” and a European state system based on sovereign nations with what he called “cultural cosmopolitanism.” To this end, Bauer’s formidable study of the nation systematically dismantles other ideas of nationality and of the nation state. His point of departure was the assertion that uncompromising cosmopolitanism was ineffective against exclusive nationalism:

> The nationalistic conception of history cannot be overcome by challenging the incontestable fact of national specificities, the incontestable fact of differences between national characters. It is only by stripping the national character of its substantive appearance, by showing that the respective national character is nothing but a precipitate of past historical processes that will be further altered by subsequent historical processes, that we will be able to overcome the nationalistic conception of history.”

Furthermore,

> The diversity of national characters is an empirical fact that can be denied only by a doctrinairism that sees only what it wants to see and as a result does not see what is evident to everyone else. Despite this, there have been repeated attempts to deny the diversity of national character and claims that differences between nations is a purely linguistic one. We find this opinion among many of those theorists whose approach is founded on Catholic doctrine. It was adopted by the humanitarian philosophy of the bourgeois Enlightenment. It also became the heritage of a number of socialists who sought to utilize it to shore up proletarian cosmopolitanism, a concept that . . . represents the first and most primitive position taken by the working class in relation to the national struggles of the bourgeois world.

> National differences, he argued, should not be seen as lasting and essential, nor should they be tied to territory. Rather, he took a contextual approach. He argued that the temporal, geographical, and cultural contexts in which a national community operated mediated

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15 Ibid., p. 111.
the ways in which facts and ideas were understood. It followed that the goal of a supranational socialist movement in which national differences were completely transcended by proletarian cosmopolitanism was unrealistic.

The same workers’ movement has emerged in all industrial nations, but the Italian working class reacts to the same facts of capitalist exploitation differently from the Scandinavian working class. This is what I have in mind when I speak of national character. I do not mean those lies perpetrated by nationalistic demagogy that find only heroes in one’s own people and only hucksters in the other. I rather mean [...] differences in the fundamental structure of the mind, in intellectual and aesthetic taste, in the form of reaction to the same stimuli, differences that we notice only when we compare the intellectual life of different nations, their science and their philosophy, their poetry, music, and visual arts, their political and social life, their lifestyle and their habits.”

In other words, membership in a nation means having a world-view shaped by a particular cultural and intellectual tradition, and this tradition constitutes what comes closest to the ‘content’ of a nation. As such, nations are potentially inclusive and conducive to cosmopolitanism. The crux of what Bauer saw as the ill-conceived nation was the idea that the nation represented permanence, rather than change. Nations, he argued were a “process” which could be described by Marxist, materialist history.

Bauer began his discussion of the nation by systematizing various contemporary ideas and exposing what he saw as the misconceptions on which they were based. Theories of the nation were divided into two basic groups: metaphysical and psychological theories. The former relied on the idea of a static national essence of either a material or a spiritual variety. The first variety—national materialism—-is distinguished from the second—national spiritualism—in that the former is based on the common characteristics of variously defined groups of people, while the latter is intended to represent a more ineffable shared way of being. National materialism included ideas of the nation as a “community of descent”, as a “linguistic community”, and as a “religious community”. Bauer argued that communities of descent were races and that race was not a prerequisite for nationhood. As Kohn would argue in 1924, for Bauer there were no modern racially homogeneous nations. In fact, since their arguments are very similar, Kohn may well have been inspired by Bauer’s work. Bauer


\[17\] This is essentially the same point that Rogers Brubaker has recently made in arguing that “nationhood is a perspective, not a thing in the world.” See cite[]Brubaker2006
wrote:

Is the nation a community of persons of common descent? Surely the Italians are descended from Etruscans, Romans, Celts, Germanic tribes, Greeks, and Saracens, the present-day French from Gauls, Romans, Britons, and Germanic tribes, the present-day Germans from Germanic tribes, Celts, and Slavs.\footnote{Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities}, p. 19.}

Although Darwin’s theory of evolution was often deployed by those who argued for the biological specificity of the nation, Bauer here uses the notion of descent to opposite ends. He emphasized that “inherited character traits” reflected ”the conditions of production of earlier generations”, not essential character.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.} Similarly, Bauer took issue with the linguistic and religious definitions of the nation. He dismissed his Marxist colleague, Karl Kautsky, arguing that “language is not the source of national specificity; it is an expression of historical development.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 16.} Linguistic determinism was as suspect a notion as a community of descent:

the Serbs and Croats, although [they] speak the same language, do not therefore constitute one people; the Jews do not have a common language and yet they are a nation.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.}

Similar examples disqualified religion since many nations, including Germany, were religiously plural.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 114.} Shared language, according to Bauer, rather than being the source of nationhood, was one of its expressions:

The community of language is … the product of highly complicated processes of differentiation and integration. The dissolution of community of fate leads to cultural and thereby linguistic differentiation, the integration into a community of fate to cultural and thereby linguistic integration. The community of language is a partial manifestation of the community of culture and a product of the community of fate.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.}

Moreover, language augmented by technology could actually undermine one of the other commonly given qualifications for nationhood: territory. The printing press, postal system, telegraph, railway, and steamship, Bauer argued, had made common area of habitation less relevant.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 115.} I will return to Bauer’s ideas on territory in the next section. For the time being, suffice it to say that Bauer’s basic point about “national materialism” was that
the characteristics that were the nation’s most readily apparent markers—common descent, language, and religion—were not to be confused with the historical processes that were their cause.

If Bauer merely dismissed definitions of the nation as lists of purportedly static and essential characteristics, he took umbrage with the idea of the Volksgeist (national spirit) and the Volksseele (National soul). These ideas, which he classified under “national spiritualism,” attributed nationality to a mystical, national way of being. Objecting to German romantic nationalism, Bauer argued that the idea of the Volksgeist represented “flawed reasoning.” It was

“...the uncritical approach that argues that a particular way of acting that is observed in a nation can be explained in terms of the national character itself. ... When we describe the national character, we do not thereby explain the causes of a number of given actions, but merely that which constitutes the common characteristic of a great number of actions of the nation and its members.”

And so, even more egregiously than national materialism, national spiritualism is circular. It explains the actions of members of a nation by a “national character” that is nothing more than the common traits of “a great number of actions”. It thus explains nothing. Moreover, national spiritualism not only treats such traits as static, but imbues them with mystical sanctity. Despite his own German nationalism (discussed in more detail below), Bauer rejected even Fichte, one of the founders of German idealism and of German nationalism:

The task of explaining in causal terms this relative community of character of a nation’s members is avoided, not solved, if one attempts to explain the actions of a nation and its members in terms of a mysterious “spirit of the people” [Volksgeist] or “soul of the people” [Volksseele]. ... According to this belief, the spirit of the people, the soul of the people, is the substratum, the substance of the nation, that which is permanent amidst all change, the unity within all individual differences, whereas individuals themselves are merely modi, mere appearances of this spiritual substance. [Bauer here footnotes Fichte’s Reden an die deutschen Nation, Leipzig: Reclam, p. 116]

In the footnote citing Fichte, Bauer writes that

It is characteristic of post-Kantian dogmatic idealism that even where it is capable of correctly grasping a phenomenon in empiricohistorical terms, it remains unsatisfied and wants

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Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 113.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 23.
to make the scientifically correctly defined empirical phenomenon into the manifestation of a metaphysical being distinct from that phenomenon. 29

This reification was in Bauer’s opinion simply “the replacement of a causal relationship by a tautology,” 30 since “that which is to be explained is itself part of the alleged explanation, the alleged cause being nothing more than an abstraction of the effects that are to be explained.” Furthermore, “The spirit of the people cannot explain the national community of character because the spirit of the people is itself nothing but the national character transformed into a metaphysical essence, into a ghost.” 31 Finally, Bauer dismissed “psychological theories of the nation;” ideas of the nation as a community united the will—and even by the moral imperative—to be a community. National consciousness, he argued, was based not primarily on feelings of affinity with one’s co-nationals, but rather on awareness of one’s difference from people of other nations. 32 This was not only ill-conceived, it was narcissistic—national pride was not a moral virtue, it was the instinct for self-preservation. 33 Bauer called nationalism based on metaphysical and psychological ideas of the nation “national-conservative politics” and dismissed it as fostering backward, nativist tendencies. Nationalism, he argued, should not be driven by a sense of moral imperative or a romantic valuing of one’s nation above others, but by reason. Nationalism was legitimate only if it had a rational goal. He called this legitimate nationalism “national evolutionary politics” 34 and noted that “[i]t earns the name evolutionary in that it breaks with the idea that our task is one of preserving the historically developed specificity of the nation in unchanged form…” 35 Using Heine and Schiller as examples, Bauer charged that

...those heavily subject to the influence of tradition, in whom selective reason only faintly counterbalances the influence of sentiment tend toward national evaluation. More sober individuals [e.g., Heine and Schiller], on the other hand, with a strong capacity for reason and a more limited capacity for sentiment, free spirits who have clearly resolved to free themselves from the power of tradition and to choose their own path independently, have no understanding of national evaluation. 36

30Ibid., p. 27.
31Ibid., p. 24.
32Ibid., p. 120.
33Ibid., p. 124.
34Ibid., p. 132.
36Ibid., p. 127.
Bauer further argued that the working class should advocate a national politics based on reason because the working class was engaged in a rational process—the class struggle. Typical for late 19th century intellectuals, Bauer also had tremendous faith that technology and progress would radically reshape society in the near future, in accordance with the class struggle. Peasants were the antithesis of the progressive, technology driven future because they were irrationally attached to tradition and were thus xenophobic. Bauer’s disdain for them was very similar to Herzl’s (as discussed in the last chapter):

The national sentiment of the peasant has no more powerful root than that of the hatred of everything foreign felt by the individual who is closely bound to that which as been inherited, to tradition. It is quite a different matter in the case of the modern bourgeois or the modern industrial worker. The city, changing fashion, and the press present him with an environment that is constantly new, one in which he has long become accustomed to seeing the exotic without experiencing strong feelings of displeasure. In this case, the love of one’s own nation has sources other than hatred of foreign specificities.37

Accordingly, the working class had to be cultivated in order to resist the regressive tendencies of the peasants and of the petty bourgeoisie. Surprisingly, this involved giving national communities certain autonomous rights, such as the right to develop strong school systems. The Czechs, for example, needed a strong national program of education or they would remain at a “low level of cultural development” and would be “incapable of conducting their class struggle”. Having defined the nation as a predominantly cultural and intellectual heritage, Bauer could claim without contradiction that “[t]he absence of national rights would awaken national hatred in them [The Czechs], and they would be welcome booty for the petty bourgeois national parties.”38 The bourgeoisie, since it became the establishment, had become an enemy of progress because it feared a democracy ruled by working-class interests. Because of this, it had become susceptible to romantic nationalism and had come to represent a regressive attachment to the status quo.39

Capitalism has produced democracy. But although democracy was the adolescent love of the bourgeoisie, it is the terror of its old age, because it has now become a tool of the working class’s claim to power.40

37 Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 123.
38 Ibid., p. 272.
39 Ibid., pp. 130-31.
40 Ibid., p. 87.
To summarize Bauer’s deconstruction of contemporary ideas of the nation, none of the attributions of intention (psychological theories) or essence (metaphysical theories) could adequately explain the nation because none of the national characteristics listed under these umbrella categories were causal. Rather, the biological, cultural, and intellectual characteristics that “communities of fate” shared were caused by shared historical experience and were thus invariably in a state of flux. At any given point there were characteristics definitional of the nation, but these not only could but would necessarily change. The nation was to be understood by recovering its historical contexts and these reflected change as much as continuity.

... [T]he materialist conception of history can comprehend the nation as the never-completed product of a constantly occurring process, the ultimate driving force of which is constituted by the conditions governing the struggle of humans with nature, the transformation of the human forces of production, and the changes in the relations governing human labor.41

Thus, in the first place we substitute for the mere enumeration of the elements of the nation a system: common history as the effective cause, common culture and common descent as the means by which this cause becomes operative, common language as the mediator of the common culture, simultaneously its product and its producer.42

Shared or “common” culture—by which Bauer meant high culture—was thus crucially important for nationhood. None of the shared characteristics within a nation were as important to its longevity as high culture and the education on which it depended.43 This is the key to understanding why Bauer thought the nation could be cosmopolitan and could buttress the international class struggle in a multinational polity. Nations were built on education not on race since education built a more more enduring community. The biological nation (community of descent) was inherently susceptible to differentiation and thus to disintegration. The community of education was enduring because it provided a stable, unifying, participatory community. Bauer provided an example:

The nineteenth century thus saw an impressive development of the popular education system. We do not need to point out what it meant for the national community of culture that the same reader used by the worker’s child in East Prussia as by the Tyrollean peasant’s

41Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 108.
42Ibid., p. 114.
43Ibid., p. 54.
child conveyed the same educational elements, the same elements of our intellectual culture, in the same uniform language.\footnote{Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities}, p. 84.}

Similarly, socialism unified and strengthened the national community further by extending the community to include everyone.\footnote{Ibid., p. 98.} The socialist nation of the future would include the whole society and would be based not on descent but on an enduring community “of education, of labor, and of cultural enjoyment.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 106.} While the nation would be a culturally homogeneous, not an international community, membership would be open to all wishing to participate—ethnic and class background were unimportant. Furthermore, this cultural nation would not be the basis for statehood but for membership in a multinational state. As Anson Rabinbach has shown, Bauer’s position was not simply rhetorical. Austrian Socialism had developed out of \textit{Arbeiterbildungssvereine} (Workers’ Educational Societies) that promoted cultural and educational programs for the working class. Later, the Social Democratic party always kept pedagogical and cultural programs as a core part of its agenda.\footnote{Rabinbach, \textit{The Crisis of Austrian Socialism}, p. 7.}

Earlier, the nation defined by education and high culture represented Engels’ idea of the “historical nation”. For Engels, nations based on the shakier ground of descent, language, territory, etc., were “non-historical nations.” The growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century had “awakened” the non-historical nations, but their class structure prohibited them from developing the high culture and progressive political ideology that underlay “national evolutionary politics.”

Like Herzl, Bauer saw romantic, ethnonationalism as the pernicious mass politics of the uneducated.

\begin{quote}
Because those classes that, in the class society, are the primary bearers of cultural development do not belong to these nations, their culture has atrophied, their language degenerated, and they have no national literature.\footnote{Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities}, p. 297.}
\end{quote}

Since culture united the nation in the present, workers needed to be included or they would not be part of the nation. An uneducated person was not a member of the nation:
...it is still fundamentally the case today that the national culture is the culture of the ruling class, that the great mass of the population still does not belong to the nation, which can still only be understood as a community of culture. Rather, the masses are merely the tenants of the nation and their exploitation provides the foundation for the proud edifices of the national culture, whereas they themselves remain excluded from it.49

And so workers must be educated. But workers would also change high culture as they contributed to it because:

...in place of the traditional they will establish new cultural forms, new symbols. And these new human beings will not enjoy the culture in isolation as did the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, as did the princes of the Renaissance, as does the bourgeoisie of today, but socially, as did the citizens of Athens. ... However, as new as this culture will be, it will also be the heir to all previous cultures.50

Bauer’s definition of the nation was thus the direct opposite of the nativism that underlay the Christian Social agenda in Vienna under Karl Lueger. We shall see shortly how this served as a platform for European unity that cut across ethnonational distinctions. A critical step in this direction was Bauer’s attempt to dismantle the pervasive idealization of the peasant as the vessel of national essence, and instead to idealize high culture:

Let any scholar today try to eliminate the influence of our classic poetry from the development of his personality, to eliminate the moment in which the youth first read with glowing cheeks Schiller’s Robbers [Die Räuber]. Let him try to eliminate the day on which the young man first pondered with Faust the mysteries of the world. Or felt one with Werther in his first anguish of love. That which our classics have created has become for each and every one of us our own personal experience, our own possession. They have contributed to our very being and indeed played a part in the formation of every German’s being. Thus, an invisible bond links us all. That which became mine also became the other’s; all of us came under the same influences, and these transform us into a community. It is this which makes us all Germans. It must be understood here that the issue at hand is not one of what significance the classic poetry of the Germans has for our national consciousness. We are not concerned here with the fact that we think of Lessing and Schiller, of Kant and Goethe in relation to having pride in things German. Rather, we are concerned here with the fact that our classic poetry has helped weld together a unitary character of the German nation by becoming an experience shared by all Germans, a determining element in their fate.51

In other words, the German romantic tradition in scholarship and literature was the locus of the nation.

50 Ibid., p. 94.
51 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
However, as indicated above, Bauer saw the nation as a perspective guided by a particular set of historical contexts. Consequently, he did not try to argue that German high culture was uniquely important, but rather that a variety of international intellectual traditions employed by Germans were what “makes us all Germans”. Not surprisingly given Bauer’s formative context, the most important traditions were English and French, with a preference for the English. If in England, the focus of scholarship had been on the practical, and in France on the theoretical, then in Germany, the two tendencies had blended. English scholarship tended not to focus on systematic analysis: “...in England, where the class struggle dissolved into a struggle around individual regulations and reforms, the ideology of each ascendent class associated itself with the preexisting ideology. The fact that this synthesis of the old and the new necessarily included contradictory elements did not lead to any unease as long as the new ideology served the needs of the newly ascended class and proved worthwhile in practice.” This led to “the capacity for sober registration of concrete facts without reducing their individual character or their diversity...”\(^{52}\) Bauer preferred this to the French way of thinking. Though the French, he remarked, were excellent theorists, they tended not to realize that that theory was just representation of the empirical and not something with meaning in and of itself.\(^{53}\) Bauer described German literature and political thought from the Enlightenment forward as a merging of English and French intellectual styles and traditions.

Germany... became the classical land in which principles were thought through and the deductions based on them taken to their conclusion. It was on such a foundation that our philosophy developed, the consistent rationalism that argued that the smallest action could not be justified unless it could be incorporated within a grand system of goals. ... One cannot comprehend the revolution of 1848 if one does not take into account this national particularity of the Germans of this era. Today a part of this mode of thinking survives among the German workers; it justifies Engels’s celebrated phrase to the effect that the German workers are the heirs of German classical philosophy, the German socialists the successors of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.\(^{54}\)

Understood as this sort of perspective and intellectual tradition, Bauer’s idea of nationality was compatible with cosmopolitanism. It was possible, if one was educated in and understood the high culture of more than one nation, to be become a member of more than

\(^{52}\)Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities*, p. 11.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., p. 12.

\(^{54}\)Ibid., p. 134.
one nation:

...the community of nature and the community of culture do not necessarily coincide: the natural descendants and the cultural descendants are not always one and the same. For the natural community links together all those who, in the process of constant interaction, are subject to a common cultural influence... the conscious choice of membership of a nation other than that of one's birth is possible. Thus says Chamisso of himself: “Through language, art, science, and religion, I became a German.”

This did not mean that one lost one’s previous nationality; rather, one became cosmopolitan. By democratizing education and access to higher culture among workers engaged in class struggle, socialism would simultaneously improve and reinforce culturally-defined nations and feed cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism was thus defined by multinational coexistence rather than by the absence of national specificity. On the level of the individual, the ability to feel at home in more than one nation was grounded in knowledge of multiple nations, not the jettisoning of national baggage. As we shall see in Chapter Five, the writer Stefan Zweig came to the same conclusion several decades later through the experience of exile. For Bauer, however, this was a theoretical argument which he demonstrated with the example of Marx:

In a personality such as Karl Marx is fixed the history of four great nations—the Jewish, the German, the French, and the English—and this is precisely the reason why his work could penetrate the history of all the great nations of our time, why one can comprehend the history of the civilized nations during the last decades only with the aid of his work.

To summarize, for Bauer socialism and the working class were the heirs to the German Enlightenment and the liberal nationalism of 1848. Exclusive nationalism was a product of the bourgeois establishment in response to fear of the working class and as such was a corruption of the ideals of 1848. The petty bourgeoisie had capitulated to the aristocracy and had created a reactionary alliance to preserve the status quo. The peasants were highly susceptible to this reactionary, exclusive nationalism, but the working class and those members of the bourgeoisie who constituted the liberal and socialist intelligentsia were progressive and would return reason and toleration to political debates about nationality in Austria-Hungary. We now turn to Bauer’s and, more generally, Austro-Marxist, ideas for

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56 Ibid., p. 96.
57 Ibid., p. 105.
national-cultural autonomy and federalism in Central Europe that the idea of the nation was intended to buttress.

4.3 THE UNITED STATES OF AUSTRIA: PROPOSALS AND PRECEDENTS

The basic Austro-Marxist program for reform of the Habsburg Monarchy rested on the following premises. First, petty bourgeois nationalist movements represented disguised class interests and impeded parliamentary work for economic and social reform. Second, such parliamentary reform depended on supranational proletarian solidarity, which the Social Democrats would promote through educational, cultural, and social-welfare associations. Third, the Habsburg empire must be preserved as a stable economic and political unit in order that capitalism could be cultivated and form the basis for the evolution of Marxist socialism. And fourth, the focus of Austrian domestic policy should be to establish a decentralized system of administration such that national autonomy—as defined through the education system, cultural associations, and use of the national vernacular in law and administration—could be recognized without threatening the integrity of the state.\(^{58}\) Their program was adopted with some compromises by the Austrian Cisleithanian Social Democratic Party in Brünn in 1918 and summarized in the following points:

1. The transformation of Austria into a democratic federation of nations. \([\text{Nationalitätenbundesstaat}]\)
2. In place of the historic crownlands, the creation of self-administering national entities, governed by national assemblies elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage.
3. The formation of national associations which would regulate their own internal affairs.
4. Protection of the rights of national minorities.
5. No recognition of a national supremacy, rejection of a “state language,” and determination of a “language of communication” by the national Parliament.\(^{59}\)

The major compromises concerned points three and five. Victor Adler and the German Austrians would have preferred that national autonomy be defined purely culturally, but

\(^{58}\)Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 178.

the Czech contingent sought full national autonomy.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, on point five, the German Austro-Marxists would have preferred German as the state language, which the Czechs opposed. But in essence, as Rabinbach summarized, “The Brünn program’s commitment to a federal solution continued the tradition of German liberalism in a situation in which that liberalism had become powerless.”\textsuperscript{61} Bauer’s definition of the nation was designed to provide a theoretical foundation for this platform and, more generally, for the proposals for decentralizing and democratizing the Habsburg Monarchy that originated in the 1848 Revolution.

To review such proposals briefly: Before Bauer, Karl Renner had argued that the democratic liberal nation state functioned on the “centralist-atomist” principle and was in essence the absolutist state in the hands of the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{62} The uncompromising principle of equality of individual citizens within the state, he pointed out, actually led to inequality since the rights of minorities could not be recognized. Assimilation was the only path to equality in such a system and yet national conflict in the Habsburg Monarchy made it clear that this was an entirely unrealistic expectation.

There had been attempts to address this problem in Austria through constitutional reforms in 1848, 1861, 1867. Regions had been given “home rule” under the control of the most populous national group and ultimately dualism with Hungary was instituted. This had fed exclusive nationalism and exacerbated the grievances of national minorities. Ultimately, as Jászi famously argued in \textit{The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy} (1929), the Habsburg Empire lacked a supranational source of identity that could compete with nationalism. Furthermore, its supranational institutions—the dynasty, the army, the aristocracy and the Catholic Church were pitted against both rising capitalist and socialist interests in the empire.\textsuperscript{63} The empire thus collapsed for internal reasons: the Habsburgs had unified their diverse subjects in opposition to the Turks, but lost this uniting purpose by the 17th century as the Ottoman threat faded. In resisting federalization and appeasement of its national minorities, Austria-Hungary ensured its own demise. Jászi’s argument remains

\textsuperscript{61}Rabinbach, \textit{The Crisis of Austrian Socialism}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{63}Jászi, \textit{The Dissolution}.
satisfactory today with only minor revisions. Austro-Marxist reform plans represented what Jászi saw as the most important of the unheeded solutions that could have saved the multinational Empire from national disintegration.

Of course, Austro-Marxists were not straightforwardly liberal like Jászi, but as we began to see in the previous section, they were the heirs to Austrian liberalism. Victor Adler, for example, began his career as a prominent liberal nationalist thinker. The Austro-Marxists, however, drew more from the German liberal tradition than the English one. Their most prominent philosopher, Max Adler, described the relationship between Austrian socialism and its German intellectual roots as follows: “if the philosophical foundation of socialism is seen to lie in anti-individualism, that is to say, in the view that man in general cannot be conceived as an isolated being, then the correct name for classical German philosophy is the philosophy of socialism.” Bauer clearly and unequivocally saw the Germans as a progressive people, whose intellectual and cultural heritage was superior in Central and Eastern Europe. In agreement with Marx, Engels, and Fischhof, Bauer thought that the region should be led by Germans.

Despite the differences in their ideological and intellectual inheritance, Jászi deeply respected Bauer’s “brilliant” work. Jászi shared Bauer’s analysis of the problem of nationalism in the Monarchy and cited him in making his argument for the cause of the Empire’s collapse. Furthermore, he argued that “not a single class of the former Austria realized so clearly the fateful problem of the monarchy as the Austrian Social Democracy.” As minister of nationalities in the Hungarian half of the monarchy during WWI, Jászi ardently promoted reform of the empire as a democratic federation. Jászi was tolerant of the Austro-Marxists’...

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64 Maureen Healy, for example, argues that in addition to the pressures of discontent national minorities, even Viennese elites had lost faith in the empire by WWI. See Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*. Similarly, István Deák has argued that although soldiers of all nationalities remained loyal to the Emperor until the fall of the empire, the Officer Corps nonetheless deteriorated in the late 19th century largely because the nobility began to desert the army and the dynasty generally. See Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918*.

65 Jászi, *The Dissolution*, pp. 177-84.

66 Quoted in Rabinbach, *The Crisis of Austrian Socialism*, p. 16.


69 Ibid., p. 177.

German chauvinism because he agreed with their negative evaluation of Hungarian nationalism. In contrast to Bauer and the German socialists, Jászi did not see himself as a member of a progressive, superior nation, but as a member of a backward nation in desperate need of improvement under the influence of liberal Western Europe. He, like his liberal and radical Hungarian colleagues, turned to England and France.

Jászi was not even critical when Bauer, usually a pacifist, was willing to endorse military force in the interest of reasserting multinationalism against the dual structure of Austria-Hungary:

[The Crown] cannot be the instrument of two wills and still hope to rule over Austria and over Hungary; it must thus ensure that Hungary and Austria have a common will, that they constitute the one empire. Hungary’s internal disunity presents the Crown with the possibility of realizing this goal. It will send its army into Hungary in order to reconquer it for the empire, but it will inscribe upon its flags: Uncorrupted universal and equal suffrage! Right of coalition for the agricultural workers! National autonomy! It will oppose the idea of the independent Hungarian nation-state with the idea of the United States of Great Austria, the idea of a federative state, in which each nation independently attends to its national affairs and all nations unite in the defense of their common interests. Necessarily and inevitably, the idea of a federative multinational state will become the instrument of the Crown, whose empire is being destroyed by the disintegration of dualism.

The idea for a federation called the United States of Great Austria was the work of Aurel Popovici, a contemporary of Bauer’s from Transylvania. Popovici published a book on the subject in 1906, contemporaneously with Bauer’s Nationalitaetenfrage. Bauer must have been aware of Popovici as the quote above not only uses Popovici’s term, but advocates his program even though, to a degree, it contradicted Bauer’s own ideas. Elsewhere in Nationalitaetenfrage Bauer argued against federation in favor of administrative decentralization. Popovici, on the other hand, proposed carving up the empire into new territories with total disregard for historical provincial territories. Nationally homogeneous territories were thus to be created through population transfers. The elimination of traditional feudal territories would, Popovici hoped, weaken nationalism and provide a new basis for a united Greater

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71 In the 1930s Bauer wrote extensively on the need to prevent war in Europe, especially between Germany and the Soviet Union. A manuscript from 1937 titled Europe on the Verge of War, or: The Soviet Union and Germany on the Path to War which was a systematic analysis of the arms race the Schlieffen plan. It resembles work Fried did before the First World War. AVGA Box 1, Folder 4. M4/T1/fol.1-19

72 Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 345.

More influential than Popovici, however, were historical precedents for Bauer’s ideas about the role of nations within the state. These came from the movement for decentralization or federation of the monarchy since the 1848 Revolution. The Czech leader, František Palacký, had opposed Austrian membership in a German confederation and promoted instead an Austrian federation based on equality among the constituent nations. In a famous letter of April 11, 1848, he remarked, “Truly, if the Austrian Empire did not already exist, one would have to hurry to create it, in the interests of Europe, in the interests of humanity.” Palacký argued that Austria should be reformed as a federation with limited central power. Only those concerns common to all the lands, including the military, international relations, finances, and commerce, would be administered by a joint imperial cabinet and controlled by a central diet. Everything else would be administered by the lands, which would be represented in the central government by chancellors. Palacký promoted federation rather than decentralization because he represented the Czech movement for national liberation, though he sought national autonomy within a multinational state rather than through territorial sovereignty.

...we can preserve our historicopolitical entity, our particular nationality and culture, and finally, our economic life nowhere and in no way better than we can in Austria: That means in a free, on the basis of autonomy and equality, organized Austria. We have no hopes and no political perspectives beyond Austria, ... Should anybody say we are friends of Austria only out of egotism, we would agree readily. Politicians, who are not naive, will admit that such friends used to be the most faithful and reliable ones.

The lands in Palacky’s model represented historicopolitical entities as advocated by the Hungarian liberal political writer, Joseph von Eötvös. Both Palacký and Eötvös blended liberal ideals with a conservative alliance with the aristocracy. This meant that they envisioned aristocratic historical territories as the empire’s federal units while also arguing that national equality was required if Austria were to survive. This led to some complicated, bi- or trilingual arrangements in some of the lands. Bauer and Renner were, naturally, opposed to historical, aristocratic rights as the organizing principle of regional autonomy, but benefitted

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74 Jášzi, *The Dissolution*, p. 245.
75 Quoted in Beller, *A Concise History*, p. 129.
77 Quoted in ibid., p. 138.
much from Eötvös’ analysis of the nationalities problem in Austria. Eötvös was actually one of the first to observe that personal autonomy would be a way to avoid inequality among nations within the empire, though he was unwilling to advocate it himself:

If the provinces of the Austrian monarchy should be divided according to the national principle, such a division could be perfect only if it were carried out, not on the territorial basis, but on the basis of the population, and if each municipality were to exercise its political rights not jointly with its neighbors, but jointly with its co-nationals.\footnote{Quoted in Kann, \textit{The Multinational Empire}, p. 95.}

Eötvös’s aristocratic allegiance and his distrust of nationalism made him suspicious of this solution. “The foundation of all national endeavors,” he posited, “rests in the belief of higher aptitude, their purpose is to rule.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.} Thus, he argued, nationalism was incompatible with both democratic principles of liberty and equality and with the dynastic state. Nationalism led to racism and imperialism and thus undermined liberalism. It also undermined one of the foundational elements of the dynastic state—a supranational, privileged class. Nationalism was thus incompatible with the Austrian state and would lead to its dissolution in several ways: Nationalism threatened constitutionalism because it sought power at the expense of equality. Similarly, nationalism sought independence without regard for human liberties and would therefore lead to absolutism. Furthermore, nationalism disregarded historical rights, which was the cornerstone of Eötvös’ political thought.\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.} Nationalism, therefore, could be a positive influence only if it represented the historical traditions of a historicopolitical entity. However, nationalism typically represented linguistic or racial characteristics and was therefore pernicious.\footnote{Ibid., p. 95.}

Within this context, Bauer’s innovation was to redefine the nation as a cultural and intellectual community, in essence defanging it so that national autonomy would not pose a threat to the unity of the state. There was no good reason, Bauer argued, for the assumption that nations and states needed to coincide. As Renner had pointed out, absolutist German states had imposed Lutheranism or Catholicism on their subjects in the sixteenth century after the Peace of Augsburg, which had only led to further religious wars. Separation of church and state had solved this problem and religious groups had proved capable of coexisting in the

\footnote{Quoted in Kann, \textit{The Multinational Empire}, p. 95.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 95.}
same states, cities, even neighborhoods. Thus, the solution to national conflict in Imperial
Austria and across Europe was the separation of nation and state. Thus, Bauer asserted,
there was no reason that the same could not apply to nationality. Just as religious groups
had control over doctrine and practice within their communities, national communities could
administer their own educational and cultural affairs while coexisting within a multinational
state.82

With this proposal, Bauer drew on the liberal nationalism of the Central European gener-
ation of the 1830s and 1840s differently than Fried and Herzl. Bauer used 1848 precedents to
argue for the viability of the multinational empire in modern, democratic form whereas Fried
and Herzl were inspired by the Mazzinian idea of national republics. The differences between
the nation states and multinational polities they imagined, however, were not substantial.
Liberal nationalism was the common inheritance of Fried, Herzl, Nordau, Bauer, and Jászi;
it transcended their political differences and underpinned German and Hungarian liberal
reformism. Herzl, for example, defined the nation less systematically, but very similarly to
Bauer in content. Both of their national ideas rested on a community of education and labor,
though the practical implications of Herzl and Bauer’s ideas were different. Herzl’s idea of
a sovereign, territorial Jewish state was in direct conflict with Bauer’s advocacy of Jewish
assimilation in a reformed Austrian Empire. Nonetheless, the similarities between the ideals
of Old New Land and national-cultural Autonomy in Austria-Hungary are striking. Both
were attempts to build a bulwark against exclusive nationalism, and both, as we shall see,
found the solution in united Europe composed of pluralist, decentralized states.

Karl Renner’s model of nonterritorial national-cultural autonomy, which greatly influ-
enced Bauer, built on these historical precedents and, as Ephraim Nimni noted, also drew on
the work of the German Historian, Friedrich Meinecke. In Weltbürgerturn und Nationalstaat
(Cosmopolitanism and the National State), Meinecke had questioned the ethical validity of
the sovereign nation state and argued that realpolitik was a justification for the breaking of
moral laws. Personality rather than nationality was the just basis for autonomy according
to Meinecke. Renner drew on this idea in formulating his concept of the “personality prin-

82Rudolf Springer. Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat. Springer is a pen name for
prise,” by which the individual belonged to nations based upon free choice of association. The “territorial principle” which was the basis for the nation state, Bauer characterized as the subjugation of national minorities, immigrants and settlers to the laws, language, and domination of the settled, autochthanous, or national majority.83

Adolf Fischhof (1816-1893), an Austrian Jewish physician, had a similar vision and was perhaps the most important historical precedent for Bauer’s reform ideas. Fischhof led the political student movement in Vienna during the March Revolution of 1848. Later, he represented the German Liberal Left on the constitutional committee in the Kremsier Reichstag. At the end of his life, he attempted to found a new German liberal party, but in the climate of increasingly popular Christian Social and Pan-German conservatism, there was an insufficient political base for his liberalism and moderation. However, his ideas for decentralization and reform of the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 were widely influential across the political spectrum. Fischhof’s reform ideas appeared in Austrian administrative policy from the 1880s until the First World War and influenced Social Democratic nationalities program as well as Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Great Austrian movement. His influence thus spread from liberals to the Socialist Left and the conservative aristocratic Right.84 Renner greatly admired him and characterized his contribution as follows:

Among all Austrian politicians of German nationality, only one, Fischhof, has understood the conditions of life of the Austrian Germans and of the empire. Harsh as the judgment may be, it is true, nevertheless, that he was almost the only political brain within the German bourgeoisie during the whole period of Francis Joseph in Austria [1848-1916]. He alone saw further into the future—everyone else stuck into the present moment, to property.85

The basis of Fischhof’s German nationalism and his reformist ideas was belief in the superiority of German culture and civilization and the conviction that German predominance within the empire would be insured not by oppressing other nations but by respecting their national rights. In this, he was representative of the moderate German liberal nationalism of 1848 generally.86

84Kunn, The Multinational Empire, pp. 150-53.
85Quoted in ibid., p. 143.
86Vick, Defining Germany.

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The three major elements of his reform plan were built around a language law, a court of national arbitration, and municipal autonomy. In Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes, published in 1869, Fischhof outlined a language law that would give citizens the right to communicate with representatives of the government in the language of their administrative district and to receive a response in that language. The administrative language of crownlands, municipalities, and districts was to be chosen locally by representatives and implemented by local laws. Schools and universities were to be set up in the local language of all settled communities in each crownland. And finally, any language spoken by at least one fifth of the population of a given crownland would be recognized as an official language in legislative bodies at all levels. This would be complicated, but the lower classes tended to be polyglot or at least able to function at a basic level in a number of regional languages for trade purposes. Major opposition would come from the monolingual German or Hungarian-speaking bourgeois and aristocratic intelligentsia. As Bauer remarked in connection to this issue, “Not having to learn anything is seen by some students as the most sacred of human rights.”

The second major element of Fischhof’s program, the court of national arbitration, would resolve conflicts through a chairman chosen by equal numbers of representatives of the nationalities in conflict. The chairman would represent a nationality uninvolved in the conflict. This was predicated on an internationelles Gesetz or nationalities law stipulating the legal equality of nations within the empire. Parliament would be reorganized as a house of representatives elected through direct ballot and a house of lords representing the crownlands. The latter would consist of landed nobility. Finally there would be a diet of representatives in accordance with nationality quotas. Fischhof proposed this form of decentralization and national autonomy as an alternative to federalism, which he opposed largely because of his own German nationalism:

No constitution can give the Germans superiority in Austria, yet it cannot take away from them moral superiority. Equal rights can be defined by law, yet not equal ability. To the most capable belongs leadership at all places and at all times.

87 Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 266.
88 Kann, The Multinational Empire, p. 146.
89 Quoted in ibid., p. 148.
As Robert A. Kann put it, “Fischhof firmly believed in the salutary conciliating effect of German nationalism’s humanitarian mission.”\(^{90}\) This humanitarian mission was, in Fischhof’s opinion, embodied in the examples of Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison. Fischhof’s promotion of municipal autonomy was not a new endeavor in the Habsburg Monarchy, but he did not see it as a measure to curtail the power of the central government over the crownlands and to limit the power of parliament in particular as was often the case. Rather, he saw municipal autonomy as a means to guarantee that the central government would protect public liberties in legislation.\(^{91}\) He saw such legislation as the foundation of liberty in those states he admired:

Only in countries with strong municipal autonomy, such as North America, England, and Switzerland, has freedom a safe asylum. Due only to its Comitats institutions was Hungary able to preserve its venerable constitution for centuries. In constitutional stages which are centralized on the bureaucratic basis the constitution can be juggled away instantly. The suppression of French liberties was the work of a short December day. With the keys to the assembly hall of the Reichstag, Prince Schwarzenberg put the western Austrian constitution in his pocket. . . . In such states the peoples have only one eye, only one mouth . . . parliament. . . . But, where there are free municipalities, every one of them is an observatory wherefrom the people guard their rights; it is a tribune where from they plead for their attacked freedom. . . . Yet not only freedom but nationality, too, finds strong cover in the municipalities. Not the crownland, but the small district can be marked off according to nationality. Within its boundaries the language of the nationality indigenous there can be cared for and cultivated lovingly. . . . For the crown, as for the people, the free municipality offers the strongest safeguard. Not only free institutions but dynasties, too, are overthrown overnight in centralized states.”\(^{92}\)

One of the underlying assumptions in Bauer’s work—that national groups, if given autonomy, would not develop exclusive, state-seeking nationalist movements—thus, came from Fischhof and the 1848 generation of German liberal nationalists. It was a patronizing assumption, positing that the Germans—a “historical” nation—were qualified and entitled to run an empire, whereas the non-historical nations were not and could be saved through local autonomy within the empire from the unintended consequences of their own national aspirations; namely, the institution of small, mismanaged, backward states. However, the policies that followed from the German liberal nationalists’ attempt to check exclusive nationalism were the most insightful ones for solving the problem of nationalism in Austria.

\(^{90}\)Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, p. 149.
\(^{91}\)Ibid., pp. 146-47.
\(^{92}\)Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 147.
and beyond. Where Herzl and Nossig proposed vague utopias, the Socialist Left, in no small part thanks to Bauer, proposed a comprehensive, policy-specific, theoretically systematic program to uncouple the nation from the state and build a democratic multinational polity that rested on representative institutions and administrative decentralization. This difference is substantial, but is also a reflection of a difference in personalities and careers. Herzl was a journalist and first and foremost saw himself as a writer who sacrificed a literary career for politics. Bauer did not see himself as an artist, but as a scholar and political activist. Where Herzl was charming and had a reputation as a bit of a dandy, Bauer’s stern intellect and rigor inspired respect and admiration. As a child, Bauer wrote a play in five acts about Napoleon’s demise as a gift to his parents. And, as a prisoner of war in Siberia during the First World War, Bauer dismissed his family’s attempts to comfort him in their letters asking them instead send “above all more news.”

Nonetheless, Herzl’s idea ultimately materialized and Bauer’s did not. During the liberal ascendence in the 1870s, Fischhof had written that “If the Slav peoples, like the German and Romance peoples, enjoyed a safe status of national property, there would be as little talk of Pan-Slavism as there is of Pan-Germanism.” By the 1890s, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism and other exclusive nationalist and nativist movements had called this statement into question, though Bauer still believed in 1906 that elements of the reform platform of the 1848 liberals could save the empire from national disintegration.

### 4.4 COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE JEWS IN EUROPE

Bauer’s ideas could be interpreted as a brilliant solution to the Jewish predicament in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Austria-Hungary and in Europe generally. National-cultural autonomy offered Jews a modern model for membership in an autonomous national

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93 “Napoleon’s Ende”, Drama in 5 Aufzügen, eine Festgabe von Otto Bauer.” Archiv der Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (AVGA) Box 2, Folder 8/T2/fol 1-12.

94 AVGA. Otto Bauer Collection, Box 1, Folder 1: Correspondence.

95 Quoted in Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, p. 147.
group centered around education, religion, and community welfare. The Socialist International, however, denounced the idea of Jewish nationhood until the First World War. Socialists leaders (many of them Jews themselves) from Germany to Russia agreed that the Jewish predicament in Russia and Eastern Europe was a class, not a national problem. Once the Pale of Settlement and, more generally, Russian state-sponsored antisemitism were abolished, socialism would pave the way for Jewish dispersion into the society at large, which would lead inevitably (and rightly) to total assimilation. Nevertheless, the idea of national-cultural autonomy was enthusiastically taken up by a number of Jewish movements in Russia that tried to blend socialism and nationalism at the turn of the century, most prominently, the Bund and Poale-Zion. Shortly thereafter, the movement for autonomy among Jewish socialists spread to the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1905, Jewish Social Democrats seceded from the Polish Socialist Party to found the Galician Bund. However, Bauer, like his Austro-Marxist colleagues, did not endorse Jewish national-cultural autonomy.

Following Marxist orthodoxy, Bauer argued that the Jews had been a nation in the medieval period, when they had had their “own fate, own history, and own culture.” This had changed with the rise of mercantilism and the growth of capitalism and of a Jewish bourgeoisie. From the eighteenth century forward, a rift developed within the Jewish community between the bourgeoisie, who became attached to Enlightenment ideals and tried to “integrate itself into the cultural community of the European peoples,” and the traditional, “ancient Jewish cultural community” (which apparently was not European). Bauer thus made essentially the same argument as Jonathan Israel has made and drew the opposite conclusion. Where Israel argued that emancipation should not be taken as an automatic or uncomplicated improvement in Jewish circumstances, Bauer firmly believed that disintegration of traditional, autonomous Jewish communities was beneficial. He was, after all, a German nationalist himself, though he never considered conversion as a path to

97 Ibid., pp. 311-23.
98 Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 293.
99 Ibid., p. 294.
total assimilation. Since acculturation tended to go hand in hand with upward mobility, Bauer concluded that the Jewish nation would not be able to develop the high culture that was essential to his conception of the nation. The East European Jews had preserved the historical Jewish languages and customs, however they represented “only . . . the exploited and dominated classes.” Without the wealthy and powerful, the Jewish nation would always have “the character of a non-historical nation.”

Bauer argued that Jewish integration was inevitable because the Jews’ dispersion throughout the capitalist economy would cause them to lose their “communities of interaction” and with these the basis for nationhood. The will to remain a nation would not suffice in circumstances where Jews interacted as much or more with Gentiles as with one another. Furthermore, separate Jewish schools would limit the mobility of Jewish workers and were therefore not in the interest of the Jewish working class. In the pursuit of a livelihood, then, separate Jewish nationhood was only an impediment.

It is the culture of a nonhistorical nation, the culture of a people who remain outside the ethos of the European peoples, who pass down from generation to generation a whole world of long-dead thoughts, desires, and customs.

Bauer was clearly as invested in the civilizing mission toward East European Jews as the bourgeois, liberal leaders of the Israelitische Allianz even if he described the process as an unavoidable, economically-driven one. This is clear from the loaded language that he used to describe the interaction between established Viennese Jews and East European refugees:

Interaction with their unassimilated national comrades tends to keep the Jews of the West at a lower level of cultural adaptation to the European nations. Nevertheless, this can only slow down the process of assimilation; it cannot prevent it.

101 Victor Adler and Otto Bauer followed Marx in their evaluation of the Jews. Their perspectives are controversial and often characterized as antisemitic. Bauer’s Marxist evaluation of the Jews is also contradictory. His position that traditional Jews needed to integrate into the “community of European peoples” contradicted his assertion from Marx that the growth of capitalism and the dispersion of the monetary economy—which had been largely Jewish—“makes the Christians into Jews”. Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, pp. 299-300.
102 Ibid., p. 297.
103 Ibid., p. 299.
104 Ibid., p. 304.
105 Ibid., p. 306.
106 On the Allianz and its mission to assimilate East European Jewish immigrants through educational and social welfare programs, see Wistrich, The Jews of Vienna, pp. 310-46.
107 Bauer, The Question of Nationalities, p. 301.
Further reinforcing the idea that East European Jews were non-European, Bauer used “the European nations” to refer only to Western Europe. Thus not only traditional, Orthodox, Yiddish speakers, but the Eastern European regions were non-European, despite the fact that Bauer claimed that “the Russian intelligentsia of today are the kindred spirits of the German academic youth of the 1830s and 1840s.” This only goes to reinforce that for Bauer, the idea of Europe and the historical nations that constituted it was based on the German Enlightenment-inspired ideas of Bildung and Kultur. Bauer’s anti-territorial idea of the nation applied to his idea of Europe as much as it did to the nation. Europe had no fixed territory based on linguistic or ethnic maps, but rather was a community of education and culture. The existence of a bourgeois intelligentsia and a national literature were critical to Eastern Europe’s membership in Bauer’s idea of Europe and Jewish assimilation hinged on their achieving that status:

As long as these peoples [Slavic peoples in Galicia, Bukovina, etc] constitute nonhistorical nations with limited cultures, they will not be able to absorb their Jewish minorities. Should the Ruthenians, however, awaken to a new energetically progressive cultural life, they will be able to exercise over the Jews of eastern Galicia just as great an integrative force as the Czechs today have begun to exercise of the Jews of Bohemia and Moravia.\(^\text{108}\)

Due to Bauer’s assimilationist agenda, the path to membership in Europe was different for Eastern Europe’s Jews and non-Jews:

It is not a matter of achieving for all nations the same juridical framework, but rather of culturally elevating all nations, of enlisting them all in the great international army of the struggling proletariat. That the German worker demands national autonomy for the Czech but refuses it to the Jewish nation derives from the fact that the capitalist mode of production elevates the Czechs to the rank of a historical nation, \textit{whereas the same mode of production transcends the Jews as a nation and leads them into the cultural community of the European nations}. (My emphasis.)\(^\text{109}\)

Bauer dismissed possible objections with the argument that loss of customs and community cohesion would endanger Jewishness altogether. The end of Jewish nationhood, according to Bauer, would simply mean that Jews would exist as Jewish Europeans.

\(\ldots\) although the national evolutionary political position \(\ldots\) normally demands only the gradual transformation of national culture, it demands from the Jews the abdication in principle of cultural specificity. The surge of sentiment with which conservatives respond

\(^{108}\)Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities}, pp. 302-03.
\(^{109}\)Ibid., pp. 306-07.
to this suggestion can perhaps be allayed by pointing to the many assimilated Jews who live on in the history of all great European nations. . . . If the Jewish cultural community is destroyed, the natural community, the race, remains. By virtue of his education, the assimilated Jew is a child of the nation whose culture he has absorbed. However, in his natural predisposition, the fate of the Jewish people remains present as an active force, a fate, that, through natural selection, cultivated in his ancestors a strongly pronounced physical type and a specific intellectual disposition. Such names as Spinoza, Ricardo, Disraeli, Marx, Lasalle, Heine and many others, without which the economic, political, scientific, and artistic history of the peoples of Europe is unimaginable, show that the Jewish people has everywhere produced its highest achievements where the inherited predisposition of the Jews and European cultural tradition have mutually nourished one another.\textsuperscript{110}

This is a reiteration of the point cited above that Bauer had made with the example of Karl Marx. Jews, because they were, according to Bauer, a race without a nation, had the ability to become members of the nations of their choosing. This cosmopolitanism, or the ability to “penetrate the history of all the great nations of our time,”\textsuperscript{111} equipped the Jews to make extraordinary contributions to the “economic, political, scientific, and artistic history of the peoples of Europe.”\textsuperscript{112} Thus, while Europe’s nations were components of Europe, the Jewish race stood above national distinctions and gained a truly European perspective. Non-Jews could choose to become cosmopolitan— to become equally comfortable in another national culture— but this was, uniquely, a natural rather than an acquired form of existence for Jews.

Bauer’s discussion of the Jews’ role in Europe resembles that of Nordau quoted in the last chapter. Moreover, Bauer’s vision of Jewish acceptance in Europe through contributions to European high culture and through the cultivation of an industrious, educated working class is virtually the same as Herzl’s— down to the ideas for worker’s corporations and decentralized politics resting on municipal autonomy. The difference was that Zionists became convinced that antisemitism was an insurmountable obstacle to assimilation. At the core of both solutions to the Jewish predicament was inclusion in a Cosmopolitan Europe. And European unity was not simply abstract or rhetorical for Bauer; its achievement was to be the next step after the creation of the United States of Greater Austria. Bauer concluded \textit{Die Nationalitaetenfrage} with a discussion of a united, socialist Europe as the long-term goal of Austro-Marxism:

\textsuperscript{110}Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities}, p. 307.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., p. 307.
Just as the development of capitalist commodity production linked the manorial estates and the towns isolated during the Middle Ages to form the modern state, so too will the international division of labor create in socialist society a new type of social structure above the national polity, a *state of states*, into which the individual national polities will integrate themselves. The *United States of Europe* will thus be no longer a dream, but the inevitable ultimate goal of a movement that nations have long since begun and that will be enormously accelerated by forces that are already becoming apparent.\(^{113}\)

The First World War and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy extinguished Bauer’s hope for a democratically reformed, multinational United States of Austria as a model for a United States of Europe. His turn, however, to *Anschluss* with Germany did not reflect a new-found belief in national self-determination based on exclusive German nationalism. Through union with Germany, which in 1918 was in socialist hands, Bauer chose a different route to the same ideals of 1848.\(^{114}\) His promotion of *Anschluss* was an attempt to shape Austria and Germany into a building block for a democratic, socialist Europe. In 1923, at the first congress of the newly reconstituted Labor and Socialist International in Hamburg, Bauer characterized socialism as the “Young Europe of the Proletariat.” Tania Maync rightly points out the evocation of Giuseppe Mazzini and the Young Europe movement of the 1830s and 1840s.\(^{115}\) When Bauer’s idea for national-cultural autonomy had failed to save the multinational empire from national disintegration, he turned to Mazzini’s 1848 vision of a united Europe composed of democratic national republics. In referring to Mazzini’s example, Bauer referred to an 1848 conception of the nation which was in no way a challenge to his own national idea. Nothing is better evidence for this than the fact that in 1924, Bauer republished *Die Nationalitätfrage* and wrote in its preface that “the core of the book is constituted by my attempt to grasp, by means of the Marxist conception of history, modern nations as communities of character [*Charaktergemeinschaften*] that have grown out of communities of fate [*Schicksalsgemeinschaften*]. This aspect of my book seems to me as relevant today as it was [in 1906].”\(^{116}\)


To summarize, the ideological differences between Austro-Marxists and the liberals and Zionists discussed in previous chapters were substantial, although crucial similarities remain. First, of the three perspectives, Austro-Marxism seemed to have the strongest German orientation, often to the detriment of explicitly Anglophile influences. Otto Bauer’s ideas of the nation, socialism, and Europe, for example, were crucially dependent on the German enlightenment ideals of *Kultur* and *Bildung*. Even if Marxists were (and saw themselves as) the heirs to liberalism, Bauer’s focus was almost exclusively on the German liberal heritage of 1848. Although he admired the English and French mind, his primary interest was in how their influences combined in his idea of the German nation. Bauer was quite clear both that the ‘historical’ German nation surpassed Eastern European and Jewish ‘non-historical’ nations and that the German nation surpassed other western European ‘historical’ ones. Perhaps this should not be surprising given that Marxism was a German intellectual tradition. However, it marked a real departure from the Viennese Jewish liberalism of Bauer’s father’s generation, perhaps one more radical than Zionism had been. Herzl, Nordau, and Nossig in particular shared with Fried and Jászi an explicitly Anglophile liberalism. This explicit anglophilia is lacking in Bauer, even if his arguments—particularly those against the purportedly causal claims of essentialist theories of the nation—resemble standard British empiricist arguments against essentialism. Despite this, the differing sources of the liberal intellectual heritage from which Herzl, Nordau, Nossig, Fried, Jászi and Bauer drew were all compatible with the ideal of a Mazzinian Europe.

Second, Bauer also drew equally on the other elements previously identified in Austrian Jewish liberal and Zionist ideals of Europe. He, like most of his generation across the political spectrum, had tremendous faith in the power of technological progress, although there was more discussion of technological innovation in Herzl’s work than Bauer’s. This is not surprising because Herzl wrote a futurist utopian novel and Bauer was primarily concerned with historically informed theory.

Third, Bauer drew on multinational Austria as a model for Europe more explicitly and systematically than any of the other figures studied here, with the possible exception of
Jászi, who was also politically involved in advocating democratic reform of the empire. Yet Bauer’s attachment was less sentimental than, for example, Stefan Zweig’s or Joseph Roth’s, whose work will be the subject of the next chapter. The Austro-Marxists, naturally, were less admiring of the aristocracy than, for example, Fried. Bauer, as a prominent politician and thinker in one of the empire’s major political parties, was concerned with the very real threat that nationalism posed to the Social Democratic Party and to the multinational structure of the state.

Finally, the differences that distinguished Bauer’s idea of Europe from those of the Zionists and the liberals were far less significant than the differences between their ideas collectively and the ideas of contemporary non-Jewish champions of European unity. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s idea of Pan-Europe—though indebted to Fried—contained aristocratic and Catholic conservative elements. Though Coudenhove-Kalergi himself was not anti-Semitic (his father had even written a dissertation on the problem of anti-Semitism) his movement attracted followers who were, and the Europe he imagined did not therefore offer a solution to the Jewish predicament. Of course, that Pan-German ideas of Europe clashed with Jewish ideas does not require much explanation. German and other ethnonationalist ideas of Europe in the interwar period rested on the notion that Europe should be composed of racially homogeneous nation states. In the case of Pan-German and ultimately Nazi ideas, this further suggested German hegemony in Mitteleuropa and ultimately in all of Europe.

In conclusion, though Jewish liberals, nationalists, and socialists offered divergent immediate solutions to the Jewish predicament and opposed each other’s ideological perspectives on many important economic, social, and political issues, their common predicament and common intellectual and cultural resources led them to formulate a strikingly similar cluster of European ideas. Moreover, they all imagined Europe as a solution to the Jewish predicament; that is, as a solution to the problem that antisemitism and ethnonationalism posed for the Jews with the national disintegration of Austria-Hungary. For all, the conception of the Jews’ place in Europe was essentially the same: A European cultural and intellectual community constituted the basis for a decentralized, multinational polity in which national affiliation(s) or lack thereof would be the choice of the individual.
5.0 THE HABSBURG EMPIRE AS A MODEL FOR POSTWAR EUROPE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The Austrian Jewish writers, Joseph Roth and Stefan Zweig, shared the goals of the political thinkers of the previous chapters. They too saw European unity as the long-term solution to the predicament that Jews faced with the rise of ethnonationalism. However, neither was particularly politically engaged. As writers, they focused on fostering multinational understanding through the cross-fertilization of the cultures and the literatures of Europe. As cosmopolitan Europeans, they saw it as their task to promote the appreciation of cultural difference and the positive creative effects of cultural hybridity within German-speaking Europe. In other words, they sought to do on the cultural level what their colleagues did in politics.

Roth and Zweig approached their shared vision of a cosmopolitan Europe from somewhat different perspectives. Zweig was born in 1881, thirteen years before Joseph Roth. Consequently, while both men grew up during the last decades of the Monarchy, Zweig experienced more of the liberal Viennese bourgeois society that was the formative context for most of the figures discussed in the previous chapters. The generational rift discussed in previous chapters is thus apparent in this chapter as well. Zweig’s work, like Alfred Fried’s, can be seen as an attempt to reform a liberal idea of Europe, while Roth’s drew more inspiration from the revival of conservative, anti-liberal forms of cosmopolitanism. Class and regional differences contributed further to the divergence between their nostalgic ideas of Austria and of Europe. Zweig was the son of a wealthy upper-middle-class, highly assimilated Viennese Jewish family. Roth was raised by his mother in Brody, a town in eastern Galicia. Though he became a highly successful German writer, he never felt entirely accepted in Viennese
bourgeois society. However, as Austrian Jewish writers who saw themselves as cosmopolitans, they shared the goal of European intellectual and cultural solidarity as a foundation for peace and unity in Europe and they posed a supranational Austrian idea as an antidote to the nationalist ideology that they identified as their primary obstacle.

The chapter is divided in three sections. The first discusses the supranational Austrian idea as a context for the cosmopolitanism of Roth and Zweig. The second section examines their hopeful attempts in the 1920s to foster cosmopolitanism through confronting xenophobic stereotypes in their writing, promoting international networks of writers, artists, and musicians, and translating and promoting foreign literatures in German-speaking Europe. The third section, which deals with the 1930s, discusses their loss of hope in European unity, their experiences of exile, and their retreat into nostalgia, both reflective and restorative,\(^1\) for the Habsburg Monarchy.

### 5.2 THE AUSTRIAN IDEA

Zweig and Roth were hardly the first to propose multinational Austria as an alternative example to the nation state in Europe. We have seen in previous chapters how Jewish Austrians were inspired by its example in their proposals for regional and Europe-wide federations. This inspiration, however, was primarily political. This chapter examines thinking about Austria as a cultural idea. This, rather than the political example, was central to Roth’s and Zweig’s thinking about Europe.

The “Austrian idea” refers to the conception of the supranational Habsburg Monarchy as a conciliatory, moderate, and pluralist state. This idea emerged in the nineteenth century as a state-commissioned attempt to portray Austria as different from the purportedly aggressive, homogenizing, Protestant and German nationalist Prussia. It is a cosmopolitan, anti-national idea, although the basis for its cosmopolitanism varied over time. The Austrian idea was championed at various points through the nineteenth century and into the interwar

period by Austrian aristocrats and other Catholics, Czech and Hungarian federalists like Palacky and Ötvös (discussed in the previous chapter), Austro-Marxists, and the liberal secular Jewish bourgeoisie. This heterogeneity may explain some of the idea’s multifacetedness. More importantly, it brings us back to one of the central constitutive elements of the late Habsburg Empire: the coalition of divergent interests in opposition to the nation state.

Curiously, according to Oscar Jászi, it is precisely because there was never a single clearly articulated and largely agreed upon Austrian idea that the Habsburg Monarchy was unable to prevent its own national disintegration. This 1929 verdict has remained largely unchallenged. From it’s beginning, the Austrian idea was, in Edward Timms’ words, about “the Austria that could have been,” not the Austria that actually was. It did not voice an ascendent public sentiment (such as nationalism), but was rather the attempt to breathe new life into a pre-national past. Timms has traced the roots of the Austrian idea to a split that developed in early nineteenth-century between Prussian and Austrian ideas of the state. The idea of the nation and the model of the state developed by the Romantics, most importantly Herder, Fichte, and Hegel, and interpreted in the second half of the nineteenth century by nationalists like Paul de Lagarde, was hostile to the multinational Habsburg Monarchy. The Empire was an obstacle to what Fichte and Lagarde regarded as national destiny—the unification of German-speaking people in Central Europe under Prussian leadership. Jews, Slavs, and other non-Germans would, according to Lagarde, be relocated to Palestine, or further east so that German Austria could be absorbed into a homogenous, German “Mitteleuropa.” Because of Austria’s multinational character, Lagarde wrote in Deutsche Schriften in the late 1870s, it lacked a unifying idea or soul and thus a justification for its existence:

“Prussia lacks a sufficient body for its soul; Austria has in its more than sufficient body no soul. Austria initially derived life from its duty as Germany’s protection against the Hungarians, later as the barricade against the Turks, but for what purpose does it persist? For the present, Austria has no idea that holds it together... Austria absolutely must pursue a judicious politics, which means a politics calculated with Prussia.”

The Austrian idea emerged, Timms argues, precisely in reaction to this Prussian sentiment;

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2 Jászi, *The Dissolution*.
3 Timms, “National Memory”.
4 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 900.
that is, as an explicit contrast to the homogenous, German Mitteleuropa idea.\textsuperscript{5} In the wake of the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, Metternich undertook the task not only of consolidating Habsburg Power and the influence of Vienna in the German Federation, but also of legitimizing Austria as a counterpoint to Prussia in public opinion both domestically and abroad. As Foreign Minister from 1809, Metternich saw that a distinctive Austrian patriotism was critical to the Empire’s survival, particularly as Bavaria sided with Napoleon against the Habsburg Army.\textsuperscript{6} His employment of Friedrich Schlegel, a leading figure in the Romantic Movement, was key to this effort. Between 1808 and 1818, Schlegel was commissioned to found and edit a number of successful newspapers and literary journals that popularized the idea of Austria which resurfaced, often with state support, in times of crisis throughout the nineteenth century and into the Empire’s final years in the twentieth.\textsuperscript{7}

In his stated task of promoting the “development of the already so often evoked Austrian national character,” Schlegel turned to history. Having converted to Catholicism from Protestantism, Schlegel idealized the Catholic medieval period before the cult of the nation state. He drew from that experience evidence for the importance of supra-national political structures. In 1810, he argued that:

Those who derive a civil society and a nation from the abstract idea of the state are simply too inclined to think of this as an entirely isolated entity existing only for itself. But neither a state nor a nation has ever existed in this isolation. World-history teaches us—and only a little reflection is required in order to perceive this—that in a system of states and nations, which, like those of Europe, have for centuries stood in such an intimate, diverse, geographically and morally ineluctable and important communion, a focal point is necessary from whence originates a supreme guiding influence over the whole.\textsuperscript{8}

Schlegel located the example of this political idea in the reign of Habsburg Emperor Charles V, the central tenets of whose policy had been “peace among the Christian powers of Europe;

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\textsuperscript{5}Timms, “National Memory”, p. 900.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 902.
\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 901.
\textsuperscript{8}“Diejenigen, die von der allgemeinen Idee des Staats, eines öffentlichen Lebens, und einer Nation ausgehen, sind nur zu sehr geneigt, sich alles dies als ein ganz abgesondertes, für sich allein bestehendes Wesen zu denken. Aber weder ein Staat, noch eine Nation ist je in dieser Einzelheit bestanden; die Weltgeschichte lehrt, und es bedarf nur einiges Nachdenken, um einzusehen, dass in einem System von Staaten und Nationen, welche wie die von Europa seit Jahrhunderten in einem so innigen, vielfachen, geographisch und moralisch unvermeidlichen und notwendigen Verkehr stehen, ein Mittelpunkt notwendig sei, von irgendwo aus ein lenkender oberster Einfluss über das Ganze ausgehen müsse. . . .” Quoted in ibid., pp. 903-904
\end{flushright}
unity in the face of a common enemy, the Turks; a preference for settling disputes by peaceful negotiation rather than by force of arms; the maintenance of good relations between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy.”9 This historical example led Schlegel to promote “a federal . . . state, which itself is a system of related nations and states.” Because it was rooted in a conservative, idealized view of the Habsburg Empire, the Catholic Church, and the aristocracy, the use of the Catholic example, Timms argues, must also be acknowledged as an early attempt to combat Whiggish history, particularly the view of the Protestant nation state as the vessel of progress. In order to formulate an idea of the state that challenged the Hegelian idea of self-sufficient, sovereign ‘Volksgeist’ that solved disputes through war rather than conciliation, it was necessary for Schlegel to look to the pre-nationalist past. He proposed the Austrian idea as a more humane model for a state than that offered by Fichte and Hegel and argued that their abstract system lacked “conscience, morality, or other Menschengefühle.”10

In brief, Schlegel’s idea was revived in the second half of the nineteenth century by the proponents of federal reform in the Habsburg Empire, including Fischhof, Palacky, and Ötvös. As discussed earlier, these figures were consequently highly influential in Austro-Marxist thinking about a federal Austria and Europe. The history of the Austrian idea before the collapse of the Empire culminates in the writing of Hugo von Hofmannsthal during the First World War. Much like Schlegel, he was commissioned by the state to “create a sense of Austrian patriotism and to influence public opinion abroad…”11 Furthermore, like Schlegel, Hofmannsthal sought a way to blend affinity with Germany and a specifically Austrian identity. Much like Fried, Hofmannsthal’s solution was to portray Austria as a more conciliatory and humane example of Germany, as he put it “Deutschlands anderes Gesicht” (Germany’s other face).12 Just as in Fried’s Wien-Berlin, Hofmannsthal compared and contrasted Prussia and Austria to Prussia’s detriment—Prussia valued efficiency, Austria humanity; Prussia was a parvenu, Austria was wise and historically grounded, and so on.13

Nevertheless, Hofmannsthal’s writing during the First World War, though more “digni-

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9 Timms, “National Memory”, p. 904.
10 Ibid., p. 904.
11 Ibid., p. 906.
12 Quoted in ibid., p. 906.
13 Ibid., p. 906.
fied and conciliatory” than the work of most war-time propagandists,\textsuperscript{14} was commissioned in service of the Austrian war effort and was thus in direct opposition to Fried’s pacifism. Furthermore, unlike Fried, Hofmannsthal’s Austrian idea was, like Schlegel’s before him, conservative and rooted in an idealized Catholic and aristocratic past. The attempt to define Europe as a community that cut across national and religious boundaries characterized Fried’s work. More generally, this re-definition of Europe on liberal nationalist rather than ethnonationalist grounds was the common long-term goal of the figures of each chapter in this dissertation. Both Stefan Zweig and Joseph Roth, however, were less involved with political nationalism. Rather than attempting to define a benign form of nationalism conducive to multinational coexistence and European unity, the two built on Schlegel’s and Hofmannsthal’s Austrian idea. Thus, a central paradox and source of tension in their work was the attempt to define the Catholic, conservative idea of Austria as the basis for a cosmopolitan Europe that included the Jews, both those of Viennese liberal bourgeoisie stripe and the less acculturated and poorer Jews of Eastern Europe.

Both Zweig and Roth hypothesized cultural understanding, mutual appreciation, and conciliation as the basis for that European unity. They believed that these were prerequisites to political action and thus prerequisites to a ‘political’ idea of Europe. They devoted their careers as writers to promoting European cultural unity through the above-mentioned qualities, qualities they found in the Austrian idea. In general, their efforts were quite similar to those described in previous chapters, but where others attempted to resuscitate political liberalism and liberal nationalism as a basis for European unity, Zweig and Roth attempted to resuscitate a pre-Lueger, cosmopolitan Austrian idea in the search for “principles of cohesion” that might cut across the national differences in post-war Europe.\textsuperscript{15} And so, during the First World War and in the 1920s, Joseph Roth and Stephan Zweig devoted much of their writing to promoting international understanding in Europe. They faced a predicament more stark and daunting than any of the figures in previous chapters. As uncompromising cosmopolitans, they were less willing to make concessions to nationalism, yet they began their careers during the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy when nationalism was not merely a dire

\textsuperscript{14}Timms, “National Memory”, p. 907.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 900.
threat to multinationalism, but had won decisively. The division of Europe along national lines had been accomplished and their objective, therefore, was not to argue against national disintegration, but to promote its reversal.

Of course some of the other key figures of this dissertation also lived and continued their work into the interwar period. Nathan Birnbaum, Alfred Nossig, Otto Bauer, and Hans Kohn all lived into the 1930s or later. Each, however, had been willing to engage with nationalism and to attempt to define a benign form that would foster multinational coexistence. They all (with the exception of Birnbaum during his Orthodox phase) generally shared Mazzini’s belief that European unity should be based on alliances between autonomous nations, even if their interpretations of that autonomy differed.

Roth and Zweig were uninterested in such political calculations. They were not looking for solutions by which claims to national self-determination could be reconciled with plural polities. They opposed nationalism on principle. They both produced what Stefan Zweig called “Jewish” writing\textsuperscript{16} which employed Jewish themes or painted somewhat idealized portraits of East European Jewish communities. However, both rejected the characterization of their work as \textit{nationally} Jewish or as portraying a Jewish nation. For example, Roth’s articles on East European Jews written during his trip to the Soviet Union in 1926 were well received in the German Zionist press. Zionists chose to interpret Roth’s descriptions of unassimilated, Yiddish-speaking Jews as evidence for the existence of a Jewish nation uncorrupted by assimilation in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{17} Roth refused to accept this interpretation of his work and responded in 1929 by characterizing Zionism as “a bitter attempt, . . . at the degradation of Judaism, or at least a throwback to a primary, national form of existence [which the Jews have] already dealt with.”\textsuperscript{18} To Roth, the fact that East European Jews possessed their own language, culture, customs, and religious practices did not make them a nation. He was not interested in essentializing these qualities as a basis for separateness. The fact that the Jews were a ‘national minority’ in the Soviet Union and in the East European

\textsuperscript{16}Zweig referred to his drama \textit{Jeremiah} as his Jewish writing Stefan Zweig. \textit{The World of Yesterday.} Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1964.


\textsuperscript{18}My translation of the original German quote in \textit{ibid.}, p. 132.
nation states was, in Roth’s opinion, a status forced upon them by antisemitism. Roth saw the acceptance of that separateness as a claim for Jewish nationality as the reification of a “wrong” West European idea that had caused nothing but trouble all across Europe.\(^\text{19}\)

Although Roth and Zweig opposed Zionist (and other) attempts to label the Jews as a nation or a national minority, neither formulated specific ideas for how Europe’s nation states could be reorganized so as to avoid Jewish national minority status. Their focus was not on policy-ready political thought, but on the promotion of mutual understanding and appreciation among Europe’s nations, embodied in the Austrian idea. This, they hoped, would cultivate an attitude of conciliation—a central component of the Austrian idea—and political reconciliation would follow. Their goal of a united, cosmopolitan, peaceful Europe was the same as Alfred Fried’s but their method was opposite. They appealed to international understanding, a project that we have seen Fried thought undermined pacifism and the movement for European unity. Yet Roth and Zweig were writers and the circles in which they had influence were composed of exactly those high cultural elites with whom Fried never felt comfortable. In these circles both Roth and Zweig were fantastically successful. Nevertheless, and more decisively and dramatically than any of the previous chapters, Zweig’s and Roth’s story is one of failure. This is partly due to the fact that Zweig and Roth both began their careers during and shortly after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and during the rise of National Socialism. Consequently, their work lacks hopeful speculation about the Empire’s viability as a modern, multinational polity. From the outset, their work was nostalgic and lacking faith in political solutions. Rejecting political activism, they saw conciliation and passivity as the appropriate response to conflict. Particularly in the 1930s, once the possibility of combatting nationalism was all but gone, Zweig and Roth abandoned all hope of vital European multinationalism and, in exile from Germany and Austria, eulogized the Austrian idea. Their commonality is striking, particularly because they brought vastly different biographies, career trajectories, and generational experiences to their work. We now turn to their initial efforts toward the goal of European unity in the 1920s, before the final rise of National Socialism. Repeating a theme echoed in previous chapters, we shall see that their efforts were colored by their Jewish experience and the belief

\(^{19}\)Gelber, “Joseph Roth”, p. 131.
in European unity as a solution to the Jewish predicament in the nation state.

5.3 HOPE IN THE 1920S

In his capacity as foreign correspondent for the prestigious Frankfurter Zeitung, Roth confronted German-speaking West Europeans with the absurdity and cruelty of their attitudes toward East European Jewish refugees. He argued that Western Europe had much to learn from the East. This section looks at Roth’s attempts in the 1920s to foster understanding and appreciation of Eastern Europe in the West and examines the idea of cosmopolitanism that underpinned his ideal of cosmopolitan Europe.

5.3.1 Roth and The Shtetl as a Source of European Cosmopolitanism

The pervasive antisemitic prejudice against East European refugees in Western Europe has been discussed briefly in other chapters. Since, however, this was a central theme of Roth’s journalistic work, a brief overview of the mentality he confronted is warranted here. Galician Jews arrived in Vienna to confront the Ostjude stereotype that the established Jewish community had, to a degree, internalized. Assimilated Jews thus perceived the Easterners as a threat to their own integrationist ambitions.\(^{20}\) The Ostjude stereotype was highly gendered, building on the vastly different value systems and social structure of Orthodox, East European Jewish communities as compared with the Western, bourgeois gender order. Among traditional, Orthodox, East European Jewries, the absence of noble or bureaucratic avenues to power left religion as the institution through which essentially all power and authority was organized. Learned men carried the highest status in their communities and book learning took precedence over occupation.\(^{21}\) Women in such Orthodox communities were responsible for the “profane” work of earning the family’s living. Their work both inside and outside of the home was defined largely in terms of keeping men free of distractions.

\(^{20}\)Aschheim, *The East European Jew.*

\(^{21}\)Hödl, *Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt*, pp. 51-52.
from their studies. Although the Hasidic movement, which initially challenged the status of book learning and observance of Jewish law as the measure of piety, spread throughout Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, it did not challenge the Orthodox gender order. The Hassidic Zaddikim, or Rebbes—those leaders who attracted large followings and established competing dynasties—still located the essence of Judaism and its maintenance in male religious practices. Instead of studying at home, Hassids traveled regularly to visit their Zaddikim. The women continued as the primary breadwinners.

Boys attended traditional Jewish schools and learned Hebrew and studied the Talmud. Girls, on the other hand, were barred from these subjects. Since the continuity of the community did not rest with them, they were much more likely to be sent to public schools. This ultimately equipped women with language skills and pragmatic knowledge that made them much better prepared to deal with the pauperization that increasingly afflicted Galician (and other East European) Jewish communities over the second half of the nineteenth century.

When traditional Jewish families arrived in Western cities such as Vienna, however, men’s religious learning and women’s pragmatic business skills were interpreted through the lens of bourgeois gender norms. East European Jewish men, because they were not gainfully employed, were seen as feminine. This stereotype spread to the Yiddish language, which was considered grammatically illogical and emotional. The shtetl environment was seen as one of histrionics and femininity. East European Jewish women, despite their membership in this generally feminized community, were considered overly aggressive and masculine. Because gender roles were reversed, both Galician-Jewish masculinity and femininity took on pejorative meanings.

The established Jewish community was highly embarrassed by the influx of Ostjuden. Afraid that Galician Jews would unleash a tide of antisemitism that would infringe upon their integration process, Germanized Jews sought both to distance themselves from the Ostjuden and thus to help in their assimilation. To the extent they existed, interventions on

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22 Hödl, Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt, p. 53.
23 Ibid., pp. 23-30.
24 Ibid., p. 60.
25 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
26 Ibid., pp. 195-197.
27 This attitude toward East European Jewish migrants was, as mentioned above, widespread throughout Europe. Although I use the German term Ostjude, the stereotype that it represents existed outside Ger-
behalf of the newcomers were infused with the agenda of normalizing Galician Jews’ gender roles according to Western, bourgeois standards. In addition, Zionism played an important part in the lives of the Galician immigrants. The Zionist movement was a vehicle by which Galician Jews could protest their exclusion from Viennese society, for example, their exclusion from certain jobs, such as clerical, managerial, and sales positions. And although Zionism was not integrationist, it was a middle-class European, nationalist movement resting on bourgeois gender norms. Galician Jews were thus instructed that men should “fight” to support the family through employment, while women should protect the family, educate the children, and provide the moral grounding within the family. Thus while Zionism offered means for Galician Jews to combat assimilation and protest the stereotypes that integrationist Jews applied to them, Galician-Jewish Zionists had learned to defend themselves not on their own terms, but in terms set by the Viennese culture. In order to join the debate, they had to assimilate the gender norms of the dominant, Germanized community. Integrationist groups also ran charities for Ostjuden. Bourgeois women’s organizations provided a variety of services to Galician-Jewish women. Their work came with the explicit goal of turning the “osteuropäischen Jüdin” (East European Jewess) into a “Dame” (lady). Such charities—promoting care for pregnant women and new mothers—encouraged assimilation to Viennese gender norms in that they were very explicit about the qualities of the “worthy, humble, poor women” that they were willing to help. Other organizations such as associations for combating prostitution were less concerned with inculcating immigrant women as with minimizing the visibility of Galician Jewish poverty. Because of concern over what it would do to the status of bourgeois, respectable, Viennese women, those who could not be inculcated with the required gender norms were even further marginalized. All of


28Hödl, Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt, pp. 11-12.
29Ibid., pp. 204-207.
30Ibid., pp. 22-22.

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this amounted to a stereotype of the *Ostjuden* as “Eastern grotesques”—a term Roth used ironically—as dirty, itinerant (by nature), money-grubbing, dishonest, religiously dogmatic rather than rational or intellectually curious, and sexually deviant.\(^\text{32}\) Roth reacted to the stereotype by inverting it. He characterized Western Europeans as insipid, boring, stiff, falsely safe and stable, cruel and arrogant, uninteresting, unfeeling, formal, awkward. He described the Berlin streets outside the Jewish neighborhood as “bland and European”.\(^\text{33}\) and portrayed the obsessive cleanliness, order, punctuality, and the industry with which people worked as a rather pathetic attempt to create a false sense of stability. The contrast Roth drew between Western and Eastern Europe essentially mirrored Alfred Fried’s contrast between Berlin and Vienna. Like Fried, Roth used a stereotype of Prussians to describe what was wrong with Europe and why reform was necessary. Western Europeans—exemplified by Germans—with their false sense of security derived from their clean and ordered lives, had become arrogant and xenophobic and had thus tarnished the very Western Civilization that they thought distinguished them.

In *The Wandering Jews*, a collection of essays on the East European Jewry published in 1926,\(^\text{34}\) Roth confronted the German public by specifying three audiences he did not want for his book. The first group is “those Western Europeans who, by virtue of the fact that they grew up with elevators and flush toilets, allow themselves to make bad jokes about Romanian lice, Galician cockroaches, or Russian fleas.”\(^\text{35}\) The second group represents the charities with civilizing missions mentioned above. His book, he wrote, “is not interested in

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33 Ibid., p. 31.
34 Roth wrote most of his reports on this subject during a four-month trip to the Soviet Union in 1926. Jurij Archipow has described Roth’s picture of the Jewish situation there as too optimistic and complementary. But, as he points out, this was the middle of the 1920s, when Jews who had been leading figures in the Revolution still enjoyed high status in society. Ten years later, they would be victims of Stalinist antisemitism. Roth, however, had no way of knowing this, nor did have access to writing critical of the regime which would only be published much later during the Glasnost period. Of course, Roth could still be relied on for a certain ambivalence and irony. He made clear, for example, that the elimination of illiteracy in the Soviet Union—which was taken as evidence for the triumph of the quantitative over the qualitative—amounted to nothing more than peasants reading trite stupidities instead of singing beautiful songs and recounting legends, as they had before. Jurij Archipow. “Joseph Roth in der Sowjetunion”. In: *Joseph Roth: Interpretation, Rezeption, Kritik*. Ed. by Michael Kessler and Fritz Hackert. Vol. 15. Stauffenburg Colloquium. Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 1990, pp. 15–17, p. 16.
those “objective” readers who peer down with a cheap and sour benevolence from the rickety
towers of their Western civilization upon the near East and its inhabitants. . . ”36 Finally, the
third group consisted of West European Jews who shared this attitude, choosing to ignore
their own East European origins. As mentioned above, the Jewish community of Vienna
was largely made up of recent immigrants from the East and Roth had little patience for
their assumption of antisemitic attitudes toward those who had simply been less fortunate
and had migrated under less favorable circumstances.37

The group for whom Roth claims the book is intended, however, does not actually exist.
It is rather a hypostatized product of Roth’s admonition of the three audiences mentioned
above, a group that would result if those audiences undertook the reforms Roth recommends:

The author has the fond hope that there may still be readers from whom the Eastern Jews
do not require protection: readers with respect for pain, for human greatness, and for the
squalor that everywhere accompanies misery; Western Europeans who are not merely proud
of their clean mattresses. These are readers who feel they might have something to learn
from the East, and who have perhaps already sensed that great people and great ideas—
great but also useful (to them)—have come from Galicia, Russia, Lithuania, and Romania;
ideas that would help shore up and expand the firm foundations of Western Civilization.”38

Roth’s tone in this introduction is aggressive. He does not plead for compassion from his
readers, but confronts them with the hypocrisy of their prejudice. To use Mark Gelber’s
analysis, Roth’s identification of those for whom the book is not intended is not an attempt
to narrow its audience, but to create a polemical atmosphere. The “intended” audience is
not realistic (nor in need of the book), but in describing their more humane worldview, Roth
is taking his actual readers to task.39

What, then, are the qualities that the East can contribute toward expanding “the firm
foundations of Western Civilization”? Roth described the Jewish neighborhood in Berlin
as dirty, crowded, and disorderly—some of the very qualities that incited West European
disdain—but drew positive conclusions from them. A scene in a shop, for example, includes a
woman who sells shoe laces and dabbles in exchanges in marginal currencies, a distinguished
broker “dressed in a very European manner” who discusses the status of the Romanian

37Ibid., p. 2.
38Ibid., p. 2.
leu with her, a man in the corner praying, and a woman behind the bar who does not keep track of the schnapps that she pours because she knows people will eventually pay for it. The atmosphere in the shop and generally in the neighborhood is familiar, informal, unpretentious, chaotic, but not tense—everyone knows each other and understands what is going on. “No one,” Roth comments, “gives a hoot about the occasional European visitor. So what if he’s a snoop—who cares? We don’t do any shady business here, you can’t pin anything on us. We’re not black marketers. We just enjoy one another’s company.”

Though they are different, they understand each other and they have a gift for multicultural coexistence. “The door is open,” Roth writes, “[i]t never occurred to anyone to close it.”

In a report on the Jews of Paris, Roth similarly wrote: “Interpreting is a Jewish calling. It has nothing to do with translating, say, from English into French, from Russian into French, from German into French. It has to do with translating the stranger, even if he hasn’t said anything. He doesn’t have to open his mouth. Christian interpreters might translate; Jewish ones intuit.” Thus in the Jewish neighborhoods, there is a real, deep sense of community based not in homogeneous nationality, but in the ability of extremely heterogeneous group of people to live together.

For Roth—as we shall see in more detail in the subsequent section—the contribution of the East, and especially of Eastern Europe’s Jews to Western Civilization is cosmopolitanism—the ability to build community anywhere, to understand strangers, and to coexist with them. As Mark Gelber has noted, Roth stresses that the Eastern Jews are themselves not ‘pure’ but have intermarried with Slavs and other peoples. Their shtetls are multicultural as are East European cities like Brody, where Roth grew up. Their communities, in Roth’s portrayal, are microcosms of the whole world. While shtetls may lack the trappings of great Western cities, such as theaters, newspapers, and operas, their Talmud-Tora schools produce “european scholars, writers, and philosophers of religion as well as mystics, rabbis and warehouse owners.”

West European nationalism (and Zionism as a product thereof) would destroy

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40 Roth, “The Orient on Hirtenstrasse”, pp. 32-33.
41 Ibid., p. 33.
42 Ibid., p. 33.
45 Quoted in ibid., p. 132.
this diversity, yet it was exactly what Europe needed. “Pure and unmixed communities,” in Roth’s view, “only produced mediocrity.” Roth’s celebration of the hybridity that characterizes the shtetl is also a celebration of the Habsburg Empire, in which such hybridity is unproblematic and even encouraged by the state.

In the 1920s Roth’s work included much of this type of politicized commentary. His fiction from this period was also devoted to themes from current events. This was to change in the 1930s when the futility of his hope for a cosmopolitan Europe (West and East) in which nationality would not be foisted on the Jews became clear. Before turning to the nostalgic fiction through which he expressed his disillusionment, we must explore Zweig’s work from the 1920s.

5.3.2 Zweig and Europe as a Republic of Letters

Stefan Zweig was less ambivalent than Joseph Roth about Europe’s prospects in the 1920s. Roth, for example, was skeptical of Wilson’s fourteen points, particularly point ten, which stipulated the right to national self-determination of the former Habsburg nationalities and necessitated the minorities protection treaties that tried (and disastrously failed) to reconcile the interests of national majorities and minorities. For Roth, the very foundations of European culture had to be reformed. For Zweig, however, European culture, as it already stood, was capable of betterment. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, for example, he was full of hope for the future and optimistic that the League of Nations would facilitate peace and unity in Europe without cultural preconditions. He wrote, in retrospect:

We believed in Wilson’s magnificent program which was quite our own; ... the streets of every city resounded with cheers to acclaim Wilson as the savior of the world ... never was Europe so filled with faith as in the first days of peace. At last the earth was yielding place to the long promised empire of justice and brotherhood; now or never was the hour for the united Europe of our dream. ... We were young, and said to ourselves: it will be the world of our dreams, a better, a humaner world.\(^{47}\)

Certainly, Zweig’s reading of post-war Europe was conditioned by a different set of experiences than Roth’s. Although the two were friends and shared a vision of cosmopolitan

\(^{46}\)Quoted in Gelber, “Joseph Roth”, p. 132.

\(^{47}\)Zweig, \textit{World of Yesterday}, p. 280.
coexistence in Europe, their cosmopolitanism had different sources. As we have seen, the model for Roth’s was East European towns like Brody, where he grew up and where people of different ethnicities lived together, intermarried, and did not politicize their differences. This heterogeneity and conspectus for peace was threatened by the rise of ethnonational mass political movements in Western Europe. Like Roth, Zweig believed that modern mass politics, and particularly nationalist movements were the most important threat to European unity. However, the supranational European “person of culture” was the focus of Zweig’s concern more than the coexistence of poor and working-class East Europeans. Zweig was, after all, thoroughly Viennese. He was brought up in a wealthy, liberal, integrated Jewish family and did not generally look outside Western Europe for inspiration. His vision of cosmopolitan Europe rested on mutual appreciation of high culture between major, West European nations. Not surprisingly, after the first world war, French-German rapprochement was his major priority. And like Alfred Fried, he believed that extensive cultural affinities already existed between European nations—European nations only needed to be made aware of them.

As Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin have shown, Zweig was typical of his generation of Viennese bourgeois youth. The Austrian bourgeois, middle class were never ready or able to assume political power. Their base in the mid-nineteenth century was small, and it further diminished after the Crash of 1873. By the 1890s the bourgeoisie and their liberal politics were, as discussed in numerous passages above, thoroughly discredited. They were replaced by the new mass political parties which Schorske described as “politics in a new key.” This led to the generational rift which Mary Gluck described in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy between the liberal fathers and their post-liberal children who became some of the major theoreticians behind the Marxist and nationalist challenges to liberalism. For those, like Zweig, who were neither attracted by the new mass politics or by immersion in business, the alternative was a flight into aestheticism. So, in Janik and Toulmin’s formulation “art, which had earlier been the decoration adorning middle-class success in business, became for the younger generation an avenue of escape.”

political movements emerged alongside each other, but independently, as the twin orphans of liberalism.”

Zweig himself was a prominent member of the Jung Wien group of aesthetes that included Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931), and Hermann Bahr (1863-1934). Their project was not unlike that Fried, Jászi, and their like; that is, to reform and resuscitate liberalism. The members of the Jung Wien, however, brought these values to art, music and literature rather than politics. Zweig’s case is interesting because although he was critical of the liberal older generation, particularly of its Victorian morality, he never fully rejected their worldview. Of his father’s generation, he wrote:

Our fathers were comfortably saturated with confidence in the unfailing and binding power of tolerance and conciliation. They honestly believed that the divergencies and the boundaries between nations and sects would gradually melt away into a common humanity and that peace and security, the highest of treasures, would be shared by all mankind.

Zweig could also not share the earlier generation’s confidence “that the technological progress of mankind must connote an unqualified and equally rapid moral ascent . . . .” Nevertheless, he did not reject the merit of their worldview entirely, referring to it as “a wonderful and noble delusion” and admitting that “there is still something in me which inwardly prevents me from abandoning it entirely.” Zweig reconciled these points of view by interpreting the values of conciliation and tolerance as a basis not for liberal politics, but for the avowedly a-political rejection of all the mass political movements that replaced his father’s liberalism. Zweig’s optimism regarding Wilson’s fourteen points was based not on politics, but on the belief that that a cultural and intellectual revival of Europe, not of the Jewish people, could offer a cosmopolitan solution to polarizing mass politics; in other words, that art could offer a new and revised platform for the conciliatory worldview of the older generation. The remainder of this section, then, looks at Zweig’s attempt to promote conciliation and European unity through literature and translation in the 1920s.

Zweig spent the First World War serving in the Vienna War Archives and used this an opportunity to write an anti-war drama. Published in the spring of 1917, Jeremias (Jeremiah)
was banned in Germany and Austria, but was staged in Switzerland. The biblical play recasts the First World War as the Hebrew war against Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. The play takes as its central theme the persecution of those who are cautious and passive in a time of patriotic militarism and shows that, in their passivity, they alone are prepared to face defeat when it comes. The favorable responses Zweig privately received convinced him that Austrians were divided into a minority of war-profiteers and belligerent nationalists and a majority that “did not dare to say openly” that they had a “hatred of war [and a] distrust of victory.”

Zweig’s supervisor at the War Archive, for example, showed his approval by granting Zweig a permit to travel to Zurich for the premier of *Jeremiah*, saying “You never were one of those stupid war-mongers, thank heaven. Well, do your best abroad to bring the thing to an end at last.” Even more significantly, on his way to Zurich, Zweig was invited to meet in Salzburg with Heinrich Lammasch—one of the leaders of the Christian Social party and later Chancellor. Lammasch expressed great admiration for *Jeremiah* and told Zweig, who was “unfamiliar with the mysteries of politics,” about the movement around the Emperor Karl to “cut loose from the dictatorship of German militarism which was dragging Austria, inconsiderately and against her real will, in the tow of its wild expansionism.”

Zweig described the “rigorously Catholic-minded” Heinrich Lammasch (and Ignaz Seipel, a cohort) as, “profound pacifists, orthodox Catholics, fanatical Old-Austrians and, as such, in deep-rooted opposition to German, Prussian, Protestant militarism which they held to be incompatible with the traditional ideas of Austria and her Catholic mission.” Specifically, Lammasch told Zweig that his play “fulfilled our Austrian idea of conciliation” and that “he hoped greatly that it would operate beyond its literary purpose.” Zweig was clearly honored. He continued to support Lammasch’s cause, a cause whose success rested, according

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55ibid., p. 258 There is evidence that this experience was less straight-forward than Zweig represented it in his memoir. While Zweig proclaimed personal pacifism, he, like Hofmannsthal, produced propaganda pieces for the war effort. Margaret Register. “Romain Rolland: One German View”. In: Modern Language Review 86.2 (1991), pp. 349–360; Steven Beller. “The tragic carnival: Austrian culture in the First World War”. In: European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914-1918. Ed. by Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 127–161, p. 149 However, the important point here is that Zweig was setting up Austria as a model of conciliation in Europe.
57Ibid., p. 259.
58Ibid., p. 259.
to Lammasch, on securing “a negotiated peace instead of the ‘Victorious Peace’ which the German military party demanded regardless of further sacrifices.” 59 Alfred Fried had also hoped for such a peace and he had advocated for it in a letter to the Austrian Foreign Minister in 1917. Though Fried had not used Lammasch’s strong language about the immorality of sacrificing Austrian lives for “German world-domination”, the basis of his argument was the same. Both men saw multinational Austria as uniquely equipped to offer a conciliatory example for post-World War One Europe. In Zweig’s words,

> It was a bold idea to bend Germany toward negotiations by a threat of a separate peace or, in an emergency, to execute the threat; it was, as history attests, the last and only possibility of saving the Empire, the monarchy and thus Europe.” 60

Zweig later bitterly regretted the ultimate failure of this movement and lamented that:

> If Lammasch had openly threatened to break away, or had broken away, he would not only have preserved Austria but would also have saved Germany from her innermost danger, her unbridled impulse to annex. Europe would be better off if the project which that wise and pious man then revealed to me had not been ruined by weakness and clumsiness. 61

Yet Zweig himself was unwilling to become part of this or any other political movement. Although he also admired Bertha von Suttner and Alfred Fried, he did not cooperate with their requests for active participation in the Austrian pacifist movement 62 despite Suttner’s admonition that he “let us few old women to whom no one listens do everything,” 63 Instead, he enjoyed the cosmopolitanism of Zurich in 1917, where people from across Europe, representing “every shade of political thought” and all languages “spent nights and days in a fever of debate which was at once stimulating and fatiguing.” 64 Zweig concentrated on cultivating such cosmopolitan environments rather than formulating or supporting a particular political means for achieving multinational coexistence, peace, or European integration. 65 His answer to politics was passivity and conciliation. Jeremiah, after all, had been about the importance

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60 Ibid., p. 260.
61 Ibid., p. 260.
62 Ibid., pp. 244, 273. Suttner thanked Zweig for mentioning her work in his feuillons and they exchanged books but Suttner was unable to secure Zweig’s commitment to become an active pacifist. See Arc. Ms. Var 305/61: Fried/Suttner Correspondence. Jewish National and University: Manuscripts and Archives Division.
63 Ibid., p. 209.
64 Ibid., p. 273.
65 Ibid., p. 244.
of accepting defeat. In other words, conciliation, though it was a characteristic he associated with classical Viennese liberalism, was not for Zweig the basis for a political position. Rather conciliation was the a-political, “Old Austrian” response to the very political conflict that caused wars and fueled national antagonism in Europe.

Zweig devoted much of his work in the 1920s to translating from the French what he saw as “European” writers and to writing biographies of great Europeans who embodied the qualities of cosmopolitanism, conciliation, toleration, and moderation that he identified as the basis for European unity. Among the contemporary figures that he most admired were Emile Verhaeren, Romain Rolland, Léon Bazalgette, Rainer Maria Rilke, and Paul Valéry. Zweig spent a great deal of time traveling in order to visit with such figures and befriend them. He understood his task of promoting European unity as based not only in literature that promoted international understanding, but in building a network of friendships between writers and artists of different nationalities. In his 1922 biography of Rolland, Zweig established his subject’s European credentials by describing Rolland’s travels in Italy and Germany, travels through which Rolland had come to appreciate German culture and had made French-German rapprochement a central theme of his work.  

Zweig described Rolland’s work as serving “not one European nation but all of them and their brotherhood. Here was a man, the poet, who brought all the moral forces into play—a loving mutual knowledge and an honest will to that knowledge, proven and refined justice and a soaring faith in the unitive mission of art.” He also characterized Rolland’s novel, L’Aube—the first volume of Rolland’s ten-volume Jean-Christophe whose subject is a German musician in France—as “the first consciously European novel, . . . the first decisive appeal towards brotherhood, . . . more penetrating than all the protests and pamphlets.”

Zweig described his friendship with Bazalgette, whom he admired for devoting ten years to translating and promoting Walt Whitman in France, as based in the fact that “neither of us thought nationally, we both liked to further foreign works with devotion and without any ulterior advantage, and we looked upon intellectual independence as the alpha and omega of living.”

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66 Rogister, “Romain Rolland”.
67 Zweig, World of Yesterday, p. 201.
it largely meant the freedom not to be defined by nationality or religion. The imposition of these categories on the individual had become ubiquitous in post-World War One Europe and Zweig wanted a restoration of pre-war freedoms. Before the war, he wrote in his memoirs:

We were able to devote ourselves to our art and to our intellectual inclinations, and we were able to mold our private existence with more individual personality. We could live a more cosmopolitan life and the whole world stood open to us. We could travel without a passport and without a permit wherever we pleased. No one questioned us as to our beliefs, as to our origin, race, or religion. I do not deny that we had immeasurably more individual freedom and we not only cherished it but made use of it.  

Part of asserting freedom from nationality was for Zweig the promotion of foreign literature. He devoted two years to translating the works of the Belgian poet Emile Verhaeren as an effort to shatter literary boundaries as well as for the fact that the latter was “the first of all the French poets who endeavored to give Europe what Walt Whitman had given America: a profession of hope and faith in the times, in the future.” It is easy to see Zweig’s compatibility with Verhaeren’s view, since, as Zweig reports, Verhaeren’s hope for the future rested in the advice to Europeans, “Admirez-vous les uns les autres”. For Zweig, it was clear that “some of [Verhaeren’s] best poems will give evidence for a long time to come of the Europe and the humanity we then dreamed of.”

Curiously, despite his border-crossing efforts, the “European” writers Zweig admired are disproportionately French and Belgian. Joseph Roth, for example, is conspicuously absent from Zweig’s memoir, though the two corresponded extensively. The same applies to Zweig’s colleagues in Jung Wien (with the exception of Hofmannsthal, whom he describes as a major source of early inspiration). This may perhaps be explained partly by the fact that these fellow Austrians did not enhance Zweig’s narrative about the international, European nature of his network of friends and colleagues. In general, Germans, besides Rilke, are not well represented in Zweig’s work. However, a more appealing explanation centers around Zweig’s deep ambivalence towards Germany. Like Roth and Fried, Zweig tended to see Prussian qualities, which he often equated with German qualities generally, as the single greatest threat to his vision of Europe. Though he did not devote a book to the subject (as Fried

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70 Ibid., p. 120.
71 Ibid., p. 120.
had), snide comments about Germany abound in his memoir. Thrown into a description of
carefree Paris, for example, he wrote “Oh, one needed to know Berlin first in order to love
Paris properly, and to experience the innate servility of Germany…” Or, in comparison
with “our musical rhythm of life” in Vienna, in Berlin “[c]leanliness and rigid and accurate
order reigned everywhere.” Sometimes his tone was more mocking, as in his description of
his landlady in Berlin during his student years:

[My landlady] in Berlin was correct and kept everything in perfect order; but in my first
monthly account I found every service that she had given me down in neat, vertical writing:
three pfennigs for sewing on a trouser button, twenty for removing an ink-spot from the
tabletop, until at the end, under a broad stroke of pen, all of her troubles amounted to the
neat little sum of 67 pfennigs. At first I laughed at this; but it was characteristic that after
a very few days I too succumbed to this Prussian sense of orderliness and for the first, and
last, time in my life I kept an accurate account of my expenses.

Whatever the reasons for Zweig’s preference for recording his French friendships, the
point is that he spent the 1920s building a network of writers across Europe, translated and
promoted them, and developed close and lasting friendships. It was a time in which he also
experienced tremendous success of his own. Immediately after the First World War, he had
rusticated from Vienna to the “romantic remoteness” of Salzburg, where, when not traveling,
he wrote. He reports that in the summers the town became the “artistic capital not only of
Europe but of the whole world.” The Salzburg Festival and other musical and theatrical
events brought talent from all over Europe as well as a distinguished and cosmopolitan
audience. Thus, he wrote, “I found myself in my own town in the center of Europe. Fate
had again granted a wish of mine which I had hardly dared dream, and our house on the
Kapuzinerberg had become a European house.” Among his guests were Romain Rolland,
Thomas Mann, H. G. Wells, Hofmannsthal, Jane Addams, Schalom Asch, Arthur Schnitzler,
and many more. “Faith in the world,” he concluded “had again become possible.”

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73Ibid., p. 113.
74Ibid., p. 113.
75Ibid., p. 346.
76Ibid., p. 347.
77Ibid., p. 347.
78Ibid., p. 348.
Zweig’s idea of Europe was, then, a classic ideal of the republic of letters. It was closely tied to his own desire to be a cosmopolitan European free to define himself in non-national terms. He fought to restore to Europe a freedom from nationalism that had existed before its division among nation states. “A certain shadow,” he lamented “has never quite disappeared from Europe’s once so bright horizon. Bitterness and distrust of nation for nation and people for people remained like an insidious poison on its maimed body.” In the 1920s, he had hoped that the bright light of cultural cosmopolitanism would remove this shadow. However, we must now turn to the 1930s, when this hope was extinguished. In exile, both Zweig and Roth retreated into nostalgia for the Habsburg Monarchy and declared Europe dead.

5.4 NOSTALGIA IN THE 1930S

When Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, Roth, who had worked as a journalist in Vienna, Berlin, and Prague, moved to France, where he sank into alcoholism and died in 1939. During this period, he deepened his retreat into the nostalgia that had already begun with _Radetzkymarsch (The Radetzky March)_ [79] 1932, continued to its sequel, _Die Kapuzinergruft (The Emperor’s Tomb)_ [80] 1938, and was expressed most profoundly in the novella _Die Büste des Kaisers (The Bust of the Emperor)_ [81] 1934. Roth’s time in exile was difficult. His income from journalistic work and film rights to his fiction dried up in Germany and, after 1938, in Austria as well. He had to rely on the support of friends, Stefan Zweig in particular. Partly because he needed the income, he was extremely productive. He was active in the émigré opposition to the Nazis and in the movement around Otto von Habsburg to restore the monarchy. He professed a deep connection to Catholicism in connection with the latter movement, although it is unclear whether he ever actually converted. [82]

Zweig went into exile shortly after Roth in 1934, emigrating first to England, then briefly to New York, and in 1941 to Rio de Janeiro, where he committed suicide in 1942. Zweig’s

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work in this period—most importantly his memoir, *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European) published several months after his suicide,\textsuperscript{83} *Brazilien: Ein Land der Zukunft* (Brazil: A Land of the Future) published in 1941,\textsuperscript{84} and *Schachnovelle* (Chess Story)\textsuperscript{85}—were also highly nostalgic and addressed, as much as Zweig ever would, the political situation in Europe. However, the character of his nostalgia was different. Zweig’s preoccupation with the Austrian idea focused more on its pre-1918 Austrian liberal cultural dimensions than the conservative Catholic and monarchist aspects that attracted Roth. This section looks at their use of the Austrian idea not as a source of inspiration for Europe’s future, but as memorabilia, a left-over from Europe’s death. Thus, in this final section we see the decisive end of Austrian Jewish attempts to resuscitate Austrian liberalism and multinationalism as a model for Europe’s future.

### 5.4.1 Joseph Roth on the National Defeat of Europe

“There is still”, wrote Roth in 1934 in the Prague paper *Die Warheit* “a yearning, a nostalgia for European cultural solidarity.”\textsuperscript{86} But nationalism, he argued, had made European solidarity impossible:

> The sense of Europe—one might call it a “conscience of European culture”—started to fade in the years when a sense of nationhood awoke. One might say: Patriotism has killed Europe. Patriotism equals particularism. The man who loves his “fatherland,” his “nation,” above all else, has cancelled any commitment he might have to European solidarity. … Most people who love their fatherland, their nation, do so blindly. Not only are they incapable of seeing the faults in their nation, their country, they are even inclined to see its faults as instances of human virtue. This is called: “National self-confidence.”\textsuperscript{87}

Nationalism, Roth argued, was a recent, almost juvenile, phenomenon, yet it had been allowed to redefine and divide a more venerable Europe. How, Roth contended, could nationalists forget that

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 226.
European culture is much older than the European nation-states: Greece, Rome, Israel, Christendom and Renaissance,\textsuperscript{88} the French Revolution and Germany’s eighteenth century, the polyglot music of Austria and the poetry of the Slavs: These are the forces that have formed Europe. These forces have combined to form European solidarity and the cultural conscience of Europe. Not one of these forces was bounded by a national border. All are naturally opposed to the barbarity of so-called national pride.”\textsuperscript{89}

Roth had devoted much of his writing in the 1920s to defending this idea of Europe. As we’ve seen, he also attempted to convince West Europeans of Eastern Europeans’ and Jews’ contributions to this idea, and consequently, of Eastern European and Jews integral place in Europe. In the 1930s, however, his prescription for reversing the damage that nationalism had wrought on the prospects for European unity served merely to point out the futility of hope for a reversal. “...[S]alvation for European culture,” Roth wrote in 1934, was still possible, but depended upon three steps:

1. Some—still accredited, still respected—international forum should announce that every—and I mean every—form of “national pride” is stupid, and that any appeal to such a feeling constitutes poor taste.
2. The League of Nations in Geneva should declare that all people of whatever race are equal, and any nation that disagrees should be thrown out.
3. And therefore Germany as presently configured—the Third Reich, in other words—should be denied the standing of every other European country. Because, of all the countries and peoples of Europe, only Germany proclaims its right to a special historical destiny. Germany should be quarantined: Then European solidarity will be restored. There is only one enemy of European solidarity today, and that enemy is Germany. That enemy is the Third Reich.”\textsuperscript{90}

The obvious and complete impossibility of this prescription’s fulfillment was an expression of defeat. In 1933, in fact, he had already written that:

Now, as the smoke of our burned books rises into the sky, we German writers of Jewish descent must acknowledge above all that we have been defeated. Let us, who were fighting on the front line, under the banner of the European mind, let us fulfill the noblest duty of the defeated warrior: Let us concede our defeat.”\textsuperscript{91}

Admitting defeat was the honorable reaction, Roth argued, but defeat did not entail truce, détente, or philosophical surrender. While non-Jewish German writers could allow

\textsuperscript{88}Roth, “Europe is Possible”, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., p. 227.
\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., pp. 227-228.
themselves to be drawn into supporting or remaining silent regarding Hitler’s destruction of Europe, such options were closed off for Jews. Jews had to remain in opposition—a defeated opposition—to nationalism. This, of course, has been one of the central arguments of this dissertation; namely, that Jewish intellectuals, despite ideological differences, all realized that an integrated Europe was the long-term solution to the predicament that nationalism posed for them. When Hitler came to power in Germany, Roth put aside such differences with German Jews and their attitudes toward East European Jews. Writing as one of them, he continued that:

we writers of Jewish descent are, thank God, safe from any temptation to take the side of the barbarians in any way. We are the only representatives of Europe who are debarred from returning to Germany. Even if there were in our ranks a traitor, who, from personal ambition, stupidity, and blindness, wanted to conclude a shameful peace with the destroyer of Europe—he couldn’t do it! That “Asiatic” and “Oriental” blood which the current wielders of power in the German Reich hold against us will quite certainly not permit us to desert from the noble ranks of the European army. God himself—and we are proud of the fact—will not allow us to betray Europe, Christendom, and Judaism. God is with the vanquished, not with the victors! At a time when His Holiness, the infallible Pope of Christendom, is concluding a peace agreement, a Concordat, with the enemies of Christ, when the Protestants are establishing a “German church” and censoring the Bible, we descendants of the old Jews, the forefathers of European culture, are the only legitimate German representatives of that culture. Thanks to inscrutable divine wisdom, we are physically incapable of betraying it to the heathen civilization of poison gases, to the ammonia-breathing Germanic war god.92

Roth saw this situation as the culmination of the very Prussian militarism and expansionism that Zweig had hoped German defeat in the First World War would smother and which Fried had devoted his career to mitigating.

If you want to understand the burning of the books, you must understand that the current Third Reich is a logical extension of the Prussian empire of Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns, and not any sort of reaction to the poor German republic with its feeble German Democrats and Social Democrats. Prussia, the ruler of Germany, was always an enemy of the intellect, of books, of the Book of Books—that is, the Bible—of Jews and Christians, of humanism and Europe. Hitler’s Third Reich is only so alarming to the rest of Europe because it sets itself to put into action what was always the Prussian project anyway: to burn the books, to murder the Jews, and to revise Christianity.”93

Having lost hope in the future of a cosmopolitan Europe in which the Jews would be free of nationalism, Roth retreated into nostalgia for the Habsburg Monarchy. This nostalgia found its most eloquent expression in the novella *Die Büste des Kaisers (The Bust of the Emperor)*, published in 1938, shortly before he died.\(^4\) The story takes place in a fictional town in Galicia and follows the life of a provincial Polish aristocrat of Italian origin through the collapse of the Monarchy and into the interwar period. Count Morstin is a cosmopolitan European, and as such, is a model Austrian:

He thought of himself neither as Polish nor Italian, neither as a member of the Polish aristocracy nor as an aristocrat of Italian descent. No, along with so many others like him in the former Crownlands of Austria-Hungary, he belonged to the noblest and purest type of Austrian there can be, which is to say: he was a man beyond nationality and therefore an aristocrat in the true sense. . . . By what criteria should he have had to nominate his allegiance to this nation or that? He spoke most of the European languages with equal fluency, he knew his way around most European countries, he had friends and relatives scattered all over the wide and colorful world. Now, the Dual Monarchy was like this colorful world *in parvo*, and that was why it was the only possible homeland for the Count.\(^5\)

The Count survives the First World War and the collapse of the monarchy and returns to his town only to find it part of the new Polish nation state. Although the town and its inhabitants are unconcerned with their new nationhood, the Count has nothing but disdain for nationality. To his closest friend, a local Jewish shopkeeper, he comments that “[t]he only thing wrong with Darwin’s theory is that he’s got it back to front. In my book it’s the monkeys that are descended from the nationalists…”\(^6\) The Count continues to wear his Habsburg uniform, because “[i]t’s too late in life for me to get used to a new one.”\(^7\) He also leaves the bust of Emperor Franz Joseph at the gate to his house. The local peasants respected his mannerisms, they “venerated his lean, bony frame, his gray hair, his ashen, crumpled face, his eyes, that seemed to be fixed on a limitless distance, and no wonder: they were looking at a long lost past.”\(^8\)

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\(^4\)Roth, *Die Büste des Kaisers*.


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 233.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 244.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 244.
When an order from Polish officials instructs him to remove the bust of the emperor from his property, the Count, along with the rabbi, the Catholic priests, the Eastern Orthodox priests, and all the townspeople, hold a formal funeral and bury it. The Count then emigrates to France, where he spends his remaining years playing chess with exiled Russian generals and writing his memoirs. Roth closes the novella with these memoirs. In the Count’s voice, he writes:

... pursuit of so-called national virtues, which are still more dubious than personal values, is fatuous. That is why I hate nations and nation-states. My former home, the monarchy, alone was different, it was a large house with many doors and many rooms for many different kinds of people. This house has been divided, broken up, ruined. I have not business with what is there now. I am used to living in a house, not in cabins.  

Roth’s Count is clearly an idealization of a conservative, aristocratic, and Catholic past. In contemporary scholarship, this idealization is sometimes seen as a blemish on his career, or at least a somewhat undignified end. Regardless, the conservative tone of Roth’s nostalgia is important. In *Yesterday’s Self*, Andreea Deciu Ritivoi outlines two contemporary sociological definitions of nostalgia, one “restorative” and the other “reflective.” The former “taps into nationalism and/or political conservatism, and since it counts on the availability of a past situation beyond strictly symbolic representations, it is inherently naive, retrograde and even paranoid insofar as it tends to read its necessary failure to restore the past as sabotage, conspiracy, or persecution.”  

This is contrasted with the more constructive reflective nostalgia, which “does not seek return as much as it prefers to brood over the impossibility to return. Pessimistic, ironic, or even cynical, reflective nostalgia zooms in on the difference between reality and simulacra, the original and the copy.... Disenchanted, reflective nostalgia does not wish for a cure; instead, it prefers to remind itself that a cure in unavailable.”  

These definitions, are, as Ritivoi points out, compromised by “the common assumption (....) that homesickness is in an inverse relationship with cosmopolitanism.” Roth’s nostalgia, though thoroughly a homesickness for cosmopolitanism, fits the “restorative” definition. Were he to have emigrated to North America, one might reasonably wonder

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100 Deciu Ritivoi, *Yesterday’s Self: Nostalgia and the Immigrant Identity*, p. 31.
101 Ibid., p. 32.
102 Ibid., p. 24.
Roth’s nostalgia could have taken a more constructive form. However, in Europe in the late 1930s as a Jewish writer, as Roth himself pointed out, the option of reconciling one’s nostalgia for a pre-nationalist idea of Europe with the Third Reich was not an option. Stefan Zweig tried to use his nostalgia for Austria as the basis for a new future in Brazil and it is to this effort that we now turn.

5.4.2 Austria Abroad: Zweig’s Response to Europe’s Suicide

Zweig emigrated to Brazil in 1941. He had visited Brazil in 1936 and had been taken with what he described as “a land whose importance for coming generations cannot be estimated even with the boldest reasoning.” The experience was humbling: Zweig described how with “astonishing speed the extremely superfluous baggage of European arrogance that I had taken along on this trip melted way. I knew I had gazed into the future of our world.”

The literary result of Zweig’s astonishment was a history of the country, *Brazilien, Ein Land der Zukunft* (*Brazil, A Land of the Future*), in which, as was his custom, Zweig tried to identify, this time in Brazil, an essential or driving characteristic. I will argue that this was the Austrian idea. The contrition that Zweig had expressed about his European arrogance had less to do with being unappreciative of non-European culture, and more to do with his failure to expect to find the values he associated with Austria in Latin America. However, having discovered in Brazil a peaceful multinational society, Zweig wrote a tribute to it that amounted to a nostalgic utopian novel about Austria.

Brazil, Zweig argued, had managed to build a society that embodied the supranational Austrian idea, something which Europe had destroyed.

[The] central problem, which forces itself upon every generation including our own, is the answer to the most simple yet most necessary question of all: How can human beings achieve a peaceful coexistence on earth, in spite of all the disparate races, classes, colors, religions, and convictions? That is the problem that presents itself repeatedly and overbearingly to every society, to every state. It has posed itself no more dangerously to any country than it has to Brazil through an especially complicated situation. And no other country—and I am writing this book to testify gratefully to that fact—has solved it in a more felicitous and exemplary manner than has Brazil. . . . For, according to its ethnological structure, if

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104 Ibid., p. 7.
it had adopted the European insanity of nationalism and racism, Brazil would have to be the most divided, the most disharmonious and agitated country in the world.\textsuperscript{106}

Zweig tended to describe Brazilians, particularly black Brazilians in patronizing language just as Roth tended to orientalize the Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy. The two groups are portrayed as simple, gentle souls who are useful in balancing the excessive energy and hygienic hysteria of West Europeans and North Americans. Thus, “It is a pleasure” for Zweig “to see intelligence combined with a quiet modesty and courtesy in the half-dark faces of the students. A certain softness, a gentle melancholy creates here a novel and very personal contrast to the sharper and more active type of the North American.”\textsuperscript{107} We see here evidence of the limits of Central European cosmopolitanism, those limits already discussed in connection with the 1848 federalist ideas for reforming the Habsburg Empire. However progressive, champions of these reforms were unable to part with the conviction that Central Europe must be led by Germans. This was a basic cultural assumption of the supranational Austrian idea that neither Zweig or Roth fully overcame. Zweig was unable to see that his ideas of ‘primitive’ cultures were politicized. Thus he was able to note at once, without further questioning, that in Brazil full equality existed and yet most Black Brazilians lived in relative poverty. He clearly assumed that the status of Black Brazilians had to do with innate capacity or the will to intellectual or professional achievement, rather than prejudice. Interestingly, however, he still promoted racial ‘mixing.’

Zweig’s basic point was that, in Brazil, defense against nationalism and racism was undertaken in order to prevent “political affairs, with all their perfidies” from becoming “the focus of private life, . . . the heart of all thought and feeling.”\textsuperscript{108} Zweig’s description of how Brazil had achieved this and cultivated peaceful, multi- or, one might even say extra-national coexistence mirrors Roth’s\textit{Bust of the Emperor}. Brazilians, just like Count Morstin and the inhabitants of his Galician town, overcame the problem of national antagonism simply by their utter refusal to acknowledge it:

In the most simple fashion, Brazil—and the meaning of this grand experiment seems exemplary to me—carried the race problem that distresses our European world to the point

\textsuperscript{106}Zweig,\textit{ Brazil}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., p. 11.
of absurdity: by simply ignoring its alleged validity. While the mistaken notion of wanting
to breed human beings “racially pure,” like race horses or dogs, prevails more than ever
in our old world, for centuries the Brazilian nation has been established on one principle
alone, that of free and unrestrained intermixing, and the total equality of black and white
and brown and yellow. What in other countries is only set down theoretically on paper and
parchment, absolute civil equality in public and private life, has a visible effect here in the
real sphere... 109

Brazil represented an antitype of the Third Reich, but in making this contrast, Zweig
drew on his nostalgia for Austria. In this sense, his Brazil resembled Roth’s nostalgic memory
of the Habsburg Monarchy 110 in another significant way. As Roth had been arguing since the
1920s, West Europeans placed too much value on technological progress and economic wealth.
Roth, in his confrontation of German prejudice against East European Jews, had argued
that they made the mistake of identifying wealth with civilization, although ‘backward’
East Europeans managed to coexist in civilized, cosmopolitan communities. East European
cosmopolitanism, Roth had argued, was a surer foundation for Western Civilization than
West European nationalism. Zweig made essentially the same argument about Brazil:

But the events of recent years have significantly changed my opinion about the value of
the words civilization and culture. I am no longer willing to equate them unhesitatingly
with the concepts of organization and comfort. Nothing has promoted this calamitous
error more than the mechanically calculated statistics concerning the national wealth of
a country, ... But those tables lack an important element, the inclusion of the human
mentality, which in my opinion is the most essential standard of culture and civilization.
... We have seen that the highest degree of organization has not prevented nations from
applying that organization solely in the interest of bestiality instead of that of humanity,
and that in the course of a quarter century our European civilization has surrendered itself
for the second time. So I am no longer willing to recognize a hierarchy based on the
industrial, the financial, the military striking power of a nation, but am rather inclined to
determine the measure of a country’s exemplariness based on its peaceful nature and its
humane attitude. 111

The Brazilian people were exemplary because they possessed an “inner conciliator-
ness.” 112 And, if it were not clear enough that Brazil represents nostalgia for what Austria
might have been had it survived the First World War, Zweig argues that Brazilian multina-

109Zweig, Brazil, p. 10.
110Note that the resemblance is to Roth’s idealized idea of the Monarchy as the home of inter-ethnic
harmony, not to the Austro-Hungarian state or its various last ditch attempts to manage multinationalism.
112Ibid., p. 15.
tional coexistence is founded in Catholic internationalism. Brazil, then, possessing in the present all that had been lost with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Anschluss in 1938, became Zweig’s hope for the future. He concluded that

[O]ne of our best hopes for a future civilizing and pacification of a world that has been desolated by hate and madness is based upon the existence of Brazil, whose will is directed solely toward peaceful construction. But where moral forces are at work, it is our task to strengthen that will. Where we, in our distressed times, still see hope for a new future in new areas of the world, it is our duty to point to this country and to these possibilities. . . . And this is why I wrote this book.\(^\text{114}\)

Zweig’s nostalgia, then, was more constructive than Roth’s in that it allowed him to come to terms with exile and to maintain his Austrian identity and values, while adjusting to change. This attempt to imagine the restoration of the Austrian idea in Brazil was, however, short-lived. The character of his nostalgia in The World of Yesterday fits Ritivoi’s “reflective” definition of nostalgia extremely well in its pessimism, irony, and its self-aware contemplation of the temptation to idealize the past, and its disenchantment.

Zweig famously describes his childhood in pre-World War One Vienna as a “golden age of security” in which, just as in his version of contemporary Brazil, Austrians were free from nationalism and mass politics. An atmosphere of “spiritual conciliation” prevailed and, thus, “all the streams of European culture converged.” It was “the particular genius of this city of music that dissolved all the contrasts harmoniously into a new and unique thing, the Austrian, the Viennese.” Here every citizen was “supernational, cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world.”\(^\text{115}\) “Nowhere was it easier to be a European.”\(^\text{116}\) And precisely because of this supranationalism, Vienna was perfectly suited to the Jews (just as Roth’s Catholic cosmopolitan Count Morstin could be content nowhere but in the Monarchy). Art was the Jews’ medium of equality and “nine-tenths of what the world celebrated as Viennese culture in the nineteenth century was promoted, nourished, or even created by Viennese Jewry.”\(^\text{117}\) The Jews, Zweig argued, gave Vienna its “European standing,” something it would lose without them.\(^\text{118}\) This argument is nowhere better illustrated than in Hugo

\(^{113}\)Zweig, Brazil, pp. 29-33.

\(^{114}\)Ibid., p. 15.

\(^{115}\)Zweig, World of Yesterday, p. 13.


\(^{117}\)Zweig, World of Yesterday, p. 20.

\(^{118}\)Ibid., p. 23.
Bettauer’s farcical novel from 1922 which describes expulsion of the Jews from Vienna and the city’s subsequent descent into a provincial town of dilettantes. Yet Bettauer’s farcical scenario became all too real. And so, Zweig’s work to promote the pre-war Austrian spirit of conciliation came to an end in 1938. Austria, he wrote, the “dismembered, mutilated land whose rulers once had reigned over Europe, was . . . the stone in the wall.” Europe “our sacred home, cradle and Parthenon of our occidental civilization” seemed to him “doomed to die by its own madness.”

Although Zweig tried to find hope in the future through an idealized Brazil—a Brazil that could become the next Austria and serve as a new platform where “Europe’s contribution to civilization could be extended and developed magnificently . . . in new adaptation”—his experience as an émigré in England, New York, and finally Brazil led him to the realization that his rootedness in Austria had been necessary to his sense of being “a citizen of the world-republic.” As an Austrian abroad, he had felt at home in the rest of the world. However, as an exile and a refugee, this was no longer possible. Instead, Zweig felt out of place: “cosmopolite that I once thought myself—I [now] am possessed by the feeling that I ought express particular gratitude for every breath of air of which I deprive a foreign people.” Unable to participate in the “rebirth” of Europe abroad, he felt defeated:

...my most cherished aim to which I had devoted all the power of my conviction for forty years, the peaceful union of Europe, had been defiled... [T]he past was done for, work achieved was in ruins, Europe, our home, to which we had dedicated ourselves had suffered a destruction that would extend far beyond our life.

Zweig’s memoir, I would argue, was his final contribution to the project he had begun in the 1920s of assembling a network of writers and artists who represented the cosmopolitan European republic of letters. Many readers, from Hanna Arendt to Michael Stanislawski have noted that Zweig revealed very little of his personal life in his autobiography. This has

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119 Bettauer, *Die Stadt ohne Juden*, Bettauer was assassinated in New York shortly after book was published by a fascist.
been attributed to a variety of factors, from Zweig’s bourgeois reserve, according to Arendt, to the argument, taken from Zweig’s own introduction and repeated by Stanislawski, that the book was intended as the autobiography of an age and of a generation, not of himself.\footnote{Michael Stanislawski. *Autobiographical Jews: Essays in Jewish Self-Fashioning*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004, pp. 103-138.} There may be much truth in these explanations, but it seems to me also that Zweig was also trying, in exile, to record himself, alongside those he translated, promoted, and whose biographies he wrote, as a member of the canon of great Europeans. And in establishing his own canonicity, those elements that mattered were his writing in support of European cross-cultural understanding, the network of like-minded, cosmopolitan European writers and artists, and the contribution of the supranational Austrian idea to the shaping of his own European idea. Soon after completing the memoir, in February of 1942, Zweig and his wife committed suicide in Petropolis, Brazil. His suicide note expresses his inability to live, as a cosmopolitan Austrian, outside of Europe:

> Before parting from life of my free will and in my right mind I am impelled to fulfill a last obligation: to give heartfelt thanks to this wonderful land of Brazil which afforded me and my work such kind and hospitable repose. My love for the country increased from day to day, and nowhere else would I have preferred to build up a new existence, the world of my own language having disappeared for me and my spiritual home, Europe, having destroyed itself.

> But after one’s sixtieth year unusual powers are needed in order to make another wholly new beginning. Those that I possess have been exhausted by long years of homeless wandering. So I think it better to conclude in good time and in erect bearing a life in which intellectual labor meant the purest joy and personal freedom the highest good on earth. I salute all my friends! May it be granted them yet to see the dawn after the long night! I, all too impatient, go on before.\footnote{Zweig, *World of Yesterday*, p. 437.}

### 5.5 CONCLUSION

Joseph Roth and Stefan Zweig shared a cosmopolitan idea of Europe as a community where the Jews, a supranational people, could be both rooted and citizens of the world. Unlike the figures from previous chapters, they were unwilling to make any concessions to nationalism. Furthermore, they refused to align themselves with any mass political movement or ideology,
which they saw merely as obstacles to the “spirit of conciliation” upon which coexistence in Europe depended. However, like all of the figures from previous chapters, they believed that European unity was the long-term solution to the problems that the nation state posed for Jews and for humanity more broadly. Thus in the 1920s, both devoted much of their writing to promoting cross-cultural understanding in Europe—particularly between the French and Germans—and to combatting Western European prejudice against Eastern Europeans.

In the 1930s, instead of adjusting their goals to the circumstances by, for example, embracing Zionism, Marxism, or Anglo-American liberalism—as many others did as émigrés—Roth and Zweig declared that Europe had “destroyed itself”\(^{129}\) and retreated into nostalgia for the Habsburg Monarchy and the supranational example it had provided for Europe. They were simply unable and unwilling to live outside the Europe they had worked so hard to build.

6.0 CONCLUSION

This dissertation has explored how the rise of ethnonationalism in Austria-Hungary and its successor states prompted Jewish thinking on the heritage, ideals, and future of Europe. The national disintegration of the Habsburg Empire caused a crisis in Austrian Jewry out of which, I argue, Jewish intellectuals came to hope for a future supra-national polity in a unified Europe. Discussions of a common European literature and culture as well as concrete proposals for European integration are scattered throughout the works of scholars, writers, and political activists who formed the Central European Jewish intelligentsia.

Jewish intellectuals were not altogether unique. European unity was broadly discussed among intellectuals across Europe in this period and was tied up in debates over the best means to prevent war, defend against external threats, and stave off decline. These debates were tied to nationalist, pacifist, socialist, and capitalist ideological interest, and, consequently, there was no consensus about unification as the solution to the threat that nationalism posed to peace and coexistence in Europe until after 1945.

What made Austro-Hungarian Jewish intellectuals unique was, as I have argued, that because of their peculiar engagement with the threat of nationalism they reached consensus on unification much earlier and despite conflicting ideological commitments. Since the ideas discussed in previous chapters were formulated within distinct ideological movements, at first glance all but those of the Zionists do not appear to be specifically Jewish. Yet when viewed together—here for the first time—they emerge as Jewish contributions because they were shared by Jews across competing movements and motivated by their more grave confrontation with nationalism.

This is not to say that the ideas of Europe in each chapter did not reflect their authors’ political views. Alfred Fried imagined a cosmopolitan Europe in which extensive economic,
infrastructural, educational, and cultural ties would erode nationalism and the idea that Europe should be composed of sovereign national components. Yet the first chapter argued that his Pan-European idea did not find supporters until after his death because the idea represented the interests of the marginal, cosmopolitan Viennese progressives. It was, furthermore, couched in the language of organicism, a trend in sociology that was to be discredited. The chapter also concluded that the neglect of Fried in the literature on the European idea has reinforced the contemporary judgment of scientific pacifism and the defeat of Jewish social reformism.

Chapter Three argued that the ideal of Jewish inclusion in a cosmopolitan Europe underlay the Jewish national aspirations of Austria’s most prominent Zionists. Cosmopolitan Zionists imagined either a Jewish society outside of Europe that, though nominally national, would be cosmopolitan and pluralist, or Jewish nationality as a cultural basis for Jewish inclusion within geographic Europe. Though, unlike Fried, they conceived of the Jews as a nation, they shared his opposition to neo-romantic nationalism. Furthermore, they shared the habit typical of the Viennese intelligentsia, to concentrate on sweeping theoretical and literary tracts at the expense of concrete organizing. Most importantly, they shared a common ideal of a liberal, pluralist Europe that included Jews and a conviction that this ideal should be achieved through liberal social reforms. Their ideas, though much more influential than Fried’s, were equally unsuccessful in spurring the kind of movement toward European unity that they sought.

Chapter Four discussed the ideal of European unity in Otto Bauer’s theory of the nation and proposals for multinational federation. Bauer’s challenge to the idea of the nation state was motivated most immediately by the threat that the nation state posed to the unity of the Austrian Social Democratic Party before the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. He disagreed sharply with Zionists about the viability of Jewish nationhood. Bauer, even more than Fried, was an assimilationist and did not see a place for Jews in Europe as a community other than through assimilation into one of Europe’s nations. The socialist, Bauer, made the most significant concessions to nationalism of all the figures discussed in this dissertation. However, much like the Zionists, his conception of the nation severely undermined prevailing definitions of the nation as a sovereign, territorial, and racial community. Thus though they
differed sharply on the question of Jewish nationhood, their goal of resuscitating a liberal, cultural conception of the nation as the vehicle for Jewish inclusion in Europe was the same. Bauer’s plans for a democratic, multinational federal Austria as a model for European unity also failed.

Joseph Roth and Stefan Zweig were far more cosmopolitan than Otto Bauer. In fact, they, more than any of the other figures discussed, were unapologetically cosmopolitan. Instead of attempting theoretically to undermine ethnonationalism and restore a liberal and cultural understanding of nationhood, these two writers, much like Alfred Fried, concentrated directly on building solidarity across Europe. Both located the inspiration for their cosmopolitanism in the supranational Austrian idea and in the threat that ethnonationalism posed to it. Though purportedly apolitical, their ideas of Europe embodied the same liberal principles that underlay the ideas of Jewish progressive pacifists, Zionists, and Austro-Marxists. And they failed for the very same reasons: their ideas of Europe represented the predicament and the cosmopolitan reactions of the marginal Austrian Jewish intelligentsia.

Without question, the scope of this dissertation is quite broad and has not done justice to any of the figures or movements it includes. Each chapter deserves its own dissertation. These limitations notwithstanding, the breadth of the topic has, I believe, led to an historiographical contribution that would not otherwise have been possible. This dissertation provides a new body of evidence for the argument that the Austrian Jewish intelligentsia, despite its political fragmentation, was, by necessity ecumenical and cosmopolitan. Carl Schorske’s famous comment that Viennese aesthetes “were alienated not from their class, but with it from a society that defeated its expectation and rejected its values”\(^1\) extends not just to a spirit of conciliation in relations between ideological opponents, but to an ideal that superseded political differences.

The dissertation also affirms Malachi Haim Hacohen’s related argument that “German acculturated Jews were cosmopolitanism’s main carriers. They were the only group that could gain nothing from ethnonationalism . . . But this class remained a small minority. Cosmopolitanism represented the response of the losers of ethnopolitics.”\(^2\) Hacohen argues

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1 Original emphasis Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, p. 304.
for the existence of a tangible community of Jewish cosmopolitan Central Europeans during the interwar period by reconstructing networks of scholars, most of them in exile, who considered themselves part of a “Central European Republic of Letters.” The argument presented here further affirms the existence of such a community by demonstrating a shared product of its cosmopolitanism—an idea of Europe that undermined the prevailing “Europe of Nations” and proposed a liberal community whose constituent component was the individual, whose membership was defined by the Aufklärung ideals of Bildung and Kultur, and in which nationality was flexible, ambiguous, and culturally rather than racially conceived.
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