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UNDERSTANDING MORAL PRINCIPLES: JONATHAN DANCY, IRIS MURDOCH, AND PARTICULARISM

PENDLETON, HIBI (2018) UNDERSTANDING MORAL PRINCIPLES: JONATHAN DANCY, IRIS MURDOCH, AND PARTICULARISM. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

There is a paradox about moral principles like ‘You ought to keep your promises.’ They seem to express universal truths that tell us what to do, but exceptional situations arise in which it seems we should not do what they tell us. Generalists like R. M. Hare resolve this paradox by arguing that accurately specified moral principles do not have exceptions, and we can use them to syllogistically derive correct judgments about actions. Particularists like Jonathan Dancy resolve the paradox by arguing that, because there can be exceptions to any moral principle, moral principles actually are false. At best they are “reminders” or “dispensable crutches.”
I argue that although Dancy’s particularism undermines generalism, it fails to capture the true normative status of moral principles. Consequently, there is a lacuna in particularism: it does not provide an adequate understanding of how moral values are related or how moral principles are action-guiding. I trace the failures of particularism, as well as generalism, to an assumption both share about generality—an assumption that tethers them to an unduly narrow conception of moral principles.
After rejecting this assumption, I draw on Iris Murdoch’s notion of vision and its perfection to develop an ideal-based account of generality. According to this account, moral thought includes reflection on substantive ideals, the content of which is partly expressed in ordinary moral principles. I argue there are two forms of generality moral principles can exhibit, which generalists and particularists alike should embrace. The first is characteristic of fundamental principles like those in Murdoch’s and Aristotle’s views. The second is exhibited in principles that help give content to moral ideals. My account (unlike particularism) allows that principles have a normative, action-guiding role, but (unlike generalism) it does not construe principles as bases for syllogistic derivations about what to do. I discuss examples of both moral exemplars and rehabilitated criminal offenders to demonstrate that principled reflection is crucial to perfecting agency. In doing this, I show how the paradox about moral principles can give way to an understanding of moral principles that captures the role they play in ordinary moral reflection.


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Details

Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
Creators/Authors:
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
PENDLETON, HIBIHAP50@PITT.EDUHAP50
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairEngstrom, Stephenengstrom@pitt.eduengstrom
Committee MemberLyne, Johnjlyne@pitt.edujlyne
Committee MemberMcDowell, Johnjmcdowel+@pitt.edujmcdowel+
Committee MemberWhiting, Jenniferwhitingj@pitt.eduwhitingj
Date: 31 January 2018
Date Type: Publication
Defense Date: 20 October 2017
Approval Date: 31 January 2018
Submission Date: 3 December 2017
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Number of Pages: 226
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Philosophy
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: moral reflection, moral perception, moral psychology, criminal rehabilitation, practical reason, legal reasoning
Date Deposited: 31 Jan 2018 18:39
Last Modified: 31 Jan 2018 18:39
URI: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/33636

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