OLD FRIENDSHIPS: EXPLORING THE HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAN-ISLAMISM AND JAPANESE PAN-ASIANISM

by

Sadia Sattar

B.A. in Anthropology, Drexel University, 2006

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

University of Pittsburgh

2008
This thesis was presented

by

Sadia Sattar

It was defended on
April 18, 2008

and approved by

Richard J. Smethurst, PhD, Professor
Martha Chaiklin, PhD, Assistant Professor
M. Pinar Emiralioglu, PhD, Visiting Assistant Professor

Thesis Advisor: Richard J. Smethurst, PhD, Professor
This thesis examines the relationship between Japanese pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists from the end of the nineteenth century till World War II. The materialization of pan-Asianism in Japan and pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was a response to the perceived acts of aggression against a fictive and universal “West.” Both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism emerged as a reaction to the strong currents of anti-Western discourse. The trajectories of both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism intertwined with major turning points in international history, such as the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), WWI, and later in the 1930s after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Intellectuals involved in both these movements engaged in intense debates about race, civilization, and empire. It was such transnational imaginations that laid the foundations of Japanese-Ottoman interactions. Pan-Islamists, keen on uniting the social, religious, and political recesses evident in the Islamic world, sided with Japanese pan-Asianists in the Early Meiji Era. It was the desire of pan-Islamic intellectuals to join forces with Japan for the purpose of constructing a twentieth century utopia under the banner of Islam, which was suitably modern, spiritual, and able to withstand Western hegemony. According to them, the strength of Japanese pan-Asianism combined with the universality of pan-Islamism’s message was an integral force in the “awakening” of Muslims around the globe. Also, Japanese pan-Asianists were keen to engage in diplomatic discourse with Ottoman intellectuals so as to overturn the Orientalist framework that had condemned the Eastern nations to a status of inferiority by the Occident.
This thesis, therefore, connects Japanese history to the world of Islam and investigates how the accepted notions of Orient and Occident, East and West, Self and Other, engineered a relationship between two very different nations. The embracing of Japan by pan-Islamist intellectuals and the affinity of pan-Asianism’s message as the East’s answer to the West (as an equal in matters of race, civilization, and culture) is indicative of an association incumbent upon restructuring the global power politics of the time.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1

2.0 PAN-ASIANISM, PAN-ISLAMISM, AND ABDÜRREŞİD İBRAHİM (1857-1944) .................................. 5
   2.1 THE RISE OF PAN-ASIANISM IN JAPAN ........................................................................................ 7
   2.2 THE GENESIS OF PAN-ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ........................................... 18
   2.3 ÉMIGRÉ ACTIVITY IN ISTANBUL AND ABDÜRREŞİD İBRAHİM (1857-1944) ................................... 22

3.0 EARLY PAN-ASIAN AND PAN-ISLAMIC VISIONS (1871-1914) .................................................... 26
   3.1 EARLY CONTACTS ........................................................................................................................... 27
   3.2 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905) AND RENEWED INTEREST ................................................. 29

4.0 THE REVIVAL OF PAN-ASIANISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM (1931-1945) ....................................... 39
   4.1 PAN-ASIANIST AND PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN THE 1920S .............................................. 40
   4.2 REVIVAL OF THE JAPANESE-MUSLIM FRIENDSHIP IN THE 1930S ........................................... 44

5.0 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 52

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................................... 55

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................................... 56

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................................... 57
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Most people are unaware of Japan’s historic connections to the world of Islam. However, there was a time in international history when Japanese pan-Asianists wanted to befriend pan-Islamists as allies in their pursuit of forming a new Asia under Japanese domination. This thesis explores the themes, events, and personalities that made it possible for Japanese pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists to work together from the end of the nineteenth century till World War II. The emergence of pan-Asianism in Japan and pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a response to the perceived acts of aggression by a fictive and universal “West.” Their prevalence is a reflection of the strong currents of anti-Western discourse prevalent in global history of the time. The ideological significance of anti-Westernism associated with these ideologies, contains several conflicts and paradoxes. First and foremost, it should be noted that in spite of the decades of relationships between the two movements, the governments of both nations never forged an official alliance. This is because even though pan-Asian and pan-Islamic policies were popular amongst their respective circles, they were not a reflection of the politics of the Japanese and Ottoman Empires. Given that Japanese pan-Asianists espoused anti-Westernism, in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration, Japan had quickly attained the status of the most Westernized and industrialized nation in Asia. More importantly,

1 The surfacing of several pan-movements shows the development of ideologies of regional contribution emerging all over the world during the 19th and 20th century.
the Japanese government maintained close political and cultural ties with Europe and America. Second, pan-Islam, officially endorsed during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909), was not a political ideology strewn with anti-Western discourse. In fact, Ottoman officials considered the adoption of pan-Islam as a compliment to modernization and Westernization in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it would be wrong to presume that Occidentalism\(^2\) was the root of such anti-Western discourse in Asia as many pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists were enthusiastic admirers of the West. Likewise, one must not reduce the prevalence of such critiques as a natural response to Western colonialism, or as a conflict between Islam and Christianity. This thesis explores the historical significance of pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism in the understanding of anti-Westernism in Japan and the Muslim world.

The trajectories of both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism intertwined with major turning points in international history, such as the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), WWI, and later in the 1930s after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Intellectuals involved in both these movements engaged in intense debates about race, civilization, and empire. It was such transnational imaginations that laid the foundations of Japanese-Ottoman interactions. Pan-Islamists, keen on uniting the social, religious, and political recesses evident in the Islamic world, sided with Japanese pan-Asianists in the Early Meiji Era. It was the desire of pan-Islamic intellectuals to join forces with Japan for the purpose of constructing a twentieth century utopia under the banner of Islam, which was suitably modern, spiritual, and able to withstand Western hegemony. According to them, the strength of Japanese pan-Asianism combined with the universality of pan-Islamism’s message was an integral force in the “awakening” of Muslims

around the globe.\textsuperscript{3} Also, Japanese pan-Asianists were keen to engage in diplomatic discourse with Ottoman intellectuals so as to overturn the Orientalist framework that had condemned the Eastern nations to a status of inferiority by the Occident.

This thesis, therefore, connects Japanese history to the world of Islam. The next chapter examines the ideologies of pan-Asianism in Japan and pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire. It also sheds light on Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857-1944), the Tatar Muslim who single-handedly established direct and personal contacts with Japanese pan-Asianists.\textsuperscript{4} Chapter three examines the trajectory taken by the Ottoman-Japanese relationship from the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century till the First World War. Initial interest in the Ottoman Empire was sparked in the 1870s when the Iwakura Mission (1871-1873) was dispatched to Istanbul and Egypt to gain first-hand knowledge about the renegotiation of the unequal treaties of 1858 signed by the Shogunate in Japan with the Great Powers in the hopes of finding a solution by adopting a legal system similar to the Ottoman case.\textsuperscript{5} This diplomatic visit triggered many Japanese trips to the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Asianists traveled to the Ottoman state and other parts of the Muslim world for intelligence and information gathering purposes. However, when both nations entered WWI on opposing sides, their relationship came to an abrupt end. Chapter four explores the beginnings of

\textsuperscript{3} Selcuk Esenbel, "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945," \textit{The American Historical Review} (October 2004).

\textsuperscript{4} İbrahim is important in this discussion as he single-handedly established contacts with Japanese pan-Asianists. It should also be noted that not all Ottoman intellectuals were keen on forming an official relationship with the East Asian empire.

nationalist thought in the Ottoman Empire and Japan and examines the consequences such identity constructions had on the diplomatic courtship between the Empires. Furthermore, this chapter dwells on the 1930s when pan-Asianism is endorsed as foreign policy by the expansionist and conservative segments of Japanese society. It is also around this time that pan-Asianist contacts with the Muslim World are reinvigorated. In spite of this, this relationship is once again terminated at the end of the Pacific War. This thesis investigates how the accepted notions of Orient and Occident, East and West, Self and Other, engineered a relationship between two very different nations. The embracing of Japan by pan-Islamist intellectuals and the affinity of pan-Asianism’s message as the East’s answer to the West (as an equal in matters of race, civilization, and culture) is indicative of an association incumbent upon restructuring the global power politics of the time.

6 See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verson, 1983) for a good discussion on the construction of nationalism and how the idea of the modern nation is essentially “imagined.”

2.0 PAN-ASIANISM, PAN-ISLAMISM, AND ABDÜRREŞİD İBRAHİM (1857-1944)

The birth of pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism are reflections of the rise of ideological movements in the nineteenth century that were influenced by the interactions between the West and the Japanese and Ottoman empires. Furthermore, these movements emerged as a response to the discontent towards the West as it was “imagined” by pan-Asian and pan-Islamist intellectuals. While the West was not monolithic, the legacy of Western superiority, unequal treaties, and even racial discrimination were pressures that gave birth to the two movements, which sought to provide Western civilization with an equal and sophisticated non-Western vision of the world order. To better understand the commingling of anti-Western discourse amongst Japanese and Ottoman intellectuals, this chapter investigates the emergence of both movements as a result of fictive imaginations of the West even though their respective societies and governments did not discard Westernization. Pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists sought to reject the perceived superiority of Western societies through the pursuit of these ideologies in order to create a new vision of the world order. In section one, the ideology of pan-Asianism (Han Ajiashugi) is explored. Most scholars cite Okakura Tenshin’s famous phrase “Asia is one,”8 as representative of the ideology. Yet, such is not the case. Pan-Asianism emerged in Japan when political groups in opposition to the Meiji oligarchy argued that the nation’s foreign policy should concentrate on

forming an alliance between all East Asian nations in order to develop a strong “Asian” identity so as to expel the Western powers from Asia. In this section, I explain that pan-Asianism arose amongst Japan’s right-wing groups owing to a rising awareness of a conflict between the white and yellow races and fueled notions of Asian solidarity in East Asia. Members of patriotic societies, the Kokuryûkai and Genyosha, conducted espionage activities and secured contacts with leaders in India, China, and Russia in an effort to further East Asian solidarity and brotherhood. Although never officially endorsed by the Japanese government, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, pan-Asianism was utilized in Japanese politics and was used as a tool for regional integration in East Asia. In addition, the ideology was also employed as a means for Japanese expansionism and imperialism.

Also addressed in this chapter is the genesis of pan-Islamism in the Ottoman state. The interactions of modern education, the development of a printing press, and the rise of an Ottoman bourgeoisie, gave birth to a rising ethnic consciousness amongst the various ethnic groups residing in Ottoman lands. Section two of this chapter investigates the rise of pan-Islamism and traces its development in the Ottoman state from an intellectual movement rooted in religion to a political ideology that was used to salvage the Empire from ruin during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909). To further elaborate on the encounter between pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism, section three of this chapter examines the activities of Russian Muslim émigrés in the Ottoman state and the Tatar Muslim amongst this intellectual milieu called Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857-1944). Not only was he successful in establishing direct contacts between pan-Islamist intellectuals and pan-Asianists in Asia and Japan, through his writings İbrahim was also
able to construct a particular image of Japan in the hearts and minds of the Ottoman public and the rest of the Arab world.

2.1 THE RISE OF PAN-ASIANISM IN JAPAN

Pan-Asian ideas emerged amongst the political opposition to the Meiji oligarchy in Japan during the Meiji Period (1868-1912) when the question of how Japan should deal with its Asian neighbors became the focal point of the nation’s foreign policy. The root of this argument rested on the oppositionists desire to form a Japanese-Korean-Chinese alliance against the Western powers. Modernization, accompanied by the nation’s rapid Westernization, was also a strong point of contention amongst pan-Asianists who considered a partnership with other Asian nations crucial in the drive to expel Western powers from Asia. In the 1860s and 1870s, pan-Asian rhetoric served as a tool to bridge the gap between Japan and the rest of Asia so as to build a common “Asian” identity, which was based on constructing an aggressive Western “Other.” However, the West was not considered to be a threat by all Meiji intellectuals. On March 16, 1885 Fukuzawa Yukichi, editor of the newspaper *Jiji shinpō* (“News of the Times”) wrote an editorial titled “Datsu-A-ron.” His message in the essay was a forceful push for the Japanese nation to dissociate itself from Asia and to strive for equal status with European nations. In the essay Fukuzawa stressed that the Japanese should consider moving towards Western civilization

---

owing to the country’s transcendence from Asian conservatism. He also stressed that since Korea and China lacked the means and the aspirations to modernization, both should be removed from Japan’s sphere of influence.¹⁰ In the midst of this conflict—join Asia/leave Asia—emerged pan-Asianism (Han-Ajiashugi) or Asianism (Ajiashugi), a concept tied to the unity of Asian nations based on a common race and culture (dôbun dôshu).

Pan-Asianism emerged in Meiji Japan as a response to the West’s interference in China and was linked to the romantic ideals of an Asian brotherhood. It was a call by certain bureaucrats and intellectuals to unite the Asian nations and fight against Western imperialism. While the Japanese government never officially endorsed the idea of pan-Asian solidarity, in the 1890s high-level Meiji bureaucrat Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1904) expressed his anxiety over a potential racial struggle in East Asia between the white and yellow races. He articulated his concern over the partition of China by the Western powers in an article published in Taiyô (“The Sun”) in 1898¹¹ and asked the Japanese to side with China against the white race. His anxiety over dangers from the West and his advocated solidarity with China exhibit the consideration of pan-Asian ideas amongst Japan’s political elite. Konoe’s call for racial solidarity in East Asia against the white powers received attention in Japan when, through the interference of Russia, France, and Germany, Japan was forced to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China in 1895. Furthermore, three years after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), fears of a

¹⁰ In “Datsu-A-ron” Fukuzawa writes: “Japan alone is having freed itself from old ways, and it must now move beyond all Asian countries by taking “dissociation from Asia” [datsu-A] as the keynote of a new doctrine. […] In pursuing its goals, Japan cannot afford to wait for the enlightenment of its neighbors, in hopes of working with them for the betterment of Asia.”
¹¹ The name of Konoe’s article was Dôjinshu Dômei: Shina Mondai Kenkyû no Hitsuyô (We must ally with those of the same race, and we must study the China problem). See Marius B. Jansen, “Konoe Atsumaro,” in Akira Iriye, ed., The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 113.
Western threat to Japan increased when the same territory was leased to Russia. Japan’s increasing strength through Meiji reforms had still not guaranteed the country an equal footing with the West, thus indicating Konoe’s prediction of a racial struggle in East Asia between the yellow and white races. Furthermore, in 1902 he formulated the Asian Monroe Doctrine, the Japanese application of the American Monroe Doctrine. In it he proclaimed that Japan had an interest in any decision regarding the future of China, which reflected both an idealistic mission to protect China on moral grounds and a realistic Japanese foreign policy to pursue the country’s self-interests in East Asia. While Konoe’s Asian Monroe Doctrine would have an effect on Japanese pan-Asianism, it did not alter Japan’s foreign policy objectives. This is because in 1902 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was created with Great Britain, which signaled to Meiji political oppositionists that the Japanese government had no intentions of siding with its fellow “yellow” race Asians.

As pan-Asianism gradually transformed its course in Japan and the rest of East Asia, it is important to ask who exactly was responsible for bringing this ideology to the forefront in

12 For the purpose of studying China and in an effort to develop an alliance between China and Japan, in 1898 Konoe founded a pan-Asian organization called the Dôbunkai (Common Culture Association). It was later renamed the Tōa Dôbunkai after a merger with the Tōakai in the same year.
13 The Monroe Doctrine was introduced during President Monroe’s speech to the U.S. Congress on December 22, 1823 and was aimed at limiting European aggression in the Western Hemisphere. It gained prominence after the emergence of the United States as a world power in the late nineteenth century. For more information see Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955).
14 It should also be noted that as Japan increased its clout in East Asia through the annexation of Taiwan and Korea and also, as a non-Western ally of Great Britain, the nation’s Asianist visions changed. This is not to say that the Japanese political elite used pan-Asianist ideology in their justification of the annexation of Taiwan or Korea. Instead, it shows the shift in Japanese political agendas and exhibits a similar change in Japanese pan-Asianism, which was graduating from a democratic vision of unifying Asian peoples, to an ideology advocating Japanese expansionism and imperialism in East Asia.
Japanese politics. Most scholars cite the writings of Okakura Tenshin (1862-1913), Kita Ikki (1883-1937), Tarui Tôkichi (1850-1922)\(^{15}\) and their political associations (seiji kessha), as examples of historical pan-Asianism in Japan. Tarui supported an “East Asian Union” in his *Daitô Gappô-ron* (“Treatise on the Union of the Great East”). Furthermore, in “Ideals of the East,” Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzô) proclaimed, “Asia is One.”\(^{16}\) This famous phrase has been interpreted as being representative of the ideology of pan-Asianism in Japan. Yet, Okakura’s originally English writings published in 1903 were not widely read in Japan till 1935 and had very little influence on pan-Asian discourse in Japan during the Meiji era.\(^{17}\) Hence, it was other authors who helped define pan-Asianism and aided in its transformation from just discourse in Meiji politics to a concrete ideology in the 1930s. The person responsible for coining the term Asianism was Kodera Kenkichi (1877-1949). His *Dai Ajiashugi-ron* (“Treatise on Greater Asianism”) triggered a wave of publications on the subject in Japan and helped bring the ideology closer to Japanese party politics and government circles, which over time established the pan-Asian movement in Japan and also, aided in the development of various pan-Asian organizations in the country.

In *Dai Ajiashugi-ron*, published in 1916, Kodera defines an “Asian identity” as the “basis of Asianism” (*Ajiashugi no kiso*). His ideas were based on the necessity of a Sino-Japanese alliance, which he saw as the first step toward Asian integration under the banner of Asianism.

\(^{15}\) Politician and founder of the *Tôyô Shakaitō* (Oriental Socialist Party) he was particularly interested in Japan’s political and economic union with East Asian neighbor China. Suzuki Tadashi, “Profile of an Asian Minded Man IX: Tôkichi Tarui,” *Developing Economies* 6, no. 1 (March 1968): 79-100.


Kodera was strongly influenced by the racial theories—fueled by the fears of a “yellow peril”—popular in the United States and Europe during the mid-19th century. He wanted to unite the people of Asia under the ideology of Asianism (Ajiashugi), a pan-ideology for Asia. Kodera’s train of thought regarding Asianism can be traced back to his vision of the Japanese nation. He came of age at a time when Japan was experiencing great industrial strides. He was also a witness to Japan’s resistance of Western imperialism and the nation’s claim to power as the regional leader of Asia through its colonization of Asian nations. Hence, his views regarding Asianism stemmed from the opinion that in order to prevent European aggression in East Asia, a close Sino-Japanese partnership had to be organized. This is exactly what he meant when defining the “basis of Asianism” in the hopes of constructing an Asian identity to foster Asian integration and defense against the clash of the races.

The publication of Kodera’s magnum opus Dai-Ajiashugi-ron triggered a wave of writings on the subject of pan-Asianism in Japan. After the appearance of his book, pan-Asian societies started using the term in their publications. Even though Kodera was never a member of any pan-Asian organizations, his work certainly inspired them. The most notable pan-Asian, or “patriotic societies” were the Genyosha (Dark Ocean Society) and the Kokuryûkai (Black Dragon Society). Members of these organizations were called “professional patriots.” Their activities concerned advancing the expansionist cause of Japanese nationalism and imperialism and their members clearly followed a pan-Asian agenda. Furthermore, these societies strove for “Asian unity” and “Asian solidarity” (Ajia rentai) and clearly pursued anti-Westernism.

18 There were many ideologies of regional contribution emerging all over the world during the 19th and 20th century. These included several pan-movements, such as pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism, etc.
The Genyosha was an early and important patriotic society that sponsored a number of operations against Russia and Russian territorial claims on the Asian continent.\(^\text{19}\) Founded by Toyoma Mitsuru in the late 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century, “its’ three main principles were “to revere the emperor, to love and respect the nation, and to defend the people’s rights.”\(^\text{20}\) Furthermore, its eight-point program included the “investigation of financial conditions and tax grievances; of economic and agricultural improvement; of the capital required to develop the region; of Russian, Tibetan, Burmese, and Indian defenses in Central Asia; of the condition of roads; and the exploration among such groups as the Muslims and Buddhist clergy, the local nomads and the Chinese, and important persons to be identified, which might be exploited for “our purpose.”\(^\text{21}\) The Genyosha was a predecessor of the Kokuryûkai (Black Dragon society), founded in 1901 by Uchida Ryohei. The Kokuryûkai’s main goal was to drive Russia out of East Asia. It’s charter members (numbering around 10,000) operated from the United States, Latin America, Ethiopia, and North Africa. Together these societies spread their expansionist motives by the implementation of criminal devices that involved activities from espionage, political blackmail, the use of terror, etc.\(^\text{22}\) Both societies were able to capitalize on their reactionary nature by acquiring contacts in the Japanese government, who kept leaders of the Genyosha and Kokuryûkai closely informed of key political inclinations and strategies.\(^\text{23}\) Both organizations represented Japanese


\(^{21}\) Office of Strategic Services, R&A reports no. 890.2.7, Japanese Infiltration among Muslims in Russia and Her Borderlands (August 1944).


\(^{23}\) Besides these two societies, there also existed other organizations committed to Japan’s nationalist and expansionist efforts in Asia. They were the White Wolf and Turan Societies, the
ultranationalism and conservatism and were successful in forging alliances with nationalists and intellectuals from Asia, such as Sun Yat-sen of China, Emilio Aguinaldo of the Phillipines, Resh Behari Bose and Rabindranath Tagore of India, and Abdurreşhid İbrahim of Russia.

It was *Ajia Jiron* (“Asian Review”) a monthly magazine published by the Kokuryûkai that started using the term pan-Asianism. In the first issue of the publication, the editors of the magazine strove to answer how the Japanese ethnic (*minzoku*) could fulfill its mission in the world:

> The danger posed by the white people (*hakujin*) to the yellow people (*ôjin*) is imminent. [...] The Japanese Empire, as the last representative of Asia, is the only one that can face and fight the West as the backbone of the yellow ethnicities (*ôshoku minzoku*). [...] We have to institute a comprehensive foreign policy, and implant the idea of Greater Asianism—the great achievement of the foundation of our country—in the minds of the people, and bring about a comprehensive solution to the East Asia problem based on this Asianism.24

The above response by the editors of *Ajia Jiron* shows the similarities of opinions they shared with the writings of Kodera on the subject of pan-Asianism. It is proof of the beginnings of the popularity and usage of pan-Asianist ideology. In the same issue of the magazine, an article titled “On Asianism” (*Ajiashugi ni tsuite*) writer Yoshimura Gentarô called Asianism “the expression of the developing strength of our Empire.” He states that the “rationale for Asianism lies in the

Reawakening of Greater Asia Society (*Dai Ajia Kai*), the East Asia One-Culture Society (*Toa Dobunkai*), the Society for Raising Asia (*Koa-kai*), and the Asia Association (*Ajia Kyokai*) to name a few.

need to deal with the outrageous danger posed by Western powers.”

Furthermore, in the same article Yoshimura echoes Kodera in that he too considers Sino-Japanese rapprochement as a necessity for Japan in its quest for leadership in Asia.

Besides the Kokuryûkai’s magazine *Ajia Jiron*, there were a number of other publications and writings on the subject of pan-Asianism. Beginning in July 1917, in the journal *Tôhô Jiron* (“Eastern Review”) articles on Asianism start appearing. By the end of the same year, the term Asianism appeared in the poetry column (*Shibunran*) of the popular magazine *Taiyô* (“The Sun”):

> Oh, our Asia, remember that this is the birthplace and the pioneer of ancient civilization; it must be resurrected in the twentieth century and recover its mighty position. […] Asians, leave behind all the minor quarrels! Relinquish selfish desires and suspicion and unite the hundred of millions—then a new Asia will surely be reborn, and Pan-Asianism (han-Ajiashugi) shall be spread with the wind and the waves.²⁶

Kodera’s writings also influenced politicians such as Nagai Ryutaro and Nagashima Ryuji. Nagai’s idea of Japanese leadership in Asia echoed Kodera’s thoughts on Asianism, as he too believed that Japan’s task, as a nation was to assume leadership in Asia against “white peril.”²⁷ Nagashima too, like Kodera, claimed that since “the West did not have the strength to support the happiness of mankind, […] Japan had the large responsibility to think about how to achieve


peace in the Orient.” 28 In addition to the writings of the above politicians, three years after the publication of *Dai-Ajiashugi-ron* Sawayanagi Masatarō 29 published a book “Asianism” (*Ajiashugi*) in which, like Kodera, he too emphasized pan-Asian unity. Furthermore, in 1924 the journal *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin* (“Japan and the Japanese”) published a special edition on Greater Asianism. Also in 1924 a short booklet titled “Islam and Asianism” (*Isureamu to Ajiashugi*) was also published thus showing the widening of Asianism’s scope in Japan and the rest of the world. In 1926 Murobose Takanobu’s three volume “Asianism” was published, which provided details on the role of Asianism in the world post World War One.

In the 1930s, Asianism (*Ajiashugi*) gained prominence amongst Japanese politics and this time around it was no longer just rhetoric pursued by the political opposition. No longer grounded in East-West civilizational discourse and fears of the “white” races prejudice against the “yellow race,” pan-Asianism was utilized by Japan to solve the crisis of Japanese imperialism in East Asia. By the 1930s, pan-Asianism had transitioned from discourse encouraging Asian unity to an ideology adopted by the expansionist, conservative, and militarist segments of Japanese society that wanted to establish an Asian world order under Japanese leadership. Japan’s shift to Asian regionalism cannot just be attributed to the influence of pan-Asian groups. Pan-Asianist groups such as the Kokuryûkai and Genyosha worked for the cause from their establishment, but their influence in Japan’s foreign policy was marginal to say the least. 30 However, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931 31 and Japan’s withdrawal from the

---

29 He was vice minister of education 1906-1908 and founder of Seikei Gakuen University.
League of Nations two years later, pan-Asianists found a very receptive audience amongst Japan’s bureaucrats and army officers and pan-Asianism gained support from the military, the government and business circles.\textsuperscript{32} Japanese politics shifted from following a pro-Western path to politically backing pan-Asianism. If explained through the lens of a domestic-policy driven initiative, pan-Asianism appealed to both ultra-national conservatives and Japan’s liberals.\textsuperscript{33} Both supported the aggressive policy in Manchuria and supported the new orientation in foreign policy symbolized by Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. Hence, Japan’s liberals shifted to pan-Asianist discourse when they noticed a tension between the decisions of the League of Nations and the country’s national interests. Furthermore, pan-Asianism became a part of Japan’s foreign policy rhetoric when, as Cemil Aydin demonstrates, “structural transformations in the international system in East Asia complemented changes in the domestic power configurations to create a situation that led to a triumph of antiliberal and Asianist projects.”\textsuperscript{34} Japan’s changing identity in the world order indicating a perceived sense of an international legitimacy crisis and its isolation after the Manchurian Incident are evidence of the changing perceptions of Japanese leadership. James Crowley suggests that the policy-making of the Japanese government during the 1930s cannot be attributed to a right-wing takeover of the government.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{31} The Manchurian Incident of 1931 began a process that led to the establishment of a Japanese controlled puppet government in Manchuria and later, Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. To create a pretext to occupy Manchuria, the Japanese Kwantung Army bombed parts of the South Manchurian Railway in Mukden on September 1931 and instead of withdrawing from the occupied territories, established the puppet state Manchukuo in February 1932. The League of Nation’s non-recognition of this state then became the reason behind Japan’s withdrawal from the league in 1933.

\textsuperscript{32} Cemil Aydin, \textit{The Politics of Anti-Westernism}, 166-174.

\textsuperscript{33} Louis Young, \textit{Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Empire} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

\textsuperscript{34} Cemil Aydin, \textit{The Politics of Anti-Westernism}, 165.
Japanese leadership. It was instead, a responsible effort by political leaders in the interest of Japan’s national defense, who were concerned about the nation’s self-sufficiency and isolation.

Pan-Asianism became an established ideology in March 1933, when about 40 politicians, military officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, including General Ishiwara Kanji, Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945), Tokutomi Sohô, Matsu Iwane (1878-1948), and Hirota Koki (1878-1948), founded the “Greater Asia Society” (Dai Ajia Kyôkai). The Society promoted East Asian unity, but also called for solidarity amongst West and Southeast Asian societies. From May 1933, the society published a journal titled “Greater Asianism” (Dai-Ajiashugi), which became the most influential pan-Asianist journal of the period and offered a wide variety of news and information on Asia, including Muslim West Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. In matters of foreign policy, Dai-Ajiashugi was anti-British, and surprisingly, not anti-American as that would have indicated a path to war. Beginning in 1938, the journal actively encouraged the concept of a “New Asia” with Japan as it leader.

The official Japanese pan-Asianism of the 1930s was thus a renewed form of its prior objectives. It still exhibited pan-Asianists desire to form close ties with Asia (including non-Chinese Asia). However, its prior spirit of Asian unity had been subverted to Japanese imperialism. Since there was no Western expansion in Asia in the 1930s, Japan barely considered its Western counterparts as a threat to its own territories. As the threat of Western

37 The journal provided its readers with news and articles on the political, social, and economic trends of the entire Asian continent, from Turkey to Iran and China to India.
imperialism was reduced, Japanese pan-Asianists continued to foster ties with Asian nationalists. However, they could no longer justify Japan’s own imperialistic conquests in China, Taiwan, and Korea. As nationalist movements gained momentum in India, China, and Korea, Asian intellectuals that had previously sided with Japan’s pan-Asianist visions of Asian collaboration sought to gain national independence and shunned Japan’s expansionist mission in Asia. In spite of increasing criticisms about its foreign policy in Asia, Japanese Prime Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke announced the formation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitō-A kyōeiken) in August 1940, another organization echoing pan-Asian sentiments. While the Sphere fostered regional cooperation, it did not imply equality amongst the various Asian nations included. And, even though it sought to establish Japanese domination in Asia, Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and its subsequent economic impoverishment clearly exposed the shallowness and unevenness of Japanese modernization and also, pan-Asianism.

2.2 THE GENESIS OF PAN-ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

While it is impossible to pin down the exact date of the emergence of pan-Islamic ideology, it is safe to say that as an intellectual movement, pan-Islamism emerged in the Ottoman Empire

39 The six recognized independent nations of the Co-prosperity Sphere were Japan, China, Manchuria, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines. Economic reasons played a big role in the 1940 announcement of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan required East Asian raw materials (oil from the Dutch East Indies and rubber from Indochina) in order to keep its manufacturing industry and military in China supplied. Furthermore, the U.S. embargo of oil and steel shipments to Japan and other restrictions on raw materials shipments by Western nations pushed the Japanese leaders to seek sources in Asian countries to ensure Japanese self-sufficiency.
around the fifteenth century. However, political pan-Islam made its appearance in the Ottoman Empire after the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774)\textsuperscript{40} with Russia, when the Ottoman Sultan made claims to religious jurisdiction over Muslims residing in territories outside Ottoman control, particularly those in Crimea. To further understand the genesis of pan-Islam as a political ideology,\textsuperscript{41} it is best to explore in detail the methods employed by the Ottoman state to administer the various ethnic groups residing in its territories. Beginning in the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman state organized its multi-ethnic empire into three millets.\textsuperscript{42} These included the Greek orthodox millet, the Armenian millet, and the Jewish millet. However, after the French Revolution, members of the various millets were influenced by the idea of nationalism. No longer Greek orthodox, but Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian, etc. instead, the millet system no longer seemed a feasible method of institutional control and efforts to reform it led to failure. This is the also when the Ottoman Empire experienced the loss of a significant amount of its geographical territory, which effectively terminated its presence in the Balkans while Western Europe experienced rapid modernization. The loss of territory and the rise of nationalist movements led to a significant challenge to the state’s legitimacy. To blend and assimilate the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples in its domains, Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) initiated a series of institutional changes, collectively known as the \textit{Tanzimat}, a series of political and economic reforms. A major reconstruction of the state created a new bureaucracy and a new more equal definition of citizenship. It should be noted that the \textit{Tanzimat} reforms were of a dual

\textsuperscript{41} Kemal Karpat, \textit{The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the late Ottoman State} (Oxford University Press, 2001).
nature. On the one hand, they aimed to create an Ottoman nation, fashioned after the European idea of nationalism and one that granted both Muslim and non-Muslims in the Empire the same rights and political duties. On the other hand, they tried to preserve the traditional rule of Islam.\footnote{Roderic H. Davison, \textit{Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876} (New York: Gordian Press, 1973), 39.}

The \textit{Tanzimat} era (1839-1876) also saw the introduction of a modern educational system in the Ottoman Empire. This produced a new intelligentsia that, through the development of print media, disseminated a great variety of ideas about modern civilization, Europe, and science. Hence, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a rising socio-political consciousness had engulfed the Ottoman state, now under the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909).

The era of the \textit{Tanzimat} (1839-1876) introduced the Ottoman public to Western education and ideals. According to Selim Deringil, the Sultan, bureaucratic elites, Young Ottoman intelligentsia and the ulema “began to look for a new basis for defining what was increasingly coming to be considered an ‘Ottoman citizenry’” as they felt “a new social base was needed if the empire was to survive.”\footnote{Selim Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808-1908,” \textit{Comparative Studies of Society and History} 35 (1993): 4.} Weary of the precarious position of the Ottoman Empire in the Islamic world, the Ottoman Sultan and his governing apparatus sought to spread amongst the masses of the Ottoman state, a political system conducive to socio-cultural and political change within each and every sphere of Ottoman society. At the same time, they wanted to maintain their Islamic identity and protect the empire from Western encroachment. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 had ended with the disastrous loss of most of the Ottoman territory in
the Balkans. As the Ottoman Empire succumbed to the inevitability of Russian control over Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, it was faced with a wave of Muslim migrations and settlements. There was an influx of Muslims of diverse linguistic and ethnic backgrounds (Circassians, Bosnians, Albanians, etc.) that now demanded a new socioethnic restructuring of the Ottoman state. Sultan Abdulhamid II thus, pursued the ideology of pan-Islamism to combat internal and external threats to the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan and his advisors hoped that the transnational nature of pan-Islamism would surpass the divides of the Ottoman millet system and in the face of the increasing refugee crisis, save the Empire from internal collapse.

The use of pan-Islamism by Sultan Abdulhamid II reveals the incorporation of Islam to compliment modernization and Westernization in the Ottoman Empire. It also shows how the implementation of pan-Islam was not considered contradictory to the reformist Westernism of Ottoman intellectuals. Furthermore, the adoption of political pan-Islam did not entail the rejection of Western civilization. It was thus a response by the Ottoman Empire to the international policies of certain Western powers. Like pan-Asianism, pan-Islamism was a means of creating a new world order. It was a way of to attain Ottoman prestige, just as pan-Asianism sought to establish a strong Asian regional identity.

45 For a detailed analysis of the loss of Balkan territories and its effects on the Ottoman state, see Suraiya Faroqhi and Fikret Adanir eds., The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (London: Brill, 2002).
47 To understand more about the structural transformation of the Ottoman state in lieu of these migrations during the second half of the nineteenth century, see Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 184-188.
2.3 ÉMIGRÉ ACTIVITY IN ISTANBUL AND ABDÜRREŞİD İBRAHİM (1857-1944)

Migrations to the Ottoman Empire began after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783. In subsequent years, the Ottoman state became the seat of migration for Muslims from the Crimea, Caucasus, Balkans, and Russia. As the immigration of Russian Muslims continued to the Ottoman lands, the Ottoman policy towards the Turkic peoples emphasized two diplomatic aspects. First, the Ottoman Caliphate sought to maintain the religious ties of the migrants to the Caliphate. Second, the Empire sought to maintain the identity of the migrants as Ottomans and Muslims in the face of Russification. However, after Istanbul’s defeat in the Russo-Ottoman war (1877-1878), the Ottoman Empire realized it could no longer intervene in the affairs of Muslims residing in Russian lands. It is for this reason that Russian Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia became known as “foreigners” in Ottoman lands. Their movement and settlement in Ottoman dominions was limited and controlled. Owing to such measures, there developed a strained relationship between the Russian educated Turkic intelligentsia residing in the Ottoman Empire.

At this particular time in Ottoman history, Istanbul became a hotbed for Russian Muslim émigrés, who owing to their anti-Russian activities and political inclinations, were exiled in the Ottoman state. Amongst this intellectual milieu emerged a Russian Tartar journalist and political

____________________________

50 Russian authorities also encouraged and even forced these emigrations, which were seen as a way of ridding the Russian lands from their Muslim population. Russian Muslims preferred the Ottoman state for its historical, political, and religious importance in the Islamic world. They also belonged to diverse ethno-linguistic and historical backgrounds. The Crimeans spoke their own Turkic (Tatar) dialect; the Caucasian groups spoke a variety of languages; the bulk of migrants from the Balkans were ethnic Turks, who spoke the Rumilian dialect. Many Crete Muslims spoke Greek and Albanians their own tongue.
activist called Abdüreşid İbrahim (1857-1944), who vociferously advocated pan-Islamism.52

His political personality was shaped, to a great degree, by the social and historical experiences that Russian Muslims has gained during the last decades of the nineteenth century. İbrahim’s journalistic and political endeavors were similar to the work of other intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire. However, what truly sets him apart from the intellectuals of this particular era was that while the others participated in constructing a particular image of Japan in the minds and hearts of the people in the Islamic world through anti-Western discourse printed in the press, it was only İbrahim who forged direct and personal relationships with Japanese operatives.

İbrahim was born in Tara, a city in the Tobol’sk governorate in Western Siberia. He was a descendant of the Bukharans who had migrated from Central Asia to the area. As an ardent student of Islamic learning, he traveled to Mecca and Medina (through Odessa and Istanbul) after the Russo-Ottoman war (1877-1878). His mentors and Muslim teachers in the Arabian peninsula encouraged him to “support the Tatar community’s struggle against Russian oppression, to nurture the idea of science and education as a key to guaranteeing a society’s future, and to espouse a pan-Islamic ideology as a way to unite East against West.”53 Hence, it was here that he formulated his own pan-Islamic thought. On his return journey from the Arabian Peninsula in 1884, İbrahim passed through Istanbul yet again. This time he met with several notable personalities of the Ottoman bureaucracy and gathered information about the Ottoman educational system, which incorporated the modern sciences into the traditional Islamic

52 Mahmud Tahir, Abdüreşid İbrahim 1857-1944, Central Asian Survey (1988), 135-144. İbrahim’s politicization was greatly influenced by Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (a noted pan-Islamic intellectual), whose Islamic modernism was the ideology upon which İbrahim based his own pan-Islamism.

Back in Siberia, he became a teacher at a local madarasah and in 1892 was appointed as a qadi (judge) in the Spiritual Assembly of the Muslim law located in Ufa. In 1895, İbrahim resigned from his post and returned to Istanbul, where he stayed for about two years and published several pamphlets, the most famous of which was Çolban Yildizi (The North Star). In this pamphlet he accused Russia’s oppression of Turkic Muslims and demanded cultural and political autonomy for Russian Muslims. From 1895-1900, İbrahim journeyed between East Turkistan and Russia, to the Ottoman Empire, and to Europe, where he cultivated relationships with Young Turks as well as Russian socialists. In 1900 he returned to Russia and settled in St. Petersburg where he published his first journal, Mirât. Around 1902-1903, İbrahim made his first journey to Japan.

According to US Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis reports published during World War Two, it was during the time prior to the Russo-Japanese War that the Japanese were actively seeking Muslims in Russia and İbrahim was amongst them. It was İbrahim’s “pan-Asian principles [that] propelled him into anti-imperialist action and into a symbolic relationship with the Japanese in which he was the link between Asians, both Muslims and non-Muslim." In Japan, İbrahim was “believed to have been involved in anti-Russian propaganda that led to his deportation at the request of the Russian consul.” On his return to Istanbul from Japan in 1904, he was incarcerated in Odessa, but released two weeks later owing to protests from other

54 Renee Worringer, “Comparing Perceptions,” 120. İbrahim was deeply interested in the education of Russian Muslims and wanted to understand the new theory of education in the Ottoman Empire (usul-ü cedid, or new principles method), which was developed by his Volga and Crimean compatriots Ismail Gaspirali and Yusuf Akçura.
56 US Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch, R&A. 890.2, Japanese Infiltration Among Muslims in Russia and her Borderlands (Washington 1944), 9; 15-16; 25-27; 30; 32; 52; 56; 58; 79-81; 84-85.
Muslims\textsuperscript{57}. Furthermore, during the Russo-Japanese war, OSS reports state that Ibrahim obtained intelligence from “Russian Muslims.”\textsuperscript{58} Thus, Ibrahim became the leading Muslim activist through his travels, his Islamic publications in Russia and Istanbul, and his ties with Japanese pan-Asianists. With his newspapers and pamphlets and through his introduction of Japanese “converts” to Islam and Muslims, he actively mediated a link between the Islamic world and the Japanese nation. This relationship is further examined in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{57} Renee Worringer, “Comparing Perceptions,” 123.
\textsuperscript{58} OSS, R&A 890.2, Japanese Infiltration Among Muslims in Russia and her Borderlands, 25.
The history of the Japanese-Ottoman relationship from 1871 until the end of World War Two indicates three distinct phases in the development of interest between pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists. Section one of this chapter focuses on the first phase of the Ottoman-Japanese relationship from the onset of the Meiji restoration in 1868 till the 1890s. This section covers the period when Japanese authorities developed a keen interest in the Ottoman Empire in order to gain full rights of sovereignty through treaty revisions with the West. The main agenda of establishing Japanese-Ottoman rapprochement during this period was to negotiate a treaty of trade and diplomacy that was mutually acceptable. In section two of this chapter, the second phase of this partnership is investigated. This phase of the Ottoman-Japanese relationship began on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). This section also highlights the various pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists that were crucial in the formulation of this partnership. Together they conducted a series of clandestine activities, formed various organizations, and formulated numerous transnational contacts that were pivotal in furthering the cause of pan-Asian solidarity.

59 I shall be discussing the third phase of this partnership chapter four.
60 The Ottoman Empire, a non-Western polity like Japan, faced “unequal treaty” privileges that were granted to the major Western powers.
However, at the outbreak of the First World War, the pan-Asian and pan-Islamic relationship suffered a few setbacks and gradually lost its appeal.

3.1 EARLY CONTACTS

Diplomatic contacts between both the Japanese and Ottoman Empires began as early as the late nineteenth century. In 1871 the first Japanese diplomatic visit to the Ottoman Empire was conducted when the Iwakura Mission (1871-1873) was dispatched to Istanbul and Egypt to investigate the Mixed Court Systems. Japanese officials traveled to the Empire to gain first-hand knowledge about renegotiating the unequal treaties of 1858 signed by the Shogunate with the Great Powers and hoped to find a solution by adopting a legal system similar to the Ottoman one. This diplomatic visit triggered many Japanese visits to the Ottoman Empire for intelligence and information gathering purposes. The Yoshida Mission of 1880 is well known as the Japanese effort to acquire first-hand information about conditions of the Near East. Organized by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Gaimushyō, the team was led by Yoshida


Masaharu of the ministry who sought an audience with the Ottoman Sultan. Owing to the heightened awareness of the Japanese government of an immanent conflict with Russia, the Yoshida Mission spent a lot of time inspecting the Ottoman and Persian border areas with Russia. On March 12, 1881, Yoshida Masaharu was granted an audience with Sultan Abdülhamid II, who encouraged the beginnings of treaty negotiations between the two nations. However, even though the Sultan was interested in extending a gesture of goodwill to the Muslims of Central and East Asia by establishing a friendship with the East Asian nation, he was careful not to arouse the suspicion of the Russian Czar, and abstained from creating an official alliance with Japan. Hence, no conclusive agreement was achieved between the two nations.

While the treaty problem remained unsolved between the Ottoman and Japanese Empires, friendly rhetoric between the Turks and the Japanese reached a new level after the disaster of the Ottoman Imperial frigate, the *Ertuğral*, which sank along Japanese shores in 1890. Sultan Abdülhamid II had wanted to send an Ottoman ship to Japan for some time, but was concerned about garnering suspicion from Russia. However, in 1890, as a gesture of goodwill in return for Prince Komatsu’s visit to the Sublime Porte in 1876, the Sultan sent the Ottoman frigate to Japan in 1890. The Ottoman battleship stayed in Japan for three months, but was struck by calamity during its return journey when it was sunk by a typhoon off the coast of Japan. The Japanese government extended both humanitarian and governmental aid to the mere 69 survivors of the calamity, who were sent back to Istanbul by two Japanese warships, Kongo and Hiei. While the

---

64 Japan was already feeling the threat of Russia’s expansion southward and anticipated a future conflict with Russia over control of the Korean Peninsula.
67 The Sultan hoped to extend his pan-Islamic foreign policy in his capacity as Caliph by sending the frigate to showcase his concern for the Muslim subjects of East Asia.
Ertuğral disaster created strong bonds between the two nations, the negotiation of an official treaty on trade and commerce did not lead to fruition. The Ottoman Sultan refused to grant Japan capitulatory privileges for equal treatment similar to that of the Great powers, but remained cordial with the East Asian nation in an effort to placate both friends and enemies in the international arena.\textsuperscript{68} The fact that Japan, a nation that had just emerged from a rebuttal of unequal treaties, was asking for the same rights as the Great Powers did not measure well with the Ottoman ruling elite.\textsuperscript{69}

### 3.2 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905) AND RENEWED INTEREST

As Japan furthered its colonial interests in China and Korea, the Japanese lost interest in signing an official treaty with the Sublime Porte as previous attempts had been less than fruitful. However, Ottoman interest in Japan was sparked by the onset of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The Sultan and Ottoman government were quite interested in the outcome of the War and received Japan’s victory with great enthusiasm. Thus began another round of communications between the two nations. Sultan Abdulhamid II commissioned his court to translate several texts on Japan during his reign, since he too was deeply influenced by Japan’s success against Russia.\textsuperscript{70} Journals and newspapers of the Ottoman Empire started constructing an image of Japan as a superior Eastern nation, which had preserved its traditions and yet, achieved modernity and

\textsuperscript{68} Umut Arik, A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations; Towards a Special Partnership (Istanbul: Turkish-Japanese Business Council (DEIK), 1989), 48.


\textsuperscript{70} Renee Worringer, “Comparing Perceptions,” 154-158.
progress. Japan was further depicted as a non-threatening nation that should be followed so as to defend the Ottoman Empire against European intervention. However, the task was not so simple. First, the Sultan was weary of the Empire’s precarious position between Europe and Russia and understood that any alliances with the Japanese could potentially anger the Czar and perhaps lead to war with the Russian Empire. Second, the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim state that could not simply praise and model itself after the achievements of a non-Muslim, Asian nation like Japan. Doing such would undermine Istanbul as the seat of power for the Muslims around the world and would also challenge Abdulhamid’s Caliphal authority amongst his subjects.

Despite the hesitance to establish a concrete diplomatic alliance with Japan, the East Asian nation’s modernization appealed to the Ottoman state for a variety of reasons. First, it had achieved a level of Western civilization in an expedited fashion and thus, succeeded in shortening the power gap between Western imperial powers and Asia. After all, it was only within thirty years of the Meiji restoration that the Japanese nation had transformed itself into a civilized, industrialized, and patriotic Asian power. Second, Japan’s rapid Westernization proved that non-Western powers had no need to compromise their cultural and religious traditions in order to achieve progress. Meiji Japan had rapidly modernized whilst keeping its traditions and refusing to bow to Western colonialism. Therefore, for Ottoman intellectuals, Japan presented a far better paradigm than France or Germany, since it proved that native cultural traditions were compatible with modern civilization. Third, Japan’s success exhibited to the Ottoman Empire that it too could escape the capitulations and Western interventions hounding its domestic affairs.
No longer wanting to be identified as the “Sick man of Europe,” the Ottoman state hoped to bring its societies to the same level of prosperity.\(^\text{71}\)

As the Ottoman interest in Japan developed, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) Japanese right-wing groups rekindled their interest in the politically engaged Muslim populations of Russia, Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world. In fact, pan-Asianist agents of the Kokuryûkai and Genyosha also sought to garner support from Muslims in the Dutch Indies and British India who were suffering under Western colonialism.\(^\text{72}\) But while these right-wing organizations continued to establish political contacts with like-minded Muslim activists in Russia, Egypt, and other Arab regions, their activities did not parallel the official foreign policies of the Japanese government, which remained in harmony with the Anglo-Japanese alliance and refrained from supporting pan-Asianist ideals. Thus, Japan’s relationship with the Islamic world commenced as a series of clandestine activities conducted through transnational contacts and meetings carrying the sentiments of pan-Asian solidarity. Office of Strategic Services reports document numerous accounts of Japanese activities among Muslims on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.\(^\text{73}\) According to Selcuk Esenbel, the political agents of the Genyosha and the Kokuryûkai, wanted to form “pro-Japanese lobbies primarily from the activist political circles among Muslims in Russia who were already in an ideological and nationalist opposition against


\(^{73}\) For a detailed analysis of Japanese activities see, “Japanese Attempts at Infiltration Among Muslims in Russia and Her Borderlands” August 1944, R&A, No. 890.2, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch.
the autocratic and pan-Slavist Tsarist regime.” Needless to say, Japanese presence in the Ottoman Empire became more pronounced after the War as Istanbul became the seat of intellectual and political activity amongst the Russian Muslim émigré population and also, Japanese pan-Asianist agents. One of such agents was Colonel Akashi Motojiro, the military attaché of Japan in St. Petersburg. While stationed in Russia, he conducted espionage activities and gathered intelligence by forming contacts with anti-Tsarist Russian Muslims. Akashi’s memoirs, Rakka Ryūsui, detail his activities with Muslim political leaders and his support of the oppositional activities of Russian Muslims.

Pivotal in pioneering this second phase of Muslim-Japanese rapprochement was Abdürr eşid İbrahim. During his second visit to Japan in 1908-1909 (through the help of the Kokuryûkai and Colonel Akashi Motojiro), Ibrahim tried to meet every kind of Japanese person for the purpose of studying Japan and its people. He met leading political figures such as Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909; one of the most eminent statesmen during the Meiji era, ex prime minister), Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922; ex-prime minister and ex-minister of foreign affairs), Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855-1932; later prime minister), Oyama Iwao (1842-1922; marshal; ex-general commander in Manchuria), and both Toyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryohei. The main purpose of his visit was to decipher whether there could exist an Islamist-Asian alliance against

Russia and Britain. During his visit to Japan, Ibrahim was asked by Japanese pan-Asianists to deliver speeches and give lectures. The following is an example of Ibrahim’s speech published in the journal Gaiko Jiho (Foreign Affairs):

In short, my visit is to investigate Japanese affairs in detail. Frankly, before the Russo-Japanese War I knew almost nothing about Japan. Japan’s great success in this war affected me so much that I decided to come to Japan. I am sure we can learn many things in Japan, which is developing day by day like the rising sun. As to our Tatar people, words cannot describe the various kinds of oppression that we suffered during 450 years under Russian rule. [...] I will repeat once more that, as a whole, Asians are disgusted by the Europeans. From this point of view, I am sure that bringing about the union of Asian countries to stand up to Europe is our legitimate means of self-defense. We Tatars do not hesitate to respect Japan as our senior, and we hope to send our youth to study in Japan. I will never believe that our independence can be achieved by ordinary means. It will become possible for us to carry out the independence movement only when the world order transforms all at once and great changes come about in the balance of power.

In all of his lectures Ibrahim would compare the similarities between Islamic traditions and Japanese virtue. He criticized the activities of Christian missionaries in Japan (a disguised form of Western colonization), and stressed the geopolitical importance of the union of the Muslim world with that of the Empire of the “Rising Sun.” Ibrahim’s pan-Islamist ideology greatly coincided with Japanese pan-Asianist motivations. As a global newcomer, Japan needed the aid of a Muslim political activist who could establish relations between the multiethnic population of

---

about 100 million Muslims in the vast regions of Eurasia and Africa. Ibrahim’s words stimulated Japanese intellectuals to extend diplomatic relations with the Muslim world, since his vision of a union of Asian countries coincided with Japan’s pan-Asianist ideology. In fact, during his visit, Abdüreşid İbrahim, Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, formed a political society called the Ajia Gi Kai (Association for the Defense of Asia). The new organization was established for the purpose of uniting and defending Asian peoples and specifically focused on strengthening the ties between Japan and the Muslim world. Furthermore, it was successful in acquiring nearly forty members from the Muslim world and around a hundred or so members from Japan. In a cooperative effort Ibrahim and eight Japanese members drafted and signed the “Muslim Pact” in 1909, the society’s secret oath which read as follows:

Arabic text: “In the name of Allah, the best of [illegible], take refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. Be ye, servants of Allah, brothers.’

Japanese text: “If we have the slightest difference of mind one from another), may we receive the August punishment of the spirit(s) of Heaven and Earth.”

Arabic text: “Keep the covenant, for the covenant is with Allah, may He be exalted.”

79 The Asianist organization had ties to Konoe Atsumaro’s Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Society) and the pan-Asian organizations, the Genyosha and Kokuryūkai.
80 For a list of the members of the organization see DaiTō 4, no. 3 (March1911): 64-65. Quoted in Cemil Aydin The Politics of Anti-Westernism: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 225 n50. DaiTō (the Great East) was the journal published by the organization. Members of the Ajia Gi Kai planned to secure branches in China, Persia, Turkey, India, and Afghanistan. Plans were also made to construct a mosque in Tokyo, which was officially opened in 1938.
81 OSS, R&A, 890. 1, “Japanese Infiltration Among Muslims in China,” 88. This OSS reports states that the Ibrahim wrote the Arabic text of the oath. The Japanese who signed this pact were Toyama Mitsuru, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Nakano Tsunetaro (writer of the Japanese text), Aoyagi Katsutoshi (publisher of the periodical Daito), Ohara Bukai (officer of the General Staff and secretary of the Toa Dobunkai), Kawano Hinonaka (politician and in 1914, Minister of
This oath exhibits the strengthening alliance between Ibrahim and pan-Asianists to further their cause against Western hegemony. Ibrahim’s motivations centered on protecting the Islamic faith from the onslaught of the West as he hoped that his new ally, Japan, would emphasize pan-Islamic and pan-Asian bonds against Western imperialism. Furthermore, Ibrahim recounted his travels throughout Asia in his famous Ottoman two-volume series entitled, *Alem-e-Islam: Japanya’da intisar-i-Islamiyet* [The World of Islam: The Spread of Islam in Japan], which was published in Istanbul between 1908 and 1911. This journal along with his other writings gave the Ottoman public insights into Japanese culture and society and pivotal in developing an image of Japan as a friend of the Ottoman Empire.

According to Selcuk Esenbel, Ibrahim’s activities consisted of training Japanese agents to be sent to Muslim countries under the disguise of a Muslim identity. Yamaoka Kotaro (1880-1959) was one of such agents. A member of the Kokuryûkai in Bombay, Yamaoka conducted espionage activities in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. While it is unclear how both met, under Ibrahim’s guidance, Yamaoka became a Muslim and was the first Japanese pilgrim to visit the holy lands of Mecca and Medina where he formed contacts with Arab leaders on behalf of the Kokuryûkai. In Mecca, Ibrahim carried out his pan-Islamic agenda by spreading ideas...
about Islamic unity, while educating Yamaoka about Islam. Yet, one wonders how pacified Ibrahim was with the new convert’s dedication to Islam and whether Yamaoka had political motivations behind his conversion. OSS reports specify that Yamaoka was some sort of operative and that he “investigated the Muslim areas of the Near East and the Caucasus from 1898 to 1910.” Therefore, while Ibrahim tried to spread his pan-Islamic ideology, Yamaoka conducted pan-Asianist propaganda by holding conferences advocating the pro-Islamic message of the Ajia Gikai and the emphasis on the formation of kaikyō seisaku, or Islam policy, a strategic policy aimed towards the Muslim peoples suffering under the Great Powers.

Another pan-Asianist convert to Islam was Hasan Hatano Uhô, an expert on Chinese Muslims and a graduate of Konoe Atsumaro’s Tôa Dôbun Shoin in Shanghai. After his very public conversion to Islam in 1911, Hatano actively published articles in English in the Muslim press throughout the world. As a member of the Kokuryûkai and the collaborator of the periodical Islamic Fraternity in Tokyo, he published articles, which consisted of “pleadings for more Muslim missionaries and literature in Japan, funds for building a mosque, descriptions of Japan, which read like a tourist booklet, and professions of great humility with regard to ‘what Islam can teach Japan.’”

86 The Gaimushyô aided in the circulation of several Muslim periodicals. These included Islamic Fraternity (1920-1911), Islam in 1911, and Islamic Unity in 1914. The first and third were in both English and Japanese, while the second was in Japanese. OSS, R&A, 890. 2, “Japanese Infiltration Among Muslims in Russia,” 31. An Arabic language press did not appear in Japan till 1929.
The strengthening of the pan-Asianist and pan-Islamist alliance in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War shows the amalgamation of two very different movements that started to serve the imaginations of non-Western comradeship. Furthermore, Japan’s victory over Russia strengthened the alternative vision of world order as the East Asian nation started to serve as a metaphor for Asian modernity for the Ottomans. The attempts by pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists in the after of the Russo-Japanese War were not only aimed towards the establishment of non-Western solidarity. They were also focused on furthering the pan-Asian and pan-Islamist partnership without jeopardizing the Japanese and Ottoman governments relationship with the Western powers. The establishment of an organization such as the Ajia Gi Kai not only expressed the fear of Western expansionism in pan-Asian and pan-Islamist circles. It also exhibited the desire of intellectuals from both movements to show Asia’s burgeoning intellectual and political strength against the West. However, just when the alliance between pan-Islam and Japanese pan-Asianism seemed to be solidifying, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 followed by Austria’s invasion of Serbia activated a chain of alliances set of a series of war declarations in Europe. At the outbreak of the Great War, both the Ottoman Empire and Japan fell into conflicting camps. Owing to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, Japan was an ally of Britain. Still, the goals of pan-Asianists remained predominantly anti-Western. The Ottoman state, however, joined the War on the side of Germany. As Turkish nationalism arose in the Muslim state, pan-Islamists worked with the Ottoman government to mobilize Muslims against the British, French, and Russian Empires.

37

to Mecca.” Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan 12 (1986): 47-57. It is evident that the purpose of these pilgrimages was to construct an informal transnational network of Muslims around the world.
Sadly, their efforts led to no avail, as the Empire was defeated in the conflict. Once more the political trajectories of both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism diverged only to be restored yet again in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident of 1931.
4.0 THE REVIVAL OF PAN-ASIANISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM (1931-1945)

In the aftermath of WWI, both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism started to lose their appeal. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War and the establishment of the Turkish National Movement, which ultimately led to the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, greatly undermined the prior strength of pan-Islamic activities in the region. Similarly, pan-Asianism’s realpolitik value declined after the Great War. Post-WWI pan-Asianists tried to stir the Japanese bureaucracy and public in their favor after the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference and the passing of the Immigration Act in 1924 in the United States, but to no avail. Section one of this chapter discusses in detail the reasons behind the failure of these two movements to garner political support in the 1920s. Events in the 1930s provided the arena for the third and final stage of the pan-Asian and pan-Islamic relationship. The use of pan-Asian ideology by Japan’s liberal internationalists in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, led pan-Asianists to once again engage in a diplomatic dialogue with pan-Islamists. Section two of this chapter discusses the consequences of this relationship, which came to an end during the Second World War.
The end of WWI saw the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish National movement. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the movement achieved a series of political and military victories, which included the British Empire’s abandonment of the Treaty of Sèvres and the negotiation of the Lausanne Treaty in July of 1923, which led to the international recognition of the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne removed the newly formed Republic from the stigma of unequal treaties and colonial intervention and also, renegotiated Turkey’s boundaries. Such conciliation showered support on the Turkish Republic from Muslim leaders all around the world, who considered Turkey to be a source of great inspiration. In India, China, and the rest of Asia, Turkey became a model for activist national movements. Gradually, pan-Islamic movements in the postwar period around the globe lost their appeal as Muslim activists around the world pressed for nationalist movements in specific Muslim nations. Furthermore, previous pan-Islamic fervor of instituting a vision of solidarity amongst Muslim countries further lost its political and intellectual effectiveness when, in his quest to establish a modern secular state, president Mustafa Kemal abolished the Ottoman Caliphate. Not only did this action send shockwaves around the Islamic world, it was successful in changing the political trajectory of pan-Islamism. The abolishment of the Caliphate in Turkey, led several Muslim leaders to call for the formation

---

89 For Indian nationalist interest in the Turkish National movement see Mohammad Sadiq, *The Turkish revolution and the Indian Freedom Movement* (Delhi: Macmillan India, 1983).
90 To decipher the international significance of the Caliphate, see Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London: E. Benn, 1926).
of a Muslim League of Nations. However, plans to select a suitable Muslim leader failed. Muslim leaders also attended conventions in Mecca (1926), Jerusalem (1931), and Geneva (1935) in support of Islamic solidarity, but owing to the lack of political support and legitimate leadership, the pan-Islamic movement did not go beyond intellectual critiques and declarations of intent.\textsuperscript{91}

Like pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism’s realpolitik value declined after the Great War. Post WWI pan-Asianism gained support amongst Japan’s right-wing pan-Asianist circles when the Japanese proposal for racial equality was rejected at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.\textsuperscript{92} Proposing to seek an equal footing with the Great Powers in the international order, the rejection of the clause confirmed pan-Asianist critiques of racial discrimination and white supremacy. However, in spite of pan-Asianism’s apprehension of the Western Powers, Japanese liberals pushed to secure Japan’s national interests and became one of the founding members of the League of Nations in 1920. Furthermore, in order to protect Japanese economic interests in the Asian continent, Japan secured the United States as one of its largest trading partners. During this time, pan-Asianists remained in opposition to the League of Nations. Their vision of pan-Asian solidarity in Asia was greatly overshadowed by Japan’s cooperation with the Western powers. However, in the aftermath of the Immigration Act, pan-Asianism found a voice in Japan’s political arena.

In April 1924, the U.S. Senate passed the Immigration Act, which banned Japanese immigration to America altogether.\(^{93}\) The pro-Western Japanese elite considered the passing of the Act to be a great humiliation. Pan-Asianist groups capitalized on the embarrassment of Japan’s pro-American liberals in a number of articles in the international publication of the Kokuryûkai, the *Asian Review*.\(^{94}\) However, while pan-Asianist arguments were still strewn with racial biases, Japanese pro-Western liberals continued to use cultural diplomacy to solve the immigration problem facing Japanese immigrants to the United States. Unlike pan-Asianists, they wanted to maintain cultural, economic, and political harmony with the United States. In August 1926, pan-Asianists organized the Pan-Asiatic Conference in Nagasaki. Inspired by Sun Yat-sen’s “Greater Asianism” lecture in Kobe in 1924\(^{95}\) and still apprehensive about the United State’s discrimination against Asian immigrants, the international pan-Asiatic conference was organized by the Pan-Asiatic Association in Japan (Zen Ajia Kyôkai) and the Asiatic Peoples League (Ajia Minzoku Dai Dômei) in Beijing. The conference was expected to attract around one hundred delegates from Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, China, and Korea, but only about a third of the number attended. The conference aimed to promote solidarity amongst Asian countries and highlighted the issues of decolonization and discussed long-term


economic goals. Delegates at the conference criticized the League of Nations, but refrained from mentioning any assumptions about racial discrimination in international affairs. Participants suggested projects promoting the use of “products made in Asia” and even recommended the “construction of a trans-Asiatic railway from Mukden to Turkey in 20-30 years.”96 Furthermore, they advocated a “renaissance of Asia’s culture and civilization; the ultimate liberation of all foreign dominated peoples of Asia; the abolition of all unequal treaties existing among Asiatic nations; and the establishment of the League of Asiatic peoples.”97 Still, the Nagasaki conference remained unpopular amongst Japan’s official and liberal circles owing to its focus on pan-Asiatic internationalism.

The Japanese government did not show any political support for the conference owing to its unwillingness to offend any Western powers. In fact, the Home Ministry prevented the conference from being held in Tokyo and relocated it to a smaller city and limited the number of participants from Japan.98 Another impediment to the success of the conference was the rising tide of nationalist movements in China and Korea. The lack of representation by Chinese and Korean nationalists at the conference revealed the contradictions between the pan-Asianist visions of the Japanese, and the Chinese, and Koreans. Japanese liberals remained hostile to the pan-Asiatic movement in Japan and were keen to prove pan-Asianism’s marginality in Japanese foreign policy. For example, in 1926 Zumoto Motosada, a liberal internationalist, gave a lecture in Geneva at a League of Nations affiliated university in which he called the Nagasaki conference, “an event of no consequence whatever, no person of any importance in any country

taking part in it.” Thus, in the 1920s pan-Asianism remained a network of idea and critiques and lacked any political support. Surprisingly, in the 1930s the Japanese government officially endorsed the ideology as a part of its foreign policy.

4.2 REVIVAL OF THE JAPANESE-MUSLIM FRIENDSHIP IN THE 1930S

The third and final phase of Japanese-Muslim rapprochement commenced in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. After this event, which was followed by Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, Japanese liberal internationalists started paying more attention to pan-Asianist ideologues in Japan. The past three decades had introduced them to pan-Asianist goals of achieving Asian solidarity through Japanese leadership. Finally, Japan’s government, in order to pursue its own desires of expansionism in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, started using pan-Asianist ideology to further it’s own political motivations. Hence, pan-Asianists found a very receptive audience amongst Japan’s bureaucrats and army officers and pan-Asianism gained support from the military, government, and business circles. It was also around this time that pan-Asianists resumed networking with pan-Islamists in the Muslim world and also, the Turkish-Tatar diaspora community residing in Central and East Asia. Japanese empire building in Manchuria provided a haven for former Young Turk officers and Muslim Tatars rejected by the Ottoman and Romanov empires. This émigrés population was considered indispensable to Japanese empire building strategies in Northwest China and Inner Asia. The Kokuryûkai, the

---

99 Zumoto Motosada, “Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement” (address delivered before the Third Annual Congress of the International University League of Nations Federation, Geneva, September 1, 1926).
Kwantung Army, and the Mantetsu (the South Manchurian Railway research organization of Japanese empire building) offered these diaspora communities refuge, as they were no longer welcome in their previous regimes.\textsuperscript{101} The Japanese army’s interest in this émigrés population was very strong because they were to be used in Japanese military and intelligence strategies in Asia against China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{102} According to Selcuk Esenbel, the interest exhibited by Japanese military authorities in Islam in indicative of their pursuit of an “Islam policy,” kaikyō seisaku.\textsuperscript{103} The assumption behind this strategic policy was that the Muslim world was as anti-Western as right-wing militant organizations in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese military persons seeking pan-Islamists from this particular diaspora considered the émigré population to be just as sympathetic to the Japanese cause in Inner Asia as the pan-Islamists, who had celebrated Japan’s victory in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.\textsuperscript{104} Hence, as Japanese Asianist strategies advanced, so did the partnership between pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists in Japan.

In 1933 Muslims from all around the globe traveled to Japan. So far-fetched were the expectations of Japan’s pan-Asianists that an invitation was sent out to a prince from the abolished Ottoman dynasty, Abdül Kerim Efendi (1904-1935).\textsuperscript{105} At the risk of jeopardizing

\textsuperscript{103} “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945,” American Historical Review 109, no. 4 (October 2004): 1140-1170.
\textsuperscript{104} The view that all Muslims amongst this diaspora were anti-Western is not true, but it shows how images of Islam and Muslims during the time were feeding Japanese stereotypes as military authorities became interested in pan-Islam and the use of Islam policy against the Soviet Union and communism.
\textsuperscript{105} The exiled prince was the grandson of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909).
Japan’s relationship with the Republic of Turkey, the prince was invited by pan-Asianists to “consider his potential contribution to Japan’s policy toward the Muslims of Central Asia in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union.” According to the Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper, the prince arrived in Japan from Singapore in May of 1933, at the invitation of Lt. General Kikuchi Takeo and Prince Ichijō. However, his arrival was protested by both Turkish and Soviet embassies in Tokyo and was considered a plot to enthrone the prince as head of a Muslim state in Inner Asia in order to establish “Muslim Manchukuo,” another puppet regime under Japan’s control. Later on, Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki gave assurances to the Turkish embassy that such was not the case. Even though the prince was invited to Japan by Lt. General Kikuchi Takeo and Prince Ichijō, members of the House of Peers and both of whom had links with the Kwantung Army whose members engineered the 1931 Manchurian invasion, the fact that his visit sparked uneasiness in Japan’s official political circles is indicative of a sense of crisis within the nation. The adoption of pan-Asianist ideology by a few key members of the Japanese government did not imply that Japan’s political circles were encouraging of Japan’s dealing with pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists in Manchuria. This is because doing so would have greatly affected the country’s relations with the West. In any case, pan-Asianist propaganda continued

106 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism, 177. Japan’s designs in the Turkic regions of China (in particular Xinjiang, Gansu, and Ningsha) involved the establishment of a pro-Japanese regime so as to construct a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and China and Manchuria.
107 Tokyo Nichi Nichi English version May 21, 1933.
109 While pan-Asianism did seek an alternative non-Western vision of the world order, few in Japan supported this mission. Even as Japan’s political clout increased in East Asia, those in power still remained weary of the West, hence undermining their own “national greatness.” For an interesting account of popular support and the Japanese army’s national influence in the years preceding the Pacific War, see Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1974).
as that same year Abdürreşid İbrahim was also sent an invitation to visit Japan. İbrahim traveled to Tokyo in 1933 and once again commenced his pro-Japanese pan-Islamic agenda.

The implementation of Japan’s strategic pursuit of pan-Islam in its foreign policy (through İbrahim and the émigrés population in Manchuria) was further solidified through the establishment of several cultural and political organizations. In the 1930s, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies developed rapidly in Japan. İbrahim traveled to Tokyo in 1933 and once again commenced his pro-Japanese pan-Islamic agenda.

Teijiro Sakuma, a one-time Kokuryûkai agent in Russian Central Asia organized the Society of Islamic Culture (Islam Bunka Kyokai) in 1935. Furthermore, in 1938 the Greater Japan Islamic League (Dai Nippon Kaikyô Kyôkai) was formed with the support of the Gaimushyô, Army, and the Navy. Later renamed Dai Nippon Kaikyoto Kyokai, the organization was formulated to “unify and supervise all other Muslim organizations in Japan, Manchuria, and occupied territory.” While initially a co-director, İbrahim later became the Muslim president of the organization. Till WWII, Dai Nippon Kaikyoto Kyokai was the official Islamic organization in Japan.

---


111 OSS, R&A, 890. 2, “Japanese Infiltration Among Muslims in Russia and her Borderlands,” 34-35. The activities of the Society focused on: 1) the introduction of Japanese culture in Muslim areas; 2) the investigation of Muslim areas; 3) publications and exhibitions of a suitable nature in Japan and abroad; 4) the exchange of students and professors with Islamic countries and reception of Muslim guests in Japan; 5) translation of appropriate literature to and from Japanese; 6) maintenance of a lecture auditorium and study rooms for Muslim students of Japanese culture.


Japan’s adoption of Islam as an integral part of its foreign policy was further revealed in 1938 when the Tokyo Mosque was constructed in Yoyogi-Uehara. Present at the opening ceremony was the coalition of Japanese pan-Asianists and Muslim Intellectuals that had begun on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War. Ibrahim was given the honor of conducting the prayers, while Toyoma Mitsuru, cut the ribbon. Ibrahim never gave up supporting the Islamist-Asianist alliance, which he had so carefully cultivated at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Tokyo, he continued his activities with Japanese convert Muslim communities and during WWII, produced war propaganda in Japan.

Critical in formulating the intellectual and political intermingling of pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism in the 1930s, were the efforts of Ôkawa Shûmei (1886-1957). A staunch pan-Asianist, Ôkawa supported the Japanese policy in Manchuria and also backed Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. From the Manchurian Incident in 1931 till WWII, Ôkawa’s activities revolved around promoting Asian solidarity and advocating Japan’s quest for leadership in Asia. He believed in Japan’s mission to lead a free Asia and thought Islam to be the key to realizing Japanese pan-Asianist motivations in the Muslim world. Pan-Islam appealed to Ôkawa owing to its transnational nature and collaboration with the pan-Islamic movement was, according to him, a force Japan needed to utilize in order to challenge the Western colonial presence in Asia.

In the 1930s, Ōkawa received government funds to establish a two-year professional school offering students instruction in Asian Studies. Established in May 1938, the school, known as Ōkawa Juku (Ōkawa School), was affiliated with the East Asian Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo, with special funds from the Manchurian Railway Company, the army, and the Foreign Ministry. The school was a concrete manifestation of Ōkawa’s pan-Asianism because the school’s curriculum inculcated students in the culture and politics of Asia as well as “Islam policy as an Asianist strategy.” Students received intensive language training in English and French and in Hindi, Urdu, Malay, Thai, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. Experts such as Kōbayashi Hajime (the first Japanese student of Al-Azhar University in Egypt), Naitō Chishû (the first Ottomanist of Japan), Ōkubo Kōji (an expert on Central Asia and Turkic affairs), Indian nationalist Rash Behari Bose, and Muslim immigrant from Russia Qurban Ali were among the language and history professors at the school. In return for receiving tuition and a stipend for two years, upon graduation students were obligated to work for the Japanese government in regions such as Southeast Asia for ten years. Ōkawa himself lectured his students on colonial history, the “Japanese spirit,” Islam, and Oriental history and single-handedly established one of the best library collections on Islam and the Muslim world in Japan.

---

117 Ōkawa Juku was later renamed Showa Gogaku Kenkyujo (Showa Language Institute).
121 In fact, many graduating students of the school found employment in the military administration in Southeast Asia during the era of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.
As Ôkawa combined his academic pursuits with political involvement on behalf of pan-Asianism, the formation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitō-A kyōeiken) in August 1940 further ingrained pan-Asianist discourse in Japan’s foreign policy motives in Asia. Japan’s liberals, who had been aware of pan-Asianism since the Meiji era, finally harnessed its strength in order to further Japanese hegemony in East Asia. The Japanese government created the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an alternative to the League of Nations to not only voice the concerns of the governments in Asia, but also to illuminate the necessity of Japanese leadership in Asia. It was an organization established to protect Japanese economic interests in the region since embargoes by the Western nations had pushed Japanese leaders to seek sources elsewhere in Asia in order to ensure self-sufficiency during the Pacific War.  

As Japan fought in World War Two, in an act of diplomacy the Turkish government severed all trade and diplomatic relations with Japan on January 6, 1945 and a few months later declared war against Germany and Japan simultaneously. While the declaration of war was just a diplomatic and symbolic gesture on behalf of the Turkish government, the action officially ended all pan-Islamic and pan-Asian interactions between the ideologues of both movements. After Japan’s loss in the War in 1945, Ôkawa Shûmei was indicted as a Class A war criminal by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal based on his role as a proponent of right-wing pan-Asianist ideology. Also, the Muslim diaspora that had been instrumental to pan-Islamic and pan-

122 Three years later, the Japanese government hosted the Greater Asia Conference in Tokyo and invited the leaders of the Philippines, Burma, the Nanking government of China, Manchukuo, Thailand, and the provincial government of India.
124 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Asian rapprochement dispersed and ceased to exist. Ibrahim died in Tokyo in 1944 at the age of 92 away from his family. Qurban Ali, one of the Muslim professors at Ôkawa Juku was arrested by the Soviets in 1945 and died in a Siberian prison camp in 1972. After the War, few Tatars remained in Japan. The rest immigrated to Turkey, while some went to the United States. Eventually, Japan and its relationship with the Islamic world became a forgotten legacy.

The birth of pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is indicative of a period of global history when intellectuals belonging to non-Western Empires started rejecting the noninclusiveness and insufficiency of the Eurocentric world order. Critiques of Western civilization stemmed from a desire to create an alternative vision of the world order that would benefit from non-Western ideals. Thus, pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists worked together in an effort to refine their own notions of culture, race, civilization, and nation. Diplomatic contacts between both the Japanese and Ottoman Empire commenced in the 1870s when the Iwakura Mission traveled to Istanbul to investigate the Mixed Court Systems. However, this diplomatic visit quickly transpired into a series of Japanese trips to the Ottoman state for intelligence and information gathering purposes. Three decades later, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), pan-Asianist agents of the Kokuryûkai and Genyosha sought political contacts with like-minded Muslim activists in Russia, Egypt, and other Arab regions. Japan’s victory in the War signaled the imminent end of the Eurocentric world order. Thus, Japan’s relationship with the Islamic world commenced as a series of clandestine activities conducted through transnational contacts and meetings carrying the sentiments of pan-Asian solidarity. This relationship was realized through the efforts of Abdüreşid İbrahim. As a Russian Muslim émigré residing in the Ottoman Empire, he was extremely critical of Russia’s treatment
of Muslims within her borderlands and was thus, actively sought by the pan-Asian societies to mobilize intelligence strategies in Japan and across the Muslim world.

The impact of World War One was felt all around the world. In the aftermath of the War, both pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism started to lose their appeal. Victory of the British Empire frustrated the intellectual and political expectations of both ideologies. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War and the establishment of the Turkish national Movement, which ultimately led to the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, greatly undermined the prior strength of pan-Islamic activities in the region. Similarly, pan-Asianism’s realpolitik value declined after the Great War. Post-WWI pan-Asianists tried to stir the Japanese bureaucracy and public in their favor after the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference and the passing of the Immigration Act in 1924 in the United States. Furthermore, during the 1920s the political trajectory of pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism was greatly affected by the rising anticolonial nationalistic movements burgeoning in the world. Therefore, along with rising anti-colonialisms in Asia and Muslim world, the abolishment of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal, and the lack of political support caused both movements to lose their realpolitik appeal. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, Japanese pan-Asianists found a very receptive audience amongst Japan’s bureaucrats and army officers as pan-Asianism gained support from the military, government, and business circles. It was also around this time that Japanese pan-Asianists revived and strengthened their contacts with pan-Islamists in the Muslim world and also, the Turkish-Tatar diaspora community residing in East Asia.

The Japanese experience with the Islamic world is significant because it reveals how transnational imaginations about the homogeneity of Western civilization and the legacy of

Western supremacy were instrumental in the creation of anti-Western discourse amongst pan-Asian and pan-Islamic ideologues. One cannot presume that Occidental, or Oriental frameworks were responsible for the prevalence of anti-Western discourse in Asia as many pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists were enthusiastic admirers of the West. Likewise, one must not reduce the prevalence of such critiques as a natural response to Western colonialism, or a conflict between Islam and Christianity, or a conflict between the “yellow” and the “white” races. While both religion and the repercussions of Western colonization are central to the understanding of the strands of anti-Western thought in the Muslim world and Japan, the historical significance of pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism lies in that fact that the political ideologues of these movements shared ideas and notions about race, universal modernity, religion, and the effect of nationalism in the modern world. In spite of a lack of shared past or commonality, they were inspired by anti-Western brotherhood. Thus, pan-Asianists and pan-Islamists worked in tandem to develop a new vision of the world order aimed at delegitimizing the imperial power structures of the world.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF PRIMARY SOURCES


APPENDIX B

LIST OF JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

Ajia Jiron
Asian Review
DaiTō
Japan Weekly Chronicle
Taiyō
Tokyo Nichi Nichi
BIBLIOGRAPHY


______. “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808-1908.” Comparative Studies of Society and History 35 (1993): 3-29.


