

The New Participation in Development Economics  
Citizen Engagement in Public Policy at the National Level:  
A Case Study of Ghana's Structural Adjustment Participatory Review  
Initiative (SAPRI)

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Development Economics and Public Policy

University of Pittsburgh

2005

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
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ABSTRACT

Mainstream development economics has typically concentrated on the *contents* of public policy, such as GNP per capita and investment rates, to the virtual exclusion of the *processes* that shape those contents and the people who are affected by public policies. This preoccupation with content has in turn translated into an inordinate focus on “hard indicators” of development, such as Gross Domestic Product and exchange rates, at the expense of “soft indicators” like citizens’ satisfaction with the contents and the process, a satisfaction which ideally should be part of the overall measure of the material and non-material progress of a nation.

After more than 50 years of hard-indicator development economics, during which social disaffection with public policy appears to have risen alongside growing and widespread poverty, perhaps it is time to incorporate soft indicators into development discourse and thus offer society a more complete view of its development efforts – a view that would not only enrich the policy process but help it to yield outcomes that at the very least reflect the aspirations and satisfactions of the citizenry. This dissertation represents a modest attempt to foster such a complementarity in the development process, using Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) as a case study.

Held in Accra in 1997, SAPRI was an effort by civil society organizations to gain a greater role in the policy process, after nearly 20 years of structural adjustment, during which public policy was formulated by a technocratic few and at the end of which social conditions had deteriorated not improved. Advocates of this “new participation,” or citizen engagement in development at the *national* rather than *local* level, argued that a participatory approach to national policy making was the surest way to “intercept” flawed policies at the national level before they become programs and projects at the local level.

The success of such participation, as viewed by the participants, not organizers, was defined in terms of inclusiveness, voice, and impact. Questionnaires were sent to them and the data analyzed with non-parametric statistics. Among other things, participants’ perceptions of inclusiveness were found to be conditioned significantly by such factors as the sex of respondent, despite efforts by organizers to promote “gender balance.” Female respondents, for example, were less likely than male respondents to view SAPRI as adequately inclusive of women and especially children’s issues, despite claims of representativeness by organizers. Voice – the

ability of citizens to make policy demands unhindered– was, as anticipated, associated more with the organizational arrangements of the process than any other postulated factors, such as analytical capacity of the participants’ organizations. Overall, respondents’ views of the impact of their participation in SAPRI on public policy were surprisingly found to reflect existing hard indicators of development. The view by majority of respondents, for example, that children’s issues received less attention at the forum was borne out by findings in the Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (2004) that the nutritional status of children under five years deteriorated severely between 1997 and 2003.

The findings are situated within the context of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, the localized version of the IMF-World Bank-inspired Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which considers “widespread civil society” participation as one of its strongest features.

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## **PREFACE**

Academic enterprises like this are seldom, if ever, entirely the product of one person. While the credit ultimately goes to the author, others usually play important behind-the-scenes roles, from helping with the sometimes-messy task of selecting a researchable topic to the structuring of the research itself, once a topic has been selected, to the tortuous exercise of research and writing. In this regard, my committee chair, Dr. Siddharth Chandra, played a major role in the preparation of this dissertation. His probing questions and insightful feedback helped me greatly in structuring the research and pointing me to the path of disciplined social inquiry. To Dr. Chandra I owe a great debt of gratitude. My thanks also go to the other members of my doctoral committee: Dr. John Mendeloff, who taught me policy analysis and as a committee member never relented with his pithy critiques of my research design until I finally was able to meet his rather high and uncompromising standards; Dr. Mark Ginsburg, who, in addition to teaching me and advising me on research methods, drew on his vast knowledge of issues and controversies in international development to help in the preparation of this dissertation. And finally, but certainly not the least in importance, Dr. Paul Nelson of the international development division, who spoke little but always offered invaluable advice in the little that he did say. My thanks also go to the many participants in SAPRI who were kind enough to oblige me and fill out the questionnaire for this study. There is no gainsaying that without them there would be no dissertation to speak of.

## **DEDICATION**

To my three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Naa-Addoley, who never ceases bombarding me with the question: Daddy, what is this? With such an inquisitive mind, there is no doubt that she will grow up to become a better researcher than her dad.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

“Development, in theory and in practice, is slave to fashion.”  
— Jan K. Black,  
*Development in Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap*

If this observation by Black is anything to go by, then development economics in both theory and practice has found its latest fashion: “Participation.” Having gone through a phase where the state was the dominant actor in development, followed by a period of diminished state role, and then the prominence of markets, development practitioners and policy makers alike now see participation as *the* answer to the seemingly intractable problems of underdevelopment. At international conferences, in donor and creditor documents, in government policy statements, and in academic writings, no discussion of “economic development” now is considered complete without some reference to participation — the direct and indirect involvement of the public (particularly the poor and other marginalized groups) in the making of economic policy and the management of development. Major donor countries now require evidence of citizen participation in development as a condition for aid to developing countries (see, e.g., USAID, 1999; UNDP 2000; CIDA, 2001; World Bank 1994; United Nations, 1995). At the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) there has since the early 1990s been an internet-based “Participation Forum” where Agency staff around the world regularly discuss participation and offer electronic testimonials to their experiences in the field. Among the world’s growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “participatory development” is now a well-entrenched creed. And at the University of Sussex in England (home of the Institute of Development Studies), there is a *Participation Group* that seeks, through research, to “clarify the

[various] meanings applied to participation and the realities of its impact on the ground” (IDS, 2000). More recently, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which compel governments to demonstrate “broad civil society participation” in the formulation of the PRSPs in exchange for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of 1999.

Participatory development as practiced in the past decade and a half, however, differs significantly from its cousin of earlier times. Unlike its predecessor, which focused on citizens’ involvement in the design and implementation of development projects in local communities, this new participation takes a step back and encourages citizen involvement in the making and implementation of *national policies* that have the potential to affect the larger economy, its various sub-sectors, and – indirectly – development projects at the local level. Advocates of this new approach to participatory development have argued that to the degree that such macro-economic and sectoral policies are essential to the success of individual development projects and programs, it is important that ordinary citizens be involved in their formulation (Abugre, 2001). They contend that policies that reflect the inputs of ordinary citizens, the intended beneficiaries of those policies, enjoy greater public support and thus have a greater chance of implementation success than those without citizen inputs (Chambers and Guijt, 1995; Campos, 1996; Campilan, 1997).

In Ghana, there have been at least four major national exercises over the past decade, all aimed at promoting this new approach to participatory development. Between 1993 and 1994, the government held a series of regional and sub-regional forums to formulate a long-term plan for the social and economic development of the country. The result was a national document, *Ghana: Vision 2020*, which proposed to transform the country into a middle-income country by

the year 2020. In 1997, a National Economic Forum, based on nation-wide public hearings, was held in Accra, the national capital, to review the general direction of the national economy and initiate policies to strengthen *Vision 2020*. In the same year, the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) was launched. And in 2001, a National Economic Dialogue was held within a similar participatory framework, culminating in the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRS) (see NDPC, 1994; SAPRI, 1998; Government of Ghana, 2002).

Of these exercises, the most extensive (spanning four years), and the best documented (in terms of participants and the various activities involved) was SAPRI. SAPRI thus lends itself best to the study of the new participation in Ghana, hence its selection for this study. There is another reason why SAPRI deserves special attention. It constituted the first citizen-inspired evaluation of development policy at the *national* level, against the background of external involvement in domestic policy formulation. This was in sharp contrast to several previous ones where citizens' "participatory evaluations" were largely restricted to local projects and programs (Amanor, 1990). This will not be the first time that SAPRI – in Ghana or any of the other participating countries, such as Ecuador, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe – has been evaluated (see, for example, World Bank, 2001; Britwum, *et al.*, UNDP, 2001; and SAPRI, 2002). The key difference between this study and the others, however, is that an attempt is made for the first time to define and establish successful participation beyond the group and event level by giving the individual participants the opportunity to speak for themselves – to present the reality of participation as they, not external experts, see it. In other words, this approach seeks to establish a micro-foundation for the macro-superstructure that has been the main measure of success in the new participation. The emphasis thus is not on advocacy groups and the abstract phenomenon of

organizational success (which are the most common measures of participatory success), but rather on the aspirations and experiences of those who actually took part in participatory events.

The dissertation takes the following form. After the introduction (Chapter 1), a statement of the problem in Chapter 2 discusses the salient dimensions of successful participation and poses the various questions that will have to be answered in order to address the research problem. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on participation from historical, theoretical, and procedural perspectives. This is followed by Chapter 4, which conceptualizes “participation” in its basic forms and addresses the issue of who qualifies to participate in the iterative and multi-dimensional processes of policy formation. Chapter 5 provides the substantive background to the study, tracing the history of structural adjustment in Ghana and its culmination in the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI). Chapter 6 reviews the structure and process of SAPRI, while Chapter 7 discusses the study’s design and data collection procedures. Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, are devoted to the analysis and interpretation of the data, as well as the conclusion and policy implications of the study.

## 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Assessments of citizen participation in the policy process have generally tended to define success merely by the number of participants involved, or the degree of complexity involved in bringing together various socio-economic groups, all of them not necessarily having a common history, objectives or strategies (e.g., see NDPC, 1994; Government of Ghana, 2001; Government of Ghana, 2002; IMF, 2002; SAPRIN, 2002). However, such a yardstick for measuring participatory success, however insightful and gratifying to the organizers, has the potential to over-state the success of participation, if the ultimate objective is to empower the people to influence public policy. For example, there may be a large number of people representing various advocacy groups but only a relatively small number of them could have attempted to make their desired policy representations at a participatory forum. And of that number, fewer still may have been given the opportunity by the forum's moderators to present most if not all of their groups' policy demands. Subsequent reports about the participatory events, therefore, may be less representative of the views and policy issues of the various stakeholders than group and process evaluations would suggest. Policy legitimacy in the eyes of sections of the public may thus be compromised in the long run, as various groups begin to feel disaffected because they do not see public policy as reflecting their concerns and priorities.

For purposes of this dissertation, a broader and measurable definition of successful participation is offered that reflects (1) the principle of *democratic inclusiveness* (or representativeness) implied in participatory development, (2) the functional objective of effectively soliciting policy demands from the citizenry, and (3) the ultimate expectation that those demands would in the future be incorporated into public policy in one form or another. With this alternative definition, therefore, the question is not simply one of whether or not participants representing various civil society and other groups took part in an elaborate public



forum characterized by complex organizational arrangements, but rather the participants' perceptions of the extent of social inclusiveness, the degree to which they successfully put forth their policy demands at the forum, and the relative impact their participation subsequently have had on public policy. Success thus can be described and quantified in terms of these constituent elements of participation and the extent to which each participant believes it was attained. This is the approach of this study and the unit of analysis, therefore, is the participant.

In attempting to establish the plausible determinants of successful participation, the study will address the following questions:

- i) To what extent were participants and their organizations representative of civil society?
- ii) To what degree did the issues discussed at the forum reflect the interests of civil society?
- iii) What was the level of economic literacy of participants?
- iv) What was the capacity of participants' organizations to conduct policy analysis to facilitate their involvement in the process?
- v) To what extent were the Forum's organizational arrangements deemed conducive to the presentation of policy demands by participants?
- vi) More than one year after SAPRI, how much, if any, did participants believe that their views have influenced public policy?
- vii) What were participants views about SAP pre- and post-SAPRI?
- viii) And, when all is said on done, does participation matter?

It is expected that the answers to these questions would help clarify or strengthen the public's understanding of the "new participation" from a micro- or individual-level perspective and at the same time provide useful new information for the planning of future forums.

### 3. LITERATURE ON PARTICIPATION

#### 3.1. PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The notion of citizen participation in national development dates back centuries, particularly in Europe and the United States, where it took the form of utopian communities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Gareth, 1996; Hardy, 2000). Participatory development in developing countries, however, is of a more recent origin, having started in the early 1950s as “community development,” an integral part of contemporary development economics (Holdcroft, 1978; Chambers, 1983). In this context, citizen participation in rural development projects became a standard part of development practice, financed largely by industrialized nations and the United Nations. Indeed, in 1951, a United Nations’ report on how to “develop the under-developed countries” noted:

One of the most difficult problems connected with the planning and directing of economic activity is the tendency towards excessive centralization, which discourages *individual effort*. The only way of meeting this is...to ensure that the political and economic planning mechanism provide the fullest scope, at each stage, for *individual and local participation*. (UN, 1951, par. 220)

By the mid-1960s, however, “most national community development programs had been terminated or drastically reduced” (Holdcroft, 1978: 18). This decline in community development coincided with the growing realization within the international development community that orthodox economics had not significantly altered existing socio-economic institutions, with the result that deeply entrenched power relations and unequal distribution of productive assets had overwhelmed whatever progress might have been made in development the period 1950 to 1965. For example, village-level community development workers tended to align themselves more

with local power elites than with the poor and dispossessed. “There was little attention given to assuring that benefits from community development programs accrued to the rural poor” (Holdcroft, 1978: 20).

### **3.2. THEORIES OF PARTICIPATION**

Critics of community development blamed its failure and eventual decline on excessive government involvement in development programs, which created self-interested bureaucracies and entrenched inefficiencies; they did not empower the citizenry, to seek their views and inputs into the policy process at all stages. The only alternative, argued these critics, was to replace “production-centered” development with “people-centered” development, where ordinary people in general, and the poor in particular, would define the goals of development, influence the management of society’s resources, and determine the direction of development itself in order to attain “economic justice and democracy” (Robertson, 2001). The critics contended that past development projects failed in part because the poor, whose understanding and cooperation are essential for implementation, were excluded from the selection and design of such projects; thus alienated, they refused to collaborate with development “professionals” (Korten, 1984; Gran, 1983; Friedmann, 1992). Such alienation and resistance were deemed to be most prevalent in rural areas. To address these problems, it was argued, the poor need to be directly involved in all phases of the development process, including policy formulation (Mosher, 1976; Lele, 1979; Montgomery, 1979).

An alternative view of participation, based mainly on the feminist rejection of mainstream development theory, argued that a general and generic promotion of participation – without addressing the differential needs of certain social groups, particularly women, as well as unequal

access to power and resources – risked entrenching social and economic inequities in a male-dominated society, irrespective of the frequency or scale of participation (Boserop, 1970; Molyneux, 1985; Moser, 1989). Special attention to women’s participation is crucial, according to this view, because in developing countries in particular they constitute the majority in economic activities, such as farming and trade, but receive a disproportionately small share of national income due to cultural and institutional impediments, such as fewer productive assets. This state of affairs invariably leads to the majority of the poor in developing countries being women. Given the centrality of the woman/mother in the home, this has important short- and long-term implications for national development. In order to reduce overall levels of poverty and promote national development thus required that special attention be paid to women by giving them greater voice in public policy and highlighting issues of particular concern to them. . This emphasis on women and their participation, not just in the policy process but in development generally, has evolved over the years through three main perspectives: 1) Women in Development (WID), which advocated special attention for women in national development planning and even led to the creation of special ministries or departments for women’s affairs; 2) Women and Development (WAD), which emerged from radical feminist thought and advocated a movement away from the patriarchal world in which WID operated and towards a more separatist world where women’s contributions to development are recognized as distinctive and independent of “patriarchal interests;” and 3) Gender and Development (GAD), which concentrated less on the biological differences between the sexes and more on gender, or socially constructed, roles for both men and women. To understand these roles and their differential effects on women is to be able to empower the powerless (i.e., women) and thus provide them with the productive resources to which they had hitherto not been able to have access (Parpart, 1989; Connelly, et al., 1995;

Rathgeber, 1990, Newland, 1991). For GAD advocates, therefore, even within a particular country discrimination against women may vary according to region of residence, profession or ethnic group. In promoting participation, therefore, it is important to take intra-gender and other social differences into consideration (Sen and Grown, 1987; Moser, 1993).

Other critiques of mainstream participation hold that the direct involvement of “the masses” (whether men or women) in decision-making may not benefit them at all in the long run, that it might rather impede development management and hence development itself because “ordinary citizens lack the foresight and imagination required to plan for the future” (Martinussen, 1995; Connelly, 2001). Others argue that contrary to the assumptions of people-centered development, local populations tend to show little or no interest in their own development beyond that to which they are accustomed. Such lack of interest ultimately makes participation an externally imposed framework not much different from state-centric development (Conyers, 1982; Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

Yet other critiques of participation emphasize entrenched social interests and unequal power relations as undermining the putative benefits of participation. Such critics, mostly neo-Marxists, argue that participation at whatever level is “asymmetric,” with the result that “economic policies and their impact upon development patterns [are] shaped primarily by the most powerful classes, those with a strong organizational infrastructure and easy access to the state” (Martinussen, 1995: 234). Elaborating on this view, Strinati (1995: 165) made the following observation: “Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.” The people-

centered perspective has also been criticized for assuming that the poor and the marginalized are a homogenous group, with frictionless and convergent interests (Nelson, 1989; Martinussen, 1995). According to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001: 81), “the myth of the noble peasant who participates based on altruistic and communitarian values, and of apolitical, egalitarian rural communities, died decades ago...Politics pervades human affairs at every level of development...[and the] poor and excluded are interest groups just like trade unions, urban elites, or manufacturers’ associations....”

Another school of thought argues that problems of citizen disinterest, unequal power relations, and divergent interests could best be addressed through education. According to this view, people have the inherent capacity to “reflect, conceptualize, and plan” and that once they are adequately informed or educated about the nature and benefits of projects, policies and their political rights and responsibilities, they would come together and advocate common, if not identical, positions on policies that affect them equally (Freire 1972; OECD 1995; Servaes 1995; Taylor, 1996; Long, 2001).

Another group of participation theories emphasizes not only citizen involvement in policy *formulation* but also in the *monitoring and evaluation* of projects or policies once they have been implemented or adopted (Kotz, 1981; Feuerstain, 1986; Chambers, 1997; Cousins, 1997; Howes, 1992). For instance, Estrella et al. (2001:3) note that “as institutions become more inclusive in the “front-end” of project development – that is, in promoting participation in appraisal and implementation – then questions of ‘who measures’ results and ‘who defines’ success become critical.” While not rejecting expert evaluations outright, this perspective is based on the assumption that such evaluations – which tend to be distant and impersonal – can be enriched with the direct “testimonials” of those who ultimately matter – the citizenry. The

approach, however, deals largely with “community-based initiatives” – such as rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and its derivative participatory rural appraisal (PRA). Nevertheless, in it can in essence be extended to national level participation, as new participation advocates emphasize the need for citizen feedback in the formulation of all forms of national policies, such as policies on international trade and taxation.

The final group of participation theories views participation as a necessary political instrument for promoting economic and national development (Harbermas, 1984; Miller, 1992; Martinussen, 1995; Long 2001; Lisk, 1995). These theories started originally as a response to the view advanced by Arrow (1963) and other others that rational decision-making by individuals (or “instrumental rationality”, as it is known in micro-economics) cannot reasonably be aggregated into the collective social decision-making implied in conventional participation theories. The advocates of this view (Przeworski, 1985; Dryzek, 1996) proposed “communicative rationality” or “deliberative democracy” as a workable alternative. According to Dryzek (1996:113), the essence of deliberative democracy “is free discussion about points of conflict oriented to some kind of agreement, and in that discussion preferences can be changed and not just aggregated.”

The Kettering Foundation (2005: 4), a major proponent of deliberative democracy, offers the following rationalization for its use in policy making:

[T]o successful candidates is delegated the responsibility of administering management of the [country’s] resources, maintaining its security, and providing for every citizen’s welfare...but not even a fairly elected representative government can accomplish its work effectively alone....If a democratic state or community is to function as well as it should, then its people must continue always to share in addressing its problems, making judgments about how to approach them, and *ensuring that the concerns, the needs, and rights of all groups among them are heard and addressed* (emphasis added), Kettering Foundation





#### 4. CONCEPTUALIZING THE NEW PARTICIPATION

The definition of participation in economic development has evolved over the years to reflect changes in both the scope and dynamics of the development process itself, as indicated below:

- With regard to rural development...participation includes people's involvement in decision-making processes, in implementing programmes, their sharing in the benefits of development programmes and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977).
- Participation is concerned with...the organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control (Pearse and Stifel, 1979).
- Participation can be seen as a process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded. This view is based on the recognition of differences in political and economic power among different social groups and classes. Participation in this sense necessitates the creation of organizations of the poor which are democratic, independent and self-reliant (Ghai, 1990).
- Participatory development stands for partnership which is built upon the basis of dialogue among the various actors, during which the agenda is jointly set and local views and indigenous knowledge are deliberately sought and respected. This implies negotiation rather than the dominance of an externally set project agenda. Thus people become actors instead of being beneficiaries (OECD, 1994).

- Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them (World Bank, 1994)
- The only way poor people can overcome their difficulties is by directly participating in the process of development, including formulation of social policy, development of programs, their implementation at the ground level, and sharing in the benefits of such programs. The participatory approach has the dual goal of promoting growth and equity while also ensuring the development of democratic processes in the grassroots (Silva and Athukorala, 1996).

The definition of Silva and Athukorala which, unlike the earlier ones, recognizes the need for the general public, especially the poor, to take part in the “formulation of social policy [and] development programs” is the closest to the meaning of “new participation” employed in this study.

The new participation deals not with *projects* in particular areas of a country but with *policies* that are expected to affect the national economy and its sub-sectors generally. Such policies may be *macroeconomic*, made up of monetary and fiscal policies, or *sectoral*, dealing with particular sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, health or exports. The ultimate goal of monetary policy, for example, is “price stability” – that is, low and stable rates of change in consumer prices. A government can use any number of “policy tools,” such as interest rates, credit requirements for banks, money supply, and exchange rates, to attain such a goal. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, deals with policies to raise revenue, finance routine government operations and economic development, and to manage the public debt. Sectoral policies, as the

name suggests, apply to particular sectors of the economy, such as agriculture or health. Government may elect, for instance, to introduce or remove agricultural or health subsidies with various consequences for the public. It becomes imperative, under these conditions, to find ways of involving the public in the formulation of policies that affect these sectors. And it is equally imperative that citizens desiring such participation equip themselves with the skills and knowledge necessary to make substantive and credible contributions to public policy.

Because the formulation and analysis of such policies have traditionally been performed by specialists, such as economists, agronomists, and engineers, national-level participation is often conducted by proxy - with civil society groups, through their various representatives, contributing experiences and suggestions of their constituents to policy makers.<sup>1</sup> Depending on factors such as time, financial resources, existing institutional arrangements between state and non-state sectors (such as capacity to communicate with others in a timely manner and procedures for such communication), the scope of participation, particularly at the national level, may range hierarchically from informational to consultational to collaborative, reflecting the degrees of participatory complexity (Crosby,2000; Edgerton *et al.* (2000)).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> (In some instances, individuals of some professional repute may contribute their expertise, in their own right, to policy makers at the national level).

<sup>2</sup> This typology is a modification of Crosby and Edgerton (2000)

#### **4.1. INFORMATIONAL PARTICIPATION**

Information sharing in participation may involve one-way provision of information by government to the public or by the public to government. At the local-level, this may entail the government notifying the local population of the government's intention to initiate a particular project already decided upon by the government. At the national level, government may communicate information about policy to the public through any number of mediums. The provision of such information may be periodic and routine, or episodic, dictated by particular developments in the national economy, such as a sudden increase in world crude oil prices and the need to raise the officially controlled local prices of petroleum products to match the increases in world prices. Public provision of information to the government may take the form of responses to surveys or, as is commonly the case, petitions by sections of the society – such as farmers or exporters – who feel that existing policies are harmful to them.

#### **4.2. CONSULTATIVE PARTICIPATION**

In consultative participation, the initiator of policy or projects does not just inform the public but invites feedback on policies under consideration, while retaining the right to make final decisions on those policies; in other words, they consult the public about public policy. Consultative participation represents an improvement over the one-way information flow discussed above but is qualitatively “less” than the collaborative two-way method (discussed below) where all sides share in problem identification and definition, and must, together, agree on the final policy, program or project decisions. Examples of consultative participation include

public reviews of draft legislation, government-led working groups, and government-sponsored planning sessions.

### **4.3. COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION**

Collaborative participation involves “full” two-way information flow on socio-economic problems and strategies for addressing such problems over which there may be disagreements as to policy priorities, for example. Collaborative participation typically takes the form of national conferences where policy issues are jointly chosen and discussed by representatives of the government and various participant groups. The end product should be a consensus document that enjoys legitimacy across a broad spectrum of society.

The scope of participation in any country also depends on such factors as time, financial resources, technical capacity (for policy analysis in both the state and non-state sectors) and institutional capacity (by both the state and non-state sectors for organizing large numbers and diverse groups of people in a timely and coherent manner). Hence, in a situation of severe balance of payments crisis, for example, where immediate government action is required, the best form of participation would be an informational one – where the government informs the public about the crisis situation, its policy options, and the expected consequences, both favorable and adverse. It need not wait for any responses from the public, the only requirement being that the government keep the public informed so that make appropriate adjustments, especially where the policies would affect them directly.

#### 4.4. SATISFACTION FROM PARTICIPATION

Besides expectations of seeing their concerns and social issues expressed in subsequent policies, the psychological gratification that citizens derive from their engagement in the development process is considered equally important to the broader definition of development as attempts to meet both the material and non-material needs of a society. Thus, in the relatively new field of “happiness economics” (also known as “subjective well-being” studies), which draws on the literature on applied psychology (Diener, 1984; Diener, *et al.*, 1999; Kahneman, *et al.*, 1999; Argle, 2001, Di Tella, *et al.*), researchers are ever occupied with “non-objectivist theoretical analyses in economics, [based on] emotions, self-signalling (self-esteem), goal completion, mastery, meaning and status” (Frey and Stutzer, 2004:3).

Several researchers in this field (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; Oswald, 1997; Argle, 2001; Winkelmann, 2002) contend that the information gained from measuring such satisfaction, or the psychological aspects of citizen engagement in the policy process, helps, among other things, to formulate tax policies that better reflect the subjective concerns of citizens as well as measure poverty and formulate appropriate policies to deal with it. In addition to applied psychology, this non-objectivist approach to evaluating citizen’s satisfaction with public policy, or processes designed to facilitate that policy, also draws on the much-older field of customer-satisfaction research that started in the United States. Though consigned to the periphery of social science in the United States, this type of research has gained respectability in several prominent European research institutions, where the effort to promote subjective indicators for public policy is relatively well established (Veenhoven, 2002; Klaveren and Praag, 2004)

In measuring successful participation, therefore, participants' expressed satisfaction with specific features of a participatory forum is as important as their satisfaction with the overall forum or the consequences of their participation for public policy in the future. Hence, it is important to determine, even before they have actually participated in a forum, whether or not participants were satisfied with the amount of time they had to prepare for the forum. Similarly, in the course of a participatory forum, they may express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with how often they are called upon to speak, if they are called upon at all, and how much they are allowed to say, relative to other participants. Such seemingly "trivial" features of participatory forums or episodes are in fact essential to encouraging satisfactory participation in the broader exercise of policy making by citizens.

#### **4.5. ENTRY POINTS IN PARTICIPATION**

Given the circular and iterative nature of the policy process, those desiring to participate in it must necessarily enter one or more of the various phases that comprise the process. These phases are: agenda setting; policy analysis and formulation; policy adoption; policy implementation; and policy monitoring and evaluation. Dunn (1994) and Brinkerhoff (2001) illustrate the policy cycle and possible entry points for non-state actors desiring to influence policy. The cycle commences with various contending social and economic issues finding their way, through their advocates, onto the policy agenda for debate, analysis and possible adoption, followed by implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as reformulation and/or termination. This iterative, multi-faceted and multi-directional nature of the policy process "means that the cycle repeats itself, reflecting the fact that policies emerge, evolve, and change



incrementally over time, rather than making quantum leaps forward with no modification from their original specification” (Brinkerhoff, 2001: 12).

Policy issues may attain agenda status exogenously or endogenously. The former may be the result of donor demands (for example, demands by the IMF that utility rates be raised to reflect “realistic prices”) or the result of promises made during an electioneering campaign (to introduce, free health care, for example). In the latter case, socio-economic issues may get on the policy agenda upon the recommendation of bureaucrats intimately familiar with the challenges of implementing particular policies, or result from evaluation findings either by social scientists or civil society organizations that suggest the need for some modification of existing policies or the formulation of new ones.

In the subsequent phases – analysis and formulation, adoption, and implementation – participation is almost always limited to information sharing and consultation in the form of feedback from policymakers to policy advocates about their intentions and priorities. Exceptions are sectoral policies, where all stakeholders (as in the case of community water and sanitation) may jointly examine and determine the nature of policies to be introduced. In the case of evaluation, as noted above, participation may range from information sharing to consultation (feedback to policymakers) to collaboration, where policy advocates demand that certain issues – such as the harmful effects of “cost sharing” in tertiary education or the impact of lower tariffs on local industry) be placed on the national policy agenda.

#### **4.6. THE PARTICIPATORY EPISODE**

The preceding descriptions applied to participation as a process only, but participation may take the form of a particular event (such as a national forum), where various stakeholders

converge to share their policy concerns and/or make policy demands on behalf of their constituencies in the expectation that those demands would be incorporated into public policy in the future. For purposes of this study, such an event is referred to as the “participatory episode.” In a participatory episode, various stakeholders, such as civil-society organizations, government ministries and departments, and in some cases external creditors, make concerted efforts to bring together representatives of various social and economic organizations to discuss and help inform public policy. These episodes may occur at different times, in different parts of a country and at different phases of the policy process but ultimately form part of the larger and continuing process of participatory development.

#### **4.7. SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION DEFINED**

According to Brownlee-Greaves (2000: 1), “participatory theory tends to focus on the structure of projects or campaigns, assuming that with a sufficiently participatory framework and approach, the campaign will have the desired impact... A participatory structure is, in itself, not sufficient for success.” It is against this background that this study attempts a new approach to measuring the extent of success during a participatory episode by directly assessing the participants’ satisfaction with their involvement in the SAPRI episode. In this regard, I propose the three main constituents of successful participation as *inclusiveness*, *voice*, and *impact*. The sum effect of these indicators should give an overall idea of whether or not a participatory episode was deemed successful by those who took part in it, and not necessarily those who organized it. “Inclusiveness” refers broadly to representativeness, as viewed by participants, in terms of the policy issues discussed, the various social groups represented, and the administrative regions of a country. Inclusiveness, in this sense, is a necessary but by no means a sufficient

condition for determining successful participation; other conditions will have to be met. “Voice” refers to the ability to make policy demands (or express policy concerns) by participants beyond fulfilling the condition of inclusiveness. Such policy demands may be made orally, in written form, or some combination of both. “Impact” addresses the question: Did participation matter? Or, to what extent, in participants’ views, were policy demands that were made at a forum later incorporated into public policy by the state?

At the most basic level, success at a participatory episode may be measured by the number of people present and, more important, the extent to which they were deemed to be representative of various socio- economic groups in the country. *But* such a definition, while useful as a first step in assessing the extent of participation’s success, suffers from certain important policy-relevant deficiencies. It does not, for example, encompass the extent to which issues addressed at the forum were deemed to be reflective of the concerns of those present or their constituent. A high degree of social, economic and issues representativeness is therefore needed in order to be able to speak of successful participation. Together, these three factors – social, economic and issues representativeness – constitute the “inclusiveness” in successful participation.

But inclusiveness alone does not, for the purposes of this study at least, address the issue of actual presentations of various policy demands at the forum. Was everybody given adequate opportunity to make their policy demands or was the process dominated by a few vocal and perhaps better-resourced participants? The attempt to measure this phenomenon leads us to a second critical dimension of successful participation: voice. Together, inclusiveness and voice will constitute the measures of intra-episode success of participation from the viewpoints of the participants, not their organizations.

Finally, beyond the measurement of inclusiveness and voice, it is important to establish the extent to which participants believe that public policy developed after SAPRI reflects the demands that they made at the forum. This would be a post-episode measure of successful participation and it is designated as impact.

The extensive, sometimes even confusing, literature on the meaning of “impact” in policy-evaluation studies (Holland, 1993; Weiss, 1997; Roche, 1999; McGee, 2001), however, requires some elaboration for the benefit of this study. Booth and Lucas (2002) discuss the different uses of the words impact, outcomes and outputs among various development agencies and practitioners. Citing the Developments Assistance Committee (DAC) and monitoring and evaluation researchers, they point out the use of the term “outcomes” to mean “specific results and the utilisation of means/services by beneficiaries,” in contrast to “movements in measures poverty,” which are referred to as “impacts” Booth and Lucas, 2002: 6). However, after noting that it is conventional “in the broader social science fields concerned with poverty-reduction strategies and poverty information...to speak of the final goal of policy as to influence poverty outcomes, or outcomes for the poor,” they make the following observation: “There is also an understandable tendency to associate the word ‘impact’ with the activity of evaluation, implying that an impact is not just a final result but one that can be attributed to a specific intervention.” (*ibid*).

Until there is some global convention on the harmonized use of these important but needlessly confusing terms, each author, it seems, is left to spell out what he means by each in order to avoid more confusion. In this study, “impact” is used as an umbrella term comprising *outputs* and *outcomes*, both reflecting to various degrees the consequences of some policy initiative, or *inputs*. These inputs may result from citizen advocacy, such as SAPRI, or

recommendations from professional policy analysis. Inputs (such as education expenditures) may produce outputs (such as school buildings, new teachers, school meals, teaching materials, or in the case of northern Ghana, bicycles for students who live long distances from their schools). However, the outcome (i.e., the direct and sometimes indirect difference that those inputs make in people's lives) would depend on the specific objectives of the policy concerned: Was it intended to reduce the dropout rate among pupils? Or improve their reading scores? Or better yet help reduce poverty in a particular community? If the objective is to reduce the dropout rate, for example, the outcome is likely to be reflected in the short- to medium-terms. If the objective was poverty reduction, it would take much longer, as pupils move through the educational system, acquire employable skills, enter the labor market, find employment, and hopefully begin to earn enough to afford, at the minimum, the basic necessities of life. Depending on context, outputs (such as new teachers employed as a result of increased budgetary allocations) may become inputs (when these teachers then begin to impart their knowledge on their students for their eventual entry into the labor force). In this study, "impact", is the aggregation of both of these consequences (outputs and outcomes) of public policy as viewed by the respondent. Hence, a respondent who feels that the dropout rate in his or her hometown has gone down as a result of SAPRI may implicitly be looking at outputs or outcomes or some combination of the two, depending on the initial conditions of education in that hometown and what they expected public policy to do about it.

#### **4.8. HOW EXTERNAL KNOWLEDGE INFLUENCES PUBLIC POLICY**

Since the 1970s when social researchers discovered that "policy makers seldom used knowledge gained through social research," the determinants of knowledge utilization in public

policy has occupied the minds of many a researcher (Nielson, 2001). Among the most common explanations of knowledge utilization in public policy are theories of the “two communities” (or “cultural gap”) of researchers and policy makers (Caplan, 1979; Booth, 1988) and the “enlightenment function” of policy-relevant knowledge (Weiss, 1977).

Different conceptions of the relevance of the policy-relevant knowledge between the generator of that knowledge and the policy makers has been cited as a major reason why such knowledge may not find its way into public policy. “There is considerable difference between what scientists and policy makers consider to be knowledge, as well as the difference between how that knowledge was developed or obtained. Social scientists generally see knowledge as something that is theoretically and methodologically sound...Policy makers see knowledge as something that comes from experience [and common sense] (Nielson, 2001:6; Booth, 1988: 226).

Weiss (1977: 533) emphasizes “conflicting demands on policy makers and disjunctions between the knowledge needs of policymakers and the research outputs of social scientists.” She adds:

On the research side, much of what goes by the name of social science knowledge is flawed, inconclusive, ambiguous, and contradicted by evidence from other studies...On the policy side, there are a host of competing claims for attention. The policymaking process is a political process, with the basic aim of reconciling interests in order to negotiate a consensus, not implementing logic and truth (*ibid*).

Even more important than the motives of the two communities is the nature of *utilization*, the definition of which has relevance for developing countries like Ghana and the phenomenon of SAPRI. Caplan (1979: 462-464) distinguishes between *instrumental* use, which involves day-to-day “administrative policy issues of limited significance...pertaining to bureaucratic management and efficiency rather than substantive public policy issues” and *conceptual* use

which entails the “gradual shift of policy makers’ awareness and re-orientation of their basic perspectives.” He adds that conceptual use of policy relevant knowledge comprises “important policy matters which affect the nation as a whole” and is always undertaken in the context of “macro-level decisions.” These are decisions that, so to speak, lead to a sea change not only in the content of public policy but also in the general philosophical direction of governance. The retrenchment of state role in the economy, for example, in favor of markets and private enterprise is illustrative of this view.

Closely associated with the preceding discussion is the realization that problem solving does not constitute “the most prevalent use of social research but that the use of research is actually much more diffuse and indirect” (Nielson, 2001: 9). According to Weiss (1979:531; emphasis added), “government decision makers tend to use research indirectly, as sources of ideas, information, and orientation to the world. *Although the process is not easily discernable, over time it may have profound effects on policy.*” To increase the chances of having their research influence policy, other researchers have suggested the adoption of participatory research, which incorporates “all relevant stakeholders into the research process, including both researchers and policy makers”. (Nielson, 2001: 7). Bernard and Wind (1998) concede that while such an approach may not guarantee the utilization of researcher-generated knowledge by policy makers it may help bring the “two communities” closer.

#### **4.9. WHO QUALIFIES TO PARTICIPATE?**

Irrespective of the nature and motivations of participation, there is always the question of who selects the participants. According to Brinkerhoff (2001:3), answering this question

requires a look at the “contextual factors relating to the political system, governance [and] social relations,” among other factors.

In the literature on policy formation, these contextual factors appear under two broad approaches: state-centered and society-centered (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The state-centered approach encompasses several models, such as the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model (Robinson and Majak, 1967; Allison, 1971; Frohock, 1979). However, the model of the greatest relevance to participatory development is the corporatist model, because it represents an interface between the state and society against a background of unequal resource endowments.

According to Staniland (1985: 73), corporatist regimes tend to have “procedures for consultation with the larger business, financial, and labor organizations, and such procedures have the effect of excluding from real political influence individuals and groups unfortunate enough not to have been co-opted” by the state. Schmitter (1974) and Staniland (1985), however, make a distinction between “societal corporatism,” common in Europe, and “state corporatism”, found in states with “delayed capitalist development” (Staniland, 1985: 75). In the former, relations between the state and non-state organizations are said to be “partial and reciprocal,” while under the latter, “the initiative and the locus of control [are] heavily on the side of the state” (Staniland, 1985: 74). Under such conditions, exercises in participatory development can become a pretext for the state to co-opt non-state actors by, for example, granting favors to some groups while restricting privileges to others (Foweraker, 1995; 2000; Diamond, 1999; Trip, 2001).

Under the society-centered approach, there is less emphasis on co-optation, and public policy is said to be determined either by class interests, or through a plurality of social groups



pursuing the common or aggregated interests of their members (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961, 1971). “For some pluralists, the state is a more or less neutral arena for conflicting and competing interests to shape policy output, and no groups are systematically discriminated against in their access to power” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 23). With the state acting as a disinterested arbiter of competing social interests, according to this view, the risk of cooptation is essentially non-existent. In fact, the various interest groups are said to enjoy a “relative power in bargaining, negotiating, marshalling votes, and otherwise influencing policy makers” (*ibid*).

#### **4.10. PROPOSITIONS OF THE STUDY**

In line with the preceding discussion, it is hypothesized here that successful participation at a national forum (measured by the various degrees of inclusiveness, voice, and impact) will be higher,

1. the greater the level of participants’ economic literacy,
2. the more favorable participants’ assessments of their organizations’ analytical capacity,  
and
3. the greater the process is deemed to be facilitative of participants’ contributions.

The concepts in the above propositions, along with other factors of plausible explanatory importance, are measured through a survey questionnaire. Based on the results of the survey, indices or scales of successful participation, as well as their plausible determinants, are constructed for the analysis and interpretation of the various relationships between the various variables.

In summary, it must be stated that successful participation in policy making is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that cannot simply be measured by the number of people present at a forum but through the individual and combined evaluation of such factors as inclusiveness (of groups, issues, and administrative regions), voice (of the participants), and impact (of participants' demands on public policy). Inclusiveness and voice are used to measure intra-episode success (that is, success within the participatory episode, or SAPRI, as judged by the participants themselves), while impact measures the effects of participation after the participatory episode is over, also as judged by the participants. Determining who participates is equally important because of the likelihood of the state co-opting civil society groups and thus undermining the substantive and democratic relevance of participation. There are instances, however, where the state could act as a 'disinterested arbiter of competing social interests' and ensure that in the long run the common interests are served.

## **5. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

### **5.1. PRELUDE TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT**

Between the year of independence, 1957, and the mid-1960s, Ghana had one of the strongest economies in Africa (Norman, 1970; Franco, 1979; Huq, 1989; Rimmer, 1992; Roe, 1992; Leechor, 1994; Werlin, 1994). However, a collapse in the world prices of cocoa, the country's main foreign exchange earner, at the beginning of the 1960s put a strain on the economy. A military coup in 1966, followed briefly by a two-year market-oriented civilian government, succeeded in restoring the economy to partial health.


Another military coup in 1972 only succeeded in ushering in a decade of widespread economic mismanagement at the hands of a "vampire elite" principally made up of military officers (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). In 1975, for instance, the economy contracted by an inflation-adjusted rate of 12.4 percent, followed by a further decline of 3.5 percent in 1976. This was followed by erratic growth rates of (positive) 8.5 percent in 1978, for instance, and then another decline of 2.5 percent the following year. In 1981 and 1982, even with the advent of structural adjustment, the economy continued on its downward slide and posted negative growth rates of 3.5 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively (see Figure 5.1). The production of cocoa, long the lifeblood of the economy, also fell markedly, from 427,000 metric tons in 1970, for example, to 179,000 metric tons in the 1982/83 season. Both exports and imports, as a share of GDP, fell from 19.3 percent and 16.9 percent, respectively, in 1970 to 15.0 percent and 14.6 percent. Along with the fall in exports came a decline in the country's international monetary reserves, essential for the importation of goods and services. Reserves declined from US\$271.1 million in

1979, for instance, to US\$138.7 million, worsening an existing shortage of essential commodities like milk, soap and cooking oil (see Figures 5.2 to 5.4).


In addition to the collapse in production, a combination of institutional rigidities and natural disasters, such as a drought and bush fires, combined to create some of the highest inflation rates in the country's history. The consumer inflation rate, which had reached a historical high of 120 percent in 1977, fluctuated at or above 50.0 percent and reached 114.9 percent before falling steeply to 22.5 percent in 1982 (See Figure 5.5). By 1983, when structural adjustment was launched, the inflation rate had climbed back to a news record: 123.0 percent.

As to be expected, the general decay of the macro-economy translated into a severe and steady deterioration in the living standards of Ghanaians. The social sector, especially health and education, as well as the micro-economy, were particularly affected through rising unemployment and stagnant wages (Riddell, 1992; Tarp, 1993; Schatz, 1994; ODI, 1996; UNDP, 1997). In 1983, with the assistance of the World Bank and other international financial organizations, a new military government that had seized power a year earlier, launched the structural adjustment program.


**Figure 5-1 Pre-SAP Economic Growth (Annual % Change in Real GDP)**




**Figure 5-2 Pre-Structural Adjustment Cocoa Production (In '000 MTs)**




**Figure 5-3 Pre-Structural Adjustment Exports and Imports (% Share of GDP)**



**Figure 5-4 Pre-structural Adjustment International Reserves (In US\$mil.)**



**Figure 5-5 Pre-Structural Adjustment Inflation Rate (Annual % Change)**




## 5.2. GHANA UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The structural adjustment program initiated by the government was implemented in three major and overlapping phases: (i) stabilization, (ii) rehabilitation, and (iii) liberalization and growth (Mosley, 1995; Helleiner, 1993; IMF, 1996). In the first phase, the government focused on stabilizing the macro-economy by, among other things, raising interest rates, cutting government spending, devaluing the national currency, and dismantling the country's complicated and cumbersome system of price controls. In the second phase, emphasis was placed on improving utilization and greater efficiency in the use of existing resources. Finally, in the liberalization and growth phase, policy focused on the revision of existing laws to stimulate investments, particularly foreign investment (World Bank, 1984; Green, 1987; Olukoshi, 1994). The program was almost entirely economic in orientation and therefore paid little or no attention to social issues, such education, health, and especially the poverty implications of structural adjustment for vulnerable groups like women and children.

In the years that followed the launching of structural adjustment, the macro-economy did in fact show considerable improvement in its key indicators, compared to the near-collapse of the economy in the decade prior to the program (see Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). In 1984, aided by good weather and bumper harvests, the agriculture-dominated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by a staggering 8.8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Other sectors, notably mining, manufacturing, services, and especially the cocoa sub-sector of agriculture, also showed signs of dramatic improvements. Cocoa production, for instance, rose from 159,000 tons in the 1983/84 season to 300,000 by 1989 and increasing further to 409,000 by the time SAPRI was


launched (World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 1995). With the rehabilitation of the once moribund industrial and agricultural sectors, the share of exports in GDP also rose from 10.8 percent in 1983 to 37.3 in 2000. In terms of macro-economic stability, inflation, which was 123 percent in 1983, tumbled down to about 40 percent the following year and then followed a generally downward trend thereafter, reaching a low of 10 percent in 1992 (Kapur, 1991; Loxley, 1991; Killick, 1993). The level of international reserves also recovered, from US\$142.6 million in 1983 to US\$511.00 by 1986. In 1986, it reached a then record of US\$738.4 million. In the subsequent years, overall economic growth remained positive, though somewhat lower than the initial burst of high growth rates that followed the initiation of structural adjustment (Rothchild, 1991; ODI, 1996; Sowa, 1994).

**Figure 5-6 Economic Growth Under Structural Adjustment (Annual % Change)**







**Figure 5-7 Cocoa Production Under Structural Adjustment (In '000 MTs)**




**Figure 5-8 Inflation Under Structural Adjustment (Annual % Change)**



**Figure 5-9 International Reserves Under Structural Adjustment (US\$ Mil.)**



**Figure 5-10 Exports-Imports Share of GDP Under Structural Adjustment (In Percent)**



### 5.3. BACKLASH AGAINST STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

But there was also an unseemly side to the good macro-economic news of structural adjustment. Successful attempts at downsizing an admittedly bloated government bureaucracy through the retrenchment of workers led to widespread unemployment and under-employment,

particularly for those who found themselves in economically less rewarding activities, such as petty trading (Boateng and Fine, 2000; Logan, 1993; Summers, 1993; Stewart, 1995; Lynne, 1996). Public sector employment, which stood at 395,000 in 1985, began to decline steadily, until it reached 143,000 in 1996. Initially, the formal private sector appeared to have absorbed some of the retrenched workers, as its ranks swelled from 60,000 in 1985 to 85,000 in 1987. Thereafter, perhaps as a result of the cooling off from the initial burst of growth, employment in the formal private sector also began to decline, reaching a low of 21,000 by 1996 (see Table 5.1 below). The end result of these developments was a steep rise in the number of self-employed petty traders, selling anything from single units of chewing gum to dog chains along the streets of the country's major cities and towns.

Over the same period, the precipitous fall in the rate of inflation translated into a rise in real earnings by about 40.0 percent between 1984 and 1990 (Boateng and Fine, 2000), but this seemingly impressive growth in earnings occurred against a background of a 20.0 percent fall in real earnings between 1960 and 1984 in the formal sector. For the vast majority of workers outside the formal sector, real earnings appeared to have stagnated or perhaps even declined further, because although the inflation rate had declined from a high of 123.0 percent in 1983 to as low as 10.4 percent by 1985, the rate soon climbed up again, reaching 39.8 percent in 1987 and, after several years of uneven growth, reached a high of 59.6 percent in 1995 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000).

**Table 5-1 Formal Sector Employment Under SAP Adjustment (1982-1996)**

	Total	Public	Private
1982	290	240	50
1983	320	250	70
1984	450	390	60
1985	455	395	60
1986	405	320	85
1987	385	300	85
1988	300	250	50
1989	215	190	25
1990	220	195	25
1991	190	160	30
1992	185	156	28
1993	179	153	26
1994	174	150	25
1995	169	146	23
1996	165	143	21

*Source: Ghana Statistical Service*

Predictably, critics, mostly academics and the very vocal labor movement, dismissed the “miracle” of economic recovery under structural adjustment as one of “job- less growth” and called for more aggressive government action to ameliorate the worsening social situation in the country. As a response, the government in 1988 initiated the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Among other things, PAMSCAD was to promote labor-intensive development projects in the rural areas and help individuals establish viable small-scale businesses. However, poor project design and lack of adequate funding from both the Ghanaian government and foreign sources severely hampered the implementation of the various policies and projects under the program (Jonah, 1989; Summers and Pritchett, 1993; European Commission, 1995; Karnik, 1996; UNDP, 1997; Aryeetey, 2000; Weissman, 1990 ).

Beyond the problem of rising unemployment and stagnating wages, civil society organizations also pointed out the decline in key social sectors, such as education and health, and an overall increase in poverty, particularly among women and children. Along with high dropout rates, schools across the country had also experienced steep falls in enrolment rates due to cut backs in education expenditures and the introduction of “cost recovery” measures that charged for some educational services that had previously been offered for free by the state (Abugre, 2001; Harrigan and Younger, 2000; Britwum, et al., 2001).

A study of the distribution of social spending (World Bank, 1995a), for example, found that between 1989 and 1992, the share of total education spending going to the poorest 20 percent of Ghanaians had fallen from 17.0 percent to 16.0 percent, while that of health had also fallen from 12.0 percent to 11.0 percent. For the richest 20.0 percent, the fall in education spending was from 24.1 percent to 21. However, for the same category of Ghanaians, the share of health sector spending rose from 31.0 percent to 34.0 percent. Among factors responsible for this state of affairs was “urban bias” in public expenditures as well as “leakages” in disbursement of funds from the central government to the regions and districts. Another World Bank study found that only “20 percent of non-wage public health expenditures and 50 percent of non-wage education expenditures” reached their beneficiary organizations in the regions and districts. (Canagarjah, 2002).

In the health sector, other developments arising from structural adjustment proved to be detrimental to many Ghanaians. The imposition of user fees ostensibly to finance the procurement of equipment and logistics led to reduced access to health services among the poor, according to the Ghana Statistical Service. Overall, outpatient attendance was estimated to have fallen by as much as 33 percent during the period of structural adjustment; in the rural areas, the

rate was said to be higher (Abugre, 2001; Cornia, 1987; Boachie-Danquah, 1992; Adepoju, 1993; Alexander, 1991; Donkor, 1997). Whatever gains in health care had been achieved during the period, such as reductions in the incidence of river blindness and polio, were attributed to programs by the United Nations carried out outside the scope of the structural adjustment program.

The overall incidence of poverty in the country also increased dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s, as reported in the Ghana Living Standards Surveys in 1988, 1989, 1992 and 1999. Methodological differences in survey design, however, made it impossible to compare poverty rates over years. These limitations were addressed in 1997 and 2000 by researchers (Memery and Mehra, 1997; Ghana Statistical Service, 2000). Table 5.2 shows the original and revised estimates of poverty in 1988, 1989, and 1992. The direction of change in the poverty rate remained the same even after the revisions, but there were substantial changes in the magnitude of the rates. Originally, the proportion of the national population living in poverty was reported to have risen from 36.9 percent in 1988 to 41.8 percent in 1989 before falling to 31.4 percent in 1992. The revised data, however, showed an increase from 26.1 percent to 31.9 percent followed by a decline to 27.4 percent in each of the corresponding periods. Indeed, in the foreword to the Ghana Human Development Report in 1997, the then minister of finance acknowledged that “recent studies...have raised worrying questions about the extent and distribution of poverty as well as the impact of the Economic Recovery Programme on vulnerable groups, particularly in rural areas” (UNDP, 1999: i). Such admissions provided fuel for those who considered structural adjustment a failure and demanded a civil society audit of it.

**Table 5-2 Poverty Rates Under Structural Adjustment**

	Previous Estimate			Revised Estimates		
	1988	1989	1992	1988	1989	1992
Accra	8.5	21.9	23.0	5.5	13.6	20.2
Other Urban	33.4	35.1	27.7	23.0	24.4	21.0
Rural Coastal	37.7	44.6	28.6	26.8	32.9	22.3
Rural Forest	38.1	41.9	33.0	21.5	28.1	23.3
Rural Savannah	49.4	54.8	38.3	42.9	51.6	45.0
National	36.9	41.8	31.4	26.1	31.9	27.4

*Source: Demery and Mehra (1995), quoted in Aryeetey (2000)*

Not surprisingly, the poverty studies showed significant variations across the country's 10 administrative regions of the country and among various socio-economic groups, particularly women and children. For example, all but three of the regions – Central, Northern, and Upper East, – recorded varying degrees of reduction in poverty rates, with Greater Accra (home to the administrative and economic capital of the country) posting the steepest drop of 80.8 percent: From 26.0 percent in 1991-1991 to 5.0 percent in 1998-1999. In the Central Region, the proportion of people living in poverty was reported to have increased by 9.1 percent (from 44.0 percent in 1991-1992 to 48.0 percent in 1998-1999); in the Northern Region, the rate reportedly increased by 9.5 percent (from 63.0 percent to 69.0 percent); while the Upper East was said to have recorded the largest increase of 31.3 percent (from 67.0 percent to 88.0 percent).

The poverty status of women and children during this period also worsened (Appiah, *et al.* 2000; Bortei-Doku-Aryeetey-, 2000). Female-headed households, they found, tended to have a higher incidence of poverty than households of similar size that were headed by men. The relationship between poverty, childhood and area of residence was aptly described by Appiah, *et al.* (2000) as follows:

The children of poor Ghanaian households are less likely to be currently attending school than their non-poor Ghanaian counterparts, though the area of residence has a more important impact than poverty *per se*. The net primary enrollment rates for the *non-poor* in Savannah [found in the three

northern regions of the country] – at 59.0 percent for boys and 46.0 percent for girls – are markedly lower than those of the *poor* in Accra (87.0 percent and 78.0 percent), respectively. Although poverty clearly reduces the likelihood of school attendance, area of residence appears to be as important, if not more so. Similar considerations apply to secondary [school] enrolments.

These revelations influenced the agitation for civil society involvement in policy making.

SAPRI was conceived and initiated in response to these calls.

In summary, the structural adjustment program launched by the Ghanaian government in the early 1980s helped to stabilize the economy and turn around growth from negative to positive. However, the extent of recovery turned out to be less than adequate, as economic growth soon stagnated. At the same time, the adverse effects of some of the policies of stabilization, such as reductions in health and education spending, began to show in social statistics, such as rising poverty among women and increases in mortality and morbidity rates. Not even PAMSCAD could reverse the situation and eventually the government bowed to domestic and international pressure to review the nature and effects of structural adjustment and draw upon the lessons learned to formulate future policies.

## **6. EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF SAPRI**

Beginning in the early 1990s, a loose network of civil society organizations around the world intensified their criticism of structural adjustment programs and called for a civil society-led evaluation of the various structural adjustment programs as a first step towards charting a new course for policies that would prove less socially harmful. The justification



for placing civil society organizations at the forefront of the review was captured in the following statement by a spokesperson of one of the civil society organizations:

SAPRI represents an opportunity to build civil society alliances, to engage with governments in a development process, and at the same time to confront an extremely changed and competitive world...Weakened states and weakened civil societies need to work together on a systematic basis in order to do better...Moving forward collectively will make it possible for all parties to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and to see how the costs and benefits of economic reforms may be shared.<sup>3</sup>

As agitation by civil society organizations mounted, the then president of the World Bank challenged them to put forward a framework for a joint Bank-civil society-state evaluation of structural adjustment. In response, the civil society organizations proposed the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) initially for a handful of countries. Ghana was one of eight countries so chosen to participate in the exercise. Within the conceptual framework of participation, SAPRI occurred within the evaluative phase of the policy cycle, thus affording participants the opportunity to assess a program that has already been implemented without adequate civil society involvement to help shape the future direction of policy on the basis of what is learned from such an assessment.

## **6.1. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL ENGAGEMENT**

The political environment within which SAPRI took place was markedly different from what prevailed in 1983 and the decade afterwards, when structural adjustment was implemented. Back then, the country was under a military dictatorship that tolerated no dissent. Many critics of government policy were either incarcerated or had to go into external exile; there simply was no

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<sup>3</sup> Abugre, Charles, Third World Network, "Why SAPRI is Important in Africa", [www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/ghana/ghanafgf.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/ghana/ghanafgf.htm)

room for civil society to engage the technocratic elite of domestic politicians and international bureaucrats who crafted their policies on unverified assumptions and expected those policies to benefit the society equitably, irrespective of one's socio-economic status.

The global criticism of SAPs as a failed development framework, driven by a policy oligarchy of local and foreign technocrats, coincided with Ghana's return to civilian multi-party rule in 1993 and rising calls for civic engagement in public policy. Article 35 of the 1992 constitution that ushered in civilian rule provided legitimacy for those calls by enjoining the state (made of up government, parliament, and other public institutions) to provide "all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision making at every level of national life and in government." A major assumption behind this constitutional provision was that even after "the people" select representatives from their ranks to manage national affairs for them, it is crucial that they "police" those representatives by actively participating in the formulation and implementation of public policy. In other words, the real business of democracy took place not during elections but between them, with civil society playing a central and catalytic role.

## **6.2. ORGANIZING SAPRI IN GHANA**

In preparing for SAPRI,<sup>4</sup> organizers addressed two major and inter-related tasks: (1) ensuring that the initiative was not the "thin edge of co-optation of [civil society organizations] by the Government-[World] Bank alliance" and (2) stimulating public interest in an issue which the government and its external financiers had dominated for nearly two decades without civil-society involvement.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Unless otherwise stated, the term SAPRI henceforth refers to the exercise in Ghana only.

<sup>5</sup> This section is based on "The SAPRI: Organizing Civil Society to Review Structural Adjustment Policies," [www.undp.org/tcdc/bestprac/social/cases/1-sapri.htm](http://www.undp.org/tcdc/bestprac/social/cases/1-sapri.htm).

Unlike corporatist participatory exercises elsewhere (such as Ireland and Latin America), where the state selects participants, the composition of SAPRI's participants was determined by the civil society organizations themselves through a process that sometimes proved contentious. Under the direction of a Provisional Working Group (PROWOG), two civil society groups – Third World Network and Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) -- initiated steps to bring together other civil society groups that would be geographically representative and reflective of all key areas of civil society organizations in terms of gender and development activities. The efforts of the PROWOG culminated in a 25-member Civil Society Coordinating Council (CivisoC) distributed as follows, after much bargaining between civil society organizations (without any state or World Bank involvement):

- Labor, represented by the Trades Union Congress: 2 seats
- Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT): 2 seats
- University Teachers Association of Ghana: 1 seat
- Polytechnic Teachers Association of Ghana: 1 seat
- Association of Small Industries: 1 seat
- Association of Ghana Industry 2 seat
- Ghana Association of Farmers and Fishermen: 2 seats
- Women's organizations 2 seats
- International NGOs based in Ghana: 1 seat
- Local NGOs: 1 seat
- Environmental NGOs: 1 seat
- Religious organizations: 2 seat

In addition to the above, the country's 10 administrative regions were grouped into six zones and assigned a place each on Civisoc. The only exception was the northern zone, comprising the three poorest regions in the country, which was given two seats.

Once its membership was in place, the Council set about the next task of mobilizing and organizing Ghanaian civil society through various national outreach conferences. It was at these conferences that participants determined the agenda of SAPRI as it was to be held. According to the United Nations Development Program, "organizations which normally would not have access to or be involved in a national advocacy exercise were drawn in, and lower officials and functionaries of some [organizations of civil society] ...became involved in ways that were not the norm in such institutions (*ibid*)." Moreover, the evaluation report of SAPRI-Ghana by the United Nations noted the following:

Prior to SAPRI, the working relations between the NGO community and the labour movement were weak. At least three factors account for this. The two types of organisations had tended to operate in different channels and generally did not see each other as different branches of a generic entity, i.e., organisations of civil society. Secondly, NGOs perceived the labour movement as "political" precisely because of its regular disagreements with governments over the socio-economic implications of development policy choices such as the SAP. Thirdly, this NGO perception of the labour movement as tending to "take on the government" was complemented by inadequate understanding of NGOs within the labour movement.

While civil society groups worked autonomously to create the agenda for SAPRI, they nevertheless coordinated most of their activities with the Ghanaian government and the World Bank, the country's single largest creditor. In all of these interactions, the government initially appeared to be more of a reluctant participant than an organization inclined to co-opt SAPRI, as

some critics of the exercise had feared. Eventually, upon the persuasion of civil society organizations, both the government and parliament took active and enthusiastic part in SAPRI, pledging to abide by the findings and decisions of the forum. Similarly, the World Bank, whose role was to help facilitate SAPRI by, among other things, ensuring that they used methodologies that would be comparable across the participating countries, was represented at various SAPRI events by an officer in charge of NGO affairs. To preserve their independence and further avoid the risk of co-optation by the Bank, in particular, the civil society groups also insisted on sourcing their own funding for the exercise.

On November 25, 1997, SAPRI-Ghana was launched in Accra, the national capital, followed by two national forums, one in November 1998 and the other in May 2001. Significantly, on the eve of the final forum, the World Bank's Vice President for Development Policy, Jo Ritzen, in meetings with various civil society organizations involved in SAPRI-Ghana noted: "The experiences of people are crucial to the development process." In terms of entry points, SAPRI was situated within the evaluation phase of the policy cycle, with the potential for participants to provide information to policy makers (agenda setting) for the next generation of policy making dealing with issues discussed at the Forum.

In summary, despite initial resistance from the World Bank and to a limited extent the Ghanaian government, civil society organizations in Ghana (and elsewhere) managed to organize a joint evaluation, involving civil society, the World Bank and the government of Ghana, of Ghana's experiences with structural adjustment over nearly two decades. This was the first major collaboration between the labor movement and other civil society groups in Ghana, due to previous mutual suspicions and misunderstanding over their roles in the development process. To ensure that the civil society organizations involved in the exercise were not co-opted, the

organizers went out of their way to secure their own funding, independent of the World Bank and the Ghanaian government. Finally, SAPRI was launched in 1997 and the final forum was held in May 2001 in Accra, Ghana.

## **7. STUDY DESIGN AND PROCEDURES**

### **7.1. DESIGN OF THE STUDY**

As noted previously, some studies of SAPRI-Ghana have already been undertaken, and these studies have emphasized how organizers overcame various institutional and organizational obstacles in order to host the exercise. From this general point of view, SAPRI-Ghana was a resounding success. But “success” according to whom, the organizers or the participants? The extant evaluations have only dealt with the former; this study proposes to look at success of SAPRI-Ghana through the eyes of the individual participants. In this regard we will focus on the three main components of successful participation discussed earlier – inclusiveness, voice, and impact.

Once we have established and carefully delineated these components, we then move on to evaluate the success of SAPRI, as viewed by the participants, by determining factors and characteristics that may be statistically associated with success as deemed by the participants themselves. Success, in this sense, would be of two kinds: intra-episode success, which determines how effective the actual participatory exercise was, and post-episode success, which measures participants' views of the impact of their participation on public policy following SAPRI. Specifically, beyond the main components of successful participation, we are interested in characteristics such as the economic literacy of the participants; their views on the analytical capacity of their various organizations; and what they thought of the SAPRI process (whether they believed it facilitated or impeded their participation). Other variables, such as the education level of participants, their sex, and their region of residence, will be evaluated on their own and

as controls in order to strengthen the assessment of the postulated relationships between the various facets of successful participation (the dependent variables) and factors associated with those variables (the independent variables).

Economic literacy will measure the extent of participants' self-rated knowledge of the kinds of economic issues that dominate public policy generally and structural adjustment programs in particular. A policy analytic capacity index will measure the extent to which participants find their organizations to be technically or professionally capable of providing them with the kind of policy analysis they need to participate effectively in a forum like SAPRI. Finally, since participants can have high degrees of economic literacy and be backed by high analytic capabilities of their organizations, but still not be able to make policy demands at public forum, their assessment of the process of participation (both before and during the review exercise) is also measured. Each of these variables, like those of successful participation, is operationalized and measured on an ordinal scale.

## **7.2. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES**

The data for the study were obtained through a survey of SAPRI participants across Ghana. The initial list of participants, obtained from the global SAPRI Network, was 240 persons.<sup>6</sup> The list was reviewed for useability, in terms of such factors as valid names, addresses, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses. Based on these criteria, 156 potential respondents were identified as valid for the purposes of this study. A pilot questionnaire was sent out to 16 of these identified respondents. They were encouraged to complete the questionnaire and return them with comments of any kind, such as comprehensibility of the questions and issues that they

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<sup>6</sup> The Institutional Review Board of the University of Pittsburgh granted approval for the study on December 6, 2002. The approval is attached as Appendix C.



would like to see covered in the study. Eleven people responded, eight of whom added comments for improvements. Based on this feedback and the author's further reviews, the questionnaire was revised and reprinted for the actual study (see Appendix A).

Copies of the revised questionnaire were mailed out to the remaining 140 respondents. Out of this number, an initial 73 responded over a four-week period, with some making additional comments not on the questionnaire's content but about SAPRI itself. Of the 73 initial responses, eight were found to be missing significant amounts of information and returned to the respondents for further attention. One of the eight was returned and eventually used for the study.

The problem of non-response bias in mailed-questionnaire, and strategies for dealing with them, are well documented (see, e.g., Erdos, 1970; Felion, 1990). Armstrong and Overton (1997) discuss a number approaches to dealing with the problem, with the "most commonly recommended...[being] the reduction of non-response itself." They suggest that "if appropriate procedures are followed," non-response should be kept fewer than 30 percent. Following this recommendation for this study, reminder post cards were later sent to all of the remaining 67 respondents, with 21 responding. Of the initial 140 mail-outs, 31 were returned as "undeliverable" by the post office and 22 respondents did not return their questionnaires at all, despite follow-up post-card entreaties to do so. Based on the foregoing, the response rate to the initial 140 mail-outs was 52.1 percent; after the follow-up letters, this rate improved to 62.1 percent. However, once the "undeliverables" are removed from the computations, the response rate climbs to 79.8 percent, about 10 percentage points higher than what was expected. In the end, 89 valid responses were used for the study (see Table 7.1). It must be stated that while the number of valid responses for the study far exceeded the

minimum 30 traditionally considered acceptable for statistical analysis (Maddala, 1983), the author believes a considerably larger number of responses would provide richer insights beyond this theoretical exploration of the black box of the new participation. This issue is taken up further in “Directions and Issues for Future Research” in the final chapter, with the proposal that the theoretical framework developed here be applied to a much larger constituency of participants in a more contemporary setting.

**Table 7-1 Summary of Mail-outs and Response Rates**

Total mail-outs *	140
Initial Responses	75
After 2 follow-ups	21
Total Responses	96
Number of Incompletes	8
Re-mailed incompletes	8
Returned Incompletes	1
Total (96) less 7 unreturned incompletes	89
No. of non-respondents	51
Of which "undeliverable"	31
Non-responsive (after follow-ups)	20
Initial Response rate	53.6%
Final Response Rate	63.6%
Final Response Rate Adjusted for 30 Undeliverables	81.7%

\* After vetting initial list of 240 for lack of address, telephone, or e-mail info.

Once the data were collected in line with the procedures outlined above, the data were analyzed and the findings were interpreted within the context of the hypotheses put forth earlier as well as the review of the literature. The analysis was conducted in three stages: descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate, based on Dometrius (1992). The basic statistical framework is the “contingency table”.

The descriptive analysis section discusses the salient characteristics of respondents, including a discussion of regional and other distributions in comparison with similar national statistics. This section also offers a preliminary assessment of respondents’ views on the various

components of their participation in SAPRI. The appropriate tables showing the frequency and their correspondent percentages of response are also reproduced, alongside the analyses. The bivariate analysis sequentially evaluated the basic statistical relationships between each component of successful participation and each explanatory variable. During this stage of the analysis, no effort was made to control for the potential effects of other (extraneous) variables while establishing the statistical and substantive relationships between each pair of variables.<sup>7</sup> To establish a statistically significant relationship between participation, which is the dependent variable, and each explanatory variable, the Chi square statistic was used at the 0.05 level of significance. If a probability value (p-value) of less than .05 was obtained, the null hypothesis that there is no association or “dependence” between participation and any of the explanatory variables was rejected. The preliminary conclusion would thus be that the relationship between the variables was in fact statistically significant. If, however, the p-value turned out to be greater than the stated significance level of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected and it was concluded that the observed relationship between the variables of interest is not statistically strong enough to be significant.

If a statistically significant relationship was observed between each component of successful participation and any other variable, the next step was to establish substantive significance by answering the question: How *strong* was the observed relationship? To do this, we turn to correlational analysis, using gamma and Kendall’s tau coefficients, the standard measures of correlational strength between ordinal variables. It was expected, in line with the hypotheses of the study, that each correlation coefficient would be positive and significant. A test of each coefficient for substantive significance at the .05 level was then conducted, with a

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<sup>7</sup> Statistical significance for the Chi-square serves as a threshold in confirming or disconfirming the hypothesized relationship between any two variables, without dealing with the strength of that relationship, which may be low or high. To determine this strength, we establish substantive significance through correlational analysis.

null hypothesis that the true coefficient is actually zero (i.e., the observed relationship between participation and the independent variables was a statistical artifact). If a p-value lower than .05 was obtained, the null hypothesis was rejected and the research hypothesis was confirmed, i.e., the observed relationship is substantively significant. If, however, the p-value turned out to be greater than the stated significance level, the null hypothesis would not be rejected and it would then be concluded that indeed, there is no relationship of substantive significance between the two variables.

The third and final stage of the analysis elaborates on the preceding two stages by going beyond bivariate analysis (which does not control for the effects of other variables) and attempts to strengthen the analysis by controlling for the effects of these other explanatory variables; this method has the advantage of eliminating or at least explaining factors other than the independent variable that may indirectly account for variations in the dependent variable during the bivariate analysis. In this regard, the gamma and Kendall's tau coefficients are re-computed and used to re-measure the strength of association between participation and the explanatory variables *simultaneously* with the control variables. Each part (or "item") of the control variable is then analyzed against the results of bivariate analysis. The test of substantive significance would be the same as in the bivariate analysis – that is, based on the gamma and Kendall's tau-b statistics.

If the re-measured relationships turned out to be essentially the same as the original ones (i.e., significant p-values), the hypothesized relationship between participation and the explanatory variables tested at the first two stages of the analysis was sent to be replicated and thus validated. We can then draw the stronger conclusion that variations in the independent variable do in fact lead to substantive variations in the dependent variable.

If, however, the relationship between participation and the independent variables is replicated for some parts of the control variables but not others, we can only draw conditional conclusions that the original relationships hold for a subgroup of the control variable but not the others.

### **7.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

Like any study, this one is not without its limitations – limitations that with the benefit of future research can be addressed as part of the cumulative process of enhancing knowledge in the social sciences in general and in relation to the topic of the new participation in particular. One possible limitation is the time span of about two-and-half years between the completion of the SAPRI exercise and the conduct of the survey. This may ordinarily be considered “too long” a time to facilitate the fresh recall of information by the respondents. Nevertheless, studies of longer time-spans have been conducted that yielded useful new information. It is expected that this study would be no different, with the caveat that any future efforts at replication consider such issues. Finally, as with all statistical methods, the contingency-tables approach used for this study has its strengths and weakness. It, for instances, relaxes the rather strict conditions of distribution of the underlying survey data without losing essential information for the ensuing analysis. The contingency table is also easy to interpret, for both the layperson and the professional. But out of this simplicity may arise the problem of too many “empty cells,” or zero counts, for items in a variable. (For example, we may have 10 females and no males in a population of 10 for the variable “sex”). Liao (2000) describes three types of empty cells: (1) sampling zero, where the sample size, such as “Chinese American farmers in Illinois”, makes it all but impossible to obtain any counts; (2) structural zero, where it is theoretically impossible to

have a count, such as male users of diaphragm contraceptive; and (3) a sparse contingency table, which may have lower observed values, “be they zero or not.”

The greater the number of categories (such as “education levels”) in a variable (such as “education”), the greater the likelihood of having empty cells and thus compromising the integrity of the analysis. To avoid this problem, Liao (2000) recommends “collapsibility,” or the recoding of the original data into fewer categories, such that items such as “strongly disagree” and “disagree” may be combined into a single category of “disagree.” The objective is to minimize the incidence of sparseness, if any, of the contingency table and thus enhance the quality of the analysis. Where, appropriate (in the analysis and interpretation section), this advice has been followed.

## 8. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

### 8.1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

Of the total 89 respondents to the questionnaire, 71 (about 80 percent) were male. The sex composition of the study's respondents, however, needs to be situated within the larger framework of sex distribution in the Ghanaian population, particularly the literate segment, which is the only one capable of taking part in an English-only exercise like SAPRI. According to the 2000 national census (GSS 2002), some 53.3 percent of Ghana's population 15 years and older were literate in either English or a known Ghanaian language. But the report also points out that "since much of the literature and mass communication [in the country] is in English, the effective literacy level [for English] is 46.9 percent." For males, the effective literacy rate was 56.0 percent, while that of the female population was 38.3 percent. Such disparities inevitably reduce the number of eligible female adults available for policy research, although the general female population accounts for just over 50.0 percent of the total Ghanaian population.

National averages also tend to disguise significant disparities across the 10 administrative regions of the country, especially disparities between the three economically deprived northern regions and the rest of the country.<sup>8</sup> The same report from the Statistical Service also notes, for example, that the *illiteracy* rate in Greater Accra Region (home to the national capital and hence the disproportionate beneficiary of most socio-economic infrastructure and services) was 20.6

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<sup>8</sup> See, *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 2000.

percent, but those for the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions were 78.7 percent, 78.1 percent, and 75.5 percent, respectively.

Combined with the comparatively low level of physical infrastructure and economic development in these regions, the pronounced disparities in literacy levels have important implications for policy research in terms of the researcher's ability to reach potential respondents on an equitable basis. In addition to having a comparatively small pool of literate participants to choose from, the researcher also faces the task of reaching people who have limited or no access to such basic facilities as post offices or telephones. Despite these limitations, all efforts were made to ensure that as much as possible the responses reflected the regional distribution of the 140 respondents originally short-listed for the study. Table 8.1 shows that with the noticeable exception of Greater Accra, the responses did roughly follow the distribution of the 140 participants.



**Table 8-1 Distribution of Respondents Versus SAPRI Participants**

	Regional Distribution of Participants	Share of Regional Distribution (%)	Number of Survey Responses	Share of Survey Responses (%)
Ashanti Region	14	10.0	9	10.1
Greater Accra	45	32.1	22	24.7
Eastern Region	11	7.9	10	11.2
Western Region	13	9.4	11	12.4
B.A. Region	10	7.1	7	7.9
Northern Region	6	4.3	5	5.6
Volta Region	12	8.6	7	7.9
Central Region	14	10.1	7	7.9
Upper East	7	5.0	4	4.5
Upper West	8	5.7	7	7.9
Total	140	100.0	89	100.0

The educational characteristics of respondents appear in Table 8.4. Just over 10.0 percent of respondents had had up to secondary school education, while another 27.0 percent claimed post-secondary, non-university education (such as technical and vocational schools). About 33.0 percent had first university degrees (B.A. or B.Sc.), 22.5 percent had master’s degrees of some kind, with another 4.5 percent having doctorate degrees. A minority of 3.4 percent had “other” levels of education. Since English literacy is a minimum requirement for participation in any forum on national policy making, one would expect that the educational qualifications of respondents would be higher than the national average. And indeed they are, according to the Fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey. Only 10.4 percent of Ghanaians were found to have attained “secondary or higher” levels “of education. In this respect, the respondents (and most likely the general group of participants) can be said to be atypical of the national population – generally better educated.

**Table 8-2 Educational Attainment of Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent of Respondents
Secondary School	9	10.1
Post-secondary non-university	24	27.0
Post-secondary university (BA/BSc.)	29	32.6
Post-secondary university (MA/MSc)	20	22.5
Post-secondary university (doctorate)	4	4.5
Other	3	3.4
Total	89	100.0
<i>No respondent reported only pre-secondary education.</i>		

In summary, it must be stated that a study of this nature that seeks to reflect as much as possible national phenomena and trends faces several structural challenges, such as wide disparities in literacy rates between men and women, and among regions, as well as the pronounced differences between various parts of the country in terms of infrastructure development and hence access to research subjects. Against this background, and other limitations, such as the poor quality of the list of participants, it is nearly impossible to select participants on the basis of a statistically representative sample of the national population. When compared to the original list of 140 participants selected for the study, however, the regional distribution of responses broadly mirrored that of the participants, the only notable exception being Greater Accra, where the response rate was considerably lower, although still higher than any other region's.

## **8.2. SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS' ORGANIZATIONS**

To measure the capacity of participants' organizations to provide them with policy-relevant information for purposes of participation, respondents were asked to assess their organizations' capacity to collect and analyze such information for purposes of participation. The results are summarized in Table 8.5. Just over half – 53.9 percent – agreed that their organizations had the facilities to collect information on economic and social policies; 36.0 percent said their organizations lacked such facilities, and another 10.1 percent offered no opinion on the topic. In terms of their organizations' human capacity to analyze any information they may obtain, 21.3 percent said they had no such capacity; 4.5 percent offered no opinion; while the remaining 74.2 percent reported that their organizations indeed had such a capacity. Asked whether or not they thought receiving policy-relevant information from government was “difficult”, 57.3 percent said it was not difficult, while another 21.9 percent said it was difficult. About 16.0 percent had no opinion. Overall, therefore, participants seemed to view their organizations as having the analytical capacity to support their efforts at participation. The relatively high score that respondents assign their organizations' analytical capacity may be partly reflective of current efforts by international organizations and donor countries to “build the capacity of civil society organizations”. These capacity-building efforts have included both human resource training at home and abroad, and well as the supply of equipment and furniture to various civil-society organizations around the country.

**Table 8-3 Policy-Analytic Capacity of Participants' Organizations**

	Organization Has Information Gathering Facilities	Organization has Technical Capacity to Analyze Policy-relevant Data	Obtaining Policy-relevant Info from Government Is Difficult
Strongly Disagree	4.5	2.2	12.5
Disagree	31.5	19.1	44.9
No Opinion	10.1	4.5	15.7
Agree	39.3	58.4	21.3
Strongly Agree	14.6	15.7	5.6

More detailed information on the participants' organizations' ability to communicate with the rest of the world (and thus presumably be adequately informed about policy issues of the day) was also collected. The results are summarized in Table 8.6 below. About 24.0 percent reported having no telephone facilities. Of those who had them, 32.6 percent said those facilities worked most of the time, while 42.7 percent said they worked some of the time; only 1.1 said they did not work at all. Slightly more than 65.0 percent had no fax facilities, a critical deficiency in an era of real-time information and communication technology. About 14.0 percent said they had such facilities and that they worked most of the time, while 15.7 percent said theirs worked only some of the time. About 6.0 percent said their fax facilities did not work. These findings do not only reflect the limits of capacity building efforts for CSOs but also a pressing need for them to do more to address such deficiencies.

**Table 8-4 Participant's Organizations' Access to Information-Communications Facilities**

	Telephone Availability	Fax Availability	Computer Availability	Internet Availability
Have None	23.6	65.2	39.3	73.0
Never Works	1.1	5.6	1.1	1.1
Works	42.7	15.7	28.1	18
Sometimes Works Most Times	32.6	13.5	31.5	7.9

With respect to computer ownership, about 40.0 percent said their offices had none, about 32.0 percent said they had computers that worked most of the time, another 28.1 percent said their computers only worked sometimes, and just over 1.0 percent said they had computers that did not work at all. The proportion of organizations with no access to the internet, not surprisingly was very high: 73.0 percent. For 18.0 percent of the organizations represented, their internet facilities worked part of the time, while only 7.9 percent had facilities that worked most of the time. Another 1.1 percent said their internet facilities never worked at all. Taken together, the findings portray a low level of information-communication technology development among participants' organizations, and hence a diminished capacity to receive or share policy-relevant information readily.

In order to obtain a consolidated view of the regional breakdown in ICT capabilities of the participants' organizations, an average for each of their responses was computed for each of the administrative regions of the country (see Table 8. 7 below). As the table shows, Greater Accra, home region of the national capital and a disproportionate beneficiary of development resources, has a massive advantage over the rest of the country in terms of access and functionality of information and communication technology. For example, 27.3 percent of respondents from the Greater Accra Region alone reported that their ICT equipment, such as telephones and fax machines, worked all of the time. This is low by international standards but quite high by Ghanaian standards. For example, only one other respondent, from the Western Region (representing 9.1 percent of total responses for that region), reported that their ICT facilities worked all the time. The Upper East, Upper West, Central and (curiously) the Ashanti and Eastern regions had very high percentages of respondents reporting that their ICT facilities

did not work at all. The threat to one-way or two-way communication as a form of participation cannot be over-emphasized.

**Table 8-5 ICT Equipment (Capacity) of Respondents' Organizations By Region**

		Have None	Never Works	Works Sometimes	Works Most of the Time	Works All the Time	Total
G. Accra	Frequency	0	4	3	9	6	22
	Percent by Regions	.0%	18.2%	13.6%	40.9%	27.3%	100.0%
Eastern Re	Frequency	1	4	2	3	0	10
	Percent by Regions	10.0%	40.0%	20.0%	30.0%	.0%	100.0%
Western	Frequency	0	2	6	2	1	11
	Percent by Regions	.0%	18.2%	54.5%	18.2%	9.1%	100.0%
Volta	Frequency	0	3	3	1	0	7
	Percent by Regions	.0%	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%	.0%	100.0%
U. West	Frequency	1	5	1	0	0	7
	Percent by Regions	14.3%	71.4%	14.3%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
U. East	Frequency	1	1	1	1	0	4
	Percent by Regions	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	.0%	100.0%
Ashanti	Frequency	1	0	7	1	0	9
	Percent by Regions	11.1%	.0%	77.8%	11.1%	.0%	100.0%
Central	Frequency	1	3	1	2	0	7
	Percent by Regions	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%	28.6%	.0%	100.0%
Northern	Frequency	0	1	2	2	0	5
	Percent by Regions	.0%	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	.0%	100.0%
B. Ahafo	Frequency	0	4	3	0	0	7
	Percent by Regions	.0%	57.1%	42.9%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	5	27	29	21	7	89
	Percent by Regions	5.6%	30.3%	32.6%	23.6%	7.9%	100.0%

In summary, respondents' organizations appear to have a relatively good human resource base for policy-relevant analyses and its associated activities, but seem to lack adequate levels of

information-technology capabilities. The very low levels of ICT development, in particular, are very disturbing, with potentially adverse effects on future participatory efforts.

### 8.3. RESPONDENTS' GENERAL VIEWS ON PARTICIPATORY SUCCESS

Table 8.6 offers a preliminary portrait of respondents' views on various indicators of successful participation. Information was gathered on "voice," that is, the extent to which the respondents believed they were able to present the views of their organizations adequately at SAPRI. Of the total 89 respondents, 83.2 percent agreed with the statement, indicating a high degree of voice (the effective communication of policy demands) at SAPRI, but another 15.7 percent disagreed. As a first step towards evaluating participatory success, this is encouraging, although matters of representativeness remain.

**Table 8-6 'Respondents Were Able to Present Overall Views of their Organizations at SAPRI'**

		Frequency	Percent	
With respect to of issues covered, 83.2 discussed at the forum	Disagree	14	15.7	the representativeness percent said issues adequately reflected
	No Opinion	1	1.1	
	Agree	54	60.7	
	Strongly Agree	20	22.5	
	Total	89	100.0	

the concerns of civil society in general, with only 5.6 percent of respondents disagreeing (see Table 8.9). This generally high level of issues representativeness, however, is reduced somewhat once the issues are further disaggregated to account for particular groups, such as women and children. For example, because it was widely argued by the organizers of SAPRI that

poverty not only increased under structural adjustment but that it affected women and children disproportionately, respondents were asked if they believed that topics covering children, women and poverty, in particular, were adequately covered at SAPRI. The results are summarized below in Table 8.10.

**Table 8-7 ‘Issues Discussed at SAPRI Reflected the Concerns of Civil Society in General’**

		Frequency	Percent				
<b>Table 8-8 ‘The Following Discussed at SAPRI’</b>	Disagree	5	5.6	<b>Issues Were Adequately</b>			
	No Opinion	5	5.6				
	Agree	17	19.1				
	Strongly Agree	62	69.7				
	<b>Total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100.0</b>				
		Children		Women		Poverty	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
Strongly Disagree	9	10.1	6	6.7	1	1.1	
Disagree	38	42.7	25	28.1	6	6.7	
No Opinion	9	10.1	5	5.6	3	3.4	
Agree	29	32.6	42	47.2	40	4.9	
Strongly Agree	4	4.5	11	12.4	39	43.8	

Slightly more than half of respondents – 52.8 percent – felt that children’s issues were not adequately discussed at the forum, compared to 37.1 percent who felt the opposite, while 10.1 percent had no opinion one way or another. Respondents’ views on the discussion of issues affecting women were much “better”, with some 59.6 percent of respondent saying that women’s issues were adequately covered at the forum while a significant minority – 34.8 percent – maintained that the treatment of women’s issues at the forum was inadequate. With respect to poverty, a significantly large proportion of respondents – 88.7 percent agreed that it was adequately covered at the forum; only 7.8 percent dissented. Hence, issues affecting one of the



most vulnerable groups in society – children – appeared to have received comparatively little attention, despite the generally high levels of issues-representativeness scored by respondents.

It is significant to note that the pattern of respondents' views on interest-group representativeness at SAPRI differed markedly from their views on voice and issues representativeness discussed in the preceding section. Of those responding, 48.3 percent did not believe that children's advocacy groups were adequately represented at the forum, although 34.9 percent felt otherwise (see Table 8.11). The *relatively* high representation for children's *advocacy groups* in a situation where 53.0 percent of respondents said that children's issues were not adequately discussed suggests a lack of voice for these advocacy groups, despite their significant presence at the forum. With regards to women's advocacy groups, 58.5 percent agreed that they were adequately represented, a similar proportion (59.6 percent) to those who felt that women's issues were adequately addressed. The 33.0 percent who did not share this view about representation were roughly the same as the 34.8 percent who disagreed that women's issues were adequately discussed. These preliminary findings on the representativeness of women's groups, compared to those of children, accord with the respondents' views on how well women's issues were addressed at the forum; it clearly suggests the need for greater voice for children's advocacy groups at similar forums in the future. As one respondent noted, the "absence of ...women and children advocacy groups [at SAPRI] has been a set back which has to be addressed to play into the process of addressing our economic situation." (Salami; Appendix D)

**Table 8-9 ‘Advocacy Groups for the Following Were Adequately Represented’**

	Children		Women		Poverty	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	9	10.1	5	5.6	2	2.2
Disagree	34	38.2	24	27.0	5	5.6
No Opinion	15	16.9	8	9.0	3	3.4
Agree	28	31.5	41	46.1	37	41.6
Strongly Agree	3	3.4	11	12.4	42	47.2

With respect to the regional representativeness of participants, 78.7 percent of respondents felt that it was adequate, 8.9 percent disagreed, and 12.4 percent offered no opinion (See Table 8.10).

**Table 8-10 ‘Regional Representation Was Adequate’**

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	2	2.2
Disagree	6	6.7
No Opinion	11	12.4
Agree	37	41.6
Strongly Agree	33	37.1

Questions were also posed about respondents’ views on the impact of SAPRI on public policy since the forum was held. The responses, as shown in Table 8.13, also varied considerably according to the issues concerned. About 79.0 percent said they viewed civil society issues as having attained more prominence in public policy since SAPRI, with another 12.3 percent dissenting and 9.0 percent offering no opinion. A slightly lower proportion – 64.0 percent – of respondents believed that children’s issues have gained similar prominence in public policy as a result of SAPRI, with 17.9 percent dissenting and another 18.0 percent expressing no views one way or another. With regards to women’s issues, some 70.8 percent felt that the state was paying more attention to them since SAPRI, while 15.7 percent disagreed, and another 13.5 percent offered no views. Finally, respondents were asked if they thought that poverty issues had attained

more prominence in public policy as a result of SAPRI. About 70.0 percent said they had, while 22.4 percent disagreed and just under 8.0 percent proffered no opinion.

The respondents' views that, compared to other issues (e.g., women's situation and poverty), children's issues gained less attention in public policy since SAPRI only reinforces their assertion earlier that, despite the high presence of child advocacy groups at the Forum, issues about children were not adequately addressed there. This in turn means that such issues continue to attract little attention in policy circles, despite the existence of various government agencies devoted to children's welfare.

**Table 8-11 'Issues about the Following have Attained Policy Prominence Since SAPRI'**

	Civil Society		Women		Children		Poverty	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Strongly Disagree	1	1.1	2	2.2	2	2.2	2	2.2
Disagree	10	11.2	12	13.5	14	15.7	18	20.2
No Opinion	8	9.0	12	13.5	16	18.0	7	7.9
Agree	51	57.3	45	50.6	44	49.4	50	56.2
Strongly Agree	19	21.3	18	20.2	13	14.6	12	13.5

#### **8.4. RESPONDENTS' GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF POLICY ISSUES**

To be able to participate effectively in a forum on the formulation of national policies, it is important that the participants have a fairly good knowledge and understanding of the kinds of issues that go into the formulation of these policies. The study adopted two ways of measuring this knowledge: Participants' general knowledge of key economic and other issues in public policy as well as the usefulness of seminars and workshops specifically designed for them prior to their involvement in SAPRI. The results are discussed as they appear in Table 8.14.

With the exception of structural adjustment issues in general, fewer than half of the respondents reported having "above average" knowledge of any of the main policy issues


presented to them – monetary policy, fiscal policy, international trade, government expenditures, government revenue, and foreign aid. Just over 50.0 percent said they had above-average knowledge of structural adjustment programs. Given the public controversy over the effects of structural adjustment, it is not surprising that participants would declare above-average knowledge of the issues at stake. The other two issue areas that respondents reported above average knowledge – monetary policy and fiscal policy – also generated widespread controversy because of their palpable effects on everyday life. Under monetary policy, for instance, the country’s currency, the cedi, has been depreciating over the years, leading to higher consumer inflation and complaints from the public.

In terms of their overall knowledge of the policy issues presented to them in the survey, only 38.2 percent of respondents reported an above-average level of knowledge. A slim majority of 50.6 percent reported an average level of knowledge while the remaining 11.2 percent reported a below average level of knowledge.

**Table 8-12 Respondents Self-rated Knowledge of Economic Issues and SAPs (%)**

Knowledge of:	Below Average	Average	Above Average
Monetary Policy	16.9	50.6	32.6
Fiscal Policy	19.1	49.4	31.5
International Trade	14.6	51.7	33.7
Government Spending	16.9	42.7	40.4
Government Revenue	12.4	40.4	47.2
Foreign Aid	11.2	46.1	42.7
Structural Adjustment	6.7	42.7	50.6
Overall Rating	11.2	50.6	38.2


**Figure 8-1 'Respondents' Overall Knowledge of Policy Issues**



### **8.5. RESPONDENTS' KNOWLEDGE OF FORUM-SPECIFIC ISSUES**

What respondents lacked in general knowledge of policy issues was addressed, to some extent, through workshops and seminars conducted by the organizers of SAPRI for the participants. Only 2.2 percent disagreed in one form or another that the workshops were useful to them, just over 20.0 percent had no opinion, while a respectable majority of 77.5 percent agreed that the workshops were in fact useful (see Figure 8.2). Judging by the responses of the participants, these workshops appeared to have aided them specifically in their participation.

**Figure 8-2 Economic Literacy Workshops Prior to SAPRI Were Useful**



How participants viewed the efficacy and/or fairness of the whole SAPRI process, from preparation to the actual forum, was considered an equally important research question. The results are summarized in Table 8.15. With some consistency, between 60.0 percent and 67.0 percent felt that they were given enough time to *prepare* for the forum and make their contributions during the forum and that the various moderators allowed them, whenever they wanted to, to make such contributions. Those disagreeing with this assessment ranged between 30.0 percent and 32.0 percent. While those disagreeing represented a smaller proportion of respondents, their number – one out of every three participants – appears significant enough to warrant the attention of future forums of this nature.

## **8.6. ESTABLISHING INTRA-EPISODE SUCCESS**

### **8.6.1. Hypothesis Testing**

This section of the analysis is based on contingency tables and their associated statistics. In order to minimize possible problems of sparse or empty cells (as discussed in the section on research design), the original data has been recoded from five items to three; the ordinality of the data is retained. The three dependent scale variables of interest are voice, inclusiveness, and impact. To ensure that the scales are reliable and consistent in their measurement of their underlying constructs, Cronbach's alpha or index of reliability was computed for each of them based on Santos (2000). The index ranges between 0 and 1, with 1, indicating perfect reliability. An alpha of 0.9 was obtained for "voice", which was considerably higher than the 0.7 deemed acceptable by Nunnally (1978). The alpha for "inclusiveness" was 0.7 while that of "impact" was 0.5. All were significant at the 05 level, although marginally so for "impact", indicating the potential for improvements in future research. The alphas for economic literacy, analytical

capacity, and process were, respectively, 0.6, 0.5, and 0.7. Each hypothesized relationship between each dependent variable and the independent variables is stated and tested, and the results are analyzed accordingly.

#### **8.6.2. Relationship between Inclusiveness and SAPRI's Organizational Arrangements**

**Null hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and SAPRI's Organizational Arrangements (Process) are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and SAPRI's Organizational Arrangements (Process) are *not* independent of each other.

How, according to research question (v), did the participants view the overall organizational arrangements of SAPRI (process) and its effects on their perceived level or degree of inclusiveness at the forum, in terms of policy issues, advocacy groups, and the 10 administrative regions of the country? Thirty-nine respondents out of the total of 89 agreed that the forum's organizational arrangement greatly facilitated their contributions at SAPRI, with 61.5 percent simultaneously saying that they considered the forum to have been inclusive, along the lines of issues, groups and administrative regions, as discussed earlier. Of those who disagreed over the facilitatory quality of the forum's process, nearly 22.0 percent also disagreed over the issues of inclusiveness. The results are summarized in Table 8.13.

The overall pattern of responses does suggest, however, that the more a person found the forum's organizational arrangements to have facilitated their participation, the more inclined they were to consider the forum as inclusive. The p-value of  $<.001$  for the chi-square means that we can confidently reject the null hypothesis of independence between inclusiveness and process and thus accept the research hypothesis. The p-value of  $<.001$  for both gamma and tau-b is

further testimony to the strength of the relationship between the two variables. In other words, the organizational efforts of the organizers, both prior to and during SAPRI, in the eyes of the participants, did pay off in terms of the democratic inclusiveness of the forum. Nevertheless, there were some participants who saw the forum as being less inclusive in terms of administrative regions and social groups. One respondent suggested that “future programs for SAPRI should also focus on the northern sector of Ghana,”, while another went a step further and suggested that “such forums could start from the district level to enable more people to take part, so as to broaden the participatory basis of the discussion) (Sakyi, Appendix A)

**Table 8-13 Relationship Between Inclusiveness and Organizational Arrangements of SAPRI**

		Organizational Arrangements for SAPRI Greatly Facilitated Participants’ Contributions			Total	
			Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	
Inclusiveness	Disagree	Frequency	3	1	0	4
		Percent within column responses	21.4%	2.8%	.0%	4.5%
	No Opinion	Frequency	9	23	15	47
		Percent within column responses	64.3%	63.9%	38.5%	52.8%
	Agree	Frequency	2	12	24	38
		Percent within column responses	14.3%	33.3%	61.5%	42.7%
Total		Total Count	14	36	39	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Chi-Square and Correlation Tests</b>						
			Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	
		Pearson Chi-Square	20.257	4	.000	
			Value	Approx. Sig.		
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b		.381	.000		
	Gamma		.620	.000		



### 8.6.3. Relationship between Inclusiveness and Policy-analytic Capacity of Participants' Organizations

**Null hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of participants' organizations are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of participants' organizations are *not* independent of each other.

This hypothesis relates to research question (iv) and the results appear in Table 8.14. Of all the respondents who felt that their respective organizations had adequate analytical capacity for purposes of participation, 50.0 percent also agreed that the forum was inclusiveness in every respect, with just 15.4 percent disagreeing simultaneously on both scores. Significantly, a large proportion of respondents either expressed “no opinion” or disagreement with the assertion that the analytical capacity of their organizations helped them to establish the inclusiveness of the overall forum. Indeed, of the 62 persons who offered no opinion on analytical capacity, just over half also expressed no opinion on inclusiveness. Evidently, participants saw very little relationship between their organizations' ability to conduct policy analysis and the inclination of the organizers to make the forum inclusive. This conclusion is statistically and intuitively appealing, since the policy analytical capacity of a respondent's organization should have no direct bearing on forums' organizers' inclination to make the forum representative.

**Table 8-14 Relationship Between Inclusiveness and Policy-analytic Capacity**

			My Organization Had the Capacity to Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI			Total
			Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	
Inclusiveness	Disagree	Frequency	2	1	1	4
		Percent within column responses	15.4%	1.6%	7.1%	4.5%
	No Opinion	Frequency	9	32	6	47
		Percent within column responses	69.2%	51.6%	42.9%	52.8%
	Agree	Frequency	2	29	7	38
		Percent within column responses	15.4%	46.8%	50.0%	42.7%
Total		Total Count	13	62	14	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square and Correlation Tests			
	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.425	4	.077

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.189	.071
	Gamma	.361	.071

**8.6.4. Relationship between Inclusiveness and Economic Literacy.**

**Null hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and participants’ level of economic literacy are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Inclusiveness and participants’ level of economic literacy are *not* independent of each other.

This hypothesis was postulated within the context of research question (iii), dealing with the level of economic literacy of participants and their successful participation. The responses appear in Table 8.15. Of the 68 respondents who agreed that the economic literacy workshops

provided by SAPRI organizers prior to the exercise were helpful to their participation 50.0 percent also agreed that the overall forum was inclusive of all major groups, issues and administrative regions, with only 1.5 percent disagreeing. Indeed, the greater the level of satisfaction with economic literacy, the greater the likelihood that the respondent would see the forum as all-inclusive. With the p-values for all three measures of independence and correlation much lower than the .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis that there is no association between the two variables is rejected.

**Table 8-15 Relationship Between Inclusiveness and Economic literacy**

		Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI Helped me Contribute Effectively			Total	
			Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	
Inclusiveness	Disagree	Frequency	0	3	1	4
		Percent within column responses	.0%	15.8%	1.5%	4.5%
	No Opinion	Frequency	2	12	33	47
		Percent within column responses	100.0%	63.2%	48.5%	52.8%
	Agree	Frequency	0	4	34	38
		Percent within column responses	.0%	21.1%	50.0%	42.7%
Total		Total Count	2	19	68	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square and Correlation Tests				
		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square		12.119	4	.016

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.300	.002
	Gamma	.629	.002

#### 8.6.5. Relationship between Voice and SAPRI's Organizational Arrangements

**Null hypothesis:** Voice and SAPRI's organizational arrangements (Process) are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Voice and SAPRI's organizational arrangements (Process) are *not* independent of each other

These hypotheses were posed to jointly address question (ii) (ability to discuss issues affecting civil society) and question (v) (the impact of organizational effectiveness on participation). The results appear in Table 8.16. Almost all the 39 respondents who saw the organizational arrangements of SAPRI both prior to and during the forum as greatly facilitating their participation ( 94.9 percent) also agreed that they were able to express adequately all the policy demands (views) of their organization at the forum. Not surprisingly, some 42.9 percent of those who saw the process as non-facilitatory of their participation also said that they were not able to adequately articulate their views at the forum. Fifty percent nevertheless felt that they were able to successfully present the policy concerns and demands of their organization as they wished, an indication that they may have encountered various difficulties in their efforts to participate in the forum, difficulties which might have diminished the effectiveness of their involvement in the forum. From these responses, it appears that the higher the satisfaction a respondent found with the organizational arrangements of the forum, the more satisfied they also were with the degree to which they were able to make their policy demands at SAPRI. The significant p-values confirm the relationship between voice and organizational facilitation.

**Table 8-16 Relationship Between Voice and Organizational Arrangements**

		Presentation Arrangements at SAPRI Greatly Facilitated my Contributions			Total	
		Disagree	No Opinion	Agree		
<b>Voice</b> (All views of my organization were successfully expressed at SAPRI)	Disagree	Frequency	6	8	2	16
		Percent within column responses	42.9%	22.2%	5.1%	18.0%
	No Opinion	Frequency	1	0	0	1
		Percent within column responses	7.1%	.0%	.0%	1.1%
	Agree	Frequency	7	28	37	72
		Percent within column responses	50.0%	77.8%	94.9%	80.9%
Total		Total Count	14	36	39	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Chi-Square and Correlation Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.757	4	.002

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.353	.000
	Gamma	.693	.000

**8.6.6. Relationship between Voice and Policy-analytic Capacity of Participants' Organizations**

**Null hypothesis:** Voice and the policy-analytic capacity of participants' organizations are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Voice and the policy-analytic capacity of participants' organizations are *not* independent of each other.

The hypotheses here deal with research question (iv) in relation to the “voice” of respondents at the forum vis-à-vis their organizational backgrounds; the results appear in Table 8.20. In addressing this question, a total of 14 out of 89 respondents conceded that their organizations had the policy analytical capacity to equip them with the requisite information to participate in a forum like SAPRI (see Table 8.17). Of those conceding, 85.7 percent also agreed that they were able to present all the views of their organizations at the forum. By contrast, some 54 percent of respondents doubted their organizations’ analytical capacity while at the same time saying that they were able to exercise adequate voice at the forum. Another 38.5 percent simultaneously cited both a lack of analytical capacity and voice, while 85.5 percent who had no opinion on the question of analytical capacity nevertheless said they exercised enough voice.

Given these facts, how significant is the relationship between the two variables – voice and policy-analytic capacity? With a the p-value of .029 (less than .05), the Chi-square confirmed the research hypotheses, while at values greater than 05, the measures of strength of association indicated the relationship between the two variables was not strong enough, statistically.] This conclusion is not as improbable or contradictory as it may seem.<sup>9</sup> There are at least two plausible explanations for it. It may be that the relationship between the two variables as presently measured is not linear, an assumption behind both Kendall’s tau and gamma. Secondly, there may be some other intervening factors whose influences are not reflected in this simple bivariate relationship. The next level of the analysis, when control variables are introduced, will help us elaborate on this part further. At this preliminary stage,

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<sup>9</sup> Dometrius (1992) warns that gamma, though the more popular and “versatile” of the two measures, tends to be “a bit generous in measuring relationships.” Kendall’s tau-b was thus introduced to “compensate” for the generosity of gamma, which uses somewhat more restrictive criteria. (While Kendall’s tau-b is used exclusively for square or equal-item contingency tables, tau-c is applied in situations where the table is rectangular or of unequal number of items in the ordinal variables).

though, it does suggest that contrary to what the literature says (see, e.g., Servaes, 1995), it will take more than strong analytical capacities for civil society organizations or their representatives to be heard at public forums; organizational arrangements also play a critical mediating role in establishing the voice of civil society at public forums. This is eloquently confirmed by one of the respondents as follows: “The involvement of civil society in decision-making has made SAPRI a unique programme...However, from my own experience, participants were not allowed to adequately express their views, even though they were allowed to talk whenever they wanted to.” (A.B. Ibn Hassan, – Appendix D).

**Table 8-17 Relationship Between Voice and Organization’s Policy Analytical Capacity**

		My Organization Had the Capacity to Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI			Total	
		Disagree	No Opinion	Agree		
<b>VOICE</b> (All views of my organization were successfully expressed at SAPRI)	Disagree	Frequency	5	9	2	16
		Percent within column responses	38.5%	14.5%	14.3%	18.0%
	No Opinion	Frequency	1	0	0	1
		Percent within column responses	7.7%	.0%	.0%	1.1%
	Agree	Frequency	7	53	12	72
		Percent within column responses	53.8%	85.5%	85.7%	80.9%
Total		Total Count	13	62	14	89
		Total Percentages	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Chi-Square and Correlation Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.777	4	.029

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.200	.089
	Gamma	.439	.089

### **8.6.7. Relationship between Voice and Economic Literacy of Participants**

**Null hypothesis:** Voice and participants' knowledge of economic issues are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Voice and participants' knowledge of economic issues are *not* independent of each other.

These hypotheses reflect a restatement of question (iii) in relation to voice and education or economic literacy, as previously defined. Reflecting the great importance that participants evidently attached to the workshops on economic and structural adjustment issues prior to SAPRI, a total of 68 of them found the workshops to have helped them in contributing effectively at the forum. Of those expressing this view, 85.3 percent conceded that they were able to effectively deliver all the policy positions of their organizations at SAPRI, while some 63.2 percent agreed that they were able to present all the policy positions of their organizations at SAPRI although they were not sure about the usefulness of the economic literacy programs (see Table 8.18). The remaining responses, however, showed no systematic patterns in respondents' assessment of economic literacy in relation to voice. This is statistically confirmed by the higher than normal p-values of both the measures of association and of strength. It seems, from this result, that economic literacy may be a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for promoting voice at a participatory episode like SAPRI. Other factors, such as a facilitatory "process", or organizational arrangements, may well prove equally important, if not more so, for a forum of this nature. We shall elaborate on this point during the next level of analysis.



**Table 8-0-18 Relationship Between Voice and Economic Literacy**

		Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI Helped me Contribute Effectively			Total	
			Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	
<b>Voice</b> (All views of my organization were successfully expressed at SAPRI)	Disagree	Frequency	0	6	10	16
		Percent within column responses	.0%	31.6%	14.7%	18.0%
	No Opinion	Frequency	0	1	0	1
		Percent within column responses	.0%	5.3%	.0%	1.1%
	Agree	Frequency	2	12	58	72
		Percent within column responses	100.0%	63.2%	85.3%	80.9%
Total		Total Count	2	19	68	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square and Correlation Tests				
		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square		7.396	4	.116

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.179	.127
	Gamma	.425	.127

In summary, the preceding section looked at factors affecting intra-episode success by testing a number of hypotheses, using bivariate analyses to examine the statistical relationship between inclusiveness and voice, on the one hand, and organizational arrangements, policy-analytic capacity, and economic literacy, on the other. The hypothesis that inclusiveness and organizational arrangements had no statistically significant relationship was rejected while economic literacy and inclusiveness were found to be related in a statistically significant way. The postulated relationship between inclusiveness and the policy analytic capacity of respondents' organizations, however, was not rejected. The ability of participants to present

their case at SAPRI was found to be strongly associated with the organizational arrangements of the forum's organizers. The link between voice and analytical capacity, however, was mixed – while a relationship existed, it was weak, perhaps because other factors will have to be jointly considered while assessing that relationship.

## **8.7. ESTABLISHING POST-EPIISODE SUCCESS**

### **8.7.1. Relationship between Impact and Organizational Arrangements (Process)**

**Null hypothesis:** Impact and organizational arrangements for SAPRI (Process) are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Impact and the organizational arrangements for SAPRI (Process) are *not* independent of each other.

These hypotheses reflect the sixth research question, which was designed to address the issue of post-episode success as viewed by participants, in contrast to the indicators of intra-episode success discussed in the preceding section. The results appear in Table 8.19 below. About 40 respondents agreed that the organizational arrangement both prior to and during the forum were helpful to their contributions at the forum. Just over 80.0 percent of these also saw the forum to have subsequently had a noticeable impact on public policy, while a significant 10.3 percent had neither an opinion on organizational arrangements nor the impact of the forum on public policy afterwards. Despite these assessments, the respondents also displayed a great deal of ambivalence towards the relationship between the two variables (impact and process), as evidenced by the high number of those offering no opinion on either one.

Not surprisingly, the measures of independence and association are higher than the .05 significance threshold, an indication that organizational arrangements, which were more relevant to the forum itself, would have any bearing on subsequent developments in public policy. We will need to consider other variables to explain participants' assessment of the subsequent impact of the forum on public policy.

**Table 8-19 Relationship Between Impact and Organizational Arrangements (Process)**

			Organizational Arrangements for SAPRI Greatly Facilitated Participants' Contributions			Total
			Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	
SAPRI Has influenced Public Policy in Ghana (IMPACT)	Disagree	Frequency	1	2	3	6
		Percent within column responses	7.1%	5.6%	7.7%	6.7%
	No Opinion	Frequency	5	11	4	20
		Percent within column responses	35.7%	30.6%	10.3%	22.5%
	Agree	Frequency	8	23	32	63
		Percent within column responses	57.1%	63.9%	82.1%	70.8%
Total		Total Count	14	36	39	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Chi-Square and Correlation Tests</b>						
			Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	
		Pearson Chi-Square	6.169	4	.187	
			Value	Approx. Sig.		
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b		.188	.056		
	Gamma		.340	.056		

### **8.7.2. Relationship between Impact and Analytical Capacity of Participants' Organizations**

**Null hypothesis:** Impact and the analytical capacity of respondents' organizations are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Impact and the analytical capacity of participants' organizations are *not* independent of each other.

As an extension of research question, these hypotheses examine the link between impact and the analytical capacity of respondents' organizations. The results appear in Table 8.20. Of those who agreed that their organizations had adequate capacity to conduct policy analysis about 72.0 percent felt that SAPRI had had a positive impact on public policy since it was undertaken. Out of the 62 persons who expressed no opinion on the analytical capacity of their organizations, 77.4 percent nevertheless agreed that SAPRI had positively affected public policy, while another 16.1 percent had no views on either issue. The various p-values suggest that the relationship between the impact and organizations' analytical capacity is relatively weak, but statistically significant. This means that a strong capacity to analyze public policy, including the effects of a participatory forum on such forum, is important but not enough to adequately assess this link. Subjective evaluations drawing on the institutional capacity of the respective organizations may have to be complemented with structured assessment that measure both outputs of policy and the observed impact of those outputs on particular socio-economic phenomenon.

**Table 8-20 Relationship Between Impact and Analytical Capacity of Participants' Organizations**

		My Organization Had the Capacity to Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI			Total		
		Disagree	No Opinion	Agree			
SAPRI influenced Policy in Ghana (IMPACT)	Has Public Disagree	Frequency	0	4	2	6	
		Percent within column responses	.0%	6.5%	14.3%	6.7%	
	No Opinion	Frequency	8	10	2	20	
		Percent within column responses	61.5%	16.1%	14.3%	22.5%	
	Agree	Frequency	5	48	10	63	
		Percent within column responses	38.5%	77.4%	71.4%	70.8%	
	Total		Total Count	13	62	14	89
			Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Chi-Square and Correlation Tests</b>						
			Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)		
		Pearson Chi-Square	14.728	4	.005		
			Value	Approx. Sig.			
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b		.145	.194			
	Gamma		.272	.194			

### 8.7.3. Relationship between Impact and Economic Literacy of Participants

**Null hypothesis:** Impact and the economic literacy of participants are independent of each other.

**Research hypothesis:** Impact and the analytical capacity of participants' organizations are *not* independent of each other.

As Table 8.21 shows, out of those who considered the usefulness of the economic literacy workshops to their participation, 77.9 percent also agreed that SAPRI did have a positive impact on public policy afterwards, while an additional 19.1 percent offered no assessment of the economic literacy workshops or the impact of SAPRI on public policy. Significantly, however, half of those who disagreed over the usefulness of the economic literacy exercise also felt that SAPRI had not influenced public policy afterwards, with another half proffering no views on the issue. The results clearly suggest that participants, with the benefit of the economic literacy programs, were more discerning in their assessment of SAPRI's effects on public policy.

The p-value of  $<.001$  for the chi-square supports this conclusion, with the p-values for measures of strength providing additional support. That both sets of measures should prove statistically significance was to be expected, because those who benefited from the economic literacy programs and found them useful were also those likely to be able to assess the policy landscape afterwards and conclude that their participation in SAPRI was worthwhile.

**Table 8-23 Relationship between Impact and Economic Literacy of Participants**

		Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI Helped me Contribute Effectively			Total	
		Disagree	No Opinion	Agree		
SAPRI Has influenced Public Policy in Ghana (IMPACT)	Disagree	Frequency	1	3	2	6
		Percent within column responses	50.0%	15.8%	2.9%	6.7%
	No Opinion	Frequency	1	6	13	20
		Percent within column responses	50.0%	31.6%	19.1%	22.5%
	Agree	Frequency	0	10	53	63
		Percent within column responses	.0%	52.6%	77.9%	70.8%
Total		Total Count	2	19	68	89
		Total Percentage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Chi-Square and Correlation Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.824	4	.008

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error	Approx. T	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.308	.109	2.562	.010
	Gamma	.597	.152	2.562	.010

The overall findings and the preceding discussions are summarized in the table below.

**Table 8.22 SUMARRY OF BIVARIATE ANALYSIS**

	PROCESS			ANALYTICAL CAPACITY			ECONOMIC LITERACY		
	Chi-sq.	Tau-b	Gamma	Chi-sq.	Tau-b	Gamma	Chi-sq.	Tau-b	Gamma
<b>INCLUSIVENESS</b>									
Coefficient	20.257	.381	.620	8.425	.189	.361	12.119	.300	.629
P-value	.000	.000	.000	.077	.071	.071	.016	.002	.002
<b>VOICE</b>									
Coefficient	16.757	.353	.693	10.777	.200	.439	7.396	.179	.425
P-value	.002	.000	.000	.029	.089	.089	.116	.127	.127
<b>IMPACT</b>									
Coefficient	6.169	.188	.340	14.728	.145	.207	13.824	.308	.597
P-value	.187	.056	.056	.005	.194	.194	.004	.101	.010

## **8.8. ELABORATION ON BIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROLS**

Up to this point, the analysis has not considered the possibility that factors other than those under consideration here – process, analytical capacity of respondents’ organization, and economic literacy of participants – may completely or partially influence successful participation at a forum, in terms of voice, inclusiveness, and impact. For example, as a result of culture, social conventions, and experience, public policies tend to affect men and women differently and they in turn tend to see and experience social and economic reality differently. Elson (1995), for instance, has extensively documented what she calls “male bias” in macro economic policies under structural adjustment (see, also, Boserup, 1970; Scott, 1995; Çagatay, 1998).] Similarly, a person’s educational background and region of residence may influence the way they view successful participation. As such a person’s ability to participate successfully and effectively is as much determined by their ability to read and write as their access to all forms of physical and institutional infrastructure (Gran, 1983; Friedmann, 1992). On the basis of this assertion, the preceding bivariate analysis is elaborated upon in the following section by controlling for respondents’ sex, educational background, and region of residence. The intent is to help understand better some of the results obtained so far. For reasons of space, the entire output for the elaboration is reproduced as Appendices A, B, and C. The table below represents only a summary of that output.



**Table 8-23 RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS USING CONTROLS**

(Each p-value refers to correlation values for (tau-b and gamma) for each bivariate relation, with the appropriate controlling variable, unless otherwise stated.)									
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Vs.	CONTROL VARIABLES							
		Sex		Education Levels			Region of Residence		
Inclusiveness vs:		M	F	Secondary	Tertiary First Degree/ Certificate	Tertiary Master's/ Higher	GA	UW,U E, NR, CR	Other Regs.
Process		.000	.800	.567	.001	.008	.571	.083	.000
Analytical Capacity		.067	.946	.265	.028	.113	.304	.418	.074
Economic Literacy		.006	.368	.859	.001	.153	.000	.701	.112
<b>Voice vs:</b>									
Process		.001	.165	.225	.010	.186	.831	.026	.005
Analytical Capacity		.135	.322	.289	.064	.776	.109	.412	.353
Economic Literacy		.457	.097	.596	.160	.493	.413	.360	.114
<b>Impact vs:</b>									
Process		.072	.417	.300	.211	.377	.023	1.0	.128
Analytical Capacity		.045	.883	.225	.065	.314	.591	.133	.821
Economic Literacy		.089	.023	.330	.083	.263	.839	.006	.114

A re-examination of the relationship between inclusiveness and process while controlling for the sex of respondents shows tau-b and gamma p-values of  $<.001$  for the male category of respondents, the same as for *all respondents combined* in the bivariate analysis. The value for the female category, however, was  $.800$ , much higher than the  $.05$  significance threshold. This means that male respondents were more likely than females to view the process as facilitatory of inclusiveness. This may be due to any number of social and forum-specific factors that generally tend militate against women’s interest, as captured in the feminist literature (Rathgeber, 1990). Due to a history of marginalization and exclusion, for example, may have causes women to feel that the organizers’ efforts at promoting equity or representation for issues, interest groups and administrative regions, as well-intentioned as they might have been, were simply not enough as a result of entrenched institutional biases against women. For advocates of WAD theories, this

would simply confirm their argument that pursuing equity for women in an overwhelmingly patriarchal society is at best an exercise in futility (Connelly, et al., 2001; Moser 1993). Although this may be the case, it is hard to imagine how a separatist feminist agenda, as pursued by WADists, can effectively address the problem. A broad-based gender-focused agenda, that in part seeks to sensitize men in particular about the “hidden dangers” of participation, may be a better option for women in particular and society in general.

In the case of inclusiveness and analytical capacity, the p-values for tau-b and gamma (.067 for male respondents and .946 for female respondents) were, as in the bivariate analysis, larger than the .05 significance level. The original finding that there was no significant relationship between the two variables was therefore confirmed, separately for the male and female subgroups of respondents.

The relationship between inclusiveness and economic literacy, which was found to be significant in the bivariate analysis, was replicated for male respondents but not for female respondents, with tau-b and gamma p-values of .006 for males and .368 for females. It appears that women overall were less likely than men to have viewed the forum as all-inclusive, despite the pre-forum efforts by the organizers to make it as inclusive as possible. In terms of issues, it could be argued that in assessing inclusiveness, women, more than men, placed more emphasis on the low level of attention given to child advocacy groups and children’s issues, for example. Indeed, when asked about their views about the adequacy of representation for child advocacy groups at the forum, 39.5 percent of male respondents agreed that it was adequate, with only 16.7 percent of female respondents sharing that view.<sup>10</sup> This confirms what has long been known in the development literature that the welfare of children is inseparable from that of their mothers

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<sup>10</sup> More specifically, 4.3 percent of male respondents said they “strongly” agreed with the statement that children’s advocacy groups were adequately represented; no female respondents shared that view.

(Stack, 1978; Moon, 1991) and the need to consider both groups jointly in the formulation of social and economic policies.

With respect to process and its effects on participants' assessment of inclusiveness, male dominance – common in many aspects of Ghanaian society– appeared have played a greater part in the allotment of speaking opportunities, for example, than one would have expected, in view of the organizers' efforts at fairness and inclusiveness, once again reinforcing the view by some feminist advocates that every effort, either by the state or civil society organizations, aimed at promoting equity must necessarily always be preponderant towards women, due to entrenched initial inequities (Molyneux, 1985).

When controlling for the possible effects of education, the relationship between inclusiveness and process was replicated for only respondents with tertiary education (first degrees/certificate or higher); the relationship between the two for participants with education up to the secondary school level proved insignificant. The tau-b and gamma p-value was .028 for first-degree/certificate holders, compared to .265 for those with up to secondary school education and those with graduate education or higher. It could be that people with generally high levels of education, for example, were more knowledgeable about the issues and thus more confident in getting themselves noticed by the moderators. Or perhaps they had better information, by virtue of their education levels, to be able to evaluate issues and groups representativeness. With respect to inclusiveness and analytical capacity, which was found not to be significant during the bivariate analysis, the relationship was found to be significant for tertiary first degree-certificate holders only. In any case, this finding suggests the need to “democratize” participation to guard against academic hegemony, where only those with very high levels of education are heard, at the expense of those who may not have such levels of education but nevertheless have important

lessons and experiences to share and to influence public policy. (Strinati, 1995). Generally speaking, it appears that participants with higher levels of education were the most likely to draw on the analytical capabilities of their organizations to form opinions about the inclusiveness of the forum. It is significant to note that for first-degree holders also, the relationship between inclusiveness and economic literacy also remained significant (as was the case under bivariate analysis), while it wasn't for those with lower or higher levels of education. The p-value for the up-secondary school sub-group was .859, compared to .011 for the first-degree/certificate sub-group and .153 for those with higher levels of education.

When considering respondents' region of residence, the relationship between inclusiveness and the other variables also showed some important differences. For example, respondents from regions other than Greater Accra and the four regions designated the poorest by the Ghana Statistical Service (Upper East and West, Northern, and Central Regions), were less likely to follow the general trend and link process positively to inclusiveness. The p-values for Greater Accra, the group of four regions, and the remaining group of regions, respectively, were .571, .083, and  $<.001$ . As regards inclusiveness and the policy-analytical capacity of respondents' organization, the original finding of no statistical relationship among all respondents was replicated among regional sub-groups as well. The p-values were .304, .418, and .074, respectively, for Greater Accra, the four poorest regions, and the other regions as a group. Finally, the relationship between economic literacy and inclusiveness, which was found to be significant among all respondents, was replicated for respondents in Greater Accra only, where the p-value was  $<.001$  – highly significant. The value for the four regions was .701 and for the other regions it was .112. Could the economic literacy workshops have been less effective in these regions than in Greater Accra? That's a possibility worth further exploration.

However, in terms of regional development, the case can be made, theoretically and empirically, that regions of a nation that suffer from severe lack of social and physical infrastructure are ill-suited to participate meaningfully in the policy formation process. And this is likely to lead to a cycle of under-development, as diminished participation means a diminished capacity to influence the equitable distribution of resources for national and regional development.

As with inclusiveness, voice had a high degree of association with process in the bivariate analysis, with p-values of  $<.001$  for each of the measures of association. Once the possible effects of other factors are accounted for, however, the relationship between the two variables becomes more nuanced and discriminatory among various sub-groups. Those from Greater Accra were less inclined to associate process with voice than those from other parts of the country. The p-value for Greater Accra was .831, compared with .026 for the four poorest regions and .005 for the other five regions combined. The absence of any association between analytical capacity and voice established in the earlier analysis, however, was replicated here, with p-values of .109, .412, and .353 for Greater Accra, for the four poorest regions and the other regions, respectively. This means that one's region of residence had nothing to do with their views on the relationship between process and voice, just as the larger population did. A similar conclusion was reached when region of residence was held constant in re-evaluating the relationship between economic literacy and voice. The lack of statistically significant relationship between the two variables was confirmed across all three groups of regions, judging by their respective p-values: Greater Accra (.413); four poorest regions (.360) and other regions (.114) While the absence of a relationship between region and voice is understandable (i.e., once everyone gets to the forum, the procedural arrangements – not region – determines opportunities to speak and to influence policy, that of process and region appears anomalous and perhaps

requires further probing. This is so because the institutional and structural endowments of a region are likely to affect how participants prepare and engage in public forums.

There appears to be a difference in the ways men and women viewed the relationship between the forum process and voice. The strong association between process and voice that was found in the bivariate analysis was replicated for men but not women. With a p-value of .001, male respondents appeared to confirm the general findings while female respondents, with a p-value of .165, seemed to disagree. Significantly, however, the lack of a substantively significant relationship between voice and analytical capacity, and between voice and economic literacy, was replicated for both sexes, as they all had p-values that were considerably larger than the .05 significance level. Again, it is possible that women considered the process somewhat discriminatory against them in terms of their ability to state their case at the forum, while men, who have historically had their way in such situations, felt no such discrimination.

### **8.9. RESPONDENTS' PRE-POST-SAPRI VIEWS ON SAPS**

In addition to evaluating the hypothesized relationships between participation and the three explanatory variables, the study also attempted to measure the potential “biases” of respondents towards structural adjustment. It was thought that due to the highly controversial and polarizing nature of structural adjustment programs, most respondents would have formed deeply entrenched positions already and would not be swayed one way or the other by the proceedings of the forum (e.g., see Aryeetey, 2000; Bortei-Doku-Aryeetey; 2000; Appiah, et al., 2000). In this respect, respondents were asked their views about structural adjustment, before and after SAPRI. The results appear in Table A12 below.

**Table 8-24 Relationship Between Respondents' Pre- and Post-SAPRI Views on Structural Adjustment**

		Respondents' Views on SAP Before SAPRI			Total	
			Favorable	None	Unfavorable	
Respondents Views of SAP after SAPRI	Favorable	Count	13	5	27	45
		Percent of Views Before SAPRI (col.)	52.0%	45.5%	50.9%	50.6%
		% of Total	14.6%	5.6%	30.3%	50.6%
	None	Count	0	1	3	4
		Percent of Views Before SAPRI (col.)	.0%	9.1%	5.7%	4.5%
		% of Total	.0%	1.1%	3.4%	4.5%
	Unfavorable	Count	12	5	23	40
		Percent of Views Before SAPRI (col.)	48.0%	45.5%	43.4%	44.9%
		% of Total	13.5%	5.6%	25.8%	44.9%
Total		Count	25	11	53	89
		Percent of Views Before SAPRI (col.)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.1%	12.4%	59.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests				
		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square		1.950	4	.745

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	-.019	.856
	Gamma	-.034	.856

Fifty-three persons (representing about 60 percent of the total respondents) reported having an unfavorable view of structural adjustment before SAPRI. Of those, 43.4 percent said they maintained that view after the forum, while another 5.7 percent expressed continued to have no opinions about structural adjustment. However, just over one half of those who had an unfavorable view of structural adjustment prior to SAPRI reported having a favorable view afterwards. At the other extreme, 48.0 percent who had a favorable view of structural adjustment reported an unfavorable view afterwards, with another 52.0 percent who had a favorable view

prior to SAPRI maintaining that view afterwards. Of those who expressed no opinion about structural adjustment before the forum, 45.5 percent ended up having an unfavorable view of it, while another 45.5 percent reported having a favorable view. Still others had rather critical views of the World Bank and the IMF, with one respondent calling on the two organizations to “drop their rigid laws to avoid the Ecuador experience,” in apparent reference to street riots that greeted IMF-inspired austerity measures in that Latin American country. (See Salami, Appendix D).

Overall, therefore, it appears that respondents did not allow their prejudices about structural adjustment to influence their assessment of it during SAPRI. If anything those with unfavorable views before the forum were slightly more likely to offer a favorable view afterwards than those with prior favorable view were to offer unfavorable views afterwards (50.9 percent) versus 48.0 percent). Those who see SAPRI as a thinly disguised attempt at co-opting civil society may cite this finding as evidence (see, e.g., Staniland, 1985). But co-optation requires some *quid pro quo*, cooperation with the co-opting authority in exchange for some policy favor. There is no evidence that that was the case at SAPRI and, as noted previously, it was to avoid both the appearance and reality of co-optation that the organizers decided to avoid World Bank financing and seek funds independently from other sources. The favorable view of the respondents, thus, may be due to the fact the forum perhaps concentrated on the positive aspects of structural adjustment (such as the elimination of hoarding of essential commodities, following the elimination of price controls by government) and, perhaps due to data availability, concentrated less on the social aspects.

Indeed, despite the public outcry over the deterioration in social conditions under structural adjustment, it was not until three years after SAPRI that the Ghana Statistical Service published a study on the incidence of poverty and its distribution in the country. Within this



statistical vacuum, most of the evidence-based defense of structural adjustment focused on the macroeconomic statistics, which were generally impressive. The various p-values confirm this assessment, suggesting a lack of statistically significant relationship between respondents' pre- and post-SAPRI views of structural adjustment. On the basis of the foregoing, we may conclude that on average respondents' views of structural adjustment were shaped to a large extent by what they learned at the forum.

## 9. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

What have we learned from this study that we didn't know before, and how can we expect the findings to help shape public policy in general and national-level participation in particular in Ghana?

The study was an attempt to explore the black box of participation at the national level, to help us understand better factors that facilitate effective and useful engagement of citizens in economic development and build on that understanding for promoting equitable development in countries like Ghana. As noted by various writers (e.g., Connelly et al., 1995; Chambers, 1997), if economic development is to benefit society at large and not just a privileged few, it is imperative that the processes that ultimately determine the allocation of society's resources adequately reflect the needs and perspectives of various socio-economic groups – particularly excluded and vulnerable groups like women and children – as well as administrative regions of a country. Simply put, this means democratizing the development process in such a way as to accommodate the concerns of all segments of society – men and women, the literate and not so-literate, the privileged and the less-privileged, the physically handicapped and the physically strong (Clark, 1991).

One way of accomplishing such democratization of development is through forums like SAPRI, where citizens get an opportunity to evaluate public policies and provide critical feedback for the enrichment and formulation of future policies. By directly assessing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the process, the participants of SAPRI who took part in

this study provide valuable insights into the past while helping shape the future of participatory development at the national level.

The hypothesized relationship that inclusiveness in SAPRI, as a constituent measure of successful participation, was a positive function of the processes put in place by the organizers of the initiative was amply borne out by the statistics. Since there is no way of promoting inclusiveness – of issues, civil society groups, and administrative regions – except through conscious organizational and institutional efforts, it should come as no surprise that process was found to be positively associated with inclusiveness.

The hypothesized relationship between inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of participants' organizations, however, was not borne out by the findings. This result thus confirmed the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables, contrary to what was hypothesized. It appears that it takes more than sound analytical capabilities of participants' organizations for there to be effective advocacy for equitable representation of issues, groups and regions at a participatory episode like SAPRI (Roweraker, 1995; Robertson, 2001). Process, as noted above, must be an important mediating factor.

The relationship between inclusiveness and economic literacy of participants was found to be significant on the basis of all three measures. This result reflects the fact that the economic literacy workshops, at least to some extent, were designed to reflect the issues, groups and regions. Those who deemed the workshops as educationally beneficial were thus more likely to see SAPRI as more inclusive than those who did not see the workshops as beneficial. This attests to the view that adequate education empowers the citizenry to effectively engage policy makers in the public policy process (Friere, 1972).

The relationship between voice and process also proved to be significant and strong across the three measures. In that the literature does not address this relationship, this study's finding contributes to our understanding of factors that make it possible for citizens to bring their voices to bear on public policy, beyond the usual theater of public gathering in the name of "participatory development." As in the case of inclusiveness, it seems self-evident and intuitively appealing that presentation and other arrangements at the forum would determine whether or not participants were able to voice their policy concerns adequately at the forum (see also Kotz, 1981; Feuerstain, 1986; Estrella et al., 2001:3). However, Strinati (1995) and those who share his views may counter this conclusion by arguing that what is described as a facilitatory process may be nothing more than the "construction of political and ideological consensus" by the "dominant groups in society" at the expense of various "subordinate groups". But such a conclusion seems to ignore the possibility of "autonomous action" which all civil society organizations are capable of taking, except in politically repressive states, which Ghana is not (Staniland, 1985; Gramsci, 1972).

The findings did not provide support for a relationship between voice, on the one hand, and analytical capacity and economic literacy, on the other. One interpretation of this result is that analytical capacity only creates the *potential* for exercising voice in a participatory episode, and that beyond the knowledge such capacity may produce, other factors (notably process) influence whether one is able to make the necessary policy demands at a forum. This is also an important finding that should inform further implementation of "capacity building" programs for civil society organizations in developing countries, in that capacity development should not be conceived as an end result but a means for facilitating effective participation.

The same observation may be made of economic literacy and voice: One requires more than such literacy to be able to make adequate policy demands in a participatory episode. As reported in Chapter 8, these variables were not found to be significant. Within a participatory episode, therefore, process appears to be an unambiguous and the strongest indicator of success, in terms of inclusiveness and voice. The relationships between inclusiveness and voice, on the one hand, and analytical capacity and economic literacy, on the other, were mixed, at best (see also Servaes 1995; Taylor, 1996).

No statistically significant relationship was found between impact and process. This overall result is not surprising, since process was an intra-episode phenomenon and could not reasonably have been expected to explain participants' views of the impact of SAPRI on public policy. There was some, albeit inconsistent, evidence for a significant relationship between analytical capacity and inclusiveness. . This result is similar to the one obtained from the voice-analytical capacity analysis. What this suggests is that while there may exist some relationship between an organization's analytical capacity and participants' assessment of the impact of their involvement on public policy, that relationship is too weak to be substantively relevant. A conscious effort to use that analytical capacity to evaluate the impact of participation, through evaluative and impact studies, for example, may therefore be required (Cooke and Kothari, 2001

Economic literacy, which was antecedent to SAPRI, turned out to have an across-the-board significant relationship to impact, a post-forum phenomenon. This finding is in line with the finding that economic literacy workshops may have equipped the participants/respondents with the skills to be able to examine public policies after SAPRI to be able to determine whether or not SAPRI has a positive impact on public policy. The

participation literature in general also supports such a conclusion (e.g., see Friedmann, 1992; Crosby, 2000; and Conyers, 2001).

The study also examined possible variations in responses based on respondents' sex, education level, and region of residence. As expected, there were significant differences in responses associated with these factors. Women, for example, were less likely to view the SAPRI process as facilitatory of inclusiveness, possibly the result of not just forum-specific factors but a long-standing sense of alienation from development activities generally. This is amply reflected in the gender and feminist literature on social exclusion and participation (e.g., see Connelly et al., 1995; Rathgeber, 1990). Another major area of divergence of views was the issue of children's welfare. Overwhelmingly, women – traditionally the primary care givers for children – were more likely than men to report that the forum did not adequately address children's issues. From a policy standpoint, this means that disproportionate efforts will always have to be made to ensure, at the minimum, a sense of inclusion among segments of the society that have traditionally been marginalized in the development process, notably women and children (see Stack, 1978). In other instances, such as the relationship between inclusiveness and analytical capacity, the original finding of no statistically significant relationship was replicated, meaning that both men and women shared similar views on the issue.

Respondents with higher levels of education tended to see the process as more inclusive and facilitatory of voice; they also were the most likely to view the pre-SAPRI economic literacy workshops as beneficial for the exercise. The policy implication here is that in the future forums of this nature must guard against “academic hegemony”, where the highly literate or formally educated derive the greatest benefit from participation.

## **Bridging Perceptions and Reality in Public Policy**

Studies of this nature that attempt to link citizens' perceptions or observations to public policy inevitably raise questions about the extent to which those perceptions do in fact reflect reality (see Augustinos and Walker, 1996; Conroy, 1998). But this dichotomy between perception and reality is gradually becoming a thing of the past, as researchers emphasize the complementarity or synergy between the two domains rather than holding one superior to the other. After all, perceptions, whatever they may be, are formed in and influence by the wider social reality that conventional researchers seem to prefer, and even if "inaccurate", perceptions shape individuals' behavior. The excessive emphasis on the "hard indicators" of social reality means that too often the "soft" yet critical human element of development is lost in the formulation of development policies, such that living conditions may be declining even as the aggregate hard indicators seem to reflect general progress.

This was the case with Ghana's structural adjustment program and its much-vaunted "macroeconomic miracle," which occurred against a background of deteriorating social conditions for many Ghanaians. Back then, no citizen had the chance to provide alternative views of social reality to policy makers, and those policy makers were thus left to cling to their illusions of progress until "time made them a victim," to use the expression of the reggae group, Third World.

Now, things are beginning to change. Bouckaert and Walle (2003) and Klaveren et al. (2004) are among researchers who argue that recent "increased attention on accountability" in public policy in particular and governance in general warrants the skillful use of both "soft" and "hard" indicators in policy research (see also Loewenstein and Elster (1992; and

Praag and Carbonell, 2004). Klaveren et al. have argued as follows: “Through self-reported measures, the respondent has the opportunity to express, in some integrated and standardized format, information that only she or he has access to ... Objective indicators alone do little to inform policy makers about public preferences.” In developing countries, the use of participatory poverty assessments (PPA), where the poor are given a chance to see poverty through their own eyes and not the analytical prisms of outside technocrats, has gained great prominence in recent years as a supplement to household surveys of poverty that governments used for their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

In preparing its PRSP, known locally as the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), the Ghanaian government’s researchers discovered from their PPA that most people had different and more variegated definitions of poverty than what was offered in the Fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS4). In addition to conventional measures of poverty, such as malnutrition and low asset ownership that were reported in GLSS4, some respondents cited “loss of dignity”, a soft indicator that was not mentioned in GLSS4, as part of their conception of poverty (Government of Ghana, GPRS, 2003). This discovery informed the government’s decision to be consciously “sensitive” in dealing with the poor around the country.

In a similar way, it is expected that the views of respondents in this study would contribute to a fuller and richer understanding of the challenges of development in general and the fight against poverty in particular by tapping into the perceptions as well as the social and policy preferences of the citizenry, attributes that too often are omitted from hard-indicator policy research. In this study, for example, respondents (especially women respondents) consistently reported that children’s issues received less attention during SAPRI *and* have done so since then.



As a confirmation of respondents’ perception, the Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) produced by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2003) revealed extensive deterioration in child welfare indicators between 1997, the year SAPRI was initiated, and 2003, when the survey for this study was conducted (see Table 9.1 below).<sup>11</sup> The steep rise in the proportion of Ghanaian children who are “wasting” (losing weight due to inadequate food intake) increased from 6.5 percent in 1997 to 19.3 percent 2003, reflects nothing short of a crisis in the country’s policy on children – a sentiment alluded to in the responses of the participants, especially women. If the welfare of children had been forcefully articulated at SAPRI and appropriate policies pursued thereafter, it is highly unlikely that the well-being of Ghana’s children would have declined as dramatically as it did. This validation of hard socio-economic indicators by the “soft” perceptions of the citizenry supports the view, stated earlier, that both realms of social reality measurement should be considered in the policy development and analysis arenas.

**Table 9.1 'Reality' of Declining Child Welfare Reflects 'Perceptions' of Respondents**

Changes in Child Nutrition Indicators, 1997 and 2003		
	<b>1997</b>	<b>2003</b>
Stunted	29.9	34.3
Wasted	6.5	19.3
Underweight	26.0	35.8

Source: CWIQ, Ghana Statistical Service.

## **1. Dynamics of Citizens’ Expectations from Forums**

As discussed earlier, citizen engagement in the policy process, among other things, can improve the quality of public policy, promote democratic development, help reduce social alienation, and in many cases provide legitimacy for policies that otherwise might be too controversial or unpopular for effective implementation. But the relationship between citizen

<sup>11</sup> Stunted children are not growing due to inadequate nutrition; wasting results from lack of enough food, irrespective of nutritional content; and being underweight means a deprivation of both (malnutrition).

engagement and citizen satisfaction with policy outcomes is not always so straightforward and may be conditioned by several factors over which policy makers may or may not have adequate control. For example, once citizens are given a sense of belonging through their participation in a development forum, they expect future policies to reflect part or all of their contributions or policy demands. Where such expectations are consistently not met, citizens become cynical towards future participatory forums and retreat deeper into their shells of alienation. To the extent that their participation in the formulation and implementation of public policy is essential to policy legitimacy, such participatory anti-climax requires the attention of policy researchers and policy makers alike.

## *2. SAPRI and Knowledge Utilization in Ghana's Policy Environment*

Beyond the self-reported assessments of SAPRI by its participants, one may also want to know if the exercise was worthwhile beyond its immediate objectives in terms of civil societies' ability to influence public policy. Or was SAPRI ultimately a skillful attempt by the World Bank to "shut up" its critics by pretending to collaborate with them? This question is pertinent because several authors (e.g., Nelson, 1995; Paul 1996; and Malena, 2000) have variously questioned the motives of the World Bank in particular and other international financial institutions in general in their attempts to engage civil society in policy making, after years of dismissing civil society organizations as a nuisance at best and ignorant about the intricacies of development at worst. Paul (1996: 2), for example, argues that efforts by the World Bank to work with civil society do "give the Bank an appearance of openness and accountability, but in the final analysis these efforts do not change the essence of power at the Bank or in the affected countries." The results, he concludes, is that "NGOs will have to work by persuasion; they will not have any direct voice in the Bank's decision-making process nor in its fundamental mission."

The final report of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), published in April 2002, appears to confirm the judgment of Paul (1996). The failure of SAPRIN to get the Bank to respond to and possibly act on the findings or recommendations of SAPRIN from 10 countries is captured in the following passage from SAPRIN's report, titled, *The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty*:

While the World Bank insisted upon, and fully participated in, collaborative efforts throughout all phases of the SAPRI process, it chose to leave it to SAPRIN to synthesize the joint national reports into a final global report. SAPRIN presented a draft synthesis to Bank officials at a meeting in Washington in July 2001 in accordance with the latter's agreement and commitment to discuss, at the highest levels of the institution, concrete changes in macroeconomic policy and policymaking based on the field findings and conclusions. SAPRIN received no such feedback from Bank management at that meeting and has yet to receive any subsequent response from the Bank, including President Wolfensohn and his office. In fact, the Bank officially withdrew from SAPRI as the report was delivered and has yet to explain to the thousands of organizations that participated in the SAPRI exercises or to the donors that financed them what follow-up actions it is taking. (SAPRIN, 2002: 3).

The behavior of the World Bank may provide ammunition to critics and cynics who view civic participation in the policy process as nothing more than an exercise in futility, a pretext for co-optation or the "construction of political and ideological consensus" by the "dominant groups in society" at the expense of "subordinate groups". (Strinati, 1995). But that would amount to an unwarranted and overly broad indictment of a process that has been used in other countries with remarkable success, in terms of the citizens' ability to influence policy collectively or even individually. In Switzerland, for example, civil society organizations, and even individuals, in addition to political bodies like the Federal Parliament and administrative department, have all exercised involvements in the policy process that range from initiating particular policy proposals to participating in debates by the Federal Council that eventually lead to tangible

policy changes (Wyss and Widner, 2001). Similarly, the Irish “social partnership agreements” of the 1980s, comprising some 19 “social partners” representing the “four pillars” of Irish society (employer and business organizations; trade unions; farmer organizations; and community and voluntary organizations), have been credited with helping reverse the country’s economic and social fortunes from stagnation to growth and development (World Bank 2000). Civil society thus can play a useful and influential role in the policy process at the national level, at least at certain times in some contexts.

The key difference between “developed” countries like Switzerland and Ireland and developing countries like Ghana in making an exercise like SAPRI relevant to the policy process is what one may call the “dual constituency problem” in poor aid-dependent countries. While public policy in the former group of countries responds primarily to the needs and demands of their domestic electorates, policy makers in the latter group must simultaneously address the needs of their domestic constituencies (who can vote them in or out of office but do not have the resources to finance development) and external constituencies like the World Bank (which wield no electoral power but use their financial muscle to pursue policies often considered more ideological than pragmatic). The result is a lack of policy autonomy or policy space for developing countries to pursue national policies that reflect the electorally expressed aspiration of their people and their peculiar political circumstances. In the end, the policy demands of their electorates may be subordinated to ideology-driven conditionalities of the World Bank and the IMF.

In the case of SAPRI, while the World Bank may have disengaged from the exercise, there is reason to believe that it in fact later hijacked the notion of civil engagement in national-level policy making and, along with the IMF, deployed it in the poverty reduction strategy papers

(PRSPs) that were launched in 1999 for debt-distressed poor countries. Those applying for debt relief under HIPC had to produce PRSPs “through a broad-based participatory process” (IMF, 1999; World Bank, 1999). Ghana was one of 41 countries that produced PRSPs under these participatory conditions. The impact of that participation on public policy, however, seems to vary along the lines of the *instrumental* and *conceptual* distinctions in knowledge use discussed earlier.

Civil society was extensively involved in the preparation of the Ghana’s PRSP. As shown in Table 9.2, however, the government’s ability to incorporate the policy demands of civil society in decision making seems to have depended on whether the resulting changes are instrumental (hence routine and non-controversial) or conceptual (which requires substantive policy change and which external benefactors might not approve). In the case of the price controls noted above, it should be clear that no government operating under the tutelage of the World Bank and IMF can autonomously implement policies that amount to price controls or other ideology-driven policies, the inherent benefits of civic engagement notwithstanding. The larger political context within which civic participation occurs is therefore as important as the inherent act of participation in influencing public policy in developing countries. For countries like Ghana, the best way to derive the maximum benefits from participatory development is to develop, in the long run, an indigenous capacity for financing their development, and thus obviating (or at least reducing) the need to turn the World Bank or the IMF.

**Table 9.2 Civic Engagement in Ghana's PRSP – Excerpts from the GPRS**

<b>Civil Society Comment</b>	<b>Government Response/Reaction</b>
Increasing access of urban poor to safe water should be included	Suggestion incorporated.
No analysis of why people are poor.	This is now dealt with in the definition of poverty.
There is a need to give greater focus on people with disabilities.	This is being given greater emphasis in current draft.
Extent of consultation with civil society not revealed.	This has now been elaborated in a section on the process of preparing GPRS.
Government must implement some form of pricing policy for selected items.	This concern is understood. However, this is a controversial issue which requires further examination before a workable solutions.

*GPRS 2003-2005, pp. 216-220.*

### **Directions for Future Research**

This study represents an attempt to create a framework for the quantitative measurement of success of national-level participation, beyond the descriptive measures that are currently in vogue (e.g., UNDP, 2001). While these descriptive measures provide a general and unquantified “feel” for the processes of participation, it is important, in this “age of measurement”, that policy makers, policy researchers, and civil society advocates have a structured and predictable notion of the dynamics of participation and draw on that understanding to improve both participation and the broader policy process as the challenges of national development continue to unfold in developing countries.

The three major components of the framework, as discussed above, are, *voice* (the ability to make policy demands at participatory forums); *inclusiveness* (of social groups, policy issues, and regional representation); and *impact* (how participation affects policy choices and policy

outputs). Moreover, it was suggested that “success” should be broken down into intra-episode and post-episode successes. This should allow advocates and researchers in particular to determine the weak links in the participatory chain and strengthen them, rather than spreading themselves thin by tackling every facet of the process.

Equally important, in any future research, it would be important to give out the questionnaire for measuring intra-episode success to respondents *during* a forum, rather than afterwards, in order to capture the views of those participants at their freshest. Also, because this study is largely exploratory, relying on a relatively small sample, conscious efforts should also be made to apply to the resulting framework to a much larger sample size. This should help to establish the robustness or otherwise of the framework. To be able to measure impact or post-episode better, one also needs to document the key policy demands made and accepted at the forum and directly evaluate future policy initiatives or documents against those demands. It must be noted, however, that it would be unrealistic to expect that all these policy demands would be incorporated into future policy, since very often political, technical, and financial matters influence both policy choices and their outcomes (see Anderson, 1994). In view of the very little research in that area, I recommend combining knowledge utilization research with participation research as a means of strengthening our understanding of both intra- and post-episode success of participation.

Finally, since I completed the dissertation, I have been involved in a number of participatory events, including membership in the civil society coalition that is “policing” the government’s preparation of the second generation of its poverty reduction strategy. A constant complaint among participants is the poor “quality of participation”. For example, during a seminar on May 26, 2005, at the Institute for Democratic Governance in Accra on

Ghana's Poverty Reduction, the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development repeatedly complained about the limited time they have to make submissions to the revised poverty reduction document. While the members of this coalition are invited to share their views or experiences in policy making, they say that they are invited on such short notice that they do not have enough time to prepare. In the event, their participation often amounts to little more than their physical presence at participatory events. Although the quality of participation was touched upon in this study, it appears that this issue should receive much more in depth attention in future research.



## APPENDIX A

### MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR SEX OF RESPONDENT

#### 1. INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCES

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.393	.089	4.390	.000
		Gamma	.695	.119	4.390	.000
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.049	.195	.254	.800
		Gamma	.091	.357	.254	.800
	N of Valid Cases		18			

#### 2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.165	.090	1.834	.067
		Gamma	.420	.214	1.834	.067
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	-.012	.182	-.068	.946
		Gamma	-.030	.446	-.068	.946
	N of Valid Cases		18			

#### 3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.207	.075	2.766	.006
		Gamma	.659	.172	2.766	.006
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.160	.178	.900	.368

	Gamma	.448	.483	.900	.368
	N of Valid Cases	18			

#### 4. VOICE AND PROCESS

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.227	.067	3.369	.001
		Gamma	.697	.125	3.369	.001
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.370	.267	1.390	.165
		Gamma	.625	.359	1.390	.165
	N of Valid Cases		18			

#### 5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.093	.062	1.496	.135
		Gamma	.433	.254	1.496	.135
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.284	.286	.991	.322
		Gamma	.469	.453	.991	.322
	N of Valid Cases		18			

#### 6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

##### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.045	.061	.745	.457
		Gamma	.253	.297	.745	.457
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.333	.201	1.662	.097
		Gamma	.692	.250	1.662	.097
	N of Valid Cases		18			

## 7. IMPACT AND PROCESS

### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.145	.080	1.798	.072
		Gamma	.345	.180	1.798	.072
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.176	.217	.812	.417
		Gamma	.322	.383	.812	.417
	N of Valid Cases		18			

## 8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.141	.070	2.002	.045
		Gamma	.457	.204	2.002	.045
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	-.037	.253	-.147	.883
		Gamma	-.063	.421	-.147	.883
	N of Valid Cases		18			

## 9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

### Symmetric Measures

Sex of respondent			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Male	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.128	.075	1.703	.089
		Gamma	.481	.209	1.703	.089
	N of Valid Cases		71			
Female	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-c	.407	.179	2.276	.023
		Gamma	.846	.157	2.276	.023
	N of Valid Cases		18			

## APPENDIX B

### MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR LEVEL OF EDUCATION

#### 1. INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCESS

##### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.187	.319	.572	.567
		Gamma	.333	.544	.572	.567
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.395	.120	3.219	.001
		Gamma	.633	.159	3.219	.001
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.404	.131	2.663	.008
		Gamma	.699	.173	2.663	.008
		N of Valid Cases	24			

#### 2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

##### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	-.316	.168	-1.114	.265
		Gamma	-1.000	.000	-1.114	.265
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.287	.122	2.200	.028
		Gamma	.553	.215	2.200	.028
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.244	.141	1.585	.113
		Gamma	.486	.242	1.585	.113
		N of Valid Cases	24			

### 3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

#### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.060	.335	.178	.859
		Gamma	.143	.787	.178	.859
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.352	.108	2.551	.011
		Gamma	.820	.171	2.551	.011
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.246	.164	1.427	.153
		Gamma	.474	.303	1.427	.153
		N of Valid Cases	24			

### 4. VOICE AND PROCESS

#### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.(c)			
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.311	.117	2.241	.025
		Gamma	.688	.196	2.241	.025
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.335	.157	2.076	.038
		Gamma	.558	.230	2.076	.038
		N of Valid Cases	24			

c No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 = Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant.

## 5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.(c)			
	N of Valid Cases		9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	First Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.395	.112	2.573	.010
		Gamma	.889	.088	2.573	.010
	N of Valid Cases		53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	First Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.048	.180	.269	.788
		Gamma	.093	.345	.269	.788
	N of Valid Cases		24			

c No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 = Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant.

## 6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.(c)			
	N of Valid Cases		9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	First Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.253	.169	1.360	.174
		Gamma	.622	.249	1.360	.174
	N of Valid Cases		53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	First Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.000	.193	.000	1.000
		Gamma	.000	.385	.000	1.000
	N of Valid Cases		24			

c No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 = Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant.

## 7. IMPACT AND PROCESS

### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.295	.208	1.037	.300
		Gamma	.667	.304	1.037	.300
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.156	.122	1.251	.211
		Gamma	.336	.245	1.251	.211
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.179	.205	.884	.377
		Gamma	.256	.291	.884	.377
		N of Valid Cases	24			

## 8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	1.000	.000	1.212	.225
		Gamma	1.000	.000	1.212	.225
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.268	.134	1.842	.065
		Gamma	.571	.251	1.842	.065
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	-.178	.172	-1.007	.314
		Gamma	-.288	.272	-1.007	.314
		N of Valid Cases	24			

## 9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

### Symmetric Measures

Education Level in Three Categories-			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Up to Second School	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	-.189	.114	-.973	.330
		Gamma	-1.000	.000	-.973	.330
		N of Valid Cases	9			
Tertiary Degrees/Diplomas	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.322	.159	1.735	.083
		Gamma	.698	.196	1.735	.083
		N of Valid Cases	53			
Beyond First Degree/Diploma	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.221	.193	1.119	.263
		Gamma	.366	.300	1.119	.263
		N of Valid Cases	24			



## APPENDIX C

### MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR REGIONS

#### 1. INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCESS

##### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.123	.214	.566	.571
		Gamma	.195	.332	.566	.571
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.333	.183	1.733	.083
		Gamma	.558	.277	1.733	.083
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.510	.115	4.202	.000
		Gamma	.808	.117	4.202	.000
		N of Valid Cases	43			

#### 2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

##### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.238	.222	1.029	.304
		Gamma	.400	.347	1.029	.304
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.156	.194	.810	.418
		Gamma	.283	.349	.810	.418
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.257	.132	1.784	.074
		Gamma	.586	.278	1.784	.074
		N of Valid Cases	43			

### 3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

#### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.592	.097	3.500	.000
		Gamma	1.000	.000	3.500	.000
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.068	.176	.384	.701
		Gamma	.152	.396	.384	.701
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.245	.141	1.588	.112
		Gamma	.600	.286	1.588	.112
		N of Valid Cases	43			

### 4. VOICE AND PROCESS

#### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.038	.177	.213	.831
		Gamma	.077	.360	.213	.831
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.464	.177	2.229	.026
		Gamma	.761	.222	2.229	.026
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.429	.100	2.800	.005
		Gamma	.860	.092	2.800	.005
		N of Valid Cases	43			

## 5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.291	.160	1.604	.109
		Gamma	.609	.253	1.604	.109
	N of Valid Cases		21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.208	.247	.820	.412
		Gamma	.341	.392	.820	.412
	N of Valid Cases		25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.123	.125	.929	.353
		Gamma	.452	.351	.929	.353
	N of Valid Cases		43			

## 6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	-.150	.176	-.819	.413
		Gamma	-.371	.467	-.819	.413
	N of Valid Cases		21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.188	.202	.915	.360
		Gamma	.400	.365	.915	.360
	N of Valid Cases		25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.351	.189	1.581	.114
		Gamma	.737	.196	1.581	.114
	N of Valid Cases		43			

## 7. IMPACT AND PROCESS

### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.355	.141	2.267	.023
		Gamma	.667	.209	2.267	.023
	N of Valid Cases		21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.000	.188	.000	1.000
		Gamma	.000	.337	.000	1.000
	N of Valid Cases		25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.228	.145	1.523	.128

	Gamma	.409	.233	1.523	.128
	N of Valid Cases	43			

## 8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.117	.217	.537	.591
		Gamma	.222	.403	.537	.591
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.292	.190	1.502	.133
		Gamma	.500	.315	1.502	.133
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.041	.179	.227	.821
		Gamma	.079	.351	.227	.821
		N of Valid Cases	43			

## 9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY

### Symmetric Measures

3 Clusters of Regions			Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Greater Accra	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.043	.214	.203	.839
		Gamma	.100	.481	.203	.839
		N of Valid Cases	21			
UW,UE,NR,CR	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.531	.152	2.754	.006
		Gamma	.822	.120	2.754	.006
		N of Valid Cases	25			
Others	Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.304	.169	1.579	.114
		Gamma	.633	.238	1.579	.114
		N of Valid Cases	43			

## APPENDIX D

### COMMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS ABOUT SAPRI

- The workshop session gave the opportunity to participants to deliberate on pertinent subjects made during the presentations. This helped to expose certain lapses of the workshop subject and to create a better way forward within the context.
  - Felix Kwaku, *Minerals Commission*
- For SAPRI in Ghana, a major weakness was the inability to have the agriculture sector research carried out. This was a particularly serious drawback when one considers the level and the role of agriculture in the economy and on any possible intervention to alleviate poverty, the level of women and children.
  - Thomas Akabzaa, *University Lecturer*.
- In my view, findings of SAPRI should be sent to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WT) in order that they could consider some of the views of civil society in beneficiary countries of SAP. Future programs for SAPRI should also focus on the northern sector of Ghana...
  - Abubakari Adams-Sandu, *Trades Union Congress*.
- Respondent feels that the time span of two years between the conference and this questionnaire is too long to recap all contributions that could enrich the study. However, the inclusion of civil society in adopting sound macro-economic policies has been commendable. The absence of the northern savannah region in the research as well as strong women and children advocacy groups has been a setback, which has to be addressed to play into the process of addressing our economic situation. Protection of our industries, rights of labour and decent work as well as the creation of a level playing field for both developing and developed world was strongly advocated.

If the World Bank is able to listen and learn as Mr. Peter Harold, then country director of the World Bank, noted, they should demonstrate that they are willing to change; and that wealth creation is fundamental to poverty alleviation. This leads to empowerment with viable and sustainable jobs at the centre of the dialogue. We would like to see the World Bank and the IMF drop their rigid laws to avoid the Ecuador experience, where people's impatience and frustration led to the overthrow of two governments, among others.

- Ms. Fati Bintu Abdul Salami, *Women's Coordinator, Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT)*
- ☑ SAPRI made it clear that sometimes our leaders fail to make the truth known to the international agencies, which bring some of these policies to developing countries as a way of alleviating poverty. Mechanisms must be put in place to monitor countries that opt for some of these policies so that civil society groups do not continue blaming the international financial institutions. Civil society must also be encouraged to be vigilant in their quest to ensure accountability on the part of the ruling government.
- Charles L. Kobby Gomez, Director, *African Youth in Development*.
- ☑ World Bank policy of emphasising basic education. It is a good idea to improve basic education but not at the expense of tertiary education, because those trained at the basic [level] will be enrolled at the tertiary [level] at the same time when resources at tertiary [level] have diminished. At the basic level, the government must ensure that no child is expelled from school or refused access to continuing schooling in any school or basic institution on academic grounds...
- Christiana Opoku, *Ghana Education Service*.
- ☑ I was very happy to have been allowed to contribute my ideas and knowledge on the impact of mine activities, having worked in mine laboratories and safety departments for about 10 years. Most participants were just emotional about the effects of mining activities without knowing what actually goes on there. The conference was useful, educative, and influential enough to impact on government policies.
- Edward T. Amanor, *Department of Chemistry, KNUST*
- ☑ SAPRI offered me the opportunity to raise issues of concern as well as gave me the opportunity to learn from others. I found it very rewarding and would wish that similar fora be organized to deal with issues bordering on social, political, and economic development. I wish, however, to suggest that such fora could start from the district level to enable more people to take part, so as to broaden the participatory base of the discussion.
- Nana Asumadu Sakyi, *Sekyere East District Assembly*.
- ☑ No doubt, SAPRI is a step forward over ERP and SAP. However, the failure of the two previous programmes to make any significant impact on the economy of Ghana led to the little hope that Ghanaians attached to SAPRI. Nevertheless, the involvement of civil society in the decision-making has made SAPRI a unique programme over the rest. However, from my own experience at the conference, participants were not allowed to adequately express their views, even though they were allowed to talk whenever they

wanted to. Again, sometimes, one was tempted to believe that government and its agencies had already drawn conclusions on the issues at stake but only allowed for such a conference to take place for the civil society to see that they have been part of the decision. My suggestion therefore is that for the purpose of meaningful development of our economy, government should always allow things to happen naturally and should minimise its intervention.

- A.B. Ibn Hassan, *Young Women's Muslim Association*.

- Government must consult their citizens adequately enough before they enter into economic relationships with external bodies and organizations. The citizenry must be educated adequately on the intricacies involved in establishing relationships in economic dealings with outside bodies. Literature available on various kinds of economic relationships between and among donors and recipient states must be made widely available to the citizenry to inform them on the choices they would suggest to government.

- Frank Coffie, *VORANGO (Member)*.

## Appendix E

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

### QUESTIONNAIRE

#### Ghana's 'Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative'

NAME OF RESPONDENT: \_\_\_\_\_

NAME OF RESPONDENT'S ORGANIZATION: \_\_\_\_\_

POSITION IN ORGANIZATION: \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:** Please, read each of the statements below and respond by circling the appropriate number below a statement. The entire exercise should take about 15 minutes.

#### 1. SECTION I

**1.1. Overall, how much of your organization's views on the effects of structural adjustment policies were you able to present at the SAPRI forum?**

1	2	3	4
None of them	Some of them	Most of them	All of them

**1.2. The issues discussed at SAPRI reflected the concerns of Ghanaian civil society.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**1.3. Women's groups were adequately represented at SAPRI.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**1.4. Women's issues were adequately discussed at SAPRI.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**1.5. All the 10 administrative regions were adequately represented at SAPRI.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree



**1.6. As a result of SAPRI, the state is more responsive to the concerns of civil society in the making of public policy.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**1.7. As a result of SAPRI, government has altered its policies to reflect the concerns of civil society.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**2. SECTION II**

**2.1. I was given enough time to prepare for the SAPRI forum.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**2.2. During the forum, I was given enough time to make presentations.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**2.3. During the forum, the moderator allowed me to make a presentation whenever I wanted to.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**2.4. Not everyone at the forum who wanted to speak was allowed to do so.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**2.5. I contributed to discussions at the Forum through (check all that apply)**

- 1.  Written presentations
- 2.  Oral presentations
- 3.  Both methods
- 4.  Other methods (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

**3. SECTION III**

**3.1. My organization has the facilities to collect information on the Ghanaian economy.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**3.2. My organization has the personnel to analyze information on economic policies.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**3.3. It is difficult to obtain information on economic policy from the government**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

**3.4. How often does each of the facilities listed below work in your office?**

	1 We Have None	2 Never Works	3 Works Sometimes	4 Works Most of the Time	5 Works All the Time
Telephone	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Fax machine	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Computers	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Internet access	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

**4. SECTION IV**

**4.1. The workshop on “economic literacy” that was held prior to SAPRI was highly beneficial to my contributions at the Forum.**

1	2	3	4
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

*Please, continue on next page.*



**5.3. Region of respondent's residence**

1. Greater Accra Region
2. Eastern Region
3. Western Region
4. Volta Region
5. Upper West Region
6. Upper East Region
7. Ashanti Region
8. Central Region
9. Northern Region
10. Brong-Ahafo Region

**5.4. What is the nature of your organization's work (e.g., women's advocacy, education, agriculture, etc.)?**

---

***THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME.***

***WOULD YOU like a summary of the study's findings to be sent to you?***

- 1. Yes                      2. No***

**NOTE:** If you have additional views on SAPRI that you would like to share, please write them on the back of this page. Thank you.

***RETURN ADDRESS:***

Isaac Thompson  
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs  
University of Pittsburgh  
3L14 Posvar Hall Pittsburgh  
PA 15206

## Appendix F

### Letter to Participants

Dear Sir/Madam:

Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been selected to take part in a research study on participatory development because of your involvement in the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) held in Ghana in 2001.

As you know, citizen involvement in the making of public policy at the national level has attained great prominence in the past decade-and-a-half as poor countries like Ghana endeavor to improve the living standards of the masses. It is now commonly agreed that the incorporation of the concerns and ideas of citizens into public policies is essential to enhancing the quality of such policies and making them sustainable.

Not much, however, is known about the process of participatory development at the national level; previous developing country experiences with participation occurred almost entirely at the local level. This study, *The New Participation: A Case Study of Ghana's Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative*, represents an attempt to understand the dynamics of participation at the national level.

The knowledge gained from the study should help development practitioners, policy makers and civil society groups to better understand and utilize participatory processes in their activities.

I would be happy, therefore, if you would take a few moments of your time and complete the attached questionnaire. **The entire exercise should take no more than 15 minutes.** Upon completion, please put the questionnaire in the enclosed *self-addressed and stamped envelope* and return it. I would appreciate it very much if you could complete and return the questionnaire within one week of receipt. Be assured that all responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.

If you would like to have a summary of the findings of this study, please state so at the end of the questionnaire. I will be happy to send you one.

Sincerely,

Isaac Thompson  
e-mail: isaac@pitt.edu

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