Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Fabiola
(2008)
FREE-RIDING AND COOPERATION INENVIRONMENTAL GAMES.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
The dissertation examines free-riding behavior and externality problems using game theory and mechanism design. Specifically, I study free-riding behavior in the negotiation process of International Environmental Agreements. I analyze how countries' noncompliance in an environmental agreement affects the results of the bargaining stage. This study explains why countries fulfill non-enforceable treaties and why some countries want to specify high commitment levels to other countries if there is no international organization that perfectly enforces the contents of the environmental agreement.The second part of the thesis studies governments' conservation programs. I assume that the production of biodiversity from these programs can generate negative or positive externalities on those nonparticipating landholders. I identify what the government's optimal transfer is when externalities are considered. Finally, the third chapter analyses an alternative definition of kindness. Specifically, we consider that a player (follower) is concerned about those actions that the other player (leader) does not choose. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payoff comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
| Creators | Email | Pitt Username | ORCID  |
|---|
| Espinola-Arredondo, Ana Fabiola | afe4@pitt.edu | AFE4 | |
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| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
10 June 2008 |
| Date Type: |
Completion |
| Defense Date: |
28 March 2008 |
| Approval Date: |
10 June 2008 |
| Submission Date: |
13 March 2008 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
biodiversity; international environmental agreements; mechanism design; Non-cooperative games; reference points |
| Other ID: |
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-03132008-165558/, etd-03132008-165558 |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2011 19:32 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 13:37 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/6492 |
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