NOTIONS OF FRIENDSHIP IN THE BLOOMSBURY GROUP:
G. E. MOORE, D. H. LAWRENCE, E. M. FORSTER, AND VIRGINIA WOOLF

by

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In this study I argue that the Bloomsbury Group’s notion of friendship was influenced by G. E. Moore’s philosophy of friendship, developed in “Achilles or Patroclus?” (1894) and *Principia Ethica* (1903), and the Great War. I posit that these dual influences were central to Lawrence, Forster, and Woolf’s representations of frustrated and melancholic friendship in their post-war novels: *Women in Love* (1920), *A Passage to India* (1924), and *The Waves* (1931). Lawrence rejected Moore’s notion of friendship, suggesting that after the Great War desexualized friendship was impossible. On the other hand, Forster and Woolf continued to believe in Moore’s concept that friendship and the “pleasure of human intercourse” are among “the most valuable things, which we can know or imagine” (*Principia Ethica* 188–89). In *A Passage to India* and *The Waves* Forster and Woolf, respectively, generatively expand and extend Moore’s philosophy of friendship to meet the complex demands of the modern world. Thus I suggest that Moore strongly influenced the Bloomsbury Group during every stage of its development, thereby complicating Leonard Woolf’s notion that Moore only influenced the group before the war. Finally, I refute allegations that the post-war modern novel is devoid of satisfying personal relationships by demonstrating that for Forster and Woolf, satisfying relationships remain a possibility.
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1.0 INTRODUCING THE CATEGORY OF FRIENDSHIP

This study began with my interest in friendship as a category of personal relationship that is, as the Oxford English Dictionary suggests, “not ordinarily applied to lovers or relatives.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “friend” as: “1.a: One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy (J.). Not ordinarily applied to lovers or relatives (but cf. sense 3, 4).”

By this definition friendship brings two people together based on mutual benevolence and intimacy, but is not normally applied to lovers or relatives. Friendship is compelling because people choose to be friends with one another, while people are not able to chose the families they are born into. Friendship and love are more similar than friendship and family relationships, because friendship and love are freely chosen (except in the case of arranged marriage), while family relationships are not. Friendship and love, however, are certainly not identical forms of relatedness. Friendship, I suggest, is generally less binding, whereas love, while also based on “mutual benevolence and intimacy,” is inherently more binding than friendship and often results in marriage and the creation of new family ties. It is particularly true that friendship is less binding if the partners in friendship are equal and do not necessarily need one another. Aristotle suggests in the Nicomachean Ethics that “perfect” friendship exists between men who are equal, do not need one another, and share similar virtues: “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are
good in themselves” (196). Perfect or equal friendship, then, becomes a matter of good or pleasure. Aristotle writes,

For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure—good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling—and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong to virtue of the nature of the friends themselves.

(196)

By Aristotle’s definition friendship becomes based on good and pleasure. Similarly, as G. E. Moore notes, we choose people that we are attracted to because they are good or because we experience pleasure when we are around them. For this reason, we hope to see them again. Moore writes, “When first we see the man or woman capable of being the object of our love, there is always something in him which we like. This may at first sight be very little, perhaps only some physical beauty or tone of his voice, and we may not be able to discover what it is: but it is sufficient to give us some desire of seeing him again” (“Achilles or Patroclus?” 1). But while friendship may begin with an attraction to a particular person based on good and pleasure, which is the “beginning of sympathy,” more is required for the cultivation of “perfect” friendship (1). As Aristotle suggests, “perfect” friendships take a significant amount of time to build and cultivate: “Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found loveable and trusted by each” (196). By Aristotle and Moore’s definitions, an initial attraction between people who are equal can develop into friendship if the relationship is carefully cultivated over time.
As noted above, friendship is “not ordinarily applied to lovers or relatives.” Friendship is different from love in that friendship, while it may be quite intimate, connotes a nonsexual relationship. A higher level of intimacy and the addition of sex make love more intense and powerful than friendship. As Freud explains, love is the most powerful bond that two people can share, and it is only in love that the one person is willing to merge with another: “At the height of being in love the boundary between the ego and the object threatens to melt away. Against all evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact” (Civilization and Its Discontents 13). However, the intensity and power of love also make it less secure than platonic friendship, in which sex plays either no role or a very small and restricted role. In this sense, I am suggesting that friendship may encompass some aspect of sex and sexuality, but that unlike love relationships, sex and sexuality do not play a major role. While love based on sexuality is more powerful than friendship, it is also potentially much less secure than friendship and can be an extremely vulnerable state: “The weak side of this technique is easy to see; otherwise no human being would have thought of abandoning this path to happiness for any other. It is that we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love” (33).

While love is the most powerful bond that can be experienced between two people, it is both highly insecure and potentially ineffective in building civilization. When man has achieved his goal of “making one out of more than one,” he feels that he has achieved his goal and “refuses to go further” (Freud, Civilization 65). As Freud suggests, we may well be able to “imagine” a “cultural community” consisting of “double individuals” who are “libidinally satisfied in themselves,” but so far society has not proven to effectively work this way. Society,
requires withdrawing “energy from sexuality” and committing energy to other forms of “binding” and “identification” that build the social world: “Reality shows us that civilization is not content with the ties we have so far allowed it. It aims at binding members of the community together in a libidinal way as well as employs every means to that end” (65). “Binding members of the community together in a libidinal” way through a range of educational, cultural, and religious institutions requires the inhibition of the instinctual aims through sublimation. Friendship is one such example of an “aim-inhibited” or “sublimated” relationship that is crucial to building society: “It [civilization] favors every path by which strong identifications can be established between the members of the community, and it summons up aim-inhibited libido on the largest scale so as to strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship” (65). The purpose of friendship is not simply pleasure or enjoyment—though as I will show, the Bloomsbury Group found friendship pleasurable—but is also used to create bonds and identification among members of communities and the larger social world. As Freud makes abundantly clear, friendship is a necessary component of civilization, which depends upon “antagonisms to sexuality” and “restrictions upon sexual life” (65). I draw attention to Freud’s theory of the role of friendship in society to suggest that friendship is not merely an anecdote or accessory to more important love or family relationships, but that it is just as purposeful as love and family relationships.

Using Aristotle, Moore, and Freud’s definitions of friendship, and specifically Moore’s idea that “by far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse of and the enjoyment of beautiful objects” as a point of departure, I study the notions of friendship elaborated by the Bloomsbury Group during the first half of the twentieth century (Moore,
Principia Ethica 189). In particular I show how Moore’s philosophy of friendship, along with the Great War, influenced the notions of friendship developed by D. H. Lawrence, E. M. Forster, and Virginia Woolf, both through their personal lives and in their works of post–Great War fiction, including Women in Love (1921), A Passage to India (1924), and The Waves (1931). For Moore, as well as the members of Bloomsbury and even one of its main detractors, D. H. Lawrence, friendship as distinguished from love and family relations was highly important. The ways in which each of these figures understood, valued, and ultimately represented friendship in his or her fictional works vary. I argue Moore and the Great War influenced Lawrence, Forster, and Woolf’s notions of friendship to a high degree, but I suggest that what each of them learned from Moore and the experience of the Great War was different.

1.1 FRIENDSHIP IN MID- AND LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

To adequately explain and compare Moore, Lawrence, Forster, and Woolf’s contributions to the Bloomsbury Group’s notion of friendship, I begin my study in the middle of the nineteenth century and explore how changes in the role of religion in social and political life influenced notions of friendship. In Chapter One I argue that after the metaphorical “death of God” in the mid-nineteenth century, new social and intellectual structures were created to account for the space left open by a significant reduction in religious belief and practice. The “death of God,” I argue, was the impetus for the creation or reinvigoration of social groups, including the Cambridge Apostles and the Men and Women’s Club. The Cambridge Apostles was created in 1820, but the group’s focus shifted significantly in the middle of the century when leaders of the Apostles, including Leslie Stephen and Henry Sidgwick, left the Church of England. While
Stephen’s resignation had “no direct political effect” on the university, Sidgwick’s resignation had great impact, prompting the Cambridge University administrators to rethink the efficacy and value of the university’s religious exams (Annan, Leslie Stephen 46–47). In 1871 the university officially repealed its religious tests, and belief in God was no longer a requirement for students and faculty of the university. For a university that had been deeply religious, this was a major paradigm shift.

In anticipation of this shift, Oxford and Cambridge University began to change their curriculums. Benjamin Jowett created the “Literae Humaniores” course at Oxford in response to a renewed interest in ancient Greek texts after the university’s religious exams were repealed (Turner 234). Cambridge University’s answer to the “Literae Humaniores” course was the Moral Science Tripos (The Student’s Guide to the University of Cambridge 166–68). The reading list for the Moral Science Tripos, as explained in the 1866 Student’s Guide to the University of Cambridge, emphasized Plato’s “moral dialogues,” including the Philebus and the Symposium, and Aristotle’s Ethics (166–68). Plato’s moral dialogues and especially Aristotle’s Ethics were influential on Bertrand Russell and Moore, both of whom read for the Moral Sciences Tripos. Reading these texts, I argue, prompted Russell and Moore to think about friendship and inspired them to write their own treatises on friendship. Russell’s “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver” and Moore’s “Achilles or Patroclus?” seek to define and place value on contemporary friendship. Moore’s piece posits that friendship should be based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling (“Achilles or Patroclus?” 1–4). It is especially notable that in Moore’s piece he posits that friendship based on this set of qualities can be experienced between men and men, women and women, and men and women: “It will, I think, now be plain from my description that the passion, with which my paper deals, may be felt
equally between either man and woman, man and man, or woman and woman; and therefore may be called either friendship or love” (4). Moore’s “Achilles or Patroclus?” served as the foundation for his seminal work, *Principia Ethica*, in which he famously claimed that “by far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects” (*Principia Ethica* 188–89).

*Principia Ethica* was published in 1903 just as the generation of Cambridge Apostles following Russell and Moore were in the middle of their Cambridge careers. The cohort of Cambridge Apostles and students who read Moore’s book, and whom I will refer to as the Cambridge Men throughout this dissertation, include: E. M. Forster (elected 1901); John Maynard Keynes (elected 1903); Lytton Strachey (elected 1902); Sydney Saxon Turner (elected 1902); and Leonard Woolf (elected 1902) (Levy 311). The Cambridge Men (and specifically Keynes, Strachey, and Woolf) imported Moore’s ideas to London and Bloomsbury, sharing them with the other members of the Bloomsbury group, most importantly Vanessa and Virginia Stephen. In the earliest stages of its development, when Moore’s ideas were new to Bloomsbury, the group was enthralled with his notion of “the good,” as well as his suggestion that the “pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects” are by far the most valuable things we can know or imagine (*Principia Ethica* 188–89).

But the radically positive nature of Moore’s view of the good, as it related to human nature, made Lytton Strachey skeptical of Moore’s philosophy. Strachey thought that Moore’s theory was “violently definite” and thought it would be horrifying if Moore’s theory became a reality; that is, Strachey could not imagine a world without “real slaughters and tortures and lusts” (“G. E. Moore Papers” Add 8330 8S/44/1). Strachey’s prescient criticism of Moore’s
work anticipated the Great War in which “real slaughters and tortures and lusts” became more of a reality than ever before. In Chapter Two I study the ways that the Great War changed the way the Bloomsbury Group viewed Moore’s philosophy. While the Great War forced the Bloomsbury Group to reconsider its devotion to Moore’s theory, it also provided them and others the opportunity to study the effects of war on personal relationships, adding depth and complexity to their theories of friendship.

1.2 THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT WAR ON FRIENDSHIP

In Chapter Two I study the effects of war on personal relationships. I argue that the Great War impacted late-Victorian notions of friendship by illuminating the fragility of human life and relationships. The Great War also gave Freud and others the opportunity to study the ways in which human beings react to the loss of friends and loved ones. Freud learned at this time that human beings experience mourning, but also at times melancholia after the loss of a loved object. To make this argument I analyze the work of the War Poets, including Guillaume Apollinaire, Issac Rosenberg, Wilfred Owen, and Siegfried Sassoon, to show how the war impacted intimate relationships between men at the front. The War Poets illustrated that the Great War brought men together in close and intimate contact and that this intimacy often led to sexual relations. While Paul Fussell has argued that the men at the front participate in a “sublimated (i.e. ‘chaste’) form of temporary homosexuality,” I argue that the men at the front were deeply involved in considerable sexual relations (272). This is evident, I argue, from the works of the War Poets, who wrote explicitly about friendship, love, and sex at the front. While Sarah Cole has suggested that the war “destroyed friendship” by bringing the men into close
quarters only to rip them apart after intense friendships had been created, I suggest that the front actually provided the space in which the men could cultivate friendships that they had not been able to cultivate previously, thus extending the boundaries of previously accepted forms of homosocial and homosexual practice. Another effect of the war, however, was that it did, as Cole suggests, destroy friendship. Rather than consider the role that these destroyed friendships played in reconstructing previously accepted notions of homosexuality, as does Fussell, for instance, I study the opportunity the Great War provided Freud and other psychoanalysts to understand the effects of loss more generally.

What Freud learned by studying former combatants and civilians was that mourning and melancholia are responses to the loss of a loved object, and that both mourning and melancholia are used to alleviate the pain of the lost love object or the idea of a lost object. The distinction between mourning and melancholia is that mourning is a normal response to the loss of a loved object, while melancholia is a potentially pathological response to the loss of a loved object or the idea of a lost object. As Freud pointed out, however, melancholia is structurally different from mourning. Melancholia often arises in those who already suffer from a “morbid pathological disposition” (Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” 2). But even more important than this attribute, however, is that melancholia often results not from the death of a loved one, but from losing someone or the idea of someone and not knowing what it is you have lost in losing them. In other words, melancholia can result from losing an idea of something rather than losing something in reality: “This, indeed, might be so even when the patient was aware of loss giving rise to the melancholia, that is, when he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in them” (166). It is this idea of melancholia that has allowed Jonathan Flately to suggest that melancholia is “an allegory for the experience of modernity” (Fatley 2). It is this notion as
well that I use as a point of departure to suggest that after the Great War, friendship itself became melancholic. I demonstrate the evidence of this thesis in my case studies of Lawrence’s Women in Love, Forster’s A Passage to India, and Woolf’s The Waves, where every occasion of friendship or potential friendship is influenced by either the possibility of loss, or by loss itself. In Women in Love, Birkin loses Gerald. In A Passage to India, Aziz loses Fielding, and in The Waves Bernard loses both Percival and Rhoda. Thus I argue that the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophies of friendship were not simply based on Moore’s theory, but on their experiences of the Great War, and on the looming possibility of losing one’s friends. I also suggest, however, that Forster and Woolf retained their belief in Moore’s philosophy of friendship even after the Great War had made it clear that human life, and therefore friendship, is fragile. I therefore refute Leonard Woolf’s notion that Moore only influenced the Bloomsbury Group in its earliest stage. While Woolf claims that by 1914 the Bloomsbury Group no longer considered Moore’s work as a “guide to practical life,” I argue that the Bloomsbury Group did continue to believe in Moore’s notion that friendship is highly valuable and utilized his theories in their practical politics (L. Woolf, Sowing 156). To make this argument, I rely on Keynes’s statement that Moore’s “religion” was the most important that he had known: “It is still my religion under the surface” (Keynes 92).

In Chapter Two I also explore the work of Judith Butler and Jacques Lacan, who extended Freud’s theory of melancholy. Butler and Lacan suggest not only that loss triggers melancholia, but also that melancholia is first experienced during the phallic stage of development, when the child must come to terms with the fact that it cannot have its primary loved objects. As Freud suggests in The Ego and the Id, the ego is constituted of “abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object choices” (24). The ego draws its
objects into its own ego so that it does not have entirely give them up. This process of identification fortifies the ego. According to Butler, however, the process of losing the loved object and introjecting them into the ego by means of identification is even more complex. The process of becoming a subject requires not simply the loss of the objects but also subordination and subjection by them. Thus, according to Butler, subordination itself “proves central to the becoming of the subject” (The Psychic Life of Power 7). One form of subjection or domination is the prohibition of the primary loved objects, which is welcome at the phallic stage of development and is welcome during the phallic stage of development “precisely because it is bound up in the narcissistic circuit that wards off the dissolution of the subject into psychosis” (103). Subject formation is always connected not to desire, but to the prohibition of desire, which effectively makes prohibition the focus of desire. Thus, according to Butler, people desire what they cannot have (103). This makes the possibility of sexual satisfaction in adulthood impossible. Lacan echoes this sentiment when he suggests that desire is perpetuated not by satisfactory object choice, but by the cause of desire itself. For Lacan, love “is in fact that which constitutes a remainder in desire, namely its cause, and sustains desire through its lack of satisfaction (insatisfaction), and even its impossibility” (The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: 6). Lacan even goes so far as to suggest that this notion of desire makes the sexual relationship itself impossible. I suggest, however, that Melanie Klein provides a different notion of subject formation and adult sexuality, which allows for the possibility that people can find satisfaction in adult relationships if they have had adequate care early in life.

At the end of Chapter Two, I argue that Klein’s theory incorporates both the modern understanding of split or melancholic subjectivity and the possibility of the late-Victorian ideal of satisfying friendship and love. Klein counters Freud’s theory of melancholy, as well as Butler
and Lacan’s notion that the impact of the loss of the primary objects in the phallic stage of development affects the functioning of adult sexuality. Klein suggests that individuals suffer depression at the loss of their primary objects not during the phallic stage of development, but much earlier—in infancy. Klein argues that babies experience “depressive feelings” when they realize that they are separate from their mothers and that these feelings “reach a climax just before, during, and after weaning” (345). But unlike Butler, who believes that melancholic injuries occur later in the phallic stage and can never be healed and or satisfied by adult sexual relationships, Klein believes that the melancholic injuries of the weaning stage can be overcome and completely healed if the child receives adequate, consistent nurturing in the years to come.

My purpose in introducing the theories of Freud, Butler, Lacan, and Klein into this dissertation is to suggest that the way we view the loss of the primary objects in childhood impacts how we experience loss and friendship and love in adult life. In addition, I suggest that Klein’s theory that people can find satisfying personal relationships aligns him with members of the Bloomsbury Group who continued to believe in the possibility of finding satisfying friendship and love relationships in adult life. This is not by any means to underestimate the impact of the Great War on human relationships, but rather to suggest that adequate friendship and love relationships can provide fortification against even the most difficult experiences. I suggest even an event as profound as the Great War is not enough to suppress the human drive toward Eros. As Freud explains at the very end of Civilization and Its Discontents, the power of Eros may in fact be stronger than the death instincts: “And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’ [p. 96f.], eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can foresee with what success and with what result?” (112). After the start of the Great War, Lawrence completely rejected the
Bloom'sbury Group’s notion of ideal friendship and personal relationships and suggested that desexualized friendship is impossible.

1.3 D. H. LAWRENCE AND FRIENDSHIP

In Chapter Three I study Lawrence’s view of friendship by investigating his letters, in which he makes it clear that he valued friendship and wanted it to play a strong role in his life. Like Moore, Lawrence claimed that friendship could exist between men and men, women and women, and men and women (“Achilles or Patroclus?” 4; The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 301–2). At the same time, however, Lawrence felt that he personally could not find adequate friendships with either men or women. In particular, Lawrence longed for friendship with men that would complement his love and sex relationships with women. Lawrence felt that people “vibrate to various frequencies” and “tones” and that sharing these vibrations with men of a similar ilk was even more satisfying than sharing these vibrations with women: “But a man will respond, if he is a friend, to the very chord you strike, with clear and satisfying timbre, responding with a part, not the whole of his soul” (Letters 1: 66–67). This, suggests Lawrence, “makes a man much more satisfactory” (66–67). Given his interest in cultivating friendships with men who vibrated on a similar frequency, Lawrence was enthralled when he was first introduced to Bertrand Russell because he thought that Russell was passionate and politically radical.

Lawrence and Russell were fast friends who were drawn to each other because they were both passionate. Lawrence’s friendship with Russell initially cushioned the loss of his friendship with both Katherine Mansfield and John Middleton Murray and helped Lawrence redirect his anti-war and anti-civilization sentiment. For Russell, the relationship provided him with a much-
needed source of “rebellion.” As Russell explains, pacifism had produced in him “a mood of bitter rebellion” and he found Lawrence “equally full of rebellion” (Portraits from Memory and Other Essays 111). The camaraderie between the two men waned, however, once Russell fully understood Lawrence’s anti-civilization philosophy. Lawrence called for a “revolution of the state” that he hoped would begin with the nationalization of industries so that men would have equal wages (Letters 2: 282). But more radical than this was Lawrence’s theory of the “sex relations” that led him to reject the Bloomsbury Group’s notion of desexualized friendship after the war (Monk 403). Lawrence explained to Russell that he thought all English people had become redundantly passive and were no longer able to act, specifically in sexual life. Lawrence used E. M. Forster as an example to suggest to Russell that men could no longer “take a woman” (Letters 2: 282). In general Lawrence felt that sexual relations had become based on “sensationalism,” rather than “a discovery” of the self and the other: “The repeating of a known reaction upon myself is sensationalism. This is what nearly all English people do now. When a man takes a woman, he is merely repeating a known reaction upon himself, not seeking a new reaction, a discovery” (285). Embedded in these comments is Lawrence’s belief that life should be based not on desexualized friendship, but on highly sexual relationships based on “whole circuit” sexuality “established between two individuals” (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious 28).

In Chapter Four I analyze Lawrence’s Women in Love, arguing that here Lawrence suggests the sex instincts are, or ought to be, the dominant force in human life, but that civilization prevents the sex instincts from being adequately expressed. For Lawrence the Great War is another indication of the advanced mechanization of society and its negative effects on humanity and on human sexuality in particular. Thus, I posit that in Women in Love Lawrence
shows both that the Bloomsbury Group’s ideal of desexualized friendship and love based on
equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling and his phallic theory of sex-instinct
satisfaction are ultimately impossible. While Birkin seems to find a version of Lawrence’s
“whole circuit” sex relationship with Ursula, this is not enough to satisfy him. Birkin longs for
an additional relationship with a man. Ursula does not understand why Birkin should want an
intense relationship with another person and is therefore disappointed because Birkin does not
fully commit to her. But in the end Lawrence kills off Gerald and suggests that Birkin cannot
have it both ways and will not get what he wants—a relationship with a man and a relationship
with a woman—within the course of the novel. Birkin most eloquently expresses his desire by
telling Ursula that he wants “an eternal union” with a man in addition to his sexual relationship
with her (Women in Love 481). Ursula does not believe this is possible: “You can’t have two
kinds of love.’ Why should you!” (481). But while Birkin is determined to have “two kinds of
love,” Lawrence himself is less sure of this possibility. For although Birkin can clearly
articulate what he wants, Lawrence does not allow Birkin to get what he wants, or to be
satisfied, within the confines of the text. The ending of the novel, I argue, is clear indication that
Lawrence had broken away completely from the Moore-influenced notions of friendship and
decided that desexualized friendship was a melancholic and ultimately impossible affair.

In addition to reading Women in Love as a war novel, I also discuss in Chapter Four
Lawrence’s relationship with Russell and John Maynard Keynes. Both Russell and Keynes
thought that Lawrence had great insight into the “insane and irrational springs of wickedness”
that exist in “most men,” but that he had no understanding of what was required for civilization
and certainly no sense of the role that personal relationships ought to play in civilization (Keynes
100). Thus, despite thinking that Lawrence had some insight into human nature, Keynes
nevertheless believed that Moore’s theory, what Keynes called his “religion,” was much more valuable than Lawrence’s view of human nature (84). Keynes explains that the Bloomsbury Group’s religion was grounded in the “English puritan tradition of being chiefly concerned with the salvation of our own souls” (84). As Keynes suggests, although the Bloomsbury Group was naïve and “not aware that civilization was a thin and precarious crust erected by the personality and the will of the very few, and only maintained by rules and conventions skillfully put across and guilefully preserved,” he still believed that their own beliefs were incredibly valuable (99). Thus, despite Keynes’s admission that there may have been “a grain of truth when Lawrence said in 1914 that we were ‘done for,’” Keynes still believed that Moore’s philosophy was the best he had known: “It seems to me looking back, that this religion of ours was a very good one to grow up under. It remains nearer the truth than any other that I know, with less extraneous matter and nothing to be ashamed of” (92).

1.4 E. M. FORSTER AND VIRGINIA WOOLF ON FRIENDSHIP

In Chapter Five, I argue that while Forster retained his belief in the value of human relationships, which he articulated in his essay “What I Believe” (1938), his novel of friendship, A Passage to India, showed the limitations of the Bloomsbury ethos of friendship and love. Forster believed that friendship was more important than loyalty to the state: “I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my country” (“What I Believe” 66). However, in A Passage to India, Forster’s characters are not able to enact his theory of personal relationships, because Fielding and Aziz are directly impacted by the British colonialism. After providing context for Britain’s imperial
project in India, I analyze A Passage to India, suggesting that the text demonstrates limitations to friendship within a colonial context and its uneven distribution of power. The difference between Fielding and Aziz, both in terms of social position and indeed their races, is brought to the surface not through the nuances of their own relationship, but through what I call the “problem of the Marabar Caves.” After a trip to the Marabar Caves, Aziz is accused of raping an English woman, Adela Quested. While Adela eventually drops the rape charges, citing her own hallucination due to stress as the root cause of the accusation, the case emphasizes the distinction between the English and the Indians. Circumstances keep Fielding and Aziz apart for two years and even after they are happily reunited, Forster makes it clear that the two men cannot overcome the limitations placed on them by the colonial situation. In their final conversation, the men address the colonial situation and the realities of their relationship. While the men ride their horses “between jolly bushes and rocks,” the narrator announces, “socially they have no meeting place” (Forster, A Passage to India 357). Rather than blame the outcome of their relationship on either the two men or the colonial situation, however, I show that Forster reasserts the Bloomsbury Group’s ethos of the importance of friendship by ending the text on a metaphysical note: the two horses that the men ride towards each other provide Fielding and Aziz an opportunity for a “half kiss,” but then the horses ride apart, demonstrating that the choice between having or not having a relationship is not within the men’s control. Forster leaves open the possibility that the men might be friends in the future under a different set of political circumstances (357).

While scholars such as Parminder Bakshi have argued that the relationship between Fielding and Aziz is “specifically homoerotic” and based on Forster’s own desire for homosexual relationships “outside of English society,” I pay less attention to this aspect of the
text in favor another aspect of the text, suggesting that although the relationship between
Fielding and Aziz may be homoerotic and may even be outright homosexual, the foundation of
their relationship is based on friendship (Bakshi 24). Thus, I conclude Chapter Five by revisiting
Forster’s “What I Believe” and Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents to suggest that even after
the Great War both Forster and Freud remained convinced that the power of Eros had the
opportunity to bring peace and save human beings from their well-known capacity for self-
destruction: “Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their
help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last” (Freud, Civilization
112). I end the chapter by suggesting through Freud’s work that the future of civilization rests
not simply on reviving the Victorian notion of friendship based on equality, sympathy, states of
consciousness, and feeling, but on the power of Eros in general.

Finally, in Chapter Six I trace Woolf’s belief in friendship through her relationship to
both her family and the Bloomsbury Group, the later of which essentially functioned as her
family after the death of her father when she was 26. Then I analyze The Waves as Woolf’s
homage to the Bloomsbury Group and her novel of friendship. I argue that Woolf posits that
friendship and the psychic connection between people impacts identity, and that this is especially
true for melancholic people. In particular I study the relationship between Bernard and Rhoda to
suggest that friendship can provide an opportunity for empathy, identification, and a deeper
understanding of both self and other. I argue that Rhoda the melancholic is looking to her
friendships for an opportunity to identify with others. While Rhoda’s melancholy prevents her
from adequately creating and maintaining friendships through identification, it also gives
Bernard the opportunity to empathize with her. This is not enough to save her—she still
commits suicide despite having a network of friends who by most accounts seem to care deeply
for her—but both Bernard and Rhoda gain from their relationship. Rhoda gains the capacity to hold on to her life longer, and Bernard is able to face the “enemy” with “effort” and persistence as he recalls his meaningful relationships with his friends (The Waves 225). When Bernard looks back at his life he feels that he is “not one person,” but “many people”—a combination of all of his friends (212). In particular, I suggest that it is Bernard’s ability to imagine how Rhoda felt at the moment of her suicide that shows his capacity for empathy. Bernard goes into the Strand and imagines the moment that Rhoda stepped into the street and killed herself. Bernard believes that he could have prevented Rhoda from committing suicide by reminding her that people care about her: “‘Wait until these omnibuses have gone by. Don’t cross so dangerously. These men are your brothers’” (216). In persuading Rhoda to live, Bernard is also persuading himself to live: “In persuading her I was also persuading my own soul” (216).

Woolf’s notion that people are psychically connected to their friends adds another layer to the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy of friendship. For Woolf, people who are not necessarily equal in terms of social class, race, or gender (or mental health) may still have the ability and opportunity to identify and empathize with others. In conclusion I suggest that Woolf’s use of Moore’s theory to show that friendship is valuable because it provides an opportunity for identification and empathy is the most modern of the theories of friendship I discuss in this project. While other scholars including Leon Edel, J. K. Johnstone, Paul Levy, S. P. Rosenbaum, and Raymond Williams have studied Moore’s impact on the Bloomsbury Group and his influence on friendship, they do not suggest as I do that Moore’s notion of friendship broadly influenced the Bloomsbury Group’s own lasting commitment to the philosophy and practice of friendship in both life and art. I argue that the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy of friendship is one of their major contributions to the culture and literature of their time.
1.5 CRITICAL STUDIES OF THE BLOOMSBURY GROUP AND FRIENDSHIP

J. K. Johnstone argues in his early work on the Bloomsbury Group that the next generation of Cambridge Apostles, many of whom would become members of Bloomsbury, found in Moore a leader “who seemed to them to have swept out the materialist, utilitarian, and moral trash of the Victorians, and to have formulated a logical, idealist philosophy based on premises that the twentieth century could accept” (10). Johnstone also notes that the Bloomsbury Group was based on friendship: “Friendship was the basis of the society; friendship had drawn its members together; and Bloomsbury depended on a family feeling for its continued existence” (17). Johnstone argues that the Bloomsbury Group’s close friendships gave them a sense of security with one another that allowed them to share their views, some of them controversial, in a “frank” manner: “Friendship made possible a frank exchange of views, which, Bloomsbury found, enlarged the individual” (17). Johnstone notes that conversation was thus a central component of the Bloomsbury Group’s practice: “For this, conversation was necessary; and because Bloomsbury loved beauty, and found conversation to be of great value, conversation became an art in its midst and was more important than it had been, perhaps, since the days of Dr. Johnson” (17). Edel also suggests that Moore’s influence provided the group with a source of homogeneity—a shared sacred text—from which to build their friendship group:

We can see in 1903 [with the publication of Moore’s *Principia Ethica*] the cornerstone of Bloomsbury being laid in Moore and the communion of the Apostles: that of a cultivation of the art of friendship, made possible by a certain homogeneity of mind that invites closeness yet safeguards independence—and ‘social awareness, and a desire to probe the common enjoyment of the Beautiful,
or the kind of pleasures expressed by Maynard when he told his father of the ‘substantial joy’ he found in logic.’ (Keynes in Edel 53)

Similarly, Rosenbaum discusses the role that Moore played in creating a foundation for the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy in his multi-volume study of the group. In Victorian Bloomsbury Rosenbaum traces Moore’s influence both in Cambridge and among the members of the Cambridge Apostles who eventually became members of the Bloomsbury Group. Rosenbaum also covers Keynes’s response to Lawrence’s criticisms of the Bloomsbury Group that I discuss in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, respectively. By engaging with the Keynes/Lawrence debate, Rosenbaum suggests that Moore’s philosophy had more impact on the culture and literature of the twentieth century than it did on philosophy: “One of the great paradoxes of twentieth-century English culture is that his [Moore’s thinking] had greater significance than had that of any other contemporary philosopher” (Victorian Bloomsbury 217). While Rosenbaum suggests that Moore’s impact was quite broad, Paul Levy argues that it was mostly personal and not as far-reaching as Rosenbaum or I suggest: “Faced with all the differing views of Moore’s influence that Keynes’s ‘My Early Beliefs’ has given rise to, the biographer of Moore’s early years concluded that Moore’s influence was ‘not importantly doctrinal at all, but personal’” (Levy in Rosenbaum, Victorian Bloomsbury 216). Moore, argues Rosenbaum, impacted the Cambridge Men and Bloomsbury Group’s “beliefs about the nature of consciousness, perception and even perhaps mysticism, about the distinctions between right and good, about the importance of personal relations as well as public affairs” (Victorian Bloomsbury 217). While Rosenbaum does point out here that the Bloomsbury Group learned about the importance of personal relations from Moore, Rosenbaum does not go into more detail
about this aspect of Moore’s influence and he does not suggest that this aspect of Moore’s philosophy directly influenced the literary production of the Bloomsbury Group.

Similarly, Rosenbaum briefly mentions Moore’s “second Apostle paper”—“Achilles or Patroclus?”—but he does not analyze the paper itself or suggest its implications for the Bloomsbury Group’s notion of friendship. He simply paraphrases some of Moore’s most salient ideas from the paper: “Moore’s second Apostle paper maintained that love—homosexual or heterosexual—was the aim of life, though the young puritan admitted it included the possibly disagreeable element of copulation” (Victorian Bloomsbury 232). Rosenbaum’s texts trace the development and history of the Bloomsbury Group, but he does not make any specific arguments that have a great impact on my own study.

Like Rosenbaum, Raymond Williams looks holistically at the Bloomsbury Group as a cultural group. Williams argues that to properly understand the Bloomsbury Group we must consider them within the larger social and political context. To formulate his position, Williams asks if the Bloomsbury Group stands for something beyond the achievements and positions of its individual members. He suggests that the members were distinct products of their class, education, and the social and political context in which they grew and flourished. The Bloomsbury Group, according to Williams, represented a “new” style and “a cool frankness” which affected their collective “emotional life” (Williams 234). Williams points to some of the cultural and political shifts that I study in this dissertation in his representation of the cultural context in which Bloomsbury existed:

The old universities were reformed and made more serious. The administrative services were both developed and reformed, by the new needs of imperial and state administrations, and by the competitive examinations which interlocked with
reformed universities. The changing character of the society and the economy built, in fact, a new and very important professional and highly educated sector of the English upper class: very different in its bearings and values from either the old aristocracy or from the directly commercial bourgeoisie. (239)

Members of the Bloomsbury Group, argues Williams, distinguished themselves from the social context in which they were born through “social and intellectual critique” and by addressing the “ambiguity of the position of the women” (242). I address this aspect of the Bloomsbury Group at various points in this study, most importantly in Chapter One, where I discuss Moore’s “Achilles or Patroclus?” and suggest that Moore believed friendship based on equality was possible between men and men, women and women, and men and women. Furthermore, Williams notes that the Bloomsbury Group anticipated what would become the “‘civilized’ norm” of an “ideological disassociation between ‘public’ and ‘private’ life” (247). I address this topic specifically in Chapter Five, where I suggest that Forster struggled with how to negotiate his characters’ private feelings in what was decidedly a public context. I value Williams’s work in “The Bloomsbury Fraction,” employ his cultural studies methodology, and use his work as a point of departure for my own. But while he suggests that the Bloomsbury Group’s “specialized positions” “have become naturalized” over time, I argue that the group’s insistence on the value of personal relationships has not become ubiquitous and that the Bloomsbury Group remains unique specifically because its members placed such a high value on personal relationships (247).^5

In addition to Edel, Johnstone, Rosenbaum, and Williams, who have written directly about Moore’s influence on the Bloomsbury Group as a cultural group, other scholars have attempted to theorize the role of friendship in various ways that are tangentially if not directly
applicable to my study. In *Modernist Fiction, Cosmopolitanism and the Politics of Community*, Jessica Berman proposes to “revive the theory of community in order to insist that it respond to the narrative construction of that term” and to “demonstrate modernism’s historical and political engagement with the dual question of community and cosmopolitanism” (3–4). In particular, she highlights Virginia Woolf’s service work and postulates that the “model of community” embodied in Woolf’s political and cooperative work is also found in her fiction (5). While I focus on *The Waves* in Chapter Six in terms of Woolf’s notion of intimate friendship as it relates to the creation and maintenance of identity, Berman argues that *The Waves* “models” “fractured yet coherent political life” (5). For Berman, *The Waves* demonstrates an “anti-fascist, feminist model of community” that serves as an “alternative model of both community and action” “resisting the gathering political concern” (Berman 5). Berman’s own work is useful to those who wish to extend the Bloomsbury Group’s notion of and commitment to friendship in a broader context as it relates to community and other larger social structures. I suggest the broader implications of the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy of friendship at various points in this study, but I do not consider the Bloomsbury Group’s commitment to community and politics in great detail.

As I mentioned above in my précis of Chapter Two, Sarah Cole has also considered the impact of the Great War on modernism and notions of friendship. In “The Ambivalence of the Outsider: Virginia Woolf and Male Friendship,” Cole argues that Woolf felt alienated from the primarily male institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge University, but she also suggests that Woolf’s novels—*The Waves* and *Jacob’s Room*, in particular—demonstrate “an understanding of the possibilities for achieving intimacy that these male institutions appear to offer” (191). Cole suggests that *The Waves* demonstrates the “rich infrastructure for facilitating male friendship” in
direct contrast to the “more isolated experience of the three young women in the novel” (191). While I engage with Cole’s argument in more detail in both Chapter Two and Chapter Six, I would like to suggest here that the most exciting aspect of Cole’s work is her suggestion that the failure of male friendship is devastating precisely because it is promised to men as reward for their efforts in war. Furthermore, Cole suggests that male friendship (before it fails) is so powerful that it has the capacity to “disrupt” and “perhaps even to destroy” “other institutions such as marriage, love, and friendship” (193). Cole’s thesis, however, relates mostly to the consequences of failed friendship, whereas I consider the generative possibilities, especially in Forster and Woolf, of successful friendships, even insofar as these friendships are shaped by various cultural constraints.

In Chapter Two I argue that in Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf suggests that one person’s pain can create an opportunity for another person to experience empathy. I show that while Septimus might be “left in a position of precarious isolation and solitude” after the war, his illness creates the occasion, as sad as it is, by which others—his wife, Lucrezia, and Mrs. Dalloway herself, for instance—are given an opportunity to explore their own capacity for empathy and understanding the other. Where Cole sees the failure of institutions of friendship to sustain men like Septimus after the horrors of the front, I argue that in Mrs. Dalloway and especially The Waves Woolf confronts the possibility of empathy, friendship, and understanding after the devastation of war. In juxtaposition to Cole’s work on the failure of male friendship after the war, Michael P. Farrell and Victor Luftig have written studies not unlike my own on the generative impact of friendship on creative work and friendship “between the sexes,” which is to say between men and women, respectively.
In Collaborative Circles: Friendship Dynamics and Creative Work, Michael P. Farrell explores the possibility that friendship can influence the production of creative work. He uses the term “collaborative circle” to describe a “group consisting of peers who share similar occupational goals and who, through long periods of dialogue and collaboration, negotiate a common vision that guides their work” (11). Farrell suggests that such collaborative circles often start as friendship groups and only later evolve into collaborative circles in which the focus of the group is not simply spending time with one another, but also producing works of art either separately or with the other members of the group’s direct influence. He proposes that collaborative circles have become more important in modernity and post-modernity “where technological and cultural changes are relentless,” often leaving families or local communities unequipped with the knowledge, skills, and “expertise” required to “socialize a child into a discipline” (12). The collaborative circle functions like a “surrogate family,” supporting the individual emotionally and psychologically while indoctrinating him or her into a specific field or profession, thereby doing the work of friendship and family simultaneously (12). Farrell even goes so far as to suggest that the dynamics of the collaborative circle can give an individual an opportunity to “dispel the shadows of their familial relationships” and thereby “gain increased mastery over the psychological processes that block or distort their creative work” (13). On this point, the collaborative circle can function much like the patient-analyst relationship, complete with the mechanism of transference. Freud first began to theorize transference, Farrell explains, by studying members of his own circle:

For example, some of his [Freud’s] fundamental insights about transference emerged out of his analysis of the dynamics of his friendship with his collaborator Wilhelm Fleiss. In 1897, while he was in the midst of his self-analysis and
working on the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud became fascinated by the parallels in a youthful relationship with a nephew very close to him in age and his adult relationship with Fleiss. (Farrell 13)

In this regard Farrell uses the theory established by Heinz Kohut to suggest that individuals do not do their best work in silent isolation, but “while embedded in a collaborative circle”: “Embedded in a relationship with a self-object, the creative person feels more cohesive and centered (Kohut 1980), more free to explore untried or even objectionable ideas, less distracted by guilt, self-doubt, resentment, or jealousy” (17). The support of a collaborative circle may help individuals move beyond their own set of immediate limitations and allow them to express their creativity more freely, but collaborative circles are not necessarily available to everyone.

Farrell explains that social class and geography are central to creating the conditions whereby collaborative circles can flourish. Thus, much like Williams, he suggests that collaborative circles, while eventually making public the benefits of group work, are formed by only the select few. “Collaborative circles are more common among upper-middle-class people living in urban settings,” however, and less common among those from working-class backgrounds and rural areas (17). Working-class people and those isolated in rural areas, he argues, tend to establish friendships rather than collaborative circles and stay closer to home when looking for friendship: they tend to be friends with “family members and neighbors” (17). Collaborative circles also thrive among those who are “marginalized in their fields or blocked in advancement” because such people may need more help in becoming recognized in the more established areas of their fields (19–20). But at the same time, Farrell makes it clear collaborative circles are sought not only by those who are not marginalized, but also by those who “feel their current roles block them from pursuing deep interests” (19–20). He argues that
the Bloomsbury Group belongs in this category because the group rebelled not simply against “authorities within their own field,” but also against, as Williams suggests, the entire culture that they inherited from their predecessors (15). One of the ways in which the Bloomsbury Group effectively rebelled, for example, was by incorporating men and women into the circle and by encouraging equality for women.

In his book Seeing Together: Friendship Between the Sexes in English Writing, Victor Luftig explains that there is no general language for friendship between men and women “no matter how intensely it may be valued” (1). He argues that during the First World War and its aftermath, friendship was “suddenly made to revert to its earlier meaning of sexlessness” and that friendship “between the sexes was accepted, hailed” and “even celebrated” (2). Luftig suggests that it was only after the Great War that friendship, “gutted of any real meaning” during the war, could be redefined and that “those who had been most dissatisfied with its earlier uses [could] begin to develop real alternatives” (2). He also notes, however, that this shift allowing “real alternatives” to friendship norms began in the Victorian era: “In Victorian England, ‘friendship’ challenged defining lines between some of the most valued bourgeois institutions—courtship, the family home, and the place of work” (3). I elaborate and extend Luftig’s argument in Chapter One of this thesis, where I posit that the metaphoric death of God and shifts in actual religious practice both in the home and at the universities created space for the reevaluation of friendship between men and men, women and women, and men and women.

In addition, Luftig suggests in “Friendship and Wartime” that during the war years “friendship between the sexes” had “acquired an idiomatic stability that it had previously lacked” (166). He attributes this new stability of friendship between the sexes to collaborative war work, as well as the post-Conscription “cooperative relations on the home front” that featured men who
were “assumed to be too old, young, or otherwise incapacitated for war or sex” (167). The Bloomsbury men, including Clive Bell and Lytton Strachey, were among those who did not go to the front and did not participate in war work in any way that would have threatened their own safety. As I detail in Chapter Six, the Bloomsbury Group remained mostly intact because so many of its members applied for and were granted exemption based on their position as Conscientious Objectors. This allowed them to maintain their friendships, and specifically friendships between the sexes, but I argue that the war was not the impetus for these relations. Throughout this thesis I show that the Bloomsbury Group had already begun to experiment with friendship between the sexes well before the start of the Great War and continued to maintain a belief in the importance of personal relationships well after.

1.6 CRITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In my study of the Bloomsbury Group’s various notions of friendship, I suggest that the group was deeply influenced by G. E. Moore’s philosophy of friendship. But rather than simply positing that Moore continued to influence the members of the Bloomsbury group in the same way over the duration of their careers, I present a rich contextualization of both the social and political environment in which Moore developed his theories, as well as the social and political environment in which the members of the Bloomsbury Group grew and developed over the course of their careers. I study the group’s notions of friendship over about thirty years, from 1903, when Moore published Principia Ethica, to 1931, when Virginia Woolf published The Waves. In 1903, I argue, the Bloomsbury Group was invigorated by the theories of Moore that Thoby Stephen and his friends had imported from Cambridge University, but their interest in
Moore’s notions of “the good,” ethics in relation to conduct, and friendship were tested by the start of World War I in 1914. Thus I suggest that it was the dual influence of Moore’s late-Victorian philosophy of friendship, coupled with the horrors of the experience of loss during the Great War, which ultimately shaped the Bloomsbury Group’s various notions of friendship. Each of the novels I study in this thesis—Women in Love, A Passage to India, and The Waves—represent friendship as frustrated and melancholic rather than satisfying and successful. However, I also suggest that Forster and Woolf in particular continued to cultivate the hope that friendship and certain states of consciousness that result from the “pleasures of human intercourse” are still among “the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine,” even after the Great War (Forster, Principia Ethica 188–89).

I include Lawrence in this study and suggest that he helped define the Bloomsbury Group’s notions of friendship by adamantly rejecting the forms of desexualized friendship that they believed in. In other words, the Bloomsbury Group’s own philosophy became clearer and more specific after he identified and rejected its positions. Lawrence himself is complicated, however, because despite his hatred for the Bloomsbury Group, he too valued personal relationships and particularly friendship to a high degree. After the start Great War it became clear to him that the Bloomsbury Group’s belief that personal relationships should be based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling seemed increasingly impossible. But his idea that personal relationships should be based on sexual desire and that the sublimation of the sexual instincts thwarted human passion only strengthened the Bloomsbury Group’s commitment to Moore’s ideals and cast Lawrence out of the Bloomsbury for good.

In presenting these arguments, I complicate Leonard Woolf’s notion that Moore was no longer deeply influential to the Bloomsbury Group after the start of the Great War by drawing
attention to Woolf’s suggestion that the Moore did in fact influence the Bloomsbury Group’s practical politics as well as their theories of art and friendship. In Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880–1904, Woolf first argues that Moore influenced the Cambridge Men’s notions of practical life: “He and we were fascinated by questions of what was right and wrong, what one ought to do. We followed him closely in this as in other parts of his doctrine and argued interminably about the consequences of one’s actions, both in actual and imaginary situations” (149). But Woolf then suggests that by the start of the Great War the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group were no longer interested in what they had learned from Principia Ethica in regard to ethics in relation to conduct and practical life:

In 1903 we had all the inexperience, virginity, seriousness, intellectual puritanism of youth, in 1914 we had all, in various ways or places, been knocking about the world for ten or eleven years. A good deal of the bloom of ignorance and other things had been brushed off us. Principia Ethica had passed into our unconscious and was now merely part of our super-ego; we no longer argued about it as a guide to practical life. (156)

I argue, however, that the Bloomsbury Group did continue to value what they had learned from Principia Ethica, including Moore’s theory of ethics in relation to conduct, and that this is evident both from the members of the Bloomsbury Group’s personal lives and from their creative works (156).

I also complicate the idea that the members of the Bloomsbury Group were such emphatic believers in Moore’s philosophy that they were, as Lawrence suggested, “done for” in 1914 (Lawrence in Keynes 103). Rather, I suggest that the Bloomsbury Group believed deeply in Moore’s doctrines for the whole of their careers, but that after the Great War they adapted
Moore’s ideas to meet the demands of the twentieth century. I argue that Forster and Woolf retained their belief in Moore’s ideals while adjusting their positions to address the limitations placed on friendship during and after the Great War. Forster, I argue, demonstrates the limitations placed on friendship by England’s colonial position in India in *A Passage to India*, while Woolf addresses the possibility that friendship may be an opportunity for empathy and greater understanding of both self and other between people who are not necessarily equal in her novel of friendship, *The Waves*. 
2.0 LATE VICTORIAN NOTIONS OF FRIENDSHIP

2.1 THE DEATH OF GOD

In the mid-nineteenth century the Evangelical movement helped to reestablish England’s shrinking religious base. Evangelicalism began in the eighteenth century, and Henry Venn’s Complete Duty of Man (1763) and William Wiberforce’s Practical View of Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians (1797) to important Evangelical texts were read well into the nineteenth century (Jay 1–2). As Elizabeth Jay explains, the heart of the Evangelical theology was the idea that man was completely immoral and had, since the Fall, failed to uphold God’s commandments. The only way that man could atone for his original sin was to “lay hold of the promises made in the Gospel” (Jay 3). Central to this process was conversion, “an intense and central experience, leading to Assurance, the certain consciousness of personal salvation” (4). Performing “good works” was also an important aspect of belief, but it was not more important than “faith in the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice” (Jay 4). While Evangelicalism was well established, in the mid-nineteenth century the Broad Church and Oxford Movements, whose members included Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Jowett of Balliol College, Oxford, began to gain popularity.

The Broad Church favored “liberal theology over Evangelical dogmatism” and “took a moderate line on the Bible as an inspired text, rejecting ‘superstitious’ trappings like miracles
and ceremonies, and highlighting God’s generous forgiveness rather than his punishment for sin” (Moran 269). And the Broad Church moderated Evangelical beliefs encouraging social and educational reform. In addition to the Broad Church movement, John Keble, John Henry Newman and Edward Bouverie Pusey created the Oxford Movement, also called the Tractarian movement, publishing Tracts for the Times between 1833 and 1841 (Moran 29). Keble, Newman, and Pusey broke away from the Evangelicals to “free the Church from political interference” of the state (Moran 29). Keble and the others wanted to show the public that “Angelical bishops inherited their power directly from Christ and his apostles, and not from any monarch or parliament” (Moran 29). But while the Tractarians sought to reinstitute the relationship between Christ and the church, others were questioning Christ and the church altogether. Among those who rejected God and left the Church of England were Leslie Stephen, the “Godless” Victorian, and his predecessor John Stuart Mill, both of whom favored reason rather than religion for social reform.

It was Mill and Stephen who began the intellectual and social reforms that would affect generations to come. In studying Stephen’s loss of faith, I argue that the dissolution of the church and the relationship between the church and the university created space for new intellectual and social groups. It was in these groups, namely the Men and Women’s Club and the Cambridge Apostles, that new theories of friendship and love between men and men, women and women, and men and women emerged in the late Victorian era. In this chapter, I first detail Stephen and others’ loss of faith and their influence on the generation of Cambridge Apostles that included Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. I also explore the Men and Women Club’s attempts to establish equality between its male and female members and the group’s theoretical interest in the influence of economic freedom on women’s sexuality. While the Men and
Women’s Club failed to establish equality between its male and female members, the Cambridge Apostles theorized that men and women could be equal partners in friendship and love. Next, I detail Russell and Moore’s notions of friendship and love established in their student Apostle papers. Moore, for example, created a theory that men and men, women and women, and men and women could be equal partners in friendship and love and argues that “the pleasures of human intercourse” are “by far the greatest goods we can know or imagine” (Principia Ethica 188). The purpose of this analysis is to suggest that the breakdown of the church opened up space for new intellectual and social relationships and that, as a result, equality between men and women in friendship and love was both theorized and practiced.

2.2 LESLIE STEPHEN AND AGNOSTICISM

Leslie Stephen’s father, James Stephen III, began his life “as a strong evangelical, and never avowedly changed” (Stephen, Dictionary of National Biography 164). But James Stephen was never a typical member of the church and “his experience of the world, his sympathy with other forms of belief, and his interest in the great churchmen of the middle ages led to his holding the inherited doctrine in a latitudinarian sense” (164). Despite his long-standing faith, Stephen’s position caused an “outcry when he was appointed to the Cambridge professorship” (Maitland 17). While James Stephen III was publicly reputed for being “a transcendental Quaker with a tendency to popery,” the relationship between the Church of England and Cambridge University was in jeopardy even before Stephen was appointed to the Cambridge professorship (17). According to Frederic William Maitland,
The university was in an irritable condition, resenting a threatened commission, and ‘the first minister of the Crown’ chose this moment ‘to send down to the university an old and tired servant of the Government’ who had his doubts about eternal punishment. Clearly the church was in danger. (17)°

The full dissolution of the relationship between the Anglican Church and Cambridge University did not occur until the next generation, when James Stephen III’s sons, Fitzjames Stephen and Leslie Stephen, attended Cambridge University.

Leslie Stephen began his undergraduate career at Cambridge University in 1850. He took his degree exams in 1854 and accepted a fellowship that included a teaching assignment the same year. To accept the fellowship and teaching assignment, he was required to become a public member of the clergy. He complied with these requirements and was ordained deacon in 1855 and priest in 1859 (Maitland 130). Stephen accepted his fellowship, teaching assignment, and clerical duties responsibly, motivated by both his father’s expectations and his strong desire to be financially independent of his family. Over time, however, the demands of his crystallizing skepticism outweighed the benefits of the fellowship. As Stephen explains in Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking, he did not abandon his belief in God, but discovered that he had never really believed in God: “The change which takes place is not, in fact, an abandonment of beliefs seriously held and firmly implanted in the mind, but a gradual recognition of the truth that you never really held them” (375). Thus, he claimed that it was with “relief not regret” that he began to look at the world without the “optical devices” of the religious beliefs he had been taught were “essential” (376). What Stephen reconciled when he realized that he had never fully believed in God was that “the ‘I believe’ of the creed seemed to mean something quite different
from the ‘I believe’ of politics and history and science” (Social Rights and Duties 12–13). From that moment forward, he was more interested in pursuing the latter.

For Stephen, admitting his loss of faith publicly was cathartic. He felt that he was “being relieved of a cumbersome burden” (Some Early Impressions 70). Though he did not necessarily want to leave Cambridge, giving up his post allowed him to return to London and begin his literary career. The latent impact of his choice was significant. As Maitland and Noel Annan argue, Stephen was a “liberator” whose resignation from Cambridge cleared the way for others to express their skepticism. Nevertheless, Stephen knew that he was letting down his family and members of the university who would be “offended” by his decision (Annan 45). As a don he was “known to the undergraduates as a man who above everything despised humbug, mental and physical laziness, indecision” (Annan 46). According to Annan, Stephen’s decision caused him great personal shame and brought him to the brink of suicide: “Shame made Stephen wish he were dead” (46). Stephen, however, recovered from the trauma and the university’s relationship to the church hardly suffered: Stephen’s resignation had “no direct political effect” on the university’s religious exams, for example (Annan 46).

2.3 THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL GROUPS

It was Henry Sidgwick’s resignation in 1869, not Leslie Stephen’s, that prompted Cambridge University administrators to rethink the value of the university’s religious exams. In 1870 Bishop Lightfoot testified that the religious exams intended to protect students’ religious beliefs actually undermined them by not allowing students to arrive at their own religious conclusions.
Belief, thought Lightfoot, could not simply be passed down by the will of the church or the university—students had to be convinced for themselves. In 1871, two years after Sidgwick’s resignation case, the university repealed its religious tests. This began a new era at Cambridge University in which the university and the church were no longer inextricably linked. Even before the university’s religious exams were abolished, however, social and intellectual groups were beginning to replace the church as the center of social and intellectual life both in the public sphere and at the universities. The Men and Women’s Club and the Cambridge Apostles were among the groups that provided nonreligious intellectual and social space for those that were questioning their religious beliefs or who were no longer part of the church.

In the 1880s the Democratic Federation, Britain’s first socialist party, was formed followed by the Democratic Labour Party in 1892. As these two national parties garnered attention, other smaller, independent parties cropped up across Britain. In the 1880s the Fabian Society was founded by Beatrice and Sidney Webb; the Fellowship of the New Life was founded by Edward Carpenter; and the Socialist League was formed by Edward Aveling, Fredrick Engels, and Karl Marx (Showalter 46). While these groups worked on broad-based social issues, the Men and Women’s Club focused on the relationship between socialism and women’s issues. The Men and Women’s Club was founded in 1885 by social Darwinist Karl Pearson and his Cambridge University friends. The Men and Women’s Club proposed to be egalitarian from the start: the group initially included an equal number of men and women. As Judith Walkowitz explains, the group focused on a range of women’s issues, including the “organization and relation of sexuality, particularly in relation to marriage, prostitution, and friendship” (135).

Specifically, the group discussed the economic consequences of socialism for women. In “Socialism and Sex,” Pearson argued that marriage and women’s economic dependence on men
constrained women’s emotional and sexual freedom. Pearson reasoned that if women earned their own money they could choose their partners based on emotional and sexual compatibility, rather than financial necessity: “The economic independence of both men and women would render it solely of mutual sympathy an affection; its forms and durations would vary according to the feelings and wants of individuals” (426–27). Economic independence would, in theory, allow men and women to equally contribute to the “labour stock of the community,” as well as preserving their “moral dignity” (417, 418). Pearson explained that while men may be willing to share their resources, “women cannot morally afford to receive” their gifts because “they cannot act honestly so long as they depend for subsistence on father, brother, husband, or lover, and not on their own labour” (418).

Despite Pearson’s theoretical interest in the role of women’s emotional and sexual freedom, the women of the group complained that Pearson was single-mindedly concerned with the “sexual revolution in terms of heterosexuality and women’s roles” and had no “vocabulary in which to discuss masculine subjectivity” (Showalter 49). The women felt that Pearson and the other men did not theorize how men could positively affect the status of women. The women members of the group thereby eventually became disenchanted with Pearson’s masculine, heterosexual approach to the sexual revolution of the late nineteenth century. The disenchanted women questioned the limitations of Pearson’s scientific methodology, while at the same time the men claimed disappointment with the women members’ intellectual capabilities and “their resistance to the language of scientific reason” (Walkowitz in Showalter 48). The disagreements between the men and women of the group illuminated “the huge gap between socialist-feminist theory and the realities of women’s lives” (Showalter 530). The group’s sexual promiscuity did not further their theoretical agenda: Pearson had affairs with Schreiner, Elizabeth Cobb, and
Maria Sharpe, and the group’s women had sexual relations with one another. This led to difficulties: Schreiner and Eleanor Marx, another female member of the Men and Women’s Club, eventually suffered from psychological problems relating to their sexual relationships with men in the group, accompanied by “nervous symptoms like those of the hysterical women Freud and Breuer were treating in Vienna” (530).

While Pearson suggested “the happiest state of the individual is to disregard sex and not be conscious…in friendship…of the likeness or difference of sex at all,” he did not practice this philosophy and allowed sex to interfere in his relationships with the women in the group (Pearson in Walkowitz 153). The premise of the group was that its members would be equal, but this premise was undermined by Pearson’s sexual and intellectual dominance and many of the members’ willingness to mix social and intellectual friendship with sexual relations. The group’s attempt to demonstrate that sexual freedom was requisite for social and intellectual equality failed. After just four years, the group dissolved in 1889.

While the Men and Women’s Club failed, the Cambridge Apostles proved to be a model of social and intellectual life. The Cambridge Apostles, or Cambridge Conversazione Society, established a model for groups that were to replace the church as the center of social and intellectual life at the university. While the group did not include women, the Cambridge Apostles of Moore’s generation began to theorize that women should be included as equals to men in intellectual and social life. As Francis Brookfield suggests, the early and mid-nineteenth century was ripe for the development of intellectual and social groups as students challenged long-held norms in the “spirit of intellectual free-masonry” (3). The Cambridge Apostles, founded in 1820, embodied this spirit, attracting the most talented students and dons for weekly
meetings based on the composition, presentation, and defense of position papers on a range of literary and philosophical problems.

From the start, the Cambridge Apostles had Evangelical ties: “A strong Evangelicalism dominated the earliest of them, and some of their families, such as the Stephens and the Trevelyan, originated in the Clapham sect” (Lubenow 346). F. D. Maurice was the first to challenge the Cambridge Apostles’ Evangelical ties (Deacon 8–9). Although Maurice remained a member of the church during his Cambridge tenure, he encouraged his students to think for themselves and independently determine what role religious belief should play in their lives: “He [Maurice] had always been uneasy about many rigidly held beliefs in all the Churches, and so he encouraged his fellow Apostles to examine their own doubts and to see whether they should pronounce open disagreements on a number of cherished religious practices” (8–9). Later, as skepticism spread, the Apostles provided its student-members and university dons a shelter where they could test their religious beliefs and skepticism in “cosy secrecy” (8).

Although the Cambridge Apostles had Evangelical ties, the group was strengthened by the dissolution of the relationship between the university and the church. The Cambridge Apostles had been known as a friendship group since its inception, but this quality intensified in the mid-nineteenth century when the university repealed its religious exams, and social and intellectual life no longer centered around the church. As Francis Brookfield explains, from its earliest days the Cambridge Apostles were committed to fostering life-long relationships with other members of the group. The bonds of “brotherhood” and not simply “society making” made the group unique (16). Its members encouraged each other’s work at the university and advocated for one another after they left Cambridge and joined the professional world (16). Richard Deacon confirms the serious nature of the society when he describes its members’
obligations to attend every Apostle meeting while in residence at Cambridge. This rule also applied to graduates and dons who had to apply to “take wings” if they wanted relief from these duties (Deacon 3). W. C. Lubenow first described the Cambridge Apostles specifically as a friendship group, suggesting that the Apostles “discussed friendship endlessly” and considered “friendship’s long history” (69). Further, Lubenow suggests that the Cambridge Apostles thought specifically about “how they might have thought or acted in times past acknowledging the personal force of friendship in times of crisis” (69). The group’s interest in friendship and love became even more important when the church was no longer the primary binding force of social and intellectual life.

The Cambridge Apostles’ interest in theories of friendship and love were reinforced by curricular changes made at both Oxford University and Cambridge University which anticipated the dissolution of relationship between the church and the university and signaled the Victorians’ revived interest in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Beginning in the 1850s, Oxford University academics sought to disentangle the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions. Frank Turner explains that Arthur Penrhyn Stanley’s Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church was the “final portrait drawn more or less according to the traditional liberal Anglican pattern of relating Socrates closely to Christianity” (299). “Thereafter,” claims Turner, “commentators of that outlook tended to employ a modified Hegelian analysis and related Socrates less closely to Christianity” (299). Benjamin Jowett was responsible for bringing this change to bear on the Oxford curriculum: in response to Jowett’s dedication to the Greek tradition, the “Literae Humaniores” course was formed. The course emphasized the works of Plato and Aristotle, and especially Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. During this time period, “more Oxford students read the Ethics, or at least its first four books, than any other single ancient treatise, and more
tutors had to teach it” (Turner 324). According to Turner, the programmatic emphasis on Greek
texts functioned as an “education in character” that began to replace strict religious practice at
the university.7

Changes in the culture and curriculum at Oxford University were later mirrored at Cambridge University. “Many Oxford conflicts between Church and State, Science and Religion, colleges and university, tutors and professors, teaching and research, ‘liberal’ and ‘professional’
education all had their analogues in Cambridge” (Engel 6). In particular, Cambridge responded
to Oxford’s Literae Humanoires course by strengthening its classics program, introducing the
“Moral Sciences Tripos” in 1851.8 Just like the Literae Humanoires course, the Moral Science
Tripos emphasized the works of Plato and Aristotle and included Plato’s moral dialogues and the
Republic and Aristotle’s Ethics.9 Many members of the Cambridge Apostles of the post-
Stephen era took the “Moral Science Tripos” and used what they learned from the Greek
tradition to formulate their own theories of friendship and love. The weekly Cambridge Apostle
meetings were a testing ground for religious skepticism and the theories of love and friendship
that replaced the university’s emphasis on religion and God.

2.4 RUSSELL AND MOORE’S PHILOSOPHICAL AGNOTICISM

After Sidgwick, who had doubts about Christianity’s “method of proof,” resigned from
Cambridge in 1869, the Apostles’ papers and weekly discussions became a testing ground for
philosophical skepticism: members of the Apostles rejected God on philosophical grounds
because they could not rationally account for belief (Lubenow 346). Among the leaders of the
next generation of the Agnostic movement were Sidgwick’s students Bertrand Russell and
Moore. In this section, I examine Russell and Moore’s early lives and their relationships to religion and the church. Russell and Moore both left the church on philosophical rather than religious grounds.

Russell left the Church in 1890, the year he began at Cambridge University, and emerged from the experience thinking that “the darkness of the godless university” encouraged creativity and a heightened sense of personal responsibility (Russell in Lubenow 406). In his autobiography, Russell speaks unemotionally of leaving the church and becoming an atheist. As a teenager Russell “began a systematic investigation of the supposed rational arguments in favor of fundamental Christian beliefs” and “one-by-one found the central dogma of Christianity unconvincing” (The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1872–1914 48). Russell’s skepticism was solidified when he read John Stuart Mill’s autobiography, in which Mill describes discussing ontology with his father and stumbling when faced with the question of his own existence. When Russell “found a sentence to the effect that his [Mill’s] father taught him that the question ‘Who made me?’ cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question, ‘Who made God?’”, he thus abandoned the “First Cause” argument and became an atheist (47–48). He was made “unhappy by the gradual loss of belief” but was also “quite glad to be done with the whole subject (47–48). Though Russell writes unemotionally about leaving the church in his autobiography, the subject was highly important to him: he wrote about God, religion, and religious doubt regularly over the course of the rest of his career.

Moore left the church on similar philosophical grounds. As a child, he attended Baptist church services with his parents; as an adolescent, he joined a group of proselytizing youths that were “ultra Evangelical” and “very similar to the type characteristic of the Salvation Army” (Moore, “An Autobiography” 11). Moore’s intense religious phase was short: while still a
student at Dulwich College, Moore followed his brother, Thomas Sturge Moore, and became an Agnostic. Like Russell, “Moore felt that a man might believe any proposition he could defend; but if the belief were challenged, and the defense not adequate, there was an absolute moral duty to no longer believe that proposition” (Levy 41). Moore’s sense of moral duty compelled him to leave the church because he could not prove that God existed.

At Cambridge, Russell began his studies by reading mathematics. In response to his election to the Apostles and his relationship with George Santayana, Russell decided to stop reading mathematics and begin reading philosophy after he completed the Part I exams (Monk 48–49). Russell studied for Part II of the Moral Science Tripos, building on the set reading list with texts recommended to him by family friend, philosopher Harold Joachim of Oxford. It was also at this time that Russell met Moore, who had just arrived at Cambridge to study Part I of the Classics Tripos (50).

While Moore initially had “little interest in philosophy,” this changed after he became the 229th member of the Apostles in February 1894 (Levy 310). Moore began his studies at Cambridge reading for Part I of the Classics Tripos and repeating much of the same work he had done at Dulwich College (58–59). For Moore, the earliest part of his Cambridge career was molded by his friendships, not his course of study: “Toward the end of my first year I began to make the acquaintance of a set of young students—most of them a year or two my seniors, both in ages and in academic standing—whose conversation seemed to me to be of a brilliance such as I had never hitherto met with or even imagined” (“An Autobiography” 12–13). The influence of Moore’s friendships on his Cambridge career was reinforced when, upon Russell’s recommendation, Moore decided to take the Moral Science Tripos for the Second Part of his
exams: "At all events at the end of the year he [Russell] urged me strongly to do what he had done and to take Part II of the Moral Science Tripos for my Second Part" (13).

2.5 RUSSELL AND MOORE’S APOSTLE PAPERS

Russell and Moore used Plato’s dialogues, The Republic, and Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics as the basis for their theories of friendship and love. The earliest articulations of the Cambridge Apostles’s theory of friendship and love are found in Russell’s Apostle paper, “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver” and Moore’s response, “Achilles or Patroclus?” My purpose here is to suggest that these early papers and the arguments that stemmed from them formed the basis for Moore’s seminal work, Principia Ethica, published in 1903, which directly influenced the Bloomsbury Group’s theories of friendship and love in the twentieth century. In particular, Russell and Moore theorize friendship and love between men and men, women and women, and men and women, and suggest that, in addition to attraction and passion, equality between partners and the use of reason are highly important to the foundation of healthy friend and love relationships.

In “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver,” Russell begins by posing the question, “What shall we do with our passions?” (90). It is this question that drives Russell’s paper and his comparison of Cleopatra, who expressed her passions, to George Eliot’s Maggie Tulliver, who did not. In a letter that Russell wrote to Alys Pearsall Smith while he was drafting “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver,” Russell claims that humans cannot control their passions and should not bother to try to suppress them. In the paper he goes so far as to conclude that we ought to follow our greatest passions most seriously: “the greater the passion is the more it ought to be followed”
Russell thus looks to the French and English “aesthetes” who “admit and glory in them [the passions]” and who celebrate passion as an aesthetic experience: “the passions in this Ethic,” suggests Russell, are “judged aesthetically and not by their practical consequences” (92). Russell explains that passion is a means and not an end to “realize the good” (93). “But as a means,” he suggests, passion “can hardly be valued too highly—the passion for knowledge, for beauty, for love are the very condition of all development, of all that is good—if the Good is that which satisfies, the desire as more or less imperfect conception of the Good, combined with the consciousness of its absence and the consequent desire for its realization” (93). Russell also explores the passion of friendship and love as one means of achieving “all that is good” by distinguishing between different types of “desire” and concludes that some types of desire are more valuable than others.

For Russell, the “lowest in the scale” of passions are the “immediate desires for physical objects for their own sakes, on account, doubtless of some quality they possess, but with conscious isolation as that which gives them value” (93). “Higher” on the scale are “particular states of mind in ourselves” that constitute “desires relative to our own psychical life” (93). The most important of these “particular states of mind in ourselves” is “desire for pleasures,” which is to say the state of mind that arises in ourselves when we desire pleasure, or a particular pleasure. The third most valuable set of passions are the “desires relative to other people’s psychic life” (94). Russell believes that it is “normal” for people “to desire for others—for our friends, our acquaintances, even perhaps our relations—everything we desire for ourselves” (94). This passion constitutes “sympathy” and is only slightly less valuable than “desires for relations between ourselves and other people, or between ourselves at one time and at another” (94). The
desire for “relations between ourselves and other people” is most valuable because it is an articulation, he says, “between others without reference to the self” (94).

Passion or desire is the impetus for all relations with others, which is why Russell argues that human beings should not ignore, resist, or suppress their passions but should negotiate them in favor of the ethical satisfaction of desire. Yet while he argues that the passions should be expressed lest humans become “purposeless anemic beings, saints perhaps, but totally incapable of any achievement,” he does not suggest that the passions should be expressed without the use of reason. In “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver,” he is mostly concerned with the negative consequences of suppressing desires and the potentially positive outcome of indulging the passions—an idea that briefly aligns him with D. H. Lawrence. While it has previously been assumed that the Cambridge Apostles were a largely homosexual group, my reading of Russell, Moore, and the Apostles of the 1890s shows that while the group had been “homosocial” since its inception, this orientation did not limit the Cambridge Apostles’ capacity to consider friendship and love for heterosexuals as well.

In Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosexual Desire, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick uses the term “homosocial” (1). According to Kosofsky Sedgwick, the idea of homosociality has been used in the study of history and social science to “describe social bonds between persons of the same sex,” indicating, however, a clear distinction from the term “homosexual” as defining a person that engages in sexual relations with a person of the same sex (1). She suggests that the term “homosocial” has also been “applied to such activities as ‘male-bonding’” in contemporary culture and has thus been used to indicate a negative form of social interaction between men (1). While Kosofsky Sedgwick sees a clear distinction between homosociality and homosexuality marked specifically by modern contemporary homophobia,
this difference was much less distinct in the Victorian era. Thus, while Kosofsky Sedgwick uses the term “homosocial” to define ways in which male-bonding and identification has been deployed to oppress women, I use the term “homosocial” in a positive way to describe male social networks, including the Cambridge Apostles, that evolved in the 1880s in response to changes in the organization of the social fabric after the death of God. I also use the term more fluidly than Kosofsky Sedgwick does: I use “homosocial” as a term that may encompass homosexuality, but that is not contingent upon it.

The Cambridge Apostles was a homosocial group which, since its inception, likely encompassed homosexual activity. However, the secret society was not publicly known as a homosexual group or even publicly known to have homosexual members until the 1890s, when many of its members were openly homosexual. The secrecy with which the society dealt with homosexuality was due to British law that criminalized homosexual acts. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 reinforced earlier policies and made all sexual acts between men illegal, but it also increased public resistance to laws regulating and prohibiting sexual activity. Specifically, the criminal trials of Oscar Wilde in 1895 publicized the potential severity of the punishment for breaking these laws.\(^{15}\) Despite these clear, public prohibitions, however, many of the Cambridge Apostles at this time were homosexual and even, according to Deacon, publicly homosexual:

> The homosexual phase in Apostolic life bloomed in the later part of the last century, reached hot-house proportions in the early part of the century, becoming blatantly and even ostentatiously aggressive under those two predacious pederasts, Giles Lytton Strachey and John Maynard Keynes. (50)
Deacon is not entirely correct to suggest that the group became publicly homosexual even at the turn of the century, because while Keynes and Strachey did become increasingly open about their homosexuality, they did not overtly advertise their sexuality during the late 1890s and early 1900s when there were still legal restrictions against homosexuality. Deacon is likewise incorrect to suggest that the “the theory that the love of man for man was greater than that of man for women became an Apostolic tradition” (57). As I have suggested, the Apostles of Moore’s generation and beyond considered the ways in which friendship and love between men and women was important. Levy draws a similar conclusion to Deacon, suggesting that the Apostles picked up or dropped their interest in homosexuality depending on the group’s most recent recruits. Levy argues that though there were overtly homosexual members of the Apostles in the 1850s and 1860s, including Oscar Browning, Roden Noel, and Arthur Sidgwick, who “may have left a legacy of homosexual jargon to the men of the eighties,” this matters “little for the Apostles of the 1890s” because there were no homosexuals elected to the Apostles in the 1890s except for Eddie Marsh (140). In emphasizing these facts, Levy subsequently undermines the homosocial and homosexual tradition of the group, while also not completely acknowledging that Cambridge Apostles were not exclusively a homosocial or homosexual group: they were also concerned with heterosexuality and women, though perhaps not, as I acknowledge, to the degree that they were interested in homosexuality.

Browning, Noel, and Sidgwick may have been openly homosexual, and Keynes (elected to the Apostles in 1903) and Strachey (1902) certainly were, but these biographical anecdotes don’t help explain the philosophy of the Cambridge Apostles that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Thus Levy weakens the significance of the work of the 1890s Apostles by suggesting that the 1880s Apostles and Oscar Wilde in the 1890s were more
influential to Russell and Moore, for example, than they actually were. Even if it was “by then fashionable to be campy,” the Apostles of the 1890s were not merely following trends; they wrote about friendship and love between men, women, and between men and women in response to the death of God as the dissolution of the church created space for new forms of relatedness that had yet to be theorized (Levy 140).

Moore’s response to Russell’s “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver,” “Achilles or Patroclus?”, is another example of the late-Victorian theory of friendship and love. The paper explores modern friendship and love between men and men, women and women, and men and women. Moore begins the paper with an exploration of Achilles and Patroclus, whose mythological relationship had been subject to scrutiny since antiquity. In the text Moore asks what man has the better position in the relationship, Achilles or Patroclus. Moore assumes that his readers think Achilles, the man of greater material advantage, should be happier than his less advantaged loved one, Patroclus. But, as Moore explains, Achilles and Patroclus do not fall into the paradigm of lover and loved one. Echoing Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, Moore suggests that Achilles and Patroclus have found perfect friendship in one another. As Aristotle explains, perfect friendship is based on virtue; it is “the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves” (196). According to Aristotle, perfect friends are most truly friends, and these relationships last the longest because virtue is enduring: “For they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as a long as they are good—and goodness is an enduring thing” (196). These friendships are the most pleasant because “that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant” (196). Finally, Aristotle is adamant that perfect friendship is rare because virtuous men themselves are rare:
For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure—good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling—and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities are alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant, and these are the most loveable qualities. (197)

Thus, claims Aristotle, “love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men” (197). He also makes the qualification that such friendships take time to build:

Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found loveable and trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they are both loveable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not. (196)

Building on the work of Aristotle, in “Achilles or Patroclus?” Moore answers the rhetorical question that he posed at the beginning of the essay, claiming that both Achilles and Patroclus have found the perfect friend in the other and are thus equally happy:

I answer (and my answer may seem hyperbolic) that both were equally happy—that in possessing the perfect friendship of one another they each possessed a source of happiness so great that all the advantages of beauty, birth, strength, and
fame, which might seem to weigh down the balance in favour of Achilles, are negligible in comparison. (1)

In other words, Achilles’s “advantages of beauty, birth, strength, and fame” are far less important to their relationship than the fact that they are equal because both are virtuous.

Moore argues that people should strive for equality in friendship and love. When Moore discusses Achilles’s activity and Patroclus’s passivity, he wonders what effect this imbalance should have “in sodomy or otherwise,” which is to say in other sex acts (1). Moore uses the phrase “or otherwise” to signal to his audience that he includes in this example not only intercourse between men, but also—at least theoretically—in sexual relationships between women and women and men and women. Moore makes the point that his theory can be applied to men and men, women and women, or men and women in two other parts of the essay. First, he suggests that people are initially attracted to other people because they find something in the other person that they like or admire. In his description of initial attraction, Moore includes both men and women:

When first we see the man or women capable of being the object of our love, there is always something in him which we like. This may at first sight be very little, perhaps only some physical beauty or tone of his voice, and we may not be able to discover what it is: but it is sufficient to give us some desire of seeing him again. This is the beginning of sympathy…” (1).

Moore declares that his theory of friendship and love applies to women as well as men. This fact is made perfectly clear, however, only in Moore’s conclusion: “It will, I think, now be plain from my description that the passion, with which my paper deals, may be felt equally between either man or woman, man and man, or woman and woman; and therefore may be called either
friendship or love” (4). The argument driving Moore’s essay, is that equality is a necessary component of “perfect” friendship and love relationships regardless of gender.

Moore praises Achilles and Patroclus because, despite their differences, they care for each other equally, and it is equal friendship and love relations that are “immensely valuable” and inherently “good” (1). Thus Moore, reiterating Aristotle’s point, qualifies his statement that we are attracted initially to others because of minor attributes, by suggesting that we only continue to be attracted to them if we are also attracted to their morals and feelings: “We are attracted not only by his face, his voice, his manner, but also by his understanding, his morals, his feelings” (3). Judging from this model, people who are initially attracted to each other will only remain attracted to each other over time if they have similar understanding, morals, and feelings. According to Moore, only friendship and love that is given and returned in equal proportion is worthy of the title “perfect” friendship or love. For Moore, these equal relationships, rather than the imbalanced type often associated with great passion, show friendship and love at its strongest by reflecting the degree to which both partners are equally sympathetic.18

Moore does discuss the sexuality of Achilles and Patroclus, noting that Achilles is considered the active person in the relationship while Patroclus is considered the passive partner. But Moore suggests that too much emphasis has been placed on the role of sexuality in relationships, and in particular the distinction between active and passive positions in the sex act: “In copulation one party is active, the other passive; and this act has been exaggerated in importance as if it was exhibited the chief if not the whole of love” (4). Sexuality is far less important to Moore than equality and mutual sympathy, which provides the “basis of love” (4). Thus he suggests that too much emphasis has been placed on the role of sexuality in friendship
and love: Moore makes a point to distinguish sex acts between those who are not equally virtuous and sex acts between those who are equally virtuous. Just as Russell argues in “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver,” Moore claims that sex can be a “low pleasure” that people mistakenly “pursue for its own sake,” thereby “forgetting the highest pleasures of love” (4). In addition, “sexual prurience” must be distinguished from sexual acts born of sympathy (4). Thus when he claims with irony “it is necessary that this prurience be indulged for the begetting of children,” he invokes the fact that both “lewd” sexual acts and sympathetic sexual acts between men and women may both beget children (4). But Moore has already made it clear that he values sympathetic sexuality between men and men, women and women, and men and women outside of procreative relations as well. Moore mocks conservative views that do not support sexuality outside of procreation accordingly when he writes:

> Hence comes that monstrous unnatural vice of copulating with a woman more often than is necessary for begetting children: hence also sodomy or sapphism, the indulgence of a desire for which, stunts or kills the capability, inborn in every human being, of enjoying the happiness of true love. (4)

It is clear from my analysis of Moore’s essay that he does not think that copulating with a woman more often than is necessary for begetting children is a vice, nor does he think that relations between men and men and women and women are, either.

According to Levy, however, Moore held “conventional views on sexual matters” and “pokes fun” at his own conservatism by exaggerating his views on sexuality in “Achilles or Patroclus?” (144). Levy posits that Moore made exaggerated claims not only to mock his own conservatism, but also to please his less conservative colleagues. His own personal views aside, however, Moore claims that sexuality may be a component of perfect friendship or love, but that
sexuality must not override equality and sympathy, which are the basis for the highest forms of love. As Charles Sanger recalls, after Moore’s presentation of “Achilles or Patroclus?”, several members of the Apostles discussed Moore’s paper and had different opinions about his argument. Sanger reports that “[Sir Ralph Lewis] Wedgwood and [Robin John Grote] Mayor differed from the rest of us in thinking that the fact of copulation made an essential difference [to friendship and love]” (2). Sanger also reports that he, Theodore Llewelyn Davis, and George Macaulay Trevelyan “thought that love and friendship graduated into one another and that copulation was of secondary importance” (2). In Moore’s conclusion, however, he refines the terms of his study, arguing that while friendship may be the foundation for love, it is “in love that we obtain the highest level of human goods” (4). The experience of love is limited to one other person and is more virtuous than even perfect friendship: “And then it is maintained that such love may be felt for one other human being in completeness so great as to deserve setting this quite apart, as the one final end of life” (4). It is later, in Principia Ethica (1903), that Moore refines his argument about the importance of friendship.

2.6 PRINCIPIA ETHICA AND THE BLOOMSBURY GROUP

In chapter six of Principia Ethica, “The Ideal,” Moore claims that friendship is not simply the foundation for love, but that the “certain states of consciousness” created by “the pleasures of human intercourse” are “by far the most valuable things, which we can know or imagine” (188). In Principia Ethica, sexuality and its relationship to friendship or love are subordinate to Moore’s interest in “states of mind” as “ends in themselves” (183–84). Thus from “Achilles or Patroclus?” to Principia Ethica, Moore’s interest shifts from matters of equality, mutual
sympathy, and sexuality to what effect relationships that encompass equality, mutual sympathy, and sexuality have on the mind and on the nature of “the good” in and of itself. I argue that it is the combination of these two sets of concerns that influenced the Bloomsbury Group and served as the foundation for their philosophies of friendship and love.

Moore argues that “states of consciousness” created by the “pleasures of human intercourse” are analogous to “states of consciousness” created by the “enjoyment of beautiful objects” (Principia Ethica 188). According to him, the pleasures of human intercourse are comparable to the pleasures of aesthetic appreciation and both require “some kind of feeling or emotion” (190). While Moore does not detail precisely what constitutes the “pleasures of human intercourse,” after comparing the “pleasures of human intercourse” and the “pleasures of aesthetic appreciation,” he explains “aesthetic appreciation” (190). He writes that it requires “not merely bare cognition of what is beautiful in an object, but also some kind of feeling or emotion” (190). Thus he suggests that people should not simply look at and see beautiful objects objectively for what they are, but that they should “appreciate” and feel” their beauty: “We require that he should also appreciate the beauty of that which he sees and which he knows is beautiful—that he should feel and see its beauty” (190). Moore also believes that people should expect “appreciation” and “feeling” in personal relationships that they deem “good” or “ends in themselves.” According to Moore, “appreciation” and “feeling” in personal relationships are even more crucial than the “appreciation” or “feeling” involved in aesthetic appreciation.

Moore claims that “a reference to material beauty” is involved in the appreciation of other persons, but that this is less important than the appreciation of a “person’s attitude towards other persons”:
It is true that the most valuable appreciation is the appreciation of other persons: but even here a reference to material beauty appears to be involved, both in respect of the fact that what is appreciated in the last instance may be contemplation of what is merely beautiful, and in respect of the fact that the most valuable appreciation of a person appears to include an appreciation of his corporal expression. (Principia Ethica 204)

While the appreciation of a person may include an appreciation of his corporal expression, just as the theory of perfect friendship and love expressed in “Achilles or Patroclus?” may include sex, it is not the most important aspect of appreciating the other, nor is it the appreciation of the way they look. Rather, says Moore, what is most important is an appreciation of the other’s attitude, specifically towards other persons: “We may admit that the appreciation of a person’s attitude towards other persons, or to take one instance, the love of love, is the far most valuable good we know” (204). The message of Principia Ethica is that the states of mind created by the pleasures of “human intercourse” and the observation of beautiful objects, which both require “appreciation” or “feeling,” are among the greatest goods that we can know or imagine. According to Moore, perfect friendship and love were a relation not only of equality and mutual sympathy, as Aristotle posited, but also of pleasure resulting from “human intercourse” with the addition of “appreciation” and “feeling.”

The Cambridge Apostles who followed Moore and who were later active members of the Bloomsbury Group included E. M. Forster, John Maynard Keynes, Desmond MacCarthy, Lytton Strachey, and Leonard Woolf. According to Woolf, Moore provided the philosophical and spiritual foundation that held together the generation of Apostles that followed Moore. While
many of the men of Woolf’s generation were friends before they met Moore, their election to the Apostles and interaction with Moore enhanced their relationships:

Moore and the Society were the focus of my existence during my last years at Cambridge. They dominated me intellectually and also emotionally, and did the same to Lytton Strachey and to Saxon Sydney-Turner. We were already intimate friends, seeing one another every day, before we were elected and got to know Moore well, but Moore and the Society gave, I think, increased depth and meaning to our relationship. (L. Woolf, Sowing 156–57)

Furthermore, Woolf claims that Principia Ethica revealed the “nature of truth and reality, of good and evil and character and conduct” and replaced “the religious and philosophical nightmares, delusions, hallucinations, in which Jehovah, Christ, and St. Paul, Kant and Hegel had entangled” them (147). But the theory that perfect friendship and love could be experienced between men and women was not fully explored by the Cambridge Apostles of Woolf’s generation until they graduated from university and moved to London, where they met Vanessa and Virginia Stephen.

The Stephen sisters moved to the Bloomsbury section of London when their father, Leslie Stephen, died. His death freed Virginia and Vanessa from the Victorian domestic and family obligations that they had inherited when their mother died years earlier. Vanessa now became the head of the household and moved herself and her siblings out of the family estate at 22 Hyde Park Gate to 46 Gordon Square in the heart of Bloomsbury—at the time a bohemian fringe neighborhood busy with the “roar of traffic” and “odd characters” (V. Woolf, Moments of Being 184). But the new home was also spacious and light,—an artist’s studio in which to create their new life of “experiments and reforms” (185). Central to the “experiments and reforms” of
Bloom's early years were the friendships cultivated between Julian Thoby Stephen’s friends from Cambridge University and the Stephen sisters.

In “Old Bloomsbury,” Virginia Woolf describes a conversation she had with Clive Bell about the nature of “good”: “[We arrived] home and found Bell, and we talked about the nature of good till almost one!” (Moments of Being 186). This conversation was important enough for Woolf to mark it with a rarely used exclamation point. The conversations between the former Cambridge Apostles and the Stephen sisters were passionate: “Never,” recalls Woolf, “have I listened so intently to each step and half-step in an argument. Never have I been at such pains to sharpen and launch my own little dart. And then what a joy it was when one’s contribution was accepted” (190). From this memoir material it is clear that Woolf and the others were excited about and valued Moore’s theory.

Other members of the Bloomsbury Group, including Desmond MacCarthy, echoed Leonard Woolf and Virginia Woolf’s sentiment that Moore was influential to the Bloomsbury Group. Strachey, however, noticed that Moore’s theory that friendship and love are among the greatest goods we can know or imagine might be too ideal. In particular, Strachey thought that Moore’s ideal was “violently definite.” The idea of Moore’s theory becoming a reality horrified Strachey. In a letter to Moore upon the publication of Principia Ethica, Strachey writes:

The last two chapters interested me most, as they were newer to me than the rest. Your grand conclusion made me gasp—it was so violently definite. Lord! I can’t altogether agree—I think with some horror of a universe deprived for ever of real slaughters and tortures and lusts. (“G. E. Moore Papers” Add 8330 8S/44/1)21

Strachey could not imagine a world in which the “the real slaughters and tortures and lusts” were removed from private and social life. In particular, Strachey could not imagine that friendship
and love could be based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling alone. Strachey thought Moore’s theory in *Principia Ethica* that friendship and love, built on the Greek tradition and replacing God in the late Victorian era, was simply too idealistic to be sustainable in modernity. Strachey’s early analysis of *Principia Ethica* anticipated the slaughters, tortures, and lust of the Great War and the subsequent critique of Moore’s work during that period. While the Bloomsbury Group honored Moore’s theory and worked hard to preserve his notion of love and friendship based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling, the Great War tested the Bloomsbury Group and others’ faith in the ideals of friendship and love.
3.0 THE GREAT WAR AND MELANCHOLIA

3.1 THE EARLY BLOOMSBURY GROUP

For the Bloomsbury Group, newly formed by the generation of Cambridge Apostles, including Lytton Strachey and Leonard Woolf, and the Stephen sisters, the first decade of the twentieth century was full of the promise that G. E. Moore’s ideal notion of personal relationships based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling would be realized. I argue that the Bloomsbury Group not only valued Moore’s theory of “the good,” but that they also thought it could be applied to practical life. As Leonard Woolf suggests,

He and we were fascinated by questions of what was right and wrong, what one ought to do. We followed him closely in this as in other parts of his doctrine and argued interminably about the consequences of one’s actions, both in actual or imaginary situations. Indeed one of the problems which worried us was what part Moore (and we, his disciples), ought to play in ordinary life, what, for instance, our attitude ought to be toward practical politics. (Sowing 149)

Woolf thought that philosophy was most useful when it was applied to politics and everyday life. He explains that he wrote a topic-paper for the Apostles’ Saturday night discussions on the applicability of Moore’s theory to politics. He concluded not that he ought to combine the philosophy of Moore with the politics of George Macaulay Trevelyn, but that he and his
colleagues ought to participate in politics because it was the right thing to do. Woolf quotes his undergraduate Apostle paper in his memoirs and writes, “while philosophers sit outside the cave, their philosophy will never reach politicians or people, so that after all, to put it plainly, I do want Moore to draft an Education Bill” (Sowing 149). Though Woolf was certain that the practical application of Moore’s philosophy was important, he also stresses that by the beginning of the Great War, Moore’s theory was no longer the Bloomsbury Group’s greatest concern. The group’s members who had worked in the world for almost a decade were world-weary, and they began to see that Moore’s philosophy was too idealistic and therefore not applicable to practical life:

In 1903 we had all the inexperience, virginity, seriousness, intellectual puritanism of youth. In 1914, we had all, in various ways or places, been knocking about the world for ten or eleven years. A good deal of ignorance and other things had been brushed off us. *Principia Ethica* had passed into our unconscious and was merely a part of our super-ego; we no longer argued about it as a guide to practical life.

(L. Woolf, Sowing 150)

While the Bloomsbury Group may no longer have considered Moore’s work as a formula for practical life, his influence had been integrated into their superegos and stayed there. But despite this integration, there was little the group could do to fully preserve Moore’s theory after the start of the Great War. The “real slaughters and tortures and lusts” that Strachey could not imagine the world without were to become more real than previously imaginable.

Neither Strachey nor the Bloomsbury Group were naïve. As Quentin Bell reflects in his memoir, the group relied on reason as a guide for personal relationships and practical life, but also believed that the potential for violence and unethical behavior existed in all human beings:
“All turn to reason as the one possible guide to human affairs precisely because the forces of violence lie within even the best intentioned men” (116). And, as Bell suggests, in the battle between reason and violence (or instinct unchecked by reason), reason rarely wins: “The difficulty, as anyone who surveys the world from Birmingham, Alabama to Salisbury, Rhodesia, and back again by way of Saigon, will know is that when it comes to the struggle between reason and violence reason nearly always takes a beating” (117). This was surely the case during the Great War.

In this chapter I argue that the Great War impacted late-Victorian notions of love. To make this argument I first analyze the work of the War Poets, including Guillaume Apollinare, Isaac Rosenberg, Wilfred Owen, and Siegfried Sassoon, and suggest their work shows that the war both intensified male friendship and love at the front while simultaneously proving that friendship and love are extremely fragile. Next, I argue that the intensity and fragility of friendship and love during the war years for both combatants and noncombatants alike became defined by the threat of loss and resulted in melancholia. In the second section of the chapter, I investigate Sigmund Freud’s theory of melancholia that he developed during the war years and published as “Mourning and Melancholia” in 1917. Using Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway as an example, I explore the literary representation of both war trauma and melancholia experienced by the friends and loved ones of combatants. I demonstrate that both combatants and noncombatants’ relationships suffered greatly because of the war, but that there is a marked difference in how they suffered. It was, I posit, the friends and loved ones of combatants traumatized by the war who suffered from melancholia. I use the conclusion of Woolf’s text, which ends with Clarissa Dalloway and her husband, Richard, embracing life, to show that war did not cause everyone to give up Moore’s valuation of friendship and love.
While my analysis of the War Poets may seem to suggest that the Great War destroyed Moore’s theory of personal relationships, I conclude that this was not the case. I posit that though the Great War created melancholic personal relationships and certainly tested Moore’s theory, Woolf and other members of the Bloomsbury Group retained Moore’s idea of personal relationships even during the most difficult challenges of the Great War. Finally, I make this claim by comparing Freud, Butler, and Lacan’s theories of subject formation with those of Melanie Klein. I suggest that Freud, Butler, and Lacan’s theory of subject formation is based on the phallic stage of development in which the Oedipus complex is experienced and resolved, while Klein relies on the idea that the subject loses its primary objects during infancy, but that good parenting helps heal those wounds during the child’s early and adolescent life.

According to Freud, Butler, and Lacan, the child never fully recovers from the loss of its loved objects and experiences melancholia as a consequence. For this group of theorists, one potential result of this loss is that neither the subject’s ego nor any one future love object can ever fully satisfy the subject as its primary objects had. Melanie Klein’s picture of loss and subject formation is different. She suggests that the primary objects are given up and introjected into the subject’s ego earlier in life, and that melancholia resulting from these losses can be ameliorated with additional care through adolescence from the primary caregivers. Klein suggests that reinforcing relations between the subject and its objects can remove infantile melancholia. Therefore, according to Klein’s model, when the adult experiences loss, he or she does not recall the loss of primary objects in despair, but recalls the experience of loss as well as the continued good relations with those primary objects in childhood. This theory changes the picture of the significance of the loss of the primary objects. If the primary objects are “lost”
early, as Klein suggests, then good relations can repair the melancholia of the loss and prevent subjects from further experiencing melancholia.

3.2 THE GREAT WAR AND MELANCHOLIC FRIENDSHIP

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Serbian youth instigated almost a half-century of international conflict and culminated in the deaths of millions of people. The conflict attracted multiple nations not simply because individual countries had commitments to their allies, but because they saw the war as an opportunity to position themselves politically for the future. Governments, civilians, and troops were quickly swept up into what W. H. Maxwell called the “war mood.” As Gerald J. De Groot suggests, people of all classes “embraced the war not just out of a sense of duty, but with a positive alacrity” (20).

But even the nationalism that arose swiftly at the beginning of the war was tested by the atrocities of the battlefield. The Great War was like no other war the world had seen in the modern era. New firearms, poisonous gases, and tanks were used for the first time. Men battled from both makeshift and sophisticated trenches not for days or weeks, but for months and years on end. The deaths on the battlefields of the Great War were often not the quick deaths of bullet wounds to the chest, but agonizing, drawn-out deaths of starvation, hypothermia, bleeding, and vaporization (De Groot 173). The war was messy, complicated, and unbelievably long. As more countries entered the battle and time wore on, more men were needed to support the military efforts. Conscription and the war as a territorial conflict of nations built the support of civilians and combatants alike. As De Groot suggests, a million or more war poems were written
in England in 1914 alone. And as scholars including Allyson Booth (Postcards from The Trenches), Mackaman and Mays (World War I and the Cultures of Modernity), and Vincent Sherry (The Great War and the Language of Modernism), have shown, the war became the central organizing principle of modernity and literary modernism.24 I add to this scholarship by suggesting that the Great War influenced the theory and experience of friendship and love in modernity, and that war-influenced friendship and love are a central theme in modernist literature.

Though a war mood was quickly created, there were many who objected to the war from the start and continued to challenge it until Armistice Day.25 Among the objectors were those who had created utopian and socialist models for social organization and living in the late nineteenth century. But, as DeGroot suggests, many forgot about this part of the war resistance as they were swept up into the war mood:

We ignored, for instance, the tremendous impact and popularity of Angell’s pacifist book The Great Illusion; the enormous progress made in international cooperation, especially in banking, transportation and communication; the world wide interest in the Olympic movement; the civility which the Hague Conference of 1901 and 1907 brought to international relations; the popularity of pacifist groups, especially those socialist-inspired; and the fact that the Anglo-German naval rivalry had eased significantly by 1912. (21)

Despite conscientious objection and other protests against the war, men left their families and women joined the workforce outside of the home in record numbers to support the war effort. As men and women left the home, the structure of the patriarchal Victorian family shifted.
In particular, the war influenced friendship and love between men in several ways. On the one hand, the circumstances of trench warfare created deep and intense relationships between men. On the other hand, the war showed the fragility of personal relationships in general. Accounts of these intense yet fragile relationships are the subject of the poetry of Guillaume Apollinaire, Isaac Rosenberg, Wilfred Owen, and Siegfried Sassoon. As the War Poets articulate, the boundaries of these intense yet fragile friendships were flexible: some of these friendships sexual and some were not. In The Great War and Modern Memory, Paul Fussell argues that the male friendships at the front were “homoerotic.” But he does not suggest that the men had sexual relations with one another, or even that their nonsexual relationships were sexually charged. Fussell writes,

I use that term [“homoerotic”] to imply a sublimated (i.e. “chaste”) form of temporary homosexuality. Of the active, unsublimated kind there was little at the front. What we find, rather, especially in the attitude of the young officers to their men, is something more like the ‘idealistic,’ passionate but non-physical ‘crushes’ which most of the officers had experienced in public school. (272)

While the majority of relations may have been “sublimated,” in Fussell’s terms, it is incorrect for him to suggest that there were few “unsublimated” or sexual relationships at the front. The War Poets’ writing describes “unsublimated” or sexual friend and love relationships at the front. Guillaume Apollinaire’s work is particularly explicit in describing the sexual quality of some relationships between the men at the front.

In “The Trench,” Apollinaire compares the speaker of the poem to a trench: “I am the white trench the white sunken body” (line 1). It is this “white trench” and “sunken body” that the speaker in the poem offers the boy to whom the poem is addressed: “Come with me boy
enter my sex which is the whole of my body / Come with me penetrate me so I can be happy with bloody voluptuousness” (lines 3–4). The speaker of the poem offers to heal the boy, who is suffering melancholia from the war: “I shall heal your hurts your worries your desires and melancholy” (line 5). And the speaker in the poem offers to do so “with the clear clean song of the bullets and the orchestra of the artillery,” which is to say with sex, violence, and with the war experience itself (line 6). While many of the war poems are much less explicit than this one, “The Trench” makes it clear that sex was an aspect of male relationships at the front. But as the poem also points out, the intensity of these relationships existed with the constant threat that they could end at any moment. Hence the object of the speaker’s affection is a boy who suffers not only from “desire,” but also “worry” and “melancholy.”

As Sara Cole argues, while popular portraits of the war often glorified friendship at the front, the war also “destroyed” friendship: “In the official language of the war, comradeship was meant to sustain the solider, to provide the possibility of heroic action, to redeem the horrific suffering that the war endless inflicted. Yet one of the basic facts of the war was that it destroyed friendship” (Modernism 139). Cole explains that friendship was supposed to “sustain the solider” by providing the possibility for “heroic action” in the war, but also simply by providing the soldiers with a sense of companionship and comfort over the duration of the war. According to Cole’s analysis, the culture demanded this notion of friendship in order to “organize and stabilize masculine intimacy” (139). As I have already shown, however, the front provided a space in which men created intense yet fragile friendships with other men that blurred the boundaries of the cultural norms established by those who were not on the front. Cole also suggests that the “bereaved male friend” became “representative of the war par excellence” and “that post-war disconnection and disillusion is often articulated specifically in terms of the
creation and loss of powerful friendships” (139). This is certainly one aspect of war literature explored by the war poets and other modernist writers. But the intense yet fragile friend and love relationships established at the front articulated much more than the “war par excellence”: they broadly illuminated that a human being is subject to mourning and melancholia when he or she experiences loss.

### 3.3 MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA

Freud theorized mourning and melancholia in response to the Great War, as he and other psychologists and psychoanalysts had many patients who returned home from the front with severe mental disturbances. Freud’s patients presented with shell shock, or traumatic war neurosis, delusions, and hallucinations, and many were or became psychotic when they returned to civilian life. Freud also learned a great deal from treating noncombatant patients, many of whom had friends and relatives who had died or been injured in the war. Though the noncombatants were removed from the horrors that those who were fighting at the front experienced, noncombatants still experienced “disillusionment” and “altered attitudes toward death” (“Thoughts for the Times on War and Death: (1) The Disillusionment of the War” 275). In Part 2, “Our Attitude Toward Death,” Freud explains that it is difficult if not impossible for humans to rationally consider the possibility of their own deaths. According to Freud, if people are able to contemplate their own deaths, they only do so as if they were spectators of the event. Humans are in general convinced of their own immortality: “Hence the psycho-analytic school could venture on the assertion that at bottom no one believes in his own death, or, to put the
same thing another way, that in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality” (289). The war, however, forced people to face their own and others’ morality: “It is evident,” writes Freud, “that war is bound to sweep away this conventional treatment of death. Death will no longer be denied; we are forced to believe in it. People really die; and no longer one by one, but many, often tens of thousands, in a single day. And death is no longer a chance event” (291). The reality of mass death gave Freud the opportunity to theorize the mourning process.

Freud learned that both mourning and melancholia are responses to the loss of a love object, and that both mourning and melancholia alleviate the pain of that loss. The distinction between mourning and melancholia is that mourning is a normal response to loss, while melancholia is a potentially pathological response. The two conditions are also structurally different. Mourning, according to Freud, is “regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as a fatherland, liberty, an ideal, or so on” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 164). The “same influences” trigger melancholia, but melancholia is distinct from mourning in that it tends to last much longer than normal grief and occurs in people who have “a morbid pathological disposition” (164). With these distinctions, Freud’s definition of melancholia is similar to earlier definitions beginning with the ancient concept of the humors, which associated black bile and the cold and dry elements of autumn with melancholia (Flately 34). Freud’s definition suggests that melancholia is different from this ancient definition of the humors in that melancholia results from loss and is thus not simply an effect of humor, disposition, or personality.

Freud explains that there are some attributes, however, that set mourning and melancholia apart, and which show that melancholia can be much more severe than a personality trait:
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. (“Mourning and Melancholia” 165)

However, beyond these symptoms, melancholia also creates a complicated view of the lost object. People who experience melancholia know that they have lost a loved object, for example, but they may not know what it is that they have lost in losing the object: “This, indeed, might be so even when the patient was aware of loss giving rise to the melancholia, that is, when he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in them” (166). According to Freud, melancholia results when someone loses something or someone that they believe is important, but that the lost person or idea may no longer have a defined value for them.

Freud’s theory that melancholia is triggered by loss, however, makes melancholia applicable to those who do not necessarily suffer “a morbid pathological disposition” and allows Jonathan Flately to argue that melancholia is “an allegory for the experience of modernity” (2). As Flately suggests, “Freud is not so much correcting or improving (as he supposed) our view of melancholia as giving us in his theory of melancholia an allegory for the experience of modernity” (2). This is certainly true for the War Poets, who explained that the war created relationships that were exposed to the constant threat of death, and were therefore inextricable from melancholia and melancholy, and which become symbolic of the experience of modernity in general and defined by the Great War in particular.

As Wilfred Owen articulates in “Strange Meeting” (1918), the men at the front were not only forced to face the mortality of themselves and their friends, but also of their enemies. In
“Strange Meeting,” the speaker recalls seeing many men severely injured or dead at the end of a battle. The speaker approaches the bodies to see if any of them are still alive. When he finds alive, he tries to assure the man that he does not need to mourn his survival: “Here is no cause to mourn” (line 13). The man responds “none,” that there is no cause to mourn, “save the undone years, / the hopelessness” (lines 14–15). Thus Owen shows that the man is at once relieved to be alive, yet also mournful for the years he has lost in the war, and the general “hopelessness” created by it. Owen specifically expresses the utter despair caused by the war in his poem “1914,” in which he describes the war as the “Winter of the World” and compares it to a “foul tornado” “centered in Berlin” (line 3). In particular he explains that the war causes not just death of human bodies, but also “a famine of thought and feeling,” destroying “love”: “Now begin / Famines of thought and feeling. / Love’s wine’s thin. / The grain of human Autumn rots, down-hurled” (lines 6–8).

While Owen expresses that war has created an occasion for mourning and has depleted the resources for human “thought” and “feeling,” it is Siegfried Sassoon who writes directly about the impact of the war on friendship and love most specifically in his poem to Robert Graves, “A Letter Home—To Robert Graves”. In the poem Sassoon addresses Graves directly, reminding him that they both greatly miss a mutual friend named David who went missing during the war. As Sassoon expresses, both he and Graves were relieved when David returned safely. First Sassoon describes having served with the other men in the war, and notes that time is “too short” and “friends too few” (lines 32). Sassoon states that he and Graves are “sad” because they miss David, “one whose yellow head was kissed” (line 34). And Sassoon explains that while the war took David away, he also returned safely: “Winter called him far away; / Blossoms bring him home in May” (lines 42–43).
While in “A Letter Home—To Robert Graves” Sassoon presents a portrait of a friendship made, lost, and regained in the war he provides a much more dire picture of the war’s effect on the young combatants in “Suicide in the Trenches.” In that poem, Sassoon recalls the journey of a simple-minded soldier who was healthy at the start of the war. This simple soldier boy, who seems initially unaffected by the war, eventually succumbs to suicide: “He put a bullet through his brain. / No one ever spoke of him again” (lines 7–8). Sassoon ends this poem with a general summary of the horrors of the war, stating clearly that only those who have experienced the war firsthand are capable of understanding the “hell” men faced on the battlefield (line 12). While on many levels this is true, Trudi Tate argues that the war affected noncombatants to a high degree as well. Tate argues that experiencing the war from a distance, even through literature, can cause war neurosis in noncombatants. Tate writes, “Witnessing such events at a distance, or being exposed to them indirectly, discursively, through stories, can cause war neuroses, just as some soldiers suffered from shell-shock without ever going into battle” (19).

Incorporating Flately and Tate’s arguments, I have shown that the war had a great impact on combatants and noncombatants, causing both “war neuroses” and melancholia. Tate claims that noncombatants felt a sense of “powerlessness in the face of others’ suffering” and that the secondary effects of the war caused “war neuroses” in some noncombatants simply through exposure to stories. I would argue, however, that Tate’s argument is too simple and that those who suffered secondary effects of the war were the close friends and loved ones of the combatants. Rather, I suggest that noncombatants who had direct friend or love relationships with combatants were particularly susceptible to the trauma, neuroses, and general mental health problems of their loved ones. Rebecca West and Virginia Woolf describe both war neuroses and the delicate melancholia suffered by the loved ones of current or former combatants.
3.4 REBECCA WEST AND VIRGINIA WOOLF’S WAR TRAUMA AND NONCOMBATANT MELANCHOLIA

As I have shown, war combatants were obviously traumatized by their experiences at the front. Many returned with war traumas more extreme than psychologists had previously witnessed. As W. H. Maxwell explains, “people found themselves in an environment such as they had never previously experienced, and their reactions toward it brought to light characteristics of which they had hitherto been unconscious, or which at any rate had never been displayed in exactly the same way” (17). While everyone suffered psychologically from the war, it was certainly the combatants and their friends and loved ones who suffered most.

In this section, I show that this is evident from Rebecca West’s depiction of Chris Baldry in The Return of the Soldier and Virginia Woolf’s depiction of Septimus Warren Smith in Mrs. Dalloway. While the former combatants in these two texts return from the war “unfit for the disciplines of peace,” I argue that each reacts to the war in a decidedly different way (Maxwell 19). Baldry’s trauma causes him to flee psychologically not only from the experiences he suffered during the war, but also from the peaceful relationship he had with his wife, Kitty, before he left for the war. Upon his return home Baldry is unable to face either the traumas he suffered at war or the peace he returns to. For Baldry, returning to peace feels as strange, foreign, and even traumatic as the life of war did when he first reached the front. Septimus’s psychological response to the war is different from Baldry’s. Septimus does not lose his memory, for example, as Baldry does, but rather is haunted by hallucinations, fears, and disassociations that prevent him from living a normal life after the war is over. While the other figures in The Return of the Soldier find ways to reintegrate Baldry back into their lives, I argue that Septimus’s relatives suffer greatly from his illness. In particular, I argue that Woolf’s Mrs.
Dalloway provides a representation of both shell-shocked combatants and the complex melancholia suffered by their friends, loved ones, and even acquaintances.

Mrs. Dalloway begins with a peaceful post-war scene. Though Mrs. Foxcroft and Lady Bexborough have lost relatives in the war, they are relieved that the fighting is over:

For it was the middle of June. The War was over, except for someone like Mrs Foxcroft at the Embassy last night eating her heart out because that nice boy was killed and now the old Manor house must go to a cousin; or Lady Bexborough who opened a bazaar, they said, with the telegram in her hand, John her favorite killed; but it was over, thank Heaven—over. It was June. The King and Queen were at the Palace. And everywhere, though it was still so early, there was a beating, a stirring of galloping ponies, tapping cricket bats. Lord’s, Ascot, Ranelagh and all the rest of it; wrapped the soft mesh of the grey-blue morning air, which, as the day wore on, would unwind them… (4)

In this passage, Woolf describes both the atrocities of war and the emotional relief that noncombatants felt when the fighting ended. The end of the war is signaled not by grand gestures, but by the simple, natural movements of “galloping ponies,” “tapping cricket bats,” and the “soft mesh of the grey-blue morning air” (4). This scene of resignation and peace is juxtaposed with the introduction of Septimus, who personifies the war: “Septimus Warren Smith, aged about thirty, pale-faced, beak-nosed, wearing brown shoes and a shabby overcoat, with hazel eyes which had that look of apprehension in them which makes complete strangers apprehensive too” (12). Septimus reminds others that while the war may be over, more violence is now always a realistic possibility: “The world had raised its whip, where will it descend?” (12).
In addition to reminding others of the war, Septimus is unable to forget the images that he saw at the front. In the middle of London traffic Septimus, accompanied by his wife, Lucrezia, becomes paranoid that he is the one who is blocking the motorcars. He sees “a curious pattern like a tree” on the car (13). This and other images accumulate in his mind “as if some horror has come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames” (13). Septimus is stunned, thinking that he has caused the traffic jam, and the thought makes him question his own existence: “It is I who am blocking the way, he thought. Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But for what purpose?” (13). Septimus experiences these sensations internally, and it is not clear that any of the other characters in the scene can tell he is in distress.

This uncertainty is broken when Septimus says, “I will kill myself,” and his wife hears him. Here Woolf begins to elaborate on how Lucrezia experiences Septimus’s own pain. Lucrezia is self-conscious about Septimus and thinks that other people must notice he is ill:

   People must notice; people must see. People, she thought, looking at the crowd staring at the motor car; the English people, with their children and their horses and their clothes, which she admired in a way; but they were ‘people’ now, because Septimus had said, ‘I will kill myself”; an awful thing to say. Suppose they had heard him? (13).

Lucrezia is clearly embarrassed by her husband’s behavior, but she also seems terrified and looks into the crowd, imagining asking for help: “Help, help! she wanted to cry out to butcher’s boys and women” (13). She remembers a time when Septimus and she were able to sit in the same place and he could read the paper silently without uttering phrases out loud. Though Lucrezia, as Septimus’s wife and lover, still has a “right to his arm,” which he gives to her willingly, it now
feels just a “piece of bone” (14). It is Lucrezia who now must support Septimus as he teeters on the edge of suicide. Furthermore, her love relationship with her husband is now marked by pain and the melancholic longing for the Septimus she knew before the war. Ironically, though Lucrezia is deeply affected by his pain, Septimus is immune to his own pain and is seemingly unable to acknowledge that he is ill.

Septimus’s symptoms, including “starts,” hallucinations, and retreats from reality, affect Lucrezia, making everything “terrible” (20). She feels abandoned when he ignores her, retreating from reality into the life of his own mind: “She could not sit beside him when he started so and did not see her and made everything terrible” (20). Despite the fact that Septimus makes her life difficult, however, Lucrezia continues to protect him from himself and from his doctors, thereby convincing herself that she can prevent his suicide: “And he would not kill himself; and she would tell no one” (20). She protects him because she loves him, but her love for him also makes her lonely. She has essentially lost the man she married and is left with only a shell of his former self: “To love makes one solitary, she thought. She could tell nobody, not even Septimus now, and looking back, she saw him sitting in his shabby overcoat alone, on the seat, hunched up, staring” (20). Lucrezia defends Septimus because she believes he is entitled to the pain he feels because he “had fought” and “he was brave” (20). While Septimus suffers because of his war experience, Lucrezia suffers because Septimus suffers.

Woolf explains that Lucrezia has left Italy and her family to live with Septimus in England. After Dr. Holmes suggests that Septimus is “not ill,” Lucrezia looks down at her hands, and notices that her wedding ring is loose because she has lost weight: “She spread her hand down before her. Look! Her wedding ring slipped—she had grown so thin. It was she who suffered, but she had nobody to tell” (20). Furthermore, Woolf’s language creates a
distinction between Septimus’s suffering and Rezia’s suffering. Septimus’s suffering is acute and he speaks in short, matter-of-fact sentences to convey his pain:

    Suddenly, he said, ‘Now we kill ourselves,’ when they were standing by the river, and he looked at it with a look which she had seen in his eyes when a train went by, or an omnibus—a look as if something fascinated him; and she felt he was going from her and she caught him by the arm. (24)

It is the narrator who elaborates the complexity of Septimus’s emotions, which are essentially hidden from him. The war has not taught Septimus to recognize his own experiences of loss and to mourn them, but rather not to feel anything at all:

    When peace came he was in Milan, billeted in the house of an innkeeper with a courtyard, flowers in tubs, little tables in the open, daughters making hats, and to Lucrezia, the young daughter, he became engaged when the panic was on him that he could not feel. (73–74)

    While Septimus knew that he “could not feel” directly after the war, his inability to experience his emotions worsens over time. It is Lucrezia who becomes responsible for interpreting his experience and feeling for him. When Septimus has an acute breakdown, he directly involves Lucrezia in the experience by asking her to hold his hand while he suffers hallucinations, and making her take dictation:

    He lay on the sofa and made her hold his hand to prevent him from falling down, down, he cried, into the flames! and saw faces laughing at him, calling him horrible disgusting names, from the walls and hands pointing round the screen. Yet they were quite alone. But he began to talk aloud, answering people, arguing,
crying, getting very excited and making her write things down. Perfect nonsense it was; about Miss Isabel Pole. (57)

In this passage Septimus forces Lucrezia to confront his disease and experience it with him. It is thus confirmed that Septimus is suffering from a “complete physical and nervous breakdown, with every symptom in an advanced stage” (81). Soon after, Septimus takes his own life, throwing himself from a window. But what is most interesting about Woolf’s portrait of war neuroses is not Septimus’s suffering and suicide, but the way in which Lucrezia and others suffer along with him. Of course Lucrezia suffers the most because she is closest to him, but Woolf suggests that other people who do not know him well are also susceptible to experiencing his pain. In particular, Mrs. Dalloway goes “through it” with Septimus, showing that even those who were not directly related to combatants or former combatants suffered greatly if only tangentially from the war.

While Lucrezia’s relationship to Septimus is clearly threatened by his experience in the war and causes her deep sadness, the war seems to make Mrs. Dalloway and her husband both melancholic and highly grateful for their relationship with one another. In this sense Woolf expresses not only that the war challenged the late-Victorian ideal of friendship by making friendship and love inherently melancholic, but also that the war reemphasized the importance of personal relationships in the face of the threat of death and melancholia. This is also present at the end of the novel, when Mrs. Dalloway and her husband, Richard, after learning separately of the death of Septimus, find each other alone during the last hours of her party.

Mrs. Dalloway hears about Septimus’s death from Mr. Bradshaw, one of Septimus’s doctors. She feels for Septimus, experiencing his death through her own body, revealing that she is sympathetic to those who have suffered “accidents”:
Always her body went through it, when she was told, first, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocating blackness. So she saw it. (156)

Mrs. Dalloway continues to sympathize with Septimus, asking, “But why had he done it?” as if attempting to truly understand what he felt in the instant he threw himself from the window. As she relates to Septimus, she admires his courage not specifically for killing himself, but because he is willing to unabashedly throw his life away, while she has never thrown away anything more than a shilling: “but he had flung it away” (156). But what she really seems to admire is that his suicide is both an act of defiance and a way for him to communicate his pain: “Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate, people feeling the impossibility of reaching a centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded; one was alone. There was an embrace in death” (156). Because Mrs. Dalloway has escaped death and Septimus has not, she feels guilty: “Somehow it was her disaster—her disgrace. It was her punishment to see sink and disappear here a man, there a woman, in this profound darkness, and she forced to stand here in her evening dress” (157). Yet Mrs. Dalloway is also incredibly grateful for her own life and embraces her everyday routine with a replenished sense of joy:

Odd, incredible; she had never been so happy. Nothing could be slow enough; nothing could last too long. No pleasure could equal, she thought, straightening chairs, pushing in one book on the shelf, this having done with the triumphs of youth, lost herself in the process of living, to find it, with a shock of delight, as the sun rose, as the day sank. (157)
It is perhaps because of Septimus’s suicide that Mrs. Dalloway feels gratitude for her own life. Despite the fact that she “felt somehow very like him,” she is also “glad that he had done it,” that he had “thrown it away while they went on living” (158, 156). Septimus’s death brings clarity and closure for Lucrezia and Mrs. Dalloway. It allows them to remove themselves from the tragedies of war and begin the work of mourning rather than continue to drown in melancholia.

Indeed, Septimus’s death is life affirming for Mrs. Dalloway. It reinforces the fact that personal relationships, even though they may not last, are worth cultivating. Woolf reminds the reader of this at the end of the text when Mrs. Dalloway’s old friend Peter is excited to see her: “‘I will come,’ said Peter, but he sat on for a moment. What is this terror? What is this ecstasy? he thought to himself? What is it that fills me with extraordinary excitement? It is Clarissa, he said. For there she was” (165).

As I have shown, *Mrs. Dalloway* describes the mental illness experienced by combatants returning from the war, as well as the melancholia experienced by the friends and loved ones of former combatants who were faced with the threat of losing them.

3.5 IDENTIFICATION, PROHIBITION, AND SUBJECT FORMATION

As I suggested in the first part of this chapter, the combatants and noncombatants traumatized by the war gave Freud the opportunity to study melancholia. What he learned was that both normal mourning and the pathological form of mourning, melancholia, show that loss triggers the reexperiencing of earlier loss, primarily of the earliest loved objects, and is thereafter connected to the process of love.28 During the phallic stage of development, the subject gives up its objects by identifying with them and taking part of them into its own ego. Judith Butler uses Freud’s
model to suggest that subject formation is always a melancholic process. She emphasizes that the subject is prohibited from having its loved objects and that, as a result, prohibition of the loved objects is eroticized (The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection 103). According to Butler, the subject is never able to find adequate substitutions for its primary loved objects in later life (103). I also suggest that Lacan uses the same model of structural development of the ego to posit his theory of the impossibility of the sexual relationship (rapport sexuel) (6–7).

In addition, I compare the work of Freud and Butler to Klein. I show that Klein emphasizes that infantile melancholia can be overcome through continued good relations with the primary loved objects and that subsequently, satisfying objects can be found in later life to compensate for the lost primary objects. Finally, I suggest that while Freud, Butler, and Lacan’s work is particularly well suited to explaining the melancholia of personal relationships experienced during the Great War, it is not commensurate with the late-Victorian notion of ideal friendship and love. Rather, I posit that Klein’s notion of melancholia that can be overcome through good relations with loved objects is commensurate with Moore’s notion of satisfying personal relationships.

Freud distinguishes between mourning and melancholia, by explaining that in melancholia the loss is not always completely realized by the subject, that it is “in some way related to an unconscious loss of a loved-object” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 166). The other important distinction between mourning and melancholia is that in mourning “the world becomes poor and empty,” whereas “in melancholia it is the ego itself” that suffers (Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” 167). This discovery led Freud to rethink the nature of loss in relation to ego development and in particular the process of identification. In The Ego and the Id, Freud explains that the process of identification with loved objects, which becomes pathological in
melancholia, is a normal part of human development and that “this kind of substitution has a
great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution
towards building up what is called ‘character’” (23). In other words, Freud suggests that the
process of losing the loved objects and the subsequent identification with them are part of normal
ego development. It is through identification that the ego finds it bearable to give up its first
objects. This process occurs in adulthood as well when a person sets up the lost loved object
inside its ego as a way to cushion the effects of its loss: “It may be that this identification is the
sole condition under which the id can give up its objects” (24). Thus Freud argues that the ego
itself is constituted by its “abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those
object choices” (24). This means that the subject introjects aspects of the lost loved object into
its own ego to retain some aspect of the lost object for itself. Through this process of
identification the subject is able to continue to love itself even after it has lost a loved object.
Rather than giving its love to the object, the subject gives its love back to the self in the form of
narcissistic love: “When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to
speak, upon the id as a loved-object and is trying to make good the id’s loss by saying: ‘Look,
you can love me too—I am so like the object’” (24). This move, however, only temporarily
stabilizes the ego.

This mode of structural identification does not necessarily save the ego from persecution.
If the ego is not convinced that it is loved in some way by its introjected identifications, then the
ego can divide again and persecute itself. Thus it is in the space between the ego, the id, and the
super-ego that the melancholic battles. It is the melancholic’s “excessively strong super-ego,”
made up of lost-object identifications, that can become too powerful and masochistic. This, says
Freud, is where the real trouble lies. If the ego “does not fend off its tyrants in time by the change
round to mania,” suicide may result (54–55). Nevertheless, Freud concludes The Ego and the Id by suggesting that Eros may be more powerful than even the death instincts: “It would be possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and (prompted by the pleasure principle) to put Eros, the mischiefmaker, to rest; but perhaps that might be to undervalue the part played by Eros” (62). At least Freud hoped that the Eros could be stronger than the death drives.

Freud’s elaboration of the theory of melancholia in The Ego and the Id points to the fact that subjectivity depends on the subject’s relationship to and identification with its earliest objects. This formulation led Butler to extend Freud’s argument and claim that every subject is melancholic because it has to give up its lost objects. Butler’s theory stresses that every single human being is always already split because it has to give up its primary loved objects and cannot find adequate substitutions for them either within his or her own ego or from objects in the outside world. This idea influences friendship and love in that it disrupts the Platonic notion that any one object can satisfy the subject. In the Symposium, Plato explains that human beings were split into two by the gods so that they would need to find their “matching” half in order to feel whole or complete again. This, says Aristophanes in his speech, “is the source of our desire to love each other” (191 C). The modern theory of friendship and love that Freud and then Butler depend on, however, shows that the concept of finding a “matching” half is impossible because human beings are created by a series of losses—and not simply the loss of the primary objects, but also friends and lovers accumulated over a lifetime.

This model suggests that no one object, friend, or lover, can satisfy the fractured modern subject, who is has not been split in two by the gods, but into many pieces by lost loved objects and subsequent identifications. This is not to say that modernity framed by the experience of
war makes satisfaction in friendship in love impossible, but it certainly complicates the late-
Victorian notion of friendship and love based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and
feeling by suggesting that the ego is a “sedimentation of relations of substitutions over time”
rather than a perfectly integrated pre-Freudian self (Butler, Psychic Life 169). Freud and
Butler’s discoveries certainly suggest that melancholia, while pathological in some, lies dormant
in all subjects. While the war brought these discoveries to the forefront by testing the human
response to destruction and death on a grand scale, the war itself cannot be blamed for splitting
the subject. According to Butler, the subject is always already split and therefore melancholic.

In The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Butler elaborates on Freud’s work in “Mourning and Melancholia” and The Ego and the Id. While Freud argued that melancholia is a pathological reaction to the loss of a loved object through identification, Butler argues that everyone experiences melancholia in the process of becoming an independent subject, whether or not they continue to identify with lost objects to a high degree. According to her, becoming a subject requires not simply the loss of the objects but also subordination and subjection by them. But, as Freud acknowledged, in the earliest stages of life, the child depends on those who care for it to sustain its very life. In this arrangement, Butler argues, the parents are necessarily in a position of power over the child, who is subordinate to them and even subject to their will. Over time, as the child matures and its ego solidifies, it works to overcome its dependence on its parents’ guidance. The child must tolerate some forms of subjection and then directly oppose that same subjection as it works to become autonomous (Butler, Psychic Life 10). Thus, “subordination” itself “proves central to the becoming of the subject” (7). It is these acts of subordination and subjection that not only “act on” the individual, but also “activate” the subject: “Such subjection is a kind of power that not only acts on a given individual as a form of
domination, but also activates or forms the subject” (83). Butler suggests, then, that subjection forms the subject.

One form of subjection or domination is the prohibition of the parents as love objects. That is, after a certain point the subject is no longer allowed to love its primary love objects to the degree that it was permitted and even required to do at an earlier stage of development. As Butler describes, this prohibition is welcome at the phallic stage of the development “precisely because it is bound up in the narcissistic circuit that wards off the dissolution of the subject into psychosis” (Psychic Life 103). Moreover, the subject gives up its primary love objects because it is promised new objects in the future. Nevertheless, she suggests, this prohibition is eroticized even though the child willingly gives up its primary love objects. Thus, humans are forbidden to “have” their primary objects if they want to become subjects themselves. As Butler posits, then, subject formation is always connected not to desire, but to the prohibition of desire. While subject formation prohibits sexuality, it also makes these prohibitions the very focus of desire, or specifically future desire:

If the very process of subject-formation, however, requires a redemption of sexuality, a founding prohibition that prohibits a certain desire but itself becomes the focus of desire, then a subject is formed through the prohibition of sexuality, a prohibition that at the same time forms this sexuality—and the subject who is said to bear it. (103)

This paradigm depends on the notion that the subject gives up its primary objects and identifies with them in the phallic stage of development.

As Freud explains in “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” human sexual life begins in infancy and certainly in childhood and that “no child—none, at least, who is mentally sound, still
less one who is mentally gifted—can avoid being occupied with sexual problems before puberty” (20). The phallic stage of development occurs between the ages of three and six during and after the weaning process, when the child gives up the pleasure of the breast and begins to experience genital pleasure. This physical transition corresponds with the child’s psychic desire to metaphorically kill its same-sex parent and sleep with its opposite-sex parent—in other words, to replace its same sex-parent as the object of the opposite-sex parent’s love (Freud, “A Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy”). As I have mentioned, the child moves through and overcomes the Oedipus complex with the promise that it will have other loved objects in the future. However, as Butler suggests, the child does not go through this process willingly; instead, the child experiences melancholy at the loss of its objects and only gives them up by introjecting them into its ego and expecting new objects that will satisfy it in the future. But Butler’s theory also presupposes that the ego is the “congealment of a history of loss, the sedimentation of relations of substitution” that cannot be fully satisfied by any one object (Psychic Life 169). According to her, the “ego is a poor substitute for lost objects, and … its failure to substitute in a way that satisfies (that is to overcome its status as a substitution), leads to the ambivalence that distinguishes melancholia” (169). In other words, Butler argues that the impossibility of finding adequate substitutions for those objects perpetuates the melancholia created by the initial loss of the object.

In his work on feminine sexuality, Jacques Lacan relies on the same phallic model of ego formation as Butler. And like Butler, he uses this structural model to suggest that no one object choice in adult life is ever fully a satisfactory replacement for the primary loved objects. For Lacan, desire is perpetuated not by the satisfying object relations, but by the cause of desire
itself, which is to say the very prohibition or impossibility of satisfaction that Butler describes. He writes,

> What holds the image together is a remainder. Analysis demonstrates that love, in its essence, is narcissistic, and reveals that the substance of what is supposedly object-like (*objectal*)—what a bunch of bull—is in fact that which constitutes a remainder in desire, namely its cause, and sustains desire through its lack of satisfaction (*insatisfaction*), and even its impossibility. (On Feminine Sexuality 6)

In this regard Lacan suggests that desire formulated through the prohibitions of the primary objects is what sustains desire, not the satisfaction of those prohibitions through satisfactory substitutions. Thus, he goes so far as to suggest that the “sexual relationship” (*rapport sexuel*) itself does not exist because “jouissance is marked and dominated by the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere in the enunciable, the sole One that interests us, the One of the ‘sexual relationship’ (*rapport sexual*)” (6–7). However, both Butler and Lacan’s work relies on the notion that subjectivity and sexuality is formulated in the phallic stage of development. Others who worked at the same time as Freud and Lacan, however, suggest that the primary objects are introjected into the ego at a much earlier stage and that the melancholia experienced by the loss of the those objects is overcome by the continued nurturing of the parents. Melanie Klein’s work on melancholia thus provides another view of subject formation in relation to losing the primary loved objects.

According to Klein, I argue, friendship and love are not always already melancholic, and satisfactory friend and love relationships can be established. In her work on melancholia, she places more emphasis on the infantile stage of development than do Butler, Freud, or Lacan. Klein argues that babies experience “depressive feelings” when they realize that they are
separate from their mothers and that these feelings “reach a climax just before, during, and after weaning” (345). She calls this state the “infantile depressive position,” which occurs during a period in which the infant tests its reality, including the reality of its relationship to its primary objects (344). When the child learns that it is separate from its mother, it experiences a deep melancholia. But unlike Butler, who believes that melancholic injuries occur later in the phallic stage and can never be healed, Klein believes that the melancholic injuries of the weaning stage can be overcome and completely healed if the child receives adequate, consistent nurturing in the years to come. 34

As Klein explains, in the infantile stages of life the child experiences its primary object, its mother, as both inside or a part of him or her, as well as outside of him or her as part of the world: “All the enjoyments which the baby lives through in relation to his mother are so many proofs to him that the loved object inside as well as outside is not injured, is not turned into a vengeful person” (346–47). With continued nurturing the child is able to overcome his or her infantile depression: “The increase of love and trust, and the diminished fears through happy experiences, help the baby step by step to overcome his depression and feeling of loss (mourning)” (346–47). Through interactions with “good” objects, the child becomes confident of “other people’s goodness” (346–47). The child also believes, through the experience of these relationships, that “his own ego can be saved” and his or her “ambivalence” toward objects as well as his or her “acute fears of internal destruction diminish” (346–47). Thus Klein argues that when the subject experiences loss again in adult life it does not simply, as Freud and Butler suggest, take the object into his or her own ego as a way of preserving the relationship. Rather, the subject identifies with the lost object and also returns to its earliest relationship with its “good” primary objects. Klein writes,
In my view, however, he not only takes into himself (reincorporates) the person whom he had just lost, but also reinstates his internalized good object (ultimately his loved parents), who became a part of his inner world from the earliest stages of his development onwards. (353)

Thus while others claim “these too are felt to have gone under, to be destroyed, whenever the loss of a loved person is experienced,” Klein is adamant that this is not the case and that the primary loved objects are maintained even during a new loss (353). If the relationship with the primary objects is good, then the subject should not experience lasting melancholia when it loses loved objects as an adult, and the subject should be able to find new objects that satisfy it.

While Freud and Butler’s theories of melancholia and its lingering effects seem adequate to describe the sheer and utter despair experienced by both those at the front and by the friends and loved ones of combatants or former combatants, Klein’s work presents a different view of melancholia that must be considered. In addition to the work on the late-Victorian ideal of love and friendship that I presented in Chapter One, I argue that Klein’s theory of melancholia serves as a psychoanalytic explanation for why friendship and love are among the greatest goods we can know or imagine. Good relations with the primary loved objects provide the basis for satisfactory friend and love relationships in later life—the relationships that ultimately make adult life worth living.
In the following two chapters, I argue that D. H. Lawrence rejected the late-Victorian and early-Bloomsbury notion of friendship based on equality, mutual sympathy, states of mind, “appreciation,” and “feeling.” Lawrence desperately wanted friendship and explained belief in friendship and his longing in particular for male friends in a letter to Katherine Mansfield on December 5, 1918:

I do believe in friendship. I believe tremendously in friendship between man and man, pledging of men to each other inviolably.—But I have not ever met or formed such friendship. Also I believe the same way in friendship between men and women, between women and women, sworn, pledged, eternal, as eternal as the marriage bond, and as deep.—But I have not met or formed such friendship. (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 301–2)

Though Lawrence wanted friendship and community, especially with other men, it eluded him in his adult life. Compared to his own ideal of friendship, Lawrence thought that the late-Victorian and Bloomsbury model of friendship was “brittle” and “superficial” and that it ignored the deep, synergistic passion that he thought was essential to life and personal
relationships. The start of the Great War, Lawrence’s relationship with Bertrand Russell, and his introduction to Cambridge society only intensified his opinion that industrial civilization and capitalism crippled man’s spirit and mechanized personal relationship, leading to the frustration and the breakdown of satisfying personal relationships. I argue that Lawrence describes this complex notion of the impossibility of satisfying personal relationships in *Women in Love*. By 1925 Lawrence claimed that he did not believe in friendship between men and women: “Friendship between a man and a woman, as a thing of first importance to either, is impossible: I know it” (*Letters* 5: 203). I argue that in addition to demonstrating the impossibility of desexualized friendship between men and women, *Women in Love* also demonstrates that after the Great War, sexual relationships are not satisfactory. Through the relationship of Birkin and Hermione, Lawrence critiques the New Woman who refuses to kowtow to men and thereby disrupts the “whole circuit” of heterosexual relations. I suggest that while Birkin and Ursula have a “whole circuit” heterosexual relationship, it only satisfies them temporarily. Birkin and Ursula’s relationship is disrupted by Birkin’s relationship with Gerald. While many critics have focused on whether Birkin and Gerald’s relationship is homosexual, I argue that what is important about the relationship is not that it is homosexual, but that it is unsatisfied. Like the men in the trenches who found temporary relief from the war in their fellow men, Birkin and Gerald’s relationship is only a temporary respite from the demands of civilization, which prevent them from living as freely as they may have liked. *Women in Love* is a complete rejection of the late-Victorian and Bloomsbury Group’s ideal of desexualized friendship, but it offers no solution for the modern, split subjectivities of its characters. Lawrence’s characters find no lasting satisfaction in friendship and love.
4.2 LAWRENCE’S IDEAL OF FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE

In his youth and young adulthood Lawrence had several important friendships with women, including Jessie Chambers, Louie Burrows, Alix Dax, and Blanche Jennings. In 1908, having passed his college examinations at University College in Nottingham, Lawrence moved to Croydon, Sussex, and began to teach at the Davidson Road School. While leaving Eastwood, where he had been born and raised, was emotional, Lawrence was eager to be closer to London as it offered “a range of entertainment and excitement worlds away from the Congregational Literary Society of Eastwood” (Worthen, The Early Years 203). Lawrence settled into his new life in Croydon and remained close to several of his contacts in the Midlands, including his long-time friend Jessie Chambers. Chambers encouraged him to publish the poems and short stories he was continuously writing and revising. She suggested that he send his work to the English Review—the “new and prestigious literary magazine edited by Ford Maddox Hueffer” (214). As James T. Boulton explains, Lawrence relied heavily on several close friendships with women in his early adult life for “both intellectual stimulus and emotional satisfaction” (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 2).

When Lawrence and Chambers finally went their separate ways, Lawrence became “unofficially engaged” to another close friend, Louie Burrows, for nearly six years until November 1910 (Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 1). Burrows, along with Dax and Jennings, were active in the women’s suffrage movement. Burrows was “devoted to the cause of women’s rights and was in close touch with members of one of the leading suffragist societies, the Women’s Social and Political Union” (2). Dax was considered the “more militant” of the two women (2). After her marriage, she became a prominent member of the Eastwood socialist group, as well as a council member of Shirebrook and the Worker’s Educational Association.
Lawrence met Blanche Jennings at a Nottingham suffragists rally and she, like Dax, was politically radical. Lawrence was drawn to Jennings because she was a few years old than he, which allowed him to express himself more freely without the threat of the relationship becoming romantic. Through their letters, Lawrence “could be flirtatious, indulge his theatricality and boisterous fun, and experiment with literary tone and style,” and Jennings could serve as a sounding board for Lawrence’s fictional and philosophic ideas (2).

In addition to these close relationships with women, Lawrence was also interested in relationships with men. In a letter to Jennings dated July 30 [–August 3], 1908, Lawrence explains that contrary to her assumptions about him, he does have male friends: “Do not suppose I have no men friends. I could show you two men who claim me as their heart’s best brother; there is another, home for vacation, who has been with me every available moment—till I am tired, I confess” (Letters 1: 66–67). Despite suggesting that he does have good male friendships, however, Lawrence also suggests that his male friendships lack intimacy. They do not, for example, rival the intimacy of David and Jonathan: “But David and Jonathan – it is as impossible as magnificent love between a woman and me” (66–67). In the same letter, Lawrence iterates his definition of friendship. He suggests that friendship is measured by “breadth of understanding” and the “delicate response from the chores of feeling which is involuntary” (66–67). He elaborates his position on friendship, explaining that it is easier for men to be friends with other men than with women:

Various folk vibrate to various frequencies, tones, whatever you like. Now a woman’s soul of emotion is not so organised, so distinctly divided and active in part as a man’s. Set a woman’s soul vibrating in response to your own, and it is her whole soul which trembles with a strong, soft note of uncertain quality. But a
man will respond, if he is a friend, to the very chord you strike, with clear and satisfying timbre, responding with a part, not the whole of his soul. It makes a man much more satisfactory. (66–67)

In this passage, Lawrence describes what he understands as the difference between the souls of men and women, which influences the way that they respond to others. For him, men are more emotionally measured and this quality makes them more capable of mirroring others’ emotions. Thus he suggests that if he is to find a woman that will satisfy him, she must have as much emotional range as a man:

To make a real wife for me you would need a woman with a great range of swift and subtle feeling; a woman whose melody of soul is not numbered by the murmur of her soul answering at once, when there is no call for such an answer; a vague wearing sound; like bees in a great lime tree, hidden together, so that the tree seems to be speaking and saying nothing. Woman can feel, but often, very often, they do not understand, understand in their souls, I mean. (66)

Thus, Lawrence suggests that marriage should exceed sex and be based on what he calls “religious feeling”:

Most people marry with their souls vibrating to the note of sexual love—and the sex notes may run into beautiful aesthetics, poetry and pictures, and romance. But love is much finer, I think, when not only the sex chord is attuned, but the great harmonies, and the little harmonies, of what we call religious feeling (read it widely) and ordinary sympathetic feeling. (66)
But while in this early letter Lawrence suggests the virtues of “religious feeling” in friendship and love, as his career progressed, and specifically in response to the Great War, his philosophy of friendship and love changed.

Lawrence cultivated close relationships with Katherine Mansfield and John Middleton Murry. As Jeffrey Meyers explains, Lawrence and his wife, Freida Weekley, highly valued their friendship with Mansfield and Murry, who were also a couple:

Both Lawrence and Frieda felt the Murrys were their most intimate friends. They first corresponded about Lawrence’s magazine articles [Murphy had just begun the literary magazine *Rhythm*], then met and quickly established a friendship. Impelled by Lawrence’s desire for like-minded companions, they twice lived and worked in neighboring houses. (136)

But the relationship between Lawrence and Frieda and Mansfield and Murry was mired by the complexity of Lawrence’s desire for his relationship with his wife, as well as friendships outside of his marriage with both men and women. Meyers suggests that “both couples had fierce attractions and antagonisms towards one another,” and that both “Lawrence and Frieda were physically attracted to Murry—a handsome, dreamy, weak and undependable man” (136). Mansfield and Murry were implicated in the bitter battles that often occurred between Lawrence and Frieda (136). Even though he and Frieda were tremendously close to this couple, Lawrence wanted to be closer still. Lawrence wanted to fill the void of the “persistent nothingness” spread by the seemingly endless war: “The sight of people in London strikes me into a dumb fury. The persistent nothingness of the war makes me feel like a paralytic convulsing with rage” (*Letters* 2: 386–87). He felt that the “spirit of militarism” was “essentially destructive” and destroyed the “individual and social being” (644). In response to the “persistent nothingness” of the war and
its destruction of the “individual and social being,” he put forth an idea to start his own island community, Rananim. On January 28, 1915, Lawrence explained the parameters of his ideal community to E. M. Forster. Lawrence wanted his utopian community to exist without class distinctions or money, and he wanted all of the members of the community not to conform to each other’s demands but to fulfill their own desires:

In my Island, I wanted people to come without class or money, sacrificing nothing, but each coming with all his desires, yet knowing that his life is but a tiny section of a Whole: so that he shall fulfill his life in relation to the Whole. I wanted a real community, not built out of abstinence or equality, but out of many fulfilled individualities seeking greater fulfillment. (266)

Lawrence reiterated this fantasy to Lady Ottoline Morrell. On the first of February, days after writing to Forster, Lawrence explained that he wanted to include her in his Island project:

I want to form the nucleus of a new community which shall start a new life amongst us—a life in which the only riches is integrity of character. So that each one may fulfil his own nature and deep desires to the utmost, but wherein the ultimate satisfaction and joy is in the completeness of us all as one. Let us be good all together, instead of just in the privacy of our chambers, let us know that the intrinsic part of all of us is the best part, the believing part, the passionate, generous part. (272)

Lawrence also wanted Mansfield and Murry to be an integral part of his community, and he was devastated when he began to feel that he cared for them much more than they cared for him. On February 24, 1915, Lawrence wrote to them, expressing his disappointment and continuing to proclaim his devotion:
I’ve waited for you for two years now, and am far more constant to you than ever you are to me—or will ever be. Which you know. So don’t use foolish language. I believe in you, and there’s the end of it. But I think you keep far less faith in me, than I with you at the centre of things. (550–51)

Despite the fact that Lawrence was incredibly disappointed that he and Frieda were not as close to Mansfield and Murry as they once were, Lawrence redirected his energy toward Bertrand Russell.

### 4.3 LAWRENCE AND BERTRAND RUSSELL

Lawrence’s relationship with Russell initially cushioned the loss of his friendship with Mansfield and Murry and helped him constructively redirect his anti-war and anti-civilization sentiment. While Lawrence and Russell were fast friends, their relationship was short lived. Within a year the two had learned that their philosophies were wholly incompatible. Lawrence rejected wholeheartedly the late-Victorian and Bloomsbury notion of desexualized friendship based on equality and mutual sympathy and claimed that humans needed to reject civilization and return to the body. Lawrence called for nothing short of a “life where men are freer from the immediate material things” and a “revolution of society” (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 294). For Russell, the war strengthened his Victorian values and he became even more adamant that the war presented a direct danger to the Western civilization that his forefathers had a role in creating. As Ray Monk explains,

The ‘effort after mental advancement’ that Russell represented as characterising European civilization since the Renaissance, and which he regarded as ‘the most
wonderful upward movement known to history,’ was exactly what Lawrence thought was the problem with Western civilization! For Lawrence, it was the concern with mental advancement that had led to the disastrous denial of the body and all the unnaturalness of European life that was a consequence of that. (425)

The matter was so serious for Russell that he also sought to distinguish himself from the Bloomsbury Group by claiming that rather than follow the call of their late-Victorian predecessors and join politics and public life, they should chose a “life of retirement” (Russell in Monk 531). Reflecting in a BBC radio address, Russell claimed that while he ever remained a Victorian at heart, the members of the Bloomsbury Group were swept away by Edwardian freedoms, which allowed them to pursue a “life of retirement”:

We were still Victorian, they were Edwardian. We believed in ordered progress by means of politics and free discussion. The more self-confident among us may have hoped to be leaders of the multitude, but none of us wished to be divorced from it. The generation of Keynes and Lytton did not seek to preserve any kinship with the Philistine. They aimed rather at a life of retirement among fine shades and nice feelings, and conceived of the good as consisting in the passionate and mutual admirations of a clique of the elite. (Russell in Monk 531)

For a time, however, Lawrence found hope and relief in Russell, and Russell found a much-needed source of “rebellion” in Lawrence. As Russell explains, pacifism had produced in him “a mood of bitter rebellion,” and he found Lawrence “equally full of rebellion” (Portraits from Memory and Other Essays 111). Lawrence and Russell were brought together as Lawrence was gradually introduced to the stars of the London literary scene, including Edward Garnett, Ford Maddox Hueffer (Ford), and the aristocrat hostess and Russell’s lover, Lady Ottoline Morrell.
Lawrence was ushered into London literary life by the help of his long-time friend Jessie Chambers. She launched his literary career, James T. Boulton suggests, by sending some of his poems, “possibly without his consent,” to Heuffer, editor of the English Review, for his consideration (Letters 1: 137). John Worthen explains the circumstances:

Jessie looked through the poems Lawrence had sent her in letters since October 1908, picked out those she thought the best and, ‘one beautiful June morning,’ copied them out. She sent four poems: two with school as their setting, two inspired by the 2-year old Helen Mary Jones. ‘I was careful to put them poem called ‘Discipline’ first, not because I thought it was the best, but hoping that the unusual title might attract the Editor’s attention.’ And, astonishingly, early in August she had a letter from Hueffer, asking to see Lawrence in London and saying that ‘perhaps something might be done.’ (The Early Years 215)

Later, in his “Autobiographical Sketch,” Lawrence also explained the circumstances:

It was while I was at Croydon, when I was twenty-three, that the girl who had been my chief friend of my youth, and who was herself a school-teacher in a mining village at home, copied out some of my poems, and without telling me, sent them to the English Review, which had just had a glorious re-birth under Ford Maddox Hueffer.

Hueffer was most kind. He printed the poems, and asked me to come and see him. The girl had launched me, so easily, on my literary career, like a princess cutting a thread, launching a ship. (592)35

Jessie’s efforts proved more than satisfactory. On September 11, 1909, Lawrence wrote to Louie Burrows explaining that Hueffer and the English Review had accepted several his
poems: “The truth is, I am very much occupied with some work of my own. It is supposed to be a secret, but I guess I shall have to tell you. The editor of the English Review has accepted some of my Verses, and wants to put them into the English Review, the November issue” (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence Vol. 1 137).

In Lawrence, Hueffer had “hoped to find” a “working class” writer whom he wanted to represent in the English Review. And in Hueffer, Lawrence had finally found an experienced and enthusiastic reader. The pieces that Lawrence wrote directly following his first acceptance with the English Review and Hueffer focused on themes from his working-class background:

It can hardly be a coincidence that, in the autumn of 1909, Lawrence wrote first his play A Collier’s Friday Night, then his short story ‘Odour of Chrysanthemums’ and then, in December 1909, two sketches of school life in Croydon which can also be linked with Hueffer. (Worthen, The Early Years 217)

After his initial meeting with Hueffer, Lawrence was introduced to Hueffer’s friends and contacts, including Ernest and Grace Rhys, and H. G. Wells (Worthen 220, 221). At a meal with Hueffer and his partner, Violet Hunt, in fall 1909, Lawrence and Jessie Chambers met Ezra Pound. “Lunch with Hueffer and Violent Hunt passed off well: ‘a young American poet,’ almost certainly Pound, was there as well and kept the conversation going” (Worthen 221). Lawrence explained this series of meetings with the literary giants of London in a letter to Louie Burrows on November 20, 1909:

Last Sunday I went up to lunch with Ford Madox Hueffer, and with Violet Hunt, who is rich, and a fairly well-known novelist. They were both delightful. Hueffer took me to tea at Ernest Rhys’: he edits heaps of classics—Dent’s Everyman’s, for instance. He is very nice indeed, and so is his wife, Grace Rhys, who writes
stories. After tea we went on to call on H. G. Wells who also lives up at Hampstead. He is a funny little chap: his conversation is a continual squirting of thin little jets of weak acid: amusing, but not expansive. (Letters 1: 144)

Lawrence reports in the same letter that he met Ezra Pound “at home” hosted by Violet Hunt at “Adelphi Terrance, on the Embankment” (145). After the gathering Pound took Lawrence to dinner at “Pagnani’s.” Pound showed Lawrence his attic flat: they “went down to his room at Kensington” where “he lives in an attic, like a traditional poet” (144–45). After these auspicious meetings, it is safe to suggest that “Jessie could be confident that, with such patrons, Lawrence was fairly launched” (Worthen, The Early Years 221). The “Men of 1914” had indeed taken in Lawrence. Wyndham Lewis popularized the phrase “Men of 1914” in Blasting and Bombardiering to categorize the literary circle that included T. S. Eliot, Ford Maddox Hueffer (Ford), James Joyce, and Ezra Pound. Lewis writes,

The men of 1914 were a ‘haughty and proud generation,’ I quote Mr. Ford Maddox Ford: the Joyces, the Pounds, the Eliots, my particular companions. Nineteen fourteen is the year I have selected for the commencement of this history, and as observed by Mr. Maddox Ford, who has seen the generation of James, Conrad, and Hudson this new ‘generation’ was remarkable for its ‘pride.’ (252)

While Lawrence had certainly been introduced to the “Men of 1914,” he had not yet been introduced to the other major London literary circle, the Bloomsbury Group.

As Boulton suggests, however, Hueffer’s greatest contribution to Lawrence’s career was introducing him to Edward Garnett in 1911 (15). Garnett and Lawrence began to exchange letters in August 1911. Lawrence explained to Garnett that he had several short stories that he
was preparing for publication. Lawrence was frustrated with Garnett’s first rejection of his work for the journal Century, claiming, “Edward Garnett sent me back the Century Stories because they aren’t suitable to the stupid American taste,” and that he planned to work on another group of stories that might be “more objective, more ordinary” and thus more acceptable for publication. They continued to write back and forth with Garnett making suggestions for revision, and Lawrence dutifully making corrections based on those suggestions. As they became closer, Garnett invited Lawrence to visit him at his home, Cearne. Lawrence was introduced to Garnett’s unconventional living arrangement with his wife and son. Lawrence explained his trip to Cearne to Louie Burrows on October 16, 1911:

   It was very fine. Garnett was alone—He is about 42. He and his wife consent to live together or apart as it pleases them. At present Mrs Garnett with their son is living in their Hampstead flat. She comes down to the Cearne for week ends sometimes Garnett generally stays one, or perhaps two days in the week, in London. But he prefers to live alone at the Cearne. But he is very fond of his wife also—only they are content to be apart a great deal. (Letters 1: 314–15)

At this point, Garnett, though it was only a few weeks after their initial meeting, was highly supportive of Lawrence’s work (Boulton 15–16): according to Lawrence, Garnett found his work “quite extra,” but noted that Garnett “rather flatters me” (Letters 1: 315). Lawrence’s work was gaining ground and he was eager to stop teaching so that he could write fulltime. Boulton explains that Lawrence caught pneumonia while working outside at Cearne, took a leave of absence from the Davidson Road School to recover and never returned, resigning on February 28, 1912. The illness turned out to be a life-changing event: just weeks after leaving the school, he met Frieda Weekley, “the German wife of Ernest Weekley, the Professor of French who had
taught Lawrence at University College, Nottingham,” and eloped six weeks later, traveling to Germany to visit Frieda’s family (Boulton 17). It was in Germany that Lawrence first met the Garnetts’ son, David. In a letter dated July 18, 1912, Lawrence explained his hope that the “rare and delicious” David would visit him and Frieda (428):

We should love to see David. Tell us his address. Send him to see us here—quick, because of our going away. He comes here from the Isarthal Bahnhof. I can introduce him to Professor Jaffé, at the University—a nice man. It would be lovely if we could do just a little for him—all we can. (426–27)

David did indeed make it to Icking, München, where he stayed with Lawrence and Frieda. Lawrence recalled how David, “Bunny,” was much like his father: “He’s awfully like you, in a thousand ways—his walk, his touch of mischief and wickedness, and nice things besides” (429). In the same letter to Edward Garnett, Lawrence also remarked that he and Frieda were both fond of David:

We are awfully fond of him. I reckon he’s a lucky dog. But I’d rather have a dog lucky and adorable, like him, than unlucky and lugubrious, like myself. You should see him swim in the Isar, that is effervescent and pale green, where the current is fearfully strong. He simply smashes his way through the water, while F. sits on the bank bursting with admiration, and I am green with envy. By Jove, I reckon his parents have done joyously well for that young man. (429)

Lawrence and Frieda’s relationship with David continued from this point forward. David visited Lawrence and Frieda regularly during the course of their stay in Europe. At this time, Lawrence had just published The Trespasser (May 1912) and was working steadily on his second novel: “I am eating my heart out, and revising my immortal Heinemann novel ‘Paul Morel’” (409).
In November 1912, Lawrence described the theme or “idea” of his novel in a letter to Edward Garnett. He explained that the main character was a young man whose adult development is thwarted by the undying love his mother had showered upon him when he was a child. He writes,

> It follows this idea: a woman of character and refinement goes into the lower class, and has no satisfaction in her own life. She has had a passion for her children, so the children are born of passion, and have heaps of vitality. But as her sons grow up she selects them as lovers—first the eldest, then the second. These sons are urged into life by their reciprocal love of their mother—loved on and on. But when they come to manhood, they can’t love, because their mother is the strongest power in their lives, and holds them. (476–77)

According to Lawrence, the book represented the “tragedy of thousands of young men in England,” including his now-close friend, David Garnett: “It may even be Bunny’s tragedy. I think it was Ruskin’s, and men like him” (477). What is interesting about this statement, however, is that Lawrence says nothing about the autobiographical implications of the novel, or about his own loving mother’s recent death. Even Frieda commented, in a note to Edward Garnett tucked into the envelope with Lawrence’s letter, that “the mother is really the thread” and the “domineering note” of the novel (477). Without any measure of self-implication, Lawrence suggests that overwhelming mothers produce homosexual sons, though Paul Morell, the main character of *Sons and Lovers*, is heterosexual, much like Lawrence advertised himself to be. Despite Lawrence’s suspicion that David might be a homosexual, David, Lawrence, and Frieda continued to be close friends. Garnett claimed that while he remained close to Lawrence over the next “three or four years that followed” the summer of 1912 when he visited Frieda and
Lawrence in Europe, he had never again seen him “so well or so happy, so consistently gay and light-hearted” (247).

While during the previous spring of 1913, Lawrence “had felt that The Cearne was the only house in England that would have them,” he now felt, in the spring of 1914, that he was welcomed in more of London’s circles than ever before: “He was soon in touch with Georgians, Imagists, Vorticists, Bloomsbury” (Kinkead-Weekes, D. H. Lawrence: Triumph to Exile 128). David Garnett gave a dinner for the Lawrences so that they could meet more of his friends than would have been possible the year before when both Lawrence and Frieda and David Garnett were traveling. In July 1914, the Lawrences returned to England and “were lent a little house off the Fulham Road by an agreeable Irishman called Campbell” (Garnett 264). Garnett threw the Lawrences a party in honor of their homecoming and marriage. According to Garnett,

It took place in the back room at Gustave’s, which at that time provided the best food in Soho. There were about eighteen people there: Frankie Birrell, Karen Costello, David Garnett, D. H. Lawrence, Frieda Lawrence, Katherine Mansfield, [John] Middleton Murry, Daphne Oliver, Noel Oliver, Ethel Pye and Adrian Stephen. Gilbert Cannan and his wife, James Strachey and Arthur Waley, may also have been there. (264)

While this was the Lawrences’ first glimpse at some of the outlying members of the Bloomsbury Group, Lawrence was brought into contact with the members of what Leonard Woolf later called “Old Bloomsbury” through Gilbert and Marry Cannan, who introduced him to Lady Ottoline (Kinkead-Weekes 131). While Mark Kinkead-Weekes suggests that Lawrence first met Ottoline in 1914, Boulton claims that Lawrence met Morrell in August 1913, when Lawrence and Frieda dined at Ottoline’s 44 Bedford Square, Bloomsbury, home (2). It is certain, however,
that Ottoline contacted Lawrence after reading *The Prussian Officer and Other Stories* (1914), and then sharing her positive impression of Lawrence’s work with Bertrand Russell. Ottoline became a central figure in Bloomsbury after the start of the Great War, when her Garsington retreat functioned as a place where the artists and intellectuals of the day could meet and discuss current affairs while sheltering themselves from the ever-present reality of war in London: “By 1915 life in London had become entirely changed by the war. Politics and all our old interests had been swept away and there seemed no spot that one touched that did not fly open and show some picture of suffering, some macabre dance of death” (Morrell 31).

To Ottoline’s correspondence, Lawrence replied on January 3, 1915, that he was happy she had written to him: “I was glad you wrote and told me you like my stories” (*Letters* 1: 253). Lawrence and Ottoline would correspond frequently for years after. While Lawrence may have first casually met Ottoline in August 1914, as Boulton suggest, scholars agree that their first formal meeting was on January 21, 1915, when Ottoline invited him to dinner at 44 Bedford Square (Boulton 2; Kinkead-Weekes, *Triumph to Exile* 131, 805; Monk 397).

Ottoline was especially important to Lawrence because she introduced him to Bertrand Russell, with whom she had begun an affair in 1911 (Kinkead-Weekes, *Triumph to Exile* 118). Russell was a Cambridge graduate, a former Apostle and a contemporary of G. E. Moore: Russell was the 224th Apostle elected in 1892, while Moore was the 229th Apostle, elected in 1894 (Levy 310). Ottoline’s husband, Phillip Morrell, accepted the affair between her and Russell under the terms that it would remain “discreet” and that she would not leave him or their daughter, Julian (Kinkead-Weekes, *Triumph to Exile* 188). This arrangement was good enough for Ottoline, who found Russell “rather crude and brutal as a lover” and was thus primarily dazzled by his intellect. Russell, however, suffered greatly from their affair because he could
never hope to have Ottoline for himself (188). Instead of a full-fledged love affair, Ottoline and Russell developed a deep intellectual friendship, writing to each other every day (188). Their relationship began to fall apart in 1914, but was reignited by Russell’s affair with Irene Cooper-Willis and “rose to new heights of physical passion” in the middle of January, 1915 (Monk 394). After both Ottoline and Russell reported in letters to the other that they had experienced “unbounded, unparalleled, dionysian ecstasy,” Ottoline met “for the first time the writer who, more than anyone else, has become associated with such reverence for the sexual act” (Monk 396–97). Monk reports that Lawrence came to dinner on January 21, 1915, at Bedford Square, and suggests that Ottoline and Russell had already formed an opinion of Lawrence based on his published novels, The White Peacock (1911) and Sons and Lovers (1913), texts that were “widely admired among their circle of friends” (398, 400). Ottoline and Russell felt even more certain of Lawrence’s talents, “passionate nature,” and “deep and rare insights” after they read Lawrence’s collection of short stories, The Prussian Officer (1914).

At their initial meeting, Ottoline had found Lawrence “completely captivating” and wanted to learn more about him. She even entertained, though not very seriously, Lawrence’s desire to build a new community, “Rananim” (Monk 400). Whether or not Ottoline took his plans seriously, she did promise to introduce him to Russell, whom Lawrence called “the philosophic-mathematics man” in a letter to Gordon Campbell a day later on February 2, 1915 (Letters 2: 273–74). The next day, Lawrence admitted to Ottoline that he was intimidated by the prospect of meeting Russell, and worried if she had not overestimated Lawrence’s virtues in describing him to Russell:

We shall be glad to see you on Saturday, if you can really come. I am still a bit scared of Mr Russell—I feel as if I should stutter.
Please don’t hold too big an idea of me—for it will be your idea which is big, more than me. And then I shall be to you like the corn on the rocky ground. Take warning by your past experiences. You are too generous in your estimations, as you well know. (274)

The first meeting between Lawrence and Russell was fruitful and began an almost year-long stretch of intense and frequent communication. Like Lawrence, Russell was looking for a deep friendship, similar to the one he had experienced with Joseph Conrad, where the superficial layers of day-to-day interactions and formalities might reveal a deeper, more philosophic connection (Monk 401). Russell sought to fill a loneliness that was exacerbated by his on-again, off-again relationship with Ottoline. He was at first highly impressed by Lawrence’s psychological insight and his ability to discern people’s underlying character quickly (Monk 403). He shared Lawrence’s desire for social revolution and the creation of a “better life” (Monk 403). Lawrence wrote to Russell on February 12, 1915, just days after their first meeting, and explained what he thought was necessary for social change:

There must be a revolution in the state. It shall begin by the nationalising of all [...] industries and means of communication, and of the land—in one fell blow. Then a man shall have his wages whether he is sick or well or old—if anything prevents his working, he shall have his wages just the same. So we shall not live in fear of the wolf—no man amongst us, and no woman shall have any fear of the wolf at the door, for all wolves are dead. (282)

In response to the letter, Russell wrote to Ottoline on February 13 and explained that he did not agree with Lawrence’s “optimism” or general theory.38
I have had a long letter from Lawrence—saying it is no good to do anything till we get Socialism—and thinking (as the young do) that because he sees the desirability of Socialism it can be got by a few years’ strenuous work. I feel his optimism difficult to cope with—I can’t share it and I don’t want to discourage it. He is extraordinarily young. I will send you the letter when I have answered it.

(The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914–1970 33)

In the same letter in which Lawrence detailed his belief in socialism, he also explained to Russell his “theory of sex relations” (Monk 403) and criticized E. M. Forster for his inability to act. Lawrence suggests that Forster tries to ameliorate his own pain and the pain of others through poetry, which he considers a passive form, rather than through “immediate physical action.” By “immediate physical action,” Lawrence means sex with women, which he thinks can cure men of their pain and heal society as well:

Forster knows, as every thinking man now knows, that all his thinking and his passion for humanity amounts to no more than trying to soothe with poetry a man raging with pain which can be cured. Cure the pain, don’t give the poetry. Will all the poetry in the world satisfy the manhood of Forster, when Forster knows that his implicit manhood is to be satisfied by nothing but immediate physical action. He tries to dodge himself—the sight is pitiful. (Letters 2: 283)

Lawrence continues his tirade against Forster, becoming even more explicit and arguing that Forster’s failure is a failure to “take a woman”:

But why can’t he act? Why can’t he take a woman and fight clear to his own basic, primal being? Because he knows that self-realisation is not his ultimate desire. His ultimate desire is for the continued action which has been called
social passion—the love of humanity—the desire to work for humanity. That is every man’s ultimate desire and need. (282)

Lawrence felt that sexual relations had become based on “sensationalism,” rather than “a discovery,” of the self and the other: “The repeating of a known reaction upon myself is sensationalism. This is what nearly all English people do now. When a man takes a woman, he is merely repeating a known reaction upon himself, not seeking a new reaction, a discovery” (285). Lawrence argued that “the ordinary Englishman of the educated class goes to a woman now to masturbate himself,” and that he does so “because he is not going for discovery or new connection or progression, but only to repeat upon himself a known reaction” (285).

Lawrence believed that at least part of the reason why men were no longer capable of action was economic. He proposed that socialism would allow men to “break the shell” of self-centered inaction and begin to live:

But we shall smash the frame. The land, the industries, the means of communication and the public amusements shall all be nationalized. Every man shall have his wage till the day of his death, whether he work or not, so long as he works when he is fit. Every woman shall have her wage till the day of her death, whether she work or not, so long as she works when she is fit—keeps her house or rears her children.

Then, and then only, shall we be able to begin living. Then we shall be able to begin to work. Then we can examine marriage and love and all. Till then, we are fast within the hard, unloving, impervious shell. (286)

After this letter, though Russell had already begun to see through Lawrence’s “passion” and recognize that his and Lawrence’s ideas were wholly incompatible, he and Lawrence
continued to correspond. He was still intrigued by Lawrence’s “passion,” despite his suspicion that Lawrence’s theories were the product of youthful rebellion, and he invited Lawrence to Cambridge to meet his friends and contemporaries: “I invited him to visit me at Cambridge and introduced him to Keynes and a number of other people” (Autobiography 11). Monk speculates that Russell was well aware that his Cambridge contemporaries, Keynes and Moore in particular, would be more troubled by Lawrence than he was and that Russell, at least temporarily, “had probably already decided that this sympathies lay more with Lawrence” (405). Russell had been accused of “undue slavery to reason” and thought that Lawrence could provide Russell with the “vivifying dose of unreason” that Russell was searching for (Portraits from Memory and Other Essays 115). While Lawrence expressed that he was eager to visit Cambridge and learn more about Russell’s world, it is also clear that Lawrence expected Russell to inhabit his world and make him comfortable on his trip to Cambridge. On February 24, in anticipation of his visit to Cambridge, Lawrence wrote to Russell:

I want to come—I want to come on the 6th and stay to the 8th—but are the two nights too long? I don’t want you to put up with my talk, when it is foolish, because you think perhaps it is passionate. And it is not much good my asking you about your work. I should have to study it a long time first. And it is not in me. I feel quite sad, as if I talked a little vulgar language of my own which nobody understood. But if people all turn into some pillars of salt, one must still talk to them. You must put off your further knowledge and experience, and talk to me my way, and be with me, or I feel a babbling idiot and intruder. My world is real, it is a true world, and it is world I have in my measure understood. But no doubt you also have a true world, which I can’t understand. I makes me […] sad
to conclude that. But you must live in my world, while I am there. Because it is also a real world. And it is a world that you can inhabit with me, if I can’t inhabit yours with you. (Letters 2: 295)

In this letter Lawrence betrays his anxiety about his visit to Cambridge, but also a self-centered view that Russell should inhabit his world rather than that Lawrence should attempt to learn more about Russell’s world before the visit. Despite the fact that the two men’s relationship was initially strengthened by Lawrence’s visit to Cambridge, it was in fact the beginning of the end of their friendship.

4.4 LAWRENCE, RUSSELL, AND CAMBRIDGE

While Lawrence was clearly repelled by the Cambridge men, Russell at first thought that Lawrence might be right to reject them and their philosophies: “He [Lawrence] hated them all with a passionate hatred and said they were ‘dead, dead, dead.’ For a time I thought he might be right” (The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1914–1944 11). After Lawrence’s visit to Cambridge, Russell wrote to Ottoline on March 8, 1915, from Trinity College, describing the visit:

Lawrence is gone, disgusted with Cambridge, but not with me I think. I felt that we got on very well with each other, and made a real progress toward intimacy. His intuitive perceptiveness is wonderful—it leaves me gasping in admiration. Keynes came to dinner, and we had an interesting but rather dreadful evening. Keynes was hard, intellectual, insincere—using intellect to hide the torment and discord in his own soul. We pressed him hard about his purpose in life—he spoke
as though he only wanted a succession of agreeable moments, which of course is not really true. Lawrence likes him but can’t get on with him; I get on with him, but dislike him. Lawrence has the same feeling against sodomy as I have; you had nearly made me believe there is no great harm in it, but I have reverted; and all the examples I know confirm me in thinking it sterilizing.

Lawrence is wonderfully loveable. The mainspring of his life is love—the universal mystical love—which inspires even his most vehement and passionate hate. It is odd that his thinking is coloured by Self—he imagines men more like him than they are. I think his thinking is quite honest, but there are painful things it hasn’t realized. (The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years 1914–1940 34–35)

While Russell was rather mild in describing Lawrence’s reaction to Cambridge, Lawrence himself was much more harsh. On March 24, 1915, he wrote to Ottoline describing the “principle of evil” he saw “so plainly in Keynes at Cambridge” (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 311). The Cambridge Men made Lawrence think of scavenging animals and insects. He was so disgusted by them that he revoked his opinion that it is best to try to understand all men from their own singular point of view. In the same letter, he writes, “It is no good now, thinking that to understand a man from his own point of view is to be happy about him” (311). Cambridge, according to Lawrence, was rampant with evil and disease:

But I can never feel happy about it, I must always want to kill it. It contains a principle of evil. There is a principle of evil. Let us acknowledge it once and for all. I saw it so plainly in Keynes at Cambridge, it made me sick. I am sick with
the knowledge of the prevalence of evil, as if it were some insidious disease.

(311)

Lawrence is even more incisive when he describes his trip in a letter to David Garnett. In it he is clear that he believes the problem with the Cambridge Men is their homosexuality, which, as he later explains in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious* (1921), prevents them from participating in the “whole circuit” of normal “sex craving” (28, 7). Lawrence explains to Garnett that sexual orientation matters greatly:

I can’t bear to think of you, so wretched as you are—and your hand shaky—and everything wrong. It is foolish for you to say that it doesn’t matter either way—the men loving men. It doesn’t matter in a public way. But it matters so much, David, to the man himself—at any rate to us northern nations—that it is like a blow of triumphant decay, when I meet Birrell or the others. *(Letters 2: 320)*

Monk explains, “It was hardly likely that Lawrence—who had earlier analysed both sodomy and celibacy as perversion, symptoms of a life enclosed in a hard shell and denied its natural growth—would find among the dons he met at Trinity many whom he would describe as ‘real men’” (407). But Lawrence was reacting against more than just the Cambridge Men’s sexuality. He seems most strongly to believe that the men lacked the ability for reciprocal relationships. For him, the men were vultures, preying and feasting on others:

Why is there this sense horrible sense of frowstiness, so repulsive, as if it came from deep inward dirt—a sort of sewer—deep in men like K[eynes] B[irrell] and D[uncan] G[rant]. It is something almost unbearable to me. And not from moral disapprobation. I myself never considered Plato very wrong, or Oscar Wilde. I never knew what I meant till I saw him [Keynes] at Cambridge. We went into his

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rooms at midday, and it was very sunny. He was not there, so Russell was writing a note. And as he stood there gradually a knowledge passed into me, which has been like a little madness ever since. And it was carried along with the most dreadful sense of repulsiveness—something like a carrion—a vulture gives me the same feeling. I begin to feel mad as I think of it—insane. (Letters 2: 320–21)

What is interesting about this passage is that Lawrence does not simply criticize the Cambridge Men, but also explains how meeting them deeply affected and influenced him. Rather than thinking that the Cambridge Men themselves were “mad,” Lawrence himself felt mad after he met them: “I begin to feel mad as I think of it—insane” (320–21). He was certainly much more affected by meeting the Cambridge Men than they were by meeting him. He explained to Russell that meeting the men made him “black and down” and that he could not “bear to smell of rottenness, marsh-stagnancy” (309). Thinking of the Cambridge Men gave Lawrence “a melancholic malaria” that he could not get rid of. He was so repulsed by them that he urged Garnett to leave “these beetles” immediately and “try to love a woman” (320–21).

While Russell may have still been “gasping in admiration” of Lawrence, and untroubled by Lawrence’s blatantlly homophobic position because he was working through his own position “against sodomy,” Lawrence himself knew that his reaction against the Cambridge Men was more indicative of his own mood than of theirs (Russell, Selected Letters 34–35). But a month before his invective letter to Garnett, Lawrence had more openly and unselfconsciously explained his own melancholia, which seems, from the following passage, to have nothing directly to do with this encounter with the Cambridge Men:

But all the time I am struggling in the dark—very deep in the dark—and cut off from everybody and everything. Sometimes I seem to stumble into the light, for a
day, or even two days—then I plunge again god knows where and into what utter
darkness of chaos. I don’t mind very much. But sometimes I am afraid of the
terrible things that are real, in the darkness, and of the entire unreality of these
things I see. (Letters 2: 307)

Lawrence intuited that Russell, too, had an instinctual, violent aspect of his personality
and pushed him to express it. In the same letter in which he rebuked the Cambridge Men,
Lawrence provoked Russell to admit his own pessimistic view that human beings are inherently
selfish and act to protect their own best interests rather than the interests of society at large:

Do you still speak at the UDC [Union of Democratic Control] of the nations
kissing each other, when your soul prowls the frontier all the time most jealously,
to defend what it has and to seize what it can. It makes me laugh when you admit
it. But we are all like that. Only, let us seize and defend that which is worth
having, and which we want. (309–310) 39

Monk suggests that in this statement, Lawrence had begun to “put his finger on the central
conflict in Russell’s nature: the tension between his feeling of alienation from the rest of
humanity and his espousal of a selfless identification with it; and the analogous tension between
his fierce, dark hatreds and universal love” (410). He argues that when Russell “had tried to see
Lawrence’s own vehement hatreds springing from universal mystical love, he was but trying to
foist onto Lawrence his own ideal” that he himself believed in love (410).

While Russell admitted that he agreed with Lawrence that “politics could not be divorced
from individual psychology,” and thus that people did not always act from reason, Russell
maintained his belief in social democracy. As Russell explains, Lawrence’s wish to free the
worker from the demands of capitalism was incompatible with social democracy and was, in
fact, a formulation of fascism “before the politicians had heard of it” (Portraits from Memory and Other Essays 12). Lawrence and Russell grew apart and within a year were no longer speaking, not because Lawrence had rejected Russell’s colleagues at Cambridge, but because Lawrence and Russell’s political positions in relation to the Great War were incompatible.

4.5 LAWRENCE AND RUSSELL’S FALLING-OUT

While both Lawrence and Russell objected to the war, their particular objections and stances against the war were different. From the start, Lawrence was “very miserable about the war” (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 205). Lawrence rejected the militarism of the war and could not side entirely with either the Allies or with Germany. Lawrence’s wife, Frieda, was German, and her father, Baron Friedrich von Richtofen (1845–1915) was a “life-long professional soldier” (206). But Lawrence’s inability to side with neither the allies or the Germans had more to do, according to Russell, with Lawrence’s general hatred of humanity than any one national allegiance or another: “He [Lawrence] tended to think both sides must be right in so far as they hated each other” (Russell, Portraits from Memory 111). Russell was deeply affected by the war and said that for him, as for many of his contemporaries, the war divided his life into “two periods, one before and one after the outbreak of the First World War” (26). Russell vehemently opposed the war. He disagreed with the policy of the Entente and did not want to be aligned with “Czarist Russia”:

I disliked the policy of the Entente, which I first heard advocated in 1902 by Sir Edward Grey at a small discussion club of which I was a member. The policy had not then been adopted and Sir Edward Grey was not then in the Government, but
he knew the Government’s intentions and agreed with them. I protested vehemently. I did not like being aligned with Czarist Russia, and I saw no insurmountable obstacle to a *modus Vivendi* with the Kaiser’s Germany. I foresaw that a great war would mark the end of an epoch and drastically lower the general level of civilization. On these grounds I should have wished England to remain neutral. Subsequent history has confirmed me in this opinion. (26)

In response to his objection to the war, Russell collected signatures of a large number of professors and Fellows to a statement in favor of neutrality which appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*. What shocked him was that once England entered the war, many of the people who had signed petitions in favor of England remaining neutral “changed their minds” and supported England in the war (27). Moreover, Russell learned to his “amazement” that “average men and women were delighted at the prospect of war” (27). And that despite the fact that “most Pacifists contended, that wars were forced upon a reluctant population by despotic and Machiavellian governments,” the opposite was true: the general population supported England in the war (27).

Though Russell was a pacifist, he was “tortured by patriotism” and “desired the defeat of Germany as ardently as nearly any retired colonel” (27). Nevertheless, he was clear that he had to adamantly protest the war and support the pacifist opposition: “I have at times been paralyzed by skepticism, at times I have been cynical, at other times indifferent, but when the war came I felt as if I heard the voice of God. I knew that it was my business to protest, however futile my protest might be” (27). Russell’s “whole nature” was tested by the war: “As a lover of truth, the national propaganda of all the belligerent nations sickened me. As a lover of civilization, the return to barbarism appalled me” (27).
While Russell was appalled by the “return to barbarism” that confronted the Enlightenment philosophies he had studied, Lawrence was angered by what he perceived as “the persistent nothingness of the war,” which made him “feel like a paralytic convulsing with rage” (Letters 2: 386–87). As Kinkead-Weekes suggests, “Lawrence’s realisation of inner evil had not only to do with the poisonous corruption of beetle and scorpion that threatened him, but also significantly related the opponents of war to those who carried it on” (D. H. Lawrence: Triumph to Exile 217). What Lawrence discovered in both Russell and himself was an evil that could only be understood to contribute to war feelings:

In both Russell the pacifist, and himself the nay-sayer, he discovered a coiling violence, possessive, aggressive, which ‘prowls the frontiers,’ not only guards what it has but ‘seize[s] what it can’ (ii. 310); issuing in a murderous rage at what threatens or prevents the self, a fierce desire to kill. (217)

According to Kinkead-Weekes, Lawrence felt that “these were the real and undeclared ‘war aims,’ all the more certainly since even those who opposed the war ought to admit that they felt them too—but they led in terrible directions” (217). Lawrence felt that Russell hid his own evil feelings “behind a mask of superior reason and pacifism,” and for Lawrence this was reason enough to end his relationship with Russell (217).

As Russell explains at the time of his disagreement with Lawrence, Russell had been “preparing a set of lectures which was afterward published as Principles of Social Reconstruction” (Portraits 112). Lawrence was looking for an outlet for his latest philosophical writing: I wrote a book about these things—I used to call it Le Gai Savaire. I want now to re-write this stuff, and make it as good as I can, and publish it in pamphlets, weekly or fortnightly, and so start a campaign for this freer life” (Letters 2: 295). Russell thought at first that he and
Lawrence might be able to collaborate on the lectures that Russell had already begun: “He [Lawrence] also wanted to lecture, and for the time it seemed possible that there might be some sort of loose collaboration between us” (Portraits from Memory 112). Russell describes a letter that Lawrence sent him when they first began collaborating. Russell quickly learned that Lawrence’s views and his own were incompatible. While Russell believed in democracy, he categorized Lawrence’s beliefs as fascist:

‘I don’t believe,’ he wrote, ‘in democratic control. I think the working man is fit to elect governors or overseers for his immediate circumstances, but for no more. You must utterly revise the electorate. The working man shall elect superiors for the things that concern him immediately, no more. From the other classes, as they rise, shall be elected the higher governors. The thing must culminate in one real head, as every organic thing must—no foolish republics with foolish presidents, but an elected king, something like Julius Caesar.’ (Lawrence in Portraits from Memory 112)

Lawrence’s reverence for the “working man,” and his class consciousness mixed with his fantasy that a world in which an “elected king” like Julius Caesar might reemerge, pointed to what Russell called the “dreamlike quality of all his [Lawrence’s] thinking” (112). Russell explained that in Lawrence’s dream world, Lawrence himself “would be the Julius Ceasar” (112).

Three months after Lawrence visited Cambridge, there was already a fissure forming between himself and Russell. While Russell was negotiating his contract with Cambridge University, Lawrence only encouraged him to leave the university, arguing that “entire separation” from the security of his position is what Russell needed most40: “If they hound you out of Trinity, so much the better: I am glad. Entire separation, that is what must happen to one:
not even the nominal shelter left, not even the mere fact of inclusion in the host. One must be entirely cast forth” (Letters 2: 347). In this letter, Lawrence expressed the idea that the “darkness” of the war was separating people and keeping him and Russell apart: “But now, only the darkness thrusts more and more between us all, like a sword, cutting us off entirely each from the other, severing us and burying us each one separate in the utter darkness” (347). From Lawrence’s increasingly hostile and radical letters, Russell “discovered that he [Lawrence] had no real wish to make the world better, but only to indulge in eloquent soliloquy about how bad it was” (Portraits from Memory 113). Russell visited Lawrence in June 1915, but by July Lawrence had “scribbled all over” Russell’s lectures and accused him of writing “social criticism” rather than “social reconstruction” (Letters 2: 361). Lawrence clarified his criticism of Russell’s lectures in a letter to Ottoline, explaining, “He [Russell] won’t accept in his philosophy the Infinite, the Boundless, the Eternal, as the real starting point, and I think, whosoever will really set out on the journey toward Truth and the real end must do this, now” (363). According to Russell, Lawrence believed that Russell’s lectures were “sticking in the damned ship and haranguing the merchant pilgrims in their own language” (Lawrence in Portraits from Memory 113). Lawrence encouraged Russell to “drop overboard” and “clear out of the whole show,” but Russell felt that this is what he was already doing and that Lawrence’s criticisms of his work were increasingly baseless (112): “This seemed to me mere rhetoric. I was becoming more of an outlaw than he ever was and I could not quite see his ground of complaint against me” (113).

In addition to continuing to personally attack Russell, Lawrence revealed more of his own radical philosophy to him—material that would later appear in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious. As Russell explains,
He had a mystical philosophy of ‘blood’ which I disliked. ‘There is,’ he said, ‘another seat of consciousness than the brain—the nerves. There is a blood consciousness which exists in us independently of the ordinary mental consciousness. One lives, knows and has one’s being in the blood, without any reference to nerves and brain. This is one half of life belonging to darkness. When I take a woman, then the blood percept is supreme. My blood knowing is overwhelming. We should realize that we have a blood being, a blood consciousness, a blood soul complete and apart from a mental and nerve consciousness. (Portraits from Memory 114)

Russell believed with increasing conviction that Lawrence’s theory was “rubbish”—he “rejected it vehemently” and suggested that it “led straight to Auschwitz” (114). Nevertheless, he was hurt by Lawrence’s personal criticisms. Lawrence claimed that Russell was a hypocrite and that rather than being a pacifist, he actually wanted war and was full of “repressed desires” that prevented him from articulating his true beliefs:

I’m going to quarrel with you again. You simply don’t speak the truth, and you are simply not sincere. The article you send me is a plausible lie, and I hate it. If it says some true things, that is not the point. The fact is that you, in the essay, are all the time a lie.

Your basic desire is the maximum of desire for war, you are really the super-war-spirit. What you want is to jab and strike, like the soldier with the bayonet, only you are sublimated into words. And you are like a soldier who might jab man after man with his bayonet, saying ‘this is for ultimate peace.’ The soldier would be a liar. And it isn’t in the least true that you, your basic self, want
ultimate peace. You are satisfying in an indirect, false way your lust to jab and strike. Either satisfy it in a direct and honorable way, saying ‘I hate you all, liars and swine, and am out to set upon you,’ or stick to mathematics, where you can be true. But to come as the angel of peace—no, I prefer Tripitz a thousand times, in that role.41 (Letters 2: 392)

In addition to claiming that Russell was “full of repressed desires, which have become savage and anti-social,” Lawrence also accused him, like the other Cambridge Men, of being superficial and false. Lawrence felt that Russell in fact hated people, but that he would not admit his own evil, his own hatred of humanity:

You [Russell] are too full of devilish repressions to be anything but lustful and cruel. I would rather have the German soldiers with rapine and cruelty, than you with your words of goodness. It is the falsity that I can’t bear. I wouldn’t care if you were six times a murderer, so long as you say to yourself, ‘I am this.’ The enemy of all mankind, you are, full of lust enmity. It is not the hatred of falsehood which inspires you. It is the hatred of people, of flesh and blood. It is a perverted, mental blood lust. Why don’t you own it? (Letters 2: 392)

In his memoirs, Russell explains how he felt after Lawrence criticized him:

I was inclined to believe that he had some insight denied to me, and when he said that my pacifism was rooted in blood lust I supposed he might be right. For twenty-four hours I thought that I was not fit to live and contemplated committing suicide. But at the end of that time, a healthier reaction set in, and I decided to have done with such morbidness. (Portraits from Memory 115)
Monk suggests that there was validity to Russell’s strong reaction to Lawrence’s criticism, because Russell continued to value Lawrence’s “psychological insight” (426). What was most difficult for Russell was not so much the criticism in general, but the fact that Lawrence did have the ability to see through to Russell’s core: “Rarely can anger have been so effectively combined with psychological penetration. It was as if Lawrence could see straight into Russell’s soul and know what would hurt it most” (426). Monk also argues that Lawrence’s criticisms of Russell stemmed from the fact that Lawrence was upset that Russell was retreating from him and that a lecture collaboration no longer seemed likely: “Lawrence had been slow to realise that Russell no longer identified himself with Lawrence’s programme for social renewal, and he felt angry at the way he had been cold-shouldered” (Monk 427). After criticizing Russell, Lawrence continued to describe himself and Russell as friends and continued to contact Russell. At the end of his memoir, however, Russell suggested that the relationship “faded away without any dramatic termination” (Portraits from Memory 115). For Lawrence, the drama of his unrealized friendship with Mansfield and Murry and with Russell, coupled with his gut-level rejection of the Cambridge Men, was just the beginning of his rejection of the Cambridge Men and Bloomsbury Group.
5.0 D. H. LAWRENCE’S WOMEN IN LOVE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I advance my thesis that after the Great War D. H. Lawrence claims that desexualized friendship is impossible, and that sexual relationships are not wholly satisfying, by demonstrating that he represents a series of failed relationships in Women in Love. Lawrence demonstrates that in modernity both the Bloomsbury ideal of friendship and love based on reason, as well as his own phallic theory of sex-instinct satisfaction based on the “whole circuit” “established between two individuals,” is no longer possible (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious 28). First, I address scholarship on Women in Love, much of which has focused on two themes: one, Women in Love as a war novel and two, the role of sexuality, and in particular homosexuality, in the novel. I return to my work on Butler and Lacan from the end of Chapter Two, and suggest that Lawrence understands individuals as split subjects, mired in the melancholia resulting from the loss of their primary loved objects, who cannot find satisfactory substitutions for those relations in adult life.

I conclude by suggesting that Lawrence’s representation of the impossibility of desexualized friendship and satisfying love relationships situates him as a modernist. I suggest that his depiction of highly fractured, modernist relationships only further demonstrates his rejection of the late-Victorian and Bloomsbury Group notion of friendship based on equality,
sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling. Finally, I address Keynes’s reevaluation of Lawrence in his *Two Memoirs*. I use Keynes’s reading of Lawrence’s philosophy to show that while Lawrence may have had insight into the “insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men,” he had no understanding of what was required to maintain civilization and certainly no sense of the role that personal relationship ought to play in the advancement of civilization (Keynes 100). This analysis of Lawrence and Keynes leads to chapters Five and Six, which address more pointedly the Bloomsbury Group’s understanding of the role of human relationships after the war. In short, I argue, in spite of Russell’s accusation that members of the Bloomsbury Group were “Edwardian” and shied away from the duties and values they inherited from their Victorian forefathers, Forster and Woolf in particular continued to value human relationships as much as their Victorian predecessors long after the Great War showed that Aristotelian, “perfect friendship” was impossible in modernity.

### 5.2 WOMEN IN LOVE AS A WAR NOVEL

As Mark Kinkead-Weekes suggests, *Women in Love* “is a war novel, even though its society is apparently at peace and its date left deliberately vague” (Kinkead-Weekes 223). Kinkead-Weekes argues that what makes *Women in Love* a war novel is that violence “wells up in most of its characters” (“Violence in Women in Love” 223). While he is correct to point out that Lawrence saw “something apocalyptic about what had happened to his world in the year of the Somme and Verdun,” I argue that the violence portrayed in *Women in Love* is not the violence of war per se, but a response to the mechanistic and militaristic pressures that the war placed on people. For Lawrence the war was endemic of the constraints placed on human beings’ instincts.
As he explains in the foreword to *Women in Love*, war prevented human beings from expressing “the creative, spontaneous soul” of humanity (x). Lawrence claimed that “we are now in a period of crisis” and that the people who will “endure” and even prosper will be those who “can bring forth the new passion” and the “new idea” that has been crushed by war (x). Lawrence thought that man was “destroying himself with consciousness, with self-consciousness” and that the way to free himself was to return to the body (Leavis, *D. H. Lawrence* 9). As Leavis posits, for Lawrence sex was nothing short of a “religion” (16). But despite the fact that *Women in Love* has many sex scenes it is not the book in which Lawrence posits a return to the body as a solution to this “period of crisis.” But, rather, in *Women in Love*, Lawrence articulates what he believes are the frustrations that occur when the body and sexuality are suppressed. He did not believe that just because the war was violent, it allowed men to express their violent and sexual instincts. Lawrence thought that war further suppressed human instincts in a great display of the so-called “power” of civilization with its guns, bombs, and zeppelins:

> Last night when we were coming home the guns broke out, and there was a noise of bombs. Then we saw the Zeppelin above us, just ahead, amid a gleaming of clouds: high up, like a bright golden finger, quite small, among a fragile incandescence of clouds. And underneath it were splashes of fire as the shells from each burst. Then there were flashes near the ground—and the shaking noise. It was like Milton—then there was a war in heaven. But it was not angels. (*The Letters of D. H. Lawrence* 2: 389–90)

*Women in Love* is a war novel, not for its direct depiction of the war, of which there is none, but because it articulates Lawrence’s theory of the ramifications of war on personal relationships.
Therefore, I argue that violence in the text is not war violence, but violence that occurs when personal relationships are frustrated.

Many scholars have addressed the issue of sex in *Women in Love*. The earliest Lawrence scholars, including F. R. Leavis, “assumed that sex in Lawrence inevitably involved a man and a woman” (Booth 86). Jeffery Meyers made a different intervention when he claimed that Lawrence was a “repressed homosexual” (Booth 86). According to Meyers, “Lawrence believed his intrinsic sexual nature was dual and not entirely male, and his male and female elements were in conflict, not in balance” (86). Meyers suggests that Lawrence’s own male and female elements “caused him to see sexual relationships in terms of struggle rather than harmony, and led to a fear of merging rather than a confidence in union” (68). It is for this biographical reason that Meyers argues that the relationships between men and women in *Women in Love* are “mutually destructive” and leave the men searching for “satisfying relationships” with other men as an alternative to their failed heterosexual relationships (68). Meyers blames the fact that in the novel the male characters do not find adequate relationships with other men on “Lawrence’s inner struggle with repressed homosexual desires” resulting in “an ambiguity of presentation” or choice, because none of the “heroes” of the novel can “commit himself completely to homosexuality” (69). While Lawrence’s own homosexuality or latent homosexuality, as well as his admonishment of the openly homosexual Cambridge Men, is likely a factor of Lawrence’s thinking in *Women in Love*, Meyers’s reductive biographical reading of the novel ignores the complexity of the multiple and overlapping friendships and sexual relationships in the story.

Kinkead-Weekes’ biography of Lawrence forces scholars after him to complicate Meyers’s analysis. As Booth suggests, Kinkead-Weekes links Lawrence’s rejection of “Cambridge homosexuals with the origins of war” (96). As Booth notes, Lawrence was
“interested in examining the underlying failings of contemporary life in terms of the self-
enclosure that, while preaching self-knowledge, idealism, and personal pleasure, actually masked
a process of degeneration” (96). Thus Booth argues that Lawrence was “deeply disturbed by
homosexual desire” and “became increasingly self-conscious about his own desires,” and used
his knowledge to “develop strategies to discipline his sexuality” (106–7). 43 While I agree with
Booth’s reading of Kinkead-Weekes suggesting that Lawrence was more conscious of his own
homosexual desire than Meyers suggests, I believe that analyses focusing exclusively on either
the heterosexual or the homosexual relationships miss the complexity of the relationships
between men and women and men and men in the text.

Carolyn M. Jones claims that “marriage and friendship between men and women are
forever in tension” in D. H. Lawrence’s novels, including Women in Love (66). While in some
regard this is true, Jones completely ignores the fact that all of the relationships in the text are
burdened with Lawrence’s sexualized language, even if they are not blatantly sexual. Jones
suggests that as “the ritual of male friendship fails,” Lawrence “turns from the public back to the
private: to marriage and the supreme human relationship” (66). But this account fails to
acknowledge that Birkin continues to long for Gerald after his death and does not find
satisfaction in returning to his marriage with Ursula. Jones acknowledges that Birkin is not
satisfied with Ursula alone, but blames this fact on “lack” of “a place and a community” rather
than Birkin’s multiple lines of desire and dissatisfaction (66).

While Jones largely ignores the topic of sexuality, Gerald Doherty and Liang-ya Liou
rely too heavily on sexualized readings of the novel to the detriment of a broader, contextual
analysis. Doherty has suggested that Women in Love functions as “a compendium of
nineteenth-century pathologies of sexual instinct—sadism, masochism, fetishism, inversion—
 theorizing desire as a lack, a functional disorientation that requires substitute objects and actions to gratify it” (138). In addition, Liou posits that “the anal intercourse between Rupert Birkin and Ursula in *Women in Love* and between Anna and Will in *The Rainbow* disrupts the distinction between normal/deviant sexuality,” and that “Lawrence’s attitudes toward male homosexuality are far from clear and ‘straight’” (Liou 60). While it may be correct that “the sodomy that he [Birkin] practices with Ursula further breaks down the purity/degradation distinction which he [Birkin] self-righteously establishes between himself and those men,” this again does not account for the fact that all of the relationships in the text are frustrated (82).

Donald Gutierrez argues that Lawrence is “an ontological writer” and is “concerned with the qualities and essences of being” (43). John B. Human echoes this point when he suggests that *Women in Love* begins where existentialism begins” in that it posits “the fact that God does not exist” (58). As I suggested in Chapter One, after the metaphoric death of God in the middle of the nineteenth century, personal relationships became increasingly important and social and intellectual groups filled the space left empty by loss of faith. As Human suggests, “each [Women in Love and existentialism] starts with the proposition that ‘God’ does not exist and that, consequently, the individual must generate his own values and meanings. That is, the individual must make his own choices, then act for what he chooses” (14). As Joyce Carol Oates notes, Lawrence would say that the “tragedy of the modern era” is “inevitably bound up with the rise of industry and mechanization” (26). For Lawrence the “‘material interests’ of which Conrad spoke so ironically are all that remain of spiritual hopes; God being dead, God being unmasked as a fraud, nothing so suits man’s ambition as a transvaluing of values, the reinterpretation of religious experience in gross obscene terms” (Oates 26). Thus even when Birkin and Gerald discuss the death of God and posit that marriage to a woman is a solution
neither man is completely convinced of this proposition: “‘And you mean if there isn’t the woman, there’s nothing?’ said Gerald. ‘Pretty well that—seeing there’s no God” (Lawrence, *Women in Love* 58). What Lawrence finds, however, is that nothing, including the “transvaluing of values,” and no one person that the individual chooses, is ever satisfactory (Oates 26).

Lawrence uses the relationship between Birkin and Hermione to critique the “old idea” of the Bloomsbury Group and New Women, who strove for intellectual and social equality between men and women (“Foreword” x). He argues, however, that intellectual and social equality between men and women ruins women’s “sex desire” or “sex-impulse,” thereby disrupting the “whole circuit” of sexual relations between men and women (*Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious* 7, 28). As Freud argues in “The Unconscious,” “Psychoanalysis has taught us that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in abrogating or annihilating the ideational presentation of an instinct, but in withholding it from being conscious” (116). Freud explains that unconscious material, though, “can produce effects” and “even [effects] of a kind that finally penetrate into consciousness” (116). These effects, however, are not the direct presentation of instincts, but “the idea that represents the instinct” (126). Freud writes, “If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it” (126). This means it is not the instincts themselves that are repressed in the unconscious, but rather the ideas and affective states related to the instincts. Thus Freud claims that there is no “pure” instinct from which human beings act, and that the instincts, except for perhaps the earliest stages of human life, are already contextually attached to and represented through emotions, feelings, and ideas.

Unlike Freud, however, Lawrence believed that human beings could act purely from instinct and that they ought to be “effectual” and “not conscious” (*Psychoanalysis and the*
While Freud argued that repressed effects and ideas caused great suffering but could be eliminated through analysis, Lawrence thought that the process of psychoanalysis was “out, under therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the moral faculty in man” and disrupted people from acting from the instincts that he believed were fundamental to man’s self expression (4). Lawrence radically believed that “the complexes were not just abnormalities,” but “stock-in-trade of the normal unconscious” (6). Furthermore, Lawrence argues that the complexes are not caused by “inhibition of some so-called normal sex-impulse,” the proof of which is that the complexes remain even if “all possible prohibitions of normal sex desire” are removed (7). In other words, for Lawrence the complexes cannot be removed by making “some unadmitted sex desire” conscious because the “incest craving” is in fact “part of the normal sex-manifestation” and does not disappear just because it becomes conscious (7). Lawrence argues that it is the inhibitions, not that which is inhibited, that causes “neurosis and insanity,” and therefore claims that the “inhibition of incest craving is crown” and that “this wrong is the cause of practically all modern neurosis and insanity” (7).

In addition to this theory, Lawrence believed that women’s “sex desire” and “sex-impulse” were more easily undermined by civilization than men’s. Lawrence thought that women were more likely to act from socially determined affective states and ideas than men. He writes, “Teach a woman to act from an idea, and you will destroy her womanhood forever” (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious 121). Similarly, Lawrence claims that humans were “driven out of Paradise,” “not because we sinned” but “because we got sex into our head” (121). Essentially Lawrence believed that if women got sex in their heads and gained intellectual and social power, they would no longer be effective lovers and wives: “First she is the noble spouse of the not-quite-so-noble-male: then a Mater Dolorosa: then a ministering Angel: then a
competent social unit, a member of Parliament or Lady Doctor or platform speaker” (121). It is Hermione, I argue, who embodies the New Woman that Lawrence so feared. In Women in Love Lawrence argues that Birkin and Hermione’s relationship cannot be satisfied because she has “got sex in her head” and is incapable of true satisfaction with a man and that Birkin wants a woman who is capable of experiencing the “the sheer unmistakable bliss of the sense of union” (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious 40).

5.3 THE NEW WOMAN OF WOMEN IN LOVE

Hermione is introduced as the “most remarkable women in the midlands,” “passionately interested in reform” (Women in Love 15–16), but also described as a “man’s woman” (16). Despite the fact that Hermione “piled up her own defenses of aesthetic knowledge, and culture, and world-visions, and disinterestedness,” Lawrence suggests that she still possessed a deficiency (17). Regardless of her social and intellectual intelligence, however, Lawrence claims that she is deficient and has no natural sufficiency:

And yet her soul was tortured, exposed. Even walking up the path to the church, confident as she was that in every respect she stood beyond vulgar judgment, knowing perfectly that her appearance was complete and perfect, according to the first standards, yet she suffered a torture, under her confidence and her pride, feeling herself exposed to wounds and to mockery and to despair. She always felt vulnerable, vulnerable, there was always a secret chink in her armour. She did not know herself what it was. It was a lack of robust self, she had no natural sufficiency, there was a terrible void, a lack, a deficiency of being within her. (16)
Just as Lawrence suggests that the “secret chink” in Hermione’s “armour” is a lack of self, he initially proposes that Birkin is the cure for Hermione’s lack: “She craved for Rupert Birkin. When he was there, she felt complete she was sufficient, whole. For the rest of the time she was established on the sand, built over a chasm … in spite of all her vanity and securities” (17). If Birkin could fill Hermione’s lack, “she would be safe during this fretful voyage of life” (17). But Birkin cannot fill her lack because “he was perverse too” and “fought her off, always fought her off” (17). Lawrence suggests that Birkin does this purposefully in an attempt to deny that “which was his highest fulfillment also” (17). Though Birkin seems to want Hermione, her outward self-sufficiency coupled with an internal “lack” of self repels him. Hermione thinks she has the “strength to keep him” because she believes self-righteously in her own higher knowledge” (Women in Love 17). But it is Hermione’s knowledge that repels Birkin. In Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious Lawrence argues that the “lesson of human consciousness is to learn not to know” and that “we must know, if only in order to learn not to know” (112). Lawrence states that what Birkin really wants is a woman who acts from her unconscious and is thereby capable of a “whole circuit” relationship “established between two individuals” (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious 28). Hermione is too intellectual to tap into her so-called unconscious instincts. She has an “idea of herself” and “she can’t get herself from her own head,” thereby, according to Lawrence, making the “whole man-and-woman game” “just hell” (121). It seems that Birkin is like the men who would “rather kill themselves than go on with it—or kill somebody else” (121).

Birkin’s relationship with Hermione completely dissolves and concludes with violence. During a summer retreat to “Breadably,” Birkin and Hermione dominate the scene:
Hermione appeared, with amazing persistence, to wish to ridicule him [Birkin] and make him look ignominious in the eyes of everybody. And it was surprising how she seemed to succeed, how helpless he seemed against her. He looked completely insignificant. Ursula and Gudrun, both very unused, were mostly silent, listening to the slow, rhapsodic sing-song of Hermione, or the verbal sallies of Sir Joshua, or the prattle of Fraülein, or the responses of the two other women. (Lawrence, *Women in Love* 84)

Birkin recognizes that though he knows Hermione quite well “through years of intimacy,” his life with her had “nothing to do with him and his desires” (98). He knows her so well that there is nothing left for him to learn: “How well he knew Hermione, as she sat there, erect and silent and somewhat bemused, and yet so potent, so powerful! He knew her statically, so finally, that it was almost like madness” (98). Hermione can sense Birkin’s growing discontent, but reacts to him by reasserting her will: “Only her indomitable will remained static and mechanical, as she sat at the table making her musing, stray marks” (99). Although her will remained strong, a “darkness had covered her” and “she was like a ship that has gone down” (99). Birkin’s retreat only makes Hermione exert her will more. While Ursula and Gudrun break from the party for a swim, Hermione tries to maintain her place by remaining with the men and discussing social politics. In the conversation, Birkin argues for the benefits of a society in which individuals can express their spirituality and where “neither equality nor inequality counts”:

> I want every man to have his share of the world’s goods, so that I am rid of his importunity, so that I can tell him: ‘Now you’ve got what you want—you’ve got your fair share of the world’s gear. Now, you one-mouthed fool, mind yourself and to not obstruct me.’ (104)
While Hermione argues “we are all one, all equal in spirit,” Birkin claims that “it is just the opposite,” that “we are all different and unequal in spirit” (103). Birkin wants nothing more than to exert his individuality and will: “‘But I, myself, who am myself, what have I to do with equality—with any other man or woman? In the spirit, I am as separate as one star is from another, as different in quality and quantity’” (103). Both Hermione and Gerald Crich reject Birkin’s thesis. Gerald suggests, “It sounds like megalomania Rupert,” to which Birkin replies “‘Yes, let it,’” and leaves the scene (104).

After Gerald’s comment, Birkin feels a sense of “compunction” and wants to be “on good terms” with Hermione. Birkin follows her to her boudoir in an attempt to reconcile, but Lawrence makes it clear that the moment for reconciliation has passed. Though Lawrence had suggested that Hermione depended on Birkin to make up for her own lack, Hermione realizes that “his presence was destroying her”: “And he was the wall. She must break down the wall—she must break him down before her, the awful obstruction of him who obstructed her life to the last” (104–5). The only solution to her frustration is violence:

A terrible voluptuous thrill ran down her arms—she was going to know her voluptuous consummation. Her arms quivered and were strong, immeasurably and irresistibly strong. What delight, what delight in strength, what delirium in pleasure! She was going to have her consummation of voluptuous ecstasy at last. It was coming! In utmost terror and agony, she knew it was upon her now, in extremity of bliss. (105)

While Hermione achieves a momentary sexualized satisfaction in hitting Birkin over the head with the lapis lazuli paperweight, this is not the type of satisfaction that Lawrence argued for in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*. Even Hermione’s momentary satisfaction is
marginalized by Birkin’s retort. Birkin reasserts the critique of the intellectual, self-conscious New Woman when he retorts: “‘No you don’t Hermione,’ he said in a low voice. ‘I don’t let you’” (Women in Love 106). Although both Hermione and Birkin try to claim control of the situation, it is clear that neither of them is remotely satisfied. Hermione soothes herself by maintaining that she did what any self-respecting woman would have done: “She was perfectly right. She knew that, spiritually she was right. In her own infallible purity, she had done what must be done. She was right, she was pure. A drugged, almost sinister religious expression became permanent on her face” (106). Birkin is left “barely conscious” but still full of desire. He retreats into the wilderness to lick his own wounds and expend his sexual energy in nature:

Yet he wanted something. He was happy in the wet hill-side, that was overgrown and obscure with bushes and flowers. He wanted to touch them all, to saturate himself with the touch of them all. He took off his clothes, sat down naked among the primroses, moving his feet softly among the primroses, his legs, his knees, his arms right up the arm-pits, then lying down and letting them touch his belly, his breasts. It was such a fine, cool, subtle touch all over him, he seemed to saturate himself with their contact. (106–7)

But these temporary fixes do nothing to cover the fact that the relationship between Birkin and Hermione is a failure. Lawrence uses it to criticize women who think rather than act from instinct. Instead, he sets Birkin off to find a woman more capable of satisfying his appetites for “whole circuit” sex with a woman:

Ursula was watching him as if furtively, not really aware of what she was seeing. There was a great physical attractiveness in him—a curious hidden richness, that came through his thinness and his pallor like another voice, conveying another
knowledge of him. It was in the curves of his brows and his chin, rich, fine, exquisite curves, the powerful beauty of life itself. She could not say what it was. But there was a sense of richness and liberty. (44)

5.4 BIRKIN’S SEARCH FOR “WHOLE CIRCUIT” SEX

Lawrence explores the notion of “whole circuit” sex between men and women in the relationship between Birkin and Ursula. While the relationship between Birkin and Hermione is based on intellectual and social equality, or at least a move toward intellectual and social equality, Birkin and Ursula’s relationship is based on sex. Lawrence suggests that part of the reason that Birkin and Hermione could not be together was that Hermione was self-conscious. In *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious; Fantasia and the Unconscious*, Lawrence explains that his notion of “whole circuit” sex is not based on equality or “union” in the traditional sense of the word. Though he claims to believe in “the sheer unspeakable bliss of the sense of union,” he suggests that “union” clarifies the “objective realization” of the otherness of the beloved—the other’s so-called “object consciousness” (*Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* 40). In other words, Lawrence argues that true union and sex should clarify the fact that the two individuals are separate. Thus, he argues for a notion of personal relationships between men and women that is at once “sympathetic” and “separatist”:

The soul cannot come into its own through that love alone which is unison. If it stresses the one mode, the sympathetic mode, beyond a certain point, it breaks down its own integrity, and corruption set in the living organism. On both planes
of love, upper and lower, the two modes must act complementary to one another, the sympathetic and the separatist. (40)

As Ed Jewinski has suggested, both Lawrence and Lacan “challenge traditional humanism” by suggesting that “selfhood” is composed of contradictory notions of “inequality (difference) and unavoidable singleness (utter oneness)” (9). Thus, Jewinski believes that Lawrence and Lacan rely on the phallus as the primary marker of human signification, which creates a strong distinction between self and other. As I explained in Chapter Two, Butler, Freud and Lacan theorize that the subject is formed during the phallic stage of development when the original loved objects are given up during the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. This phallic-based notion of subject formation creates, however, a sharp distinction between self and other and suggests that later in life no one subject can be fully satisfactory.

As I have suggested, in Women in Love Lawrence depicts characters who cannot find satisfactory replacements for their primary objects. Nevertheless, he insists that his characters strive not for “good enough” relationships in Winnicott’s sense, but for “whole circuit” sex that maintains the distinction between self and other (D. W. Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena—A Study of the First Not-Me Possession” 94; Lawrence, Women in Love 481). The relationship between Birkin and Ursula is Lawrence’s depiction of an attempt at “whole circuit” sex. But like the relationship between Birkin and Hermione, this relationship is also frustrated and ultimately unsatisfied. Kate Millet argues that Lawrence wanted his female characters “to relinquish self, ego, will, individuality—things that women had but recently developed” (243). Millet adds that that “Lawrence’s unique solution” to his “powerful feelings of hostility and negative attitude toward women” is to “marry and smother them” (243). This
is precisely what Lawrence does to Ursula, but the relationship does not prove to be satisfactory to her or Birkin, because Birkin longs for a connection with a man.

From the beginning of *Women in Love*, Ursula is drawn to the “physical attractiveness in him” (44). Birkin is also attracted to Ursula, who, as a schoolmistress, is very different from the London’s bohemian set: “painters, musicians, writers—hangers-on, models, advanced young people” and “anybody who is openly at outs with the conventions” (60). In Chapter XI, “An Island,” Birkin declares that “love” is only part of any successful relationship:

I don’t believe in love at all—that is, any more than I believe in hate, or in grief. Love is one of the emotions like all the others—and so it is all right whilst you feel it. But I can’t see how it becomes an absolute. It is just part of human relationships, no more. And it should only be part of *any* human relationship. And why one should be required to *always* feel it, any more than one feels sorrow or distinct joy, I cannot conceive. Love isn’t a desideratum—it is an emotion you feel or you don’t feel, according to circumstance. (129)

For Ursula, however, love is essential, and she is appalled that Birkin takes it so lightly. She suggests that if Birkin does not believe in love, then he should not bother about humanity at all: “Why do you bother about humanity?” (129). Ursula seems to be the kind of subservient-to-love woman that Lawrence thought all women should be. Despite the fact that Ursula is put off by Birkin’s definition of love, she is simultaneously drawn to him:

Ursula disliked him. But also she felt she had lost something. She looked at him as he sat crouched on the bank. There was a certain priggish Sunday-school stiffness over him, priggish and detestable. And yet, at the same time, the moulding of him was so quick and attractive, it gave such a great sense of
freedom: the moulding of his brows, his chin, his whole physique, something so alive, somewhere, in spite of his look of sickness. (129)

Birkin creates a “duality of feeling” in Ursula, which is much like the theory of “sympathy” and “separatism” that Lawrence put forward in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (41). Birkin’s “soul” is likewise “arrested in wonder” and “pure, perfect attraction” (Women in Love 130). Ursula feels as if Birkin has put her under a spell: “A strange feeling possessed her, as if something were taking place” and “some sort of control was being put on her” (130). Their “little conflict” over “social orders” “had torn their consciousness and left them like two impersonal forces”—“two impersonal forces” that are ripe for “contact” with the other (131). Birkin thus proceeds to invite Ursula back to his “rooms” at the mill and asks her, “Don’t you think we can have some good times?” (131). So begins their affair based on the duality that Lawrence felt was necessary for “whole circuit” sexual relationships.

Birkin explains his notion of their relationship to Ursula and it is clearly not what she had in mind. He suggests that “perhaps the highest, love-impulse” is to “resign your will to the higher being,” the man (141). For Birkin a woman is no different from a horse because both have “two wills” that “act in opposition”: “With one will,” explains Birkin, “woman wants to subject herself utterly,” and “with the other she want to bolt, and pitch her rider to perdition” (141). Birkin admits that he “can’t say it is love” he has “to offer”; what he wants is “something much more impersonal and harder,—and rarer” (Love 141). While Ursula claims she is a “bolter,” she is also hurt when she cannot convince Birkin to tell her that he loves her. Birkin claims that he wants the version of her that her “common self denies utterly” at the exclusion of her “good looks,” “womanly feelings,” and thoughts, opinions and ideas; for him, “they are all bagatelles” (147). Despite the fact that Birkin’s demands make Ursula feel “unfree and
uncomfortable,” she “liked him so much” and figures, “Why drag in the stars!” (148). In other words, she overrides her discomfort with Birkin’s theories and proceeds with the relationship. But while the relationship between Birkin and Ursula gets off to a swimming, if not well-thought out, start, it quickly peaks and then dissolves. At the end of Chapter XIII, “Mino,” Ursula persuades Birkin to tell her that he loves her: “‘Yes,—my love, yes,—my love. Let love be enough then.—I love you then—I love you. I’m bored by the rest’” (154). From that moment Ursula gives herself over to Birkin, and it is clear by how she feels next that she and Birkin have consummated their relationship in his rooms at the mill. She is thus deeply disappointed that after his admission of love he neglects to show up to Mr. Crich’s “water-party” as he promised her he would. Ursula was “deeply and passionately in love with Birkin,” but her love made her “capable of nothing” (190). All she could do was wait to see him again:

She merely sat by herself, whenever she could, and longed to see him again. She wanted him to come to the house—she would not have it otherwise, he must come at once. She was waiting for him. She stayed indoors all the day, waiting for him to knock at the door. Every minute, she glanced automatically at the window. He would be there. (190)

Birkin’s failure to show up makes Ursula feel like dying: “‘Unless something happens,’ she said to herself, in the perfect lucidity of final suffering, ‘I shall die. I am at the end of my life’” (191). Lawrence suggests that Ursula feels “crushed and obliterated” because she was “fulfilled”: “After all, when one was fulfilled, one was happiest in falling into death, as a bitter fruit plunges in its ripeness downwards. Death is a great consummation, a consummating experience. It is a development from life” (191). While Lawrence suggests that Ursula embraces the feeling of
moving closer to death—"So it was then!"—it is clear that she has become unhinged, the love she had for Birkin replaced by hatred:

It was not temporal, her hatred, she did not hate him for this or for that; she did not want to do anything to him, to have any connection with him. Her relation was ultimate and utterly beyond words, the hate was so pure and gem-like. It was as if he were a beam of essential enmity, a beam of light that did not only destroy her, but denied her altogether, revoked her whole world. (198)

While Ursula is clearly unhinged by her love/hate relationship with Birkin, which cannot have been pleasurable or satisfying to her, Birkin is equally miserable because although he “knew his life rested with her,” he felt that “he would rather not live than accept the love she proffered” (199). To him the “hot narrow intimacy between man and wife was abhorrent” and sex was “such a limitation”:

It was sex that turned a man into a broken half of a couple, the woman into the other broken half. And he wanted to be single in himself, the woman single in her self. He wanted sex to revert to the level of the other appetites, to be regarded as a functional process, not as a fulfillment. He believed in sex marriage. But beyond this, he wanted a further conjunction, where man had being and woman had being, two pure beings, each constituting the freedom of the other, balancing each other like two poles of one force, like two angels or two demons. (199)

What Birkin truly wanted was “to be with Ursula as free as with himself, single and clear and cool, yet balanced, polarized,” because “the clutching, the mingling of love was becoming abhorrent to him” (200). Lawrence suggests that Birkin finds that Ursula is just like Hermione: “She too was the awful, arrogant queen of life, as if she were a queen bee on whom all the rest
depended” (200). Because Ursula cannot yet give Birkin “the perfection of the polarised sex-circuit,” he takes refuge in his relationship with his friend Gerald (201).

It is only later in the text that Lawrence has Ursula give Birkin what he wants. In conversation with Hermione, Ursula continues to question what Birkin wants from her. Hermione remarks that he simply wants a slave: “‘Then why doesn’t he marry an odalisk?’ said Hermione in her mild sing-song, ‘if it is that he wants.’ Her long face looked long and sardonic” (295). Ursula ponders this point and declares that Birkin does not want a slave, and the narrator suggests, “He wanted a woman to take something from him, to give herself up so much that she could take the last realities of him, the last facts, the last physical facts, physical and unbearable” (295). But Ursula is still not sure that she is up to the task. Birkin has “taken out a marriage license,” but “Ursula deferred from day to day” and “still wavered” (350). Even though the paperwork has been all but taken care of, Birkin is no more convinced of the value of marriage—for him “it’s a mere question of convenience” (351). After they are married, both Birkin and Ursula do seem to gain some sense of peace from their relationship. Birkin and Ursula and Gerald and Gudrun have planned a trip for Christmas on the Tyrol. On the voyage, both Birkin and Ursula explain their satisfaction in the darkness of their sea voyage. Ursula is overcome by a “sense of the unrealized world ahead”:

In the midst of this profound darkness, there seemed to glow on her heart the effulgence of a paradise unknown and unrealised. Her heart was full of the most wonderful light, golden like honey of darkness, sweet like the warmth of day, a light which was not shed on the world, only on the unknown paradise towards which she was going, a sweetness of habitation, a delight of living quite unknown, but hers infallibly. (388)
Birkin has a similar reaction: with Ursula “enfolded” around him, “his soul was at peace”: “This was the first time that an utter and absolute peace had entered his heart, now, in this final transit out of the life” (388). Their sense of peace, however, is shaken by Gerald’s death in the snowdrift, revealing the fragility of their own relationship and Birkin’s inability to be satisfied by any one object. While Ursula does not fully understand why she is not enough for Birkin—“Why aren’t I enough for you?” she laments—Birkin is sure that marriage to a woman is not enough to satisfy him (408). The seriousness of his love for Gerald is finally proved by his death.

5.5 TWO KINDS OF LOVE

In my analysis of the relationship between Birkin and Gerald, I focus not simply on homosexuality, but on the fact that their homosexual relationship is ultimately frustrated and unsatisfying, underscoring what I argue are two of Lawrence’s theses. On the one hand, Birkin and Gerald’s decidedly sexual relationship shows that desexualized friendship after the Great War is impossible. On the other hand, the relationship is unsatisfied, showing that after the Great War no one object choice can adequately satisfy the individual. Lawrence challenges his theory of “whole circuit” love, showing that in addition to his relationship with Ursula, Birkin also wants a relationship with Gerald, but ends up suggesting that even more than one personal relationship does not necessarily satisfy the individual. Birkin wants “two kinds of love,” but in the multiplicity of his desire he ends up with no love or satisfaction at all (Lawrence, Women in Love 408).
The first American edition of Women in Love was published in 1920 without Lawrence’s original prologue. It begins directly with Chapter One, “Sisters,” which introduces Ursula and Gudrun Brangwen immediately. The posthumously published “Prologue,” however, prefaces the relationship between Gerald and Birkin, signaling the importance of their relationship to the entire text. As George Ford explains in his introduction to Texas Quarterly’s publication of the prologue, the prologue was written as Lawrence rigorously revised the novel and “decided, at one point, to begin with a different opening chapter altogether” (93). Lawrence’s purpose in the prologue, suggests Ford, was to “make the opening Prologue chapter focus instead upon the two men, Birkin and Gerald, and to sketch for us the history of their friendship up to the time of the marriage of Gerald’s sister” (93). The significance of the prologue is that it draws attention to Birkin and Gerald’s relationship from the start. Ford suggests that the preface reveals Lawrence’s attraction to and desire for the male form: “Rarely does he bring his women characters before us as physical presences, whereas his male characters are distinguished by descriptions of their bodies” (94). Furthermore, Ford suggests that Lawrence focuses particularly on the sexual parts of the male body: “Often these descriptions focus attention on male loins or thighs” (94). Ford notes that the prologue is filled with descriptions of the male body, as are the unpublished drafts of other chapters. Ford argues that Lawrence may have “rejected” the prologue, as well as descriptive passages from other scenes, for fear of censorship: “After the suppression of The Rainbow in 1915, he could ill afford another disastrous suppression” (95).

But Ford also argues that Lawrence removed the prologue and specific portions of the other text in order both to tone down the sexual nature of the relationship between Birkin and Gerald, and to remove implications that Lawrence thought that the relationship between Birkin

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and Gerald was “corrupt”: “There were at least times when Lawrence had considered the friendship between Birkin and Gerald as something corrupt” (Ford 96). In particular, Ford points to a passage that Lawrence removed from Chapter XVI, “Man to Man,” in which Lawrence had compared love between men to death:

Gerald and he had a curious love for each other. It was a love that was ultimately death, a love which was complemented by the hatred for woman…It tore man from woman, and woman from man. The two halves divided and separated, each drawing away to itself. And the great chasm that came between the two sundered halves was death, universal death. (Lawrence in Ford 95)

Ford suggests that removing such passages for the published version of *Women in Love* instead allowed Lawrence to “explore the possibility of two ideal relationships, that between Birkin and Ursula, with its redemptive effects on the hero, and that between Birkin and Gerald” (Ford 96). While Ford is correct to point out that Lawrence explores both the relationship between men and women and the relationship between men and men, he is not quite right in suggesting that the relationship between Birkin and Gerald is simply a “coordinate” or a “complement” to Birkin’s relationship with Ursula. I argue that it is clear from both the prologue and the published version of the text that Lawrence explores both of these relationships to represent the complexity of modern desire and ultimately the impossibility of satisfaction.

In the prologue the attraction between Gerald and Birkin is announced immediately: “Birkin and Gerald Crich felt take place between them, the moment they saw each other, that sudden connection which sometimes springs up between men who are very different in temper. There had been a subterranean kindling in each man” (98). But only three paragraphs later, Lawrence announces that “then had come the sudden falling down to earth, the sudden
extinction,” and that then the men had parted, with Birkin headed to Munich and Gerald Crich en route to Paris and London (98). In the prologue Lawrence moves Birkin back and forth between the feelings of deep attraction—“they knew that they loved each other, that each would die for the other”—and resignation: “All the same, there was no profession of friendship, no open mark of intimacy,” and “they remained to all intents and purposes distant, mere acquaintances” (98, 101). While trying to negotiate his feelings for Gerald, Birkin who is “sick” and “helpless” goes back to Hermione, but, as I mentioned above in my analysis of Birkin and Ursula, he is not happy with Hermione, either. After “superfine nights of ecstasy” with Hermione, Birkin is overcome with a “revulsion against her” (102). And although he claims to want “to be able to love completely” in a “complete oneness in contact with a complete woman,” it is Gerald whom he is attracted to: “All the time, he recognized that, although he was always drawn to women, feeling more at home with a woman than with a man, yet it was for men that he felt the hot, flushing, rousing attraction which a man is supposed to feel for the other sex” (108). In addition, “In the street, it was the men who roused him by their flesh and their manly, vigorous movement, quite apart from all individual character, whilst he studied the women as sisters, knowing their meaning and intents” (108). The prologue ends with the declaration that though they have been apart for some time and “Birkin forgot him,” that “in both men were the seeds of a strong, inflammable affinity” (111).

In the version of the text published in 1920, the reader is not given this background on the two men. The reader instead meets Gerald through the eyes of the narrator, who describes Gudrun’s attraction to him:

Her son was a fair, sun-tanned type, rather above middle-height, well-made, and almost exaggeratedly well-dressed. But about him was also the strange, guarded
look, the unconscious glisten as if he did not belong to the same creation as the people about him. Gudrun lighted on him at once. (Women in Love 14)

The friendship between Birkin and Gerald is introduced after the wedding as the Criches retreat to “Shortlands, their home” (23). The two men engage in a conversation about acting from one’s “impulses.” Birkin argues that men should act from their impulses, while Gerald chides him, noting that if men did so there would be violence. He accuses Birkin of speaking “pure nonsense,” while Birkin claims that Gerald is afraid of himself and his own unhappiness. But their talk brings them “into a deadly nearness of contact,” which reveals their intimate feelings for each other:

There was a pause of strange enmity between the two men, that was very near to love. It was always the same between them; always their talk brought them into a deadly nearness of contact, a strange, perilous intimacy which was either hate or love, or both. They parted with apparent in concern, as if their going apart were a trivial occurrence. (33)

Although Birkin and Gerald temporarily keep their relationship to a “trivial occurrence,” the “heart of each burned from the other” (33). But the narrator suggests that they intended to “keep their relationship a casual free-and-easy friendship” and that “they were not going to be so unmanly and unnatural as to allow any heart-burning between them” (33–34). This pact, however, does not last long. In Chapter V, “In the Train,” Birkin and Gerald meet on the train platform and begin a discussion about the purpose of life. Birkin badgers Gerald, asking him if he thinks “love is the be-all and end-all of life” (57). They discuss the love of women and Gerald declares that he does not believe that a woman will ever constitute the center of his life. Birkin explains his theory of “perfect union” or “sort of ultimate marriage” with a woman (58).
Gerald explains his belief that life is “artificially held together by the social mechanism” and that life “doesn’t centre at all” (Women in Love 58). Birkin meanwhile explains his belief that “there isn’t anything else” besides “perfect union” with a woman, “seeing that there is no God” (58). Gerald resists Birkin’s theory, suggesting that if they have to make their lives “up out of one women” they will not be happy. Despite disagreeing with Birkin in this conversation, Gerald “was held unconsciously by the other man” and “wanted to be near him” and “within the sphere of his influence” (59). The men come very near to each other in Chapter XVI, “Man to Man,” and in Chapter XX, “Gladiatorial.”

In “Man to Man,” Birkin struggles with his relationship with Ursula. The narrator explains that Birkin feels that Ursula thinks of herself as a “queen bee on whom all the rest depended” and that Birkin finds it awful to be a “possession at the hands of woman” (200). The narrator contemplates why “we consider ourselves, men and women, as broken fragments of a whole” who are not satisfied unless we find our other halves. Birkin falls ill, takes to his bed, and is visited by Gerald, who “really loved Birkin,” “though he never quite believed in him” (201). As their conversation progresses, Birkin’s thoughts drift to his deep and unsatisfied desire for Gerald:

Quite other things were going through Birkin’s mind. Suddenly he saw himself confronted with another problem—the problem of love and eternal conjunction between two men. Of course this was necessary—it had been a necessity inside himself all his life—to love a man purely and fully. Of course he had been loving Gerald all along, and all along denying it. (206)

There is no room for the men to deny their love, however, in “Gladiatorial.” After his proposal to Ursula, Birkin retreats to Gerald’s estate where he finds him bored and full of
“nothingness” and “hollowness.” Gerald is glad that Birkin has arrived: “I’d just come to the conclusion that nothing in the world mattered except somebody to take the edge off one’s being alone: the right somebody” (266). Birkin “spitefully” suggests that Gerald means the right woman and suggests that Gerald punch something to soothe his boredom. They engage in a “jiu-jitsu” match and “strip” in order to “do it properly” (268). There is little question of the sexual nature of their wrestling match from passages such as this:

They stopped, they discussed methods, they practised grips and throws, they became accustomed to each other, to each other’s rhythm, they got a kind of mutual understanding. And then again they had a real struggle. They seemed to drive their white flesh deeper and deeper against each other, as if they would break into a oneness. Birkin had a great subtle energy, that would press upon the other man with an uncanny force, weigh him like a spell put upon him. Then it would pass, and Gerald would heave free, white, heaving, dazzling movements.

(270)

Gerald admits that the love he feels for Birkin is different and more intense than the love he has felt for women: “I’ve never felt it myself—not what I should call love. I’ve gone after women—and been keen enough over some of them. But I’ve never felt love for a woman, as I have for you—not love. You understand what I mean?” (275). What Gerald recognizes in Birkin that he has not found in women is “something abiding, something that can’t change” (275). Gerald asks Birkin if he thinks he shall ever find that in a woman. Birkin suggests that he doesn’t know if he will find a woman he can love, but that he understands that Gerald is looking for “fulfillment” (276). At the same time, both men are pursuing relationships with women, Birkin with Ursula and Gerald with Gudrun.
In “Marriage or Not,” Birkin and Gerald discuss the ramifications of marriage on their relationship. Birkin explains that he believes “in the additional perfect relationship between man and man—additional to marriage” (352). Gerald responds, “I can never see how they can be the same” (352). Birkin replies that the relationship between husband and wife is not the same as the relationship between two men, but that both types of relationships are “equally important, equally creative” and “equally scared” (352). Gerald suggests that “nature does not provide the basis” for powerful sex between men. Birkin disagrees and encourages Gerald to “get rid of the exclusiveness of married love” and “admit the unadmitted love of man for man” (353). Gerald is unwilling to believe Birkin’s thesis, however, not because he is not attracted to him, but because he refuses to “make a pure relationship with any other soul” (353). Instead, Gerald is willing to get married and submit to being established, so that he can “retreat in the underworld for his life” (353). The narrator suggests that if Gerald could allow himself to “accept Rupert’s offer of love,” then he would also be able to find love with a woman, but Gerald is unable to commit to Birkin and unlikely to commit to a woman:

Yet he could not accept the offer. There was a numbness upon him, a numbness either of unborn, absent volition, or of atrophy. Perhaps it was the absence of volition. For he was strangely elated at Rupert’s offer. Yet he was still more glad to reject it, not to be committed. (353)

Although Gerald’s retreat from relationships is different from Birkin’s inability to be happy with just one lover, both of these love triangles speak to Lawrence’s thesis that after the Great War, no one object choice is satisfying. The difference is that while Gerald does not know what he wants, Birkin knows exactly what he wants and cannot have it.
After Gerald’s death, Birkin is initially “disgusted at the inert body laying there”: Birkin “turned away” and rationalized that it was “best to cease to care” (477–78). But Birkin clearly believes that Gerald loved him: “Those who die, and dying still can love, still love,” claims Birkin, and “do not die” (480). Despite the fact that Birkin takes some comfort in believing that Gerald loved him and still loves him, Gerald’s death in the snowdrift shows that the relationship between Birkin and Gerald cannot be satisfied. But Birkin’s failure to find satisfaction in either his relationship with Ursula or Gerald is indicative of an even more tragic problem—that after the Great War, no one object can be satisfying. Birkin wants what he knows he cannot have: “another kind of love.” Birkin wants “an eternal union with a man” in addition to his relationship with Ursula (481). When Ursula claims, “You can’t have two kinds of love,” she speaks as a restrictive, civilizing force (481). Birkin’s psyche is split and the multiplicity of his desire prevents him from finding satisfaction in either Ursula or Gerald. Birkin is the modern subject who cannot find adequate replacements for his primary objects, and his intense but ultimately unsatisfied relationships with Ursula and Gerald demonstrate the Lacanian notion that it is desire, not satisfaction, that perpetuates desire, making sexual relations impossible. Lawrence’s understanding of the split modern subject, juggling multiple desires and suppressing violent instincts, forced John Maynard Keynes, a fully paid member of the Bloomsbury Group, to reevaluate his opinions of Lawrence.
KEYNES'S REVALUATION OF LAWRENCE

Despite the fact that Lawrence and Russell had a serious falling-out and only remained friends for about one year, Lawrence and Russell’s debate and specifically Lawrence’s criticisms of Russell, the Cambridge Men, and the Bloomsbury Group continued to provoke interest long after Russell and Lawrence were no longer friends. Lawrence’s criticism of Bloomsbury provoked interest because others, including John Maynard Keynes, noted that insight into Bloomsbury was pointed and in many regards correct. Lawrence understood something about human nature that Bloomsbury did not. As Keynes suggests, Lawrence understood that there were “insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men” (100). As is evident from Lawrence’s depiction of frustrated, violent, and ultimately unsatisfying relationships in Women in Love, he understood that human beings were not as loving and unselfish, or easily satisfied, as the late Victorians and early Bloomsbury Group had assumed from their privileged pre–Great War position. As Freud suggests in Civilization and Its Discontents, his own response to the Great War, we cannot underestimate the degree to which even civilized men still act uncivilized:

The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. (69)
It was Lawrence’s intuition of human nature that led Keynes to suggest that Lawrence may have been correct when, in 1914, he stated that the Bloomsbury Group was “done for” (103).

Late in his career, Keynes wrote a memoir of Bloomsbury in which he discussed Lawrence’s criticisms of the group. In retrospect, Keynes thought that Lawrence’s criticism of the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group may have been at least partially correct, but he maintained that the Cambridge/Bloomsbury ethos, as inherited from Moore, was still the best religion he had known. In the introduction to Keynes’s memoir, “My Early Beliefs,” David Garnett, Lawrence’s former friend, explains that Keynes wrote his memoir in response to Garnett’s memoir on the same the topic. Both Garnett’s and Keynes’s essays were written as contributions to Bloomsbury’s Memoir Club. Though Garnett claimed that he did not know the date his own paper was written, Keynes’s paper was written in the beginning of September, 1938, when Garnett’s paper was “fresh in his [Keynes’s] mind” (75). Garnett argues that Lawrence’s rejection of Bloomsbury was a form of “religious intolerance” and that Lawrence was “a prophet who hated all those whose creeds protected them from ever becoming his disciples” (75). Keynes, however, was less harsh in his retrospective discussion of Lawrence. Keynes felt that in many ways Lawrence had been correct to critique the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group for being superficial and self-centered.

Keynes recalls that Lawrence influenced the conversation when he dined at Cambridge. He suggests that it was not the “sort of conversation” they would have had if they “had been alone” (79). The conversation, suggests Keynes, was directed at Lawrence with the intention of getting him to participate: “It was at Lawrence and with the intention, largely unsuccessfully, of getting him to participate” (79). But in this passage, Keynes plainly explains that he and the others were testing Lawrence, leaving him both “overwhelmed” and simultaneously “attracted
and repulsed” by “Cambridge rationalism and cynicism,” which were “then at their height” (79). Furthermore, Keynes claims that Cambridge was “obviously a civilization” that was “uncomfortable” and “unattainable” for Lawrence (79).

Keynes was a fully paid member of the Bloomsbury Group. In addition to being a renowned economist, he was also greatly involved in the arts. For example, he created lines of public funding for various arts organizations, including the “Camargo Society for the ballet, the Cambridge Arts Theatre, the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, the Contemporary Arts Society, the London Artists Association, and other groups” (Goodwin 5). Keynes was also the “principle designer for the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts and its successor organization the Arts Council of Great Britain” (Goodwin 5). These organizations “sought to provide a vehicle for public support of the arts with minimal private control” and served as the model for similar organizations in North America, including the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States and Canada Council (Goodwin 5).

As I mentioned above, after Lawrence visited Cambridge, he claimed that the Cambridge Men repulsed him. One of the things he hated was that they “talked endlessly,” yet seemed “cased each in a hard little shell of his own” and communicated with no one. Lawrence wrote to Ottoline on April 19, 1915, explaining that he had hosted David Garnett and Francis Birrell after the famous first meeting at Cambridge. Lawrence explains their incessant talk this way:

When Birrell comes—tired and a bit lost and wondering—I love him. But my God, to hear him talk sends me mad. To hear these young people talk really fills me with black fury: the talk endlessly, but endlessly—and never, never a good or real thing is said. Their attitude is so irreverent and blatant. They are cased each in a hard little shell of its own and out of this they talk words. There is never for

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one second any outgoing of feeling, and no reverence—not a crumb or grain of reverence. I cannot stand it. I will not have people like this—I had rather be alone. They made me dream in the night of a beetle that bites like a scorpion. But I killed it—a very large beetle. I scotched it—and it ran off—but I came upon it again and killed it. It is this horror of little swarming selves that I can’t stand: Birrells, D. Grants, and Keynes. (The Letters of D. H. Lawrence 2: 319)

In response to their conversation and Cambridge in general, Keynes agreed with Lawrence that the Cambridge Men did speak of “brittle stuff” and thus that Lawrence’s criticisms of the group, while incomplete and unfair,” were “not usually baseless”: “I have said that I have forgotten what the conversation was about. But I expect I was pretty brittle stuff—not so brittle as Frankie Birrell—but pretty brittle all the same” (80). Thus, Keynes qualified Lawrence’s criticism by suggesting that Lawrence was responding to what the group lacked, rather than what it had or stood for: “And although it is silly to take it, or to estimate it, at its face value, did the way of responding to life which lay behind it lack something important? Lawrence was oblivious of anything valuable it may have offered—it was a lack that he was violently apprehending” (80).

Despite this potential “lack” that Lawrence recognized, however, Keynes found much more value in the positive attributes of the Cambridge/Bloomsbury ethos. He explains that Moore’s Principia Ethica had a profound and lasting impact on the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group, and that it formed the basis for their life-long philosophy. Insofar as Keynes values Moore’s influence, he aligns himself with the other members of the Bloomsbury Group who, in their varied and particular ways, revered Moore:

I went up to Cambridge at Michaelmas 1902 and Moore’s Principia Ethica came out at the end of my first year. I have never heard of the present generation
having read it. But, of course, its effect on us, and the talk which preceded and followed it, dominated, and perhaps still dominate everything else. We were at an age when our beliefs influenced our behaviour, a characteristic of the young which is easy for the middle-aged to forget, and the habits of feeling formed then still persist to a recognizable degree. (Keynes 81)

As Keynes explains, the most important aspect of Moore’s philosophy for the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group was an emphasis on states of mind. In this sense the Cambridge/Bloomsbury set were particularly engaged in the ways in which both actions and thoughts produced particular mental sensations. The group was not concerned with what value these states of mind may or may not have, but simply valued experiencing them:

Nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and other people’s of course, but chiefly our own. These states of mind were not associated with action or achievement or with consequences. They consisted in timeless, passionate states of contemplation and communion, largely unattached to ‘before’ and ‘after.’ Their value depended, in accordance with the principle of organic unity. (81)

As Keynes suggests, “love” was one of the most important states of mind. He qualifies this statement, however, and explains that the Cambridge Men’s and the Bloomsbury Group’s interpretation of Moore’s philosophy was mostly “austere and platonic” and nothing like Lawrence’s theory of love based on the body and instincts. Keynes explains that according to the group’s interpretation of Moore’s theory, “some of us might argue that physical enjoyment could spoil and detract from the state of mind as a whole” (83–84). While Keynes called Moore’s philosophy a “religion” at the beginning of his essay, he later suggests that this is not a label other members of the group would have been comfortable with at that time because they
regarded Moore’s work as a form of “neo-platonism,” which was “entirely rational and scientific in character” (86). Keynes explains that their “religion” was grounded in the “English puritan tradition of being chiefly concerned with the salvation of our own souls” (84). In the group’s earliest years, pleasure was not a consideration for them:

Then there was the question of pleasure. As time wore on toward the nineteen-tens, I fancy, we weakened a bit about pleasure. But, in our prime, pleasure was nowhere. I would faintly urge that if two states of mind were similar in all other respects that was one pleasurable and the other painful there might be a little to be said for the former, but the principle of organic unity was against me. It was the general view (though not quite borne out of the Principia) that pleasure had nothing to do with the case and, on the whole a pleasant state of mind lay under grave suspicion of lacking intensity and passion. (90)

The Cambridge Men and Bloomsbury Group’s “lack” of passion, or disassociation from passion, may have been one of the elements that Lawrence apprehended in them. But for Keynes to say that the group lacked passion is not entirely correct. The group may have lacked passion of the body, but they certainly experienced passion of the mind and indeed were passionate about many aspects of their lives.

Keynes also suggests that the Cambridge Men and the Bloomsbury Group discarded Moore’s notion of “ethics in relation to conduct.” While I suggest elsewhere, through the work of Leonard Woolf, that this was not the case, Keynes insists that he and his colleagues “did not pay attention to this aspect of the book or bother much about it,” and that they lived in the “specious present,” refusing to worry about the “game of consequences” (95). It is likely that Keynes is again referring to the earliest manifestation of the group, because, as I argue in
Chapter Two, the group was politically active and engaged in anti-war efforts from the start of the Great War. However, at the time, and perhaps even during and after the war, Keynes insists that the group’s ability to live in the “specious present” allowed them to create art and philosophy without worrying about the direct use and value of their efforts. They were, according to him, “amongst the first” of their generation, and “perhaps alone amongst” the their generation, “to escape from the Benthamite tradition.”

Moreover it was this escape from Bentham, joined with the unsurpassable individualism of our philosophy, which has served to protect the whole lot of us from the final *reductio ad absurdum* of Benthamism known as Marxism. We have completely failed, indeed, to provide a substitute for these economic bogus-faiths capable of protecting or satisfying our successors. But we ourselves have remained—am I not right in saying *all* of us?—although immune from the virus, as safe in the citadel of our ultimate faith as the Pope of Rome in his. (97)

Keynes also reports that the group put aside Moore’s edict to “obey general rules” and instead “claimed the right to judge every individual case on its merits, and the wisdom, experience, and self-control to do so successfully” (97). Keynes argues that though this position is “dangerous,” it was nevertheless central to the Bloomsbury ethos: “It was a very important part of our faith, violently and aggressively held, and for the outer world it was our convention and traditional wisdom. We were, that is to say, in the strict sense of the term immoralists” (97). Keynes admits that this philosophy was “flimsily based” “on an *a priori* view of what human nature is like, both other people’s and our own, which was disastrously mistaken” (98). Keynes suggests that the group’s utopian view of human nature was “disasterously mistaken” because it relied on a notion of moral progress:
We were among the last of the Utopians, or meliorists as they are sometimes called, who believe in a continuing of moral progress by virtue of which the human race already consists of reliable, rational, decent people, influenced by truth and objective standards, who can safely be released from the outward restraints of convention and traditional standards and inflexible rules of conduct, and left, from now onwards, to their own sensible devices, pure motives and reliable intuitions of the good. (98–99)

Keynes suggests that Victorian rationalism and Moore made the Bloomsbury Group overly confident that human nature was inherently good:

In short, we repudiated all versions of the doctrine of original sin, of there being insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men. We were not aware that civilization was a thin and precarious crust erected by the personality and the will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and conventions skilfully put across and guilefully preserved. (99)

As I suggested in Chapter Two, the Great War shattered many of the Bloomsbury Group’s ideals, including their ideal of human rationalism. But Lawrence already had the inclination that there were “insane and irrational springs of wickedness” in most men (99). For this reason Keynes acknowledges that Lawrence may have had better insight into human nature than the Cambridge Men or the Bloomsbury Group, who were in many senses “pre-Freudian” (100). Still, in 1939, Keynes felt that the group suffered “incurably from attributing an unreal rationality to other people’s feeling and behaviour (and doubtless to my own, too)” (100).

Thus Keynes thought that Lawrence was correct in ascertaining that the Bloomsbury group’s “pseudo-rational view of human nature led to a thinness, a superficiality, not only of
judgment, but also of feeling” (101). Moore’s philosophy had “left out altogether some whole categories of valuable emotions,” and in attributing “rationality to human nature” the group “ignored certain powerful and valuable springs of feeling” (101). Finally, Keynes suggests that “some of the spontaneous, irrational outbursts of human nature,” and “even feelings associated with wickedness” can have value (101). Thus, Lawrence understood the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy to be “brittle” because “there was no solid diagnosis of human nature underlying them” (102). While Keynes thought that Lawrence’s valuation of the Bloomsbury group was in some ways “unfair,” Keynes suggests that there may have been “a grain of truth when Lawrence said in 1914 that we were ‘done for’” (103). Keynes writes,

If, therefore, I altogether ignore our merits—our charm, our intelligence, our unworldliness, our affection—I can see us as water-spiders, gracefully skimming, as light and reasonable as air, the surface of the stream without any contact at all with the eddies and currents underneath. And if I imagine us as coming under the observation of Lawrence’s ignorant, jealous, irritable, hostile eyes, what a combination of qualities we offered to arouse his passionate distaste: this thin rationalism skimming on the crust of the lave, ignoring both the reality and the value of the vulgar passions, joined to libertinism and comprehensive irreverence, too clever by half for such an earthy character as Bunny [David Garnett], seducing with its intellectual chic such a portent as Ottoline, a regular skin-poison. (103)

Despite this admission, however, Keynes retained the belief that the Bloomsbury ethos was the most important he had ever known: “It seems to me looking back, that this religion of ours was a very good one to grow up under. It remains nearer the truth than any other that I know, with less
extraneous matter and nothing to be ashamed of” (92). And it was Moore’s philosophy of friendship that continued to inspire Forster and Virginia Woolf even after the Great War proved the difficulty of finding satisfaction in personal relationships.
D. H. Lawrence radically broke from the Bloomsbury Group, claiming that after the Great War desexualized friendship and finding satisfaction in any one object was impossible. While E. M. Forster was also deeply troubled by the war, he retained the late-Victorian and early-Bloomsbury belief in personal relationships based on equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling. Forster reiterated the Bloomsbury notion of friendship in “What I Believe,” where he suggested that he would rather betray his country than a friend: “If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country” (78). Despite his philosophical position, however, his novel A Passage to India portrays a much different, more realistic notion of post-war friendship. In A Passage to India, Fielding and Aziz encounter one another because of Britain’s colonial position in India, but they are also prohibited from being friends and lovers for the exact same reason. In the novel Forster explores the implications of war and Britain’s imperial project in India on personal relationships. Like Lawrence, Forster finds that personal relationships are impossible. But while Lawrence found that after the war desexualized friendship and personal relationships were impossible because human beings are always already sexual and because split subjects cannot find satisfaction in one object, Forster found that structures of power and governments prohibited the full functioning of satisfying personal relationships.
While in *A Passage to India* Forster finds that his and the Bloomsbury Group’s ideals of friendship cannot be experienced in the context of imperialism in British India, he does allow the novel to hold open the possibility that friendship between Fielding and Aziz, which is to say between the English and the Indians, may be possible in the future when the imperial situation does not make it impossible. By allowing for this possibility, Forster maintains the belief in personal relationships that he learned from the late Victorians and Moore, and that he helped to cultivate during his entire career. Forster wrote “What I Believe” in 1938, fourteen years after *A Passage to India* was published, reinforcing the fact that while the world had experienced the great losses during the Great War and stood to suffer even greater losses in the Second World War, which had not yet begun, he continued to pursue his philosophy of friendship.

In this chapter I begin by providing a context for Britain’s imperial project India. I show that the imperialist project was promoted not simply as a political and governmental project, but also as a cultural project. I rely on Edward Said’s notion of the “idea” of empire to show how empire was spread culturally. In particular I show the impact of the imperial project on networks of sex, particularly between British men who traveled or worked abroad and their colonial subjects, both men and women, in India and other British territories. I then proceed to analyze *A Passage to India* as a representation of Forster’s beliefs in the value of personal relationships and his knowledge of the limitations placed on personal relationships because of the colonial project. After my analysis of *A Passage to India*, I explain how Forster continued to work on his ideas about friendship and personal relationships in “What I Believe.” I argue that he continued to believe in the value of personal relationship, and that he felt the positive aspects of human nature could eventually overcome the negative aspects of human nature. Using Freud’s work in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, I argue that like Freud, Forster believed that the erotic instincts
could overcome the death instincts, that human reason could overcome human instinct, and that
the late-Victorian and early Bloomsbury Group ideals of friendship could and would prevail.

6.1  BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The death of Queen Victoria in 1901 marked the end of the Victorian era and beginning of the
Edwardian era. Queen Victoria’s death, along with the end of the South African War in 1902,
also ushered in a new era of the British Empire (Brown and Louis 1). As Judith Brown and
William Roger Louis explain, the thirty years leading up to the Great War in 1914 in Britain and
Europe were defined by a “scramble for remaining territory in Africa and the Pacific” (2–3). In
Britain the “scramble” for imperial expansion included “frenzied activity in naval construction
and the modernization of the Royal Navy,” as well as building projects in the territories
including “docks, roads, railways, plantations, and mines” that “spread in Asia and Africa at the
same time that British goods and money penetrated indigenous societies” (2–3). Britain’s direct
competition with Europe, as well as its increasing domination in its territories, led to a
“Darwinian atmosphere of survival of the fittest” and contributed to “a spirit of fierce British
nationalism” that was “associated with the Empire as a whole” (2–3). As Paul Ward explains,
Empire and monarchy had been important aspects of British nationalism from the late eighteenth
to late twentieth century: “Between 1876, when Disraeli gave Queen Victoria the title of
Empress of India, and 1953, the monarchy was fundamentally entwined with the idea and reality
of the British Empire. They were seen together as forming two basic foundations upon which
Britishness could be built” (14). And it was from the 1870s forward that India became “the most important element in British strength” (Brown and Louis 5).

Britain’s imperial situation in India was unique because it required fewer statesmen than other colonial territories: “India was administered by fewer than 1,000 covenanted members of the India Civil Service, almost exclusively British” (Brown and Louis 5). This, coupled with the large Indian army of 150,000 troops, made “Britain the great military power in the East in the early years of the century” (5). While Britain did not directly support the Indian Army, which was “self-financing,” it did support India in other ways. Britain invested in India’s infrastructure, improving a rail system that was already the “largest rail system in Asia” (7). British nationalism and support for the empire in India and other regions decreased, however, after the start of the Great War. As Brown and Louis explain, “The two most significant results of the First World War were the emergence of a British Middle Eastern Empire and the intervention in colonial affairs by the United States” (10). But British citizens already regarded the colonial project with pessimism well before the Great War. “Pessimism” was the “all-pervasive and quintessential characteristic of Edwardian thinking” in response to the “aftermath of the most important and divisive war of Empire since the loss of the American colonies”—the Anglo-Boer or South African War:

The South African War (which used to be known as the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–1902) cast a sulphurously long and exceedingly sober shadow. The complacency of the pre-war years, the mindless jingoism of Mafeking night (17 May 1900), had comprehensively faded in the cold light of day, in the aftermath of the most important and divisive war of Empire since the loss of the American colonies, a difficult and humiliating conflict in which an Imperial army of a quarter a million
men had taken three years, at a cost of £270m (exclusive of pos-war construction), to subdue an amateur backwoods army from two archaic states whose combined (white) population did not exceed that of Flintshire and Denbighshire, as Lloyd George put it. (50)

As British citizens began to question the efficacy of the imperial project and specifically its barbaric military practices, British educational and cultural institutions began campaigns to reignite British nationalism and support for its continued military presence outside of Britain.

Institutions of higher education continued to prepare students to take civil service positions abroad by teaching the history of imperialism, foreign languages, law, and medicine, as well as “forestry, agriculture, surveying, engineering, and anthropology” directly geared toward imperial missions (Brown and Louis 212–13). Donald Smith and Lord Strathcona created the Wembley Exhibition in 1924 as an “officially sanctioned exhibition of Empire” (213). The purpose of the Wembley Exhibition became to “restore nation and Imperial confidence after the war and to proclaim the economic importance of Empire to the British” (Mackenzie in Brown 213). The official guidebook to the Wembley Exhibition described the purpose of the exhibit this way:

To find, in the development and utilization of the raw material of the Empire, new sources of Imperial wealth. To foster inter-Imperial trade and open fresh world markets for Dominion and home products. To make the different races of the British Empire better known to each other, and to demonstrate to the people of Britain the almost illimitable possibilities of Dominions, Colonies, and Dependencies overseas. (214) 53

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The British Broadcasting Corporation also played a role in building support for Empire in the early twentieth century. The BBC’s first “Director-General,” John Reith, “viewed the Empire as a significant source of broadcasting material and topic of central concern to national life, one which could be turned to nationalist, moral, and quasi-religious ends” (MacKenzie in Brown 218). The BBC broadcast George V’s speech for the Wembley Exhibition in 1914 and hoped to contribute to “the cohesion of British subjects and of the world-wide family of English-speaking peoples” (21).

Similarly, the Imperial Institute of South Kensington, which opened in 1893 after the Indian Exhibition of 1886 and the Jubilee of 1887, became more successful after the start of the Great War in 1914. While the “elaborate and costly” building struggled with financial problems from the time it opened, it was saved by a group of industrialists including Robert Hadfield and the “old millionaires Viscounts Cowdray and Wakefield” (Mackenzie in Brown 8). And after 1924 the Imperial Institute was “described as taking on the role of a permanent ‘Wembley,’” becoming “closely associated with the work of the Empire Marketing Board, which raised money for a cinema in the institute” (220). These programs in Britain, however, had little impact on the colonized people who lived in the countries under British rule.

Denis Judd explains that after George Curzon stepped down as Viceroy of India in 1905, there followed a “dramatic turning of the tide of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled in India” (114). Echoing this position, Ronald Hyam explained that the period after the Great War “led to an intellectual revolt against the European order” (Britain’s Declining Empire 31). At this time, members of the colonized countries began incisive critiques of colonial power and gave “greater credence to Gandhi’s contention that the industrialised West had not opened up a morally and socially sustainable path for humanity” (31). In particular, Rabindranath Tagore
(1861–1941), an Indian “poet, philosopher and guru,” helped start a “world-wide discourse” that formed “a critical prelude to the struggles of decolonisation” (31). Tagore and others were reacting against the limitations of the Montague-Chelmsford reforms that introduced a limited form of self-government to the Indians. Indians did not think that the Montague-Chelmsford provisions gave them enough rights and were subsequently blindsided by the Rowlatt Act of 1919, which rescinded the freedoms the Indians had recently been granted: “Not only had the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms not gone far enough, the Rowlatt Act which perpetuated wartime ordinances into peace-time legislations—permitting the British to hold Indians without trial—contradicted the spirit of the reforms” (Bose and Jalal 137; Bates 131). The Rowlatt Act led Ghandi to “launch his first major all-Indian agitation,” which he described as a “‘black act’ passed by a ‘satanic’ government” (Bose and Jalal 137).

In response, Gandhi called for an “all-Indian mass protest movement” (Bose and Jalal 137). At the core of his method of protest was “the hartal, or stoppage of work” (Brown 219). But Gandhi’s interventions did not have an immediate impact. Instead, the Rowlatt Act led to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and continued violence. As Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal explain, “On 13 April 1919 a peaceful unarmed crowd of villagers who had come to Jallianwala Bagh in Amristar, looking for a fair [as in a celebration] and oblivious to the martial law regulation prohibiting meetings, were fired upon by General Dyer’s men; 379 innocents were felled by British bullets and more than 1200 injured” (138). The “fair,” as Crispin Bates explains, was the Baisakhi festival, “a particular important occasion in the Sikh religious calendar, for which reason a large number of people had poured into the city from the surrounding villages, few whom had heard about the order” (131). Because these people lived in villages and did not have access to communication, they had not heard about the martial law
prohibiting meetings of large groups of people and were blindsided when they reached Amristar and were attacked. Several British officials were killed as well, directly undermining Ghandi’s intention for nonviolent protest and indicating “Gandhi had not yet fine-tuned his agitational techniques and was not fully in control” (Bose and Jalal 138). While the passing of the Rowlatt Acts marked Gandhi’s commitment to Indian politics, Gandhi’s work did not immediately signal change in the relationship between the British and the peoples of India. True change would not come until independence in 1947. In addition, below the political surface, other changes were taking place. Relationships between the Indians and the British, which were generally tense but also at times amicable, were becoming more rigid. In particular, both the government and the culture at large were more closely monitoring relationships between British and Indian men.

6.2 BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Ronald Hyam suggests that there was a long history of young British men looking for and experiencing casual homosexual and heterosexual sex in their travels abroad. Hyam explains that this was particularly true before the “Purity Campaign” of the 1880s and was bolstered by Britain’s imperial projects, which gave British men “an enlarged field of opportunity”:

Greater space and more privacy were available; inhibitions relaxed. European standards might be held irrelevant. Abstinence was represented as unhealthy in a hot climate. Boredom could constitute an irresistible imperative. The Indian army conveniently arranged for prostitutes. Local girls would offer themselves; or boys, especially in Ceylon. (88)
British men’s “enlarged field of opportunity” was related, of course, to their status and positions of authority abroad. This was especially true of white men who were not simply traveling, but actually heading colonial posts in foreign lands. Hyam suggests “running the Victorian empire would probably have been intolerable without resort to sexual relaxation” (89–90). He acknowledges that the colonial project was often very lonely and that there were few sources of stimulation: “The historian has to remember the misery of Empire: the heat and the dust, the incessant rain and monotonous food, the inertia and the loneliness, the lack of amusement and intellectual stimulus. There were no cars, no radios, sometimes not even enough neighbors to make up a proper game of tennis or bridge” (89–90). In addition, Hyam reports that many of these relations resulted in marriage. In the mid-eighteenth century, ninety percent of the British in India married Hindu women, or “half-Indians” also known as “Anglo-Indians” or “Eurasians” (116).

In the late eighteenth century, however, this trend shifted. There was an increasing presence of Protestant and Evangelical missionaries in India who contributed to “a tighter morality in European society in Calcutta” (Hyam 116). This trend, along with Governor-General Cornwallis’s mission to prohibit Anglo-Indians from holding civil or military office positions with the East India Company after 1791, made for a much less hospitable environment between the British and the Indians. As Hyam suggests, these provisions made it “impossible to meet Indians as friends” as “new standards of racial prejudice were, it was said, imposed by hostesses drawing intricate distinctions between shades of colour, as the memsahibs elaborated an imperial social etiquette” (118–19). By the twentieth century, the “predominant atmosphere was one of physical aloofness and suppressed eroticism” (121). In addition to the presence of Protestant and Evangelical missionaries in India in the late eighteenth century, by the late nineteenth century
there were a series of laws enacted in Britain and its territories to control prostitution and prevent
the spread of infectious sexually transmitted diseases. The Contagious Diseases Act, passed in
1864, allowed officials to arrest prostitutes, test them for sexually transmitted diseases, and
confine and treat them if they were found to have any venereal disease. Following the
Contagious Diseases Act, Josephine Butler launched the Purity Campaign in 1869 (149–150).
The Purity Campaign in Britain had international impact: “In Paris in 1904 a dozen European
countries came to an international agreement to combat traffic,” and “in 1910 a similar
convention declared procuring to be an offence” (150). The League of Nations adopted this
“emerging pattern of international co-operation” and began to use its influence to create
international law protecting human trafficking. All the while, “male homosexuality remained
illegal” (Bush 84).

At the same time that homosexuality continued to be illegal and especially shunned on
the surface in the context of colonial India, there was also an increasing “feminization of
Empire” in the early twentieth century, which contributed to a loosening of gender roles and
dynamics. Women were increasingly recognized in society and allowed to participate in
government, indirectly increasing tolerance for homosexual practices as well (Bush 80). As
Barbara Bush explains, “The feminization of Empire, however, was reflected in an increasing
emphasis on welfare and development, and the growing role of gender in colonial policy and
practice” (80). In addition, “The promotion of domesticity demanded fuller ‘incorporation’ of
colonial wives, and in general, a higher profile for white women in the colonies” (80). Women
gained increasing access to the university and the professions: “By 1910 women constituted 20
percent of university students, and the 1919 Sex Disqualification Removal Act opened hitherto
male professions to women” (81). Despite the loosening of gender roles as women were allowed to enter the professions, homosexuality continued to be policed culturally.

Homosexuality was problematic to the politics and culture of Empire because relationships between British and Indian men “subverted heterosexual white domesticity, transgressed the race boundaries on which the stability of Empire depended, and thus weakened the foundations of colonialism” (Bush 84). Relationships between British and Indian men, however, continued to be popular, demonstrating that human beings desire connections with one another over and above racial, cultural, and religious differences and even in spite of the limitations placed on them by structures of government and power. As Freud suggests, in normal behavior the ego seeks out emotional relationships with objects in its purview: “But it [the ego] does not turn away from the external world; on the contrary, it clings to the objects belonging to that world and obtains happiness from an emotional relationship to them” (Civilization and Its Discontents 32). Furthermore, he suggests that humans want to “make love the centre of everything” and look for “all satisfaction in loving and being loved” (32–33). Personal relationships, however, are not immune to cultural influence. As Said explains, the “idea” of empire is just as important as the actual political and governmental structures.

In Cultural and Imperialism, Edward Said explains that empire depends not simply on the expansion of new territories, but also on the continuation of existing projects:

In the expansion of the great Western empires, profit and hope for further profit were obviously tremendously important, as the attraction of spices, sugar, slaves, rubber, cotton, opium, tin, gold and silver over centuries amply testify. So also was inertia, the investment in already going enterprises, tradition, and the market or institutional forces that kept the enterprises going. (10)
Said emphasizes the importance of inertia in the continuation of colonial projects. The colonial project also relied on the power of psychological inertia. After a time the colonizers and the colonized became trained to believe in the validity of their roles in the colonial project. As Said explains, it was a “commitment to constant circulation and recirculation” and “replenishment” of bodies and power that helped create and perpetuate a psychological state that “allowed decent men and women to accept the notion that distant territories and their native people should be subjugated” and that imperial nations had an “almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, and less advanced people” (10). As I mentioned above, it took comparatively few British civil servants, soldiers, and civilians to dominate large countries such as India (Smith in Said 10). Said suggests that creating this imbalance of power required “specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices” along with a unfathomable “will” and “self-confidence” that “can only be guessed at” (Said 9, 11). In other words, the culture created and perpetuated by the imperialist project had just as much if not more power than the government that put it in place. As Said suggests, “These attitudes are at least as significant as the number of people in the army or civil service, or the millions of pounds England derived from India” (11). “The enterprise of empire,” he writes, “depends on the idea of having an empire, as Conrad so powerfully seems to have realized, and all kinds of preparations are made for it within a culture” (11). It is only after both governmental and cultural structures have been reinforced and repeated that “imperialism acquires a kind of coherence, a set of experiences, and a presence of ruler and ruled alike within a culture” (11). This is true in A Passage to India, where Forster’s characters struggle with the psychological impact of imperialism and specifically the psychological impact of imperialism on personal relationships.
In my analysis of *A Passage to India*, I argue that Forster uses both his own experiences of India and his theory of personal relationships and friendship to represent the impact of the colonial project on personal relationships. While Forster wants to demonstrate that the late-Victorian and early-Bloomsbury notion of friendship is possible between the British and their colonial subjects, his novel reveals something else. He reveals in *A Passage to India* that despite human beings’ best intentions, friendship and love cannot overcome the prohibitions placed on people by their governments and perpetuated by culture. Thus I argue that while Forster believed in the power of human relationships and the possibility of finding satisfying personal relationships, he ends up suggesting that ideal human relationships are not possible in every context. Thus I pay less attention to whether or not Fielding and Aziz had a sexual relationship and more attention to the way in which the friendship ignited, unfolded, and eventually became impossible in the colonial context. I argue that for Forster, friendship as a basis for love and sexuality was more important than sexuality itself. This is evident in *A Passage to India*, where friendship and sympathy trump sexuality.  

*A Passage to India* describes the relationship of Fielding and Aziz in two stages. First, Fielding and Aziz meet and are instantly drawn to one another. Second, though the men are drawn to one another, both are aware that their friendship cannot come to fruition because Fielding is British and Aziz is Indian. This stage of the relationship makes Fielding melancholy: he feels old and jaded by years of experience in India, where he has had difficulty in personal relationships. Aziz has boundless energy and youth and remains hopeful about his relationship with Fielding. Aziz’s boundless energy, youth, and optimism, however, become his downfall. His optimism about relationships between colonizers and colonized leads him to organize the trip to the Marabar Caves, which results in Miss Quested’s rape claim and Aziz’s arrest. Though he
is eventually acquitted, the trial reemphasizes colonial rule and the impossibility of Fielding and Aziz’s friendship. Fielding marries Mrs. Moore’s daughter from a second marriage, but even this does not stop the ever-optimistic Aziz from believing in the possibility that they might be friends in the future. He is realistic, however, and knows that they cannot be friends until colonial rule is revoked and India is independent from Britain: “‘India shall be a nation! No foreigners of any sort! Hindu and Moslem and Sikh and all shall be one! Hurrah! Hurrah for India! Hurrah! Hurrah!’” (A Passage to India 361). While it is Fielding who asks Aziz why they cannot be friends, both men already know the answer. Their desire for friendship is no match for the politics and culture of imperialism.

6.3 THE POSSIBILITY OF FRIENDSHIP IN A PASSAGE TO INDIA

As Tony Davies explains, A Passage to India received mixed reviews. While most of the reception was warm, the text was criticized by “Britons who had lived and worked in British India—among whom the novel evidently caused a good deal of offence” (Davies 2). On the one hand, Indian reviewers including St. Nihal Singh felt the novel was accurate, and praised the text for its honest depiction of “Anglo-Indians” who worked in India. But other critics felt that Forster’s focus on personal relationships overshadowed the complex relations not only between the British and the Indians, but between the factions within the Indian population as well—namely the Muslims and Hindus (3). Later, after the Second World War, English critics would again praise the novel for its attempt to imagine a world in which the British and the Indians, the colonizers and colonized, could coexist, and what effect this potential paradigm shift had on literary representations of the colonial and postcolonial world. For F. R. Leavis, the text is
undeniably “a classic: not only a most significant document of our age, but a truly memorable work of literature” (The Common Pursuit 277). Leavis suggests the novel is “an expression, undeniably, of the liberal tradition,” because it touches upon “racial and cultural problems” and “personal relations” (277). And he argues that the novel makes the liberal tradition seem “the humane, decent, and rational—the ‘civilized’—habit” and the “invaluable” project it is (277).59

As Sara Suleri suggests, in A Passage to India, Forster is “highly conscious of the limits rather than the expansiveness of cultural sympathy” and explores the difficulties of inviting an “other” into what she calls the “alternative space of friendship” (The Rhetoric of English India 133). Suleri argues that friendship takes place in an “alternative space” outside that normally occupied by either lovers or family, and that friendship thus potentially provides a unique opportunity to bridge cultural and national boundaries because it does not demand the intensity of love or the commitment of family. However, she maintains that friendship between people of different cultures is nevertheless eroticized as “an alternative colonial model” in which “the most urgent cross-cultural invitations occur between male and male, with racial difference serving as a substitute for gender” (133). Thus, Suleri claims that in A Passage to India, racial difference is eroticized and that “the visibility of race is rendered synonymous with the invisibility of sexual preference” (133). She further discusses the implications of race on the sexual relationship between Fielding and Aziz, arguing that Aziz is “accorded a certain mobility as a racial body which allows him an exemption from his role as complete participant in the colonial encounter” (133–34). Suleri also suggests that Aziz’s body is inherently marked by his race and thus his body signals that he must conform to modes of “nationalist rhetoric,” which give him no opportunity to transcend his own circumstances (133). Suleri argues, “As a consequence, Aziz represents a belittled racial body whose attractions can never be literalized” (136). Finally, she
suggests that all of these provisions add up to a relationship between Fielding and Aziz that is a “cultural ‘nothing’” (137).

While I agree with Suleri’s argument that Aziz’s racial body is a defining feature of his relationship with Fielding, and that the cultural difference between the two men ultimately determines the outcome of their relationship, I do not agree with Suleri’s notion that their relationship is reduced to a “cultural ‘nothing’.” It is clear from the start of *A Passage to India* that Fielding and Aziz’s personal relationship is the focal point of the novel. I argue that in the first section of the text, Forster represents Fielding and Aziz’s attraction to one another and their desire to be friends despite the fact that they are from different cultures and on different sides of Britain’s colonial project. The novel opens with a discussion of cross-cultural friendship as a group of Indian men discuss “whether or not it is possible to be friends with an Englishman” (*A Passage to India* 7). During this discussion the men lie on a “broad verandah” that they find “delicious” (7). The sensuous environment innocently coats Mahmoud Ali’s apprehension, as Hamidullah posits that cross-cultural friendship is “possible in England” because he had “received a cordial welcome at Cambridge” (7). But Mahmoud Ali argues, “It is impossible here” (7). The Indians, who have not had interactions with Englishmen outside of India, feel that it is impossible for Indians and Englishmen to be friends. Thus, Forster suggests that the Englishmen arrive in India “intending to be gentlemen” only to learn that “it will not do” (7). This suggests that something changes in the Englishmen after they have been in India for some time, but that initially they are capable of being friends with the Indians.

The sexual implication of the relationships between English and Indian men is also clear from the beginning of the novel. In “The Politics of Desire: E. M. Forster’s Encounters with India,” Parminder Bakshi explains Edward Said’s argument that from Homer forward, the
“Occident” appropriates the “Orient” for its own purposes, consequently co-opting the power of the “other” for itself. Bakshi adds to Said’s thesis and suggests that Forster’s interest in India is “specifically homoerotic” and that Forster maps his own homosexual desire onto the people and landscapes of India, “othering” both the East’s people and its geography. Building on Forster’s biography and historical fact, Bakshi explains that “homosexuals were forced to look outside of English society for places and ideas more conducive to male friendship” (“The Politics of Desire” 29). As J. Weeks explains in “Sex, Politics, and Society,” the Section 11 of Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, known as the Labouchère Amendment, and the subsequent Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1912, introduced “new penalties against male homosexual behaviour—significantly both in private as well as in public” (87). While it is certainly true that the male relationships explored in A Passage to India are sexualized, I argue that this is not the most important aspect of the novel. I argue that the desire for friendship between the men ultimately overrides the sexual implications of the text. Nevertheless, sexuality is an important component of the first section and is part of why the men are attracted to each other. Likewise, the racial and cultural differences that clearly separate Fielding and Aziz by the end of the novel are not presented as an obstacle to their relationships in the first section, “Mosque.”

Fielding is introduced as the “Principal of the little college at Chandrapore” “with a belief in education” (A Passage to India 64). Furthermore, Forster suggests that Fielding is different from other Englishmen. Fielding is not like those who use their power to take advantage of Indian men. In fact, Forster suggests that Fielding does not get along with the other Englishmen in India: “He could not at first see what was wrong. He was not unpatriotic, he always got on with Englishmen in England, all his best friends were English, so why was it not the same out here?” (64). It is “not the same out here” because Englishmen in India have colonial power that
they do not have in England. By making this statement, Forster separates Fielding from the other Englishmen and suggests that while Fielding was a “disruptive force” at work, “he was happiest in the give-and-take of private conversation” (65). It is also clear that unlike other Englishmen, Fielding is capable of friendship with nonwhite men. The narrator suggests, “He had no racial feelings—not because he was superior to his brother civilians, but because he had matured in a different atmosphere, where the herd-instinct does not flourish” (65). Fielding and Aziz’s nonjudgmental attitudes and eagerness for personal relationships draw them to one another immediately.

When Fielding invites Aziz to tea for the first time, Aziz is excited because “he had never met the Principal, and believed that a serious gap was going to be filled” (63). Aziz “longed to know everything about the splendid fellow,” including his “salary, preferences, antecedents” and “how one might please him” (63). Aziz’s desire to get to know Fielding is undoubtedly sexually charged, but unlike Lawrence, Forster approaches the subject of sex subtly. When Fielding invites Aziz to make himself “at home,” the remark is “unpremeditated”—it is simply “what he felt inclined to say” (66). It is Aziz who thinks that there is a deeper meaning in Fielding’s remark. Forster’s language, however, conceals what Aziz might think. Aziz replies to Fielding’s invitation rather innocuously: “May I really, Mr. Fielding? It’s very good for you,’ he called back; ‘I like unconventional behaviour so extremely’” (66). The scene becomes increasingly “unconventional” as Aziz helps dress Fielding after he emerges from the shower. Fielding is missing a collar stud, and Aziz takes one “which was part of a set that his brother-in-law had brought him from Europe” off of his own shirt to give it to Fielding (68). Yet despite this seemingly sexualized act, Forster is careful to remind the reader that the foundation of the men’s attraction to one another is not simply sexual: as Aziz enters Fielding’s chamber, he “began to
look round, as he would have any old friend” (68). Simultaneously, “Fielding was not surprised at the rapidity of their intimacy” and “sat down gaily on the bed” (68). Fielding and Aziz’s informality, however, becomes increasingly restrained as their conversation begins to shift to their cultural and racial differences.

The two men are clearly aware of the cultural and racial differences between them, and they approach these differences with humility and understanding. Aziz is surprised to see that Fielding’s books are not “ranged coldly on shelves,” as he considered customary for Englishmen (68). Subsequently, he asks Fielding to use this opportunity to teach him new words and improve his English. But Fielding finds nothing wrong with Aziz’s accent and instead marvels at the “liveliness with which the younger generation handled a foreign tongue” (68). Aziz reminds Fielding that “the club moved slowly” and “still declared that few Mohammedans and no Hindus would eat at an Englishman’s table, and that all the ladies were in impenetrable purdah” (68–69). Through these comments, Fielding and Aziz show that they as individuals, rather than as members of their respective nations, represent the future of positive relations between the English and Indians. Thus, though Fielding later declares “a single meeting is too short to make a friend,” is it clear from their first interaction that he and Aziz are immediately attracted to each other (70). Fielding begins to feel “fundamental goodwill” toward his companion, while Aziz in turn feels “safe” with Fielding: “He [Aziz] was safe really—as safe as the shore-dweller who can only understand stability and supposes that every ship must be wrecked” (70). Despite this auspicious start to their relationship, however, as the novel unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that the relationship between Field and Aziz cannot ultimately be satisfied because of their racial differences.
At the end of the chapter the men meet again for tea and continue their sympathetic relationship. They discuss their families and, in an act of intimacy and faith, Aziz shows Fielding a photograph of his wife. While Aziz believes in and practices purdah, he is willing to share his wife’s photograph with those that he considers true friends: “All men are my brothers, and as soon as one behaves as such he may see my wife” (125). While Fielding is flattered by the gesture of intimacy, Aziz’s trust and ultimately optimism makes Fielding sad because he no longer thinks that he is capable of the same level of emotion: “Fielding sat down by the bed, flattered at the trust reposed to him, yet rather sad. He felt old. He wished that he too could be carried away on the waves of emotion. The next time they met, Aziz might be cautious and standoffish. He realized this and it made him sad that he should realize it” (127). Whatever feelings Fielding may have for Aziz, they are ultimately checked by the reality of the colonial situation.

6.3.1 The Problem of Marabar Caves

The middle section of A Passage to India, “The Caves,” is concerned in particular with Miss Adela Quested’s claim that Aziz raped her in the Marabar Caves. The chapter is built upon a trip planned by Aziz to give the British women a deeper understanding of Indian culture. But what he proposes to show them is unclear. The caves are described as “older than all spirit,” yet they have been passed over by spiritual seekers including the Buddha (136). There is something both remarkable and unnerving about the Marabar Caves:

To call them ‘uncanny’ suggests ghosts, and they are older than all spirit. Hinduism has scratched and plastered a few rocks, but shrines are unfrequented,
as if pilgrims, who generally seek the extraordinary, had here found too much of it. Some saddus did once settle in a cave, but they were smoked out, and even Buddha, who must have passed this way down to the Bo Tree of Gya shunned a renunciation more complete than his own, and had left no legend of struggle or victory in the Marabar. (136)

It is within this ambiguous but potentially highly charged spiritual environment that the group trip takes place. As I suggested, the purpose of the trip planned by Aziz is to give the British women a deeper view of Indian culture, but the group of British and Indians also forms “a stupendous replica of the tea party”—that is, they plan to have an English picnic at the caves. While Aziz is excited about the party because it will give him an opportunity to make up for the fact that he was less than hospitable to the English women earlier, Fielding is not interested in the trip. He foresees both “friction” and “expense,” but agrees to ask the women and to attend himself to please his friend Aziz: “He began to securing Fielding and old Godbole, and then commissioned Fielding to approach Mrs. Moore and Miss Quested when they were alone—by this device Ronny, their official protector, could be circumvented” (139). Aziz is similarly warned by his other friends that he should not “mix himself up with the English ladies,” but his own enthusiasm and naivety overrule his better judgment (140). Aziz is also inspired by the possibility of spending yet more time with Fielding, outside of either of their rooms. So, disregarding advice, Aziz sets the field trip in motion.

Fielding’s naivety is coupled with the English women’s lack of “race consciousness,” because as the narrator suggests, “Mrs. Moore was too old” and “Miss Quested too new” to the scene to worry about any potential problems of the trip (142). The trip, and the incident between
Aziz and Miss Adela Quested in the Marabar Caves, are prefaced by a description of Aziz’s excessive interest in intimate relations—and his friendship with both Mrs. Moore and Fielding:

Like most Orientals, Aziz overrated hospitality, mistaking it for intimacy, and not seeing that it is tainted with the sense of possession. It was only when Mrs. Moore or Fielding was near him that he saw further, and knew that it is more blessed to receive than to give. These two had strange and beautiful effects on him—they were his friends, his for ever, and he theirs for ever; he loved them so much that giving and receiving became one. He loved them even better than the Hamidullah’s because he had surmounted obstacles to meet them, and this stimulates a generous mind. (157)

This description of Aziz’s large capacity to love and be loved is tempered by Mrs. Moore’s reaction to the trip to the Marabar Caves, which she finds “horrid” (162). She “nearly fainted” in the Marabar Caves, which was said to be “natural enough” because she “had always suffered from faintness” (162). But Mrs. Moore claustrophobia is really created by the abundance of people in the caves, which causes her to lose Aziz and Adela: “Crammed with villagers and servants, the circular chamber began to smell. She lost Aziz and Adela in the dark, didn’t know who touched her, couldn’t breath, and some vile naked thing struck her face and settled on her mouth like a pad” (162). In addition, she hears “a terrifying echo” in the caves which makes it difficult for her to differentiate the sounds from one another (162). And as she looks around for the “villain” who might have touched her, she finds no one suspicious—just the same group of people she had entered the cave with. Rather than proceed to the next cave, Mrs. Moore decides not to go on the exhibition, and Aziz goes off alone with Miss Quested to the “Kawa Dal” (165). While Mrs. Moore gives them her blessing to continue on without her, her memories of the scene
in the cave become “more disagreeable and frightening” and she recalls the echo, which “began in some indescribable way to undermine her hold on life” (165). The echo, at a moment in which she “chanced to be fatigued,” had managed to murmur, “‘Pathos, piety, courage— they exist, but are identical, and so is filth. Everything exists and nothing has value’” (165).

As Aziz and Miss Quested continue to the next cave, they have a short discussion. Adela is engaged to Mrs. Moore’s son, Ronny Heaslop, a city magistrate in Chandrapore. As they walk and talk, Adela thinks about her engagement and questions whether or not she and Ronny are really in love. She thinks that she does not love Ronny, but that it is not worth the effort to break off the engagement because “she wasn’t convinced that love is necessary to a successful union” (168). To soothe her own anxiety, Adela asks Aziz if he is married. He replies that he is, and Adela pushes the conversation further, wondering if he, like many Moslems, has more than one wife: “Probably this man had several wives—Mohammedans always insist on their full four, according to Mrs. Turton” (169). Aziz is appalled by her candor:

The question shocked the young man very much. It challenged a new conviction in his community, and new convictions are more sensitive than old. If she had said, ‘Do you worship one god or several?’ he would not have objected. But to ask an educated Indian Moslem how many wives he has—appalling, hideous! (169)

Adela, who is does not know that she has in any way said the “wrong thing,” continues along the path, still wondering about the legitimacy of her upcoming marriage: “She followed at her leisure, quite unconscious that she had said the wrong thing, and not seeing him, she also went into a cave, thinking with half her mind ‘sightseeing bores me,’ and wondering with the other half about marriage” (169). Adela’s thoughts when she enters the cave provide the context
for and eventual retraction of her claim that Aziz raped her. Adela gets lost from Aziz and the
rest of the group and wanders into a cave without him. Aziz briefly begins to look for her,
noting that her field glasses “were lying at the verge of a cave, half-way down an entrance
tunnel,” but he is distracted by the arrival of Fielding, who had missed the train initially and had
thus arrived in Miss Derek’s car (171). Both Fielding and Mrs. Moore are troubled by the fact
that Adela is missing. Aziz expects sympathy from Fielding and Mrs. Moore and hopes that they
will understand the situation, but they do not. Fielding’s years of experience in India make him
suspect the worst, and Mrs. Moore, though she has only been in India a few months, is already
hardened:

Loving them both, he expected them to love each other. They didn’t want to.
Fielding thought with hostility, ‘I knew this women would make trouble,’ and
Mrs. Moore thought, ‘This man, having missed the train, tries to blame us.’; but
her thoughts were feeble; since her faintness in the cave she was sunk with apathy
and cynicism. The wonderful India of her opening weeks, with its cool night and
acceptable hints of infinity, had vanished. (175)

Adela does not reemerge until Aziz is arrested. His arrest comes as a surprise to him as well as
to Fielding, who immediately tries to take control of the situation and defend his friend.

While Fielding defends Aziz, the others are not as quick to stand by his side. When
Fielding and the collector discuss the case, the collector acknowledges that the case “might rest
upon some mistake,” but the “mistake” is not simply that Aziz has been wrongly accused; rather,
for the collector, the mistake must rest with both parties (181). He suggests,

‘It does indeed. I have had twenty-five years’ experience of this country”—he
paused, and ‘twenty-five years’ seemed to fill the waiting-room with their
staleness and ungenerosity—‘and during those twenty-five years I have never known anything but disaster when English people and Indians attempt to be friends.’ (181–82)

The point of the collector’s statement is to suggest that in the colonial situation, both parties are necessarily implicated in the negative outcomes of people who “attempt to be friends” (181–82).

The difficulty of personal relationships between the English and the Indians is highlighted throughout the trial. Immediately following Aziz’s arrest, the “Europeans were putting aside their normal personalities and sinking themselves into their community” (183). But what is most striking is the blurriness and difficulty of the case. When Fielding and Godbole discuss the case, Godbole explains that the “whole of the universe” is actually implicated in the event and that no one party is guilty or innocent:

‘I am informed that an evil action was performed in the Marabar Hills, and that a highly esteemed English lady is now seriously ill as a consequence. My answer to that is this: that action was performed by Dr. Aziz.’ He [Professor Godbole] stopped and sucked in his thin cheeks. ‘It was performed by the guide.’ He stopped again. ‘It was performed by you. ‘It was performed by me.’ He looked shyly down the sleeve of his own coat. ‘And by my students. It was even performed by the lady herself. When evil occurs, it expresses the whole of the universe. Similarly when good occurs.’ (197)

In professor Godbole’s understanding, the entire community is implicated in what happened in the caves, not simply either the British or the Indian population. At the trial Fielding is criticized for missing the train and not being present to prevent Adela from traveling alone with Aziz. As various possible scenarios are presented to substantiate Adela’s claims, many of the claims refer
back the fact that Adela Quested and Aziz are from different cultures. But the real trouble seems to lie not in this reality, but rather in how Adela, Aziz, and members of the court perceive the situation.

During the trial, Adela stays with Miss Derek and Mrs. McBryde. Her hosts are unsympathetic to her mood changes and the fact that she “vibrated between hard commonsense and hysteria” (214). She explains to them, in fact, that Aziz had never actually touched her at all: “It seemed like an age, but I suppose the whole thing can’t have lasted thirty seconds really. I hit at him with the glasses, he pulled me round the cave by the strap, it broke, I escaped, that’s all. He never actually touched me once. It all seems such nonsense” (214). But even more interesting is that Adela simultaneously feels “unworthy” of Ronny as if she had had in fact been violated in the caves, and specifically, as if the crime was her fault:

For a time her own logic would convince her, then she would hear the echo again, weep, declare she was unworthy of Ronny, and hope her assailant would get the maximum penalty. After one of these bouts, she longed to go out into the bazaars and ask pardon from everyone she met, for she felt in some vague way that she was leaving the world worse than she had found it. She felt that it was her crime until the intellect, reawakening, pointed out to her that she was inaccurate here, and set her again upon her sterile round. (215)

Specifically it is the echo from the cave that haunts Adela, as it had haunted Mrs. Moore: “The echo flourished, raging up and down like a nerve in the faculty of her hearing, and the noise in the cave, so unimportant intellectually, was prolonged over the surface of her life” (215). Adela suggests that only Mrs. Moore can help her get rid of the echo in her mind: “Only Mrs. Moore could drive it back to its source and seal the broken reservoir” (215). But with Mrs. Moore
unreachable, Adela spends her days during the trial “in this atmosphere of grief and depression” (215–16). Her confusion and indifference work against her because she is finally incapable of describing the particular “detestable” cave that she believed Aziz had followed her into. And at the trial her bewilderment and self-implication causes her to revoke her accusation against Aziz (214).

While Adela “had always meant to tell the truth and nothing but the truth,” the trial revealed to her that the incident in the caves was directly connected to her engagement to Ronny (251–52). She thought that by discussing her engagement to Ronny, she had provoked Aziz into attacking her: “She had thought of love just before she went in, and had innocently asked Aziz what marriage was like, and she supposed that her question had roused evil in him” (252–53). Adela is worried, however, not about giving the details of the molestation that “would have distressed other girls,” but about revealing her “private failure” (252–53). But even this fear of “private failure” is diminished as her mind begins to fail her and she has a nervous breakdown. As she attempts to recall the details of the event for the court, she has an out-of-body experience:

A new and unknown sensation protected her, like magnificent armour. She didn’t think what had happened or even remember in the ordinary way of memory, but she returned to the Marabar Hills, and spoke from them across a sort of darkness to Mr. McBryde. The fatal day recurred, in every detail, but now she was of it and not of it at the same time, and this double relation gave it indescribable splendor. (252–53)

Adela recalls the event as if she were capable not only of her own experiences, but of the experiences of an outsider witnessing the event as well: “Her vision was of several caves. She saw herself in one, and she was also outside it, watching its entrance, for Aziz to pass in. She
failed to locate him. It was the doubt that had often visited her, but solid and attractive, like the
hills, ‘I am not—’ Speech was more difficult than vision. ‘I am not quite sure’” (254). Thus
Adela confesses that she herself has made a mistake and that Aziz never followed her into the
caves.

Immediately, Adela’s confession is brought to bear on the text’s two most important
subjects, English and Indian relations and specifically the relationship between Fielding and
Aziz. While Adela “had renounced her own people,” her nervous breakdown and withdraw of
the charges against Aziz free him and Fielding to be friends again. Fielding is happy when
Adela begins to have a breakdown, because he knows that it will allow him to be friends with
Aziz again: “Slight noises began in various parts of the room, but no one yet understood what
was occurring except Fielding. He saw that she was going to have a nervous breakdown and that
his friend was saved” (255). Fielding has been in India long enough that he does not
automatically side with Adela, but nevertheless he knows that by simply being English he is
expected to sympathize with her. Adela’s confession prevents him from having to fulfill his
national allegiances and he is free to continue his friendship with Aziz:

    The English always stick together! That was the criticism. Nor was it unjust.
    Fielding shared it himself, and knew that if some misunderstanding occurred, and
    an attack was made on the girl by his allies, he would be obliged to die in her
defense. He didn’t want to die for her, he wanted to be rejoicing with Aziz. (260)

Adela’s confession is horrifying to the English. After leaving court she is not ushered
away by friends and family, but is “drawn into a mass of Indians of the shopkeeping class, and
carried by them toward the public exit of the court” (257). She is then let out into the streets,
where she overtaken by the sights, sounds, and smells of the East:
The faint, indescribable smell of the bazaars invaded her, sweeter than a London slum, yet more disquieting: a tuft of scented cotton wool, wedged in an old man’s ear, fragments of pan between his black teeth, odorous powders, oils—the Scented East of tradition, but blended with human sweat as if a great kind had been entangled in ignominy and could not free himself, or as if the heat of the sun had boiled and fried all the glories of the earth into a single mess. They paid no attention to her. (257)

While Adela feels “emptied” and “valueless,” Aziz has been restored by the outcome of the case (258). In honor of Mrs. Moore, he decides not to take monetary compensation from Adela:

Aziz yielded suddenly. He felt it was Mrs. Moore’s wish that he should spare the woman who was about to marry her son, that it was the only honour he could pay her, and he renounced with a passionate and beautiful outburst the whole of the compensation money, claiming only costs. (290)

Despite the fact that Fielding is able to rejoice with Aziz and resume their friendship, Forster still does not allow them to completely fulfill their relationship. “The Caves” ends with yet another misunderstanding. Although Fielding and Aziz had rejoiced after the end of the case, they are not the friends they once were. Fielding has been accused of having relations with Miss Quested and is away at a conference, leaving Aziz behind, bitter that Fielding has taken up with the woman he still considers as an enemy:

Aziz had no sense of evidence. The sequence of his emotions decided his belief, and led to the tragic coolness between himself and his English friend. They had conquered but were not to be crowned. Fielding was away at a conference, and
after the rumour about Miss Quested had been with him undisturbed for a few days, he assumed it was true. He had no objection on moral grounds to his friends amusing themselves, and Cyril, being middle-aged, could no longer expect the pick of the female market, and must take his amusement where he could find it. But he also resented him making up to this particular woman, whom he still regarded as his enemy; also, why had he not been told? What is friendship without confidences? He himself had told things sometimes regarded as shocking, and the Englishman had listened, tolerant, but surrendering nothing in return. (302)

The last section of the text makes it clear that though they have overcome hurdles, Fielding and Aziz’s friendship is by no means stronger than the cultural and political forces of the imperialist project.

6.3.2 The Impossibility of Friendship in *A Passage to India*

Toward the end of the novel, after the court scene, and after Adela Quested has dropped the rape charges against Aziz, Fielding and Aziz discuss the case. Fielding chastises Aziz for his inability to be grateful that Miss Quested has dropped the charges against him. Fielding says, “Your emotions never seem in proportion to their objects, Aziz,” attacking him for being overly emotional in general (282). Aziz, clearly frustrated by Fielding’s lack of emotion, responds in turn, “Is emotion a sack of potatoes, so much the pound, to be measured out? Am I a machine? I shall be told I can use up my emotions by using them, next” (282–83). To which Fielding replies: “I should have thought you would. It sounds common sense. You can’t have your cake
and eat it too” (283). Forster also suggests “it is this underdeveloped heart that is largely responsible for the difficulties of Englishmen abroad” (5). It is clear that Fielding’s “underdeveloped” heart is responsible for some of his difficulties communicating his feelings to Aziz. When he tells Aziz that he can’t have his cake and eat it too, Aziz responds by saying that if Fielding is right, “there is no point in any friendship” (283). And he adds sarcastically, “It all comes down to give and take, or give and return, which is disgusting, and we had better all leap over this parapet and kill ourselves” (283). After Fielding accuses Aziz of being unfair, Aziz replies that Fielding must be willing to share himself and reveal his “difficulties” if they are “to be friends for ever” (283). But the effects of the colonial situation on their personal relationship are already more than clear. As the narrator explains, “when they argued about it [the rape charges against Aziz] something racial intruded—not bitterly, but inevitably, like the colour of their skins: coffee-colour versus pinko-grey” (289–90). Fielding encourages Aziz to “let Ms. Quested off paying” and Aziz eventually capitulates, citing his “high and fantastic estimate of Mrs. Moore” (289). But even Aziz’s willingness to capitulate to Fielding’s request does not rescue their relationship. Aziz decides to take his children back to “Mussoorie” and Fielding returns to England, eventually to marry Stella Moore, Mrs. Moore’s daughter from a second marriage.

Two years later, the men are joined again. “Some hundreds of miles westward of the Marabar Hills, and two years later in time, Professor Narayan Godbole stands in the presence of God” (317). It is at this time that Fielding returns: “Fielding’s visit was official. He had been transferred from Chandrapore, and sent on a tour through Central India to see what the remoter states were doing with regard to English education” (327). Aziz and others believe that Fielding married Miss Quested, but the truth that he married Stella, Mrs. Moore’s daughter from a second
marriage, is not revealed until near the end of the text: “He had married, he had done the expected with Miss Quested, and Aziz had no wish to see him again” (327).

As the narrator explains, a rift developed between Fielding and Aziz after the trial when Fielding did not join Aziz’s celebratory procession, and during Fielding’s two-year absence: “A rift had opened between them after the trial when Cyril had not joined in his procession; those advocacies of the girl had increased it; then came the post-cards from Venice, so cold, so unfriendly that all agreed that something was wrong; and finally, after a silence, the expected letter from Hampstead” (328–29). Aziz takes this news quite harshly and refuses to read any more letters that Fielding sends him: “Subsequent letters he destroyed unopened. It was the end of a foolish experiment. And though sometimes at the back of his mind he felt that Fielding had made sacrifices for him, it was now all confused with his genuine hatred of the English. ‘I am an Indian at last,’ he thought, standing motionless in the rain” (328–29). In the shadow of the Criminal Investigation Department, Aziz finds a new partner: “Life passed pleasantly, the climate was healthy so that the children could be with him all the year round, and he had married again—not exactly marriage, but he liked to regard it as one—and he read Persian, wrote poetry, had his horse, and sometimes got some shikar while the good Hindus looked the other way. His poems were all on one topic—Oriental womanhood” (329).

When the men finally meet again, they discuss what Aziz sees as Fielding’s deception:

‘What does it matter to me who you marry? Don’t trouble me here at Mau is all I ask. I do not want you, I do not want one of you in my private life, with my dying breath I say it. Yes, yes, I made a foolish blunder; despise me and feel cold. I thought you married the enemy. I never read your letter. Mahmoud Ali deceived me. I thought you’d stolen my money, but’—he clapped his hands together, and
his children gathered round him—‘it’s as if you stole it. I forgive Mahmoud Ali all things because he loved me.’ (339)

At this point Aziz is clear that he does not want to be friends with Fielding or any other English person: “I wish no Englishman or Englishwoman be my friend”’ (339). Eventually it is revealed that Fielding in fact married Stella, Mrs. Moore’s daughter from a second marriage: “She had always been so good, and that youth whom he had scarcely looked at was her son, Ralph Moore, Stella and Ralph, whom he had promised to be kind to, and Stella had married Cyril” (340). The climax of their relationship—“that was the climax, as far as India admits one”—occurs when, during a spiritual ceremony on the water, two boats collide, one carrying Fielding and Stella and the other carrying Aziz and his companions (354):

The shock was minute, but Stella, nearest to it, shrank in her husband’s arms, then reached forward, then flung herself against Aziz, and her motions capsized then. They plunged into the warm, shallow water, and rose struggling into a tornado of noise. The oars, the sacred tray, the letter to Ronny and Adela, broke loose and floated confusedly. Artillery was fired, drums beaten, and elephants trumpeted, and drowning all in an immense peal of thunder, unaccompanied by lightening, cracked the mallet on the dome. (354)

The unexpected crash of the boats in the middle of a spiritual party brings Fielding and Aziz together again, but there is still a veil of confusion over their relationship and the entire scene:

The image went back too, and on the following day underwent a private death of its own, when some curtains of magenta and green were lowered in front of the dynastic shrine. The singing went on even longer…ragged edges of religion…unsatisfactory and undramatic tangles… ‘God is love.’ Looking back
at the great blur of the last twenty four hours, no man could say where was the emotional centre of it, any more than he could locate the heart of a cloud. (354)

Although the men are happy to be back together, they are also aware that after their “last ride” they could “meet no more” (357). On their “last ride” the men begin to talk about the “Native States,” but are distracted by each other’s friendship and the beauty of the day:

He began to say something heavy on the subject of Native States, but the friendliness of Aziz distracted him. This reconciliation was a success, anyhow. After the funny shipwreck there had been no more nonsense or bitterness, and they went back laughingly to their old relationship as if nothing had happened. Now they rode between jolly bushes and rocks. Presently the ground opened into full sunlight and they saw a grassy slope bright with butterflies, also a cobra, which crawled across doing nothing in particular. (357)

They also discuss Fielding’s impending marriage to Stella, and the narrator reveals that Fielding is “not quite happy about his marriage: “He was passionate physically again—the final flare-up before the clinkers of middle-age—and he knew that his wife did not love him as much as he loved her, and he was ashamed of pestering her” (357). Aziz listens to Fielding lament about his wife and is just happy to have another day with Fielding, even though he knows it is likely his last. Fielding also feels that “this was their last free intercourse” and that “all the stupid misunderstandings had been cleared up” (357).

But as the narrator suggests, there is really no place for their friendship to exist; their relationship has no homeland: “Socially they had no meeting-place”. Fielding had resituated his life in English territory by marrying a “countrywoman” and wondered if he was actually willing to “defy all his own people for the sake of a stray Indian” (357). The answer to this question is
no; Fielding is not willing to defy his own people to maintain his friendship or have a dalliance with “one stray Indian” (358). Aziz is instead described as simply “a memento” and “a trophy” (358). While Fielding remains aloof and denies his feelings, Aziz reacts emotionally to the end of their relationship. He briefly thinks of his wife and “then the whole semi-mystic, semi-sensuous overturn, so characteristic of his spiritual life, came to an end like a landslip and rested in its due place, and he found himself riding in the jungle with his dear Cyril” (359). The two men spend their last moments together discussing the cultural forces that keep them apart. Aziz demands that he should have a motherland free of English rule:

Still he couldn’t quite fit in Afghans at Mau, and, finding he was in a corner, made his horse rear again until he remembered that he had, or ought to have a mother-land. Then he shouted: ‘India shall be a nation! No foreigners of any sort! Hindu and Moslem and Sikh and all shall be one! Hurrah! Hurrah for India! Hurrah! Hurrah!’ (361)

While the men talk about English and Indian politics, it is clear that their cultural difference is their main source of strife and that it frustrates them both. Fielding returns Aziz’s statement and mockingly suggests that the Indians need the British to govern them: “India! What an apotheosis! Last comer to the drab nineteen-century sisterhood! Waddling in at this hour of the world to take her seat! She, whose only peer was the Holy Roman Empire, she shall rank with Guatemala and Belgium perhaps” (361). To this jab, Aziz responds in an “awful rage”:

Down with the English anyhow. That’s certain. Clear out, you fellows, double quick, I say. We may hate one another, but we hate you most. If I don’t make you go, Ahmed will, Karim will, if it’s fifty-five hundred years we shall get rid of you, yes, we shall drive every blasted Englishman into the sea, and then’—he
rode against him furiously—‘and then,’ he concluded, half kissing him, ‘you and I shall be friends.’ (362)

Fielding responds to Aziz’s mix of anger and desire by “holding him affectionately” and saying, “Why can’t we be friends now?” and, “It’s what I want” and “it’s what you want” (362). While it is clear that Foster remains true to his humanist beliefs by suggesting that even in the end the men want to be friends, he is also realistic and knows that the men’s cultural differences prevent their friendship. To stay true to his humanist beliefs, however, Forster ends the text on a highly metaphysical note, allowing the horses, the sky, and the universe to make the decision for the men:

But the horses did not want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn’t want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temple, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw the Mau beneath: they didn’t want it, they said in their hundred voices, ‘No not yet,’ and the sky said, ‘no, no there.’ (362)

The idea that Fielding and Aziz cannot be friends “yet,” or “there,” which is to say in post-war India, leaves open the possibility that they might be friends in the future, somewhere else. Forster reasserts this possibility when he gives Fielding, who had been the more reticent of the two men all along, the last line. It is Fielding, finally, who does not want to accept that their cross-cultural love and friendship is prohibited. He declares, “It’s what I want” and “it’s what you want” (362). Desire, however, in the end, is not enough to affirm their relationship.

While Jessie Matz suggests that the “half-kiss” between Fielding and Aziz “indicates a firm refusal to take a sunny view of the Anglo-Indian future,” I argue that the ending is left ambiguous so that despite the obvious obstacles to their relationship, Forster can maintain the
possibility that they will have a friend or love relationship in the future (Matz 307). The ambiguous ending allows him to steadfastly reassert his belief in the implicit importance and value of personal relationships. While Matz posits that the fact that Forster did not write fiction from the ages of forty-five to ninety proved that “one could not fit new gay life into old heterosexual forms, even if one were England’s greatest living novelist,” it is also true that Forster continued to expound his belief in the importance of personal relationships through his political writing (304). Thus, as Mohammed Shaheen suggests, “Forster presumably never abandoned liberal humanism as a major goal in life. He simply realized that its practice in India under imperialism was out of context” (83–84). And Shaheen writes, “Liberal humanism, one can imagine Forster whispering, falls short of compatibility with imperialism which is itself a deviation from any human norm” (83–84). Despite his acknowledgement of these limitations, however, Forster continued to believe inherently in the possibility of transcendent personal relationships. This is particularly clear from his “What I Believe,” in which he famously argues that he would rather betray his country than a friend and testifies that erotic instincts trump the death instincts.

6.4 FORSTER’S “WHAT I BELIEVE”

While I argue that Forster continued to value personal relations after the Great War, others such as Anthony Copley have suggested that although “Forster is seen as an exponent of liberal humanism, one who cherished individual and personal relationships,” his belief in these values diminished over time. Forster claimed that he was “sorry to have lived on into the 1930s” not
simply because it was a “dangerous” time, but because he felt that he was “not equipped to understand them [the years, specifically, of the Second World War and after]” (Forster in Copley 109).  Although Forster was deeply upset that the world was at war yet again, he did not give up his belief in friendship and personal relationships. He wrote “What I Believe” in 1938 on the brink of the Second World War. In the text he explains that he does not believe in “Belief,” but instead in creating a “creed of one’s own” (65). He finds “faith” a “stiffening process, a sort of mental starch, which ought to be applied as sparingly as possible” and suggests that he does not believe in belief for the sake of belief “at all”:

Herein I probably differ from most people, who believe in Belief, and are only sorry that they cannot swallow even more than they do. My law-givers are Erasmus and Montaigne, not Moses and St Paul. My temple stands not upon Mount Moriah but in that Elysian Field where even the immoral are admitted. My motto is: ‘Lord, I disbelieve—help thou my unbelief.’ (65)

Nevertheless, Forster acknowledges that he does in fact live in “an Age of Faith.” His chosen form of faith is personal relationships. He claims that in a “world full of violence and cruelty,” personal relationships are “comparatively solid” (65). Personal relationships, however, are only “comparatively solid” insofar as “Psychology” has “split and shattered the idea of a ‘Person,’” revealing that “there is something incalculable in each of us, which may at any moment rise to the surface and destroy our normal balance” (65). In other words, Forster points to the notion that the modern subject is “split” and “shattered” by a lifetime of experiences and traumas, desires and wishes, and constantly shifting perspectives and cultural demands.

While Forster acknowledges that human beings don’t and can’t know themselves or other people well, he suggests that we must believe in personal relationships anyway: “We don’t
know what we are like. We can’t know what other people are like. How, then, can we put any trust in personal relationships, or cling to them in the gathering political storm? In theory we cannot. But in practice we can and do” (65). We believe in personal relationships despite the fact that we cannot know ourselves or other people and despite the fact that human beings are in large part imperfect and unreliable.

Thus what is important to Forster about personal relationships is that people engage in them because they want to and not because they have to, as they are obliged to follow certain social regulations and the law. Personal relationships, then, are not subject to “contract,” but personal “reliability”—a person’s ability and desire to do what they say they are going to do, or even more simply, to do the correct thing regardless of whether or not they will be rewarded for doing so (66). For Forster, personal relationships are “a matter for the heart, which signs no documents,” and requires only “natural warmth” (66). He believes that men are naturally warm; but that over the course of their lives they inevitably have “bad luck,” face personal disappointments and become “chilled” as a result of the disappointments they encounter. Forster argues, however, that most men “want to retain this faith” in personal relationships, because it gives them another opportunity to realize that they are not “the only light that is shining in the darkness” and “not the only one the darkness does not comprehend” (78).

Personal relationships give men and women the opportunity to connect to one another, share common concerns, and affirm that they are not alone in the world. Despite the seeming benefits, however, Forster writes that personal relationships are no longer considered fundamental and are rather despised and considered “bourgeois luxuries” in times of conflict, when there are supposedly more fundamental issues that demand attention: “Personal relations are despised today. They are regarded as bourgeois luxuries, as products of time and fair
weather which is now past, and we are urged to get rid of them, and to dedicate ourselves to some movement or cause instead” (66). Forster, therefore, makes the famous claim, “I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my country” (66). He justifies this radical claim by citing Dante’s Brutus and Cassius, who were relegated to “the lowest circle of Hell because they had chose to betray their friend Julius Caesar rather than their country Rome” (66). While Forster acknowledges that it is not likely that anyone will be asked to choose directly between their friend and their nations or states, he nevertheless suggests that this is a possibility:

> Probably one will not be asked to make such an agonizing choice. Still, there lies at the back of every creed something terrible and hard for which the worshipper may one day be required to suffer, and there is even a terror and hardness in this creed of personal relationships, urbane and mild though it sounds. (66)

Although people are not often asked to chose between loyalty to friends and loyalty to the state, his thesis is theoretically significant because he notes that “love and loyalty to an individual can run counter to the claims of the State” (66).

Forster’s “What I Believe” is not, however, completely optimistic about the future. Rather, Forster is optimistic about the human ability to bear and endure challenge and difficulties and to go on living in spite of the problems civilization faces. He writes, “No millennium seems likely to descend upon humanity; no better and stronger League of Nations will be instituted; no form of Christianity and no alternative to Christianity will bring peace to the world or integrity to the individual; no ‘change of heart’ will occur” (69). Despite this truth, however, Forster says that we need not “despair” because human beings will also continue to behave creatively and positively: “Yet we need not despair, indeed, we cannot despair; the evidence of history shows
us that men have always insisted on behaving creatively under the shadow of the sword” (69). Forster is concerned that if people do not stop killing one another and choose to live in a more civilized manner, then the world “may get worse,” but he does hold open the possibility that the world could improve if human creativity and reason can triumph over humans’ destructive instincts: “What is good in people—and consequently in the world—is their insistence on creation, their belief in friendship and loyalty for their own sakes; and, though Violence remains and is, indeed, the major partner in this muddled establishment, I believe that creativeness remains too, and will always assume direction when violence sleeps” (69). This is precisely what Freud suggests at the end of Civilization and Its Discontents when he expresses the belief that the erotic instincts can overcome the death instincts. Freud discusses this topic over the course of his publishing career and in depth in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905); “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917); Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920); The Ego and the Id (1930); and Civilization and Its Discontents (1929).

6.5 FREUD’S NOTION OF CIVILIZATION

In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud suggests that while the effects of the loss of a loved object, “fatherland, liberty, an ideal and so on” could be severe, the erotic instincts are often strong enough to help the subject overcome its melancholic response to said loss (“Mourning and Melancholia” 164). As Freud explains at the conclusion of The Ego and the Id, extreme pathological forms of melancholia are often accompanied by an internal fear of death. The ego that finds itself abandoned by its objects also “feels itself hated and persecuted by the super-ego instead of loved” (60). Because the ego does not feel either protected by the love of an object, or
by its own mechanisms of self-preservation, it finds itself in “excessive real danger which it believes itself unable to overcome by its own strength” (61). Suicide is the outcome of the worst of such cases. The ego “sees itself deserted by all protecting forces and lets itself die” in a state that resembles “the anxiety due to separation from the protecting mother” (61). Despite the potential severity of pathological melancholia, however, Freud maintains that the id—while it “has no means of showing the ego either love or hate” and while “Eros and the death instinct struggle within” it for satisfaction—can push the subject back toward life (62). Thus he leaves open the possibility that Eros is stronger than the death instincts:

It would be possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and (prompted by the pleasure principle) to put Eros, the mischiefmaker, to rest: but perhaps that might be to undervalue the part played by Eros. (62)

In this subtle yet provocative passage, Freud suggests that Eros, the “mischiefmaker,” is just as strong if not stronger than the death instincts. This is not to say, however, that the competition between the death instincts and the erotic instincts is not intense, nor is it to say that the death instincts are not strong. As Freud shows, the erotic instincts can be used in the service of the death instincts.

As Freud explains in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, humans react to “unpleasurable tension” by trying to lower tension, thereby avoiding unpleasure and trying to produce pleasure at all costs (3). As Barbara Low taught Freud, the “dominating tendency in mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general” is “to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the ‘Nirvana principle,’ to borrow a term from Barbara Low)” (67). Low’s principle confirmed for Freud the “existence of the death instincts” and showed that like the
erotic instincts, the death instincts can be pleasurable and find expression through the “pleasure
principle” (67). As Freud notes, there is a “sadistic component in the sexual instinct” that “can
make itself independent and can, in the form of a perversion, dominate an individual’s entire
sexual activity” (65). But besides the possibility of perversion, Freud suggests that sadistic
instincts have some place in normal sexuality: “Is it not plausible to suppose that this sadism is in
fact a death instinct, which under the influence of the narcissistic libido, has been forced away
from the ego and has consequently only emerged in relation to the object?” (65). As Freud
explains, the death instincts enter the service of the sexual function:

It [the death instinct] now enters the service of the sexual function. During the
oral stage of organization of the libido, the act of obtaining erotic mastery over an
object coincides with the object’s destruction; later, the sadistic instinct separates
off, and finally, at the stage of genital primacy, it takes on, for the purpose of
reproduction, the function of overpowering the sexual object to the extent
necessary for carrying out the sexual act. It might indeed be said that the sadism
which has been forced out of the ego has pointed the way for the libidinal
components of the sexual instinct, and that these follow after it to the object.
Wherever the original sadism has undergone no mitigation or intermixture, we
find the familiar ambivalence of love and hate in erotic life. (65)

By this definition the death instincts “serve” the erotic function, but only in “a displaced” way
(65). Eroticism, then, is one example of the life instincts overpowering the death instincts.
While the death instincts can “serve” the erotic function and therefore the life instincts in a
displaced way, there is another state in which the life instincts truly prevail: love.
As Freud explains, in general the ego does what it has to do to maintain the border between itself and others and only allows these boundaries to dissolve in the state of love:

There is only one state—admittedly an unusual state, but not one that can be stigmatized as pathological—in which it does not do this. At the height of being in love the boundary between the ego and the object threatens to melt away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact. (Civilization and Its Discontents 32)

The ego comes nearest to its goal of connecting with objects in the world in the process of making “love the centre of everything” and trying to find satisfaction “in loving and being loved” (32–33). The problem with looking for satisfaction in love, Freud argues, is that love can be highly unstable. “We are,” he suggests, “never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love” (33). Love is also limited in that while its purpose is “making one out of more than one,” once the subject has satisfied its need for love with one other person it “refuses to go further,” which is to say it refuses or may refuse to use its erotic or libidinal urges to connect with people outside of its primary relationship (65).

However, civilization, as Freud explains, requires “relationships between a considerable number of individuals” (Civilization 64). He suggests that civilization depends on and “aims at binding the members of the community, together in a libidinal way” and employs every mean possible to achieve that end” (65). Human beings are willing to restrict the satisfactions of their sexual lives or to extend the energies they would perhaps rather give to just one person in order
to cultivate friendship and other identifications with people their intellectual and social communities:

It favors every path by which strong identifications can be established between the members of the community, and it summons up aim-inhibited libido on the largest scale so as to strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship. In order for these aims to be fulfilled, a restriction upon sexual life is unavoidable. (65).

While human beings tend to be willing to give up some of their sexual instincts for “aim-inhibited” relationships of friendship and community, Freud is careful not to excite too much optimism for this humanistic tendency. He cautions that human beings are not simply loving characters willing to give up their own satisfactions for the sake of the good of their communities and institutions:

The element of truth behind all of this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. (Civilization 69).

Thus Freud explains that while “civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into
one great unity, the unity of mankind,” civilization must also constantly battle against man’s aggressive instinct: “But man’s natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each opposes the programme of civilization” (82).

Like others who had lived through the Great War, Freud was acutely aware that human beings had mastered more powerful technologies of destruction than ever before. He theorized that humans’ ability to exterminate one another created a new sense of anxiety that pervaded all aspects of life. Despite having lived through the Great War, however, his study of the human mind also showed him that there was a glimmer of hope for civilization resting in the power of Eros. What he could not know is what the future would hold:

Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness, and their mood of anxiety. And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’ [p. 96], eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can foresee what the future with what success and with what result? (Civilization 112).

Freud postulated that the future of civilization rested not on the philosophy of the late Victorian era, but on striking a balance between the life and death instincts: “On the one hand love comes into opposition to the interests of civilization; on the other, civilization threatens love with substantial restrictions” (58). Essentially, Freud thought that Eros must have a place in world if civilization would hope to exceed its own capacity to destroy itself. Virginia Woolf also believed strongly in the power of Eros. In The Waves, she describes a group of characters
psychically connected through a network of shared experiences, emotions, and feelings. For Woolf, equality is not a prerequisite for friendship, but the result of friendship based on empathy and understanding.
7.0 “IN SOME VAGUE WAY WE ARE ALL THE SAME PERSON”: FRIENDSHIP IN VIRGINIA WOOLF’S THE WAVES

7.1 MOORE’S INFLUENCE ON WOOLF

Virginia Woolf’s brother Thoby Stephen studied at Cambridge University and was friends with the Cambridge Men—E. M. Forster, John Maynard Keynes, Desmond MacCarthy, Lytton Strachey, Sydney Saxon Turner, and Leonard Woolf—who moved to London after graduation. The Cambridge Men met Woolf and her sister, Vanessa Bell, and formed the Bloomsbury Group. The Cambridge Men brought Moore’s theories to Bloomsbury and helped shape how the Stephen sisters and the Bloomsbury Group thought about friendship. Moore’s theory that “the pleasures of human intercourse” are “by far the most valuable things, which we can know or imagine” quickly became the central idea from which the Bloomsbury Group’s philosophy grew (Principia Ethica 188–89). There is, however, little concrete evidence that Woolf read Moore’s Principia Ethica from cover to cover, or that she was fluent in the finer points of his philosophy. Clive Bell, for instance, doubted that “either of the Stephens gave much thought to the all-important distinction between ‘Good on the whole’ or ‘Good as a Whole’” (133). Similarly, Vanessa Bell reports in “Notes on Bloomsbury” that she herself had not read Principia Ethica and doubted that Virginia had (101–2). It is clear, however, from Woolf’s diaries and her fiction that she fully understood and was influenced by Moore’s most accessible and popular ideas. For
example, as I mentioned in Chapter One, in her diary Woolf recalls in detail a discussion that she had with Clive Bell on the nature of good:

Margaret sent round her new motor car this afternoon and we took Violet to pay a series of calls, but of course, forgot our cards. Then I went on to the Waterloo Road and lectured (a class of working men and women) on the Greek Myths. Home and found Bell, and we talked about the nature of good until almost one!

(Moments of Being 186)

In her description she uses a rare exclamation point, an enthusiastic punctuation mark she did not often use in her personal or published writing. It is also clear that she was influenced by the dialectic style of argument that the Cambridge Men learned and perfected at Cambridge and brought with them to Bloomsbury. Woolf found these conversations on “philosophy, art and religion” challenging and pleasurable (190): “Never have I listened so intently to each step and half-step in an argument. Never have I been at such pains to sharpen and launch my own little dart. And what a joy it was when one’s contribution was accepted” (190).

Furthermore, Woolf references Moore’s theory of “the Ideal” in her first novel, The Voyage Out (1915). She creates a conversation between Rachel and Richard Dalloway in which they discuss the ideal. Rachel asks Richard if he has accomplished what he set out to do:

‘Have you done what you’ve set out to do?’ She asked. ‘A searching question! I answer—Yes and No. If on the one hand I have not accomplished what I set out to accomplish—which of us does?—on the other hand I can fairly say this: I have not lowered my ideal.’ He looked resolutely at the sea-gull, as if his ideal flew on the wings of the bird. ‘But,’ said Rachel, ‘what is your ideal?’ ‘There you ask too much, Miss Vinrance,’ said Richard playfully” (66).
Later, playing on the dated significance of *Principia Ethica*, Woolf writes,

‘We can’t make you take us seriously, Mrs Ambrose,’ he protested. ‘May I ask how you’ve spent your time? Reading—philosophy? (He saw the black book.) ‘Metaphysics and fishing!’ he exclaimed. ‘If I had to live again I believe I should devote myself to one or the other,’ he began turning pages. ‘Good, then, is indefinable,’ he read out. ‘How jolly to think that’s going on still!’ ‘So far as I know there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.’ That’s just the kind of thing we used to talk about when we were boys. I can remember arguing until five in the morning with Duffy—now secretary for India—pacing round and round those cloisters until we decided it was too late to go to bed, and we went for a ride instead. Whether we ever came to any conclusion—that’s another matter. Still, it’s the argument that counts. It’s things like that that stand out in life. Nothing’s been quite so vivid since. It’s the philosophers, it’s the scholars,’ he continued, ‘they’re the people who pass the torch, who keep the light burning by which we live. Being a politician doesn’t necessarily blind one to that, Mrs Ambrose.’ (77–78)

In addition to Woolf’s clear homage to Moore in this passage, I argue that she was more broadly influenced by his philosophy. In particular, I suggest that she was influenced by his notion that “by far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects” (*Principia Ethica* 188–89). Woolf was particularly concerned with how people were connected psychically: that is, connected through their minds, and not
simply their bodies. As the narrator remarks near the end of *A Passage to India*, Fielding has recognized “that we exist not in ourselves, but in terms of each other’s minds”:

> And, fatigued by the merciless and enormous day, he lost his usual sane view of human intercourse, and felt that we exist not in ourselves, but in terms of each other’s minds—a notion for which logic offers no support and which had attacked him only once before, the evening after the catastrophe, when from the verandah of the club he saw the fists and fingers of the Marabar swell until they included the whole night sky. (Forster 277–78)

While this realization seems illogical to Fielding, Woolf suggests that the psychic connections between people are an important element of friendship.

Woolf suffered the loss of both of her parents, and her older brother Thoby, before her twenty-sixth birthday. The death of her parents caused great her suffering, and she had substantial mental breakdowns after each of their deaths. Woolf, like her contemporaries I have already discussed, was also greatly impacted by the Great War. In the face of such grave losses and the possibility of even more loss during times of war, her friendships with the other members of the Bloomsbury Group, and her marriage to Leonard Woolf, sustained her. She valued friendship, not simply as entertainment or leisure, but as a way of understanding herself and others more profoundly.

In addition to studying the role that friendship played in her life, in this chapter I argue that Woolf represents friendship in her novel *The Waves* (1931). I argue that she demonstrates that friendship and the psychic connection between people impact the creation and maintenance of identity. I also suggest that she shows that friendship is extremely important to melancholic people and especially melancholic women, because it can have a positive therapeutic impact for
both the melancholic subject as well as their friends. In addition, I argue that Woolf shows that friendship can provide an opportunity for empathy, identification, and a deeper understanding of both self and other. Finally, I suggest that Woolf departs from Moore’s notion of friendship based on equality in that she believes not in equality in friendship per se, but in the idea that friendship can exist between those who are not equal. She maintains, however, that “states of consciousness” that arise from “human intercourse” are valuable. She suggests that we should value the “states of consciousness” that arise from “human intercourse” precisely because these states of consciousness give friends the ability to know one another deeply. For this reason, I argue that Woolf presents a post–Great War view of friendship that acknowledges the psychological impact of war. And I argue that she suggests that while human beings are not equal physically, mentally, socially, and politically, we should strive to value one another equally.

7.2 VIRGINIA WOOLF ON FRIENDSHIP

As I have noted, Woolf lost both of her parents early in her life. The loss of her mother, Julia Stephen, at the age of thirteen was profoundly difficult. As Hermione Lee explains, her mother’s death, and memories of her mother, continued to haunt Woolf throughout her life. Lee notes that Woolf ended her autobiographical portrait “Reminiscences” (1908) with a complex portrait of her mother. In the following passage, Woolf suggests that though her mother has died, she is carefully remembered and continues to influence the lives of those who knew her:
Living voices in many parts of the world still speak of her as of someone who is actually a fact in life. Whether she came merry, wrathful or in impulsive sympathy, it does not matter; they speak of her as of a thing that happened, recalling, as though all around her grew significant, how she stood and turned and how the birds sang loudly, or a great cloud passed in the sky. Where has she gone? What she said has never ceased. She dies when she was forty-eight, and your mother [Vanessa Bell] was a child of fifteen. (“Reminiscences” 39–40)

In this passage the phrase “Where has she gone? What she said had never ceased” addresses the notion that Woolf was never able to fully let go of her mother. Lee tries to imagine what Woolf’s life would have been like if her mother had lived a much longer life:

But suppose her mother had been ninety-six? She would have outlived her youngest daughter by a year. And what then? No departure from Kensington—no shedding of Duckworths—no Bloomsbury—no Jewish husband—no To The Lighthouse? Or would Virginia and her siblings have discounted Julia’s views, left her behind, and visited her occasionally out of sense of duty (as she and Leonard periodically visited his demanding old mother)—a deaf, tiresome, toothless, aged Victorian lady? (79–80)

But the point is Julia Stephen did not live into old age and her death haunted Woolf. But it is also the case that her mother’s death freed Woolf to have a life she could not have imagined if her mother had lived on through Woolf’s own adulthood. In “Sketch of the Past” Woolf elaborates on the notion that her mother was indeed the greatest influence in her life:

To return to the particular instance which should be more definite and more capable of description than for example the influence on me of the Cambridge
Apostles, or the influence of the Galsworthy, Bennett, Wells school of fiction, or the influence of the Vote, or of the War—that is, the influence of my mother. (80–81)

Woolf notes that the writing process functioned for her as a substitute for formal psychoanalysis. Through writing, she was able to express her deepest thoughts about her parents and thereby let her parents, and her thoughts about them, go:

Then one day I was walking round Tavistock Square I made up, as I sometimes make up my books, *To the Lighthouse*; in a great, apparently involuntary, rush. One thing burst into another. Blowing bubbles out of a pipe gives one the feeling of the rapid crowd of ideas and scenes which blew out my mind, so that my lips seemed syllabling in their own accord as I walked. What blew the bubbles? When then? I have no notion. But I wrote the book very quickly; and when it was written, I ceased to be obsessed by my mother. I no longer hear her voice; I do not see her. (81)

While Woolf was so crushed by her mother’s death that she suffered her first mental breakdown, she was more certain that her father’s death actually benefited her life, freeing her from the tyranny of his control and allowing her to become the artist that she wanted to be. In a diary entry from November 28, 1928, Woolf reminisces about what would have been her father’s ninety-sixth birthday. She expresses that she is glad he did not live into old age because she believes his life would have ended hers by stifling her creativity and ability to write:

Father’s birthday. He would have been 96, yes, today; & could have been 96, like other people one has known; but mercifully was not. His life would have entirely ended mine. That would have happened? No writing, no books;—inconceivable.
I used to think of him & mother daily; but writing The Lighthouse, laid them in my mind. And now he comes back sometimes, but differently. (I believe this to be true—that I was obsessed by them both, unhealthily; & writing of them was a necessary act.) He comes back now more as a contemporary. I must read him someday. I wonder if I can feel again, I hear his voice, I know this by heart? (The Diary of Virginia Woolf 3: 208)

Woolf also notes in this passage that in the process of writing To the Lighthouse, she was able to free herself from the constant presence of her parents in her thoughts.

The loss of her parents, however, came at a cost. Woolf suffered her first mental breakdown after her mother’s death, in the summer of 1895 when she was just thirteen. While I will not delve far here into the subject of Woolf’s mental illness, I do want to note Hermione Lee’s characterization of it. As Lee explains, Woolf “was a sane woman who had an illness” (171). Lee makes this statement to suggest that Woolf never took advantage of her own illness and its concomitant symptoms, but rather faced her challenges with “courage, intelligence, and stoicism” and had “remarkably little self-pity” despite her fairly consistent setbacks (171). As Lee explains, Woolf was susceptible to “recurrent episodes whose symptoms might range from weeks of intense depression to a night’s anxiety or a sudden faint” (171). And having lost her parents, her support system was not as sophisticated as it might have been. Her illness certainly encouraged her to seek other lines of support; her relationship to her sister Vanessa and her husband Leonard became important to her maintaining a certain level of well-being.

Vanessa was particularly important to Woolf after the death of their father. It was at this time that Woolf had her second serious breakdown, and Vanessa who first took care of her and then arranged for her to stay with a family friend, Violet Dickinson, who could look after her on
a full-time basis. As Frances Spalding suggests, Virginia developed at this time a hatred of Vanessa, who “had the burden of looking after her” (42–43). Spalding reports that according to Quentin Bell, Virginia “attempted suicide” while at Dickinson’s house by “throwing herself out a window,” but she suffered no major injuries. Vanessa’s leadership after the death of their father had great impact on Woolf’s life. It was Vanessa who decided to move herself and her siblings out of 22 Hyde Park Gate to Bloomsbury. As Spalding explains, Bell was a looking for a change and wanted to live somewhere she did not have family connections (43). Their new house at 46 Gordon Square became the meeting place of the people who would become Woolf’s life-long friends and the core members of “Old Bloomsbury.” Thoby had introduced his Cambridge colleagues to his sisters before he even graduated, but it was after his death in 1906 that the group began to coalesce.

Vanessa’s marriage to Clive Bell in 1907 and Virginia’s marriage to Leonard Woolf in 1912 were central to the continuation of the Bloomsbury Group. Vanessa, and particularly Leonard, continued to be central members of Virginia’s support system for the rest of her life. Leonard Woolf claims that “Virginia is the only person whom I have known intimately who had the quality which one had to call genius” (Beginning Again 28). With Woolf’s genius, however, came her difficulty as well. Leonard Woolf describes Virginia’s difficulty in a generous way, describing her ability to “leave the ground” in the middle of an ordinary conversation and embark on extraordinary stretches of talking in which she would describe the scenes around her or in her mind in elaborate detail:

But at any moment, in a general conversation with five or six people or when we were alone together, she might suddenly ‘leave the ground’ and give some fantastic, entrancing, amusing, dreamlike, almost lyrical description of an event, a
place or a person. It always made me think of the breaking and gushing out of the springs in autumn after the first rains. (30–31)

Leonard Woolf accepted Virginia’s ability to “leave the ground” and the difficulties that came with it, and fell in love with her: “By the end of 1911 I knew that I was in love with Virginia and that I should have to make up my mind rapidly what I was to do about it” (52). After Leonard proposed to Virginia, she told him she needed some time to think about her answer. As Lee reports, it has been suggested that Vanessa encouraged the marriage, desperately hoping to transfer responsibility for Virginia’s health to Leonard: “It’s been suggested that she was so eager to transfer the responsibility for Virginia to Leonard Woolf that she was not entirely candid with him about the nature and the extent of Virginia’s earlier breakdowns” (302). Thus the pressure on Virginia to accept the marriage proposal was immense and caused her great mental suffering. In the end she accepted the proposal, but she became ill immediately after their marriage. While Leonard Woolf does not detail Virginia’s breakdown in his memoirs, –stating only that she “was ill in London, after we were married,” Lee is more precise in explaining the anxiety that Woolf felt after Leonard proposed to her (Beginning Again 57).

As Lee suggests, the courtship between Virginia and Leonard was “pressuring and intense” (303). Virginia was busy finishing her first novel, while Leonard was trying to decide whether or not he should return to his civil-service post in Ceylon. After Leonard proposed, he asked for an extended leave from his post so that he could have more time to think about the next step of his career. At exactly this time, Woolf began to experience great anxiety and was forced to undergo another rest cure:

On 14 February, about a month after his proposal in January, he asked for his leave to be extended. At exactly this time, she began to suffer from ‘wild dreams’
and anxiety, and on 16 February she went back to Twickenham for another rest-
cure, and was not allowed to receive “emotional” letters from him or to see him.

(303)

Leonard’s extension was not granted, so he took a risk and resigned his position in the civil
service at the end of April. About a week later, Virginia wrote to explain her thoughts about the
engagement, but she did not give him a concrete response. In the letter she seems troubled by
her own mental instability, but admits that her feelings for Leonard are growing stronger:

And then I am fearfully unstable. I pass from hot to cold in an instant, without
any reason; except that I believe sheer physical effort and exhaustion influence
me. All I can say is that in spite of these feelings which go chasing each other all
day long when I am with you, there is some feeling which is permanent and
growing. (V. Woolf in H. Lee 305; Letters of Virginia Woolf 1: 496)

What Lee finds most striking about this letter is that Woolf seems to think that she and Leonard
might be capable of creating a new form of marriage, one less about compromise and duty and
more about freedom and partnership:

Like the heroine of a Restoration Comedy laying down her provisos, or the New
Woman of an Ibsen play, she is determined that this will be the kind of marriage
in which human character has changed. This is to be a pioneering, a ‘modern’
marriage. The letter ignores material matters of career, money, or habitats. It is
about reshaping the possibilities of marriage, rejecting the standard issue.

‘Perhaps we shall get it, how splendid!’ (H. Lee 306–7)

Lee notes that “perhaps they did” find a new form of marriage that supported and
sustained what both of them needed as individuals (307). The marriage of Leonard and Virginia
Woolf was by most accounts highly successful: it lasted through the rest of Virginia’s life and was only disrupted by yet another breakdown—the one that would ultimately cost Woolf her life. In her suicide note, Woolf suggested that Leonard had provided her with “complete happiness” and that “no one could have been as good as you have been” (V. Woolf in Lee 747; The Letters of Virginia Woolf 6: 486–87).

While no relationship is perfect, it is clear that both Vanessa and Leonard played a key role in supporting Virginia’s life, keeping her cared for and safe. In addition to these two crucial relationships, she was also bolstered by the enthusiasm of her friends.

### 7.3 VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE BLOOMSBURY GROUP

As I detailed at the beginning of Chapter Two, the members of the Bloomsbury Group became life-long friends after meeting one another through Vanessa and Virginia’s brother Thoby Stephen. The members of the group enchanted Woolf from her earliest meetings with them:

> And part of the charm of those Thursday evenings was that they were astonishingly abstract. It was not only that Moore’s book had set us all discussing philosophy, art and religion; it was that the atmosphere—if in spite of Hawtrey I may use that word—was abstract in the extreme. (V. Woolf, “Old Bloomsbury” 190)

Similarly, Woolf says that the group was rejuvenated by the reintroduction of Roger Fry in 1910, which refocused them from the “abstract” to the “particular” (172):

> The old skeleton arguments of primitive Bloomsbury about art and beauty put on flesh and blood. There was always some new idea afoot; always some new
picture standing on the chair to be looked at, some new poet fished out from obscurity and stood in the light of day. (197)

Woolf explains that the old theoretical arguments were fleshed out and put into practice, and that there was always new material circulating.

In “Memories of Roger Fry,” Vanessa Bell explains the energy that Roger Fry brought to Bloomsbury. Fry was ten years older than most of the members and already had much public experience as both an art critic and painter. His career was taking off just as he entered the Bloomsbury circle, presenting the first Post-Impressionism exhibit in 1910. Bell writes, “Then, suddenly, bewilderingly, here, well arranged, not too many yet enough, in a pleasant gallery in Grafton Street were all the painters one had had glimpses of: Cézanne, Van Gogh, Gauguin” (Sketches in Pen and Ink 129). This exhibit, she suggests, influenced young and old painters alike, who were freed from old realist constraints to paint as they pleased: “One or two old painters who had plodded patiently all their lives, painting as they understood they should paint, threw their petticoats, should one say, over the windmill and became comparatively honest and sensitive” (130). Further, Bell remarks, “it is impossible to think that any other single exhibition can ever have had so much effect as did that on the rising generation” (130). Roger Fry brought new light to the Bloomsbury Group’s conversations on abstract philosophy and anchored them through a new set of shared ideas and tasks in the pre-war years.

In his memoirs, Leonard Woolf describes Bloomsbury after the start of the Great War. As I suggested in Chapter Two, he argues that by 1914 the group had “been knocking about the world for ten or eleven years” and that “a good deal of ignorance and other things had been brushed off us” (Sowing 150). Woolf also suggests that because of their life experience, the principles of Principia Ethica had passed into their “unconscious” minds and no longer
functioned “as a guide to practical life” (150). The Great War, however, did not break up the Bloomsbury Group, but made it stronger than ever.

Vanessa Bell explains that the Bloomsbury Group was “not destroyed as probably many other circles were destroyed by the departure of all its young men to the wars” (Sketches 112). The reason that Bloomsbury stayed together was because many of them were conscientious objectors who did not play active roles in the war. They were thus able to stay at Charleston, Bell’s property outside of London. As Bell notes, “for some time therefore they [the young men of the Bloomsbury Group] were let alone and quietly pursued their usual professions,” and “for a time Bloomsbury still existed even if crushed and bored by the outer world” (112). But not all of the members of the Bloomsbury Group holed up at Charleston. E. M. Forster had a job tracking missing soldiers in Alexandria (Glendinning 197). Leonard Woolf claimed exemption “on the grounds of health (shaking hands) and domestic hardship,” though he felt he should do more than simply opt out of the war (203). Keynes did not object to the war itself, but he did object to conscription and eventually claimed conscientious objection. Both Keynes and Woolf would make their major contributions to the war effort through government work, writing, and publishing.

The Hogarth Press was initially formed on a whim when Leonard and Virginia found a used printing press during a shopping trip. They thought that learning how to print would be a useful side project for them both and would provide Virginia with a much-needed antidote to the stress of her rigorous writing schedule: “It struck me that it would be a good thing if Virginia had a manual occupation of this kind which, say in the afternoons, would take her mind completely off her work” (V. Woolf, Beginning Again 213). The press was formally founded in 1917, and during the early years they “printed works of literature almost exclusively” (Willis 213).

Keynes was educated at Eton, England’s most famous public school, and King’s College, Cambridge, where he studied mathematics. Like many of the Cambridge men who would later become members of the Bloomsbury Group, Keynes was a member of the Cambridge Apostles. He was emphatic that Moore and the Apostles were central to his post-university social, intellectual, and professional life. As Robert Cord writes, Moore’s *Principia Ethica* (1903), “with its emphasis on truth, love and beauty and ‘good’ states of mind that these produced,” had a tremendous influence on Keynes’s “philosophical outlook” and “the importance he attached to friendship and the love of art” (12). Unlike other members of the Bloomsbury Group who had artistic ambitions, Keynes was primarily a mathematician, economist, and philosopher, both at university and throughout his career. He was also an avid appreciator, collector, and promoter of the arts who used his political clout to garner funding and other support. He made sure that he
and his affiliates “devoted any spare time to sustaining the imaginative life, especially through participation in the activities of non-governmental organizations” (Goodwin 5). Keynes contributed to and promoted the “Camargo Society of the ballet, the Cambridge Arts Theatre, the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, the Contemporary Arts Society, and the London Artists Association, and other groups,” and he founded the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, which provided the foundation for the Arts Council of Great Britain (5).²⁶²

Keynes cultivated his interest in the arts while maintaining a high-profile career in government. At the end of the Great War, Keynes, only thirty-five, was promoted to the new “A” Division of the department of the Treasury, “whose jurisdiction included all external finance” (Hession 128). He was also a founding member of the League of Nations, created after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, in an attempt to prevent future war. His most important political contribution, however, was The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). In the text Keynes criticized the Allied nations for imposing what he believed were exorbitant reparations on Germany. He argued that Germany would not be able to comfortably pay its debts and predicted that the reparations would cause undue economic hardship to a generation of citizens who were not responsible for the war, resulting in civil unrest. Keynes successfully combined Moore’s belief in the importance of art and his goal of applying ethics to practical life to his own work.

As I have suggested, the Bloomsbury Group continued to be inspired by Moore over the duration of their careers. The Memoir Club, formed on March 6, 1920, served as the binding agent for the Bloomsbury Group after the Great War. At the club’s first formal meeting, members began to present their reflective memoirs of Bloomsbury and other topics important to the entire group (L. Woolf, Downhill All the Way 114). As Leonard Woolf explains, the
Memoir Club consisted of the thirteen original members of the Bloomsbury Group, as well as the occasional invited visitor. The premise was that members agreed to speak and write in “absolute frankness,” which Woolf admits dissolved into “relative frankness,” sharing as much of their intimate beliefs as possible (114). According to him, “In our reminiscences what we said was absolutely true, but absolute truth was sometimes filtered through some discretion and reticence” (114).

The presented memoirs became increasingly “longer” and “more serious” and produced important work. As I mentioned, Keynes’ Two Memoirs blossomed from two essays that he wrote for the Memoir Club, “Dr. Melchior” and “My Early Beliefs.” Several of Virginia Woolf’s Memoir Club papers are also notable, including “22 Hyde Park Gate” (1921), “Old Bloomsbury” (1922)\(^7\), and “Am I a Snob” (1936). The meetings kept Leonard and Virginia engaged in London life. They had been living in Richmond but were gladly “sucked into other parties both in and outside of Bloomsbury” (L. Woolf, Downhill All the Way 115). Virginia enjoyed these parties immensely, and their social engagement through the Memoir Club prompted a move back to London so that she “might go and hear a tune, or have a look at a picture, or find out something at the British Museum, or go adventuring among human beings” (117). She craved social life, but the excitement of social stimulation also had the potential to compromise her mental health. Leonard Woolf writes that while his wife was indeed “inhibited” at Richmond, “social pleasures” were a danger to her:

It [Virginia’s mental health] had become much more stable, but it could never be neglected or ignored, and nothing was more dangerous for it than the mental fatigue produced by society and its social pleasures. She was one of those people
who drained herself, exhausted herself mentally, both passively and actively, not only at a party but in any conversation or social intercourse. (117)

It was Virginia’s desire for a more robust social life that prompted her and Leonard to move back to London. Leonard notes that it was easier to protect Virginia from overexhaustion and social stimulation in Richmond. She was persistent, however, and he relented. They moved back to London in January 1924 to 52 Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury. Indeed it was “conversation or social intercourse” and “social pleasures” that energized and inspired Virginia Woolf, making the Bloomsbury Group a radically important part of her life (V. Woolf in Downhill 117). The Bloomsbury Group, I argue, was just as important to her as her intimate and supportive relationships with Vanessa and Leonard.

Virginia Woolf pays homage to the Bloomsbury Group in her novel The Waves. As Lee suggests, it is a novel “of friendship, her Bloomsbury novel—six people bound together all their lives in a loose affiliation—is the only one of her novels which is not ostensibly concerned with family life or inheritance” (265). In the following sections I analyze The Waves and suggest that beyond simply writing about friendship, Woolf posits that friendship and the psychic connection between people impact identity, especially for melancholic people and melancholic women in particular. I also argue that she shows that friendship creates the possibility for empathy, identification, and a deeper understanding of both self and other.
7.4 FRIENDSHIP AND IDENTITY

In this section I show that in *The Waves*, Woolf demonstrates that friendship is important for the creation and maintenance of identity. While Sarah Cole has argued that Woolf had a “vexed” relationship to the “powerful communities with which she associated throughout her life,” and that she presented “frustration and rage at being excluded from the luxurious elitism of Oxford and Cambridge,” it is clear that Woolf only felt frustration and rage at being excluded from these institutions and the resources they provided because they were valuable (“The Ambivalence of the Outsider” 191). In *The Waves* there is certainly a divide between the way that the men and women experience life-long friendship. This distinction may be a result of the fact that male and female characters have different relationships to various supportive institutions. I disagree with Cole, however, that Woolf draws a distinct line between the experience of friendship between her male and female characters. While later in this chapter I argue that friendship potentially has a greater impact on women than on men, I suggest that this has more to do with the way in which women relate to others than to the institutions women either are or are not a part of. Woolf’s intent in *The Waves* is not to critique the inequities between the education of men and women, for instance—she does that work in *A Room of One’s Own* (1929) and *Three Guineas* (1938)—but to suggest the complex ways in which people, friends, are psychically connected.

In a letter to Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson dated October 27, 1931, Woolf responded to Dickinson’s praise of *The Waves*. She was glad he had seen her vision and had experienced what she “wanted to convey” (*Letters of Virginia Woolf* 4: 397). As Woolf reports in this letter, critics felt that *The Waves* was a “hopelessly sad” novel that conveyed the sentiment that “nothing matters” (397). Her purpose, however, was quite different. She wanted to show not that life was meaningless and sad, but that “things matter quite immensely” (*Letters* 4: 397). While
Woolf admitted that she was not precisely sure what the significance of things is, she was clear that “there is significance”: “What the significance is, heaven knows I can’t guess; but there is significance—that I feel overwhelmingly” (397).

One of Woolf’s goals in The Waves was to show that “in some vague way we are the same person, and not separate people” (Letters 4: 397). To tackle the project of explaining this idea, she conceived of a novel that would trace the relationship between six characters from childhood through adulthood. She wanted to show how the six characters were connected mentally through shared feelings and thoughts. To render the mental connections between her characters and the “mind thinking,” Woolf decided that there would be no plot, and no characters in the traditional sense (Diary 3: 229). In “Modern Fiction,” Woolf details her goals for the modern novel. She writes,

look within and life, it seems, is very far from being “like this.” Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions—trivial, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; the moment of importance came not here but there; so that, if a writer were a free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must, if he could base his work upon his own feeling and not upon convention, there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style, and perhaps not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors would have it. Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us
from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible? We are not pleading merely for courage and sincerity; we are suggesting that the proper stuff of fiction is a little other than custom would have us believe it. (Collected Essays 2: 106)

Woolf knew that in The Waves she was going to let go of the “proper stuff of fiction,” but she did not know exactly how she would execute the task. At the beginning of the writing process she knew only “that there must be more unity between each scene” than she could find “at present” (The Diary of Virginia Woolf 3: 229). But what would hold the book together?

Early in the planning process, Woolf claimed that autobiography might the central organizing principle of The Waves: “Autobiography it might be called,” she wrote (Diary 3: 229). By June 23, she had sketched a more definitive shape for the novel and wrote, “This shall be about Childhood,” but “it must not be about my childhood” (236). Laura Marcus has suggested that The Waves is among Woolf’s most autobiographical novels, but that her project was to detach autobiography from “ego” and create “autobiography fuelled by a desire for anonymity” (Marcus 137). As Marcus explains, The Waves served to negate “the paradox” between Woolf’s dual interest in autobiography and impersonality (137). According to Marcus, Woolf showed that while individuals are separate from one another, “identity is not isolable” (137). In other words, Woolf simultaneously suggests that individuals are always separate from other people, but also deeply influenced by and connected to the environment and the people who surround them.
From the start of *The Waves*, Woolf expresses that her characters are extremely close to one another. As a young child, Bernard suggests that he and his classmates melt into each other with shared language: “‘But when we sit together, close,’ said Bernard, ‘we melt into each other with phrases. We are edged with mist’” (10). Yet despite this closeness, they “make an unsubstantial territory” (10). Thus, Bernard suggests that as young children the characters’ identities are still diffuse and malleable. As Bernard remarks, his own identity is not yet fixed: “Every hour something new is unburied in the great bran pie. What am I? I ask. This? No I am not” (56). He questions his identity more when he leaves the room of “people talking.” Left alone, he is not “one and simple,” but “complex and many” (56).

While Bernard is willing to be “complex and many,” a “man of no particular age or calling” who is “merely” himself, Woolf’s other characters are less certain of themselves and less comfortable with the idea that identity is not fixed, but flexible and inherently influenced by and connected to the environment and other people. Neville, for example, is more sensitive to the influence of other people than Bernard is. When Bernard approaches, some part of Neville leaves his own body to meet him: “Something now leaves me; something goes from me to meet that other figure who was coming and assures me that I know him before I see who it is” (60–61). While Neville seems to enjoy the intimacy he shares with Bernard, he also acknowledges that intimacy is sometimes painful. He suggests that intimacy opens up the possibility that one can be “mixed up” with others rather than autonomous and separate from them:

‘How curiously one is changed by the addition, even at a distance, of a friend. How useful an office one’s friends perform when they recall us. Yet how painful to be recalled, to be mitigated, to have one’s self adulterated, mixed up, become
part of one another. As he approaches I become not myself but Neville mixed up with somebody— with whom?— with Bernard? (60–61).

While Bernard is at his core unthreatened by others’ influence, Neville is less secure. For this reason he is envious of Bernard, who can both enjoy the pleasures of intimacy and remain himself. Yet despite his envy, Neville also appreciates Bernard who—as only a close friend would notice and recall—fills the pot “so that when you put the lid on the tea spills over” and you “mop it up clumsily, with your pocket handkerchief” (64). Neville expresses his deep appreciation for Bernard by giving him a poem about friendship. In response, Bernard remarks, “He has left me his poem. O friendship, I too will press flowers between the pages of Shakespeare’s sonnets! O friendship, how piercing are your darts— there, there, again there” (66). But while Bernard suggests that Neville’s affection brings him “confidence,” Bernard is simultaneously “humiliated” by the poem because in it Neville defines Bernard, making him “single” rather than “multiple,” which is how Bernard understands himself: “It was humiliating; I was turned to small stones. All semblances were rolled up. ‘You are not Byron; You are your self.’ To be contracted by another person into a single being—how strange” (66). Bernard is specifically uncomfortable that Neville makes him “single” because, as Bernard suggests, “we are not as simple as friends would have us to meet their needs” (66). In other words, Bernard suggests that Neville makes him “single” for his own purposes, rather than because Bernard is in fact simple or easily knowable. Similarly, Bernard explains that the stimulation of friendship can also be unpleasant. Since Bernard’s friends steal his “moment of emotion” and the pleasure of solitude, he is happy to release the tension of simulation. “How grateful to draw the blinds,” he remarks, “and admit no other presence” (66).
Exploring the contradictory pains and pleasures of friendship in the next passage, however, Bernard, in spite of the pleasures of reducing stimuli and lowering tension, is also happy to have his friends and Eros return: “to feel returning from the dark corners in which they took refuge those shabby intimates, those familiars, whom, with his superior force, he drove into hiding” (66). Thus, he suggests that while it is sometimes painful to have one’s identity influenced by others, the pleasures of intimacy outweigh the pains. As Freud explains, however, despite the human desire to keep levels of tension low, the pleasure associated with the cycle of tension and its release motivates people to continue to seek personal connections with others. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he writes that the “life instincts” both break the peace and constantly produce tensions “whose release is felt as pleasurable” (77). Furthermore, Freud suggests that “[the ego] does not turn away from the external world; on the contrary, it clings to the objects belonging to that world and obtains happiness from an emotional relationship to them” (Civilization and Its Discontents 32). While both Bernard and Neville are clearly cognizant of the fact that friendship influences identity, a symbiotic relationship that can be both pleasurable and painful, the women in the novel are even more sensitive to how others influence their personal identities.

In section two of The Waves, in which the characters are adolescents away from home at boarding school, Woolf describes the women’s interest in and sensitivity to what others think of them. As Chloë Taylor has argued, each of the three female characters has a distinct relationship to the Lacanian social order. Taylor claims that “Susan represents the woman who fully identifies with the mother and rejects language, or the paternal, while Jinny represents the phallic woman who fully assimilates herself into the symbolic, rejecting the maternal and embracing the role defined for her within patriarchy” (61). Finally, Taylor suggests that Rhoda “represents the
woman who is suspended in between” the mother and the father, and that she “eventually teeters on the side of the mother, goes mad, and embraces death” (62). Her argument that Rhoda vacillates between identification with the mother and the father suggests, as I argue, that Rhoda does not have a fixed sense of her own identity. This makes Rhoda, like Neville, particularly vulnerable to the influence of others on her identity, which in turn makes her particularly vulnerable to the pains and pleasures of friendship.

Though Rhoda is particularly vulnerable, all of the female characters are deeply concerned with the other women and what the other women think of them. Susan looks into the mirror as she runs down the stairs and onto the landing on her way to the next school activity. In the mirror she sees the reflections of two other young women, Jinny and Rhoda, and she “recalls” them, describing their personalities, as well as how she understands herself in relation to them. She explains that Jinny is “in front” with “Rhoda lagging behind” (29). Susan perceives Jinny as energetic and outgoing; “Jinny dances” and “turns cartwheels in the playground” (29). Jinny is also irreverent, because she “picks some flower forbiddenly” and “sticks it behind her ear,” prompting Miss Perry’s “dark eyes” to “smolder with admiration” (29). While Jinny prompts “admiration,” Susan remarks that she herself does not. Miss Perry’s admiration is “for Jinny, not me” (29). According to Susan, Rhoda, on the other hand, merely lags behind and does not prompt admiration from anyone (29).

While Susan and the others think that Jinny is outgoing and admired, Jinny is far less self-confident than others think, and like the other women, her identity is influenced by what the other women think of her. Just like Susan, Jinny observes herself and the two other girls in the mirror. But while Susan thinks Jinny is energetic, outgoing, and confident, Jinny is actually more insecure than she appears. Jinny thinks that Susan is more beautiful than she is, with her
“grass green eyes which the poets will love” (30). According to Jinny, Susan’s eyes are characterized by “close white stitching” that “put out” Jinny’s own eyes. Jinny even thinks that Rhoda’s face, though “mooing” and “vacant,” is also more “complete” than her own, “like those white petals she used to swim in her bowl” (30). After viewing the other young women and comparing herself to them, Jinny reaches the second landing that has a “long glass,” which gives her a view of herself “entire” (30). She sees her “narrow body” and “thin legs” that, far from being robust, “ripple like a stalk in the wind” (30). She describes herself as “between” the other two young girls: “I flicker between the set face of Susan and Rhoda’s vagueness” (30). It is clear from these descriptions that the young women carefully observe their friends and define themselves in relationship to them.

Just as Susan recognized Jinny’s penchant for dancing, Jinny herself remarks that dancing is an important part of her life. Yet Jinny’s description suggests that she understands her love of dance in relation to the personalities, interests, and unique qualities of her friends. While Jinny admits, “I never cease to move and to dance,” she also suggests that her movement doesn’t simply reflect her energy and outgoing personality, but also a restlessness she is not proud of: “I move like the leaf that moved in the hedge as a child and frightened me” (30). Similarly, she admits that she has trouble reading, that she “cannot follow any word through its changes” or “any thought from present to past” (30). She also notes that she does not possess Susan’s sensitivity or Rhoda’s capacity for dreaming: “I do not stand lost, like Susan, with tears in my eyes remembering home; or lie, like Rhoda crumpled among the ferns, staining my pink cotton green, while I dream of plants that flower under the sea, and rocks through which the fish swim slowly” (30). Again, Jinny does not simply describe herself singularly, but in relation to the
other women, demonstrating Woolf’s thesis that friends, and women friends in particular, see or understand themselves in relation to each other.

7.5 FRIENDSHIP AND MELANCHOLIC PEOPLE

While Freud’s theory of melancholia has been applied broadly to theories across the disciplines, his original theory is grounded in the principles of psychology and psychoanalysis as he claimed that melancholia usually occurs in people who have “a morbid pathological disposition” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 164). This distinction is important because I posit that Woolf’s character Rhoda is a melancholic figure in Freud’s original terms. While Woolf does not reveal any details of Rhoda’s early family history, or her personal experience of the Great War, for instance, it is clear that Rhoda is defined by a perpetual sense of loneliness, which influences her personal relationships, friendship, and love. I argue that Rhoda is more vulnerable to her friends’ influence on her identity and sense of self, and more sensitive to the pains and pleasure of being “recalled” by her friends, than the other characters.

Early in the text Woolf describes Rhoda as acutely aware of what it is like to be alone; she is the first character to utter the word “alone”: after seeing a group of birds, Rhoda notices that one sang “by the bedroom alone” (The Waves 6). Her observations signal her acute awareness of what it means to be alone. But her observational power by no means suggests that she is happy in her solitude. Her loneliness is a source of pain that makes her long to be someone other than herself. When Rhoda observes Jinny, Susan, and herself in the mirror she does not notice the women’s particular characteristics—Jinny’s “dances” or Susan’s “grass-green eyes,” for example—but only abstractions of them. Rhoda comments only that the other women
“have faces” (31). Although Rhoda also sees herself in the mirror—“that is my face,” she observes—she does not want to see her image because she feels that she has no face and consequently does not exist: “In the looking-glass behind Susan’s shoulder—that is my face. But I will duck behind her to hide it, for I am not here. I have no face. Other people have faces; Susan and Jinny have faces; they are here” (31). Rhoda believes that others notice her lack of self and that she is “seen through in a second” (31). She also believes that other women are more secure and even more real than she is. The other women “laugh really” and “get angry really” while Rhoda must observe others to know how to act: “I have to look first and do what other people do when they have done it” (31). Thus, because she does not possess a self as the other women do, friends influence her identity and even her actions.

Although Rhoda desperately wants friends, her lack of self makes it more difficult for her to relate directly to others. While Jinny “pulls on her stockings” “with extraordinary certainty” and Susan is “more resolute,” Rhoda feels that both of the women despise her for “copying what they do” (31). Rhoda explains that the other women are reluctant to share their knowledge with her because they know she is going to imitate them. While Susan teaches Rhoda “how to tie a bow,” Jinny “has her knowledge but keeps it to herself” (31). Because Susan and Jinny seem more secure than herself, Rhoda thinks that they “have friends to sit by” and “things to say privately in corners” while she does not (31). And while she only abstractly attaches herself to “names and faces,” she nevertheless values the “names and faces” she attaches herself to. She takes whatever kind of human attachment she can get, hoarding these connections “like amulets against disaster” (31). But Rhoda’s collection of “amulets” does not bolster her sense of self as she thinks they will. The “unknown faces” she chooses make her anxious: “I choose out across the hall some unknown face and can hardly drink my tea when she whose name I do not know
sits opposite. I choke. I am rocked from side to side by the violence of my emotion” (31). Yet despite loose connections causing Rhoda great anxiety, she continues to crave attention from others and look for friends. She imagines “nameless,” “immaculate” people looking for her from behind the bushes” (31), and she is willing to go to extremes to get attention. Rhoda says, “I leap high to excite their admiration,” and “at night, in bed, I excite their complete wonder” (31). She is even willing to put herself in danger to get the attention she craves, explaining that at night, dreaming, she often imagines dying, “pierced with arrows to win their tears” (31).

What Rhoda seeks is the opportunity for identification that Freud explained is crucial not only for the creation of the ego, but also for creating love between two people and building social bonds between groups (The Ego and the Id 23–30, 34–36). Freud also says, however, that melancholic people are predisposed to strong attachments based on identification in adult life because they did not have the opportunity for normal relationships with their primary objects in childhood. Having essentially lost their primary objects, melancholic people are forced to set up those lost objects as part of their ego through identification, rather than suffer the complete loss of them. He writes, “We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by supposing that [in those suffering from it] an object which was lost has been set up again inside the ego—that is, that an object-cathexis has been replaced by identification” (23).

While I focus on the mechanism of strong identification in melancholic people, Freud makes it clear that identification is an important component of normal ego and character development as well. He writes, “We have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its ‘character’” (Ego 23). Identification is not only crucial to human development, but is also a necessary building block for successful social life. As Freud
explains, humans are not content with genital love that “leads to the formation of new families,” but also aim at “binding the members of the community together in a libidinal way” (Civilization and Its Discontents 65). The libidinal ties required to create community are based on “strong identifications” and require “aim-inhibited libido” and “restriction upon sexual life” (65). Rhoda’s desire for identification and friendship, however, is not this sophisticated insofar as she is still trying to find her sense of self rather than test how she fits into the larger social world. Her need for identification is based on her need for reaffirmation of her self, rather than her desires to be part of a particular social group. This is evident from Woolf’s description of Rhoda’s desperate attempts to connect to and identify with others, even strangers. When others speak to her, she is elated despite her anxiety. When she connects with a stranger by noticing a destination-sticker on his or her luggage, the moment of identification makes the “town run gold”: “If they should say, or I should see from a label on their boxes, they were in Scarborough last holidays, the whole town runs gold, the pavement is illuminated” (The Waves 31). But these elusive dreams of identification are not enough to make Rhoda feel whole. When she sees her “real face” in the looking glass, she is reminded that she is alone and “often” falls “down into nothingness” (31). To protect herself, Rhoda has to hit her hand “against some hard door” to bring her “back to the body” (31). Her contact with inanimate objects, as when she stretches her toes so that “they touch the rail at the end of the bed,” is a substitute for her lack of contact with human objects and makes her feel secure: “I will assure myself, touching the rail, of something hard. Now I cannot sink; cannot fall through the thin sheet now. Now I spread my body on this frail mattress and hang suspended. I am above the earth now. I am no longer upright, to be knocked against and damaged” (19). This makes her feel more connected to the physical and emotional world from which she is ultimately alienated. If she grasps onto “the rail at the end of
the bed,” for example, she will not be able to “sink” or “fall through” her sheets. Thus, when Rhoda lies down to sleep, she positions herself horizontally and close to the earth, so she can no longer be “knocked against and damaged” (19).

It is only in the “black plumes of sleep” that Rhoda is momentarily stable and even has power over other people (19). In her dreams she escapes from her controlling aunt: “Traveling through darkness I see the stretched flower-beds, and Mrs. Constable runs from behind the corner of the pampas-grass to say to my aunt has come to fetch me in a carriage. I mount; I escape; I rise on spring-heeled boots over the tree-tops” (19). But Rhoda’s aunt quickly usurps her imagined power: Rhoda falls into the carriage where her aunt sits “nodding yellow plumes with eyes hard like glazed marbles” (19). When Rhoda wakes she is relieved to see a “chest of drawers” (19). But as much as she wants to pull herself “out of these waters,” she knows that there is little she can do to keep the waves of melancholy at bay. Though she dreams of having a stronger sense of self, as I have demonstrated in the passage above, her strong desire to identify with others compromises her identity and makes friendship impossible.

When the group of friends arrives at boarding school, they quickly unpack their bags and sit under a “map of the entire world,” which symbolizes the endless possibilities for the futures of this group of potentially illustrious friends (23). Rhoda, however, is overwhelmed when confronted with the other students and their expectations for the future: “This great company,” she remarks, “has robbed me of my identity” (23–24). Despite the fact that she longs for connection and identification with others, in the company of her classmates she is “nobody” and has “no face” (23–24). Rhoda suggests that in the group they “are all callous” and “unfriended,” rather than supportive and friendly (24). Although her friends “torture her,” she cannot afford to leave them. She relies on her friends to “replenish her dreams” and confirm her existence: Louis
utters, “We wake her. We torture her. She dreads us, she despises us, yet comes cringing to our sides because for all our cruelty there is always some name, some face, which sheds some radiance, which lights up her pavements and makes it possible for her to replenish her dreams” (90). Though Rhoda appears reliant on her friends to bolster her sense of self, she also acknowledges that they are callous, and she develops defense mechanisms for protecting herself from them.

Rhoda claims that she will “seek out a face, a composed, a monumental face, and will endow it with omniscience”—the omniscience she lacks. But rather than wearing this mask in public to protect herself from the threats of the external world, she wears the mask “under” her dress “like a talisman” (24). Rhoda promises to “display” her “assortment of treasures” in the woods where no one else will see her (24). Thus, while even a mask concealing her identity cannot save her from the pressures of the external world, she seems to have a separate, more whole self that only exists when she is alone. She puts on a façade to protect herself in her new environment so that she “will not cry,” and promises to hold onto the possibility that her true self and indeed her only real power—her “assortment of curious treasures”—can be displayed only when she is alone. Rhoda exemplifies a melancholic person whose personal identity is deeply influenced by others and who at the same time feels most herself when she is alone (24).

While friendship is ultimately not enough to save Rhoda from herself—she commits suicide midway through the text—it is clear that while she was alive, connection and identification with others gave her some hope. As Louis explains, “For all our cruelty there is always some name, some face, which sheds some radiance, which lights up her pavements and makes it possible for her to replenish her dreams” (90). If friendship makes it possible for Rhoda to “replenish her dreams,” Woolf shows that for some the experience of loss provides the
opportunity not only for identification, but for empathy as well. While Rhoda may be too vulnerable to be capable of true empathy towards others, Bernard’s strength allows him to experience the full range of the pains and pleasures associated with being “recalled” by others. Bernard is also capable of empathy.

7.6 A WORLD WITHOUT A SELF

In the final section of The Waves, Bernard is the only character who speaks. This is significant because he is given the responsibility for summing up the life-long friendships between the characters and reiterating several of novel’s most important arguments about friendship. He summarily explains that friendship influences identity, is both painful and pleasurable, is particularly important to yet challenging for melancholic people, and provides an opportunity for empathy. His capacity to empathize and be friends with Rhoda, for example, suggests that friendship can occur between people who are not necessarily equal, and that these empathic friendships can be benefit both parties. In particular for Bernard, empathy and friendship are coping mechanisms for the inevitable losses associated with old age and the threat of impending death. But more broadly speaking, Woolf argues that empathy and friendship can transcend difference.74

In the interlude that precedes the final section of the text, day has turned to night, signaling the middle and old age of the characters and the impending threat of death:

Now the sun has sunk. Sky and sea were indistinguishable. The waves breaking spread their white fans far out over the shore, sent white shadows into the recesses of sonorous caves and then rolled back sighing over the shingle. (181)
Though the sun has fallen “below the clouds,” signaling both the end of the day and the end of the characters’ lives, Bernard nevertheless resolves to face the “enemy” with “effort” and persistence (225). Though he doubts that language can effectively communicate meaning, and wishes for a more intimate mode of communication—“some little language such as lovers use, broken words, inarticulate words, like the shuffling of feet on the pavement”—he does his best to tell the his friends’ stories (184). He wonders, however, if old age is the “end of the story,” and he has existential thoughts not unlike those that Rhoda experienced earlier in the text: “Life is not susceptible perhaps to the treatment we give it when we try to tell it,” he says (205). Like Rhoda, who was earlier comforted by “a chest of drawers,” Bernard is relieved that some things in life are simple, including inanimate objects that he can easily recognize and define: “A sideboard covered with cruets; a basketful of rolls; a plate of bananas—these,” he remarks, “are comfortable sights” in an ever-changing world (205). He reiterates an earlier point when he received the friendship poem from Neville. Bernard repeats the observation that he is not “single,” but “many”:

“Our friends, how seldom visited, how little known—it is true; and yet, when I meet an unknown person, and try to break off, here at this table, what I call my “life,” it is not one life that I look back upon; I am not one person; I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am—Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda, or Louis: or how to distinguish my life from theirs. (212)

In this passage Bernard suggests that to look back and understand his life, he must also look back and understand the lives of his friends. In particular, he recalls in the last section the deaths of Percival, who died during a horse-riding accident while on a colonial mission in India, and
Rhoda, who commits suicide. As Bernard empathizes and identifies with them, they give him the strength to face old age and the inevitability of death.\(^{76}\)

Rhoda’s suicide comes near the end of the novel, when her pain becomes too much and she kills herself, as Bernard explains, by haphazardly walking into the middle of the street. In the last passage from Rhoda’s point of view, she imagines being cut “in two” by a train, still grasping her “ticket to Waterloo firmly” (180). Bernard empathetically tries to imagine her feeling at that moment:

I went into the Strand, and evoked to serve as opposite to myself the figure of Rhoda, always so furtive, always with fear in her eyes, always seeking some pillar in the desert, to find which she had gone; she had killed herself. ‘Wait,’ I said, putting my arm in imagination (thus we consort with our friends) through the arm. ‘Wait until these omnibuses have gone by. Do not cross so dangerously. These men are your brothers.’ (216)

Bernard feels that he needs to convince Rhoda and himself that life is worth living because he feels he is inherently connected to her: “In persuading her I was also persuading my own soul. For this is not one life; nor do I always know if I am man or woman, Bernard or Neville, Louis, Susan, Jinny or Rhoda—so strange is the contact of one with another” (216). In this passage he reiterates his close connection not only to Rhoda, but to the rest of the friends in the group as well.

Over the course of his lifetime, Bernard has been able to experience both the pains and the pleasures that his friends experience: “Here on my brow is the blow I got when Percival fell. Here on the nape of my neck the kiss that Jinny gave Louis. My eyes fill with Susan’s tears” (222). But in particular, Bernard is able to empathize with Rhoda, whose pain is severe. When
he recalls the moment of her suicide he feels in his own body the “rush of wind of her flight when she leapt” (222). He can identify with her because he acknowledges that in some way or another we are all fending off the threat of our inevitable deaths. He avows, “Always it begins again; always there is the enemy; eyes meeting ours, fingers twitching ours; the effort waiting” (225). Bernard, it seems, becomes increasingly sensitive to the pain of others in old age, as he acknowledges that he will not live forever. While he has moments in which he thinks that he no loner possesses the desire for life that he once did, he surprises himself when his will to live returns. He is once again ready to confront the enemy: “Once more, I who had thought myself immune, who has said, ‘Now I am rid of all that,’ find that the wave has tumbled over me, head over heels, scattering my possessions, leaving me to collect, to assemble, to heap together, summon my forces, rise and confront the enemy” (225). Bernard, the “proud horse whose rider first spurs and then pulls him back,” once again finds a wave of desire to move forward and continue living (228).

And it is friendship that motivates Bernard to “call the waiter” and “pay the bill,” and fulfill even the smallest demands of life. He promises to “fling” himself, “unvanquished and unyielding,” toward life (228), strengthened by his empathy with Rhoda, as I have explained, and identifying with Percival, imagining that he, Bernard, is “like Percival when he galloped in India”: “It is death against whom I ride with my spear couched and my hair flying back like a young man’s, like Percival when he galloped in India” (227). Bernard’s strong sense of self allows him to empathize and identify with his friends, which as Tammy Clewell suggests is not a narcissistic practice, but “names the condition for our ethical orientation in the world” and provides “the very condition” for the Derridean notion of “hospitality, love, and friendship” (Clewell 207; Derrida, “By Force of Mourning” 188).
Clewell argues that in her fiction Woolf reinvented mourning after the “cataclysmic traumas of the First World War” and that in the sustained effort to confront the legacy of the war, Woolf repeatedly sought not to heal wartime wounds, but to “keep them open” (198). For Clewell, Jacob’s Room and To the Lighthouse represent Woolf’s “refusal to engage in a process of mourning engaged at ‘working through’ despair and grief” (198). The opposite is true of The Waves, in which Woolf shows Bernard, for example, “working through” the grief he experiences when Percival and Rhoda die. While I do not read this novel precisely as a war novel, I would suggest in response to Clewell’s argument that Woolf does not seek to keep wartime wounds open, but rather to demonstrate how empathy, identification, and friendship can be an act of healing.

While Woolf shows in The Waves that friendship is influential in creating and maintaining identity, she also shows that friendship, and particularly the experience of losing a friend or loved one, create the opportunity for empathy and identification. For Bernard, Percival and Rhoda are valuable because of the friendship they offer. Although Bernard likely gave more to Rhoda when she was alive than she was able to give him, in the end he is the one who receives the benefits of friendship. As Jacques Derrida explains, using Montagine’s essay “On Friendship,” it is the one who gives in friendship who ultimately receives: “The gift is not impossible, but it is the receiver who gives, and from this point on neither measure nor reciprocity will legislate friendship,” and it is a relationship of “neither synchrony nor symmetry” (The Politics of Friendship 179). For Aristotle and Montaigne, “perfect” friendship based on principles similar to Moore’s notions of equality, sympathy, states of consciousness, and feeling can exist between people who are similar enough that they do not need one another, and seems therefore to exist beyond exchange value. But the more closely the ancient and late-
Victorian notions of friendship are considered, the more they seem limited. For while Moore seems quite modern by proposing that men and women can be friends, he presupposes that they ought to be equal first. What makes Woolf’s notion of friendship particularly modern is that she suggests that friendships based on “usefulness” and not necessarily equality can be just as virtuous and pleasurable as friendship based on equality. She argues that friendship already exists beyond the structure of the law, and is, in Derrida’s words, already “just beyond the law” and “measured up against measurelessness” (306). Friendship, claims Woolf, benefits both the giver and the receiver and therefore has the power to transcend the limits of friendship based on equality. In this regard, Woolf modernizes even Moore’s theory of friendship. While in *The Voyage Out* Woolf acknowledges Moore’s theory that ideal friendship, based on equality, mutual sympathy, “states of mind,” “appreciation,” and “feeling,” are among the greatest goods we can know or imagine, Woolf explores in *The Waves* the possibility not only that friendship is a fundamental component of the creation and maintenance of identity, but also that friendship which promotes empathy and identification, and is therefore “useful,” can be just as valuable as friendship based on an ideal notion of equality. Friendship, suggests Woolf, is an opportunity not for perfect equality or ideal relationships between equals, but for identification, and maybe even empathy.
8.0 CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have focused on notions of friendship in England from the mid-nineteenth century through the publication of Woolf’s *The Waves* in 1931. As I have shown, notions of friendship are influenced by cultural and political forces and are therefore constantly shifting to reflect the demands and values of the time. The Bloomsbury Group is a fascinating case study of friendship, one that is greatly enriched by the large archive of letters, diaries, memoirs, essays, and novels that they left behind. Woolf wrote a biography of Roger Fry, Quentin Bell wrote a biography of Virginia Woolf, and they left behind countless documents that defined their group, known both affectionately and with a bit of chagrin, as “Bloomsbury.” As Hermione Lee has suggested, as time went on and the group became more popular, it also had more detractors:

> From the moment, around 1919, that it [Bloomsbury] began to be perceived as a clique, it inevitably gained its enemies and detractors. After the war, when the Gordon Square friends became famous, the execration increased, and the caricature of an idle, snobbish and self-congratulatory rentier class promoting its own brand of high culture began to take shape. (261)

Lee also notes that Woolf continued to refer to Bloomsbury as “our set” over the course of her life. In her diary on December 21, 1924, Woolf wrote, “All our Bloomsbury relationships flourish, grow in lustiness. Suppose our set to survive another 20 years, I tremble to think how thickly knit & grown together it will be” (*The Diary of Virginia Woolf* 2: 326.) While Woolf
and others complained at times about their notoriety, the vast archive of their highly biographical and self-referential works make it clear that they wanted to be remembered as much as they wanted to remember one another. My work on the Bloomsbury Group as a social group has led me to think about what kinds of social groups exist today and how they are similar to or different from Bloomsbury. The Bloomsbury Group were certainly unique in their ability and desire to interact with one another on a regular basis. As I have mentioned, certain clusters of the group lived together or in near proximity to one another from 1907 through 1941, when Virginia Woolf committed suicide. The Memoir Club continued to meet even after her death for many years. In today’s complex world, where fewer people live in the same place for any extended amount of time, let alone their entire lives, the possibilities for the kind of face-to-face contact that Bloomsbury relished have diminished dramatically. Technological advances have dramatically changed how we create, share, and store both personal and professional information.

Creating a study of turn-of-the-millennium notions of friendship would present a new set of challenges and require a different set of materials. While the Bloomsbury Group created an extensive archive of documents, today’s friendship groups are often conducted remotely online. The Bloomsbury Group’s letters, diaries, and memoirs are today’s emails, “tweets,” and blog entries. As Christine Rosen suggests in “Virtual Friendship and the New Narcissism,” today’s self-portraits are “crafted from pixels rather than paints” and are “interactive, inviting viewers not merely to look at, but also respond to, the life portrayed on line” (1). In some ways online discussion boards are not much different than a Memoir Club meeting, but in other ways Friendster, MySpace, Facebook and other social media platforms are drastically different than face-to-face friendship meetings. While similar information might be communicated online as in an in-person meeting, personal contact is eliminated.
Facebook and other online platforms are also different from in-person meeting groups because they are able to connect people across the world. And as Duncan J. Watts of Columbia University has recently shown in his book *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*, the Internet has the power to connect any two people in fewer than seven steps: “[Internet-based] messages reached their targets in five to seven steps, on average” (Watts in Rosen 4). As Rosen suggests, it is clear that the number of such “weak ties” is multiplying exponentially, but she asks an important question: “What kinds of communities and friendships are we creating?” (5). She notes that whereas online communities used to be based on “metaphors of place,” they are now based on “metaphors of the person” (6). “As researchers of the Pew Project have noted,” reports Rosen, “the proto-social networking sites a decade ago used metaphors of *place* to organize their members: people were linked through virtual cities, communities and homepages” (6). The social-networking sites of today are not based on common concerns or interests, but on sharing “personal information”—statistics like one’s name, astrological sign, and hometown and personal preferences such as favorite music, products, celebrities/public figures, services, and TV shows.

After studying the Bloomsbury Group—a social group or community with a specific set of shared interests as well as a commitment to friendship as a social practice—I think that the online networks of today, while decidedly broader than anything the Bloomsbury Group could have imagined, cannot be nearly as satisfying as having the same set of close friends for a lifetime. While I realize it is anachronistic to suggest that a friendship group approaching the level of intimacy and longevity of the Bloomsbury Group might ever be achieved online, I am intrigued by social networking sites and their utopian mission to help people “communicate more efficiently with their friends, families, and coworkers” (Zuckerberg). And I wonder if the
people who use these sites meet the mission that the sites creators have outlined for them: does Facebook help people communicate “more efficiently”? And what exactly is the purpose of “efficient” communication for personal relationships?

While the Internet may provide people with tools to “communicate more efficiently,” it is not clear that it helps people develop intimate or lasting connections with others. As Rosen suggests, friendship, “in its traditional sense,” is “a relationship which, broadly speaking, involves the sharing of mutual interests, reciprocity, trust, and the revelation of intimate details over time and within specific social (and cultural) contexts” (9). By this definition, certainly commensurate with the Bloomsbury Group’s own ethos, friendship “can only flourish within the boundaries of privacy,” making “the idea of public friendship” an “oxymoron” (9–10). By both Bloomsbury and Rosen’s definitions, online social networking sites do little to promote the kind of deep and lasting relationships that can only be cultivated in private and over time. The question, then, is what kinds of relationships do these online spaces promote? And what do they tell us about social interaction today? Rosen, Jean M. Twenge, and W. Keith Campbell suggest that the social-networking sites of the 2000s—those that start with personal postings and rely on the “Circle of Friends” model of creating groups by invitation only—create and promote narcissism.

Rosen argues that people differentiate between the friends they “see in the flesh” and their online friends and know that their relationships with people they see in person are more substantial than those they make or remake in the virtual world:

Of course, it would be foolish to suggest that people are incapable of making distinctions between social networking ‘friends’ and friends that they see in the flesh. The use of the word ‘friend’ on social networking sites is a dilution and a
debasement, and surely no one with hundreds of MySpace or Facebook ‘friends’ is so confused as to believe that those are real friendships. (10)

Yet the process of collecting online friends must be pleasurable and valuable to people or else they would not do it. Rosen suggests that collecting friends is “not an expression of the human need for companionship,” as surely the Bloomsbury Group was, but an expression of the “need for status” (10). Similarly, Twenge and Campbell believe that “narcissists thrive on social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook” because these sites “reward the skills of the narcissist” such as “self-promotion, selecting flattering photos of oneself, and having the most friends,” and promote “the kind of superficial, emotionally bankrupt relationships favored by narcissistic people” (110). Twenge and Campbell report that a recent study conducted at Carnegie Mellon University suggests that online discussion forums like MySpace and Facebook reward frequent posts and revealing more about oneself in the form of “greater acceptance” or more “friend requests,” but that “actually helping others or asking questions leads to rejection” (110). This suggests that MySpace and Facebook may promote “weak ties” that make us feel loosely connected, but not the deep, long-lasting connections that make us feel supported.

MySpace and Facebook provide the ability to create and cultivate “friendship” without ever coming face-to-face with another person, offering the possibility of looking without being seen. In other words, one can scan MySpace and Facebook profiles without the profilers’ knowledge. As Caitlin Mueller argued in the Stanford Daily in 2008, people are more interested in “stalking the profiles of others than in primping their own” (Mueller in Twenge and Campbell 109). Mueller’s statements suggest that people enjoy looking without being seen and that their pleasure in looking overrides even their concerns about what they look like to others online.
While I think it is nearly impossible to compare the Bloomsbury Group’s notions of and forums for friendship with today’s post-modern notions of friendship and online social networking systems, I do find it interesting that the Cambridge Men and members of the Bloomsbury Group redefined friendship at the turn of the last century, while the technology entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley reshaped our methods for communicating and building and sustaining friendships at the turn of this century. What remains to be seen are what values today’s social-networking sites are actually creating and promoting. Rosen, Twenge, and Campbell have made some very interesting yet early predictions about the growth of social networking sites and an increase in narcissistic behavior. In a world in which we have given up so much of our privacy for the sake of online presence and the hope of creating an ever-wider circle of acquaintances and business contacts, the costs and benefits of such choices remain to be seen and fully understood. What is clear is that the Bloomsbury Group valued the kinds of intimate, lasting friendships that may be in danger of extinction today.
APPENDIX A

“MORAL SCIENCES TRIPOS”

1. Moral Philosophy

Plato, The Moral Dialogues.
Aristotle’s Ethics.
Cicero’s De Finibus, de Officiis.
Clarke’s on the Attributes, and on Unchangeable Morality.
Butler’s Sermons.
Dugald Stewart on the Active Powers.
Foley’s Moral Philosophy.

2. Mental Philosophy.

Plato’s Theaetetus.
Aristotle de Anima.
Descartes on Method.
Locke’s Essay.
Hob’s Philosophy (Hamilton’s Notes and Discussions).
Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. (In Robin’s Series.)
Victor Cousin’s Philosophie du XVIII Siecle.
Sir W. Hamilton’s Lectures on Metaphysics.

3. Logic.

Aristotle’s Categories and Analytics.
Trendelenburg’s Elementa Logicae Aristotelicæ.
Aberch, with Manuel’s Notes.
Whately’s Logic.
Sir W. Hamilton’s Lectures on Logic.
J. S. Mill’s Logic.
W. Thompson’s Laws of Thought.
Hume’s Novum Organum.
Whewell’s Novum Organum Renovatum.

4. History and Political Philosophy.

Plato’s Republic.
Aristotle’s Politics.
Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois.
Guizot’s History of Civilization, and History of Representative Government.
Hallam’s Middle Ages and Constitutional History.
Brougham’s Political Philosophy.
A knowledge of the facts of history as referred to in the
speculative works will be required.
5. Political Economy.
Adams Smith’s Wealth of Nations (McClure’s Edition).
Malthus on Population and on Political Economy.
Ricardo’s Political Economy.
J. S. Mill’s
McClure’s
R. Jones on Rent and on Political Economy.
Carey’s Political Economy.
Michel Chevalier’s Cours d’Économie Politique.

Gautier de Jure Belli et Pacis.
Ratherforth’s Institutes.
Warshington’s Philosophia Juris.
Redden’s Inquiries in the Science of Law.
Beeston’s Principles of Moral Philosophy and of the Civil Code.
Lermier’s Philosophie du Droit.

7. The History of Philosophy.
Ancient and Modern.

For the sake of beginners, I venture to give a few hints with regard to the use to be made of this list, so to the order in which the books should be taken, their relative importance, &c. &c. To begin then with Moral Philosophy, the most important works here appear to me to be Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Ethics, and Butler’s Sermons; but a Student who is only commencing this study, will probably find Dugald Stewart and Whewell (especially the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy) more suited to him at first. Clarke and Paley should be read along with the Lectures. It will be found interesting to compare with Paley the latest development of the same school in J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism. A careful analysis should then be made of Butler’s Sermons.1 Before beginning Plato and Aristotle, it would be advantageous to read the Essays in the first volume of Grant’s edition of the Ethics of Aristotle. An analysis should then be made of the Republic (Davies and Vaughan, or Whewell’s translation), and notes made of any difficulties or of any apparent objections to the doctrines or arguments of the text. Plato’s Ethical Philosophy is so fully contained in the Republic that it is only for the sake of illustration that it would be necessary to refer to other dialogues. The most important in this view are the Protagoras, Cogitas, Philebus, Meno, Phaedrus, Laches and Charmides. The Ethics of Aristotle (translated by Chase) should be treated in the same manner. Cicero should be read, exhibiting the ethical views of the Stoics and Epicureans, which should be also studied in the larger histories of philosophy. Kant and Fichte should be left to the last: the Metaphysic of Ethics of the former has been translated into English by Syme, who has added some chapters from the Practical Reason. A history of modern German philosophy should be read along with these books.

1 Dr Whewell has brought out an edition of the Sermons on Human Nature, with Preface and notes.
APPENDIX B

G. E. MOORE’S “ACHILLES OR PATROCLUS?” (1894)
I believe all the brothers understand that the subject of my paper is to be 'friendship' in general. I chose the form of question 'A', or 'P', from a weak desire to comply with the custom of the society, to be terse and epigrammatic. Yet I think I can justify my treatment of this form: It may be interpreted which of these two (taking them as a model pair of friends) had the preferable lot. I answer (and my answer may seem to be hyperbole) that both were equally happy - that in possessing the perfect friendship of one another they each possessed a source of happiness so great that all the advantages of beauty, birth, strength, and fame, which might seem to weigh down the balance in favour of Achilles, are negligible in comparison.

What truth there may be in this hyperbole, I hope first to make clear; the form of question also suggests another topic, namely in friendship it is necessary that one party should be active (priness) and the other passive (priness), and what effects on the happiness of each follow from this activity or passivity - in society or otherwise; this shall be afterwards discussed.

I have not resisted my impulse to try to connect the subject with the whole theory of the universe; and before I stop on this to me forbidden ground, I must throw a sop to the dragon who guards it. I cannot plead any right to enter, but I only beg you to go, if I am quite on the wrong track, to say so very clearly - to tell me what I may attempt, what not; if on the other hand, he thinks, that even where I sit as it were in the Platonic cave, I may come to comprehend some little glimpse of reality, I beseech him then that he will do his best to show it me.

In order to prove friendship so immensely valuable, as I estimated it above, it seems necessary in some way to define the 'good' and show the relation of friendship to it. Now let consciousness be analysed into 3 parts, the will, the intellectual, and the emotional. Which of these is it, or all, whose perfection gives us the end of life? This may be rejected, as only the efficient cause, or perhaps the accompaniment of the other two. The highest function of the intellect is to perceive the whole of what is and the whole of what should be (which perhaps are not different) - that is to know the true and the good. This more knowledge it seems to me impossible to regard as an end in itself - certainly, if it be so, it is different intension from any of the ends which we practically pursue: these are all satisfactory states of emotion such as could only accompany knowledge, not be identified with it. There remains the emotional faculty, the perfection of which I cannot but consider as the final end of all life: it is on the activities of this faculty that pleasure (the most obvious of practical ends) attends, and on its perfect activity, I conceive, attends happiness, which is a perfect and complete pleasure. The intellect is only a means to obtaining this highest pleasure, by discovering that which can excite it: it is possible to conceive of a perfectly happy being without either will or intellect (though in the world as we know it, such must have had the first in order to arrive at perfect happiness), but the idea of a perfect activity of will and intellect, without any emotional faculty to take pleasure in their activities, seems to me absolutely incompatible with happiness. Thus God's perfection is summed up not in his All-knowledge but in his All-love, that is, presumably, the love of himself, who is the whole of reality.

We, the imperfect, also only contain such end as is within our reach, when we too are loving the best reality that we know. Best, I say, because reality, owing to our imperfection, appears to us as part good, part bad; we cannot love the whole, because we cannot see it all to be good, as God does; therefore we must love the best we see. But again we cannot love abstractions, such as our idea of perfection, so well as we can love a reality. God loves only reality, which may indeed correspond to our idea of perfection but is lovable only because it is real. We must, then, love the best real thing we know, in order to attain to the utmost
happiness of which our imperfect soul is capable; and this thing will be another human soul; for, when we most love the beauty of nature, we love an imagination of our own minds, an unreal thing; and, when we love the creation of another mind, a picture, poem, or symphony, surely the mind which created it must be much more lovable? Than the best man is the most worthy object of our love. But here again we must remember our imperfections: (1) we have not capacity enough to love all the best that we see, (2) the love of men dead or otherwise beyond our reach must be fainter as depending on the memory or imagination, than that of those who are often present with us, (3) our intellectual capacity of judging what is best, though it raises our emotional capacity along with it, yet always keeps ahead of it, so that we are only able to love something inferior to that which at times we most admire and always pronounce to be best. The object of our most perfect love must therefore be often present to us, must be limited in extent, and must not be better in kind than will correspond to our average capacity for loving.

In loving such an object, it would appear from the foregoing argument that we perform the highest function of which our nature is capable — that on which happiness depends; the highest activity of our intellect having been always a necessary means to our partaking the most lovable, and thus indirectly determining our choice, but only a means. And thus the seeming hyperbole with which I began, turns out to be no more than true; and a perfectly sober judgment will accept the lines of Coleridge.

All thoughts etc.

[All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,
All are but ministers of love,
And feed his sacred flame. — Coleridge. 'Love.']

I will now proceed to define more exactly the nature of this permanent emotion or passion which I call love, and to determine what is the proper object of it. I have hitherto tacitly made three important assumptions (1) that this passion is the same as friendship (2) that its object must be only one human being (3) that ourselves cannot be the proper object of our own love.

I will dismiss the 3rd first because it is not of much importance for the purpose of this paper. I said above that God’s perfect love was of himself because he was the whole of reality, which for him too is perfectly good; we certainly are unable to spend all our power of passion on ourselves but must have something external to ourselves; the basis of love is a sympathy; and there seems some explanation of this in the fact that in thus connecting something external with ourselves we first gain a true notion of reality and go some way towards the all-embracing love of God.

Now for my second assumption. I have already given some reasons for it in explaining the imperfection of our own capacities. It does indeed seem an experienced [sic] fact that such a perfect and lasting passion as I speak of can only be felt by each of us towards one other person; and, that this may appear more plainly, I will here try to set out in detail what I take to be the marks or 'notes' of love or friendship, and how this passion arises. The question of how far passion should enter into friendship, one on which Plato and Bacon, at least, say against me, I will discuss later. Here I give my own view.

When first we see the man or woman capable of being the object of our love, there is always something in him which we like. This may at first sight be very little, perhaps only some physical beauty or a tone of his voice, and we may not be able to discover what it is: but it is sufficient to give us some desire of seeing him again. This beginning of sympathy, it is true, may arise towards many people beside him who is to become our friend; and if it goes far enough these are people whom we 'like' or would like to be friends with; but my point is that, though it may arise towards other
people too, it must arise towards our future friend. As I said, the chief
mark of it as yet is the desire to see the person again; we see him again,
and each time we find more things attractive in him. With persons whom
we merely like, there comes a point when we see things not attractive in
them, and therefore they can never be our true friend. With him, the more
we see, the more we like, and the more we desire to be with him. We are
attirated not only by his face, his voice, his manner, but also by his
understanding, his name, his feelings. The reason of our attraction we
shall probably not be able to give; the same or greater merits may be
perceived by our intelligence in other persons, whom we never or rarely
desire to see; but to him our sympathy goes out.
So far these marks of friendship may exist towards several persons
those whom we commonly call friends, persons with whose tastes we have much
in common, and who are not without some (it may be a large) degree of
that attractiveness for us, which we may find in some almost worthless
persons, and which again may be utterly wanting in others that are very
worthy. But the difference between these friends and that perfect friend is so great
that they seem really worthy to be called by the same name. Then we shall
not always desire to see; from them we must keep some secrets. But with
him we shall desire always to be (mad'mai sundaravuti as Aristotle says);
whether talking or silent we shall show that his presence gives us delight;
when we wake in the morning, we shall be satisfied by the sight or the thought
of his love; in all our work, his presence or the knowledge of his delight
in us, will give us much sense of completeness, that all our faculties will
manifest themselves to the utmost. From him we shall have no
secrets at all; all that concerns him will be interesting to us; and we
shall not conceive to speak to him plainly, what we think, of all those
persons and things which may seem to affect him most nearly; it will
be impossible for us to wound his prejudice or his pride. Lastly, we shall
always prefer his good to our own; we shall always be trying to give him
pleasure; and, if need be, shall be eager to die for him.
Such a passion, I think 'twill be admitted, we can scarcely have
for more than one person; if it could be felt even towards two, then
those two would have to love one another as well as we loved each of them; and
it is very rare to find such a concurrence of sympathy. I have been describing
friendship throughout on the understanding that it is mutual between the two
friends. If it be not, and one have a very strong passion for the other,
which is not at all or but little returned; then that man is as far the most
miscreant of men, as he, whose love is returned, is the happiest. Such a
passion, it seems to me, can never really be as strong, as one that is satis-
fied; for it shows that there is something in the object of love not perfectly
satisfying: his want of love for us, at all events, we cannot love: therefore
our love is not perfect. It is this unreturned passion, which Plato and
Beacon vituperate as love, saying 'tis intense and not tranquil. Certainly
it is not tranquil; it quite prevents the proper exercise of our functions:
we are always restless and cannot work for imagining how to win some sign of
love from him to whom we give every sign. But it is the unsatisfied
desire mixed with this passion, that makes it adverse to tranquility, not the
passion's own intensity. The intensity is greater where it is returned, but
that return establishes an equilibrium, and that equilibrium a tranquility,
desirable because it is full of life: tranquility in itself is not desirable
because it may mean death, and even the painful restless life of unsatisfied
passion is better than this. Passion is generally unsatisfied, because it
is fixed only on part of the object of it, as its physical qualities -
and so is imperfect. In this case it seems best to overcome it by removal
from the loved object; or else by imagining that he gives signs of all the
love we need; or lastly by trying to cultivate our sympathy for some other
person or thing.
It will, I think, now be plain from my description that the passion, with which this paper deals, may be felt equally between either man and woman, man and man, or woman and woman; and therefore may be called either friendship or love. It will also be plain that both parties must be active and both also passive in all the essential acts of their relation; of these, which are unessential one will be active in some, the other in others. I will take an important example. In copulation one party is active, the other passive; and this act has been exaggerated in importance as if in it was exhibited the chief if not the whole of love. I take it, on the other hand, that sexual prurience is to be very clearly distinguished from that sympathy which I have laid down as the basis of love. It is necessary that this prurience be indulged for the begetting of children; and, though for a man and woman who truly love one another copulation will be disagreeable, yet they will share this as they share other trials and troubles, alleviating the unpleasantness by the consciousness of their sympathy. But, unfortunately, copulation, like other low pleasures, has attractions for most people so that they pursue it for its own sake, forgetting the highest pleasure of love, which alone and the means to it they ought to pursue. Hence comes that monstrous unnatural vice of copulating with a woman more often than is necessary for begetting children; hence also sodomy and sapphism, the indulgence of a desire for which, aunts or kills the capability, inborn in every human being, of enjoying the happiness of true love.

I have no time to discuss more of the many points connected with this subject; but I hope that if any others seem important to you, you will not confine the discussion to those noticed in the paper. I will briefly sum up the heads of my treatment. First, by a deductive argument, it is shown that in love we obtain the highest of human goods. And then it is maintained that such love may be felt for one other human being in a completeness so great as to deserve setting quite apart, as the one final end of life.
APPENDIX C

C. P. SANGER TO BERTRAND RUSSELL (NOVEMBER 11, 1894)
TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

[Handwritten text]

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

Nov. 11th 76

[Handwritten text]
The fruit of life is a sound
advice always a "good"
as a man. I can understand
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I might have said
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never been a friend
of any good meaning.

I might have said
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of any good meaning.

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LYTTON STRACHEY TO G. E. MOORE (OCTOBER 11, 1894)

Dear Moore,

I have read your book, and want to say how much I am excited and impressed. I'm afraid I must be mainly blamed among 'writers of dictionaries', and other persons interested in literature', so that I feel a sort of essential vanity, knowing about all my judgments of fact. But on this occasion I am
carried away. I think your book has not only wonched & shattered all writers in ethics from Aristotle to Christ & St. Francis to Hume. It has not only laid the future foundation of ethics, it has not only left all modern philosophy far astern. There seem to me small achievements compared to the establishment of that method which shines like a sword between the lines. It is the scientifi. method deliberately applied, for the first time, to reasoning. To that time? You perhaps make your head, but home at work, who will be able to tell me, me, that, or twentythree times as many, or before? The truth: there can be no doubt, is really from the 29th March. I date from Oct. 1903, the beginning of the Age of Reason.

The last two chapters interest me most, as they were reason lost to me than the rest. Your grand conclusion made me snap - it was so violently definite. Lord! I can't get altogether.
I send this, dear one, I hope or pray that you realize how much you mean to us. It was very pleasant to be able to feel that one came into the dedication. But expression is so difficult, so very difficult. There are so many cold material restrictions that the best of life seems to be an act of faith.

Yours is a confession of faith, from your brother,

Lytton Thacker.


Cambridge University. The Student’s Guide to the University of Cambridge. Cambridge; London: Deighton, Bell, and Co.; Bell and Daldy, 1866.


Donalson, George. “‘Men in Love?’? D. H. Lawrence, Rupert Birkin and Gerald Crich.” D. H.


---. “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver.” 1894. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Cambridge


Sharp, Jenny. “The Unspeakable Limits of Civility: A Passage to India.” Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.


Turner, Frank. The Greek Heritage of Victorian Britain. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University


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NOTES


2 I quote from Sir David Ross’s translation, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

3 See Appendix A for a typescript version of “Achilles or Patrolcus?” The “Papers of G. E. Moore” (Add. MSS 8330, 8875). Add 8875 12/1/2b. 1-4.

4 See Appendix D for the full letter from Strachey to Moore. I reproduce this letter with permission of the Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Department.

5 In the conclusion of this dissertation I discuss the ways in which the Bloomsbury Group anticipated the social networking movements of the 2000s through their extensive club meetings, letters, and memoirs.


7 For more on the impact of Greek culture on the Victorians, see Linda Dowling’s Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Culture.

8 For more on the nineteenth-century Cambridge University Curriculum, see Christopher Stray’s Classics in 19th and 20th Century Cambridge: Curriculum, Culture and Community. See also Elisabeth Leedham-Green on the development of the Moral Science Tripos in A Concise History of the University of Cambridge. For a historical perspective on this issue, see The Student’s Guide to the University of Cambridge, authored and published by University of Cambridge in 1866 and 1893 respectively.

9 For the complete list of the recommended texts for the “Moral Science Tripos,” see The Student’s Guide to the University of Cambridge. See Appendix A.

10 Russell’s essays on religion are collected in Why I Am Not A Christian: and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects and Al Seckel’s Bertrand Russell on God and Religion.

Russell’s Apostle paper, “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver” (1894), is reprinted in Russell’s The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell Vol. 1: Cambridge Essays 1888–1899.

Moore’s “Achilles or Patroclus?” is unpublished. Multiple handwritten drafts and typed manuscripts of the document are located in the “G. E. Moore Papers” at Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Department. In this text I refer specifically to Moore’s document numbered Add 8875 12/1/2 1-4. The document is reproduced in Appendix B with permission of Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Department.


Russell read William James’s Psychology (1892) as research for “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver.” Yet while Russell’s essay is immersed in the psychological terminology of his day, “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver” precedes the circulation of Freud’s work in English. Thus, when Russell uses the word “repression” in this essay, he is not referring to Josef Breuer and Freud’s theory. Breuer and Freud first introduced their theory of unconscious “repression” in “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication” (1893). Monk analyzes “Cleopatra or Maggie Tulliver” without addressing this point. See Monk’s Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (91).

For more on the Oscar Wilde trials, see Richard Ellmann’s Oscar Wilde (435–78).

See Homer’s The Iliad. See also the Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff Hackett translation of Plato’s Symposium (lines 179E-180B).

I quote from Sir David Ross’s translation, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

On unreturned passion Moore writes: “It is the unreturned passion, which Plato and Bacon vituperate as love, saying ’tis intense and not tranquil; it quite prevents the proper exercise of our functions: we are always restless and cannot work for imagining how to win some sign of love from him to whom we give every sign. But it is the unsatisfied desire mixed with this passion, that makes it adverse to tranquility, not the passion’s own intensity” (Add 8875 12/1/2b 3).

See Appendix C for the full letter. Charles Percy Sanger’s letter to Bertrand Russell dated Nov. 11th ’94 is reproduced with permission from “The Bertrand Russell Archives,” McMaster University, Archives and Research Collections, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4L6, Canada.

Paul Levy’s text brought this letter to my attention. See Levy’s Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles (140).
In the opening of chapter six, “The Ideal,” Moore defines the term “ideal” in relation to the “good.” In the chapter Moore relies on his third definition of “ideal” as something that is “good in itself in a high degree” (183–84). The full passage reads: “But thirdly, we may mean by calling a state of things ‘ideal’ merely (3) that it is good in itself in a high degree. And it is obvious that the question what things are ‘ideal’ in this sense is one which must be answered before we can pretend to settle what is Absolute or the Human Good. It is with the Ideal, in this third sense, that this chapter will be principally concerned. Its main object is to arrive at some positive answer to the fundamental question of Ethics—the question: ‘What things are good or ends in themselves?’ To this question we have hitherto obtained only a negative answer: the answer that pleasure is certainly not the sole good” (183–84).

See Appendix D for the full letter from Strachey to Moore. I reproduce this letter with permission of the Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Department.

Gerald J. De Groot suggests that the initial conflict was not a well-planned and serious military attack, and that the conflict could have been resolved quickly and more amicably had not a multitude of nations use the threat of war as an opportunity to position themselves politically for the future. John Keegan, however, argues that the attack on Franz Ferdinand was better planned than De Groot suggests. Keegan writes,

The Habsburg army’s summer manoeuvres of 1914 were held in Bosnia, the former Ottoman Turkish province occupied by Austria in 1878 and annexed to the empire in 1908. Franz Ferdinand, nephew to the Emperor Franz Josef and Inspector General to the army, arrived in Bosnia on 25 June to supervise. After the manoeuvres concluded on 27 June, he drove the next morning with his wife to the provincial capital, Sarajevo, to carry out official engagements. It was an ill-chosen day: 28 June is the anniversary of the defeat of Serbia by the Turks in 1389, Vidov Dan, the event from which they date their long history of suffering at the hands of foreign oppressors. The role of the oppressor, after the retreat of the ottoman Turks, had been assumed, in the eyes of nationalist Serbs, by the Habsburgs, and the provincial administration had been warned that his visit was unwelcome and might be dangerous. The warnings he ignored; threats to the great were commonplace in an era which had brought the killings by fanatics and lunatics of a Tsar, an Austrian Empress and a President of the United States. In this case a murder team was in place, a group of five young Serbs and a Bosnian Muslim, he recruited by the conspirators for cosmetic purposes, all equipped with bombs and pistols. (49)

See Maxwell’s The Psychological Retrospect of the Great War.

In Postcards From the Trenches, using the framework of architectural space, Allyson Booth argues that “the buildings of modernism may delineate spaces within which one is forced to confront both war’s casualties and one’s distance from those casualties” and that “the dislocations of war often figure centrally in modernist form, even when war itself seems peripheral to modernist content” (4). Mackaman and Mays collect a group of essays concerned with the Great War, culture, and literature. And with chapters on Eliot, Pound, and Woolf,
Sherry seeks to elaborate the historical significance of modernist poetry and fiction within the context of the war.

See also Jay Winter’s *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* and Patricia Rae’s *Modernism and Mourning*.

25 See Jonathan Best’s *The Greatest Day in History*. Best’s text dramatically recalls the final days of the Great War, including the Bloomsbury Group’s reaction. Best describes Bloomsbury’s relief that the war was finally over, as well as Keynes’s skepticism that the peace would actually settle the European conflict. In particular, Keynes worried that Germany would not be able to pay for the reparations that were demanded:

> It was the peace that worried Keynes. As a Cambridge don and Treasury economist, he was already planning ahead for the reconstruction of Europe after the war. He was worried about the reparations to be demanded of Germany. He was afraid the Germans would be pushed beyond their ability to pay. Keynes understood the desire to make the Germans pay every last penny for all the damage they had done, but as an economist he knew it could never happen. The Germans should be encouraged instead to get back on their feet as quickly as possible. It was in everyone’s interest that they did. (283)


27 Many cultural theorists have used Freud’s work on mourning and melancholia as a point of departure to broadly study the cultural function of loss. For a range of cultural studies articles on loss, see Peter Homan’s *Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory at Century’s End*. In the introduction to the text, for example, Homan argues that Germany’s post-war recovery can be understood in relation to the concept of mania as a process of defense against depression. According to Homan:

> This defence begins with a loss and the refusal to become introspective toward oneself in the face of that loss. Denial of the loss ensues. Then, denial shifts into an interest in depersonalized aspects of the external environment, such as technology, and one develops endless energy, always directed outward, of the pursuit of such tasks. Successful closure is accompanied by an enormous sense of relief, and the final state of affairs is rightly described as ‘the inability to mourn,’ to which we in effect add ‘the inability to be depressed’ as well. The rapidity and thoroughness of the German postwar recovery was widely remarked upon and admired at the time. (12)

28 For more on the connection between mourning and love in antiquity in particular, see Henry Staten’s *Eros in Mourning: Homer to Lacan*.

29 I refer to the Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff translation published by Hackett Publishing Company.
As Freud explains in “Mourning and Melancholia,” mourning is the regular result not simply of a loved person, but also “to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as fatherland, liberty, an ideal and so on” (164). While I mainly discuss the implications of the loss of a loved person (or object), other scholars have considered the broad political implications of Freud’s work on mourning and melancholia. For example, see David L. Eng and David Kazanjian’s collection: *Loss the Politics of Mourning*.

In *Gender Trouble*, Butler expands this view, arguing that the process of the loss of primary objects through prohibition during the phallic stage of development also creates or solidifies the subject’s gender and sexual orientation. In “Prohibition, Psychoanalysis, and the Heterosexual Matrix,” Butler argues that homosexual desire is both denied and preserved through the child’s experience of the Oedipal family. As Butler suggests,

> For the young girls as well [as the young boy], the Oedipal complex can be either ‘positive’ (same-sex identification) or ‘negative’ (opposite-sex identification); the loss of the father initiated by the incest taboo may result either in an identification with the lost object (a consolidation of masculinity) or a deflection of the aim from the object, in which case heterosexuality triumphs over homosexuality, and a substitute object is found. (*Gender Trouble* 76)

Freud began to develop his work on child sexuality and its role in the development of personality in *Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality* (1905).

For another analysis of Klein’s theory of melancholia in relation to the culture and literature of modernity, see Esther Sánchez-Pardo’s *Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist Melancholia*. She argues that the first half of the twentieth century can be characterized by a cultural melancholia created through the human death drive. Sánchez-Pardo provides textual studies of works by Djuna Barnes, Lytton Strachey, and Virginia Woolf, as well as analysis of the visual works of René Magritte.

Like Klein, Kristeva also places importance on the relationship between the mother and child at the earliest stages of development. While I do not focus on Kristeva’s work in detail here, my analysis of Klein’s definition of infantile melancholia and its implications for objects relations in adults was also informed by Kristeva’s *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia* and *Tales of Love*.

Lawrence’s “Autobiographical Sketch,” and this passage in particular, was brought to my attention by Worthen (215).

Chambers memorializes this moment in her *D. H. Lawrence: A Personal Record*. Chambers writes,
The reply came in August when the Lawrences were on holiday in Shanklin in the Isle of Wright. It said, as nearly as I can remember, that the poems were very interesting and that the author had undoubted talent, but that nowadays luck played such a large part in a literary career, and continued, ‘If you would get him to come and see me some time when he is in London perhaps something might be done.’ The letter was signed Ford Maddox Hueffer, a name I knew only in connection with the first instal[1]ment of the serial story, *A Call*, in the current number of the *English Review*. I replied that Mr. Lawrence was away at the moment, but when school re-opened I was sure he would be glad to call on Mr. Hueffer. (158)

37 Leonard Woolf named the following figures as members of Old Bloomsbury:

the three Stephens: Vanessa married to Clive Bell, Virginia, who married Leonard Woolf, and Adrian, who married Karin Costello; Lytton Strachey; Clive Bell; Leonard Woolf; Maynard Keynes; Duncan Grant; E. M. Forster (who will be referred to in this book as Morgan Forster or Morgan); Saxon Sydney-Turner; Roger Fry. Desmond MacCarthy and his wife Molly, though they actually lived in Chelsea were always regarded by us as members of Old Bloomsbury. (Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911–1918 22)

38 As Russell explains in his memoir, *Portraits from Memory and Other Essays*, his letters to Lawrence are lost. Russell writes: “We exchanged a number of letter of which mine are lost but his have been published” (112). Scholars rely on Lawrence’s letters to Russell, Russell’s letters to Ottoline Morrell and Russell’s autobiographical material to explain the relationship between Russell and Lawrence.

39 The UDC, or Union of Democratic Control, was a prominent pacifist organization. Lowes Dickinson was the group’s first president and Russell was a founder-member (*The Letters of D. H. Lawrence* 2: 309).

40 As Boulton and Zytraruk explain, “On 28 May 1915 Trinity College rescinded their earlier decision to appoint Russell to a Research Fellowship; instead they agreed to renew his Lectureship for 5 years. Russell was sure that the College Council had been swayed by disgust at his involvement with the Union of Democratic Control” (*The Letters of D. H. Lawrence* 2: 347).

41 Russell had sent Lawrence a copy of his article “The Danger to Civilization” as a proposed contribution to the new journal Lawrence was putting together called *The Signature*. See also *Collected Works* 2: 387, 392. In letter #980 Lawrence explains to Russell that he and John Middleton Murry and Katherine Mansfield planned to put together “a little paper” (387). Lawrence also asked Russell if he wanted to join the journal as a founder-member.

42 *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* is perhaps Lawrence’s “solution” to this “period of crisis,” for in the novel relationships are fulfilled.
See also George Donaldson’s “Men in Love? D. H. Lawrence, Rupert Birkin and Gerald Crich.” Donaldson suggests that Lawrence leaves the relationship between Birkin and Gerald purposefully unclear:

It is ‘clearly offered’ by the novel, there [in the Prologue] that Birkin’s conception of a relationship between ‘man and man’ is of something ‘additional to marriage,’ but what that relationship is to be is quite unclear. What does Birkin mean by ‘perfect’ relationship between men here, or, at the close of the novel, by ‘sheer intimacy’ and ‘eternal union’? What does Lawrence mean him to mean? The phrases themselves suggest the possibility of sexuality, but are still perhaps not committed to it even as a possibility. (53)

It has been noted widely by scholars that Lady Ottoline Morrell served as the model for Hermoine in Women in Love. See, for example, Liou (80) and Kinkead-Weekes (223).

The phallus, however, is not the same as the male organ. As Jewinski explains, the phallus is “a marker of difference” and “a sign of what divides us from the imaginary (the humanist vision in Lawrence) while at the same time it compels us to act in a preordained manner within the social order” (Jewinski 18). See also Lacan’s description of the phallus in “On Jouissance” and “God and Women’s Jouissance,” The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Sexuality and the Limits of Knowledge Book XX: Encore: 1972-1973 (1–13, 64–77).

In “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena—A Study of the First Not-Me Possession,” Winnicott defines the concept of the “good enough mother” and argues that “there is no possibility whatever for an infant to proceed from the pleasure-principle to the reality principle or towards and beyond primary identification (see Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 14) unless there is a good enough mother” (94). The “good enough mother” is a mother who makes “active adaptation to the infant’s needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the infant’s growing ability to account for failure of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration” (94). The adaptive behaviors of the mother-child dyad are crucial to the child’s development. According to Winnicott, “If all goes well the infant can actually come to gain from the experience of frustration, since incomplete adaptation to need makes objects real, that is to say hated as well as loved. The consequence is that if all goes well the infant can be disturbed by a close adaptation to need that is continued too long, not allowed its natural decrease, since exact adaptation resembles magic and the object that behaves perfectly becomes no better than an hallucination” (94).


Simone De Beauvoir’s criticism of Women in Love is similar in some regard to Millet’s. In The Second Sex, De Beauvoir argues that in Lawrence’s fiction woman functions as “a pole necessary for the existence of the pole of the opposite sign” (215). She suggests, therefore, that
women exist so that men can define themselves in opposition to women. However, she also argues that the male figures in Women in Love, and Gerald in particular, fail because, as Gudrun seems to intuit, they use their sex as a “tool of the will” (215). When men and women are understood as opposite poles, dependent on the other to define themselves, both, according to De Beauvoir, are bound to suffer: Gudrun’s dissatisfaction is the “punishment meted out to the individual who is victim of himself” (217). According to De Beauvoir,

He cannot, being solitary, invade her solitude; in raising the barriers of his ego, he has raised those of the Other: he will never be reunited with her. At the end Gerald dies, killed by Gudrun and by himself. (217)

Finally, for De Beauvoir, what is most striking about Lawrence’s characterization of men and women in Women in Love is that “neither is a subject” (218). On this point, De Beauvoir’s reading aligns Lawrence with Freud and his notion that in modernity the split subject can no longer be satisfied. But De Beauvoir retracts this statement about subjectivity, because Lawrence, while none of his characters seem to be whole subjects, “believes passionately in the supremacy of the male,” the “phallic current,” and the fact that it is the male who provides “transcendence” for the couple (218). According to De Beauvoir, in Women in Love, Lawrence continues to maintain the paradigm that “man is a phallus and not a brain” and that woman “unreservedly accepts being defined as the Other” (244). In doing so, Lawrence attempts to reassert the notion that a human can exist in a pure state before it develops its individual subjectivity. Thus, Lawrence’s characters are nonsubjects “concerned” in earnest “with discovering the sexuality that lies beyond or behind discourse” or language (Kellog 36).

For more on Lawrence and subjectivity, see Kellogg’s “Reading Foucault Reading Lawrence: Body, Voice, and Sexuality in Lady Chatterley’s Lover.” See also Foucault’s The History of Sexuality: Volume One: An Introduction (157–59).

48 See the “Prologue to Women in Love” and John Worthen’s “The First ‘Women in Love,’” which discusses the “Prologue” as well as the first drafts of the novel. See also Lawrence’s The First ‘Women in Love,’ edited by John Worthen and Lindeth Vasey.

49 Ford suggests that Donald Carswell, who read a typescript of Women in Love and may have annotated it in December 1916 for Lawrence, “may have warned him of the risks involved” (Ford 96).

50 S. P. Rosenbaum discusses the Keynes-Lawrence debate in Aspects of Bloomsbury: Studies in Modern English Literary and Intellectual History. Rosenbaum points out that Russell’s memoir Portraits from Memory (1965), as well as Leonard Woolf’s Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years: 1880-1904 (1960), have significantly restructured the Lawrence-Keynes debate. As I have pointed out above and which Rosenbaum also notes, Lawrence and Russell were initially drawn together by their objection to the war. Rosenbaum also notes that Leonard Woolf disagreed with Keynes estimation of how Moore influenced Bloomsbury. Rosenbaum notes,
“Woolf flatly disagreed that he and his friends ignored Moore’s morals and adopted only his religion” (71). I have emphasized this point in Chapter Two by suggesting that the Bloomsbury Group was indeed influenced by the fifth chapter of Principia Ethica, “Ethics in Relation to Conduct.”

See also Quentin Bell’s “Maynard Keynes and His Early Beliefs” in Elders and Betters.

51 The members of the Bloomsbury Group started the Memoir Club in 1920. The club consisted of the members of the Bloomsbury Group, as well as Janie Bussy and Quentin Bell (Q. Bell 221). The Memoir Club wrote and presented their memoirs of their earlier years in Bloomsbury. As Leonard Woolf recalls,

The original thirteen members of the Memoir Club, identical with the original thirteen members of old Bloomsbury, were all intimate friends, and it was agreed that we should be absolutely frank in what we wrote and read. Absolute frankness, even among the most intimate tends to be relative frankness; I think that in our reminiscences what we said was absolutely true, but absolute truth was sometimes filtered thorough some discretion and reticence. At first the memoirs were fairly short; at the first meeting seven people read. But as time went on, what people read became longer and, in a sense, more serious, so that after a few years normally only two memoirs were read in an evening. (L. Woolf, “The Memoir Club,” in Rosenbaum 154)

52 Raymond Williams has opposed this position by insisting that the Bloomsbury Group was politically engaged:

Nothing more easily contradicts the received image of Bloomsbury as withdrawn and languid aesthetes than the remarkable record of political and organizational involvement, between the wars, by Leonard Woolf, by Keynes, but also by others, including Virginia Woolf, who had a branch of the Women’s Cooperative Guild meeting regularly in her home. (“The Bloomsbury Fraction” 235)

53 This material is quoted from the publicity leaflet, British Empire Exhibition (Wembley, 1924) and the British Empire Exhibition, 1924, Official Guide (London, 1924) as reprinted by Brown (214).

54 For more information on how and why it took relatively few people from the imperial nations to rule their territories, see Tony Smith’s The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late Industrializing World.

55 As Mary Lago and F. N. Furbank explain, before the start of the Great War Forster had returned from a trip to India and quickly completed a novel on a “homosexual theme” entitled Maurice (Selected Letters 1: 1879–1920 205). Forster knew, however, that Maurice “could not be published” because of its blatant homosexual themes that would likely be the subject of censorship (217). This may be one reason that Forster conceals some of the potentially homosexual parts of A Passage to India.

Many scholars have given accounts of Forster’s representation of the various Indian sects in A Passage to India. Amardeep Singh’s essay “Reorienting Forster: Intimacy and Islamic Space” is particularly interesting. Singh argues that Islamic “space” is important in Forster’s oeuvre: “Featuring prominently among these spaces specifically marked as Islamic, including mosques as well as the secular architecture of India’s composite Indo-Islamic past” (26). Singh thus offers a “postcolonial” reading that he suggests “does not renegotiate the by now overly familiar problematic of rape and colonial racism, which has constituted dominant ‘postcolonial’ readings of A Passage to India since the publication of Jenny Sharpe’s influential essay, ‘The Unspeakable Limits of Civility’” (37).

For another postcolonial reading of A Passage to India, see Benita Parry’s “E. M. Forster: A Passage to India.” Parry studies the text’s “ecstatic visions” and “demonic visitations” and their relationship to “sanctioned modes of cognition” (261).

For more on the relationship between globalization and modernism, see Melba Cuddy-Keane’s “Modernism, Geopolitics, Globalization.” Cuddy-Keane explains that while globalism and globalization are popularly believed to be recent phenomena, accelerated in the last hundred years by technological innovation that allows for faster exchanges of people and goods, in reality global developments can be traced back to the Roman and Mongol empires. Further, Cuddy-Keane explains that there was a shift beginning in the eighteenth century away from “incipient global forms to the primacy of the nation state,” which again became global with modern technological advances (539). Cuddy-Keane aims to show the ways in which literary modernisms are engaged with issues of “globalization” not simply in terms of economics and global trade, but of “cultural globalization” and exchange. Cuddy-Keane suggests that investigating the role of literature in globalization “deflects the appropriation of ‘globalization’ for a process driven and determined solely by economics, claiming cultural globalization as an equally important, if indeed not earlier, development” (540). Cuddy-Keane also suggests that studying literary globalization creates the possibility of an alternative discourse of globalization itself—one that “at the very least complicates the specters of exploitation and homogeneity that are often assumed to be the inevitable consequences of a globalized world” (540).

Leavis adamantly attributes the flaws of Forster’s critical and journalistic work to the “liberal culture” “manifested by Bloomsbury” (276). Nevertheless, Leavis simultaneously claims “too much is lightly dismissed” by using the term “liberal” “as a term of derogation” (277). Leavis clearly valued Forster’s “liberal” position in his novels, but Leavis thinks Forster’s “liberal” position weakened his criticism and journalism.
While I have not focused specifically on trying to discern whether or not Adela was raped, this point has been highly important to feminist critics. Critics have focused in particular on Forster’s revision of the rape or purported rape scene from the draft version to the published manuscript. The draft version of *A Passage to India* makes it clear that Adela was raped in the Marabar Caves. Scholars have discussed why Forster made the incident less clear in the published version of the text. For more on this topic, see Elizabeth Wall’s “An Aristotelian Reading of the Feminine Voice-As-Revolution in E. M. Forster’s *A Passage to India*.”

See also Jenny Sharpe’s “The Unspeakable Limits of Civility: *A Passage to India*.” Sharpe argues that Forster “sets up an opposition between the English woman and the Indian man,” thus forcing the critic and reader to “defend either the native man or the white woman against his/her opponent,” which had led to analyses of the text that operate stringently along gender lines (Sharp 18–19).

Sara Mills argues that *A Passage to India* is a modernist text “in the sense that it is not entirely a classic realist narrative” because “there are moments within the text [including the ending] when the meaning seems to be unclear, where the text seems to be having difficulties expressing what happened, or where the reader is left in doubt as to what exactly happened” (130). Mills uses this observation with the theoretical work of Alice Jardin and Julia Kristeva to argue “‘the feminine’ intrudes into a text,” causing the reader to focus on the “rhythmic qualities and repetitions of sounds rather than the content” (Jardin in Mills 125, 127).

While “What I Believe” (1938) is Forster’s most famous political article, he wrote extensively on politics during his career. He began writing essays as a student at Cambridge. From that point on he wrote both fiction and literary journalism. In 1920, for example, he became the literary editor of the *Daily Herald* for one year (Trilling 140).


See note 37 for Leonard Woolf’s list of the members of “Old Bloomsbury.”

For more on the biography of Roger Fry, see Virginia Woolf’s *Roger Fry*.

Keynes himself was exempted from compulsory service because he worked for the government. However, he also claimed conscientious objection in February 1916:

In February 1916, he made a special application to be completely exempted on the specific grounds of conscientious objection to ‘surrendering my liberty of judgment on so vital a question as undertaking military service…I am not prepared,’ he wrote, ‘on such an issue as this to surrender my right of decision, as to what is or is not my duty, to any other person, and I should think it morally wrong to do so.’ (Keynes in Hession 128)
After his Cambridge graduation, Keynes was not awarded a fellowship in mathematics, which would have led him to an academic career. Instead, he transitioned into economics leading him to a government position. From 1906 to 1908 Keynes worked in civil service at the Indian Office, a position that he left to teach economics at Cambridge (Cord 18). This led to a job in the Treasury at the start of the Great War.

Goodwin explains that the Arts Council of Great Britain served as the model for the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA), the Canada Council, and other similar “arts funding agencies” (Goodwin 5).

See note above for the full list of the members of “Old Bloomsbury.”

As Jeanne Schulkind explains, Woolf’s “Old Bloomsbury” was written and presented to the Memoir Club either near the end of 1921 or at the beginning of 1922 (179). Schulkind cites Bell on this point: “it was read to the Memoir Club (in about 1922)” (Q. Bell Virginia Woolf: A Biography 1: 124–25, notes).

See Cole’s “The Ambivalence of the Outsider: Virginia Woolf and Male Friendship.” While I do not fully agree with Cole, her work is valuable to scholarship on modernism and war, as well as more broadly on the topic of friendship. Cole’s notion of modern friendship, however, is more rigid than my own, particularly as she writes about male friendship, while in my analysis of The Waves I consider male friendship, female friendship, and friendship between men and women. Cole’s emphasis on male friendship leads her to read Woolf primarily as a war novel. In The Waves, I argue, Woolf does not simply examine friendship between men or loss produced by the war, but friendship between the sexes and loss produced by accident, mental illness, and old age.

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, a student at Cambridge University, was the 209th member of the Cambridge Apostles. He was elected in 1885, two years prior to Roger Fry (Levy 309). Lowes Dickinson studied history at Cambridge and spent most of his career there becoming a don. He was connected to the Bloomsbury Group, though not a member of “Old Bloomsbury” or the group’s most immediate circle outside of thirteen original members. As Lee reports, Lowes Dickinson wrote “one of his eccentrically typed lettered from Cambridge, calling it [The Waves] a great poem” (Lee 612). Woolf was happy with his response.

As Brian Phillips has noted in “Reality and Virginia Woolf,” Woolf’s novels and particularly The Waves are full of representation of “things” (415). This is significant, Phillips suggests, because much scholarly attention is paid to Woolf’s representation of thought.

While I certainly suggest that there is an ethical quality to the empathy that Bernard feels for Rhoda in particular, Judith Lee has argued that Woolf’s text and indeed “all aesthetic activity has an ethical content because it originates in bodily, sentient experience” (181). Using Elaine Scarry’s theory from The Body in Pain: Making and Unmaking the World, Lee explains that for Scarry, war involves “unmaking the world” because it causes pain and “reverses the process of
imagining” by destroying the body, which is essentially responsible for all forms of human creation. In *The Waves*, Lee argues, “Woolf shows aesthetic activity as a fundamental impulse that proceeds from pain and has ethical content because it involves the social relations that are for her an inescapable part of our consciousness” (182).

75 For more on language in *The Waves*, see Julie Vandivere’s “Waves and Fragments: Linguistic Construction as Subject Formation in Virginia Woolf.” Vandivere argues, “Throughout *The Waves*, the sorts of grammatical and figural complexities” signal “the text’s recurrent doubts about the stability of any linguistic or ontological assertion” (226).

76 While I do not discuss Percival in detail, much critical work has focused on his role in the novel. In particular, scholars are interested in Percival’s colonial mission where he is representing “the West” and treated like a “God” (*The Waves* 102). For more on Percival, see J. W. Graham’s “Manuscript Revision and the Heroic Theme of *The Waves*.”

See also Gabrielle McIntire’s “Heteroglossia, Monologism, and Fascism: Bernard Reads *The Waves*.” McIntire suggests that the group’s “hero worship” of Percival is one of ways in which Woolf mediates on the “nearness of fascist rhetoric and sentiment to the politics and rhetoric of everyday English life” (30). Of further interest to my study, McIntire uses a Bakhtian analysis to argue that while *The Waves* is “dramatically heteroglossic, it resists its own polyphony in still another way because of the profound homogeneity of social class, age, and educational background of characters” (41). I have focused, however, on the differences between the characters, particularly on gender and personality difference, to suggest that their friendships are “useful” rather than perfect.

77 Clewell also argues that Woolf’s work “prefigures Derridean insights” and poststructuralism in general (207–8).

78 Hermione Lee cites this passage in *Virginia Woolf* (264).


80 Facebook is a social networking site developed by Mark Zuckerberg and officially founded on February 4, 2004.