Semantic epistemology: A brief response to Devitt

Machery, E (2012) Semantic epistemology: A brief response to Devitt. Theoria (Spain), 27 (2). 223 - 227. ISSN 0495-4548

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Abstract

In this article, I argue that philosophers' intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people's and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Machery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY
Date:	2 July 2012
Date Type:	Publication
Journal or Publication Title:	Theoria (Spain)
Volume:	27
Number:	2
Page Range:	223 - 227
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.6223
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0495-4548
Article Type:	Review
Date Deposited:	27 Feb 2013 18:50
Last Modified:	08 Aug 2022 18:25
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17448

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