BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIES: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTELLECTUAL PARADIGM IN RUSSIA

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This dissertation takes as its primary task the evaluation of a conflict of paradigms in Russian philosophical thought in the past decade. If until the early nineties Russian philosophers were often guilty of uncritically attributing to their domestic philosophy a set of characteristics that fell along the lines of a religious/secular binary (e.g. literary vs. analytic; continuous vs. ruptured), in recent years the same scholarship is moving away from the nineteenth-century model of philosophy as a “path” or “special mission,” as it has been called by Konstantin Aksakov, Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, and later, Nikolai Berdiaev, among others. I begin in the first chapter by throwing light on these binary assumptions, with the goal of revealing them to be of decreasing value in the past decade, in that they have contributed to the further crystallization of the essentializing ascriptions of the romanticized Orthodox narrative. In the second chapter I then trace the religious paradigm to the twenty-first century, where it continues to thrive in the often criticized sub-departments of the History of Russian Philosophy.

Yet, if the religious narrative has historically been the dominating approach, I argue in chapters three and four that a number of trends have emerged that seek to discredit it, many of which appeal to Western ideals of “professionalism” while condemning the tradition of the Russian intelligentsia. For these critics, the goal is often not to limit through exceptionalist claims in the style of nineteenth-century religious philosophy, but to open up a discursive field (from both outside and within the religious tradition) in which connections are made between
philosophy in Russia and the rest of the world. Thus, the title “Between Philosophies” touches on the two main observations of this work: 1) that much of philosophical production in Russia remains stratified over the issue of religious thought; and 2) that despite great strides to demystify philosophy in the twentieth century, there remains an often monolithic approach to the discipline, whereby responses to the query “What is contemporary Russian philosophy?” either delineate a rigid set of requirements or deny the existence of the tradition altogether.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Russian philosophical thought enjoys a peculiar, isolated popularity in contemporary Anglo-American scholarship. While Russianists produce a modest, yet steady, flow of articles and books on Sergei Bulgakov, Fedor Dostoevskii, Aleksei Losev, and Vladimir Solov'ev, as well as research on nineteenth and twentieth century political philosophy in Russia, this scholarship occurs outside the intellectual jurisdiction of both the analytic and Continental philosophical schools. Though of the highest quality in its own right, were we to transplant this research into

1 Note on Transliteration: System II will be used throughout, except in the case of Russian names where the cited author has a specific transliteration preference under which he/she has published, in which case that spelling will be used.

2 Here the reader will immediately note two areas of exception in Anglo-American scholarship. First, there are a small but solid number of scholarly studies on Russian philosophers and traditions other than the abovementioned spheres. These include: George Kline’s work, ranging from articles on Semen Frank to the logical works of Nikolai Vasil'ev; James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin’s three-volume Russian Philosophy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965); Caryl Emerson’s body of work on Mikhail Bakhtin; Scanlan’s edited volume Russian Thought After Communism: The Recovery of a Philosophical Heritage (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Philip T. Grier’s work on Ivan Il'in; Edith Clowes’ Fiction’s Overcoat: Russian
the departments of the History of Russian Philosophy in the Russian Federation, we would find these two conceptions of one and the same discipline to be incommensurable. It is not that the subject matter of these traditions is so fundamentally different; in fact, as we will see in the second chapter, Bulgakov, Dostoevskii, and Solov'ev are the most frequently visited thinkers in both Anglo-American scholarship and contemporary histories of Russian philosophy. Rather, it is that the terms and foundations of these traditions, as well as what is at stake in the discourse of each, are markedly divergent, making for two schools of thought that rarely enter into dialogue with one another. It is perhaps for this reason that English-language research on Russian philosophy is often received quite critically in Russia. And, although we might be inclined to view the position of the literary scholar as a privileged one, in that he is separate from the academic practice of philosophy and might therefore be able to provide an external critique,


Second, while it is the case that the majority of research on Russian philosophical thought is conducted within Slavic or Russian departments, there are at least three scholars housed in departments of Philosophy: Philip T. Grier, George Kline, and James P. Scanlan (as of 2010, both Kline and Scanlan are emeritus professors).
literary scholars are often received at the doorstep of Russian philosophy as dilettantes—as uninformed “Russophiles,” tinkering in disciplines in which they do not belong.”

While an analysis of such attitudes might easily send us off into a galaxy of broad queries, including “Who has the right to practice philosophy?” and “What should this discipline entail?,” the first two chapters of this work focus on a problem more specific to the practice of philosophy in Russia. If it is possible to agree on a general definition of philosophy as a cluster of universally accessible approaches to knowledge—whether through a consideration of concerns pressing to the entire human race, as José Ortega y Gasset proposed, or through the creation and manipulation of concepts, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—then why has contemporary philosophy in Russia failed to connect with a significant audience abroad? Here I will answer that the failure is both externally and internally imposed: not only do Western scholars of Russian philosophy engage consistently with the same predictable selection of historical texts, but many of Russia’s own philosophers tend to conform to one of


Here by “universally accessible” I have in mind the classical, or standard, branches of philosophy that transverse linguistic, national, and political borders, such as aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science, etc.
two unproductive models, either adhering to an essentializing and exclusionary approach to Russian philosophy or denying the existence of the discipline altogether.

I begin in the first chapter by addressing the first of these two unproductive models, which pivots on a series of binary assumptions often uncritically attributed to Russian philosophical thought (both in its study in Russia and in the West). Traceable in important ways to the influence of German idealism in Russian intellectual circles in the nineteenth century, these binaries are, at their most basic level: 1) religious/secular; 2) literary/analytic; and 3) continuity/rupture. We can further collapse these three bifurcations into two narratives we find existing in opposition to one another from the post-Chaadaev period to the contemporary: the religious and the secular narratives. Although these two narratives are an irremovable aspect of historical discourse about philosophy in Russia, by laying out the details of these binaries it is my goal to reveal them as unproductive, in that they contribute to the further crystallization of the essentializing ascriptions of the traditional Orthodox nationalist (and Romantic, to a certain extent) narrative.

In the second chapter I further analyze the interrelatedness and prevalence of these narratives through a close textual study of the genre of the writing of the history of Russian philosophy in Russia. I begin with the very first of such histories, Archimandrite Gavriil’s *Russian Philosophy* [*Russkaia filosofiia*, 1940], and trace the genre through the contemporary period, where a large number of histories have been published during the post-Soviet era. In these histories we see perhaps most clearly the failure of the religious narrative to translate its concerns outside the country, let alone outside the walls of each author’s respective sub-department of the history of Russian philosophy. The isolation of such thinkers is particularly surprising when we view these histories side by side with the discipline of Slavic Studies, given
that the subject material of these histories is almost identical with the most popular figures (Bulgakov, Dostoevskii, and Solov'ev) in the Anglo-American study of Russian philosophical thought.

Having laid the descriptive groundwork, in the remaining chapters I examine the contemporary situation of both narratives through several case studies. We will see that despite the frequent artificial bifurcation of Russian thought into two “schools,” its landscape is quite rich, with a plurality of trends and schools equal to, if not unparalleled in, Western philosophical practices. Moreover, within the play of this plurality we see that the Russian philosophical tradition is currently undergoing an important paradigm shift. It is breaking away from the essentializing, Orthodox model of philosophy as a “path,” a “lifestyle,” or a “special mission” unique to Russia, and moving toward a more universal conception of the discipline, whereby a thriving philosophical community is based on interaction with a wider range of foreign scholars, contributions to international discussions, and a radically redefined conception of professionalism. Yet, although the fact that questions such as “Who should constitute Russia’s intellectual elite” are being asked indicates a shift toward self-reflexivity that the historiographical genre has yet to reach, the answers to these questions often still fall along religious/secular lines, even within seemingly unrelated contexts, such as discussions on the status of the intellectual and intelligent in contemporary culture.

Here the title “Between Philosophies” touches on two of the primary observations of this work. First, it plays on the “all or nothing” conception of philosophy that is often invoked in contemporary histories of Russian philosophy, where the title “Russian philosophy” [russkaia filosofia] frequently requires strict adherence to a specific set of essentializing criteria. Second (and conversely), the title also indicates what I see as an important shift of paradigms in the
twenty-first century. This shift involves a move from a dominating religious tradition in the 1990s toward attempts in the past five years to identify with different models of professionalism, professional organizations, etc. In fact, as we will see in Chapter Four, in the past decade several well-known philosophers have begun to speak out against the religious/secular binary as the main internal hindrance to the development of philosophy in Russia. Embracing the advancement of this paradigm shift as the most important task of philosophy at the present, these thinkers offer for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union widely publicized oppositions to the religious narrative, opening up a discursive field in which criticism seeks not to limit through exceptionalist claims but to make connections between philosophy in Russia and in the rest of the world.
According to a number of Western and Russian critics, an enduring assumption about philosophy in Russia is that the discipline can be neatly divided into religious philosophy, on the one hand, and various forms of secular philosophy, on the other. For Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who would become the first president of Czechoslovakia less than a decade after publishing *The Spirit of Russia* [*Rußland und Europa*, 1913], it was this supposed split—the juxtaposition of the “genuine Russian life” found in the monasteries with the imported Europeanization of downtown St. Petersburg and Moscow—that acted as one of the most oppressive burdens weighing on the “Russian character.” Masaryk’s conclusion is only one instance in a vast tradition of speculation on Russian religious thought as the “true Russian philosophy,” whether in the form of myths of the “Russian soul,” a search for the “Russian idea,” or conjecture on the “impending...
revelation on the Russian soil.”⁶ While the minutiae of these texts vary, when we step back to survey a historical selection of responses to the query “What is Russian philosophy?” we see that these answers are not only quite consistent, but they contribute to a larger, essentializing mythology about Russian thought—one that is much more influential than the sum of its parts. In order to better understand the contemporary practice of philosophy in Russia, which is the ultimate goal toward which this work is directed, we must first lay bare the often unquestioned binary assumptions ascribed to Russian philosophical thought in the past two centuries (religious/secular; continuity/rupture; literary/analytic). Through such a study we will see that not only are the twentieth and twenty-first century instantiations of the religious and secular narratives intimately tied with a long line of post-Chaadaevian revision, but, in the contemporary context, the continued adherence to these binaries is revealed not only to be unproductive, but antiquated and nonsensical.

2.1 TWO COMPETING NARRATIVES: THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR

Historically, each branch of the religious/secular disjunction has gone hand in hand with a set of features meant to characterize and define Russian thought: the religious tradition, we are told, is literary, anti-rational, and unwavering; in contrast, the secular narrative comprises everything

that is not religious, and its truths, always susceptible to rupture and fragmentation, take an analytic rather than spiritual form. In Western scholarship, the sub-discipline of Russian religious philosophy is by far the more frequently studied half of this binary. We can say the same about Russian criticism of the post-Soviet period, which rediscovered Orthodox thought in the late eighties/early nineties and continues to produce a large volume of scholarship on Russian religious philosophy to this day. The primary claim about this tradition, both in Russia and the West, is that it can be attributed with a literary (as opposed to analytic) character. In The Icon and the Axe (1966), for instance, James Billington remarks that “it has been said that Russia’s thinkers are not formal philosophers but poets.” This common assumption gives way to the view that Russian religious philosophy is best expressed not according to the rigid logical and stylistic conventions of the philosophical tract but within the creative expression of poems and novels. It is not surprising, thus, that Fedor Dostoevskii, Fedor Tiutchev, Lev Tolstoi, and Maksimilian Voloshin, among others, often find their way into the religious narrative’s canon of Russia’s great minds.

Yet, even thinkers who prefer philosophical tracts to poetry and fiction are often guilty of imbuing their work with literary language on Russian exceptionalism, giving suggestions on how

7 Although the religious narrative remains extremely influential in the present, a number of competing philosophical approaches have arisen, of which I will speak in chapters three and four.

8 Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (NY: Knopf, 1966), 55.
Russia might “fulfill her destiny” (Konstantin Aksakov), or “throw off the yoke of the logical systems of European philosophy” in order to preserve her “integrity of being” (Ivan Kireevskii). For Nikolai Berdiaev, Russian literary works, with their moral quality, comprise a philosophical genre that is “specifically Russian”: “Russian literature will bear a moral character more than all world literatures, as well as a concealed religious character.” According to Semen Frank, “in Russia, the deepest and most important thoughts and ideas were expressed not in systematic, academic writing, but in the literary form.” Likewise, Aleksei Losev emphasizes: “Russian fiction—this is the true Russian philosophy.”

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12 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 34.


[“Русская литература будет носить моральный характер, более чем все литературы мира, и скрыто-религиозный характер.”] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.


[“Русская художественная литература - вот истинная русская философия”]
Studies of Russian philosophical thought outside of Russia just as frequently align their work with the literary and mystical spheres rather than the analytic. Not only do contemporary English- and German-language publications on philosophy in Russia favor religious and literary thinkers, but much of scholarship outside Russia in general seems to suggest that Russia has contributed nothing to university and/or academic philosophy. Indeed, in The Spirit of Russia, Masaryk seeks to prove that “an analysis of Dostoevskii is a sound method of studying Russia” (viii)—a country whose literary works, he continues, “arouse harmonious echoes in [his] own Slav nature.”

An example of one such amalgamation of the religious and the literary in contemporary Russian philosophy appears in the work of St. Petersburg philosopher Aleksandr Kazin, who refers to Aleksandr Pushkin and Fedor Tiutchev in order to express what he calls the “formula” of Russian thought. For Kazin, the necessity for viewing Russian thought according to a

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15 Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, 5.

Among contemporary Western studies that have offered reasons as to why Russian philosophical thought has taken a dominantly literary form, Clowes’ Fiction’s Overcoat is one of the most convincing. Clowes argues that the rich tradition of Russian speculative philosophy was in part facilitated by the already long-standing tradition of Russian poets and authors who engaged with philosophy in their work, thereby allowing philosophy in Russia to grow “in the discursive space between imported systematic models of abstract thought … and narrative, dramatic, and lyric models of fictional philosophizing.” See Clowes, Fiction’s Overcoat, 5-6.

unique formula reveals itself not only in Tiutchev’s over-quoted stanza “Russia cannot be understood with the mind” (1866), which famously asserts that “one can only believe in Russia,” but also in a quotation of Pushkin, who observes that “[Russia’s] history requires a different idea, a different formula,” since the spiritual nature of the “Russian soul” is incompatible with the finitude of human reason—and, ultimately, with sterile, secular philosophy. Rather than outdated literary musings, these appeals to a “specifically Russian” nature (often predictably citing Tiutchev) still surface frequently in academic publications and at conferences. For Al’bert Sobolev, in fact, the literature-centrism of Russian philosophy is so strong that it is only by limiting their attention to the humanities (for Sobolev, “philosophy” and “science” [nauka] are two distinctly different categories) that Russian philosophers can enjoy future successes. It is not surprising, thus, that in Kazin’s book Russia and World Culture [Rossiia i mirovaia kul’tura, 2004] he emphasizes the literary and non-academic thrust of the tradition by spending the majority of the book discussing literature (Aleksandr Pushkin, Fedor Tiutchev, Fedor Dostoevskii, and Vladimir Nabokov) and even film (Vasilii Shukshin and Andrei Tarkovskii) as the site of Russia’s philosophical monuments.

19 See Kazin, “Formula Rossii.”
20 Sobolev, O russkoi filosofii (SPb: Mir, 2008).
21 Kazin, Rossiia i mirovaia kul’tura (SPb, 2004).
Furthermore, the religious narrative is frequently described as having not only a non-academic, and primarily literary, quality, but also an amorphous moral and ideological character, often subsumed under the already clichéd category of the “Russian idea.” This term denotes a concept that thinkers like Berdiaev, tracing it back as far as Byzantium, have viewed as an irremovable quality of the mysterious “Russian soul.”22 The term “Russian idea” first appeared in 1861, when Fedor Dostoevskii wrote, “We foresee that the character of our future activity should be panhuman to the highest degree, that the Russian idea, possibly, will be a synthesis of all of those ideas, which develop with such persistence, with such courage.”23 Two decades later, Vladimir Solov'ev presented his essay “Russkaia ideia” (1888) in a Paris salon, again calling for synthesis, this time an ecumenical unification of the Christian confessions.24 In 1946 Berdiaev’s Russian Idea appeared, though he appealed to his readership not in the name of universal salvation, as Solov'ev before him, but in the name of Russia’s becoming the “new Jerusalem.”25

22 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 14-15.


[“Мы предугадываем, что характер нашей будущей деятельности должен быть в высшей степени общечеловеческий, что русская идея, может быть, будет синтезом всех тех идей, которые с таким упорством, с таким мужеством развивает”]

24 The lecture was published immediately in French and finally translated into Russian in 1909.

25 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 248.
In reality, the notion of a “national idea” or “national soul” is a relatively modern conception, gaining popularity with the Romantic literary tendency of the author to elevate his own national scholarship as superior to all others. In particular, it is indebted to Friedrich Schelling’s conception of “national spirit” in his *Naturphilosophie*, in which all the phenomena of nature are interwoven into one interdependent whole. This Romantic concept was then appropriated and projected backwards, becoming an intellectual commonplace as if it had always existed. Indeed, retrospectively reclaimed as early as 1842, this concept underlies the confession of Nikolai Gogol’s *Taras Bul'ba*, who declares in the Russian-nationalist revision of the novel that although he has made the acquaintance of many agreeable individuals from lands both near and far, they, in some indescribable way, cannot compare to the brethren of the Russian soil: “No, they are sensible people, but not the same; the same kind of people, but not the same! No, brothers, to love as the Russian soul loves is to love not with the mind or anything else, but with all that God has given, all that is within you.”

The issue at hand is not whether the old Cossack’s assertions about the Russian people are true or false, but the way in which his

26 Gogol', *Taras Bul'ba* in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*. V. 2 (M: AN SSSR, 1937), 133.

[“Нет, умные люди, да не те; такие же люди, да не те! Нет, братья, так любить, как русская душа, - любить не то чтобы умом или чем другим, а всем, чем дал бог, что ни есть в тебе ... .”]

It is not surprising that this statement, occurring in book IX of the novel, became the key phrase of Vladimir Bortko’s nearly 17 million dollar (500 million ruble) production of *Taras Bul'ba* (2009). The line both begins the film and acts as the catch phrase of the promotional trailer. See: http://tarasbulbafilm.ru
comment is an early example of the Romantic model of Russian exception. Here the notion of the “Russian soul” is primordialized as an essential feature of the Russian character, becoming the pathos of a historical drama that takes place over two centuries before Schelling’s Naturphilosophie.27

In addition to the literary/analytic disjunction, where, in the religious context, the former is privileged and circumscribed by the concept of the “Russian idea,” another set of characteristics—a paradoxical mix of continuity and rupture—is found in the religious subset of the religious/secular binary. Here, in accordance with the essentializing requirements of the “Russian idea,” philosophy is viewed as a continuous, innate tradition. In “On Humboldt” [“Po povodu Gumbol'dta,” 1849], this is what Aleksei Khomiakov called Russia’s “straight path” from Byzantium to the present.28 In symbolist poet Maksimilian Voloshin’s “Wild Field”

27 For contemporary speculation on the “Russian idea,” see, for example, Mikhail Maslin, comp, Russkaia ideia (M: Respublika, 1992), or A. Ia. Zis', Russkaia ideia v krugu pisatelei i myslitelei russkogo zarubezhia, vol. 2 (M: Iskusstvo, 1994).


Such imagery is still found in contemporary writing, though not always among Orthodox oriented philosophers. For instance, in a February 2010 interview with Russian Journal [Russkii zhurnal], Vitalii Kurennoi made the argument that, “through Byzantium, Russian culture is historically much closer to the legacy of antiquity than is American culture.” See: Kurennoi, “Filosofia fil'ma. Interview with Vitalii Kurennoi,” Russkii zhurnal (9 Feb. 2010), http://www.russ.ru/pole/Filosofiya-fil-ma

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[“Dikoe pole,” 1920], the unbroken chain of Orthodoxy, which stretches from the distant past into the future, is expressed by way of the medieval folk mythology of the bogatyrs: “Everything that has been will repeat itself nowadays … / And again the vastitude will grow dark, / And they will remain, two in the desert—/ In the sky—God, on the earth—bogatyrs.”

Yet despite the ease of comprehension they permit, a binary understanding of Russian thought (Isaiah Berlin’s hedgehogs and foxes; Vladimir Paperny’s cultures one and two), proves to restrict more than it facilitates. That is, the religious/secular division encourages the anchoring of Russian philosophical thought by an antiquated model, within the discourse of essentialist (and, in some cases, nonsensical) categories. Rather than simplifying a discussion of

[“Русская культура связана с античным наследием более прямыми историческими связями, нежели американская, — через Византию.”]


[“Все, что было, повторится ныне ... / И опять затуманится ширь, / И останутся двое в пустыне—/ В небе—Бог, на земле—богатырь.”]

philosophical thought, this binary instead preempts any serious discussion, as the scholar is first required to either a) enter the model without questioning it, or b) reject these assumptions and commit himself to breaking down the terms at play. The deficiency of this model becomes apparent when we consider that although thinkers like Khomiakov and Kazin adhere to a continuity narrative that constructs genealogical links between Byzantium and contemporary Russian thought, when considered in the context of the historical realities of the Soviet period their religious narrative also (paradoxically) requires of its adherents a belief in historical rupture—a belief necessary in order to account for the majority of the twentieth century, during which religious philosophy had no official role. I call this the “after-the-break” argument.

In the classics of Russian religious philosophy, the contradictory foundation of the “after-the-break” argument is most famously articulated in Berdiaev’s Russian Idea [Russkaia ideia, 1946], in which he asserts that although “discontinuity is characteristic for Russian history” [emphasis added], the Russian idea (although paradoxical in nature) does not fluctuate. The “after-the-break” narrative is also expressed in Khomiakov’s claim that the direct link between Byzantium and the present is often obscured by historical discord: “Our gifted young turn lovingly to the straight path once shown us by Byzantium and then concealed from us by the storms of our turbulent history.”32 Thus, history itself takes the blame for philosophy’s problematic years.

31 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 1-2.

[“Для русской истории характерна прерывность.”]

32 Khomiakov, “Po povodu Gumboldt’a,” 228.
In the contemporary period, this paradox is perhaps best articulated in the early work of self-titled synergetic anthropologist Sergei Horujy, who stated that, although religious philosophy is an irremovable part of the “Russian national character,” it nevertheless remained dormant during the almost seventy-five years of atheistic hegemony in 1991. Although, as we will see in Chapter Four, developments in Horujy’s later writings make it impossible to identify him unequivocally with the religious narrative, in the mid-nineties the title of his book, *After the Break* [*Posle pereryva*, 1994], articulated the Phoenix-like resurrection of Russian thought in 1991. In an article by Vladimir Bibikhin, also called “After the Break” and included in the collection *A Different Beginning* [*Drugoe nachalo*, 2003], Bibikhin writes of the same philosophical rupture, replacing the word *pereryv* [break] with the more poetic *umolkanie*, or “a lapse into silence.” Of the early 1990s, during which, in his view, the tradition reemerged from its own ashes, Horujy writes: “And only then can you go further—*after the break*.”


[“И лишь тогда сможешь идти дальше – после перерыва.”]

It is significant that Horujy and Bibikhin avoid the use of the word “*perelom*” for “break,” with its residual connotations from Stalin’s Great Break [*Velikii perelom*] of the late 1920s, after which the Soviet Union veered off the path of NEP toward wide scale industrialization and collectivization.
As I hinted at earlier, the seemingly paradoxical ascription to philosophy of both continuity and fragmentation proves, in fact, to be quite strategic. That is, Russian religious philosophy had to “take a break” during the Soviet period in order to secure its own survival. For if it is indeed anti-institutional, shirking the rigid structure of academies and faculty meetings while flourishing in prose, poetry, and mysticism—if it is, as historian of philosophy Aleksandr Ermichev has claimed, “the car that runs the red light,” in that it knows no societal or earthy limitations—then religious philosophers had no choice but to lay their “poor philosophy” to rest, lest it become institutionalized and corrupted by curricula, dialectical materialism, and state-mandated textbooks. Had they not done so, these thinkers would have had no way to account for the short century during which Orthodox philosophy was not only unable to fulfill its “special mission,” as Khomiakov had put it, but had absolutely no official role within the borders of the Soviet Union. In this way, the “after-the-break” argument—the idea that Russian philosophy is a necessary part of the “Russian soul” but goes into hiding in the face of unfavorable conditions—allows religious philosophers to bypass this troublesome period. In effect, they put their ideology to sleep for a long winter, so that in late perestroika it could be resurrected “after the break” and the mission resumed with a cry “Come forth!” like Jesus to Lazarus in one of the most famous passages of the New Testament.

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36 Ermichev, Personal interview (April 2007).

37 With the phrase “poor philosophy” I am referring to Ermichev’s monograph My Poor Russian Thought [Moia bednaia russkaia mys’] (SPb: SPBGU, 1997).


39 John 11:43: King James version.
Traditional reconstructions of twentieth-century Russian philosophical thought typically adhere to the “after-the-break” view, which takes as its starting point the departures of the Oberbürgermeister haken and the Preussen on 22 September and 16 November 1922 respectively. These two voyages, which have conjointly come to be known as the Philosophy Steamer, carried off some of the period’s most influential Russian philosophers and their families, including Iulii Aikhenvald (literary critic and translator of Schopenhauer), Nikolai Berdiaev, Semen Frank, Ivan Il’in, Lev Karsavin (historian of art and ideas), Aleksandr Kizevetter (founding member of the Kadet Party), Nikolai Losskii, and Mikhail Osorgin (journalist and prose writer).40 Lenin had been tracking these intellectuals as early as the 1890s, when he began familiarizing himself with contemporary philosophical trends, both Western and domestic: “Volodia is vigorously reading all kinds of philosophy,” Nadezhda Krupskaya wrote in

40 The departure of the Philosophy Steamer has been addressed at length both in Russia and in the West in a number of historical and cultural studies, including, most recently, books by Lesley Chamberlain and Stuart Finkel. See Chamberlain, The Philosophy Steamer: Lenin and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (London: Atlantic, 2006), which was published in the United States as Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy Steamer and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (St. Martin’s P: NY, 2007). See also: Stewart Finkel, On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007). For a full list of deportees from Moscow and Petrograd see Appendix Two of Chamberlain’s Philosophy Steamer.
a letter to her mother-in-law Mariia Ul'ianova on 20 June 1899. “That is now his official occupation.”

This wide scale expatriation of the intelligentsia sent a resounding message to the rest of the world. Often treated by many scholars as the final political move in the wholesale transformation of the Russian intellectual climate from idealism to communism, for Horujy the domestic impact was irreparable: once these doors closed, they did not open again until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He candidly observed, “With the dispatch [of the philosophy steamer], philosophy ended in Russia; and that which we have since then called by this name is in reality only one of the services of the totalitarian machine.”

Skipping more than three quarters of a century, the “after-the-break” story then picks up in late perestroika and the early 1990s, during which previously banned texts began to fill the pages of scholarly journals. The return of the intellectual legacy of the Russian religious renaissance—or what Georgii Florovskii has dramatically called Russia’s “philosophical awakening” [filosofskoe probuzhdenie]—in turn spurred a conversion from dialectical materialism to idealism. This more recent conversion finds a historical precedent in


the 1890s, when the Legal Marxists of the 1890s, such as Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Frank, Petr Struve, and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, turned toward idealism. According to Chamberlain, the Legal Marxists “became Marxists as students only because … no liberal theory was available.”^44 While this view is overly simplistic—Berdiaev, for instance, was writing on Marxism as late as 1937 with *The Beginnings and Meaning of Russian Communism* [*Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma*]—nevertheless, as these thinkers matured they did begin to incorporate Orthodoxy into their philosophical systems and, by the early 1900s, most had made a complete transition to idealism. Yet, while the Legal Marxists disagreed with the Tsarist State as students of Marxism, and then later disagreed with the impending communist regime as Orthodox thinkers, the transition from Marxist-Leninism in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a shift that occurred alongside the State; as Russia transformed itself from an officially Marxist-Leninist to an officially Orthodox empire, many academics followed. Despite the differing political events behind each conversion, in both cases it is apparent that the distance between materialism and idealism is not a chasm but a single step—a space the émigré narrator’s suitcase in Sergei Dovlatov’s novella likens to the size of a suitcase: “On the bottom—Karl Marx. On the lid—Brodsky.”^45

In opposition to the religious narrative, of which I have been speaking, secular philosophy is often deemed the product not of national literature, but of the worldwide philosophical stage: that is, it takes place within the international institution of academia that


[“На дне—Карл Маркс. На крышке—Бродский.”]
recognizes philosophical rhetoric and not national peculiarities as a common, universal language. By its critics, secular philosophy is often treated as a catch-all category, comprising what does not fall under the religious rubric. This “miscellany” includes the various strands of Marxism in Russia and the Soviet Union, the poststructuralist and postmodern movements of perestroika and the post-Soviet period, and philosophers who simply choose not to mix scholarship and religious beliefs. With its cold rationalism and refusal to draw causal links between the metaphysical and the Russian soil, secular philosophy is the antithesis to the amorphous “Russian soul.” This view most often appears in the work of contemporary scholars who reject the model of “national philosophy” and who, refusing to require the presence of theology as a prerequisite for the existence of philosophy, place their work instead within an ongoing universal intellectual dialogue and not within the construction of a national idea. A secular approach to Russian philosophy is present in much Western criticism on Russian philosophical thought, including the work of Evert van der Zweerde, who, in his many articles challenges the conflation of the designators “philosophy in Russia” and “Russian [russkii] religious philosophy,” consistently coming to the conclusion that “philosophy as such cannot be ‘Russian’ any more than it can be French or German.”


Tere Vadén makes a similar case with regards on Finish philosophy in “What is ‘Local Thinking’? (Can there be a Finnish Philosophy?)” in Re-ethnicizing the Minds? Cultural Revival
In Russian scholarship the secular approach is present in Vladimir Pustarnakov’s study *University Philosophy in Russia* [*Universitetskaia filosofiia v Rossii*, 2003], where he focuses exclusively on the rich tradition of Russian academic philosophy, beginning with the early years of Moscow State University. Moreover, Nelia Motroshilova, who has written extensively on Russia’s religious philosophers, is careful to distinguish two strains in religious thought: “pure theology” and religious metaphysics. In her work she avoids the essentialism of the former while acknowledging the latter as fundamental to the Russian intellectual tradition.47

Another figure who in many ways represents the secular subset of the religious/secular binary is Vladislav Lektorskii, editor since 1988 of Russia’s most prestigious philosophical journal, *Questions of Philosophy* [*Voprosy filosofii*]. In a lecture at a 1998 conference in Freiberg, Germany, Lektorskii spoke of the profound wave of philosophical interest in the early 1990s, designating this period the “philosophical boom.” As he notes: “Philosophy [was] not imposed upon anyone [in this decade]. The most diverse ideas and conceptions [were] expounded in philosophical publications.”48

Yet, to Lektorskii’s commentary we must add an important addendum regarding the content of the “philosophical boom.” It was not only that philosophers had begun actively

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47 Motroshilova, Personal interview (January 2009).


[“Философия никому не навязывается. В философских публикациях излагаются самые разные идеи и концепции.”]
publishing and commenting on philosophical themes almost overnight, but, in particular, it was the legacy of pre-revolutionary Orthodox philosophers that had taken the discipline by storm. The early stages of this “philosophical boom” saw the publication of a number of essays by Sergei Averintsev in the tenth issue of Questions of Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii] in 1987, while in 1988 a long awaited two-volume collection of Vladimir Solov'ev’s work was released by the publisher Philosophical Heritage [Filosofskoe nasledie]. In the following months and years the floodgates opened with full force: Questions of Philosophy published several works by Gustav Shpet in November 1988, while Thoughts about Literature [Mysli o literature], a collection of articles by Vasiliy Rozanov, appeared in October 1989 as part of the series “To the Lovers of Russian Literature” [“Liubiteliam rossiiskoi slovesnosti”]. In the second half of 1989 a new series, “From the History of Domestic Thought” [“Iz istorii otechestvennoi mysli”], appeared as a supplement to Questions of Philosophy, publishing both Berdiaev’s Philosophy of Freedom [Filosofiia svobody, 1911] and The Meaning of the Creative Act [Smysl’ tvorchestva, 1916].49 A year later Berdiaev’s The Russian Idea (1946) was published in the first two issues of Questions of Philosophy, while in June of 1991 the collections Landmarks [Vekhi, 1909] and From the

49 It is important to note that the years 1989-1990 also saw the publication of Introduction to Philosophy [Vvedenie v filosofii], the replacement textbook for the standard ideological readers Foundations of Marxist-Leninism [Osnovy marksizma-leninizma] and Foundations of Marxist Philosophy [Osnovy marksistkoi filosofii]. Appearing in two volumes and with a substantial initial print run of 500,000, Introduction to Philosophy included an entire chapter in the second volume entitled “Personality” [“Lichnost’”] (a previously forbidden topic), attributed to Moscow-based philosopher and man of the sixties [shestidesiatnik] Erik Solovev'.

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Depths [Iz glubiny, 1918], many articles in which were contributed by philosophers and critics exiled from the Soviet Union on the Philosophy Steamer, were released as part of “From the History of Domestic Thought.”\(^\text{50}\) In this fashion, the legacy of Russian Orthodox philosophy was resurrected enthusiastically and re-appropriated from all sides as the path of contemporary Russian thought, dominating much of philosophical production for the first decade of Russia’s newly post-Soviet history.

Yet, while the flood of classics of Russian religious philosophy seemed to signal great success and prolificity for the future of Russian thought, the optimism of the “philosophical boom” was downplayed by many outside of religious philosophy. For instance, while Kazin and Horujy viewed the post-Soviet period as the time in which philosophy returned to Russia, Lektorskii was quick to remind that although the early 1990s marked the introduction of more freedom to the discipline, some of the past two hundred years’ most important thinkers emerged from the Soviet university system, well before the “philosophical boom.”\(^\text{51}\) As examples, Lektorskii names Eval’d Il'enkov and Moscow Methodological Circle [Moskovskii metodologicheskii kruzhok, or MMK] members Merab Mamardashvili, Georgii Shchedrovitskii,


Although Lektorskii does not want to deny that the Soviet period was troublesome for philosophers—he points out, for instance, that in the 1950s philosophy was taught only in a small number of higher institutions—he nevertheless stresses that Il'enkov and the MMK members produced great works of philosophy despite institutional and ideological restrictions. “Nowadays we sometimes have a distorted image of that time,” Lektorskii stated in a 2004 interview. “Interesting people appeared even then. They were not always able to publish everything, but some ideas were already being worked out and discussed.”

Moreover, not only was the rapid transition (and in some instances, seemingly overnight conversion) of thinkers from the dogma of Marxism to the ideology of Orthodoxy alienating to many, but as Valerii Podoroga has noted, there was a growing realization among non-religious philosophers of an expanding chasm between the language, methodology, and subject matter of Russian philosophy of the late-Soviet/early post-Soviet period and the standards of Western academics. This disconnect between possibility and actuality was mirrored in the political

52 After Zinov'ev left the group due to methodological differences, the Moscow Methodological Circle gradually became known as the Moscow Logical Circle [Moskovskii logicheskii kruzhok, or MLK].

53 Lektorskii, “Philosophy is the Self-Consciousness of a Culture. An Interview with V. A. Lektorskii,” *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 42.4 (Spring 2004), 78.

54 Ibid., 74.

55 Podoroga, Personal Interview (June 2009).

This chasm was apparent to many of the participants of a two-week philosophical summit at the Interuniversity Center in Dubrovnik, Croatia in October of 1990, where Susan Buck-Morss
climate, where the new promise of international collaboration and cooperation ushered in alongside the “philosophical boom” were confronted with the literal boom of El'tsin’s shelling of his own White House in October of 1993. The quick dissipation of the optimism surrounding the “philosophical boom” is apparent in the large number of new journals founded during this period, most of which failed within two years of El’tsin’s coup. These include: The Figure of Thanatos [Figura Tanatosa; SPb, 1992-1995], Parallels [Parallel; M, 1991], Silentium [SPb, 1991-1992, 1996], Sphinx [Sfinks; SPb, 1994-1995], Socio-logos [Sotsio-logos; M, 1991-1993], One Hundred Pages [Sto stranits; SPb, 1991-1994], and Steps [Stupeni; SPb, 1991-1997].

While the “after-the-break” narrative can be viewed as necessary for the survival of the religious subset of the religious/secular binary, it is also apparent why thinkers like Lektorskii do not find it problematic to view Soviet-era philosophizing as “proper philosophy.” For, if philosophy is a discipline, one that is structured by the professional institutions within which it resides, then the Soviet period was nothing more than a changing of the guards—a shift from one practice to another. Within the mindset of this secular narrative, then, it becomes possible to see how although the nature of philosophy changed during its tumultuous Soviet history, it could not disappear entirely, given that philosophy departments, philosophy professors, and philosophy reports that Western and Soviet Marxists were unable to communicate effectively with one another, although both sides were supposed to be representing the same so-called “left.” See Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge: MIT, 2000).

56 Two exceptions include the journal of the Institute of Man, entitled Man [Chelovek; M, 1990-present] and Logos [M, 1991-present].
students remained, and that philosophical texts continued to be produced and discussed. This is
the objective of James P. Scanlan’s study Marxism in the USSR (1985), where he demonstrated
that Soviet philosophy was less monolithic than scholars often assumed and that “power over the
dictionary, which Soviet authorities have enjoyed for decades, ha[d] not given them complete
power over minds.” Lektorskii further confirms the perseverance of Soviet-era philosophy
under authoritarian conditions in his two-volume edited collection Philosophy Does Not End:
From the History of Domestic Philosophy [Filosofiia ne konchaetsia: iz istortii otechestvennoi
filosofii, 1998], which includes the work of philosophers from the 1920s through the 1980s,
demonstrating that according to the secular narrative there was no “lapse into silence,” and that
philosophy never did take a break.

2.2 HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND LINGUISTIC ANCHORS

(RUSSKII VS. ROSSIISKII)

The division of Russian philosophical thought into two branches (the religious and the secular)
can in many ways be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century as an outgrowth of
the Slavophile/Westerner debate that had consumed much of the 1830s and 1840s. This
debate, in turn, was itself in part a result of the post-Chaadaev era of philosophizing ushered in
with his eight Philosophical Letters [Lettres philosophiques], written in French between 1829
and 1831 following his service in the Napoleonic wars. The letters were addressed to Ekaterina

57 Scanlan, Marxism in the USSR. A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought (Ithaca and
Panova, a woman of reputation not only for beating her serfs and having borrowed money from Chaadaev’s family and refusing to make good on her debt, but for being sympathetic to the Roman Catholic confession. The latter made her a suitable interlocutor for at least the first of Chaadaev’s letters, which condemns Russian Orthodoxy as having paralyzed the Russian character.

As we read from letter to letter, however, we see that each text demonstrates extraordinary development in Chaadaev’s own thinking. Although in the first letter he expresses an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of Russia’s place (or lack thereof) in intellectual history, by the sixth he has already begun to sketch a philosophical system in which many of the “national peculiarities” he denounced in 1829 are now treated as advantages—as testaments to Russia’s unique status and exceptional potential. Regardless, after the first letter was published in the Moscow journal *Teleskop* in 1836 the journal was immediately closed and its editor, Nikolai Nadezhdin, was exiled to the north until 1838. While Chaadaev escaped exile, he was declared mad and sentenced to medical examinations and eighteen months house arrest. It was with a sense of irony, thus, that he titled his next (and last) philosophical essay “Apology of a Madman” [“Apologiia sumasshedshego,” 1837].

For Billington, Chaadaev’s work “stands as a kind of signpost, pointing toward the radical Westernizing path that was soon to be advocated for Russia.”⁵⁸ And indeed, in his first letter Chaadaev makes claims that would later be reiterated by the Westernizers, accusing Russia of having contributed nothing substantial to world culture:

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⁵⁸ Billington, *The Icon and the Axe*, 315.
One of the worst features of our peculiar civilization is that we have not yet
discovered truths that have elsewhere become truisms, even among nations that in
many respects are far less advanced than we are. It is the result of our never
having walked with other nations; we belong to none of the great families of
mankind; we are neither of the West nor of the East and we possess the traditions
of neither. Somehow divorced from time, the universal education of mankind has
not reached us.59

Rejecting the Slavophile’s support of the Orthodox confession as the only true expression
of Christianity, Chaadaev goes on to lament that Orthodox Christianity has actually paralyzed the
Russian population with its tendencies toward laziness and resignation in mediocrity. While
Catholicism remains the driving force behind all great Western civilizations, he continues,
Eastern Orthodoxy has transformed the Russian into an eternal nomad, with “no definite sphere

59 Chaadaev, “Lettre Première,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis’ma, vol. I ( M:
Nauka, 1991), 89.

[“C’est une des choses les plus déplorables de notre singulière civilization, que les vérités les
plus triviales ailleurs, et même chez les peoples bien moins avancés que nous sous certains
rapports, nous sommes encore à les découvrir. C’est que nous n’avons jamais marché avec les
autres peoples; nous n’appartenons à aucune des grandes familles du genre humain; nous ne
sommes ni de l’Occident ni de l’Orient, et nous n’avons les traditions ni de l’un ni de l’autre.
Placés comme en dehors des temps, l’éducation universelle du genre humain ne nous a pas
atteints.”]
of existence” and no proper habits, no rules.”\textsuperscript{60} This idea was reformulated later by Westernizing philosophers such as Vissarion Belinskii in his “Letter to Gogol” \textit{[“Pis'mo k Gogoliu,” 1847]}, where Belinskii wrote that Russia has been buried under sermons, prayers, mysticism, and pietism.\textsuperscript{61}

Yet, Billington also notes that \textquote{Chaaadaev’s dark portrayal of Russia’s past and present serves to dramatize the brightness of the future,\textsuperscript{62}} and it is this future-oriented view, combined with a partially developed theory of unity, that actually places him (the Chaadaev of the later letters and of the \textquote{Apology}) in dialogue with the Slavophiles in an important way. In letter seven, for instance, in a passage reminiscent of Leibniz’s writing on the harmony between theology and the physical sciences, Chaadaev details how finite minds collide metaphysically as physical bodies do in nature, united not only in their likeness, but in their mirroring of the one \textquote{Supreme Mind.”} On this unity between God, men, and physical processes, he concludes letter eight: \textquote{All the labor of the intellectual generations is destined to produce but this result, the

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\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 90.
\textquote{Point de sphere d’existence determine pour personne, point de bonnes habitudes pour rien, point de règle pour aucune chose.”}
\textsuperscript{61} Belinskii, \textit{“Pis'mo k Gogoliu,”} in \textit{Izbrannye filosofskie sochineniia} (M: Gos. izd-vo, 1956), 536-546.
\textsuperscript{62} Billington, \textit{The Icon and the Axe}, 315.
terminal point and goal of all things, the final phase of human nature, the resolution of the universe, the great apocalyptic synthesis.”63

Thus, it is not surprising that not only did the Slavophiles—or Samobytniki, as they called themselves—take notice of Chaadaev’s contributions, but the writing of the first generation of Slavophiles can in many ways be seen as a lengthy reaction to Chaadaev. We see this perhaps most explicitly in the work of Khomiakov, who wrote several letters directly to Chaadaev, as well as treatises on the latter’s *Philosophical Letters*. Even thinkers who we are hard pressed to fit into either the Slavophile or the Westernizing camp reacted to Chaadaev in some way. For Aleksandr Herzen, it was the Chaadaev period—or, more specifically, the Decembrist revolt of 14 December 1825 (26 December in the New Style)—that marked the point at which we can speak of the emergence of “a European state within the Slavic state”64: a dichotomy visible in the

[“Tout le travail des ages intellectuels n’est destiné qu’à produire ce résultat definitive, terme et fin de toutes choses, dernière phase de la nature humaine, dénouement du drame universel, la grande synthèse apocalyptique.”] Trans. from Edie, James M, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, *Russian Philosophy*, vol. I (Chicago, 1969), 154.

subsequent split of Russian intellectuals, more or less, into Slavophile and Westernizer factions.\textsuperscript{65}

Before Chaadaev—or, perhaps, before the extensive response to Chaadaev—it is difficult to speak of developed, coexisting religious and secular philosophical branches. While there were no doubt splits and schisms throughout the history of Russian theology (e.g. between Iosif Volotskii and the non-possessors [nestiazhateli], or the Old and New Believers), the religious/secular question was traditionally one that was played out on the political stage rather than in the philosophical arena. What is more, pre-Chaadaev philosophical circles had not yet gained enough internal support and external acceptance to challenge the validity of one another on the scale of the schism that occurred between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, or, much later, between the materialist philosophers and religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Thus, it is not surprising that it was precisely the impending political revolution that secured a historical place for the religious/secular binary, leading to the grand campaign of Soviet philosophy against the religious thought that had not only flourished, but dominated, in Russia.

In the present period, when Russian philosophical thought has developed into a complicated network of trends, thinkers, and inclinations, and when we can easily speak of developed intellectual debates within the discipline, the two dominant narratives—the religious and the secular—have not only ideological differences, but are separated by a significant linguistic rift: the semantic discrepancy between the Russian descriptors \textit{russkii} and \textit{rossiiskii}, the meanings of both of which are collapsed into the English adjective “Russian.” The former is

\textsuperscript{65} Of course this distinction is easily confounded by a figure like Mikhail Bakunin, who does not fit neatly into either category.
the more historical of the two and originates as the adjective from the noun Rus’, which dates back to the Primary Chronicle, or Tale of Bygone Years [Povest’ vremennykh let, 1040-1118]—an annual register of important events in Rus’ beginning in the year 852. In contemporary linguistic politics, the word has, in many instances, come to imply a national, and even ethnic, character, such as the meaning contained in the word “Russian” in the phrase “His native language is Russian,” or “She is of Russian descent.”

This contemporary meaning makes the adjective favorable to Russian philosophers who attest to the “unique,” yet simultaneously universal, nature of their “national philosophy.” “Russian [russkii] is not synonymous with Christian,” stated Evgenii Trubetskoi in a paper he read at a meeting of the Religious-Philosophical Society on 19 February 1912, “but is a national and individual specificity among Christianity, valuable beyond measure, and which has an undeniable universal, world-wide significance”66 “Russkii” is the only adjective found in the popular histories of Russian philosophy from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including Archimandrite Gavriil’s Russian Philosophy (1840), E. L. Radlov’s Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy (1912), Boris Iakovenko’s Sketches of Russian Philosophy (1922), Gustav Shpet’s Sketch of the Development of Russian Philosophy (1922), Georgii Florovskii’s The Ways


[“Русское – не тождественно с христианским, а представляет собою чрезвычайно ценную национальную и индивидуальную особенность среди христианства, которая несомненно имеет универсальное, вселенское значение.”]
of Russian Theology (1937), Vasilii Zen'kovskii’s History of Russian Philosophy (1948-1950), and Nikolai Losskii’s History of Russian Philosophy (1951).67

Russkii has been able to develop this secondary, nationalistic implication thanks to the introduction of a second adjective for “Russian,” rossiiskii, inducted into the language by Ivan IV and derived from the contemporary proper noun for Russia [Rossiia], which is first known to have been recorded in a Moscow grammar in 1517. It was used frequently by Ivan IV and, later, Avvakum.68 Rossiiskii designates “Russian” in the territorial, geographical, and imperial sense of the phrases “The Russian Federation” and “Russian citizenship,” thereby allowing russkii to cover the domain of the national, the linguistic, the cultural, and the ethnic. Unlike russkii, rossiiskii allows for individuals of different nationalities, linguistic backgrounds, ethnicities, etc. to be included within its demarcation, as it has no national tinge, but simply designates territory. It is not surprising, thus, that rossiiskii and not russkii was the term used in the official imperial title to designate what fell under the jurisdiction of the Russian empire: it begins “We, … By the Grace of God, Emperor, and Autocrat of the all Russias … ” [“My, … Bozhiiu Milostiiu, Imperator i Samoderzhets Vserossiiskii … ”] and continues with a list of all the empire’s territories, from Finland to Armenia.

In an analogous fashion, the adjective “Soviet” became an equally all-encompassing term, stretching its imperial arms from Leningrad to the Central Asian republics to Sakhalin. In

67 The corresponding Russian titles are as follows: Russkaia filosofiia; Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii; Ocherki russkoi filosofii; Ocherk razvitiia russkoi filosofii; Puti russkago bogosloviia; Istoriiia russkoi filosofii (from here on abbreviated as Irf); and Irf.

theory, “Soviet” fulfilled the same function as “rossiiskii”—i.e. to delineate empire without excluding any of its peoples, to unite a number of varied ethnicities and religions (Belarusian, Jewish, Kazakh, Russian, Ukrainian, Vol'ga-German) under one centralized power. And while any cultural historian is aware that this was the case only in theory (one need only remember, for instance, the closings of Yiddish Theatres in the Soviet Union or the State’s policy on Central Asia and the “Virgin Lands” campaign of the 1950s), linguistically the two terms purport to denote the same idea.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term rossiiskii returned to the official State lexicon, retaining its monarchic connotations of an empire that reaches to the far ends of its territory in order to collect and collapse its many territories under one common term. It also carried on the goal (again, in theory) of the term “Soviet,” in the sense that it is a term that purposefully claims to make no ethnic or religious presuppositions, allowing for a manifold of ethnic and ethno-territorial modifiers to gather under it its linguistic umbrella. It is not surprising, thus, that secular thinkers often prefer the adjective rossiiskii, which is believed to designate the appropriate geographical territory without spinning the thought that occurs within its boundaries in a nationalistic light—that is, as a particularistic articulation of a specific identity. Nevertheless, such usage has grown slowly (albeit steadily), and the term rossiiskii is still often thought to sound contrived, or even to be ridiculous, by scholars (particularly more traditional historians of Russian philosophy) content with the meaning that russkii can bring to a title or a text.

In an early refusal of the use of rossiiskii, Mikhail Gromov writes in his 1997 study, The Structure and Typology of Russian Medieval Philosophy [Struktura i tipologiia russkoi srednevekovoi filosofii]: “of the term “Russian [rossiiskii] philosophy” it is possible to speak in
the sense of a kind of detached conception, as we speak of “European philosophy” as a whole, but authors who use this term speak specifically of Russian [russkii] philosophy as such.” 69 In fact, what Gromov is reacting to here may be the fact that, in reality, there is no ideal term at the scholar’s disposal. For instance, rossiiskii, as well as the newer combination “philosophy in Russia,” are criticized for leading to problems in regards to Russian émigré writers, who clearly do not fall into that geographical category. 70 The more awkward title “Russian-language philosophy” is equally problematic, as it limits the inclusion of Russian thinkers who publish in foreign languages: for instance, Chaadaev’s letters in French or contemporary thinkers who regularly publish in English or German-language journals. At the 2008 presentation of Mikhail Maslin’s Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia [Russkaia filosofii: Entsiklopediia, 2007], discussed further in chapter three, Aleksandr Ermichev expressed his distaste for what he perceived to be Maslin’s favoring of the “Philosophy in Russia” descriptor: ““Philosophy in

[“о термине ‘российская философия’ можно говорить в качестве некоего условно выделяемого понятия, как мы говорим о ‘европейской философии’ в целом, но авторы, использующие его, говорят … именно о русской философии как таковой”]

70 Here I would argue that “philosophy in Russia” is not as restricting as it initially seems to be. It is not uncommon for intellectual groups or trends to be given geographical names that represent only a portion of its members. Here we could remember the term “Austrian philosophy,” which is used to refer to the anti-Kantian school of Franz Brentano during the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, though Brentano himself was German and not Austrian.
Russia’ and ‘Russian [rossiiskii] philosophy’—I dislike this division terribly. Believe me, it is wrong, it is mistaken.”\textsuperscript{71}

Still, although much has been written about the russkii/rossiiskii distinction in the cultural and historical spheres, such discussions have yet to reach the discipline of philosophy in any serious way with the exception of a few instances, the earliest perhaps being Artem'eva’s note at the beginning of her 1994 article “‘Departmental Philosophy’ in Russia” [“‘Kafedral'naia filosofiia’ v Rossi’”], which begins with the clarification that “the conceptions of ‘Russian [russkii] philosophy’ and ‘philosophy that is studied in Russian [rossiiskii] educational institutions’ are not synonymous, neither in content nor range, although some researchers of Russian philosophy cannot imagine the possibility of its development outside the boundaries of ‘schools.’”\textsuperscript{72} Other such examples can be found in a 1998 lecture given by Lektorskii in


[“‘Философия в России’ и ‘Русская философия’ – ужасно мне не нравится это разделение. Поверьте мне, это неправильно, это ошибочно.”]

\textsuperscript{72} Artem'eva, “‘Kafedral'naia filosofiia’ v Rossi’. Istoki i traditsii,” Sfinks 2 (1994), 7.

[“... понятия ‘русская философия’ и ‘философия, изучаемая в российских учебных заведениях’ не тождественны ни по содержанию, не по объему, хотя некоторые исследователи русской философии не мыслят возможности ее развития кроме в рамках ‘школах.’”]
Freiberg, Germany on “On the Contemporary Situation in Russian Philosophy” [“O sovremennoi situatsii v rossiiskoi filosofii”], or in the 2009 collection *Russian Post-Soviet Philosophy: An Exercise in Self-Analysis* [Rossiiskaia postsovetskaia filosofia: opyt' samoanaliza].


75 The corresponding Russian titles are as follows: Russkaia filosofskaia mysli' X-XVII vekov; Ocherk istorii filosofii “Samobytno-russkoi”; Irf; Russkaia filosofiiia. Opyt tipologicheskoi
It is clear that in present scholarship the \textit{russkii/rossiiskii} bifurcation, where \textit{rossiiskii} is what slips out of \textit{russkii}'s hegemonic grasp, continues to dictate the way about which Russian philosophical discourse is written and discussed. Furthermore, there exists an understood and unspoken bifurcation among journal editors and academic publishers where advocates of the religious narrative and traditionalists use \textit{russkii} and consider it normative, while other members of the philosophical community use \textit{rossiiskii} in their own work, or, even if they use \textit{russkii}, at least consider \textit{rossiiskii} a tenable term. While the religious/secular binary has been periodically challenged, most often by Western scholars calling for the deconstruction of the religious narrative and its essentializing and discriminatory tendencies, this linguistic division remains, for the most part, unexamined and unchallenged.

One exception worth noting appears in Horujy’s work, where he privileges the title “Christian philosophy in Russia” over “Russian [\textit{russkii}] religious philosophy.”\textsuperscript{76} The “ethnic characterization” of the latter, Horujy writes, “is alien to philosophy as such [and] should not be attached even to its present form.”\textsuperscript{77} In this rare example we see Horujy, a thinker who, after all, calls for the development of the Russian philosophical tradition along Orthodox (specifically, hesychast) lines, making a clear distinction between religious metaphysics and aggressive Orthodox Nationalism. It is a particularly welcome development when such thinkers speak out

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{kharakteristiki; Lektsii po istorii russkoi filosofii XI-XX vv; Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov; Letopis' russkoi filosofii: 862-2002; Irf; Irf, and; Irf.}
\item Horujy, “Breaks and Links. Prospects for Russian Religious Philosophy Today,” in \textit{Institute of Synergetic Anthropology}, \url{http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=1402}
\item Idid.
\end{itemize}
against the binaries so often utilized by Russian, and, I would add, Western thinkers, in discussions about Russian thought: as Horujy notes, these binaries include “Russia versus the West, the authentic Russian (samobytnoye) versus the borrowed, and so on.” In an equally interesting turn, Horujy asserts that it is precisely Orthodoxy that will break down these binaries. “Now an analysis should incorporate a new structural level,” he writes. “Eastern Christian discourse comes forth as the third level mediating the opposition of ‘Russia versus the West’ and for this reason both the situation and our analysis of it go beyond the plane of binary oppositions” [sic].

In their study Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstandings and Professorial Power (1994), rooted in their perceived crisis in the French university system, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron argue that what makes a linguistic misunderstanding in the academic context “so serious is that it goes beyond the superficialities of jargon to the operation of a code.” Challenging a historically dominant signifier, like the russkii default, is no easy task. As Bourdieu and Passeron write: “Academics and students can walk away from the system, but at their own cost. Stay within the system, and their attitudes and behavior will continue to express the particular logic of its operations.” To give up the narrative is to give up one’s

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.


81 Ibid., 13.
security within an established system of values, perhaps explaining the often critical stance of the Russian philosophical hegemony to the use of rossiiskii in academic writing and speech.\footnote{In some ways this can be compared to the movement toward gender neutral language in American academia beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present. Before this period, hypothetical situations in academic writing were almost all unquestioningly constructed around the preposition “he” (i.e., “The individual concept of each person contains once and for all everything that will ever happen to \textit{him} …”), as opposed to “she” (i.e., “The individual concept of each person contains once and for all everything that will ever happen to \textit{her}”). And while academic writing has often tried to use as much as possible the asexual “one” in order to avoid an explicitly masculine gender identification, the influence of the Third Wave of feminism has led, in many circles of philosophy, to “she” being considered the new default academic pronoun. In a 2008 issue of the prominent analytically inclined philosophical journal \textit{Noûs} (Vol. 42, Feb.), for instance, all six of the articles (all male authors) choose feminine personal pronouns and examples more often than male ones. In only half of the articles did the pronoun “he” appear (not counting references to male authors). While this is a dramatic shift, however, the distinction between two similar adjectives—\textit{russkii} and \textit{rossiiskii}—surpasses the realms of political correctness and gender equality that are at the center of the “he/she” debate. For neither pronoun is colored with national, imperial, religious, and even ethnic implications, as \textit{russkii} and \textit{rossiiskii} are.}
Traditionally, the analytic and Continental traditions have been treated as two irreconcilable sides of the same problem. As Babette Babich has formulated it, it as if each side of the debate represented a fundamentally different answer to the ever-present question “What is philosophy?”83 The moment of rupture between these two trends is typically traced to the immediate post-Kantian period, during which it is possible to observe the development of two different approaches to philosophy—one gravitating toward figures like Hegel and Heidegger, and the other toward Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. The latter, now termed analytic philosophy, is often argued to have been, until very recently, a “pre-Kantian” sub-discipline of philosophy, having arisen as a reaction to the absolute idealism of British philosophers like F.H. Bradley and T.H. Greene. Both Russell and G. E. Moore began their careers at Cambridge, known for its “Cambridge idealism,” but broke from British idealism and moved toward logic, specifically toward Frege, believing that an excessive idealism had become so engrained in contemporary philosophical practices that even the study of Kant had been tainted and must be quarantined and abandoned.84 These thinkers became known for their return to a pre-Kantian period, aligning themselves instead with David Hume: for instance Frege, whose Basic Laws of Arithmetic [Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1893, 1903] is in some important ways a reply to


Hume’s *A Treatise on Human Nature* (1739-1740), or Quine, who was rumored to have only taught one course in the history of philosophy in his career—on Hume. In fact, it is often argued that it was not until P. F. Strawson’s *The Bounds of Sense* (1966) that it became thinkable to treat Kant in any serious philosophical work (and, soon afterwards, unthinkable not to address Kant). Thus, as Wilfrid Sellars, and later, Robert Brandom, have suggested, analytic philosophy can be said to have had both a Humean and a Kantian component, both of which persist until the present.\(^8\)

\(^8\) The analytic tradition clearly holds much of the power in American philosophical scholarship—a fact that is apparent in the much debated Blackwell’s *Philosophical Gourmet Report*, which ranks the top fifty Ph.D. programs in Philosophy (as well as the top fifteen in the UK, the top five in Canada, and the top five in Australia and Asia) based on “faculty quality and reputation” every two years. See *Philosophical Gourmet Report*, ed. Brian Leiter. http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/. The list consistently ranks only analytic programs highly. Despite numerous open letters and petitions circulated from within the discipline (primarily from Continental scholars) expressing outrage at the rankings, the site remains a popular tool for prospective graduate students in Philosophy. According to an open letter by Richard G. Heck, Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, the analytic bias of the list is a direct result of editor Brian Leiter’s own “oft-expressed and very intense distaste for much of what goes on in certain ‘continental’ departments.” See: Heck, *About PGR*. http://frege.brown.edu/heck/philosophy/aboutpgr.php. On the *Philosophy Gourmet* site, Leiter takes a clear stance on this issue: “‘Analytic’ philosophy is now largely coextensional with good philosophy and scholarship, regardless of topic or figure. … Only analytic philosophers aspire to
While analytic philosophy is said to gravitate toward more technical studies of philosophy of language and logic, the Continental tradition is typically said to focus on metaphysics, doing so with a more literary (often identified by the analytic tradition as “obscure”) style. Although one can clearly identify methodological and stylistic differences between thinkers like Heidegger and Frege, the term “Continental” actually appeared in popular use only in the post-WWII era as a way to collect the many strands of so-called non-scientific philosophy of Western and Central Europe—existentialism, phenomenology, postmodernism, structuralism, and post-structuralism—under one convenient heading. Nevertheless, as early as 1945 Bertrand Russell distinguished “two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively.”

Simon Glendinning goes as far as claiming that the term Continental philosophy does not denote anything in particular, but is simply a catch-all term, often employed pejoratively by analytic philosophers to describe what is left after they have determined what falls under the category of “analytic.” Yet, even if the term did emerge as a post-War post-facto classificatory heading, it would be wrong to assert that Continental is still synonymous with that which is not analytic. In America, Continental denotes a very particular type of philosophical education: a strong foundation in the history of philosophy and course offerings in contemporary French and German philosophy and phenomenology. In fact, as Randall Collins points out, we would be the level of argumentative sophistication and philosophical depth that marks the great philosophers.” See Leiter, “What the Rankings Mean” and “‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ Philosophy,” *Philosophical Gourmet*. http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp

better off to assume that these “two allegedly antithetical traditions are network cousins, full of common ancestors two or three generations back.” 87 And in fact, the Continental/analytic binary is as easily confounded as the Russian religious/secular distinction, not only by the many thinkers who converse fluently on both sides of the “chasm,” but in recollecting instances in which a thinker clearly aligned with one tradition has acted “out of character.” By way of example we might look to of the dense, technical writing of Edmund Husserl, widely considered the starting point of phenomenology proper (a subset of the Continental tradition), or the influence of Lev Tolstoi’s *The Gospel in Brief* [*Kratkoe izlozhenie Evangeliia*, 1906] on Wittgenstein (if not philosophically, than spiritually) during the period in which he was writing the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1918/1921)—a monument of analytic philosophy. 88


88 I will not discuss such exceptions at length, since they are outside the scope of this dissertation, but another such example is Alvin Plantinga, who approaches the philosophy of religion from the standpoint of logic. For a discussion of Plantinga’s work on theology in relation to the Continental tradition, see: Nick Trakakis, “Meta-Philosophy of Religion. The Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy of Religion,” *Ars Disputandi* 7 (2007). http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000296/article.pdf

In Russian thought we are hard pressed to make the same clear-cut distinction between an analytic and a Continental tradition, although both can be said to exist. Though it is often taken as fact that the so-called Continental tradition barely penetrated Soviet academia in any popular way until Merab Mamardashvili, in the contemporary context the term Continental might call to mind the flourishing phenomenological schools in both Moscow and St. Petersburg (special centers for phenomenological philosophy exist in both cities), as well as the still very real influence of Georges Bataille, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, along with other French Marxist and post-Marxist thinkers, in the well-known “Sector of Analytical Anthropology” at the Moscow Institute of Philosophy and their associated outlets, the publishing house, Ad Marginem. According to Mikhail Epstein, however, the Continental/analytic division is “almost irrelevant” in Russia, not because of the absence of Western influence during the Soviet period, but because philosophy in Russia “addresses a conception of being that is itself constructed by thinking. Beginning with Chaadaev, and the Westernizers and Slavophiles, Russian philosophy focused on the secondary reality, one created by ideas.”

In Epstein’s opinion, it seems, Russian thought is best compared not to the Western tradition, but to itself: “It may have been


‘derivative’ and ‘secondary,’ but not so much in respect to Western thought, as in relation to properly Russian, ideologically produced, utterly artificial, fabricated, and fantastic reality.”

I would argue that the irrelevance of such a classification does not have to do with the deficiency of Russian philosophers to overcome internal dilemmas and to relate to their international counterparts, as Epstein’s commentary seems to suggest, but more due to a difference in self-identification and in the classification and organization of philosophical sub-disciplines. While Anglo-American Continental programs offer selections of courses in the history of philosophy, postmodernism, feminism, and the philosophy of religion in order to appeal to a particular audience and strengthen their status as Continental centers, within Russia these sub-disciplines would rarely find common ground with one another. By this I mean that while Russian-language research in phenomenology might remind the Western scholar of the English-language study of phenomenology—that is, the same figures, research of the same high quality, etc.—in the Russian context the average phenomenologist would balk at the idea of having any intellectual relationship to religious philosophy or postmodernism.

Thus, while our initial response might be that that the Continental tradition should align with the Russian religious narrative along the lines of conceptual and methodological similarities, in fact the former has much in common with the traditional characteristics of analytic philosophy. Not only is religious thought (as is the analytic tradition) often accused of its disinterest in meta-analysis and its lack of acceptance for other traditions, but we can place the religious narrative and the analytic tradition in dialogue based on indicators of hegemony. Like analytic philosophy, the Russian religious tradition has historically been the more

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90 Ibid., 34.
authoritative of the two (minus, of course, the Soviet period) and retains this hegemony to the present.\footnote{The monolithic grasp of both the religious (in Russia) and the analytic (in the English-speaking world) can be argued to be slipping: for example, in Russia we see the emergence of Western-trained, secular scholars and, in the West, the appearance of “Continental” philosophical personalities such as Slavoj Žižek, who now has had several films made about his life and work.}

Thus, it turns out that the initially peculiar identification of Russian thought with analytic philosophy is dictated by the politics of intellectual hegemony. Such dominating forces—what Ivan Kireevskii labeled the “self-propelling knife of reason”\footnote{Kireevskii, \textit{Kritika i estetika} (M: Iskuuskvo, 1979), 251.}—exist in every academic circle, and it is precisely this structure that is the focus of much of Artem'eva’s article “Philosophy as Fate: A. T. Bolotov” \footnote{Artem'eva, “Filosofiia kak sud'ba: A. T. Bolotov,” \textit{Die Welt der Slaven} LI (2006): 2.} [“Filosofiia kak sud'ba: A. T. Bolotov,” 2006], where she discusses the sometimes arbitrary way in which the philosophical hierarchy—“the list of great names”—become canonized, and the difficulty one has in challenging that canon after it has become crystallized.\footnote{Having expounded the dominating narratives about Russian philosophical thought in the context of the debate between analytic and Continental philosophy, we see that the Russian and Western traditions, in this respect (and in others, as I will later propose), are in fact quite}
similar. This leads to an understanding of philosophy not as nation specific, as many representatives of the religious subset of the religious/secular binary would like to claim, but as universal and, in its universality, dialectical. While Glendinning wants to argue that the analytic/Continental distinction is in fact a fiction—a “projection of the Anglo-American academy onto a Continental Europe”95—I prefer to agree with James Stieb’s claim that the divide is not only unavoidable (he notes that today even the sciences are no longer unified) but, in many cases, necessary, as “philosophy is dialectical (like political systems). It needs an ‘other’ to pit itself against.”96 This is why some of the most productive years in Russian philosophical production occurred after Chaadaev, after the emergence of rival camps within the

94 One study, W. J., Gavin and T. J. Blakeley’s *Russia and America: A Philosophical Comparison* (Dordrecht and Boston: Springer, 1976), also puts Russian thought and American philosophy in dialogue with one another, drawing comparisons between Petr Chaadaev and Ralph Waldo Emerson; Aleksandr Herzen and William James; John Dewey and Nikolai Chernyshevskii; etc.


We can even see divisions within individual academic strains, such as the fact that within analytic philosophy there can be said to be a further division over the validity of naturalism, aligning thinkers either with the naturalist camp or against it. For more on this debate see Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds. *Naturalism in Question* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004).
discipline—all helping to usher in the period from 1838-1848: what Pavel Annenkov, and later Isaiah Berlin, called the “Remarkable Decade” [Zamechatel'noe desiatiletie]. I would augment Stieb’s argument, however, with the claim that this dialectical “pitting” is most productive only when it is combined with a certain amount of self-reflexivity: such reflection is apparent in the multitudes of books and articles in recent years that have appeared on the topic of the analytic/Continental divide, but are noticeably absent from the majority of Russian philosophical production, a topic I will take up in detail in the following chapters.

Although binaries often present themselves as convenient organization tools, it is not my intention here to work within their borders. Instead, I address the religious/secular disjunction to lay bare the common assumptions about Russian philosophical thought in order to move towards demystifying and transgressing them. The necessity for such a task is supported by the number of thinkers in the history of Russian philosophical thought who have confounded the above binary (rendering it restrictive and, thus, unproductive), and also by the fact that, despite these contradictory moments, the religious/secular question continues to be an often unquestioned assumption.

One such figure who confounds this binary is Vasilii Rozanov, who repeatedly aligned himself with the literary tradition by referring to himself frequently as Dostoevskii’s Underground Man, but whose loosely connected, often paradoxical, works were often highly critical of religion. Sometimes the paradox exists on the level of the author’s view of his own work, such as Dostoevskii, who claimed to avoid mysticism, defining Orthodoxy in A Writer’s Diary [Dnevnik pisatelia, 1873-1881] as achieved “not by mystical beliefs but by love of
humanity,"97 but who all the while supported Russian ethnic (and, by extension, national) superiority through his many mentions of the “Russian idea.” Another such instance of paradox is found in the work of Aleksandr Zinov'ev, whose oeuvre includes both logical tracts and philosophical novels (or “sociological novels,” as he has referred to the genre). Like Ludwig Wittgenstein’s apostrophe to the reader at the conclusion of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, while binaries may appear helpful tools initially, the reader “eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it).”98


3.0 HOW RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY WROTE AND UNWROTE ITS OWN HISTORY

One of the broadest statements we could make about contemporary Russian philosophy, were we to allow ourselves for a moment the pleasure of such generalizations, might concern the difficulty of its characterization. While the average non-American philosopher has things to say about American pragmatism, the non-French about French postmodernism, and the non-German about German traditions of philosophical historiography, it is rarer that the non-Russian philosopher would care to converse on the topic of Russian thought.99 With the exception of small pockets of specialists (most notably in China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States), as Konstantin Rylev notes, outside Russia, “Russian philosophy is received … with a shrug of the shoulders.”100

99 Even in the field of Slavic Studies, which is the location of much of the scholarship on Russian culture and intellectual life, rarely do we find work on philosophical thought. Vladimir Krasikov discusses the lackluster representation of Russian philosophy on the English-language internet in Russian Philosophy Today (2008). See Krasikov, Russkaia filosofiia today (M: Volodei, 2008), 234-260.
Several reasons are repeatedly given to explain the marginal status of Russian philosophy. The most common of these claim Russia’s turbulent political history as a retarding factor in its intellectual development, point to a general unease within leading philosophical circles over inducting additional countries into the Western intellectual community, or cite the Russian language as a barrier in a predominantly English-driven philosophical market. While there is truth in all of these reasons, I would add one additional explanation that specialists, rightfully optimistic about the promise in Russian’s swift, post-Soviet intellectual development, are often hesitant to intimate: namely, that Russian thought has only a marginal role in the international community in part because Russian philosophers have yet to assert themselves in this community in any substantial way.\footnote{101} While this does not absolve the intellectual politics of noting that while Russian literature, art, science, film, and even the ‘Russian character’ are more or less well-defined, the nature of Russian philosophy remains a mystery.

[“В Европе русскую философию воспринимают … с пожиманием плеч.”]

Here it should be noted that Harbin, China, the primary destination of anti-Bolshevik, Russian émigrés during the pre-revolutionary period, is home to an active center for the study of Russian religious philosophy that regularly sends graduate students to Russia.

\footnote{101} There are certainly exceptions to this claim, such as Nikolai Berdiaev, whose many books in Western languages have been and remain influential; Lev Shestov, who enjoyed popularity especially in France in the twentieth century surrounding an elevated interest in existentialism; Vladimir Kantor, who was included among the list of twenty-five “great global thinkers” in 2005 in the French weekly \textit{Le Nouvel Observateur}; and Mikhail Ryklin, who was awarded the Leipzig...
the West, with its tendencies to canonize and colonize certain names and trends while letting others disappear into the folds of history, Russia must first enter into the system before we evaluate how that system reacts. Thus, while the non-French philosopher is bound to have come across American philosophy at some point during his academic career, we cannot rightfully expect the non-Russian philosopher to have any acquaintance with Russian thought.\textsuperscript{102} Even if a rich tradition of philosophy exists in Russia—one that is perhaps even, as Evert van der Zweerde has noted, “part of the European philosophical tradition from the very beginning”\textsuperscript{103}—it slips further and further off the philosophical map if no one is reading it.\textsuperscript{104}

If the cards for Russia abroad look grim, when we turn to Russian-language criticism we are given the impression that the domestic situation is even worse. Not only is it impossible to speak of a developed study of Russian philosophy outside the borders of Russia, but it is also often just as difficult to find a satisfactory characterization of Russian philosophy within

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Book Prize for Mutual Understanding in 2007, and whose work on the Moscow metro has enjoyed widespread popularity among Slavists.
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\textsuperscript{102} That is, to go out of his way to be a specialist in everything: to realize that Orthodox philosophy, for example, far from comprises the majority of the philosophical production of Russia, let alone know what Orthodox philosophy entails.


\textsuperscript{104} By “philosophical map” I mean what is accepted as the “philosophical canon,” usually corresponding to what is taught in required courses to university students.
Russia. Philosophy in Russian is incredibly pluralistic—at times almost unmanageably so, as we will see in chapters three and four. Yet a frequent opinion of Russia’s philosophers reflects another set of beliefs: that there is no philosophy at home, or that philosophy now exists primarily in deficient, imitative, or absurd forms.

According to a 2003 article by Aleksandr Ivanov, for instance, there can be no philosophy in Russia because contemporary Russian intellectual culture is entirely without ideas. In 2009, philologist Igor' Smirnov (University of Konstanz) travelled to Moscow to present an augmented version of Ivanov’s thesis: not only is the current Russian intellectual climate “idealess,” but its dominating characteristics are deception and hedonism. Daniil Kotsiubinskii has talked of Russian philosophers’ “deficient intellectual independence”; Dmitrii Gal'kovskii of their “complete unfruitfulness.”

Although a member of a more conservative

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105 Here I remind the reader that in speaking of “Russian philosophy” I mean “philosophy in Russia” and not the more narrow “Russian philosophy” [russkaia filosofiia], as defined in chapter one. I periodically use the English “Russian philosophy” for the sake of variability.


107 Smirnov, “Byvaiut li bezydeinye epokhi?” (paper presented at “Intellektual'nti iazyk epokhi: istoriia idei, istoriia slov” conference at the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia, 16-17 February 2009).

generation (he completed a graduate degree in philosophy in 1955), Valentin Tolstyk (Institute of Philosophy, Moscow) expressed the same cynicism in his memoirs: “The current era is clearly not philosophical. It is rather, in spirit and tone, more about the commercial market and the social scene,” he laments. In a review of “the year in philosophy,” publisher Valerii Anashvili summed up the situation colorfully and to the point: “the year 2008 did not really demonstrate any ‘trends or directions,’ but rather, it revealed a magnificent illustration of a simple fact: in the heads of our intellectuals, politicians, and population, only the most wild, impetuous, absurd, far-from-reality phantasms and perceptions continue to live and thrive.”

The sheer number and ardor of such comments suggests an alarming poverty of philosophy, as if a scan of the

109 Valentin Tolstyk, My byli. Sovetskii chelovek kak on est’ (M: Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 2008), 191.

[“Время сейчас явно не философское, скорее, тусовочно-рыночное по своему духу и тону.”]


[“2008 год скорее не продемонстрировал какие-то ‘тренды и направления,’ а явил собой великолепную иллюстрацию простого факта: в головах наших интеллектуалов, политиков и народонаселения продолжают жить и резвиться лишь самые дикие, буйные, несуразные, далекие от реальности фантазмы и представления.”]
“domestic philosophy” stacks in any Russian library would not yield any contemporary additions to the collection.\textsuperscript{111}

Yet, turn to the most traditional sub-field of philosophy in Russia, the history of Russian philosophy, and we are faced with a paradox. The self-abnegation of Russian philosophers, publishers, and intellectuals in regards to their own discipline stands out against a publication boom in the field of the history of Russian philosophy. Here I speak primarily of textbooks for the courses on Russian philosophy taught by their respective authors, all bearing some version of the same generic yet totalizing title: \textit{History of Russian Philosophy} \textit{[Irf]}\textsuperscript{112}. Most also include

\textsuperscript{111} It should be noted that such accusations are by no means limited to contemporary Russian thought. In a 2009 review of Vladimir Krasikov’s previously mentioned \textit{Russian Philosophy Today}, Vitalii Kurennoi recalls a similar allegation by the Marquis Astolphe de Custin in 1839: “Russia in an empire of catalogs. If you look over the headings alone everything seems wonderful, but beware of looking past the chapter names. Open a book and you will see that there is nothing in it. True, all the chapters are labeled, but they have yet to be written.” Qted. Kurennoi, “Soblazn tekhnologii,” \textit{Pushkin} 1 (2009), 114.

\textsuperscript{112} In the name of manageability, I have made two important distinctions here. First, I am interested solely in the history of Russian philosophy and not the entire study of the history of philosophy in Russia. While I would not disagree that the writing of Russian philosophy is part of this larger discipline, substantial work has already been done on the writing of the history of philosophy. See, for instance, Evert van der Zweerde, \textit{Soviet Historiography of Philosophy}. \textit{Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka} (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) and Vitalii Kurrennoi, “Zametki o
some sort of pedagogical subtitle, such as *Textbook for Higher Education Institutions* [*Uchebnik dlia VUZov*], *Course of Lectures* [*Kurs lektsii*], or, on the front cover of one history, “Recommended by Teachers at Moscow State University” [“Rekomenduetsia prepodavateliami MGU”]. ¹¹³

Certainly the active publication of histories of Russian philosophy is not enough to combat the argument that there is no philosophy in Russia today. If we look past the generic titles to the actual content of these histories, however, we see that although most present themselves as textbooks or educational supplements (many of which enjoy steady institutional funding precisely because of this fact), they are much more interesting than these pedagogical designation suggests. On the one hand, when compared to the tradition of Russian philosophical historiography, these histories are highly conservative in matters of content and form: both the subject matter (names, trends, movements) and the manner of presentation are predictable in

nekotorykh problemakh sovremmenoi otechestvennoi istorii filosofii,” *Logos* 3-4 (2004), 3-29. Moreover, these studies rarely touch the writing of the history of Russian thought.

The second distinction I have made is that, in order to work with a manageable number of texts, I have limited myself only to those books that purport to be histories of Russian philosophy. This thereby excludes the overwhelming number of pedagogical texts found on the shelves of university bookstores, many of which focus on exam preparation by advertising themselves not just as textbooks, but as study guides, handbooks, definition lists, and even “cheat sheets” [*shpargalki*].

almost every instance. On the other hand, in their traditionalism they are received as anachronistic. They clash with the changing discipline around them—a discipline that is increasingly looking to the contemporary West rather than to the Russian past in the search for a new philosophical paradigm. With such a vast array of histories in play at the present moment and with new histories and textbooks continuing to be published in the Russian Federation, it appears that the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy is paralyzed in the role of historian, when continuously rewriting the history of Russian philosophy is unlikely to earn it a place in the international philosophical community. In this chapter I argue that it is precisely this confusion of paradigms—the distinction between the sub-discipline of the History of Russian Philosophy [Istoriia russkoi filosofii] and a Western model of philosophical dialogue; the distinction between “historian of Russian philosophy” and “Russian [rossiiskii] philosopher”—that is at the center of the tension surrounding the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy, which retains its commitment to a philosophical tradition of the past while inciting an impassioned, discipline-abnegating compulsion to speak out against it.

Although it is not my goal here to retell the history of histories of Russian philosophy, a detour is necessary in order to make clear the tradition out of which the contemporary writing of the history of Russian philosophy comes.

3.1 HISTORIOSOPHY AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

When we speak of modern European historiography, it is impossible to agree on a common genesis point. While in Germany the tradition is typically thought to have begun with Leopold von Ranke (e.g. History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514 [Geschichte der
romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514], 1824), in Denmark it is traceable back to Arild Huitfeldt’s non-chronological Chronicle of the Kingdom of Denmark [Danmarks riges kronike, 1595-1604]. Evaluations of the French tradition then generally move forward in time, either to the Marquis de Condorcet, who wrote his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind [Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain] while in hiding from the authorities between 1793 and 1794, or to Jules Michelet, who completed his eighteen-volume history of France in 1867.

By “modern history” I have in mind histories that take a narrative approach to their subject matter, be it Huitfeldt’s noticeable sympathies for the aristocratic state and skepticism with regards to primary sources, or the emphasis on great politicians and quotations from primary sources in Von Ranke. In other words, modern historiography marks the deliberate interpretive retelling and organization of history. Here we cannot but turn to Hayden White’s thesis in Metahistory (1973), where he maintains that writing a history is essentially a poetic act. The historiographer takes texts, which make up the “data” of his work, and fashions an aesthetic product from them, which he then labels and distributes as “history.” As White notes, “there can be no ‘proper history’ which is not at the same time ‘philosophy of history,’” as to write a history is to already have a particular reading of the past in mind.114

While annalistic literature, or the simple recording of history, was present in Rus' as early as the Primary Chronicle [Povest' vremennykh let], Vasilii Tatishchev’s five-part interpretive Russian History Dating Back to the Most Ancient Times [Istoriia Rossiiskaia s samykh

—presented to the Academy of Sciences in 1739 but the first volume published only in 1768-1769—is typically considered the beginning of modern Russian historical inquiry. This continues with historical investigations by Mikhail Lomonosov, Mikhail Shcherbatov, and Ivan Boltin, and, several decades later, blooms in the form of Nikolai Karamzin’s unfinished poetic epic—his twelve-volume *History of the Russian State* [*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 1818].

An interest in historiography was slow to take up root in the discipline of philosophy, however. The first history of Russian philosophical thought—*Russian Philosophy* [*Russkaia filosofiiia*]—was published in 1840 by Archimandrite Gavriil, yet it was not until the early twentieth century that other texts of the same genre began to appear. Still, from the very

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115 For a history of the transition from an annalistic to a modern mode of history writing, see Tat’iana Artem’eva, “Ot letopisi k istorii” in *Ot slavnogo proshlogo k svetlomu budushchemu. Filosofiia istorii i utopia v Rossii epokhi Prosveshcheniia* (SPb: Aleteiia, 2005), 12-52. For a summary of the writing of Russian history from Tatishchev to the post-Stalin years, see Anatole Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, 2 ed. (Princeton: Greenwood P, 1958).

In the context of chapter one, it should be noted that Tatishchev and Karamzin use *rossiiskii*, a likely product of their enlightenment-era approach to historiography. On the first page of his history, for instance, Tatishchev directs his reader to Christian Wolff’s treatises on physics and moral philosophy to gain a better understanding of the author’s own conception of history.

116 In *University Philosophy in Russia* [*Universitetskaia filosofiiia v Rossii*, 2003], Vladimir Pustarnakov identifies the period between 1819 and 1823 as the first stage in the development of
beginning, these histories embraced the identification of Russian philosophy’s “characterizing traits” as their primary task. The goal was to delineate clearly Russian thought from other philosophical traditions, albeit (rather surprisingly) rarely with the motive of elevating it above all others. In fact, Boris Iakovenko and Gustav Shpet, following in the footsteps of Petr Chaadaev, would instead make a case for Russia’s intellectual inferiority in their *Sketches of Russian Philosophy* [*Ocherki russkoj filosofii*, 1922] and *Sketch of the Development of Russian Philosophy* [*Ocherk razvitiia russkoj filosofii*, 1922], respectively. Given that their approaches to form are nearly identical, what distinguishes histories of Russian philosophy from one another are the sets of “characterizing traits” that they offer—an objective that leads to a competitive dialogue between histories in which they reference, polemicize with, and, sometimes, even denounce, one another.

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Russian philosophical historiography. In this period, Russia saw the gradual release of a four-volume collection of speeches by Moscow University professors from its founding in 1755 to the 1820s, supplemented with short biographical sketches. See: *Rechi, proiznesennye v torzhestvennykh sobraniakh Imp. Moskovskogo universiteta russkimi professorami onogo s kratkim ikh zhizneopisaniem*, 4 vols (M: N.p., 1819-1823). This project is more accurately described as historical documentation rather than historiography, however, as the collection does not include any attempt to provide a historical narrative but simply brings historical documents together under one heading. The same could be said about Aleksandr Galich’s earlier two-volume *History of Philosophical Systems* [*Istoriia filosofskikh system*, 1818]—a dictionary of philosophical terminology.
Archimandrite Gavrili, or Vasilii Voskresenskii, was Professor in the Department of Ecclesiastical Law at Kazan’ State University from 1835 until 1850. *Russian Philosophy* was the concluding volume of his six-part *History of Philosophy* [Istoriia filosofii], written between 1839 and 1840. Here Gavrili offers a tripartite model for understanding Russian thought, emphasizing Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality [narodnost’] as the three fundamental pillars of Russian philosophy—a tradition he traces back to the Christianization of Rus’ in 988. While his inclusion of theologians and statesmen in the ranks of Russia’s first philosophers would evoke suspicion from his predecessors, there is nothing surprising in Gavrili’s methodology. Seven years earlier, in 1833, along with his Minister of Education Sergei Uvarov, Nicholas I had adopted a tri-partite policy concerning the structure of the university system in the Russian Empire, declaring that the principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality (often called the “Uvarov triad”) should govern where public education was concerned. Even before Nicholas’ decree, early glimmerings of the triad are found in Karamzin’s history. Structurally typical of the Enlightenment in its encyclopedic, catalogic leanings, Karamzin’s history reprimands the early Slavs for their misguided belief in unfettered freedom, failing to recognize what they would

117 Even before Archimandrite Gavrili’s history there is a long tradition of viewing Russian thought as something removed from both Western and Eastern practices. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, when G. W. Leibniz began his correspondence with Peter the Great regarding the establishment of a Russian Academy of Sciences, it was precisely this “otherness”—specifically, Russia as a *tabula rasa* in matters of the sciences—that drew him to the project. See Leibniz, *Leibniz in seinen Beziehungen zu Russland und Peter dem Grossen*, 2 parts, comp. Wladimir Guerrier (Leipzig: N.p., 1873), II 9.
later relish: the advantages of strong rule. It was precisely this allure of despotism in Karamzin that Pushkin mocked in his epigram from 1818:

In his *History*, elegance and simplicity

Prove to us without bias

The necessity of autocracy


[“В его «Истории» изящность, простота / Доказывают нам, без всякого пристрастья, / Необходимость самовластья / И прелести кнута.”]

By the early twentieth century other histories of Russian philosophy began to appear.\footnote{It should be noted that in the 1800s Sil'vestr Gogotski i’s *Philosophical Lexicon* [*Filosofskii leksikon*, 1857] and *Philosophical Dictionary* [*Filosofskii slovar’,* 1876] were also published in Russia.} The earliest of these was Evgenii Bobrov’s three-volume *Philosophy in Russia. Materials, Research, and Notes* [*Filosofia v Rossii. Materialy, issledovaniia i zametki*, 1889-1903]. A student of Leibniz scholar Gustav Teichmuller at Dorpat University (present-day University of Tartu) and, later, professor at Kazan’ State University, Bobrov was himself a dedicated Leibnizian. He is often linked with the early university tradition in Russian philosophy, which, although neglected in comparison with scholarship on German or American academic philosophy, was itself rich with an often psychology-oriented positivism and a substantial neo-
Kantian tradition. Known for his own contribution to the Russian neo-Kantian movement—the reformulation of the slogan “back to Kant” as “back to Leibniz”—Bobrov’s history, which he published in six installments over the course of fourteen years, is equally centered on the academic tradition. Rather than provide classifying traits (and in this way, making a methodological choice that we will later see is typical of those histories that focus on academic philosophy), Bobrov concluded that it was structured inquiry in the discipline of the history of philosophy alone that could provide objective answers in an intellectual climate of controversial topics.

A decade after the release of Bobrov’s third volume, Ernest Radlov published Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy [Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii, 1912], a development of an earlier work published in a German-language journal in 1890. After studying in St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Leipzig, Radlov returned to Russia to become a founding member of the Philosophical Society at St. Petersburg University in 1901, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and, toward the end of his life, director of the St. Petersburg public library (1917-1924). He wrote several philosophical textbooks and histories, including History of Philosophy [Istoriia filosofii, 1897], Sketch of the History of the Historiography of Philosophy [Ocherk

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121 Bobrov, Filosofiia v Rossii. Materialy, issledovaniia i zametki, 3 vols (Kazan': N.p., 1899-1903).

istorii istoriografii filosofii, 1899], *Introduction to Philosophy* [Vvedenie v filosofiiu, 1912], and *Philosophical Dictionary* [Filosofskii slovar’, 1913].\(^{123}\) For Radlov, philosophy was a universal knowledge system comprised of sub-disciplines (philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, psychology, and sociology), all of which are directed toward the investigation of three primary philosophical concepts: truth [*istina*], existence, and duty [*dolzhenstvovanie*]. The unpacking of these concepts, in which intuition, speculation, and critical reflection were all to play an important role, would in turn lead to answers to what Radlov viewed as the three fundamental questions of human existence: How does one explain natural phenomena, human perception and knowledge, and human action?

In his *Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy* Radlov undertakes a task as paradoxical as the above coexistence of critical reflection and speculation. He sets out to write the history of philosophy of a country that, according to him, has produced *no* original philosophy. Here we clearly see the legacy of Chaadaev’s first philosophical letter from 1829, as

\(^{123}\) Radlov also participated in the editing of the collected works of Vladimir Solov’ev (1911-1914), about whom he wrote several books. For his editorial work, see Radlov and S. M. Solov’ev, eds., *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergieevicha Solov’eva*, 3 vols (SPb: Prosvieshchenie, 1911-14). For his original work on Solov’ev, see Radlov, *Kharakter tvorchestva Vl. Solov’eva* (SPb, 1909); *Uchenie Vl. Solov’eva o svobode voli* (SPb, 1911); *Gnoseologii Vl. Solov’eva* (M, 1913); and *Vladimir Solov’ev. Zhizn’ i uchenie* (Spb, 1913). Radlov also published a *Philosophical Dictionary of Logic, Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, and the History of Philosophy* [Filosofskii slovar’ logiki, psikhologii, etiki, estetiki i istorii filosofii, 1911 and 1913].
Radlov laments that the Russian people “do not have an original philosophy or a self-sustained philosophical system at all.” It is impossible to speak of Russian philosophy in the same way that one speaks of French, German, or English philosophy, he continues, insofar as a national philosophy and national philosophers (“Descartes for the French, Kant for the Germans, Bacon for the English”) do not exist in Russia.

Yet, after first condemning Russian thought as unoriginal, bordering on nonexistent, Radlov continues by delineating its two distinguishing characteristics, retracing the same paradoxical steps Chaadaev took as his thoughts develop over the course of the eight letters. The

124 Radlov, Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii (SPb: N.p., 1912), 3.
[“У русских нет вполне оригинальной философии, самостоятельной философской системы.”]
125 Ibid., 4. Here Radlov’s argument is consistent with Chaadaev’s allegations in his Philosophical Letters, where he states that, thus far, Russia has made no significant intellectual strides and has contributed nothing substantial to world progress. Similar accusations can be found in the work of Nikolai Berdiaev, who titles one section of his Cloudy Faces: Types of Religious Thought in Russia [Mutnye liki: tipy religioznoi mysli v Rossii, 1915-1922] as “Apotheosis of Russian Laziness” [“Apofeoz russkoi leni”]. Narratives that emphasize the unoriginality and failure of Russian thinkers are prevalent even in contemporary scholarship, such as Boris F. Egorov’s more recent book Russian Utopias [Rossiiskie utopii, 2007], in which he argues that the defining features of Russian philosophers are faith in utopia, hope in providence, and crippling laziness (what Nikolai Dobroliubov coined “Oblomovshchina” in 1859).
first distinguishing characteristic that Radlov cites is a borrowing and simplification of Bobrov: the propensity toward the search for truth and the meaning of life. The second characteristic, Radlov continues, is Russian philosophy’s preoccupation with spirituality, mysticism, and questions that address the power and necessity of faith. It is this paradox—the identification of distinguishing traits of a philosophy we are told does not exist—that fails to trouble Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk in his 1913 *The Spirit of Russia* when he praises Radlov for “admit[ting] that Russia has not yet produced a thoroughly original and independent system of philosophy” while also “refus[ing] to accept the skeptical view that, while philosophy is known in Russia, there is no Russian philosophy.”

In the second edition of *Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy* (1920), Radlov revises his take on Russian philosophy significantly. The tradition is now characterized, he writes, by “a dominating interest in ethical questions—not in theoretical questions, but specifically in the application of ethical theories in practice.” It is also characterized by “a love for the objective, in the negation of subjectivity.”

Matvei Ershov’s *The Path of the Development of Philosophy in Russia* [*Put’ razvitiia filosofii v Rossii*, 1921] combines the university-focus of Bobrov’s *Philosophy in Russia* with the


127 Radlov, *Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii* (SPb, 1912), 4.

[“Первая—это преимущественный интерес к этическим вопросам, притом не теоретическим, а именно к применению этических теорий на практике ... Вторая ... состоит в любви к объективному, в отрицании субъективизма.”]
negation of Radlov’s 1912 Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy. He discusses in detail developments in philosophy at Moscow State University (e.g. Pamfil Iurkevich, Matvei Troitskii, Nikolai Grot), St. Petersburg University (e.g. Mikhail Vladislavtsev, Aleksandr Vvedenskii, Nikolai Losskii), and Kiev University (e.g. Sil'vestr Gogotskii and Aleksei Kozlov). Although Ershov’s approach is optimistic—Russian philosophy will, without a doubt, make its mark—he admits that it has so far failed in developing an original domestic tradition: what he views as the main requirement of a “national philosophy.”

Like Bobrov’s methodologically similar history, Ershov fails to provide an answer as to what “original” might mean in this case. He is clear, however, that it can occur only in the universities (specifically, in Moscow and St. Petersburg) and only in a post-1863 Russia—the date of the statute that called an end to over a decade of prohibition of philosophy in institutions of higher education (between 1850 and 1861/63, depending on the university).

As the century progresses and university philosophy is quickly upstaged by religious metaphysics and theological concerns, the delineation of “characterizing traits” becomes an irremovable part of philosophical historiography. Although the insistence of historians on offering these personalized schemas is explainable by White’s evaluation of history as a

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128 Ershov, Put' razvitiiia filosofii v Rossii (Vladivostok, 1922), 5. Ershov’s conception of philosophy here is linked to the Russian nation [natsiia], as the development of philosophy in a particular country is dependent on the political policy, both foreign and domestic. See Ershov, Puti razvitiiia, 66-67.

129 Ibid., 23.

130 Ibid., 14.
narrative, or poetic, act, his thesis does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the exceptionalist, and often messianic, tendencies in these histories. I would argue that these tendencies are profitably viewed in terms of a changing view of the discipline of philosophy from something that occurs in the universities and academies to a metaphysically based practice. This change is then reflected in a linguistic distinction prevalent in the discussion of Russian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Just as russki and rossiiskii have taken on particular etymological and ideological functions, beginning at the turn of the nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, historiography is often set aside in favor of the Romantic borrowing, “historiosophy.” Moreover, Russian thinkers have taken great care to distinguish and elevate historiosophy from the history of philosophy, though the distinction is never truly clear.\textsuperscript{131}

In his 1883 essay “Philosophy of History and Historiosophy” [“Filosofia istorii i istoriosofii’], for instance, historian Nikolai Kareev claims that while the philosophy of history is the “philosophical survey of the past fates of humanity,” historiosophy refers to the

\textsuperscript{131} On historiosophy in Russian Rosicrucian thinker Ivan Lopukhin see Andreas Berg, “Ivan Lopukhin and the Development of Mystical Historiosophy in Late Eighteenth-Century Russia,” The Yearbook of the “Gheorghe Şincai” Institute for Social Sciences and the Humanities of the Romanain Academy XI (2008), 44-57. For a rare contemporary use of the term in reference to a non-Russian thinker, see Arthur McCalla, A Romantic Historiosophy: The Philosophy of History of Pierre-Simon Ballanche (Boston: Brill, 1998).
development of philosophical theories of historical knowledge and the historical process.\textsuperscript{132} Here Kareev seems to want to identify the surveying and description of various views (for him a somehow purely empirical, and possibly objective, project) as the philosophy of history, whereas the actual formation of these positions falls into the category of historiosophy. In this way the historian of philosophy turns his back to the future, becoming the passive observer of the past that Walter Benjamin saw in Paul Klee’s \textit{Angelus Novus} (1920), whereas the historiosopher participates actively in the making of intellectual history.\textsuperscript{133} Alongside the many problems with this opaque distinction, such a view lies in clear contrast with the dominant Western model that places historical investigation precisely within the bounds of the philosophy of history (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and even, for that matter, Fukuyama).

The ill-defined term “historiosophy” also appears in Nikolai Berdiaev’s assertion that “original Russian thought is born as historiosophical thought,” thus elevating historiosophy as superior to other historical modes.\textsuperscript{134} According to Georgii Florovskii, historiosophy is any speculation on the “fate of Russia,” which he sees most apparently in Chaadaev and, shortly after, the Slavophiles.\textsuperscript{135} We encounter the same discriminating use of the term as representative of some “innate” quality of Russian thought in Vasilii Zen'kovskii’s \textit{History of Russian

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Berdiaev} Berdiaev, \textit{O russkoi filosofii} (Ekaterinburg, 1991), 5.
\end{thebibliography}
Philosophy [Irf, 1948-1950], where he explains that Russian thought is “completely historiosophical” [“сплош' иstoriosofichna”], since “it is constantly addressing the question of the meaning of history, the end of history, etc.” In recent scholarship, Lev Shaposhnikov and Aleksandr Fedorov’s 2006 History of Russian Philosophy [Istoriiia russkoi religioznoi filosofii] evokes this enigmatic category in a section dedicated to “The Historiosophy of the Slavophiles” [“Istoriosophiia slavianofilov”], while Mikhail Maslin’s 2008 History [Irf] notes that, for Solov’ev, historiosophy was “an attempt to understand world history as a ‘long line of free actions.’” In his 1994 “Introduction to the Historiosophy of Russia” [“Vvedenie v istoriosophiiu Rossii”], Aleksandr Kazin notes that in Russia the historiosophical question is “a question of Russia as a spiritual-historical reality: her past, her present, and her future.” In all cases, no attempt is made to explain to the reader in what the difference between the philosophy of history and historiosophy might consist.

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[“… больше всего занята темой о человеке, о его судьбе и путях, о смысле и целях истории.”]
137 Shaposhnikov and Fedorov, Istoriiia russkoi religioznoi filosofii (M, 2006); Maslin, ed, Istoriiia russkoi filosofii (M: Vysshaia shkola, 2008), 344.
139 Here a productive comparison can be made to Henry Laurie’s history of Scottish philosophy, Scottish Philosophy in its National Development (1902). Although Laurie’s history clearly employs a romantic model, in that the author consistently returns to stating his goal of “considering the philosophy of Scotland as a national development,” he does so exclusively by
In an entry for “istoriosofiia” in Viacheslav Kemerov’s *Philosophical Encyclopedia* ([Filosofskaia entsiklopediia, 1998], author E. V. Gutov provides us with a bit more clarity, defining the term as “the philosophy of history in the form of an integral [tselostnoe] insight into drawing Scottish thought into comparison with corresponding international philosophical dialogues: for instance, discussing Immanuel Kant as a critical response to David Hume, or tracing the influence of Thomas Reid on French spiritual thought. See Laurie, *Scottish Philosophy in its National Development* (Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1902), 7.

However, James McCosh’s *The Scottish Philosophy* from 1874 does engage in identifying explicit “characterizing traits” and, in fact, the first section of the work is entitled “Characteristics of the School.” Here we learn that Scottish philosophy is identifiable by three main features: 1) its employment of the method of observation; 2) a view of self-consciousness as the instrument of observation; and 3) the idea that, with the help of consciousness, one is able to come to know principles prior to and independent of experience (what Reid called “principles of common sense”). See McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy* (NY: R. Carter, 1874), 2-7.

In contemporary histories, however, we no longer find such Romantic inclinations. For instance, Alexander Broadie’s *A History of Scottish Philosophy* (2009) does not focus on providing characterizing traits of Scottish philosophy (except for the assertion that Scotland’s rich philosophical tradition testifies to a deep interest in abstract speculation), but instead poses the question, “What do we mean by ‘Scottish philosophy?’” He concludes: “There surely cannot be anything Scottish about the question whether our powers of sense perception deliver up truths about the world, nor anything Scottish about the answer. That is surely incontestable.” See Broadie, *A History of Scottish Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), 2.
the variability and the continuity of concrete historical forms.”

Here we see the influence of F. W. J. Schelling, who, in parting ways with what he saw to be the stifling rationalism of his college roommate, G. W. F. Hegel, viewed history not only as the process of the gradual unfolding and self-revelation of the absolute. It also included an intuitive element, engaging the human intellect in the urgent task of grasping history’s “One Ideal.”

Under the early influence of Fichtean transcendental idealism, this ideal was most attainable through the creativity of the arts. After moving through a period of productivity on absolute identity (which was, for Schelling, the condition for consciousness), Schelling would later add religion as another access point into the object of history. What the arts and religion had in common was that they reached this “One Ideal” of the world system through intuition [Anschauung], on which was based not just the whole of mathematics, but the natural sciences in their most perfect form. Although much of Schelling—particularly the Naturphilosophie—is criticized for being poorly organized and underdeveloped (or simply erroneous), it was perhaps this porosity that made his thought so attractive to Russian thinkers, finding in it room for interpretation and appropriation.

For Gutov, the object of history is revealed through historiosophical intuition, or knowledge of the three stages in which history is grounded: 1) the beginning of history; 2) the end of history; and 3) the space between them, which includes the process of world-creation

"философии истории, созданная как целостное постижение вариативности и преемственности конкретных исторических форм"

[mirotvorenie] in the form of historical, social cultural, and religious continuity—that is, as Gutov elaborates, man’s inclusion in the universal process. This tripartite division of human history will immediately take the reader back to Hegel’s division between traditional society, modernity, and a third stage—one that would take the best aspects from the previous two, and one that the author’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* [*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807] was, rather egotistically, meant to usher in.

Perhaps an even more fruitful connection could be made to August Cieszkowski’s reading of Hegel in *Prolegomena to a Historiosophy* [*Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, 1838]. Here the three stages include: 1) the primal harmony of antiquity; 2) the alienated reflection of the Christian period, marked by a tension between spirit and matter, as between action and thought; and 3) the eventual overcoming of duality through the synthesis of opposites. While Cieszkowski’s three-fold division appears almost structurally identical to the Hegelian arrangement, it was, as Arthur McCalla notes, a “confrontation of Hegel with the messianism of the Polish Romantics.”

Cieszkowski’s third stage was in fact a post-Hegelian state, in which the Hegalian dualism between spirit and particular existence was overcome through a synthesis of opposites, making way for a palingenetic immortality. In this final stage, the soul would

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progressively perfect itself through a series of transfigurations, continuing well past the endpoint of history in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.

Indeed, Gutov may have had Cieszkowski in mind when he called attention to the specifically Christian form of historiososophical insight, where the individual comes to comprehend the “essence” of history—the universal laws and metahistorical meanings developing in it.¹⁴⁴ This happens, he notes, through a synthesis of Judaic messianism and the eschatological elements of the New Testament, in particular the Book of Revelation. For Gutov, thus, historiosophy is a higher form of the history of philosophy, in which the individual gains insight into the absolute knowledge of history: for Cieszkowski—its post-Hegelian *telos*; for Schelling—its “One Ideal.”

In the writing of the history of Russian philosophy, the growing messianic urgency to have a historiosophy—a theory of history that is somehow particularly suited to the Russian context—escalates in the mid and late twentieth century: this time, not only as an extended response to Romanticism, but as a result of the fact that, after the expatriation of the intelligentsia in the early 1920s, Orthodox philosophy continued its life abroad in émigré communities of exiled religious philosophers. Georgii Florovskii’s history, *The Ways of Russian Theology* [*Puti russkogo bogosloviia*, 1937], for instance, not only limits its content to religious philosophy, but spends at least half of its focus on what the author calls “the path to catastrophe”—the lead-up to the Philosophy Steamer—with section titles like “On the Eve” [“Nakanune”] and “The Russian Soul at the Fatal Junction. The Beginning of the Tragedy of Russian Culture” [“Russkaia dusha

na rokovom perekreste. Zaviazka russkoi tragedii kul'tury”. 145 In fact, of the most well known of such philosophers, only Pavel Florenskii and Aleksei Losev remained in Russia, and both ended up in the camps. 146 The writing of the history of philosophy during this period, thus, can in some way be seen as an attempt to recreate pre-revolutionary orthodox scholarship within Russian diasporas. 147 As Adbusalam Guseinov and Vladislav Lekstorskii have put it, “it was

145 Florovskii left the Soviet Union before the dispatch of the steamer, moving first to Bulgaria in 1920, to Prague in 1926, and to New York in 1948.

146 Losev, who was arrested in 1930 on the charge of “militant idealism,” served three years of a ten-year sentence and, nearly blind, was allowed to return to Moscow in 1933 after working to complete Stalin’s White Sea Canal; Florenskii, imprisoned for a monograph he had written about the theory of relativity, spent several years in the infamous Solovki prison camp before he was shot in 1937.

147 It should be noted, however, that Florovskii’s history was received as extreme even within the context of émigré Orthodoxy. Its orientation on an idealized, pre-revolutionary past received staunch criticism from other philosophers abroad and in the 1937 article “Orthodoxy and Humaneness” [“Ortodokiia i chelovechnost’”] published in the émigré journal Path [Put’], Nikolai Berdiaev, who was known for his own form of religious extremism during the later years of his life, condemned Florovskii’s history, suggesting that it would have been better titled the Waylessness of Russian Theology [Besputstvo russkogo bogoslovia]. Angry about the way he was portrayed in the book, Berdiaev accuses its author of being a “Romantic Byzantinist” and not a “Russian Christian:” “Florovskii describes Fr. S. Bulgakov and me up until the year 1917, but our most important books, those defining our world-view, were written after 1917. This is
effectively Russian philosophy itself which was in exile: it survived in the countries of Europe, but as a fragment of the old Russia, as a pale manifestation of its arrested dreams.”

Following Florovskii’s history, between 1948 and 1950 in Paris Vasilii Zen'kovskii published *History of Russian Philosophy* [Irf]. “If it is necessary to give some sort of general characteristics of Russian philosophy,” Zen'kovskii begins, as though any proper historiographical project requires such a characterization, “then in the first place I would have to propose the *anthropocentrism* of Russian philosophical pursuits. Russian philosophy … is above all concerned with the *theme of man*, of his fate and paths, of the meaning and goals of history.” Here Zen'kovskii emphasizes the “profound and essential” role of religion,” yet he is careful not to subsume the majority of Russian thought under the category of theology—a


[“О. Г. Флоровский характеризует о. С. Булгакова и меня до 17 года, в то время как главные наши книги, определяющие наше миросозерцание, написаны после 17 года. Это неправильно.”]


[“Если уже нужно давать какие-либо общие характеристики русской философии, … то я бы на первый план выдвинул антропоцентризм русских философских исканий. Русская философия … больше всего занята темой о человеке, о его судьбе и путях, о смысле и целях истории.”]

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reservation that may account for the popularity of his text and its perceived objectivity among many contemporary historians, religious and secular alike.

A year later, History of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 1951] was published by Nikolai Losskii, whose death in 1965, along with the death of Fedor Stepun in the same year, is typically considered to mark the end of the period of Russian émigré philosophy. Like Radlov and Florovskii, Losskii defines the nature of Russian thought as anti-theoretical and religion-oriented: “Russian philosophers believe in intellectual intuition, in moral and aesthetic experiences, which reveal the highest values to us; but above all they believe in the mystical religious experience, which establishes a connection between man and god and his kingdom.”

Although he dedicates a substantial part of the chapter “Epistemology, Logic, and Metaphysics on the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century” to the importance of epistemological questions to Russian thinkers (particularly “intuitivism in epistemology,” or what he calls “epistemological realism”), his history quickly lapses into a predictable survey of the principal thinkers and ideas of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with over sixty pages on Vladimir Solov'ev alone. Perhaps the most interesting moment of Losskii’s text appears in the penultimate chapter, dedicated to “recent developments in Russian philosophy,” which also unfortunately

150 Losskii, Istoriia russkoj filosofii (M: Progress, 1994), 472.
[“Русские философы доверяют интеллектуальной интуиции, нравственному и эстетическому опытом, раскрывающим нам высочайшие ценности, но прежде всего они доверяют мистическому религиозному опыту, который устанавливает связь человека с богом и его царством”]

151 Losskii, Istoriia russkoj filosofii, 90-146.
includes a nepotistic nod to himself and his son, with individual sections entitled “N. Losskii” and “V. Losskii.”

The streamlining of philosophy during the Soviet era, whether in the form of early purges or varying restrictions on publishing, in many ways carved out an attractive niche for the study of the history of philosophy. As Van der Zweerde notes, historiography developed as “a semi-autonomous discipline in combination with the—in the last resort political—requirement to stay, at least formally, within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.” ¹⁵² In other words, the history of philosophy was an almost ideologically neutralized sphere in which philosophers could quietly carry out their research without the anticipation of much trouble from the authorities. The same could not be said for the sub-field of the history of Russian philosophy, however, which, when separated from its ideologically problematic components (i.e. mysticism, religious philosophy, idealism), left little for the researcher to study. It is not surprising, thus, that the few histories of Russian philosophy in the Soviet Union took the form of criticism of these very elements.

For instance, the multi-authored *From the History of Russian Philosophy* [*Iz istorii russkoi filosofii*, 1952] begins by denouncing the histories of Iakovenko, Shpet, and Radlov as fallacious works by “the most cynical idealist-reactionary White-émigré pseudo-historians” for engaging in the “mockery of the philosophical thought of the Russian people.” ¹⁵³ In the first


chapter, Mikhail Iovchik (founder and former chairman of the Department of the History of Russian Philosophy at Moscow State University under the auspices of which this history was written) assures the reader that in the place of religious thought, Marxist-Leninism has allowed the realization of the previously impossible: that is, the scientific study of the particularities of the development of Russian philosophy (and the philosophies of all nations, for that matter). The identifying characteristic of Russian thought, he continues, is its fusion of progressive materialistic tendencies with democratic thinking as it seeks to answer the burning question of philosophy: Did God create the world, or does material exist independently and eternally? The impatient reader is in luck; the answer is given before the question is posed.\textsuperscript{154}

We find a less dogmatic appraisal in Anatolii Galaktionov and Petr Nikandrov’s \textit{History of Russian Philosophy} [\textit{Irf}, 1961], which appeared in two later versions: the second in 1970 as \textit{History of Russian Philosophy XI-XIX c.} [\textit{Isf XI-XIX vekov}], and the third in 1989 as \textit{History of Russian Philosophy IX-XX c.} [\textit{Isf IX-XX vekov}].\textsuperscript{155} Both members of the Department of the

[“издевательство над философской мыслью русского народа”]

\textsuperscript{154} No less biting in its criticism is Valerii Kuvakin’s \textit{Religious Philosophy in Russia} \textit{[Religioznaia filosofiia v Rossii}, 1980], which studies Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and others as examples of an anti-intellectual bourgeois philosophy. See Kuvakin, \textit{Religioznaia filosofiia v Rossii} (M: Mysl', 1980).

\textsuperscript{155} In the 1961 version the volume declares its task to be the illumination of philosophical trends “in correspondence with Lenin’s instructions” [“v sootvetstvii s ukazaniiami V. I. Lenina”]. This preface is removed from both subsequent editions. Galaktionov and Nikandrov, \textit{Istoriia russkoi filosofii} (M: Izd-vo sotsial'no-ekon. lit-ry, 1961), 3.
History of Philosophy at the then Leningrad State University, Galaktionov and Nikandrov begin their study of “original Russian philosophy” in the mid-nineteenth century, spending a considerable amount of time on Maksim Antonovich, Mikhail Bakunin, Vissarion Belinskii, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Aleksandr Herzen, and Dmitrii Pisarev. By the 1860s Russian thought was so influential, the history confirms, that it had an influence not only on its brother Slavic peoples, but on the more progressive countries of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{156} While naturally spending a great deal of time on the tension between idealism and materialism, the history ironically spares the reader the totalitarianism of “characterizing traits,” providing instead a welcome summary of thinkers (e.g. Konstantin Kavelin, Nikolai Speshnev, and Maksim Kovalevskii) that are rarely mentioned in religious or university-focused histories alike. The same is the case for the five volume, multi-author \textit{History of Philosophy in the USSR} [\textit{Istoriia filosofii v SSSR}, 1968-1988], which instead highlights “tendencies” [\textit{tendentsii}] in Russian philosophical thought, such as “god-searching” and “confrontations with rationalism,” rather than characterizing traits.\textsuperscript{157}

We find a similar situation in Georgii Plekhanov’s three-volume \textit{History of Russian Social Thought} [\textit{Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli}, 1914-1925]. Although Plekhanov opens by stating that the entirely of his work comes from the point of view of Marx’s famous formula “being determines consciousness,”\textsuperscript{158} he avoids essentializing Russian philosophy, actually referring to Belinskii as a fanatic for his claim in “A View of Russian Literature from 1864”

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\textsuperscript{156} Galaktionov and Nikandrov, \textit{Russkaia filosofiia XI-IX vekov} (L, 1970), 17-18.
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[“Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1846 goda”] that “one of the greatest, most intelligent successes of our time is that we finally understood that Russia had her own history, one that does not resemble the histories of any of the European states.”

In looking back over the writing of the history of Russian philosophy, the reader will be immediately struck by the relentless insistence on essentialization with regards to classification. While classification is an unavoidable aspect of scholarship, here the answer to the question “What is Russian philosophy?” can be summed up in the delineation of sets of intrinsic properties or “characterizing traits” in the Introduction (or, in the case of Losskii’s history, the Conclusion), which the remainder of the text then serves to prove. These characteristics, in turn, are highly correlative to the structure of the intellectual hegemony of the day. In Archimandrite Gavriil’s history, this classificatory tendency took the form of an essentializing “national” narrative that offered a view of philosophy as intimately connected with a concept of Russian Orthodoxy, autocracy and, nationality. In Russian histories from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1922, and then continuing in émigré communities abroad until 1965, this same classifying tendency is apparent in philosophy’s movement to an almost exclusive Orthodox focus, as well as an increase in messianism and “historosophical” approaches. At home, histories from this same period responded to the further compaction of the discipline according to the current official narrative, where the representation of Russian philosophy (for instance, on the pages of the many editions of the philosophical encyclopedias and dictionaries) depended on the edition, as each re-print reflected the state’s stance on philosophy at a given time.

159 Plekhanov, Istoriiia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, 9.
3.2 CONTEMPORARY HISTORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS AND ARGUING OVER PHILOSOPHY

When we turn to contemporary histories of Russian philosophy we see that, in regards to content, they do not differ substantially from their predecessors. There is still a frequent focus on the religious tradition (e.g. Serbinenko, Shaposhnikov, Zamaleev), with few either substantially (Maslin) or exclusively (Pustarnakov) addressing university philosophy. What sets the contemporary writing of the history of Russian philosophy apart from the earlier tradition, however, is the sheer volume of histories published. This trend begins in the nineties, with Mikhail Gromov and N. S. Kozlov’s *Russian Philosophical Thought X-XVII c.* [Russkaia filosofskaiia mysl’ X-XVII vekov, 1990], Vasilii Vanchugov’s *Sketch of the History of “Original Russian” Philosophy* [Ocherk istorii filosofii “Samobytno-russkoi”, 1994], Sergei Levitskii’s *Sketches on the History of Russian Philosophy* [Ocherki po istorii russkoi filosofii, 1996], and Avraam Novikov’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [Irf, 1998].

[Один их величайших умственных успехов нашего времени в том состоит, что мы, наконец, поняли, что у России была своя история, нисколько не похожая на историю ни одного европейского государства.]

160 Here we should also note Andrei Sukhov’s tediously titled *Russian philosophy. Path of Development. Sketches of Theoretical History* [Russkaia filosofiia. Put' razvitiia. Ocherki teoreticheskoi istorii], which appeared in 1989. Sukhov was the head of the sub-department for the history of Russian philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences (Moscow) between 1982-1992 and was influential in policy making. Another interesting text by Sukhov, though not structured as a history, is his *Russian Philosophy. Particularities, Traditions,
By the early twenty-first century we see the publication of these histories develop into an outright historical boom with several histories released each year, the most well-known of which are Petr Sapronov’s *Russian Philosophy. An Attempt at a Typological Characterization* [Russkaia filosofia. Opyt tipologicheskoi kharakteristiki, 2000]; Aleksandr Zamaleev’s *Lectures on the History of Russian Philosophy XI-XX C.* [Lektsii po irf XI-XX, 2001]; P. V. Kalitan and A. P. Kozyrev’s *Russian Philosophy: Diversity in Unity* [Russkaia filosofia: Mnogoobrazie v edinstve, 2001]; Petr Apyshko’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [IrF, 2001]; Igor’ Evlampiev’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [IrF, 2002]; Zamaleev’s *Chronicle of Russian Philosophy: 862-2002* [Letopis’ russkoi filosofii: 862-2002, 2003]; Leonid Stolovich’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [IrF, 2005]; Boris Emel’ianov and Konstantin Liubutin’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [IrF, 2005]; Lev Shaposhnikov and Aleksandr Fedorov’s *History of Russian Religious Philosophy* [Istoriia russkoi religioznoi filosofii, 2006], and Mikhail Maslin’s *History of Russian Philosophy* [IrF, 2008], although this list is far from exhaustive.

While it could be argued that in the past twenty years literature and cinema have lived through their respective historical crises and moved on to other topics of investigation (e.g. ethics, contemporaneity, imperial anxiety), the legacy inherited from perestroika—the idea that everyone has the right to his own history and to publish this history—remains an increasingly

Historical Fates [Russkaia filosofia. osobennosti, traditsii, istoricheskie sud’by, 1995]. Here Sukhov vacillates between essentializing Russian philosophy and situating the tradition critically in the history of philosophy. That is, he makes comments about the “uniqueness” of Russian thought while also labeling some phenomena as products of a shared Western philosophical approach. See: Sukhov, *Russkaia filosofia* (M: IF RAN, 1995).
relevant guiding principle in the discipline of philosophy. We can, thus, speak of an almost hyper-developed tradition of philosophical historiography. And while we cannot deny the solid scholarship of many of these texts, after twenty years of publishing such histories they are rarely able to offer anything new, solidifying their role as the frequent object of scrutiny in the mainstream Russian academic community.

Furthermore, not surprisingly the majority of these contemporary studies are still engaged in the pigeonholing of Russian thought according to essentialized characterizing traits. Take, for instance, Shaposhnikov and Fedorov’s 2006 *History of Russian Religious Philosophy*. Although more developed and self-reflexive than many histories from the twentieth century, the authors still present their characterizing traits in the work’s Introduction. These are: 1) *diffusion*, relating specifically to the wide array of philosophical ideas at play at any time; 2) *ontologism*, referring to the ontologization of truth as apparent in the hesychist tradition; 3) *aestheticism*; and 4) *sobornost’,* or “unity in the many.” While these four traits are perhaps a helpful summary of important trends in Russian philosophical thought, Shaposhnikov and Fedorov go on to flex their historiosophical muscles in their condemnation of earlier histories by Shpet and Iakovenko, noting that both philosophers could not have possibly properly understand the role of “original Russian thought,” given their own European-centric bias.¹⁶¹

Evlampiev’s 2002 *History of Russian Philosophy* continues down this path, though taking an unexpected approach. The author argues that one of the pivotal characteristics of Russian philosophy is its “intuitive relationship to the world,” expressed best through artistic, non-

academic, and emotional stylization. By itself, this thesis is not novel. Evlampiev’s argument conforms to the literary-mysticism attributed to the religious narrative, and here the use of the word “intuition” reminds us not of Kant, but of the above discussion of historiosophy. Yet, although his nearly 600-page history includes all the expected names, it begins with nineteen pages on the medieval “prehistory” of Russian thought (of which six are dedicated to iconography), devotes 166 pages to the nineteenth century, 353 to the twentieth century, and ends with fifteen pages on Soviet philosophy: five on Marxism and Leninism in the Soviet Union; ten on Mikhail Bakhtin and Merab Mamardashvili. Evlampiev concludes by identifying Andrei Rublev, Fedor Dostoevskii, and Andrei Tarkovskii as Russia’s most important philosophical minds—the exemplifying trio of the “path” of the Russian philosophical tradition.

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163 Ibid., 576.
In this regard, Evlampiev’s history is unlike the others, which spend a substantially larger number of pages on the nineteenth century than the twentieth. Were we to remove Evlampiev’s history from the above graph (he spends thirty-eight pages on Lev Karsavin, forty-two on Semen Frank, and thirty on Ivan Il’in), the twentieth century would be substantially less represented than the nineteenth. Despite this discrepancy, however, scholarship on these two centuries greatly outweighs that on the pre-Enlightenment period, which is treated as a pre-history to Russian philosophical thought, and also on the eighteenth century, which is typically only discussed superficially. As Mihkail Gromov noted, an entry for “Enlightenment” is even missing from

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164 Although each history has a different number of total pages, the use of a stacked-column graph resolves this discrepancy.

165 For comparison’s sake, Evlampiev spends only ten pages on Shpet.
Maslin’s *Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia* [Russkaia filosofiia: Entsiklopediia, 2007]. However, no period is as neglected as the contemporary, which is almost always passed over in silence.

The one exception to this is Maslin’s 2008 *History of Russian Philosophy*. Favoring the secular and academic traditions over the religious, Maslin’s study spends sixteen more pages on the Westernizers than on the Slavophiles—a difference that comprises more pages than are devoted to Solov'ev in the entire history. Maslin’s *History* also includes developed chapters on the Russian academic structure, Soviet materialism, cosmology, philosophy of science, and discussions of late-Soviet philosophy of methodology and cognition (e.g. Bonifatii Kedrov, Pavel Kopin, and Merab Mamardashvili). A total of sixty-three pages are devoted to secular philosophy during the Soviet period (thirty-seven to Marxist-Leninism; twenty-six to non-Marxist, non-religious Soviet thought), while an unprecedentedly high number of five pages is dedicated to the post-Soviet era. Unfortunately, this final section, “Philosophical Research in the Post-Soviet Period,” is as vague as its title. Maslin speaks mainly of the post-1991 crisis of values and “search for elements of a new worldview,” though he does not say much about the actual academic work being done in the present. The exception is a brief overview of Aleksandr Zinov'ev’s political writings and the identification of a few post-Soviet trends, such as the “philosophy of international relations” and new developments in logic, the details of which are left to the reader’s imagination.

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Moreover, looking over contemporary histories of Russian philosophy, we also cannot help but notice the profoundly flexible concept of philosophy at play, where the title “philosopher” includes theologians, writers, and other cultural figures that would never find their way into the Anglo-American canon, and rarely even into the Continental one. In Zamaleev’s 2001 *History*, for instance, we learn that the Russian philosophical tradition stretches as far back as the eleventh-century, to Vladimir Monomakh. Similarly, in one of the earliest of the contemporary histories, Gromov and Kozlov’s *Russian Philosophical Thought* from 1990, the authors trace the history of philosophy back to the *Primary Chronicle* [*Povest' vremennykh let*] entry for 6494 (986) often referred to as “The Philosopher’s Speech” [“Rech' filosofa”], calling it Russia’s own version of a Socratic dialogue. In Maslin’s *Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia*, Russia’s philosophers include a list of names—Aleksandr Blok, Catherine II, Denis Fonvizin, Nikolai Gogol’, Kazimir Malevich, Sergei Uvarov—that would make a mainstream Slavist feel like an expert in the domain of Russian philosophical thought.

While it cannot be denied that religious metaphysics make up a large part of the Russian philosophical tradition, more often than not, anomalies in the philosophical canon often correspond to a conflation between religious metaphysics and theology. In Viktor Il'in’s history from 1997, philosophy has its roots in Byzantine thinkers like fourth century bishop Vasilii the Great (Kesariiskii) and, three hundred years later, John of Damascus. Viacheslav Serbinenko’s


The entry for 6494 (986) begins on line 84:17, the philosopher’s first appearance is at line 86:8, and the philosopher’s speech begins at 87:23.
history details the development of philosophy from eleventh century Kiev-Pechersk monk Feodosiia of Pechersk to Aleksei Losev. Most histories include the Greek born, Italian educated Mount Athos monk Maximus the Greek (Michael Trivolis) among the ranks of Russia’s great early philosophers. As Edward Swiderski speculates, it would be illuminating to see the reaction of an outsider, unaware of the specificities of Russian culture and philosophy, to “how explicitly philosophical schemes are set alongside overtly theological frames of reference.”

In fact, with the exception of their shared treatment of the three most discussed thinkers—Solov'ev, Bulgakov, and Berdiaev—it seems that on all other fronts, philosophers cannot agree on what the title “Russian philosophy” signifies, when it began, or what thinkers are to be included among its ranks. The positive result of this is that the influx of differing opinions has led to the development of a wide array of interpretational schools apart from the universalizing tendencies of a single hegemonic narrative. The negative result is that not only has the post-Soviet influx of historical narratives on many levels attenuated respect for the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy, but the publication and distribution of many of these histories are surrounded by hegemonic struggles and bitter polemics—squabbles that emphasize the vacuum-like nature of this facet of post-Soviet philosophical production.

One such debate concerns the work of Aleksandr Zamaleev, head of the sub-department of the History of Russian Philosophy at St. Petersburg State University, and his philosophy textbook *Lectures on the History of Russian Philosophy from the 11th to the 20th century*. This textbook was the subject of a controversial newspaper article in 2000 by St. Petersburg

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philosopher Pavel Kuznetsov, where Zamaleev is accused of presenting a false history in his book and, ultimately, of being a phony scholar. At one point Kuznetsov indirectly suggests through a clever use of paralipsis that Zamaleev is a “fossilized Soviet dinosaur” [“iskopaemyi sovetskii dinozavr”], and here the reader is reminded of 1950s-era issues of Questions of Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii], where it became common for authors to refer to their colleagues with zoological metaphors, some of the most popular being “mole,” “ostrich,” and, of course, “goat.” In his article, Kuznetsov also plays a game where he opens to random pages of Zamaleev’s History in order to find what he deems the most ridiculous statement on the page.

Then, in 2001, Zamaleev published his own monograph entitled New Research on Russian Philosophy [Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii], which is dedicated to criticizing his colleagues for their recent histories of Russian philosophy, as well as for misquoting his work in their own (here we remember Berdiaev’s quarrel with Florovskii over the misrepresentation of his own work). By way of criticism of Evlampiev’s history—a revised version of his doctoral dissertation, for which Zamaleev acted as a committee member—Zamaleev published his formal comments from the defense. “There is absolutely no room [in Evlampiev’s work] for Christianity,” Zamaleev notes. And had Evlampiev read Berdiaev more carefully, he continues, he would have known “that Dostoevskii, as a metaphysical thinker, was formed in the

170 Kuznetsov, “Filosofia v Rossii…,” Knizhnoe obozrenie “Ex libris NG” (15.06.2000), 3.
172 Zamaleev, Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii (SPb: Letnii sad, 2001), 19.
[“совершенно не нашлось место для христианства”]
womb of Christianity and not Gnosticism.”

The work takes a tone similar to that of Kuznetsov’s article, and Zamaleev begins his monograph with an address to the reader that seems to sum up the state of post-Soviet philosophy particularly well: “Have you noticed,” Zamaleev asks, addressing the reader, “how much misunderstanding and discord has arisen in the name of love for the history of Russian philosophy?”

One might expect that such an intellectual scuffle could occur only in St. Petersburg, which has gained the reputation of being the more ostentatious and bohemian of Russia’s “two capitals.” It is often taken as fact in Moscow that St. Petersburg thinkers are more provincial, more Orthodox, and, thus, try harder to produce something “original” in order to make a mark on the academic scene. Vasilii Vanchugov confirms this stereotype in his study *Moscowosophia and Petersburgology: the Philosophy of a City* [Moskovosofiia i peterburgologiia: filosofiia goroda, 1997] where he notes that, in cultural and geographical mythology, Moscow is represented as more organic, academic, and—in the end more “Russian—city.” In Moscow, Aleksandr Ostrovskii wrote, “everything Russian becomes clearer and dearer.”

While such

173 Ibid., 23.

[“Достоевский как метафизический мыслитель формировался в лоне христианства, а не гностицизма”]

174 Ibid., 6.

[“Замечали ли Вы, читатель, сколько недоразумений, сколько разногласий возникает на почве любви к русской философии”]


overarching claims are obviously unproductive, besides being outright fallacious, St. Petersburg’s reputation is bolstered by its long legacy of intellectual squabbles beginning in the early Academy of Sciences (est. 1724): most notably, Mikhail Lomonosov’s 28 May 1743 arrest in correlation with the case against Chancellery Director Schumacher on charges of discourteous behavior toward his colleagues at the Academy, interrupting academic conferences with indecent pranks, and rowdy drunkenness in the Department of Geography—the same year in which he reportedly hit an Academy translator in the face with a candlestick. However, not only do the histories under discussion here come from Moscow and St. Petersburg in almost equal numbers (taking into consideration the greater number of philosophy faculty members in Moscow than St. Petersburg), but Moscow too participates in its fair share of “misunderstanding and discord … in the name of love for the history of Russian philosophy.”

The most recent of such disagreements concerns the publication of Maslin’s Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Together with Russian Philosophy: A Dictionary [Russkaia filosofiiia: Slovar’, 1995], two History of Russian Philosophy textbooks edited by Maslin and others from 2001 and 2008, and an electronic library of Russian philosophical thought from the eleventh to the eighteenth century (Russian Philosophical Thought XI-XVII c. [Russkaia filosofskaiia mysli XI-XVIII, 2007]), this encyclopedia was meant to serve as “an essential

177 It was while under arrest for this rowdiness that Lomonosov wrote his famous “Morning” and “Evening Reflections upon God’s Grandeur” (“Utrenee” and “Vechernee razmyshlenie o bozhiem velichestve”). For more on scandals in the early Academy see Tatiana Artem’eva, “Skandaly v Academia” in Semiotika skandala (M: Evropa, 2008).

178 Zamaleev, Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii, 6.
foundation for systematic professional preparation by specialists in the history of Russian philosophy,” both in Russia and abroad.\textsuperscript{179} Its objective, as expressed by Maslin at a 2008 roundtable, sponsored by the journal \textit{Questions of Philosophy}, is commendable: to demonstrate that “Russian philosophy is by no means concerned only with its own ethno-cultural reality, but with the universal problems of world philosophy.”\textsuperscript{180}

Much of this roundtable, however, was spent on debates over the names present or absent in the history, over how many pages were spent on a work by Vasilii Rozanov, and over why substantially fewer pages were spent on works perceived to be more important. Most critical of this work was Sergei Horujy, who concluded that not only was the \textit{History} lacking a rationale and methodology, but that it did not do Russian philosophy the justice that it deserves.\textsuperscript{181}

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[“составляют необходимую основу для систематической профессиональной подготовки специалистов по истории русской философии.”]

180 Ibid., 5.
[“русская философия обращена отнюдь не только к собственной этнокультурной реальности, а ко всеобщим проблемам мировой философии”]

Horujy was not present at the roundtable discussion but sent written comments on the volume for inclusion in \textit{Questions of Philosophy}.

181 For a similar debate surrounding the 2000 publication of the \textit{New Philosophical Encyclopedia} [\textit{Novaia filosofskaia entsiklopediia}, 2000], see Andrei Vaganov, “Internet eshche ne stal
Regarding what he saw as the unfettered, irrational representation of the history of Russian philosophy in this encyclopedia, Horujy wrote: “The subject matter presented to us under the name Russian Philosophy … is actually, as expressed in Gogol’, ‘neither this nor that. The devil knows what it is.”  

While we have come to expect a certain amount of intellectual discord among academics, philosophers in Russia have earned a reputation of practicing philosophy in a style that Aleksandr Rybas has likened to the style of a Russian horn orchestra [rogovaia muzyka], where the goal is to drown out one’s neighbor rather than to complement him.  

Like the cacophony

[“Предмет, что под именем РФ представлен нам … на самом деле, по Гоголю выражаясь, – ни то ни се, а черт знает что.”]  

183 For Alexander Rybas’ use of this metaphor in a review of the X Historians’ Symposium of Russian Philosophy (2007), see Rybas, “On Contemporary Russian Philosophy, Landshaft 1 (2008), 18. The first such horn orchestra was organized in 1751 by S.K. Naryshkin and Ia. Maresh. Performances included anywhere between 91 and 300 copper hunting horns, each one emitting only one note. See K. Vertkov, Russkaia rogovaia muzyka (L, 1948). Horn orchestras are also mentioned in Derzhvin’s odes “Felitsa” (1792) and “Ruins” [“Razvaliny,” 1799, as well as in Lomonosov’s “On the Invention of Horn Music” [“Na izobretennie rogovoi myzyki”] (1753).
of Dostoevskii’s “Bobok” (1873), voices compete with one another in such a way that they cause what Dostoevskii described as a dissonant muddle [katavasiia], resisting the traditional point/counterpoint model of contemporary academic philosophical criticism and creating what Zamaleev has colorfully described as “an arena for ideological clanking.” Such a situation is surely what Victorino Tejera had in mind when he wrote that “it is unphilosophic for living thinkers to argue with, or criticize each other, from their own premises only and not address each other’s basic assumptions.” 

3.3 WHAT COMES AFTER THE END OF PHILOSOPHY?

Having traversed the history of Russian philosophical historiography, we have seen that the discipline is constantly engaged in a process of self-definition—of attempting to encase itself within a single totalizing narrative, one that was often dependent on the intellectual hegemony of the day. Most frequently taking the form of the identification of “characterizing traits,” these aligned themselves with the political realities of the time—whether the Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality of Nicholas I, the renewed optimism in secular philosophy after the discipline’s return to the universities in the early 1860s, or the growing preoccupation with identifying the


[“арена для идеологических бряцаний”]

characteristics of the Russian “national character” and/or “Russian idea” in the twentieth century as the Soviet regime squeezed Orthodoxy out of its imperial ideology.

In the contemporary period, references to the “Russian idea” and “straight path of Byzantium” have been replaced by two dominating approaches: 1) an adherence to traditional methods of historiography; and 2) a denial of the domestic philosophical tradition altogether, where the response to the query “Is there philosophy in Russia?” is often emphatically negative. If we were to step back and look at these symptoms as a trend in philosophy rather than as nation-specific—as a path chosen by philosophers rather than as some Florovskian “path of philosophy”—then the conflicted state of philosophy in Russia actually brings it in to closer dialogue with contemporary Western debates, particularly those occurring in the American philosophical tradition.

A useful model can be found in Alasdair MacIntyre’s book *After Virtue* (1981), where he describes a hypothetical situation (modeled on the opening of Walter M. Miller’s novel *A Canticle for Leibowitz* [1960]) in which a natural disaster has destroyed the continuity of all academic knowledge, leaving behind only fragments of books and memories of experiments. If humankind were to go about trying to reconstruct this lost knowledge from what remained after the catastrophe, MacIntyre continues, the results of academic progress would look more or less the same on the surface, but underneath they would lack the theoretical contexts and attitudes that once gave them their significance and grounded them within a shared history of intellectual progress.

For MacIntyre this condition of “grave disorder” is not merely a hypothetical catastrophe, but describes the state of contemporary American ethical philosophy, where “modern moral utterances and practices can only be understood as a series of fragmented survivals from an older
past,” disconnected from the intellectual connections that should accompany them. He locates evidence of the collapse in two dominating symptoms of the period: 1) “the multifariousness and apparent incommensurability of the concepts invoked;” and 2) “the assertive use of ultimate principles in attempt to close debates.” In describing these symptoms, in fact, MacIntyre could very well have been speaking not of ethical philosophy but of the writing of the history of philosophy in contemporary Russia, where both traits—bitter debates and the tendency to fall back on “ultimate principles” (i.e. essentialized characterizing traits)—comprise the primary avenues for criticism against this sub-discipline.

While the explosion of historical narratives in the past twenty years demonstrates that there is widespread interest within Russia in producing philosophical texts and in the search for Russia’s intellectual legacy, we are hard pressed to describe a way in which they offer something new to contemporary scholarship. More often than not they say a lot without saying anything at all, in the sense that they conform to an already crystallized canon of historiography and recreate what has already been published. In the case of those histories that do provide a radically new reading of history, such as Evlampiev’s naming of Rublev, Dostoevskii, and Tarkovskii as the thinkers most indicative of the Russian philosophical tradition, their adherence to the traditionalism of the religious/literary narrative detract from their academic credibility, rendering them, in the eyes of their critics, just another history of Russian philosophy.

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187 Ibid., 35.

188 Ibid., 35.
Those who comment on Russian philosophy are often equally guilty, continuously refuting its existence in totalizing critiques. In many ways the “end-of-philosophy” narrative of thinkers like Ivanov and Smirnov is just as essentializing as the ultimate principles of histories of Russian philosophy. Both offer totalizing, “characterizing traits” through which one is encouraged to view the whole of Russian thought. This danger is particularly apparent if we remember Sergei Prozorov’s suggestion that the “end of history” narrative is so prevalent that it is a contender for a new Russian idea—a new set of totalizing characteristics within which Russian thought must be viewed.

If we return to the abovementioned imagery of “intellectuals without ideas” (Ivanov and Smirnov) and heads filled only with phantasms (Anashvili), I would argue that when critics speak out against the idealessness of Russian philosophy, they speak not of ideas, per se, but of “originality.” Each of these histories offers many ideas—one would be hard-pressed to dispute this fact. But whether these ideas are original or not is up for debate. Without delving into the countless approaches on what constitutes originality and the implications of such a judgment, we might best be guided by Adriaan Peperzak’s view that the label “originality” depends wholly on the reception of a particular idea among others who are qualified to receive that idea. If a community of specialists finds an idea novel and worth referencing in their own work as such, then it has proved itself original.


I would go one step further and argue that by “idealessness” these critics have in mind not only “originality,” but that by “originality” they actually mean “Western.” When they speak of empty discussions, academics with heads full of nonsense, and the end of history, they are not necessarily implying that the country is not producing anything, but that it is not producing anything up to the standard of some Western ideal of philosophical production. Not surprisingly, this model is often a German one. Vitalii Kurennoi, for instance, compares what he sees as the subpar level of some Russian scholarship—rash generalizations, irresponsible use of sources, and speculations on the “Russian soul”—with the rigor of the German academic model. In particular, he compares Krasikov’s 2008 study of contemporary Russian thought, *Russian Philosophy Today*, with Christian Tilitzki’s 2001 study of German university philosophy [*Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten*], pointing out that only the latter includes “two volumes of empirical material.”

In distributing much of philosophical production between either histories of Russian philosophy and speculation on the end of philosophy, Russian commentators on the history of Russian philosophy are, in some metaphorical sense, writing themselves out of existence. Better yet, they are in-between philosophies, separating themselves from an old tradition while stagnating in the formation of a new one. As Valerii Podoroga noted at a June 2009 Moscow conference in response to Fredric Jameson’s “new reading” of Marx’s *Capital*, “We do not need another reading of *Capital*, what we have to do is re-write *Capital*.”

Here Podoroga is

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192 Podoroga, Commentary at “Critical Thought in the 21st Century” conference, Moscow, Russia (June 2009).
speaking to a crucial accusation of the history of philosophy—that its historians are involved in
the endless regurgitation of dead philosophers in place of actually producing philosophy
themselves. In the context of the history of Russian philosophy, we might say that rather than
repeatedly revisit and rewrite its past, historians of Russian thought might set themselves toward
contributing something “original” (in Peperzak’s view of the word) to that history.

In this vein, in his study Soviet Historiography of Philosophy from 1990, Van der
Zweerde wrote:

If … Soviet philosophy can finally drop its claim to be the highest
achievement of the historical development of philosophy, to be on the right
path, set down by Lenin, and to be a unified, continuously developing system, …
in that case we might be surprised by the intellectual vigor of many Soviet
philosophers and should be prepared to see historians of philosophy turn into
philosophers in their own right.193

Although its fortuitous publication—less than a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union—
quickly rendered the language of these comments outdated, Van der Zweerde’s appraisal not
only captured the trouble of late Soviet historiography, but continues to epitomize the
contemporary situation in the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy. Though Hegel
asserts in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that the study of the history of Philosophy is
the study of Philosophy itself, as the Mad Hatter edifies Alice in Lewis Carol’s work: this does
not mean that the opposite is true. That is to say that although many of Russia’s preeminent

193 Van der Zweerde, Soviet Historiography of Philosophy, 39.
scholars of Russian philosophy are content in the role of historian, that does not mean that to
study philosophy in Russia is necessarily to rewrite its history.

Having been engaged in the writing of the history of Russian philosophy since
Archimandrite Gavriil’s *Russian Philosophy*, histories of Russian philosophy have changed
little—both in form and content—for almost two-hundred years. They continue to be published
in ever increasing numbers in the face of equally increasing commentary on the emptiness of the
Russian philosophical tradition. However, out of this radical divergence of opinions we see an
exciting paradigm shift taking place in other areas of philosophy. Just what this new paradigm
entails will be the subject of the next two chapters.
In the previous chapter we saw how the contemporary writing of the history of Russian philosophy, when viewed in the context of the critical attitude that surrounds these histories, appears to paint a rather bleak picture for the study of Russian philosophical thought. If we move outside the debates surrounding these histories, however, we see that by no means is Orthodox thought the dominant philosophical approach in the twenty-first century, though the issue of Russian religious thought does often figure predominantly in contemporary debates. If in the nineties an explosion of Orthodox speculation seemed to define much of the philosophical production in Russia, in the contemporary period the post-Soviet revival of the pre-revolutionary religious narrative has been put into question on a number of fronts. The religious narrative, in turn, is rapidly being overtaken by a plurality of developed, self-reflexive philosophical trends—many of which are unrecognizable against the backdrop of the religious/secular binary discussed in the first chapter. One such trend takes the form of an on-going dialogue on the transition of the model of “Russian philosopher” from a member of the intelligentsia [intelligent] to an intellectual [intellektual]. The latter is a category with a lengthy Western history, including elaborations by Stefan Collini, Antonio Gramsci, P.G. Hamerton, Russell Jacoby, Richard A. Posner, and others, although such discussions on the status of the intellectual (often referred to as
the “public intellectual”—the term to which Jacoby has laid claim as being the first to use\textsuperscript{194} have more or less ceased in the twenty-first century following a flurry of studies in the eighties and nineties on the “death” of the public intellectual. In Russian philosophical discourse, this discussion has recently become a popular topic of inquiry in some circles, although its understanding of the role of the intellectual differs substantially.

\subsection*{4.1 THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF THE INTELLECTUAL}

In the past century, speculation on the role of the intellectual in society has inspired volumes of criticism from a number of camps. Although the prehistory of the adjective “intellectual” in scholarship can be traced back as far as the thirteenth century, with Italian chronicler and archbishop Jacobus de Voragine and his contemporaries using the Latin \textit{intellego} and its range of forms (e.g. \textit{intellectus}, \textit{intelligentia}) to refer to the human faculty of understanding,\textsuperscript{195} Stefan Collini notes that the term began its contemporary life only in the mid-nineteenth century. According to Collini, the development of a social connotation outside the term’s traditional employment in the cognitive realm was facilitated by P. G. Hamerton’s idiosyncratic study \textit{The

\textsuperscript{194} Jacoby, \textit{The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe} (NY: Basic, 1987), xvi.

Intellectual Life, appearing in 1873.\textsuperscript{196} Though he does not use “intellectual” as a noun, Hamerton paints a portrait of variations on “the intellectual life,” dedicating each segment of his book to a different genus of participant in this erudite existence: these include “the student of literature,” “the lady of high culture” and “the young man of the middle class, well-educated, who complained that it was difficult for him to live agreeably with his mother.”\textsuperscript{197} Hamerton’s definition is remarkably egalitarian, as he understands “the intellectual life” in the most general sense—it does not require an elite status, but simply a dedication to literature, the sciences, or the fine arts.

By the 1890s, this meaning of “intellectual” had begun to appear in the work and correspondence of Maurice Barrès, Henry Bérenger, Paul Bourget, and other fin-de-siècle “men of letters.”\textsuperscript{198} However, the term is generally accepted to have gained notoriety with the public response that surrounded the publication of Émile Zola’s open letter, “J’Accuse!,” on the front page of \textit{L’Aurore} on 13 January 1898.\textsuperscript{199} Written in support of French officer Alfred Dreyfus, who had been tried and convicted on charges of treason, Zola’s letter is considered the inaugurative modern instance of a link between a Hamertonian understanding of the “intellectual life” and the media vehicles of the public sphere. Although, as in Hamerton’s book, the noun

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\textsuperscript{197} Hamerton, \textit{The Intellectual Life} (NY: J. B. Alden, 1873), xiii-xix.

\textsuperscript{198} Collini, “The History of a Word,” 20. For a detailed history of the development of the term “intellectual,” see Collini, ibid., 15-44.

\textsuperscript{199} Zola, “J’Accuse!” \textit{L’Aurore} 87 (13 January 1898): 1-2.
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“intellectual” is absent from Zola’s letter, it gained currency less than a month later in Maurice Barrès’ “Protest of the Intellectuals” [“La Protestation des intellectuels”], which was published in support of “J’Accuse!” on 1 February 1898 in Le Journal. Together these letters, colored by the public and political drama that surrounded their publication, were seen as the pioneering effort on the part of intellectuals to influence public opinion—or, as Zola put it: “to enlighten those who have been kept in the dark.”

Yet, if we turn backwards in time to Kant’s essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” [“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” 1784] and, later, The Conflict of the Faculties [Der Streit der Fakultäten, 1798], we see that the expectation of a civic function from the intellectual was not novel to the late nineteenth century. Kant had already speculated on the public dimension of intellectual life in his discussions of the “Gelehrter.” Although translated most often as “scholar,” Gelehrter does not mean for Kant a scholar in the pedagogical sense of the word, nor is he referring to a well-rounded homme de lettres. Instead, with Gelehrter he is indicating a particular group of public intellectuals whose duty it was to address the public on particular issues of expertise: one Gelehrter may investigate the injustice of taxes, he notes, while another might be obliged to lay bare the mistaken aspects of Church


201 Here we might also remember Moses Mendelssohn’s “On the Question: What Does “to Enlighten” Mean?” [“Über die Frage: was heißt aufklären?,” 1784].
symbolism. This necessary public function is what Kant calls the “public use of reason:” that is, “the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world.” In this way Kant’s intellectual is responsible not only to his own faculty of reason but to the public that he addresses, whereby he has a civic duty to impart to the public only “carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts.”

While the Dreyfus affair thrust the category on which Kant had already speculated into the public eye, by the twentieth century it had become common to speak of “intellectuals” not only as a social category, but as intimately connected with both the public and political spheres. Not surprisingly, for Gramsci the intellectual was necessarily a political being given that his

203 Ibid., 76.
204 Ibid., 76.

Kant’s view of an intellectual elite, or Gelehrten, was challenged by Herder’s contemporary ideal of citizen’s vanguard, in which the national culture of the people [Volk] played a prominent and universalizing (and, in some senses, homogenizing), role. For more on Kant’s and Herder’s views of the intellectual see: John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002).
social function was bound in his class roots. It is along these lines that Gramsci famously distinguished organic intellectuals from traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals are those thinkers who make up the core of a particular class; their profession is an incidental characteristic of their being, as they are identified first and foremost with the class to which they organically belong. Conversely, traditional intellectuals are those professionals in the sciences and humanities who serve the particular social function of their profession. While they are likely to conceal their attachment to their class in order to claim that their social function (i.e. the fruits of their particular vocation) is somehow independent of class ties, they too are guided by concrete historical processes and social developments.”

We see these same sentiments in Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli’s claim at the end of the twentieth century that the intellectual is necessarily a political being, in that he is either the creator or employer of ideology.

It was precisely the shift from a view of the “intellectual life” as one of abstraction (taking place in the realm of “pure thought”) to having a necessary public (and, often, political) function that French homme de lettres Julien Benda resisted in 1927 in his La Trahison des


According to Benda, the group of learned individuals whose duty it was to speculate about abstract metaphysical concepts of the good, the beautiful, and the just without being influenced by individual and institutional concerns—a kind of pre-Kantian intellectual milieu—had let themselves be swayed and seduced by class, national, and revolutionary politics in the twentieth century.

However, Benda’s backward-looking attempts to neutralize the sphere of the intellectual, relegating the savant to a de-politicized and de-ideologized space of pure reflection, did not stand up against the growing tendency to collapse the terms “intellectual” and “public intellectual” into one another. In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, the public function about which Kant had spoken had become a prerequisite for one to be bestowed the title of “intellectual.” We see the emphasis on public value epitomized in Richard A. Posner’s table of the top six-hundred intellectuals (1995-2000), which includes such well-known figures as Hannah Arendt, Roland Barthes, Isaiah Berlin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, George Orwell, and Edward Said, and which was compiled based solely on measures of public notoriety: media mentions, web hits, and scholarly citations. Indeed, according to Neil Jumonville, the intellectual is “a generalist knowledgeable about cultural and political matters … whose ideas reach a substantial public.”

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207 The book was translated into English in 1955 as *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*, although “learned” more accurately captures Benda’s use of the “des Clercs.”


For Collini, the intellectual’s creative, analytical, and scholarly capacities are almost secondary to his public function. The intellectual must: 1) reach a wide (often unintended) public; 2) successfully articulate some concerns of that public; and 3) establish a positive reputation for these articulations.\textsuperscript{210} Like Kant before him, Noam Chomsky adds to the intellectual’s public responsibility the duty “to speak the truth and to expose lies,” particularly where “the creation and analysis of ideology” is concerned.\textsuperscript{211}

Yet, alongside the crystallization of the intellectual as a necessarily public being, beginning in the 1980s surrounding Russell Jacoby’s \textit{The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe} (1987) we see the emergence of a number of works that posit the “death” of the intellectual in the face of his failure to live up to his communal duty. In his book, written as a response to Harold Stearn’s 1921 \textit{America and the Young Intellectual} (a study of the problem of the emigration of American intellectuals to Europe), Jacoby makes the claim that boredom and demoralization have become the prevalent sentiments in the American universities. He criticizes academics of being “high-tech intellectuals, consultants, and professors—anonymous

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\textsuperscript{210} Collini, \textit{Absent Minds}, 52.


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souls, who may be competent, and more than competent, but who do not enrich public life."  

While in the preface to the 2000 edition of his work Jacoby admits that time has partially eclipsed part of his original argument, his conclusion remains relatively unchanged: “[Intellectuals] have become more professional and insular; at the same time they have lost command of the vernacular, which thinkers from Galileo to Freud had mastered.”  

Whether nostalgia plays a role in this disenchantment (the author argues in the preface to the second edition that it does not), Jacoby is lamenting the eclipsing of the intellectual by the academic, whereby, in this view, the demands of the professional sphere have corrupted the ideals of reflection and public service.

We see the same disillusionment with the intellectual milieu in Michel Foucault. “If this category exists,” Foucault writes, “which is not certain nor perhaps even desirable—[they] are

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212 Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals*, x.

213 Ibid., xv.

Even as early as 1979, George Konrád and Ivan Szélényi’s *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (1979), a Marxist samizdat manuscript smuggled out of Hungary, suggested that intellectuals were falling short of fulfilling their public function. Intellectuals have “a monopoly over culture in any society,” Konrád and Szélényi claim, but they fall short of using their power wisely by “refus[ing] to foster the culture of other classes. … In this way they prevent the working class from becoming conscious of its own identity.” See: Konrád and Szélényi, *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, ed. Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 247.
It is in this vein that Alexander Nehamas, a philosopher known for his achievement in interdisciplinary “border crossing” (between analytic and Continental philosophy, as well as between philosophy and literature) accused his contemporaries in American philosophy of being good scholars but poor intellectuals. Although they had impressive publication records, no amount of peer-reviewed journal articles or conference presentations could keep them from falling further away from the public, their work virtually inaccessible to those outside their specialization.

As John Gross sees it, the death of the intellectual may not be necessarily due to shortcomings within the profession, but is perhaps indicative of a shift in intellectual culture more broadly conceived, whereby the written genre no longer holds the esteemed position it did


According to J. P. Nettle, while the intellectual must engage the public (typically in periodicals), the scholar has no predicate for societal action and his medium of choice tends to be academic books and/or refereed journals. See Nettle, “Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent,” in Philip Rieff, *On Intellectuals; Theoretical Studies, Case Studies* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 89.

during an earlier stage of modernity. More specifically, for Daniel Bell this shift was made possible by the rise of the sciences in the twenties, thirties, and forties, during which theoretical knowledge came to the forefront as the determining factor in new directions in research and scholarly inquiry: “Does one want a more awesome example than the atom bomb?,” he provokes. In the opinion of Paul Johnson, however, the “death” of the intellectual was made possible much earlier, in parallel with the decline of clerical influence in the eighteenth century, thereby opening a space for the influence of secular knowledge. We could add to this list of factors the rise of specialization in academia, whereby the “man of letters” is often viewed to have been replaced by specialized academics who cater to the university market and not the public. Bruce Wilshire aligns this phenomenon with the emergence of the research university where specialism, in his opinion, has taken precedence over teaching. While these two skills are not mutually exclusive as Wilshire imagines them to be, Gramsci makes a similar claim when he speaks of academia in the twentieth-century as the multiplication and narrowing of knowledge into various specializations.


218 Bell, The Intellectual and the University (NY: The City College, 1966), 3.


When transposing the seemingly endless debates over the status, responsibilities, and origins of the “intellectual” into the Russian context, it becomes necessary to distinguish the word “intellectual” from the Russian “intelligent.” While we have seen that the development of the term “intellectual” takes place in a developed Western literature (which, in the present, both ties the intellectual to the public sphere and refutes his existence), intelligent refers specifically to a member of the intelligentsia: a social group emerging in Russia in the 1850s and 1860s with figures like Fedor Dostoevskii, Mikhail Katkov, Nikolai Mikhailovskii, Vasilii Rozanov, and Anatolii Lunacharskii, among others. As Vera Leikina-Svirskaia has noted, for the most part these thinkers came from the land-owning classes but not from the gentry; they were the product of the formation of educated raznochintsy in the 1840s who became déclassé as they emerged from the universities highly educated and, as Hugh Seton-Watson points out, “profoundly alienated from the political and social regime.”

The word “intelligentsia” is generally accepted to have first appeared in the Russian language in 1836 in the diaries of Vasilii Zhukovskii, though it was still only in sporadic use in the 1860s and 1870s. We find it, for instance, in Petr Boborykin’s novel Sound Virtues [Solidnye dobrodeleti, 1870], but it is absent from definition dictionaries such as Vladimir Dal’s Definition Dictionary [Tolkovoi slovar'], 1861-1868) and Feliks Toll’s Table Dictionary [Nastol'nyi slovar']


Yet, the lack of a word for this phenomenon did not stop scholars like Bulgakov from projecting the intelligentsia back to the eighteenth century, identifying its emergence as a product of the Petrine reforms—a result of the introduction of modern, secular education to Russia (for Johnson, we will remember, the role of the intellectual declined in the West in the eighteenth century along with a decline in the influence of the clergy). In his 1999 study Vittorio Strada concurs, noting the contemporary intelligentsia is a post-Petrine phenomenon, “the roots of which differ from the pre-modern form of intellectual life.

In fact, upon attempting to assemble a stable definition of word “intelligentsia” one finds the task nearly impossible, as the term was employed from a variety of positions, used as both a term of high tribute and a term of abuse. In “Psychology of the Russian Intelligentsia” [“Psikhologiia russkoii intelligentsii,” 1910], literary and language scholar Dmitrii Ovsiannikov-Kulikovskii tries to forge a universal definition, whereby the intelligentsia is equivalent to all of educated society—“it includes everyone who one way or another, directly or indirectly, actively

or passively takes part in the intellectual life of the country.”  

According to P. B. Ivanov-Razumnik, the intelligentsia has a strong humanistic component, as it is “characterized by its creation of new forms and ideals and by the active realization of them in life in the tendency toward physical and intellectual, societal and personal liberation of the individual.”

For Maksim Slavinskii, journalist and editor of several political and economic journals (e.g. Freedom and Justice [Svoboda i pravo], Russian Thought [Russkaia mysli'], and Herald of Europe [Vestnik Evropy]), “the intelligentsia is not just the creator of all immaterial values, … but is the permanent distributor of [those values].”

In this view, without the intelligentsia progress


[“Интеллигенция — это все образованное общество; в ее состав входят все, кто так или иначе, прямо или косвенно, активно или пассивно принимает участие в умственной жизни страны.”]


[“… характеристируема творчеством новых форм и идей и активным проведением их в жизнь в направлении к физическому и умственному, общественному и личному освобождению личности.”]

would be impossible for the Russian people. It is no surprise, thus, that for Slavinskii “it is the intelligentsia [that] stands guard for all elements of the national consciousness of its people.”

While in the above definitions, all from the first decade of the twentieth century, the term “intelligentsia” has a positive significance, “intelligentsia takes on a negative connotation in the same decade with its employment in the 1909 collection Landmarks [Vekhi], edited by political philosopher and future government functionary Mikhail Gershenzon. The debates within and surrounding Landmarks demonstrate the flexibility of the term. While the authors of Landmarks (Nikolai Berdiaev Sergei Bulgakov, Petr Struve, and others) would most certainly have considered themselves the vanguard that, in Slavinskii’s 1910 definition, “stands guard for all elements of the national consciousness of its people,” it is precisely this vanguard that they spoke out against with their employment of the term. In its usage among these thinkers, “intelligentsia” takes on a pejorative function, referring to the positivists that emerged in Russia in the seventies with (e.g. Mikhailovskii, Petr Lavrov) and the Marxist materialists that followed in the nineties (e.g. Aleksandr Bogdanov and Anatolii Lunacharskii).

[“Интеллигенция является не только создателем всех нематериальных ценностей, находящихся в культурном обороте данного народа, но и неизменным распределителем их”]

^230 Ibid., 231.

[“Интеллигенция стоит на страже всех элементов национального сознания своего народа.”]

^231 Ibid., 231.
According to Berdiaev, for instance, the materialistic hegemony that had taken hold of Russia’s intellectual and political life “combined a rational consciousness with extreme emotionalism and with a weak appreciation of intellectual life as an autonomous value.” The intelligentsia was demagogic and averse to objectivism and universalism, he continued, and it maintained a dangerous reverence of science. It is because of this materialist intelligentsia, the Landmarks authors claimed, that Russia had been unable to form a “national philosophical tradition.” For Berdiaev in particular, the intelligentsia’s primary transgression was its atheism: “its atheism is the fault of its will, for it freely chose the path of worshipping man and thereby crippled its soul and deadened within itself the instinct for truth.” This view was shared by Ivan Petrunkevich, who claimed in 1910 that “the Russian intelligentsia, having adopted an atheist worldview, took up a false place in its relationship to the people.”

[“В русской интеллигенции рационализм сознания сочетался с исключительной эмоциональностью и с слабостью самоценной умственной жизни.”]

233 Ibid., 7-8.  

234 Ibid., 13.  

235 Ibid., 22.  
[“Виновата и сама интеллигенция: атеистичность ее сознания есть вина ее воли, она сама избрала путь человечепоклонства и этим исказила свою душу, умертвила в себе инстинкт истины.”]

In this way, the term “intelligentsia” could be easily filled with a particular meaning and used in one’s favor as frequently as it was used against one’s enemies. According to Martin Malia, what united the various directions in which the term was spun was the fact that all the groups against whom the term was employed no longer had a place in the old estate system.\textsuperscript{237} Thus, it is not surprising that although the \textit{Landmarks} writers had the future Bolsheviks in mind when they attacked the “intelligentsia” for being a false, atheist vanguard, when Lenin dispatched many of Russia’s philosophers abroad (including some of these same \textit{Landmarks} authors) on the two voyages of the Philosophy Steamer in 1922, he sentenced them on the charges of being members of the intelligentsia. The front-page headline in \textit{Pravda} on 31 August 1922, titled “The First Warning” [“Pervoe predosterezhenie”], announces the impending expulsion of the Kadet Party, White Guard “intelligentsia” on which the government has “already wasted enough effort.”\textsuperscript{238} While Berdiaev and company were criticizing the materialists for sitting in their ivory towers—for being ineffectual, “secretarian intellectuals who

\textsuperscript{237} Malia, “What Is the Intelligentsia?,” 446.

\textsuperscript{238} \textit{Pravda} 194 (31 August 1922), 1.
are artificially isolated from national life,”—Lenin was using the same argument (and the very same word) as fuel to scatter them across Europe. Like the title “philosopher”—which was for Plato one of the highest honors an individual could attain, and for Dostoevskii “a term of abuse, meaning fool”—from our historical position we see that the term intelligentsia was a space easily filled with the particular intention of the user as a form of ideological ammunition.

Despite the lengths to which speculators on the meaning of “intelligentsia” were willing to go to defend their own definition of the word—employing it to mean either idealist or materialist, Orthodox or socialist practices of thought—until recently the distinction between the intellectual and the intelligent has been discussed only superficially. We see this distinction anachronistically imposed on Berdiaev in the English-language versions of his contribution to Landmarks, where he is translated into English as saying that “there is good reason for calling this group ‘intelligenty,’ as distinct from ‘intellectuals’ in the broad national and historical sense of the word.” However, there was no precedent for the word “intellectual” in Russian at the

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239 Berdiaev, Vekhi, 1.

240 We see the flexibility of this term not only in Lenin’s 1922 dispatch of the intelligentsia, but in the work of Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, economist and “Legal-Marxist,” who claimed that one of the most characterizing traits of the Russian intelligentsia was its sympathy to socialism. See Tugan-Baranovskii, “Intelligentsiia i sotsializm,” Intelligentsiia v Rossii (M: Mysl', 1971), 235.


time, and Berdiaev never makes use of the word “intellektual.” Instead, alongside “intelligentsia” he occasionally employs the pejorative suffix “shchina” in “intelligentshchina.” In this way he is able to not dismiss the historical phenomenon of the intelligentsia entirely, structuring his word choices accordingly so that if the intelligentsia refers to the phenomenon in general, then the intelligentshchina is the embodiment of the negative pathos of the contemporary Russian intelligentsia. The use of “intelligentshchina” as specific to the materialist intelligentsia appears to be strategic, as in the last line of his contribution to Landmarks he states that the goal of the volume is to set the stage for a new intelligentsia to be born.243

As Aleksandr Kustarev notes, the semantic flexibility—and frequent opacity—surrounding the word “intelligentsia” continues into the Soviet period. Kustarev posits that there were two primary myths according to which the intelligentsia was viewed, each (ironically) labeling the Russian intelligentsia as “unique” in an argument that pivoted on the intelligentsia’s supposed unparalleled spirituality [dukhovnost’].244 According to the first story, the intelligentsia was hailed as superior because of this spirituality; according to the second, it was the intelligentsia’s claim to spiritual insight that had retarded Russia’s intellectual and political

243 Berdiaev, Vekhi, 22.

development. In both narratives the Russian intelligentsia is treated as unique—whether as unique in a superior way, or unique in its Chaadaevian predisposition to stagnation. However, as Kustarev notes, in both it is also taken as fact that there is no intelligentsia in the West, while in Russia there are no intellectuals.\footnote{Ibid., 69. For more on the intelligentsia and intellectuals by Kustarev, see: Kustarev, \textit{Nervnye liudi. Ocherki ob intelligentsia} (M: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2006).}

Kustarev’s work is only one of many recent instances of contemporary Russian-language criticism on the difference between the intelligentsia and intellectuals. Just as Western criticism of the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first saw a number of books on the downfall and disappearance of the intellectual from public life, in contemporary Russian writing we could turn to Serguei Oushakine’s “Functional Intellectuality” [“Funktsional'naia intelligentnost’,” 1998], Boris Uspenskii’s edited volume \textit{The Russian Intelligentsia and Western Intellectualism: History and Typology [Russkaia intelligentsia i zapadnyi intellectualism: istorii i tipologii, 1999]}, or Boris Firsov’s “Intelligentsia and Intellectuals at the End of the XX c.” [“Intelligentsiiia i intellektualy v kontse XX veka,” 2001].\footnote{See: Oushakine, “Funktsional'naia intelligentnost’,” \textit{Polis} 1 (1998), 8-22; Uspenskii, ed., \textit{Russkaia intelligentsia i zapadnyi intellectualism: istorii i tipologii} (M: OGI, 1999); Firsov, “Intelligentsiiia i intellektualy v kontse XX veka,” \textit{Zvezda} 8 (2001).} More recently, the debate over the distinction between \textit{intelligenty} and intellectuals has found a home in the two-volume series
Thinking Russia [Mysliashchaia Rossiia], edited by Vitalii Kurennoi and published in 2006 and 2009 respectively.247

In “Intellectuals” [“Intelлектуаль”] from the first volume, Kurennoi speaks of Russian thought in the twenty-first century as making the transition from the model of the intelligentsia to the contemporary model of the intellectual.248 For Kurennoi, the intelligent can be differentiated from the intellectual in that the former not only has a social function, but he fits into a specific type of behavior and style of life [obraz zhizni].249 “The intelligent is an ‘integrated individual,’” he continues.250 It is a social type—a group of “well-rounded dilettantes” [“всесторонние diletanty”].251 The recent demand for a new word—“intellectual”—to replace a social group that

247 Both volumes were included on the short list for the 2009 “Social Thought Prize,” presented annually by the Institute for Social Design [Institut obshchestvennogo proektirovaniia].


249 Ibid., 8.

250 Ibid., 8.

251 Ibid., 9. Here, the label “dilettante” seems not only to play into the pejorative use of the term surrounding Landmarks, but picks up on the contemporary negative connotation surrounding the title “generalist.” While in biology, a generalist species is an exceptional one in that it is able to thrive in a variety of habitats and that can survive off any number of food sources, with the rise of the contemporary university system generalism has been used as the negative opposite of specialization. This despite the fact that, in the intellectual sphere, “generalist” has historically referred to those polymaths (“Renaissance men,” or the Latin Homo universalis) who were
no longer exists (and, as he notes, has not existed for a long time), signals the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding intellectual culture in the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{252} This is not unlike Vladimir Shlapentokh’s thesis that while the intelligentsia involves itself in routine functions, intellectuals are those superior individuals who comprise the highest stratum of the learned.\textsuperscript{253} Not surprisingly, however, in his 1990 book \textit{Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power} Shlapentokh uses the words interchangeably, noting that “intelligentsia” is the word used in Russia, while “intellectuals” is the Western word for the same phenomenon.\textsuperscript{254} For, in his opinion, “only at the height of McCarthyism did the lives of American intellectuals compare to those of their colleagues in socialist societies.”\textsuperscript{255}

Sergei Sergeev’s distinction between \textit{intelligent} and intellectual in his contribution to \textit{Thinking Russia II} is much different than Kurennoi’s. Initially, Sergeev’s definition of the intelligentsia seems not unlike Ovsiannikovo-Kulikovskii’s, in that both thinkers view the intelligentsia as including everyone who participates in academic life (what Hamerton described as a dedication to literature, the sciences, or the fine arts). For Sergeev, the intelligentsia is a professional group in the production and spread of ideas—professional in the sense that they live knowledgeable in a variety of fields and strove for diversity in his wisdom, such as Leonardo da Vinci and G.W. Leibniz.

\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{253} Shliapentokh, “Intellektualy kak nositeli spetsificheskikh moral'nykh tsennostei: tam i zdes',” 22 49 (1986), 165-166.


\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 280.
off the material rewards of their work. He delineates five intellectual “types” that make up the intelligentsia: 1) anyone who works in the intellectual profession; 2) a creator and/or propagator of spiritual values; 3) an individual (regardless of education) who lives a deeply religious life, often undertaking service “in the name of the people”; 4) any highly spiritual, cultured, and moral individual; 5) a representative of any new exploitative class that takes the place of the bourgeoisie. He stresses that for each of these five types, their intellectual activity is their profession, citing by way of example Belinskii, Dostoevskii, Mikhailovskii, Rozanov, and Lunacharskii.

While the contemporary reader might find Sergeev’s definition of intelligentsia too inclusive, in the sense that it seems to make room for academics, spiritual leaders, cultured individuals, and proselytizers, he delineates intellectuals as a subcategory of the intelligentsia. Thus, if intelligenty are those individuals who both participate in “the intellectual life” and who live off that work, then intellectuals embody all these qualities plus an additional (and necessary) ideological function. While this ideological function does not have to be their primary engagement or the primary source of their income (here he cites Karamzin and Pushkin as

257 Ibid., 15-16.
258 Ibid., 19-20.
examples),

Sergeev emphasizes that intellectuals are those *intelligenty* who act as official institutional, governmental, and clerical representatives. They are functionaries and bureaucrats like Lomonosov (whom he calls an example of a “pure government intellectual”), Tatishchev, Bolotov, Shcherbatov, and Radishchev—all “intellectuals who pursu[ed] ideological and scholarly production alongside their primary occupation.”

Here Sergeev focuses in particular on Tatishchev, whom he views as a bureaucrat moonlighting as an intellectual.

After distinguishing intellectuals from the larger category of *intelligenty*, Sergeev goes on to elevate the non-ideological intelligentsia above intellectuals, though he admits that government intellectuals are rapidly growing in numbers.

While the nuances of his distinction are not entirely clear—and, ultimately, he will later collapse the two terms into one and use them interchangeably in the second half of the work—the primary quality under scrutiny seems to be the addition of ideology. Both intellectuals and *intelligenty* are “professional,” but only the *intelligent* earns his living off some ideal of pure work, whereas the intellectual lowers himself to the institutional, ideological realm.

John Gross makes a similar argument in *The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters* (1969), where he writes that “journalism is a career; literature is, or ought to be, a vocation.”

Here, for Gross, career seems to imply that journalists live off their work,

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260 Ibid., 20.

[“… занимающихся идеологическим и гуманитарным производством «по совместительству» с основной деятельностью.”]

261 Ibid., 21.

where as literature is a calling—a reference to the original use of the term “vocation,” which was employed in the context of clergymen.263

Still, Sergeev’s trouble with intellectuals appears not to be that they earn money off their work (he notes that the intelligentsia too are “professionals”). Rather, it is their official status that he finds disconcerting. This is not an unusual approach, and here we see a link to the average Soviet-era academic’s attitude toward his craft. In fact, this is the same idea on which the after-the-break narrative from Chapter One pivots: the idea that due to censorship, politics, lack of materials and the opportunity for international collaboration, philosophical discourse persevered in the Soviet Union not through official channels like publications and lectures, but as a style of life. Philosophy was believed to have taken up residence in private apartments and the desk drawer, in the form of late-night discussions and well-circulated copies. In this sense, philosophy was viewed not as a profession, but as an activity. Bright, well-articulated, original ideas did not necessarily get you published, pay the bills, earn you prestige, or grant you permission abroad. According to this story, it was not “practicing” philosophy (in the official, clinical sense) that mattered, but the act of philosophizing. In his commentary on the insufficiency of the current philosophical climate, Valentin Tolstykh displays a clear nostalgia for this ideal of “philosophy as activity”: “Philosophical societies, seminars, self-titled public

263 In an article in the first volume of Thinking Russia, Vadim Radaev makes use of the idea of “professionalism” in a similar way, defining professionalism in philosophy as earning a living through the practice of philosophy. See Radaev, “Issledovat'el'skie instituty: sostojanie i problemy. Beseda s Vadimom Radaevym,” in Mysliashchaia Rossii I (M: Nasledie Evrazii, 2006), 44.
lectures, meetings in stairwells and kitchens, where the most unexpected, clever, and tricky questions of human life were posed—these have all disappeared somewhere.”  

In Tolstykh’s statement we see a conflation of philosophy with its mode of practice. Noticing that the location of philosophy has shifted from private gatherings to more public mediums, Tolstykh concludes not that something has changed in the discipline, but that philosophy in Russia has simply ceased to exist (very much in the style of criticism of histories of Russian philosophy, as seen in Chapter Two). A similar, albeit less aggressive, extension is made by Valentin Bazhanov, who laments the deserted stacks of the Russian State Library in Moscow (still affectionately referred to as “Leninka”), where in the 1970s and 80s “there were already long lines at the coat check by ten in the morning.” 

Still, it would be irresponsible to peg this assumption as some particularity of Russian intellectual citizenship, as the view of philosophy as a “way of life” or “state of being” (as opposed to a craft or profession) is as old as philosophy itself. In the Republic, Plato sets philosophy apart from (and above) the arts (e.g. drama, poetry, rhetoric), the danger in the arts being their foundation on imitation. They require of the craftsman (the imitator) no knowledge

\[264\] Tolstykh, My byli. Sovetskii chelovek kak on est’ (M: Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 2008), 191-92.  
[“Куда-то исчезли философские сообщества — семинары, самозванные публичные лекции, “лестничные” и “кухонные” баталии, где ставились и обсуждались самые неожиданные, хитрые и каверзные вопросы человеческого бытия.”]

\[265\] Bazhanov, “O filosofii i ee imitatsii v sovremennoi Rossii s tochki zreniia istorika i filosofa nauki,” in Rossiiskaia postsovetskaia filosofiiia: opyt samoanaliza, ed. Maiia Soboleva (Munich: Otto Sagner, 2009), 146.
of the truth behind what they imitate, and so the painter of the horse’s bridle, for instance, does not need to have any knowledge of the reins and bit themselves—their mechanism, their composition, their function—in order to paint their likeness.266 But, while the cobbler or the metal-worker do require a knowledge of the workings of the reins and bit to construct them, for Plato the philosopher is still higher on the chain of virtue, for even though such artisans do have knowledge of the things they create, and these things have a function, their craft is still just that—a craft. Unlike the painter and the cobbler, who both (to varying degrees) love only beautiful things, the philosopher “believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things that participate in it and does not believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants.”267 In this way, for Plato, the status of philosopher has no internal variations, in that one cannot be a good or a poor philosopher in the way that one can be a good or a poor carpenter.268 In this sense, for Plato philosophy as a “lifestyle” and philosophy as an official practice are one and the same. Unlike Sergeev’s and Tolstykh’s chastising of the alleged corruption of the virtue of philosophy with institutional preoccupations, for Plato the philosopher must have an official, public function, for only philosophers are fit to rule the city and to advise those who do. Thus, for Plato the idea of philosophy for philosophy’s sake is not opposed to institutional and ideological structure, but is necessary to it.

267 Ibid., 476c.
268 Ibid., 475d.
While Sergeev chooses his examples of official intellectuals from the eighteenth century, we might say that the distinction he draws is particularly relevant to the twentieth century where, by 1917, Lenin had appropriated much of the contemporary philosophical debates and recast them as Party ideology; in this way we find a re-inauguration of the model of the “official academic”—or, those scholars supported by government institutions who wrote under the banner of dialectical materialism and who served as the medium through which Party rhetoric was realized. These scholars not only enjoyed publishing and research privileges, but were declared “official” by the State. Such partitioning of “official” and “unofficial” philosophy, or, more often, “philosophy” and “pseudo-philosophy,” allowed the Party to pit the discipline against itself in the name of philosophy and of the State, rendering competing theories, in many cases, powerless, and thus allowing for their repression.

Yet, even the position of the official academic (although one of power) was periodically in flux, updating itself to the ever-changing policy of the Party. The elasticity of this official narrative and the corresponding flexibility required of Soviet official academia is apparent in an examination of the canonical texts of Soviet-era philosophy: these include, for instance, the many volumes of the *Concise Philosophical Dictionary* [*Kratkii filosofskii slovar’*] during the Stalin and post-Stalin period—written collectively, as if dictated to an anonymous pen by the official voice of the State. When policy changed, so did the texts. Books’ publishers would periodically mail new pages to subscribing institutions, which were then expected to cut and paste into their copies of the books in order to keep them up to date with the official history of the State.

Such textual dethroning is perhaps most apparent in the history of Soviet science and the philosophy of science. This is particularly evident in the case of Trofim Lysenko, whose
controversial rejection of Mendelian genetics was pronounced in August 1948 as the agronomical theory of the Soviet Union under Stalin.269 As Loren Graham notes: “no longer could it be hoped that Party organs would distinguish between science and philosophical interpretations of science. … Soviet scientists were genuinely fearful that each field would produce its own particular Lysenko.”270 In 1964, however, after Brezhnev’s succession of Khrushchev, the Soviet administration began to allow criticism of Lysenko’s work for the first time. Already by the 2 September 1965 meeting of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Sciences Lysenko’s research was officially discredited as pseudoscience, after which textbooks were adjusted accordingly.271 It is in this way that the official scholar, like any official text, acted as a figurehead of the immediate policy of the State—a position that, at any given moment, encompassed the past, the present, and the future, all from the vantage point of the contemporary, in that it constantly altered itself, its past, and its future in step with the Party’s protean teleology. In other words, as policies changed, history adjusted itself accordingly, so that it appeared as though the policy at any given moment had always been that way, and would always be that way.

In the concerns of thinkers like Sergeev and Tolstykh, we see unease over what they view as a similar conferring of philosophy with an official role: that is, a perceived wide scale shift from philosophy as an organic practice (as a “way of life”) to a career. Sergeev’s elevation of


270 Ibid., 15.

271 Ibid., 148.
the intelligentsia as “a group of intellectuals par excellence,” though logically inconsistent with his earlier statement that intellectuals are a more specific category of the intelligentsia, seems to suggest that that intelligentsia is superior because its members are untainted by ideology and institutional concerns. In other words, they have not sacrificed the Hambertonian ideal of a reflective existence for a more profitable way of life.272

If we place this argument in the context of the Western debate over the status of the intellectual, we see that the two approaches stand in direct opposition to one another. Representative of the Western debate of the last quarter of the twenty-first century, Foucault’s, Gross’, and Jacoby’s respective arguments on the death of the intellectual all, in some way, point toward the loss of a public function—a function that, for Collini, comprised an engagement with a wide public, the successful articulation of concerns to that public, and the establishment of a reputation for these articulations.273 For Sergeev, however, it is the introduction of a public function that threatens the well-being of the intelligentsia. Here, the intellectual does not represent the apex of contemporary scholarship, but is a deficient, opportunistic (and here we might say capitalistic) scholar who has betrayed the ideal of the intelligentsia.

272 In reality, however, while the debate over the intellectual and the intelligent has come into focus in Russian criticism only in the twenty-first century, if we abide by classical definitions of the intellectual as a highly educated individual (often a generalist) who reaches the public in some substantial way (as Collini, Jumonville, and Posner would claim), then Russia (including the Soviet period) has always had a strong tradition of intellectuals.

273 Collini, Absent Minds, 52.
Thus, while both the Western and Russian versions of these debates engage the category of the intellectual on the question of his public role, we see a striking conceptual difference between them. It is not just that the category of the intelligentsia plays no role in the Western versions of these debates, but we see how contemporary reflections on the intelligentsia/intellectual distinction in Russia recall (even if only to a highly diluted extent) the religious/secular binary that dominated the 1990s. If the category of the “intelligentsia” is frequently believed among its supporters to have historical ties to Russian speculative philosophy (Berdiaev, Ivanov-Razumnik) and is idealized as the intellectual force behind progress (Sergeev, Slavinskii, Tolstykh), the “intellectual” is treated by the opposing camp as part of a Western ideal of scholarship (Kurennoi, Radaev, Shlapentokh). Thus, the two radically different views on the intelligent in Thinking Russia become clear: while according to Sergeev, the intelligentsia represents a specifically Russian tradition of Hambertonian-like speculation and philosophizing, for the opposition, the intelligent is identified by his clinging to an antiquated, isolating, and, ultimately, unproductive style of life, which removes him not only from the public, but from the worldwide intellectual process. In fact, we see that contemporary Russian debates over intelligent/intellectual are again divided along the same old lines of the religious/secular narrative: that is, the more conservative group views the entire Western discussion of intellectuals as foreign to the Russian tradition of the intelligentsia, while a more Western oriented opposition calls for the end of discussions of the intelligentsia as Russia's “true great minds.”

Within the boundaries of these debates over the status of the philosopher in Russia, however, we also see an extremely diversified and self-reflexive body of criticism—especially in the two volumes of Thinking Russia, which contain numerous layers of disagreement and
contradiction among their authors. Not only are these volumes self-reflexive, in that they address the current state of contemporary Russian philosophy (and not only its history, as we saw in the previous chapter), but they undertake such an examination from many points of view at once. It is precisely this presence of internal discord—both on a structural and conceptual level—that I would pinpoint as one important indicator of a healthy philosophical climate. On the structural level, in *Thinking Russia* we see internal discord as a primary organizing premise: by this I mean that articles that contradict one another and offer competing points of views are placed side by side. On the conceptual level, however, in the two volumes of *Thinking Russia* there is very little dialogue between articles. This lack of self-referencing is particularly noticeable in the second volume, where the reader anticipates a dialogue with the first.

In the next chapter we will see a second approach to internal discord in the work of two contemporary philosophers. There, discord is used not as a method of structuring the text, but as a conceptual strategy. The goal is not to place competing theories side by side but to break the religious/literary narratives open from inside, demystifying the very terms in use by simultaneously employing and confounding them.
5.0 THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TURN: TWO INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE “RUSSIAN IDEA”

The study of “literature as philosophy” in Anglo-American universities has historically made up its own sub-discipline, where it has been housed primarily in Continentally minded Philosophy or English departments and circulated in its own specialized academic journals. If we trace the same phenomenon in Russian thought from the nineteenth century and the Silver Age, we do not see nearly the same level of anxiety over whether literary criticism (often disparaged in Europe and the United States as being popular philosophy for dilettantes) has a role in university philosophy. Indeed, as Abdusalam Guseinov and Vladislav Lektorskii point out, “in Russia, there were no concrete borders between professional philosophy and popular philosophy until the contemporary period.” Not only were the lines between these areas of philosophical inquiry blurred (if not entirely erased) during the nineteenth century and Silver Age, but as we saw in the first chapter, literature-centered speculation on the “Russian idea” became the dominant pursuit of much of Russian philosophical production in the immediate post-Soviet period. We already

274 For instance, the journal Philosophy and Literature based at Bard College.

saw how this blending of philosophy and literature continues in the sub-departments of the History of Russian Philosophy in the twenty-first century, where Dostoevskii, Tiutchev, and Tolstoi regularly appear as figureheads of the Russian philosophical and spiritual tradition.

In this chapter I will look at two contemporary alternatives to the religious narrative and the religious-literary conflation: Valerii Podoroga’s visual, or analytic anthropology, and Sergei Horujy’s synergetic anthropology. Both Podoroga (currently the chair of the Sector for Analytic Anthropology at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow) and Horujy (director of the Institute for Synergetic Anthropology in Moscow) began rejecting the re-appropriation of pre-revolutionary religious philosophy as early as the early nineties, and both take anthropology as their point of departure in proposing a new, non-essentializing philosophical paradigm for contemporary Russian thought. By calling them “alternative” I do not mean to imply that Podoroga’s and Horujy’s approaches to philosophy are in some way anti-literary, or even anti-Orthodox. In fact, both thinkers regularly appeal to Russian fiction in their work, and Horujy’s approach is explicitly Orthodox-centered, while Podoroga’s is often relegated by critics to the sphere of “postmodern literary criticism.” Rather, by referring to them as “alternative” I have in mind the fact that they signal important shifts in Russia’s “Continental tradition,” such as it was, away from what Horujy has called the “methodological sloppiness” of pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy (and, by extension, much of the post-Soviet resurrection of this school of thought). While there are countless interesting

contemporary thinkers who do not conform to the religious stereotypes about Russian thought, I have chosen to look specifically at Podoroga and Horujy here: 1) because they began their criticisms of the “Russian idea” already in the early-nineties; and 2) because their criticisms come not from the camp of analytic philosophy (for which religious and literary philosophy is an easy target) or some other outside sphere, but from inside the literary/religious narrative. By this I mean that, at first glance, the language and content of their work appear to align them unequivocally with many of the standard clichés of Russian speculative thought, while in fact, upon closer inspection, we see that their respective relationships to the history of Russian thought are methodologically quite innovative.

5.1 ANTHROPOLOGY AS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY

It is no surprise that in the past decade anthropology has become the point of departure not only for Podoroga’s and Horujy’s methodologies, but for a manifold of other philosophical critiques. From the very beginning of its development, anthropology was based both in scientific and philosophical inquiry, relying on the virtues of the two fields of scholarly inquiry

277 To Podoroga’s and Horujy’s anthropological approaches we could add a number of new anthropologies being practiced and developed in Russian academies, including Fedor Girenok’s much criticized “archeo-avantguardism” and Ivar Maksutov’s philosophy of “hyper anthropology.” The growing number of alternative anthropologies in the contemporary period should come as no shock, given the longstanding emphasis of Russian thinkers (in particular, historians of Russian philosophy) on anthropology and the problem of man.
to help describe the physical and metaphysical life of man. We can trace the roots of modern anthropology to the intellectual life of the second half of the eighteenth century, to thinkers like French philosopher and political theorist Marquis de Condorcet; German ethnologist and naturalist Georg Forster; Scottish philosopher Henry Home (Lord Kames); Montesquieu; Leibnizian and author of *Anthropology for Physicians and the Worldwise* [*Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*, 1772] Ernst Platner; Scottish historian William Robertson; and Voltaire. As John Zammito notes, during this period:

> the crystallization of anthropological discourse arose from the convergence of a number of disparate inquiries: the medical model of physiological psychology, the biological model of animal soul, the pragmatic or conjectural model of cultural-historical theory, the literary-psychological model of the new novel (*Tristram Shandy, Sorrows of Young Werther*), and the philosophical model of rational psychology grounded in the quandaries of substance interaction. \(^{278}\)

In short, anthropology arose “as part of the response to the failure of the mechanist paradigm to incorporate the life sciences,”\(^ {279}\) and it was this blending of several disciplines across the sciences and the humanities that accounted in part for its attractiveness to thinkers from a wide array of fields.

To the abovementioned list of pioneers in anthropology we must add Immanuel Kant, who in 1798 published his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* [*Anthropologie in

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\(^{279}\) Ibid., 229.
pragmatischer Hinsicht], the result of twenty-five years of lecture notes from his university courses on anthropology.\textsuperscript{280} Although we see hints of the development of a new approach to the study of man earlier—for instance, in David Hume’s statement in his \textit{Treatise of Human Nature} (1739) that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”\textsuperscript{281}—it has been argued that Kant’s work is the first systematic outline of this new discipline.\textsuperscript{282} His work was a summary not only of what anthropology should study, but how it should go about this study, and what the implications of such a study would be for human life.

In particular, in the \textit{Anthropology} Kant characterizes this new discipline as an “observational doctrine” \textit{[Beobachtungslehre]},\textsuperscript{283} presenting it, at least superficially, as a purely

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{280} According to Manfred Kuehn, “the \textit{Anthropology} clearly belongs among the small group of works which were conceived as textbooks for introductory course given at university level.” See: Kuehn, “Introduction,” in Kant’s \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, ed. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), xi.
\item \textsuperscript{281} Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888), xx.
\item \textsuperscript{282} As Manfred Kuehn observes, Kant’s first lecture on anthropology predates even the 1774 edition of Home’s \textit{Sketches of the History of Man} by more than a year. See: Kuehn, “Introduction,” vii. Zammito takes Kant’s work on anthropology back even further, making the case that already in 1768, several years before Kant began his anthropology lectures and four years before the publication of Platner’s \textit{Anthropology}, Kant “was already very advanced toward his conceptualization of a new disciplinary anthropology.” See: Zammito, \textit{Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology}, 292.
\item \textsuperscript{283} Kuehn, “Introduction,” viii.
\end{itemize}
empirical endeavor.\textsuperscript{284} Furthermore, as Manfred Kuehn notes, Kant “also felt it necessary to point out explicitly that [in the \textit{Anthropology}] he would not address such ‘subtle’ but ‘eternally futile’ questions or philosophical problems as the mind-body relation.”\textsuperscript{285} We see this separation between anthropology and “serious philosophy” (in this case, metaphysics) in Kant’s statement that, in anthropology, “experiences are appearances united according to laws of understanding, and in taking into consideration our ways of representing things, the question of how they are apart from their relation to the senses is not pursued at all; for this belongs to metaphysics, which has to do with the possibility of \textit{a priori} cognition.”\textsuperscript{286} Kant continues by saying that man’s inner life, made up in part by his inner sense and intuition, “[is] not merely \textit{anthropological}.”\textsuperscript{287} Thus, one’s consciousness of oneself, of how one appears to oneself through inner experience, does not belong to the sphere of anthropology, but to that of psychology and metaphysics.

This division between anthropology and “serious philosophy” is often attributed to a split in Kant’s work between a pre-critical stage and a critical stage: in other words, between the early, popular Kant of the \textit{Anthropology} and the older, more academic post-1781 Kant of the Critiques. The \textit{Anthropology} is attributed to his less mature \textit{oeuvre}, while the point at which he became a mature thinker (and turned away from anthropology) is typically placed at the

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\textsuperscript{284} Although, as Zammito points out, his method was perhaps more physical than empirical. See: Zammito, \textit{Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology}, 302.
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\textsuperscript{285} Kuehn, “Introduction,” viii-ix.
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\textsuperscript{286} Kant, \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, ed. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 33.
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\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., 53.
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completion of his *Inaugural Dissertation*, published in 1770, in which he denounces the empirical sciences (among whose ranks he includes anthropology) as naïve. The split between “professional” and “popular philosophy” that Guseinov and Lektorskii speak of in the abovementioned quotation is quite similar, as their concept of “professional philosophy” implies scholarship that requires “special training” to comprehend.\(^\text{288}\) And indeed, not only is this the analytic camp’s most common critique of Continental philosophy and “literature as philosophy”—that it is not “technical enough”—but the same critique was made of Kant’s work on anthropology. Although two thousand copies of the *Anthropology* were printed in its first edition (more than any of the first editions of his other works) and his lectures on anthropology were anecdotally said to be more popular among his students than any of the other topics on which he lectured, Kuehn notes that, *critically*, the book did not gain the philosopher any respect.\(^\text{289}\) It received only a single, embarrassing discussion in contemporary journals upon its publication—a negative review by Friedrich Schleiermacher, who reduced the text to “a collection of trivial matters.”\(^\text{290}\)


\(^{289}\) Kuehn, “Introduction,” x.

\(^{290}\) Qtd. ibid., x.

Indeed, the replacement of anthropology by “serious scholarship” is assumed to have gone hand-in-hand with a significant decline in his status. Zammito notes that, while Kant was a well-known participant in intellectual and university culture in the 1760s and some of the 1770s, he had fallen out of widespread recognition almost entirely by the time he completed the twelve-
Yet, although Kant’s empirical anthropology seems to in many ways coincide with generalizations that we might make about anthropology in its contemporary form—the history of man and the objects of man, accompanied by a kind of Geertzian “thick description”—it would be incorrect to accept a clear break between anthropology and metaphysics in his work. While metaphysics might not have had a place in anthropology, Kant was clear that anthropology did play an important role in metaphysics. In his summary of the four eternal questions of the discipline of philosophy in the *Logic* (*Logik*, 1800), for instance, the final query is an explicitly anthropological one: namely, “What is a human being?” Moreover, Kant notes that all four questions—the others being: What can I know?; What ought I to do?; and, What may I hope?—“could be reckoned to be anthropology, because the first three questions are related to the last.”\(^{291}\) In this way, it is only with the help of the anthropological method and the knowledge it provides that the philosopher is able to achieve the primary goals of philosophy: “to be able to determine: 1) the source of human knowledge; 2) the extent of the possible advantageous use of all knowledge, and finally; 3) the limited use of reason.”\(^ {292}\) Thus, while critics are often inclined to separate the *Anthropology* from the rest of Kant’s philosophical *oeuvre*, Kant himself made his stance on anthropology very clear: although anthropology was certainly more superficial than psychology and metaphysics, it was to serve as the doorway to these higher disciplines.

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We see a similar struggle to reconcile philosophy and anthropology played out in Podoroga’s and Horujy’s contemporary projects. The tension between a notion of academic philosophy and some form of popular philosophy (in this case, anthropology) remains salient even in the twenty-first century, and both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s philosophical anthropologies fall into the latter, marginal category. They are criticized as being just two more re-appropriations of the pre-revolutionary tradition, whether in their religious content (Horujy) or in their speculative language (Podoroga and Horujy). While both approaches do make use of some of the language and gestures of the dominating religious paradigm that was resumed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in reality they seek to forge a new paradigm for Russian philosophical thought.

In presenting Podoroga’s and Hojury’s philosophies as alternatives to the religious narrative, I do not have in mind Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigm shifts. First, Kuhn’s approaches to the concept of “paradigm shift” is limited to the context of the active, informed achievements in the sphere of the theoretical sciences. Second, for Kuhn, such paradigm shifts work in only one direction—that is, we can never look back once we have accepted a former paradigm as mistaken, and incorrect attempts to forge new paradigms are rarely remembered.

294 Ibid., 17. Thus, Kuhn notes that, now knowing that light is photons, we can never return to the scientific paradigm held in the early nineteenth century that asserted that light was transverse wave motion.
Alasdair MacIntyre offers what I find to be a more workable model for the humanities in his essay on the "epistemological crisis," which he sees not as a wholesale shift from one paradigm to another but as involving the historically informed construction of a new narrative, that "enables the agent to understand both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them." The resolving of an epistemological crisis does not result in us being in a position to claim that we possess the truth or are now fully rational, he continues. We can say only that "this is the best account that anyone has been able to give so far, and that our beliefs about what the marks of ‘a best account so far’ are will themselves change in unpredictable ways." While we do not necessarily find this level of modesty in the two alternative anthropologies that I want to look at here, both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s approaches are active attempts to resolve a very real epistemological crisis of contemporary Russian philosophical thought.

5.2 AGAINST "METHODOLOGICAL SLOPPINESS": VALERII PODOROGA AND SERGEI HORUJY

In 1993 and 1994, Valerii Podoroga—head of the then Laboratory for Post-classical Research [Laboratoriiia postklassicheskikh issledovanii] at the Moscow Academy of Sciences—led a series...


296 Ibid., 5.
of ten meetings at the newly opened Center for Modern Art in Moscow. Together the seminars made up the “Visual Anthropology Workshop” [“Masterskaia vizual'noi antropologii”] and were attended by philosophers, artists, and art critics. Each meeting took the form of interactions with, and discussions on, a variety of visual artifacts (some of which were authored by workshop participants), including both classical and avant-garde paintings, drawings, photographs, films, installations, and performances. As Podoroga described it during one of the meetings, his anthropology “is like any other anthropology: it studies morals and customs, symbols, gestures, rules and all the other multifarious particulars of the everyday and not-so-everyday life of man.”

In * Phenomenology of the Body [Fenomenologiia tela, 1995],* Podoroga emphasizes that his practice of visual anthropology, which exists as a sub-category of the larger methodology of analytic anthropology, is not about challenging the discipline of anthropology, but of extending its reach from observations of data (in this case, artistic, cinematic, and literary texts) to “a philosophical understanding of anthropological material.”

297 The Center for Modern Art in Moscow opened in 1991.


[“Визуальная антропология … подобно всякой другой антропологии, исследует нравы и обычаи, знаки, жесты, правила и все другие разнообразные реквизиты обыденной и необыденной жизни человека.”]


[“В анализе я стремился идти от литературных, живописных, кинематографических образцов к философскому осмыслению антропологического материала.”]
In reality, however, in Podoroga’s anthropology the focus is not as much on the objects of study as on the very mechanisms and practices of observation. Here the gaze is turned upon its own source so that the act of perceiving itself becomes the object of criticism. The idea that “we never have the power to be one step ahead of our own bodies”\textsuperscript{300} takes up the center of Podoroga’s anthropology, and during the Visual Anthropology Workshop many of the discussions focused on the human body as an inescapable border between the observer and the observed. Implicitly recalling Kant’s own lengthy discussions of the faculties of the senses in the \textit{Anthropology}, Podoroga focused on the concept of “surface” and on one’s sensing of one’s own “skin”—that is, the physical outer limit of the human body. “Human behavior is given to us, but always through the observer,” Podoroga says in his characteristically postmodern style of presentation, and so the task of visual anthropology is “to observe what is human in man.”\textsuperscript{301}

Here the word “human” can be read as referring to the limits of human observation, again emphasizing the focus in his work on the borders between the body and the external world.

Although the Visual Anthropology Workshop was conceived immediately after the

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 50.

\textsuperscript{301} Podoroga, ed., \textit{Masterskaia}, 50.
collapse of the Soviet Union (it was the first of its kind in the then newly post-Soviet Russian Federation), it bears little stylistic resemblance to the otherwise dominating resurrection of the legacy of pre-Revolutionary Russian religious philosophy.\textsuperscript{302} Instead, any thematic or conceptual structure is undermined by the dissociative poetics of postmodernism. In fact, even more so than any theories of visual observation or art theory, the primary mechanism at play in Podoroga’s Visual Anthropology Workshop is postmodern philosophy and its aesthetic and semantic canon. We pick up not only on references (more often implied than explicit) to Georges Bataille, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, but the workshop, especially when looked at as an ongoing conversation, is structured by the pastiche that has in many regards become the identifying structural unit of postmodernism. Here I have in mind not only the aesthetic hodgepodge implied by the word “pastiche,” which is apparent in the way that discussions move from one topic to the next with little structure, and whereby ideas are rarely “summed-up” or brought to a logical conclusion. I have in mind also, in some senses, the imitative meaning of “pastiche,” in that the discussions are a reflection of a particular postmodern style of philosophizing whereby a variety of broad, speculative, and often abstract, topics and questions are introduced and then quickly replaced, leading to a sweeping, almost performative, play of ideas that do not necessarily lead to answers but to more questions and more ideas. Alexei Penzin has called this

\textsuperscript{302} The topic of post-Soviet identity is equally absent from the discussion—a topic that would later become fundamental to the research conducted in Podoroga’s sub-department at the Institute of Philosophy in the late nineties and the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Podoroga’s philosophy of “‘exceptionalism’ [ekstseptsionalizm], where the content lies not so much in the critique as it does in the potentialization of other discourses.”

We see this gradual unfolding of discourse at the third meeting of the Visual Anthropology Workshop, for instance, which took place on 9 December 1993 and included invited guest Susan Buck-Morss. The theme of the day was the nature of “disgust,” and the discussion moved from questions of whether aversion can or cannot be the main inspiration behind a work of art to a discussion of the nature of art itself. “What is a work of art?,” asked Elena Petrovskaia, faculty member in Podoroga’s department at the Institute of Philosophy. “Is it what you put in quotation marks, or are the quotation marks themselves the work of art?”

Continuing with postmodernism’s fondness for capitalization and punctuation (be it the use of quotation marks, parenthesis, the hyphen, or the act of “bracketing”), the conversation then jumped back to the question of aversion, where Podoroga makes the distinction between “ot-vrashchenie,” or “dis-gust,” and “so-vrashchenie,” or “sed-uction.” He identifies these phenomena (which he hyphenates to play on their shared root vrashchat’ [to turn or rotate]) as


[“В целом она определяется как философский «экспеционализм», работа которого состоит не столько в критике, сколько в потенциализации других дискурсов.”]

304 In an equally postmodern gesture, the answer that Petrovskaia gives is that the quotation marks themselves are the work of art. See: Podoroga, ed., Masterskaia, 74

[“Что же является произведением искусства – то, что ты ставишь в кавычки, или сами кавычки?”]
inverse reactions, explaining in a drawing that if we start at a center, or “null,” point of observation, “disgust” is the observer’s turning away from that point, while “seduction” is the turning toward or down onto that same point. This schema is then abandoned without much further reflection and the conversation moves on to a different topic.

The very same focus on human corporeality is apparent in Podoroga’s personal body of work, where literature (and sometimes cinema and the other visual arts) becomes the primary object of study. In his work on Dostoevskii, Podoroga defends the claim that the author’s heroes lack definition from their surroundings and are fused to the settings and plots in which they find themselves. They are “bodies without skin,” Podoroga writes, in that they “include within themselves ‘their personal’ objects, landscapes, people, time (by which [they] live and die), space (which they render habitable or traverse), bodies, faces, looks, etc.” Thus, the typical Dostoevskian hero is not given through description and strategic narrative unfolding, but

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305 Ibid., 85

306 For Podoroga’s most recent work on literature, see: Mimesis. Materialy po analiticheskoi antropologii literatury, 2 vol (M: Kul'turnaia Revoliutsiia, Logos, and Logos altera, 2006); On cinema and painting, see, for instance: Podoroga, Fenomenologii tela (M: Ad Marginem, 1995) and “Litso i pravila raskroia. Fiziognomicheskii opyt Sergeia Eizenshteina,” in Fenomenologii tela (M: Ad Marginem, 1995): 282-326.


[“включает в себя ‘свои’ вещи, ландшафты, людей, время, которым живут и умирают герои, пространство, которое они обживают или пересекают, тела, лица, взгляды и т.п.”]
is exposed to the reader “like a wound.” It is for precisely this reason that architecture plays a fundamental role in Dostoevskii’s work, whereby the interior of one’s room acts as the skin that the heroes lack.308

According to Podoroga, it is Dostoevskii’s narrators that strip the characters bare of their metaphorical skin. In particular, they do so through their rapid, rambling narratorial style. This is a narration not in the classical sense, in which action depends on the movement of the characters’ bodies from scene to another or from one action to the next; it is an unstoppable verbal acceleration nourished on the destruction of the human form, where narrative progresses at the expense of the body. As Dostoevskii’s stories move forward, bodies are exposed, wounded, stricken with illness and anxiety, and exterminated; they are bought and sold, broken through suffering and hard labor, and thrown to the floor in fits of hysterics and acts of confession. Podoroga refers to this encounter of the Dostoevskian form, which he terms a “new experience of the body,” as regressive: it propels the character backward to its most corporeal state, a condition Podoroga likens to Catalepsy, where the muscles become uncontrollably rigid and bodily functions slow down dramatically.

What is more, Podoroga adds that although Dostoevskii’s narrators strip their characters bare and expose them to humiliating and injurious acts, the narrators themselves have no personal sensory experience of corporeal life. Thus, through narration “there is no situation of vision created for the reader, by the help of which he might perceivably (through touch) imagine the figures of the characters, things, natural objects, time, or space. … [Dostoevskii’s] is a dim

308 Ibid.
and unprepossessing world.”309 Given that for Podoroga it is the sense of touch that is frequently privileged above the other modes of perception (we will recall that even in his description of visual anthropology, the boundaries of our skin are the very limits of our perception), it is not surprising that Podoroga focuses on here is Dostoevskii’s narrators’ deficient sensory capabilities. While it may be ironic to speak of connecting with a text through touch, for Podoroga, what these narrators lack above all is the ability to provide the reader with this tactual experience. Unable to rely on the language of Dostoevskii’s narrators for a haptic connection, the reader is left no choice but to turn to the pace of narration as a guide. Thus, as Podoroga writes: “In Dostoevskii, the haptic is reduced to the experience of the speed of the events of the narration, and it is only through this shroud, as if falling on the text of his novels, that we get the sensation of a new experience of the body.”310 In this way, Dostoevskii’s bodies are not written

309 Ibid.

[Но в текстах Достоевского для читателя не создано никакой ситуации видения, с помощью которой он мог бы зримо (через касание) представить себе фигуры персонажей, вещи, природные объекты, время и пространство. Это мир тусклых и невзрачных … .]

310 Ibid.

[“ … гаптическое сводится у Достоевского к переживанию скорости событий речи, и только через эту пелену, словно опустившуюся на тексты его романов, мы получаем ощущение нового опыта тела …”]

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as subjects that move within the narrative, but they are “alcoholic, hysterical, epileptic, body-machines, body-victims,” subject to their respective narrator’s own self-absorbed momentum.\footnote{Ibid.}

For Podoroga, it is crucial that the reader understand the alienating nature of Dostoevskii’s texts as facilitating this new experience of the body. To react negatively to his rapid narratorial style would be to misunderstand the author, he argues. But should such a misunderstanding occur, it would not a problem of one’s knowledge or consciousness, he argues, but a problem of the body.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, as Podoroga emphasizes:

We misunderstand a text not because we lack the knowledge to comprehend it, but because we are unable … to establish adequate corporeal communication with it, because we are unable to ‘enter’ into a new imaginary space, just as the language that describes it remains profoundly foreign to us and even seems incapable of being literary language.\footnote{Ibid.}

Podoroga is careful to distinguish Dostoevskii the author from his narratorial voice, although he does draw a comparison between the speed of narration in Dostoevskii’s works and the author’s own habit of dictating his novels rather than writing them.\footnote{Ibid.}
Jumping ahead a little over a decade, the second “alternative anthropology” in question is philosopher and theoretical physicist Sergei Horujy’s synergetic anthropology.\textsuperscript{314} Although Horujy and Podoroga are of the same generation (Horujy was born in 1941 and Podoroga in 1946), Horujy’s anthropology made its appearance as a developed methodology only in 2005 with the publication of \textit{Studies in Synergetic Anthropology} \cite{horujy:2005}.\textsuperscript{315} This was the same year in which Horujy founded the Institute of Synergetic Anthropology [Institut Sinergiinoi Antropologii], of which he is the director. The opening of the Institute came about around the same time that Horujy and several other members of the section for Science and Theology at the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences renounced their memberships during a falling-out over (from Horujy’s perspective) pseudoscientific and unprofessional behavior on the part of several Academy members.\textsuperscript{316} The Institute of Synergetic Anthropology is not a formal, accredited institution of higher education, but runs a lively lecture

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\item \textsuperscript{314} Horujy’s synergetic anthropology has also appeared recently in Mikhail Epstein’s “Ideas Against Ideocracy: The Platonic Drama of Russian Thought,” in \textit{In Marx’s Shadow. Knowledge, Intellectuals, and Power in Eastern Europe and Russia}, ed. Costica Bradan and Serguei A. Oushakine (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2010), 13-36.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Horujy had been writing on synergy as early as 1995, with the publication of \textit{Synergy. Problems of the Asceticism and Mysticism of Orthodoxy}. See: Khoruzhii, \textit{Sinergiiia. Problemy asketiki i mistiki Pravoslaviia} (M: Di-Dik, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{316} For more on this see Stoeckl, “Sergei S. Horujy’s ‘Synergetic Anthropology,’” note 3.
\end{itemize}
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series at various venues and hosts an extensive on-line library of texts on all aspects of Synergetic Anthropology in several languages.\textsuperscript{317}

The goal of the Institute, in the words of its mission statement, is to familiarize the intellectual community with the ideas of synergetic anthropology.\textsuperscript{318} Here, in the original Russian, the modifier “synergetic” is the unexpected adjective “\textit{sinergiinyi}” (as opposed to “\textit{sinergichnyi}”), which refers back to Byzantine Church Father and defender of Hesychasm Gregorios Palamas, canonized in 1368 as a Saint in the Eastern Orthodox Church. Hesychasm, a process of gaining insight into God through various forms of retreating into the self, including solitude, rigorous aestheticism, and trance-like repetition of the Jesus Prayer (“Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, the sinner”), came under attack by the Orthodox Church in the mid-fourteenth century. In particular, Hesychasm was accused of polytheism for viewing God not as a unity but as two distinct substances. We see suggestions of the source of this charge in Palamas’ use of the Greek \textit{energeiai} to distinguish between the energy of God and the essence of God. While we do not have access to God’s essence, Palamas argued, we do have access to his energy, “which penetrates and changes a man’s heart when it is diffused throughout his body.”\textsuperscript{319}

\textsuperscript{317} In February of 2006, a Center for Synergetic Anthropology was established as part of the Department of Philosophy at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow). The Center is run by Oleg Genisaretskii and Horujy. See: http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/sci/137463

\textsuperscript{318} Khoruzhii, \textit{Institut sinergeiinoi antropologii}, http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3

It is from Palamas’ understanding of *energeiai* that Horujy derives the adjective “sinergiinyi,” which he employs as a descriptor of his Neo-Patristic concept of “synergy”—a metaphysical conformity of events, or the joining of both human and divine energies as the final rung of the Hesychast spiritual ladder. Horujy continues that, unlike classical European approaches to anthropology, which begin and end their examinations with the physiognomic and behavioral characteristics of man, synergetic anthropology’s foundation in Hesychasm allows us to “view [man] as a formation of energy—as an aggregate of all possible multidirectional energies.” The individual passes through a number of possible energy configurations as he ascends the “Hesychast ladder,” striving toward the final goal of a dialogue with God—the top of the ladder; the “highest configuration.”

While Kantian anthropology treats man and his sensory faculties as the primary object of study, Horujy moves the body from the center to the border. He is not interested in man’s


Horujy has mentioned that he began studying Hesychasm in the 1970s, together (in part) with Vladimir Bibikhin. See: Khoruzhii, “Filosofiia pod antropollogicheskim uglom zreniiia” *Institut Sinergiinoi antropologii*, http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=4301#H


[“…рассматривает его как энергийное образование, совокупность всевозможных и разнонаправленных энергий”]

development as an isolated subject, or in the sense data we may gain about him, but on the limits of man and the spaces in which he interacts with others—in particular, his interactions with divine energies. These synergetic relationships occur in the space that Horujy calls the “anthropological border” (“antropologicheskaia granitsa”). In her extensive work on his synergetic anthropology, Kristina Stoekl has called this Horujy’s search for an alternative to the Cartesian subject,323 since Cartesianism does not make room for a discussion of the energies of God and man, nor for the process of deification [obozhenie] that occurs when these energies join.

At its most basic level, synergetic anthropology seeks to provide us with a way to describe and explain religious (and primarily, but not exclusively, Orthodox) phenomena from a purportedly methodological, or systematic, point of view. What is more, Horujy’s explicitly Hesychast approach seeks to transform human action and man’s relationship with the divine into a fecund sphere of anthropological inquiry rich with phenomena overlooked by traditional anthropological methodologies.324 Horujy claims that we can speak about religious phenomena in many of the same ways and with much of the same vocabulary (e.g. energy, synergy) with which we discuss scientific data. Therefore, when we switch from the scientific to the religious, he contends, it does not require a methodological move from logic to mysticism, just as, in the Russian context, it does not imply that we must turn away from science and toward pre-revolutionary religious philosophy. In this sense it is productive to compare Horujy with Pavel


324 Khoruzhii, “Filosofiia pod,” 2.
Florenskii who, in his work in physics and electrodynamics at the beginning of the twentieth century—and in particular, in his book *Imaginary Numbers in Geometry. The Expansion of the Field of Two-Dimensional Forms of Geometry [Mnimosti v geometrii. Rasshirenie oblasti dvukhmernykh obrazov geometrii, 1922]—sought to prove that his geometrical reconfiguration of Einstein’s theory of relativity was the same geometrical structure we might find in the kingdom of God.*

Like Podoroga, Horujy is often quick to apply his synergetic anthropological method to literature, and we see one such application in his reading of Dostoevskii’s *The Brothers Karamazov [Brat'ia Karamazov, 1880].* For Horujy, the novel’s “anthropology of the Karamazov’s” is in many ways a reflection of Dostoevskii’s own understanding of Hesychasm.* Not only was Dostoevskii most certainly familiar with the tradition of Hesychasm, but Horujy points out that in the summer of 1878, as he was beginning work on *The Brothers Karamazov,* the author made a brief visit with Vladimir Solov'ev to the fifteenth-century Optina Desert Monastery in Kozel'sk, Russia.* It is in part due to this trip to the


326 Horujy is well known not only for his active and widespread promotion of synergetic anthropology, but for his co-translation of James Joyce’s *Ulysses* (1922), published in 1993. See Dzheims Dzois, *Uliss,* trans. Viktor Khinkiss and Sergei Khoruzhii (M: Respublika, 1993).

327 Khoruzhii, “‘Brat'ia Karamazovy,’” http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3595
“center of Hesyachast thought,” Horujy argues, that accounts for the important status of Hesychasm in the novel, and for the fact that the “anthro-cosmos” of the novel is rooted almost entirely along the border where anthropological phenomena and Hesychasm meet.328

In contrast to Podoroga’s reading of Dostoevskii, in which the narrator moves his characters backwards toward a regressive, cataleptic corporeality, Horujy focuses on the movement of Dostoevskii’s spiritually privileged characters up the Hesychast ladder. While for Podoroga it is the narrator who moves bodies according to his will, for Horujy the narrator has no anthropological role in The Brothers Karamazov; he has no position of his own—no singular, Bakhtinian voice. Horujy argues that the Hesychast doctrine is most apparent in the character of Dmitrii Karamazov, who embodies in his conversion the two main rungs of the Hesychast ladder: the struggle with human passion and the need for repentance through Christ. Again, here Horujy makes use of the dialectic of synergy: “As Hesychsm tells us, the world of repentance and the world of passions stand in opposition to one another and man must forge a path through them, overcome one with help of the other, to move further, higher.”329 We see the various stages of the Hesychast ladder played out in the text, he asserts, from Dimitrii’s struggles with

328 Here Horujy again speaks of borders, this time of the border between the anthropological life of man and the practices of Hesychasm. He calls the points where these two meet the “bordering stratum,” or “layer” [“primykaiushchii sloi”]. See Khoruzhii, “‘Brat'ia Karamazovy,’” 7-8.

329 Ibid.

[“Как говорит исихазм, мир покаяния и мир страстей противостоят друг другу, и человек должен выстроить путь через [sic] них, отринуть один и с помощью другого двинуться дальше, выше.”]
desire to his conversion at the novel’s close. It is for these reasons that Horujy not only cites *The Brothers Karamazov* as an exemplary instance of synergetic anthropology in practice (even if only in “literary practice”), but he identifies its publication as ushering in a revival of Hesychast thought in late nineteenth-century Russia.

Without stepping into a debate over whether there was such a Hesychast revival in Russia and whether *The Brothers Karamazov* was the force that brought it about, we might note that, upon first glance, both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s respective anthropologies stir up the same criticism as Kant’s *Anthropology*: that is, What do these “anthropologies” have to do with philosophy? Moreover, they also evoke the standard critical query directed at contemporary Russian philosophical thought: Are not analytic anthropology and synergetic anthropology just two more speculative attempts on the part of literary criticism and/or Orthodox theology to forge seamless, exclusionary worldviews that promote exceptionalism and exclude dialogue?

While both thinkers are undoubtedly the object of reproach for their non-classical approaches to philosophy, what makes them interesting for our purposes is that they both exist inside the classical Russian speculative tradition *without* conforming to all the clichés bound to the religious narrative. In this sense, we might view them in light of the enlightenment anthropological project: that is, if anthropology arose in the work of Kant, Platner, and Home “as part of the response to the failure of the mechanist paradigm to incorporate the life sciences” as Zammito suggests, then in the post-Soviet period we might view new anthropological approaches (of which Podoroga’s and Horujy’s are only two) as similar reactions against some failed paradigm. In this particular case, for both Podoroga and Horujy, the failed paradigm is the

religious narrative—and, more specifically, the legacy of pre-revolutionary Russian religious
philosophy—resurrected by the overwhelming majority of thinkers after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.

In visual anthropology, for instance, Podoroga does not seek to identify what is Russian
about Russian literature, or to link it with the history of Russian philosophical thought. On the
contrary, he rarely cites Russian-language sources in his work, seeking instead to propagate a
reading of the Russian literary tradition that is linked with the Continental tradition—primarily
French post-structuralism and postmodernism and the Frankfurt School. As Penzin points out,
in Podoroga’s lectures in the late nineties he regularly used the term “negative anthropology” as
a means of connecting what he and his colleagues at the Institute of Philosophy were doing with
the Frankfurt school and Günther Anders, in whose work traditional anthropological methods
were criticized for failing to account for the real conditions of human existence in modernity:
suffering, alienation, violence, and terror.

Although Podoroga labeled his anthropological approach “analytic” early on in the
workshops, insofar as the goal was to analyze observation from a philosophical perspective, we
see that it is quite the opposite of Wittgenstein’s description of analytic philosophy in both the
Tractatus (1921) and the Logical Investigations (1953), where philosophy does not lead to more

\[\text{\textsuperscript{331}}\] In particular, he has criticized the Russian tradition for uncritically blurring the boundaries
between literature and philosophy, arguing that although the two disciplines are intimately
related in Russia, this relationship has a long and complicated history. See: Podoroga,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{332}}\] Penzin, “Minima Anthropologica.”
quandaries but is the way that we simplify discourse and dissolve problems: as Wittgenstein
describes it, the aim of philosophy is “to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle.” In
Wittgenstein’s model, thus, the successful philosopher closes the space of philosophy through
the offering of answers, so that when he has finished his work he has no questions with which to
occupy himself. Podoroga takes the opposite approach. Instead of closing down philosophical
discourse, whether through analytic reduction or through the identification of “characterizing
traits” or “Russian ideas,” in analytic anthropology the result is the opening of a wider and wider
space of discourse through the posing of more and more abstract questions. “The analytic
procedure is simple,” Podoroga writes. “It is to trace the perception of any given utterance,
which, as we know, is not carried out in its own time: that is, any utterance is irrecoverable, but
if it is recovered it is done so at the expense of the time of understanding.” In this way, the
analytic method works towards “the reconstruction of the meaning allotted to a given object …

Sect. 309.

334 Penzin has called this Podoroga’s approach of “neutrality in the ‘war of discourses. See:
Penzin, “Minima Anthropologica.”

335 Podoroga, ed., Avto-bio-grafiia. *K voprodu o metode. Tedradi po analiticskoi antropologii* (M:
Logos, 2001), 164-6.

[“Аналитическая процедура проста: проследить за восприятием того или иного
высказывания, которое, как мы знаем, осуществляется не в его собственном времени, т.е.
всякое высказывание невосстановимо, а если восстанавливается, то за счет времени
понимания.”]
in every opposing discourse.” Thus, his use of the adjective “analytic” here has less to do with the analytic approach as a philosophical movement and more to do with the systematic tracing of utterances in and out of various contexts.

In synergetic anthropology we see the same rejection of the standard religious narrative. Although Horujy emphasizes that, in synergetic anthropology, the individual’s spiritual journey begins with a turning [obrashchenie] toward God and ends with deification [obozhenie] through synergy, Horujy explicitly avoids aligning himself with Solov'ev’s discourse on all-unity or Godmanhood, as he finds it un-nuanced, neo-Platonic (as opposed to Neo-Patristic), and ultimately, unable to account for essential (i.e. having to do with essences) differences between humans and the divine. In fact, Horujy takes great and careful pains to differentiate his Orthodox philosophy from much of the history of Russian philosophy. Despite the explicitly religious content of his writing, he has described his development of synergetic anthropology as a “moving away from the ‘methodological sloppiness’ of the pre-revolutionary religious philosophers to the theological rigor of the Neo-Patristic theologians.”

In articles, talks, and at round tables he has spoken out against the concept of the Russian idea, as well as against the use

336 Ibid., 8.

[“… аналитическая работа сводится к реконструкции смысла, которым наделен тот или иной объект … в каждом из противоборствующих дискурсов.”]


of the phrase “Russian philosophy” [“russkaia filosofiia”] as necessarily implying Russian religious philosophy. Furthermore, he has criticized Mikhail Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev, as well as their contemporary followers for considering Solov’ev’s philosophy of “all unity” a starting point for any serious Orthodox metaphysics.339 Here the identification of “methodological sloppiness” and the negative attitude toward the majority of pre-revolutionary Russian religious thought is crucial, for although he may not always be successful in convincing his readers, Horujy actively works against the essentializing tendencies of the standard religious/literary conflation.

Although Podoroga’s analytic anthropology is primarily a-religious, delving into religion only as far as in a Heideggerien sense, what it shares with Horujy’s explicitly Orthodox synergetic anthropology is that both shift the focus from a man-centered conception of anthropology to a philosophical anthropology of the border. In Podoroga’s case, this shift occurs by focusing not just on the human faculties of observation, but on the limits of observation and on the limits of the body itself. While during the Visual Anthropology Workshop much of the discussion was not on the individual as anthropological subject but on “skin” and the physical limits of the human body, Horujy’s own parallel shift from the center to the border occurs in his discussion not of individual essence, but of the borders where human and divine energy converge. In both instances we see the influence of postmodern readings of Heidegger, and while this might be expected in Podoroga’s case, it should also not surprise us in Horujy’s, given the long collegial relationship between Horujy and Vladimir Bibikhin (1938-2004), who was

339 Ibid., 7.
Losev’s student and secretary and a translator of Heidegger.\textsuperscript{340} Here, in the move from a purely descriptive anthropology to metaphysical (or, at least, phenomenological) concerns—be it Podoroga’s reflection on the manipulation of time through narrative or Horujy’s theories of the merging of human and divine essences—we see the shift from a physiological anthropology to the metaphysical. It was precisely this kind of content, one could speculate, that might have appeased Schleiermacher, transforming Kant’s \textit{Anthropology} in his mind from “a collection of trivial matters,”\textsuperscript{341} or mere \textit{Beobachtungslehre}, into a discipline of real philosophical significance for mankind.

While, realistically, Podoroga’s and Horujy’s anthropological approaches to philosophy would find little sympathy in the overwhelmingly analytic Western philosophical context, in Russia they are alternatives in a philosophical climate that is still, in many spheres, dominated by pre-revolutionary approaches to the discipline. They are active rejections of the “literature as religious philosophy” model by two of Russia’s most well-known contemporary philosophers. By no means do Podoroga and Horujy shed entirely the standard criticisms of Russian philosophical thought—in many instances they even play into these criticisms. However, their alternative anthropological approaches are important insofar as they challenge the traditional narrative of what is meant by the term “Russian philosophy,” calling for a revision of not only the terms at play, but the foundation on which these terms rest.


\textsuperscript{341} Qtd. Kuehn, “Introduction,” x.
6.0 CONCLUSION: “A HOLIDAY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY”

In February of 1912 in the journal *Russian Thought* [Russkaia mysl’], Pavel Novgorodtsev, professor at Moscow State University and a leading figure in both the neo-Kantian movement and the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party, wrote of the thirty-year anniversary of colleague Lev Lopatin’s philosophical career:

This was not the typical anniversary celebration, signifying a long term of service or a period of enduring labor. There was something more here: In truth, it was a holiday of Russian philosophy, which, through the persona of Lopatin, celebrated its coming of age, possibilities of independent creation having opened before it.342


[“Не обычное юбилейное чествование, обозначающее срок долгой службы или искус продолжительного труда; тут было нечто большее: это был поистине праздник русской философии, которая в лице юбиляра праздновала свое совершеннолетие, пред которой открылись перспективы самостоятельного творчества.”]

Lopatin and Novgorodtsev were colleagues at the journal *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* [Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii], which Lopatin co-edited and to which Novgorodtsev
Novgorodtsev’s language here is likely to elicit at least two questions from the contemporary reader: 1) Does “independent creation” indicate a philosophizing that is no longer imitative of the West, whereby Russia’s “coming of age” is synonymous with her becoming more “Russian”; or 2) Does “independent creation” signify Russia’s contribution of original, influential ideas and texts to the international philosophical community, in which case “coming of age” is synonymous with the engagement of a wider circle of external intellectual and academic institutions?

These two lines of questioning are by no means specific to Novgorodtsev’s praise of domestic philosophy, but represent two historically self-standing approaches to the study of contributed. Novgorodtsev, a doctor of civil law, was one of Russia’s most active advocates of a rule-of-law state governed by the theory of natural law—the idea that law is dictated by nature, and is therefore universal. In accordance with these loyalties, for Novgorodtsev the most pressing question of his contemporary was a neo-Kantian one: “to understand the connection between the existent and the imperative and their ultimate harmony.” See: Kuvakin, ed., *A History of Russian Philosophy, from the Tenth through the Twentieth Centuries*, vol. II (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994), 544. In his later articles, such as “The Essence of Russian Consciousness” [“Sushchestvo russkogo soznaniia”] and “The Church in Its Relation to the Spiritual Life of the Future Russia” [“Tserkov v ee otnoshenii k dukhovnoi zhizni budushchei Rossii”], we see a growing inclination to include religious considerations into his reconciliation of the contemporary political reality and the idea of a universal code of law.
Russian thought. These divergent methodologies, as we have seen, permeate all orders of philosophical inquiry, from broad questions concerning the beginning of the Russian philosophical tradition, its “characterizing traits,” and its most notable figures, to minor details, such as the terminology (russkii or rossiiskii) that we are to employ when we speak of the tradition.

If we turn our attention to the first line of questioning, where the holiday of philosophy may be interpreted as the celebration of Russian philosophy coming to terms with its own “Russianness,” it would be no exaggeration to say that speculation on the “originality” of Russian philosophy is a specter from which thinkers (both past and present, Russian and non-Russian) have long been unable to escape. This is the more historical paradigm, whereby Russian philosophy—a concept that, given Russia’s autocephalous legacy, has often been synonymous with Russian Orthodox philosophy—is viewed as somehow fundamentally different from the West and thereby indescribable outside the microcosm of its own national thought. This is also the very same paradigm that was re-appropriated in the early nineties as the proper path for the future of Russian philosophy.

343 Here I should emphasize that in using Novgorodtsev’s speech as an example, I am aware that this involves, to a certain extent, projecting a contemporary debate on to an early twentieth century text. This is not necessarily something that we should avoid, however, for although Novgorodtsev clearly did not have these two lines of analysis in mind while preparing his remarks for Lopatin’s jubilee, the ambiguity in them highlights the historical difficulty in untangling the two narratives from one another.
As we have seen, however, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the pendulum has begun to swing toward the second line of questioning. Whether disillusioned with the idea that Russia has some special philosophical gift it was meant to share with the world, or, more likely, never convinced by that argument to begin with, we see the emergence of the second reading of Novgorodtsev’s commentary. Namely, the idea that the primary goal of Russian philosophers should not be to highlight the originality of Russian thought, but to work toward ways in which Russian thinkers might contribute more frequently and actively to the international philosophical scene. Although we can find such figures in all historical periods, it is particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century that we see the emergence of a number of studies on Russian philosophers from all spheres—from religious thinkers to logicians; from social philosophers to “scientific atheists.”

Perhaps more surprising, however, are attempts to break down the religious/secular boundaries altogether in the work of thinkers like Podoroga and Horujy who, although themselves conforming to a number of stereotypes surrounding religious and literary oriented philosophy, dismantle the narrative from within, attaching unexpected meanings to historical signifiers. As this occurs, and if borders between sub-departments and schools begin to break down, the very concept on which this work is titled—the idea of being “between philosophies,” or “between paradigms”—becomes anachronistic, and for the better. The contemporary holiday

344 One such example is the series “Philosophy in Russia in the Second Half of the XX c. [“Filosofii Rossii vtoroi poloviny XX veka”] edited by Vladislav Lektorskii, et al. The series comprises twenty one volumes on thinkers such as Valentin Asmus, Aleksei Losev, Merab Mamardashvili, Lev Mitrokhin, Georgii Shchedrovitskii, and Aleksandr Zinov'ev.
of Russian philosophy, then, would be a parting with the tradition of philosophy as a hegemonic, objectively existing set of essentialized national characteristics, as demonstrated in histories of Russian philosophy from 1840 to the present. Collectively, it appears that much of the contemporary body of work is already seeking to do just that, widening the scope of what is to be housed under the term “Russian Philosophy” and actively forging a new definition so that by “russkaia filosofia” we mean not just “Russian religious philosophy,” but “philosophy in Russia.”


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