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Sui, Yong (2007) THREE ESSAYS ON AUCTION THEORY AND CONTEST THEORY. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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In the first chapter, ¡°All-Pay Auctions with Resale¡±, I study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. I show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players' valuations and creates a signaling incentive for players. I characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale and provide sufficient conditions for existence of symmetric equilibria. Under those conditions I show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. The initial seller could benefit from publicly disclosing her private information which is affiliated with players' signals.Outcome in all-pay auctions is deterministic since the highest bidder wins the prize with probability one. However, many realistic contests have in-deterministic outcome and no player can guarantee winning the prize. The second chapter, ¡°Rent-Seeking Contest with Private Values and Resale¡±, studies rent-seeking contests with private values and resale possibilities. With an in-deterministic success function, the resulting possible inefficiency creates a motive for aftermarket trade. Players' valuations are endogenously determined when there is an opportunity of resale. I characterize symmetric equilibria. I assume that the winner has full bargaining power; however, the results extend to other resale mechanisms. I show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more wasted social resources since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities.In the third chapter, ¡°The Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Incomplete Information¡±, I study the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests with incomplete information. Sufficient conditions under which equilibria exist are provided for both finite-action and continuum-action cases. Using a two-bidder example, we derive some properties of equilibria and show a special case of revenue equivalence between contests with incomplete information and contests with complete information.


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Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Sui, Yongyos11@pitt.eduYOS11
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairBLUME, ANDREASablume@pitt.eduABLUME
Committee MemberMATROS, ALEXANDERalm75@pitt.eduALM75
Committee MemberGAL-OR, ESTHEResther@katz.pitt.eduESTHER
Committee MemberUNVER, UTKUuunver@pitt.eduUUNVER
Date: 19 September 2007
Date Type: Completion
Defense Date: 10 May 2007
Approval Date: 19 September 2007
Submission Date: 9 July 2007
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: all-pay auctions; auctions; contests; incomplete information; resale
Other ID:, etd-07092007-224804
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 19:50
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:45


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