Sui, Yong
(2007)
THREE ESSAYS ON AUCTION THEORY AND CONTEST THEORY.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
In the first chapter, ¡°All-Pay Auctions with Resale¡±, I study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. I show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players' valuations and creates a signaling incentive for players. I characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale and provide sufficient conditions for existence of symmetric equilibria. Under those conditions I show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. The initial seller could benefit from publicly disclosing her private information which is affiliated with players' signals.Outcome in all-pay auctions is deterministic since the highest bidder wins the prize with probability one. However, many realistic contests have in-deterministic outcome and no player can guarantee winning the prize. The second chapter, ¡°Rent-Seeking Contest with Private Values and Resale¡±, studies rent-seeking contests with private values and resale possibilities. With an in-deterministic success function, the resulting possible inefficiency creates a motive for aftermarket trade. Players' valuations are endogenously determined when there is an opportunity of resale. I characterize symmetric equilibria. I assume that the winner has full bargaining power; however, the results extend to other resale mechanisms. I show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more wasted social resources since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities.In the third chapter, ¡°The Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Incomplete Information¡±, I study the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests with incomplete information. Sufficient conditions under which equilibria exist are provided for both finite-action and continuum-action cases. Using a two-bidder example, we derive some properties of equilibria and show a special case of revenue equivalence between contests with incomplete information and contests with complete information.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
|
| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
19 September 2007 |
| Date Type: |
Completion |
| Defense Date: |
10 May 2007 |
| Approval Date: |
19 September 2007 |
| Submission Date: |
9 July 2007 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
all-pay auctions; auctions; contests; incomplete information; resale |
| Other ID: |
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-07092007-224804/, etd-07092007-224804 |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2011 19:50 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 13:45 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8318 |
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