THE VISIBILITY OF SEXUAL MINORITY MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

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The South African state has responded favorably to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations’ (SMOs) efforts to protect and extend sexual and gender minority rights, whereas Namibian state leaders have verbally attacked LGBT organizing and threatened to arrest sexual and gender minorities. In these countries, LGBT persons have organized themselves into publicly visible social movement organizations (SMOs) over the last ten years. Amid such different official responses to LGBT organizing, how, when, and why do Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations become publicly visible or retreat from visibility? To answer this question, I turn to sociologist James M. Jasper’s (2004, 2006) concept of “strategic dilemma.” LGBT social movement organizations encountered strategic dilemmas of visibility or invisibility when they decide whether and how to become visible, modify their public profile, or forgo political opportunities. To understand the micropolitical dynamics of how LGBT social movement organizations negotiated such strategic dilemmas of visibility and invisibility, I engaged in intensive, continuous ethnographic observation of four Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations for approximately 800 hours and analyzed my ethnographic fieldnotes. I also analyzed more than 2,100 newspaper articles and LGBT SMO documents and conducted 56 in-depth interviews with staff, members, and leaders of LGBT SMOs. In this dissertation, I explore the varied strategic dilemmas of visibility and invisibility that Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs faced. My findings advance social movement theorizing by demonstrating the importance of studying social
movements in the global South. In addition, my findings contribute to postcolonial feminist and quee theorizing by showing how marginalized sexual and gender minorities in post-apartheid Namibia and South Africa used public visibility as a strategy to argue for their democratic inclusion.
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Visibility is a key issue. . . . [C]onstitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech and the right to protest publicly make “the debate on sexual issues much freer than it was in the past.” This ensures greater visibility and makes it possible for people to share a common language about these issues (Hattingh 2005:223-24). Despite the efforts of state leaders and members of the public to keep lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals out of public view in Namibia and South Africa, sexual and gender minorities have transformed themselves into visible social movement organizations (SMOs) at certain times over the past decade.¹ LGBT SMOs emerged on the cusp of democratic, post-apartheid transformation in Namibia and South Africa, at a time rich in political opportunities. By SMO, I mean “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement . . . and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218). In this project, I examine the strategies LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa used to become publicly visible or withdrawn from visibility. The act of promoting itself as an organization to different audiences, including the public, constituents, the media, and the state, constitutes “visibility,” whereas withdrawing from target audiences constitutes “invisibility.” “Strategies” consist of the choices that SMOs make in the pursuit of visibility or invisibility with audiences and constituencies (Gamson 1975; Ganz 2000, 2004).

Research on sexual and gender minority movements in southern Africa is important because it questions the assumption that LGBT movement ideologies, identities, and organizational forms travel from a “more developed” global North to an “underdeveloped” global South. Virtually all that we know about organized sexual minorities is based on studies of groups in North America and Western Europe (Adam 1987; Chauncey 1995; D’Emilio 1984, ¹ I use “LGBT” and “sexual and gender minorities” interchangeably throughout the dissertation, but I prefer the term sexual and gender minorities because it encompasses emerging public sexualities and genders that may not yet have a name.
Although some scholars examine LGBT movements in non-Western developing nations (Brown 1999, 2002; Green 1999; Palmberg 1999; Parker 1998; Thayer 1997) or as a global phenomenon (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Altman 2001; Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), research on organized sexual and gender minorities in southern Africa is scant (see Dirsuweit 2006). This scholarly lacuna can be attributed to a broader sense that political repression, homophobia, and a lack of international support in most southern African countries, with the exception of South Africa, prevent any civic groups from organizing successfully for social change (Ungar 2001). Such a formulation assumes, rather than finds, that southern African LGBT movements will fail and ignores the possibility of a spillover of ideas and strategies from South Africa to other nations. In fact, an LGBT minority movement has flourished in both postcolonial Namibia and South Africa.

I selected Namibia and South Africa as comparative case study sites because, despite similarities in their eradication of apartheid policies and installation of national liberation movements as ruling parties, the countries differ significantly in how they currently treat sexual and gender minorities and LGBT movements. As it made the transition to a nonracial democracy, South Africa became a world leader in its reconciliation of the racial, social, and political abuses of apartheid. Unlike more repressive states in Namibia and Zimbabwe whose leaders have issued “vitiolic public statements about homosexuality” (Morgan and Reid 2003:376), South Africa’s post-apartheid state has responded favorably to LGBT social movement organizations’ demands for broadened rights, which include immigration and adoption rights for same-sex partners. In contrast, Namibia’s postcolonial state has been increasingly authoritarian and hostile toward political dissenters, the media, and social movements. LGBT SMOs have waged largely defensive campaigns in this nation, often in alliance with women’s rights and human rights movements.

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1.1 Theoretical Framework

Asking questions about how LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa devise and
deploy strategies of visibility and invisibility means incorporating different theoretical perspectives. I draw on theoretical traditions that treat visibility and invisibility as tropes for social and political oppression. First, I draw on postcolonial feminist theorizing to understand how oppressed groups overcame political and social invisibility by overturning the constructs that colonialists used to divide and control indigenous Africans in places like Namibia and South Africa. I situate how heterosexism in some African feminist theorizing illustrates the politics of visibility that African feminists navigate in their choices to include or exclude sexual and gender minority rights. Then, I review how queer theorizing deals with questions of visibility and invisibility of sexual and gender minorities.

Because I am interested in how LGBT SMOs “manage” their visibility, I draw heavily on social movement research and theory that explains the behavior of social movement organizations. My work extends existing social movement research on the disappearance of social movements from public view by challenging the supposition that once an SMO emerges publicly, it will remain in public view, and by considering how and why groups may prefer to withdraw from the view of target audiences. My research also will contribute to existing work by questioning the appropriateness of social movement models based on North American and Western European context for use in Namibia and South Africa.

1.1.2 Postcolonial Feminist Theorizing

Postcolonial and Northern feminist scholars share an interest in giving voice to women (of color) in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Jeater 1993; Schmidt 1992). Postcolonial and Northern feminist researchers have investigated how and why historical accounts silenced women and sexual and gender minorities in the global South as political agents (Alexander 2005; Mohanty 2003).2 Silence is an analogous trope to invisibility in that histories have not treated women, and by extension, sexual and gender minorities, in colonial and postcolonial societies as publicly visible subjects (Spivak 1988). Such silencing of women’s experiences is sometimes duplicated in postcolonial scholarship. Postcolonial feminists have identified and tried to correct

2 I commit the error that Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) critiques by characterizing “Third World women” and LGBT persons instead as “women and sexual and gender minorities in the global South.” I use this as shorthand in my recapitulation of feminist arguments. In this dissertation, I examine in detail the situations in which LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa arises and unfolds.
the masculinist bias of some postcolonial thought. An excellent example of this is Anne McClintock’s (1995:64-65) identification of how Homi Bhabha (1994) excludes women as he explains colonized subjects’ silent, invisible, and intimate parody (mimicry) of colonialists. Bhabha’s focus only on exchanges of power and discourse between colonized men and male colonialists “elid[es] gender difference” and “implicitly ratifies gender power, so that masculinity becomes the invisible norm of postcolonial discourse” (McClintock 1995:64-65).

Just as postcolonial feminists locate and remedy gender biases in some postcolonial scholarship, they also identify and correct the ethnocentric bias of some Northern feminist theorizing. In this manner, postcolonial feminists decenter the United States and other Northern countries as default countries of reference (Alexander 2005; Mohanty 2003). Postcolonial feminist theorizing faults Western feminist theorizing for homogenizing women’s experiences and subjugation under the category of victimization (Bulbeck 1998). In particular, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) takes issue with Western feminism’s assumption that it holds the keys to the deliverance of all “Third World women.” Uncovering the “ethnographic universalism” that plagues some feminist theorizing, Mohanty (2003) questions the appropriateness of the category of “women” because the use of the term as a “homogeneous category . . . robs [women in the Third World] of their historical and political agency” (p. 39). For Mohanty (2003), feminist theorizing must be more sensitive to the multiple, interlocking oppressions women (of color) in different countries face when making their experiences visible and recognize how women are agents of power and history in their own right. Feminist, historical, and sociological studies that examine women’s participation in anticolonial and nationalist struggles are examples of restoring women’s agency in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Kuumba 2002; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2006; Staunton 1991). Understanding that women make decisions on their own behalf, albeit within a sometimes limited range, corrects the tendency of some feminist and postcolonial studies to treat women as the “‘site rather than the subjects of certain historical debates” (Loomba 1998:222). Postcolonial feminists recognize how “[w]omen are not just a symbolic space but real targets of colonialism and nationalist discourses” (Loomba 1998:222). This mode of inquiry is useful because it identifies how the agency of women, and potentially sexual and gender minorities in postcolonial contexts, can redress persisting colonial inequalities.

At the heart of postcolonial feminist theorizing is an incisive analysis about the interlocking mechanisms that render women and sexual and gender minorities invisible and
powerless. Invisibility may actually afford women and sexual and gender minorities an advantage, by hiding their political organizing. However, equating the lack of political organizing on the part of oppressed groups to political backwardness or underdevelopment is grossly inaccurate (Alexander 2005). M. Jacqui Alexander (2005) demonstrates how ethnocentric assessments about the types and levels of political organizing outside the colonial metropole imperil the utility of feminist theorizing that originates in the global North. She “challenge[s] prevalent metropolitan impulses that explain the absence of visible lesbian and gay movements as a defect in political consciousness and maturity, using evidence of publicly organized movements in the United States as evidence of their originary status in the West and their political maturity” (Alexander 2005:28). Simply because women’s or LGBT political organizing is not readily publicly visible does not mean that it does not exist; activists may have to negotiate layers of public visibility in order to preserve their resources, and in some extreme cases, their lives (Alexander 2005; Cohen 2005; Rothschild 2005). Alexander (2005) articulates the importance of examining social movements in the sociopolitical contexts in which they originate, while being careful about what theories and methodologies feminist scholars use when studying such movements.

Postcolonial feminist theory provides useful analytic tools for my research because this mode of inquiry demonstrates how visibility and invisibility can serve as strategies for contesting power, such as through “invisible,” micro-level forms of protest that colonized persons performed (Bhabha 1994; Fanon 1963, 1965, 1967; Spivak 1988). This approach highlights how the invisibility of non-heterosexual women and persons of color is produced through denying them access to social and political rights and institutions. This theoretical perspective illuminates how visibility and invisibility can act as a conduit through which oppressed groups, such as colonized indigenous groups and black southern African women, materialize publicly as groups with political agendas and how they may begin to forge alliances with other oppressed groups.

1.1.2.1 Homosexuality and African Feminism(s)

African feminist theorizing has identified a range of nationalist, patriarchal, and colonialist mechanisms that have rendered women invisible. Yet within African feminism(s), sexual and gender minorities remain invisible. This is due to African feminists’ concerns about how state leaders and opponents of homosexuality use non-normative genders and sexualities to
discredit feminism. Managing the visibility of feminism in Africa has appeared as a practical and theoretical concern for African feminists. “Overt and public feminism has its price, but women now seem willing to pay it” (Mikell 1995:418). Southern African feminists, in particular, have been sensitive to the portrayal of feminist organizing and the characterization of women’s rights in these countries. They are aware of the visibility problem that certain feminisms pose in traditional, indigenous southern African societies (Hassim 2005). This type of African feminism is conscious about not alienating black African men, an example of how African feminists negotiate the public representation of the movement.

A feminism that interpellates men as gendered subject first and foremost will fail to gain the support or attention of most black men. A feminism that acknowledges the importance of other identities, especially race and class, and locates itself in the context of history and globalization is more likely to succeed (Morrell 2002:323).

By projecting an image of feminism that is in step with African nationalism(s), some feminists demonstrate that they are concerned with the public profile of their efforts.

Though national liberation can be a vehicle for appropriating feminist projects, it has also served as a political opening for some feminist movements. Melissa Steyn (1998) recounts her memory of how South African feminists neutralized nationalist designs on gender equality in the transition from racist, apartheid rule to a nonracial democracy. South African feminists worked to ensure that “the women’s movement in South Africa [would] not meet the fate of so many other women’s movements in nationalist struggles, namely that once liberation had been won, women’s issues would once again be relegated to a subordinate role” (Steyn 1998:41-42). In this sense, national liberation struggles and the transition from apartheid to a nonracial democracy in Namibia and South Africa posed significant political opportunities for feminist activists (Penzhorn 2005). Despite these opportunities, African feminists have often been on the defensive when patriarchal political leaders demonize feminism. “Feminist organizers in many countries now face draconian responses to the portrayal of their work as a threat—to country, community, or family” (Rothschild 2005:11).

Carefully monitoring the content of African feminisms is a priority for some scholars and activists. Homosexuality has been particularly problematic for some African feminists (Amofo et al. 2005), as evidenced by how heterosexism and heteronormativity go unquestioned (Muthien 2003) in some African feminist theorizing. The “localized practices and . . . centralized institutions [that] legitimize and privilege heterosexualuality and heterosexual relationships as
fundamental and ‘natural’ within society” constitute heteronormativity (Cohen 2005:24). Gwendolyn Mikell (1997:4) describes African feminism—in the singular, not as plural phenomena—as being “distinctly heterosexual, pro-natal, and concerned with many ‘bread, butter, culture, and power’ issues.” Such a heterosexual bias has rendered African women whose sexuality and gender do not map onto traditional gender dichotomies invisible (Mikell 1997), such as Ifi Amadiume’s (1987) assumption that woman-to-woman marriages never entail same-gender sexual contact. Some Africanist scholars dispute this bias empirically, but do not take a political stand that examines the basis for Amadiume’s (1987) heterosexual claims and analysis (Njambi and O’Brien 2000). Other scholars question whether same-gender erotic desire circulated as a possibility for African women before and during colonial occupation (Wieringa 2005). Same-gender erotic desires may have occurred as a possibility in postcolonial southern Africa only recently, as the language to articulate these desires and link them to viable social identities has become increasingly available. Nevertheless, “same-sex practices did and do exist in Africa, in remarkable quantity and diversity, but not necessarily as identities” (Arnfred 2004c:21; see also Phillips 2001). When and how same-gender sexual practices occurred under the guise of Western sexual identity labels, such as gay or lesbian, or have been incorporated into indigenous and coloured linguistic and cultural practices as new sexual identities, remains contested (Cage 2003).³

Heterosexual bias in feminism often leads to the debate over whether homosexuality is unAfrican (Aarmo 1999; see Hames 2003). Used to force sexual and gender minorities into public invisibility and to thwart criticisms of democratization in Africa, this claim that homosexuality is unAfrican finds adherents among conservative Christians, state leaders, and even feminists throughout southern Africa (Arnfred 2004a:73). Some African feminists deny that homosexuality is a reality for African women and worry that taking a stand on sexual minority rights will undermine the feminist movement’s public reputation and gains. Relating her experience at an African literature conference, Juliana Makuchi Nfah-Abbenyi (2005:275) explains how African women in attendance claimed

lesbianism was not a “problem” in Africa, it simply was not “our problem.” . . . In other words, those women vehemently affirmed their heterosexuality. . . . [T]his choice continues to stigmatize and perpetuate prejudice against what one can conjecture to be a “silenced” number of lesbian African women, who cannot

³ Coloured is a “colonially created category for mixed race people” (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:165).
speak openly about their sexuality and therefore cannot publicly and politically fight for their rights. Heterosexual women find themselves in an “enviable” bargaining position, but it is won at the expense of these silenced others. (P. 275)

Critical reflection on the exclusion of lesbians from African feminist dialogues stands as a potential obstacle for African feminisms. Marc Epprecht (2001a) questions how this exclusion is “different in principle from the ways that men historically silenced women’s voices” (p. 23). Homophobia is typical of some African feminisms, and exclusionary practices are common for some African feminists when homosexuality emerges as a subject of debate (McFadden 1996). “[W]hen [an] attack is made on homosexuality in our presence, many women . . . who would ‘normally’ consider themselves tolerant (that definitive characteristic of African progressives), either participate in the attacks (they are perverts!; they are sick!; they are influenced by Whites!; etc.) or they shy away” (McFadden 1996:viii). For McFadden (1996), what angers some African feminists about female homosexuality is lesbians’ opting out of heterosexual family and community structures, which strikes them as a betrayal. The privileging of individual sexuality over group responsibilities underscores some African feminists’ rejection of homosexuality as a cause for feminist political organizing (Epprecht 2001a). Maintaining a gender and heterosexual dichotomy then is important to some African feminists.

An African queer critique of the heterosexism implicit in some African feminist theorizing focuses on how the latter upholds a gender dichotomy in representing the past and present (van Zyl 2005b). Scholars have documented that black southern Africans engaged in same-gender sexual practices before, during, and after colonialism, debunking the notion that homosexuality is unAfrican (Bleys 1995; Epprecht 1998a; Morgan and Reid 2003; Spruill 2004; Swarr 2003). Such studies demonstrate how the erasure of same-gender sexual practices and relationships from history perpetuates gender inequalities, sexism, and homophobia and encourage African feminists to examine the oppressions that sexual and gender minorities face (Spurlin 2001; Epprecht 2004). Some African feminists have initiated critiques of heterosexism and begun to support LGBT organizing (Machera 2004; Nfah-Abbenyi 2005). In this manner, sexual and gender minorities are becoming visible in potentially positive ways for African

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feminists, suggesting possible new alliances between LGBT and feminist organizing. I turn now to queer theory’s analysis of the politics of visibility (Clarke 2000).

1.1.3 Queer Theorizing

Queer theorists have been interested in questions of visibility for some time, similar to feminist theories that examine how heterosexual privilege is invisible to its possessors. Queer theorizing positions visibility and invisibility as mutually dependent. I extrapolate from queer theorizing about individual-level visibility and the visibility of non-normative genders and sexualities to organizations that represents sexual and gender minorities. This orients my thinking about how visibility and invisibility function differently for individuals and for groups as processes and about how individuals and groups use public visibility and invisibility as instruments of power. Moreover, I follow calls to consider the constructions of gender and sexuality alongside those of race, ethnicity, and class (Barnard 2003; Cohen 2005; Mercer 1994; Sullivan 2003).

Examining the strategic implications of the public visibility of sexual and gender minorities is important to my project because it means looking at the impact of sexual and gender minorities organizing on a broader structure of social rights. Pierre Bourdieu (2001), who is not regarded as a feminist or queer theorist, inspects the mechanisms of “visible invisibility” that sexual and gender minorities desire in their quest for full and equal rights that other “good citizens[s]” have (p. 123). He describes the LGBT movement as unfolding as though sexual and gender minorities “who have had to fight to move from invisibility to visibility, to cease to be excluded and made invisible, [and] sought to become invisible again” when activists demand the same rights as heterosexuals. Bourdieu’s point is to question whether, in this scenario, sexual and gender minorities actually want what they will get because it will mean they will receive the same rights as all individuals and thus recede into public invisibility. According to Bourdieu, it is difficult to battle homophobia, intolerance, and discrimination from a position of invisibility.

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5 For a discussion about the need for theorizing that addresses the oppression of sexual minorities apart from feminist theorizing, see Rubin (1993).
1.1.3.1 Public Performances of Sexualities and Genders

Queer theory and feminism intersect in Judith Butler’s (1993) useful work on gender as subversive parody and performativity. Subversion involves mimicking the norm and reinforcing it as a reference point, much in the same way that same-sex marriage mimics heterosexual marriage, some queer critics of same-sex marriage argue. This redefinition of performativity gels with Michel “Foucault’s notion that regulatory power produces the subjects it controls, that power is not only imposed externally, but works as the regulatory and normative means by which subjects are formed” (Butler 1993:22). Performativity as drag is not necessarily subversive for Butler (1993), because there are many cases in which it merely mimes, reverses, and reinscribes heteronormativity without critically questioning it.

Sometimes, drag performances do amount to social and political disruption. In their ethnography of a Key West, Florida, drag club, Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor (2003) contend that performers enact social protest, although the identification of a concrete opponent remains elusive in their description. They suggest that “transgressive action . . . destabilizes gender and sexual categories by making visible the social basis of femininity and masculinity” (Rupp and Taylor 2003:212). For Rupp and Taylor, the broader implication of this transgressive action is the communal aspect of the enactment and consumption of the drag performance, which primes audience members, especially those who are LGBT persons, to create an oppositional consciousness. Although their argument may not satisfy social movement scholars that drag performances amount to social and political protest, nevertheless, their work is useful for thinking about the visible and performative nature of protest and for naming those involved in the staging and consumption of protest.

1.1.3.2 Sexual Rights and the Public Sphere

Political organizing around sexual dissidence takes place in a heteronormative public sphere (Warner 2002). Understanding Jürgen Habermas’ (1991) distinction between the private and public spheres is particularly helpful. In the nineteenth century in North America and Western Europe, coincident with rise of colonialism, the source of personal autonomy shifted from the private sphere of the conjugal family to the public sphere. “[P]rivatized individuals viewed themselves as independent even from the private sphere of their economic activity – as persons capable of entering into ‘purely human’ relations with one another” (Habermas
Individuals attained social relationships apart from economic transactions in civil society by exchanging ideas democratically in the public sphere. In the public sphere, individuals crafted, developed, performed, and honed their civic subjectivities, affording them the status of citizen. Individuals developed and equipped themselves with mentalities that enabled them to contribute to the maintenance of the public sphere. Like-minded individuals who objected to political mandates engaged in public-spirited debate in the public sphere (Lichterman 1996). In this sense, the public sphere could potentially facilitate and constrain political organizing. Feminist and queer theorists challenge the exclusionary principles of the public sphere and the masculinist, ethnocentric, racist, and classist bias in the construction of a universalist, white, heterosexual, middle-class man who participated freely and without constraint in the democracy Habermas (1991) describes as emerging from the public sphere (Bell 1995; Fraser 1997; Warner 2002). However, along with feminist and queer theorists, scholars of colonial and postcolonial southern Africa find that the concept of public sphere has some utility, due to the global diffusion of capitalism. Class formation and masculine domination of the public sphere typified public spheres in the global North and South (Breckenridge 1998).

Challenging the exclusionary nature of the public sphere permits those who espouse queer politics to destabilize sexual identities publicly. Thus, the queer invasion of heterosexualized spaces, such as shopping malls, amplifies sexual minorities’ public visibility (Richardson 1996:16). “There is an emphasis on occupying space, both culturally and socially” (Richardson 1996:15). There is a tension between visibility and invisibility in the public sphere in the sense that although a heterosexually saturated public sphere may operate such that it demands the invisibility of sexual and gender minorities, enough openings exist to afford sexual and gender minorities the agency to determine whether visibility or invisibility is the best strategy. Diane Richardson (1996) examines the line of thought that Eric O. Clarke (2000) and Michael Warner (1999) expose in gay and lesbian politics that aim for normalcy. She asserts, “Being queer is not about seeking the democratic right to privacy, the right to do what one wants in private, it is concerned with establishing safe space for public sexualities” (Richardson 1996).

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6 I have not been able to locate Africanist sources that critique the Western concept of the public sphere. This may be due in part to a larger postcolonial critique of the overlay of Western forms of domination and governance on to colonized places, which were parcelled into territories that became (democratic) nations. The very concept of nationhood is itself Western, and as postcolonial feminists have made clear, deconstruction can only take political organizing so far (Bulbeck 1998). Yet it is clear that the idea of the public sphere has global currency (Baker 1995; Dawson 1995; Jacobs 2002; Zegeye and Harris 2002).
Within this framework, establishing a safe space for public sexualities might entail promoting the visibility of sexual and gender minorities, demonstrating that homosexuality is not unAfrican, and challenging widely held assumptions about sexual and gender minorities circulating in the public sphere. Visibility emerges as a fundamental question for LGBT persons as individuals, but also as a concern for sexual and gender minorities as a social group. There is very little research, however, on how organized groups pursue this agenda of “establishing safe space for public sexualities,” which is a gap I hope to fill with my research (Richardson 1996:15).

1.1.4 Social Movement Theorizing

Whereas queer theory heralds the promise of public visibility as a means to destabilize identity categories (Green 2007; Jagose 1996), social movement research investigates how organized sexual and gender minorities package and disseminate their claims. Queer theory is interested in why individuals use public visibility to overturn stable sexual identity categories, whereas social movement theory attends to how groups make themselves and their claims public.

I draw on two strains of social movement theorizing—new social movement (NSM) theory and political process theory (PPT)—which, together, explain how SMOs devise and deploy strategies of visibility and invisibility based on their internal processes and response to an external sociopolitical context. Mario Diani and Donatella della Porta (1999) offer a useful working definition of social movements as “(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest” (della Porta and Diani 1999:16). This definition highlights the major components of social movements: how collective identities hold members together, how groups develop and pursue their goals through protest, and how politics and culture serve as sources of conflict that mobilize groups to act.

I use “strategies of visibility” as a concept instead of “tactics of visibility.” John Lofland (1996:259) differentiates between strategies and tactics in terms of level of abstraction within an SMO’s decision-making process. “Strategy is a way of ‘framing’ specific choices about targeting, timing, and tactics” (Ganz 2000:1010). Tactics refer to the isolated choices that “govern behavior toward” different audiences and opponents (Lofland 1996:259). Thus, tactics
make up a particular strategy. Instead of studying choices as discrete occurrences or tactics, I am interested in determining if the choices that SMOs make accrue in any meaningful way to an overarching strategy of visibility or invisibility.

1.1.4.1 New Social Movement Theorizing

New social movement (NSM) theorizing examines the political organization and identities of the new middle classes that contribute time, energy, and resources to achieving shared goals of social and political change. NSMs are often organized nonhierarchically and put consensus-based, participatory democracy into practice (Edelman 2001; Pichardo 1997). Theorists regard LGBT movements as NSMs because they occupy a space of “noninstitutional politics which is not provided for in the doctrines and practice of liberal democracy and the welfare state” (Offe 1985:826). NSMs also respond to the “broadening, deepening, and increasing irreversibility of forms of domination and deprivation” that accompany capitalism (Offe 1985:845). In their pursuit of “quality of life concerns,” NSMs are self-reflexive in that they persistently question their ideological orientation and purpose, inculcating the norm of “conscious choices of structures and action” (Pichardo 1997:421, 415). According to Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper (2001), NSMs seek “recognition for new identities and lifestyles,” a statement consistent with the equation of NSMs with identity politics (p. 286).

NSM theorizing will remain limited as long as researchers cite only cases from North America and Western Europe, which suggests that this phenomenon depends on a certain mode of economic development with attendant rights and privileges for the new middle class (Pichardo 1997). NSM theorizing also offers an identity-based account of how movement groups recruit members and make their identities relevant and worthy of public attention. An account of these processes “gives us a window on the implicit meaning that makes organization in the abstract . . . mean very different things in different contexts” (Lichterman 1998:408). By itself, NSM theorizing can account for the initial emergence of a group through the solidarity that sexual and gender minorities express through their shared experiences of oppression and for the collective identity that develops within the group and sustains participation. Yet it does not account for the processes by which the group perceives external opportunities for deploying sexual identities that contest a dominant heteronormative framework.
In an important move for social movement theory, Mary Bernstein (2002) advocates abandoning the distinction between “political” and “cultural” movements (p. 536). Using the U.S. gay and lesbian movement as a case study, she demonstrates how the movement pursues political and cultural goals in the interest of provoking wider social structural change. I follow Bernstein’s (2002) example in bringing together NSM and political process theorizing in order to understand how, when, and why LGBT social movement organizations in Namibia and South Africa use strategies of visibility and invisibility. Though she does not use the concept of visibility and invisibility, Bernstein (2002) shows how aspects of sexual and gender minority identity are neither entirely visible nor entirely invisible because “to mobilize a constituency, a social movement must draw on an existing identity or construct a new collective identity,” which is drawn from the submerged experiences of activists (p. 539). Whereas Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2002) assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between individual and group visibility in sexual minority movements’ coming out routines, Bernstein (2002) instead portrays how groups assemble and mobilize a collective identity related to their sexuality.

1.1.4.2 Political Process Theorizing

Political process theorizing (PPT) considers social movements as the primary actors in a field of political opportunities and constraints (della Porta and Diani 1999). Although theorists initially designed the model to explain social movement mobilization in Western democratic contexts (Schock 1999), other scholars have used the framework to explore how revolutionary movements in developing countries toppled authoritarian regimes and transformed themselves into political parties. PPT casts social movements as capable of taking advantage of shifting opportunities in “cycles of protest” to pursue their goals (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998). For Sidney Tarrow (1998), shifts in the political opportunity structure can incite or obstruct social movement activity and also initiate a new phase of political action. PPT also assumes that public visibility is an intrinsic feature of any social movement, for as Francesca Polletta (1998) observes, scholars often define movement emergence using a spatial metaphor: its ability to surface, to emerge, and to gain enough momentum that scholars notice it.

Within a PPT framework, the shift to democracy in Namibia and South Africa resulted in more opportunities for sexual and gender minority movement organizations to make demands, generating cascading effects such as increased LGBT cultural and political visibility. PPT is
useful for explaining the ascendancy, maintenance, and dissolution of LGBT movements in Namibia and South Africa (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Croucher 2002; Engel 2001) because it draws attention to the ebb and flow of movements over time as shifts in the external political environment make certain actions possible, and other less possible, for SMOs. In addition, PPT’s emphasis on “cycles of protest” raises questions about how changes in strategic choices among LGBT SMOs may be patterned in a cyclical fashion, such that they may accrue to an overall strategy of visibility and invisibility.

PPT also offers social movement scholars another useful analytic category for understanding strategies, that of the repertoire of contention. Tarrow (1998) elaborates on how social movements store and transmit knowledge about strategies that have yielded success and failure to offspring movements through a repertoire of contention. A structural and cultural concept, the repertoire of contention encompasses “not only what people do when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do” (p. 30). In other words, the repertoire of contention entails actions groups take, how they determine what constitutes a feasible action, and how other audiences will respond to the action. Charles Tilly (1988) enumerates examples of different strategies that populate the repertoire of contention, all of which have a component of publicity: “meetings, marches, demonstrations, petitions, strikes, public confrontations with authorities, and similar forms of collective action” (p. 4). The equation of visibility with the repertoire of contention deserves closer scrutiny from scholars.

1.1.4.3 Strategic Choice Framework

A strategic choice framework can merge a culturalist (NSM) and political (PPT) approach by allowing analysts to focus on how, when, and why SMOs make certain choices (Jasper 2004, 2006). By strategic choices, I mean the decision to use SMO resources to execute a task in the pursuit of a larger organizational or movement goal. Internal SMO dynamics and an external sociopolitical context influence the choices that SMOs make (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Jasper 2004). “Strategic choices are made within a complex set of cultural and institutional contexts that shape the players themselves, the options perceived, the choices made from among them, and the outcomes” (Jasper 2004:5). For instance, Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004) found that the decision of anti-drunk driving activists in the United States to assist
survivors of drunk-driving incidents could boost a chapter’s credibility with different audiences, but such assistance also siphoned resources and emotional energy from chapter leaders and members, creating a deficit for the SMO (pp. 641-2). By focusing on the micropolitical decisions that take place within SMOs, researchers can examine how choices unfold and affect the development of SMOs (Blee and Currier 2005). Strategic choices can encompass deciding whom to recruit (Gamson 1975; McAdam 1988), which tactics to use (Carmin and Balser 2002; Downey 1986; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004), which audiences to target (Gamson 1975), how to present a collective identity publicly (Bernstein 1997; Einwohner 2006), and whether and how to respond to political opportunities (Blee and Currier 2006).

The strategies LGBT SMOs in one country use may influence those that LGBT SMOs in a neighboring country uses. Examining the diffusion of strategies among LGBT SMOs can lead to questions about fundamental assumptions of social movement theory. Such scrutiny challenges whether confrontational queer politics like that which ACT-UP favored in North America are suitable in Namibia and South Africa, where the cultural, social, and political histories of sexual and gender minorities are quite different. Strategic choices develop in and are constrained by local sociopolitical contexts, but it does not mean that SMOs devise them in isolation. It is possible that activists draw on their understanding of how SMOs in a neighboring country use strategies of visibility and invisibility. Activists in these organizations may consult international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or local SMOs about what other groups have done in similar circumstances. By examining the refinement and shifts of Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices in their sociopolitical contexts, I hope to shed light on internal SMO dynamics, as scholars know little about SMOs in both countries or about LGBT SMOs in the global South. However, I do not draw conclusions about the effectiveness of SMOs’ strategic choices due to the difficulty associated with measuring SMO outcomes (Ganz 2000).

1.1.4.4 Visibility as a Social Movement Concept

How groups manage to achieve public visibility remains a mystery for some social movement scholars. Ruud Koopmans (2004) casts this question in the following way

On an average day in a random Western democracy, thousands of press statements are issued by a variety of parties, interest groups, and movement organizations, hundreds of demonstrations, meetings, strikes, vigils, and other
protests are staged, and numerous press conferences vie for the attention of the public and policy-makers. (P. 371)

This statement indicates the uphill struggle for groups to attain public visibility. Very little social movement activity percolates into public view (Blee and Currier 2005), if scholars take a strict view of the media controlling visibility in a top-down manner. By studying visibility and invisibility through SMOs’ strategic choices, I hope to disrupt the assumption that events or issues only achieve public visibility in one way: through the media. Examining a range of strategies demonstrates how variable organizational visibility and invisibility can be.

SMOs often achieve public visibility when they take advantage of political opportunities. Koopmans (2004) uses political opportunity as a concept to describe how SMOs try to obtain media coverage or reach certain audiences as they manipulate opportunities to their advantage. Koopmans and Susan Olzak (2004) portray these opportunities as distinctly discursive because activists use the public sphere strategically to “communicate messages to fellow activists and potential adherents” and “to gain crucial information about the actions and reactions of authorities, political opponents, allies, and sympathizers” (p. 199). This description demonstrates how SMOs may use the media strategically for gathering and disseminating information (Carroll and Ratner 1999; Ryan 1991). Although Koopmans (2004) expressly focuses on visibility from the media’s perspective, I am more interested in examining visibility and invisibility from the perspective of SMOs.

Just as organizations may pursue public visibility at times, they may also pursue public invisibility. This is an unstated assumption in Koopmans’ (2004) and Koopmans and Olzak’s (2004) discussions of social movement actors’ pursuit of strategic public visibility. They use political process theory as a way to examine the media as a political opportunity (Koopmans 2004), but other potential audiences, such as the state, the sexual minority community, human rights organizations, and other sympathetic or hostile groups, constitute part of the larger external sociopolitical environment (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). There may be groups in the external sociopolitical environment to which LGBT SMOs may not want to be visible. An SMO in a repressive sociopolitical context may eschew public visibility in favor of invisibility in order to avoid confrontations with a group that makes threats against the well-being of the organization or its members or to concentrate on projects that do not necessarily require media attention (Earl 2003). Hostile groups, such as antigay religious groups or political parties with antigay platforms, may comprise audiences to which organizations may want to be invisible (Miceli
2005). In this sense, hostile audiences may not be safe for LGBT SMOs. Activists may decide that it is more judicious to wage their protest through backchannels by engaging in subtler cultural and political forms of resistance, such as “behind-the-scenes behaviors rather than public ones” (Earl 2003; see also Johnston 2006). In periods of political and cultural tranquility, SMOs may appear stagnant because they do not engage in overt protest (Taylor 1989), but invisible forms of protests may indicate subtle forms of resistance to political domination and social inequalities (Bhabha 1994; Scott 1985). SMOs may also not want to wear out their welcome in the media, or if they change their goals, they may recede from visibility to tailor their visibility strategies to fit the new goals.

SMOs may construct interior spaces to allow members to withdraw from public scrutiny and plan their next moves safely. Such free, or safe, spaces “are the environments in which people are able to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills, and values of cooperation and civic virtue” (Evans and Boyte 1992:17). Safe spaces are variations of free spaces. They are likely more insular than free spaces, due in part to the feared repression that an SMO or individuals who possess a stigmatized identity face. Free or safe spaces are often unobtrusive and not readily observable by casually interested individuals because they are part of pre-existing groups or social institutions or are physically more inaccessible to public viewing (Morris 1984). Though some scholars question the utility of free and safe spaces as a concept (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Polletta 1998, 1999), Mai Palmberg (1999:267) regards safe spaces as key to the relationship between LGBT SMOs and the sexual and gender minority community. For Palmberg (1999), safe spaces function as a precursor to political organizing. She contends that organizations operate as a “safe space” for sexual minorities because they “provide meeting places and . . . answer the psychological needs of insecure and harassed gays and lesbians” (Palmberg 1999:267). However, this supposes that perhaps all sexual and gender minorities in southern Africa experience marginalization because of their sexual orientation, which is a dangerous generalization. Nevertheless, SMOs may operate as concrete safe physical spaces where sexual and gender minorities can explore their sexual and gender identities. Additionally, the public action of “lobbying for gay rights” is an important political reminder to sexual and gender minorities that organizations are fighting for their rights, but this public visibility “can take a more ostentatious form, giving the world a ‘here

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7 I use the term “antigay” as an umbrella term to capture a wide array of anti-LGBT prejudice and attitudes.
we are’ message, through carnivals and other manifestations of visible existence” (Palmberg 1999:267; see also Spruill 2004; Swarr 2004). The latter form of cultural visibility reminds sexual and gender minorities that the more they enter the public sphere, the safer they may feel, increasing the likelihood they may engage in political and cultural work.

Pursuing visibility may be an important overall strategy for LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa since countering homophobia involves exposing it in multiple places: the state, social institutions, public sphere, and private sphere (Koopmans 2004). Some scholars insist that visibility is an imperative first step for sexual minority groups, by allowing LGBT persons to meet safely and bring their grievances to the public (Palmberg 1999). The argument that LGBT SMOs must be visible to protect and advance the interests of LGBT persons is the foundation for the “coming out” visibility strategy that some LGBT SMOs in North America and Western Europe use. Yet it is unclear to what extent Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs employ such strategies (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002).

1.1.5 LGBT Visibility in Movements

LGBT social movement organizations are emerging throughout the global South (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Bacchetta 2002). In his analysis of LGBT movements in southern Africa, Mark Ungar (2000) links the globalization of the movement to the growing authority of international human rights organizations—Amnesty International, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC)—which pressure states that sponsor homophobia or persecute sexual and gender minorities to be more tolerant of sexual and gender diversity. International NGOs may facilitate the transmission of movement ideologies, identities, and organizational forms from the global North to the global South, but LGBT SMOs in the global South may selectively borrow strategies from the North, an example of how strategic choices unfold differently in various places. Considering how political strategies are unevenly dispersed globally, Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2002) dispute Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) seemingly ethnocentric understanding of protest cycles as containing periods of turbulence that spread from
“center to periphery”: from urban to rural and from the United States and Western Europe to underdeveloped countries. “Although he [Tarrow] acknowledges that non-Western people may receive diffusion items generated in the West, he pays little attention to how such cross-border dissemination evolves or why it occurs in some times and places and not others (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002:703-4, original emphasis). Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) disagree with the ethnocentric, essentialist tendency in Tarrow’s (1998) formulation because it misses the dynamics of how strategies travel from one place to another or why this transmission occurs within some movements and not in others.

I return to Chabot and Duyvendak’s (2002) analysis of the transnational diffusion of strategies across LGBT movements because they make several erroneous assumptions about the visibility of LGBT movements in southern Africa. The linchpin of their argument is that “although it has never gone uncontested, ‘coming out’ represents the diffusion item disseminating within and between gay and lesbian movements since the end of the 1960s” (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002:712). They first assume that LGBT movements opt to “come out” in public. This premise is linked to the metaphor of visuality implicit in much social movement literature, which presumes that social movement emergence amounts to groups accruing enough internal momentum and/or external interest that they achieve public visibility with their actions or statements. In this sense, all LGBT movements must evolve in the direction of public visibility if they are to succeed. However, there is danger in promoting a single model of social movement evolution because it may not be applicable to contexts outside of Western democracies in which there has been or is limited democratic debate in the public sphere.

Second, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) suppose that individual “coming out” routines accrue systematically to the level of group organization. If enough individuals come out publicly as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, Chabot and Duyvendak assume that they will somehow organize themselves into a publicly visible group, as though social movement organization is an organic occurrence emerging spontaneously from the public outing of many sexual and gender

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8 I attribute ethnocentrism to Tarrow’s (1998) formulation, though Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) do not use this term. They prefer the concept “essentialist diffusionism,” a burdensome term that still captures the criticism of how some North American and Western European social movement scholars privilege the global North as the site of “developed” political strategies, which are then exported to the global South. Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) are interested in showing how sometimes, “diffusion items” such as strategy and ideology, as in the case of Gandhian nonviolence, originate in the global South and enter circulation in the global North (see also Chabot 2004).
minorities. This logic is faulty because it presumes that there is a natural correspondence between individual visibility and group visibility, much in the same way that some activist groups in the U.S. assume that gay economic visibility, as in increased spending power, or gay cultural visibility, as in television shows featuring gay characters, is equivalent to gay political visibility (Clarke 2000). Cities may have neighborhoods where gay men and lesbians dominate the public space as consumers and “citizens,” but their presence does not guarantee that these individuals have actively sought to organize themselves (García Canclini 2001). The formulation also assumes that personal sexual and gender identity becomes politicized through the coming out routine. Certainly, coming out may involve consciousness-raising of a sort for individuals, but this does not necessarily translate into political action.

Ungar (2000:64) similarly errs when describing the political opportunities that accompanied the eradication of apartheid resulted in the “increased visibility of LGBT communities.” Implicit in his analysis is that organized groups took advantage of these opportunities to make political advances. The public visibility of a sexual and gender minority community means that there will also be publicly visible sexual and gender minority movement organizations. Organizations may or may not deploy strategies of visibility in places where they are known, as in the sexual minority community: gay-owned businesses, nightclubs, and bookstores, community centers, and health clinics that cater to persons living with HIV/AIDS.

Third, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) assume that once groups and individual “come out,” they remain out. Social movement scholarship, especially Verta Taylor’s (1989) work on the abeyance structures of the U.S. women’s movement that sustained the movement during its doldrums, dispels this assumption because it demonstrates that in politically hostile circumstances, groups may recede from public visibility or limit their visibility so that they can pursue projects without harassment from the state or other opponents. Mark Gevisser (1995) chronicles the ebb and flow of LGBT organization efforts from the 1950s to the present in South Africa, offering evidence that internal and external factors led to the disappearance of groups. Individuals may be “out” publicly as sexual and gender minorities with friends, family, and coworkers, but organizations may not be so visible to the public or even to the sexual and gender

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9 I omitted “intersexed” from this list because only one South African LGBT SMO, Behind the Mask, I observed included intersexed individuals in the list of sexual and gender minority interests it represents. Behind the Mask covered few stores related to intersexed persons in South Africa.
minority community. Activists in these organizations may preserve the organization’s anonymity so that they can offer discreet counseling services to sexual and gender minorities and persons living with HIV/AIDS or withdraw from public view to refashion its objectives and strategies. Invisibility may have its rewards for groups because if they reemerge to the general public and to the sexual and gender minority community, they may appear revitalized, resulting in more political clout for their efforts.

Fourth, Chabot and Duyvendak’s (2002) emphasis on coming out routines exaggerate the importance of a group’s (or individual’s) emergence as publicly visible because the SMO (or individual) becomes reduced to or synonymous with its initial coming out story. The preoccupation with origins can lead to unproductive debates about an SMO’s authenticity and if it “really” pursues the interests of the sexual and gender minorities that it purports to represent. While these debates may be important to SMO, it can paralyze social movement research. It is difficult to assess if an SMO hews to its “original” intent because the passage of time may lead to contradictory accounts from activists about the SMO’s origins.

Fifth, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) claim that the HIV/AIDS pandemic spurred the transmission of coming out routines from Western democracies to developing countries. However, it does not seem to be the case that Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs emerged as organizations primarily in response to HIV/AIDS. Though Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) acknowledge that LGBT movement in South Africa owes its emergence to activist ties with the antiapartheid movement and the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1980s, even this does not consider earlier attempts at LGBT organizing that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Gevisser 1995). HIV/AIDS organizing emerged as an offshoot of LGBT activism in the 1980s and 1990s when HIV-positive gay activists such as Zackie Achmat called on LGBT SMOs to address how the pandemic went unacknowledged among men who have sex with men and women who have sex with women. Achmat’s Treatment Action Campaign stands out an exemplar of militant AIDS activism, calling on the state to provide treatment to persons living with HIV/AIDS and to attend to the transmission of HIV among men who have sex with men and women who have sex with women (Friedman and Mottiar 2005, 2006; Robins 2006).

Finally, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) do not entertain the notion that events or advances in political organizing in neighboring southern African countries can and do ignite sexual minority debates locally. For instance, President Robert Mugabe’s antigay rhetoric in
relation to the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe’s attempt to lease a booth at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair from which to distribute pamphlets promoting safer sex and counseling groups sparked homophobic statements from leaders in other southern African countries including Namibia (Epprecht 2004; Hoad 1999, 2000; HRW and IGLHRC 2003). South African LGBT SMOs staged protests in objection to Mugabe’s homophobia when he visited South Africa in the mid-1990s. As I will elaborate in Chapter Three, LGBT movement ideologies and strategies circulated from South Africa to Zimbabwe and Namibia, and Zimbabwean organizational forms also impacted Namibian LGBT organizing.

1.1.6 The LGBT Movement as a Case for Studying SMO Visibility

Visibility is a useful strategy and theoretical orientation that LGBT movements in the global South have embraced (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). Just as publicity functions differently in distinct political fields (Beissinger 1999), LGBT persons around the world experience visibility and invisibility in diverse ways. Processes of visibility become hybridized as LGBT SMOs incorporate them into their own repertoires of action and cultures (Bhabha 1994; Phillips 2001).

Many scholars have examined the production of visibility of LGBT persons as individuals and as a social group, primarily in the North. These processes include promulgating positive messages about LGBT persons in the media, which “can prepare the ground for gay civil rights protection” (Hennessy 1994:31-32). A large body of scholarship shows how performing sexualities publicly creates spaces for fluid social and sexual identities (Butler 1990, 1993). Geographers, in particular, have studied how LGBT persons in North America and Western Europe mask their sexual identities to avoid harassment or violence in heterosexualized public settings (Corteen 2002; Steinbugler 2005). Research on the queering of spaces in the Ivory Coast (Nguyen 2005), Thailand (Sinnott 2004; Wilson 2004), Brazil (Green 2001), and Argentina (Foster 1998) expands existing research on LGBT identities outside of North America and Western Europe, the use of public space by LGBT persons and groups, and the processes by which LGBT persons opt to become visible or to withdraw from visibility (Corteen 2002).

Though these studies make important contributions to the burgeoning literature on LGBT performances of identities, the conceptual opacity of visibility still beleaguered many studies of
LGBT publicity. What happens after LGBT persons become visible? Does the performance of visibility end with a permanent state of visibility? Unless scholars address these questions, the assumption that after “coming out” publicly, LGBT persons in the global North and South remain out, goes unquestioned. Visibility for LGBT persons becomes a default outcome or accomplishment dispersed across time and space, rather than an unfolding social process, strategy, or performance that takes place within a confined time and space. LGBT public visibility may be a political victory in North America or Western Europe, but regarding the concept only as an accomplishment obscures the processes by which LGBT persons elsewhere emerge publicly and the obstacles they face in so doing.

Just as scholars ignore the processes by which LGBT persons become and remain visible, they also disregard how LGBT SMOs become visible. The “struggle to be seen” (Guidry 2003:493, emphasis removed) transcends movements for social change, yet few studies interrogate how social movements cultivate visibility. How social movements or SMOs manage their public visibility remains a process that many scholars overlook, even though it is crucial to an organization’s ability to broker relations between unconnected activists or groups (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) or to obtain funding or support from international donors (Bob 2002, 2005). Studying how SMOs cultivate public visibility or retreat from public view can shed light on how activists prioritize and tailor their messages for certain audiences.

The LGBT social movement is an excellent case study for examining how social movement organizations craft their own visibility. Social movement organizations are guarantors of “safe space[s]” for LGBT persons because they “provide meeting places and . . . answer the psychological needs of insecure and harassed gays and lesbians” (Palmberg 1999:267). How, when, and why do LGBT social activists use a collective identity publicly? Does the deployment of markers of LGBT public collective identities, if there are any, differ in the global North and South? If so, how?10 If scholars do not pose these crucial questions about the strategic nature of visibility, it runs the risk of becoming a flypaper concept, catching all forms of LGBT movement publicity.11

10 Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to contrast strategies of public visibility among LGBT SMOs in the global North and South, such a study could problematize how these strategies are diffused from one nation to another and how movement cultures and strategies evolve locally.

11 Other forms of publicity include how LGBT persons consume goods and how corporations target them with advertising (Chasin 2000). These may be less relevant forms of publicity for LGBT persons in poor nations.
1.2 THE AIM OF THIS PROJECT

In this dissertation, I will examine the strategies of visibility and invisibility of LGBT SMOs in Windhoek, Namibia, and Johannesburg, South Africa, from 1995 to the present. Strategies of visibility refer to decisions and actions that a sexual minority movement organization takes to become visible to an audience or constituency, a group from which the SMO can recruit members (Gamson 1975). A group may also use “strategies of invisibility” to remain hidden from certain audiences or simultaneous strategies of visibility and invisibility when it wants to work with certain organizations in coalitions, for instance, but not be publicly visible to everyone. Possible target audiences include the state and its appendages, general public, mass media, political parties, Northern donors, “religious, medical, and educational organizations, professional associations, and private associations” with their grievances and messages (Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004:28; see also Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Lind and Share 2003).

In South Africa, the LGBT movement has percolated to greater public visibility in the media than the Namibian movement has, due in part to the success the South African movement had in getting the African National Congress (ANC) to enshrine sexual minority rights permanently in the constitution. The Namibian movement has not experienced such a large win. Nevertheless, it is worth studying how movements in differing sociopolitical contexts make strategic choices about their public visibility and invisibility. A comparison of cases will help to shed light on this lingering question.

In addition to supplementing the scarcity of research on LGBT movements in general, this research will contribute to the understudied cases of LGBT movements in southern Africa, specifically, in Namibia and South Africa. Most research on social movements in these nations concentrates on the labor movement (Seidman 1994), anti-apartheid movement (Gurney 2000; Seidman 2001), national liberation movement (Leys and Saul 1995; McConnell 2000; Melber 2004), and the women’s rights movement (Becker 1995; Hassim 2005; Kuumba 2002). Although a few scholars are beginning to investigate sexual minority movements in southern Africa (Aarmo 1999; Epprecht 2004; Hoad 1999), they focus on episodes, such as the constitutional protection of sexual rights in 1996 in South Africa (Cock 2003; Croucher 2002; Gevisser 1995) or on Namibian President Nujoma’s rhetoric that attacks sexual minorities (Dunton and
Palmberg 1996; Palmberg 1999). Such attention to extraordinary episodes misses the cultural and political mechanisms by which organizations sustain a long-term campaign against homophobia in official and public spaces (Epprecht 2004). In addition, my research will help rectify the paucity of research of SMOs in the global South, specifically in Namibia and South Africa, by highlighting the strategic range and capacity of SMOs in differing sociopolitical contexts (Ganz 2000, 2004; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005). My multi-method data collection procedure captures the external sociopolitical context in which Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs operate and SMOs’ internal dynamics. I use micro-level ethnographic fieldwork and intensive interviews to understand the internal dynamics of social movement groups and historical document analysis and interviews to examine the external sociopolitical field in which groups operate (Ray 1999).

1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

In Chapter Two, I chronicle the rise of South African LGBT organizing in the context of apartheid laws and policies from the 1960s to 2006. I pay particular attention to how antiapartheid and gay and lesbian organizing was intertwined. I also document the emergence of Namibian LGBT organizing after national independence and in response to state repression. I also introduce the four LGBT SMOs with which I conducted intensive ethnographic observation and explain their organizational structure and goals.

In Chapter Three, I detail how I collected and analyzed ethnographic, interview, and document data. I explain how I operationalized the concept of visibility and invisibility through ethnographic observation, qualitative interviews, and archival and organizational documents. I also consider the effect of my subject position as a white American female academic on research sites and participants who were diverse in terms of their race, gender, sexual orientation, and class.

In Chapter Four, I examine how LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility unfolded differently for the Forum for the Empowerment of Women and Sister Namibia in differing sociopolitical contexts in South Africa and Namibia. Scholars sometimes regard SMOs’ strategic choices as infinite, reflecting this framework’s utility in open, democratic systems. I
explore, in great detail, the constraints that LGBT SMOs in these newly democratizing nations faced when making certain choices. I answer three research questions in this chapter. First, how, when, and why do LGBT SMOs choose to become visible to different audiences? Second, how and why do LGBT SMOs choose which constituency/ies they will represent? Third, how and why do LGBT SMOs choose in which campaigns they will become involved?

In Chapter Five, I analyze how LGBT SMOs in South Africa and Namibia receded into invisibility by forgoing political and legal opportunities. In the first part, I consider how South African LGBT SMOs failed to mobilize around the same-sex marriage win. I focus on events that siphoned attention away from SMOs’ commitment to the same-sex marriage campaign. In the second part, I investigate how Namibian LGBT SMOs eschewed a legal strategy in light of the state’s hostility. This contributed to the movement’s overall invisibility on legal challenges, such as striking down sodomy laws. In this chapter, I consider how strategic inaction on the part of LGBT SMOs accrues into an overall pattern of invisibility.

In Chapter Six, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations handled the strategic dilemma of public presentation. First, Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project encountered the dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican because they received funding from Northern donors. Second, Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations confronted the dilemma of whether and how to introduce a unified pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. They were concerned that unfavorable visibility at the African Commission could result in negative consequences for their local organizing and for LGBT persons in different African countries. Third, Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs had to decide whether to include transgender persons in the African LGBT activist contingent that would attend the African Commission’s meeting in Banjul, The Gambia. I contextualize this dilemma by probing how Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs integrated and defined transgender rights, identities, and issues differently.

I conclude my examination of South African and Namibian LGBT SMOs in Chapter 7 by revisiting the contributions my dissertation makes to social movement, postcolonial feminist, and queer theorizing. I also examine the implications of my findings for transnational queer studies. Of importance for transnational queer analyses is an ongoing interrogation of the portrayal of
LGBT persons in countries in the global South as victims. I also consider the ethnocentric bias implicit in some queer scholarship and international LGBT organizing.
2.0 THE SEXUAL MINORITY MOVEMENT IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid profoundly affected the lives of South African and Namibian sexual and gender minorities and limited opportunities for political organizing (Holmes 1997:162). The South African apartheid state treated sexual and gender minorities differently depending on their race and gender. For instance, the state regarded homosexuality as a white problem, leaving black and coloured sexual and gender minorities untouched (Gevisser 1995; Retief 1995). Legally, nonwhite sexual and gender minorities did not exist as governable subjects based on their sexual or gender identity, but rather as racialized subjects under apartheid. As such, the apartheid state interpreted sexual and gender categories rigidly, polarizing heterosexual and homosexual identities and practices (McClintock 1995). In general, white lesbians were not visible to state leaders because they were “assumed to exist in lesser numbers than homosexual men” and not to be mothers; however, when they became the subject of state scrutiny during discussions of amending the Immorality Act in Parliament in the late 1960s, members of Parliament discussed lesbians “in terms of their sexual activity, looks, and butch role-playing” (Retief 1995:103). Legislators worried about white lesbians only to the extent that they did not conform to white Afrikaner expectations about femininity, heterosexual marriage, and motherhood (McClintock 1995). Black and coloured lesbians and gay men ultimately remained invisible to apartheid authorities, but enterprising black and coloured South Africans operated informal township bars out of their homes and provided spaces for black and coloured lesbians and gay men to socialize (Chetty 1995a, 1995b; Gevisser 1995).

In this chapter, I situate the emergence and growth of LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa against the backdrop of apartheid laws and policies and antiapartheid and national liberation movements. I also introduce the four lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMOs) that I studied: Behind the Mask (South Africa), the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (South Africa); Sister Namibia (Namibia); and The
Rainbow Project (TRP). I begin by describing how and why South Africa and Namibia constituted the same country until 1990 and how apartheid affected the citizens of both countries and sexual and gender minority organizing.

2.1 APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Until 1966, South Africa ruled Namibia—formerly South West Africa, a German colony—but between 1966 and 1989, South Africa defied United Nations directives to relinquish Namibia as a colonial possession and subjected Namibians to apartheid laws and policies (Saul 2005; Saunders 2000). South Africans and Namibians share a common history of being subject to apartheid laws, practices, and policies. Under apartheid, the state banished many Africans to ethnic homelands, or “bantustans” (Kössler 2000; Mamdani 1996). Implemented formally in 1948, the apartheid principle of “separate development” held that cultures would evolve independently of one another, according to their own gifts and trajectories, on homelands that “aimed to engineer a complete balkanization of the country” (Jacobs 2002:282). The relocation of black South Africans and Namibians to homelands reduced many to extreme poverty. Other apartheid policies and practices included controlling the movement of nonwhites with pass laws, using nonwhites to police and repress nonwhites, and preventing nonwhites from accessing high-paying, prestigious jobs and educational opportunities (James and Lever 2001; Jensen 2001; Landis and Davis 1979; Mamdani 1996). “In Namibia, as in South Africa, oppression occurred not so much by terror per se as by the routinization of terror in day-to-day interaction” (Gordon 2002:77). Though the apartheid regime politically excluded nonwhite South Africans and Namibians through legislation, whites needed the economic participation and labor of nonwhites to propel South Africa’s economic development forward (Younis 2000:80). The simultaneous economic inclusion and political exclusion of nonwhite South Africans nurtured a budding working class and underclass that enabled the African National Congress (ANC) to mastermind a mass antiapartheid movement within the country’s borders (Younis 2000).

Despite the extreme set of controls that the state instituted, white South Africans became nervous about the independence movements in neighboring central and southern African nations, and “the determination to maintain white supremacy grew” (Frederickson 2002:133). Covert
resistance became organized public displays of resistance, as in the cases of black women protesting the implementation and enforcement of pass laws in the 1950s (Kuumba 2002; Walker 1982) and of armed violent conflict in Namibia and South Africa (Leys and Saul 1995). Resistance owed its emergence to working-class interests as white and nonwhite workers protested worsening industrial working conditions (Seidman 1994; Younis 2000). By the mid-twentieth century, each country had a national liberation movement that was antiapartheid and anticolonial in political orientation. In South Africa, antiapartheid activists organized into different groups, with many aligning with the ANC, and some leaders voluntarily went into exile in Europe and North America to pressure Northern governments and citizens to take action against South Africa (Thorn 2006). In Namibia, the movement focused on liberating the nation. The South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia fought for independence on two fronts: internationally by demanding that the United Nations force South Africa to give up its mandate over South West Africa and locally by resisting South Africa’s apartheid rule through armed fighting. Thus, the Namibian struggle for independence from South Africa had a decidedly local and international flavor, a strategy that antiapartheid and sexual minority activists continued to utilize.

2.2 GAY AND LESBIAN ORGANIZING IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: 1960S-1970S

South African gay and lesbian activists have tended to distinguish between the formation of gay and lesbian subcultural institutions, such as bars, clubs, and similar meeting places, and political organizing (Gevisser 1995). This dichotomy mirrors the tendency of some scholars to separate culture and politics when analyzing social movements (Bernstein 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Staggenborg 2001). This distinction stems from the apartheid state’s repression of sexual minorities through policing and laws, thus forcing black, coloured, and white gay and lesbian subcultures into invisibility (Gevisser 1995). In the 1950s, white gay bars and parties

12 I intentionally use the terms “gay and lesbian” and “LGBT” to indicate historical shifts in sexual and gender minority organizing in including individuals and issues that did not map neatly on to “gay and lesbian” identities and issues.
escaped notice from apartheid authorities who were too busy trying to stamp out black national liberation activists in the 1950s (Cage 2003:12), but state repression in the 1960s made some white gay men and lesbians question the utility of public organizing, initiating a trend of sporadic public visibility and invisibility of sexual minority organizing in South Africa. Thus, few gays and lesbians “have been prepared to ‘go public’ as leaders” since the 1960s due to a feared state backlash (Gevisser 1995:45).

Any talk of “rights” was regarded by suspicion not only by the authorities, but by the conservative white gay community itself, which eschewed any identification—either overt or implicit—with the broader liberation struggle. But even in the largely black gay organisations of the 1990s, which have embraced strongly liberationist politics, the tension between political activism and the maintenance of social space still exists (Gevisser 1995:45).

Gulfs between black, coloured, and white gay and lesbian organizing in South Africa have existed since the 1960s, just as the inclusion of white lesbians in white gay male organizing has been uneven over the years. Yet white gay men and lesbians did not form communities and social spaces before or even independently of coloured and black gay men and lesbians. White and coloured gay urban subcultures coexisted and flourished in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban between the mid-twentieth century and the present (Chetty 1995a; Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992; Lewis and Loots 1995; Reid 2005).13 Gay men, however, consistently excluded lesbians from gay venues because “in the patriarchal society of apartheid South Africa, these places were the hunting grounds of men only” (Cage 2003:11). White gay men and lesbians periodically joined forces to oppose repressive legislation and policing between the 1960s and 1980s.

South African LGBT activists long regarded the state as a primary target. The apartheid state’s legal and social control over citizens made it a principal social institution in the lives of South Africans and Namibians (Mamdani 1996). “[F]or white lesbian and gay South Africans . . . the force of antigay laws was profound,” yet “the criminal laws against homosexuality entailed significantly worse problems for lesbians and gays of color” (Goodman 2001:94). Intent on eradicating homosexuality among whites, the police raided urban epicenters of white gay

13 Relationships among black South African men of differing ages and statuses were also common in mines, sometimes resulting in “mine marriages” (Moodie, Ndatshe, and Sibuyi 1988; see also Epprecht 2004). Black lesbian sangomas (traditional healers) have been mainstays and important religious leaders in their communities in the past and present (Morgan and Reid 2003; Nkabinde 2005). Earlier in the twentieth century, same-gender sexual relationships were visible to German anthropologist Kurt Falk, who documented such relationships among the Herero and Damara (Falk 1998; see also !Khaxas 2005).
socializing, such as bars, massage parlors, and clubs, between the 1950s and 1970s. Organized outrage in the white gay community did not surface until January 1966 when the police raided a private party in the Johannesburg suburbs and arrested white gay men attending the party, claiming that the host was an unlicensed alcohol vendor (Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992:154). This raid and proposed amendments to the Immorality Act of 1967 prompted white gay and lesbian professionals to launch the Homosexual Law Reform Fund in 1968, which operated mostly in Johannesburg and Pretoria. The group opposed proposed amendments to the Immorality Act that would criminalize both male and female same-gender sexual acts; this legislation “would have had the effect not only of bringing lesbians into the scope of the law, but of making male homosexuality itself statutorily illegal, whereas previously, only public male homosexual acts had been regulated by statute” (Gevisser 1995:31; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992:155). In this period of public and state scrutiny, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund made strategic choices about how to publicize their meetings and whom to include in the organizing effort. They held their first meeting on 10 April 1968 “at the Park Royal Hotel in Joubert Park,” in the then-white gay neighborhood of Hillbrow.\(^\text{14}\) This constituted the “first gay public meeting ever held in South Africa” (Gevisser 1995:32). Members advertised the meeting “by word of mouth and by very discreet pamphleteering in the bars. About 100 people attended. There was strict screening at the door—to prevent intrusion by either police or the media” (Gevisser 1995:32). The attention activists paid to how and to whom organizing was visible demonstrates how public visibility and safety were concerns for white gay and lesbian activists in the 1960s. Instead of mobilizing the enervated white gay and lesbian community for a sustained political campaign, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund only targeted the state (Gevisser 1995:33). A white gay male oligarchy limited the group’s focus and controlled the group’s funding. The Fund succeeded in persuading Parliament to drop some of the more stringent criminalization measures, though Parliament did pass amendments that prohibited dildoes, raised the age of consent of same-gender male sexual acts from 16 to 19, and criminalized the congregation of two or more men for the purpose of “‘sexual gratification’” (Gevisser 1995:35). Sodomy laws remained intact; the Homosexual Law Reform Fund “simply staved off even more repressive legislation” (Gevisser 1995:36). In fact, authorities had the power to construe gay activist meetings as  

\(^{14}\) See Chapter Four for a discussion of Hillbrow’s transformation from a white gay suburb to a poor black inner-city neighborhood.
illegally promoting and inducing sexual acts between members of the same gender under the revised laws; however, the police only concentrated on eliminating public sex between men (Gevisser 1995:36-37). Repressive laws that penalized gay men and lesbians still remained in effect.

Why didn’t the Homosexual Law Reform Fund draw on the liberatory rhetoric and ideas circulating among antiapartheid movement activists? Mark Gevisser (1995:33-34) suggests that the Homosexual Law Reform Fund could have drawn on the protest formula that the early antiapartheid movement favored with the Defiance Campaign or on the model of nonracial equality espoused in the Freedom Charter. In 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the ANC passed the Freedom Charter, “which projected a nonracial future South Africa that ‘belongs to all who live in it, black and white’” (Younis 2000:89); this document cast South Africa as a country in which black and non-black South Africans could live peacefully (Welsh 2000). In 1952, in the form of a national Defiance Campaign, the ANC asked members to transgress apartheid curfew, pass, and segregated facility laws (Younis 2000:85). “By inundating the prisons and courts beyond their capacity, the campaign was intended to demonstrate their ability to impair the functioning of the system, and, it was hoped, achieve the repeal of the oppressive laws” (Younis 2000:85). White gay and lesbian law reform activists did not borrow antiapartheid rhetoric or strategies for several reasons. First, employing a transgressive strategy like violating laws constituted “high-risk activism” for middle-class gays and lesbians; they had too much to lose in terms of their class position and safety (McAdam 1988). Second, the ANC’s status as a banned political party at the time alienated many white gay and lesbian activists who did not want to invite further state scrutiny of their lives (Gevisser 1995:36). Third, because apartheid laws kept white and nonwhite gay men apart, black African gay men involved in antiapartheid politics were not able to introduce white gay men to equality rhetoric, though white and coloured gay men socialized in urban areas before the introduction of apartheid legislation (Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992). Fourth, the state defined homosexuality purely as

15 Lesbians were invisible under South African law until the proposed changes to the Immorality Law, which failed to materialize. The apartheid state and white society did not consider same-gender relationships among women to be threatening or even possible because Afrikaner nationalism was so androcentric (McClintock 1995). However, the threat of Communism and black insurgency changed the political landscape, as they introduced ideas that could fundamentally alter the white supremacist, classist, sexist, and heterosexist South African society. Under these circumstances and with the carefully managed public profile of the Homosexual Law Reform Fund, same-gender relationships among white women were understood as possible and potentially threatening to Afrikaner nationalism and ideals of family purity.
a white problem (Gevisser 1995; Retief 1995). Had the state targeted black gay men and lesbians for arrest and harassment, antiapartheid activists may have treated this as yet another instance of the oppression of black South Africans. Finally, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund’s narrow focus on preventing the passage of anti-homosexual legislation kept the movement from situating the issue within a larger framework of equality. White gay and lesbian activists could not sustain legal reform organizing in the late 1960s because “it was a narrowly-defined, single-issue campaign aimed at blocking potential legislation rather than at building an enduring gay and lesbian community” (Gevisser 1995:36). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the movement drew on hallmarks of antiapartheid organizing, such as liberatory rhetoric and broad outreach to South Africans of different races.

Racist and homophobic policies that the apartheid ruling party, the National Party, penned reinforced one another throughout the 1970s. “[A]n obsessive interest in sexual policing was as important to successive Nationalist governments as racist legislation was. The Christian Nationalist apartheid ideology was based on keeping the white nation not only racially pure, but ‘morally’ pure as well” (Cage 2003:14). In this period, the white lesbian and gay community retreated inwardly and concentrated on creating venues for socializing, rather than mobilizing around political goals (Gevisser 1995). Many individuals who would emerge as key gay, lesbian, and bisexual activists in the 1980s and 1990s became involved with and learned valuable lessons from the antiapartheid and student movements in South Africa during the 1970s through SMOs such as the National Union of South African Students (Kraak 2005). However, toward the end of the decade, several white gay and lesbian SMOs were launched and failed; most did not percolate to public view because they did not widely advertise their goals. For example, in April of 1972, white students at the University of Natal in Durban tried to form the South African Gay Liberation Movement, but the organization disappeared from public view when police investigated whether the group was encouraging others to engage in “illicit activity” (Gevisser 1995:43). In 1976, the Gay Aid Identification Development and Enrichment (GAIDE), a white gay and lesbian organization, formed also in Durban, but leaders did not intentionally seek publicity; a psychologist affiliated with the SMO demanded that the state cease its “repression of homosexuals” (Gevisser 1995:44-45). GAIDE initiated the trend of gay and lesbian SMOs relying too much on individual powerful leaders, only to buckle when leaders sought refuge beyond South Africa or mishandled SMO funds (Gevisser 1995:45). A few short-lived
publications that targeted white gay men emerged and quickly disappeared in the late 1970s, due to the financial unsustainability of white gay magazines and the Publications Control Board’s censorship (Gevisser 1995:46).

Though police raids of gay clubs abated after 1969, they resumed in the late 1970s amid the social opprobrium that alleged drug and alcohol abuse brought. Well-versed in the history of the gay liberation movement in the United States, some white gay activists depicted a police raid at a bar called The New Mandy’s as the South African equivalent of the Stonewall raid and protests (Gevisser 1995:47). 16

[Patrons were manhandled [by police], photographed, verbally abused, and kept locked up in the building until morning. There were a few black gay men present at the club, and they came in for the harshest treatment. . . . [C]lientele, and particularly the drag queens, fought back . . . [T]his raid—and a subsequent one the following year at the same club—. . . prompted some gay people to . . . begin talking of rights once more (Gevisser 1995:47).

Mark Gevisser (1995) attributes the rekindling of talk of gay and lesbian rights to a similar emotional outrage that white lesbians and gay men felt a decade earlier when lawmakers were intent on imposing more negative sanctions on them; at that time, activists organized to halt the repressive legislation. After the raid at The New Mandy’s bar, members of the sexual and gender minority community channeled their anger at the state into political organizing. Though The New Mandy’s raid was not the actual crucible for tying sexual minority rights to the antiapartheid movement, disgruntlement with the apartheid state’s treatment of sexual minorities positioned the gay and lesbian movement in the 1980s to have more in common with the antiapartheid movement than it had in the past.

2.3 GAY AND LESBIAN ORGANIZING IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1980S

Larger gay SMOs still distanced themselves from antiapartheid organizing in the early 1980s. One reason for this distancing is that some white, middle-class gay men were racist (Kraak 2005:123). Though LGBT bars and nightclubs slowly were becoming racially integrated, some white gay men worried that “people of colour [were] ‘taking over,’” which resulted in the

enforcement of apartheid measures within gay venues by ignoring or excluding sexual minorities of color (Isaacs and McKendrick 1992:94). Additionally, “[t]here was very little sense of a black gay community. So for white political activists the spheres of political and gay identities just did not come together, as they might have in a Western country” (Kraak 2005:123). Such a contradiction would result in some SMOs’ downfalls and the spinoff of multiracial LGBT SMOs. Some white, middle-class gay and lesbian activists did not want to provoke the state’s hostility, a continuing thread of white gay activist reluctance. In 1981, the launch of Lambda in Johannesburg as an “activist organisation [was] aimed at protecting the rights of homosexuals while at the same time remaining apolitical” (Gevisser 1995:47). Remaining apolitical proved difficult for activists while a mass antiapartheid movement was brewing. As antiapartheid activists expressed their discontent more visibly in the mid- and late 1970s, more moderate white Afrikaner South African leaders such as President P.W. Botha claimed that Afrikaners “must adapt or die” and modify their leadership style and policies (Welsh 2000:479). Such a change would require a corresponding transformation of Afrikaner nationalist ideals, which historically had been “synonymous with white male interests, white male aspirations and white male politics” (McClintock 1995:369), and of how Afrikaners and white South Africans generally viewed the nation as a country to share, rather than as a “land of their own” (Shearing 1986:295, emphasis original). Botha’s proposed constitutional reforms included

- giving Asian Indian and coloured persons the right to vote in their own separate parliamentary chambers; abolishing pass laws restricting the movement of Blacks into cities; increasing spending on Black education; and abandoning the laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003:28).

However, Botha and his National Party supporters also intended these reforms to undermine and deflate the growing antiapartheid insurgency (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003), or as former banned sociologist Fatima Meer (1984) stated, the reforms manifested a “desire to manage conflict, involving a dangerous plan to control, coerce and eliminate all opposition” (p. 83).17

Racial and sexual politics in the gay and lesbian movement collided in the 1980s. The tension between remaining apolitical or becoming political dogged sexual minority SMOs throughout the 1980s as the antiapartheid movement gained momentum and as international gay rights organizations pressured white South African gay SMOs to develop an antiapartheid

17 Banned persons could only meet with a limited number of other people at a time and could not publish any material, thus allowing the apartheid state to preempt the publication of what leaders deemed incendiary.
platform. In April of 1982, the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA), the first national-level gay and lesbian SMO, recruited white, middle-class gay men and lesbians as dues-paying members and established branches throughout country, but remained silent on oppressive apartheid legislation and policing. Ann Smith (1982:12), a white lesbian founding member of GASA, called on other lesbians to join GASA, “as [gender] separatism within a gay movement is totally inappropriate given the reasons why such a movement is necessary in the first place.”

More than twenty years later, Smith (2005) acknowledged the short-sightedness of GASA in remaining apolitical and not defining gay liberation as a larger problem of social and political oppression that both sexual minorities and nonwhite South Africans faced. She stated that the only connections that GASA leaders identified with other liberation ideology was with a “kind of basic feminism. . . . [W]omen were fighting for equality and so were we” (Smith 2005:60). Feminist theorizing vaguely informed GASA, but it did influence the formation of a white lesbian feminist SMO, Lesbians in Love and in Compromising Situations (Armour and Lapinsky 1995). According to Mary Armour and Sheila Lapinsky (1995:299), lesbians remained a numerical minority in gay SMOs because some lesbian feminists opted to participate in “women-centred and women-only organisations.” In addition, lesbian-only SMOs did not take off because South African lesbians hesitated to “work on issues that have to do with lesbians alone,” as this form of identity politics forced “black and white women . . . to ignore other forms of oppression” (Armour and Lapinsky 1995:299).

Black gay men and lesbians remained minorities in GASA. The organization’s marginalization of black members and its apolitical stance ultimately led to its demise. At a time when antiapartheid politics were heating up, it became impossible for the SMO to remain relevant. In 1983, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) first discussed whether to decline the group’s application for membership after it refused to take a stand on apartheid (Croucher 2002). If the International Lesbian and Gay Association were to reject GASA for this reason, GASA’s representative asserted that other members of ILGA “must be scrutinised for their lack inclusiveness towards women and racial or ethnic minorities” (Croucher 2002:308; Rydström 2005:35). Ann Smith (2005:61) explicates GASA leaders’ approach to handling calls to oppose apartheid.

[W]e were afraid in our white liberal safety, to rock the boat too much: it was dangerous enough in those days to defy the tenets of apartheid by having an association open to people regardless of their colour. A founding principle of
GASA was that we would . . . “keep out of politics.” What we understood by the word “politics” was overt opposition to the apartheid laws of the government. . . . We thought that such a stance would guarantee us at least some measure of protection from the draconian laws which frequently led to the banning of organisations and individuals. . . . [W]e perpetuated the myth . . . that it is possible to compartmentalize forms and expressions of oppression (Smith 2005:61).

For GASA members, providing a “racially integrated space” was “not just the best we could do, it was all we could do” (Smith 2005:61). The International Lesbian and Gay Association and black GASA members, such as Simon Nkoli, disagreed. Nkoli joined GASA in 1982, formed an internal group of black gay men, faced opposition from white GASA members, and was threatened with expulsion from the group (Gevisser 1995). Nkoli had joined the Congress of South African Students in 1976, and in 1984, he was arrested and jailed alongside United Democratic Front members for killing a supposed police informant at the funeral of victims killed by police in Sebokeng township (Luirink 2000:19). Gay and lesbian activists hailed Nkoli’s bravery in coming out while in prison, much to the dismay of his United Democratic Front (ANC) comrades.

Nkoli’s actions not only challenged the notion that homosexuality was unAfrican, but demonstrated the presence of gay men and lesbians in the anti-apartheid movement. . . . Gay groups in the US and Europe took up Nkoli’s cause, demanding his release, and brought the issue of gay and lesbian identity into the foreground of anti-apartheid politics (Kraak 2005:130).

Nkoli became internationally visible as a bridge between gay and antiapartheid organizing. The International Lesbian and Gay Association interpreted GASA’s silence about Nkoli’s imprisonment as confirmation of its apolitical stance and grew concerned that “after Nkoli’s arrest, there was no group [in South Africa] that reached out to black people” (Rydström 2005:37). The formation of the Rand Gay Organisation (RGO), a black gay and lesbian SMO, by Alfred Machela in August 1986 offered an alternative to GASA and demonstrated that taking a stand against apartheid and for gay rights was not contradictory (Gevisser 1995:57). Machela disputed GASA’s statements to the International Lesbian and Gay Association and argued, “GASA does not represent the entire gay movement in South Africa. We would like to distance ourselves from GASA. And we don’t wish them to represent us at any level without our mandate” (qtd. in Croucher 2002:319). The International Lesbian and Gay Association

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18 The United Democratic Front, “a local and legal front for the ANC, was launched nationwide in 1983 upon the crest of [a] new wave of township resistance” (Bozzoli 2004:37).
ultimately expelled GASA in 1987 for not following through on promises to support Nkoli and not opposing apartheid publicly (Cock 2003; Rydström 2005; see also Botha 2005a, 2005b).

The Rand Gay Organisation soon disappeared, but any vacuum that it may have left was quickly filled by the founding of Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression (LAGO) in 1986 in Cape Town. Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression emerged to address GASA’s failure to oppose apartheid and demonstrate that “‘gay rights are human rights’” (Nicol 2005:72). The antiapartheid movement did not necessarily welcome the support and action of gay and lesbian activists. Members of Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression faced accusations that they were “hijacking the anti-apartheid struggle for our own partisan ends. The fact that both LAGO and OLGA had approximately 90 per cent white membership made us especially vulnerable to such perceptions” (Nicol 2005:72-73). The charge that homosexuality was not African became a vehicle for silencing black gay and lesbians within the antiapartheid movement who tried to characterize sexual rights as human rights and has continued to function as a way to make black LGBT persons and organizing invisible. Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression eventually dissolved and was replaced by the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists (OLGA) because members experienced an ideological division: some members believed it impossible to separate gay and lesbian organizing from a broader struggle to liberate South Africa, whereas others who hewed to gay liberationist ideology thought that the SMO’s opponents were both the National Party and the antiapartheid movement because both groups were “equally homophobic” (Nicol 2005:73). The emergence of politicized groups like the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists and black and coloured gay and lesbian SMOs, such as the Cape Town-based African Gay Association and Johannesburg-based Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand (GLOW), signified a shift in the gay and lesbian movement’s shunning of antiapartheid politics to engaging with the antiapartheid movement (Nicol 2005:75).

Black, coloured, and white gay and lesbian activists who supported and/or were involved with the antiapartheid movement within South Africa pursued a range of strategies. For instance, as part of a broader attempt to eradicate apartheid policies and laws, activists targeted the ending of military conscription as a way to thwart the state’s campaign of terror inside and outside South Africa. In 1988, the highly publicized trial of a white gay conscientious objector, Dr. Ivan Toms, revealed the fissures in the End Conscription Campaign. The Campaign demanded that Toms, a core member of the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists, hide that he was gay, in order to
preserve the support of white South African families affected by compulsory military service and sympathetic to the antiapartheid movement (Conway 2004; Nicol 2005; Toms 1995). By refusing to support Toms’ conscientious objector defense, the ECC “avoided attacking the nexus of heterosexual masculinity, militarization and citizenship that underpinned the apartheid order and reduced the ECC’s potential for posing a radical challenge to the apartheid order” (Conway 2004:26; see also Nicol (2005) and Toms (1995)).

Toward the end of the 1980s, multiracial gay and lesbian SMOs directed their attention to ANC leaders within and outside of South Africa to persuade them to include sexual minority rights in their revision of exclusionary apartheid laws.19 Gay and lesbian antiapartheid activists in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and several Scandinavian countries pressured ANC leaders to include sexual minority rights in their proposal for a new constitution (Kraak 2005). Peter Tatchell (2005), a famed British gay rights activist, exposed homophobia within the ANC in his interview with Ruth Mompati, a women’s rights activist and executive member of the ANC. Insinuating that homosexuality was unAfrican and a Western phenomenon that had not appeared in South Africa “until recently,” Mompati stated:

I cannot even begin to understand why people want gay and lesbian rights. The gays have no problems. . . . I don’t see them suffering. No one is persecuting them. . . . We don’t have a policy on gays and lesbians. We don’t have a policy on flower sellers either (qtd. in Kraak 2005:132; see also Tatchell 2005).

Mompati’s statements illustrates the sentiment that racial oppression trumped sexual oppression, a position against which antiapartheid gay and lesbian rights activists railed, especially since so many were themselves white (van Zyl 2005c). Mompati viewed gay and lesbian organizing as potentially derailing the ANC’s efforts to liberate South Africans from apartheid rule. Within this framework, the antiapartheid movement and national liberation outranked sexual minority liberation. However, sexual minority activists did not hierarchize each movement’s goals; instead, they emphasized the complementarity of these goals in the creation of a nonracial, nonsexist, and non-homophobic South Africa. Mompati’s remarks elicited concerned responses from British, Dutch, and other Scandinavian gay and lesbian antiapartheid activists, and the ANC countered by issuing statements in support of gay rights (Fine and Nicol 1995). Through Thabo Mbeki, “then Director of Information,” the ANC formulated an official policy on sexual minority

19 From my archival research, ABIGALE was apparently the first LGBT SMO to include bisexual persons alongside lesbians and gay men. However, despite the inclusion of bisexual persons, there has been no organizing specifically around bisexual issues or examination of biphobia within the movement.
rights: “The ANC is . . . firmly committed to removing all forms of discrimination and oppression in a liberated South Africa . . . That commitment must surely extend to the protection of gay rights” (qtd. in Fine and Nicol 1995:271; emphasis removed). The ANC adopted a pro-gay rights stance to distinguish itself from the apartheid regime’s anti-homosexuality platform; the more distance the ANC put between itself and the National Party, the more successful it hoped it would be in generating a nonracial democracy (Altman 2001).

Within South Africa, the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists took the lead in organizing gay, lesbian, and bisexual SMOs to generate a policy recommendation for the ANC about sexual minority rights, which the SMO submitted to the ANC in September 1990 (Fine and Nicol 1995). Lobbying political parties thus became a customary strategy for LGBT activists. This trend emerged a few years earlier. For instance, the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA) brought activists together to form the National Law Reform Fund; they sought to take advantage of President P. W. Botha’s proposed National Party reforms and raise thousands of rands to fund this campaign and to organize mostly white gay men and lesbians to express their support for gay and lesbian-friendly candidates (Gevisser 1995).

The 1980s also marked another significant change in South Africa’s landscape. HIV/AIDS emerged as a health concern among sexual and gender minorities. For a few years, GASA devoted a column in its newspaper Link/Skakel, which later became the monthly publication Exit, to updating the (white) gay community about HIV/AIDS-related services and information about how to reduce their vulnerability to exposure. The media played a role in depicting gay men as responsible for the transmission of HIV/AIDS. Around 1985, the media stopped referring to HIV/AIDS as the “gay plague” and racialized and de-gayed AIDS as the “black death” (Gevisser 1995:59). “[B]lack gay men who moved between the white gay subculture and the townships” were blamed “for importing the epidemic into heterosexual black society” by black heterosexual South Africans (Gevisser 1995:59). Multiracial gay and lesbian SMOs such as the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists offered AIDS social support services to nonwhites and whites alike from the mid-1980s onward. This marked the beginning of the LGBT movement’s work on HIV/AIDS, such as by providing counseling and other social services to HIV-positive persons and lobbying for treatment access. South African LGBT

20 The currency of South Africa is the rand, and the Namibian currency is the dollar, which is pegged to the rand.
activists developed a public reputation as one of the only groups willing to address the seriousness of the pandemic.

2.4 LGBT ORGANIZING IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S

2.4.1 South Africa

In the years immediately during and after the post-apartheid transition, the antiapartheid movement demobilized, as participants were hopeful that the new government would quickly and evenly implement laws and policies guaranteeing equality. South African LGBT activists seized political opportunities to pursue broadened rights, which include immigration, adoption, and marriage rights for same-gender partners. In this receptive, post-apartheid political environment, former antiapartheid activists fled political parties and mass democratic movement organizing, in favor of interest group politics (Jacobs 2002). “Well-funded non-governmental organizations, pressure groups and lobbyists are replacing the mass-based and grassroots organizations that arose to oppose the apartheid regime and serve as the voice of the citizenry” (Zegeye and Harris 2002:255).

In the 1990s, black South Africans more visibly organized themselves to address the needs of sexual minorities in townships. Launched in 1988 by Simon Nkoli, the Gays and Lesbians of Witwatersrand (GLOW), a primarily black gay and lesbian SMO, emerged as a visible force. According to a former member of GLOW,

[B]lack people never had a movement that they could go to and feel at home. [T]here was GASA, and there were other white movement [organizations]. But a lot of black people didn’t feel welcomed, or they didn’t feel safe to go to those organizations. When GLOW was started in 1988, we found that a lot of black people . . . came out and then they joined the movement (Interview, 4 November 2005).

For many black sexual minorities in Johannesburg, GLOW was the first SMO to recruit them actively and to demonstrate that the gay and lesbian movement was not restricted to white South Africans. Beginning in 1990, GLOW sponsored the yearly Lesbian and Gay Pride march in Johannesburg and championed “gay rights as human rights” (Gevisser 1995:63). In the early
1990s, white sexual minorities dominated the march, though more black sexual minorities participated with each year, a trend that has continued (Gevisser and Reid 1995). Throughout its existence until its demise in the mid-1990s, GLOW balanced the tension between supporting the goal of obtaining gay liberation through pursuing sexual minority rights and between providing social spaces and social services, evincing the tendency of LGBT SMOs to combine strategies of being publicly visible and responding to the social and material needs of impoverished sexual and gender minorities of all races (Gevisser 1995; Gevisser and Reid 1995). In part, this reflects a divergence in SMO leaders’ interest in challenging homophobia and obtaining gay rights and SMO members’ interest in “anything that generates income and provides a safe social space” (McLean and Ngeco 1995:182). GLOW also faced the difficulty in maintaining a public presence in both Johannesburg and surrounding townships. The SMO created a “Lesbian Forum” to offer a “consciousness-raising space for its largely-black membership” and regularly concentrated its activities, such as the annual general meeting and drag competitions in Soweto (Gevisser and Reid 1995:279). Yet the annual Lesbian and Gay Pride march, though it generated “an annual moment of public visibility” for sexual and gender minorities and for the movement in general, did “little to build organisation in the townships” (Gevisser and Reid 1995:280).21 Mark Gevisser and Graeme Reid’s (1995) well-meaning criticism of GLOW’s priorities in staging the march/parade demonstrates the range of strategic choices that many South African LGBT SMOs face.

[The march] is a costly affair that swallows most of GLOW’s budget and takes up most of the time of the activists who organize it. Perhaps, if more time and money went into organising the townships, township chapters of GLOW would march under their own banners . . . . The march would then present to South Africa a more representative spectacle of gay life (Gevisser and Reid 1995:280).

Neither Gevisser and Reid (1995) nor GLOW wanted the South African LGBT movement to promote a normalized image of gay men and lesbians. Instead, the authors and the SMO viewed the march as an opportunity to draw attention to the LGBT movement’s insistence on equality and that “in South Africa all oppression must be challenged” (Gevisser and Reid 1995:281).

The march also indicated that the LGBT movement was serious about seizing the coalescing political opportunities in the transition from apartheid to a nonracial democracy

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21 The march has taken place each year in Johannesburg since 1990. A few years ago, as Cape Town gained a reputation internationally for its bustling LGBT community, it began to stage its own march (Oswin 2005).
Early in 1990, President F.W. de Klerk authorized the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and unbanned the ANC as a political party, official recognition of the sea change that was taking place (Lodge 2002; Welsh 2000). LGBT SMOs similarly took advantage of the transformation.

That was the time of the revolution and things changing for South Africa because people like Nelson Mandela were released from prison. We were looking into our future; we were looking into having our first elections. So many things were happening at once at that time, and I think our [Lesbian and Gay Pride] march also made that stand to say, “We are there. Gay people exist” (GLOW member, interview, 4 November 2005).

With the first free elections within reach, LGBT SMOs continued to press the ANC about sexual minority rights. However, the movement faced homophobic opposition within the ANC and other less sympathetic political parties. Between 1991 and 1993, Winnie Mandela, the wife of acclaimed ANC and antiapartheid leader Nelson Mandela, scandalized gay and lesbian activists with her antigay defense at her trial for her role in the 1988 death of teenager Stompie Moeketsi Seipei and assault of three other young men (Holmes 1995, 1997). Her defense alleged that she and members of the football club she led rescued the four young black men from the homosexual advances of a white gay Methodist minister, who were cloistered together in cramping sleeping quarters “familiar to many subjects of apartheid residential conditions, such as in industrial compounds and hostels” (Holmes 1995:289; see also Elder 2003). Not only did her defense claim that Mandela saved the four young black men from homosexuality, which they painted as a perversion, but they also insinuated that homosexuality was a product of apartheid—“a white contamination of black culture. This [was] a directly oppressive dismissal of the rights of black lesbians, gay men and bisexuals” (Holmes 1995:289). Staging protests regularly, GLOW demanded that the ANC reject her antigay defense (Gevisser 1995; Holmes 1995). The ANC National Executive Committee failed to act on the homophobia that the trial perpetuated and reflected “an executive-level inability to deal with real public differences within the ranks of the liberation movement” (Holmes 1995:291).

Despite the ANC’s failure to address homophobia within the party, LGBT SMOs worked closely with ANC officials and representatives from other political parties to develop a constitution that would protect sexual minorities from discrimination. An important step in this process involved the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists’ (OLGA) creation of a Charter of Lesbian and Gay Rights in 1990, which the SMO revised in 1992 based on consultation with
Xhosa-, English-, and Afrikaans-speaking gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons (Fine and Nicol 1995). Based on the ANC Freedom Charter, which emphasized nonracialism and inclusionary politics (Hirschmann 1990; Seekings 1991), OLGA hoped the Charter of Lesbian and Gay Rights would “serve as a judicially-recognised guideline” for the constitutional protection of sexual minority rights (Fine and Nicol 1995:275). The ANC included sexual minority rights in its Bill of Rights late in 1992, as did the Democratic Party and Inkatha Freedom Party (Croucher 2002:320; see also Christiansen 2000 and Johnson 1997). In December 1994, more than 60 SMOs formed a “single-issue” umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE), also known as the Coalition, to “coordinate the lobbying effort to retain the sexual orientation clause in the draft South African Constitution” (Cock 2003:37; NCGLE undated brochure; Oswin 2007:649-51). An “atmosphere of inclusivity” typified the constitutional drafting and ratification (Croucher 2002:322). The ANC ushered in this open atmosphere by soliciting public input on its Bill of Rights and on the formulation of constitutional amendments between 1990 and 1993 (Croucher 2002:322). Once the ANC included sexual minority rights in its Bill of Rights, other political parties engaged in the same action because “few if any political parties wanted to be seen in the media as promoting any form of animus in light of South Africa’s history of brutal racial injustice” (Massoud 2003:303).

In recognition of the potential electoral might of sexual minorities, both the ANC and Democratic Party advertised in gay publications, encouraging gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons to vote for their candidates.

The Coalition participated fully at all stages in the drafting of the Equality Clause and responded specifically to different political parties’ statements supporting, modifying, or opposing the clause. Part of the Coalition’s success in persuading the ANC to include sexual minority rights in the Equality Clause stemmed from its strict adherence to a master frame of “equality and non-discrimination.” In its formal submission to Parliament, the Coalition recommended that the state undo the painful shared “history of legislated prejudice, exclusion and discrimination,” including “discrimination against gays and lesbians,” by prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (NCGLE 1995). In May 1996, after the

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22 GLOW cofounded the Coalition.
23 The “Equality Clause” (Section 9:3-4) states:
Equality Clause was permanently enshrined in the constitution, the Coalition “shifted its focus to the implementation of the rights protection in this historic Constitution and to supporting the continued development of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movement throughout Southern Africa” (NCGLE undated brochure). The reference to disseminating the LGBT movement throughout southern Africa is important because the Coalition played a crucial role in fostering the Namibian LGBT movement.

After securing a win with the Equality Clause, the Coalition pursued legal extension and clarification of sexual minority rights. The “next step was to use the [Constitution] to overturn local sodomy laws and, more importantly anti-gay public sentiments” (Massoud 2003:304). The Coalition’s Equal Rights Project added public education of the general public and of sexual and gender minorities as a strategy efforts due to the discrepancy between conservative political attitudes among South Africans toward sexual minority rights and the progressive national constitution (NCGLE 1996). A 1995 national survey of South Africans revealed that only 38 percent favored equal rights for sexual minorities and 41 percent believed homosexuality was unAfrican (Reid and Dirsuweit 2002:104). Massoud (2003:304) states that those who supported sexual minority rights “were more likely to be white, literate, from urban areas, Catholic, Hindu, or Protestant, and younger than those who were against gay rights,” suggesting that older South Africans and blacks who lived in rural areas and had little education were likely to oppose equal rights for sexual minorities. Building on the success of the Equality Clause, the Coalition, which, in 1999, became the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, also known as the Equality Project, (Dirsuweit 2006), subsequently filed successful lawsuits that decriminalized sodomy (1998), permitted same-gender couples to access pension benefits jointly (1999), granted immigration rights to foreign same-gender partners of South African citizens (1999), allowed same-sex couples to adopt children (2002), and obtained the right for same-gender couples to marry.

3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination (Republic of South Africa 1996).

24 This was the first reference to “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered,” which became LGBT as shorthand among activists, I located within the South African LGBT movement.
Leading the charge on legal issues enabled LGBT SMOs to concentrate on a wider range of issues, such as providing mental and physical health services to sexual and gender minorities, monitoring media portrayals of LGBT persons, and caring for the specific needs of HIV-positive LGBT persons; such social organizing is concentrated around urban centers and universities. These SMOs worked together as a loose coalition named the Joint Working Group, which met twice a year. SMOs selectively worked together on campaigns that benefited them and their constituents, as was the case of joint research projects that SMOs used to lobby local and regional state officials. I describe the purpose and structure of the South African LGBT SMOs I selected to study below.

2.4.1.1 Behind the Mask

Behind the Mask (BTM) publishes a website with information about the cultural and political status of sexual and gender minorities throughout Africa, including Namibia and South Africa. The name “Behind the Mask” referred to the cloak of social, cultural, political, and legal invisibility that African LGBT persons don every day. Launched in 2000, Behind the Mask described its goals of linking sexual and gender minority SMOs and LGBT persons as proceeding from South Africa’s progressive constitution in the hope that “African gays and lesbians, whatever class or ethnicity, or those supporting the rising GLBT-movement on the African continent” will embrace equal rights for sexual minorities (Alexander 2002:229). Reporting on LGBT issues and providing a forum for LGBT persons to express their concerns online comprised Behind the Mask’s efforts to peel back such masks. In particular, Behind the Mask addressed issues of interest to black LGBT persons, such as hate crimes, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and unemployment (Interview, BTM staff member, 13 January 2006). On its website, Behind the Mask stresses its efforts to offer “a platform for exchange and debate for LGBTI groups, activists, individuals and allies” through online chat rooms and frequently

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25 Dirsuweit (2006:330) attributes the Coalition’s transformation into the Equality Project to the “unsustainability” of inclusion. The Coalition had 80 member organizations at the height of its existence and could not cope with the “resource drain” of so many groups that needed funding and bureaucratic support, not all of which were SMOs or even LGBT in focus (Dirsuweit 2006:330). The Coalition dismantled its coalitional form and became a “network” that [would] be the channel of communication for people on the street and [would] work at grass roots level to ensure that everyone [would] have access to the law reforms secured” by the Equality Project (“Change of Face” 2000:10).
updated stories about organizing, state repression of sexual and gender minorities, what it is like to be LGBT in different African countries (http://www.mask.org.za/). Some stories focused on the negative consequences of being LGBT in repressive countries like Uganda or Zimbabwe, but many stories illuminated the benefits of coming out as a LGBT person. Behind the Mask’s website design allowed for “anonymous” viewing. A staff member distinguished the SMO’s website from other gay-themed websites. “It’s not a gay site with pictures of naked men or pictures of women with [bare] breasts. . . . Our strength is we’re able to give people information without it . . . blaring on the screen” (Interview, 31 October 2005). In this sense, Behind the Mask eschewed prurient visual content, such as nude pictures, to distinguish itself from commercial LGBT websites in South Africa.

Due in part to its financial and geographical base in Johannesburg, South Africa, Behind the Mask dedicated most of its journalistic resources to reporting on LGBT issues in the country, although it was developing a network of correspondents throughout Africa. The organization also worked to strengthen bonds with and among other southern African LGBT SMOs. In its early years, Behind the Mask was housed in the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa. The organization itself served as an incubator for the Forum for the Empowerment of Women. Behind the Mask sponsored and supported another organization, the South African Youth Liberation Organisation, a grassroots effort based in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces linking young black LGBT youth to one another by providing them with access to computers and the Internet and by cultivating leadership among LGBT youth.

Eleven people staffed the organization when I observed Behind the Mask from October 2005 to March 2006: the Dutch founder who served as a part-time paid consultant, the director, 27

26 Although Behind the Mask and other South African LGBT SMOs included intersexed persons in their definition of LGBT persons, I gathered only a few stories on the BTM website that addressed issues specific to intersexed persons. In addition, some activists had not incorporated the “I” in their use of the LGBT acronym, as they admitted that they do not understand intersexed persons’ issues yet. As such, I use the LGBT acronym in keeping with South African LGBT activists’ vocabulary.

27 In 2000, a Dutch investigative journalist, Bart Lurink (2000), launched Behind the Mask to supplement the paucity of Internet reporting on LGBT organizing in southern Africa. After confirming that no other Internet magazine fulfilled this purpose, Lurink secured a small grant from a Dutch donor, Hivos, to design a website. Lurink’s experience combining antipartheid and LGBT activism is reflected in Behind the Mask’s commitment to antiracism, antisexism, and anti-homophobia. On the surface, a foreigner’s founding of an African LGBT SMO might smack of paternalism, and one could claim that Behind the Mask’s origins are not African. It is not my goal to prove whether the website and SMO are truly African. However, it is necessary to acknowledge debates that encircle foreign funding of African LGBT SMOs, which I address later. Over the years, Lurink made a concerted effort to ensure that black African staff guided Behind the Mask. Though he retained a leadership position throughout Behind
the managing editor, the office administrator, the housekeeper,\textsuperscript{28} the webmaster, the part-time French translator, the junior reporter, the human rights researcher, and two temporary, unpaid interns from Germany and Uganda.\textsuperscript{29} Eight staff identified as black, and three staff identified as white. All staff members sometimes wrote stories for the website, although the reporter and managing editor wrote regular feature stories as their primary duties. Apart from the Dutch founder, American office administrator, Burundian French translator, and German and Ugandan interns, the rest of the staff were South African. Reporters wrote in English, and some stories were translated into French. Behind the Mask also recruited correspondents living in other African nations to report on LGBT social issues, increasing the organization’s ability to gather firsthand information about what was happening in other African countries.

Most Behind the Mask staff members were, by definition, amateur journalists or “journalistic activists” (\url{http://www.mask.org.za}, Accessed 23 January 2006, see also Atton, 2003). Apart from the founder and the managing editor, both of whom were trained journalists, no staff member staff had formal journalism training, though the junior reporter was pursuing a degree in communication at a South African university. Behind the Mask provided compulsory training and writing workshops for staff and foreign correspondents who wrote for the website. To address the lack of formally trained journalists, Behind the Mask overhauled its hiring policies to ensure that it recruited staff with professional journalism experience.\textsuperscript{30}

Amateur journalism has been a valuable tool for African LGBT activists in generating a network capable of disseminating the movement’s claims and demands around the world. Aware of the widespread hostility to homosexuality, Behind the Mask framed its stories to show LGBT

\textsuperscript{28} All four SMOs I observed employed a housekeeper on a full- or part-time basis. With the exception of Sister Namibia, the housekeepers at Behind the Mask, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, and The Rainbow Project were treated as staff members. Housekeepers at Behind the Mask and FEW participated in staff meetings and gave updates about their work. TRP’s housekeeper worked on a part-time basis; staff meetings occurred on the days that the housekeeper was not present. All four SMOs were keen on employing members of the constituencies they represented and helping them to gain professional skills that would enable them to work elsewhere. Part of the insistence of retaining housekeepers might stem from Namibia and South Africa’s colonial past and colonialists’ demand for cleanliness (Burke 1996; McClintock 1995).

\textsuperscript{29} While I observed Behind the Mask, the position of senior reporter remained vacant because the organization’s hiring committee found that applicants were over- or under-qualified.

\textsuperscript{30} I was unable to verify the exact number of foreign correspondents Behind the Mask claimed, as the organization was unsure which correspondents to classify as active.
persons that they were not alone and LGBT SMOs what groups in other African countries were
doing to fight social and political repression.

2.4.1.2 Forum for the Empowerment of Women

The Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) aimed to increase the visibility of
black South African lesbian women and to create safe spaces for black lesbian women vulnerable
to violence. FEW developed as a project of Behind the Mask, but each group’s focus diverged
from one another. A couple of black lesbians who were Behind the Mask staff members became
interested in local South African problems affecting black lesbians in 2002; their activism
siphoned energy and resources from Behind the Mask and sometimes derailed that SMO’s
commitment to journalistic activism. In 2003, FEW established itself as an independent SMO
and succeeded in obtaining funding from Northern donors in 2004 for its Rose Has Thorns hate
crimes and anti-rape awareness and eradication project, which started a couple of years earlier.

For such a young SMO, FEW had a large staff. During the time of my ethnographic
observation, FEW employed five full-time staff consisting of a director, a public relations and
outreach officer, a junior training officer who functioned as the director’s personal assistant, a
computer specialist responsible for maintaining the office’s computers and teaching computer
skills classes to FEW members, and a receptionist who doubled as an officer manager. The
organization employed six part-time staff, all of whom identified as black: one domestic worker;
one activities coordinator who oversaw the SMO’s soccer team, the Chosen FEW, and dramatic
troupe named SAFrodykes management; and four community representatives who served as
liaisons between the SMO and Johannesburg townships. The SMO built in staff turnover into its
plan by implementing six-month contracts for the junior training officer and community
representative positions so that more members would benefit from gaining employment
experience and on-the-job skills training that they could take with them to other jobs. The SMO
also allowed two or three part-time volunteers whom the director had elevated to leadership
positions related to the management of the SMO’s soccer team and dramatic troupe to attend
staff meetings to report on their activities; these volunteers were likely to be hired in the future as
paid community representatives because they were familiar with the organization’s procedures.

31 The SMO planned on hiring a bookkeeper after my observation ended.
2.4.2 Namibia

LGBT SMOs became visible in the early 1990s. The first SMO was the Gay and Lesbian Organisation of Namibia (GLON). In its first and only public action in 1995, GLON opposed the Lutheran Church’s attempt to block sexual minorities from becoming ordained ministers and announced plans to form their own church for gays and lesbians (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:111; Munamava 1995). However, the organization’s history and reputation as a mostly white gay and lesbian prevented GLON from effecting substantive social change for sexual minorities (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006).

Homophobic comments made by Namibian government officials catalyzed the movement in the mid-1990s. By attacking LGBT persons publicly, former President Sam Nujoma and the ruling party, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), handed sexual minorities a politicized identity around which they could organize. “In this sense, Mugabe [the President of Zimbabwe] and Nujoma are indeed ‘promoters’ of ‘homosexuality’ in their societies” (HRW and IGLHRC 2003:8). However, the Namibian LGBT movement and its supporters developed a pattern of reacting to official state-sponsored homophobia. In 1995, state leaders’ attacks on gays and lesbians commenced, making political organizing on the part of LGBT persons necessary. The state-run newspaper, New Era, fanned antigay flames by interviewing state leaders and featuring opinion columns written by government ministers who denied sexual minority rights in the new democracy, even though the Namibian Constitution guaranteed equal rights for all citizens (Diescho 1994). Such comments included columns authored by then-Finance Minister Helmut Angula in which he claimed that “homosexuality is an unnatural behavioural disorder which is alien to the African culture” (Angula 1995b) and even suggested that women could “abort a foetus if they thought it might grow up to be gay” (Angula 1995a). Responding to government ministers’ antigay declarations, Sister Namibia, a feminist SMO, cleverly stated, “[h]omophobia (unlike homosexuality and lesbianism) can be cured,” and asserted that homosexuality is African (Sister Namibia 1995). Dismissing Angula’s contention that homosexuality could be cured, the Namibian Clinical Psychological Association (1995) admonished state leaders for airing their ignorance about homosexuality so publicly because “statements such as this will portray senior officials of this country as ill-informed and visionless” (p. 21).
After a year of official silence on homosexuality, Nujoma used the SWAPO Women’s Council Congress in Gobabis in December 1996 as an opportunity to denigrate sexual minorities ( Günzel 1996 ). Namibian civil society responded to and condemned Nujoma’s attack “as an indication of emerging authoritarianism in Namibia” ( HRW and IGLHRC 2003:5-6 ). Sister Namibia and the newly formed Rainbow Project (TRP) also responded to Nujoma’s aggression by publicly calling on Nujoma to withdraw his comments and stop making “statements regarding issues with which he is not familiar and which could have a detrimental impact on part of the Namibian population” ( TRP 1996 , see also Field 1997 ). Drawing on what would become a familiar anti-Western, antigay, and xenophobic refrain, then-SWAPO Secretary for Information and Publicity Alpheus Naruseb articulated SWAPO’s official position on homosexuality, “[M]ost of the ardent supporters of this (sic) perverts are Europeans who imagine themselves to be the bulwark of civilisation and enlightenment. They are not only appropriating foreign ideas in our society but also destroying the local culture by hiding behind the façade of the very democracy and human right we have created” (“Alpheus Comes Out” 1997 ).

Foreign onlookers became unnerved by such unprecedented homophobia from state officials. Diplomats including ambassadors from European Union (EU) members and foreign LGBT movement organizations voiced their concern about SWAPO’s suddenly public antigay position (“EU ‘Concern’” 1997 ). Attempting to quell foreign diplomats’ concerns, then-Prime Minister Hage Geingob promised that “no homosexuals or lesbians have ever been prosecuted, intimidated, arrested or denied employment” (“Geingob Steps” 1997 ). To clarify misconceptions about homosexuality, activists from Sister Namibia and TRP jointly organized a panel of speakers featuring Namibian and South African LGBT persons and Namibian human rights experts, which was the first public LGBT-specific event in Namibia (Maffeis 1997 ). Nevertheless, Nujoma continued to use SWAPO venues such as the Youth League Congress to remind Namibians loyal to the party to persecute gays and lesbians on the grounds that homosexuality is foreign to Namibia; he also queried, “Where were they [gays and lesbians] when we sacrificed our lives during the bitter liberation struggle?” (“Nujoma Renews” 1997 ). Nujoma soon widened his intended targets to include “independent media, political opposition leaders, women’s rights activists, and foreigners” ( HRW and IGLHRC 2003:5-6 ).

With the exception of occasional antigay letters from newspaper readers, antigay attacks ceased for more than a year until late in 1998 when then-Minister of Home Affairs Jerry Ekandjo
threatened to criminalize homosexuality (Weidlich 1998). TRP and other human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) asked Ekandjo to retract his statement and asserted that such legislation would contravene the Namibian Constitution (Maletsky 1998). In a public statement, TRP observed, “[W]henever there are political conflicts, gays are always drawn into” them, suggesting that official homophobia might be little more than a ruse to deflect attention away from serious problems like corruption and poverty (Nanyeni 1998). For example, in 1999, when discussing the national budget, an unlikely forum for debating sexual minority rights, Ekandjo’s deputy, Jeremiah Nambinga, renewed his boss’ demand to criminalize homosexuality (Maletsky 1999). Playing a characteristically conciliatory role, Geingob assured Namibian sexual minorities that the state would not criminalize homosexuality. However, the matter resurfaced several years later in May 2004, when then-Justice Minister Albert Kawana repeated that homosexuality is “‘illegal and criminal’” during a debate in the National Assembly about including a clause in the new Labour Bill prohibiting discrimination of sexual minorities (Dentlinger 2004a). Politicians seemed bent on jettisoning sexual minorities from the Namibian socio-political imaginary entirely. Resuming his verbal harassment of LGBT persons, Ekandjo exhorted police officers to “‘eliminate’” gays and lesbians, which elicited demands from TRP and other human rights NGOs for the Minister to apologize for and take back his statement (Amupadhi 2000). Though Ekandjo stated that his call for eliminating gays and lesbians was not an incitement to violence, he maintained, “‘We never had moffies in mind when Swapo drafted the Namibian Constitution 10 years ago,” insisting on referring to same-gender-loving persons pejoratively (Hamata 2000; emphasis added).

State leaders’ harassment of sexual minorities did not stop after civil society displayed solidarity with LGBT SMOs. In March 2001, when addressing University of Namibia students, whom Nujoma regarded as youth vulnerable to the supposedly predatory appetites of gays and lesbians, he encouraged police to “arrest, imprison, and deport homosexuals and lesbians found in Namibia” (“President Nujoma” 2001). Joining other organizations such as the LAC and TRP (Menges 2001), the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) condemned Nujoma’s antigay

32 The new Labour Bill no longer protects workers from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
33 “Moffie” is a term that became popularized among Western Cape Coloured gay communities in South Africa in the 1950s. The word originated as “[s]ailor slang” in 1929, as a derivation from “morphy . . . a term of contempt among seamen for effeminate, well-groomed young men” (Cage 2003:83). The term was used by gay men to valorize and recognize other gay men, but also was deployed pejoratively as in Ekandjo’s statement.
remarks because they “not only contradict[ed] the Namibian constitution but may also endanger
the physical safety of this minority group” (“Gays Will Be Detained” 2001). The NSHR’s fears
were realized when the members of the Special Field Forces (SFF) singled out men in Katutura,
a township outside of Windhoek,

wearing earrings and, in some cases, ripped them off the surprised victims’ ears. .
. One of the SFF members . . . said the order had come from the President.
“Where did you see men wearing earrings in our Oshiwambo culture? These
things never happened before Independence. Why are they [men wearing
earrings] only happening now after Independence?” (Hamata 2001)

Nujoma’s remarks once again drew international criticism from varied sources: the Black
Radical Congress in the United States, the South African Durban Lesbian and Gay Community
and Health Centre, the International Lesbian and Gay Association and the EU (Black Radical
Congress 2001; Council of the European Union 2001; Mkhize 2001; Mtetwa 2001). Attributing
Nujoma’s antigay attacks to authoritarian tendencies, Sister Namibia denounced Nujoma and
SWAPO’s scapegoating tactics: “Creating enemy images diverts attention from the failure to
stem poverty, unemployment, violence against women and children and HIV/AIDS, and makes it
easier to fiddle with the constitution while no-one is looking” (Sister Namibia 2001). Though
Nujoma suspended his antigay attacks in 2002, he resumed in September 2003 when addressing
a “hastily-organised gathering of University of Namibia and Polytechnic students” and
collectively dressed down “some whites, homosexuals and journalists” whom he accused of
openly opposing the state and “policy of national reconciliation” (Kuteeue 2003). State leaders
utilized the rhetoric of declaring any political dissent as unpatriotic, reactionary, and
undemocratic, demonstrating SWAPO’s supreme claim to legitimacy as the democratizing and
decolonizing authority in Namibia (Melber 2006a, 2006b). In 2004, as the state continued to
harass human rights organizations, journalists and LGBT persons, TRP bemoaned the “slow
erosion of good governance practices” as evidenced in the difficulties that many sexual
minorities experienced in being open about their sexualities (Shigwedha 2004). Recently, Sister
Namibia and TRP quickly neutralized homophobic remarks that current Deputy Minister of
Home Affairs and Immigration Theopolina Mushelenga made in September 2005 by naming her
comments as “hate speech” and regarding her comments as a “‘direct attack against the civil
rights” of LGBT persons in Namibia (Graig 2005). Since Nujoma left office in March 2005,
President Hifikepunye Pohamba and the ministers he appointed refrained from ridiculing LGBT
persons, with the exception of Mushelenga’s unexpected comments. The absence of hate speech
gave hope to LGBT activists that they might be able to negotiate LGBT human rights with Pohamba’s administration in the future.

How did the state and SWAPO come to single out sexual minorities for attack? There are three strands of thought about this issue. The first strand states that other political goals and concerns, such as anticolonial, antiapartheid, and antiracist struggles, merely submerged and displaced homophobia. Political opportunities arose for marginalized and oppressed groups, such as sexual and ethnic minorities, to express their concerns under an umbrella of tolerance in the newly independent state. But these struggles did not specifically pinpoint homophobia as a problem, even though the rhetoric of equality promises rights for all, including sexual minorities (Epprecht 2004). Therefore, homophobia resurged as a problem and fascination, just as it did under colonialism (Bleys 1995).

The second strand of thought regards state-sponsored homophobia as indicative of state leaders’ increasing authoritarianism and general hostility to criticism (HRW and IGLHRC 2003). This is evident in the state’s crackdown on journalists, SWAPO’s barring of journalists’ access to its yearly congress, the state’s condemnation of the National Society of Human Rights’ scathing reports on the state’s performance, and the state’s hostility toward the Council of Churches in Namibia’s attempt in 1996 to stage a national reconciliation conference. The Council of Churches in Namibia’s efforts at national reconciliation upstaged the state because it became painfully clear that the state was not acting quickly enough for civil society and that civil society was seizing the reins of national reconciliation, an action that the SWAPO and the state had determined that they were the best equipped to take.

The third strand of thought treats SWAPO as a national liberation movement that never fully lived up to its promise to liberate the country entirely from the shackles of inequality (Melber 2004). Instead, it focused on retaining control of the state. State leaders’ increasingly authoritarian positions affirmed this view. Although SWAPO claimed to be democratizing the nation, Henning Melber (2004) counters that the movement’s primary goal was decolonization, not democratization, and it did not even fully succeed in decolonizing Namibia. Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (2003) support Melber’s interpretation of the state’s crackdown on political dissent. Because decolonization supplanted democratization as the movement’s primary goal, the state and public sphere were not as completely transformed as those in South Africa.
In the midst of the Namibian nation-building, democratization, and decolonization processes, LGBT organizing expanded in scope (Lorway 2006). Though the movement remained confined to Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project, it became entrenched in Namibian civil society. For example, both LGBT SMOs played important roles in the Namibian Non-Govermental Organisation Forum (NANGOF). Below I describe the purpose and structure of Sister Namibia and The Rainbow, the two Windhoek-based LGBT SMOs I studied.

2.4.2.1 Sister Namibia

The Namibian women’s movement emerged out of the struggle for national liberation (Becker 1995). Many Namibian women joined the armed struggle and SWAPO’s women’s wing (Hubbard and Solomon 1995). From the beginning, SWAPO and political parties dominated women’s movement politics (Geisler 2004). Some autonomous women’s organizations sprouted up on the eve of independence, but SWAPO frowned on activities that siphoned energy and resources from the business of liberation. However, the ruling party relaxed its stance when leaders realized that women’s rights activists could accomplish a great deal through grassroots efforts, alleviating the state of some responsibilities. A number of women’s rights organizations distanced themselves from an overtly feminist stance, though many practiced feminism in their social and political work, such as eradicating violence against women (Geisler 2004:146; Hubbard and Solomon 1995:182). Feminist organizations thus emerged in Namibia, undeterred by SWAPO’s political domination. One such SMO was Sister Namibia.

A small group of feminist formed Sister Namibia in 1989 just before the country formally declared independence (Frank and !Khaxas 2006). Core SMO members focused on publishing a magazine of the same name for the SMO’s first decade of existence (Frank and !Khaxas 2006). Early in its existence, Sister Namibia functioned more informally, suggesting that the SMO took a while to consolidate its structure and internal culture.

[A]ll of us who joined Sister were interested in the magazine. [W]e called ourselves a collective. So when I joined, we still didn't have a building; we didn't have paid staff. We were meeting in private people's houses. We were stealing paper from various government ministries and photocopying at night or [using] other people's copying machines and doing the layout by hand. So it was just a collective of women who wanted to make a magazine (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006).
Settling into formal routines and growing as a collective, Sister Namibia established a volunteer (member) management committee and paid staff, who were initially recruited from the cadre of volunteers. “The organization had grown, but our structures hadn't really. Our ideology hadn't grown with it” (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). For a time, a disjuncture existed between volunteers and paid staff. The SMO suffered growing pains, as volunteers chafed against the guidelines that paid staff instituted. “There was this kind of feeling [that] . . . the volunteers are the intellectuals who can lead the organization, who can fundraise, who can do things, and the staff are there to implement” and to report to the management committee (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). Nevertheless, the SMO concentrated decision-making power in membership body that elected members of the management committee at the annual general meeting (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). This friction alienated some staff in the mid-1990s, who left the SMO and moved on to other job opportunities. Staff and the SMO outgrew one another in a sense as Sister Namibia became more political, but the SMO settled into a comfortable staff and management relationship. Staff included a director, bookkeeper, receptionist, a delivery person, part-time housekeeper, and contract media officer. Black and white lesbian Namibians held prominent roles in Sister Namibia, with at least three working formally as the SMO’s director, and staff and members were multiracial. Three staff identified as black, two as coloured, and one as white.

After allowing LGBT activists to use the organization’s office and resources for the first TRP meetings in 1997, Sister Namibia has been at the forefront of the movement ever since.34 Sister Namibia embraced lesbian rights and an anti-homophobic stance in 1993. The organization committed itself to fighting sexism, racism, and homophobia, which is evident in articles in *Sister Namibia* that educated readers about how these forms of oppression limited girls and women’s choices and potential. For instance, in an article about bisexuality, the author explored the personal, social, and political significance of being bisexual and exposed misconceptions about being bisexual, such as the assumption that bisexuals were intersexed and possessed both male and female sexual organs because they were attracted to members of the same and opposite gender. The author also interviewed local psychologists and bisexual women to find out what it meant to Namibians; one Namibian bisexual stated that some gay and lesbian activists were upset that bisexuals were not as involved in the movement. “Therefore lesbians

34 In TRP’s early years, several activists worked both with TRP and Sister Namibia.
sometimes feel a bitterness towards bisexuals, who are less likely to become politically involved. They act like butterflies who harvest the fruits that lesbians have struggled for, without thinking what it costs” (Cuijpers 1997:9). Sister Namibia did not shy away from addressing such controversy within or outside the feminist or LGBT movement in Namibia. This refusal to back down made the organization an internationally recognized defender of women’s and LGBT rights. Sister Namibia achieved international acclaim when the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) awarded the organization with the Felipa de Souza Award in 1997 for standing up for sexual minority rights in the face of homophobic attacks from state officials and ensuring that lesbian rights were on the agenda at the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China (“Sister Wins” 1997).

No stranger to controversy, Sister Namibia was often on the receiving end of criticism from the state for its unswerving support of women’s and LGBT human rights. This was the case when Sister Namibia launched the Namibian Women’s Manifesto, a document that cast lesbian rights as women’s rights. Sister Namibia experienced an anti-lesbian backlash firsthand when the state divided lesbian rights from women’s rights. The state and SWAPO-dominated groups hostilely responded to Sister Namibia’s efforts (Rothschild 2005). Notably, state officials’ campaign to discredit the Namibian Women’s Manifesto coincided with a member of Sister Namibia who filed for permanent residency on the grounds of being in a committed relationship with her lesbian partner and raising her partner’s son (Frank 2001b). Though Sister Namibia ended its work related to Namibian Women’s Manifesto, the organization incorporated concepts of diverse gender and sexual expressions in its work. Later in 2006, Sister Namibia planned to unveil its pioneering project aimed at increasing women’s sexual autonomy and awareness of sexual rights.

2.4.2.2 The Rainbow Project

Establishing a public profile was a priority for TRP from the organization’s launch in 1997. The first meeting at Sister Namibia’s office drew more than 100 members of the LGBT

35 The state used sexuality as a smear tactic to silence opponents. For example, attempting to discredit the opposition party, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), Nujoma alleged that the party’s leader, Ben Ulenga, and fellow councillors in Oshakati were homosexuals who did not have the nation’s best interests in mind (Shivute 2004). Ulenga and his CoD colleagues subsequently demanded that Nujoma apologize for labeling him a homosexual (Amupadhi 2004). Conversely, in August 2004, the SWAPO Women’s Council accused Sister Namibia of being little more than an extension of the Congress of Democrats, a label that Sister firmly rejected (Dentlinger 2004b).
community. Attendees agreed that GLON would not be an appropriate vehicle for their concerns because GLON’s history as a white gay and lesbian organization might alienate LGBT persons of other races and ethnicities. Approximately fifteen core volunteers with the skills, resources, and time enabled TRP to start with great success unlike many other under-resourced African LGBT SMOs. TRP also benefited greatly from guidance from the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, which taught TRP how to operate in repressive circumstances. A major obstacle that TRP faced in its development concerned the recruitment of nonwhite members. Foreign and Namibian whites dominated the core group of volunteers. TRP began to reach out to different ethnic groups by offering services that diverse communities needed, such as a soup kitchen and a sexually transmitted disease clinic. TRP eventually suspended these “bread-and-butter” activities because they siphoned energy and resources from other projects, such as a legal rights and education campaign. The SMOs partnered with other organizations that provided such services so that LGBT persons could still meet their basic needs.

TRP mainstreamed LGBT rights as human rights instead of treating all problems that sexual minorities experience as LGBT-specific. This strategy recognized how important support from other human rights NGOs was to TRP and the Namibian LGBT movement. To this end, TRP joined the Namibian NGO Forum’s (NANGOF) Human Rights and Democracy Sector and participated in the Multimedia Campaign Against Violence. TRP initiated its “LGBT Awareness Week” in late November 1999, an event that ultimately metamorphosed into a Human Rights Week and included human rights NGOs in its planning and execution. In April 2001, TRP and other civil society NGOs staged a human rights march, which marked an important turning point in mainstreaming LGBT rights with human rights. In 2005, TRP returned the Human Rights Week to the originally named LGBT Awareness Week, highlighting LGBT rights and celebrating achievements in the LGBT community.

In March 1998, when TRP held its first strategic planning workshop, attendees “stressed the need for increased visibility of the project at community, national and international level [sic]” (“Adding Colour” 1998). Throughout 1998 and 1999, TRP regularly held workshops for members on themes such as “It Is OK to Be Gay.” After TRP opened its office in June 2000 (Menges 2000), it prioritized giving all members of Namibia’s LGBT community a space in the organization and office, which was concretized in the resource center. Filled with educational
and entertainment materials, the office’s resource center functioned as a safe meeting space for LGBT persons. Additionally, different segments of the LGBT community found a home at TRP. A Women’s Caucus formed in 1998 and was renamed the Different Identities Group. Gay men organized the Male Think Tank, and LGBT youth founded the Rainbow Youth. The office drew visitors, researchers, and members. TRP employed the following staff: a director, an office manager, an information and publicity officer who was designing the organization’s website and produced a weekly radio show, “Talking Pink,” a project director who oversaw a project on incorporating sexual diversity and spirituality, an outreach officer who informed members of upcoming events and ran a video project that traveled to smaller towns throughout Namibia, a part-time housekeeper, and a full-time volunteer who assisted with the production of the radio show. 36 Three staff members identified as black, two as coloured, and one as white.

TRP focused on several different projects. First, the organization aimed to build the capacity of staff, trustees, volunteers, and beneficiaries, knowledge that TRP passes on to other African LGBT SMOs. Second, within the broad LGBT human rights and advocacy program, TRP addressed how LGBT Christians could integrate their spirituality and sexuality, and it devised a pilot program for schools in which students would learn about and discuss democracy, human rights, and diverse sexualities. For instance, in June and July 2006, the director met with students and teachers at a secondary school to discuss sexual diversity within a context of human rights; TRP’s director viewed the education program as introducing students and teachers to critical thinking and understanding about democracy and human rights at a time when dissent with and questioning of the state and SWAPO was not encouraged. Two new programs under development would fall under the human rights and advocacy program: later in 2006, the health program would take up the health needs of LGBT persons, and in 2007, the law reform project was intended to inventory existing laws that pertained to sexual minorities and to investigate how TRP could seek changes to laws without upsetting the fragile tolerance that existed under Pohamba’s administration. Third, TRP’s leadership program assembled a coherent strategy for the movement and exported skills training to other African LGBT SMOs. Fourth, under the outreach program fell the yearly LGBT Awareness Week, the award-winning radio show on Katutura Community Radio, “Talking Pink,” one of the few shows in Africa that dealt with

36 In 2006, the outreach officer, the project director, and the information and publicity officer took the video project to Tsumeb, Oshakati, and Aranos.
LGBT issues, and a video project that brought LGBT-themed films to different Namibian communities in order to initiate dialogue around LGBT issues.

Sister Namibia and TRP established themselves as credible SMOs working for LGBT rights in Namibia, as demonstrated by their continued funding from international donors such as the embassies of the Netherlands and Finland, HIVOS (a Dutch NGO), and Astraea Lesbian Foundation. Such credibility and success in mobilizing LGBT persons in Namibia enabled both SMOs to lead efforts to broaden the LGBT movement in southern Africa and throughout the continent. Both SMOs contributed to the founding of the Coalition of African Lesbians, the first organization of its kind in Africa to address African lesbian women’s issues, in 2003. The Coalition of African Lesbians met annually, and in June 2006, the organization adopted a constitution and elected a management committee to guide its evolution. TRP managed the All-Africa Rights Initiative, which evaluated the social and political situation in different African countries and assisted fledgling SMOs in applying for funding and developing their internal capacities. At the behest of foreign donors, TRP also joined the East Africa Convening to investigate the lack of LGBT activism in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. In addition, TRP intended to work with the Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals of Botswana.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Namibia’s independence from South Africa and South Africa’s liberation from apartheid initiated democratic nation-building. Amid these changes, the LGBT movement in each country responded to changes in the state. In South Africa, LGBT activists successfully made impressive legal gains for sexual and gender minorities thanks to accommodating state leaders, but in Namibia, LGBT activists had to contend with opposition from state leaders and the ruling party, making some strategies impossible or at least untenable. In this dissertation, I examine how Behind the Mask, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project made certain strategic choices related to their visibility or invisibility in these changing political environments. In the next chapter, I explain how I conducted this study.
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

3.1 INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

To understand variation in the strategic choices that social movement organizations (SMOs), the unit of analysis in my research, made about their public visibility and invisibility, I studied comparable LGBT SMOs in Windhoek, Namibia, and Johannesburg, South Africa. I selected Namibia and South Africa as nations in which to conduct my research because each national state treated LGBT organizing and rights differently. The Namibian state’s hostility to LGBT organizing and rights limited the strategic choices that SMOs could make about their visibility and invisibility. The South African state’s receptiveness to LGBT organizing and rights enabled SMOs to diversify their strategic choices about whether, how, when, and why to become publicly visible or invisible. Selecting these countries also allowed me to hold each nation’s sociopolitical context constant because Namibia and South Africa shared a common history (Frank and !Khaxas 1996). They constituted the same country until South Africa relinquished control of Namibia in 1988 and Namibia formally declared independence in 1990 (Melber 2003). Choosing to study LGBT social movement organizations in these two countries thus constituted the basis for my paired comparisons approach (Blee and Currier 2005; della Porta 2002; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005). A paired comparisons approach permitted me to examine in-depth case studies side by side “without losing the ‘thick description’ of the units of analysis” (della Porta 2002:297, see also Ragin 1987:38-44).

Practical decisions about where to execute my research became necessary due to the SMO density of each national LGBT movement and to each country’s population size. The South African LGBT movement differed in size from the Namibian LGBT movement. In the mid-1990s, approximately ten South African LGBT SMOs were operational during this period of movement organizational density (Armstrong 2002; Dirisuweit 2006). In contrast, only three
Namibian LGBT SMOs emerged in 1997 to oppose state leaders’ antigay remarks. The difference in the each movement’s organizational density likely stems from the difference in each country’s population. Namibia has a population of two million, while South Africa has a population of 45 million (World Bank 2006). Because of this different population size and SMO density in each country, I confined my case study selection geographically to Windhoek and Johannesburg, to focus on organizations in urban centers. At the time I initiated my field research, the Johannesburg metropolitan area was home to an estimated eight million people, whereas approximately 250,000 people inhabited the Windhoek metropolitan area. Though Johannesburg was significantly larger than Windhoek, I decided that this size difference would not bias my data collection, as the unit of analysis for this study was the LGBT social movement organization. When formulating my research design, I thought that I would be able to select from several LGBT social movement organizations with differing levels and types of visibility because LGBT organizing in other countries in the global South was concentrated in urban centers (Brown 1999; Green 1999; Palmberg 1999). In addition, both cities had features that made them suitable as case study sites. Multiple local and national newspapers and women’s human rights SMOs were located in Johannesburg and Windhoek. Johannesburg was also home to the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA), which stores historical materials from LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa (Manion 2005).

Practical considerations also limited my selection to two sites. With limited financial means and a constrained timeline, I began my data collection immediately in Johannesburg. Because I delayed selecting LGBT SMOs for more intensive study until I had inventoried SMOs in Johannesburg and engaged in archival research, this siphoned time that I could have used to observe internal SMO dynamics. In addition, studying SMOs in Cape Town or another South African city would have upset the balance I established by limiting my case study sites to Johannesburg and Windhoek. I located no other existing LGBT SMOs beyond Windhoek before and during my fieldwork, which made the addition of another Namibian city to my case study sites impossible.

37 Before entering the field, I only had a Mellon Predoctoral Fellowship and small grant from the Society for the Scientific Study of Sexuality to support my data collection. I received a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation (SBE 0601767) in March 2006, which covered the costs of transcribing the in-depth qualitative interviews I conducted. I decided to confine my data collection to less than one calendar year because the Mellon Fellowship only guaranteed one year of support.
A cross-national study has advantages and shortcomings (Dogan and Pelassy 1990). Carrying out research in two comparative case study sites can facilitate the in-depth examination of micro-level phenomena, such as internal social movement organizational dynamics (Hantrais 1999:99). However, collecting data in two comparative case study sites can limit the generalizability of findings across social movements in general and LGBT movements in particular. Since my goal with this project has been to examine how, when, and why LGBT SMOs exercise certain choices related to their visibility or invisibility, my focus on micropolitical dynamics outweighs the potential analytic deficit that accompanies a small cross-national sample ($N$) size.

### 3.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Understanding the internal logic that drove Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ strategic choices motivated my use of multiple qualitative methods. Multiple methods can “illuminate previously unexamined or misunderstood experiences” and “increase the likelihood of obtaining scientific credibility and research utility” (Reinharz 1992:197). Researchers describe the use of multiple methods as “triangulation,” which describes the process of using mixed multiple methods to generate coherence about and increase the validity of findings (Blee and Taylor 2002:111; Moran-Ellis et al. 2006:47-50; Richardson 2000:934). I gathered and analyzed newspaper and historical organizational data, conducted and analyzed in-depth qualitative interviews, and engaged in ethnographic observation to understand LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about visibility and invisibility.

#### 3.2.1 Data Collection Sequencing Strategy

I employed a sequencing strategy for executing my data collection (Mason 2002). By a sequencing strategy, I mean that I staggered my data collection so that I only gathered information relevant to Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ strategies of visibility and invisibility. The information I gathered informed and limited the
subsequent data I collected. Figure 3 depicts my data collection in chronological order. Though some steps overlapped, the order symbolizes the sequence in which I collected my data.

**Figure 1: Sequencing of Data Collection**

The first step consisted of amassing and analyzing articles from Namibian and South African news media. I began collecting online newspaper articles in September 2004 from Namibian and South African mainstream and LGBT-specialty media, and I visited Northwestern University’s Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies and photocopied newspaper articles from Namibian and South African mainstream sources. Second, between September and November 2005, I gathered archival data at the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA) in Johannesburg about the historical development of the Namibian and South African LGBT movements. I did not engage in archival research in Windhoek because I gathered Namibian LGBT movement records at GALA, as Namibia lacked an LGBT historical archive. For the third step, I engaged in intensive, daily ethnographic observation of two LGBT SMOs in Johannesburg between October 2005 and April 2006 and of two LGBT SMOs in Windhoek between April and July 2006. While I observed the activities at SMO, I collected records related to SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility and invisibility. After I had engaged in ethnographic observation of SMOs for a few weeks, I engaged in the fourth and final step, interviewing SMO staff and members. I discuss my collection and analysis of news articles and archival documents together below.

Before entering the field, I had intended to observe LGBT public and commercial spaces, such as bars, bookstores, and clubs, in Johannesburg and Windhoek because I had anticipated that SMOs might casually recruit members from and advertise events in such venues. After engaging in archival research and ethnographic observation of SMOs and interviewing SMO members and staff, I discovered a gap between LGBT SMOs and LGBT public and commercial spaces (Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992). SMOs did not use such spaces for
recruitment or advertisement, unless they held specific organized events at these venues. Examples of such events include SMO-sponsored events at gay and lesbian bars in Braamfontein, a suburb north of downtown Johannesburg, during the Lesbian and Gay Pride march in September every year. Thus, I decided to forgo observing LGBT public and commercial spaces.

3.2.2 Newspaper and Archival Research

I limited my online search of newspaper articles to those published between 1995 and 2006. In 1995, Namibian state leaders began publicly issuing antigay statements that elicited responses from LGBT SMOs, and South African LGBT SMOs campaigned for sexual minority rights to be permanently enshrined in the Constitution. Before entering the field in Johannesburg, I acquainted myself with developments in the South African and Namibian LGBT movements over the previous decade by gathering and coding news articles from Namibian and South African mainstream and LGBT-specific online news sources. My primary online South African mainstream news sources were The Mail and Guardian and South African Press Association, and my online Namibian mainstream news sources were The Namibian and New Era. South African LGBT-specific online news sources included Exit, Mambaonline, and Behind the Mask.

When I entered the field, I quickly realized the limitations of media data. I had a distorted sense of which South African and Namibian LGBT SMOs existed before I started my archival research and ethnographic observation. This distortion is likely attributable to different forms of bias that affect how the media portray social movements and protests (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Danzger 1975; Davenport and Ball 2002; Earl et al. 2004; Hug and Wisler 1998; Martin 2005; Oliver and Maney 2000; Ortiz et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2001). To illustrate this sense of distortion, I present how my preliminary analysis of two South African LGBT SMOs’ standing in the movement based only on media coverage differed from what I learned about these organizations when I conducted fieldwork in Johannesburg from September 2005 to April 2006.

In 2006, the South African LGBT social movement organization, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance, to receive the second largest amount of media coverage seemed to supplant the SMO, the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, with the largest amount of media coverage as the most featured South African LGBT organization in the media. In fact, the Lesbian and Gay Equality
Project disappeared altogether from media coverage. Figure 3 below charts the peaks and low points of media visibility of two South African LGBT SMOs.

Figure 2: Frequency of Selected South African LGBT SMOs in News Media, 1998-2006
Between 1998 and 2006, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE), which later became the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (LGEP) in 1999 (Dirsuweit 2006:331),\(^{38}\) was featured in 237 articles, and the Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA) garnered mention in 80 articles.\(^{39}\) Of 17 South African LGBT SMOs that appeared in the news between 1998 and 2006, the Coalition-Equality Project (48.6%) and GLA (16.4%) received 65 percent of the total LGBT SMO news coverage. 1999 was an important year for both SMOs, as the Coalition-Equality Project appeared in almost 70 news articles, while the GLA received mention in about 20 articles. After 1999, the Equality Project appears to have declined in importance, while the GLA steadily climbed in the amount of the media coverage it received. Based on these data, I surmised that Coalition-Equality Project and the GLA were the largest South African LGBT SMOs because they appeared in the news media most frequently (Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005). Given the Equality Project’s lack of and GLA’s rise in media coverage, it seemed reasonable to infer that the GLA supplanted the Equality Project as the most influential LGBT SMO in South Africa; I gauged influence by media coverage.

After I was immersed in the political reality of the South African LGBT movement, I learned that my preliminary findings were false. The Equality Project and the GLA were not equivalent, large, and powerful organizations within the movement, as their prominence in the media suggested. Once I gathered organizational records about the Coalition from the Gay and Lesbian Archives and GLA press releases from Behind the Mask, I conducted a content analysis of these documents and discovered a different explanation for why these two organizations figured so prominently in mainstream and LGBT-specific media coverage. Mainstream and LGBT-specific media concentrated on the legal status of sexual and gender minorities. The Coalition—later the Equality Project—was the public face of the LGBT movement for its entire existence, from the time that it was formed in 1994 to persuade political parties to protect sexual minority rights (Oswin 2007). The GLA emerged in November 1998 as a gay and lesbian political party and subsequently issued statements about the legal and political status of South African sexual and gender minorities (Hagen 1998). The Coalition-Equality Project and the GLA

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\(^{38}\) The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality was also known as the Coalition, and the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as the Equality Project.

\(^{39}\) I began this analysis in 1998, the year in which the GLA publicly emerged.
featured prominently in such reportage because each organization’s stated goals were achieving and defending the legal equality of sexual and gender minorities.

The media treated the GLA and Coalition-Equality Project as legitimate representatives of the South African LGBT movement. The Coalition-Equality Project and other LGBT SMOs excoriated the GLA and informed the media that the GLA was a sham organization consisting of one person who faxed provocative press releases to the media and LGBT social movement organizations (DeBarros 2006; IRIN 2006). Between 1998 and 2006, the GLA issued many controversial public statements about the following: excluding transvestites and transgender persons from membership (“SA Gay Group” 2004); calling on police to arrest drag queens at the Johannesburg Gay Pride parade for violating an apartheid-era law that forbids people from disguising their faces in public (Mambaonline 2004); asking the state not to give antiretroviral medication to persons who contracted HIV sexually (Mambaonline 2005); outing lesbian and gay students at their high schools who planned on bringing their same-gender partners to dances in an effort to encourage them to be public about their sexualities (SABC 2005); and advocating for the reinstatement of the death penalty (SAPA 2003, 2004). Mainstream media did not verify such statements that the GLA made until January 2006 when the GLA claimed to have encouraged more than a hundred gay men who did not know their HIV status to donate blood at South African National Blood Service centers in protest of a ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men (Gallagher 2006).

Such sensationalized media coverage of Namibian and South African sexual and gender minorities demonstrates how articles about LGBT organizing in these two countries were biased. This is the case with the media’s treatment of the GLA as a legitimate LGBT SMO.

The media sometimes misrepresents [sic] what [SMOs] want to say. . . . For example, . . . the GLA put out ridiculous press statement saying they’d had a big national conference and had decided to change their name from the Gay and Lesbian Alliance to the Death Penalty Party. Of course, the newspapers responded by putting out articles saying, “Gays Call for Death Penalty.” That’s despite that organizations . . . repeatedly informed the media about the nature of the GLA and warned them not to publish these press releases, which have little basis in the real world. That illustrates how big a gap there is between organizations and the media because organizations are still struggling to get their messages into the media. (South African LGBT activist, interview, 26 October 2005).

The LGBT activist’s statement illustrates the bias of media reporting about sexual and gender

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40 LGBT-specific media stopped treating the GLA as a reputable organization in 2004.
minority organizing, making the media an unreliable indicator of public visibility. Not only did LGBT SMOs experience problems with publicizing their efforts in the media, a problem that many other movements around the world share, but they also had to contend with the Namibian and South African media’s tendency to stereotype sexual and gender minorities. With the GLA, the media opted to cover the group’s eccentricity in keeping with the mainstream news media’s commercial interest in entertaining readers. According to a Behind the Mask staff member, the media “always want to portray us [LGBT persons] in a negative light. . . . They can never write something positive about the LGBT community” (Interview, 13 January 2006). Due to this media bias, I decided not to select SMOs solely based on their media visibility because synonymizing social movement or SMO visibility with media coverage flattens visibility into an outcome. Instead, I treated the media as one of many audiences available to social movements and SMOs and as one source of information about SMO strategies (Gamson 1975).

I spent several weeks at the Gay and Lesbian Archives in Johannesburg between the end of September and November 2005 photocopying and analyzing historical documents from each country’s LGBT movement. I first gathered historical documents related to the LGBT movement’s role in drafting the Equality Clause, a portion of the South African Constitution that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; this meant that I gathered documents going back to the late 1980s. I did not include these data in my document analysis, but they enabled me to write more detailed historical account of movement activities between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. I also pored over the records of key SMOs that were or had been based and active in Johannesburg, including the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, the Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand, and ACTIVATE. I spent the bulk of my time scanning and photocopying articles from Exit, a South African newspaper targeting white middle-class gay men, and from GALA’s collection of news clippings related to LGBT issues, rights, and movement activities. From my online searches, a visit to Northwestern University’s Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies, and my research at GALA, I gathered approximately 1,600 newspaper articles from Namibian and South African news sources about LGBT movement activity in both countries. I coded and analyzed national mainstream and LGBT-specific sources, but I confined my coding and analysis of local newspapers to those covering Johannesburg and Windhoek. Table 1 below contains the names of all Namibian and South African mainstream and LGBT-specific news sources from which I
selected articles to code and analyze. For the duration of my fieldwork in Johannesburg and Windhoek (September 2005-July 2006), I also purchased daily, weekly, and weekend newspapers and clipped articles related to LGBT organizing, rights, and issues, with the exception of The Windhoek Advertiser, which stopped publishing in the early 2000s.

Table 1: Namibian and South African News Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mainstream Sources</th>
<th>LGBT-Specific Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>The Namibian (national, independent)</td>
<td>Sister Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Windhoek Advertiser (local, independent)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Era (national, state-owned)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Southern Times (local, independent, weekly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Business Day (local, independent, centrist)</td>
<td>Behind the Mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Mail and Guardian (national, independent, liberal)</td>
<td>Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sunday Times (local, independent, conservative, weekly)</td>
<td>Mambaonline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Citizen (local, independent)</td>
<td>Q Online</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sowetan (local, independent, liberal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Star (local, independent, liberal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Press (local, independent, “black community-oriented,” weekly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sunday Independent (local, independent, weekly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My criteria for clipping articles included mention of LGBT SMOs by name, homosexuality, LGBT organizing, or LGBT cultural visibility. For example, when I searched Namibian and South African news sources online, I entered keywords, such as homosexuality, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, into sources’ search engines. I entered these articles into QSR NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching, and Theorizing) 6 and 7, a qualitative data analysis program, and generated inductive codes from a glossary of themes that emerged from my intensive observation of SMOs, which I detail below. I also created deductive codes from secondary sources about LGBT organizing in the global South, such as being recipients of donor aid (Arnfred 2004b). I then entered the articles into SPSS and coded them according to the following: day, month, year, LGBT SMOs mentioned, LGBT-related issue, and

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41 Unless otherwise indicated, all mainstream newspapers are daily newspapers. Political classifications of newspaper sources come from the World Press Review. The World Press Review describes its mission as the following: “to foster the international exchange of perspectives and information” (http://www.worldpress.org/, accessed 14 April 2007).
type of source.

I also collected approximately 500 documents from the Gay and Lesbian Archives and the Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs I observed. Several years ago, GALA solicited materials from SMOs in neighboring countries, and SMOs, such as The Rainbow Project in Namibia and the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, donated materials to GALA. Thus, I was able to gather organizational records from the Namibian LGBT movement, even though I had not yet visited the country. I organized and coded these documents thematically according to issue, event, and strategic choice.

3.2.3 Ethnographic Observation

Understanding the internal logic guiding SMOs’ strategic choices and how strategic choices shifted over time drove my ethnographic observation. By ethnography, I mean observing SMO activities and interacting with SMO staff and members “for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, [and] asking questions” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:1). Studying strategic choices poses operationalization difficulties for scholars because, “although choices about targeting, timing, and tactics can be directly observed, the strategic “frame” within which we make these choices—and provide them with their coherence—must often be inferred (Ganz 2000:1010). I observed SMOs consistently for a period of time so that I could follow their internal logic and assign them “coherence” so that they were not a jumble of unrelated choices, when instead, they constituted a series of choices that affected and even constrained the subsequent choices that SMO members and staff believed to be possible (Blee and Currier 2005; Ganz 2000). Through daily fieldwork with each SMO, I studied how, when, and why they made themselves visible or invisible to the media, the state, the public, sexual minority populations, and other audiences. I did not limit myself to observations that occur in the office setting. If an SMO staged an event or meeting elsewhere, I gained permission to “shadow” staff and members as they represented the SMO elsewhere. This flexibility prevented me from privileging the office as the only “legitimate” site of organizational interaction. I took detailed notes about staff meetings, informal conversations I had with staff
members and visitors, and events that took place at and away from SMO offices. Purposive sampling drove my selection of LGBT SMOs for intensive ethnographic observation (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). Random sampling would have been impossible and unsuitable for my purposes, given my interest in choosing organizations that had been visible for some time. I entered the field not knowing which LGBT SMOs I would study because I wanted to avoid turning visibility into a constant and to ensure that there was variability in visibility over time in SMOs that I observed. My criteria for selecting visible organizations were that an SMO had to be in existence for at least two years and to have some form of verifiable, routinized visibility, such as a regular meeting space or office. I selected SMOs that had existed long enough to have established processes for making strategic choices and whose visibility I could verify through archival records, interviews, or historical accounts. I tracked SMOs with some identifiable level of visibility, meaning that I had to be able to locate them through conventional means, such as through the media, word of mouth, or advertised meetings. I eliminated SMOs that met sporadically, were in existence for two years or less, or were visible fewer than five times. Organizations that I eliminated included a Jewish LGBT organization and a Muslim LGBT organization, each of which met inconsistently and lacked public meeting space.

Selecting SMOs to study once I arrived in South Africa and Namibia enabled me to avoid biasing my SMO selection because I had an adequate understanding of what organizations existed and were doing. Before I left for South Africa, I collected data from Namibian and South African print and online mainstream and LGBT-specific news sources and from the websites of local Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs, international human rights NGOs, international LGBT SMOs, and Behind the Mask. These data acquainted me with the range of LGBT organizing in each country and the issues that SMOs addressed. However, if I had selected the SMOs that I would observe before I reached South Africa and Namibia, I would have biased my selection. I did not have all the available information within my grasp until I arrived in South Africa because I was unsure which SMOs were operation and which ones were defunct. For instance, before leaving Pittsburgh, newspaper articles I had gathered frequently named the

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42 See Appendix A for the ethnographic observational template I used. I drew on my experience observing SMO dynamics when I worked as Dr. Kathleen M. Blee’s research assistant on her National Science Foundation-funded project (SBE-0316436) when I drafted the observational template. I revised the template and added observational categories if I had not observed such discussions or decisions before.
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as a leading SMO in Johannesburg; upon my arrival, I learned that the Equality Project’s board of trustees temporarily suspended the SMO due to allegations of financial mismanagement (Krouse 2005). I was not privy to this information until I spoke to local activists familiar with the SMO’s demise, and I ruled out observing the Equality Project’s activities.

Only two social movement organizations in each city met my minimum criteria for documented public visibility and for being in operation for at least two years. As a result, the selection process was simple and convenient. The ease of this selection suggested that Johannesburg was no longer a hotbed of LGBT organizing. The number of Johannesburg-based social movement organizations had declined steadily since the late 1990s, reducing the number of possible organizations I could study. In addition, no Namibian LGBT social movement organizations besides Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project existed, which meant that the LGBT movement had remained largely confined to these two organizations.

All social movement organizations shared organizational characteristics. All employed professional staff, maintained an office open to the public, received funding from Northern donors, and claimed to represent the interests of the entire or a segment of the LGBT community in their country or throughout Africa. They diverged in their constitution of membership. Behind the Mask has been a professional and volunteer-driven SMO since its inception, whereas FEW, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project once were membership-based. FEW, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project recently made the transition from membership-based organizations to trusts that an executive board oversees; responsibility for and governance of the social movement organization shifted from members of the Namibian LGBT community to a select few. This restructuring satisfied Northern donors who were sometimes uneasy about allocating funds to fledgling organizations.

Studying two organizations meant that I was not able to study each SMO so intensively because “the more settings studied the less time that can be spent in each” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:40). What I may have sacrificed in terms of micro-level detail I made up for in rich observation about SMOs’ strategic choices about visibility and invisibility as I concentrated on staff members and visitors’ talk about audience, constituencies, and campaigns. I estimate that

43 In a subsequent study, I hope to document the proliferation and depopulation of LGBT social movement organizations in South Africa between the 1960s and the present.
I spent 800 hours observing activities and interactions at all four SMOs. I averaged 20 hours a week of ethnographic observation. Gathering data from social movement organizations with varying degrees of public visibility allowed me to develop a more robust analysis of the strategic choices that organizations made about their visibility and invisibility. I limited my observation to what happened at organizations’ offices or when they participated in off-site events. Below I describe how I analyzed my ethnographic data in conjunction with my documentary and interview data.

### 3.2.4 Interviewing

To ensure that I understood how, when, and why social movement organizations made certain strategic choices about their visibility or invisibility, I interviewed SMO staff and members. Using a digital voice recorder, I conducted 56 in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with LGBT SMO staff and members in Johannesburg and Windhoek to understand how and under what circumstances SMO promote their visibility or withdraw from it. By semi-structured interview, I mean that I used an interview schedule with a predetermined list of possible questions I could ask respondents, but I let respondents’ answers to the questions guide the order in which I posed questions or provoke new and follow-up questions not on the schedule. Semi-structured interviews allowed me to understand strategic choices “from the perspective of movement actors” (Blee and Taylor 2002:92).

To capture a range of LGBT SMO staff and member attitudes, I engaged in purposive sampling when I selected activists to interview (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003). I strategically selected activists with different roles in the SMO who had been involved with the organization long enough to describe its decision-making process, audiences, constituency, and campaigns to interview. Selecting activists to interview based on their role in the organization, instead of using other criteria such as gender, race, age, or length of time in the organization, made sense because I was interested in their understanding of how the organization made strategic choices. It is likely that their role in the organization influenced their proximity to decision-making processes, which in turn provided them with a more in-depth understanding of different strategic choices. I began interviewing staff and members only after I had spent enough time observing an organization to have established trust and rapport with staff and members. During the interview, I asked
respondents about shifts in the group’s visibility and invisibility strategies, how the organization tailored its strategies for different audiences, how the organization decided to publicize its work and goals, and the organization’s routines for making itself accessible to the public and targeted constituency. Additionally, I asked respondents to comment on recent occurrences in which the organization took strategic steps to make itself publicly visible. I also asked respondents about what attracted them to the organization and their attitudes regarding the correlation between individual LGBT visibility and invisibility and organizational visibility and invisibility (see Appendix B). I compared interviewees’ responses to questions about the organization’s routines as checks against my notes and analysis about the SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility and invisibility.

I conducted all interviews in English, though in three instances, respondents claimed that their English was limited. However, they fully participated in the interview and answered in English, and we had little difficulty in understanding each other’s meanings. I protected the anonymity and confidentiality of subjects by using pseudonyms for staff, members, and leaders in my field notes and transcriptions of interviews, by not recording personal identifiers on tape, and by keeping my field notes, transcribed interviews, and digital interview files on a laptop computer encrypted with a password, ensuring that I was the only person with access to this information. After I finished interviewing staff and members, I sent the digital recordings via email to a transcriptionist in the United States who had no ties to Namibia or South Africa. She transcribed the interviews and emailed the transcripts back to me, and I began analyzing the interviews in QSR N6 and N7.

Interview participants varied in terms of their nationality, race, gender, and sexuality. Of the 56 individuals I interviewed, 26 were Namibian, 23 South African, and 7 non-Namibians or non-South Africans. Foreign staff members originally hailed from Uganda, Burundi, Germany, Jamaica, the Netherlands, and the United States. Table 2 below contains demographic information about respondents regarding their race, gender, and sexuality.
I interviewed an almost equal number of self-identified men (n=27) and women (n=28) and one female-to-male preoperative transgender person. Of the staff and members I interviewed, 45 percent (n=25) identified as gay, 43 percent (n=24) as lesbian, 7 percent (n=4) as heterosexual, and 5 percent (n=3) as bisexual. Gay men and lesbians dominated the staff and membership of LGBT SMOs in both countries. Almost 73 percent (n=41) of respondents identified as black, 20 percent (n=11) as coloured, and 7 percent (n=4) as white. Unlike lesbian and gay SMOs in the 1980s in South Africa or the first attempt at organizing in Namibia, LGBT SMOs in Johannesburg and South Africa were multiracial, and power and leadership had shifted to black and coloured Namibian and South Africans. Of the leaders of SMOs I studied, two identified as black lesbians, one as a coloured gay man, and another as a white lesbian. Leadership positions in LGBT SMOs thus were no longer solely the domain of white gay men.

### 3.2.5 Data Analysis

I analyzed the news media articles and organizational records data separately from the interview and ethnographic observational data. This separation made sense given my interest in understanding LGBT social movement organizations’ strategic choices contemporaneously and over time. In QSR N6 and N7, I utilized the same thematic coding categories for all data as a way to ensure consistency in coding. I integrated news media articles and organization records and then coded them together thematically, and I repeated this process for interview and
ethnographic data. Deductive codes that I gleaned from secondary sources, such as social movement literature, included audience construction, constituency construction, talk about opponents, and antigay sentiments. Inductive codes that emerged from my initial perusal of my data include mention of foreign donors and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), democratic procedures at SMOs, and how organizations perceive and react to political opportunities.

3.3 SAFETY, ACCESS, AND RAPPORT

3.3.1 Safety

Before entering the field, I worried that my presence at Namibian LGBT social movement organizations as a white American researcher would make them vulnerable to state scrutiny. Once in Windhoek, I learned that apart from isolated incidents of the police harassing individuals they believed to be sexual or gender minorities, the state had not initiated a comprehensive crackdown on LGBT organizing such as that which had occurred in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s (HRW and IGLHRC 2003). Namibian staff and members assured me that my fears were unfounded, but I still took steps not to draw undue attention to my presence or to publicize my research agenda in Namibia. Similarly, when I followed community representatives from the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) into townships on visits to prospective members, I took care in monitoring the conversations I initiated on public transport. Because I did not want to imperil the community representative’s work in townships, I was careful not to initiate “lesbian”-themed discussions, such as how black lesbians negotiated their personal visibility in townships.

Conducting research in Johannesburg was also a cause of concern for me due to the city’s international reputation for being violent (Dirsuweit 2002; Reid and Dirsuweit 2002). I quickly learned that I could avoid violence by staying away from isolated areas and not carrying around valuable possessions, such as my laptop computer. I also discovered that research participants shared my safety concerns. For instance, FEW sponsored a self-defense training class at the request of a staff member who was sometimes hassled by youths on her way to and from the
organization’s office. FEW invited me to participate in the training because not only did they consider me to be a fixture in the organization by that time, but they also recognized that I traveled as they did. I commuted mostly by minibus taxis, though occasionally, I paid for more expensive private taxis if I had an appointment somewhere or if I was carrying my laptop or other valuables. In a sense, safety concerns enabled me to alleviate the unease that potential research participants had around me at first. Asking how I traveled to the office let research participants offer advice about which places in Johannesburg to avoid and how I should safeguard my valuables. In this and other ways, they were sources of important knowledge. Though participants and I shared somewhat similar safety concerns around transport and walking in Johannesburg, our safety concerns differed because of where we lived. Whereas many participants returned home to sometimes difficult township lives, I was able to rent a room in an apartment and then a house with numerous security features designed to counteract unpredictability, which included an electrified fence, electric gate, two-meter-high walls, and windows with burglar bars. My class position insulated me from the more volatile aspects of living in Johannesburg’s townships.

3.3.2 Access

Gaining access to Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations was complicated at first. Conversations with local activists proved important to how I selected SMOs to study and obtained permission from SMO leaders to carry out intensive ethnographic observation at their offices. I had to prove that I was trustworthy to staff and members. I prepared a short, jargon-free research proposal that explained the parameters of my research; I made it clear that I was interested in observing the SMO’s meetings and activities. I stated that I wanted to learn about how the SMO presented itself publicly, interacted with different audiences, and decided to work on or withdraw from certain movement campaigns.

An archivist at the Gay and Lesbian Archives put me in touch with the director of Behind the Mask. After meeting with the director, I learned that the organization would be suitable for my study because staff monitored the media and participated in LGBT movement activities within and beyond South Africa. Through Behind the Mask, I was able to learn about the current state of LGBT organizing in Namibia, and staff put me in touch with the directors of Sister
Namibia and The Rainbow Project (TRP). Fortunately, in February 2006, both directors of Sister
Namibia and TRP traveled to Johannesburg for a meeting with LGBT organizations from South
Africa and Zimbabwe. I met with both directors and gained permission from them to study their
organizations, even before I set foot in Namibia. I obtained access to three LGBT SMOs quickly
and easily, but getting access to the Forum for the Empowerment for Women (FEW) proved
difficult. I present an excerpt from my fieldnotes, which exemplifies the series of negotiations I
had with the director of FEW before she granted me permission to observe the SMO’s activities.

In her effort to protect FEW after negative encounters with researchers (she didn’t
go into detail), the director wanted to ensure that researchers wouldn’t publish
anything that portrayed the organization in a negative light. She had an
investment in preserving FEW’s reputation as an organization. She characterized
previous researchers as taking information from FEW, without giving anything
back. She seemed especially angered that researchers left participants’ lives
unimproved with their research results (Fieldnotes, 18 November 2005).

The director’s past interactions with foreign researchers inclined her to deny my request to study
the organization, and her comments illustrated how important the SMO’s public visibility and
reputation were to her. Coupled with subsequent meetings with the director and the public
relations officer, my presence at Behind the Mask enabled me to obtain access to FEW because I
was not a “fly-in, fly-out” type of researcher the director distrusted. It took a couple of months to
cultivate the trust of the director of FEW, an example of how forging research relationships can
require a great deal of time and energy (Reinharz 1992).

Delineating the boundaries of my inquiry was important because I wanted SMO staff and
members to understand that I was not interested in telling stories of pain or in exploiting their
members. Many Namibian and South African LGBT persons experienced negative sanctions
associating with disclosing their sexual and gender orientations, making them “interesting”
objects of study to outsiders like myself who wanted to understand the persistence and
permutation of violence in these postcolonial countries. I did not want to objectify or exploit
LGBT persons and their narratives of suffering or tragedy, and I clearly stated that I would leave
the site of observation if staff or members began to disclose personal information, such as how
they experienced and handled violence. The use of research participants’ stories because of their
violence or difference violates basic feminist ethical principles because it reduces research
participants to objects, denying them agency in the research process (Reinharz 1992; Steady
2004). I am not suggesting that the only narrative that Namibian or South African LGBT persons
are capable of recounting is one of suffering. Rather, I mean the most common narratives selected by students of the Namibian and South African LGBT movement are those of violence, poverty, and limited choice (Dirisuweit 2006; see also Mbembe 2001). Though I do not deny that such narratives are worthy of study, I was more interested in focusing on organized expressions of agency (McDonald 2002; Steady 2006): LGBT social movement organizations. With such a focus, I attempt to dispel the notion that to be a sexual or gender minority in the global South is to lead a life mired in difficulty (Lewis 2004).

My focus on organizational choices and practices facilitated my access to SMOs and to activists. First, my object of scrutiny was not the individual activist, but rather the SMO, which is reflected in my ethnographic observational template and interview questions. In this way, I did not stray into the realm of private experience; when I interviewed SMO staff and members, I was interested in their public experience with the SMO. Second, my focus on the SMO allowed me to construct SMO staff and members as experts on SMOs. Some staff and members seemed to appreciate the valorization of their expertise during the interview. A few times, respondents made remarks such as “I didn’t realize I knew so much” or “I can’t believe I’m saying this much about” a particular SMO. Respondents did not necessarily know how much they knew about the organizations, and this may have proven to be an important source of validation for them.

Organizations also viewed me as a resource. I was able to contribute to SMOs by performing routine or special tasks if staff needed assistance. I wrote an annual report for one organization, composed and copy-edited a few stories for Behind the Mask’s website, taught a couple of communication classes for FEW about how to walk away from tense situations, assisted a FEW staff member with her curriculum vitae as she applied for a paid internship, answered the telephone if Sister Namibia or The Rainbow Project staff were in a meeting, copy-edited articles for an edition of Sister Namibia, assisted visitors in identifying materials for research or personal use at Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project’s resource centers, and participated as a guest interviewee on The Rainbow Project’s “Talking Pink” radio show about bisexuality. I also shared my collection of news media articles related to same-sex marriage to Behind the Mask and the Gay and Lesbian Archives as they tried to encourage the South African Joint Working Group to pursue same-sex marriage.
3.3.3 Researcher Identity

My nationality, race, gender, class, and sexuality affected my research in different ways. As a white woman, some black and coloured Namibian and South African LGBT activists regarded me suspiciously until I spoke; then they realized that I was American. Whiteness has a long troubled history in both countries, and potential research participants interpreted my race and nationality through a lens affected by apartheid laws and policies (Steyn 2001). In Namibia, on a couple of occasions, staff or members who did not know I was observing interactions at Sister Namibia or The Rainbow Project greeted me in Afrikaans, as was customary among individuals speaking with those they perceived to be white Namibians. After I sheepishly confessed that my Afrikaans was nonexistent, staff and members initially regarded me as an oddity, but soon adjusted to my presence.

Most staff and members of LGBT SMOs welcomed and accommodated my presence after I explained my research to them. After I introduced myself to staff and members, several inquired, “Why are you doing research here?” I interpreted their question to mean, “Why did you leave the United States to come to Namibia/South Africa to conduct your research?” I explained my interest in comparing how SMOs make decisions under differing political circumstances, but the question of whether I was there to study otherness and to exoticize political organizing around sexual and gender minority issues remained. Ethnographers historically had unsavory connections to colonialism in Africa (Bleys 1995; McClintock 1995). This did not exempt the type of research in which I engaged; answering the difficult question about why I was doing research in Namibia and South Africa with a response such as “to learn about [social movement] processes, I had to go somewhere” would have been disingenuous (Zabusky 2002:121). I explained the motivation for my selection of Johannesburg and Windhoek as comparative case study sites in terms of my interest in showing social movement scholars who tend to study movements in the global North that some theories and concepts may have little bearing in the global South. Staff and members seemed to understand this explanation, but they also wanted to know how this research would benefit the movement and their organizations (Steady 2004). I explained that it would take some time to analyze my data and to formulate conclusions. A way I hope to be able to give back to these organizations is to deposit my findings with them and at the Gay and Lesbian Archives in Johannesburg.
Being a woman facilitated my entry into two organizations, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) and Sister Namibia, probably because both organizations define women as part of their targeted constituency (see Chapter Four). My dress and appearance also provoked interesting questions from staff and members about whether I identified as “butch” or “femme.” I typically dressed very casually in keeping with the attire of staff and members at both organizations, and I confined my wardrobe largely to black outfits. I wore no makeup and almost always wore running shoes to ease my walking in Johannesburg and Windhoek. At Behind the Mask, FEW, and The Rainbow Project, staff and members speculated about my gender identity. Interestingly, such conversations demonstrated how I became a subject of inquiry, much in the way that organizations held my interest as a subject of research. I asked probing questions about what “butch” and “femme” meant for LGBT SMO staff and members. Some believed that I would identify as butch because I dressed so sportily and was tall and large in comparison to some Namibian and South African women, while others interpreted my customary silence and helpfulness, such as when I offered to get others coffee or tea while I prepared my own, as “femme” behavior. Such conversations demonstrated that some gender categories and behavior (dress and physical bearing) might fit into a typology of “butch” and “femme,” but not all gender categories were translatable as I explicate in Chapter 6.

My sexuality became a topic of conversation for staff and members at a couple of SMOs (Swarr 2003). After the director of FEW granted me access to the organization, she asked me how I identified in terms of sexuality and stated, “You can tell me that it’s none of my business.” Fearful that she might revoke her decision, I answered her, which seemed to satisfy her. She asserted, “At least you’re one of us. There’s nothing I can stand more than straight people studying us.” She reclassified me as less “other” than before I answered her question. Staff and members also inquired about my sexuality in more circumspect ways, as an attempt to gauge my interest in LGBT politics generally and a way to get to know me as a person. Some LGBT activists and antigay opponents assumed that those who supported sexual and gender minority organizing were lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. Understanding this dimension of their query, I answered their questions as best I could, though I instituted boundaries whenever possible to ensure that I did not disclose information that would restrict my access to the organization or potential interview participants.
Designing a comparative research project that involves multiple qualitative methods takes a great deal of thought and refinement. The project that I imagined doing before I entered the field is not the research I ended up conducting. For instance, I discarded a part of my project involving the observation of LGBT public and commercial spaces in Johannesburg and Windhoek because social movement organizations did not use them to recruit members or supporters or to advertise their work. I continued to modify the observational and interview templates I routinely used to reflect how my understanding of organizations’ strategic choices had changed. I did not want to lose or miss any data, a fear that I share with many qualitative researchers. Employing multiple methods allowed me to increase my confidence that I am telling the story about Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about the visibility and invisibility as accurately as possible.
4.0 HOW NAMIBIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS NAVIGATE STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Current theorizing about strategic action assumes that social movements are free to choose from a range of possible strategies (Jasper 2006:2). This perspective presumes that social movements operate in fairly open and permissive democratic contexts in the global North. However, social movements in some newly democratizing nations in the global South may have to select from a more modest and limited strategic arsenal. The state and other institutional political actors at the helm of democratizing efforts configure and can potentially limit what is possible in terms of strategic action. Social movements can and do play an important role in delimiting the boundaries of strategic action, but not all social movements are equal in their access to resources and political opportunities. I use a comparative approach to strategic action to explain 1.) how sociopolitical contexts bound SMOs’ strategic choices and 2.) how SMOs’ strategic choices unfold in differing sociopolitical contexts (della Porta 2002). By comparing how SMOs that belong to the same movement deploy strategic choices in differing sociopolitical contexts, I examine the boundaries of strategic choices, which are finite in some newly democratizing nations in the global South.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMOs) encounter many strategic dilemmas as they try to find optimal ways to achieve movement and organizational goals (Jasper 2004, 2006). By strategic dilemma, I mean the predicament of selecting between “two or more options, each with a long list of risks, costs, and potential benefits” (Jasper 2006:1). A considerable strategic dilemma LGBT social movement organizations sometimes face is whether, how, when, and why to become publicly visible or to withdraw from public view. This dilemma can be especially salient for LGBT SMOs that operate...
in sociopolitical contexts hostile to sexual and gender minorities because they confront opposition that may harm members or hamstring organizational plans (Earl 2003; Palmberg 1999). Organizations active in accommodating sociopolitical contexts may seemingly have more options for sexual and gender minority activism. Thus, organizations’ orientations to strategic choices may depend on the external sociopolitical context in which they operate. Actions toward or away from public visibility involve deciding whom to represent as well as to which audience(s) an organization should make itself visible. I distinguish these types of dilemmas, following William A. Gamson (1975), as those involving target audiences (whom SMOs try to change or influence) and those involving constituencies (whom SMOs try to recruit and mobilize).

In this chapter, I explore how one Namibian and one South African LGBT social movement organization navigate a series of strategic dilemmas that involve issues of visibility toward audiences or constituencies. I examine how these strategic dilemmas unfolded within each organization and with respect to each country’s sociopolitical environment. LGBT social movement organizations in both countries both struggled against the stigmatization and marginalization of sexual and gender minorities. They diverged in how they juggled and responded to strategic dilemmas (Ganz 2000, 2004). First, I consider how a South African lesbian organization, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women’s (FEW) exclusionary orientation guided its strategic choices. By exclusionary strategic choices, I mean decisions intended to shield an organization and its members from harm and scrutiny and to cement a homogeneous and insular collective identity. Because FEW had a primary goal of eliminating violence against black lesbians, they made exclusionary strategic choices that created and maintained safe spaces for black lesbian members. Second, I investigate how Sister Namibia, a Namibian feminist and “lesbian” SMO, negotiated strategic dilemmas within a context of state hostility to sexual and gender minorities, sexual and gender minority rights, and LGBT SMOs. In contrast to FEW, Sister Namibia developed an inclusionary principle that guided its choices about engaging the state and casting lesbian rights as women’s rights. By inclusionary strategic choices, I mean decisions designed to cultivate relationships with diverse audiences and to cement an organization’s broad, inclusive, and national collective identity. I am interested in understanding how, when, and why FEW and Sister Namibia made certain strategic choices and the consequences of those choices. I used micro-level ethnographic data to trace how FEW,
which was formed in 2003, made strategic decisions amid a political context full of possibilities in South Africa. I employed document data, interviews, and ethnographic data to illuminate how Sister Namibia, which was launched in 1989, made strategic choices in the more restrictive sociopolitical environment of Namibia.

4.2 FORUM FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN (SOUTH AFRICA)

The Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) devised an exclusionary orientation that guided its strategic choices about visibility toward its constituency and audiences as it created safe spaces for black lesbians who were vulnerable to violence. FEW approached gender- and sexuality-based violence from a perspective that emphasized “disaggregation . . . because homosexuals are positioned differently in their communities, and may experience violence purely on the grounds of their alternative sexuality . . . but homophobia also means that avenues available to heterosexual women may not be available to them [lesbians]” (van Zyl 2005a:238). In this way, African radical feminism informed FEW’s overall strategy of insularity and exclusion. Establishing safe spaces for black lesbians to meet and organize was a strategic goal consistent with a radical feminist position that was distrustful of male-dominated movements and prioritized “exclusively female organizations that would offer a safe organizational safe for women, one characterized by the values of teamwork, nurturing, and mutual support” (Hassim 2005:33). I explore several strategic dilemmas that FEW encountered. First, I consider how FEW handled the strategic dilemma of creating safe spaces for its constituents, including deciding where to locate its office, how to monitor internal spaces, and who to allow access to the organization’s physical spaces. Second, I examine FEW’s dilemma of how to define its target constituency (who could be members). Third, I delve into how the organization navigated the dilemma of whether and how to participate in public protest, that is, how to present itself toward an audience.
4.2.1 The Dilemma of Organizational Space

How to create and protect safe organizational spaces emerged as a key strategic dilemma for FEW. On the one hand, staff and members wanted the organization to be open to the public, in a limited way, to educate South Africans about hate crimes against black lesbians. On the other hand, staff prioritized creating spaces so that the organization’s constituency of black lesbians would feel safe and welcome. In February 2006, Zoliswa Nkonyana, a young black lesbian who lived in Khayelitsha, a Cape Town township, was murdered by a group of men because of her sexuality (Huisman 2006; Thamm 2006). The circumstances of Nkonyana’s murder mirrored the psychological and physical insecurity that many black South African lesbians faced everyday. A black woman’s masculine dress and behavior might lead male perpetrators to target supposed black lesbians—who were sometimes rumored in townships to be lesbians—for punishment, according to a FEW staff member.

If you are femme, it doesn’t really show that you are a lesbian. . . . But when you are butch, it’s when you dress like a man and you act like a man in a way, and that’s when you become maybe a target, I would say. . . . That’s when they see that you are born with the breasts and all that, but you are acting differently. You dress differently because you dress like a man. That’s when they want to prove a point to you that actually you are a woman, you know; that’s when they start raping you. . . . [We’re] trying to be like them, and they [men] want to see how strong you are and all that. . . . Are you really, you know, can you stand for it or whatever, and [they] prove it to you that actually you are a women [sic] and they rape you (Interview, 17 February 2006).

Though many black lesbians signified their gender and sexuality through their physical appearance, male perpetrators often targeted butch lesbians with masculine appearances for attack; femme lesbians with feminine appearances slipped by undetected. The public visibility of non-normative gender and sexuality was a basic concern for black lesbians. Invisibility was an attractive cloak to some black lesbians who had survived or feared being the targets of hate crimes.

Staff resolved its dilemma of organizational space by creating an insular, homogeneous space for current and prospective black lesbian members as a safe haven from violence and uncertainty. Within a larger environment of risk for black lesbians in townships and in Johannesburg, FEW worked from a default position of invisibility and insularity to target specific, mostly local audiences and to recruit black lesbians, the SMO’s constituency. From its
inception, FEW prioritized fashioning and fostering a collective black lesbian social movement identity among members by creating and maintaining safe spaces for members (Springer 2005). The SMO achieved this goal by inculcating homogeneity in safe organizational physical spaces. In this manner, FEW’s formation and preservation of safe spaces fed into an overarching strategy of insularity and exclusion guiding the organization’s actions. These safe spaces attracted and retained members, allowing the organization to maintain its footing in Johannesburg townships. The organization enforced the safety of its spaces in all activities and services that it provided. Services and activities included, but were not limited to: a gender and sexuality resource library; computer, communication, and photography skills training; a theatrical troupe (SAfrodykes); women-only soccer team (the Chosen FEW); self-defense training; gender and sexual identity workshops; and counseling. These services and activities reinforced the collective identity the organization crafted around black lesbian women overcoming and eradicating violence. To maintain this narrow cohesive identity and organizational insularity, FEW made a series of strategic decisions about organizational physical spaces, such as where to locate its office in Johannesburg.

4.2.1.1 The Dilemma of Office Location

In 2005, FEW faced a strategic dilemma about where to locate its office. Establishing office space in central Johannesburg would put the SMO close to local authorities, such as the Constitutional Court, and to other SMOs, but creating office space in a township would facilitate black lesbian members’ immediate access to the organization and provide them with safe space to congregate and socialize. FEW ultimately decided to lease office space in central Johannesburg, instead of one of the predominantly black townships, where most members lived primarily because of safety concerns, thus reinforcing the organization’s exclusionary strategic choices. Therefore, FEW made an exclusionary strategic choice about office location that insulated the organization from danger.

Thanks to funding from European donors, FEW leased office space in 2005 in the Constitutional Court complex in Hillbrow in central Johannesburg. The Constitutional Court occupied the site of the Old Fort and the former Women’s Gaol (Jail), which once functioned as prisons for black, Asian, coloured, and white men and women (Gevisser 2004). In 2003, the Constitutional Court Women’s Gaol complex invited organizations representing groups
marginalized under apartheid, such as sexual and gender minorities, to apply for office space. Behind the Mask—the other South African LGBT SMO that I studied intensively—originally obtained office space there. As two staff members at Behind the Mask became more interested in the needs of black South African lesbians, they agreed to launch FEW as a separate SMO with its own vision. When FEW received funding, the organization moved to an office downstairs in the Constitutional Court complex.

Despite the Constitutional Court’s new halcyon image, the complex was located in troubled Hillbrow, which had a long history as a vibrant gay community from the 1950s through the 1970s until its economic decline in the 1980s. As the apartheid state brutally repressed antiapartheid protest, the national economy experienced a downturn, resulting in the disruption of social services to inner-city Johannesburg. Homeless and poor South Africans and African émigrés moved into Hillbrow, contributing to the neighborhood’s reputation for “incivility” (Chipkin 2005:94; see also Morris 1999 and Simone 2004). Residents of Johannesburg regarded Hillbrow as a dangerous inner-city suburb, despite the city’s “political, social and economic transformation . . . [which] had moved the city away from its racialised past by 1999” (Dykes 2004:175). Violent muggings over the last decade put those who frequented Hillbrow, including FEW’s staff, members, and visitors, on alert.

The threat of generalized violence in Hillbrow and Johannesburg townships underscored the specific specter of violence against which FEW organized. Eradicating violence against black lesbians was FEW’s chief goal. Therefore, a culture of security blanketed the SMO. FEW translated this need for security into insularity and homogeneity. As soon as visitors entered the Women’s Gaol, they had to pass through and sign in with security. A few footsteps took them past a well-tended garden, through a courtyard filled with apartheid memories, and into FEW’s buzzing office. Noise from the office confirmed the presence of staff and members and reinforced a sense belonging for young black lesbians, some of whom were thrown out of their homes due to their sexuality. That FEW had an office in the former Women’s Gaol was of historic significance. “Women used to be locked up in here. Now women are coming out and saying, ‘We're free and we're speaking our minds,’ at the same place that people were locked up” (Interview, 17 March 2006). Embossed testimony from former women prisoners on all the windows reminded visitors, members, and staff of the prison’s role in sustaining apartheid. It
would have been unthinkable twenty years ago for young black lesbians to congregate in the courtyard at the Women’s Gaol, unless they were prisoners being escorted to their cells.

The organization worked to transform such places of inequality and discrimination into safe spaces. As a result, many FEW members I interviewed described FEW as a “home”:

It’s a home in a sense that you get empowered mentally. You get information, you get informed . . . you get skills . . . and you grow as an individual personality. You get to identify yourself, you get to assert, to learn more about yourself. And you get to deal with your issues in a right way, in a good way, positive way. And it’s . . . a safe space for everyone. (FEW member, interview, 14 February 2006)

The SMO structured its spaces as welcoming and nurturing to members to enable them to become more assertive. Likewise, FEW’s homogeneity encouraged members and staff to regard the organization’s space as comfortable and safe. In this way, homogeneity doubled as insularity. Members and staff prized the security that came from associating with other black lesbians, which created both homogeneity among members and staff and insulated them from cultivating working relationships with South Africans who differed from them. Thus, homogeneous members and staff were insulated when they were within the SMO’s confines, a safe haven from Johannesburg’s diversity and turbulence. This insularity did not prevent FEW from working with other LGBT SMOs or with other movement organizations, such as those that opposed violence against women. The narrow strategy of insularity through the creation and maintenance of safe spaces enabled the organization to become publicly visible to select audiences, such as the black lesbians FEW recruited. As I explain below, the recruitment of black lesbians also ensured the SMO’s continued existence, as the organization had a reservoir of members whom staff could train to assume leadership positions in the future.

FEW’s decision to locate its office in central Johannesburg had some negative material consequences for members. This decision frustrated some FEW members because they had to travel long distances to reach the main office. Satellite offices would have enabled members to “access all of these resources near them instead of them coming all the way to town” (FEW member, interview, 16 March 2006). A staff member echoed this sentiment.

If they [FEW] had offices down there, it would be easier for them [members] because they'd [members] know that the office is just within walking distance, you know, instead of having to catch a taxi. And it's quite a long drive. And they still have to walk up the steep hill [from the Park Station taxi rank in downtown Johannesburg to the office]. So, yes, it's quite a distance. If they had offices [in the townships], they [members] wouldn't have to walk the distance and worry about transport fare because sometimes they don't even have that money to go
there. You [members] want to speak to someone. You're dying to speak to someone. You're dying to be heard. You can't even make a call because you can't afford it at that time. So if they [FEW] had offices in the townships, it would be easier for them [members] because they'd know, “I'm just walking there, and I know I'm going to find someone to talk to” (FEW staff member, interview, 17 March 2006).

Members often sacrificed materially to make the trip into central Johannesburg by forgoing cell phone calls and saving money. FEW’s choice for its office location constrained some members’ ability to visit the office.

FEW responded to members’ concerns about its invisibility in townships by hiring community representatives to recruit black lesbians and meet with current and prospective members about their needs and concerns. FEW’s director claimed that the organization was the only South African LGBT SMO to bring recruitment, events, and organizing directly to their constituents. Due to the economic limitations that many black lesbians faced, community representatives traveled to one familiar township and one new township on a monthly basis. They met with women individually or in small groups, often in their homes. By meeting lesbians where they lived, community representatives circumvented the problem of requiring current and prospective members to travel to inner Johannesburg because it was expensive for many jobless women (Swarr and Nagar 2003).

Establishing a satellite township office was an option that some South African LGBT SMOs in other cities had exercised. A Cape Town-based organization managed a satellite office for several years in a nearby township, whereas a Pretoria-based organization experienced difficulty maintaining an office in a township. FEW could have drawn on this precedent of locating its main office or a satellite office in a township. For example, FEW could have established office space in Soweto, as another LGBT-friendly HIV/AIDS organization, the Soweto HIV/AIDS Counsellors Association, had. However, the centrality of the office and proximity to other state entities generated new possibilities for FEW’s role within the LGBT and feminist movements.

Setting up an office in central Johannesburg produced positive results for FEW. First, this choice created new opportunities for the SMO to influence the state. Having office space in the Constitutional Court complex afforded FEW credibility as a political organization by being steps away from the judicial branch of the South African government. For instance, FEW provided transport for dozens of black lesbian members from townships to the office for several
consecutive days in May 2005 to put pressure on the Constitutional Court to rule in favor of same-sex marriage rights. In this manner, FEW established itself publicly as a core player in the South African LGBT movement with its ability to mobilize a substantial number of members to participate in protests at the Constitutional Court. The organization also vaulted black lesbians into the South African public imaginary through their participation in protests. Additionally, having access to the Commission for Gender Equality, which was just steps away from FEW’s office, might advance FEW within the feminist movement. The Commission permitted “feminist activists simultaneously to represent ‘women’s interests’ within state policymaking processes to mobilize support for new gender relations in society at large” (Seidman 2003:546). In the future, feminist SMOs might turn to FEW as a physically well-placed ally to press the Commission about pursuing matters of importance to the feminist movement. Moreover, access to large, luxurious meeting spaces in the Constitutional Court complex enabled FEW to host or co-host (with Behind the Mask) LGBT movement activities, allowing the SMO to demonstrate its ability to juggle logistical concerns. This might portend the allocation of more movement-related responsibilities to FEW.

A central office in Johannesburg was also practical for FEW. Some townships to Johannesburg’s north were quite far from townships to the city’s south. If members had to travel from a northern township to a southern one, it would be prohibitively expensive for them because most minibus taxis passed through central Johannesburg and required passengers to change minibus taxis, thus forcing members to pay double the fare. FEW avoided unduly straining members’ material resources. FEW’s office was within easy walking distance to the city’s transportation hub, Park Station, which served short- and long-distance buses and trains. In addition, locating the office in central Johannesburg ensured that FEW did not privilege one township over another. Members who resided in Alexandra, a northern township, for instance, would not be alienated because FEW’s office was located in Soweto.

4.2.1.2 The Dilemma of Internally Monitoring Spaces

Another strategic dilemma that FEW had to confront about organizational spaces involved whether to monitor the behavior of staff, members, and visitors to ensure the safety of organizational spaces or to let them socialize freely with other black lesbians. Sometimes, general members and staff behaved in ways that staff interpreted as endangering themselves,
other members, and the SMO. Staff had to decide how to balance their responsibilities to the SMO in dealing with members’ sometimes unpredictable behavior and their yearning to socialize with members they rarely saw. Staff also had to contend with the contradiction of disciplining their peers, an action that could alienate some members who might already be recovering from violence or dealing with familial rejection. However, staff agreed that it was more important to keep members, the organization, and themselves safe than to worry about infantilizing members who took exception to staff members’ monitoring of their behavior. Staff ultimately hoped their supervision of members would result in members’ absorption of ways to monitor spaces they entered outside of FEW and their increased self-assertiveness.

At staff meetings, staff members continually voiced concerns about monitoring organizational spaces. For example, at the meeting following the organization’s annual general meeting (AGM), the director criticized staff for not halting the disorderly behavior of members at the AGM, which included making unreasonable demands on FEW about providing them with costly fares for private taxis, drinking too much alcohol, and stealing from other members (cell phones) and the organization (food and drinks). The director worried that the FEW’s landlord, the Constitutional Court complex, would believe the organization could not control its members and forbid it from holding future events there. The director attributed this breakdown to staff’s lack of assertiveness and guests’ unruliness. She stated, “We need to help them [members] understand the boundaries of the organization. . . We’re trying to balance our concern for the organization with our concern for people,” such as their personal safety in traveling to and from FEW events. The director stressed that she did not want to be the only one enforcing the rules and limits of the organization. She explained that one reason she trained staff to be assertive (besides overcoming their gender socialization, which taught them to be submissive) was to deal effectively and decisively with the public. With the consent of staff members, she banned alcohol at future events, unless it was for the executive board members who were “mature enough” to handle the alcohol (Fieldnotes, 13 February 2006). This decision had the effect of restoring the responsibility for supervising members’ conduct within all organizational spaces to all staff members. This episode also reminded staff members to practice their assertiveness concretely by asking members to behave responsibly and in a manner that respected the organization; thus, staff embodied and enforced the “empowerment” in the organization’s name.
4.2.1.3 The Dilemma of Access to Organizational Spaces

A third strategic dilemma concerning organizational space was how to control access to FEW’s office and workshop spaces. Such exclusionary strategic choices worked well within the space of the office, but posed difficulties when staff hosted events beyond the organization’s office. Spatial exclusions at FEW were inflexible, as evidenced in the office’s physical safety. Men were not allowed to step into the office space itself. Visitors had to pass through and sign in with security before entering the office complex. The receptionist was able to see if male visitors were approaching the office from across the courtyard. Instead of allowing men in the office, staff met openly with them in the courtyard to preserve the gendered integrity of the office. No staff members were allowed to be alone with men. This strategic choice helped members, especially those who were survivors of hate crimes, feel safe within the organization. The presence of men might have endangered the psychological recovery of members who had survived violence at the hands of men. The absence of men gave women the space to mend in a non-threatening environment.

Spatial exclusions based on gender and sexuality extended to the events that FEW held in townships, but beyond the organization’s office boundaries, FEW faced a dilemma of how to enforce them. Each year, FEW staged a community intervention in a township in which local lesbians and FEW community representatives and staff meet with local authorities, such as the police, educators, and health care providers, to discuss how they could better serve black lesbians. At a community intervention in April 2006 in Mohlakeng, a township one hour southwest of Johannesburg, FEW staff held an anti-violence training for members. Before the anti-violence training workshop began, FEW’s director asked several black gay men, ostensibly in drag, who helped staff to clean and set up the facility, to leave and barred them from attending the workshop. These men identified as gay, not as transgender, according to a FEW staff member. Graeme Reid (2005) explains why some black South African gay men did not identify as transgender, but as “ladies” (p. 213). “Ladies are gay. To be a lady does not mean that you want to be a woman, although some pass quite successfully as women. . . . To be a lady is to be a

44 Butch lesbians who were visitors or prospective members of FEW were often known by staff members and were not miscategorized as men. I neither observed nor heard stories of staff misrecognizing butch lesbians as men. Because most members came from poor or working-class backgrounds, they dressed more casually than black men who were employed by other NGOs and dressed well or men of different races who wore uniforms that indicated their business affiliations (telephone repairpersons). This difference in dress might have also distinguished FEW members from black heterosexual or gay male visitors.

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gay and to be gay is to be socially effeminate and sexually passive” (Reid 2005:213). Even though “ladies” might suffer the similar stigmatization that black lesbians did, FEW excluded black gay men. A FEW member attributed the strategic choice of excluding gay men from events to the director who “for one doesn’t like gay men. Every time we have an event and gay men are here, she just tells them, you know, ‘This is a lesbian organization.’ . . . But we work with the LGBTI [community], but mainly it’s the L that we’re interested in” (Interview, 8 March 2006). In the case of the workshop, the director worried that the presence of men would undermine an ethos of honesty and disclosure she hoped to instill there. She insinuated that men, no matter their sexual orientation, would disrupt the proceedings. She also claimed, “I don’t know what their [gay men’s] issues are,” suggesting that a gulf separated black lesbian issues from those of black gay men.

Even though black gay men, especially those whose gender nonconformity was most visible, experienced violence and discrimination because of their perceived sexual and gender transgression like many black lesbian women, creating a woman-only space trumped LGBT individuals’ common experience of violence. In this way, the organization actively emphasized the bonds of gender within the organization. Including gay men in events might have alienated black lesbian members because they might have perceived black gay men as men before they viewed them as similarly vulnerable based on their gender and sexual nonconformity. FEW’s approach diverged from that a Pretoria-based SMO, which addressed the risk of black lesbians and gay men “in under-resourced contexts” of being raped together in its booklet explaining how sexual minorities can survive rape (ILGA 2006b:14). Instead, FEW treated black lesbians’ vulnerability more specifically by encouraging members to identify how indigenous South African cultures required women to be passive and to challenge this cultural norm by becoming assertive. As a result, FEW offered services specifically to help black lesbians to become more assertive. FEW’s communication, computer training, and photography classes and counseling services and the director’s grooming of staff members all boosted members’ self-esteem in all-

45 Though FEW did not provide services for or represent black gay men, the SMO did participate in advocating for the South African National Blood Service (SANBS) to rescind its ban on blood donations from gay men on the grounds that “even though the issue ‘doesn’t affect us as lesbians,’ according to FEW’s director, FEW needs to support the LGBTI sector and fight discrimination wherever the organization finds it. FEW must stand with ‘our gay brothers.’ The director explained that an obstacle was proving that the ban was unconstitutional because ‘donating blood is not a right; it’s a privilege’ . . . The director stated that the organization supported the Joint Working Group’s [a national group of South African LGBT SMOs] position that the gay blood ban is discriminatory and that she’d represent FEW at upcoming meetings with SANBS on the issue” (Fieldnotes, 13 February 2006).
female environments. The presence of gay men likely would have dampened the camaraderie and support I witnessed, for instance, during a self-defense training for staff members. As staff self-consciously practiced self-defense moves, some hesitated to engage in a show of force or hostility. To energize reluctant staff members and focus them on practicing self-defense tactics on a male instructor wearing full-body padding, some shouted phrases, such as “Kick him hard in the groin!” Had FEW invited gay men to participate in the self-defense training, many staff members might have felt intimidated by them and not practiced what they had learned.

Sponsoring self-defense training workshops and distributing pamphlets that “advise lesbians on the best ways to prevent themselves from being seriously injured” were also ways that FEW tried to instill spatial monitoring in members (Mufweba 2003). Such spatial monitoring was a crucial means of reducing the unpredictability of new, mixed-gender environments for members and staff. For example, community representatives were careful about their personal safety when visiting unfamiliar townships. They normally made appointments with gatekeepers and did not wear T-shirts that identified them as members of FEW. Several current and prospective members usually met the community representative when she arrived in the township, substantiating the adage that there is safety in numbers.46 FEW also encouraged members to engage in similar behavior. As FEW staff intended for the anti-violence training in Mohlakeng to result in participants duplicating safe spaces outside the workshop, FEW staff recommended that members monitor their behavior and surroundings. One staff member stated, “We can’t expect to be lovey-dovey in a heterosexual tavern . . . [Men think] ‘they’re [lesbians] on each other, and we can’t put our thing [penis] there,’” which aggravated men because lesbians were sexually off-limits and made other women sexually unavailable to them. FEW’s director summarized that even though black lesbians lived in a country where LGBT persons had the same rights as heterosexuals, public same-gender sexual behavior was not tolerated: “We can do this [engage in sexual behavior] in a safe space—not in a taxi or at the Bree or Noord taxi rank [a hub for taxis to townships].” Being aware of the gendered composition of space was another strategy that FEW staff tried to inculcate in members. In a

46 When shadowing a community representative, I became concerned that my presence as a white woman on one such visit would compromise her safety, and I volunteered not to go. I did not want to draw unnecessary attention to the community representative because it was uncommon in this more remote township to see a black woman and white woman on foot together. However, the community representative assured me that my presence would not endanger members, and I resumed my observation of her recruitment efforts.
disturbing tale of violence, a member recounted how a heterosexual female friend of hers participated in setting up her rape served as a sobering reminder of being wary around others. The director stressed that unless survivors and members knew exactly with whom they were socializing, it might be better to socialize only with black lesbians, further reinforcing the safety of homogeneous spaces.

FEW initiated a series of strategic choices about how to constitute and monitor the organization’s physical spaces that coincided with its exclusionary choices about its constituency. These decisions about whom FEW classified as members affected members’ access to its services. In addition, these decisions also alienated some members who did not meet the detailed membership criteria. Together, these exclusionary choices about membership strengthened the organization’s insularity and homogeneity.

4.2.2 The Dilemma of Membership

A second major strategic dilemma that FEW faced concerned how to delineate its membership. FEW wanted to control who could access the organization, yet many potential members did not necessarily identify either as women or as lesbians, forcing the organization to confront how to recognize gender nonconformity. FEW defined its goal of stopping hate crimes against black lesbians within a larger framework of redressing inequalities that stemmed from apartheid. Poor, working-class, and jobless black lesbians who had survived hate crimes constituted an extremely marginalized group in a nation where blacks were denied access to decent education and jobs and subject to state violence (Mamdani 1996). Such violence was magnified in urban townships marked by violence, frustration, and an uncertain sense of the future. Poor, undereducated, and unemployed black lesbians who could not escape unpredictable township life sometimes became victims of violence (Moothoo-Padayachie 2004; Muholi 2004).

Staff approved my presence at the anti-violence workshop, but while I was there, a staff member asked me not to observe the small groups in which workshop attendees revealed sometimes harrowing stories of surviving violence. The staff member worried that my presence as an outsider (a white American female researcher) would inhibit the ethos of openness that staff hoped to instill in the working groups; I complied with her request. After the small groups concluded their discussion, a representative from each small group was tasked with summarizing, in broad strokes, the type of violence and harassment that attendees had experienced. However, some attendees narrated in detail stories of violence. The attendee who narrated her cautionary tale of how a heterosexual female friend set up her rape seemed to have little difficulty repeating her story in front of the larger group (and me), and I use it here as evidence because she intended the story to teach her peers about how to keep themselves safe.
FEW decided to work exclusively with poor or working-class black lesbian women in Johannesburg and the surrounding townships in part because the LGBT movement had not addressed their needs specifically. In keeping with an overall strategy of homogeneity and insularity, FEW decided to limit who could become members of the SMO. Prospective and current members were subject to a series of exclusions on the basis of race, gender, class, and sexuality and whether they were survivors of hate crimes.

Community representatives primarily enforced membership exclusions because they were best suited to do so. FEW’s leaders did not live in townships and earned a decent income because of their paid positions at the SMO; though, as black lesbians, they felt at risk for violence, their experiences did not mirror those of prospective members as closely as those of community representatives. Community representatives hailed from townships and identified as black lesbians, and before joining FEW, they had little prior job experience, if any. Some community representatives had survived being raped or beaten because of their sexuality and could empathize with prospective members in similar situations. Thus, they embodied the members they were trying to recruit.

To ensure membership exclusivity, prospective members filled out questionnaires that community representatives brought on their recruitment trips to townships. Questionnaires included questions about their sexuality, gender, class, race, and hate crime survivor status. To make members feel safe in the SMO’s spaces, FEW excluded all biological males, regardless of their sexual orientation. FEW recruited only self-identified women or lesbians as members because many members were survivors of rape and violence. To allow only women without jobs or a secondary school diploma to enroll in the skills training it offered; however, women with diplomas and jobs could still participate in events and use the organization’s library. Women who had survived hate crimes had the greatest access to all of the organization’s services and spaces. Safeguarding the homogeneity of its membership enabled the organization to focus narrowly on increasing the public visibility of black lesbians as a social group and fighting hate

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48 In discussions and interviews I had with staff and members about why hate crimes occurred, I got the impression that perpetrators were often nonwhite. Survivors and FEW staff and members attributed the prevalence of hate crimes against black lesbians to intolerance within indigenous African communities and cultures. They did not address a possible racial component to hate crimes against black lesbians, but in a country where white-on-black hate crimes are persisting social problems, this might be a parameter of violence that FEW has not measured yet.
crimes against them and to allow members to share their painful narratives of violence in an effort to cement a black lesbian collective identity.

FEW intentionally recruited black lesbians only, but defining what it meant to be a black lesbian emerged as a dilemma for the organization when members were not sure how to identify in terms of their gender or sexual identity.\(^{49}\) During a visit I made to Tembisa with a community representative, a township one-half hour east of Johannesburg, a prospective member hesitated in naming her gender and sexual orientation for a community representative. Unsure of her gender and sexual identity, she asked the representative, “Am I a man or a lesbian?” (Fieldnotes, 13 February 2006). Such sexual and gender identity “confusion” was not uncommon among black lesbians whom FEW recruited, because those who recognized themselves as gay or lesbian might be commonly known as “istabane,” a person whose body was “not strictly male or female” (Swarr 2003:196, emphasis original). Because anatomical sex and socially constructed sex, gender, and sexual identity categories did not map neatly on to one another, such slippages sometimes erupted as identity incongruence, an unsettling idea for some conservative South Africans and a potential dilemma for an organization built around stable notions of gender and sexuality. A FEW staff member described how some black lesbians believe they were heterosexual men before coming into contact with FEW.

> [S]ome . . . will think that they are straight [men] at this point. They don't really know. Maybe they’ve got this feeling to gravitate to another woman, but they don’t know what to do with that. I mean, according to the community that we are around, . . . it’s wrong to feel like that and because of culture, because of the religion . . . I mean they don’t know what to do with how they feel (Interview, 17 February 2006).

Another member explained how the conflation of visible sexual and gender identity caused some black South Africans to assume that those who dressed like men and were in relationships with women identified as men.

> The public has a perception that lesbians are trying to change themselves to be men. . . . The only difference between me and a straight person [sic] is that I love women; they love the opposite sex. At the end of the day, behind this lesbian is a woman. I wouldn’t change to be a man for anything. They need to understand that we're lesbians because we love other women, not because I look butch that I’m trying to be a man (FEW member, interview, 16 March 2006).

\(^{49}\) For example, FEW did not block bisexual women from joining, but the SMO did not zealously recruit them.
Women-loving women unfamiliar with the black lesbian community also often referred to themselves as men. Staff extended membership to such members and encouraged them to enroll in sexual and gender identity workshops in which they learned “about lesbianism” (FEW staff member, interview, 8 March 2006). According to a FEW staff member, “I didn’t know anything [about being a lesbian]. I just thought I was just a tomboy. . . . I didn’t know the basics of being lesbian, but yes, they [FEW] told me” about what it meant to be a lesbian and how to protect herself (FEW staff member, interview, 8 March 2006). This strategic inclusion of prospective members who initially identified as men instead of as women and lesbians, before enrolling in any of FEW’s gender and sexual identity workshops, allowed FEW to mold the collective identities of members and to guarantee the homogeneity of individual sexual and gender identities. FEW still viewed anatomical females who identified as men, by virtue of their being in a relationship with a woman or attracted to women, as prospective members because for the organization, such recruits had not been exposed to information about gender and sexual identities. This decision enabled FEW to cast a wider membership net than if the SMO had restricted itself to recruiting only women who were sure they were lesbians and were familiar with “lesbian” as a sexual identity category.

These membership exclusions contributed to the creation of safe spaces for poor black lesbian women, insulating them from class differences that might have proven to be potentially divisive. FEW strategically recruited women who originated from similar backgrounds to create a distinctive, mobilizable, and homogeneous collective identity that addressed extreme disadvantage. Exclusionary strategic choices thus were acceptable, but only if they were performed “by a minority group or one whose oppression ranks higher on the totem pole of pain. Thus a whites-only group is unacceptable, but a blacks-only one is not. A gay-but-not-transgender group is offensive, but a transgender-only one makes perfect sense” (Wilchins 2004:148). For FEW, race, gender, class, sexuality, and hate crime survivor status were signifiers of disadvantage against which it worked in its efforts to empower black lesbians to become women who could overcome oppression. Interestingly, FEW did not politicize a black racial identity in its construction of a lesbian collective identity, though blackness had been a mobilizable force within South African townships, a legacy from antiapartheid organizing (Bozzoli 2004; Hirschmann 1990). For instance, FEW did not reclaim or revalorize blackness as a category of worth and celebration (Springer 2005). Instead, FEW coded race (black) and class
(working poor) to signify disadvantage. The conflation of these indicators of disadvantage insulated FEW’s safe spaces and members.\textsuperscript{50}

In spite of FEW’s success in achieving homogeneity in members’ class, gender, sexual, and hate crimes survivor status, membership exclusions around race and ethnicity proved discordant for some members. FEW excluded South Africans of white, Asian, or coloured descent. Under apartheid, black South Africans found themselves continually disenfranchised, whereas “Coloured and Asian Indian groups” were “grant[ed] specific rights of self-rule and government in townships and parliament” in 1983 and 1984 (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003:30). FEW prioritized working exclusively with and on behalf of one of the most disempowered and disenfranchised groups in post-apartheid South Africa, even though it alienated some members. A member explained how the director refused to hire her because she identified as coloured, even though she was qualified for the post.

When they took me in at FEW, they knew I was coloured. . . . When I went to apply for a job at FEW, a lot of people said to me, “You've got a lot of potential.” . . . And then she [FEW’s director] said to me, “I'm first going to give preference to black people because it's a black organization.” And then I said, “Well, I'm black; my skin is black.” And then she said to me, “No, but you're coloured; that is the race that you come from.” And she said she was going to give coloureds last preference. . . . I see myself, identify myself as a black woman. . . I'm also from a poverty-stricken community and family. . . . I also come from a disadvantaged community (FEW member, Interview, 9 February 2006).

This member’s disgruntlement originated from the director’s narrow interpretation of her racial identity within a post-apartheid framework. In her zeal to rectify the injustices that poor black South African lesbians suffered, the director ignored this member’s political racial identification and the rape she had survived. This coloured member understood her exclusion as another form of discrimination, although she was surprised that an SMO that represented her political and social interests would pass her over for a staff position. Except for her parentage, the member met all of the organization’s stringent membership requirements.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} To date, South African LGBT SMOs have not openly derided FEW’s exclusionary choices about its membership. \textsuperscript{51} FEW’s membership exclusions also extended to researchers. For several months, FEW declined to grant me research access, until staff and members of Behind the Mask (BTM), where I was already conducting research, vouched for me, and until I had submitted two sets of my research proposal and met with staff members three times to discuss the boundaries of my proposed ethnographic observation. Once I received research permission, I attended all meetings and events held at the office and in townships, with the exception of counseling sessions and staff meetings at which personal matters were discussed. However, the chairperson of FEW’s executive board was a white lesbian and had important connections within the South African LGBT and feminist movements that FEW
Some members remained immune to and incognizant of the membership exclusions that FEW exercised. The SMOs’ positive messages of empowerment promoted homogeneity that masked its exclusionary strategic choices. According to one FEW staff member,

> At FEW, they don’t look who you are. They don’t look at the face or your appearance or anything. They just like the soul behind the appearance, and at FEW, there’s no discrimination. There’s no black or white . . . there’s no better or bad, there’s no ugly or beautiful. It’s all about sisterhood and womanhood. And whenever you are sitting in that room, you look at the person sitting next to you, [and] you feel that you’re all the same because in a different way you’ve been through the same experiences. So looking at the person next to you, you see the reflection of yourself (Interview, 14 February 2006).

It is notable that this staff member claimed that members’ appearances or self-identifications were not important. In fact, it was just the opposite. FEW exercised exclusionary strategic choices swiftly and successively as soon as new individuals accessed the organization; members of FEW did not witness these exclusionary choices in the open because community representatives and staff members enacted them as embedded bureaucratic decisions, such as when staff decided at meetings which members to enroll in their communication, computer, and photography skills courses based on the answers members provided on their membership questionnaires. Thus, the lack of mention of difference within the organization was in keeping with FEW’s insularity and homogeneity. This FEW staff member likely had not observed any discrimination because staff ensured the homogeneity of the organization’s space. In this way, FEW enforced and monitored group boundaries over time, sedimenting a black lesbian collective identity (Springer 2005; Whittier 1995). Monitoring the group’s boundaries through membership exclusion was one means by which FEW created alternative cultural and political safe spaces for members. It made sense that the staff member did not distinguish between black and white sexual identities because FEW did not practice or rehash this distinction in organizational spaces. Instead, the organization implemented these exclusions beyond the scope of staff and members’ perception.

could use to its advantage. This may indicate a trend that in the future, FEW might make exceptions to its exclusionary practices if they did not endanger, but rather, advanced the SMO’s goals.
4.2.3 The Dilemma of Protest

FEW also confronted the thorny dilemma of whether to participate publicly in protests as proud black lesbians or to protect the safety of members and the organization’s reputation. Underscoring this dilemma was the commonality of violence that characterized apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. FEW’s director aptly captured how South Africans had become inured to violence when, at an anti-violence training workshop, she remarked all South Africans “should be in therapy [because of apartheid]. . . . We’ve grown accustomed to violence, and we do nothing about it. We should have a problem with violence being perpetrated against us” (Fieldnotes, 13 April 2006). Though FEW had a goal of eradicating violence, the SMO tried to avoid it. This dilemma became evident in two public protests in which FEW participated. In September 2005, FEW mobilized 150 black lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons to march in the first Black LGBT Pride parade in Soweto. A FEW staff member thought that the high number of attendees likely quelled any potential counter-movement activity or violence (FEW member, interview, 16 March 2006). However, an even larger number of LGBT persons and supporters could not prevent an isolated violent episode a few days later at the Johannesburg LGBT Pride parade. A member on FEW’s float was severely wounded when a broken bottle volleyed from the crowd struck and lacerated her neck. A nurse practitioner, the partner of a FEW staff member, rushed to the woman’s aid; the member survived this seemingly random act, but FEW interpreted it as a specific attack against black lesbians. Within the span of a few days, SMO staff and members experienced exhilaration at marching unimpeded through Soweto for the first time as part of a black LGBT contingent and then devastation when one of their own was injured. These varied experiences exemplify how FEW operated within and negotiated tumultuous public spaces. The salience of violence influenced how, when, and why the SMO engaged in public protest by selectively participating in public protests.

The organization marshaled its intolerance for violence into judiciously joining public protests. From February to May 2006, FEW staff and members participated in protests denouncing violence against and the rape of South African women, regardless of their race, class, or sexual orientation at former Deputy Vice-President Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. A black female HIV-positive activist and family friend in her thirties accused Zuma of raping her while she was staying at his Johannesburg home in November 2005. The trial received much media
attention because just a few months before his arrest for rape, Zuma had been dismissed from his executive post amid a corruption scandal. In the ensuing media frenzy, issues of how commonplace the rape of and violence against women were in South Africa were juxtaposed next to sexism and misinformation about HIV transmission. Zuma’s defense claimed that the sex was consensual, an assertion with which the prosecution disagreed because the rape survivor, a Zulu woman, regarded Zuma as a father figure and not as a potential sexual partner; the rape survivor even identified herself as a lesbian to demonstrate that she was further disinclined to have chosen Zuma as a sexual partner (“Zuma Found Not Guilty” 2006). Zuma cited Zulu culture in his defense, even testifying in spoken Zulu, and claimed that the garment the survivor was wearing at the time constituted a request to have sex; not to honor her “supposed” request would have amounted to rape according to Zuma’s interpretation of Zulu customs. The prosecution stated that Zuma entered the guest room where the survivor was sleeping with the intention of raping her. The defense refuted this version of events and also tried to discredit the survivor by casting her as someone who, in the past, had falsely accused other men of rape in her effort to gain attention. During and after the trial, Zuma maintained that the survivor accused him of rape as part of a wider political conspiracy that his enemies within the African National Congress had hatched as an attempt to derail his presidential candidacy (Evans and Wolmarans 2006).

Zuma’s rape trial served as a rallying call for different social movements—including feminist and HIV/AIDS activists—to come together to fight violence against women. On the first day of the Zuma trial in February 2006, several dozen “gender activists”—the South African media’s characterization of the anti-violence-against-women activists—protested the high rates of violence against women in South Africa and called for justice for all female survivors of violence. Hundreds of pro-Zuma activists, many of them Zulu like Zuma, demonized the rape survivor and gender activists with chants and signs, some of which read “Burn the Bitch,” referring to the rape survivor, and one even lit a picture of the survivor on fire. In contrast with

52 Zuma’s defense outraged HIV/AIDS activists, who participated in the protests. In his characterization of the rape as consensual sex, he claimed he did not use a condom. He stated that he showered after having sex with the HIV-positive survivor—herself an HIV/AIDS activist—as a precaution against HIV transmission. Activists accused Zuma of setting back HIV education a decade.

53 The survivor was wearing a kanga, a knee-length piece of fabric fashioned to cover a woman’s torso and tied above one’s breasts, which Zulu women often wore in the privacy of their rooms or homes. As was customary with the kanga, the survivor was not wearing undergarments, which Zuma interpreted as part of her supposed invitation to have sex.
pro-Zuma supporters’ anti-feminist displays, feminist activists focused on the rape charge itself as a manifestation of violence against South African women, the vilification of the survivor by Zuma supporters, and the judicial system’s unfair treatment of female rape survivors, exemplified by the trial judge’s ruling to allow the defense team to portray the survivor as someone with a history of making false rape allegations to get attention.

FEW’s initial choice to participate in the protest as part of the gender activist contingent illustrates how the strategic choice about whether or not to participate in public protest can unfold for SMOs. The environment outside the Johannesburg High Court, which is situated in the downtown commercial business district, was tense on the first time that seven FEW staff and members attended the protest, which was the second day of the gender activists’ protest and of the trial. After consulting with FEW’s media and outreach officer who attended the protest on the previous day, staff and members carried a folded banner with the organization’s logo in a bag. They were careful not to be too conspicuous on the walk from FEW’s Hillbrow office to the High Court, a route that took them past the Park Station bus and train terminal and through a throng of street hawkers. Drawing attention to their sexual nonconformity on this well-trafficked route was undesirable for FEW staff. Underneath plain T-shirts and jackets, they wore FEW T-shirts with catchy slogans such as “Hate Won’t Make Me Straight,” “Get It Straight, I Can’t Be Fixed,” and “The Rose Has Thorns,” the slogan from the organization’s anti-rape campaign. Once they arrived in front of the courthouse, FEW staff ducked under police cordons and melted into the crowd of pro-Zuma supporters who were toyi-toyi-ing. FEW staff looked no different than pro-Zuma supporters, apart from their lack of Zulu nationalist symbols such as the soon-to-be-ubiquitous T-shirt “100% Zulu Boy,” a reference to Zuma’s adherence to Zulu customs (Moya 2006). They made their way through the crowd, trying to locate the gender activist contingent. FEW staff and members spent 15 minutes wandering through the crowd with no luck; they did not locate other feminist and HIV/AIDS activists. For twenty minutes, they discussed finding a place at the edge of the crowd to set up a protest, but all admitted to feeling uncomfortable and unsafe among pro-Zuma supporters. One FEW staff member who was there that day described her discomfort being outside the court amid Zuma’s supporters.

54 The toyi-toyi is a boisterous protest tactic composed of dancing and chanting reminiscent of militant antiapartheid protests predominantly attended by black South African youths (Bozzoli 2004; Seidman 2001).
It was very scary for us because the Zulu men and women were busy swearing at us, and we were so scared that if we just decided to leave that place, they would follow us. . . . They were busy swearing at us, and they had the sjambok [leather or plastic whip often used by the South African Police Service] in their hands and everything, and we got so scared. Anything could have happened in that space (Interview, 8 March 2006).

This FEW member described her nervousness at the unpredictability of the protest and the likelihood that the Zulu pro-Zuma supporters would harass them as black lesbian activists. That pro-Zuma supporters and the police had sjamboks (nightsticks), a symbol of apartheid violence sometimes wielded indiscriminately by South African police, made FEW members nervous; the instrument could easily become a weapon of violence directed against them. The homophobia that some Zulu nationalists espoused underscored the potential violence and harassment that FEW members feared. As an LGBT student activist at a nearby university explained,

Zulu culture is very masculine oriented, very patriarchal with very strict and clear definitions of what makes a man. Anything that deviates from that, which would include issues around sexual orientation, would then be taboo. . . . In terms of culture, you’d get arguments coming up like . . . if the family starts taking different forms, our culture will lose its vibrancy or . . . its moral fiber (Interview, 5 December 2005).

Because Zulu culture relied on strict patriarchal standards of conduct, Zulu pro-Zuma supporters likely would not have tolerated any counter-protestors, especially black lesbian protestors, in their midst. FEW staff and members did not want to provoke the animated crowd.

After calling the FEW media and outreach officer who was not in attendance, staff and members decided against publicly protesting as members of FEW because they feared that the presence of black lesbian activists would aggravate the socially conservative Zulu crowd. They opted not to identify themselves as being with FEW or as lesbians by keeping their FEW T-shirts underneath jackets and shirts and the FEW banner folded. The strategic choice that FEW staff and members made kept them safe, they believed. Had staff donned their FEW T-shirts before venturing to the courthouse, they likely would not have entered the crowd of opponents. The decision to enter the crowd indicated that FEW staff lacked accurate information about the protest and did not understand how emotionally charged pro-Zuma activists were. Though FEW

55 FEW staff and members’ fears were well founded. In September 2006, Zuma spoke disparagingly of sexual minorities, as Parliament held public hearings about same-sex marriage legislation (“Zuma Earns Wrath” 2006).
staff and members opted to remain publicly invisible on that day, a strategic decision that ensured their safety, they protested alongside gender activists on subsequent days.

It is interesting that staff risked snaking through the multitude of opponents on the assumption that other gender activists were on the other side of the crowd. Making publicly identified gender activists pass through the crowd of the rowdy Zuma supporters to a separate protest area, which the police had cordoned off as the gender activist contingent area, would have amounted to intimidation on the part of police (see Earl 2003). Pro-Zuma protestors might have physically and verbally attacked gender activists if the police had not separated both groups with a barricade. The police continued this practice on subsequent protest days to keep pro-Zuma activists from assaulting gender activists. Instead, pro-Zuma activists hurled insults at gender activists behind the police lines and occasionally forced the police to push back their barricades to accommodate the swelling crowd of Zuma supporters.

FEW’s regular participation in this protest widened the organization’s narrow vision to accommodate larger campaigns focused on eradicating violence against all women, instead of concentrating only on violence against black lesbians. FEW recruited members to attend and participate in the protests at the Zuma rape trial between February and May 2006. This did not conflict with community representatives’ ongoing recruitment of members because they simultaneously recruited new members while spreading the word about the protests; a feminist anti-violence SMO paid for some FEW members’ public transportation from Johannesburg townships. Participating in the protests also led FEW to join a larger national feminist anti-violence campaign called the One in Nine Campaign, which referred to a statistic that only one in nine South African women filed rape charges with police. FEW staff envisioned the organization’s participation in this anti-violence campaign as a vehicle for publicizing and educating the general public about the rape of black lesbians as a South African social problem.

Guided by an exclusionary orientation, FEW made a series of strategic choices about how to create and monitor safe spaces, who could join the organization, and whether and how to participate and present itself in public protest. These choices enabled FEW to become a place of

56 FEW never objected to the protests’ general focus on eliminating violence against all South African women, even though the rape survivor at the center of Zuma’s rape trial herself identified as a black lesbian as the trial unfolded (“Zuma Found Not Guilty” 2006). FEW and Zuma supporters interestingly did not utilize the rape survivor’s racial and sexual identities to advance their own goals. However, FEW engaged in public protest cautiously and in a way that protected staff and members.
comfort for members who widely regard the organization as “home.” In addition, its strategic choices reinforced the organization’s public collective identity as a black lesbian organization.

4.3 SISTER NAMIBIA (NAMIBIA)

As a feminist and sexual minority movement organization, Sister Namibia approached dilemmas of visibility guided by an inclusionary orientation. Launched in 1989 on the eve of independence, the feminist organization was poised to take advantage of the political opportunities that a newly democratizing country could offer. However, Sister Namibia’s radical feminist politics and anti-homophobic stance produced polarizing responses from state and South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) leaders. Such official opposition and its radical feminist ethic prompted Sister Namibia to adopt an inclusionary orientation because members did not want the organization to be isolated as a political outcast. This principle is evident in the SMO’s description of itself as “an autonomous, non-governmental women’s human rights organisation that works toward a society liberated from patriarchal domination in which all people have equal rights and opportunities and live in peace, prosperity and dignity” (Sister Namibia 2003:2).

Sister Namibia faced several dilemmas about visibility. The first two dilemmas involved constituencies: how to define its membership in a newly independent Namibia and whether, how, and why it should address lesbian issues in conjunction with feminist concerns. The second two dilemmas involved audiences: whether, how, and when it should respond to the state and ruling party’s antigay hostility and how to deal with Northern donors as an audience.

4.3.1 The Dilemma of Membership

How to define its membership was early strategic dilemma that Sister Namibia encountered. Based in Windhoek, Sister Namibia was launched in 1989 before Namibia formally declared independence from South Africa (Frank and !Khaxas 1996). As a feminist organization in a newly independent nation, Sister Namibia could have aligned itself with political party
interests, specifically with SWAPO, and recruited women along party lines; such an association would have facilitated Sister Namibia’s access to state officials and resources (Geisler 2004). The organization could also have fully embraced its radical feminist position and addressed the needs and inequalities that many Namibian women experienced, which did not necessarily correspond to political party interests (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:182). Whereas FEW strictly monitored membership and recruitment along race, sexuality, gender, class, and hate crime survivor status, Sister Namibia opted to frame its constituency broadly as consisting of all Namibian women and rejected the choice to hew to SWAPO’s mandate. In turn, this decision impacted the organization’s physical space and reputation as an inclusionary feminist organization. The SMO maintained a welcoming office in Windhoek, which helped the organization boost its local credibility by offering meeting space for different projects and campaigns. In this sense, Sister Namibia provided a safe, physical and ideological space for Namibian lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women to congregate. In addition, anyone could use the SMO’s resource center (library); while I observed the SMO’s activities, several men conducted gender-related research, much to the delight of staff members. Despite the SMO’s location on the northwestern corner of Windhoek, somewhat distant from the city’s bustling transport hub, visitors consistently walked up the steep driveway and past the Sister Namibia sign and rang the bell. After the receptionist buzzed them in through the security gate, they popped in and asked questions, read feminist theory or literature written by women, or conducted research for school projects or personal enlightenment.

Amid the heightened emotions that accompanied the early years of Namibia’s independence, Sister Namibia reached out to women across the country to make gender equality a reality. The organization initially concentrated on publishing a magazine in 1989. The magazine introduced many Namibian readers to feminist concepts and issues, and writers and editors even included glossaries that defined terms unfamiliar to readers, such as feminism, bisexuality, and discrimination, and translated stories originally written in English into Afrikaans and Oshiwambo, the most widely spoken indigenous Namibian language. These ideas resonated particularly with a Sister Namibia staff member who described her initial acquaintance with the organization through the magazine.

I started reading the *Sister Namibia* magazine because I always questioned gender roles, and I always questioned the role of woman in my culture, in my life, [and] in my family. And it never made sense to me. And so I came across this magazine
that explained all of these things that I had questions about, and nobody [in my family] could answer me (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 21 June 2006).

For this staff member and other members like her, the magazine recruited them as members. For Sister Namibia, membership was a loose category, unlike for FEW. Sister Namibia wanted to reach as many Namibian women as possible and viewed itself and the feminist movement as benefiting from a more casual understanding of membership in order to enable as many women as possible to identify with the organization and to demand gender and sexual equality. This strategic definition reinforced the SMO’s image of itself as representing all Namibian women. As such, the magazine was a powerful recruitment tool and means of raising Namibian women’s expectations for equality in their lives.

The magazine had a personal transformative effect on many Namibian women and girls, extending the organization’s reach beyond the capital city. The magazine’s circulation enabled the organization to substantiate its self-identity as a national organization and reach beyond Windhoek. In addition, the magazine allowed members the flexibility to raise more specific, central issues related to their goals for obtaining gender and sexual equality for all Namibian women. According to two longtime members of the organization,

The SISTER collective and the magazine provide an important space in which we can develop our identity and creativity. Working together with other lesbians and supportive heterosexual women has brought us out of our social isolation and strengthened our sense of community. This has heightened our awareness of the need for political action on lesbian issues. Through the magazine we can share all this with our readers, and contribute towards the building of a new society based on new values (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:116).

For these members, the magazine brought different women together and served as a rallying point for the organization and contributed to the growing awareness of publicly treating lesbian rights as women’s rights.

4.3.2 The Dilemma of Being a Lesbian SMO

Whether, how, and why to support lesbian rights and issues publicly constituted another strategic dilemma for Sister Namibia. It was one thing to demand that the state apologize for its antigay statements on the grounds that such intolerance was undemocratic. However, endorsing sexual and gender minority rights would mean that Sister Namibia was not just a feminist
organization, but also a lesbian organization. Sister Namibia decided to transform itself into an organization with a distinct ideological position and constituencies, which included lesbian and bisexual women. Through the issuing of press releases critical of state leaders’ antigay statements and its public stance in support of sexual minority rights, Sister Namibia identified ideologically with a budding sexual minority movement. The organization already had a structure in place—staff, office space, and the magazine—to facilitate its public profile as a lesbian organization. To remain updated on developing political issues, the SMO decided to hire an educational officer whose responsibilities included researching “issues that are not covered by the mainstream [media] such as backstreet abortions, women in the sex trade, and homosexuality in the various ethnic groups” (Sister Namibia meeting minutes, 19-21 February 1996). The organization thus mainstreamed homosexuality as a feminist concern.

Sister Namibia played a significant role in launching The Rainbow Project (TRP), a LGBT rights SMO, and both organizations maintained close ties after TRP’s launch in 1997. Along with Sister Namibia’s denunciations of state and SWAPO officials’ homophobic remarks, this relationship bolstered its reputation as a lesbian organization. Sister Namibia did not have to support the launch of an LGBT SMO. In fact, it could have capitalized on its public reputation as a “lesbian organization” itself to launch and lead a sexual and gender minority rights movement. Sister Namibia backed TRP’s launch as an independent SMO because it did not want to relinquish its commitment to feminist goals over pursuing lesbian rights. This is evident in Sister Namibia’s avoidance of recruiting men as members or participants in their political campaigns, an indication of its dedication to promoting women’s and lesbian rights first and foremost, although men were welcome to visit and use the SMO’s library. Transforming its stigmatized public identity as a lesbian organization, Sister Namibia embraced its identity as a sexual minority SMO. For instance, scoffing at a foreign donor’s assumption that TRP was the only LGBT SMO in Namibia, Sister Namibia’s director claimed, “‘Sister Namibia is an LGBT organization in our own right.’ She cited Sister’s work in mainstreaming lesbian rights with women’s rights, the stories on lesbian issues in the magazine over the years, and the videos and books in the library” (Fieldnotes, 19 July 2006).

57 In a strange twist, TRP has consistently obtained funding since 1999-2000 and has not shown any signs of fiscal weakness. In contrast, Sister Namibia floundered financially during the period of my ethnographic observation, as I will explain later.
Sister Namibia’s outspoken views about lesbian rights transformed the organization into a safe space for many lesbian and bisexual Namibian women in the 1990s and 2000s. A staff member described how she discovered how the feminist organization welcomed Namibian lesbians even though Sister Namibia was not actually a lesbian organization, but Sister [was] providing a safe space for lesbians, even for gay people, because when I came in here, I also saw that there are books for gay men to read. . . . At that stage, Sister was situated in central town. . . . I felt very good for the first time when I go [sic] in there, and the coordinator at that time—she really make [sic] me feel welcome, and I felt that this is just the right place that I was looking for. And I have to say that through Sister, I am growing stronger and stronger to come out and to live my life [as a lesbian] (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 15 May 2006).

Much like FEW, Sister Namibia provided Namibian lesbian and bisexual women with a space in which to meet and to discuss their sexuality safely. The organization also enabled these women to become political activists.

While Sister Namibia’s identity as a lesbian organization generated positive results for the organization and LGBT movement in Namibia, it also yielded negative consequences for the SMO's feminist projects. In 1999, SWAPO and state leaders used Sister Namibia’s controversial reputation against the organization (Rothschild 2005). By controversial, a staff member explained,

Sister is a cutting-edge controversial organization that will say things other people will not say. . . [W]hatever we say, somewhere the word lesbian will be in it. (laughter) But they just expect that from us now, and that what we say is challenging of the status quo. So I think once you have that kind of image . . . of being a cutting-edge, controversial, sometimes off-the-map human rights organization that will speak things that nobody else will speak, but that need to be spoken—that will break silences. And I think Sister has the same kind of reputation. When Sister speaks, then the journalists will listen, and people will come. They want to know. They want to find out what's up (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 23 May 2006).

The state’s antipathy toward Sister Namibia was not a source of contention within the SMO, but rather was a source of validation and attracted other audiences, such as the media to the organization. The staff member’s comments exemplified how different audiences structured the collective identity of SMOs. “It isn’t just the SMO that has a stake in defining the group’s collective identity. So too do movement organizations, rival SMOs, law enforcement officials, and the media” (Friedman and McAdam 1992:166). However, by courting these different audiences, Sister Namibia’s controversial reputation made it vulnerable to attack by the state.
The state and SWAPO discredited Sister Namibia’s ambitious campaign to empower Namibian women politically. The organization’s Namibian Women’s Manifesto outlined the 50/50 Campaign, which aimed to encourage voters to consider children’s and women’s issues when voting, to “mobilize women as 51 per cent of the electorate to actively participate in all aspects of the forthcoming elections,” to demand more women appointed to cabinet positions, and to ask political parties to create “zebra lists” that alternated women and men’s names on election lists (Sister Namibia 1999). Using the election as a political opportunity, Sister Namibia again catapulted to public prominence. However, the organization’s categorization of lesbian rights as women’s human rights proved to be divisive (Rothschild 2005). The SWAPO-affiliated Minister of Women Affairs, the SWAPO Women’s Council, and the University of Namibia’s Multidisciplinary Research Centre, which were all initial signatories to the Manifesto objected to the inclusion of lesbian rights in the demand for rights for marginalized women and girls, which read: “The human rights of all women, as guaranteed in the Namibian Constitution, need to be ensured, including the rights of the girl child, women living under customary law, women in marginalised ethnic groups, sex workers, disabled women, old women and lesbian women” (Sister Namibia 1999). A Sister Namibia staff member recalled the clamor that ensued after these main objectors withdrew their support for the Manifesto. She expressed her disappointment that groups interested in advancing women’s political representation and empowerment could not work together
to give women training on becoming decision makers, to train them on politics, to train them on their rights. And then all of a sudden, the Minister of Women Affairs . . . withdraw [sic] just because of one sentence [about lesbian rights] in there. . . . They just think outside that Sister is a lesbian organization, and they look away from the other good work that Sister is actually doing as a women’s organization. . . . I think they really don’t look at what Sister is doing—the good work that Sister is doing (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 15 May 2006).

The staff member attributed naysayers’ objection to the categorization of lesbian rights as women’s rights to homophobia and a narrow understanding of Sister Namibia’s work. The organization’s identity as representing lesbians and reputation as an entity that would not compromise on gender and sexual equality led to its double stigmatization as a controversial organization and as a lesbian organization. Additionally, a few of Sister Namibia’s leaders identified as lesbians. Because lesbian women led Sister Namibia (see chapter 5), the Minister of Women Affairs stated that Namibians should avoid the SMO because the leaders were
opportunists who “wanted to get married.” Sister Namibia’s director believed “her legal battle to obtain permanent residency as part of a ‘black and white lesbian couple’ who took the government [SWAPO] to court over holding their family together raged on while they were building the 50-50 Campaign” (Fieldnotes, 13 June 2006). Staff speculated that these occurrences contributed to the state’s ostracism of Sister Namibia and its political work. Sister Namibia still did not budge from its position that sexual minority rights deserved attention alongside women’s rights.

The strategy of selecting and reaching out to diverse audiences, such as opposition political parties, independent media, and human rights and pro-democracy organizations, allowed Sister Namibia to balance the narrowing strategic choices available to it in the Namibian sociopolitical environment. After the unveiling of the Manifesto, whenever the organization submitted a petition to Parliament about women’s or children’s rights, the Minister of Gender Equality and Child Welfare—formerly, the Minister of Women Affairs—quashed it simply because it came from Sister Namibia. However, it was hard for the Minister to ignore the SMO, according to the director, because “we’re too good at networking [with other NGOs]” (Fieldnotes, 27 April 2006). In spite of SWAPO’s rejection of the Manifesto, opposition parties were supportive and conducted their own events around increasing women’s political participation and representation. Independent media and NGOs also wooed Sister Namibia. Media support was unusual for most SMOs, which often pursued media attention with few results (Carroll and Ratner 1999). According to a staff member, the media initiated contact with Sister Namibia about the Manifesto and related events: “We stopped calling them; they started calling us” (Interview, 23 May 2006). Extensive, sympathetic coverage by independent media might have contributed to the reasons why SWAPO and the state spurned the Namibian Women’s Manifesto, 50/50 Campaign, and Sister Namibia (Hopwood 2006).

Though diversifying its audiences as a strategy enabled Sister Namibia to broadcast its message and bypass state channels, these new audiences lacked resources that would help the SMO fund its daily operations. With its public reputation as a lesbian organization and

58 State-owned and –controlled media, such as the newspaper New Era and the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, were under orders from the state not to give LGBT organizing favorable coverage. This ban prevented TRP from having a radio show on the independent Katutura Community Radio (KCR) a few years ago because KCR rented space in a state-owned office building, and the landlord threatened to evict KCR if TRP broadcast its show there. TRP succeeded in getting its own radio show when KCR moved to a privately owned building in Katutura township.
responsiveness to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia, Sister Namibia became a political pariah from the perspective of SWAPO and the state. The state’s hostility toward Sister Namibia resulted in no national funding for its efforts.

4.3.3 The Dilemma of Responding to Hostile Audiences

Whether and how to address state leaders’ antigay statements was another strategic dilemma Sister Namibia faced. Sister Namibia could have opted to respond when state leaders began to make antigay statements publicly in the mid-1990s and risk the wrath of state and SWAPO officials, or the organization could have remained silent and avoided provoking state and SWAPO officials’ ire. The organization decided to respond directly to leaders’ homophobic rhetoric, thus acquiring the public reputation of being a “lesbian” organization. This trend began in 1995 when it called on Deputy Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation Minister Hadino Hishongwa and Finance Minister Helmut Angula to apologize for antigay remarks that the state-operated newspaper *New Era* solicited from them. Hishongwa vilified homosexuality as foreign and in need of social and state control so that the state could eradicate it from Namibia. “Homosexuality is like cancer or AIDS and everything should be done to stop its spread in Namibia. . . . To him [Hishongwa], homosexuality is western, evil and destructive—and should be fought by an emerging society like Namibia” (Mwilima 1995). Hishongwa also rejected the notion that freedom fighters liberated Namibia so that sexual and gender minorities could have the ability to demand equal rights in the new democracy (Mwilima 1995). Setting in motion the organization’s strategy for responding decisively to homophobic remarks that SWAPO and state leaders made, Sister Namibia decided to send a press release to all major Namibian and Windhoek newspapers immediately. The SMO disputed the imputation that homosexuality was a disease with a cure, and instead, valorized same-gender sexual relationships as “alternative, life-affirming physical, emotional and spiritual forms of love” (Sister Namibia 1995). The SMO also refuted the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican and un-Namibian by citing German anthropologist Kurt Falk’s (1998) findings that same-gender sexual relationships among
Namibian indigenous groups had long existed (Falk 1998; Sister Namibia 1995). Asserting that homosexual, lesbian, and gay identities would continue to be a permanent part of the Namibian sociopolitical landscape, Sister Namibia concluded the letter by wittily stating, “[F]ortunately for our two Ministers, homophobia (unlike lesbianism) can be cured!” (Sister Namibia 1995). As evidenced from Sister Namibia’s thorough rejoinder, the SMO established a pattern for responding to the state and SWAPO whenever an official spouted homophobic rhetoric, no matter what else the organization was doing. The organization also intended for its frequent appearances in the local and national media to reach the general public; by being logical and thorough in their rebuttals to officials’ homophobic rhetoric, members hoped that they would begin to persuade Namibians to tolerate sexual and gender diversity, albeit slowly.

Sister Namibia’s politicized identity as a “lesbian” organization solidified when the organization called on then-President Sam Nujoma to apologize for antigay remarks he made at the SWAPO Women’s Council Congress in Gobabis in early December 1996. The organization swiftly issued a press release, which highlighted the state’s “firmly entrenched democracy” and argued that leaders could not rule on issues of morality. Citing urgency in fighting “hate speech,” Sister Namibia warned that

Today it is homosexuals and foreigners who are being labeled and threatened, tomorrow it may be trade unionists, unemployed PLAN [national liberation struggle] fighters, women, members of specific ethnic groups or political parties, people with disabilities, religious groups or others.

We . . . urge him [Nujoma] to follow the example set by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, who strongly supported the inclusion of gay and lesbian rights to freedom from harassment in the South African constitution which he signed into power last week (Sister Namibia press release, 17 December 1996).

Sister Namibia issued a call for tolerance based on a principle of democratic inclusion and eradication of racial injustice left over from apartheid. Heralding former President Nelson

59 It is interesting that Sister Namibia cited a German anthropologist in their defense of homosexuality as a Namibian tradition. Kurt Falk conducted his research at the height of German colonialism. Antigay proponents could have rejected Falk’s research out of hand because anthropologists in the early twentieth century often produced knowledge to generate knowledge about and extract information from indigenous communities so that colonialists could subjugate them more efficiently (Bleys 1995). Sister Namibia risked the SMO’s reputation by siding with a German anthropologist over the Namibian state, but favored citing research in support of their position that homosexuality was African, even if the anthropologist was a German national and had conducted his research at the height of German colonialism in Namibia. In this sense, Sister Namibia was trying to make the point that homosexuality and Namibian national identity need not be antithetical, but the SMO did (unknowingly) open itself to attack.

60 The SWAPO Women’s Council functioned as the women’s arm of the national-liberation-struggle-cum-ruling-political-party (Becker 1995).
Mandela’s embrace of sexual minority rights in South Africa was an especially important strategy for Sister Namibia, given that SWAPO claimed to have democratized and decolonized Namibia fully. SWAPO’s version of democratization and decolonization differed from that pursued by the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, according to Sister Namibia, which questioned SWAPO’s authority and legitimacy by bringing up the example of the ANC. SWAPO’s legitimacy rested “on the claim of the liberation [movement] being representative of the majority of the people,” and SWAPO defined the majority as being heterosexual and traditional, which could be interpreted as SWAPO’s intention to protect indigenous customs (Melber 2003:144). Democratization for SWAPO meant consolidating power; instead of extending rights to all Namibians, SWAPO-affiliated elected officials discriminated against Namibian sexual minorities. Concerned that SWAPO and state leaders’ homophobic statements indicated a growing authoritarian streak in Nujoma’s administration, human rights SMOs—specifically, the National Society for Human Rights and Legal Assistance Centre—joined Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project, a newly formed LGBT social movement organization, in demanding that Nujoma and his peers retract and apologize for their remarks. The support of these organizations buttressed Sister Namibia’s position in civil society and prevented the state from singling the organization out for repression at that time.

Sister Namibia did not have to engage the state so directly and expose itself to vulnerability. However, ignoring state and SWAPO leaders’ antigay rhetoric would have granted them carte blanche to harass and scapegoat sexual and gender minorities. The state and SWAPO likely would have interpreted widespread silence on its antigay position as validation. Not responding would have dishonored lesbians who were members of Sister Namibia and undermined the SMO’s feminist commitment to “work[ing] toward a society liberated from patriarchal domination in which all people have equal rights and opportunities and live in peace, prosperity and dignity” (Sister Namibia 2003:2).

With this press release and subsequent ones, Sister Namibia emerged as a fierce critic of the SWAPO-led state’s persecution of sexual minorities and democratization efforts. SWAPO-affiliated state officials correspondingly treated Sister Namibia as a scapegoat because the party maintained “a highly unreceptive attitude towards criticism, especially when it is articulated within a public discourse. Non-conformity is associated with disloyalty if not betrayal” (Melber 2003:144). Sister Namibia proved to be effective at manipulating frames to “win advantage with
authorities and the public” by connecting their criticisms of the state “discursively with larger cultural themes and values,” enabling the organization’s message to resonate with target audiences (Miceli 2005:295). However, Sister Namibia was careful to assert the African-ness and Namibian-ness of homosexuality as a means to ensure that the SMO was not discredited as a puppet of Northern countries and donors. In this way, the SMO had to ensure that its messages and strategies “were not so blatantly Western as to provide state authorities with a legitimate pretext to crack down on the movement” (Snow and Benford 1999:32).

4.3.4 The Dilemma of International Donors

How and where to obtain financial support for their efforts was another strategic dilemma Sister Namibia had to negotiate. Sister Namibia could have turned the magazine into a profitable enterprise, but this likely would have distracted the organization from its women’s rights campaign. Sister Namibia also could have looked beyond Namibia to the global North for financial support, but this might have put the organization at the mercy of donors that had “differing priorities” and worked at a “different pace” (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:183). The organization decided to seek financial support from donors in the global North. Ultimately, the strategic choice to cultivate international funding partially constrained Sister Namibia’s national activities, as foreign donors demanded that the organization implement bureaucratic measures that siphoned resources it could have otherwise used for lesbian rights and feminist projects.

Sister Namibia’s strategy for responding immediately and precisely to antigay statements that state and SWAPO leaders issued garnered the organization an international reputation for being a sexual minority organization and human rights defender. In this way, the organization leveraged its accrued national visibility into material benefits and international acclaim. 1997 marked the year in which Sister Namibia ascended to international prominence because it publicly countered SWAPO and state leaders’ homophobia and received the Felipa de Souza Award from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (Frank 2000), which “recognizes the courage and activism of grassroots groups and individuals working for the fundamental human rights of all people” (http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id=76, accessed 2 May 2007). Combined with the Namibian state’s refusal to grant Sister Namibia funding, the organization’s national and international reputation facilitated the organization’s
application for funding from foreign donors. Favorable national and international attention enabled Sister Namibia to obtain funding from Hivos, a Dutch NGO donor, for its “sexuality research and education program” (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 23 May 2006). Though its international reputation reaped more opportunities for the SMO to network with Northern donors, this choice devastated Sister Namibia. For most of 2005 and 2006, Sister Namibia’s director devoted herself to developing funding proposals to launch the Coalition of African Lesbians and to plan the new organization’s second annual meeting in Johannesburg. However, Sister Namibia suffered during this time financially because the director took on too many extra-organizational responsibilities related to launching the Coalition of African Lesbians and restarting Katutura Community Radio (KCR). The director did not apologize for these efforts. She almost single-handedly resurrected Katutura Community Radio, the first community radio station in Namibia, which was suspended because of financial mismanagement in 2004. The director also helped to fundraise for Coalition of African Lesbians because she believed it was important to establish a continental organization for African lesbians that could support struggling lesbian SMOs and publicize the situation of lesbians in different African countries.

These smaller strategic choices that the director made diverted her attention away from fundraising with current and potential Northern donors, which jeopardized Sister Namibia’s financial situation. During the period in which I observed the SMO’s activities and meetings, Sister Namibia was on the verge of financial collapse. Until June 2006, the director was unable to finalize the year’s contracts with staff because she was waiting for a donor, which had approved funding for staff salaries just one month earlier, to deposit funds in the SMO’s bank account. The director encouraged staff to polish their skills and résumés because the SMO might have to close its doors until she could obtain funding to ensure its continued existence. As the SMO owned the building in which its office was located, the director even discussed renting Sister Namibia’s office space as meeting space to raise money, a sign of the organization deepening financial crisis. Citing how time-intensive the organizing and fundraising for CAL was, Sister Namibia’s board of trustees made the director promise that “she would not start a new organization for at least three years” (Fieldnotes, 6 July 2006) because they needed her to focus only on producing the magazine and locating dedicated funding for the organization, which proved to be difficult.
Unable to obtain funding from Namibian or southern African sources, Sister Namibia was totally reliant on Northern donors. All the SMOs in my study obtained funding from Northern donors, an indication that the philanthropic sector in southern Africa was underdeveloped and that southern African governments did not view sexual and gender minority service provision as a priority. In a meeting with Norwegian and Tanzanian researchers in April 2006, the director of Sister Namibia explained how Sister Namibia recently lost funding from two donors; one donor yanked development funding from Namibia altogether because the nation had ascended to middle-income country status in Africa. Donors might have believed that Namibia was becoming more self-sufficient, although they continued to earmark funds for HIV/AIDS relief and prevention efforts. This set in motion for Sister Namibia a self-reinforcing cycle of prioritizing Northern donors as the organization’s primary target audience, forcing the organization to assign lesser priority to its constituency: Namibian women and magazine readers. The organization published the magazine irregularly and stopped maintaining its relationship with the magazine’s vendors and distributors in 2005 and 2006, shrinking the magazine’s readership and subscriptions. Sister Namibia’s inability to sustain relationships with magazine distributors contributed to its invisibility with readers and members throughout the country, leading some readers, including some members of Parliament, to contact the organization and inquire why they had not received their magazine.

Donors also forced Sister Namibia to prioritize them as a primary target audience by insisting on drop-in visits, unexpected audits, and training meetings that Sister Namibia staff had to attend. Such siphoning of time made it increasingly difficult for the organization to follow up on the 50/50 Campaign or to initiate the next phase of its sexuality research and education program, which was to consist of a broad sexual rights political campaign. Sister Namibia was unable to sustain this sexual rights campaign because donors refused to fund staff salaries for personnel who could have performed specific tasks, which would have allowed the director to concentrate on supporting the organization’s longevity. Donors increasingly favored funding consultants to work on short-term projects. This prevented Sister Namibia from hiring additional staff to handle complicated and specialized tasks, such as acting as liaisons with the media, government, other human rights organizations, and other target audiences. Instead, as Sister Namibia’s budget shrank, the organization could not retain its public relations officer. During the period of my ethnographic observation, the organization hired a former public relations officer as
a consultant for three months who was responsible for producing a radio show, writing stories for the magazine, and meeting with target audiences when possible. The director handled all complicated content, edited the bimonthly magazine, fielded requests from donors, and oversaw the daily operations of the organization. The remaining staff members—a bookkeeper, receptionist, and delivery person—each performed tasks within a limited range. Though the director encouraged all staff members to expand their task repertoires by taking classes whenever possible and obtaining their driver’s licenses, staff members’ limited training and the SMO’s strained resources prevented staff members from taking on additional specialized responsibilities that would have alleviated the director’s burdensome workload.

Sister Namibia benefited materially from its national and international reputation through funding from Northern donors. However, as was the case with many development projects, donors expected that they would quickly become sustainable, permitting donors to direct funding to new projects. Frustrated by the bureaucratic entanglements with donors she had to navigate, Sister Namibia’s director claimed on several occasions as I observed the SMO that she had no time to find ways to make the organization sustainable. As donors reduced or withdrew funding, thus limiting Sister Namibia’s strategic choices for obtaining material support, the director had to scramble to locate new donors or to beg donors to reconsider their decisions, hence eking out the SMO’s existence month by month.

Sister Namibia’s inclusionary orientation permitted it to make choices that preserved its existence in a hostile sociopolitical environment. Sister Namibia has been internationally recognized for its inclusion of lesbian rights as women’s rights. However, the organization made strategic choices that ultimately inhibited its ability to influence audiences, such as a national audience of readers of Sister Namibia, the state, Northern donors based outside of Namibia, and other human rights SMOs.

4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Amid political receptiveness to sexual and gender minority rights among state officials, the South African LGBT movement crystallized sufficiently in the 1990s and early 2000s, making “new kinds of . . . organizations thinkable and possible” (Armstrong 2002:198). The
specialization of other LGBT social movement organizations permitted FEW to cultivate a selective approach to its public visibility with different constituencies and audiences, namely by fostering an exclusionary orientation, in order to provide safe spaces for black lesbians away from everyday hostilities. In contrast, state antagonism toward sexual minority rights in Namibia in the 1990s forced Sister Namibia to favor an inclusionary principle that oriented its strategic choices.

FEW carefully navigated dilemmas of organizational space, membership, and protest in its effort to maintain its safe spaces for black lesbian members. The organization’s safe spaces acted as stabilizing forces in members’ lives, in turn, boosting their self-confidence and solidifying their collective identity as black lesbians who were trying to eradicate intolerance and violence against women and sexual and gender minorities. Given South Africa’s complex apartheid history of exclusion through spatial monitoring and segregation (Reddy 2005), FEW’s preference for making exclusionary strategic choices is not surprising. Responding to the contemporary political and social legacy of intolerance and violence, FEW prioritized providing psychological, physical, and social stability for members through membership and spatial homogeneity, whom the organization trained to represent it at public protests. In this way, FEW’s exclusionary strategic choices attempted to improve the situation of its constituency of black lesbians and to bring black lesbians’ concerns to the attention of audiences, such as the media and general public.

The Namibian state and ruling party produced an environment hostile to sexual and gender minority organizing, prompting Sister Namibia to adopt an inclusionary orientation to making strategic choices. Sister Namibia reached out to a general constituency and multiple audiences—more audiences than FEW. These audiences included opposition political parties, the media, the general public, and human rights and pro-democracy SMOs. Sister Namibia pushed its goals of women’s political empowerment and the equal treatment of lesbian rights as women’s rights with these audiences. Sister Namibia targeted Namibian women for recruitment through the publication of the magazine, the Namibian Women’s Manifesto, and 50/50 Campaign. To sustain such broad-based work, the SMO opted to seek funding outside of Namibia because the state refused to consider Sister Namibia as a worthy recipient of state funds. Northern donors exacted a heavy price for their funding (Zald 1992), forcing Sister Namibia into a cycle of bureaucratic frustration. To keep receiving money from Northern donors, Sister
Namibia had to submit different financial reports and funding proposals to different donors, work that fell to the director. In this way, Northern donors dominated Sister Namibia as an audience in 2005 and 2006, preventing the SMO from publishing the magazine regularly and disrupting the SMO’s connection to different audiences. The director’s commitment to launching the Coalition of African Lesbians and reviving the defunct Katutura Community Radio also inhibited the SMO’s ability to locate additional sources of Northern funding.

The sociopolitical context in which social movement actors like SMOs make strategic choices matters. Certain choices are possible in a permissive sociopolitical context, but others can have serious, negative consequences for SMOs. SMOs involved in marginalized politics, such as sexual and gender minority organizing, already struggle against a deficit of invisibility. When they decide to emerge from their position of invisibility, certain choices may be off-limits. Future studies can ascertain how and whether the development of an exclusionary orientation is an indicator of the range of strategic choices possible to SMOs, whereas the development of an inclusionary orientation may suggest that strategic choices available to SMOs are quite limited.
5.0 HOW STRATEGIC CHOICES CAN MAKE SMOS MISS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

What can organizational invisibility in moments of political opportunity reveal about social movement organizations, their strategic choices, and the sociopolitical environment in which they operate? Social movement organizations (SMOs) sometimes miss political opportunities due to the strategic choices they make (Sawyers and Meyer 1999). Political opportunities are institutional political openings in which activists, social movement organizations, and movement can advance their standing and/or goals and/or disseminate their messages to different audiences (Almeida 2003; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tilly 1978). There are different types of political opportunities that social movement organizations can miss that go beyond institutional politics; these include gendered, discursive, and cultural opportunities (Abdulhadi 1998; Borland 2004a; Ferree et al. 2002; Frank and McEneaney 1999; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McAdam 1996; McCammon et al. 2001). Holly J. McCammon, Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery (2001) argue that political opportunities can be gendered; they contend that transformed attitudes about the roles women could play in politics and society at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States “increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage” (p. 51). Cultural opportunities are elements of a social movement organization’s sociopolitical environment that facilitate and constrain the ability of an organization to recruit and/or mobilize members and to communicate its goals in a compelling way to different audiences (Einwohner 1999:170-71). While potentially a subset of cultural opportunities, discursive opportunities are features of “public discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere,” and when a message does not resonate with the public, a social movement organization is more likely to miss the opportunity to publicize its goals (Koopmans and Olzak 2004:202). Missed opportunities then are “moments when mobilization is possible that activists do not, or for some
reason can not, use to their advantage” (Sawyers and Meyer 1999:189). Occurrences of missed political opportunities have analytic utility for scholars because they can signal movement decline, as in the case of women’s movement organizing in the United States in the 1980s (Sawyers and Meyer 1999). Scholars tend to interpret the invisibility of social movements or SMOs in expected political opportunities as a sign of a movement or organization in distress (Bagguley 2002; Sawyers and Meyer 1999:193; Taylor 1989).

Missed opportunities may not always indicate movement *denouement*. Organizations may be invisible in moments of opportunity for several reasons. Social movement organizations may intentionally miss opportunities because internal problems demand their attention (Sawyers and Meyer 1999). Organizations may not “frame” political opportunities as such, instead letting them disappear (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kowalchuk 2005; Kurzman 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Suh 2001). Organizations may unintentionally miss opportunities. Organizations may classify opportunities as advantageous, but lack the resources to optimize them, forcing them to let opportunities drift away, perhaps never to encounter them again. Organizations may also miss opportunities at first, but seize them as time passes. In this way, they may temporarily seem submerged or invisible in a moment of opportunity. Or, depending on the nature of the opportunity, organizations may recognize the opportunity *as* an opportunity, but because it is an institutional feature, organizations may figure that they can secure the opportunity at another time. In other words, organizations may envision opportunities as coming around again. Shifts in the political opportunity structure or within a social movement may also cause organizations to miss opportunities because organizations may have to respond to such changes first before seizing an opportunity, if they do at all.

I apply Jasper’s (2004, 2006) “strategic dilemma” approach to diagnosing missed opportunities to understand how some strategic choices preclude social movement organizations from taking advantage of a political opportunity. I examine how and why South African and Namibian social movement organizations missed two political opportunities with legal dimensions. First, using ethnographic and document data, I examine how South African LGBT social movement organizations made strategic choices regarding campaign involvement that led them to abandon—for a short time—the same-sex marriage campaign early in 2006. Second, using interview and document data, I explain how Namibian state repression (change in the political opportunity structure), attitudes, and perceived inequalities kept members of The
Rainbow Project from pursuing a political opportunity related to sexual and gender minority equality.

5.1 SOUTH AFRICA: MISSED OPPORTUNITY?

Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement organizations’ interaction with the internal movement environment and the external sociopolitical environment affected how they mobilized around same-sex marriage. These interactions delayed social movement organizations’ involvement in the marriage equality campaign for a few months early in 2006. Below I describe the circumstances leading to and the immediate reaction of Johannesburg-based LGBT activists to the same-sex marriage ruling, focusing on social movement organizations’ roles in mobilizing around the ruling. Then I explore how LGBT social movement organizations reacted to the void left by the LGBT SMO responsible for legal lobbying and advocacy, leaving organizational staff wondering how and what they should do following the ruling. Finally, I demonstrate how LGBT social movement organizations navigated the dilemma of getting involved in the South African National Blood Service’s on blood donation from men who have sex with men, which diverted the organizations’ attention away from the same-sex ruling.

5.1.1 Mobilizing around Marriage Equality

The African National Congress’ (ANC) ascent to power in the transition from apartheid rule to a nonracial democracy in the early 1990s constituted a political opportunity for the South African LGBT movement (Cock 2003; Croucher 2002). In 1994, South African LGBT SMOs formed an umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (the Coalition), to make the Equality Clause a permanent part of the Constitution (Oswin 2007:649-51). Between 1994 and the present, the Coalition and its successor, the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (the Equality Project) pressured lawmakers to revise “eighteen pieces of legislation . . . to ensure equitable treatment of homosexuals,” including laws pertaining to “property, tax, estate, refugee, and labor-relations laws, as well as the public provision of such services as education,
health care, protection against domestic violence, and housing” (Oswin 2007:651). The Coalition-Equality Project also successfully deployed legal tactics to decriminalize sex between men (1998), extend immigration rights to foreign same-gender partners of South African nationals (1999), allow same-gender partners to access pension and insurance benefits together (1999), enable same-gender couples to adopt children together (2002), and permit same-gender couples to marry (2005) (Behind the Mask 1999; Dirsuweit 2006; Epprecht 2004; Goodman 2001; Oswin 2007:651; SAPA 1999). These legal wins document how the movement embraced litigation as a viable tactic over almost a decade. Building on these legal wins, the Equality Project headed the drive to legalize same-sex marriage.

In South Africa, marriage equality was the zenith of the LGBT movement’s legal campaign. The Lesbian and Gay Equality Project recruited a white lesbian couple to petition the Department of Home Affairs to recognize their marriage. In October 2002, the Pretoria High Court rejected their bid, arguing that lawyers had not contested the constitutionality of existing marriage law. Throughout the legal struggle, the Equality Project served as amicus curiae, or “friend of the court,” “making information and its expertise available to the court to put it in a better position to make a decision” (Smith 2002). In July 2004, five LGBT social movement organizations banded together with several same-gender couples and filed a case with the Pretoria High Court challenging the constitutionality of the marriage law (Somerville 2004). The case finally came to the Constitutional Court in May 2005. Whenever cases were heard in Pretoria or Johannesburg, staff and activists from the Equality Project and the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) mobilized the LGBT community to show their support for the right for same-gender couples to marry publicly by participating in rallies outside the court or marches. On 1 December 2005, the Constitutional Court finally issued a ruling on the case. Justices ruled in favor of same-sex marriage and stipulated in the majority opinion that if Parliament did not equalize marriage legislation within one year, then on 1 December 2006, the

61 Teresa Dirsuweit (2006:330) attributes the Coalition’s transformation into the Equality Project to the “unsustainability” of inclusion. The Coalition had 80 member organizations at the height of its existence and could not cope with the “resource drain” of so many groups that needed funding and bureaucratic support, not all of which were SMOs or even LGBT in focus (Dirsuweit 2006:330). The Coalition dismantled its coalitional form and became a “network” that will be the channel of communication for people on the street and will work at grass roots level to ensure that everyone will have access to the law reforms secured” by the Equality Project (“Change of Face” 2000:10).

62 These organizations included the Equality Project, the Triangle Project (Cape Town), the Durban Lesbian and Gay Community Health Centre (Durban), OUT LGBT Well-Being (Pretoria) and the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW-Johannesburg).
gender-neutral words “or spouse” would be added to existing marriage laws, making it possible for same-gender couples to marry and register their relationships officially with the Department of Home Affairs.

Many activists were hesitant about centralizing same-sex marriage as the unitary goal of the movement early in 2006 due to its rhetorical and practical limitations. Some Johannesburg-based South African LGBT activists’ expressed ambivalence about pursuing same-sex marriage as a movement goal because it entailed assimilating into “rigid state-regulated heterosexual family models,” whereas gaining access to the “legal benefits and responsibilities that go along with marriage, from medical decision-making, to child support, to inheritance” was enticing for others (Adam 2004:272). Other activists worried that a focus on same-sex marriage would marginalize campaigns fighting violence against sexual minorities. For instance, in an interview after the ruling’s announcement, Behind the Mask’s director, though enthusiastic about the ruling, asserted that the state had not protected LGBT persons with hate crimes legislation or prevented black lesbians from being singled out for rape. In her opinion, though symbolic recognition of the equality between same-sex and heterosexual marriages might ignite the gradual acceptance of LGBT persons, it would not suddenly ameliorate the poverty or unpredictability in which many black sexual and gender minorities live.

Very little fanfare in the LGBT community or movement accompanied the ruling because social movement organizations only learned about the hearing one day before the reading of the ruling on 1 December 2005. FEW was unable to arrange transport for black LGBT persons to come from townships to participate in a rally supporting same-sex marriage, as they had done at previous hearings. However, members of FEW and Behind the Mask staff wore T-shirts with slogans that supported same-sex marriage or identified them with either organization turned out for the ruling. After the hearing, activists streamed outside building housing the Constitutional Court and celebrated the ruling. Many reporters from South African mainstream newspapers and radio and TV stations descended on the crowd to obtain comments on the ruling.

Activists dispersed after the ruling’s announcement. Unlike previous same-sex marriage court cases, there was no public protest or sustained gathering of LGBT movement activists to respond to the ruling and demand immediate access to marriage. Activists and leaders from LGBT SMOs in Johannesburg and Pretoria met separately with the Equality Project lawyers away from the media to discuss the ruling’s implications and how to proceed. Leaders from a
Pretoria-based organization and Behind the Mask hoped that a press conference they had hastily organized for later in the afternoon would commence this process. Behind the Mask’s office was the logical site for a press conference because of its space to host reporters, close proximity to the Constitutional Court, computer and telephone resources, and reputation as a LGBT media organization with mainstream media contacts. However, only one reporter from a local radio station attended the press conference. While juggling the pressure to post stories featuring analysis and details of the ruling and interviews with activists on hand to witness the ruling on the website, Behind the Mask staff scrambled to locate contact information for reporters for mainstream news agencies, revealing a weakness in the organization’s structure. Although Behind the Mask had been in existence for five years and was a leading LGBT media organization, it clearly lacked reliable contacts among South African media and the infrastructure to coordinate a press conference for an event of the same-sex marriage ruling’s significance and magnitude. Had the organization received more advance notice than one day, Behind the Mask may have been able to handle the event. Nevertheless, that SMO representatives held a meeting so soon after the ruling’s announcement and staged a press conference suggests that they intended to use the ruling as an opportunity for further organizing.

Amid celebrating the marriage verdict in the hours after the ruling’s reading, Behind the Mask staffers concentrated on following the media’s immediate response. Most major South African mainstream and LGBT news outlets carried the same-sex marriage story. For Behind the Mask staff, news coverage became personal. The Behind the Mask newsroom erupted in laughter when a staff member located a story that featured a photograph of two young, gay black interns embracing and kissing one another on the cheek; the photograph did not identify either one by name. Neither intern was in the newsroom when Behind the Mask staff discovered the photograph, but when one intern in the photograph entered the newsroom later, staff again burst into laughter, prompting him to ask cautiously what was so humorous. A staff member gestured to the intern to look at her computer. Upon seeing himself in an embrace with the other intern, who was just a friend, at first, he became worried that his father would see the photograph on the news; his father knew he was openly gay, but he would not approve of his son flaunting his sexuality on the news, which is how the intern claimed his father would interpret the picture. Later, the intern became angry at the photographer who took the picture. He claimed that out of all the pictures the photographer snapped, the media outlet used one in which two men openly
embraced. He suggested that the news media were perpetuating a salacious stereotype about gay men demonstrating their affection publicly. However, the intensity with which Behind the Mask staffers and mainstream and LGBT news media covered the marriage ruling did not last. Several days after the ruling, local and national newspapers no longer carried stories about the ruling. LGBT social movement organizations also did not hold any public discussions about pressing Parliament to amend marriage laws, although at the press conference, SMO leaders pledged they would urge Parliament to follow the Court’s directive to correct existing laws. SMOs also did not counter some homophobic statements that conservative and religious leaders made.

The lack of mobilization for the ruling’s announcement on 1 December ran counter to the week of mobilization that LGBT SMOs planned for the same-sex marriage hearing before the Constitutional Court in mid-May 2005. On 16 May 2005, member of and staff at FEW were planning a march scheduled for the following day. They made signs and wore shirts with slogans, such as “‘10 Years of Democracy: Great Constitution, But Let’s Make It Real!’” and “‘Get It Straight, I Can’t Be Fixed,’” and practiced a song with the lyrics: “‘Cowards move backward, we brave ones move forward. Kusasa ekuseni sifuna amalungelo okushada (tomorrow morning we will demand the right to marry). Government we are tired of co-habitation, we need to get married legally’” (Msiza 2005). This effusive display of support for the same-sex ruling was not in evidence on 1 December 2005. On 17 May 2005, organizations such as FEW and the Equality Project mobilized a crowd dominated by black LGBT persons to participate in a march. The Durban Gay and Lesbian Health Centre, a LGBT social movement organization that delivered services for sexual and gender minorities, staged a “satellite” march at the Durban High Court in solidarity with the Johannesburg marchers. A Behind the Mask journalist commented that black LGBT persons “overshadowed all others present outside the Constitutional Court. . . . They were singing and shouting slogans of struggle reminiscent of pre-1994 [antiapartheid movement] era” (Behind the Mask 2005).

While I observed FEW, Behind the Mask, and Joint Working Group staff meetings from December 2005 until April 2006, activists occasionally discussed how to mobilize around the same-sex marriage campaign. The Joint Working Group was a small, loose national coalition of LGBT social movement organizations consisting of eight LGBT organizations: Behind the Mask, FEW, the Equality Project, the Triangle Project, OUT-LGBT Well-Being, the Gay and Lesbian Archives, Durban Lesbian and Gay Community and Health Centre, and the University
of South Africa’s Centre for Applied Psychology, which was directed by a longtime LGBT rights activist. Activists from Behind the Mask and FEW talked about pushing forward with the same-sex marriage ruling when they met separately and together with the Joint Working Group, but they did not agree on how to proceed. They questioned how they should carry on in the wake of the Equality Project’s demise.

5.1.2 When an SMO Enters Abeyance

The void left by the Equality Project forced LGBT social movement organizations to question whether and how to strategize about pursuing the same-sex marriage campaign. The Equality Project had devoted itself to legal lobbying and advocacy related to sexual and gender minority rights, territory that other social movement organizations generally left alone (Oswin 2007). When the Equality Project still existed as the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, social movement organizations “did not give direction to” the Coalition, even though they belonged to it (Oswin 2007:653). In this manner, social movement organizations were accustomed to regarding the Coalition as the leader of South African LGBT organizing around legal campaigns (Stychin 1996). Organizations treated its successor similarly, allowing the Equality Project to spearhead important legal battles for sexual and gender minority rights.

The Lesbian and Gay Equality Project closed its doors in July 2005 and went into abeyance, just two months after lawyers with the Equality Project had presented their arguments in favor of same-sex marriage to the Constitutional Court (Bagguley 2002; Taylor 1989). Allegations of financial mismanagement and of personality conflicts among staff and board members contributed to the organization’s suspension. The Equality Project’s disappearance from the same-sex marriage campaign left social movement organizations unsure how to proceed. First, the Equality Project was an unstated media representative for the movement, due in part to South African media’s preference for covering legal issues. According to findings from a study that the Gay and Lesbian Archives (2006) conducted, of all media reports involved LGBT issues, rights, and persons, “legal issues and evolving legislation receive[d] the largest amount of media attention, i.e. changes in legislation, such as same-sex marriage,” which totaled almost 25% of all South African news clippings collected (p. 15). Before its suspension, the Equality Project frequently appeared in the media. Yet the organization’s disappearance left
some SMOs unprepared to engage with the media, although some organizations such as the Triangle Project and FEW had established clear media campaigns. For instance, Behind the Mask realized, in the wake of the same-sex marriage ruling, that it lacked a coherent plan for dealing with South African media, a deficiency the SMO was remediying by devising a media policy and anti-homophobia training program for journalists in the mainstream media. Similarly, without the Equality Project to take the lead, organizations did not know how to proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign. This resulted in the invisibility of Johannesburg-based social movement organizations in the media, to the general public, and to the state in relation to the same-sex marriage campaign.

Deliberations about how to proceed kept the Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement organizations—and the movement in general—invisible in the months following the Constitutional Court ruling. In particular, the Joint Working Group had difficulty identifying a replacement for the Equality Project as the leader in the same-sex marriage campaign because LGBT social movement organizations already had too much work of their own. They lacked the capacity to respond quickly and flexibly to the vacuum left by the Equality Project. South African LGBT social movement organizations focused on very different issues, such as media monitoring (Behind the Mask); health and mental health service provision (OUT-LGBT Well-Being in Pretoria); black lesbian visibility and hate crimes against black lesbians (Forum for the Empowerment of Women); or social and health services for LGBT persons (Durban Lesbian and Gay Community and Health Centre and the Triangle Project in Cape Town). Legal issues were the domain of the Equality Project. Organizations also limited their services and individual campaigns to their geographic locations. Because organizations were so distant from one another, few organizations regularly worked together face-to-face. Exceptions were those based in Pretoria and Johannesburg. With such narrow organizational and geographic focuses, organizations such as Behind the Mask and FEW did not have the capacity to take over for the Equality Project. This was especially evident in the specialized knowledge necessary for conducting an effective legal campaign (Stychin 1996). In the Equality Project’s absence, activists questioned how the movement would offer legal services for LGBT persons, aggressively pursue legal clarification and extension of LGBT rights in the future, or move forward with the same-sex marriage case.
Some hoped that the Joint Working Group member organizations could pool their knowledge and resources together to overcome the void left by the Equality Project. The Joint Working Group temporarily reassured LGBT persons and activists that they would push forward with the campaign by issuing a press release immediately after the same-sex marriage ruling, promising to pressure Parliament to legalize same-sex marriage. In early March 2006, the Joint Working Group held a meeting at which representatives from member organizations and other stakeholders in the LGBT community discussed the Equality Project’s revival. Consultants hired by Northern donors that financed many South African LGBT social movement organizations’ projects previewed their recommendations for the Equality Project’s resuscitation. Recognizing that the Equality Project’s “public image has been dented but not destroyed” after the organization’s collapse (Nell and Shapiro 2006), the consultants stressed that Joint Working Group members would have to decide how to proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign because the Equality Project would not be operational until mid-2006 at the earliest. In addition, the consultants suggested that the Equality Project would scale back its legal and media work once it reopened. According to the consultants, a newly-revived Equality Project would not have the resources to manage the movement’s response to the same-sex marriage case and would still have to flesh out its new mandate, ultimately leaving the Joint Working Group in charge of the same-sex marriage case. It seemed that the LGBT movement would remain indefinitely invisible in national discourse about same-sex marriage.

However, a few organizations explained how they could overcome their invisibility with respect to the same-sex marriage campaign. For instance, FEW claimed that it had already incorporated the campaign into its agenda and advocacy work and could poll members about how they wanted to proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign. A former Equality Project staff member who had taken a position with a Pretoria-based organization revealed that her organization had recently begun examining possible mobilization strategies around marriage, which coalesced with the organization’s hiring of her. However, the Pretoria-based organization did not want to manage the marriage campaign because it did not know in which direction the campaign should develop. This worry was encapsulated by a staff member from this organization querying, “Who are we representing?” Not only did she question whether her organization would represent the entire movement on the marriage issue, but she also interrogated which audience or constituency the SMO claimed to represent. The lack of consensus on and clarity about whom
the movement represented and which SMOs could speak on behalf of the movement indicated the state of the movement’s disarray and unpreparedness to tackle the marriage campaign and activists’ insecurities about the Joint Working Group’s relationship to the movement and to LGBT constituencies. By the end of the March 2006 meeting, JWG member organizations had not resolved how the group would issue press statements or coordinate media work.

The Joint Working Group and member organizations were careful not to move blindly forward without considering the movement and individual organizations’ placement with respect to the campaign. The Joint Working Group itself was a new body, having only come into existence in 2005. The Joint Working Group did not want to become publicly visible with respect to the same-sex marriage campaign in a disingenuous way. Member organizations wanted the national body to develop a coherent plan and strategy before moving forward. In this way, South African LGBT social movement organizations agreed temporarily on remaining invisible until they had sorted out a manageable, consistent strategy and message about the same-sex marriage campaign. Joint Working Group member organizations acknowledged the importance of sustaining the same-sex marriage campaign, but some organizations could not commit resources to media or advocacy work because they were overstretched. At the end of the March Joint Working Group meeting, support for continuing joint media work around the campaign emerged. Behind the Mask and the Gay and Lesbian Archives (GALA) offered to compile and give their articles and research on the marriage case to a committee. Organizations emerged from their invisibility in September 2006 and mobilized around the drafting of the Civil Unions Bill, which had been introduced in Parliament. The bill passed in November and allowed couples to register their partnerships as civil unions with the Department of Home Affairs, but not to call them “marriages,” generating possible grounds for another campaign (LaFraniere 2006; Pressly 2006).

5.1.3 The Dilemma of Participating in a Campaign

Just two months before South African LGBT social movement organizations met to discuss how to handle the absence of the Equality Project and to advance the same-sex marriage campaign, their attention was siphoned from the campaign by a scandal. Responding to the scandal kept organizations, including Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement
organizations, from working on the campaign. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance claimed in a press release on 10 January 2006 that a number of gay male members had donated blood at South African National Blood Service (SANBS) centers without disclosing their sexual orientation to staff or knowing their HIV status in defiance of a ban prohibiting men who have sex with men from donating blood. Organizations, including FEW and Behind the Mask, faced a strategic dilemma regarding how and whether to respond to this crisis. Not responding to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s alleged action would appear to anti-LGBT opponents and the general public that LGBT social movement organizations sanctioned this action, possibly giving anti-LGBT opponents fodder for a countermovement campaign. However, becoming involved meant that organizations would likely divert attention and resources away from the same-sex marriage campaign.

At stake was the movement’s credibility and sexual and gender minorities’ standing in the national imaginary. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s supposed action against South African National Blood Service centers constituted a “threat” for some South Africans (Muller 2006; Saturday Star 2006). Militaristic rhetoric in The Saturday Star’s sensationalized headline, “Gays Launch Blood War,” put LGBT activists on alert not just because of the exaggerated diction, but also because of the allusion to sexual and gender minorities’ attack on the general South African populace (Gallagher 2006). HIV/AIDS threatened millions of South Africans, and a tainted national blood supply was unthinkable. The notion that LGBT activists would jeopardize the blood supply available to all South Africans threatened to delegitimize activists’ demands for full, inclusive citizenship. If angry (heterosexual) South Africans ceased to recognize sexual (and gender) minorities as citizens, then violence based on misrecognition could ensue (Butler 2004). For activists, the legal gains the movement made over the previous decade, such as winning the right for same-gender couples to marry, would be meaningless if antigay sentiments transformed into homophobic violence and rhetoric.

Concerned about sexual and gender minorities’ political and social status and the possibility of violent response, LGBT social movement organizations, including FEW, Behind the Mask, and the Joint Working Group, decided to become involved in the gay blood donation imbroglio. Condemning the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s tactics and distancing themselves from it, LGBT social movement organizations sought to control the situation before the Gay and Lesbian Alliance damaged the movement’s reputation. Not only were South African LGBT
SMOs shocked by the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims about gay men donating blood without knowing their HIV status, but they were also infuriated by the mainstream media’s lack of fact-checking before publishing the story. Using the Joint Working Group as an institutional mouthpiece, organizations issued press releases that deplored the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s supposed action and indicted the media for treating the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as a credible organization without ascertaining the validity of its claims. Several days after the gay blood donation scandal broke, South African National Blood Service centers reported that there was no proof of hundreds of gay men donating blood in contravention of the ban. Disturbed by the mainstream media’s tendency to run with sensationalized, unproven stories that attract readers, LGBT social movement organizations registered a complaint with the Press Ombudsman, who, in turn, “reprimanded” The Star for its unethical conduct in not thoroughly vetting the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims (Linington 2006). LGBT social movement organizations regarded the lack of journalistic fact-checking as “anti-LGBT prejudice” because no journalists publicly questioned the absurd claim that hundreds of HIV-infected gay men descended on the blood . . . services with only one goal in mind: tainting the life-giving resource which is our blood reserves. The immediate question is: why would hundreds of gay men want to do this? . . . The patently ridiculous claim of mass-infection of blood reserves was accepted at face value, suggesting a framing of LGBT people as sociopathic, which probably springs from perceptions of homosexuals as socially deviant (van der Westhuizen 2006).

These comments published in a Pretoria-based LGBT social movement organization’s newsletter attributed the sensationalize coverage of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims to a persisting belief among heterosexual South Africans that sexual minorities were socially aberrant and to the media’s unacknowledged bias against sexual and gender minorities. Thus, LGBT social movement organizations found themselves with two opponents, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance and the media.

LGBT social movement organizations treated the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as hostile and as a countermovement organization working against sexual and gender minorities and the movement (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rohlinger 2002). LGBT social movement organizations discredited the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as the “true voice” of the “lesbigay” movement, which it regularly claimed in its press releases. Behind the Mask staff joked that the Gay and Lesbian Alliance press release writer was “one man who sat in his home drafting
ridiculous, antigay press releases all day” and faxed them to the media and organizations. They also noted that the press releases were difficult to read, due to their rambling nature. The Cape Town-based Triangle Project (2006) agreed with these assessments in a press release:

The GLA has a long history of issuing frequent “press releases” that range from controversial to bizarre. The so-called organisation does not have an address or a land-line phone number and all previous efforts to meet with the GLA have failed. There is no evidence to suggest that the GLA consists of more than one attention-hungry individual with a fax machine and a cell phone.

The Triangle Project disputed the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s organizational capacity and commitment to the movement in the press release, isolating the “organization” as a front for one person. The Triangle Project even questioned whether the Gay and Lesbian Alliance qualified as an organization because South African LGBT activists had surmised that one man was behind the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s outlandish claims. In this press release, the Triangle Project suggested that to label the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as a gay and lesbian organization demeaned other South African LGBT social movement organizations because the Gay and Lesbian Alliance had made claims and taken actions that hurt sexual and gender minorities. Staff members at the Triangle Project and other South African LGBT social movement organizations like the Triangle Project, a Behind the Mask reporter had tried and failed to contact the individual listed as the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s media spokesperson several times. The reporter admitted that she personally wanted nothing to do with a man and organization she viewed as antigay; in this sense, she regarded the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as an enemy. When I asked another Behind the Mask staff member if the organization would issue a press release about the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims related to the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men, he stated that Behind the Mask was in a “tough position” because it had a mandate to be an “objective” media organization, but it also engaged in “journalistic activism” on behalf of LGBT persons by writing and publishing stories about African sexual and gender minorities. Therefore, not responding to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s tactics could be construed as indifference. Behind the Mask ultimately did not issue a press release, leaving the impression that it was maintaining an objective position on the issue, though it scrupulously followed and reported on developments in the story. However, Behind the Mask and FEW approved the Joint Working Group’s press release and efforts to discuss the ban on blood donation from men who have sex with men with the South African National Blood Service.
Circumventing the Gay and Lesbian Alliance, LGBT social movement organizations directly approached and met with the South African National Blood Service and the South African Blood Transfusion Service in mid-February 2006 about rescinding the male blood donors who have sex with men. FEW staff participated in these negotiations, an example of how the gay blood donation ban gripped a variety of organizations. Explaining the importance of supporting their “gay brothers,” the leader of FEW claimed at a staff meeting that fighting the ban on gay blood donation was a chance to battle institutional homophobia and show solidarity with other members of the LGBT sector (Fieldnotes, 20 February 2006). LGBT activists who met with representatives from the South African National Blood Service and the South African Blood Transfusion Service alleged that the ban was “blatantly homophobic” (Mambaonline 2006), though they tended to agree that giving blood was a privilege, not a right. Both the Blood Service and Transfusion Service used studies that the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had conducted to justify the ban, citing statistics that men who have sex with men were more at risk for contracting HIV. Activists disputed such logic, asserting that the ban was heterosexist and discriminatory and that in South Africa, HIV transmission rates were higher among heterosexuals.63 The South African National Blood Service premised the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men on the CDC’s conclusions that HIV transmission rates were higher in men who have sex with men because they supposedly engaged in unprotected anal sex more frequently than other populations. When meeting with the South African National Blood Service, LGBT activists reminded those who advocated the ban on gay male blood donations that South African heterosexuals sometimes had unprotected anal sex and that some gay and bisexual men did not engage in anal sex. The Blood Service representative and LGBT social movement organizations agreed that before the Blood Service finally ruled on whether to allow men who have sex with men to donate blood, it would commission a study on HIV transmission rates among South African gay, bisexual, and heterosexual men and women. Beginning on 1 November 2006, the Blood Service would allow men who had abstained for six months from having sex with men to donate blood, but this did not satisfy the Joint Working Group, which argued that “the question should not be whether you have had sex with another

63 In 2003, the Triangle Project contended that “[b]etween 12 and 30%” of gay South African men are HIV-positive, but did not elaborate on the discrepancy in these figures (Smetherham 2003).
man but that all blood donors should be asked if they use a condom while having sex” (Behind the Mask 2006).

Within a few months, organizations realized they had pursued the gay blood donation ban as far as they could until the South African National Blood Service finished investigating whether using the United States’ Centers for Disease Control’s parameters was appropriate for South Africa. LGBT social movement organizations thus resumed their mobilization around same-sex marriage. Organizations pressed Parliament to pass favorable legislation affording same-gender couples the right to marry. In November 2006, just a few weeks before the Constitutional Court’s 1 December deadline to resolve the matter, Parliament passed the Civil Unions Bill, which fell short of activists’ hopes of the state labeling and recognizing their committed relationships as marriages (Pressly 2006).

South African LGBT social movement organizations missed the opportunity of mobilizing around the Constitutional Court’s favorable same-sex marriage ruling only for a short time. Changes in the external sociopolitical environment and internal movement environment affected organizations’ strategic choices about whether and how to follow the ruling. The void that the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project left when it disappeared forced LGBT social movement organizations to question how to move forward with the same-sex marriage campaign and which LGBT organization would helm the effort. Deliberation about how to proceed kept LGBT social movement organizations publicly invisible with respect to the same-sex marriage campaign for a few months. In addition, LGBT social movement organizations faced the strategic dilemma of becoming involved in the crisis initiated by the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims. LGBT organizations decided to address the crisis and work with the South African National Blood Service to end the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men. This decision diverted attention and resources from the same-sex marriage, contributing to social movement organizations’ invisibility with respect to the political opportunity of the Constitutional Court ruling. South African LGBT social movement organizations intentionally missed the opportunity posed by the same-sex marriage ruling only for a short time so that they could respond to the changes in the external sociopolitical environment and internal movement environment. Sometimes, social movement organizations’ invisibility in moments of political opportunity is attributable to perceptible shifts in the external and internal environments.
5.2 NAMIBIA: MISSED OPPORTUNITY.

Using logic similar to that of South African LGBT activists who elicited the African National Congress’ support in protecting sexual minority rights, Namibian LGBT activists worked with the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in the early 1990s (Cock 2003; Croucher 2002; Oswin 2007; Stychin 1996). Through well-placed political connections, activists managed to get a sexual nondiscrimination clause included in the Labour Act of 1992 (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006), making Namibia the first African nation to protect sexual minorities from employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.64 The Namibian LGBT movement seemed set to pursue legal sexual and gender minority rights. However, TRP failed to mobilize around a case involving one of their own. In 1999, Liz Frank, a founding member both of TRP and Sister Namibia, filed a legal claim for permanent residency based on her long-term relationship with a Namibian woman with whom she was raising a child. I argue that not mobilizing around this case constitutes a missed opportunity—a moment when The Rainbow Project could have mobilized publicly around sexual and gender minority rights but did not. How and why did The Rainbow Project miss this opportunity? The organization made strategic choices that prevented it from taking advantage of this political opportunity. First, TRP had to decide how it would respond to the repressive sociopolitical environment. Second, TRP had to determine whether and how it would provide social services in response to the material needs of many black and coloured members.

5.2.1 The Dilemma of State Repression

The Rainbow Project (TRP) faced the strategic dilemma of whether or how to respond to state repression. TRP formed in 1997 precisely to counter state leaders’ homophobia and threats. However, the organization had to decide whether it was worth openly opposing state and SWAPO leaders and risk provoking the state leaders’ unleashing of police and making good on

64 In 2004, the Namibian Constitutional Assembly replaced the Labour Act with more conservative legislation that omitted the clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which The Rainbow Project (TRP), did not challenge (Fenwick 2005). I do not elaborate on TRP’s lack of mobilization around the new Labour Act legislation because I am still investigating this.
their threats of repression. If TRP did not respond, state and SWAPO leaders might construe TRP’s silence, or the lack of opposition from LGBT social movement organizations, as validation of their homophobia. TRP opted to respond swiftly to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic comments, much like its parent social movement organization, Sister Namibia, had. But beyond reacting pointedly and immediately to state leaders’ homophobic rhetoric, TRP staff and members were unsure how they should proceed with their plans to improve the legal and political situation of Namibian sexual and gender minorities. TRP made a series of related decisions that ultimately kept it from pursuing legal action.

TRP’s start was quite strong, given the tumultuous political environment in which it operated. Despite the state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks, TRP members still regarded Namibia’s fledgling democracy as a political opportunity. Members hoped that Namibians would “react negatively to the marginalisation of groups whom they feel have a valid right to co-exist in the community,” a view that emerged from “the struggle for Independence and overthrowing the apartheid regime” (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:1; see also Frank and !Khaxas 1996). However, to ensure that Namibians believed that LGBT persons had a “valid right to co-exist” with them, TRP decided to pursue educational and cultural events alongside legal and political mobilization because the organization wanted Namibians to “[accept] homosexual, bisexual, and transsexual individuals as possessing this right” (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:1). TRP decided to commit itself to responding decisively to state leaders’ homophobia because not to do so could result in worsening legal and political circumstances for sexual and gender minorities. TRP members firmly believed they had an important democratizing role to play in a country that “possesses abundant optimism” (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:2).

[Namibia] is grappling with many issues inherent in a fledgling democracy. . . . It is now that different groups in the community are exploring their new-found freedom. They are discovering that with this freedom comes responsibility to all members of their society. It is in the fluid constructions that are currently taking shape in Namibia that TRP would like to build its base. We do not want to wait until these constructions are set rock solid and have to undergo the painful task of disassembling them (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:2).

TRP members interpreted the country’s democratization process as a political opportunity for pursuing its goals and for finding a place in Namibia for LGBT persons.
At TRP’s first meeting in 1997, members discussed how the new organization should respond to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia. Some members seemed more inclined to institutionalize spaces for gays and lesbians to socialize without fear, while others stressed the need to “change laws” and “not hide away” like “closet cases” because Nujoma and his peers verbally attacked sexual minorities (TRP meeting minutes, February 1997). A few attendees offered concrete suggested courses of action, such as filing a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman or suing the state because of leaders’ statements. Different actors had conventionally filed “complaints relating to maladministration by public officials” with the Namibian Office of the Ombudsman (Gomez 1995:157). But actors had increasingly requested the Office of the Ombudsman “to investigate violations of human rights as well. . . . In the Namibian case, the ombudsman may also give legal assistance or advice to those seeking enforcement of fundamental rights through the courts” (Gomez 1995:157). TRP members were acquainted with the expanded role of the Office of the Ombudsman due to their close ties to the Legal Assistance Centre, which would continue to be a close ally of the organization.

TRP also decided to prioritize legal mobilization. At its yearly strategic planning meeting in 1998, which members of the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality moderated, members agreed the organization would prioritize “decriminalising sodomy, employment benefits, immigration cases, and gay-bashing” as pressing concerns (TRP 1998:16). Members of the Coalition shared their experience organizing around sodomy and advised TRP to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy very carefully, given the hostile sociopolitical environment in which TRP operated. Members identified several avenues for their legal program including “going to court” and “lobbying political leaders” and the public (TRP 1998:17). However, TRP members agreed that “[c]hanging the Constitution to include sexual orientation” as the South African movement had was “not ideal” because state and SWAPO leaders might interpret suggested Constitutional amendments as a threat to their authority (TRP 1998:17). Members seemed satisfied that “[b]asic rights [were] covered” and instead decided to work within existing frameworks (TRP 1998:17).

In June 1997, TRP filed a legal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman objecting to homophobic remarks President Nujoma made in December 1996 and to SWAPO leaders’
statements made in January 1997 and disclosed this action to the Namibian media (“Gay Rights Group” 1997; Günzel 1997). Citing equality statutes in the Namibian Constitution, the organization requested that the Office of the Ombudsman probe Nujoma’s statement as a human rights violation. TRP alleged that “discrimination can also come verbally . . . . This request is further motivated by a fear that such remarks can lead to incitement to violence and discrimination against law abiding [sic] citizens” (TRP Submission to the Ombudsperson, 4 June 1997). However, the Office of the Ombudsman declined to investigate the matter for two reasons. First, the Office of the Ombudsman claimed that it could only investigate grievances pertaining to employment discrimination due to a person’s sexual orientation in compliance with the Labour Act of 1992, and TRP’s complaint did not fall within this framework. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman rejected the complaint because TRP publicized its filing, which violated the principle of confidentiality under which the Ombudsperson operated, such “that it would seem that the Office was used as a stepping stone to raise publicity for your cause” (Office of the Ombudsman letter, 30 September 1997). Thus, TRP’s pursuit of publicity related to the investigation resulted in negative sanctions by the Office of the Ombudsman and limited the redress that the organization could seek with respect to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks. Unless Parliament prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, as the South African Parliament had done one year earlier in the Constitution, Namibian sexual and gender minorities would not be able to pursue legal redress through the Office of the Ombudsman.

TRP members also decided to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy, understood as sex between men, a law “inherited from the colonial regime” (Tibinyane 1998:20).66 TRP members understood the sodomy law as “a violation against their human rights because as long as both parties [were] consenting adult, there could be nothing wrong with it” (Tibinyane 1998:20). One member recommended publicizing a statement made by then-Ombudsperson Bience Gawanas that “sodomy [would] be decriminalized” (TRP meeting minutes, 18 March 1997:2). Early in 1997, a couple of law school students demanded a public discussion about the legal position of gay and lesbians (Davids and Shanghala 1997:11). Uncertainty about this statute remained. On

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66 Dianne Hubbard (2000), a Legal Assistance Centre researcher, supported repealing the sodomy law because the Combating of Rape Act, which was passed in 2000, “expanded the definition of rape to include forcible sodomy” (p. 11).
behalf of TRP, in 1998, the Legal Assistance Centre requested clarification about the sodomy law, specifically asking if Prosecutor General “would continue to prosecute charges of sodomy where the sexual act has taken place in private between two consenting adult males” (LAC letter, 24 April 1998). The Prosecutor General declined to discuss the issue (TRP meeting minutes, 6 May 1998, 3 June 1998). The Attorney General, however, asserted that “the sodomy law [was] unconstitutional and [had] to be challenged” (TRP meeting minutes, 3 June 1998). The Attorney General apparently did not push this constitutional inquiry further, constituting another institutional obstacle to TRP’s effort to decriminalize sodomy.

Amid a sociopolitical environment that was increasingly antagonistic toward sexual and gender minorities in the frequency and intensity of state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks, TRP decided to switch strategies. The organization decided to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy less publicly with the help of the Legal Assistance Centre, though by the end of 1999, it was not clear how the organization would proceed with this campaign (TRP meeting minutes, 20 June 1999, 1 December 1999). In 2000, the political opportunity of pursuing the decriminalization of sodomy narrowed when President Nujoma made homophobic remarks, and Home Affairs Minister Jerry Ekandjo who was “in charge of the police . . . commandeered 700 newly recruited police officers to ‘eliminate’ gay men and lesbians ‘from the face of Namibia’” (Amupadhi 2000). These statements put TRP on the defensive. In a press release condemning these remarks, TRP criticized SWAPO members and state officials who had publicly stated that “the Constitution included the rights of homosexual people,” requested the state to snub Ekandjo’s demand that police arrest sexual and gender minorities, and demanded the state “to repeal or amend all laws that discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in Namibia.”*67 In this tense atmosphere, “[a]s an organisation fighting for minority rights,” TRP internally and publicly recognized “the importance of the support of the majority” and invited heterosexual Namibians to join the organization (TRP 2000:11).

Nervousness about publicly clarifying the legal status of homosexuality made activists hesitate about moving forward with law reform. Writing in 1996, before Nujoma’s highly publicized attacks on lesbians and gay men, Liz Frank and Elizabeth !Khaxas (1996) confessed

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67 Clarifying that his call for the police to “eliminate” sexual minorities in Namibia did not mean killing them, Ekandjo explained that sexual minorities had no rights under the Namibian Constitution, unlike sexual and gender minorities in South Africa.
they did “not know which way Namibia [would] develop on” legal reform, even though Namibia was a safe haven for same-gender couples (p. 116).

[A] number of couples . . . moved from South Africa to Namibia during the 1980s to escape the persecution of interracial and lesbian love that exists there. No one we have asked, including the State Attorney, can remember a single case of legal prosecution of lesbians or gay men in this country (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:115).

Fearful of provoking a repressive state response, activists let SWAPO determine which South African laws to repeal. This fear intensified for LGBT activists between 1999 and 2001 when President Nujoma and Home Affairs Minister Ekandjo rekindled their homophobic commentary, which I outlined above. Their remarks coincided with Liz Frank’s lawsuit against the Department of Home Affairs. Frank was trying to obtain permanent residency based on her committed relationship to her Namibian same-gender partner and their raising of a son together (Frank 2001a). The Rainbow Project chose to defer pursuing sexual and gender minority legal rights at the moment of political opportunity of Frank’s case. The organization made this decision because it did not want to aggravate state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia and spark homophobic violence, a real concern for many Namibian LGBT persons. While Frank’s case was underway, Sister Namibia launched the Namibian Women’s Manifesto and 50/50 Campaign, which I described in Chapter Four. State leaders including the Minister of Women Affairs withdrew their support for the Manifesto because it broadened the definition of women’s rights to include lesbian rights (Rothschild 2005). TRP deferred launching a separate public legal campaign that clarified sexual and gender minority rights in order not to incur the wrath of state and SWAPO leaders and not to jeopardize the Manifesto and 50/50 Campaign. In addition, state leaders’ hostile attitude toward LGBT persons rendered TRP somewhat ineffective and invisible. Apart from issuing press releases at different points condemning or praising the legal system’s handling of the case, TRP did not mobilize constituents around expanding sexual and gender minority legal rights. Instead, TRP chose to ask the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) to call on the Namibian state to grant Frank permanent residency. ILGA could mobilize activists in the global North to pressure Namibian state officials about this matter when it held its yearly world conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1999.

Several activists believed that while Nujoma held office, any attempt to overturn the sodomy law or to expand LGBT rights would fail. Official homophobia and the Ovambo ruling ethnic majority’s patriarchal practices, exemplified in Nujoma’s frequent justifications for why
lesbians and gay men did not deserve equal rights, “[limited] the space available to the LGBT community to push the boundaries of the interpretation of the constitution in a more liberal direction” (Isaacks 2005:79). State and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia impacted the organization directly. In part, this was part of a growing backlash among conservative African political leaders—often those who waged liberation struggles against foreign, occupying armed forces—against South Africa’s liberal politics.

The Rainbow Project decided that, as long as state leaders persisted in issuing homophobic threats, it would be best to postpone a public legal campaign centered on sexual and gender minority rights. The organization decided to develop an inclusionary orientation centered on human rights. TRP cast sexual and gender minority rights as human rights. Thus, to thwart state repression and to cultivate support from other civil society organizations, TRP styled itself as a broad-based human rights organization in Namibia. For instance, TRP members coached key political or religious readers to denounce antigay rhetoric by voicing their support for all human rights, instead of specifically singling out sexual and gender minority rights. TRP members worried that only defending sexual and gender minority rights would make LGBT persons more vulnerable to attack by virtue of supporters and activists discussing these issues publicly. The organization also joined the Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum (NANGOF—NGO Forum) in 1999, cementing its collective identity as a human rights organization. The organization even renamed its yearly LGBT Awareness Week as “Human Rights Awareness Week” in 2001 in an effort to mainstream sexual and gender minority rights in Namibian human rights discourse (TRP Management Committee meeting minutes, 9 May 2001). TRP also collaborated with other human rights organizations on children’s rights and stopping violence against women. Participating in such campaigns and state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic threats kept The Rainbow Project from pursuing legal clarification of sexual and gender minority rights and allowed it to recast itself as a human right organization.69

68 The Ovambo constitute an indigenous majority in Namibia.
69 Periodically, TRP staff and members resuscitated the idea of pursuing legal rights, as in the case of decriminalizing sodomy, which resurfaced as an issue in May 2001 and June 2002, but these discussions did not materialize in action (TRP Management Committee meeting minutes, 9 May 2001, 13 June 2002).
5.2.2 The Dilemma of Social Service Provision

A second strategic dilemma that TRP had to navigate was whether and how it would meet the diverse material needs of poor, unemployed, and undereducated members. On the one hand, TRP founding members aspired to represent all Namibian sexual and gender minorities and improve their everyday lives so that members could take full advantage of their constitutional rights. On the other hand, members worried that providing social services would derail the organization’s planned sexual and gender minority rights campaign.

First, members were unsure how to handle the differences among Namibians who differed in terms of their class, racial, and ethnic identities. TRP’s founding members resembled their South African counterparts who were “privileged mostly white, mostly middle-class, mostly urbanized lesbians and gays, who [were] safe enough to come out and identify as lesbian or gay, [and] fight for their rights” (van Zyl 2005c:31). Though TRP might have initially functioned as an exclusive social movement organization (SMO), founding members aspired to transform it into an “inclusive” SMO, which, according to Bernstein (1997:539), tries “to educate and mobilize a constituency or maximize involvement in political campaigns.” As an inclusive SMO, TRP founding members successfully recruited black and coloured sexual minorities from diverse class backgrounds in Windhoek. They were so successful that several white founding members dropped out from the organization, presumably because of racial tension and divergent interests among white members. According to a founding member of and staff person at TRP, the organization had to diversify its membership in terms of race, ethnicity, and class. In the new post-apartheid Namibia, if activists “were going to form a group that only had white members, you were not going to be a voice that people were going to take seriously. You're not going to have any credibility in this country” (TRP staff member, interview, 11 July 2006). The organization held meetings and recruited black and coloured members in Katutura, a black Windhoek township, and Khomasdal, a coloured Windhoek township. This resulted in a shift in membership from a dozen white members to several dozen mostly black and coloured members, and membership increased steadily between 1998 and 2002.

TRP founding members also decided to empower black and coloured members, who dominated the organization in number of members, and to encourage them to participate in the organization. This internal focus detracted attention from sexual and gender minority rights, but
members prioritized it anyway in an effort to institute a democracy within the organization that they hoped to duplicate more widely in Namibia. Thus, the organization devised democratic practices intended to elicit participation from black and coloured members and to establish rules and procedures for decision making. This introduction of democratic practices reinforced TRP’s collective identity as a promoter of human rights and democracy in Namibia. The organization’s constitution afforded all members decision-making power through voting at meetings. From 1997 to 2003, a core group of about a dozen volunteers from middle-class backgrounds managed TRP and held open monthly meetings at which members could voice their concerns or make suggestions about current and future projects. Despite leaders’ best intentions, however, the polyvocality that democratic practices nurtured stymied the organization’s decision-making processes and devolved into cacophony. Beginning in 2001, meetings became fora for members to gripe about minuscule issues within TRP, such as which kind of paper to buy (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006). These complaints brought TRP to a standstill. Becoming too accessible to members through democratic procedures prevented TRP staff from providing services and information to a broader LGBT community for a time. Such squabbling masqueraded as attempts by discontented members to shift TRP’s focus to social service provision; for a short time, TRP ran a medical clinic and soup kitchen at their Windhoek office. A member who “believed he would eventually become the TRP director” promised to create jobs for TRP members who sided with him or give people money to pay rent, an assurance at which several members scoffed because it revealed how little some members knew about what foreign donors—TRP’s main source of funding—would finance (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006). Eventually, the infighting escalated to verbal and physical attacks and personal vengeance. A gay coloured founding member of TRP commented that some members engaged in petty payback: “I hate you, so I’ll sleep with your boyfriend” (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006). Members also concocted conspiracy theories. Some disgruntled TRP members accused staff of misappropriating funds and increasing their salaries, accusations that continued to persist.  

Staff offered to let members examine the organization’s finances, but no one took them up on this offer, probably because most members had little experience navigating complex budgets. These

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70 Alleging financial misconduct, a former TRP member told a staff member he was going to sue the director because the director had purchased a new car recently. The director downplayed the threat, pretending to taunt the absent former member, “Fine. Come and try to take my car. See who you’re dealing with” (Interview, 11 July 2006).
episodes resulted in the drafting of a code of conduct that outlined how members were expected to behave in the office and at staff and membership meetings.

TRP members and staff regarded the provision of social services as a strategic dilemma, even though it did not have to be one. In this sense, the “recognition-distribution binary [that] haunt[ed]” the South African LGBT movement also affected the Namibian movement (Dirschweitz 2006:328). On the one hand, some members and staff believed that if TRP offered social services to members, it would overwhelm and prevent the organization from pursuing legal rights that would lead to social and political recognition of LGBT persons’ equality in Namibian society. In addition, they feared that Northern donors would not fund poverty-alleviation programs designed for sexual and gender minorities because other nongovernmental organizations offered such services. On the other hand, some members and staff believed that they owed it to poor, unemployed, and undereducated members to provide social services to them because they had nowhere else to turn, which constituted the redistribution of resources and opportunities that would enable Namibian LGBT persons to improve their everyday material existence. As long as they obtained funds in the name of Namibian LGBT persons, they believed that members should have equal access to them. Staff and members regarded the provision of social services as an “either-or” dilemma; either they provided social services, or they did not. Members wanted to end the internal fighting before the organization imploded. Poor, black, and coloured members requested that TRP provide basic services, whereas white, middle-class members envisioned the organization taking on less tangible projects, such as law reform. After TRP’s office opened in 2000, in-fighting intensified because members expected the organization to provide for some of their basic needs; the organization’s ability to open an office signaled to some member that TRP had money. Such needs diverged from those that white middle-class core members had diagnosed for Namibian sexual minorities, but for a time, the core group addressed these concerns until providing services like a soup kitchen for members became too chaotic for staff members, as soup kitchen visitors traipsed in and out of the office.

Fulfilling poor black and coloured members’ basic needs overwhelmed TRP for several years, telescoping its plans for law reform. Pursuing a legal campaign did not make sense for those unfamiliar with the Namibian legal system and Constitution. Many TRP members I interviewed cast the concerns of LGBT persons in terms of basic needs like education and jobs, which they interpreted as removed from the legal arena. TRP members widely upheld the view
that if Namibians could marry persons of the same gender, few black and coloured LGBT persons would seize this opportunity because marriage would hold few immediate material benefits. Several black and coloured members eventually defected from TRP because they perceived that the TRP’s leaders were not attuned to their needs.

Members found it difficult to recognize and maintain class diversity among the organization’s members. It was easy to run a meeting when twelve mostly white and middle-class people with similar life experiences, values, and worldviews agreed on a common vision for fighting state homophobia, but incorporating “250 to 300 voices from diverse backgrounds [became] very difficult” (Interview, 11 July 2006). One member concluded that TRP’s original constitution could only have worked if all members hailed from the middle class. “An organization like ours can’t be completely democratic,” or else members will run it into the ground with endless basic needs (Interview, 11 July 2006). According to this perspective, some members expected the organization to solve their basic problems immediately.

Several former and current black members alleged that TRP’s management was racist. Very few black LGBT persons had been hired as staff members or included in important decisions, despite founding and core members’ claims that the constitution facilitated the incorporation of members of previously underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities. One member claimed that because so many black LGBT persons turn out for events, those unfamiliar with or new to TRP might assume that the office staff members were all or mostly black, which was not the case (Interview, 30 June 2006). Sharing the view of another member I interviewed, the same member alleged that staff only informed black TRP members about events when they wanted to show donors how racially diverse the Namibian movement was, as a way to prove to donors that TRP was doing its part to repair race relations damaged by apartheid policies (Interview, 30 June 2006).

While conflict roiled TRP, core founding members asked donors to order and pay for an external review in 2002 because TRP was “being smothered under personal shit” (Interview, 11 July 2006). Donors financed an external review that recommended that TRP become a trust, an organizational form in which TRP staff would be accountable only to an executive board and not to hundreds of members, and abandon social-service provision for members with “bread-and-butter” needs. Donors worried that too many service provision programs like the soup kitchen
would bankrupt TRP. If members had not voted to transform TRP into a trust that could initiate programs, such as a law reform project, donors would have suspended funding and restarted TRP as a trust after a cooling-off period, forcing the organization into abeyance. This was not necessary because core group members persuaded enough members to vote for TRP to become a trust with a board of directors to whom staff reported.

5.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Johannesburg-based South African LGBT social movement organizations were in a unique position to take advantage of the favorable Constitutional Court same-sex marriage ruling. However, when the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project folded, organizations found themselves questioning how they would proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign because the Equality Project had pioneered this campaign. This change in the LGBT movement’s composition made organizations examine how they would fill the void that the Equality Project left. In addition, organizations had to make a strategic choice about whether and how they would react to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s allegation that gay men donated blood without revealing their sexual orientation or knowing their HIV status. Organizations’ hesitation about the campaign and decision to refute the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s credibility and to fight the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men caused them to become invisible with respect to the same-sex marriage campaign. However, they were temporarily invisible and resurfaced in support of the campaign later in the year.

The Rainbow Project initially made the strategic choices to address state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks as soon as they occurred and to pursue legal clarification of sexual and gender minority rights by beginning with the decriminalization of sodomy. The organization encountered institutional obstacles when the Office of the Ombudsman refused to consider TRP’s complaint of discrimination due to President Nujoma’s 1996 homophobic comments and

71 Though the soup kitchen proved to be a logistical impediment at the office, one staff member reflected fondly on the camaraderie that accompanied this effort. She told me that different members donated funds or ingredients for the soup, and one member came in a couple of days a week to prepare and serve the soup. It was heartening for her to see LGBT persons pull together and take care of their own.
also when the Prosecutor General and Attorney General did not investigate the constitutionality of the sodomy law. Amid intensifying state leaders’ homophobia, TRP decided to refashion itself as a human rights organization to garner wider support for LGBT rights. Internal clashes involving divergent visions for how the organization should develop also drew staff and members’ focus inward between 1998 and 2002, which would have prevented the organization from dedicating resources and attention to a legal campaign, if members and staff had agreed to pursue it. Hence, TRP deferred its legal campaign for several years, and discussions of decriminalizing sodomy disappeared from the organization in 2002.

Being invisible in or dropping out of a campaign altogether can indicate movement or organizational distress. In the case of The Rainbow Project, its invisibility with respect to a legal campaign was a sign of inner turmoil, but there was also another dimension to the organization’s apparent disinterest in mounting a legal challenge. The organization opted to respond to Namibian state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks by issuing press releases to the media, but it did not want to endanger the fragile position of LGBT persons, which members feared might worsen if state and SWAPO leaders felt threatened by the organization. On the other hand, South African LGBT social movement organizations disappeared en masse in the wake of the same-sex marriage win. The movement’s invisibility was not due to a crumbling movement, but rather to strategic planning and decision making related to how to proceed with the campaign and how to handle the unexpected debacle initiated by the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s threat about possibly contaminating the national blood supply.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how social movement organizations’ strategic choices coupled with changes in the external sociopolitical environment (or political opportunity structure) can make them miss moments of opportunity. South African LGBT organizations were eventually able to seize the opportunity to promote its same-sex marriage campaign, but in Namibia, TRP had not yet initiated a legal campaign due to internal problems and to state repression. Missed opportunities constitute interesting analytic puzzles for social movement scholars interested in social movement development and internal dynamics. As I have shown, being invisible in (or missing) a moment of opportunity does not connote an inevitable demise for social movements or social movement organizations.
6.0 THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION

How to present the movement publicly is an important strategic dilemma of visibility in the Namibian and South African lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMOs) I studied. By public presentation, I mean how a social movement organization projects itself to target constituencies and audiences, usually in an effort to gain support (Bob 2005). Without a public presentation that resonates with target constituencies and audiences, SMOs can lapse into invisibility and find it difficult to identify audiences they can influence or constituencies from which to recruit (Benford and Snow 2000). For example, feminist activists in the United States in the 1950s found it difficult to advance women’s rights amid political and social conservatism, specifically public antifeminist attacks. In this hostile environment and amid media outlets’ unfavorable portrayal of feminist leaders and organizations, some feminist activists retreated from public view (Rupp and Taylor 1987:18-23). A public presentation that grips the attention of a constituency or audience can enable SMOs to widen their base of support, extending their visibility to different audiences.

The dilemma of public presentation can be especially vexing for social movement organizations that advocate for unpopular political or social change or that operate in a repressive sociopolitical environment. Prior social movement scholarship demonstrates that it is difficult for social movement organizations to garner support within a hostile or repressive sociopolitical environment (Blee 2002; Earl 2003; Johnston 2006; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Linden and Klandermans 2006; Tamale 2007). SMOs whose messages and goals are at odds with social convention may find it hard to garner public attention or to sustain dialogues with chosen audiences. In such cases, SMOs sometimes seek out favorable media coverage or publicity in order to generate support for the movement. Kathleen M. Blee (2002) explains that some women who participated in racist movements in the United States volunteered to be
interviewed in the hope of correcting, in their view, unsympathetic and “superficial media reports” (p. 10, see also Blee 2006).

Public presentation is one element of a social movement framing strategy (Benford and Snow 2000). By “framing,” I mean how SMOs “fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves” to “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996:6; qtd. in Miceli 2005:595). In particular, framing theory usefully elaborates how SMOs assemble messages for particular audiences and demonstrates how messages “resonate” with audiences and constituencies (Miceli 2005; Snow and Benford 1992). How to frame an SMO and present it publicly is a strategic dilemma that some SMOs encounter. SMOs’ success in recruiting and retaining members can hinge on organizations’ public articulation of an attractive, appealing goals and mission with which individuals want to be associated (Friedman and McAdam 1992). In this sense, projecting a movement publicly that is coherent and unified can benefit SMOs by garnering them continued support from target constituencies and audiences.

In this chapter, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations approached the strategic dilemma of publicly portraying (framing) a pan-African LGBT movement. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations faced the same strategic dilemma of public presentation: whether and how to respond to the charge that homosexuality was unAfrican, a public assertion antigay opponents had increasingly made since the mid-1990s (TRP staff member, interview, 11 July 2006, see also Aarmo 1999; Hoad 2007; Mathuray 2000; Phillips 2001). Not to respond might allow antigay opponents to interpret organizational silence as success in suppressing LGBT organized resistance and as validation for their position. Yet responding could put them at risk for hostile reactions from opponents, as “visibility makes for an excellent target” (Weston 1997:xiii).

Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs confronted the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican on their own soil. Though the South African state had been receptive to LGBT rights, some state leaders openly expressed the view that homosexuality was unAfrican. Most recently, in September 2006, former Deputy Vice-President Jacob Zuma “condemned . . . same-sex marriages, saying they are ungodly and against African tradition” (Memela 2006). Namibian LGBT SMOs also routinely faced public statements from state leaders that homosexuality was unAfrican. As recently as September 2005, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration Theopolina Mushelenga publicly stated at a ceremony commemorating fallen national liberation
and anticolonial heroes, “Sexual intercourse between people of the same sex is disgraceful according to our African culture” (Graig 2005). In the same speech, she also blamed gays and lesbians for HIV/AIDS (Graig 2005). Her antigay comments elicited calls from Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project for Mushelenga to resign.

The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied recognized that this dilemma also had an international dimension. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff and members were concerned about a possible growing backlash against LGBT organizing throughout Africa. Thus, Namibian and South African LGBT organizations found ways to forge connections with other African LGBT activists and social movement organizations. By helping struggling LGBT organizations in other African countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, Namibian and South African LGBT organizational staff hoped that they could generate a unified pan-African LGBT movement. If the movement existed in enough African countries, they decided, antigay opponents would find it difficult to ignore African sexual and gender minority organizing and to sustain the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican. Using ethnographic and interview data, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs navigated the strategic dilemma of public presentation, specifically by proving that homosexuality was African. First, I examine how Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project approached the strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for soliciting and accepting funds from Northern donors. Second, I consider how leaders from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project, along with other Zimbabwean and South African LGBT activists, navigated the strategic dilemma of publicly presenting a pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Third, I explore how leaders from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project approached the strategic dilemma of whether to include transgender persons in the pan-African LGBT activist contingent that would attend the African Commission.

6.1 THE DILEMMA OF A BEING PERCEIVED AS UNAFRICAN
The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied, specifically Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project (TRP), faced a strategic dilemma in their relationship with Northern donors. On the one hand, these groups knew that funding from Northern donors would allow them to retain staff and engage in advocacy on behalf of Namibian and South African sexual and gender minorities, while they would have difficulty locating African sources willing to finance controversial issues, such as advocacy for African LGBT rights and persons. But such funding risked their efforts to work within a pan-African LGBT movement, if they were perceived as unAfrican because they received funding from Northern donors.

Behind the Mask and TRP faced the allegation that because they received funding from Northern donors, they were “gay for pay” (Interview, TRP staff member, 22 February 2006). “Gay for pay” had different meanings for LGBT social movement organizations and for antigay opponents. Some translated the term as suggesting that Africans only engaged in same-sex sexual acts with foreigners for money out of financial necessity. Others interpreted “gay for pay” in terms of organizational mandate; activists might only claim to represent sexual and gender minorities to receive funding for different initiatives, such as poverty alleviation or HIV/AIDS prevention, when, in reality, they might not serve LGBT persons at all. This reinforced the belief that homosexuality was unAfrican among antigay opponents across the continent who equated funding from Northern donors with LGBT social movement organizations obtaining ideas and resources for political organizing from non-African sources. According to antigay critics, when LGBT SMOs totally relied on foreign funding, they were little more than puppets of Northern donors (Epprecht 2001; Oswin 2005; Richardson 2005). For critics, Northern donors were sources for sexual and gender identities that disrupted indigenous and traditional African social norms, and LGBT organizations that received international funding operated neither independently nor in an authentically African way. Within a growing pan-African LGBT movement, some activists voiced concerns that Northern funding damaged their public profile with audiences that they wanted to influence in their respective countries. According to those activists opposed to relying solely on Northern funding, depending too much on Northern sources not only diminished LGBT social movement organizations’ resourcefulness and innovation, but also prevented LGBT organizations from working with one another across nations (ICC and GALZ 2004:8). Such African LGBT activists feared that they would never be
able to forge a truly “African” LGBT movement because LGBT social movement organizations would have to submit their ideas and projects to Northern donors before getting funding. In other words, an African LGBT movement would always bear the rubber stamp of Northern donors’ approval and might never attain visibility and credibility with different audiences.

Like Sister Namibia and the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW), Behind the Mask and TRP decided to accept funding from Northern donors and continue to solicit funding from such sources. This strategic choice placed these SMOs in a position of being indebted to Northern donors. When donors requested that Behind the Mask and TRP perform a task, they had little choice but to accept or risk losing some or all of their funding.

In 2005-6, Northern donors, namely Hivos and the Ford Foundation, asked Behind the Mask and TRP to work with struggling LGBT social movement organizations in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.72 Northern donors were responding to dysfunctions they had encountered in 2003 when they began funding young LGBT SMOs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. They grew concerned when they learned that some organizations had obtained funding under possibly false pretenses. Donors hired an independent researcher to investigate where their funds went and which LGBT SMOs were or were not legitimate. Donors defined legitimate SMOs as those that could account for how they spent funds and carried out projects they included in their annual reports. In other words, legitimate SMOs documented their activities and spending in ways that assured them a public profile. With respect to the alleged fraud among LGBT organizations, donors reasoned that they could not indefinitely fund LGBT SMOs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania that kept “disappearing into bottomless pits” (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 2006). Donors wanted assurances that these organizations would have some longevity and could be accountable for funds and training. Thanks to the independent researcher, donors discovered that SMOs had been submitting annual reports that “could not be true” (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 2006). Repressive laws prevented public LGBT organizing and other forms of critical oppositional political organizing in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as donors knew. As a result,

these LGBT social movement organizations could not have held large public events without drawing attention and ire from the police or Kenyan, Ugandan, or Tanzanian state (Tamale 2007:21). When the donor-hired researcher interviewed individuals in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania who claimed to represent LGBT organizations that received funding from Northern donors and that had hundreds of members, owned property, and/or held large events, she discovered that many claims were only partially true. For instance, LGBT organizations that had existed for less than a year in a repressive country likely did not have hundreds of members because LGBT persons might not want to join an organization officially in the event that the state cracked down on LGBT organizing and seized organizational records. The donor-hired researcher learned that in a few cases, individuals did not work with LGBT persons at all. In fact, when interviewed by the donor-hired researcher, some admitted they hardly knew any LGBT people. Instead, such individuals improperly obtained and used funds from Northern donors.

Northern donors turned to southern African LGBT activists to help solve the funding problem in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Donors invited the directors of Behind the Mask and TRP to act as consultants with budding LGBT social movement organizations and disseminate the donor-hired researcher’s findings among activists in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The directors were tasked with conducting in-country meetings with activists in each country. However, they canceled the meeting with Tanzanian LGBT activists for several reasons. First, they had fewer contacts among Tanzanian LGBT activists who would be willing to participate in such a meeting; issues of trust and fear of being outed kept some Tanzanian LGBT activists from attending. Second, since many activists were not proficient in English, it presented a language barrier for the Behind the Mask and TRP directors. Third, religious differences would have made it difficult for them to discuss the researcher’s findings. TRP’s director hailed from Namibia where 95% of the population identified as Christian, and in Tanzania, many LGBT activists identified as Muslim; adherents of each belief system defined and interpreted gender and sexuality differently, according to TRP’s director. In this way, cultural and religious differences posed potentially insurmountable obstacles to a pan-African LGBT movement.

Going into the meeting, donors and the Behind the Mask and TRP directors expected Ugandan and Kenyan LGBT activists to develop country-specific strategies and an overall regional strategy. They also hoped the meeting would also help foster trust among activists, who had apparently been fighting among themselves. At the meetings with Ugandan and Kenyan
activists, the Behind the Mask and TRP directors talked about the research findings and explicated that activists would not immediately and automatically receive funds from donors simply because they attended these meetings. They also helped meeting attendees enumerate their needs, which donors defined as obstacles that kept SMOs from applying and receiving donor funding. After the meetings, both directors recommended that donors meet individually with SMOs to assess the risk and worth of investing in them.

Donors assumed that LGBT activists from Kenya and Uganda would listen to and work well with southern African LGBT activists, presumably because of their common collective identity as Africans. Donors also supposed that activists’ common experience of organizing amid state homophobia and repression would enable southern African activists to have access to more information about Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT organizations’ needs than Europeans or North Americans would have (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 2006). As the directors of Behind the Mask and TRP learned, Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT activists were wary of southern African activists because they feared being outed publicly more than anything, due to the hostile political situations in which they operated.

Self-preservation initially motivated Behind the Mask and TRP’s directors’ decision to participate as facilitators. In 2003, southern African LGBT activists learned that the fate of their organizations might be intertwined with that of Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian SMOs, prompting them to cultivate an interest in identifying the problems in the region. Hivos informed its African LGBT “partner” organizations in an email message that it was difficult to work with LGBT SMOs in East Africa.

On several occasions organisations did not show up for scheduled meetings with Hivos staff. Correspondence is often slow and questions raised are not answered or answered too late. Narrative and financial reports are sent too late and do not provide sufficient insight into the results of the project supported. When contract periods end no follow up proposals for further support are submitted. New proposals arrive very late. Meanwhile organisations are building up debt because office rent and utilities are not paid and subsequently expect Hivos to pay for these debts.

As a result of these experiences, Hivos opted to “discontinue” direct funding to African LGBT social movement organizations and explore indirect means of support such as “short courses or exchange meetings.” Due to the East African financial scams, Hivos, in particular, suspended funding to some LGBT organizations, with the exception of southern African SMOs, such as TRP, the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, and Behind the Mask. After Hivos disclosed its
concerns, Behind the Mask and TRP staff worried that scam artists had referred to their organizations in their fraudulent funding applications, sullying the organizations’ names without staff knowing a scam was taking place. Behind the Mask and TRP staff members also grew concerned that widespread fraud could result in cessation of funding of all LGBT projects in Africa, which would jeopardize their operations (Interview, BTM staff, 22 February 2006). Thus, they developed a vested interest in ascertaining the existence of East African LGBT social movement organizations and decided to honor Northern donors’ request that they work with Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian LGBT activists.

Interest in creating and sustaining a pan-African LGBT movement also motivated Behind the Mask and TRP’s directors’ choice to participate in investigating and mentoring Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT activists. The Rainbow Project, in particular, benefited from similar advice and mentoring from the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe and the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality. Behind the Mask and TRP staff believed their organizations should continue the tradition of supporting struggling LGBT organizations elsewhere. According to a TRP staff member,

[W]e would not have been where we were. [The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe and the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality] were very actively involved in helping us strategizing and doing workshops . . . so that we could acquire the skills that were necessary in helping us understand the political landscape as it was unfolding in Namibia and helping us understand why we should not be tackling some laws and giving some attention to other. . . . So in that sense they were really invaluable to us (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).

The staff member describes how the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe and the Coalition supported TRP’s development through mentoring. The Coalition played an especially significant role by advising TRP to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy cautiously. Sharing their organizing experiences with budding LGBT social movement organizations in East Africa appealed to TRP staff because they “wanted to play a role in providing assistance and support to some of the young LGBT initiatives out there,” which donors supported in principle and with funding (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). Similarly, Behind the Mask was partly founded to ensure African LGBT activists could access information about homophobia and LGBT movement success in other African countries and to train activists to report on political developments related to LGBT organizing in their countries. Both Behind the Mask and TRP
consulted with new LGBT social movement organizations in neighboring countries early in their history, as a TRP staff member explained.

And so from the beginning Hivos, for instance, would push us to engage with young groups in . . . Botswana . . . . And . . . a precedent was set. So when the East Africa Initiative . . . came up and [donors] had to identify organizations, by then, Behind the Mask, for instance, were already involved in training in different southern African countries. They [donors] found that TRP and BTM [Behind the Mask] were the most suitable organizations to help these organizations through some of the difficulties that they experienced because in East Africa there wasn't an established LGBT organization (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).

Due to TRP’s experience trying to initiate LGBT organizing in Botswana and Behind the Mask’s training of activists to chronicle their organizing experiences, donors sought them out as well-equipped mentors. Northern donors could rely on Behind the Mask and TRP to advise struggling organizations in East Africa, an example of the close ties between these organizations and donors. Namibian and South African LGBT organizations could prove to donors that they were using funds in ways that supported and sustained the LGBT movement’s growth in other African countries. And Behind the Mask and TRP regarded this as a way to create a stronger African LGBT movement.

Every established LGBT organization on the continent, in the end, benefits your position. Because if there's a strong voice in Kenya and there's a strong voice in Uganda and Tanzania, you know we can break away of this whole issue of it [homosexuality] being unAfrican (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).

Despite what seemed to be a mutually beneficial working arrangement, the directors of Behind the Mask and TRP felt uncomfortable playing any role in evaluating East African LGBT organizations for funding. They believed it was problematic for a LGBT social movement organization to vet newer organizations for funding. This situation placed established social movement organizations in an unequal power relationship with new or struggling LGBT organizations. LGBT organizations with international funding such as Behind the Mask could put “more grassroots organisations” at a disadvantage because donors flocked to the former, boosting their public visibility while “contribut[ing] to the invisibility and/or the de-resourcing of less mainstream organisations,” such as struggling LGBT organizations in East Africa (Chasin 2000:202, cited in Richardson 2005:528). Behind the Mask and TRP staff had thought about how to handle this contradiction. In particular, a TRP staff member believed that an organization’s continued funding benefited the African LGBT movement, even though organizations might
be competing for the same resources. . . . I don't necessarily think that is unhealthy. I do believe, however, that there's a bigger picture. . . . It's great that at the moment, TRP has access to donors; we have close relationships with them. The donor money seems to come to us much easier than to most other organizations. . . . And that is good. But I think there's a bigger picture that as TRP we're trying to see. . . . [W]e really feel that a movement in other African countries benefits the continent. We see how things spill over” (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).

Behind the Mask and TRP staff did not believe that applying for organizations funds from Northern donors conflicted with their commitments to helping struggling LGBT activists and movement organizations elsewhere in Africa because if they ceased to exist, then there would no continental watchdogs for LGBT rights. Behind the Mask and TRP staff couched their organizations’ work in a pan-African LGBT movement context.

To outsiders, foreign donors might seem unusually interested and invested in cultivating the LGBT movement in East Africa, as evidenced by their recruitment of the directors of Behind the Mask and TRP to brief Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT activists on the donor-hired researcher’s findings about fraud among East African LGBT organizations. As a TRP staff member commented, the repressive “political atmosphere in these countries [was] ripe for LGBT activism,” implying that the political repression of LGBT organizing could generate outrage and organized resistance against the increasingly authoritarian Ugandan and Kenyan state leaders (Interview, 22 February 2006). For example, President Yoweri Museveni’s increasing unpopularity with Ugandans might jeopardize his chances for another term in office. Namibian and South African LGBT activists believed that Uganda was “becoming another Zimbabwe. Everyone’s being stepped on as the government becomes more and more paranoid. It’s now more of a police state than it used to be” (Interview, TRP staff, 22 February 2006). The TRP director claimed he could feel the air thicken with oppression when he stepped off the plane in Entebbe during a visit to consult with Ugandan LGBT activists. A Behind the Mask staff member reported experiencing similar feelings of discomfort when she attended a weeklong conference on developments in information and communications technologies in Uganda. Former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi was widely criticized for his authoritarian leadership, evidenced by election fraud and his threats to fire civil servants who supported the political opposition (Brown 2001:726; 2004). Much like former Namibian President Sam Nujoma, he condemned homosexuality while he was in office, though the Kenyan state “assume[d] the . . . . LGBT community is too small to warrant its time and attention. . . . Current LGBT organisations
therefore operate so as not to antagonise the government” and opt to become publicly invisible (Baraka 2005:27). Thus, Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders and Northern donors interpreted the state repression of sexual and gender minority organizing as an indicator of mounting authoritarianism in postcolonial African nations, such as Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Cameroon (see also Melber 2004).

State officials in postcolonial African nations hostile to LGBT organizing additionally opposed LGBT organizing as a way to curb foreign cultural and political influence in their countries. Such opposition was consistent with their concerns about being recolonized by Northern countries. Some governments proposed legislation to prevent LGBT organizations from registering with the state (Nigeria) or simply refused to let them to register at all (Uganda). This presented Northern donors and East African LGBT activists with a vexing problem. Unlike southern African countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa that are based on the Roman-Dutch legal system, the Ugandan state follows the English legal system and requires social movement organizations to register with the state as voluntary associations in order to receive funding from foreign sources. As long as LGBT SMOs remained unregistered, they could not receive funds from donors. Donors could channel money through other registered organizations and develop the movement in each country, but they would prefer to let SMOs gain expertise in handling and being accountable for the funds. More importantly, donors had to obey the laws within the countries in which LGBT social movement organizations operate. This would bar them from channeling funds to underground activists in countries that did not let LGBT social movement organizations register with the state.

All the Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied consistently encountered the strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for receiving funding from Northern donors. However, they opted to continue applying and receiving funding from them, even though it jeopardized their credibility and claim to be African. Suspending or scaling back their efforts did not appeal to LGBT SMO staff; hence, they decided to keep applying for and receiving funding from Northern donors. This strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for soliciting and accepting money from Northern donors is related to a dilemma of how to present a pan-African LGBT movement publicly to an African institutional political body.
Activists faced two dilemmas related to presenting themselves as a pan-African LGBT movement to an African human rights body. First, staff members of Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project (TRP), along with other southern African, European, and North American LGBT activists, had to decide if they would press LGBT rights violations at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African Commission would be one of the first times for the African LGBT movement to present itself to an African political institution; hence, its first impression on commissioners was important to Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff. If African LGBT activists remained silent about sexual and gender minority rights abuses, then officials in their respective countries might continue to turn a blind eye to such violations. However, if African LGBT activists moved forward with abuse claims, they could spotlight how LGBT rights abuses qualify as human rights abuses and insist that the African Commission lean on African nations in which such abuses were rampant. In other words, African LGBT activists could effect top-down change if the African Commission ordered member nations of the African Union to stop persecuting sexual and gender minorities. Second, they had to determine how to present a unified African LGBT movement for the first time to the African Commission. Attending the meeting as self-identified African LGBT activists could help elevate the pan-African LGBT movement’s continental visibility and dispel the misconception that homosexuality was unAfrican. On the other hand, emerging publicly as a united African LGBT movement might detract attention away from the contingent’s LGBT rights abuse claims, if commissioners and those in attendance viewed an African LGBT movement as a spectacle. Thus, presenting themselves publicly would likely be tricky, as activists would have to decide who could join the contingent, which violations to pursue, and to which audiences they would introduce a pan-African LGBT movement.

In March 2006, representatives from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) convened a meeting of southern African LGBT activists, including staff members from Sister Namibia, The Rainbow Project, and Behind the Mask, to discuss broadening and forging a pan-African LGBT movement. Behind the Mask hosted the meeting, befitting the organization’s reputation for updating African LGBT activists about what was happening throughout the continent. The IGLHRC representatives broached the possibility of
approaching the African Commission with LGBT human rights abuse claims at the meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006. Proving the organization’s reputation as an international authority on sexual and gender minority rights, the IGLHRC representative first described her organization’s objectives, record with approaching regional and supranational human rights commissions elsewhere, and interest in collaborating with African LGBT activists. She cast IGLHRC as an advocacy organization, focused on documenting LGBT human rights abuses cooperatively with local LGBT activist groups. After elucidating how IGLHRC had worked with Special Rapporteurs at the United Nations (UN) at the 1995 Beijing, 2000 Beijing +5, and 2005 Beijing +10 meetings to disseminate information about LGBT human rights violations, which gave the organization some international credibility (Bob 2005; Tarrow 2005), a representative stressed, “The UN isn’t going to save us,” though she admitted that it was an important vehicle for addressing violations. Revising its focus from the supranational to the regional level, IGLHRC had partnered with Latin American LGBT SMOs and regional human rights commissions, such as the European Union Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Despite success with legal human rights tactics, an IGLHRC representative posed two important questions to the southern African LGBT activists who attended the meeting: “Will changing laws necessarily change culture? Is it possible to work with the African Commission?” Casting the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights as a potential political opportunity constituted a reversal of position for IGLHRC (Murray and Viljoen 2007:106). In 2000, IGLHRC had advised against filing LGBT human rights complaints with the African Commission because if activists did not give commissioners adequate warning and time to prepare for the contentious issue of sexual and gender minority rights, commissioners might sanction “the idea that homosexuality is opposed to ‘African values.’ Such a precedent would be extremely difficult to reverse” (IGLHRC 2000:39, qtd. in Murray and Viljoen 2007:106).

Before making a decision about whether to regard the African Commission as a political opportunity for drawing attention to LGBT human rights violations on the continent, activists named obstacles to LGBT organizing in African countries. They linked these obstacles to LGBT human rights abuses appropriate for the African Commission to address. Activists enumerated different pressing issues facing African sexual and gender minorities, including the following: lack of access to information; freedom of expression; police impunity, harassment, torture, extortion, and illegal detention; difficulties organizing and registering with the state as LGBT
rights organizations; violence and hate crimes; state and religious homophobia; lack of research on LGBT issues; and the eroding rule of law and weakening judiciaries. This inventory put parameters on subsequent discussions of what would constitute the pan-African LGBT movement’s agenda at the African Commission, encouraging activists to strive for clarity and consistency in articulating their goals. Naming countries in which LGBT human rights abuses were egregious, such as Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda, convinced activists of the need to bring these abuses to the African Commission’s attention. They decided to regard the African Commission as a political opportunity for addressing LGBT rights violations on the continent and to plan to attend the upcoming meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006. Activists’ support for this plan grew when an IGLHRC representative mentioned that a commissioner informed him that the African Commission would welcome a sexual minority rights case.

In light of such possible receptiveness at the African Commission, activists believed that addressing the antigay backlash in Nigeria was even more urgent for activists. In December 2005, IGLHRC invited six African LGBT activists to the 14th International Conference on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections in Africa conference in Abuja, Nigeria. As a result of the recent legalization of same-sex marriage in South Africa and LGBT activists’ presence at the conference, Nigerian lawmakers and supporters of a bill drafted preemptive legislation that would outlaw same-sex marriage and prevent sexual and gender minority activists from forming organizations or registering with the state (Ekwowusi 2006). An IGLHRC representative who attended the Nigerian conference seemed astounded that the “queer noise” they made in Abuja resulted in this legislation, although he noted, “When there’s activism, there’s a response.” Activists at the IGLHRC meeting discussed how this response constituted a negative response to South Africa’s dominance as a progressive nation beloved by Northern democracies and to the idea that LGBT activists were “importing [homosexuality] from southern Africa all of a sudden” (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). Due to the political fragility that the legal preemption of LGBT organizing and same-sex marriage in Nigeria represented, activists recognized that they had to present an LGBT movement that the African Commission recognized as “African.” If African LGBT activists did not present the movement as African, such as through their depiction of LGBT rights abuses, commissioners and NGOs could dismiss the movement as the puppet of Northern donors.
Analyzing the antigay outcry in Nigeria led activists and IGLHRC representatives to question whether the African Commission constituted an international political opportunity after all. Southern African LGBT activists shared the IGLHRC representative’s understanding that antigay legislation and homophobia were negative responses to sexual minority visibility in Africa. The IGLHRC representative warned that a “direct push to file” a claim with the African Commission might not be the best approach because it could spawn a worse backlash in countries like Cameroon where police had arrested, detained, and convicted several alleged gay men and lesbians of sodomy, a punishable legal offense, a few months earlier. An IGLHRC representative also reminded participants of the prevalent perception in Africa that once LGBT issues showed up in the press, they would be on everyone’s radar, increasing the likelihood of a backlash against sexual minorities. While understanding the potential negative response that might accompany the increased public visibility of an LGBT activist contingent at the African Commission, some participants advocated filing LGBT human rights abuse complaints there, albeit with some parameters. Proposed parameters involved framing sexual and gender minority rights violations within a framework that commissioners would understand. For instance, a member of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe suggested that activists should frame sodomy laws and the death penalty as colonial laws. Southern African LGBT activists agreed that they wanted to encourage the African Commission to recommend that some African nations no longer punish sodomy or homosexuality with a death sentence. They were savvy in linking sodomy laws and the death penalty because they could introduce a hot-button issue, the decriminalization of sodomy, through a more benign issue, the elimination of the death penalty. In addition, by casting sodomy and the death penalty as left over from colonialism, southern African LGBT activists hoped to capitalize on commissioners’ preference for decolonizing legal statutes. By packaging the potentially contentious issue of decriminalizing sodomy with a commonly understood human rights violation, the death penalty, southern African LGBT activists intended to present an image of an African LGBT movement as not making waves and as working within a preexisting African political framework.

A concern related to the packaging of LGBT rights abuse complaints was preparing audiences for the complaint and which audiences at the African Commission might be the most sympathetic. Staff members from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and TRP knew about the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) rejection of the International Lesbian
and Gay Association’s application in January 2006 for consultative status on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender issues without a hearing “[f]or the first time in [ECOSOC’s] history” (ILGA 2006a). A European LGBT activist living in Zimbabwe suggested the Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) Forum as a safe place to announce the African LGBT movement’s presence and to facilitate networking with interested and sympathetic human rights NGOs. At the NGO Forum, many African and international organizations “discuss particular themes which are then usually presented in a number of resolutions to the Commission, some of which it goes on to adopt in its own forum” (Murray and Viljoen 2007:110).

The NGO Forum could be an important sounding board for the African Commission because it responded more positively to complaints and resolutions that appeared first before the NGO Forum (Murray and Viljoen 2007:110). An IGLHRC representative warned against springing LGBT human rights resolutions on unsuspecting NGOs or the African Commission because the global LGBT movement “got killed in Geneva” when a Brazilian contingent advanced a resolution at the United Nations without consulting other organizations. She suggested strategically inserting references to sexual minorities on mainstream issues that affected many people; she noted that IGLHRC succeeded in getting language about sexual minorities and orientation included in torture legislation because “no one wants to say, ‘It’s okay to torture gays.’” Reminding African activists of IGLHRC’s successes and experience might have encouraged participants to suggest mainstreaming LGBT issues by interjecting them into other discussions at the NGO Forum, such as those about torture and illegal detention, and gauging the response. The group of southern African LGBT activists deliberated how to infiltrate and participate in the NGO Forum. A Sister Namibia staff member advocated approaching feminist NGOs that had prior experience working with the African Commission. Southern African LGBT activists also concurred that those who went to Banjul, The Gambia, to attend the African Commission’s meeting should resist the temptation to dominate discussions by portraying LGBT issues as more dire than other situations. For instance, a member of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe warned against exaggerating LGBT human rights abuses not only because the African LGBT movement could be discredited as too self-important, but also because hyperbolized LGBT rights abuses could enable the African Commission to set aside serious, widespread human rights violations in places like Darfur, Sudan, in favor of addressing
LGBT rights abuses first. The Zimbabwean activist acknowledged that some human rights abuses were just as pressing, if not more so, than LGBT rights violations.

The strategic choices that southern African LGBT activists made at the March meeting resulted in moderate success. When the contingent of LGBT activists from throughout Africa attended the African Commission’s meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006, they liaised with a Nigerian human rights NGO. The NGO allowed a member of the contingent, a Cameroonian lesbian woman who had obtained asylum in the United States, to take its first “speaking slot and address the case of illegally detained and imprisoned gay men and lesbians in Cameroon” (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2006). According to a Sister Namibia staff member who was part of the African LGBT activist contingent, commissioners “‘perked up’ when [the Cameroonian lesbian woman] addressed the plight of gays and lesbians, perhaps because it was the first time someone from an LGBT organization had addressed the African Commission or because LGBT issues titillated the commissioners” (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2006). Staff members from Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project regarded their trip to the African Commission as successful because no one refused to grant them access to the NGO Forum or to the African Commission, and they forged ties with Nigerian and other African feminist and human rights organizations. In a sense, they packaged the pan-African LGBT movement’s concerns about LGBT rights violations in a way that fit preexisting discussions about human rights. Careful deliberation about which strategic choices to make regarding how to present a pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resulted in success for activists’ first foray into this venue, in the opinion of Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project staff members.

6.3 THE DILEMMA OF INCLUDING TRANSGENDERED ACTIVISTS IN A PAN-AFRICAN LGBT MOVEMENT

A strategic dilemma that emerged during the discussion about how to present a pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission involved whether to include transgender activists in the contingent. On the one hand, including transgender activists would be consistent with some Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ efforts to
overturn exclusionary apartheid policies and to represent the interests of marginalized sexual and gender minorities. On the other hand, commissioners and representatives of African NGOs might become confused by the presence of transgender activists alongside gay, lesbian, and bisexual activists and concentrate on the difference of transgender activists, instead of the merits of LGBT rights abuse claims.

Participants initially disagreed about the level and type of visibility activists should have at the African Commission meeting. Such disagreements demonstrated the lack of consensus about what a pan-African LGBT movement should look like. They drew on their knowledge of sexual and gender minority organizing throughout the continent to explain possible restrictions on organizing. Everyone agreed on an equal representation of men and women and a black African majority, which would help the contingent to debunk the myth that only whites were lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. A European LGBT activist living in Zimbabwe suggested that the contingent should not include transgender individuals because their presence might unnerve conservative African leaders and attract unwanted negative attention to LGBT issues. He argued that it would be more strategic to introduce issues and activists whom commissioners would understand, namely gay and lesbian activists. He worried that including transgender activists and issues on the first time LGBT activists approached the African Commission would derail their efforts to address LGBT human rights abuses because African officials would concentrate on trying to understand what being transgender means or disparage transgender individuals because they did not understand them. An IGLHRC representative contextualized the European activist’s concern by acknowledging that transgender activism was not as mainstreamed with African sexual minority activism, as it had been in Thailand, Malaysia, and Argentina, but disagreed with him about delaying the inclusion of transgender activists. Other southern African LGBT activists also demurred and stated they would invite transgender activists if they could identify individuals willing to participate publicly as transgender persons. Southern African LGBT activists’ unity was indicative of their reputation for being inclusionary by using criteria that international human rights and LGBT organizations favored. Overall, African activists agreed on a policy of inclusion to ensure that the African LGBT activist contingent to the African Commission represented the diversity of the LGBT movement on the continent and decided to include transgender activists in the contingent.
The dilemma of whether and how to include transgender activists in the African LGBT contingent—or how to present the African LGBT movement—dovetailed with another strategic dilemma: how to deal with the growing perception that South Africa’s political progressiveness in terms of protecting sexual minority rights and affording same-gender couples the right to marry was a threat to state officials in African nations who favored a more conservative social and political agenda. For instance, Nigerian lawmakers interpreted the presence of African LGBT activists at an AIDS conference in Abuja and South Africa’s marriage equality laws as threats. A Namibian LGBT activist asserted that it was not just South African LGBT activism that alienated antigay opponents in West and East Africa, but also the visibility of southern African LGBT activists from Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s. According to a TRP staff member, opponents had “the idea that we’re importing it [homosexuality] from southern Africa all of a sudden because that's the new argument that we're hearing more and more (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). In this sense, antigay opponents regard southern African LGBT activists as a front for Northern dominance, due in part to their reliance on Northern donor funding, as I elucidated above. The visibility of Namibian, South African, and Zimbabwean LGBT social movement organizational staff as leaders of a budding African LGBT movement could pose problems for its development, if suspicion about southern African activists’ dominance persisted among African LGBT activists and antigay opponents.

Once again, I turn to the dilemma of public presentation that LGBT activists faced in proving that homosexuality was African through a pan-African LGBT movement. It seems difficult to speak of a unified pan-African LGBT movement, which was in its infancy, when the movements in Namibia and South Africa developed so differently around incorporating and understanding transgender persons, rights, and issues. For instance, southern African LGBT activists did not discuss bringing transgender rights violations to the attention of the African Commission. This may have been due to a lack of clarity about what transgender rights and issues were in the pan-African LGBT movement and within individual African nations. Differences in LGBT movement development across African nations underscore the dilemma of including identities, rights, and issues that Namibians, South Africans, and Africans in other countries have not claimed and forging a unified African LGBT movement. How can the pan-African LGBT movement represent transgender identities, rights, and issues when some
movements have not clearly defined or organized around them, and others have incorporated transgender rights and issues? How can movements that unfold differently unify under an umbrella of a pan-African LGBT movement?

6.3.1 Incorporating the “T” with the “LGB” in Namibia and South Africa

Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations strove to be inclusionary in the wake of exclusionary apartheid policies and laws, but differed in their handling of and timing in integrating transgender rights and issues. Staff at Behind the Mask and TRP recognized the hurdles they faced in including and representing bisexual and transgender members. It makes sense to compare the delay in including bisexual and transgender persons and concerns in Namibian and South African LGBT organizations because, according to one critic, contemporary activists still have “a long way to go in terms of inserting the B [bisexual] and T [transgender] into the G&L [gay and lesbian] discourse, and thus officially beginning to recognise sexual preference beyond . . . homo and hetero” (Muthien 2005:56). Thus, there have been slippages in Namibian and South African LGBT movement organizations and their structures, related to the gradual introduction of bisexual and transgender persons, rights, and issues.

In the mid-twentieth century and beyond, gay and lesbian identities gained traction among South African sexual and gender minorities both as social and collective political identities. Much discourse about sexual minority organizing in South Africa before the late 1980s only referred to gay and lesbian activism. In contrast, bisexual persons, rights, and identities historically were invisible in South African society and within sexual and gender minority organizing. Few black, coloured, and white bisexuals publicly claimed a bisexual identity probably because they were married, and “heterosexual marriage and procreation are strongly enforced social obligations” (Stobie 2003:45). Married men and women who engaged in same-sex sexual practices were unlikely to advance bisexual interests publicly because they had not publicly embraced their bisexuality.

Another reason for the invisibility of bisexual persons in South Africa was the polarization of homosexuality and heterosexuality. Some activists and researchers perpetuated this dichotomy by claiming African men and women who had sexual and romantic relationships
with members of the same and opposite gender as gay men and lesbians, instead of treating them as bisexual persons (Stobie 2003, see also Kendall 1999). One was either homosexual or heterosexual, making bisexuality an impossible personal or collective identity to realize. Thus, bisexual persons found themselves rejected by gay, lesbian, and heterosexual persons and communities. A South African bisexual woman explained that gay men and lesbians did not trust bisexuals. “Sometimes we are seen as sitting on the fence and enjoying the best of both worlds; usually we are seen as being unable to come out of the closet” (Sam 1995:191). As a result, “[m]ost lesbian and gay organisations [didn’t] really cater for bisexuals” or transgender persons (Sam 1995:191).

In the 1980s, most South African gay social movement organizations concentrated only on gay or lesbian issues. Later in the 1980s, a few gay and lesbian SMOs incorporated bisexual concerns. By the mid-1990s, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality had publicly integrated transgender persons, rights, and issues into its claim to represent the interests of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. With the notable exception of the Forum for the Empowerment for Women (FEW), most South African social movement organizations include bisexual and transgender in their descriptions. Recently transgender organizing took off in South Africa. A transgender SMO called Gender DynamiX, based in Cape Town, worked with South African LGBT social movement organizations on incorporating transgender issues and interests into their work. Unlike South African LGBT organizations, The Rainbow Project (TRP) in Namibia included transgender rights and issues in its goal-setting process from its start in 1997. In its constitution, TRP described itself as mobilizing around “equal rights and opportunities for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals and any other group that suffers discrimination in public life and under law.” Later, TRP substituted “transgender” for “transsexual” in its self-description.

Transgender persons were not always invisible in South Africa and Namibia, when they constituted the same country. The apartheid regime offered a few perquisites for gender minorities, specifically for transsexual persons, which are unavailable today (Swarr 2003). Black, white, and coloured transsexual persons could undergo sex reassignment surgery and
could legally change their identity documents to reflect their altered gender under apartheid (Swarr 2003). 

Poor South Africans (most often those who were coloured or black, as a result of apartheid’s linked racial and economic policies) were increasingly given access to free sex reassignment procedures. . . . Such procedures had contradictory causes and effects; . . . they legitimized gender binaries by shaping South Africans’ bodies to fit them, and . . . they allowed the advancement of apartheid medical science with little regard to the suffering caused to transsexuals who had to live with the consequences of failed procedures (Swarr 2003:57-8).

Apartheid authorities believed that performing such surgeries restored gender balance to society and social institutions, such as the military, which enforced the regime’s policies and laws. As such, transsexuals could obtain sex reassignment surgeries at no financial cost to themselves, though as Amanda Lock Swarr (2003) explains, there could be severe physical and psychological consequences from botched procedures. The state also used sex reassignment surgeries as means of oppression to “correct” gay men and lesbians’ sexualities by changing their genders. Activists affiliated with the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project unearthed evidence that South African Defence Force (SADF) doctors performed sex reassignment surgeries against the will of at least 900 gay and lesbian military personnel; SADF intended such surgeries to correct recruits’ sexual anomalies by altering their gender (van Zyl et al. 1999). The goal of the Equality Project’s research was to uncover evidence of human rights abuses against LGBT persons so that South Africans in a post-apartheid era could ensure that such abuses and intolerance were eliminated.

While sexual minorities were able to obtain legal protection and additional rights after discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was banned in the Constitution, gender minorities languished for a few years in South Africa because “transsexuals . . . had no activist presence in South Africa” (Swarr 2003:68). It was “impossible to change one’s sex legally” for a few years until 2003 (Swarr 2003:42). With the passage of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 in May 2003, individuals who underwent sex reassignment surgery could modify their identity documents to reflect their accurate gender identity (Dirsuweit 2006:336). Transgender and intersexed persons could thus register their gender changes with the state. But “apart from the odd support group for transgender people, there is very little by way of active

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73 Following Amanda Lock Swarr (2003:43-4), I use the term “sex reassignment surgery.” Swarr (2003) uses it because South African transsexuals and medical personnel favor it, but acknowledges the incongruity of the term because it “supposes that such surgeries bring bodies into alignment with a person’s gender, i.e. that the body has developed incorrectly and sex must be ‘reassigned’” (pp. 43-4).
organisation around these communities. Within the LGBTI community, these . . . identities are abjected by those who see themselves as the normal majority” (Dirsuweit 2006:336-7). Nevertheless, transgender persons, rights, and identities have a history in South Africa and Namibia, when the latter was still part of the former.

6.3.2 Representing Transgender Persons, Rights, and Issues Now

Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff recognized that the low representation of transgender (and bisexual) activists, leaders, and issues was a strategic dilemma for their LGBT movements (Muthien 2005:56). How could these organizations make claims on behalf of persons who did not exist in their countries? In March 2006, at a Joint Working Group meeting, representatives from leading South African LGBT social movement organizations pledged to recruit more transgender (and bisexual) persons as members and activists. A representative from the new Joint Working Group member organization, Gender DynamiX, volunteered to guide the umbrella group through this process (www.genderdynamix.co.za, accessed 26 April 2007). In Namibia, The Rainbow Project (TRP) decided to pursue public education about gender and sexual identities through workshops for members and a weekly radio show, “Talking Pink.” TRP staff acknowledged that few members and Namibians knew what it meant to bisexual or transgender.

On one episode of “Talking Pink” that took place one week after a discussion about bisexuality, a pre-operative male-to-female transgender person named Noël called TRP and volunteered to participate in an interview with the host and an invited “expert”—TRP’s director—about her gender.74 TRP’s director recognized how little Namibians understood about gender and sexuality, which was evident in the radio program host’s commentary about what it might mean to be transgender.

Host: [S]he's [Noël] not comfortable in terms of explaining herself [her gender and sexuality] to people. How do you see that? The term gay is more commonly used; it's more commonly understood. So what is your point of view on that?

TRP director: I think that only now are people really beginning to understand the issue of being gay. As we know, there's a lot less tolerance towards bisexual

74 I use a pseudonym for the guest on “Talking Pink” in keeping with the principle of confidentiality and anonymity I used with interview participants.
people. And at the moment there's no understanding of transgender issues at all. And I can imagine what an incredibly difficult time it must be explaining to people what it means to be transgender.

The TRP director acknowledged that few Namibians, even members of The Rainbow Project, really understood the meanings attached to being gay. Within the last few years, gay men and lesbians felt comfortable and safe enough to come out publicly as homosexual and talk openly about their lives on “Talking Pink” and in Namibian print, electronic, and televisual media. However, bisexual and transgender persons were invisible to the general Namibian public. The director suggested that being visible equated to being understood; if Namibians could see and talk to individuals who identified as gay or lesbian, they could understand their experiences. Yet this was not the case for bisexual and transgender persons, whose gender and sexuality did not correspond to a dichotomy of homosexuality-heterosexuality, which Namibians were beginning to understand and tolerate, in the opinion of TRP’s director. A person who visibly deviated from dichotomous gender and sexual categories was at risk for violence.

Research has shown that transgender people, of all the sexual minorities, experience the most violence from outside towards them and that an incredible eighty percent of violence that transgender people face come from families of people that are close to them. So those are just shocking figures. And you know, with the odds stacked against you like that, who would you want to share the fact with that you are transgender?

TRP’s director acknowledged that transgender persons might not identify publicly as transgender in light of the potential for violent responses from strangers and their families. Some families employed violence as a means of social control to coerce transgender persons to adhere to gendered social norms and familial expectations about individuals marrying persons of the opposite gender and having children (Aarmo 1999). The director continued to interrogate dichotomous sexual and gender identity categories and asserted,

I think that more people should be confused about their sexuality, including heterosexual people. There's no such thing as a neat little box in which you fit as a heterosexual person or I fit as a gay person or Noël fits as a transgender person. And so I'm really surprised that there aren't more people that [sic] would acknowledge the fact that they are confused . . . . So there's nothing wrong with being confused about your sexuality. I do think the old issue that bisexual or transgender people specifically are confused is completely nonsense. I do feel that bisexual and transgender people go through a much more difficult time coming to terms and identifying accurately what their sexuality is. But I think it has a lot to do with the fact that there is so little understanding of bisexuality and being transgender in our communities (Radio show, 3 July 2006).
The director acknowledged the relative newness of transgender and bisexuality as identity categories and experiences for Namibians. However, even though the director stated that it was “nonsense” to believe that bisexual and transgender persons were more “confused” than heterosexuals, gay men, or lesbians, bisexual and transgender persons might experience trouble expressing their gender and sexual identities to other Namibians who only understood gender and sexuality in a dichotomous framework. In light of this difficulty, The Rainbow Project decided to educate Namibians and members of the Namibian LGBT community about bisexuality and transgender identities. But TRP did not clearly articulate what transgender (or bisexual) rights and issues are. For instance, it is evident from the director’s statements that violence intended to punish gender nonconformity was a serious issue facing Namibian sexual and gender minorities, but TRP did not explicitly frame it as a transgender rights violation. Nevertheless, a detailed discussion about bisexual and transgender identities seems to be a first step for TRP in putting transgender identities, rights, and discourses into circulation.

Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations differ in how and when they included and addressed transgender rights, issues, and persons. TRP did not offer a clear definition for “transgender.” In contrast, a South African transgender social movement organization, Gender Dynamix, defined transgender as “the sense of self [that] is in conflict with the gender assigned to a person at birth, and its corresponding stereotypical role.” The organization also recognized that transgender could be an umbrella term for different identities, such as “transsexual, cross-dressing, transvestite, consciously androgynous people, people who are genderqueer, people who live cross-gender, gender blenders, butch women, effeminate men, drag kings, and drag queens” (www.genderdynamix.co.za/content/view/24/115/, accessed 26 April 2007, emphasis removed). Discussions about how to obtain rights for and represent transgender persons are ongoing in South Africa, but they are just starting in Namibia. Yet, in their discussions about how to participate as a pan-African LGBT movement at the African Commission, Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff did not discuss what they meant by transgender. How will a pan-African LGBT movement handle such discussions and take into account how LGBT movements unfold differently with respect to transgender issues?
6.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Publicly presenting a pan-African LGBT movement constituted a strategic dilemma for the Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied. They consistently faced criticism from antigay opponents that homosexuality was unAfrican. Choosing to apply for and accept funding from non-African sources put LGBT SMOs, such as Behind the Mask and TRP, at risk for being perceived as unAfrican. The Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs I studied chose to seek and accept funding from Northern donors so that they could remain in operation, even though they risked being perceived as unAfrican. This dilemma exemplified how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations found themselves and a pan-African LGBT movement increasingly vulnerable to attack from antigay opponents.

Another dilemma that Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations encountered was how to present a pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, an African institutional political body. Leaders from Sister Namibia, TRP, and Behind the Mask joined other Zimbabwean and South African LGBT activists and representatives from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission in deliberating whether to view the African Commission as a political opportunity and then how to portray the pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission in terms of LGBT human rights violations to pursue, to which audiences to present the movement, and how to compose the pan-African LGBT activist contingent. This discussion led to the dilemma of whether to include transgender activists in the pan-African LGBT activist contingent, and Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders ultimately supported the idea of including transgender activists.

Yet how to portray a unified pan-African LGBT movement prompts lingering questions. First, there is the prickly question of what exactly is African about the LGBT movement. It is a substantive issue that antigay opponents, intentionally or unknowingly, raised when they charged that homosexuality was unAfrican. What is unAfrican about homosexuality? Opponents might argue sexual identity terminology—lesbian, gay, and bisexual—is unAfrican (Aarmo 1999; Hoad 2007; Mathuray 2000; Phillips 2001). Sister Namibia, TRP, Behind the Mask, and the Forum for the Empowerment of Women all participated in collecting narratives from individuals...
attracted to those of the same gender to demonstrate that some Africans are homosexual (see Morgan and Wieringa 2005). Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations affirmed that those who hailed from African nations and identified as a sexual or gender minority were indeed African. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations seemed to define “African” in terms of working within African countries and with native Africans who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, expressed their sexual attraction to members of the same gender, or articulated some form of gender nonconformity. Do these definitions correspond to how LGBT social movement organizations or activists in other African countries define “African”?

Another possible obstacle to creating and portraying a unified pan-African LGBT movement involves how the movement unfolds differently in various African countries. In particular, Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs incorporated and defined bisexual and transgender issues, persons, and identities differently, one indication that the LGBT movement developed differently in each country and possibly in other African countries. Sexual and gender minority identity categories may gain traction in some countries and not in others, just as some LGBT issues and rights may emerge as more important than others. Handling these social and political differences across African nations may prove difficult, as it did for activists discussing how to present a unified movement to the African Commission. Namibian, South African, and Zimbabwean LGBT activists agreed on the importance of portraying a unified pan-African LGBT movement that reflected the diversity and political positions of activists from different countries. Nevertheless, they may eventually face opposition within the movement as it recruits more activists from throughout Africa whose agendas and identities diverge from those of southern African LGBT social movement organizations.

A backlash against South Africa’s political position and southern African nations’ economic growth that is starting to ripple throughout the continent may impact a budding pan-African LGBT movement. In particular, opposition to southern African LGBT activists’ hegemony is mirrored in complaints that southern African LGBT activists are exporting homosexuality and LGBT organizing to different African nations (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). Behind this antagonism is a negative reaction to the introduction of foreign political and social influence, even if it comes from another African source, what Francis B. Nyamnjoh (2006) labels xenophobia. Antigay opponents have grown wary of South Africa’s
political dominance and neoliberal democratic agenda, exemplified by the state’s support of sexual and gender minority rights. For instance, Nigerian lawmakers cited South Africa’s embrace of LGBT rights as negative social and political development.

A pan-African LGBT movement will likely not be immune to sociopolitical shifts and negative reactions from antigay opponents to South Africa’s reputation as a budding neoliberal democracy. To ensure that the pan-African LGBT movement does not alienate future allies, southern African LGBT social movement organizations may find themselves having to relinquish control of the movement. Namibian, South African, and Zimbabwean LGBT social movement organizations may find themselves having to retreat to a position of lesser public visibility in the pan-African LGBT movement, in order to prevent the emergence of an African anti-LGBT counter-movement and to preserve gains that the pan-African LGBT movement may make with political institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This may constitute a long-term strategic dilemma of deciding how to portray a pan-African LGBT movement in a shifting external sociopolitical environment.
7.0 REVIS(IBILITY)ING LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

7.1 THE ANALYTIC UTILITY OF STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

Analyzing Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ (SMOs) strategies of visibility and invisibility from a strategic dilemma approach afforded me the flexibility of tracing how decision making and deliberation within SMOs about becoming visible or invisible to certain audiences or constituencies unfolded (Jasper 2004, 2006). This analytic approach kept me from treating visibility and invisibility as unchanging qualities of SMOs. My use of strategic dilemmas advances social movement theorizing by demonstrating how changes in SMOs’ public visibility and invisibility can reveal how and when SMOs miss or forgo political opportunities, how they deal with state repression, and how they respond to changes in the external sociopolitical environment.

In addition, my use of a strategic dilemma approach helps me to question the universality of visibility as a necessarily desirable quality of and outcome for LGBT social movement organizations. LGBT social movement organizations in the global South may not want to be visible because in a repressive sociopolitical environment, they might be vulnerable to attack by the state (Earl 2003). Sister Namibia encountered the strategic dilemma of whether or not to embrace its unofficial identity as a “lesbian organization.” Accepting this identity put the organization at risk for negative state sanctions, as exemplified in the state’s refusal to extend funding to Sister Namibia and state officials withdrawing their support for the Namibian Women’s Manifesto and 50/50 Campaign. Moreover, being visible to certain audiences at all times could be taxing on SMO staff and members. The Rainbow Project (TRP) faced this strategic dilemma in the guise of whether to provide social services to members in need; TRP staff were overwhelmed by the volume of requests for services, as members demanded unfettered access to the organization. The SMO was too available and too transparent to
members who flooded the organization with requests. Therefore, TRP decided to discontinue social services for members and to transform its organizational structure. The change in organizational structure disappointed some members, especially those who lived outside of Windhoek, because staff members did not frequently update members, as they had in the past. A TRP member from Swakopmund, a Namibian town on the Atlantic Ocean, stated, “We don't even know what the social events are they are doing there in Windhoek. We don't know anything. We don't even know the members. We don't even know who's working there” (Interview, 19 May 2006). In these ways, issues of visibility and invisibility often involve strategic dilemmas for SMO.

7.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation makes several scholarly contributions to social movement, postcolonial feminist, and queer theorizing.

7.2.1 Contributions to Social Movement Theorizing

First, I regard visibility and invisibility as social movement organizational dynamics worthy of further study. Widely accepted definitions of social movements state that organized collective action must be sustained and visible over time (Tilly 1978). Such a definition places a premium on the publicity of political organizing, yet treats it as an unquestioned assumption. Indeed, few studies interrogate how social movement organizations (SMOs) become publicly visible or withdraw from public view into invisibility. As I argue, an SMO’s visibility or invisibility involves strategizing and deliberation. For instance, Sister Namibia decided to respond publicly to Namibian state leaders’ homophobic comments to demonstrate that some Namibians would not accept such intolerance; their visibility was calculated and specific to state leaders’ homophobic remarks. TRP’s invisibility in not pursuing the decriminalization of

75 Exceptions are those studies that examine the decline or abeyance of social movements and/or SMOs and how SMOs take advantage of discursive opportunities in the media (Bagguley 2002; Borland 2004b; Guidry 2003; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989).
sodomy indicates staff and members’ internal discussions about whether such litigation would provoke hostility from the Namibian state; the SMO’s invisibility also resulted from staff and members’ internal debates about providing social services to members.

Second, my research demonstrates that when social movement organizations are invisible in moments of political opportunity, it does not necessarily mean that they are floundering. SMO invisibility may be a sign that an SMO is forgoing a political opportunity. Social movement organizations may withdraw from public visibility and intentionally forgo political opportunities while they deliberate whether to take advantage of them. For instance, South African LGBT SMOs withdrew from public visibility with respect to the same-sex marriage win first to weigh how they could fill in for the defunct Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, which had overseen the same-sex marriage campaign. They deferred becoming involved in the campaign for a few months while they defused a tense situation involving the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claim that dozens of gay men who did not know their HIV status donated blood at South African National Blood Service centers to protest a ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men. Careful dissection of such missed or forgone opportunities—when researchers can reasonably expect SMOs to take advantage of a political opportunity—can illuminate whether SMOs are in decline or have withdrawn in order to regroup and plan their next step.

Third, my research casts light on LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa, which social movement scholars have hitherto overlooked. Using a comparative case study approach, I demonstrate how state responsiveness in South Africa to LGBT organizing facilitated the visibility of LGBT organizing, whereas state hostility in Namibia to LGBT organizing caused LGBT social movement organizations to consider their visibility to audiences carefully. I have shown how LGBT SMOs in two countries that shared a common sociopolitical history varied in their handling of strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility. As I explicated in Chapter 6, LGBT organizing continues to emerge in countries throughout Africa, including Kenya and Uganda, providing social movement researchers an excellent opportunity to consider the growth of a new social movement outside the global North. In such rapidly democratizing nations, scholars may witness an increase in the number of movements of disenfranchised citizens organizing to take advantage of available political opportunities.

7.2.2 Contributions to Postcolonial Feminist Theorizing

Though I have consciously avoided using the rhetoric of citizenship in my analysis of how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations handled strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility, LGBT organizing in these countries is an example of a citizenship movement. A “citizenship movement” like the LGBT movement makes demands for full political and social inclusion on behalf of a constituency, such as sexual and gender minorities (Jasper 1997:7). My focus on how Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs navigate how and when they are visible or invisible to state appendages advances postcolonial feminist theorizing, which places urgency on understanding and challenging how the state regulates the bodies and pleasures of women and sexual and gender dissidents (Alexander 2005; Kim-Puri 2005).

Postcolonial feminist theorizing has prioritized understanding how nationalist and anticolonial movements utilize women’s rights and feminism to advance their causes, only to end up silencing women in liberated nations (McClintock 1995). I documented a similar trend with respect to Namibian state leaders’ attempts to silence organized sexual and gender minorities by claiming that homosexuality is unAfrican. I demonstrate how state repression could derail LGBT SMOs’ plans, forcing them into invisibility. Members of TRP deferred demanding their legal rights as Namibian citizens in light of state leaders’ homophobic statements in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this manner, TRP, and by extension, LGBT persons, were sacrificed in favor of decolonization. State leaders who belonged to the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) hewed to the position that homosexuality was unAfrican and that eliminating homosexuality was a necessary step in decolonizing Namibia. This situation differed from that of South Africa when supporters of “gay and lesbian rights reject[ed] their exclusion from the new South Africa by a cultural-nationalist solution to colonialism” (Spruill 2001:5). TRP members agreed that overturning the sodomy law and initiating a legal campaign for sexual and gender minority rights could generate hostilities for TRP and the movement unless more human rights organizations articulated support for LGBT rights. Thus, the organization decided to shift its attention to styling itself as a human rights organization and strengthening bonds with Namibian human rights organizations. As long as SWAPO retains control of the Namibian state, TRP will likely tailor its strategies to suit the ruling political party.
In addition, I show how sexuality can be an instrument “used to attack women’s organizing” in postcolonial African countries such as Namibia (Rothschild 2005:1). Sister Namibia braved antigay opposition and embraced its unofficial reputation as a lesbian organization by including lesbian rights in its women’s political empowerment and rights campaign in 1999. However, state and SWAPO leaders tried to discredit the organization’s campaign by attributing more grandiose plans to Sister Namibia, such as obtaining the right for same-gender couples to marry. Despite such obstacles, Sister Namibia embraced its controversial reputation for its feminist organizing and as a lesbian SMO and continued to obtain media coverage. The experiences of Sister Namibia and TRP stand in stark contrast to the ability of South African LGBT SMOs to protect sexual and gender minority rights. However, these experiences may be helpful for sexual and gender minorities in other African nations in which leaders link a ban on homosexuality to decolonization. How Sister Namibia and TRP handled these impediments may provide LGBT activists in places such as Nigeria, Cameroon, and Uganda possible templates for action or inaction.

7.2.3 Contributions to Queer Theorizing

Social movement scholars recently have turned to queer theorizing for resources on how to understand mobilizing around shifting collective and sexual identities (Bernstein 2005; Gamson 1995; Rupp and Taylor 2003). According to Mary Bernstein (2005), “queer politics was . . . the antithesis of identity politics: a theory and a politics with which to transcend group categories and to bring diverse groups of marginalized people together under one umbrella” (p. 56). In this way, queer theorists encourage activists and scholars to imagine ways to destabilize and decenter sexual and gender identity categories (Berlant and Warner 1998). I borrow this notion of destabilization by concentrating on how power shifts and how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations opt to participate or withdraw from power struggles (Foucault 1978). Instead of examining how these SMOs define and mobilize sexual and gender identity categories, I focus on the strategic actions and choices of Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs. Thus, my analysis does not freeze SMOs’ use of sexual identity categories, but instead demonstrates how SMOs refine and shift such categories, rendering them more flexible. In my analysis, I have tried to demonstrate how some identities and categories
undergo modification through Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ actions and decisions, such as through the Forum for the Empowerment of Women’s delineation of black lesbian membership and the discussion of transgender identities on TRP’s radio show. Finally, my use of strategic dilemmas enables me to parse out how LGBT SMO staff and members perceive power shifts and whether or not they can optimize them.

Just as I have avoided crystallizing sexual and identity categories in Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ work, I have also tried not to ascribe political strategies to organizations simply because of their geographic location or relationship with a receptive or hostile state. I eschewed using preexisting categories of LGBT organizing strategies in the hope that grounding my data collection and analysis in the everyday political realities of Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations would allow me to understand the strategic dilemmas that SMOs faced in all of their complexity. For instance, I did not use the trope of “coming out” in this dissertation, unless Namibian or South African LGBT SMO staff or members mentioned it to me. Some scholars assert that “coming out” can be an important political strategy for LGBT persons in the global South (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). Coming out tends to refer to the self-disclosure of one’s non-normative sexual and/or gender identity to a target audience (Cage 2003). Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2002) blur the distinction between individuals coming out and the formation of LGBT social movement organizations. In other words, they conflate individuals coming out with the establishment of SMOs. I do not disagree that coming out as a strategy has gained in popularity around the world or that it differs in implementation, frequency, and quality in local arenas (Bacchetta 2002; Manalansan 1997). However, a rise in the number of LGBT social movement organizations does not necessarily mean that more LGBT persons have come out publicly. LGBT social movement organizations may be “out” even before many individuals are. TRP staff and members acknowledged that the organization was a beacon for closeted Namibian LGBT persons. The organization’s existence emboldened LGBT persons, especially young people, to disclose their non-normative sexual and gender identities to their families. Future research could elucidate how, when, and why LGBT social movement organizations favor or shun coming out as a strategy.

LGBT social movement organizations do not even have to be populated by sexual and gender minorities; they merely have to claim to represent them. As my research shows, LGBT social movement organizations are cropping up in East Africa, but some do not actually
represent LGBT persons. Those who claimed to lead these potentially fraudulent LGBT organizations did so because it was lucrative. They knew Northern donors wanted to support democratic growth and human rights throughout the continent. Northern donors’ interest in financing LGBT organizing and Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders’ mentoring of lone LGBT activists in East Africa may indicate a pattern of establishing LGBT social movement organizations before LGBT persons have emerged to organize themselves.

What is different about the pattern of Northern donors’ financial support of fledgling organizations and Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs leaders’ advising of LGBT activists is that they are encouraging East African activists to build organizations very quickly, even if they lack LGBT persons to support the organization. These actors hope to imbue East African LGBT organizing with a sense of permanence that antigay opponents cannot erase. In other words, the combined work of Northern donors and Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders may result in LGBT organizations being out before many individuals in East Africa are. Creating LGBT organizations for persons who have not yet (and who may not ever) claim these collective identities demonstrates how manipulable sexual and gender identity categories are, a key contribution of queer theorizing. This is also an example of how African LGBT organizing does not follow the patterns of sexual and gender minority organizing in the North or elsewhere in the global South.

7.3 TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF NAMIBIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa has been fraught with success and failure, much like LGBT organizing in countries in the global North and South. Future research could trace the origins of contemporary LGBT social movement organizational forms and compare them with LGBT organizing in the global North (Armstrong 2002). Subsequent research could also investigate the influence that South African, Namibian, and Zimbabwean LGBT organizing has had throughout Africa and map out resistances to southern African hegemony with respect to LGBT organizing on the continent. Such research could illuminate the geopolitical dimensions and limitations to organizing around sexual and gender minority rights. In particular, cultural and
national differences between African nations may impede African LGBT organizing, especially if African LGBT activists contest southern Africans’ dominance of LGBT organizing on the continent. Social movement theorizing could be greatly enriched by considering the complexity of organizing, especially around LGBT rights, in countries in the global South. To demonstrate the importance of decentering social movements in the global North as normative referents in social movement analysis, I chose to study how LGBT social movement organizations negotiated strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility in Namibia and South to show that SMOs fighting for similar rights converge and diverge in how they handle such dilemmas.

Future research projects on southern African LGBT organizing will likely have a transnational and/or comparative slant to them in recognition of the increasingly transnational quality of LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa. The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied attained international visibility with Northern donors and international human rights organizations through their local work in advancing the rights of LGBT persons. For instance, Sister Namibia was recognized in 1997 by the International Gay and Lesbian Human Right Commission for standing up to former Namibian President Sam Nujoma’s homophobic statements. Western European LGBT and antiapartheid activists similarly pressured the African National Congress (ANC) to support sexual minority rights as ANC officials pioneered the direction of the new post-apartheid South Africa (Croucher 2002; Gevisser 1995). However, I did not situate these SMOs in a global LGBT movement because such an endeavor exceeded my data collection capacity, though this is a promising avenue for future research.

Approaching research on LGBT organizing in the global South with some caution is wise. Postcolonial feminist and queer scholars have been attentive to how the global South is still a laboratory for some Northern scholars interested in testing the universality of sexual and gender identity categories (Alexander 2004; Binnie 2004; Mohanty 2003; Hoad 2007). Along these lines, some queer studies scholars have raised questions about the international attention paid to LGBT rights and the repression of sexual and gender minorities in countries in the global South. Though Neville Hoad (2000) admires what groups such as IGLHRC have accomplished in prosecuting LGBT rights violations, he expresses concern about how they engage in these campaigns because “they have an interest in making conditions look as bad as possible in other
countries” (p. 153, see also Bacchetta 2002). In this way, international human rights organizations like IGLHRC may be (unwittingly) complicit in universalizing the experiences of LGBT persons in the global South as victims. Some queer studies scholars argue that ethnocentrism underlies international human rights organizations and some lesbian and gay studies scholars’ focus on LGBT persons in repressive countries in the global South (Binnie 2004:76). Jon Binnie (2004) contends that ethnocentric, normative assessments accompany international NGOs and Northern LGBT activists’ interest in liberating LGBT persons in countries like Namibia and Uganda. “The logic goes something like this: you are less developed than us because you treat your gays badly. . . . [W]e are more civilized than you because we give more rights to lesbians and gay men” (Binnie 2004:76). I share these scholars’ concerns about reducing the experiences of LGBT persons in Namibia and South Africa to victimization and reproducing ethnocentric, normative judgments in my analyses (Binnie 2004; Hoad 2007). My interest in examining how LGBT social movement organizations navigated strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility stemmed from a commitment to demonstrating how staff and members of Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs were actively engaged in transforming the sociopolitical environments in which they operated and in which their constituencies lived.

I also wanted to debunk the “developmental narrative of lesbian and gay rights” (Binnie 2004:76). Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs did not cast the pursuit of LGBT rights as political, economic, or social development that would allow these countries, once they granted them to sexual and gender minorities, to be regarded as developed nations. Rather, they cast these rights as Namibian, South African, and ultimately, African, as demonstrated in southern African LGBT activists’ discussions about how to approach the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Though I do not offer an authoritative account of Namibian and South African LGBT organizing, I have demonstrated how scholars can study LGBT organizing in the global South and interrogate assumptions about social movement visibility and the political “development” of nations with respect to sexual and gender minority rights.
APPENDIX A

OBSERVATIONAL TEMPLATE

Date of Observation
Group Name
1. What is the SMO’s atmosphere like today (office, other location)? How do staff, volunteers, and visitors interact? Are there any visitors?
2. How are external groups such Northern donors discussed?)
3. How do SMO staff, volunteers, and visitors discuss target audiences, such as the state, media, sexual and gender minority community, or other LGBT SMOs?
4. What is the SMO’s publicity efforts like?
5. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors discuss withdrawing from or their ambivalence about an audience, constituency, or campaign (if they do)?
6. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors talk about recruiting new members or staff (if they do)?
7. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors talk about the SMO’s website (if they do)?
8. What internal problems or disagreements (about publicity, visibility, invisibility, audience, constituency, or campaign) take place?
9. How are choices (specific or general) made?
10. What is your general impression about the SMO?
11. Does anything new or unexpected occur?
12. Does anything that you expected to occur not happen?
13. Did I learn anything new about the SMO today that I did not know?
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Script for interview: I am Ashley Currier, and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America. I am conducting a study of the gay and lesbian movement organizations in Johannesburg/Windhoek. I will be interviewing you about your history of activism (if applicable) and, particularly, your impressions of the movement in Johannesburg/Windhoek. The interview will take approximately one hour. Dr. Kathleen Blee, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America, is supervising my progress on this project.

B.1 DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

I noted respondents’ answers to the following questions by hand and did not record them digitally.

1. Date/Time of Interview:
2. Location of Interview:
3. How old are you?
4. How do you identify in terms of gender?
5. How do you identify in terms of race or ethnicity?
6. Could you describe your history of activism with this SMO? (Take notes on the respondent’s role in the organization, length of time with the organization, and type of activities performed with/for the organization.)

B.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

I recorded respondents’ answers to the following questions digitally. I asked additional questions so that respondents could clarify or expand on their answers.

1. How did the organization’s offices come to be located here? What are the advantages of this location? Disadvantages? Have members ever discussed moving the office to another location? What prompted the discussion? When did this discussion take place? (Probe for specific information: Could you give me an example of what you mean by disadvantage?)

2. Does the group hold events or meetings in other places? Why do they hold them in those places? How does the group go about securing the space? In the past, did the group hold events or meetings in different places? Why did the group stop using those places? (Probe for ties to other groups/organizations.)

3. Could you name some organizations with which your group works? What kind of work does your organization do with them? Why does your organization work with them? When did your group start working with these organizations? How has your group’s relationship with other groups change over time? When did these changes occur? (Probe for specific names of groups.)

4. Could you name organizations with which your group does not work? Did your organization work with them in the past? Why doesn’t it work with them anymore? Are there organizations with which your group will not work? Why not? (Probe for specific names of groups.)

5. Could you describe the organization’s purpose to someone who is not familiar with it? What services/activities does the organization offer? Did your group once offer services/activities that it has since discontinued? Why and when did the group discontinue these services/activities? (You could lead into visibility questions with the
following: If someone were looking for ________ services—name some from the organization—where would this person look? How would s/he know where to go?) What attracts people to your organization? Why do you think people go to these places? What specifically is it about the organization that makes people come back?

6. Could you describe the organization’s membership (racial/ethnic, class, age, gender, religious affiliation, where they live)? How did they find out about the group? Do members recruit others? Has the membership changed over time between 1995 and the present?

7. What audiences is your organization trying to reach? Why is your organization trying to reach them? How does your organization identify these audiences? How does your organization try to reach these audiences? When do you know if you’ve reached these audiences? Have you have “success” with your approach in reaching these audiences? Has the organization tried to reach other audiences in the past? How and when did your group try to establish this contact? (Probe for specific names of groups.)
   a. Has your organization tried to reach sexual minorities of different racial or ethnic backgrounds?
   b. Of different age groups?

8. What audiences does the organization try not to reach? Why does the organization try not to reach these audiences? Has the group ever been interested in these audiences? When was your group interested in these audiences? What led to your group’s disinterest in these audiences?

9. How would you describe your organization’s relationship with mainstream media? With black media? With white media? With movement-oriented media? With print media (newspapers)? With television media? With Internet media? Does the organization have a contact at ________ (name media source)? How did the organization develop this contact?

10. If the organization doesn’t seem to pursue media attention, ask: Why does the organization not have a relationship with the print/TV/Internet media?

11. Do you think that it is important for the organization to have contacts in the media? Why?

12. When does the organization contact the media? Are there times when the organization does not contact the media? Were there points in the organization’s past that it did not
maintain contact with the media? How did the organization avoid contact with the media? Why did the organization avoid contact with the media?

13. Are there times when the media contact the organization? What happens? (Probe for specific instances.) Have the media contacted the organization in the past? What happened when the media contacted the organization in the past?

14. Does your organization have a website? (If “yes,” ask questions a and b. If “no,” ask c and d.)
   a. Who designs the website? How did the organization come to decide on the design and content of the website? How long has the organization had a website?
   b. What does the organization use the website for? How often is it updated?
   c. Has the organization discussed having a website?
   d. Did the organization ever have a website? (If yes, ask: What led to the website’s dismantling?)
   e. What do you think prevents the organization from getting a website?

15. How do people come to learn about your organization? Does the organization actively promote itself in public?
   a. Where and how does the organization promote itself publicly?
   b. How does the organization identify venues for such promotion?
   c. What places does the organization not promote itself? Why doesn’t it pursue promotion there?
   d. Did the organization promote itself differently in the past? How did the organization promote itself in 1995? In 2000? Now?

16. Do you think that there is a link between the visibility of the organization and sexual minorities “coming out”?

17. What do you think it means for an organization to be visible? (Ask for specific example).

18. How important do you think it is for an organization to be visible? To whom should the organization be visible? What are the best ways for the organization to be visible? When should the organization be visible? How should it be visible?

19. How important do you think it is for an organization to be invisible?

20. What is the organization’s relationship to the sexual minority community? Is the organization known in the community? What is the organization known for in the
community? What does the organization do in the community? (Probe by asking for specific examples of relationships.)
APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

AARI All-Africa Rights Initiative
ABIGALE Association of Bisexuals, Gays, and Lesbians (South Africa)
ACHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AIDS Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ANC African National Congress (South Africa)
BTM Behind the Mask (South Africa)
CAL Coalition of African Lesbians
CoD Congress of Democrats (Namibia)
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
FEW Forum for the Empowerment of Women (South Africa)
GAIDE Gay Aid Identification Development and Enrichment Organisation (South Africa)
GALA Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa
GASA Gay Association of South Africa
GLA Gay and Lesbian Alliance (South Africa)
GLON Gay and Lesbian Organisation of Namibia
GLOW Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand (South Africa)
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
IGLHRC International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
ILGA International Lesbian and Gay Association
LAGO Lesbians and Gay Organisation (South Africa)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGEP</td>
<td>Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NANGOF</td>
<td>Namibian Nongovernmental Organisation Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCGLE</td>
<td>National Coalition Gay and Lesbian Equality (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>New social movement theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLGA</td>
<td>Organisation of Lesbians and Gays (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Political process theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGO</td>
<td>Rand Gay Organisation (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social movement organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation (Namibia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRP</td>
<td>The Rainbow Project (Namibia)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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