

Language Attitudes and Identity in Taiwan

by

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Psychology B.A., Goshen College, 1995

Submitted to
the Graduate Faculty of Linguistics

in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

University of Pittsburgh

2003

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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July 30, 2003

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I. INTRODUCTION

Within the study of sociolinguistics, language is more than a phonetic, morphological and syntactic system designed to transmit notions of thought, it is also a carrier of culture, social identity, and status within society. As Christina Paulston (1986, p. 119) succinctly states, “language mirrors social conditions, mirrors man’s relationship to man”. In this understanding, examining the social constructions of language, reflected in interactions on both an interpersonal and societal level, can provide insight into the underlying structures of power and hierarchy involved in group relations.

Attitudes toward language are one way in which such insights may be derived. Attitudes are believed to be made up of underlying affective and cognitive components, highly influenced by the social structures within society. As Feifel (1994) writes, “Social forces will create different language attitudes towards language varieties which are spoken by those who are part of the power structure and those who are not” (p. 55).

Language attitudes are one way in which researchers endeavor to understand ideologies toward language within a given society. Analyses of language ideology are very important, as A.C. Hsiao (1997) writes, because “language ideology is related to the social position and experience of a group and to their political, economic, and symbolic interests, ... [and] will lead to the understanding of social relationships in a specific society” (Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 304). In Shirley Heath’s (1989) definition, language ideologies are “self-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group” (Heath, 1989, p. 53). As will be discussed further in this paper, a higher level of understanding of this nature in Taiwan could help to understand the future of the island’s relations with the mainland.

A brief disclaimer

With the return of Hong Kong (in 1997) and Macao (in 2000) to Chinese sovereignty, Taiwan represents the last glaring symbol in Beijing of China's apparent weakness under Western imperialism. Given the nation's proud history, this factor has left deep wounds on the national pride and collective psyche of many mainland Chinese. Therefore, the question of Taiwan's status within China is a highly sensitive area; it is much more than a political or an economic matter, it is a highly emotional one as well. For that reason, I hope that a brief recognition of my interests and experiences may serve the reader to better understand my motivations for undertaking the line of questioning discussed in this paper.

My fascination with Taiwan stems from having spent three years in the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1998-2001. Personal involvement in the country deepened the respect and admiration I felt for my Chinese students and friends, and intensified my interest in learning more about the issues facing their future. As a central concern, the 'Taiwan issue' figures prominently in the news, and was particularly featured during the presidential election in 2000. As I learned about the issues in Taiwan and the achievements they have realized, I gained much respect for the people across the Straits. Ideally, it is my hope that an examination of language ideology in Taiwan will bring a deeper level of understanding to the issues separating Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.

Overview

The language used by the island's people has often been a political question within Taiwan. During the previous century, the island has faced successive attempts at linguistic

assimilation by Japanese (1895-1945) and mainland Chinese (1945-1988¹), followed by current revitalization efforts for ‘native’ language varieties. Particularly in the former cases, government policies were designed to impose a new ethnic identity based on the culture and language of the politically dominant group. For centuries, however, the island has been a ‘multi-lingual’ and ‘multi-cultural’ society, comprised of ethnically distinct tribes of Malayo-Polynesian descent and dialectally different Chinese immigrants. The domination by the mainland Chinese faction has led to sharp in-group/out-group distinctions between those Chinese that immigrated to Taiwan before 1895 and the politically dominant immigrants that arrived with the new regime in 1945.

In more recent years, increased in-group awareness among subordinated factions has led to greater politicization of language. In their efforts to mobilize and rally support for stronger democracy and political recognition, native languages were used as a point of unification. They came to be regarded as “a symbol of defiance against the establishment, as an expression of democratization, as a sign of localism, and as an assertion of ethnolinguistic identity” (Tse K.P, 2000, p. 161). Within the last twenty years, these subjugated groups have been successful in securing greater power and representation in the government, and have subsequently made significant gains toward protecting their language freedoms. Mother-tongue language courses have been accepted and initiated throughout primary schools on the island, and many organizations have been developed for the protection and appreciation of these language varieties.

The island, however, continues to struggle to reconcile past injustices, present relations with the mainland, and questions of a future communal identity. Recent years have seen an emerging Taiwan-centered awareness in contrast to the mainland China-centered ideology

¹ In 1988 the first native-born Taiwanese, Lee Tung-Hui, became president, although the structure of the Republic of China (ROC) is still in place.

imposed by the dominant group following WWII. Though clear divisions still remain, this growing sense of identity is characterized by ‘reconciliation’ between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese and is meant to encompass all the groups on the island (Corcuff, 2002; Li K.C., 2002; Wachman, 1994; Tse K.P., 2000; Huang S.F., 2000). As Huang Shuan Fan (2000) writes, the “quest for national identity and internal reconciliation” is “the one single issue that looms largest in Taiwanese consciousness and that ranks as the country’s real national sport” (p. 144).

The relation language has to this emerging identity, however, is unclear. Although a non-Mandarin Chinese language variety, Southern Min, has traditionally served as the mother-tongue of the vast majority of the population, policies designed to install Mandarin as the official language have been enormously successful. Linguistic research of the last few decades has indicated a continual shift toward use of Mandarin (Cheng, R., 1979; Huang S.F., 1988; Huang S.F., 1993; Chang M.Y., 1996), and some fear for the erosion or loss of non-Mandarin varieties within Taiwan (see Chuang P.F., 2000; Mo R.P., 2000). These languages are most often used in the home, and use is often stratified by age (Chuang P.F., 2000)—a solid indication that language shift toward Mandarin is taking place.

In accordance with governmental policies, the ‘pure’ Beijing variety of Standard Mandarin Chinese has been the norm used in language education for many years (Lin, W.Y., 2001; Cheng, R., 1985). Due to the features of the language contact situation, however, the form of Mandarin commonly used in Taiwan often differs from the imposed standard in terms of syntax (Kubler, 1985; Cheng, R., 1985; Sanders, 1992), phonology (Kubler, 1985; Duanmu S., 2000), and lexical features (Kubler, 1985; Du, Y., 1999). Several linguists (Kubler, 1985; Li, D., 1985; Hsu, 1987; Tse K.P., 2000) have questioned whether this Taiwanese form of Mandarin could become the language associated with the rising Taiwanese identity. As Kubler (1985)

writes, “This is the type of Mandarin learned by almost all Taiwan children as their native language and is the speech form likely, some day, to be the native language of all” (p. 174). Kwock Ping Tse (2000) questions this possibility as well, but writes that “since this variety was still rated low on Feifel’s (1994) ‘status’ factor, this prediction may not materialize in the foreseeable future” (p. 163).

This statement forms the basis of motivation for this study: Have language attitudes changed since further political liberalization within Taiwan? Could the Taiwanese-Mandarin language variety be a symbol that differentiates Taiwanese from other Chinese groups? What variety, if any, will be most likely to characterize this rising sense of identity?

Language and regional identity in China

The interaction between language and regional or national identity has been well documented in the sociolinguistics literature for many years. Language is often a marker of social identity (Giles & Johnson, 1987; Tabouret-Keller, 1997; Stavenhagen, 2002), and can be used as a justification for in-group and out-group distinctions (Tong Y.Y. et al., 1999). Cases very similar to that of Taiwan can be found in the regional studies of Ukrainian (Bilaniuk, 2003), Breton (Hoare, 2000), and Galician (Beswick, 2002).

Examinations of regional linguistic identity in China, however, are complicated by the fact that the “divergence in speech between different regions is countered by an even stronger force of uniformity in the oneness of the written medium” (Ping C., 1996, p. 226). That is, great disparity in regional language varieties exists within China to the extent that they are often mutually incomprehensible in their oral form (i.e., Cantonese and Mandarin). With the Chinese orthographic system, however, the meaning of an ideogram remains constant despite regional

variation in the phonetic structure ascribed to it. In other words, people can understand the written form of Chinese if not the spoken version.

For hundreds of years, this feature has allowed for intra-regional communication throughout the Chinese nation, providing the literate the means to communicate regardless of regional origin. This factor has played a crucial role in sustaining a sense of unity throughout the vast cultural and linguistic landscape of China. As Robert Ramsey (1987) writes, “The power of unification exerted within Chinese culture by Chinese writing should not be underestimated; even the illiterate have always felt its influence” (p. 18).

For these reasons, mutually unintelligible Chinese language varieties are considered to be dialects of the same language within China. “The same factors that help divide Romance into several languages [i.e., nationalism] serve to unite Chinese into a single language” (Ramsey, 1987, p. 18). This poses a certain challenge as it runs counter to the commonly accepted (Western) method of language typology in which mutually incomprehensible varieties are regarded as different languages, not dialects. In fact, when attempts are made to define Chinese ‘dialects’ as divergent ‘languages’, “some Chinese patriots see this as an attempt by imperialists to divide China” (Cheng R., 1994, p. 389). Following Cheng’s (1994) example, I will use the terms ‘dialect’ and ‘language’ interchangeably throughout this paper.

Within Taiwan, however, some linguists contend that ascribing ‘dialect’ status to native mother-tongues effectively leads to their subordination under the Mandarin standard. As is a common maxim in sociolinguistics, a language is primarily a dialect with an army and a navy. Accordingly, some Taiwanese linguists argue against the system of language typology endorsed by China. As one Taiwanese linguist has commented:

“It is wrong that we treat [Southern Min] as a dialect, not as a language, simply because it is an offshoot of ancient Chinese. This can be compared to the fact that English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, even Hindustani are branches of an ancient Indo-European language. No one would say that Hindustani is a dialect of English, though English has become an international language. If Hindustani is not a dialect, why should [Southern Min] or Hakka be one?” (c.f. Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 309).

It should be noted that there are recent efforts among Taiwanese linguists to develop a commonly-accepted writing system for non-Mandarin languages in Taiwan (Chiung W.V., 1999; Ping C., 1996). This is intended to raise the status of non-Mandarin Chinese varieties from ‘dialect’ to ‘language’ (Hsiao A.C., 1997). In view of language ideology theories, this essentially cuts to the core of Taiwan’s unity within the Chinese cultural sphere.

In similar ways, the distinction between ‘regional’ versus ‘national’ identity in Taiwan is essentially a political statement regarding the island’s inclusion within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For instance, Shih Cheng Feng (1997) disputes arguments that the Taiwanese identity is a manifestation of regionalism. He argues that, compared to regional identity in the United States, Americans “may deem that it does not make any difference whether they live in Ohio, Iowa, or Idaho. But for the Taiwanese, any province in China will be as foreign as any state in the United States is” (Shih C.F., 1997). However, as Alan Wachman (1994) contends, “Taiwanese culture is a regional variation of Chinese culture. It is not unique and shares a good deal with the culture of southeastern China, particularly of [Fujian] Province, across the Taiwan Strait” (p. 101). Since ‘Taiwanese’² is a nativized form of Southern Min carried over from the mainland³, the previous statement applies to language in much the same way. Since it is very difficult to separate language ideology from political factors, I will refer to the growing

² Although not quite politically correct, Southern Min within Taiwan is often referred to as ‘Taiwanese’ (‘*Táiyǔ*’ [台語] Lit. Taiwanese-language) in reference to the overwhelming representation of Southern Min speakers in Taiwan. I will use the term ‘Southern Min’ in this paper, however, for purposes of clarity.

³ It is spoken throughout southern Fujian and the northeast tip of Guangdong.

consolidation within Taiwan as a ‘regional/national identity’ to reflect both the linguistic and political distinctions.

II. BACKGROUND

In order to discuss language attitudes in relation to a Taiwan-centered identity, it is important to understand how the people have been both connected and disconnected from the mainland throughout history. Furthermore, an examination of the language contact situation and factors of language shift are crucial to understanding the political, economic, and cultural conditions on which language attitudes in Taiwan are based.

Taiwanese Identity

Geographic and Ethnic Overview

To serve as an orientation, the island of Taiwan is located to the east of mainland China, separated by the 220km wide Taiwan Strait [see [MAP](#), Appendix E]. It is the largest body of land between Japan and the Philippine islands, and is approximately the size of West Virginia (Chuang P.F., 2000). The population of just over 22 million is comprised of four primary ethnic groups: Aborigine (combined) 1.7%, Hakka 12%, Southern Min 73.3%, and Mainlanders 13% (Huang S.F., 1993). At least 58% of Taiwanese live in urban areas, and the literacy rate is just over 93% (Chuang P.F., 2000).

It should be noted that the major conflict discussed in the following two sections are based on divisions *within* the same ethnicity: those Han Chinese that immigrated to Taiwan before 1895 and those that immigrated after 1945. These groups are often labeled ‘*běnsǎng rén*’ [本省人] (“local province people”) and ‘*wàishǎng rén*’ [外省人] (“outer province people”), respectively. Huang Shu-Min et al. (1994) argue that the Chinese term used for

ethnicity, ‘*mínzú*’ [民族], more accurately conveys the notion of ‘nationality’. They advocate the expression ‘*mínqún*’ [民群] to indicate a sense of ethnicity in which patrilineality, locality, and language are defining features. In this sense then, *běnsǎng rén* and *wàishǎng rén* may be analyzed as divergent ethnic groups, or *mínqún*.

European Colonization

Although it is not clear exactly when the first people settled in Taiwan, the island was populated thousands of years ago by several aborigine groups of Austro-Polynesian descent. As mainland Han Chinese immigration developed, the aborigine groups living in the western plains of Taiwan were gradually dominated and assimilated into Han culture. Those living in the central mountainous areas, however, were less subject to Chinese domination and have maintained distinct cultural identities to this day. Currently the aborigine ethnic category is comprised of ten tribes, each of which possesses a separate language of the Austronesian-Formosan language family (Chiung W.V., 2001).

Taiwan was first encountered by Western powers in the mid-sixteenth century after a Portuguese ship capsized on the island. They stayed only long enough to dub the landmass ‘Ilha Formosa’ (Beautiful Island) before moving on to a more permanent location in Macao. A few years later, the Dutch arrived and established a very lucrative trading colony under the Dutch East India trading company. In order to grow more sugarcane and rice, the Dutch encouraged Han migration from the mainland and effectively initiated an agricultural revolution on the island (GIO_a, 2002). Dutch Christian missionaries also developed the first orthographical system for Taiwanese languages during this time, although it was not widely popularized (Chiung W.V., 1999).

Chinese Immigration: Qing Dynasty (1683-1895)

The first major influx of Han Chinese, however, began around the middle of the seventeenth century. Facing long periods of famine, civil war and lawlessness during the prolonged collapse of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), many Chinese were forced to flee the mainland. Some of these migrants were Ming loyalists who, after forcing out the Dutch, used Taiwan as a naval base to attack the mainland.

In 1683 the newly ascendant Qing empire invaded the island to purge the Ming elements, and established Taiwan as a prefecture of the mainland. In the following centuries, “Taiwan was fully integrated into the Chinese empire, with numerous Taiwanese attending traditional academies and passing civil service examinations” (GIO_b, 2002). This allowed entrance into national-level government posts throughout China.

Qing rulers largely treated the territory with passive neglect, however, as it was considered a backwater territory and a haven for pirates. Corruption was widespread among officials appointed to Taiwan, and many revolts and rebellions by the Taiwanese took place as a result (Mo R.P., 2000).

With sustained immigration Han Chinese came to dominate the island. The great majority of Chinese immigrants were from coastal cities of what is now Fujian province, neighboring Taiwan across the strait. According to a 1924 census, 83.1% of the Han Chinese in Taiwan originated from Fujian, a full 80% of which came from only two cities in the province—Quanzhou and Zhangzhou (Chiung W.V., 2001). Accordingly, their Chinese dialect, Southern Min, is also one of the major languages of Taiwan and is still the mother-tongue of a large percentage of the people today.

Another primary group of Chinese immigrants are the Hakka, an ethnic group with wide pockets of distribution throughout many areas of China. Although widely disbursed they tend to

maintain a distinct culture and language (Huang C.M., 1997). The Hakka in Taiwan emigrated largely from two cities, one in Zhejiang province and the other in Guangdong province (Chiung W.V., 2001). However, their freedoms were constrained by Qing restrictions, which were imposed on the belief that the cities were prime havens of pirates (Chiung W.V., 2001).

Although the majority of Chinese immigrants shared a common background and dialect, they were in no way unified as a people when they first arrived. Group rivalry, based on city of origin, was commonplace, and violent confrontations often occurred over settlements of land and other resources (Hsiao, A.C., 2000).

After approximately two hundred years on the island, however, commonalities in folk music, religious beliefs, and co-residence came to replace co-origin on the mainland as integrating features (Chen, D.S., 2001). In addition, ancestor worship gradually began to focus on a lineage based in Taiwan rather than the mainland (Chen, D.S., 2001). Together, these characteristics signify a shift “from an immigrant to a native society” (Chen D.S., 2001, p. 63).

It is also important to note that a common national vernacular was not established in China until the 1920’s, and so the official ‘standardized’ oral language⁴ throughout China was only used by the few government administrators sent to the island. As this language “had only limited impact upon the speaking practices of the majority of Taiwan’s population”, the Southern Min dialect remained the dominant language of the island (Sandel, in press, p.9).

Japanese Domination (1895-1945)

Despite the developing attachment to the island, it wasn’t until 1895 that a distinct identity as ‘islanders’ began to develop. In that year, the Qing dynasty was forced to cede Taiwan to Japanese control following defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895). As a

result, many Taiwanese felt betrayed and forsaken by their Chinese compatriots, and a sense of alienation from the mainland has been a core sentiment of the Taiwanese ever since. “This bitterness springs from a sense of being deserted by the motherland, of being put under oppressive foreign rule, and of being helpless in shaping their own future” (Tse K.P., 2000, p. 158). In fact, shortly before the Japanese arrived, a group of elite Taiwanese attempted the establishment of an independent Republic of Taiwan. Their efforts were, however, quite short-lived (Morris, 2002).

The presence of a contrastive dominant culture, and status as a subjugated people, were instrumental in the formation of a common sense of identity among the Taiwanese. Distinct social markers presented by the Japanese served to differentiate the colonizers and the colonized, and inter-group terms such as ‘Taiwanese people’ and ‘Taiwanese language’ were introduced to unite the Han Chinese, sometimes including the Hakka as well (Hsiao A.C., 2000). During this time, the Taiwanese “began to absorb a sharply defined sense of ethnicity.... [and] a new ethnic category, the so-called ‘Taiwanese’ then emerged” (Huang S.M. et al., 1994, p. 17). In order to protect local Taiwanese culture and language⁵, intellectuals established journals and magazines, and formed opposition groups to call for representation of Taiwanese interests at the national level in Japan. Eventually, the Japanese did grant an elective local government in 1935, primarily “to counter the islanders’ agitation and relieve tension” on the island (Mo R.P., 2000, p. 72).

The colonists’ intentions, however, were to fully transform the island into a natural extension of Japan, in terms of both culture and economics. In society, many Taiwanese were pressured to assimilate by assuming Japanese surnames and dressing in Japanese clothing, and

⁴ *guānfāng yǔyán* [官方语言], Lit. “officials’ language” or ‘Mandarin’ Chinese

language policies in the media and schools ensured the spread of Japanese. Shortly after the colonists arrived, schools were established to teach the ‘national language’ and instill the qualities of proper imperial citizenship (Hsiao A.C., 2000). By 1937, the number of Taiwanese who could comprehend Japanese rose to 37.9%, though in 1944 official estimates placed the number at 80% (Hsiao A.C., 2000). The upper classes, primarily, were fluent in Japanese (Huang C.M., 1997).

Although Japanese had become the dominant language in the public sphere, by the mid-1940’s language use was stratified. The older generation relied on native languages, the middle generation had mixed native tongue/Japanese ability, and the younger generation tended toward use of Japanese (Hsiao A.C., 2000). Local Taiwanese languages were still quite active in other domains, however, and did not completely bow down under the influence of Japanese hegemony. As a Taiwanese linguist in 1946 commented: “The roots and trunks of the native tongues have not been shaken, but the function of their branches and leaves has changed” (c.f. Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 51).

In the end, though, many people had come to appreciate certain aspects of Japanese culture and control. During their fifty years of colonization, the Japanese developed an efficient administrative system, and created new infrastructure, a modernized agriculture, and an industrialized economy. In addition, the enrollment rate for elementary school children in 1944 was 81%, the highest in Asia (Huang S.F., 2000). All told, it led to greater economic development and a higher standard of living for the Taiwanese people, and toward the end of WWII, Taiwan had become “the most progressive area in Asia outside Japan” (Mo R.P., 2000, p 69). As Huang Shuan Fan (2000) writes, “many Taiwanese had become highly Japanese. They

⁵ This was influenced by the ‘*báihuà*’ [白话] movement on the mainland to replace the official written language, based on classical Chinese, with a standardized vernacular (Hsiao A.C., 2000).

spoke the language, identified with much of the culture, and enjoyed the benefits of Japan's stable rule" (p. 141).

Chinese Immigration (Redux): Republic of China (1945)

As World War II raged on in Europe and the Pacific, allied leaders in attendance at the 1943 Cairo Conference⁶ determined that Taiwan would be handed over to mainland Chinese rule following the resolution of the war. Accordingly, the Republic of China (ROC), which had replaced the Qing dynasty in 1912, took full control of the island in 1945. As a result, thousands of soldiers and officials arrived to install the new government and establish control. In addition, streams of refugees from the mainland poured in along with them. Between 1945 and 1949 alone, nearly two million government workers, soldiers, and refugees immigrated to Taiwan (Hsiao A.C., 2000). Although they came from many different parts of China and spoke a wide variety of dialects, they were united by a common lingua franca, Mandarin Chinese. Today, these people, popularly referred to as Mainlanders (*wàishěng rén*), now form approximately 15% of the population. They were quick to give up their native dialects, and used Mandarin Chinese as their primary language. It is important to note that Mandarin Chinese is mutually incomprehensible with the Southern Min dialect.

Taiwanese sentiments toward the Mainlanders were initially quite high following retrocession, as they were overjoyed to be free from the yoke of colonialism. They also expected equal and fair treatment from their Chinese brethren. These feelings quickly disintegrated, however, when it became clear that the Mainlanders would not live up to expectations. Buffeted by years of government corruption, Western imperialism and war, the mainland of China did not have the stability to maintain a strong course of development until after 1949. When the

Mainlanders arrived on the island, many were viewed by the Taiwanese as ‘country bumpkins’, less modern and sophisticated than the Japanese, and through their influence, the Taiwanese themselves. This also “caused [the Taiwanese] to see themselves as different from the Mainlanders” (Wachman, 1994, p. 45).

In addition, officials of the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling political party of the ROC, did not fully trust the Taiwanese due to the relative success of the Japanese assimilation policies. Shortly after retrocession, the spread of the national language was considered an important objective for the KMT to establish control. Due to the ubiquitous presence of Japanese culture and language on the island, policies were quickly initiated to ‘de-Japanize’ and ‘re-Sinicize’ the population (Hsiao A.C., 1997). Language use was a key measure in these endeavors, as “Mainlander officials often claimed that the Taiwanese were still ‘enslaved’ to Japanese culture because they had no command of Mandarin” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 55). The majority of government positions were subsequently filled by officials from the mainland instead of local Taiwanese. The first governor-general of the new province claimed that in order “to build up *China’s Taiwan*, first of all, [Taiwanese] must learn the national language. It is very dangerous to conduct direct elections for the posts of district chiefs and city mayors right now because [the island would thus] become *Taiwanese Taiwan*” (c.f. Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 55, italics in citation).

Furthermore, as the end of World War II revived hostilities between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland, much of the economic wealth and resources developed under the Japanese were confiscated and sold by the Mainlanders to finance the continuation of the civil war. Consequently, many Taiwanese came to see the ROC as “the Japanese colonial system revived” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 56).

⁶ U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Kai-Shek.

The Question of Provincial Origin: 2-28-47

These factors lead to heightened tensions between the Taiwanese and the recently arrived mainlanders. On February 28, 1947, a street disturbance in which a Taiwanese man was shot by police ignited a two-week long series of revolts on the island. During the revolts, many Mainlanders were assaulted or killed, and rampant crowds occupied government buildings, took over radio stations, attacked police stations and looted arms (Hsiao A.C., 2000). In fact, it was not unusual for insurgents to question a Mainlander using local Taiwanese languages, and “If he or she could not reply in the languages—which in fact was very common—the insurrectionists would beat, if not kill, him or her” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 57).

Officials privately came to the conclusion that Japanese influence was the primary cause of the insurgency, due largely to the fact that chants and slogans were conveyed in Japanese and Southern Min. “While it might seem natural for the Taiwanese to voice their anger in the languages which they had at their command, it convinced Mainlanders that the ‘contamination’ of Taiwanese minds by Japanese influence was more serious than they had originally thought” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 57).

In the midst of the chaos, the Taiwanese became organized and pressed the government for ambitious retributions to atone for the incident. They demanded an apology from the governor, political reforms and increased liberalization, disarmament of the military and finally, self-rule. Although the government responded sympathetically at first, the increasingly radical demands put them in a difficult situation.

Ultimately, the insurrection resulted in a massacre in which approximately 15,000 Taiwanese were killed under a declaration of martial law (Huang S.F., 2000). A large majority were among the elite or politically prominent, and of those who survived, many “alienated themselves from the government and/or withdrew from politics” (Wu N.T., 1994, p. 154).

Others resigned themselves to exile to organize opposition groups bent on removing the KMT regime. Many Taiwanese felt that the brutal counter-insurgency was designed to “systematically [wipe] out the political and intellectual elite of Taiwan” (Wachman, 1994, p. 99). Popularly referred to as 2-28, this incident reinforced the antagonism between the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese, and “proved to be the critical watershed of Taiwanese consciousness” (Huang S.F., 2000, p. 141). Although this deep division between Mainlanders and Taiwanese is gradually growing less distinct, it still has great impact on Taiwanese society today.

Language Shift and Revitalization

KMT Language Ideology: Access to L2

Martial law remained in effect for many years, and through their dominance in the ruling structures of the ROC, Mandarin-speaking Mainlanders effectively subjugated the Taiwanese majority. The national language was promoted as a symbol of unity with the mainland, and the goal of assimilating the Taiwanese became more urgent following the revolt. After 2-28, use of any language other than Mandarin was considered “a threat to national cohesion and unity” (Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 306-307).

Use of the ‘national language’ acquired greater significance following the events of 1949. In that year, with popular support from the Chinese masses, the communist forces successfully routed the armies of the ROC and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. In a hasty retreat, the ROC government was able to flee en masse to Taiwan. The KMT rejected official recognition of their defeat, however, and maintained the conviction that they were the rightful rulers of the Chinese motherland. Refusing to relinquish claims of total sovereignty, they vowed that the ROC would soon restore control on the mainland, drive out the Communist

‘bandits’, and reunite China under the ROC banner. Furthermore, in light of the radical Communist ideology to eradicate the outdated ‘bourgeois’ conceptions within Chinese society, the KMT felt that they were the lawful representation of ‘authentic’ Chinese culture. The degree of ‘Chineseness’ of the ROC state, then, was seen as a measure to validate these claims, and ultimately, the legitimacy of KMT rule over the mainland.

As a result, the proliferation of Mandarin took on greater symbolic significance in Taiwan. As Ping Chen (1996) writes, “If the language planning policy of the KMT government in Taiwan differed in any way from the policy it held on the mainland before 1949, or from that of the CCP on the mainland after 1949, it is that the official measures adopted to promote the standard language became harsher, sterner, and more effective” (p. 234). Under the ideology enforced by KMT policies, Taiwanese were required to abolish their sense of localism by sacrificing their native dialects for a national Chinese identity and the Mandarin language (Hsiao A.C., 1997). After years of struggle for self-determination and cultural preservation under Japanese rule, the Taiwanese were now forced to accept an ‘authentic’ Chinese ideology and language imposed by the KMT. In other words, they were forcibly resigned to adopt certain aspects of Chinese culture which they did not identify with, and to relinquish those that they did.

The authoritarian, one-party governmental system contributed greatly to the state’s ability to instigate the spread of Mandarin. Despite outward assertions of democratic principles and ideals⁷, the ROC was in fact “more similar to the communist states it claimed to oppose than the democratic ones it claimed to emulate” (Wachman, 1994, p. 131). The ruling structure of Taiwan was primarily based on a model of Leninist political organization, bestowing all political, social, and economic resources in society to KMT control (Wu N.T., 1994). In

⁷ This distinction, in contrast to their communist cousins across the Taiwan Strait, allowed the ROC to garner support from the U.S. and international recognition in the U.N. until 1971.

addition, most officially sanctioned non-governmental organizations, such as trade unions or sporting clubs, were in fact founded by the KMT to prevent oppositional alliances and to weed out potential communist insurgents. Subsequently the KMT had “unofficial influence in nearly all spheres of the society” (Feifel, 1994, p. 74), establishing a de facto Mandarin-only policy throughout the island.

The first step the KMT took to ensure the spread of Mandarin was to enforce its use in the public education system. In 1946, the Commission on the Promotion of Mandarin (CPM) established the national language as the sole language of instruction at all levels of education, regardless of the fact that it left many students, formerly educated in Japanese, functionally illiterate (Hsiao A.C., 1997). Although Mandarin had been the language of education on the mainland since 1929, Taiwan was the only non-Mandarin region throughout China in which all classes at all levels, including the first grade, were conducted entirely in the national language (Cheng R., 1979).

Restrictions on the use of non-Mandarin languages in the schools grew increasingly severe throughout the following decades. In 1956, the Department of Education made it a punishable offence to speak non-Mandarin languages during class time. Taiwanese students could be fined one dollar for speaking their native tongue, or have a ‘dog card’ hung around their neck signifying that non-Mandarin speakers were more like dogs than human beings (Huang C.M., 1997). Harsher forms of punishment were not uncommon. By 1964, these rules were extended to domains beyond the classroom, and consequently, use of non-Mandarin languages at any point at school was outlawed.

As Dell Hymes (1971) has observed, ‘colonial’ powers often work to “persuade the colonialized that they, or ways in which they differ, are inferior—[and] convince the stigmatized

that the stigma is deserved” (Dell Hymes, 1971, p. 1). In Taiwan, students were made to feel ashamed of speaking their native languages, and by extension, being Taiwanese. Alan Wachman (1994) writes:

“Taiwanese came to feel that their dialect, literature, poetry, songs, and drama were all inferior to Mandarin and the cultural works of the mainland” (p. 108) “...[and that] their dialect was somehow less dignified, dirtier, than Mandarin. Taiwanese who spoke Mandarin encumbered with a Taiwanese accent felt vulnerable each time they opened their mouths and ashamed that culturally—and perhaps, inherently—they were inferior to Mainlanders” (p. 108).

The media also worked toward similar ends. Despite the preference among advertisers’ for Southern-Min broadcasts, large government subsidies for Mandarin-language programs effectively ensured their prevalence on TV (Young, 1988). Hsiao A Chin (2000) argues that the low budgets accorded to non-Mandarin programs helped to lower the prestige of the Southern Min dialect. In addition, “the characters in these [Southern Min] programs were of low socio-economic status: illiterates, peasants, workers, fishermen, elders, and especially old women. Thus [Southern Min] was represented as a marker of backwardness, vulgarity, ignorance, femininity, and aging” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 130).

However, given the demographic situation of the population, programs in Southern Min grew increasingly popular. When the first television station was created in Taiwan in 1962, the KMT specified that non-Mandarin programming could not exceed 16 percent of total broadcast time (Hsiao A.C., 2000). Within a few years, however, nearly half of prime-time programs were broadcast in Southern Min (Huang C.M., 1997). By 1972, the government imposed stronger restrictions to curb non-Mandarin languages, stating that ‘dialect’ programming may not exceed more than one hour per day, in two half-hour segments (Young, 1988). In 1976, the Law of Radio Broadcasting and Television Programming (RBTP) defined the acceptable ratio of native

language to national language programming and stipulated that the percentage of non-Mandarin languages must decline thereafter on a yearly basis (Huang C.M., 1997).

Non-Mandarin languages were prohibited in other areas of society as well. For instance, ROC law requires compulsory military service for all men over the age of 18, and the ban on non-Mandarin languages was strictly enforced in the armed forces. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the military published manuals for teaching Mandarin during basic training, and even encouraged young men to take Mandarin courses before enrolling (Chang M.Y., 1996).

Furthermore, fluency in Mandarin was a mandatory condition for government positions shortly after retrocession. This also helped to solidify Mainlander hegemony in the government. In 1965, the KMT declared that civil servants were to speak only the national language during office hours, and Mandarin was established as the language of the court of law. This was done regardless of whether or not those involved in court actions could understand the language (c.f. Hsiao, 1997). In the early 1980's, efforts were made to prohibit any language but Mandarin in meetings, official business, public speeches, and conversations that occurred in public. By this time, however, the liberalization movement had gained enough strength that popular objection forced the authorities to abandon such extreme measures (Hsiao A.C., 1997).

Economic Growth and Rise of the Middle Class

Commonly, social and economic forces often operate concurrently to increase the pressure or motivation to conform to the language that is most dominant, or which could lead to a higher standard of living. In Taiwan, the dramatic economic developments and subsequent changes in social mobility for the Taiwanese increased the pressures to learn and speak Mandarin. They also, ironically, helped to bring about conditions in which the Taiwanese could attempt to maintain Southern Min.

After the ROC settled into Taiwan, the terribly high inflation that had plagued the government on the mainland also hit Taiwan, and the economy floundered. In addition, most of the developments accrued before WWII were either destroyed or sold off to finance the war against the communists. The Kuomintang, however, needed to transform the island into a ‘model province’ to demonstrate their ability to govern, and prove themselves to be “the good sovereign holding the ‘mandate of heaven’” (Feifel, 1994, p. 32). Therefore, the KMT initiated land reforms and embarked on a series of nine four-year economic development plans to rebuild the island. Taiwan also received a great amount of aid and advice from the United States in international, political, and institutional dimensions as well, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 (Howe, 2001).

The land reforms undertaken by the KMT were the first step to revitalizing the economy. In 1952, Taiwan’s economy was still largely agricultural-based, with farm production making up 35.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (Mo R.P., 2000). Over half of the population made its living through agriculture, and 52.4% lived in rural areas (Tsai W.H., 1992). The new reform policies reduced rent, sold tens of thousands of hectares of land formerly owned by the Japanese, and compelled landlords to relinquish large portions of their property to the tenants who tilled it. Subsequently, land reform “redistributed wealth in the rural areas, increased the number of small landowners, and eliminated the rural property base of the old landlords” (Mo R.P., 2000, p. 80). These changes encouraged the rapid growth in production which helped to provide the capital needed for industrial expansion. A sharp population increase in the early 1950’s, and the ensuing decrease in labor costs, also contributed significantly to industrialization.

The growth of industry lead to rapid urbanization of the population throughout the 1960’s and 70’s. Under advice of U.S.-trained experts, the KMT strengthened industrial output through

both public and state-owned enterprises and instituted policies to promote exports, ease trade restrictions, and encourage domestic and foreign investment (Mo R.P., 2000). By 1980, only 18.4% of the workforce was involved in farming as the economy grew less dependent on agriculture (c.f. Mo R.P., 2000). These changes lead to a quick rise in the urban population, as “many young people wanted to escape farm life and [so] left the countryside” (Feifel, 1994, p. 34). In less than thirty years, the number of people living in rural areas (with a population lower than 50,000) decreased by 22.7% (Tsai W.H., 1992).

The rise in wealth had great impact on the educational system as well. In 1990, government expenditure per student was sixty-six times that of 1961, as the percentage of the Gross National Product spent on education more than doubled during the intervening years (Tsai W.H., 1992). Illiteracy rates for those of 6 years and older dropped from 25.9% to 6.8% in the same time period. Student enrollment and the need for teachers also increased dramatically. Between 1950 and 1980, 4,402 new public schools were built, and the number of full time teaching positions rose from 29,020 to 166,727 (Mo R.P., 2000), an increase of 474%. Opportunities for higher education also surged ahead with the creation of new vocational schools, colleges, and universities. The greatest increase in student enrollment in Taiwan occurred in higher education, rising from 3.9% to 18.9% between 1962 and 1990 (Tsai W.H., 1992). Subsequently, “within three decades, the number of college and university students had grown more than 80 times” (Mo R.P., 2000, p. 82). As Mandarin was the sole language allowed in school, these developments clearly had a great impact on language shift.

In Chinese society, education has long been seen as the primary means of social advancement. Ever since the 6th century, Chinese citizens could enter into a secure and prestigious lifestyle as a government official by successfully completing the arduous Imperial

Examination. Commerce, however, was considered to be of less worth to society, and it was often referred to as the ‘crooked road’ (Feifel, 1994). Academics on the other hand, is commonly thought of as the ‘white path’ toward prosperity. Today, children experience great pressure to excel at school, even at the expense of their health (Cheng R., 1979). “It is common for students to study for twelve hours a day, seven days a week for more than a year preceding an entrance examination... [and] some parents do not mind taking the risk of sacrificing even their children’s relationships with their families and relatives” (Cheng R., 1979, p. 551).

It is not surprising, then, that parents often encourage use of the national language among their children to prepare them for success in school. Parents seeking advancement for their children often “refuse to speak [Southern Min] to their infants and toddlers so as to prepare them better for the ‘good’ preschools, kindergartens, and elementary schools—i.e., those schools that educate children successfully for entrance into middle schools and colleges” (Gates, 1981, p. 265).

Urbanization also directly facilitated the shift to Mandarin. Initially, Taiwanese and Mainlander communities were rather segregated following retrocession. When they first arrived in Taiwan, ROC government and military officials naturally occupied the houses, schools, and living arrangements left vacant when the Japanese evacuated the island. Although Japanese policies were intended to assimilate the Taiwanese population, they did not attempt to do so through mixed communities and social institutions. Consequently, Japanese schools and housing arrangements were largely separated from those of local Taiwanese. As the Mainlanders essentially picked up where the Japanese left off, “the colonial era’s tendency toward residential segregation was thus carried over into the new [ROC] state” (Gates, 1981, p. 262). The majority

of Mainlander immigrants settled in these northern urban areas, and even today, sixty-seven percent of Mainlanders live in the greater Taipei area alone (Chiung W.V., 1999).

Upward mobility was possible, however, for those Taiwanese who conformed to the doctrines of the KMT. “If the native people were ready to accept the ideology (or truth as it was called) of the existence of one unified China under the leadership of the KMT with one true language, ... the path of advancement was open to them.... Many of the local people accepted these conditions” (Feifel, 1994, p. 32). Furthermore, industrialization not only meant a greater supply of blue-collar jobs, it also created a more urgent need for qualified administrators as well. Since proficiency in Mandarin was necessary to move beyond the factory floor, Mandarin became a key to a more prosperous lifestyle. Subsequently, urbanization resulted in an increase of daily interaction between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, particularly in the northern region where the Mainlanders were concentrated. Some Taiwanese were able to achieve entrance into the higher echelons of business, government, and the military as well. Therefore, these revolutions reinforced the shift to Mandarin Chinese, especially for the children who needed a common language to interact with their peers.

The combination of industrialization, urbanization, and an increase in educational opportunities contributed to the rise of the middle class among the Taiwanese, which helped to bring about greater political involvement. By 1983, middle class occupations, such as government personnel, administrative and managerial workers, staffs at educational institutions, and professional and technical workers, made up 28.4 percent of the total labor force in Taiwan (Tsai W.H., 1992). With higher material wealth and social standing, the Taiwanese had a higher stake in the issues concerning the island and a greater awareness of political affairs. Subsequently, they “demanded a more meaningful [level of] participation in the government’s

decision making process” (Mo R.P., 2000, p. 102). Figure II-1 (below) succinctly illustrates the processes which worked to bring about these changes in Taiwanese society.




Figure II-1 Interactional Effects of Economic Change on Political Participation in Taiwan

(Tsai W.H., 1992, p. 368)

Government Liberalization

Through these factors, the system of government gradually began a process of liberalization. Particularly, the Taiwanese middle class became more involved in the civil establishment, through voting and running for political office. By the early seventies, the number of Taiwanese in the KMT was roughly equal to the number of Mainlander members (Hsiao A.C., 2000). They were mostly in the local and district offices, however, and were still under-represented on the national level (Wu N.T., 1994). Still, they continued to make gains. By 1988, the percentage of Taiwanese on the KMT Central Committee, whose members select the more powerful Standing Committee, reached 32.8% [59/180]; in 1952, the percentage was only 3.1% [1/32] (Wu N.T., 1994).

In addition, after several decades, the mainland officials who came to power in the post-war period began to reach retirement age, and native Taiwanese were needed to take their place. In 1984, for instance, native-born Lee Tung Hui was promoted to the position of vice-president, and in 1988, became the first native-born President of the ROC and chairman of the KMT. President Lee recruited many Taiwanese into decision-making circles of his government, and essentially drove mainlanders out of the core of power (Mo R.P., 2000). By 1992, Taiwanese membership in the KMT reached 70%, and in 1993 Taiwanese achieved a 57% majority in the ruling body of the KMT (c.f. Hsiao A.C., 2000).

Ideological shifts within the government were also influenced by developments on the international level. For instance, in order to seek geo-political leverage against the Soviet Union, President Nixon announced plans in 1971 for the U.S. to pursue a policy of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The ROC subsequently relinquished their seat in the United Nations in anticipation of full recognition of PRC sovereignty on the mainland. Many nations dropped diplomatic relations with the ROC as a result, and with the loss of international support, the already weak claims to power over the Chinese motherland effectively disintegrated. Thereafter, many Mainlanders came to the realization that the island could no longer be considered a 'temporary' residence until the ROC reestablished power on the mainland. Subsequently, the China-centered ideology pushed by the KMT lost a great amount of legitimacy, and urgency, within Taiwan.

These changes strengthened a coalition of opposition groups⁸, which were often formed along ethnic lines, challenging KMT rule. People were increasingly vocal about strengthening the status of their culture, language and identity. Altogether, these groups helped to spark an

⁸ called 'dāngwài' [党外], Lit. 'outside the party'

ethnic and linguistic ‘revitalization’ on the island. For instance, by the late 1980’s, Southern Min movies, pop songs, and literature grew to be quite prevalent, university students formed organizations to encourage the use of Southern Min, and others started journals and magazines to promote their mother-tongue. In addition, language began to serve as a means of unification, and use of Southern Min became “a symbol of political dissent and ethnic loyalty” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 133). It was the language used in meetings, rallies and protests, and it raised support among the majority of the populace.

In 1987, after one Taiwanese representative in the DPP refused to speak Mandarin during a meeting of the legislature, language use became a prominent issue throughout the island. It was the first of several such confrontations, which served to spark many discussions about language issues. Particularly, native languages came to openly signify attachment to the island and an indexation of ‘Taiwanese’ identity. As Joseph Hsu (1987) writes, “thus Taiwanese speakers become more conscious of their language, not so much as a means of communication but rather as an identifying marker” (p. 372).

Although the formation of non-KMT political alliances was still forbidden under ROC law, the opposition groups officially merged into the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. The KMT, however, did not suppress the movement, and the tacit show of support helped to bring about a series of political reforms in subsequent years.

The most significant of these reforms was the repeal of martial law in 1987. The forty year span in which martial law stood after 2-28 made it “the longest period of uninterrupted martial law in world history” (Chuang P.F., 2000, p. 14). Soon after the repeal, punishments for speaking non-Mandarin languages were banned, and television stations were allowed more time to broadcast in non-Mandarin languages. In addition, a group of DPP activists pressured for an

inquiry into the 2-28 incident and turned the previously taboo topic into a public issue. In 1991 a committee was organized to open the existing archives and examine the incident, the findings of which “made it clear” that prominent high KMT officials “committed serious mistakes while using troops to suppress resistance” (Hsiao A.C., 2000, p. 169). A monument was also commissioned to help atone for the tragic event.

The DPP, however, intended to force further steps to make up for the China-centered policies of previous years. Among the objectives of the DPP platform are the goals to promote “greater Taiwanese ethnicity by advocating bilingual education, enhancing the study of Taiwan’s history and culture, and allowing Taiwan’s people to determine Taiwan’s future identity” (Mo R.P., 2000, p. 102). In 1989, several DPP candidates on the mayoral level listed mother-tongue education as one of their campaign promises. Seven of them were elected to office, and each tried to initiate bilingual education programs in the elementary and junior high schools of their respective districts.

These programs, however, violated the Mandarin-only language policies of the KMT. As the city and county councils were still controlled by KMT officials, government funding was cut for the upstart programs. The DPP officials found a loophole, however, by offering the courses on an extra-curricular basis for 40-50 minutes during the week (Mo R.P., 2000). In addition, though the Ministry of Education declared that schools could not discriminate against non-Mandarin languages in the early 1990’s, it also stipulated that mother-tongue education should not obstruct the promotion of Mandarin (Huang C.M., 1997). Subsequently, the main goal of the programs has been to “repair” and “preserve” ethnic languages (Chen S.C., 1996). Other districts, especially those run by the KMT, allowed the decision to hold native-language classes to be made by individual schools.

Notably, in 2001 the Ministry of Education initiated ‘native dialect’ language course requirements for primary school students throughout the island. First through sixth grade students are now obligated to take one to two hours a week of Taiwanese, Hakka or an aboriginal language. The government also loosened restrictions on teacher certification, and increased teacher education with an emphasis on language training (United Daily News, 1999). However, many critics see this as simply a token measure, not substantial enough to combat the effects of four decades of stringent Mandarin-only language policies (Huang S.F., 2000). As Huang Chuen Min (2001) argues, although significant reforms are being made, it still remains to be seen whether these adjustments “are a fashion from the western society or a political compensation to ethnic minorities” (p. 132).

Not surprisingly, these developments have also aroused fears among other groups. Some think mother-tongue instruction will obstruct students’ learning of Mandarin, and others believe it will threaten the unity of the country by encouraging ethnic rivalry (Chen S.C., 1996). Hakka and aborigine groups are concerned that they will not receive sufficient resources and materials under the strength of the Southern Min majority. Both groups fear losing their native tongues, regardless of what degree of bilingual education the government is willing to provide (Huang C.M., 1997).

In a similar way, many Mainlanders have begun to worry about their own future status, and fear both potential discrimination and an uncertain future. As language has been a marker of identity, some Mainlanders chose to keep silent at times in order to avoid revealing their non-native heritage (Li K.C., 2002). Furthermore, second-generation “Mainlanders have to cope with anxiety over language use during their work every day. They are under pressure to attend Taiwanese language classes; otherwise they can only choose to avoid ethnic conflict” (Li K.C.,

2002, p. 120). On a social level, inability to speak Taiwanese makes some Mainlanders feel “incompetent in their interactions with other ethnic groups, and uncertain about their identity as Taiwanese” (Huang C.M., 1997, p. 144). As Alan Wachman (1994) writes, “Younger mainlanders who have known no home other than Taiwan may find disorienting the sudden rise of Taiwanese nationalism, which casts them in the role of political minority” (p. 105).

This reality is also expressed, in no small way, by the efforts of Mainlander officials within the KMT to learn native languages, particularly Southern Min. These developments represent the efforts of the KMT to “‘localize’ itself and win support of the major ethnic group” (Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 304). Though Mainlanders still have many advantages in society, the opportunities for further generations to secure positions within the government are growing fewer, creating a need to find positions within the local economy (Feifel, 1994). As Southern Min is still a major language in some business circles, particularly outside of Taipei, the lack of basic Southern Min skills can be a disadvantage (Wachman, 1994). It is now popular, understandably, for Mainlanders to learn Southern Min.

Taiwanese Identity: Redux

As the island struggles to define its future, many intellectuals have argued that the imposed China-centered ideology of the past has created, at best, an unhealthy situation in Taiwan. They contend that their society has been forced to maintain a false sense of attachment to ‘China’ while simultaneously ignoring, even disdaining, the realities of the current land in which they live. Among their arguments is the notion that all people in Taiwan share a collective past and will inherit a similar future, and “must accept the culture they live with as a new form of Chinese culture” (Wachman, 1994, p. 104).

Ideally, this new Taiwan-centered ideology encompasses all, and attempts to mold the island into a pluralistic union. Current developments in native-tongue language education are an example of these ‘*běntǔ huà*’⁹, or nativization, policies. Recent curriculum standards developed in 1993 are designed to serve these ends as well. Previous curricula concentrated heavily on a Chinese political identity, particularly dealing with cross-straits relations, and included few if any chapters about Taiwanese minority groups or native cultures. The new curriculum, however, includes subjects on ‘loving one’s homeland’ and ‘understanding Taiwan’, which are “analogous to Taiwan-centered recognition” (Huang S.M., 1997, p. 83). These and other efforts are designed to alter the focus of Taiwanese society “from the present forward to what Taiwan must be, rather than from the present backward to cling to an ideal that was not realized” (Wachman, 1994, p. 104).

As further generations of Mainlanders come to identify more with the land in which they grow up, rather than the phantom homeland examined in school, it is largely believed that a consolidation of identity is likely to continue. Although interethnic divisions run deep within society, the differences between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese are likely to dissipate eventually. As Li Kuang Chun (2002) writes:

“It is well agreed that first-generation Mainlanders will soon die out. All the early ethnic distrust due to opposed historical experiences will soon disappear. Besides, Taiwan itself is becoming more open and diversified. This increasing pluralism in terms of social composition will weaken the significance of ethnic categories” (Li K.C., 2002, p. 119).

Furthermore, it is notable that the official demarcation of identity¹⁰, based on father’s place of origin, was repealed in 1992. This system had served “as an instrument of identity categorization by law” and had been a ‘potential tool of ethnic discrimination’ (Corcuff, 2002, p.

⁹ [本土化] Lit. native-soil-‘ize’

¹⁰ This is known as the ‘*jíguàn*’ [籍贯] system (Li K. C., 2002).

171). As Corcuff (2002) argues, although it is false to assume that claims of ethnic reconciliation have *already* been realized, people take the division into consideration much less than before, which shows that “the progressive emergence of a new ethnic consciousness is real” (p. 188).

Sociolinguistic Situation

Although the revitalization efforts of native languages have been significant, the post-war language policies designed to install Mandarin Chinese as the national language clearly have been enormously successful. Currently within Taiwan, approximately 95% of the population can communicate in Mandarin Chinese, both orally and in writing (Tse K.P., 1986). It remains the language used in education, despite the initiation of native dialect language courses. Although Southern Min continues to be a very prominent language,¹¹ its use tends to be stratified by age. That is, in a situation very similar to the status of Japanese before retrocession, the older generation predominantly uses local dialects, the middle generation uses both local dialects and Mandarin, and the young primarily use Mandarin (Chuang P.F., 2000).

One significant theme of Chuang Pei Fen’s (2000) qualitative research study was that “speaking [Southern Min] is associated with the stereotyped image of older people” while “In contrast, the younger generation expressed that [Mandarin] represented high language vitality” (p. 133). Furthermore, speaking Mandarin represents education or literacy, which “is so important that some grandparents believed the fact that their grandchildren could speak Mandarin Chinese was positive whether they could communicate with them or not” (Chuang P.F., 2000, p. 124).

¹¹ Cheng (1994) estimates that it is still the native tongue of over 75% of the people.

In a language attitude survey conducted in 1992, respondents in all ethnolinguistic groups indicated “sentimental and instrumental attachment toward Mandarin”, though attitudes toward non-Mandarin languages were divided along ethnic lines (Young et al., 1992, p. 12). That is, Southern Min and Hakka respondents had more sentimental attachments toward local dialects than Mainlanders did, and felt more strongly toward the maintenance of mother tongues. In a matched-guise attitude study conducted in 1990, Mandarin rated highest as the language of status, and rated similarly in terms of solidarity with Southern Min (Feifel, 1994). Feifel (1994) also argues that, relating to questions administered in his survey, results indicated that “Mandarin has become an inevitable component of a positive personal identity for the whole population” (p. 195).

Other studies have indicated that the younger a Taiwanese person is, “the lesser his or her ability to speak the mother tongue” (Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 308). In Southern Min-speaking families today, 84% of children are able to speak Mandarin before they enter primary school; by the time they reach six years old, the number climbs to 94% (Chang M.Y., 1996). It seems that the ‘primary mechanism’ for shift, a lack of intergenerational transmission of the traditional tongue (Paulston, 1994), is clearly a characteristic of language behavior in Taiwan.

Taiwanese Mandarin

For several years, however, linguists have noticed the emergence of a unique form of Mandarin highly influenced by the language contact situation in Taiwan. In accordance with early ROC language policies, the standard of Mandarin propagated by the government and used in schools is based on the Beijing dialect. In fact, language teachers in Taiwan “are very concerned with correct pronunciation of Mandarin in the ‘pure’ Beijing form, and much teaching time is spent on eliminating the ‘Taiwan’ accent in speaking Mandarin” (Lin W.Y., 2000, p. 38).

In actual practice, however, the Mandarin spoken by non-native speakers has been the model outside of the classroom environment (Cheng, R., 1985). The Mandarin spoken on the island has been influenced not only by the preponderance of Southern Min speakers, but also by the fact that the majority of Mainlander immigrants were from the southern areas of China. As Mandarin is not the native dialect of the southeast [see [MAP](#), Appendix E], even among Mainlanders, “those not originally [Beijing] Mandarin speakers are much more numerous, and are politically and economically more powerful than [Beijing] Mandarin speakers” (Cheng, R., 1985, p. 354).

After fifty years, the Mandarin most commonly spoken in Taiwan has come to differ from that of the Beijing standard in terms of phonological, syntactical, and lexical features (Kubler, 1985, p. 157). As David Li (1985) writes, some of these differences have “gradually been recognized by speakers from the mainland, including those from the [Beijing] area” (p. 125). This section examines these aspects in more detail.

Phonology

The most characteristic phonological feature of the Mandarin spoken in Taiwan is the lack of a final [-ɿ] suffix (儿) commonly used in Beijing Mandarin. For instance, ‘yī diǎn’ [一点] ‘a little’ is often pronounced on the mainland as ‘yī diǎnr’ [一点儿], or /y'di.an/ → [y'di.ɿ]

In addition, the initial retroflex fricatives of Beijing Mandarin (MD) are not present in Southern Min (SM) and many other southern Chinese dialects (Norman, 1988), and so these phonemes are difficult for these speakers to pronounce. As a result, Taiwanese–Mandarin (TM) is also characterized by a lack of retroflex initials (Kubler, 1985). With the Beijing standard as the official model, “whether or not one can pronounce these sounds correctly is often the key factor in determining whether one speaks good Mandarin” (Kubler, 1985, p. 159).

Table II-1 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Phonology (Consonants)

(Kubler, 1985, p. 158)

<u>Consonants</u>		<u>Pinyin</u>	<u>Hanzi</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>Standard Mandarin</u>	<u>Taiwanese Mandarin</u>	
<u>MD</u>	<u>TM</u>						
<u>ONSETS</u>							
[tʂʰ]	→	[tsʰ]	chī	吃	‘to eat’	/tʂʰ ɿ /	/tsʰ ɿ /
[tʂ]	→	[ts]	zhǐ	只	‘only’	/tʂ ɿ /	/ts ɿ /
[ʂ]	→	[s]	shí	十	‘ten’	/ʂ ɿ /	/s ɿ /
[z]	→	[dz]/vowel	rúguǒ	如果	‘if’	/zʊkʷɔ/	/dzʊkʷɔ/
[f]	→	[ɸ]	fùmǔ	父母	‘parents’	/fʊmu/	/ɸʊmu/
[l]	→	[ɿ]	lái	来	‘to come’	/lai/	/ɿ /
<u>FINALS</u>							
[iŋ]	→	[in]	jīngyú	鲸鱼	‘whale’	/dziŋ ʷ /	/dziŋi/
[əŋ]	→	[əŋ]	yīshēng	医生	‘doctor’	/y.ʂəŋ/	/i.səŋ/
http://hctv.humnet.ucla.edu/departments/linguistics/VowelsandConsonants/course/chapter1/chapter1.html							

There are also differences in vowel sounds between Mandarin and Southern Min, leading to the particular features of Taiwanese-Mandarin.

Table II-2 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Phonology (Vowels)

(Kubler, 1985, p. 160)

<u>Vowels</u>		<u>Pinyin</u>	<u>Hanzi</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>Standard Mandarin</u>	<u>Taiwanese Mandarin</u>	
<u>MD</u>	<u>TM</u>						
[y]	→	[i]	yùnqì	运气	‘good luck’	/yntʂʰ i /	/intsʰ i /
[ɿ]	→	[u]	háizi	孩子	‘child’	/hai ʰtsɿ /	/hai ʰtsu /
[ɣ]	→	[o] or [ɔ]	gè	各	‘each’	/kɣ /	/kɔ /
[uo]	→		shuō	说	‘to speak’	/ʂuo /	/sɔ /
[ou]	→		lóu	楼	‘floor’	/lou /	/lɔ /
[iou]	→	[io] or [iɔ]	liù	六	‘six’	/liou /	/lio /
[ei]	→	[e]	hēi	黑	‘black’	/hei /	/he /
[ie]	→	[i+e]	xiè	谢	‘to thank’	/sie /	/si+e /
[uei]	→	[u+e]	duì	对	‘be correct’	/tuei /	/te /
http://hctv.humnet.ucla.edu/departments/linguistics/VowelsandConsonants/course/chapter1/vowels.html							

Syntax

Syntactic differences are also characteristic of Taiwanese-Mandarin. Though Cheng (1985) and Kubler (1985) both discuss many syntactical features that distinguish Taiwanese-Mandarin and Standard Mandarin, only a few will be reviewed here.

First of all, a contrast between habitual and future action can be neutralized in Standard Mandarin, though it is always overtly expressed by an auxiliary verb in Taiwanese—*beh* ‘want’ for future, and *u* ‘do, have’ for actualization. Taiwanese Mandarin tends to differ from Standard Mandarin in this respect as well.

Table II-3 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Syntax (Habitual vs. Future) (Cheng R., 1985, p. 355)

HABITUAL:		FUTURE:	
‘do you eat beef?’		‘Are you going to eat that piece of beef?’	
MD:	你吃不吃牛肉? <i>nǐ chī-bù-chī niú-ròu</i> you eat-not-eat beef	MD:	那块牛肉你吃不吃? <i>nà-kuài niú-ròu nǐ chī-bù-chī</i> that-piece beef you eat-not-eat
TM:	你有没有吃牛肉? <i>nǐ yǒu-méi-yǒu chī niú-ròu</i> you have-not-have eat beef	TM:	那块牛肉你要不要吃? <i>nà-kuài niú-ròu nǐ yào-bú-yào chī</i> that-piece beef you want-not-want eat?
SM:	lí ū chiàh gū-bah bô? you have eat beef not.have	SM:	hit-tè gū-bah lí beh chiàh ? that-piece beef you want eat not

Furthermore, the contrast between simple past and perfective is neutralized in Standard Mandarin in affirmative and interrogative sentences, while it is clearly marked in Southern Min. Standard Mandarin does make this contrast in negation, however, through the use of *méiyǒu* [没有] ‘did not’ for past and *hái méiyǒu* [还没有] ‘not yet’ for perfective. Taiwanese-Mandarin, however, follows the pattern of Southern Min.

Table II-4 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Syntax (Simple Past vs. Perfective) (Cheng R., 1985, p. 359)

SIMPLE PAST:		PERFECTIVE	
a): ‘did you eat the beef?’		a): ‘Have you eaten the beef?’	
MD:	牛肉你吃了没有? <i>niú-ròu nǐ chī le méi-yǒu</i> beef you eat ASP not-have	MD:	牛肉你吃了没有? <i>niú-ròu nǐ chī le méi-yǒu</i> beef you eat ASP not-have
TM:	牛肉你有没有吃? <i>niú-ròu nǐ yǒu-méi-yǒu chī</i> beef you have-not-have eat	TM:	牛肉你吃了没有? <i>niú-ròu nǐ chī le méi-yǒu</i> beef you eat ASP not-have
SM:	gū-bah lí ū chiàh bô? beef you have eat not.have	SM:	gū-bah lí chiàh bōe? beef you eat not.yet
b): ‘Yes, I did.’		b): ‘Yes, I have.’	
MD:	我吃了。 <i>wǒ chī le</i> I eat ASP	MD:	我吃了。 <i>wǒ chī le</i> I eat ASP
TM:	有，我有吃。 <i>yǒu, wǒ yǒu chī</i> have I have eat	TM:	有，我吃了。 <i>yǒu, wǒ chī le</i> have I eat ASP
SM:	ū, góa ū. have I have	SM:	chiàh a. eat ASP
c): ‘No, I didn’t.’		c): ‘No, I haven’t.’	
MD:	我没吃。 <i>wǒ měi chī</i> I not eat	MD:	我还没吃呢。 <i>wǒ hái méi chī ne</i> I yet not eat ASP
TM:	没有，我没有吃。 <i>méi-yǒu, wǒ méi-yǒu chī</i> not-have I not-have eat	TM:	没有，我还没有吃。 <i>méi-yǒu, wǒ hái méi-yǒu chī</i> not-have I yet not-have eat
SM:	bô, góa bô (chiàh) not.have I not.have eat	SM:	iáu-bōe, góa iáu-bōe not-yet I not-yet eat

In addition, there also tends to be a difference in the use of the verb phrase directionals *lái* [来] ‘come’ and *qù* [去] ‘go’ as well. Traditionally, the most common way to specify direction in Standard Mandarin is to use the verbs *lái* [来] and *qù* [去] preceded by a coverbal phrase using *dào* [到] ‘to’ or *shàng* [上] ‘on’ (Kubler, 1985). Southern Min, however, lacks the equivalent of these coverbs, and so it is common in Taiwanese-Mandarin for the place word

to directly follow the main verb (Kubler, 1985). It should be noted, however, that this feature is universal to southern Chinese dialects (c.f. Cheng R., 1985), and is increasingly recognized as an accepted standard in China (Kubler, 1985). Example 2, however, shows the carry-over to Taiwanese-Mandarin from Southern Min of the compound verb *lái- qù* [来去] (literally come-go) that is ‘unacceptable’ in standard forms of Standard Mandarin (Kubler, 1985). In Southern Min, this compound verb is usually preceded by ‘bèq’ ‘will’ and is used instead of *khī* ‘go’ with the “first person singular and plural pronouns in non-past time” (Kubler, 1985, p. 167).

Table II-5 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Syntax (Comparison of Directional Verbs) (Kubler, 1985, p. 167)

1:	Where do you want to go?	2:	I’m going to see a friend.
MD:	你要到哪儿去?	MD:	我要去看一个朋友
	<i>nǐ yào dào nǎ-r qù?</i>		<i>wǒ yào qù kàn yīgè péngyou</i>
	you want to what-ASP go		I want go see one MW friend
TM:	你要去哪里?	TM:	我要来去看一个朋友
	<i>nǐ yào qù nà-li</i>		<i>wǒ yào lái-qù kàn yī-gè péng-you</i>
	you want go what-place		I want come-go see one-MW friend
SM:	Lī bèq khi tōu-ū?	SM:	Guâ bèq lǎi-khì khuà: cīt-ě piēng-iù.
	you will go what-place		I will come-go see one-MW friend

Lexicon

Developments across the straits have affected the lexicon of Mandarin Chinese as well. For instance, Sanders (1992) has researched differences in markers of modality, comparing similar conversations between Beijing speakers and Taipei speakers in a home setting. He noted differences between Taipei and Beijing speakers in the semantic range of both *yào* [要] ‘will/want’ and *huì* [会] ‘able to/can’, and found great divergence in preference of words expressing degrees of ‘ability’—*néng* [能] ‘be possible /can’ vs. *huì* [会] ‘able to/can’. Furthermore, Du Ying (1999) found that, particularly through loan words and ‘homegrown’ expressions, the majority of the new words and expressions in written Mandarin that have arisen

in recent years are different across the Taiwan Straits. Kubler (1985) also discusses several lexical terms often used in Taiwanese-Mandarin that have been influenced by, or derive from, Southern Min (table 6).

Table II-6 Taiwanese-Mandarin: Selected Lexical Differences (Kubler, 1985, p. 172)

Taiwanese Mandarin		Standard Mandarin		Gloss/Comments
ā	阿	lǎo	老	Honorific prefix used with names and kinship terms; SM ā
ho:		bùshì ma?	不是吗?	Final particle which expects agreement from interlocutor concerning speaker's statement.
jī mǔ	鸡母	mǔjī	母鸡	'hen' –a number of common nouns in SM and M have different order of constituent morphemes
tái	台	liàng	辆	Measure word for vehicles; cf. SM tái

Language and Taiwanese Identity

It seems clear that, after fifty years of divergent social, economic, and political developments, the Mandarin most commonly spoken in Taiwan has characteristics that differentiate it from the Standard Mandarin derived from the Beijing dialect. Du Ying (1999) claims that “the gap between the two lexicons across the Straits reflects the gap between the two cultures, and both will widen as long as the two sides are separated” (p. 158-159). David Li (1985) in fact, argues that in the unknown future, “the linguistic differences between Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan and Mandarin Chinese in Beijing will be widened to the extent that people from both sides of the Taiwan Straits will have greater difficulty in attaining mutual intelligibility without effort” (p. 123).

Although this claim is not likely to be realized soon, other linguists contend that Taiwanese-Mandarin is, or will be, “an identity marker of the Taiwanese natives” (Hsu J., 1987, p. 375). Cornelius Kubler (1985) argues for this possibility as well, suggesting that this variety

can either be characterized as Mandarin spoken with mistakes, or a different form of Mandarin. He states, though, that since these features are increasingly common among native Mandarin speakers in Taiwan, it is not right to say that their native language is ‘incorrect’. As Kubler (1985) writes, “there is developing in Taiwan today a kind of ‘standard’ Taiwan Mandarin spoken by the great majority of both native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. This is the type of Mandarin learned by almost all Taiwan children as their native language and is the speech form most likely, some day, to be the native language of all” (Kubler, 1985, p. 174).

Huang Shuan Fan (2000) alludes to this possibility as well. In his discussion of efforts of reconciliation between Mainlander and native Taiwanese, Huang (2000) writes that language behavior is an ‘interesting reconciliation’ in itself, marked by the emergence of what he calls an ‘amalgamated language’. In his definition, this is a heavily code-mixed variety using either Mandarin or Southern Min as a grammatical base “overlaid with a profusion of Taiwanese/Mandarin lexical elements in an utterance” (Huang S.F., 2000, p. 144). Although this presents a different sort of mixed language than the Taiwanese-Mandarin previously discussed, it still indicates a linguistic consolidation that could, someday, be representative of the rising identity.

Kwock Ping Tse (2000) has discussed questions of language in relation to the common Taiwanese identity in a more direct manner. Citing previous survey data, Tse (2000) writes that there is a ‘clear shift’ toward this sort of ‘pan-ethnic’ Taiwanese identity, though its relation to language is unclear. The same surveys, Tse (2000) states, indicate that fluency in Southern Min is not a central condition for being Taiwanese; more significant are place of birth, ancestral birthplace, place of residence, and self-identification with Taiwan. Tse (2000) does, however, question the possibility that Taiwanese-Mandarin may be a feature of the emergent identity. He

writes, “Perhaps some day a language variety will emerge as a major characteristic of this supra-ethnic identity in Taiwan and one possible candidate might be Taiwanese-Mandarin. But since this variety was still rated low on Feifel’s (1994) ‘status’ factor, this prediction may not materialize in the foreseeable future” (Tse K.P., 2000, p. 163).

These claims form the basis of motivation for this current study. Given the current state of bilingualism and increasing consolidation of identity between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, I would like to know whether Taiwanese-Mandarin is, or could be, a marker of this emerging regional/national identity. Therefore, the main focus of this study is to examine whether language attitudes have changed in the intervening years since Feifel’s (1994)¹² previous research. As John Edwards (1985) writes, “the social context in which evaluations occur is not a static entity; as it changes, one should expect to see alterations in attitudes too” (p. 149).

Language Attitudes

Attitudes in and of themselves have long been a domain of social psychological research. They are commonly defined as “a disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to a class of objects” (Edwards, 1994, p. 97). Although attitudes can not reliably predict how people will behave in a given set of circumstances or prescribed situations, they are often used to explain and predict persistent patterns in behavior over a period of time. Knowing someone’s attitudes toward smoking, for instance, “may sum up likely behavior in a range of contexts over time” (Baker, 1992, p. 11). In Fasold’s (1984) definition, language maintenance or shift can be regarded as “the choices made by the members of a particular speech community, reflecting their cultural values, [that] add up to shift or maintenance in that community” (p. 214). Therefore, language attitudes may help to understand what choices in language behavior people are more

likely to make over a long period of time, and may help to predict shift or maintenance of a language variety within the speech community.

Typically, attitudes are said to be a higher abstraction of three compositional elements: cognition, affect, and readiness for action. As Edwards (1994) writes, “one knows or believes something, has some emotional reaction to it, and therefore, may be assumed to act on this basis” (p. 97). A person’s attitude toward learning French, for instance, may be affected by whether it is *thought* to be useful, *felt* to be pleasing or beautiful, and influences his or her *likelihood to speak* the language.

An important conceptual foundation of language attitudes is that there are no inherent qualities of language varieties that cause one to be perceived more favorably than another. This notion is strengthened by the research of Giles et al. (1974), who found that people unfamiliar with a certain language are unable to differentiate between more prestigious and less prestigious varieties of the same language. That is, linguistic features ascribed with more ‘standard’ or ‘aesthetically pleasing’ qualities by native speakers are not accessible to non-speakers of those varieties. This indicates that attitudes toward language are fundamentally evaluated on social, not linguistic, terms. Therefore, when people speak of affective qualities of a language variety, it is not the language that is being evaluated, but an underlying stereotype of the speakers themselves. For this reason, attitudes toward divergent language varieties “are better understood as attitudes towards the members of language communities” rather than the variety itself (Edwards, 1994, p. 89).

In this way, then, by judging the speakers of in-group language varieties, respondents are also indirectly evaluating members of these in-groups as well, essentially making qualitative

¹² Feifel (1994) collected his data in 1990.

judgments regarding language and their own group identity (Edwards, 1985). Fundamentally, as Edwards (1985) writes, language attitudes “allow some insights into the perception and presentation of identity” (p. 151). Through this process, language attitudes may be considered “to be important in language restoration, preservation, decay or death” (Baker, 1992, p. 9).

Studies of attitudes toward language have typically assumed two different viewpoints, a mentalist and a behaviorist view. The mentalist camp considers attitudes to be a ‘state of readiness’, “an intervening variable between a stimulus affecting a person and that person’s response... A person’s attitude, in this view, prepares her to react to a given stimulus in one way rather than another” (Fasold, 1984, p. 147). With the behaviorist view, on the other hand, “attitudes are to be found simply in the responses people make to social situations” (Fasold, 1984, p. 147). As Feifel argues, the “automatic associations that are outside of the direct awareness of the actors”, which essentially describes the mentalist perspective, have “the most critical effects on actual language use” (Feifel, 1994, p. 55). “If the mentalist conception of language attitude turns out to be right, then, if we know a person’s attitudes, we would be able to make predictions about her behavior related to those attitudes, with some degree of accuracy” (Fasold, 1984, p. 148).

Therefore, by looking at potential changes in attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin by way of the mentalist perspective, we can perhaps understand whether this language variety is more likely to be used, emulated, and accepted throughout society. In other words, we may be able to monitor whether or not this language variety could eventually come to represent a future consolidated Taiwanese identity.

Kwock Ping Tse (2000) based his prediction on a language attitude survey conducted by Feifel (1994). In this study, Feifel (1994) employed a matched-guise technique to understand

language attitudes toward Mandarin, Southern Min, and Taiwanese-Mandarin throughout Taiwan. The matched-guise research design, developed by Lambert et al. (1960), attempts to restrict the transparency of the study so that the respondents are not aware of the concepts under investigation. In this method, respondents are asked to evaluate the personality qualities of speakers of different language varieties in a tape-recorded message. Although respondents typically believe each variety was produced by a different speaker, they were, in fact, made by the same bilingual or trilingual speakers producing a different ‘guise’ for each variety. In this way, “if the same person is rated differently in different ‘guises’, it has to be the difference in language that accounts for it” (Fasold, 1984, p. 150).

In order to monitor potential changes in language attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin, this study attempts to replicate Feifel’s (1994) research by employing the same basic materials. The following section will describe this in more detail.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The primary motivation for this research study is to understand whether Taiwanese-Mandarin can be related to the emerging sense of Taiwanese identity. Following Tse’s (2000) statement that this is unlikely to happen given the low results this language variety achieved in Feifel’s (1994) study, the first research question is: Have language attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin changed since further political liberalization within Taiwan? Furthermore, in order to gauge whether language can potentially be a reliable indicator of the rising Taiwanese identity, a second research question is: does Taiwanese-Mandarin serve to differentiate Taiwanese from other Chinese, particularly those from the southeast region of the mainland with similar dialectal features? I offer the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis one states that language attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin, as employed by Feifel (1994), will be unchanged in relation to Mandarin and Southern Min on all measures in comparison with previous results. Furthermore, respondents will not indicate a greater level of desired resemblance to the Taiwanese-Mandarin speakers than Feifel's (1994) study demonstrated (Secondary Hypothesis 1a).

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis two states that Taiwanese people will rate Taiwanese-Mandarin higher on all measures than will Chinese people originating from southern dialect speaking areas of the mainland. In addition, the two additional adjective pairs derived from interviews with Taiwanese will factor differently for Taiwanese respondents than with mainland respondents (Secondary Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, Taiwanese respondents will be more successful in attributing Taiwanese-Mandarin guises to Taiwanese speakers than will respondents from the mainland (Secondary Hypothesis 2b).

Research Design

Participants

The Taiwanese sample of respondents (n=40) included twenty males and twenty females, with an average age of 31 (SD 9.4). Within Pittsburgh, data (n=16) was collected among the Taiwanese student population and Taiwanese attending different Chinese churches in the city. Data (n=24) was also collected by Taiwanese research assistants in Taipei. Of all surveyed, 4 claimed Mainlander heritage, though 11 came from either exogamous (n=8) or endogamous (n=3) Mainlander parentage. All of the participants surveyed in Pittsburgh claimed status as

Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, though 4 were of exogamous and 2 were of endogamous Mainlander parentage¹³. Of all participants, 31 had received a university education, 3 attended college, 1 received only a high school education, and 2 reported ‘Other’ (2 missing). Twelve respondents were from the north of Taiwan, 2 were from the south, and 4 originated from the middle region of Taiwan.

In order to test whether Taiwanese-Mandarin can be related to the emerging Taiwanese identity, the language attitude survey was administered to twenty-five Mainland Chinese originating from the southeast of China as well [see [MAP](#), Appendix E]. Only native speakers of southern dialects from the mainland were chosen for this sample. It is assumed that these speakers’ Mandarin accents will be more likely to show features similar to Taiwanese-Mandarin as well. Furthermore, as noted previously, the features of Mandarin in Taiwan have also been influenced by the fact that the majority of mainlanders emigrating to Taiwan after 1945 were from the southeast region of China. “Especially influential are the Wu speakers—who include the political elite from Zhejiang... and the financial tycoons and textbook writers from Shanghai” (Cheng, R., 1985, p. 354).

The mainland sample was comprised of people from Shanghai (10), Zhejiang (3), Hunan (2), Fujian (2), Jiangsu (2), Jiangxi (1), Guangxi (1), and Guangdong (1). One respondent had grown up in Hong Kong but was a fluent speaker of Mandarin¹⁴. There were 12 males and 12 females among respondents (one missing), the average age of respondents was 33, and 17 received a university education, 5 attended college, and 2 received only a middle school education.

¹³ Under the ‘*jíguàn*’ [籍贯] system, this would have qualified them as Mainlanders.

¹⁴ Due to differences among language policies between the PRC and the Hong Kong SAR, statistics were compiled with and without this token with no significant effect on the results.

Speech Sample

This study used the identical master tape employed by Feifel (1994) in his previous research. The recordings included four speakers, two male and two female. Each speaker produced guises in Standard Mandarin, Taiwanese-Mandarin, and Southern Min for a total of twelve voices on the tape. Two other samples, in Mandarin and Southern Min, were included at the beginning of the tape as examples. Participants were instructed to complete the survey for the examples as well, in order to ensure comprehension and familiarity during the actual test. According to Feifel (1994), speakers were all about thirty years of age and each had grown up in Taiwan. Two were from families with endogamous Taiwanese parents, one speaker had a Mainlander father and a Taiwanese mother, and the fourth was of endogamous Mainlander parentage. Each speaker was employed in the communications field: two worked at a radio station in Taipei, one in a TV station, and the fourth in the administration of the National Theatre in Taipei. Three of the four speakers grew up in Taipei, and the other in a small town in central Taiwan.

As Feifel (1994) reports, a rigorous process was applied in order to ensure validity of the language guises on the tape. After a pre-test among university students, “Only those speakers whose guises were all regarded as authentic/standard and natural, whose [Southern Min] and Taiwanese-Mandarin guises were attributed to local people and whose Mandarin guise was attributed to a Mainlander rather than to a local were eventually included” (Feifel, 1994, p. 117). An example tape with speeches by authentic speakers was also provided for the speakers to emulate. The texts written for the Taiwanese-Mandarin and Standard Mandarin guises did not differ to a great extent, though speakers were instructed to add additional non-syllabic retroflex features [] [ㄐ] for the Mandarin guise as it felt natural to them. Speakers were instructed to

produce the Taiwanese-Mandarin guise as it is commonly heard on the street (Feifel, 1994). Overall, speakers were given latitude to add their own interpretation to the guise. The order of speakers and language guise is presented below.

Table III-1 Order of Speakers and Language Guises

Number	Speaker	Language Variety
1	Male 1	Mandarin
2	Male 2	Southern Min
3	Female 1	Taiwanese-Mandarin
4	Female 2	Southern Min
5	Male 1	Southern Min
6	Male 2	Mandarin
7	Female 2	Taiwanese-Mandarin
8	Female 1	Southern Min
9	Male 1	Taiwanese-Mandarin
10	Female 2	Mandarin
11	Male 2	Taiwanese-Mandarin
12	Female 1	Mandarin

The topic chosen for the recording dealt with a motorbike accident, as “it is something that could happen to anyone, and it is a subject of everyday conversation” (Feifel, 1994, p. 116). Each voice guise had a duration of about 35 seconds, with about one minute and 45 seconds of silent space between each guise for respondents to complete the survey questionnaire. After evaluating the voices, participants were asked to fill out an additional questionnaire for background information. The total procedure took approximately 35-40 minutes.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire used in this study was also nearly identical to that devised by Feifel (1994). Following Feifel’s (1994) example, each participant was instructed to imagine that they would be listening to a series of fourteen voices, the first two of which were given as examples. For each voice, they were told to imagine the person speaking to them on the telephone and then

rate their impression of the speaker afterwards. Respondents evaluated each language guise on pairs of polar opposite adjectives aligned on a six-point scale, according to the semantic differential scale technique designed by Osgood et al. (1957). The scale indicates a range of semantic meaning in between each pole, for instance, with ‘dull’ on one side and ‘bright’ on the other side. If the speaker is believed to be educated, the respondent will likely rate the person higher on the ‘bright’ side of the continuum.

Example: 1) Intelligent x:___:___:___:___:___ not intelligent

Although Feifel’s (1994) format allowed seven ratings on the continuum, only six were allowed in this study. This forces respondents to make a decision on either side of the continuum by disallowing a completely neutral option. All surveys were written in Chinese characters, with the traditional font (*‘fántǐzì’* [繁体字]) for Taiwanese respondents, and the simplified font (*‘jiǎntǐzì’* [简体字]) for mainland respondents.

The adjective pairs selected for the questionnaire originated from earlier language attitude studies conducted by Western researchers in non-Chinese settings. The characteristics were proven relevant in surveys concerning varieties of French (Lambert, et al., 1975), Spanish (Carranza and Ryan, 1975), and Catalan (Woolard, 1989). The adjectives were also selected in cooperation with Huang Shuan Fan, a sociolinguist from the National Taiwan University. “The traits were also selected because they seemed to be the most suitable for representing the status, solidarity and activity dimensions of evaluation” (Feifel, 1994, p. 119). Personality trait-pairs were scrambled to reduce transparency of the three factors, and positive and negative poles were arranged in a mixed order so that “the judges were forced to evaluate each trait separately” (Feifel, 1994, p. 120).

Although the adjective pairs were not derived natively by Taiwanese, a previous study (Yang and Bond, 1990) had been conducted to test the validity of Western constructs of personality perception imported to the Chinese context. This research compared factor analysis results from adjectives pooled from Mandarin-language media in Taiwan with ‘imported’ personality constructs from Western settings. Results indicated that “the basic emic dimensions of Chinese person perception” do not differ to a great extent from imported Western perceptions (Yang and Bond, 1990, p. 1090). Of the five factors derived from the Mandarin sample, four could be “adequately explained by varying combinations of the five imported factors” (Yang and Bond, 1990, p. 1087). As Feifel (1994) writes, the strong similarity between factors “indicates that these may be more universal, culture-independent dimensions of attitudes and perceived personality” (p. 60).

Feifel (1994) conducted his study among five different population groups throughout Taiwan: primary school students, middle school students, university students, working age adults, and retired persons. Altogether, his subject size included over 600 participants. In order to compare relative change in attitudes over time, the factor loadings derived from the working age population (between university and retirement) of Feifel (1994) were chosen for this study. The adjective traits for this population were factored as follows:

Table III-2 Factor Loadings: Solidarity, Status, Activity (Feifel, 1994)

Factor 1: Solidarity	Factor 2: Status	Factor 3: Activity
Sincere <i>Chéngkěn</i> 诚恳	Intelligent <i>Cōngmíng</i> 聪明	Conversable <i>Jiàntán</i> 健谈
Modest <i>Qiānxū</i> 谦虚	Leadership <i>Yǒu lǐngdǎo nénglì</i> 有领导能力	Having character <i>Yǒu gèxìng</i> 有个性
Content <i>Zhīzú</i> 知足	Self-confident <i>Yǒu zìxìn</i> 有自信	Ambitious <i>Hàoshèng</i> 好胜
Not selfish <i>Bù zìsī</i> 不自私	Social status <i>Yǒu shèhuì dìwèi</i> 有社会地位	Humorous <i>Yǒu yōumògǎn</i> 有幽默感
Likeable <i>Lìngrén xǐ'ài</i> 令人喜爱	Not superstitious <i>Bù míxìn</i> 不迷信	
Reliable <i>Kěkào</i> 可靠	Open <i>Kāifàng</i> 开放	
Courteous <i>Yǒu lǐmào</i> 有礼貌	Good-looking <i>Wàibiǎo hǎokàn</i> 外表好看	
Fair <i>Gōngzhèng</i> 公正		
Obliging <i>Suíhè</i> 随和		
Diligent <i>Rènzhēn</i> 认真		

In addition, two additional adjectives pairs were added to the questionnaire: ‘kind/unkind’ (*yǒu qīnqiē gǎn/méi qīnqiē gǎn*) [有亲切感-没亲切感] and ‘informal/formal’ (*fēizhèngshì de/zhèngshì de*) [非正式的/正式的]. These characteristics were derived from interviews conducted with native Taiwanese. The words were freely associated with language during the interview, following questions relating to language attitudes. It is believed that should these words group together in a significant way in a factor analysis for Taiwanese respondents, it could indicate a relation between language and Taiwanese identity.

In addition to the semantic differential questionnaire, Feifel (1994) also asked respondents to judge the likely age and profession of each voice guise, as well as their place of origin. In order to suit this question to Hypothesis 2 of this study, ‘*běnsǎng rén*’ [本省人]

(native Taiwanese) and ‘*wàishěng rén*’ [外省人] (Mainlander) were changed, respectively, to ‘*Táiwān rén*’ [台湾人] (from Taiwan) and ‘*dàlù rén*’ [大陆人] (from the mainland). This is to allow a cross-straits comparison rather than one designed solely for the Taiwanese context. Following Feifel’s (1994) questionnaire, two questions “in two dimensions of identification” were included as well: “How much do you feel you resemble this person?” and “How much would you want to be like this person?” The following section will describe the results obtained in this study.

IV. RESEARCH RESULTS

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis one stated that language attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin would be unchanged in relation to Mandarin and Southern Min on all measures in comparison with Feifel’s (1994) results. Results achieved supported this hypothesis: Taiwanese-Mandarin rated lowest on all factors among the sample of Taiwanese respondents. No discrepancies among the ranking of the language varieties were found on all measures in comparison to previous results.

A significant main effect was found for the speakers, however, indicating that respondents were rating the speaker as well as the language variety. For instance, Male 2 (speaker 2) was rated significantly higher ($p < .05$, $< .001$) on solidarity across language varieties than all other speakers. Similarly, respondents significantly ($p < .05$, $< .001$) preferred Female 2 (speaker 4) on status and activity across varieties as well. In other words, regardless of the language variety spoken, respondents reported greater solidarity with Male 2 than other speakers, and ascribed a higher level of status and activity to Female 2. The reasons for this are unclear, but are likely due to speaker performance, as well as reactions toward voice quality and tone. Although the guises presented by the speakers were arranged in a mixed order (see Table III-1),

which would decrease the likelihood that respondents were consciously aware of the actual limited number of speakers, this nevertheless undermines the fundamental assumption of the matched-guise test used in this research. That is, respondents were not evaluating *only* the language varieties in question, but the particular voice qualities of the different speakers.

Table IV-1 Results: Speaker Effect (Taiwanese Sample)

Speaker	Factor	Mean Difference			
		Male 1	Male 2	Female 1	Female 2
Male 2	Factor 1	0.34**	Ø	0.33*	0.32*
Female 2	Factor 2	0.22	0.25*	0.40**	Ø
Female 2	Factor 3	0.16	0.36*	0.31*	Ø
*significant at the p<.05 level **significant at the p<.001 level					

Factor 1: Solidarity

On the solidarity factor, Southern Min rated highest (mean=3.74), followed by Mandarin (mean=3.67), and finally Taiwanese-Mandarin (mean=3.52). The solidarity rating for Southern Min was significantly higher (p<.05) than Taiwanese-Mandarin, though no such difference was found between Mandarin and the other language varieties. These results are similar to those found in Feifel (1994). Further discussion of these results will be presented in the final section of this paper.

Table IV-2 Results: Hypothesis 1—Factor 1 (Solidarity)

Factor 1: Solidarity		Mean Difference		
Variety	Mean	MD	SM	T-M
MD	3.673	Ø	-0.065	0.157
SM	3.738		Ø	0.222*
T-M	3.516			Ø
*significant at the p<.05 level				

Factor 2: Status

In terms of status, Taiwanese respondents judged Mandarin to be highest (mean=3.89), followed by Southern Min (mean=3.49), then Taiwanese-Mandarin (mean=3.07). Results

between each language variety are significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. Again, these findings parallel those of Feifel (1994).

Table IV-3 Results: Hypothesis 1—Factor 2 (Status)

Factor 2: Status		Mean Difference		
Variety	Mean	MD	SM	T-M
MD	3.894	∅	0.4*	0.823*
SM	3.494		∅	0.423*
T-M	3.071			∅
*significant at the $p < .001$ level				

Factor 3: Activity

Results on the activity dimension showed no significant difference between Mandarin (mean=3.99) and Southern Min (mean=3.83). However, Taiwanese-Mandarin (mean=3.06) rated significantly lower ($p < .001$) than both Mandarin and Southern Min. This differs slightly from Feifel's (1994) previous results in which no statistical difference was found between Southern Min and Taiwanese-Mandarin. Although the relation between the two varieties is identical to the previous study, current results indicate that this difference did not likely occur by chance.

Table IV-4 Results: Hypothesis 1—Factor 3 (Activity)

Factor 3: Activity		Mean Difference		
Variety	Mean	MD	SM	T-M
MD	3.997	∅	0.170	0.934*
SM	3.827		∅	0.764*
T-M	3.063			∅
*significant at the $p < .001$ level				

Table IV-5 Results (Feifel, 1994): Factor 3 (Activity)

Data results of Feifel (1994)			
Factor 3: Activity		Mean Difference	
Variety		MD	SM
MD		∅	0.213
SM			∅
T-M			∅
*significant at the $p < .05$ level			

Secondary Hypothesis 1a:

Secondary Hypothesis 1a stated that respondents will not indicate a greater level of desired resemblance to the Taiwanese-Mandarin speakers than Feifel's (1994) study demonstrated. Results supported this hypothesis as well: desired resemblance to the Taiwanese-Mandarin (mean=2.54) speaker was significantly lower ($p < .05$) than both Mandarin (mean=2.85) and Southern Min (mean=2.78). No significant difference was found between Mandarin and Southern Min. These results are in keeping with those of Feifel (1994).

Table IV-6 Results: Hypothesis 1a—Desired Resemblance

Desired Resemblance		Mean Difference		
Variety	Mean	MD	SM	T-M
MD	2.850	Ø	0.075	0.494*
SM	2.775		Ø	0.419*
T-M	2.356			Ø
*significant at the $p < .05$ level				

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis two predicted that respondents from southern-dialect areas of the mainland will rate Taiwanese-Mandarin significantly lower on all factors compared to Taiwanese respondents. However, results¹⁵ did not support this hypothesis. In comparison of attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin between the mainland and Taiwanese samples, no significant difference was found on any factor. There was, however, a significant difference ($p < .001$) on the solidarity dimension for the Standard Mandarin variety. The mainland sample (mean=4.16) rated Mandarin speakers higher along the solidarity dimension than did the Taiwanese sample (mean=3.67).

This most likely represents the fact that political challenges to the dominance of Mandarin in Taiwan were largely successful, allowing greater political acceptance of non-

Mandarin varieties as a symbol of solidarity. On the mainland, however, any sort of similar challenge has been unsuccessful, and so it is understandable that Mandarin acts as the primary linguistic symbol of solidarity in comparison with Taiwanese respondents.

Table IV-7 Results: Hypothesis 2— Factor 1 (Solidarity)

Factor 1: Solidarity		Mean Difference	
Sample	Mean	MD	SM
Mainland	4.162	Ø	0.489*
Taiwan	3.673		Ø
*significant at the $p < .001$ level			

Secondary Hypothesis 2a:

Secondary Hypothesis 2a stated that two additional adjective pairs ('kind/unkind' and 'informal/formal') previously derived from interviews with Taiwanese will factor differently for Taiwanese respondents than with mainland respondents. Results indicated that the adjective pairs correlate positively at a significant level ($p < .05$, $p < .001$) among three of the four Taiwanese-Mandarin guises for the sample of Taiwanese respondents. That is, speakers of this language variety were more likely to be judged as both 'kind' and 'informal'¹⁶ than speakers of the other language varieties. A significant correlation was also found for the Mandarin guise of Female 2.

Table IV-8 Results: Hypothesis 2a—Taiwanese sample

Speaker	Language Guise	Pearson Correlation
Male 1	Taiwanese-Mandarin	0.495**
Male 2 (not significant)	Taiwanese-Mandarin	-0.232
Female 1	Taiwanese-Mandarin	0.332*
Female 2	Taiwanese-Mandarin	0.559**
Female 2	Mandarin	0.572**
*significant at the $p < .05$ level		**significant at the $p < .001$ level

¹⁵ As not all mainland respondents had basic proficiency in Southern Min, results for this language variety were excluded in this analysis.

¹⁶ As the means for these adjective pairs were on the positive side of the continuum ('kind': mean=3.11; 'informal': mean=2.85), we know that speakers were not judged to be 'unkind' and 'formal'.

Results for the mainland sample do not show a similar pattern. No significant correlations were found on any of the Taiwanese-Mandarin guises among mainland Chinese respondents. However, a significant ($p < .001$, $p = .05$) negative correlation was found for one Southern Min guise, and one Mandarin guise. Both speakers were female.

Table IV-9 Results: Hypothesis 2b—Mainland sample

<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Language Guise</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation</u>
Female 1	Southern Min	-0.661**
Female 2	Mandarin	-0.397*
*significant at the $p = .05$ level **significant at the $p < .001$ level		

For the Taiwanese respondents, the fact that ‘kind’ and ‘informal’ correlated positively for three out of four Taiwanese-Mandarin guises is significant. This data indicates that Taiwanese respondents considered Taiwanese-Mandarin speakers to be both ‘kind’ and ‘informal’ more so than speakers of the other language varieties. Furthermore, mainland respondents did not indicate a similar pattern of perception.

The relation that these findings have toward language attitudes or identity, however, is unclear. One possibility is that these terms relate to a minor construct separate from the more major factors that tend to emerge from factor analyses. Osgood et al. (1957) note that as “a large portion of the total variance remains unaccounted for, we assume there must be other factors operating” (p. 325). They state that there are “a large number of relatively specific semantic factors” (Osgood et al., 1957, p. 326), and so there are many possible minor constructs to which these terms could relate.

It is also possible that this difference represents incongruence between an imported and an indigenous set of personality descriptors. Although the research of Yang and Bond (1990) showed little difference in cross-cultural constructs of personality in Taiwan, the authors believe that locally derived instruments “will evidence more powerful relation to criterion variables than

will imports” (Yang and Bond, 1990, p. 1094). They admit, however, that this was not the focus of their research, and if indigenous instruments do have an advantage, “they will only be relatively better than imports” (Yang and Bond, 1990, p. 1094). It could be possible that these words demonstrate a superiority, however slight, of indigenously derived instruments. Further discussion on this point follows in the next section. Though the word ‘kind’ did appear on Yang and Bond’s (1990) ‘Social orientation vs. Self-centeredness’ factor¹⁷, a Mandarin translation of this descriptor was not provided. Therefore, there is no way to know whether the adjective pair in this study was identical to that used by Yang and Bond (1990).

It is quite possible that these terms may be commonly used in the discourse when discussing Taiwanese-Mandarin, or those who fit the stereotype of these speakers. Since they were freely derived from interviews, the significance of these items could indicate a close relation to the general conception of these speakers within Taiwan. This notion is further supported by the fact that both terms ‘kind’ and ‘informal’ often surfaced in subsequent interviews; however, they were not used in reference to Taiwanese-Mandarin. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the term ‘informal’ most typically describes a situation, and not necessarily a person’s personality.

Secondary Hypothesis 2b:

Secondary Hypothesis 2b stated that Taiwanese respondents will be more successful in attributing Taiwanese-Mandarin guises to a Taiwanese origin than will respondents from the mainland. Results indicated that for the sample of Taiwanese respondents, the Taiwanese-Mandarin guise was attributed to a Taiwanese origin 89% of the time, while the mainland sample did so 53% of the time. This indicates that Taiwanese people are more likely to recognize a

¹⁷ Which Feifel (1994) approximated to the ‘solidarity’ factor.

person speaking Taiwanese-Mandarin as being from Taiwan than are southern mainland Chinese people.

Table IV-10 Results: Hypothesis 2b—Origin Attributed to TM Guise

Origin Attributed to Taiwanese-Mandarin Guise						
Taiwanese respondents				Mainland respondents		
Origin:	Taiwan	Mainland	Missing	Taiwan	Mainland	Missing
Total:	143	13	4	53	43	4
Percentage:	89%	8%	3%	53%	43%	4%

In addition, Taiwanese respondents attributed the Mandarin guise to Taiwanese origin only 39% of the time. As Taiwanese-Mandarin was more than twice as likely to be ascribed to Taiwanese origin, this result suggests that the variety may be recognized as indigenous to Taiwan. Furthermore, mainland Chinese were much more likely to attribute Taiwanese origin to Taiwanese-Mandarin speakers (53%) than to Mandarin speakers (9%). This indicates that both mainland and Taiwanese respondents were able to differentiate the two varieties, and both were more than twice as likely to ascribe the non-standard version to Taiwanese speakers. Since there is great regional variation among Chinese language varieties, however, the two options presented ('mainland Chinese' and 'Taiwanese') were insufficient to test this measure with great validity. For instance, it is possible that mainland respondents were only ascribing a non-standard Mandarin language variety to someone from a non-Mandarin dialect region of China [see [MAP](#), Appendix E].

Table IV-11 Results: Hypothesis 2b—Origin Attributed to MD Guise

Origin Attributed to Mandarin Guise						
Taiwanese respondents				Mainland respondents		
Origin:	Taiwan	Mainland	Missing	Taiwan	Mainland	Missing
Total:	62	97	1	9	88	3
Percentage:	39%	61%	0.1%	9%	88%	3%

Several interviews with Taiwanese living in Pittsburgh were conducted as well in order to understand language attitudes from an ‘emic’ perspective. The following section will explore these findings in greater detail.

V. DISCUSSION

As discussed earlier, attitudes include a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably to a given set of objects (Edwards, 1994). Although measures of attitudes cannot reliably predict overt behavior in a particular situation, they may be able to indicate a greater tendency or inclination to behave in a certain way over time (Baker, 1992). The attitudes toward Taiwanese-Mandarin, shown in Feifel (1994) and replicated in this current study, seem to indicate that Taiwanese-Mandarin continues to have low regard within the Taiwanese speech community in comparison with other varieties. Results of this study also confirm the reliability of the methodology previously employed. However, the supplemental test conducted, which added to the questionnaire two characteristics derived through interviews with Taiwanese, casts doubt on the validity of Feifel’s (1994) matched-guise survey. The fact that these additional terms correlated significantly among Taiwanese, and not mainland respondents, for Taiwanese-Mandarin indicates that further research may be necessary to fully examine the validity of Feifel’s (1994) previous study.

Furthermore, results from both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this study support the notion that Taiwanese-Mandarin may already be “an identity marker of the Taiwanese natives” as Hsu (1987, p. 375) contends. For instance, although little difference was found on Feifel’s (1994) measures in attitudes between Taiwanese and mainland speakers of Mandarin, both groups were more than twice as likely to ascribe the Taiwanese-Mandarin guises to Taiwanese speakers. Of all interviews conducted, every informant indicated that language is a

principle means to differentiate Taiwanese from other Chinese people. Informant One, a former ESL student, said that “the way Singapore people speak Mandarin, Hong Kong people speak Mandarin, mainland Chinese speak Mandarin, and Taiwanese people speak Mandarin are all different...intonation, and usage, that is, the words used to [in English] ‘describe something’, they’re all different.”¹⁸

When asked for clearer explanation, several speakers noted the lack of retroflex as a major distinction. Informant Two, for instance, responded, “Taiwan people’s Mandarin and the Mandarin on the mainland aren’t the same. Their Mandarin is rather ‘rr rr’, rather retroflexed — [mimics retroflex] ‘When I speak like this, you can hear it right?’— but Taiwanese aren’t like that, Taiwanese are rather ‘flat’, rather ‘wide’ [i.e., not-retroflexed].”¹⁹ Informant Four said, “the most obvious is the retroflex, people from the mainland and Taiwanese, most obvious is the retroflex, but that’s mostly the northern accent of the mainland.”²⁰

Several informants responded that they would be able to differentiate between Taiwanese and mainland speakers of Southern Min as well. Informant Eleven said, “if they’re speaking Mandarin I can tell the difference, actually I can tell them apart because mainland Southern Min

¹⁸新加坡人讲中文, 香港人讲中文, 大陆人讲中文跟台湾人讲中文都不一样啊...腔调啊, 然后用法, 就是“describe something”用的词啊, 不一样啊。

Xīnjiāpō rén jiǎng Zhōngwén, Xiānggǎng rén jiǎng Zhōngwén, dàlù rén jiǎng Zhōngwén, gēn Táiwān rén jiǎng Zhōngwén dōu bù yīyàng 'a... Qiāngdiào 'a ránhòu yòngfǎ jiùshì 'describe something' yòngde cí 'a bù yīyàng 'a.

¹⁹台湾人的国语跟大陆人的国语不一样。们的国语会比较‘儿儿’, 比较卷儿; 这样子讲话儿, 听的出来吗儿? 可是台湾人比较不会。台湾人比较平, 比较宽一点。

Táiwān rén de Guóyǔ gēn dàlù rén de Guóyǔ bù yī yang. Tāmende Guóyǔ huì bǐ jiào 'ér 'ér, bǐjiào juǎnr;... wǒ zhèyàng zi jiǎnghuà 'ér, tīng de chūlái ma 'ér? Kěshì Táiwān rén bǐjiào bù huì. Táiwān rén bǐjiào píng... bǐjiào kuān yīdiǎn.

²⁰最明显是卷舌, 大陆人「跟」台湾, 最明显是卷舌...但是那是比较大陆北部腔。

Zuì míngxiǎn shì zhuǎnshè, dàlù rén [gēn] Táiwān, zuì míngxiǎn shì zhuǎnshè... dànlǐ nà shì bǐjiào dàlù běibù qiāng.

and Taiwanese [Southern Min] aren't quite the same—the usage is different.”²¹ When asked whether he could distinguish between the speech of a person from Fujian and a person from Taiwan, Informant Ten said, “I still can tell, the way they speak Mandarin is different.”²² However, as Informant Four replied, in terms of language, “it’s easy to tell the difference between someone from Taiwan and an ordinary person from the mainland, but Taiwan and Fujian is very difficult.”²³

It seems clear, at least, that Taiwanese people feel they have a unique way of speaking Mandarin. The Government Information Office of Taiwan, in fact, notes the lack of a non-syllabic [-ɹ] suffix (儿) and retroflex initials as major differences between the Mandarin spoken in Taiwan and that of Beijing (GIO, 2002). David Li (1985) makes a distinction between these characteristics of Mandarin in Taiwan (accepted as ‘standard’) and other features of Taiwanese-Mandarin discussed earlier (dubbed ‘sub-standard’). It is the latter that was employed in Feifel’s (1994) research and used again in this study. This raises the question of why people hold such low regard, particularly in terms of status, for the only language variety that may be considered indigenous²⁴ to the Taiwanese people, and is, as Feifel (1994) states, “widely heard on the streets” (p. 116).

One answer to this question lies in the fact that Taiwanese-Mandarin is most often associated with uneducated speakers “who did not learn Standard Mandarin well when they were

²¹如果他讲国语的话我分得出来, 其实...我分得出来的因为大陆的闽南话跟台湾的台语有一点不太一样——用法不一样。

Rúguǒ tā jiǎng guóyǔ de huà wǒ fēndechūlái, qíshí ...wǒ fēndechūlái de yīnwei dàlù de Mǐnnánhuà gēn Táiwān de Táiyǔ yǒu yīdiǎn bù tài yīyàng - - yòngfǎ bù yīyàng.

²²还是可以, 讲的国语都不一样。

Háishi kěyǐ, jiǎng de Guóyǔ dōu bù yīyàng.

²³台湾跟一般大陆人很简单, 但是台湾跟福建很难。

Táiwān gēn yībān dàlù rén hěn jiǎndān, dànshì Táiwān gēn Fújiàn hěn nán.

²⁴ That is, derived within Taiwan and not predominantly imported from other areas.

young” (Feifel, 1994, p. 22). As Informant Two responded, “Taiwanese-Mandarin, in my opinion, I think it can be said it’s more what people in the countryside speak.”²⁵ When asked whether she speaks Taiwanese-Mandarin, she responded “No! No, I can’t say I do. Because my [Southern Min] isn’t good. I can’t say I have any Taiwanese-Mandarin.”²⁶ Informant Three described a Taiwanese-Mandarin speaker as someone who “primarily spoke [Southern Min] but later the government stipulated that he should speak Mandarin. That countryside, small town person, still had to learn Mandarin; there was nothing he could do to have clear, standard pronunciation, so he has a bit of an accent from that area. That sort of Mandarin is what we call Taiwanese-Mandarin.”²⁷ As most Mainlanders settled in northern urban areas of Taiwan, it was more difficult for those in rural districts to receive an education in ‘standard’ Mandarin.

Furthermore, during the height of KMT-imposed Mandarin hegemony, the Taiwanese-Mandarin variety experienced the same condemnation and ridicule as Southern Min. As Shih Cheng Fen (2002) writes, Taiwanese-Mandarin “spoken by the Natives had long been ridiculed... with the intention to humiliate the Natives and to deprive their collective self-pride” (p.6). David Li (1985) states that Taiwanese-Mandarin was often scorned as unacceptable to the ‘educated’, particularly from 1949 to 1975. Taiwanese-Mandarin did not, however, garner the

²⁵台湾国语的话, 对我的话, 我会觉得是比较乡下人在讲的。

Táiwān Guóyǔ de huà, duì wǒ de huà, wǒ huì juéde shì bǐjiào xiāngxià rén zài jiǎng de.

²⁶ [‘所以你觉得你不会讲台湾国语吗?’]

[‘Suǒyǐ nǐ juéde nǐ bùhuì jiǎng Táiwān Guóyǔ ma?’]

我不会啊, 应该不会吧. 因为我台语不好, 应该不会有台湾国语.

Wǒ bù huì 'a, yīnggāi bùhuì ba. Yīnwei wǒ Táiyǔ bù hǎo, yīnggāi bù huì yǒu Táiwān Guóyǔ.

²⁷他以前大部分都说台语, 但是后来不时政府规定说要讲国语. 那比较下乡的, 小镇来的, 他还是学讲国语的时候就没办法, ‘字正腔圆’, 所以带一点那个地方的口音. 那讲出来的国语我们觉得说台湾国语.

Tā yǐqián dàbùfen dōu shuō Táiyǔ, dànshì hòulái bùshí zhèngfǔ guīdìng shuō yào jiǎng Guóyǔ. Nà bǐjiào xiàxiāng de, xiǎo zhèn lái de, tā hái shì xué jiǎng Guóyǔ de shíhou jiù méi bànfǎ, zìzhèng qiāngyuán, suǒyǐ dài yīdiǎn nàge dìfang de kǒuyīn. Nà jiǎngchū lái de Guóyǔ wǒmen juéde shuō Táiwān Guóyǔ.

same amount of loyalty during the period of liberalization as other language varieties. As Informant Three said, “sometimes, when mocking something, we speak Taiwanese-Mandarin.”²⁸

A further possible explanation may be that the methodology employed by Feifel (1994) is not a valid instrument to gauge language attitudes in this context. The matched-guise technique has been widely criticized in the past for the artificiality of the measure, and as Lee (1971) contends, the “repeated, content controlled messages” have no “corollary outside the laboratory except, perhaps, in a receiving line” (p. 411). According to Lee (1971), the contrived environment in which the evaluations are made “also invalidate much research by inducing experimental reactivity” (p. 414). In other words, subjects’ knowledge of participating in an experiment can affect the results and obscure the validity to which the measure can be applied to the situation in reality.

Given the cultural importance placed on education in the Chinese context, it is quite possible that participants were relating the experimental setting to an educational environment (i.e., taking a test or quiz). Their evaluations, then, may be more aligned to the ‘proper’ attitudes instilled through school, in which Standard Mandarin officially reigns supreme, rather than what may be found in a less formal environment. That is, evaluations may have been based more on how they have been *taught* to respond, instead of how they might react in a more natural setting.

The discrepancy between the indigenously derived characteristics and Feifel’s (1994) survey may also illustrate the danger in translating adjectives from similar research and using them in differing cultural systems. As noted earlier, though Yang and Bond’s (1990) study suggests that the constructs used to evaluate personality are similar between Western and Chinese cultures, they also believe that indigenous instruments are likely to have a higher level

²⁸有时候会有一点会嘲笑说什么…讲话…台湾国语。

Yǒu shíhòu huì yǒu yídiǎn huì cháo xiào shuō shénme... jiǎng huà... Táiwān Guóyǔ.

of validity than imported measures. This view is supported by a study (Triandis and Marin, 1983) which indicated that an indigenously-derived instrument was more powerful than an imported measure, though both yielded statistically significant results. Results of the current study demonstrate, as well, the inferiority of measures imported from other cultural settings.

The discrepancy found may also illustrate the historical, and highly significant, divide between spoken and written Chinese. For instance, the translation of the adjectives employed by Feifel (1994) may be more formal than those found in popular discourse. Particularly, the characters used to translate the formal adjectives would be a stronger index of the grand tradition of Chinese culture and learning, skewing the results to favor the high form of the language. This notion can be applied to all matched-guise studies employing a questionnaire, as the language in which the survey is conducted is likely to have an effect on respondents' evaluations as well.

Furthermore, though it scored lowest in status and solidarity on Feifel's (1994) survey, some informants indicated very positive sentiments toward Taiwanese-Mandarin, particularly in terms of solidarity. Informant One said, "it is just only when we are speaking with really good friends that you can use Taiwanese-Mandarin. Because when you are speaking with friends you don't know very well, you can only use Mandarin, because Taiwanese-Mandarin is a rather 'informal' way of speaking. So, when you are with friends speaking Taiwanese-Mandarin it shows that your friendship is really good."²⁹ Informant Three also said that "now there are a lot of people that want to learn Taiwanese-Mandarin. It's only for amusement, though."³⁰

²⁹因为我们只有在跟很要好的朋友讲话的时候才会用台湾国语. 因为你跟不熟的朋友讲话你只会讲国语, 因为台湾国语是一个比较不正式的讲话方式. 所以当你跟朋友讲台湾国语的时候就表示你们的交情很好.

Yīnwei wǒmen zhīyǒu zài gēn hěn yàohǎo de péngyou jiǎnghuà de shíhòu cái huì yòng Táiwān Guóyǔ. Yīnwei nǐ gēn bù shú de péngyou jiǎnghuà nǐ zhǐ huì jiǎng Guóyǔ, yīnwei Táiwān Guóyǔ shì yī gè bǐjiào bù zhēnshí de jiǎnghuà fāngshì. Suǒyǐ dāng nǐ gēn péngyou jiǎng Táiwān Guóyǔ de shíhòu jiù biǎoshì nǐmen de jiāoqing hěn hǎo.

³⁰现在有很多人就是故意学台湾国语, 有趣而已.

Xiànzài yǒu hěn duō rén jiù shì gùyì xué Táiwān Guóyǔ, yǒu qù 'éryǐ.

Altogether, the results of this study indicate that further research is warranted to better understand attitudes in Taiwan toward Taiwanese-Mandarin, which would be necessary to provide a more accurate basis for Tse's (2000) previous prediction. Subsequent research, for instance, could employ methodologies similar to those conducted by Giles and Bourhis (1976) which attempt to address the criticisms leveled toward the matched-guise/questionnaire format [see Fasold (1984) for a review].

It is also possible that the 'amalgamated language' described by Huang Shuan Fan (2000), rather than the features of Southern Min discussed above, could be more likely to represent the emergent Taiwanese identity. As Informant Eleven said, "if you speak Southern Min and Mandarin mixed together, generally you are Taiwanese."³¹ Informant One replied, "if you mix [Southern Min] and Mandarin you must be Taiwanese, ... in no other place do people mix Mandarin and [Southern Min]."³² (When asked about people in Fujian, her opinion was that they primarily speak Southern Min and probably don't mix the two varieties.³³) In addition, Informant Seven said that she uses both Mandarin and Southern Min most often used with friends, and will "speak Mandarin for a bit, and [Southern Min] for a bit, like that—mixed speech... Most people in Taiwan are like that, Mandarin and [Southern Min] spoken mixed together."³⁴ Informant Ten said, "Lots of people are like this, tons and tons of Taiwanese people use [Southern Min] and Mandarin mixed together, almost everyone speaks [Southern Min] and

³¹混在一起讲一般是台湾人，是这样子。

Hùn zài yīqǐ jiǎng yībān shì Táiwān rén, shì zhèyàngzi.

³²因为会把台语跟国语混在一起的一定是台湾人。没有一个地方的人会把国语跟台语混在一起。

Yīnwei huì bǎ Tái yǔ gēn Guó yǔ hùn zài yīqǐ de yīdìng shì Tái wān rén. Méiyǒu yīgè dìfāng de rén huì bǎ Guó yǔ gēn Tái yǔ hùn zài yīqǐ.

³³福建人可能他讲国语的时候就是讲国语，讲闽南语的时候就是讲闽南语。而且我觉得他们大部分人都只讲闽南语。

Fújiàn rén kěnéng tā jiǎng Guó yǔ de shíhòu jiù shì jiǎng Guó yǔ, jiǎng Mǐnnányǔ de shíhòu jiù shì jiǎng Mǐnnányǔ. Érqiě wǒ juéde tāmen dàbùfēn rén dōu zhǐ jiǎng Mǐnnányǔ.

³⁴讲国语讲几句啊，台语讲几句，这样子一混合讲...大部分台湾现在是这样，国语台语一起混合讲。

Jiǎng Guó yǔ jiǎng jǐjù 'a, Tái yǔ jiǎng jǐjù, zhèyàng zi - hùnhé jiǎng... dàbùfēn Tái wān xiànzài shì zhèyàng, Guó yǔ Tái yǔ yīqǐ hùnhé jiǎng.

Mandarin mixed together.”³⁵ Informant Eleven said that in Taiwan, this way of speaking seems to be “a sort of culture... a sort of culture. It wasn’t possible earlier... it wasn’t possible earlier”³⁶ [due to restrictive language policies].

In reply to questions regarding domain categorization of Southern Min and Mandarin, Informant One’s response symbolized the conflict between Chinese and Taiwanese identity and desire for consolidation. She said that she would like to speak Southern Min to a greater degree, “but it doesn’t mean I don’t want to speak Mandarin. These two languages, in my opinion, have the same importance, are just as... good.”³⁷ In response to a similar question, she said (animatedly):

“These languages coexist, they don’t conflict with each other, there’s no conflict... It’s not because I speak this I don’t speak that, because I speak that I don’t speak this, the two languages are parallel... they are [in English] ‘the same, the same importance’ ... these two languages can’t conflict.”³⁸

However, as the island territory continues to struggle to define its future identity, language itself is a domain in which these struggles, these conflicts, take place. Although use of language has “become more communicatively and pragmatically oriented and less emotionally triggered” (Tse, 2000, p. 161), recent discussions within the government indicate that many policy issues have yet to be resolved. One such issue deals with the form of Romanization utilized throughout the island. Some argue for the widely accepted standard, Pinyin, which is

³⁵ 太多台湾人是这样的，太多太多台湾人...是用台语跟国语混合讲，大部分都是台语国语混合讲。

Tài duō Táiwan rén shì zhèyàng de, tài duō tài duō Táiwan rén ... shì yòng Táyǔ gēn Guóyǔ hùnhé jiǎng, dàbùfēn dōu shì táyǔ guóyǔ hùnhé jiǎng.

³⁶ 好像，就是说，是一种文化，一种文化，以前不会，以前不会。

Hǎoxiàng, jiù shì shuō, shì yīzhǒng wénhuà, yīzhǒng wénhuà, yǐqián bù huì, yǐqián bù huì.

³⁷ 我想讲台语并不表示我不想讲国语。这两个语言对我来说同样的重要，同样的...好。

Wǒ xiǎng jiǎng Táyǔ bìng bù biǎoshì wǒ bù xiǎng jiǎng Guóyǔ. Zhè liǎng gè yǔyán duì wǒ lái shuō tóngyàng de zhòngyào, tóngyàng de ... hǎo.

³⁸ 他们两个是并行的。他们两个没有互相冲突，这两个没有冲突。不会因为讲这个不讲这个，讲这个不讲这个。两个语言是并行的，...就是他们是‘the same, the same importance’。这两个语言不会有冲突。

Tāmen liǎnggè shì bìngxíng de. Tāmen liǎnggè měi yǒu hùxiāng chōngtū, zhè liǎnggè měi yǒu chōngtū. Bù huì ‘yīnwei jiǎng zhègè bù jiǎng zhègè, yīnwei jiǎng zhègè bù jiǎng zhègè. Liǎnggè yǔyán shì bìngxíng de... jiù shì tāmen shì ‘the same, the same importance’. Zhè liǎnggè yǔyán bù huì yǒu chōngtū.

also used on the Chinese mainland. Others contend that this system can not adequately represent minority language varieties, and some say that it would essentially bring the island one step closer to unification with the mainland.

In many ways, it could be argued that peoples' loyalty toward Southern Min is a reflection of their sense of identification with the island and 'Taiwanese' heritage. For instance, A Chin Hsiao (1997) writes that local identity is a strong component of the Southern Min revitalization movement, as suggested by promoters' views on the relationship between language and culture. She states, "For them, language is the carrier of culture, and the decline of a language is symptomatic of the atrophy of a specific cultural tradition on which one's ethnic identity hinges" (Hsiao A.C., 1997, p. 310). In response to the question of what might be the case 30 years in the future, Informant Ten replied:

"I don't know, (laughter) I would prefer unification, but a lot of Taiwanese people don't want to reunite... those who don't want to unify really want 'nativization', you can really see it. They keep telling the next generation that they must speak [Southern Min]. That's to say, these people who want independence, they must teach their next generation to speak [Southern Min]."³⁹

Furthermore, some Taiwanese linguists are endeavoring to create a popular system of writing that would do away with use of Chinese characters for Southern Min. As A.C. Hsiao (1997) writes, "For them, to abolish the writing system of Mandarin as an inept system to voice Taiwanese-ness is to slough off Chinese-ness; to have a Taiwanese writing system is to recognize the existence of a different cultural system" (p. 312). If these endeavors grow in

³⁹不知道(laughter)我是想要统一啊,但是台湾人很多不相统一.你不想统一,不想统一的人他就会有'本土的,就会出来啦.他就一直叫他们的人一定要他们的下一代一定要讲台语啊...就是说,这一些想要独立的人,他们一定会叫他们的下一代的人讲台语.

Bù zhīdào (laughter) wǒ shì xiǎng yào tǒngyī 'a, dànshì Táiwan rén hěn duō bù xiǎng tǒngyī. Nǐ yī bù xiǎng tǒngyī, bù xiǎng tǒngyī de rén tā jiù huì yǒu 'běntǔ de' jiùhuì chūlái la. Tā jiù yīzhí jiào tāmen de rén yīdìng yào tāmen de xià yīdài yīdìng yào jiǎng Tái yǔ 'a... jiùshìshuō, zhè yī xiē xiǎngyào dúlì de rén, tāmen yīdìng huì jiào tāmen de xià yīdài de rén jiǎng Tái yǔ.

popularity and have wide acceptance in society, it would indicate a stronger degree of cultural separation between Taiwan and the mainland⁴⁰.

The political and societal obstacles facing revitalization efforts of Southern Min, however, will be very difficult to overcome. The prolonged dominance of the KMT has established Mandarin as the language of education, and despite the achievements of DPP initiatives to secure bilingual education in the schools, there is not a strong level of support, or funding, for mother-tongue education throughout all layers of government. Neither is there a wide level of support among parents or children, which is likely the most crucial factor. To put it simply, as proficiency in a native dialect is not required for standardized exams, they are worried that learning native languages would negatively impact on students' ability in Mandarin, and result in lower scores on their high school and college entrance examinations (Mo R.P., 2000).

Though many obstacles exist, some indications support the likelihood of sustained maintenance, at least through several generations. The size of a given population, for instance, “does appear to correlate significantly with language maintenance” (Clyne, 1997, p. 310). Therefore the great predominance of the Southern Min-speaking population will certainly work in their favor. Furthermore, Mo Ruo Ping (2000) argues in his doctoral dissertation that the Southern Min revitalization movement comes as a result of geographic nationalism, which, as Paulston (1994) has found, lends to the maintenance of the traditional language.

As the distinction between regional and national identity is, in essence, a political statement on the island's inclusion within the Chinese cultural sphere, the developments of

⁴⁰ It should also be noted that there is a discrepancy between Simplified Chinese characters (*'jiǎntǐzì'* [简体字]) used on the mainland and Traditional Chinese characters (*'fántǐzì'* [繁体字]) used in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese populations. Although it does not fulfill the motives of these Taiwanese linguists, this difference may already serve as a symbol of distinction from the mainland for Taiwanese people. For instance, as a Taiwanese person once told me, the lack of the 'heart' [心] radical in the simplified version of the character 'love' [simplified: 爱; traditional: 愛] implies an absence of love in the hearts of mainland Chinese under communist rule.

language behavior in Taiwan could give an indication of what that outcome might be. As attempts to revise the heritage of the KMT's China-centered ideology also threaten PRC claims of sovereignty as well, official support of Southern Min as a national language is a risky endeavor. This is evidenced by the fact that, when DPP candidate Chen Shui Bian was elected President in the year 2000, his acceptance speech was presented in Mandarin as a gesture of reconciliation with the PRC. Even the seemingly innocuous act of placing the word 'Taiwan' on the cover of the Taiwanese passport was enough of a symbolic move toward independent statehood to compel rhetorical condemnation from the PRC government (Xinhuanet, 2003).

Furthermore, though political contention continues to characterize cross-straits relations, Taiwan's economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the mainland. As Chen Dung-Sheng (2001) writes, "The deepening of economic interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland, the settlement of an increasingly larger number of Taiwanese businessmen and migrants in the mainland, and the emergence of a Mandarin-based media industry from across the Straits will certainly complicate the consolidation of Taiwanese identity" (p. 129). As Paulston (1994) has found, "ethnic groups very rarely opt for continued language maintenance if the social conditions favor a shift to the national language" (p.40). Overall, it can be said that "the major linguistic consequence of ethnic groups in prolonged contact within one nation is language shift of the subordinate groups to the language of the dominant group. The major dependent variable is the rate of shift" (Paulston, 1994, p. 19). Therefore, it is very likely that the shift toward Mandarin will continue, although a level of bilingualism will be prolonged for several generations.

As the island struggles to define its future, language ideologies will continue to play a role in the potential outcome. Though the possible language of a 'consolidated' Taiwanese

people may not be the variety of Taiwanese-Mandarin as employed in this study, it is, however, most likely to be a language with predominant Taiwanese characteristics.

VI. APPENDICES

Appendix A: Matched-Guise Survey (English)

Questionnaire – Introduction Page and Rating Scales

Adapted from Karl-Eugen Feifel (1994)

You will now hear 14 persons telling the same story.

Please imagine hearing the voices on the telephone and answer the following questions spontaneously according to your impression of the speaker: (the first two voices are for practice, then the regular questionnaire follows).

- Example:
- 1) If you believe that the speaker is very intelligent, then mark:
Intelligent : : : : not intelligent
 - 2) If you believe that the speaker is not intelligent at all, then mark:
Intelligent : : : : not intelligent
 - 3) If you believe that the speaker's level of intelligence is middle to high, then mark:
Intelligent : : : : not intelligent
or
Intelligent : : : : not intelligent

Speaker: _____

From hearing the speaker's voice, what kind of person do you think the speaker is:

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. intelligent | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | unintelligent |
| 2. high social status | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | low social status |
| 3. biased | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | fair |
| 4. self-confident | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | not self-confident |
| 5. reliable | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | unreliable |
| 6. likeable | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | hateful |
| 7. conservative | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | open |
| 8. having character | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | not having character |
| 9. conversable | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | uncouth |
| 10. ambitious | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | unambitious |
| 11. humorous | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | humorless |
| 12. superstitious | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | not superstitious |
| 13. obliging | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | unsociable/eccentric |
| 14. selfish | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | not selfish |
| 15. sincere | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | insincere |
| 16. not religious | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | pious |
| 17. diligent | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | careless |
| 18. impolite | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | courteous |
| 19. discontent | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | content |
| 20. not having leadership | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | having leadership |
| 21. arrogant | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | modest |
| 22. short | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | tall |
| 23. good-looking | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | ugly |
| 24. kind | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | unkind |
| 25. informal | __ : __ : __ : __ : __ | formal |

26. Age ____

27. How much do you feel you resemble this person?

Very much __ : __ : __ : __ : __ not at all

28. How much would you want to be like this person?

Very much __ : __ : __ : __ : __ not at all

29. The speaker's probably occupation now (or in the future):

Driver ____ Lawyer ____ Salesperson ____ Manual worker ____
 Teacher ____ Office worker ____ Housewife ____

30. Origin of speaker:

Taiwan ____ Mainland ____

31. Coming from:

a big city ____ a small town ____ the countryside ____

Appendix B: Matched-Guise Survey (Chinese)

(Simplified Characters 简体字)

Questionnaire – Introduction Page and Rating Scales

Borrowed from Karl-Eugen Feifel (1994)

以下您将听到 14 个人讲述同样的故事，请您想像是在接电话中听到的声音，
并将您对讲话人的印象依直觉如下作答：
(前两个声音只是示范，其后才是正式的问卷)。

- 例： 1) 您认为讲话人相当聪，则：
聪明 : : : : 不聪明
- 2) 您认为讲话人相当不聪明，则：
聪明 : : : : 不聪明
- 3) 您认为讲话人聪明程度在中上，则
聪明 : : : : 不聪明
或
聪明 : : : : 不聪明

讲话人：_____

从他的声音听起来，您猜想他是怎样的人呢？

- | | | | |
|-----|----------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1. | 聪明 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不聪明 |
| 2. | 有社会地位 | __:__:__:__:__ | 没社会地位 |
| 3. | 偏私 | __:__:__:__:__ | 公正 |
| 4. | 有自信 | __:__:__:__:__ | 没自信 |
| 5. | 可靠 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不可靠 |
| 6. | 令人喜爱 | __:__:__:__:__ | 令人厌恶 |
| 7. | 保守 | __:__:__:__:__ | 开放 |
| 8. | 有个性 | __:__:__:__:__ | 没个性 |
| 9. | 健谈 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不擅言词 |
| 10. | 好胜 | __:__:__:__:__ | 淡泊 |
| 11. | 有幽默感 | __:__:__:__:__ | 没幽默感 |
| 12. | 迷信 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不迷信 |
| 13. | 随和 | __:__:__:__:__ | 孤僻 |
| 14. | 自私 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不自私 |
| 15. | 诚恳 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不诚恳 |
| 16. | 不信教 | __:__:__:__:__ | 虔诚 |
| 17. | 认真 | __:__:__:__:__ | 随便 |
| 18. | 没礼貌 | __:__:__:__:__ | 有礼貌 |
| 19. | 不知足 | __:__:__:__:__ | 知足 |
| 20. | 没领导能力 | __:__:__:__:__ | 有领导能力 |
| 21. | 自大 | __:__:__:__:__ | 谦虚 |
| 22. | 矮 | __:__:__:__:__ | 高 |
| 23. | 外表好看 | __:__:__:__:__ | 外表不好看 |
| 24. | 有亲切感 | __:__:__:__:__ | 没亲切感 |
| 25. | 非正式的 | __:__:__:__:__ | 正式的 |
| 26. | 年龄__ | | |
| 27. | 您觉得讲话人和您同一类型？ | | |
| | 相同 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不同 |
| 28. | 您喜不喜欢像他？ | | |
| | 喜欢 | __:__:__:__:__ | 不喜欢 |
| 29. | 讲话人可能（或未来）的职业： | | |
| | 司机__ | 律师__ | 店员__ 工人__ |
| | 老师__ | 上班族__ | 家庭主妇__ |
| 30. | 讲话人是： | 台湾人__ | 大陆人__ |
| 31. | 从： | 都市来__ | 小镇来__ 乡下来__ |

講話人：_____

從他的聲音聽起來，您猜想他是怎樣的人呢？

1. 聰明 _____ 不聰明
 2. 有社會地位 _____ 沒社會地位
 3. 偏私 _____ 公正
 4. 有自信 _____ 沒自信
 5. 可靠 _____ 不可靠
 6. 令人喜愛 _____ 令人厭惡
 7. 保守 _____ 開放
 8. 有個性 _____ 沒個性
 9. 健談 _____ 不擅言訶
 10. 好勝 _____ 淡泊
 11. 有幽默感 _____ 沒幽默感
 12. 迷信 _____ 不迷信
 13. 隨和 _____ 孤僻
 14. 自私 _____ 不自私
 15. 誠懇 _____ 不誠懇
 16. 不信教 _____ 虔誠
 17. 認真 _____ 隨便
 18. 沒禮貌 _____ 有禮貌
 19. 不知足 _____ 知足
 20. 沒領導能力 _____ 有領導能力
 21. 自大 _____ 謙虛
 22. 矮 _____ 高
 23. 外表好看 _____ 外表不好看
 24. 有親切感 _____ 沒親切感
 25. 非正式的 _____ 正式的
26. 年齡_____
 27. 您覺得講話人和您同一類型？
相同 _____ 不同
 28. 您喜不喜歡像他？
喜歡 _____ 不喜歡
 29. 講話人可能（或未來）的職業：
司機_____ 律師_____ 店員_____ 工人_____
老師_____ 上班族_____ 家庭主婦_____
 30. 講話人是： 台灣人_____ 大陸人_____
 31. 從： 都市來_____ 小鎮來_____ 鄉下來_____

Appendix C: Interview Questions (English)
(not all questions were used in each interview)

Age:

Education level:

Ethnicity:

Where were you born?

Where were your parents born?

Would you consider yourself 'waisheng ren' or 'bensheng ren'?

What is your mother-tongue?

- I know there are many languages spoken in Taiwan, but almost everyone can speak Mandarin. Do you think everyone should speak another Taiwan-related language other than Mandarin? Why/why not?
- Imagine you are at lunch with friends eating noodles. What language do you most often use? Why? Would you ever use only Southern Min when you are with friends? Why/why not?
- Does it make you angry/happy/indifferent when you are with friends and everyone uses a combination of Mandarin and Southern Min?
- Would it be different if you were with Chinese people you didn't know or have just met?
- What language would you use in a job interview? Why? Would you ever use words from Southern Min, or only Mandarin? Why?
- I know that sometimes politicians will use both Mandarin and Southern Min when giving a speech. Do you feel proud when they use Southern Min?
- I know that, generally speaking, mostly older people speak Southern Min, and fewer young people can speak it. What do you think the situation will be thirty years from now?
- Are people from Taiwan different from other Chinese people? How?
- In a group of Chinese people from all over the world, do you think you would be able to tell which people are from Taiwan? How?
- Can you tell just by the way they speak?
- What if the group was only made up of people from Taiwan and Fujian?
- In a group of Chinese people from all over the world, and they all speak Mandarin, what would you think if other Taiwanese people used a mixture of Southern Min and Mandarin?
- Is the ability to speak or understand Southern Min important to being a person from Taiwan?
- Earlier you said your ethnicity was... Can you explain that some more?

Appendix D: Interview Questions (Chinese)

(not all questions were used in each interview)

年龄

教育程度？

民族？

你的出生地在哪儿？


你父母的出生地在哪儿？

你是外省还是本生人？

你的母语是什么？

- 我知道在台湾你们说几种方言，可是人人都会讲国语。你认为台湾人应该用方言吗？
- 你们跟朋友之间来往用方言，国语，还是什么都可以？请想象你跟朋友来往，在吃午饭，面条什么的。请解释一下
- 如果你和朋友在一起的时候，朋友把闽南话与国语混合在一起说，你会觉得高兴，不高兴，还是没有什么感觉？
- （哪）那么，如果他们不是很熟悉，感觉完全一样吗？或者有一些不同？你觉得他们怎么样？请解释吧。
- 你在工作面试的时候，是用国语，方言，还是混合在一起的？
- 我知道台湾的政治家有时候在演讲时，会用闽南话或客家话。听到他们说台湾方言让你很自豪吗？
- 听说，总的来说，老人用闽南话，年轻人用国语。就是这样吗？再过三十年以后会是怎样一种情况？
- 你觉得台湾人跟其他的中国人有区别吗？是什么区别？
- 如果你去一个中国人的海外联谊会，你可以判断谁是台湾人吗？是用什么方法判断的？
- 如果只听他们说话，可以判断吗？
- 如果这组人只是从台湾和福建来的，你还可以区分吗？
- 在这个海外联谊会上，如果听到一个人把国语与闽南话混合在一起，你还能判断他是从哪儿来的吗？
- 能讲和听懂闽南话对于作为一个台湾人来说很重要吗？
- 以前，你说你的民族是。。。你为什么这样说？可以解释一下？

Appendix E: Chinese Linguistic Groups (Map)



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